[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE UPPER BIG BRANCH MINE TRAGEDY
=======================================================================
FIELD HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
EDUCATION AND LABOR
U.S. House of Representatives
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD IN BECKLEY, WV, MAY 24, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-65
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Education and Labor
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available on the Internet:
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/house/education/index.html
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
56-355 PDF WASHINGTON : 2010
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC
area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC
20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR
GEORGE MILLER, California, Chairman
Dale E. Kildee, Michigan, Vice John Kline, Minnesota,
Chairman Senior Republican Member
Donald M. Payne, New Jersey Thomas E. Petri, Wisconsin
Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon,
Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott, Virginia California
Lynn C. Woolsey, California Peter Hoekstra, Michigan
Ruben Hinojosa, Texas Michael N. Castle, Delaware
Carolyn McCarthy, New York Vernon J. Ehlers, Michigan
John F. Tierney, Massachusetts Judy Biggert, Illinois
Dennis J. Kucinich, Ohio Todd Russell Platts, Pennsylvania
David Wu, Oregon Joe Wilson, South Carolina
Rush D. Holt, New Jersey Cathy McMorris Rodgers, Washington
Susan A. Davis, California Tom Price, Georgia
Raul M. Grijalva, Arizona Rob Bishop, Utah
Timothy H. Bishop, New York Brett Guthrie, Kentucky
Joe Sestak, Pennsylvania Bill Cassidy, Louisiana
David Loebsack, Iowa Tom McClintock, California
Mazie Hirono, Hawaii Duncan Hunter, California
Jason Altmire, Pennsylvania David P. Roe, Tennessee
Phil Hare, Illinois Glenn Thompson, Pennsylvania
Yvette D. Clarke, New York [Vacant]
Joe Courtney, Connecticut
Carol Shea-Porter, New Hampshire
Marcia L. Fudge, Ohio
Jared Polis, Colorado
Paul Tonko, New York
Pedro R. Pierluisi, Puerto Rico
Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan,
Northern Mariana Islands
Dina Titus, Nevada
Judy Chu, California
Mark Zuckerman, Staff Director
Barrett Karr, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on May 24, 2010..................................... 1
Statement of Members:
Altmire, Hon. Jason, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Pennsylvania...................................... 14
Capito, Hon. Shelley Moore, a Representative in Congress from
the State of West Virginia................................. 9
Kline, Hon. John, Senior Republican Member, Committee on
Education and Labor........................................ 6
Prepared statement of.................................... 7
Miller, Hon. George, Chairman, Committee on Education and
Labor...................................................... 1
Prepared statement of.................................... 5
Table: ``Names of the 29 Miners Who Died at the Upper Big
Branch Mine on April 5, 2010........................... 67
Letter, dated May 28, 2010, from Hon. Hilda L. Solis,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Labor.................... 68
Mollohan, Hon. Alan B., a Representative in Congress from the
State of West Virginia..................................... 9
Prepared statement of.................................... 10
Rahall, Hon. Nick J. II, a Representative in Congress from
the State of West Virginia................................. 7
Prepared statement of.................................... 8
Shea-Porter, Hon. Carol, a Representative in Congress from
the State of New Hampshire................................. 14
Woolsey, Hon. Lynn C., a Representative in Congress from the
State of California........................................ 12
Prepared statement of.................................... 13
Statement of Witnesses:
Cook, Charles E., uncle of Adam Morgan....................... 26
Prepared statement of.................................... 27
Long, Leo, grandfather of Ronald Lee Maynor.................. 66
Manchin, Hon. Joe III, Governor, State of West Virginia...... 15
Prepared statement of.................................... 18
Morgan, Steve, father of Adam Morgan......................... 24
Prepared statement of.................................... 25
Mullins, Clay, brother of Rex Mullins........................ 29
Prepared statement of.................................... 31
Peters, Alice, mother-in-law of Edward Dean Jones............ 28
Prepared statement of.................................... 28
Quarles, Gary, father of Gary Wayne Quarles.................. 21
Prepared statement of.................................... 23
Rockefeller, Hon. John D. IV, a U.S. Senator from the State
of West Virginia........................................... 11
Solis, Hon. Hilda, Secretary, U.S. Department of Labor....... 2
Stewart, Stanley ``Goose,'' miner, Upper Big Branch Mine..... 32
Prepared statement of.................................... 34
Additional submission: ``Enhanced Underground Hourly Rate
Agreement and Covenant Not to Compete''................ 50
THE UPPER BIG BRANCH MINE TRAGEDY
----------
Monday, May 24, 2010
U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Education and Labor
Washington, DC
----------
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:00 a.m., in room
C, Beckley Raleigh County Convention Center, 200 Armory Drive,
Beckley, West Virginia, Hon. George Miller, Chairman of the
Committee, presiding.
Committee Members Present: Chairman George Miller, and
Representatives John Kline, Ranking Minority Member; Lynn
Woolsey; Jason Altmire; and Carol Shea-Porter.
Also Present: Senator John D. Rockefeller and
Representatives Nick J. Rahall, Shelley Moore Capito, and Alan
B. Mollohan.
Also Present: The Honorable Hilda Solis, Secretary of
Labor; Joe Main, Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and
Health; and Brian Kennedy, Assistant Secretary, Office of
Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs.
Staff Present: Aaron Albright, Press Secretary; Jody
Calemine, General Counsel; Lynn Dondis, Labor Counsel,
Subcommittee on Workforce Protections; Richard Miller, Senior
Labor Policy Advisor; Revae Moran, Detailee Labor; Meredith
Regine, Junior Legislative Associate, Labor; Barrett Karr,
Minority Staff Director; Loren Sweatt, Minority Professional
Staff Member.
Chairman Miller. Good morning. I'm Congressman George
Miller and I want to just make a statement before we begin this
hearing, a very important hearing. I'd like to recognize a
special guest, and I'm very pleased that she has taken her time
to join us today to listen to the families. And that is
Secretary of Labor, Hilda Solis, who is sitting along over
here. Hilda, Secretary Solis--we've known one another a long
time.
Secretary Solis served as a Member of Congress from 2001 to
2009 and she was confirmed as Secretary of Labor in February of
2009. She traveled here from Washington in order to hear
firsthand the testimony of the family members touched by the
Upper Big Branch tragedy. And again, I want to thank her for
being here and she was here right after the tragedy onsite with
the members of her Department, and we certainly appreciate you
being here then also, Hilda, and if you would like to take a
couple of minutes for the purpose of making remarks before we
start the hearing, you're recognized.
Secretary Solis. Thank you very much, Chairman Miller. I
want to also acknowledge Senator Rockefeller, who is here in
the delegation here from West Virginia, but more importantly,
the Committee on Labor and Education for being here and, of
course, obviously, the families. I wish we were here under
different circumstances; however, we do need to begin our
discussion. I just want to thank you, Governor, for also being
here with us.
Let me first express my deepest condolences to the families
once again, friends and co-workers of the twenty-nine miners
who perished in the Upper Big Branch mine and the surviving
miners. Our prayers and our thoughts are with you and your
families. As the President said, we owe them more than prayers;
we owe them action and we owe them accountability. They ought
to know that behind them there's a company that's doing what it
takes to protect them and a government that is looking out for
their safety.
At 3:02 p.m. on April 5th, 2010, an explosion occurred at
the Upper Big Branch Mine. I had the opportunity to watch the
mine rescue teams and MSHA personnel coordinating their
response and the search for the survivors. I traveled to West
Virginia then because I knew and I felt it was my duty to make
sure that you knew that the Department of Labor was doing
everything in our power to get to your loved ones and to get
them out of the mine and back at home.
I had the honor and privilege of meeting some of you and
being with you as you waited for news about your loved ones.
You showed an unbelievable level of courage and composure even
when you knew you were facing the most difficult odds. I've
held those conversations very close to me since then. The
mother praying for the safe return of her son. The grandfather
who himself is suffering from black lung, desperate for
information about his grandson. And the wives and children
agonizing over what they can do to ease the sufferers in pain.
Tragically, we later learned that all twenty-nine men lost
their lives, but we can all honor them by ensuring that justice
is served on their behalf, and that an accident of this
magnitude never happens again.
Shortly after the explosion occurred, I briefed the
President, along with the leadership of MSHA, on the explosion
and our response. He was very clear in his direction to us.
First he asked us to maintain a level of transparency in our
investigation. Secondly, he told us to provide regular updates
to the family members. And finally, he instructed us to take no
action to interfere with any ongoing criminal investigation.
The Mine Safety and Health Administration led by my very
capable Assistant Secretary Joe Main, who is with me, is
conducting a thorough and comprehensive investigation into what
caused the explosion on that day. MSHA also is conducting a
thorough physical investigation of the mine and will hold a
number of public meetings. MSHA's process will allow for
unprecedented public participation, enabling members of the
public to offer their insights into the causes of the
explosion.
If you have something to say, you will have an opportunity
to say it. Our process is designed so we can learn the truth
regarding what happened at Upper Big Branch and determine what
is needed to enhance protections for mining safety.
I'm grateful to Chairman Miller and the Committee and all
the Representatives here for having held this hearing today for
us and the families. I look forward to working with members of
the Committee to strengthen our mine safety and health laws. I
want to thank Governor Joe Manchin and the entire West Virginia
delegation for their leadership and commitment to the mining
community and the people of West Virginia.
Again, I'd like to especially thank the families for their
courage and those of you that are here to testify today before
this Committee. Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to
speak, and I thank you for agreeing to be here to speak on
behalf of your husbands, your fathers, your sons, your
brothers, your uncles, and your friends. We take every incident
that results in injury or loss of life seriously and
personally, and I personally make a commitment that we will do
everything in our power to see that we resolve this issue and
that it doesn't happen again. Thank you.
Chairman Miller. Thank you, Madam Secretary. A quorum being
present, the Committee will come to order. And I want to thank
at the outset all my colleagues and certainly all of our
witnesses today for being here. We appreciate the effort and we
know how difficult it is. We're going to begin with opening
statements by members of the Committee and the West Virginia
delegation, so it's going to take us a little bit of time to
get underway here, but we'll try to keep it short. It's
something a politician says at the outset of every speech.
As I said, good morning. I'd like to welcome everyone to
today's hearing on the Upper Big Branch Mine tragedy. The
Education and Labor Committee has traveled to Beckley to hear
from families who are grieving and to look for the answers to
our nation's most devastating mine tragedy in forty years.
Just a few weeks ago, Americans were once again transfixed
on the unfolding tragedy of the coal mine. While our rescuers
worked heroically to find miners who we all hoped would still
be alive, our nation hoped and prayed that early reports of
four unaccounted miners indicated that there might be some
survivors. Sadly, these hopes faded. Twenty-nine coal miners
died that day. More importantly, this community lost husbands,
fathers, sons, and best friends.
On behalf of all my colleagues, I want to express our
deepest sympathies to you and your families. Our best thoughts
and prayers continue to be with you and your communities who
have suffered this big loss. I know that your testimony today
will be painful for you to deliver. Nevertheless, your
testimony is critical for us to hear. I thank you very much for
being here to participate in today's hearing.
I would like to recognize all the brave miners involved in
the rescue effort. These men and women worked around the clock,
day after day. You, too, have the appreciation of our nation
for your selfless efforts. I'd like to extend our gratitude to
Governor Joe Manchin, Congressman Nick Rahall, and the rest of
the West Virginia delegation that Nick will be introducing in a
minute, all of whom were on the ground at that time helping
families during the rescue efforts. Secretary Hilda Solis, who
has joined us today, she was on the ground and met with miners
and their families during this same ordeal. And I'm also
grateful for the participation of all the West Virginia
delegation helping us to put this hearing together. They
provided valuable support to make sure that the lessons from
these tragedies are not forgotten.
I want you to know that we're all working together on
legislation to make something--to try to make sure something
like this doesn't happen again. Today we'll hear from you, the
panel of family members, about how this tragedy has affected
you.
While the cause of this tragedy remains under
investigation, the hazards miners face underground are not a
mystery. We know how coal dust can explode like gun powder when
ignited by methane. We understand the disastrous results when
miners operate at the margins of safety in order to put more
coal on the belt. We know what happens when workers' voices are
silenced by fear of retaliation for speaking out on safety
problems that they see and experience. And we know the
consequences for safety when operators game the system in order
to escape much tougher safety oversight. What happens is that
miners die.
Despite these truths, I am sure that many are skeptical
that elected officials have the willingness to do anything
about it. There is a frustration that as attention to the
tragedy fades, mine owners simply will return to business as
usual. There's a frustration that no one will be held
accountable for the deaths of so many loved ones. The real
safety reforms will fall by the wayside again. I share this
concern. I've seen it happen before. But we cannot succumb to
defeatism and cynicism when it comes to the lives of our fellow
human beings, and I will not.
This Committee has heard from many families over the years
who have suffered great loss, as you have. And I made a promise
to them and I cannot forget that promise. I made a pledge to
the families at Sago, Aracoma, Alma, Darby, and Crandall Canyon
in Ogden, Utah that we would do everything in our power to
uncover the cause of these tragedies, to hold responsible
parties accountable, and to prevent miners from suffering a
similar fate. And I extend that same promise to the families of
Upper Big Branch.
Your families paid the ultimate price for a job our nation
depends upon. Losing a family member to this kind of tragedy
can fill one with a sense of powerlessness; however, I have
found in the face of overwhelming tragedies, families display
incredible strength and determination.
It was the coal miners' families that helped to provide the
final push to give miners a fighting chance after the last
tragedies of Sago and those mines. It was the coal miners'
families that got the legislature to pass the MINER Act. As a
result of that, we're looking more at what happened after the
accident. Mminers now have at least 96 hours of breathable air
stockpiled; lifelines and tracking communication systems are
being installed; and mine rescue teams are properly trained,
equipped, and ready to respond.
While this is a significant step forward, I felt that we
missed an opportunity to do more to protect the health and
safety of our nation's miners. Every day miners show up for
their shift knowing that there's a chance that they may not
return to their families. Miners for generations have lived
with this fear. But I firmly believe there are things that we
can do to ensure every miner who goes to work is able to return
home safety to their families at the end of their shift.
Congress has an obligation to make it so, and we will.
And I want to again thank you all for coming. I'd like now
to recognize the Senior Republican Member of the Committee,
Congressman John Kline from Minnesota, with the purpose of an
opening statement.
[The statement of Chairman Miller follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. George Miller, Chairman,
Committee on Education and Labor
Good morning. I would like to welcome everyone to today's hearing
on the Upper Big Branch Mine tragedy. The Education and Labor Committee
has traveled to Beckley, West Virginia to hear from families who are
grieving and looking for answers to our nation's most devastating mine
tragedy in forty years.
Just a few weeks ago, Americans were once again transfixed on an
unfolding tragedy at a coal mine, while rescuers worked heroically to
find miners who we all hoped were still alive. On April 5, a massive
explosion on a scale that is nearly incomprehensible ripped through the
Upper Big Branch Mine.
Our nation hoped and prayed that early reports of four unaccounted
miners indicated that there might be survivors. But, sadly, these hopes
faded. Twenty-nine coal miners died that day. More importantly, this
community lost husbands, fathers, sons, and best friends.
On behalf of all of my colleagues, I want to express our deepest
sympathies to each of you and your families. Our thoughts continue to
be with you and your communities who have suffered such a big loss.
I know your testimony today will be painful for you to deliver.
Nevertheless, your testimony is critical for us to hear. I thank you
very much for agreeing to participate in today's hearing.
I would also like to recognize all of the brave miners involved in
the rescue effort. These men and women worked around the clock, day
after day. You, too, have the appreciation of this nation for your
selfless efforts.
I would also like to extend our gratitude to Governor Joe Manchin
and Congressman Nick Rahall, who were on the ground helping families
and miners during the rescue efforts.
Secretary Hilda Solis also joins us today. She was also on the
ground and met with miners and their families during this ordeal.
I am also grateful for the participation of other members of the
West Virginia delegation today -Congresswoman Shelley Moore Capito,
Congressman Alan Mollohan, and Senator Jay Rockefeller. The West
Virginia delegation has provided invaluable support to make sure that
lessons from this tragedy are not forgotten.
I want you to know that we are all working together on legislation
to make sure something like this doesn't happen again.
Today we will hear from a panel of family members about how this
tragedy has affected them.
While the cause of this tragedy remains under investigation, the
hazards miners face while underground are not a mystery.
We know how coal dust can explode like gunpowder when ignited by
methane. We understand the disastrous results when a mine owner
operates on the margins of safety in order to put more coal on the
belt. We know what happens when workers' voices are silenced by fear of
retaliation for speaking out on safety problems they see. And, we know
the consequences for safety when an operator games the system in order
to escape much tougher safety oversight.
Miners die. That's what happens.
Despite these truths, I am sure that many are skeptical that
elected officials have the willingness to do anything about it. There
is frustration that as attention to this tragedy fades, mine operators
will simply return to business as usual. That no one will be held
accountable for the deaths of so many loved ones, and real safety
reforms will fall by the wayside again.
I share this concern. I've seen it happen before.
But we cannot succumb to defeatism and cynicism when it comes to
the lives of our fellow human beings. I will not.
This committee has heard from too many families over the years who
have suffered a great loss, as you have. I made a promise to them and I
cannot forget that promise.
I made a pledge to the families of Sago, Aracoma Alma, Darby and
Crandall Canyon that we would do everything in our power to uncover the
cause of those tragedies, to hold responsible parties accountable, and
to prevent other miners from suffering a similar fate.
I extend this same promise to all the families of Upper Big Branch.
Your families paid the ultimate price for a job our nation depends on.
Losing a family member to a senseless tragedy could fill you with a
sense of powerlessness. However, I have found that in the face of
overwhelming tragedy, families display incredible strength and
determination.
Coal miners' families helped to provide the final push to give
miners a fighting chance after an emergency. As a result, mines must
have at least 96 hours of breathable air stockpiled, lifelines,
tracking and communications systems installed, and that mine rescue
teams be properly trained, equipped and ready to respond. While this
was a significant step forward, I felt that we missed an opportunity to
do more to protect the health and safety of our nation's miners.
Every day, miners show up for their shift knowing that there is a
chance they may not return to their families. Miners for generations
have lived with this fear.
But I firmly believe that there are things we can do to ensure that
every miner who goes to work is be able to return home safely to their
families at the end of their shift. Congress has an obligation to make
sure that is the case.
And we will.
I thank you all for coming today and look forward to your
testimony.
______
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank also
the Governor for being here and certainly all the witnesses.
I'm pleased to see Secretary Solis, Assistant Secretary Main,
and the members of the community and the families for being
here today and for being so welcoming to us.
This hearing is a somber occasion, but an important one.
The April 5th explosion of the Upper Big Branch mine stole the
lives of 29 miners and forever changed the lives of their
families, friends, co-workers, and communities. Today's hearing
provides us and the public a forum to hear directly from
survivors of this tragedy, the family members who lost loved
ones, and the leaders helping them cope.
The federal investigations are ongoing and congressional
oversight has only just begun. There are still far too many
questions and far too few answers. In Congress, our job is not
only to write federal laws, but to exercise oversight of those
laws and the agencies administering them. We have powerful
investigative tools and a large bully pulpit from which to
speak. With that comes a solemn responsibility to investigate
carefully, thoroughly, responsibly, and openly.
Chairman Miller and I have worked together, as have members
of our staffs, in preparation for that investigation. Our goal
is to examine mine safety laws, looking at how they have been
implemented and whether they're being obeyed. What we will not
do is undercut or impede the important investigations currently
underway by MSHA and other federal authorities. Instead, our
job is to look more broadly at the safety of underground coal
mining.
In time, I expect we will be discussing regulatory and
legislative changes to strengthen mine safety by demanding step
by step compliance with and enforcement of mine safety laws.
That's not why we're here today. Today we're here for the
families. You all are not here to listen to me, but I'm here to
listen to you, and once again, I'd like to thank you for that
opportunity and, Mr. Chairman, I give back.
[The statement of Mr. Kline follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John Kline, Senior Republican Member,
Committee on Education and Labor
Thank you Chairman Miller and let me also extend my thanks to
Governor Manchin, the community surrounding Montcoal, and especially
the family members who are welcoming us here today.
This hearing is a somber occasion, but an important one. The April
5th explosion at the Upper Big Branch mine stole the lives of 29 miners
and forever changed the lives of their families, friends, coworkers,
and communities. Today's hearing provides us and the public a forum to
hear directly from survivors of this tragedy--the family members who
lost loved ones and the leaders helping them cope.
The federal investigations are ongoing, and congressional oversight
has only just begun. There are still far too many questions and far too
few answers.
In Congress, our job is not only to write federal laws, but to
exercise oversight of those laws and the agencies administering them.
We have powerful investigative tools and a large bully pulpit from
which to speak. With that comes a solemn responsibility to investigate
carefully, thoroughly, responsibly, and openly.
Chairman Miller and I have worked together--as have members of our
staffs--in preparation for that investigation. Our goal is to examine
mine safety laws, looking at how they have been implemented and whether
they are being obeyed. What we will not do is undercut or impede the
important investigations currently underway by MSHA and other federal
authorities. Instead, our job is to look more broadly at the safety of
underground coal mining.
In time, I expect we will be discussing regulatory and legislative
changes to strengthen mine safety by demanding steadfast compliance
with--and enforcement of--mine safety laws.
But that's not why we're here today.
Today, we are here for the families. You all are not here to listen
to me--I am here to listen to you, and once again, I'd like to thank
you for that opportunity. I yield back.
______
Chairman Miller. I thank the Gentleman. Without objection,
the Committee is joined today by Congressman Rahall,
Congresswoman Capito, Congressman Mollohan, and Senator
Rockefeller. As they appreciatively welcome this Committee to
the state, I would like to offer each of them an opportunity to
have an opening statement and to submit any additional
testimony that they would like to in written form. And with
that I would like to recognize my colleague in the House,
Chairman Nick Rahall.
Mr. Rahall. Thank you, Chairman Miller. I appreciate you
and Ranking Member Kline, members of the Committee and
Subcommittee Chair Lynn Woolsey for being with us today. And I
thank as well Congressman Mollohan and Congresswoman Capito for
taking part in this hearing. I appreciate the Governor being
here, Senator Rockefeller, and I know we have a representative
from Senator Byrd's staff here as well. I thank Secretary Hilda
Solis, a former member of our Natural Resources Committee, and
find now that she once again has shown her concern for our coal
miners' families and mine safety by being with us today.
We'll be hearing today from family members and friends of
the 29 miners lost in the tragic mine explosion on April 5th of
this year in Massey Energy's Upper Big Branch mine, not far
from where we sit. I'm grateful to each of you for giving voice
to the men who cannot speak for themselves. I know that you are
still grieving.
We have many other family members in attendance as well
that are not at the witness table and I know that this is going
to be difficult, that you are under extreme pressures. But I
assure you, by your speaking today, you are making a
difference, you are making a difference for our future coal
miners. You are reminding us that this is not just about better
mine safety machines or more accurate measurements. And it is
certainly not about making money. This is about human lives.
Those 29 miners should not have perished in that mine and,
for them and for all miners on the job today, I hope you will
continue to keep speaking out. We must make every effort. We
must go around every corner. We must turn every head in
protecting our most valuable God-given resource, our coal
miners.
Chairman Miller and many Members here, certainly Governor
Manchin, Senator Rockefeller, we've been through this process
before, trying to enact mine safety improvements. Congressman
Mollohan, Congresswoman Capito had disasters in their districts
as well. And the one element of that effort that can make a
difference beyond anything else is the tenacity that Chairman
Miller referred to in his opening comments, the tenacity of the
family members who are determined to see that something good
comes of their insurmountable and immeasurable loss.
It is a sad and infuriating reality that every piece of
legislation ever passed that advanced mine safety has been
written in the blood of coal miners. I thank each of you again
for being here today. I thank our Governor and I will now
recognize Congresswoman Shelley Moore Capito, in whose
district, as we all know, the Sago disaster occurred several
years back. Congresswoman Capito.
[The statement of Mr. Rahall follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Nick J. Rahall II, a Representative in
Congress From the State of West Virginia
Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Kline, Members of the Committee, I
thank you for allowing me and my fellow members of West Virginia's
Congressional Delegation to take part in this hearing today. I
appreciate your coming to Beckley, to my District, to gain what I
believe will prove to be valuable insight.
I also thank Secretary Hilda Solis, a former member of the Natural
Resources Committee, which I chair, for her presence here in Beckley,
once again.
We will hear, today, from family members and friends of the 29
miners lost in a tragic mine explosion on April 5th of this year in
Massey Energy's Upper Big Branch Mine, not far from here.
I am grateful to each of you for giving voice to men who cannot
speak for themselves. I know that you are still grieving. I know this
is difficult, and that you are under extreme pressures. But I assure
you, you are making a difference by speaking today.
You are reminding all of us that this is not just about better mine
safety machines or more accurate measurements. And it is certainly not
about making money. This is about human lives. Those 29 miners should
not have perished in that mine, and, for them, and for all miners on
the job today, I hope you will keep speaking out.
Chairman Miller and I have been through this process before of
trying to enact mine safety improvements. And the one element of that
effort that can make a difference, beyond anything else, is the
tenacity of family members who are determined to see that some good
comes of their immeasurable loss. It is a sad and infuriating reality
that every piece of legislation ever passed to advance mine safety has
been written in the blood of coal miners.
I thank and welcome our Governor, Joe Manchin. Governor Manchin and
I have been through too many of these kinds of tragedies together and
he has worked hard to institute some impressive changes here in West
Virginia that can help to inform and enlighten our efforts at the
federal level.
I feel confident that he agrees with me when I say the explosion at
the Upper Big Branch Mine was a tragedy that never, ever should have
occurred.
We owe it to the families of those earnest, hard-working miners who
perished in that mine to get to the bottom of it. We owe them
accountability. And we owe them, and all mining families, our devoted
energies to help prevent similar tragedies from occurring again in our
nation's coalfields.
I appreciate this Committee's starting that concerted effort here
and now.
______
Mrs. Capito. Thank you. I'd like to thank my colleagues.
I'd like to thank each of them for coming to Beckley. Welcome
to West Virginia to my colleagues and I'm glad we have a
beautiful day for you to see that it is almost heaven, quite
frankly, as we call it. To the families, thank you for your
bravery for testifying today and for the strength that you
bring to the table. I thank the Governor as well for being here
and also for his steadfast support during that tragic week in
April at the Upper Big Branch mine. I want to thank my
colleagues as well and certainly the Secretary and Assistant
Secretary.
Quite frankly, I have a longer statement, but I said I'd
submit that for the record. I just wanted to say that being a
West Virginian, this accident has taken a tremendous toll on
all of us. It has simply been devastating for us, most
certainly more personally for those who we're going to hear
from today.
Many questions remain and we're not going to get those
questions answered until the teams can actually re-enter the
mine and find out exactly what happened, but some of the early
descriptions of what happened down there when they say that the
rails for the mantrips were twisted like pretzels and machinery
tossed aside from the blast, there was obviously something
horribly wrong.
But I find it hard to believe after Sago in 2006 in my
district that an accident of this magnitude could actually
occur. So, you know, we passed legislation in response to Sago
with your leadership and others to avoid an accident such as
this from happening again, and here we are. This proves we must
continue to work together to keep our miners safe and prevent
this from happening again.
I have numerous questions that I'd like to have answered,
but I'd really rather listen to what our witnesses have to say
today, so I will submit those questions for the record. But I
just want you to know this is going to be difficult for you but
I appreciate your willingness to come before us today. You will
make a difference. Thank you.
Mr. Rahall. Thank you, Congresswoman Capito. Joining us
this morning from the first congressional district, your friend
and mine, and a gentleman who called me every day wanting to
know the status and how we were coming on our recovery efforts,
is Congressman Alan Mollohan of the first district.
Mr. Mollohan. Thank you, Chairman Rahall. It's an honor to
join this panel. I want to thank the Chairman of the Committee
for allowing me to do that, Chairman Miller. First of all to
the family members, your testimony here today is brave and will
be very, very useful and give us special insight as to what's
happened here. And your knowing the day-to-day experiences of
your loved ones as they went in and out of the mine, those
added insights cannot be derived from any other source than
from your testimony here today, so thank you for joining us.
The tragedy that you and the community has experienced is
really beyond belief.
Senator Rockefeller, I am not surprised that you're here
joining this House panel. It's extraordinary that you'd do that
and it's an indication of your commitment to the health and
safety of West Virginians and coal miners in particular and
your dedication overall.
Hilda Solis, thank you for the good work that you're doing.
I had the honor to join Secretary Solis in the Federal Number 2
mine up in my congressional district about a year ago, so she
had early on in her service to the country, the Secretary of
Labor had coal mining high on her list. She's been down
underground and from that experience at least knows the
environment of which we speak here today.
Chairman Miller, thank you again for allowing me to join
the hearing today and thank you for coming to West Virginia,
for bringing your Committee to our state. There aren't very
many coal mines in California, I understand one, and I was
extraordinarily surprised to hear that there was one in your
congressional district. But for more than 30 years, George
Miller has been one of the mine workers' real champions.
Whether you're an Oakland dock worker or an Indiana iron worker
or a West Virginia coal miner, George Miller has always had
your back. I think we heard that in his opening remarks, that
commitment. In the dark days after Sago, it was George Miller
who pledged his support for tougher mine safety laws and I know
that he's angered and I know that he's pained by what happened
at Upper Big Branch, and I know that his leadership will be
crucial in the months ahead.
The other great leader in mine safety in the House of
Representatives here today, of course, is Congressman Nick
Rahall. He knows more about the coal industry and has fought
tirelessly for the safety and welfare of the coal miners than
anybody else in Congress. He understands better than anyone,
what we need to do to protect those men and women who go
underground every single day.
We don't know what went wrong at the Upper Big Branch but
we'll be finding out. And once we do, Nick Rahall, Congressman
Miller, Senator Rockefeller all will be making sure of two
things. First, that we hold the people accountable; and
secondly, that we make sure that what happened at Upper Big
Branch never happens again. You'll probably never be able to
guarantee a miner's safety anymore than we can guarantee any
worker's safety, but that's the goal that we strive for. Nick
Rahall and George Miller's leadership will bring us closer to
that.
Again, to the family members, thank you for coming this
morning. The nation needs to hear from you and you're brave to
be here this morning to share with us the special insights into
this disaster. I had the honor to meet with several of you last
month and it's a special strength to be here today to share
with this Committee and the public your grief and your sorrow
and your knowledge. As Congressman Rahall just said, you're
making a difference today. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Mollohan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Alan B. Mollohan, a Representative in
Congress From the State of West Virginia
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to join your hearing this
morning.
And thank you also for coming to West Virginia today, for bringing
your committee to our state.
There aren't very many coal mines in the chairman's district, but
for more than 30 years, George Miller has been one of the mine worker's
real champions.
Whether you're an Oakland dock worker, an Indiana ironworker, or a
West Virginia coal miner, George Miller has always had your back.
In the dark days after Sago, George Miller pulled Nick Rahall and
me together and pledged his support for tougher mine safety laws.
And I know that he is angered and pained by what happened at Upper
Big Branch, and I know that his leadership will be critical in the
months ahead.
The other great leader in mine safety is, of course, Congressman
Nick Rahall. He knows more about the coal industry--and has fought
harder for it--than anyone else in Congress.
And he understands better than anyone what we need to do to protect
those men and women who go underground every single day.
We don't know what went wrong at Upper Big Branch. But we will find
out. And once we do, Nick Rahall will make sure of two things:
First, he will hold people accountable.
And second, he will make sure that what happened at Upper Big
Branch never happens again.
We will probably never be able to guarantee a miner's safety,
anymore than we can guarantee any worker's safety. But that is the goal
that we strive towards. And Nick Rahall and George Miller's leadership
will bring us closer to that goal.
Finally--to the family members testifying: Thank you for coming
this morning.
I had the honor to meet with several of you last month. It takes a
special strength to share with this committee and the public your grief
and your sorrow.
As Mr. Rahall just said, you are making a difference today. Thank
you.
______
Mr. Rahall. Thank you. Chairman Miller, it is now my honor
to introduce an individual from the other body, as we call it,
the United States Senate. It's not often that a United States
Senator will join a House Member's Committee hearing, but we're
honored today to have our junior Senator from West Virginia, an
individual who was on the scene at the UBB site many times and
is no stranger to mine disasters, either, Senator Jay
Rockefeller.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Congressman, and I
sincerely thank the Chairman, George Miller, a champion on all
fronts to workers of all kinds, coal miners in particular.
Hilda Solis, whose father worked in a battery acid factory out
in California, has all kinds of health problems himself. She
knows what goes on and she can extrapolate that experience into
your experience, and you know we're all here sharing the grief
that you feel.
It's a very sensitive hearing today because I have an
instinct to kind of want to talk about what we should do in
terms of legislation, because that's just who I am. I want to
make sure that this doesn't happen again, and I do believe that
all mine accidents are preventable and I'll never waver from
that opinion. And here you are, and it's hard.
I think that during the course of some of the statements
that you give and questions that we ask, you may feel stronger
now than you did then and it may be hard to answer, and that's
okay, totally okay. because you are the experts. We come here
because you're the ones who sit around the kitchen table every
evening when you get home and talk to your family members. Or
sometimes people don't talk to their family members about what
they do, because that's also in the nature of coal mining. They
hold it inside of themselves, which makes it more painful, in a
sense, at a hearing like this. But that's why you're so brave
to be here.
You're the experts. You're the ones that's been inside coal
mines, many of you for decades, doing this work and you've seen
it all. It always interests me that, you know, this hurts the
nation, this tragedy, and yet at the same time I know that, you
know, even in West Virginia, 98 percent of the people have
never been underground, can't do it. You can if you're
Governor, you can if you're a Senator, you can if you're a
Cabinet Secretary, but otherwise, pretty much you can't. And so
it's in a secret world that's filled with danger that you do
your work, and it's up to us who do know what happens
underground to make sure we do all we can to hold companies
accountable for what they do, to make sure that equipment isn't
tampered with, to make sure that your lives are protected,
shielded and protected to the extent that we can do that.
And then there's always the question of follow-up, you
know, what is MSHA going to do? What are the state folks going
to do? And I'm going to question Governor Manchin, I'm really
proud of him, about how the state and federal government could
cooperate better. Some do and I think we sometimes overlap and
I don't think that's necessary, or maybe it is. We need to talk
about that.
There's so many safety things that we can do. We can put it
into legislation and it will make you and future generations of
your families who go into coal mining safer. But, you know, in
essence we've come here today to honor you in your grief,
respect you, to cherish you, and yet to learn from you. We're
not the experts and you are, so this is our day to listen to
you and I really look forward to your testimony. Thank you.
Chairman Miller. I want to thank again all the members of
the West Virginia delegation. Senator Rockefeller, thank you
for being here and joining our Committee. I'd like to recognize
three members of our Committee who have come here. First of
all, our Subcommittee Chair, Lynn Woolsey, who does safety
every day for America's workers. Lynn is my colleague from
California.
Ms. Woolsey. Right. And I have been underground. A couple
months ago it occurred to me after several turns of chairing
the Workforce Protection Subcommittee, I'd better get down, I'd
better get underground in a mine so I'll have some idea of what
we're talking about, what your experience would even be. And
I'm so glad that I did, because I would probably not have been
able to relate at all, I mean, other than tragically, to what
happened. I want to thank you for coming here to testify.
It was a tragic explosion last month at the Upper Big
Branch mine, and we don't know what the cause of the explosion
was yet, I mean, it hasn't been determined. But indications are
that the blast could have been avoided if the operator had put
miners' safety above production and profits. So you have to
know that we're so honored and so humbled that you would come
here and speak with us after losing loved ones, friends,
brothers, sons, those that make such a difference in your
lives, and this is such a difficult time.
It's been truly a terrible year for miners, but none worse
than your experience here at the Upper Big Branch mine. But so
far in 2010, and this is May, forty miners have been killed in
mine accidents, exceeding the total number of all of the year
2009. This is absolutely unacceptable and know that every
single person up here believes and knows that.
The original Mine Act was passed some forty years ago and,
you know, we know that health and safety has improved a bit,
but it has not improved enough. This is the 21st Century, for
heaven's sake, and we must do more. But we need your help and
we're hoping that your valuable information about the
conditions before the explosion will help us, because you know
and have information about how the mine was operated, not just
this mine, but other mines operated by Massey Energy.
And your testimony today will assist us with what we need
to do next to ensure that owners and operators are held
accountable for the health and safety of their workers. I'm
particularly concerned about what I've been hearing, that
miners at Upper Big Branch felt they could not report unsafe
conditions because they feared they would lose their jobs.
Unfortunately, mine inspectors cannot be at the mines all the
time and it is absolutely necessary that miners feel free to
report violations.
To do that, we need to strengthen the whistleblower
provisions of the mine law. We have done that just recently
with the newly introduced Protecting American Workers Act, the
OSH Act, which revamped the whistleblower program in the
Occupational Safety and Health Act. So everyone on this panel
this morning, every one of you is appreciated. We know you are
committed.
Governor, we loved what you're doing from day one so that
miners can go to work each and every day and come home safe to
their families at night. No family member should stay home
wondering if their loved one will be home with them that
evening. So I look forward to your testimony and we promise we
will be working to go forward to protect you. Thank you.
[The statement of Ms. Woolsey follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Lynn C. Woolsey, a Representative in
Congress From the State of California
I want to thank you all for agreeing to testify today on the tragic
explosion last month at the Upper Big Branch mine.
Our thoughts are with you and the other family members who have
lost loved ones at Upper Big Branch and at other mines.
And thank you Governor Manchin for being here as well.
While the cause of the explosion has not yet been determined,
indications are that the blast could have been avoided altogether if
Massey Energy had put miners' safety above production and profits.
We are so honored that you who have lost fathers, sons, brothers
and friends are willing to come forward at this very difficult time.
This has been a terrible year for miners.
So far in 2010, 40 miners have been killed, higher than mining
fatalities in all of 2009.
This is unacceptable.
We now are in the 21st century, and we need solutions that will
truly keep miners healthy and safe as they go about their work.
You have valuable information to give us about the conditions of
the mine before the explosion and about how Massey Energy treats its
workers.
And we want your advice on what we can do to ensure that owners and
operators are held accountable for the health and safety of their
workers.
There is a lot to be done but one essential reform is to ensure
that workers are free to report safety and health violations and
without worrying that they will lose their jobs.
From what I heard, miners at Upper Big Branch did not complain
because they knew they would be fired if they did.
That culture needs to change, and I would like to see mine
legislation contain the same whistleblower provisions that are in the
Protecting America's Workers Act, which reforms the Occupational and
Safety Act.
Again thank you so much for coming today, and I look forward to
your testimony.
______
Chairman Miller. Thank you. Now I'd like to recognize
Congressman Jason Altmire from Pennsylvania, the Pittsburgh
area. He's interested in coal mining and mine safety. Jason.
Mr. Altmire. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to
briefly say that we recognize, all of us up here, how
incredibly difficult a day this is for you to be here, to tell
your story about your family and your friends in the mine. And
we don't take lightly the fact that you are in an incredibly
unimaginable painful time in your life. And we want you to
know, having Secretary Solis here, Governor Manchin, Senator
Rockefeller, the entire West Virginia House delegation, members
of this Committee, that we are here to hear from you, and we
take very seriously what you have to say. And we are going to
use the testimony that we hear today to hold accountable those
who are responsible for this tragedy and to make sure that it
will never happen again. That's the purpose of why we are here,
we are here to hear from you, and we can't thank you enough for
being here to join us and the pain that this has inflicted upon
you and this entire community. We understand that this is a
difficult time. So thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing and thank you to the witnesses.
Chairman Miller. I'd like to introduce Congresswoman Carol
Shea-Porter from New Hampshire. She's a member of the Committee
and she's very involved in all of the issues with worker
safety.
Ms. Shea-Porter. I'm from New Hampshire and we don't coal
mine there, but I will say that we are so grateful to our
fellow Americans who do this dangerous work for all of us. We
in New Hampshire watched and prayed with you and we cried with
you. And we admired your courage and we also were very moved by
your sorrow. It's our obligation on this Committee to find out
exactly what happened and we can't do that without you.
So we're very grateful that you would come forward and tell
your stories. We've heard these stories before. My heart breaks
and my mind shouts no and I know every member of the Committee,
and the Senator, and the Secretary of Labor, and the Governor,
and everybody else gathered here has the same mission, to make
sure that we're not back here or in some other hall in a couple
of years hearing the same stories. It's our job to prevent it
and I'm thanking you for telling us how.
Chairman Miller. Thank you. With that, we'll move to our,
to hear from our witnesses. Thank you for your patience during
these opening statements, and I'd like to recognize Mr. Rahall.
Mr. Rahall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is my distinct
honor to thank once again and to welcome the Governor of our
state, Joe Manchin. He and I have been through a couple of
these tragedies in a couple of years in my district alone, and
the Governor, along with our state legislature, has worked
tirelessly to institute some impressive changes here in West
Virginia, to inform and enlighten our efforts at the federal
level.
The Governor has served our state since the year '05,
previously served as our Secretary of State from 2000 to '04.
He comes from a family that's long dedicated to public service
and he possesses a deep understanding of coal mining, what it
means to our economy, what it means to our energy picture, and
what it means to our state of West Virginia.
He's had personal experience, having lost a loved one in
previous disasters in this state and his insight into how these
tragedies touch families is invaluable to our work here. He and
I were together all week during this disaster at UBB and he
certainly is a strong advocate for mine safety and the rights
of our coal miners, and I certainly appreciate him being here
today and welcome him.
Governor Manchin. Congressman--I'm sorry.
Chairman Miller. No, I was going to say, roughly what we're
going to do here is, we're going to begin with the Governor and
then we'll work our way down the line. A green light will go on
when you begin testifying and then, after 4 minutes, an orange
light will go on, and then a minute later, a red light. So if
you could sum up your testimony at that time.
But both to the Governor and to the members of this panel,
we want you to testify in the manner you're most comfortable
with and make sure you're able to tell us the things you think
we should hear. So the lights are a little bit more guidance
today than they might be in Washington, where we're fairly
strict about it, because we want to make sure that we hear from
you. Thank you very much. Governor.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOE MANCHIN, III, GOVERNOR,
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
Governor Manchin. Chairman Miller, thank you so much, and
Ranking Member Kline; and Congressman Rahall, for your kind
introduction; Congressman Mollohan; Congresswoman Capito;
Senator Rockefeller; to all of the Members; and to Secretary
Solis; and to Assistant Secretary Main. I'm honored to be here
today with the families of these men who lost their lives in
the Upper Big Branch mine, Mr. Stewart, and all the others here
who represent the family members. And I think you know the
commitment and dedication we all have and the love they have
for the families.
Since I learned of the terrible tragedy, my first priority
has been to ensure that our miners are represented honorably
and their families have the support and protection that they
need during this difficult time. I've personally been through
this with the loss of my uncle in 1968 at the Farmington Number
9 mine explosion, along with a lot of my friends and classmates
in school.
It's important for me to make certain that those who do not
know West Virginia miners and their families will come to
understand the character and substance of these wonderful
people who play such an important role in this great state and
in our nation. When you hear the testimonies of the men and
women sitting alongside of me today, and as you see the
strength and courage on their faces, you're going to be
inspired as I am, and you will better understand the heart and
soul of West Virginia and her people.
West Virginia has a rich history and mining is a very
important part of that history. Coal from West Virginia has
powered this country in times of prosperity, in times of
depression, and in times of war. Mining coal is hard and
challenging work and when it's not done properly, it's very,
very dangerous as we know. However, in this day and age, we
should be able to mine coal safely without risking the lives of
our miners as they are the people we depend on to sustain our
way of life.
That is why, since the tragedy at the Upper Big Branch
mine, my main objective has been to determine what occurred, to
make certain it doesn't happen again, and determine whether
there is intimidation or any other action at the Upper Big
Branch mine that puts profits before safety. You can put a
price on a ton of coal and I can tell you the price of every
piece of machinery in that mine, but I cannot tell you the
price of the miner, because he or she is priceless. West
Virginia expects, we expect every employer in every field of
work to prioritize safety ahead of everything else. The person
who goes to work each morning to provide a living for
themselves and their family should expect nothing less than to
return home safe.
Almost immediately after I learned of the accident at the
Upper Big Branch mine, I appointed J.W. McAteer, Assistant
Secretary of the Mine Safety and Health Administration under
President Clinton, to head an independent investigation into
the explosion. Mr. McAteer is a native of Fairmont, West
Virginia, my home area, Marion County and Fairmont. He brings a
wealth of experience to the table. He's devoted a considerable
portion of his professional life to mine safety and health
issues and he is an experienced investigator. At my request,
Mr. McAteer led an independent blue ribbon panel in 2006 after
the Sago and the Alma-Aracoma mine accidents in West Virginia.
He has also assembled a team of independent experts to work
alongside Director Ron Wooten and his team of state
investigators from the West Virginia Office of Miners' Health,
Safety and Training.
Director Wooten and Mr. McAteer have been working closely
with MSHA and we appreciate that cooperation and we'll continue
to do so throughout this investigation. West Virginia deserves
to know what happened at Upper Big Branch. We deserve to know
why this tragedy occurred and whether it could have been
prevented.
There are questions we need answered. Why did serious
safety violations repeatedly occur at Upper Big Branch? Were
the miners concerned about their safety? Were miners threatened
or intimidated from speaking out? If state or federal
regulators knew that the mine was unsafe, why was it allowed to
continue to operate?
There's been much discussion about administrative and
judicial procedures that can allow a mine to remain open in the
face of significant safety violations that would otherwise
warrant a closure order. We need to ask ourselves, ``Is
bureaucracy getting in the way of safety?''
I have asked Mr. McAteer's team and Director Wooten to
answer these questions and many more. I've also asked them and
other mine safety experts, including our State Board of Coal
Mine Health and Safety, to recommend legal reforms. I will
incorporate their proposals and some of my own into a
comprehensive mine safety plan that will address several issues
for West Virginia.
One proposal that I think is critical is the establishment
of a certified mine safety team in every mine. I envision teams
of miners in each mine that are trained and certified to
identify dangerous situations and work day in and day out at
those mines. These miners should be empowered to make decisions
and take actions and should be protected by law from threats,
harassment, or intimidation.
We also need to look at rock dusting standards. Just days
after the Upper Big Branch explosion, I ordered Director Wooten
to begin testing mines for compliance with an 80 percent total
combustible content of rock dust standard. This has been
recommended by the National Institute of Occupational Safety
and Health reports. I believe West Virginia should mandate this
standard.
Some other proposals I'm considering include updating mine
ventilation standards in our state code, enhancing criminal
penalties for tampering with or altering safety equipment,
furthering whistleblower protections, and incorporating more
technology in the mines for accident prevention and rescue.
In addition to specific reforms, we should reexamine our
overall regulatory schemes, both state and federal. For
example, I've been told by representatives of one coal operator
that the United States Bureau of Mines, which was closed in the
mid-nineties, had a program staffed with highly qualified
personnel that reviewed and approved design plans for all new
mines. I was told that there has not been as significant a
level of engineering and review of new mine plans since the
Bureau closed. Perhaps this is an area where we need to
improve.
Corporate governance is another issue the state or federal
government should address. No one in a corporate or business
structure from the top to the bottom should be protected or
untouchable under the law if the corporation or business fails
to make safety a priority or fails to empower workers to make
the workplace as safe as possible.
With that being said, we have many mining companies in West
Virginia and around this country with excellent safety records
that put the safety of their miners ahead of everything else. I
want to commend those operators for focusing on safety and I
encourage others to follow their lead.
We need to look at what these companies are doing that is
above and beyond what is legally required, and ask ourselves
whether those standards should be required of the coal mines.
If a company can focus on safety ahead of profits and still
compete in a global marketplace, every company can build a
successful business model around the culture of that today.
I want to challenge the coal industry to set a new bar for
workplace safety. That is why I ordered, in the days following
the Upper Big Branch, a day of honor and mourning for our
fallen miners, and asked coal operators to cease production for
one whole day to focus on safety. I asked every underground
mine operator and miner to go to work and commit for one day to
focus completely on making their workplace as safe as possible.
I felt this was an appropriate way to honor the miners at Upper
Big Branch, and a way to give direction to the coal industry on
where we need to go as a state and a nation.
As we move forward and form new goals for mine safety, I
will continue to make certain that the laws that are already on
the books are stringently enforced. I've already ordered
increased coal mine inspections and stricter enforcement of
coal mine health and safety laws in West Virginia. Just days
after Upper Big Branch, I ordered the Office of Miners' Health,
Safety and Training to immediately inspect every coal mine in
the state of West Virginia. The worst offenders, those with the
records of the most serious health and safety violations, were
inspected within hours of my order.
We've also established a 24-hour, 7-day-a-week industrial
accident safety hotline, which allows callers to anonymously
report problems in the workplace without fear or intimidation.
The hotline has been up and running for a short time, but has
already seen many, many results. I hope that it will encourage
more workers to become involved in strengthening safety
procedures from the front lines.
In closing, I want to thank you for this opportunity to
speak to the Committee about these important issues. I also
want to thank the families for being strong during this
difficult time. I know the values and I know the strength of
each one of you and your families and I appreciate it very
much. West Virginia is a beautiful state, as you can see,
filled with proud, hardworking people who are supported by
strong families and who never ask for anything other than an
honest day's pay for an honest day's work.
Mining is a way of life for many West Virginians. West
Virginia miners, like their fathers and grandfathers who mined
coal before them, have not only a strong commitment to provide
a good living for their families, but also, which I think goes
unnoticed or maybe not much known about, a patriotic pride that
their work, their work, and the energy that they produce, has
made this country what she is today. It's made her strong and
free and continues to keep her strong and free. They're very
proud of that.
I want to thank you for the opportunity to speak out about
what I see and we will talk in more depth, I'm sure, about the
overlapping events that go on in so many areas. Thank you.
[The statement of Governor Manchin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joe Manchin III, Governor,
State of West Virginia
Secretary Solis and distinguished representatives, I am honored to
be here today with the families of the men who lost their lives at the
Upper Big Branch mine and with Mr. Stewart, a miner who worked at Upper
Big Branch.
Since I learned of this terrible tragedy, my first priority has
been to ensure that our miners are represented honorably and that their
families have the support and protection they need during this
difficult time.
I have personally been through this type of tragedy, losing my
uncle and many friends in the 1968 Farmington No. 9 mine explosion.
So, it is important to me to make certain that those who do not
know West Virginia miners and their families will come to understand
the character and substance of these wonderful people who play such an
important role in this great state and in our nation.
Today, and as you see the strength and courage on their faces, you
will be inspired, as I was at Upper Big Branch, and you will better
understand the heart and soul of West Virginia and her people.
West Virginia has a rich history, and mining is a very important
part of that history. Coal from West Virginia has powered this country
through times of prosperity, times of depression and times of war.
Mining coal is hard and challenging work, and when mining is not
done correctly, it can be very dangerous. This we know for a fact.
However, in this day and age, we should be able to mine coal safely
without risking the lives of our miners--the very people we depend upon
to sustain our way of life.
That is why, since the tragedy at Upper Big Branch, my main
objectives have been to: determine what occurred, make certain it does
not happen again, and determine whether there was intimidation or any
other action at Upper Big Branch that put profits ahead of safety.
You can put a price on a ton of coal, and you can put a price on
every piece of machinery in a coal mine, but you cannot put a price on
the life of a human being; it is priceless. West Virginia expects
employers to prioritize safety ahead of everything else. A person who
goes to work each morning to provide a living for themselves and their
family should expect nothing less than to return home safely.
Almost immediately after I learned of the accident at Upper Big
Branch, I appointed J. Davitt McAteer, assistant secretary for the Mine
Safety and Health Administration under President Bill Clinton, to head
an independent investigation into the explosion.
Mr. McAteer, a native of West Virginia, brings a wealth of
experience to the table. He has devoted a considerable portion of his
professional life to mine health and safety issues and he is an
experienced investigator. At my request, Mr. McAteer led an independent
blue ribbon panel in 2006 to investigate the Sago and Aracoma mine
accidents in West Virginia.
Director Ron Wooten and his team of state investigators from the
West Virginia Office of Miners' Health, Safety and Training. Director
Wooten and Mr. McAteer have been working closely with MHSA and will
continue to do so throughout this process.
West Virginia deserves to know what happened at Upper Big Branch.
We deserve to know why this tragedy occurred, and whether it could have
been prevented.
There are questions we need answered. Why did serious safety
violations repeatedly occur at Upper Big Branch? Were the miners
concerned about their safety? Were miners threatened or intimidated
from speaking out? If state or federal regulators knew the mine was
unsafe, why was it allowed to continue to operate?
There has been much discussion about administrative and judicial
procedures that can allow a mine to remain open in the face of
significant safety violations that would otherwise warrant a closure
order. We need to ask ourselves: Is bureaucracy getting in the way of
safety?
I have also asked them, and other mine safety experts, including
our state Board of Coal Mine Health and Safety, to recommend legal
reforms.
I will incorporate their proposals, and some of my own, into a
comprehensive mine safety plan that will address several issues for
West Virginia.
One proposal that I think is critical is the establishment of
certified mine safety teams in every mine. I envision teams of miners
in each mine that are trained and certified to identify dangerous
situations. These miners should be empowered to make decisions and take
actions, and should be protected by law from threats, harassment or
intimidation.
We also need to look at rock dusting standards. Just days after the
Upper Big Branch explosion, I ordered Director Wooten to begin testing
mines for compliance with an eighty percent total incombustible content
rock dust standard, as recommended by a National Institute of
Occupational Safety and Health report. I believe West Virginia should
mandate this standard.
Some other proposals I am considering include: updating ventilation
safety standards in our state code; enhancing criminal penalties for
tampering with or altering safety equipment; furthering whistle blower
protections; and incorporating more technology in the mines for
accident prevention and rescue.
In addition to specific reforms, we should reexamine our overall
regulatory schemes--both state and federal.
For example, I have been told by representatives of one coal
operator that the United States Bureau of Mines, which was closed in
the mid-nineties, had a program staffed with highly qualified personnel
that reviewed and approved design plans for all new mines. I was told
that there has not been as significant a level of engineering review of
new mining plans since the bureau closed. Perhaps this is an area we
need to improve.
Corporate governance is another issue the state or federal
government should address. No one within a corporate or business
structure, from top to bottom, should be protected or untouchable under
the law if the corporation or business fails to make safety a priority
or fails to empower workers to make the workplace as safe as possible.
With that being said, we have many mining companies in West
Virginia and in this country with excellent safety records that put the
safety of their miners ahead of everything else. I want to commend
those operators for focusing on safety and I encourage others to follow
their lead.
We need to look at what these companies are doing that is above and
beyond what is legally required, and ask ourselves whether their
standards should be required at every coal mine. If a company can focus
on safety ahead of profits and still compete in a global marketplace,
every company can build a successful business model around a culture of
safety.
I want to challenge the coal industry to set a new bar for
workplace safety.
That is why I ordered, in the days following Upper Big Branch, a
day of honor and mourning for our fallen miners, and asked coal
operators to cease production for one whole day, to focus on safety. I
asked every underground mine operator and miner to go to work and
commit to one day focused completely on making their workplace as safe
as possible. I felt this was an appropriate way to honor the miners of
Upper Big Branch, and a way to give direction to the coal industry on
where we need to go as a state and a nation.
As we move forward and form new goals for mine safety, I will
continue to make certain that the laws that are already on the books
are stringently enforced.
I have already ordered increased coal mine inspections and stricter
enforcement of coal mine health and safety laws in West Virginia. Just
days after Upper Big Branch, I ordered the Office of Miners' Health,
Safety and Training to immediately inspect every coal mine in the
state. The worst offenders, those with a record of the most serious
health and safety violations, were inspected within hours of my order.
We have also established a twenty-four hour, seven days a week,
industrial accident safety hotline, which allows callers to anonymously
report problems in the workplace without fear of retribution. The
hotline has been up and running for a short time, but is already seeing
results. I hope that it will encourage more workers to become involved
in strengthening safety procedures from the front lines.
In closing, I want to thank you for this opportunity to speak to
the Committee about these important issues. I also want to thank the
families for being strong during this difficult time.
West Virginia is a beautiful state, filled with proud, hard-working
people, who are supported by strong families, and who never ask for
anything other than an honest day's pay for an honest day's work.
Mining is a way of life for many West Virginians. West Virginia
miners--like their fathers and grandfathers who mined coal before
them--have not only a strong commitment to provide a good living for
their families, but also a deep and patriotic pride that their work,
and the energy they produce, has made and continues to make America
strong and free.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak today.
______
Chairman Miller. Thank you, Governor. Congressman Rahall?
Mr. Rahall. Thank you, Chairman Miller. Thank you, Governor
Manchin. I'm going to introduce the six members of the panel
all at the same time here. They will go right down the line and
I will give a short bio of them right now.
First will be Mr. Gary Quarles, who is the father of Gary
Wayne Quarles. Gary Wayne was a 33-year-old long wall shear
operator at Upper Big Branch Mine who lost his life in the
explosion on April 5th. Mr. Quarles is also a coal miner and
has worked in coal mines for 34 years. He is currently employed
at the Parker Peerless mine, which is also operated by Massey
Energy Corporation.
The second one will be Mr. Steve Morgan. He is the father
of Adam Morgan. Adam was just 21 years old when he was taken
from his family in the Upper Big Branch explosion. He was an
apprentice. He was just starting out. Steve Morgan has worked
in the mining industry for 29 years and is currently employed
at the Pinnacle mine in Pineville, West Virginia, but I am
told, he has not been back underground since the explosion.
Our third witness will be Mr. Eddie Cook. Eddie is Adam
Morgan's uncle. Mr. Cook has substantial experience in coal
mining, having been a coal miner for over 30 years. He's
currently employed at the Pinnacle Mining Company's mine which
is operated under Cleveland Cliffs.
Our fourth witness is Alice Peters. She is the mother-in-
law of Edward Dean Jones. Jones, age 50, was an assistant mine
foreman who lost his life in the Upper Big Branch mine tragedy.
Our fifth witness is Mr. Clay Mullins. He is the brother of
Rex Mullins. Rex was a 50-year-old long wall end gate operator
at the UBB mine. Clay Mullins has worked in mining for 32 years
and formerly worked at the Upper Big Branch mine. Mr. Mullins
is currently employed at Speed Mining in Cabin Creek, West
Virginia.
And our sixth witness is Stanley ``Goose'' Stewart, who
formerly worked in the coal mine industry for 34 years and
spent the last 15 years working in the UBB mine until the date
of the explosion. Mr. Stewart worked the second shift at UBB
and was close friends with many of those that were killed that
day.
I thank you all for your courage to be here to talk with us
and I know that we have other family members in the audience as
well, and hopefully we will give them a chance later to speak
if they should so desire. We will start now with Mr. Quarles.
STATEMENT OF GARY QUARLES, FATHER OF
GARY WAYNE QUARLES
Mr. Quarles. Thank you. My name is Gary Quarles. I am the
father of Gary Wayne Quarles who was killed as the result of an
explosion at the Upper Big Branch Mine on April 5th, 2010. Gary
Wayne was my only son and my best friend. He has two children.
We shared numerous good times together, including hunting and
fishing. I live in Naoma, West Virginia, and Gary Wayne lived
in a double-wide home immediately adjacent to my home on my
property.
I am also a coal miner and have worked in the mines for 34
years. I worked in union mines for 23 years and I've worked in
non-union mines the rest of the time. Other than working for 2
years in a saw mill, I've worked my entire adult life in the
coal mining business.
I have experience in all aspects of coal mining, including
being a roof builder, a long wall operator, and driving a
shuttle car. My son and I actually worked together at several
mines. I am presently employed by Massey at the Parker Peerless
mine, but I am off work because of trauma I have suffered as a
result of losing my son.
Safety inspections were much different in the union mines
I've worked at than most of the non-union Massey mines. When an
MSHA inspector comes onto a Massey mine's property, the code
word goes out, ``We've got a man on the property.'' Those words
are radioed from the guard gate and relayed to all working
operations in the mine. The mine superintendent and foreman
communicate directly by phone and there are signals that
require the foreman who is underground to answer the phone.
This is one way the message is conveyed that an inspector is on
the property. When the word goes out, all effort is made to
correct any violations or direct the inspectors away from
violations.
When I worked at the union mines, workers at the mine would
accompany the MSHA inspectors during their inspections. I was
on the safety committee and members of the committee took turns
going around with MSHA inspectors and pointing out areas of
concern. Moreover, at the union mine I was able to refuse to
work in unsafe conditions without fear of retaliation.
When the MSHA inspector comes to a Massey mine, the only
people accompanying him are Massey company people. No coal
miner at the mines can point out areas of concern to the MSHA
inspector. In fact, for a miner working for Massey, the feeling
is, if a MSHA inspector fails to say anything about all these
safety problems, what right do I have to say anything about
them. And I definitely would be terminated or retaliated
against if I said anything.
MSHA inspectors at Massey do little to protect miners.
Employees who work in the underground coal need the absolute
right to address the MSHA inspectors directly and to tell them
about any areas of concern they have without fear of
retaliation. We absolutely look to MSHA for leadership,
particularly on safety issues, but MSHA has let us down many
times. The MSHA inspectors usually do their inspections during
the day shift, but miners mine coal during many other shifts.
MSHA needs to conduct inspections during the evening shifts
and Saturdays in addition to the weekdays to ensure that they
are there whenever coal is being mined. Having them only
inspect mines during the day obviously creates opportunity for
the mines to not comply with all safety requirements during the
hours that they know the inspectors will not be around. When
MSHA is not present, there is no thought of doing anything
other than producing coal. The miners are not allowed to hang
curtains or conduct any other safety operations if they would
interfere with or delay the production of coal.
In my experience, I believe the law could be strengthened
to help protect the safety of miners in the following ways:
Have the inspectors conduct inspections during
every shift when coal is being produced at the mine, not just
the day shift.
Require inspectors to randomly select different
miners to accompany them during their inspections so that the
miners could tell the inspectors about their concerns without
fear of retaliation.
Hold inspectors responsible for the safety of the
miners. These men look at federal mine inspectors for
leadership.
Do not allow any prior warnings of inspections.
When an MSHA inspector comes onto a mine property to conduct an
inspection, there should be a severe penalty for alerting
anyone of the inspector's presence. A penalty that discourages
anyone from providing such a warning. MSHA inspectors should be
able to come unannounced and inspect mines at any time.
The Upper Big Branch mine used to be a very safe mine, but
something happened. During the last year, I understand that
there were serious violations at the mine and many D orders
written. This mine was clearly not safe and the result was 29
miners died, including my son. He worked 14 years underground,
was on the long wall for 8 years. Someone needs to be held
responsible for these deaths and, more importantly, we need to
change the laws or modify them to make sure this does not
happen again.
I ask the members of this Committee to undertake such a
commitment to my family and the families of all of us who have
lost their loved ones in this explosion to make sure that this
never happens again. We have had enough tragedy in West
Virginia in the coal mines. There should be no reason for this
to continue. And I am asking you to pass laws to ensure that
miners do not have to work in an unsafe place and that they can
refuse to work if it is unsafe without the fear of being fired.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Quarles follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gary Quarles, Father of Gary Wayne Quarles
My name is Gary Quarles. I am the father of Gary Wayne Quarles who
was killed as a result of the explosion at the Upper Big Branch mine on
April 5, 2010. Gary Wayne was my only son and my best friend. He has
two children. We shared numerous good times together, including hunting
and fishing. I live in Naoma, West Virginia and Gary Wayne lived in a
double wide mobile home immediately adjacent to my home on my property.
I also am a coal miner and have worked in the mines for 34 years. I
worked in union mines for 23 years and have worked in non-union mines
the rest of the time. Other than working for 2 years in a saw mill, I
have worked my entire adult life in the coal mining business. I have
experience in all aspects of coal mining, including being a roof
bolter, a long wall operator, and driving a shuttle car.
My son and I actually worked together at several mines. I am
presently employed by Massey at the Parker Peerless mine, but I am off
work because of the trauma I've suffered as a result of losing my son.
Safety inspections were much different in the union mines I've
worked at versus the nonunion Massey mines. When an MSHA inspector
comes onto a Massey mine property, the code words go out ``we've got a
man on the property.'' Those words are radioed from the guard gates and
relayed to all working operations in the mine. The mine superintendent
and foreman communicate regularly by phone, and there are signals that
require the foreman who is underground to answer the phone. That is one
way that the message is conveyed that an inspector is on the property.
When the word goes out, all effort is made to correct any deficiencies
or direct the inspector's attention away from any deficiencies.
When I worked at union mines, workers at the mine would accompany
the MSHA inspectors during their inspections. I was on a safety
committee and the members of the committee took turns going around with
the MSHA inspectors and pointing out areas of concern. Moreover, as a
union miner I was able to refuse to work in unsafe conditions without
fear of retaliation.
When the MSHA inspector comes to a Massey mine, the only people
accompanying him are Massey company people. No coal miner at the mine
can point out areas of concern to the MSHA inspector. In fact, for a
miner working for Massey, the feeling is, if an MSHA inspector fails to
say anything about all of these safety problems, what right do I have
to say anything about them, and I definitely would be terminated or
retaliated against if I said anything.
MSHA inspections at Massey did little to protect miners. Employees
who work in underground coal need the absolute right to address the
MSHA inspector directly and tell him about any areas of concern they
have--without fear of retaliation. We absolutely looked to MSHA for
leadership, particularly on safety issues, but MSHA has let us down
many times.
The MSHA inspectors usually do their inspections during the day
shift, but the mines mine coal during many other shifts. MSHA needs to
conduct inspections during the evening shifts and Saturdays, in
addition to the week day shifts to ensure that they are there whenever
coal is being mined. Having them only inspect mines during the day
obviously creates an opportunity for the mines to not comply with all
safety requirements during the hours that they know the inspectors will
not be around. When MSHA is not present, there is no thought of doing
anything other than producing coal. The miners are not allowed to hang
curtains or conduct any other safety operations if they would interfere
with or delay the production of coal.
From my experience, I believe the law could be strengthened to help
protect the safety of miners in the following ways:
Have the inspectors conduct inspections during every shift
when coal is being produced at the mine, not just during the day shift.
Require inspectors to randomly select different miners to
accompany them during their inspections, so that the miners can tell
the inspectors about their concerns without fear of retaliation.
Hold inspectors responsible for the safety of the miners.
These men look to federal mine inspectors for leadership.
Do not allow any prior warning of inspections. When an
MSHA inspector comes onto a mine property to conduct an inspection,
there should be a severe penalty for alerting anyone of the inspector's
presence, a penalty that discourages anyone from providing such a
warning. MSHA inspectors should be able to come unannounced and inspect
mines at any time.
The Upper Big Branch mine used to be a very safe mine but something
happened. During the last year, I understand that there were serious
violations at the mine and many (d) orders written. This mine was
clearly not safe and as a result 29 miners died, including my son. He
worked for 14 years underground and had been on the long wall for 8
years.
Someone needs to be held responsible for these deaths. And more
importantly, we need to change the laws or modify them to make sure
this does not happen again. I ask the members of this committee to
undertake such a commitment to my family and the families of all of us
who have lost their loved ones in this explosion to make sure that this
never happens again. We've had enough tragedy in West Virginia in coal
mining. There should be no reason this continues, and I'm asking you to
pass laws that ensure that miners do not have to work in an unsafe
place, and that they can refuse to work if it is unsafe without the
fear of being fired.
Thank you.
______
Chairman Miller. Thank you very much. Mr. Morgan, welcome.
STATEMENT OF STEVE MORGAN, FATHER OF ADAM MORGAN
Mr. Morgan. Thank you. I'd like to thank you for the
opportunity to talk on behalf of my son, Adam. My name is Steve
Morgan. I'm the father of Adam Morgan who was 29 years old when
he was taken from us on April 5th at the Upper Big Branch mine.
Adam and I would always talk in the evening when he would
come home from work. He'd tell me the problems they'd run into.
He talked a lot about they had a lot of ventilation problems at
that mine. Stoppings were knocked out when he went in on his
job on dayshift where he'd have to replace it while they were
still running coal. Like six stoppings at a time when
ventilation was broke and, even on the intake side fittings,
the air to the long wall, a curtain would be around to direct
it down the long wall face and he would go in and come home and
tell me that he'd have to put them curtains up.
He was just a trainee, but he was smart enough to know that
you had to have ventilation. He had 2 years of mine engineering
so, you know, there he worked one summer an internship at the
mine where I worked at when he was going to college, so he
knowed everything that was supposed to be.
And he talked about water in the entries there that had
blocked off the ventilation, you know, that restricted air flow
with so much water, and he would come home and he'd be wet all
the way up to his chest with water there, and he'd wade in that
from the block back. And he talked--he come home several times
early on account of ventilation problems, they sent him home
early and talked about the methane, the high level of methane
they'd run into, you know. And for that he would come home. One
week prior to the accident, on account of high gas levels, they
sent him home early.
And he talked about float dust, a lot of float dust in the
mine there. Some places he'd work he couldn't even see what he
was doing. And he told the rock dust had to be done. They'd
call when the safety inspector was on the way in and rock dust
certain areas. You're cleaning, he had to clean it to make it
look pretty for the inspector when he come in. He done that.
Like I said, he was a trainee. He'd be left alone a lot,
too. As a trainee, he ain't supposed to be left alone. He's
supposed to have a black hat, a certified man, with the
trainee. They would leave him alone back in the plow there,
back behind the plow, back behind the entry building cribs and
somebody would show up with the inspector and so on. They would
bring him out of there and put him with a black hat so they
wouldn't catch him by hisself, because it's against the law for
a trainee.
He told me, too, about--I told him, I said when they ask
you to do something like that our practice at the mine when I
worked in the union mine for 29 years, that if you are doing
something that's unsafe and you feel it's unsafe, you go
through a procedure and tell your foreman and say, ``I feel
it's unsafe, could you remove me from that area and find me
some other work? I ain't refusing work, but I want to stay out
of that place.'' That worked for us, you know, they'll move you
and then they'll go around and take care of the situation.
So he told his boss that--I told him how to do it. I said,
you know, go in this procedure so they won't get mad at you. I
said, tell them you think it's unsafe and you want to be put
out by in a safer area, because he was a trainee, and see what
they tell you. The boss pulled him to the side there by
hisself, and told him, said, ``If you're going to be that
scared of your job there, you need to rethink your career,
because that's the way we do things.''
Like I say, I worked a union mine for 29 years. We have
that right to refuse to work in an unsafe area. And he was
talking about every time he'd come home we talked about it. It
was always ventilating for methane or unsafe conditions that he
had to go through to work. And I told him, I said, you need
to--actually, I tried to talk him into quitting 2 weeks prior
to the accident. I said if it's that bad, you need to go ahead
and come on out and we'll find you something else.
But that's the only place they were hiring trainees. And he
said, ``Well, Daddy,'' he said, ``when I make my black hat,
I'll get a better opportunity to get a job elsewhere when
you've got your black hat,'' because he'd done been told by
several miners if he had his black hat, they would hire him
today, you know. I tried to talk him into that and he said,
``When I make that black hat,'' he said, ``I'll go ahead and
quit right after that.'' He was up for--his time was up. He was
going to make his black hat that week.
And you know, there's laws and everything out there already
to protect these people, there just ain't nobody enforcing it.
And that ain't, you know--the inspectors, we deal with them
every day. I think they do a good job and our mine also, your
foreman at that mine, when he takes on that job, he takes on
that responsibility to make sure you work safe and take care of
you. And I think the foreman, too, ought to, you know, rethink
their job. They need to do what they're supposed to. They can
make it safer. I've done some, you know, foreman or boss or
two, and I ain't never had no accident or no violation. It
ain't hard to do, I don't think. And I want to thank you for
your time.
[The statement of Mr. Morgan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Steve Morgan, Father of Adam Morgan
My name is Steve Morgan. I'm the father of Adam Morgan, who was 21
years old when he taken from us on April 5, 1010 at Upper Big Branch.
Ventilation
Ventilation always bad
Stoppings regularly knocked out--rebuilt six one day. Very
irregular and creates major ventilation concern to have 6 stoppings in
one area down, however, ventilation was so bad that they were
constantly tearing down and reconstructing stoppings and even required
engineers to come in and help design the layout. Was in water up to his
waist which restricted air flow.
Curtain on intake side that feeds air to longwall face would be
removed on a regular basis.
Ventilation was so bad he was sent home early several times,
including once about a week before the explosion because they weren't
getting enough air.
Methane
Would mention high levels of methane at least weekly.
Float Dust
Would be times it was so thick he couldn't see.
All return air was going to plow, pulling all dust towards his work
area.
Once he told me that they were notified an inspector was on his way
in, and he was told to hurry up and apply rock dust to keep the float
dust down.
Overall Safety
Adam would be left alone to work behind the plow in bad top to
build cribs despite being a red hat, or apprentice miner, and when an
inspector came out they would take him outby with a black hat, or
experienced miner, as required by law.
I told Adam to tell his boss that this practice was unsafe and he
didn't want to do it and when Adam told boss, the boss told him if he
was that scared, he needed to rethink his career
Working Union v. Working Massey
I have worked 29 years as a union coal miner. Adam worked 6 months
at Massey.
When safety concerns are present, I have the right as a union miner
to refuse to do an unsafe job without fear of losing my job. When Adam
voiced his concern to company officials, he was told he may need to
find a new job.
Instances such as those explained to me by my son would neither be
condoned nor allowed to occur at the mine where I work, but were
routine at UBB.
This has affected me to the point that my career as a miner is
uncertain and I have been pulled out of the mine due to panic attacks
and anxiety.
______
Chairman Miller. Thank you. Mr. Cook?
STATEMENT OF EDDIE COOK, UNCLE OF ADAM MORGAN
Mr. Cook. My name is Eddie Cook. I'm Adam Morgan's uncle.
Adam was 21. April the 5th, you know, the explosion took him
away from us. I worked at Cleveland Cliffs Pinnacle mine for 30
years, union. And I went back to the mines right after the
explosion, was talking to several people, you know, about the
practices that was going on at UBB.
And one of the guys, I didn't get his name, come up to me
and he said, ``You know, I've worked here about 5 years.'' He
said, ``Everything that you're saying as far as mining with no
curtain, lack of rock dusting, methane checks not being what
they was supposed to be,'' he said, ``I did it because I
thought that was the way mining was.'' He said, ``I was young
and didn't know no better. Well, I come to work here and you
guys as the union,'' and I'm not here to toot a union horn, but
we showed him the right way to do it. And he said, ``I
appreciate it,'' you know. And he said, ``The reason we done it
and that most of the young people do it is they're taught that
way.''
And, you know, like Mr. Morgan said, you know, as a union
person, we have the right to refuse to do work we think is
unsafe. Non-union mines, you don't have that. You don't have
the right to refuse. If you refuse, they tell you to ``get your
bucket and go home,'' you know. ``If you don't want to work
here, we've got people out on the street wanting your jobs. And
if you don't like the way we run it, you can go home.''
And then you've got these people that tell, you know,
you're talking about the whistleblowers. That's great if you
can inform, you know, get a law that helps these whistleblowers
keep their jobs, that's great, but they're going to fire them
down the road for something else, you know? They're going to
find something down the road to fire them for. ``We didn't fire
him for telling on us. We fired him for having a cat fight,''
you know.
Why don't we get a committee in each state to check on
these people, you know? You get fired, give them a number to
call, say ``Hey, listen, they fired me. I want you to check in
on it.'' You know? And then go back to the operators and say,
``Okay, you know, you fired this guy for this. We're going to
do this to you, you know.''
As far as MSHA goes, I think MSHA at our mines does a great
job, seriously. But I think they need a little bit more power.
You know, you need to give these people some more power to
where, if they see something wrong, okay, we're going to shut
this down right now. We're going to shut it down until you get
it fixed, is what I think on that.
As far as, you know, they have the power to come in and
give you orders and shut you down, and they give you so many
times and so much time, but if you keep doing this and you keep
getting shut down, you're not going to do it much longer, you
know, because you're losing production and if you shut down
production, these people ain't going to be in business. I think
that, if we could give MSHA more power to enforce the laws that
we have now, I think we would see a difference.
But as far as union mines, ask yourself how many Massey's
got, because they know their union would be people that would
work like law enforcements. They have the right to say no. And
they don't have the right to say no, now. I think we need to
get them some power. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Cook follows:]
Prepared Statement of Charles E. Cook, Uncle of Adam Morgan
My name is Charles E Cook, but I go by Eddie.
I'm the uncle of Adam Morgan, who was 21 years old when he taken
from us on April 5, 1010 at Upper Big Branch.
I have over 30 years experience in mining, 29 of which are at a
union mine.
I work at the Pinnacle mine for Cleveland Cliffs, and we try to do
things the right way. Not long after the explosion, I talked to a guy
at the mine I work who used to work at the Upper Big Branch mine. I
told him that I heard tales of things like coal being mined with the
curtains pulled down, and he confirmed that this was a regular practice
in his time at the mine, and he ultimately lef tteh mine because of
certain practices. He stated that he was not even aware that the way
certain things were done at UBB were unsafe or illegal until he came to
the Pinnacle mine and saw how we operated and tried to comply with
mining laws.
As a union miner, I have the right to refuse to perform a job if I
think it is unsafe without a fear of losing my job. I would like to see
the same protections for all miners, not just union miners. There needs
to be a system in place to protect whistleblowers and to ensure that
these miners won't be fired a few weeks down the road for some other
reason when in reality it is just retaliation for pointing out safety
concerns or refusing to do unsafe jobs.
MSHA needs to be granted more authority and power to shut down
sections of a mine or the entire mine if an unsafe condition is noted
which presents a serious risk to miners, instead of having to wait for
several repeat occurrences of the same violation.
______
Chairman Miller. Thank you. Ms. Peters, welcome to the
Committee.
STATEMENT OF ALICE PETERS, MOTHER-IN-LAW OF
EDWARD ``DEAN'' JONES
Ms. Peters. My name is Alice Peters and I am the mother-in-
law of Edward Dean Jones. Dean was killed in the explosion on
April the 5th at the Upper Big Branch mine. He was 50 years old
and was a section foreman. He had worked at the mines over 13
years, and as a miner for over 30 years.
Dean was married to my daughter, Gina. They had one son,
Kyle. Kyle suffers from cystic fibrosis and has medical
problems that require constant medical care. I was very close
to my son-in-law and regularly spoke with him on the phone and
in person. I also helped them care for my grandson.
My daughter and I are particularly close. Since the death
of her husband at the Upper Big Branch mine explosion, my
daughter, Gina, has been very upset. She will not go out unless
I'm with her, even to the grocery store or the beauty salon.
She will not go out unless I am with her and then she cries the
entire time. She is having an extremely difficult time with the
loss of her husband and her concerns for the future.
Dean told me many times that he had concerns about the
ventilation at the Upper Big Branch mine. He often told me and
his wife that he was afraid to go to work because the
conditions at the mine were so bad. He also told me at least
seven times he told Massey that--they told him if he shut down
production because of ventilation problems, that he would have
no hours. He would lose his job. They knew about his son, and
that Dean needed to keep his job to make sure his son could get
the medical care he needed.
On more than one occasion, I called the mine and told them
there was an emergency regarding his son, that he had to come
home, in order to get him out of the mines because I feared for
his safety.
My son-in-law was a very good miner and could have gotten a
job anywhere. He had a college degree in mine engineering;
however, because of the physical disability of his son and the
absolute necessity of maintaining his health insurance
benefits, Dean wasn't able to leave Massey's employment. He
continued to work in that mine, even though he knew it was
unsafe and he was afraid of being fired, losing his health
insurance. Thank you.
[The statement of Ms. Peters follows:]
Prepared Statement of Alice Peters, Mother-in-Law of Edward Dean Jones
My name is Alice Peters and I am the mother-in-law of Edward Dean
Jones. Dean was killed in the explosion on April 5th at the Upper Big
Branch mine. He was 50 years old and was a Section Foreman. Dean had
worked at the mine over 13 years and. as a miner for over 30 years.
Dean was married to my daughter, Gina, and they have one son, Kyle.
Kyle suffers from cystic fibrosis and has medical problems that require
constant medical care.
I was very close to my son-in-law and regularly spoke with him on
the telephone and in person. I also helped them care for my grandson.
My daughter and I are particularly close.
Since the death of her husband at the Upper Big Branch Mine
explosion, my daughter Gina has been very upset. She will not go out
unless I am with her, even to the beauty salon. She will not go out
unless I am with her, and then she just cries the entire time. She's
having an extremely difficult time with the loss of her husband and her
concern for the future.
Dean told me many times that he had concerns about the ventilation
at the Upper Big Branch mine. He often told me and his wife that he was
afraid to go to work because the conditions at the mine were so bad. He
also told me that, at least 7 times, he was told by Massey supervisors
that, if he shut down production because of the ventilation problems
(bad air), he would lose his job. They knew about his son and that Dean
needed to keep his job to make sure his son could get the medical care
he needed. On more than one occasion, I called the mine and told them
there was an emergency regarding his son that he had to come home and
handle in order to get him out of the mine, because I feared for his
safety..
My son-in-law was a very good miner and could have gotten a job
anywhere--he had a college degree in mine engineering. However, because
of the physical disability of his son and the absolute necessity of
maintaining his health insurance benefits, Dean was unable to leave
Massey's employment. He continued to work in that mine even though he
knew it was unsafe because he was afraid of being fired and losing his
health insurance coverage.
______
Chairman Miller. Thank you. Mr. Mullins.
STATEMENT OF CLAY MULLINS, BROTHER OF REX MULLINS
Mr. Mullins. Yes, my name is Clay Mullins. First of all,
I'd like to thank Governor Manchin for all the support that you
showed all the family members. I lost my brother Rex at the UBB
Mine explosion. Rex was a good father, husband, a son, and a
brother. He loved to hunt and fish. He loved working with wood,
making chairs and all sorts of things. He loved spending time
with his grandkids. He was an avid West Virginia football and
basketball fan. He liked his job, and that job he had on the
long wall and he did it well.
I'm also a coal miner. I've been a coal miner from 1977 to
the present. I also work on a long wall section. I've been
around long wall mining for approximately 10 to 12 years. I
worked previously at UBB with my brother as well, as with all
the other miners at UBB. I'm a maintenance foreman on the long
wall and I'm currently employed at Speed Mining in Cabin Creek,
West Virginia.
I have not worked since the UBB mine accident. I worked
previously at UBB before we moved to Logan's Fork. When I was
at UBB before, we always had methane. In that coal seam, you've
always got methane. You've just got to take the right measures,
the right ventilation will take care of your methane problems.
Sometimes we'd have water get in our returns and they would
stop off ventilation and reverse the ventilation air filters,
but we always corrected it. When I was there before, we always
took care of the problems that we had. But things must have
changed since I left, because I've been going through the
violations they received, and they received a lot of
ventilation violations, and a lot of serious ventilation
violations.
As far as knowing when the inspectors was coming to the
mines, when the inspectors come across the bridge to the guard
shack, the guard at the guard shack immediately informs the
mine office there's an inspector on the property. When he calls
the mine office and the mine offices call underground and tell
all the sections that they had an inspector on the property, to
make sure everything was right and, if it wasn't, to fix it
before the inspector got there, to make sure it was right.
A lot of this--I place a lot of fault with Massey on the
way that they run the mines. Also, there's a lot of fault with
MSHA for a mine having this many ventilation problems and not
being shut down and being corrected. They might have corrected
at the time, but apparently that correction didn't work or we
wouldn't be here today.
I think you need to make some laws that, if you've got a
mine that's having serious ventilation problems or any serious
problems that's going to cause injury or death to any of our
miners, that we need to pass a law to give MSHA the power or
someone the power to come into that mine and, if the operator
does not get that mine fixed and in the condition, a safe
working condition for the men, then someone needs to come in,
step in, and say, ``Enough's enough, we're going to fix this.
We're going to shut down and we're going to fix this. Until
this problem is corrected, you're not going to operate no
more.''
This is my brother. I don't have him no more. I worked with
all these guys at this mine, all except about four of them. I
knew them. This is my other friends and brothers that I lost.
And members of the Committee, I would hope that you all would
pass a law that protects all these miners. There are 29
families that suffered. I don't want to see 2 years down the
road or 4 years down the road another 10, 20, or 30 families
wearing shirts like this. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Mullins follows:]
Prepared Statement of Clay Mullins, Brother of Rex Mullins
______
Chairman Miller. Thank you. Mr. Stewart.
STATEMENT OF STANLEY ``GOOSE'' STEWART,
UPPER BIG BRANCH MINER
Mr. Stewart. I'd like to thank you, Chairman Miller, for
allowing me to speak before this committee today. My name is
Stanley Stewart. Most people know me as ``Goose.'' I've worked
in the coal mines for 34 years, the last 15 of those at Upper
Big Branch. I worked as a jack setter, a shear operator on the
long wall, and I was a continuous miner operator at the time of
the explosion. I'm here to tell my story today because I worked
at Upper Big Branch and I was 300 feet underground the day the
explosion occurred.
Although I did not lose a family member, I feel as if I
did. Men like William Griffith, Ricky Workman, Eddie Mooney,
Timmy ``Grizz'' Davis, Gary ``Spanky'' Quarles, Rex Mullins,
and 23 others who were like brothers to me.
I also know firsthand how bad conditions were at the mine
and want everyone to know. In fact, last July because I was so
scared and mad, I told my wife, Mindi, if anything happens to
me for her to get a lawyer and sue them. I told her, I said,
``This place is a ticking time bomb.'' She told me to write
things down that were wrong because she wouldn't know what to
do or say. So I began to write down a few things I knew that
were illegal and wrong.
On April the 5th, I was sitting on the mantrip at about 3
p.m. with several other miners. We were approximately 300 feet
underground. We were getting ready to head to the section when
I felt a breeze coming from inside the mine. The intensity
picked up quickly and I realized something bad was happening.
So I left the mantrip and started making my way toward the
outside.
Before I could get out, the air velocity increased to what
I felt was hurricane strength, and I felt my feet wanting to
leave the ground. The air was full of dust and debris, and I
couldn't see. Although I didn't have far to go, I nearly
panicked, afraid that I might not make it outside being that
close.
Many things were wrong at the mine, such as low air. The
area of the mine we were working was liberating a lot of
methane. Mine management never fully addressed the air problem
when it would be shut down by inspectors. They would fix it
just enough to get us to load coal again and then it would be
back to business as usual. The long wall worried me because of
the ventilation. My experience on the long wall, I knew the
ventilation system they used did not work and, with so much
methane being liberated, no air moving, I felt that area was a
ticking time bomb.
I was told before the April 5th explosion that they had
experienced at least two fire balls on the drum of the shearer.
I knew that meant methane was building in that area and also
building ventilation problems. The questions that I have are:
how does methane build up to the point where a fireball would
start and how could this happen if the methane detectors had
been working or working properly?
On July 26th, 2009, on the evening shift, our crew was told
by management to make an air change from sweep air to split air
on the Head Gate 21 where the long wall is now. But we were
developing the continuous miner section at this time. We
knocked stoppings while crews were still working. Anything to
do with changing ventilation, by law, a mine has to be
evacuated because there won't be enough air. People working
``in by'' will have their air short-circuited by the change in
ventilation. However, the section crew was still working when
the air change was made. And I'm not sure if MSHA was aware of
the whole situation, but it scared me and, when I got home, I
wrote it down.
The morale around the mine for the most part was bad. No
one felt they could go to management and express their fears
about the lack of air on our sections. We knew that we'd be
marked men and that management would look for ways to fire us.
Maybe not that day or that week, but somewhere down the line,
we'd disappear. We'd seen it happen, and I told my wife I felt
like I was working for the Gestapo at times.
They took vacation time from the miners last year because
they wanted a certain average of coal loaded a shift by
vacation time. The conditions of the mine where we were working
were so bad it was nearly impossible to load that much coal
safely. So we lost our vacation.
I've worked close to 20 years in a union mine and 15 years
non-union, so I've been on both sides of the fence--long enough
to know the difference in how miners should feel in both
working environments. In the union mine, if you had safety
concerns, you had the right to refuse to work in unsafe
conditions without fear of losing your job. Working in a non-
union mine, you do not have those rights. You know you have to
operate with a lack of air or in unsafe conditions. They want
you to load coal at all costs, and I feel that mentality is
handed down from top management.
I used to tell the guys during an organizing drive that no
amount of money is worth your rights, but Massey--and Mr.
Blankenship in particular--ran a hands-on anti-union campaign
and threatened to shut the mines down if the union was voted
in. He preached he wanted flexibility. It didn't take me long
to know what his flexibility was. Do it his way or else. Massey
don't need you. Get your bucket and get off the property.
In general, MSHA needs to examine if long wall ventilation
systems should go to the gob areas and determine that this
method properly expels methane and the bad air from the
sections. I feel that the ventilation should be directed to the
``out by'' section of the mine. I've worked the long wall at
the Peabody Number 7 mine next to UBB with this set up and it
worked.
Outlaw companies need to be put on pattern of violations
easier than the existing laws allow. Protesting violations
should not keep them from being put on a pattern. Once put on a
pattern, then the company should have to pay MSHA-sponsored
people for an undetermined amount of days, 24/7 until they can
find out why the mine is being put on a pattern of violation
and make them fix it. I think it's a shame you would have to
babysit companies to make them comply, but if that's what it
takes, that's what it takes.
As far as I know, not one pattern of violation has been
issued since the law was created in 1977. I feel that UBB
should have been put on a pattern a long time ago. And also I
feel the safety standards there, they're sufficient if they are
obeyed and enforced, but there is room for improvement. Rock
dusting standards should be improved and Congress needs to
close the loophole to let mine operators off the pattern of
violations.
That was one of the beauties of working in a UMWA mine. You
did things right, the company tried to do things right, as
opposed to my last 15 years of employment. We did some things
right, but were forced to do many things wrong. Thank you, sir.
[The statement of Mr. Stewart follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stanley ``Goose'' Stewart, Miner,
Upper Big Branch Mine
My name is Stanley Stewart. Most people know me as ``Goose.'' I
have worked in coal mines for 34 years and at the Upper Big Branch mine
for 15 of those years. I have worked as a jack setter and shear
operator on the long wall, also worked 3 years on the outby long wall
and from January 2009 to April 5, 2010, a continuous miner operator.
I am here to tell my story today because I worked at the Upper Big
Branch mine until the day of the accident and was 300 feet underground
the day the explosion occurred. Although I did not lose a member of my
family, I lost several co-workers, including William Griffith, Ricky
Workman, Eddie Mooney, Timmy Davis, Gary Quarles, Rex Mullins and 22
others who were like family to me. I also know firsthand how bad
conditions were at the mine and want everyone to know. In fact, last
July, I told my wife, Mindi, ``If anything happens to me, get a lawyer
and sue the [blankety blank] out of them! That place is a ticking time
bomb.'' Only I didn't say ``blankety blank'' to her because I was so
scared--and mad! She told me to write down things that were wrong
because she wouldn't know specifics or the terminology to convey what
was happening. I began to write down things I knew were illegal or
wrong.
On April 5th, I was sitting on a mantrip at about 3 pm with several
other miners approximately 300 feet underground. We were getting ready
to head to the section when I felt a breeze coming from inside the
mine. The intensity picked up quickly and I realized that something bad
was happening so I left the mantrip and started making my way toward
the outside. Before I could get out the air velocity increased to what
I felt was ``hurricane strength'' and I felt my feet wanting to leave
the ground. The air was full of dust debris and I couldn't see.
Although I didn't have far to go I panicked, afraid that I might not
make it out to safety.
Red flags
Many things were wrong at the mine such as low air constantly. The
area of the mine we were working was liberating a lot of methane. Mine
management never fully addressed the air problem when it would be shut
down by inspectors. They would fix it just good enough to get us to
load coal again, but then it would be back to business as usual. The
long wall worried me because of the ventilation. My experience in the
mines showed me that the ventilation system they had didn't work. And
with so much methane being liberated, and no air moving it gave me the
feeling that area was a ticking time bomb. I was told prior to the
April 5th explosion, that they had experienced at least 2 fireballs on
the drum of the shearer. This leads me to believe the methane was
indeed building in that area, showing lack of air and ventilation
problems. One question that I have is how could methane build up to
that point where a fireball could start? How could this happen if the
methane detectors had been working?
On July 26, 2009 on the second shift, our crew was told by
management to make an air change from sweep air to split air in Head
Gate 21. They knocked stoppings while crews were still working.
Anything to do with changing ventilation, by law, the mine is to be
evacuated because there won't be enough air. People working inby will
have their air short circuited by the change in ventilation. However,
the section crew was still working when the air change was made. I'm
not sure MSHA was aware of the whole situation. But it scared me, and
when I got home I wrote it down.
Mindset of miners
The morale around the mine for the most part was bad. No one felt
they could go to management and express their fears or the lack of air
on our sections. We knew that we'd be marked men and the management
would look for ways to fire us. Maybe not that day, or that week, but
somewhere down the line, we'd disappear. We'd seen it happen and I told
my wife, I felt like I was working for the Gestapo at times. They took
vacation from the miners last year because they wanted a certain
average of coal loaded a shift by vacation time. The conditions of the
mine where we were working were so bad, it was nearly impossible to
load that much coal safely.
Union vs. Non-union
I worked close to 20 years in the union and 15 years non-union so
I've been on both sides of the fence long enough to know the difference
in how miners feel in both types of working environments. In the union
if you had safety concerns you had the right to refuse to work in
unsafe conditions without fear of you job. You felt at ease and
comforted by your rights. Working at a non-union mine you do not feel
that comfort. You know you have to operate with a lack of air or in
unsafe conditions. They want you to load coal at all costs and I feel
that mentality is handed down from top management. I used to tell the
guys during an organizing drive that no amount of money is worth your
rights. But Massey and Mr. Blankenship in particular ran a hands-on
anti-union campaign and threatened to shut the mine down if the union
was voted in. He preached he wanted ``flexibility''. It didn't take me
long to know what his flexibility was; do it his way or else ``Massey
don't need you. Get your bucket and get off the property''.
Law improvement
In general, MSHA needs to examine whether it should allow long wall
ventilation systems to go to the gob area and determine if this method
properly expels methane and bad air from the section. I feel that
ventilation should be directed to the outby section of the mine. I've
worked the long wall in the Peabody Number 7 Mine, next to UBB with
this set up and it worked.
Outlaw companies need to be put on Pattern of Violations easier
than the existing law allows. Protesting violations should not hide the
violations and should not keep them from being put on pattern. Once put
on a pattern then the company should have to pay MSHA sponsored people
for an undetermined amount of days 24 hours, 7 days a week to find out
why that mine has been put on the pattern of violations and make them
fix it. Something is wrong when not one pattern of violation has been
issued since the law was created in 1977.
I feel the safety standards can be sufficient if they are obeyed
and enforced, but there is room for improvement. Rock dusting standards
should be improved, and Congress needs to close the loop holes that let
mine operators off the pattern of violation.
That was one of the beauties of working in a UMWA mine; you did
things right, the company tried to do things right as opposed to my
last 15 years of employment. We did some things right, but were forced
to do some things wrong.
______
Chairman Miller. Thank you, Mr. Stewart. Thank you to all
of you for providing us your testimony. I think we can already
see the value of it. Mr. Quarles, Mr. Morgan, Mr. Mullins, and
Mr. Stewart, it's my understanding that none of you have
returned to work since this accident; is that correct?
[Affirmative nods from said witnesses.]
Chairman Miller. So, what is your status? You've made this
decision. You don't want to; you cannot return to work. What is
your status with the company or with the union?
Mr. Stewart. I'm currently drawing Workers' Compensation.
I'm under a doctor's care. I cannot go back in that coal mine.
Been through a lot in 34 years, and always stood tall and went
back. I can't go back this time.
Chairman Miller. Mr. Mullins?
Mr. Mullins. Same here. I'm under a doctor's care. I'm just
like Goose, I'm under a doctor's care. I'm going to counseling.
I don't think I can go back there.
Chairman Miller. Mr. Morgan?
Mr. Morgan. Yeah. I'm under a doctor's care. I went back 14
days after April 5th and tried it there. I worked 7 days and I
was just getting more and more ill thinking about Adam there
and had panic attacks, anxiety, and depression and didn't want
to be left alone. And I'd get, you know, angry, too. And I went
to the doctor and asked about it and they told me I better take
some time off.
Chairman Miller. Thank you. Mr. Quarles?
Mr. Quarles. I'm off under a doctor's care, too. I just
can't see myself going back. I ain't never been afraid to go
underground in my life, but I just can't see myself wanting to
go even close to it, I dread that.
Chairman Miller. Mr. Morgan, Mr. Mullins, Mr. Stewart,
well, actually the four of you again, if you don't mind. Mr.
Cook, you can--in the discussions with your son and your
brother and other members and your own experience working in
the mine, and some of you worked there before, it sounds a
little bit random whether or not you were in a safe environment
or you weren't, depending, you know, at this mine.
Mr. Quarles, you testified and you said it was a pretty
good mine, but things have changed and Mr. Morgan tells us his
son is almost telling a horror story at the beginning of every
shift where he has to go back and put the mine curtains and the
ventilation back into some kind of shape to get ready to go to
work, but other people were working there on the previous shift
where those things happened and the curtains were not rehung or
what have you. Is that a fair summation?
Mr. Morgan. Yeah, that's what he said. And they moved the
power pack on the long wall when they set back, you know, and
they wouldn't put the intake curtain back in. When he would go
in in the morning, he'd even tell the foreman, he'd say we've
got to have that curtain in there and he'd say this is just a
young man who's been in the mine six months. But you're an
engineer and you knew that curtain shouldn't have to go back in
there, it should have already been back in there to feed the
air down to the long wall.
Chairman Miller. There's been a lot of discussion here
about ventilation, and if I listened to you correctly as you
related your discussions with your family members, if there was
a ventilation plan, and it sounds like you began with a
ventilation plan, when you know where you're going to be doing
the cutting, where you know you're going to be doing the work,
you design the ventilation plan to take into account the level
of methane, the kinds of activities there, but that ventilation
plan seems to rather quickly erode after you start working in
that area. Correct me if I'm wrong, but that plan doesn't
appear to be worth much for very late into that area where
you're working.
Mr. Stewart. I used to tell my boss, I'd say if the
management would get the air to the section, we could ventilate
the section, but we've got to have it. And we couldn't get it.
I mean, I've seen the anemometer not even move, right dead in
our intake before it even got to the section. And, you know,
I'll give that boss I had at that time credit. He said we
weren't going to load and we went to look for air but, you
know, if it ain't there, you can't find it. And management, I
don't know, I would refer to them as the village idiots. They
don't know how to ventilate a coal mine. I mean, it's their job
to get the intake up to the section and then it's our job to
ventilate the facings.
Chairman Miller. Mr. Mullins?
Mr. Mullins. That's correct, exactly what they said is
correct.
Chairman Miller. Mr. Cook?
Mr. Cook. You know, our mines probably about a month ago
had ventilation problems and MSHA come in and shut us down.
Said that's it. You're going to be shut down until you get this
repaired. Now, if we can do that at a union mine, why can't you
do it at non-union mines?
Chairman Miller. Mr. Quarles?
Mr. Quarles. I know when my son was there at UBB before the
long wall, left UBB and went to Logan's Fork, me and him would
talk about Logan's Fork, how bad Logan's Fork was. And then
when the long wall left Logan's Fork and come back to UBB, he
said, ``My God, Dad,'' he said, ``Logan's Fork is a credit to
what this is here.'' So something did happen. At some time or
another, a lot of the people liked to work at UBB. That was my
understanding. But between the time the long wall left UBB and
went to Logan's Fork and come back, something changed. I don't
work there--that's just what he was telling me.
Chairman Miller. Thank you. Governor, if I might just take
a moment here. I'm intrigued, very disturbed by this testimony,
but I'm intrigued by your notion of certified mine teams,
because again, throughout this testimony and these discussions
with family members, and discussions staff have had, there's
just--it appears in this case there's just a constant sense of
intimidation and retribution if miners spoke out and the idea
that it seems to me we have to devise a system here where an
issue of whether or not safety is going to be reported, whether
or not corrections are going to be made, whether or not men are
going to have to enter the mine or not cannot be catch as catch
can. Cannot be dependent upon who's in that mine at that
particular time, whether that's an SOB who threatens to fire
you or whether that's someone saying let's get this thing
fixed.
The system seems to protect those individuals a little bit
more than it does the miners, and you referred to the
bureaucracy. When you work your way through, when we had the
hearings on the avoidance of the patterns of violation, it's
pretty clear that this whole system is set up and the people
who could not get it were the companies who were interested in
keeping themselves from being closed. If anybody else
circumnavigated the system, they would just run out of strength
at some point. So just listening to this testimony, I'd like to
come back to your suggestion about the certified mining teams
and about how we provide that kind of insulation protection for
people who have to make life and death decisions about the
operation of this workplace.
Governor Manchin. You know, it's quite disturbing to hear
what we're hearing, and I heard this for 5 days after talking
with the families and spending that much time with them, so it
just weighed on me. After the Sago and Aracoma, we knew exactly
that we had a problem if something, God forbid, happened, if
somebody got trapped, there ought to be lifesaving measures.
Lifesaving measures, we could go and get them and get them out
safe. We had 12 miners onsite that we should have been able to
save if we could have had these steps in place at Sago.
So we knew that we had to have rapid response. We weren't
getting new people moving quick enough with the right
equipment. We knew we had to have tracking and communications
and we knew we had to have lifesaving oxygen. That was pretty,
you know, standard and pretty straightforward. We did that
immediately and passed legislation in one day, took it to
Congress, and Congress took it. I commend all of you for
working as quickly as you did.
This one here is telling us until we have an investigation,
we really don't know. But we know by hearing testimony from
everybody here that it was a time bomb waiting to happen.
Now, if this is going on in other mines and we don't know
about it, and people are able and almost expect certain routine
inspections at certain times and, even at that point in time,
if there's a surprise or there's enough knowledge or enough
awareness to do something to make it look like everything is
fine, how do you prevent that?
We've heard from UMWA mines, we've heard from basically
companies that are responsible, and the majority in West
Virginia empower their miners, empower people in the workplace,
and all I have said is, if we have situations that don't do
that because of a lack of organization or however they're
structured, then we should empower every miner to be able to
pull the plug and every good operator and every good corporate
structure or business structure should have that as their
standard of operation.
And I'm thinking, okay, how do we do that and do that in
law or code? And I said, you know, all my life I've heard
rescue teams and how well they were trained, and I've watched
how brave too many times in my life, how brave these people are
that would go in and risk their own lives. I've watched them at
Sago and I've watched them at Aracoma. I even remember back in
Farmington in 1968, they were willing to put themselves in
jeopardy every time.
And I thought, if we can have a rescue team, why can't we
have a prevention team? Why can't we have people that
basically, 24/7, seven days a week they're on site? They report
only to MSHA and to the state inspectors of what they see and
are protected by law, that they can't be fired, retaliated, or
intimidated and be able to say listen, I shut this down for
this reason, and we're not going to continue that. And they
have the power and the weight of the law with the criminal
proceedings against people who try to circumvent that. That's
all I try to do, is try to bring a common sense approach to how
we could prevent this.
I don't want to sit with another family member, other than
in good times. Not in such horrible, sad times. So that's where
this came from and I know we can do it. You know, we have
people--you know, there's only so many things that can cause an
explosion. You've got to have fuel and you have to have an
igniter. The fuel was methane and coal dust and you combine
those two and you've got a real lethal force on your hands. The
igniter could be many things in a mine. It could ignite a mine,
just the sheer mining of a mine could have an igniter and
sparks, so you've got to have sufficient ventilation.
And they know when it's the most dangerous time, when
they're moving and switching and changing. That's when you--
you're not operating at that time, you're really concerned
about a safe condition. And if a person's on the front line 24/
7, their life's on the line, and they are trained. These are
certified trained by MSHA and by the state, people that can
identify that. They're saying no, no, no, we don't need this.
They should have the weight and protection of the law behind
them.
Chairman Miller. Thank you. I've taken a little prerogative
as the Chair, I've gone over a little bit of time on this and I
want to make sure Mr. Kline has the same amount of time, but it
seems to me anybody at the gate and they're calling the mine to
tell them the inspector's there or they're telling them,
however they're interfering with that process of the MSHA
Department of Labor people, somehow, that just on its face has
to be an obstruction of justice, if you're interfering with
this really lifesaving activity that goes on on a regular
basis. I look forward to working with you on this issue, and I
think the members of this Committee will also.
When I was a young man, I worked in a lot of oil refineries
and on oil tankers, went out to sea and it was before OSHA, and
we had no protective gear. And when I worked in the oil
refineries, some of those very large oil storage tanks,
cleaning them out, we had individuals that would go face down
because of the fumes. We'd just drag them out and go complain
and say maybe we should have--sometimes they'd put a fan in one
of them, the flanges, and they would just say, well, we don't
have a fan today. It's your job to clean this out. And you
know, to have OSHA there and have mine safety available, to not
be able to enforce it because it is that line of protection for
these families. I thank you. Mr. Kline?
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank the
witnesses. We knew this would be tough testimony and I know
that it was. It's pretty compelling. No one could be here today
or be watching and listening to this on television or radio and
not feel anger and some frustration. So I want to thank you for
your testimony and just let you know that we, all of us, we
can't feel your pain. No one can feel that pain like you can,
but we all of us want to do everything we can to keep others
from feeling that pain.
There have been many ideas that some of you put before us,
some suggestions. I found myself starting to write a little
note in the margin and then a bigger note and then another
piece of paper full of notes and I know that staff behind us
and around are doing the same things.
There are clearly some things that happened that shouldn't
have happened, based on your testimony. Some of the things,
apparently, there are already laws in place and they either
weren't obeyed or weren't enforced, or both. Some of them are
new ideas and we will be working together to explore those and
see what can be done, what needs to be done in the way of
legislation.
Governor, I just want to thank you as my colleagues have
for everything that you've been doing. It's interesting because
you're a mining state. We've looked at the situation a number
of times where you have these two governmental entities that
are involved, Senator Rockefeller broached this subject and you
did as well, Governor, where you have the federal MSHA and then
you have the West Virginia Miner's Health Safety and Training.
I don't know how to ask this without putting you on the spot,
but if you could just sort of in general tell us what you think
about how those are working together and is that something that
we should be looking to address, that overlap, I think the
Senator called it.
Governor Manchin. Since I've been Governor, we have the
best relationship right now. I will say that unequivocally.
Now, it's been a very short relationship, but it's a good
relationship, and I can tell people really want to get to the
problems and work together. I couldn't figure out in Sago and
Aracoma how we could have the feds doing their thing, meaning
MSHA being the federal, and the state doing their things where
both reported inspections to you, though. I'd say why weren't
we sharing information? Why don't we share what one team had
seen in a mine and why didn't we share it to see if it would
benefit other people? Why are we having both teams focused on
inspection but making no one--but again, this is all training.
I don't know about the--I know the government sometimes,
when we have a horrible, horrible tragedy or anything that
happens, we will come back, whether it be state or federal, and
pass pieces of legislation and have so-called word overkill.
Well, the bottom line is, we know that if we don't act, what
happens. We're all sitting here.
But, on the other hand, if you talk to the miners
themselves, those on the front line, you talk to good
operators, how can you make mistakes, starting with the
engineering, I mentioned that, your mines would have to--mines
would shut down. You know, why didn't they have the top
engineers looking and overseeing saying, hey, that's not a good
plan for a mine, that doesn't make sense. This is much better
and it's proven to work.
Every seam is different. Some are different than others,
but we don't have that type of oversight. I'm understanding
now, the mines themselves, the mine companies hire their
engineers to turn it in and it's supposed to be stamped off,
and okay, looks good to me. I'll tell you for sure that's what
they're telling me now.
The other thing is that MSHA is basically only inspecting.
Could we devote more of our time in the state on training, to
make it safer? We have to look at a way we can correlate better
with you. We're going to mine coal in West Virginia. This
country needs coal. We can do it better.
And I think working together now, developing a plan that
really makes sense, having these men here on the front line,
34, you look at the experience just sitting here, having them
tell you. If I had a guy come in and tell me this, this and
this and work with him, if I could sit down on a review period
or panel, how about when the inspecting team comes in?
Shouldn't there be a cross-section of the miners sent down for
exit so you can walk out after your inspection and say this is
what we saw, what do you have to say about that? No one's ever
enforced that, no one's ever asked them to do it or ever been
involved. Some mine operators do it voluntarily, some don't do
it at all, or won't do it.
And I'm not blaming them, I mean, everybody says why do I
have that attitude coming in here? Well, I sit with the
families. I know. I was a family member sitting there for a
long time wanting to know in that vein what happened over 20-
some years, what happened in Farmington with my uncle and all
my friends. And I want to make sure that when we're done, we
know exactly what happened and we have a third-party, if you
will, that has the expertise that says we confirm and we're
disagreeing until we get an answer.
Mr. Kline. I very much appreciate your saying you're
working very well with MSHA and I understand the Secretary and
Assistant Secretary here are observing, so I won't ask for
their input here. But I guess at the heart of the question is
sometimes agencies work really well together because their
personalities work well together, and sometimes they're doing
that in spite of how they're set up and the legislation that
controls them. So, the question for us is, we're going to go
forward and we're going to look at this and see if this is an
issue, a situation where it might not work so well if it
weren't for personalities. That's something apart of what we
ought to be addressing in whatever legislative action we take.
Governor Manchin. I'll make a recommendation. We definitely
will. Our state probably depends more on MSHA than any other
state as far as coal mining, and with that being said, we think
there are things you could do better. We think there's things
that we could do better and there's certain things that we
think that we do that we shouldn't be doing and probably vice-
versa.
I would be happy to go down through the list. And I will be
consulting with experienced miners and look at what we do. And
I will give you a complete written recommendation of what we
believe should be done and what we believe we should--everybody
right now is afraid to make any changes because they're saying
if I have an inspector, they'll think we're becoming lax on
inspection. If we devoted more time towards training and
working on safety and knowing that we had the force of law with
one inspection, I've heard this many times, but no one will
ever speak about it in public. They're concerned and will say
we're not tough enough on crime. You'd have to be smart and we
have to be smart as far as our mine safety. And if these
gentlemen think it takes two agencies and it takes this and
that or if it takes three--but that's why I say, if you
empowered the miner, you've got the greatest inspector at all
times at the front line 24/7 protected by law. And then we
could make sure that everyone can do their job much better.
Mr. Kline. Governor, I was busy writing down here one of my
marginal notes, Bureau of Mines are now closed, their review
plans. What happened? As I said, others are writing down much
more extensive notes and this is all a matter of record and
we're going to need that input as we go forward. Just another
question again. I know I can't put you on the spot, although
that's sort of our job up here, but I'll try not to do that.
Can you give us any indication of when Mr. McAteer's
investigation will have something that would be useful by you
and us?
Governor Manchin. He's coordinating Sago and Aracoma-Alma
mine. He's coordinating with MSHA and the state, also, but he's
doing it independent, looking at everything he possibly can and
reports back to me. And I don't have a timetable right now. As
you know, they can't even get in the mine.
We're told by June the 2nd, fairly soon here we might be
able to go up and inspect it, the long wall, to see if the
readings are sufficient to get in and do the job. That's what
I've been told. Until that's safe, until he's able to get in
with his inspectors and be able to tell me, that's what he did
with Aracoma and Sago and pretty much coincided with where MSHA
was going at that time and also the state was going. But it
just gives the extra comfort level for me to see independently
and go back and talk to the families and have a report. Even
when it's all said and done, there's going to be people with
different theories on this, but I'm hoping this will be very
conclusive of what happened.
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Governor. Again, thank you all. I
yield back.
Chairman Miller. Mrs. Woolsey?
Ms. Woolsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
witnesses, who were marvelous. You are marvelous. We were
listening to every word that was coming from you. This is the
Ed and Labor Committee of the formal Committee. Labor meaning
we're responsible for the National Labor Relations Act, et
cetera, to protect workers who want to organize. So I have,
it's appropriate for me to ask this question. I'm going off
base just slightly, but when working for a union mine gives you
voice and safety, why isn't Massey organized? What did they do
to the organizers? What goes on? It is Mr. Cook? Who wants to
answer that? Turn on your microphone, please, Mr. Cook.
Mr. Cook. When you give the people the right to refuse to
do illegal findings, then they're going to not produce as much
coal, and that's the name of the game, profit, to Massey. And
that's the reason they don't want the union in there. They
even--I had a brother-in-law that worked for Massey in '95 and
was killed, and he said that they showed anti-union films as
part of his orientation in that mine.
Ms. Woolsey. But this is the 21st Century and many of you
all have great educations, so you know better than that. You
know that if you organize--listen to me I'm going to organize
you. As a group you do have a bigger voice than Massey, so what
did they do that intimidates the workers so that this is not--
you don't have that protection?
Mr. Cook. You can go to any mines and organize and they
have a vote. If they vote it in, you know, over 50 percent,
then they're union. But Massey says you vote us union and we'll
shut down. So you're out of a job.
Ms. Woolsey. But those are threats.
Mr. Cook. The non-union mines pay more money. Pays--
basically, they give them more money, bonuses for loading coal.
We don't get that. Because it's incentives for producing coal
over safety. So the union does not allow us to have bonuses.
Ms. Woolsey. Well, okay. Let me ask the question a little
bit different. Not about the unions. Are you able to call MSHA
and report directly and anonymously or individually what you
see going on in your workplace?
Mr. Cook. Anyone can call MSHA anonymously, union or non-
union.
Ms. Woolsey. Okay. And what is the response when that
happens?
Mr. Cook. Usually MSHA will come out and check out your
problem. Or the state, either one will come out and check out
your problems. The procedure that goes on in a non-union mine,
I couldn't tell you that because I've never worked at one.
Ms. Woolsey. This leads me to you, Governor. The certified
mine teams, who would they report to? Who would have to respond
to them after they come up with good ideas, and does MSHA and
your state complement, do they have the staff and the resources
to actually react and respond to everything that they would be
hearing? I mean, it's my understanding that Massey has over 600
citations, MSHA citations.
Governor Manchin. First of all, the first thing we could do
after 5 days sitting would be heard, Congressman Rahall was
with me, the first thing we did was organize our hotline and
expand out hotline. We've had a hotline, but I wanted to make
sure we could tie it in with advertising, people knew they were
empowered. I didn't want any worker in any workplace associated
with miners thinking they could be in a situation and not be
pointed to us.
I would like to think that between MSHA and the state--and
we're talking serious violations, okay? You hear so much and I
don't know enough about how violations are written except that,
when there's ventilation, when there's ignition, when there's
belts, when there's fans running, things that cause serious
injuries or death should be the highest priorities and there's,
you know, a few of those. And those should be the highest alert
that anyone should be on and if someone calls and we have a
roof that hasn't been bolted, we have a belt, we have that,
they should be able to go.
Ms. Woolsey. Well, do they have the resources and the
staff?
Governor Manchin. I believe we do. We put in more and you
all put in more and the bottom line is, are we over-
bureaucrating it, if you will? I don't know enough and I can't
sit here and tell you that----
Ms. Woolsey. I don't know how we'd be over-bureaucrating--
--
Governor Manchin. Well, the bottom line is, what do you
consider a violation serious enough here? If someone calls
about ventilation? Ventilation, you know, is going to kill
somebodybecause, with that, then you get methane built up. If
you're not rock dusting and you're--I don't know why for the
last 40 or 50 years, we've only rock dust intake at 65 percent
and everything else is 80. We immediately put an order out and
said 80, we're going to do it by law. That should be common
sense. Why didn't we do it before? You know, I'm not blaming
anybody.
But the bottom line is, let's face it, when you say there's
a ventilation problem, there's a rock dust problem, there's a
roof bolt problem, those are things that kill people. That
should be the first thing. I would think that would be a red
flag for our state and also for the feds.
Now, the other types of violations, 6,000 violations, how
can you have 6,000 violations on ventilation and rock dusting,
you know, seriously, and we don't have enough resources, and a
lot of those violations are serious where people are hurt or
killed and just operational, the professionals can speak to
that more than I can.
Ms. Woolsey. And my time is up. I suppose we'll go around
again?
Chairman Miller. It's the intent of the Chair, I'm going to
go through the members of the Committee. I'll to Mr. Altmire
next and then Ms. Shea-Porter and then we'll go back to the
delegation, starting with Mr. Rahall, Ms. Capito, back and
forth. Mr. Altmire?
Mr. Altmire. Ms. Peters, you spoke about Dean's experience
in the 13 years that he worked at Upper Big Branch, and you
said that he had expressed many concerns about ventilation and
had reported to Massey at least seven times that you were aware
of. When did he first express these concerns? Was this
something he noticed more recently, and was there a progression
of concern in the recent years?
Chairman Miller. Ms. Peters, if you could pull your
microphone?
Ms. Peters. It happened a long time before this happened.
We had, me and my daughter, it went back to Don Blankenship,
and told them about the men that didn't have any air. And I
don't know what happened, but my son-in-law, he would be
driving and go to sleep and he would go to sleep coming from
work. And they said, the doctors said it was because he wasn't
getting enough oxygen and they said it was when the men came
out on the mantrip that, not the day this happened, but most of
the men went to sleep.
And he called, I don't know how many times, 2 or 3 days
before this happened, he called and asked them and told them he
needed air. And one of the men from Performance Coal told him
you know coal. See, they wanted a 150 feet each day and they
were unable to get that and keep all the curtains up and
everything. So he told him, he said you go ahead and close the
section down. He closed it down, but he told him he would fire
him. He said you pack your bags and leave.
Mr. Altmire. Mr. Morgan, you said that Adam had also talked
about the ventilation problems at UBB in the short time that he
had been there. And what did your experience tell you? What was
the advice that you gave to him when he first came to you to
talk about that?
Mr. Morgan. Talking about the ongoing ventilation problems,
he'd ask me questions about it, you know, about this. If you've
got this, where the long wall miner's in a turn, one time he
asked me, he said, ``Ain't these curtains supposed to be up,
Dad, over here?'' And he explained it. And I said, ``Yeah, all
that has got to be up for the ventilation.''
And he said, just about every shift he worked he had to do
some kind of ventilation repair, you know, and some like I said
he done on his own, which, you know, you're a trainee in a
mine. He shouldn't be the one to have to know. Somebody there
should know a lot more than he did.
Mr. Altmire. You mentioned on that point, if I heard you
correctly, that he did speak with one of his superiors about
that and was given sort of a dismissive reply that, if you're
worried about that kind of thing, maybe you should look for
another line of work?
Mr. Morgan. Yeah. They told him--a long wall coordinator--
--
Mr. Altmire. Are you comfortable sharing with this
Committee the name of that individual?
Mr. Morgan. Yeah. I don't see why not. Jack Rolls is his
name. That's when he told him if he was that scared or whatever
doing his job and stuff that he needed to rethink the job.
Mr. Altmire. Mr. Stewart, you have been at UBB for 15
years; is that correct? You talked about the violations that
you saw and the concerns that you had. Similar to the question
I asked Ms. Peters, is that something that you saw that was
more progressive in recent years? That it was getting worse as
time went on?
Mr. Stewart. As far as the long wall goes, it was just--we
never had proper air on that long wall. The type of ventilation
we used, we'd get down close to where you was finishing the
panel and that you normally didn't have much air because they
return it into the crib area and I believe it gets blocked.
I've worked where you can't see your hand in front of your
face all day long. As far as the miner section goes, yeah, in
the past year, we've had problems with it more recently. And
I'd like to touch one fact that I don't know if this pertains
to your question, but we were made to turn crosscuts into the
intake for awhile. This came from the president of the company.
And we said, hey, that's against the law. You're not supposed
to punch a crosscut through in your intake--you're supposed to
turn it the other way. It's against the mine law. But the boss
said no, he said do it this way. So that's the way we did it.
Probably done about 25 like that before he finally said we
could do it the right way. Now, why we were doing it the wrong
way, I have no idea. Yeah, they've been--I think the
ventilation got worse in recent times this past year.
Mr. Altmire. Thank you, Mr. Stewart. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Ms. Woolsey. Ms. Shea-Porter.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you. Thank you to all. I'm going to
read some testimony from another mine disaster when we had a
hearing in 2007 and ask you about this. I would say at the
time, ``Did somebody come to the mines quarterly or monthly and
remind everybody, we understand the politics in this mine is
tough. We know that you risk losing your job if you speak up,
but we're going to provide some protection and anonymity and
then we'll follow up. So, if you lose your job within 6 months
or a year, we'll be standing alongside you and make sure that
the people who punished you for speaking up pay the price.
Otherwise, all we have are reports on a shelf and then we have
families with pictures again.''
So I'd like to start with you first, Governor. This is a
different Governor. Is there some way for miners or their
families to be able to reach out before the accident, and do
you offer protection for them, whistleblower protection?
Another mine disaster.
Governor, I love your idea of having somebody in that mine.
But let me ask you for right now, is there an ombudsperson?
Could there be somebody from your state, if there isn't, that
would go into these mines monthly and remind the workers that
you're actually there standing for them and they have a place
to turn to?
Governor Manchin. I just asked Director Ron Wooten, because
the question was asked by Ms. Woolsey about the resources, and
we do, and they do, respond to every request. From the
standpoint, my idea is based around if you have the people who
will work and you have the most experience in someone on
ventilation and someone on rock dusting and someone on roof
bolting, and those are the most experienced people, they're
working there every day. That would be the team. I understand,
among all the mines, in almost all the mines, they have their
safety teams, and a lot of the good operators can empower and
they do empower the miners to pull the plug.
So, with that being said, you've got to make sure we do
interact before we react. Because reaction is what we're doing
now and that was in 2007, I think I know where that was, and
ours was in 2006, and it continues on. How a person cannot come
forward unless you give them the power of the law and criminal
proceedings against the hierarchy, the corporate hierarchy, all
the way up. If it just stops at the foreman, you can go find
another foreman. But if it goes clear to the hierarchy as far
as the corporate structure. from the CEOs to the Board of
Directors, people knowing that this is our standard operating
procedure. This is what we voted on. This is how we're running
our company. Unless they feel they're protected by the
corporate veil when we can't get there, I'll guarantee you it
won't change.
Ms. Shea-Porter. So what we hear today is fear and I think
about all the people in the community who heard these stories.
Now I remember a woman who lost her family member saying the
mine was speaking to us. The mine was speaking to us. And what
I'm hearing here is essentially the same thing. But somehow or
another, what you know and who you tell, it just falls silent
someplace. And so I'm not sure. I don't work in that
environment. But I know one thing. I know that everybody in
that mine needs to know that they can, if they stand together,
that they won't lose their job in 3 months or 6 months.
So let me ask somebody who's been working the mine. Mr.
Morgan, when somebody's hired in the mines, are they given the
information about, this is the number that you call, here's an
ombudsperson, here's a magnet you can put on your refrigerator?
Is there some way that the signal comes to the worker and the
family member that we really mean business here? Here's the
information. Because, how can you go to a wall, for example, to
see the number that you call up to report trouble, tells
everybody that you're looking for a number to report something.
Is there something done proactively when you're hired that
makes it safe?
Mr. Morgan. Like you say, on the board, all we've got is a
number and we can call it.
Ms. Shea-Porter. It's on the board? So if you walk up to a
board, somebody might see you?
Mr. Morgan. Yeah, you know, you get the number off the
board and take it home, you know, the hotline number and stuff
like that, you'd have it handy then.
Ms. Shea-Porter. At the time I said maybe you should be
given a card and a refrigerator magnet when you're hired so it
goes home to the family members, it goes home and you don't
have to possibly identify yourself. We've got to do better. I
know now that we're all working to do that. This is really very
familiar.
Governor Manchin. Public service announcements, as you
know, we've stepped those up. And also the hotline, making sure
everyone that calls in is absolutely protected, a secure line.
We're doing more of that. We're starting to get phone calls and
turning the mines in to the state inspectors and MSHA. The feds
all have hotlines also and they say the hotlines are posted in
every mine.
The bottom line is, if a person has nowhere else to work
and they feel that that unspoken threat is there--these are the
bravest human beings you ever--the families are the strongest
human beings. Their will to survive and will to provide for
their families, you've heard some testimony, just a few. It's
unbelievable, and we should never allow this to happen.
And so, from that standpoint, we want to work with
everybody in Congress. We're going to move forward as quickly
as we must in the state of West Virginia, but we don't want to
go along a path that's not parallel to what you all are doing
either. But if we can move faster, we will, and we'll be
prudent as we can and we think basically the protection of the
corporate veil right now is to the point where we're not
getting to the crux of the problem.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you for your great suggestions. I
yield back.
Chairman Miller. Thank you. Mr. Rahall?
Mr. Rahall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you know, Chairman
Miller, this week in the Committee that I Chair on natural
resources, we will begin hearing on the oil rig disaster.
Minerals Management Service, which is to the oil industry what
MSHA is to the coal industry, comes under the jurisdiction of
our national committee. We'll also have BP, TransOcean.
However, what strikes me here is, after hearing testimony
last week before the Senate Appropriation Subcommittee, hearing
our senior Senator conduct some tough questioning, it appears
to me that BP, TransOcean, Halliburton, and Massey have all
hired the same public relations firm. And the strategy is to
point the finger at the other guy.
That seems to be what happened last week in the Senate
Committee. Massey's saying it had a conflict with MSHA over a
ventilation plan. Don Blankenship said that Massey engineers
thought the plan that MSHA had Massey implement at UBB was
unsafe. Now, I'd like to ask the panel, if you were the
operator of a mine, and you thought the ventilation plan that
MSHA gave you was unsafe, would you continue to operate that
mine?
Witnesses. No.
Mr. Rahall. Is that a unanimous no? All right, I think I
heard all six of you testify no. Let me ask you, and I believe
I just heard the Governor say this, would a good operator where
safety is indeed the number one concern for that operator,
allow the coal miners to shut down the operation? Is that an
accurate statement or no?
Mr. Stewart. Could you say that again?
Mr. Rahall. Can a coal miner by himself in other
operations, other than Massey, shut down a coal mine if he or
she feels it's unsafe?
Mr. Cook. You mean the whole coal mine?
Mr. Rahall. Yes.
Mr. Cook. No.
Mr. Rahall. What about at a union mine?
Mr. Cook. You can't shut down the whole mine.
Mr. Stewart. You can remove yourself from unsafe
conditions. You can't shut the mine down.
Mr. Rahall. Okay. Are Massey employees required to sign as
a condition of employment a ``quit statement?'' Are any of you
familiar with a quit statement? You're shaking your head yes,
Mr. Mullins?
Mr. Mullins. I've heard that. When I worked for them I did
not have to sign one, but I know of men that did have to sign
one.
Mr. Rahall. And what is a quit statement?
Mr. Mullins. It's a statement they agree to quit and they
keep it in their file and whenever they want to get rid of
them, they use that to get rid of them.
Mr. Rahall. It gives them ground to get rid of that person?
Mr. Stewart. They do have an enhanced agreement, have you
heard of that?
Mr. Rahall. Yes.
Mr. Stewart. You're aware of the ``enhanced agreement.'' I
call it a slave labor contract.
Mr. Rahall. Would you explain what that enhanced agreement
is?
Mr. Stewart. The enhanced agreement is the coal market
opened up a few years ago, in '03 or something like that. And
they went to losing employees in droves because, you know, the
men were sick of putting up with things from it. Anyway, in
order to keep their employees, they came up with what they
called an enhanced agreement. Give everybody a pay raise, they
sign it, they're guaranteeing you a job for 3 years. And it
goes on to say that you can be fired for unsatisfactory work or
anything, you know, but they're guaranteeing you a job for 3
years. If you don't sign, you'll be working at will and you
will not get the same pay raise that everybody else gets. So,
you know, it kind of blackmailed the men in there making six
more dollars an hour than you are because you won't sign their
agreement. And you also, if you quit or were fired or whatever,
you could not seek employment in a 95 radius of any Massey
mine.
I mean, this is America, isn't it? Now, I don't know if
that would legally stand up. I don't think it would. But
anyway, you know, the men sign it to get their pay raises and,
you know, a lot of them probably figure, well, they own me now.
So that's the enhanced agreement. I can get a copy of it for
anyone who would like one.
Mr. Rahall. Would you submit a copy of that to the record?
Mr. Chairman, I'd like for him to submit a copy of that to the
record.
Chairman Miller. Yeah, without objection. It would be
included in the record here.
[The information follows:]
------
Mr. Rahall. Thank you, Goose. Let me ask you, while you're
speaking, and before I run out of time. At the same hearing
last week, Mr. Blankenship was asked if he knew of miners that
requested transfers from a mine due to their concerns about
safety. He said he did not know of any such instances. Without
mentioning any names, do you know of any miners who have sought
transfers from UBB due to safety concerns?
Mr. Stewart. Honestly, I don't know of any personally that
had.
Mr. Rahall. Any other members of the panel?
Mr. Mullins. Yes. Grover Skeens. One of the victims in
there. His sister told me that he went to management and told
them that he felt that something bad was going to happen and
that he requested a transfer and they denied him that transfer.
Mr. Rahall. Where is he working now?
Mr. Mullins. He was one of the----
Mr. Rahall. I'm sorry, I'm sorry. You're right.
Mr. Stewart. Excuse me, I'm sorry. My former boss quit
about 2 months before the explosion due to concerns because he
would go outside and tell upper management that we had low air.
I worked at Head Gate 22 Section where Dean did. And nothing
would be done. He got scared, not only for his safety, you
know, he got scared, you know, that he was going to get in
trouble himself if something happened. So he quit. He didn't
ask to be transferred.
Mr. Rahall. Who was that?
Mr. Stewart. Richard Hutchins.
Mr. Rahall. Okay. I think my time is up. Thank you.
Chairman Miller. Congresswoman Capito.
Mrs. Capito. Thank you. I would like to thank you all. Some
of the suggestions that you've already brought forward, I
think, are very good ones. First of all, the one that mentioned
having MSHA inspectors inspect on the weekends and on the
evening shifts makes great sense. I'm surprised it hasn't been
done already.
The other one is the pre-warning for when the inspector is
coming. We all know there are guard shacks, you know, to get up
onto a mine site, for safety reasons. In discussions I've had,
I think MSHA has already started to make some adjustments
there, but in this day of technology, I don't know how you cut
off communications, and that's going to be a tough one. But
hopefully, that's something we can work on. Simplistically, let
me ask you this, Mr. Stewart, and give me a sense of--
ventilation, obviously, is the issue here. During a shift--do
you work an 8- or 10-hour shift?
Mr. Stewart. Ten.
Mrs. Capito. During a 10-hour shift, how many times could
the ventilation change and shift during a 10-hour shift? Or
does it change week to week or--could you just give a sense of
that?
Mr. Stewart. Well, it shouldn't change. You should have
plenty of air. But on our section there would be times, you
know, we would go in and there wouldn't be any air. And then
you would have a little bit. It would fluctuate.
Mrs. Capito. Would that be because of the curtains--?
Mr. Stewart. I'm talking about our main intake.
Mrs. Capito. The main intake?
Mr. Stewart. Right.
Mrs. Capito. You mentioned water, too, is a problem.
Somebody mentioned.
Mr. Stewart. Yeah, water was a problem on the long wall.
That's what I'm talking about. They ventilated, they returned--
their return went in by where the roof fell in and they had
water problems. I suspect it roofed out, which would allow a
large area for possibly methane to accumulate.
Mrs. Capito. So basically then, how often in this
particular mine--MSHA is required to inspect four times, but at
this particular mine, MSHA was on site much more than four
times? Does anybody know, or you weren't there?
Mr. Stewart. They were there on a regular basis.
Mrs. Capito. Monthly, weekly?
Mr. Stewart. I worked eight to ten. Like someone stated
earlier, they weren't on the evening shift much. But I did see
them fairly regular, so I had a couple tell us, you know,
``hey, guys, if you all need to tell us anything, just in
passing by, you know, just let us know,'' you know. I thought
that night that he knew, you know, if we were caught going to
an inspector, we were going home for good. But, you know, he
was trying to give us a hint, you know, get him the word on
whatever. I appreciated that.
Mrs. Capito. Let me ask the rest of you all that mined in
deep mines. When ventilation shifts like this, and you shut it
down, can you correct it in a matter of hours or is it
something, you know? Give me a time sense on that.
Mr. Mullins. It depends on what kind of ventilation problem
you're having. I mean, you could have had stoppings knocked
out. If it's a matter of stoppings being knocked out, then
you've got----
Mrs. Capito. That could be small or large?
Mr. Mullins. Yeah, that could be small or large.
Mrs. Capito. I think--go ahead. I'm sorry.
Mr. Mullins. If you've got water in the gob area, like
Goose is talking about, in the return area, blocking, then it
could be hours or it could be up to a day or two to get a pump
back there, get pumps set up to pump the water out, to open
that area up so that air could flow. It's different.
Mrs. Capito. It varies. One of the reasons I'm interested
in this is because of one of Governor Manchin's suggestions on
having somebody on task at the mine, you know, at all times,
working at the mine, correct? MSHA can't be there every minute
to see the shift changes and safety should be the culture,
shouldn't be a chilling effect. And if you go forward with a
concern about ventilation or anything serious, that you're
going to be retaliated by job loss or loss of your insurance
when you have a child, you have to have this insurance and many
of us understand that as well.
And I guess what I'm wondering, in the broader sense, you
all worked a lot of different mines. Is this a culture that--I
mean, is this a concern that's pervasive? The morale has got to
be low in terms of across the industry when you get a gut check
like this, losing so many lives. But in terms of being more
aware, being willing to come forward, being willing to
whistleblow, being willing to pay attention to what ventilation
is doing at the time, all the different signs of the methane
gas, do you get a sense that things, you know, how is the
general sense in the mines right now? And you all haven't gone
back--well, you did, Mr. Morgan, go back again. In one of your
discussions, and I know you've got a lot of friends and
relatives who work in the industry.
Mr. Morgan. Where we worked at, the morale was pretty good.
Everybody knowed they could go in and work safe. They don't
have to do nothing illegal or, you know, to be punished for it.
It's just--I worked other mines, too, and I could tell a
difference when you go back and forth to each mine.
Mrs. Capito. So each mine has its own personality?
Mr. Morgan. Yeah, they do. When you're talking about the
ventilation, when he was talking about that and water and
stuff, too, a lot of times the ventilation, they'll cut down
substantially. Like you say, you can notice it sometimes just
by seeing it. A lot of your men won't know it and your foreman
will have to take air in and if he tells you to go up there,
like if you're running a continuous miner in the long wall and
he tells you to go in there and cut coal, he's supposed to tell
you how much air is behind that line there. If he tells you
you've got the required amount, that's all you go by. You're
taking his word, so if he's a couple thousand feet short on his
CFM, what he's supposed to have, and he tells you you've got
it, you don't know until you go in there and mine and you get
gases. That's the only word you've got to go by unless you take
an air reading and air monitor. Everybody ain't got that.
Mr. Cook. As far as Mr. Stewart talking about the
ventilation from the long wall being pulled to the job, that's
what ours is. And we had people that walked that perimeter
every day. They checked for methane in the mine and they
checked for air. It's a good system if it's done right.
Mrs. Capito. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Miller. Congressman Mollohan.
Mr. Mollohan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There's been an
awful lot of testimony about questions about ventilation. I
have a few myself. Mr. Morgan, you testified that Adam would
talk about the curtain, the intake side feeds the long wall
face would be removed on a regular basis?
Mr. Morgan. Yeah.
Mr. Mollohan. Mr. Stewart, Mr. Quarles indicated that there
would be code words for men on the property and that meant an
inspector was around. My question is, first of all you have a
ventilation plan that has been worked on, probably by a lot of
different people in the mine, and it's been approved by federal
and state inspectors; is that correct?
Mr. Stewart. Yes.
Witnesses. Yes.
Mr. Mollohan. And that ventilation plan in this mine, do
you feel as approved, if followed, it would have been adequate
to ventilate the mine?
Mr. Cook. I don't know what they had.
Mr. Stewart. It should have been adequate, but for whatever
reason, you know, I'm not in management. They couldn't get the
air to the section. I don't know what problems they were
having. They kept putting up double doors all over the mine,
you know. I don't know if they needed to add another fan. I
really can't answer that. But they just couldn't get the air up
to the sections it was needed.
Mr. Mollohan. Was that on a regular basis?
Mr. Stewart. It has been the past year.
Mr. Mollohan. You've described a number of ventilation
plans, ventilation problems, number one not being able to get
enough air on the section, and you're talking about some saying
that the curtain was taken down and that obviously was
intentional. You're talking about men working when they were
changing from a sweep to a split. And directing air into the
gob, which you just said was okay if it's done properly and
there's no obstruction.
But if you're having all these conditions, when--and are
these conditions such a nature that an inspector, a federal or
state inspector arrives at the mine, and there's notification
that there's a man on the property, are these the kind of
conditions that could be corrected before the federal or state
inspector gets down to the area in the mine?
Mr. Stewart. Not all of that, but what they liked to do was
like, you know, misdirect the inspector somewhere else. Say,
they go check this, whatever, and on several occasions in the
past year we have been withdrawn and the mine has been shut
down. And whatever they did while they had a closure order on
it, they done enough to get the inspectors to okay it to go
back in. It wouldn't last.
Mr. Mullins. They have regulators in your intake that you
can regulate your air through to certain parts of the mine
where you want it, and if you can't get enough air to one
section, you can open up a regulator and send more air that
way, but in doing that, you may take away from this section.
So, yes, they can control the ventilation, somewhat.
Mr. Mollohan. But your testimony here today is that it was,
or let me ask you, was this effort to correct conditions before
an inspector got into a problem area, was that on a regular
basis, was that infrequently, was it----
Mr. Mullins. I really can't answer that, because I left
Massey 3 years ago and went to another company to work, but my
brother remained there.
Mr. Mollohan. Did he ever talk about that?
Mr. Mullins. No. The only thing my brother said, I talked
to him Easter Sunday before this happened, and the only thing
that he said to me was that all they thought about there was
running coal. The president of the company, I think was Chris
Blanchard, he didn't like him very well and he said all he
cared about, and he didn't care nothing about safety and stuff,
all he cared about was production. He wanted to run, run, run,
no matter what the conditions were, you run.
Mr. Mollohan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Miller. Senator Rockefeller?
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It just
occurs to me listening to your very, very frank testimony and
on the point about what ought to be done and what the problems
are, that fear is a terrible, terrible thing to live with. But
they've got you. Because they pay you $60,000 or more, so
what's a fellow to do? Gonna walk off the job? Gonna try to
tell somebody there's something wrong, one of the management
people? What are you going to do? And they know that. So
they've got you.
Now, that's part of Appalachian culture. I'm not sure I
like it, but it goes back 100 years, the way companies operate.
All this reminds me--I wasn't here 100 years ago, but I was
here 50 years ago, and it was sort of like the same thing. So I
want to make these points and ask questions.
The, you know, my conference committee in the Senate, we
conducted the hearing on Toyota. As you know, Toyota had some
safety problems and we went after them pretty hard and now
we're doing legislation that affects all car companies and it's
going to be tough legislation. But one thing Toyota had at I
think most of their production facilities, and I assume they
still do, is if any single worker felt that something was going
wrong on that line, and I've seen this, all they have to do is
reach up and pull a string or small rope like that. The entire
line shuts down. And immediately somebody in management comes
over to find out what the problem is. And you don't start up
until the problem is fixed. That's the way to do that.
People talking about British Petroleum and this oil spill.
They take their CEO and took full responsibility, full
responsibility. No American taxpayer is going to pay one dime
for anything we did. He took responsibility as a CEO, which
means that the Board is involved.
We don't do that in this industry. Everybody--oh, we've got
all these experts. They know more than the federal government.
They know more about ventilation than the federal government.
The federal government isn't on the line all the time. We are,
we know.
Well, maybe that's true, maybe it isn't but, you know, the
pressure is on those folks who are the experts, too, and if
production is issue number one, their expertise doesn't mean
anything.
So if you get these conflicts between MSHA and, you know,
the folks in the mine company about what constitutes good
ventilation, I'm really struck by the amount of conflict. Well,
they don't know what they're talking about. We've got a plan.
In the meantime, the ventilation is what takes away the
methane, takes away the rock dust, all the rest of it. The
ventilation is key, you've all made that clear. But what's to
be done about it? Massey said we're the experts. Experts are
only good so long as they can exercise what they're expert at,
and I don't think that's the case.
The CEO and the Board of Directors have to be involved in
the consequences. I really believe in that. I really believe
that there ought to be something akin to that Toyota pull down
the rope. And the closest thing so far is the whistleblower.
And I think that ought to be a part of it, a part of the new
legislation with protections. But one of you said, ``yeah,
we'll have a whistleblower, but they'll be able to get around
that.'' Who was it that said that? One of you did.
Mr. Cook. As far as fired?
Senator Rockefeller. Yeah.
Mr. Cook. Yeah, they'll find something.
Senator Rockefeller. Well, tell me.
Mr. Cook. They can find anything. If you blow the whistle
and they find out about it, they can fire you for being an
unsafe worker. They can fire you for having----
Senator Rockefeller. Make up whatever they want?
Mr. Cook. Yeah, they can make up whatever they want, or
they can dock you so bad that you want to quit.
Senator Rockefeller. So, Mr. Chairman, that's something
we've got to look at very carefully and make sure we get right
so the protection really is there.
Mr. Quarles. Sir, 2 months down the road they're having a
layoff and you'll be laid off, when they're still interviewing
people to be hired.
Senator Rockefeller. When the market is down, they'll use
that.
Mr. Quarles. You'll be gone some way or another. If you do
anything toward them, some way or another, they will get rid of
you.
Senator Rockefeller. Isn't it possible, if I don't
question, Mr. Chairman, isn't it possible, I cannot believe it
is not possible to have ventilation as object number one,
solving the ventilation problem and the whistleblower problem,
so miners are people again, not serfs? They've got a
whistleblower, they've got protection, they're people. You're
the ones down there, you're the experts and you learn from
experience.
Management may have all the engineering degrees from Penn
State or whatever they want, but they're not down there the
same way that you are. You learn through experience what did
work, what didn't work, or worked at certain mines, union, non-
union, whatever. But they've got to be able to listen to you.
So final question, Mr. Chairman. When you talked--well,
I'll use you, Mr. Stewart. You didn't say this, but I'll just
use you. That miners--about inspectors being there on a pretty
regular basis, and see that, really opens up a question to me.
Pretty regular. If they're there and they're going to get
caught as they cross the bridge to come in at the check-in box,
unannounced or not, they've got to be there a lot. Was it every
day, was it every few weeks, were they good, were they tired,
were they working a 10-, 12-hour shift? I mean, I think a lot
of this gets down to what the Governor talks about and that is
bureaucracy.
Let's face it, we've had some administrations that didn't
really care a whole lot about safety. And, during that time,
there wasn't a whole lot of pressure on inspectors to, you
know, keep them in training and get out there and be
aggressive. We have to have aggressive inspections, both state
and federal. And state and federal have to learn how to work
together. I don't have time to ask you this question, Governor,
but we have to learn how to work together to maximize our
efficiency and our presence in the mines. I don't think that
was a question, but I wanted to make that statement. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Miller. Thank you. It is not the intention of the
Chair to have a second round, but if there is a member who has
a question--I'm not going to have a second round, but if
someone has a burning question. I think the panel--it is also
the intent of the Chair in our discussions in setting up this
panel, there were people who had some qualms about whether they
were going to come before the Committee or not, and I think
maybe your testimony may make it easier for somebody if there's
somebody in the audience that's related to a family member, if
they want to come up, after we dismiss this panel, I would be
happy to give a couple of minutes. We won't have questions, but
just people who think there's something that ought to be put on
the record.
If people are reluctant to do that, we certainly will
recommend or we'll consider written statements from additional
family members. Now that they see how this is unfolding, I
think it's apparent to everyone how important this testimony
about what people, unfortunately the victims here that were in
the mines, were talking about prior to this accident. It's a
very, very important component of our investigation. Mr. Kline?
Is there any Member? Congresswoman Woolsey?
Ms. Woolsey. I'd like to pass on just so people realize
that we're not passive about this, it is very clear that we're
going to strengthen the mining laws and we also are very aware
that MSHA and the Department of Labor is aware that MSHA
doesn't have enough inspectors on the ground. We're not up to
par in terms of where we ought to be with the numbers for 2010.
And we do acknowledge the bureaucracy.
We need to strengthen our laws. The pattern of violation
process has too many loopholes, and we want to strengthen the
civil and criminal penalties to make it meaningful when we have
penalties, make sure that laws are felonies and not
misdemeanors. Of course, enhance the whistleblower protections
so they're meaningful, and make sure that miners don't lose pay
while a withdrawal order is in effect.
So it's all about empowering miners. The Department of
Labor is totally with you, and they also and we also recognize
that safety teams can only work if supervisors or foremen are
expected to make the fixes when there's hazards, and if they
don't do it, that they are punished. So thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Miller. Thank you. Mr. Kline?
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We may not all of us on
this panel agree about everything that needs to be done or
ought to be done in Congress, but we do agree that there's a
problem and we ought to work on it. We do agree that it's part
of Congress's job to take a very close look at the Department
of Labor and MSHA and make sure that they have the resources
they need and also that they're doing what they're supposed to
do.
I want to thank you, Governor. It's just terrific of you to
take so much of your time and come here and share with us
things that you're doing as a state and, of course, your
support, love and support for the family members. And then to
the family members again, thank you very much for your courage
in coming up here today and the frankness of your testimony. It
is indeed moving, as well as certainly informative. And again,
thanks to my colleagues and all the people in the community for
coming out here today. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Miller. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you
to all the Members of Congress for being here and for
participating in this hearing. Thank you, Governor, for your
time and your knowledge and your actions that have been so
swift after these tragic accidents in your state. I certainly
want to thank Secretary Solis for being here and listening and
Assistant Secretary Main for all your work that you've been
doing on this investigation.
When we have one of these tragic accidents, very often in
the Congress and you've heard it here again today, we have
talked about the fact that this is an industry that makes our
country strong, makes our country free. It is very clear to
most of the public and certainly members of Congress that coal
mining is not an optional economic activity.
This country desperately needs the coal, the coal mines,
and the miners to engage in this very dangerous occupation but
critical occupation to the economy of this nation, the well-
being of this nation.
I think today with the leadership of the Governor, the
response of members of this Committee and we'll see the Senate
and the investigations, nobody's drawing conclusions, but I
think you can conclude that perhaps we have now drawn the
understanding that the participation of miners in creating the
safe workplace environment is no longer optional.
Whether they're union or non-union, this has got to be a
matter of policy. You should not put your life at risk or your
family's life in jeopardy over the question of what is the
threshold when you step in that mine, is it union or non-union?
We have a lot to learn from the unions and there's a lot to be
said for how they engage in safety practices, but the fact of
the matter is, this is going to have to be a matter of policy.
I think the Governor put his fingers on it. One with the
certified committees but, two, with the bureaucracy. When we
had our hearings earlier about the avoidance of--help me,
staff--pattern of violation. You just wanted to go outside and
scream when you were reading the manner and means by which this
was enforced or not enforced or how it could be gamed or how
the calendar could keep you from being a serious violator. Even
though you were a serious violator, if you held on long enough
and you sent enough lawyers to court, you would look like one
of the safer mines in the country. That's just got to stop.
That just is going to have to stop.
It's very interesting in the preliminary work that MSHA
did. They have a conclusion that this was, they did right after
this accident at Big Branch and their conclusion is this. Today
some mine operators can consistently, can consistently engage
in dangerous violations of the law and then avoid the penalties
by aggressively contesting every citation.
That just goes to the issue of the citations, but the fact
of the matter is, when you wind your way through this
bureaucracy that for the most part was constructed with the
serious input of the industry, that some mining operations, and
we're not saying all, can consistently engage in dangerous
violations of the law and men have to work in those
environments. That just has to be unacceptable to us as a
nation, and to us as Members of Congress, and I just can't tell
you how important your testimony is to get an understanding of
this environment.
At an earlier accident, I was haunted by the testimony of a
wife who spoke about her husband coming in the house late and
describing how unnerved he was by the conditions at the mine
and then how angry he was when he got up to go to work in the
mine because of the conditions. And I just felt, as a Member of
Congress, maybe that was the most important piece of testimony
I've ever received around this set of circumstances because it
told you all that you needed to know.
He kept going back to that mine until it took his life. And
she knew something was very wrong. He knew something was very
wrong and they had no way to transmit it and to get it
corrected without putting themselves in jeopardy financially,
whatever their situation was in the community. And we're
talking about a very, very serious and dangerous work
environment.
This mine we're discussing today, Big Branch, I've come to
understand you've got to ventilate a million cubic feet of
methane a day. That sounds like a ventilation plan that has to
be seriously thought out and seriously enforced. That's not a
casual amount of methane. So, again, thank you so very much. I
know that several of you--Governor, you wanted to make a point.
I'm sorry.
Governor Manchin. I just wanted to thank you on behalf of
the miners and the miners' families and the state of West
Virginia and all people for you bringing this powerful
Committee, but most prestigious Committee here and yourself,
Congressman Kline and to your staff members and to our West
Virginia delegation and all of you all for taking the time to
come to West Virginia. We appreciate this more than you know.
I don't mean to be derogatory at all when I say
bureaucracy. We're all policymakers, but sometimes when the
average person sitting here will say, ``well, we're talking
about hiring more people, appropriating more money, is it
really going to fix the problem?'' and I think they need to
know that we're going to fix this problem. If it takes more
people and money, that's what it will take. If it doesn't, and
we revamp the laws we have, that's what we should do, and the
bottom line is how they're empowered and protected and make
sure that the corporate veil doesn't protect anybody from
criminal wrongdoing when we know they did it.
I think those are the things that we're talking about, and
overlapping or redundancy. How do we complement each other
rather than doing the same thing? Redundancy doesn't make a lot
of sense. When you see different inspectors coming with
different criteria, these are all things that can be fixed, but
these are things basically that's evolved over the years,
really, since Farmington, my hometown 1968, things started
happening. Everybody was truly just trying to move in the right
direction and if it got embargoed, if you will, it's time to
fix it, and I think that's what we're hearing, and that's why I
appreciate so much you all taking the time to come.
And I know on behalf of all the men who testified and the
wonderful mother-in-law who testified and probably knows more
about her son-in-law than most people know, but these are
wonderful people, they're good people, and they deserve to have
the representation that you all are giving them right now and I
appreciate that very much.
Chairman Miller. Thank you very much. I think as I listen
to you discuss bureaucracy and as I think about it, we know
that laws grow up over time and there's a lot of
inconsistencies and loopholes and over time you start playing
them off against one another and you can never quite get it
done. But we also know as Assistant Secretary Joe Main said
when he came to our hearing earlier this year, he really told
us about a system that had been conquered by the attorneys and
if that system wasn't changed, it was going to crumble, and
that was the system that was between safety and danger as it
currently exists. I think we now recognize that what he told
us, we have to act on, the system has got to change.
I know that several of you witnesses here today continue to
work and be employed in the mining industry, and I want to be
very clear about something. Your testimony aids this
Committee's oversight activity. This testimony we seek in order
to better perform our oversight of disasters, like the Upper
Big Branch, as well as better inform our legislative response.
Attempts by any person to retaliate against you for your
testimony are prohibited and would be viewed as an attempt to
obstruct, influence, impede, or do improper exercise of this
congressional Committee's power of inquiry.
Your willingness to aid the inquiries of this Committee and
the United States Congress are deeply appreciated. So I want
you to understand that. That is your right, that is your
protection, and we need to know if any such actions are taken
against you or other family members. This is a formal
congressional investigation and we're here to protect our
witnesses.
And without objection, all the members, the panel will have
14 days to submit additional materials or questions for the
hearing record. And before we adjourn--You're excused. If there
are family members, and I'm restricting this to family members,
who think they might want to add something given what they've
heard here this morning, I would certainly welcome them to come
forward and make a statement. This is without attorneys, so you
all have to make up your mind here in a couple of minutes.
Thank you so very much. You said you wouldn't know what to say
when you got up here.
Can we have a raise of hands, is there anybody that's
interested? Mr. Long. Could we ask that conversations, can you
take the conversations to the back of the room?
STATEMENT OF LEO LONG, GRANDFATHER OF
RONALD LEE MAYNOR
Mr. Long. My name is Leo Long. I had a grandson that was
killed in the Upper Big Branch mine at Massey. You know, he
stayed with me for years and years. I put him through school,
he graduated, went to work. I seen him every day, every night.
After he got married, he moved right beside of me and I'd
see him when he'd come in of an evening from work from the
mines. And I'd ask him about it. He said, ``Papaw,'' he said,
``we have to work in water.'' I said, ``Ronald, why don't you
just come on out?'' And he said, ``If I do, I'll be fired.''
And he told me something else. I worked in union mines for
30-some years, but I wasn't inside. I was an outside man. He
told me that Massey, as soon as the inspectors would start off
the hill, they would call back in and if they found a
violation, the boss would tell them get back to work. If they
didn't go back to work, they'd be fired. And he had to work in
water. And he'd come home, he'd come home many a day soaking
wet where they had to work in water.
He had to leave his wife and two little kids, a little girl
and little boy, one's eight and one's two. He left his family.
I'm asking you all to please do something for the rest of the
coal miners that's in the mines. I pray for it every night,
every day. But if you all don't do something, something like
this is going to happen again. But I beg you to do something.
And he told me something else, he told me something else
that the men up here didn't mention. He told me, like the
methane, he said that the company had a way to bridge the
continuous miner over to keep on working if the methane got
so--when the methane gets so high, it's supposed to shut
everything down. But Massey had a way to keep the continuous
miner working, bringing coal out. Money come before the men
did. You was only a number. They could get men back in their
place. But I ask you all to do something, please.
Chairman Miller. Thank you.
Mr. Long. And I went to see a lawyer. I told him I did not
want one penny from his estate because I gave him everything
that I owned. It should have been me under the ground instead
of him. It should have been, not my grandson. He was just like
a son to me. But I do thank you all for listening to me. And
please, whatever you do, try to get some kind of law passed so
they can ventilate them mines.
He would tell me the mine wasn't ventilated. He would go to
sleep, as soon as he would get home and take a shower, he would
go to sleep on the couch and just drop off and go to sleep,
where he was breathing that gas, methane. But I thank you all
for listening to me.
Chairman Miller. Thank you.
Mr. Rahall. Thank you, Mr. Long. As one who was at the site
all week, I got to know Mr. Long pretty well. Mr. Long would
stay outside in his car continually waiting for word. And
you're quite a brave individual.
Mr. Long. I stayed there five nights and five days.
Mr. Rahall. You were there in your car five nights and five
days. I know the Secretary made sure as well she had the
opportunity to visit, Assistant Secretary Main visited with
you. Everybody who was there came over to say hello to Mr.
Long.
Mr. Long. And he had to stay in that mines nine days. They
called us, called the home. After they called his wife, they
called us Tuesday morning, on that following Tuesday morning
about fifteen after one and said Ronald Lee was the last one
that came out, the last man out.
Mr. Rahall. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Long.
Chairman Miller. Thank you.
Mr. Long. Thank you for listening to me.
Chairman Miller. With that, the committee will stand
adjourned.
[Additional submissions of Mr. Miller follows:]
NAMES OF THE 29 MINERS WHO DIED AT THE UPPER BIG BRANCH MINE ON APRIL 5, 2010
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Family member who
First name Last name Age Job title Total experience At UBB mine testified Relationship
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Jason Atkins 25 Roof Bolter Operator 3 Yrs 24 weeks 44 weeks ................. ..................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 Carl Acord 52 Roof Bolter Operator >33 Yrs 44 weeks ................. ..................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 Christopher Bell, Sr 33 Longwall Utility 36 weeks 8 weeks ................. ..................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4 Gregory Brock 47 Electrician >5 Yrs >5 Yrs ................. ..................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5 Kenneth Chapman 53 Roof Bolter Operator >28 Yrs 24 weeks ................. ..................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
6 Robert Clark 41 ContinousMinerOperator >11 Yrs 44 weeks ................. ..................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7 Charles T Davis 51 Longwall Foreman >32 Yrs >8 Yrs ................. ..................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
8 Cory Davis 20 Underground Apprentice 20 weeks 8 weeks ................. ..................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
9 Michael Elswick 57 Beltman/Fireboss 33 Yrs 3 days ................. ..................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 William Griffith 54 ContinousMinerOperator >36 Yrs 16 Yrs 32 weeks ................. ..................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
11 Steven Harrah 40 Assistant Mine Foreman >9 Yrs 1 Yr 4 weeks ................. ..................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
12 Edward D Jones 50 Assistant Mine Foreman 29 Yrs 13 Yrs 24 weeks Alice Peters Mother
in Law
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
13 Richard Lane 45 Longwall Foreman >8 Yrs 36 weeks ................. ..................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
14 William Lynch 59 Shuttle Car Operator >34 Yrs 44 weeks ................. ..................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
15 Joe Marcum 57 ContinousMinerOperator >32 Yrs >16 Yrs ................. ..................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
16 Nicholas McCroskey 26 Electrician >3 Yrs 1 Yr 24 weeks ................. ..................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
17 Ronald Lee Maynor 31 Scoop Operator 3 Yrs 24 weeks 3 Yrs 24 weeks Leo Long Grandfather
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
18 James Mooney 51 Shuttle Car Operator 32Yrs24weeks >10 Yrs ................. ..................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
19 Adam Morgan 21 Underground Apprentice 8 weeks 8 weeks Steve Morgan Father & Uncle
Eddie Cook
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
20 Rex Mullins 50 Headgate Operator >20 Yrs 6 Yrs 40 weeks Clay Mullins Brother
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
21 Joshua Napper 26 Underground Apprentice 8 weeks 8 weeks ................. ..................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
22 Howard Payne, Jr 53 Roof Bolter Operator >12 Yrs >11 Yrs ................. ..................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
23 Dillard Persinger 32 Shield Operator >2 Yrs >2 Yrs ................. ..................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
24 Joel Price 55 Shearer Operator >35 Yrs 2 Yrs 24 weeks ................. ..................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
25 Gary W Quarles 33 Shearer Operator >14 Yrs 12 Yrs 24 weeks Gary Quarles Father
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
26 Deward Scott 58 Shuttle Car Operator >38 Yrs 44 weeks ................. ..................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
27 Grover Skeens 57 Maintenance Foreman >33 Yrs >14 Yrs ................. ..................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28 Benny Willingham 61 Roof Bolter Operator >34 Yrs 44 weeks ................. ..................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
29 Ricky Workman 50 Shuttle Car Operator >9 Yrs >8 Yrs ................. ..................--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: MSHA's Preliminary Reports of Accident (Forms 7000-13) and information from the May 24, 2010 hearing (the names of the witnesses and their
relationships to the miners).
______
Secretary of Labor,
Washington, DC, May 28, 2010.
Hon. George Miller, Chairman,
Committee on Education and Labor, U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Chairman Miller: I wanted to thank you again for allowing me
to participate in the field hearing in Beckley last week on the Upper
Big Branch Mine tragedy. I was so moved by the compelling testimony
given by the family members of the victims and Mr. Stewart, the UBB
miner. I will never forget listening to Steve Morgan testify about
trying to convince his son Adam to quit his job at UBB just two weeks
before the disaster. No parent should have to live with that kind of
pain. I am so grateful to you for giving these families an opportunity
to tell their stories.
I also want to assure you that Assistant Secretary Joe Main and I
listened carefully to the lessons that these family members and Mr.
Stewart have to teach MSHA about how we can prevent disasters like UBB.
Even before the hearing, MSHA has already:
adopted a new approach to inspections to ensure that our
inspectors are getting a clear and accurate picture of conditions in
the mines they inspect--not just the picture that the mine operators
want to provide. MSHA is changing and varying the methods to predict
the times and types of inspections that MSHA will perform;
taken bold action, like our recent blitz inspections, to
make sure we are focusing our enforcement efforts on the mines that
pose the greatest danger to miners' safety;
augmented our existing anonymous 1-800 tip line for miners
to report hazards with a toll-free line specifically for anyone who has
information related to the UBB disaster that they would like to
communicate to MSHA anonymously; and,
coordinated with the state of West Virginia to coordinate
our investigations and oversight. In addition, MSHA Assistant Secretary
Main reached out to all the state mining agencies upon his confirmation
to improve the working relationship and better coordinate safety and
health activities. He arranged for the state mining agencies to meet
with all the MSHA Coal District Managers to discuss increased
cooperation. MSHA will also soon sign a new Memorandum of Understanding
with the state agencies to improve and expand cooperation and
coordination in ensuring that mine safety and health laws are followed
and are effective.
MSHA officials will be more than happy to meet with you and your
staff to brief you on the details of these and other initiatives.
The hearing made clear that we have a great deal of work ahead of
us to ensure safe conditions for all miners. I look forward to working
with you and the entire Committee as this process moves forward.
Sincerely,
Hilda L. Solis,
Secretary of Labor.
______
[Whereupon, at 11:54 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]