[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
OUR NATURAL RESOURCES AT RISK: THE SHORT- AND LONG-TERM IMPACTS OF THE
DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL (PART 1 OF 3)
=======================================================================
OVERSIGHT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INSULAR AFFAIRS,
OCEANS AND WILDLIFE
of the
COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
Thursday, June 10, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-56
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Natural Resources
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index.html
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COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES
NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, Chairman
DOC HASTINGS, Washington, Ranking Republican Member
Dale E. Kildee, Michigan Don Young, Alaska
Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, American Elton Gallegly, California
Samoa John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee
Frank Pallone, Jr., New Jersey Jeff Flake, Arizona
Grace F. Napolitano, California Henry E. Brown, Jr., South
Rush D. Holt, New Jersey Carolina
Raul M. Grijalva, Arizona Cathy McMorris Rodgers, Washington
Madeleine Z. Bordallo, Guam Louie Gohmert, Texas
Jim Costa, California Rob Bishop, Utah
Dan Boren, Oklahoma Bill Shuster, Pennsylvania
Gregorio Sablan, Northern Marianas Doug Lamborn, Colorado
Martin T. Heinrich, New Mexico Adrian Smith, Nebraska
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico Robert J. Wittman, Virginia
George Miller, California Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts John Fleming, Louisiana
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Mike Coffman, Colorado
Maurice D. Hinchey, New York Jason Chaffetz, Utah
Donna M. Christensen, Virgin Cynthia M. Lummis, Wyoming
Islands Tom McClintock, California
Diana DeGette, Colorado Bill Cassidy, Louisiana
Ron Kind, Wisconsin
Lois Capps, California
Jay Inslee, Washington
Joe Baca, California
Stephanie Herseth Sandlin, South
Dakota
John P. Sarbanes, Maryland
Carol Shea-Porter, New Hampshire
Niki Tsongas, Massachusetts
Frank Kratovil, Jr., Maryland
Pedro R. Pierluisi, Puerto Rico
James H. Zoia, Chief of Staff
Rick Healy, Chief Counsel
Todd Young, Republican Chief of Staff
Lisa Pittman, Republican Chief Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INSULAR AFFAIRS, OCEANS AND WILDLIFE
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam, Chairwoman
HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina, Ranking Republican Member
Dale E. Kildee, Michigan Don Young, Alaska
Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, American Jeff Flake, Arizona
Samoa Doug Lamborn, Colorado
Frank Pallone, Jr., New Jersey Robert J. Wittman, Virginia
Gregorio Sablan, Northern Marianas John Fleming, Louisiana
Donna M. Christensen, Virgin Jason Chaffetz, Utah
Islands Bill Cassidy, Louisiana
Diana DeGette, Colorado Doc Hastings, Washington, ex
Ron Kind, Wisconsin officio
Lois Capps, California
Carol Shea-Porter, New Hampshire
Frank Kratovil, Jr., Maryland
Pedro R. Pierluisi, Puerto Rico
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico
Nick J. Rahall, II, West Virginia,
ex officio
------
CONTENTS
----------
Page
Hearing held on Thursday, June 10, 2010.......................... 1
Statement of Members:
Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate in Congress from Guam 1
Prepared statement of.................................... 2
Brown, Hon. Henry E., Jr., a Representative in Congress from
the State of South Carolina, Prepared statement of......... 4
Cassidy, Hon. Bill, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Louisiana......................................... 3
Statement of Witnesses:
Barham, Hon. Robert J., Secretary, Louisiana Department of
Wildlife and Fisheries..................................... 26
Prepared statement of.................................... 28
Response to questions submitted for the record........... 31
Cresson, David, Executive Director and CEO, Coastal
Conservation Association Louisiana, Baton Rouge, Louisiana. 106
Prepared statement of.................................... 107
Fry, Donald Michael, Ph.D., Director for Conservation
Advocacy, American Bird Conservancy, Washington, D.C....... 85
Prepared statement of.................................... 87
Lambert, Captain Ryan, Director, Louisiana Charter Boat
Association, Luling, Louisiana............................. 128
Prepared statement of.................................... 130
Response to questions submitted for the record........... 132
Lyder, Jane, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife
and Parks, U.S. Department of the Interior................. 17
Prepared statement of.................................... 19
McDonough, Joanne, Nature Tourism Specialist, Alabama Gulf
Coast Convention & Visitors Bureau and the Mississippi-
Alabama Sea Grant Consortium, Orange Beach, Alabama........ 133
Prepared statement of.................................... 135
Mitchelmore, Carys L., Ph.D., Associate Professor, University
of Maryland Center for Environmental Science, Chesapeake
Biological Laboratory, Solomons, Maryland.................. 92
Prepared statement of.................................... 94
Ragen, Timothy J., Ph.D., Executive Director, Marine Mammal
Commission................................................. 33
Prepared statement of.................................... 35
Response to questions submitted for the record........... 40
Robichaux, Brenda Dardar, Principal Chief, United Houma
Nation, Golden Meadow, Louisiana........................... 75
Prepared statement of.................................... 76
Rolfes, Anne, Founding Director, Louisiana Bucket Brigade,
New Orleans, Louisiana..................................... 139
Prepared statement of.................................... 141
Viles, Aaron, Campaign Director, Gulf Restoration Network,
New Orleans, Louisiana..................................... 79
Prepared statement of.................................... 81
Voisin, Mike, CEO, Motivatit Seafoods, Houma, Louisiana...... 101
Prepared statement of.................................... 103
Westerholm, David, Director, Office of Response and
Restoration, National Ocean Service, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.... 5
Prepared statement of.................................... 7
Response to questions submitted for the record........... 14
Williams, John, Executive Director, Southern Shrimp Alliance,
Tarpon Springs, Florida.................................... 115
Prepared statement of.................................... 117
Response to questions submitted for the record........... 123
Letter to the Environmental Protection Agency and
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration dated
May 5, 2010, submitted for the record.................. 121
Letter to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration dated June 22, 2010, submitted for the
record................................................. 127
Additional materials supplied:
Broussard, Michael, Corsair Charters, Letter submitted for
the record................................................. 157
Fleming, Capt. Laurel, Daphne, Alabama, Letter submitted for
the record................................................. 157
Irving, Lynn, Dauphin Island Kayaks, Letter submitted for the
record..................................................... 158
Johnson, Melissa, Paul Nettles, Cynthia Ramseur, and Leah
Bray, South Coast Paddling Company, Letter submitted for
the record................................................. 159
Mitchell, Capt. Bill, Orange Beach, Alabama, Letter submitted
for the record............................................. 160
Nelson, Capt. J. Christopher, Alabama Kayak Adventures, Inc.,
Letter submitted for the record............................ 160
Reas, Sherrie, Skipper ``J'' Dolphin and Nature Cruises,
Letter submitted for the record............................ 161
Singleman, Homer, Volunteer Water Quality Testing, Letter
submitted for the record................................... 161
Wilkinson, Capt. Kathy, Eco-Tours of South Mississippi, LLC,
Letter submitted for the record............................ 162
OVERSIGHT HEARING ON ``OUR NATURAL RESOURCES AT RISK: THE SHORT- AND
LONG-TERM IMPACTS OF THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL'' (PART 1 OF 3)
----------
Thursday, June 10, 2010
U.S. House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Insular Affairs, Oceans and Wildlife
Committee on Natural Resources
Washington, D.C.
----------
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m. in
Room 1324, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Madeleine Z.
Bordallo [Chairwoman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Bordallo, Kildee, Christensen,
DeGette, Sablan, Kind, Capps, Shea-Porter, Lujan, Pierluisi,
Wittman, Fleming, and Cassidy.
Also present: Representatives Boustany, Bilirakis, and Cao.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE IN
CONGRESS FROM GUAM
Ms. Bordallo. Good morning, everybody. The Subcommittee on
Insular Affairs, Oceans and Wildlife will come to order.
Today is the first of three hearings that the Subcommittee
will hold on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion. This is
in addition to two Full Committee oversight hearings already
held by Chairman Rahall and two oversight hearings Subcommittee
Chairman Costa will hold later this month.
As the Committee with primary jurisdiction over offshore
oil and gas drilling, we will exercise our oversight
responsibilities to the fullest extent, and we take these
responsibilities very, very seriously.
Before we begin, I would like to express sincere
condolences to the families of the 11 individuals who lost
their lives the night of this tragic explosion on behalf of
myself, Ranking Member Brown and the entire Subcommittee. We
know that the healing process will be long and difficult, and
our prayers are with them.
Today is Day 52 of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, and I
suspect that for many of the people in this room, those 52 days
feel more like 52 years. Yet, in many ways, they also must feel
like it is a tragedy that has only just begun. Despite the fact
that BP collected 15,000 barrels in the 24-hour period ending
midnight Tuesday, an unknown amount of oil continues to flow
and we have no idea how much oil has actually spilled into the
Gulf overall.
Also, while Federal scientists confirmed yesterday that
there is oil floating beneath the ocean's surface, they still
do not know the full scope of the plumes, or what their
existence means for Gulf ecosystems. The only certainty is that
with the still spewing well head over 5,000 feet deep, and the
release of record amounts of oil and dispersant, the effects of
this disaster on the ocean, estuaries, fisheries, wildlife,
beaches and the people of the Gulf Coast are going to be felt
long after the well has been completely capped.
At this moment dead birds, turtles, dolphins and fish are
washing up on our shore, and brown goo is lapping up on our
beaches and wetlands. Below the surface, the release of oil and
dispersant at depth is creating the plumes that I mentioned.
Previous oil spills have shown that oil stays in these
ecosystems for decades, damaging highly productive and
sensitive areas that serve as habitats and nurseries for a
large variety of species.
Today we will begin to explore some of the short- and long-
term impacts of the oil spill on trust resources, including
fisheries, birds and other wildlife, marine mammals, tribal
resources, protected fish and wildlife habitat, and other
natural areas. This morning and this afternoon, we will also
focus on the implications for local communities who depend on
many of those resources for their livelihoods.
I thank all the witnesses for being here today during what
is a very challenging and extremely busy time, and look forward
to hearing your testimony.
Before we go into that, I would like to recognize our
acting Ranking Member, Mr. Cassidy, for his opening remarks.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Bordallo follows:]
Statement of The Honorable Madeleine Z. Bordallo, Chairwoman,
Subcommittee on Insular Affairs, Oceans and Wildlife
Today is the first of three hearings that the Subcommittee will
hold on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion. This is in addition to
two Full Committee oversight hearings already held by Chairman Rahall
and two oversight hearings Subcommittee Chairman Costa will hold later
this month. As the Committee with primary jurisdiction over offshore
oil and gas drilling, we will exercise our oversight responsibilities
to the fullest extent, and we take these responsibilities very, very
seriously.
Before we begin, I would like to express sincere condolences to the
families of the eleven individuals who lost their lives the night of
this tragic explosion on behalf of myself, Mr. Brown, and the entire
Subcommittee. We know that the healing process will be long and
difficult, and our prayers are with them.
Today is Day 52 of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. I suspect that
for many of the people in this room, those 52 days feel more like 52
years. Yet, in many ways they also must feel like it is a tragedy that
has only just begun. Despite the fact that BP collected 15,000 barrels
in the 24-hour period ending midnight Tuesday, an unknown amount of oil
continues to flow, and we have no idea how much oil has actually
spilled into the Gulf overall.
Also, while federal scientists confirmed yesterday that there is
oil floating beneath the ocean's surface, they still do not know the
full scope of the plumes or what their existence means for Gulf
ecosystems. The only certainty is that with the still-spewing well head
over 5,000 feet deep, and the release of record amounts of oil and
dispersant, the effects of this disaster on the ocean, estuaries,
fisheries, wildlife, beaches and the people of the Gulf Coast are going
to be felt long after the well has been completely capped.
At this moment, dead birds, turtles, dolphins and fish are washing
up on shore and brown goo is lapping up on our beaches and wetlands.
Below the surface, the release of oil and dispersant at depth is
creating the plumes I mentioned. Previous oil spills have shown that
oil stays in these ecosystems for decades, damaging highly productive
and sensitive areas that serve as habitats and nurseries for a large
variety of species.
Today we will begin to explore some of these short- and long-term
impacts of the oil spill on trust resources, including fisheries, birds
and other wildlife, marine mammals, tribal resources, protected fish
and wildlife habitat and other natural areas. We also will focus on the
implications for local communities who depend on many of those
resources for their livelihoods. I thank all the witnesses for being
here today during what is a very challenging and extremely busy time,
and look forward to hearing your testimony.
______
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BILL CASSIDY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF LOUISIANA
Mr. Cassidy. Madam Chair, thank you for holding this
hearing today. I am pleased that my colleagues are committed to
pursuing solutions to the ongoing oil spill. The people of the
Gulf Coast, including especially the people of my State of
Louisiana, have had their lives upended by this disaster, yet
the actions of this Committee, the Congress and Administration
will also have a significant impact. Our government has the
power to mitigate or to terribly worsen the damages caused by
the spill.
Madam Chair, this disaster may affect the economy of the
Gulf for years to come. Now, while most of the Gulf remains
open for fishing and seafood coming from the Gulf is safe, we
are already seeing a reduction in demand for Gulf seafood. Now,
this loss of market share does not just affect fishermen, but
seafood processors, truckers who take the seafood to market and
workers from almost every other aspect of the Gulf's commercial
fishery. And it is not just commercial fishermen who suffer.
Recreational fishermen, charter boat owners and businesses that
depend upon recreational fishing also suffer.
Now, the loss of habitat for fish and wildlife could take
years to restore. The Gulf is resilient, but if an entire year
of spawning potential for fish is lost to the spill, and the
marshes are not able to support the juvenile fish and wildlife
next year, it may take even our Gulf fisheries longer to
recover.
That said, many of the folks who make their living in the
fisheries live next door to the folks that make their living in
the offshore oil and gas industry, and these two industries
have successfully operated side-by-side for years. I met
yesterday with an oyster processor, and he said in times that
were slow for fisheries, people would work in offshore oil and
when times were slow for offshore oil, they would work in the
fisheries. He is concerned that this one-two punch will be
impossible for our coastal economy to overcome.
Now, we all use products from the offshore oil and gas
industry to fuel our cars, airplanes, for plastics and
fertilizers, for a wide variety of products that come from
petrochemicals, so it is important to remember that the United
States relies on all the natural resources of the Gulf, and not
just the fish.
Madam Chair, the spill is a disaster and a tragedy. First
of all, we must stop the leak of oil. The coastline must be
protected, and what has been spilled must be cleaned. But the
national economy and the Louisiana coastal economy need to
continue to operate. While we can recover from the oil, Gulf
Coast communities cannot endure the loss of jobs and its
citizens.
The Federal Government must not make knee-jerk decisions
that further cripple the Gulf economy. We must find out what
went wrong with the Deepwater Horizon and ensure that this
doesn't happen again, but calls to stop all oil and gas
production in the Gulf will only cause us to lose more jobs,
more businesses and more of our economy.
The Federal Government should take steps to help the people
affected by the spill now, even before the spill is plugged.
For example, we need to make sure that Americans know that
seafood from the Gulf is safe. We need to work together to make
sure that people affected by this disaster are financially
compensated in a timely manner.
Fishermen who have boat and insurance payments and who
cannot work must be compensated quickly so they do not lose
their boats and their homes, and those businesses that depend
upon fishermen must be fairly compensated as well. Otherwise,
they won't be there when the fisheries reopen. Whole
communities that rely on the fishing industry could disappear
if those affected are not compensated fairly and quickly.
Madam Chair, our response to this disaster needs to be
guided by facts, not emotion. Not political opportunism, but
facts. Let us stay focused on the evidence, figure out what
measures will ensure that the people, the economy and the
ecosystems of the Gulf will thrive.
Thank you, Madam Chair, for convening this hearing. I look
forward to hearing from our witnesses. And I ask one more
thing. Could I ask unanimous consent to submit a statement for
Mr. Brown for the record?
Ms. Bordallo. Hearing no objection, so ordered.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brown follows:]
Statement of The Honorable Henry E. Brown, Jr. Ranking Republican
Member, Subcommittee on Insular Affairs, Oceans and Wildlife
Madam Chairwoman, I want to compliment you for scheduling this
series of hearings on the short-term and long-term impacts of the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
It has now been 52 days since the Deepwater Horizon exploded and
sank some 42 miles off the coast of Louisiana. This spill is an ongoing
tragedy for the Gulf Coast region, its economy, the Gulf of Mexico
environment and the millions of people who live there.
It is heartbreaking to see pictures of Brown pelicans and
loggerhead sea turtles covered with oil and the growing number of
wildlife that have perished because of this spill. It was also
disturbing to learn that two national wildlife refuges, Breton in
Louisiana and Bon Secour in Alabama have been directly impacted by oil
and that 33 additional refuges along the Gulf Coast are now at risk.
While British Petroleum has appropriately stated that it will not
be bound by the liability limits contained in the Oil Pollution Act of
1990, we have sadly watched as a number of BP containment strategies
including Top Hat, Top Kill, Junk Shot and Saw and Suck have all failed
to stop the spill.
We have all watched in horror as the impacts of this accident grow
with each passing day. It is sobering indeed that 78,264 square miles
or 32 percent of the Gulf of Mexico is closed to fishing.
We will hear testimony today confirming the fact that commercial
fishing produces about 1.27 billion pounds of fish and shellfish worth
in excess of $700 million dollars and that the fishing industry
generates some 185,000 jobs in the Gulf of Mexico. This oil spill has
not only potentially killed their livelihood at least in the short-term
but their way of life. Every effort must be made to fully compensate
those adversely affected by the oil spill, to expeditiously clean-up
the effects of the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe and to restore faith
in the people of the Gulf Coast. None of this can happen, however,
until this well is permanently capped.
As a representative of the 1st Congressional District in South
Carolina, which contains some of the finest beaches in the world, I
have not been watching this spill as a casual observer. According to
the Unified Area Command, it looks increasingly likely that oil from
the Deepwater Horizon will end up in the Loop Current and may adversely
affect beaches in North and South Carolina.
I, therefore, have a vested interest in trying to ensure that the
Gulf Coast region has sufficient supplies of boom, dispersants and
skimmers and the maximum amount of oil is either burned, contained, or
sucked up from the Gulf of Mexico. Sadly, we know that once the oil
comes ashore, it becomes more difficult to deal with it.
Finally, despite this tragic spill, I remain a strong supporter of
offshore natural gas development. I would also remind my colleagues
that the primary reason that an increasing number of wells have been
drilled in ultra deep water is because this Congress has for decades
prohibited development in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and
shallower offshore areas around the nation.
Madam Chairwoman, I look forward to hearing from our distinguished
witnesses who I am sure will give us their unique prospective on the
impacts of this tragic oil spill.w
______
Ms. Bordallo. I would now like to thank the Acting Ranking
Member, Mr. Cassidy from Louisiana, for his opening statement
and for joining us today for this hearing.
I would also like to ask unanimous consent that our
colleague from Louisiana, Congressman Charles Boustany, be
allowed to join us on the dais for this hearing and Congressman
Cao. Hearing no objection, so ordered.
At this time I would like to introduce the first panel of
witnesses that we have here, and I am going to begin by
introducing each of you and then you will be giving your
testimony.
Mr. David Westerholm, Director, Office of Response and
Restoration, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
or, as everyone knows, NOAA; Ms. Jane Lyder, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Fish, Wildlife and Parks, U.S. Department of the
Interior; Mr. Robert J. Barham, Secretary, Louisiana Department
of Wildlife and Fisheries; and Dr. Timothy J. Ragen, Executive
Director of the Marine Mammal Commission.
I welcome you all this morning, and I will begin by
announcing that we have a red timing light on the table which
will indicate when five minutes have passed and your time has
concluded. We would really appreciate your cooperation in
complying with these limits. We have three full panels at this
hearing, so we probably will be going well into the afternoon.
So be assured, though, that your full written statement will be
included in the record.
And now I would like to begin by introducing Mr.
Westerholm. Thank you for being here today. You may begin your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF DAVID WESTERHOLM, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF RESPONSE AND
RESTORATION, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Westerholm. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman and Members of
the Subcommittee, for the opportunity testify on NOAA's role in
the response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. My name again
is Dave Westerholm, and I am the Director of NOAA's Office of
Response and Restoration.
I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the critical roles
that NOAA serves during oil spills and the importance of our
contributions to protect and restore the natural resources,
communities and economies affected by this tragic event.
Before I discuss NOAA's efforts, however, I would like to
express my condolences to the families of the 11 people who
lost their lives in the explosion and sinking of the Deepwater
Horizon mobile offshore drilling unit. NOAA is deeply concerned
about the immediate and long-term environmental, economic and
social impacts to the Gulf Coast from the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill. Over the past seven weeks, NOAA has provided sustained
scientific support to the unified command. NOAA is fully
mobilized and working tirelessly to lessen the impacts on the
Gulf Coast and will continue to do so until the spill is
controlled, the oil is cleaned up, the natural resource damages
are assessed and the restoration is complete.
My testimony today will discuss NOAA's roles in spill and
natural resource damage assessment. I will also highlight a few
of the environmental impacts of this oil spill on sensitive
resources as we currently understand them. NOAA has three
critical roles during spills. Our first role is as scientific
advisor to the Coast Guard or the Federal on-scene coordinator,
and we provide trajectory projections on the fate and transport
of oil, we conduct overflights and mapping, we identify
sensitive environmental resources in areas and conduct
shoreline surveys and guide cleanups. As part of this process,
resources from across our agency have been brought to bear from
satellites to weather, from ocean observing to fisheries, from
our ships and planes to our incredible scientists.
We also assess and restore natural resources injured by the
spill and their loss and human uses through a process called
the Natural Resource Damage Assessment, or NRDA. Finally, we
represent the Department of Commerce in spill response decision
making activities through the national response team.
Stewardship to protect and restore the nation's natural
resources is shared among several Federal agencies, states and
tribal trustees. NOAA, acting on behalf of the Secretary of
Commerce, is the lead Federal trustee for many of the nation's
coastal and marine resources. NOAA and other Federal, state and
tribal trustees are authorized by the Oil Pollution Act or OPA
to recover damages from the responsible party or parties on
behalf of the American people and public for injuries to and
loss/use of trust resources resulting from an oil spill. OPA
encourages compensation in the form of restoration, and
appropriate compensation is determined through this NRDA
process.
At the outset of the spill, NOAA quickly mobilized staff to
begin coordinating with Federal and state co-trustees and
responsible parties to collect a variety of data that were
critical to help inform the damage assessment. NOAA and co-
trustees continue to collect data in the Gulf of Mexico and
across five states that will be useful to determine what
natural resources have been injured, and what human uses have
been lost due to this oil spill.
Several technical working groups composed of state and
Federal natural resource trustees and representatives from BP
are gathering historical information and developing and
implementing baseline pre-spill and post-spill impact field
studies for multiple resource categories. Resources being
assessed include fish and shellfish, bottom dwelling biota,
birds, marine mammals, turtles and sensitive habitat such as
wetlands, seagrass, beaches, mud flats, deep and shallow corals
and the entire water column, including bottom sediments.
Shoreline surveys and additional baseline and injury
assessment plans are now being implemented. Although the
concept of assessing injuries may sound relatively
straightforward, understanding complex ecosystems, the services
these ecosystems provide and injuries caused by oil and
hazardous substances takes time, often years.
I would like to talk briefly about the oil spill impacts on
sensitive habitats, fisheries, marine mammals and sea turtles,
all of which are of great concern in the Gulf of Mexico. The
effects of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill on natural resources
are dependent on multiple factors, including oil composition,
oil quantity, dispersal techniques, what resources are present
and exposed and the intensity and duration of contact with
organisms.
Ninety-seven percent by weight of the commercial fish and
shellfish landings from the Gulf of Mexico are species that
depend on estuaries and adjacent wetlands for some point of
their life cycle. Landings from the coastal zone in Louisiana
alone make up nearly one-third of the fish harvested in the
United States. In such an incredibly productive area, important
habitat covers nearly every part of the ecosystem.
In closing, I would like to assure you that we will not
relent in our efforts to protect, assess and restore the Gulf
Coast during and after this horrific spill. Thank you for
allowing me to testify on NOAA's response and damage assessment
efforts. I am happy to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Westerholm follows:]
Statement of David Westerholm, Director, Office of Response and
Restoration, National Ocean Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce
Thank you, Chairwoman Bordallo and Members of the Subcommittee, for
the opportunity to testify on the Department of Commerce's National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) role in the response to
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
My name is David Westerholm and I am the Director of NOAA's Office
of Response and Restoration. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss
the critical roles NOAA serves during oil spills and the importance of
our contributions to protect and restore the natural resources,
communities, and economies affected by this tragic event. Before I
discuss NOAA's efforts, I would first like to express my condolences to
the families of the eleven people who lost their lives in the explosion
and sinking of the Deepwater Horizon platform.
NOAA's mission is to understand and predict changes in the Earth's
environment and conserve and manage coastal and marine resources to
meet our Nation's economic, social, and environmental needs. NOAA is
also a natural resource trustee and is one of the federal agencies
responsible for protecting, assessing, and restoring the public's
coastal natural resources when they are impacted by oil spills,
hazardous substance releases, and impacts from vessel groundings on
corals and seagrass beds. As such, the entire agency is deeply
concerned about the immediate and long-term environmental, economic,
and social impacts to the Gulf Coast and the Nation as a whole from the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. NOAA is fully mobilized and working
tirelessly to lessen impacts on the Gulf Coast and will continue to do
so until the spill is controlled, the oil is cleaned up, the natural
resource damages are assessed, and the restoration is complete.
My testimony today will discuss NOAA's role in the Deepwater
Horizon response; natural resource damage assessment; short and long-
term environmental impacts of this oil spill; and community outreach
efforts.
NOAA'S ROLES DURING OIL SPILLS
NOAA has three critical roles mandated by the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 and the National Contingency Plan:
1. During the emergency response, NOAA serves as a conduit for
scientific information to the Federal On-Scene Coordinator.
NOAA provides trajectory predictions for spilled oil, conducts
overflight observations of oil on water, identifies highly
valued or sensitive environmental areas, and conducts shoreline
surveys to determine clean-up priorities.
2. As a natural resource trustee, NOAA conducts a joint
Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) with co-trustees to
assess and restore natural resources injured by the oil spill.
NRDA also assesses the lost uses of those resources, such as
recreational fishing, canoeing, and swimming, with the goal of
implementing restoration projects to address these injuries.
3. Finally, NOAA represents the Department of Commerce in
spill response decision-making activities through the National
Response Team.
Response
The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is the Federal On-Scene Coordinator and
has the primary responsibility for managing coastal oil spill response
and clean-up activities in the coastal zone. During an oil spill,
NOAA's Scientific Support Coordinators deliver technical and scientific
support to the USCG. NOAA's Scientific Support Coordinators are located
around the country in USCG Districts, ready to respond around the clock
to any emergencies involving the release of oil or hazardous substances
into the oceans or atmosphere. Currently, NOAA has all of its
Scientific Support Coordinators located throughout the country working
on the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
With over twenty years of experience and using state-of-the-art
technology, NOAA continues to serve the Nation by providing its
expertise and a suite of products and services critical for making
science-based decisions. Examples include trajectory forecasts on the
movement and behavior of spilled oil, overflight observations, spot
weather forecasts, emergency coastal survey and charting capabilities,
aerial and satellite imagery, and real-time coastal ocean observation
data. Federal, state, and local entities look to NOAA for assistance,
experience, local perspective, and scientific knowledge. NOAA's Office
of Response and Restoration (OR&R) was called upon for scientific
support 200 times in 2009 for issues related to oil and hazardous
substance spills.
Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA)
Stewardship of the Nation's natural resources is shared among
several federal agencies, states, and tribal trustees. NOAA, acting on
behalf of the Secretary of Commerce, is the lead federal trustee for
many of the Nation's coastal and marine resources, and is authorized by
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 to recover damages on behalf of the
public for injuries to trust resources resulting from an oil spill. The
Oil Pollution Act encourages compensation in the form of restoration
and appropriate compensation is determined through the NRDA process.
NRDA in NOAA is conducted by the Damage Assessment, Remediation and
Restoration Program (DARRP). Established in 1990 after the Exxon Valdez
oil spill, DARRP is composed of a team of scientists, economists,
restoration experts, and attorneys to assess and restore injured
resources. Since the enactment of Oil Pollution Act, NOAA, together
with other federal, state, and tribal co-trustees have recovered over
$500 million for restoration of natural resources injured by oil,
hazardous substances and vessel groundings. NOAA works cooperatively
with co-trustee agencies and (in the case of a cooperative assessment
of injuries) the responsible party (or parties) to share data and
information collected during the spill and during the injury
assessment. Working cooperatively with the responsible party and co-
trustees can save time and money and can result in restoration being
implemented faster and more efficiently.
National Response Team
The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency
Plan, more commonly called the National Contingency Plan, is the
federal government's blueprint for responding to both oil spills and
hazardous substance releases. The purpose of the National Contingency
Plan is to develop a national response capability and promote overall
coordination among the hierarchy of responders and contingency plans.
NOAA represents the Department of Commerce on the National Response
Team and works closely with regional response teams and local area
committees to develop policies on dispersant use, best clean-up
practices, and communications, and to ensure access to science-related
resources, data, and expertise.
NOAA'S RESPONSE EFFORTS
NOAA's experts and ship and aircraft assets have been assisting
with the response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill from the
beginning, providing coordinated scientific services when and where
they are needed most.
At 2:24 a.m. (central time) on April 21, 2010, NOAA's OR&R was
notified by the USCG of an explosion and fire on the Mobile Offshore
Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, approximately 50 miles southeast of
the Mississippi Delta. The explosion occurred at approximately 10:00
p.m. on April 20, 2010. Two hours, seventeen minutes after notification
by the USCG, NOAA provided our first spill forecast predictions to the
Unified Command in Robert, Louisiana. NOAA's National Weather Service
Weather Forecast Office in Slidell, Louisiana, received the first
request for weather support information from the USCG at 9:10 a.m. on
April 21, 2010, via telephone. The first graphical weather forecast was
sent at 10:59 a.m. to the USCG District Eight Command Center in New
Orleans.
Support from NOAA has not stopped since those first requests for
information by the USCG. Over the past seven weeks, NOAA has provided
scientific support, both on scene and through our headquarters and
regional offices. NOAA's support includes daily trajectories of the
spilled oil, weather data to support short- and long-range forecasts,
and hourly localized `spot' forecasts to determine the use of weather
dependent mitigation techniques such as oil burns and chemical
dispersion applications. We develop custom navigation products and
updated charts to help keep mariners out of oil areas. NOAA uses
satellite imagery and real-time observational data on the tides and
currents to predict and verify oil spill location and movement. To
ensure the safety of fishermen and consumer seafood safety, NOAA has
closed oil-impacted areas to commercial fishing. NOAA scientists are in
the spill area taking water and seafood samples to determine which
areas are safe for commercial fishing. NOAA will reopen these areas
only if it is assured that fish products within the closed area meet
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) standards for public health and
wholesomeness. To that end, NOAA, in conjunction with FDA, is
continuing to refine a reopening protocol based on both chemical and
sensory analysis of seafood within the closed area. NOAA's marine
animal health experts are providing expertise and assistance with
stranded sea turtles and marine mammals. NOAA is flying multi-spectral
scanning missions over the spill to determine oil density and
thickness, and has dedicated ship and aircraft assets to determine the
influence of the Gulf of Mexico Loop Current on transporting the oil
outside of the Gulf of Mexico. The influence of the Loop Current and
the presence of submerged oil plumes are areas of ongoing research that
NOAA and its federal and academic partners are investigating.
NATURAL RESOURCE IMPACTS FROM THE DEEPWATER HORIZON
The effects of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill on natural resources
are dependent on multiple factors including oil composition, oil
quantity, dispersal techniques, and contact with organisms. Offshore
oil can impact the upper meter or so of the water column, mixed layer
deep water, and the sea floor. When the oil moves onshore, the
shoreline, nearshore waters, and coastal habitats may be impacted.
Shorelines and coastal wetlands in the Gulf of Mexico
Gulf of Mexico coastal areas contain more than half of the coastal
wetlands within the contiguous United States (Louisiana alone contains
approximately 40 percent of the total). These coastal areas play a
vital role in the reproductive cycle of many fish species, serving as
important nursery grounds, for example. These coastal areas also serve
an important role in the protection of human life and property, by
providing a natural buffer to protect coastal communities from coastal
storms, for example. The Gulf of Mexico region has been losing coastal
land at a very high rate over the last 50 years. The effect of the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill and the dispersants used, on coastal
wetland loss will be determined by how much oil reaches coastal
wetlands, and how long the oil persists. Large amounts of oil resting
on vegetated coastal shorelines could cause the vegetation to become
stressed and die. This could cause the roots to die, which would weaken
marsh soils. Weakened marsh soils would then be at risk of accelerated
erosion from waves and storms. The long-term effects to these habitats
have yet to be determined.
Fisheries and Fisheries Habitat in the Gulf of Mexico
Ninety-seven percent (by weight) of the commercial fish and
shellfish landings from the Gulf of Mexico are species that depend on
estuaries and the adjacent wetlands at some point in their life cycle.
Landings from the coastal zone in Louisiana alone make up nearly one-
third (by weight) of the fish harvested in the continental United
States. In such an incredibly productive area, important habitat covers
nearly every part of the ecosystem. Some examples of important habitat
include the open water column, floating sargassum mats, deep-sea soft
corals, hard coral reefs, rocky hard-bottom substrates, ledges and
caves, limestone outcroppings, artificial reefs, mangroves, sandy
bottom, muddy bottom, marshes, submerged aquatic vegetation, bays,
lagoons and even the sandy beach, which turtles use for laying eggs. In
federal waters, species that use the surface would be most impacted by
the early stages of the oil spill. As the crude oil sinks, the bottom-
oriented fish community may be impacted. In general, the 42 reef fish
species managed by NOAA in the Gulf of Mexico are often found in bottom
areas with high relief, such as coral reefs, artificial reefs, and
rocky hardbottom surfaces. If the oil slick reaches the bottom or
nearshore/inshore areas, a majority of the reef fish species could be
affected. Some reef fish spawn in spring, and their eggs and larvae are
usually planktonic, carried by currents rather than through their own
control. These larvae would not be able to avoid or escape the oil if
currents brought them together. Sargassum mats are nursery habitat for
some species, including gray triggerfish and amberjacks. Sargassum mats
that intersect the oil could affect these species. In state waters, all
coastal species could be affected if the oil spill reaches nearshore
waters. In addition, shrimp larvae usually spend the early months of
their life in inshore waters before migrating toward the ocean. Brown
shrimp postlarvae migrate from February to April, and white shrimp
begin their migration from May through November. Additionally, during
the spring and summer months, several Gulf shark species use coastal
habitats as nursery areas. If oil were to reach any of the coastal
areas where these species occur, they could also be affected.
Effects of Oil on Marine Mammals and Sea Turtles
Oil is a mixture of chemicals, each of which may have different
effects on marine animals and in combination these chemicals may be
even more hazardous. In addition, some of the chemicals and methods
used to clean up oil spills may also have effects on marine animals.
For example, dispersants are used as a mitigation tool to help prevent
greater impacts on the shoreline. Decisions to use dispersants must
consider the potential benefits of decreasing the risk of oiling to
shoreline habitats that many sensitive species rely upon and the
potential increase of the risk of dispersants to organisms in the water
column and on the seafloor. The full effects marine species are exposed
to depend upon:
The mixture and types of chemicals that make up the
oil or are used to clean up the oil;
The amount of exposure (dose for internal exposures
or time for external exposures);
The route of exposure (inhaled, ingested, absorbed,
or external); and
The biomedical risk factors of the animal (age, sex,
reproductive stage, and health status). For turtles, this will
include differing impacts and vulnerabilities at the different
life stages such as eggs, post-hatchlings, juveniles, and
adults. For cetaceans, this will include neonates, calves,
juveniles, and adults.
Cetaceans, manatees, and sea turtles may be exposed to chemicals in
oil (or in products used to treat oil spills, such as dispersants) in
two ways: internally (by eating or swallowing oil, consuming prey
containing oil based chemicals, or inhaling volatile oil-related
compounds) and externally (by physically coming into contact with oil
or dispersants, when swimming or coming ashore).
Whales, dolphins, manatees, and sea turtles are all air breathers
and must come to the surface frequently to take a breath of air. In a
large oil spill, these animals may be exposed to volatile chemicals
during inhalation. Depending on the size of the spill, marine mammals
and sea turtles could be exposed to these chemicals for relatively long
periods of time. Research on dolphins in human care has shown that the
animals avoid oil on the surface of the water. However, observations of
wild dolphins have documented the animals swimming, feeding, and
socializing in oiled water. Several characteristics of sea turtle
biology and behavior put them at risk, including the lack of avoidance
behavior of oiled waters, indiscriminate feeding behavior, and large
pre-dive inhalations. Additionally, sea turtles and their eggs may
experience oiling impacts on nesting beaches through chemical exposures
resulting in decreased survival to hatching and developmental defects
in hatchlings.
NOAA'S NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT EFFORTS
Oil spills affect our natural resources in a variety of ways. They
can directly impact our natural resources, by oiling marine mammals,
for instance. They can diminish the ecological services an ecosystem
can provide, such as the loss of critical nursery habitat for shrimp,
fish, and other wildlife or the loss of floodwater protection resulting
from an oil spill. Oil spills may also diminish how we use natural
resources by affecting fishing, boating, beach going, and wildlife
viewing opportunities.
At the outset of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, NOAA quickly
mobilized staff from its DARRP to begin coordinating with federal and
state co-trustees and the responsible parties to collect a variety of
data that are critical to help inform the NRDA. Several technical
working groups (composed of NOAA, federal and state co-trustees, and
representatives from one responsible party (BP)) are gathering existing
scientific information and developing and implementing baseline (pre-
spill) and post-impact field studies for multiple resource categories.
Resources being assessed include fish and shellfish, bottom-dwelling
biota, birds, marine mammals, turtles, and sensitive habitats such as
wetlands, submerged aquatic vegetation, beaches, mudflats, deep and
shallow corals, and the water column, including bottom sediments. The
trustees are also collecting and reviewing relevant water column,
shoreline, wildlife and other data being collected as part of the
response and by other entities.
NOAA research ships and contracted ships have been deployed to
collect chemical and biological samples pre- and post-oiling.
Additional baseline and injury assessment plans are now being
implemented. Existing plans will be updated and others developed going
forward to determine what resources are, have been, or could be exposed
to oil. The information below provides an update on the cruises and
data collections efforts for various sensitive resources and habitats.
The data and information being collected will be used to determine how
best to restore injured resources and develop the most appropriate
restoration projects to compensate the public for associated lost
services.
While it is still too early in the process to know what the full
scope of the damage assessment associated with the Deepwater Horizon
oil spill will be, NOAA and co-trustees are concerned about potential
short and long-term impacts to fish, shellfish, marine mammals, sea
turtles, birds, and other sensitive resources, including impacts to
their habitats, such as wetlands, beaches, bottom sediments, and the
water column. These areas may include National Estuarine Research
Reserves and National Marine Sanctuaries that may be impacted by the
oil spill. The data collected in the Gulf of Mexico and across the five
Gulf states (Texas, Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida) will
be used to determine what natural resources have been injured and what
human uses have been lost due to the spill. The information provided
below outlines NOAA's cruises and data collection efforts for various
sensitive resources and habitats.
Water Column
The purpose of the water column assessment is to document the
persistence, fate, and transport of the oil in the water column and the
resulting exposure to fish, shrimp, and other aquatic resources to this
oil over time. Baseline (pre-oiling) water quality data for the coastal
areas of the five Gulf states have been, and continue to be, acquired
by the trustees. This includes water samples collected in near shore
areas and from long-term monitoring sites from NOAA's Mussel Watch
program.
Cruises aboard NOAA vessels, NOAA contracted vessels, and partner
research vessels began in late April and have continued to gather data
specific to the water column inside and outside of the oil slick. For
example, scientists on the M/V Jack Fitz (a NOAA contracted vessel) are
conducting water column profiling by sampling water at depths up to 800
meters to the surface for the presence of dissolved aromatic
hydrocarbons and free oil droplets. During these cruises, water samples
were collected to analyze for the presence of oil and whether any oil
recovered matched the Deepwater Horizon oil ``fingerprint.'' These and
other data will be used to determine the presence of a submerged plume
and to calibrate a 3D model of the entire oiled area.
Fisheries (Nearshore & Offshore) and Plankton
In addition to the historical baseline data on fisheries
assemblages in the Gulf of Mexico, cruises are collecting pre- and
post-oiling data on fish and plankton resources. An initial cruise on
the R/V Weatherbird II (a National Science Foundation vessel) in late
April collected water and biota data from outside the oiled zone. A
second cruise that started on May 4, 2010, collected data on living
marine resources at 32 existing Southeast Area Monitoring and
Assessment Program (SEAMAP) sites off of the Florida panhandle (as
baseline) and 6 stations in the vicinity of the oiled area. In addition
to sampling for adult and larval fish and plankton, water samples were
collected to characterize oil droplet numbers and size in the vicinity
of the plume. Samples were also taken to assess toxicity, stable
isotopes, sediments, and bottom-dwelling biota.
The NOAA ship R/V Gordon Gunter has conducted a survey of fish
larvae in the Gulf, and has also been deployed to use its sonar
equipment to map the presence of submerged oil. Water samples will be
analyzed to confirm sonar readings. Cutting-edge technology developed
by University of South Florida scientists, called the ``SIPPER,'' will
be deployed to allow scientists a view of microscopic marine life, such
as zooplankton, fish eggs and larvae, as well as miniscule droplets of
oil. NOAA has also chartered the F/V Beau Rivage to collect samples for
seafood safety and analysis.
Oysters and Other Nearshore Benthic Biota and Habitat
NOAA's Mussel Watch Program quickly mobilized to sample shellfish,
water, and sediments at 64 sites in the Gulf of Mexico, ranging from
the Brazos River in Texas eastward to the Florida Keys, in order to
establish baseline data before the oil hit the shoreline. These samples
will be analyzed for 60 oil-related compounds known as polycyclic
aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH). Oil from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill
has a unique chemical ``fingerprint'' of constituent PAHs and other
compounds that will allow Mussel Watch researchers to distinguish
contamination from this spill from oil coming from other sources. Once
the oil hits the shoreline, new samples will be taken and tested.
Shoreline Habitats
NOAA is currently working with other resource trustees to document
what shoreline habitats (e.g., beaches, mudflats, mangroves, wetlands)
are, have been, or could be exposed to the oil. Trustees are working to
assess pre- and post-oiled shorelines, and will document the spatial
extent and degree of oiling on intertidal shoreline habitats. Aerial
surveys were conducted, pre-oiling, to provide a base assessment of the
shoreline. As the oil contacts the shoreline, aerial imagery will also
be used to identify priority response initiatives and vulnerable
habitat, to provide up-to-date information on the location of the oil,
and to support field work to verify degrees of oiling. This information
will be used to produce maps that will detail the extent of shoreline
oiling over time. Ground survey teams will build upon these maps to
create more detailed shoreline maps that will be used to identify
monitoring stations for any subsequent injury-assessment studies.
NOAA has been collecting aerial photographs of our Nation's coast
since the early 1900s. Following an incident such as an oil spill or a
natural disaster such as a hurricane, these photos provide emergency
and coastal managers with information needed to develop recovery
strategies, identify hazards, and locate errant vessels.
Other Resource and Habitat Assessment Efforts
In addition to the work described above, additional assessment
efforts are being conducted by the co-trustees to determine what
resources are, have been, or could be exposed to oil for the following
categories:
Submerged Aquatic Vegetation: A work plan to assess
potential impacts to this resource and document potential
presence of and exposure to petroleum hydrocarbons and
dispersants from discharged and dispersed oil is under
development.
Birds: Work plans to assess baseline conditions of
pelagic, colonial marsh, and other birds are in place. Bird
survey teams continue to survey beaches for birds in Florida,
Alabama, and Mississippi. Work plans to assess post-oiling
impacts to birds are underway.
Marine Mammals and Turtles: The trustees continue to
conduct marine mammal and turtle aerial surveys by fixed-wing
planes and helicopter to document exposure, acute effects, and
potential changes in behavior or distribution.
Deep- and shallow-water corals: Trustees are
compiling existing data and information about the deep- and
shallow-water coral communities, as well as any information
about their sensitivity to dispersed oil. More formal
assessment plans to document pre- and post-oiling conditions
are being developed, although data collection has already
begun. A major ongoing deepwater coral study funded by Minerals
Management Service and NOAA's Office of Ocean Exploration and
Research is being utilized for an initial Tier 1 NRDA impact
assessment of deep coral and chemosynthetic community habitats.
This study includes invaluable pre-spill baseline imagery and
active in situ experiments.
Terrestrial Wildlife: Appropriate information about
terrestrial wildlife communities - for example, deer, rabbits,
quail, and turkeys - and information about their sensitivity to
oil is being collected, and a more formal assessment protocol
is under development.
Human Use: NOAA and co-trustees are collecting
existing information about human uses, including cultural uses.
Field teams are conducting user intercept surveys from
Louisiana to Florida. Overflights are being used to gather
beach use information along the Gulf Coast.
Sampling and Data Management
For all the efforts listed above, NOAA, the co-trustees, and the
responsible party have agreed to a data workflow process so that
samples collected for analytical chemistry follow the same means of
tracking, chain of custody, quality assurance/quality control, and data
delivery into a unified database for analysis. NOAA, in coordination
with DOI and other federal agencies, is providing geospatial support
through the Environmental Response Management Application (ERMA). ERMA
is a web-based Geographic Information System tool designed to assist
both emergency responders and environmental resource managers who deal
with events that may adversely impact the environment. ERMA is serving
as a tool for coordinating information across the response teams and
providing a common operational picture. Because of the demand for this
capability, NOAA will soon release a public version of ERMA. The ERMA
website (http://www.geoplatform.gov/) allows the public timely access
to information cleared by the Unified Command.
NOAA's Commitment to NRDA and Restoration
Although the concept of assessing injuries may sound relatively
straightforward, understanding complex ecosystems, the services these
ecosystems provide, and the injuries caused by oil and hazardous
substances takes time--often years. The time of year the resource was
injured, the type of oil or hazardous substance, the amount and
duration of the release, and the nature and extent of clean-up are
among the factors that affect how quickly resources are assessed and
restoration and recovery occurs. The rigorous scientific studies that
are necessary to prove injury to resources and services may also take
years to implement and complete. The NRDA process ensures an objective
and cost-effective assessment of injuries--and that harm to the
public's resources is fully addressed.
NOAA'S COMMUNITY OUTREACH EFFORTS
During a NRDA, there are a number of opportunities where input and
guidance from citizens and local and regional environmental groups are
needed. Perhaps the most substantive way communities and environmental
groups have helped during past damage assessments is by informing the
trustees about potential restoration projects that address the injured
resources and services. For example, an environmental group has been
contracted to implement a restoration project addressing injuries from
the 2004 Athos I oil spill in the Delaware River. Additionally, for
past damage assessments, trustees have surveyed and held workshops with
communities and environmental groups to identify potential restoration
projects.
NOAA and co-trustees and responders are already informing citizens
about the Deepwater Horizon response effort and the damage assessment
through a variety of mechanisms. Although not an exhaustive list, a few
examples are highlighted below:
Representatives from NOAA have participated in
multiple public meetings throughout the Gulf region. Two weeks
after the oil spill, NOAA met with representatives from nine
national environmental groups to inform them about our response
and NRDA efforts. NOAA is participating in weekly conference
calls organized by the Council on Environmental Quality with
these and other local and regional community and environmental
groups.
To support the local communities as they deal with
the economic, social, and environmental impacts of the spill,
NOAA is working with Gulf of Mexico Sea Grant Programs to host
a series of town hall meetings in Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Alabama. The meetings are designed to assemble subject-matter
experts on the issues of most concern to the public. Within
each town hall meeting there will be a series of ``open
house,'' issue-specific workstations (e.g., tax issues for
fisherman and others that have lost jobs and income). These
town hall meetings will allow the public to receive direct
information and ask questions. Similar meetings in Florida and
Texas will be conducted in the coming weeks.
NOAA is assisting with outreach to various academic
groups in the Gulf, including the Northern Gulf Institute (a
NOAA Cooperative Institute), National Estuarine Research
Reserves and Sea Grant to ensure that their capabilities can be
effectively used in the oil spill response and recovery effort.
Gulf State Coastal Management Programs, keystone NOAA
partners, are contributing to the response by participating in
sampling operations, serving on NRDA assessment working groups,
staffing state command posts, and providing assistance to local
governments. NOAA is acting as an information clearinghouse on
issues such as availability of training, assessment protocols,
and general information sharing.
NOAA is working through its Gulf Coast regional
offices, state, local, NGO, and academic partners to provide
opportunities to volunteer and participate. For example, NOAA
helped organize volunteer beach clean-ups to remove pre-spill
debris from state beaches, which eliminates obstacles and
improves access, thereby helping to facilitate easier oil
shoreline cleanup. In Alabama, ten volunteer beach clean-up
events were organized and 125 volunteers picked up 4,000 to
5,000 pounds of debris from Alabama's beaches.
To facilitate on-the-ground understanding of the
spill, NOAA is awarding grants for rapid response projects to
monitor the impacts of the oil spill on Louisiana's coastal
marshes and fishery species through the Sea Grant Program.
In addition, NOAA's Gulf Coast Sea Grant Programs are
developing a web site to serve as a central database listing
ongoing research activities and identify funding opportunities
for oil-spill related research, whether conducted by
government, academic, or privately-supported scientists. The
intent of this website is to provide a single, comprehensive
view of research activities in the Gulf that are being
undertaken in connection with the Deepwater Horizon oil spill,
to foster coordination of these efforts.
CONCLUSION
I would like to assure you that we will not relent in our efforts
to protect the livelihoods of Gulf Coast residents and mitigate the
environmental impacts of this spill. In the wake of such an event, we
are reminded of the fragility of our coastal ecosystems and the
dependence of coastal economies on the health and prosperity of our
seas. Thank you for allowing me to testify on NOAA's response and
damage assessment efforts. I am happy to answer any questions you may
have.
______
Response to questions submitted for the record by David Westerholm
Questions from Congressman Pedro Pierluisi (D-PR)
1. On May 27, NOAA issued a press release in which the agency stated
that its Climate Prediction Center expects an ``active to
extremely active'' hurricane season for the Atlantic Basin this
year. Specifically, NOAA said there is a 70% probability of 14
to 23 ``Named Storms'' and 8 to 14 Hurricanes, 3 to 7 of which
could be Major Hurricanes. In light of these estimates, I am
concerned that the resulting change in currents and wind
patterns might move oil toward the Caribbean islands. Does NOAA
consider this a possible or likely scenario? If so, what should
the two U.S. jurisdictions in the Caribbean--Puerto Rico and
the U.S. Virgin Islands--be doing to prepare for such a
scenario and to mitigate any potential damage?
There is a low probability of oil from the Deepwater Horizon BP oil
spill impacting Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands.
It is possible that oil from the Deepwater Horizon BP oil spill may
become entrained in the Loop Current. The Loop Current is an area of
warm water that comes up from the Caribbean, flowing past the Yucatan
Peninsula and into the Gulf of Mexico. From there, it generally curves
east across the Gulf and then flows south parallel to the west Florida
Coast. As it flows between Florida and Cuba it becomes the Florida
Current and it becomes the Gulf Stream as it travels up the Atlantic
Coast. While there is potential that a hurricane could change the
current and wind patterns in the Gulf, because the Loop Current stays
well north of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, it is unlikely this
would cause oil impacts to Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands.
NOAA is closely monitoring the oil slick and the Loop Current using
satellite imagery, ocean observations, and aerial observations. There
are regular overflights to observe the movement of oil near the Loop
Current. There is a vessel operating continuously off the Dry Tortugas
surveying for tarballs, and another vessel regularly going into the
eastern edge of the Loop Current conducting oil and tarball surveys.
The majority of the oil slick still remains north of the Loop Current.
To date, there has not been any confirmed oil from the Deepwater
Horizon BP oil spill in the Florida Straits. If a significant amount of
surface oil enters the Loop Current and begins to move toward the
Florida Straits and Eastern Seaboard, NOAA will be able to see it,
predict the movement, inform states and communities, and help guide
preparedness, response and cleanup efforts.
Questions from the Ranking Republican Member, Congressman Henry Brown,
Jr. (R-SC)
1. According to recently released Coast Guard logs, the Administration
was aware of the catastrophic nature of the Deepwater Horizon
spill in the first days after the explosion. Instead of no oil
being spilled or less than 1,000 barrels, the logs indicate
that between 64,000 to 110,000 barrels could gush out of the
well in the event of a complete blowout. Were you aware of this
Coast Guard information? If not, how would this have changed
your overall strategy for dealing with this spill?
The 64,000-110,000 barrel per day flow rate estimate was provided
as a potential ``worst case'' scenario in the case of a total wellhead
blowout. In the case of the Deepwater Horizon BP oil spill, a full
wellhead blowout did not occur. While the flow rate estimates have
changed as new information has become available, from day one the
federal government has implemented a full-scale response effort
assuming a worst case scenario.
2. Concern has been raised by Mr. Williams (from the third panel)
about the long-term impact of the dispersants and on the
decision to disperse the oil into the water column rather than
allow it to rise to the surface. He points out that many fish
species are spawning at this time of year and their larvae are
also dispersed in the water column potentially causing a long-
term crash of some fish species. Has your research shown this
to be a valid concern? If so, how many year classes are likely
to be affected?
When an oil spill occurs there are no good outcomes. Dispersant use
is one of a few tools that may be employed to minimize consequences of
an oil spill. The use of dispersants is an environmental tradeoff.
Using dispersants decreases the environmental risks to shorelines and
organisms at the surface. However, the dispersed oil could increase the
risk to organisms in the water column including fish eggs and larvae.
Impacts of oil to fish larvae may include death, delayed growth,
impaired development, and greater vulnerability to predation.
While it is still too early in the process to know what the full
scope of the damage assessment associated with the Deepwater Horizon BP
oil spill will be, and how many year classes of fish will be impacted,
NOAA and co-trustees are committed to evaluating and monitoring the
short- and long-term impacts to fish, shellfish, marine mammals, sea
turtles, birds, and other sensitive resources, including impacts to
their habitats, such as wetlands, beaches, bottom sediments, and the
water column. NOAA is examining historical distributions of fish larvae
in the Gulf of Mexico and comparing the historical distribution with
the current distribution and projected trajectory for the oil, as a
tool to assess the possibility for exposure to both oil and
dispersants. NOAA is also conducting laboratory studies to determine
the possible impact of oil and dispersants on Gulf fish species. In
addition, a number of NOAA research vessels are conducting surveys and
are collecting pre- and post-oiling data on fish larvae in the Gulf.
Cutting-edge technology developed by University of South Florida
scientists, called the ``SIPPER,'' will be deployed to allow scientists
a view of zooplankton, fish eggs, and larvae, as well as miniscule
droplets of oil.
There has been research conducted on the effectiveness and effects
of dispersants and dispersed oil for more than three decades; however,
important gaps exist. Research is needed to determine the effects of
oil and dispersants that are suspended in the water column on mid-water
and pelagic species, as well as on deep-water corals, chemosynthetic
communities (animal communities living in the deep sea on dissolved
gases), and benthic habitats. Such studies can provide valuable
information on the sensitivity and/or resilience of these deepwater
communities, and can inform future response actions and assessment
work.
3. Claims have been made that there are undersea plumes of oil that
are moving throughout the Gulf. NOAA has been attempting to use
acoustic technology (which are normally used for fish surveys)
to determine whether these claims are true. Is this technology
working to detect large concentrations of oil and, if so, are
these claims accurate?
NOAA is testing the application of its multibeam and fisheries echo
sounders for oil detection, tracking, and mapping. Typically used for
depth soundings and biomass measurements, respectively, the sonars have
(in limited research) demonstrated a capability to record acoustic
returns associated with oil in the water column. The NOAA ship Thomas
Jefferson was detailed to the Gulf of Mexico in early June, and is
involved in missions to collect water samples for chemical analysis and
to test the feasibility of using acoustic and flourometric scanning to
help find potential pockets of subsurface oil clouds. The science team
onboard the Thomas Jefferson included researchers from NOAA, the
Environmental Protection Agency, the University of New Hampshire, and
the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. Observations from the initial
mission include:
1. Scientists observed high fluorescence and reduced dissolved
oxygen anomalies at around 1,100 meters depth, 7.5 nautical
miles southwest of the wellhead. Laboratory analysis of water
samples from this area is underway to help determine if this is
an indication of subsurface oil.
2. Scientists also observed a subtle acoustic anomaly in the
same vicinity. Additional analysis of the acoustic data from
both NOAA ship Thomas Jefferson and NOAA ship Gordon Gunter
will be needed to make further conclusions. Additional field
work is also planned to test this method of using acoustic data
to locate underwater oil.
3. The Moving Vessel Profiler, which allows data to be
collected throughout the water column while the vessel was
underway, was equipped with a special fluorometer. The
fluorometer was tuned to crude oil and was used to collect
fluorometric data from the surface down to about 100 meters
deep in shallower water from Mobile, Alabama, to Port Fourchon,
Louisiana. The samples were taken while the boat was underway,
with the instrument moving from the surface to the bottom and
back to the surface approximately every 1.5 miles. While there
are only limited data with which to compare results, the method
has been shown to be an effective way to detect water masses
with high fluorometry in the coastal zone. Much of Thomas
Jefferson's second mission, currently underway, will be focused
on gathering more detailed data in the coastal zone, and
collecting supporting data with the conductivity (salinity),
temperature, and depth (CTD) instrument and water samples to
further refine our understanding of possible submerged oil in
the coastal zone. Any information on anomalous masses
discovered in the coastal zone will be shared with other
researchers and emergency responders.
4. Scientists observed several seeps of what appears to be
natural gas in an area of known gas seepage, located to the
southwest of the spill site.
Once the water samples from this mission are analyzed, scientists
will compare those findings with the acoustic and flourometric data to
determine if the imaging data are useful in helping to find subsea oil
at low concentrations.
The NOAA Ship Thomas Jefferson trip report is available at: http://
www.noaa.gov/sciencemissions/PDFs/
tj_deepwaterhorizon_responsemissionreport_june3_11_
2010final.pdf
The NOAA Ship Gordon Gunter trip report is available at: http://
www.noaa.gov/sciencemissions/PDFs/
gunter_may27tojune4_%20mission_summary.pdf
4. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 has a mechanism for a responsible
party to reimburse people for lost income and wages. How will
those who rely on natural resources for subsistence purposes be
made whole?
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) contains a provision that
allows for individuals to submit private claims for cost and damages
for the loss of subsistence use of natural resources. NOAA cannot
provide specific information on the claims process, as it is outside
our purview. The U.S. Coast Guard's National Pollution Fund Center has
posted step-by-step guidance on the OPA claims process, claim forms,
and information on the types of losses that may become the subject of a
claim (http://www.uscg.mil/npfc/claims/). Those interested may also
consult the Deepwater Horizon Response website, http://
www.restorethegulf.gov, for more information on claims for people that
rely on natural resources for subsistence.
We understand that BP has also established a claims process, called
the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, that will be administered by Ken
Feinberg and will operate independently of BP. The GCCF will handle
claims for subsistence use losses.
5. Can communities submit claims for increases in social services
which are as a result of the spill?
NOAA is not in charge of the Oil Pollution Act claims process. The
U.S. Coast Guard's National Pollution Fund Center's website outlines
the options available to state and local governments to file a claim
for costs involved with providing increased or additional social
services (http://www.uscg.mil/npfc/claims/). Communities may also
consult the Deepwater Horizon Response website, http://
www.restorethegulf.gov for more information. This website provides
specific information on what types of claims are permissible and whom
to contact.
6. Is the Administration taking any action to let people know that
they do not need a lawyer to file claims and that government
centers are being set up to help people with claims? Would the
Administration support legislation that would cap the amount or
percentage of money a lawyer can receive from oil spill claims?
This question is outside NOAA's area of expertise. NOAA's role in
the Deepwater Horizon spill is to provide technical and scientific
support to the National Incident Commander, to conduct a joint natural
resource damage assessment pursuant to the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) with
co-trustees to assess and restore natural resources injured by the oil
spill, and to close oil-impacted areas to fishing in order to protect
the safety of the food supply. The U.S. Coast Guard's National
Pollution Fund Center's website provides information on the OPA claims
process (http://www.uscg.mil/npfc/claims/).
7. Mr. Cresson has two suggestions for mitigation projects (an
artificial reef and a hatchery). Would these projects be
considered as ``restoration'' and therefore possibly funded by
BP or the Oil Spill Trust Fund?
NOAA and state and federal co-trustees are conducting a joint
natural resource damage assessment, as mandated by the Oil Pollution
Act (OPA) to determine injury to and lost use of public natural
resources. NOAA and the co-trustees are in the initial phase of this
process and are currently gathering data on impacts to resources such
as fish, shellfish, birds, and sea turtles, their associated supporting
habitats (wetlands, beaches, corals, etc.), and recreational uses
across the Gulf of Mexico. The trustees will then quantify the total
losses and develop restoration projects that compensate the public for
their losses (pursuant to OPA). Looking forward, during the restoration
planning process, the trustees will consider a variety of restoration
project alternatives and, guided by the project selection criteria in
the OPA regulations, will choose those projects that will most feasibly
compensate the public's losses. The trustees will issue a draft
restoration plan for public comment that details the projects that were
selected and those that were not (based on the project selection
criteria). A final plan will be issued by the trustees detailing the
selected projects which will then be used to guide restoration. The
projects suggested by Mr. Cresson, if selected during that process,
would be submitted as claims for payment by the responsible parties or
by the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.
______
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Westerholm, for your
detailed explanation of NOAA's role to date in the Deepwater
Horizon spill response.
Before we continue with the next witness, I would like to
ask for unanimous consent that the gentleman from Florida,
Congressman Gus Bilirakis, be allowed to join us on the dais
for this hearing. Hearing no objection, so ordered.
Ms. Lyder, please proceed with your testimony.
STATEMENT OF JANE LYDER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR FISH
AND WILDLIFE AND PARKS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Ms. Lyder. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Madam Chairwoman
and Members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity
to be here today to discuss the impacts of the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill on fish and wildlife and their habitat in the
Gulf of Mexico and to talk about the Administration's ongoing
response.
We at the Interior Department also extend our condolences
to the families of those who lost their lives, to those who
were injured in the explosion and the sinking of the Deepwater
Horizon, and to those people whose livelihoods are being
devastated by this oil spill.
I have some photographs that I would like to use to
illustrate my short statement here. I spent about a month in
Houma, Louisiana, and I came to really love the area. I wanted
you to see some of what I saw.
What you see here is I want to give you an idea of what
Fish and Wildlife Service, Park Service and USGS employees are
doing in the Gulf. First, they are helping deploy and maintain
almost two million feet of containment boom with the goal of
protecting the most sensitive areas of marsh and other vital
habitat along the Gulf Coast.
The next picture is three levels of boom. You have heard a
lot about boom. In the foreground you see the heavy duty Navy
boom, then you see the orange beach boom behind that, and then
the absorbent boom closest to shore to try and catch the oil
that gets through the other barriers.
With our state fish and wildlife partners, we are surveying
for sea turtles, birds, manatees and other wildlife along the
coasts of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and western Florida,
and we are conducting natural resource damage assessments that
will help us hold BP and other parties responsible for damage
and help fund restoration of the vital ecosystems of the Gulf,
once the spill has been contained.
The Gulf of Mexico is one of the world's most ecologically
rich areas and provides habitat for a great diversity of fish,
birds, mammals, reptiles and other wildlife. Many species of
wildlife live along the Gulf Coast and are affected by the oil
spill.
We believe 35 national wildlife refugees are potentially at
risk from this spill. So far, two have been directly impacted--
Breton in Louisiana and Bon Secour in Alabama. Only Breton has
been closed to the public. These islands are part of Breton,
and they have booms surrounding them.
There are 10 National Park System units that are
potentially at risk from the oil spill. This is Gulf Island's
National Seashore. Several hundred thousands of acres of
habitat associated with projects funded through the North
American Wetlands Conservation Act are being threatened by the
oil spill.
Millions of NAWCA grant and partner matching dollars have
been or are being invested in coastal areas of Texas,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida to protect, restore
and enhance wetlands and wetland associated uplands for
migratory birds and other wildlife.
Hundreds of species are currently in their breeding or
spawning periods, including sea turtles, many local bird
species such as brown pelicans and least terns, as well as
various fish and invertebrates that are critical species at the
base of the ecosystem.
Oil spills affect wildlife and their habitats in many ways.
Oil causes harm to wildlife through physical contact,
ingestion, inhalation and absorption. Floating oil can
contaminate plankton, algae, fish eggs and larvae. Fish and
some seabirds can become contaminated by feeding on these
organisms or by direct contact with the oil.
Larger animals in the food chain can consume contaminated
organisms as they feed on these fish and other prey, and this
can impact an entire ecosystem. We expect wildlife impacts will
be subtle and chronic and persist for years and could possibly
have population level impacts.
We don't know yet what the long-term impact from this oil
spill will be. We have millions of migratory birds that range
across the Western Hemisphere that winter in or migrate through
the area. Many of these birds are currently farther north on
their breeding grounds in Canada and the northern prairies of
the United States. However, we expect the oil will persist
long-term in the food chain, and they will see impacts when
they return in the fall.
The Gulf is also a stopover for hundreds of millions of
neotropical songbirds that rest there and feed during their
spring and fall migrations. These birds, too, could potentially
be affected by the spill.
Assuming substantial quantities of oil enters the coastal
marshes of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida, we can
expect very significant impact to the whole coastal ecosystem.
In addition to severe and long-term impact to marsh vegetation,
various invertebrates such as crabs and shrimp and many
vertebrates, including fish, birds, turtles and mammals, will
be affected.
The injury suffered by water and wading birds such as the
brown pelican is potentially the most dramatic. Health effects
to birds of exposure to oil include death, poisoning, skin
irritation, matting of feathers and poor temperature
regulation.
Longer term effects are less understood, but oil ingestion
can cause organ damage and damage to an embryo. Damage to the
immune system can lead to secondary infections that cause
death. Behavioral changes may affect an animal's ability to
feed. Long-term consequences can include impaired fitness.
Oil has the potential to endure in the environment long
after a spill and has been detected in sediment 30 years after
a spill. We don't know yet what impact it will have on the
marsh plants. Impacts associated with the conversion of
wetlands to open waters, subsidence and sea level rise will
serve only to weaken what are already fragile coastal wetlands.
As my friend from NOAA mentioned, efforts are already
underway to determine the magnitude of the injuries to natural
resources so that BP and other responsible parties can be held
accountable. Fish and Wildlife Service and the Park Service are
working with NOAA as trustees of these resources to understand
these injuries. A restoration plan will be developed with
public input that specifies the actions necessary to restore
the resources and their habitat.
For the past 18 months, Interior has focused most of our
new capacities in landscape planning and science, to build what
we call landscape conservation cooperatives, and we are doing
this with our partners, our state partners. In this picture we
have a state employee, we have a Fish and Wildlife Service vet
and we have the Acting Director of the Fish and Wildlife
Service, Rowan Gould, all taking part in the response on the
Gulf.
The Deepwater Horizon spill is the latest in a series of
events graphically illustrating our nation's need to
understand, value and nurture the Gulf of Mexico ecosystem. The
spill has illuminated the need for additional information and
has made us all aware that the impacts of this spill are
graphic, obvious and tragic to our natural resources.
This Administration is committed to helping the people in
the communities of the Gulf Coast persevere through this
disaster, to protect our important places and to learn valuable
lessons that will help prevent similar spills in the future.
I would be happy to answer any questions the Subcommittee
might have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Lyder follows:]
Statement of Jane Lyder, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Fish and
Wildlife and Parks, U.S. Department of the Interior
Chairwoman Bordallo and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to be here today to discuss the impacts of the
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill on fish and wildlife and their habitat in
the Gulf of Mexico, and the Administration's ongoing response. Before I
begin, I would like to take a moment to express my condolences to the
families of those who lost their lives, to those who were injured in
the explosion and sinking of the Deepwater Horizon, and to those whose
livelihoods are being devastated by this oil spill.
It has been more than 50 days since BP's Deepwater Horizon offshore
oil drilling platform exploded and sank 40 miles southeast of the
Louisiana coast, releasing millions of gallons of crude oil into the
Gulf of Mexico. The volume of escaped oil continues to grow, expanding
the area of impact and increasing the impacts to precious natural
resources throughout the Gulf region.
Federal authorities have been on scene from the very beginning--
since the first hours of this disaster when it began as a search and
rescue mission. Our highest priority is stopping the ongoing leak and
preventing more oil from being released.
An equally important priority is protecting the resources that are
or may be affected by this spill. To that end, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS), the National Park Service (NPS), and other
federal agencies are working tirelessly to protect fish and wildlife,
safeguard vital habitat, and public lands and resources that belong to
the American people. These professionals are also documenting impacts
and working to understand the long-term effects of the spill, so that
we can hold the responsible parties accountable.
The scope and impacts of this spill are extraordinary. We do not
know at this time the extent of the impacts, but we believe that in all
likelihood, they will affect fish and wildlife and plant resources in
the Gulf - and across the country - for years, if not more likely
decades, to come.
The Administration's Response
The Deepwater Horizon incident is being managed under a Unified
Command System, located in Houma, LA. Operational activities are being
directed from Incident Commands in Houma, LA, Mobile, AL, St.
Petersburg, FL, and Houston/Galveston, TX. An additional Command Center
is being established in Miami, FL. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
is the lead federal agency for Wildlife Operations, under the command
of the Incident Commander. A Joint Information Center (JIC) has been
established in Robert, LA to provide informational support and serve as
a conduit for ensuring that information is forwarded to the public.
In addition, Secretary Salazar dispatched me and others from the
Department's natural resources and science team to Incident Command
centers, including the Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and
Parks, Tom Strickland; the Director of the National Park Service, Jon
Jarvis; the Acting Director of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
Rowan Gould; and the Director of the Bureau of Land Management, Bob
Abbey and Dr. Marcia McNutt, Director of the U.S. Geological Survey and
Science Advisor to the Secretary. In total, more than 24,000 federal
and private personnel are responding to the incident.
The National Incident Commander and the Federal On Scene
Coordinator are directing efforts and are accountable for the
Administration's response. They will ensure that BP, one of the
responsible parties, is meeting its obligations and pursuing all
possible contingencies and bringing the right resources to respond to
this spill. The Administration is working to ensure that all necessary
and available federal resources are being directed to this crisis.
All of these leaders, along with personnel from bureaus and offices
within the Department, work with other federal, state, and local
officials to monitor and respond to immediate threats to fragile
habitat; assess and address long-term damage to impacted resources; and
develop and provide data and information for use by the Unified Command
in responding to the incident.
This is the most complex and challenging oil spill our country has
ever encountered. The source of the spill is 5,000 feet beneath the
ocean surface where there is no human access and almost all the work is
being done with remotely operated vehicles. The damaged well is
continuously discharging large volumes of hydrocarbons into the water
column. Access to the discharge site is controlled by the technology
that was used for the drilling, which is owned by the private sector.
Due to its technical expertise, specialized equipment, and on-site
presence, BP's involvement in the efforts to stop the leak is vital to
reaching a solution. The responsible parties are also responsible for
the cleanup and environmental damage, and BP, one of the responsible
parties, has assured the Administration that it will pay for the
response and subsequent restoration efforts.
As of June 8, 377 FWS personnel, 97 NPS personnel, 45 U.S.
Geological Survey personnel and the following DOI personnel are
stationed on the frontlines at National Wildlife Refuges and National
Park units, involved in key decisions at command centers, and
participating in air, sea and beach operations to respond to reports of
injured wildlife and impacted coastal habitat:02
Department of the Interior Deployed Resources - Deepwater Horizon
Source: Department of the Interior Bureau and Office Reports--June 8,
2010
Bureau/Office Personnel Locations
DOI Office of the Secretary 38 Washington and Gulf Area
Fish and Wildlife Service 377 Refuges and Incident Command Posts
Minerals Management Service 170 Response Centers. Others at District, Regional,
and Headquarters. Oversight Support Teams.
National Park Service 97 Parks and Incident Command Posts
USGS 45 Regional Offices and Incident Command Posts
TOTALS 727 .................................................
In addition, there is a FWS All Hazard Team located at the Regional
Spill Response Center, in the FWS Southeast Regional Office in Atlanta,
GA, providing support. Finally, many more Department of the Interior
employees are working on the spill from their home duty stations.
Examples of field operations directly involving FWS, NPS, and USGS
staff include:
Helping deploy and maintain almost 2 million feet of
containment boom, with the goal of protecting the most
sensitive areas of marsh and other vital habitats along the
Gulf coast.
Conducting beach surveys to monitor sea turtle nests
and developing protocols for cleanup crews should we discover
oiled nests.
Engaging in multiple over flights to survey for
birds, manatees and other wildlife along the coasts of
Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and western Florida. These
over flights aid in establishing a baseline that will help us
document and quantify impacts as they occur and quantify
impacts and predict effects into the future.
Conducting Natural Resource Damage pre-assessments
that will help us hold BP and other parties responsible for
natural resource damage, and help fund restoration of the vital
ecosystems of the Gulf once this spill has been contained.
Impacts to Wildlife and Habitat
The Gulf of Mexico is one of the world's most ecologically rich
areas and provides habitat for a great diversity of fish, birds,
mammals, reptiles and other wildlife. Many species of wildlife,
including some that are threatened or endangered, live along the Gulf
Coast and are being affected by the oil spill. The Department of the
Interior and its bureaus have responsibility for a spectrum of natural
resources in the Gulf that will be impacted by the oil spill, including
National Wildlife Refuges, National Park units, migratory birds, and
threatened and endangered species, such as manatees, and sea turtles.
Short-Term Impacts
Oil spills affect wildlife and their habitats in many ways. The
severity of the damage depends on the:
Type and quantity of oil spilled;
Condition of the oil on and below the surface,
including the length of time it is in the water before it hits
land or wildlife encounters it;
Season and prevailing weather;
Type of shoreline; and
Type of waves and tidal energy in the area of the
spill.
Presence of dispersants
Hundreds of miles of Louisiana shoreline have been directly
impacted by oil, and last week oil came ashore in neighboring states.
Many acres of marsh have been impacted by the spill, while additional
acres have been impacted by sheening, a process whereby oil spreads out
on the surface of the water. Over 300,000 acres of Louisiana marshland
are currently being monitored.
We believe 35 National Wildlife Refuges located in the Gulf are
potentially at risk from the oil spill. So far, two have been directly
impacted by oil - Breton (LA) and Bon Secour (AL). Only Breton NWR has
been closed to the public. Low-level over flights are prohibited there
to protect nesting brown pelicans and terns. Last week, we also saw
impacts to the Gulf Shore National Seashore. There are ten National
Park System units that are potentially at risk from the oil spill.
Petit Bois Island and Horn Island at Gulf Islands National Seashore
were the first National Park units to be impacted, with tar balls and
oil sheen washing up along a two-mile stretch of beach, but the island
remains open to the public. Teams have been evaluating and responding
to the situation, but cleanup efforts have been hampered by inclement
weather. A light scattering of oil appeared this past Monday at Peridio
Key that clean-up crews addressed and the Fort Pickens and Santa Rosa
areas continue to receive light oiling, which are being cleaned-up. Tar
balls have also been observed in Dry Tortugas National Park, but these
were determined to not be affiliated with the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill. The affected areas were cleaned over Memorial Day weekend. There
has been no oil from the Deepwater Horizon incident at other national
parks in the Gulf, and monitoring continues at all park coastal areas.
Additionally, coastal habitat associated with projects funded by
millions of dollars of the North American Wetlands Conservation Act
(NAWCA) grants are potentially threatened by the oil spill. Significant
NAWCA grant and partner match dollars have been or are being invested
in coastal areas of Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida
Gulf to protect, restore, and enhance wetlands and wetland-associated
uplands for migratory birds and other wildlife. We are also concerned
about Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration Act
(CWPPRA) projects. CWPPRA provides for targeted funds to be used for
planning and implementing projects that create, protect, restore and
enhance wetlands in coastal Louisiana and other Gulf states. The CWPPRA
program receives millions of dollars in federal funding each year to
fund projects.
This spill occurred at the peak of the breeding or spawning periods
of a large number of species in the Gulf, including sea turtles, many
local bird species such as brown pelicans and least terns, as well as
various fish and invertebrates that are critical species at the base of
the ecosystem. As these birds and other wildlife ingest oil, inhale
fumes, become covered with oil, and consume marine resources that are
affected by oil, the entire Gulf ecosystem will be impacted throughout
the food chain, from marine plankton, fish, and shellfish, to birds,
mammals and other wildlife. Direct mortality will occur. We also expect
wildlife impacts to be subtle and chronic and persist for years and
could possibly have population-level impacts.
Oil causes harm to wildlife through physical contact, ingestion,
inhalation and absorption. Floating oil can contaminate plankton, which
includes algae, fish eggs and the larvae of various invertebrates. Fish
and some seabirds can become contaminated by feeding on these organisms
as prey, or by direct toxic effects of oil. Larger animals in the food
chain can consume contaminated organisms as they feed on these fish and
other prey and die, thus impacting entire ecosystems through a
cascading effect.
We share the public's frustrations that BP has been unable to
protect the Gulf coastline from oil coming ashore. For this reason, we
are redoubling our efforts to pressure BP to deploy more resources
where they are needed most.
Long-Term Impacts
The long-term impacts from the Deepwater Horizon release cannot be
determined at this point. There are still unanswered questions about
the amount of oil released and remaining in the Gulf, the effects of
dispersants used at the surface and at depth, and how this particular
oil will degrade in the environment. An Environmental Incident Science
Team, led by the USGS and with personnel from FWS, NPS, and MMS
representing their bureaus' science and resource-management needs, is
developing a long-term science plan designed to address these needs as
we move from the immediate response phase into the longer-term response
and recovery phase. Even before completion of this plan, we can make
reasonable inferences based on scientific literature, prior experience,
and expert judgment.
We expect to see a high degree of mortality in microscopic and
macroscopic life (e.g. zooplankton, larval fish and crustaceans) that
encounter oil and other toxins in the water. We also fully expect
secondary, tertiary, and top consumers/predators in the food web, such
as invertebrates, fish, birds, turtles, and mammals, to be negatively
impacted directly or through cascading effects in the ecosystem.
We are particularly concerned about the health of birds in the Gulf
of Mexico, including the millions of migratory birds that range across
the Western Hemisphere but ultimately winter in or migrate through the
estuaries, marshes and other coastal areas of the Gulf as they move
through the central flyway. Birds are a key indicator species of the
health of the Gulf environment and we have begun the numerous
investigations necessary to understand the extent and magnitude of the
impact to bird species in the region.
Many of the migratory birds that winter along the Gulf Coast are
currently farther north on their breeding grounds in Canada and the
northern prairies of the United States. However, we expect the oil to
persist long-term in the food chain. When these migratory birds return
to the Gulf Coast in the fall, they will likely be exposed to oil as
they forage, or possibly face starvation as a result of depleted
insect, marine and plant life due to oil incursion. These coastal areas
are also the key stopover sites for hundreds of millions of neotropical
migratory songbirds that rest and feed in these habitats during both
their spring and fall migrations. With the likely persistence of this
oil and its impacts for years to come, myriad bird species will
potentially be affected.
Assuming substantial quantities of oil enter the coastal marshes of
Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida, we can expect very
significant impact to the entire coastal ecosystem of these areas. In
addition to the severe, and likely long-term, impact to marsh
vegetation, various invertebrates such as crabs and shrimp and many
vertebrates including fish, birds, turtles, and some mammals could be
significantly affected. The injury suffered by water and wading birds
such as the brown pelican, mottled duck, egrets, ibises, and herons
will be potentially dramatic. We have all already seen the terrible
photographs of fully oiled pelicans either dead or struggling to
survive.
Health effects to birds of exposure to oil include death,
poisoning, skin irritation, matting of feathers leading to loss of
flight and poor temperature regulation. Longer-term effects of oil on
birds and marine mammals are less understood than are short-term
impacts, but oil ingestion has been shown to cause suppression of the
immune system, organ damage, as well as reproductive changes such as
embryo death in eggs and behavioral changes leading to reproductive
impairment. Damage to the immune system can lead to secondary
infections that cause death and behavioral changes may affect an
animal's ability to find food or avoid predators. Long-term
consequences can include impaired fitness and reproduction, potentially
impacting population levels.
Oil has the potential to endure in the environment long after a
spill event and has been detected in sediment 30 years after a spill.
In tidal flats and salt marshes, oil may seep into muddy bottoms and
persist for an extended period of time, remaining toxic and preventing
the germination and growth of coastal and marine plants. The effects of
oil on the vegetation and invertebrates in these systems will
undoubtedly have long-term impacts on fish and wildlife populations.
These plants are important to the buffering capacity of marshes and
wetlands from storm events and provide habitat for birds and other
animals. Impacts associated with the conversion of wetlands to open
water, subsidence, and sea level rise will serve to only weaken the
ability of the coastal wetlands to withstand and recovery from the
impacts of future storm or spill events.
Furthermore, any projection of damages may be impacted by the use
of dispersants in response to this spill. This spill has resulted in
the use of dispersants in quantities unprecedented in the United States
(over 1,100,000 gallons), and the first use of dispersants at
significant depth (over 300,000 gallons). EPA Administrator Lisa
Jackson has pointed out the following:
We know that dispersants are less toxic than oil.
We know that surface use of dispersants decreases the
risks to shorelines and organisms at the surface. And we know
that dispersants breakdown over weeks rather than remaining for
several years as untreated oil might.
After testing and authorizing dispersant use
underwater, we also remain optimistic that we are achieving
similar results with the use of less chemicals.
The dispersants are meant to help breakdown the oil and decrease
the resulting damage. As the dispersant is used underwater, EPA is
requiring BP to do constant, scientifically rigorous monitoring so that
EPA scientists can determine the dispersants' effectiveness and impact
on the environment, water and air quality, and human health. The
Administration will continue to closely scrutinize the monitoring
results and reserve the right to stop the use of subsea dispersants if
the science indicates that this method has negative impacts on the
environment that outweighs its benefits.
The preliminary assessment of wildlife and habitat impacts to date
from the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill is only a precursor of major and
long-lasting ecological impacts to the Gulf of Mexico, and beyond,
should the Loop Current carry the oil toward the Florida Straits.
Engaging the Public
The Administration is undertaking a variety of activities to engage
the general public and local communities and to disseminate and receive
information about the environmental impacts of the Deepwater Horizon
oil spill.
Secretary of the Interior Salazar, as well as other Administration
leaders, is meeting regularly with national, state and locally elected
officials to share information and receive input. In addition,
Administration representatives are meeting with communities at town
hall meetings and in other forums. For example, this week,
representatives from the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Service, the Environmental Protection Agency and other state and
partner agencies responding to the Deepwater Horizon incident, will
host two Open House Expos in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana. The Open
House Expos will offer Plaquemines residents the opportunity to engage
one-on-one with experts about the techniques, strategies and materials
being used in the spill response. Officials have also participated in
teleconference briefings for congressional staff, frequently held press
announcements and briefings for the media, and provided other periodic
briefings for nongovernmental organizations and other partners.
The Administration is utilizing new media to reach interested
members of the public. As of June 9, there were: 32,148 Facebook
followers, 7,218 Twitter followers, 2.3 million views on YouTube of
more than 55 posted videos, 136,682 views of the photographs posted on
Flickr, and over 78 million hits on the primary website set-up for the
incident, www.deepwaterhorizonresponse.com/. All information is being
coordinated through the JIC, which is staffed with representatives from
federal agencies and others.
A number of incident ``hotlines'' were established early in the
Administration's response to the oil spill to encourage information
sharing directly with the public. For example, there is an
environmental hotline with community information (866-448-5816), an
assistance hotline to make requests for booms and offering vessels of
opportunity (281-366-5511), a wildlife distress hotline (866-557-1401),
a claims hotline (800-440-0858) and a volunteering hotline (866-647-
2338). Contacts have also been set-up to receive technical response
suggestions and forward them to the Unified Command if they are useful.
Looking forward, the Department of the Interior, in conjunction
with the Department of Homeland Security, has launched an investigation
into the causes of the Deepwater Horizon offshore oil drilling platform
explosion, and is holding public hearings, calling witnesses, and
taking any other steps needed to determine the cause of the spill. In
addition, the 30-day safety review that President Obama ordered the
Department of the Interior to undertake has been presented to the
President and has helped us understand what safety measures should be
immediately implemented.
In mid-May, the National Academy of Engineering agreed to the
Secretary of the Interior's request to review the Deepwater Horizon
spill. This highly respected organization is a part of the National
Academy of Sciences (NAS), and will bring a fresh set of eyes to this
tragedy. The National Academy of Engineering will conduct a rigorous,
independent, science-based analysis of the causes of this oil spill.
The NAS has carried out similar independent investigations into events
like the space shuttle Challenger accident.
Restoring Natural Resources
In order to restore natural resources in the Gulf of Mexico injured
by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the Administration's efforts must
initially focus on stopping the release of oil from the well and
containing the oil to mitigate impacts to trust resources along our
fragile coastline. We must also direct our efforts towards determining
the magnitude of the injuries to natural resources so that BP and other
responsible parties can be held accountable for restoring them.
Preparation for determining the extent of the injuries to natural
and cultural resources is already underway, as natural and cultural
resource experts in the FWS, NPS and other federal agencies are
actively collecting baseline sediment, water and photographic data,
conducting beach surveys on public lands, surveying the coasts for
injured birds, manatees and other wildlife, and conducting Natural
Resource Damage pre-assessments. FWS and NPS, along with other
Interior, state, tribal and federal partners, will act as ``trustees''
for natural resources injured by the oil spill. FWS has responsibility
for National Wildlife Refuges, threatened and endangered species,
migratory birds, anadromous fish, and other natural resources that fall
under the jurisdiction of FWS. NPS has responsibility for National Park
units and the natural and cultural resources and habitats protected
within their boundaries including wildlife, seagrass beds, coral reefs,
mangroves, salt marshes and shipwrecks and other historic features. As
trustees, we will identify the natural and cultural resources injured,
determine the extent of the injuries, recover damages from the
responsible parties, and plan and carry out natural resource
restoration activities. Even though some assessment work has begun,
natural resource trustee agencies will not be able to determine the
magnitude of the resource injuries until the oil spill is stopped and
the effects are understood.
Once the magnitude of the resource damage is determined, the
trustees will pursue a claim against BP and other responsible parties
of the Government's conclusions as to the full costs of the
restoration, for the loss of natural resources and natural resource
services to the general public, and for the cost of the response and
assessment activities. In testimony before the House Energy and
Commerce Committee on May 25, the Department of Justice reiterated the
Administration's commitment to explore all legal avenues to ensure that
those responsible for this disaster pay for all of the devastation that
they have caused.
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) was passed in the wake of the
Exxon Valdez disaster to provide specific legal authority for dealing
with the consequences of oil spills. OPA assigns responsibility for
cleaning up such spills. It also provides a liability scheme for
payment of damages, ranging from the immediate and ongoing economic
harm that individuals and communities suffer to the potentially
devastating and long-term harm done to precious natural resources.
Although OPA is the primary federal vehicle for addressing
liability for response costs and damages resulting from oil spills, it
is not the only legal vehicle for seeking compensation for incidents
such as those now unfolding in the Gulf. OPA expressly preserves state
and other federal mechanisms for pursuing damages for injuries caused
by such incidents and for assessing penalties for the underlying
conduct that may cause such disasters. For example, the National Park
System Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C.19jj) establishes additional
authority for addressing natural and cultural resources for which the
National Park Service is trustee.
After the claim is resolved, whether by settlement or litigation,
the trustees will develop a final restoration plan with public input
that specifies the actions necessary to restore the injured resources.
The trustees will then monitor the restoration projects to gauge
progress, performance and success of the restoration actions as well as
the need for any interim corrective action.
The Secretary of the Interior has made absolutely clear in meetings
with BP executives that BP, as a responsible party, will be held fully
accountable for paying costs associated with this spill. In a letter to
Secretary Salazar and Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano, BP
has confirmed that it will pay all damages regardless of whether the
statutory liability cap contained in the OPA applies. While the
investigations into the cause of this disaster are still underway, the
Administration will ensure that those found responsible will be held
accountable for their actions.
Looking Forward
The Administration believes the visible natural resource impacts to
date, particularly to fisheries and wildlife, are only the start of
what will be a major and long-lasting ecological disaster. Science
underpins everything we do in conserving fish and wildlife and other
natural resources. It broadens and deepens our understanding of natural
processes and ecosystems, and in so doing it enables us to be more
effective, judiciously allocate our budget and assets, make sound
decisions, and better meet our stewardship responsibilities in serving
the American people.
For the past 18 months, the Department of the Interior has focused
most of our new capacities in landscape planning and science to build
what we call Landscape Conservation Cooperatives, or LCCs. These LCCs
are designed to help us and our conservation partners develop and apply
up-to-date scientific theory and practical approaches to helping fish
and wildlife adapt to the adverse effects of large-scale ecological
disruptions, such as climate change and now the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill.
In addition, other areas within FWS such as the migratory bird and
habitat conservation programs have a significant role in assessing the
oil spill's impacts and developing monitoring programs and protocols.
Our National Wildlife Refuge System has moved forward to develop
unified, integrated systems to monitor resources on refuges, inventory
those resources, and make that information available for analysis by
our own scientists and their counterparts in other agencies,
nongovernmental organizations, universities, and the public. Inventory
and vital signs monitoring programs currently in place in National Park
units will contribute to analyses and assessment of impacts as well.
Additional efforts by the Department are currently underway to develop
long-term integrated science plans for the marine and coastal
ecosystems of the Gulf of Mexico.
Addressing the environmental impacts of this oil spill is going to
be very challenging. Fortunately, we are in a better position now that
we have begun to bring partners together to develop science capacity
through the LCCs surrounding the Gulf Coast. As with our work on
climate change, the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster will
require the cooperation and shared resources of many partners to come
together, bring ideas, and analyze, address, and mitigate impacts to
fish and wildlife and other natural resources using science. When it
comes to the long-term restoration efforts, the LCCs now being
established will play a key role in helping us determine when and how
that restoration will occur along the Gulf Coast.
Through these conservation partnerships we plan to bring together
the scientific capabilities, ideas, resources, and the ability to
leverage resources to address challenges posed by the oil spill and
reduce its effects on fish and wildlife, National Wildlife Refuges,
National Park units, commercial fishing, ecosystem functions, and other
important resources in the Gulf.
Dealing with the more immediate challenges presented by BP's
offshore platform disaster will require better coordination of science,
planning, and operations to address the ongoing impacts to the Gulf of
Mexico and the likely broader effects that may occur outside this area.
Conclusion
The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill is the latest in the series of
events graphically illustrating our Nation's need to understand, value,
and nurture the Gulf of Mexico ecosystem. The spill has illuminated the
need for additional information about wildlife, fisheries, and habitats
as we try to quantify the damage, and understand the cumulative effects
of the catastrophic stressors acting on the Gulf Coast system. The
immediate impacts of the spill are graphic, obvious, and tragic to our
natural resources and the people who cherish and make their livelihood
from the Gulf. The deepwater location of this spill, in combination
with the volume of oil discharged and oceanographic and weather
influences introduce major uncertainty into defining the full range of
foreseeable impacts.
We must bring to bear our best scientists and our best science, to
understand the Gulf's resources at risk, the impact of oil on the
health of those resources, and the future trajectories of critically
important resources to Gulf Coast communities and our nation as a
whole. We must better understand, and predict the future paths of the
fisheries, the migratory birds, the endangered species, and the local
and national economies associated with these resources.
This Administration is committed to helping the people and
communities of the Gulf Coast region persevere through this disaster,
to protecting our important places, and to learning valuable lessons
that will help prevent similar spills in the future.
______
[NOTE: Ms. Lyder's responses to questions were not received by the
time this hearing went to print.]
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Ms. Lyder, for
describing the efforts of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
and the National Park Service to respond to the impacts of the
oil spill on protected wildlife and their habitats.
I know you have spent many weeks, as you said, in the Gulf
already and appreciate the time that you took to be here today.
Mr. Barham, thank you for being here today despite the
demands on your time and attention in Louisiana. Please begin
your testimony.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT J. BARHAM, SECRETARY,
LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES AND WILDLIFE
Mr. Barham. Madam Chairman, Members and distinguished
guests, along with Assistant Secretary Randy Pausina of
Wildlife and Fisheries it is an honor to represent the
Department here before you today. Under the leadership of
Governor Bobby Jindal and our team, we have lived the Deepwater
event literally 24 hours a day, seven days a week, since April
20.
Our first thoughts were with and will remain with the
families who tragically lost their loved ones in this event.
From an environmental standpoint, this could not have occurred
at a worse place. Louisiana's estuarine environment, its
marshes and its sea coast is America's wetlands.
Alaska and Louisiana produce more than half of the seafood
consumed in the United State, Louisiana producing over 25
percent of the seafood daily consumed from the tables of
America. We lead America in the production of oysters, shrimp
and blue crabs, so it is a wonderfully rich environment that is
imperiled by this event.
Unfortunately, associated with this uncontrolled oil spill,
BP conducted an experiment that had never been done before.
They decided to use subsea dispersants. Subsea dispersants have
no scientific background where you can assess the impact of the
use of those dispersants. At pressures up to 16 atmospheres and
very cold temperatures, we just don't know what will occur with
the injection of those dispersants.
It is not like oil that comes to the surface. As bad as it
is, we have a whole lot more experience dealing with oil on the
surface than we do in the subsea, where we have literally no
experience. One has to suspect their position was that out of
sight/out of mind would be their best course of action. If it
didn't appear on a satellite photograph, a lot of folks would
say well, it doesn't look like it was that bad to me.
But we all know now that there is a cloud of dispersant and
oil spread across the coast. Surface dispersants travel
primarily by the wind. Subsea dispersants don't move that way.
They move through unpredictable and varying currents that move
across the Gulf, so what we are facing is we have an unknown
quantity in the water column and we will not know for years
what the impact will be on the food chain that affects the
entire ecosystem and the productive capability of Louisiana's
marshes.
This event will not end the day that the oil stops flowing.
It will not end literally, as the Chairman pointed out, perhaps
for years or decades, and we pray not for centuries, that we
will be looking at this. LSU tells us that the transfer rate
for neutrally buoyant particles at 5,000 feet to the surface is
potentially up to 300 years. That is a frightening scenario. It
will be long after all of us are gone that people will be
studying this event.
One of the great challenges we have is Louisiana seafood is
considered to be the finest in the country. It is safe, secure
and of high quality. We have to maintain that. We are doing
closures and openings every day, but it is a challenge. One of
the real challenges is we can't develop a chemical profile to
test for Corexit associated with the oil.
Madam Chair, we have asked the EPA. We have asked BP. We
have asked NALCO that produces Corexit to give us the
components and the percentages of those components so that we
can develop a test, a chemical profile, so we can test for that
material in the tissue that we are collecting. As I speak to
you today, we have not received that information yet, 50 some
days into this event. If the government has its boot on the
neck of BP, it is time to exert some additional pressure.
We have all seen the horrific photographs of our birds that
are on the coast, the sea turtles that are washing ashore and
the dolphins. It is literally heart wrenching to watch what is
going on on the coast.
There is a bitter irony because, in the last year, the
brown pelican was just delisted as an endangered species. It
was a wonderful testimony to conservation efforts that brought
this majestic bird back from the brink of extinction. The
pelican is our state bird. It is very special to all of us, and
our biologists are working tirelessly to preserve this
creature, along with the others.
What I can promise you, Members and Madam Chair, is that
the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries in Louisiana will work
tirelessly to ensure that this American treasure, the wetlands
of America, are preserved and that all of us will continue to
be able to refer to Louisiana as the sportsmen's paradise.
We will work as long and as hard as it takes to win this
fight, one we cannot lose. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Barham follows:]
Statement of The Honorable Robert Barham, Secretary,
Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries
Mr. Chairman and distinguished committee members, thank you for the
invitation to appear today to discuss an issue important to my state,
but equally important to the Gulf Coast region and the nation. I am
Robert Barham, Secretary for the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and
Fisheries.
My state is blessed with abundant and diverse natural resources.
Louisianans cherish these resources but we have never been an ``either/
or'' state. We have long been a major fisheries producer as well as
major energy producer. Louisiana accounts for one quarter of the
commercial fisheries production of the lower 48 and at the same time a
third of the nation's natural gas and oil supply is either produced in
Louisiana, produced off our coast, or moves through our state.
Louisiana is also known worldwide as the Sportsman's Paradise. Our
coastal marshes and wetlands are the most important waterfowl wintering
area in North America providing habitat for about 2 million migratory
waterfowl. They are also home to some of the largest alligator, river
otter, and water bird populations in the country.
The fishing industry and oil and gas industry have had a mutually
beneficial coexistence in my state for many decades and we recognize
that Louisiana's role as a major energy producer is vital to our
national security but the recent Deepwater Horizon incident brings home
the unfortunate ecological consequences which can result from energy
production.
What's at Risk
Commercial and recreational fishing is a way of life in coastal
Louisiana. All of our coastal communities had their beginnings as
fishing villages and fishing is still a major economic engine in those
communities. The cultural identity of these communities is also largely
defined by fishing.
Commercial Fisheries
Louisiana is second only to Alaska in terms of commercial fisheries
production and home to 3 of the top 7 commercial fishing ports in the
country. About 1 billion pounds of fisheries products worth over $272
million are produced annually. In recent years Louisiana landed
significant portions of the total U.S. commercial harvest of many
species, including, 35% of the shrimp, 36% of the oysters, 56% of the
Gulf menhaden and 27% of the blue crab, 55% of the black drum, 23% of
all snapper species, and 20% of the yellowfin tuna. Nearly 13 thousand
commercial fishermen and over 1,500 seafood dealers/processors and
brokers register each year to provide this nation with fresh seafood.
Recreational Fisheries
Louisiana's recreational harvest is second only to Florida among
the states surveyed by the NOAA Fisheries recreational survey.
Louisiana-based recreational anglers caught high proportions of the
total U.S. recreational harvest of many species, including, 57% of the
black drum, 56% of the red drum, 28% of the sheepshead, 29% of the
southern flounder, and 51% of the spotted seatrout from the states
surveyed by the Marine Recreational Fishery Statistical Survey. Over
13% of the total marine recreational harvest in the nation is landed in
Louisiana. We have a large Charter Fishing industry and tourist make up
a large portion of their clientele. Annually 660 charter fishing guides
provide their services to recreational fishermen. On average 4.5
million saltwater recreational fishing trips start and end out of
Louisiana fishing sights.
Species of Special Interest
There are 21 species of marine mammals and 5 species of sea turtles
that occur in the area of the spill.
Jobs, Income and Tax Revenues
Louisiana's commercial and recreational fisheries resources provide
the state and national economy with an important source of jobs,
income, and tax revenues. A recent study of the economic benefits of
fisheries, wildlife and boating in Louisiana prepared by Southwick
Associates indicates that marine commercial and recreational fishing
supported $2.2 billion in retail sales, 34,078 jobs, $588 million in
salaries and wages, generated $198 million in federal income tax
revenue and had a total economic impact $3.1 billion. Louisiana's
commercial fishery is a major driver of the restaurant industry and the
recreational fishery is a major driver of the tourism industry in the
entire Gulf region.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6977.002
.epsCoastal Habitat
Forty percent of the coastal wetlands within the lower 48 states
are in Louisiana. Louisiana is also home to the delta of the largest
river on the continent and unlike the coastal habitat of much of the
country Louisiana's coast is composed of thousands of miles of
shoreline dominated by highly fragmented vegetated wetlands. These
coastal wetlands are laced with large and small bays, lakes, bayous,
canals, shallow ponds and remnant barrier islands. These wetlands
support our highly productive fisheries but also perform an important
function in protecting our coastal communities and oil and gas
infrastructure from storm surge.
State Response
The immediate reaction to the Deepwater Horizon explosion was
concern for the loss of life and the recovery and safety of the
survivors. Initially there was no confirmed oil leakage but once the
rig sank, oil leakage was confirmed and became an issue of concern.
It became apparent early on that dealing with the consequences of
this incident would not be a sprint but rather a marathon the length of
which is yet to be determined.
I, along with Governor Jindal and other state officials met with
the Coast Guard and BP officials early on to get an understanding of
their response capabilities and response plans and we immediately began
preparations for the potential damage resulting from movement of leaked
oil to our coast. Department field staff began daily reconnaissance of
our entire coast looking for presence of oil or oiled wildlife and that
effort continues indefinitely. Key state officials, parish presidents,
emergency operations professionals, levee district officials and others
continuously met to discuss strategies to fill the voids we identified
in the response efforts by BP and the Coast Guard.
Using all information available regarding the location and
trajectory of the surface oil, the Department worked with both federal
and state partners to identify the most highly sensitive shoreline
areas that would most likely be impacted and developed boom deployment
plans to protect these areas. The initial boom deployments to protect
highly sensitive areas took place well before any oil made landfall but
these deployments proved to be very unstable due to wave, wind and
current action.
Using information on the likely movement of oil into an area I
along with the Secretary of our State Department of Health and
Hospitals coordinated the implementation of precautionary closures to
fishing in designated areas and initiated sampling and testing of fish
to modify and adjust area openings and closures.
Simultaneous with the implementation of the initial boom
deployments and when it became apparent that neither BP nor the Coast
Guard had a detailed ``boom plan'' we worked with our state partners
and local government officials to develop a boom plan for the entire
coast, identifying primary closure points focused on attempting to keep
oil from the most interior reaches of our wetlands.
The state also fully utilized all available freshwater diversions
to flow freshwater into our coastal areas in an attempt to minimize
intrusion of oil into our wetlands.
As a result of the limited effectiveness of the initial boom
deployments the state, again working with local government officials,
the state developed a dredging plan to build ``sand booms'' along the
alignment of the historic barrier islands and filed for an emergency
permit from the Army Corps of Engineers.
Louisiana has from the start ``leaned forward'' with actions,
proposed response plans and advice to both BP and the Coast Guard.
What We Know
The characteristics which make Louisiana's coast highly productive
from a fisheries standpoint also make them exceptionally vulnerable to
oil impacts. The topography of coastal Louisiana presents unique
challenges with respect to oil movement and infiltration into these
areas as well as unique clean-up challenges. Simply put, our coast is
not composed of beaches which can be reasonably cleaned.
In the short term we know that there has been and continues to be a
tremendous loss of earnings for a large and diverse group of people
dependent on our coast. Payrolls have already been cut. Commercial
fishermen have been deprived of the opportunity to fish. The
availability of seafood products to seafood docks and processors has
been severely limited if not eliminated. Restaurants and seafood
consumers in the region and throughout the nation have been deprived of
highly prized food products. Charter Captains have been deprived of the
opportunity to take clients on fishing trips and have had many future
booked trips cancelled. Sports fishermen have not been able to fish.
All of the industries and businesses that rely on commercial and
recreational fishing have been negatively impacted by the lack of
expenditures by fishermen, dealers and processors.
Most of our large commercial fisheries are based on estuarine
dependent species many of which spawn offshore in the Gulf, the eggs
and larvae are carried inshore on currents where they grow into
juveniles and sub-adults and then move back to the Gulf as adults.
Other species primarily occupy near shore and inshore areas throughout
their life cycle while some spend their entire life out in the open
Gulf.
A tremendous volume of oil has spread throughout a large area of
the Gulf. Oil has also reached Louisiana's shores in many areas and has
infiltrated into some of our interior coastal waters. It is likely that
virtually all species of aquatic life at some stage of their life cycle
have been or will be exposed to some form or concentration of oil
leaked from the Deepwater Horizon.
Coastal shorelines, sea turtles, marine mammals and numerous
wildlife species have already been oiled.
In addition to the massive amount of oil, there is also a large
volume of oil dispersants that have been applied to our coastal waters,
and it is likely that virtually all species of aquatic life at some
stage of their life cycle have been or will be exposed to some
concentration of dispersants.
We know that the oil leaked has ``weathered' into various water/oil
emulsions and other forms, and in general that the more ``weathered''
forms of oil are more stable and persistent in the environment.
Unfortunately, national media reports have led to negative consumer
ideas about the quality and safety of harvested seafood products
despite the fact that we have implemented a continuing testing program
and have issued precautionary fishing closures so that those Louisiana
seafood products that are making it to the wholesale and retail market
remain safe and wholesome.
Consumer confidence questions combined with reductions in product
availabilities have influenced the market share of our seafood products
and recent experiences with disruption of our seafood supply by
Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Ike and Gustav have demonstrated the extreme
difficulty recapturing that market share. Negative consumer confidence
also threatens our Charter, restaurant and tourism industries.
In addition to the economic impacts, fishing is a way of life and
an integral part of the culture of coastal Louisiana. Many of the
fishing businesses that are threatened have been in families for
generations. Coastal residents are experiencing extreme anxiety because
of the ``unknowns'' both of their short term future and long term
future. In a nutshell, coastal Louisiana has been turned on it head.
What we don't know
Unfortunately there are many things we don't know.
At this point we do not know the total volume of oil which has
leaked from the Deepwater Horizon into the Gulf nor do we have
consensus as to what volume continues to leak daily.
We have some knowledge of the extent and distribution of oil at the
surface but the distribution changes with time as the volume grows and
natural forces relocate and spread oil from the source site. The
movement of oil is not in a straight line but rather omnidirectional.
Large volumes of dispersants have been and are continuing to be
used both on the surface and injected into the plume below surface.
This has been a serious concern of mine and on May 18th I wrote to BP
officials expressing my concern and requesting additional data and
information on the dispersants being used. In addition to concerns
regarding the direct effects of dispersants on aquatic life it has
become increasingly evident that there is a significant volume of oil
below the surface of the water and it is difficult if not impossible to
track movement of oil into new areas.
As the oil ``weathers'' it is transformed into various types of
water/oil emulsions or other forms, is ``scattered'' in response to
dispersants, and the movement dynamics of each of these react uniquely
to the naturally occurring transport mechanisms in the Gulf and inshore
waters. We do not have a complete understanding of the transport
mechanisms but these same transport mechanisms transport fish eggs and
larvae to areas critical to their survival into juveniles and adults.
The marine/estuarine ecosystem is highly complex and natural
fluctuations in species composition, abundance and distribution are a
basic feature of its normal function. We have limited understanding of
these natural fluctuations.
Impacts from large volume surface spills have been documented (i.e.
Exxon Valdez) however there is little documented information on large
volume deepwater leaks. Surface spills likely have differing impacts
than deepwater leaks.
We have limited knowledge of the concentrations of oil and
dispersants at various levels of the water column. Eggs and larvae of
various species are transported at the surface or at various levels of
the water column.
We do not have a complete understanding of the toxicity of various
concentrations of oil and dispersants to all of the life stages of all
species of aquatic life.
Eggs and larvae are passively transported by currents and would not
be expected to exhibit any oil avoidance behavior however we have
limited if any knowledge of avoidance behavior by those life stages in
which they are active swimmers.
We have little knowledge of deepwater transport mechanisms.
We have little knowledge of deepwater ecology.
Although we have some experience with relatively small scale
releases of oil in our inshore areas, the immediate and residual
effects of large quantities of oil over large shallow areas or large
areas of vegetative wetlands are largely unknown.
The list can go on. There are many questions which will require
answers if we are to truly understand the ecological impacts.
Closing
As I mentioned earlier this is not a sprint and it is difficult to
envision where we will be when and if this marathon comes to an end.
The economy and culture of coastal Louisiana is a unique blend of
many things similar to the unique blends prepared by our great chef's
in New Orleans when they prepare that succulent dish of gumbo. In the
case of coastal Louisiana our coastal ecology and fishing is and always
has been the main ingredient. At this point the main ingredient is
threatened and the future is anything but certain.
______
Response to questions submitted for the record by Robert J. Barham,
Secretary, Louisiana Department of Wildlife & Fisheries
July 6, 2010
Madeline Z. Bordallo, Chairwoman
Subcommittee on Insular Affairs, Oceans and Wildlife
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Congresswoman Bordallo:
This is in response to your request for additional information
relating to my testimony on June 10, 2010 before your committee
concerning ``Our Natural Resources at Risk: The Short and Long Term
Impacts of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.''
``As you stated in your testimony, there are many things we do not
know about the potential ecological impacts of this oil spill.
Given this uncertainty, what is your confidence level that
seafood products are safe? Would Louisiana certify its seafood
as such and assume liability?''
Ensuring seafood safety has been and continues to be one of
Louisiana's main goals and responsibilities. Soon after the event
Louisiana's trustee agencies responsible for the safety of seafood, the
Departments of Wildlife & Fisheries, Health & Hospitals, Agriculture &
Forestry and Environmental Quality, convened to develop an action plan
to ensure seafood safety. The plan was presented to BP for funding and
to date has not been approved. However, we aren't waiting for BP to
fulfill our mission. The Departments of Wildlife & Fisheries and Health
& Hospitals has been collecting tissue samples weekly from shrimp,
fish, crabs and oysters throughout coastal Louisiana since the spill to
test for contamination from oil. To date all seafood sampled has been
found to be within normal levels. Besides seafood testing, we conduct
daily oil spill reconnaissance missions throughout coastal Louisiana.
When oil is found and projected to impact coastal areas, I immediately
issue a precautionary closure of the potentially impacted area. It's
not until the oil is no longer present in an area and laboratory test
indicate that tissue samples are within normal limits that I will
consider reopening an area to fishing. Enforcement of fishing closures
plays a major role in ensuring seafood safety and our enforcement
agents take that responsibility very seriously. They are on the water
at all times verifying that fishing is not taking place in closed
areas. If a fisherman is found fishing in a closed area, they are made
to discard their entire catch on the spot. These are some of the
immediate actions we are taking to ensure seafood safety. Further
actions currently in development include a Louisiana Quality Control
and Assurance Program that provides traceability of seafood from the
water to the plate, seafood testing and a professionalism program
designed to instruct fishermen and seafood processors seafood safety
practices. Be assured that we are committed to providing safe seafood
to consumers and certify as much as any state fishery management agency
can that the seafood coming out of Louisiana waters is as safe to eat
no as it was prior to the oil spill. As to the question of liability,
until BP fully provides the resources needed by the state to insure
seafood safety, the issue of liability is on their heads.
``In your testimony, you stated that Louisiana has fully utilized all
available freshwater diversions to minimize intrusion of oil
into coastal areas. Has Louisiana implemented a monitoring
program to observe the changes in salinity which could produce
lethal and sub-lethal effects on wildlife, and in particular
oysters?''
Absolutely! It's important to recognize that oysters are unable to
move and always susceptible to environmental conditions. However, being
an estuarine species requires they have a tolerance for fluctuations in
their habitat such as salinity. In fact, freshwater is essential to
oyster survival by reducing predation and providing needed nutrients.
Louisiana has and continues to maintain an extensive estuarine resource
monitoring program. I have submitted a proposal to BP to intensify
resource monitoring efforts throughout Louisiana's valuable estuaries.
Approval to proceed is hopefully forthcoming. Again, we are not waiting
for BP to act. We've begun intensive sampling of Louisiana's oyster
resource on our state seed grounds and have developed a plan to monitor
oyster mortality. The decision to maintain maximum freshwater diversion
flow was not taken lightly or without much scientific debate. I felt it
more important to keep oil from inundating estuarine areas and protect
our oyster growing area from possibly decades of oil related impacts
and accept short term possible loss of oyster resource from freshwater.
``It is my understanding that States participate in the development of
and sign-off on all Area Contingency Plans, which identify
sensitive areas where boom is deployed in the event of an oil
spill. Was this the case for Louisiana?''
We believe this question would be best answered by the Louisiana
Office of Coastal Affairs.
Sincerely,
Robert J. Barham, Secretary
Louisiana Department of Wildlife & Fisheries
______
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Barham, for helping
us better understand the implications of the Deepwater Horizon
oil spill on Louisiana's coastal and marine ecosystems.
And next, our final witness on this first panel will be Dr.
Ragen. You may begin.
STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY J. RAGEN, Ph.D.,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION
Dr. Ragen. Thank you, Madam Chair and Members of the
Committee, for inviting the Marine Mammal Commission to testify
on this event. The Commission also wishes to express its
condolences to the families of those who lost their lives and
all those whose lives and livelihoods have been so disrupted.
Our current understanding of the effects of oil on marine
mammals is rudimentary, based largely on anecdotal information,
and the information we have often pertains to seals and sea
otters, which are not marine mammals that occur in the Gulf of
Mexico. The marine mammals in the Gulf are whales, dolphins and
porpoises with one exception, the Florida manatee.
The first contact between oil and marine mammals will
involve contact with the skin, the eyes, respiratory tissues
and so on. Contact with the skin may lead to anything from
irritation to necrosis of the skin, but there is some evidence
that at least on a short-term basis cetaceans can tolerate that
kind of contact. We don't know about the effects on a long-term
basis.
Inhalation may cause a problem inasmuch as we have seen
pulmonary emphysema in sea otters that have been breathing
fumes from oil. Contact with eyes may cause ailments such as
conjunctivitis. Ingestion may be the more significant
consequence or factor. Animals may be able to tolerate a small
amount of oil, but in larger amounts or over prolonged periods
ingestion may lead to impairment of kidneys, liver and the
brain. It may also impair the digestive, immune and
reproductive systems, leading to general illness or death.
The actual response in all of these cases depends very much
on the nature of the oil that is involved, i.e. its composition
and its toxicity, and it depends on the animals that are also
involved, what species they are, whether or not they are in
good health or poor condition, et cetera.
Response activities also may have effects. We don't know
much about the effects of these dispersants on marine mammals,
but that is an area where we have similar kinds of concerns. In
addition, all the activity in the Gulf with vessels and
aircraft may lead to disturbance of marine mammals, introduce
noise into the environment, and those effects may cause animals
to abandon prime habitat or perhaps disrupt social structures,
such as pods or mother/calf pairs.
The long-term effects are primarily ecological, and those
remain to be seen. We could see declines in abundance of
populations due to increased mortality or decreased
reproduction. Prey availability may decline, which will also
affect the marine mammal populations. Animals that are
particularly sensitive to the stress of the spill may be more
subject to the effects of disease or parasites.
We should expect to see some surprises in this instance. We
know that the Gulf has hypoxic zones and harmful algal blooms.
We do not know how the oil will interact with the factors that
create those conditions. We also should be aware that highly
perturbed marine ecosystems my take decades or more to recover,
and they may not recover to the same state that they were in
before the spill.
You asked about our ability to assess the effects on marine
mammals. As we speak, NOAA, Fish and Wildlife Service, the
Department of the Interior, the Gulf States and a number of
other cooperating agencies are flying surveys. They are
sampling animals. They are coordinating stranding efforts and
trying to make the best out of examinations of dead animals to
see what killed them.
All that being said, we will have a very difficult time
determining what the effects are on marine mammals. Our primary
difficulties are that it is tough to study marine mammals in
the wild generally. It is much tougher under circumstances like
these.
In addition, we do not have adequate baseline information
for most of the marine mammals in the Gulf. NOAA's stock
assessment reports include 21 species and 58 stocks of marine
mammals in the Gulf. Of those, we have adequate baseline
information on abundance for six stocks.
With regard to the likely impacts of oil and gas activities
in the Gulf and elsewhere, i.e. generally, I tend to produce or
to break down oil and gas activities into different categories.
Construction and decommissioning, general operations and
support activities are all activities that can be managed with
appropriate mitigation measures.
The Commission has more concern about the effects of
seismic studies because they introduce a large amount of sound
into the marine environment, which may cause behavioral changes
in the marine mammals or affect them physiologically; for
example, lessening their ability to hear.
We are also concerned about oil and gas transportation.
Tankers have long been known to be a source of oil spills. In
the Gulf, oil is generally transported by pipelines, which are
safe; but we also know that pipelines are subject to problems
as well--as we saw in 2005 with Katrina and Rita.
Our scientists are not necessarily able to evaluate all of
these potential problems as well as we would like them to be
able to do it. The Marine Mammal Commission has a concern that
very often we initiate some of these activities without
collecting adequate baseline information so that we can conduct
before and after statements or evaluations of the effects.
We also are concerned that monitoring and mitigation
measures may be used for certain aspects of oil and gas
activities like seismic studies, but that those monitoring and
mitigation measures aren't always effective. They need to be
evaluated more closely. We need more research in order to
understand how well those measures actually work. As a
consequence of the uncertainty in these, sometimes regulators
are faced to make choices based on insufficient information.
Last, I will say that you asked me to talk about minimizing
the effects or the impacts of oil and gas operations, and I
will give you just three brief suggestions.
One is that we need to consider where we get resources and
who should take the burden of proof for doing the kinds of
research we need to understand these. I would recommend that
the government consider leveraging resources from the industry
in order to understand the resources that they put at risk with
their activities.
Second, I would recommend that we need a much more
systematic approach to how we manage oil and gas management.
Many of the problems that we are talking about here I think
could be detected and dealt with if we were more rigorous and
systematic in our approach.
And, finally, I would say that I believe we need to
consider a change in culture. We all want to know what went
wrong and how to fix it, but we also should be asking what
conditions led to things going so horribly wrong. Multiple
agencies are involved, and all of us agencies should be asking
is there something we could do better.
And last, society I think also must take a hard look. We
need to examine the roots of the problem that caused us to make
risky decisions related to industries like this. Doing so is
essential to achieve a sustainable future with acceptable
environmental risk for marine mammals and for a marine
ecosystem.
Thank you again, Madam Chair, for inviting me to testify,
and I will be glad to answer any questions that I can.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Ragen follows:]
Statement of Timothy J. Ragen, Executive Director,
U.S. Marine Mammal Commission
Madam Chairwoman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
inviting the Marine Mammal Commission to testify on the effects of the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill on marine mammals. I am Tim Ragen,
Executive Director of the Commission. Your questions to the Commission
pertain to the effects of this spill and how to prevent such effects in
the future.
I begin my testimony by noting that our current understanding of
the effects of oil on marine mammals is in many respects rudimentary
because of the difficulty and costs of studying the health of marine
mammals at sea, particularly during an oil spill. Our understanding is
based primarily on anecdotal information from other spills such as the
Santa Barbara spill in 1969 and the Exxon Valdez spill in 1989, as well
as a small number of focused studies involving captive animals. In
addition, much of the existing information pertains to pinnipeds (i.e.,
seals, sea lions) and sea otters, which do not occur in the Gulf of
Mexico. Unfortunately, the scientific foundation for evaluating the
potential effects of the Deepwater Horizon spill on many marine mammals
inhabiting the Gulf is weak. Almost all of those are cetaceans (whales,
dolphins and porpoises), the exception being the manatee. However,
there is considerable information on the effects of oil on other
mammals, such as laboratory rodents and humans, so that information can
be used to help anticipate how oil might affect the Gulf's marine
mammals.
Short and Long-Term Effects
Your first question to the Commission asked about the short- and
long-term effects of the Deepwater Horizon spill on marine mammals. The
potential short-term effects include those that result from direct
contact with or ingestion of oil or inhalation of oil fumes. Direct
contact of a marine mammal with oil may cause skin irritation,
inflammation, and eventually necrosis. However, the limited information
available from field observations and studies with captive dolphins
suggests that the epidermis of at least some cetaceans may be highly
resistant to such effects. The Commission knows of no studies of
cetaceans exposed to oil for extended periods (i.e., days or weeks), so
the long-term consequences of skin contact with oil are not clear at
this point. Oil contact with eyes, mucous membranes, and respiratory
tissues may cause more important effects. For example, harbor seals
oiled by the Exxon Valdez spill developed conjunctivitis, and similar
responses can reasonably be expected in cetaceans. Contact with
respiratory tissues coupled with inhalation of fumes appears to have
caused airway inflammation and pulmonary emphysema in sea otters, and,
here too, a similar response can reasonably be expected in cetaceans.
Cetaceans also may ingest oil either indirectly as they consume prey or
the prey itself may be contaminated. Manatees may ingest oil if it
reaches the shallow waters of their range and coats the vegetation that
they depend on for food. And if Bryde's whales or other baleen whales
(although uncommon in the Gulf of Mexico) encounter oil, their feeding
may be affected by fouling of their baleen (the comb-like array of
keratinous plates they use to filter food from sea water). Some amount
of ingestion may be tolerable but, depending on the amount and nature
of the oil ingested (e.g., its composition, toxicity) and the animal
involved (e.g., species, animal health and condition), ingestion may
cause significant effects on vital systems (e.g., immune, reproduction,
digestive) and organs (e.g., liver, kidneys, brain) ranging from
generalized illness to death. Studies using captive polar bears showed
that ingestion of even relatively small amounts led to kidney failure
and death. Even when the immediate effects appear to be or are
sublethal, they may affect the health and condition of animals and
their ability to reproduce, with consequences for population status.
Similarly, apparently sublethal effects may lead to long-term problems
if, for example, the contaminants from the oil or dispersant are
carcinogenic.
To date, the existing evidence suggests that at least some
cetaceans are able to detect the oil, but they do not necessarily move
away from it to avoid contact, inhalation, or ingestion. In previous
small spills in the Gulf of Mexico, bottlenose dolphins have been
observed moving under booms and surfacing and feeding in the oil. In
fact, given the vast area affected by the spill, marine mammals that
typically inhabit the central and eastern portions of the northern Gulf
may not be able to avoid contact at the surface or in the water column.
Their tolerance to oil, weathered oil, or dispersed oil likely depends
on numerous factors such as its composition and toxicity, amount
encountered, duration of contact, foraging patterns and physiology of
the species involved, and health and condition of the affected
individuals. In general, the more toxic components of spilled oil also
are the more volatile and they tend to evaporate more quickly. After a
short-lived spill, the period of exposure to those volatile components
may be relatively brief. However, in a prolonged, continuous spill like
the Deepwater Horizon, marine life in the spill area, including marine
mammals and their prey, may be exposed to the more volatile components
of the oil for days, weeks, or longer. Individuals in poor health or
condition, or that are otherwise stressed may be more vulnerable to
such effects (e.g., pregnant females that already are taxed
physiologically may be less able to complete a pregnancy successfully).
At this time of year, bottlenose dolphins are calving in coastal areas,
which may add to their risk.
Cetaceans in the Gulf also may be affected by response activities.
Large amounts of dispersants have been used, some of which have been
applied in relatively new ways (i.e., at the ruptured wellhead), and
EPA and the Coast Guard have directed British Petroleum (BP) to reduce
the volume of dispersants used due to toxicity concerns. Scientists
will gather evidence where they can, but may never be able to describe
just how these dispersants affected the regional marine ecosystem,
including marine mammals.
Response activities also have included and likely will continue to
include a large number of vessels and aircraft in addition to the
relatively high levels of activity characteristic of this region for
decades. All of these vessels and aircraft may disturb animals by their
presence and noise. Here, the primary concern involves behavioral
effects, although ship strikes (i.e., collisions of ships and whales)
also are possible when vessels are moving at relatively high speeds,
and animals may be entangled in response-related debris left in the
water. Behavioral effects may include abandonment of important habitat,
changes in foraging distribution or patterns, changes in movement
patterns or migration, and disruption of social structures (e.g., pods,
mother-calf pairs).
Short-term ecological effects may occur if the spill reduces the
availability of prey species (e.g., fishes, various invertebrates)
either by killing them or altering their productivity or distribution.
In addition, cetaceans whose health or condition is compromised by the
spill may be more susceptible to disease or parasites.
Long-term effects may include lower abundance of animals in any
given population due to increased mortality or failure of reproduction
(including congenital defects in the next generation that were exposed
in utero), shifts or constriction in distribution, and negative impacts
to the health and condition of individual animals and populations. Such
changes will reflect the sum total of the immediate impacts of the
spill and spill response, and the impacts that persist because the
ecosystem has been altered through long-term contamination by oil and
dispersants, loss of prey, and physical alteration of inshore
ecosystems during response efforts (e.g., building of sand berms to
keep oil out of wetlands). The persistence of such effects will depend
on (1) the extent to which the oil released to the environment can be
removed or is weathered and degraded to non-toxic forms, (2) the
toxicity, persistence, and ecological effects of the dispersants, and
(3) the nature and rate of recovery of other components of the Gulf
ecosystems (e.g., prey populations). The complexity of the Gulf
ecosystem and the large amount of oil spilled over a prolonged period
may lead to an unprecedented variety, severity, and longevity of
effects in the Gulf. For example, it remains to be seen how the oil,
dispersants, and the products of their degradation interact with the
factors that create hypoxic zones and harmful algal blooms, which have
become important features of the northern Gulf ecosystem. At least
harmful algal blooms are known to have potentially severe effects on
marine mammals and other marine life. And, as marine scientists are
learning from long-term monitoring elsewhere, in at least some cases
highly perturbed marine ecosystems may take decades to fully recover,
or may recover to alternative states (e.g., Prince William Sound).
Finally, all the above short- and long-term changes may be
particularly significant for species or stocks listed as endangered or
threatened (e.g., Florida manatee, sperm whale) or stocks with low
abundance (e.g., inshore coastal bottlenose dolphins, Bryde's whales).
Assessment of Effects
The second question you asked the Commission to address is whether
the effects of the spill and response activities can be fully assessed.
The Commission begins its response by noting that the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Fish and Wildlife Service,
the Gulf states, and a range of cooperating agencies are working
diligently to assess effects to the extent possible. They are
coordinating stranding teams to search for and respond to stranded
marine mammals. They also are flying surveys to document the observed
number of animals by species, their distribution, and their
interactions with oil. They are attempting to biopsy animals in the
field to assess important biological information (e.g., contaminant
levels). In addition, they have prepared to receive marine mammals in
need of rehabilitation and to conduct necropsies and other analyses of
animals found dead to determine cause of death. Thirty-three marine
mammal carcasses had been found at the time this testimony was
prepared.
All that being said, it will still be extremely difficult to assess
the full effects of this spill because the needed information is
difficult to collect on marine mammals in the wild, and because
sufficient baseline information is lacking for most stocks. According
to stock assessment reports prepared by NOAA (and described in the
Marine Mammal Commission's 2008 annual report), the Gulf of Mexico is
habitat for 21 marine mammal species comprising 58 stocks. NOAA has
``adequate'' abundance estimates, that is, abundance estimates that
meet the agency's own standards, for only 6 of those stocks, largely
because the resources needed to conduct such assessments have been
directed toward other priorities. Simply put, in all but a few cases,
the lack of adequate pre-spill information will hamper a detailed
assessment of changes in stock status, including the most basic
information on changes in abundance. The agencies will need to find
alternative means for assessing the effects, but the utility of those
alternative measures remains to be seen. This is particularly
unfortunate because the changes that occur in marine mammal populations
might otherwise have served as useful indicators of the health and
recovery of the northern Gulf ecosystem over time. There are exceptions
to this rule because the Minerals Management Service and NOAA have
conducted extensive studies on one species (e.g., the sperm whale; see
Jochens et al. 2008 \1\) and also have supported some surveys for the
cetaceans in the region. Similarly, the Fish and Wildlife Service and
the state of Florida have conducted extensive studies on the Florida
manatee. However, on balance, the information needed to characterize
baseline conditions for the remaining stocks is limited. For that
reason, it may be the most informative to focus comparisons on those
few stocks for which scientists have the best information (e.g., sperm
whale, manatee, several bottlenose dolphin stocks). However, there is
no basis for assuming that those few well-studied stocks are
representative of the others, as Gulf marine mammals exhibit a variety
of life history and natural history traits (e.g., preferred prey,
foraging depths), occupy different ranges and ecological niches, and
will have been affected in varying ways and to varying degrees by the
spill.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Jochens, A., D. Biggs, K. Benoit-Bird, D. Engelhaupt, J.
Gordon, C. Hu, N. Jaquet, M. Johnson, R. Leben, B. Mate, P. Miller, J.
Ortega-Ortiz, A. Thode, P. Tyack, and B. Wursig. 2008. Sperm Whale
Seismic Study in the Gulf of Mexico: Synthesis Report. U.S. Department
of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, Gulf of Mexico OCS
Region, New Orleans, LA. OCS Study MMS 2008-006. 348 pp.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the absence of better information, those responsible for
assessment of effects may err in at least two basic ways. First, they
may find dead animals and mistakenly attribute their deaths to the
spill when, in fact, that is not the case. Scientists were on the verge
of making this mistake with gray whales after the Santa Barbara spill
in 1969 and the Exxon Valdez spill in 1989, when they initially assumed
all stranded whales had stranded as a result of contact with oil.
Second, observers will undoubtedly fail to encounter all of the
affected marine mammals, as some are likely to die and sink--their loss
being neither detected nor documented. This second type of error may
well explain the loss of killer whales in the Prince William Sound area
after the Exxon Valdez spill. Thus, any counts of dead animals may well
underestimate the total number lost. The counts may be adjusted by
applying a correction factor, but the basis for choosing such a factor
is not clear. Here, again, it is worth noting that scientists were able
to detect the loss of killer whales after the Exxon Valdez spill
because they had gathered sufficient baseline information prior to the
spill; in that case, the photo-documentation of individual whales. It
is also worth noting that after virtually all such events, scientists
have decried the general lack of baseline information but much of that
information has not been collected before another event is upon us.
Likely Impacts of Oil and Gas Activities in the Gulf and Elsewhere
Your third question pertained to the likely impacts of oil and gas
activities on marine mammals in the Gulf and elsewhere. The impacts of
oil and gas activities can be considered in six main categories, as
follows.
Construction and decommissioning of infrastructure
(e.g., platforms, pipelines) may disturb marine mammals by the
presence, activities, and noise of multiple vessels and
aircraft, and by the removal of some structures using
explosives. These activities are relatively short-lived and the
effects of their disturbance reasonably can be considered
transient and can be held to insignificant levels if
appropriate mitigation measures are taken to avoid adverse
effects on marine mammals and other marine life.
Seismic studies are vital to oil and gas operations
in the marine environment and pose a number of potentially
significant risks to marine mammals. They are required to
locate and evaluate oil and gas reservoirs, study the
surrounding seafloor, site offshore infrastructure (e.g.,
production platforms, wind turbines), guide drilling
operations, and assess changes in reservoirs over time as
production proceeds. The primary risk they pose to marine
mammals is from the introduction of high intensity, pulsed
noise (airguns) into the marine environment. The noise from
seismic survey sound sources has been shown in some
circumstances to cause significant behavioral effects (e.g.,
changes in bowhead migratory paths) and has the potential to
cause physiological effects (e.g., hearing impairment and, at
least hypothetically, development of gas emboli due to changes
in dive behavior). On average, a dozen or more seismic surveys
are conducted in the Gulf each month. The above-cited study by
Jochens et al. (2008) suggests seismic studies have only
limited effects on sperm whales (i.e., what appear to be
relatively minor changes in foraging behavior). However, the
existing evidence is not sufficient to conclude that seismic
studies have no significant effects on other species. This
topic is a matter of considerable scientific discussion at
present.
General operations (drilling and oil/gas extraction)
are usually less disruptive once they have begun if they are
carried out without major incidents. Sightings of marine
mammals near production platforms suggest that at least some
marine mammal species tolerate or habituate to the presence of
oil and gas infrastructure and activities and, in fact, may be
attracted to them because they often provide habitat for other
marine life.
Support activities involve vessel trips or helicopter
flights to and from platforms to change crews, provide
supplies, and remove wastes. These activities also pose risks
of disturbance because of the amount of activity involved and
the noise created. Vessel traffic also poses a risk of vessel
strikes that may injure or kill marine mammals. Here, too, the
existing scientific information is not sufficient to
characterize the effects of support activities on marine mammal
stocks with confidence.
Oil and gas transportation requires the use of
vessels and/or pipelines to move crude oil and gas from the
drill site to refineries. Tanker accidents have been a leading
cause of oil spills in the marine environment. Pipelines appear
to be considerably safer, but are not without risks themselves,
as observed in 2005 when hurricanes Katrina and Rita destroyed
a large number of pipeline segments in the Gulf.
Habitat degradation and contamination may occur as a
result of multiple activities or events. Drilling generates
muds and cuttings that often, but not always, are injected back
into the ground. These muds may introduce heavy metals and
other toxic materials into the marine ecosystem. Vessels that
visit or are stationed at platforms may cause spillage of fuels
or other petroleum-based products that, unless completely
recovered, may add to nearby contamination. As all of us have
just been soundly reminded, drilling operations do fail on
occasion, leading to severe consequences. As described earlier
in my testimony, the release of large amounts of oil in the
marine environment poses a number of risks to marine mammals.
At present, scientists are not fully capable of measuring all of
the above effects. In many instances, the Commission believes that oil
and gas operations are initiated before adequate study to characterize
the potentially affected environment, its biological community, and its
natural variation over time and space. Monitoring and mitigation
measures may be employed, but almost always those measures are of
limited utility and their shortcomings are not adequately described.
Developing better measures is technically challenging, and progress has
been slowed by lack of resources. The result is that regulators often
are faced with uncertainty and must make assumptions and judgments that
should be better informed.
Minimizing the Impacts of Oil and Gas Operations
Your final question sought advice on how the impacts of oil and gas
operations on marine mammals and marine ecosystems might be minimized.
I consider this question to be the most important. I will focus on
three considerations: resources and the burden of proof; a more
systematic approach to oil and gas management; and the need for a
change in culture.
Resources and the Burden of Proof--The lack of information on
marine mammals in the Gulf of Mexico is an impediment to management
and, in this case, assessment of the effects of the spill. Even basic
abundance estimates for most marine mammal stocks in the Gulf are out
of date, unacceptably imprecise, or simply don't exist. The federal
government should explore opportunities to leverage resources of the
private sector for the purpose of assessing the elements of those
ecosystems that they are placing at risk. That exploration should
include a hard look at the fundamental question of what responsibility
those exploiting marine energy resources have to support studies of the
ecosystems that they are placing at risk rather than waiting until an
accident occurs to then attempt such analyses retrospectively. In the
Commission's view, these companies not only bear the fiscal burden of
demonstrating that their technologies are safe for use in the marine
environment, but should support environmental research.
A More Systematic Approach to Oil and Gas Management--It appears
that some of the lessons from previous spills have not been heeded and
that a more systematic and rigorous evaluation of such projects is
needed. The following problems exemplify the lack of rigor in our
management process.
Baseline information: As noted earlier, agencies have
not collected the baseline information needed to (1) evaluate
the resources at risk from oil and gas development and (2)
assess the effects of a significant problem such as this spill.
This was one of the major lessons derived from the Exxon Valdez
spill in 1989.
Monitoring and mitigation: Monitoring and mitigation
measures are inadequate for many aspects of oil and gas
production related to marine mammal protection. Federal
agencies need to implement a systematic, well-considered
strategy for evaluating and improving such measures over time.
Response measures: The nature of response efforts to
stop the Deepwater Horizon spill suggests the need for improved
preparation for a serious accident at depth. Agencies must
improve planning and capability for responding swiftly and
effectively to a failure at such depth.
Worst-case scenarios: Risk management requires
accounting not only for the probability of a major spill, but
also for the consequences if one occurs. Potentially
catastrophic consequences must be considered even if the
probability that they will occur is low. Proper assessment of
risks requires recognition that they are a function both of
probability and consequences.
These are just a few of the key areas for improvement related to
oil and gas operations revealed by this tragic event. Clearly, a much
more systematic and rigorous review is needed to improve oversight of
the activities of the oil and gas industry in the marine environment
and to minimize the probability and effects of such events in the
future.
A Change in Culture--Finally, the Commission believes that all
involved agencies and parties need to ask what went wrong in this
particular case. Clearly, everyone is awaiting more specific
information so that the immediate problems can be corrected. But
responsible parties also must ask what conditions allowed things to go
awry in so many ways. For example, multiple agencies are involved in
reviewing matters related to offshore oil and gas exploration,
development, and production, including the Marine Mammal Commission.
The Commission believes that all agencies need to take a hard look to
determine if and where our efforts might have fallen short.
Furthermore, society needs to consider how to respond to this
tragedy. Our society has known for decades that fossil fuels are a
diminishing resource, and our current dependence on them is not
sustainable. But because of our dependence on fossil fuels, society, or
its agencies, may be driven to take risks that otherwise would not be
acceptable. To create management systems that truly minimize the risks
of events like this oil spill, society also needs to examine and
address the roots of the problem--that is, the underlying factors that
drive us to make risky decisions. Doing so is essential to achieve a
sustainable future with acceptable environmental risks and a
correspondingly secure future for marine mammals and marine ecosystems.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I will do my
best to answer any questions you may have.
______
Response to questions submitted for the record by Timothy J. Ragen,
Executive Director, Marine Mammal Commission
Questions from Chairwoman Madeleine Z. Bordallo (D-GU)
1. Do NOAA and the Fish and Wildlife Service have access to data on
marine mammal incidental take during oil and gas activities or
is it solely managed by MMS? When will it be published or
publicly available?
The answer to this question varies by geographic region. With one
exception, oil and gas operators in the Gulf of Mexico generally opt
not to apply for or obtain incidental take authorizations under the
Marine Mammal Protection Act. In the Gulf, oil and gas operations may
result in the taking of cetaceans from 21 species (i.e., sperm whale,
dwarf sperm whale, pygmy sperm whale, Bryde's whale, killer whale,
false killer whale, pygmy killer whale, Cuvier's beaked whale,
Blainville's beaked whale, Gervais' beaked whale, Atlantic spotted
dolphin, pantropical spotted dolphin, striped dolphin, spinner dolphin,
rough-toothed dolphin, bottlenose dolphin, Clymene dolphin, Frasier's
dolphin, Risso's dolphin, melon-headed whale, short-finned pilot whale)
comprising 58 stocks. They may also take the single sirenian species in
the Gulf, the Florida manatee. The reasons that operators do not
routinely apply for and obtain incidental taking authorizations to
include at least the species most likely to be encountered are unclear
to the Commission. The exception to this pattern is that oil and gas
operators have obtained authorizations to take marine mammals
incidental to explosive removal of platforms and related structures.
The applicable regulations are codified at 50 C.F.R. Sec. 216.221 et
seq. Section 216.217 sets forth several monitoring and reporting
requirements that provide NOAA with data on the taking of marine
mammals incidental to removal activities. In 2009 a total of 120
reports were submitted to the Galveston Laboratory (National Marine
Fisheries Service) for removal activities. These reports are not
published but are available to the public.
NOAA and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and
Enforcement (formerly Minerals Management Service) are working toward
implementing the incidental take provisions of the Marine Mammal
Protection Act (section 101(a)(5)) for other oil and gas operations in
the Gulf of Mexico \1\. It is not yet clear when authorizations will be
sought or issued, but it is expected such authorizations will include
monitoring and reporting requirements sufficient to provide useful data
on the types and levels of incidental taking that occur. Once
authorizations are issued and reports submitted, that information would
be available for public review.
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\1\ The Bureau also may initiate section 7 consultation under the
Endangered Species Act for listed species (e.g., sperm whale), which
might result in the issuance of an incidental take authorization under
that Act and the establishment of other reporting requirements.
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Although oil and gas operators in the Gulf of Mexico do not
generally obtain authorizations under the Marine Mammal Protection Act,
the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement
consults with the NOAA and the Fish and Wildlife Service \2\ to develop
``Notices to Lessees.'' Those notices establish the requirements for
various aspects of oil and gas operations designed to protect marine
resources, including marine mammals. The four notices most pertinent to
protecting marine mammals establish requirements for oil and gas spill
response plans, management and disposal of debris, mitigation measures
and observer programs applicable to seismic studies, and avoidance of
vessel strikes. The latter two require operators to report marine
mammal sightings and observed behavior to the Bureau, which enters them
into a database and sends the information to NOAA's National Marine
Fisheries Service. However, the information sent to NOAA is in summary
form and applies only to species listed under the Endangered Species
Act (i.e., the sperm whale). Therefore, it does not provide a
sufficient basis for determining the number of takes for most marine
mammal species. That information is not published but is available to
the public.
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\2\ In the Gulf of Mexico, the Fish and Wildlife Service has
authority only for manatees and, for most operations, the likelihood of
taking a manatee is exceedingly small.
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In Alaskan waters, the Bureau also uses Notices to Lessees to
establish requirements for oil and gas operations. However, oil and gas
operators conducting activities offshore of Alaska generally apply to
NOAA and/or the Fish and Wildlife Service for incidental take
authorizations associated with various operations (e.g., seismic
surveys, exploratory drilling). In Alaskan waters, oil and gas
operations may result in the taking of several marine mammal species,
including bowhead whales, beluga whales, narwhals, polar bears,
walruses, ringed seals, bearded seals, spotted seals, ribbon seals,
harbor seals, sea otters, killer whales, harbor porpoises, gray whales,
humpback whales, fin whales, and minke whales. As part of the
authorization process, operators are required first to estimate in
advance the anticipated take levels and then to assess the impact of
such taking on the affected species and stocks (i.e., as part of their
application) by monitoring their activities and reporting the actual
takes that occur. These reports are provided to NOAA and the Fish and
Wildlife Service and are available to the public upon request.
2. How has this data informed the Marine Mammal Protection Act
incidental take rulemaking process?
United States citizens (i.e., individuals, organizations,
corporations, or agencies) whose actions may take marine mammals
incidentally may apply for an authorization for such taking under
section 101(a)(5)(A) of the Marine Mammal Protection Act. That
provision requires rulemaking for each category of authorization, \3\
under which letters of authorization are issued to individual
operators. The intent of this provision is to ensure that the human
activities (e.g., oil and gas operations) do not (1) affect more than
small numbers of any marine mammal species or stock, (2) have more than
a negligible impact on that species or stock, and (3) have an
unmitigable adverse impact on the availability of those species or
stocks that are taken for subsistence uses in Alaska. In addition, the
process requires that NOAA or the Fish and Wildlife Service set forth
permissible methods of taking and other means of achieving the least
practicable adverse impact on the marine mammal species or stocks and
their habitat.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ A streamlined, notice and comment process is available under
section 101(a)(5)(D) for issuing incidental harassment authorizations
for activities that will take marine mammals by harassment only.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ability of managers and scientists to make the above
determinations may be confounded by uncertainty in the data collected
to estimate and characterize the level and significance of takes. That
is, the two key questions are how many marine mammals are taken in the
course of an activity and what is the biological significance of those
takes. The same two questions can confound management of other human
activities in the marine environment (e.g., use of Navy sonar,
commercial shipping, seismic surveys for geophysical study).
To address those questions, NOAA and the Fish and Wildlife Service,
working with other interested agencies, including agencies whose
actions may take or authorize others to engage in activities that take
marine mammals, are seeking means to reduce or avoid effects on marine
mammals and to better estimate their significance, a process essential
to informed management. Although this is an ongoing process, the
information currently being collected from oil and gas activities in
the Gulf of Mexico is not adequate for that purpose. First, although
the reports required under the Notices to Lessees secure information
for all marine mammals sighted, the information transmitted to NOAA is
only for listed species (i.e., the sperm whale). Second, lessees only
report what they observe. There is no attempt to account for animals
that may have been in the area or may have been taken but were not
observed. Third, the reports do not discuss the potential significance
of observed interactions on the species or their habitat (i.e., they do
not necessarily meet the Marine Mammal Protection Act standard that
takes have no more than a negligible impact and be mitigated so that
they have the least practicable impact). In view of these shortcomings,
the Commission does not believe that the data currently being collected
from oil and gas activities in the Gulf of Mexico are sufficient for
informing and improving the incidental take authorization process.
Given the large number of operations in the Gulf, the most effective
means for addressing these shortcomings and for assessing the
cumulative impacts of these multiple activities may be through a
coordinated mitigation, monitoring, and reporting program established
under a programmatic authorization process. In contrast, the data
collected in the course of oil and gas activities in Alaskan waters are
more comprehensive and are analyzed more fully. Those data provide some
basis for informing and improving the incidental take authorization
process, which is currently lacking in the Gulf of Mexico.
To provide similar improvements for activities in the Gulf of
Mexico, the joint efforts by NOAA and the Bureau to implement the
incidental take provisions of the Marine Mammal Protection Act should
be expedited to the extent possible. That process should provide
substantially better information on the marine mammal species taken,
the approximate number of takes, and the biological significance of
those takes.
______
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Dr. Ragen, for all of
your recommendations and to all of the witnesses this morning.
You have given us a better insight in this catastrophe, and the
Members here of the Committee will be asking questions.
I will begin with myself. I have a few questions. There is
a time limit again for all of us, so we are going to have to
get through this. But my first is for Mr. Westerholm.
It is my understanding that some autonomous underwater
vehicles are being used currently to collect data on oxygen
levels, salinity changes and oil presence in the Gulf. Have you
found this data helpful, and do you have a long-term plan to
continue to use these gliders to monitor the impacts of the
spill?
Mr. Westerholm. Yes. We will be using a number of tools,
and gliders are one of those tools. Some of them have the
capability to actually collect samples and bring those samples
up.
Those gliders will help us determine a number of things. We
are able to look at many of the subsurface elements that you
spoke of, and we will continue to do those, but also continue
to use other measurement techniques to get as much information
as we can.
Ms. Bordallo. I have a few more questions, and in the
interest of time if you could just give me a yes or a no?
Mr. Westerholm. Absolutely.
Ms. Bordallo. All right. As you know, NOAA's Office of
Response and Restoration has been severely underfunded for the
past several years and, as a result, had to initiate a
stringent workforce structuring plan to downsize your
operations. Did this downsizing impair NOAA's ability to
respond to the Deepwater Horizon spill?
Mr. Westerholm. Yes.
Ms. Bordallo. Have you had to hire an additional technical
staff to restore its capabilities?
Mr. Westerholm. We have. We have actually brought some
people back from retirement and gone to other areas the best we
could for the spill.
Ms. Bordallo. All right. Considering the fact that NOAA
responds to roughly 200 spill events a year, does NOAA
presently have the capability to respond to another spill if it
happened say tomorrow?
Mr. Westerholm. We would do the best we can, but all of my
resources are down at the spill right now.
Ms. Bordallo. All right. In order to be better prepared and
prepositioned to respond, should NOAA also receive an annual
appropriation from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund just like
other Federal agencies, including the Coast Guard and the EPA?
And I am sure you will say yes to that.
Mr. Westerholm. I would certainly say that that would be a
consideration of the Administration, but obviously if we did we
would use that money to enhance the staff.
Ms. Bordallo. Very good. All right. And I have one for Ms.
Lyder. BP was granted a categorical exclusion last year,
allowing the rig to be approved without environmental analysis
that would usually be required under the National Environmental
Policy Act.
What is the status of the review by CEQ and the Department
of the Interior to strengthen the guidance given to agencies
about when or when they should not use exclusions?
Ms. Lyder. That review is very much ongoing now. It is not
complete yet. They are looking at that particular categorical
exclusion. They are also looking at it in the context of the
overall investigation that they are doing in Louisiana on the
spill.
Ms. Bordallo. All right.
Ms. Lyder. So all I can tell you is it is ongoing.
Ms. Bordallo. All right. And MMS issued hundreds of
drilling permits for projects in the Gulf of Mexico, without
obtaining Federal permits detailing how energy exploration
could affect endangered species or marine mammals.
How can we ensure that the scientific advice of other
Federal agencies is given appropriate consideration before the
Interior Department approves permits? For example, should we
require formal consultation? Should other Federal agencies be
required to certify a permit?
Ms. Lyder. I can assure you that that process is being
reviewed and possibly changed right now.
Part of what happened was that because a catastrophic oil
spill was viewed as very unlikely because we hadn't seen a
catastrophic oil spill from a rig since the late 1960s, that
was part of the analysis, but now we have seen a catastrophic
oil spill and so the consultation process will change.
Ms. Bordallo. All right. Also, Ms. Lyder, should the
Environmental Contaminants Program in the Fish and Wildlife
Service also receive an annual appropriation from the Oil Spill
Liability Trust Fund to be better prepared to respond to
spills?
Ms. Lyder. Well, I will ditto the answer of my friend from
NOAA. It is certainly something that should be considered and,
if it was, we would use it much the way NOAA would use theirs;
but that is a decision for the Administration.
Ms. Bordallo. Ms. Westerholm, I have one more question
before my time is running here. Baseline information for whales
and dolphins in the Gulf of Mexico are sorely limited.
According to the Marine Mammal Commission, abundance
estimates for only three of the 24 stocks listed in the
National Marine Fisheries Services stock assessment reports
meet the Service's own standards for acceptable precision. How
then will NMFS determine what changes occur as a result of the
oil spill in population, size, distribution and habitat use?
Mr. Westerholm. Obviously, based on just your explanation,
it is going to be very challenging and difficult to do that. I
am not sure we will be able to get an exact answer to that. We
will obviously do the best we can.
Ms. Bordallo. If you could get back if you have an answer?
Mr. Westerholm. I will.
Ms. Bordallo. All right. Thank you very much. I will now
defer to the Ranking Member, Mr. Cassidy, for any questions he
may have.
Mr. Cassidy. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Westerholm, was
any work done, to your knowledge, prior to this incident,
looking at the effect of dispersants when used in ultra-deep or
deep drilling?
Mr. Westerholm. To my knowledge, that has not been done.
This was a technique that had been spoken about, but had not
been done in the United States.
Mr. Cassidy. Now, has anybody done, to your knowledge or
anyone else's knowledge, any study of the effects of the
ecosystem of the deepwater? For example, we have oil coming out
5,000 feet below sea level. Has anybody done any work on that
effect prior to this incident?
Mr. Westerholm. Again, I would say that you would break
that into two categories. One, how to respond to deep well
release. Certainly some of that was speculative. We don't have
a lot of experience in this country, but other parts of the
world that has happened.
The second is what impact that might have on the biological
and ecosystem and, again, that research has been very limited
because of the limited number of spills that have happened.
Mr. Cassidy. Now, I guess one of my concerns is as I
prepared for this or as I have kind of worked this, this is
something from the National Research Council of the National
Academies Oil in the Sea III, and in 2003 they published this
calling upon NOAA, MMS and Coast Guard to study these issues.
I guess I am wondering now, in 2010, why in the heck did
those agencies, and obviously you can't answer. You are not the
head of the show, but can you postulate why recommendations
were made and totally apparently ignored, which would have been
tremendous to have now?
Mr. Westerholm. You know, I can say that there are several
recommendations, having some familiarity with that book and
some past experience in the Coast Guard, that some actually
were not ignored and obviously some action was taken, but again
limited research funding, as well as the ability to run
specific tests on dispersants and other activities was
challenging.
Mr. Cassidy. Now, don't I know that in Norway they have
actually done deepwater releases of oil and they have looked at
the effects of that oil in the water column and presumably how
to deal with that? Why can the Norwegians do it and we cannot?
Mr. Westerholm. Well, I would defer to my colleagues at EPA
and others, and a lot of that goes back to the regulations in
place to allow us to actually release oil and do studies on
release.
We can do it in certain test tanks. There is one in New
Jersey. But I will say that we have sent people over to Norway
to observe their test and work with them over the years.
Mr. Cassidy. OK. I will just tell you as a person from
Louisiana who is terribly upset over this, I am also terribly
upset that recommendations made in 2003 in advance of deepwater
drilling have been totally ignored. Not totally, but apparently
substantially ignored because we are trying to figure out now
what dispersants do with the deepwater.
Dr. Ragen, you mentioned the effects of oil upon marine
mammals, but you are speaking specifically of oil I gather, and
that is really not the issue here. What we are speaking of is
highly dispersed hydrocarbons, which in the so-called plume are
still measured in parts per million is my understanding, but it
otherwise looks like oil.
Any thoughts about that? How would you apply your
testimony, if you will, to this very dispersed hydrocarbon and,
by the way, also low sulphur, relatively light crude, relative
to, I gather, what was spilled in Alaska, which was heavy
crude?
Dr. Ragen. I would say that we have virtually no
information on how these plumes and oil in the midwater column
affect marine mammals. It remains to be seen what the actual
composition of that is, and how long it persists, and how long
it would affect the marine mammals that are there.
Probably our main concern would be its effect on the
ecosystem, which may change the availability of prey for marine
mammals, et cetera. If these kinds of plumes have significant
effects on production in the ecosystem or the transfer of
energy through the trophic food web then I would expect that
the marine mammals would suffer the consequences of that, but I
am speculating right now because we just don't have that kind
of information.
Mr. Cassidy. So your testimony was more on the direct
effects of oil, as opposed to highly dispersed hydrocarbons?
Dr. Ragen. Correct. We don't know how----
Mr. Cassidy. I am almost out of time. Let me grab the
Secretary for just a second. Secretary Barham, man. If there is
anybody who has been an effective point person in protecting
the fish and wildlife of Louisiana, it has been you. You and
the Governor and Billy Nungesser have done a standout job.
Now, clearly you are heart and soul. You can introduce
yourself to each other. You grew up in Houma, despite that
north Louisiana accent so he says. I don't know if it is true.
What would be your opinion about the six-month moratorium that
is being suggested by the Administration?
What would be the impact of that? Knowing that you
represent the fisheries, what is your opinion on that and its
potential impact upon coastal Louisiana?
Mr. Barham. Well, the entire culture of south Louisiana is
dependent on both oil and fisheries. We have worked hand in
hand for generations, and it is part of the complex that make
up our culture along the coast.
We want to provide the energy that America desperately
needs, well managed. It is a part of a good system in
Louisiana. But we also have to do the things it takes to be
sure that we never have an occurrence like this again.
Mr. Cassidy. OK. I yield back.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank the gentleman from Louisiana, the
Ranking Member, and will now go to Members for questions. I
would ask the witnesses if they could make their answers as
concise as possible, since we do have two more panels to hear.
Next I would like to recognize the gentleman from New
Mexico, Mr. Lujan, for any questions.
Mr. Lujan. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. And again as
we begin, our prayers are with the families that have been
impacted and those that had their lives tragically taken as
well.
My first question is for Ms. Lyder. It is my understanding
that MMS has categorically excluded exploration and drilling
plans from environmental review. Picking up with some of the
questions asked by our Ranking Member about the impact of oil
on ecosystems, does MMS still consult with other Federal
agencies on these drilling plans such as the one BP was
operating under when the spill happened? If not, how do the
drilling plan evade such consultation?
Ms. Lyder. Well, first, I want to point out that I am not
in the part of the Department that manages MMS so I don't know
that I can give you a direct answer on those, but I do know
that that process is being reviewed.
I do know that when a company presents an exploration plan,
there is a process of review that involves other agencies. I
don't know about the specific actions under that exploration
plan.
Mr. Lujan. Is Fish and Wildlife consulted in these areas?
Ms. Lyder. Yes, Fish and Wildlife Service is consulted.
Mr. Lujan. So in that area has there been activity through
Fish and Wildlife to understand the impacts?
Ms. Lyder. Well, as I said earlier, the plan that was
presented to the Fish and Wildlife Service presented a
catastrophic oil spill as a very, very unlikely scenario and so
it was evaluated in that capacity, and we now know that that
isn't true and that is part of the problem.
Mr. Lujan. Mr. Westerholm, a 2003 report by the National
Research Council predicted that the oil in a deepwater blowout
could break into fine droplets, forming plumes of oil mixed
with water, that would not quickly rise to the surface.
Why, then, are we apparently unprepared to manage the
current situation, and why did NOAA's Office of Response and
Restoration appear to be unprepared for this type of spill
event?
Mr. Westerholm. I will break that answer into two parts.
One would be what we would expect, and I think you are
absolutely right. Some of the oil will strip off as it comes up
from the bottom, in this case over a mile. Some of the smaller
particles will stay in residence in that water column for some
period of time.
Our initial evaluation of that, we have sent out a number
of ships and we are looking for more information, but our
initial evaluation obviously is showing it in the parts per
million and parts per trillion in a couple samples. We will
certainly have more. That is not to say that even at that level
there isn't a concern, but there is no ability to pick it up at
that level. It is not like the oil you can pick up off the
surface.
The second would be the ability to be prepared for that.
Part of the answer I spoke of earlier is some of the things
that we obviously would be doing if we were funded at a
different level, and that would be three-dimensional modeling
and the ability to do some of this.
Mr. Lujan. Is NOAA in a position today to release their
validated results of the damage assessment data to the public?
Mr. Westerholm. I may not have explained it very well, but
the damage assessment is a public process; and there will be a
time when, after the data is collected and quality control and
assured, that it will be released in a public forum. The public
is actually part of that restoration process.
Mr. Lujan. Are there any other trustees that are reluctant
to release this data, or is it NOAA's position that, once it
goes through this process that you describe, it will be
released?
Mr. Westerholm. It actually is a trustee council that makes
that decision of all the state and Federal trustees, as well as
any tribal representation, and they will make that decision.
Mr. Lujan. There was a comment by Sharon Gibson, who is a
Commerce Department spokeswoman, on an article on June 8 that
said that this information would be made available to the
public as soon as possible. However, we can't make the decision
unilaterally since the states are co-trustees of the Natural
Resource Damage Assessment process, and we are currently
working with the state partners.
So has there been any reluctance by states at this time
that you are aware of to furnish that information?
Mr. Westerholm. You know, not that I know of sitting here,
but certainly I can check on that.
Mr. Lujan. Mr. Secretary, is this the some information that
you stated you want to get out to the public as soon as
possible?
Mr. Barham. Obviously we would like to have information of
that type as rapidly as we could get it.
Mr. Lujan. Very good. I certainly hope that as soon as
possible and as early as possible, Mr. Westerholm, that we can
get this information.
It seems that as we are trying to assess what has happened
out there and to get an accurate account of the oil spill, and
especially with the plumes, that we need to get this damage
assessment--not only for underwater, but also with the impact
to our fisheries--with the people that have been displaced.
And with that, one of the responsibilities outlined and
mandated to NOAA is to make sure that they are getting a true
account of the impact of the recreation with fishing, with what
has happened to the economy, as well as the impacted people. Is
NOAA in any way working with the locally impacted people to
make sure that they are getting treated fairly by BP with
response to getting the money coming to them?
Mr. Westerholm. As far as the individuals, and let me break
that down real quickly. We are working. We are working with the
states. We are working with local citizens to get out
information certainly on the commercial fishing side and the
fisheries closures. Absolutely. We are working with those
communities.
There are people who have been injured--private citizens--
by BP, and their compensation would be going directly through
BP in the existing process.
We are also working with the fisheries councils and
fisheries management of all the states and the border where we
share our Federal waters with their state waters to make sure
that there is some consistency in determining fisheries
closures and reopenings and impacts.
In addition, the Department of Commerce is looking at small
business and the economic impact of the spill.
Mr. Lujan. The reason that I ask the question about the
damage assessment data, Madam Chair, is I seem to believe that
getting an accurate account of this information will help the
locally impacted people be able to make a stronger case for
reimbursement from BP, and that is why this information is so
critical.
Ms. Bordallo. Absolutely.
Mr. Lujan. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Ms. Bordallo. I agree. If the Members so desire, we can
have a second round of questions if you request it.
And now I would like to recognize the gentleman from
Virginia, Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Thank you,
members of the panel, for joining us. I want to expand on some
of the questions.
I am really concerned about the impact of this spill on
individuals. I spent 18 years in the area of seafood safety,
marine resource and water quality. I have lived it. I know many
folks in the Gulf that deal with seafood. I know the effect on
people's lives down there. I represent an area in the
Chesapeake Bay who is intimately tied to the water, to the
seafood resources there and to water quality, so I have a deep
affinity to what the folks in the Gulf are going through.
And I want to begin by this, asking Secretary Barham. I
know that Secretary Locke has declared a fishery disaster for
the region. Can you tell me your experience with fishery
disaster designations? How are they implemented? How effective
are they in getting dollars directly to fishermen, communities,
processors that are affected by this spill in the Gulf?
Mr. Barham. Congressman, our experience is that it is a
very slow process. It is not a response that adequately
addresses the need, the immediate need that is in the industry.
And it is not just you tend to think of just the fishermen
that are on the water, but, as you know, it is a whole ripple
effect up and down a chain from the processors to the ice
houses to the bait dealers, even to the restaurants that cater
to the recreational or commercial fishermen, even up to the
high end restaurants that serve the seafood.
So there will be a tremendous ripple effect through the
entire economy along the coastal areas of Louisiana, and it is
hard to find businesses that don't have some direct connection
to this industry. So it is such a long, slow, and laborious
process that oftentimes these people go broke before they get
relief.
Mr. Wittman. Mr. Secretary, I would agree with you. In
fact, I would say this; that there are a lot of relationships
between the Louisiana seafood industry and the seafood industry
up and down the East Coast. I can tell you Virginia seafood
dealers rely on Louisiana seafood dealers, so there will be a
ripple effect even outside the Gulf area.
Mr. Barham. I completely agree. Very similar to the
Chesapeake area and other areas up and down the eastern
seacoast.
Mr. Wittman. Absolutely. Mr. Westerholm, the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990 does have a mechanism there to hold the responsible
parties in line, to make sure that they get resources to help
those folks out that have been affected by these oil spills. I
am going to go back right to those coastal communities that are
going to be affected by this on a day-in and day-out basis and,
again, I have a deep affinity to coastal communities,
representing one.
Can you tell me where things are currently with that, what
the efforts are to get resources in a timely manner? These
people are not fishing right now, which means every day they
are not is a day of lost resources. And it is not as though
they can make that up in the future because fishing happens in
seasons, so this is lost income that they never get back.
Can you tell me where the process is to make sure that
those folks are being supported and being made whole through
this process?
Mr. Westerholm. I can certainly try to give you a quick
answer, but really that information lies with BP as the
responsible party and the National Incident Command and Admiral
Allen, who is monitoring the claims process.
But the claims that have been made, BP is providing all
that information to the Incident Command and the Coast Guard
for determining what claims have been requested, what claims
are processed, who has been injured. If indeed a claim has been
denied, that individual has the right to claim directly against
the fund, and the National Pollution Fund Center and the Coast
Guard would take care of that claim.
In addition, one of the things that you just spoke of, the
disaster declaration. In the event that it wasn't a claim that
was paid under the Fund, a supplemental request from the
Administration to that disaster declaration would assist those
fishermen and those communities.
Mr. Wittman. All right. Secretary Barham made a comment
earlier I want to expand upon. He was talking about how the
publicity from the spill is affecting the seafood market in
Louisiana that is not affected by the spill. I know exactly how
that works. If you hear something about the Gulf, even the
seafood that is coming out of there, sales go down because of
that.
Can you tell me what NOAA is doing through the National
Marine Fisheries Service to help with that, to get information
out about the seafood resource, to talk about the safety of the
seafood resource so that the commerce that is going on there
can continue? Because we know the potential for this whole
thing to shut down even those elements of the seafood industry
that are able to process seafood, that can do it safely and
provide a safe product.
Mr. Westerholm. Absolutely. That is a great question, and
the answer is twofold. One, we have closed those areas that
have been impacted by oil so that the areas that are considered
open, where fishing and seafood harvesting is still done, are
safe. Seafood coming from there would be safe, so someone would
be in violation of, obviously, going into a closed area.
The second is our seafood safety testing program, which is
designed to enhance the ability not only to reopen fisheries
but, during this time, to test fisheries to ensure the safety
of the seafood products going to market.
Mr. Wittman. Are you finding good coordination with the
Food and Drug Administration that also oversees seafood safety
and their ability to get the word out and to make sure that
people are aware of seafood safety there?
Mr. Westerholm. I know we are working closely with them and
the same entities within each of the various states in terms of
closing their fisheries and working with their health
officials. Beyond that, I can't speak to how that relationship
is working, but I know we are working on those issues.
Mr. Wittman. OK. Well, I would just urge you to make sure
that there is a coordinated effort between states and all the
Federal agencies that coordinate the issues with seafood
safety.
Madam Chairman, thank you so much. I yield back.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank the gentleman. And now I would like
to recognize the gentlelady from California, Ms. Capps.
Mrs. Capps. Thank you, Madam Chair. This topic today is
very critical, as you know.
As many of my colleagues know, I lived through the 1969 oil
spill in Santa Barbara, which is in the heart of my
congressional district. This was a major spill in terms of
ecological damage. The direct costs of that spill were enormous
and lasted a very long time, but it pales in comparison to what
we are seeing now in the waters and the wetlands in the Gulf.
I want to move quickly through a series of questions, if I
could, starting with you, Mr. Westerholm. Scientists are
scrambling to study the BP oil spill now, knowing that it is in
many ways a unique event. Never before has a leak from such
depths vented so much oil for so long. Scientists have many
questions.
Mr. Westerholm, in your testimony you say that one purpose
of the national contingency plan is to ensure access to science
related resources data and expertise to the NOAA response
teams. Some scientists that have received National Science
Foundation Quick Response grants to gauge the spill's
ecological effects say they are not getting full access to this
data.
My question is, how is NOAA ensuring that these response
teams, including scientists collecting data now in the Gulf,
have full access to all available NOAA data?
Mr. Westerholm. Well, certainly I would be very interested
in hearing from those scientists because we are committed to
getting them and the public the information as soon as
possible.
Mrs. Capps. So you are committed to getting that data out
to them as soon as possible?
Mr. Westerholm. Yes.
Mrs. Capps. That is good because scientists have been on
the front line of this disaster, and we all need their help,
their research in terms of how to move forward.
Now a question for both you and Ms. Lyder from the Interior
Department. Do NOAA and the Interior Department have the
current biological capacity and the biological manpower in the
Gulf to meet this escalating need?
Mr. Westerholm. I will speak first, and obviously this is a
continuing spill----
Mrs. Capps. Yes.
Mr. Westerholm [continuing]. And we have not stopped the
leak and it is ongoing.
Mrs. Capps. Yes.
Mr. Westerholm. So, as we stand right now, we have enough
labs and we are collecting enough specimens to begin to do
that, but obviously the system could be taxed if things
continue the way they are.
Ms. Lyder. My answer would be yes. The full Fish and
Wildlife Service is involved in this. We have scientists in the
Park Service. We have scientists at the U.S. Geological Survey.
We are using every bit of that resource, so yes.
Mrs. Capps. OK. Could you give the Subcommittee some early
thoughts on the kinds of future efforts that will be needed to
mitigate for the loss of wildlife and habitat, and what kind of
measures will be needed--this is a projection, but I think it
is important for us to hear from you--to build resiliency and
redundancy back into the ecosystems to compensate for all of
this damage?
Ms. Lyder. Well, I think one thing we all know is that this
was already an ecosystem that was in trouble. We have talked
about Gulf Coast restoration for a long time, and I think we
need to look at ways to strengthen the ecosystem to get it
beyond where it was before the spill and to use this money, use
this opportunity, to be part of a long-term restoration plan.
In the immediacy we are looking at habitat that could
replace oil, habitat for the fall migration, ways to attract
migratory birds to areas that are oil free. We are looking at a
lot of immediate responses, but we are also looking at ways, as
we go through the NRDA process, to use this process for
replacement of oil habitat for restoration of----
Mrs. Capps. Do you have anything to add, Mr. Westerholm?
Mr. Westerholm. And I would just echo that and say a key
part of that is to develop a system that is resilient in the
future to be able to survive----
Mrs. Capps. All right.
Mr. Westerholm [continuing]. Through these types of
conditions.
Mrs. Capps. Back to you, Ms. Lyder. Can you describe for
the Subcommittee the importance of the Fish and Wildlife
Service Environmental Contaminants Program, and what its
function is in response to this spill?
Ms. Lyder. The Environment Contaminants Program is the
program that responds to oil spills and to other degradation in
habitat. What is of most concern to the Fish and Wildlife
Service when there is a spill or a catastrophe is, first of
all, destruction of habitat. We care about species populations,
we care about individual animals, but destruction of habitat is
what we are most concerned about.
Our Environmental Contaminants Office is the office that
looks at the impact of chemicals, oil and whatever in the
environment and how best to clean it up, so----
Mrs. Capps. Just a real quick followup. Is this
contaminants program able to meet its obligation then, since it
has such a critical role, to respond to the catastrophe, as
well as all of the existing programs and needs around the
country?
Ms. Lyder. Right now we are using much of that capacity in
the Gulf, and we will have to assess after this spill whether
we need to increase that capacity.
Mrs. Capps. And that leads to what about the future? Any
thoughts?
Ms. Lyder. Right. We are looking at possibilities of
putting together response teams by state so that when there is
an emergency like this, we have a lot of backup.
We have the luxury of bringing backup in to Houma and in to
the incident commands from all our regions around the country,
and we are doing that. We are rotating people in and out and in
and out in the Gulf.
Mrs. Capps. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank the gentlelady from California. And
now I would like to recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr.
Fleming.
Mr. Fleming. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Let me address Mr.
Barham first of all.
I am the Congressman from the 4th District of Louisiana,
among several Congressmen from Louisiana here this morning, and
first of all I want to say thank you and I want to commend you
and our Governor, Billy Nungesser, and many others who are
doing an outstanding job very vigorously standing point trying
to protect our state, its marshes, its wildlife. Certainly call
upon us if there is anything we can do to help you beyond what
we are trying to attempt to do now.
I am disappointed that we are almost two months and you
haven't gotten answers yet about the dispersants. I am advised
that the EPA has the information and hopefully will turn it
over soon, but I think that is a slowness of response.
I am also very disappointed that despite the tough
rhetoric, our Administration, it took almost two months to get
approval for the berm creation to create a barrier for the oil
spill coming up on our shores. There are other issues too, and
I am just going to clip them off real quick and get a response
from you on those.
I understand you have made several requests on May 24 to
Secretary Salazar that the Louisiana annual apportionment for
the Sport Fish Restoration Program used to manage our coastal
fisheries be apportioned at an annual rate equal to an average
of the last three years of funding. Have you received a
response to that, sir?
Mr. Barham. No, sir, I have not.
Mr. Fleming. OK. There was a request to BP on May 24 for
about $30 million in funds to implement a multi-year fishery
resource monitoring program that you indicated was designed to
provide the information needed to manage the fishery resources
of Louisiana as a result of the spill. Have you received a
response on that, sir?
Mr. Barham. No, sir, I have not.
Mr. Fleming. On May 28, together with the Louisiana
Workforce Commission, Louisiana Recovery Authority Office of
Community Development, Louisiana Economic Development,
Louisiana Department of Social Services and Louisiana
Department of Health and Hospitals, to BP for an initial $300
million in funding to provide swift and ameliorative response
for the individuals and businesses greatly impacted by this
disaster, as well as to address the long-term impacts. Have you
receive a response yet, sir?
Mr. Barham. No, sir, I have not.
Mr. Fleming. Now, I understand that there are a lot of
boats being docked, a lot of workers in the fisheries industry
who are being impacted and can no longer go out and fish and to
make a living.
Can you give me an idea or give us an idea here today how
quickly BP is responding to their claims for reimbursement for
money and time lost?
Mr. Barham. Congressman, I would be less than honest if I
didn't tell you that it has been frustratingly slow in
response. These people, as you say, are ready to work and do
what is needed to provide for their families and to pay the
bills that are needed, and they are caught in a terrible
situation. It has been slow.
Mr. Fleming. OK, sir. So what you are saying is that the
Administration, with its very tough rhetoric about boots on the
neck and kicking body parts, and the fact that our President
has never spoken to the CEO of BP, despite all of these things,
we are yet getting too much down the road, and we are getting
essentially no response to these many important elements?
Mr. Barham. Well, I think the Administration has shown that
they clearly care about what is going on in Louisiana. The
President has been down several times, and I sense a
frustration on lots of fronts about the response by BP
primarily.
They have said lots of things, and either did not follow
through or evaded giving responses at all. It has been
disappointing in that sense. It is easier to make a flashy ad
on television than it is to actually respond to needs.
Mr. Fleming. Yes, sir. One final thing as my time runs out.
It is my understanding that numbers of lawyers are descending
on Louisiana, making the claim that in order to make a claim to
BP you must have a lawyer. Is that true?
Mr. Barham. Well, I can't answer for the individual. We
have made some claims on BP and we have some pretty good
lawyers in Louisiana, but I haven't gotten responses even with
them.
Mr. Fleming. OK. So you are saying even with lawyers we are
not getting responses?
Mr. Barham. We haven't yet.
Mr. Fleming. OK. All right. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank the gentleman. And I would like now
to recognize the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Kind.
Mr. Kind. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you so much for
holding this very important hearing, and I want to thank the
witnesses for your testimony today and everything that you are
doing to try to mitigate and limit the damage of this obvious
ecological and wildlife disaster. It is a national nightmare
that is slowly unfolding before our very eyes. Our concern and
sympathy are obviously with the families that lost loved ones,
but also with the entire region.
I represent a district in western Wisconsin. My backyard is
North America's largest waterfowl migratory route, and the
spread of this wildlife and ecological damage is immeasurable
at this point. Obviously it is going to affect each and every
one of us in the Norther Hemisphere at least.
It just seems to me like it is all hands on deck right now.
Put politics aside. We have to work together and figure out the
best solution to cap this thing, and then limit the damage that
is being done, and learn the lessons so that they are never
repeated again in the future.
I understand the State of Louisiana made the decision to
open up the Mississippi River flowage into the delta area. I
don't know if anyone has been monitoring that to see, or could
testify as far as the effectiveness of that and how helpful
that might be, but that might be a good place to start. I would
be curious to hear from anyone who might.
Mr. Westerholm or Secretary Lyder, do you have any opinion
in regard to the effectiveness of opening up the river down
there?
Ms. Lyder. I can tell you that it has been very effective
in protecting the Delta National Wildlife Refuge. The flows are
high. The current is pushing the oil away from that eastern
side of the river, and we just hope that the flows can remain
high.
Mr. Kind. Are there any potential negative consequences to
doing that as far as the toxicity level and the impact that
might have on wildlife?
Mr. Barham. I will respond to that. Yes, there are
negatives. When you flush freshwater over the richly productive
oyster seed grounds--you have Mr. Voisin coming up on a later
panel today that will explain that, but you are going to kill
those oysters if they are inundated with freshwater over an
extended period of time.
So it is a tradeoff. You are keeping that oil out for some
of the marine creatures, but you are also potentially killing
off very productive oyster seed grounds underneath those
diversions.
Mr. Kind. Let me ask you. Mr. Westerholm, Secretary Lyder,
are you or is USGS doing any computer modeling in regard to the
spread of this damage, and what we might ultimately be facing
here?
Mr. Westerholm. I can take that one. Every day we do
trajectory analysis of where the oil is going and where it is
spreading to, including a loop current analysis to see if it
would be going south and through the Florida Straits and out
that way.
So the short answer to your question is yes, we are doing
the trajectory analysis on it. There are some hydrant dynamics
and other things that we don't have all the answers to. This
freshwater push is one.
Mr. Kind. Right.
Mr. Westerholm. We know physically what will happen, but
being able to measure it and put it in there. We marry up.
Every day we marry up what is predicted by the models with what
actual observation is to improve it, so on a daily basis it is
a continually improving process.
Mr. Kind. Well, I guess how confident are you in the
accuracy of that analysis that is being done, or is it new
terrain that we are just hoping----
Mr. Westerholm. Well, I would not say it is new terrain. I
think many of the trajectory models that we have have
accurately predicted the shoreline impacts and where the oil is
migrating.
You know, it is a large Gulf out there, but we seem to have
a pretty good handle on where the oil is from our satellite
imagery, visual imagery and putting that into our models.
Mr. Kind. Assistant Secretary Lyder, as an active member of
the Congressional Sportsmen's Caucus I know there is a
tremendous outdoor sporting alliance out there with a
tremendous amount of technical expertise that might be helpful.
Has there been any outreach with that coalition at all as
far as things that they might be able to assist with technical
assistance in the field or any resources they might be able to
bring?
Ms. Lyder. I don't know about the coalition in particular.
I know there has been outreach with the sport fishing community
on the delta, and I know they have been involved certainly in
taking experts out, taking scientists out.
The marinas are unfortunately instead of taking
recreational fishermen out, they are now taking people out
looking for oil, looking for birds, and they have a wealth of
information. They know that area better than anybody else. It
is their zone, and we are----
Mr. Kind. What about organizations like DU or Pheasants
Forever? Has there been any----
Ms. Lyder. We have been in contact with those
organizations, and certainly their local branches have been
involved in the response.
Mr. Kind. Because there is a huge migratory bird community
out there as well.
Ms. Lyder. Yes, there is.
Mr. Kind. They have been actively involved?
Ms. Lyder. Yes.
Mr. Kind. OK. Well, thank you again for your testimony and
all the work that you are doing. Madam Chair, that is all I
have. I yield back.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank the gentleman. And now I would like
to recognize the gentlelady from the Virgin Islands, Ms.
Christensen.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for
having this hearing. I had the opportunity to travel with
another subcommittee earlier this week to Louisiana and to
participate in a hearing there that included two young women
who had lost their husbands, and one of the shrimpers was there
to testify as well. We did a fly over of the spill area.
The hearing and the time we spent there really highlighted
many of the concerns, like the lack of attention to problems
that existed on Deepwater Horizon before the explosion. The
inadequate response from BP was very strongly documented in
that hearing, the impact on the health of people working on the
cleanup, as well as the marine life there.
It was very disheartening to me that with what I understand
are over 3,000 oil and gas platforms in such a sensitive and
important area that our Federal agencies were so lax in their
permitting, and also it seems that we were unprepared for this
worst case scenario. As disheartening as it is for me, it is
devastating to the people who live there, as we are hearing
today.
So let me get to my questions. Some of them have been asked
already. Director Westerholm, this is a devastating spill at
any time, but it comes at the beginning of hurricane season. So
what plans does NOAA have in place to address this spill,
should we have a hurricane in the Gulf?
Mr. Westerholm. Yes, ma'am. Let me take that three ways.
One, as you know, the predictions for hurricane season just
came out, and we expect it to be an extremely active season
this year----
Mrs. Christensen. Yes.
Mr. Westerholm [continuing]. So that is very concerning.
Second, we looked at what might the impact of oil be on the
hurricane? What might the impact of the hurricane be on the
oil?
And then, last, we looked at the logistics capability of
saying, with all this activity going on in the Gulf and we have
to have an evacuation, how long and how much forecast can we
give so we can adequately evacuate the area during the time
when a lot of response operations are going on?
But let me take that second piece of that question because
I think that is the one you are driving at. A hurricane,
depending on where it goes and how it goes--obviously we can
envision a lot of different scenarios, but it does have the
capability of taking at least some of that surface oil and
pushing it up into areas that wouldn't otherwise be oiled by
normal activity.
Mrs. Christensen. OK. Well, I guess we have an idea of
where it is going, but there is nothing that we are going to be
able to do about it except respond.
Mr. Westerholm. Well, do you mean after the fact?
Mrs. Christensen. Yes.
Mr. Westerholm. Certainly during the hurricane, if of any
intensity, you would not be able to conduct operations during
that period of time, and we would have to react in the
aftermath of the storm.
Mrs. Christensen. As of today, what percentage of the Gulf
fisheries closed, and what do we anticipate----
Mr. Westerholm. It is approximately a third. I don't think
there was a closure today, so it just around 32 percent. That
is of course the Federal waters. Each of the states have their
fisheries closures also.
Mrs. Christensen. Yes. Deputy Assistant Secretary Lyder,
under the Park System Resources Protection Act of 1990,
responsible parties who damage national park resources, living
or nonliving, are fully liable for the cost of the damages, as
well as for response cost.
When you add up the damages prefatory to billing BP and its
subcontractors, will your damages include the expenses that you
have incurred in sending extra staff to the Gulf region and for
conducting baseline studies and otherwise preparing for damage
to park resources?
Ms. Lyder. Yes.
Mrs. Christensen. And do you have good baseline data on the
fish and wildlife in the Gulf, or are you collecting them as we
speak? I ask that because my fishermen and many who have
testified here have talked about the lack of good data.
Ms. Lyder. We have collected baseline data for our refuges
and for our parks. Our park baseline data was collected and
completed before any oil touched any park resources.
Fish and Wildlife Service, we have 35 refuges we think may
be affected. We have not completed all the surveying, but we
are pretty far along. One thing about this oil spill, it did
give us some lead time before it started hitting land, and so
we are pretty far along on our baseline assessments for the
refuge system.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you. Mr. Barham, in your testimony
you talked about the voids in the response efforts by BP and
the Coast Guard. You probably have shared some of those maybe
and I missed them, but could you just go over for me what some
of those voids were and if they existed earlier? Have some of
them been addressed?
Mr. Barham. Well, one of the glaring ones is that we could
not get the information on Corexit as far as the components and
the percentages of those components so we could develop a
profile, a chemical profile to run testing on tissue samples.
Mrs. Christensen. And we heard that on Monday in Louisiana
as well.
Mr. Barham. Yes. And we still don't have that information.
Mrs. Christensen. Do you have the two compounds?
Mr. Barham. We know the compounds that are used in Corexit.
We just don't have the percentages and, without the percentages
of the composition, you can't develop the chemical profiles to
do the testing in the tissue.
It makes a whole lot of difference how much of what is
used, not just that you know what is in the compounds.
Mrs. Christensen. Right.
Mr. Barham. And the other thing is we did have delays in
regard to our proposal for berms. We did not have alternatives,
and we clearly understood that if you can catch oil on a hard
surface, it is much easier to clean.
You essentially can't clean the marsh. When it intrudes
into the cane and the marshes, you are going to lose that
marsh. That is what holds our coast together. That is the long-
term challenge, as the Assistant Secretary has been talking
about.
And we were very slow on that. Now, we have had approval of
six of the berms, but those berms are not only valuable in the
continuing intrusion of the oil that we expect for a long time,
but it also is important from a hurricane perspective to
mitigate the damage in the tidal surge that is going to come
into these wetlands and potentially carry this oil into marsh
habitat.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you.
Ms. Bordallo. Your time is expired. Just to remind the
Members that we will have a second round if you so desire.
Now to recognize the gentlelady from New Hampshire, Ms.
Shea-Porter.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you. Mr. Westerholm, how long have
you been in your job, please?
Mr. Westerholm. It is about two and a half years.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Two and a half years. OK. Thank you. Well,
I was reading from your testimony, and you said that NOAA is a
natural resource trustee, and your job is protection and
assessing, and so I just wanted to read something that Mr.
Barham said when he was talking about the oil in his testimony.
He said, ``We do not have a complete understanding of the
toxicity of the various concentrations of oil and dispersants
to all the life stages of all species of aquatic life.''
He goes on to say, ``We have little knowledge of deepwater
transport mechanisms. We have little knowledge of deepwater
ecology. Although we have some experience with relatively small
releases of oil in our onshore areas, the immediate residual
effects of large quantities of oil over large, shallow areas we
don't know. Largely unknown.'' And he said the list can go on.
So, when you said to protect and assess, how did you do that?
How were you engaged in trying to protect the coast?
And before I go any further, because I think all of us have
a responsibility for this. In 2008, back and forth, Congress
has fought over whether oil is safe, whether we should be
changing this. I have listened to my colleagues who are now
upset with the government for not responding fast enough, and
they were the ones who said don't worry. This can't happen.
There is a kind of arrogance on the part of human nature to
assume that there won't ever be an accident, and therefore we
don't have to know this. So what was NOAA's role to protect and
assess? What exactly were you assessing? Because when I listen
to the other gentleman's assessment, he said we don't know.
Mr. Westerholm. So I will address it. There were several
questions there, and I will do the best I can do address them.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you.
Mr. Westerholm. Part of that in the protection is what we
are required to do under law and by regulation, and that is
early on in the planning stages and the preparedness stages
exercises.
During the response, actually providing scientific support
and assessment of what is going on and making recommendations
so that we try to minimize it, not eliminate, because it is
impossible to eliminate, but minimize the environmental damage.
So in many cases, as my colleagues have pointed out, it is a
tradeoff. And then last in the restoration phase, restore the
environment to the pre-spill conditions.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Yes.
Mr. Westerholm. So part of the----
Ms. Shea-Porter. Excuse me for interrupting, but did you
think or ever have a conversation with anybody? Wow, what would
happen if we had a big spill----
Mr. Westerholm. Yes.
Ms. Shea-Porter [continuing]. Off the coast of Louisiana?
Mr. Westerholm. Well, part of that is the structure, and if
you are looking at me personally----
Ms. Shea-Porter. No. Your agency. I just want to know did
you----
Mr. Westerholm. Absolutely.
Ms. Shea-Porter [continuing]. Fear this?
Mr. Westerholm. Part of the process is there is an area
committee for each of the Coast Guard sectors down there--it
involves the state, local citizens, industry and others--to
develop plans to respond to spills, including some offshore
spills, including working with MMS.
The second piece of that is the regional response teams,
which approve dispersants and others and----
Ms. Shea-Porter. Right. But let me get back because I want
to go back to before the accident because this won't be our
last one.
Mr. Westerholm. Right.
Ms. Shea-Porter. I want to do what we can right now to make
sure we prevent it. Did you ever express any concern that there
didn't seem to be enough regulation? Did you work with other
agencies?
You know, we had a very, very, very friendly
Administration, very friendly to the oil industry, and now we
know that there were a lot of things that were very, very
wrong. Did you have any awareness, any concern that we weren't
properly overseeing drilling?
Mr. Westerholm. I think that goes back to two questions.
Again, one is did we do everything to work with our partners to
help prepare for the eventuality of oil spills in advance, and
we did. Now, obviously this was an unprecedented event. Part of
the offshore----
Ms. Shea-Porter. Wait. Wait. I am sorry to keep
interrupting you, but you said we did everything we could.
Well, what did you do?
Mr. Westerholm. OK.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Because we are watching this, and there
seems to be very, very little that is working, and it has taken
time to get this together. I am not just trying to go after
you. I am concerned that what happened was everybody could see
the possibility. I believe that we could see the possibility.
Indeed, I am going to quote Dr. Barham at the end, who
asked. He said, ``But because of our dependence on foreign
fuels, society or its agencies may be driven to take risks that
otherwise would not be acceptable.'' In my mind, this was never
an acceptable risk. We have fought about this in Congress. They
wanted to drill even closer. They wanted to drill right off the
coastline.
In your role and NOAA's role, did anybody say this is a
really bad idea because, actually, we don't really know what we
are doing yet? Because your job, your agency's job again, and I
will read it: Protect, assess, natural resource trustee.
Mr. Westerholm. Correct. So if you will let me go back,
part of that process in the beginning is the assessment of
whatever activity is going on and our participation in that.
In addition, our participation in developing spill response
plans to mitigate environmental damage when it occurs. We were
involved with that, and that has continued. I think the
response group that stood up and the activities that are going
on now is a representation of that.
Ms. Shea-Porter. I am grateful for the effort.
Mr. Westerholm. The second part of your question is----
Ms. Shea-Porter. I am very grateful for the effort, but we
know we are not getting too far. Did you do a tabletop exercise
before the accident?
Mr. Westerholm. Several, but I don't believe we have done
one for deepwater drilling off the coast. We may have, but I am
not aware of one, and that gets to the second part of your
question, which is permitting of deep well drills and what
activities should we have expected, or did we expect, which is
different.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Did you ever protest it?
Mr. Westerholm. Did I personally?
Ms. Shea-Porter. Protest, right. The agency.
Mr. Westerholm. I am not sure that we have. I know we
provided comments. I don't know about a protest.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you.
Ms. Bordallo. Your time has expired. I would like now to
recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Kildee.
Mr. Kildee. Thank you, Madam Chair. I am assuming, to Ms.
Lyder, that the Fish and Wildlife Service will need to make
adjustments in its Migratory Bird Conservation Grant Program,
such as grants funded under the North American Wetland
Conservation Act.
Will certain areas affected by the spill be ineligible in
the short term, and will it be the responsibility of BP to
cover the cost to restore any recently completed conservation
project that is damaged by the oil spill?
Ms. Lyder. It will be the responsibility of BP to restore
any project that has been completed and that has been damaged,
and we are working with our partners.
In fact, I have a note that said we had a meeting today
with Ducks Unlimited and with the National Fish and Wildlife
Foundation, and we are looking at where we now need to focus
our efforts, focus our NAWCA grant money in response to the
spill.
Mr. Kildee. Mr. Westerholm, you had contingency plans for
something like this, but nothing on this magnitude. What
changes would you make in your plans, had you been able to
anticipate the sheer magnitude of this oil spill?
You had some contingency plans. What changes would you make
now for the future, or what changes do you think would have
been more effective had they been in place when this took
place?
Mr. Westerholm. Yes. And I think that that is a great
question because I think some of the premises that the original
plans for worst case scenario that were built on certainly have
changed.
The expectation that the systems would work and the blowout
preventers would work and you would be dealing with a spill of
a certain magnitude over a certain period of time. We are
obviously getting to the point where we are exceeding that, so
one of the changes would be to look at those conditions where
we would have a spill for a long period of time.
The second thing that I would do is put more emphasis on
the oil coming up from subsea. Especially in this case we have
mile deep, but we have other drilling units out there that are
pumping oil from that depth and greater, so I think certainly
part of the planning and exercises and contingencies would
incorporate that.
And then more investigation and research on what happens to
that oil at depth, what happens if you disperse that oil at
depth. And I think those are some of the initial lessons we are
learning now that we are going to try to build on for better
planning in the future.
Mr. Kildee. And as tragic as this whole thing has been, we
have to try to learn as much as possible from this. I am sure
your agency is going back through the learning process and
seeing how much you can anticipate and what measures you might
take.
Mr. Westerholm. Absolutely. I think we all are going back
through that process, and we will continue. You know, as many
have said at this table already, the spill is not over even
when the oil stops. There will be years of learning and
additional research that will be needed.
Mr. Kildee. Thank you. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank the gentleman from Michigan, Mr.
Kildee. And now I would like to recognize the gentlelady from
Colorado, Ms. DeGette.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I have a
question for the entire panel.
I know you have talked a little bit about dispersants so
far. I am wondering. The use of dispersants in this spill has
been widespread and extensive, and what we are hearing now is
dispersants are causing oil to remain in the water column,
rather than collect on the surface so, as a result, plumes of
oil are dispersing into the Gulf. A lot of people are saying
that we are just trading the devil we know for the devil that
we don't know.
So my question is, do any of you think that we know enough
now to conclude that dispersed oil will be less harmful to the
ecosystem than nondispersed oil? Whoever wants to start can.
Mr. Westerholm. I will start.
Ms. DeGette. OK.
Mr. Westerholm. OK. You know, I don't think we do know
enough. I think that is one of the reasons we are trying to do
as many measurements and testing as we can.
One of the expectations and maybe some of the answers we
don't know is how fast that will biodegrade. Will the impact on
the ecological system and resources be greater than if black
oil were to get up into the marshland?
Obviously you would want to be able to not have the oil
come out at all or collect it all, but in those environmental
tradeoffs those decisions are made and we are trying to measure
those and get the most----
Ms. DeGette. What kind of timeframe are you looking at to
figure that out? Because I will tell you. Some of us from the
Energy and Commerce Committee--Dr. Christensen was there with
me and others and Mr. Burgess. I don't see him, but we were
down in New Orleans on Monday of this week, and we saw the
black oil already in the marshlands.
We were told by the Louisiana Fish and Wildlife Service and
others that once that gets back up in there to the marsh, it is
going to kill everything, including the plants. So what is your
timeframe? What is your timeframe for figuring this out so we
know what to do?
Mr. Westerholm. And I apologize for maybe not quite
understanding the question. Obviously there are two different
things. The black oil getting into the marshes is part of that.
What the application dispersants was doing is to minimize that.
Ms. DeGette. Minimize that.
Mr. Westerholm. Obviously it would have been a lot worse
had they not dispersed the oil. However, the dispersed oil does
have an impact, and that is why we are trying to get as many
measurements----
Ms. DeGette. And what is your timeframe for figuring that
out?
Mr. Westerholm. Well, we have ships out there now
collecting samples to determine at what level the oil is in
parts per million, parts per trillion, and try to figure out
where that oil is, and then we know from some ecological
studies what that impact might be.
Ms. DeGette. So they are still putting the dispersants out,
though, correct?
Mr. Westerholm. They are, although, as you may recall,
there have been limitations put on in the----
Ms. DeGette. Right.
Mr. Westerholm [continuing]. Intervening weeks and the
amount if dispersants and where they can use them.
Ms. DeGette. Right. So again my question. Do you have any
sense how long it is going to take you to make that
determination?
Mr. Westerholm. Well, I think every day they make the
determination as to the use of dispersants or in situ burning
or----
Ms. DeGette. For that particular situation.
Mr. Westerholm. Correct.
Ms. DeGette. But what I am saying is----
Mr. Westerholm. The long-term impact is something that we
are continuing to study.
Ms. DeGette. Yes. So do you have some sense when you are
going to have a view? Because this is going to be a problem.
This leak is going to continue for some time.
And my question is, rather than making a day-by-day
decision, do we put the dispersants today or not, when are we
going to know what kind of policy we are going to have on this?
Mr. Westerholm. Well, part of that, as you know from the
subsea one, is continuous daily tests to determine the dissolve
oxygen level and the toxicity test on rotifers that EPA and
ourselves and others are looking at, and so if it exceeds
certain toxicity levels, they shut off the subsea dispersants
at that moment.
The other part of it is one we are trying to get a better
picture of of the three-dimensional impact of the oil and the
water column.
Ms. DeGette. So you don't foresee a cohesive policy
dispersants/no dispersants? What you are saying is that
decision is being made on a daily basis based on the
conditions?
Mr. Westerholm. It is at the regional response team and
the----
Ms. DeGette. OK. One last question. BP originally stated
there aren't any plumes and has continued to insist that there
are no underwater oil plumes in large concentrations from the
spill. Mr. Westerholm, are BP's statements consistent with the
findings of NOAA and other researchers?
Mr. Westerholm. And as you know, we have only begun to get
those first pieces of information back, but I think it is
important to define the definition of plume and how people
envision it.
It is much like smoke coming out of a fire. You certainly
see black smoke, and as it rises up in the air it gets lighter
gray and lighter gray and then you can't see it. Even those
areas where you can't see, our detection ability to measure in
the parts per million/parts per trillion in what may not be
visible is still there.
The water column is very much the same thing. As it rises
from depth, it disperses and the water column gets moved by the
currents, but continually expands in a plume-like feature. But
we know that even in small parts that there can be impacts to
the environment, so that is what we are trying to measure.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much. And now I would like to
recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Boustany.
Mr. Boustany. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I represent
Louisiana's 7th Congressional District. I have roughly half the
coast of Louisiana from the central to the western part of
Louisiana, the Texas border.
And let there be no mistake. This is a real tragedy, a
human tragedy. We lost 11 lives in this. Others were injured.
It is an environmental and ecological challenge and tragedy,
and it is an economic tragedy.
And as I look at the title of the hearing, I see the title
is Our Natural Resources at Risk: The Short and Long Term
Impacts of the Deepwater Horizon Spill. I can't help but think
of a sentiment I share with my fellow Louisianans--Secretary
Barham referenced this--and that is our unique Louisiana
perspective on this.
We have always had a sense of balance about how our
environmental, our economic and our energy policy can go hand
in hand together. We value all three and know that all three
are critically important as we look at our natural resources.
We value our wetlands, which we consider to be America's
wetlands. These are working wetlands where we strike that
balance.
For over 50 years, Louisiana delegations have fought to get
revenue sharing from the oil produced so that we could protect
our coastline. We had minimal success with that just recently a
few years ago. And as we look at this, I urge everybody to step
back and think about that balance and what is going to be
necessary for the economic health of our country, as well as
our energy security.
I have deep, deep concerns about the moratorium imposed by
the President that is going to affect 33 exploratory wells in
the deepwater of the Gulf of Mexico. I want to lay out a few
facts. Roughly 33 percent of the nation's domestically produced
oil comes from the Gulf of Mexico and 10 percent of the
nation's natural gas. Eighty percent of the Gulf's oil and 45
percent of its natural gas comes from operations in more than
1,000 feet of water, the deepwater.
Suspension of these operations means that roughly 33 of
these floating drill rigs, which are typically leased for
hundreds of thousands of dollars per day, could be idled for
six months or longer, given the current moratorium. The
economics behind this amount to somewhere around $250,000 to
$500,000 per day per rig, roughly resulting in somewhere
between $8.2 and $16.5 million per day in costs for idle rigs.
Secondary impacts of all this include the supply boats,
roughly two boats per rig, with day rates of around $15,000 to
$30,000 a day for each of the 33 rigs. This is roughly a $1
million impact per day.
But also consider the impacts to the suppliers and related
services to this valuable industry that supports our nation's
energy supply--the welders, the divers, the caterers, the
transportation, the mechanics, the electricians, those who
fabricate the tools, the drilling fluids and so forth. We are
talking about a huge economic impact.
Let us look at the direct cost. If you take these rigs, 90
to 140 employees at any one time. Double that because you have
two shifts per day. You have two week shifts, so you can
multiply that. We are talking about 800 to 1,400 jobs per idle
rig platform that are at risk. Those are the direct jobs. And
for every one of those jobs, there are roughly four to six
additional jobs that provide support.
These are good paying jobs. We are talking about the
potential for lost wages, just with the rigs, of over $5 to $10
million per month per drilling platform. That could be over
$165 to $330 million per month if you take all 33 of these
rigs. These workers, many of them work in Louisiana. Our state
is going to see a decline in income tax revenue and sales tax
revenue. Many of our small communities depend almost solely on
the revenue generated by this industry.
Now I want to reference something that Secretary Salazar
has said in reference to this. The 33 Gulf wells where
operations have been suspended are ones that were inspected
immediately after the Deepwater Horizon blowout, and according
to Secretary Salazar, I quote, ``only minor problems were found
on a couple of rigs.''
He goes on to say, I quote, ``Additional safety measures
can be taken, including dealing with cementing, encasing of
wells and significant enhancements and redundancies of blowout
prevention mechanisms. Although these rigs passed the
inspections, we will look at standards that are in place.''
This deepwater moratorium is arbitrary, and it is
irresponsible. It is going to cause a severe economic hardship
to the State of Louisiana, unlike anything we have ever seen,
and that is part of our overall environmental concern. It is
the human environment that is going to be affected here.
And so I am urging that we take a step back and have some
balance as we look at this and be thoughtful about how we
approach this. It is unreasonable to impose a six-month or more
deepwater moratorium. It is unnecessary. There have already
been delays in putting together this Presidential commission,
undue delays.
I have a letter here that I am sending out to Secretary
Salazar and the President today urging the President to move
forward so we can get the necessary information together. Much
of it is there. But to continue to delay this is unreasonable
and wrong.
And finally on the shallow water moratorium, the Department
of the Interior has been extremely irresponsible by misleading
many of us in Louisiana with equivocal information about
whether there is a moratorium or not. I have sent two letters
now--one of them was a bipartisan letter--urging the immediate
lifting of the moratorium on shallow water drilling. We are
talking about very mature technology, very different
technology, and this is critical to jobs and the economy of
Louisiana and the energy security of our country.
So I am urging this Committee and the Congress to work with
the Administration. Let us be reasonable about how we approach
this. I see that my time has expired, Madam Chair. Thank you.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank the gentleman from Louisiana for his
comments and certainly will take that under advisement. I would
like now to recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Bilirakis.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I appreciate it
very much. And thank you for allowing me to sit in on the panel
today.
Mr. Westerholm, in your testimony you indicated that,
amongst other things, NOAA's mission is to conserve and manage
coastal and marine resources to meet our nation's economic,
social and environmental needs. It is with that in mind that I
relate to you the concerns of several fishermen in my district.
The immediate and overwhelming fear is insolvency. They
wonder how they are going to support their families if their
livelihoods are decimated. Many have offered suggestions from
relaxing catch quotas to waiving permitting fees. These are
proud, robust workers, who cringe at the thought of standing in
line to get a paltry check from BP. They want to work.
While I realize that the primary focus remains on capping
the well, and it should be, have there been discussions within
NOAA about short-term relief for those in the fishing industry,
and what are the prospects for long-term relief?
Mr. Westerholm. And thank you for the question. Apart from
the disaster declaration that we spoke of earlier, you did
mention catch quotas and permit fees.
And while I can't speak to any specifics on that right now,
it is under discussion, and I believe that in the advent of
stopping the leak and when the spill is cleaned up, NOAA has to
look at their whole fisheries management cycle over this year
and next year, based on the impact that this has had to the
fishing community, and is committed to do so.
Mr. Bilirakis. Great. Thank you. I would also like to
follow up with Ms. DeGette's question on dispersants. I know
that representatives from the Southern Shrimp Alliance have
expressed a deep and abiding fear that the use of the
dispersants poses an exponential threat to certain species in
the Gulf of Mexico.
As I understand it, John Williams, the Executive Director
of the Alliance, wrote NOAA and EPA weeks ago, but has yet to
receive a response. I hope I can get an answer right here and
now. Why are dispersants still being used when EPA called upon
BP weeks ago to find a less toxic means of breaking up the oil
slicks at the surface?
It is unprecedented that tens of thousands of gallons a day
of dispersant are being used subsurface. We have no clue what
type of long-term ecological destructions these toxins will
cause. Would you agree with me that while the spread of oil is
destructive enough, oil compounded with the dispersant is
exponentially more devastating? If so, why are dispersants
still being used?
I would like to hear I guess first from Mr. Westerholm and
anyone else who would like to address that issue as well on the
panel. Thank you.
Mr. Westerholm. I will take the question first. And the
short answer is that dispersants are still being used as a
tradeoff with respect to the total environmental risk.
And I would say that one of your statements, which was the
toxicity of dispersed oil in that localized area is probably
greater based on testing. However, the construct of using
dispersants is that it will more quickly biodegrade and so
being that far out offshore the oil that is already dispersed
will disperse and biodegrade before it reaches shore.
And that balances the tradeoff. Obviously one of the things
we are concerned about is what is that impact of that dispersed
oil in the ecosystem that is being dispersed.
Mr. Barham. If I could join? The problem with the
dispersants is it is subsea. There is no scientific data that
it will degrade quicker at subsea conditions under pressure and
in those temperatures. Absolutely no scientific confirmation of
that.
The problem we have is that it is now there unseen and
unknown as to where it is going. We are constantly on patrol.
We will have places where we will see absolutely no evidence of
oil being present. The next day you will have heavy oil. It
obviously came in under the booms that are out there. It
traveled in a subsea transport system.
We have no idea the impact on the entire food chain that is
going to be there. You asked a question earlier. The lady from
California, I believe, asked a question how--Colorado. I am
sorry. Asked a question how long we will be assessing this. It
will probably be decades because you will have to do constant
analysis, and what we fear is that there is some link in the
food chain that will be destroyed by these subsea dispersants.
These are little microscopic particles that can be consumed
all the way by the plankton, the phytoplankton, the copepods,
the shrimp, the larvae, the sea creatures that are out there
and then consumed farther and farther up the food chain, and
until we have had the time to assess that that is the fear we
have. This is an experiment that has been conducted which we
objected to from the very beginning.
Mr. Bilirakis. Anyone else on the panel? Yes, please. Thank
you.
Dr. Ragen. I would just comment that dispersants are
controversial in virtually every oil and gas situation. I would
agree with this comment. Dispersants are a tool. We just need
to know how to use them well.
And in order to do that I think we need the background
research at periods when we are not in the middle of an
emergency or a crisis in order to understand the nature of the
dispersants, how they work with specific types of oil, whether
they work better in offshore areas or near shore areas, et
cetera.
There is a lot of background work that really needs to be
done that I think tends not to happen as it should when we are
not in the middle of a crisis and so now we are faced with
making ill-informed decisions sometimes.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank the gentleman. I would like to now
recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Cao.
Mr. Cao. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I just want to
ask the panel a very specific question regarding the subsurface
oil plumes that we have been hearing through the news.
It seems to me that it goes against all logic. If oil is
lighter than water it should float up to the surface. So why
are we having the problem of subsurfaces? Is that part of the
dispersants that are being used that somehow make this oil
heavier than water?
Mr. Westerholm. I can take the first part of that question
and look at it from both a surface and subsurface. If you are
looking at the injection of subsurface dispersants, I think it
was rightly brought up that we don't know all we need to know
at depth.
However, oil will rise. Even dispersed oil will rise. It
will rise at a slower rate the smaller the micronic size, so if
you have a very small particle it may take a very long time to
get to the surface. If you don't treat it at all, the majority
of that oil comes up in about three hours.
So even if you never disperse the oil, small particles of
oil break off, and it is our estimate that maybe somewhere
between 30 and 50 percent of the oil that is emanating from the
bottom already disperses in the water column before it gets to
the surface whether you added any chemicals or not to it.
So when you add the addition of subsurface dispersants you
are accentuating that issue in putting it in there, but
ultimately those oil particles will start to rise to the
surface. However, if they are small enough, they may be carried
by subsea currents in a particular way.
What we are trying to do is map that three-dimensional
picture out the best we can to determine at what level they
are. Even if they are not visible, is there a detection? How
far away from the wellhead source is that detection?
Mr. Cao. Now, my next question is to you again, Mr.
Westerholm, and to Ms. Lyder. I would like to know what are
your respective agencies' plans, the long-term plans with
respect to the recovery of the Gulf Coast? I guess what would
be your role in the long-term recovery plan?
Mr. Westerholm. I guess I will speak first on it. And I
would divide that into a couple sections. One is the natural
resource damage assessment process that we talked about, and
Ms. Lyder will also talk about that issue and how that damage
assessment will be used to restore the environment to the pre-
spill conditions.
The other part, though, and part of our long-term plans is
looking at the economic impact from the Department of Commerce
and the fisheries, which I spoke of earlier, so there is a
fisheries/seafood safety impact that has to be considered,
independent of the natural resource damage assessment process.
Ms. Lyder. Yes. I want to point out that BP as the
responsible party is responsible not just for long-term
restoration costs, but also for immediate response, and part of
the immediate response that we are looking at right now is what
are we going to do about the birds, the migratory birds that
are coming back in the fall.
How are we going to divert them from heavily oiled areas?
What are we going to do about the fish and the wildlife that
are suffering right now, and how are we going to prevent
further damage? And that is part of removal response under the
Oil Pollution Act. That is a covered expense that BP should be
responsible for.
Mr. Cao. I understand, but can the government participate
to expedite this recovery process----
Ms. Lyder. Oh, yes.
Mr. Cao [continuing]. And then just hand them the bill and
ask them to reimburse you all for it?
Ms. Lyder. Oh, yes. The government can come up with what
the removal action should be, can go to the Coast Guard and say
this is what we want to do, this is what we need to do and we
want the funds to pay for it, in which case the Coast Guard
then decides if it is an appropriate response cost, gives us
the money and bills BP for the cost.
So that is separate from the natural resource damage
assessment process. We are a trustee in that process, the State
of Louisiana is a trustee in that process, and BP will also be
responsible for the long-term restoration of what has been
damaged.
Mr. Cao. My next question is to Secretary Barham. I know
that the Governor and the parish presidents are pushing for a
system of 24 berms being built. Right now the Coast Guard has
approved the construction of six of them. Is that correct?
Mr. Barham. That is correct.
Mr. Cao. And based on your assessment of the success with
respect to the berms, should we go ahead and push for the
construction of the remaining berms that right now have not yet
been approved?
Mr. Barham. Absolutely we should. It is the first line of
defense for oil that is coming ashore. It is much easier to
clean. You can clean oil from a hard surface much easier than
you can from a marsh environment. It is almost impossible in a
marsh environment to clean.
Beyond that, it also will mitigate the damage of a tropical
storm or hurricane as far as storm surge and carrying this oil
into the marshes and the habitat that these migratory waterfowl
use and other creatures along the coast. So absolutely we are
pushing for the continuation of this, the construction of these
berms.
Mr. Cao. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Those are all of
the questions I have. Thank you for allowing me to participate
in this hearing.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank the gentleman, Mr. Cao from
Louisiana. We are going now into the second round, and I just
have a couple of quick questions here, but I would like to
remind the Members that we still have two full panels to hear.
This has to do with, Ms. Lyder, migratory birds, wading
birds and colonial nesting birds are all expected to be
significantly impacted by this spill. What is the
Administration doing to pursue civil, if not criminal,
penalties under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act against BP?
Ms. Lyder. Well, my understanding is the Department of
Justice is looking at all aspects of civil and criminal
liability for the spill. The Migratory Bird Treaty Act--excuse
me. I have the Houma cold that is circulating through the BP
facility, a facility that is supposed to house 300 people, but
has 1,000 right now.
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act is a strict liability
statute. It works with prosecutorial discretion. We decide when
we are going to bring a criminal action against somebody who
has caused the death of migratory birds.
We are not right now--at least I am not aware of us--
actively looking at criminal sanctions under the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, but I do know that Eric Holder is looking at all
levels of liability for the spill, and I imagine the Justice
Department has probably considered that. Our Solicitor's Office
will be working with the Justice Department as they decide
which elements of law to hold the responsible party liable for.
Ms. Bordallo. Good. My second part of that question. Are
present wildlife rehabilitation facilities adequate to address
the volume of birds impacted by the spill, or are additional
facilities needed?
Ms. Lyder. The rehab centers are fairly nimble. The
planning for the rehab centers was to stand up a few of them
with the idea that there would be backup centers, so I think at
this point the rehab centers are in a good position.
Ms. Bordallo. Very good. Dr. Ragen, just for the record I
would like to ask you a couple questions. You have testified
that, at the appropriate time, the Commission likely will
sponsor a review of the spill responses to learn as much as
possible from it and use that information to help the
regulatory agencies improve their ability to respond to such
events in the future.
When will this take place? When would be an appropriate
time, and what will be the scope and the content of the
Commission's review?
Dr. Ragen. I think we would probably prefer to wait until
this situation is under better control. Right now we are
focusing on trying to provide as much support for NOAA and the
other agencies and the work that they are doing.
When things seem to come under control and while things are
still fresh in our minds, I think that would be the appropriate
time to sit down and say what went wrong, what worked well in
your response, and how do we prevent that in the future. So I
am anticipating and I am hoping that that might be sometime
perhaps late summer, early fall.
Ms. Bordallo. Good. OK. All right. And to your knowledge,
has either NOAA or the Fish and Wildlife Service ever
authorized the incidental take of a marine mammal during oil
and gas activities in the Gulf of Mexico? And if not, can you
please explain why?
Dr. Ragen. To my knowledge, they have not. Virtually all of
our oil and gas activities in the incidental take
authorizations pertain to marine mammals in arctic waters,
Alaskan waters and so on.
I cannot explain to you why that does not happen in the
Gulf, and that is something that I think needs to be rectified.
Ms. Bordallo. All right. Well, we need these answers for
the record. How does this process work different for the Gulf
of Mexico than other regions--well, you just answered that I
guess--such as Alaska where authorizations are secured prior to
offshore drilling?
Dr. Ragen. That is correct.
Ms. Bordallo. Yes. All right. In the past year and a half,
how many takes of endangered species and marine mammals have
been reported from OCS activities in the Gulf?
Dr. Ragen. I cannot give you an exact number. I can look
that up, but the takes would include from seismic studies, from
vessels and from support activities, et cetera, so I would
guess that the takes would number in the hundreds or thousands.
Ms. Bordallo. All right. And do NOAA and the Fish and
Wildlife Service have access to this data or is it solely
managed by MMS, and when will it be published if there is any
data?
Dr. Ragen. I believe that NOAA, in particular, and also the
Fish and Wildlife Service should have access to the data
because they are the ones that issue the incidental take or
harassment authorizations.
Ms. Bordallo. And last, how has it informed the Marine
Mammal Protection Act incidental take rulemaking process?
Dr. Ragen. I think our primary problem is that when we look
at applications for incidental take authorization, there are
areas there is considerable uncertainty about what the impact
will be.
We have tried to identify those areas and lay out
strategies for reducing that uncertainty through research over
time, but that is a painstaking and slow process, slower than
frankly I think it should be, and so our direction right now is
to try to keep drawing attention to these things to anticipate
the kind of effects that we have described here today and
figure out strategies for both monitoring and preventing them
in the future.
Ms. Bordallo. Well, certainly the Committee is interested
and we will be following and monitoring this process.
I would now like to recognize the Ranking Member, Mr.
Cassidy, for any questions on the second round.
Mr. Cassidy. Dr. Ragen, the Ixtoc blowout in Mexico
released probably about six million barrels, give or take a
million. Clearly we must have data on, I am told, the
fisheries. Now, granted that was not marshland affected. That
was open water, but your testimony and Dr. Lyder's testimony
pertains more to open water.
Those fisheries apparently recovered. Do we have data and
can we use that data to predict the effects on the open water
species, shrimp, et cetera, of this blowout, which so far has
not achieved the volume of the Ixtoc?
Dr. Ragen. I can't actually tell you the data that we have
on the shrimp and fisheries in those areas. Most of the
information that I would have access to would be pertaining to
marine mammals.
Mr. Cassidy. OK. In the marine mammals. Was there an effect
from the Ixtoc on the marine mammals?
Dr. Ragen. I do not believe that we have good information
on the effect on marine mammals. One of the problems that we
have with these things is that we expect that the effects occur
at sea, many of the effects. They probably are not observed and
so it is very hard to put any hard and fast numbers on how many
animals might have been affected.
Mr. Cassidy. Dr. Lyder, again the Ixtoc. What was that
effect, which we are talking about the ecosystems? Presumably
there was some analysis of the effects on the ecosystem in the
Gulf from that blowout.
Ms. Lyder. Well, my understanding is that there was a
thought by the MMS and others involved in the U.S. industry
that what occurred in the Ixtoc blowout could not occur in U.S.
waters and on our OCS.
Mr. Cassidy. No. I am just concerned, though, as it regards
its effect upon plankton, shrimp, et cetera.
Ms. Lyder. I would defer to NOAA on plankton and shrimp. I
know that the oil eventually did wash up in Texas, and it had
impacts on beaches, but in terms of what we focus on, the
species we focus on, there is not a lot of similarity between
the Ixtoc.
Mr. Cassidy. Then let me go to you, sir.
Mr. Westerholm. And I probably don't have a great answer
for you but, as I recall, there were certain studies that were
done on the beaches of Texas when the oil reached up there, but
very limited studies on----
Mr. Cassidy. No. But I am speaking about the oil plumes.
Was there no work done on the oil plumes back then?
Mr. Westerholm. Back then? No.
Mr. Cassidy. OK. Now, Lake Barre had a----
Mr. Westerholm. But you were looking at a different type of
release from Ixtoc, so----
Mr. Cassidy. I accept that.
Mr. Westerholm. OK.
Mr. Cassidy. Lake Barre had a big effect upon the lagoon in
Louisiana. It is Terrebonne Parish. Secretary Barham, you can
correct my geography, but I think Lake Barre had a huge
pipeline contamination, oil into the bayous there. And I gather
that those marshlands recovered reasonably well.
Any comment on that vis-a-vis that experience and how it
instructs us for this experience, either you, Mr. Westerholm,
or you, Secretary Barham?
Mr. Barham. I don't think there is a lot of comparison
between that. I am not as familiar with that event, but of
course I believe that would have been processed oil for one
thing, and it was in a very enclosed environment, although
terribly impactful for that.
This is spread across a whole system, and you are talking
about a whole food chain potentially endangered by the events
offshore, so I don't think we will gain a lot of information
specific to this event from comparing it to that one.
Mr. Cassidy. Mr. Westerholm?
Mr. Westerholm. Yes. I think that is a great analogy, and I
think that each spill has its own unique capabilities. You
know, one of the things that was mentioned before is this is
such a biologically diverse area that it is often hit hard and
one of our more sensitive areas, but because it also is one of
the most thriving areas, the recovery rate oftentimes in this
area is great.
So I think there are a couple issues to worry about. One is
marshland; if we lose the marsh grass, what impact that might
have on the sedimentology and others. What about the habitat?
What about the seasonal spawning in particular species? So
there are a lot of issues that will come up because of this
spill.
Mr. Cassidy. But do we have data from Lake Barre to know
how Lake Barre recovered?
Mr. Westerholm. I don't know if we have data on that.
Mr. Cassidy. OK. Next, let me ask one more thing. Now,
clearly the marshlands are where we know that there is the
potential havoc. Now asking NOAA, how are you allocating your
resources vis-a-vis deepwater research versus marshland?
Frankly, it seems like the marshland is what we know will
be most impacted, whereas the deepwater is more theoretical.
Can you give me a sense of the allocation of your resources one
versus the other?
Mr. Westerholm. I can tell you that, in the past, most all
of it was in the marsh area and the impact of oil on marshes
and the ability to clean it up. I think after this spill, some
of the priorities will change to deepwater release of oil and
what the impact----
Mr. Cassidy. But currently in terms of your current
research effort.
Mr. Westerholm. Right now it is a sampling effort to
collect as much information as possible.
Mr. Cassidy. And that is deepwater and marshland?
Mr. Westerholm. It is both.
Mr. Cassidy. OK. And my last question, if I may, since I
have the Secretary from Louisiana and the Federal officials. Is
there any problem with the interface between the Federal
Government and the state government since our waters only go
out three miles, and clearly this is impacting state waters
more so than other Gulf states?
Mr. Barham. No. We will absolutely depend on cooperation
from all our Federal partners and the other people associated
with this event, and we will just overcome any problems that
develop. We can't afford to have problems.
Mr. Cassidy. OK. Thank you. I yield back.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank the gentleman. And now I would like
to recognize the gentlelady from Colorado.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. I just
want to follow up a little bit on Mr. Cassidy's last line of
questioning abut the marshlands, and I wanted to ask you, Mr.
Barham, about that.
Because as you heard me say with my previous questions, I
was down there with the Energy and Commerce Committee, and we
went out in boats and we saw the miles and miles of marshlands,
and what we were told I think by some folks from your agency is
that where the water is moving then that will have a natural
ameliorative effect. The oil might come in, but it will go back
out again.
And what they are really worried about is when the oil gets
into those marshes, and it doesn't move out. Not only does that
have a bad effect on the grasses and the other vegetation, but
also on the wide variety of fish and birds and mammals and
others that use those marshlands for the breeding grounds.
So my followup question to you is, what impact do you think
that the oil is having on that marsh ecosystem, and do we have
any sense of good methods to remove that oil from those vast
miles and miles of marshlands?
Mr. Barham. I will answer you the second part of your
question first. No, we do not have a good method to remove
them. That is why we believed from the start that these berms
are so important to keep them from intruding into the marsh.
If you went with me on a day-to-day basis out to those cane
areas and the marsh area, what would strike you is how deathly
silent it is.
Ms. DeGette. Yes.
Mr. Barham. If you went on a normal day, first the
mosquitos would carry you away and the gnats and the flies and
all the creatures that the birds are feeding on and the little
fish are feeding on. It is deathly silent, and nothing would
bite you.
Ms. DeGette. Yes. Well, we did get a few bites, but not as
many as we probably would on the other days.
Mr. Barham. That is right. It is a whole system, and once
that oil intrudes into that cane and into that marsh, you
cannot get it out.
Ms. DeGette. Let me ask you a question about those berms.
Because I hear what you are saying about the berms, but I don't
think, having observed it with my own eyes, that there would be
any way we could build enough berms to protect all of that
marshland. Maybe I am wrong, but it----
Mr. Barham. Well, you can create berms that will protect
the most critical parts or the most fragile parts.
Ms. DeGette. But you have to do it really in a targeted
way.
Mr. Barham. We do, and we have a target plan. The berms
that we have proposed, we believe, are very targeted and in
good locations, in the prime locations to do that protection
that we desperately need.
Ms. DeGette. But you are still going to have vast damage in
those other areas.
Mr. Barham. We are. We already will have it because of the
intrusion of the oil into those areas now, which we can't get
out.
Ms. DeGette. Secretary Lyder, I am wondering if you know,
or if someone else on the panel knows, what is the holdup to
construction of those berms that Mr. Barham is talking about
that we have seen so much in the media?
Ms. Lyder. Well, the state filed its application with the
Corps of Engineers on May 11, and we met on May 12. All the
Federal agencies met with the Corps to discuss it, and then the
state came to Houma and met with the Fish and Wildlife Service
and the U.S. Geological Survey on the 13th, and on the 14th
they amended their proposal.
On the 27th, the Corps of Engineers gave them a permit for
six, about 45 miles worth of berm. Then there was a question as
to how much of that would be an appropriate response expense
for BP to pick up, and that was the Coast Guard's decision, not
the Corps of Engineers and not any of ours.
Initially the Coast Guard said just one part would be an
appropriate response, and then after the Governor spoke with
the President, the President asked Thad Allen if he would
please reconsider, and he came back and said yes, the whole 45
mile area is appropriate response.
And my understanding is they have begun. The dredges are
moving. I don't know that the berms are actually there. The
state had asked for 128 miles of berm, and they have been given
a permit for 45 miles of berm.
Ms. DeGette. And what is the reason they haven't been given
the rest of those?
Ms. Lyder. Well, originally when the state came in they
said it would take six to nine months to build the system of
berm they were interested in, so I think there was some concern
on the part of the Corps and the Coast Guard that it wouldn't
be a timely response in terms of the oil involved.
There are other issues that the Corps and the Coast Guard
had that were not Interior Department issues. We were a little
concerned about where the dredged sand would come from and its
impact on the Barrier Islands out there, but within days that
was resolved. We met with the state.
As I say to everyone, Houma is open 24 hours a day and
people are working 24 hours a day, so things actually can be
done quickly if people get together and talk and try to work
them out. At least at the Interior Department we work very
closely with both the fisheries and wildlife people and
Louisiana's coastal protection agency.
Ms. DeGette. I am sure the Chair and the Ranking Member
would join me in saying anything we can do to facilitate those
conversations because if those berms are going to work for even
some of those marshlands, then we should make that happen. It
shouldn't be a matter of resources or miscommunication or
something like that. If they are going to work, they should
happen. This Committee, I am sure, will work with you to make
those connections.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank the gentlelady from Colorado. I would
like to thank the witnesses on the first panel--you have been
here all morning--for their testimony and for being here today
and now call up the second panel of witnesses. Thank you very
much.
[Pause.]
Ms. Bordallo. All right. Ladies and gentlemen, if the
second panel would please be seated as soon as possible? We do
have votes midafternoon, so we would like to get through the
next two panels.
The witnesses on the second panel, please be seated. Ms.
Brenda Dardar Robichaux, Principal Chief, United Houma Nation;
Mr. Aaron Viles, Campaign Director, Gulf Restoration Network;
Dr. Michael Fry, Director for Conservation Advocacy, American
Bird Conservancy; Dr. Carys Mitchelmore, Associate Professor,
University of Maryland Center for Environmental Science; and
our final witness on the second panel is Mr. Mike Voisin, CEO,
Motivatit Seafoods.
I would like to welcome our second panel of witnesses and
again note that the red timing light on the table will indicate
when your five minutes have passed, and your time is concluded.
We would appreciate your cooperation in complying with these
limits, but also be assured that your full written statement
will be included in our record.
Principal Chief Robichaux, thank you for being here today.
You may begin.
STATEMENT OF BRENDA DARDAR ROBICHAUX, PRINCIPAL CHIEF, UNITED
HOUMA NATION, GOLDEN MEADOW, LOUISIANA
Ms. Robichaux. Good morning, Madam Chair.
Ms. Bordallo. Would you get closer to the microphone,
please?
Ms. Robichaux. Good morning, Madam Chair and to you all. My
name is Brenda Dardar Robichaux, and I am Principal Chief of
the United Houma Nation. Thank you for giving us a voice in
this process.
We have several tribal citizens here today, Vice Principal
Chief Michael Dardar; Incoming Principal Chief Thomas Dardar;
my father, Whitney Dardar, a lifelong commercial fisherman; and
my sons.
The United Houma Nation is an indigenous nation of
approximately 17,000 citizens who reside along coastal
southeast Louisiana. We have existed in the bayous and rivers
of Louisiana for centuries. The relationship between the Houma
people are our land is fundamental to our existence as an
Indian Nation.
The medicines we use to prevent illness and heal our sick,
the places our ancestors are laid to rest, the fish, shrimp,
crabs and oysters our people harvest, our traditional stories
and the language we speak are all tied to these lands
inextricably. Without these lands, our culture and way of life
that has been passed down generation to generation disappear.
Since 2005, we have dealt with four major hurricanes and,
through our own efforts, have made significant progress in
recovering and getting our lives back. Today, the BP Deepwater
Horizon disaster presents us with perhaps the greatest
challenge in our history. For the Houma, this oil spill looms
as a death threat to our culture as we know it.
There is plenty of evidence of how these estuaries, bayous,
plants and wildlife will be devastated. Not only will it change
the environment we live in, but our land loss will be
critically accelerated, dwarfing the impacts of Katrina.
Providing our families with meals based on fresh seafood and
game may no longer be an option, which means putting food on
the table will be difficult for some of our people.
But the seafood industry is also a major source of
employment. During the shrimp season, my father says it is like
Christmas every morning. I fear he may never have another
Christmas. The tribe is also concerned about those making a
living in related professions, such as net makers, tour guides,
marinas and restaurant owners. None of them have been
compensated adequately.
We are concerned because many of the stories that we see in
the media about BP cleaning up don't match what our own eyes
have seen. Tribal members in surrounding communities have all
reported there are many contaminated areas where there is no
sign of cleanup work. Only a fraction of the workers and boats
that are certified for the cleanup are being utilized.
People working for cleanup aren't being properly advised on
how they need to protect their long-term health from the
poisons that they are handling. We are concerned that waste
produced by the spill cleanup will find its way into disposal
sites and our tribal area, such as the oil fill waste disposal
site next to our Grand Bois community.
Federal law defines any waste generated during the
production of petroleum as nonhazardous, no matter how
poisonous they actually are. Because of this absurd definition,
these materials can be land farmed in community as nonhazardous
all fill waste. We do not want these materials dumped in our
communities again, and we would respectfully request that this
law be changed to protect all U.S. citizens and all communities
from this kind of waste.
Most worrisome is the fact that we are now in hurricane
season. A tropical storm or hurricane coming ashore can flood
these communities with an oily-waste storm surge, similar to
the Murphy Oil incident in St. Bernard Parish during Hurricane
Katrina. These homes and properties were declared hazardous
sites and are toxic and uninhabitable to this day.
When a disaster hits, Federal resources are filtered to
Federally recognized tribes. We have been recognized by the
State of Louisiana, but have been stuck in the Federal
acknowledgement process since 1979. As a result, we do not
receive services from the BIA or any other agency that requires
Federal recognition status.
We would ask that we be included in the Federal dialogue
about how this spill will affect tribal communities, whether we
are recognized or not. Our tribe will also require independent
sources to credibly collect data on air, water, and soil
quality to provide the special outreach efforts our tribal
citizens will need to respond effectively to changing
conditions.
The Houma are strong, independent and resilient people. We
have watched hundreds of acres of wetlands wash away. We have
seen freshwater bayous turn into saltwater. We have seen our
traditional medicines disappear. We have seen our lands taken
from us because our people were not taught to read and write.
We have spent 30 years in the Federal acknowledgement process
without a final determination.
Through it all we have done what is necessary to survive,
but this oil spill presents a major challenge to our existence
as a tribe. I ask that you please support our efforts to bring
resources to the United Houma Nation to preserve our way of
life for current and future generations. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Robichaux follows:]
Statement of Brenda Dardar Robichaux, Principal Chief,
United Houma Nation
Good morning Chairwoman Bordallo, Ranking Member Brown and members
of the Subcommittee. My name is Brenda Dardar Robichaux and I am
Principal Chief of the United Houma Nation of Southeastern Louisiana.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify at today's hearing -``Our
Natural Resources at Risk: The Short and Long Term Impacts of the
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.'' We have several tribal citizens here
today - Vice Principal Chief Michael Dardar, incoming Principal Chief
Thomas Dardar and my father, Whitney Dardar a life-long commercial
fisherman.
The United Houma Nation is an indigenous nation of approximately
17,000 citizens who currently reside along coastal, southeast
Louisiana. The Houma, first encountered by LaSalle in 1682, have
existed in the bayous and rivers of South central Louisiana long before
Louisiana became a state and New Orleans became a French colony. Today,
nearly 90% of our citizens reside in coastal Terrebonne, Lafourche,
Jefferson, St. Mary, St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes. The majority
live in communities which are at or below sea level.
The relationship between the Houma People and these lands is
fundamental to our existence as an Indian nation. The medicines we use
to prevent illnesses and heal our sick, the places our ancestors are
laid to rest, the fish, shrimp, crabs and oysters our people harvest,
our traditional stories and the language we speak are all tied to these
lands inextricably. Without these lands, our culture and way of life
that has been passed down generation to generation will be gone.
Tribal citizens have been living, hunting, fishing, shrimping,
crabbing, trapping and harvesting oysters in the coastal marshes and
wetlands of our communities for centuries. Our people follow the
seasons. In the summer we catch shrimp, crabs and garfish. In the
winter we harvest oysters and trap nutria, muskrat, and otters. This is
how my father and countless other tribal citizens make their living.
This lifestyle is now in jeopardy.
Houma fishermen are intimately familiar with the lakes and bayous
of our region. They know the stories of how these places got their
names. They know how the tides flow and the winds blow. They can
predict the weather without the help of technical gadgets.
Not only are many tribal citizens both directly and indirectly
dependent on the commercial fishing industry, but Houma citizens
harvest palmetto in the coastal marshes for basket weaving, Spanish
moss for traditional doll making and many herbs and plants for
traditional medicinal remedies used by tribal traiteurs or traditional
healers. All of these traditions are in danger of disappearing once the
continuing flow of oil infiltrates the inner coastal marshes and
wetlands of our communities. These plants are irreplaceable and many
only grow in our rich marshes.
The United Houma Nation is no stranger to dealing with adversity.
In the early 1900's Houma children were not allowed into public schools
because they were Indian. Christian missionaries came into our
communities in the 1930's and established schools for Houma children.
Those schools only went up to the seventh or eighth grade, the teachers
were often unqualified and children were punished for speaking their
language. It was not until the passage of the Civil Rights Act that the
Houma children were allowed into public schools. The lack of
educational opportunities resulted in many Houma People continuing the
traditional ways of making a living off the land.
Another obstacle for the Houma has been obtaining recognition from
the federal government. We have been recognized by the State of
Louisiana but have been mired in the Federal Acknowledgment Process
since 1979, a year after the system for recognition was established..
In 1985, we filed our petition; we received a negative proposed finding
in 1994. The proposed finding stated that we met four of the seven
criteria for acknowledgment. Subsequently, we filed our rebuttal in
1996 to demonstrate that we do meet the remaining three criteria.
Nearly fifteen years after we submitted our rebuttal and over thirty
years after we began the process, we still do not have a final
determination. We have one of the largest petitions on file and are the
largest tribe to go through the federal acknowledgment process. Despite
our lack of federal recognition, the United Houma Nation continues to
function as a government and provides services to tribal citizens.
Located in coastal Louisiana, our communities face special
challenges. We have long lived with hurricanes, and over the years, we
have become efficient in preparing for and recovering from them. Within
the last five years, we have dealt with four major hurricanes - Katrina
and Rita in 2005 and Ike and Gustav in 2008 - and, though these storms
presented incredible challenges, we have made significant progress in
recovering and getting our lives back. The Tribe established a
hurricane relief center where tribal citizens can receive cleaning
supplies, food, clothing and other essential items. We coordinated
hundreds of volunteers to help clean and rebuild homes. Through our own
efforts, we have been able to get tribal citizens back on their feet
and some back into their homes.
While it takes time to recover from hurricanes, even after these
huge storms, our people were able to resume their lives and our
fishermen have gone back to work. Because most of the Houma communities
exist outside of hurricane protection levees, they are at constant risk
from normal tidal flooding and from tropical storm and hurricane
surges. With each hurricane, some tribal members move outside the
tribal communities to areas less prone to flooding. Many cannot afford
the insurance to rebuild.
Now, the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster presents us with perhaps the
greatest challenge in our history as we are at risk of losing the heart
of our culture - our homelands. It is without question that the oil
spill will affect the estuaries within which the Houma tribal fishermen
make their living. As the oil enters our coastal marshes the wetland
vegetation will be killed. This prevents fish, shrimp, crabs and
oysters from reproducing because these marshes are where these species
spawn and receive protection from natural predators. In addition, these
marshes are home to already diminishing wetland mammals such as mink,
otter and muskrat.
Once the vegetation is dead, mud plains poisoned with oil will
become open water, thereby eliminating critical habitat. Not only will
this spill change the environment we live in, but our land loss will be
critically accelerated, dwarfing the impacts of Katrina and the other
recent hurricanes. This spill will have far-reaching effects that will
compromise the economic, environmental and mental health of all of
southeast Louisiana. For the Houmas, it also looms as a death threat to
our culture as we know it.
Our tribal citizens are deeply concerned about the short and long
term impacts of this oil spill. Growing up I never knew we were
considered poor by government standards because we had a rich culture,
were surrounded by abundant natural resources, and always had fresh
food on the table. I grew up eating fish, shrimp, crabs, oysters, ducks
and rabbits. Providing our families with meals based on fresh seafood
and game may no longer be an option, which means putting food on the
table will be difficult for some of our people.
But seafood is more than just a major source of food for our tribal
citizens. Working in the seafood industry is also a major source of
employment. During shrimp season, my father says it is like Christmas
every morning. I fear that he may not have another Christmas. While
some tribal fishermen have received checks from BP, these do not
replace what they have temporarily and maybe even permanently lost. The
Tribe is also concerned about those making a living in related
professions such as net makers, seafood distributors, restaurant owners
and others. With a limited education through no fault of their own,
many tribal citizens do not have options for alternative employment.
How will they support themselves and their families once the checks
stop.? The answer we do not know.
We are concerned that waste produced by the spill clean up (used
booms, pads, etc.) will find its way into disposal sites in our tribal
areas, in particular our Grand Bois community. Grand Bois is located
adjacent to an open pit oilfield waste disposal site in Lafourche
parish. The 1980 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) defined
any wastes that are generated during the exploration and production of
petroleum, which will include any wastes generated in the clean up of
this spill, as non-hazardous. Neither the crude oil nor any dispersants
used in responding to this disaster are regulated as hazardous waste.
Although these materials are hazardous by nature, they can be
``landfarmed'' in Grand Bois and other communities as ``Non-Hazardous
Oilfield Waste'' or NOW. We do not want these materials disposed of in
our communities, and we would respectfully request that this law be
changed to protect all US citizens from exposure to these harmful
chemicals. The citizens of Grand Bois as well as the thousands of
citizens who live near oilfield waste disposal sites can testify to the
toxic effects of these supposedly non-hazardous materials.
Most worrisome is the fact that we are now in hurricane season. The
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) predicts between
14 and 23 named storms this year and between 3 and 7 major hurricanes.
The entire United Houma Nation along the Louisiana coast is completely
vulnerable to widespread inundation by oil-contaminated waters. Some of
our communities have been totally excluded in parish and Army Corps of
Engineers levee protection systems, and many communities have very
little and/or compromised protection.
A tropical storm or hurricane coming ashore west of Louisiana
before the oil flow is capped and existing surface and subsurface oil
cleaned up will flood these communities with an oily waste storm surge,
similar to the Murphy Oil incident in St. Bernard Parish during
Hurricane Katrina. Residents' homesteads had to be purchased by Murphy
Oil. These properties and homes are uninhabitable to this day. A
minimal tropical storm or even a simple strong summer storm during high
tide will be disastrous to our communities. Our citizens are now very
concerned that if they are required to evacuate, they may never be able
to return to their homes. Such a very possible scenario will equate to
thousands of Houmas being permanently displaced.
We have a special concern for the effects of this disaster on our
youth. In early May, the tribe held a tribal youth leadership
conference. Participants were asked about their concerns for the future
and nearly all of them mentioned the oil spill. They are concerned that
they will not be able to carry on the traditions of our people.
As a result of our lack of federal acknowledgment, we do not
receive services from the Bureau of Indian Affairs or any other agency
that require federal recognition status. When a disaster hits, federal
resources are filtered to federally recognized tribes. Although
sympathetic to our needs, their hands are tied in providing financial
assistance to the United Houma Nation that suffers the greatest impacts
of these disasters. A final determination on our petition was due over
10 years ago. We have dealt with countless hurricanes during that time
and now this massive oil spill. We most certainly could have used
additional resources that would be available to federally recognized
tribes and need them now more than ever. In this case of the oil spill,
we have been contacted by the U.S. Department of Interior, the U.S.
Department of Commerce, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. We plan to continue
discussions with these departments and are hopeful that sufficient
resources will be made available to the United Houma Nation.
Because of the enormous scope of this disaster, our tribal
leadership must make tremendous efforts to ensure that our members
receive timely and accurate information about its ongoing environmental
and health impacts. Due to limited educational opportunities in the
past, many of our tribal elders lack the skills needed to read and
understand written notices or effectively use the Internet to gather
information. Many of our communities are isolated, and there is limited
if any monitoring of environmental conditions in them. Our tribe will
require resources to collect data on air, water, and soil quality and
to provide the special outreach efforts our tribal citizens will need
to respond effectively to changing conditions.
The Houma are a strong, very independent, and resilient people. We
have seen small canals turn into large bayous; we have watched hundreds
of acres of wetlands wash away; we have seen freshwater bayous turn
into saltwater; we have seen our traditional medicines disappear; we
have seen tribal members move out of our communities due to constant
flooding; we have seen our lands taken from us because our people were
not taught to read and write and we have spent 30 years in the federal
acknowledgment process without a final determination. Throughout it
all, we have done what was necessary to survive.
This oil spill presents a major challenge to our existence as a
tribe. Therefore, I ask that you please support our efforts to bring
resources to the United Houma Nation to preserve our way of life for
current and future generations.
______
[NOTE: Ms. Robichaux's responses to questions were not received by the
time this hearing went to print.]
Ms. Bordallo. I thank you very much, Principal Chief
Robichaux, for your very thoughtful input on this, and we will
have some questions for you later.
Mr. Viles, I look forward to your testimony, and you may
proceed.
STATEMENT OF AARON VILES, CAMPAIGN DIRECTOR,
GULF RESTORATION NETWORK, NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA
Mr. Viles. Chairwoman Bordallo, Subcommittee Members, thank
you for the opportunity to testify in front of you today. My
name is Aaron Viles. I am the Campaign Director with the Gulf
Restoration Network. We are a 15-year-old nonprofit
environmental advocacy organization, with an exclusive focus on
the health of the Gulf of Mexico. We have staff in New Orleans,
in Texas, in Florida, and we have board members representing
all five Gulf states.
So as you might anticipate, this crisis has been a game
changer for us and has absolutely forced us to drop what we
were doing to respond to this, which a lot of people are
calling it a spill. I don't really think that captures this
issue adequately. This is a deepwater drilling disaster that
has opened up a fissure in the earth that is spewing forth
incredible amounts of oil, unprecedented amounts of oil.
And I think we should be mindful of how we reference it
because we are almost minimizing it when we call it a spill or
a leak. A spill is what happens when my daughter knocks over
her glass of milk. This is far more significant. We have seen
multiple Exxon Valdez's worth of oil emptied into the Gulf of
Mexico, and we know the environmental impacts will be
significant and long lasting. We will be responding to this for
years, if not decades.
I have issued robust comments for my testimony. Please look
at those. If you want the facts and the figures, they are
there. What I would like to tell you is more of what we are
seeing on the ground with our efforts to monitor this disaster.
We were one of the first nonprofits in the air to take a
look at the source of this, to go 45 miles off the bird's foot
delta in a private plane and look at it. It was Sunday, April
25, and it was mind blowing to see how large it had already
grown.
I think at that point--I am not sure what the timeline is,
but I think BP might have been saying that it actually wasn't
issuing any oil, but clearly that was not accurate, which is
what we have seen from BP since day one is inaccurate
statements being made about the impacts. They have minimized.
They have denied. They have delayed their response, which I
think is inexcusable and quite possibly criminal.
I know that we have been restricted in what we are able to
do to monitor and respond to this disaster. The flight that we
went on took quite a lot of work to try to get out there. My
pilot, my volunteer pilot with South Wings, another nonprofit
organization, spent his entire Saturday on the phone trying to
get clearance to fly into the area.
There is a temporary--``temporary''--flight restriction.
You know, 42 days in we still have that flight restriction,
which does not let pilots drop below 3,000 feet in a vast and
growing expanse of the Gulf of Mexico. That I think is
unnecessary. It is an overreach.
When he spent his Saturday to try to get into that flight
restricted area, first he talked to the FAA, who quickly put
him in touch with duty agents of the Coast Guard. He bounced
between those folks for quite awhile, until late Saturday night
he got a phone call from somebody at the Deepwater Horizon
Response Center, actually an employee of BP, telling him that
we could not get a discrete code to fly into that area. We did
it anyway.
We were lucky because the conditions were clear, and we got
images that showed what BP was doing at the source, which was
not consistent with what they were telling the public. We saw
three boats out there. This was Sunday, the first Sunday of
this disaster. They had talked about dozens of boats being
mobilized and thousands and workers, and we saw three boats.
One of them was a skimmer that was not in fact skimming.
Apparently the conditions were too rough. It was a very
moderate day for the Gulf of Mexico with probably under three
foot seas.
Since that, we have been continuously underwhelmed by the
response. I know that we had a great panel, the first panel. We
had two veteran representatives talking about the expansive
efforts. I will say that what we continue to see, although it
is more significant than it was, is still not up to the
challenge.
We have called for a really Federalized response to this
effort and not using BP and not letting them control the
efforts or direct the efforts with a thumbs up from the Federal
Government, but in fact bringing in the military to make this
happen.
Four and a half years ago, almost five years ago, we went
through a horrific scenario that I didn't think I would ever
seen anything close to again. Unfortunately, what we are seeing
right now is likely ultimately going to be worse when it comes
to the impacts on our ecosystem. And unfortunately we had a sea
of Federal response at that time, and I would hope that a
general honorary type could be found to marshal the Federal
resources to combat this crisis.
So as I wrap up, I would like to urge this Subcommittee to
help the region. Specifically, we are very interested in seeing
the appointment and creation of regional citizen advisory
councils. There is an opportunity to create them under the OPA,
and I think they have been very effective in Alaska. They need
to be created in the Gulf of Mexico, and we need your help to
make that happen.
Also, we need to make sure this does not happen again. As
we clean up this ecosystem that is incredibly threatened right
now and vulnerable because, in part, of a 50-year legacy of oil
and gas exploration and abuse in Louisiana's coastal wetlands,
we need to make sure this ecosystem is restored and we need
Federal resources to do that.
We know that this Administration has been very engaged.
They actually created a road map for restoration that we
thought showed great promise, was very ambitious. It of course
has been a little bit deprioritized right now understandably,
but as we move forward with the NRDA process, we need to look
at that restoration road map as a way to actually restore this
ecosystem.
And then finally I think what we need to see is a far more
aggressive response as to getting our transportation sector off
of oil so this doesn't have to happen again. We have heard a
lot of people defending the oil industry. We have heard a lot
of pushback against, in my mind, a sensible six-month
moratorium to assess what happened and make sure it doesn't
happen again, but clearly the best way to make sure this
doesn't happen again is to keep us from having to get into the
deep and ultra-deep waters, by reducing our dependence on oil.
So I would like to just wrap up by saying thank you again
for the opportunity to come here and share our views with you,
and I look forward to any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Viles follows:]
Statement of Aaron Viles, Campaign Director, Gulf Restoration Network
The Gulf Restoration Network is a fifteen year old environmental
advocacy organization exclusively focused on the health of the Gulf of
Mexico. Our mission is to unite and empower people to protect and
restore the natural resources of the Gulf for future generations. Our
primary efforts have focused on ensuring healthy waters, protecting and
restoring coastal wetlands, and defending marine fisheries and
ecosystems. We have staff in Texas, Florida and in our home office of
New Orleans, with board members representing all five Gulf states.
Since April 22, 2010 when the Deepwater Horizon sank into the Gulf,
we have re-assigned staff and organizational resources and sought to
independently monitor and respond to this growing, slow-motion,
environmental catastrophe, which is likely to be judged as the worst
our nation has experienced.
We have monitored BP's deepwater drilling disaster from the water
and the air, with an average of two flights and one boat trip per week.
Our first flight over the surface of the disaster occurred on Sunday,
April 25th, and we were shocked. Despite claims made by BP at the time,
that dozens of boats had been mobilized, we saw three boats on site,
neither of which were skimmers. Three boats. Just three days after the
rig sank, an enormous amount of sheen and emulsified oil had already
accumulated at the surface of the disaster.
An amount of oil equivalent to multiple Exxon Valdez tankers has
flowed into the Gulf of Mexico, and clean up and containment efforts
have been horribly ineffective. Despite a regime of skimming, booming,
and burning, only a small percentage of BP's crude has been physically
removed from the Gulf so far. In addition to the insult of the oil, is
the exceptionally risky science experiment being conducted with the
dispersants. An unprecedented amount, currently over 1 million gallons
of dispersant has been applied both to the surface, and injected
undersea. The long-term impacts of the dispersants to the benthic
community and up the food chain is unknown.
As reported by NOAA and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the
numbers of dead and stranded wildlife are beginning to tell the tale of
the magnitude of this disaster. As of June 8th, 315 sea turtles have
been collected in BP's drilling disaster impact area, 265 were dead,
and 50 were collected alive, most at sea and visibly oiled. Of the five
species of sea turtles that live in the Gulf, 3 are classified as
endangered, and 2 are threatened. The most endangered seaturtle, Kemp's
ridley seems to be hit the hardest, as juveniles of this species have
been the most dominant species found. If beaches are oiled at the time
of turtle nesting, it is likely that emergent hatchling mortality will
increase, both due to the impacts of the oil on the turtles, as well as
contact associated with the process of physically removing oil. August
is the important nesting time for the endangered loggerhead turtles
which are already experiencing a reduction in observed nests in the
Alabama/Florida panhandle area at risk of BP's crude.
So far, 1007 birds have been collected, 594 of which were dead, 413
of which were alive and oiled. The images of oiled brown pelicans seen
by the world, are haunting, and troubling, as the Louisiana state bird
was only removed from the endangered species list just last November.
This is the time of the year that pelicans nest. Much nesting occurs on
barrier islands, several of which are currently surrounded by oil.
Sadly, even if the birds can maintain their nests until fledglings
hatch, it is likely this spill will have significant impacts on those
fledglings. First flight for the brown pelican doesn't happen for 75
days, a time during which the blind and featherless hatchling is
entirely dependent upon their parents, as both the mother and father
play a role in caring for the hatchlings. Plunge feeders which
apparently are unable to differentiate between oiled and non-oiled
waters, the brown pelican is highly susceptible to oiling, and studies
have shown that even cleaned and rehabilitated birds do not return to
optimal health.
Two stranded dolphins have been collected, and 30 dead dolphins
have been found. Marine mammals are susceptible to the oil and
dispersants through ingestion or inhalation. As marine mammals surface
to breathe, the highly volatile nature of this oil can have significant
impacts on these animals, including respiratory inflammation, pneumonia
and death. Further, the inhaled vapors can confuse the animals causing
them to become stranded.
The Mississippi Canyon area is the primary feeding area of the Gulf
of Mexico sperm whale sub-population, currently estimated at 1665
individuals. Sperm whales are endangered and the subject of a recovery
plan. These whales spend their time in the area year-round. Sperm
whales dive even deeper than the 5,000 feet depth of the well-head, and
spend \3/4\ of their time hunting. When they surface, they often sit in
a vertical, rest dive, as they recover their energy. In this state,
they have been known to be hit by boats, suggesting that in this state
the whales have decreased acuity, a situation which may lead them to be
further exposed to and affected by oil pollution. Impacts to sperm
whales can come from ingestion of oil, respiratory distress from
hydrocarbon vapors, contaminated food sources, and displacement from
primary feeding areas. Current research suggests that if human-caused
mortality exceeds 3 whales annually, then recovery of the Gulf sperm
whale pod will be negatively impacted. The total impact of the oil on
sperm whales may be difficult to determine, as sperm whale carcasses
are unlikely to be found due to their off-shore habitat.
Other offshore species are threatened as well. The globe trotting
Western Atlantic bluefin tuna is an amazing fish, larger than Shaquile
O'Neal and can swim faster than a greyhound can run. But their
populations have been cut by 80% since 1970 due to overfishing, and
they only spawn in the Gulf of Mexico. April and May are the peak
spawning time for this species, and researchers have found significant
amounts of larvae in what is now BP's impact area. This is troubling as
fish eggs and larvae are highly sensitive to oil and dispersants. As a
result, this year's age-class of bluefin tuna, as well as many of the
42 federally managed species in the Gulf of Mexico may suffer
significant decreases to population size, which will in turn effect the
commercial and recreational fisheries of the Gulf. For example, we may
see impacts to commercially and recreationally important species that
are already overfished, such as red snapper, greater amberjack, gag
grouper, and gray triggerfish.
Dispersants, like BP's preferred product, Corexit 9500/9527, are a
mixture of solvents, surfactants and other secret ingredients that are
designed to make oil more soluble in water. Most of what is known about
the toxicity of dispersants and dispersed oil is based on acute
toxicity tests. The scientific literature suggests that acute (short-
term) toxicity tests with death as the primary endpoint may not
adequately assess the long-term impacts of chemically-dispersed oil.
Long-term studies are needed to adequately determine delayed effects
due to metabolism of chemically-dispersed oil, bioaccumulation, or
photo-enhanced toxicity. The scientific literature is inconclusive on
the impact of dispersants to the marine environment. One long-term
study did show that dispersants reduced the persistence of oil in
subtidal and intertidal sediments compared to untreated oil. However,
in toxicity studies, it has been shown that Corexit 9500A combined with
fuel oil #2 is more lethal than either fuel oil #2 or the dispersant
alone. Additionally, when the chemically-dispersed oil is exposed to
sunlight it undergoes photomodification, transforming it into a more
toxic chemical. Chemically dispersed oil is significantly more toxic
than oil alone when exposed to sunlight.
Photosensitization could be another long-term problem.
Photosensitization can occur when polycyclic aromatic hydrocrabons
bioaccumulate in the tissues of aquatic organisms and form free-
radicals when these organisms are exposed to sunlight. If, as feared,
Gulf species accumulate toxic dispersed oil in their tissue, then
exposure to the sun could increase the toxicity For example, Corals
would be at risk for photosensitization since they are known to
bioaccumulate spilled oil quickly and are not adept at filtering the
toxins out.
The general consensus of the scientific community is that the use
of dispersants requires a trade-off. The choice to use dispersants
means accepting 1) greater concentrations of chemically-dispersed oil
in the water column, 2) a potential reduction in persistent stranded
oil, and 3) increased unknowns in terms of long-term toxicity on
sediments and marine life. So far, BP has applied over 1 million
gallons of dispersant to the surface and subsea in response to their
drilling disaster. The initial decision to use dispersants was based on
a stated desire by the company and the federal agencies to keep the oil
out of sensitive marsh areas at the expense of deep water marine life
in the hope that marine bacteria would metabolize the oil. However, the
current situation makes clear that the application of dispersants are
not preventing oil from reaching shore, and that no amount of
dispersants will be sufficient to prevent landfall in light of the
magnitude of the amount of BP's oil that continues to flow into the
Gulf. A growing concern is that the bacteria that eat oil also
metabolize oxygen in the process. This has the potential to create an
enormous area in the Gulf with depleted dissolved oxygen, which in turn
may result in fish kills and other environmental damage. In short, BP's
continued application of dispersants is tantamount to the largest
chemical experiment ever attempted in the Gulf of Mexico or elsewhere
and the magnitude of the negative impacts of this experiment on the
marine resources of the Gulf may not be known for decades.
As experienced on our first flyover, and seen on every flight and
boat trip taken since that first week of the disaster, the efforts by
BP to contain and clean up their oil are underwhelming and insufficient
to the enormous challenge they have created for themselves. Boom is
inadequately deployed to protect coastal resources, and insufficient
for the task, in part due to dispersants moving the oil below the
surface of the Gulf. Whether by choice or by neglect, not enough
physical removal of the oil is occurring, and the oil is making it into
Louisiana's marsh.
One take-away lesson of this disaster is that the Gulf coast is
environmentally rich, yet also an exceptionally fragile ecosystem. As
we hold BP accountable we must ensure that there is sufficient funding
to ensure that a thorough assessment of the damages, both short and
long-term, to this ecosystem are fully documented and that, where
possible, restoration of those resources be required. We have a
responsibility to ensure protection and restoration of the marine
resources of the Gulf states.
We also cannot forget the coastal resources that are being
impacted. For example, the wetlands of the Mississippi River Delta, now
threatened by BP's oil, make up 41 percent of the nation's total
coastal wetlands. As an economic resource they are invaluable,
providing support to 40 percent of the national oil refining capacity,
28 percent of the national fishing harvest, the largest concentration
of migrating waterfowl in the United States, and a variety of other
wildlife. Coastal Louisiana also boasts productive agriculture and
tourism industries, including a now-limited and hamstrung multi-billion
dollar commercial and recreational fishing industry and support
services. In addition to the many economic benefits wetlands provide,
the value of the storm protection they have historically offered for
the residents of the Mississippi River Delta is a priceless commodity.
Louisiana's coastal wetlands were already in trouble before BP's
drilling disaster, with 25 square miles of those wetlands disappearing
each year. The oil now entering those wetlands will only increase
coastal wetlands loss. Louisiana officials estimate that the cost to
restore the state's coastal wetlands is at least $50 billion and will
take over three decades to complete. Coastal scientists are in
agreement that wetland loss is an overwhelmingly complex issue and
includes a myriad of direct and indirect sources. Two of the primary
forces at work in Louisiana's coastal zone - oil development and
navigation--have clearly benefitted the nation, and as such, argue for
a national commitment to the region's recovery.
Although the most commonly cited cause of Louisiana's wetland loss
is the blockage of sediment input from the Mississippi River, oil and
gas-related activities are the second most significant cause of this
loss. Studies have empirically demonstrated that the direct and
indirect effects of oil and gas exploration, recovery, and development
are together responsible for 40 to 60 percent of documented wetland
loss. And, even Shell Oil's own scientists predict that if nothing is
done to restore and protect coastal wetlands, Louisiana could lose
another 500 square miles over the next 50 years.
The spider-web of canals, which support the 500-plus oil and gas
drilling sites throughout the coastal zone, have led to a significantly
increased rate of land loss due to the hydrologic isolation of the
local marsh from neighboring water bodies caused by the spill banks
surrounding each waterway. Today, over 10,000 miles of canals dredged
by the oil and gas industry remain open, forging a canal-spill bank
network that represents seven percent of the current total wetland
area. Despite developments and improvements in the drilling process,
historic practices such as the abandonment of oil and gas canals, has
prevented the natural re-growth of the surrounding wetlands.
In hindsight, it is no surprise that 80 percent of national wetland
losses--the most dramatic coastal wetland losses in the US--are in the
states of the Gulf Coast. Since 1930, Louisiana has lost about one
million acres of coastal wetlands.
There is still hope for Louisiana. Projects implemented locally and
regionally have demonstrated that wetland environments are incredibly
regenerative. As dead-end canals are filled in and spoil banks are
demolished, vegetative re-growth flourishes and subsidence reversal
shows promise. It is also clear that reintroduction of Mississippi
River fresh water and sediment through large-scale river diversions
will play a role, in addition to pipeline sediment delivery of dredged
spoil.
In our efforts to ensure that BP addresses the environmental
consequences of its actions, we must ensure that Louisiana's wetlands
are restored. State and federal agencies should focus restoration
funding received from BP on healing the old scars of existing canals
and spoil banks at least as much as with the steady-handed and clear-
minded distribution of future dredging permits.
As state and federal trustees move forward with a Natural Resource
Damage Assessment, and ultimately use the NRDA to hold BP to account
for this crisis, GRN urges the trustees to utilize existing yet under
resourced coastal restoration efforts and initiatives as the vehicles
for the natural resource restoration that BP must pay for.
In summation, the Gulf Restoration Network is highly concerned that
BP's deep water drilling disaster will have significant, long-term
impacts to the marine ecosystem of the Gulf of Mexico. Sea turtles,
seabirds, marine mammals and coastal habitats are all being affected
now, and will continue to experience harm as BP's oil and dispersant
mix pollutes the Gulf. We are calling for an end to the use of
dispersants unless and until the EPA and independent scientists can
show that the risk is outweighed by the rewards. We are calling on a
full federalization of the cleanup efforts, leaving BP to bring their
expertise to bear one mile below the seafloor, but calling in the Navy
to bring the full resources and organization of the U.S. military to
the war against BP's crude. BP must ensure the natural resources of the
Gulf harmed by their oil are restored, or if impossible, that their
investment in the resources of the Gulf match the destruction they have
caused. In addition, we must ensure our coastal communities, which have
not recovered from the hurricane seasons of 2005 and 2008 are defended
and given the resources necessary to ensure their future.
We are calling for the creation of a Gulf of Mexico regional
citizen's advisory council, consisting of commercial and recreational
fishing interests, tourism, conservation and local government
representatives spanning all five Gulf states. The advisory council
should be created in order to provide an effective counterweight to the
energy industry in the Gulf of Mexico, which has for far too long,
allowed unchecked exploration and development in the sensitive habitats
of the North Central Gulf of Mexico. A well-resourced, staffed and
deployed advisory council should be created while we seek answers as to
the causes and consequences of BP's deepwater drilling disaster, and
should be funded by those who profit off the exploitation of our Gulf.
Ultimately, Congress must make the changes necessary that a
disaster such as this never happens again, either in the Gulf of
Mexico, or any U.S. coast. Regulations must be effective and enforced,
deep water drilling must develop a safety net able to prevent this
scenario, and it is time to get serious about moving our transportation
sector away from oil. If these lessons are not learned, and our leaders
do not sound the call for a clean future for the Gulf and all our
coasts, than this tragedy will have been in vain.
Thank you for the opportunity to share our views.
______
[NOTE: Mr. Viles' responses to questions were not received by the time
this hearing went to print.]
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Viles, for your
valuable input here for the Committee.
And welcome back to the Subcommittee, Dr. Fry, and please
begin your testimony.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL FRY, PH.D., DIRECTOR FOR CONSERVATION
ADVOCACY, AMERICAN BIRD CONSERVANCY, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Dr. Fry. Thank you for inviting me to testify. My name is
Dr. Michael Fry. I am Director of Conservation Advocacy at
American Bird Conservancy. I work on issues of pesticides, oil
spill and other toxics.
I also serve as chair of the Minerals Management Service
Scientific Advisory Committee for Environmental Studies
Program. I served on this committee from 1988 to 1996 and as
chair for two years and was reappointed to the committee in
2006. The Scientific Committee reviews the Environmental
Studies Program and makes recommendations on studies and
program direction to the Secretary of the Interior.
I am an avian toxicologist with expertise on the effects of
oil spills and dispersants on seabirds. I have described the
effects of oil on birds in my written testimony.
There are many parallels between the Exxon Valdez spill and
the Deepwater Horizon spill. The Exxon spill was a catastrophic
event that occurred over a period of only a few days, but the
oil spread across southern Alaska for months. More than 1,300
miles of shoreline were oiled and, even after cleaning, it took
years for the habitats to recover. Some sensitive habitats
still have oil.
The oil probably killed hundreds of thousands of birds,
although only 35,000 birds were recovered. Many bald eagles
were oiled and killed, but the population recovered quickly,
while other species still have not fully recovered 21 years
after the spill. I expect the Deepwater Horizon spill will have
equally far reaching and long-term effects, and the wetlands
and mangroves will not recover for decades.
The persistent oil in wetlands will have long-term negative
effects on nesting seabirds. This year it will be impossible to
prevent nesting birds from trying to find food outside of
boomed areas. There will be near total breeding failure in
oiled areas this year.
A major difference between the Exxon Valdez spill and the
Deepwater Horizon is the continuing release of huge quantities
of oil into the ecosystem. The explosive discharges of oil at
depth result in naturally dispersed oil under the surface, as
well as floating oil on the surface. All of this oil will
continue with movements and will likely oil more than a
thousand miles of coastline during the coming storm season.
In addition to birds, endangered sperm whales in the Gulf
of Mexico are at high risk of death, just as killer whales were
killed in the Exxon Valdez spill. Sperm whales are territorial
and live in the oiled areas. They have been observed surfacing
in oil slicks, and they will inhale the oil, suffocate and die.
These animals need special attention.
I need now to change subjects and discuss the Minerals
Management Service Environmental Studies Program that my
Federal advisory committee is charged with reviewing and
evaluating. This program began in the 1970s with a good budget
to develop baseline data on the sea bottom, seabirds, marine
mammals, fish and their habitats. I was an expert for the U.S.
after the Exxon Valdez oil spill.
Without detailed studies funded by the MMS during their
program, identification of injury would not have been possible.
If I could show that first graph? Thank you. Today, however,
the budget of the Environmental Studies Program at MMS is about
one-third of the $55 million figure that it was in 1975, and if
corrected for inflation it is now about 10 percent of what it
was in 1975.
This graph shows only a token increase in studies
immediately after the Exxon Valdez, the little blip there
halfway down the graph, but then a substantial cut almost
immediately after that. It is not appropriate for Congress to
continually cut the budgets of mission-oriented studies and
expect that there will be no future consequences.
This is a time of significant expansion in the mandated
Minerals Management Service to evaluate new areas off the
Atlantic coast, Florida, the Pacific Northwest, as well as
expanding existing programs in southern California and Alaska.
It is the opinion of the Advisory Committee that the
current MMS program is severely underfunded, and that the
Scientific Committee in 2008 recommended to the Secretary of
the Interior that the Environmental Studies budget be at least
doubled. A fivefold increase would bring it back to earlier
levels.
We repeated this recommendation in 2009, and I urge the
Subcommittee and your congressional colleagues to substantially
increase the budget for these studies. The U.S. collects $23
billion annually in royalties and bonus bids from the MMS
leases. None of these dollars go back into the MMS program.
The consequences of inadequate congressional appropriations
have now come home to roost with the Deepwater Horizon
disaster, which was partly a result of extending leasing beyond
the understanding of the risks. MMS critically needs augmented
funding to catch up to the demands of the domestic oil
production.
In 2009, they made a plea--if we could show the second
picture--for the studies in the North Aleutian Basin, also
known as Bristol Bay, Alaska, because of the highly productive
crab and red salmon fisheries and extremely large number of
migratory birds and critically endangered Pacific right whales.
This picture shows a small portion of the birds and a whale
surfacing in the middle. You can see it is an incredibly
productive area and really at risk from the oil spills.
I personally recommend that no leasing be conducted in
Bristol Bay or the Arctic Ocean until adequate studies are
funded to understand the risks in these highly sensitive
habitats. The risks of floating ice in the Arctic, as are shown
by iceberg scars on the ocean floor, point to the dangers of
icebergs and huge sheets of ice damaging oil facilities with
catastrophic consequences.
If spills cannot be prevented in these critical habitats,
no leasing should go forward. It will be impossible to clean up
oil under ice cover. It is irresponsible to continue leasing
and exploration in icy waters without developing and testing
the safety and response systems that will be needed when the
inevitable Arctic Ocean spill happens.
It has been announced that the MMS will be split into three
separate bureaus to separate royalty collection from leasing
and regulatory parts of the agency. I strongly believe that the
mission targeted Studies Program remain within the Leasing
Branch so that the mission targeted studies can best be
designed in support of future leasing. Without that remaining
there, if the Studies Program is changed to another agency it
will lose that mission target orientation.
I thank the Committee for letting me present my views and
the views of the Federal Advisory Committee. I will be glad to
respond to questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Fry follows:]
Statement of Donald Michael Fry, PhD, Director,
Conservation Advocacy, American Bird Conservancy
Chairman Bordallo, Ranking Member Brown, and distinguished members
of the Insular Affairs, Oceans and Wildlife Subcommittee, I would like
to thank you for inviting me to testify on behalf of the American Bird
Conservancy (ABC) and the Federal Advisory Committee for Minerals
Management Service Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies
Program.
My name is Dr. Michael Fry, and I am the Director the Conservation
Advocacy Program at American Bird Conservancy. In addition to being
responsible for interpreting the science and federal policy issues
concerning pesticides and other toxics, my job includes a issues
related to the effects of wind projects on habitat impacts and
mortality to birds.
My qualifications include a PhD in Animal Physiology from the
University of California, Davis, and 35 years experience in avian
ecology and toxicology at the University of California and at American
Bird Conservancy. I serve as Chair of the Minerals Management Service,
Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program, Science Advisory
Committee.
American Bird Conservancy (ABC) is a 501(c)3 not-for-profit
organization, whose mission is to conserve wild birds and their
habitats throughout the Americas. It is the only U.S.-based, group
dedicated solely to overcoming the greatest threats facing birds in the
Western Hemisphere. In brief, ABC has been an active participant in
national symposia on seabirds and has an active program for
conservation of seabirds throughout the Americas and Pacific.
My second role today is that of Chairman of the Federal Advisory
Scientific Committee for the Outer Continental Shelf Environmental
Studies Program. I served on this committee from 1989 to 1996, as
Chairman for two years, and I was reappointed to the Committee in 2006
and am the current Chairman. The Scientific Committee reviews the
environmental studies program studies plan each year and makes
recommendations on proposed studies and suggestions for program
direction to the Secretary of Interior.
I am an avian toxicologist with experience in studying the effects
of oil spills on populations of seabirds, including the pathology of
oil and the effects on behavior and reproduction of birds exposed to
oil. I conducted research on seabirds experimentally exposed to oil in
the 1980s, and worked with the oil spill responders in Alaska following
the Exxon Valdez spill. After the Exxon Valdez spill I participated in
the Natural Recourses Damage Assessment with the Trustees, and helped
evaluate the long-term effects of the spill on the many bird species
present in Coastal Alaska.
Oil exposure to seabirds causes a cascade of injuries. The initial
injury is fouling, and everyone has seen photos of pelicans and other
birds coated with oil so that they are unable to fly or forage for
food. Oil, either fresh, weathered or chemically dispersed, destroys
the insulation properties of feathers, and allows water to penetrate to
the skin of birds. When this happens, the birds become cold, and must
metabolize stored nutrients in order to maintain body temperature. This
causes loss of stored fat followed by muscle wasting, so that the birds
are severely weakened, cannot fly, cannot feed, and rapidly
deteriorate. If not recovered by rescue teams within a few days, they
will starve to death. If oiled birds are far out to sea, many will
drown and sink without ever being detected. This is particularly true
for diving juvenile Northern Gannets, which are highly pelagic and
remain out at sea throughout the year. Gannets were the first birds
recovered at sea in the Deepwater Horizon spill, and I fear that many
will be oiled and never be detected or recovered.
The cascade of injury continues with internal oil exposure. Birds
that attempt to clean themselves by preening oil from their feathers
will ingest quantities of oil, which causes injury to the digestive
tract, liver and kidneys, resulting in greatly elevated stress, and
especially impaired kidney function. Exposure to fresh oil containing
the gasoline components results in respiratory injury from inhalation
of toxic fumes. Without adequate veterinary care, most moderately and
heavily oiled birds will die.
The consequences of even light exposure to oil can be severe and
long-term. We did studies in the 1980s in which we lightly oiled
different species of seabirds with less than 1/3 of a teaspoon of oil.
Most exposed birds abandoned their nests and failed to breed, or failed
to hatch the few eggs that were laid, and shearwaters oiled in one year
had impaired reproduction in the year following exposure as well. I
expect that even lightly oiled pelicans, gulls, herons, and other birds
exposed in this spill will have breeding failure this year, and the
great disturbance in the colonies will carry forward at least into the
breeding season of 2011. I sincerely hope that the oil spill responders
and Natural Resource Damage Assessment teams will be able to continue
their studies into future years to be able to adequately assess the
injury to the ecosystem caused by this spill.
I would like to discuss the similarities and differences between
the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill and the Deepwater Horizon (AKA Mississippi
Canyon 252) oil spill.
The Exxon spill was a catastrophic event that occurred over a
period of only a few days, but which spread across Southern Alaska for
months. More than 1300 miles of shoreline were oiled, and even after
cleaning it took years for the habitats to recover. Some sensitive
habitats, such as shellfish beds of mussels in rocky intertidal areas
still have oil present. The spill caused injury to many species of
birds and marine mammals, and probably killed hundreds of thousands of
birds, although only about 35,000 oiled birds were recovered. Some of
the species, such as Bald Eagles, recovered quickly, with no detectable
population effects after only a couple of years, while others, such as
Marbled and Kittlitz's Murrelets, Harlequin Ducks, Black
Oystercatchers, and Common Murres exhibited population level decreases
that could be detected for several years. A few of the species may
still not have recovered to pre-spill numbers, and it is now 21 years
after the spill. Exxon was prosecuted and convicted for violations of
the Migratory Bird treaty Act, and for violations of the Clean Water
Act. I believe violations of both laws have also occurred with the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill and warrant prosecution.
I expect that the Deepwater Horizon spill will have equally far
reaching and long-term effects on bird species in the Gulf of Mexico,
and that the wetlands and mangroves of the Gulf Coast will not recover
for decades. Although I am not an expert on mangroves, I believe that
if sensitive mangroves are killed, it is likely that some barrier
islands will be weakened and may erode more quickly, increasing the
risks of storm damage, especially during hurricane season. The presence
of persistent oil in wetlands will have long-term negative effects on
the colonial waterbirds that use these islands as nesting areas. Brown
Pelicans, Laughing Gulls, herons, egrets, spoonbills, ibises and
gallinules have already been affected, with responders having recovered
more than 1000 birds alive and dead so far. I expect the number of
injured wildlife to continue to increase, as it is impossible to
prevent birds that are caring for chicks from trying to forage for food
outside boomed areas, even if their breeding islands remain
successfully protected by oil booms. Diving species such as pelicans
and terns will continue to hunt for fish in oiled waters, and will
become victims of the spill. The un-hatched eggs of these birds may
become contaminated with oil, which will cause failure, and it is
probable that entire colonies of wetland birds will fail this year, and
perhaps experience lowered breeding success in future years.
A major difference between the Exxon Valdez spill and the Deepwater
Horizon spill is the continuing release of huge quantities of oil and
the constant release of fresh oil into the ecosystem. The depth of
water is also a major difference, as the explosive discharges of oil at
depth results in immediate natural dispersion of small droplets into
the water column, in addition to the dispersion of oil using chemical
dispersants. Dr. Ed Overton of LSU has eloquently described these
phenomena, and has described the mix of very sticky weathered and un-
weathered oil, which complicates the skimming and cleanup operations.
Like the Exxon Valdez oil, this oil will continue to move with currents
and along shorelines and may oil a similar amount of shoreline,
especially if blown toward shore during the anticipated storm season.
The endangered marine mammals of the Gulf of Mexico, especially
Sperm Whales, I believe are at high risk of injury and death from this
spill. Sperm Whales have been observed surfacing in the oil slicks, and
could easily inhale oil which would cause injury or death. This
occurred with Killer Whales (Orcas) during the Exxon Valdez, and
although no Orca carcasses were observed or recovered in 1989,
observers were able to identify missing members of whale pods (groups)
in years following the spill and were able to document the injury to
the Alaska whale population. A great deal of work has been done with
the Gulf of Mexico population of Sperm Whales, and an emergency team of
observers should be deployed to document whale behavior and potential
injury from this continuing spill, which is occurring within known
territories of Sperm Whales.
There are excellent teams of wildlife rehabilitators caring for
oiled birds at several sites along the Gulf Coast. These are well
trained people some if which I worked with in Alaska in 1989, and have
been well organized with funds generated by the Oil Pollution Act of
1990, passed by Congress following the Exxon Valdez spill. These teams
had equipment and supplies pre-deployed in the Mississippi Delta prior
to the spill and staff were immediately sent to set up their facilities
within days after the explosion and fire on the Deepwater Horizon rig.
I believe this wildlife rescue effort will be successful in cleaning
birds, as responders continue to clean oil from the beaches and coastal
waters. However, if the spill continues, which is likely, the cleaned
birds will have no safe place to return to, and it may be impossible to
successfully return them to the wild. Even if birds are taken far
outside the spill area, it is probable that they will try to return
even hundreds of miles back to their breeding colonies, which may still
be oiled, and this will prove disastrous for all the birds nesting
along the Gulf Coast. There has been some press and media discussion of
the futility of cleaning oiled birds, and some have even recommended
that all oiled birds be euthanized humanely without attempting to clean
or rehabilitate them. I strongly disagree. The knowledge of cleaning
and rehabilitation of birds gained by bird rescuers during the past 40
years has been impressive. Every spill has been a training ground for
increasing knowledge, which is shared and communicated at national
meetings, in journal articles, and in training sessions every year. The
success at cleaning and rehabilitation has improved over the years, and
will continue in the future, as no one has been able to prevent oil
spills from occurring. The Fish and Wildlife Service and private
organizations have conducted radio telemetry studies to evaluate
survival of oiled birds, and in many cases the cleaning and
rehabilitation efforts have successfully returned many, or in some
cases, most of the oiled birds back to the wild to successfully breed
in subsequent years. This has not been true for some species and some
oil spills, and the success has been highly variable from spill to
spill, but I believe that continued wildlife response is very important
and warranted. Just as human medicine and surgery have advanced over
the past hundred years, the art and science of wildlife rehabilitation
are advancing, and should continue, and should continue to be well
funded.
I would like to briefly change subjects and discuss the Minerals
Management Environmental Studies Program that my Federal Advisory
Committee is charged with reviewing and evaluating. MMS contracts
studies which are necessary targeted research on environmental issues
related to offshore energy production, including risks to the
environment and the technological advances to reduce risk and avoid
environmental injury arising from energy production.
The MMS studies program began with a good record for comprehensive
evaluation of the offshore environment and seabed and has continued
during the period I have been a reviewer of the program. MMS began this
program in the mid-1970s with a significant budget to contract, oversee
and evaluate environmental studies, and developed an excellent baseline
of studies during the 1970s and 1980s.
One of the primary charges of the studies program was, and
continues to be, developing baseline information on the natural
resources of areas with potential for energy production. MMS conducted
a continent wide Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program
(OCSESP) to inventory the resources offshore in the Gulf of Mexico,
Eastern seaboard, Pacific Coast and Alaska. Without the MMS studies
data, the US would not have had the scientific background to be able to
assess the oil spill injury from the Exxon Valdez, nor would the US
have been able to identify the significance of the injury to many
species of seabirds, marine mammals, fish and their habitats.
I was a technical expert for the US and the Oil Spill Trustees on
the injury and recovery of wildlife from the Exxon Valdez spill, and
was a technical expert for the US in the ensuing litigation to recover
funds from Exxon to restore the environment and compensate injured
parties. Without the detailed studies funded by the MMS during their
OCSESP program, identification of injury would not have been possible.
Today, however, the budget for the Environmental Studies Program at
MMS is about 1/3 the $55 million figure that it was in 1975, and if
corrected for inflation, the current budget of approximately $20
million is only about 10% of what it was in 1975.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6977.001
.epsThis is at a time of significant expansion of the mandate of
MMS, not only evaluating vast new areas of the outer continental shelf
off the East Coast of the US, the Eastern Gulf of Mexico, the Pacific
Northwest, and the Arctic Ocean, but also for expanding the existing
programs in the Western Gulf of Mexico, Southern California, and
Alaska.
The new proposed leases in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas in the
Arctic Ocean will pose unprecedented challenges, and without adequate
funding I foresee disasters in this uncompromising environment.
In addition, MMS is faced with new challenges of evaluating the
environmental concerns of offshore wind technologies, which present
very different challenges than that of assessing risks and technology
development of offshore and deepwater oil and gas production. It has
been the opinion of the MMS Science Advisory Committee that the current
MMS Environmental Studies Program is severely underfunded, and the
Scientific Committee in 2008 recommended to the Secretary of the
Interior that the environmental studies budget should be at least
doubled to adequately fund the necessary environmental studies that
must be done to assess the offshore resources and protect the offshore
environment, including the seabed. We repeated this recommendation at
our 2009 meeting in Anchorage as well.
In the past, MMS has developed and carried out a comprehensive
program to evaluate oil and gas exploration technologies, oil spill
prevention, regulation of spills and discharge of oil drilling fluids
and wastes. In addition, the Environmental Studies Program has
conducted a program to identify and protect sensitive and unique sea
bottom ecosystems, especially ``hard bottom'' communities, as well as
marine mammals, seabirds and fish. They have conducted studies of the
potential disturbance of seismic exploration noise on marine mammals,
toxicity of oil to seabirds and other marine life, and disturbance of
sensitive animals from placement of platforms and drilling operations.
In my opinion, the MMS has successfully conducted a broad range of
studies, and has reduced risks in the offshore environment with an
excellent record up to this Spring.
I know that these are difficult economic times, but I urge the
Subcommittee and your colleagues in Congress to adequately fund the
environmental studies program so that with continued and expanded
offshore development, both for oil and gas, and for alternative energy,
the MMS will be able to continue their excellent record of
environmental evaluation.
At the 2009 Anchorage meeting I made a personal plea for expanded
environmental studies in the North Aleutian Basin, also known as
Bristol Bay, because of the highly productive crab and red salmon
fisheries, an extremely large number of migratory and resident
seabirds, and critically endangered Pacific Right Whales found in the
region.
The Environmental Studies Program was unable to fund many valuable
studies with their ever decreasing budgets (in constant dollars), and I
personally recommended that no leasing be conducted in Bristol Bay or
the Arctic Ocean until adequate studies could be undertaken to
understand and minimize the risks to these highly sensitive habitats.
Today I more strongly believe this, and I continue to recommend that
leasing of Alaskan waters be deferred until adequate studies are
undertaken to assess and minimize risks. It is especially important to
better understand the risks posed by floating ice in the Arctic, as
iceberg scars present on the ocean floor belie the dangers of icebergs
or huge sheets of ice damaging oil production facilities with
catastrophic consequences, as it will be even more difficult to clean
up a spill in arctic waters than it is in the Gulf of Mexico, which is
proving to be almost impossible. I believe it is highly irresponsible
to continue leasing and exploration in icy waters without first
studying and refining the safety and response techniques that will
almost certainly be needed when the inevitable Arctic Ocean oil spill
occurs.
In 2008, the U.S. collected almost $23 billion in revenues from
federal oil and gas production and leases: $13 billion in royalties and
$10 billion in bonus bids. None of these dollars went back into the MMS
program to fund the critical mission-related studies that MMS needs to
be able to support their leasing activities. I personally think it has
been a very dangerous situation for the Agency to try and continue to
lease in uncharted waters without adequate studies, and I believe the
consequences of inadequate funding by Congress, and the unknowns in
attempting to cope with infrequent but highly injurious accidents such
as the blowout of the well during operations aboard the Deepwater
Horizon have been exacerbated by extending leasing beyond the
understanding of the risks. MMS critically needs augmented funding to
catch up to the demands of our domestic energy production.
I believe it is a very significant part of the budget graph that
Congress augmented the studies Budget immediately after the Exxon
Valdez oil Spill, but then just a few years later again substantially
lowered the appropriations for this program. I believe it is not
appropriate for Congress to continually cut budgets of mission oriented
studies and expect that there will be no future consequences.
Recently it has been recommended that the MMS be split into three
separate Bureaus to separate the royalty collection from the leasing
and regulatory parts of the Agency. I have no opinion as to the
appropriateness of this action, nor of the effect on the functioning of
the Agency, but I would strongly plea that the mission-targeted studies
program remain within the leasing branch, so that mission-oriented
studies can best be designed and conducted in support of future
leasing. I think it would be damaging to the Agency to transfer the
Studies program into a another Agency, such as USGS, because the
mission and focus of another Agency would be quite different, and the
mission-targeted nature of the studies program would likely be lost,
with consequential further loss of critical information needed to
understand the interactions between energy development and the
environment and to reduce the risks of venturing into uncharted waters.
I thank the Committee for inviting me to present my views and the
views of the Federal Advisory Committee at this hearing. If you have
any questions I will attempt to respond now or later in writing.
Thank you very much for giving me this opportunity to testify,
______
[NOTE: Mr. Fry's responses to questions were not received by the time
this hearing went to print.]
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you very much, Dr. Fry.
Dr. Mitchelmore, it is your turn to testify. Please begin.
STATEMENT OF CARYS MITCHELMORE, PH.D., ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR,
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND CENTER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE,
CHESAPEAKE BIOLOGICAL LABORATORY, SOLOMONS, MD
Dr. Mitchelmore. Thank you. Good afternoon, Madam Chair and
Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to
discuss scientific issues concerning dispersant use. I am Carys
Mitchelmore. I am an aquatic toxicologist and have been
researching the impacts of pollutants, including oil and
dispersants, on organisms for over 15 years.
Unfortunate recent events in the Gulf have brought to the
forefront issues pertaining to the impacts of oil. My testimony
today will focus on some effects and uncertainties regarding
dispersant use.
Related to this I would like to stress two major points.
First, significant data gaps in understanding the fate and
effects of dispersants and chemically dispersed oil exist,
particularly with subsea applications. Second, there are
numerous reasons why the impact of chemically dispersed oil in
the environment may be underestimated.
Dispersants are used to redirect an oil slick by breaking
it up into small droplets that move down into the water,
spreading in three dimensions. They do not remove oil. They
simply alter its chemical and physical properties, changing
where it goes, where it ends up and its potential effects.
Subsurface dispersant application is used to keep the oil in
the water column, preventing it from coming to the surface.
With the Deepwater Horizon leak, dispersants are used to
protect organisms from contacting the surface slick and to
protect sensitive shorelines and wetlands from the slick coming
ashore. This protection is an environmental tradeoff and is at
the expense of organisms living in the water column and
potentially those on the sea floor.
Toxicological data feeds into these tradeoff decisions.
However, limited toxicological information exists to fully
assess its risk to organisms, particularly in the long term.
Toxicity data, based on short duration exposures and the risk
of death to organisms, are those most often used to assess how
toxic a chemical is, and which species are those most at risk.
Indeed, the National Contingency Plan Product Schedule uses
such tests.
Toxicity depends on the specific dispersant under study,
the species and the life stage of that particular species.
However, even using these simple acute toxicity tests, there is
conflicting scientific evidence on whether chemically dispersed
oil is more, equally or less toxic than oil.
Acute toxicity tests are limited as organisms can also be
affected in other ways other than death. Dispersants and
chemically dispersed oil can cause many sublethal impacts,
including reduced growth and reproduction, cardiac and
metabolic problems, immune system suppression, developmental
deformities, cancer and changes in behavior.
These subtle endpoints can have huge consequences for
populations, and delayed effects may occur long after brief
exposures. Some species, like corals, are more sensitive than
others. Tradeoff decisions between species are difficult if
toxicity data is not available for these or closely related
species.
Data may also not be available for the vulnerable early
life stages of organisms. This is of concern as larval life
stages often inhabit near surface waters during reproductive
seasons where dispersed pollutants are at their highest
concentrations. Furthermore, traditionally laboratory tests can
underestimate toxicity to fish, larvae and other translucent
organisms like corals.
In surface waters, natural sunlight can interact with the
oil taken up by organisms, thereby increasing toxicity up to
50,000 times. This photo enhanced toxicity mechanism will
increase the footprint of dispersed oil effects.
Dispersants change how organisms are exposed to oil and may
facilitate the uptake and bioaccumulation of oil. It is what
dispersants do to oil that often drives toxicity rather than
the inherent toxicity of the dispersant itself. Small oil
droplets are taken up by suspension feeders such as oysters.
Zoo plankton can mistake oil droplets for food. Current models
that predict oil spill effects do not take into account droplet
exposure pathways.
Phytoplankton and zooplankton reside in surface waters.
This is where the plume is most concentrated. These are
essential components at the base of the food web. If these
organisms are lost, then higher trophic level organisms,
including the coastal and shoreline organisms that dispersants
are used to protect, will simply not have enough food and will
suffer reduced growth, reproductive output and eventually
death. These organisms may also accumulate oil and so
contaminate the seafood that feeds upon them.
With the Deepwater Horizon leak, many further unknowns
exist, given the sheer volume of dispersants used and novel
subsurface application. A recent meeting conducted concluded to
date that dispersant use has been less environmentally harmful
than allowing the oil to reach sensitive wetlands. However,
increased monitoring should be carried out, and tradeoff
decisions should be constantly reevaluated and will become more
complex with an increasing amount of oiled shorelines.
In summary, Madam Chair and fellow representatives, we face
huge challenges to protect the health of our coastal and
oceanic systems. With oil spills, this involves making
difficult tradeoff decisions and what species to protect at the
expense of others.
By using dispersants, we change how organisms are exposed
to oil, yet we do not fully understand the implications of
this. Where and how and even what organisms are exposed? How do
we identify sensitive species? And what are the sublethal and
long-term effects, and what is the impact to the food web?
The recent spill in the Gulf has brought us into
unchartered territories, given the volume and duration of
dispersant use, its novel application at the seabed, limited
baseline monitoring data to evaluate the species at risk. With
more information, we can be better prepared to deal with such
disasters. Increased knowledge translates to better solutions,
and we need that knowledge now. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Mitchelmore follows:]
Statement of Carys L. Mitchelmore, Ph.D., Associate Professor,
University of Maryland Center for Environmental Science, Chesapeake
Biological Laboratory, Solomons, Maryland
Chairman Bordallo and members of the Subcommittee. I am Dr. Carys
Mitchelmore and I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for
inviting me today to highlight some of the issues concerning the
effects of oil spill dispersants and dispersed oil.
By way of background: I am faculty at the University of Maryland
Center for Environmental Science, Chesapeake Biological laboratory. I
have been conducting research and publishing books and articles for
over 15 years concerning the impacts of pollutants, including oil and
oil spill dispersants on many aquatic species. Today I am representing
my views as a researcher in the field of environmental health. I began
investigating the impacts of oil on marine organisms following the
Aegean Sea Oil spill in 1992. Since then, as opportunities have arisen,
I have carried out research investigating the effects of oil and it's
constituent compounds on bivalves, corals, fish and reptiles.
Specifically, in the last few years my focus has been on investigating
the routes of exposure to and the toxicity of the dispersant Corexit
9500 and dispersed oil on sensitive species, such as corals (REFS 1-9).
I was also co-author on the recent 2005 NRC publication on ``Oil Spill
Dispersants: Efficacy and Effects'' (REF 10).
Unfortunate recent events in the Gulf have once again brought to
the forefront issues pertaining to the impacts of oil, oil spill
dispersants and dispersed oil in our marine and coastal ecosystems. My
testimony today will focus on issues relating to the potential impacts
and the uncertainties (data gaps) regarding oil spill dispersants and
dispersed oil. The three key points I would like to raise today are the
following:
1. Limited data is available concerning the toxicity of
dispersants and dispersed oil.
There are significant data gaps relating to
understanding sublethal, delayed and long-term effects,
particularly to sensitive species (e.g. corals).
2. Ecosystem-based approaches.
Is bioaccumulation of oil in the food web enhanced
or decreased with dispersants?
Indirect toxicity issues can influence higher
trophic level organisms.
3. What and where are the data gaps?
What would help reduce the uncertainties in
dispersant application decisions?
Specifically what are some of the unknowns with the
recent oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.
Issues relating to the two drivers of toxicity;
concentration and time.
New application methods (subsurface rather than
surface).
Limited toxicity data regarding the less toxic
dispersant alternatives.
Overview and Introduction: What are dispersants and why are they used?
When oil is spilled response decisions are quickly made based upon
the best available science and on numerous and often continually
changing variables. The use of dispersants is an environmental trade-
off; the protection of one habitat at the cost of another. In the
current Gulf of Mexico oil spill (Deepwater horizon (DWH) leak)
dispersants are used to protect the shoreline (and surface) species at
the expense of organisms residing in the water column and potentially
those in the benthic (seabed) environment.
Dispersants are chemical mixtures containing solvents, surfactants
and other additives, (including proprietary chemicals) that are used to
facilitate and enhance the break-up with wave energy of the surface oil
slick into small oil droplets that disperse into the waters below. They
do not remove oil from the environment, they simply change the inherent
chemical and physical properties of the oil and in doing so alter the
oil's transport, fate and potential effects. The small droplets stay
suspended in the water column and spread in three dimensions instead of
two. The premise behind dispersant use is that this oil movement
results in a plume of dispersed oil and dispersants that is quickly
reduced to low levels with depth in the Ocean. In addition, this
dispersal effectively increases the surface area to volume ratio of oil
so that microorganisms that naturally degrade oil can be more effective
in doing so.
The Gulf of Mexico contains sensitive coastal habitats, such as
wetlands, that serve as nursery grounds to numerous species, including
those that migrate long distances to these breeding areas. Oil coated
shorelines not only decimate intertidal food reserves for ourselves
(e.g. oysters, crabs, shrimp, fish) and other organisms but will also
cripple recreational activities and local economies. Oil, if allowed to
come to shore, can remain in those habitats (e.g. in the sediment) for
long periods of time continually exposing and impacting local resources
for years or decades following the oil spill.
Recently a scientific meeting (May 26-27th) of over 50 experts from
government agencies, academia and industry was convened specifically to
provide input for the Gulf of Mexico's regional response teams (4 & 6)
on the use and effects of dispersant and dispersed oil in going forward
with future incident decisions. It was the consensus of the group that
``up to this point. . .dispersing oil into the water has generally been
less environmentally harmful'' (see REF 18). However, concerns were
made over the unknowns especially regarding the fate and potential
long-term effects (discussed in later sections herein) of dispersants
and dispersed oil and their continued long-term use. Therefore, some
strong caveats were mentioned; that increased monitoring efforts and
continued re-assessments should be made to ascertain that these trade-
off decisions are still scientifically sound. I highlight these latter
points.
With increased time these trade-off decisions could change given 1)
the volume of dispersants used and the footprint (in space and time) of
the impacted area in the water-column, 2) sensitive species movement
into and out of different habitats (e.g. bluefin tuna and other species
spawning in the open Ocean waters), 3) continued and increasing impact
of oil onto sensitive shorelines, therefore, reducing the percentage of
habitat saved by using dispersants. Of concern is that we do not (and
probably never will) know the extent of the harm and loss of organisms
in the water column and on the seabed. Mapping of who, what, and where
species are in these habitats is limited or in the case of the seabed
down at 5000ft, non-existent.
Summary of what is known about the short and long-term effects of
dispersants and dispersed oil.
1. Limited data is available concerning the toxicity of dispersants and
dispersed oil.
As concluded in both of the NRC dispersant reports (REFS 10, 11)
limited toxicological information exists to fully assess the risks to
organisms to dispersants and dispersed oil. Although this lack of
toxicological data is not unique to oil spill dispersants. It is
mirrored by the tens of thousands of chemical contaminants (again often
proprietary mixtures) that are also being released into the
environment. The majority of toxicity data regarding dispersants and
dispersed oil address acute and short-term effects derived from
laboratory toxicity tests. There is much more limited data available
detailing the potential sublethal or delayed effects of exposure, which
could be much more detrimental to a population in the long term.
Examples of the major questions that arise are detailed in the
following sections:
a) How toxic are the dispersants alone?
Although dispersants themselves would not be released into the
environment alone, toxicity tests are required (for human and
environmental safety) so that they can be approved for use (i.e. listed
on the EPA's National Contingency Plan Product Schedule (NCPPS) table;
see REF 12) and included on the products material data safety sheets
(MSDS). However, many of the dispersants are proprietary and do not
list their chemical components in detail on the MSDS sheets. In
addition, toxicity studies are often limited in scope (i.e. they are
acute short-term toxicity tests in two standard test organisms). Acute
toxicity tests are used to compare toxicity between chemicals and
between organisms to identify highly toxic chemicals and sensitive
organisms. Results are standardized and presented as the lethal
concentration of a chemical that causes death to 50% of the test
organisms following a set exposure time (i.e. LC50, 24-96 hours). The
lower the LC50 level is (i.e. the number), the more toxic the chemical.
With respect to dispersants, toxicity depends upon the specific
dispersant under study, the species being tested and also the life
stage of the particular species under investigation. Some organisms are
much more sensitive to (i.e. affected by) dispersants than others. For
example, gulf mysids and copepods (crustaceans), diatoms (algae) and
fish larvae are affected at low concentrations of Corexit 9500 (i.e.
LC50, 96 hour at the low ppm level). However, other organisms are only
affected by 3-10-fold higher concentrations of Corexit 9500. To date
the majority of toxicity studies (those listed in the NCPPS table and
in the scientific literature; see REF 10) have been focused on the
Corexit formulations. Fewer toxicity studies (i.e. less species
evaluated) have been carried out for Corexit 9500 compared with the
earlier Corexit 9527 formulation. In comparison, to date even more
limited and scientifically robust data exists (that is publically
available) for any alternative formulations. Some studies have found
dispersants to be less toxic compared with oil or dispersed oil in
direct comparisons, although some studies report an increased
dispersant toxicity compared with oil or dispersed oil (see REF 10).
b) How toxic is dispersed oil?
There is conflicting scientific evidence to date regarding the
toxicity of dispersed oil in comparison to oil. The 2005 NRC report
addresses this at length (REF 10). For example, some studies have
stated that dispersed oil is more toxic than oil, others have shown
that the toxicities of dispersed oil and oil are equivalent. The NRC
1989 report concluded that the acute lethal toxicity of chemically
dispersed oil is primarily associated not with the dispersant but with
the dispersed oil and it's dissolved constituents following dispersal.
Some species and life stages are much more sensitive than others, for
example, the LC50s for oyster and fish larvae were as low as 3mg/l
(i.e. 3ppm) for dispersant alone (Corexit 9527) and 1mg/l (i.e. 1ppm)
for dispersed oil (REF 13).
It is inherently difficult to compare dispersed oil with oil and
discrepancies can arise simply due to the experimental design of the
toxicity tests. Therefore, in the 1990's efforts were made to
standardize toxicity tests (i.e. CROSERF and following publications;
see discussion in REF 10). Great advances were made at that time,
however, there is a dire need to expand this work further to include
new additional and complicating issues that will be discussed in the
following sections.
Understanding basic toxicity mechanisms and species sensitivity
across diverse taxa in laboratory studies aid in the risk assessment of
what organisms are potentially those most at risk. During a spill these
data can be compared with the predicted dispersed oil concentrations
(using computer modeling) or actual oil concentrations measured in the
field. There is still a need to fill the serious fundamental scientific
data gaps regarding the basic toxicology of dispersants and dispersed
oil as highlighted in the NRC reports.
Recently the EPA (directive dated May 10th and addendum 2 on May
20th) requested that BP should use a less toxic dispersant. Given their
LC50 guidelines only four of the listed products on the EPA NCPPS would
meet these toxicity criteria. BP responded to EPA's request within 24
hours (posted on May 22nd) and defended their use of the Corexit
formulations stating limited toxicity data, potential long-term effects
of some components in some alternative formulations coupled with
limited availability in the volumes required for the Gulf spill.
Following BP's response the EPA announced (addendum 3 on May 26th) that
in addition to requiring that BP reduces it's use of dispersant (by
around 75%) particularly at the surface they also stated that they will
be carrying out toxicity tests to further evaluate these alternative
products.
c). Sublethal, delayed toxicity and potential long-term effects.
As summarized in the recent NRC publications oil and oil spill
dispersants can cause many effects, including death and a variety of
sublethal impacts including reduced growth, reproduction, cardiac
dysfunction, immune system suppression, metabolic and bioenergetic
effects, developmental deformities, carcinogenic, mutagenic,
teratogenic effects and alterations in behavior (REFS 10, 11). These
more subtle endpoints than death can none-the-less have huge
consequences for populations. Additionally, delayed effects may occur
which are hard to track and follow following an oil spill event unless
monitoring programs span years after the spill event. Even then these
monitoring programs may come too late i.e. if baseline monitoring
before the spill was not carried out it is impossible to fully assess
the final extent of damage. Some aquatic species are more sensitive
than others to dispersants and/or dispersed oil. Therefore, making
trade-off decisions between species is difficult if toxicity data is
not available for those or closely related species. Additionally, it
has been shown that it is the early life stages of organisms, e.g. eggs
and larvae that are more sensitive to chemicals and are at particular
risk. This is especially of concern given that these life stages often
inhabit surface waters, especially as is the case for the Gulf of
Mexico now given that this is the spawning and reproductive period for
many species.
i) Water column organisms: Organisms resident in the water column
are those at risk following dispersant application. A dispersed oil
plume contains high levels of dispersant, dissolved oil and oil
droplets meters down into the water column. It is in these surface
waters that many organisms are concentrated in. This includes
phytoplankton (algae) and zooplankton (small invertebrates or larvae of
fish and other organisms); essential components at the base of the food
web that organisms (including shoreline species) rely upon.
Other organisms at risk include fish, reptiles and marine mammals.
A dispersed plume is not static. Like a surface slick it will move with
the wind and ocean currents. In some cases the larger organisms (large
fish, reptiles and mammals) having detected a harmful substance may be
able to move away and avoid the plume if their sensory systems and
behavioral mechanisms have not already been impacted by the oil plume.
This is not the case for the smaller organisms. They will more than
likely move with the plume increasing their duration of exposure to the
toxicants. Dispersed oil may affect these water column organisms in a
number (or combinations) of ways:
1) direct toxicity through exposure to the dissolved oil
components and/or dispersant.
2) ingestion of oil particles and hence bioaccumulation of oil
components.
3) coating of external surfaces (e.g. gills/skin) by oil droplets
potentially enhancing oil uptake (dissolution) across surfaces or
simply physical effects reducing respiration leading to eventual
smothering and death.
Recent studies demonstrating sublethal effects and new toxic
pathways suggest that the full impact of exposure to dispersed oil may
be underestimated and further studies are required to investigate this
in detail. For example, in translucent organisms (e.g. fish larvae) the
toxicity of accumulated oil can be 12-50,000 times underestimated
because the traditional toxicity tests were not carried out under
conditions of natural sunlight (REF 14, REF 10). This phenomenon called
`photoenhanced toxicity' may be critical in determining the effects of
dispersed oil in surface dwelling (e.g. translucent pelagic larvae) and
shallow water translucent organisms (including corals).
Studies have also shown that dispersants may facilitate the uptake
and potentially the bioaccumulation of oil constituents in organisms
from ingestion routes (e.g. see REF 15) or by oil droplets sticking to
biological surfaces (e.g. fish gills; see REF 16) and facilitating the
dissolution of oil components (dissolved polycyclic aromatic
hydrocarbons (PAHs)) into tissues. However, dispersed oil has also been
shown to be less `sticky' and does not interact with biological
surfaces or sediment (see discussions in REF 10). These issues relating
to the fate (i.e. where the oil ends up) are important to know for a
full risk assessment on the impact of dispersants. As with
photoenhanced toxicity any enhanced bioaccumulation routes would
increase the `footprint' of the potential effects of dispersed oil and
further studies are required to address these data gaps and
uncertainties in predicting the fate and effects of dispersed oil.
ii) Benthic/Intertidal organisms (e.g. oysters, mussels and crabs):
In a deep open ocean spill benthic organisms are usually at minimal
risk of exposure and the direct effects of surface dispersed oil.
Although they still could be indirectly affected by the oil spill if
their food source is impacted. However, if the dispersed plume comes
towards shallower coastal locations then intertidal and benthic
organisms will be exposed. Suspension (filter) feeders, such as oysters
and mussels, will bioaccumulate oil droplets in addition to the
dissolved oil components. Dispersed oil droplets generally range in
size from <3 to 80mm. These sizes overlap with the preferred size range
of food for many suspension-feeding organisms, including zooplankton
(see later). Oysters and amphipods can select these particles, as they
are similar in size to the phytoplankton they feed upon.
The importance of this oil droplet (or particle bound oil PAH)
exposure route was highlighted in studies flowing the New Carissa Oil
spill near Coos Bay, Oregon. Mussels (suspension feeders) contained
much higher levels of oil constituents (PAHs; 500 times more) than
crabs (an omnivore) collected from the same area (REF 17). Chemical
(PAH) profiles also highlighted that the mussels had accumulated the
PAHs both from the dissolved oil constituents in the water and from oil
droplets whereas crabs had only accumulated them from the dissolved
phase. These data are very important as current computer models
designed to predict the effects of an oil spill do not take into
account exposure routes other than the dissolved components. This
research has implications for the effects of a dispersed oil plume on
coastal fisheries and highlights the importance in understanding the
routes of exposure of oil to species and in determining the levels of
oil constituents in each of these phases for a better understanding of
risk.
Of additional relevance for the DWH oil leak is the novel use of
dispersants at the subsurface. This type of application has never been
done before and the impacts are unknown.
iii) Corals: In the last few years my research group has
investigated the toxicity of dispersants and dispersed oil on corals.
Laboratory experiments were conducted to investigate the acute,
sublethal and delayed effects of dispersant and dispersed oil (Corexit
9500 and weathered Arabian light crude oil, 1:25 ratio). In summary,
soft corals died in environmentally relevant concentrations of
dispersant (LC50 8 hours 30ppm; LC50 96 hours <16.5ppm). Sublethal
behavioral effects (narcotic response resulting in the cessation of
coral pulsing) were observed within hours at low (10ppm) exposures. In
attempting to mimic a dispersed oil plume moving through a reef corals
were exposed for 8 hours to dispersant alone (at 20ppm i.e. the dose
used for the 1:25 (v/v) dispersant:oil ratio), dispersed oil (dissolved
PAHs and oil/dispersant droplets and dispersant) and undispersed oil
(i.e. dissolved PAHs under an oil slick) using an oil loading of 0.5g
l1 oil:water (1:2000 w/v). After exposure corals were placed
in clean seawater to follow potential delayed effects and sub-lethal
repercussions. Thirty-two days after exposure coral growth was
significantly reduced in the chemically dispersed oil and dispersant
exposures and delayed effects (further death in the dispersed oil
treatments) were observed. The cnidarians accumulated oil (PAHs) in
their tissues derived from both the dissolved oil components and the
oil droplets. This highlights that to fully assess and understand the
risks involved from dispersed oil consideration must be given to the
exposure route of the oil for a particular species rather than simply
the total amount of oil.
2. Food web effects.
As mentioned in previous sections the upper layers of the water
column are teeming with phytoplankton and zooplankton that are critical
components of the food chain. All complex food webs, including those
for shoreline/coastal species contain these organisms at their base. If
these organisms are removed then higher trophic level organisms simply
will not have food to eat and will ultimately suffer reduced growth,
reproductive output and eventually death. Therefore, dispersants and
dispersed oil do not have to directly affect an organism for them to
have serious repercussions. This is called indirect toxicity, whereby
the contaminant impacts organisms that another organism needs for food.
These lower food chain organisms can also accumulate oil (either
inside them or stuck on the outside of their bodies) so that organisms
feeding on them become, and often to much higher levels, contaminated
with oil. Suspension feeding organisms, like zooplankton (e.g.
copepods), which are extremely important food sources at the lower end
of food webs, have been found to feed on dispersed oil particles (size
range 5-60mm). This has effects on those organisms; organisms higher up
the trophic level that feed on them and ultimately may poses severe
food safety issues for humans (contaminated seafood etc). Information
related to the trophic transfer of contaminants is relevant to fully
understand and evaluate the risks of oil exposure. Models currently
based on dissolved oil levels can significantly underestimate oil
exposure.
3. In summary what we still don't know (data gaps and uncertainties).
In addition to those highlighted in the previous sections there are
still many unanswered questions that we need to know to fully assess
the risks involved with dispersants and dispersed oil. These were
highlighted in the 2005 NRC report (REF 10). Although the 2005 NRC
study was specifically tasked to address the potential risks of
dispersant use in near-shore environments many of the conclusions of
the report are valid in open-ocean spills, such as the DWH leak. Many
questions and data gaps needed for improved risk analyses and
ultimately effective oil spill responses were highlighted. Some basic
concepts and issues regarding dispersed oil fate and effects simply
lacked adequate research. In addition other areas of study require
increased research efforts, as conflicting data currently exists.
The many questions and issues that we have limited data for include
the following;
1. What is the fate of dispersants and dispersed oil (i.e. where
will they end up, in what form, how biodegradable are they and what are
the break-down products? Are the break-down products more or less
toxic?
2. What are the potential-long term effects of dispersant and
dispersed oil, even after a brief exposure, to aquatic organisms? What
are the sublethal effects? Will there be delayed effects?
3. There are limited studies on sensitive at risk organisms (e.g.
corals).
4. Does dispersed oil reduce or enhance uptake/bioavailability of
oil to organisms?
5. Does photoenhanced toxicity increase the `footprint' of
effects?
6. Does dispersed oil reduce or enhance microbial degradation? If
enhanced will this bacterial `bloom' result in an increased dead zone
in the water (i.e. increased footprint in hypoxic zones or just a
significant reduction in water oxygen levels)?
7. Is dispersed oil less `sticky' to biological surfaces and
sediment?
8. What are the routes of exposure to organisms to dispersed oil?
Is it dissolved PAHs or the oil droplets, or both.
9. How will the food web be impacted? Issues relating to trophic
transfer and species loss.
10. What are the new risks with subsea application? Is the oil
readily biodegradable? Will it cause more damage than allowing the oil
components to disperse into the air, weather and degrade by abiotic and
biotic surface processes?
Unfortunately many of these questions are unanswered given the very
limited opportunities available to carry out research in these areas.
Some of the research recommendations made in the 1989 NRC report (REF
11) were once again highlighted in the 2005 NRC report (REF 10) as
these research questions had not been undertaken during those 16 years.
Since the 2005 NRC report some limited progress has been made in
addressing the data gaps outlined.
As stated before oil spill responders base their decisions on the
sound scientific data that is available to them regarding species that
would be at higher risk than others from the impact of oil or dispersed
oil. The NRC report (2005) highlighted that some of the very basic
assumptions made concerning the use of dispersants have still not been
adequately investigated, despite being highlighted in the earlier 1989
NRC report (REF 11). For example, one main argument for using
dispersants is that they enhance microbial degradation of the oil.
Conflicting data exists regarding this assumption. Some studies have
shown that dispersants are toxic to some bacteria and that
biodegradation is reduced in chemically dispersed oil exposures. Other
studies have shown enhanced biodegradation and increased numbers
(blooms) of bacteria. The question is if blooms occur will this have a
significant impact on dissolved oxygen levels in the water (i.e.
likened to nutrient enrichment and eutrophication)?
Additional Specific issues regarding the Gulf Oil spill.
The unfortunate recent events in the Gulf have once again raised
many of the issues discussed above regarding the fate and effects of
dispersants and dispersed oil in addition to adding further questions
regarding the novel use of undersea dispersant application. As many
have asked in the past weeks, potentially what will the environmental
consequences be of the dispersant application, what will be affected,
to what extent and how? This is impossible to predict for many reasons.
As mentioned earlier open ocean spills are pre-approved for
dispersant application given the minimal perceived risks to the ocean
and the seafloor based upon the depth and volume of water available to
dilute the dispersed oil. However, this spill is unique and a first for
many reasons opening up many questions regarding the decision to use
dispersants and what their potential effects may be. First, the sheer
volume of dispersants applied is unprecedented; no spill in U.S. waters
has used the amount of chemical dispersants that have currently been
released (nearly 1 million gallons as of June 6th, 2010). Although it
should be noted that the IXTOC spill (1979; see REF 19) in the Gulf of
Mexico used a total of 2.5 million gallons of dispersant (not in U.S.
waters), two-thirds of which were Corexit 9527. As in the IXTOC spill
dispersants are usually only applied to surface slicks. In the DWH leak
dispersants are also being applied at the leak site. The question is
how will this dispersed oil impact the benthic (seafloor) environment?
The surface oil slick is easily viewed via satellite but what about
the sub-surface plume(s)? In toxicology it is the concentration of and
the duration of exposure to a toxicant that determines its effect.
Therefore, we need to know where the plume is, at what concentration,
for how long and what species are present. Various agencies, oil spill
responders and independent scientists are running models trying to
predict the oil plumes concentration and trajectory. Additionally some
measurements of oil concentrations/particle sizes are being taken at
depths in the Ocean around the spill site. Only in knowing the size of
this plume in three dimensions, the concentration of the dispersed oil
in the plume at these locations and the duration of exposure in one
area, will predictions be able to be made of the potential effect.
Indeed increased monitoring of subsurface plumes was a recommendation
from the recent dispersant meeting (REF 18). Unlike with oil impacts
along the coast and shoreline, it is very difficult to see the actual
effects of the dispersed oil in the Ocean. Organisms, that die will
fall to the seafloor. Those that do not die may not show sublethal
repercussions for a while. Declining populations of a water column
species may occur and shoreline species may become severely limited in
their food sources in addition to being faced with a contaminated food
source.
With the increasing volume of oil and dispersants entering the
system for extended periods of time there may be, at some time, a point
reached in which the harm to the water column organisms (and now
potentially benthic organisms) does not outweigh the harm to the
shoreline. This may be particularly relevant if shorelines are
increasingly being impacted by the oil. Therefore, these original
trade-off decisions will become less clear. These dispersants are
approved for use in the open ocean, although there is no limitation as
to how much and for how long they can be used. How long can the
`solution to pollution' reasoning hold? Furthermore, with the continued
production of dispersed oil plumes from the surface and from the ocean
floor will the dispersed oil plume reach the shallower, coastal
locations that the decision to use dispersants has been based on? It is
quite possible that a dispersed oil plume may reach and impact a
shoreline.
In summary
Chairman Bordallo and members of the subcommittee I would like to
thank you again for allowing me to testify today regarding the effects
of oil spill dispersants. We face huge challenges to protect our
coastal and oceanic ecosystems. As in the case of oil spills this
sometimes involves making difficult trade-off decisions on what
ecosystem to protect at the expense of another. However, pollution
cannot simply be treated as `out of sight out of mind' or that `the
solution to pollution is dilution'. These assumptions need careful
analyses on a continued basis that depend upon sound scientific data.
The proprietary components in dispersants should be made available to
researchers and further toxicity testing of dispersants is required
especially if considering alternate formulations. Although many
decisions are based upon acute short-term toxicity studies we are
constantly unraveling new and more subtle sublethal toxicological
pathways and toxicity mechanisms. These sublethal impacts ultimately
have dire consequences to a species survival, consequences of which
alter the fine balance of food webs, alter ecosystem services, and the
overall health of the environment. During an oil spill event it is hard
to assess the effects on the organisms that you do not see and equally
challenging to follow the potential long-term consequences of the
spill. More respect needs to be given to efforts directed at baseline
monitoring and mapping of our Oceans and seafloor ecosystems. We cannot
assess impacts or follow restoration efforts unless we know what
species were there beforehand. We need to monitor the subsurface
plume(s) in space and time.
There are still many unanswered questions and uncertainties
associated with the decisions to apply dispersants. I emphasize the
recommendations for additional studies made in the recent NRC report
that will help fill these critical data gaps in the knowledge and
understanding of the behavior and interaction of dispersed oil on the
biotic components of ecosystems (see REF 10). Whatever choices are made
this unfortunate recent event in the Gulf will impact ecosystem health,
local economies, food sources and recreational activities, the extent
to which is currently unknown. We need better information to close
these uncertainty gaps that oil spill response decisions are based upon
and we need it now. Thank you.
References Cited:
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Livingstone D.R. and Albaiges J. 1996. Effects of the Aegean Sea oil-
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submitted Summer 2010). Effects of the oil dispersant Corexit 9500 on
two symbiotic cnidarian species following short-term laboratory
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(Data available now in the final report submitted to the funding agency
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Beard, E., Baker, J.E. and Hatch, W. (to be submitted Summer 2010).
Acute, sublethal and long-term effects of oil, dispersant (Corexit
9500) and dispersed oil on the tropical soft coral (Xenia elongata)
following laboratory exposures. (Data available now in the final report
submitted to the funding agency if requested).
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18. http://www.crrc.unh.edu/dwg/
dwh_dispersants_use_meeting_report.pdf
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______
[NOTE: Dr. Mitchelmore's responses to questions were not received by
the time this hearing went to print.]
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Dr. Mitchelmore, for
making these important points about the impacts of this
situation.
Mr. Cresson, we will hear from you next.
Mr. Voisin. Thank you.
Female Voice. Mr. Voisin. I am sorry.
Mr. Voisin. Thank you. I am Mike Voisin.
Ms. Bordallo. Oh, I am sorry.
Mr. Voisin. That is OK, Madam Chair. Nobody can pronounce
my name.
Ms. Bordallo. Voisin. Voisin.
Mr. Voisin. Voisin.
Ms. Bordallo. Correct.
Mr. Voisin. It means neighbor in French.
STATEMENT OF MIKE VOISIN, CEO, MOTIVATIT SEAFOODS, HOUMA,
LOUISIANA
Mr. Voisin. Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you
today and the Committee about the impacts of the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. I am a seventh
generation seafood and oyster farmer and processor in the Gulf
of Mexico.
Charles Darwin said a long time ago that it is not the
strong that survive. It is not the most intelligent, but those
that adapt to change. In south Louisiana we are used to
adapting to change. Sometimes it comes rapidly at us. Sometimes
it takes time.
The spill is clearly an ecological and human challenge that
will surely affect not only the fragile habitats where
fisheries, including shrimp and oysters, are harvested, but the
very core of the community that brings these iconic delicacies
from the waters of the Gulf to the tables of America.
The Gulf community is one built not only on the bounty of
pure waters, but on the backs of small businessmen and women
whose families, like mine, immigrated to the shores of
Louisiana, called by the sea and a culture like no other in
this country. The culture and those Americans, we now need your
support during these challenging times.
Fishermen, shrimpers, oystermen who harvest safe, healthy
seafood from the Gulf are being impacted by precautionary
closures of state and Federal waters along parts of the coast
like no other else in the region. We support the precautionary
closures in order to ensure consumers continue to have access
to seafood maintained with a level of quality and safety
expected from the Gulf, but the impact of these needed safety
precautions falls disproportionately on the men and women who
work the waterways.
The short- and long-term impacts of the spill are being
felt and will be felt for a considerable amount of time in Gulf
Coast communities. Short-term, besides the environmental and
resource challenges, there are lost incomes and insecurities
about the future ability to earn an honest living.
Longer term is difficult to prognosticate at this time,
since the event continues and the economic and human challenges
are not yet close to being complete and understood. In my
written testimony I have lists of what I consider the short-
and long-term impacts.
There needs to be a continued long-term commitment by the
Federal Government, the Gulf states and, most importantly, the
responsible party to mitigate the damages and return our
communities to what they were prior to these challenging times.
In 2008, our 17,000 commercial fishermen in Louisiana alone
harvested 1.27 billion pounds of seafood, creating a total
economic impact of over $2.4 billion. Meanwhile, 3.2 million
recreational fishermen along our shores took to the waters,
completing a total of 24 million fishing trips.
The reality of the potential economic impact of the oil
spill on species like oysters may be extensive. The Gulf of
Mexico states lead the Nation in the production of oysters. My
home, Louisiana, is the second largest seafood producing state
in the country, and the impact of the spill on our fisheries
and our businesses are sure to range from immediate to long
term, as I have previously discussed.
But just how much of an impact it will have can't be
determined yet. We are not just talking about multiple habitats
and multiple species like crabs, shrimp and oysters and
finfish. We are talking about multiple communities--St.
Bernard, Plaquemines, Terrebonne, Jefferson, Vermillion, St.
Mary, Iberia and Lafourche Parishes--as well as all the Gulf
states.
One of the challenges we are also faced with is this
moratorium on oil and gas exploration in the offshore. That is
the second, a greater tragedy in my mind that what is happening
almost with the oil spill. The oil spill is a tragedy and it is
an economic challenge, but the moratorium being put on will be
the potential death knell to these communities. We must have
that moratorium lifted so that these communities can viably
move forward and continue to have an economic base.
In leaving I will share with you a quote from Raul Armesto,
and it says, ``The world isn't interested in the storms you
encountered, but whether or not you brought in the ship.'' I
will share with you that we will bring that ship in. We have
had many storms in the last five years, and we will work
through this challenge and we will bring the ship in.
I must apologize. I have to leave to catch a plane. We have
to meet with some Cabinet Members in New Orleans tonight,
having dinner and some meetings, so I would be glad for a
couple minutes if you have any questions of me. I will be glad
to answer them. If not, I really have to leave to catch that
plane. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Voisin follows:]
Statement of Michael C. Voisin, Motivatit Seafood's LLC,
Gulf Oyster Industry Council, Houma, Louisiana
Good morning, Thank You for the opportunity to speak to the
Committee today about the impact of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in
the Gulf of Mexico.
The spill is clearly an ecological and human challenge that will
surely effect not only the fragile habitats where fisheries, including
shrimp and oysters are harvested but the very core of the community
that brings these iconic delicacies from the waters of the Gulf to the
tables of America. The Gulf community is one built not only on the
bounty of pure waters but on the backs of small business men and women
whose families, like mine, emigrated to the shores of Louisiana; called
by the sea and a culture like no other in this country.
That culture and those Americans need your support during these
challenging times. Fishermen, shrimpers and oystermen who harvest safe
healthy seafood from the Gulf are being impacted by precautionary
closures of State and Federal waters along parts of the coast like no
one else in the region. We support the precautionary closures in order
to ensure consumers continue to have access to seafood maintained with
the level of quality and safety expected from the Gulf but the impact
of these needed safety precautions fall disproportionately on the men
and women who work the water.
The short and long-term impacts of this spill are being felt and
will be felt for a considerable amount of time in Gulf Coast
Communities. Short term, besides the environmental and resource
challenges there are lost incomes and insecurities about the future
ability to earn an honest living. Longer term is difficult to
prognosticate at this time since the event continues and the economic
and human challenges are not yet close to being complete and
understood. I have listed below a number of thoughts relating to both
short and long term challenges.
There needs to be a continued long term commitment by the Federal
government, the Gulf Coast States and most importantly the responsible
party to mitigate the damages and return our communities to what they
were prior to these challenging events.
In 2008, our 17,000 commercial fishermen in Louisiana alone
harvested 1.27 billion pounds of seafood, creating a total economic
impact of over $2.4 billion. Meanwhile, 3.2 million recreational
fishermen along our shores took to the water completing a total of 24
million fishing trips.
The reality of the potential economic impact of the oil spill on
species like oysters could be extensive. The Gulf of Mexico States lead
the nation in the production of oysters; nearly 70% of all the oysters
harvested in this country or some 500 million pounds of in-shell
oysters are produced annually with an annual total economic impact of
over $600 million. That's more than 250 million pounds of in-shell
oysters from Louisiana alone.
My home, Louisiana, is the second largest seafood producing state
in the country and the impact of the spill on our fisheries and our
business are sure to range from immediate to long term as I have
previously discussed. But just how much of an impact it will have can't
be determined at this point because there's never been an oil spill of
this magnitude in the Gulf and unfortunately, at last check, the oil
continues to flow.
We're not just talking about multiple habitats, multiple species--
crabs, shrimp, oysters, fin fish--we're talking about multiple
communities and multiple livelihoods St. Bernard, Plaquemines,
Terrebonne, Jefferson, Vermillion, St. Mary, Iberia and Lafourche
Parishes as well as all of the Gulf States.
Thank you for doing your part to focus on the impact this disaster
is having on another irreplaceable resource we pride our selves on in
the Gulf. . .the Seafood Community.
I will be glad to answer any questions you may have.
Potential Short and Long Term Impacts;
1) The short and long-term impacts of this oil spill on the
local community--Workers are starting to lose their jobs,
they'll stop spending as freely in the community, homes sales
are going to suffer (as well as sales tax revenue). . .this is
going to ripple through the entire community as the fishing
community idles, layoffs continue (they're already starting).
Government services budgets will tighten, potentially long
term, we may be looking at a loss of population as people look
for work in other areas or move in with family members in other
communities and states
Short term
Extreme stress of the presence of liquid hydro
carbons introduced to the fisheries and wild life
habitat areas causing potential casualties in some
species
Greater demands placed on community services
that include but are not limited to rental assistance,
utility assistance, food stamps, and unemployment
benefits.
Loss of wetlands--direct damage and further
destruction of the wetlands increases flooding risks
from hurricanes
Loss of Jobs
Fisheries--not able to fish because
of closure of fishing areas, oyster leases and
shortened season. Erratic seasonal openings and
closings driving up fuel and provision costs.
Support business closing because of a lack of
inventory (processors), lack of customers
(docks and ice houses)--and lack of market
(concern about contamination). The traditional
transition industry that those working in the
fisheries depend up to survive difficult time
is the oil field service industry
Oilfield service--Current Moratorium
on drilling will force drilling operation to
other countries causing significant layoffs
starting immediately and lasting for
potentially up to 5 years
Commercial retail--Small grocery
stores, marine mechanics and dock service
companies in the lower areas of the States that
service the fishing community will be hard hit.
Local restaurants that depend on an abundance
of local, available seafood will be challenged.
Recreation and leisure--Multiple
bookings have been canceled by those seeking
recreational fishing among the charter
companies. Bird watching, swamp tours and
recreational boating will be negatively
impacted.
Banking--Many of the local and
regional banks may be at risk because of
limited portfolios to the region.
Loss of cultural livelihoods
subsistence fishermen and hunters no
longer able to live off of the land--many
Native American and/or some Vietnamese
Long term
Review and reevaluation of Census data--our
census data has been mostly collected but will not
reflect the short or long term damages to the community
that will include the sudden loss of income and rise of
unemployment. Ineligibility relating to federal
assistance and support funds will further hamper and
impede community outreach, infrastructure rebuilding
and economic development programs availability.
Loss of large capital equipment to other
countries with the oilfield service companies
Loss of tax revenue
Loss of population seeking work
Loss of business infrastructure
Loss of local lending capacity
2) The need for prolonged commitment by the Federal government, the
States, and the responsible party to mitigate damages. The Responsible
Party needs to be responsive to the individuals, communities and
businesses its actions are impacting and in a timely manner. Allowing
for an extended reviews process (two to three weeks for some) for
claims to be processed is unreasonable when it means the business may
close. The States must be nimble in their response and support of
business' needs--we cannot wait 18 months (or longer) to implement
programs to assist in this disaster.
British Petroleum role and responsibility--Fund the cleanup and
restoration of our environment. Take the initiative in the areas that
their expertise is unique or proprietary.
Federal role and responsibility--Oversee and insure
delivery of goods, services, technical assistance, enforcement
of law, restitution and replacement to extent the damages
warrant. Insure the delivery system for a plan of recovery.
State role and responsibility--Insure continuity and
relevance of requests for reimbursement of damages made.
Estimate the total potential loss and develop a plan in
conjunction with local officials to insure as rapid a recovery
as possible
Local role and responsibility--make relevant claims.
Work with the States to develop a broader strategy to recovery.
Inform the Federal Agencies of issues not being resolved. Make
known to all three the impacts of their actions and any
unintended consequences thereof.
3) The sufficiency of community outreach to disseminate information
to and receive information from the public about the environmental
impacts of this oil spill
Environment impact
Assess and monitor fisheries to reassure the
safety of domestic product
Resonation of the wetlands to insure the
stability of the marsh, for all species rebound,
protect the citizenry from hurricane
Transparence is critical to regain the trust of
the citizenry
Economic development
Local economic development organizations and
planning and development districts need to be
coordinated
Unintended consequences developing because of
lack of coordination and inclusion are further damaging
the economic environment of the community
Workforce development
Work with local economic development, community
colleges and workforce investment boards to develop
strategies to bridge the unemployment gaps.
______
[NOTE: Mr. Voisin's responses to questions were not received by the
time this hearing went to print.]
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Voisin. Voisin. Is that
correct?
Mr. Voisin. Voisin.
Ms. Bordallo. Voisin.
Mr. Voisin. Voisin.
Ms. Bordallo. All right. Thank you for sharing your
concerns, and if you do leave, we understand.
I have one more person I would like to call upon for this
second panel. I am doing this to accommodate our Ranking
Member, Mr. Cassidy, since he is one of his constituents.
So I would like to call on Mr. Cresson, Executive Director
and CEO of the Coastal Conservation Association Louisiana.
Could you please come up and take a seat at the table with the
second panel? All right. And please proceed with your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF DAVID CRESSON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AND CEO, COASTAL
CONSERVATION ASSOCIATION LOUISIANA; BATON ROUGE, LOUISIANA
Mr. Cresson. Yes, ma'am. Thank you. Madam Chairman, thank
you for calling on me to testify today. My name is David
Cresson. I am the Executive Director of the Coastal
Conservation Association of Louisiana.
Our Louisiana chapter of CCA has more than 15,000 members
and volunteers. Our national organization has about 100,000 in
17 coastal states. We are involved in a number of conservation
projects, including building artificial reefs across our coast
that contribute to restoration efforts and create fish habitats
for species that are targeted by anglers.
Serving as executive director of CCA Louisiana is my job,
but it is much more than that to me. I am a Louisiana native
who was brought up fishing, hunting and enjoying the Louisiana
outdoors. Many of my fondest memories growing up in New Orleans
are the times spent on the water with my dad, trying to catch
trout and redfish.
I grew up dreaming of the day that I could own my own boat
and fishing camp, so that I could treat my own children to
those same wonderful times. A few years ago I was able to
purchase a fishing boat and later a modest camp in Plaquemines
Parish near the mouth of the river. Until the oil spill, my
family and I spent many of our weekends at our little camp,
fishing and enjoying the time together.
In an instant, that has been taken from us. Now the area
around our camp is saturated by oil and closed to fishing so
that what we have now is a boat we can't use and a camp we
can't use. An important part of our family activities have been
taken from us. Now, if my situation were an isolated one, there
wouldn't be much to discuss. The problem is that my situation
is one of thousands like it across our state.
Recreational fishing is much more than an occasional trip
to the coast. You will see in my written testimony that an
extended Gulf-wide recreational closure will cost us billions
of dollars and thousands of jobs. These are friends and
families who have built lives over decades that are being
destroyed as the oil overtakes our coast. We simply don't know
if the many small businesses that rely on recreational
fishermen using their services will survive.
Studies will be required to learn the harm that the oil has
inflicted on marine life. Programs will be needed to reverse
that damage. CCA will be a partner in conducting these studies,
and we will be involved in the rebuilding effort.
Moving forward, CCA believes there are two areas that must
be addressed in the fisheries recovery--new artificial reefs
and a large fish hatchery. Over the years, CCA has been active
in coordinating construction of numerous artificial reefs along
our coast. These reefs serve as habitats for all sorts of
marine life, including the species targeted most by our
anglers.
Our reef projects stretch from the eastern coast to the
western coast of Louisiana, and as part of the rebuilding
effort, we propose that many new artificial reefs using
recycled, safe materials be constructed across our coast to
attract the type of marine life that is being killed or chased
away by the oil spill. The project would cost an estimated $20
million.
Along with our Wildlife and Fisheries Department, we also
propose building a state-of-the-art fish hatchery in Louisiana.
Before the spill, Louisiana's estuaries were some of the
richest in the world, meaning there was no need for a hatchery
system to supplement fish populations. There is no question
that the spill will have an effect on our current fish
populations, but an even greater effect on the next several
years of species recruitment.
Very simply, oily water cannot support fish spawning. Our
fish population and, therefore, our economy will be devastated
without a hatchery to supplement the process. The project will
cost between $50 and $75 million to complete, but that is a
drop in the bucket when you consider what is at stake. We need
our friends in the Federal Government to support this project.
Madam Chair and Members of the Subcommittee, CCA's reason
for existing is to conserve our marine resources. Never in our
history have we encountered a manmade disaster such as this, a
disaster we anticipate will wreak more damage on our fish
resources than any hurricane ever has.
Facing adversity is nothing new to the people of Louisiana.
Over the years, we have been devastated by hurricanes, floods
and other disasters. Our people have the spirit and the stamina
to overcome, but clearly this is not a battle we can win alone.
We will need the great resources of the Federal Government and
that of the parties responsible for this disaster to help us.
In closing, I have a personal friend who was killed in the
explosion on the Deepwater Horizon, a young man whose wife was
expecting their second child just days after the accident. I
attended his funeral and mourned with his family, still shocked
at the unthinkable loss.
Over the past several weeks, I have visited the once
vibrant marsh and picked up handfuls of thick, sludge-like oil.
I have looked into the eyes of fishermen and small businessmen
who have a lifetime invested in our coast. I have seen tears in
grown men's eyes as they talk about closing their doors. I have
seen the disappointment in my own children when I tell them I
don't know when we can fish again.
On behalf of CCA, my family and the hundreds of thousands
of Louisianans who have made a life on our coast, we need you
to help provide the resources that will make it possible for us
to one day resume our lives as we once knew them. I thank you
for your time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cresson follows:]
Statement of David Cresson, Executive Director,
Coastal Conservation Association Louisiana
Good morning Madame Chairwoman. My name is David Cresson, and I am
the executive director of the Coastal Conservation Association of
Louisiana. I am a native Louisianian and a recreational fisherman. I
would like to thank you for this opportunity to address the Committee
as it discusses the long and short term impacts of the Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill.
CCA was created 33 years ago by recreational anglers who were
frustrated by the damage being done to marine resources in the Gulf of
Mexico from rampant commercial overfishing. Although today CCA has
about 100,000 members in 17 state chapters along the Gulf, Atlantic and
Pacific coasts, it all began with just 14 men and women who saw a need
to combat commercial fishing excesses and conserve the resources that
they cherished. Their spirit of conservation and stewardship started
with the ``Save the Redfish'' campaign and soon swept across the entire
Gulf Coast. By 1985, Gulf-state chapters had formed from Texas to
Florida. By decade's end, state chapters were founded through the mid-
Atlantic region, and by the early `90s, development of the New England
state chapters was completed. In 2007, Washington and Oregon opened CCA
chapters.
CCA has been active in virtually every national marine fisheries
debate since 1984 and has participated productively in state and
federal fisheries management issues for longer than three decades. CCA
continues to operate as a three-tiered organization, affecting issues
on the local, state and national levels. We have built a very
successful model for marine conservation, one in which our members are
tied directly to the resources they cherish through stewardship and
conservation programs. Our members have fully embraced their role as
stewards of the marine environment.
CCA Louisiana had more than 15,000 members before April 20, 2010,
when the Deepwater Horizon rig exploded and sank 50 miles off our
coast. Those members have played an important role in securing
Louisiana's title as the Sportsman's Paradise. They have been engaged
in countless programs and projects to secure the future of our
cherished marine resources.
Before the oil spill, CCA Louisiana was celebrating its 25th
anniversary. Our membership was at an all-time high. We were
celebrating things like the inauguration of a CCA scholarship in marine
sciences and a significant increase in youth participation in our STAR
tournament. We were celebrating the growth of our artificial reef
program through which we have spent millions of dollars over the years
to build and restore marine habitat. We were celebrating our highly
successful derelict crab trap removal program, a new youth education
program, and the growth of our scientific fish tagging program. We were
celebrating the successful removal of indiscriminate and destructive
fishing gear from state waters. We were celebrating the signing of a
Presidential executive order making red drum a game fish in federal
waters. We were celebrating the dedication of our brand new state
headquarters in Baton Rouge.
We were celebrating the thousands of ways sportsmen and sportswomen
have shown their commitment to protecting and conserving the unique
marine environment that is a way of life for us in Louisiana.
I am here today to tell you that the celebration is over. I am here
to tell you that many of our members believe that all that work and
effort and sacrifice is in mortal jeopardy. Many of our members believe
that the future they were working so hard to secure, a future in which
their kids and grandkids would have the same opportunity to enjoy
coastal Louisiana in the same ways that they did, is threatened. Many
of our members believe that the danger that faces not just Louisiana,
but all of the Gulf States is beyond their ability to control, impact
or influence. And they are scared. Scared and angry.
There have not been many challenges in the past 25 years that the
members of CCA Louisiana have not met head on, with their eyes clearly
on the horizon. What I see now is a remarkably committed group of
people who, for the moment at least, simply don't know where to even
begin. The challenge before us is playing out on such a scale that not
even the men and women of CCA Louisiana, the same ones who have beaten
the odds time and again in their efforts to protect their marsh, their
coast, their Gulf and their fish, can find a way to answer it.
I have no doubt that we will find a way to reverse this disaster. I
am confident that these darkest of days will be beaten back by the
people of Louisiana through the same types of projects that have
defined CCA since the beginning. We will rebuild reef by reef, acre by
acre, fish by fish. When the leak is plugged and the last camera is
turned off, when the rest of the world is no longer focused on the Gulf
of Mexico, we will still be here, as we always have been, ready to do
what needs to be done to restore the heart and soul of Louisiana. And
that will be enough. It will be enough because it HAS to be enough.
Because many of us are convinced that when hearings like these have
come to an end, there will still be much work to be done. Most of that
work will be done under a hot sun, by small groups of people,
struggling in the mud and muck, to rebuild by our hands what was
destroyed by others. That work will be done out of the spotlight, away
from the microphones, out of sight and out of mind of the vast majority
of people watching now.
And that will be OK. If I may be so bold as to speak on behalf of
the people of Louisiana, we have been here before.
I am glad to have this opportunity before you today not to cast
blame or come with hand outstretched. I am glad to have this
opportunity today to tell you about groups like CCA, groups that will
not just go away when the going gets tough. I am glad to be here today
to tell you of the men and women who are going to suffer from a
terrible mistake not of their own making, and who are going to find the
will not only to survive, but also ensure the survival of the things
they hold dear. It is often when we have lost faith in the things of
man that we turn to the things of nature to restore our faith in
ourselves. I believe it will be that way in Louisiana.
It will not be easy, though. The connection that our members feel
to the marine life of the marsh and of the open Gulf is at a tenuous
point. There is a very real danger that, having been cut off from the
Gulf of Mexico, having watched the marsh die around them, some people
may find it difficult or impossible to return. We hope that is not the
case, but no one should underestimate the psychological and financial
impacts a slow-motion, unstoppable disaster like this can have on a
region. Especially one that is tied so intrinsically to the marsh.
I have a camp in Buras, Louisiana--near the mouth of the
Mississippi River in Plaquemines Parish--that is a refuge for me and my
family. It is our gathering place, it is the place where I hoped to
craft a lifetime of memories for my kids, just as my father and I
cemented our relationship in the outdoors hunting and fishing. What
will become of that camp if the environment around it is poisoned? What
will become of the businesses that depend on people like me going to
their camps, going fishing, buying fuel for their boats and trucks,
eating out at local restaurants, visiting local bait shops and tackle
shops? When the marsh dies, the economy that is built around it will
inevitably die as well, and that is as great a threat to our way of
life as the oil itself.
The oil spill has resulted in some of the largest fishery closures
in history of the Gulf of Mexico, closures that impact both the
anglers, tournaments and the businesses that rely on angler
expenditures. While much of the focus both in the media and in this
Administration has been on the impacts to commercial fishing
operations, the damage done to the recreational sector by this disaster
must be addressed as well. It may very well be larger in economic
terms.
According to a recent economic impact study conducted by Gentner
Consulting Group for the American Sportfishing Association, if the
entire Gulf were closed to recreational fishing from May through
August, the region would lose $1.1 billion in revenue, which supports
$2.5 billion in total sales, $1.3 billion in value added, $811.1
million in income and 18,785 jobs. These are not small numbers. That's
$8.6 million in expenditures lost for every day of a total closure
which generates $20.2 million in total sales, $10.5 million in value
added, $6.6 million in income and supports 22 jobs every day. These are
just numbers to many of the people at this hearing--statistics to be
pored over by economists and lawyers. But these are our friends, our
supporters, our neighbors and our families. These are lives that have
been built over the decades that are ebbing away like the tide, as the
oil makes its way inexorably towards our coast.
Some may point out that the entire Gulf is not closed, nor is it
likely to ever be all closed at once. Even though the closures
announced to date have encompassed less than the entire Gulf, and have
hovered around the 35 percent mark, Gentner asserts that any closure is
likely to reduce the trips taken by more than just the area closed
because anglers, particularly non-resident anglers, will likely avoid
taking a saltwater fishing trip even if their local waters are not
officially closed due to adverse feelings about encountering the oil
spill. This will be particularly true as the spill spreads to other
popular recreational areas on the Florida Coast. If the spill or the
perception of adverse impacts from the spill further spreads to the
Keys and Eastern Florida beaches, these damages will increase
dramatically.
While unlikely, if the closures last long enough, anglers may quit
making expenditures on durable equipment entirely. If all durable goods
expenditures cease in the Gulf of Mexico, $14 billion in revenue will
be lost annually as a result of the Deepwater Horizon incident. This
level of expenditure supports $32.8 billion in total sales, $26.3
billion in value added, $10.7 billion in income and 261,855 jobs.
Fifty-thousand of those jobs are in Louisiana. While it is unlikely
that all durable equipment expenditures will cease, the longer the
closures persist, the more likely that anglers will buy fewer lures,
rods and reels, other equipment, etc. Others may pull their boats and
end expenditures on boat maintenance and storage. Boaters will think
twice about upgrading or buying a new boat this year and all these
choices have negative economic consequences directly tied to the spill.
Admiral Thad Allen pointed out last weekend that the crisis created
by the oil spill will continue until the fall. As Admiral Allen put it,
and I quote: ``This is a siege across the entire Gulf. This spill is
holding everybody hostage, not only economically but physically. And it
has to be attacked on all fronts.''
Nobody really knows what long-term impact the spill will have on
recreational fishing. We do know the immediate impact, and it is that
recreational fishing in the closed areas is down to zero. We do know
that we will have an enormous rebuilding job. The longer the crisis
lasts, the longer it will take to get back to where we were. We don't
know if the many small businesses that rely on recreational fishermen
using their services can survive. Even CCA, a charitable organization,
will suffer serious financial hardship due to reduced memberships and
tournament entries.
Studies will be required to learn the harm that massive amounts of
crude oil have inflicted on marine life. Programs will have to be
implemented to reverse that damage. CCA will be a partner in conducting
these studies and we will be deeply involved in the rebuilding effort.
There are two important areas that CCA believes must be addressed
in the recovery--new habitat, namely artificial reefs and grass
plantings, and a significant fish hatchery and research center.
Over the years, CCA has been active in coordinating construction of
numerous artificial reefs along our coast. These reefs serve has
habitats for all sorts of marine life, including the species of fish
targeted by most anglers. Our reef projects stretch from the eastern
coast to the western coast of Louisiana. As part of the rebuilding
effort, we propose that many new artificial reefs--using safe, clean
recycled materials--be constructed across our coast to attract the type
of marine life that is being killed or chased away by the oil spill and
to replace reefs that will be damaged or destroyed by the oil settling
out of the water column. This project would cost an estimated $20
million.
Along with our Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, we also
propose building a state of the art fish hatchery in Louisiana. Before
the spill, the estuaries in Louisiana were some of the richest in the
world, meaning there was not a significant need for a hatchery system
to supplement fish populations. There is no question that the oil spill
will have an effect on our current fish population, and an even greater
effect on the next several years of species recruitment. Very simply,
oily water cannot support fish spawning. Referring to Gentner
Consulting Group's numbers above, we cannot afford several years of
greatly reduced or no spawn. Our fish population (and therefore our
economy) will be devastated without a hatchery to supplement the
process. The project will cost between $50-$75 million to complete. .
.a drop in the bucket when you consider what is at stake. We will rely
on our friends in the federal government to support this project.
Madam chair and members of the subcommittee, CCA's reason for
existing is to conserve our marine resources. It is what we were
founded on and what drives our vision. Never in our history have we
encountered a man-made disaster such as the BP oil spill. For that
matter, we anticipate that the oil spill will wreak more damage to our
fish resources than any hurricane has done.
Facing adversity is nothing new to the people of Louisiana. Over
the years, we've been devastated by hurricanes, floods and other
disasters. Our people have the spirit and stamina to overcome great
obstacles, but clearly this is not a battle we can fight and win alone.
We will need the great resources of the federal government and that of
the parties responsible for this disaster to help us.
I have a personal friend who was killed in the explosion on the
Deepwater Horizon. . .a young man whose wife was expecting their second
child just days after the accident. I attended his funeral and mourned
with his family, still shocked at the unthinkable loss. Over the past
several weeks, I have visited the once vibrant marsh and picked up
handfuls of thick, sludge-like oil. I have looked into the eyes of
fishermen and small businessmen who have a lifetime invested in our
coast. I have seen tears in their eyes as they talk about closing their
doors. I have seen the disappointment in my own children when I tell
them I don't know when we can fish again. On behalf of all of CCA, my
family and hundreds of thousands of Louisianans who have made a life on
our coast, we don't expect anybody to come in and rescue us; we just
want to be provided the resources that will make it possible for us to
one day resume our lives on the coast as we once knew them.
Thank you.
______
[NOTE: Mr. Cresson's responses to questions were not received by the
time this hearing went to print.]
Ms. Bordallo. I thank you very much, Mr. Cresson, for your
testimony and to all the others. Certainly the Committee
understands your plight, and I have great feelings for all of
you that have lost your livelihoods, and really the future is
unpredictable.
I have some questions, and of course the Ranking Member
will have some questions as well for you. I would like to begin
with Ms. Robichaux. I was truly struck by your testimony. The
oil spill looms as a death threat to the Houma culture. What
will it mean for members of your tribe to be separated from
each other and from the land that has defined the United Houma
Nation?
Ms. Robichaux. It is hard to even discuss this without
getting quite emotional. We have lived in our traditional lands
for generation after generation. It is very common to have a
grandparent living next door to grandchildren and extended
family. We are a community.
We have lived that way for many, many years, and the mere
thought of having to move away from our traditional homeland
and not live as a community, as a family, is just
heartbreaking. I don't know how we are going to be able to
survive that.
Ms. Bordallo. What is the population of your tribe?
Ms. Robichaux. We have 17,000 tribal citizens. The majority
of them live from St. Mary Parish to Plaquemines Parish, so we
are all along the southeastern coast of Louisiana.
Ms. Bordallo. The other question that I have is, you
testified that many tribal citizens do not have options for
alternative employment. Can you expand upon that?
Ms. Robichaux. Yes. Our Indian children were not allowed
into regular public schools until the Civil Rights Act in the
mid-1960s so the people of my father's generation have only a
seventh grade education.
They have trawled and fished and harvested oysters their
entire lives so it would be really difficult for them, at this
point, to be trained to do something different. This is what
they have done for generation after generation so we are tied
to the fishing industry, whether it is the net makers or the
extended services that are provided through the fishing
industry.
Ms. Bordallo. Now, the other question really applies to
everybody that has testified here today. I am very curious.
Have you received any financial assistance after the spill?
Ms. Robichaux. Some of our tribal fishermen have applied
for financial assistance from BP.
Ms. Bordallo. BP.
Ms. Robichaux. And even that is a challenge because of the
lack of educational opportunities. We have great concern that
when they go through the application process, they may be taken
advantage of and not understand fully what they are signing.
So, some of them have been able to do that, but even with
that system, there is no consistency. Our net makers might be
compensated $1,000, where all of the nets that they have made
and the orders have been canceled, as well as the fact that no
more orders are being placed. So, there is really no
consistency in the process as to how people are being
compensated.
Ms. Bordallo. I understand that BP put out a $5,000
amount--is that correct?--to each of the fishermen whose
livelihoods have come to a halt? Is that so? $5,000?
Ms. Robichaux. That is correct. They have made an initial
payment of $5,000, and it is unclear whether or not there will
be forthcoming payment.
And so we have families that are really concerned about
being able to provide for their families, to pay their bills
and to provide food on the table because some of them have
received that $5,000 payment, but we don't know if there is
going to be another one forthcoming.
Ms. Bordallo. Well, especially if you have a small fishing
business and you have employees. I don't know how far $5,000 is
going. It is just inconceivable that a multi-billion-dollar
company can issue a $5,000 check a couple of times to the
fishermen. I don't know. This is something that really concerns
me.
Mr. Viles, what do you foresee as the worst case scenario
for the Gulf of Mexico coastal and marine environment?
Mr. Viles. Well, I try not to think about that really. I
think what we have tried to focus on is monitoring the issue
and responding where we can, and urging a better, more
proactive response, cleanup, and containment efforts.
But clearly Louisiana's coastal marsh is what drives the
ecosystem of the Gulf of Mexico. Ninety-five percent of all the
marine life in the Gulf of Mexico relies on estuaries, and the
Mississippi River is by far the most significant estuary in the
Gulf so this could be a horrific experience for the Gulf of
Mexico and we might see the impacts from everything from the
sperm whales that were discussed, and we are very frightened
about the impacts on that unique pod of whales and the bluefin
tuna.
Bluefin tuna are a globetrotting species, and they actually
come into the Gulf of Mexico every April and May to spawn.
Clearly this year's spawning class, because they actually spawn
in this exact BP impact zone, they are going to be impacted.
But of course meanwhile we have longliners. Thirty-two
percent of the Gulf Federal fishing waters are closed right
now. The rest is open. The longline fleet has gone out into the
open areas, and the longline fleet, even though they are going
after yellowfin and swordfish, there is an awful lot of bluefin
bycatch. So we are concerned that we aren't seeing a proactive
enough response from the Federal fisheries management folks to
ensure that we are keeping the impact to a minimum right now.
But clearly it is going to affect everything from the
shrimp and the oysters on up the food chain. Hopefully it
won't. We have not seen as widespread an impact to our coastal
marsh now as we could have. Clearly the oil is still coming and
will be coming at us for months, so we don't know what the
worst case scenario is, but we certainly hope that we avoid it.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much. My time is up, and I
would like to turn to the Ranking Member now for any questions
he may have.
Mr. Cassidy. Mr. Cresson, I have the advantage. I went with
you down to Plaquemines Parish to see and speak to the marina
owners, and I was struck. So here we see the fishing industry,
as Ms. Dardar speaks so well of, is devastated. Second, we see
that the oil and gas is going to be destroyed by the moratorium
with the people unable to make their house payments, et cetera.
What you are saying is that there is a third leg to that
coastal economy, which is the recreational fishing, and that
now that third leg may be removed almost as much by perception
perhaps, as well as by the spill. Now, that just seems the
harder of the three to address.
You mentioned the hatcheries, the fisheries. Any other
specific things you would suggest for this kind of softer, yet
incredibly significant, source of jobs?
Mr. Cresson. Yes, sir. Thank you, Congressman. You are
correct. The recreational fishery is a bit harder to put your
arms around because there are so many pieces of it that come
from the great sport that we love down in Louisiana.
What I would hope for is that this body, and the entire
Federal Government, consider recreational fishermen and the
businesses that rely on them in whatever Federal relief package
is put out there. You heard Secretary Barham earlier talk about
wildlife.
Mr. Cassidy. Now, you don't mean me going down to do my
annual fish, my catching a bunch of speckled trout with my son.
You mean the people that have the marinas----
Mr. Cresson. Yes.
Mr. Cassidy [continuing]. The bait shops, et cetera?
Mr. Cresson. Absolutely. And the people that rely on you
and your son to go fish. But the marinas, the bait shops, the
tackle shops.
The $5,000 check that the Chairwoman mentioned is simply
not cutting it for these guys. They are closing their doors on
a daily basis, and even if they get one next month they will
close those doors. There is a perception that our recreational
fishery is closed. That is a major problem because the majority
of our state waters you are still able to fish.
But to answer your question directly, Mr. Congressman, we
need to make sure that the Federal Government and BP recognize
the needs of recreational fishermen in this industry when the
time comes, and we thank you for your time.
Mr. Cassidy. Thank you very much.
Mr. Cresson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cassidy. Mr. Viles, I keep on asking this but
apparently, frankly, I keep asking because I haven't heard. I
am not saying that in kind of a rude way. I am just very
curious.
The Ixtoc put a tremendous amount of oil into the Gulf. Do
we know what the sperm whales did during that or the bluefin
tuna, et cetera?
Mr. Viles. We don't know. It was an incredibly understudied
spill. It was in Mexico. Clearly some U.S. resources were put
to help fight it and help shut it down.
Red Adair came out, and actually I talked to somebody who
was the ROV supervisor who watched them go through their golf
ball exercise as well. Of course, what ultimately shut that
down was a relief well, which we know is----
Mr. Cassidy. Now, you imply that we have some sense of the
bluefin tuna population. In fact, you stated that, and we know
that it is overfished.
So is there any sort of--I mean, if we graph it out we can
say here was the Ixtoc, here was the oil and this is the
protected population at that time. Was there a dip in the
population, or did it remain a constant, sort of being
overfished?
Mr. Viles. Yes. I don't know. Sorry. I am sorry. That
research, to my knowledge, has not been done.
Mr. Cassidy. Ms. Mitchelmore? Dr. Mitchelmore. I am sorry.
Sorry to be so rushed. I am supposed to vote, and if I don't
vote I don't get reelected next time.
Ms. Bordallo. You have two minutes.
Mr. Cassidy. Two minutes. The problem with the dispersants.
I am told by NOAA that the effect of the sunlight on the small
globules and the evaporation of the benzines, et cetera, will
make the oil by the time it hits the Gulf Stream going up the
Atlantic probably inert.
And it may coalesce and form weathered tar balls, but it is
not going to be something which is going to poison fisheries in
the Atlantic. And yet your testimony suggested that
photosensitivity has a different effect than what NOAA is
suggesting. Any comments on that?
Dr. Mitchelmore. Yes. That is a couple part question. The
first is yes, you do lose some of the smaller, volatile oil
components at the surface and the weathered oil does lose those
as it moves, but those are the more long-term oil components so
you have to tease apart what are the acute short-term effects,
rather than the long-term effects. So these more weathered oils
will have effects. They are just more long term, like
carcinogenic effects.
Mr. Cassidy. Carcinogenic on the fish or upon the humans
that ingest the fish?
Dr. Mitchelmore. Both. I mean, it depends.
Mr. Cassidy. Because the carcinogens, the oil will go to
the liver. The liver is not typically ingested by the human, so
I think of other research data showing that mercury affects
people that eat the liver of the fish, which most of us don't
eat.
Dr. Mitchelmore. It depends on the organism you are eating.
Some organisms can remove the oil better than others, so it
depends on what you are eating.
Mr. Cassidy. I have to yield back, and I have to go vote.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. I thank the Ranking Member. Panel
2, you will be excused.
We will recess for one hour so that Panel 3 can maybe take
their lunch, and we will come back in one hour, which would
make it--what time is it now?
Female Voice. It is 1:15. 2:15.
Ms. Bordallo. 2:15. 2:15 we will reconvene.
[Recess.]
Ms. Bordallo. Good afternoon. The Subcommittee on Wildlife
and Oceans will now restart, and I would like to call on the
third panel to please be seated at the witness table.
Thank you. I would like to introduce the members of the
third panel who will testify this afternoon. John Williams,
Executive Director of the Southern Shrimp Alliance; Mr. Ryan
Lambert of the Cajun Fishing Adventures; and Ms. Joanne
McDonough, Nature Tourism Specialist, Alabama Gulf Coast
Convention & Visitors Bureau; and Anne Rolfes, Executive
Director of the Louisiana Bucket Brigade.
Is Ms. McDonough in the room?
Ms. Rolfes. She was just outside.
Ms. Bordallo. Oh, all right. Fine. OK. Well, we will begin
with Mr. Williams. And again, I think you have been seated here
all morning so you do know that we have a time limit, and the
red light will flash on, but we will accept your full written
statement into the record.
So, Mr. Williams, thank you for being here today and thank
you for the long wait you have had, but we knew this was going
to be a long hearing. So please begin.
STATEMENT OF JOHN WILLIAMS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, SOUTHERN SHRIMP
ALLIANCE, TARPON SPRINGS, FLORIDA
Mr. Williams. Thank you. Madam Chairwoman and Members of
the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to address the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill's impact on the shrimp industry. I
am the Executive Director of the Southern Shrimp Alliance, and
I am also a shrimper. Our organization was founded over eight
years ago to represent the shrimp industry in the Gulf and
south Atlantic.
Thousands of people currently make their living shrimping
off of our southern coast. In recent years, we have survived
regulatory shutdowns, high fuel prices, low shrimp prices and
massive hurricanes. I have to believe that somehow we will
survive this disaster as well.
But let us make no mistake about it. The impacts on the
shrimp fishery will be cataclysmic. Every day brings a
bewildering flood of new information. The truth is, we don't
know what the full extent of the damage will be, and it will be
years before we do.
I would like to focus today on three areas for moving
forward, where I think Congress and this Administration should
work together. First, the oil spill compensation process for
shrimp fishermen must be fair and efficient. As you know, the
spill has completely shut down a significant portion of our
industry. Fishermen face a very uncertain future and cannot
wait for relief. When shrimpers ask what they can do, I
honestly don't know what to tell them.
The Oil Pollution Act says that fishermen will be made
whole for their economic damages, but if you speak to shrimpers
in the Gulf, rich confusion reigns. Even the President is now
making statements recognizing that this system appears to be
fundamentally broken. This situation is completely
unacceptable.
Congress and the Administration must either use existing
authority to streamline the current process or establish a new
one that is tailored to the magnitude of this spill. Despite
lessons learned from the Exxon Valdez, history is about to
repeat itself. The lawyers will get rich, and the fishermen
will go broke. Congress can fix this problem.
My second point is U.S. shrimp currently being sold in the
marketplace is safe, wholesome and healthy. This message is
absolutely crucial if we are to survive this crisis. The
growing misconception that Gulf shrimp is not safe is untrue
and unacceptable. We greatly appreciate the efforts of NOAA and
FDA to test seafood and inform the public that seafood from the
Gulf is safe.
But obviously much more must be done to ensure that this
message is heard and understood. It appears that the
government's seafood testing and safety efforts are being done
without significant industry participation. A stronger
partnership between industry and the Federal Government is
needed.
A good first step would be the creation of a joint task
force, with the fishing industry and the government charged
with minimizing the impact of the oil spill on the Gulf seafood
market. Funding a consumer education program regarding the
safety and health attributes of Gulf seafood would also be
helpful.
My final point is that a more formal partnership between
the fishing industry and the government should be established.
History has taught us that fishermen bear the economic brunt of
the damage from oil spills, and the oil companies do everything
they can to minimize their responsibilities. This spill will be
no different.
Our survival depends on the responsiveness of our
government, and I must say that fishermen are losing
confidence. Every day fishermen ask me if our government is
really working for us. Everything about this spill seems to be
downplayed by one Federal official after another, and there is
a widespread perception that the government is not being
responsive to even the most basic environmental, economic and
health concerns.
On May 5, we sent a letter to EPA and NOAA, voicing strong
concerns regarding the impact of the chemical dispersants used
by BP on marine life, including shrimp. We have not received
any response to these concerns. Meanwhile, credible scientists
have echoed our concern, and yet BP has continued to apply
another million gallons of dispersants.
As we understand it, government officials made a decision
that the harm caused by oil spread throughout the water column
was preferable to allowing water to rise and remain on the
surface. Both NOAA and EPA have described their decision as
simply an environmental tradeoff. To date, no one in our
government has taken the time to sit down with us to explain
why our shrimp industry became a national tradeoff.
The use of dispersants is symptomatic of the need for a
much stronger and more constructive partnership between the
Administration and the fishing industry. This spill will impact
the shrimp industry for a long time, yet the government's
actions will be drawn away to another important issue soon
after the spill is capped.
Before our fishermen are forgotten, it is vitally important
that systems be established now that will remain in place for
the long term to help the fishing industry recover. A
commission should be created to advise Congress and the
Administration of the continuing impacts of the spill as they
are discovered and documented; formulate specific
recommendations as to an appropriate response to adverse
impacts; and provide regular reports on the progress of the
efforts to provide fair compensation to fishermen for economic
harm caused by the spill.
In closing, I would like to say that while our fishermen
are suffering, nothing we face can ever be measured against the
personal tragedy of the families of the loved ones and those
who perished on the Deepwater Horizon rig. I just want to
recognize them and let them know that they are in our prayers.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Williams follows:]
Statement of John Williams, Executive Director, Southern Shrimp
Alliance
Madame Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
giving me the opportunity to address the Deepwater Horizon oil spill's
impact on the shrimp industry. I am John Williams, the executive
director of the Southern Shrimp Alliance. I am also a shrimper. My son
has followed me into the commercial fishing industry and two of my
three brothers are commercial fishermen as well. I have been
commercially fishing for over forty years and have owned and operated
shrimp boats that worked the Gulf of Mexico and South Atlantic since
1973. I began working on a shrimp boat as a boy in North Carolina in
1960 and began commercially fishing for a living in Florida in 1968. I
also own a seafood unloading/wholesaling facility and a seafood retail
market in Tarpon Springs, Florida.
The Southern Shrimp Alliance was founded over eight years ago to
represent the interests of the shrimp industry spanning from Texas to
North Carolina along this country's southern coastal waters. We got
together to respond to the negative effects of a flood of unfairly
traded imports and to insure the future viability of the shrimp
industry in this country. I participated in the creation of the
Southern Shrimp Alliance and have since taken on the position of
executive director because I believe that the shrimp industry is worth
fighting for, both for the people who have been shrimping U.S. waters
for decades and for their children, who are now taking over or will
soon take over their parents' businesses, continuing a proud tradition.
Since the Southern Shrimp Alliance's formation, the shrimp industry has
battled intense efforts to regulate us out of existence, faced
historically high fuel prices at times when prices for our shrimp were
at historic lows, and suffered through the devastating effects of
massive hurricanes like Katrina, Rita, and Ike. The industry survived
all of those challenges, just like the shrimp industry will survive the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. But these past few years have taken an
immense toll on us and the oil spill will likely weaken our industry
further.
Statistics maintained by the government tell the tale of how much
the industry has already been weakened. In 2002, the offshore shrimp
fleet spent over 200,000 days shrimping in the Gulf of Mexico. By 2008,
after six successive years of decline, the fleet spent less than 63,000
days shrimping--less than a third of the fishing effort we claimed just
a few years before. In 2002, the states of Texas, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia issued nearly 22,000 commercial
shrimp licenses. By 2008, these five states reported issuing less than
9,000 such licenses.
Nevertheless, despite these significant setbacks, thousands of
people in the Gulf of Mexico and South Atlantic continue to make their
living through shrimping. The industry continues to land product worth
over $400 million each year, an amount that, on its own, seriously
understates the total impact of shrimp fishermen on the economies of
coastal communities. Because of its sheer size, the industry will
survive this ecological nightmare, but the fact that an industry will
continue in some shape or form is little comfort to the men and women
who have struggled to make it through to this year and now face
imminent bankruptcy because of the oil spill. Our prayers are said
first and foremost to the families of those that perished in this
tragedy. At the same time, thousands of members of our industry are
desperately in need of help.
In my testimony today, I am going to organize my comments to first
address the Southern Shrimp Alliance's concerns regarding shrimpers
that have been put out of work by the oil spill, then discuss our
concerns relating to those shrimpers that have been able to continue to
work in areas not yet affected by the spill, and, finally, the role
that we believe the shrimp industry should play with respect to the
government's efforts to respond to the continuing impacts of this
tragedy in the future.
The Compensation Process for Shrimp Fishermen Affected by the Oil Spill
Must Be both Fair and Efficient
For a significant portion of our industry, the oil spill has
completely and totally prevented making a living on the water.
Virtually all of these shrimpers have spent the last five years cutting
every expense they could to survive through an extended period of
unparalleled low prices and high costs. These shrimpers have little, if
anything, in reserve and an inability to fish, to generate income,
presents an immediate threat to their solvency. These fishermen cannot
wait for relief. Either they receive assistance now that keeps them in
business or their small businesses fail and they join the ranks of the
unemployed. There are not many other opportunities for gainful
employment for these fishermen. The entire industry cannot be expected
to smoothly transition into workers at Walmart or other service
industries and they cannot all become census workers.
And, yet, when shrimpers ask the Southern Shrimp Alliance for
guidance on what they can do, I do not know what to tell them. The law
in this area is complicated and the experience of commercial fishermen
harmed by the Exxon Valdez spill is by no means comforting for
fishermen in the Gulf. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), passed by
Congress in the wake of the Exxon Valdez spill, should give us comfort.
On the printed page, the OPA says that businesses will be made whole
for their economic damages caused by an oil spill. Because substantial
amounts of shrimping grounds are closed as the result of the Deepwater
Horizon's spill, there is no question that shrimp fishermen have been
directly harmed by the disaster. Yet, if you speak to many shrimpers in
the Gulf, you will hear massive confusion as to what they ought to do
and what they might be entitled to.
On one side, British Petroleum has done at least some of what is
required of it under the OPA in establishing a claims process. On
another side, lawyers of all stripes have descended on the Gulf Coast
and told shrimpers that the OPA process is fundamentally flawed--why
would BP do right by them of their own volition? -- and that they need
to sign up for legal representation now, today, to get the relief they
deserve. In response, some shrimpers have submitted claims to BP,
others have signed contingency fee agreements that would hand over
between one-third and forty percent of any funds received to an
attorney, while still others have not taken any action because they do
not know what to do or who to believe.
One voice notably absent has been that of the federal government.
In the wake of a disaster with unprecedented impacts on commercial
fishermen, the government can and should play a central role in
informing members of the industry of programs in place to assist them.
There are many legitimate questions and concerns that must be answered
with respect to the OPA claims process. The press has focused on the
question of the OPA's liability limit of $75 million for BP with regard
to economic damages. Given the number of businesses affected by the oil
spill, economic damage claims are likely to greatly exceed $75 million.
Press reports indicate that BP claims to have already paid out $50
million in compensation for economic damages. Once this liability limit
is reached, the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund is unlikely to be able
to make up the difference as most of the OPA's current one billion
dollar cap per event will be accounted for by costs related to clean up
efforts.
Although BP has said in public statements that it will not impose a
cap on economic damages and that it will compensate all legitimate
claims, it is unclear, in practice, what such declarations mean and
whether they have any legal effect. Those that cannot shrimp now are
unlikely to be able to return to their fishing grounds anytime in the
near future and are unable to predict with accuracy now what the
ultimate impact of the spill will be on their businesses. Although the
OPA contemplates partial claims and partial recovery, fishermen are
very concerned that, when it is all said and done and television
cameras have turned away from the oil spill to cover other events,
funds will not be available to address continuing harm to shrimpers.
Even if no liability cap is imposed and all legitimate claims are
paid, the claims process established by the OPA is likely to be
overwhelmed by those affected by the Deepwater Horizon spill. The scope
of the impact on people in the Gulf is staggering and expands by the
day. It would seem to be extremely unlikely that either BP or the U.S.
Coast Guard's National Pollution Funds Center (NPFC) will be able to
administer the OPA relief process in a timely, expeditious manner. In
the face of significant resources constraints and short statutory
deadlines, it is inevitable that meritorious claims will be
inaccurately rejected and individual fishermen will struggle to
meaningfully contest any adverse conclusions drawn by BP or NPFC as to
the impact that the spill has had on commercial fishing industries.
Without the ability to rely on some basic baseline data or structure of
analysis for evaluating claims, the OPA claims process pits the
individual shrimper initially against BP, its claims adjustors, and
attorneys and, later, against the entirety of the NPFC if any
disagreement arises.
Last week, before the House Judiciary Committee, Mississippi's
Attorney General, Jim Hood, testified as to his concerns, and the
concerns of other Gulf states' Attorney Generals, regarding the OPA
claims process administered by BP. Attorney General Hood noted that
endorsement of the claims process procedure by the Gulf states'
Attorney Generals ``would encourage greater participation in it,'' but
explained that he and the other Attorney Generals ``cannot embrace any
claims review process until we receive adequate assurances of its
fairness.'' If the Attorney Generals of the Gulf states are unable to
express support for the OPA claims process as administered by BP, how
is a shrimper supposed to determine whether to file a claim or, indeed,
what steps he or she ought to take?
In the absence of any guidance from the federal government,
attorneys seeking to sign up clients have filled the void. Some of
these attorneys tell shrimpers that the OPA process is fatally flawed,
that they must sue or hire an attorney to enter into settlement
negotiations with BP to obtain fair compensation, and that they must
sign contingency agreements that promise those attorneys significant
portions of any funds received. Where these attorneys' efforts are
particularly aggressive, in the absence of any federal government
guidance, fishermen have been left to the wolves. Widespread reports of
undue pressure placed on shrimpers to sign such contingency agreements
are troubling and add to the confusion held by many in the industry.
Shrimpers, and commercial fishermen generally, do not want to live
off of BP or off of a government largesse. Fishermen want to fish. But
without solid assurances that commercial fishermen will be made whole
for the economic damages they are suffering now and will continue to
suffer as fishing grounds remain closed, many more shrimpers will be
forced to exit the business in the hope of finding something, anything,
that will put food on the table for their families. For these reasons,
the Southern Shrimp Alliance believes that Congress should strongly
consider establishing a new process for addressing the injuries caused
to commercial fishermen by the oil spill that accounts for the
unprecedented nature of the disaster and its impact on the fisheries of
the Gulf of Mexico. Such a process would give shrimpers comfort that
they will receive fair compensation for what has taken place, such that
they will be able to start shrimping again as soon as there are clean
waters to shrimp and clean shrimp to land.
In the interim, recent comments by the President appear to
recognize the deficiencies of the OPA claims process for commercial
fishing businesses and their employees. The Administration seems to be
similarly concerned that the process be both efficient and fair. We are
hopeful that in response to continued Congressional oversight,
proactive efforts will be made to make the OPA claims process as
amenable to fishermen as possible.
U.S. Shrimp Currently Being Landed and Sold in the Marketplace Is Safe,
Wholesome and Healthy
It is also important to keep in mind that the oil spill has not
impacted all of the Gulf of Mexico nor all of the waters commercially
fished for shrimp in the United States. Every day, shrimpers continue
to go out and work unpolluted waters and land wholesome, healthy U.S.
shrimp. But we fear that this is not something that the majority of the
American consuming public necessarily understands.
The Southern Shrimp Alliance greatly appreciates the efforts of
NOAA Fisheries to inform the public that the seafood currently
available from the Gulf is safe because of both (1) the fishery
closures in areas affected by the oil spill and (2) rigorous testing of
these products. But more needs to be done to ensure that this message
is heard and understood. For important and valid reasons, the public's
focus has been on the harmful effects of the oil spill and the
devastating toll the spill is taking on the environment in the Gulf.
The first thing that the public thinks of with respect to wildlife in
the Gulf of Mexico is contamination by oil. For shrimpers, this means
that not only are the fishermen put out of work by the spill harmed,
but those shrimpers that have been to date unaffected face the
possibility of a significant decline in demand for their product
because of pervasive fears regarding the safety of anything caught in
the Gulf or shrimp landed anywhere in U.S. waters.
Assuring the public of the safety of seafood landed in the Gulf is,
therefore, essential to our industry. For the time being, this concern
relates to those fishermen who ply waters not impacted by the spill.
For seafood landed in unaffected waters, there is no question that
these products are safe. But at some point in the future, waters
currently closed to commercial fishing will be opened. Consumers will
inevitably wonder whether the openings came too soon and whether the
seafood landed in these waters is genuinely safe. For these reasons, a
long-term strategy for ensuring consumers of the safety and health of
seafood landed in the Gulf is required.
The Southern Shrimp Alliance is grateful for the establishment of a
federal seafood safety/testing program in Pascagoula, but would like to
see a far greater partnership between industry and the federal
government in developing long-term strategies to insure the public of
the safety of Gulf seafood. A good first step would be the creation of
a joint task force with members of the commercial fishing industry and
the federal government charged with focusing on what steps need to be
taken to minimize the negative effects of the oil spill on the market
for Gulf seafood. An important next step would be the Congressional
creation and development of a fund designed to provide consumer
education regarding the safety and positive health attributes of Gulf
seafood.
Formal Partnerships between the Commercial Fishing Industry and the
Government Should Be Established in Response to the Oil Spill
Every significant oil spill with which I am familiar has taught
that commercial fishermen bear the brunt of the damage caused by the
contamination. As such, there should be no surprise that the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill will disproportionately impact commercial fishermen
in the Gulf. Moving forward, we hope that our government will
appreciate the vulnerability of commercial fishermen affected by the
oil spill. Fishermen do not need the government's assistance because
they are helpless. Fishermen are famously and fiercely independent and
self-sufficient, and many shrimpers fearlessly stepped into the breach
to try and mitigate the harm caused by the Deepwater Horizon spill. But
the circumstances of the spill now force beleaguered, battered small
businesses to fight for fair treatment from companies and a government
that have substantially more resources at their disposal.
For example, shrimpers have not simply waited for a man with a
check to come riding by when oil contamination closed down their
fishing grounds. Scores of shrimp fishermen eagerly volunteered to
assist BP and the government in cleanup efforts and very few have been
taken up on their offers. For those shrimpers that have participated in
the cleanup process, the reports of health problems related to those
efforts are extremely disconcerting. These fishermen report that their
concerns have either been ignored or ridiculed and fear that pressing
their concerns further will result in loss of the only income available
to them. This is inexcusable. Whatever myriad considerations confront
this Administration with respect to the oil spill, a concern that
should transcend any other is making sure that those working to
mitigate the spill's effect are not put in harm's way. Yet, there is
little evidence that federal officials have worked with fishermen
working on spill remediation to ensure their safety or address their
specific concerns.
For our part, the Southern Shrimp Alliance has faced the lack of
responsiveness directly in the concerns we voiced to government
officials regarding the use of certain toxic dispersants applied by BP.
On May 5th, we sent a letter to Lisa Jackson, the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency, and Dr. Jane Lubchenco, the
Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
voicing strong concerns regarding the impact of the chemical
dispersants used by BP on marine life. I have attached a copy of the
letter to my testimony and ask that it be included as part of the
hearing record. In the letter, we noted that the toxins in the
dispersants were likely to have direct adverse impacts on both
vertebrate and invertebrate marine life and, further, that the
dispersal of oil throughout the water column would increase, rather
than mitigate, the harmful environmental effects of the oil spill on
marine life. We have not received any response, formal or informal, to
these concerns.
In the absence of any direct response, we are given to understand
by the public statements of these two agencies that a decision has been
made that the environmental harms caused by oil spread throughout the
water column were preferable to the environmental harms caused by oil
allowed to rise and remain on the surface. Dr. Lubchenco has publicly
described the decision to employ dispersants as a ``trade-off
decision.'' (Timothy B. Hurst, ``EPA, Coast Guard OK Use of Subsea
Dispersants for Oil Spill'' (May 15, 2010) available at: http://
ecopolitology.org/2010/05/15/epa-coast-guard-ok-use-of-subsea-
dispersents-for-oil-spill/). An official within the Environmental
Protection Agency has separately explained, with respect to the
dispersants, ``the chemical that's being used has toxicity associated
with it, and I think, as the agency has tried to be very clear, this is
about an environmental trade-off.'' (Christopher Snow Hopkins, ``EPA:
BP Cleanup Means Environmental Tradeoff'' NationalJournal.com (May 11,
2010) (quoting Jim Jones, EPA Office of Chemical Safety and Pollution
Prevention) available at: http://energytopic.national
journal.com/2010/05/epa-bp-cleanup-means.php).
To date, no one in our government has taken the time to explain to
commercial fishermen or, indeed, the general public why marine life was
sacrificed as a trade-off for preventing oil from floating to the
surface and creating even more of a public relations nightmare. The
statements of government officials appear to concede that the federal
government was acutely aware of the environmental harm that would ensue
from approving the use of massive quantities of toxic dispersants
underwater. To be clear: The shrimp fishery, along with the oyster,
crab, bluefin tuna, and other important commercial fisheries in the
Gulf, are what was ``traded-off'' in the decision to allow the
unprecedented use of these toxic chemicals. And along with these
fisheries, there appears to have been an intentional determination made
that the thousands of family-owned small businesses in the Gulf related
to commercial fishing would bear the brunt of the environmental impact
of the spill.
It may yet be proven that there were valid scientific reasons for
the decision to allow the use of dispersants, but we fear that the
decision had little to do with science and more to do with limiting the
visual impact of the oil spill by keeping oil in the Gulf out of the
viewfinders of television cameras. Our fears appear to be validated by
the insistence of both BP and federal agencies that underwater oil
plumes do not exist, despite mounting evidence to the contrary from
independent observers and scientists. And, still, neither EPA nor NOAA
has reached out to the commercial fishing industry to convene a formal
meeting with those whose commercial futures were endangered by this
``trade-off'' to explain the decision, answer questions, and address
concerns obviously held by fishermen.
There needs to be a much stronger partnership between the
Administration and the commercial fishing industry to address both
short term and long term issues arising from the spill. However, such a
partnership will not take place unless Congress forces the issue.
Without Congressional oversight, too much focus will continue to be
placed on managing the public relations aspects of the spill rather
than addressing the substantive problems generated by what might now be
fairly considered as the largest environmental catastrophe in U.S.
history.
At this moment in time, the nation's eyes are affixed on the
fishing industry in the Gulf and the public's strong sympathy has been
voiced (and felt) regarding our plight. But we know that these
sentiments, while very much appreciated, are fleeting. The impact of
the Deepwater Horizon spill will be felt over a long period of time,
well after the public's attention has been drawn away to other
important issues confronting this country. As such, it is vitally
important that formalized systems be established now that will remain
in place for the long-term to help the commercial fishing industry
recover. Precedent for such entities exists in the actions taken by
Congress in the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez spill, when various
bodies were created that explicitly required the inclusion of
commercial fishermen. Here, an advisory body or Commission should be
created to (1) advise Congress and the Administration of the continuing
natural resource and economic impacts of the spill as they are
discovered and documented over the coming years; (2) formulate specific
recommendations to Congress and the Administration as to appropriate
responses to those adverse impacts identified; and (3) provide regular
reports on the progress and development of efforts to provide fair
compensation to commercial fishermen for economic harm caused by the
spill.
Thank you again for inviting me to present the concerns of the
domestic shrimp industry and I am happy to answer any questions that
you might have.
______
Southern Shrimp Alliance, Inc
P.O. Box 1577
Tarpon Springs, FL 34688
Ph. 727.934.5090
Fx. 727.934.5362
john@shrimpalliance.com
May 5, 2010
Lisa P. Jackson,
Administrator
Environmental Protection Agency
Aerial Ross Building
1200 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20460
Dr. Jane Lubchenco,
Administrator
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
1401 Constitution Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20230
Dear Administrator Jackson and Administrator Lubchenco:
The Southern Shrimp Alliance deeply and sincerely appreciates the
extraordinary efforts ongoing by your agencies and others to address
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Our industry stands-by to assist in
any way it can to mitigate the adverse impacts of this terrible
accident.
Nevertheless, the Southern Shrimp Alliance is extremely concerned
about the serious effects on marine life of chemical dispersants being
used to treat this spill. Recent reports indicate that nearly 170,000
gallons of toxic dispersants have been applied both at the surface and
underwater in the direct vicinity of the leak. BP further reports that
it has plans to increase its use of dispersants in the immediate
future.
While such dispersants may be useful in reducing but not
eliminating a surface oil slick and the associated damage to marine
life and shoreline habitats, their use also creates an entirely new set
of environmental hazards that may be more pernicious and even more
difficult to mitigate. Removing oil from the surface certainly has its
benefits, but it may also promote an ``out-of-sight, out-of-mind''
perception of the spill's true ongoing and long lasting impacts.
Our first concern is the direct toxicity to vertebrate and
invertebrate marine life which may present itself over time throughout
the food chain--from plankton--to some of the nation's most valuable
fish and shellfish species--to protected marine mammals, sea birds and
endangered species of sea turtles. Obviously, we are extremely
concerned with the toxic effects on the shrimp resource -both directly
and indirectly through their feed. As you know, shrimp are now at their
most vulnerable life stages as larvae move from offshore spawning areas
to inshore nursery areas and then return offshore. Much of this
activity takes place in the water column as well as on the bottom.
In addition, like many US fisheries, the Gulf shrimp fishery
operates under a very aggressive and costly federal regulatory regime
that protects sensitive species of marine life including those such as
sea turtles likely to be exposed to the toxic effects of dispersants
now being used in unprecedented amounts. Our fishery has an
extraordinary record of sea turtle protection and restoration in the
Gulf which could be severely undermined by the massive use of
dispersants.
Our second major area of concern lies with the physical effects of
dispersants on the oil itself. We understand that the very purpose of
dispersants is to cause the spilled oil to disperse into the water
column rather than rise to the surface. Again, we recognize this may
have the benefit of reducing shoreline habitat impacts and speeding-up
the natural degradation of oil.
However, the result that cannot be seen on television is that both
toxic dispersants and the oil itself (which can also be toxic to marine
life) is dispersed throughout the water column where the eggs and
larvae of countless species of marine life as well as the plankton and
other small organisms on which such larvae feed are present in very
large numbers. As mentioned, this is indeed a critical time for shrimp
larvae. It is also a critical time for bluefin tuna spawning and larvae
in the Gulf. Along with the Mediterranean, the Gulf of Mexico is one of
only two spawning areas in the entire Atlantic Ocean basin for a
species now receiving very serious global conservation concern. It
further occurs to us that injecting the dispersant at the point of the
spill at a depth of 5000 feet will guarantee these adverse impacts are
maximized throughout the entire water column which serves a critical
habitat for so many species.
We further understand that dispersants cause a certain amount of
oil to sink and remain on or near the ocean floor presenting yet
another invisible hazard to the benthic ecosystem that cannot be
tracked or cleaned-up. Based on our understanding of Gulf currents, oil
on or near the bottom may well spread to and literally smother the
western Gulf in the opposite direction of the surface currents and
winds now carrying the spill more to the east. This may vastly expand
the ecological and economic impacts of the spill. Again, releasing huge
quantities of dispersants directly at the sea floor would seem to
exacerbate these environmental hazards.
Given your Agencies' paramount responsibilities for protecting the
marine environment and marine life on behalf of the American people, we
ask you to give our concerns your most serious consideration. We can
certainly appreciate the pressures and demands on all federal agencies
and BP itself to respond as quickly and aggressively as possible to
what may become an unprecedented environmental catastrophe, but we must
ask you to ensure that those actions will not create an even greater
and more long lasting hazard that is even more difficult to monitor or
to clean-up.
Thank you for your consideration. We look forward to your response.
John Williams,
Executive Director
______
Response to questions submitted for the record by John Williams,
Executive Director, Southern Shrimp Alliance
Questions from Chairwoman, Congresswoman Madeline Z. Bordallo (D-GU)
1. Given that the annual value of landed product by the shrimp
industry is greater than the oil spill liability limit of $75
million dollars, do you think the liability limit should be
raised?
Indeed, the annual ex-vessel value of landings of shrimp in the
Gulf of Mexico far exceeds the $75 million cap. Over the 10-year period
of 1999-2008, the annual ex-vessel value shrimp landings from the Gulf
averaged $424 million. Given the unprecedented magnitude of the ongoing
Deepwater Horizon spill, and the catastrophic impacts on both the
shrimp fishery and resource that may last for decades, it is clear the
$75 million cap would preclude any possibility of achieving the goal of
`making fishermen whole' as indicated by BP and the Administration.
However, since the hearing, BP and the Administration have agreed
to establish a $20 billion fund for these purposes. This may obviate
the need for Congress to take on what might be a difficult legal
challenge to amend the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) in order to
raise the liability cap retroactively for application to this event.
Nevertheless, we believe that there is a very obvious need for the cap
to be raised or eliminated for future events given the lessons learned
from this spill about the perils of deepwater drilling. It should be
noted, however, that even the $20 billion fund may be inadequate to
address this spill which, as of this writing, has exceed 150 million
gallons. Much of this oil has been dispersed throughout the water
column and is likely to inflict very widespread economic impacts for
decades to come.
Questions from the Ranking Republican Member, Congressman Henry Brown,
Jr. (R-SC)
1. You note that lawyers are descending on Louisiana and telling
people that they have to have a lawyer before they submit a
claim to BP. What is your reaction to this and how can the
Administration or Congress deal with these predatory lawyers?
As explained in my testimony, the circumstances surrounding the
spill in the first 60 days or so created widespread fear and confusion
among fishermen in the Gulf. Part of this was caused by uncertainty
over whether there would be a $75 million cap on BP's liability which
was clearly insufficient to provide adequate compensation for
fishermen's claims. Another part was caused by the horror stories of
the fishermen's experience with the Exxon Valdez spill. Still another
part was caused by the reality that even though the goal of OPA 90 may
have been to eliminate the need for fishermen to hire a lawyer, the
system requires fishermen to present and argue their claims before BP
and its claims adjusters and attorneys. If claims to BP remain
unresolved after 90 days, fishermen must then argue their case before
the Coast Guard to secure compensation through their National Pollution
Fund Center. This process is very intimidating and perhaps beyond the
capabilities of many fishermen, especially those who may not speak
English as their first language.
These fears and the specter of a confusing and protracted battle
with BP and the Coast Guard made it easy for unscrupulous lawyers to
prey on many fishermen. As Congress intended, in cases such as the
Deepwater Horizon spill where there is a clear and uncontested
responsible party and there are clear and demonstrable impacts on
fishermen, OPA 90 must provide fishermen with a very clear, user-
friendly system to make claims and receive compensation without the
need to hire a lawyer. Unfortunately, there was an unacceptable absence
of clear guidance provided to fishermen by the Administration on how to
participate in the claims process. The Administration could and should
have substantially improved this situation by communicating much more
quickly, clearly and effectively to the fishing community how the
claims process works and distribute information to fishermen
specifically refuting the irresponsible claims of predatory lawyers.
The Administration should have served more as an advocate of fishermen
in this difficult process.
2. Should the Administration be taking any action to let people know
that they do NOT need a lawyer and that government centers are
being set up to help people with claims? And should the
Administration doing anything to stop these predatory lawyers
or prosecute them for making false claims?
In a situation such as this, the US government has the fundamental
responsibility to do what is necessary to protect its citizens from
harm. Consistent with this responsibility, the Administration should
serve in the role of an advocate to protect the interests of fishermen
who have become victims of this spill through no fault of their own.
Part of that is to provide and communicate to the fishing community a
clear and simple roadmap for dealing with a multitude of impacts
including how to file claims and receive compensation. In our view,
there was and continues to be a huge void in organized, effective
communications between the Administration and the fishing community on
virtually all fronts including claims, seafood testing and safety,
spill remediation, etc.
Another part of the Administration's responsibility is, of course,
to take whatever steps are necessary to protect fishermen from
predatory lawyers by publicly distributing information to refute their
false claims and aggressively prosecuting those that have broken the
law. Instead, to many fishermen it appears that the Administration has
been much more interested in down-playing the magnitude and effects of
the spill, to the benefit of BP. Again, the Administration has made and
continues to make critical decisions affecting the lives and futures of
the fishermen in a complete vacuum.
For these reasons, SSA has recommended to the Administration that
it formally establish a seafood industry advisory board to develop and
provide constructive advice to the various agencies on a range of short
and long term response processes and issues relevant to the seafood
industry. In addition to providing useful advice to the Administration,
this advisory board would also provide a forum through which the
Administration can more effectively communicate critical information
(such as regarding the claims process and the claims of predatory
lawyers). I have attached a copy of my June 22, 2010, letter to NOAA
Administrator Lubchenco on this matter. (see Attachment)
Since the hearing, the Administration and BP reached an agreement
to establish a $20 billion fund, and the President appointed an
independent administrator, Mr. Kenneth Feinberg, to implement the
claims process in a fair and expedited manner without the need for
fishermen to hire lawyers. We see this as a very encouraging step in
the right direction and it would appear to address the problems
regarding predatory lawyers. Frankly, however, the jury is still out on
how well this new process will work and if the $20 billion fund will be
adequate to fully address the economic impacts on our fisheries that
may occur for decades into the future. To this final point, it remains
unclear whether any statute of limitations for making claims will apply
under this new system such as under OPA 90, and this needs to be
clarified. Again, the impacts of this spill on the fisheries including
fishery closures and on the market for Gulf seafood--and the consequent
need for adequate and effective compensation system--may continue for
decades and should not be precluded by an arbitrary statute of
limitations.
3. Would you support legislation that would cap the amount or
percentage of money a lawyer can receive from oil spill claims?
Yes.
4. It has been noted that after Hurricane Katrina, Gulf fishermen lost
market share to foreign sources of seafood. You have a lot of
experience with trying to regain market share from foreign
competitors. What should the Federal government be doing to
protect the U.S. seafood industry?
I will address the two primary areas of concern we feel the Federal
government should focus on to protect the domestic shrimp producing
industry in the context of shrimp imports, 1) enforcement of US trade
laws, and 2) the safety of imported shrimp.
Enforcement of Trade Laws
The US imported more than 1.12 billion lbs of shrimp from 47
nations in 2009, the vast majority of which was produced on farms in
lesser-developed nations with environmental, food safety, and labor
standards far below the US. Imports have accounted for over 90% of
shrimp consumption in the US since 2001; 91% in 2008.
Shrimp imports have decimated prices paid to US shrimp fishermen.
Average dockside prices for shrimp declined approximately 40% in the
Gulf and 30% in the South Atlantic between 2000 and 2006, while, in
2009, dockside prices were the lowest in memory. Shrimp fishing effort
and the number of active vessels operating in the US fleet have been
reduced sharply.
In 2005, in response to a petition filed by the SSA, the Dept. of
Commerce/International Trade Commission determined that six countries
were in violation of US law for dumping their shrimp into the US market
and ordered that antidumping duties be applied to shrimp imports from
those nations. (Brazil, China, Ecuador, India, Thailand and Vietnam).
Shortly after duties were imposed, without prior consultation with
the US shrimp industry, the USTR agreed to expedite the government of
Ecuador's WTO challenge to the antidumping duties, leading to
Ecuadorian shrimp being removed from the antidumping orders in 2007.
In early 2009, in response to erroneous and overreaching WTO
decisions, two substantial exporters of Thai shrimp were excluded from
the antidumping orders, and the only special program implemented by
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to ensure the collection of
antidumping duties owed, the enhanced continuous bonding program, was
eliminated.
In addition, the distribution of collected antidumping duties under
the Continued Dumping and Subsidies Offset Act (CDSOA) has been poorly
managed by CBP. This has resulted in a vastly disproportionate share of
distributions going to a small number of processors and other shrimp
purchasers at the expense of shrimp fishermen. While the CDSOA program
has been repealed for duties collected on imports entering the United
States after October 1, 2007, there is still a significant amount of
money that has yet to be distributed to the industry.
Enforcement of shrimp antidumping duties and related trade laws is
a top priority for SSA and this is one of the key issues the US
government should be focused on to protect the domestic shrimp
industry. SSA works closely with CBP, Commerce, and other federal
agencies to investigate violations and take enforcement actions
including efforts to address the following issues.
1) Lax Enforcement of Trade Laws
SSA worked diligently to demonstrate that the
industry was materially injured by reason of dumped
subject imports, and has continued to defend the orders
throughout the administrative reviews. Despite these
efforts, the trade relief granted to the US industry
was significantly weakened by administrative agencies
in purported response to indefensible WTO
determinations.
2) Failure of Importers To Pay Duties
When importers fail to pay the antidumping
duties imposed on shrimp imports, it completely
undermines the protection Congress intended to provide
domestic producers. Failure to collect duties denies
domestic producers a level playing field and now
results in a substantial loss of revenue to the US
Treasury.
CBP developed an enhanced bonding pilot
program to enforce the collection of duties for shrimp
because failure to pay duties for other commodities has
been rampant (>90%).
Nevertheless, the WTO subsequently ruled
against the CBP enhanced bonding program and CBP has
recently decided to abandon it. Even with the enhanced
bonding program in place, CBP has reported that over
$68 million in antidumping duties on shrimp imports
have not been collected. Without it, SSA expects that
unpaid duties by shrimp importers will increase sharply
and, therefore, deny the US shrimp industry adequate
protection from dumping.
Importers also avoid paying antidumping
duties by manipulating the new shipper review process.
These reviews allow a purported new shipper to
establish through a single sale that no antidumping
duty deposit need be made on the shipper's exports.
Because our duty system is retrospective, a single
importer can bring in vast quantities of dumped shrimp
from the new shipper before dumping duties are imposed.
Once duties are imposed, the importer commonly declares
bankruptcy, only to pop up again at a later date as a
different corporate entity. According to GAO, the
discretion to increase the volume of imports a new
shipper must make to qualify for a new shipper review
rests with Congress, not with Commerce or CBP.
3) Circumvention
Importers avoid paying antidumping duties by
mislabeling shrimp as being produced in a nation not
subject to antidumping duties. Example: Chinese shrimp
transshipped through Indonesia and mislabeled as
Indonesian origin.
Importers also avoid paying antidumping
duties by mislabeling shrimp as being in a product form
not covered by the antidumping duties. Example: Chinese
shrimp mislabeled as ``dusted'' shrimp.
Importers also avoid FDA import restrictions
by transshipping through third-party countries to
conceal true country of origin. Example: Chinese shrimp
subject to FDA import restrictions due to contamination
with illegal antibiotics was transshipped/mislabeled as
Malaysian.
SSA has recommended a number of Federal initiatives to address the
issues outlined above including the following:
Investigate and enforce US trade and food safety laws
to ensure the payment of antidumping duties and to prevent
circumvention through transshipments and mislabeling.
Develop legislation to raise the amount of commercial
shipments that a new shipper is required to have in order to
precipitate a new shipper review by Commerce.
Develop legislation to create basic requirements for
importers that would afford CBP discretion to deny importer of
record status to habitual violators of U.S. law.
Safety of Shrimp Imports
FDA-banned antibiotics and pesticides harmful to human health are
widely used in foreign shrimp farms. By treating their farms with
veterinary drugs and pesticides foreign shrimp farmers are able to
substantially increase the stocking density of shrimp in their ponds
while preventing disease outbreaks that would normally occur under such
high-density, low sanitary conditions. Artificially increased yields in
their ponds translate to artificially-low production costs and export
prices--and, ultimately, lower prices paid to US shrimpers at the
docks.
Although it inspects only about 1-2 percent of shrimp imports, FDA
has found a variety of banned antibiotics and pesticides harmful to
human health in shipments of farmed shrimp from all the major farmed
shrimp producing nations including China, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam,
India, etc.
Other major shrimp import markets (EU, Canada and Japan) implement
far more stringent imported food safety controls than the US. As those
countries succeed at keeping their consumers safe from contaminated
shrimp imports, their rejected shrimp is diverted to the US market.
Because the use of illegal antibiotics and pesticides provides
foreign shrimp farmers with a substantial competitive advantage over US
producers of high quality wild shrimp, there is an enormous economic
incentive for those shrimp farmers to use illegal substances and almost
no disincentive to ship contaminated shrimp to the US under its lax
testing regime.
Shrimp imports exceeded 1.24 billion pounds in 2008, 1.12 billion
pounds in 2009, of which more than 80% were raised on farms in nations
with environmental, food safety, and labor standards far below the US.
Consequently, it is very likely that large quantities of imported
farm raised shrimp contaminated with harmful antibiotics and pesticides
are being eaten by US consumers every year. Some of these contaminants
are implicated in causing aplastic anemia and others are implicated in
causing cancer. The long-term toxicity and bacterial resistance effects
of sustained exposure are not fully understood but may present the most
serious concern of all.
The failure of the US food safety system to prevent the importation
of large quantities of contaminated farm-raised shrimp poses a serious
human health risk to US seafood consumers.
The current FDA system for inspecting and preventing the
importation of contaminated shrimp is extraordinarily lax and
ineffective--especially relative to other major seafood consuming
markets including Canada, the EU and Japan.
The US has become the preferred market (dumping ground) for
exporters of contaminated shrimp that will not be accepted into other
markets.
SSA's objectives for the Federal response to this problem include:
Require foreign producers/nations to achieve
equivalence to US food safety standards
Substantially increase FDA inspection rates for
imported seafood
Raise integrity of inspection laboratories
Prevent US consumption of shrimp found to be
contaminated--destroy
Increase consequences (penalties) for violations
Increase international coordination of enforcement in
other major import markets.
Specifically, SSA has submitted legislative proposals to Congress
for inclusion in the comprehensive food safety legislation currently
under consideration. These include provisions to require and provide
funding to FDA for an enhanced seafood testing program that will
substantially increase the quantity of shrimp imports FDA tests each
year for illegal antibiotics and pesticides. A requirement for FDA to
increase its testing from less than 2% to 20% of seafood imports would
finally put the US on par with other major importing markets such as
the EU, Canada and Japan. SSA's legislative proposals also include
provisions to impose monetary penalties (fines) on importers that
import contaminated seafood, and impose licensing requirements for
importers.
5. Secretary Locke has declared a fisheries disaster. Have you had
experience with fisheries disaster declarations before and if
so, did much if any of the funding actually reach fishermen?
SSA has not been directly involved with the distribution of funds
under fishery disaster declarations. This has been a function of the
individual affected States. It is our strong impression, however, that
important improvements to the process for distribution of funds to
fishermen should be made. While it may continue to be desirable for
federal funds to be distributed by each affected State to the affected
fishermen through their own administrative systems, additional and more
specific Federal guidance and requirements for the handling of such
distributions by the States appears warranted to ensure the purposes of
the federal disaster declaration and funding to assist fishermen are
actually achieved.
Attachment
Southern Shrimp Alliance
P.O. Box 1577 Tarpon Springs, FL 34688
955 E. MLK Dr. Suite D Tarpon Springs, FL 34689
727-934-5090 Fax 727-934-5362
June 22, 2010
Dr. Jane Lubchenco,
Administrator
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
1401 Constitution Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20230
Dr. Lubchenco:
I understand there is to be an important meeting this week in the
Gulf region to include NOAA/NMFS leadership, FDA and the White House
regarding the government's fisheries reopening protocol/policy.
This is to respectfully request you to please consider and, if
appropriate, discuss at that meeting my recommendation that the federal
government establish a seafood industry advisory body as an integral
partner in the short and long term responses to the oil spill.
This body should be comprised of top-tier industry leaders and
charged with participating in--and providing expert input and advice
to--the several ongoing response processes that are relevant to our
industry including but not limited to:
1) fishery closure/opening protocols and decisions;
2) oil clean-up procedures and technologies including the
health and safety of clean-up personnel;
3) claims procedures for the $20 b escrow account;
4) seafood safety inspection protocols;
5) communications to the public concerning seafood safety; and
6) sustained monitoring and response to potentially very long
term impacts on fishery resources and economies that will
require compensation and remediation for many years after this
event has long faded from public attention.
The Gulf seafood industry, including many thousands of family-owned
small businesses in hundreds of fishery-dependent communities, will
continue to sustain profound economic and social disruptions which in
some cases may prove to be irreversible. It is highly likely to be the
most adversely impacted stakeholder in the government's response
efforts, yet it has no formal voice in the decision-making processes
mentioned above, or a defined role in their implementation. This is a
critical omission.
I'm speaking on behalf of the Southern Shrimp Alliance, but I feel
confident that other major components of the Gulf seafood industry
would concur with the need and desirability for our industry to be your
partner in making the government's response as effective as possible.
I would also note that this industry not only holds a vast wealth
of knowledge and expertise that would contribute substantially to the
quality of response decisions and implementation, it also constitutes a
vast resource of manpower that can be used to physically implement some
aspects of the response, especially aspects of the seafood safety and
clean-up missions.
Finally, the ability to contribute directly to this process would
provide a basis for a greater level of confidence in the government's
response within these constituencies.
Please seriously consider establishing a Gulf seafood industry
advisory body to become the federal government's partner in responding
to this historic event. I would be pleased to discuss this with you at
your earliest convenience.
My sincere thanks for your consideration--
John Williams, Executive Director
Southern Shrimp Alliance
______
Ms. Bordallo. I thank you, Mr. Williams, for your testimony
this afternoon, and I believe we have a heightened appreciation
for your situation.
Mr. Lambert, I look forward to your testimony, and you may
now proceed.
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN RYAN LAMBERT,
CAJUN FISHING ADVENTURES, LULING, LOUISIANA
Captain Lambert. Thank you, Madam Bordallo. My name is Ryan
Lambert, and I am a charter fishing guide out of Buras,
Louisiana, ground zero for the Horizon oil spill. I am a member
of Ducks Unlimited, CCA and sit on the board of directors for
the Charter Boat Association.
I wrote a pretty speech, but I am not going to use it. I am
going to go personally on ground zero, if you will, and bring
it down to laymen's terms. When people ask me what is the
impact you have had on the oil spill, the only thing I can tell
them is to take everything that you know from school to
fundraising, to being a speaker and, in one day, all of that is
useless.
They say experience is invaluable. Well, right now it is
worthless because when I pull up to the dock I can look at the
water level, I can look at the wind direction, where the tide
is. I know right where to go to catch what kind of fish. I know
where to go for what duck, because I am a passionate duck
hunter and duck guide as well. And right now all that is
worthless.
So the first thing I thought about was the 11 families when
it first happened. You know, I had no idea that I would be
impacted. I said those poor guys. They are just making a
living, and they lost their lives supporting their families.
But a few days later when it got bigger and bigger and
bigger, it started coming in to us and the reporters started
showing up. They wanted us to take them to the oil. Well, we
took them out, but no one could find the oil. This went on, and
then all of a sudden, they found some on Pass a l'Outre where
everybody did their photo ops. After 47 days and people were
still having trouble--I mean, experienced people that know the
water were having trouble finding the oil, I said I am going to
take a trip myself.
I threw my old black lab in the boat and I figured I would
go to a restoration project about 90 miles away from the spill,
because I knew it had a hard beach there and whatever was
floating up, I would find. On the way, I saw a couple of oil
sheens and then got a little closer. I could see a few pelicans
that were just starting to turn a little rusty on the breast.
Upon reaching the beach, everything looked fairly normal. I
walked two or three miles down the beach, and I started
noticing clams, more shells than there normally are. Upon
looking closer, they were actually fingernail clams, which drum
and ducks and everything, that is the start of all life. I said
why are there so many?
I got closer to the water, because the water is real murky
from the water being high. It is at 13.2. It just crested last
week. When I got down to the water there were millions and
millions of what they call moose, these tar balls, in the surf.
They were just going back and forth and washing back and forth.
They had a couple on those photo ops that they see on the
beach, but there were millions of them, and they were all
encrusted with these shells. These are the things that people
don't see, you know.
So three days later I go back on Day 50, and I go to that
beach and as far as you can see, for miles and miles, there is
oil and millions and millions of tar balls, and all the aquatic
grasses that are caught up in that and some various--you know,
the pelicans were having a harder time, and they were kind of
teetering as they flew.
I thought, why are there no booms here? Why are there no
people working, you know? You see 50 people standing on the
tent in Grand Isle where the TV cameras are. You know, it is
out of sight, out of mind, and that is why the dispersants were
used. And the only reason I am seeing all of this is because it
is a secluded beach that only someone like myself would go to.
So when I look off to the east I see Chinooks and
Blackhawks carrying sandbags back and forth, back and forth,
trying to stop the gaps because we didn't take the time to
build the restoration projects like the one I was standing on,
and now we are vulnerable. Now they are spending millions and
millions of dollars trying to fill those breaches with
sandbags.
You know, now we are talking about spending $350 million to
build the berms when we should have spent it already to protect
Louisiana because if we had a solid beach, all this would come
on the beach. We would suck it up, and we would go about our
business; but now farther down closer to the spill, there are
millions of those tar balls. They are not floating. They are
underwater because of the dispersants. People can't see them.
The whole marsh is going to be filled with that and every
invertebrate, every crustacean, every larvae and fish egg is
going to be encrusted on those things, They are all going to
die, and we will lose a few year classes because Mother Nature
tends to heal herself.
But on the way back, I captured a pelican. You know, I ran
it down and I jumped out and I grabbed it and I was going to
bring it to the rescue center. I am running short on time. I
have a lot to say. That mess was all over its beak, and as they
preen to clean themselves, they just spread it, spread it
everywhere.
What is going to happen come August, and the oil is still
supposed to be leaking then. The migration. The waterfowl will
come down. We are talking about 15 million ducks and geese that
will be coming through Louisiana, and the very nature of these
ducks, the way they act, is a lot of them are dabblers and they
will be feeding, and as they have their beak down in that stuff
it is going to get all over it. It is so sticky. When they
preen, they won't be able to fly.
Then where we are at they are wrapped up in tens of
thousands offshore where the slicks are, where the big slicks
are, so that is going to be detrimental as well. And then it is
a threefold deal because probably 100,000 of them will winter
in my area. Fifteen million will pass through and go to Central
America, Nicaragua, Honduras. There won't be a food source
because that oil is killing the aquatics and the invertebrates,
so they won't be able to sustain themselves to get across the
Gulf.
If we lose half of the Mississippi flyway, the economic
impact will be gross from Alaska to Canada, all through
Wisconsin, Minnesota, all through the Mississippi delta. I
mean, people won't be able to duck hunt for years, and it will
be unbelievable.
So there is very little that we can do, short of opening up
the river, to make nature flush itself out and help with that.
You know, I tell people, no matter what, I will fish come hell
or high water. Well, Katrina put 24 feet of water in my lodge
so I have already seen the high water. Now I am afraid of what
I am going to deal with now. Thank you for letting me testify
and share my thoughts.
[The prepared statement of Captain Lambert follows:]
Statement of Captain Ryan Lambert, Director,
Louisiana Charter Boat Association
I am deeply grateful to the Subcommittee for the opportunity to
testify at this hearing, and to explain the impact that the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill is having on my community, my business and my way of
life.
I am a member of Ducks Unlimited and the Coastal Conservation
Association, and sit on the Board of Directors for the Louisiana
Charter Boat Association, as well as being President of Cajun Fishing
Adventures. As a professional fishing and hunting guide with 29 years
of experience, I have built one of the most successful fishing lodges
in the state of Louisiana. I am licensed by the Coast Guard, and I have
been hunting, fishing, trapping and shrimping in South Louisiana all of
my life.
As the years have passed, our way of life has been increasingly
threatened due to the erosion of our wetlands. These wetlands are a
place where our unique culture has existed for generations. They are
our home, and we value working in the rich gulf waters.
The people of Louisiana have been stereotyped as being
``backwards'' or ``behind times''. The truth is, we are just salt-of-
the-earth Americans. Americans that are not afraid to roll up our
sleeves and make a living off of the land. When our shrimp season
closes or our crabs aren't giving, we adjust to find another way to
make our money off the land. We don't run to the unemployment line and
we don't seek the help of agencies. Unfortunately, now that our shrimp
boats are in dock and our crab traps are on the bank, there aren't any
sportsmen wanting to come down to fish or hunt waterfowl with guys like
me.
With millions of gallons of oil entering this fragile ecosystem
from the oil spill of the Deepwater Horizon, Never before has our
national treasure, been in more jeopardy than it is now. It is apparent
that it is time for us to turn to you for the help we need to save our
precious wetlands and our way of life.
For far too long, Louisiana's restoration projects have been held
back due to red tape and political bureaucracies. It is time for
someone to step to the plate and reconnect the Mississippi River to the
marshes it sustains. This disconnect is at the root of our problem. A
spotted owl can stop the logging industry. An endangered mouse can halt
a housing development. But we lose the size of a football field every
30 minutes as we sit back and let the greatest estuary in North America
go by the way side. This estuary supports the vast majority of south
Louisiana with its great abundance of resources such as oil, seafood,
fishing and hunting. It is an economic engine in itself.
The Mississippi River is one of the most highly engineered in the
entire world and provides great benefit to the nation's economy at
Louisiana's expense. For years the Corps of Engineers has dredged the
river and put the sediment in hopper barges taking it offshore to dump
it in the gulf instead of putting it to good use in our wetlands. The
reason given was that it is not cost effective to use it in the marsh.
How many millions of dollars do we need now because we did not spend
the extra money to use this resource wisely?
Twenty-five years ago, the restoration of a major portion of the
Plaquemines Parish shoreline, the Shell Island project, was estimated
to cost $35 million. Unfortunately, it was not completed at that time.
That same project has again been under study by the Corps of Engineers
for over five years. The current estimated cost is $250 million. The
time for studies has past.
The Corps is primarily a flood control and navigation agency, and
has no mission or procedure to elevate the restoration of south
Louisiana to levels of equal importance as its traditional missions.
The precedent is no action. We need a new precedent. We need to take
extraordinary action, which will involve risk and uncertainty. We need
to send the Corps a new mission. A mission that is at least equal to
the navigation of the lower Mississippi, a mission of restoration!
As we did after Katrina, we are again watching our military
helicopters flying sandbags trying to plug the large gaps in our
coastlines. Had we taken control of our river and sediment years ago,
we would not have to protect ourselves from the large plumes of oil
lurking off the coast. We would not be in the fix we are now in. This
is the forth time in recent years we have felt the sting of our
failures. Without taking into account the hurricanes and this oil
spill, we are losing countless acres of wetlands every day. The time
has come to save our national treasure.
Other states refuse to drill off their coast, yet they allow
Louisiana to take the hit when something like this oil spill happens.
Louisiana has been refused royalties due to the state for drilling in
our fragile ecosystem. Now after all the years we have been supplying
the country with 30% of domestic oil from the gulf, we will start
getting well-deserved royalties in 2016. This is too little too late.
This money should be sent to Louisiana immediately. The money should be
sent to fund programs such as the Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection
and Restoration Act (CWPPRA) and used solely for the restoration of our
abused coast.
We don't know for sure the long term affects that the dispersants
and the millions of gallons of oil are going to have on our marshes. We
do fear that after the visible oil is cleared and the news media is
gone, we will be left to wait for mother nature to heal herself. We
will be left without a way to make a living and our wetland will just
wash away.
It seems that many people refuse to see the big picture of what is
really happening. While the loss of pelicans and turtles are
devastating scenes, the real damage is going on inside the marshes.
These marshes serve as the nursery to twenty percent of the nation's
commercial seafood. The eggs and larva of shrimp and crabs, the spat
from oysters, as well as the young of many of our fish species are
being killed by the millions. Without these young and the invertebrates
that they feed on, Louisiana, and our way of life, will be changed
forever. All life starts at the bottom of the food chain, this is where
the most damage will occur when the oil and dispersants cover our
waters.
Also when one of the greatest natural spectacles in North America
starts in late August, with the migration of our waterfowl and other
wetland birds, if the oil is not cleaned up by then, this alone will be
truly a national disaster of epic proportions. This migration will send
some 15 million waterfowl passing through south Louisiana. A great
percentage of them will winter in Louisiana until the spring winds call
them back to the north to nest. The wetlands of the Gulf Coast comprise
the most important wintering area for waterfowl and many other wetland
dependant migratory birds in North America. Perhaps 50% of the ducks in
the north migrate through or winter in Gulf Coast wetlands. The spill
will devastate these birds, some of which are already threatened.
Everyone has seen the photos of pelicans and other shore birds covered
in oil. Imagine photos of millions of waterfowl and other beautiful
birds, covered in black. My other fear is that the small animals and
invertebrates as well as many aquatic grasses will not be present.
These are the fuel sources that take many of these birds to Central
America to winter. Plaquemines Parish where I make a living contains
14% of America's wetlands. A major percentage of the Mississippi flyway
waterfowl winters here. This is ground zero for the Deepwater Horizon
oil spill. If we lose 50% of these waterfowl, the economic impact will
be felt from Alaska and Canada and throughout the central United States
for many years.
I sit here preparing my written testimony, having just returned
from a visit to one of our completed restoration projects. I think
about how optimistic I was this morning before arriving on the beach. I
thought maybe BP was right--that it is not coming inshore because after
47 days, I hadn't really seen the giant oil slicks everywhere. Now I
have lost the wind from my sails after seeing millions of tar balls
rolling in the surf. Not only was every tar ball covered with small
dead clams, but just under the surf are millions of these clams
covering the beach. This is just the start of the death that we will be
seeing in the future.
By BP putting the dispersants on the oil, it has sunk out of sight
of the cameras. The oil is there, millions of gallons of it. It is just
starting to make its way to the Louisiana shores. My walk took place
ninety miles from the Deepwater Horizon. Areas closer to the oil well
don't have a beach to protect it from the oil balls coming into the
marsh. They are underwater were you can't see them, but they are there.
This is just the start of what's to come. The oil will be coming from
the depths for years, not floating on the surface but out of sight. It
is not to late to rebuild our coast. We need to open up the Mississippi
to the marshes and let it do its job the way nature intended it to.
There is a happy medium between navigation and restoration. We need to
find that place and find it fast. Now is not the time for more studies.
It's time to get the river flowing through the natural channels that
still exist. Sure there will be shoaling in places, but it doesn't take
the whole river to navigate to New Orleans.
I thank the subcommittee for letting me share my thoughts on our
great Mississippi delta. I would also like to take this opportunity to
invite each and every one of you to come down and let me show you in
person just what I am talking about.
Thanks.
______
Response to questions submitted for the record by Ryan Lambert,
Cajun Fishing Adventures
Questions from Chairwoman Madeline Z. Bordallo (D-GU)
1. Can you further describe the cascading impacts of the oil spill
from the wetlands to professional fishing and hunting
operations, like the one that you own?
Chairwoman Bordallo, the impacts are just as you asked, cascading.
At first customers started cancelling their trips due to the media
coverage. Then the Wildlife and Fisheries started closing waters around
us. After there was not a great deal of oil floating into the bays the
water was partly reopened. Customers then did not rebook due to the
opening and closing of the water happening to rapidly. I tried to keep
my lodge opened for the sake of my employees. A few really good clients
would come in at the last minute trying to help us out. Now my guides
have left to work for BP in the oil spill because they are paying the
boats $1500 per day. As I write you I have three more days for my
brother and I to fish before I close my doors. Soon all the water will
be closed because as you know the well is still leaking. Only time will
how long I will be closed due to the dispersants and the oil being
underwater. I see animals at the bottom of the food chain dying 1000
fold since I was in Washington. No one seems to see the small changes
because it doesn't make for good news.
Questions from the Ranking Republican Member, Congressman Henry Brown,
Jr. (R-SC)
1. Captain Lambert, do you support Governor Bobby Jindal's proposal to
build temporary barrier islands to protect Louisiana's
wetlands? What are the benefits and any potential liabilities
of this approach?
Congressman Brown, I do support Mr. Jindal's proposal only because
it will protect us from the oil that is coming in from underwater due
to the dispersants. If we have the brumes, the oil will be stopped on
the sand to be easily cleaned just like in other states. If we don't
have them the oil can enter the marshes where it can't be cleaned. It
will kill the very ecosystem that sustains life in Louisiana. I only
hope that it isn't to late already. I know that the oil will be coming
in for years to come so in the long run the brumes will be a great
help. On the other hand, I would rather have used the resources that
are being used to do the job right. For years Louisiana has lost miles
of shoreline each year. We have studied and tested all of my life. Now
it is time to work without bureaucratic roadblocks to bring Louisiana
back. These brumes might be a starting place to rebuild after the oil
spill is nothing but history.
2. Have you filed any claims against BP? What was the basis of your
claim and what has been BP's reaction?
I have filed a claim with BP. They have assigned an adjuster to my
claim and we are in the process of getting all of my tax papers
together for him. They have paid money up front and will true up as we
go along. I don't know on what they are going to pay as of yet but will
find out soon.
3. What role has the media played in building the perception that the
Gulf of Mexico and its beaches are covered with oil? How do we
correct these misconceptions?
As you know the media makes a living on selling sensationalism.
When they came here, they wanted to see the worst places and to hear
the folks hating on BP. They couldn't believe that we didn't want to
stop drilling here. At first we had to look really hard just to find
oil for them to film. When they found a spot they all went there to use
the same oil for their stories. This is just the way the industry works
and I don't think that there is much we can do about that.
4. Do you support President Obama's proposal for a six-month
moratorium on deepwater exploratory drilling in the Gulf of
Mexico?
I do not support the moratorium. I have lived next to the oil
industry all my life. This is one accident all be it a giant one that
has happened. If there are 33 deepwater rigs, send 33 teams out to
investigate these rigs to make sure that they have all the safety
precautions in place. This should not take 6 months. Louisiana will be
in enough trouble without putting another industry out of business. If
these rigs leave here they won't be coming back.
5. Please explain your proposal to open up the Mississippi River to
the marshes? What is the potential cost and the time to make
that project a reality?
There are many of the natural bayous that still exist, these bayous
were formed by the river overflowing its banks each spring. I feel that
we should build spillways in places in southeast Louisiana where there
is open land. Now we have diversions that pipe the water under roads
and into the marshes. While these do work I think that the spillways
would be more natural and move more water and sediments into the
marshes. By doing these spillways mother nature will clean up the oil
years faster than we will be able to do ourselves by flushing it out
into the gulf again and covering it with sediments. There will be set
backs such as Oystermen saying that it will kill their oysters because
of the fresh water coming in to fast. What this tells me is that the
oysters are where they don't belong. As the marshes have eroded they
have moved the oysters closer and closer to the river. They are now
where they don't belong and we will have to face the realism of moving
them or losing them for the sake of keeping Louisiana. I don't know the
cost of these spillways but there are many of them that have been
planed and studied like everything else here. There are people at NOAA
that can answer this part of the question much better than I. I know
that CWPPRA has been the only program that has built restoration
projects thus far. It works because there are five different agencies
that work together and hold each other accountable for the completion
of these projects. We need to give them the monies from the oil
revenues and from the oil being captured from the Deepwater Horizon.
If you have more question or want to talk more about this please
give me a call at 504-559-5111 and I will be happy to talk with
everyone interested.
Thanks
______
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Lambert, for sharing
your experience with us. We appreciate it.
We will have questions for the panelists later. We will now
turn to Ms. McDonough. Welcome to the Subcommittee, and please
begin your testimony.
STATEMENT OF JOANNE McDONOUGH, NATURE TOURISM SPECIALIST,
ALABAMA GULF COAST CONVENTION & VISITORS BUREAU, ORANGE BEACH,
ALABAMA
Ms. McDonough. Thank you, Madam Chairman and fellow
Committee Members, for the invitation to testify here
concerning the importance of nature tourism in the Gulf of
Mexico region.
I serve as a nature tourism specialist with the Alabama
Gulf Coast Convention & Visitors Bureau and the Mississippi-
Alabama Sea Grant Consortium. We work closely with nature tour
operators to educate people about the importance of
environmental ethics and stewardship of the Gulf of Mexico
natural resources.
Nature tourism may be simply defined as visiting natural
landscapes to enjoy scenery and view the wildlife at home and
around the world. This industry relies profoundly on healthy
ecosystems and biodiversity. Tourism is the world's largest
industry and nature tourism its fastest growing sector.
A national survey conducted in 2006 by the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service revealed that $22 billion was spent on
hunting, fishing and wildlife viewing just in the Gulf Coast
region. Watching wildlife generated $6 billion. Hundreds of
thousands of jobs are sustained mainly by small businesses,
whose profits circulate through local coastal communities
throughout the Gulf of Mexico.
Alabama and Mississippi include 966 miles of estuarine
shoreline with 98 miles of Gulf front beaches. Alabama's sugar
white beaches attracted more than four million tourists in
2009, generating more than $3 billion into the coastal
communities of Baldwin and Mobile Counties. Nearly $2 billion
of that was generated just between Memorial Day and Labor Day.
Before the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe, a fleet of
vessels in Orange Beach, Alabama, were capable of carrying
hundreds of thousands of tourists to the fertile breeding
grounds of wild bottlenose dolphin. Thirty-one captains and
crew are trained by the Dolphin Smart Program that promotes the
sustainable viewing of dolphin in their natural habitat. Today,
they are idle at the dock. Phones are silent.
Before oil began coating Louisiana wetlands, in Mississippi
kayak paddles were scheduled to dip into the Pascagoula River,
the last remaining free-flowing river in our nation. Certified
coastal nature guides in Alabama were booking kayak tours
through cypress gum swamps, emerging into the Mobile-Tensaw
Delta, one of the largest, intact wetland ecosystems in the
United States.
Sailing charters were ready to ply the nutrient-rich waters
of Mobile Bay, a national estuary, and the second largest,
intact river delta system in the Nation. Their phones are
ringing, only with cancellations.
The nature of our coast along the Gulf of Mexico is
critical to our nation's economy, our natural heritage, our
cultural integrity. Our natural assets not only afford
destinations for leisure; our Barrier Islands are the first
line of defense for storm resilience. Our maritime forests play
a vital role in providing clean air. Oyster reefs and seagrass
beds provide clean water and safe food. Just as these habitats
suffer untold losses due to this catastrophe, so will entire
generations of people in Gulf Coast communities.
A toxic tide assaults our shores every day. I carry an
urgent plea from tour operators and coastal residents. BP
response efforts are slow, inadequate and disorganized. We need
jobs. Out of state workers are being hired for jobs the local
workforce could perform.
I bring personal stories with me. Captain Chris Nelson
echoes their concerns. These are his words. ``I have always
been a realist, not a pessimist, but when it came to our
beautiful natural wildlife, I was an optimist. Today, I cannot
claim that. I have lost hope.''
With your help, we can make sure wildlife will have clean
homes, restore nature tourism, and bring back hope for coastal
residents, like Captain Chris. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman,
fellow Committee members, for your efforts in addressing this
manmade disaster.
Recommendations are in my written testimony, and I am happy
to answer questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. McDonough follows:]
Statement of Joanne McDonough, Nature Tourism Specialist, Alabama Gulf
Coast Convention & Visitors Bureau and the Mississippi-Alabama Sea
Grant Consortium
I deeply appreciate your invitation to provide testimony before the
Subcommittee concerning the economic impact of Nature Tourism in the
Gulf of Mexico region. My name is Joanne McDonough, and let me first
say on behalf of the Alabama and Mississippi coastal communities I
represent: our heartfelt condolences are extended to the families of
those 11 men who died in the Deepwater Horizon tragedy. They are
foremost in everyone's mind, as well as those whose quality of life and
livelihoods are affected by this unprecedented catastrophe spilling
untold gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico.
Even before this disaster, coastal natural resources have been
under constant threat. Sixty percent of the United States river systems
drain into the Gulf of Mexico. Gulf wetlands have been under constant
assault by unsustainable development, violent weather and sea-level
rise.
I serve as a Nature Tourism Specialist with the Alabama Gulf Coast
Convention & Visitors Bureau (AGCCVB) and the Mississippi-Alabama Sea
Grant Consortium (MASGC). We are dedicated to promoting the sustainable
use of our natural resources to benefit the environment, the economy
and future generations. We work closely with nature tour operators to
support, enhance and sustainably grow the nature tourism industry. In
2007, I began managing a Nature Tourism Initiative that was launched in
Baldwin and Mobile counties in 2000, and the Initiative is currently
expanding to the coastal counties of Mississippi. I serve as the
director of the Certified Coastal Nature Guide Program that was
launched in February of 2010 on Alabama's Gulf Coast; my office is
located in Gulf Shores, Alabama. Before joining the Nature Tourism
Initiative, I was the Chief Operations Officer of Caribiana Sea Skiffs,
our family boat building company in Orange Beach, Alabama, and a U.S.
Coast Guard licensed Captain conducting nature tours along the bays and
bayous of Baldwin County.
Nature tourism, sometimes referred to as eco-tourism, may be simply
defined as visiting natural landscapes to enjoy scenery and view
wildlife at home and around the world. Some activities include bird
watching, marine mammal viewing, kayaking, visiting protected areas,
and in some cases specifically promoting conservation of nature. This
industry relies profoundly on healthy ecosystems and biodiversity.
Tourism is the world's largest industry and Nature Tourism its fastest
growing sector.
According to the 2006 National Survey of Wildlife Related-
Recreation, conducted every 5 years by the U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Service, expenditures for fishing, hunting and wildlife viewing in the
Gulf Region topped $22 billion. Wildlife viewing alone contributed over
$6 billion. Hundreds of thousands of jobs are sustained mainly by small
businesses whose profits circulate through local coastal communities
throughout the Gulf of Mexico.
Clearly, America's fascination with Mother Nature has moved beyond
mere recreation to become an economic catalyst for Gulf Coast
communities and offers enormous opportunities to engage people of all
ages in the need for environmental ethics and stewardship of the Gulf
of Mexico.
In Alabama and Mississippi, Perdido Bay, Mobile Bay and the
Mississippi Sound are important estuaries representing a total surface
area of 5,981km\2\. Mobile Bay and the Pascagoula River drainage basin
in the Mississippi Sound are of special concern to MASGC. The 480
square mile Mobile Bay estuary contains a documented 337 species of
fish, more species per area than any other region of North America. Of
the 74 major river estuaries in North America, the Pascagoula River is
the only one in the United States that remains unaffected by channel
fragmentation and flow regulation along its entire length. As a result,
the Pascagoula River is a vital center of biodiversity and essential
fish habitats for numerous threatened and endangered species.
Alabama and Mississippi include 966 miles of estuarine shoreline
with 98 miles of Gulf front beaches. According to the 2009 Economic
Impact Reports, Alabama and Mississippi coastal beaches attracted more
than 9.5 million tourists who contributed more than $4 billion to the
local economies. While everyone recognizes that natural resources are a
primary reason those visitors come, effectively communicating with
local businesses about the economic value of healthy ecosystems and
educating them about the sustainable use of our natural resources is a
challenging task.
In the field, well-planned and managed nature tourism businesses
have proven to be one of the most powerful incentives to conserve and
protect biodiversity. The Alabama Gulf Coast Convention & Visitors
Bureau (AGCCVB) recognized the potential of nature tourism and formed a
partnership with the Alabama Department of Conservation and Natural
Resources (ADCNR) and the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service in 2000 to
create the Alabama Coastal Birding Trail. Since then, the Convention &
Visitors Bureau has been conducting surveys of overnight guests to
Baldwin County to measure the growth of the nature tourism industry.
The surveys reveal that in 2000, nearly 100,000 visitors participated
in wildlife viewing activities. In 2009, nearly 400,000 visitors
participated in wildlife related activities.
When I joined the Alabama Nature Tourism Initiative in 2007, we
began taking an inventory of nature tour operations in Baldwin and
Mobile counties by conducting face-to-face interviews, using AGCCVB
Industry Partner membership data and postings by company websites, at
that time we determined at least 40 nature tour companies were
operating in Baldwin and Mobile counties. On April 20, 2010 at least 64
businesses were identified in both counties, these numbers do not
include the charter fishing companies. MASGC began a Mississippi Nature
Tourism Initiative in 2009 and preliminary data estimates at least 10
nature tour companies are operating on the Mississippi Gulf Coast; we
are in the process of meeting face-to-face with these existing tour
operators.
The Convention & Visitors Bureau economic impact report of
overnight guests to Baldwin County revealed that in 2009, Alabama's
coastal beaches attracted over four million visitors who spent more
than $2 billion. $1.7 billion of that was generated between Memorial
Day and Labor Day.
Before the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe, a fleet of more than 32
vessels in Orange Beach, Alabama, were capable of carrying hundreds of
thousands of tourists to the fertile breeding grounds of wild
bottlenose dolphin. Thirty one captains and deck hands are trained by
the Dolphin SMART program that promotes the sustainable viewing of
dolphin in their natural habitat. Today, many captains and their crew
are idle at the dock, phones are silent.
Before oil began coating Louisiana wetlands, in Mississippi paddles
were scheduled to dip into the cypress-tupelo swamps along the
Pascagoula River, the last remaining free flowing river in our nation.
Certified Coastal Nature Guides in Alabama were booking kayak tours
through cypress-gum swamps emerging into the Mobile-Tensaw Delta, one
of the largest intact wetland ecosystems in the United States, second
only to the Mississippi River Delta. The Delta itself covers over
200,000 acres of swamps, marshes, and river bottomlands that are among
the most impressive in the world, in fact Congress named the Delta a
National Natural Landmark. Tidal freshwater marshes occur in the
extreme lower portion of the Delta near the mouth of Mobile Bay.
Sailing charters were ready to ply the nutrient rich waters of Mobile
Bay, a national estuary and the second largest intact river delta
system in the nation. Phones are ringing with cancellations.
Marsh meadows framed a perfect picture for bird watchers
documenting spring migrations along the Alabama Coastal Birding Trail.
Bon Secour National Wildlife Refuge represents the best remaining
stopover and staging habitat for Neotropical migratory songbirds during
the spring and fall migration along the Alabama coastline. Our barrier
islands are formed by crystal-white sand that tumbled from the
Appalachian Mountains over eons and are a beachcomber's treasure chest,
and the refuge of nesting sea turtles and horseshoe crabs continuing an
ancient ritual of the cycle of life. The newly designated National
Coastal Scenic Byway encourages new businesses to open their doors
along a route that reveals the waters, ways and wildlife of Alabama's
Gulf Coast.
The nature of our coasts along the Gulf of Mexico is critical to
our nation's economy, our natural heritage, our cultural integrity. Our
natural assets not only afford destinations for leisure, our barrier
islands are the first line of defense for storm resilience. Our
maritime forests play a vital role in providing clean air. Oyster reefs
and sea grass beds provide clean water and safe food. Just as these
habitats suffer untold losses due to this catastrophe, so will entire
generations of people in the Gulf of Mexico.
I carry an urgent plea from tour operators and coastal residents.
We need jobs. Out-of-state workers are being hired for BP oil response
jobs the local workforce can perform. I bring the personal stories from
nature tour operators with me, and Alabama Kayak Adventures' Captain
Chris Nelson echoes their concerns, these are his words. ``I have
always been a realist, not a pessimist, but when it came to our
beautiful natural wildlife, I was an optimist. Today I cannot claim
that. I have lost hope.''
With your help we can make sure wildlife will have clean homes,
restore Nature Tourism, and bring back hope for coastal residents like
Captain Chris.
Recommendations
Jobs
The most immediate need is jobs. Some tour operators who were hired
for the Vessels of Opportunity Program have been deactivated, while out
of state vessels are still on the payroll. All BP oil response jobs
should be available first and foremost to local residents.
Claims Process
Many coastal residents who lost their livelihoods are frustrated by
the claims process when attempting to recover lost revenue. Please
exert your influence to insure they are truly compensated for their
losses.
Habitats
Dolphin viewing tours are the largest sector of the nature tourism
industry in Baldwin and Mobile counties. Perdido Bay and Wolf Bay are
nursing, feeding and breeding grounds for Bottlenose Dolphin. In 2009
more than 100 sightings were reported of West Indian manatees in
Alabama waters, they are a federally listed endangered species. Local
research to answer key questions about what is ``home'' to these marine
mammals is seriously underfunded.
Restoration and the creation of new habitats need funding.
We must protect as much clean habitat as possible, we can't afford
more loss. The following programs have been implemented in Alabama.
Your support will help promote the sustainable use of our natural
resources to benefit the environment, the economy and future
generations.
Certified Coastal Nature Guide Program (CNGP) http://gulfshores.com/
things-to-do/coastal-nature-guide/
The CNGP is a partnership program developed by the AGGCVB, MASGC,
Weeks Bay National Estuarine Research Reserve (WBNERR), and the Alabama
Department of Conservation and Natural Resources (ADCNR). The goal of
the program is to adopt and promote sustainable wildlife viewing
practices that preserve healthy and resilient coasts of the Gulf of
Mexico. The purpose for developing this program is to:
Create a well-trained Nature Tourism staff to educate
customers using the services of these businesses.
Provide local communities with information and
techniques to enhance waterfront related economic activities
and protect the health of the natural Gulf Coast environment
Ensure that Gulf Coast communities and industries
have healthy economies that include an abundance of recreation
and tourism opportunities.
All Coastal Nature Guides encourage responsible viewing of wildlife
by following the program's code of ethics and statement of commitment,
which are adapted from the United Nations Environment Program, Tour
Operators Initiative. Some examples of the statement of commitment
include:
(1) I am committed to developing, operating and marketing
nature tourism in a sustainable manner that makes a positive
contribution to the natural and cultural environment, which
generate benefits for coastal communities, and which do not put
at risk the future livelihood of local people.
(2) I commit to create awareness and active involvement among
my customers towards the natural, social and cultural
environment of the places we visit.
(3) I will encourage other nature tour operators to follow the
code of ethics.
Some examples of the code of ethics include:
Promote conservation and wise use of valuable coastal
natural resources to all citizens
Do not feed, pursue or harass wildlife
Turn off or shield all lights that can be seen from
the beach during turtle nesting season
Leave natural, historic, and cultural objects and
artifacts where you find them
Practice ``catch and release'' fishing to protect and
conserve fisheries
Share the Beach Sea Turtle Volunteer Program
http://www.alabamaseaturtles.com/
Every year from May through October female sea turtles swim the
world's oceans, migrating home toward the beaches where they were born,
continuing an ancient ritual of reproduction. Of the seven species of
sea turtles in the world, three types may be fortunate enough to reach
coastal waters and emerge from the Gulf of Mexico to nest on Alabama's
Gulf Coast: Loggerhead, Kemp's Ridley and Green, all three are listed
as endangered species by the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service.
For the last eight years, a dedicated force of concerned citizens
armed with trash bags, cell phones and GPS devices has been scouting
Alabama's sandy shores in an effort to make our local beaches sea
turtle friendly. The Share the Beach program brings hundreds of
volunteers together, each nesting season, to search along the shoreline
for sea turtle nests. In 2009 sixty-four loggerhead (Caretta caretta)
nests and two Kemp's Ridley (Lepidochelys kempii) were identified from
Dauphin Island (Mobile County) east to Alabama Point (Baldwin County)
near the Florida state line. An estimated 4,513 hatchling safely made
it into the Gulf of Mexico, with the overall survival of hatchlings (#
to water/# of eggs) estimated to be 63.6%.
In April 2010 the Orange Beach Fishing Association reached out to
the Nature Tourism Initiative to develop a sustainable fisheries
certification program. We have drafted the framework for the CFISH
program
Certified Fisher Invested in Sustainable Harvests Program (CFISH)
The mission of the CFISH Program is to work towards healthy,
sustainable Gulf of Mexico marine resources and insure that fishing
will not negatively impact on marine habitats and other marine species.
To be successful, charter fishing experiences should provide quality
opportunities to engage the public with natural resources in ways that
lead to greater understanding and appreciation, while protecting,
preserving and sustaining Gulf of Mexico marine resources.
The founding program sponsors of the program are the MASGC, Auburn
University Marine Extension & Research Center (AUMERC), ADCNR/Marine
Resources Division, the Orange Beach Fishing Association (OBFA) and the
AGCCVB. This vision is shared not only by the program sponsors, but is
supported by local partners who assist the program sponsors in the
regional growth and implementation of the program.
Continued support and funding for Federal partnership programs
Dolphin SMART Program http://sanctuaries.noaa.gov/dolphinsmart/
Dolphin SMART is a partnership program developed by NOAA's Office
of National Marine Sanctuaries and NMFS, the Whale and Dolphin
Conservation Society, and the Dolphin Ecology project. The purpose of
the program is to:
Minimize the potential of wild dolphin harassment
caused by commercial viewing activities
Reduce expectations of close interaction with wild
dolphins in a manner that may cause harassment
Eliminate advertising that creates expectations of
engaging in activities that may cause harassment
Promote stewardship of local coastal waterways
Dolphin SMART is a unique voluntary recognition program and
education program. Program participation is for commercial businesses
conducting and booking wild dolphin tours, or any commercial vessel
that may opportunistically view wild dolphins. It offers incentives for
businesses that follow the program criteria and educate their customers
about the importance of minimizing wild dolphin harassment. It also
includes an important research component that provides insight about
the daily lives of the local, wild dolphin populations. This program is
currently being implemented in Florida and Alabama. The ADCNR, Coastal
Section is implementing the Alabama program and partners include the
MASGC and AGCCVB.
Thank you Madame Chairwoman, Ranking member Brown and fellow
committee members for your efforts in addressing this manmade disaster.
References
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service 2006 National Survey http://
library.fws.gov/pubs/nat_survey2006_final.pdf
The Gulf of Mexico at a Glance http://gulfofmexicoalliance.org/pdfs/
gulf_
glance_1008.pdf
The 2009 Alabama Travel & Tourism Economic Impact Report http://
www.alabama.travel/media/media_room/Report/
2009TourismReport.pdf
The 2009 Mississippi Travel & Tourism Economic Impact Report http://
www.visitmississippi.org/resources/
FY2009_Economic_Contribution_Report_
and_Cover.pdf
Alabama Gulf Coast Convention & Visitors Bureau Tourism Impact Report
http://gulfshores.com/stats/2010%20Update%20Presentation.pdf
Alabama Gulf Coast Convention & Visitors Bureau 2009 Visitor Profile
http://gulfshores.com/stats/Klages%202009%20Annual%20Report.pdf
The Mobile-Tensaw Delta http://www.alapark.com/press/release.cfm?ID=272
State of Mobile Bay http://www.mobilebaynep.com/site/news_pubs/
Publications/Indicator_Report-Final.pdf
Mississippi-Alabama Sea Grant Consortium ``Healthy Coastal Ecosystems''
http://www.masgc.org/page.asp?id=195
______
[NOTE: Ms. McDonough's responses to questions were not received by the
time this hearing went to print.]
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you very much, Ms.
McDonough, for describing the very concerning state of coastal
tourism.
And finally on our third panel, I welcome to the
Subcommittee Ms. Rolfes. Please begin.
STATEMENT OF ANNE ROLFES, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, LOUISIANA BUCKET
BRIGADE, NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA
Ms. Rolfes. Thank you. My name is Anne Rolfes, and 10 years
ago I founded a nonprofit organization called the Louisiana
Bucket Brigade to work with people who live next to oil
refineries and chemical plants.
For the past decade I have spent a lot of time on the front
porches of people who live right next to the oil industry, as
close as I am to you right now. From this vantage point, I have
seen all kinds of things, and I am not at all surprised that we
have had such a terrible catastrophe. We are only lucky that it
hasn't happened more often and sooner than this disaster in the
Gulf.
I could walk you into the file room. This is actual data,
not opinion. I could walk you into the file room at the
Department of Environmental Quality and the EPA and show you
permits and variances and accident reports that would make your
hair stand on end. It is not just the oil rigs that have a
problem; it is the oil industry. That is refineries, its
pipelines and other infrastructure.
The dynamic that we are seeing playing out in the Gulf is
one that I have seen every week for the last 10 years. The
permit applications are not meaningful examinations of the work
at hand, but instead they are cut-and-paste quick jobs. And
when there is an accident like we have just seen, there is a
very predictable series of events that happen--downplay the
problem: blame somebody else; minimize the impact on those
hardest hit; and resist the Federal Government's attempts at
enforcement with every breath of the corporation's body.
If this sounds familiar, it is exactly what is happening in
the Gulf right now. And we know the outcome. We know, as with
the Exxon Valdez and with many other accidents in Louisiana
that never make the headlines, we know that what happens is
that maybe after years and decades, a very wealthy oil company
finally gives money to the people who it has damaged, but this
is always much, much too late.
My question is, since we know what is going to happen here,
why can't this time be different? And that is why I am here
today.
I was at lunch, and I picked up Roll Call, your newspaper,
and there is an ad from BP just like the ones we see in the New
Orleans papers. It says that our focus has been on helping
fishermen by making payments to replace their lost monthly
income.
I know of one payment, so this ad as far as I am concerned
is absolutely not true, and the fact that they can put it in
the newspaper under your very noses, I think, speaks volumes to
the power of the oil industry and the real need for you all to
get engaged.
And so to that extent, as far as encouraging Federal and
congressional involvement, the following areas are ones in
which we desperately need Federal intervention. The first is on
wildlife. I think other people more knowledgeable than I have
spoken.
The second is health. I think we all heard the stories--I
don't know if they made the rounds in D.C.--of workers who were
out on boats, cleaning up the oil, and then became ill from the
odors. They were told by BP not only could they not wear
respirators, but they would absolutely be fired if they wore
them. How can this be? Why isn't OSHA out on those boats with
monitors?
I have heard subsequently that OSHA said they have been
monitoring, and there is no problem. No. What it says is that
OSHA is not monitoring effectively because you have scores of
cleanup workers who have been made sick.
Where is the Department of Labor? Where is the Department
of Justice to step in right now and tell BP that they are not
allowed to give directives like that? How is it that an oil
company is more powerful than the Federal Government? I don't
understand.
In addition to the problems of the cleanup workers, when I
was in the airport on the way here, I went through piles of
messages from people who were calling my tiny organization
asking about exposure. They are sick with respiratory illnesses
when they have never been sick before. Again, there is
something wrong here when a small, nonprofit agency is seen as
more responsive than the Federal Government.
The second or the third area where we need your
intervention is with the economy. Our fishing guide here can
speak volumes to that, but there has been a lot even from our
own Congressmen about the balance that has to be struck between
the oil industry and the fishing industry and wildlife.
I am here to tell you that it is absolutely not balanced.
It is so far in favor of the oil industry, and I think that
these ads in the paper and even our own representatives'
statements really prove that point. We agree we need balance.
We need to have some sort of ecological and environmental
health protections.
Right now what is happening is that the oil companies are
externalizing their costs on the backs of Louisiana residents.
Certainly the fishermen and the shrimpers and all the indirect
people who make their livings off of this industry need to be
made whole, and BP should not be allowed to get away with false
statements like this.
The final area where we need government intervention is in
the area of information control and management. BP is
absolutely controlling media access to destroyed places, as
well as scientist and nongovernmental organization access. How
is it that they can prevent the documentation, which will in
the end prevent their liability?
There are no databases currently that can tell you how many
accidents there have been in the Gulf. There are no databases
run by the government that can tell you how many accidents the
oil industry has had over the long term. This is a basic tool
that ought to be used. I mean, why doesn't EPA, for goodness
sakes, have a database and NOAA and MMS have a database where
anybody can go and look at this information?
There are absolutely things that we can do to correct this
problem. I am not a cynical person. I want to believe that
since we have seen all of this before, this time can be
different. I hope that you all can make it so.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Rolfes follows:]
Statement of Anne Rolfes, Founding Director, Louisiana Bucket Brigade
Introduction
My name is Anne Rolfes and I am the Founding Director of the
Louisiana Bucket Brigade, a non profit environmental health and justice
organization. Since 1999 I have collaborated with communities impacted
by the petrochemical industry. Most of my experience is working with
people who live next to Louisiana's 17 oil refineries. I spend my time
in the neighborhoods and have a solid understanding of what these
neighbors experience and how the oil industry conducts itself in this
region.
In April of 2010, 47 people were killed because of this nation's
reliance on fossil fuels. Seven workers at Tesoro Corp`s refinery in
Washington state 1, 29 miners in West Virginia 2
and 11 people on BP's Deepwater Horizon rig in the Gulf of Mexico.
3 While the subject of this hearing is the BP Oil Disaster,
it is important to recognize the human costs of this country's
addiction to fossil fuels. The tragic events of April 2010 should be an
inspiration to move toward a future of renewable energy.
The following testimony is in response to the questions posed in
the letter from Subcommittee Chair Madeleine Z. Bordallo dated May 28,
2010. I detail a number of problems in this testimony but I believe
that these problems can be solved and the response improved.
1) The short and long-term impacts of this oil spill on the local
community.
A. BP Exacerbation of Impacts
Both the short and long term impacts of the oil disaster in the
Gulf are being exacerbated by BP's conduct in the weeks since the
explosion. BP is not just failing to act but is taking steps that make
the problems worse both now and in the long term.
All of the information detailed here has been documented since
April 20, 2010 during time spent in the impacted coastal communities of
Louisiana. In some cases the press has also documented the problem. I
encourage Congressmen and women and their staff to go to the Gulf
Coast, not as a Congressional entourage with VIP status, but as
ordinary citizens looking for information. By being on the ground
without fanfare, our representatives can learn the truth.
Many of the residents of the coastal communities are afraid to
speak out on these issues for fear of repercussions, including loss of
employment from BP. 4 This fear has been voiced repeatedly
to me and to my co workers since April 20.
i. Health
Since the disaster began on April 20th the following BP activities
have been documented.
a) Clean up workers are being told by BP that they will be fired
if they wear respirators to protect themselves from chemical exposure.
5 We have heard these stories since May 14, 2010 from
fishermen in Barataria, Lafitte, Grand Isle and Venice. Workers have
requested respiratory gear because of the exposure happening while they
work. Because BP is the employer, these fishermen will not speak out
publicly for fear of losing this chance at making money.
BP has made statements detailing the health protective gear it
has provided.
``We want to ensure workers' health and safety are protected,
so we give them Tyvek suits, nitrile gloves, safety glasses,
hard hats when working near overhead hazards, rubber boots,
plus hearing protection, insect repellant, sunscreen, lip balm,
personal floatation devices and steel-toe boots,'' Curry said.
6
This does not mean that all workers are consistently being
provided with such equipment.
While BP insists that its air samples have shown no problems,
this is at odds with workers' experiences of falling ill after
breathing in chemicals. It is also at odds with news reports
about hospitalized workers. 7
b) On Thursday, June 2nd my co workers Anna Hrybyk and Shannon
Dosemagan spoke to a nurse who was stationing the medical tent within
the BP zone in Grand Isle, Louisiana. This nurse was part of the
official parish response that was advertised as the place that workers
and others should go to if they experience health problems from the
spill. The nurse was incredibly frustrated. She had arrived on the
scene to treat medical emergencies, and her equipment included IV's,
suture stitching materials and more. She reported that all of this
equipment was taken away from her by BP officials and that she was left
with only aspirin and band aids. She reported that BP is running its
own Emergency Medical Service and that the sickest people are being
taken there and avoiding the parish emergency center. This is a concern
for three reasons: 1/BP has a vested interest in minimizing health
concerns; 2/People may not be getting the best care possible and 3/The
company that has caused the problem is controlling the medical records
and information. The health problems treated by what the nurse called
``BP's EMS'' may not ever be part of the public record.
c) BP CEO Tony Hayward's remark that sick workers ate tainted food
was not an aberrant remark but consistent with BP's response of
minimizing health concerns. ``I'm sure they were genuinely ill, but
whether it was anything to do with dispersants and oil, whether it was
food poisoning or some other reason for them being ill,'' Hayward said.
8.
ii. Economy
The problems detailed here can be discovered by spending a day in
the impacted communities.
There is not a consistent commitment to hire local fishermen whose
livelihood is threatened by this spill. While some fishermen have been
hired in the clean up efforts, workers are being brought in from New
Orleans and elsewhere.
Local businesses are not being used. BP is contracting with service
providers--houseboat owners, catering services--outside of the impacted
communities. From the beginning government spokespeople spoke of the
need to hire locally during the response, but this is not happening.
BP first insisted that workers sign waivers in order to get clean
up jobs. While the first round of waivers did not hold up in court, it
fell to non profit agencies and local lawyers to challenge this
practice. These waivers were declared without effect in U.S. District
Court on May 2, 2010 by Judge Berrigan. 9
Individuals are left on their own to negotiate with BP, including
negotiations regarding employment and compensation. Local reports
indicate that without a degree of individual power or negotiating
skills, locals are likely to be ignored or undercompensated. ``If you
are powerful or persuasive or are known as a local leader, you will be
hired and generously compensated.'' 10 Established, written,
transparent hiring and compensation policies must be developed.
BP made $5,000 grants to fisherman but this amount was deducted
from the pay of those hired by BP. 11 Some of the fishermen
did not learn this until they received their pay checks.
According to reports from a local non profit organization called
the Bayou Interfaith Shared Community Organizing, some workers are not
being paid or are being paid late.
iii. Information Control
A comment from a resident of Terrebone Parish on June 7, 2010:
``To me that's one of the most frightening things--BP's
control. Their brazen control of the clean up, of the disaster.
Putting oil on property doesn't give them the right to control
the property. How much power do these people have?''
BP is restricting access to shoreline and marsh areas where there
is oil or other apparent damage. Air traffic above the spill is also
restricted. Among those prevented from accessing the sites are the
media and scientists working in the public interest.
Private security forces are hired to keep people off of public
beaches. While the public does need to be protected, this protection
needs to be within reason. Workers on Grand Isle report that the beach
closures, including Elmer's Island, appear not to be about health
protection but about preventing residents, the media and others from
documenting the oil spill. Security forces deny access even for
organizations and institutions with trained professionals working on
the spill. Going through official process to get BP approval takes days
and usually does not result in access.
Some workers have been required to sign an agreement not to talk to
anyone about the impacts that they have witnessed. 12 When
this issue was raised in a town hall meeting with BP, they replied that
this is not their fault, that the agreement is the subcontractors'
policy. BP has the power to negotiate whatever it wants in its
subcontracts; this clause should be removed.
The long term impact of this short term control of information is
that BP is preventing full documentation of the disaster's impacts. The
response is thus inhibited as well.
B. Health Impacts
The Oil Spill Crisis Map created by Tulane University and the
Louisiana Bucket Brigade has received 86 reports of health complaints.
13 Media outlets, community organizations and other
witnesses on this panel have documented even more community exposure,
worker illness and hospitalization.
C. Direct Economic Impacts
The direct impacts to fisherman, oystermen, shrimpers, crabbers and
those who work in the seafood industry have been noted in the media. A
story from the Oil Spill Crisis Map details the impacts.
Oyster Shucker from New Orleans as detailed on the Oil Spill Crisis
Map (www.oilspill.labucketbrigade.org)
``I'm New Orleans and I get called in by people who have
parties. I show up--I have my metal grated gloves and my oyster
knives and I get all set up for parties. At St. Patrick's Day
instead of going to the parade I set up and shucked oysters. I
made a pretty nice pay day that day. For the next 5-7 years all
that shellfish is compromised--it's going to be toxic with
dispersant. You can tell people don't eat it but people who are
subsisting on it are going to eat it. It's going to affect
those communities health wise. Suddenly everybody's going to
get cancer, birth defects.
And now, I'm going to be out of work. I've got my gloves for
shucking, but I'm going to have to hang them up, so to speak.''
D. Indirect Economic Impacts: Taxpayers pay for BP's negligence
While the Oil Pollution Act mandates that BP pay for the clean up,
there are additional costs with no system for mandating BP payment.
These costs include the burden to the public health care systems in the
Gulf Coast as well as the long term impact of individuals' compromised
health status. If exposure makes people sick, they may have less
earning capacity over the long run. If these people are forced to rely
on Supplemental Security Income or long term disability, then the U.S.
taxpayers are paying for BP's grievous mistake.
The section below details the Gulf Coast's lack of capacity for
indentifying chemical exposure. There are not enough doctors in the
region who are trained in chemical exposure and health impacts. If the
government stationed such toxicologists along the Gulf Coast, the
program would pay for itself in identifying people made sick and
incapacitated because of BP. In this scenario, BP--not the U.S.
taxpayer--would then pay for the loss of livelihood.
E. Impacts as reported on the Oil Spill Crisis Map
The Oil Spill Crisis Map (www.oilspill.labucketbrigade.org) is a
project of Tulane University's Disaster Resilience Leadership Academy
and the Louisiana Bucket Brigade. This web based map facilitates
community reporting of the disaster via text messaging, on line
reporting or e mails. As of June 8, 2010 there are 616 reports that
document livelihoods at risk, health problems, injured marine life and
oil sightings by Gulf Coast residents. The members of the committee are
urged to review this map to see firsthand what is happening on the
ground along the Gulf Coast.
Citizen reports as of June 8, 2010:
Odor Complaints: 181
Health Complaints from Exposure: 86
Oil on Marine Wildlife: 63
Oil on Birds: 47
Oil on Other Wildlife: 49
Oil on Shore: 130
Oil on Water: 111
2) The need for prolonged commitment by the Federal government, the
States, and the responsible party to mitigate damages.
A. Current problems that prevent effective mitigation
Please note that these problems are detailed as a first step to
effective government involvement. This is not an attempt to provide
simply a laundry list of complaints; instead, this is an analysis of
the problems that prevent effective mitigation. If these problems are
addressed then we have a real chance at effective disaster response.
i. Oil Pollution Act
BP's pattern of minimizing the problems and preventing
documentation are noted above. According to federal government
officials (including EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson 14), the
Oil Pollution Act (OPA) stipulates that if BP is to pay for the clean
up then it has to also administer the response. This is a clear
conflict of interest and is preventing a proper response.
We encourage two responses to the confines of OPA: 1/Government
intervention to the fullest extent allowable under the law. Is the
government using all of its powers within the context of OPA? A review
should be conducted. 2/Change the law. Special legislation should be
enacted now, to immediately apply the lessons we are learning on the
ground. One of the biggest lesson is that BP has too much control.
ii. Louisiana's lack of capacity
The Louisiana health care system does not have the capacity to
diagnose and treat people with chemical exposure. We do not have the
capacity to clean our shores and marshes, provide alternative
employment for the people thrown out of work, or conduct or adequate
water, soil and air sampling.
iii. Ineffective federal and state agencies
The situations detailed above demonstrate the government's
ineffectiveness in controlling BP. Additional problems with the
response are as follows and must be addressed before the government can
effectively mitigate damages.
Based on 11 years of experience with the Louisiana Department of
Environmental Quality (LDEQ), we have no confidence that the agency is
capable of taking any steps to protect people or the environment. This
agency should be invested with as little responsibility as possible.
The good news is that the EPA--not LDEQ--seems to be managing the
situation. This should continue.
There should be a robust federal presence on the ground preventing
the local communities from being taken advantage of by BP. While
various agencies like the EPA and NOAA have been visible, they have not
been successful in stopping the worst harms of BP. Agency challenges
are as follows.
OSHA--Workers are prevented from wearing protective
gear and air quality information is absent.
EPA--BP continued to use Corexit even after the EPA
asked them to change to a less toxic alternative 15
Air quality is deemed safe despite community members'
experiences to the contrary.
NOAA--BP has consistently underestimated both the
amount of oil leaking 16 from the well and the area
impacted by the spill. 17
Law enforcement/federal investigators--BP is
overstepping its boundaries in preventing the media and the
public from documenting the damages; people on the local level
are being cheated by BP via poor health protections and
employment issues as detailed above.
iv. History of Accidents in the Oil Industry in the Gulf and in
Louisiana
The oil industry in Louisiana has a terrible problem with accidents
off shore and on shore. BP is responsible for this disaster, but
federal and state agencies clearly failed in their oversight. Prolonged
government commitment is needed but that commitment has got to be
effective.
``Workers plunged dozens of feet through open unmarked holes.
Welding sparked flash fires. Overloaded cranes dropped heavy
loads that smashed equipment and pinned workers. Oil and
drilling mud fouled Gulf waters. Compressors exploded. Wells
blew out.'' 18
Despite the egregious state of oil rigs, in the five years before
the explosion of the Deep Water Horizon, 400 investigations of rigs
resulted in only 16 fines. 19 The problem on shore with
refineries is just as bad.
According to refinery reports to the state, ten of the largest
refineries in the state averaged ten accidents a week from 2005-2008.
20 Despite these facts--facts reported by the refineries
themselves--there has been no comprehensive action taken by the LDEQ or
EPA to stop these accidents. Both agencies know about the accidents as
the data has been communicated repeatedly to the LDEQ and all levels of
the EPA. While we are told by the EPA to go through a process and be
patient, the accidents continue and people's lives are at risk. We
don't want another tragic disaster to take place.
Many of these refinery accidents include preventable accidents that
are violations of the Clean Air Act. Proof of the poor state of
operations is found in the results of two citizen enforcement cases
brought by local residents against Murphy Oil and ExxonMobil's
Chalmette Refining. In both cases the refineries were on the losing end
of motions for summary judgment. This excerpt from the citizens suit
against ExxonMobil's Chalmette Refining details a troublesome dynamic
in the industry.
``Plaintiffs have alleged, and the documented violations
indicate, that Chalmette repeatedly violates the Clean Air Act
and that, unless some action is taken to prevent the illegal
conduct, there is a real threat that such violations will
continue to occur.'' 21
Citizens suits like this one happened because refinery neighbors
had to take enforcement into our own hands; federal and state
enforcement was and is not happening. The situation is truly desperate.
Accidents in the industry are ongoing but the agencies are not
enforcing the law. We have been shouting about this problem for years.
These failures do not mean that there is no role for government.
Instead, they point out the need for a government that is more active
on the ground protecting citizens. Being active means being with people
in their communities and conducting investigations. In regard to the
oil spill, government officials should not be locked away in a command
center or stuck in meetings.
B. Government Steps that should be Taken to Mitigate Damages
Intervening vigorously on the ground to stop the abuses that are
taking place is the best way to mitigate the damages, especially in the
short term. Additional steps, as follows, should be taken to prevent
future accidents.
A many of these steps involve more vigorous federal oversight, the
agencies involved--including the EPA and OSHA--should eliminate
unproductive staff positions and ramp up its investigation and
enforcement division. Fines collected via these activities might help
to offset the costs of additional enforcement.
i. Examine the entire oil industry
The preceding section has detailed the problems within the oil
industry as a whole. Proper mitigation includes looking at the entire
industry.
ii. Information management: create a database of accidents for all
sectors of the oil industry
Our expertise at the Louisiana Bucket Brigade is with refinery
accidents. Our Refinery Efficiency Initiative is our program to
encourage accident reduction at all 17 refineries in the state.
Refinery accidents are a serious problem; according to refineries' own
reports, from 2005-2008, ten of Louisiana's largest refineries averaged
ten accidents a week and released significant amounts of pollution:
15.6 million pounds of air pollution and 21.8 million gallons of water
pollution.
We know these numbers because we have created a database based on
information from the refinery reports to the Louisiana Department of
Environmental Quality (LDEQ). The LDEQ also maintains a database, but
this database presents reports one at a time. Absent our database, the
state and federal agencies have no mechanism for comprehensively
viewing refinery accidents. This is a surprising situation given that
we are a small non profit with far fewer resources than the government.
The situation--lack of information in one place--may be the same
for oil rig accidents in the Gulf. Creating publicly accessible
databases of information would allow all parties--oil companies,
regulators and the public--to understand accident trends over the long
term. This understanding is key to prevention.
iii. Conduct a robust review of the oil industry plans for the worst
case scenario and mandate that the planning is really for the
worst case
In my experience with refineries, the worst case scenario planning
usually involves an assumption that the worst case scenario will not
happen, and the planning is for a lower level problem. This should be
changed.
iv. Pass the Pallone bill to eliminate the liability cap for oil
spills
As long as there is a cap there is an incentive to take risks--to
drill and to spill.
v. Use of best available technology in all phases of the oil industry,
including clean up and accident prevention
This accident has illustrated the oil industry's emphasis on
drilling technology at the expense of safety technology. Rules
regarding use of best available technology need to be tightened and
enforced throughout the industry.
3) The sufficiency of community outreach to disseminate information to
and receive information from the public about the environmental
impacts of this oil spill.
A. Community outreach has historically been poor
During Hurricane Katrina a million gallons of oil were spilled by
Murphy Oil into a residential neighborhood. EPA distributed fliers to
those returning to the neighborhood, but the fliers gave no information
about the oil; instead the fliers focused on the danger of household
cleaning products that might have spilled and failed to mention the
oil. This is the level of incompetence that we have historically dealt
with.
This EPA is much better and has taken time to meet with community
members and NGO's. There remain problems, however, with the veracity of
EPA's information and with a meaningful follow up to community
suggestions. For example, the EPA air monitoring web site states that
``EPA's air monitoring conducted through June 6, 2010, has
found that air quality levels for ozone and particulates are
normal on the Gulf coastline for this time of year.''
22
There are a number of problems with this statement:
EPA is not conducting robust hot spot monitoring
EPA is extrapolating to an entire region based on
limited data
There is no baseline for this time of year so a
comparison is impossible
We have communicated these concerns to EPA but nothing has changed.
The air sampling that has been conducted by EPA is better than in past
years but is still not right. Rapid Response Teams to respond to odor
complaints by citizens should be established. Engaging citizens to
sample should also take place. And OSHA needs to monitor vigorously;
air monitors should be put on the boats with the clean up workers. Both
of these agencies as well as BP are reporting that air quality is fine.
This does nothing to convince residents who fall sick from odors.
Instead, the gap between their experience and the sampling results
builds distrust in the government and in BP.
B. Locally based organizations can help with outreach
After ten years of working in communities impacted by the oil
industry, we have learned that the best way to solve for these problems
is to engage the local communities as equal partners. There has to be
tracking to make sure that there is no retribution for those community
members who dare to speak critically of the oil industry. They cannot
be viewed as less knowledgeable than the oil industry or regulators.
The people who live with the impacts of the industry have a special
expertise whether they are refinery neighbors or fishermen out of work.
They are well positioned to offer solutions.
There are organizations working on the ground in the Gulf Coast
that have community connections. These include Bayou Interfaith Shared
Community Organizing, Mobile Baykeepers, the STEPS Coalition and the
various shrimpers and fishers associations. Locally based
organizations--those with a constituency of impacted people--should be
the vehicles for information dissemination. If the government or needs
these organizations to effectively communicate with the public and with
those impacted, then these organizations should be paid for their time.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I believe that as
terrible as this crisis is, it represents an opportunity to get the
response right and show that government is competent. Why can't this
time, too, bring forth a Greatest Generation that responds to this
disaster in the right way and uses it as a catalyst for a change to
renewable energy? But time is of the essence. There is still time to
improve on the response and change our fossil fuel future, but we must
act quickly. I will help in any way I can.
endnotes
1 Associated Press, ``Seventh Person Dies from Wash State
Refinery Fire,'' April 24, 2010, http://www.kgw.com/news/
national/92006674.html
2 Urbina, Ian, ``No Survivors Found after West Virginia
Mine Disaster,'' New York Times, April 9, 2010, http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/04/10/us/10westvirginia.html
3 Times Picayune, Meet the Eleven Men Who Died on the
Deepwater Horizon Rig in the Gulf, May 1 2010, http://
www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/05/
details_on_scene_as_deepwater.html
4 Cohen, Elizabeth, ``Fisherman's Wife Breaks the
Silence,'' CNN, June 3, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/HEALTH/
06/03/gulf.fishermans.wife/index.html?hpt=C2
5 Lawrence, Grant, ``Fishermen Hospitalized: BP not
Allowing Clean Up Workers to Use Respirators,'' Alternet.org,
May 27, 2010, http://blogs.alternet.org/grantlawrence/2010/05/
27/fishermen-hospitalized-bp-not-allowing-clean-up-workers-to-
use-respirators/
6 Hammer, David, ``BP clashes with critics on Gulf of
Mexico oil crisis response,'' Times Picayune, May 31, 2010,
http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/05/
post_6.html
7 Associated Press, ``Hospital treating 7 oil spill cleanup
boat crewmen,'' May 27, 2010, http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-
oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/05/hospital_treating_7_oil_spill.html
8 Hammer, David, http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/
index.ssf/2010/05/post_6.html
9 Lodge, Bill, ``BP Scratches Waivers for Fishermen,'' The
Advocate, May 4, 2010 http://www.2theadvocate.com/news/
92735704.html
10 Conversation with Terrebone Parish resident, June 7, 2010
11 Babcock, Stephen, ``Anxiety, Booms and Claims,'' NOLA
Defender, http://noladefender.com/content/anxiety-booms-claims
12 Grand Isle Louisiana Town Hall Meeting, June 2, 2010
13 www.oilspill.labucketbrigade.org, June 8, 2010
14 Conversation with Lisa Jackson, May 24, 2010
15 Tilove, Jonathan, ``BP is Sticking with its Dispersant
Choice,'' Times Picayune, May 21, 2010, http://www.nola.com/
news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/05/
bp_is_sticking_with_its_disper.html
16 Gillis, Justin, Calculations of Gulf Spill
Underestimated, Scientists Say, New York Times, May 13, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/14/us/14oil.html
17 WDSU TV New Orleans, Plaquemines Parish: BP
Underestimating Oil's Effect, June 1, 2010, http://
www.wdsu.com/news/23757362/detail.html
18 Olsen, Lise and Eric Nalder, ``Offshore Accidents Bring
Few Penalties,'' Houston Chronicle, June 7, 2010, http://
www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/business/deepwaterhorizon/
7039960.html
19 Ibid.
20 ExxonMobil, CITGO, Murphy et al reports as available at
http://farm.ewg.org/sites/labb/
21 Vance, Sarah, THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, EASTERN
DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA, February 3, 2005, p. 18
______
[NOTE: Ms. Rolfes' responses to questions were not received by the
time this hearing went to print.]
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much for your testimony. I
want to say that everything that has been said this afternoon
on this Panel 3 has been very valuable to our Committee.
One question I am just going to ask before I start with my
questions, and I would like to welcome the Ranking Member, Mr.
Cassidy, back. I know he has questions as well.
You know, I keep thinking about the Hurricane Katrina and
how disorganized that was following the hurricane. I remember
watching on TV. I think some National Guard General jumped up
on a truck and said, ``I am in charge.''
Now, the incident commander in this case is supposed to be
someone from the Coast Guard. Is that correct?
Ms. Rolfes. Yes.
Ms. McDonough. Thad Allen.
Captain Lambert. Yes, Thad Allen.
Ms. Bordallo. All right. Is everybody aware of that?
Captain Lambert. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Bordallo. All right. Are they really indeed in charge?
They are? They step right up to the plate? They are the ones
you go to when you see all this? Because several of you in your
testimonies prior to this panel have said things are
disorganized.
Ms. Rolfes. I think BP is in charge, and when I have spoken
with people from the government, including the EPA
administrator herself, I was expressing the opinion that sure,
BP needs to pay, but why should they be administering all the
response.
And what I was told was that the Oil Pollution Act says
that if BP is going to pay, then they have to run things also.
I don't know if that is true or not, but in my estimation I
think the response is certainly better than Katrina. I don't
think there is any question about that, but in my opinion BP is
absolutely running the show.
Ms. Bordallo. Well, in any disaster, any incident, somebody
has got to be the top gun. If they assign the Coast Guard, then
they are the people that you have to go to and then they. in
turn, can direct you in other directions, but someone has to be
on the top directing. Several of you here said that things are
disorganized, even to this day.
Ms. Rolfes. That is true.
Ms. Bordallo. So that is something maybe the Committee will
have to look into that.
Now I have questions for Mr. Williams. As a member of the
Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus, I am deeply
concerned about the impacts of this oil spill on Vietnamese
Americans, many of whom participate in the shrimp industry in
the Gulf. Do you think outreach to these communities about the
Vessels of Opportunity Program and the claims process has been
adequate?
Mr. Williams. I don't know if I would call it adequate, but
I know that there has been some outreach to these communities
through our organization. We have several of the Vietnamese
American communities as members in our organization, and we
certainly reach out to these folks as we do with everyone.
I don't know as far as a government outreach. I couldn't
speak to that, but I think they have been informed to a degree.
Ms. Bordallo. One of our colleagues was here this morning,
and he was concerned about this and so I thought I would ask
that of you so we have it on the record.
Now, BP has repeatedly stated that it will pay all
legitimate claims, yet it has never expounded on what is and is
not a legitimate claim. How does this lack of certainty impact
those in the shrimp industry?
Mr. Williams. It causes a lot of confusion with the Oil
Pollution Act and the opportunity to file a lawsuit through a
class action. It causes a lot of confusion. The members and
members of the industry, they don't know what to do.
But when BP is making statements that they will pay all
legitimate acts or legitimate claims, but they don't define
what a legitimate claim is. I think it causes a lot of
confusion, and I think it is going to cause confusion because
they won't go further than we will pay all legitimate claims.
What do you consider a legitimate claim? Once again, they
will say, ``We pay all legitimate claims.'' It is causing
confusion right now amongst the industry.
Ms. Bordallo. Well, the full Committee on Natural Resources
has had a hearing where the BP executives were here, and they
stated over and over again that they were going to pay this and
pay that, and now I am hearing that there have only been some
token checks issued for $5,000 to the fishery industry and they
want to know. Have those claims been issued, I mean these
papers to----
Mr. Williams. I am not sure if all or any claims have been
paid in full. I think the $5,000 is sort of a down payment on
your claim.
Ms. Bordallo. It is a token payment. Yes.
Mr. Williams. Yes, until it is resolved at a later date.
Ms. Bordallo. Well, that is not a lot of money, $5,000----
Mr. Williams. No, it is not.
Ms. Bordallo [continuing]. In a situation like this. Some
of these fishery companies have several employees. Am I correct
on that?
Captain Lambert. Yes. Twenty-two families work out of my
lodge alone.
Ms. Bordallo. That is right.
Captain Lambert. And the legitimate claim, the Oil
Pollution Act, says that they are liable to pay net profit. So
net profit is far from what your real expenses, fixed expenses,
are.
And, also, what they are waiting for and why, in my
opinion, they are stalling is that every one of the shrimpers
and fishermen that work in the spill, whatever they make goes
to help mitigate the loss of BP. So if they owe me $1 million
and I work all year long cleaning up oil and I make $900,000,
they only owe me $100,000. Why should they be able to mitigate
their losses and use us as free labor?
Ms. Bordallo. That is right. Also now you don't know then
if any claim documents have been issued to any of these people?
Captain Lambert. What they have done, the first time you go
in you file your claim. They give you a $5,000 check on the
spot. Then shortly thereafter, like myself, they will put me in
a big claims file, and they called the house this week and said
we want a profit and loss statement every 15 days.
Now, I don't do that for myself, and I am sure not going to
make my CPA do it for them. I do quarterlies. All they are
trying to do is, if the news media is staying at my lodge, they
want to use that money to mitigate their loss.
Ms. Bordallo. I see.
Captain Lambert. They took and put me out of the very thing
I do for a living, and if I go to WalMart and I am a checker
and I make $50,000 that comes off of what they owe me. That is
ridiculous.
Ms. Bordallo. All right. So setting aside the $5,000 token
payment, has there been any claims paid?
Captain Lambert. Not so much as claims right now. There is
another $5,000 in the mail, and it comes with----
Ms. Bordallo. Yes. That is two. I understand there were
two.
Captain Lambert. Yes. It hasn't got there yet, but it is in
the mail.
Ms. Bordallo. I see. But no claims payments to your
knowledge have been made?
Captain Lambert. I think there was one offer of 60 percent
of his gross I think they offered one guy.
Ms. Bordallo. I see. Well, this is something we will have
to investigate.
I have a question then for Mr. Lambert. Yes. On Tuesday, BP
announced that it would donate the net revenue from recovered
oil from the well to create a new wildlife fund. For what
restoration activities should this fund be used?
Captain Lambert. I think all the money should go to CRPA
and restore our coastline and open up the natural channels of
the river and bring it back to where it was when I first
started guiding between the levee and the Gulf of Mexico, 6.3
miles. That was solid grasslands and solid estuary.
Now there is not one blade of grass in that 6.3 miles. When
I leave the dock, I could close my eyes, turn loose of the
steering wheel and I won't hit anything. It is four foot deep.
We need to restore Louisiana, and Mother Nature will take care
of the wildlife herself.
Ms. Bordallo. Ms. McDonough, has there been adequate
training for tour operators to participate in the Vessels of
Opportunity Program?
Ms. McDonough. Yes, there has, and some of the tour
operators have been in the Vessel of Opportunity Program, but
when I left recently, they deactivated.
Ms. Bordallo. Deactivated?
Ms. McDonough. Deactivated. And what I am hearing from them
is that they are now circulating vessels, but there are still
vessels in our waters that are not local, and they are waiting
in line and being deactivated.
Ms. Bordallo. All right. One more question, and then we
will turn it over to the Ranking member. How can data collected
by your organization be better integrated to guide oil spill
response and recovery activities? This is for Ms. Rolfes.
Ms. Rolfes. There is no central--we have gathered oil spill
data about refinery problems and oil spills and explosions. It
is all from the record, from the records from refineries to the
states and to the EPA. So certainly what we have is public
information that is on our website.
I think the issue is where is that amalgamation of data on
oil spills? I mean, it wouldn't take an agency very long to
just put together a database with all of the inspection
information, as well as all of the spill information. It is
just a matter of a few people sitting down and entering it into
spreadsheets and then having a database that can be searchable.
Without this kind of database, nobody--not a
congressperson, not a citizen, not even the oil companies--can
understand their comprehensive accident history. When we
released our database, we actually had Exxon Mobil ask a local
reporter what we found, and all we did was put their own data
together. I mean, they just don't have a comprehensive
understanding, and if they did it might help with prevention.
Ms. Bordallo. Someone mentioned there was nobody from OSHA
around.
Ms. Rolfes. Yes. That was me. Yes, when these workers were
sick. It is unbelievable. I mean, the workers, and I am sure
you probably have friends who were made sick on these vessels
when they are cleaning up. They are told they would be fired,
and yet the answer from OSHA is that everything is normal.
Well, they are not out on the boats monitoring where they
ought to be. Every boat that goes out with cleanup workers
ought to have monitoring on it. To me that is just common
sense.
Ms. Bordallo. All right. Thank you. And now I recognize Mr.
Cassidy.
Mr. Cassidy. Mr. Williams, I came in late, and I may have
missed it as I scanned your testimony, but when we spoke
yesterday, you had kind of a novel way of getting shrimpers
back out in the Gulf shrimping. Do you want to explain that? Do
you recall that?
Mr. Williams. No. I am sorry. I didn't hear you.
Mr. Cassidy. I don't have my glasses on, so if it looks
like I am peering out into the distance I am.
Mr. Williams. OK.
Mr. Cassidy. It was about shrimpers perhaps getting a
guarantee of a certain amount of money to return to shrimping.
It will be a flat guarantee.
If they go out and they don't get anything, their costs are
met, but ideally they will go back out there and find something
in the areas that are not closed off. Am I getting that right,
or am I totally confused?
Mr. Williams. Maybe I am confused. I don't recall that.
Mr. Cassidy. No problem.
Mr. Williams. OK.
Mr. Cassidy. Now, ma'am, as with regard to paddle trips in
the Pascagoula, there is not oil in the Pascagoula River, so is
it this perception that is causing the paddling to be canceled?
Ms. McDonough. Yes, sir. Yes. You know, coastal Mississippi
and the whole Gulf appears awash, you know. And there are still
some areas that tour operators could be getting their summer
clients down, but there is a perception that it is everywhere.
You know, unfortunately----
Mr. Cassidy. So part of what we have to do, because Mr.
Voisin who spoke about oysters earlier, spoke about how much of
his oysters are still good, but there is a perception that they
are not good.
I suspect Mr. Lambert could take me someplace I can still
catch my limit of speckled trout.
Captain Lambert. Yes. Actually I have 10 boats running
today, but that is the first trip in two weeks due to the fact
that 99 percent of our trips are canceled.
And the only reason this trip is they have been coming with
me for years and they said we are coming even if you have to
get some pigs and a band. We are coming. It was just support
was all it was.
Mr. Cassidy. But you are able to take them to someplace
where they can catch fish that you can actually eat?
Captain Lambert. I have 10 percent of my waters still open,
and we are just utilizing what we have. I won't shut down until
they shut me down.
Mr. Cassidy. OK. So as much as anything, what we need to
come out of here is an understanding that, although there is a
terrible problem, for many people with viable businesses the
Gulf is open and they can take their paddle trips in the
Pascagoula and they can eat the shrimp, trusting that the FDA,
the USDA, et cetera, are inspecting those and making sure they
are safe.
And so we want to avoid a manmade economic disaster on top
of the manmade economic disaster. Does that make sense?
Mr. Williams. Well, the problem is that when they close the
waters, they will say at 6:00 tomorrow morning this area is
closed, and I only have one area left. If they do that when
people are eating dinner, I say ``Fellas, we just got closed.
You all can't fish tomorrow.''
You know, there are too much logistics on getting there and
getting the people together in order to make it happen, so they
just cancel.
Mr. Cassidy. Yes. OK. So it is the uncertainty of it as
much as anything.
Ms. Rolfes, what I am told by the EPA folks is that the
benzines, the aromatic amino acids, are quickly evaporated when
they hit the water, that there is an air quality issue in the
immediate area where the stuff is bubbling up, but certainly by
the time it gets to the beach, the volatile organic chemicals
have dissipated and what is left, for example, the weathered
tar ball--I specifically asked about that--is basically inert,
with nothing left that could harm you except dermatitis and
irritation of the skin.
They don't recommend bathing in it, but at the same time
they say no special equipment is required to scoop up. So is
your concern with the beach activity or is your concern with
the folks actually going out testing near the explosion site?
Ms. Rolfes. It is with both. Certainly the cleanup workers
are a concern, but there are other activities that do impact
air quality. For example, when there have been burn-offs on the
ocean, as there were early in the spill, the impacts were felt.
I think probably in Buras you all could probably smell things.
And people continue to smell what they believe to be oil
and gas. Although the hope certainly is that it would volatize
and that it wouldn't affect people, I think that actual
experience is proving to be quite different from that.
The problem is that what we ought to do is just have air
monitoring to figure this out one way or the other, right, but
the monitoring--it is not dissimilar to the dispersant issue.
There is a lot that we don't know. There is a lot that we don't
know about the exposure to these chemicals low level over the
long term.
But more than that, the EPA is not monitoring in the right
places. They are not doing hot spot monitoring at the moment
when people smell it. They do have probably the most
comprehensive air sampling program that we have ever seen in
this part of the world, and I applaud them for that effort, but
we need to have good monitors in Buras when people are smelling
the bad things.
Because what happens is people are exposed. They smell oil
because they are burning it or for some other reason, and then
EPA and OSHA come out and say there is no problem. What that
does is it just breeds distrust and sadness about our
government. It doesn't make me change my opinion that I was
just exposed.
And I think that there is a way to do the sampling right.
We are trying to work with EPA to do that, but there is no
question in my mind that people are absolutely being exposed
onshore. I mean, again I could give you a sack of phone
numbers.
Mr. Cassidy. But is there any data? I presume you mentioned
that DEQ and EPA----
Ms. Rolfes. Yes.
Mr. Cassidy [continuing]. Do have monitors out there. What
do their monitors show?
Ms. Rolfes. Some of their monitors do show fairly
significant amounts of benzine in the air, which is a Class A
carcinogen, so there is an amount of data that is showing that
there is a problem.
There is other data that is being collected absolutely in
the wrong places, and the problem is that the EPA then uses
this data to extrapolate to an entire region. So, for example,
they would have an air monitor at the Washington Monument, and
then use that data to say that the air in this room is fine.
Well, all that monitor tell you is that the air at the
Washington Monument is fine. You can't extrapolate it.
Mr. Cassidy. So is the EPA incompetent?
Ms. Rolfes. I don't think they are incompetent. I think
they are working hard. I think that they need a new model for
air monitoring, and doing something new is always scary.
Mr. Cassidy. Now let me ask you, because it seems so
apparent to you.
Ms. Rolfes. Yes.
Mr. Cassidy. But why is it so unapparent to them?
Ms. Rolfes. Because I think it is a new model. You know, I
have spent time with the administrator. I think they are not
very comfortable, for example, giving Mr. Lambert an air
monitor for his house, but they should be because he could be a
partner on the ground to take a sample.
I mean, he is a smart man. He knows how to use equipment.
It is just a new model that they would be uncomfortable with.
Mr. Cassidy. I yield back.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank the gentleman from Louisiana. And now
I would like to recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Bilirakis. Is that close enough?
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Madam Chair. I really appreciate
it. And thank you for allowing me to be on the panel. Thank
you, Mr. Cassidy. I really appreciate it very much.
I am proud to represent portions of Florida's Gulf Coast. I
realize the economic and societal benefits of both recreational
and commercial fishing. This industry generates $11 billion in
Florida and $50 billion nationwide. I have grave concerns about
the implications of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill on this
dynamic industry.
While our top focus must remain on stopping the flow of oil
into the Gulf of Mexico, we must also begin looking at the
long-term impacts that this disaster will have on the
ecosystems and our economy and discuss solutions.
Mr. Williams, welcome and thank you so much for your
leadership at the Southern Shrimp Alliance. I am proud to say
that we are both from Tarpon Springs, Florida. I know you are
here to relay the fear, concerns, hopes and wishes of local
shrimpers who have helped provide billions of dollars a year in
revenue for Florida.
You shared with me prior to today's hearing a real concern
you have about BP's use of toxic dispersants. I know that you
sent a letter to NOAA and the EPA and have been trying to get
an answer from them about the implications of the long-term
impacts that dispersants will have on the shrimping industry.
I questioned NOAA earlier today regarding that very issue.
However, I received an unsatisfactory response, really no
answer. It is alarming to me that the government agencies
tasked with protecting our natural resources in fact are
clueless to the effects of toxins that they preapproved.
Because one of the primary concerns is seafood safety, I am
hoping that you might be able to offer some insight regarding
the use of dispersants. I know you can only speculate because
the government is not sharing information, but do you think
fish species and seafood safety would be in less peril had
dispersants not been used? The rest of the panel also is
welcome to comment.
Mr. Williams. I certainly do. Certainly I am not a
scientist, but we sent our letter early on, May 5, and that was
prior to their incredible amount of dispersants being used. I
think since then they have used another million gallons of this
dispersant.
We sent a letter voicing our concerns that if you are going
to use something that you have no science on, no data, you
shouldn't try to mitigate one disaster by creating another one,
and that is exactly what they did. They told us early on that
oil would not reach the shores. It did. Now they are telling us
dispersants are not that toxic. They can be used. They are not.
We have Federal agencies reluctant to call it whatever they
want to call it, plumes of oil down there. The fact is it is
there. It has been proven. The data is there to prove it, but
they are still reluctant to admit that this is a problem. It is
a problem. It will be a problem not only for decades, but we
feel generations.
I don't know how you go about cleaning it up, but the
dispersants have been used. They continue to be used, which
they shouldn't. At one point EPA advised BP to use a less toxic
dispersant. BP just basically refused and said no, that we are
going to continue using this. This is the most effective. It
was preapproved by EPA so we can use it.
But, yes. To your question, I believe we have created a
disaster that we will not be able to address for many, many
years, possibly generations, by the use of these dispersants.
Mr. Bilirakis. Anyone else like to comment?
Captain Lambert. Why would they use the dispersants in the
first place, if not to hide the fact that the oil is here and
it is coming? If we could clean it off the surface, why not let
it come to the surface?
No one knows for sure the long-term effects because they
haven't gave us the percentage of the compounds that are in it,
but it is biotechnology that eats oil. There are so many high
tech and private sector things that they can do, and no one is
using anything. The whole thing is out of sight, out of mind,
from the tar balls coming in under the water to the dispersants
hiding the oil. The whole thing is a slight of hand show.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much. As a followup, your
previous answer suggests that you have been frustrated in
trying to have a good dialogue with the government officials,
whether it is NOAA, EPA, the Coast Guard or the Department of
the Interior.
Do you believe, and this is for the entire panel. Do you
believe there is a deliberate effort to shut you and the entire
fishing industry out of the conversation? I know they are not
encouraging you.
Captain Lambert. I don't believe, because I testified in
Galliano when Secretary Salazar and Napolitano were in, and
Secretary Salazar actually got up and made BP come to the
Louisiana Charter Boat Association and negotiate.
On the first negotiation, Senator Landrieu came to it at a
restaurant, and she told BP. She said you know, the law states
that you have to pay net profit, but net profit is the law. I
am not in the mood for net profit. That is not making these
people whole. You need to come and negotiate and find a better
way.
Mr. Bilirakis. Anyone else?
Captain Lambert. So we didn't support it.
Mr. Williams. Yes. I don't know if I would go so far to say
it is a deliberate attempt to shut us out, but the fact is they
have shut us out. For whatever reason I don't know, but they
have shut our industry out. They have not responded to us.
They are missing a great opportunity to allow industry to
have input on all these actions and decisions, and to date they
have not allowed us to do that.
Mr. Bilirakis. Give me some ideas on how the Federal
Government can partner with the local fishing industries.
Mr. Williams. Well, as far as seafood safety and testing,
we have basically an unlimited resource out there. The boots
are on the ground, if you will.
If they would just come to us, form a coalition or a task
force, if you will, to involve the industry because these
folks--it is pretty obvious that they cannot do this alone. We
are probably the best environmental stewards of our resource
that there is out there. We have to make a living off that
resource, and we know it better than anyone.
You just can't make the decision without involving us
because we can do this as far as seafood testing, cleanup. We
have thousands of boats that can be involved in the cleanup
process. There are a few hundred now, but there can be more.
Keep us involved.
But when we are working on the cleanup at least provide us
with the adequate safety gear that we need to keep these folks
from getting sick. I have horrific stories of folks that are
getting sick on these boats. Members, our organization members,
directors are on these boats. They are getting sick.
Innovative gear technology. You know, there is a move
underway now from the industry to try to come up with a trial
that could possibly work to clean this subsea oil out or
subsurface oil out of the Gulf. We are working on that. That is
what we do as an industry.
We were involved from day one with the turtle excluder
devices. That came from industry. You have to involve us to
make sure that this works. Don't just sit back and have three
agencies make decisions that impact us, when they could use us
as a resource and these decisions will be better and a lot
quicker.
Mr. Bilirakis. Anyone else? Any suggestions from the rest
of the panel?
Captain Lambert. Yes. What we have done in Louisiana is
equivalent to someone coming to you and saying let us levee off
the Everglades to where no freshwater can get to it and just
let it starve to death.
So the biggest thing to fix this is to bring nature back to
itself but, in the interim, while we are losing year class
after year class until the dispersants and the oil are gone, we
could have hatcheries like the CCA gentleman, David, had
mentioned, to have hatcheries to put those year classes in so
when the attrition takes the older fish and the breeders that
we don't miss a few years where there are no fish. Oysters,
shrimp, everything, crabs. They could do all of it.
Ms. Rolfes. And it is a common dynamic when there is a
problem--well, not just when there is a problem, but with the
oil industry that it is the regulators like NOAA or EPA or
whoever it is and industry talking. It makes sense that they
talk because they are supposed to be regulating them.
I think they get out of the habit of including the people
who are the most impacted. I see it. I can tell you, I see it
every day in the work that I do. And so from my point of view,
you all could play a real service just every single time
saying, ``Where are the shrimpers? Where are the fishermen?''
Because out of habit they will not--out of habit and maybe
something more sinister, but they will shut the people most
affected out. I can tell you that is a pattern, and there needs
to be a real strong movement to make sure they are included.
Mr. Bilirakis. Very good. Thank you very much for your
testimony, all of you. I appreciate it. I yield back.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank the gentleman, and I think this
pretty much brings our hearing to a close. I just have one
quick question here before we wind up.
We mentioned all the people that should be there, and are
not there, and those that are there. National Guard. Have you
seen them?
Captain Lambert. Yes. There is a lot of Coast Guard
personnel there, and they are working very, very hard to bring
the sandbags in.
When you say the helicopters are bringing them, you have
18-wheelers bringing them in and you have guys filling them. I
mean, they are working very hard in 96 degree weather with 100
percent humidity. They are doing a good job.
Ms. Bordallo. What states are these National Guards from?
Captain Lambert. All over.
Ms. Bordallo. All the Gulf states?
Captain Lambert. Mostly Louisiana National Guard at this
point, but----
Ms. Bordallo. All right.
Captain Lambert [continuing]. There are some of them up
from different--some of the higher ups.
Ms. Bordallo. Very good. Because I know they played an
important role in Hurricane Katrina as well.
Captain Lambert. They did indeed.
Ms. Bordallo. Well, I thank the third panel for your long
stay here up on the Hill all morning and most of the afternoon
and all of the witnesses for their participation in the hearing
today.
Members of the Subcommittee may have some additional
questions for you, and we will ask that you respond to these in
writing. In addition, the hearing record will be held open for
10 days for anyone who would like to submit additional
information for the record.
If there is no further business before the Subcommittee,
the Chairwoman thanks the Members for their participation here
this morning and also the Members of the Subcommittee who have
participated in the hearing. The Subcommittee now stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:29 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Additional material submitted for the record follows:]
Email submitted for the record by Michael Broussard,
Corsair Charters
From: Michael Broussard [corsaircharters@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, June 01, 2010 1:41 PM
To: Joanne McDonough
Re: Oil spill effects
Hi Joanne,
I hope this finds you happy and well but as you well know it is a
bleak time we are facing now. So far my bookings are down 90% and I
can't help thinking how terrible it must be for our animal friends,
whom I love dearly, to die smothered in crude oil. I can't predict the
future but I do believe my career of 46 years is over and life as we
knew it is also. Economics ended my commercial fishing days. I thought
I would finish my life as a charter operation but I do not at this time
think that is going to happen. Seems as though I made a poor career
choice but it has been one hellava ride. Probably wont be able to sell
my boats and my property will be worth a fraction of what I paid for it
but I'm sure we will all proceed bravely.
Thanks for your help and I hope to see you soon,
Mike
Michael Broussard
Corsair Charters
______
Letter submitted for the record by Captain Laurel Fleming,
Daphne, Alabama
June 6, 2010
Joanne McDonough
Nature Tourism Specialist
Gulf Shores Convention & Visitors Bureau
Gulf Shores, Alabama 36542
Dear Joanne,
In April 2005, I relocated to Gulf Shores, Alabama, to fulfill my
dream of living on the gulf coast. By weaving both my horticulture
background and sailing experience, I've made a niche for myself in this
coastal community.
Baldwin County thrives on tourism. The income I contribute to our
household is derived 100% from the tourist trade. However, since the
Deepwater Horizon incident, our tourism numbers have dropped
dramatically. We have few guests to sustain our real properties, and
few tourists to participate in our ecological tours and sailing
charters.
My friend and coworker, Captain Chris Nelson, and I joined forces
and chartered Alabama Kayak Adventures. We provide guests the
opportunity to discover and experience our lightly traveled coastal
waterways via kayak. Many never know these estuaries, creeks, and bays
exist. We educate them in the importance of our estuaries and explain
how both humans and nature depend on these areas for everything from
water filtration to seafood reproduction. They experience our wildlife
in its natural habitat and discover flora and fauna not found on the
beach. More often than not, what they see, hear, and experience are
once-in-a-lifetime opportunities.
Alabama Kayak Adventures also serves fisherman with inshore and
near-coastal fishing tours. Most people who come here expect to fish
for saltwater species in the bays and near the beaches, not bass in
freshwater rivers. Now our waters are closed to fishing. Our business
is being destroyed.
Chris and I have poured our hearts and souls into this business
only to have it crumble following the oil spill incident. The money and
time we've invested into equipment, marketing, and education may never
be recouped. We both earned our USCG Maritime Captain's licenses and
Coastal Nature Guide certifications for the purpose of providing these
memories to our Gulf Coast visitors.
As a deckhand aboard Cetacean Cruises sailing charters, we have
suffered major income losses, and I depend on gratuities. We have gone
from daily cruises to one or two cruises a week, and the number of
passengers has dwindled to minimal. On these cruises we view and
educate passengers about a favorite natural resource, the wild
bottlenose dolphin. These creatures are oftentimes the highlight of the
evening. Also within our sights is a Bald Eagle's nest. These
magnificent raptors are returning to our area, and our guests are able
to view this symbol of freedom in the wild, not behind the bars of a
cage. Today few tourists are booking these cruises. Who wants to
vacation in a spoiled environment?
Our livelihoods are dying along with the estuaries and sea life of
the region. The residents of the Alabama Gulf Coast are fighters. We
will survive, but how? If we can't use the natural resources we so
desperately depend upon, what are we to do? For some, this community
and way of life is all they know. God help us all.
Respectfully,
Captain Laurel Fleming
Daphne, Alabama
______
Email submitted for the record by Lynn Irving,
Dauphin Island Kayaks
From: DauphinIslKayaks@aol.com [mailto:DauphinIslKayaks@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, May 28, 2010 10:56 AM To: Joanne McDonough
Subject: Re: I am going to Washington, DC to testify
Hi Joanne,
Things are like a ghost town. I am down about $3000. now from this
time last year. I have gotten $1000. so far. We had just bought another
jeep 4 days before the spill. My mortgage went up to $1408. from $800.
because of ins. I had made almost $6000. in Jun and July from last
year. The monies we made in mar. and apr. we spent replacing and
updating supplies. My house cleaning will not really help or Mike's
cooking job 3 days a week..at a seafood rest, so the trickle effect is
starting. My accountant was supposed to finish my '08 and '09 taxes but
she is loosing her mind and cannot handle the stress anymore. Her
income came from the big fish co's in Bayou. She is 63 and is in a
state to find a job. There really aren't any in Mobile.
I have had a few rentals, $400. since apr. 19th. They want to help
us in our time of need and pray that it will not hit us..but we know
better with that plume coming into mobile bay. It is killing me and I
am sad about the animals especially that little dauphin we saw on our
dauphin boat tour. I am soooo sick to my stomach and I feel panicky. I
may loose my house which I only owe $44000.and my jeeps. I depend on my
eco tourism income to get through the winter. My house is not in
sellable condition and I guess it won't really matter. I went to my
shrink yesterday, he is worried about me. I went through loosing my
husband, my dad, my 21 yr old cat, my restaurant and roof to Ivan and
fighting cancer, all from '01--'04. Been struggling since Ivan and
Katrina to keep my biz going. '08 was finally the light at the end of
the tunnel. I guess this proves we should not count of anything.
There are so many people that may lose everything and the
environment will never be the same.
I love you Joanne and I know you are heart sick also, and thank you
for every thing you have done for me and soooo many. Give my regards to
Washington and tell them that BP needs to pay for our homes so we can
move to another area where there are jobs.
Again.. Thank You..
Lynn
______
Memorandum submitted for the record by Melissa Johnson, Paul Nettles,
Cynthia Ramseur, and Leah Bray, Owners, South Coast Paddling Company
MEMORANDUM
To: Subcommittee on Insular Affairs, Oceans and Wildlife.
Via Joanne McDonough, Nature Tourism Specialist
From: South Coast Paddling Company
Re: June 10, testimony regarding BP drilling disaster in Gulf of
Mexico and its impact on nature tourism in coastal Mississippi.
As of last evening, 25% of the Gulf of Mexico is closed to fishing.
Patches of oil and debris from the original blow-out of Deepwater
Horizon have been coming onto Mississippi barrier islands and western
shores for about two weeks. Oil has been gushing at an unknown daily
rate, somewhere between 210,000 gallons and one million gallons per
day, since April 20. It is a calamity, an economic and environmental
disaster of unprecedented magnitude. No one knows what the impacts will
be on our fragile coastal ecosystems. We are all stunned and afraid -
and most of us had yet to recover from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in
2005. Now we must face an ever-growing disaster with lesser known
negative impacts to our environment, our communities, our livelihoods,
our homes and families.
The fear and uncertainty have had a direct impact on South Coast
Paddling Company's kayak touring business. Within days after the
drilling rig blow-out, we started receiving cancellations of
reservations. Local residents who might use our kayak touring services
are not booking reservations. Visitors are not coming to the Gulf
coast.
We fear that the start-up financing spent over the last year will
not yield the anticipated business over the summer, leaving us with
very little optimism for the future.
We set out with a solid plan to build a business based on a need in
this community. In good faith and with the unqualified approval of our
lender we took out a loan. We made all the right contacts and got more
than adequate media coverage for events held to promote ourselves, the
paddling community, and our city. The early spring bloomed with a
promise of reaping the benefits and sharing our gorgeous waterways with
others. On a day in late April a blowout at the Deepwater Horizon wiped
out all our efforts in a matter of days.
We do not blame ourselves: we blame our government's ineptness at
regulating a polluting and dangerous industry and we blame BP
executives for their greed and disregard for human life and natural
resources.
This month, during the season when we should have been running
trips all week long and banking for the slower winter, we will not be
able to pay our employees, our rent, our bank note. We have applied to
BP's damages and claims department and while they sound helpful, and
the amount of money they have they distributed as of May 31st is $39.4
million to 30, 619 claimants. According to these figures put out by BP
in the Deepwater Horizon Joint Information Center updates each claimant
so far has averaged about $1200.
The early anxiety over how quickly they will get this stopped is
giving way to a deep seated dread of how the disaster on our coast will
affect every living creature here--the very web of existence. As
worried as I am for my business, there is a far greater tragedy
unfolding unseen here. As a human being I have options; I may be
bankrupted, but I can devise a fresh plan and make a new start. My
heart aches for my fellow inhabitants: for the least terns, black
skimmers, dolphins, and turtles. They have no choices, they have been
created to live and feed a certain way. Whether they are oiled or
whether their food sources slowly dwindle, they are helpless to change
their fates.
In closing, there are two intertwined tragedies occurring: the one
that involves the environment and the one to the people who live here.
None of our lives will be the same. BP and fellow companies have been
allowed through government neglect to create a perfect storm of
unprecedented magnitude and small companies like us, the tidal marshes,
and the vast Gulf with its hidden beauties will pay the price.
We are asking that all speed be made to end the current calamity
quickly. We further ask that no efforts be spared in keeping this sort
of disaster from happening to others. For the people of the coast
please exert your influence to insure that we are truly compensated for
our losses. For this place and its non human denizens: pray, and try to
prevent even more harm from occurring.
Sincerely,
Melissa Johnson, Paul Nettles, Cynthia Ramseur, Leah Bray
Owners, South Coast Paddling Company
2335 Government Street, Ocean Springs, MS 39564
228-872-2030 www.southcoastpaddling.com
______
Letter submitted for the record by Capt. Bill Mitchell,
Orange Beach, Alabama
Bill--The Dolphin Cruise Captain
I chose to live in this area 13 years ago because it was wild and
beautiful. I bought waterfront property with the hope of starting a
dolphin and nature cruise business and paying off the loans in 15
years. For seven years I have worked year round many times 12-14 hours
a day to build my dream and be in a position to retire in the beautiful
place I love.
Now the wildlife I take people to see is in danger and the
customers I depend on to pay my bills aren't coming. Even the property
I have may be worth much less or undesirable to live on. What did I do
wrong to deserve this? How do you make me and my dream whole? How many
years will things be worse and how long will BP work to restore what we
have lost?
So far I have received nothing. My boats have not been allowed to
work in the vessels of opportunity program while boats from unaffected
areas of the country have flooded in to work. My claim requests have
been met with requests for volumes of financial information. I have
given BP everything they requested to document my business and its
losses including daily income records for years, tax documents for
city, county, state and federal agencies, vessel information, as well
as very detailed personal information. I have been treated like a
criminal when they are the ones stealing my livelihood. I got my claim
number a month ago and have not seen a penny, only promises of a $5,000
advance? All the people who work for me are suffering but I can't get
any help!
How is BP making me whole as they promised? What has the government
done to make sure we get help? I can't wait for the years of litigation
that are coming. Does anyone hear me? I have a small business on the
beautiful coast of Alabama, will it last?
Capt. Bill Mitchell
Orange Beach, Al
______
Letter submitted for the record by Captain J. Christopher Nelson,
Alabama Kayak Adventures, Inc.
Dear Joanne,
I have lived here on the Gulf Coast for about seven years. I am an
outdoors man and decided to open up a business that would allow me to
spend more time with the salt waters that I had grown to love. I
proceeded to acquire my USCG Captains License. After obtaining that
license, I began to build Alabama Kayak Adventures, Inc. I had a goal
to create a business that would provide people an opportunity to
observe nature, enjoy beautiful scenery, and relax with a slow paced
experience. It also would allow me the pleasure of spending time on the
water and to make a career from the resource that I love. I have worked
closely with you and other experts in our Convention & Visitors Bureau,
as well as with the Mississippi-Alabama Sea Grant organization and many
other well respected groups to learn as much as I can about our eco
system. I even obtained my Coastal Guide Certification.
A little over a month ago, when the Deepwater Horizon incident was
reported, I began to slowly realize that my future on the water may
never happen. After only a few short months in business, there will be
no way for me to provide for my family with a tourism based business.
Baldwin County, Alabama, has a tourism-based economy. There are no
significant quantity of products manufactured here. We make memories in
people's lives, we provide a place: THAT is our product. Today the
state fishing pier was closed at 6:00 pm and a swim advisory was posted
advising against swimming on our beach. This was a result of the recent
oil contamination on our beach. Our community will slowly dwindle. The
sea turtles will not make it to the beach this summer, The tarpon will
not migrate here this July. Heaven help the 11 or 12 summer-resident
manatee that are now migrating from south Florida. The tourists will
not be here for the 4th of July holiday. Why come to a beach community
that has no beach? The snow birds will not come in the winter; after
all, the beach will not be fit for even a midday stroll.
I am not a tree hugger, nor have I ever been opposed to drilling in
our Gulf waters. I have complained just like the next guy about the
price of my fuel at the pump, but never really even considered an
alternative. I only expected that each person working with the
petroleum industry in the Gulf of Mexico treat it as if it were their
own back yard. Apparently that was not the case. Today my community is
in distress. It is unlikely that we will recover from this for many
years. I will not receive a dime from BP, yet they have taken my career
as well as the careers of many of my friends. I have always been a
realist, not a pessimist, but when it came to our beautiful natural
wildlife, I was an optimist. Today I cannot claim that. I have lost
hope. The US Government, BP, and this disaster has taken away my
spirit.
Sincerely,
Captain J. Christopher Nelson
Alabama Kayak Adventures, Inc.
______
Letter submitted for the record by Sherrie Reas,
Skipper ``J'' Dolphin and Nature Cruises
I took the boat today from The Wharf out to Tacky Jacks. I looked
around at the birds fishing in Mobile Bay and I realize what I was
seeing could soon be a thing of the past. If the oil gets in our bays,
the birds I watched today will probably die. The sad part is there is
not much I can do to stop it. Going out and looking at booms everyday
and reporting problems with them is the only thing I can do at this
time. I know that this oil will effect every person in this area in one
way or another and I am saddened at all the hurt it will cause. The
animals can't run and they can't hide and we can't protect them from
this. I am at a loss as is everyone who lives in this area.
My business is suffering now and will continue to suffer until this
mess is cleaned up and all our animals are thriving again. We can't
take people out to see oil, they want to see nature.
Thank you for all your help and concern in all this mess. I will be
thinking of you on the 8th.
Sherrie Reas
Skipper ``J'' Dolphin and Nature Cruises
______
Letter submitted for the record by Homer Singleton,
Volunteer Water Quality Testing
I don't know exactly how feasible the webcam idea is but what
brought it to mind is that dolphins have been seen in weather or beach
cams from time to time. With a little input from the dolphin watch
people choosing strategic locations shouldn't be a problem and with
minimal training a volunteer could screen the footage so that the pro's
only have to screen useful segments. webcams tolerant of our conditions
may be expensive but I suspect they are quite economical compared to
putting salaried people our there to collect the information. The
alternative is where we are now, which is we just don't have the
information.
The issue of adequate labs is a major issue. The specimens I
collected two weeks ago are frozen and stored with specimens from
earlier that week, from the week before and from the month before. I
think a considerable number from earlier in the year or last year have
been sent in but the current ones are sitting in the freezer until the
budget permits.
Part of our understanding of Wolf Bay was being improved through
nutrient studies as part of the phytoplankton monitoring network (read
Harmful Algae Bloom monitoring for the more familiar tag). It's ended
for lack of funds. That's particularly disconcerting since a study
(Auburn University) of the watershed (tributaries) is in progress. The
correlation of data from the two projects would have been far more
helpful that either is alone.
Right now there's an emphasis on computerization and modeling. The
problem is that it is useful only on large scale applications. So when
when we come down to practical applications (Corps of Engineers
permitting for example) the large scale ``data'' is just not useful at
that level. Wolf Bay Watershed is 12 miles by 10 miles.
Some of what was our more valuable assets is the salt marsh about 3
miles long and 3/4 mile deep along the south western bank of the bay.
It used to furnish enough shrimp to support a lively little
recreational shrimping action daily during the season. Now we seldom
see two boats shrimping, let alone the dozens that once did. Why?
Nobody knows because we don't have the data. Volunteer efforts have
tried to make inroads in the void but there just isn't enough support.
A considerable portion of the monitors I've trained don't monitor today
because they can't get the equipment and chemicals necessary. We have
funding available for education, not enough but we have some.
Unfortunately there is virtually no funding for the ``educated'' to do
what needs to be done with the education. There's a huge deficiency in
follow up, follow through or what ever you what to call it. We can
babble on about science interminably, but it's meaningless without
data.
What that means in the face of the looming threat is that we
probably will not be able to quantify the full nature and extent of the
damage and loss. We just don't have the data. But the worse aspect
comes when we try restoration. There are just too many gaps in our
knowledge to be able to put marsh back.
The oil may blow ashore here. If it does we will pay dearly for our
failure to learn what we could have learned. The real crime and
tragedy, however, would occur with the next spill if we do not learn
from this experience so that we institute and fund the study necessary
to know how to respond.
There is the need for precautions and better containment and
recovery at the drill site if we continue to drill. But there is an
equal, if not greater, need to know our shores well enough to care for
them. There have been many spills since drilling began in the Gulf of
Mexico, not so bad as this, but none have been good that I have heard
about. To hope that there won't be another bad one would be like
playing russian roulette, not the smartest thing I ever saw.
By the way, I hope the dolphin watch folks are keeping logs of the
individuals and pods they are sighting. That will be important if our
population is impacted.
Homer Singleton
Volunteer water quality testing
______
Letter submitted for the record by Capt. Kathy Wilkinson,
Eco-Tours of South Mississippi, LLC
Hi, Joanne.
I'm glad they've asked you to testify--I'm sure you'll do a great
job. I think my concerns are the same as everyone's as far as wildlife
goes... There is no way to express the worry I have for the estuary
should the oil penetrate the mouth of the river. It makes me physically
ill to think about the possible effects of the oil.
I began my business, Eco-Tours of South Mississippi, in the spring
of 2006. The business was growing slowly, but steadily over the past
four years. The economic downturn of 2008 was a bump in the road, but
we were enjoying a slight resurgence in the past 6 months. I was
looking at my best spring ever--March was my best March so far, and
April was shaping up to be the best April. That is, until the oil
spill. The first week or so, people were simply sizing up the spill. I
was extremely frustrated by the reaction of both BP and our government.
By the end of the first week and a half of the spill, my phone had all
but stopped ringing. This time of year, we normally receive multiple
phone calls each day that result in quite a few bookings. I'm still
doing some tours, but the volume I was expecting this spring has not
materialized.
So... that's that... I'm worried about the future of the Gulf; the
future of the estuary; the future of my business, and just hope the oil
gusher in the Gulf of Mexico doesn't change life as we know it here on
the coast.
Good luck. Let me know how it goes.
All the best,
Capt. Kathy Wilkinson
ECO-TOURS OF SOUTH MISSISSIPPI, LLC
228-297-8687
www.ecotoursofsouthmississippi.com