[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EXAMINING THE TRAGIC EXPLOSION AT THE KLEEN ENERGY POWER PLANT IN
MIDDLETOWN, CT
=======================================================================
FIELD HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WORKFORCE PROTECTIONS
COMMITTEE ON
EDUCATION AND LABOR
U.S. House of Representatives
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD IN MIDDLETOWN, CT, JUNE 28, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-70
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Education and Labor
Available on the Internet:
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/house/education/index.html
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COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR
GEORGE MILLER, California, Chairman
Dale E. Kildee, Michigan, Vice John Kline, Minnesota,
Chairman Senior Republican Member
Donald M. Payne, New Jersey Thomas E. Petri, Wisconsin
Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon,
Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott, Virginia California
Lynn C. Woolsey, California Peter Hoekstra, Michigan
Ruben Hinojosa, Texas Michael N. Castle, Delaware
Carolyn McCarthy, New York Vernon J. Ehlers, Michigan
John F. Tierney, Massachusetts Judy Biggert, Illinois
Dennis J. Kucinich, Ohio Todd Russell Platts, Pennsylvania
David Wu, Oregon Joe Wilson, South Carolina
Rush D. Holt, New Jersey Cathy McMorris Rodgers, Washington
Susan A. Davis, California Tom Price, Georgia
Raul M. Grijalva, Arizona Rob Bishop, Utah
Timothy H. Bishop, New York Brett Guthrie, Kentucky
Joe Sestak, Pennsylvania Bill Cassidy, Louisiana
David Loebsack, Iowa Tom McClintock, California
Mazie Hirono, Hawaii Duncan Hunter, California
Jason Altmire, Pennsylvania David P. Roe, Tennessee
Phil Hare, Illinois Glenn Thompson, Pennsylvania
Yvette D. Clarke, New York [Vacant]
Joe Courtney, Connecticut
Carol Shea-Porter, New Hampshire
Marcia L. Fudge, Ohio
Jared Polis, Colorado
Paul Tonko, New York
Pedro R. Pierluisi, Puerto Rico
Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan,
Northern Mariana Islands
Dina Titus, Nevada
Judy Chu, California
Mark Zuckerman, Staff Director
Barrett Karr, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WORKFORCE PROTECTIONS
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California, Chairwoman
Carol Shea-Porter, New Hampshire Cathy McMorris Rodgers,
Donald M. Payne, New Jersey Washington,
Raul M. Grijalva, Arizona Ranking Minority Member
Timothy H. Bishop, New York Peter Hoekstra, Michigan
Phil Hare, Illinois Joe Wilson, South Carolina
Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan, Tom Price, Georgia
Northern Mariana Islands
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on June 28, 2010.................................... 1
Statement of Members:
Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Connecticut....................................... 1
Prepared statement of.................................... 4
Additional submission:
Crabb, Carle Ray IV, brother of Ron Crabb, prepared
statement of....................................... 40
DeLauro, Hon. Rosa L., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Connecticut....................................... 5
Prepared statement of.................................... 7
Larson, Hon. John B., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Connecticut....................................... 8
Prepared statement of.................................... 9
Murphy, Hon. Christopher S., a Representative in Congress
from the State of Connecticut.............................. 10
Prepared statement of.................................... 11
Statement of Witnesses:
Badamo, Edward, fire chief, South Fire District.............. 27
Prepared statement of.................................... 29
Bresland, Hon. John S., U.S. Chemical Safety Board........... 13
Prepared statement of.................................... 14
Corbett, Glenn, associate professor and chair, department of
protection management, John Jay College of Criminal Justice 36
Prepared statement of.................................... 38
Giuliano, Hon. Sebastian, Mayor, Middletown, CT.............. 25
Prepared statement of.................................... 26
Nevas, Judge Alan H., Chair, Governor's Kleen Energy Systems
and Explosion Origin and Cause Panel....................... 30
Prepared statement of.................................... 33
Thomas, Jodi M., wife of Ron Crabb........................... 22
Prepared statement of.................................... 23
EXAMINING THE TRAGIC EXPLOSION
AT THE KLEEN ENERGY POWER PLANT
IN MIDDLETOWN, CT
----------
Monday, June 28, 2010
U.S. House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Workforce Protections
Committee on Education and Labor
Washington, DC
----------
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., City
Hall Council Chambers, 245 deKoven Drive, Middletown,
Connecticut, Hon. Joe Courtney [member of the committee]
presiding.
Present: Representative Courtney.
Also Present: Representatives DeLauro, Larson and Murphy.
Staff Present: Lynn Dondis, Labor Counsel, Subcommittee on
Workforce Protections; James Schroll, Junior Legislative
Associate, Labor; Loren Sweatt, Minority Professional Staff
Member.
Mr. Courtney. The proceedings of the Subcommittee on
Workforce Protections will come to order.
For some of the guests who are here today who maybe have
some questions about the proceeding that we're holding this
morning, I'm Congressman Joe Courtney. We're joined here by
other Members who will be introduced in a moment.
I sit on the House Education and Labor Committee which is
the Committee of the House of Representatives which has
cognizance or supervision of laws and regulations concerning
workplace safety. This is a Committee which really beginning on
February 7th has been in constant contact with local officials,
federal officials, Members here in the delegation. They've been
tracking the events here because there are issues involved here
that intersect with the Occupational Health and Safety Act, as
well as other federal regulations which they have been working
on prior to the incident on February 7th and certainly
subsequent.
The purpose of this proceeding is really to hear directly
from the witnesses that have been invited this morning so that
the Committee can learn more about what happened and use that
in its decision making about possible legislation and other
actions which the Committee may take action on.
We had hoped this morning that the Chair of the
Subcommittee, Congresswoman Lynn Woolsey from California, was
going to be in attendance. She had been in constant contact,
particularly with Congresswoman DeLauro about holding this
hearing today by the Subcommittee. Unfortunately, she became
ill over the weekend and was unable to make the flight in from
California to Connecticut. So as someone who sits on the
Committee, she asked me to pinch hit this morning which I'm
certainly happy to do, but obviously we're joined by other
Members of the delegation who have been very deeply involved in
this issue and this incident and they certainly will be part of
the proceedings as far as asking questions to the witnesses
that are here today.
And without objection, all Members will have 14 days to
submit additional materials for the hearing record.
Lynn had prepared a few remarks which again, from the
Committee's standpoint, wanted to sort of set the context here
this morning. And again, on her behalf, I want to thank the
witnesses for being in attendance this morning.
I particularly want to thank Jodi Thomas for being here
today. This is not easy and we are honored that you are here
today. Judge Thomas, the Probate Judge of Colchester does an
outstanding job for the community, and it's going to help all
of us I think better understand about what needs to be done to
protect our workers, generally, and also from this inherently
dangerous gas blow procedure.
I think all the Members here are really interested in
urging OSHA to move forward in terms of learning more about
what actually happened and steps that could be taken to ensure
that it does not happen again.
Six good men were killed as a result of this explosion. At
least 50 others were injured. Our thoughts again are with the
surviving family members. The Dobratz family is also here
today. I want to recognize them and thank them for being in
attendance. Again, they lost Raymond Dobratz, who was an
outstanding member of the community of Old Saybrook,
Connecticut, and again our heart goes out to you and our
thoughts and our prayers are with you.
Again, I want to welcome Congresswoman DeLauro, Congressman
Larson, Chris Murphy, who are all here today.
Again, from Lynn's standpoint, she wanted to set the
context of why the Congress is concerned about what happened in
Middletown, Connecticut. It's important to recognize that this
has been a tragic year for the American worker.
On April 2, a blast at the Tesoro oil refinery in
Anacortes, Washington caused the deaths of seven workers who
were engulfed in a ``firewall.'' In 2010, 47 mine workers in
coal and metal/non-metal mines have been killed at work, higher
than all the mining fatalities in 2009. This includes the 29
miners who were killed on April 5 when a massive explosion
ripped through the Massey Energy's Upper Big Branch mine in
Montcoal, West Virginia.
As early as this week, a number of us on the Committee are
going to be introducing legislation to reform the Mine Safety
and Health Administration to again address obvious gaps in the
law that could have prevented that tragedy from happening.
On April 20, 11 workers were lost and 17 injured following
an explosion on the Deepwater Horizon drilling ship leased by
BP in the Gulf of Mexico. That disaster, obviously, is tragic
for the families of those 11 workers for which our Committee
held a hearing last week. And the spill is so enormous that the
environmental and economic effects will be felt in the Gulf
region for years to come.
These accidents all have a common thread. All of them are
caused by methane or other flammable gases which were allowed
to leak or to build up to dangerous levels and then exploded
because they found ignition sources. Aside from these more
visible accidents, there are thousands of equally tragic deaths
that occur in ones and twos, away from the limelight.
So it's important that we as a nation begin to address the
flaws that may exist within our regulatory and legal structure
and that's the purpose of today's proceeding.
Today, we are examining the blast at Kleen Energy,
specifically the pipe cleaning procedure known as a ``gas
blow'' that caused the explosion. When a natural gas power
plant is built, piping must be installed to connect the
turbines producing the energy with a natural gas pipeline. That
piping must be cleaned to remove any debris that could damage
the turbines. The cleaning is accomplished by forcing an
element, such as natural gas, steam, air, nitrogen, or water,
through the piping at high pressure.
The Chemical Safety Board which is represented here today,
an independent federal agency charged with investigating
industrial chemical accidents, has been investigating the
incident at Kleen Energy. And it has determined that using the
``gas blow'' procedure to accomplish the cleaning is
``inherently dangerous'' because the gas is highly flammable.
Air, steam or nitrogen are much safer and just as effective in
removing the debris.
Despite safer alternatives, the use of natural gas is still
popular.
It is important to note that General Electric, which
supplies most of the turbines to these plants--although not the
one installed at Kleen Energy--is recommending that air blows
and other alternatives to natural gas be used when cleaning the
piping for their own product. That is good because as
unbelievable as this sounds, there is no law, regulation,
standard or code--either in Connecticut or on the federal
level--that directly regulates the ``gas blow'' procedure in
natural gas power plants. This is especially troublesome
because more and more power plants are being built each year.
The Department of Energy projects that 125 natural gas plants
are going to be built over the next 5 years, so this is
obviously a very relevant issue for our nation which is
obviously addressing issues of trying to get to cleaner energy
sources to deal with this procedure.
We need to fix the problem, and the CSB has made urgent
recommendations to OSHA and other organizations, such as the
National Fire Protection Association, which issues voluntary
consensus codes for industry to use to prevent fires and
explosions. We invited NFPA to testify here today, and it
declined. Based on NFPA's recent rejection of even modest
changes to its gas code, it is becoming increasingly doubtful
whether the NFPA will follow CSB's recommendations. If those
that are being asked to act, do not take action, Congress
should move swiftly to protect workers at natural gas power
plants from this dangerous procedure. If we are going to send
workers into harm's way, we need to ensure that they are safe
and healthy at work and return to their families each day.
Again thank you all so much for coming today and I look
forward to your testimony.
Now I would like to recognize the gentlewoman from the 3rd
Congressional District of Connecticut who represents the City
of Middletown who has been there with this issue from February
7th and on, Congresswoman Rosa DeLauro.
[The statement of Mr. Courtney follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joe Courtney, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Connecticut
I want to thank you all for agreeing to testify today about the
tragic explosion in February at the Kleen Energy Power Plant in
Middletown, Connecticut.
Six good men were killed as a result of this explosion, and at
least fifty others were injured.
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is
currently investigating the blast.
So, OSHA is not testifying today because its inquiry has not been
completed.
OSHA officials have informed me that OSHA expects to complete its
investigation later in the summer, and we all look forward to learning
what it has discovered and what actions it intends to take.
Our thoughts are with Ms. Thomas who will be testifying today about
her husband Ron Crabb, and Carle Crabb, Ron Crabb's brother, who I
understand is in the audience today.
The Dobratz family is also here.
They lost Raymond Dobratz in the explosion.
My heart goes out to you and to others who lost loved ones at the
Kleen Energy site in this senseless accident.
I want to welcome my Connecticut colleagues, Representatives
Delauro, Larson and Murphy, all of whom are sitting with me on the dais
today.
We are all making sure we take steps to prevent a similar explosion
in the future.
This has been a tragic year for the American worker.
On April 2, a blast at the Tesoro oil refinery in Anacortes,
Washington caused the deaths of seven workers who were engulfed in a
``firewall.''
So far in 2010, forty-seven miners in coal and metal/non-metal
mines have been killed at work, higher than all the mining fatalities
in 2009.
This includes the twenty-nine miners who were killed on April 5
when a massive explosion ripped through Massey Energy's Upper Big
Branch mine in Montcoal, West Virginia.
As early as this week, we are introducing mine legislation that
will help prevent a disaster of this magnitude from ever happening
again.
On April 20, eleven workers were lost and seventeen injured
following an explosion on the Trans-Ocean Deepwater Horizon drilling
ship leased by BP in the Gulf of Mexico.
That disaster is tragic for the families of those eleven workers,
and the spill is so enormous that the environmental and economic
effects will be felt in the gulf region for years to come.
These accidents have a common thread--all of them were caused by
methane or other flammable gasses, which were allowed to leak or build
up to dangerous levels, and then exploded because they found ignition
sources.
Aside from these more visible accidents, there are thousands of
equally tragic deaths that occur in ones and twos, away from the
limelight.
So we have our hands full.
Today we are examining the blast at Kleen Energy, and specifically
the pipe cleaning procedure, known as a ``gas blow'' that caused the
explosion.
When a natural gas power plant is built, piping must be installed
to connect the turbines producing the energy with a natural gas
pipeline.
The piping must be cleaned to remove any debris that could damage
the turbines.
The cleaning is accomplished by forcing an element, such as natural
gas, steam, air, nitrogen or water through the piping at a high
pressure.
The Chemical Safety Board, an independent federal agency charged
with investigating industrial chemical accidents, and represented here
today, has been investigating the incident at Kleen Energy.
It has determined that using the ``gas blow'' procedure to
accomplish the cleaning is ``inherently dangerous'' because the gas is
highly flammable.
Air, steam or nitrogen are much safer and just as effective in
removing the debris.
Despite safer alternatives, the use of natural gas is still
popular.
Let me note that General Electric, which supplies most of the
turbines to these plants--although not the one installed at Kleen
Energy--is recommending that air blows and other alternatives to
natural gas be used when cleaning the piping.
That is good because as unbelievable as this sounds, there is no
law, regulation, standard or code--either in Connecticut or on the
federal level--that directly regulates the ``gas blow'' procedure in
natural gas power plants.
This is especially troublesome because more and more power plants
are being built each year.
We need to fix the problem, and the CSB has made urgent
recommendations to OSHA and other organizations, such as the National
Fire Protection Association (NFPA), which issues voluntary consensus
codes for industry to use to prevent fires and explosions.
We invited NFPA to testify here today, and it declined.
Based on NFPA's recent rejection of even modest changes to its gas
code, it is becoming increasingly doubtful whether the NFPA will follow
CSB's recommendations.
If those that are being asked to act, do not take action, Congress
should move swiftly to protect workers at natural gas power plants from
this dangerous procedure.
If we are going to send workers into harm's way, we need to ensure
that they are safe and healthy at work and return to their families
each day.
Again thank you all so much for coming today and I look forward to
your testimony.
______
Ms. DeLauro. Thank you very much, Congressman Courtney. I'm
delighted to be here this morning and if I might just take a
second and recognize a couple of folks who are here, people
that we've worked with over these last several months. State
Representative Joe Serra is here; our former State Senator,
Billy Ciotto; John Olsen, head of the Connecticut AFL-CIO;
State Representative Linda Orange from Colchester; and
Councilman Bauer. This has been a collaborative effort of
federal, state, and local officials to try to determine what
happened and how we try to move forward.
I would also like to thank today's distinguished panel.
Mayor Giuliano, thank you. Fire Chief Edward Badamo; the
Honorable John Bresland, a former Chair of the U.S. Chemical
Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, a Member; and also here
to welcome the new Chair of the CSB, Rafael Moure-Eraso; and
also a new Member, Mark Griffin, who was here and they were
confirmed by the Senate last Thursday. We also have Professor
Glenn Corbett of the Department of Protection Management, and
John Jay College of Criminal Justice; the Honorable Alan Nevas,
Chair of the Governor's Panel into the Kleen Energy explosion;
and Jodi Thomas, whose husband, Ron Crabb, perished in this
terrible explosion.
Thank you for contributing today. We thank you for your
broader efforts in the wake of this tragedy. I know local
leaders such as Mayor Giuliano and Chief Badamo, as well as
representatives from Kleen Energy Systems, have all been
working very hard over the past few months to figure out
exactly what happened last February. I thank you for your
diligence. I stood with the Mayor and with the Chief on the
night of February 7th and if nothing but the quick reaction,
the concerned reaction for the loss of life and for trying to
secure the facility, it was apparent that our local responders
knew what they were doing and were carrying out their task
effectively.
I would also like to say a thank you to my colleagues,
Chairman George Miller and Chairwoman Lynn Woolsey. We are
obviously all concerned that Lynn is not well, but we thank
them for agreeing to hold this field hearing of the Workforce
Protections Subcommittee here in Middletown; and to Congressmen
Courtney, who sits on the Committee; and to my colleague, John
Larson. John Larson and I share the responsibility for
representing Middletown in the United States House of
Representatives. I'm delighted to be joined by Congressman
Murphy as well this morning.
From Day One, the Subcommittee has been tremendously
responsive and we thank them for their support.
To everyone here in the Middletown community, coming
together, you have risen to help the families of those who
perished in the tragic Kleen explosion last February. It is
your compassion and your strength and you truly rose to the
occasion and you make us all proud.
We are here today to examine the causes and the
circumstances surrounding that awful explosion, which as you
know, claimed the lives of six men: Ronald Crabb, Peter
Chepulis, Raymond Dobratz, Kenneth Haskell, Christopher
Walters, and Roy Rushton, and injured over 50 workers at the
Kleen Energy plant. It's worth repeating the names over and
over again, lest we forget who they are, what they did, and
that their families have to survive.
But our task today is not simply one of historical inquiry.
To do right by the men who perished in this accident and their
colleagues, we must take this incident as an impetus for
action. We know this natural gas explosion was not the first of
its kind. In 2003, a Fairfield, California plant ``gas blow''
procedure gone wrong caused significant property damage,
shattering windows a quarter of a mile away. And a 2009 plant
explosion in Garner, North Carolina resulted in 3 deaths and 71
injuries. But if we act this time, if we act this time, we can
help ensure the Middletown explosion is one of the last of its
kind.
Particularly with 125 more natural gas power plants
commissioned to be built over the next five years, it behooves
us to explore exactly what went wrong here in Middletown and
take the necessary steps to see it does not happen again. I
know the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the
Chemical Safety Board and the Governor's panel have been
thoroughly investigating this accident with regulatory action
in mind, and we look forward to hearing and reviewing their
recommendations and we are prepared to act as Members of
Congress.
The fact is we have much to do in the realm of worker
safety across the board. An average of 15 workers per day die
from work-related incidents, and another 8 to 12 million
workers suffer work-related injuries on an annual basis. No
doubt there are steps we can take to mitigate these dismal
numbers. For example, Chairwoman Woolsey has introduced the
``Protecting America's Workers Act,'' which grants stronger
enforcement capacity to the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, OSHA, and which I and my colleagues are proud
to co-sponsor.
We can make sure that regulations exist to protect our
working men and women in dangerous jobs and prevent future
tragedies such as this. To take just one example, at the
moment, natural gas is the only fuel gas not regulated by OSHA,
even though its consumption exceeds any other gas fuel. To take
another, the CSB has determined that the ``gas blow'' procedure
is inherently dangerous and should be discontinued in favor of
safer alternatives, but as the Governor's Commission also
pointed out in their findings, there is no law, standard, or
code on the books to regulate or prohibit this procedure. These
seem like exactly the sort of lapses in regulatory oversight
that can and should be rectified.
No one wants to see any more lives lost. And we all agree
that we should do everything in our power to protect our
workers. That is why we are here today, to listen, to glean
everything we can and to move forward. I thank the panel for
being here today, and I look forward to hearing their
testimony. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Ms. DeLauro follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Rosa L. DeLauro, a Representative in
Congress From the State of Connecticut
Thank you and good morning.
Let me begin thanking today's distinguished panel--Mayor Giuliano,
Fire Chief Edward Badamo; the Honorable John Bresland, Chair of the
U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, Professor Glenn
Corbett of the Department of Protection Management at John Jay College
of Criminal Justice, the Honorable Alan Nevas, Chair of the Governor's
Panel into the Kleen Energy explosion, and Jodi Thomas, whose husband
Ron Crabb perished in this terrible explosion.
Thank you for contributing today, and for your broader efforts in
the wake of this tragedy. I know local leaders such as Mayor Giuliano
and Chief Badamo, as well as representatives from Kleen Energy Systems,
have all been working very hard over the past few months to figure out
exactly what happened last February. I thank you for your diligence.
Thanks also to my colleagues Chairman George Miller and Chairwoman
Lyn Woolsey for agreeing to hold this field hearing of the Workforce
Protections Subcommittee here in Middletown, and to Congressmen Joe
Courtney, Chris Murphy, and John Larson for being here today. From Day
One, the subcommittee has been tremendously responsive and I thank them
for their support.
And, of course, thank you to everyone here in the Middletown
community who have come together and risen to help the families of
those who perished in the tragic Kleen explosion last February. In your
compassion and your strength, you have done all of Connecticut proud.
We are here today to examine the causes and circumstances
surrounding the awful explosion of February 7, which, as you know,
claimed the lives of six men--Ronald Crabb, Peter Chepulis, Raymond
Dobratz, Kenneth Haskell, Christopher Walters, and Roy Rushton--and
injured over 50 workers at the Kleen Energy plant.
But our task today is not simply one of historical inquiry. To do
right by the men who perished in this accident and their colleagues, we
must take this incident as an impetus for action. We know this natural
gas explosion was not the first of its kind. In 2003, a Fairfield,
California plant ``gas blow'' procedure gone-wrong caused significant
property damage, shattering windows a quarter of a mile away, and a
2009 plant explosion in Garner, North Carolina resulted in three deaths
and 71 injuries. But if we act this time, we can help ensure the
Middletown explosion is one of the last of its kind.
Particularly with 125 more natural gas power plants commissioned to
be built over the next five years, it behooves us to explore exactly
what went wrong here in Middletown and take the necessary steps to see
it does not happen again. I know the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, the Chemical Safety Board and the Governor's panel have
been thoroughly investigating this accident with regulatory action in
mind, and I look forward to hearing and reviewing their
recommendations.
The fact is we have much to do in the realm of worker safety across
the board--an average of fifteen workers per day die from work related
incidents, and another 8 to 12 million workers suffer work-related
injuries on an annual basis. No doubt there are steps we can take to
mitigate these dismal numbers. For example, the Chairwoman has
introduced a ``Protecting America's Workers Act,'' which grants
stronger enforcement capacity to the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, and which I am glad to co-sponsor.
And we can make sure that regulations exist to protect our working
men and women in dangerous jobs and prevent future tragedies such as
this. To take just one example: At the moment, natural gas is the only
fuel gas not regulated by OSHA, even though its consumption exceeds any
other gas fuel.
To take another: The CSB has determined that the ``gas blow''
procedure is inherently dangerous and should be discontinued in favor
of safer alternatives, but, as the Governor's Commission also pointed
out in their findings, there is no law, standard, or code on the books
to regulate or prohibit this procedure. These seem like exactly the
sort of lapses in regulatory oversight that can and should be
rectified.
Nobody wants to see any more lives lost. And we all agree that we
should do everything in our power to protect our workers. That is why
we are here today, to listen, to glean everything we can and to move
forward. I thank the panel for being here today, and I look forward to
hearing their testimony. Thank you.
______
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Rosa. Now I'd like to recognize
the Member from the 1st District who also represents a portion
of Middletowners with us here today, Congressman John Larson.
Mr. Larson. Thank you very much, Joe, and I thank the
Committee for putting this very important hearing together.
Thank you, Joe, for being here to chair and oversee this
meeting and this testimony that will be critical to legislation
as we put it forward.
Connecticut is a very small delegation, but I'm honored to
be here with four of the five Members of the United States
Congress as we listen to this testimony here this morning. I'm
honored to be joined by Joe Courtney, Chris Murphy, and
certainly by the dean of our delegation and someone as Joe
rightly pointed out, who has been on top of this issue from the
moment it happened. I'm honored as well, as she mentioned Joe
Serra, and Billy Ciotto who works in my office who has been our
point person here in Middletown. And although we represent a
small portion of Middletown, let me say that what happened here
in Middletown touched everyone across the State of Connecticut.
And I dare say across this country.
As you listened to what Joe Courtney had to say about what
is befalling working men and women all across this great nation
of ours, you understand the need and importance of hearings
like this. But Mayor Giuliano and Chief Badamo, let me say
especially to the community of Middletown, with the great
dignity and empathy and the outpouring of compassion and the
incredible memorials that soon ensued demonstrated just what
kind of community Middletown is. And frankly, I think the whole
community stands taller and prouder because of the kind of
compassion.
And to have Jodi here today, your courage, your valor, your
ability to come here and testify, I'm sure how painful this
must be in remembering Ron, just how vital this testimony is to
not only Members of Congress, to people all across this nation.
You heard Joe and Rosa both outline what we've learned in
the aftermath, where fundamental problems and gaps in
regulation that directly led to this disaster. But we look
forward to your testimony which we believe will reveal that no
agency was tasked with regulating the gas blow. And that
procedure has been determined to be the cause of the explosion.
In addition, as was earlier enumerated by my colleagues,
there are no specific codes or regulations that would have
applied to the process of cleaning natural gas piping at the
Kleen Energy Power Plant. Even more concerning, as Rosa pointed
out, similar explosions have occurred across the country in
California, she indicated, in North Carolina as well. Despite
these repeated occurrences there has not been a clear solution
established to address these safety gaps once and for all.
While we await the findings of the OSHA investigation that
is scheduled to be completed by the end of July, it is clear
that urgent action needs to be taken. The Chemical Safety Board
has made recommendations for additional regulatory action by
OSHA, a change in the National Fuel Gas Code, and further
legislative action by the State of Connecticut. I look forward
to working with the Committee, and my colleagues from the
Connecticut delegation, and the regulatory agencies to make
sure that this type of disaster never occurs again.
While we can never undo the tragic events of February, we
can honor the memory of the fallen by guaranteeing that we have
the regulations and standards in place to ensure that every
worker across this country is protected.
I want to thank as well, Professor Corbett, Judge Nevas,
John Bresland also for joining us here today, and also
recognize the fact that the family of Raymond Dobratz is here
as well. Thank you for your testimony and we appreciate your
service to your country.
[The statement of Mr. Larson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John B. Larson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Connecticut
I would first like to thank the Education and Labor Workforce
Protections Subcommittee for holding this proceeding and my colleagues
from the Congressional delegation for being in attendance.
The tragedy that occurred here in Middletown, CT was felt across
the nation. However, the hardest hit, were those families who lost
their loved ones on that terrible day in February. I want to especially
acknowledge the courage of Jodi Thomas for being here today to testify.
Your act of bravery in being here to not only talk about your wonderful
husband, Ron, but to discuss ways to prevent this type of accident from
ever occurring again is truly remarkable and admirable. I also
understand that the family of Raymond Dobratz is in attendance. I would
like to express my deepest condolences to you and my appreciation for
your courage to be here for this important hearing. To all of the
victims and families who were either killed or injured in the
explosion, I offer my sincere regrets and sympathy.
I would also like to thank the other members of the panel from
Connecticut for being here, including Chief Badamo, Mayor Giuliano, and
Judge Nevas, as well as John Bresland from the Chemical Safety Board
and Dr. Glenn Corbett.
In the aftermath of all that took place we learned that there were
fundamental problems and gaps in regulation that directly led to this
disaster. As the testimony from our witnesses will reveal, no agency
was tasked with regulating the ``gas blow'' procedure that has been
determined to be the cause of the explosion. In addition, there are no
specific codes or regulations that would have applied to the process of
cleaning natural gas piping at the Kleen Energy Power Plant. Even more
concerning is that similar explosions have occurred across the country
in the past several years, including in North Carolina in 2009. Despite
these repeated occurrences there has not been a clear solution
established to address these safety gaps once and for all.
While we await the findings of the OSHA investigation that is
scheduled to be completed by the end of July, it is clear that urgent
action needs to be taken. The Chemical Safety Board has made
recommendations for additional regulatory action by OSHA, a change in
the National Fuel Gas Code, and further legislative action by the State
of Connecticut. I look forward to working with the subcommittee, my
colleagues from the Connecticut delegation, and the regulatory agencies
to make sure that this type of disaster never occurs again.
While we can never undo the tragic events of February, we can honor
the memory of the fallen by guaranteeing that we have the regulations
and standards in place to ensure that every worker is protected. I look
forward to hearing the testimony and recommendations made here today
and thank you all once again for attending today's critically important
hearing.
______
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, John.
And Chris Murphy from the 5th District who is a Member of
the Energy and Commerce Committee is also with us this morning.
Chris?
Mr. Murphy. Thank you very much, Representative Courtney
and thank you to Chairman Woolsey, although we're sorry she
can't be here. We certainly appreciate the opportunity to have
this Committee come to Connecticut in order to glean on the
ground facts that we know are necessary for action moving
forward. My thanks as well to Representative DeLauro and John
Larson, who both from the minute this happened were on the
ground, starting the process that we stand here continuing
today to figure out what went wrong, what we can learn from it
and how we can change the law to make sure that it doesn't
happen again. To the Panel, especially to Ms. Thomas for
joining us here today, I look forward to your testimony.
Between the events of this past February and the explosion
at the facility in North Carolina of last summer, it's clear
that we do not have an adequate safety system in place for
handling industrial natural gas lines. The Chemical Safety
Board's report provides exhaustive evidence to the fact that
despite clear and documented safety risks, gas blows remain the
most prevalent method to purge gas lines.
Beyond the decision to use gas itself in the blow down,
it's also clear that successive purges that took place at the
Middletown site on February used an excessive level of gas and
did not adequately vent it once released. In examining these
facts, one of the many questions before us becomes clear. Is
natural gas an appropriate substance to employ when it comes to
clearing debris from piping systems? And beyond the individual
codes and the regulations in need of revision, something that
we will talk much about today and the days following, it's
important that we ensure that the overall safety of natural gas
power plants going forward meets the highest of standards.
Gas power plants are nothing new here in the Northeast
where they shoulder the majority of our generation needs along
with nuclear power. However, as we work to enact national
energy policies to lower greenhouse gas emissions, natural gas
plants will likely begin to emerge in significantly greater
numbers than they are even today throughout the country.
Furthermore, newly discovered recoverable domestic gas reserves
will also make long-term investment in gas resources more
attractive, and further drive the expansion of gas generation
facilities. Gas will remain a vital part of our energy mix, and
we owe it to ourselves, to the country, and to those that are
working in the construction field related to gas development,
to ensure the gas plants meet the highest safety standards.
Accidents like those here in Middletown should mark the
beginning of a renewed commitment to safety rather than just an
initial indicator of a deeply troubling trend.
I think I can speak for all of us here today when I say
that our thoughts and prayers are with you, Ms. Thomas, with
the families of those killed, including Peter Chepulis, a
constituent of the 5th Congressional District.
As Congressman Courtney noted, there is overlapping
jurisdiction on the path forward. I serve as a Member of the
Energy and Commerce Committee which has jurisdiction, in part,
over the Chemical Safety Board and I look forward to the
testimony today. I look forward to the joint collaborative work
that the Energy and Commerce Committee and the Education and
Labor Committee are going to put forward to take the lessons
learned from this tragedy to make sure that we push forward a
new way to regulate industrial gas lines. I thank
Representative Courtney of the Committee and our Panel for
being here today.
[The statement of Mr. Murphy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher S. Murphy, a Representative in
Congress From the State of Connecticut
I'd like to thank Chairwoman Woolsey and Ranking Member Rodgers for
bringing this Committee here to Middletown to investigate this tragic
accident. I also appreciate the willingness on behalf of our panel here
today to work with us to further this effort. We have a great deal of
work to do before we can ensure that incidents like these never befall
another community.
Between the events of this past February and the explosion at the
ConAgra SlimJim facility in North Carolina of last summer, it's clear
that we must have an adequate safety system in place for handling
industrial natural gas lines. The Chemical Safety Board's report
provides exhaustive evidence to the fact that, despite clear and
documented safety risks, gas blows remain the most prevalent method to
purge gas lines.
Beyond the decision to use gas itself in the blowdown, it's also
clear that the successive purges that took place at the Middletown site
on February 7 used an excessive level of gas and did not adequately
vent it once released. In examining these facts, one of the many
questions before us becomes clear--is natural gas an appropriate
substance to employ when it comes to clearing debris from piping
systems?
Beyond the individual codes and regulations in need of revision,
it's important that we ensure the overall safety of natural-gas power
plants going forward. Gas-fired plants are nothing new here in the
Northeast, where they shoulder the majority of our generation needs,
along with nuclear power.
However, as we work to enact national energy policies to lower
greenhouse gas emissions, natural gas plants will likely begin to
emerge in significantly greater numbers throughout the country.
Furthermore, our newly-discovered recoverable domestic gas reserves
will also make long-term investment in gas resources more attractive,
and further fuel expansion of gas generation facilities. Gas will
remain a vital part of our energy mix for years to come, and we owe it
to ourselves and our communities to ensure that gas plants meet the
highest safety standards. Accidents like those here in Middletown
should mark the beginning of a renewed commitment to safety, rather
than an initial indicator of a deeply troubling trend.
I think I can speak for all of us here today when I say that our
thoughts and prayers remain with Ms. Thomas and the families of those
killed in the Kleen Energy disaster. Their lives will never again be
made whole, and we owe them our diligence and hard work in today's
proceedings. I appreciate the opportunity to appear with the
subcommittee today, and look forward to the witnesses' testimony.
______
Mr. Courtney. Great. Thank you, Chris. Again, just for the
record, today I'm joined on the dais here with staff from the
Education and Labor Committee, both minority staff and majority
staff. There's a full record and transcript that's being made
of the proceedings and any exhibits that are being submitted or
written testimony, of course, will be made part of the record.
And again, we're taking this back to Washington again for
Congresswoman Woolsey's Committee to deliberate on.
Now I'd like to introduce our distinguished panel of
witnesses with us here today. Our first witness will be John
Bresland who is the Board Member of the U.S. Chemical Safety
Board and until yesterday was its Chairman and CEO. He has
served as chair since 2008 and has been on the Board since
2002. Mr. Bresland graduated in chemistry from Londonderry
Technical College, Northern Ireland, and from Suffolk
University in England. He is a Member of the American Institute
of Chemical Engineers, the American Chemical Society, and a
Fellow of the Royal Society of Chemistry.
Ms. Jodi Thomas who will be testifying second, serves as a
full-time Probate Judge for Colchester and Lebanon. Prior to
becoming a Judge, she worked as an attorney, a law clerk to the
Superior Court Judges for the State Judicial Branch, in a task
force clerked for the General Assembly's Energy and Technology
Committee. She received her undergraduate degree from Sacred
Heart University and a law degree from Quinnipiac University
School of Law.
She will be followed by Mayor Sebastian Giuliano, the Mayor
of Middletown, Connecticut, a position he has held since 2005.
Prior to becoming Mayor, he worked as an attorney at Giuliano
and Scalora, a law firm from 2001 to '05. He received his J.D.
from Catholic University and his B.A. from Boston College.
Mr. Edward Badamo is the Fire Chief of the South Fire
District and has served in this role since March 2008. He was
the Incident Commander for the Kleen Energy Incident and
oversaw response and recovery operations for 28 days at the
Kleen Energy site. Prior to becoming the Fire Chief, he was the
Deputy Chief of Operations and a Training Officer for the South
Fire District, dating back to January 2005. He holds a
Bachelor's degree in Public Safety Administration from Charter
Oak College, several fire and rescue certifications, and
certificates, and is a licensed paramedic.
The Honorable Alan Nevas, a distinguished witness here
today, was the Chair of the Kleen Energy Systems and Explosion
Origin and Cause Panel. He was appointed to this position by
Connecticut's Governor, Jodi Rell. Judge Nevas served with
distinction on the U.S. District Court for the District of
Connecticut for over 20 years. He served in the State
Legislature and has a distinguished career in the Connecticut
bar. He serves now as an arbitrator and mediator at Levitt
Rockwood, PC. He graduated with a B.A. from Syracuse University
and received his law degree from NYU.
Mr. Glenn Corbett is an Associate Professor and Chair of
the Department of Protection Management at John Jay College of
Criminal Justice. He currently serves on the Fire Code Advisory
Council for New Jersey and is a former member of the Federal
Advisory Committee of the National Construction Safety Team.
Professor Corbett is the technical editor and columnist for
Fire Engineering Magazine. He received his master's in
Engineering from Wooster Polytech and a B.A. from John Jay
College of Criminal Justice.
Just welcome to all of the witnesses and just again by way
of explanation, those little panel--those light panels, if
you've never testified at one of these hearings, let me explain
the lighting system and the five-minute rule. Everyone,
including Members, is limited to five minutes of presentation
or questioning. The green light is illuminated when you begin
to speak. When you see the yellow light, it means you have one
minute remaining, and when you see the red light it means your
time has expired and you need to conclude your testimony. I'll
be pretty generous in terms of that point, but in any case,
that's what the system is and then there will be questions
following. We'll go right down the line in terms of the
testimony here.
And Mr. Bresland, welcome to the Committee.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN BRESLAND, BOARD MEMBER,
U.S. CHEMICAL SAFETY AND HAZARD INVESTIGATION BOARD
Mr. Bresland. Good morning Congressman Courtney,
Congresswoman DeLauro, Congressman Larson, and Congressman
Murphy. I am John Bresland, board member of the U.S. Chemical
Safety Board.
My statement today is on my own behalf and does not
necessarily reflect the views of the other four board members.
Last week I stepped down as a board chair to make way for
President Obama's new appointment, Dr. Rafael Moure-Eraso, who
is sitting behind me today. All of us welcome Dr. Moure and we
look forward to his leadership over the next five years.
The Chemical Safety Board, or CSB, is an independent, non-
regulatory federal agency that investigates major industrial
accidents involving hazardous materials. Most recently we've
been called in to investigate the causes of the explosion and
fire of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico.
For the past four and a half months, the CSB has conducted
an intensive investigation of the root causes of the accident
at the Kleen Energy Power Plant here in Middletown. This
accident occurred during the procedure called a gas blow used
to clean natural gas piping. During this procedure, a huge
volume of high-pressured natural gas was vented directly to the
atmosphere. I must say as an aside, someone who has worked in
industry for many years, I wasn't aware that there was such a
procedure and I was quite shocked to realize there actually is
a procedure like this.
The CSB team has interviewed more than 90 witnesses,
gathered large numbers of documents, and painstakingly examined
the site and key pieces of evidence. We have also exhaustively
reviewed applicable federal and state regulations, and other
codes and standards. The CSB has uncovered what we believe is a
significant gap in these standards, a gap that threatens the
continued safety of workers at facilities that handle flammable
natural gas.
The tragedy that took six lives and injured many others at
Kleen Energy was not the first explosion involving natural gas
that the CSB has investigated. On June 9, 2009, a destructive
gas-purging accident occurred at the ConAgra Slim Jim meat
processing facility in Garner, North Carolina. These deadly
accidents in Connecticut and North Carolina were preventable.
Gas company records show that some two million standard cubic
feet of natural gas were released to the atmosphere during the
gas blows of Kleen Energy on the morning of February 7th. That,
by the way, is enough to fuel a typical American home every day
for 25 years.
You can get an idea of just how much flammable gas is
released in the gas blow from the photograph on the easel taken
a week before the explosion at Kleen Energy. I'm looking at the
photograph on my right here. You can just see how much gas and
debris was being ejected into the atmosphere.
On the morning of the accident, no safety meeting was held
among the workers involved in the gas blows and many personnel
who were not essential to the gas blows remained on site. At
approximately 11:15 a.m., the gas found one of the numerous
available ignition sources and exploded. Through extensive
research, our team discovered that since 2001, at least two
other fires and explosions have occurred at gas power plants
during gas blows. One of these explosions at a Calpine power
plant in 2003 is pictured on the easel, the one with the flame.
But alternatives to using natural gas are readily
available. They include blowing with air, nitrogen, or steam,
or using a cleaning device called a pig, which can be pushed
through the piping using air. Many companies already use these
alternative techniques, yet we find that natural gas blows
remain the most popular single pipe cleaning method and they're
still going on despite our previous announcement about the
hazards.
In our review of federal standards, safety codes, and
industry guidance, we find nothing that specifically prohibits
natural gas blows or mandates the use of available, inherently
safer techniques. Indeed, we found a series of exemptions
governing the natural gas in our industry.
The CSB has a solution. At our CSB public meeting tonight
in Portland, I intend to vote for and support new urgent safety
recommendations that we have developed, calling for OSHA to
enact new regulations to control this hazard and I will
encourage the other board members to do the same.
The new regulations would prohibit the use of natural gas
for pipe cleaning and they would require the participation of
workers and contractors in developing safe gas handling
procedures. We consider these recommendations urgent, in part
because some 125 new gas-fired power plants are planned for
completion in the next five years including a number here in
Connecticut and I believe that number we will hear tonight is
between six and eight here in Connecticut.
If the Board approves the recommendations this evening, we
plan to conclude the CSB investigation of the explosions at
Kleen Energy and ConAgra in the strong belief that we've
identified the principal root causes of these disasters. We
will focus our future energies on advocating the swiftest
possible adoption of our recommendation by OSHA, the National
Fire Protection Association, and other recipients.
I thank you again for convening today's hearing and I thank
you and the entire Connecticut congressional delegations for
your unwavering support of CSB's investigation and our work to
improve industrial safety and I will be happy to answer any
questions that you may have.
[The statement of John Bresland follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John S. Bresland, U.S. Chemical Safety Board
Good morning Chairman Woolsey and distinguished members of
Congress. I am John Bresland, board member of the U.S. Chemical Safety
Board. Thank you for convening this important field hearing of the
House Education and Labor Committee and for inviting me to appear
before you.
My statement today is on my own behalf and does not necessarily
reflect the views of the other board members. This week we are
welcoming two new members to the Chemical Safety Board: Dr. Rafael
Moure-Eraso, who will serve as the new chair, and Mr. Mark Griffon. Dr.
Moure and Mr. Griffon were confirmed by the Senate just last Wednesday
evening.
The Chemical Safety Board or CSB is an independent, non-regulatory
federal agency that investigates major industrial accidents involving
hazardous substances. We were established in 1998 and have investigated
approximately 70 industrial fires, explosions and toxic gas releases
across the country. These include the West Pharmaceutical explosion of
2003, the BP Texas City refinery explosion of 2005, and the Imperial
Sugar explosion of 2008. Most recently, we have been called in to
investigate the causes of the explosion and fire at the Deepwater
Horizon oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico.
For the past four-and-a-half months, the CSB has conducted an
intensive investigation of the root causes of the February 7, 2010,
accident at the Kleen Energy power plant under construction here in
Middletown. That investigation began less than 24 hours after the
explosion and has involved a large number of our personnel.
I myself observed portions of the site on the Tuesday immediately
following the explosion (Figure 1). It was a scene of devastation and
of tragedy. For us, it was one of the most challenging investigations
we have ever conducted.
Our team has interviewed more than 90 witnesses, has gathered large
numbers of documents from all the parties involved, and has
painstakingly examined the site and key pieces of evidence. We have
also conducted an exhaustive review of applicable federal and state
regulations, codes, and standards governing the gas power industry and
the work activities underway on the morning of the explosion.
CSB Investigation of Kleen Energy Explosion Reveals Significant Gap in
Current Standards
Madam Chairman, the CSB team has uncovered what we believe is a
significant gap in these standards--a gap that threatens the continued
safety of workers at facilities that handle flammable natural gas.
CSB investigators have determined that no specific federal
workplace safety standards prohibit intentional, planned releases of
natural gas into workplaces, as occurred here on February 7. We also
determined that there are safe, feasible, economical alternatives to
the unsafe gas-handling practices that caused this accident.
The tragedy that took six lives and injured at least 50 others at
Kleen Energy was not the first explosion involving natural gas that the
CSB has investigated. On June 9, 2009, a similarly destructive accident
occurred at the ConAgra Slim Jim meat processing plant in Garner, North
Carolina (Figure 2). That explosion during what is known as ``gas
purging'' of a process pipe killed four workers and injured 67 others.
It substantially destroyed the facility, leading to a permanent
shutdown that cost more than 600 jobs in the region.
A mere three days before the accident at Kleen Energy, on February
4, the CSB held a public meeting in North Carolina to present our
preliminary findings on the ConAgra explosion and to issue urgent
safety recommendations for changes to the National Fuel Gas Code to
prevent the unsafe indoor venting of gas during purging operations.
At the hearing, accident victims spoke to the Board--none more
poignantly than Debra Pettiway, who worked for ConAgra and whose only
son, 33-year-old Lewis Watson, also worked at the Slim Jim plant and
was killed in the explosion, leaving behind a wife and child. Ms.
Pettiway implored the Board, ``For the people that did die, please
don't let them die for nothing.'' Ms. Pettiway's plea has, I believe,
inspired our continuing work to promote the safer handling of fuel
gases--the work that we plan to complete here today in Middletown.
Madam Chairman, I am here to testify that these deadly accidents in
Connecticut and North Carolina were preventable. There are readily
available alternative practices that will completely eliminate the
hazard. It is my earnest hope that standards will be put in place that
will require these safer practices in the future.
Natural Gas Blow Released Huge Volume of Flammable Gas at Kleen
The explosion at Kleen Energy occurred during what has been termed
a ``natural gas blow.'' This was a procedure to clean out debris from
large, newly constructed natural gas piping that provided fuel to the
plant's large electricity-generating gas turbines.
The cleaning of natural gas piping is a necessary activity when
putting new piping into service at gas power plants, because even small
debris particles can cause damage to the turbines, which are very large
and costly. The turbine manufacturers--including companies like Siemens
and General Electric--require cleaning of the piping as a condition of
the warranty on the turbines.
Although contractors involved in constructing the Kleen Energy
plant had considered using high-pressure air to clean out the piping,
it was eventually decided to use high-pressure natural gas for this
purpose. Using natural gas, we determined, has generally been done as a
matter of custom and convenience at new power generation facilities,
since an abundant supply of high-pressure natural gas is readily
available from nearby gas pipelines that are already connected into
these plants.
Gas blows of this kind can result in vast releases of natural gas
to the atmosphere. Figure 3 shows a gas blow conducted at Kleen Energy
about a week prior to the accident; a geyser-like plume of gas and
debris towers over the large plant.
Over a four-hour period on the morning of February 7, workers were
conducting a series of 15 planned gas blows involving different
sections of piping within the plant. The gas was supplied at a high
pressure of approximately 650 pounds per square inch gauge (psig).
This gas was vented directly to the atmosphere, without being
captured or combusted. The venting occurred through large, horizontal,
open pipe ends that were less than 20 feet off the ground and were
located in congested areas adjacent to the power generation building.
Our investigators obtained gas company records that show that some
two million standard cubic feet of natural gas were released to the
atmosphere during these gas blows on February 7. To put that into some
perspective, that is more than two billion BTUs worth of gas--enough to
fuel a typical American home every day for more than 25 years.
During the final ten minutes prior to the blast, approximately
400,000 cubic feet of gas were released. That is enough gas to fill a
pro basketball arena with an explosive fuel-air mixture.
Workers Were Not Adequately Involved in Safety Planning
No safety meeting was held that morning among the workers involved
in the gas blows. About 150 workers were present at the site. Although
workers were evacuated from the area south of the power generation
building, there was no effort to evacuate nonessential personnel from
the building itself; however, a few workers evacuated themselves due to
concern about the odor from the gas that was being released.
While efforts were made to eliminate or control ignition sources
outside the building, some ignition sources were difficult or
impossible to eliminate. In addition there were abundant ignition
sources that remained inside, including electrical devices and welding
equipment. We view that the formation of a flammable gas cloud was the
fundamental hazard, and thus determining a specific ignition source has
not been a major focus of our investigation.
At approximately 11:15 a.m. the gas found one of the numerous
available ignition sources and exploded.
Two Previous Fires or Explosions Occurred During Natural Gas Blows at
Power Plants
CSB investigators discovered that this was not the only explosion
that has occurred during a natural gas blow at a power plant. In
October 2001, a fire occurred during a natural gas blow at a First
Energy power plant in Ohio. Flames reportedly shot 30-40 feet in the
air following a sudden, unexpected ignition of the gas. In that case,
operators were able to shut off the supply of gas within a period of
seconds, before injuries or serious damage occurred.
The next occurrence was even more serious. On January 26, 2003, a
similar explosion occurred at the Calpine Wolfskill Energy Center in
Fairfield, California. This blast, which was actually photographed as
it began (Figure 4), also happened during a gas blow to clean piping,
using high-pressure (630 psig) natural gas.
The explosion was powerful enough to be heard 10 miles away.
However, workers were 80 to 140 feet away from the location of the vent
and were spared injury. Investigators from Calpine noted that one of
the causes of the accident was that available alternative cleaning
methods such as compressed air were not being used.
Perhaps because these previous accidents did not cause severe
injuries or damage, they were not widely publicized or acted upon by
the gas power industry, which has continued to use natural gas for pipe
cleaning.
Natural Gas Blows Remain Common, Despite Safer Alternatives
Following the explosion at Kleen Energy, we enlisted the help of an
industry organization called the Combined Cycle Users' Group to conduct
a survey of gas power companies concerning their pipe cleaning
practices. The survey confirmed that there are a number of alternatives
to using natural gas blows for cleaning debris from pipes.
These alternatives include blowing with air, nitrogen, or steam, or
using a cleaning device known as a ``pig'' which can be pushed through
the piping. Although no method is completely free of any risks, using
compressed air, for example, completely eliminates the catastrophic
fire and explosion hazard associated with using natural gas. Other
methods, such as using a cleaning pig with compressed air as the motive
force, also eliminate the fire hazard.
These methods are practical and affordable and work as well if not
better than natural gas. Many companies use these alternative
techniques. Despite the availability of these alternative methods, we
were disturbed to find that natural gas blows remain the most popular
single technique, practiced by 37% of respondents in our survey. We
even learned of several natural gas blows that were performed after the
CSB's announcement at a news conference on February 25th that these
operations were inherently unsafe and should be avoided.
General industry safety guidelines dating back for several decades
emphasize the importance of eliminating process hazards to the greatest
degree possible, rather than trying to control the hazards of
inherently dangerous activities. This approach, often termed ``inherent
safety,'' recognizes that despite the best of intentions, efforts at
controlling serious hazards are ultimately prone to failure over time.
In the safety hierarchy, permanent elimination of a hazard is always
preferable whenever it is possible to do so.
While not every natural gas blow leads to an explosion or to
injuries, the activity is inherently dangerous and difficult to conduct
in a way that reliably results in safe dispersion of the gas before it
contacts an ignition source. In fact, there are even indications that
natural gas blows can self-ignite due to static electricity or impact
sparks from metal debris.
Madam Chairman, the hazard of natural gas releases into workplaces
is one that can and should be eliminated.
Current Regulations and Guidance Allow Natural Gas Blows
CSB investigators examined numerous standards, codes, and guidance
from the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers (ASME), the Electric Power Research Institute
(EPRI), and the State of Connecticut. Yet we found nothing that
specifically prohibits natural gas blows or mandates the use of
feasible alternatives.
What we did find in our investigation was a series of exemptions
governing the natural gas power industry. For example, we found that
the National Fuel Gas Code (NFPA 54), which has been adopted by at
least 35 states across the U.S., has a specific exemption for power
plants and for piping above a pressure of 125 psig. We found that other
NFPA documents that provide guidance for power plants, including NFPA
37 and NFPA 850, are silent on the issue of gas blows.
In addition we were told that industry representatives have
resisted the development of NFPA or other consensus codes that would
contain potential mandatory safety requirements for the power industry.
NFPA 850, a document focused on fire protection in the electric power
industry, has thus been designated a ``recommended practice'' rather
than a code and it remains completely voluntary in all jurisdictions.
Urgent Safety Improvements Are Warranted
Madam Chairman, I would submit to you that the present patchwork of
inadequate codes and voluntary practices does not protect America's
workers from the kind of explosions that killed six at Kleen Energy,
killed four at ConAgra, and threatened many others with death or
injury.
That's why today, at our CSB public meeting later this evening, I
intend to vote for and support new urgent safety recommendations
calling for OSHA to enact new regulations to control this hazard, and I
will encourage the other Board members to do the same.
The two accidents at Kleen Energy and ConAgra--and many others over
the years--underscore the fact that OSHA currently has no regulatory
standard for the safe handling of natural gas. In contrast, OSHA has
specific regulatory standards for other flammable gases, including the
liquefied petroleum gases propane and butane as well as acetylene and
hydrogen.
Data gathered by our investigators demonstrate, however, that
natural gas is far more widely used than the other common flammable
gases. For example, natural gas use exceeds that of propane by a factor
of 15 (Figure 5). Propane use is specifically regulated by OSHA;
natural gas is not.
I will not seek to catalogue here all the accidents that have
resulted from unsafe natural gas releases in industrial workplaces--
they are both serious and numerous. Our draft urgent recommendations
mention some of the most severe examples, including the catastrophic
coal dust explosion that was ignited by an inadvertent gas release
during the purging of a natural gas line at the Ford River Rouge power
plant in Dearborn, Michigan, in 1999. That single accident killed six
workers, injured dozens of others, and caused an estimated one billion
dollars in property losses.
Other jurisdictions have gone further than federal OSHA. In
California, state construction regulations prohibit work in an
atmosphere where flammable gas exceeds 20% of the lower explosive limit
(LEL). Similar regulations prohibit any work activity in an atmosphere
above 20% of the LEL in a majority of Canadian provinces.
OSHA Should Develop Safety Standards for Natural Gas
The draft urgent recommendations that the CSB will consider tonight
would call upon OSHA to enact new gas safety regulations that will:
Prohibit the use of natural gas for pipe cleaning, the
cause of the explosion at Kleen Energy
Prohibit the venting or purging of fuel gas indoors, the
cause of the explosion at ConAgra
Prohibit any work activity where the flammable gas
concentration exceeds a fixed, low percentage of the lower explosive
limit
Require that companies involve their workers and
contractors in developing safe procedures and training for handling
fuel gas
I believe OSHA should proceed with developing these regulations as
quickly as possible, as a matter of considerable urgency. In the
electrical generating sector alone, there are some 125 new gas-fired
power plants planned for completion between 2010 and 2015 (Figure 6).
These plants not only represent a major financial investment, but
unless steps are taken to prevent unsafe gas blows, many workers may be
placed in harm's way over the next five years.
Additional draft urgent recommendations will seek safety
improvements from the NFPA, the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers, the Electric Power Research Institute, the major gas turbine
manufacturers, and the State of Connecticut and other states.
All these recommendations remain ``draft'' until they are voted on
and approved by the full Board. I ask consent to have the 12 draft
recommendations--together with more than 60 findings of fact that
support the recommendations, included in the record of this morning's
hearing.
If the Board approves the recommendations this evening, our
intention is to conclude the CSB investigations of the explosions at
Kleen Energy and ConAgra. We believe that the 12 urgent recommendations
proposed today--together with the two urgent recommendations we issued
on February 4--address all of the principal root causes of these two
tragic accidents. If adopted by the recipients, I have no doubt that
future accidents will be avoided and lives will be saved as a result.
We need to put an end to the unsafe and potentially deadly practice
of venting huge volumes of natural gas in the vicinity of workers and
ignition sources. The CSB's draft recommendations represent a
comprehensive, multi-layered strategy for doing just that.
Let me add, Madam Chairman, that we had an encouraging meeting just
over a week ago with the OSHA Assistant Secretary, Dr. David Michaels,
and his deputies to discuss the proposed recommendations. I know that
Dr. Michaels and the other dedicated leaders and staff of OSHA are just
as concerned about these recent fuel gas accidents as we are.
I hope that as you proceed with your work on this issue, you will
consider providing OSHA with whatever specific fiscal resources,
personnel, or statutory tools it may need to proceed quickly with the
new recommended standards.
I thank you again, Madam Chair, for convening today's hearing and I
thank you and the entire Connecticut Congressional delegation for your
unwavering support of the CSB's investigation and our work to improve
worker safety. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
______
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Bresland.
Ms. Thomas?
STATEMENT OF JODI M. THOMAS, WIFE OF RON CRABB, A PIPEFITTER
WHO DIED IN THE KLEEN ENERGY EXPLOSION
Ms. Thomas. Good morning. My name is Jodi Thomas. I'm a
little under the weather. My voice is breaking up. I apologize.
My husband, Ron Crabb, was killed in the Kleen Energy explosion
on February 7, 2010. He was 42 years old. I thank you for the
invitation to speak and tell you about this wonderful man.
Ron was a man who lived and loved life every day. He loved
his family with his whole heart. He inspired a loyalty in
friends that I have seldom seen in my lifetime. He brought joy
and laughter to so many people, even strangers. He was a very
special person, the kind you only meet once or twice in a
lifetime, if you are lucky. When he saw that something needed
change, he tried to help fix it. When he saw that someone
needed a hand, he gave it. He gave of himself freely and with
joy.
He also gave his time to the community, the union and the
people of the State of Connecticut in numerous elected and
appointed positions. For this, he was honored with the
Connecticut Secretary of State's Public Service Award in 2003.
Ron was very proud of his trade and he believed strongly in
the principles of unionism. He was a talented, skilled
tradesman who worked hard and conducted himself ethically and
with integrity. He believed that everyone should have a voice
and believed in focusing on unity and common ground.
Job-site and worker safety were also very important to Ron
and I can recall several specific examples of Ron reporting
violations or sending his men home until a safety issue, like
exposure to asbestos, was fixed.
Ron had been working 40 hours per week at the Kleen Energy
plant since September of 2009, when he was hired by IST,
Instrument Sciences and Technologies, to perform the
instrumentation and control work at the plant. In late January
2010, IST asked Ron to be the General Foreman for
instrumentation and he was given authority to hire a crew. He
then began working seven 12-hour days and had been doing so for
only about a week or two before the explosion.
Ron and I talked about his job at Kleen Energy at least a
little bit every night. I know that he felt challenged by the
work and wanted to do a good job, not just because of his work
ethic, but also to help his trade possibly secure more work in
this specialty area. Ron had, in fact, been offered another job
twice during the time he worked at Kleen Energy, but turned it
down. Instead, he decided to stay and honor his commitment to
see instrumentation through.
I hope to be able to give a sense of how this devastating
tragedy has affected our lives. Ron left behind two sons: my
stepson, Tyler, age 18, and our six-year-old little boy, Dylan.
Ron adored his sons. By everyone's account, he was an
extraordinary father. Every day when we heard Ron's footsteps
come up the porch, Dylan would jump up and scream ``Daddy's
home!'' The dog would jump up and run to the door and a smile
would come across my face. Our home lit up with joy when Ron
came home from work each day.
Dylan is too young to grasp the full magnitude of this
devastating loss and how it will impact him in the future. But,
what he does know is that his daddy went to work one day and
never came home. He also knows that daddy died in an explosion.
Because of this, the security of his world has been shattered.
He worries about something bad happening to me when he is not
with me. The most heartbreaking thing, though, is that this
beautiful little boy will be deprived of his father's love,
guidance and companionship for the rest of his life.
As for me, this loss, and my grief, are so big that I can
hardly find the words to express them. I can best describe it
as profound heartache. Ron, to me, was an angel here on earth.
I thanked God every night for nineteen years for bringing Ron
to me. And I was so proud of him, who he was as a man, a
husband, a father, a tradesman, a public servant, loyal,
ethical, loving, intelligent, funny, strong. But most of all, I
just loved him with all my heart. Nineteen years may seem like
a long time, but it was not enough.
The manner and cause of Ron's death have only compounded
our family's grief. This tragedy should never, ever have
happened. It was preventable. This is why I urge you, please,
do not allow Ron's death to be in vain. Real change, real
protection for hardworking Americans, must come out of this. It
is the only way to truly honor him and the other men who lost
their lives, whose families are forever broken. Together with
the other tragedies that occurred this year, and the world of
heartache and loss that have resulted, the lessons here could
not be any more apparent or urgent. Failing to make good come
from this would be the biggest tragedy of all.
My family and I support, wholeheartedly, the enactment of
H.R. 2067, the Protecting America's Worker Act. We are grateful
to the many co-sponsors of this bill, including Representative
Courtney and all of the Connecticut Congressional delegation.
Responsible parties must be held accountable, including civilly
and criminally, where appropriate. OSHA and other relevant
agencies must be given the tools and means to make that happen.
We also believe that safety whistleblowers should be afforded
greater protections and that victims' families should be
allowed greater access in investigations. We very strongly
support passing legislation making it illegal to offer or give
financial incentives or bonuses for early completion of certain
projects like power plants. Finally, we absolutely believe that
new power plants should not be exempt from regulation.
Thank you so very much for this opportunity to speak and
for your work on these critical and urgent issues.
[The statement of Jodi Thomas follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jodi M. Thomas, Wife of Ron Crabb
My name is Jodi Thomas and my husband, Ron Crabb, was killed in the
Kleen Energy explosion on February 7, 2010. He was 42 years old. I
thank you for the invitation to speak and tell you about this wonderful
man.
Ron was a man who lived and loved life every day. He loved his
family with his whole heart. He inspired a loyalty in friends that I
have seldom seen in my lifetime. He brought joy and laughter to so many
people, even strangers. I have boxes full of cards and letters from
people telling us how Ron touched their lives and what a good man he
was. Everyone just loved him, from the time he was a little boy. He was
a very special person--the kind you only meet once or twice in a
lifetime, if you are lucky. When he saw that something needed change,
he tried to help fix it. When he saw that someone needed a hand, he
gave it. He gave of himself freely and with joy.
He also gave his time to the community, the union and the people of
the State of Connecticut. He had just completed a six-year term on the
Town of Colchester Board of Finance and served on the Colchester
Democratic Town Committee. He was the immediate Past-President of the
Connecticut Plumbers & Pipefitters Union, Local 777. Prior to that
post, Ron served as Recording Secretary for the Local and as a member
of its Executive Board. Ron also served for six years on the
Connecticut Department of Consumer Protection's Licensing Board for
Heating, Piping, Cooling and Sheet Metal Work, having been appointed
and re-appointed by two consecutive Governors. He was honored with the
Connecticut Secretary of State's Public Service Award in 2003.
Ron was very proud of his trade and believed strongly in the
principles of unionism. He was a talented, skilled tradesman who worked
hard and conducted himself ethically and with integrity. He believed
that everyone should have a voice and believed in focusing on unity and
common ground. I have personally heard countless stories of Ron
diffusing tension on various jobs or working parties through
jurisdictional and other disagreements. Jobsite and worker safety were
also very important to Ron and I recall several specific examples of
Ron reporting violations and/or sending his men home until a safety
issue, such as exposure to asbestos, was fixed.
Ron had been working 40 hours per week at the Kleen Energy plant
since September 2009, when he was hired by IST to perform the
instrumentation and control work at the plant. This is a specific area
within the trade for which Ron had obtained specialty certification. He
had done instrumentation and control work at many power plants over the
years, when those jobs were available and in between regular
pipefitting jobs. About 4 or 5 months after starting at Kleen Energy,
in late January 2010, IST asked Ron to be the General Foreman for
instrumentation and he was given authority to hire a crew. He then
began working seven 12-hour days and had been doing so for only about a
week or two before the explosion.
Ron and I talked about his job at Kleen Energy at least a little
bit every night. I know that he felt challenged by the work and wanted
to do a good job, not just because of his work ethic, but also to help
his trade possibly secure more work in this specialty. Ron had, in
fact, been offered another job twice during the time he was at the
Kleen Energy plant, but turned it down. Instead, he decided to stay and
honor his commitment to see the instrumentation through.
I hope to be able to give a sense of how has this devastating
tragedy has affected our lives. Ron left behind two sons: my step-son,
Tyler, age 18, and our our six-year-old little boy, Dylan. Ron adored
his sons. By everyone's account, he was an extraordinary father. Every
one of my son's friends (and their parents) thought he was the greatest
dad in the world--and he was. He took Dylan (and often his friends)
everywhere--enjoying all that nature can offer and especially fishing,
hiking and sports. And no matter how hard Ron had worked on a given
day, he always had time to wrestle and play with Dylan. Every day when
we heard Ron's footsteps come up the porch, Dylan would jump up and
scream ``Daddy's home!'' The dog would jump up and run to the door and
a smile would come across my face. Our home lit up with joy when Ron
came home from work each day.
Dylan is too young to grasp the full magnitude of this devastating
loss and how it will impact him in the future. But what he does know is
that his daddy went to work one day and never came home. He also knows
that daddy died in an explosion. Because of this, the security of his
world has been shattered. He worries about something bad happening to
me when he is not with me. The most heartbreaking thing, though, is
that this beautiful little boy will be deprived of father's love,
guidance and companionship for the rest of his life.
As for me, this loss, and my grief, are so big that I can hardly
find the words to express them. I can best describe it as profound
heartache. Ron, to me, was an angel here on earth. My angel and my soul
mate. We were in love from the moment that we met and always knew that
we were meant to be together. I thanked God every night for nineteen
years for bringing Ron to me. And I was so proud of him--who he was as
a man, a husband, a father, a tradesman, a public servant--loyal,
ethical, loving, intelligent, funny, strong. But most of all, I just
loved him with all my heart. Nineteen years may seem like a long time,
but it was not enough.
The manner and cause of Ron's death have only compounded our
family's grief. This tragedy should never, ever have happened. It was
preventable. This is why I urge you, please, do not allow Ron's death
to be in vain. Real change, real protection for hardworking Americans,
must come out of this. It is the only way to truly honor him and the
other men who lost their lives, whose families are forever broken.
Together with the other tragedies that occurred this year, and the
world of heartache and loss that have resulted, the lessons here could
not be any more apparent or urgent. Failing to make good come from this
would be the biggest tragedy of all.
My family and I support, wholeheartedly, the enactment of H.R.
2067, the Protecting America's Worker Act (``PAWA''). We are grateful
to the many, many co-sponsors of this bill, including Representative
Courtney and all of the Connecticut Congressional delegation.
Responsible parties must be held accountable, including civilly and
criminally, where appropriate. OSHA and other relevant agencies must be
given the tools and means to make that happen. We also believe that
safety whistleblowers should be afforded greater protections and that
victims' families should be allowed greater access in investigations.
We very strongly support passing legislation making it illegal to
offer or give financial incentives or bonuses for early completion of
certain projects like power plants. Finally, we absolutely believe that
new power plants should not be exempt from regulation.
Thank you so very much for this opportunity to speak and for your
work on these critical and urgent issues.
______
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Jodi, for the courage to be here
today and to deliver those remarks. As someone who had the
opportunity to observe Ron's involvement in the community and
his involvement with his family, every word that you said is
true and more. I really appreciate you taking the time and
having the strength of character to be here today.
Major Giuliano.
STATEMENT OF HON. SEBASTIAN GIULIANO,
MAYOR OF MIDDLETOWN
Mr. Giuliano. Thank you for the opportunity to address you
today. I am Mayor Sebastian Giuliano of Middletown,
Connecticut. While I am not in any position to discuss what was
happening at the Kleen Energy Plant immediately prior to the
explosion, I can discuss our response in the aftermath. I have
some brief remarks, the text of which I will place into the
record, and then I will be happy to take questions, if Members
of the Subcommittee would like to ask any.
All Middletown emergency responders were advised of the
incident within minutes and immediately went into action.
Likewise, emergency responders from neighboring communities all
were on site amazingly quickly. Command posts were established
and NIMS protocols were instituted. NIMS for those who might
not be aware or familiar with the acronym is National Incident
Management System. Firefighters were on site to put out the
fire and to rescue any victims. Police secured the site and,
along with the Fire Marshals and after all rescue operations
were completed, searched for and gathered any evidence of the
cause and origin of the blast.
The rapid response and the speed with which resources were
organized and allocated were due in great part to the training
in emergency preparedness that we undergo. That training is
provided for and funded, in significant part, by Congress.
Without this type of training, this situation undoubtedly would
have been even more disastrous.
While prevention is always the best and wisest investment,
the nature of the response to an incident can make the
difference between minimization of harm and having a situation
spiral out of control. I am extremely proud of the manner in
which our emergency responders handled this tragedy. They
reacted as professionally and competently as they did because
they take advantage of every opportunity to train. While we had
not trained for this specific incident, our normal scenario is
more likely to be a natural disaster such as a hurricane, flood
or blizzard, the principles are the same and everybody adapted
quickly to the situation.
I would urge that funding for emergency response training
for local responders be retained, if not increased. As some of
our nation's largest disasters, both natural and manmade, have
demonstrated, the most effective response is local response.
More importantly, in most disaster scenarios, state or federal
help may be days or weeks away and local responders will likely
be ``on their own'', at least during the initial stages of an
event. Being well trained to identify available resources and
how to summon and deploy them, will make the difference in our
ability to get through those first few hours or days while
waiting for state or federal assistance to arrive, or to
determine whether such assistance will be needed at all.
I believe that we in Middletown approached this tragedy
with the correct priorities. On February 7, our focus was to
bring the event under control, secure the site and search for
and rescue victims first, then to recover and remove the
remains of those who lost their lives. Once we had accomplished
those objectives, the activities changed over to investigation.
Whether search and rescue or investigation however, all
appropriate steps were taken throughout the process to ensure
that the site was as safe as possible for those who had to
enter.
Justice requires that, for the sake of the dead and
injured, we determine what led to this tragic loss of life and
health. To best ensure that evidence would be preserved, the
Middletown Police, under the supervision of the State's
Attorney for the Middlesex Judicial District, procured a
warrant from a Judge of the Superior Court and secured the site
as a ``crime scene'' for approximately three weeks thereafter.
During that time, police, along with the South Fire District
and the State Fire Marshal, recovered, seized, and secured
important physical evidence, now undergoing evaluation and
testing. It is our hope that everything we have done will help
in the search for answers to the questions that everyone has
been asking since February: ``How did this happen?'' and ``How
can we prevent it from happening to someone else?'' If such
questions can be answered, then those who lost their lives will
rest more peacefully knowing that their fellow workers will be
safer in the future.
I again thank you for taking the time and effort to convene
this panel and I offer my welcome to all of you to Middletown.
[The statement of Sebastian Giuliano follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Sebastian Giuliano, Mayor, Middletown, CT
Thank you for the opportunity to address you today. I am Mayor
Sebastian Giuliano of Middletown, Connecticut. While I am not in any
position to discuss what was happening at the Kleen Energy Plant
immediately prior to the explosion, I can discuss our response in the
aftermath. I have some brief remarks, the text of which I will place
into the record, and then I will be happy to take questions, if members
of the Subcommittee would like to ask any.
All Middletown emergency responders were advised of the incident
within minutes and immediately went into action. Likewise, emergency
responders from neighboring communities all were on site amazingly
quickly. Command posts were established and NIMS protocols were
instituted. Firefighters were on site to put out the fire and to rescue
any victims; Police secured the site and, along with the Fire Marshals
and after all rescue operations were completed, searched for and
gathered any evidence of the cause and origin of the blast.
The rapid response and the speed with which resources were
organized and allocated were due in great part to the training in
emergency preparedness that we undergo. That training is provided for
and funded, in significant part, by Congress. Without this type of
training, this situation undoubtedly would have been even more
disastrous.
While prevention is always the best and wisest investment, the
nature of the response to an incident can make the difference between
minimization of harm and having a situation spiral out of control. I am
extremely proud of the manner in which our emergency responders handled
this tragedy. They reacted as professionally and competently as they
did because they take advantage of every opportunity to train. While we
had not trained for this specific incident--our normal scenario is more
likely to be a natural disaster such as a hurricane, flood or
blizzard--the principles are the same and everybody adapted quickly to
the situation.
I would urge that funding for emergency response training for local
responders be retained, if not increased. As some of our nation's
largest disasters--both natural and manmade--have demonstrated, the
most effective response is local response. More importantly, in most
disaster scenarios, state or federal help may be days or weeks away and
local responders will likely be ``on their own'', at least during the
initial stages of an event. Being well trained to identify available
resources and how to summon and deploy them, will make the difference
in our ability to get through those first few hours or days while
waiting for state or federal assistance to arrive, or to determine
whether such assistance will be needed at all.
I believe that we in Middletown approached this tragedy with the
correct priorities. On February 7, our focus was to bring the event
under control, secure the site and search for and rescue victims first,
then to recover and remove the remains of those who lost their lives.
Once we had accomplished those objectives, the activities changed over
to investigation. Whether search and rescue or investigation however,
all appropriate steps were taken throughout the process to insure that
the site was as safe as possible for those who had to enter.
Justice requires that, for the sake of the dead and injured, we
determine what led to this tragic loss of life and health. To best
insure that evidence would be preserved, the Middletown Police, under
the supervision of the State's Attorney for the Middlesex Judicial
District, procured a warrant from a Judge of the Superior Court and
secured the site as a ``crime scene'' for approximately three weeks
thereafter. During that time, police, along with the South Fire
District and the State Fire Marshal, recovered, seized and secured
important physical evidence, now undergoing evaluation and testing. It
is our hope that everything we have done will help in the search for
answers to the questions that everyone has been asking since February:
``How did this happen?'' and ``How can we prevent it from happening to
someone else?'' If such questions can be answered, then those who lost
their lives will rest more peacefully knowing that their fellow workers
will be safer in the future.
______
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Mayor.
Chief Badamo.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD BADAMO, FIRE CHIEF,
SOUTH FIRE DISTRICT
Mr. Badamo. Members of the Committee, thank you for your
commitment to workplace and worker safety by holding this
hearing. I am Edward Badamo, Fire Chief for the South Fire
District, and I will testify in my role and the role of the
District in the Kleen Energy incident. The Kleen Energy power
plant is not the first plant to be located within the South
Fire District, NRG is actually located right down the street.
However, this is the first to be fed primarily by natural gas
fed through the Algonquin Pipeline.
Prior to the date of the explosion, the plant construction
from our perspective was moving forward without any fire code
concerns. Although we were involved in the building and
inspection process, through plan review and site visits, we
held no regulatory authority over the gas blow procedure. The
only issue that we dealt with during the construction was early
on due to the blasting because this plant is being built on a
Feldspar Rock quarry and there was localized damage done to
some homes.
The role of the South Fire District on the day of the blast
sounds relatively simple, but was complicated due to the
processes that existed on the site. I will be brief, but our
initial efforts were to rescue the injured workers. While the
firefighters were performing their primary searches, the
command post was attempting to ascertain from the various
trades an accountability of who was on site and if they knew
they were accounted for, where they were so we could direct
crews to that area. This was extremely difficult and took
nearly a day and a half before we were able to confidently say
that everyone was accounted for. During this time we attempted
to control the power and ensure that the gas to the building
was secured. We also had a fire in the rear of the building
that was also being controlled.
Between the on-site work and the coverage for the remainder
of the city, the incident required the efforts of 18 fire
departments, 8 ambulance services, 6 police departments, 6
Emergency Management Agencies, 16 Community Emergency Response
Teams, the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, and several
other supporting agencies.
There were a lot of resources utilized that day from a
fire-rescue perspective that were made possible through the
various grant funding projects. None of these roles or
functions would have been easily completed without you
supporting these grants. The sustainment of the grant programs
referenced in my full testimony as well as the assistance to
fire fighters' program in the future is critical, especially to
small fire departments like ours with limited local resources.
Over the 21 days that the fire department spent on the site
for safety, we were confronted with new challenges on a daily
basis. From the development of procedures for the evacuation of
the remaining pressurized gas in the pipe, to the removal of
gas cylinders, to the falling debris hampering the
investigations, to the coordination of all of the various
agencies involved, every day was a learning experience.
The gas blows themselves are not regulated by the fire
department and according to NFPA 54, power plants are exempted
from the regulation. NFPA 54 also only regulates piping up to
125 psi. The day of the blast they were using over 600 psi.
While we were advised of the schedule of the blows and our fire
marshal was explained the safety process out of courtesy, we
made no operational changes for them. The day of the explosion
was actually the second day of gas blows. They did some the
weekend prior, and several on that day prior to the explosion.
Since the investigation is ongoing, I am not going to make
reference to specific gas-related procedures that should be
followed for the future. However, I would recommend that the
process involve a regulatory authority in one form or another,
whether it is as simple as a requirement that the company
submit its safety form to an agency for review and then the
procedures are reviewed by a third party. That process can
obviously be expanded to include pre-blow inspections and have
an on-site component during the blows. But more importantly and
regardless of the changes made to any of the regulations, the
safety of workers on these types of sites needs to be ensured.
I feel that the Governor's Commission led by Judge Nevas has
made some excellent recommendations that will work towards
ensuring worker safety at least here in Connecticut.
I would also ask that the Committee investigate and include
any changes made that large multi-trade sites become required
to utilize some type of credentialing and accountability system
for anyone working or visiting the site. This would have made
our on scene rescue efforts much easier, rather than working
through a day and a half of interviews and searching before
everyone was accounted for.
Finally, I would ask that the legislators not only continue
to support grant funds for emergency services, but that you
look into establishing a fund to help support the local
agencies that are affected by incidents such as this. In this
case, we were able to successfully seek restitution from the
company, but if we were not able to or were not successful,
this would have greatly reduced the department's funds and
ability to operate.
Although the families and workers that were killed or
injured during this disaster are never really going to recover
from the events of February 7th, it is important to determine
the cause of the blast and come up with solutions so a tragedy
such as this never happens again.
Again thank you for your efforts.
[The statement of Edward Badamo follows:]
Prepared Statement of Edward Badamo, Fire Chief, South Fire District
Members of the Committee: Thank you for your commitment to
workplace and worker safety by holding this hearing. I am Edward
Badamo, Fire Chief for the South Fire District and I will testify my
role and the role of the District in the Kleen energy incident. The
Kleen Energy plant is not the first power plant to be located within
the South Fire District, NRG is actually located right down the street.
However, this is the first to be fed primarily by natural gas fed
through the Algonquin Pipeline. Although NRG has a gas feed, it does
not run its turbines by Natural Gas.
Prior to the date of the explosion, the plant construction from our
perspective was moving forward without any fire code concerns. Although
we were involved in the building and inspection process, through plan
review and site visits, we held no regulatory authority over the gas
blow procedure. The only issue that we dealt with during the
construction was early on due to the blasting because this plant is
being built on a Feldspar Rock quarry and there was localized damage
done to some homes.
The role of the South Fire District on the day of the blast sounds
relatively simple, but was complicated due to the processes that
existed on the site. I will be brief, but our initial efforts were to
rescue the injured workers. While the firefighters were performing
their primary searches, the command post was attempting to ascertain
from the various trades an accountability of who was on site and if
they were not accounted for, where they were so we could direct crews
to that area. This was extremely difficult and took nearly a day and a
half before we were able to confidently say that everyone was accounted
for. During this time we attempted to control the power and ensure that
the gas to the building was secured. We also had a fire in the rear of
the building that was also being controlled. Between the on-site work
and the coverage for the remainder of the city, the incident required
the efforts of 18 fire departments, 8 ambulance services, 6 police
departments, 6 Emergency Management Agencies, 16 Community Emergency
Response Teams, the American Red Cross, the Salvation army, and several
other supporting agencies.
There were a lot of resources utilized that day from a fire-rescue
perspective that were made possible through the various grant funding
projects. The Connecticut Urban Search and Rescue Team which is not
federally recognized was called to the scene and the local
decontamination unit was also sent, both of these are funded through
Homeland security funds. There were interoperable communications
brought to the site which were funded through the Public Safety
Interoperability Communications grant. Our local Emergency Management
Director, the Community Emergency Response teams, and the Incident
management teams have never operated at a duration incident of this
length, complexity or magnitude. These are funded through the Emergency
Management Performance Grant. None of these roles or functions would
have been easily completed without you supporting these grants. The
sustainment of these programs as well as the Assistance to Firefighters
Grant program in the future is critical especially to a small fire
department like ours with limited local resources.
Over the twenty eight days that the fire department spent on the
site for safety, we were confronted with new challenges on a daily
basis. From the development of procedures for the evacuation of the
remaining pressurized gas in the pipe, to the removal of damaged gas
cylinders, to the falling debris hampering the investigations, to the
coordination of all of the various agencies involved, every day was a
learning experience.
The gas blows themselves are not regulated by the fire department
and according to NFPA 54, power plants are exempted from the
regulation. NFPA 54 also only regulates piping up to 125 psi. The day
of the blast they were using over 600 psi. Connecticut adopted NFPA 54
into its Connecticut State Fire Safety Code. While we were advised of
the schedule of the blows and our fire marshal was explained the safety
process out of courtesy, we made no operational changes for them. The
day of the explosion was actually the second day of gas blows. They did
some the weekend prior, and several on that day prior to the explosion.
Since the investigation is ongoing, I am not going to make
reference to specific gas related procedures that should be followed
for the future. I would recommend that the process involve a regulatory
authority in one form or another. Whether it is as simple as a
requirement that the company submit its safety form to an agency for
review and then the procedures are reviewed by a third party. That
process can obviously be expanded to include pre-blow inspections and
have an on-site component during the blows. But more importantly and
regardless of the changes made to any of the regulations, the safety of
workers on these types of sites needs to be ensured. I feel that the
Governors Commission led by Judge Nevas has made some excellent
recommendations that will work towards ensuring worker safety.
I would also ask that the committee investigate and include in any
changes made that large multi-trade sites become required to utilize
some type of credentialing and accountability system for anyone working
or visiting the site. This would have made our on scene rescue efforts
much easier, rather than working through a day and a half of interviews
and searching before accounting for everyone.
Finally, I would ask that the legislators not only continue to
support grant funds for emergency services, but that you look into
establishing a fund to help support the local agencies that are
affected by incidents such as this. In this case we were able to
successfully seek restitution from the company, but if we were not able
to or were not successful, this would have greatly reduced the
department's funds and ability to operate.
Although the families and workers that were killed or injured
during this disaster are never really going to recover from the events
of February 7th, it is important to determine the cause of the blast
and come up with solutions so a tragedy such as this never happens
again.
Again thank you for your efforts.
______
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Chief.
Judge Nevas.
STATEMENT OF HON. ALAN NEVAS, CHAIR, GOVERNOR'S KLEEN ENERGY
SYSTEMS AND EXPLOSION ORIGIN AND CAUSE PANEL
Mr. Nevas. Good morning. This is a role reversal. I
generally am used to imposing time limitations on the people
speaking to me, rather than having the time limitations imposed
on me. However, I left that life a year ago.
I'm not going to repeat many of the things that have been
said this morning, but I do want to add some comments of my
own. First, there was reference, I think, in Ms. Thomas'
remarks to the fact that this was done so it would be quicker.
While it's not contained in our report, it was my understanding
that there was a May 31st deadline and that if the construction
company met that deadline, there was to be a completion bonus.
I think that's something that should be explored. It has not
been discussed a great deal, but certainly something that the
Committee should be looking at.
Also, many of the recommendations that I'll summarize in a
few minutes and that have been made this morning are valid,
good, and will be very beneficial, but they will take time for
Congress to act, for the Connecticut General Assembly. So the
recommendations that we're making, as I'll indicate are
recommendations that I think can be implemented much more
quickly by the Siting Council and I'll go into that very
shortly.
The Commission that I chaired was charged with determining
the origin and cause of the explosion which took the lives of
six men and injured more than 30 other people and our goal was
to provide information necessary for a second Commission to be
chaired by Mr. James Thomas, the so-called Thomas Commission,
to carry out a separate assignment and that is to recommend
specific legislative or regulatory changes.
Our work was affected, of course, by the fact that the site
was designated a crime scene by the Middletown State's
Attorney's Office and that investigation is still ongoing. We
heard many, many witnesses testify, all of whom made excellent
presentations and whose contributions were very valuable. We
know, of course, from what others have said and we know it is a
fact that this explosion resulted from a process known as
cleaning or blowing the pipeline and in this case the blowing
was effected through the use of large quantities of natural gas
propelled outside the Kleen Energy power block under very high
pressure where it accumulated and ignited from a source near
the power block.
The investigation is ongoing, of course, and it's going to
focus on the precise mechanisms and procedures that led to the
use of natural gas for the cleaning process, as well as the
manner and means in which the gas was used.
Armed with this information, we identified the regulatory
structure applicable to the cleaning process and made suggested
revisions.
The construction of this plant was heavily regulated and
supervised by many agencies including OSHA, the local building
inspectors, the local fire marshal, state fire marshal, state
building inspector, DTUC, DET, Connecticut Department of Labor,
Connecticut Department of Consumer Protection and the
Connecticut Siting Council. However, as has been said and I
cannot emphasize strongly enough, no agency, not one agency had
overall oversight with regard to that part of the process known
as cleaning or blowing the pipeline, a process that is a
necessary step in the construction of any natural gas fuel
power plant.
The recommendations from the Thomas Commission which we
made suggest a variety of areas that should be pursued:
1. Determine whether any other state or federal agency has
developed a regulatory structure applicable to natural gas
pipeline cleaning.
2. Consult with industry experts to determine which methods
of gas blowing are used and/or recommended, and identify the
advantages and disadvantages of each method.
3. Identify the agency, or agencies, best suited to
regulate the gas blow process.
4. Recommend the level of training and expertise necessary
for that agency to effectively establish and enforce necessary
cleaning regulations.
5. Consider recommending that the Connecticut Siting
Council impose safety conditions upon any entity constructing a
power plant that will employ the gas blow cleaning process.
6. Consider recommending that the Connecticut Department of
Consumer Protection and/or the Connecticut Department of Labor
identify, if appropriate, special licensing, credentials and/or
training for those assigned to effect power plant gas blows in
Connecticut. Further, recommend that those agencies address
whether work schedule limitations are appropriate for those
assigned to perform power plant gas blows in Connecticut. Some
of these people have been working many, many hours each day for
multiple days in a row and that's something that should be
addressed.
7. And consider recommending the establishment of
regulations in the following areas: for every method of gas
blowing, the qualifications, training, credentials and/or
licensing needed for the staff involved in the gas blow
process; determine which and/or whether any of the gas blow
agents now in use should be permitted in the future; identify
acceptable practices for each gas blow agent; identify the type
and level of notice that must be given by the contractor to the
regulatory agencies, prior to any gas blowing operation; the
establishment of design specifications for the materials to be
used in the gas blowing process; the establishment of site
requirements and limitations, that is, identify the personnel
who may be on site before and during the gas blow; set the
qualifications for those individuals; identify the roles of
individuals permitted to be on site; set appropriate perimeter
security; consult with appropriate authorities as to the
propriety of drafting regulations intended to prevent worker
fatigue; and the establishment of gas blow procedures.
8. Recommend an agency or entity responsible for serving as
a ``clearinghouse'' to coordinate the efforts of every
regulatory agency with responsibilities associated with the
construction of a power plant.
In addition to the points that I've made, I want to make an
additional suggestion to Derek Phelps who is the chair of the
Connecticut Siting Council. Hopefully, the Thomas Commission
will develop specific, proposed, statutory and regulatory
recommendations as quickly as they can. But those
recommendations will have to await the next session of the
General Assembly.
The current permit for the Middletown Kleen Energy facility
expires on November 30, 2010. And in order to renew
construction, it must apply for a renewal and/or extension of
its current permit to the Siting Council. If Mr. Thomas and his
Commission have made its recommendations by the time the Siting
Council is prepared to act, I would strongly urge the Council
to attach as conditions to any permit it issues, language that
addresses the findings of this Commission and the adoption of
the specific recommendations of the Thomas Commission.
It has also been suggested that a ``coordination council''
consisting of pertinent state agencies be assembled to share
information during the course of construction of a large power
facility. The Siting Council might serve as that coordinating
entity using its ``changed conditions'' authority if concerns
arise that there is a pattern of violations during
construction. The Siting Council should review this report and
ultimately the Thomas Commission report to determine whether
its ``changed conditions'' authority would enable it to review
all power plants within its jurisdiction to determine whether
such plants warrant further attention.
It is also suggested that the Thomas Commission solicit
comments and input from the Siting Council as to how the Siting
Council might address concerns relative to gas-fired baseload
power plant facilities that have been permitted in the past and
the records of which are now closed.
I want to close in expressing my profound sympathy and
regret to the families of the victims of the explosion. I
believe that the most fitting memorial to those victims is a
careful, precise and thorough response that eliminates the
possibility of such an event ever occurring in the future. It
is my firm belief that the work of the Commission, and the work
of the Thomas Commission, and the Siting Council, and all other
agencies involved will combine to effect such a result.
[The statement of Alan Nevas follows:]
Prepared Statement of Judge Alan H. Nevas, Chair, Governor's
Kleen Energy Systems and Explosion Origin and Cause Panel
I. Introduction and Executive Summary
The Commission that I chaired was charged with determining the
origin and cause of the February 7, 2010, explosion at the Kleen Energy
construction site in Middletown, Connecticut. That explosion took the
lives of six men and injured more than thirty other people. The goal of
the Commission was to provide information necessary for a second
Commission, to be chaired by Mr. James Thomas (the ``Thomas
Commission'') to carry out a separate assignment. The Thomas Commission
has been tasked with recommending any necessary specific legislative or
regulatory changes.
The mission of the two Commissions, working interdependently, is to
ensure that the events of February 7, 2010, are never repeated in the
State of Connecticut. It is hoped, further, that the recommendations of
these two Commissions will be of value to this Committee, federal
regulatory authorities and to regulatory authorities in other states.
After this Commission began its work, the complexion of the ongoing
investigation of the Kleen Energy explosion underwent a significant
change when, on February 23, 2010, a judge of the Connecticut Superior
Court signed a search and seizure warrant applicable to the site of the
explosion. This Commission recognized that the criminal option must be
explored to the fullest, out of respect for the six men who died, their
families, and those who were injured in the explosion. It was incumbent
on the Commission to complete its assignment without compromising the
ongoing criminal investigation. The members of the Commission made the
following determinations:
1. The February 7, 2010 explosion was the product of a process used
to clean a natural gas pipeline using large quantities of natural gas
that came into contact with an ignition source known in the industry as
a ``gas blow;''
2. Although the Kleen Energy construction project was heavily
regulated by a variety of agencies, no agency regulated the process
used--or any process that might be used such as gas purging--to clean
the natural gas pipeline that was the source of the explosion; and
3. There are significant regulatory steps that should be taken to
ensure that the events of February 7, 2010 are not repeated.
The Explosion
Kleen Energy Systems, LLC began constructing a natural gas and oil-
fired power plant in Middletown, Connecticut in 2008. Kleen Energy
expected that construction of its plant would be complete sufficiently
in advance of November 2010, in accordance with its capacity contract
with Connecticut Light & Power. Kleen Energy's source for natural gas
was via a pipeline servicing the Northeast. On February 7, 2010, at
approximately 11:15 a.m., a large explosion occurred at Kleen Energy's
plant. At 11:19 a.m., first responders in Middletown learned of the
explosion and received reports of multiple casualties.
The Commission heard presentations from Middletown South District
Fire Chief Edward Badamo, who was the incident commander at the site
and whose Deputy Chief/Fire Marshal, Steve Krol, was statutorily
charged with determining the origin and cause of the explosion. He was
aided in his investigation by the Middletown Police Department, and the
Office of the State Fire Marshal which, in turn, was aided by the
Connecticut State Police Central District Major Crime Squad.
Although the investigation is still ongoing, significant resources
and efforts have been devoted to the investigation, including the
collection of more than 115 items of evidence and the completion of
more than 100 interviews, as well as twenty days of on-site
investigation by multiple investigative entities, including but not
limited to the South District Fire Department, the Office of the State
Fire Marshal, the Middletown Police Department, the Connecticut
Department of Environmental Protection, the Office of the Chief State
Medical Examiner, The United States Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, and the United States Chemical Safety Board.
The investigation to date, although incomplete, established without
question that the explosion resulted from a process known as
``cleaning'' or ``blowing'' a natural gas pipeline for the purpose of
removing debris from the pipeline, i.e., a ``gas blow.'' In this case,
the ``blowing'' was effected through the use of large quantities of
natural gas, propelled outside the Kleen Energy power block under very
high pressure, where it accumulated and ignited from a source near or
in the Kleen Energy power block.
Although the investigation is ongoing, and will focus on the
precise mechanisms and procedures that led to the use of natural gas
for the cleaning process, as well as the manner and means in which the
gas was used, dispersed, and ignited, what is known is that it was the
process of cleaning the natural gas pipeline in the manner described
that led to the explosion. Armed with this information, my Commission
identified the regulatory structure applicable to the cleaning process.
Further, we recommended possible revisions to the regulatory structure
relative to gas blows for consideration by the Thomas Commission.
The Existing Regulatory Structure
The construction of the Kleen Energy plant was heavily regulated
and supervised by a variety of agencies, including federal OSHA, the
local building inspector, the local fire marshal (both of whom were
supported by the Office of the State Fire Marshal and the Office of the
State Building Inspector), the Department of Public Utility Control,
the Department of Environmental Protection, the Connecticut Department
of Labor, the Connecticut Department of Consumer Protection, and the
Connecticut Siting Council. However, no agency had oversight with
regard to that part of the construction process known as ``cleaning''
or ``blowing'' the natural gas pipeline, a process that is a necessary
step in the construction of any natural gas-fueled power plant.
Changes to the Regulatory Structure
It is for the successor Thomas Commission to determine what
regulatory changes should be recommended. However, in an effort to
assist that Commission with its work, we suggested a variety of areas
that should be pursued. They are as follows:
1. Determine whether any other state or federal agency has
developed a regulatory structure applicable to natural gas pipeline
cleaning (hereinafter, ``gas blowing'' or a ``gas blow'').
2. Consult with industry experts to determine which methods of gas
blowing are used and/or recommended, and identify the advantages and
disadvantages of each method.
3. Identify the agency, or agencies, best suited to regulate the
gas blow process.
4. Recommend the level of training and expertise necessary for that
agency to effectively establish and enforce necessary cleaning
regulations.
5. Consider recommending that the Connecticut Siting Council impose
safety conditions upon any entity constructing a power plant that will
employ the gas blow cleaning process.
6. Consider recommending that the Connecticut Department of
Consumer Protection and/or the Connecticut Department of Labor
identify, if appropriate, special licensing, credentials and/or
training for those assigned to effect power plant gas blows in
Connecticut. Further, consider recommending that the latter agencies
address whether work schedule limitations are appropriate for those
assigned to perform power plant gas blows in Connecticut.
7. Consider recommending the establishment of regulations in the
following areas:
a. For every method of gas blowing, the qualifications, training,
credentials and/or licensing needed for the staff involved in the gas
blow process;
b. Determine which and/or whether any of the gas blow agents now in
use should be permitted in the future;
c. Identify acceptable practices for each permissible gas blow
agent;
d. Identify the type and level of notice that must be given by the
contractor to the regulatory agency, or agencies, prior to any gas
blowing operation;
e. The establishment of design specifications for the materials to
be used in the gas blowing process;
f. The establishment of site requirements and limitations (e.g.,
identify the personnel who may be on site before and during the gas
blow; set the qualifications for those individuals; identify the roles
of individuals permitted to be on site; set appropriate perimeter
security; consult with appropriate authorities as to the propriety of
drafting regulations intended to prevent worker fatigue).
g. The establishment of gas blow procedures (e.g., identify what
other activities, if any, may take place on site prior to, during, and
after the cleaning process; identify, if appropriate, weather
conditions that will preclude the cleaning operation; establish
limitations for the periods of cleaning; establish appropriate site
monitoring, both in terms of personnel and detection equipment, before,
during and after the cleaning).
8. Recommend an agency or entity responsible for serving as a
``clearinghouse'' to coordinate the efforts of every regulatory agency
with responsibilities associated with the construction of a power
plant. The agency or entity recommended would serve to track and record
the work of all other regulatory agencies. The Department of Emergency
Management and Homeland Security has expressed a willingness to
identify models of the latter form of operating structure.
Statement by the Chairman
Everyone should be grateful to Governor Rell for her wisdom and
compassion in dealing with the terrible events that occurred in
Middletown on February 7, 2010. The findings and recommendations of the
Commission I chaired and subsequently the Thomas Commission will
hopefully prevent such a tragedy from occurring in the future.
The members of the Commission and their staffs worked very hard in
preparing for our hearings and made essential contributions to our
final findings and recommendations. Former Commissioner of Public
Safety John Danaher and his staff assisted in the drafting of our
report and Chairman of the DPUC Kevin DelGobbo and his staff provided
the venue for our hearings and gave essential administrative support.
Attorney Brian Spears of Levett Rockwood P.C. in Westport gave his
invaluable assistance and input in the preparation of the final report.
In addition to the points set forth above, let me add an additional
suggestion to Derek Phelps and the Connecticut Siting Council.
Hopefully, the Thomas Commission will develop specific proposed
statutory and regulatory recommendations as quickly as they can.
However, the adoption of their recommendations will in all likelihood
have to await the next session of the General Assembly.
The current permit for the Middletown Kleen Energy facility expires
on November 30, 2010, and it must apply for a renewal and/or extension
of that permit. If the Thomas Commission has made its recommendations
by the time the Siting Council is prepared to act, I would strongly
urge the Council to attach as conditions to any permit it issues,
language that addresses the findings of this Commission and the
adoption of the specific recommendations of the Thomas Commission.
It has also been suggested that a ``coordination council''
consisting of pertinent state agencies be assembled to share
information during the course of construction of a large power
facility. The Siting Council might serve as the coordinating entity
using its ``changed conditions'' authority if concerns arise that there
is a pattern of violations during construction. The Siting Council
should review this report and ultimately the Thomas Commission report
to determine whether its ``changed conditions'' authority would enable
it to review all power plants within its jurisdiction to determine
whether such plants warrant further attention.
It is suggested further that the Thomas Commission solicit comments
and input from the Siting Council as to how the Siting Council might
address concerns relative to gas-fired baseload power plant facilities
that have been permitted in the past and the records of which are now
closed.
II. Reports by the Members of the Governor's Kleen Energy Origin and
Cause Commission
This Commission was comprised of pertinent Connecticut agencies,
each of which was tasked with reviewing the circumstances surrounding
the Kleen Energy explosion and rendering a written report. The reports
of the agencies and our final report are posted on line at: http://
www.ct.gov/dpuc/.
Conclusion
I want to close in expressing my profound sympathy and regret to
the families of the victims of the Kleen Energy Plant Explosion. I
believe that the most fitting memorial to those victims is a careful,
precise and thorough response that eliminates the possibility of such
an event ever occurring in the future. It is my firm belief that the
work of the Commission, and the work of the Thomas Commission, will
combine to effect such a result.
______
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Judge.
Professor Corbett.
STATEMENT OF GLENN CORBETT, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR AND CHAIR,
DEPARTMENT OF PROTECTION MANAGEMENT, JOHN JAY COLLEGE OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Mr. Corbett. Acting Chairman Courtney, Congresswoman
DeLauro, Congressman Larson, and Congressman Murphy, thank you
for inviting me to testify about the explosion at the Kleen
Energy power plant in Middletown, Connecticut. I am an
associate professor and chair of the Department of Protection
Management at John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York
City.
Prior to coming to John Jay, I spent nearly eight years as
a code enforcement official in the Austin and San Antonio,
Texas Fire Departments. Currently, I am a member of New Jersey
State's Fire Code Council and continue to be involved in a
variety of code-related issues. However, I am representing only
myself today.
The explosion at the Kleen Energy plant on February 7,
2010, has exposed a large gap in our national model codes, in
particular, provisions dealing with natural gas purging and
``gas blow'' operations. This incident, in addition to another
similar explosion at the ConAgra Slim Jim plant in Garner,
Norther Carolina in 2009, demands that this problem be promptly
and properly addressed in our model codes.
The inherent danger of purging gas piping of trapped air
with natural gas is obvious. While such purging operations are
necessary and commonly take place in small installations such
as a residential gas-fired equipment without incident, the
higher volumes of expelled gas in larger commercial and
industrial installations presents a much greater danger to
construction workers and the public. Gas blow operations, on
the other hand, conducted with very high gas pressures and
using natural gas to remove trapped debris such as slag, are
inherently dangerous and present significant danger not only to
the workers, but surrounding occupants to that facility.
Stringent regulations are critical to ensure proper safety.
As many of you are aware, our nation relies heavily on the
construction and safety codes developed by private, non-profit
code-writing organizations such as the National Fire Protection
Association and the International Code Council. Their codes and
standards are adopted, and in many cases modified by local
governments, states, and the federal government.
The two most relevant codes addressing gas purging
operations are the National Fire Protection Association's NFPA
54: the National Fuel Gas Code and the International Code
Council's International Fuel Gas Code. However, electric
utility plants, as identified earlier, such as the Kleen Energy
facility are outside the scoping provisions of both of these
codes. In addition, the high pressure gas blow that was used at
the Kleen Energy facility reported had 650 psi, also outside
the scope of NFPA 54 and the International Fuel Gas Code. It is
the scoping provisions of these two codes that create the
greatest impediment to ensuring worker safety in the
construction and operation of electric power utility plants
that utilize natural gas as a field.
In the wake of the ConAgra and Kleen Energy incidents, the
NFPA issued an emergency tentative interim amendment to NFPA
54, changing the gas purging provisions. A subsequent vote was
taken of the technical committee charged with overseeing NFPA
54, and it failed to meet the necessary two-thirds affirmative
vote needed for permanent inclusion in the code. While these
failed provisions were an improvement on the previous code
language, these changes would have done nothing to address the
scoping exemptions. While these failed provisions were an
improvement on the previous code language, these changes would
have done nothing to address the scoping exemptions for
electric utility power plants nor would they have dealt with
the very dangerous gas blow operations that we've discussed
already. While the International Code Council has vowed to
update the 2012 edition of the International Fuel Gas Code, it
is unclear what those changes may be.
At the heart of ensuring a safe work environment and public
safety in terms of gas purging and gas blow operations is code
enforcement, of course. The enforcement of NFPA 54 and the
International Fuel Gas Code often lies with local government
plumbing inspectors, and in some cases, state inspectors.
However, these inspectors do not typically inspect the gas pipe
discharge areas prior to the purging or gas blow operations,
nor do they witness the actual operation itself. The codes do
not require that an inspection of gas purging operations or gas
blows be performed. I do not believe that the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration had a policy of inspecting gas
purging or gas blow operations at the time of the Kleen Energy
explosion.
Looking to the future, I believe that gas purging
operations in medium and large scale installations, defined by
pipe size, pressure, gas flow rate, must receive much closer
scrutiny. I believe that gas blow operations, on the other
hand, using natural gas are inherently dangerous and must be
prohibited, substituting the use of compressed air or
mechanical device such as the ``pigs'' that have been
described.
Specifically, I recommend the following changes to NFPA 54
and the International Fuel Gas Code:
1. Broaden the scope of these codes to include power
plants. While some modifications will need to be made to the
codes, it is crucial that the exception for power plants be
eliminated.
2. Require that medium and large scale installations
receive a permit for gas purging operations. Given the danger
involved, I recommend that this requirement be placed in NFPA
54, the International Fuel Gas Code, as well as the Uniform
Fire Code NFPA #1 which is actually the fire prevention code or
the typical fire code that many jurisdictions use. Gas purging
operations in medium and large scale installations should not
only receive a site inspection and approval of the plumbing
inspector but should also receive the concurrent approval of
the local fire marshal.
3. Prohibit gas blows using natural gas. They should be, as
I mentioned earlier, conducted using non-flammable gases or
mechanical devices such as ``pigs'' run through the pipe to
remove debris.
It is not clear that NFPA 54 and the International Fuel Gas
Code will ever actually be changed to include power plants
within their scopes, however. And this is of grave concern to
me. I have no confidence the NFPA or the ICC are actually going
to make these changes that have been discussed here, as well as
the other witnesses that have discussed already. In addition,
it is not clear that these codes will be amended to prohibit
gas blows. These problems are too significant and must be
addressed immediately.
I believe that it is imperative that the issue of gas
purging and gas blows at construction sites be addressed
specifically by the federal government to ensure worker safety.
OSHA should develop regulations dealing with gas purging and
gas blow to operations to ensure worker safety.
I specifically recommend that OSHA be authorized to create
regulations dealing with these specific situations, again
prohibiting gas blowing using natural gas, and instituting
essentially a permit system similar to what they use for
confined spaces or what we call lock out/tag out regulations.
In closing, I wish to thank the Subcommittee on Workforce
Protections for allowing me to testify on this very important
issue. I look forward to answering any questions that you may
have and I ask that my testimony be included into the formal
record.
[The statement of Glenn Corbett follows:]
Prepared Statement of Glenn Corbett, Associate Professor, Chair,
Department of Protection Management, John Jay College of Criminal
Justice
Chairwoman Woolsey, Ranking Member Rodgers, and members of the
Subcommittee on Workforce Protections: thank you for inviting me to
testify about the explosion at the Kleen Energy power plant in
Middletown, Connecticut. I am an associate professor and chair of the
Department of Protection Management at John Jay College of Criminal
Justice in New York City. Prior to coming to John Jay College, I spent
nearly eight years as a code enforcement official in the Austin and San
Antonio, Texas Fire Departments. Currently, I am a member of New
Jersey's Fire Code Council and continue to be involved in a variety of
code-related issues. I am only representing myself today.
The explosion at the Kleen Energy plant on February 7th, 2010 has
exposed a large gap in our national model codes, in particular,
provisions dealing with natural gas purging and ``gas blow''
operations. This incident, in addition to another similar explosion at
a ConAgra Slim JimTM plant in Garner, North Carolina in 2009, demands
that this problem be promptly and properly addressed in our model
codes.
The inherent danger of purging gas piping of trapped air with
natural gas is obvious. While such purging operations are necessary and
commonly take place in small installations such as residential gas-
fired equipment without incident, the higher volumes of expelled gas in
larger commercial and industrial installations presents much greater
danger to construction workers and the public. Gas blow operations,
conducted with very high gas pressures to remove trapped debris such as
slag, are inherently hazardous and present significant danger to
workers and occupants in a facility. Stringent regulations are critical
to ensure proper safety.
As many of you are aware, our nation relies heavily on the
construction and safety codes developed by private, non-profit code-
writing organizations such as the National Fire Protection Association
and the International Code Council. Their codes and standards are
adopted--and in many cases modified--by local governments, states, and
the federal government.
The two most relevant codes addressing gas purging operations are
the National Fire Protection Association's NFPA 54: The National Fuel
Gas Code and the International Code Council's International Fuel Gas
Code. However, electric utility power plants such as the Kleen Energy
facility are outside the scoping provisions of both of these two codes.
In addition, the high pressure ``gas blow'' that was used at the Kleen
Energy facility, reportedly 650 psi, is also outside the scope of NFPA
54 and the International Fuel Gas Code. It is the scoping provisions of
these two codes that create the greatest impediment to ensuring worker
safety in the construction and operation of electric power utility
plants that utilize natural gas as a fuel.
In the wake of the ConAgra and Kleen Energy incidents, the National
Fire Protection Association issued an emergency tentative interim
amendment to NFPA 54, changing the gas purging provisions. A subsequent
vote taken of the technical committee charged with overseeing NFPA 54
failed to meet the necessary \2/3\ affirmative vote needed for
permanent inclusion in the code. While these failed provisions were an
improvement on the previous code language, these changes would have
done nothing to address the scoping exemptions for electric utility
power plants nor would they have dealt with the very dangerous gas blow
operations. While the International Code Council has vowed to update
the 2012 edition of the International Fuel Gas Code, it is unclear what
those changes may be.
At the heart of ensuring a safe work environment and public safety
in terms of gas purging and gas blow operations is code enforcement.
The enforcement of NFPA 54 and the International Fuel Gas Code often
lies with local government plumbing inspectors, and in some cases,
state inspectors. However, these inspectors do not typically inspect
the gas pipe discharge areas prior to the purging or gas blow
operations nor do they witness the actual operation itself. The codes
do not require that an inspection of gas purging operations or gas
blows be performed. I do not believe that the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration had a policy of inspecting gas purging or gas
blow operations at the time of the Kleen Energy explosion.
Looking to the future, I believe that gas purging operations in
medium and large scale installations (as defined by pipe size,
pressure, and gas flow rate) must receive much closer scrutiny. I
believe that gas purging operations using natural gas are inherently
dangerous and must be prohibited, substituting the use of air or
mechanical devices such as a ``pig.''
I recommend the following changes to NFPA 54 and the International
Fuel Gas Code:
1. Broaden the scope of these codes to include power plants. While
some modifications will need to be made to the codes, it is crucial
that the exception for power plants be eliminated.
2. Require that medium and large scale installations receive a
permit for gas purging operations. Given the danger involved, I
recommend that this requirement be placed in NFPA 54, the International
Fuel Gas Code, as well as the Uniform Fire Code NFPA #1 and the
International Fire Code. Gas purging operations in medium and large
scale installations should not only receive a site inspection and
approval of the plumbing inspector but should also receive the
concurrent approval of the local fire marshal.
3. Prohibit gas blows using natural gas. Gas blows should be
conducted using non-flammable gases or mechanical devices such as
``pigs'' run through the pipe to remove debris.
It is not clear that NFPA 54 and the International Fuel Gas Code
will ever actually be changed to include power plants within their
scopes. In addition, it is not clear that these codes will be amended
to prohibit gas blows. These problems are too significant and must be
addressed immediately.
I believe that it is imperative that the issue of gas purging and
gas blows at construction sites be addressed by the federal government
to ensure worker safety. The Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (O.S.H.A.) should develop regulations dealing with gas
purging and gas blow operations to ensure worker safety.
I recommend that O.S.H.A. be authorized and charged with developing
regulations dealing with all gas purging and gas blowing operations,
including the following:
1. A prohibition on gas blowing operations using natural gas.
2. A permit system for conducting gas purging operations in large
scale commercial and industrial occupancies. Regulations similar to
O.S.H.A.'s confined space ``lock-out tag-out'' permit requirements
should be developed to ensure proper gas purging operations in large
installations. A permit will ensure that the site of the purging
operation has been inspected for proper equipment installation, the
necessary monitoring equipment is in place, and that a safe dispersal
area has been established prior to conducting the operation.
In closing, I wish to thank the Subcommittee on Workforce
Protections for allowing me to testify on this very important issue. I
look forward to answering any questions that you may have.
______
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Professor Corbett. For the record,
I just wanted to add that we also have written testimony
submitted by Carle Crabb, Ron Crabb's brother which again the
Committee will take to Washington.
And Carle is seated in the front row and thank you for
being here today.
[The statement of Carle Crabb follows:]
Prepared Statement of Carle Ray Crabb IV, Brother of Ron Crabb
Hello, my name is Carle Ray Crabb IV. I am the brother of Ron
Crabb, who died, in the tragic explosion on February 7, 2010 at the
Kleen Energy Power Plant in Middletown, Connecticut. We were both
Journeyman Pipefitters and did a 5 year apprenticeship, and have over
15 years in the trade. We both worked primarily in the heavy industrial
and commercial fields in our trade. I have worked in gas, coal, oil,
and nuclear power houses. I've also worked in U.S. Government labs,
along with the chemical, automobile, pharmaceutical, food industries,
gas, oil refineries, and pipelines. Our jobs can be dangerous, but with
the responsible parties taking proper safety precautions and proper
safety training methods, you should be able to go home at night and see
your family.
My brother ranked right up there with some of the most
knowledgeable pipefitters that I know. If I ever had a question I could
call him and get an answer. I talked to Ron quite often, at least every
other week if not weekly. For the two weeks prior to Feb 7th we
probably talked 10 times.
When my brother and I got into the trade in the early 90's it was
quite enjoyable. An honest 8-for-8, do it right the first time, do
quality work, and be a skilled craftsman. We were proud to be
steamfitters (pipefitters).
Unfortunately, the industry has morphed into is totally different
nowadays. It is not just our trade, but just about every business in
America. We are in a period where only one thing matters, and that is
making money. Most industries take every short-cut possible and cut
costs in every way possible. They are running on such bare bones--
manpower, knowledge, and resources--that human life and fines are
figured into the cost of doing business. Not all, and I would like to
thank the few that care, especially Exxon Mobile; their safety program
should be a role model for the rest of them.
From my perspective on what should of happened on Feb 7th, 2010 at
the Kleen Energy plant in Middletown, CT and what actually happened is
unmistakably, pure and simple, TOTAL GROSS CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE! The
shortcuts and total disregard for safety were unbelievable from my
experience as a journeyman pipefitter!
You might ask yourself how could this act of total disregard
happen; pure and simple--MONEY AND LACK OF REGULATION!--HURRY IT UP AND
GET IT DONE MENTALITY. Which in this instance, when dealing with a
procedure that is this dangerous, it is PURELY CRIMINAL!
Unfortunately there is no regulatory body or set regulations for
this procedure in a new powerhouse. It is totally up to the General
Contractor to police the subcontractors and their safety teams. In
other words, it's the Wild West. This procedure has been done many
times safely, but each time it is up to the safety teams to write the
procedures, and unfortunately, many times, not only have these safety
teams ever worked in the heavy industry field, but have never seen or
been involved in a line purged with natural gas!
I don't know how a procedure could have changed so dramatically
from Feb 4th to Feb 7. 2010, but it went from having a plan to the wild
west in three days. If you get a chance, take a look at the action
taken on the 4th then look at the 7th. The difference is purely
criminal; these poor gentlemen did not stand a chance.
I ask members of this panel and every member of the U.S. House of
Representatives to please get some regulations on this procedure and
please pass P.A.W.A.-H.R.2067 because this has been a terrible year for
the American Worker.
In the two weeks leading up to the explosion my brother and I
talked around ten times. We talked about a lot of topics family,
hunting, fishing, sports, their new G.S.P. puppy, Maya, and a little
about work. When it came to the subject of work there was a lot of
stuff that we just didn't have to say to each other as it was just a
``given''. Like ``they are cutting corners'' or ``they want more
production'' or ``the safety department is a joke;'' it all was a
given. When Ron mentioned the blow down more than twice, I knew he was
nervous about it. My thought s on it were he will be all right because
he was a General Foreman for the instrumentation and had nothing to do
with it. He should be in the trailer or not on-site when this procedure
will be going on.
On Saturday, February 6, 2010, we talked for an hour. Ron went into
great detail about his 2 son, areas we only talked about briefly. I
could tell he was nervous about tomorrow the way he opened up. We ended
our conversation like we always did--Love and Miss You Bro, be Safe.
On Feb 7, 2010, around 7p.m., when my mother and myself finally got
the confirmation of his death, all I could say to her was how unfair
life can be. Here is a person who used every minute of every day, had
so much going for him and his family, and was basically a role model
for everyone he came in contact with. What a tragedy!
On many occasions I have flown into Bradley Airport to see my
brother, his family, and their faithful G.S.P. Rooster. But on February
8, 2010, it was the hardest landing I ever had to do because this time,
my brother would not be there. I knew that from this day forward, like
so many of my brother's friends and complete strangers, the only thing
that matters is seeing Jodi, Dylan, and Tyler through this tragic
event. The next week has been hard on us all. The one reality check I
had every day was trying to get my brother's dog into the house. He sat
on the ice of the drive way, through snow and freezing temps, for hours
at a time--waiting for my brother to come home; but this time he was
not coming.
Ron was more than a brother to me. I always considered him to be my
life-mate someone to grow old with and share the many laughs of life. I
guess I have to thank God for all the time we spent together hunting,
fishing, playing baseball, and just being brothers. Love and miss you
Ron--be safe for ever.
Once again I beg this committee and congress to pass legislation
for this process and to pass P.A.W.A. H.R.2067 to protect myself and
all American Workers!
No man or woman should not be able to return to their home at the
end of the work day.
Thank You.
______
Mr. Courtney. Now we're just going to open it up to some
questions. I just wanted to start by first of all, Jodi, when
you described Ron's position at the site, it was significant
that you described he was actually working on instrumentation
and controls. Is that correct?
Ms. Thomas. Correct.
Mr. Courtney. So he actually was there on the site not
directly involved in the gas blow procedure, isn't that
correct?
Ms. Thomas. Correct. He was not working for Keystone which
was the subcontractor.
Mr. Courtney. The subcontractor who was in charge of the
gas blow. And I guess just to sort of go back to the Chief's
testimony and the Judge's testimony about trying to get some
rules in place for when these procedures are taking place in
terms of whether or not people who were not directly involved
in the gas blow, even really belong on the site when something
like this is occurring. And the fact that it appears there were
no rosters that you could consult in terms of--maybe just sort
of respond to that, Chief.
Mr. Badamo. There were supposedly some rosters that we were
never ever able to truly locate, nor were we ever able to truly
locate the people who had those rosters. So we simply had to go
by the word of the workers and that took a day and a half to
interview all of the workers on that site that day to determine
whether all of them were accounted for.
Mr. Courtney. So obviously, it would have been much better
for you if you would have been able to arrive at that scene and
have a list of exactly who was there, obviously on the site,
and that was not available to you?
Mr. Badamo. Correct. From a fire department perspective, we
don't operate on any site without a true accountability of all
of our personnel, where they are. We have a tag system. We know
every single person who is on that site and usually where they
are on that site. A system like that being employed here would
have made our efforts in the rescue and finding of the victims
much easier.
Mr. Courtney. And Judge, again, you sort of raised the
question of whether or not something, when a procedure like
this is taking place, whether or not there's any reason for
people who are not directly involved to even be within the
radius of the activity and that seemed to be one of the
recommendations you wanted to make to the Siting Council.
Obviously, that didn't take place in this incident.
Mr. Nevas. That's correct. The Chief, I think, articulated
it correctly that anybody could be there, just walk on the
site, no record of who was there or who wasn't there. I suppose
there was a time record in terms of their punching in at the
beginning of the work day, but in terms of maintaining rosters
or any oversight of who was there, my understanding is that
there was none. So anyone could wander in and out of the site
at will.
Mr. Courtney. So Professor Corbett, aside from getting to
the sort of core issue of whether or not natural gas blows
should be permitted at all, the fact is there still aren't
basic rules about evacuating nonessential personnel or even
keeping adequate records of who's there. That's how unregulated
this procedure is. Is that correct?
Mr. Corbett. Right. Obviously, this disaster brought this
all to the forefront and there's a bunch of issues that you've
heard here today that need to be addressed certainly.
Mr. Courtney. And I guess just to go back to your point
about whether we can rely on voluntary code regulation which
has been really the operating system for this industry, I mean
you're somebody who has been directly involved with that
process. I mean it sounds like you're saying we've really just
got to go to a different place to get rules and I wonder if you
could sort of comment about whether making recommendations
really should be what this Committee should do or whether or
not we should move more directly to changing the law.
Mr. Corbett. Thank you for asking that question. I just
want to spend a couple of moments talking about my involvement
over the last several years, particularly with issues of 9/11
specifically. I work a lot with a lot of 9/11 families and of
course, there's a variety of issues that have come up with
respect to highrise building design, for example.
I will preface the rest of my comments with saying I'm a
member of the NFPA and they do a lot of good things, but in my
career I've encountered several of these kind of wait a minute
moments with the NFPA specifically on very obvious problems
that they fail to address. I brought with me today a book that
actually two years ago, almost exactly two years ago, I went
with a colleague and several family members from 9/11 to the
NFPA Standards Council which is the top entity within their
structure that actually is the final step before codes are
issued. And one particular thing that had come up and one
proposal that my colleague had made was to actually widen
stairwells in highrise buildings from the more traditional 44
inches that is pretty much the standard across the country to a
wider 56 inches. Forty-four is actually based upon the width of
a World War I soldier's shoulder width. That's how far back
that 22 inch times 2 rule goes to essentially come up with 44
inches.
And in the wake of 9/11 that was one of the things I
thought would be a very easy thing to change. I thought it
would go through without any question. Well, I was wrong
because we actually did try to change this to widen stairwells
to 56 inches. Again, I went to the Standards Council with my
colleague and other individuals who are concerned about this
issue and we were turned down. I even brought this text called
``Walking Forward, Looking Back''. It's actually a set of
photographs taken on 9/11 including the only known set of
photographs taken inside either of the towers that survived,
the photographs that survived. And I showed the Standards
Council this one particular photograph and if you look at it,
you can actually see the people standing on the stairwell
stopped to let the firefighters go by. And I though here's
something as basic as the ability for a set of firefighters to
go up and a set of civilians to go down or just as importantly
two sets of civilians to go down in a stairwell because some
people, of course, take longer than others and this would allow
a more quicker descent.
In retrospect, we learned with the investigation, for
example, that had the attacks occurred later in the day, of
course, it would have been more people in those buildings and
in actuality people would have died leaving, trying to get out
of the building because the stairwells would have been so
crowded. So all these issues, this photograph which I showed to
all the members of the Standards Council and said, ``please,
make this simple change of going from 44 to 56'' fell on deaf
ears and to this day that regulation was never changed.
And again, I've had experiences like this through my career
either as a participant or as an observer and this is the
situation my final comment would be. This is the situation for
Congress to act. When the private sector, like the NFPA or the
International Code Council, does not act, I think the ball ends
up in your court and you actually have to move these changes. I
think we should forget about the NFPA and ICC and go right to
OSHA to deal with the situation.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Professor.
Mr. Corbett. Thank you.
Mr. Courtney. Congresswoman DeLauro?
Ms. DeLauro. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I want
to say thank you to all of you. We spend a lot of time in
hearings, my colleagues and I, and listen to testimony. I want
to just really applaud the clarity of the testimony and the
candor and the lucid recommendations that this Committee can
take back on a number of instances, whether listening to
family, listening to local government, the challenge of the
state government and the Commission, and the Chemical Safety
Board and our expert in the Fire Protection Codes.
Let me start with a question to both Mr. Bresland, Mr.
Corbett, and I think you've stated this, but I want to try to
ferret it out a little bit more.
How confident are you that OSHA will issue a new regulatory
standard for the practice of gas blower purging? That is to
come up some time in July. Does OSHA even have the authority to
issue a new safety standard in this area? Let me just lay out a
couple of things.
Dr. Bresland, do you concur with Judge Nevas' particular
recommendations and particularly his comments on the role of
the Siting Council in that effort?
Mr. Bresland. Well, just let me address the issue of OSHA,
because we did meet with the Assistant Secretary Michaels the
week before last to discuss the issue of the recommendations
that we were planning to make to OSHA. They were receptive to
those recommendations which basically will say OSHA should ban
the practice of venting natural gas directly to the atmosphere
in these high-pressure systems.
However, the second comment that we got from them was that
developing regulations in OSHA is a very lengthy process and
they were talking in terms of five years to do this.
Ms. DeLauro. It doesn't have to be that way.
Mr. Bresland. I think you maybe want to go and talk to them
and find out why it is that way, but that is certainly a fairly
consistent refrain that we do get from OSHA on several
recommendations that we have made to them.
Perhaps a legislative approach to this would be a more
direct and faster way to do it. As I said in my comments, I
find it quite--I'm not sure what word to use, maybe bizarre is
the right word to use, that a company will spend what I
understand is $1.3 billion building operations like this,
they're within months of starting it up, and then they use this
inherently dangerous process and basically blow it up and kill
people, injure people. It doesn't make any sense to me.
Ms. DeLauro. Mr. Corbett, the point is though as well that
natural gas is readily available and that's why it's used for
this process. There are safer alternatives that clearly--there
have been demonstrated safer alternatives. Why are we not
moving to those safer alternatives and that become the
standard? Just explain to me why this has to be the case? We
know it's a proven effort to use the pigging, air, whatever it
is. I'm not an expert in these areas, but I've read enough to
know that there are safer alternatives.
Why aren't we mandating safer alternatives?
Mr. Corbett. I agree with you totally. I mean I would
imagine why it's conducted this way is because of cost. That's
the simplest answer for the question.
Ms. DeLauro. It's less costly to use natural gas to do this
procedure?
Mr. Corbett. Natural gas is right there, it's readily
available. So we've got to bring in other equipment,
procedures, people, perhaps to do the perhaps the--it would be
obviously a more safe process of using either the pigs or using
compressed or what have you, so but why in the regulatory
standpoint, again in the private sector, I don't understand--
this is again, this is the 800 pound gorilla that's in the room
and the NFPA and the ICC and I just don't understand why they
won't address it. The only thing I can, of course, surmise, is
that a lot of these technical committees and that's where a lot
of the work is done are dominated by industry representatives.
So that's why I'm suggesting that although OSHA, of course,
as we have heard has issues of trying to get regulations put in
place. That takes time as well, but I don't know what the other
alternative is because again we're totally relying on the
private sector to develop these codes and standards. If they're
not going to do it, then OSHA seems like the only path that we
can go down.
Ms. DeLauro. I know that my time is up. Judge Nevas, which
agency should be in charge? If no agency is in charge, who
should be in charge from your investigation?
Mr. Nevas. In the best of worlds, OSHA. But I think we
should be realistic here and practical and we know, you know
far better than I, that for a regulatory, a federal regulatory
agency to make major changes in its regulations is going to
take a long, long time.
I just commented to the Chief, luckily, if it got done in
three years I think that would be a miracle, but my point and
the point I want to emphasize and I obviously speak only for
the Commission that I chair and we are concerned with the State
of Connecticut and how it will move forward. Obviously, I
think, I hope that we can provide a model for other states to
follow. But my point is that all of these safety measures that
have been discussed this morning, the recommendations to OSHA,
to you, for federal legislation and the suggestions that I make
can be implemented for Connecticut quickly, quickly. We can get
it done in the next four or five months because that Siting
Council will have jurisdiction over Kleen Energy when they come
to the Siting Council, whenever they come. It will obviously
have to be some time this summer or early in the fall and say
we want to resume construction. We want to complete this plant,
but we need a new permit because we can't get it done by
November 30th. And the Siting Council will be able to say we'll
give you that permit, but you're going to have to agree to do A
through Z when you resume construction.
So for Connecticut, we can get it done quickly. From your
perspective on a national view, obviously you're constrained by
legislation, by committee work, by bureaucracy, but we're not
going to be constrained by that here in Connecticut and we can
get it done.
Ms. DeLauro. Thank you so much.
Mr. Courtney. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you. Let me ask maybe the predicate to
Representative DeLauro's question of why haven't we changed
from gas? Why use gas in the first place? Is it an issue of--
and I guess this is a question for Professor Corbett. Is it an
issue of cost? Is it an issue of effectiveness versus the other
potential technologies? Why is gas so prevalent, given the fact
that even someone without a chemical safety background could
understand that it's the most volatile of the potential litany
of tools to use?
Mr. Corbett. All I can say is that I think it comes down to
cost because the gas is already there. You know, if we talk
about doing mechanical pigs or using compressed air, nitrogen,
what have you, all those things are additional work and time
and money. So I think that's really what it comes down to, but
again given its obvious danger, it's unfathomable to me why we
continue to do this. I mean we're just--I guess we can say
we've been lucky where explosions haven't happened and so----
Mr. Murphy. Banning gas seems like a no brainer and I guess
I'd like to examine a little bit more about the NFPA for a
second. If I'm a worker on one of these sites, it would make me
very uncomfortable to know that the entity in charge of
developing these standards is representative, in part or in
large part, by industry which has an incentive to try to lower
costs and to try to decrease the time of completion, especially
if there's money involved.
Can you talk a little bit as a member of that body, can you
talk a little bit about who in NFPA is accountable to how you
get selected to that panel? Tell us a little bit about that
Board.
Mr. Corbett. I am a member of the NFPA, as a general
member, but they issue hundreds of codes and standards for a
variety of things. And each one of them has at least one
technical committee which is responsible for sort of overseeing
the document in this case, let's say NFPA 54.
On those committees, in their structure, they are supposed
to have specific numbers of different types of people on those
committees. It could be enforcement authority. It could be
special knowledge expert, industry reps, insurance industry,
all those kind of people who are supposed to be on those
committees. And so when you actually look at the committee
membership very often you'll see that there's an imbalance in
some cases where too many of one type of entity--as a matter of
fact, one of the CSB identified another, ironically another
what's called a recommended practice, NFPA 850, which is
specifically for electrical power plants and there's not one
fire service or enforcement official I can even see on their
committee and ironically they have identified that that code
and standard refers back to NFPA 54 for natural gas,
ironically, which on the other hand is exempted in the other
standard, so there is a lot of issues here. I think that we
depend very heavily on them.
And again, on the balance, they do a lot of good work, but
there are situations where things like this happen that are
real problematic.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Bresland, can you comment on this issue for
a moment on whether we are smart or not to rely on a body that
is populated in large part by industry and has an imbalance on
many of its committees with respect to either safety
professionals or representatives of labor, representatives of
the workers who are doing this on the ground. What are your
thoughts or CSB's thoughts on the reliance that we have on
these voluntary organizations and the makeup of the
organizations?
Mr. Bresland. I should point out that at our hearing this
evening when we're going to vote on our recommendations, we
have recommendations proposed to a variety of different
organizations, not just OSHA, but we've got recommendations to
the National Fire Protection Association; recommendations to
the American Society of Mechanical Engineers; recommendations
to the major gas turbine manufacturers; recommendations to the
Governor and to the State of Connecticut which basically says
we recommend that the State of Connecticut actually ban this
practice of using flammable gas; and a recommendation to the
Electric Power Research Institute.
Going back to one to the major gas turbine manufacturers,
they do require that the gas be cleaned before it goes into
their turbines. These are very, very expensive pieces of
equipment and we are recommending that they develop technical
guidance for the cleaning of the fuel pipeline without using
natural gas. And I think if we're looking for a quick way to
solve this problem without either OSHA or without waiting for
OSHA or without waiting for legislation, the people who have
the most interest in making sure that they do not get dirty gas
and they do not blow these facilities up would be the
manufacturers of the turbines.
Your question on NFPA, I'm not an expert on NFPA, but I've
dealt with them off and on during my eight years on the
Chemical Safety Board. I've been, I guess, confused by their
process and why they developed really good recommendations and
good practices and other times, for example, with ConAgra, the
one that happened that last year, there are issues and it
doesn't seem to move forward in a way that would make just
common sense.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you.
Mr. Courtney. We're going to do another round of questions,
if people don't mind. And thank you again for your great
testimony and patience.
Mr. Bresland, it was almost just a few days before February
7th that the Chemical Safety Board had made urgent
recommendations again to the industry and again to some of the
voluntary codes which were not--which fell short of actually
banning the natural gas blow process. Again, it was more
focused on whether or not people should be in enclosed spaces
where this procedure was going forward.
Obviously, you've sort of moved, the CSB has sort of moved
to where again tonight you'll be making a different set of
recommendations and I guess what happened, first of all,
between then and now, both procedurally, but also substantively
as far as the CSB was concerned?
Mr. Bresland. Well, there are two--what happened is that
there are two completely different situations. In the case here
in Middletown you're dealing with high pressure gas, 600 psi
blowing out into the atmosphere. In the case at ConAgra, it was
just the normal gas that perhaps that you would be using in
your home, low pressure gas and they were in the process of
starting up a hot water heater and they allowed that gas to
vent inside the building, so the low pressure gas vented inside
the building. The concentration of gas buildup that came in
contact with an ignition source and there was a catastrophic
explosion that killed a number of people and basically
destroyed that facility because it has closed down with the
loss of hundreds of jobs.
So you're dealing in one case with a very high-pressure
issue of gas being blown to into the atmosphere and the other,
you're dealing with low-pressure gas being allowed to build up.
What we recommended was that that build up of gas inside the
building should be prevented. Hopefully, there will be a
recommendation by NFPA going in that direction, although as
Professor Corbett has said it's run into some roadblocks along
the way.
Mr. Courtney. So then there's some distinction in terms of
what you'll be recommending tonight between--what you're
talking about tonight will be focused on power plants as
opposed to sort of smaller cleaning operations like the
ConAgra, so there will be sort of a threshold difference?
Mr. Bresland. What we'll be recommending tonight will be
both. We'll be recommending that OSHA prohibit the release of
flammable gas to the atmosphere. That's the issue that we're
talking about what happened here at Kleen Energy in Middletown.
We're also recommending that and the words are ``prohibit
fuel gas venting or purging indoors, prohibit venting or
purging outdoors where fuel gas may form a flammable
atmosphere.'' So we're going with both instances, although in
reality they are two very different issues.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you. Professor Corbett, when we had our
hearing last week on Deepwater Horizon, there was testimony
that the oil rig workers actually, there's a procedure for sort
of time out that they could basically stop working and try and
put again sort of an emergency procedure to protect themselves.
And again, Ms. Thomas testified about Congresswoman Woolsey's
bill, the Protecting America's Workers Act, which would again
provide that sort of across-the-board.
What's your opinion about this situation? I mean were
workers, do they have that capacity to--like they did
apparently on an oil rig or do we still have gaps even in
something as basic as that?
Mr. Corbett. Not to my knowledge. I don't think that
existed in this particular situation, so I mean with the
absence of the regulations you're reliant then on the
contractor to set up the procedures and things and to some
extent the local community to be involved with that. But I
don't believe so, no.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you. Another area for us. Congresswoman
DeLauro.
Ms. DeLauro. Just a couple of quick things. Is the safety
meeting that didn't happen, is that required before a gas blow,
can anybody just tell me? Is that a requirement to have a
safety meeting before a gas blow?
Mr. Bresland. I don't think there would be a legal
requirement that you would have a safety meeting before a gas
blow. It's probably a function of either the company's policy
or perhaps a union agreement, a labor agreement between labor
and management.
Ms. DeLauro. But it's not mandated to do something like
that.
Mr. Bresland. I don't think so.
Ms. DeLauro. Quick question to you, Chief, was anyone from
your Department present during any of the gas blow procedures
conducted on the site?
Mr. Badamo. No. We were notified of them, but were not
present.
Ms. DeLauro. Mr. Corbett, you say that--the Chief said a
Fire Marshal was informed. He couldn't take any action because
he has no authority, the Fire Marshal. Should the Fire Marshal
have authority?
Mr. Corbett. I think part of it also is the fact, I mean,
even myself--I wasn't very familiar with gas blow operations
until this incident occurred. And I don't know, and again I
can't speak for the Chief, but I would imagine it wouldn't
probably set off any alarms in their organization, but I mean I
would almost bet you if someone walked in to the Chief and
said, ``Chief, I'm going to be blowing 400,000 cubic feet of
gas, is that okay with you?'' I'm sure he would have probably
said, ``no.''
Ms. DeLauro. If NFPA applied to power plants, would local
authorities come into play? Would that have made this event any
different?
Mr. Corbett. Again, the gas blow, we have to distinguish
between the gas purging operations that are in NFPA 54 right
now as specified dealing with trapped air inside the pipe as
opposed to gas blow situations which are an attempt to blow
debris and other kind of things out of the pipes, so gas blows
aren't even defined in NFPA 54. Even if the scope was expanded
to include power plants, gas blows aren't even in there right
now.
Ms. DeLauro. Mr. Bresland, in your testimony there is a
chart which is a really extraordinary chart here. It's a graph
that shows the annual U.S. consumption of various flammable
gases, although propane and other liquified petroleum gases,
hydrogen and acetylene are regulated, I need my glasses here--
there it is, it's right there. Okay, so that you can see, but
OSHA currently has no specific standard for the safety of
natural gas, for methane, which is by far the most common gas.
Why? And you have looked at these issues for a while and why
are power plants exempt from these regulations and these
assessments?
Mr. Bresland. The answer to your first question about
natural gas regulation, I don't know why there are no specific
OSHA regulations regarding natural gas.
Ms. DeLauro. Is there any history of that? Do you know
anything about that or the exemption in terms of power plants'
exemption?
Mr. Bresland. I don't know that is an exemption per se,
it's just something that hasn't happened. It hasn't been
addressed over the years.
Your second question, what was the second part of your
question?
Ms. DeLauro. I'm trying to remember. Oh, it's actually the
exemption, why power plants----
Mr. Bresland. That might be a better questions for
Professor Corbett to answer because he's more of an expert on
NFPA issues than I am.
Ms. DeLauro. Why are power plants exempt?
Mr. Corbett. I don't know. I really don't. I'm not sure.
There are other codes and standards in the NFPA that
specifically either scope in or scope out specific types of
buildings' occupancies and I don't know for those reasons
either why that happens.
I know again, another colleague years ago, they tried to
put in the scope of a particular code that deals generally with
life safety issues. They wanted a specific requirement in there
to specifically state the users of the code that this code was
not to be applicable for terrorism-resistant building designs
and the NFPA turned them down on that proposal which implies
that the code should be used for that. So it's very confusing.
I don't have an answer for you. I think we'd have to ask
them.
Ms. DeLauro. Mayor, the training and the resources to train
your first responders, can you make the federal connection or
connect the dots between the resources that the Federal
Government provides in this area and your ability and Chief
Badamo's ability to do the kinds of job that's needed to be
done on the night of February 7th?
Mr. Giuliano. Well, Congresswoman, this is really something
that comes through Homeland Security. And they set the
standards, National Incident Management System standards. They
determine what qualifications we all need and I even was sent
to training shortly after I was elected. I'm going to be honest
with you, most of us grumbled about it, ``why are we doing
this? What are we doing this for?'' And on February 7th, we
were extremely glad that we did because what otherwise would
have been, would have been a state of mass confusion. When
confronted with that site, that event immediately after this
thing had occurred, it would take you enough time just to
absorb it. And to be able to have that training, that stuff
that's in the back of your head, in your subconscious come
forward and say, ``now I know what I have to do'' was
invaluable.
Again, the only clearinghouse for incidents that could
filter into this training system would be at the federal level.
They're the only ones who could say this happened in the Gulf,
that happened at the ConAgra plant. This natural disaster
happened over here. This terrorist attack happened over here.
And this is what we've learned from all these things.
Ms. DeLauro. What happens when those funds are cut?
Mr. Giuliano. Well, one, you don't update your training,
and two, you don't have the ability to quote often stage. We do
exercises and that information comes in from those sources. If
the funds are cut, we don't have the resources to even do the
exercises that keep us kind of at a higher edge. So you talk
about what happened on this and everything that happened before
and what could have been done. I don't think anybody saw it
coming. I don't think even the workers on the site saw this
coming. It happened that quickly.
When you look at, for example, the photos of the January
30th blow down right here, that one--what I was told was that
was textbook, nothing went wrong with that. Now it's hard to
believe that eight days later everybody got stupid and did it
wrong. So something extremely small must have occurred that
wasn't immediately obvious that something was going wrong.
Nobody picked up on it. And look at the devastating result. So
your margin for error, very, very tiny in these types of
things.
I noticed that maybe not directly address the question
about training, but what you're dealing with, sometimes in any
event when you see them coming, great, you can kind of stop
them. But most of these things you don't see coming. How are
you going to respond immediately and you're not sure what's
happening. You've got emergency responders on their way to the
site trying to figure out while they're going there what
they're going to be facing when they get there. So a lot of
that preparation has got to kick into gear on your way and
beforehand.
Ms. DeLauro. Thank you.
Mr. Courtney. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. Professor Corbett, you've been on the hot seat
for much of today, so I'll put you back for the final round of
questions. What I heard you say with respect to where you think
OSHA should step in is in gaps where the NFPA or the ICC has
not sufficiently protected the public.
And I wonder if that is realistic or possible, or whether
we need a full substitution for the current rulemaking and
current standard-setting process, whether we really can expect
to have OSHA be knowledgeable on a weekly, monthly, or yearly
basis what gaps exist when they're not really in charge to
begin with of these safety standards or whether we need a
wholesale substitution of regulatory authority where OSHA or
some other federal entity steps in, rather than--I heard what
you may be suggesting which is a concurrent responsibility
between private groups and then when they screw up, the Federal
Government.
Am I wrong to suggest that maybe we should be thinking in a
little bit more ambitious terms?
Mr. Corbett. Well, I testified before the House Science
Committee twice in the wake of 9/11 and the first hearing I
think it was Congresswoman Sheila Jackson-Lee actually brought
up that exact question, shouldn't we be actually doing this at
the federal level rather than relying on the NFPA?
I can remember sitting at that table just like I am now and
literally feeling the room move and the tension that went up,
skyrocketed in there. There are benefits to the process that
exists now because you do bring a lot of people to the table
that have specific knowledge, but there are these situations
that arise that, you know, shows the dark underside of this
process that things like this happen and we end up having to go
to the government, have the feds take the lead on it.
Personally, I would have no problem if the Federal
Government were to assume this responsibility. I don't know
that they want to do that. There's all sorts of states' rights
issues here.
I will say one thing in response to Judge Nevas' comments.
Many years ago, a similar situation with the NFPA, we had a
situation in Newark, New Jersey in the 1980s where there was a
large tank that overfilled from a pipeline, a gasoline tank. An
explosion occurred, a worker was killed and one of the most
fundamental issues was monitoring the level of gasoline inside
this million barrel tank basically and the New Jersey group,
the New Jersey Fire Director, and several people went to the
NFPA and said, ``look, why can't we have a manual gauging of
these tanks? We have to have some kind of automated system,''
and the NFPA Technical Committee turned them down too, back in
the '80s.
As I say, that's the reason this comes up every few years,
the same kind of issues. So my personal perspective, I would
certainly support the government taking this over.
Mr. Murphy. Judge Nevas, on your recommendations to the
Siting Council, the Siting Council is not really a construction
safety organization. It's a siting organization, and there are
safety concerns, obviously, inherent in siting, but do you
worry about asking the Siting Council to get involved in maybe
an area that they are not completely familiar with? Is that
asking too much?
Mr. Nevas. Not at all. I think they can draw on outside
experts if they think they need them. But I think what we're
recommending is practical, common sense suggestions as to how
to prevent this, time limitations on how long the worker can
work there, whether or not you're going to use natural gas or
nitrogen or air. To that point, Congressman Murphy, my
understanding is that when you blow with natural gas you can
accomplish the goal of clearing your lines in the matter of a
couple of days. If you use nitrogen, or some other agent, it
can take a couple of weeks. So obviously from the contractor's,
the builder's point of view, he wants to get it done quicker.
That doesn't mean it's safer, obviously.
So I think the Siting Council can take a very practical,
common sense approach. They can look at the recommendations of
our Commission. They can draw on other experts to make
suggestions to them. And then they can implement those
suggestions and recommendations very clearly and very concisely
when they renew this permit and say these are the conditions
under which this permit is being renewed and you've got to do
all these things and we're going to watch you and monitor you
to make sure you do them.
Mr. Murphy. And finally, if I may, to the Mayor and the
Chief, construction is back up and running, the plant is
scheduled to be online in the spring or summer of next year, I
believe. Can you talk for just a few seconds to the extent that
you believe things have changed there or how things have
changed with respect to your relationship on the site? Are you
confident that some lessons have been learned and that there's
a different level of safety sensitivity on the site?
Mr. Badamo. I think there definitely is. Obviously,
whenever any tragedy happens, you learn from the mistakes that
were made previously, you grow from those and I believe they
are moving forward with those, with that in mind. They are
moving forward. The construction process is continuing, the
rebuilding process is continuing. They are expected to be done
tentatively some time in April of next year, if everything goes
accordingly as they move forward.
As far as our relationship, our relationship has only grown
to become more inclusive, not that we were excluded before, but
we are definitely more included in some of the things. And
again, like Mr. Corbett has said earlier, we don't have
expertise in all of these processes. Over those 21 days, I
learned a heck of a lot about gas pipes and blows and things
that I never even dreamt that I would ever have an experience
with, so we do our best. And during that day we relied on them
and their safety procedures, even though we were presented them
to be safe. They have made other changes in processes and I
think that this site is actually going to become a starting
point for the future of building power plants because I think
they're going to work towards attempting and utilizing newer,
safer practices that can be employed in the future.
Mr. Nevas. Mr. Chairman, can I just add something?
Mr. Courtney. Sure.
Mr. Nevas. Derek Phelps, who is the chair of the Siting
Council is here and he just passed me a note and I'd like to
tell you what he says in this note. ``This past week, we, the
Siting Council, received Kleen Energy's request to extend its
certificate for construction. It includes a commitment to
comply with all, the panel that I chaired, recommendations.
This Tuesday, the Council will take up a motion to reopen and
consider the recommended action and the hearing is tentatively
scheduled for August 3rd.''
So it's going to get done and it's going to get done
quickly and efficiently and competently. And Connecticut can be
a leader in this area under the leadership of Derek Phelps and
others on his Council and other people who have an interest in
this, including people at this table.
Mr. Bresland. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Courtney. Sure.
Mr. Bresland. May I make a comment? At our hearing this
evening, we will have an expert who has a lot of experience in
the issue of this sort of natural gas blowing and has done it
over the years and has converted himself to not doing it any
more. He'll be talking to us about the issues of using nitrogen
instead of natural gas. And I anticipate that he will say that
it's less expensive and more efficient to use nitrogen rather
than natural gas so it will be interesting to hear and we'll
have an opportunity to question him when he testifies this
evening.
Mr. Courtney. Great. Thank you, Mr. Bresland. And thank
you, Mr. Phelps, for sharing that update.
Mr. Mayor?
Mr. Giuliano. Mr. Chairman, there is another power plant in
Middletown that is under construction right now. They're
building two peaking generators. They've advised us that their
blow downs will be done with nitrogen. Their engineers simply
don't like natural gas. They just deem it too risky. So I think
the industry is catching on that while purging, while doing
this blowdown with natural gas at Kleen Energy might have
seemed like a good idea at the time, in retrospect, the loss--
as I said, it's obviously something very, very minor that
changed the whole picture, caused loss of life, loss of
property, loss of limb. It's just not worth it. It's just not
worth it.
Mr. Courtney. Again, clearly, the people in the State of
Connecticut's awareness and sensitivity to this issue was
raised dramatically, but as committee staff can verify, there
still are other power plants across the country that are still
using natural gas and that's why I think we have work to do too
on this side of the microphone.
And for the record, I just wanted to share also which the
staff reminded me is that NFPA was invited to be here today. We
didn't issue subpoenas for this hearing, but they declined the
opportunity to testify, but obviously we had some great input
from Professor Corbett.
Did you want to make one final comment and then we'll start
to wrap up?
Mr. Corbett. Just to follow up with Congressman Murphy's
question. I just would encourage the congressional delegation
to consider exactly what we just talked about because there's a
lot of history of unfortunately disasters happening at one
place and it's geographic. The changes only are made in this
case in Connecticut. We've had that happen. With the overfill
of big tanks, New Jersey's Fire Code carried that for years and
the rest of the country did not. So it could happen in
California, Alabama, what have you.
Speed is important, but also recognize we need to get it
across the country.
Mr. Courtney. And obviously with 125 of these plants going
up----
Mr. Corbett. Right, there are going to be other places.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you. For the purposes of final remarks,
I wanted to defer to the Congresswoman for the City of
Middletown and I want to again thank the witnesses for their
great testimony here today, Rosa.
Ms. DeLauro. I want to say thank you to the Chairman and to
my colleague, Chris Murphy, and John Larson, who is here this
morning as well. I want to say thank you to the committee staff
and my staff for your efforts in putting this together. I want
to particularly thank the witnesses. As I said a moment ago,
it's striking the candor, the clarity and the concreteness of
your recommendations about how we should try to move forward.
You have given us real direction and with the wrap up comments
that you all have made and with Siting Council, with the
hearing tonight, I think we can move forward.
I appreciate what you said, Professor Corbett. We have to
make these standards national. This cannot be 50 different
kinds of procedures. They have to be national in order to
ensure the safety of the men and women who work in these
facilities and are constructing these facilities. To that, I
want to just say again thank you, but especially to you, Jodi,
because we owe it to you. We owe it to the families of the
victims to act on what we've heard this morning.
You said something very poignant. Quite frankly, it
harkened me back to listening to testimony right after Katrina,
not Katrina, the September 11th, when a woman in Oregon said
``my husband left in the morning and he didn't come back at
night. It's your job,'' she said to us, ``it's your job to give
us the confidence that when they go off in the morning that
they're going to come home at night.''
We cannot remedy the situation for you or for Tyler or for
Dylan, but it is you and the other families that are our
starting point and our ending point as we try to move forward.
I think in these four months and I will say in great part
due to the work of the CSB, Judge Nevas, of your work in the
Commission that we do understand that there is a wide gap in
the regulatory framework that needs to ensure worker safety.
It's clear that we should not rely on voluntary compliance and
voluntary self-regulation. It does not work, and that the
practice of gas blowing or even gas purging should be regulated
at the local, state, and federal levels.
There is an inherent risk in this practice and we cannot
allow more lives to be lost. Failure to act and I know this is
true for all of my colleagues here, failure to act is not an
option and that's why Mr. Courtney, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Larson,
with this Committee, with Chairman Woolsey and Chairman Miller,
that we intend to develop a legislative remedy.
So I look forward to work with all of my colleagues and
listening to state and local officials with whom we have worked
closely with over the last several months to come to a remedy
to this effort. So I thank you very, very much again for being
here with us this morning.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Rosa. On behalf of the Education
and Labor Committee, I want to thank again all of the witnesses
for their outstanding testimony. They have given us just
fabulous information to take back and we look forward to
working with you as the Subcommittee moves forward in terms of
the recommendations and possible legislation that we'll move
forward on.
So I have to, according to the rules, state that as
previously ordered, Members will have 14 days to submit
additional materials for the hearing record. Any Member who
wishes to submit followup questions in writing to the witnesses
should coordinate with majority staff within 14 days and
without objection, we are hereby adjourned. Thank you very
much.
[Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]