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    2010

                    THAILAND: THE PATH TOWARD RECONCILIATION

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                     SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC AND
                             THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 JUNE 10, 2010

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 111-118

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

     Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

                                     ______
                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
    GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York           ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
    ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American      CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
        Samoa                            DAN BURTON, Indiana
    DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey          ELTON GALLEGLY, California
    BRAD SHERMAN, California             DANA ROHRABACHER, California
    ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York             DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
    BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts         EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
    GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York           RON PAUL, Texas
    DIANE E. WATSON, California          JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
    RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri              MIKE PENCE, Indiana
    ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey              JOE WILSON, South Carolina
    GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia         JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
    MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York         J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
    THEODORE E. DEUTCH,                  CONNIE MACK, Florida
        FloridaAs of 5/6/       JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
        10 deg.                          MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
    JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee            TED POE, Texas
    GENE GREEN, Texas                    BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
    LYNN WOOLSEY, California             GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
    SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
    BARBARA LEE, California
    SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
    JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
    MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
    BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
    DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
    JIM COSTA, California
    KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
    GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
    RON KLEIN, Florida
                       Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
                    Yleem Poblete, Republican Staff Director
                                     ------

          Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global Environment

                ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa, Chairman
    GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York           DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
    DIANE E. WATSON, California          BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
    MIKE ROSS, Arkansas                  DANA ROHRABACHER, California
    BRAD SHERMAN, California             EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
    ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York             JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
    GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    The Honorable Scot Marciel, Deputy Assistant Secretary and
      Ambassador for ASEAN Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
      Affairs, U.S. Department of State..............................     7
    Ms. Catharin E. Dalpino, Visiting Associate Professor, Asian
      Studies Program, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service,
      Georgetown University..........................................    23
    Karl Jackson, Ph.D., Director of Asian Studies and South East
      Asia Studies, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
      International Studies..........................................    33
    Mr. Richard Cronin, Senior Associate, The Henry L. Stimson Center    42

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress
      from American Samoa, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia, the
      Pacific and the Global Environment: Prepared statement.........     4
    The Honorable Scot Marciel: Prepared statement...................    10
    Ms. Catharin E. Dalpino: Prepared statement......................    27
    Karl Jackson, Ph.D.: Prepared statement..........................    35
    Mr. Richard Cronin: Prepared statement...........................    45

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................    66
    Hearing minutes..................................................    67
    The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega: Material submitted for the
      record.........................................................    68

                    THAILAND: THE PATH TOWARD RECONCILIATION

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, JUNE 10, 2010

                  House of Representatives,
                  Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific
                                and the Global Environment,
                                  Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:45 p.m., in
    room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eni F.H.
    Faleomavaega (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. The Committee on Foreign Affairs,
    Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global Environment
    will come to order. The hearing today is to review the current
    crisis in Thailand. I know that my good friend, ranking member
    of the subcommittee, Mr. Manzullo, will be here later, and I am
    sure other members of the subcommittee will also join us. I am
    very appreciative of our experts who will be testifying,
    especially my good friend, Secretary Marciel, for taking time
    from his busy schedule to participate in this hearing this
    afternoon.
        So I will proceed with my opening statement.
        I had the privilege of meeting earlier this afternoon with
    the Special Envoy of the Prime Minister of Thailand. He is
    meeting with various officials in the administration and
    Members of Congress. For the life of me, I have a very
    difficult time pronouncing his name. I thought my name was bad.
    I will learn to get the rest of his name for the record down
    the line. I would like to proceed now with my opening statement
    for this hearing this afternoon.
        For over 5 years, the people of Thailand have seen their
    country embroiled in political strife, principally, but not
    exclusively, between two groups commonly referred to as the
    Yellow Shirts and the Red Shirts. The tension between the
    previous government under Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and
    the Yellow Shirts led to a military coup in 2006 and the exile
    of Prime Minister Thaksin.
        After 1 year of rule by an interim government established
    by the coup, control of the country reverted to a
    democratically-elected government. But the political strife
    continued, peaking with the recent Red Shirt antigovernment
    demonstrations in Bangkok, which left over 80 people dead. The
    bloodshed and ongoing instability is cause for concern for the
    United States as well as for Thailand's many other friends in
    the region and in the world.
        Although relative calm has returned to Bangkok in recent
    days, most of the contentious issues remain unresolved. Indeed,
    the recent riots and crackdowns appear to have deepened
    divisions within Thai society. The process of reconciliation
    must be reinvigorated, hopefully, and properly, or tensions
    will remain, and the risk of further violence and instability
    will grow.
        I honestly believe the five-point plan proposed by Prime
    Minister Abhisit in early May of this year provided the right
    starting point for such a process. The plan called for all
    parties to uphold the monarchy, to resolve fundamental problems
    of social justice, to ensure that the media could operate
    freely and constructively, to create an independent committee
    to investigate casualties of the recent crackdowns and to carry
    out political reforms resulting in fresh elections that I
    believe were to be called this November. The plan formed the
    most pragmatic and plausible path toward an amicable return to
    stability, democracy and the rule of law.
        Just today, in a nationwide telecast, Prime Minister
    Abhisit called on all Thais to participate in the five-point
    plan for reconciliation. As a start, a religious ceremony
    involving five religious faiths was held this morning. The
    Prime Minister also asked leaders across the spectrum to gather
    opinions over the next 2 weeks on how best to implement the
    road map through meetings, which the Prime Minister and his
    Cabinet would facilitate. In addition, he announced that a
    committee to review the Constitution was being formed and next
    week the government would organize an assembly of three
    agencies--the National Economic and Social Development Board;
    the National Health Insurance Board; and the Thai Health
    Promotion Foundation--to gather opinions on how to solve the
    problems of social disparities.
        Thailand has gone through political crises in the past,
    including the Black May crisis of 1992; student massacre at
    Thammasat University in 1976; and the student uprising in 1973.
    What we have witnessed over the past few months, however,
    exceeds all of these in terms of those injured and killed, as
    well as the depth of the social fissures underlying the crisis.
    There is no doubt that Thailand has entered a critical period,
    one that could determine the direction of the country for years
    to come.
        Clearly the conflict in Thailand is an internal issue, and
    only the people and the leaders of Thailand can chart their way
    toward a resolution. Yet, as a close friend of Thailand, we
    should stand by the country during this difficult period and
    encourage the Thai Government and the people of Thailand to
    move toward reconciliation and the rule of law.
        It was with those words in mind that I introduced House
    Resolution 1321 last month expressing the sense of the House of
    Representatives that the political situation in Thailand be
    resolved peacefully and democratically. While that resolution
    has yet to advance, on May 24, the Senate introduced and
    adopted Senate Resolution 538, which was based on House
    Resolution 1321, and which expressed precisely the same
    position. I continue to believe the House should pass its own
    resolution due to the importance of the bilateral relationship.
    Our long history of friendship gained official sanction in 1833
    when Thailand became the first treaty ally of the United States
    in the Asia-Pacific region.
        In recent decades we have strengthened our ties to the
    military alliance we forged in 1954, through our designation of
    Thailand as a major non-NATO ally in 2003 and Thailand's valued
    contributions of troops in support of our U.S. military
    operations in Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and
    Iraq.
        I just want to note for the record that, in my service as a
    Vietnam veteran, I will never forget the contributions and what
    it means to have a friend in those days of the Vietnam War.
    Thailand was one of our most important allies, and I will say
    this publicly to my colleagues and to the people, on behalf of
    our country, we are grateful for all that Thailand has done as
    a close friend and ally of the United States.
        Thailand has also been a major trading partner of the
    United States, a regional leader, a force for stability in
    Southeast Asia and a country with which we share common values
    and interests. The United States has always appreciated
    Thailand's many international contributions and we respect and
    admire its unique culture.
        Just prior to this hearing, His Excellency Mr. Kiat
    Sitthiamorn, Special Envoy of the Prime Minister, met with the
    members of the Foreign Affairs Committee and gave a first-hand
    account of the issues confronting Thailand. The crisis is
    complex and multidimensional, one that involves political
    conflict, economic tensions, social strifes and personal
    enmities. Fortunately, we have with us today our good friend
    Deputy Assistant Secretary Marciel and a group of experts to
    help us understand the things happening in Thailand, and they
    will be sharing with us their testimony as well.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Faleomavaega follows:]

        Mr. Faleomavaega. And with that, I would like to begin the
    hearing by having our Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian
    and Pacific Affairs and Ambassador to ASEAN, Secretary Scot
    Marciel, as our first witnesses this afternoon. Secretary
    Marciel is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service and
    has served in posts in Vietnam, the Philippines, Hong Kong,
    Brazil and Turkey, and as staff in the Economic Bureau's Office
    of Monetary Affairs. He is a resident of California, a graduate
    of the University of California at Davis--actually you should
    have gone to Berkeley, but that is okay, I forgive you--and the
    Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He is married and has two
    daughters.
        Secretary Marciel.

       STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SCOT MARCIEL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
      SECRETARY AND AMBASSADOR FOR ASEAN AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF EAST
          ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

        Mr. Marciel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
    Member Manzullo, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you
    very much for inviting me here today to discuss recent events
    in Thailand, our longtime friend and treaty ally in Southeast
    Asia.
        While the streets of Bangkok have returned to relative
    calm, the situation remains fragile, and the issues that must
    be addressed for calm to become stability are complex and
    challenging. Thailand has just experienced the worst political
    violence in a generation. The causes of the recent events are
    complex, and the consequences are not easy to predict. We were
    greatly saddened by the loss of life that resulted from the
    clashes. One hopeful sign, however, is that the Thai political
    debate now is once again taking place in the Parliament rather
    than through violent street protests.
        Our friendship with Thailand is based on a relationship
    that spans over two centuries and a common set of values that
    define our two peoples. Among these are a commitment to
    democracy; an emphasis on good governance, accountability, and
    transparency in the actions of government; and the rights of
    peaceful freedom of assembly and expression. These values are
    an integral part of the vibrant society that Thailand is today,
    and they serve as important touchstones for all sides in
    efforts to chart a path forward to national reconciliation.
        The importance to the United States of our long-standing
    friendship with Thailand cannot be overstated. As one of only
    five U.S. treaty allies in Asia, Thailand remains crucial to
    U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. The U.S.
    mission in Thailand, one of the largest in the world, affords
    the United States a regional operating platform that would be
    difficult to replace elsewhere. Our bilateral relationship
    provides incalculable benefits in health, security, trade and
    investment, in law enforcement cooperation, and humanitarian
    assistance to refugees to both countries.
        The last several years have been turbulent for Thailand.
    The restoration of elected government in early 2008 ended the
    short-lived post-2006 coup interim government, but left major
    divisions in the Thai body politic. Court decisions forced two
    Prime Ministers from office in 2008, and three times in the
    past 2 years the normal patterns of political life took a back
    seat to disruptive street protests. The yellow-shirted People's
    Alliance for Democracy occupied Government House from August to
    December 2008, shutting down Bangkok's airports for 8 days, to
    protest governments led by the People's Power Party, the heir
    to the Thai Rak Thai Party of deposed Prime Minister Thaksin.
        The fall of the PPP-led coalition government in December
    2008 and its replacement by the current coalition reversed the
    previous political configuration. In April 2009, the red-
    shirted United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship, UDD,
    disrupted a regional Asian summit, ASEAN summit, and sparked
    riots in Bangkok after Mr. Thaksin, now a fugitive in the wake
    of his conviction on abuse of power charges, called for
    revolution to bring him home.
        Neither of these earlier protest cycles, however,
    approached the March 12 to May 19 crisis in terms of the human
    and financial toll exacted. The crisis, which paralyzed the
    government, left 88 people dead and caused an estimated $1.5
    billion in arson-related property losses, accentuated major
    political cleavages in the Thai population.
        Throughout the recent turmoil, the United States has been
    active in promoting dialogue, reconciliation, and the peaceful
    settlement of political disputes. Secretary Clinton, for
    example, released a video message to the Thai people on April
    13 urging peaceful dialogue. Our embassy in Bangkok engaged
    with Thai Government officials at all levels as well as leaders
    of the opposition Red Shirt movement to underscore both the
    value we place on our relationship with Thailand and the
    importance of resolving political differences through
    compromise rather than force or violence. We also worked to
    ensure that we were doing everything possible to protect the
    safety and well-being of American citizens in Thailand.
        While the government succeeded in ending the protest and
    restoring order, the fundamental divisions within Thai society
    that lie at the root of the political tensions remain. We
    welcome Prime Minister Abhisit's vow to follow through on the
    reconciliation road map proposal he originally put forward with
    the goal of ending the UDD protest peacefully. We support the
    establishment of an independent fact-finding commission to
    review the incidents of violence from March through May and
    determine who is responsible.
        While this would be a positive first step, it should not be
    the last. Now more than ever it is critical for all Thai actors
    to promote dialogue and reconciliation, to recognize the
    legitimate grievance of Thai citizens, to support the equal and
    impartial application of the law, and to foreswear the use of
    violence to resolve political differences.
        The Prime Minister's original proposal included a date in
    November for early elections. He has since indicated that
    conditions in Thailand do not allow for November elections. The
    door to early balloting is not closed, however, and while it
    will be up to the Thais to work out the date, the Prime
    Minister's own plan acknowledged that democratic elections are
    an important part of reconciliation.
        The United States has stressed consistently that all sides
    should work out differences within Thailand's democratic
    framework and without resorting to violence. Assistant
    Secretary Campbell reiterated this point on his recent visit to
    Bangkok. The right to peaceful assembly is a key component of
    Thai democracy, but Thais must also exercise their
    responsibility not to let that peaceful assembly turn violent.
    Responsible leaders across the Thai political spectrum and in
    civil society need to emphasize to their supporters that in a
    democracy, violence has no place in politics. Leaders who
    refuse to condemn violent acts do a disservice to their cause,
    to their supporters, and to their country.
        Thailand remains one of our oldest treaty allies in Asia
    and our close friends. The United States can be a source of
    support as the Thai work to resolve the issues that still
    divide them, but it is the Thai people themselves who must make
    the difficult choices on how to proceed. For our part, the
    United States will continue to do what we can to promote
    reconciliation among the Thai people and to preserve and
    strengthen this enduring friendship.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am pleased to answer
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Marciel follows:]

        Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you.
        We are joined by the ranking member of the subcommittee, my
    good friend from Illinois, for his opening statement.
        Mr. Manzullo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this
    very important hearing.
        America's relationship with Thailand dates back over 177
    years to 1833, in the days of President Andrew Jackson.
    Thailand remains an important friend of the United States, and
    we value the relationship.
        The Ambassador of Thailand to the United States recently
    paid an official visit to the congressional district that I
    represent and Rockford College, which I have the honor to
    represent. We truly appreciate his visit. It was a rare
    opportunity for college students to ask questions of an
    ambassador, and he is a truly witty man, and we are absolutely
    thrilled he took the time to come out and spend time with these
    young people.
        We urge the good people of Thailand to seek peaceful and
    nonviolent ways in which to express their disagreement. We also
    urge the Royal Thai Government to hold elections as soon as
    feasible. Most importantly, elections resulting from a free and
    fair process have to be respected. I understand that the
    current crisis has many dimensions and goes beyond Red Shirts
    and Yellow Shirts; however, our desire is to encourage a
    genuine reconciliation amongst the good people of Thailand.
        We look forward to hearing the second panel.
        I appreciate, Mr. Marciel, your excellent testimony and the
    number of years you spent working on this issue. I know it has
    got to be very dear to your heart.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. I thank the gentleman from Illinois.
        Mr. Secretary, as I recall, in recent years when there was
    a military coup in Thailand, we immediately imposed sanctions.
    Are those sanctions still in place or have they been lifted?
        Mr. Marciel. Mr. Chairman, you are right. After the coup in
    2006, we did put in place sanctions as required by law because
    we determined it was a military coup under the law. We lifted
    those sanctions after the subsequent elections at the end of
    2007, I believe it was. Early 2008.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Which raises another question. I wanted
    to dialogue with you on the question of sanctions. I know our
    law does stipulate that whenever there is a military coup, we
    put on sanctions. But there was a tremendous sense of
    disappointment as I met with the leaders of Thailand. They felt
    betrayed. They felt that the United States should not have put
    these sanctions in place for the simple reason that this is an
    internal matter, and that the government and the people were
    trying every way possible to reconcile and go back to a
    democratic form of government.
        Do you think this law still has merit? Because here is
    another instance when there was a military coup that took place
    in Pakistan, by I think a general named Musharraf. For 8 years
    the coup was in place and we did not put any sanctions on
    Pakistan. Somewhat of a contradiction, in my humble opinion.
        Should there be a better way of measurement on how our
    Government should react or respond to coups? Each country has
    their own particular situation. As to why the coup took place
    in Pakistan, which we didn't put any sanctions--in fact, we
    gave Pakistan billions of dollars, and for our own reasons. But
    when a friendly ally like Thailand had a coup for whatever
    reasons, we put the same onus on them and make them feel like
    they are a hostile and undemocratic country. And I wanted to
    ask your opinion, do you think the law is good? Is it a good
    law?
        Mr. Marciel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. A couple of
    comments, if I could.
        One, you are right that a number of people in the
    government, the postcoup interim government, complained about
    the imposition of sanctions, which was a cutoff of assistance,
    certain types of assistance. It wasn't sanctions of the sense
    of ending trade or banning investment; it was rather limited.
    Others, I have to say, in Thailand criticized us for not being
    tough enough and not responding harshly enough, asking were we
    sending an adequately strong message about our democratic
    values. So we kind of got it from both sides, to be perfectly
    honest.
        I think the key for me is that the sanctions are one piece
    of the reaction, as you know, mandated by law. I think the
    bigger picture, though, is how we tried to deal with that
    government. We did not become an enemy or hostile to Thailand
    at all. We made it clear throughout this period--and I remember
    it well because it was a difficult period when a country that
    is an ally and a close friend and is important to all of us was
    going through a difficult period. We had to impose these
    sanctions, but we also did work very carefully and very closely
    with the government and others in Thailand to try to help them
    move forward out of this situation.
        So I think we played a positive role, despite the
    requirement to impose those sanctions, in helping Thailand to
    move on to the next step postcoup and back to democracy.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Do you think perhaps rather than just
    immediately--because the law dictates as soon as a coup is
    committed that we apply sanctions--do you think the law could
    be revised, or amended at least, to give the administration or
    Congress a little leeway or time to examine the given sanctions
    so that we don't put sanctions automatically in the way that we
    have done to Thailand and we have done to Fiji, and we don't do
    it to Pakistan?
        Mr. Marciel. Mr. Chairman, in all honesty I am not sure
    that I can speak for the administration on this. Certainly I
    think it is a worthwhile discussion to have certainly among
    Congress and between the administration and Congress. But I
    couldn't give you an authoritative statement from the
    administration on that.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you.
        The situation and the crisis in Thailand is a lot deeper
    than the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts. We know that. I
    think there is also the question of the rise of the middle
    class where they seem to place a very critical emphasis on this
    Yellow Shirt and Red Shirt problem that we are faced with. I
    just wanted to ask what is the current situation so far as who
    really is pulling the strings, thereby causing the Red Shirts
    to do what they are doing right now? According to media
    reports, they say Thaksin is behind it, and other reports say
    that a group of prominent middle-class businessmen might be
    behind it. It seems every time the government tries to bring
    everybody together to reconcile, they suddenly break off the
    negotiations. Can you elaborate? Can you share with us why
    there seems to be this uncertainty and--I shouldn't say
    contradictions, but who is leading the Red Shirts in that
    respect?
        Mr. Marciel. Mr. Chairman, that is actually a very good and
    very difficult question.
        I have been working on Southeast Asia off and on for about
    25 years. I am not sure I have encountered a situation as
    complex as the one in Thailand right now in terms of trying to
    understand the politics. It is extraordinarily complicated. And
    as you pointed out, it is not as simple as one group against
    another. There are very many layers and complexities involved.
        Certainly we have seen a number of factors at play. One of
    those is I think there is a general consensus that one of the
    things that Prime Minister Thaksin did when he was Prime
    Minister was, if you will--I don't know if it is the right
    term--empowered a certain part of the population that
    previously may not have been as active in politics as it was.
    So you have certain elements of the population more active in
    politics, which generally is a good thing in terms of
    strengthening a democracy.
        But as far as pulling strings, our view, if I could
    simplify, would be to say that there are a lot of people out
    there protesting who have legitimate grievances and complaints.
    There are also people, including the former Prime Minister, who
    are encouraging and supporting the protests. I think it would
    be a mistake to say that it is all Prime Minister Thaksin or
    anybody else pulling strings. I think our understanding is that
    was one factor, but that there are thousands of people out
    there who felt strongly about what they were protesting for. So
    it is not someone pulling strings, although there are obviously
    people who are working to support those protests.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. In our meeting earlier with the Prime
    Minister's Special Envoy, Mr. Kiat Sitthiamorn, he indicated
    that the current crisis has resulted in a loss of some $50
    billion, affecting the economy of Thailand. Their tourism
    industry, in particular, has been severely affected by the
    crisis.
        My understanding is that when Prime Minister Thaksin became
    Prime Minister, he made tremendous advancements in providing
    help to the poor and destitute in the rural areas. Despite
    problems that affected the Thai Government's operations,
    somehow they helped people from the rural areas out in the
    country, basically people who are low-income level, and this is
    the reason why he is still so popular among the poor people.
        Is he the first Prime Minister who has given substantive
    attention to the needs of the poor in Thailand? Why does there
    seem to be such a consistent support stream of people out of
    the rural areas of the country?
        Mr. Marciel. Mr. Chairman, I don't know that I would say
    that he is the first Prime Minister to pay attention to the
    poor, but he certainly made it a major part of his platform to
    enact or expand programs that were designed to help rural
    areas. I think, as I understand it, the current government of
    Prime Minister Abhisit has actually continued a number of these
    programs or adjusted them somewhat, recognizing that some of
    them had value. So he certainly did play a role there.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. As I recall, Prime Minister Thaksin was
    taken to court for certain transactions as a businessman. Was
    it some kind of a telecommunications company that he sold or he
    purchased? I think he sold his company in Singapore for which
    he did not pay taxes; is that a fact? Is that true?
        Mr. Marciel. Mr. Chairman, I don't remember all of the
    details of it. There was certainly an issue when he sold his
    telecommunications company, and it got a lot of attention in
    Thailand, and it was being looked at by the Thai authorities.
    He was tried for corruption in the middle of 2008. I don't
    remember exactly what the charges are, but we could get that
    information to you if I can follow up.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Can you, please? I would like to make
    that part of the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]
     Written Response Received from the Honorable Scot Marciel to Question
        Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega
        Thaksin Shinawatra's sale of a telecommunications business to a
    foreign firm in 2006 (during his tenure as Prime Minister) prompted
    allegations of improper tax exemptions and abuse of power. The Thai
    Securities and Exchange Commission investigation cleared Thaksin of all
    wrongdoing that year.
        In October 2008, after the coup and change of government, the Thai
    Supreme Court issued an arrest warrant for Thaksin related to the 2006
    sale.
        In January 2007 the Royal Thai Government charged Thaksin for
    allegedly improper land purchases, unlawful use of state funds, and
    obstructing competition against his personal business by imposing an
    excise tax on telecommunication firms.

        Mr. Faleomavaega. Please, I am not pointing fingers; I am
    not trying to declare the man guilty, I am simply saying this
    is one of the problems that he encountered when he was Prime
    Minister. If there were other issues--was there some kind of a
    conspiracy or those who opposed him? Were there trumped up
    charges? Was he basically banished from Thailand, or can he
    return to Thailand at any time?
        Mr. Marciel. Mr. Chairman, he was convicted, and he fled
    Thailand, and so right now he is a fugitive. I don't want to
    speak for the Thai Government on this. I assume he probably
    could come back to Thailand, but he would face that conviction
    and whatever sentence he had.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. I am going to withhold further questions
    and yield to my good friend from Illinois for his questions.
        Mr. Manzullo. Mr. Chairman, you asked two questions that I
    wanted to ask. I think if I asked the same questions, I would
    get the same answer, and I am satisfied with the answers that
    you gave.
        More of an observation than anything, and it doesn't
    require any comment on your part, is the Thais' tremendous
    loyalty to a democratic state, for lack of a better word. I
    have talked to so many Thais, and they really love democracy.
    And one Thai told me, we love it so much that sometimes the
    military thinks it must enforce it. I thought that is an
    interesting comment. And yet whenever there has been a coup,
    the coup shortly thereafter talks about having elections, a
    continuous return to democracy. That is what makes the Thai
    situation so unique, so challenging, but so important that we
    encourage the Thais to work through this process to become even
    more established in their democratic values and ideals.
        I don't know what more the American people or our
    Government can do to encourage them to do that, because it is
    really engrained into their spirit.
        Did you want to comment on that? You don't have to.
        Mr. Marciel. Well, thank you, Congressman.
        Just briefly I would say that I agree that the Thai people
    care about their democracy. They want it, and I think Secretary
    Clinton has said all democracies are works in progress by
    definition, and the Thai one clearly is, and it is going
    through a difficult time now. I think there is a strong
    commitment to democracy among the Thai people, and for that
    reason I am confident over time they will be able to work it
    out, but obviously one of the struggles right now is between
    two--actually more than two, but fundamentally two different
    visions on how to move ahead.
        But I agree with you very much that the Thai are committed
    to democracy, and that this is something that the American--our
    role is to be as supportive of the nation and people of
    Thailand as possible, and to give all possible encouragement
    for them to work this out with the understanding that they are
    the ones who will have to work it out.
        Mr. Manzullo. Thank you.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. I thank the gentleman from Illinois for
    his questions. I was going to follow up with a question he had
    alluded to earlier. What exactly is the role of the military
    right now in the Government of Thailand? How much influence
    does the military have in Thai society, be it business or
    social?
        Mr. Marciel. Well, the military certainly has influence in
    the broader Thai body politic. It is a very respected
    institution in Thailand. It doesn't play a direct role in
    politics in the way in some countries military men are in
    Parliament, that sort of thing.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. How big is the Thai military?
        Mr. Marciel. I don't know.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Can you provide that for the record?
        [The information referred to follows:]
     Written Response Received from the Honorable Scot Marciel to Question
        Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega
        The estimated size of the Royal Thai Army is approximately 200,000
    personnel and consists of seven infantry divisions, one armored
    division, one cavalry division, two special forces divisions, one field
    artillery division, and one air defense artillery division.
        According to Royal Thai Government figures, the 2009 Thai military
    budget was 170 billion baht ($5.2 billion), or 8.2 percent of the total
    national budget and 1.9 percent of Thailand's GDP. The RTG has budgeted
    155 billion baht ($4.8 billion) for 2010, a decrease of approximately
    nine percent.
        The Thai military controls a few businesses but does not have a
    major role in the Thai economy. The military supervises a battery
    factory and tanning plant as well as small military-related production
    of uniforms, small arms and other items for military personnel use. The
    Thai military controls some media outlets, such as TV Channel 5 and
    numerous radio stations. According to the Thai Ministry of Finance,
    these businesses are taxed and their revenues are used mostly for
    internal operations.

        Mr. Faleomavaega. I am also curious how much the Thai
    Government pays into its military budget, and how it affects
    the entire defense structure of Thailand. I would appreciate if
    you can provide that for the record.
        Mr. Marciel. I will be happy to do that.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Is the military also involved in
    businesses like those other countries? I am curious.
        Mr. Marciel. I have to say, Mr. Chairman, I am going to
    have to get back to you on that. I think there is some
    involvement, but it is not something that I have followed. I
    will have to get you an answer on that.
        My guess is one of the experts on the panel that follows me
    will be able to give you an answer on that.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. A good example of this is Indonesia. This
    has been one of the most difficult problems in controlling
    their military, because they are involved in business and a lot
    of illegal business goes on in Indonesia. I was wondering if
    the same is true of Thailand.
        How much trade do we currently conduct with Thailand, in
    terms of our investments?
        Mr. Marciel. Mr. Chairman, I am afraid I am on a losing
    streak here.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. I think they should fire your political
    staff behind you for not giving you this good information.
        Mr. Marciel. I apologize. That is something I should have
    at my fingertips, and I don't, but we will get that to you.
        [The information referred to follows:]
     Written Response Received from the Honorable Scot Marciel to Question
        Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega
        For 2009, U.S. exports to Thailand amounted to $6.9 billion and
    U.S. imports from Thailand totaled $19.1 billion.
        According to the Commerce Department's Bureau of Economic Analysis,
    U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Thailand on a historical cost
    basis was $9.128 billion in 2008 (latest data available).
        The U.S. goods and services trade with Thailand totaled $35 billion
    in 2007 (latest data available). Exports totaled $10 billion; imports
    totaled $25 billion. The U.S. goods and services trade deficit with
    Thailand was $14 billion in 2007.
        Thailand is currently the United States' 23rd largest goods trading
    partner with $26 billion in total (two ways) goods trade during 2009.
    Goods exports totaled $6.9 billion; goods imports totaled $19.1
    billion. The U.S. goods trade deficit with Thailand was $12.2 billion
    in 2008. Trade in services with Thailand (exports and imports) totaled
    $3.4 billion in 2008 (latest data available). Services exports were
    $1.7 billion; services imports were $1.7 billion. According to Thai
    Government statistics, in 2009, Thai imports from ASEAN amounted to
    $26.9 billion and Thai exports to ASEAN reached $32.4 billion.

        Mr. Faleomavaega. What is the population of Thailand?
        Mr. Marciel. It is about 65-70 million.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. I will give you a gold star for that.
        Mr. Marciel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me a
    question I can answer.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. I do want to thank you and I do want to
    thank Secretary Clinton for her interest in making sure that
    our involvement is constructive and positive, and in assuring
    the people of Thailand that the United States stands ready to
    help in any way.
        I think my good friend from Illinois mentioned something
    about democracy. Correct me if I am wrong, Mr. Secretary, but
    there is no perfect democracy in this world today; am I wrong
    on that?
        Mr. Marciel. You are not wrong on that.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. And I might add that democracy is nothing
    but an experimentation. It is a process. It took us 200 years
    to give African Americans the right to vote, or something like
    that, and we are still not there yet. We would like to see
    Mother Liberty with the blindfold and say that the Constitution
    is color blind, and that we look to the character of the person
    as the essence and not so much the color or ethnicity or
    nationality. I suppose that is the essence of democracy for
    which we strive, and I think we sometimes tend to forget that
    we try to democratize all other countries based on our
    application of democracy. Do you agree with that; do you think
    Thailand should follow our democratic system? We don't have a
    king, that is for sure.
        Mr. Marciel. I guess I would put it this way, Mr. Chairman.
    You are right, there is no perfect democracy. We are all
    working to strengthen our democracies. I think democracies can
    learn from each other. We all, and certainly you all, try to
    strengthen our democracy, and that is the best we can do.
    Others may chose to follow to some extent or take some lessons
    from it, and we obviously follow what others do as well and
    sometimes learn lessons from others.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. What do you consider to be the most
    critical issue for our country, in terms of our relationship
    with Thailand that should never waiver or never be lessened in
    any way? I guess the word ``security'' comes to my mind in
    terms of our relationship with an important country like
    Thailand. How is our security relationship currently working
    with Thailand?
        Mr. Marciel. Our security relationship with Thailand is
    very good. Our military has worked together very well. Thailand
    continues to host annually the Cobra Gold exercise, which, as
    you know, is a very large, multilateral exercise. And overall
    there is extremely good cooperation in many ways on the
    military side as well as on the law enforcement side, including
    with Thailand hosting a regional law enforcement academy which
    plays a very positive role.
        In my view, the most important thing for the United States,
    important as the security relationship is, the most important
    thing for the United States to keep in mind now as Thailand
    goes through this period, we are, as I said earlier, friends
    with the entire nation and all of the people of Thailand, and
    that is something that we need to remember constantly as they
    go through this crisis with different groups debating each
    other.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. It is very interesting to note with
    interest Cambodia, Vietnam, I believe even Laos, their
    principal trading partner right now is China. And I am just
    curious, where does Thailand fall into this?
        Mr. Marciel. Thailand is also a significant trading partner
    for all of those countries. Trade among the ASEAN countries has
    increased at a rapid rate, and with the advent of the ASEAN
    Free Trade Agreement this year, we can expect that to continue
    to increase. I can get you numbers on the trade, but it is
    certainly important, as well as Thai investment in those
    countries.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Please. And in your capacity also as
    Ambassador to the ASEAN organization, I am just curious, there
    have been recent reports of Myanmar's interest in developing a
    nuclear weapon, and I was wondering if this would have serious
    implications for those countries in Southeast Asia if Myanmar
    seeks to do the same thing like in North Korea. North Korea now
    has eight atom bombs, or something like that?
        Mr. Marciel. We have certainly read with interest the
    recent reports on a possible nuclear initiative by Burma. I
    can't say too much about it in an open hearing, but obviously
    we follow it very carefully.
        I think there are two issues. One is whether there is some
    kind of serious nuclear program in Burma, which certainly would
    be tremendously destabilizing to the entire region. And second
    is also the Burmese acquisition of other military equipment,
    conventional, which also can affect regional stability. So we
    are looking at both of those questions very closely.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Can you also provide for the record the
    number of Thai Americans we have in our country? Besides Tiger
    Woods.
        [The information referred to follows:]
     Written Response Received from the Honorable Scot Marciel to Question
        Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega
        According to ``We the People: Asians in the United States,'' Census
    2000 Special Reports, CENSR-17, issued in December 2004, page 1,
    110,850 respondents reported to be of Thai origin. An additional 39,243
    respondents identified themselves as being of mixed Thai heritage. If
    both groups of respondents are included, there were 150,093 Asians with
    Thai heritage in the U.S. in 2000. The 2010 Census figures are not
    available yet.

        Mr. Faleomavaega. Do you know that Tiger Woods is more Thai
    than African American because his mother is from Thailand? I
    don't know how many Americans know that.
        I think we currently have 690,000 foreign students who
    attend American colleges and universities. And the number one
    country is China with 100,000; India with about 90,000. I am
    curious, how many students from the ASEAN countries attend
    American colleges and universities?
        I have always firmly believed this is probably one of our
    most important assets--allowing students from all over the
    world to come and study in America and see America for what it
    is, and to understand and appreciate the institutions and what
    we are striving for. I am just curious if Thailand is also in
    that light in terms of the number of students from Thailand who
    are currently attending our American colleges and universities.
        Mr. Marciel. Mr. Chairman, I absolutely agree that it is
    very much good for the United States, as well as for the
    sending countries, to have students studying in the United
    States. I can get you the numbers for all of ASEAN and for
    individual countries. Thailand is a major--I have the numbers
    here. Great.
        We currently have almost 9,000 students from Thailand
    studying in the United States. Sorry, this is actually from a
    couple of years ago, a few years ago. Thailand, almost 9,000;
    Indonesia, a little over 7,000; Vietnam, 6,000; and China at
    this point 67,000. So that is extraordinarily high. But overall
    for ASEAN, the numbers have been going up. Certainly from
    Vietnam, they have been going up very rapidly. Indonesia, they
    have gone down somewhat, which is a concern for us. And
    Thailand, it is more stable. I can get you all of the numbers.
        [The information referred to follows:]
     Written Response Received from the Honorable Scot Marciel to Question
        Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega
        According to the 2009 Open Doors report, the numbers of ASEAN
    students studying at U.S. universities and colleges during the 2008/
    2009 academic year (the most recent available statistics) are as
    follows:

                            Brunei                                                        39
                            Burma                                                        667
                            Cambodia                                                     386
                            Indonesia                                                  7,509
                            Laos                                                          80
                            Malaysia                                                   5,942
                            Philippines                                                4,226
                            Singapore                                                  3,989
                            Thailand                                                   8,736
                            Vietnam                                                   12,823
                            ASEAN Total                                               44,397

        Mr. Faleomavaega. This is a program that our Government
    should engage in--to encourage and bring students from the
    ASEAN countries to study in our colleges and universities.
        Mr. Marciel. We do have a number of programs, Fulbright
    obviously, but other programs that provide scholarships or
    otherwise encourage students from ASEAN to study in the United
    States. We are always talking about how we can do more. In the
    President's planned trip to Indonesia, looking at how we can
    encourage more Indonesian students here is a big priority for
    us. So, yes, it is something that we should be doing.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. It is my understanding that the
    President's trip to Indonesia has been cancelled again. Is
    there any indication when he might be doing this in the coming
    months? This is three times now that he has cancelled the trip.
        Mr. Marciel. He has postponed the trip, Mr. Chairman, I
    believe, because of the environmental crisis in the Gulf of
    Mexico, but still intends to go, but there is not a new date
    set yet.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. I note with interest during the
    Presidential campaign there was a national blog that said that
    I, humble me, was specially appointed as an agent of Barack
    Obama to go to Indonesia, which I did. I went to Indonesia to
    go to the school that he attended, to make sure that there was
    no indication whatsoever that Barack Obama was born in
    Indonesia. Say hello to the birthers for me on that.
        But at any rate, Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for
    your patience and good humor in seeing this through. I do want
    very much to do all we can, at least as Members of Congress, to
    be as helpful as we can to the people and good leaders of
    Thailand.
        Did you want to add any more to your statement?
        Mr. Marciel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Only that the administration view is exactly the same. The
    United States wants to do all we can to help our friends in
    Thailand get through this, and we hope the administration and
    the Congress can work together in support of the Thai people
    and----
        Mr. Faleomavaega. And the administration is supportive of
    the five points outlined by the Prime Minister in May?
        Mr. Marciel. That is right, Mr. Chairman, we are.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and thank you
    for coming.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. We have some good experts here on our
    next panel. Our second panel includes Dr. Karl Jackson, Dr.
    Richard Cronin and Ms. Catharin Dalpino.
        Dr. Jackson is the director of the Asian Studies program at
    the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins
    University. A C.V. Starr distinguished professor of southeast
    asian studies, he also serves as the director of the Southeast
    Asia Studies program at the SAIS. Until 1991, he was professor
    of political science at the University of California,
    Berkeley--go, Bears--where he began teaching in 1972.
        Dr. Jackson served as the National Security Adviser to the
    Vice President from 1991 to 1993. Prior to that he was Special
    Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and
    was also senior director for Asian affairs at the National
    Security Council. Mr. Jackson served as a Deputy Assistant
    Secretary of Defense of East Asian Affairs. He also was the
    president of the U.S.-Thailand Business Council. He has written
    several books and is very much up to date on the situation in
    Thailand.
        Professor Dalpino is a former diplomat, scholar,
    international organizations professional staff member and
    program manager of an NGO. She has been a university professor
    for over 10 years, teaching courses in international relations,
    human rights and democracy promotion, politics and security and
    international relations in Southeast Asia.
        Ms. Dalpino was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
    Democracy, Human Rights and Labor for 5 years, where she had
    special responsibilities for U.S. policy in China, Indonesia,
    Burma, Bosnia, Haiti and Rwanda. She also led the U.S.
    delegation to the Group of 24, which coordinates democracy
    promotion assistance to Eastern Europe. Prior to joining the
    State Department, Ms. Dalpino was a policy analyst for the
    World Bank and an officer at the Asia Foundation, where she
    served as the Foundation's resident representative for
    Thailand, Laos and Cambodia.
        In 1997, Ms. Dalpino became a fellow at the Brookings
    Institution, where she researched and wrote on U.S.-Asian
    relations for 7 years. During this time, she taught at
    Georgetown University, Johns Hopkins University School of
    Advanced International Studies and also George Washington
    University. She has also directed projects on U.S. Relations in
    Southeast Asia for the Stanley Foundation, on Agent Orange in
    Vietnam for the Aspen Institute and on U.S.-Cambodian relations
    for The Asia Society. She has written three books on U.S.
    policy toward Asia.
        Dr. Richard Cronin is a senior associate and director of
    the Southeast Asia program at the Stimson Center, a nonprofit
    organization dealing with foreign security policy, in
    Washington, DC.
        Dr. Cronin currently works on transboundary and
    nontraditional security issues in the Mekong Basin and
    Southeast Asia from a political economy perspective. He has
    written and coauthored several articles on Thailand's regional
    relations and the political crisis that culminated in the May
    19 violence for the Stimson Foundation's home page. He is also
    lead and coauthor of several books. My gosh, I can go on and on
    here.
        He has taught comparative Asian political economy at Johns
    Hopkins and Chuo University in Tokyo, and was also a Vietnam
    veteran intelligence officer in the U.S. Army 1st Infantry
    Division in 1965 and 1966. I was there 1967 and 1968, so you
    left before I came.
        I want to thank you very much for your presence and coming
    here to testify to the subcommittee.
        If I may, I would like to give the honor to Professor
    Dalpino for her opening statement.

       STATEMENT OF MS. CATHARIN E. DALPINO, VISITING ASSOCIATE
      PROFESSOR, ASIAN STUDIES PROGRAM, EDMUND A. WALSH SCHOOL OF
                 FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

        Ms. Dalpino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, my views on this topic today are informed by
    living and working in Thailand over a span of three decades and
    my present work as director of Thai studies at Georgetown
    University, but I haven't focused my statement on the very rich
    history of U.S.-Thailand relations. I would like to focus very
    specifically on the current state of the reconciliation process
    in Thailand and what it might take to put that process on
    firmer ground.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Without objection, all of your statements
    will be made part of the record. If you have any added
    materials, things to add, we are happy to receive them.
        Ms. Dalpino. Mr. Chairman, it has been frustrating to some
    of us who follow Thai affairs to watch the coverage over the
    past few years in Thailand, because I think in particular the
    international community is sometimes given to what I would
    describe as the myth of monoliths, of being able to parse this
    crisis into Red Shirt versus Yellow Shirt, rural versus urban,
    rich versus poor, even authoritarian versus democracy. I am
    afraid that if this kind of dichotomy continues, it is going to
    stigmatize a large group of people and lionize another large
    group of people on any given occasion, and it is important in
    the reconciliation process to move to a more nuanced view of
    this crisis. So I thank you very much for these hearings and
    for your interest in this topic.
        I would say at the present time Thailand is suspended
    somewhere between the crisis and normal political life. I share
    your interest and your support for the five-point
    reconciliation plan. I think, however, as that plan goes
    forward, many Thais, particularly those who were in opposition,
    will look at a number of other things as well to see if the
    government is going to be able to forge a genuine
    reconciliation. And they will look particularly at whether
    treatment of several issues is evenhanded.
        Here are some indicators. I think they will look at due
    process for the UDD leaders and demonstrators under arrest.
    This will be a good opportunity for the government not only to
    show adherence to the rule of law, but also moving to a new
    kind of political balance.
        They will look at the length of the emergency rule period
    which is currently in operation and this week was renewed for
    another month. Certainly that is part of restoring order to
    Thailand, but as that--but as the need for that begins to wane,
    I think there will be attention to when emergency rule is
    lifted and in what sequence, particularly when it is lifted in
    the north and the northeast, which is where Thaksin had a great
    deal of political strength.
        I am heartened that the Prime Minister is committed to an
    investigation of the casualties incurred on both sides during
    the recent crisis. I think there will be close attention to who
    is appointed to a commission and what kind of balance that
    represents.
        And lastly in the short term, I think the timing of
    elections is a very, very difficult issue. Obviously, elections
    in the shortest possible term would help to restore democracy.
    But I have to say in all candor that there is a danger that if
    elections are called too soon, and not sufficient
    reconciliation has been achieved, that whatever the outcome is,
    it could restart a cycle of violence if the losers are not
    prepared to accept the outcome of the democratic process. And I
    think in our own representations and recommendations to our
    Thai colleagues, I think we have to remember how very, very
    complicated even just the timing of the election will be at
    this point in time.
        Even if managed skillfully, I think the initial stage will
    not automatically ensure long-term political stability in
    Thailand, and I would like to point out three issues which have
    been very much at the center of Thai political development. One
    is addressing the center-province dynamic. It is true former
    Prime Minister Thaksin brought to light many issues of rural
    versus urban. In truth, the Thai system has been centralized
    historically. It still is, but there have been attempts to
    decentralize. I don't think just transferring funds to the
    rural area is going to do it. I think there is also an issue of
    transferring some degree of political power, and that will take
    quite a long national discussion.
        Also, adhering to the rules of the political game in a
    democracy is something that the Thais will have to consider and
    to work on quite a lot, particularly in a parliamentary form of
    government. And again, what we have seen with the cycles of
    violence and retribution with the Yellow Shirts versus Red
    Shirts, when one side does not get an outcome they want, they
    want to pull the whole system down. And working toward a
    political culture that allows for loyal opposition and
    acceptance of the democratic process will be very important.
        Traditionally, Thai governments are coalition governments,
    and I think there are some good reasons for doing that, but
    that actually doesn't help this idea of accepting an outcome if
    you can negotiate some of the aspects after election. That is
    just to flag that issue.
        Lastly, I think we will see another round of constitutional
    revision and reform, and that is good. I think there are
    particular issues in the current Constitution that Thailand
    might look at, including the clause that abolishes the
    political party if a party member is convicted of electoral
    fraud.
        When he came into office, Prime Minister Abhisit flagged
    that and tried to get the parties to discuss either revising or
    abolishing that, because it really is a nuclear option, and it
    was behind a great deal of the discontent in the UDD with the
    dissolution of Thai Rak Thai and the People's Power Party. But
    beyond specific constitutional revisions, I think that
    strengthening the Thai sense of Constitution will be important
    as well. Thailand has had 17 Constitutions since it became a
    constitutional monarchy in 1932. And forging a Constitution
    that can be revised as need be but still remain will be
    important.
        There are two major wild cards that could affect the
    reconciliation process. And one would be transitions in the
    monarchy, both in the palace and in the Privy Council, which
    might come naturally and might have been expected for some
    time, and also the issue of Thaksin's continued impact on Thai
    politics and the calculation of how much is gained or lost by
    having him inside or outside of the country, inside or outside
    of the tent, is something clearly that not only this government
    but other parts of the Thai system will have to consider.
        Let me talk very briefly about U.S.-Thailand relations and
    what the United States might do at this point in time. I agree
    with everything that Secretary Marciel said about the
    importance and the salience of U.S.-Thai relations and I think
    that the United States has a stake in helping to strengthen
    Thai democracy and supporting the return to stability. But it
    has to do so with some thought and restraint. And in contrast
    to some countries in the post-Cold-War world that had
    significant international involvement in the democratic process
    of their democratization Thailand's democratization is very
    much of its own making. And it has welcomed support from the
    international community as a support, not as a leading factor.
        I have no reason to believe that they would not welcome
    support, but I think it has to be very skillful and somewhat
    indirect. I also do think that it is very important that any
    democracy assistance that the United States or U.S.
    organizations that are not governmental that be rendered at
    this point in time be perceived as being nonpartisan in terms
    of the Thai political factions.
        A second thing that I think the United States could help,
    if Thailand so desires this assistance, is helping to break the
    cycle of impunity that we have seen not only with the Red
    Shirts but with the Yellow Shirts--going back to the time in
    August 2008 when people broke into the Prime Minister's
    residence and chased him to the airport the VIP lounge of the
    airport--that both the Yellow Shirts and Red Shirts have
    conducted themselves as they have because they believe that
    they could, and that developing a strong, accountable,
    effective security force is actually part of a democracy,
    because you will have public demonstrations. You should expect
    to have them, even welcome them as part of democracy and not
    see them as a crisis every time they are brewing.
        Our relationship on the security side has obviously focused
    on military, has not focused on police reform, but I think that
    there might be an opportunity to do so if Thailand believes
    that that is desirable.
        Lastly I think that we can help our Thai interlocutors by
    engaging them in what I would call ``beyond the crisis
    thinking'' and drawing them out in terms of our security,
    economic and cultural relations, and not waiting for that to
    happen automatically but reaching out to them. That will help
    to restore a sense of normalcy and help to regain, help
    Thailand regain momentum in the international community.
        Let me end with a regional postscript. I find it very
    interesting that Vietnam, in its capacity as chairman of ASEAN,
    2 weeks ago issued a statement on the situation in Thailand
    that was supportive of Prime Minister Abhisit's government, but
    also commented that Thai stability is very important to
    Southeast Asian regional stability and offered, as a group,
    ASEAN to help Thailand. That is fairly unprecedented. ASEAN has
    issued some statements on Burma under international pressure,
    but I think that this is an encouraging sign for ASEAN as well,
    and might be followed up on.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Dalpino follows:]

        Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you Professor Dalpino.
        We are also joined here by another distinguished member of
    our subcommittee, the gentlelady from California, Dr. Watson,
    former Ambassador to the Federated States of Micronesia, and we
    welcome her.
        Diane, did you have an opening statement you wanted to----
        Ms. Watson. I did. I might be a little late because I think
    that the professor probably has mentioned all those things. But
    let me just reiterate some of what was said. I would like to
    really thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing on the
    situation in Thailand. And in my experiences in the Far East, I
    was very, very upset over the situation in Thailand. I remember
    going there in the early sixties, and it was such a historical
    trip for me and such a peaceful, wonderful trip back to the
    ``King and I.''
        By the way, I ended up doing that whole presentation when I
    was teaching in Okinawa because I love the culture so much and
    I trained my students--I had a gifted class and I trained them
    to play those roles. And so I just really fell in love with the
    Thai culture.
        So I have been very concerned, with what happened this past
    March with the red-shirt protesters occupying the streets of
    Bangkok for all of 9 weeks, and probably more, and at first
    these protests seemed to be peaceful; however, as the weeks
    progressed, clashes between the Red Shirts and the security
    forces escalated into urban warfare and by mid-May, 88 people
    had been killed and thousands wounded.
        The Red Shirts took to the streets in support of their
    ousted leader, Thaksin, and to demand an earlier election.
    Though the current Prime Minister offered a plan that would
    allow for early elections in return for an end to the protests,
    reconciliation still seems elusive.
        This morning the full Committee on Foreign Affairs led a
    hearing about human rights and democracy. Thailand is an
    important lesson in democracy building. Thailand has long been
    one of the brightest stars in Asia and one that saw economic
    and democratic progress throughout the nineties. However, since
    the military coup in 2006, which ousted the PM, tensions
    between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts have been
    increasing.
        The fundamental divide between the two groups centers on
    the electoral process, with the Yellow Shirts arguing that
    ethical imperatives trump the polls, while the Red Shirts
    believe that governance should be determined entirely by the
    population's vote.
        Many Thais are looking to the reigning monarch for support
    and a decision that will reduce the division between these two
    groups. The King, however, has been been ill and has not
    offered guidance in the situation as he has in the past. His
    son, the Crown Prince, is not seen as the leader his father
    once was, causing increased discomfort among the Thai populace.
        Thailand is standing at a crossroads, one whose road signs
    are confused by the political environment. And I don't know if
    reconciliation is necessary. We can't let the people of
    Thailand fall into a civil war without offering our help.
        And I missed most of the testimony. I understand we were on
    the second panel, Mr. Chairman, but I certainly want to learn
    more about what you would suggest our best action should be.
        And as I mentioned our hearing that we had in International
    Relations, we are looking at all of our foreign policy programs
    and how best to assist these countries. And I always have to
    remind our side of things, is that these are sovereign nations
    and that what we do is we build from the ground up. We cannot
    go in there and tell the people, but we can encourage them to
    look at democratic policies.
        So I would like to hear from the panelists. And I did hear
    what the professor was saying when I came in, as how you would
    direct our country, our USAID programs, millennium programs and
    so on, to assist the Thais and particularly those who are not
    comfortable with their government the way it is, and just how
    we can best assist in these circumstances.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. I will say to the gentlelady that she has
    a very formidable understanding of the situation in Thailand.
    We had Secretary Marciel testify earlier, who pretty much
    corroborated your testimony. So you did not miss much.
        Ms. Watson. Well if I had time, Mr. Chairman, if we could
    just hear--start with Dr. Jackson, and then the professor and
    Dr. Cronin.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. All right, Dr. Jackson would you proceed,
    please?

    STATEMENT OF KARL JACKSON, PH.D., DIRECTOR OF ASIAN STUDIES AND
     SOUTH EAST ASIA STUDIES, THE PAUL H. NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED
                         INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

        Mr. Jackson. Yes. First of all it is a great pleasure to be
    back in front of the committee. Twenty years ago I used to
    testify in front of this committee when I was in government,
    Steve Solarz would really regularly give me a thrashing, and we
    both became good friends and colleagues as a result and remain
    so until this day.
        Given that my statement is already part of the written
    record, I would make only three or four short points given the
    hour and the fact that there may be some votes.
        The first point I would make is that the demonstrations we
    have witnessed in Bangkok over the last several months are a
    by-product of an ongoing set of socioeconomic and political
    changes that been taking place for the last 30 years.
        The rise of upcountry political movements really began in
    the 1970s and the 1980s. Thaksin didn't cause this movement of
    upcountry. He simply sensed it better and rode it more
    competently than anyone else had before.
        Thaksin's money and his political savvy mattered, and his
    personal charisma helped, but the upcountry movement to obtain
    a larger slice of the pie is here to stay in Thailand.
        The second point I would make is that a large number of
    upcountry people, especially from the lower part of the
    socioeconomic structure, have developed an emotional
    identification with this man, Thaksin Shinawatra, which will
    not wear off simply because the Government of Thailand puts in
    place Thaksin-like policies.
        Many people seem to feel that one of their own was
    illegally displaced by a military coup and that their votes
    have been repeatedly nullified by a Bangkok-dominated court
    system.
        Now it does not matter whether these perceptions are
    factually accurate. What really matters is that these feelings
    of alienation exist, are widespread, and constitute the
    fundamental political problem facing Thailand at this time.
        The third point I would make concerns reconciliation, the
    process about which the chairman, Scott Marciel, and Professor
    Dalpino have spoken. Reconciliation will take time. But it must
    involve a genuine willingness on the part of the government to
    collaborate with the opposition. Meetings with academics, with
    journalists, with thinkers, all of these being representatives
    of Bangkok domination, are not the same as seeking
    reconciliation directly with the leaders of the red-shirt
    movement.
        Jailing and labeling the Red Shirts as terrorists will
    drive this mass movement underground, I fear. Like the chairman
    I am a member of the Vietnam generation which saw many
    insurgencies around Southeast Asia. This is the last thing that
    any of us want and I'm sure it is the last thing that the
    Government of Thailand would want, but it is something we must
    be concerned with.
        The fourth point I would make echoes very much the comments
    of Catherin Dalpino, even though we didn't actually talk about
    this ahead of time. Elections alone, even early elections, are
    not enough. A complex of series of political deals needs to be
    worked out among competing elites to reestablish trust and
    legitimacy for whatever government results from the next
    election. The parliaments of the streets, represented by the
    Yellow Shirts and the Red Shirts, must somehow be brought back
    into the legal Parliament itself. The critical imperative is to
    get politics off of the street and back into legal
    institutions.
        The best of all possible outcomes might well turn out to be
    a government of national unity involving all the major
    political parties.
        And lastly, and again echoing my colleague, Professor
    Dalpino, the legitimacy of Thai judicial and law enforcement
    institutions depends on making them even-handed and apolitical
    and perceived as such by most of the people of Thailand.
        Thank you very much Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Jackson follows:]

        Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you Dr. Jackson.
        Dr. Cronin.

    STATEMENT OF MR. RICHARD CRONIN, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, THE HENRY L.
                             STIMSON CENTER

        Mr. Cronin. Thank you Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Dr.
    Watson.
        Thank you very much for this opportunity to testify at what
    I think is a very well-named titled hearing, this emphasis on
    reconciliation, path to reconciliation, that my colleagues have
    already been discussing. And to echo both of them, I mean this
    is really a major challenge and we have already heard some
    reasons why that is so.
        I am going to take a slightly different tack in my
    presentation, and that is that I am going to come at this issue
    somewhat from a more political economy way, if you would; that
    is, some underlying reasons that go even deeper than political
    developments. And one of these really is fundamentally the
    inability of the political system, which has been changing and
    adapting over time, to adapt to the impact of globalization and
    rapid economic growth that left some parts of the country
    behind.
        I would make the point that Thailand has trebled its GDP in
    the last 20, 30 years; and its poverty index, rate of poverty
    has dropped from the thirties and forties to under 10 percent
    recently. Things are a little tougher now because of the
    financial crisis. And so all the boats have been rising, but
    they haven't all been rising as fast. So that is one, I think,
    important point.
        And on the other hand, Thailand--so Thailand has really
    benefited from globalization in many ways. It has got a key
    geographic location, it has enjoyed large-scale manufacturing
    investment by Japanese, American, European companies, and has a
    relatively well-educated population. I mentioned national
    income tripled in the past two decades.
        But on the other hand, Thailand was really the cause and
    the poster child, if you will, of the 1997 financial crisis. It
    was when Thailand's balance of payments got too far out of
    whack, that they could not sustain the value of the baht, that
    they were established against the dollar. And that led not only
    to collapse and great chaos in financial and economic chaos and
    even social chaos in Thailand, but it also created a deep
    resentment against some aspects of globalization and
    particularly against the IMF's prescription, which is quite
    wrong, of belt-tightening rather than actually measures to
    stimulate the economy to keep the GDP from falling too fast.
        And in some ways the democrats in Thailand have been
    associated with that IMF medicine, and the Prime Minister,
    Thaksin, and the past former Prime Minister never left them or
    the other people forget it.
        There is also an issue that both my colleagues have raised
    one way or another, and that is an attitudinal problem between
    Bangkok and the rural areas, or upcountry, as Karl Jackson put
    it. And that mindset is evident in many ways. It is certainly
    greatly perceived by Thais outside Bangkok, particularly in the
    north and northeast, as a kind of sophisticated-urbanites-
    versus-country-bumpkins kind of attitude. And this has come out
    in ways that have been harmful to Thailand.
        For instance, we have heard reference to the 1977, sorry,
    1997 Constitution, and that Constitution aimed in a number of
    ways to eliminate revolving Cabinets but also to put
    educational requirements in place for membership, for running
    for legislature. It tried to create a strong Cabinet, a strong
    Prime Minister, and in many ways you could say it was a little
    bit of an elitist approach or an academic approach to
    Constitution making. And it backfired in a way.
        Prime minister Thaksin came in and took advantage of all
    those provisions and, as we already heard, was able to mobilize
    a huge electoral base in the north and northeast of Thailand,
    and particularly the issue of this emotional connection that
    Karl has mentioned is very important.
        Just a couple of points I would make. One is that much has
    been made of the fact that the army overthrew the democratic
    elected Thaksin government, but not enough attention has been
    given to the fact that constitutional changes practically made
    it impossible for Thaksin to be dislodged by constitutional
    means. So once he won the second election in 2005 by a huge
    margin, and then got in trouble over this Shin Corporation sale
    to Singapore's Temasak Holdings Company, a sovereign holding
    company, he called for a snap election. The whole business of
    Shin had been a little too much for the population to take,
    even going beyond his enemy, his core supporters.
        And so he called a snap election in which members could
    not, you could not form a party less than 90 days before the
    election. He called it in a shorter period than 90 days, and it
    wasn't possible for them to rename their party, to form
    coalitions, or even to attract members from Thaksin's party
    into a different opposition party.
        And that is why they took to the streets, first the Yellow
    Shirts; and then, of course, eventually the Red Shirts emulated
    the Yellow Shirts for some of the same reasons, although the
    government had changed.
        So I am trying to emphasize that there are some structural
    issues and some accidents that are partly substantially
    connected to rapid economic change, globalization, et cetera,
    but also rooted in some attitudes between Bangkok people and
    the rest of the country, particularly the northeast.
        I think in terms of looking to the future, Prime Minister
    Abhisit had already made a number of I think very successful
    moves, and one is that he survived an attempted censure and no-
    confidence vote in the lower house of Parliament.
        And one of the interesting things about that is that there
    were fewer votes against him than the total number of
    opposition members in the Parliament. So it would appear that
    he has made some inroads there, and he also has a very high
    approval rating, around 70 percent right now. And that has
    taken over most of the provinces, and it would seem that it
    would include a number of the provinces where the Red Shirts
    are prominent as well.
        He has promised to hold new elections and this has actually
    been postponed until next year. And the main reason, as we
    already heard I think, is that if we had another election,
    Thailand had another election marred by violence, it would be
    kind of even a bigger disaster than where we are right now. But
    at the same time, there has to be an election and there has to
    be the perception of legitimacy of whatever government is
    installed following that.
        To pile on in a way, but one thing that will not likely
    achieve reconciliation is demonizing Thaksin. Thaksin is a
    force to be reckoned with. He is a crook. He not only was a
    crook but he was a human rights abuser. He conducted this anti-
    narcotics campaign war on drugs for 3 months in 2003 where more
    than 1,000 people allegedly were killed, either in shootings on
    the streets, by the police and other security authorities, or
    died in jail having been beaten to death. And this is pretty
    well-documented in the human rights report that the State
    Department prepares every year--for that year, in which case
    was 2003.
        Reconciliation is very important to the United States.
    Thailand is very important to the United States. And Thailand
    is a middle power with whom the United States has robust
    relations and a broad agenda. A treaty ally, Thailand provides
    important cooperation against terrorism and posts the annual
    Cobra Gold gold multinational combined joint military
    exercises, as we have heard. And those were held, actually, as
    recently as February of this year.
        Bangkok is also a regional hub for USAID. We have a
    regional office there for our activities, our aid programs, and
    of course a major center for U.S. corporate investment.
        To conclude, what I would like to say is that the main
    thing the United States can do now is to promote reconciliation
    or to help promote reconciliation is to maintain constructive
    relations with the Abhisit government and support appropriate
    efforts to rebalance the economy in ways to promote more
    equitable development.
        This is a tough assignment right now because of the global
    financial crisis which is requiring a kind of unwanted
    rebalancing of economy in favor of domestic growth rather than
    export-led growth.
        In this context, though, probably the single most important
    thing the administration and Congress can do is to reject
    overly simplified explanations for the crisis and recognize
    that given Thailand's constitutional complications, moral
    support for the Abhisit government does not represent a
    compromise with U.S. democratic values and ideals. I think that
    is a very important point.
        Thailand has had a tumultuous political history, as we have
    heard already. But it is also a very resilient country, and it
    is a country that values its long, sometimes interrupted, path
    toward a more participatory and more democratic system. Thank
    you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Cronin follows:]

        Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Dr. Cronin.
        Congresswoman Watson for her questions.
        Ms. Watson. I really want to thank this panel for the
    insight you share with us. And I am wondering, what is the
    impact of the turmoil in Bangkok? What does it mean to that
    entire ASEAN region? What impact will that have? And look at
    it, too, in terms of tourism. That was a place that was a
    destination for a lot of us, and now when you see the pictures
    on TV, it certainly wouldn't attract a whole lot of tourists
    probably anytime soon.
        So can you comment on the political impact in the region
    and what you see in terms of business trade tourism?
        Mr. Jackson. I would say that what is remarkable about
    tourism is that it seems to be extraordinarily resilient. Even
    given the events of this past May, apparently occupancy is back
    in the high thirties already in the Bangkok hotel system, and,
    of course, it is quite large and robust in places like Phuket.
    Obviously Thailand has been hurt and its tourism image has been
    hurt. But I guess Thailand is such an attractive place--as you
    found, and I did approximately at the same time--it seems to be
    slowly rebounding.
        Now, the second thing you asked was about the political
    impact regionally. I think ASEAN has as its absolute
    fundamental starting principle, noninterference in the domestic
    affairs of other countries, other members of ASEAN. And I think
    ASEAN will maintain this principle.
        However, ASEAN as an organization functions mostly behind
    closed doors and at dinner parties and on golf courses, and I
    am sure that there will be quite frank talks and expressions of
    concern by almost all of the ASEAN countries about Thailand
    becoming, not the rock of stability, but a source of
    uncertainty in the region. And so I am sure Prime Minister
    Abhisit and Foreign Minister Kasit will hear this from their
    colleagues, and I am sure each of those gentlemen is doing as
    much as they possibly can to try and get Thailand beyond this
    very difficult juncture in history.
        Ms. Watson. Thank you. Professor.
        Ms. Dalpino. First, Congresswoman, let me tell you that my
    first direct experience with Thailand was also in the early
    sixties and I understand completely why you fell in love with
    it then. I did too.
        Let me address a couple of points. Thailand is a regional
    hub logistically in terms of transportation, and that is very
    important. Had that really been withheld for any significant
    amount of time, I think the whole region would have suffered,
    not just Thailand.
        Thailand has been important to our relationship to ASEAN.
    The Thais have tended to be very much a promoter of more U.S.
    involvement in the region and regional organizations. They will
    be very forward-leaning about supporting more of an Asia
    Pacific community and looking for ways to include the United
    States in the regional framework. And so that is a very
    important partnership.
        I agree that I think that the ASEAN states were somewhat
    dismayed by the events. What I worry about is that there are
    two ASEAN states, well three, but the two oldest democracies in
    ASEAN are the Philippines and Thailand. And both of them in
    their different ways are struggling with the process of
    consolidation, which is much more difficult than just entering
    into a democratic transition. Indonesia's democracy is still a
    little too young to make these sorts of generalizations, and my
    fear is that what Thailand and the Philippines have gone
    through in recent years, different experiences, will slow down
    the democratic processes in other countries in the region.
        But lastly, let me also say that I think there is an
    opportunity here, and I ended my statement, my testimony, by
    talking about this statement that ASEAN did issue about
    Thailand, which is fairly unprecedented, and one of the reasons
    they were able to issue that is that the ASEAN Secretary
    General is former Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan. He was
    Foreign Minister in the late nineties when he tried to persuade
    ASEAN to move to something called ``flexible engagement'' which
    would give ASEAN more involvement in the internal affairs of a
    member state if it affected the whole group. And it is sort of
    exquisitely ironic that this situation is going to pass, and
    that I think that Secretary General Surin is probably
    encouraging ASEAN to step up to the plate on Thailand and
    hoping perhaps to change the paradigm of the group just a
    little bit.
        Mr. Cronin. If I could add just something to that, more
    from the geopolitical point of view, and that is that one of
    the things we haven't talked about--because it is not a hearing
    on China--is that China is a big factor here in the region. And
    the United States, particularly the Obama administration, has
    made a decision to reengage with Southeast Asia, with ASEAN,
    and particularly in the Mekong region of which Thailand is a
    hub.
        Thailand has welcomed and facilitated our efforts at
    reentry into the region. A senior Thai official told my
    colleague Tim Hamlin and me last summer that Thais recognize
    the move is geopolitical and they welcomed it. And this is, I
    think, a good indication of the political relationship. And at
    the same time Thailand doesn't want to be nor do its neighbors
    want to be caught in any kind of struggle for influence between
    the United States and China.
        But that is really not what it is about. I think it is a
    question of how the regional economies will develop, what their
    core will be, and what the relationships--political
    relationships that will come out of that.
        So Thailand is a very important country. In ASEAN there are
    two countries that are kind of the poles of strongest
    influence. One is Thailand and the other is Indonesia; and
    presently, they are on the same page, if you will, with most of
    the issues that concern the United States.
        Ms. Watson. Thank you so much and I yield back, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you.
        Professor Dalpino, I note with interest in your statement
    you noted that Thailand has had 17 Constitutions. My gosh. And
    it seems that every time there is a coup they change their
    Constitution. So the Constitution is not taken in the same
    perspective as we have. We still have only one Constitution and
    rarely amend it in terms of whatever the--however the pendulum
    swings in terms of our own political development and all of
    that.
        And I also note with interest is that maybe this is the
    reality. You said that the road to reconciliation in Thailand
    is not likely to be smooth in either the short or long term.
    That is about as realistic as you can get. So does this mean
    also, in your best opinion, that the future of Thailand right
    now is, at a very, very serious crossroad where it could go
    either way?
        And I also note that the situation with the Royal Family is
    a big factor. It is my understanding that the Crown Prince is
    not exactly well-loved by the people of Thailand, but his
    sister, I think the oldest of the princesses, seems to be very
    well loved by the Thai people. The Crown Prince is likely to be
    the heir to the throne if something happens to His Majesty.
    Could that be a critical factor in the future of Thailand's
    situation, politically?
        Ms. Dalpino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I don't
    really think there will be a succession crisis. Thailand
    follows primogeniture in the monarchy. And so from the very
    beginning the Crown Prince, the only male, was the heir
    apparent.
        It is true that--and some of my colleagues might want to
    correct me on the exact history--that in the Privy Council
    there was a provision that would enable Princess Sirinhorn to
    take the throne if her brother could not serve. That regulation
    went into effect before the Crown Prince had a legal male heir.
    So I don't know what the status of that would be.
        But I think that whatever the next generation would hold
    for Thailand, I think it would be a shock to have the world's
    longest reigning monarch, who was in many ways a modernizer,
    pass from the scene. And I think even among the best of times,
    that would be a major adjustment for Thailand.
        To answer the first part of your question, I have a lot of
    faith in Thai resilience and the Thai ability to compromise. I
    am a little alarmed that the situation has almost gotten beyond
    that. But my wanting to point out that there are both short-
    and long-term dangers is to sort of alert the committee to the
    fact that things could take a sharp turn for the negative at
    any point. And I think it will be many years before Thais feel
    that politics are on firmer ground.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Dr. Jackson, I note with interest your
    very broad stroke of the brush in terms of how Thai society has
    evolved. And basically there seems to be the Bangkok urban rich
    people versus the rural areas. How does that relate to the
    population? Do the majority of people in Thailand live in urban
    areas; are they in urban city areas like Bangkok?
        Mr. Jackson. The fundamental problem of Thai politics is
    that most of the money is in Bangkok and most of the votes are
    outside. And that is a fundamental tension in the political
    system that has grown more intensive over the last 20 years.
    Several of the constitutional changes have really been designed
    to try to modulate this but it will continue to be a source of
    difficulty unless and until--in my opinion--and this is only my
    opinion--unless and until some pretty fundamental
    decentralization takes place whereby if people were
    dissatisfied upcountry, they might petition their local
    government or their provincial government rather than going to
    the streets of Bangkok.
        And so in my own view, one of the things that might
    conceivably help with long-term reconciliation would be
    decentralization because the Bangkok system, that is, the Thai
    system, has always been a very centralized kingdom, and the
    whole thrust of modernization in the 20th century was to
    centralize and bring power to the center. And it seems to me
    one way to buy political space is to reverse this process at
    least partially.
        Other big cities like Chiang Mai could conceivably have
    their own elected Governor as Bangkok now does. This is one
    possibility.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Is it your view that one reason why
    former Prime Minister Thaksin identified so well with the
    lower-income class people in the rural areas is because he
    probably did more than any previous Prime Minister to really
    help the lower-income people in the rural areas? Does that seem
    to be why there was such a close relationship between the
    people of the rural areas and Thaksin, despite the fact that he
    is a rich person?
        Mr. Jackson. An enormously rich person. There are two
    aspects of it. One is that his government did do more for
    upcountry Thailand than other previous governments had done.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. That is a fact.
        Mr. Jackson. That is a fact. He not only promised to do
    something, he did the unforgivable. He delivered on his
    promises after he was elected.
        But the second aspect is the one that I think is the more
    critical; that is, he turned his own personal narrative of rags
    to riches into something with which many people who are poor in
    Thailand identify. This is a guy who, when his father died, had
    no inheritance; his family lived upstairs from the family
    coffee shop. When he came to the States he worked in a Kentucky
    Fried Chicken place to pick up money. Not only are there
    certain facts to this story, I am sure that on the stump,
    although I have never heard him on the stump, he can embellish
    this story in quite remarkable ways. And a lot of people
    identify with that rags-to-riches story, and Thaksin's goal was
    that he was going to abolish poverty in Thailand. That is what
    he said his goal was.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. I note with interest, Dr. Cronin, you
    said the problem with Thailand is this fundamental attitudinal
    issue, to which Dr. Jackson has alluded. Here is a fellow who
    goes from rags to riches to becoming Prime Minister. He reached
    out to the lower-income people and gave them hope. They think,
    if he can do it, I can do it too. And, as Dr. Jackson said, he
    delivered on his promise to help the people in the rural areas.
        He mentioned that it seems that the government has
    demonized Prime Minister Thaksin's problems, his human rights
    abuses and drug trafficking. Does that really go over well in
    the rural areas, the people that seem to have such a strong
    affinity or devotion to him because he was able to identify
    with them more so than the rich and the people of means, of
    affluence, living in Bangkok?
        Mr. Cronin. Yes. That is a very good point, an interesting
    point. I think that those of us who look at Thailand and try to
    figure out what is going on shouldn't lose sight of the fact
    that Thaksin's sins were not as criticized in the rural areas
    as in the cities. But there is also this contradiction that
    everybody in Thailand, including Bangkok people, many, many
    people anyway, supported his anti-narcotics campaign. It just
    got a little sticky when, say, if you are a middle-class
    professional Thai and you look over the balcony from your
    apartment or your condominium and you see a corpse lying in a
    pool of blood in the street who is alleged to have been
    involved in drugs.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Would you say that those people involved
    with drug trafficking could have been from affluent
    backgrounds?
        Mr. Cronin. Probably not. Maybe the users, like here, are
    from a more affluent society, but drugs have permeated much of
    Thai society.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. We have got a similar problem here with
    Latin America. The Latin American leaders complained to us that
    if there wasn't such a tremendous demand for drugs in America,
    maybe we wouldn't have drug problems. Not so much those who are
    using the drugs, but rather those who are trafficking it.
        Mr. Cronin. The real point is one you mentioned at the
    beginning of this particular exchange, and that is that, again,
    whatever Thaksin's flaws and failings, which are widely
    recognized, there was still this attitudinal issue that for
    whatever reason, personality, background--hardscrabble-to-
    riches background, the people did identify with him in a way
    they don't in Bangkok.
        And I mentioned earlier this issue with the Constitution
    and efforts to write a Constitution that was more academic and
    squeaky clean and would basically, if you will, keep them away
    from the government.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Let me ask all three of you, did you
    think his trial was impartial and fair as far as the judiciary
    is concerned in Thailand? I am talking about Prime Minister
    Thaksin's.
        Mr. Jackson. I wish I could say that I was really familiar
    with the trial itself. I am familiar with the charges, which
    had to do with a particular piece of property that was
    purchased by his wife; and the charge, if I remember correctly,
    was that she was allowed to purchase this at below market price
    when she was married to the Prime Minister of Thailand at the
    time. I don't think anyone really challenged the facts in the
    case.
        The question was, is this offense sufficient to convict and
    send to jail a person who by then was a former Prime Minister?
    The Thai court decided yes.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Is this an every day thing that goes on
    anyway? I mean this is just Prime Minister Thaksin. It happens
    to other government leaders who have these kinds of business
    transactions? To us it is a conflict of interest, but to them,
    carrying on to the benefits.
        Mr. Jackson. I think your colleague outlined the two
    democracies problem of Thailand; that is, there is one
    democracy that thinks only in terms of who can get the most
    votes and therefore control Parliament. This is the upcountry
    democracy that Thaksin cultivated and utilized.
        There is the Bangkok democracy which says ethics are all
    important; we are trying to clean up the swamp, and the
    conflict that we have watched in Bangkok in the streets is the
    outgrowth of this underlying struggle.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Professor Dalpino.
        Ms. Dalpino. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I would like to turn
    to this issue of Thaksin in the rural areas. He is not
    universally loved in the rural areas. He was not at the time.
    And I think we need to break down the monolith of rural areas.
    He was popular in the north, he was from Chiang Mai. He was
    popular in the northeast for a number of complex reasons, the
    relative poverty and the fact that the political dynamic in the
    northeast makes it all too easy to deliver the northeast en
    bloc, unfortunately. He is very unpopular in the rural south.
        And here I think we need to bring in the forgotten conflict
    which is the deep south conflict and the insurgency that has
    been going on since 2004. I do not think it is fair to
    attribute the restart of that conflict entirely to Thaksin, but
    he did not make it any easier with his approach which is a very
    ham-fisted, very heavy-handed, very assimilative approach. And
    here, ironically, he demonstrated all of the qualities that
    people are complaining about that so-called Bangkok leads with.
    It shows he is a very complex person, obviously, but he does
    also come from that class as well in many ways. So I think when
    we think about the rural areas, we need to remember the rural
    areas themselves in Thailand are much more diverse than some
    people would understandably----
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Dr. Cronin.
        Mr. Cronin. If I could add to that as well, the issue that
    you have raised of ``doesn't everybody do it'' is certainly a
    valid issue. But in Thaksin's case, of course, you have scale
    which was very, very large. The other thing is that--and really
    the problem isn't one of perceptions. So he was a crook, yes.
    Was he persecuted? That is a matter of perception, and
    disagreement. And one of the problems for the Thai Government
    is, for instance, they are having a hard time getting
    international banks, Interpol, et cetera, to help them deal
    with him and the money that he has stashed abroad. And the
    problem is that the more they demonize him, the more it conveys
    an impression that, well, he may have been a bad guy, but this
    is a political thing and therefore we don't want to have
    anything to do with it.
        And the real problem, I think, is that the system as it is
    set up cannot deal with a situation in which Thaksin came back.
    And so this is a huge challenge because in a new election his
    supporters could, if not gain a majority, lead a coalition
    where they could pass laws that would allow him to come back
    under amnesty or something like that. And that would be a
    nightmare. It is a nightmare scenario.
        So I really have to sympathize and empathize with the
    political establishment in Thailand. It is presented with this
    dilemma that is very, very difficult. And it again goes back to
    the issue then of perceptions and attitudes, so that what the
    government should be doing and what it is doing in terms of
    programs and funding, et cetera, does Thaksin one better in
    terms of providing more development and more services to the
    rural areas. But at the same time, if that is not done with the
    right psychological element to it, if it is done by bureaucrats
    who are kind of giving it down rather than involved in a
    cooperative venture, then it still leaves an opening for
    trouble in the future.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. What would be all three of your
    perspectives if, let's say there is a point of reconciliation,
    and I am sure that it would be agreeable to the Red Shirts that
    Thaksin is allowed to come back and allowed to run for Prime
    Minister. Will that reconcile a lot of the current humbug and
    the situation of the crisis the way it stands right now?
        Ms. Dalpino. Mr. Chairman, I think in the short term that
    probably would just restart the cycle of conflict and violence.
    But in the long term, I think that the ideal under that
    scenario of his returning would be that he would be allowed to
    return, contest for power, that the outcome of the election
    would be respected, but that there would be sufficient checks
    and balances on the system so that he could not subvert the
    Constitution and that if he does indeed have any--as there
    should be on any Thai politician, and I have long maintained
    that Thaksin is not a throwback, a genetic throwback to the
    average politician in Thailand, but that the system could deal
    with him.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Let's say that by a court of law he has
    been found guilty. Let's say, and I am making a big assumption
    here, that he is pardoned. As a point of reconciliation, that
    would be satisfactory to the Red Shirts, and say, our leader is
    back now, let's leave it now to the people of Thailand to make
    that decision of whether or not he is capable or has the
    ability to sway the majority of the people of Thailand to have
    him as the Prime Minister.
        I don't know, this is another point that they--I am sure
    the government is trying to figure out exactly where the Red
    Shirts are coming from and where the Yellow Shirts are coming
    from.
        At what point do you think there will be some point of
    reconciliation that we can see something more positive than
    what it is now? Dr. Jackson.
        Mr. Jackson. I would go back to Thai history to 1973-76.
    The military dictator of Thailand was a man named Marshal
    Thanom Kittikachorn, and in 1973 he was forced to leave the
    country after a student uprising in which people were killed on
    the streets. He subsequently returned to the country, shaved
    his head, became a Buddhist monk, and then after a time period
    slid seamlessly back into Thai society and into private life
    and lived out his entire existence in Thailand.
        I think that it would be very difficult for the forces in
    Bangkok, that is, the Bangkok dominated courts, the people
    around the monarchy, the people around the Democrat Party, to
    accept the idea of Thaksin Shinawatra being allowed to return
    and to run in politics. However, I think it is not impossible
    that he might be allowed to return quietly to Thai society. And
    I think that that is something that is terribly important to
    him as an individual. So there is some quid pro quo here that
    could conceivably be worked on.
        I think the people who are in power now in Bangkok would
    want to extract a promise, an enforceable promise, that he
    would never again directly participate in politics. So that is
    where I see the possibility of a deal; but I would add, I have
    no relevance to either side of this deal.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Professor Dalpino.
        Ms. Dalpino. I think that the immediate issue is what would
    happen if his successor party to Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai party,
    the Puea Thai party, should get a plurality in the next
    election? Thaksin himself is a wild card. What he actually
    wants is not something that is entirely clear.
        So I am not sure that even the Puea Thai would want to
    stake a whole policy on his return. And one scenario might be
    that he just diminishes in importance as some of these issues,
    particularly having to do with discrepancies between center and
    provinces and economic discrepancies are addressed, I think it
    is very important to decouple Thaksin from those issues,
    because those issues are very longstanding. They have been
    existing in Thailand for decades and decades and decades.
        But I think that you don't even need to think about a
    return. I think that some parts of the--many of Thaksin's
    detractors believe that if Puea Thai party were to come into
    power, then Thaksin would be able to manipulate power through
    them. And that is a very immediate issue, and I think probably
    the crux, in the short term, of reconciliation.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Dr. Cronin.
        Mr. Cronin. Well I would fall, I think, in the same line of
    argument; that is, I would distinguish between Thaksinites and
    Thaksin. And definitely Thaksinites must have a share of
    political power in the future, and that could well come in the
    form of plurality in the next election. I don't know. But it is
    a challenge I think for the democrats and their ruling parties
    to compete in the rural areas with the Thaksinites.
        Eventually, I think that Thaksin is going to turn up again
    one way or the other, and the question is can he be contained
    in the sense of being forced to stay out of politics as a
    bargain, at the price of coming back and doing his business and
    other things that he does. But he will always be there behind
    the scenes.
        And so ultimately I think you go back to Karl Jackson
    talking about decentralization, talking about the kind of
    political change which would minimize or reduce the importance
    of single figures, you know, charismatic figures, getting back
    to a kind of politics that is more multipolar and consensual,
    and I think that that is the best way Thailand should try to go
    anyway.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. I have not had a chance to field any
    critical editorials or commentaries made about the result of
    Prime Minister Thaksin's court trial. And I get the impression
    that perhaps as quoted in his opinion, he wasn't treated
    fairly. And for reasons, as you say, that he no longer comes
    back to the country, I suspect that he will immediately be put
    in jail, which is something that will cause even greater
    problems to the society or to the people in Thailand.
        And I raise the question--I am sorry I couldn't get him to
    come and testify to this subcommittee. I would love to have
    him. I don't even know if he is allowed to come to our country
    in terms of we would probably send him by way of reciprocity to
    Thailand if he ever was to come to the United States.
        But I just, as I am sure you are concerned, as are my
    colleagues, he is a very colorful leader. As you said, he went
    from rags to riches, becoming a billionaire by being a
    successful businessman, seemingly, and wanting to help Thai
    society in that respect by giving some of the wealth or
    whatever it is that the government can provide to those who are
    less fortunate.
        How serious is this idea that the middle class, and I am
    very vague on this, and I really want to understand, is there
    really a middle class in Thailand that seems to be one of
    critical influence, whether it be with the Red Shirts or the
    Yellow Shirts in the crisis? And then the problem is you can't
    point exactly who is the leader of this so-called middle class
    that seems to have a lot of influence. How did they get the
    tires? How did they get all of these things to allow them to
    cause this demonstration that is now turning violent? Is there
    really a middle class that is bringing out this sense of
    frustration through these factions that we see causing the
    crisis we have in Thailand?
        Mr. Jackson. First of all, there certainly is a Bangkok
    middle class. There is also an urban middle class up in Chiang
    Mai. It is one of the great products of the kind of economic
    development that we have seen in the last 50 years in Thailand.
        However, the middle class and its involvement in politics
    is somewhat episodic. In 1973, it very much sided with the
    students. By 1976, it didn't support the very nascent democracy
    because the democracy and in the perceptions of the middle
    class had gone off the track. If you look across Thai history,
    you see the middle class coming in and coming out.
        In the latest series of conflicts, I don't know that anyone
    ever did any real polling, or at least I am not aware of any,
    my colleagues may be, but if anything, civil society forces and
    the Bangkok middle class probably had their hearts, not with
    Thaksin but with the Yellow Shirts because they saw Thaksin
    absorbing all of the enterprises around Bangkok. He was
    becoming so overly powerful that he was almost strangling
    future opportunities for them.
        So I don't think anyone knows exactly how the middle class
    of Bangkok splits at any given time, but it was at least my
    impression that, if anything, they tended to be on the side of
    anti-Thaksin forces.
        One footnote. In 2005, there was an election in Thailand.
    It was at the end of a regular term of Parliament, Thaksin's
    first term. At the end of that term of Parliament, there was
    this election, and it was the highest turnout in the history of
    Thailand. And the Thai Rak Thai Party of Thaksin took 61
    percent of the vote nationally. TRT took 56 percent of the vote
    in Bangkok. So my colleague, Professor Dalpino's caution that
    this is always complex and it is always moving is well taken.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Professor Dalpino?
        Ms. Dalpino. Thailand has always had a middle class, but it
    has grown exponentially in the last several decades. In fact,
    in 1957, the public uprising in the middle class forced a very
    prominent political figure to be thrown out of the country.
    That has always been there.
        I would actually dissent a little bit from the idea that
    the middle classes were inherently against Thaksin. They
    actually were for him in the beginning. The Bangkok middle
    class, too. He represented something different to them than
    Thaksin represented to the rural areas. He represented
    globalization. He was the head of a very well known
    international telecommunications firm. He represented national
    pride. Thai Rak Thai means Thais loving Thais. He specifically
    targeted Thailand's loss of face during the 1997 financial
    crisis and promised that Thailand would pay back the IMF
    bailout funds early, and he represented a kind of
    sophistication that went down very well with the younger
    generations.
        Usually when a prime minister is inaugurated, he goes to
    the temple and prays for guidance. When Thaksin was
    inaugurated, he put his wife into the family Porsche and went
    to Starbucks. That to the Bangkok middle classes was cool. It
    is just that they had more of a frontrow seat for some of his
    governance style after that, and they became disillusioned with
    him in many ways, and the rural areas, for one reason or
    another, were less quick to become disillusioned with him while
    he was in power.
        Mr. Cronin. I think Catharin has put it very well. It is a
    very complex situation, and I tend by nature to look for
    structure or more general explanations for things. I think one
    of them is that Thaksin was a modern man, and Thaksin was going
    against----
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Was he a maverick?
        Mr. Cronin. Maverick, yes. Also, in terms of his
    globalization orientation, his business interests, the way he
    did things, he was a CEO with all of the good and bad of that
    kind of a personality. And he was going against a political
    order which, as I said at the beginning in my statement, wasn't
    changing as fast as the economic situation was changing. So
    that is one important element.
        The other is this issue to talk about not oversimplifying
    things, a lot of the Red Shirts came to Bangkok with pickup
    trucks, and they had all of the appliances and here you are
    talking almost more of a rising expectations issue than abject
    poverty. So those rising expectations came from people who want
    to become part of the political process, and if they find
    themselves regarded as bumpkins and somebody to somehow be kept
    out of the center of power, that creates some real problems.
    And there was a kind of heady sense of power and empowerment
    that Thaksin generated and that these Red Shirts brought them
    with them to Bangkok for the demonstrations.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. I know I have taken so much of your time
    already this afternoon, and I want to thank all of you for the
    excellent testimony you have provided the subcommittee. We may
    be holding another subcommittee hearing on the issue, but I
    understand that my good friend, the chairman of the Senate
    Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Asia Pacific, Senator
    Webb, has just returned from Thailand, and hopefully, we can be
    of help to the good people of Thailand in resolving this crisis
    that they are faced with right now.
        All of your statements will be made part of the record, and
    if you have any additional materials to be added, they will be
    made part of the record as well.
        I sincerely thank you for coming this afternoon. I learned
    a lot. I certainly got an education myself. I have visited
    Thailand a couple of times, and it is a very, very beautiful
    country with a rich culture. And something that I always sense
    that we have to be mindful of ourselves, that sometimes our
    tendency to tell other people how they should conduct
    themselves by way of using our form of democracy as the end all
    and be all for other countries to follow, I don't think that is
    a very good way of helping the good people of Thailand.
        I do want to keep in touch with you. We may have perhaps a
    reunion when we find out what is going to happen in the next 5
    or 6 months.
        As you mentioned, Ms. Dalpino, the timing of the election
    is going to be so critical, and exactly how the negotiations,
    how it is going to come about and whether or not the people of
    Thailand are going to accept whatever the government is going
    to be able to negotiate with the leaders and the members of the
    Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts. And our friend, former Prime
    Minister Thaksin, in my own humble opinion, will have a
    critical role to play. I hope he does it in a positive and
    constructive way for the sake of the people of Thailand.
        Thank you so much. The hearing is hereby adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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