- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2010

[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2010

_______________________________________________________________________

HEARINGS

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE
JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania, Chairman
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida
PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey
JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia TODD TIAHRT, Kansas
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio JACK KINGSTON, Georgia
ALLEN BOYD, Florida KAY GRANGER, Texas
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky
SANFORD D. BISHOP, Jr., Georgia
MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York
CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full
Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking Minority Member of the Full
Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees.
Paul Juola, Greg Lankler, Sarah Young, Linda Pagelsen, Paul Terry,
Kris Mallard, Adam Harris, Ann Reese, Brooke Boyer, Tim Prince, Matt
Washington, B G Wright, Chris White, Celes Hughes, and Adrienne Ramsay,
Staff Assistants
Sherry L. Young, Administrative Aide
________
PART 2
Page
Marine Corps Ground Equipment.................................... 1
Soldier Equipment, Ergonomics and Injuries....................... 47
Army and Marine Corps Readiness.................................. 139
Army and Marine Corps Force Protection........................... 191
Air Force Military Personnel..................................... 281
Military Personnel--Army......................................... 367
________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
PART 2--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2010
?

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2010

_______________________________________________________________________

HEARINGS

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE
JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania, Chairman
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida
PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio
JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio TODD TIAHRT, Kansas
ROBERT E. ``BUD'' CRAMER, Jr., ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
Alabama JACK KINGSTON, Georgia
ALLEN BOYD, Florida
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
SANFORD D. BISHOP, Jr., Georgia

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
56-260 WASHINGTON : 2010

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin, Chairman

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington JERRY LEWIS, California
ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky
PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia
NITA M. LOWEY, New York JACK KINGSTON, Georgia
JOSE E. SERRANO, New York RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New
ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut Jersey
JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia TODD TIAHRT, Kansas
JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts ZACH WAMP, Tennessee
ED PASTOR, Arizona TOM LATHAM, Iowa
DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama
CHET EDWARDS, Texas JO ANN EMERSON, Missouri
PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island KAY GRANGER, Texas
MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho
LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas
SAM FARR, California MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois
JESSE L. JACKSON, Jr., Illinois ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida
CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan DENNIS R. REHBERG, Montana
ALLEN BOYD, Florida JOHN R. CARTER, Texas
CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey KEN CALVERT, California
SANFORD D. BISHOP, Jr., Georgia JO BONNER, Alabama
MARION BERRY, Arkansas STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio
BARBARA LEE, California TOM COLE, Oklahoma
ADAM SCHIFF, California
MICHAEL HONDA, California
BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
STEVE ISRAEL, New York
TIM RYAN, Ohio
C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
Maryland
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida
CIRO RODRIGUEZ, Texas
LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania

Beverly Pheto, Clerk and Staff Director

(ii)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2010

Tuesday, March 10, 2009.

MARINE CORPS GROUND EQUIPMENT

WITNESS

LIEUTENANT GENERAL GEORGE J. FLYNN, DEPUTY COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE
CORPS, COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION

Mr. Murtha's Opening Statement

Mr. Murtha. The committee will come to order.
I want us out of here by 11:00, General. I hope your
answers won't be too long. The thing that I wanted to talk
about mainly is the cost of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle
(EFV) and how you are going to get this program under control.
We spent $4 billion up to this date, and you just took over
the program, but we need to have some recommendation from you
for the subcommittee so that we will be able to follow this
program more closely. We keep putting money into research, and
we keep finding you need more and more money. You save money by
cutting down on the numbers, but I am not sure how much
research you are saving. But the money you have asked for this
year--we have got to know as you go along exactly where we are
so that we can cut the thing off, we can come to an agreement
to cut this thing off, because you have got a lot of good
programs, and usually you run those programs very well, but I
am just worried about this particular program.
It started when I was Chairman before. I went to see it
down at Dumfries, and it looked like it was going to be a
program we needed. We have done very few amphibious operations
under duress, and I believe the Marine Corps needs a capability
of landing against a threat.
But having said that, we have got to get this program under
control. It is just so expensive, and when I went back and
looked, I had the staff go back and find the World War I--you
see this, Bill, a World War I tank. Bill, see this World War I
tank? It looks like their EFV.
Mr. Young. They used a lot of imagination.
Mr. Murtha. Yeah. This is today's vehicle, and that one
probably costs less than $1,000 apiece. But at any rate, we
look forward to hearing your testimony, and I will see if Mr.
Young has any comments.

Opening Statement by Mr. Young

Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I want to
welcome the general to be here this morning.
Having the Marines able to move lightly and quickly, I
think, is extremely important. And probably we have seen in
Iraq the Marines have gotten a little heavier. And I know that
in some conversations and meetings, the case was made for a
faster, lighter vehicle that would be more secure and more
effective. So, General, we are just anxious to hear what you
have to tell us about that, because I think we all want to
provide whatever it is the Marine Corps needs to be an
effective fighting force, which the Marines have always been.
Mr. Murtha. General, summarize your statement. We will put
the full statement in the record, without objection.
General Flynn. I understand, sir.

Summary Statement of General Flynn

General Flynn. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Young and members
of the committee, it is an honor and a privilege to appear
before you today.
We share a common passion, and that is that all of us are
committed to providing the men and women in uniform the best
leadership, training, equipment, family support and quality of
life possible. With this in mind, I am prepared to discuss your
Marine Corps' ground equipment requirements today.
Our requirements are the results of detailed and a
disciplined process that is informed by several things: first
of, all our legislative roles and missions in Title 10; the
guidance we received from the Secretary of Defense; the
Commandant's guidance, to include the core competencies
contained in our recently published Vision and Strategy; the
combatant commanders' needs; and also requirements that are
generated from the bottom up by our warfighters. Additionally,
as the Nation's expeditionary force in readiness, we must also
consider the need for both amphibious and land-based
operations, and the requirement for a balance in capability
across the range of military operations that we are likely to
see so that we can gauge in everything from presence to crisis
response to conventional operations.
Our requirements must be able to respond to threats we see
today while guarding against surprise in the future. It is my
belief that our ground requirements reflect the balance that is
needed for the current threat and any potential threats in the
future by our Nation from your Marine Corps.
I thank the Committee for all their support, sir, and I am
ready to answer your questions, sir.
[The statement of General Flynn follows:]

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Remarks of Mr. Murtha

Mr. Murtha. There are a couple of programs that worry us.
Out in the field the troops are concerned about how heavy the
armor is; body armor I am talking about. And, of course, we
worry about the size and the weight of the vehicles, because
getting them to wherever we are going to go. But we are
fighting a war 8,000 miles away, so we have got to get the
equipment and the troops there. And the complaints I hear in
the field are the deployments over and over again and the fact
that the troops have what they consider equipment that is too
heavy. But this particular EFV, flat bottom, aluminum bottom,
worries us.
I know you took over the command, and you are going to give
us some guidelines, and we need some recommendations of how we
can follow research and development better. We have been remiss
ourselves in spending $4 billion. It seems to me we should have
caught this earlier, and I know you have revised it. I saw an
article where you turned the corner. But the problem is it
costs a lot of money to turn the corner for 600 vehicles which
will cost approximately $20 million apiece. So we have got some
real problems here, but working with you, we hope that we can
get this thing in the right direction.
And I mentioned to you earlier, let's look at alternatives.
For instance, most of this is not going to be spent in the
water; most of it is going to be spent on land. And that is why
the vulnerability is so important, and that is why I worry
about the flat bottom, aluminum bottom so much. But we know we
can work it out. I know when General Gray came here as a
Commandant, he said, just give us as much as you can, we will
work it out. Well, this program has gone a little bit more than
``as much as you can.''
Mr. Young.

PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATIONS

Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, one of the first questions that
comes to my mind is why are you able to reduce your requirement
for the EFV from over 1,000 vehicles to just under 600?
General Flynn. Congressman Young, the reason why we are
able to do that is because we have taken a comprehensive look
at our ground vehicle strategy, and what we have tried to do is
we tried to build a flexible strategy that just had about the
minimum amount of capability that we needed to do the
operations that we are expected to execute either today or in
the future. Key components of that strategy are the
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, the Up-Armored Humvees, the
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (EFV), the Marine Personnel
Carrier and also the Internal Transportable Vehicle. Those have
all been sized not so much to give you three Marine
Expeditionary Forces' (MEFs') worth of capability, but to give
you sufficient capability to respond to operations from the
various combatant commanders. And that is how we have been able
to do it. The EFV program has been reduced to provide us with
two brigades' worth of forcible entry lift, sir.
Mr. Young. Will the requirement be filled by other vehicles
that are either in development or that you are planning to
develop?
General Flynn. Yes, sir. The rest of the capabilities will
come from the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), which has
just started the technology demonstration phase, and that will
go on for about 24 to 27 months. We will continue to upgrade
our Humvees that we have right now, our Up-Armored Humvees, and
we will also take advantage of technology to try to make them
lighter along the way. There are some promising things out
there that we are looking at to make the vehicle lighter. We
are also looking, in conjunction with the Army, at an all-
terrain-type Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle,
and at the same time we are also increasing our capabilities.
Our Logistics Vehicle Systems (LVSs) are going to be replaced
by the logistics--a new variant of the logistics vehicle. And
we are also going to be upgrading some of our Medium Tactical
Vehicle Replacements (MTVRs) as well, sir.
So it is a holistic strategy that is designed to provide a
variety of capabilities at the right level, maybe not for every
MEF to have the same level, but a reservoir that we could do
balanced operations across a wide spectrum of operations, sir.
Mr. Young. General, let me go to the EFV. And I am
wondering, are you expecting too much out of that vehicle? I
understand that it is a flat-bottom aluminum hull that is
basically meant to bring the Marines onshore with the
possibility of bolting armor on the bottom of it once the
marines reach the beach. Is that practical?
General Flynn. Sir, this goes to the issue of having
balanced capability. One of the things as a sea-based force
that we have to be concerned with is our ability to also
operate from amphibious shipping. And one of the things that
General Conway has given me marching orders on is to find ways
to lighten the weight of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force. Part
of our ability to do that, we will be able to take a look at
what missions we are going to have to perform and be able to,
if you will, scale the armor on our vehicles based on the
threat and the operating area where these vehicles are likely
to operate. It is not meant for you to take an operational
pause in operations. There are a whole number of ways that we
protect our Marines as we accomplish our mission, and one of
those ways would not be to stop in the middle of operations to
bolt on your armor. But it is going to be a consideration in
your planning and in your load planning.
One of the things I am concerned about, sir, is the weight
of our vehicles and where we are going. We could become too
heavy to come from the sea. And everything we are seeing in the
future is that we are going to have to have that capability,
and we are going to have to look at technology, we are going to
have to look at science to tell us how to lighten that vehicle.
And one of the simple ways of doing it right now is having the
capability to bolt on and bolt off armor.
Mr. Young. General, explain to me--we have the Landing
Craft Air Cushion (LCAC), which is supposedly what I have--I
think we have all been on it, so we know that it moves quickly,
it is fast, it will come up over the beach. It will go inland
until there is some kind of a barrier that stops it. What is
the difference in the projected use of the EFV versus the LCAC?
General Flynn. Sir, the LCAC, first of all, unarmored
coming in. You then would have to land at the beach, stop,
offload your fighting vehicles. And in the face of an opposed
landing, you would be at a disadvantage there. So it is not
armored. And when we have looked at the operational constraints
on it, it really doesn't work for us.
The EFV, you know, hits the beach and continues fighting
inland. Again, the EFV is one tool in the kit. We are looking
at alternatives, as the Chairman suggested. We will continue to
look at alternatives to see what makes operational sense. But
our initial look at the LCAC option, sir, was that it was not
practical at this time, sir.
Mr. Young. The EFV would be carried in the same type of
ship that carries the LCAC?
General Flynn. Yes, sir. The EFV would be carried in an
amphibious ship, but then we would have to preload the
different spaces and the different load plans on the amphibious
ships, which you are very familiar with. It does change that
load plan significantly, sir. And it does change the
capability, our ability to build combat power ashore quickly,
sir. It does change the way that we do things. And based on our
initial operational look on it, it wasn't feasible with an
unarmored like LCAC. So right now we don't have an armored LCAC
under development, sir, but like I said, all options are being
looked at, sir.
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much. I look forward to
the rest of your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Bishop.

EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE (EFV)

Mr. Bishop. Sir, we have been tasked with looking very,
very, very closely at all of our weapons systems and
determining what, if any, are not the most efficient use of
taxpayers' dollars, while at the same time maintaining our
mission of the most effective weapons for our men and women who
are in harm's way. And, of course, it is very difficult, and it
is a tough job. Some tough decisions are going to have to be
made. And this particular project, the EFV, seems not to be
proving cost-effective based upon the amount of time, the
dollars and the effective outcomes.
Several liabilities have been demonstrated. Most prominent
to me is the fact that once it has landed, about to embark upon
a landing, it is 90 seconds of time when you have got marines
that are packed in with all of their equipment that they
actually are immobile and sitting ducks, and to the extent that
that exposes them, that is a problem.
You also have the difficulty in being able to justify
continuing to spend the dollars on this when right now it is
not meeting all of the expectations that we have.
And so my concern is why shouldn't we consider eliminating
or looking at cutting back on this particular weapons system?
How much is it costing us per year?
General Flynn. Sir, there are a number of questions that
you asked. As the EFV transitions from planning where it is
going about 25 to over 25 knots inshore, it has to transition
to get the track back down. It continues to move forward at
roughly the same speed that the current Amphibious Assault
Vehicle (AAV) does, and then it can engage to continue to come
ashore. So there isn't an operational pause.
Mr. Bishop. Don't you have to bolt on the armor?
General Flynn. No, sir. That would be a situational
dependent on the armor protection for the EFV. Right now the
underbelly protection on the EFV is the same as that of a
Stryker. So based on the mission that we would be using, the
protection of the EFV and that type of situation would come
from the speed of the EFV, and better tactics, better training
of our marines and procedures. There is protection in mobility
all by itself.
Mr. Bishop. Maybe I misunderstood. I thought that I
understood that the bottom of it was aluminum.
General Flynn. Yes, sir. It is a flat hull.
Mr. Bishop. It does not have sufficient strength or heavy
enough armor initially without the extra bolt that--bottom on
to withstand the Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and
certainly the Explosive Formed Projectiles (EFPs).
General Flynn. Again, the idea would be in your tactics to
avoid the IEDs and EFPs and be able to move forward. The EFV is
not designed to perform a role, say, that you see the MRAP
performing in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) right now. We will
not use it for that.
The other part of your question that you asked is why are
we doing multiple types of vehicles is because we are trying to
create a family of capabilities to have capabilities in a wide
range of environments.
On the performance of the program, sir, I can't justify the
previous performance of the program. When it went through its
recent certification in 2007, one of the things that came out
of that requirement was we came up with five knowledge points
where that the program has to perform. If at any point in one
of those five knowledge points it does not perform, you know,
they are called off-ramps for a reason. And we have those five
performance knowledge points right now. It just passed its
first knowledge point, and it is being monitored very closely,
as the Chairman mentioned, to make sure that we continue to do
that, sir.
Mr. Murtha. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Frelinghuysen.

WEIGHT OF EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE

Mr. Frelinghuysen. I am afraid many of our questions are
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle-centric here. First of all,
obviously the Marines are like a favored nation. We would like
to give you whatever punch you need. I was out to take a ride
in one of these vehicles about 3 years ago. I think it was then
Colonel Brogan, and now it is General Brogan. A lot of
enthusiasm.
How much does it weigh right now, the EFV?
General Flynn. Sir, I think the weight of the vehicle is
about 50 tons, I believe, sir.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. The weight concerns me just as a lay
person. It is remarkable that you could have something that
goes into the water, comes out and could be a land vehicle. You
put 17 Marines in the back of it; isn't that what the game plan
is?
General Flynn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. With all their gear, how much is that?
How much weight does that add to it?
General Flynn. Sir, every combat Marine carries about 100
pounds of gear, 80 to 100 pounds.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. A lot of gear.
The issue here, if you have bad weather, I mean, we were
out there, and I am sure they wouldn't have taken us out unless
the weather was fairly mild. I mean, I wondered whether we
would ever come up--I won't say for air, but it wasn't rough
seas, and, you know, there is a lot of weight in that vehicle.
If we are 50 or 60 miles offshore, let's say off Korea
somewhere, you know, who has done the homework in terms of its,
let's say, survivability in bad weather? Can you talk a little
bit about that?
General Flynn. Sir, all of the----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I think it is a neat idea, and I am
supportive of it, but I am concerned about the weight and, you
know, just the view of maybe this could be sort of a sitting
duck out there.
General Flynn. Sir, the vehicle has the survivability to
launch from over the horizon and to get safely to the shore. We
have plenty of experience doing amphibious operations and
launching even----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. The history of the Marines in terms of
amphibious, I think, is remarkable. But, I mean, with this new
fighting vehicle, 50 miles from shore in bad weather----
General Flynn. Sir, those are the considerations that an
operational commander would have to take into account on the
timing of the operation. They have existed forever, and they
will continue to exist. And that is one of the things that
commanders decide is what risk they can take. But the vehicle
is capable to launch from over the horizon and to get safely
ashore, sir. There is no doubt in my mind about that
capability, sir.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Hinchey.

JOINT LIGHT TACTICAL VEHICLE (JLTV)

Mr. Hinchey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you very much. I am sorry I got here a
little bit late. I wasn't able to hear the things that you
opened up with.
I was wondering, however, about the situation in
Afghanistan, which is likely to be different than the situation
in Iraq, and the fact that the President is moving 17,000
additional troops over there, particularly marines. And I am
wondering whether about the JLTV, this new vehicle, and how
likely that is to be useful, perhaps more useful than other
vehicles, particularly in the circumstances that we have to
deal with in Afghanistan. And I was wondering what you might
think about that and if it is something that we should focus
attention on, what we might do successfully to move it forward
as quickly and effectively as possible.
General Flynn. Sir, we are excited about the JLTV within
the Marine Corps. For all the reasons that some of the Members
have already said, we would like to get lighter. And we see in
the JLTV the possibility based on what we think is possible
with technology to get a vehicle that is more mobile and is
lighter.
One of the things that attracts us to why we are trying to
keep the JLTV within weight parameters is we want it to be
helicopter transportable with the ability of--to be able to go
where the enemy may not think you are capable of going. Plus
the ability of a lighter vehicle allows us more flexibility on
being able to load on ship, and also there is a degree of
mobility that comes on the ground by just being lighter and
having the ability to go into areas where we may not have the
right trafficability.
So the current status of the program is it has just started
its technology demonstration phase. I think there are three
variants that are being done by three different companies. And
what we are doing is we are going to see what comes out of that
technology demonstration phase, sir, and our key thing that we
are pushing for is we need the vehicle to remain light. And we
need it to be mobile both on the ground and also transportable
from the sea and from the air.
Mr. Hinchey. I have been spoken to by some company that is
in the process of developing a security material which is much
lighter, but apparently much stronger, to surface around the
bottom or elsewhere on vehicles like this. It is amazingly
light, but very, very strong. Is that something that makes
sense particularly for the LTV?
General Flynn. Sir, any material that is a leap ahead in
technology that makes us lighter is something that we would be
interested in. And we are seeing a lot of things that come out
of science to offer potential to be lighter and at the same
time get the same level of protection.
Mr. Hinchey. So this is something that is getting attention
and----
General Flynn. Yes, sir. We are always looking at new
materials through our research labs, and our R&D efforts are to
get lighter.
Mr. Hinchey. General, thank you very much.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Kingston.

ACQUISITION LESSONS

Mr. Kingston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I wanted to talk to you about the MRAPs, and we
had recently heard from the inspector general's report on--
basically it was Defense-wide procurement problems. But he had
focused in on the Marine Corps and the MRAP purchasing and just
kind of bouncing around said that contracting officers,
officials used inappropriate contract approaches, ignored
acquisition regulations, used ineffective pricing tools
resulting in prices that could not have been determined to be
fair or reasonable. The Marines did not use the Truth in
Negotiations Act to obtain costs or pricing data to ensure fair
and reasonable price, thus concluding that the contracting
officials did not adequately evaluate prices during the source
selection, resulting in the Marine Corps having no assurances
that prices paid were fair and reasonable, and likely paid more
than it should have for the vehicles. The IG estimated that for
one contractor, there was about $45 million in lost potential
savings because of the failure to obtain volume discounts. I am
sure you are familiar with that.
But those are some of the things that we had from that
hearing. And I was wondering, first of all, it is just so
disappointing to think that that would happen. So I would like
to know, how did it happen, in your estimation? And then, what
are you doing about it? And, you know, I mean, I have been in
Washington for a while, and government agencies are always
telling you what they are going to do about something. And if
what they are going to do about things were all done, then none
of these testimonies would have happened.
So I guess my bigger question is I would rather look back
than hear the forward, because I have heard the forward so many
times. And as Mr. Frelinghuysen says, everybody in this
Committee is very, very pro-Marine. So it is even a little bit
more disappointing to think that this would happen to you guys.
But it certainly did happen, and, in my opinion, it was a very
scathing report. So tell me your side of the story. And I will
yield.
General Flynn. Sir, I am not a procurement specialist. I am
the requirements guy. And I have read the report. And I will
tell you this: The MRAP, we were the lead. The Marine Corps was
the lead procurement agency for the entire Department of
Defense. And what we were trying to do was in a very short
period of time meet the needs of the warfighter, both Soldiers
and Marines and Sailors and Airmen, on the ground in Iraq. We
went out to, I think, initially 10 companies and asked them to
provide prototypes that were immediately thrust into testing,
and we went and got best of breed. And based on who could
produce what, contracts were awarded.
I am not taking exception to the report, sir. There is some
disagreement that I could give you additional information for
the record as to what we agree with and what we don't agree
with in the report. But one of the things with an IG report,
there are always lessons learned, sir. This was a unique
procurement program that did deliver, I think, in almost record
period of time. And there are lessons to be learned from that,
and we have taken those lessons to heart, and you will see that
we will apply those lessons to future activities.
But this was, I very much believe, a unique effort, sir,
that did deliver capability pretty quick. And could it have
been done better, sir? I am not going to argue with that. It
could have. But we have learned from that, sir, and we will
make it better in the future.
Mr. Kingston. The IG report did say that you did do
everything very, very quickly, which was maybe the first call-
in on this, and perhaps some of the dollars that were lost were
made up for in lives that were saved, because I know that we in
Washington were very excited about MRAPs, and everybody was
pushing for them.
General Flynn. As you know, sir, there were many models and
many companies to produce that, and there was the ability to
get the industrial base to produce as many vehicles and three
different variants of those vehicles as quickly as possible,
sir.
Mr. Kingston. Well, thank you, General.
[Clerk's note.--Information provided to Mr. Kingston.]

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Mr. Murtha. Ms. Kilpatrick.

READINESS

Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, it is good to see you again. Thank you for your
help in getting me ready for understanding what we do here.
I noticed by your testimony, you are calling it the Marine
Corps ground equipment. My question, having heard some of my
illustrious colleagues talk to you about the readiness of our
Marine Corps--and I like the multitype vehicles that you use.
EFV is what I have been reading about the last few hours, 24
hours or so. Two questions: Is the Marine Corps ground
equipment ready, capable, up to par as we move into this new
conflict? And not new, but Afghanistan, as we are moving out of
Iraq into Afghanistan? Is the multitype vehicles, including the
EFV and the--I was in Stryker, by the way. I went to see
Stryker in Michigan a couple weeks ago and was there and
found--you mentioned it this morning in terms of part of this
multifleet that you have. How does it compare to the EFV? And
are we ready in general as we move forward out of Iraq into
Afghanistan with this terrain and all that goes with that?
General Flynn. Ma'am, one of the things that we are doing
based on the support over the years that we have received from
the committee is we have been resetting the force. We have been
recapitalizing our equipment. Right now what we are doing is we
have our feet in two canoes almost. And what we are doing is we
are preparing the equipment that is coming out of Iraq, and we
are taking equipment out of storage in the United States and
sending that to Afghanistan. And then we will take the
equipment from Iraq and put it through our maintenance depots,
and we will also do some triage on the equipment when it is
coming out of theater. So we have a pretty detailed, solid plan
to make sure that we maintain readiness through this transition
and to also reset the force where possible.
Basic difference between an EFV and a Stryker is one is a
track vehicle designed to be able to also swim in from 25 to 40
miles off the coast. Stryker is a wheeled vehicle, and it
doesn't have that capability. They have similar capabilities in
terms of mobility. But again, we are looking for both type
vehicles in our inventory. We are looking for the EFV, and we
are also looking for a Marine Personnel Carrier, one of the
vehicles that has a lot of similar characteristics to what a
Stryker has.
Ms. Kilpatrick. And will we meet this kind of R&D for the
EFV? I mean, are we going to make it? I know they are back end.
General Flynn. Ma'am, right now what has happened with the
EFV, it has gone through its first knowledge point right now a
couple of months ago, and it performed better than the
requirement. We were looking for 43.5 hours between failures
and we predict 61 hours. We have other knowledge points coming
up that are required for the program to meet. At the same time,
components now are actually undergoing testing now, heat,
vibration testings, to make sure that when we put the
prototypes together, that we are not going to be surprised by
any issues with components. So we have the message of the
importance of monitoring the performance of the program while
it goes through this critical phase.
Ms. Kilpatrick. And then finally, Lima, Ohio, is where you
make the EFV. You also make the Stryker there. I am from
Michigan. We are hurting bad. When you get it right, we want
you to also make it in Michigan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MARINE HELICOPTER

Mr. Murtha. Well, I appreciate the indulgence of the
Committee. As I said, I wanted to be out of here as soon as we
could today.
But let me just caution General Flynn, I went out to visit
the armed helicopter last year, and when I came back, I sent
the staff out, and we cut it in half. Even though we have a
member of the Committee that is from that area, we felt it
couldn't carry the weight. It was already excessive weight for
the engine. They paid no attention to what I said. The Army
agreed with me, and we eliminated the program.
Helicopter One. Long before anybody else said anything,
this Committee said, we cut $200 million. We are not going to
spend that kind of money, the requirements the Secret Service
put on that helicopter. And so we cut $200 million out of that
program.
This program is on the bubble as far as I am concerned,
General. I mean, this program, we spent $4 billion. And I am
prepared to recommend to the subcommittee that we continue the
program with your assurance that you are going to give us some
responsible recommendations about what is happening and
guidelines about what is happening as it goes down the road.
And you are going to look at alternatives. And this is so
important, the alternatives to this vehicle. You know, $4
billion we spent. The rest of the money we spend--if we have
spent it, it would be $20 million per vehicle. I think some
changes need to be made in it. And on the other hand, you are
the guy that is going to run the program. You are going to make
the requirements.
But I have a great concern about this program going
forward. I know the Commandant personally is taking an interest
in it, and that reassures me that we will be able to recommend
that it go forward and spend a little more research money this
year as you give us quarterly reports about how the program is
going. So I appreciate your indulgence and look forward to
trying to work out these programs with you for the rest of the
year.
Any questions, Bill?

INTERNALLY TRANSPORTABLE VEHICLE

Mr. Young. I guess I have one quick question. On the
Internally Transportable Vehicle (ITV), General, the overcost
has been very, very substantial. Can you tell us why?
General Flynn. Sir, I would like to answer that question
for the record for you if I could, sir. I couldn't give you
that answer right now, sir.
Mr. Young. Okay.
General Flynn. And I would like to answer it for the record
for you, sir, to make sure I have it correct.
Mr. Young. Okay. The reason I asked the question, the
average cost for the ITV has risen from $94,000 to $209,000 for
the vehicle, and if you add the mobile ammunition trailer, it
has risen from $579,000 to over $1 million. So this gets my
attention. So if you could provide us some information on that,
I would appreciate it. Thank you.
General Flynn. Sir, I will, sir. Thank you.
[The information follows:]

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Mr. Murtha. Ms. Kaptur, we are trying to adjourn the
Committee.
Ms. Kaptur. Go right ahead, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Visclosky, unless you have some questions,
we are going to adjourn the Committee.
Mr. Visclosky. I am fine, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Thank you very much. The Committee will adjourn
until tomorrow at 10 a.m. Thank you very much.
General Flynn. Thank you, sir.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the
answers thereto follow:]

Contracting MRAPs

Question. Congress has appropriated over $22 billion for
procurement of MRAPs DoD-wide. These funds were made available to
respond to a critical need--and did so.
However, a Department of Defense Inspector General report, (dated
26 Feb 2009) states that contracting officials used inappropriate
contracting approaches, ignored acquisition regulations, or used
ineffective pricing tools resulting in prices that could not always be
determined to be fair and reasonable.
The IG did compliment the Marine Corps because they took effective
actions to accelerate delivery of MRAP vehicles and addressed material
shortfalls. In addition, the Army and Marine Corps developed MRAP
requirements based on theatre commander assessments.
The IG report on the Procurement and Delivery of Joint Service
Armor Protected Vehicles, found that the Marine Corps Systems Command
did not properly determine that contract prices were fair and
reasonable when they awarded nine firm fixed price contracts for Mine
Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. As of June 30, 2008, the
contracts were valued at $9.1 billion. Contracting officials relied on
competition as the basis for price reasonableness even though the
awards were made for dissimilar vehicles with a wide range of prices.
Generals, is this true? Were common procurement practices vitiated
in order to speed the process?
Answer. While expediency is a hallmark trait of the MRAP program,
all necessary procurement and acquisition procedures were considered
and utilized. The mode for achieving the speed and effectiveness of
placing MRAPs in the hands of the warfighter was to run many processes
in a compressed and simultaneous manner. At no point did we ever
consider that our approaches made any of the steps ineffective or
invalidated in any manner the required federal, DoD, and service-unique
acquisition regulations and policies.
Question. If so, have your services done an analysis of cost
savings that might have been realized? For example, for Category I
vehicles, the prices ranged from $306,000 to $1,089,000. The current
lead contracting officer could not explain how the price and evaluation
team concluded that prices were fair and reasonable.
Answer. We believe the price range in the DoD IG report on page 25
is misleading. In January 2007, nine vendor proposals demonstrated
potential to meet the program's overarching objective, which was to
field the maximum number of survivable, safe, sustainable MRAP vehicles
in the shortest period of time. Contracts were awarded to each vendor
to deliver two CAT I and two CAT II vehicles for initial test and
evaluation. We believed from the onset that ``some'' of the vehicles
may not pass production verification and survivability tests, but we
could not tell that definitively from the paper proposals. For that
reason, it was decided that leaving any high potential producer that
``could possibly'' manufacture a survivable vehicle on the sidelines
was an unacceptable risk when the Joint Forces had an urgent need for
these vehicles.
Of the nine vendors, Oshkosh Truck (OTC), at $306,199, was the
least expensive, but failed Limited User Evaluation (LUE); General
Purpose Vehicles (GPV) was the most expensive at more than $1 million
per vehicle, but was terminated for convenience because the company
failed to deliver any test vehicles. GPV's paper proposal offered an
enhanced maneuverability and mobility solution (the only vendor to
offer this capability). GPV's contract award was terminated, and the
entire $5.1 million was de-obligated. The unit prices on page 25 of the
report reflect unit pricing for a procurement order quantity of 1 to
200 vehicles. Approximately 95% of the MRAP vehicles actually procured
were purchased at higher step ladder quantity pricing where unit price
ranges did not range so greatly among the vendors.
Question. According to the IG, ``For $1.2 billion of non-vehicle
items, (the IG) found no corresponding independent government cost
estimates for evaluation. The Marine Corps also did not obtain volume
pricing discounts from two contractors for orders in excess of 1,500
vehicles.'' Can you respond to this?
Answer. We believe that MCSC netted actual savings of $127 million
by negotiating bilateral contract modifications to produce more than
the 1,500 vehicles that were originally contracted for in the base
year. We purchased those vehicles at base-year price rather than
option-year pricing. The difference between ordering at base-year
rather and option-year pricing of 4,186 vehicles was $127 million. We
understand the approach suggested by DoD IG. The DoD IG method suggests
potential savings of $45.6 million by using volume discounts. We do not
believe we would have received both discounts. We believe our method
was a better investment for the government, as reflected in net actual
savings of $127 million versus a hypothetical savings of $45.6 million.
Question. General, have actions been taken to identify why this
happened, who is responsible, and how to preclude this from happening
in the future?
Answer. The Marine Corps has incorporated the DoD IG report
recommendation that future procurements for MRAP vehicles are properly
competed or justified on a sole-source basis. Our acquisition
strategies included this consideration for the MRAP II and sole-source
award of MRAP CAT III procurements. MRAP-All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV)
prices for each part of the competition will be negotiated separately.
MCSC has communicated to its contracting officials the importance
of making price reasonableness determinations and ensuring cost or
pricing data are requested. MCSC is building a framework for the price
reasonableness determination that will be used for the M-ATV
procurement. This procurement, though part of the overall Joint MRAP
Vehicle Program, is being conducted by the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive
and Armaments Command (TACOM).
We have attempted to build sufficient flexibility into the
production contract to deal with both planned and potential quantities.
We also sought both step and cumulative quantity discounts as part of
the Request for Proposals for the M-ATV procurement. An OSD Peer Review
was conducted before the request for proposal (RFP) release, and a
second Peer Review is being conducted during M-ATV source selection.

Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)

Question. Since the initiation of the JLTV program, the military
departments have procured over 16,000 Mine Resistant, Ambush Protected
(MRAP) vehicles. Now, the MRAP Joint Program office is in the process
of procuring 400 light variants of the MRAP for duty in Afghanistan,
and a more mobile MRAP All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) is being considered.
Still, the JLTV program--a quite similar vehicle, is still under
development.
Given the similar requirement and specifications for the M-ATV and
the JLTV--combined with the immediate need for mine resistant protected
vehicles in Afghanistan, is it necessary for BOTH of these programs to
continue?
Answer. The M-ATV program will rapidly procure, in 2009-10,
vehicles to meet the combatant commander's immediate requirement to
overcome the mobility deficiency of previous versions of MRAP in
Afghanistan and to provide a more robustly armored vehicle than the Up-
armored HMMWVs. The narrow set of requirements that define M-ATV are
focused on armor protection and increased off-road mobility in the
Afghanistan terrain. The requirements do not take into account
limitations posed by shipboard or tactical aviation transportability
requirements. The requirements that define the Joint Light Tactical
Vehicle (JLTV) program are heavily influenced by lessons learned from
the MRAP program. The JLTV program is currently in the technology
development phase of the acquisition process where vehicle prototypes
and requirements will be evaluated, assessed and adjusted for the
purpose of controlling risk and unneeded cost growth. Unlike the narrow
focus of the MRAP program, JLTV seeks to achieve an appropriate balance
of protection, payload, and performance (mobility and transportability)
to support Joint warfighter requirements across the range of military
operations and in a wider variety of operational environments and
terrain.
Question. Could you describe where each of these programs are in
terms of development?
Answer. JLTV--The Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) approved the
Milestone A Decision in December 2007. A Request for Proposals was
released in February 2008 and three contracts were awarded in October
2008 to Lockheed Martin/BAE, GTV (Joint Venture between GDLS & AMG) and
BAE/International Navistar, which was followed by protests submitted to
the GAO on behalf of Northrop Grumman and Textron. The protests were
recently denied and the program started the 27 month TD Phase in March
09. TD phase results will inform and support finalization of the
Capabilities Development Document (CDD).
M-ATV--A non-developmental item (NDI) solution for the M-ATV is
sought in response to a U.S. Central Command Joint Urgent Operational
Needs Statement (JUONS). After a first round of armor, ballistic and
mobility testing, the Government awarded five indefinite delivery
indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts Thursday, 30 April 09 for three
additional production representative vehicles. These 15 vehicles are
now at Aberdeen for additional mobility and ballistic testing and all
other evaluation. The Government anticipates down-selecting to one
offeror for production delivery orders, but may not limit itself to one
vendor. A production contract may occur by the end of June 2009.
Question. Do you think it is feasible to combine this effort to
produce one good machine? If so, what would that cost in terms of time?
Answer. No. M-ATV is an immediate solution to address concerns
about protection and off-road mobility for the emerging theater
requirements. JLTV is intended to be a long term solution that balances
the ``Iron Triangle'' of protection, performance, and payload, while
maintaining expeditionary transportability. While M-ATV will provide
protection and limited mobility, it trades expeditionary
transportability and provides limited payload.

EFV Program Necessity

Question. Granted, there are scenarios that would justify any
program, but given the fact that the U.S. has not conducted a beach
assault landing in 59 years, is it possible that the EFV is no longer
necessary?
Answer. The Marine Corps has conducted more than 100 amphibious
operations in the last 25 years; operations such as Liberia, Somalia,
Grenada and the amphibious demonstration during Desert Storm which tied
up numerous Iraqi divisions during the liberation of Kuwait. EFV will
provide the necessary capabilities to meet the security challenges
across the quadrants of conflict (Irregular, Traditional, Catastrophic
and Disruptive) not available in any other platform. EFV remains
crucial to Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare and Ship-to-Objective
Maneuver, important concepts in today's anti-access environment. Anti-
ship cruise missile lethality was demonstrated when Hezbollah struck an
Israeli warship during the Lebanon crisis in 2006; we need to keep
ships over the horizon. A surface amphibious assault platform that
self-deploys from a ship at high speed provides the joint commander
mass combat power ashore. Keeping amphibious ships 25 nautical miles
from the beach reduces the threat from cruise missiles and mines. The
Joint Requirements Oversight Council validated the characteristics for
effective amphibious assault. The EFV uniquely provides such essential
characteristics.
Question. It has been suggested that the fleet might need to
operate at least 100 miles from shore--beyond EFV's range. What is the
possibility of this occurrence?
Answer. All of the current planning and doctrine projects that the
Navy will be able to maneuver within 25 nautical miles, a distance that
allows it to react and respond to a potential missile threat. A surface
amphibious assault platform that self-deploys from a ship at high speed
provides the joint commander the ability to mass combat power ashore.
Keeping amphibious ships 25 nautical miles from the beach reduces the
threat from cruise missiles and mines. The Joint Requirements Oversight
Council validated the characteristics for effective amphibious assault.
Question. Are we to the point where we debate whether or not this
program should go forward?
Answer. We are extremely confident that the EFV program is on the
right track to produce a very effective combat vehicle, one that is
vital to the Corps' ability to conduct ship to objective operations.
The EFV was certified to Congress in June 2007 (following a Nunn-
McCurdy Breach) as:
-- Essential to national security.
-- No alternative will provide equal or greater capability at less
cost.
-- New cost estimates are reasonable.
-- Management structure for program is adequate to manage program
and costs.
During the Nunn-McCurdy certification process (2007) an IPT
concurred with earlier AoA findings and indicated there are no
alternatives to the (Fix EFV) alternative which will provide equal or
greater military capability at less cost.
-- A key takeaway is that initiating a (New Start) would increase
operational risk due to later deliveries (nearly 5 years), and pursuing
the (Upgrade AAV) alternative, while entailing lower costs, would
provide less military capability due to the slow speed of the AAV.

Cost/Benefit of EFV Development Program

Question. Exactly how much have we spent in research and
development costs for this program?
Answer. The following is a break-out of RDT&E costs:

RDT&E

-- Program Value at Recertification (OSD-09)--$3,304.7
-- Expended To Date--$2,291.5
Question. What are the projected development costs to complete this
program?
Answer. The costs to complete SDD-2 are approximately $728M.
Question. Have any studies been undertaken to determine the cost of
a redesign that would take into consideration a more resistant shaped
hull?
Answer. The safety and survivability of our Marines is paramount to
our mission success. An EFV Mine Protection feasibility study was
completed in late 2007 along with a study from The Center for Naval
Analyses (CNA) which assessed external V-Hull, Internal V-Hull and
applique configurations for survivability and performance impacts. The
CNA study concluded that the applique configuration provides increased
mine blast protection with minimum performance impacts. While
restricted to a flat-bottomed hull by the design requirements of a
high-speed tracked amphibian, the underbelly survivability design of
the EFV has taken a critical approach to integrate proven survivability
attributes. A Level ``A'' kit matches or exceeds the upgraded
underbelly protection offered to the LAV-25/LAV III and Stryker by
their survivability kits, and the Level ``B'' kit matches or exceeds
the upgraded protection offered by the Bradley M2/M3 (BUSK) upgrade
kit.
Question. Because of costs, the Marine Corps has reduced the
previously planned number of units by one-half. This program is far
from over. Do you think that number will be reduced again?
Answer. The Marine Corps did not reduce the program due to cost per
vehicle but rather as a result of a self-assessment of the future
battle field and the need for a better mix of vehicles to overcome
future threats. In early 2007, The Defense Department's Strategic
Planning Guidance (SPG) directed the Marine Corps to look at its entire
mix of vehicles for providing mobility across the spectrum of conflict.
The Marine Corps has proposed reducing its requirement from 1,013 EFVs
to 573 in order to procure larger quantities of other vehicles and
provide protected ground mobility to the greatest possible portion of
the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). By accepting risk in
strategic flexibility (prepositioning), and reinvesting resources to
enhance irregular warfare mobility capabilities, the Marine Corps will
field a balanced vehicle fleet to support all assigned missions. In
some ways the Marine Corps conducted its own QDR to better position
itself as the nation's force of choice.

EFV's Resistance to Land Mines and IEDs

Question. According to the EFV website: The EFV design mitigates
the damage caused by IED and RPG threats similar to those encountered
by US forces in Iraq. How is that possible given the flat bottom
design?
Answer. The safety and survivability of our Marines is paramount to
our mission success. While restricted to a flat-bottomed hull by the
design requirements of a high-speed tracked amphibian, the underbelly
survivability design of the EFV has taken a critical approach to
integrate proven survivability attributes. A study conducted by Center
for Naval Analyses (CNA) concluded that current bolt on applique
configuration provides increased mine blast protection with minimum
performance impacts. A Level ``A'' kit matches or exceeds the upgraded
underbelly protection offered to the LAV-25/LAV III and Stryker by
their survivability kits, and the Level ``B'' kit matches or exceeds
the upgraded protection offered by the Bradley M2/M3 (BUSK) upgrade
kit. Additionally, the EFV is equipped with specifically designed blast
shock absorbing seats for the crew and the embarked infantry and staff
which provide protection from mine blast shock.
Question. Your plan proposes that once ashore, armor could be
applied to the underside of the EFV. Initially, how will armor get to a
beach landing and secondly, who is going to stop, crawl under that 16,,
clearance and bolt on armor while being fired upon? Is this a realistic
scenario?
Answer. The maneuver and lethality of the EFV will allow the
combatant commander to conduct continuing operations through the
initial phases of an operation. The bolt on of additional armor would
not take place until the security environment allowed it and at a
location that is equipped for the support (i.e. a rear logistics
operating base with appropriate support).
Question. Would a V-shaped V-Hull force a total redesign of the
EFV?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If the EFV fails its second Systems Development and
Demonstration (SDD), would it not be difficult to justify a third SDD
phase?
Answer. There are various review and oversight processes in place
which will monitor the progress of the program, as required by the EFV
Nunn McCurdy Certification restructure. In addition to these reviews
and oversight opportunities, the program has established ``Knowledge
Points'' which will help ensure that the program stays on course to
successfully meet its reliability requirement.
-- The first such Knowledge Point (KP-1) was successfully completed
in December 2008 as the EFV program successfully released a Critical
Design Review (CDR) during a capstone event that assessed the EFV
design as mature with a predicted reliability estimate of sixty-one
(61) hours Mean Time Between Operational Mission Failure (MTBOMF)
greatly exceeding the exit criteria of forty-three point five (43.5)
hours.
Remaining Knowledge Points to occur in FY11/FY12&FY13 are:
-- KP-2 New Demonstrated Reliability after redesign (22-27 hour
MTBOMF)
-- KP-3 New Projected Reliability after reliability growth mods (on
curve)
-- KP-4 New Demonstrated Reliability after reliability growth mods
(on curve)
-- KP-5 New Projected Reliability Meets KPP Requirement

The Acquisition Program/Ambitious Schedule

Question. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) alleges that:
``The program did not allow enough time to demonstrate maturity of the
EFV design during Systems Development and Demonstration (SDD). The
original SDD schedule of about three years proved too short to conduct
all necessary planning and to incorporate the results of tests into
design changes. Specifically, the original schedule did not allow
adequate time for testing, evaluating the results, problems, and
retesting to make certain that problems are fixed before moving
forward.'' Have these problems been addressed?
Answer. The failure of the initial System Development and
Demonstration phase (SDD) prototypes to demonstrate acceptable
reliability during 2006 Operational Analysis (OA) was the primary
reason the program was restructured in 2007. A focused Design For
Reliability (DFR) effort ensued where best practices in reliability
engineering, including the utilization of an Industry Standard software
suite, and robust Systems Engineering processes were instituted to
improve the EFV's design and performance. At the culmination of the DFR
effort, System Critical Design Review (CDR), the EFV design is
predicted to have a reliability of 61 hours mean time between
operational mission failure (MTBOMF), which exceeds the reliability
growth curve threshold allocation of 43.5 hours established for the CDR
during the program restructure.
Question. Do you see improvements in the program that will allow it
to move forward in an efficient manner?
Answer. The EFV program successfully passed a Defense Acquisition
Board Review following the Preliminary Design Review in Feb 2008. USD
(AT&L) approved the award of the SDD-2 contract for the construction of
seven EFV prototypes to be manufactured at the Joint Services
Manufacturing Center in Lima, Ohio. The first new EFV prototype is
expected to roll off the assembly line in March 2010.
The EFV program held a successful Critical Design Review (CDR) in
December 2008 which assessed the EFV design as mature with a predicted
reliability estimate of sixty-one (61) hours Mean Time Between
Operational Mission Failures (MTBOMF) greatly exceeding the exit
criteria of forty-three point five (43.5) hours.
Question. The EFV Approval was granted for the purchase of seven
more EFV prototypes--because the originals were worn out. The vehicles
have incurred a 168 percent per-vehicle cost increase, and the Marines
will now procure only half as many (573) as originally planned.
Combined with the need to purchase even more prototypes, and the cost
growth, both factors appear to be excessive. Can you elaborate on why
both situations have occurred?
Answer. In early 2007, The Defense Department's Strategic Planning
Guidance (SPG) directed the Marine Corps to look at its entire mix of
vehicles for providing mobility across the spectrum of conflict. The
Marine Corps has proposed reducing its requirement from of 1,013 EFVs
to 573 in order to procure larger quantities of other vehicles and
provide protected ground mobility to the greatest possible portion of
the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The current SDD prototype
vehicles have been vigorously tested and have now reached the wear and
tear equivalent of a 20-year service life which is adversely impacting
the ability to distinguish inherent vehicle reliability performance
from age-induced failures. In order to continue to grow reliability,
new test assets are necessary to verify new design changes.

EFV Transformation From Sea to Land Mode

Question. Is the EFV not a sitting duck while waiting to transform
to a shore mode?
Answer. Under the Ship to objective maneuver (STOM) concept, there
is no operational pause at the beach. Although the EFV must reduce its
operational speed during transition from sea to shore it does not come
to a stop but rather it can maintain speeds in excess of 5 knots. The
EFV seamlessly transports Marines from ships located beyond the horizon
to inland objectives without a pause in movement.
Question. Are there efforts to enhance this transformation time--or
eliminate it altogether by making the transformation on-the-move?
Answer. The EFV can transition on the move from high water speed of
25 kts to land mobility. Although the EFV must reduce its operational
speed during transition from sea to shore it does not come to a stop
but rather it can maintain speeds in excess of 5 knots that is
Equivalent to or better than the legacy Assault Amphibious Vehicle.

EFV Design

Question. General, have you seen the interior of an EFV?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Wouldn't you find it difficult to fit a Marine, and all
his equipment on either side of the engine, and then the remaining crew
in the passenger compartment?
Answer. Each Marine has an individual seat that has been
ergometrically designed. Testing has demonstrated that not only can the
EFV carry 17 combat-equipped Marines but it does so in a way that makes
them a more effective fighting force at the objective. When compared to
the current AAV, Marines who spent three hours inside each vehicle
performed much better in accomplishing various combat tasks following
their ride on an EFV.

Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC)

Question. General, other than financial constraints, the Committee
understands that the Marine Corps believes that a shift to the right
could better synchronize it with fielding of the EFV. We've discussed
EFVs. Is this the ``real'' reason?
Answer. The Marine Corps announced in May 2008 it was deferring
Milestone A (MS A) for the MPC program to the FY10 time-frame to allow
the Marine Corps to effectively prioritize near-term investment
decisions, in order to provide a synchronized mobility strategy with
respect to the capabilities MPC, the EFV and JLTV offer for the future.
Question. General Flynn, General Brogan, also in the room with us
today, said, ``The Marine Corps wants that vehicle, (referring to the
MPC) the requirement is definitely there.'' General, what amount of
time is reasonable for Congress to extend such programs?
Answer. The two-year investment period will allow for the
maturation of Government Furnished Equipment and armoring technologies
the Marine Corps plans to integrate onto the vehicles once produced. In
addition, an MPC Technology Demonstration effort has been initiated to
inform CDD development on achievable capabilities and integration
risks.
Question. Also, it is the understanding of the Committee that, in
the interim, the Marines will continue to use MRAP vehicles and older
assault amphibious vehicles. Realizing that the Marine Corps did an
analysis of alternatives over a year ago, and considering the research
and development costs, and by your own admission, the MPC was ``out-
prioritized in . . . terms of budget,'' did the Marine Corps consider
the Army's Interim Armored Vehicle, the Stryker, a vehicle with very
similar requirements?
Answer. The MPC AOA identified a medium armored personnel carrier
as the solution to the MPC requirement. The initial Analysis of
Alternatives (AoA) included Stryker ``legacy'' but it did not meet the
MPC requirements.
When the Army was moving toward a Stryker upgrade we saw an
opportunity to collaborate on a joint material solution. Since that
time, we understand that the Army has limited their Stryker work to
product improvement on same basic Stryker chassis, thus limiting the
scope of Stryker improvements. For the record however, it's fair to say
Stryker will necessarily be considered in its current and Product
Improvement Program (PIP) configuration as we update the AOA in the
future.
The MPC program office is closely monitoring Stryker MOD and that
it could likely compete as a MPC candidate.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.]
Wednesday, March 11, 2009.

SOLDIER EQUIPMENT, ERGONOMICS AND INJURIES

WITNESSES

GENERAL PETER W. CHIARELLI, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY
GENERAL JAMES F. AMOS, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

Introduction

Ms. Kaptur [presiding.] The Committee will be in order. We
would ask our special guests to take their place.
I want to welcome everyone this morning. Today our
Committee will hold a hearing on the causes and possibly some
solution for the injuries suffered by our soldiers and marines
due to the very heavy equipment loads carried by our infantry.
We are pleased to welcome General Peter W. Chiarelli, the
Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, and General James F. Amos, the
Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. Thank you, gentlemen,
so very much. These two gentlemen are well qualified to address
the problems and some potential solutions to how we, simply
put, are breaking down our soldiers and Marines. Thank you both
for being here and for your many years of service to our
Nation.
General Chiarelli, you have stated that the Army has over
20,000 soldiers in a nondeployable status, many of them
nondeployable due to injuries received by carrying a very heavy
combat load over rugged terrain for an extended period. The
load that our soldiers and Marines carry over extended
distances, over rough terrain, and often at high altitudes
frequently exceeds 100 pounds. Body armor alone can weigh 30
pounds. The personal weapon, ammunition, water, possibly a
radio, spare batteries, all add to the load that must be
carried.
The Committee is looking forward to your statements and
answers to our questions on how we can provide better load-
carrying devices, how we can take some gear out of the
rucksack, possibly by more frequent and more forward resupply,
and how we can make gear lighter while still achieving the
desired capabilities.
Before we turn to the opening statements from our
witnesses, I would like to recognize the distinguished Ranking
Member of our Committee on Defense Mr. Young for any remarks
that he might have. Thank you so much, Bill.
Mr. Young. Madam Chairman, thank you very much. And I want
to share in the welcome, your welcome, to the two very
distinguished military leaders.
The men and women who serve in our uniform are the best
part of our national defense. All of the technology in the
world isn't going to work right without the right people
handling it. This subcommittee has a very, very strong feeling
toward anyone who serves in our military.
The interesting subject today talking about lightening the
load is a good idea, because I have seen some of the soldiers
in the field trying to handle those 100-pound and more loads of
equipment, weapons, whatever. And that is a pretty tough load
to begin with, let alone when you get up to an altitude up to
10,000 feet or more, which is some of the Afghan territory. So
the subject of today's hearing is really, really important, and
we look forward to your testimony. Thank you for being here
today.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Young, very much.
And now, General Chiarelli, you may proceed with your
summarized statement, and your entire statement will be placed
in the record.

Summary Statement of General Chiarelli

General Chiarelli. Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Young,
distinguished members of the Committee, I thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the impact of
combat loads on soldiers serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. This
is my first occasion to appear before this esteemed Committee,
and I pledge to always provide you with an honest and
forthright assessment. I have also submitted a statement for
the record, and I look forward to answering your questions at
the conclusion of my opening remarks.
First, on behalf of our Secretary, the Honorable Pete
Geren, and our Chief of Staff, General George W. Casey, I would
like to take the opportunity to thank you for your strong
support and demonstrated commitment to our soldiers, Army
civilians and family members. I and the other senior leaders of
our Army care deeply about them.
A soldier's well-being is our foremost priority in
everything we do. Over the past several years, the Army has
fielded numerous technologies that have greatly improved a
soldier's capability and the survivability of the force.
However, the further challenge effected by this progress has
been more and more weight added to a soldier's load, and the
wear and tear on soldiers demonstrated by the increases we have
seen in musculoskeletal issues has had significant impact on
our deployability rate.
This is a challenge, and it needs to be addressed; however,
we must also recognize that there is no simple solution. The
realty is there is a trade-off to be made between the force
protection and effectiveness. Certainly we could outfit a
soldier with every piece of body armor and equipment available,
essentially encasing him or her in a cocoon of protective
technology; however, doing so would diminish his or her
effectiveness and his or her ability to maneuver on the
battlefield, thus putting him or her at even greater risk. A
cumbersome load, for example, could cause heat injury or hamper
a soldier's ability to take cover quickly from enemy fire in
the event of an attack.
So the challenge cannot be solved simply by developing,
procuring and fielding lighter technology and equipment,
although that is a critical part of the solution. Instead, to
properly address issues requires a comprehensive approach that
focuses on improving soldier training and conditioning, as well
as finding alternate ways to transport equipment and supplies
on behalf of soldiers. And I ensure the members of this
Committee that it is what our Army senior leaders are focused
on doing. We are exploring short-term solutions, as well as
those that will meet ground force needs well into the future.
First, we are in the process of changing the Army's
physical fitness doctrine and training programs to better
prepare soldiers to the demand of military operations.
Individual evaluations suggest that soldiers who train and
condition properly are much less likely to sustain an injury
after deployment. Therefore, we believe the best way we can
help our soldiers to avoid injury due to excessive load is by
preparing them as well as possible for the physiological
demands of their mission, and the results today have been very,
very positive.
A concerted effort is also being made to reduce the
heaviness and bulkiness of combat gear and body armor required
on the battlefield. Right now this can be accomplished by
reducing the area of coverage and/or the level of protection in
certain areas. And we rely on commanders on the ground to make
correct decisions on behalf of soldiers on mission parameters
such as climate, environment, time and mission duration. Let me
be clear that this is absolutely where and by whom these
decisions should and must be made: by commanders on the ground
who are well trained and fully understand the various
considerations and the current enemy situation, not by those of
us removed from the battlefield, back in Washington.
Our job is to make sure commanders have everything they
need to be successful. And a variety of research, development
and engineering organizations are currently assisting the Army
in tackling the challenge of soldier load. The challenge of
equipping soldiers on the battlefield with the right technology
and level of protection without overloading them is a difficult
one; however, I am confident that we are taking the correct
actions to reduce the burden on soldiers by making adjustments
to the Army's physical training and conditioning programs, by
finding ways to reduce the weight of integral pieces of
equipment and body armor, and by pursuing improved new
technologies and methods for carrying or delivering part of the
load.
I assure the members of this Committee that there is no
greater priority for me and the Army senior leaders than the
safety and well-being of our soldiers. The men and women who
wear the uniform of our Nation are the best in the world, and
we owe them and their families a debt of gratitude for their
service and many sacrifices.
Chairwoman Kaptur and members of the Committee, I again
want to thank you for your continued and generous support of
the outstanding men and women of the United States Army and
their families, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you
very much.
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you very much, General Chiarelli. Thank
you for your testimony.
[The statement of General Chiarelli follows:]

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Ms. Kaptur. General Amos, why don't we proceed with you.
Good morning. Welcome.

Summary Statement of General Amos

General Amos. Chairwoman Kaptur, and Ranking Member Young,
and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for this
opportunity to share what the Marine Corps is doing to mitigate
combat load injuries and to lighten the load for our
warfighters. On behalf of all Marines, Sailors and their
families, I extend my appreciation for the continued support
that this Committee and Congress provides to our Marine Corps.
I will take this opportunity to highlight just a few things
that the Marine Corps is doing with regards to lightening the
load.
Over the last 4 years, the Marine Corps has not seen a
significant increase in injuries directly related to changes in
the weight or the type of equipment. A delicate balance exists
between mission accomplishment and force protection. Numerous
tactics, techniques and procedures have been developed to
mitigate the distances dismounted Marines must traverse and,
therefore, the amount of gear they must carry.
The fact remains, however, that current military operations
ultimately require Marines to dismount and engage the enemy in
close combat. To do so necessitates Marines that are agile and
unencumbered enough to carry the day, but protected enough to
survive. This is a delicate balance.
The most significant part of the individual Marine's load
is his or her body armor. At least 30 percent of a Marine's
load is his personal protective equipment. The technology to
protect Marines is better than in previous generations, but
comes with significant cost and weight. Please know that your
Marines are the best protected force on the battlefield. We
have ensured that they have the very latest technology has to
offer. Because we are constantly engaged in fluid combat
operations, we understand that our commanders on the
battlefield are in the best position to determine the most
effective combat load for any given situation. Operational
commanders determine how best to equip their Marines based on
their analysis of mission requirements, the enemy situation and
environmental conditions.
To enable this flexibility we provide a range of options in
personal protective equipment that can be configured to meet
varying levels of threat. You will see some of that here
demonstrated this morning shortly.
We believe conditioning is a major contributing factor to
the success of mitigating combat load injuries. Physical
fitness is an essential part of the Marine Corps and has been
rooted in our most basic levels of training. Marines are
renowned for their being physically ready for the challenges of
austere and demanding environments, but there is always room
for improvement.
As part of our lessons learned process, we determined that
we needed to tailor Marine physical training to the realities
of weight and combat missions. In October of 2008, the Marine
Corps added a new combat fitness test to its longstanding
physical fitness test. The combat fitness test is actually a
training regimen that specifically addresses movements typical
of combat operations and seeks to improve a Marine's ability to
perform them while decreasing associated injuries.
The best weapon and most precious asset in the Marine Corps
is the well-trained and -equipped and -conditioned Marine. With
your continued support your Marine Corps will remain the
Nation's force on readiness and continue to fulfill its mission
of being ready when the Nation is the least ready.
Thank you. I request my written testimony be accepted for
the record, and I look forward to your questions.
[The statement of General Amos follows:]

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WEIGHT OF BODY ARMOR

Mr. Young. Madam Chairman, I wonder if you could invite the
soldiers with their heavy equipment to take a seat and lighten
their load a little bit.
General Chiarelli. If it is okay with you, sir, could we,
before they sit down, explain what you see here very quickly? I
will use the soldier, Staff Sergeant Fred Rowe. Fred is from
Greenville, Kentucky. He is married and currently doesn't have
any kids. He has been assigned to both the 82nd and is
currently assigned to the 101st preparing for a deployment to
Afghanistan. He has been to Iraq twice on two deployments. This
will be his first to Afghanistan. And on his second deployment
to Iraq, he took three rounds to the chest and got up and
completed the mission, which shows you the quality of
protection provided by these plates.
We asked Staff Sergeant Rowe to wear the full-up, what the
Army calls the improved outer tactical vest with the SAPI
plates front and rear, plus SAPI plates on the side. His,
without all the other accoutrements, because it is a size
medium, weighs 30 pounds. To give you an example, if we were to
move up to a size large, like I would wear, I would be carrying
an extra 3.2 pounds, because of the extra weight of the plates,
up to 33.2 pounds. But this is the full-up gear right here that
provides the best protection over the largest portion of the
body that both the Marines and the Army have at this time.
Ms. Kaptur. General Chiarelli, what is the total weight of
equipment that Sergeant Rowe is carrying right now? I notice he
doesn't have on the optical scanner and some of the other
things.
General Chiarelli. I did not totally weigh his ruck.
Sergeant Rowe. Depending on the mission, ma'am, my kit has
weighed up to about 98 pounds at one time, depending on the
mission. Sometimes it is about 70 pounds. But with ammunition,
grenades, flashbangs and all the other equipment, it is going
to be over 70 pounds every time that you go outside the wire.
On an extended mission during a surge, my kit weighs just shy
of 100 pounds.
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you. Thank you for that.
To your knowledge, Sergeant Rowe, have the soldiers ever
been asked about equipment loads in your career? Do you ever
get a survey or anybody talk to you about what could we do to
lighten your load?
Sergeant Rowe. Yes, ma'am. I have actually taken a survey
multiple times. I think in the survey it asked if you would
accept the responsibility of having like a plate carrier or
something lighter that doesn't have as much flak protection
from the shrapnel and 9-mils. And as far as I know, every
person that has ever worn the kit that we had to wear has
checked ``yes'' in their block.
Mr. Young. Sergeant, your experience in Iraq when you were
hunting down or pursuing a terrorist, he was moving pretty
light, I understand, he didn't carry the heavy load because he
hit and run. How much restriction is there on you in pursuing
that bad guy and hunting him down?
Sergeant Rowe. Most of the time I was in Iraq, sir, I was a
sniper, and we weren't actually chasing people down. But when I
was an infantry squad leader, we would react to contacts, and
if the individual is not in your line of sight, basically if
you can't just see him right away in the street within 100
yards or so, you can't pursue. You would have to go ahead and
stand your ground and maintain what you have, because there is
no way that you will ever catch them.
Mr. Young. I bet you couldn't do the 100-yard dash in 10
seconds, could you?
Sergeant Rowe. No, sir.
Mr. Young. Thank you for what you have done and what you
will continue to do. We appreciate your service to our country.
Sergeant Rowe. I am happy to do it, sir.
Mr. Rothman. Would it be possible for the soldier to
describe from bottom to top what he is wearing?
Ms. Kaptur. Certainly, certainly.
Sergeant Rowe. Well, we start out with the desert boot,
sir. And depending on the terrain, we have five different pairs
of boots that you can wear, and some of them can actually be
pretty heavy. If you are walking on concrete, they are going to
have a thicker sole. They are about a pound heavier each.
Then you go to the pads. We have insert pads that we could
be wearing, but we have the outer knee pads and elbow pads that
are mandatory for you to wear. They have better protection, but
it gets a little restrictive. He was talking about chasing down
someone. Whenever you can't even move your arms or legs it is
pretty hard to run. When you move up, then you have your groin
protector, which is a 9-mil flak, as well as around your neck,
and pretty much everything around the plates.
When you move up the vest, you have usually some kind of a
harness that holds all your magazines and pouches over top of
your armored vest; and, depending on the mission, what ammo you
are going to take, how many grenades you are going to take, or
whatever equipment you are going to have. Always your
survivability kit, first aid. And then you also have your vest
which has--as the general was saying, depending on your size it
can go up between--probably about 5 pounds, sir. And then
lastly you have your ACH helmet, which is a lot lighter than
the ones we had in the past.
Mr. Rothman. And what is on your back?
Sergeant Rowe. This is an over daypack, sir. This is what
we call an assault bag. You can't really fit a whole lot more
than just a MRE and maybe a little water or extra ammunition in
it.
Mr. Rothman. How much water do you carry?
Sergeant Rowe. Depending on how long you are going to go
out, sir. Normally we have to have at least 4 quarts on us at
any time. But if you are going to go out for a day or 2 days or
a week, then you are going to have to pack up your trucks and
carry more water in your bags, just depending on the mission
and how long you are going to be out.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Madam Chair.

SCALABLE BODY ARMOR

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Rothman, very much.
I was going to ask, Sergeant Rowe, if you step a little bit
to your right we are going to ask General Amos to introduce
your guest from the Corps, and I know Congressman Frelinghuysen
has the next question.
General Amos. Sergeant Harres, come on up here.
Ma'am, this is Sergeant Harres, Infantry Marine and squad
leader, two combat tours, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, both of
them in Iraq. And he is wearing what we call the scalable
armor. Now, we did our best to try to put the same equipment on
the vest itself, but you will notice that the vest that he is
wearing provides him a lot more opportunity to move. And so
what this has done, this was an attempt about a year and a half
ago to develop an opportunity to divest yourself of some of the
heavy equipment and protection, and recognizing up in the
mountains of Afghanistan, in the hot temperatures and high
attitude, you need to be able to move just exactly for the very
reason that Congressman Young talked about.
So this is a scalable vest. It is called a plate carrier.
It has the same enhanced small-arms protective plate in the
front, one in the back, just the same way as his vest does. It
has the plates on the side. If you would point to the side SAPI
plates. Those just attach off and on, and that is an outshoot
of about the last 3 years of combat in Iraq, understanding that
the snipers would shoot at the sides. So we put those on there.
This thing is significantly lighter. It is about another 10 to
15 pounds lighter than what we have over here, and we are
issuing that now to the Marines in Afghanistan. And again, we
are allowing the commander to make the call.
We have a full vest that we did not bring, very, very
similar to this vest. It weighs 33\1/2\ pounds. It looks
exactly like this except it has got Marine tan. So we have that
capability, and we provide that protection.
Most of our Marines in Iraq right now are wearing a heavier
gear. This an acknowledgement that if we can scale and allow
the commander to pick the right armor, depending on what the
situation is, then he is more apt to be able to maneuver in
high attitudes and high temperatures.
Sergeant Harres, do you have anything you want to talk
about about your personal----
Sergeant Harres. When I was in Iraq, we had the full flak,
which when we were able to adapt to it, I thought it was fine.
Once I moved to the plate holder, like the General said, you
are able to move freely. On our recent trip to Iraq and
Afghanistan we had to use them. It doesn't offer necessarily as
much protection, but up in the hills of the Afghanistan
mountains, it will definitely will be a lot better to use, I
think.

FIRE-RESISTANT ORGANIZATIONAL GEAR

General Amos. One of the things that you will see, you will
notice on Sergeant Harres, he has got kind of a strange-looking
shirt on. That was developed about 2 years ago as a result of
our Marines being burned when the IEDs would go off. And we
ended up with a lot of Marines on their hands, neck, body being
burned. And you would see it down at Brooke Army Hospital. So
the Marine Corps Systems Command developed and did a rush. We
really worked very quickly to develop what they call FROG gear,
which is fire-resistant organizational gear, and it now has it
for the shirt. We have got a thing we put over our--a balaclava
we put over our head. And we have got Nomex gloves. And the
whole idea is to reduce the burning in the event of a vehicle
IED mishap.
So we have gone to that. And, in fact, you will find a lot
of Marines wearing aviation flight suits right now, because
they are Nomex, on patrol in Iraq. They like them because they
are fire resistant.
Ms. Kaptur. Congressman Frelinghuysen.

ADJUSTING LEVELS OF PROTECTION

Mr. Frelinghuysen. It is 130 degrees in Iraq, and you are
an Army sniper, and let us say you are a Marine sniper. Do you
have the flexibility on your own to reduce the amount of gear
you have so you can actually maneuver? It is pretty damn
difficult to fire a rifle if you can barely move your arms. I
just wondered do you have that flexibility, or is there some
greater God in terms of a unitary policy that you have to obey,
both the Marines as well as the Army? Do you have some ability
to adapt?
Sergeant Rowe. No, sir. You are not allowed to shed gear,
so to speak. In the past I have done it to adapt to the mission
and to get on my belly, hide on the desert to be able to make
that shot. I have done that. It is not allowed.
You can't shed gear because, as the general was saying, the
commander is trying to protect their soldiers, and they don't
want to have to answer for that. That is why we as soldiers
would like to go to something like that that allows us to be
more mobile and versatile so that we wouldn't have to shed our
gear. We would wear everything at the same time to accomplish
position.
General Chiarelli. And that is exactly what we want to go
to is that same capability to do that. But I will tell you, in
2006, since we are talking about snipers, the snipers were, in
fact, aiming for the femoral artery of the leg even wearing
this gear in order that they could get a soldier to bleed out.
So the thought in 2006 of shedding this kind of protection for
something less, you would be putting your soldiers' lives at
risk. I think most commanders would power this down to company
commanders, particularly in Afghanistan, to make that call
based on an enemy situation as to when they can shed gear and
go to a plate carrier because the situation allows it.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you both for your service.
Thank you, Madam Chair.

EQUIPMENT WEIGHT

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you.
I think I would like to hold questions for the moment. We
would like to ask our guests to please be seated. And while
they are doing that, General Amos and General Chiarelli, what
is the total potential weight that each soldier or marine would
have to carry; what is the potential total weight?
General Amos. I have got some actual figures here. We have
a battalion that just came back from Afghanistan about 3 months
ago, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines. And in an effort to try to
capture what their weights were, we sent a Marine Corps lessons
learned team over to Afghanistan and actually weighed these
guys and say, okay, put them on a scale with what they
typically wore. And the lightest was the squad leader. So that
was the Marine that was in charge, typically a sergeant like
Sergeant Harres, that was wearing 78.94 pounds of gear. The
mortarman was the heaviest in that squad, and he was wearing
142.26 pounds of gear.
Now, there is an old military historian by the name of
S.L.A. Marshall, who many, many years ago said an infantryman
should never wear more than 50 percent of his body weight. So
this mortarman that is wearing 142.26 pounds, when you think
about how much he probably typically weighed, maybe 170, 180
pounds, and you go back to what S.L.A. Marshall talked about,
this has been a problem for infantrymen, to be honest with you,
all the way back to the days of Alexander the Great, and it is
a problem, and it is something we are struggling with.
But I will tell you from the services side of the house,
there is no slack in effort to try to capture as much advanced
technology that is out there to lighten the load. And we can
talk about this in this hearing, we can talk about initiatives
that are under way right now to lighten a load, but there is no
shortage of money being spent from the science and technology
in the developmental world to try to get our Marines' and
soldiers' loads down. And there are several initiatives which
we can talk about.
Ms. Kaptur. General Amos, do you want to proceed with any
additional statement at this point?
General Amos. I don't, ma'am, but I will be happy to answer
any questions.
Pete, do you have anything on the weight?
General Chiarelli. Our doctrinal fighting load is 48
pounds, and it can range from 48 pounds up to 120 pounds. We
have done some looking at Afghanistan. The average fighting
loads in Afghanistan are 63 pounds. I think that is basically
what Sergeant Rowe indicated, maybe a lot lighter than in
Afghanistan than they are in Iraq. And they vary from that 63
pounds up to 130 pounds.
I took a look at World War II fighting loads, and the
difference between World War II fighting loads and the fighting
loads I just cited just now is about the weight of the tactical
vest you see right there. So what we have added since World War
II in the amount of weight is basically in that IOTV with SAPI
plates, but additional capabilities that our soldiers didn't
have in World War II. So we are looking at an average load of
63 pounds in Afghanistan today.

REDUCING EQUIPMENT WEIGHT

Ms. Kaptur. General Chiarelli, in your testimony submitted
to the record, you indicate that in one study infantry soldiers
carrying a load of 101 pounds for 12.5 miles had a decrease of
26 percent in marksmanship, being the number of targets that
were hit; a 33 percent increase in the distance from the target
center; and an increase in back pain compared to preload and
march scores. And then a little bit later on it indicates in
your testimony that a 72-pound load increased energy required
by 40 percent on behalf of the soldier. And the time required
to complete an obstacle course increases 10 to 15 percent for
every additional 10 pounds carried.
My question to you really is what are we doing? I look down
the list that every Member has gotten of equipment that is
being carried by our soldiers, and we put all this money into
research, but the optical scope and illuminator, that is almost
9 pounds itself. What kind of dispatch is there to try to look
at each piece of equipment and to try to halve its weight?
General Chiarelli. We are working very hard at finding ways
to lighten the load, I can promise you that. One of the things
we are looking at is civilian off-the-shelf solutions to many
of the things we do. And our rapid-equipping force is leading
the way in the Army at finding some of those things that will
lower the weight.
But I have to tell you, the advent of the SAPI plate is the
mid-1990s. We fielded the first SAPI plates, ceramic plates, in
early 2000. And the protection that they have provided and
their ability to stop rounds is such that we have offered a
level of protection to soldiers that they have never had on the
battlefield. Our sergeant here would not be alive today if he
did not have those SAPI plates on.
I made a trip up to ARL, our Army Research Laboratory, to
see what they were doing to try to lighten those plates even
further, and they told me, quite frankly, that it is going to
take a lot more time given the improvement in ballistics which
they have to stay up on.
We have come up with two improvements to the SAPI plates.
We are on E-SAPI today, which provides more ballistic
protection. It did not increase the weight, but it has more
ballistic protection. But the technological chances of being
able to cut that weight in half are still many years down the
road when it comes to the plates themselves. But we are looking
for other ways that we can do that.
I might mention, I totally agree with General Amos.
Physical conditioning and--what we are finding through the
University of Pittsburgh study that is being conducted--
nutrition are key elements in helping soldiers when they have
to carry these loads in avoiding the kind of musculoskeletal
issues that we are seeing today.
Ms. Kaptur. Could you please provide for the record, and
then I am going to call on Mr. Young, a brief summary of each
piece of equipment that the soldier is carrying or the Marine
is carrying and the research under way to lighten that piece of
equipment? I would be very grateful for that.
[The information follows:]

For over a half decade, the Army has initiated a number of programs
to transform how individual Soldiers are equipped given their unique
size, weight, power, and environmental considerations. There are well
over 300 items that could be issued to the Soldier depending on their
mission and where they would be deployed. Army investments impacting
Soldier load include the following and are not all inclusive of Army
efforts.
1. Clothing and Individual Equipment--There are numerous Army
initiatives like rucksacks, flashlights, and sleeping bags. By using
some Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) items we are already lightening
the Soldier's load by as much as 70% on individual items. Other
clothing enhancements such as Extended Cold Weather Clothing System
(ECWCS) provide cold weather protection made from light weight material
that makes the ECWCS 7 lbs lighter than previous versions.
2. Lethality--There are numerous initiatives that will lighten the
Soldiers load. Among the highlights are: The M240L lightweight
machinegun which will reduce the weight of the M240B machinegun by 7.1
lbs, a savings of 26%. The use of the XM806 lightweight .50 caliber
machinegun and tripod lessens the load by 64 lbs over the M2 machinegun
and tripod, a savings of 50%. The switch from the M122 machinegun
tripod to the M192 tripod will reduce the weight by 6.5 lbs, a savings
of 34% on the M249 and M240B. The combination of optic sights and laser
pointers will provide as much as a 34% savings (1.42 to .56 lbs) in
Soldier load weight. Another area of Soldier load savings has been
obtained in sensors and lasers, where the medium Thermal Weapons Sight
was reduced 44% (5.0 lbs to 2.8 lbs).
3. Ammunition--Lightweight steel cased ammunition currently in
development has demonstrated a weight savings of 25% over current
7.62mm ammunition. The Lightweight Small Arms Technology project is
investigating new case telescoped ammunition which promises to save
between 35 to 40% over current ammunition weight. Caseless telescoped
ammunition is also under development and promises to save up to 50% (7
lbs to 4 lbs) of the ammunition weight along with 40% reduction in
volume.
4. Soldier Protection--Technology development efforts are working
toward weight reductions for body armor (vests and plates) and helmets
through advances in fibers, textiles, and ceramics. High performance
fibers with significantly increased tensile properties have the
potential to provide weight savings of 30-40% of the fabric components
of body armor. Lightweight ceramics is focused on increased multiple
hit capability, improved durability, and the ability to form the
ceramic plate into more complex shapes that can better conform to body
shape and provide for increased mobility. Within the past 24 months
alone, the Army has made improvements to the Soldier's Interceptor Body
Armor system with the introduction of the Improved Outer Tactical Vest
which reduces system weight by over 16% (18.6 lbs to 15.7 lbs). In
addition, there are ongoing actions to evaluate a lighter tactical vest
(plate carrier) for Soldier use. The purpose of the evaluation is to
provide the operational commander with flexibility to use a plate
carrier to adjust Soldier loads based on terrain conditions (patrolling
in and around mountainous regions). Additionally, development of the
new Enhanced Army Combat Helmet has the potential to provide another
10% reduction in weight from its predecessor while providing improved
ballistic protection. The overall goal for the Army's S&T effort is to
reduce body armor Soldier load by an estimated 10 lbs.
5. Power--Technology development efforts will achieve weight
reductions for power sources through improved battery technology,
hybrid power sources and battery charging systems. Lithium carbon
monofluoride primary batteries have demonstrated a 2X reduction in
weight through improvements in energy density compared to current
primary batteries. Wearable, rechargeable Lithium-polymer batteries
will conform to and mate with body armor and will achieve improved
fightability. Hybrid power sources based on methanol fuel cells will
reduce the number of batteries required for multi-day Soldier missions.
6. Combat Rations--The recently developed First Strike Ration, a
compact, eat-on-the move, assault ration for consumption during initial
periods of high intensity conflict, provides a 49% weight savings over
a one day supply of MREs. Technology development efforts will achieve
additional weight reductions for combat rations through the use of
novel lightweight packaging materials and improvements on specialty
rations.

Ms. Kaptur. Mr. Young.

ROBOTIC VEHICLES

Mr. Young. I want to thank the Chair. And we had discussed
at a prior meeting the possibility of devising a system or
procedures to provide UAV support or some robotic-type support
for the fighter. For example, in here, what the sergeants are
wearing, it doesn't include their weapons; it doesn't include a
whole lot of ammunition; it doesn't include water that they
might need for a couple of days; it doesn't include
communications equipment, radios, night vision goggles, things
of this type.
Is there any work being done by the Army Materiel Command
in trying to devise a strategy or procedure or a method where
the troops on the ground could be helped with some of this
extra heavy load, what they need when they get to the fight,
but they might not need getting to the fight?

AIRDROPS

General Chiarelli. There is. First of all, we are looking
at robotic vehicles as a way of being able to transfer that
load from the soldier to a vehicle that would travel along with
the soldier and carry a good piece of that. That technology is
something we are looking at and testing right now.
But currently in Afghanistan--I will let Jim talk about
UAVs and what they can do--we are using as a primary way to
take this load off the soldier's back by use of airdrops. We
deliver 26,000 pounds a day using airdrops, different airdrop
technologies. And we have come up with technologies that are
very, very accurate at half the cost of what they used to be
and don't require soldiers to recover the components of the
airdrop. Basically those things which bring that load to ground
are discarded after the drop is made. So this is going a long
way in helping us to get some of those pounds off our soldier's
back. And we see the increase in airdrops as something that is
proven to be very, very helpful in Afghanistan.
General Amos. Sir, we also are using the airdrops, TRANSCOM
General McNabb and all his airmen have done some remarkable
work with precision airdrops using parafoils to try to get the
stuff out so you don't have to either carry it along the
highways of Afghanistan, which are becoming more and more IED-
laden. I mean, that is an effort that is under way right now
and works quite well.
About a year and a half ago, the Marine Corps commissioned
a study by the Naval Research Advisory Committee on the issue
of lightening the load, and after about 6 months of effort by
some very renowned ladies and gentlemen across our country
going into industry and into all the S&T developmental parts of
the world and then going back into history, they came out and
they said, look, we are probably right now at about as far
along as we can be with current technology as we know it today
with regards to being able to lighten things like the SAPI
plate, small-arms protective plate. We need new technology to
be able to get that thing lighter. But they said, there is
other ways that you can lighten a load. One is weight
redistribution; in other words, the actual weight. It is a bit
of a ruse, but it actually works. You can redistribute the
weight and get it more over your hips and therefore feel like
you can actually lift yourself better and maneuver better. So
that is one way.
The other piece of it was get it off the Marine or the
soldier and get it onto something else that actually can carry
it for you. The front cover of our Marine Corps Gazette this
month has a picture of a Marine up in the mountains of eastern
California at our Mountain Warfare Training Center loading up
mules. Now, I realize that is not new technology, but we
actually teach a course for Marines how to load mules, and we
use it in places like Afghanistan. So at the very bottom of the
food chain, that would be the basic way you would transfer
loads.

CARGO UNMANNED AIRVEHICLE

But what we are looking at right now, and what is a near-
term requirement is the whole idea of a cargo UAV. And if you
can imagine, we are pretty successful with UAVs now. We like
them. We have got little ones, and we go all the way up to the
big ones. But nothing is out there to haul stuff around the
battlefield.
A year ago we had a battalion engaged in Afghanistan, and a
company got into a heck of a fight, and it was in the
summertime, it was hot. We had one opportunity to resupply
them. And I remember reading the report, the spot report, from
the company commander, and he had a choice between getting--
being resupplied with water or being resupplied with
ammunition. And it was at that point we said, we have got to do
better than this. And so the concept of a cargo UAV was born.
And right now the whole idea would be we are going to get
something off the shelf within the next--hopefully the next 3
to 4 months. We had an Industry Day last week within the Marine
Corps and brought in folks that had these commercial off-the-
shelf UAVs that are out there, and can it be modified to carry
cargo, somewhere anywhere between 500 pounds to probably 1,250,
1,500 pounds. Take off vertically, precision, set it down, drop
it off, then go to the next stop. Redo it all day, all night.
UAVs aren't afraid to fly at night. They just go up by
themselves and do it.
That is where we are headed. We want to get a solution now
to get into Afghanistan this summer. And then we have a program
where we are looking for something that would be optimum for
the future; an expendable, low-cost, precision UAV to be able
to carry an unmanned aerial vehicle--excuse me, logistics. So
you are going to hear more of that as we find out what we are
going to do, but we are committed to getting that for this
coming summer.

ROBOTIC CARGO VEHICLES

The other thing is what General Chiarelli was talking about
is DARPA has a project they call Big Dog, and it was a robot.
It looked about the size of a Great Dane, and it had robotic
legs, and it had a gasoline-powered motor on it, and it had
gyro-stabilized legs, and it could climb up. And the whole idea
is to shed weight on this thing. They have taken that now to
the next level, and I was briefed on it about 2 weeks ago, and
I think there is great potential.
We won't see that this month, but we hopefully will see
that sometime in the next 24 months where you can imagine a
squad with one of those robotic dogs, quiet, completely self-
contained, where you can put 300 or 400 pounds on this thing,
and it will just follow you along, like my Labrador Retriever
does today. So there is a lot of effort going on to try to shed
the weight onto something else.
Mr. Young. General, thank you very much for enlightening us
about the newest technology of the mules. Whatever works.
Madam Chairman, you have got a good attendance today, so I
am going to yield back my time so other Members can take part
in this hearing.
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Young.
Mr. Visclosky.

INJURIES DUE TO WEIGHT

Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Madam Chair. Just two questions.
There is a wide range as far as the weight a troop carries. Is
there a weight beyond which frequency of injuries grows
dramatically? Is there some threshold where suddenly you are
seeing a lot more injuries to our troops because of the weight?
General Amos. Sir, I don't have that information. I would
say intuitively obviously the higher we get up these weights
that I talked to you about in the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines,
140 pounds, there is absolutely no question that you might be
able to carry that around the street, but when you start going
up mountains, you can't do it. You stop hopping in and out of
MRAPs, step down from an MRAP that sits 2\1/2\ to 3 feet high
off the ground.
Mr. Visclosky. And you get shot at.
General Amos. Absolutely.
Intuitively there is a threshold, but I don't know
precisely what it would be. I don't know that we have that kind
of information.
Mr. Visclosky. I assume there would be some variation
between the size of the actual soldier, airman and the load
they are carrying, too. I was just wondering if suddenly you
are seeing some incremental increase along a certain threshold.
One other question. For those who are our enemies, what is
their basic load, if there is such a thing? My impression is it
is relatively light, but I do not know.
Mr. Moran. It is the weight of a weapon. That is about it.
General Chiarelli. That is about it, the weight of the
weapon. They do not have protective gear. But their casualties
are much higher than ours, and their effectiveness is not as
great as ours because of their lack of the equipment and the
protection we are able to provide our soldiers and Marines.
Mr. Visclosky. I assume there is some advantages.
Understanding they have higher casualties, and there are other
things we can do to compensate for the lack of mobility because
of the amount of weight our troops are carrying, what advantage
do they have because they are so light?
General Chiarelli. I think that is why we are both looking
at it different ways, so we can lighten the load, and
particularly move to a plate carrier where the enemy situation
allows you to do that without putting the soldier or Marine at
greater risk than you are willing to accept and that he is
willing to accept given the enemy situation.
Mr. Visclosky. I wish you well. I just can't imagine how
terrifying it is. You are in combat, you are risking your life,
you are carrying this, and then to find that right adjustment.
And I honest to God wish you well, and whatever we can do to
help. I appreciate it.
General Amos. And it is a balance, sir. The flip side of it
is if you talk to our staff sergeant and the sergeant that were
in heavy combat, they would tell you that there were times when
they absolutely would not have wanted to shed any of the stuff
that they were wearing because the threat dictated that if you
are riding around in the back of an MRAP or an up-armored
Humvee in an area that is known for IEDs, most of the soldiers
and Marines, I would say, would rather have that stuff on than
a plate carrier, because a plate carrier covers significantly
less of your body. So there are times when they absolutely want
to have that kind of coverage.
And as General Chiarelli was talking about, in 2006,
General Brogan, who is sitting behind me, as a result of an
Urgent UNS, developed ARB, what we now wear, our big vest, a
modular tactical vest. And the whole idea was countersniper. It
was the shots coming in the neck, the shots coming in under the
arms, the shots coming into the hips. And so we did a rapid
turnaround to develop this thing. Now it is bigger and bulky.
It is just like their vest, but it had a purpose. And the whole
idea now is if we can give the commander on the ground the
opportunity to make decisions on how much or how little, then I
think that is absolutely where we need to go. But we value life
a lot more than our enemy does, and the last thing we want to
do is send a young soldier or Marine home because of maybe a
lack of irresponsibility or a lack of responsibility on our
part. So it is a balance.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much for your service.
Ms. Kaptur. Mr. Frelinghuysen.

WEIGHT OF MACHINE GUNS

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Gentlemen, we have made some progress in
terms of the weight of soldier weapons. I respect Picatinny
Arsenal. They just lowered the weight of the .50-caliber
machine gun, doing some things relative to the weight of
barrels, the ammo, the clips for ammo, I guess they call it
plasticize, use of titanium. Are you satisfied we are making
enough progress in that area? Perhaps General Chiarelli.
General Chiarelli. I think that is one of the areas that
really shows a tremendous opportunity to make some real
reductions in weight. We found in the Special Operations
community an M240 machine gun, which I think most of you know
is a pretty good-size machine gun. Special Operators had had
this weight problem. With the standard one we issue our
soldiers, they had developed, and I believe it came out of
Picatinny, a weapon that was 9 pounds lighter. When you can
shed 9 pounds on a machine gun like that, that is a tremendous
weight savings. We have issued 100 of them and have another 500
on order to get out to our soldiers in Afghanistan.
The same thing with the M249, commonly called the SAW. They
have been able to shave off an additional 2 pounds off of it
and make it much lighter.
Picatinny is working on caseless ammo, I know, and that
shows a great future, because if you could get rid of that
brass on every single round of ammunition you carry, you could
shed more load. The issue with that, of course, is we will have
to move to something other than the M4, because it, as I
understand it, will not fire caseless ammo. But those are the
kinds of things that I see that show great promise for helping
us lighten that load.

CARGO UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

Mr. Frelinghuysen. On just getting back to the use of UAVs,
the cargo, I assume the larger the UAV, perhaps the greater
opportunity for the enemy to detect what we are using. How are
we dealing with those types of issues? And I assume you get the
conditions on the ground. I am talking more about Afghanistan
here where you have a brownout, and you would have a similar
sort of situation, whether you have the opportunity to bring in
water or ammo. I just wonder what sort of progress are we
making with the UAVs.
General Amos. Sir, right now we don't have one in theater
right now. We have UAVs, but we don't have a cargo UAV. And as
a result of this Industry Day that we had a week ago, we are
trying to sort out, okay, what is out there now that is already
made so that we can capitalize on that.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Sir, one has to assume obviously the
Special Operators are getting stuff in, but they are using
conventional airdrops.
General Chiarelli. I think they are using most of the
airdrops and some of the airdrop technology that has been
brought on board in Afghanistan.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. UAVs are on the drawing board, the
cargo?
General Amos. Sir, they are from the sense of what we would
really like to have in the future. That is the one that is--
those are kind of under development. But the near-term itch,
which is the forces in Afghanistan right now, I am looking for
something more than a developmental solution, I am looking for
something now.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We can't wait.
General Amos. We can't wait, and for all the reasons we
talked about. We don't know how big this is. We don't what we
are going to decide on. I have seen pictures of ones, I have
seen them, that are as big as this room, and I have seen
smaller ones.
Ideally what you would like to have is something that is
small, that is quiet, that can carry this load of 500 to 1,200
pounds. And that is where we are going for right now. We just
don't know. There are some small commercial helicopters, some
very small ones, that we have companies looking can they modify
that to fly it remote control, just like we do all our other
UAVs, hand them off as it moves into theater, moves farther
downrange, and then take control at the receiving station and
then just land the thing. And the good thing about that is even
in a dust storm, a UAV can land by itself. It is not like me as
a pilot where you get nervous in a brownout. We don't have it
yet, but we hope to have it and introduce it this coming
summer. That is where we are headed.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Excellent.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Frelinghuysen.
Mr. Moran.

COMBAT LOAD

Mr. Moran. Thank you very much, Ms. Kaptur. And we thank
you for chairing a meeting from two such distinguished military
leaders, and I have great respect for both of you. In fact,
General Amos, I was pretty impressed.
I mentioned to General Amos late in the afternoon yesterday
that my nephew, who is in the Marine Corps, was complaining
because he was sent to New River on financial management
because of some dumb Appropriations Committee that wanted more
financial management people in the Marines, so he got stuck
with that. So I mention it, and today he is in Iraq fighting.
You know, it is conceivable it could be coincidence, but I just
gave all the credit to you. I was really impressed.
In our briefing where we are told that we have about 20,000
soldiers that are nondeployable--I think that was in your
testimony, General Chiarelli--largely because of bone and
muscle injuries, and it is increasing, it seems fairly
dramatically, about 10 percent annually, it appears. Now, the
explanation, it says that you are planning on lessening
equipment loads, improving conditioning, providing new load-
carrying capacity, technology, et cetera.
I don't think any of us think that the problem is one of
the human endurance of the soldiers, but it is probably more
the human judgment of their superiors that--yourselves
excluded, obviously. I wouldn't say it because I know you do a
fine job. But I think over time we have loaded them up. And I
suspect I am not alone in this. It is too much; 100 pounds is
too much to be carrying on a regular basis, let alone 140. In
terms of maneuverability, adaptability and just what the human
body is capable of bearing over long period of time, it is too
much.
And I believe you when you say we are working on lightening
it, but we have been in Afghanistan for 7 years, we have been
in Iraq for almost 6, and it seems to be going in the other
direction. Now, maybe we are part of the problem. I mean, I
have got a question here about are you trying some of the new
sniper technology that is put on vehicles but could be put on
soldiers individually that detects where sniper fire came from?
I mean, that is new technology. But gosh, in this context of
that much weight having to be carried by individual soldiers, I
can't imagine adding anything to it no matter how helpful that
technology was. And yet we are talking about radios, we are
talking about any number of other things that just seem at some
point counterproductive.
You wonder in a platoon if we couldn't share some of the
load, that if everybody has to--I mean, if we come up with
radios, obviously not everybody needs to carry the radio. If
you were to use sniper technology, not everybody needs to have
that, et cetera.
I know you have thought about this, and I don't want to
belabor the point, and it has been pretty much the thrust of
everybody's question, but we are concerned, I think
legitimately so.

RECRUITING STANDARDS

Let me ask a question, though, about the Army fitness
levels, General Chiarelli, because that is where we read the
articles. They apply primarily to the Army apparently. We have
made accommodations for prior, I don't want to say--I guess
felony records, although I don't think it is so much felony,
but brushes with the law and so on. We apparently have relaxed
those standards. We have relaxed some of our educational
standards we read. But we have too many soldiers who are being
rejected for reasons of obesity.
Now, I was asking some of the folks about that, and they
said, well, one of the problems is not just obesity, but we
have a cookie-cutter approach. We take the weight and the
height, and that determines whether somebody is eligible or
not.
One of the things that disturbed me, a young man I know who
is a ballplayer, really well conditioned, he can run a sub-5-
minute mile, but he was rejected because he was too heavy even
though it was all muscle. Now, that was ROTC, so I don't know
that that applies to regular standards, but if it does, it
seems to me we need some flexibility; that the Body Mass Index,
the conditioning, that needs to really be what we are looking
at and not just some standard criteria, simplistic criteria
really. My son is 6-6, he weighs 290 pounds, but he has got a
33-inch waist. You can't pinch his skin anyplace, but he is
over your criteria. He would be labeled as obese, and he is
anything but.
General Chiarelli, do you have that kind of flexibility in
determining how we define obesity?
General Chiarelli. We do. And the regulation uses height
and weight as a screening tool only. Body fat is the final
determinant on whether or not we feel that you are obese and do
not meet Army standards. So anyone who would only use height
and weight and use that alone to disqualify an individual from
service, that would not be in keeping with the regulation as I
last read it, which requires that only as a screening tool. But
body fat is the final determinant on whether or not you are
obese.
Mr. Moran. Well, maybe ROTC has different criteria that are
not wholly consistent with regular enlistment. But you guys are
doing a great job. This is not a hearing to be critical, but it
is an opportunity to register concern. We are asking too much
of our soldiers when they are having to carry that much heavy
equipment. It is wrong, it has got to change, we have got to
figure out a way to lighten their load. Thanks.
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Moran.
General Chiarelli. May I apologize and just make a
qualification?

NONDEPLOYABLE STATUS

Ms. Kaptur. General, please.
General Chiarelli. On our statement that we have 20,000
nondeployable soldiers, that is correct on any given day, plus
or minus. But if I in any way inferred that those are all due
to musculoskeletal issues, I apologize, because that is not my
intent. We currently have 10,000 soldiers in warrior transition
units who are nondeployable who are injured in combat or have
very complex medical cases. And then we have another 10,000
soldiers who, for whatever reasons, are nondeployable, and a
small fraction of those are musculoskeletal issues we are
seeing coming out of Afghanistan. We just see that as a portion
that we need to attack to get at this issue of
nondeployability. But even if we were able to eliminate all of
those, it would be a small fraction of the 20,000 that we have
that are nondeployable.
Mr. Moran. I think our testimony said many of these 20,000,
so I thank you for that clarification.

REDUCING EQUIPMENT WEIGHT

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you for the clarification.
Both generals, can we assume that the contractors who
provide all this equipment are under direction by each of you
to reduce the weight, that there is ongoing effort, in each
piece of equipment? Can we assume that or not?
General Amos. Ma'am, we, the contractor will respond to the
amount of pressure directly applied to them. And what we do
when we are, when we are developing a piece of equipment, for
instance the scalable plate carrier, we sit down, and we will
work with them when the contractor--we actually particularly go
out and we will say, okay, this is the requirement, and then we
will get some bids in and then we will pick the prime
contractor. And the prime contractor then will have to meet the
specifications of the contract. So we actually work with them.
For instance, we have got kind of a warfighting lab, but we
have got a Marine Expeditionary Rifle Squad Group of folks,
kinds of a skunks works that deals specifically with making
sure the stuff we buy is as light as we possibly can get it,
and it fits well where it is supposed to fit on the body. And
we try that out on Marines.
So the answer is, they are. They are not actually just
turned loose to just give us what they have and we accept it.
We force the issue on trying to get the very latest amount,
everything from just shedding pieces of this kind of Kevlar web
gear to get it down to a weight that we think is the very least
but yet provides the minimum amount of protection that was
required. So we do that, ma'am. We don't turn the contractors
loose on this thing. They actually have to live up to our
standards.
Ms. Kaptur. Well, I would hope that in communications with
them, that, you know, you would reemphasize in written form
your strong efforts to try to reduce the weight, whether it is
the material, whether it is metals, whatever it is, I would
think that that would be a very useful effort.
General.
General Chiarelli. We, too, are looking for solutions to
this, not only in our laboratories but with commercial off-the-
shelf pieces.
I was given two charts prior to the hearing where we are
down to, as Sergeant Rowe talked about his knee pads, we are
looking at a brand new knee pad now that will save 8-ounces
over the current knee pads that he wears. I have got two pages
of all those items, from boots to knee pads to compasses to
sights to flashlights, where we are looking at different ways
that we can procure equipment, both developed in our labs but
also commercial off-the-shelf that will lighten that load. And
we are literally looking at reductions of ounces to try to, in
the smallest pieces of equipment, to try to get a cumulative
good for the soldier.
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you both. That is very encouraging.
Mr. Kingston.
Mr. Kingston. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
General, you mentioned earlier that you were looking at an
off-the-shelf solution in some of those equipment. What would
be some of those items that you were talking about?
General Chiarelli. Boots, sir, knee pads, flashlights,
angle-head flashlights, assure-fire magazines. You can reduce
weight quite a bit with magazines. We have found a magazine
that over the load 8.8 ounces possibility.
Mr. Kingston. And you are referring to retail purchasing?
General Chiarelli. Some of this is commercial off-the-shelf
that is produced.
Mr. Kingston. And that is a fairly attractive product to
you then, right?
General Chiarelli. It is.

RAPID EQUIPPING FORCE

Mr. Kingston. And what kind of procurement problems does
that create?
General Chiarelli. We have the Rapid Equipping Force
established at the beginning of the war that we use extensively
to go and find those technologies. They have individuals down
range. And I think, as Sergeant Rowe mentioned, he indicated he
filled out some surveys. I would bet that some of those surveys
were from our Rapid Equipping Force, asking soldiers what are
the pieces of equipment that you would like to see lightened?
How can we help you out? What do you need that is better?
And they go to our labs to look for solutions, and many
times they find them there. They go to the Special Operations
community. They go cross service to make sure that there is not
something in another service that we are not aware of. I gave
you the example of Special Operations and the 240 machine gun.
That was found by our Rapid Equipping Force. And they look for
commercial off-the-shelf items to lighten that load.
Mr. Kingston. If you found a commercial flashlight that was
better than the one you are using and it was universally
accepted among the soldiers, how hard is it for you to move
towards, let's just get rid of the old flashlight and buy this
new one? How difficult is that to do? How much red tape do you
encounter?
General Chiarelli. Today that is something we can do rather
rapidly with the Rapid Equipping Force.
Mr. Kingston. So the Rapid Equipping Force, it is working
fairly well?
General Chiarelli. Very well.
Mr. Kingston. Are there any suggestions for changes and
improvement?
General Chiarelli. Well, I worry at times that, with the
loss of supplementals, that we will not have the funds that we
need sometimes to ensure that they have the money that they
need. And believe me, they follow all the procurement rules.
They even have a PEO that oversees what they are doing. But
they can move rather rapidly through the system. So I worry
that, at times, unless we look at some procurement reform,
organizations like our Rapid Equipping Force and the Army
Asymmetric Warfare Group may have problems doing their job.
Mr. Kingston. I haven't read your testimony. I have scanned
bits and pieces of it, but I don't see that in here as you are
underscoring the importance of that kind of flexibility. Is it
in here?
General Chiarelli. I believe it is, sir.
Mr. Kingston. Okay.
General Chiarelli. We talk about the REF.
Mr. Kingston. Okay. Because I think it is very important
for Members of Congress to know that you do need to have that
flexibility, because I remember one time General Meigs, when he
was in charge of the Joint IED Task Force, he said that you
have got to keep in mind we are competing against every Radio
Shack product that is out there in the commercial world, and we
have to stay ahead of them. Only we have to buy through the
government and sometimes that slows us down. And so I think
that we need to understand that in order for you to have as
many choices of products as possible, you have to consider
these commercial things and have the flexibility to move on
them.
General Chiarelli. It is absolutely amazing what this task
force has been able to do. They are able to fill 60 percent of
those things that soldiers ask for in less than a year, 60
percent. And 40 percent, the other 40 percent is under 2 years.
That is 90 individuals I have in that task force. We purposely
kept it small. And most of them are forward in the field
collecting data from soldiers and finding out how we can get
them the things that they need.
Mr. Kingston. Well, if there is anything else you want to
add to your testimony, you certainly can do that for the
record. What page is it on?
General Chiarelli. Thank you, sir. I promise you I will
review my testimony, make sure I have given you a fair
explanation of REF, and if there is more information I can
provide, I will provide it and get it to the Committee as soon
as I can.
[The information follows:]

The REF helps address specific capability shortfalls by canvassing
government, industry, academia, and the scientific community for
existing or emerging technologies. It provides limited quantities of
the best available off-the-shelf equipment to the Warfighter as quickly
as possible.
Among the many items REF has provided to units in theater are
remotely-operated cameras that assist with force protection at Forward
Operating Bases and Combat Operating Posts; IED and other explosive
material detectors that help our Soldiers defeat IED threats; improved
ballistic protection for military vehicles that increases
survivability; and lighter machine guns in Afghanistan that are helping
to reduce the weight of a Soldier's Load.
To give you a perspective of recent initiatives coming out of the
REF: in September 2008, during a visit to a brigade combat team (BCT)
in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the REF received requests to
lighten the load of Soldiers operating in extreme elevations greater
than 6,000 feet. REF formed an Integrated Product Team (IPT) in October
2008 with Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier, the Asymmetric
Warfare Group (AWG), Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC), and the
Army Infantry Center to develop solutions. Within 47 days, the IPT
identified, coordinated, and obtained from U.S. Special Operations
Command 104 lightweight machine guns and delivered the weapons to the
requesting BCT in OEF with user training provided by Crane Naval
Surface Center and the AWG. These weapons decreased the Soldier's load
by up to 9 pounds. Concurrent to this effort, an AWG field team helped
the BCT craft an Operational Needs Statements (ONS) focusing on lighter
body armor.
Simultaneously, AWG developed a formal assessment plan in
partnership with Johns Hopkins University to prove or disprove the
hypothesis that weight impacts on a Soldier's performance with regard
to suitability, survivability, lethality, and maneuverability. The
assessment takes a holistic look at the Soldier as a system and focuses
on the implications and effects of lightening the Soldier's load,
rather than assessing individual pieces of equipment.
When REF received the approved ONS from the warfighting commander,
the organization coordinated with PEO Soldier and the Army Staff; and,
REF is now working with AWG and the IPT to provide a BCT in OEF with
lightweight body armor and 14 additional pieces of equipment. These
items, combined with the lightweight machine guns and lightweight body
armor, have the potential to decrease a Soldier's load further by 14 to
23 pounds. Once completely employed, this equipment will be assessed in
OEF by AWG, ATEC, and BCT personnel and the results--good or bad--will
inform future REF equipping actions and Army fielding decisions.

Mr. Kingston. Okay. Thank you, General.
Thank you.
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you very much.
Mr. Rothman.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Generals, thank you for your service. I have lots of
questions. Just to put some of this in context, is there a
better equipped fighting force in the world than ours?
General Amos. Sir, that is absolutely a resounding no.
There is not.
General Chiarelli. Totally agree.
Mr. Rothman. Next. Just to put this in context, additional
context, it is really critical, General Chiarelli, for us to
receive that percentage of nondeployed units who are there
because of these kind of stress and ergonomic injuries, so if
we could get that for the record, that is critical, because we
are here. And listen, we are all parents or concerned people
who care about our kids and grandkids and certainly our
soldiers and Marines and everyone fighting for us. We don't
want them to carry any more than they need to do their mission
and survive. But the balance is between flexibility of force,
survivability, and mission accomplished. So how badly are our
forces suffering, so to speak, because of this great burden of
equipment? And how is it being manifested, either in, or
rather, reflected in failure of mission, compromise of mission,
and nondeployed units?
So we have to know what we are giving up because,
obviously, if we have a finite sum in our budget, should we be
pouring it all into a cheaper, lighter rucksack or some other
training, pay, benefits, whatever other need we have to
address. So if we can get that for the record, sir, that would
be great. Unless you have a better answer than you just gave
Mr. Moran.
General Chiarelli. I don't believe I do. And I don't
believe at this time I am going to be able to provide you the
level of precision you want in trying to determine that. I was
briefed last night about work being done by the University of
Pittsburgh with the 101st where Sergeant Rowe will go. It is
work like that that is going to get us to that finite number,
and I promise that as soon as it is available, I will give it
to the Committee. Everything I have now is anecdotal.
[The information follows:]

Currently, there is no scientific evidence to support a cause and
effect relationship between the musculoskeletal injuries being incurred
in Theater and load carriage. Clinical presumption and anecdote are
driving current discussions. In pursuit of reliable data we have begun
to submit protocol proposals to the newly established CENTCOM
Institutional Review Board (IRB) for approval to deploy US Army
Institute of Environmental Medicine (USARIEM) investigators to both
Theaters. There has been some data collected on types of
musculoskeletal injuries and conditions in-Theater. Investigators in
one study showed that of the 48% of Soldiers who wore Individual Body
Armor for 4 hours or more, 70% had neck and back pain. Another study
queried Soldiers deployed in 2003 and 2004. The back was the most
common site of injury (32% low back, 9% mid back and 6% neck). In
addition, 68% of medical evacuations to pain management centers from
Iraq were for spine pain. From Jul 04 to Oct 08, low back, mid/upper
back, and neck pain were the chief complaints of Soldiers seeking care
from physical therapists (Combat Support Hospital: 22%, 7%, and 5%,
respectively, and Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) 23%, 8%, and 6%,
respectively). Still, other data from a physical therapist assigned to
a BCT reveals the following breakdown of musculoskeletal injuries: 22-
25% low back, 6-10% mid back, 4-10% neck, 19-22% shoulder, and 25-44%
lower extremity. It is imperative that future research studies focus on
the prevalence of injuries that can be attributed to the weight of the
load that our service men and women must carry. If there is a direct
cause and effect link, then specific factors must be studied (i.e., the
amount of weight, gender, and the duration and frequency of load
carries).

Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Generals.
I apologize. I am trying to get through as many questions
as I can. How big a problem is this for your forces, for you,
as commanders, in terms of your strategic objectives or the
mission objectives for you? Has it compromised your ability to
get your jobs done in the respective theaters, for example,
Iraq and Afghanistan.
General Amos. Sir, it hasn't within the Marine Corps. I
will just speak for my community. It has not. And again, go
back to how we began here with the recognition by both services
that we need the scalable, you know, the opportunity to do the
scalable body armor. And if you remember kind of where we began
several years ago with a lot of casualties in 2005, heavy
casualties, a lot of public interest generated, rightfully so,
by parents and by Members of Congress and by Marines. We began
looking for ways where we can provide that ultimate protection.

BATTERIES

Mr. Rothman. So you feel we have made tremendous progress,
the survivability of injuries on the battlefield and less
injuries than before, given the activity every single day and
exposure of our forces to harm. We have done extraordinarily
well.
One other fast question. Batteries. What does the average
soldier or Marine carry in terms of batteries?
I will tell you why we are asking. We are working with
different folks in R&D about battery technology to lighten the
weight of batteries. Would that make a significant dent in the
weight that a Marine or soldier would carry?
General Chiarelli. Yes, it would. And we are already seeing
great advances in battery technology that is pushing that
weight down. If you talk about our ground soldier ensemble,
that we have been able to drop the weight of it by a pound and
a half in newer models because of batteries, improvement in
battery technologies. We now have batteries that are scaled for
the mission. Short mission, smaller battery, lighter battery.
Longer mission, larger battery, more power for a longer period
of time so battery technology is something that is definitely
working to lighten the load.
Mr. Rothman. And finally, your request in the 2010 budget
will incorporate what you believe is the dollar figure
necessary to, in the context of all your needs, address this
issue to the extent that you feel is appropriate? Or are you
going to be underfunded in this 2010 budget in this area?
General Amos. Sir, it is yet to be seen because we haven't
seen what has been approved by the Department of Defense, and
you know that. So not only can we not comment, I really don't
know what that is. But I will tell you that, from the Marine
Corps side of the house, the research and development dollars,
which are mostly paid for out of supplementals right now, but
we have put 3 percent, we have increased our R&D money in the
budget by 3 percent. It doesn't sound like a lot, but it is a
significant amount of money in the baseline.
But the R&D piece of this thing is yes, the answer is yes.
And as long as we get that, then we will be able to continue
because this is science and technology stuff. This is DARPA
working on lightening the batteries and all the things that we
have been talking about today. This is stuff that costs money
to experiment with. So the answer is yes from the Marine Corps
side.
Mr. Rothman. R&D. Very important. Thank you, Generals.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Rothman.
The Committee has just been great this morning. It has been
a very easy job. Very respectful of one another.

INJURIES

Ms. Granger. Thank you. I have to follow up on Mr. Rothman
because what we are talking about is balance, how do we balance
protection of our troops, effectiveness, all of that. And you
are looking at equipment and redistribution. But we also have a
responsibility to our troops that it is one decision you will
make when you are in the field and you are there in the action
and you are 27 years old.
The other thing, responsibility, we have talked on this
subcommittee so long, is what our responsibility is to those
troops for their lifetime for the service they gave. So maybe
because I took two pain pills when we are sitting here for my
back, that may be the reason that I focus on this. But I know
that this weight literally can contribute to a lifetime of
difficulties and pain. So we have to keep that in account also,
too. It is our responsibility for all of you who serve and to
do the best we can for you now and for the rest of your lives.
So this is a very important issue. And I think we should be
looking at everything.
I happen to know at the University of North Texas Health
Science Center, which is in my district, it has been a lot of,
given a lot of attention to that. And part of it can be some
treatment in the field by medics to give some relief, as well
as the training that you are talking about and nutrition. So I
think we really need to focus on through this all the time,
whatever science we need, research, give you the right
equipment at the lowest weight, but keep that responsibility in
mind of when you leave the service or you retire that we have
left you in the best physical shape we can.
General Amos. Ma'am, if I could comment on that. There is
recognition that if you go back to boot camp in the Marine
Corps 15 years ago, we issued recruits flat-bottom sneakers,
Converse sneakers. And then we went out, and we couldn't
understand why they twisted their ankles and why they had flat
feet and why we had all these shin splints. So now we brought
in athletic trainers, and we actually have them at all our
recruit depots. We have them at our entry level training, like
Schools of Infantry (SOI), and we have athletic trainers now
out in the fleet at the major headquarters to help us
understand how you better condition Marines and what kind of
equipment we can get for them that would help prevent the kinds
of injuries that we saw 15 years ago.
We actually have, on the onset of injuries at some of our
entry level training, that recruit gets whisked off, finds
himself or herself in front of a bona fide athletic trainer
doing rehabilitation kind of exercises, so there is a
recognition of just exactly what you are talking about, that we
need to bring that piece of it in here. It is not just
equipment lightening; it is the whole thing. It is the balance
on your body and then how you condition your body.
General Chiarelli. If I might add, we, in Afghanistan, are
assigning physical therapists down to the brigade and battalion
level so that we have that doctor down there that is able to
work that injury, should that injury occur and be a
musculoskeletal. I think your comments were so correct.
I would also argue that when I was 19 years old, I felt I
was a lot more bulletproof than my parents felt that I was. And
I would do probably some things that, in my older age, I
question why I did that.
I think we always have to remember that when we are
shedding protection, that at 19, you probably feel that I can
outrun that bullet, whereas someone with a little more
experience, a little more time in combat, realizes that that is
not something you can always do. So I think it is important to
give our leaders the ability to make that important call.
Ms. Granger. Thank you very much.
Ms. Kaptur. Mr. Bishop.

WEIGHT OF WEAPONS

Mr. Bishop. Thank you very much.
And again, welcome gentlemen. Again, this is a very, very,
very pertinent subject area, and this Committee is very
concerned about it. One of the things that we have been doing
over the last 3 or 4 years with regard to equipment weight, we
funded research on new weapon systems to reduce the load. And
one of the requirements was that the weapon and ammunition be
reduced for the very reasons that we are here today. The XM-8
was a weapon system that has been looked at by the Army, and of
course, it has been tested in part at Picatinny. But the key
was reducing the weight of the ammunition, using the polymer,
as opposed to brass casings, and that preliminary research
indicated it would reduce the weight by two-thirds. The average
weight would go from 15 pounds to 5 pounds for the ammunition
and the weapon, which was seen to be an improvement, but
somehow that was moved from the Army to the Joint Committee for
study for use across the services, and somehow that has bogged
down. But that certainly goes to emphasize what we are talking
about here.
The other thing is, I have not heard anybody mention Kevlar
for the body armor, which, around the beginning of the
deployments to Iraq, parents were going to sporting goods
stores or various places and mailing Kevlar vests to their
children over there, which spurred this committee to try to
accelerate the acquisition and the procurement of the body
armor. Kevlar, I was told, and I am not an expert on it, is a
lot lighter and would give more flexibility. And if you could
comment on that, that would be fine.
But the other thing I want to touch upon, which I think is
extremely important today is I am told by staff that the
military is not making informed decisions for improving the
tactical combat casualty care or the body armor because you are
not collecting sufficient data. We are told that 67 percent of
the wounded are returned to duty in theater, and many of them
are not treated in a hospital, and as a result, we have almost
no information on what medical care was provided at the point
of the injury. And the Secretary of Defense's Committee on
Tactical Combat Casualty Care says that less than 1 percent of
all wounded has complete documentation.
It seems that without a systematic data collection and
analysis, far forward medical care can't improve, and we also
can't learn about the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the
body armor that protects our troops. Is there a way that you
can get data at the level of the first responders, rather than
trying to collect it at the surgical center, at the medical
center, at some point later, so you know where it was that the
body was penetrated, what kind of body armor was worn, was it
was properly positioned, and all of those kinds of things, so
that the changes that we make at this committee that we fund
that you ask us for are not based on anecdotal information but
on systematically collected and studied data?
General Chiarelli. Well, as far as the current plates that
we use, our SAPI plates, I am confident that they are the
finest piece of equipment available today. We have made
movement forward in Kevlar, and both General Amos and, Marines
and the Army are looking at a new helmet, Kevlar helmet that
will provide additional protection.
When it comes to providing care forward on the battlefield,
after spending 2 years in Iraq, I can tell you that I feel that
one of the things that has led to the high survivability rate
of our soldiers is our combat lifesaver program where your
buddy is trained in emergency medicine and can immediately
render aid. I don't know of anyone who has a penetrating wound
that would not be transferred where the kind of data that you
are talking about, sir, could be collected. I mean, any kind of
a penetrating wound, you are going to get immediate aid by a
combat lifesaver, and then you are going to be moved to that
location. But I am sure there are things that we could do to
better collect that data when it comes to our ability to
electronically provide it. But I will have to take a look and
see exactly what we are doing.

STRESS INJURIES

Mr. Bishop. The stress fractures, the orthopedic type
injuries that result from the load carrying, or the load
shifting, which generally are not documented, according to the
Secretary of Defense's Tactical Committee, don't get any
documentation, less than 1 percent, which means that we really
don't have data. We know that there are some injuries from
these loads, but we don't have real documentation of it.
General Chiarelli. That is why I am excited about what the
University of Pittsburgh is doing for. They are in, I believe,
the second year of a long term study to collect just that kind
of data. Both before the rotation, and once the soldier
returns, and providing the soldier the tools he needs to work
on his physical strength while he is deployed.

DEPLOYMENT TIMES

Mr. Bishop. If the Chairwoman will allow me to ask one more
question, I will be grateful. It has to do with the deployment
times. For the Army, it is 12 to 15 months, and the Marines it
is 7 months. Someone carrying 100 pounds in 110-degree weather
would wear down the body much more with the extended
deployments than with, for example, with the Marines, the
shorter deployments. And of course, the better dwell time would
give the body a much better time to recuperate. Is that also a
contributing factor to the injuries that we are talking about
with the load carrying, the fact that they have extended
deployments?
General Chiarelli. There is no doubt in my mind. I think
you have stated that absolutely correct. It is both a function
of dwell time and the opportunity to recover from the injuries.
But it is also a function, I think, why we are seeing more
effect of this than the Marines are because of 12- to 15-month
deployments.
Mr. Bishop. And nutrition.
General Chiarelli. And nutrition.
[The information follows:]

Documentation of medical care by first responders at the Point-of-
Injury (POI) is problematic. Not all first responders are medics who
are trained to document medical care. Every squad, platoon, and company
has Soldiers who are trained as combat lifesavers who may be the first
responder rendering emergency life-saving first aid. In a September
2007 report, the Committee on Tactical Combat Casualty Care (CoTCCC),
Sub-committee on First Responders, examined this issue. Of over 30,000
Wounded-in-Action reviewed in the report, less than 10% of records had
pre-hospital documentation and in only 1% of cases was the information
available found to be adequate. This lack of information flow from POI
does not meet the CoTCCC standard which states that critical data
elements of health care information must be reliably communicated along
the evacuation chain to ensure optimal care. Also, reliable first
responder information is critical to inform improvements to
tourniquets, hemostatic dressings, needle length for decompression of
tension pneumothorax and airway management, as several examples.
The Office of the Army Surgeon General, in conjunction with the
Army Medical Department Center and School, is piloting a prototype
First Responder Card for use in the Improved First Aid Kits. A minimum
set of documentation must be recorded and transferred up the evacuation
chain as a standard of care. Working with the US Army Medical Materiel
Agency, our goal is to build an easy to use, easy to train, rugged, low
cost paper-based tool for first responders, combat lifesavers, and
combat medics. We will train Soldiers to ensure that this does not
detract from the focus of applying the immediate emergent medical care
that can save a Soldier's life. Upon arrival to higher levels of care,
this information must be subsequently captured in AHLTA-T, the theater
electronic medical record. Handheld devices such as the Battlefield
Medical Information System Tactical--Joint are useful for acute care
(e.g. sick call) documentation, but impractical for documenting care at
the POI. It is not reliable as a consistent, DoD-wide method to capture
combat casualty care.
There is some aid station combat casualty care data available, but
it is sparse. The Combat Theater Registry (Navy, San Diego) does
capture aid station (Level 1) data which is integrated with the Joint
Theater Trauma Registry, which also captures a minimal amount of Level
1 data. An improvement in capturing Level 1 data is critical to fully
inform improvements to first responder devices and lifesaving
interventions.
The data that we currently receive from Level 1, but predominantly
from higher levels, have been put to use in developing improved
materiel solutions and tactics. The DoD Medical Research Program for
the Prevention, Mitigation and Treatment of Blast Injuries was
established in July 2006 and since its inception, has made significant
improvements in the way we protect our warfighters from blast-related
injuries, in the way we treat injured warfighters, and in the way we
rehabilitate injured warfighters for return to duty or to healthy
civilian life. Among many noteworthy contributions was the
establishment of the Joint Trauma Analysis and Prevention of Injury in
Combat (JTAPIC) Program.
The JTAPIC Program links the DoD medical, intelligence, operational
and materiel development communities with a common goal: to collect,
integrate, and analyze injury and operational data in order to improve
the understanding of our vulnerabilities to threats and enable the
development of improved tactics, techniques, and procedures and
materiel solutions that will prevent/mitigate traumatic injuries.
The JTAPIC program is a multi-lateral and multi-community
partnership sharing and analyzing data in order to provide actionable
information to improve Warfighter survivability. Partners include the
Army National Ground Intelligence Center; Office of the Armed Forces
Medical Examiner; PM-Soldier; Army Research Lab; Army Aeromedical
Research Lab; Army Institute of Surgical Research; Army Infantry
Center, Naval Health Research Center; and Marine Corps Systems Command.
JTAPIC has made a significant difference in the way we protect our
Warfighters from combat injuries by:
Providing actionable information to combat vehicle program
managers leading to modifications and/or upgrades to vehicle equipment
and protection systems, (seat design, blast mitigating armor, and fire
suppression systems).
Establishing a near-real time process for collecting and
analyzing combat incident data that confirmed the presence of threat
weapons of interest
Analyzing combat incident data to identify vulnerabilities
in operational procedures, and rapidly conveyed those vulnerabilities
to commanders in theater
Assisting PEO-Soldier in establishing a process for
collecting and analyzing damaged personal protective equipment (PPE),
such as body armor and combat helmets, to provide PPE developers with
the information they need to develop enhanced protection systems.
The JTAPIC Program received the 2008 Department of the Army
Research and Development Laboratory of the Year Award for Collaboration
Team of the Year in recognition of these accomplishments.

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you.
Ms. Kilpatrick.

PREPARATION FOR COMBAT

Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Generals, it is good to be with you this morning. The best
part of our military are the men and women, soldiers, sailors,
Marines and Air Force, who commit their lives every day to
defending our country. I served on the Air Force Academy board
for about 4 years, and visiting Colorado and watching them and
hearing them, and now having gone to see some Marines and Navy
and also Army, it is the troops who really defend us. And they
are so young. And as a grandmother, I am just always moved by
their dedication.
The two sergeants, both having been deployed to Iraq, and
one, if not both, on their way to Afghanistan, lessening the
load is paramount. And I know there is only two or three ways
to do it. Either you reduce the area that is covered, or you
develop technological kinds of things you are both working on.
And the testimony you provided this morning has been very
helpful. Or you transport by some other means, unmanned vehicle
or others, some of the equipment so that they have it when they
need it. I like the fact that you said air dropping. And
sometimes when you air drop some of it disintegrates or goes
somewhere, so you don't have to worry about it. And they still
have what they need to defend themselves, as well as their
brigades and the like.
I am real concerned. I love what you said, too: We value
life more than many of our enemies. And because of that, and I
heard a little squabble over here when one of my colleagues
asked, does our--I am saying enemy; you all might call them
somebody else--take care of their soldiers and Marines like we
do in terms of their body armor. And the answer was no. They
sometimes just have a weapon or two, so they are lighter, and
they can move around. You also mentioned they are skillful
enough where they know our body armor, so they try to shoot
where they know it is not. I don't know how you defend against
that. And the technology you discussed about it.
Their fitness. One thing I have found on my travels is the
men are small, men and women. And having just come from
Chairman Norm Dicks' district and having been on an aircraft
carrier as well as a couple of submarines, going up and down
the steps and all of that, it is very important, in combat as
well as they do their fitness training. And you have talked
about that this morning, that they be prepared for what is
before them.
Iraq is one war, and I thank God I have always been an
opponent and looking forward to the drawing down of some of our
troops there. But some of those same troops are now on their
way to Afghanistan. Different terrain. Different war. I come
from Michigan, where 25 different sets of Arabs have been
living with us all our lives. Friendly, all of that, in
Michigan. So when we go to another country with a different
kind of social values, religious beliefs and all of that, we
are really, in addition to fighting the physical war, we are
also fighting culture, religion and all of that. So we come to
a situation where the soldiers and Marines and sailors and all
are in a difficult situation.
I am very concerned about Afghanistan, very concerned. All
my Arab friends say it is a different kind of people there,
even than Iraq. The two sergeants, both sergeants, yes, have
dedicated their lives, have come back healthy. They are now
about to be deployed somewhere else. Is lessening the load as
paramount as the Stryker Brigades or the other brigades that
they have to fight with, the comprehensive coordination of the
various military services?
You know, in this Committee, and chairman--all our chairmen
really in our Committee, the men and women come first. And
whatever they need, I don't care what OMB says, you have to let
us know that. And I am not real sure that enough of that is
being done, number one. Are we ready for Afghanistan as we
uptroop there and diminish the numbers in Iraq?
Generals, are our men and women prepared? Would you say
that yes, we have done all we can as this committee and their
supervisors and commanders, that they are ready to fight this
war? I know that was a lot.
General Amos. Ma'am, give me the opportunity to answer
first here. A resounding yes. I appeared before this
subcommittee last year several times as the head of
requirements for the Marine Corps. And as Pete and I began our
verbal statement this morning, we began with a thank you. And
the honest to goodness truth is, thank you, because I can't
think of one thing, and I am not making this up, I can't think
of one thing that the Marine Corps said, hey, we really need,
that this Committee said, I am sorry, we can't afford it. That
has not happened one time. So the answer to that is, you have
given us everything we need. We anticipate that that will
continue as we go into the fiscal year 2010 and we get the FYDP
bill for POM 10. So I am optimistic about that.
The training piece is pretty amazing because you take, I
will give you an example of a young battalion, Second
Battalion, Seventh Marines. Excuse me, Third Battalion, Seventh
Marines, right in the middle of Ramadier, in heavy kinetics.
And things changed instantly. Almost within about 2 weeks, that
battalion, who had gone out and losing Marines, they had lost a
bunch of Marines. All of a sudden the Sunni awakening finally
came from east, excuse me, west to east and hit Ramadi. And
when that happened the, Sheikhs in Ramadi began to change. And
so here are 19- and 18-year-old men that lost their best friend
2 weeks ago, that are now being asked to change their mind set.
It is like reprogramming a new Windows application in their
brain going, hey, listen, we have to treat these people
differently. We have to approach them completely differently.
And they did it. They were able to change. So that is, first of
all, that is a testimony to the kind of young men and women we
have.
And the second piece of it is that, which gets to your
question, is the training that they get before they go, in both
our services, I promise you that it is focused, it is
absolutely drilled into culture, language. It is not just
kinetics. It is not just, how bad can we be? In many cases, it
is, how good can we be? So the training is very specific. We
are putting in 8,000 Marines right now into Afghanistan over
the next 90 days. Every one of those Marines have gone through
about 3 or 4 months of extensive training to prepare them for
the culture, the physical fitness part of this thing, the
language and their mission. So that is the Marine Corps.
First of all, you have done a remarkable job taking care of
us. Second of all, your Marines, your young men and women are
prepared.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you, General.
General Chiarelli. I can't add anything to that. All I can
say is thank you, thank you for everything the Committee has
done. You have given us everything we need and I know of no
time that there has been something that you have told us no, I
am sorry we can't do. And for that, we are grateful. And I know
I speak for the 1.1 million soldiers and their families in
thanking you for all that you have done and will continue to
do.
Ms. Kilpatrick. It is important, the data. I was going to
say something about the data. And I see Congressman Bishop did
that. Very important. It has got to be scientific as we go
forward, whatever we need to lighten the load and to win the
war and to bring all of our soldiers and sailors and all of
that home. Thank you for your service.
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you very much.
Mr. Dicks.

NONDEPLOYABLES

Mr. Dicks. General Chiarelli and General Amos, sorry I
wasn't here, but we had to have a hearing with the Forest
Service this morning before my other committee. But I want to
thank you both for your good work and your efforts to help our
troops.
Let me ask you something. You know, we now say we have
20,000 who are nondeployable. What happens to those
nondeployables? What do they do?
General Chiarelli. 10,000, or just under 10,000,
Congressman, are currently in our Warrior Transition Units, and
they are on a regimen of care that will either see them leaving
the service or possibly returning back to their units. That
number has dropped from a high of 13,000 in July down to now
less than 10,000, somewhere in the vicinity of 9,700 or 9,800.
The other 10,000 that I speak of are normally left in units.
They have injuries that are not as severe, that do not require
that they be seen in a WTU, and they remain with the rear and
heal, making their medical appointments and hopefully, before
too long, returning to their unit.
Mr. Dicks. It would seem, you know, that some of these
people would be, as you have suggested, be able to do other,
have other roles in logistics or support or whatever. And I
take it that is what you are doing.
General Chiarelli. That is exactly what we are doing. That
is why they are not all in a WTU. If you are in a Warrior
Transition Unit, your number one goal is to get better and make
a determination whether or not you are going to remain with the
service because that is what you and your family want to do or
whether you have made a decision to leave the service. Those
that are left with their units, the rear detachments in their
units, they are doing other tasks in that rear detachment and
getting better.
Mr. Dicks. Every time I go out there at Madigan to see the
Warrior Transition Unit at Fort Lewis, all these troops want to
do is get back to their unit. So I don't detect that this is,
you know, that anybody is taking, maybe there are a few, but
the vast majority want to get well and return to service. I
mean, I take it that is how you view this as well.
General Chiarelli. That is exactly right. I can't state
that any better.

EXTENSION BONUSES

Mr. Dicks. General Amos, what about the Marines? What are
you doing with your nondeployables?
General Amos. We don't have, because our deployment
schedule is a little bit--nondeployables make up Marines that
are fixing to, at the end of their service, some are wounded
and they are attached to our Wounded Warrior Battalions. Our
numbers are significantly smaller. Those that are in our
Wounded Warrior Battalions are just exactly like General
Chiarelli talked about. Their primary focus on life is to get
well, and we work with them and care for them. That number is
reasonably small. But because of the 7-month deployments, what
this allows us to do to those Marines that would normally be
towards their end of service and maybe not deployable for a
lengthy deployment, the 7 months allow us actually some more
flexibility and allows us to harvest out and get those Marines
and put them in.
We have also offered bonuses for Marines that will stay and
extend. In other words, if you have only got 5 months left on
your contract, and instead of becoming a non deployable, if you
want to stay with your unit, which is exactly what most
soldiers and most Marines want to do, they want to deploy. They
may not want to re-enlist, but for a small amount of money, we
can afford them the opportunity to stay and complete that
deployment. So we are trying to be creative to keep a lot of
those. There is a portion of them, now, that we actually put in
the training pipeline. In other words, they are back at Lejeune
and Pendleton and out at 29 Palms, and because of their combat
experience they have become role players, they become mentors,
they become trainers for the Marines for the units that are
actually going through. So there is nobody sitting around
lamenting the fact that--we are actually using them.

LAND WARRIOR

Mr. Dicks. Okay. I have another quick question for General
Chiarelli. Tell us about the land warrior equipment. When I was
out at Fort Lewis, they told me that this was, that they had I
guess it was one of the Stryker Brigades had used it, and
everybody thought it was a huge success. Tell us about this.
What is this, I guess as I understand it is technology that
enhances communications and situational awareness.
General Chiarelli. It is an amazing piece of kit. And I
think it is going to be revolutionary. And I think that the
Stryker Brigade, the first one that used it came back and
indicated that they were much more effective in this kind of
fight that we are in. I will tell you that, for this Committee,
that that first piece of kit that we issued and what it does do
is it provides situational awareness and allows you to provide
down to that soldier level through an eyepiece that he looks
into, where all his buddies are and anybody else who is
approaching his position that is using this kind of gear. So it
gives him unbelievable situational awareness and ability to
pass down information. It comes at a total weight of 10 pounds.
We have improved that through battery technology down to 8.5
pounds. And we are coming out with a new system called ground
soldier ensemble which will get even lighter. But this is one
of those instances where we have added to the soldiers weight
but the soldier is more than happy to carry it because of the
extra capability it gives them in the fight.
And I agree with you, it was the soldiers at Fort Lewis who
used the very first models of this who came back and said, this
is something we just have to have.
Mr. Dicks. And what about, how will this play out in
Afghanistan? Is this something that we are going to need in
Afghanistan?
General Chiarelli. We will have it in Afghanistan with one
of the units we are sending over now, Congressman, from Fort
Lewis.
Mr. Dicks. Yeah. Five Two.
General Chiarelli. Five Two will go over with it and we are
very, very excited about collecting the data to see how
effective it is in that kind of environment.
General Chiarelli. Thank you.
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you very much. I have to say in listening
this morning, certainly thinking about Afghanistan, the
relationship between weight and endurance in a mountainous
terrain concerns this Member. And I know we have talked a lot
about alternatives to carrying all that weight and not knowing
all of the encounters that our soldiers will have. Some of the
information in the record here about, or in the testimony
relating to upper body endurance decreasing 60 percent for
periods during which that soldier has to walk 10 to 15 miles is
a pretty stark figure. And I know the generals are more aware
than anyone what this actually means.
Congresswoman Granger talked about back injuries, and for
the individual body armor, it states here in the testimony,
actually of General Chiarelli, that 48 percent of the soldiers
who wore that for 4 hours or more, 70 percent had neck and back
pain, and that from the years 2004 to 2008, low back, mid upper
back neck pain were the chief complaints of soldiers seeking
care, and that injury is likely to be greater in Afghanistan,
given the higher elevations and steep rugged terrain. So I am
asking myself here, you know, you generals have really
incredible responsibility here to try to provide our soldiers
with the greatest ability for success in their mission with
this incredible weight.
I mean, it is unbelievable what they are doing. But this is
just a huge burden and we worry about, I worry about
maneuverability. I worry about endurance. I mean, each of us
have been at places in our lives where you knew you were at the
edge of your endurance, and that is not a very good feeling.
And so I just wish you well in your efforts. And this committee
stands ready to support you in any way that we can.
I was going to ask Mr. Young if he had any concluding
comments at this point.
Mr. Young. Madam Chairman, I want to thank General
Chiarelli and General Amos for being here today and for working
so hard on this issue. But I especially want to thank the two
sergeants who came in carrying their heavy load to demonstrate
for the members of the Committee just exactly what it is we are
talking about. We can talk about it a lot. But we understand it
a lot better when we really see it. So thank you very much for
inviting the two sergeants in.
And Madam Chairman, it has been a good hearing and thank
you very much.
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Young.
And we would like to thank, again, General Chiarelli and
General Amos formally this morning for your appearance. For the
sergeants who so ably represented your services, thank you.
Thank you for your commitment to our country. For all those who
have attended, and I want to thank the subcommittee this
morning. You have been fantastic. Thank you very much.
The Committee will adjourn until 1:30 this afternoon,
Wednesday, March 11. At that time the Committee will hold a
hearing in closed session on the readiness of the Army and the
Marine Corps.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the
answers thereto follow:]

Combat Loads Contributing to Injuries

Question. In a February 1st, 2009 article in the Washington Post,
the Marine Corps Commandant General James Conway is quoted as saying
``We are going to have to lighten our load.'' In the same article,
General Chiarelli, referring to the fact that injuries are forcing more
soldiers to stay at home, making it very hard for the Army to fill
units for upcoming deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq, you are quoted
saying ``There is no doubt that [in] our non-deployable rates, we're
seeing an increase. I don't want to see it grow anymore.'' General
Chiarelli, you indicated that the number of total non-deployables, for
the Army, has risen by an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 since 2006, putting
the current number of non-deployables at about 20,000.
Just how much total weight are our Soldiers and Marines asked to
carry on foot patrol including body armor, food, water, weapon,
ammunition, and communications gear?
Army Answer. Today, the average Soldier load consists of a
rucksack, weapon, ammunition, helmet, and other gear; the total weight
can range from 63 to 130+ pounds depending on the variables of mission
type, duration, and environment. On patrols in Afghanistan, the
Soldier's load is approximately 125 pounds. In addition, the individual
components of Individual Body Armor (IBA) worn by Soldiers ranges from
2.5 pounds (side plate carriers) to 9.6 pounds (outer tactical vest) to
10.5 pounds (front and back Enhanced-Small Arms Protective Inserts
(ESAPI) ballistic plate inserts); the total weight for a full set of
IBA range in weight from 26 pounds to over 41 pounds. These extra
pieces not only add more weight, but the cumbersome gear often hinders
Soldier movement.
Marine Corps Answer. Marines carry equipment based on their billet,
mission, environment, and enemy threat. The Marines and sailors load is
composed mainly of equipment that is basic to all billets and then
unique equipment associated with the specific billets and missions. The
basic equipment is usually in the 75-90 pound range depending upon the
individual Marine's size. However, additional equipment and ammunition
is usually required based on the task organization requirements and
duration of the missions.
A survey was conducted with 2nd Battalion 7th Marines deployed to
Afghanistan from April 2008 to November 2008. This post deployment
survey was conducted in January 2009. The battalion did not have any
trends of weight related injuries.
Enclosure/Table 1 graphically illustrates the weight carried by
each Marine by billet and the variance in weight by billet.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6260A.055

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6260A.056

Infantry equipment can be consolidated into six basic categories:
personal protective equipment, weapons, ammunition, optics and sensors,
and sustainment miscellaneous equipment (i.e., water). Enclosure/Table
2 illustrates the weight per individual broken out into the six
categories.
The load a Marine or sailor carries varies, but this data set
represents the range of loads that are actually carried by Marines and
sailors in Afghanistan.
Question. General Amos and General Chiarelli, what is the
prevalence of injuries that can be attributed to the weight of the load
that our Marines and Soldiers must carry?
Army Answer. Currently, there is no scientific evidence to support
a causal relationship between Soldier load and the musculoskeletal
injuries being incurred in theater. Clinical presumption and anecdotes
are driving current discussions. In pursuit of reliable data we have
begun to submit protocol proposals to the newly (2009) established
CENTCOM Institutional Review Board (IRB) for approval to deploy US Army
Institute of Environmental Medicine (USARIEM) investigators to both
theaters. To date, there has been some data collected on types of
musculoskeletal injuries and conditions in-theater. Investigators in
one study showed that of the 48% of Soldiers who wore the Individual
Body Armor (IBA) for 4 hours or more, 70% had neck and back pain.
Another study queried Soldiers deployed in 2003 and 2004. Responses
indicated that the back was the most common site of injury (32% low
back, 9% mid back and 6% neck). In addition, 68% of medical evacuations
to pain management centers from Iraq were for spine pain. From Jul 04
to Oct 08, low back, mid/upper back, and neck pain were the chief
complaints of Soldiers seeking care from physical therapists (Combat
Support Hospital: 22%, 7%, and 5%, respectively, and Brigade Combat
Teams (BCTs) 23%, 8%, and 6%, respectively). Still, other data
collected by a physical therapist assigned to a BCT reveals the
following breakdown of musculoskeletal injuries: 22-25% low back, 6-10%
mid back, 4-10% neck, 19-22% shoulder, and 25-44% lower extremity. It
is imperative that future research studies continue to focus on the
prevalence of injuries that can be attributed to the weight of the load
that our service men and women must carry. Meanwhile, we must continue
to pursue ways to reduce the heaviness of the combat loads being
carried by Soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Marine Corps Answer. Our data indicates that a large percentage of
non-battle injuries are due to musculoskeletal injuries (approximately
40%). Weight load may play a role in some of these injuries but its
exact contribution is not certain as the Marine Corps has not been
systematically collecting the necessary data elements to perform an
appropriate analysis. Going forward, the Marine Corps is currently
evaluating what data elements are essential to better address this
topic.
Question. Are the type of injuries that are caused by heavy loads
generally the sort that heal fairly quickly or are we facing large
numbers of long-term rehabilitation and permanent disability?
Army Answer. Soldiers have only been wearing this load in a
prolonged repetitive manner during combat conditions or approximately 5
years (short-term). Therefore it is difficult to draw any
scientifically valid conclusions about long-term effects and
rehabilitation. However, the Army is in the process of conducting
studies to examine the short- and long-term impact of load carriage on
the musculoskeletal system as well as studying preventive interventions
that may be helpful. For instance, the Military Performance Division of
the US Army Research Institute for Environmental Medicine (USARIEM) has
several ongoing dies addressing these issues to include studying the
``Effectiveness of Core Stabilization on a Soldier's Ability to Carry a
Load'', ``Effects of the New Plate Carrier System on Body Mechanics and
Physiological Responses to Carrying a Load.'' In an effort to address
injury prevalence and activities associated with injuries, USARIEM and
the Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (CHPPM) is
surveying a group of Soldiers deploying to Theater. This study proposes
to survey injured Soldiers in a support battalion as well as an
infantry battalion to determine the cause of injury and identify
potential risk factors with a goal of creating a predictive model that
allows one to identify or predict the types of injuries Soldiers may
encounter by military occupational specialty and activity. Finally, the
University of Pittsburgh in collaboration with the 101st Airborne
Division (Air Assault) is attempting to link the demands of training
and military operations to injury and performance outcome testing by
analyzing the biomechanics, musculoskeletal, physiological and
nutritional profiles of Soldiers at the 101st. The bottom line is that
the Army is addressing this issue in a multifaceted manner by
conducting research, improving physical conditioning to optimize
performance, incorporating injury's prevention methods, and pursuing
lighter protective equipment.
Marine Corps Answer. Most injuries are temporary in nature and heal
fairly quickly. By definition, sprains, strains and stress fractures
fall into this category. There will certainly be service members who
will experience more serious injuries, however we have not seen a
significant change in the referral pattern to the Physical Evaluation
Board that would imply that large numbers of these types of injuries
are occurring.
Question. Is there a basic load weight beyond which the frequency
of injuries grows dramatically?
Army Answer. There are currently no known scientific studies that
can confirm the causal relationship between load weight and the
frequency and severity of injuries. However, multiple studies
illustrate how carrying a heavy load can cause pain, reduce
performance, and increase fatigue. In one study, Special Forces
Soldiers carried loads of 75, 106, and 134 pounds for 12.5 miles (as
fast as possible) with three days of rest between trials. Results
indicated that Soldiers complained of 37% more back discomfort with the
134 pound pack than with the 106 pound pack. Additionally, their
marksmanship performance declined 66% for the first minute after the
march, but at two minutes post-exercise their performance was similar
to pre-march performance. In another study, infantry Soldiers carrying
a load of 101 pounds for 12.5 miles had a decrease of 26% in
marksmanship (number of targets hit), a 33% increase in distance from
the target center and an increase in back pain compared to pre-load and
march scores. Other studies showed that after wearing Individual Body
Armor (IBA) and walking for 30 minutes on a treadmill, upper extremity
muscle endurance decreased 60% and lower extremity muscle endurance
decreased 15%. As muscle endurance decreases, the risk of injury
increases. This factor is further compounded when Soldiers are then
asked to conduct operations in uneven or mountainous terrain or conduct
lengthy urban operations.
Marine Corps Answer. Individual tolerances to load weight occur
along a continuum. We have no data that points to a specific load at
which injuries become significantly more likely.
Question. How many Marines and how many Soldiers are currently in a
non-deployable status due to injuries that can be linked to the weight
of the individuals' basic load?
Army Answer. Although we are seeing an increase in musculoskeletal
injuries related to deployments, there are currently no scientific
studies available that can confirm this causal relationship between
Soldier load and musculoskeletal injury.
Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps does not currently have a
method in place to track the number of Marines that are in a non-
deployable status due to sustained injuries related to their combat
load.

Body Armor

Question. When anyone attempts to address the problem of reducing
the weight of the load the individual soldier or Marine must carry, the
first thing that comes to mind is usually body armor. For many soldiers
and Marines, body armor is also the heaviest single item in the load.
Body armor has saved many lives. But it is very heavy and any weight
that can be taken out of body armor without sacrificing protection is
worth pursuing.
What are the various types of body armor, including for the Special
Forces?
Army Answer. The Army issues Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) to all of
its Soldiers. IBA has a modular capability and can be reconfigured by
the commander to meet their mission and threat requirements. As of 11
May 09, the Army will issue a plate carrier to one battalion in 4th ID,
which is the same plate carrier that SOCOM issues to US Army Soldiers
in its units.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6260A.057

Marine Corps Answer. The four types of body armor currently in use
by the Marine Corps are the Modular Tactical Vest (MTV), Outer Tactical
Vest (OTV), Scalable Plate Carrier (SPC), and Full Spectrum Battle
Equipment (FSBE). The MTV offers the greatest area of soft armor
coverage, and is used by Marine units deployed to the MARCENT Area of
Operations (AO) in support of both Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The MTV was fielded in response to an
Urgent Universal Needs Statement (UUNS) issued by in-theater units. The
OTV remains the Program of Record body armor system for the Marine
Corps and is issued to Marines and units that are not deploying to the
MARCENT AO. The OTV is issued to Marines in between deployments to the
MARCENT AO for use in training. The SPC is the lightest set of body
armor utilized by the Marine Corps. The reduction in weight is made
possible by a decrease of the soft armor area of coverage. The SPC was
also initiated through the submission of an UUNS. It is intended for
use by infantry units deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF), as well as Combat Vehicle Crewmen deployed to any theater in
support of combat operations. FSBE is a specialized body armor variant
used by U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC),
Reconnaissance units, Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO),
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), Marine Security Forces Battalion,
Fleet Antiterrorism Security Teams (FAST), and the helicopter assault
company from within the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) assigned to a
Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).
Question. What comprises a set of body armor?
Army Answer. A set of Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) consists of the
Outer Tactical Vest (OTV) or the Improved Outer Tactical Vest (IOTV), a
set of Enhanced Small Arms Protective Inserts (ESAPI), the Deltoid
Auxiliary Protection (DAP) and the Enhanced Side Ballistic Inserts
(ESBI). The Army is in the process of transitioning from OTV to IOTV.
The IBA provides protection against fragmentation and small arms
ammunition.
Marine Corps Answer. Body armor consists of the carrier, ``soft
armor'' Kevlar inserts, and ``hard'' ceramic plate inserts. The carrier
is the frame, and holds the soft and hard armor inserts. ``Soft''
Kevlar inserts provide ballistic protection against fragmentation and
9mm caliber ammunition, and when inserted into the carrier, protect a
large portion of a Marine's torso. ``Hard'' ceramic plates, called
Enhanced Small Arms Protective Inserts (ESAPI) provide protection
against higher caliber ammunition. They cover the most vital areas of a
Marine's torso: front, back, and sides.
Question. What do the various parts weigh, such as side armor and
deltoid armor?
Army Answer. The weights of Interceptor Body Armor components for
size large are as follows: The Outer Tactical Vest weighs 10.6 lbs +
Deltoid Auxiliary Protector at 5.5 lbs + the Side Plate Carriers at 2.5
lbs gives the set a total weight OTV of 18.6 lbs.
The Improved Outer Tactical Vest weighs 13.2 lbs + Deltoid
Protector at 2.5 lbs brings the total weight IOTV of 15.7 lbs. The
Enhanced Small Arms Protective Inserts weigh 12.5 lbs and Enhanced Side
Ballistic Inserts (ESBI) weigh 5.0 lbs.
Marine Corps Answer. The Modular Tactical Vest (MTV) is composed of
the carrier with soft armor inserts (15.5 lbs), front and back ESAPI
plates (12.5 lbs combined weight for size large), and two Side-ESAPI
plates (combined 4.6 lbs). The system, in size large, weighs a total of
32.6 lbs.
The Outer Tactical Vest (OTV) is composed of the carrier with soft
armor inserts (12.3 lbs), front and back ESAPI plates (12.5 lbs
combined weight for size large), and side ESAPI plates (4.6 lbs). Total
system weight in size large is 29.4 lbs.
The Scalable Plate Carrier (SPC) is composed of the carrier with
soft armor inserts (8.8 lbs), front and back ESAPI plates (12.5 lbs
combined weight for size large), and side ESAPI plates (4.6 lbs). Total
system weight in size large is 24.9 lbs.
The Marine Corps does not use deltoid armor.
Question. What is the total weight of each type of body armor
currently in use?
Army Answer. The charts below shows the weight comparisons of body
armor currently in use by US Army Soldiers:

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6260A.058

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6260A.059

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6260A.060

Marine Corps Answer. The total weight of each type of body armor
currently in use is as follows:
Modular Tactical Vest (MTV) = 32.6 lbs
Outer Tactical Vest (OTV) = 29.4 lbs
Scalable Plate Carrier (SPC) = 24.9 lbs
Question. Apparently, some commanders have requested a type of body
armor called ``Plate Carrier'', which is considerably lighter than
regular body armor. Do you favor ``Plate Carrier'' as an alternative to
regular body armor?
Army Answer. Yes. I am in favor of plate carriers as an additional
capability for commanders when conditions, e.g. enemy and/or terrain,
means weight savings and requirements for mobility outweigh the extra
protection provided by the Outer Tactical Vest/Improved Outer Tactical
Vest. In order to develop an operational requirement, the Army will
evaluate selected plate carriers in a Soldier Protection Demonstration
in May 2009.
Marine Corps Answer. We are fielding the Scalable Plate Carrier
(SPC) in addition to the Modular Tactical Vest (MTV). This provides
commanders in the field with the flexibility to equip Marines based on
operational requirements in consideration of the threat, environmental
and operating conditions. The SPC is not a replacement for the MTV,
which is our primary protective body armor. The SPC is roughly seven
pounds lighter than the MTV but provides less coverage. It is used with
the same Enhanced Small Arms Protective Inserts (E-SAPI) as the MTV and
in the body areas covered by the E-SAPIs, the protection is identical.
The SPC allows for greater mobility with reduced thermal stress in high
elevations, thick vegetation and tropical environments than the MTV.
Question. Is the wearing of body armor ever optional?
Army Answer. There is no DA policy mandating the wear of body
armor. Decisions regarding body armor are left to Commanders at the
appropriate level based on sound tactical and operational requirements.
When making decisions regarding body armor, the overriding concern of
Commanders is the welfare of Soldiers.
Marine Corps Answer. Yes. The intent of the Marine Corps' policy
defining Armor Protection Levels (APL) is to establish standards to
enable commanders at the Lieutenant Colonel-level and above to tailor
protective postures for their units based on the threat, climatic or
other conditions, and based on guidance or direction from Service or
theater combatant commanders. The lowest level of protection does not
require body armor. Higher levels of protection require the Scalable
Plate Carrier (SPC) or the Modular Tactical Vest (MTV) to be worn. The
highest level adds the the Enhanced Small Arms Protective Inserts (E-
SAPI) to either the SPC or the MTV.
Question. In the near term and long term, what is within the
reasonable art of the possible for body armor? How can we achieve
better protection with less weight?
Army Answer. The Army's Science and Technology (S&T) programs are
pursuing performance enhancements through advances in high performance
ballistic fiber and textile technologies, transparent polymers,
composites, nanotechnology, and materials systems integration. The goal
of this research is to produce lighter materials that will provide the
same level of protection at significantly reduced weights. Efforts will
continue to focus on collaboration with the medical S&T community to
understand the effects of body armor designs on the human body. This
collaborative approach seeks to provide holistic ballistic and blast
protection to enhance Soldier survivability.
Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps uses a combination of
continuous strategic market research, Quarterly Industry Days, and the
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program to leverage both
Industry and the Research and Development communities. As it relates to
body armor and reducing weight, the Marine Corps is currently pursuing
SBIR efforts in the areas of developing a lighter weight Enhanced-SAPI
(E-SAPI) plate. Within the current technology, lighter weight can only
be achieved by trading off areas of coverage within the overall design
of the system. Long term efforts to reduce the overall weight of body
armor is likely to be contingent upon the development of a
revolutionary new material that can meet, or exceed, current
performance requirements.
Question. Are adequate inventories of body armor available for
training and combat operations in the Army and Marine Corps?
Army Answer. The Army has procured sufficient quantities of
Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) for combat operations and training
requirements. The Army is currently procuring an Improved Outer
Tactical Vest (IOTV) for the IBA to replace the older Outer Tactical
Vests. The priority for fielding of the IOTV is deployed and deploying
Soldiers. The Marine Corps will respond to you directly regarding their
inventory and availability of body armor for training and combat
operations.
Marine Corps Answer. Yes, the Marine Corps has adequate inventories
of body armor available for training and combat operations.

Land Warrior

Question. For a number of years the Army experimented with a
technology designed to take communications and situational awareness to
the level of the individual soldier. However, size, weight and power
supply concerns eventually resulted in program termination. At
approximately the same time one battalion set of equipment was put into
service on an experimental basis in Iraq, in a Stryker unit. The Land
Warrior equipment was found to be very desirable. Army equipment
developers have resurrected the Land Warrior technology in the Soldier
Ensemble program.
How much weight does the Land Warrior component that included in
the Soldier Ensemble add to the load the individual soldier must carry?
Army Answer. The Land Warrior capability currently fielded to the
5/2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) adds approximately 13.3 lbs to
the Soldier's load. The Land Warrior program was terminated in FY07 and
is fielded to the 5/2 SBCT as an interim solution. The Ground Soldier
Ensemble (GSE) program was established as a program of record in FY09
and passed Milestone A in January 2009. The GSE program is undergoing
engineering development prototyping and design refinement that will
determine the final weight of the ensemble. The threshold weight
requirement is 14 lbs and the objective weight requirement is 10 lbs.
Question. As research and testing continue, what is the objective
weight for this communications technology?
Army Answer. The Ground Soldier Ensemble (GSE) is the program of
record that replaces the Land Warrior capability that has been fielded
to the 5/2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) as an interim solution.
The GSE program is undergoing engineering development prototyping and
design refinement that will determine the final weight of the ensemble.
The threshold weight requirement is 14 lbs and the objective weight
requirement is 10 lbs.
Question. Does the radio in the Soldier Ensemble replace any other
radio that is currently carried?
Army Answer. The radio in the Ground Soldier Ensemble (GSE) will
not replace any other radio that is currently carried. The initial
versions of the GSE will use the Combat Net Radio System (CNRS) as
Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) and replace the CNRS with the
rifleman radio of the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) family of
radios as GFE when it is available.
Question. What is the weight of the spare batteries for the Soldier
Ensemble that a soldier must carry?
Army Answer. The Land Warrior program was terminated in FY07. There
are two battery sizes used for the current Land Warrior system fielded
to 5/2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team as an interim solution. The LI-145
weighs 2.25 lbs and the LI-80 weighs 1.15 lbs and are used as the
mission (long or short) dictates. The current program of record, Ground
Soldier Ensemble (GSE), may use these batteries, but the GSE is
currently undergoing engineering development prototyping and design
refinement. Advances in battery technology that provide lighter more
powerful energy sources may be applied to GSE when they become
available and other techniques to reduce battery weight may be used,
such as improved power management and components that consume less
power.

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) to Reduce Injuries Due to
Heavy Loads

Question. The Army has formal and informal Tactics, Techniques and
Procedures for doing about everything. Often the best, most effective
way of doing something in the Army is figured out by the soldiers and
sergeants and later is adopted by the Army and taught in the school
house.
What Tactics, Techniques and Procedures have been developed to help
foot Soldiers and Marines deal with all the gear they have to haul with
them, including their own personal gear and the Soldiers' share of
platoon equipment such as climbing gear or various weapons, ammunition,
and sensors?
Army Answer. The Army has formal and informal Tactics, Techniques
and Procedures (TTP). New TTPs that are adopted by the Army and taught
in Army schools are often developed by Soldiers and sergeants at the
lowest levels. Over the course of a deployment, Soldiers become more
astute at cross-loading gear between patrol members. Soldiers identify
multifunctional equipment to reduce redundant items. They emphasize
carrying only mission essential items, leaving behind non-essential
equipment. Soldiers conceal and cache water and food at forward
locations for use at a later date and for re-supply. Soldiers have
effectively planned and used helicopter sling load operations and
aerial resupply operations. Currently in Afghanistan an average of 11.7
short tons of supplies--to include liquids--are delivered per day to
Soldiers via air drop. Over the past 12 months this averages roughly
750,000 to 800,000 pounds of air-dropped supplies per month. Some
extraordinary situations permit Soldiers to incorporate the use of pack
animals, such as the regular resupply efforts for several austere
Observation Posts in Afghanistan and the use by US Army Special Forces
in Afghanistan since 2001. Even when these TTPs are incorporated into
missions, Soldiers often carry three days of supplies for a 24-hour
patrol.
Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps is proactive in its approach
to lightening the combat load that Marines carry in the field. We are
pursuing solutions and exploring future initiatives that range from
using new, lightweight materials, to policies designed to tailor armor
protection levels that match threat conditions, to the use of robotics
to assist in carrying unit equipment. We are keenly aware that the
heavy loads carried by our Marines impact their endurance,
effectiveness, mobility, and lethality as they fight lightly equipped
irregular forces in places like Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Marine Corps has invested heavily in ``Lighten the Load''
initiatives through the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab and the Marine
Corps Systems Command through the Program Manager, Marine Expeditionary
Rifle Squad (PM MERS). It is important to note though, that many of the
best tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment ideas have been
developed by individuals and small units during training and while
deployed. The Marine Corps is committed to finding and following the
best methods to ``lighten the load,'' improve individual mobility, and
thereby enhance the survivability of our Marines in combat.
The Marine Corps completed an extensive survey of individual
Marines from December 2007 to February 2008, which determined that most
survey participants believed that excessive combat loads negatively
impacted their performance. Many of the lessons learned in this survey
have been successfully addressed, and continue to impact the design,
procurement, and testing of individual equipment.
The Marine Corps focuses on incorporating high performance,
lighter-weight materials for individual weapons, ammunition, personal
protective equipment (PPE), and uniform items. This focus has resulted
in the development of such items as the Scalable Plate Carrier (SPC)
for Marines deploying to Afghanistan. The SPC offers the same level of
ballistic protection as the Modular Tactical Vest (MTV) in a
configuration well-suited for the difficult terrain of Afghanistan. The
SPC has achieved a 7.7 pound, or 24% reduction in weight from the MTV,
which significantly increases individual mobility and maneuverability.
Surveys and After Action Reports have told us that Marines have a
strong preference for this system over the MTV. As a result, we have
transitioned the SPC to be a program of record and are expanding the
Acquisition Objective (AO) to 65,000 systems to equip the Marine Corps'
entire Ground Combat Element (GCE).
Another item that Marines have expressed their support for is the
Enhanced Combat Helmet. The Commandant recently made the decision to
pursue the new helmet, which will be made of a new material that
improves ballistic protection without increasing the weight of the
helmet. In fact, the new helmet, which is shaped like the Army Combat
Helmet, will actually weigh slightly less than a current helmet.
Other examples of reductions in equipment weight help illustrate
the success the Marine Corps is achieving in this critical area. In
response to comments from Marines deployed to Afghanistan, we are now
developing the 3 Season Sleep System (3S). There is a compelling need
in Afghanistan for a sleeping bag that increases thermal protection and
comfort at reduced weight and volume. The 3S gains 15 degrees
fahrenheit of protection, reduces weight by one pound, and reduces
volume by 15 percent as compared to the existing Modular Sleep System.
Question. Are Soldiers trained and inspected on how to pack gear
for the best distribution of weight?
Army Answer. Yes, soldiers are trained and inspected on how to pack
gear in basic training and when they get their unit of assignment. The
Soldier is taught the importance of packing his gear beginning in Basic
Training, focusing on weight distribution to prevent injury and
accessibility. This training is constantly reinforced in our
operational units. Prior to going out on mission, leaders conduct
inspections to ensure their Soldiers have the right equipment and it is
packed properly. Our modular (molle-system) packs and required
equipment can be modified for each mission. Leaders balance the benefit
of reducing the weight our Soldiers carry with the risk of not having
necessary equipment available if needed. During pre-combat inspections,
Soldiers are inspected on the packing of their gear for the best
distribution of weight. Our current Army Combat Uniform (ACU) rucksacks
and ballistic vests are designed to assist the Soldiers by allowing for
a more effective distribution of weight based on mission requirements.
Marine Corps Answer. During entry-level and throughout their career
progression courses, Marines are taught that it is a unit leaders'
responsibility to plan for and conduct inspections prior to every
tactical evolution. The Marine Corps includes pre-combat checks and
inspection tasks for individuals, unit leaders, and small units in our
Training and Readiness Manuals. Inspections of all types receive close
attention by unit commanders and the pre-combat checks focused on the
proper preparation and fit of individual equipment are among the most
important of these inspections.
Because of the rapid fielding and improvement of individual combat
equipment, the Marine Corps has also produced a number of media tools
and training opportunities that help train individual Marines and their
leaders on the proper adjustment, fit, and wear of the individual body
armor. Many of these tools are available online and are accessible from
Marines' home computers. Experience has shown us that training is a key
component of ensuring Marines wear their equipment for optimal fit,
function, and weight carriage. The use of New Equipment Training Teams
(NETT) has also allowed us to go directly to the Marines to support the
fielding of new equipment.
Question. Is there a hierarchy of what gear is left behind beyond a
certain load weight?
Army Answer. There is not an Army-wide standardized hierarchy of
what gear is left behind beyond a certain weight. After considering the
mission profile and the anticipated threat level, commanders exercise
command judgment to strike an appropriate balance between the dual
imperatives of ensuring maximum feasible individual force protection
and the requirement to accomplish the mission. In addition to
individual protective equipment, the commander must also identify
mission critical unit equipment to bring on the operation. Once these
decisions are made and approved by the higher level chain of command,
noncommissioned officers then enforce this load discipline and monitor
Soldier well-being and safety.
Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps emphasizes the conduct of
mission analysis and estimates of the situation. This essential
leadership step allows unit leaders to appropriately plan for their
mission, which includes planning to bring the gear and equipment
necessary to accomplish their assigned tasks, and to plan for
contingencies such as emergency resupply and requesting support from
adjacent units. This planning evaluates guidance from unit commanders,
environmental conditions, and the enemy threat.
Many individual Marines surveyed by the Marine Corps Warfighting
Lab indicated they believed the authority to designate appropriate
levels of personal protective equipment should be delegated to unit
commanders. Consequently, the Commandant of the Marine Corps recently
adopted a service policy granting the authority to determine the
appropriate level of individual armor protection to unit commanders,
lieutenant colonel and higher. This policy, which does not interfere
with Joint or Theater Combatant Commanders' established policies,
allows Marine commanders to appropriately scale personal protective
equipment to meet the mission, environment, and threat in order to
achieve optimum individual combat loads.
Question. Do units sometimes bring along extra soldiers in order to
carry mission critical equipment?
Army Answer. When the Army develops combat systems, we integrate
the materiel solution with doctrinal concepts, organizational design,
training programs, leader development, personnel requirements, and, if
necessary, facilities in order to create the required combat
capability. Many items of combat equipment require multiple soldiers
not only to carry but also to employ the system effectively. For
example, we often cross load ammunition among multiple soldiers for
unit weapons systems not only to lighten individual loads but also to
ensure adequate quantities of ammunition make it to the objective.
Likewise, an assistant gunner for a machinegun crew will not only
assist with target location but will also carry the tripod to lighten
the gunner's load. Our process for developing combat capabilities
accounts for these soldier load and system employment considerations in
determining organizational designs and personnel requirements.
Therefore, it would not be correct to state that units sometimes bring
along extra soldiers in order to carry mission critical equipment. If
the equipment is mission critical, then the soldier is also critical to
the unit's ability to accomplish the mission.
Question. Do units sometimes bring along extra Marines in order to
carry mission critical equipment?
Marine Corps Answer. Units conduct pre-mission planning to
determine the number of personnel, weapons, equipment, and logistics
required for a particular task. In the event that a unit leader
determines he requires additional personnel, it is up to them to
identify their requirement up their chain-of-command for resolution.
I should point out that the Marine Corps rifle squad is a 13-man
unit, whereas an Army squad is composed of 9 men. The greater size of
Marine rifle squads allows a unit to spread their combat and mission-
specific equipment across a greater number of individuals. In addition,
the Marine Corps is procuring the Infantry Automatic Rifle to replace
the M-249 Squad Automatic Weapon. This new lighter, more portable
accurate weapon will consume less ammunition while making the
individual Marine lighter and more lethal.
Question. What lessons have been learned thus far from operations
in Afghanistan about dismounted, backpack operations in rugged and high
altitude terrain?
Army Answer. The: leaders of the Army units operating in this
rugged terrain have recognized that in order to defeat a highly mobile
adversary, who is familiar with the terrain and often carries 75-100
pounds less in gear than our Soldiers, that operational changes and a
lightened load were needed in the execution of missions. Over time
these units have increased small unit operations that use a variety of
patrol and infiltration routes, and create a smaller signature and a
reduced resupply burden. These units have learned to conserve
ammunition, food, and water, and to use clandestine cache sites and
other resupply techniques such as helicopters, sling loads, and air
drops. Brigade Combat Team and Battalion Commanders have authorized
changes to the equipment posture to reduce weight and to match the load
to the mission and the threat. Junior leaders in these units have
adapted planning methods to identify multifunctional equipment and
tailor loads based on the mission and the environment while also cross-
loading mission essential equipment within the patrol. The Army
recognizes the importance of replicating this demanding environment at
the Combat Training Centers and home station pre-deployment training.
Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned is
the repository of lessons learned from combat and is available to all
Marines on the unclassified NIPR network. Each deploying infantry
battalion produces lessons learned briefs that address a range of
topics, but nearly always include observations about the impact of
terrain and climate on individuals.
Units deploying to Afghanistan report that individual combat loads
can often exceed 110 lbs. The earliest lessons learned from Afghanistan
have directly impacted the decision and design of the Scalable Plate
Carrier and Enhanced Combat Helmet.
Operations are best conducted by small units, who are able to move
more effectively than larger units. These operations are often
conducted for durations of up to a week because of the physical toll of
moving in mountainous terrain.
In conducting estimates of the situation, it is necessary for units
at all levels to conduct risk vs. mobility calculations. Small unit
experiences in Afghanistan have established new movement rate factors
for both dismounted and vehicle operations. Both dismounted and vehicle
operations are significantly impacted by the difficult terrain. Across
the board, unit commanders point to the training of their small unit
leaders, Corporals and Sergeants, as one of the best investments that
can be made to ensure successful operations in Afghanistan.
Question. What if anything has been done to improve the physical
fitness of Soldiers to enable them to endure the weight of the pack?
Army Answer. The Army Physical Fitness School at Fort Jackson,
South Carolina has drafted a new doctrine called Army Physical
Readiness Training (Field Manual 3-22.20 / near-final draft) that
aligns our physical fitness doctrine with our current operations and
training doctrine. The Army's Training and Doctrine Command has already
posted the draft manual on the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) for
implementation and use by our leaders and Soldiers. The new Army
Physical Readiness Training focuses on improving Soldiers' aerobic
endurance, muscular strength, muscular endurance, power, and movement
proficiency which physically prepares Soldiers and units to meet the
physical demands of full spectrum operations.
Prior to the release of our new doctrine, many units across the
Army, with the assistance of subject matter experts, had adopted a
variety of injury prevention and performance enhancement physical
fitness programs. For example, Special Forces and many Brigade Combat
Teams have implemented programs that, in addition to traditional
aerobic exercise, emphasize core strengthening, short term bursts of
power, and speed and agility drills.
Additionally, prior to deployment, Soldiers wear their gear with
increasing frequency to build physical endurance for long-duration
missions.
Question. What if anything has been done to improve the physical
fitness of Marines to enable them to endure the weight of the pack?
Marine Corps Answer. In MARADMIN 579/06 the Marine Corps announced
a Concept for Functional Fitness designed to provoke debate within the
Marine Corps on the most effective approach for preparing Marines
physically and mentally for the demands on combat.
The Functional Fitness Program is the commander's program. This
program allows flexible, adaptive training that is focused on
individual and unit requirements. Unit commanders preparing their units
for operating in mountainous terrain of Afghanistan, for example can
tailor their program to the specific physical rigors they expect to
face. Marines, as combat athletes, need a comprehensive fitness program
that will develop the physical skills necessary for combat; including
core strength, endurance, speed, and coordination. The Marine athlete
should be prepared for the physical challenges of combat with a program
that develops both General and Specific Physical Preparedness--a
program that integrates strength training based on functional, compound
movements with multi-disciplinary speed, agility, and endurance
training. The program should be intense and infinitely varied. The
program must also be interesting--we want Marines to stick with it, and
from all indications, it is working. Marines are excelling in the most
demanding combat environments because of their preparation, training,
and focus on injury prevention.
The Marine Corps Combat Fitness Test (CFT) is being implemented as
a means of evaluating functional fitness by replicating a variety of
physical challenges that Marines face in combat. The CFT measures
readiness by requiring Marines in boots and utilities to sprint a timed
880 yards, lift a 30-pound ammunition can overhead from shoulder height
repeatedly for two minutes, and perform a maneuver-under-fire event.
The maneuver-under-fire event is a timed 300-yard shuttle run that
requires Marines to pair up by size and perform a series of combat
related tasks.

Training

Question. The Committee understands that Soldiers and Marines carry
combat loads often exceeding 100 pounds which limits their mobility and
over time may cause stress injuries. The Committee also understands
that to be ready for tough combat, the Soldiers and Marines must
receive tough training.
While training at home station, do Soldiers and Marines carry the
same equipment and weight that they will carry when deployed to
Afghanistan?
Army Answer. Yes. Based on their anticipated mission, unit pre-
deployment training plans routinely include activities such as road
marches or negotiating stairs and obstacles with weighted vests and
rucksacks to simulate combat load equivalent weights.
Unit commanders seek all reasonably available means to simulate the
environmental conditions anticipated during the deployment. An
individual Soldier's equipment weight is often determined by whether
operations are mounted or dismounted, the duration of the operation,
the frequency that the Soldier wears all of his equipment, and by
individual duties.
Some unique items of equipment, such as special radios, are
provided in the theater of operation. The units simulate the weight of
the items when wearing their equipment for physical conditioning.
Marine Corps Answer. Marines train with the same individual
equipment that they will deploy with. They will also train with the
same type of major end items (i.e. Humvees, mortars, etc.), but will
fall in on the equipment sets already in theater when they arrive in
Afghanistan. This is the same procedure as Iraq.
Question. What sort of physical conditioning is done to prepare
Soldiers and Marines for the heavy loads they will have to carry in
Afghanistan during home station training?
Army Answer. Units most apt to carry heavy loads will invest
additional time in more comprehensive physical fitness opportunities
such as weight training, obstacle courses, combative activities, and
timed distances marches over uneven terrain with their equipment. For
example, Special Forces and many Brigade Combat Teams have implemented
programs that, in addition to traditional aerobic exercise, emphasize
core strengthening, short term bursts of power, and speed and agility
drills.
Exercise periods are conducted with sufficient intensity,
frequency, and duration to maintain adequate cardio-respiratory
endurance, muscular strength and endurance, flexibility, and body
composition.
Rather than just emphasizing aerobic and muscular endurance, the
new draft Army doctrine, Army Physical Readiness Training (Field Manual
3-22.20 / near-final draft), focuses on improving Soldiers' aerobic
endurance, muscular strength, muscular endurance, power, and movement
proficiency which physically prepares Soldiers and units to meet the
physical demands of full spectrum operations.
Marine Corps Answer. A combination of strength, mobility and
anaerobic/aerobic endurance training is conducted by Marines prior to
deployment. A typical week's physical training plan includes load
bearing conditioning hikes, weight lifting using compound functional
movements and agility training such as sprint workouts with changes of
directions and jumps. The goal of pre-deployment physical training is
to enhance a Marine's physical capacity across a broad spectrum of
physical skills. All training is done in a progressive manner with
controls applied such as programmed rest to allow for adaptations and
to mitigate injuries.
Question. How is physical fitness maintained once the unit has
deployed to Afghanistan?
Army Answer. Many Soldiers maintain fitness through the routine
execution of rigorous combat operations on difficult terrain and under
various, often heavy loads. Physical Training (PT) programs vary by
location and mission. Most locations offer access to a variety of
physical fitness equipment and facilities. Units have a variety of PT
plans based on mission, time, and troops available. Soldiers have also
demonstrated remarkably innovative methods of constructing PT equipment
and facilities in austere conditions. In addition, much of the Army's
Physical Fitness Training Manual (FM 21-20) is dedicated to exercises
that can be performed without the use of equipment, such as partner
resisted exercises and calisthenics.
Marine Corps Answer. During deployment, Marines remain fit through
the conduct of rigorous missions under demanding operational
conditions, augmented by the continuous unit and individual physical
fitness training which is a vital element of our Marine Corps regimen.
Question. How do the Army and Marine Corps prepare soldiers for
high altitude operations such as those they will perform in
Afghanistan?
Army Answer. The Army prepares Soldiers to conduct high-altitude
operations by ensuring they are in the best physical condition possible
prior to deploying. Soldiers conducting rigorous physical fitness
training will more readily adapt to the demands of high-altitude
operations. While units may not have the opportunity to train in
mountainous areas, Soldiers can and do conduct physical training
wearing their combat gear and incorporate road marches over uneven
terrain and negotiate obstacles while wearing their equipment. High-
altitude oxygen levels are difficult to replicate prior to arriving in
theater, but the Soldiers adjust their physical conditioning activities
upon arrival in theater to further improve themselves prior to assuming
mission.
Marine Corps Answer. Fortunately, our Marine Air Ground Task Force
Training Center (MAGTFC) in 29 Palms, California and our Mountain
Warfare Training Center (MWTC) in Bridgeport, California closely
approximate the environmental conditions (to include altitudes) found
in Afghanistan Regional Commands (RC) South and East. Marine units
deploying to RC South conduct their mission rehearsal exercise (MRX) at
29 Palms prior to deploying. Marine Embedded Training Teams (ETTS)
deploying to RC East in Afghanistan conduct their pre-deployment
training at the Mountain Warfare Training Center (MWTC) in Bridgeport,
California, where the altitude ranges from 6,800 to 11,300 feet and
there is significantly complex, compartmentalized terrain. At these two
operational venues, Marines conduct a number of tactical exercises
while exposed to Afghanistan-like environmental conditions.

Data Collection at Point of Injury

Question. The Military is not making informed decisions on
improving Tactical Combat Casualty Care or body armor because currently
the Department is not collecting the data. 67% of the wounded are
returned to duty in theater, and many of those are not treated in a
hospital. As a result, we have almost no information on what medical
care was provided at point-of-injury. The OSD Committee on Tactical
Combat Casualty Care states that less than 1% of all wounded has
complete documentation.
Changes to training and equipment for first responders are the
result of anecdotal ``lessons learned'', not data-based best practices.
Without systematic data collection and analysis, far-forward medical
care cannot improve.
What data would be beneficial in your minds to lighten or alter
current body armor?
Army Answer. The following data would be important when assessing
possible modifications to body armor: type and frequency of injury,
activity that resulted in the injury, content of combat load carried,
type of body armor, location (distance traveled, speed, grade),
environment/climate conditions, length of patrol (days), prior training
history with current equipment/load, fitness level (aerobic capacity,
muscle strength, Army Physical Fitness Test), anthropometrics (body
weight, height), medical history for previous injuries and predisposing
conditions, job duties, physical activity within country and
demographics (number of deployments, gender, age, education, etc). It
would also be beneficial to know how well the body armor fits, if it is
comfortable, and the frequency and duration that it is being worn.
Data are being collected from numerous sources: the Army Joint
Theater Trauma Registry and the Navy Trauma Registry collect extensive
medical data on wounded in action service members and tracks combat
injury patterns, general wound trends, treatments and outcomes. The
Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner (OAFME) collects medical
injury data, to include full-body CT scans on every returning killed in
action service member and has received over 900 pieces of personal
protective equipment (PPE). PEO-Soldier analyzes PPE received by the
OAFME and has implemented PPE collection teams in Iraq to collect body
armor from wounded-in-action personnel. The data collected includes the
PPE and the available operational and intelligence data surrounding the
event. The Army National Ground Intelligence Center tracks operational
and intelligence data that surrounds fatal and/or wounding incidents.
The Army Research Laboratory analyzes selected injury-producing
fragments to identify new or unique characteristics.
The Joint Trauma Analysis and Prevention of Injury in Combat
program combines the analysis of operational/intelligence, material
performance (PPE and vehicular), and medical outcome data from combat
incidents and integrates the data into actionable information.
Equipment Analysis characterizes damage to the PPE from the wounding
incident and drives requirements and design decisions and to develop
biomedical standards. Threat and Operational Analyses look at weapon
and material performance, threat trends, and incident lessons learned.
Medical injury and outcome analyses lead to evidence-based changes in
clinical practice and treatment. Actionable information derived from
these analyses have led to direct feedback to combatant commanders to
alter tactics, techniques, and procedures; confirmed the presence of
weapons of interest; and guided program managers as they make equipment
and vehicle modifications and upgrade decisions.
Marine Corps Answer. Optimally, we would like to lighten the
service member's combat load without compromising protection from
injury from every weapon system, including IED devices. This is a
complex risk/benefit analysis that requires careful study. Lighter
armor that does not adequately protect a Marine from known hazards is
not acceptable but neither is armor that is unnecessarily heavy.
Question. Changes in force protection issues (e.g. body armor, eye
protection) are not informed by point-of-injury medical information.
Without this data it is impossible to know if recalled body armor
performed to standard, and what changes are needed to improve body
armor. Additionally, data on body armor success are lost when service
members are treated and returned to duty, so the Army may accidently
decrease protection. Data collected on body armor use at the hospital
is error-prone and incomplete--it is something best collected by the
first responder, not the surgeon.
If data is not collected adequately, how will increasing/decreasing
the weight of body armor alter protection of the soldiers?
Army Answer. Battlefield point-of-injury medical information is
valuable in helping to inform Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
decisions. However, point of injury data is difficult to collect due to
the constraints of time and distance on the battlefield while working
to keep wounded Soldiers alive. Arguably, point of injury data is not
the only source of information for helping DoD in making these
important PPE-related decisions. PPE development, fielding, and recall
decisions should be informed by data collected from all available
sources to include point of injury data, ballistic testing, research
and development and experimentation data, intelligence analysis,
operational risk analysis, and modeling and simulation programs.
Point of injury data provides the developers and managers of PPE
with valuable information, however, is often insufficient to fully
inform PPE decisions. For example, the Rapid Equipping Force (REF)
developed a project to provide lightweight plate carriers to infantry
units operating in the mountains of Afghanistan. The plate carriers
would lighten the physical load and reduce thermal load on Soldiers as
they fight an unencumbered enemy at elevations of 6,000 to 8,000 feet.
To inform Senior Army Leadership decisions, the REF sought point of
injury data from Joint Trauma Analysis and Prevention of Injury in
Combat (JTAPIC) and U.S. Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity
(AMSAA) to help inform the decision for a plate carrier. Specifically,
REF requested all gunshot wound data for all US Soldier combat
casualties in Afghanistan for the year 2008. Data provided included
only the gunshot wound points of entry for Soldiers killed in action
during 2008. While information provided tremendous insight to the Army
in their equipment selection process, collecting data took extensive
man-hours and provided a limited data set. Furthermore, the data
provided did not include the key information requirements of caliber of
munitions and wounds that caused Soldier mortality.
Bridging the gap of information, REF requested extensive ballistic
testing throughout the decision-making process, including Army standard
protocol ballistic testing and special follow-on ballistic testing. REF
also sought significant intelligence information from the warfighting
J2 and the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC). In addition, REF
requested the Army Research Lab's (ARL) support in conducting modeling
and simulation to characterize the risk to the Soldier wearing a
smaller vest know as the Modular Body Armor Vest (MBAV). ARL modeled
injury analysis based on NGIC threat information and the
characteristics of the MBAV.
Testing and analysis included actual threat ammunition and
specialized gel frames that simulate human soft tissue and the actual
MBAV coverage area. ARL conducted additional ballistic testing and
extensive modeling to reliably predict both the severity and
probability of injury to the Soldier based on both the Enhanced Small
Arms Protective Insert (ESAPI) and soft armor coverage of the Soldier
against threats the Soldier would likely face in this specific area of
operations. The ARL data included several thousand gunshots against
virtual Soldiers using specifically controlled variables to include
muzzle velocity, caliber, point of aim, and human vital organ location
relative to the edge of the MBAV, to name just a few. Again, while
point of injury data is valuable in making PPE decisions, it is not as
complete in comparison to using point of injury data used in
conjunction with the data collected through ballistic testing,
intelligence and modeling and simulation.
In summary, the REF utilized 2008 JTAPIC gunshot casualty data and
additional ballistic, intelligence and modeling/simulation data to
assist in determining the impact of the reduction in level III a (soft
armor) coverage area of the MBAV. Additional gunshot ``wound'' data
would have strengthened the analysis, but it was not available. The
advantages of the approach used by the REF include:
(1) Infinite number of data points: ARL was able to simulate 15000
shots in three hours; JTAPIC data only included double digit (actual
number classified) shots throughout 2008.
(2) Wide Range of threat: Using AMSAA data, ARL was able to conduct
analysis simulating fragmentation (grenade), Assault Rifle (AK-47),
Machineguns (PKM) and sniper weapons. JTAPIC casualty data did not
identify threat weapon or caliber of threat round
(3) Experimental Control: Variables can be isolated; confidence in
results can be increased through repetition; and results can be more
precisely documented.
Additional potential improvements that should be considered:
Although the modeling data provided greatly informed the decisions by
Army Leadership, both ARL and Natick Soldier Research Development and
Engineer Center have identified a shortcoming with the existing Soldier
performance models. The models do not take into account the degradation
and optimization of Soldier performance based on load or other enhanced
capabilities relative to the risks of threats. A modeling tool that
incorporates the threat modeling with soldier performance modeling
would best show tradeoffs in protection and Soldier performance.
Also, the medical and intelligence communities would benefit from
new tools that assist care providers in quickly collecting vital
information about Soldier wounds. Medical professionals must quickly
triage, stabilize, treat and evacuate our wounded Soldiers in combat.
The tools available to medical professionals today lack sufficient
capability to clearly and quickly collect detailed point of injury
data. Such tools that help medical care providers quickly characterize
our Soldiers' wounds would be invaluable in informing PPE decisions in
the future. NGIC recently approached the REF with the concept of a tool
that can assist first responders with the capability to collect wound
data and associated threat data at the point of injury. This tool, if
developed, could potentially allow more complete battlefield point-of-
injury medical information collection that will not interfere with care
provided to the injured Soldier.
Marine Corps Answer. Data on the effectiveness of body armor
against a particular threat or set of threats is analyzed extensively
before body armor is procured and fielded. Additionally, it is tested
continuously as part of the acquisition process. If that test and
evaluation did not happen then we would run a very probable risk of
fielding body armor without truly understanding what capability we are
or are not providing to our Marines, regardless of its weight.
Additionally, when equipment such as body armor is fielded, we
routinely conduct user surveys and follow-up evaluations to ensure that
equipment is meeting mission requirements.

Data Collection at Point of Injury

Question. Limited medical intelligence on the effectiveness of
enemy weapons is being gathered because of the lack of data collection.
U.S. forces are unable to detect minor changes to enemy weapons and
tactics, they can only respond to major changes in hospitalization
trends--which means a missed opportunity to prevent the injury.
What data are currently being collected to determine what body
armor would benefit a soldier in a specific AOR or theater?
Army Answer. Data is being collected from numerous disparate
sources: the Army Joint Theater Trauma Registry and the Navy Trauma
Registry collect extensive medical data on wounded in action service
members and tracks combat injury patterns, general wound trends,
treatments and outcomes. The Office of the Armed Forces Medical
Examiner (OAFME) collects medical injury data, to include full-body CT
scans on every returning killed in action service member and has
received over 900 pieces of personal protective equipment (PPE). PEO-
Soldier analyzes PPE received by the OAFME and has implemented PPE
collection teams in Iraq to collect body armor from wounded-inaction
personnel. The data collected includes the PPE and the available
operational and intelligence data surrounding the event. The Army
National Ground Intelligence Center tracks operational and intelligence
data that surrounds fatal and/or wounding incidents. The Army Research
Laboratory analyzes selected injury-producing fragments to identify new
or unique characteristics.
The Joint Trauma Analysis and Prevention of Injury in Combat
program combines the analysis of operational/intelligence, material
performance (PPE and vehicular), and medical outcome data from combat
incidents and integrates the data into actionable information.
Equipment Analysis characterizes damage to the PPE from the wounding
incident and drives requirements and design decisions and to develop
biomedical standards. Threat and Operational Analyses look at weapon
and material performance, threat trends, and incident lessons learned.
Medical injury and outcome analysis lead to evidence-based changes in
clinical practice and treatment. Actionable information derived from
these analyses have lead to direct feedback to combatant commanders to
alter tactics, techniques, and procedures; confirmed the presence of
weapons of interest; and guided program managers as they make equipment
and vehicle modifications and upgrade decisions.
Marine Corps Answer. No specific data collection is underway at
this time. The Marine Corps has three principal means to collect data
and/or identify operational deficiencies. The first is through the
Urgent Needs Process, whereby Marine units can identify deficiencies
utilizing and Urgent Universal Need Statement (UUNS). The value of the
UUNS is that it is submitted via the chain of command so that everyone
can rapidly be informed of the deficiency and can take immediate steps
to validate it and correct it. The second is through ongoing collection
efforts at the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL). MCCLL
archives all collected information, analyzes it, creates and
distributes reports throughout the Marine Corps. These reports often
provide the basis for making equipment decisions. Thirdly, individual
Marines may submit suggestions and recommendations or identify
deficiencies, via Email, telephone or mail, to the Marine Enhancement
Program (MEP). The MEP serves to rapidly address requirements,
particularly in infantry units.

Preventative Care and Operational Deployments

Question. The military departments have been focusing on
identifying and mitigating health risks associated with heavy combat
loads, through preventive and protective measures associated with
deployments.
What specific preventative measures are being taken?
Army Answer. In general, carrying excessive loads may cause
injuries or pain to the spine, lower extremities, and shoulders. Proper
strengthening, conditioning, and training can help mitigate the risks
associated with heavy combat loads. Many units use physical therapists
to assist them in injury surveillance, data collection and injury
prevention, as well as developing performance enhancement programs. The
Ranger Regiment, Special Forces and several brigade combat teams (BCTs)
have programs that emphasize core strengthening, muscle power, speed,
and agility drills which not only strengthen the muscles that protect
the spine, lower and upper extremities, but also improve the
physiological responses to exercise. The Center for Health Promotion
and Preventive Medicine (CHPPM) worked with the Army Physical Fitness
School from 2001-2005 to develop, improve, and test the new Army
Physical Fitness doctrine called Physical Readiness Training (PRT).
They evaluated the PRT concept for its injury reduction potential at
Individual Entry Training, Advanced Individual Training and operational
Army infantry training (Fort Polk, 4th Bde of the 10th Mountain (MTN)
Div). The program for 10th MTN involved PRT exercises, core
strengthening, a decrease in running to three days a week or less and
aggressive strength training in multiple planes using pull-up bars, dip
bars, etc. This resulted in a 20% reduction in overuse injury rates.
The Rangers also used a performance enhancement program and had similar
results. BCTs use their physical therapists to develop performance
enhancement programs that reduce injury rates and improve overall
fitness.
Marine Corps Answer. To prevent musculoskeletal injuries, Marines
remain fit through the conduct of rigorous missions under demanding
operational conditions, augmented by the continuous unit and individual
physical fitness training which is a vital element of our Marine Corps
regimen. Appropriate Operational Risk Management (ORM) procedures have
been established to assess and mitigate risk with physical training
while deployed.
Question. How do you sustain the programs that have been created to
ensure a healthy force?
Army Answer. The Army Physical Fitness School at Fort Jackson, in
collaboration with the Center for Health Promotion and Preventive
Medicine (CHPPM), researched our physical fitness doctrine and found
our current model that emphasizes aerobic and muscular endurance does
not correlate well with the physical fitness requirements of current
combat operations. To fill this gap, the Physical Fitness School
designed a new doctrine called Army Physical Readiness Training (Field
Manual 3-22.20) that aligns with our current operations and training
doctrine. Army Physical Readiness Training focuses on improving
Soldiers' aerobic endurance, muscular strength, muscular endurance
(anaerobic endurance), power, and movement proficiency (incorporates
balance, flexibility, coordination, speed and agility) which physically
prepares Soldiers and units to conduct full spectrum operations. In
addition, physical therapists assigned to the brigade combat teams,
Special Operations units, and Initial Entry Training, serve as subject
matter experts in injury prevention and performance enhancement. In
this role, they assist unit leaders in developing programs that, in
addition to traditional aerobic exercise, also emphasize core
strengthening, muscle power, and speed and agility drills. Physical
therapists also spend significant time educating the leadership on
proper training techniques, conducting injury surveillance and
reporting the trends back to the leadership who then modify the
training based on the injury data. There are multiple injury prevention
and performance enhancement programs across the Army, run by unit
leaders with the advice and assistance of physical therapists. Proper
injury surveillance, injury prevention and performance enhancement
necessitates a concerted effort between the unit leadership, physical
therapists, other medical personnel, CHPPM personnel, clinical
researchers, and other Army proponents such as the Comprehensive
Soldier Fitness Program. This requires an investment in research
protocols that help identify best practices and assist in standardizing
these programs across the Army.
Marine Corps Answer. Effective sustainment is accomplished by
adequately resourcing and managing programs. Periodic program review
and inspection are other program quality controls.
Question. How have changes in the school house been implemented
based on injuries sustained during deployments?
Army Answer. Lessons learned from current operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan and research conducted by the United States Army Center for
Health Promotion and Prevention Medicine (USACHPPM), the Army Physical
Fitness Research Institute (APFRI), and the U.S. Army Physical Fitness
School (USAPFS) have resulted in significant changes in physical
readiness training in the Institutional Army (school house). The
training base has placed greater emphasis on physical conditioning to
prepare our Soldiers for the rigorous demands of combat. These changes
are most evident in Initial Military Training--Basic Combat Training,
One Station Unit Training, Advanced Individual Training, and the Basic
Officer Leadership Course. A key difference is placing less emphasis on
the Army Physical Fitness Test and greater emphasis on physical
conditioning and readiness. In basic combat training, Soldiers wear
body armor, helmets, and carry their weapons to a much greater extent.
Soldiers do more marching with rucksacks and other loads. The physical
readiness program places greater emphasis on nutrition and lessons
learned from sports medicine on how to avoid injury. Drill Sergeants
and other IMT Cadre have modified their physical conditioning programs
to account for the overall lower physical fitness of the teenage
population volunteering to serve. They have changed fitness readiness
training with a number of initiatives including a program called ``Four
for the Core'' which focuses on the core muscles groups as they are
actually used in the Army. Strengthening these core muscle groups helps
to reduce injuries. Additionally, Drill Sergeants and other Cadre train
proper lifting and loading techniques. The Army is staffing a new
manual--FM 3-22.20 Army Physical Readiness Training. The new manual--
based on the best practices of physical fitness training and sports
medicine includes greater emphasis on all the components--muscular
strength, muscular endurance, aerobic endurance, anaerobic endurance,
and mobility.
In our officer and noncommissioned officer courses, the Army is
educating its leaders how to plan and conduct physical readiness
training, teach nutrition, and train Soldiers to be ``Tactical
Athletes,'' who are prepared for the rigorous physical demands of
combat. Officers and noncommissioned officers learn that improved
physical fitness can lessen the chance of injury but there are physical
limits to how much weight a Soldier can safely carry. Junior leaders
learn how to plan patrols and other operations to limit the loads
placed on their Soldiers. They further learn the importance of
supervision and pre-combat inspections to prevent Soldiers from adding
unnecessary weight to their loads.
Marine Corps Answer. A comprehensive review of USMC fitness
programs began in Nov 2006. Key outputs of this review resulted in the
following changes to Physical Training (PT) programs in Entry Level
Training (ELT) and in guidelines for commanders in designing unit PT
programs: Greater emphasis on anaerobic (short burst) capacity, de-
emphasis of long distance running, increase in body movement skills
(agility) and increase in progressive load bearing capacity. These
changes are reflected in PT application, testing, and also in education
of Marine leaders in the Training and Education continuum. Nutrition
education begins in boot camp conducted by Semper Fit and continues in
the T&E continuum as well.
Question. How have physical fitness tests been updated to reflect
the current conflicts ``lessons learned''?
Army Answer. The lessons learned from the operational environment
have been applied to physical fitness training. Army training policy
states, ``Commanders will conduct physical training programs that
enhance Soldiers' abilities to complete Soldier or leader tasks that
support the unit's Mission Essential Task List . . . .'' This focus
ensures that Soldiers can accomplish their assigned tasks in combat
versus pass a physical fitness test.
Lessons learned from the current operating environments in Iraq and
Afghanistan led to a thorough review of physical fitness training and
testing. This caused a shift from physical fitness training and testing
to physical readiness training and assessment in support of full
spectrum operations that we are conducting in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Specifically, commanders have increased emphasis on total body muscular
strength, flexibility, and anaerobic training to increase operational
effectiveness and reduce the risk of injury associated with load
carriage.
Marine Corps Answer. In May 2008, the Commandant of the Marine
Corps (CMC) approved the Combat Fitness Test (CFT) which was
implemented in Oct 2008. It is designed to be a complement to the USMC
semi-annual Physical Fitness Test (PFT) which includes a 3 mile run,
abdominal crunches and pull-ups for males/flexed arm hang for females.
CFT events are: Movement to Contact (880 yd run), Ammo Lift (repetitive
overhead lift of a 30 lb ammo can for two minutes), and Maneuver Under
Fire. The last event is a 300 yd shuttle run which includes sprints,
numerous changes of direction, a fireman's carry, buddy drag, ammo can
carries and a simulated grenade throw. The CFT has helped shape USMC
fitness programs, which will serve to enhance combat-related
conditioning.

Airdrop Logistics Systems

Question. Soldiers and Marines on field operation must either carry
their supplies with them or receive periodic resupply in the field. The
Committee is aware that due to Afghanistan's rugged terrain and lack of
infrastructure the Army frequently uses parachutes to resupply units in
the field. Such airdrops use a variety of equipment and tactics to
accomplish the resupply mission.
What are the factors that influence the decision to resupply a unit
by airdrop?
Army Answer. Airdrop is a field service that can provide additional
flexibility to commanders. It makes it possible to support ground
operations that would otherwise be logistically infeasible. Airdrop
enables forces to rapidly resupply critical items over extended
distances directly to or near forward units when ground resupply is
otherwise impractical or cost/risk prohibitive.
Airdrop is often militarily advantageous because it permits
sustainment deliveries to units operating away from airfields and
landing zones or in remote, difficult to access terrain. Airdrop also
permits sustainment deliveries to units operating in hostile territory
where ground sustainment convoys become a combat power intensive
operation in their own right. Airdrop also allows the timely delivery
of combat forces and materiel, concentrated and in mass, in minimum
space and time (often with the element of surprise). Finally, some
airlift aircraft can accurately airdrop personnel and materiel in
conditions of poor visibility that would otherwise preclude air/land
operations (e.g., using the adverse weather aerial delivery system).
Marine Corps Answer. The factors influencing decisions to resupply
a unit by airdrop are:
1. Urgency. How fast does the unit need to be resupplied?
2. The distance between the unit needing resupply and the
resupplying base.
3. Surrounding terrain.
4. Air and ground threats to aircraft.
5. Rigging time of gear and equipment.
6. Availability of parachute riggers.
7. Aircraft availability.

Question. How many airdrop resupply operations occur on average in
a month in Afghanistan?
Army Answer. On average, there are approximately 40 resupply
operations during the winter months and 50 resupply operations during
the summer months. There are more during the summer months because
there are more operational missions during the summer.
Marine Corps Answer. On average, resupply air drops occur 40 times
during winter months and 50 times during summer months in Afghanistan.
Quantity difference is attributed to higher operational tempo in the
summer months.
Question. What is the tonnage of supplies delivered by airdrop in a
typical month in Afghanistan?
Army Answer. In Afghanistan, we currently average 366 tons of
supplies delivered via airdrop per month.
Marine Corps Answer. The typical monthly tonnage of supplies
delivered by airdrop averages 366.
Question. Please describe for the Committee the type of airdrops
that are used, such as high altitude vs. low altitude, and the
advantages and disadvantages of each.
Army Answer. During typical high altitude airdrop missions using
fixed wing aircraft, we drop supplies from between 1500,-3000, above
ground level (AGL). We can drop supplies from as high as 6000, AGL. We
base the use of high altitude airdrops mostly on terrain and/or threat
level. For low altitude airdrops, we can use Low Cost Low Altitude
parachute systems during which supplies are dropped from 150,-200, AGL.
High velocity (HV) parachutes are smaller in diameter and descend
at a faster rate. We use HV parachutes to target small drop zones (DZ).
We use HV parachutes on an average of six missions a month to deliver
durable commodities such as water and MREs. For example, two DZs are
only accessible through the use of HV parachutes because they are so
small in size (one has a 300 yard radius; the second measures 380 yards
110 yards). HV parachutes provide the ability to strike small
areas with greater accuracy, but HV parachutes tend to ``steal'' air
causing a few not to inflate thus destroying the load or just landing
hard. A 10% loss using this method is considered an acceptable loss.
Low velocity (LV) parachutes are larger and descend at a slower
rate. We use the LV parachute most often. LV parachutes provide greater
survivability of loads. A disadvantage of using LV parachutes is they
are a less precise method of delivery; strong winds can cause the
parachute to overshoot the DZ making it impossible to recover either
parachute or load.
Marine Corps Answer. Aerial Delivery Specialists speak in terms of
high velocity (HV) versus low velocity (LV) air drops.
Conventional high velocity (HV) parachute air drops are conducted
at altitudes of 1,500-3,000 ft above ground level (AGL). High velocity
(HV) parachute air drops are conducted an average of six times per
month. High velocity (HV) parachutes are primarily used with durable
cargo.
Advantage:
Conventional high velocity (HV) parachute air drops are more
accurate compared to conventional low velocity (LV) air drops.
Disadvantage:
It's possible that 30% of the cargo being air dropped will be
damaged.
Conventional low velocity (LV) parachute air drops are conducted at
altitudes of 150-1,250 ft above ground level (AGL). Low velocity (LV)
air drops are preferred for precious cargo.
Advantage:
The survivability of cargo being air dropped is higher compared to
high velocity (HV) air drops.
Disadvantage:
It's possible that 10% of the cargo being air dropped will be
damaged.
Joint Precision Air Drop System (JPADS) air drops are conducted at
altitudes of 4,000-24,500 ft mean sea level (MSL). The current Joint
Precision Air Drop System (JPADS) being utilized in Afghanistan is the
Joint Precision Air Drop System (JPADS) 2K Screamer, a system fielded
through rapid acquisition. However, the Joint Precision Air Drop System
(JPADS) 2K Firefly is the system of record and is currently being
fielded throughout the Department of Defense (DoD), and will replace
the Joint Precision Air Drop System (JPADS) 2K Screamer and Joint
Precision Air Drop System (JPADS) 2K Sherpa.
Advantages:
It allows the aircraft to stand off at a greater distance,
minimizing ground threats.
The aircraft stand-off will also enable clandestine resupply of
reconnaissance forces without giving away their positions.
Increased survivability of load.
The Joint Precision Air Drop System (JPADS) allows multiple loads
to be dropped from the same aircraft on one pass with different drop
zones programmed into the Airborne Guidance Unit (AGU).
Increased accuracy of desired point of impact.
Disadvantages:
Cost of system compared to conventional parachute systems.
The Airborne Guidance Unit (AGU) will need to be recovered.
Question. What types of parachutes are available for airdrop
logistics missions? Are they precision or non-precision parachutes?
Army Answer. We use five different types of non-precision
parachutes in Afghanistan. Three Low Velocity (G-11, G-12, Low Cost Low
Velocity) and two High Velocity (Low Cost High Velocity, 26 foot High
Velocity). The Firefly is the only precision parachute currently used
in Afghanistan.
Marine Corps Answer.
Non-Precision Parachute Systems (Conventional Parachutes):
1. G-11B
2. G-12E
3. G-14
4. A family of Low Cost Air Delivery System (LCADS), Low Cost Low
Velocity (LCLV) and Low Cost High Velocity (LCHV) parachute systems.
5. 26 Ft high velocity (HV)
Precision Parachute Systems:
1. JPADS 2K Firefly
2. JPADS 2K Screamer (current system being utilized in Afghanistan)
Question. Are the parachutes recovered after use?
Army Answer. The Low Cost Low Altitude parachutes are not recovered
after use. The receiving unit disposes of them. Less than 1% of the
parachutes returned are reusable.
Marine Corps Answer.
Parachutes are normally recovered; however, recovery can be waived
by units, depending on the tactical situation.
The Joint Precision Air Drop System Airborne Guidance Unit (JPADS
AGU) will need to be recovered.
Question. Are any airdrop operations accomplished by contractor
support?
Army Answer. Contractors do not build or inspect the loads. Product
Manager Force Sustainment Systems' Forward Service Representative (FSR)
at Bagram Airfield, provides technical support (maintenance, packing,
software updates to the GPS system, etc.) to the 95 Firefly parachutes.
Blackwater Aviation pilots fly the CASA 212/235 aircraft from which
military personnel drop loads using Low Cost Low Altitude parachutes.
Only military personnel are responsible for pushing the load out of the
aircraft. Blackwater Aviation employees are based out of Bagram
Airfield.
Marine Corps Answer. Xe (formerly known as Blackwater Company)
conducts a large percentage of the Low Cost Low Velocity (LCLV) air
drops out of CASA 212 aircraft. They currently conduct these air drops
three days a week, mostly to the Army Special Operations Forces.
Question. What is the cost of the various airdrop parachute
systems?
Answer. Costs vary from $539 to $36,000, as shown following.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Parachute System Cost
------------------------------------------------------------------------
G-11......................................................... $8,721
G-12......................................................... 3,769
Low Cost LV.................................................. 1,680
Low Cost HV.................................................. 539
26ft Ring Slot (High V)...................................... 911
Firefly precision parachute.................................. 36,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Marine Corps Answer.
1. Joint Precision Air Drop System (JPADS) 2K FireFly--$65,000
2. Joint Precision Air Drop System (JPADS) 2K Screamer--$30,000
3. G-11B--$8,721
4. G-12E--$3,769
5. G-14--$595
6. 26 Ft High Velocity (HV)--$911
7. Low Cost Low Velocity (LCLV)--$1,680
8. Low Cost High Velocity (LCHV)--$539

Multifunction Utility/Logistics and Equipment Vehicle

Question. The foot soldier has always carried a substantial load
including weapon, water, food and shelter. With advances in warfighting
technology the soldier's load has added body armor, batteries, mines
and platoon equipment. The Army may add to the soldier's load an
individual communications device such as Land Warrior, micro unmanned
air vehicles, various sensors, small robots, and more batteries.
Soldiers and Marines that fight on foot are experiencing increasing
numbers of stress injuries related to the heavy loads they carry.
However, one of the 14 systems of the Army's Future Combat Systems is
the Multifunction Utility/Logistics and Equipment Vehicle (MULE). It is
essentially a small robotic truck. The ``MULE'' is being developed in
three variants: armed, countermine, and transport.
Please explain for the Committee how the transport variant might
somewhat lessen the load for the foot soldier.
Answer. The MULE-T has the primary mission of supporting dismounted
infantry by transporting 1900 lbs, which is the equivalent of two
squads of equipment. Equally important, the MULE-T provides the
commander flexibly to support many missions. The MULE-T provides other
options or capabilities such as transporting other provisions necessary
to the mission: ammo, food, water, batteries; short-term emergency
casualty evacuation; integrated battery recharger; Chemical,
Biological, Radioactive, Nuclear detection systems; and Ground Mobile
Radio, which can provide a communications relay for dismounted
operations; and utilization as a resupply vehicle, to send back to
supply points.
The MULE-T is a force multiplier. It reduces potential injuries and
eases the wear and tear on the Soldier by shouldering much of the
Soldier's basic load. The MULE-T will enhance the dismounted Soldiers'
ability to engage the enemy after long marches over difficult terrain.
The MULE-T has demonstrated the mobility to keep pace with the
dismounted Soldier. The MULE Engineering Evaluation Unit (EEU) has
accomplished the following: climbed a Jersey barrier, traversed a 1-
meter step, negotiated a 1.8 meter gap and achieved speeds of 55kph.
This mobility supports the rigors faced by the dismounted Soldier, and
with a maximum speed of 65kph, the MULE can support and keep pace with
the mounted force.
Question. How useful would such a vehicle be in rugged, mountainous
terrain as encountered in Afghanistan? How useful would such a vehicle
be for the type of operations ongoing in Iraq?
Answer. Based upon the ability to negotiate 60 degree slopes, the
Tweel technology and the six-wheel independent articulating suspension,
the MULE would be very useful in both theaters of operation
(Afghanistan and Iraq). The MULE is a diverse platform, with three
variants: Armed Reconnaissance Vehicle-Assault (Light) (ARV-A (L)),
MULE-T and MULE-Countermine (MULE-CM). Employment in an operational
environment (OE) is dependent upon Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain,
Time Available and Civilians (METT-TC). Tactically, ARV-A (L) can be
employed to establish support by fire positions in all OEs, and it can
be utilized as the first asset to engage enemy combatants with its
firepower capabilities, thereby forcing the enemy to commit its
position, giving friendly forces the ability to maneuver and engage the
enemy out of contact.
The MULE-Transport can be used to carry two dismounted infantry
squads' combat equipment, or provide logistical support to mounted and
dismounted forces by carrying 1900 lbs of resupply, repair parts, squad
equipment, or perform emergency Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) to a
casualty evacuation point.
The MULE-CM, together with Ground Standoff Mine Detection System
(GSTAMIDS) capability, will support mounted force's movement through
mine detection and neutralization situations. The MULE-CM will have the
capability to detect, mark lanes, and neutralize anti-tank mines while
mitigating the warfighter's exposure to life-threatening situations by
placing an unmanned ground system in danger first.
Question. How is the MULE powered?
Answer. The MULE is powered by a diesel electric system. This
engine, when coupled with the generator, is capable of generating 116KW
(mech)/100KW (Elec) 610 Volt power. Power is generated to articulate
each of the six suspension arms independently on the platform. The
power also provides 610 Volts DC to power the mission equipment package
for the ARV-A (L) and MULE-CM. The 28 Volts DC is provided to run all
of the computers and electronic systems.
Question. Please explain how the autonomous navigation system
works.
Answer. The autonomous navigation system (ANS) has four basic modes
of operation: waypoint navigation or route following, leader-follower
(vehicle), leader-follower (soldier), and teleoperations. The ANS is a
unique combination of hardware (sensors), global positioning satellite/
inertial navigation system (GPS/INS), and navigation software that
takes sensor input and derives a safe and efficient path for the
unmanned platform to travel.
In the teleoperations mode the ANS provides situational awareness
and driver's aids to the operator including obstacle cueing and vehicle
orientation. The ANS is the primary driving and awareness sensors. The
sensors provide capability for daytime, low-light conditions, and
infrared sensors for nighttime operations.
Semi-autonomous operations are handled in several different modes.
In the leader-follower (vehicle) mode, the ANS receives position and
route information from the leader vehicle and commands the MULE to
essentially follow the same positions. The ANS also provides local
awareness and obstacle detection/avoidance in this mode, modifying the
route as required.
In the leader-follower (Soldier) mode, the ANS provides the same
services, as well as maintaining a safe distance from the followed
Soldier.
In the route-following mode, the ANS receives global information
from the network. The ANS develops routes and alternative routes,
utilizing models to select the best route to meet the mobility plan,
and then generates a route plan.
Question. Has the transport MULE demonstrated technology readiness
sufficient for fielding as part of the early spin out of FCS equipment
to light infantry forces?
Answer. No, the MULE is not ready for fielding under the early spin
out. The MULE is an integrated platform requiring not only its mobility
but the ANS, network communications (radio and waveforms) and the
Common Controller with its Battle Command Software to control the
platform. The MULE-T, as an integrated platform with all of the
supporting subsystems, is preparing for Integrated Qualification Test
(IQT) in May 2011.
The MULE Early Evaluation Unit has demonstrated the following
mobility: climbed a Jersey barrier, traversed a 1-meter step,
negotiated a 1.8 meter gap and achieved speeds of 55kph. The ANS, which
provides the critical sensors/software to conduct unmanned operations,
has demonstrated similar success during the summer of 2008 with
prototype testing at White Sands Missile Range. The ANS prototype
platform accomplished speeds of 36 kph with waypoint following with
obstacle avoidance, 40 kph under leader-follower conditions with
obstacle avoidance, and a maximum speed of 54 kph with waypoint
following but no obstacle avoidance.
Question. Will the MULE be part of the first FCS equipment spin
out? If so, what is the distribution plan?
Answer. No, the MULE is not part of the first FCS spin out effort
to the Early IBCTs. Currently, the MULE program will conduct a dual
Critical Design Review (CDR): the MULE-T CDR is scheduled for January
2010, and the ARV-A (L) and MULE-CM CDRs will be conducted in May 2010.
The MULE-T Individual Qualification Test (IQT) will start May 2011,
followed by the ARV-A (L) and MULE-CM IQT in November 2011. The MULE is
currently scheduled to be fielded as part of the Spin Outs to the
Threshold IBCTs in 2015.

Research in New Cargo Carrying Devices

Question. The Committee understands that the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency is conducting research projects in search of a
robotic pack mule. One project is referred to by the nickname ``Big
Dog.'' The device is about the size of a large dog. It has mechanical
legs, and can carry up to 340 lbs.
Has the Army or Marine Corps participated in the development phase
for this or a similar program?
Army answer. The Tank Automotive Research, Development, Engineering
Center (TARDEC), as part of the U.S. Army Research, Development, and
Engineering Command, has executed $2 million since 2003 to develop a
perception module for the ``Big Dog.'' TARDEC is actively participating
in DARPA's Source Selection Board for a follow-on effort to the ``Big
Dog.''
Marine Corps answer. The Marine Corps supported the most recent
development phase of Big Dog through a Memorandum of Agreement between
the Marine Corps and DARPA with a total Marine Corps investment of
$750,000. During this phase, the Marine Corps established a military
utility assessment of a legged robot carrying a 81mm mortar, bi-pod,
base plate, and support equipment (approximately 200 lbs) at the pace
of a walking Marine over a representative cross-compartment hiking
trail and for five miles on a flat surface. This assessment was
completed satisfactorily in August 2008.
Question. Does the Army or Marine Corps plan to transition this
device, or a similar device to a service program to develop a system to
move logistics with the soldier, and to take some of the weight out of
the soldiers back pack?
Army answer. The FCS MULE-Transport (approved in the FCS
Operational Requirements Document) is currently the Army program which
will provide robotic logistics support to the dismounted Soldier with a
Milestone C in 2013 and first unit equipped slated for 2014, but not
all units will be fielded the system. Because the FCS MULE effort
pursues a mounted formation construct and the Soldier load problem is
also associated with dismounted Infantry units not utilizing vehicle
support, the FCS MULE may not be suitable for all formations.
The Army and Marine Corps are assessing a variety of unmanned
ground vehicles to lighten the Warfighter's load, but outside of the
FCS MULE system, there are no other currently validated requirements to
support the initiation of a Service program.
The Army and Marines did assess the ``Big Dog'' and will assess its
follow-on Legged Squad Support System (LSSS) for military utility and
effectiveness through a series of Warfighter assessments. Currently,
there is no agreement on ``Big Dog'' in place between DARPA and the
Army on transition to program of record, acquisition, fielding and
sustainment. To entertain transition, the Army would have to endorse a
development path that DARPA constructs that would give confidence that
a reasonable Technical Readiness Level (TRL) could be achieved such
that the Robotic System Joint Program Office could complete
development. ``Big Dog'' is currently assessed at TRL 6 (System
Prototype Demonstration in a relevant environment) and this assessment
usually translates to several years required to mature to a producible
system, if fully funded. Currently, there is no plan to endorse the
development path. Based on current assessments, the potential for
operational employment of ``Big Dog'' is not viable in the foreseeable
future.
One system currently being assessed that shows promise is the Squad
Mission Support System (SMSS). A Limited User Test (LUT) is being
executed in 1st Quarter, FY10 with a follow on assessment in OEF during
2nd Quarter, FY10. The SMSS Technology Readiness Level (TRL) is 7/8 and
targets the immediate problem of robotic soldier load solution
integration. The Capabilities Production Document (CPD) will provide a
full and open competition solution within three years. The Subsequent
Product Improvement Program will reflect lessons learned.
Marine Corps answer. There is currently no plan to transition the
Big Dog or any similar legged robot to a service program of record. The
technology still requires considerable refinement before it has
operational utility. In view of the technological immaturity, DARPA has
developed a proposed follow-on project called the Legged Squad Support
System (LS3) which would build on the technical advancements made
during the Big Dog program. Should this program be approved, the Marine
Corps Warfighting Laboratory has expressed the intent to continue
involvement in the development and assessment of the military utility
of such technology in reducing the load of dismounted Marines and in
logistically supporting infantry units.
Question. What would be the desirable characteristics of a small
mechanical device to assist the dismounted soldier or Marine in
carrying essential gear?
Army answer. The following are the desirable characteristics of a
small mechanical device to assist the dismounted Soldier or Marine in
carrying essential gear:
--follow dismounted operator semi-autonomously (follow a designated
soldier's path)
--200 meters line of sight (Threshold); 1000 meters line of sight
(Objective)
--1.8 miles per hour steady march
--15 miles per hour burst speed for 200 meters
--capable of autonomous navigation to preprogrammed waypoints on
command; high mobility, agility and dexterity; laterally traverse--30%
slope; climb/descend--60% slope
--ability to avoid same obstacles as a Soldier
--sustainable/maintainable
--maintain operational readiness rate of 92%
--meantime between system abort--110 hours
--meantime between essential function failure--37 hours
--meantime to repair--not to exceed 30 minutes;
--maximum time to repair--10.5 hours
--place into operations within 7 minutes with no special tools; 700
lbs (Threshold); 1300 lbs (Objective) payloads
--low noise signature--operate at a noise level that will not
compromise the location of a squad
--Endurance--24 hours (Threshold); 72 hours (Objective) using
standard military batteries
--transportable/deployable--deployable by air, sea, and rail;
capable to be airdropped
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command began formal staffing of
the capabilities document for the Squad Multipurpose Equipment
Transport at the end of April 2009, focusing on leader/follower and
some semiautonomous movement (threshold payload--700 lbs) to lighten
Soldier load. The objective is approval of the capabilities document no
later than 1st Quarter, FY10 with a projected date for Initial
Operating Capability of 3rd Quarter FY12.
Marine Corps answer. There is currently no comprehensive Marine
Corps list of key performance parameters for mechanical devices.
However, several ``mechanical device'' approaches may have utility in
assisting the dismounted Marine in carrying essential gear: (1)
exoskeleton to assist the individual's innate strength and endurance,
and (2) a robotic ground vehicle. For the first approach to be feasible
would require that the system provide load bearing capability for a
representative militarily useful period of use (2 to 4 hours) across a
variety of terrain at a pace at least equal to dismounted forces, using
on-board power. For a vehicle to be useful, it would have to carry a
minimum of 450 pounds, be capable of keeping up with and following in
trace of dismounted forces in typical cross country terrain, and have
the capability of conducting a typical 24-hour profile with on-board
power or fuel. Ideally, a robotic ground vehicle would also be capable
of ``supervised autonomy'' following a designated Marine at an assigned
distance, following a roadway or trail, following GPS waypoints, and be
capable of obstacle avoidance. Both technology approaches must be
capable of operation with minimal sound signature and be maintained and
supported by infantry Marines with minimal training and without
detracting from their tactical responsibilities. Because of ongoing
experimentation, the Marine Corps is not prepared to formalize the list
of requirements or establish key performance parameters at this time.
Question. What are the obstacles facing current efforts to field a
mechanical mule?
Army answer. The biggest issues facing a mechanical MULE are
balancing a solution to various performance requirements for both Army
and Marine Corps units and unit types that provide military utility for
a MULE. These range from as simple as vehicle size (i.e. does it
support a team, Squad, platoon, Airborne, Air Assault?); mobility
requirements (i.e. should it support only dismounted Soldiers, should
it support both mounted and dismounted, what are the terrain profiles
it has to navigate?); technical supporting requirements (i.e. what
level of autonomy/control should it have, what level of anti-tamper
should be built into the system, what are its maintenance and repair
requirements, should it be air droppable?). Each of these requirements
can drive a drastically different material solution impacting both
technical and cost risks. The Army is developing a common MULE chassis
that will be used to support the Soldier logistics of two squads, mine
detection, and unmanned armed reconnaissance. These UGVs are designed
to support Soldiers in a following mode both when they're mounted and
dismounted.
Marine Corps answer. The Marine Corps has not developed a specific
requirement for a ground vehicle--a ``mechanical mule''--to
logistically support or lighten the load of dismounted Marines. Further
study to define the key performance parameters needed for such a
capability is necessary before the Marine Corps can determine if this
approach is supportable, affordable, and the best solution to the
identified problem.
Question. Are there any other technologies or devices that the
Services are looking into as well?
Army answer. The Army is pursuing multiple technologies that would
enable the Soldier to carry greater loads. The technologies fall into
two categories, (a) Soldier borne load carrying technologies and (b)
autonomous unmanned ground vehicles (UGV) technology similar to the
robotic pack mule.
The Natick Soldier Research Development Engineering Center (NSRDEC)
is pursuing two technologies to enhance a Soldier's ability to carry
heavy loads in the future. The eXOSkeleton (XOS) for logistic support
project is a powered, full body wearable robot for human performance
augmentation. XOS is expected to assist Soldiers by augmenting manual
handling/materials handling capacities up to 200 pounds (lbs). NSRDEC's
Enhanced Load Carriage for the Lower Body effort is focused on the
development of a simple lightweight, low-power, wearable leg brace type
device to increase Soldiers' load carrying capacity to 150 lbs with
reduced biomechanical stress to the user.
The Army is also developing the Multifunctional Utility/Logistics
and Equipment (MULE) Vehicle, a 2.5-ton Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV)
that will carry 1,900-2,400 pounds of equipment and rucksacks for
dismounted infantry squads.
Additionally, there are a number of smaller eXperimental Unmanned
Ground Vehicle (XUGV) efforts that Army Science and Technology (S&T)
uses as test beds for the purpose of developing and maturing
technologies for unmanned ground vehicles. Technologies under
development and/or maturation include safe operations (detect/track
moving objects), obstacle avoidance, and platform control ranging from
tele-operation to semi-autonomous (platform autonomy with Soldier-in-
the-loop).
Marine Corps answer. The Marine Corps has been observing Army
experimentation using robotic ground vehicles at Fort Benning and the
robotic vehicle being explored by the US Special Operations Command
sponsored Combat Autonomous Mobility System (CAMS) Joint Concept
Technology Demonstration. In addition, the Marine Corps Warfighting
Laboratory is exploring the utility of both autonomous ground and air
systems for sustaining dismounted forces in planned experiments during
July-August 2009 and has solicited industry response to a Request For
Proposal for current unmanned air delivery systems capable of
demonstrating tactical utility as early as this summer.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.]
Wednesday, March 11, 2009.

ARMY AND MARINE CORPS READINESS

WITNESSES

GENERAL PETER W. CHIARELLI, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY
GENERAL JAMES F. AMOS, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

Introduction

Mr. Murtha. This afternoon's hearing is on the readiness of
the Army and the Marine Corps.
I am going to put my whole statement that the staff
prepared in the record, but the meat of it is that only 8
percent of the Army is C-2 or better. Only 50 percent of the
Marine Corps is C-2 or better, and we know that is
substantially lower than it was just a few years ago. So our
problem is, what do we have to do in order to help you fix that
problem.
I know you are under orders from the White House. You can
only talk about certain things; you don't know exactly what the
White House is going to propose. But we have been working on
this subcommittee for years, putting reset money in, putting
all kinds of things in the budget which we think are so
important to the troops out in the field.
And there is a very small percentage of people who are
actually doing the fighting and very small percentage of
families that are actually involved. And we know how hard it is
on them. We want to help alleviate that as much as we can.
I know you are going to present us a better picture than we
see. But when I was in the field at Fort Carson, I haven't seen
as many complaints as I heard since 1974. And I talked to 12
people at Parris Island in 1974; I talked to 12 people at Fort
Carson just a few weeks ago. So as I have said over and over
again, our intelligence hadn't predicted anything, so none of
us know. But if we continue to stress guerilla warfare and wear
our troops down, if some other contingency happens, we are not
going to have what we need in order to meet that contingency.
So we appreciate your coming before the committee; we
appreciate your dedication. And you inherited a very difficult
job, both of you. And so I look forward to hearing your
testimony.
But we have a motion from Mr. Young.
Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, I move that those portions of the
hearing today which involve classified material be held in
executive session because of the classification of the material
to be discussed.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Young, comments?
Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the comments that you
made. And I think it might be helpful to the committee if we
had some examples of why the C-2 level, C-3 level, what
actually causes degradation of the standing, because sometimes
I understand they are not really that big a deal, but maybe
they are.
So I think it would be helpful for us to know that.
Mr. Murtha. General Chiarelli.

Summary Statement of General Chiarelli

General Chiarelli. Well, sir, as you know, we have and we
are moving to a readiness system that will take us in two
directions. One is, we will give you our rating on what our
core mission is--that mission for which the unit was designed,
as opposed to our deployment mission; that mission which the
unit is about ready to embark on.
Because of the demand on the force, a majority of our
forces are, in fact, training to and equipping to that mission
they are going to deploy on, which is much different than that
mission which they were designed for. And I think when you see
those low C-2 numbers in the Army--in fact, I know when you see
those low C-2 numbers--that is for core mission rather than the
mission they are about to deploy on.
And we deploy differently for that deployment mission with
much of the equipment that you pick up when you deploy, what we
call TPE, theater-provided equipment, that you fall in on when
you arrive.
A good example would be MRAP. We have only 25 MRAPs back in
the States today that we are training on. We are bringing back
another 26. We have one full motion simulation training at Camp
Shelby, and we will have another 13 fielded by October of this
year. So the training on MRAP right now, for the most part, has
to take place downrange, a conscious decision that we made.
Why? We made it because we felt it was more important to
put soldiers going into harm's way in MRAPs rather than bring
them back and be part of the training base.
So I think the C numbers you are seeing are because we,
with the demand on the force, with only having 1 year deployed,
1.3 months back at home, units are neither equipping nor
training for their C mission; they are training for that
mission they are about ready to deploy on, which is different
than that C-rating you read.
[The statement of General Chiarelli follows:]

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Mr. Murtha. General Amos.

Summary Statement of General Amos

General Amos. Sir, we have exactly the same system.
The C-ratings, of course, are a function of training and
personnel and equipment. As we talked before the hearing, we
ended up with people that are being pulled out of, and
equipment being pulled out of, units back in the rear, moving
forward. So all our forward deployed units, and I have got the
numbers here, are--94 percent of our units that are forward
deployed are what you would call C-1 or C-2.
But for that specific mission that they have overseas, we
have in Afghanistan a couple of units that are not C-1 or C-2,
and it is just simply a function of, they don't have enough
manpower. A couple of battalion, logistics battalion in
Afghanistan, it is not C-1 and C-2, but we are fleshing that
out with the advent of the forces or the influx of the forces
coming up.
But what you really have is, you have the sorts of this C-
rating which is the design mission of that unit. And we have,
for instance, two artillery battalions right now in Iraq, one
doing civil/military ops, the other doing security force
operations securing the bases, and they are not doing anything
with regard to artillery. They are C-1 and C-2 for the mission
assigned in Iraq, but they are C-3 and C-4 for their assigned
mission, which is their constant, everyday wartime mission.
So we have the same situation, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of General Amos follows:]

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Remarks of Mr. Murtha

Mr. Murtha. Well, we want to help you. When Bill Young was
the chairman we put a lot of money--and how much did we put in
there, Bill? We put $40 billion or $50 billion in--do you
remember--for reset and so forth over the last few years.
But we need some help. You get all kinds of rumors, which
systems are the most important. But we need you to tell us so
we can negotiate with the Defense Department about what we need
to do.
And we are going to have a supplemental here; we don't have
the exact schedule, but it has to be done before May or June,
or the Army will have a real difficult time. We want to make
sure we do the right thing in the supplemental in order to
increase readiness not only for the core mission or not only
for the mission that you have in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also
for the core mission, which is some contingency that happens
down the road.
But I appreciate what you are going through. And we talked
before this hearing started. I have a great concern about
getting back to where we should be with the forces, and you
need to give us a little bit of an idea.
What I would suggest you do--and I suggested this before
the meeting started--you need to go out and look at what I have
just looked at. You need to talk to the troops in the field and
see what they say. You need to hear about this equipment and so
forth, not just telling me that, Well, everybody says the same
thing; they complain a lot.
We know that. I have heard it before. I heard it in 1974
and 1975, and we got rid of thousands and thousands of people.
It was an indication that there was a problem.
I am saying, there is an indication that there is a problem
right now, and we need to look at it. Whether it is inadequate
recruiting, whether it is people being recruited, whether there
are too many waivers, I don't know what the hell it is.
But we want to help you, and we can't help you if you don't
really give us the details of what you suggest we need to do.
Mr. Young.

RESET ISSUES

Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, I don't have any further opening
statement, but I do have some questions. I would like to get
into the issue of reset.
This committee has dealt with reset issues quickly and
effectively once we were made aware of the need, and I would
like to hear from you what the reset requirements are today and
what you expect they might be in the future.
Also, I have a concern about what equipment--when we leave
Iraq, what equipment will we bring back from Iraq, if any? Will
we be sending any of that equipment to Afghanistan or just what
happens there? And what kind of a reset issue will we be
considering for you when all this happens?
General Chiarelli. I can't give you a dollar figure on
reset because, as you know, we are in the middle of putting
together the budget--or other people are putting together the
budget. And I am in a position right now, I can tell you, that
we are going to need to reset. And reset is absolutely
critical.
The problem we are having today is the amount of time we
have back home to both reset equipment and reset personnel. As
I was explaining to the chairman earlier this afternoon, we are
currently 1 year deployed, 1.3 years back at home. We are just
over 1 year, almost a 1-to-1, with some units 1.3 being the
average. So that puts a pressure on not only resetting people,
but resetting equipment.
We are moving a lot of our theater-provided equipment from
Iraq into sets that are available for forces going into
Afghanistan. As you know, our numbers aren't as great in
Afghanistan today, nor will they be based on current plans,
than they are in Iraq right now. But we are freeing up some
sets and beginning to set the theater for additional Army
forces that are flowing into Afghanistan. So some of that
theater-provided equipment will move over to Afghanistan.

AFGHANISTAN

Mr. Young. So what about Marine Corps equipment, bringing
back home or sending to Afghanistan?
General Amos. Sir, right now we have got a little over
45,000, what we call principal end items in Iraq. And our
schedule for drawing down in Iraq is over the next 12 months.
There is an effort--we just stood up kind of a blue ribbon team
in to join the staff in Iraq, in the Anbar Province for General
Tryon, to help him develop the plan for the retrograde over the
next 12 months. So we are going to have to start pulling some
of that equipment out.
We are at eight or nine battalions of Marines 3 or 4 years
ago. By May, we will be down to three infantry battalions, an
LAR battalion and a security battalion. So a lot of that
equipment is still in Iraq. There is a natural reluctance by
the commanders on the ground to say, ``Well, I just might need
that, you know.'' I don't want to be the commander that says,
you know, I sent it home and now I need it.
But those are days that have gone; the commander on the
ground now understands that. So we are retrograding that stuff
out over the next 12 months.
There is going to be--I asked the question, ``How much of
that is going to find its way over to Afghanistan?'' And
roughly 15 percent--excuse me, roughly 13 percent of the
equipment in Iraq right now is going to migrate over to
Afghanistan. And this is stuff that is quality. I don't want
you to think we are taking it from the junkyard in Iraq and we
are going to send it to Afghanistan; this is stuff in what we
would call class A condition. In other words, it is ready to
go.
Some of it is what we would call forward in stores
equipment, equipment that has been sitting there. So an up-
armored Humvee or an MRAP, in case one gets blown up, now I
don't have to order one, I just pull it off the lot. That is
the kind of stuff that is going to find its way into
Afghanistan.
So we have got a plan to get the stuff out of Iraq over the
next 12 months. And that is going to be very difficult because
we are all going to be in competition for the same highways,
the same heavy equipment transport, the same airports, the same
ship berths down at Kuwait, the same wash-down racks. So all
this like a great ballet.
We are going have to start getting that stuff out. We have
a plan, we are marching towards it, and then we are going to
take a piece of that stuff right now, and it is moving into
Afghanistan.
Mr. Young. Thank you.

CONTRACTORS

Mr. Murtha. I asked President Obama the other day, I said,
you have 150,000 contractors in Iraq, 274,000 in the theater in
CENTCOM. He was surprised at that.
He said, turning to the Secretary of Defense or the Chief
of the Joint Chiefs, he said, How are we getting them out? Can
you tell me how you are getting those contractors out? Are they
coming out at the same speed the troops are coming out.
Mr. Moran. Is that a question to the Generals?
Mr. Murtha. Yes.
General Chiarelli. Intuitively, I would say, yes, sir. I
have not checked on those numbers. The last I looked, when you
took the whole contractor population, we have 1.1 contractor
for every soldier currently in Iraq and Afghanistan today.
I think you are going to find far fewer contractors in
Afghanistan than you do in Iraq, albeit we are still relying on
contractors to do much of our maintenance. And part of the
reason we have been able to keep equipment reliability in
theater so high--we have seen the highest numbers we have seen
in the Army in a long time, over 90 percent on track and wheel
vehicles and over 75 percent on aviation aircraft--is because
of those contractors and because we are rebuilding and
resetting some of that equipment right in theater.
Mr. Murtha. It costs $44,000 more, on average, for a
contractor than it does for a direct hire. We need a schedule.
Somebody needs to give us a schedule of how we are bringing the
contractors out as we are bringing the troops out. If we bring
out another 20,000 troops and you leave 25,000 contractors
there, we haven't made much progress. So we need, this
committee needs to see what you are leaving there and how you
are bringing them out.
General Chiarelli. I owe you that, Mr. Chairman.
[The information follows:]

The Department of Defense, U.S. Central Command, and to a lesser
extent the Department of the Army, continually assess the Iraqi
personnel requirement to ensure the appropriate personnel strength to
accomplish the mission. Logistics planning is in full swing to weigh
the requirements for contracted support during redeployment,
considering declining troop strength as well as increased need for some
services, for example transportation, base closure and remediation
support, and property management. The timeline for contractor
redeployment may not mirror that of the Warfighters and may not be
proportional. Additionally, as troop numbers grow in Afghanistan, some
contractors may shift rather than redeploy. Redeployment timelines for
combat forces and contractors are not discussed in non-secure forums
due to operational security.

Mr. Murtha. Mr. Dicks.

TRAINING

Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As I understand it, because the Army is rotating so fast
going back into Iraq, that will change somewhat now. That is
why--they are only training, as I understand it, for a
counterinsurgency mission.
Is anybody training for anything other than that?
General Chiarelli. At lower levels, they are, sir. But I
think you are exactly correct in indicating when you have got
only one----
Mr. Dicks. One year.
General Chiarelli. One year or a little bit more than one
year at home, you are focusing after your reset period almost
totally on that deployment mission. Now, I think General
Petraeus and General Liarno would argue that we have not lost
the ability to synchronize kinetic effects on the battlefield;
and we do that every single day for shorter periods of time
than you would see if we were training for our core mission,
but we still have the ability to do that. So sometimes I think
we may overstate the degradation in those capabilities, but
they are definitely degraded.
Mr. Dicks. But we would definitely have the most combat
trained force, probably, in American history. I mean, more
people have been in combat, both Guard and Reserve and active
forces than in any other time, I would think.
General Chiarelli. There has never been a more battle-
tested force than you have today; that is correct, sir.

READINESS RATINGS

Mr. Dicks. Now, tell me about these D ratings which would
measure readiness against a directed mission. We understand
that this is something the Army is going to do and it is going
to do rather soon.
General Chiarelli. We begin in May. We are going to get rid
of what you used to see was a PCTEF rating. A PCTEF rating went
from 1 to 4. You would be PCTEF-4 prepared for the next
mission, but you didn't even know why. It just said PCTEF-4.
Not only will we provide a D-rating, and that is going to
be the rating, the readiness rating, for the mission you are
about to deploy on; but we are going to require commanders to
tell us, what is. your rating in personnel, what is your rating
in training, what is your rating in equipment, so that you can
see how they are doing in those three critical areas and really
have an opportunity to judge their readiness.
Commanders will not have the ability to subjectively
upgrade those individual ratings. They will have the ability to
subjectively upgrade the overall rating on D, but you will be
able to see what the actual ratings are and can judge where
they are in those three critical areas.
Mr. Dicks. On December 1----
Mr. Murtha. Let me----
Mr. Dicks. I yield to the chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Let me just say, we don't want you to hide from
us the real readiness capability of the Army. I hope that is
not what you are trying to do. We need to know if there is a
problem, so we can fix it.
I mean, I hear what you are saying, but I get very nervous
when you are going to come up with a rating other than an
overall rating. You explained the difference, but I hope you
don't send over here and start to degrade the C-ratings.
General Chiarelli. That will not happen.
Mr. Murtha. All right.
Mr. Dicks. It would be good, though, that we could assess,
I think, the readiness to do the mission that they are going to
be having to do. I think that--I think the more information we
have, the better off we are. Just, that is my impression.
Let me also ask you about this. On December 1, 2008, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense issued guidance elevating the
importance of irregular warfare to be strategically important
as traditional warfare.
Can you tell us what the Army is doing in this core? What
does this mean or what does it mean for the future?
General Chiarelli. Well, sir, I could give you all kinds of
examples. I think that both General Amos and myself would say
that I think we are proud of both of our services' ability to
adapt to this new kind of warfare, the kind of warfare that I
believe is going to dominate our future.
I will tell you, if you look at how we have restructured
our force--I think you know we have gone to a modular force. We
have gone to a readiness system that is based on the Army force
generation model, which basically says, every unit goes from
deployment to a reset period of 180 days, then, as long as we
can, in a train-and-ready phase that gets ready for that next
deployment. We hope it can be longer than 6 months, sometimes
it is 8 months, sometimes it is 9 months right now. We would
like to get it out to a year and a half or even greater. And
then it goes into a deployment. That is what we have been able
do with a modular force.
When it comes to force structure, besides modulizing the
force, we have grown five battalions of special operations
additional over what we had in 2001. We have grown 50 companies
of civil affairs, 3,000 contractors.

STABILITY OPERATIONS

Mr. Dicks. Let me just add one thing; my time is quickly
running out.
Secretary Gates recently wrote that the United States needs
a military whose ability to kick down the door is matched by
its ability to clean up the mess and even rebuild the house
afterward.
What do you think that means.
General Chiarelli. In my 2 years in Iraq, I saw that every
single day, the ability to go in, apply kinetic effects and
follow up immediately with those kinds of things that you would
consider part of a stability operation. It was an absolute
requirement. And when we did that, we provided for the safety
of our forces; when we didn't do that, the neighborhoods became
much more dangerous for us.
So Soldiers have to be able to--as Charles Krulak said a
long time ago, they have to fight that three-block war. One
minute they are applying kinetic effects, the next minute they
are ready to go into stability operations; and it can change
with a snap of your fingers.
Mr. Dicks. General, do you have anything else you want to
add to that?
General Amos. Sir, I think the kind of warfare we are in
right now, and the Secretary has talked about, is going to be
around for at least the next several generations. I think he is
right.
But he also uses the terminology ``a balanced force,'' and
the net balanced force, we think the interpretation is, okay,
our focus can be on this thing called ``hybrid warfare.''
This kind of warfare that General Chiarelli is talking
about is, one day you are playing in cowboy stadium; the next
day you are playing in the parking lot; and the day after that,
or maybe that same day, you are playing in the Winn-Dixie
parking lot over there, and you are playing different kind--and
it all happened at the same time. So that is that hybrid
warfare.
But the balance that we owe our Nation is the ability to be
able to do that. And I think we have proven that we can do that
really well. And we are doing it, by the way, with young men
and women that are just good, solid soldiers and Marines; and
we are training with those skills through all the different
training regimens we have.
But we also owe our country the ability to be able to do
those other things that represent the balanced force. In the
case of Marine Corps, that is that forcible entry from a naval
sea base or a naval operation. We are the only force that can
do that. That doesn't mean the Army can't join us and do that;
I am just saying that is a responsibility, that is core
competency for the Marine Corps, and we owe that to our Nation.
So we need to be able to train and do those things as well.
The growth of the Marine Corps, the drawdown in Iraq and the
reasonable approach to Afghanistan are going to provide us that
opportunity. But I think it is a balanced force; that, I think,
is what we are talking about.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Frelinghuysen.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for the doubleheader today, this
morning's hearing as well as the one this afternoon.
Last week we had some of the Air Force brass in here from
TRANSCOM and the Air Mobility Command, and we obviously had
extended discussion on airlift needs, the whole tanker issue. I
don't want to get into that, but I would like your take on
aviation readiness in a theater where we are going to be
putting a lot more soldiers, and Marines particularly.
What is the state of aviation readiness in terms of
choppers? And both the chairman and I have a keen interest in
the aeromedevac in Afghanistan, given there is some estimate
that if someone is wounded, obviously the sooner you get them
to safety and to a surgical tent or whatever they might need
for medical purposes.
Can you sort of talk to us about your general aviation
readiness and the specific thing which affects the soldier's
well-being, the ability to evacuate soldiers and Marines that
are wounded?
General Amos. From the Marines' perspective, both in the
Anbar Province, we have had a pretty sizeable air combat
element on the ground in Iraq for some time. And we have got a
very small air combat element on the ground in Afghanistan
right now, and we are about to blow that balloon up. We, are
going to put a pretty good-sized piece of both rotary wing and
fixed wing and tactical air in Afghanistan.

CASUALTY EVACUATION

Mr. Frelinghuysen. How many choppers do you have in
country?
General Amos. We have four CH-53Es in Afghanistan and four
attack helicopters right now in Afghanistan for 2,300 Marines.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. And, General Chiarelli, how-many
choppers does the Army have?
General Chiarelli. We will have--we are adding another
combat aviation brigade for our 2nd Combat Aviation Brigade in
Afghanistan, which will take us up somewhere in the vicinity,
depending on the exact table of organization of that 2nd
Brigade, over 220 helicopters.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Aero medevac, where do we stand in our
ability to get our soldiers out on an expedited basis?
General Amos. Sir, I was there a month ago. And again this
is the southern part for the Marine Corps.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. This is sort of the dedication to CSTAR,
to some extent?
General Amos. Sir, it is. And I primarily think it is not
so much CSTAR as much as casualty evacuation, and the ability
to do a medevac or a casualty evacuation for a wounded soldier
or Marine. Again, it is a bit of an immature theater down in
the Helmand Province right now, and it is about to become more
mature with the advent of the, or the influx of forces. And we,
too, are going to bring in a bunch of helicopters, along with
the Army.
But right now, when we were there a month ago, the Marine
battalion commander said it takes about 2 hours and 20 minutes,
on average, to get a casualty evacuation moved from the point
of being wounded to what we call Level II care.
Now, I will tell you, the Department of Defense, the
Secretary of Defense, has taken that on. And to rearrange
assets--and that is part of the reason why we are bringing in
more assets, as well as the Army, to take care of that, but
part of that is relying on our allies. In other words, having
to rely on some of our allies to provide a casualty evacuation
at 2:00 in the morning to a country that doesn't fly on low-
light NVGs at 2:00 in the morning, they won't do it.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. These are the same allies in some cases
who are not joining the battle in the same way our people are,
but they have assets to contribute to this getting our soldiers
and Marines to get medical help?
General Amos. Sir, they do in some cases. I will tell you
that there are--from my personal opinion, there are not enough
down in the southern part of Afghanistan, but that is about to
change. And the Secretary of Defense is taking this on
personally.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. So the 2-hour thing here is going to be
measurably shortened?
General Amos. Sir, our goal is--when it comes to where the
Marines are and anybody operating in a Marine zone is to get
back to what we call ``the golden hour,'' and that is, from the
time you are injured to the time you reach the first medical
(Level) II treatment facility is inside 60 minutes.
We did that very well. The Army and the Marine Corps did
that side by side in Iraq, and it saved an untold number of
lives.
We have a lot of motivation to get back to that in
Afghanistan. We are just not there yet.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We have a keen interest in that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Let me just say, the figure we have is a 72-
minute average. Twice as many people die in Afghanistan,
because they don't get the medical help, as die in Iraq--not
quite that; it is 19 percent versus 11 percent. But this
committee sent staff, and I went out to Nellis to look at the
assets there, and we put $100 million into those assets.
If we don't know the problem we can't fix it. If you don't
have the assets, you can talk about trying to put those assets
out there, but if we don't know soon enough, we can't put the
money in and get the assets there. This committee is concerned
about that, but you have got to tell us when there is a
problem.
I am surprised that you say that it takes 2 hours and 20
minutes to get them in. That is a revelation to me, because 72
minutes is the average.
General Amos. Sir, that was a battalion commander. That is
me, looking a lieutenant colonel in the eye and talking about
the casualty evacuation. I said, ``How long is it taking you?''
``On average,'' he said, ``2 hours and 20 minutes.''
Mr. Murtha. That is unacceptable.
General Amos. I agree with you, sir.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Visclosky.
Mr. Visclosky. No questions. Thank you.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Moran.

MISSION CAPABLE

Mr. Moran. Thank you.
I have to say, boy, the Committee has a good staff. They do
terrific work. For example, they bring to our attention that in
2003--and these are numbers I know that both generals are
familiar with--50 percent of the Army was C-2 or better, and
now we are down to 15 percent. And when you account for
deployment, only 8 percent of Army units, both C-2 or better
and available to address a contingency operation. And of that 8
percent only 4 percent are C-1, fully mission capable.
So this is something the Chairman has been harping on for
basically 5 years, but every year it just seems to get worse.
And, of course, it is the critical issue that we are bringing,
that we are discussing today. The Marine Corps is in better
shape in that situation.
And we are concerned. I share the concern of the chairman
and the vice chair about subjective ratings. Of course, this D
category is a concern.

STOP LOSS

But the first thing I want to ask you specifically about is
stop loss. I don't know about my colleagues, but it may just be
that when somebody is subjected to stop loss, those are the
ones you hear about. But, boy, I hear a lot about folks that
have been kept in a voluntary service through what you consider
to be stop loss. And the subcommittee provided money, $72
million, to deal with that, yet none of it has been used? Why
might that be?
And a stop loss is more an issue with the Army, so let me
ask General Chiarelli.
General Chiarelli. Well, sir, both the United States Army
and Department of Defense are working on a comprehensive stop
loss plan that will be complete very, very soon that will look
at all of stop loss, not only those soldiers that are stop
loss, but stop loss as an instrument that the Army uses in the
future. And I expect that before too long you will have the
opportunity to see--I know they are putting the final touches
on that, and I know it has the personal interest of the Chief
of Staff of the Army, the Secretary of the Army and the
Secretary of Defense.
I do, and I know that no one cares about soldiers more than
the members of this Committee. And I know we are focused on
that 1 percent of the Army, less than 1 percent the Army, that
is stop loss--6 to 7 percent in any one time. And I know that
this Committee knows that every one of those soldiers signs a
contract that indicates that that might happen.
But I will tell you that when we start paying that money,
you need to understand that stop loss numbers are going to go
up. Because when Private Chiarelli can reenlist in February 2
months into a deployment, he is not going to; he is going to
collect whatever that final amount is until the last month
before he goes home; and then, if he plans to reenlist, he will
reenlist.
Mr. Moran. So you are afraid they are going to game the
system if you make that incentive available?
General Chiarelli. Sir, I am not saying we can't make the
incentive--I am just----
Mr. Murtha. We have solved this thing. We have put $500 per
person in for 160,000, whatever it is. We don't want any
argument from the Army. I have heard all the arguments. The
Secretary of Defense talked to me about it, and he rejected
your proposal.
We expect you to work something out.
General Chiarelli. Sir, I will do whatever we are told. I
just wanted to give you----
Mr. Murtha. I heard all the arguments.
Mr. Moran. Well, it sounds like we are not going to pursue
this any further, General. I think the Committee is--on the
policy is pretty clear. Secretary Gates did say publicly that
he is going to end it. And there must be a way that you can
deal with the potential gaming of the system.
The IRR is a problem with the Marine Corps, though, more
than the Army. Do you want to address that issue, General Amos?
General Amos. Sir, it is actually not a large issue now.
Some time ago the Secretary of Defense authorized us to,
authorized the Marine Corps to involuntarily recall up to 2,500
Marines. To date, we have recalled, involuntarily, 1,779 of
those. Right now, in Iraq we have 463 members on this current
deployment in Iraq out of 22,000 Marines that are over there on
IRR involuntary recall. That will end after the end of this
year. We don't like it.
But here is the real truth with the IRR recall. A lot of
these young men and women want to come back on active duty, but
they can't volunteer because they will lose their jobs. And so
the agreement we have had with Marine Forces Reserve
(MARFORRES) are, when you do this and you are about to call
somebody back on active duty involuntarily, ask them if they
are covertly a volunteer. And in the clear majority of the
cases they are. There are some, I am sure, that are not, but
most of them are; and they say, ``But we can't do that, we
can't volunteer, so you tell us, and we will be happy to
come.''
So we have very small numbers, and we are going to cut
that, off at the end of the year.
Mr. Moran. Good. Because the fact that it is such small
numbers, I think, is probably an even greater argument that it
doesn't need to exist. Because if there is anybody that is
involuntarily serving, it diminishes our confidence and pride
that this is a voluntary Army. So you understand that.
Mr. Murtha. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Kingston.

DEPOT MAINTENANCE

Mr. Kingston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Amos, you have--27 percent of your equipment is in
theater right now?
General Amos. I am sorry, I can't hear you.
Mr. Kingston. Twenty-seven percent of your equipment is in
theater; is that what I heard?
General Amos. I would have to take a look at that. I think
that is probably--I may have said that in my statement.
Mr. Kingston. I think it was in there.
General Amos. It probably is. That number sounds right,
sir.
Mr. Kingston. Well, you only have two depots. Is that
enough to take care of all your stuff?
General Amos. I only have two what?
Mr. Kingston. Depots.
General Amos. It is. It is. In fact, right now, both in
Albany and Barstow they are working--at least at Albany, I am
not sure about Barstow, but Albany is working one shift. They
have the capability through contractors, through temporary
hires, through overtime, to easily go to two shifts; and they
are prepared to do that.
In fact, the plan is under way right now, as we retrograde
that equipment out of Iraq, that I talked about earlier, that
will find its way to Blount Island and from Blount Island it
will get dispersed to either Albany or Barstow for rework. And
I have been assured that there is plenty of space, head space,
to be able to rework all the equipment we have.
Mr. Kingston. So there is actually maybe even a little more
capacity in Albany than you are utilizing.
General Amos. There is, sir. In fact, I can tell you, I
have got it in here, we are doing a significant amount of work
right now for other companies, other services at Albany.
Mr. Kingston. In fact, as I recall, about 5 years ago you
up-armed the Humvees for the Army at Albany.
General Amos. I can't tell you specifically. I can tell you
how many Humvees we did at Albany.
But I will give you an example. Last year, fiscal year
2008, we did $392 million worth of business at Albany for the
Marine Corps. The other services we did $85 million, and for
commercial contracts we did another $26 million.
So it really becomes a business at Albany. And the
commander there, Major General Williams, looks for business
wherever he can get it. He has the capacity to blow that up to
two shifts a day and take all that stuff in.
So we do business for the Army, I am sure, but I just can't
tell you. I don't have those figures in my data.
Mr. Kingston. Mr. Bishop knows more than I, but I am 90
percent sure that they did start up-armoring the Humvee for the
3d Infantry in maybe 2004 or something like that.
General Amos. I will tell you, we took 934 Humvees in
fiscal year 2008 and rehabilitated them there at Albany.
Mr. Kingston. With all the reset that is needed, is there
more that the depots can do for you right now?
General Amos. When you say, ``Is there more they can do,''
I mean, right now, they are doing everything that we have asked
them to do with regards to equipment. Where the more comes in
is, we have got to get them the equipment to be able to work on
and to be able to rehabilitate. And that goes back to what
Congressman Young said earlier, How much of that stuff are you
going to bring out of Iraq? And we never really answered that
question.
We are going to bring everything out of Iraq unless it is
sitting over in a junk pile because it has been blown up, or
the U.S. Government has authorized a foreign military sale to
Iraq, the country. But we are going to bring everything back,
and it will be triaged there at Blount Island. And if it is
good or it is cost effective to rehabilitate it, then we are
going to send it to other depots.
Mr. Kingston. I appreciate that. And I don't know if Mr.
Bishop has any questions that we can yield on our time.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I would yield back.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Rothman.
Mr. Rothman. Mr. Chairman, I would be willing to yield to
Mr. Bishop now since he represents Albany.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Bishop.

RESET FUNDS

Mr. Bishop. Thank you very much, my colleague, and thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
And welcome again, gentlemen. Reset funding and
prepositioning equipment sets, two issues that are very
important to me, very important to Albany as far as the Marine
Corps is concerned, but let me deal with the Army first.
This Committee over the past few years has appropriated
about $8 billion to the Army for reset; and as I understand it,
about $3.7 billion of that has been obligated. But the Army's
equipment on hand continues to be an inhibiting factor in the
readiness status of the forces.
And it is expected that the Army is going to request
additional reset funds in the 2009 supplemental. But, of
course, we don't know what, because I think the Secretary is
not willing to have that discussed while the budget is still
being formulated.
But are you facing any major capacity problems? Is the fact
that production challenges that are facing the Army reset in
terms of depot capacity and industry--because I know we were
doing some of your depot work in Albany, as Mr. Kingston
alluded to--and do you still have equipment in depots, like in
Anniston, still sitting out or waiting for repair? And what
will this supplemental funding request do to your reset
requirements?
General Chiarelli. Well, I can tell you there are depots
who are just doing a magnificent job on reset. And the capacity
and ability of the depots to reset our equipment, particularly
given our short dwell time back at home, has been one of the
true success stories of this conflict.
Mr. Bishop. I don't mean to interrupt you, but they are
telling me that lined up outside the depot in Anniston are tons
and tons of these damaged vehicles that have been sent back.
General Chiarelli. Let me take that for the record, sir,
and go and check on the exact conditions in Anniston.
[The information follows:]

In order to provide a comprehensive response regarding equipment
backlog at ANAD, we have verified our depot capacity and programs for
critical systems at ANAD and the remaining four maintenance depots:
Corpus Christi, Letterkenny, Red River, and Tobyhanna Army Depots. We
continue to have ample capacity to meet Army requirements.
The few cases where our depots have not been able to meet the Army-
directed production schedules have been the result of supply chain
issues or lack of unserviceable assets, and not the capacity of our
depots. For example, at Anniston, our slower-than-required production
of M2 machine gun production during the first part of fiscal year 2009
(FY09) was the result of nonconforming parts in the supply system. Army
Materiel Command, Defense Logistics Agency, Headquarters, Department of
the Army and parts suppliers worked together to resolve these problems.
Once acceptable parts were available in sufficient supply, ANAD was
able to quickly increase its production of M2 machine guns from 400 per
month in 1st Quarter FY09 to 700 per month to meet the Army
requirements. An example of unserviceable asset shortfall is the M1114
HMMWV program at Red River Army Depot. Currently there is a shortfall
of several hundred vehicles scheduled to be shipped from Southwest Asia
that have not yet arrived, therefore, impacting the production
schedule.
Our depots have the capacity to accomplish additional workload in
all areas, especially considering the additional capability we have
available through partnering arrangements and national maintenance
contracts with original equipment manufacturers such as Oshkosh,
Raytheon, and Boeing Aerospace Engineering.

Mr. Bishop. Okay. You may continue.
Sir, were you done?
General Chiarelli. I will tell you that some of that
equipment readiness that you allude to is masked by the fact
that when a commander doesn't have his equipment and it is in
reset, when he is reporting against equipment on hand, of
course that equipment is not on hand, it is in reset, which
makes his C-rating or D-rating go down, particularly his C-
rating. His D-rating really never catches up to get up to where
we want him to be at D-1 until he gets over and falls in on the
theater-provided equipment that is only available in Iraq and
Afghanistan for him to fall on.
And all our units that are in Iraq and Afghanistan are C-
1--or D-1 for its equipment.

PERCENT EFFECTIVENESS

Mr. Bishop. You haven't implemented the D-ratings as yet;
you are just in the process of implementing those.
You haven't fully implemented the D-ratings yet, have you?
General Chiarelli. We have not, but we have the percent
effectiveness ratings. And a large majority, or lower percent
effectiveness ratings you see now, although you can't see it
because we have never provided that specificity that I talked
about earlier, a large reason why those percent effectiveness
ratings stay low until it gets over there is because it falls
in on that theater-provided equipment.
Mr. Bishop. Exactly. And that gets us to the question of
other contingencies.
If the unit is ready when it is deployed, but the part of
the unit that is not deployed, that is back home, is in a state
of unreadiness, a very, very low state of readiness; is that
not correct? Because the equipment is deployed, the personnel
is deployed, and basically the unit is depleted except for the
stay-at-home portions.
General Chiarelli. At the current demand for our units our
ratings are lower than they would be if we were able to get
more dwell time. But right now we have over 32 units when you
figure in the friction deployed brigade combat teams around the
world, 32. That is a huge number. And that is why you have that
dwell time, that 1 year deployed, 1.3 at home.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Rothman.

FORCES OUT-OF-BALANCE

Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you again gentlemen. Good to see you again. And thank
you for your service, really outstanding.
You each in your respective written testimony, and I am
sorry I was late for your oral testimony, so if you covered
this the answer to this question, I apologize.
Talk about your forces out of balance. Does that sound
familiar? And the question is, given the present trend in
funding that you reasonably anticipate in the upcoming
supplemental and in the future, how long before it will be
before the Army and, respectively, the Marines are in balance?
General Chiarelli. My in balance number is a factor of
demand, and that is what is causing me to be out of balance. It
takes me time to reset both people and equipment. And with only
a year plus a couple of months between deployments, that is
what has put me out of balance.
We expect and we hope----
Mr. Rothman. So, General, it is not about funding then, per
se?
General Chiarelli. My out-of-balance problems right now are
primarily because of demand, and we hope to be in balance where
we are 1 year deployed, 2 years at home, or close to--or 18
months at home; I am sorry, 1 year and 18 months at home. We
hope to be there by 2011.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you.
General.
General Amos. Sir, I put in my written statement the
estimate that $20 billion--and I am not getting out ahead of
OSD on this, but $20 billion today is the rough reset cost for
the Marine Corps. There are a couple of points I would like to
make. If the war ended today and we said, this is it, everybody
come out of Iraq, come out of Afghanistan, it would probably
take 5 years for the Marine Corps to get rebalanced or
readjusted. And that is not because Congress isn't being
generous.
It is a function of production lines and contracts and some
things that have gone out that they aren't even making anymore,
legacy systems, and being placed with a newer generation of
equipment.
But $20 billion is a rough assessment. I am told that my
predecessor, General Magnus, when he sat here last year, when
asked that question, said it would be about $15 billion.
I asked my staff. I said, well, so far this Committee has
generously given the Marine Corps a little over $12 billion for
reset. So I said, What have we done with it?
Well, we have gone and we have bought new Humvees, we have
bought new LAVs, we have bought the stuff that has been blown
up, the stuff that you see on TV, we are wearing stuff out at
six times the rate that it was built for. The Humvee, I think,
has typically averaged 7,000 miles. We are wearing them, out.
Mr. Rothman. I get it. We have got to grow the force, but
that all depends on demand on even a growing force, and then
replace the burned-out equipment.
I want to make sure I ask one last question, General
Chiarelli, and I apologize if I am the only one who doesn't
know the answer to this question. You said in your statement
only three out of ten applicants are even eligible for military
service--three out of ten applicants, people applying. Could
you explain that, please?
General Chiarelli. They have disqualifying conditions,
everything from schooling to health problems to obesity, that
make it impossible for that portion of the population to join
the Army. So out of every ten Americans that are in that
population only three qualify.
Mr. Rothman. Three applicants. That is amazing. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Ms. Granger.
Ms. Granger. I don't have any questions.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Hinchey.

TRAINING, CAPABILITIES, AND EQUIPMENT

Mr. Hinchey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Generals. Thank you very much for your
leadership and the very important work you are doing for this
country. Thank you all very much. I appreciate it.
But reading through the information, I just get the
impression that your job is getting more difficult and has
gotten more difficult over the last several years. The
condition of many people in both the Army and the Marine Corps,
their capability, the capability of dealing with issues, has
declined substantially since the invasion of Iraq.
According to the information that we have, at least 50
percent of the Army was C-2 or above, and 80 percent of the
Marines was C-2 or above. Now 15 percent of the Army is C-2 or
above, and about 50 percent of the Marine Corps is about C-2 or
above.
And what you were just answering about the qualifications,
also, I think, has something to do with that, because the
qualifications for enrollment in the military declined over the
last several years. And I think that that has put the military
in a rather rough situation, in a more difficult set of
circumstances.
What do you think should be done about this? Do you have
any plans? I know you are thinking about it. But do you have
any ideas about what should be done, how we should handle this,
how we can deal with the effectiveness of the military now that
we have 17- going in, 7- of the 17,000 going into Afghanistan,
particularly in dealing with a different kind of complex
situation there, different than the circumstance that they have
been dealing with in Iraq?
General Amos. Sir, I will take it on first.
Back to the--kind of the beginning of what you said,
Congressman, I want to assure you that the C-3 and C-4 ratings,
especially when it comes to personnel, are not a function--and
it comes to training--are not a function of the quality of the
young man or woman we have in, because that young man or woman
is better today than they were when we crossed the border in
March of 2003. The quality is there; I can assure you of that.
The Marine Corps hasn't lowered its standards on anything.
In fact, just by virtue of the numbers have increased in their
recruiting. So the quality of it is more than bravery. It is
that young man or woman making those decisions that we talked
about in the very last hearing that we were in here. So I want
to assure you of that.
The second piece of it is that the training part, when it
comes to the lower rating of C--50 percent for us, and I really
think it is 47 percent of our deployed; our nondeployed units
are at C-3 and C-4--that is strictly a function of the fact
that we have stripped out those principal players that we need
back home, to train, and have deployed them in the way of
individual augments, joint manning documents.
We have taken a large percentage of the Marine Corps, and I
think I speak for the Army, and put them forward along with the
combat forces. So you don't have the leadership back home in
some cases. It is not willy-nilly. It is not, the prisoners are
running the battalions. That is not it. But you lack some of
those unique skills back in the rear.
The other thing I will tell you is that the equipment piece
of this thing, we have the bulk of the equipment we need. Now,
we are wearing it out, blowing it up and whatever, and it is in
pretty good shape; but we have taken a larger percentage of
that stuff back in the rear and moved that forward. So now the
folks in the rear don't have all the equipment that they need
to train on.
It is not a function of, you didn't give us the money. We
have been buying everything that we could get our hands on. But
the fact of the matter is that the requirements in Iraq and
Afghanistan are significantly greater equipment-wise for an
individual unit.
I will give you an example. A typical infantry battalion in
the Marine Corps has about 40-plus Humvees. The ones in Iraq
right now are running around about 160 and 180 Humvees, because
they are spread out.
So that is where the equipment has gone. It is in good
shape. We just don't have enough of it back in the rear to get
the training levels of--to be able to increase the C-ratings
that we are talking about.
General Chiarelli. I have very little to add to what Jim
says.
The number one thing to improve those C-ratings for the
United States Army would be to increase the time at home
between deployments. It just has such an effect; it has an
effect on equipment.
But what we are seeing and what I am faced with right now,
since the Secretary of the Army has put me in charge of taking
a look at this whole problem we have with the stress of the
force and the suicides, the increase in suicides that we are
seeing, is the stress on individuals. And there is no doubt in
my mind that when you are on deployments, third and fourth time
on 12-month deployments----
I did mention to the chairman just before we started, and I
think it is noteworthy, that we won't get our last combat
brigade off of 15-month deployment until June of 2009. We will
not get our last combat service support and combat service unit
off of a 15-month deployment until September of 2009 because
they all deployed before August of 2008 when we went to 12-
month rotation. So that is very, very difficult.
Those units will come home after a 15-month deployment, and
if demand stays the same and we are at 1.3, they won't even get
a 1-to-1 dwell log ratio.
So many of the problems that we see today, I believe, will
be well on their way to being solved if we can extend that
amount of period. And that is what General Casey talks about:
Get the units back in balance, so they can both train on their
deployment medal, their core medal, and you will see
improvements there; and then help recover people and equipment.
Mr. Hinchey. Thank you.
Mr. Bishop. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Hinchey. I think my time is up.
Mr. Murtha. Mrs. Kilpatrick.

DEPLOYMENTS

Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The title of this closed hearing is Readiness--I think the
last two or three, and we are getting around the corner.
We are not ready. I don't feel like you are ready.
The 1 to 1.3, which I believe is mandatory, you had two
young sergeants here earlier today that have been deployed
twice. Using them as an example, did they get the 1.3? Are we
about to send them back to Afghanistan without it?
There was one of each. I know that is an average, so maybe
one did and one didn't.
General Amos. Sergeant, the Marine sergeant got 1-to-1
dwell between. He is working for me right now, so he is into
his dwell. But between deployments he was gone 7 months and
home for probably 7 months, maybe even 6 months.
Ms. Kilpatrick. And is that in the States or was he with
his family for those months?
General Amos. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Yes, ma'am, what? I mean, was he back here?
General Amos. He was back here.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Here in the U.S.?
General Amos. He was back here in the United States. He was
back at Camp Lejeune between the deployments.
Ms. Kilpatrick. I guess I am asking, in that 1.3 or 1.8
that you talk about that is out of the theater, back in the
States, is that also included with their family or is that not
included?
General Chiarelli. I would be more than happy to take that
on, because I get beat up every time I go to a spouse group of
deployed spouses. I say, Well, we are giving your husband 1
year at home, and I get fingers in my face saying, No, you are
not, General; don't tell me that, General. My husband comes
home, he has to go to a noncommissioned officer course for 2 or
3 months. He comes back, he is now in his train-ready phase, he
goes to the field to train up because we have to train before
we deploy.
They say, Don't tell me, General, that my husband is home
for 12 months; he is not with me for 12 months.
Ms. Kilpatrick. But is he in the house for 12 months?
General Chiarelli. No, he is not, when he deploys from Fort
Campbell to Fort Knox before he goes to the field, and his wife
is back at home.
Ms. Kilpatrick. And back at home is in another State?
General Chiarelli. No, it is probably right there, ma'am.
Ms. Kilpatrick. I think that makes a difference. And you
all have said that over in everything we read--family contact,
children contact is so important.
So I think we are ready because you said so, and I wouldn't
second-guess that. But I think not because of the suicides, the
tension, how we are sending, we are sending you to a new
terrible terrain for another increase in the war that we have
been in before we even started in Iraq.
And you talked about the demand, General. Demand is going
to be more, it is not going to be less. And your men,
particularly in the Army men and women, are going to be more
tired and more worn out because of the short times home,
because of the toughness of their assignment.
The chairman said over and over again that we want to help.
And I know you all are good stewards, and I appreciate your
service and all that you are doing. But we can't help if we
don't know. And our number one goal is to save and serve the
men and women that you command, that they can be whole and well
and alive when they come back.
And this is a closed hearing, so I just expected to hear
something more closed. I am kind of hearing the same thing. And
I know that is what you are supposed to do, you are in my range
absolutely and all that.
But having said that, I don't feel good that we are
protecting our men and women who commit their lives to our
country. You are doing the best you can with what you have, but
I just don't feel like we are helping enough and you are not
giving it to us enough.
Nothing to take away from you. It is just that since I am a
lay and new and all of that. They deserve everything they need,
much of which is home with their families and that wife you
just described.
Being out of theaters is three-fourths of the battle; that
is good. And of course they have to keep training. But they
also need time so their children can be healthy and their wives
can be. Do you know what I mean? That unit and that extended
family, I don't think anything substitutes for that.
And whatever we have to do to get you there, which may be
more enlisted. I mean, let us up the numbers. Nobody has talked
about that in any of the meetings I have been in yet and how we
do that. Is that necessary? No one has spoken to that.
So thank you for your service. I don't even want you to
answer unless you feel compelled to do so. I have got a raw
feeling right here. And the demands are going to increase; war
is not going to end.
Arbitrarily bringing them home this October or this June,
that is too arbitrary. And I don't know, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
they must say something to the President. But together we have
got to make it better. Ending both of the wars and bringing all
of the soldiers home is my first wish in life.
But what you do is major, and it is also tragic. And it is
war; we are at two wars, so nothing is the same.
Mr. Chairman, thank you, sir.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Young.

INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE (IRR)

Mr. Young. Just one question. On the IRR, as you deal with
all these personnel issues, how often have you had to use call-
ups from the IRR?
And the second part of that question, how long is a person
considered to be a member of the IRR or subject to call-up from
IRR?
General Chiarelli. Any numbers I would give you, sir, would
be swags right now. If you would let me take that for the
record, I will get you the exact numbers we are calling up
right now and try to give you some historical data on the
number of IRR that we, the United States Army, have called up.
And I am not sure what the age restriction or time out of the
service is for calling up the IRR, but I will find out and get
it to you.
Mr. Young. That would be fine. Thank you.
[The information follows:]

Over the past eight years, the Army has used the Presidential
Reserve Call-up Authority twice: once for operations in Kosovo and also
for operations in Bosnia.
Ready Reservists are currently called to active duty pursuant to
title 10, US Code, Section 12302, for a period not to exceed 400 days:
365 days involuntary mobilization, plus 35 days authorized for out-
processing and post-mobilization leave.

Mr. Murtha. Mr. Dicks.

STANDARDS FOR RECRUITS

Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In December--excuse me.
In addition, for 2008, 83 percent of the active Army met
the high school diploma benchmark. The Marine Corps, on the
other hand, attracted highly qualified recruits; 96 percent of
the Marine Corps recruits are high school graduates, and 66
percent score in the top three categories in the Armed Service
Vocation Aptitude Battery Test.
General Chiarelli, with the state of the economy and people
more willing to join, will the Army be able to raise its
standards of recruits from what it has been?
General Chiarelli. We already have, sir. We have already
stopped giving the waiver for adult major misconduct. It is no
longer given. So if you are considered an adult in a State and
conduct some kind of major misconduct and are found guilty of
that major misconduct, you cannot join the United States Army.
That is no longer a waiver.
I have been following the recruiting figures here in the
last couple of months. And I think you know that it is very,
very hard, at least for the United States Army, to get over 90
percent of the high school graduates in January. Those numbers
usually go up when you get near the school time and people come
out of school.
We have seen our numbers up over 90 percent in the last 2
months that I have checked, in high school graduates. We are
because of--and I think it should be, you would all
understand--seeing a tremendous improvement in the quality that
we are able to attract to the United States Army because of, I
am sure, the economic situation our Nation finds itself in.
Mr. Murtha. Could you be more specific? Exactly what is the
difference?
I mean, when you went to a volunteer Army, the reasoning
was, you would have more high school graduates, the standards
would be higher, we don't want draftees. That was where you
were, and where are you going now?
General Chiarelli. I don't have those figures right in
front of me, but I know we were down as low as 79 percent. I
expect those numbers to steadily increase; I know they are
already up in months.
Mr. Murtha. Send it for the record.
General Chiarelli. I will. I will provide you those Mr.
Chairman.
[The information follows:]

In fiscal year (FY) 2005, the regular Army's Tier 1 Education
recruiting accomplishment (i.e., high school graduates and above) fell
below DoD's Standard of 90% for the first time since FY83.
Specifically, the Army's Tier 1 Education recruiting percentage fell to
87% in FY05, decreased to 81% in FY06, and reached a 79% nadir in FY07
before rebounding to 83% in FY08.
In response to this problem, Army leaders implemented programs and
policies to attract more new recruits with a Tier 1 Education
credential. Currently, the Regular Army's New Recruit Tier 1 Education
percentage is 94% and the Army is expecting to close-out FY09 close to
that percentage.

Mr. Dicks. General Amos, even though the Marine Corps is
growing to an end strength of 202,000, the Marine Corps has
always been very successful at maintaining a high level of
recruits. Can you explain why?
General Amos. Sir, the quality of recruits, even from last
year, has gone up from 96 percent, 96.2 percent high school
graduates, to 97.2 right now. So I will tell you, I think we
have it a little bit easier. And I mean that because we recruit
to a very narrow slice of the American society--the clear
majority of young men and women don't want to join the Marine
Corps--and we have an attraction to that very narrow band. We
promise them----
Mr. Dicks. Like Mr. Murtha and Mr. Young.
General Amos. And his brothers and his nephews. But we do,
and so we have a very narrow band.
Our numbers, we are going to recruit about 42,000 this
year. We are well on our way. In fact, we are having to slow
down the recruiting a little bit. It has been very successful.
But I do think we have it a little bit easier. And I tell
you that the young men and women, the athletes, they come out
and they say, I want to be a part of that organization. It is
attractive to them. So it has been good to us.
Mr. Dicks. What about--how do you do your recruiting? Do
you have professional people that are officers or not NCOs? Who
do you use to recruit.
General Amos. Sir, we use NCOs. We have officers that are
the commanding officers; the recruiting stations, we have
officers to recruit officers; but the clear majority of our
recruiters are young sergeants and staff sergeants.
And the recruiting screen team goes out once a year and
they pick the best that we have out there. We force them, in
many cases against their will, to come in to become a
recruiter. We train them, and then we send them out for 3
years, and we hold them accountable.
So it is our NCOs. These kids are ripe. Half of them, in
fact, probably almost all of them, are wearing combat ribbons
with multiple deployments. The only reason they don't want to
go become a recruiter is because it is probably the hardest job
in the United States Marine Corps. They would rather be in
combat than have to go around and try to recruit two, three
recruits every single month per man.

TRAINING EQUIPMENT

Mr. Dicks. That is a good point.
Going back to just one thing, and I will be done, Mr.
Chairman. To both of you, what has been the greater hindrance
to full spectrum readiness--equipment on hand or trained
personnel or both? It is the equipment that is the problem,
right? We don't have enough equipment at home to train the
people when they come back?
General Chiarelli. My number one problem, sir, is time at
home to get to those C-ratings that you are looking at. It is
time at home to do that training in addition to your deployment
training, because they are two different training sets.
Mr. Dicks. But we do have a lack of equipment?
General Chiarelli. We are able to get----
Mr. Dicks. I know the Guard and Reserve--the Guard does,
for sure. What about the Army?
General Chiarelli. We are making great improvements. Thanks
to the work of this committee, we are making great improvements
on Guard equipment also, sir.
It is time at home for the active component force rate.
Mr. Dicks. That is your biggest problem.
General Amos.
General Amos. Sir, there is equipment shortfall back home.
Again, the aggregate number of pieces of equipment are in the
Marine Corps. There is just a disproportional amount of it
forward deployed because of the increased requirement in
theater, which means we don't have as much we need back at the
home station to train. So that is absolutely correct.
The other thing that we lack back home is the time to
train. Even if we had the equipment back here to be able to do
the other full spectrum operations, that other piece of the
balanced core capabilities that you expect of your Marine
Corps, we don't have enough time to do those kinds of things.
We are going to get there. I think we are headed in the
right direction. And I would like to be able to come back a
year from now and say, I think things are--I think we are
getting back, I think our dwell is getting better, I think we
are able to do some of the amphibious kinds of things that you
expect your Marine Corps to be able to do.
We just can't do all of that right now. We do pieces of it,
but we can't do it universally across the Marine Corps.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
Mr. Murtha. Let me add the recruiting of the Marine Corps.
Now, when I joined, my mother cried the whole way to the
recruiting station. And she cried and cried and cried. She
wanted me to finish college. Then, when my second brother went,
she cried; the third brother went, she cried.
The fourth brother, she joined me and said, I am afraid he
is going to join the Army. So the information the Marine Corps
puts out has something to do with recruiting people.
Ms. Kaptur.
General Amos. Sir, you have got to remember this guy to my
right is my blood brother right now.
General Chiarelli. That is okay, sir.
Mr. Murtha. Ms. Kaptur.
Ms. Kaptur. Mr. Chairman, I arrived late, so I prefer just
to listen for awhile.
Mr. Murtha. We have reached the end.

TRAINING

Ms. Kaptur. Since I haven't heard all the questions, I want
to thank both Generals for appearing today, and I am sure
someone else has asked about where and how irregular warfare
training will be done.
Has somebody else asked that question?
Mr. Dicks. We just barely got into it. I think it could be
followed up on.
Ms. Kaptur. I was very interested in Secretary Gates'
statements back in December. And I am just curious at this
point, for the Corps and the Army, how you are thinking about
this irregular warfare proposal and where such training would
be done and how it would be done.
General Amos. Ma'am, if I can just answer for the Marine
Corps, it is already being done. It has been done now for the
last several years, and that is the reason why we have met with
such success in Iraq.
We are doing that through not only our professional
military education, the actual in-house schools that Marines go
to, but also the training out on 29 Palms, the desert training,
the things that we call home station training. We do language
training, we do immersion language training back at the units
before they even go to the advanced training before they
deploy.
We have stood up a Center for Irregular Warfare in the
Marine Corps. We have stood up a Marine training and advisory
group which deals with that kind of--that hybrid warfare, kind
of helping other nations train their military and their police.
We are doing that right now and we are doing it quite well.
So we have actually--if you were to say, Marine Corps,
start irregular warfare training today, I would look at you,
ma'am, and I would say, ``Ma'am, we are already doing it.''
When I say, ``There is nothing else that needs to be
done,'' I don't mean it to sound arrogant, like. I am just
saying that we have invested a significant amount of the Marine
Corps training and retorqued it so that we take those young men
and women and just train them in hybrid warfare.
Ms. Kaptur. But--your focus is on training your own force,
but then transferring those skills from a security standpoint
to the host nation? It does not involve the development of
civilian systems?
You stop at the security mission, correct?
General Amos. Actually, what we do is capitalize on the
civilian mission.
For instance, we have police forces. It started with the
Los Angeles police force, and the Army has it, and we actually
bring policemen in. A lot of them are Reserves. And we bring
these law enforcement teams in and they help us; they help
teach us how to train Iraqis and Afghanis.
So there are skill levels that are out there that we bring
in to be able to train other countries. Law enforcement is a
good example.
I will tell you one that we need to bring in and develop,
and that is probably agriculture. When you start thinking about
trying to transition the poppy fields in southern Afghanistan,
we are going to need that help.
Now, I will be honest with you, we have had some talent
within our services. We have got farmers, but we are going to
need some help from the other agencies to come in and try to
give the Afghanis an alternative to growing poppies.
But there is a good example of some stuff that really needs
to come into our service to help us.
Ms. Kaptur. What about Army?
Thank you, General.
General Chiarelli. Just to build on that, Jim's last point,
we have since stood up agriteams. They are National Guardsmen
from farm States. I just visited one at Camp Atterbury here a
couple of weeks ago. It was an amazing sight to see, 60 men--
farmers with guns, so to speak--who had been partnered with
Purdue University for a 9-month period. They were learning the
exact dialect of Urdu that they would be deploying into in
Afghan and, at the same time, learning farming techniques that
could apply in Afghanistan--not the ones that would be used
here in the United States in Nebraska or Iowa, but the ones
that could be used in Afghanistan.
These teams are strategic in nature. They have strategic
impact. It is one of the most successful programs that we have
going. We are doing the same kind of thing in our national
training centers and have been doing it now since 2003-2004.
I might just add, when I took the 1st Cavalry Division to
Iraq in 2004, I had to drag my officers kicking and screaming
to cultural awareness classes and try to get them to pick up on
their own a little bit of Arabic. When we left, I did an AAR,
after action review, with young captains and lieutenants. I
didn't do it, I had a major do it, so I would get through.
The two things that they said that they would have changed
in their training program before coming over would have been,
number 1, ``I would have had more cultural awareness
training,'' and number 2, ``If you would have brought me to the
level of language proficiency I was on day 90, I would have
been there on day 1. If you are all forced to learn the
language, you just want to have those skills on day 1, rather
than day 90.''
I am proud of all our forces and how we have done that.
Mr. Murtha. Ms. Granger.

TIME AT HOME

Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Today, we have talked about training and equipment,
recruitment, meeting your recruitment goals, and contractors.
But you say the biggest problem is time at home.
It does go back to Ms. Kilpatrick's question. It is obvious
to me, you either need more people or you need less mission. So
is it more people or are you doing--for instance, when you
talked about, it was quoted, ``rebuilding the house,'' well, is
it the military who should be rebuilding the house or less of
that mission?
General Amos. Ma'am, this Committee 2 years ago, when the
Marine Corps said, ``We need to grow to 202,000 to increase the
dwell time''--in other words, to give us that breather in
between so we can do the things that we have just talked
about--this Committee supported it in money, in spirit and
right on up to the fact that we are just about there. So it is
a function of, you need more people.
But what has happened in that same period of time, the
demand in many cases has increased. In other words, when the
Marine Corps said, ``We need to grow to 202,000,'' the Marine
Corps was sitting with about 23,000-24,000 Marines on deck in
Afghan and Iraq. We had nobody on deck in Afghanistan.
Today, we have about 22,000 Marines in Iraq; 2,300 on deck
in Afghanistan, putting another 8,000 in there.
So what has happened is we have begun to eat some of that
elasticity that we hope to be able to provide our forces back
home. Now, that is the bad news.
The good news is that I think the way we are going with a
drawdown in Iraq and what I hope is a right approach in
Afghanistan, I think we are going to be able to see what you
are talking about. But you are not going to see it right now.
You won't see it in the Marine Corps for probably another 18
months.
General Chiarelli. I can control just about everything but
demand, ma'am. And that is the problem I have right now. The
demand for Army forces is so great.
As I indicated, we have 26 brigades deployed worldwide, not
just in Iraq and Afghanistan, but in other places. The brigade
that is sitting in Korea today might as well be sitting in the
middle of Baghdad because I can't get at it. It is deployed.
And in addition to that, replacing those brigades takes me
another six brigades' worth of friction at any one time,
because for a period of time, I have two brigades doing the job
of one.
So when you get up in numbers of over 30 that is where I am
seeing the stress on the forces, in that short period of time
they have back home, that dwell time, in order to meet this
demand. And that is the only thing I can't control right now.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Dicks.

AIR REFUELING

Mr. Dicks. General Amos, whe the Air Force acquires a new
tanker, would you like it to be able to refuel the Marine Corps
Osprey, as a personal matter?
General Amos. Sir, I think you asked me that question last
year, didn't you?
Mr. Dicks. Yeah. I think you said ``yes'' last year, too,
as I recall.
General Amos. As a matter of fact I believe I took that for
the record because I didn't really know.
I know the MV-22 Osprey tanks behind Marine C-130s and Air
Force C-130s and airplanes like that.
I don't know that--I think the answer I got; I had better
be careful here--I don't think we tank the V-22 off of Air
Force C-135. In fact, I know we don't.
Mr. Dicks. Wouldn't it be in terms of just flexibility, if
you would be able to have the ability to do it?
General Amos. Sir, I am a pilot and I have tanked off of
every kind of airplane airborne and you can never have enough
gas.
So does that----
Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
Mr. Murtha. The hearing is adjourned until 10:00 a.m.,
Thursday, March 12th.
Thank you very much, Generals.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Boyd and the
answers thereto follow.]

Sincgars

Question. When does the Army expect to make an award on the Request
for Proposal for SINCGARS?
Answer. The Army expects to make an award at the end of May 2009.
The Army delayed the award due to Section 113 of the Duncan Hunter
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, (Public Law
110-417). Section 113 restricts obligation or expenditure of not more
than 75 percent of the Fiscal Year 2009 funding until 30 days after the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration
provides Congress a report on Army Tactical Radio Fielding Plans. The
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration
provided the report in April 2009.
Question. Is the $87M that was fenced in the FY09 Defense
Appropriations bill included in this RFP award?
Answer. Yes. The funding will be released to the Program Management
Office once the following two items are completed: (1) 30 days after
Congress received the Army Tactical Radio Fielding Plan from the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration
in April and (2) The Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 110-329), page 244,
provides that none of the funds in this Act shall be used for
procurement of Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System
(SINCGARS) radios until the Secretary of Defense certifies to the
congressional defense committees that any such procurement of SINCGARS
radios will use full and open competition to provide the best value for
the Army radio requirements including consideration of multi-band,
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) solutions.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense has given the Secretary of
the Army the responsibility to address this issue because the Army has
responsibility for procuring the SINCGARS radio and this certification
was provided to the Congressional Defense Committees in April.
Question. How many suppliers are eligible to compete for this RFP?
Answer. The RFP is open to all manufacturers that can supply a
tactical radio meeting the minimal requirements listed in the RFP. The
Army's market research indicated at least two potential suppliers.
Question. What is the Army's plan for acquiring Commercial off the
Shelf (COTS) radios that can meet Operational needs per the FY07 GWOT
directive?
Answer. The Army responded on June 21, 2007 to the FY07 GWOT
language provided in House Report 110-60, page 126.
The Committee directed the Army report to the Congressional Defense
Committees explaining the strategy to leverage available and qualified
industrial capacity to produce the needed SINCGARS at a significantly
faster rate.
The Army discussed the matter with ITT Corporation who at the time
was under a competitively awarded contract to produce SINCGARS radios.
ITT committed to increasing production up to 10,000 SINCGARS per month
in order to meet Army fielding requirements. A copy of ITT's formal
commitment to support this increased production capacity was enclosed
with the original response. Therefore, the surge in ITT production
capability met SINCGARS fielding requirements and significantly reduced
delivery times of the needed radio systems.
The Army also conducted a market survey to determine if other
qualified vendors could meet SINCGARS requirements to the
specifications of the SINCGARS Operational Requirements Document (ORD).
Only ITT was able to meet the full ORD requirements at that time.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Boyd.
Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto
follow:]

Redeploying Contractors from Iraq

Question. General Chiarelli, the Defense Department has a greater
number of deployed contractors in Iraq than deployed Military
servicemembers. How will you ensure that contractors will be redeployed
proportionately to redeploying servicemembers? What is your schedule
for redeploying contractors from Iraq?
Answer. The Department of Defense, U.S. Central Command, and to a
lesser extent the Department of the Army, continually assess the Iraqi
personnel requirement to ensure the appropriate personnel strength to
accomplish the mission. Logistics planning is in full swing to weigh
the requirements for contracted support during redeployment,
considering declining troop strength as well as increased need for some
services, for example transportation, base closure and remediation
support, and property management. The timeline for contractor
redeployment may not mirror that of the Warfighters and may not be
proportional. Additionally, as troop numbers grow in Afghanistan, some
contractors may shift rather than redeploy. Redeployment timelines for
combat forces and contractors are not discussed in non-secure forums
due to operational security.

Medical Casualty Evacuation Timeframes

Question. General Chiarelli, how long (in hours and minutes) has it
taken to MEDEVAC personnel from Iraq to medical treatment facilities?
How long (in hours and minutes) has it taken to MEDEVAC personnel from
Afghanistan to medical treatment facilities? What is the MEDEVAC
timeline goal? What is the Army doing to achieve MEDEVAC goals?
Answer. Army analysis (data from Jun 08-Dec 08) shows that the
average time to evacuate a wounded Soldier to a hospital in Iraq is 45
minutes and the average time in Afghanistan is 1 hour and 20 minutes.
Analysis continues, but preliminary numbers show an improving trend in
OEF (during Oct 08-Dec 08 the average time was 1 hour and 11 minutes).
The timeline standard for MEDEVAC is one hour. In fact, there is an
ongoing joint effort to improve the MEDEVAC system to achieve the 1
hour standard. The Army, as part of this effort, has sourced a forward
surgical team and four UH60 MEDEVAC helicopters/crews. The Air Force
and the Navy have also provided additional assets as part of this joint
effort. In addition, the Army will deploy an additional forward
surgical team, a medical brigade command and control headquarters, and
an additional 12-ship MEDEVAC company as part of a combat aviation
brigade deployment. We expect that the employment of these assets will
move the MEDEVAC time to less than 60 minutes in MND-East and South.

Backlog at Anniston Army Depot

Question. General Chiarelli, please describe the depot maintenance
backlog for equipment to be repaired at Anniston Army Depot (ANAD).
Answer. In order to provide a comprehensive response regarding
equipment backlog at ANAD, we have verified our depot capacity and
programs for critical systems at ANAD and the remaining four
maintenance depots: Corpus Christi, Letterkenny, Red River, and
Tobyhanna Army Depots. We continue to have ample capacity to meet Army
requirements.
The few cases where our depots have not been able to meet the Army-
directed production schedules have been the result of supply chain
issues or lack of unserviceable assets, and not the capacity of our
depots. For example, at Anniston, our slower-than-required production
of M2 machine gun production during the first part of fiscal year 2009
(FY09) was the result of nonconforming parts in the supply system. Army
Materiel Command, Defense Logistics Agency, Headquarters, Department of
the Army and parts suppliers worked together to resolve these problems.
Once acceptable parts were available in sufficient supply, ANAD was
able to quickly increase its production of M2 machine guns from 400 per
month in 1st Quarter FY09 to 700 per month to meet the Army
requirements. An example of unserviceable asset shortfall is the M1114
HMMWV program at Red River Army Depot. Currently there is a shortfall
of several hundred vehicles scheduled to be shipped from Southwest Asia
that have not yet arrived, therefore, impacting the production
schedule.
Our depots have the capacity to accomplish additional workload in
all areas, especially considering the additional capability we have
available through partnering arrangements and national maintenance
contracts with original equipment manufacturers such as Oshkosh,
Raytheon, and Boeing Aerospace Engineering.

Individual Ready Reserve

Question. General Chiarelli, how many times has the Army used the
Presidential Reserve Call-up Authority over the past eight years? What
is the period of obligation once a Ready Reserve service member has
been called up?
Answer. Over the past eight years, the Army has used the
Presidential Reserve Call-up Authority twice: once for operations in
Kosovo and also for operations in Bosnia.
Ready Reservists are currently called to active duty pursuant to
Title 10, US Code, Section 12302, for a period not to exceed 400 days:
365 days involuntary mobilization, plus 35 days authorized for out-
processing and post-mobilization leave.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.]
Thursday, March 12, 2009.

ARMY AND MARINE CORPS FORCE PROTECTION

WITNESSES

LIEUTENANT GENERAL N. ROSS THOMPSON III, MILITARY DEPUTY TO THE ACTING
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ACQUISITION LOGISTICS AND TECHNOLOGY,
UNITED STATES ARMY
LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES D. THURMAN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3/5/7,
UNITED STATES ARMY
LIEUTENANT GENERAL GEORGE J. FLYNN, DEPUTY COMMANDANT, COMBAT
DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

Introduction

Mr. Visclosky. This morning the Committee will hold a
hearing on force protection in the Army and Marine Corps.
We are pleased to welcome Lieutenant General James D.
Thurman, the Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Lieutenant
General N. Ross Thompson III, Military Deputy to the Acting
Assistant Secretary of the Army; and Lieutenant General George
J. Flynn, Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and
Integration, United States Marine Corps.
Also in attendance, but I am told by General Flynn not
allowed to speak because he is a Notre Dame graduate, Brigadier
General Michael M. Brogan, Commander of Marine Corps Systems
Command, who is with us as well.
And I would be remiss at the beginning if I did not again
congratulate General Flynn on Navy's recent victory over Notre
Dame in football.

Opening Statement

Today we will explore a broad range of topics related to
force protection, ranging from individual equipment, to MRAP
trucks, to avoiding fratricide, to countering IEDs and snipers,
to security of base camps.
Over the Thanksgiving break, Chairman Murtha visited
Landstuhl Hospital in Germany and had the opportunity to talk
to some of our soldiers and Marines hospitalized there. One of
the conversations dealt with maintenance and recovery of the
MRAP. During today's hearing, in addition to other items of
interest, the committee wishes to address specifically
maintenance and recovery, scheduling design change, and
contracting of MRAPs. In addition, it has been suggested that
the MRAP, as design and fielded for the fight in Iraq, may not
be suited to fight in Afghanistan.
Gentlemen, we are looking forward to your opening
statements. But first let me recognize my good friend, the
distinguished ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Young,
for any remarks he may have.

Remarks of Mr. Young

Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
And I want to again welcome our distinguished guests back.
This is beginning to be a habit so far this year. But we are
always happy to see you.
We are going to have a series of votes around 11 o'clock,
which are going to probably interrupt severely the hearing. So
I am going to forgo any opening statement in the interest of
time so that we can hear the testimony of the distinguished
witnesses.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much, Mr. Young.
And, gentlemen, all of your statements will be entered into
the record. And I believe, General Thompson and General Flynn,
you have prepared remarks.

Summary Statement of General Thompson

General Thompson. Well, Congressman Visclosky, Congressman
Young, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, on behalf
of both myself and General Thurman, thank you for the
opportunity to discuss Army force protection programs.
Along with the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, I have a
joint written statement that I will respectfully request be
made part of the record for today's hearing.
Our highest priority is the protection of our warfighters
in an operational environment that today is both ambiguous and
unpredictable. Over the last 8 years, we have successfully
adapted our institutional processes to expedite the development
and delivery of the latest force protection equipment to our
deployed forces.
With the support of Congress and the American people, the
Army has invested heavily in new equipment and technologies to
enhance soldier survivability and lethality. We recognize that
our enemy is highly adaptive, and we established systems,
enabled by your funding and support, to responsibly and rapidly
procure equipment and promising technologies to protect the
force.
Today's soldiers are better equipped and better protected
than ever before. The Army's framework for force protection is
a systems-of-systems approach that integrates layers of
protection to reduce vulnerability to attacks. These layers--
situational awareness, individual protection, vehicle
protection, and countermeasures--are integrated through the
development of appropriate tactics, techniques, and procedures
based on lessons learned and rehearsed through realistic
training.
As you know, today's battlefield has no front lines and
poses threats throughout the entire area of operations. We have
equipped our soldiers with precision lethality and advanced
situational awareness systems required to defeat the asymmetric
threats. We have developed and fielded extensive equipment for
soldier survivability, including individual protection programs
ranging from the advanced combat helmet, to life-saving body
armor, to clothing that allows our warfighters to adapt to
varying mission requirements and environmental conditions.

MINE-RESISTANT AMBUSH-PROTECTED VEHICLES

Soldier survivability has also increased in the area of
vehicle protection. The Army worked closely with the Marine
Corps to field the Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicle, or
MRAP, in record time. Presently we have over 9,000 MRAP
vehicles in use in theater, providing enhanced crew protection
and saving lives.
Our industry partners challenged the limits of technology,
guiding off of our requirements, and evolved the MRAP vehicles
from providing only improvised explosive device, or IED,
protection to providing both IED protection and explosively
formed projectile protection.

JAMMERS

In the area of countermeasures, all MRAP vehicles have CREW
jammers integrated before deployment. ``CREW'' stands for
``Counter Radio-controlled IED Electronic Warfare'' jammers. We
devised joint strategies to keep our current fleet of jammers
relevant to the constantly evolving threat. And we firmly
believe that the success of the CREW program has led to
significant reduction in the radio-controlled IED threat.
Likewise, the counter-rocket artillery and mortar, or C-
RAM, capability is an acquisition success, where joint efforts
enabled the rapid development and fielding of a capability to
detect, engage, and destroy in-flight rocket artillery and
mortar rounds.
Soldier survivability has increased dramatically with the
provision of force protection solutions. And we thank you all
for your strong support of our efforts. Your commitment to our
men and women in uniform is widely recognized throughout our
ranks.
Sir, this concludes my opening remarks, and General Thurman
and I look forward to your questions.
[The joint statement of General Thompson and General
Thurman follows:]

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Mr. Visclosky. General Flynn.

Summary Statement of General Flynn

General Flynn. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Young, and members
of the Committee, it is again an honor and privilege to be with
you all today. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss our
force protection requirements with you today.
Make no mistake about it, taking care of our Marines in
harm's way is our number-one priority. The Marine Corps's
approach to force protection is balanced and integrated. The
three key parts are training; better tactics, techniques, and
procedures; as well as equipment.
This approach is needed to make sure that we maintain the
initiative in dealing with a thinking and adapting enemy, that
we do not rely on a single approach that limits our operational
flexibility and effectiveness, and that we maintain both our
individual and operational agility across the range of military
operations.
Additionally, we are always searching for and evaluating
new concepts and technologies to see if they can provide us
with operational advantage and enhanced force protection. And
we field them as rapidly as we can.
I look forward to answering your questions, and I thank the
Committee for all its support that it has provided us.
[The statement of General Flynn follows:]

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Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much.
Mr. Young.

COMMON ACCESS CARDS

Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, the issues of force protection, of
course, are primary because we have to give our soldiers the
best protection we can in order for them to carry out the
mission that is important. And I am sure that a lot of the
members will be discussing specific force protection measures.
But I want to ask you about the common access cards that
are made available to contractor personnel, and that so many
are unaccounted for. Do you see this as a problem? And if so,
what can you do about it, or what are you doing about it?
Because having unauthorized personnel have access to
sensitive areas where our American lives can be threatened is a
worrisome situation. So I just wonder where we are on the issue
of these common access cards.
General Thurman. Congressman Young, first off, the forward
operating base commander in all the forward operating bases,
whether it be in Iraq or Afghanistan, control access into the
base. What we do, to get to your specific point, is we use the
biometrically enabled card system through the biometrics system
to screen personnel before they come in to make sure that that
data on that card is who that person is. And we have been
working a lot to make sure that we control that access, but the
commanders do that.
The other thing that we have is the surveillance systems in
and around the base, plus the detection screening devices when
folks come in and out of the base camp.
General Flynn. Sir, one other thing, based on my experience
in being able to get around Camp Victory or even down at the
British camp down in Basra, is we had to have extra additional
cards, other than the common access cards, to get access to
different areas. In fact, I carried around four ID badges with
me, depending on where I was going.
So I realize the sensitivity of the common access card, but
we have taken some mitigation things in practice that do
mitigate it. But I understand your message about having control
over the cards.
Mr. Young. Information that the staff has provided us says
that the Department has approved an estimated 39,000 contractor
employees for cards without verifying that background checks
had been initiated or completed. Is this accurate information?
General Thurman. Congressman Young, we can take that
information and go back and verify that. I don't have knowledge
of that right now. But I would be more than happy to go back
from the Army and tell you what we know, working with General
Thompson, and provide you what the Army has.
Mr. Young. Well, I do have a real concern about this
because access to sensitive areas where American lives can be
threatened by people who--we might not even know who they are,
whether they have ever been vetted for security, is worrisome
and bothersome. So I hope you all pay attention to that.
Am I talking to the right people? Should I be talking to
someone else about this issue?
General Thompson. Yes, sir, I think you are talking to the
right people here.
From the standpoint of procedures, the people do have to go
through background checks. To your specific question about
contractors, contractors have to go through background checks
to participate in any of the work that they do for the
government. And those procedures are in place.
The other way to control that, and one of the things that
we have just put in place in the Army recently, is another
additional step with the country clearances. To make sure that
when somebody has to go through the process to get a country
clearance to go into theater, we run the joint checks to make
sure that person doesn't come up as a convicted felon or has
any issues that we would be concerned about.

BIOMETRICS

From an acquisition perspective, I think that we are really
going in the right direction, and it was touched briefly on
with General Thurman, with biometrics. Leveraging the database
and the use of biometrics, you know, the fingerprint data, the
eye scans, is really an area that has great promise in the
threat environment that we are in theater right now and has a
great promise for law enforcement. And that is a jointly-run
program, the Biometrics Task Force for the Department of
Defense is run by the Army as the executive agent, but all of
the materiel solutions, from a database to the scanning
devices, are all jointly developed and jointly worked.
General Flynn. Congressman Young, I will owe you an answer
back on our procedures for issuing the card, as well as our
access procedures. And we will give you that as a record
response, sir, if that is okay.
[The information follows:]

The Army does not prescribe guidance or overarching policy on
installation or base access. This would fall under the auspices of The
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense and U.S. Central Command for
bases on theater.

Mr. Young. Well, thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Young.
Mr. Moran.

COMMON ACCESS CARDS

Mr. Moran. Thank you very much, Mr. Visclosky.
This is a shared concern, I think, on both sides of the
aisle, this issue of common access cards. We had some testimony
from the Inspector General that was very disturbing. And I
would like to know, what has happened to all of these common
access cards that were issued by contractors?
There were, I think we were told, about 24,000 issued for
the employees alone; 303 contractors, as I recall, were given
the authorization to issue common access cards. They were
issuing them to their employees. And, as Mr. Young has
suggested, they were giving them to people without requiring
that they go through the vetting process.
Are we getting those cards back? You know, you are telling
us what you are doing in the future, although it seems like
this has been going on for 6 years now. But what are we doing
about the cards that exist out there now?
General Thurman. Congressman Moran, I know that the
procedures that we just more or less talked about here have
been implemented. And I know that, in theater, working with the
contracting office down there, that they are going back and
attempting to try to regain control of those.
I think what is important is what we have done with the
biometrics, with the biometrics identification system and how
that interfaces with the automated FBI database.
Mr. Visclosky. General, if you could move your mike up,
please. Thank you.
General Thurman. And so what I can do is I can go back to
the theater and get you exactly the answer to that question.
And I would be more than happy to do that.
Mr. Moran. Well, I think it would be useful because, until
you can respond to the IG's findings, now that we know the
extent of this, we have some culpability as well if we don't
deal with it.
They said that about 93 percent of the cards that had been
issued to foreign nationals had a government Internet access
code on them. In other words, they could pass as government
employees. A large number of the cards mistakenly, erroneously,
perhaps deliberately, misidentified people as government
employees rather than contractors. And while the IG can do
these surveys and give us this information, we need to know the
extent to which our security has been compromised by people
getting on the base without proper authority.
I mentioned a time when I was in Baghdad and there were
these folks flashing--while we were waiting in line, they were
going through another entrance. And I asked if he was Army, and
one of the MPs--I said, ``Who are all of those guys?'' And he
said, ``Well, they are Halliburton. They run the place.'' Well,
they had their common access cards that had been issued by
other Halliburton employees. And, you know, they never should
have been issued.
So it is one thing to say you are tightening up, you are
bringing in more technology. I don't think our concern was so
much the cards that were issued by the military; they were the
cards issued by contractors to contractors.
The Chairman has time and again talked about the fact that
the contractors are really taking over many of our efforts to
perform what used to be inherently governmental services. When
we saw the number of contractors in Iraq, it was as many as we
had military people. All of them have common access cards.
The IG also said that 93 percent of those cards have an
inaccurate expiration date on them. You don't have to write all
this down; it is in the IG's report.
We need to follow up on this stuff. You know, if he gives
us this information, we are made aware of it. If we don't
follow up and then there is some very serious breach of
security, as I say, we share some culpability.
So I am glad Mr. Young raised this. Common access cards
is--I think that is something that we are going to have to put
some emphasis on until it is corrected.
I will assume that you are no longer issuing--letting any
contractors issue those cards. Is that true?
General Thurman. Congressman, is--I agree with you, there
should not be any loose cards out there that are floating
around. And we owe you the detailed procedures and what we are
doing about the cards that was in the IG report. And we will
bring that back to you. We need to go back to theater and get
their current status of that, and I would be more than happy to
take that for the record and bring it back.
[The information follows:]

The Army does not prescribe guidance or overarching policy. This
would fall under the auspices of The Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense, Intelligence and U.S. Central Command.

Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would be interested for the record to know who it was
that gave the authorization to the contractors to be issuing
these cards to other contractors. Who is responsible for the
policy itself, and who actually allowed that to occur?
It doesn't matter who the contractor was. That was an
inherently governmental function, and it does compromise our
security.
General Thompson. Sir, I do know that the procedures today,
if you are a government employee, military or civilian, you get
a common access card and a personal identification number. And
that is how you get access into or onto a base.
If you are not a government employee, your access is based
on the biometrics data, the fingerprint or the iris scan, the
eye scan. And that is checked against both the FBI database and
the Advanced Battlefield Information System (ABIS) database,
which is another database. And that database is both here but
there is also the local database that is there.
So we have really tightened up the procedures on access to
all the bases based on what I just described.
Mr. Moran. So just having that common access card doesn't
get you onto the base anymore?
General Thompson. Doesn't get you onto the base.
Mr. Moran. Well, they didn't mention that to us.
General Thompson. Without a pin or, if you are a
nongovernment employee, without a biometrics scan of some kind,
either fingerprints or the iris scan.
Mr. Moran. But not what is on the card. They have to put
their own fingerprint in, and then they have to check it
against a database. It is not dependent upon what card they
happen to be carrying.
General Thompson. Right. And the database is both local and
global. And so they update the local database. And if there is
any doubt, then that individual doesn't get on the base.
We can go back, like General Thurman said, and detail out
the exact specific procedures that we go through. But I do know
that that is the broad description of how they do that today.
Mr. Moran. Well, if that policy is being followed, it is
not as much of a concern, but that is not what we were led to
believe by the IG. Thank you.
Thank you.
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Moran, we will get back to you on the
authorization and the sequencing too. I think that is a very
important question.
Mr. Frelinghuysen.

ELECTRONIC FRATRICIDE

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, welcome back. In a hearing like this, you never
know what might get thrown at you. I have some questions
relative to electronic fratricide on the battlefield.
A couple of years ago, I was at Offutt Air Force Base in
Nebraska. And since it is on the Air Force Web site, the Rivet
Joint aircraft has some pretty remarkable capabilities. One of
the things I heard from the crews--I asked them how many
missions they were flying over Iraq. And I was surprised--this
was a couple of years ago--when they said none. And it was
interesting, they explained that the sensors on the aircraft
were, in effect, being jammed by all the devices deployed on
the ground. I don't know whether there has been some
improvement, but I would like your take on what is happening
there.
I read in the New York Times, General Thompson, that the
Army is setting up its own teams for electronic warfare. What
is the battlefield out there like now? And what should we
anticipate in this sort of area as we move troops from Iraq
into Afghanistan? What sort of problems are there? Either from
a Marine or Army perspective. It is pretty important.
General Flynn. Sir, one of the things is, there is no doubt
that the electronic spectrum is getting pretty crowded. And one
of the key things that we are doing--and I know we are doing
this in the Marine Corps, and I am sure the Army is--is we are
deconflicting the frequency spectrum and what has been going on
in the airwaves based on what missions are being performed.
Because there are some issues with--some of the devices
countering out another device.
So it is almost very similar to what you do in fire support
coordination. You deconflict based on the mission that you are
doing. And we have built the expertise at the operational
planning unit to do frequency deconfliction, and that is what
we are doing. We have to do it not only for our transmissions
but also for some of our collection efforts and all those
things. We do deconflict now, sir, and it is an active part of
our operational planning and execution matrices.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. And you are also obviously, both your
service and the other services, are involved in the IED task
force. And that, obviously, has----
General Flynn. Yes, sir. In fact, we took a lot of our
electronic warfare pilots and we trained them. Actually the
Navy deployed some of them, with both Army and Marine forces,
to help us with the management of the frequency spectrum.
So it is something that we actually have to manage and we
have to deconflict, sir.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Yeah. Well, I am sure.
I want to hear the Army, where do you stand. I wonder
whether the issue is being managed here. Obviously, our enemy
knows of this, sort of, situation, and they can actually
potentially make it worse.
General Thurman.

SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT

General Thurman. Congressman Frelinghuysen, what I would
tell you, sir, is, similar to the Marine Corps, one of the
things that I learned--and I learned this the hard way going
into Iraq initially--is how crowded the frequency spectrum is
getting. When you add things such as our friendly devices as
Blue Force Tracking, the Force XX1 Battle Command Brigade and
below systems that we have that shows us where everybody is on
the battlefield, your Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), the full
motion video--all of that takes spectrum. And then you put in
our jammers.
What we had to do on my second tour was make sure that
before every combat operation that you are constantly
deconflicting the spectrum.
And so we have learned a lot about this. It is going to be
the future.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Well, the spectrum is shared. You know,
in Afghanistan we have our NATO ``allies,'' I say in quotes,
and they obviously have, you know, their own set of
electronics.
General Thurman. Right. And you are absolutely right, we
have established electronic warfare as a specialty in the Army.
We learned a lot from the Navy. The Navy helped us with this.
And we see that as one of the things that we have to continue
to develop in the future so we can get at those sorts of things
that you see to make sure our systems are more effective.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. But, historically, tell me if I am
wrong, the Army has been relying on the expertise of the Air
Force and Navy, is that right?
General Thurman. Sir, initially, we had to go to the Navy
to help us with the counter-IED effort because that is where a
majority of the expertise was. And now we are developing our
own capability in the Army, and we share joint assets.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I just want to know whether there is a
game plan here.
General Thurman. Yes, sir, there is.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Is there a task force?
General Thurman. Yes, sir. We are documenting electronic
warfare specialist into the Army force structure.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We have--the higher level is obviously
ongoing cyber attacks.
General Thurman. Right.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. And you have other assets which could
be, you know, compromised.
General Thompson. What General Thurman, Congressman
Frelinghuysen, is pointing out is that we did rely, initially,
heavily on the Navy and the Air Force, because they had
electronic warfare specialists as part of their force.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. And you are training some of them up,
according to what I am reading.
General Thompson. We have created that capability in the
Army. We are starting to train soldiers from a force structure
perspective, which is the process that General Thurman
controls. We are growing that capability inside the Army.
And from a systems perspective, we look to deconflict that
spectrum before we field something to a unit. So, in a lot of
the labs and the chambers that we have, we put CREW devices
with Blue Force Tracking, as an example, to make sure that
there is not spectrum deconfliction. When we get a threat and
we know the threat is using a different part of the spectrum,
based on the intelligence reports, we adjust.
When you see upgrades to things like the CREW system, the
anti-jam system, it is based on the threat moving to a
different part of the spectrum. So we update the system and we
do that deconfliction as much as possible.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. This is a huge issue. It is a moving
target. And you are giving us some pretty good clear assurance
here across the services that you have this issue in hand?
General Flynn. Yes, sir.
General Thurman. I would just caveat one thing. We just
have to continue to be adaptable to the threats as they emerge
and as we field more systems to make sure, from a joint
perspective, that we fully understand what we are doing in the
joint domain of the spectrum. The spectrum is a huge,
complicated issue.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. The enemy has been looking over our
shoulder, you know.
General Thurman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Not only in Iraq, but obviously there
are other adversaries. And I assume they know there is a
certain degree of--I won't say chaos, but some difficulty in
this issue of deconflicting.
General Thurman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Is that accurate?
Okay, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Visclosky. Ms. Kaptur.

MRAP MAINTENANCE

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome. Good to have you before us this morning.
I just wanted to focus on MRAPs and the maintenance of
those and how they are being received by soldiers and Marines
in the field.
Our chairman, Mr. Murtha, has on several occasions spoken
about encounters he has had, one in particular with a Marine in
Germany at Landstuhl who commented that when they had a
breakdown in theater that the Marines really weren't trained to
fix it. And, in fact, the MRAP had to be winched and put on a
flatbed and then hauled in to a repair site where contractors
worked on it.
And my question is, is the field repair of MRAP vehicles
beyond the training level of our Marines and soldiers? And are
these repairs now being handled by contractors, or are you
integrating this into the training of our regular force?
General Flynn. Ma'am, I think there are two parts to your
question there.
Out in the field, if an MRAP loses its mobility, the
ability to recover that by another vehicle--for example, if it
can still roll, you can self-recover with another MRAP, meaning
you can hook up to it and you can tow it back into the
operating base. If it has a severe mobility loss, meaning lost
wheels, axles, we have to send out a pretty heavy vehicle,
normally a tank retriever, to bring it back just because of the
weight of this vehicle.
When the program was fielded, we did contract for 2 years
at the operating bases for contractors to do that maintenance.
That is not necessarily a bad thing for us, because it meant
that we could keep Marines focused on doing other things, and
we just bring it in to the garage to get fixed.
We don't do repairs on the road. We recover and bring them
back to the operating base. And the issue there--and I
understand where that Marine was coming from--is it is a heavy
vehicle, and the only way you can bring it back really is with
a vehicle of equal size and equal power to bring it back in,
ma'am.
Ms. Kaptur. So you are telling me that the repairs right
now, General, are being done by contractors then?
General Flynn. In the forward operating bases, yes, ma'am.
Ms. Kaptur. Are you considering transitioning contracts to
insourcing rather than outsourcing the repairs?
General Flynn. Ma'am, when the vehicle was fielded, we had
a 2-year maintenance contract that was part of how the program
was developed. And right now we are looking at the way ahead on
how to continue on with the maintenance of the vehicle.
Ms. Kaptur. Who handles that? Is it just one contract with
one major company?
General Flynn. Ma'am, I would like to take that for the
record. I am not sure how many companies are involved in that.
[The information follows:]

The following companies have contracts to perform maintenance on
MRAPs in the Forward Operating Bases: (1) MANTECH (Afghanistan/OEF
contractor logistics support only); and (2) MRAP Original Equipment
Manufacturers (OEMs) provide Field Service Representatives (FSRs) as
technical support to both OIF and OEF. The OEMs include BAE, Navistar
Defense, General Dynamics Land Systems--Canada, and Force Protection
Industries, Inc. Additionally, government mechanics from Red River Army
Depot provide sustainment-level maintenance support in Iraq and Kuwait.

General Thompson. I can add to that a little bit. And the
real expert on MRAP is sitting behind us here. But, from a
broad standpoint, it is not atypical to do contractor logistics
support for the first couple of years a system is fielded. And
MRAP is no different.
The emphasis on MRAP initially was getting the most
vehicles out there as fast as possible. And although you like
to bring the logistics package and the sustainment package
along, we took conscious, purposeful decisions to field more
systems. And we are catching up a little bit on the sustainment
packages. But we do have the contract logistics support.
Because there are different variants of the systems, it is with
the contractors that built those systems, for the most part.
We did the same thing with Stryker a number of years ago
when we fielded the Stryker vehicles. We made a decision to
field those with mostly contract logistics support. And we are
now bringing that capability to maintain the Strykers back in
and training the soldiers to do that and putting that force
structure into the Stryker formation.
And so, as we go forward on MRAP, ma'am, depending on how
many and what variants we keep in the force structure, we will
train soldiers and Marines on how to take care of those things
and not rely exclusively on the contractors.
Ms. Kaptur. I am glad to hear that, because we have some
information here. For instance, a soldier doesn't know how to
release the air brakes prior to the vehicle being towed, or
they can't do simple repair like headlights. This is according
to information that we have.
So I am just curious, I mean, you would think the soldier
would be at one with their equipment, or at least there would
be people trained in theater to handle whatever might occur
since these are so essential. We have had over 60 percent of
our injuries due to explosive devices-related----
General Thompson. When those soldiers and Marines that are
using those vehicles get those vehicles fielded to them, they
get new equipment training. So they are taught the things that
they need to be taught in order to operate those vehicles
safely and to do the operator-level maintenance. We call it
``Dash 10'' level maintenance, but it is the operator-level
maintenance. So it would surprise me that we didn't take that
soldier through the training to know how to release that brake
on the system, because that is part of operator-level training.

MRAP VEHICLE IMPROVEMENTS

Ms. Kaptur. Mr. Chairman, time has probably expired, but I
also wanted to ask questions for the record dealing with the
actual comfort of the soldier or Marine in the vehicle and any
after-market changes that have been made so that they are not
bumping their head or it is easier for them to get down.
I know that, when we were over there, we looked at several
pieces of equipment; we talked to the soldiers and the Marines
who were using them. And what changes have been made or are you
considering making in the after-market arena to make it more
functional?
For instance, they were complaining that when they had to
sit in the back, they were facing inward rather than outward,
so that they could see the field. And I don't know whether that
has been changed or not.
Do you have any comments you want to make on after-market
changes?
General Thompson. We continue to take feedback from the
soldiers and the Marines in the field and make improvements to
those vehicles. We do that not just on MRAPs but on all
systems.
To the specific question about the soldiers facing inward,
I mean, one of the issues there----

GUN PORT ON MRAPS

Ms. Kaptur. They can't fire through the ports. That is the
issue.
General Thompson. Yes, ma'am. But gun ports on the sides of
the vehicles were something that was looked at initially, and
we elected not to go with the gun ports--and I can ask Mike
Brogan to correct me if I am wrong--because a port is a hole in
the side of the vehicle, and that creates a seam, if you will,
or an area of vulnerability. And so the vehicles are being used
as transport--we don't necessarily want to fight from those
vehicles. And so, having gun ports on the vehicles is not
something that we want.
And because of the protection from the undermine, the
vehicle has got a V-shaped hull. So the configuration that the
manufacturers did--we left it up to them, based on our
requirements. But if you can imagine a V-shaped hull, where the
space is, the leg room, if you will, is in the center where the
V goes down. And so a lot of the seats facing to the center are
because of leg-room considerations and space considerations
inside the vehicle.
Mr. Visclosky. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Ms. Kaptur. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Kingston.
Mr. Kingston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HUSKY MINE DETECTING VEHICLE

General, I wanted to ask on the Army side of things--and I
am not sure if the Marines are using the Husky or not. But I
actually did not know about the Husky until the National Guard
brought it to my attention and they wanted funding for it, the
Georgia National Guard.
But, as you know, since 1979 the USDA has been using
ground-penetrating radar to study soil samples and
archaeological and cultural resources and things like that, but
that the Husky puts this to use for IED detection. And yet--I
have to confess full ignorance, there may be a lot of money in
the budget already for it, but I have never heard about it from
the Army. I heard about it from the Army Guard.
So I was just wondering, is this something that is very
useful? Somewhat useful? Does it have problems? And do we need
to support more money for it?
General Thurman. Congressman Kingston, the Husky, what our
experience has been, it is a good vehicle. It is good to look
at shallow buried IEDs. We have those in our route clearance
teams operating in Iraq today. We are going to be putting some
into Afghanistan. They have asked about those.
And what it does, it looks for nonmetallic and metallic
IEDs and for underbelly threats. That was one of my biggest
complaints, as a division commander, is having some type of
ground-penetrating capability that you can find deep-buried
IEDs. And we are still working through that. The Joint IED Task
Force has been working that. But this is an important system to
keep in our route clearance teams.
Mr. Kingston. Well, why is it, just to kind of explain it
to me, that the National Guard is asking for it as opposed to,
say, the MRAP?
And this Committee, as you know, got very excited about
MRAPs 2 or 3 years ago. And you hear so much about the
reduction in fatalities and injuries because of MRAPs, but we
don't hear about ground-penetrating radar systems like the
Husky as one reason that the fatalities have decreased.
How many are there in there? How wide is the use, for
example? And is it something that this committee should really
be more enthusiastic about?
General Thurman. Congressman, what I would tell you, as a
guy that takes the requirements into the Army, is we look at a
myriad of route clearance capabilities. And Husky is one of
those that we have in the system--or in our route clearance
capability. And we can give you the full lay-down of all of
those capabilities and show you the importance of each one of
those. And I would be happy to lay that down for you.
But, yes, right now Afghanistan has asked for 80 of them to
go in there. And the 48th Brigade, who I have been working very
closely with, out of Georgia, they will fall in on the MRAPs
that are over there. But we are going to put more route
clearance capability into Afghanistan.
Mr. Kingston. So if we request an earmark for more of that,
that would be something that we would get Pentagon support for?
General Thurman. Sir, I will take the requirement and I
will pass that up once we validate that, depending upon the
other balance of capabilities they are asking for in
Afghanistan.
Mr. Kingston. I think that the 48th got--is Kentucky
Guard----
Mr. Visclosky. Excuse me, if I could. General, if you could
move the mikes closer to you? Thank you. That would be
terrific.
Mr. Kingston. But they seem to have gotten, you know, fired
up about it from the Alabama National Guard. But as they were
about to go over there, they said, ``We really would like to
have these.'' And so----
General Thompson. I think what we should do, Congressman,
is go back and look at what we have as the total requirement,
which is the purview of the G-3. How many of those do we think
we need in the force structure? And I, frankly, don't have that
information right in front of me, and how many we have bought
to date and the distribution of those assets in theater.
If the Guard is asking for them, there is no preference to
give them to, active soldiers versus Guard soldiers. Whatever
soldier needs that capability is going to get that capability.
And we do look at the balance of those. And Huskies, like
General Thurman said, are part of the dedicated route clearance
and convoy clearance teams that go out there in advance of a
convoy or a mission to do whatever they can to eliminate the
IEDs that could be out there in the force. And Husky is a great
system. And from a requirements perspective, we should take
that number back to you and lay that out.
Mr. Kingston. All right.
[The information follows:]

The total Army Program of Record requirement for Huskies is 710.
This is based on a Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTO&E)
requirement for 672 Huskies in 28 Route Clearance Companies and for 38
Huskies to support Table of Distributions and Allowances (TDA) units.
In addition, the Army has a validated Operational Needs Statement (ONS)
for a total of 286 Huskies in both the Iraq (222) and Afghanistan (64)
Theaters. We have fielded 201 to U.S. forces in Iraq and 44 to U.S.
forces in Afghanistan. We will begin fielding systems to fill MTO&E
requirements in FY10.

General Flynn.
General Flynn. Sir, my experience, I have actually been on
route clearance with the Husky. I was with the Alabama National
Guard. So it is a valuable capability for the IED.
But it goes back to the larger issue, that the way to
defeat the IED is through multiple platforms. There is no one
silver bullet. And this capability is one of those
capabilities. Just like, right now we are looking at other
capabilities that we would like to take into Afghanistan to
enhance our counter-IED capabilities. So all these are pieces
to the puzzle of putting the enemy on his back heels and us
maintaining the advantage. But it is an effective capability.
And my understanding of this equipment is, when units
deploy into the theater, they fall in on it. So it was a key
part of the 20th Engineers Brigade route clearing teams, no
matter what area of Iraq they were operating in.
Mr. Kingston. Well, we certainly want to work with you guys
on this, because we want to make sure everybody--you know,
where it is practical, that we can support the effort together.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you.
Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Dicks. Why don't we go ahead with the regular order? I
will come in at the end.
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Bishop.

BODY ARMOR

Mr. Bishop. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Dicks.
Gentlemen, welcome. I am interested to explore body armor.
General Thurman, recent news articles in the Army Times and
Defense Review, along with your testimony, indicate that the X
Small Arms Protective Insert XSAPI plates will provide better
protection than the current Enhanced Small Arms Protective
Inserts. And in your testimony you state that the Army is going
to procure 120,000 sets of the X Small Arms Protective Inserts
in 2009. And you say that the plates will be shipped to Kuwait
as a contingency stock, and they will be available for use by
the theater commander.
If the X Small Arms Protective Insert plates are better
than the other plates, why are you storing them as a
contingency stock rather than getting them out to the soldiers
immediately?
And wouldn't you say that there is a greater need for the X
Small Arms Protective Insert plate in Afghanistan, particularly
where, according to news accounts, the enemy is using the
Chinese armor-piercing rounds, which are copycat rounds of our
armor-piercing rounds? So wouldn't you think that it would be
urgent to get that out to the soldiers immediately as opposed
to stocking them in Kuwait as a contingency?
General Thurman. Congressman Bishop, we made that decision,
on the 120 sets, to go ahead and move those into theater
contingency stocks, because the theater had not asked
specifically for those to be issued. And that is why we
positioned those forward.
Now, in a classified sense, we can show you the data that
we have on the threat. And we would be more than happy to show
you that, with the penetration capability and all of that and
what that defeats.
[The information follows:]

The Army G3 and ASA(ALT) have worked in conjunction with SAFM-BUL
to arrange a classified briefing for Congressman Bishop on the topic of
the current threat level in Afghanistan and how it relates to body
armor.

Mr. Bishop. But you do, in summary, think that it is better
than the ones currently used?
General Thurman. I will let General Thompson address from
the perspective of body armor, because he works that every day.
But I would tell you I think the body armor we have today is
very good, the Interceptor Body Armor that we have.
Mr. Bishop. I was just trying to understand if one was
superior to the other. And according to Army Times and Defense
Review, the X Small Arms Protective Inserts are better than the
enhanced.
General Thompson. Sir, I would answer the question this
way, if I could: ``Better'' is in the eyes of the beholder. So
does XSAPI provide a higher level of protection? Yes, or we
wouldn't have procured it.
Do we need that level of protection based on the threat?
And that is what General Thurman is referring to. That is
something that we cannot discuss here.
Mr. Bishop. Okay. I understand now.
General Thompson. But the XSAPI is heavier. And so it is
the balance, it is the better--from the commander's
perspective, do I want something that is maybe high level of
protection, but if it is heavier, how does that impact my
soldier or Marine's ability, especially in a place like
Afghanistan, to carry all that extra weight and be able to do
his mission.
Mr. Bishop. Yeah, we had a hearing on that yesterday, so I
appreciate it.
General Thompson. Yes, sir. And so it was part of the
decision calculus. And that is why having it available in
theater so, if the threat materializes or the commander thinks
he needs that, then it is available to them. So that is where I
leave that question at that point.

BODY ARMOR TESTING

Mr. Bishop. That is understandable.
Do the Army and the Marines collaborate in the process of
improving the body armor?
The DoD Inspector General (IG) recently reported that there
were some deficiencies in the Army's data recording process for
the testing of the body armor. Can you, kind of, tell us in
terms of those deficiencies that the Inspector General
discovered?
And describe for us the stages that body armor is actually
tested. And tell us--and Ms. Kaptur has stepped out, but the
subcommittee is very, very concerned about--well, very, very
interested in, I should say, the extent to which the testing is
contracted out.
General Thompson. There are a couple parts to your
question.
Do the Army and the Marine Corps collaborate on personal
protection equipment for soldiers and Marines? The answer is,
absolutely. That data is shared.
The standardization of test processes and test criteria is
something that is ongoing right now. And that was one of the
subjects of the DoD IG report. And that effort, not just with
the Army and the Marine Corps but also with the Special
Operations Command, is ongoing right now.
We have addressed, well before the IG report was written,
the systemic issues and the test processes and the test
procedures on all personal protective equipment at multiple
levels inside of the Army and the Marine Corps. We have a
process called the Army and Marine Corps Board where we look at
these requirements and look at how do we develop those joint
solutions so if, for example, if we go to a higher level of
protection on a combat helmet, is it just the Marines that are
going to do that or are the Army and the Marines going to do
that together? And those are the kinds of discussions we have
all the time.
The body armor that the soldiers have is the best in the
world. The body armor protects the soldiers against the threats
that are out there. We test the body armor through multiple
means. You can't even begin to produce body armor unless you go
through a first article test to go into production. And then,
when you are in production, every production manufacturer has
lot acceptance tests, where we test the individual lots before
they are issued, even after they have gone into production.
And then we have a very detailed surveillance testing
program, where we pull plates out of the inventory and test
them with nondestructive test equipment. We X-ray them, and
then we bring them back and shoot them to make sure that,
depending on how long they have been out there in the field,
they are still providing a level of protection.
So I am very confident that the overall testing process
that we have in place makes sure that the plates are good when
they are issued and that they are good after they have been in
the field for a while.
Mr. Bishop. Is that process contracted out, or do you do
that in-house?
General Thompson. Part of the testing has been done by
National Institute of Justice-certified lab facilities in the
past, with the appropriate government oversight. And this is an
issue we are working through right now.
From a policy perspective, we have elected to bring in-
house the testing of body armor, because we think it is an
inherently governmental thing. If the capacity is not there to
do it in-house in a government facility, we may do some of that
in the contractor facility, but it will have the appropriate
inherently governmental oversight of that process from the
standpoint of the program office and the Defense Contract
Management Agency.
And even if it was done in the contractor facility in the
past or could be done in the contractor facility in the future,
it will be done against the standard test protocol and process.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Visclosky. Ms. Granger.

HELICOPTER SURVIVABILITY UPGRADES

Ms. Granger. Thank you.
My question has to do in Afghanistan with the consideration
of our airborne assets, specifically helicopters. And we have
had hearings and know that the Army and Marines both are
increasing the number of helicopters.
My concern is the leftover missiles from the Soviet-Afghan
conflict. And my report said there could be as many as 2,000
Stinger missiles and portable surface-to-air missile systems
that I know are outdated, but how do we--what do we
specifically know about their capability and the danger to our
helicopters, particularly with, like, the SAM-7, the Stinger
assets in there left by Iran? And can you address that, please?
General Thurman. Yes, ma'am. What I would tell you, as far
as the specifics of what we know about that, that is classified
information. And we could do that in a closed hearing with you
on that.
[The information follows:]

The Army G2 has worked in conjunction with SAFM-BUL and OCLL to
arrange a classified briefing for Congresswoman Granger on the topic of
leftover missiles from the Soviet-Afghan conflict.

I would tell you that is a concern of ours. And that is why
it is so important to continue to upgrade our countermeasures
systems on all of our aviation assets as we put more airframes
into Afghanistan. But we can tell what you we know about that
in a classified sense.
Ms. Granger. We will make sure that happens.
General Thurman. All right, ma'am.
General Flynn. Ma'am, from the Marine side of the house,
too, since the beginning of our operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, we have continually been upgrading the aircraft
survivability measures that are on the airframes. So we can
give you the capabilities of those systems in a classified
forum, as well as what we think the threat we are going to
face. And that is the best forum to do that, and we will be
happy to do that.
Ms. Granger. We will do that.
Thank you.
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Hinchey.

JOINT LIGHT TACTICAL VEHICLE

Mr. Hinchey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Generals. Thanks very much. I very much
appreciate what you are doing and very much appreciate the
answers that you are giving to these questions. It is very
informative, and I think it helps us a lot.
One of the things I wanted to mention to you is the focus
of attention that you give on the safety and security of the
military operations, the vehicles and things of that nature.
And, as I understand it, there is a new vehicle that is under
development, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. The focus of
attention for this vehicle apparently is on the circumstances
that are known and, to some extent, anticipated in Afghanistan
rather than Iraq. And, as I understand it, this vehicle is
still undergoing analysis, or it hasn't gotten to the point of
development yet. And I would appreciate anything that you could
tell us about that.
In addition, I understand also that there is a possibility
that there may be a requirement for a hybrid in that Joint
Light Tactical Vehicle. Is that the case? Or is something else
as sophisticated as that moving forward?
General Flynn. Sir, we are very interested in the Joint
Light Tactical Vehicle. It is a joint program. And, as I read
the other day, the Australians are also interested. So also
some of our allies are interested.
One of the things on the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle is,
it is in the technology demonstration phase right now. And that
phase will last about 24 to 27 months. There are three
different manufacturers, with three variants each, that are
going to go through this demonstration phase for us to find the
best possible alternative.
The key part about this vehicle is what we are seeking to
do in the development of the vehicle is we are seeking to get
the right balance between what we call the iron triangle--to
balance payload, performance, and protection--and to get the
best out of all three. Because there is protection in mobility,
and there is also, you know, the ability to payload. The
heavier you armor the vehicle, the less payload you have. So in
this vehicle we are trying to balance all three. And we are
trying to get back some of our battlefield mobility in this.
And also the transportability of the vehicle, we want to be
able to have it to be helicopter transportable by the CH-47 and
by our heavy lift assets as well. And I know that, as we are
looking at the vehicle, we are going to press technology to
deliver the best they can in terms of the power train, in terms
of the engine. All those things are things that we are going to
look at, as this goes through its technology demonstration
phase right now, sir.
General Thompson. And, sir, if I could just add to that
from an acquisition perspective, where MRAP is led by the
Marine Corps program office with full Army participation, the
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle is led by the Army with full
Marine Corps participation. So these are two great examples, I
think, where we look together at what the requirements are and
try to develop joint solutions.
And everything that General Flynn just described is exactly
correct. We are at the first part of the technology
demonstration phase for the three contractors that were
competitively selected. And there was a protest to the GAO by
two contractors that weren't part of the three that were
competitively selected to go into source selection. And the GAO
ruled in favor of the government and said our source selection
process was done fairly. And so we will evaluate those three
contractors over the next 27 months.
Mr. Hinchey. Is the hybrid issue going to be included in
this?
General Thompson. The three designs that are in the
technology demonstration phase do not include a hybrid
solution. But at the end of the technology demonstration phase,
those three and any other competitor out there that wants to
propose against our requirements will be fairly evaluated and
taken forward. So if somebody has a hybrid solution in a
vehicle that meets the other requirements, they will have an
opportunity to compete again and be selected.

FORWARD OPERATING BASE SECURITY

Mr. Hinchey. Thanks very much.
If I have time for just one more brief question about the
situation that is developing in Afghanistan, last July there
was an attack in eastern Afghanistan against our military
forces. And I think that there were a number of military forces
at that time who were killed. I think that number was nine or
something in that neighborhood. There were something in the
neighborhood of 200 people that caused that attack, and they
were very well armed with a variety of materiels. And I think
that it is to be expected that something similar to that is
going to happen again; we are going to experience those kinds
of things coming up in the future.
Can you now, under these circumstances, tell us how many
operations there are in eastern Afghanistan, anticipating what
is going to happen in the future? And what kind of technology
is about to be used or is in the process of being used to try
to determine when those kinds of attacks are likely to occur?
Is there anything like that that you can talk about right now?
General Thurman. Congressman, I know exactly what you are
talking about, about the attack that you referred to.
The theater commander, General McKiernan, in Afghanistan,
working with CENTCOM over there, can tell you, you know, from
an operational perspective what they are doing.
As far as technologies, what we are trying to do is to give
them the surveillance capabilities, the sensors, the cameras.
They have asked for that to protect those combat outposts and
forward operating bases. And we are pushing some of those
capabilities forward. As a matter of fact, recently I saw some
of it in use. So you have that around the base perimeter or the
combat outpost to provide that early warning and sensors.
But it goes back to what General Flynn said a while ago.
There is no silver bullet with the way they are operating, and
it requires training and constant awareness of the enemy and
the threat you are facing.
General Flynn. One thing I would like to add to what
General Thurman said: This all starts back in the United States
when we do our predeployment training. Right now, what we are
focusing on is developing at the company level, which is a new
twist of how we are operating now, intelligence cells and
operation cells at the company level because of how we are
spreading out on the battlefield to deal with this threat.
We are also providing them with the ability then to
integrate the intelligence that they are getting from various
sources, to include human intelligence, on the ground. Like
General Thurman said, we have developed for Afghanistan for our
forward-operating bases a new ground-based surveillance system
that they can use, both--some that are--you have the big
version that you need a tractor trailer to move; you have a
medium one that can move with a Humvee-type vehicle; and then
we also have one that is man-portable.
So we are not only equipping Marines and soldiers with the
things that they need to be safe, but we are training on how to
do it. And we need to make sure that they know how to do it
before we deploy them. So that is all a key part of doing the
things and to make sure we are not surprised out in the field,
sir.
Mr. Hinchey. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Dicks.

MRAP ALL TERRAIN VEHICLE

Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Generals.
Maybe you have covered this, but I am just going to ask it
one more time. We understand that some of the MRAPs are too
heavy and would have a problem going offroad. And now going
into Afghanistan, you know, you are talking about the all-
terrain vehicle, or there is another one, the Joint Light
Tactical Vehicle.
Are we in a situation where we are buying too many of the
MRAPs that are too heavy and are not as flexible? There has
been a concern about that. Or are we adapting and going with
the lighter vehicle? And can you give us the status on it?
General Flynn. Sir, from the Marine Corps perspective, what
we developed last summer was a comprehensive ground tactical
wheeled vehicle strategy, or a ground tactical vehicle
strategy. And what we are trying to do in that strategy is to
field the number of vehicles that have different capabilities
in the right numbers that gives us balance, that we could use
vehicles where they could best be used situationally dependent.
For example, the current MRAP we have does very well in certain
areas of Iraq; it wouldn't do so well in some areas in
Afghanistan.
We are looking for a lighter vehicle. We are looking for
vehicles with more flexibility so that we could use them over a
wider range. And we do have that plan to do it, and we are
actively pursuing it.
The key thing for us to do is to balance the needs of each
of those vehicles, that we get the right number and have just
the right amount of capability and not excess capability in any
one area, sir. And that is our approach.
Mr. Dicks. Okay.
What is the Army's approach?
General Thompson. Sir, it is the same. The total
requirement for MRAPs to date has been over 16,000 vehicles.
About 12,000 of them are for the Army.
Mr. Dicks. Are we buying ones that we don't need?
General Thompson. No, sir. We are at the end of the
requirement and the production for the MRAP. The MRAP all-
terrain vehicle is a requirement to get a lighter vehicle that
can handle some of the offroad mobility with the levels of
protection that we seek. We are in the source selection process
right now to get a lighter MRAP to handle some of the
challenges in Afghanistan.
Mr. Dicks. So how many have we bought so far?
General Thompson. The total requirement and buy for MRAPs
has been 16,238.
Mr. Dicks. But how many have we bought now?
General Flynn. We have bought them, sir.
Mr. Dicks. This is for both the Marine Corps and the Army?
General Thompson. And the Navy.
Mr. Dicks. So the light ones are on top of the 16,000?
General Thompson. That is correct.
Mr. Dicks. Are there going to be extra ones that are not
used in Iraq or Afghanistan that are going to be deployed in
the United States back to the units?
General Thurman. Yes, sir.
General Thompson. Yes, sir. What the services have done is,
we have looked at the enduring requirement for MRAPs. A lot of
those type of vehicles will be in route clearance companies.
But we know what we think the requirement is for MRAPs and
the MRAP all-terrain vehicles in Afghanistan. From an Army
perspective, for Afghanistan it is about 2,670 MRAPs. And we
think the requirement right now today is for about 2,000 of the
lighter MRAP all-terrain vehicles. None of the MRAP all-terrain
vehicles have been bought yet because we are just now in the
evaluation process.
Mr. Dicks. So you need 4,600?
General Thompson. No, sir. The Army requirement right now
is 2,080 for the MRAP all-terrain vehicle.
Mr. Dicks. Okay. But you are not going to use any of the
regular MRAPs?
General Thompson. No, we are, sir.
Mr. Dicks. How many of those?
General Thompson. The requirement for Afghanistan is 2,675.
That is a subset of the 16,000 that have already been bought.
So we are going to use them in Afghanistan and are looking--if
we have a viable solution against the requirement for a lighter
vehicle, we will put some of them on contract as we go forward.
Mr. Moran. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Dicks. I yield.

MRAP PROCUREMENT

Mr. Moran. Thank you, sir.
The IG also told us that, with regard to these purchases,
oftentimes you don't seek out quantity discounts, and, in one
case, spent $90 million more than needed to be spent because no
quantity discount was requested or provided.
Mr. Dicks. That was the Marine Corps that did that.
General Flynn. Sir, let me answer that, sir, if I could.
Mr. Moran. There was a 1,500 MRAP order, I grant you. But
they also talked about the fact there was a disparity in the
price of MRAPs from $300,000 to $1.1 million. And that applied
to the Army, as well as the Marine Corps.
But go ahead.
General Flynn. Sir, the best way I can answer that was the
Marine Corps was the program lead for the entire Department of
Defense. And we have reviewed the IG report, sir. And keep in
context that when the MRAP program was under way then, and we
were trying to field those vehicles as quickly as we could. We
went out to nine or 10 different manufacturers of those
vehicles to ask them to give us the best that they could give
us and that we would push them through so that we could get
these vehicles as quickly as we could to the soldiers and the
Marines who needed them.
And, as the IG reviewed that, you know, we understand what
is in the report, sir. We took the lessons learned and we will
apply that to procurements in the future. But, again, sir, this
was one where speed was important, and that is what we did,
sir.
Mr. Young. Mr. Dicks, would you yield for a question here?
Mr. Dicks. Yes, I yield.

MRAP DISPOSITION

Mr. Young. The issue of MRAPs in Iraq is a bookkeeping item
here. As we withdraw from Iraq, we won't be using nearly as
many MRAPs in Iraq. The MRAP is not the ideal vehicle for
Afghanistan because of the terrain, because of the lack of
paved highways, because of the mountains, et cetera.
So the MRAP ATV is, as Mr. Dicks has been discussing--what
is the plan for the MRAPs that we will no longer use in Iraq,
that we will not send to Afghanistan? Are we going to bring
them home? Are we going to leave them in Iraq? Are we going to
sell them to somebody? What is the plan.
General Flynn. Sir, from the Marine Corps, we own about
2,225 MRAPs. And our plan right now is to keep about 800
operational, and we would put the remainder into our
prepositioned stocks for use in an area that they would be
well-suited to be operated, sir.
So that is what we are looking at right now. It is not
finalized. But some would remain in the operational inventory,
depending on where they were needed, and then the rest would be
put in our prepositioned stocks. And some could even be put in
our sea-based prepositioned stocks. But we are still working
through the plan, but that is the general approach right now,
sir.
Mr. Dicks. Can the MATV be transported on a C-130?
General Thompson. I am just checking with General Brogan.
The requirement is to be able to. So that is one of the
things that we will be able to evaluate from the offerors that
are in the source selection right now, is can they meet the C-
130 transportability.
Mr. Young. Can we get General Thompson's response to the
question, what do we do with the MRAPs?
Mr. Dicks. Yeah, of course. I yield.
General Thompson. I am going to let General Thurman answer
that one, because it is more of a requirements issue, sir. And
so he is going to give you that answer.
General Thurman. Congressman Young, what we have looked at
is, right now there is a need right now for 702 training
vehicles to eliminate some of the training concerns that we
have had with soldiers going over, you know, getting new
equipment fielding. There is a requirement right now. We are
trying to fill that. So there is a training requirement to put
that at our combat training centers in our training centers so
we get that training.
The Army is much like the Marines. We are going to put some
forward stations in our Army prepositioned stocks. We are going
to put some of them in our other formations to enable them--or
maneuver enhancement brigades or sustainment brigades. There is
a requirement for command and control vehicles in some of our
logistical units.
So what we have looked at is how we use all those. We
intend to integrate the MRAPs in a lot of our force structure
in the Army. So they are not going to be sitting being wasted.
We don't see that. And that is what we are undergoing right now
as we look at all our force structure.
Mr. Young. Well, I thank you.
Thank you, Norm.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Visclosky. Ms. Kilpatrick.

Remarks of Ms. Kilpatrick

Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, Generals, one more time.
That is where I was going with some of that, but let me ask
you this. From the discussion I have heard this morning and the
reading, the Marines service is in charge of the MRAPs
procurement, the coordinating and all of that.
General Flynn. That is correct, ma'am.
Ms. Kilpatrick. And the JLTV, which is another joint
operation, the Army is going to be in charge of that.
General Thompson. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Similar vehicles, right? MRAP and the JLTV,
is it a different vehicle, is it similar?
General Flynn. Yes, ma'am, it is different in a number of
ways. The MRAP vehicle--for example, the MRAP all-terrain
vehicle that we are looking at developing, as General Thurman
said, it is going to be C-130 transportable.
Ms. Kilpatrick. And is that the same, when you talk about
the MRAP vehicle, the ATV vehicle, is that the JLTV?
General Flynn. No, ma'am.
Ms. Kilpatrick. That is a third.
General Flynn. They are two different vehicles. And
primarily you can distinguish them by weight and capability.
The MRAP all-terrain vehicle, we are hoping that that weight is
going to be somewhere around 22,000 pounds. On the JLTV we are
looking for a vehicle that--I would hope, optimistically, is
transportable by helicopter, so you have got to be in about the
15,000-pound range.
Ms. Kilpatrick. ATV's weight, what is that?
General Flynn. An all-terrain vehicle, 22,000 pounds is
about where we are look at. I think max on a C-130 is about
25,000 pounds.
Ms. Kilpatrick. And both of those are anticipated to be
used in Afghanistan?
General Flynn. I think the JLTV, because it is going
through the technology demonstration phase right now, we are
not going to see that vehicle until, I think, 2015, is when we
are going to have that.
Ms. Kilpatrick. So it won't be immediately in Afghanistan.
I hope we are out of there long before that.
General Flynn. That is what we are looking at, ma'am, is we
are not seeing complete fielding of the vehicle until 2015.

FORCE PROTECTION

Ms. Kilpatrick. So do we have the force protection
available as we move into Afghanistan, in terms of the
equipment and all? Not just the body armor, but the whole
arena. Are we ready to protect the forces with what we have
today?
General Flynn. Ma'am, I think if you go back to what I said
a little bit in the beginning, is that force protection is a
combination of a number of things.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Sure.
General Flynn. We have made tremendous, I think, progress
in how we train the force before it deploys. We are using new
techniques. We are using new observation techniques. We are
using new tracking techniques. Our goal at times is to always
be the hunter and never be the hunted.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Except we are being hunted at the moment.
General Flynn. And we are the hunters now. And we give
Marines that mindset. And part of that is knowing the
environment that you are operating in, anticipating changes in
that environment, and knowing exactly when that changes. And
that allows us to spot IEDs. That allows us to figure out
people who don't belong.

ARMORED TRUCKS

Ms. Kilpatrick. Okay. Let me stop, because--thank you,
General. And I appreciate it. Thanks for that dedication.
So, therefore, if the JLTV is not going to be ready, and
you said the MRAP ATV might be ready, will we have the quantity
we need in the terrain of Afghanistan to protect the troops and
win the war? Now, ``win the war'' is a whole philosophical
thing, but protect the troops is--is it enough? I mean, do we
have enough to go in there? The President has already announced
that we are sending so many thousand into Afghanistan. Are my
troops going to be protected?
General Flynn. Ma'am, the short answer is your troops are
going to be protected.
Ms. Kilpatrick. And will they have what they need to fight?
General Flynn. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Kilpatrick. All right, General, please.
General Thurman. Ma'am, if I could, every single day and
week we look at the requirements through a process inside the
Army of meeting the needs of the commanders to make sure not
only do they have what they need in theater but also the next
deployers. I look at that every single day in the Army over
there to make sure that we are meeting those needs.
And I would just say what General Flynn said. We have a
combat-experienced force now, and we are leveraging everything
we learn every day in terms of what we are seeing on the
battlefield. But I can assure you that we are going to make
sure, from an Army sense and a Marine Corps, that we provide
the best equipment we have.

COMMON ACCESS CARD

Ms. Kilpatrick. Okay. And if the President announces and we
are not ready, will the services speak out and say, ``Mr.
President, we may need a little bit of time to get ready for
this''? We were not ready when we went into Iraq, and
consequently we went in there with the wrong vehicles and too
many IEDs and all of that. I am hopeful we don't repeat, and it
sounds like we are more ready for this one.
Which is that common access card. It is not the combat
vehicle, but it is just as important. And it would help today,
General Thompson, when you talked about the other two lines of
verification being biometrics, because that is important. The
last time I think we heard just the card, and contractors were
issuing the card to contractors. And we didn't feel like the
monitoring--which is why some of my colleagues spoke about that
today. It is so important.
And you are going to get back with us with some more
information.
General Thompson. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Contractors issuing cards to other
contractors with little monitoring, that is not a good thing.
Thank you. Please protect the troops. Do your jobs. We love
you and appreciate your service. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

FORCE PROTECTION CHALLENGES

Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much.
Gentlemen, I would like to talk to you about force
protection challenges for logistics units. It certainly
received national attention in March of 2003, during the second
Gulf War, when a convoy of the U.S. Army's 507th Maintenance
Company and elements made a wrong turn and were ambushed.
Could you provide us an overview of the organizational
training and equipment improvements made to improve force
protection for Army and Marine Corps logistics units?
And the other question would be, how have any doctrine or
training programs been changed to try to improve circumstances?
General Thurman. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to answer
that. I am very familiar with 2003.
What we have done is--it is not one piece of kit, if you
will, that protects a convoy. First off, it is the training
that we have done at our combat training centers. But convoy
protection has been improved in what I would classify in about
four distinct areas.
It is improved situational awareness. And what am I talking
about there? I am talking about having the right communications
gear in the vehicles: the blue force tracking system, which
tells everybody where they are at and exactly the location. We
have issued satellite communications. The use of also our
normal onboard SINCGARS radio.
IED detection is a second component that we have had, that
we have talked about with CREW devices. Vehicle survivability;
the individual soldier protection. The convoys that move back
and forth are either in an up-armored Humvee or they are in an
MRAP. The commanders decide the distribution of that. The other
thing that we have done is we have put the armored security
vehicle out there, in helping escort these convoys.
So, you know, soldier protection, the vehicle survivability
and IED detection, and just having a knowledge of what is going
on on the battlefield of the threats.
And, last, it is training. And you can never be satisfied
with your training levels. That is what I have learned as a
professional. And you never can believe your own publicity. And
you have to constantly take those lessons learned and integrate
them in our training centers.
Mr. Visclosky. And how has the training evolved, General?
General Thurman. Sir, what we have done, at least in the
Army, at our three major combat training centers at Fort Irwin
and at the Joint Readiness Training Center down at Fort Polk
and the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in
Hohenfels, Germany, our joint multinational training center, we
do extensive convoy live fire, role players, use of contractors
against uncooperative irregular threats, if you will. And we
have issued a lot of convoy planning tools that have been
distributed widely across the Army.
I think we have done a lot. And we learned a lot, making
sure that we have the right basis of issue in terms of
equipment, how we equip our logistics formations.
General Flynn. Sir, the key thing is, it all starts first
with individual training and combat skills, and then we move to
unit training. The key part is all our units, before they
deploy, have to get certified through their predeployment
training. You actually get a report card, if you will, or an
evaluation of how effective your unit is in an immersive
environment. And we actually do it all live-fire, so we know if
you can handle the situations.
Like General Thurman said, improve situational awareness on
the battlefield, knowing where everybody is, and also knowing
what threats you are likely to face. Better mission planning
before you go outside the wire and execute those logistics
support missions. And improve survivability on the vehicles,
and also enhancements to those vehicles in terms of not only
survivability but also our weapons mix in that, and also the
addition of CREW devices to the systems that counter the IEDs.
So it has been a comprehensive approach, and it is one that
we test before they leave here to make sure they have what it
takes to survive.

COUNTER SNIPERS

Mr. Visclosky. If I could ask about countering snipers,
too, which obviously can disrupt operations, could you address
what technology-based solutions are currently being used? And,
again, getting to the issue of training, situational awareness,
any changes in evolution that has taken place, as far as
countering snipers?
General Flynn. Sir, there are two approaches to countering
snipers. One is pre-shot, and the other one is post-shot. The
best counter to a sniper is another sniper. And we make sure
that we train our snipers to be the best and most deadly on the
battlefield. And they are. The pre-shot deals with enhanced
optics for your observation skills. Post-shot, we are looking
at technology for muzzle flash and also for different acoustic
devices on the battlefield.
So it is a multiple approach to counter sniper but one
that, again, starts with the basics of training and basic
observation skills. But we leverage technology in the areas of
optics and acoustics.
Mr. Visclosky. Could I just ask, is it a growing problem?
Has it always existed? Is it static, as far as incidence? Is it
diminishing in Iraq and Afghanistan? I don't want to make an
assumption either way.
General Flynn. I am not sure if it is--I think snipers on
the battlefield will always be a challenge. And I think it will
be situational-dependent. And one type of area where you are
operating could be the best place for a sniper to operate. So
the enemy is going to try to take advantage of that situation.
And we have to do all that we can to maintain the advantage
over the enemy where we think snipers are likely to operate,
sir.
General Thurman. Mr. Chairman, what I would tell you is,
for counter-sniper, what we have done in the Army, similar to
the Marine Corps--it is just something I think we will have to
see in the future and on any battlefield--but what we have done
is we have employed the acoustic gunshot detection system
Boomerang and the gunshot detection C2 system on some of our
platforms. We have used closed circuit televisions.
And I agree that, in order to defeat a sniper, you need to
have more snipers on the battlefield and awareness of the
enemy. The SWAT system, which is individual gunshot detection,
we have fielded in Iraq right now today roughly 350 sets. We
just put 100 sets with the 56th National Guard Brigade Stryker
that deployed. The use of binoculars, thermal imagery
magnifiers. The measures such as just veils and protection.
The other system that we have put in theater is a Common
Remotely Operated Station (CROWS) system, which is to protect
the gunners on our combat platforms. It has been integrated on
the M1, the up-armored Humvee. I had the opportunity to test
that, when it first came out in Baghdad. So you can mount,
obviously, all your machine guns or your MK-19 grenade
launcher.
So it is a combination of those types of technologies. But,
more importantly, it gets back to training levels and awareness
of the environment you are operating in. And I can't
overemphasize that.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you.
Mr. Young.
Mr. Young. No more questions.
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Dicks. No further questions.
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Frelinghuysen.

BLUE FORCE TRACKING

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
That CROWS system is pretty neat and pretty important.
Thank you for mentioning it.
Just a comment. On the blue force tracking, this is sort of
a work in progress, isn't it? You invoked the blue force
tracking system as if it was complete. Hasn't it been worked on
for 4 or 5 years?
General Thurman. Well, I will let General Thompson talk
about the system itself.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I sort of got the feeling that it is not
totally mature.
General Thompson. That is correct, Congressman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I think it is important to know. I mean,
we have issues of the enemy doing things to us, but, in
reality, we have so much of our own equipment over there, we
are potentially jamming our own ability to communicate.
General Thompson. But on all our systems, not just blue
force tracking. But we are constantly upgrading those systems
based on the changes, if the technology is available, the
threat materializes. We go through a change proposal, an
engineering change proposal process. We do software upgrades
for software-intensive systems. And so, depending on what
system you are talking about, you could be in multiple versions
of software. But that is just part of the normal acquisition
process in response to the requirements.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. For the record, I would like to get for
the Committee a description of where we stand relative to the
various technologies that are included in that system.
General Thompson. In the blue force tracker?
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Yes.
General Thompson. Yes, sir.
[The information follows:]

The Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below (FBCB2) Blue Force
Tracking (BFT) system has been a major combat multiplier since its
introduction to our combat formations in 2003. Since first use in
Operation Iraqi Freedom, Program Management FBCB2 has fielded over
70,000 BFT systems to Active, Guard, and Reserve components. FBCB2-BFT
is the primary ground and air platform battle command system for our
joint forces. It provides Situational Awareness (SA) information (where
am I, where are the friendly forces, where is the enemy?), and Command
and Control (C2) messaging between our platforms, remote tactical
operation centers, and headquarters locations.
There are several reasons why our Soldiers and Marines continue to
request more systems: (1) ease of use, (2) supports their mission
across extremely large operational areas, and (3) provides reliable
communications, even with all the other electronic equipment on the
platform. Feedback from Soldiers and commanders in theater indicates
that BFT is often the only means they have to communicate beyond line-
of-sight while on the move in remote, high threat environments. PM
FBCB2 implemented an accelerated design, development, production, and
fielding of a BFT capability that does not interrupt existing Counter
IED capabilities. The key to ensuring these remain an enduring
capability is close collaboration with the organizations that provide
Counter Remote Controlled IED (RCIED) Electronic Warfare (CREW)
capabilities. Furthermore, BFT provides the ability to communicate
using free text messaging with anyone else who has BFT, regardless of
whether they are different units, ground or air, Army or USMC--it does
not matter.
While BFT is a critical enabler in its form today, there are
additional critical areas that are addressed in our Joint Capabilities
Release (JCR) software development. The FBCB2 JCR software will include
the application that incorporates these capabilities in the following
paragraphs. Government acceptance testing commences early May 2009. In
August 2009, we will conduct testing to ensure software
interoperability with other Army and joint warfighting systems. The
FBCB2 JCR will be postured to begin fielding after a successful
operational evaluation in April 2010. Capability will include but not
be limited to the following improvements:
1. Simplifying the Database. FBCB2 JCR will allow users to start up
and join a network with minimal pre-configured information, and then to
send ``Self Descriptive SA'' to share address book information with
others (like address, role name, alias, map symbol code and task
organization) to support SA and C2 messaging. With JCR, networks will
no longer be related by hierarchy, are extremely simple to plan, and
are not affected by task reorganization.
2. Securing the network: Achieving a Secret L-band capability is
one of the most sought after improvements requested by our Soldiers. We
have developed a technical solution to achieve this using the
Programmable In-line Encryption Device (short title KGV-72). This
capability prevents unauthorized exploitation of BFT data while in
transit over the network, and is scheduled to be fielded with the JCR
software as part of the Army's Battle Command Capability Set beginning
in
FY11/12. Fielding will be in accordance with Department of the Army
priorities.
3. Improving the speed of the L-Band network. PM FBCB2 will
complete the development and testing of the Blue Force Tracker 2 (BFT
2) satellite network/transceiver in FY 10, and will insert this widely-
requested capability into the Battle Command Capability Set FY11/12
baseline once ready. BFT 2 will provide update rates (increased
position accuracy) and enable the distribution of more tracks to meet
the additional FBCB2 fielding density. This greatly improved bandwidth
(over 10 times greater) opens the possibility of pushing other types of
data down to our platforms across the battlefield. The BFT 2 Satellite
Network Upgrade Program will expand the performance, capacity and
capability of the FBCB2 satellite communications network.
4. Improving the hardware. PM FBCB2 has had great success with
maintaining a reasonable pace with the commercial computer market. We
have started fielding ruggedized platform computers with dual core
processing capability, two times the random access memory, and four
times the hard drive capacity. We continue to improve the performance
of our system while continuing to reduce the cost per platform.
Furthermore, we are engaged with other project offices, exploring ways
that we can leverage common computers, and looking for ways to reduce
the number of unique systems on our tactical platforms.

MRAP TRAINNG

Mr. Frelinghuysen. I, sort of, wanted to get a question
on--you know, everybody loves the MRAPs, and obviously they
have done a remarkable job in saving lives--the training
aspect.
I think before testimony before the House Armed Services
Committee back in January, I understood that the Army had only
filled 4 percent of its vehicle requirements for training. Was
that accurate? And if that is accurate, has that been improved
considerably?
General Thurman. Yes, sir. First off, that was accurate. We
made a conscious decision to push all the MRAPs forward, so we
had the protection first. And then we knew all along we would
have to make up a training requirement.
Currently, the requirement is for 702 full-up MRAPs to do
training. We have also----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. But in terms of actually--those who are
qualified. You know, this isn't driving a Humvee. You know,
this weighs a billion tons. There are not too many people that
are capable of doing that. I just sort of wondered where the
Army stands relative to those that are qualified to actually
run the vehicles.
General Thurman. Well, we license those soldiers to make
sure that--obviously, they have had the required training. That
is documented. It is documented with the units.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I asked the question, if we are sending
1,800 into Afghanistan--and the picture I have is MRAPs stuck
in the mud, and then you have to use a vehicle of a similar
weight to pull them out, because there are so few roads over
there. And then there is the issue of rollovers here. There
have been considerable rollovers. I assume that has something
to do with lousy infrastructure, either in Iraq or Afghanistan.
In Afghanistan, you virtually don't have any, other than the
roads we have built.
Are the people trained that are using these vehicles, as
well as the new ones?
General Thurman. Yes, sir. Currently, the Army is fielding
a drivers trainer, a common drivers trainer with
interchangeable cockpits, if you will. And then we are doing a
rollover egress trainer that we will push forward, that, if the
vehicle rolls over, there will be a trainer. And that will be
in Iraq and in Afghanistan.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. The issue for me is training
requirements. How many people are qualified?
General Thompson. Sir, we won't let--not just on MRAPs, but
we go through a licensing process for every type of vehicle in
the Army's inventory. And so you get the training that you need
to be able to operate that vehicle, whether it is a tank, an
MRAP, a Humvee, a Bradley fighting vehicle.
To the specific numbers on MRAPs, we have, because of what
General Thurman said, we pushed the vehicles forward because we
wanted the protection there as much as possible. We now have 25
of those vehicles in the training base in the United States,
another 25 en route. And the total requirement of the training
base is the 702 that General Thurman alluded to.
We have got common driver training, simulators. The
requirement is for 20 of those; seven of those have been
fielded to date. Rollover trainers, the requirement is for 25;
five of those were shipped to theater this month. And we know
where we want to put the other 20. So we are putting them where
the soldier population is greatest, and so that the soldiers
that are on orders to deploy get to learn and experience that
vehicle in a simulation training environment.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. So there is some lagging in training.
And do the training hours match what the Marines are doing?
Marines are required to drive 125 training miles. I mean, do
you match what the Marines are doing, in terms of their
training requirements?
General Thompson. I don't know the answer to that question.
We would have to go back and look at the hours and the types of
training.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. The bottom line for me--you know, we may
be exiting from Iraq. We are moving more MRAPs into
Afghanistan, and their use is limited because of the lack of
anything to drive on. And I just wondered whether the people
that are going to be using those MRAPs are--if you have enough
backup. Can you get it for the record, if we don't have it
here?
General Thompson. From my perspective, the way I would
answer that is that you want to do more training rather than
less training. And so the availability of vehicles and the
availability of the simulator trainers and the rollover
trainers is lagging a little bit from what we would like to
see. You want more actual hands-on training done and more
simulation training done. And we have both the systems being
fielded and the money to be able to do that today.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. You have the money?
General Thompson. We have the money to do that. That is the
issue.
General Thurman. Congressman, if I may, also we did field
some surrogate trainers at our combat training centers. We took
some of the five-ton vehicles and we modified them to try to
get ahead of the training issue.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Dicks. Is the training done in Kuwait? Or where is it
done?
General Thurman. Congressman, for the folks going into
Iraq, they train in Kuwait, and then we do new equipment
training in Afghanistan. That is why it is important, at least
that is from the Army. As we get more trainers, we want to put
them out at certain installations so we can catch up with this.
Mr. Dicks. So they are in Kuwait, and then they go into
Iraq. Are you going to use Kuwait for Afghanistan, as well? Did
I hear you say that?
General Thurman. They need to do the new equipment training
in Afghanistan.
Mr. Dicks. And then we are going to get some so we can do
some equipment training in the United States?
General Thurman. Yes, sir, that is how we are doing.

JOINT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT ORGANIZATION

Mr. Dicks. Okay. Let me ask you this: How do you work with
JIEDDO, with General Meigs?
General Flynn. Sir, I work very closely with them, sir. The
Marine Corps warfighting lab works for me, and we are directly
linked to JIEDDO on a daily basis.
Mr. Dicks. It looks like, when I just saw the briefing, the
numbers in Iraq are coming down rather dramatically, of IED
attacks, but they are going up in Afghanistan. Is that how you
see it?
General Flynn. Sir, in the latest data I saw this week,
that is true. But, also, our force levels are going up. And
when you track the data, because our force levels are going up,
there is a relationship. For example, the Marine Corps, we just
went back to Afghanistan, so our encounters with IEDs are going
up right now. And it is on an upward trend, and it is on an
almost near-zero trend in Iraq right now. So, as we are meeting
with the enemy, sir, we are seeing them employing IEDs.
Mr. Dicks. General Thurman, do you have anything you would
like to add to that?
General Thurman. I would just add to that, Congressman,
that is exactly what we are seeing in the Army. And what you
have to worry about are those areas that maybe you haven't been
in.
Mr. Dicks. Yeah.
General Thurman. And that is where you really have to pay
attention there, because you will stumble onto something there
if you are not careful. But that is what I would tell you. But
I have been watching--you know, I watch IEDs every day. But we
work very close with General Meigs.
Mr. Dicks. I liked what the General said here earlier, that
it takes a multitude of technologies. It isn't just one silver
bullet on this in this IED world. And I think the JIEDDO thing
has been a big success.
And the other thing that was interesting about the
briefing, this isn't just Iraq and Afghanistan. This now is a
worldwide event that we are going to have to work with our
allies and friends around the world in adapting to. We have
been very fortunate that we haven't had attacks like this in
the United States, but in other parts of the world, it is a
pretty common occurrence.
General Thurman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Kingston.

CH-47F CHINOOK

Mr. Kingston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I wanted to ask you about the CH-47F Chinook
helicopters, again, that the Guard uses. I understand they are
28 short. And I was wondering what a statistic like that really
means, when they say 28 short. They are asking for a plus-up in
the budget of six, and I just wanted to get your opinion on
that.
General Thurman. From the requirement perspective, we are
short some aircraft. One thing, since the start of the war, in
terms of the combat losses, actual combat losses, we have lost
112 aircraft. That was my latest account. And then you add on
the attrition, so it takes you up to about 100. That is not CH-
47s. That is all aircraft. And, to date, for the combat losses,
we have had about 28 return--we have had 28 returned, for an
all total of 40 when you look at what has been washed out or
from a safety standpoint.
We do not have all the aircraft we need right now, due to
losses and that. And when we went through the aviation
transformation, we reorganized inside the reserve components
and the Army to make our combat aviation brigades more capable.
So what we have done is we make sure that the units that are
going into the theater are full up. That is how we manage
aircraft. And we work close with the National Guard Bureau and
the Army National Guard to make sure that they have what they
need.
We can get you the complete laydown on CH-47s, and I would
be happy to do that, of the total requirement of where we are
headed with the CH-47F. And I can take that and show you by
State.
[The information follows:]

The Army has a requirement for 489 CH-47 aircraft. It is now
modernizing from the CH-47D to the CH-47F and will complete this by
2018. Today, the Army has 457 CH-47 on hand. This includes 56 MH-47 for
Special Operations, 63 CH-47F, and the remaining 338 aircraft being CH-
47D. Of the 338 CH-47D, 29 are currently inducted to the
remanufacturing line and will be returned as new CH-47F. Seven CH-47D
aircraft are at Corpus Christi Army Depot and will be returned as
recapitalized, like-new, CH-47D.
The Army National Guard and the United States Army Reserve have a
requirement for 195 CH-47 aircraft. This includes 159 aircraft in the
National Guard and 36 in the Army Reserve. Both the Army National Guard
and the United States Army Reserve requirements are authorized for
units that in many cases are spread across several states.
The Army National Guard maintains CH-47 units in 24 states. The
Guard resources units to 100% of authorization one year prior to
mobilization. Deployed units have their full complement and this
includes Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Illinois and South Carolina with
six on hand of six required; Texas and Oklahoma deployed with one extra
aircraft above their 6 required to meet mission requirements. Alabama,
Georgia and Washington have 6 of 6 as they prepare for deployment.
California and Hawaii have 10 of 12. Oregon and Mississippi have five
of six. Nebraska, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Minnesota, Ohio, Michigan,
Nevada, and Montana have four of six. Maryland and New York have three
of six.
The United States Army Reserves maintains three CH-47 companies:
one in Fort Lewis, WA, one in Fort Eustis, Virginia, and one company
split between Olathe, Kansas and Fort Carson, Colorado. Currently, the
company from Fort Lewis is deployed with eight of its 12 aircraft. Two
of its remaining four aircraft are at Corpus Christi Army Depot and
Fort Carson, Colorado.

Mr. Kingston. If we requested the plus-up of six in the
fiscal year 2010 budget, is that something you would support?
Or how would you feel about that?
General Thurman. Sir, as a G-3, I need to go back, because
the budget from DoD has not been sent out on fiscal year 2010.
And so I would have to go back and just look at what the total
requirement is on what you are asking specifically, on the six.
Mr. Kingston. One reason why their request caught my
attention is yesterday we had a hearing where we discussed the
average weight of an infantry soldier right now is 93 pounds,
in terms of the fully equipped rucksack and everything that
goes on him. And, you know, particularly in Afghanistan where
you have such rugged terrain and mountains and so forth, it
would appear that those Chinooks would be very helpful in terms
of lightening the infantry load.
General Thurman. Yes, sir. And we are, in fact, increasing
aviation in Afghanistan just for those reasons. Helicopters are
one of the most high-demand items that comes in to me as a
requirement.
Mr. Kingston. Well, I would love to get your opinion on it,
particularly the fiscal year 2010 budget.
General Thurman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kingston. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Bishop.

MEDEVAC

Mr. Bishop. Thank you very much.
I would like to talk about medevac, if you will, for a
moment. In January, before the House Armed Services Committee,
Secretary Gates addressed the difference in medevac response
times in Iraq and Afghanistan. And of course he said the goal
in Iraq was to have a wounded soldier at a hospital in an hour
and, in Afghanistan, close to 2 hours. And he directed that
there would be an increase in the number of medevac helicopters
and medical professionals that would be assigned to
Afghanistan.
What were the shortages in medevac assets in Afghanistan
that he identified? And what additional assets, both medical
and aircraft, have actually arrived in Afghanistan since that
time, and what is on the way? What is the average time to
evacuate a soldier now in Afghanistan?
And we understand that certain combat search and rescue
aircrews have been reconfigured to help with the medevac
problem and the shortfall. What are the pitfalls of taking the
combat search and rescue aircrews and assigning them to this
medevac, as opposed to their search and rescue functions? And
that would be of interest, of course, to Mr. Kingston. He
represents Moody Air Force Base, which does significant search
and rescue. And have those search and rescue operations been
helpful in Afghanistan to solving the medevac shortfall?
General Thurman. Congressman, we have done extensive work
with the Marine Corps, as well as the other services. You know,
this is a joint war, down in Afghanistan, and we need to use
all joint assets that are available to extract our people off
the battlefield in a timely manner.
We are going to put more medevac aircraft, at least from
the Army side, into Afghanistan. You are correct, we were not
meeting the standard. But, you know, it is the size of that
country, as compared to Iraq, is considerably different. I
equate it to Texas versus West Virginia, about that size.
That said, what we are trying to do is look, also, with our
forward surgical team capability, to put more of those assets
in, so you can quickly treat a soldier, Marine, airman, sailor,
or whoever is out there, contractor, in a quick manner. We are
not there yet, on dropping that down to an hour. But we are
serious about this. We need to use all assets that we have in
there, is what I would tell you in this environment.
General Thompson. I think the exact numbers, I mean, the
forward surgical teams, is about a 40 percent increase that is
going to go into Afghanistan. And the numbers of medevac
aircraft that we plan on putting over there is about a 75
percent increase over there today.
Mr. Bishop. What is the timeline on that?
General Thurman. Sir, we are working that right now. We are
talking in the next 30 days, as we work that.
General Flynn. Sir, on the medevac, we have changed our
force deployment posture. At the beginning of the year or just
prior to the beginning of the year, we only had an infantry
battalion over there. We have now since changed, and we are
actually deploying our air assets with it.
And, just like General Thurman said, it is not just the air
assets. It is also the level-two surgical care. So we are doing
a number of things.
And, you know, for the record, in a classified setting we
can give you the medevac laydown of where are all the different
aspects of the care, is I think is the best way to answer the
question for you now, sir, as well as what is going on now and
what is projected for the future to be in theaters.
[The information follows:]

This is a more complex situation than we have faced in Operation
Iraqi Freedom; and as such, we are ensuring that we get it right on
behalf of our Soldiers. I will have my staff coordinate with your
office to provide you a detailed classified briefing on MEDEVAC
operations in Operation Enduring Freedom at first opportunity.

Mr. Bishop. But basically medevac for Marines is provided
by the Navy.
General Flynn. No, sir.
Mr. Bishop. You are doing it jointly?
General Flynn. Army, Marine, Air Force, you know, sir, they
are all part. When you see the medevac laydown, it is a number
of assets that do it, just like the hospitals.
Also, it is coalition, as well, too, sir. Because in the
areas we are working, a lot of the areas that we work are under
the control of our NATO allies. And, in some cases, that is
where the medevac and the medical treatment facilities are, as
well, sir.
General Thompson. A wounded service member is a wounded
service member. So they get cared for or medevac'ed, if
necessary, by whatever asset is available.
General Thurman. Congressman, we would be very happy to
come over and give you a complete medevac briefing, and to any
of the other members, on exactly what we are doing in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Mr. Bishop. I would love to have that, sir.
General Thurman. But particularly in Afghanistan.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you.
Thank you, sir.

STRYKERS

Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much.
Gentlemen, the Army recently notified the Committee that
the Stryker order was being modified and that 270 medevac
variants would be changed to other variants, such as infantry
combat vehicles, in order to establish a Stryker brigade combat
team equipment set in Afghanistan.
I would have two questions on the situation. The first is,
will the Army request funds to replace the 270 Stryker medevac
vehicles that were deleted from the order? And secondly, what
is the Army's overall strategy and timeline for replacing the
M-113s and heavy brigade combat teams with updated vehicles?
General Thurman. First off, Mr. Chairman, we did do that,
because, to answer the Stryker question upfront, you know, we
are moving a Stryker brigade combat team into Afghanistan. We
have not done that before. So what we are doing--you know the
Lines of Communication, the ground LOCs? It takes longer to get
equipment into Afghanistan rather than coming in from Kuwait
and driving into the next country over. So to cut down on the
need for a strategic area, we need to establish a theater-
provided equipment base, because we see Strykers being replaced
in Afghanistan. That was requested by the theater commander.
So we needed more Strykers, in this case. We believe we can
use the MRAP amulets and integrate that in the Strykers. So
that is what we think we need to do so we can establish
theater-provided equipment over there. And we can get you the
exact requirement on that, in terms of funding, of what that
would be.
We do have a strategy to replace--we do need to replace the
M-113s. And that is part of our overall strategy in the Army,
that we would be happy to lay that down for you, too, and show
what you we are trying to do here with that. Because that
vehicle, frankly, will not survive in this environment.
[The information follows:]

We are working closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense
on a strategy to replace our aging fleet of combat vehicles, which
includes the M113. When the budget is released, we will be able to
discuss where we are in the deliberations to date. More generally
however, the Army's modernization strategy is focused on building a
versatile mix of mobile, networked BCTs that can leverage mobility,
protection, information, and precision fires to conduct operations
across the spectrum of conflict. As part of that effort, we will
institutionalize a full spectrum set of Mine Resistant-Ambush Protected
(MRAP) vehicles that incorporates MRAP and Up-armored HMMWVs (UAH) into
our formations. We are also conducting a holistic review of the
capability requirements for our combat platforms, focusing on the
wartime lessons learned by Soldiers, commanders and the Joint community
that are applicable to our current and near future operations.

Mr. Visclosky. So you will have a request for funds?
General Thurman. That is being worked in the building right
now. And I don't have all that with me right now, exactly what
that would be.
General Thompson. If I can just add to that just a little
bit, so what General Thurman is describing, if you are going to
put a Stryker brigade into Afghanistan, very difficult to get
vehicles into theater. So once you get them there, you would
like not to have to send another Stryker brigade in and send it
in with its vehicles. So the vehicles that will go there will
be left behind in the theater and maintained in the theater.
The diversion of assets from the planned production of 200
medical vehicles to something else--and that is the plan that
is being worked for approval inside the Pentagon right now--is
to then convert those vehicles to the other vehicle
configurations, so when that unit that is going over there
comes back, they can come back and have an equipment set that
they can train on. Because it is our plan that there will be an
equipment set that is left in theater for a while for Stryker
units to fall into.
We will integrate that into the force structure. There is
going to be battle damage and losses to those vehicles. But
that is being worked right now. And that was the genesis or the
reason for the request to divert those assets from one type of
vehicle to another.
Mr. Visclosky. And for the record, you will provide more
information on the replacement program for the 113s then?
General Thurman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. If the chairman would yield?
Everybody likes to be in the Stryker brigade, but Stryker
vehicles like roads as well. They prefer, you know, what we
call normal roads.
What are their capabilities in Afghanistan, given what we
have with the weight problems with MRAPs? And, obviously, the
Stryker vehicles have a degree of vulnerability, as remarkable
as they are, that the MRAPs don't have.
So on the issue--and maybe you want to put it in for the
record--you know, what are the limitations if we are going to
move, you know, the Stryker brigade in there on these vehicles,
given just the topography, terrain, and lack of infrastructure?
General Thurman. Congressman, we can give you more
information on this. But what I would tell you is, the theater
commander asked to use those in certain areas, because he felt
he needed the mobility and the infantry capability.
[The information follows:]

Like MRAPs, or any other heavy vehicle, Strykers have mobility
limitations. Steep mountainous terrain with unimproved roads present
challenges to the Stryker's maneuver capability. Aware of these
limitations, the theater commander requested that a Stryker Brigade
Combat Team (SBCT) be deployed specifically to Regional Command South
in Afghanistan where the terrain is more suitable for Stryker maneuver.
The SBCT is a full-spectrum, wheeled combat force designed and
optimized primarily for confronting low-end and mid-range threats that
may employ both conventional and asymmetric capabilities--like the
threat we are facing in Afghanistan. The SBCT's capabilities differ
significantly from those found in traditional brigades. In addition to
its three infantry battalions, the SBCT has a cavalry squadron for
reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA), a brigade
support battalion, a field artillery battalion, a military intelligence
company, an engineer company, a signal company, an anti-tank company,
and a headquarters company. This mix of capabilities allows the SBCT to
cover a larger operational area and to provide greater firepower than
an Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT). Additionally, because of the
common chassis in its formation, the SBCT allows a smaller sustainment
footprint than a Heavy Brigade Combat Team or an Infantry Brigade
Combat Team outfitted with multiple variants of MRAPs. This is vitally
important considering limitations on our lines of communications in
Afghanistan.

Mr. Frelinghuysen. They sure are. I am just worried about
the ability of vehicles getting from point A to point B.
General Thurman. Yeah, I think the terrain--and I don't
want to get into the operational employment of what he intends
to do. I think we will support what he is trying to do over
there for that particular capability. It is a valid concern,
with the concerns you brought up. But we can show you that.
All of them have slat armor on there. We will equip them
the same way we do in Iraq. But there are mobility challenges,
depending on where you are in Afghanistan. But we can show you
that in more detail, if you would care to have that.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Okay. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Thompson. And I think--and I am not the operator
here; I am the acquisition representative. But I think that the
theater commander asked for that Stryker brigade and will put
that Stryker brigade in places in Afghanistan where the unit
capability is maximized.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I want you to strut your stuff. But, in
reality, I want to make sure, if we get Stryker vehicles over
there, that they can be, you know, as best we can, widely used.
And since we don't own the whole country, you know, we are
somewhat limited in the areas which we have responsibility for.
It would be interesting to know how we are matching, you know,
our ability to maneuver on what you and I would call roads, of
which they have very few, and what they call, you know,
highways.
Thank you.
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Bishop.

MRAP COMPATIBILITY TO AFGHANISTAN

Mr. Bishop. Thank you.
Gentlemen, we have talked a lot about MRAPs today. But one
thing for sure is that they are pretty huge vehicles. And
throughout the services, I think about 11,000 of them being
used in Iraq, 2,000 to 3,000 in Afghanistan, and a lot more
being used for training.
For each of the services, could you tell me, with the troop
levels coming down in Iraq in the coming year and the lack of
MRAP compatibility to the Afghanistan terrain, and since they
are expensive to transport and operate, what are you going to
do with the MRAPs in Iraq following our withdrawal over there,
or, I should say, our redeployment from there? Will they be
kept in Kuwait to be a part of our prepositioned equipment set?
Will the U.S. retain all of the remaining MRAPs, or will a
portion of them be allocated to foreign military sales? I know
that there are some plans on the shelf, ready for execution on
command, for moving some of the equipment back.
But, you know, for each of you, what is it that you are
going to be doing? And how much is going to stay? How much is
coming back? And is it possible, fiscally, for us to move all
of this expensive equipment back, logistically?
General Flynn. Congressman Bishop, we own about 2,200
MRAPs. What we are going to do is we are going to take about
800 of them and they will remain in the operating forces. And
then the remainder we are going to return to our prepositioned
stocks.
So that is our basic plan right now. It is still being
refined. But that is where we are right now in the planning
process, sir.
General Thurman. Congressman Bishop, depending upon how
long we are deployed, obviously there is a requirement for
MRAPs as long as we are deployed, whatever those troop levels
end up being. So they will stay forward with the units.
What we are going to do if the demand drops down, we have
already documented 1,400 into our route clearance companies
that we intend to document in the force structure.
Mr. Bishop. What does that mean? That means preparing them
to bring them back home?
General Thurman. Yes, sir. We are going to bring a number
of these back, and we intend to integrate them into our force
structure. And we are working that right now inside the Army,
in our force structure.
There is a requirement right now for approximately 702 MRAP
training vehicles. And then there is another requirement to be
pushed into our--and replenish our Army prepositioned stocks
that we have that would be forward deployed in Kuwait, in this
case.
And then we have looked to put some in the enabling
formations, our logistics formations, to include, like, the
sustainment brigades for command and control purposes. We have
fires brigades, C2. So we can give those the level of
protection in there that they would need.
And so we are working right now, working with our Training
and Doctrine Command, and seeing how we document these vehicles
and put them in the actual force structure as a requirement.
Mr. Bishop. What about Guard and Reserve? For training
purposes? Is that included in the 700 that you put in for
training?
General Thurman. Yes, sir. There are X number going to Camp
Shelby, Camp Atterbury, around to our mobilization sites that
we have in the Army.
But when I speak of total Army requirement, I talk for the
Army, the Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard.
Mr. Bishop. One of the concerns that the National Guard, in
particular, has is that they have not, in the past, had
sufficient equipment on which to train and, when they were
called up, were only able to get abbreviated training on the
equipment that would be used. And, of course, the MRAPs were
fairly recent. And initially, when they were deployed, they
didn't have those, didn't have training on them. The result was
a lot of accidents, rollovers and the like, because they
weren't adequately trained on it.
How will the Guard be assured of getting the actual
equipment on which to train so that, in the future, we don't
have those kinds of injuries and accidents?
General Thurman. Congressman, we will make sure that, for
instance, we have done extensive work and improvements on Guard
equipping. First off, we will make sure that they have the
required equipment and not outdated equipment to do the
homeland defense mission that they have to do with their Title
32. We call that dual-use equipment. I think you are familiar
with that.
Mr. Bishop. Right.
General Thurman. And then what we make sure of on every
unit that is going to deploy, we treat them no different from
an active unit. We make sure that they have every piece of
equipment that they need prior to deploying. We make sure of
that in the Army. So they can do the required training.
Mr. Bishop. Because even the active-duty Army, as far as
the most recent engagement with Iraq, have not had the actual
equipment, the most updated equipment for their pretraining,
and they didn't get it until they went to the desert, just
prior to deployment. And that was limited, because that was a
limited exposure. Whereas if the back sets were at home, they
could train on them constantly as a part of their reset and
their dwell time.
General Thurman. What we are doing in the Army today, we
manage on our equipment readiness through the Army force
generation process. And we have established an equipping
strategy that we are going to equip units to a certain level as
they flow through this force deployment model. And we can show
you how we are thinking about doing that, and we would be more
than happy to do that.
Mr. Bishop. Okay. You did not mention--you mentioned the
700 and several thousand. But you have about 11,000 all
together. You didn't respond to the foreign military sales. Are
you going to put some of them up for foreign military sales?
General Thompson. I think that the planning right now is of
the roughly 12,000 MRAPs, Army MRAPs, that, with the training
and the prepositioned sets and in the force structure, we have
accounted for using about 9,500 of those 12,000 MRAPs.
So we haven't gotten to the end-state yet on how we would
use the other 2,500. Maybe some more of those would go in the
force structure. But that is the ongoing analysis. So that is
the rough math.
Foreign military sales or leaving some of them behind with
the Iraqi forces is certainly a possibility. We haven't done
any of that yet. There are no foreign military sales cases
pending today that I am aware of related to MRAPs.
But that is the rough math.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Kingston.

Comments of Mr. Kingston

Mr. Kingston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to make a statement as much as anything. But,
you know, this whole hearing, of course, has been about
equipment, which, of course, that was its purpose. But we all
know that the number-one asset is the individual soldier.
But one thing that frustrates me about today's military--
and I understand the ``Army of one'' culture, which is, you
know, a great concept. But sometimes you need a Chesty Puller
or an Audie Murphy or a Jimmy Doolittle or a Eugene Fluckey to
get a message across to people. And we don't ever talk about
individual soldiers in Iraq or Afghanistan unless they have
done something wrong or, you know, there was a tragedy
involving them.
Who are the school kids going to read about? When you are
recruiting a 19-year-old, who do you get them to be inspired by
if they don't know somebody personally who has been in Iraq or
Afghanistan?
And does that bother you at all? Because I have talked to
people about it, and they have said, you know, ``Army of one,
everybody is a hero,'' which is right. But I think, for all of
us, when we go, you know, not just to Walter Reed but people
who have not been injured--you know, there is a lot of heroes
and a lot great stories out there, but we never get them out to
the public. And I think that would be useful in terms of
putting a face on the soldier.
And I know that is not your job description and not the
purpose of the hearing, but I just wanted to mention it. I
don't know if you can comment or not.
General Flynn. Sir, like you said, I think all the men and
women who wear the uniform of the United States are heroes in
their own right. And I think they are an example for all of us,
you know, for all citizens.
Just within the last month, I had the privilege of going to
the Navy and Marine Corps Museum at Quantico. And the Secretary
of the Navy awarded two Navy Crosses posthumously to the
families of two Marines who manned their post in the face of a
suicide vehicle coming to their checkpoint, which saved the
lives of well over 50 individuals. And they stayed until they
stopped the vehicle.
When you looked around in the audience there, there were a
lot of Marines there, there were soldiers there, there were
sailors there, and there were a lot of individuals who had
served in the military. It was a publicized event, but that is
who came.
So I think there is a message in what you are saying, is,
you know, we do have heroes out there. Just this week I read in
the newspapers about the Air Cross being awarded to an airman.
I think it is one of the few times that the Air Cross has been
awarded, you know, in recent times for heroism on the
battlefield.
So those things are happening. It is just that sometimes
they just don't seem to get the publicity that they should.
Mr. Kingston. If we can get it outside of the circle of
those who wear the uniform and get it inside those who buy $2
coffees at the coffee shop, that would really, I think, be very
helpful. And I don't--I mean, we all have a responsibility on
that, I think.
General Thurman. You know, Congressman, I think that is a
very good point that you bring up. We can cite similar acts of
bravery and actions on the battlefield of what our men and
women do. And, as I always say, there is nothing more important
than a soldier. You know, the experiences that I personally had
in Iraq, as I walked in--just this morning, I got an e-mail
from a soldier, specialist, who said, ``Do you remember me? You
came in the operating room and gave me a coin, and I have lost
my coin. Can you get me another one?'' And I said, ``Give me
your address, and it will be out today.''
But the commitment that we have in this war, I think we
need to probably make sure that everybody is aware of that.
And, you know, we are all modest people because we care about
this country. And I think it would probably help this country
more if we got that information out more.
Mr. Visclosky. I thank the members.
Generals, thank you very much, each one of you, for your
service and for those you command.
And we are adjourned.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the
answers thereto follow:]

Counter-Rocket, Artillery and Mortar (C-RAM)

Question. Starting in 2005 the Army began to deploy a land version
of the Navy's 20 mm Phalanx Close-In Weapon System. The Army's version,
the Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar or C-RAM is a system used to
destroy incoming artillery, rockets and mortar rounds in the air before
they hit their ground targets. The system has been deployed to protect
large fixed facilities in Iraq such as the Green Zone and Camp Victory.
Do both the Army and Marine Corps use the Counter Rocket, Artillery
and Mortar System (C-RAM)?
Army Answer. No. C-RAM systems have been fielded to multiple
Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) (Army,
USMC, coalition) by the Army. FOBs with C-RAM Sense and Warn are manned
Army personnel, and FOBs that also have the Phalanx Intercept
capability are operated by a combination of Army and Navy personnel.
C-RAM Sense and Warn capability was initially fielded to 4 United
States Marine Corps (USMC) FOBs in Iraq where it was operated by U.S.
Army personnel but integrated into the USMC Base Defense Operations
Centers. Available USMC sensors at these FOBs (AN/TPQ-46 Firefinder
radars) were integrated into the C-RAM system. As the threat was
reduced, the 4 C-RAM systems at the USMC FOBs were relocated to
different FOBs in OIF.
Additionally, while not fielded in Afghanistan, C-RAM has completed
integration and testing with the USMC Hostile Artillery Locator (HALO),
an acoustic detection system for mortars and artillery, and with the
USMC SCAN EAGLE, an unmanned aerial vehicle with an electro optical
sensor.
Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps does not currently have a
capability similar to C-RAM or a shoot down capability against enemy
indirect fire. In Iraq and Afghanistan the U.S. Army has responsibility
for Forward Operating Base (FOB) counter indirect fire interdiction.
The Marine Corps provides radar and sensor support for Army C-RAM at a
number of FOBs. Currently there is no requirement for C-RAM in the
Marine Corps.
Question. Please provide an overview of where C-RAM is deployed and
describe its operation.
Army Answer. C-RAM is deployed to 15 Forward Operating Bases (FOBs)
in Iraq. Three of these FOBs (Two U.S. and one coalition) have
Intercept capability along with Sense and Warn capability. The
remaining 12 have Sense and Warn capability only.
Sense. The operation of the C-RAM system is initiated by Sensing
(detection) of a rocket or mortar round directed toward a C-RAM
protected FOB by U.S. Army/Marine Corps indirect fire sensors:
Lightweight Counter Mortar Radars (LCMR); Firefinder Radars (AN/TPQ-36,
37 or 46); Giraffe radars (foreign system); or the radar on the Land
based Phalanx Weapon Systems (LPWS). Sensing of rocket and mortar
rounds is performed at both C-RAM Sense and Warn FOBs and C-RAM
Intercept FOBs.
Warn: Warning is the action controlled and implemented by C-RAM to
warn personnel within the hazard area of incoming rockets and mortar
rounds. Warnings are dependent on detection of incoming threats by the
indirect fire radars. The Army/Marine Corps indirect fire radars report
both the Point of Origin (POO) of the rocket or mortar round and its
projected flight path. The POO and projected flight paths from the
indirect fire radars are correlated by the C-RAM Command and Control
(C2) system. To reduce the probability of false warnings that might be
issued based on a false detection by an Indirect fire radar,
correlation of data from two or more indirect fire sensors is required
to validate that there is in fact a rocket or mortar round inbound (The
radars on a large base may produce as many as 500 false detects a day).
This correlation normally occurs within 6-8 seconds. If C-RAM C2
validates that there is an inbound threat, it calculates the predicted
Point of Impact (POI), then identifies all of the audible and visual
alarms required to warn personnel within the hazard area in the
vicinity of the POI, and initiates a warning with just these essential
warning devices. This localized warning ensures that personnel who are
not within the hazard area can continue their work, while those in the
hazard area seek protection. Warnings are typically initiated 10-20
seconds prior to expected impact. Warning is performed at both C-RAM
Sense and Warn FOBs and C-RAM Intercept FOBs.
Response. Response is action taken to respond to an insurgent
rocket or mortar launch crew with either lethal or non-lethal effects.
Response is coordinated by the C-RAM systems through its integration
with Army, U.S. Air Force (USAF) and USMC Battle Command Systems.
Concurrent with validation of an inbound rocket or mortar round, C-RAM
C2 reviews the POOs reported by the indirect fire radars and if
necessary calculates a new POO. C-RAM C2 then provides the new POO to
Army, USAF and USMC Battle Command systems. This information enables
the Battle Captain to review the possible means for response
(counterfire, quick reaction force, UAV, Army aviation, AF fixed wing
aircraft, Electro-Optical/Infrared Sensors for Positive Identification,
etc.) and then to select the optimum method of either lethal or non-
lethal Response. Response is performed at both C-RAM Sense and Warn
FOBs and C-RAM Intercept FOBs.
Intercept. For those FOBs that are equipped with an Intercept
capability, the C-RAM C2 will also receive the location and track of
any friendly aircraft in the vicinity from Sentinel radars. Concurrent
with initiating Warnings and with providing POO to Battle Command
systems, C-RAM C2 will calculate the location of the incoming round and
send this information to those Land Base Phalanx Weapon Systems (LPWS)
that are in a position to acquire, track, and destroy the threat. Those
LPWS then acquire and track the round with their own fire control
radars. The location and velocity of any friendly aircraft in the area
is provided to LPWS, which use the location of friendly aircraft to
calculate a dynamic ``Do Not Engage Sector.'' This establishes a volume
around each friendly aircraft location as it moves that precludes any
firing that might endanger the aircraft. If the incoming round comes
within range of the LPWS and engaging the incoming round will not
endanger any friendly aircraft, the Engagement Control Officer will
view the imagery from the LPWS Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) camera
and visually verify that the target is in fact a rocket or mortar round
and that there are no friendly aircraft within the field of view of the
FLIR. If he confirms this, the Engagement Control Officer will direct
engagement of the incoming round by LPWS. The rounds used by the LPWS
that do not impact with the rocket or mortar round self destruct,
precluding lethal effects and minimizing effects on the ground.
Intercept of rockets and mortar rounds is performed only at C-RAM
Intercept FOBs.
Marine Corps Question. Please provide an overview of where C-RAM is
deployed and describe its operation?
Answer. The Marine Corps does not have C-RAM. The Army should
answer.
Question. Is C-RAM deployed to Afghanistan as well as Iraq?
Army Answer. Currently C-RAM systems are only deployed by the U.S.
Army in Iraq. However the U.S. military headquarters in Afghanistan is
reviewing a draft requirement requesting the fielding of C-RAM systems
to multiple Forward Operating Bases in Afghanistan.
Additionally, a partner in the NATO command in Afghanistan has
deployed a limited C-RAM Sense and Warn capability to one NATO Forward
Operating Base in Afghanistan. There are currently no C-RAM systems
deployed in Afghanistan by U.S. Forces.
Marine Corps Answer. Marine Corps does not have C-RAM. The Army
should answer.
Question. How has C-RAM performed in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Army Answer. The C-RAM System-of-Systems has performed well in Iraq
with over 800 timely and accurate warnings of incoming rockets or
mortar rounds, with a success rate over 70 percent and over 100
successful intercepts of rockets or mortar rounds without endangering
any aircraft.
C-RAM systems deployed in Iraq have averaged a greater than 90
percent operational availability rate.
The CENTCOM Deputy Commander identified C-RAM as a force multiplier
that is saving lives and has recommended that C-RAM be transitioned
from supplemental funding to the base budget.
There are currently no C-RAM systems deployed in Afghanistan.
Marine Corps Answer. Marine Corps does not have C-RAM. The Army
should answer.
Question. Given that our fixed facilities are sometimes located in
densely populated urban areas, how is collateral damage avoided?
Army Answer. Multiple procedures/hardware systems have been
incorporated to prevent collateral damage by the C-RAM intercept
systems fielded to three Forward Operating Bases in Iraq.
First, the C-RAM Interceptor, the Land Based Phalanx Weapon System
(LPWS), uses ammunition that self-destructs after a fixed time of
flight. Thus, rounds that are fired at a rocket or mortar round that do
not strike the target self-destruct into small fragments.
Second, the C-RAM system has established minimum firing elevation
limits (both physical and software) for each LPWS position. This
ensures that any rounds fired that do not intercept the intended rocket
or mortar round, detonate in the air at an altitude sufficient to
ensure that any fragments falling to the earth do not cause any lethal
collateral damage. The minimum altitude for this self-destruction was
established based on testing by an Army test agency.
Third, physical and software cut-outs have been established and
incorporated for each LPWS position, which precludes firing in
directions where structures or other obstructions do not allow
sufficient range for the bullet fly-out and safe self-destruction.
The Sense and Warn systems at 12 FOBs in Iraq are passive, thus
there is no potential for collateral damage.
Question. Are sufficient C-RAM systems available for our deployed
forces and for training purposes?
Army Answer. There are sufficient C-RAM systems to meet current
requirements of the Warfighter in Iraq and to support training. We have
and must continue to enhance system-of-system capabilities of deployed
and training systems to address changing enemy tactics and evolving
threats.
If C-RAM Sense and Warn requirements are validated for Afghanistan,
procurement of additional C-RAM Sense and Warn systems will be
required.
Marine Corps Answer. Marine Corps does not have C-RAM. The Army
should answer.

DoD IG Findings Concerning the Marine Corps' Procurement of MRAPS

Question. In his testimony before this subcommittee on February
26th, the DoD Inspector General stated the Marine Corps Systems Command
did not properly determine that contract prices were fair and
reasonable when they awarded nine firm fixed price contracts for Mine
Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. The per vehicle price that
the Marine Corps paid for Category I vehicles ranged from $300 thousand
to $1.1 million. He further stated that the Marine Corps also did not
obtain volume discounts from two contractors for orders in excess of
1,500 vehicles at an additional cost to the taxpayer of $90 million.
The Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics,
agreed with the IG's conclusions.
General Flynn, are you aware of the DoD IG's findings that the
Marine Corps failed to establish fair and reasonable prices on MRAPs
and failed to request quantity discounts? Would you comment?
While we understand that the Marine Corps sought to procure MRAPs
swiftly, how do you justify the omission of an independent cost
analysis?
Answer. Provided below:
1. Purpose. Provide the House Committee on Appropriations,
Subcommittee Defense (HAC-D) with information, for the record, as to
the Marine Corps' position on the Procurement and Delivery of Joint
Service Mine Resistant Armor Protected (MRAP) Vehicles DoD IG Report--
29 January 2009 (Report No. D-2009-046). On 10 March, LtGen George
Flynn, Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps' Combat Development and
Integration, served as a witness before this committee. LtGen Flynn
stated, he would provide ``additional information, for the record, as
to what we agree with and what we don't agree with in the report.''
2. Take Away. Both the ASN(RDA) and the Marine Corps provided
written comments to the DoD IG report and disagreed with a number of
assertions in Finding C.
3. Key Points
The Marine Corps agrees with the following:
Finding A. Actions Taken to Accelerate Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected Vehicle Delivery
DoD IG concluded that the combination of actions executed
to address the urgent need for accelerating the delivery of MRAP
vehicles to theater was innovative and effective.
The DoD IG found that Marine Corps System Command (MCSC)
implemented aggressive contractual delivery schedules to meet the
theater demand for MRAP vehicles as directed by the Secretary of
Defense.
4. Recommendations
The Marine Corps has incorporated the DoD IG report
recommendation that future procurements for MRAP vehicles are properly
competed or justified on a sole-source basis. Our acquisition
strategies included this consideration for the MRAP II and sole-source
award of MRAP CAT III procurements. MRAP-All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV)
prices for each part of the competition will be negotiated separately.
MCSC has communicated to its contracting officials the
importance of making price reasonableness determinations and ensuring
cost or pricing data are requested. MCSC is building a framework for
the price reasonableness determination that will be used for the M-ATV
procurement. This procurement, though part of the overall Joint MRAP
Vehicle Program, is being conducted by the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive
and Armaments Command (TACOM).
We will attempt to build sufficient flexibility into the
production contract to deal with both planned and potential quantities.
We also sought both step and cumulative quantity discounts as part of
the Request for Proposals for the M-ATV procurement. An OSD Peer Review
was conducted before the request for proposal (RFP) release, and a
second Peer Review is being conducted during M-ATV source selection.
The Marine Corps disagreed with the following:
Finding C. Price Reasonableness Determination
We disagree with the DoD IG report conclusion that the
MCSC contracting officer chose an inappropriate contract type for the
MRAP procurement. The Director of the Defense Procurement Acquisition
Policy and Strategic Sourcing (DPAP), also agreed that firm fixed price
was the correct contract type. He stated ``The use of firm fixed price
contracts would be perfectly appropriate if buttressed with the
appropriate analysis to determine fair and reasonable prices.'' We
believe our approach, vetted with OSD, was appropriate. We believe that
the contracting officer reasonably determined that a fixed-price
contract was appropriate for the MRAP procurement.
We believe that MCSC netted actual savings of $127 million
by negotiating bilateral contract modifications to produce more than
the 1,500 vehicles that were originally contracted for in the base
year. We purchased those vehicles at base-year price rather than
option-year pricing. The difference between ordering at base-year
rather than option-year pricing of 4,186 vehicles was $127 million. We
understand the approach suggested by DoD IG. The DoD IG method suggests
potential savings of $45.6 million by using volume discounts. We should
have asked for an additional volume discount. We do not believe we
would have received both discounts. We believe our method was a better
investment for the government, as reflected in net actual savings of
$127 million versus a hypothetical savings of $45.6 million.
We believe the price range in the chart on page 25 is
misleading. In January 2007, nine vendor proposals demonstrated
potential to meet the program's overarching objective--field the
maximum number of survivable, safe, sustainable MRAP vehicles in the
shortest period of time--received contract awards to each deliver two
CAT I and two CAT II for initial test and evaluation. We believed from
the onset that ``some'' of the vehicles may not pass production
verification and survivability tests, but we could not tell that
definitively from the paper proposals. For that reason, it was decided
that leaving any high potential producer that ``could possibly''
manufacture a survivable vehicle on the sidelines was an unacceptable
risk when the Joint Forces had an urgent need for these vehicles.
Of the nine vendors, Oshkosh Truck (OTC), at $306,199, was the
least expensive, but failed Limited User Evaluation (LUE); General
Purpose Vehicles (GPV) was the most expensive at more than $1 million
per vehicle, but was terminated for convenience because the company
failed to deliver any test vehicles. GPV's paper proposal offered an
enhanced maneuverability and mobility solution (the only vendor to
offer this capability). GPV's contract award was terminated, and the
entire $5.1 million was de-obligated. The unit prices on page 25
reflect unit pricing for a procurement order quantity of 1 to 200
vehicles. Approximately 95% of the MRAP vehicles actually procured were
purchased at higher step ladder quantity pricing where unit price
ranges did not range so greatly among the vendors.
As of 16 March 09, MCSC has ordered 16,242 vehicles to
meet DoD requirements. Of the five vendors that produced significant
quantities of vehicles, the top vehicle unit price paid by the
Government was $629,800 (for 75 vehicles); the lowest was $443,000,
representing an average base variant cost of $507,860 with an average
unit price variance across vendors of $112,891.*
*The actual average cost of a CAT I = $507, 728; the actual average
cost of a CAT II = $508,472
Ultimately, MCSC ordered large quantities of CAT I and CAT
II vehicles from five fully qualified vendors. These manufacturers
proved their ability to produce vehicles with the required production
numbers and to deliver within established timelines.

Joint Light Tactical Vehicles

Question. In response to an operational need and an aging fleet of
light tactical wheeled vehicles, the Joint Services developed a
requirement for a new tactical wheeled vehicle platform that would
provide increased force protection, survivability, and improved
capacity over the existing up-armored HMMWV (UAH) while balancing
mobility and transportability requirements with costs.
Since the initiation of the JLTV program the military departments
have procured over 16,000 Mine Resistant, Ambush Protected (MRAP)
vehicles. Over 13,000 have been delivered to the combat theaters.
Currently the MRAP Joint Program office is in the process of procuring
400 light variants of the MRAP for duty in Afghanistan, and a more
mobile MRAP All Terrain Vehicle is being considered. Meanwhile, the
JLTV program continues.
How have the requirements for JLTV changed based on the experiences
of U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Army Answer. The Army and Marine Corps will continue to refine
their requirements as the JLTV program progresses through its
Technology Development Phase. Our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan
provide a wealth of insight into user requirements and the challenges
of balancing the sometimes competing or contradictory requirements of
performance (mobility and transportability), protection, and payload,
with protection having the most negative effects on other requirements.
Operations in both locations, as in most other places in the world,
indicate a need for more of all three of these major requirements. The
JLTV requirements have been heavily influenced by our experiences with
improvised explosive devices while at the same time realizing that the
heavy armor used in the MRAP program to mitigate that threat has
severely limited the off-road utility and payload capability of those
vehicles while at the same time creating significant air and shipboard
transportation challenges. The combination of MRAP testing results
(understanding of underbody blast phenomenon for specific hull designs)
and medical analysis of occupant injury (understand injury mechanisms
of all sources) is informing a more comprehensive and effective
description of protection/survivability requirements to define the JLTV
requirement for the next phase. The resulting JLTV requirements seek a
balance in the required capabilities through modular, selective, and
scalable protection.
Marine Corps Answer. The Army and Marine Corps will continue to
refine their requirements as the JLTV program progresses through its
Technology Development Phase. Our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan
provide a wealth of insight into user requirements and the challenges
of balancing the sometimes competing or contradictory requirements of
performance (mobility and transportability), protection, and payload,
with protection being the most difficult to balance against the other
requirements. Operations in both locations, as in most other places in
the world, indicate a need for more of all three of these major
requirements. The JLTV requirements have been heavily influenced by our
experiences with improvised explosive devices while at the same time
realizing that the heavy armor used in the MRAP program to mitigate
that threat has severely limited the off-road utility and payload
capability of those vehicles while at the same time creating
significant air and shipboard transportation challenges. The
combination of MRAP testing results (understanding of underbody blast
phenomenon for specific hull designs) and medical analysis of occupant
injury (understanding injury mechanisms of all sources) is informing a
more comprehensive and effective description of protection/
survivability requirements to define the JLTV requirements and the
resulting requirements will seek a balance in the required capabilities
through modular, selective, and scalable protection.
Question. On 29 October 2008, the Pentagon narrowed the field of
vendors to the Lockheed Martin, General Tactical Vehicles and BAE
Systems/Navistar teams to compete for the final version and contract
for the JLTV. However, there have been media reports of a new
requirement to develop a hybrid electric propulsion capability, a
technology that none of the three chosen teams offered. Requirements
creep has driven up the cost and extended the schedule for many
programs. Please explain the late decision regarding hybrid electric
propulsion.
Army Answer. There is no requirement to develop a hybrid electric
propulsion capability. The JLTV Purchase Description (PD) is a
performance based document. The PD specifies requirements for fuel
efficiency, mobility, carrying capacity, etc. The vendors propose their
solution to meet these requirements. The media report was incorrect.
Marine Corps Answer. There is no new requirement to develop a
hybrid electric propulsion capability. The JLTV Purchase Description
(PD) is a performance based document. The PD specifies requirements for
fuel efficiency, mobility, carrying capacity, etc. The vendors propose
their solution to meet these requirements. The media report was
incorrect. The JLTV program requirements are unchanged.
Question. Two of the losing bidders, teams that were not chosen to
go forward with the development effort, filed protests. What is the
status of resolving the protests?
Army Answer. Northrop Grumman and Textron Marine and Land Systems
filed protests with the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
following the contract awards for the JLTV Technology Development
effort. GAO denied both protests on February 17, 2009 and contract
performance has resumed.
Marine Corps Answer. Northrop Grumman and Textron Marine and Land
Systems filed protests with the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
following the JLTV TD contract announcement. The Army responded in
accordance with GAO guidelines. GAO denied both protests on February
17, 2009 and contract performance, which was stopped during the
protests, has now resumed.

Disposition of MRAPS

Question. Throughout the services, there are some 11,000 MRAPs
being used in Iraq, with some 2,000 to 3,000 in Afghanistan, and even
more used for training.
I would like each service to respond:
With troop levels drawing down in Iraq in the coming year, and with
the lack of MRAP compatibility to the Afghan terrain, and since they
are expensive to transport and operate, what will the US military do
with MRAPs in Iraq following a US withdrawal from that conflict?
Army Answer. We are exploring the long term placement of all Army
MRAPs in the force structure, not just the ones in Iraq. As a first
step, the Army is retrograding some of the early model MRAPs out of
Iraq. The first 126 of these vehicles will be used to fill operational
requirements of support units based in Kuwait. An additional 702 MRAPs
will be cascaded out of theater to train units preparing to deploy.
There will also be 167 MRAPs kept in Kuwait to provide additional
training opportunities for these units as they enter theater. Finally,
approximately 150 vehicles will be held in Kuwait as Theater
Sustainment Stocks.
Question. Will MRAPs be kept in Kuwait to serve as part of
prepositioned equipment sets?
Answer. Initial indications are that a number of MRAPs will be
placed in Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS). HQDA G-3/5/7, Army Materiel
Command, Army Training and Doctrine Command and Army Central Command
are currently reviewing required quantities and variants to be placed
in APS.
Question. Will the US retain all of the remaining MRAPs, or will a
portion of these items be allocated for foreign military sales?
Answer. The Army is analyzing possible roles for MRAP once they are
no longer needed in theater, but has not made final decisions on the
disposition of all MRAPs and plans to make decisions on this matter by
the start of FY10. Some of the issues that will influence future
decisions are: the number of vehicles available at the end of the
conflict; the condition of the vehicles, lessons learned concerning
reliability mobility, and suitability of each variant. In the event
that some variant(s) are deemed unsuitable for placement in the force
structure, they could be made available for FMS.

Task Force ODIN

Question. Please describe Task Force ODIN, including its mission
and capabilities, and structural components.
Answer.------
Question. How effective has Task Force ODIN been in countering IED
bomb makers and placers?
Answer. Overall IED Activity in Iraq has significantly declined
since the Army made a combination of changes. We deployed Task Force
ODIN, MRAP vehicles and conducted a Surge of forces in a short period
of time. The specific reduction in Army casualties from IEDs and
changed enemy tactics because of these changes cannot be identified.
Question. What, if any, relationship does the Army have with JIEDDO
with regard to the task force?
Answer. The Army Aviation Directorate works closely with JIEDDO on
many projects that support Task Force ODIN. JIEDDO funded many of the
sensors and technologies that are employed by Task Force ODIN and we
continue to leverage their technology enhancements as they support Army
requirements.
Question. What is the relationship of Task Force ODIN to ongoing
Secretary of Defense efforts to increase ISR assets available in
theater?
Answer. The Army proposed many of the technological solutions for
Task Force ODIN Afghanistan to the Secretary of Defense ISR Task Force
for funding support. Beyond funding, the ISR Task Force also helped
ensure rapid integration with combat support agencies and accelerated
the OEF theater ISR architectures, improving dissemination of Task
Force ODIN information.

Medical Evacuation

Question. On January 27th, 2009, in testimony before the House
Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense Gates addressed the
difference in medevac response times for Iraq and Afghanistan. He noted
that the goal in Iraq is to have a wounded soldier in a hospital in an
hour. However for Afghanistan the time is closer to two hours.
Secretary Gates has directed increases in the number of medevac
helicopters and medical professionals assigned to Afghanistan.
What are the factors that cause medevac to take significantly
longer in Afghanistan than in Iraq?
Army Answer. From the Army's perspective several factors affect
operations. Afghanistan's geography differs significantly from Iraq. A
combination of size, mountains, and weather directly contribute to
increased response times in Afghanistan. The array, or geometry, of
evacuation assets across the area of operations is a second factor that
varies between theaters and cause increased response time. This array
is tactically determined by the challenging terrain, limited operating
bases, and a finite number of operating assets. Thirdly, the lack of
parity in operating assets between theaters also contributes to the
increase response time in OEF. Since the two areas of operation pose
different challenges and characteristics, Multi National Forces Iraq
(MNF-I) and International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) Afghanistan
until recently applied different planning standards for acceptable
risk--one hour in Iraq and two hours in Afghanistan. The differing
standards were based on terrain, mission assessment, medical assets,
and maturity of the infrastructure. Additionally, in Afghanistan, the
participating NATO countries operate using their own countries rules
which differ from those in the U.S. Military.
Question. What are the factors that cause medevac to take
significantly longer in Afghanistan than in Iraq?
Marine Corps Answer. This response is a collaborative effort
involving the Joint Staff J-4 HSSD, HQMC I&L, Offices of the Army and
Air Force Surgeons General, and OPNAV N-931.
At the time of SECDEF January, 2009 testimony, there were a number
of factors causing significantly longer MEDEVAC mission times in
Afghanistan as compared to Iraq. Factors were geographic/weather
related and also included the actual force lay down locations which
supported the asset. Additionally, in Afghanistan, U.S. forces were
required to operate under NATO business rules which differ from our own
rules as it relates to MEDEVAC procedures. This situation has been
remedied and U.S. forces are now able to launch MEDEVAC helicopters and
provided the required NATO information when requested/required after
the fact.
Question. What additional medevac assets, both medical facilities
and aircraft have actually arrived in Afghanistan, and what additional
assets are on the way?
Army Answer. Army MEDEVAC assets, both medical facilities and
aircraft, form part of the joint effort to increase MEDEVAC assets in
Afghanistan. One Army forward surgical team has arrived. Additional
Army assets scheduled to arrive include one forward surgical team, a
medical brigade command and control headquarters, four additional
MEDEVAC aircraft and crews, and one 12 ship MEDEVAC company. These Army
assets are part of a joint effort to increase overall MEDEVAC
capability in Afghanistan. The Joint Staff has oversight of all joint
additional assets supporting Afghanistan.
Marine Corps Answer. This response is a collaborative effort
involving the Joint Staff J-4 HSSD, HQMC I&L, Offices of the Army and
Air Force Surgeons General, and OPNAV N-931.
Naval Service forward medical facilities and CASEVAC capability
along with Army and Air Force MEDEVAC assets, both medical facilities
and aircraft, form part of the joint effort to increase MEDEVAC
capability in Afghanistan. At this time, one direct support Marine
Corps forward surgical team and one general support Army forward
surgical team has arrived. Additional forward Naval Service and Army
assets are scheduled to arrive including three direct support Marine
Corps forward surgical teams, one general support Navy forward surgical
team, one additional general support Army forward surgical team, four
additional Army MEDEVAC aircraft and crews, and one 12-ship Army
MEDEVAC company. This joint effort will increase overall MEDEVAC
capability in Afghanistan.
Question. Are there remaining shortages of medevac aircraft;
aircrews; and Forward Surgical Teams in Afghanistan?
Army Answer. The Army has not identified any remaining shortages of
MEDEVAC assets in Afghanistan for Regional Commands (RC)--East or
South. Army MEDEVAC assets, both medical facilities and aircraft, form
part of the joint effort to increase MEDEVAC assets in Afghanistan. One
Army forward surgical team has arrived. Additional Army assets
scheduled to arrive include one forward surgical team, a medical
brigade command and control headquarters, four additional MEDEVAC
aircraft and crews, and one 12-ship MEDEVAC company. These Army assets
are part of a joint effort to increase overall MEDEVAC capability in
Afghanistan. The Joint Staff has oversight of all joint additional
assets supporting Afghanistan.
The additional assets will achieve parity between OIF and RC--East
and South. The Joint Staff is leading efforts to improve the evacuation
system in RC--North and West.
Marine Corps Answer. This response is a collaborative effort
involving the Joint Staff J-4 HSSD, HQMC I&L, Offices of the Army and
Air Force Surgeons General, and OPNAV N-931.
The Marine Corps and Army have not identified any remaining
shortages of MEDEVAC assets in Afghanistan for Regional Commands (RC)--
South or East. The additional assets described in the answer to
Question 2 above will achieve parity between OIF and OEF RC--South and
East. In addition, the Joint Staff is leading efforts to improve the
evacuation system in RC--North and West.
Question. Today, what is the average time to evacuate a wounded
soldier to a hospital in Afghanistan?
Army Answer. Army analysis shows that the average time to evacuate
a wounded Soldier to a hospital in Afghanistan was 80 minutes with data
from Jun 08-Dec 08. Analysis continues, but preliminary numbers show an
improving trend in OEF (Oct 08-Dec 08 the average time was 71 minutes).
Marine Corps Answer. This response is a collaborative effort
involving the Joint Staff HSSD, HQMC I&L, Offices of the Army and Air
Force Surgeons General, and OPNAV N-931.
Army analysis shows that the average time to evacuate a wounded
service member to a hospital in Afghanistan was 80 minutes with data
from Jun 08-Dec 08. Analysis continues, but preliminary numbers show an
improving trend in OEF (Oct 08-Dec 08 the average time was 71 minutes).
As of today, USCENTCOM will reassess evacuation times after receiving
the additional assets described in Question 2.
Question. The Committee understands that certain Combat Search and
Rescue aircrews have been reconfigured to assist with the medevac
shortfall. What are the pitfalls of this alternative?
Army Answer. From the Army's perspective, the challenge is the
standardization and integration of the U.S. Air Force Combat Search and
Rescue aircraft into the Army evacuation structure and standards.
Differing equipment, medical protocols, training, aircraft
configuration, procedural standardization, control, reporting, and
resourcing integration are all potential pitfalls to this alternative.
Marine Corps Answer. This response is a collaborative effort
involving the Joint Staff J-4 HSSD, HQMC I&L, Offices of the Army and
Air Force Surgeons General, and OPNAV N-931.
The Marine Corps does not employ Combat Search and Rescue aircrews.
Through conversations with and documentation from the Army, the
challenge is the standardization and integration of the U.S. Air Force
Combat Search and Rescue aircraft into the Army evacuation structure
and standards. Differing equipment, medical protocols, training,
aircraft configuration, and procedural standardization are all
potential pitfalls to this alternative. In addition, procedural,
command and control, reporting, and resourcing integration are also
possible pitfalls. Air Force emphasized that HH-60G Combat Search and
Rescue (CSAR) helicopters are conducting ``when requested'' OEF MEDEVAC
missions. The main adverse impact of utilizing Air Force CSAR assets
for MEDEVAC is the decreased availability of assets for other potential
missions, such as humanitarian assistance and other unplanned
scenarios. The Air Force has temporarily ceased advanced training at
the HH-60G Weapons School (Nellis AFB, NV) to support the MEDEVAC
mission. The Navy is currently manned at 54% (75/139) with Search and
Rescue Medical Technician (Navy Enlisted Code 8401) making it difficult
to maintain inLieu-Of sourcing solutions for MEDEVAC.
Question. What if any are the significant limitations of our
medevac helicopters that are in use in Afghanistan?
Army Answer. For Army MEDEVAC helicopters, the significant
limitations are degraded performance during high altitude operations,
communications, and night illumination. MEDEVAC helicopters performance
starts degrading at altitudes of approximately 5000 feet and above and
worsens with increasingly high altitudes. The Army has mitigated this
risk by installing more powerful engines in the MEDEVAC aircraft going
into theater. The 701C and 701D engines increase performance and
improve high altitude operations. These engines are part of the Army
mission equipment package for MEDEVAC aircraft going into Afghanistan.
Line-of-sight air-ground and air-to-air communications are
significantly impacted by the high terrain. To improve communications
in MEDEVAC aircraft, the Army fields satellite communication radios to
improve the non-line of sight, or over-the-horizon, communications
capability. Finally, low night illumination severely limits night
vision goggle MEDEVAC operations. Commanders developed control measures
for night flying to mitigate the risk associated with this limitation.
The control measures are the use of flight corridors and elevation of
risk approval authority for missions not flown on designated corridors.
Although the Army has fielded a forward looking infrared system (FLIR)
to MEDEVAC helicopters, this system is used to identify personnel at
the landing zone.
Marine Corps Answer. This response is a collaborative effort
involving the Joint Staff J-4 HSSD, HQMC I&L, Offices of the Army and
Air Force Surgeons General, and OPNAV N-931.
The Army has determined that its MEDEVAC helicopters significant
limitations are related to: degraded performance during high altitude
operations, communications, and night illumination. MEDEVAC helicopters
performance starts degrading at altitudes of approximately 5000 feet
and above and worsens with increasingly high altitudes. The Army has
mitigated this risk by installing more powerful engines in the MEDEVAC
aircraft going into theater. The 701C and 701D engines increase
performance and improve high altitude operations. These engines are
part of the Army mission equipment package for MEDEVAC aircraft going
into Afghanistan. Line-of-sight air-ground and air-to-air
communications are significantly impacted by the high terrain. To
improve communications in MEDEVAC aircraft, the Army fields satellite
communication radios to improve the non-line of sight, or over-the-
horizon, communications capability. Finally, low night illumination
severely limits night vision goggle MEDEVAC operations. Commanders
developed control measures for night flying to mitigate the risk
associate with this limitation. The control measures are the use of
flight corridors and elevation of risk approval authority for missions
not flown on designated corridors. The Army has fielded a forward
looking infrared system (FLIR) to MEDEVAC helicopters in order to
enable location of personnel at pick up sites.
Question. How have Air Force Combat Search and Rescue helicopters
and crews contributed to solving the medevac shortfall in Afghanistan?
Army Answer. From the Army's perspective the Air Force Combat
Search and Rescue (CSAR) helicopters have provided an acceptable ``in
lieu of solution to the Combatant Commander's need for MEDEVAC
helicopters. The U.S. Air Force has six dual mission (MEDEVAC and
Combat Search and Rescue) CSAR aircraft operating in Afghanistan. An
additional six CSAR aircraft have been deployed as a bridging solution
until the Army's Combat Aviation Brigade arrives with its organic
twelve UH-60 aircraft MEDEVAC Company. However, the additional six CSAR
aircraft will redeploy out of Afghanistan in late summer 2009. The USAF
is best able to provide the specific contributions of its CSAR
helicopters during MEDEVAC operations in Afghanistan.
Marine Corps Answer. This response is a collaborative effort
involving the Joint Staff J-4 HSSD, HQMC I&L, Offices of the Army and
Air Force Surgeons General, and OPNAV N-931.
Dating back to 2006, the Air Force Combat Search and Rescue
helicopters and crews have been contributing to the MEDEVAC missions in
Afghanistan. In a contributable effort to solving the MEDEVAC shortfall
in Afghanistan, all Air Force HH-60G helicopters in Afghanistan are
tasked to perform the MEDEVAC. This includes the six additional
helicopters received in early 2009. U.S. Army MEDEVAC capability
arrives in Afghanistan in mid-2009 at which time U.S. Air Force MEDEVAC
employment will be reassessed.

Identification Friend or Foe (IFF)

Question. The range and lethality of modern weapon systems can
result in accidental or friendly fire or fratricide situations. The
Army long sought technology to assist with the battlefield
identification of friendly forces on the ground and in the air. During
the first Gulf War, during the hours of darkness, an Army Apache
helicopter fired an anti-tank missile on a U.S. armored personnel
carrier mistakenly identifying the M113 as Iraqi. In April of 2004
former professional football player Pat Tillman was mistakenly engaged
and killed by small arms fire from his fellow Army Rangers. In both
cases the only means of identification was visual.
What technology is currently available to U.S. forces to positively
identify friend from foe?
Army Answer. Since the first Gulf War we have made significant
investments in improved sensors, optics, battle command systems, and
markings that have enhanced overall combat effectiveness while
significantly improving our capability to identify friend from foe.
Technologies available during the first Gulf War consisted of Optical
Sights, Thermal Integrated Sight Unit, a limited number of Global
Positioning Systems (GPS), and various rudimentary markings, such as
the Korean War vintage VS 17 Cloth Panel and inverted ``V'' markings.
Today, most of our Stryker Vehicles, Abrams Tanks, Bradley Fighting
Vehicles, and Apache helicopters are equipped with Second Generation
Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) sights and Soldiers are being equipped
with improved thermal sights and night vision goggles (NVG). These
devices have greatly extended the range at which battlefield entities
can be identified, particularly during hours of darkness and during
limited visibility. In battle command, we have fielded thousands of
Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below/Blue Force Tracking Systems.
These systems, combined with the proliferation of GPS, have given
commanders much better battlefield situational awareness, enabling them
to avoid situations, such as incidental contact between friendly units,
that could lead to fratricide. The Land Warrior and future Ground
Soldier Ensemble capabilities provide unparalleled dismounted combatant
location fidelity and situational awareness, greatly reducing the
chance of fratricide with small units. The fielding of Unmanned Aerial
Systems (UAS) with a variety of sensor packages and the Long-Range
Advance Scout Surveillance System has also added greatly to overall
improvement in battlefield situational awareness and target
identification. Regarding markings, we have fielded thousands of the
Joint Combat Identification Marking System (JCIMS) kits that provide a
relatively inexpensive, and low technology capability to assist in
identifying friend from foe. JCIMS kits include metal and cloth panels
covered with a special film that produces a unique thermal signature
visible by FLIR and thermal sights and a small infrared beacon that
emits a unique strobe that can be seen by ground platforms,
helicopters, and dismounted combatants using NVG. Collectively, these
investments, combined with improved training, doctrine, tactics,
techniques and procedures, and rules of engagement have essentially
mitigated the types of fratricide incidents experienced during the
first Gulf War.
Marine Corps Answer. The ability to positively identify friend from
foe requires a complex interaction of training, doctrine, tactics
techniques and procedures (TTP) and rules of engagement (ROE), and
information derived from command and control/blue force tracking (C2/
BFT) and cooperative target identification (CTI) systems. Within the
current available technologies there is not a capability that would
allow for the positive identification of friend from foe at the shooter
level. However there has been a great deal of Joint and Coalition
effort completed that will, at the platform level, provide the
capability to identify a like equipped platform as a friend and a non-
equipped platform as an unknown. C2/BFT systems support the reporting
and display of friendly position location information (PLI) on
digitized map displays that provide a commander-focused general
knowledge of friendly forces on the battlefield to facilitate C2 and
mission execution requirements. At the individual platform/shooter
level, CTI systems are required to provide real-time information to
facilitate force sorting and enable a ``shooter-focused'' shoot/don't
shoot decision for detected entities in a weapon sight.
Ground-Ground Operations. In ground-ground operations,
we've made significant investment in the Force XXI Battle Command
Brigade and Below (FBCB2), Data Automated Communications Terminal
(DACT), and Mini Transmitter (MTX) C2/BFT technologies to improve a
commander's situational awareness (SA) of friendly force locations on
the battlefield. We've also invested in improved optics and visual
marking systems to better enable the visual identification at the
shooter level of detected ground platforms and individual combatants.
While the investment in C2/BFT, optics, and JCIMS partially address the
Combat Identification (CID) technology gap in the ground-ground
environment, they do not negate the need for a positive CTI capability.
At the shooter level in direct-fire ground engagements, SA (blue icons
on a digitized map) is not sufficient--there will always be a data
correlation problem between the gun sight and the SA tool--regardless
of the accuracy of the friendly force SA data. OEF/OIF friendly fire
data validate the continued need for a CTI (interrogation and reply)
capability to support ``force sorting'' and fratricide mitigation for
detected entities in the gunner's sight.
Joint Fires Operations. In the Joint Fires arena, we've
fielded the Target Location Designation Handoff System (TLDHS),
Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receiver (ROVER) technologies to
support Digitally-aided Close Air Support (DaCAS), and the LITENING
advanced targeting pod to better enable the visual acquisition and
identification of ground targets at the terminal control node. These
technologies, combined with significant improvements in standardized
Joint Tactical Air Controller ( JTAC) training, and the development of
Joint TTP for DaCAS have significantly mitigated the likelihood of
repeating early OEF and OIF air-ground fratricide events--but do not by
themselves negate the need for an air-ground CTI technology.
Surface-Air and Air-Air Operations. In surface-air and
air-air arena, the Mark XII Mode 4 IFF system continues to be the
primary system for the identification of U.S. and Coalition friendly
aircraft.
Question. What advancements in technology are in development by the
Army and Marine Corps?
Army Answer. Over the next two years we plan to invest resources in
Science and Technology to mature battlefield identification
technologies that will enable us to address remaining capability gaps
in the areas of dismounted combatants, air-to-ground, and light
vehicles. Promising technology options in development for these
applications include the following: Radio-Based Combat Identification/
Situational Awareness for dismounted combatants, air-to-ground, and
light tactical vehicles; Millimeter Wave Question and Answer technology
for air-to-ground and light tactical vehicles; Laser/Radio Frequency
for light tactical vehicles, Reverse Mark X11A Mode 5 Identification
Friend or Foe and Radio Frequency Tags for air-to-ground and dismounted
combatants; Optical Combat Identification System for dismounted
combatants; Combat Identification Server for dismounted combatants and
air-to-ground; and Joint Battle Command-Platform for improved and
increased battlefield situational awareness. These efforts are underway
to reduce the cost of Millimeter Wave Question and Answer technology
for use on heavy turreted platforms, such as the Stryker, Abrams tank,
and Bradley Fighting Vehicle. We are working with the Marine Corps in
all of these endeavors.
Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps is continuing its pursuit of
Cooperative Target Identification technologies providing our shooters
with a capability to positively identify and sort friends from
potential enemies at the point they are detected on the battlefield.
The following technologies were assessed at the Coalition Combat
Identification Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (CCID ACTD)
Urgent Quest and were identified as technologies warranting further
investment:
Battlefield Target Identification Device (BTID). A STANAG 4579
compliant, coalition interoperable, millimeter wave-based ground-ground
CTI technology providing a shooter-focused interrogation-reply
capability supporting the identification of friendly vehicles in a
gunner's sight in less than 1 second. BTID also provides an inherent
Digital Data Link (DDL) and Data Exchange Mode (DEM) to mitigate SA
latency of equipped coalition vehicles in the immediate vicinity of the
host platform. Current applications of C2/BFT technologies do not allow
for the update rate that is provided by BTID resulting in latent data
unsuitable for split second decision-making. BTID will mitigate this
problem. BTID is the only interrogation and reply technology with
proven military utility and effectiveness in the ground-ground
operational domain. While not formally assessed, air-ground BTID
technologies have been demonstrated at past ACTD events and are
scheduled for formal assessment at the CCID ACTD Bold Quest
Demonstration scheduled for October 2009. Additionally, private
industry has demonstrated a capability to track dismounted combatants
through portable, miniaturized BTID transponders. Based on a successful
military utility assessment at the 2005 CCID ACTD Urgent Quest
demonstration, the Marine Corps has resourced an Army-led joint BTID
acquisition approach endorsed by the Army Marine Corps Board, Joint
Requirements Oversight Council, and Service Secretaries for the ground-
ground BTID technology. Recent reprogramming of FY10 and FY11 BTID
funding by the Army have caused an OSD-directed internal Army review of
its strategy to bring itself back into compliance with the joint BTID
acquisition strategy. Along with the U.S., the United Kingdom, Italy,
Spain, Sweden, France, and Canada have obtained or procured BTID
devices for testing and demonstration purposes, but are awaiting a
decision by the United States as to whether or not to continue to
pursue the technology from a coalition/NATO perspective. The Marine
Corps continues to support and fund a Joint effort with the Army
identified as Component Lead.
Radio Based Combat Identification (RBCI). A software waveform
upgrade to the SINCGARS radio providing an interrogation/reply
capability for an operator selectable geographic point. RBCI provides
an ``area clearance'' capability for indirect fires (i.e. artillery,
mortars, naval gunfire, etc) and CAS--it is not designed to provide a
point-to-point interrogation/reply CTI capability for ground direct-
fire weapons. Based on the results of the 2005 CCID ACTD Urgent Quest
demonstration, the AMCB directed the Services fund the integration of
RBCI transponder (reply) software on all U.S. SINCGARS radios (Army and
Marine Corps) and subsequently the Marine Corps integrate an RBCI
interrogation capability into its Target Location Designation Handoff
System (TLDHS) for indirect fires and CAS area clearance.
Joint and Coalition Technology Development (Air-Ground). In air-
ground operations, the CCID ACTD Bold Quest 09 demonstration scheduled
for October 2009 will assess and/or demonstrate air-ground technologies
with significant joint and coalition interest. Bold Quest 09 will
include five aircraft air-ground CTI technologies (Pod-mounted BTID,
Pod Mounted RBCI, Reverse IFF (Mode 5), Reverse IFF (Mode S), and the
CID server--a net-centric tactical service oriented architecture using
existing equipment and infrastructure to provide requesting aircraft
with 5 closest ground friends in the vicinity of an identified target
or geographical point of interest. Bold Quest 09 assessment results
will be used by the Joint community to support a follow-on Analysis of
Alternatives (AoA) to inform the way-ahead for a joint/coalition air-
ground CTI capability. Joint and Coalition Technology Development
(Surface-Air and Air-Air). In surface-air and air-air operations, U.S
and Coalition forces are currently developing a MARK XII Mode 5 IFF
capability as a replacement for the existing MARK XII Mode 4 capability
which is currently providing a friendly identification capability in
the surface-air and air-air operational environments. Within the U.S.
Joint Services, a Joint Mode 5 fielding schedule has been coordinated
through the JFOCM-chaired Combat Identification-Blue Force tracking
Executive Steering Committee and endorsed by the JROC to establish an
Initial Operating Capability in 2014 and Full Operational Capability in
2020 for the Joint Services.
Question. Is there a technology solution that can be easily shared
with allied military and police forces?
Answer. We continuously share information on our identification
friend or foe technology efforts with the Five Power Senior National
Representatives--Army countries and with our NATO Allies through active
participation in the Working Groups and as a party to NATO
Standardization Agreements. We also work closely with various allies in
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) projects. The
Coalition Combat Identification ACTD is an example of successful
cooperation and sharing of technology with our allies. This U.S.-led
ACTD included the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Canada,
Sweden, Denmark, and Australia, and its goal was to evaluate the
military utility of various identification friend or foe technologies
to minimize fratricide incidents and provide increased combat
effectiveness in Joint, Allied and Coalition operations. The capstone
event for this ACTD was a force-on-force operational demonstration
conducted in fall of 2005 at the United Kingdom's Salisbury Plains Army
Training Facility. On a case-by-case basis friend or foe solutions
developed for U.S. forces may be shared with allied military forces
through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process. This is particularly
true with allies who participate as coalition members with the U.S. in
combat operations in order to achieve interoperability. Recent examples
include the transfer or lease via FMS of numerous night vision devices,
Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below/Blue Force Tracking, Joint
Combat Identification Marking Systems, Ground Laser Target Designators,
Unmanned Aerial Systems (RAVEN), and Forward Looking Infrared
technology. Recipient countries include Canada, Australia, Spain,
Croatia, Albania, Bosnia, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Estonia,
Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Romania, and
Slovakia. In addition, Section 1202 of the National Defense
Authorization Act allows Combatant Commanders to provide command and
control technologies on a loan basis provided directed provisos for
such loans are met. Upon completion of coalition combat operations
these articles are returned to the Combatant Command. Technology
sharing with police forces is much more difficult due to proprietary,
export control, and security classification restrictions.
Marine Corps Answer. The following technologies can be shared with
allied military and/or police forces--Joint Combat Identification
Marking Systems (STANAG 2129 compliant).
Question. Is any such technology now in use by the security forces
of Iraq and Afghanistan?
Army Answer. U.S. friend or foe technologies are not currently in
use by Iraqi and Afghan security forces. Some export variant night
vision equipment and basic Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) technologies
have been or will be transferred to Iraqi and Afghan security forces.
The main purpose of these transfers is to build night fighting
capability for these forces. Identification of battlefield entities as
friend or foe during hours of darkness is a secondary benefit to these
transfers. U.S. forces are well trained in fratricide avoidance
involving Iraqi and Afghan security forces.
Marine Corps Answer. The following technologies are now in use--
Joint Combat Identification Marking Systems (STANAG 2129 compliant).

Biometrics

Question. Biometrics is the science and technology of measuring and
analyzing biological data. It can be used to identify humans by their
fingerprints, hand prints, DNA, facial shape or eye scan.
How is biometric technology employed to assist with force
protection in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Army Answer. With respect to force protection, Army forces
fundamentally use biometrics capabilities to account for and facilitate
population management within an area of operations.
At detainee facilities, host nation police academies, forward
operating bases, and within battlespaces, Soldiers collect biometrics
data on individuals within those areas using both fixed-site base
access systems and handheld devices. Soldiers then transmit those
collections to the DoD biometrics database for potential matching and
subsequent intelligence exploitation. Once vetted, Army forces use that
biometrics data to verify an individual's identity with certitude. If a
biometrics identity is not flagged within their devices following the
vetting process, Soldiers can confidently and safely grant access and
privileges (e.g. training, hiring). If the biometrics identity is
flagged within their devices, Soldiers take the appropriate action
against the flagged individual (e.g. detain, deny access, deny
training) upon encounter.
Marine Corps Answer. Biometric tools are used in combat patrols,
detainee screening, vehicle checkpoints, entry control points, and for
the screening and badging of Iraqi and Afghan Security Forces.
Aggressive employment of biometric systems has restricted the enemy's
freedom of movement appreciably, aiding in the disruption of enemy
operations.
Question. Does the Army employ biometric identification in other
places?
Answer. Yes, Army Special Operations Command (ARSOC), under the
operational control of the joint regional Special Operations Commands
(SOCs), actively employs biometrics worldwide in conjunction with host
nation military forces. In addition, Army conventional forces have
employed biometrics in a force protection capacity during operations in
Bosnia.
Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps is running a pilot project at
MCB Camp Pendleton to determine the utility of biometric technology for
base access. PP&O (PS) is leading this effort.
Question. Looking to the future, what are the additional
applications to use biometrics to contribute to force protection?
Army Answer. Critical to the DoD and Army's biometrics advancement
is the development of ``stand-off'' technology that will allow Army
forces to verify identities from afar. This technology and approach is
more proactive in nature and will allow Soldiers to identify enemy
prior to their advances at check points or gates.
In the future, biometrics employment will also extend to the
protection of Army forces at CONUS and OCONUS home stations. A
biometrically-enabled approach to physical and logical access to
installations, facilities, and networks would provide greater
protection than the badge-based approach that is currently employed. In
conjunction with local and federal law enforcement partners, even those
non-DoD individuals with access to home stations (e.g. deliverers,
contractors) would be biometrically vetted prior to entry.
Marine Corps Answer. As DoD biometric technology and employment
matures, and as global collection of biometric signatures expands, DoD
will realize an unprecedented capability to positively identity, track,
and locate persons of intelligence and security interest.
Question. Does the Army and Marine Corps currently employ any long
range biometric devices? (For example at automobile check points?)
Army Answer. No, Army forces do not currently employ any long-range
biometrics devices. Of course, Army forces possess various long-range
surveillance systems but none are currently equipped with facial
recognition or iris technology. However, on a limited scale, the DoD
Biometrics database does have the capability to match facial images
extracted from video and still photography.
With respect to automobile check points, the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) is currently working with the
Combined Security Transition Command--Afghanistan (CSTC-A) to field a
long-range camera system within Kabul that will have an Automatic
Number Plate Capability, but the system has no biometrics capability.
At the forefront of DoD and Army Research and Development efforts
is the development of ``stand-off'' biometrics systems that will allow
for increased collection, screening, and targeting using facial
recognition and iris technology.
Marine Corps Answer. No, the Marine Corps is closely watching this
technology evolve, however. In particular, iris-on-the-move and at-a-
distance could enable faster throughput at checkpoints.

Countering Sniper

Question. One sniper can seriously disrupt a unit's operation and
mission accomplishment. Countering the efforts of enemy snipers is
accomplished both through material solutions and through better tactics
and training.
What are the technology-based solutions currently in use to detect
and counter snipers?
Army Answer. The materiel solutions currently being fielded as part
of the Army's ongoing Counter Sniper equipping effort are:
Boomerang III Acoustic Gunshot Detection System
SWATS (Soldier Wearable Acoustic Targeting Systems)
Vanguard (Remote Weapon Station integrated with a Gunshot
Detection System)
Handheld Thermal Imagers (Mini Thermal Monocular)
Stabilized and Ruggedized Binoculars
3x Magnifier for the Close Combat Optic
Security Veils (for Guard Towers)
Perimeter Security Veils
Turret Nets
Fast Obscurant Grenades
Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps has and is investigating
several technologies to combat snipers. Currently, there are over 100
Boomerang acoustic counter sniper systems being used by Marines in
theater. This is not a USMC program of record, but one that the Army's
Rapid Equipping Force (REF) has allowed us to use. In addition, we have
investigated a variety of Optical Augmentation devices, and the Ground
Wearable Acoustic Counter Sniper (GWACS) system.
Question. Who in the Army and Marine Corps has the responsibility
for organizing, manning, and equipping the forces in the field for the
counter-sniper fight?
Army Answer. The Secretary of the Army is responsible for the Title
10 functions of Organizing, Supplying, Equipping, and Training Army
Forces. As a general rule, the VCSA approves and the DCS, G-3/5/7
implements organizational design changes proposed by the Commander,
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) for all Army Operating Forces
including incorporating a counter-sniper capability based upon current
and emerging doctrine and an approved requirements determination. To
accomplish this, TRADOC has established the Sniper Defeat Integrated
Capabilities Development Team at the Maneuver Center of Excellence
(MCOE) which consists of representatives from across TRADOC to include
the Combined Arms Center (CAC), Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM),
the Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN), and the Intelligence Center.
This team also coordinates with the ASA(ALT) and Army Materiel Command
for materiel solutions to counter-sniper operations.
Marine Corrps Answer. Currently there is not a dedicated Program
Manager for counter-sniper operations within the Marine Corps Systems
Command, nor has a formal requirement been defined. Within the Marine
Corps Warfighting Lab and Combat Development Directorate, there are
counter-sniper programs that work closely with each other, and both
also stay in contact with the relevant Program Managers in the Marine
Corps Systems Command, such as PM MERS, ICE, Small Arms, and Optics.
Question. Currently, what are the sniper detection devices fielded
to deployed units for individuals, vehicles and fixed bases?
Army Answer. The materiel solutions currently in use that are
designed to detect the location of snipers are:
Boomerang III Acoustic Gunshot Detection System--a vehicle mounted
system that pinpoints incoming small arms fire from an enemy shooter
based on the acoustic signature made by the passing bullet and the
muzzle blast from the rifle which fired it. Since October 2008, the
Army has fielded over 700 Boomerang IIIs to units in Iraq and
Afghanistan and plans to field over 2000 more this year. Boomerangs are
being installed on Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles and
M1151 Up-Armored HMMWVs.
Soldier Wearable Acoustic Targeting System (SWATS): a lightweight,
Soldier portable system which locates hostile rifle fire in the same
manner described above. Since November 2008, the Army has fielded over
1000 SWATS to units that have requested the system through the Army's
Rapid Equipping Force (REF) or via an Operational Needs Statement
(ONS).
Fixed location gunshot detection was not part of the Counter Sniper
equipping effort. The few fixed site gunshot detection systems that
have been employed and assessed in theater did not meet the criteria
for inclusion on the Counter Sniper equipment list.
Marine Corps Answer. Through the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, the
Marine Corps has and is investigating several technologies to combat
snipers. Currently, there are over 100 Boomerang acoustic counter
sniper systems being used by Marines in theater. This is not a USMC
program of record, but one that the Army's Rapid Equipping Force (REF)
has allowed us to use. In addition, we have investigated a variety of
Optical Augmentation devices, and the Ground Wearable Acoustic Counter
Sniper (GWACS) system. Early Attack Reaction System (EARS), a more
technologically mature system manufactured by QinetiQ, has been
employed by the Army as Soldier Wearable Acoustic Targeting System
(SWAT). The Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Combat Development
Directorate is currently investigating if the requirement the Army has
generated for that program could be used by the Marine Corps as well.
We also continue to actively investigate potential new systems through
industry, academia, and other agencies within the government and
Department Of Defense in our efforts to find the most cutting edge
technology to protect our Marines from the sniper threat.
Question. Please describe the current threat to U.S. forces in
Afghanistan and Iraq due to snipers.
Answer. ------.
Question. Is sniper detection equipment available for training at
home station?
Army Answer. Optical-based sniper detection equipment, such as
hand-held thermal imagery devices and stabilized and ruggedized
binoculars, are part of unit equipment when authorized by their
modified table of organization and equipment, and as such, are
available for use during a unit's home station tactics training.
However, the more advanced acoustics-based sniper detection equipment
systems currently being used in Iraq and Afghanistan are not yet
available in sufficient quantities to support training at home station.
To date, all initial commercial-off-the-shelf purchases of
acoustics-based vehicle-mounted and individually-worn sniper detection
equipment systems were fielded directly to tactical units in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Initial training on the systems fielded to date is
accomplished through new equipment training teams. For all subsequent
training, it is conducted by outbound units training inbound units
prior to their transition of authority for the mission.
Marine Corps Answer. Yes, boomerang acoustic counter sniper systems
currently being utilized and tested by Marines are available for
training. In addition to technology the Marine Corps has implemented a
program that identifies and teaches skills to make Marines more
efficient ``hunters'' in all environments, especially urban. The goal
is to improve operational effectiveness, while reducing casualties.
Marine Corps Combat Development Command directs the development of the
Combat Hunter Program to ``be the hunter, not the hunted''. The Marine
Corps War fighting Lab brought in Subject Matter experts such as
hunters and police officers to teach Marines to become more efficient
``Hunters''. Civilian experts with big game hunting, tracking, and
profiling experience supported the experiments.
The mission of Combat Hunter, which is now a training program
available for deploying units, is the creation of a mindset through
integration of enhanced observation, combat profiling, and combat
tracking in order to produce a more ethically minded, tactically
cunning, and lethal Marine better prepared to succeed across the range
of military operations.
Marine snipers are used as counter-snipers and as such are well
suited for detecting and engaging enemy snipers. One of the 0317 Marine
Sniper Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) tasks in the Training and
Readiness (T&R) manual is to conduct counter sniper operations. This is
taught as a learning objective in the USMC Weapons Training Battalion
Scout Sniper Team Leader Course, and it is an advanced 2000 level
skill.
Question. Please explain how the Army coordinates the efforts of
urgent war time fielding efforts and regular order procurement
programs.
Army Answer. The Army has two processes which act as linkages
between the equipping efforts required for current operations and the
institutionalized acquisition programs which are focused on
modernization and transformation.
The Senior Budget Requirements and Program Board (BRP) is focused
on coordinating Army staff elements in identifying and resourcing
equipping solutions to meet the validated requirements of currently
deployed and future deploying units to Iraq and Afghanistan. The
resourcing decisions made by the BRP involve numerous ongoing
acquisition programs and items that are in sustainment. The Army's
acquisition community and the Army Materiel Command (AMC) work very
closely with the BRP to ensure all war time equipping requirements are
met.
The Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition (CDRT) process
identifies non-standard systems (commercial-off-the-shelf and non-
developmental items) which were inserted for limited use in current
operations that should become standard Army equipment and transition
into institutionalized acquisition programs via the Joint Capabilities
Integration Development System (JCIDS). The CDRT monitors the
nonstandard equipment which is inserted into Iraq and Afghanistan in
order to bridge capability gaps identified by the requesting unit(s).
Based on the feedback of the unit and other operational assessments,
the CDRT council makes recommendations to senior Army leadership on
whether the technology should remain in theater as a sustainment item,
terminate, or transition into a formal acquisition program.
For example, there are two potential acquisition programs that
involve Sniper Detection technology which came about as a result of the
CDRT process. The Gunshot Detection System and the Individual Gunshot
Detector programs now have JCIDS compliant requirements documents and
will compete for funding in the FY12-17 Program Objective Memorandum
(POM). These programs were the result of the CDRT council carefully
evaluating the feasibility of earlier versions of acoustic gunshot
detection systems and recommending to Army decision makers that it
become an enduring capability.
Marine Corps Answer. In addition to close coordination with Army
for counter-sniper solutions. We also continue to actively investigate
potential new systems through industry, academia, and other agencies
within the government and Department Of Defense in our efforts to find
the most cutting edge technology to protect our Marines from the sniper
threat. Both the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab and the Marine Corps
Systems Command work closely with the Army as well as other DoD
organizations to investigate, test and procure technologies to help
combat the enemy sniper threat.
Question. Is there a plan to issue sniper detection equipment to
all Army and Marine Corps units including National Guard and Reserve
units?
Army Answer. Yes. The equipment which is being fielded to units in
Iraq and Afghanistan as part of the ongoing Counter Sniper equipping
effort is fielded in accordance with the priority established by the
local command. Thus, the units which receive the equipment may be an
Active, National Guard, or Reserve unit if the local command determines
that unit meets the criteria for receiving Counter Sniper equipment.
Furthermore, Counter Sniper equipment is accounted for as Theater
Provided Equipment (TPE) and will therefore transfer from losing unit
to gaining unit during Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority
(regardless of what component the units are). The Marines have counter-
sniper equipment in the. field for assessment but have not yet begun to
issue these items across their deployed force.
Marine Corps Answer. Currently, there are over 100 Boomerang
acoustic counter sniper systems being used by Marines in theater. We
are also investigating a man wearable acoustic counter sniper system
called the GWACS. A more technologically mature system manufactured by
QinetiQ called EARS has been adopted by the Army as a program of
record. The Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Combat Development
Directorate is currently investigating if the requirement the Army has
generated for that program could be used by the Marine Corps as well.

Lost Weapons

Question. In recent testimony before the Subcommittee on National
Security and Foreign Affairs, of the Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform of the House of Representatives, a witness from the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported on the weaknesses in
the system to maintain accountability for weapons provided to the
Afghan National Security Forces, (the Afghan National Army and Afghan
National Police). From 2002 to 2008 the United States Government, with
the U.S. Army and Navy as action agents, purchased and transferred to
the Afghan Security Forces over 242,000 light weapons and small arms,
at a cost of about $120 million. Other countries have provided another
130,000 weapons for the Afghan National Security Forces. However,
lapses in accountability occurred throughout the supply chain. The GAO
found that the Army and Combined Security Transition Command--
Afghanistan did not maintain complete records for an estimated 87,000
of the 242,000 weapons, and that it is impossible to determine their
disposition or location.
General, can you explain for the Committee the loss of
accountability for 87,000 weapons that were provided to the Afghan
security forces?
Army Answer. There are two accountability issues regarding the
87,000 weapons reported in the Jan 2009 GAO audit (GAO-09-267). The
first is serial number accountability and the second is physical
accountability of the weapons in Afghanistan. The Army can only address
the serial number accountability as the physical accountability of
weapons is not under the control of the Army Acquisition Community and
should be addressed by Central Command and the Combined Security
Transition Command--Afghanistan (CSTC-A).
In the case of some 46,000 weapons acquisitions for Afghanistan,
the requirement for serial number accountability and tracking was not
included in Army contract provisions let by the U.S. Army Security
Assistance Command (USASAC). Due to this oversight, serial numbers were
not provided by the commercial brokers with shipments of these weapons,
and not entered to the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program (DODSASP)
registry. USASAC has since gone back to the contractors and received
all the missing serial numbers for the Afghanistan contracts. All
future contracts will contain, as a condition of the contract, a
requirement for the vendor to provide serial numbers at time of
shipment. USASAC is providing CSTC-A with all serial numbers and is
working to ensure the entry of all serial numbers into the DODSASP
registry as required by regulations.
Question. Is it likely that some of these weapons may now be in use
by the Taliban and others who regularly strike at our Soldiers and
Marines and our allies?
Answer. The Army does not have that data.
Question. How have U.S. forces improved accountability for weapons
transferred to Afghan Security Forces?
Answer. The Army does not have oversight accountability of weapons
provided to the Afghan Security Forces. As we understand, Combined
Security Transition Command--Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is currently
recording and tracking the serial numbers of all U.S. procured weapons.
For any additional information, Commander, U.S. Central Command can
provide the most current data.

Sensors

Question. The Army is proceeding with plans to take technology that
is ready now in the Future Combat Systems program, and ``spin it out'',
that is, field it ahead of the rest of FCS to Infantry Brigade Combat
Teams. One of the items to be spun out is ``Unattended Sensors'', both
tactical and urban.
What is the difference between a tactical sensor and an urban
sensor?
Answer. The Tactical-Unattended Ground Sensors (T-UGS) can be used
to perform various mission tasks including perimeter defense,
surveillance, target acquisition, situational awareness and Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear early warning. The gateway nodes
organize and maintain the cluster; collect, process, and correlate
sensor data; and automatically report preprocessed contact and hazard
data to the Common Operating Picture (COP) via Joint Tactical Radio
Systems (JTRS) links to the network. The T-UGS clusters will be
distributed initially through soldier emplacement and ultimately via
unmanned ground and air platforms.
The Urban-Unattended Ground Sensors (U-UGS) is a network-enabled
reporting system that brings force protection into an urban setting and
residual protection for cleared areas or for other Military Operations
in Urban Terrain (MOUT). U-UGS will be hand employed by Soldiers or by
robotic vehicles to monitor and provide early warning and situational
awareness. U-UGS provide remote monitoring and warning capability to
the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and small unit (platoon) in a MOUT
environment for securing areas such as tunnels, caves, sewers,
structures, and buildings. The U-UGS system will be used by the BCT to
support dismounted operations in urban environments via intrusion
alerts for closed areas that have been cleared of enemy soldiers, by
monitoring urban congestion points such as corridors and stairwells;
and guarding other avenues of approach such as sewers, culverts, and
tunnels. Consisting of small, lightweight, and inexpensive sensors and
associated processing and networked communications assets, the U-UGS
system will support BCT operations by providing efficient, economical,
and persistent coverage of areas of special interest to the BCT
commanders. Inexpensive local networked communications will be
interoperable with the JTRS network at the U-UGS gateway node to
provide the urban situational awareness.
Question. How are the new FCS sensors different from the unattended
sensors used during the Vietnam War?
Answer. There are significant differences between FCS sensors and
those used during the Vietnam War. The drivers for these differences
revolve around the advances in technology development, computer
processing, and Battle Command software being used in the development
of the FCS network. Rather than a standalone sensor, the FCS sensors
are networked and provide the Soldiers with enhanced situational
awareness.
UGS systems were developed to monitor the movement of enemy
personnel. The original sensors were actually air-dropped radio
sonobouys that were adapted by the U.S. Navy for ground use by
replacing existing hydrophones with microphones and geophones (seismic
sensors). These seismic/acoustic sensors were the only type to receive
widespread deployment during the Vietnam War; these were produced in
hand implanted and air-dropped versions, both containing common
modules. Without modern electronics these sensors were easily
susceptible to background noise. While able to detect footsteps and
vehicles at ranges in excess of 30 meters, false alarms were often
generated by events such as aircrafts overhead, wind, thunder and rain.
To combat these problems the several sensors were planted in strings
(lines), real targets would be expected to set off the sensors in
sequence, while background interference would set off all the sensors
simultaneously.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Source: Investigation of an Unattended Wireless Ground Sensor
System; George F. Hahn Department of Electrical and Computer
Engineering, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FCS sensors include: Ground Sensor Suite, Air Sensor Suite and
UGS. Combinations of these sensors provide the FCS (BCT) with the
ability to ``see first'' and provide the warfighter with actionable
information.
The FCS UGS will provide a variety of remote sensing capabilities
intended to enhance the commanders' tactical situational awareness and
intelligence picture. As an integral component of the FCS layered
sensor network, the remotely deployable UGS will provide enhanced
threat warning, situational awareness and force protection in both
tactical and urban environments for extended periods. FCS UGS provides
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance/Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear (ISR/CBRN) awareness to the BCT of areas not
covered by manned/unmanned ground/air vehicles. It also detects and
locates intruders, monitors cleared rooms during structure clearing
operations (protecting the rear), and monitors cleared structures for
re-entry.
Question. Are these sensors in use in Iraq or Afghanistan?
Answer. Currently FCS UGS are not used in Iraq or Afghanistan.
While there are other UGS systems currently employed in Operation Iraqi
Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom, FCS UGS are designed to meet the
FCS Net-Centric Key Performance Parameter as part of the overall FCS
System of Systems solution. Critical command and control, fusion, and
other FCS Battle Command functionality built on the FCS-unique System
of Systems Common Operating Environment are an integral part of the FCS
UGS systems. The Army Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence has
determined that FCS UGS are the Army's UGS Program of Record, and that
all UGS-related requirements should be provided to and synchronized
within the FCS program.
Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager FCS in conjunction
with Program Manager FCS have been actively involved in applying
lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom
UGS. Consequently, the FCS T-UGS program has adopted a new form factor
(NFF) design that is a smaller hand emplaced variant of the original T-
UGS design. These NFF T-UGS will also incorporate increased battery
life technology and radio range extension nodes. This smaller design is
a result of lessons learned in theater.
Question. How will these new sensors contribute to force protection
in the field or in base camp?
Answer. U-UGS provides the BCT enhanced situational awareness and
force protection in urban environments. The U-UGS provides remote
monitoring and warning capability for the current force small unit
(section) in caves and in urban environments such as tunnels, sewers,
structures, and inside of buildings. The U-UGS will be used by the BCT
to support dismounted operations in urban environments. The U-UGS
network will support current force operations by providing efficient,
economical, and persistent coverage in urban areas and caves.
Utilization of both the T-UGS and U-UGS systems greatly enhances
the Soldiers force protection by denying enemy forces freedom of
maneuver and early detection capabilities.
Question. When will the first Army Brigade Combat Team receive
fielding of these tactical and urban unattended sensors?
Answer. Fielding of T-UGS/U-UGS to Spin Out Infantry Brigade Combat
Teams begins in FY11.
Question. What prevents enemy forces from picking up our sensors,
or booby trapping them so as to harm our soldiers when they are
recovering a sensor?
Answer. The UGS sensor will send an alert to the Common Operating
Picture identifying the approach of enemy forces or individuals into a
sensor field by various acoustic, seismic, magnetic and imaging
sensors. These sensors are also used to characterize the approach of
the target. However, if disturbed, the FCS UGS incorporates anti-tamper
technology alerting the FCS network and renders the ``disturbed'' node
useless. The disturbed node must be recovered and sent back to a Depot/
Contractor repair facility for rework before it can be re-issued for a
future employment.

Common Access Cards

Question. One of the key components of force protection is
controlling access to military bases or sensitive facilities within the
bases. An area of special emphasis is controlling the access of non-
federal, contractor employees. Access control becomes a critical area
of force protection at forward deployed bases where the majority of
contractor employees may be host country or third country nationals.
Gentlemen, how do you rate your service for base access control both in
the United States and at forward deployed locations?
Army Answer. The Army does not prescribe guidance or policy on
installation or base access. This would fall under the auspices of The
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Intelligence and US Central
Command.
Marine Corps Answer. Marine Corps forces that are forward deployed
maintain a strong security posture at bases and outposts. The
combination of manpower, technology, tactics and Military Working Dogs
give base security forces a demonstrable capacity to control access and
screen personnel and equipment. Marines employ technology with proven
performance, including biometric systems, surveillance systems,
personnel and cargo scanning systems and barrier systems. The
continuous application of Random Antiterrorism Measures by commanders
ensures that: 1) Marines keep terrorists and insurgents tactically off-
balance and 2) we remain ``hard to kill''.
USMC installations in the United States have also used the same
security capabilities. The continuous application of Random
Antiterrorism Measures present a number of security challenges to those
who may wish to harm us. That said, there are a number of challenges
for USMC installations in CONUS. These include, but are not limited to,
the age of the entry control facilities, continued growth in and around
our installations that limits expansion and the requirement for
substantial infrastructure investment in order to implement the most
effective access control procedures.
Question. The primary access control tool in use at our military
bases throughout the world to include forward based facilities and
outposts in Iraq and Afghanistan, is the Common Access Card (CAC). The
Department of Defense Inspector General, in recent testimony before
this Committee, reported serious concerns about the use of the CAC
Card. Thousands of cards were not affiliated with a contract and
thousands more did not have expiration dates linked to contract
completion. The IG testified that contractors could approve and issue a
CAC card which grants an individual unfettered access to military bases
with no government oversight. One of the contractors who had issued CAC
cards is KBR. The Inspector General reported that 39,000 applications
for a CAC had been approved without the required background checks and
about 212,000 contractor personnel had email addresses that
misclassified the contractor personnel as U.S. Government personnel.
The IG testified that an individual who had no affiliation to DoD (as
either an employee or contractor) obtained a CAC and stole 10 million
gallons of fuel from Iraq. This misidentification is also a potential
security risk because individuals who obtain CAC cards could
misrepresent themselves both in person and on DoD networks to
improperly obtain sensitive information.
Gentlemen, are you familiar with the various problems the Inspector
General identified with the issuing, use, and termination of Common
Access Cards?
Army Answer. Yes. The Army was briefed regarding the DoD Inspector
General Audit, Project No. D2007-D000LA-0199.001, Controls Over the
Contractor Common Access Card Life Cycle.
Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps is aware of the findings with
regards to issuance, use and termination of CACs to contractors. The
Marine Corps has found no evidence that the Inspector General findings
have occurred within the Marine Corps, however in light of these
findings we have undertaken an aggressive audit and training initiative
to ensure that those government personnel in positions to sponsor and
issue CACs are abiding by and understand DoD and Marine Corps policy.
Question. What is your service doing to get control of Common
Access Cards and base access control?
Army Answer. The Army does not prescribe guidance or policy on
installation or base access. This would fall under the auspices of The
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Intelligence and US Central
Command.
Marine Corps Answer. The Marine Corps has consistently applied DoD,
DoN and Marine Corps policy with regards to the CAC program and in
doing so has maintained program control. The Marine Corps has
implemented internal program reviews (audits) to ensure that:
1. The Marine Corps has appropriate policy for the issuance, use
and termination of CACs, which is aligned with DoD policy.
2. All Marine Corps Contractor Verification System (CVS) Trusted
Agents (TA) are government civil servant or Marines, as sponsorship for
a CAC is an inherently governmental responsibility.
3. The Marine Corps applies consistent and effective corrective
action. The Marine Corps has a wide range of possible corrective
actions that may be taken, including training, revocation of
credentials/access, and punitive action for non-compliance with DoD and
Marine Corps policy.
With regard to base access control policy, the Marine Corps
established a standard baseline installation access control policy
throughout the Marine Corps. MARADM1N #533/08 identifies the Common
Access Card (CAC) as the primary token for all Marine Corps
installation access control systems. While access control systems must
use the CAC as the primary token, possession of a CAC does not
automatically equate to installation access. The CAC, as an
authentication credential, identifies the individual and should be used
in conjunction with access control policy and procedures to implement a
comprehensive installation access control program.
Question. Do you agree that the best fence and most fortified entry
points are rendered useless is access if given to, or perhaps sold to,
an adversary?
Army Answer. Yes.
Marine Corps Answer. And in light of that threat, the Marine Corps
continues to look for technological solutions that will enhance the
capabilities of the staff at our access control points in an effort to
effectively screen persons attempting to enter our bases, deny
unauthorized access/entry, and simultaneously maintain safe and
efficient movement of authorized personnel.
Question. Should there be service-wide, or Department of Defense-
wide, guidance for the issuance, use and termination of contractor
Common Access Cards?
Army Answer. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Personnel and Readiness) DTM 08-003, ``Next Generation Common Access
Card (CAC) Implementation Guidance'', dated 1 Dec 08 provides guidance
for the issuance, use and termination of contractor Common Access
Cards. This guidance will be further amplified when DoD publishes the
required DODI.
Marine Corps Answer. Both the DoD and Marine Corps have published
policy for the issuance, use and termination of contractor CACs. The
Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness (USD (P&R)) has
published Directive Type Memorandum (DTM) 08-003, ``Next Generation
Common Access Card (CAC) Implementation Guidance'' provides the
overarching directive for the DoD. In conjunction with the USD (P&R)
DTM 08-003, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps has published
Marine Administrative Message (MARADMIN) 624/08 ``MCBUL 5512. Homeland
Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12 Compliance Within the Marine
Corps'' detailing the requirements for issuance of CACs to contractors
within the Marine Corps.
Question. Did someone in the US Military give KBR authority to
decide who would receive Common Access Cards?
a. If so, who was that person?
Army Answer. The Army Human Resources Command provided the Army
Material Command (AMC) Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP)
the capability to issue Common Access Cards (CAC) to DoD Contractors
deploying in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom
(OEF/OIF). This authority was given under the stipulation that CAC
issuance would be in accordance with DoD policies in effect at the time
and under government supervision and oversight.
b. When was the decision made? Has anyone been reprimanded for this
decision to hand over the CAC vetting process to KBR?
Answer. The decision to provide a CAC issuance capability to LOGCAP
was made following a formal request of 19 June 2003 from the Program
Manager for LOGCAP. LOGCAP program management was responsible for
ensuring that background vetting was accomplished in accordance with
policies in effect at the time.
Marine Corps Answer. We have found no evidence that the Marine
Corps gave KBR the authority to decide who would receive CACs. The
Marine Corps follows DoD policy as issued by OUSD P&R with regard to
the vetting and issuance of the common access card (CAC). Issuance of a
Common Access Card to a contractor requires sponsorship by a Marine or
government civilian employee. Issuance of the CAC at a Marine Corps ID
Card Facility is accomplished by military, civil service or contracted
employees supporting that facility. The issuance process requires a
minimum of a two (2) person validation:
1. The government official acting as the sponsor through the
Contractor Verification System (CVS) (CVS Trusted Agent (TA)),
The Real-time Automated Personnel Identification System Verifying
Official, who validates the identity documentation and issues the CAC.
The CAC can only be issued to individuals who meet the vetting
requirements; have a government sponsor; have a valid record in the
Defense Eligibility Enrollment Reporting System (DEERS), and presents
two forms of valid identification, one being a government issued
picture ID, to the Verifying Official for validation and scanning as
part of the card issuance process.
Question. Are KBR employees still approving CACs independent of DoD
review?
Answer. No. Eligibility and verification for contractor CACs issued
at KBR's Houston, TX deployment facility are processed by a government
Trusted Agent (TA) via the Contractor Verification System (CVS).
Marine Corps Answer. We have found no evidence that KBR employees
are approving CACs independent of DoD review within the Marine Corps.
Question. If no formal DoD decision was made to give KBR authority
to issue CACs, has anyone from KBR been held accountable for
overstepping their approved role in granting the cards?
Army Answer. KBR never had the authority to issue CAC independent
of LOGCAP management and oversight.
Marine Corps Answer. This question is not applicable to the Marine
Corps.
Question. If KBR did not have DoD approval to decide who would
receive CACs, were DoD personnel in the field aware that KBR employees
were issuing the cards in violation of their contract and DoD security
guidelines?
Army Answer. The Army Human Resources Command provided the Army
Materiel Command (AMC) Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP)
the capability to issue Common Access Cards (CAC) to DoD Contractors
deploying in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom
(OEF/OIF). This authority was given under the stipulation that CAC
issuance would be in accordance with DoD policies in effect at the time
and under government supervision and oversight.
The decision to provide a CAC issuance capability to LOGCAP was
made following a formal request of 19 June 2003 from the Program
Manager for LOGCAP. LOGCAP program management was responsible for
ensuring that background vetting was accomplished in accordance with
policies in effect at the time.
Marine Corps Answer. This question is not applicable to the Marine
Corps.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.]
Tuesday, March 17, 2009.

AIR FORCE MILITARY PERSONNEL

WITNESSES

HON. CRAIG W. DUEHRING, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, MANPOWER
AND RESERVE AFFAIRS
LIEUTENANT GENERAL RICHARD Y. NEWTON, III, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF,
MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Introduction

Mr. Rothman. The Committee will come to order. This morning
the Committee will discuss Air Force Personnel. We are pleased
to welcome the Honorable Craig Duehring, Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force For Manpower and Reserve Affairs; and Lieutenant
General Richard Newton, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for
Manpower and Personnel.
The realities of the world have changed dramatically and
continue to change daily. In response to these changes, the Air
Force is embracing a collaborative and supportive role in the
types of ground operations being conducted in Iraq and
Afghanistan. In general, Air Force leaders have adjusted
quickly by developing efforts to meet challenges not
traditionally borne by Air Force personnel.
The Air Force has stepped up to meet these challenges.
However, this places a greater demand on its personnel. Unlike
the Marines and Army, which are both expanding, the Air Force
has a force-shaping plan in effect to reduce personnel.
However, the Air Force ended the reductions to meet these
new requirements. Air Force leaders are working toward the
right mix of airmen, and the committee is very interested in
what force-shaping measures the Air Force will use to recruit
the right people, train them properly, maintain high standards,
and grow experience in a manageable way.
We look forward to the testimony and to a spirited and
informative question-and-answer session.
And now, before we hear your testimony, gentlemen, I would
like to call upon Congressman Frelinghuysen, my colleague from
New Jersey, who was the senior member here on the Republican
side.

Remarks of Mr. Frelinghuysen

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The record should note that both the ranking and the
chairman, probably for the first time in history, are leading
the debate on this public hearing. So thank you very much for
the recognition.
And welcome to both of our distinguished guests.
Secretary Duehring, I note, from looking at your resume,
your distinguished career. You were awarded the Silver Star;
flew over 800 missions in Vietnam, that is one hell of a lot of
missions.
And I want to recognize your long public service, as well,
General Newton, thank you for your service.
I am told that the Air Force has been in a continual global
combat engagement since 1990, and I am sure that, over the
years, it has been to differing degrees of severity, but it is
an extraordinary fact nonetheless. Despite this unprecedented
operation tempo, the Air Force continues to reach most of its
recruiting and retention goals, an impressive achievement. Yet
I know that several areas remain difficult, such as medical
professionals and certain enlisted retention zones.
I look forward, knowing that there is a renewed focus on
the nuclear enterprise and additional Intelligence,
Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) mission that have caused you
to reserve planning reductions to your end-strength numbers, a
process that is neither quick nor cheap.
But like the Chairman this morning, I welcome you here for
this very important hearing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Congressman Frelinghuysen.
Now, Secretary Duehring, we understand that you and General
Newton will each make a brief opening statement. You may
proceed. Your entire statement will be placed on the record.
And let me echo my friend and colleague from New Jersey, we are
honored to have such two distinguished gentlemen and heroes
here today. We hope that your service in your present
capacities will be the crowning jewels of each of your
respective distinguished and remarkable careers.
Mr. Secretary.

Summary Statement of Secretary Duehring

Mr. Duehring. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You set a very high
standard now.
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you for this
opportunity to speak with you today about our United States Air
Force's military personnel.
I want to take this opportunity to thank the members of
this Committee and the entire House of Representatives for your
unwavering support of our men and women in uniform and their
families.
Our Airmen have been continuously deployed and globally
engaged in combat missions for over 18 straight years. While we
remain committed to winning today's fight in preparing for
tomorrow's challenges, we have further refined our priorities.
We are focusing on reinvigorating the Air Force nuclear
enterprise; partnering with the joint and coalition team to win
today's fight; developing and caring for Airmen and their
families; modernizing our air and space inventories,
organizations, and training; and recapturing acquisition
excellence.
In order to continue engaging both current and emerging
global threats, our recruiting mission goes beyond simply
finding the right numbers. It includes ensuring the right
quality and the right skills are present in potential
candidates so they can effectively support the Air Force's
diverse mission.
We also continue to invest in retaining the high caliber
men and women that we recruited. In fiscal year 2008, overall
active duty enlisted and Air Force reserve, enlisted and
officer retention rates finished below annual goals. While the
active duty officer corps and the National Guard met or
exceeded all of other aggregate of retention goals.
The first quarter of fiscal year 2009 shows overall active
duty retention is trending slightly upward. But some of our
critical stressed specialties continue to experience
significant shortfalls. And we continue to rely heavily on
bonuses and quality-of-life initiatives to resolve these
shortages.
With the heightened operations tempo we are experiencing,
we remain mindful of the increased stressed placed on our
Airmen and their families. The Air Force employs a variety of
screening tools to monitor Airmen's health, to enhance
detection of psychological issues, and provide for early
intervention when required. Almost 13 years ago, we created the
Air Force Suicide Prevention program, which centers on
effective education, detection and treatment for persons at
risk. While we are making significant progress on suicide and
mental health issues within the Air Force, we continue to work
with our sister services to make our programs more effective.
Today's Airmen are clearly in this fight. As Air Force
leaders, we are committed to doing our part to manage end-
strength efficiently to maximize capability, recruiting and
retaining the highest quality and diverse Airmen, while
continuing to focus on the health, well-being and readiness of
our Airmen and their families. We appreciate your continued
support to the men and women of our Air Force, and I look
forward to your questions.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
General.

Summary Statement of General Newton

General Newton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
committee, I also want to thank you for this opportunity to
discuss our efforts to ensure we attract and recruit and
develop and retain a high quality and diverse fighting force.
Today Airmen are fully engaged in joint operations across
the globe and stand prepared for rapid response to asymmetric
as well as to conventional conflicts.
The Air Force is totally committed to winning today's fight
with the innovative combat spirit our airmen demonstrate on a
daily basis regardless of the task. As of this morning, we have
approximately 38,000 Airmen, active duty, Guard, and Reserve,
deployed in support of global operations, and approximately
217,000, total force airmen supporting all 10 combatant
commanders.
These airmen are doing amazing things for the joint
warfighting team. Our aim is to improve capability by tapping
into all available recruiting and retention sources so we do
not lose the war on talent. As we prepare for an uncertain
future, we are transforming the force to ensure we are the
right size and shape to meet emerging global threats with
joint- and battle-trained airmen. This requires a commitment to
invest in our people and our quality-of-life programs.
This commitment includes continued support for special
paying allowances to address specific recruiting and retention
concerns. And for example, the Air Force continues to develop
both accession retention incentives to ensure the right mix of
health professionals. Additionally, our most critical
warfighting skills require special focus on retention due to
the demands of the high operations tempo placed on Air Force
airmen who perform such duties as para rescue and combat
controller, tactical air control party and explosive ordinance
disposal.
Just as important, we are committed to taking care of
families and wounded warriors as an essential piece of
retaining a highly effective force. Special emphasis has been
placed on our reintegration efforts for our returning deployers
and their families to ensure that we practically tackle any
difficulties that they may experience. Our airmen and family
readiness centers along with professionals in the medical
community work together as a seamless team at the base level to
meet the needs of our airmen and their family members.
In conclusion, our airmen are integral to the success of
the joint warfighter while executing the Air Force mission and
keeping the Air Force on a vector for success against any
potential threats. Again, thank you for your unfailing support
to the men and women and our families in our Air Force, and I
look also forward to your questions.
[The joint statement of Secretary Duehring and General
Newton follows:]

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END-STRENGTH NUMBERS

Mr. Rothman. Thank you, General.
I think, if one reads the biography of each of these
distinguished gentlemen, they will be extremely impressed. It
was noted that the secretary flew 800 missions, but I just
thought I would mention that Lieutenant General Newton was a
command pilot with over 2,900 flying hours in aircraft such as
the B-2, B-1B, B-52 and T-38 as well.
But now you gentlemen have different responsibilities.
If you could, Secretary Duehring, explain what the end-
strength number is that you project and the budget projects for
the 2010 fiscal year and how you got there.
Mr. Duehring. Yes, sir, I will give you some history as to
how we got there. A few years ago, I believe it was in 2005,
when the previous secretary and chief of staff determined that
the Air Force would reduce 40,000 people, and our new goal then
was 316,600 people. We began ramping down at that time.
About this time last year January, February, the Army and
then the Marine Corps announced that they were increasing their
numbers. And of course, because we are tied so closely to what
they do, we have to provide the air lift and a lot of other
support, we reassessed what our bottom line should be. And our
best guess at that point started building on some of the
missions, cyber mission, cyber mission came back up; we had the
incident with the nuclear weapons, of course, we needed to get
our arms around again, just regular support for the Army and
Marine Corps caused us to reevaluate exactly where we were.
They took this discussion to the Secretary of Defense, and
in June of last year he said, okay, you are now pretty close to
330,000, and why don't you stop right in here? What happens
when you have taken actions to decrease total end strength is,
you can't turn it off overnight. It is sort of like an airplane
in the descent; you have to pull back, and it is still going to
go down a little ways, so we did. We are back up to about
329,000 plus change right now. It caused a little problem in
that we needed to fund that, and we needed to find funding out
of the existing budgets at that time, because we were planning
on going down, and we had always spent those dollars.
The final answer to your question, Mr. Chairman, is really
in the fiscal year 2010 Presidential budget, which will be
coming out very shortly, but we are pretty close to where we
will probably end up. I do want to make the point that we
didn't add back people that we had planned on removing. We
built up in these other areas because of new missions that we
saw. So it as an adjustment like that.
Mr. Rothman. In my opening remarks, I mentioned that there
were activities that the Air Force was providing that were not
part of its traditional mission. We spoke earlier, but I think,
for the record, I would like to hear the numbers of Air Force
personnel doing those nontraditional things and what those
constitute.

NON-TRADITIONAL MISSION

Mr. Duehring. Yes. I have some of those at my fingertips.
The average over the last 5 years of the numbers of Airmen who
have been deployed for OIF-OEF tasking has been about 80,000
per year. Now we do a check, we checked it this morning again
to make sure we had the latest information. About 38,000
deployed at any given time, and if you are talking about
CENTCOM, of that number, 28,000 are in CENTCOM.
And you have to remember that we have a lot of commitments
around the world in other areas as well. We have about 4,000
people who are involved in what we call Joint Expeditionary
Tasking (JET). JET used to be called in-lieu-of tasking. In-
lieu-of tasking doesn't really tell what we are doing. In-lieu-
of tasking sounds like we are there for a moment and we are
pulling back out. That is not the impression we want to give,
because we are very much part of the joint team, the combined
team, the allied team. And so we are going to stay as long as
we have to.
Now, in addition, what people don't see is that we have a
lot of folks who, in effect, fight from home station. The Army
has to deploy if it is going to go fight a battle. The Marine
Corps deploys. The Navy takes the fleet and goes over the
horizon. The Air Force, in many, many, many cases, to the tune
of about in 217,000 people, actually fight to one degree or
another from their home station. Now this could be folks in the
space business who are monitoring or keeping the satellites,
the global-positioning satellites, in proper orbit. This could
be the new Global Strike Command that we are setting up. This
could be the cyber programs that we are setting up as well. And
we discussed earlier some of the intelligence programs that,
because of the capabilities we have now, allow us to bring
information back here to be evaluated. It is just an increase
in technology, which by the way is good for us, because we
don't have to deploy more people. It is cheaper, plus they like
sleeping in their own beds every night.
Mr. Rothman. That includes operation of the UAVs from here.
Mr. Duehring. It does. We have a number of bases. That is
going on as we speak.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you.
General, did you want to respond to something.
General Newton. Sir, if I may, just quickly, again, as the
secretary alluded to, our 217,000 Airmen as they are directly
in line in support of providing capabilities to all 10
combatant commands, keep in mind that, again, as we are
engaged, we are engaged across a spectrum from Operation Noble
Eagle which began on the morning of September 11th, 2001, we
have flown 54,000 Operation Noble Eagle missions since then; to
providing capabilities to General Petraeus in the Central
Command region, as we have highlighted as well; all the way to
the high end with regard to providing strategic deterrence for
this Nation.
So it is, again, as our Airmen, we are an expeditionary
force, again, with the challenges that we face in the 21st
century, we see ourselves not only fighting from in garrison or
in place but also from a deployed location as well. So it spans
again across a spectrum of capabilities but also conflicts for
this Nation.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you.
Congressman Frelinghuysen.

AIR FORCE NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
One of the other hats I wore, I was ranking on Energy and
Water, and I have a keen interest in the Air Force nuclear
enterprise. In his report on the state of the military nuclear
enterprise, former Secretary Jim Schlesinger said, ``The
decision that junior officers assigned initially to ICBMs will
spend the remainder of their careers in the space mission area,
and thus outside the broader Air Force, both devalue the
mission area and have the effect of reducing the depth of Air
Force nuclear experience, especially among mid-career and
senior officers.''
I would say, with apologies to General Newton, I think
everybody who joins the Air Force wants to fly via a fighter
pilot. What are we doing relative to changing the attitude that
many felt has been somewhat current about getting into those
parts of the nuclear and space enterprise which are very
essential to our national security?
General Newton. Chairman, if I may, I am speaking as an
experienced bomber pilot from our Strategic Air Command days,
and also the son of a bomber pilot, as well. But our chief of
staff and our secretary have put as a top priority
reinvigorating the nuclear enterprise of the U.S. Air Force. As
we discussed previously, when we had the unauthorized weapons
transfer back in the summer of 2007, August 30th specifically,
of 2007, if you recall from Minot to Barksdale and so forth--
Again, stemming from that instant back in August of 2007
that was, from my personal view, a significant wake up came
from the United States Air Force. And as we refocused on a
nuclear enterprise, and we have taken, not only from a
commander-directed investigation but all the way through a Blue
Ribbon Review that the Air Force undertook, through Dr.
Schlesinger's report and so forth, we have come a long way. We
still have a ways to go.
We are planning on setting up an Air Force Global Strike
Command. We have already set up Air Force Global Strike Command
Provisional. We plan on again bringing that command up to
strength here soon. We have assigned both, the plan is to
assign both B-52s and B-2 bombers, for instance, as well as
intercontinental ballistic missile forces to that Global Strike
Command. We are also taking a look at how we, not only from an
equipment standpoint, but how we are organized and trained as
well, but also how we develop our force. In your question, you
alluded to the fact, I take license with your comment, that
some of the experience and the capabilities in our airmen
perhaps atrophied away.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Institutional memory is important.
General Newton. Yes, sir. As Secretary Schlesinger reported
on, we are going to, again, take a lot of the insights that
Secretary Schlesinger and the Commissioner provided us and put
more emphasis and more focus on nuclear duties. For instance,
an ICBM officer serving at Minot Air Force Base today will
serve there perhaps in the capacity as a lieutenant and a
captain, but can also, will continue to develop one's career
across the nuclear enterprise, where many of our men and women
just like we have done in the past can serve in a variety of--
--
Mr. Frelinghuysen. So how are you proceeding to attract and
retain the people you have and, more importantly, get ready
shall we say to incentivize those who would enter the Air Force
to get into the nuclear enterprise? How are you identifying
people that are highly capable who you want on your nuclear and
space team?
General Newton. Part of that is a recruiting effort, but it
is also how we assess, particularly within our officer ranks,
also how we retain----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. How are you doing it now? The wake-up
call was delivered.
General Newton. It was. We are meeting most of the
requirement with the nuclear enterprise. We are short in the
bomber pilot and the bomber navigator force; that has been an
issue to deal with not only within the nuclear enterprise but
also across the rated community, particularly in the bomber and
the navigator ranks and so forth. We are going to provide,
again, many opportunities not only for them to serve but for
them to also reach their full potential with a career in the
United States Air Force, those who have come from the nuclear
ranks.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. So, as you go out there to attract and
retain the people you need, where are you getting the money to
do it?
General Newton. Yes, sir, with regard to recruiting and
retention, we are large across the Air Force. We feel confident
we will meet our recruiting goals as well as our retention
goals certainly through fiscal year 2009. We feel that we have
at this point the resources to do that as well as to provide
the opportunities to get back to the nuclear issue and provide
them the opportunity for not only duties in a nuclear
enterprise but also for them to advance their careers.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. So you turned the corner in terms of
making sure that this part of the Air Force is indeed a career
path and is of value?
General Newton. Yes, sir, it is. I go back to my initial
comment by the Chief of Staff General Schwartz and our
Secretary, Secretary Donley making this absolutely a top
priority. Part of reinvigorating the nuclear enterprise is not
necessarily just with equipment, but I think more focused on
our Airmen and giving them the opportunity to reach their full
potential in the nuclear enterprise. And that is where we
believe we have indeed turned the corner, but we still have
work do. I am confident that we will again provide for those
opportunities and for the career development.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Let me just say, for the record, my
chairman has come in, Chairman Visclosky, we are asking about
the Air Force's role on the nuclear enterprise, and we have
been assured that there has been a huge about-face here. And
whatever the cultural roadblocks that were there have been
removed, and indeed, you are making some considerable progress.
General Newton. Yes, sir, we are.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you.
Now Congressman Dicks, please.

OPERATION NOBLE EAGLE

Mr. Dicks. What is the status of Operation Noble Eagle? To
date, how many combat air patrol missions supporting Operation
Noble Eagle has the active Air Force flown?
Mr. Duehring. Sir, we have that information. There are
quite a few numbers involved. If I could, I would like to just
take it for the record and give it to you in a document, but I
can tell you the status right now is that we still participate
in Operation Noble Eagle. In fact, that is the oldest mission
we have on the war on terrorism. I would like to highlight the
Air Force's roles for those of us who were here on September
11th and remember that when the first aircraft approached the
East Coast, the first response was by the United States Air
Force. Specifically it was the Air National Guard. It was a
unit from North Dakota, the Happy Hooligans, who happened to be
flying out of Langley Air Force Base, Virginia at that time,
were vectored and diverted from their mission toward the
aircraft and then, after that, the tankers from Bangor, Maine,
one on the runway and one getting ready to taxi out. We had the
Air National Guard from D.C., followed by the Marine Corps Air
Reserve flying F-18s out of Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland at
that time. So that is our oldest mission. We continue to fly
it. It has changed the number of Combat Air Patrols (CAPs),
more people on alert rather than CAP, depending on the need at
the time. I am happy to give you a better----
Mr. Dicks. Give us an update. That would be great.
We understand that the Air National Guard is not flying
these patrols anymore, that they are just on alert status at a
number of installations. Is that correct?
Mr. Duehring. The Air National Guard still has the primary
role for the Air Sovereignty Mission, but the Air Sovereignty
Alert status is what they are in when they are on the ground,
and as soon as they raise off the ground and become Operation
Noble Eagle, and I would say as requirements dictate and I am
thinking in terms of political conventions, the inauguration,
other events where we may want to have people a little closer
to the action, those aircraft can easily be put into a CAP.
Mr. Dicks. I just was curious because our staff here says
that the Air National Guard is not flying these patrols.
Mr. Duehring. When they wouldn't be----
Mr. Dicks. But is on alert status at a number of
installations. So are you saying that, unless there is some
reason, they are not doing these patrols?
Mr. Duehring. That is largely correct, yes, sir. Because
you are using up the air frames, of course, and somebody has to
decide, you know, when is the threat great enough to have
people airborne? We can get them up there pretty darn fast. For
example, the Air National Guard performed 481 ONE CAP sorties
during 2007 and 304 during January through August of 2008 in
addition to their ASA missions.
Mr. Dicks. You will give us an update on that?
Mr. Duehring. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. The Navy has individual augmentees that are
serving in Iraq. What about the Air Force?
Mr. Duehring. We do, too. It is a Reserve program. These
are people who differ from your traditional drilling reservist
in that they would not have a Reserve unit. With an
intelligence unit, I belong to the 153rd Intelligence Squadron.
My unit gets called up, and away I go. Individual Mobilization
Augmentees are more assigned to a specific job against an
active Duty billet with an active Air Force unit, wing, WIA
Team or other headquarters position.
Mr. Dicks. How many Air Force augmentees are serving either
in Iraq or Afghanistan?
Mr. Duehring. I would have to get that for you.
[The information follows:]

The Air Force Reserve has 138 Individual Mobilization
Augmentees serving in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Mr. Dicks. The Navy number was like 12,000 down to 10,000.
General, do you have any idea?
General Newton. I believe you are referring to our Joint
Expeditionary taskings. We provide capability in the U.S.
Central Command (US CENTCOM) region, for instance, either by
unit or by individuals. Right now, we have----
Mr. Dicks. But these were people who were actually serving
in Iraq, they were volunteers. I know the Navy people call it,
they were not part of--they would be part of a unit but----
General Newton. Like you said, individual augmentees. We
task ours to do Joint Expeditionary taskings. We have
approximately 3,500 of them serving under these Joint
Expeditionary taskings.
Mr. Dicks. Is that affecting readiness in any way?
General Newton. Sir, it is not. Again, we have Airmen
tasked to provide capabilities to the joint warfighter from,
120 days to 179 days to 365 days. But, again, part of what you
alluded to in terms of these individual taskings.
Mr. Dicks. So you guys are going to reduce your overall
personnel by what 20,000 or what I think the number was or
40,000.
Mr. Duehring. 40,000, yes sir.
Mr. Dicks. But now Secretary Gates has said, no, don't do
that. So how will this affect your ability to go out and buy
equipment? That was the reason you were going to reduce
manpower.
Mr. Duehring. No. Well, what we did was, when we made the
decision to reduce by 40,000, that took us back to 316,000,
which was still our goal, but because of the new missions,
including the nuclear mission which we had to reevaluate, the
cyber works, some Special Operations requirements and, of
course, associated maintenance, other programs that evolved
because the Army is increasing their numbers and the Marine
Corps is increasing their numbers, we have built up from that
point. It looks like we are buying back, but that is not really
what we are doing.
These are missions we didn't know about in 2005 when we
made the decision to draw down. So the Secretary said, level
off at about 330,000; you have my approval to do that, and
let's reassess exactly what you need. We had to ask the Army
and Marine Corps for their numbers. And where we are going to
actually give you a finite amount will be in the President's
budget for fiscal year 2010, which is coming very soon.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you.
Congressman Tiahrt.

AIR NATIONAL GUARD

Mr. Tiahrt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is nice to see that the sun is shining in New Jersey
with both the ranking member and the chairman here in control.
I wanted to talk a little bit about this National Guard
thing because I think there has been some effort in the Air
Force to sort of take the teeth away from the Guard. I know, at
McConnell Air Force Base, our Air National Guard unit had done
a lot of fighter training over the years. We eventually went to
B-1s and we had the B-1 wing for a while, and it had the
highest readiness rate and did an excellent job responding to
everything that was thrown their way. And we had a great place
for them. They only, even during midnight launches, only
received one call from Derby, Kansas, which is right south of
the base and that is the flight path. And it was a lady who
wanted to know when you were going to quit launching the B-1s
so she could let her dog out because she was worried that her
dog might bark at the planes and disturb the neighbors. She
wasn't worried about the B-1s, but she was worried about her
dog barking.
I do think that there has been some shift to move the Guard
to a more of a transport and tanker command rather than having
them fly fighters, and I think they have a very important role
in having teeth in the Guard. So I wanted to let you guys know,
as part of the Air Force, that we think the Guard plays a very
important role, and we are very proud of the job they do. And
we ought to keep them active in flying jets and bombers.

PROCUREMENT SPECIALISTS

Now I want to talk about procurement as a career path. I
know that General Shackleford now is somehow heading up
procurement, and I am confident that he is competent, but are
you familiar with the Gansler Commission from 2007? It was done
by the Army, and it looked at sort of the procurement problems
that they were facing, just to refresh your memory. If you
haven't seen it, you ought to go look at it. It said basically
that we ought to set up a career path within the services for
procurement.
Now if you look outside the Defense industry and you look
outside the Department of Defense, you will find that many
companies have specialists that focus on this area. And it is a
career path where they can specialize in buying other things.
The Boeing Company, for example, they call it materiel. It is
the people within Boeing responsible for getting supplies lined
up and providing resources to that company. Other companies
have different names for it.
But, basically, it is a career path where you have
specialty, people who specialize in dealing with contractors
and dealing with engineers and dealing with finance people,
dealing with all those items necessary to bring services and
hardware on line. But it seems like, within the services that
we are having a hard time setting up that career path. We will
have people come in for a couple of years and go out. It is
part of the checking a box to get this overall career path
satisfied. And it really doesn't give people an opportunity to
focus on this very essential part of what Department of Defense
does.
If you think about the billions of dollars that we spend
every year and compare that to the private sector, and we
really need some specialists. We have people who specialize in
this, and they are buying a whole lot less dollar wise, and
when it comes to national security, a whole lot less important.
So here we have the Department of Defense and, in particular,
the Air Force, where we are looking at the next-generation
bomber; where we are going to replace the tankers with KC67s
eventually, hopefully this year, and C-17s and kinds of these
high dollar items, yet we don't have somebody who has this
extensive knowledge in, how do you stabilize a design? How do
you stabilize requirements? How do you stabilize the price? And
I think what happens is, we get a user who comes in and takes
over the top procurement, and he has his own views of what
would be nice add-ons to a product, and we never hold a
baseline. And the result is that we have a longer development
and procurement and development process. It becomes less and
less popular, and then we start cancelling product. Like the F-
22, at some point in the past, we should have drawn a baseline
and said, this is what the plane is going to look like; we will
build it; and then at the first PDM, we will add on these
things. My point is, I think a specialist would save money. I
think they would save us schedule, and these very important
hardware items would come on line and would do so in a timely
fashion.
What consideration is the Air Force giving today to setting
up a career path in procurement?
General Newton. Sir, if I may, your points are well taken.
Our Chief, General Schwartz, and our Secretary, Secretary
Donley have set forth a number of priorities, from
reinvigorating the nuclear enterprise, as we previously
discussed, to developing our men and women and their families,
but also they have put a premium on acquisition excellence. And
that is not only from a process standpoint, as you alluded to,
from determining requirements all the way to delivery of the
capability of the joint warfighter, but also making sure that
we are properly organized, trained and developing our people.
And therefore, I know, having had many conversations with
General Schwartz, our Chief of Staff, about this is making sure
as we return to an acquisition excellence effort within the
United States Air Force, that the premium has to be put on how
we develop our people. We give them the training, and we give
them the education, but we also need to give them the career
development that would not just be a touch-and-go opportunity
within the acquisition community. We have to put a premium on
their service, not only from building experience but also
building relationships across the entire DoD enterprise.
I have not read the Gansler Report but am least being
familiar with it, and I know one of the tenants was that
relationship, in terms of that acquisition excellence across
not only Service but the DoD, is absolutely critical. And so
that is where we are placing a premium and significant amount
of importance to a new tanker and new capabilities within a new
designed bomber and so forth.
Sir, may I retack on the teeth part of your comment, if I
may?
Mr. Tiahrt. Yes.
General Newton. Again, this is a total force capability we
have in the United States Air Force, regardless of whether it
is from a fighter platform, a space platform, or from a bomber
or a tanker. But if I may, I think one thing that really makes
us a world class premium United States Air Force across any air
force in the world, it is our tanker capability. It is our
ability to put people, equipment and, quite candidly, bombs on
target is not necessarily just from a shooter perspective but
from a tanker capability as well. And the men and women who
serve the total force, particularly in the Guard, do that every
day, and they do it wonderfully.
Mr. Tiahrt. Well said.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you.
Mr. Visclosky.
Mr. Visclosky. I would associate my words with Mr. Tiahrt
and pay respect to the State of New Jersey.
Mr. Rothman. Bless you.
Mr. Dicks. May I have one second? I understand that 43
percent of the acquisition spots in the Air Force are vacant;
is that correct?
General Newton. Sir, let me take that one for the record.

AIR FORCE ACQUISITION

Mr. Dicks. It is a big number, and I think Congress is
responsible. The former chairman of the Armed Services
Committee, who no longer serves, he used to call the
acquisition people ``shoppers'' in a very derogatory attention
to it. Now we don't have enough people to do these programs,
and we have the kind of scandalous result that occurred on the
tankers, which is, in my judgment, was a, with eight different
grounds of reversal by the GAO and many generals outside of the
Air Force retired were shocked to see this happen. And so
something is wrong with Air Force acquisition. If it is a lack
of personnel or whatever, we have got to got this straightened
out.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rothman. Surely. I just want to exercise the rare
privilege of me being the Chair. Do you acknowledge and accept
the notion that the failure in the tanker situation was as a
result of insufficient acquisition personnel?
General Newton. Mr. Chairman, rather than alluding to that
particular tanker issue, what I do acknowledge is the absolute
necessity that we provide the opportunities for men and women
to serve in the acquisition career field, that we nurture their
development and that we give them the opportunity to reach
their full potential in the acquisition community.
Mr. Rothman. I understand that. But is there a deficiency
in that area now?
General Newton. Sir, I believe we can improve that area. I
believe that we, as part of the top priorities that the Chief
of Staff has as to how we go about ensuring that we provide
acquisition excellence within the United States Air Force, that
it starts with our people. And again, we give them every
opportunity. It is the due diligence, just like was referred to
in the previous comments with regard to the nuclear enterprise,
the same level of effort or a similar level of effort needs to
be provided to our professionals.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you.
Mr. Moran.

CONTRACT SERVICES

Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Rothman.
The National Defense Authorization Act last year required
each of the services to come up with a full inventory of all of
the contracted services, the number of contractors, the number
of contracts, et cetera. The Army did that, and obviously, the
Army had the biggest task ahead of them. It is the largest of
the services that we know, but the Air Force hasn't. Why would
you not have complied with that authorization requirement to
come up with the full inventory to have contract services?
Mr. Duehring. I am sorry, sir, I honestly don't know why
they didn't.
Mr. Moran. Well, it is a concern of this Committee, and it
is something that the Appropriations Committee wanted as well
as the authorizing committee. We found out that much of the
combat effort, at least the support of the combat effort, was
contracted out. And we had as many contractors over in Iraq as
we had military and civilian personal.
Do you consider the contract workforce part of the total
Air Force workforce?
General Newton. Sir, if I may ask, I think I understand
what you are asking, are you talking about the----
Mr. Moran. The number of people contracted who are not Air
Force civilian or military personnel.
General Newton. This is a reduction of reliance on
contractors and now part of the civilian workforce. If I may
provide, I will take the question for the record in terms of
providing specific numbers, but I do believe that we are, based
on the NDAA specific, abiding by that, and we have reduced our
contractors by approximately 500. And we are starting to see
some savings in terms of how we are actually increasing because
of the reduction in civilian contracts. We are seeing an
increase in our civilian workforce to nearly approximately 800
to 850 civilians. What I see is a growth through the out-years
of increasing that number to perhaps 2,500 in terms of adding
to our civilian workforce.
Let me, please, if I may, provide specific numbers for you.
Mr. Moran. Well, I don't doubt that you made some efforts
in bringing back some of those inherently governmental jobs
that have been contracted out, but the committee wanted to know
what the inventory is. How many contractors do you have? How
many contracts? And we haven't gotten that. And we need that to
make our decision with regard to the proper allocation and the
like. The Army did it. As I say, we haven't gotten that
information from the Air Force, and it raises red flags. If you
don't know how many contractors or contracts, that is a problem
in and of itself.
General Newton. Sir, I am not prepared to answer that now,
but I will certainly take the question for the record and get
back with you.

EXPAND TRADITIONAL AIR FORCE ROLE

Mr. Moran. I notice that there is a new initiative within
the Air Force to expand your traditional Air Force role. For
example, some of the Air Force personnel are conducting ground
combat operations, which was not a traditional Air Force role,
but you have been doing that in Iraq and Afghanistan. Normally,
when people are recruited, that is not what they are
necessarily recruited for. And then there are other roles that
most people would not have originally assumed were traditional
Air Force missions and requirements. And it is a change, as has
been mentioned, to the Air Force culture. What we wonder about
is, how are they trained? Who does the training? Do you sort of
contract out the training to the Army and Marine Corps for
roles that traditionally had been performed by them? How do you
go about doing this?
Mr. Duehring. For those who come into basic training, last
year we increased our time in basic training by 2 weeks, from 6
and a half to 8 and a half weeks. This was to introduce combat
skills training. I think the first graduate came out last fall
in the October time frame. That still is not going to prepare
them for the roles. They will go from there to the skills
training, and they still get combat skills training throughout
this time, but once they get to their base, and they get into
the AEF rotation. Or if they are in one of the career fields
that goes more often than that, quite frankly, for longer
periods, like civil engineers, the vehicle operations who very
often go out in the convoys with the Army, we will send them,
yes, to schools.
We started initially, as I recall, about 2004 when the Army
first said it could use a little help in some of these areas,
and vehicle operations I remember very clearly because the
first group who went over there wasn't prepared very well. They
were pretty good drivers and could fix the trucks. We took them
into Kuwait, and I was in DoD at that time; I wasn't in the Air
Force. But I watched what happened. They got their top-off
training there. We don't do that anymore. Well, there is still
training there, of course, but we have schools back here,
whether it is in New Jersey at Fort Dix; we have a lot of folks
come through Fort Dix.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Good.
Mr. Duehring. More coming I am sure. We have also some
places in Texas that we have been going to, near San Antonio. I
have been to Fort Hood and seen some of the work there. I have
seen Air Force people at Fort Bragg, but now, to the degree
that we can, we are trying to do some of that training
ourselves, realizing that, because the threats change, the
types of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that they might
encounter, the attacks, however they are doing it this week,
can change, they still will get some top-off training even as
they go into country.
So it is a joint program. Some of it is ours, and some is
the Army's. I go on the road every month. I visit two to five
bases a month; I say, do you feel trained, or do you feel
comfortable in what you are doing? I always hit the forces. I
always hit Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). I always hit the
vehicle operations guys, and I say, how comfortable are you? I
am getting very positive responses, and that was not true back
in 2004.
Mr. Rothman. Mr. Kingston.
Mr. Moran. Well, thank you.
Mr. Chair, let me underscore the fact that we want this
information. We are asking for it from all the services: What
is the extent of the contracting out? Where is it? What roles
are contracting? We want to know the total number of contract
personnel, number of contracts, that kind of thing. We are
trying to get our hands around what is the real total workforce
here, how it is being distributed, who is fighting the wars, et
cetera. Thank you.
Mr. Rothman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Kingston.

PHYSICAL FITNESS

Mr. Kingston. I want to follow-up on Mr. Moran's questions
in terms of the physical fitness. We had a hearing last week
with the Army about the amount of equipment a soldier carries,
which can weigh up to 93 pounds. Are you having the same
problem with particularly against your security forces because
they would be the ones carrying the most on the ground, right?
General Newton. Yes, sir, we are very much committed to a
fit-to-fight total force, specifically within the security
forces community. Again, nothing has come to my attention in
terms of any type of inadequacy in terms of physical fitness
amongst our security forces.
However, I can tell you I have been to the schoolhouse down
at Lackland Air Force Base outside of San Antonio, Texas, and I
can tell you, it is a very fit training regimen. It goes also
back to emphasis with regard to fit-to-fight starting in basic
military training. But our airmen are, as we focus not only on
their fitness but in terms of their health and wellness as
well, but again, to go back more to your point, nothing that I
had knowledge of relates to what you just described the Army
may be having.
Mr. Kingston. Well, what my question is, do you know how
much their equipment weighs? And for the infantry soldier in
the Army, it was about 93 pounds.
General Newton. Yes, I recall seeing that information for
the Army. I will have to get back to you in terms of
specifically.
Mr. Kingston. You probably don't have the same problem
because, otherwise, you would probably have been asked this
several times, I would imagine.
General Newton. Yes, sir, but I can, not only within our
security forces, but we also have a number of Airmen who are
assigned to providing capabilities to Army or ground units
engaged, for instance, our tactical air control party and so
forth, because they are tasked to carry the same capabilities
with them as they deploy with their counterparts, even within
the ground forces or Special Operations Forces.
Mr. Kingston. Well, if they are at Lackland training, then
the altitude is going to be a lot different in Afghanistan. And
I wonder if you have problems with altitude sickness, or is
that something that takes about a week to get adjusted to, and
then for the guys on the ground, they are okay with it?
General Newton. Yes, sir. That is part of any unit that is
being deployed, particularly from a garrison force that, as you
alluded to, is not at altitude; it takes a period of time for
them to be acclimated to the theater or the local operation
that they happen to be engaged with.
If I may also say when you deploy to places like
Afghanistan or any other place around the world, as we find our
Airmen deployed globally, it does take some time to get
acclimated. Also there can be varying degrees of training that
you can start in garrison to be deployed in.
Mr. Kingston. What do you do for that? Is it mostly the key
time on the ground before they really go out in full
engagement, so that their bodies can get use to it? Or do you
take a pill or drink lots of liquid? How do we get a guy
jumping out of a plane to hit the ground running?
General Newton. Yes, sir, we have a commander's program,
particularly when they deploy to a variety of, in many cases,
austere locations to get their Airmen fit. I do not have a
specific regimen for you. It is not only your physical
activity, but one must ensure you are not dehydrated, having
flown long durations, sorties for instance and so forth. It is
a type of diet that allows you to be fully engaged.
And the last point I would make is that it is not
necessarily the training, but it is also the duration of
mission that they are tasked to do, extended hours and so
forth, so there was a lot of physical regimen involved.
Mr. Kingston. Another question. Some Army Non-Commissioned
Officers (NCOs) had said that some of the new recruits are able
unable to pass the physical readiness test. Is the Air Force
finding that to be true?
Mr. Secretary, you are shaking your head.
Mr. Duehring. That is true, because I think the number that
we hear very often is, only 27 percent of the high school
graduates are actually eligible, qualified to join the
military. And that includes, of course, not only physical
fitness, but lifestyle decisions and things like this. But this
is something that is in the papers a lot. We get feedback from
the recruiters that kids just aren't as tough as they once
were.
Another problem, doesn't affect us too much, but it does
affect the SEALs, and I have some friends in that business, is
the kids coming in don't know how to swim, because we don't
take our kids off to a Red Cross beginners course like they did
when we were kids. It is a real challenge, and we have to work
with them.
Mr. Kingston. How about kids on Ritalin, is that a problem?
Mr. Duehring. I have heard something about this. I would
like to take that back before I misspeak, because it has been
quite some time since I have heard that discussed. But I don't
think you can come in--I am thinking now that you can't come in
if you are on Ritalin, of course, as an 18-year-old or 19-year-
old.
Mr. Kingston. I don't think you can.
Mr. Chairman, this is my last question, if I could finish
it.
From time to time, we get calls from kids who want to join
the services, but they are unable to because they are on
Ritalin. It is a widespread use, as you know, particularly I
think in private schools where the parents are saying, oh my
kid is not going to get in med school because he is in 6th
grade right now and doesn't have a 3.5 average, and so they
panic and put them on Ritalin. What happens to them is, they
play football and soccer; they have a full high school
experience, full college experience. And then one day they want
to get into the military, and they find out that if you have
been taking Ritalin, it is considered a disability, and it is a
shock to them. And I was just wondering. So if you can go back
and look at that.
Mr. Duehring. I would like to get a medical opinion on
that. We are happy to provide that for you, sir.
Mr. Kingston. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rothman. Ms. Kaptur.

DEPLOYMENT AND PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I apologize for being late. I had a conflict this morning
and will have to leave shortly after the questioning to go back
to the other committee as well.
Thank you for your service, and I want to focus my
questions on the psychological health of warriors. I wanted to
just ask, General, whether you would consider F-16 units that
are based at Guard bases under your command?
General Newton. I am sorry, would you rephrase that
question? I am sorry.
Ms. Kaptur. Yes, I am just curious as to whether war-ready
units that are under the auspices of the Guard in a given State
like Ohio, F-16 units that are under Army Air, and whether you
consider them under your command because they are war-ready
units.
General Newton. Yes, ma'am. In the United States Air Force,
it is a total force perspective, regardless of units, our
Airmen, for that matter, serve in a capacity of inactive duty
or Guard or Reserve. And so we very much approach how we
organize training equipped from a total force perspective. So,
yes, we would consider them a part of the total force Air
Force. However, Air National Guard units fall under active Air
Force command when they are activated to title 10 Status.
Otherwise, ANG units remain under their respective State
governor's control.
Ms. Kaptur. I thank you very much for that, because I am
interested in the portions of your testimony. I am interested
in it all, but the part dealing with deployment and
psychological health.
We in Ohio, over several cycles now, have been attempting
to work with the Guard there, Army and Army Air, including our
F-16 units, but many other units around the State, to test the
returning veterans through the Guard.
Is it difficult in Ohio because we have so may Guard and
Reserve based units, plus we have Wright Pat for active duty,
and we have many soldiers returning home and Airmen returning
home where there is no base. And we have a very extensive
psychological testing program that we are undertaking.
One of the issues we have confronted, and I would like to
give you a piece of paper on this, and we are working with
several universities, Case Western University, Western Reserve
University, University of Toledo Medical University, University
of Michigan. So it is a region-wide consortium that are trying
to embrace these returning vets and to follow them through
their life to see when PTSD might onset and so forth. Of all of
services, the Air Force is the least prevalent. I mean, Army
and Marines are much more than Air Force in general. But one of
the difficulties we have had with the Ohio Guard, and we are
not sure what level this decision is being made, we wanted
voluntary genetic testing. We want to create a DNA profile of
susceptibility to these illnesses.
Ms. Kaptur. And at some level they are saying, well, you
know, we cannot do this. And we cannot figure out whether it is
at the national level, whether it is the Guard bureau, whether
it is some commander at some level that we do not know,
somebody at DoD.
I am wondering if you could help us with that, because we
really want to--we know all medical conditions have genetic
markers, whether it is Alzheimer's, whether it is PTSD; and the
goal is to create the largest epidemiological profile ever
done, with over 3,000 returning soldiers and airmen who
voluntarily agree to be tested.
Then there is a real, you know, sophisticated sampling
technique that they use and so forth. But this has proven to be
a bit of a stumbling block. And I would just like to have the
right person contact me because it is nettlesome.
I told these people, I said before, when we get started on
this I want a Nobel prize out of you; I do not want anything
less. We are going to understand this and we are going to treat
it. We are going to identify it and we are going to treat it,
and we have got to have this.
So I would like to know if you could help us with that,
work with our Guard bureau, work with whoever at DoD is
responsible for this. And let's get a really excellent research
profile that will yield the results that we need.
Mr. Bishop. Would the gentlelady yield?
Ms. Kaptur. I would be pleased to yield to the gentleman.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you.
In that regard, I would like to remind the gentlelady--
there was at some point some research being done by the Army
with regard to PTSD and some genetic markers and some DNA that
would be predictable. And at some point there was some
controversy about the study because there was a need for high
recruitment, and they were afraid, some say, that these genetic
markers would prevent their reaching the recruitment goals
because it would predict who was likely to be susceptible to
PTSD, which was a very interesting thing, and the study was
stopped for some other supposedly unrelated reasons.
We touched on that last year in Committee.
Ms. Kaptur. I thank you. Well, maybe we are running into
the same speed bump here. I do not know. But it is a very
important speed bump. And I would like to have a discussion
with whoever is involved in the decision-making chain. General
Wayt, the Ohio Guard commander, is very involved in these
issues, but I am not sure that this is not above his pay grade.
General Newton. If I may, your points are well taken, and
certainly I will take that back. But we in the United States
Air Force--regardless, active duty, Guard, Reserve, civilian,
family members and so forth--are very much concerned and/or
focused on the health and wellness of our airmen and their
families. And in a high operations tempo environment, we are
seeing stresses that again are imparted by either duty deployed
in such places as Iraq or Afghanistan or 135 other locations
around the world where we find Airmen serving, as well as
stresses that we have back home in garrison at our bases as
well.
So I take your point, and again--the focus is on the health
and wellness of the men and women who serve, as well as their
family members. It is absolutely essential that we not be in a
reactive mode, but we get ahead of this and we focus on it as
well.
Ms. Kaptur. I thank you, General, and I look forward to
hearing from you.
Mr. Rothman. Ms. Granger.

DEPLOYMENTS

Ms. Granger. Thank you. We have heard from the Army that
their deployments are down to 1 year--they were at 15 months--
and the Marines Corps is at 7 months. And my question to you
is, going back to what Mr. Moran said about combat roles and an
increase in difference in your role, will this change the
deployment time? And how will it affect it?
Mr. Duehring. Let me give us a little background on how we
got to where we are and what I think is going to happen in the
future. The Air Force had a continuing commitment starting
before 9/11. I remember working for OSD at the time, watching,
you know, all the Services. And because the Services were all
being committed, the Air Force obviously had to play its role.
And the Guard and Reserve, for example, going back to pre-first
Gulf War, maybe fewer than a million man-days a year on active
duty. And by the time we got up to around the end of the
century, shall we say, it was 13.1 million man-days a year, so
you could see that this workload was increasing.
What the Air Force did was establish the AEF rotation
policy, the Aerospace Expeditionary Force rotation policy. Very
simply, it put all of the forces, with the exception of a few
that we kept in reserve, into groups, of which there were--
well, actually five basic groups that went for three months at
a time, and they just kept rotating. And what this meant was
that if you, as a member of the first group, went for three
months--first of all, you were going to know well in advance
when you were going and you knew when you were coming back--
very good for the Guard and Reserve right away, because they
could tell their employers as well.
And you knew that when your turn came, it would not be on
Christmas again. If you had missed Christmas or missed
somebody's birthday, you were going to be pushed three months
down the road.
Well, this served us well. We then pushed it to--that was
not quite long enough to be in theater. So we voluntarily moved
it to 120 days, 4 months, and it just--the cycle just got a
little bit bigger and longer. I remember when General Blum, who
had recently taken over as the chief of the National Guard
Bureau, came up with--he called it the hurricane charts, which
is how he wanted to move the Army National Guard; and it was
the same type of idea, to give predictability. This idea now
has really spread throughout all of the Department.
The Army, of course, likes--they move large units. They
like to have them on the ground for a year. So that meant,
whatever action has to go ahead of time and then there is some
action on the back side, that is, in addition to it.
And then they moved up to 15 months, because as you may
recall, the threat--it peaked about a year or two ago, and we
started keeping people longer and longer and longer, okay?
The Air Force tried tenaciously to stick to its AEF
rotation cycle, but we found in certain career fields we could
not do it. And remember, I talked about vehicle ops; those guys
went and they drove with the Army. We talked about EOD, and
still, to this day, our EOD people are embedded in Army units.
You go out there you will see them; in fact, sometimes they
wear Army uniforms. There is a whole laundry list of ones that
we have talked about, these joint expeditionary taskings.
These folks, the Army wanted to keep for a year. We
honestly do not think that is a good idea. We find that the
stress after about eight, nine months--by the way, you noticed
the Marines stayed at seven months. They have always stayed at
seven; they believe in that.
But we found if we stayed longer, the stress starts going
up dramatically and all these other issues take place. If we
can get them back after six months, let them calm down, let
them get back with their families and adjust, we can call them
up again. They will be ready to go again.
So what we did is, we took the 12-month rotation that the
Army wanted and divided it in half and said, Mr. Army, would
you accept that? And they have, by and large, accepted that.
There are some exceptions to it. Usually people volunteer if
they want to stay longer than that, okay?
So we knew that civil engineering, we knew EOD, we knew
that some of the medical people, intelligence, stress career
fields were going six months, and this messed up our AEF
rotation cycle. So we said, okay, let's identify those people
and say they are going to go for six months. And what that did
was, it allowed us to clearly identify who was stressed, which
career fields we just did not have the right number of people
in for this new mission.
And the other thing it gave our people was predictability.
And we said, okay, we admit you are going for six months now,
179 days, whatever the case may be. And at least, you know,
next August you will probably go again. And that helped
tremendously.
To answer your question, long answer to a short question
is, about 52 percent of our deployments now, by counting
people, is six months or greater. As long as we are in the
program, the Joint Expeditionary Force, we are going to have
units that are going to be committed at six-month intervals.
We would still like to stay with the AEF rotation cycle,
and the greatest pressure comes from the Guard and the Reserve.
Example: If you are an airline pilot and you are flying F-16s
in Ohio, wherever the case may be, and you go downrange and you
are flying a 767 back home, you are going to run out of
currency in 90 days. And it is extremely expensive for the
airline to requalify you in that airplane. So what we have
worked out with the airline industry is, if you take them for
six months--I am sorry, I am sorry--two months, 60 days, bring
them back, get a few flights in the 767, you can have them back
again because you have just reset the clock.
So in cases like this where it works to our advantage, we
would like to stay with the AEF rotation cycle. But we
recognize in probably a dozen career fields it is just not
possible. But at least our folks know what is happening when.
Mr. Rothman. Mr. Bishop.

SUICIDE PREVENTION

Mr. Bishop. Thank you very much. And again welcome,
gentlemen. And I appreciate it very much, the enlightenment you
have shared with us.
With regard to the increased stress level that I heard you
discussing, the last suicide prevention study by the Air Force
was done in 2005. And you have talked about the additional
missions and the impact that has had on your personnel.
Do you think that it is time now to upgrade that,
considering the fact that the Army and the Marine Corps,
because of their missions, have experienced a tremendous
challenge with regard to suicide- and PTSD-related to the
extended deployments and the new missions? That is the first
question.
The second question relates to the high operational tempo,
which has put a real strain on your personnel accounts, causing
the funding to run out before the end of the fiscal year.
Talking about the 2009 fiscal year execution, can you tell me
what the monthly burnout rate for your personnel costs are and
when, in this fiscal year, you expect that your personnel
accounts will run out of money?
Three quick questions.
Mr. Duehring. Let me start with the second one because it
is the easiest one to answer.
The monthly burnout rate is 2.2 billion. And the going
broke date right now we estimate is around 12 September; and we
are hoping that the supplement will pick up in there.
The suicide issue, I will give you the simple answer first,
which is, we can give you whatever you would like on suicides
any time. We do review it in house. We do a review of the
suicide rates at the Air Force level, the major command level,
and the wing level; for those more oriented towards the Army,
think of it as a base level.
We have what we call a Community Action Information Board--
I think it is at each one that reviews this--twice a year. And,
of course, commanders, we at our level see it a lot more
frequently than that. We get a summary every week, and if there
is an incident----
Mr. Bishop. Do you see any trends?
Mr. Duehring. Trends, we have--I have got a couple of
figures here.
Mr. Bishop. That you can relate particularly to the op
tempo?
Mr. Duehring. We are kind of holding our own.
Let's see, pre-1996, in our comments we talked--in my
comments I talked about the new holistic program that we had
adopted in 1996. And our rate prior to that was 13.5 percent,
and since then it has been 9.8 percent, although it is----
Mr. Bishop. That is the suicide rate?
Mr. Duehring. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bishop. Thirteen percent?
Mr. Duehring. Yeah, we are below the national average. Yes,
13.5, I am sorry, 13.5 based on 100,000.
Mr. Bishop. Oh, okay.
Mr. Duehring. I got talking. I got so wrapped up in it, I
am sorry, sir; 13.5 per 100,000?
Mr. Bishop. Out of 100,000?
Mr. Duehring. Yes, sir. And then, after that, 9.8.
Mr. Bishop. And you attribute that to your 1996 program?
Mr. Duehring. Yes.
Mr. Bishop. But you have not really been keeping up with it
since 2005?
Mr. Duehring. No, we do. Within the organization we have.
There has not been a request from Congress to provide that
information. We can certainly give it to you any time that you
would like to have it.
Mr. Bishop. I think it would be very helpful to us, because
we have got the information from the Army and the Marine Corps,
and with the increased tempo of the Air Force, particularly as
you describe the high stress level, we probably need to know
that also. Because there might be something we may need to look
into with regard to what is happening with your Air Force
personnel----
Mr. Duehring. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bishop [continuing]. And their families.
General Newton. Sir, may I add just a brief comment?
From a commander standpoint or previous commander
standpoint, one suicide is one too many, and we are always
striving to prevent the next. And so what we have in place
through the years is a very focused, engaged commanders program
at the unit level or at the base level all the way up to our
Chief of Staff and our Secretary of the Air Force as well.
And so, we are constantly engaged. We are not only engaged
within the United States Air Force, but are looking for
successes perhaps in other programs that the United States
Army, United States Marine Corps, and United States Navy have
engaged with as well.
So it is not just the Air Force, isolated. In fact, I have
engaged with Lieutenant General Mike Rochelle, who is the Chief
of Personnel for the Army on the Army suicide program and what
they are doing. So it is a matter of us also integrating and
understanding what other Services are going through.
Mr. Bishop. So is that because you have seen some trends
and you expect that that might increase and so you are trying
to anticipate it?
General Newton. Yes, sir. We are obviously--as the
Secretary referred to, it still remains a very high operations
tempo environment. We do not want to put ourselves in a
reactive mode; we want to be proactive.
And to go back to my first point, one suicide is one too
many, and we are always striving to prevent the next one as
well.
Mr. Bishop. Just one follow-up with respect to the search
and rescue missions of the Air Force, I know at Moody Air Force
Base in Georgia there was a period, particularly at the
beginning of the Iraq war, where they had been called upon
pretty heavily; and of course, that was a lot of stress there
among families and there were some suicide attempts there. And,
of course, there was a lot of family disruption and family
violence on return, and divorces.
That seemed to have been at the beginning, and I don't know
how it has developed since 2001-2002. But I certainly would
like to have that information.
General Newton. Yes, sir, I'd be delighted to provide you
with that information. We could spend a lot of time talking
about some of the preventive measures and programs we have
engaged.
[The information follows:]

During 2001 and 2002 the rate of substantiated child maltreatment
at Moody AFB, GA was significantly higher than the Air Force average
rate (FY01: 14.72 vs. 7.35 per 1,000; FY02: 15.25 vs. 7.32 per 1,000).
Substantiated spouse maltreatment was elevated in 2001 (19.15 vs. 16.12
per 1,000). From 2002 to 2008 the child and adult maltreatment rates
dropped to a rate at or below the Air Force average. Variation between
Family Advocacy Officers (FAO's) substantiation rates was a concern in
family advocacy at all bases. In 2004, the Central Registry Board was
implemented and helped reduce variation in the substantiation rates
among different bases. The Central Registry Board implementation
accounts for part of the decrease in the substantiation rates during
2002-2008. Additionally, FAO's and their staff received robust training
to address their basic processes, to include variation of
substantiation rates. This training improved the quality of the FAO's,
their staff, and the overall program capabilities.
From January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2008 there were three
completed suicides at Moody AFB, GA. The deaths occurred in 2001, 2006,
and the last in 2007.

Mr. Rothman. Ms. Kilpatrick.

FAMILIES OF SERVICEMEMBERS

Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, Secretary, thank you. Good morning. Thank you for
your service. It has been very interesting, the discussion
here.
And I notice from what I read, health care, health
professionals within the Air Force, is down from where you
would like it to be. You have several incentive programs,
including scholarships and the like, to help get that number
up. In light of the last discussions we have had in this room
this morning talking about health care, but I think I want
focus on the children of service people, because I think there
might be some relationship between being in theater, and I
think Ms. Granger talked about the time between that in their
tours, as well as when they come home, and suicide. Somewhere
is some correlation.
And whatever reports you would provide, I would like to see
some of that if there is some correlation on that, health care
in the services and your need for--what you have for the
enlisted as well as for the families. How adequate is it? How
short are we? What needs to be done? And children particularly.
In my own district, children of service people who come
home between deployments, not long enough because it is
probably never long enough when you are fighting two wars, the
children seem to suffer mental stress.
General Newton. Yes, ma'am.
If I may add, I am the son of an Air Force officer, and
recall, when my dad was in Vietnam for a year and so forth, I
candidly experienced some of the--certainly the separation
between myself and my father and saw the stresses that my mom
had. Of course, that was a different era, different war, and so
forth.
And being the father of two daughters we talk a lot about
this in terms of the stresses that we see in our force.
I am very confident of the health care that the United
States Air Force is providing to our members, as well as the
family members. I certainly agree with you that the stresses
that the members, particularly those serving in deployed
locations, but also back home at bases, the stresses that they
are undergoing, it does have an impact on our Air Force
children, if I may call them that; and that we go into this
knowing and understanding that a stressed force has impacts on
family members as well.
And, therefore, we are striving to understand what those
stresses are--we are not accepting the fact that they do not
exist; they do--that we need to be proactive in dealing with
family stresses as well. And so I would be delighted to provide
you much more information on these programs.
Ms. Kilpatrick. And how we can help to make sure we meet
those goals of health care professionals.
General Newton. Absolutely.
[The information follows:]

The Air Force supports Airmen and their families from the front
line to the home front by offering proactive services and programs that
assist in identifying and resolving concerns that bring about family
stress, and to provide a variety of avenues to reduce stress.
At home station, information and referral services are offered
directly to spouses and families, such as: pre-deployment briefings for
members and families, free weekly morale calls to keep families
connected and help reduce their sense of isolation, reintegration
briefings for 22,000 spouses that prepared them for changes during the
separation and to improve the quality of the reunion-22,000
reintegration briefings were conducted over the last year alone. The
Air Force also offers communication/life skills development workshops,
free oil changes funded by Air Force Aid Society for each deployed
family, and financial counseling at home station and at deployed
locations. The Airman Readiness Center at Al Udeid provided over 8,000
consultations on topics that covered financial readiness,
reintegration, and reunion with families and workplaces. Over the last
year, the Air Force also provided employment and career education
assistance for 40,000 spouses to prepare for portable careers.
The Air Force offers many other programs to help our Airmen and
their families through stressful periods. For instance, the Extended
Duty Child Care program provides 16,000 hours of free child care each
month, and is designed to assist Airmen who have to work longer hours,
evenings, overnight, and weekends. The Give Parents a Break program
provides parents with a few hours break each month from the stresses of
parenting--and the Air Force partners with the Air Force Aid Society to
provide free child care to parents who are subject to unique stressors
due to the nature of military life such as deployments, remote tours of
duty, and extended hours. The Air Force Aid Society provides invaluable
support to our Airmen and families, and funds 5,000 hours of respite
child care annually. Department of Defense funded Military and Family
Life Consultants are also available at all Air Force locations to
provide non-medical counseling to Airmen and their families and help
resolve some of the stressors associated with the military lifestyle.
Also, Air Force Youth Programs partner with the National Military
Family Association Operation Purple Camps to provide 7-10 free, week-
long camps to help military kids experience fun while learning coping
skills to deal with war-related stress. Children of deployed members
receive priority to participate in the Youth Camping Program, which
offers residential and specialty camp opportunities and experiences for
more than 20,000 youth annually. This year, the Air Force Reserve
Command hosted a Deployment Camp for children of Air National Guard and
Air Force Reserve Airmen.
Additionally, the Air Force has made great efforts to expand or
create fitness programs and facilities that cater specifically to
parents and families. It is hard to find a fitness center in the Air
Force that does not have a family-oriented fitness room that allows
parents to workout with their children. At Ramstein Air Base in
Germany, fitness professionals show their commitment to families by
creating programs such as Mommy and Me, Yoga for Kids and
Strollerobics. Through innovative approaches like these, family members
have an avenue to reduce stress during spouse deployments as well as to
help reduce the stresses of post-partum depression and weight gain.

Ms. Kilpatrick. Then my other question relates to, last
session the Congressional Black Caucus met with the Joint
Chiefs of Staff regarding flag officers and the lack thereof of
minorities--all minorities, I might add. Has there been any
report or anything out on how that is going, from one star up
and how the pipeline is? Are there people being prepared for
that? I mean, do we need to do something?
General Newton. Yes, ma'am. Again, under the leadership of
our Secretary Donley and, particularly, General Schwartz, our
Chief of Staff, we are making sure that we provide the
opportunity for every Airman to reach his or her potential. The
fact that our Nation----
Ms. Kilpatrick. We found last year that sometimes they
transfer out before they--got to stay in the stream. Sometimes
they transfer out.
General Newton. Yes, ma'am. It is not only an issue with
regard to recruiting and accessions, but also retention. It is
a matter of mentoring our men and women, who want to strive to
meet their potential, that they have the opportunity to do
that.
Our Nation is evolving in terms of, the talent that it has.
As your Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Personnel for
the United States Air Force, there is a war for talent out
there. Certainly General Schwartz feels that we need to go to
every community that this Nation has to offer to be able to
take the talent that every man and woman who is eligible to
come into the United States Air Force--not just a recruiting
effort, though.
Ms. Kilpatrick. It is retention and it is about those being
in now. Because you have to start somewhere; we understand
that.
General Newton. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Kilpatrick. In the pipeline now, have we done anything
over the last couple years? Is there any reporting where really
the flag officers, one star and up, can----
General Newton. We have a number of general officers who
are certainly African American and other demographics as well.
Again, I believe we need to diversify our capabilities and
diversify our force, I believe that is a mission imperative,
that is a national strategy imperative. It is the right thing
to do, but it is about mission effectiveness.
I could probably provide you numbers off line if you would
like to.
[The information follows:]

Current Air Force general officer demographics break down into six
categories; women, black, Asian/Pacific Islander, Hispanic, American
Indian and white. Based on the most recent numbers, our total general
officer population is 299 of which we currently have 27 women (1
lieutenant general, 5 major generals and 21 brigadier generals), 13
African Americans (1 lieutenant general, 5 major generals and 7
brigadier generals), 3 Asian/Pacific Islanders (1 major general and 2
brigadier generals), 4 Hispanics (1 lieutenant general and 3 brigadier
generals) and 1 American Indian serving as a brigadier general.

Ms. Kilpatrick. And I read about that 27 percent, and I
think this is related to that. I think when you have flag
officers who are of those very multiethnics, then you get a
stronger force. Our retention and recruitment may be down, but
all that plays into getting where we want to be, I believe.
General Newton. A couple weeks ago I attended the Black
Engineer of the Year award in Baltimore, for instance. And you
have got a number of youngsters in this case who are steeped in
math, technology, engineering and sciences who come to
Baltimore on an annual basis. I want to make sure that we have
an opportunity to go--again, recruit across the entire U.S.
population, but perhaps to communities that we have not focused
on very effectively in the past.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Perhaps Members of Congress can be of
assistance in that.
General Newton. I would be delighted to have that
discussion. I know my Chief would as well.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you.
General Newton. And also for your insights and support.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Appreciate that, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rothman. Call on the ranking member, Mr. Frelinghuysen.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Newton, ISR--intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance--what are its manning requirements?
General Newton. Yes, sir, based on the requirement of the
joint warfighter, particularly in the U.S. Central Command
region, we have been tasked to provide an increase in
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities
that are particularly borne out in our unmanned aerial vehicles
program, the Reaper and the Predator. We have been tasked by
the Department's leadership that we provide 50 combat air
patrol capability.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. The CAPs?
General Newton. CAPs, yes, sir.
Therefore, as we look to the proposed active duty end
strength of 330,000, the number that we have discussed
previously that we put as a priority towards that end strength,
we also put a high priority to providing those ISR,
particularly in the platform of----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. You have put a high priority on it. Are
you providing incentives, financial incentives?
General Newton. Yes, sir.
For instance, our men and women who fly or who operate the
unmanned aerial vehicles out of Creech Air Force Base just
outside of Las Vegas, they are our bomber pilots and fighter
pilots and navigators and so forth, we provide them aircrew
continuation pay or aircrew incentive pay.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. So you are meeting that obligation?
General Newton. Sir, we are. There is a very high
operations tempo environment at Creech Air Force Base, as you
well know, because of the demand----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Some remarkable things are going on
there.
General Newton. Yes, sir. And we are meeting the demands
and capabilities of the joint warfighter, and see increased
demands on the horizon.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. There are some jobs that are, should we
say ``down and dirty,'' some pretty tough areas, which if you
look at recruiting and retention, EOD, explosives, combat air
controllers, pararescue of securities, how are we doing in
those areas?
This sort of gets back to our previous discussion here. A
lot of people sign up for things and then, you know, these are
part of your overall mission. How are we doing in those types
of areas?
I remember at, I think, Offutt Air Force Base you had a
pretty good linguists school. You know, how are we doing in
those areas--EOD, rescue, combat air controllers?
Mr. Duehring. Some of those, of course, have an increase in
the requirements, which is a challenge in that, as soon as the
requirement comes down and we have to fill it--and you cannot
just fill it overnight. So we use the bonus authority that we
have been given, very often to encourage people to come into
those career fields.
Now, EOD has some problems in the middle level. We would
try to retain those people. We would emphasize retaining those
folks because of the stress.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. You retain them with bonuses and other--
--
Mr. Duehring. We do. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. And there has been some level of success
in that area?
Mr. Duehring. There has.
Also we are trying to reduce the stress; you know, we
look--are there other people who can do the job? We work with
the other Services in trying to space out the deployments,
actively--very, very actively looking at who is available to do
what.
In the ISR program last fall we felt we were getting pretty
thin in the number of people that we had available to actually
fly these CAPs day in and day out. And what we did is, we
looked at each of the bases. In this case, North Dakota found
that they had a couple extra folks who were not that heavily
tasked, and we moved them in temporarily, or we gave the CPA to
another base to do it.
It is a lot of creative work to try to take the stress off
as well as put people in from the bottom.
Talking ISR, we are looking at some Navy assets, people
who--you know, the Navy is closing down a lot of their P-3
operations, and certainly on the Reserve side of the house, the
FA-18s are going away, others. We have got pilots there: We
would love to have you; we have got this great job if you would
like to come over.
So we look everywhere we can to try to take the pressure
off, as well as to build the force up from the bottom.

RECRUITING AND RETAINING

Mr. Frelinghuysen. The last question I have: What are you
doing about recruiting and retaining civilian and military
people that are, shall we say, knowledgeable about mental
health?
Mr. Duehring. Well, of course there has been a significant
increase in the requirement, the whole medical career field.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I sort of remember where some of the
other services are, but quite honestly I cannot remember what
your percentages were. How do they stand?
There is a lot of competition out here----
Mr. Duehring. Absolutely.
Mr. Frelinghuysen [continuing]. From the civilian side,
just in the general population. But how about on the Air Force
side of things?
Mr. Duehring. I will give you just a tidbit, and then I am
probably going to have to take the rest to give you an answer
back.
But I know that we have 600 active duty mental health
providers now. And we added 200 civilians to that recently. I
just got that information as we were preparing for this
hearing.
But as far as the overall numbers, I would be happy to send
those to you if I could.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I would like to have those for the
record.
Again, thank you both for your testimony.
[The information follows:]

Air Force active duty and reserve/guard components are using all
accession and retention pay authorities established by 37 USC Chapter
5. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)
sets rates for medical specialties in each military component, with
input from medical departments of all three services. Pays for a
particular specialty are generally level across the three Services. 37
USC Sec 335, Consolidation of Special Pays, will allow accession and
retention pays for mental health specialties that previously had been
ineligible for these pays. It is anticipated this guidance will allow
each Service the authority to better focus available funds to support
accession and retention of critically short specialties.
Air Force active duty and reserve components also use 10 USC
Chapter 105 and 10 USC Sec 16302 for the Health Professions Scholarship
Program and Health Professions Loan Repayment Program with regards to
these accession and retention programs. The Active Component also uses
Department of Defense Instruction 6000.13 for implementation guidance
for many of our accession and retention programs.
Our civilian component has multiple tools to attract and retain
civilian mental health providers:
Recruitment bonuses for new accessions (up to 25% of base
salary)
Retention allowances to sustain high caliber employees (up
to 25% of base salary)
Credit for non-federal and Uniformed Service experience
for annual leave accrual for new employees
Student Loan Repayment for new accessions ($10K per year
with $60K max payment)
Superior Qualification Appointments (for GS employees
only) provides an advance in-hire rate up to Step-10 of assigned grade

MENTAL HEALTH SPECIALTIES
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Retention
Civilian Civilian Active Active rate * at
Specialty auth/ percent duty auth/ duty mid-career
assigned manned assigned percent (10 YOS)
manned (percent)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Psychologist........................................ 18/18 100 256/205 80.1 6
Social Worker....................................... 168/165 98.2 199/209 105.0 53
Psychiatrist........................................ 1/1 100 87/94 108.0 25
Mental Health Nurse **.............................. 1/1 100 47/55 117.0 39
Mental Health Technician............................ 11/12 109 763/695 91.1 22
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table taken from 2008 HMPDS Report.
* Retention Rate added by AF/A1I based on current data. Mid-career (10 yr point) used as commonality among
career fields with differing educational obligations and requirements.
** Mental health Nurse: Due to small population size, Retention Rate may have high error rate.

Retention Rates
The average career length (ACL) for mental health providers is as
follows:
(Time is in Commissioned Years of Service (CYOS))
ACL--Social Worker--12.78 CYOS
ACL--Mental Health Nurses--11.22 CYOS *
* Mental Health Nurse (46P) authorizations are extremely small
(<100); data based on 3-yr average (FY06-FY08)
ACL--Psychiatrists--8.78 CYOS
ACL--Psychologists--5.47 CYOS
The decision point is where all military and educational
obligations have been fulfilled and the individual is first able to
separate. Based on historical data, retention for Mental Health
Providers is as follows:
Clinical Psychologists--20% after their military obligation is
complete (4yrs)
Mental Health Nurses--58% after their military obligation is
complete (4 yrs)
Psychiatrists--25% after their military obligation is complete (9
yrs)
Social Worker--88% after their military obligation is complete
(4yrs)

PILOTS AND NAVIGATORS

Mr. Rothman. I am going to ask a couple of follow-up
questions.
General, you mentioned briefly that there was some
additional need for bomber pilots and navigators. Could you
describe that a little bit?
General Newton. Yes, sir, I can. Again, it is not just
within the bomber community per se in terms of our what we call
``rated community,'' those who are trained specifically for
flight duties on the officers' side.
There is--throughout our Air Force, some needs that need to
be met across the rated community. It is not just Airmen who
are flying aircraft, but those who are assigned particular
duties that may be outside the cockpit. For us, it is staff
that requires their expertise at a staff level.
And so, as we focus on reinvigorating the nuclear
enterprise as our very top priority, we are making sure that we
have the appropriate number and quality of air bomber pilots
and navigators to fulfill those tasks. Again, we see that as an
increased requirement, and we are going to make sure that we
fulfill those requirements.
Mr. Rothman. And is it fair to say that the 2010 budget
submission will reflect your attention in that area?
General Newton. Sir, our plan is to make sure that we
indeed fulfill those requirements.

PERSONNEL AND READINESS

Mr. Rothman. Let me ask you, if you were sitting up here,
what question would you ask? What should we know that we have
not asked about with regard to Air Force personnel and
readiness?
General Newton. I will save the last for you.
But, sir, if I may, I believe the discussion--if I could
take a reflection on the last hour and a half or so: The
discussion with regard to all things people in the United
States Air Force is, first, a very top priority of ours. We are
an Air Force that provides total force capabilities to the
joint warfighter, as I mentioned, to nearly over 135 locations
around the globe.
As we meet the demands of today, the issue is not
necessarily just an end strength issue in terms of what the
number is, but in terms of how we are going to shape that
force, how we are going to shape that force for the joint
warfighter today, but also for tomorrow.
That compels us to put our priorities, sir, as our previous
discussion with regard to intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance capability. It requires us to put a priority
into the nuclear enterprise, to reinvigorate the nuclear
enterprise. It also compels us to make sure this growing cyber
capability with regard to network attack and network defense is
at an absolute premium. It is to make sure that we continue to
maintain a capability to provide acquisition excellence to this
Nation and to this Department.
Also we have to do effective maintenance with our aircraft.
It is all based on priorities, from reinvigorating the nuclear
enterprise, and partnering with the joint and coalition team to
winning today's fight.
It is certainly about taking care of our Airmen and their
families. It is making sure that we continue to modernize our
aircraft, and space inventory as well, and recapturing
acquisition excellence.
The last point I would raise, what I could have described
to you would have been in terms of platforms, things, aircraft,
space capabilities. What we focus on is our people. We provide
opportunities for development and take care of our Airmen and
their families.
Mr. Rothman. Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Duehring. You know, I started out in the Air Force a
long time ago and retired, and then fortunately came back after
working for a while with OSD. And my Air Force has changed
quite a bit.
I was a fighter pilot--and we talked about that a little
bit in the beginning--but that is not necessarily where most of
the work is being done today. You know, that may well be more
tomorrow's mission. And right now, I do not think that the
American public realizes how much we are in the fight every
single day because we do not deploy to do it.
If you go to Minot Air Force Base, if you go to North
Dakota, the Guard unit up there, the Predator Guard unit, if
you go to Creech, if you go to any of the missile career
fields, if you go to the space folks out in Colorado Springs or
if you go up to Fort Dix and watch the people who are going
through--on their way over, of course--you then would get some
sense of the day-in-and-day-out participation, seven days a
week. And this brings about some problems that we have to watch
out for.
The stress is not always associated with deployments. The
stress could well be the individual sitting there in a secure
environment at Creech who is actually launching missiles on
targets and then has to decompress as he walks out the door,
get into his car, go home and listen to how little Johnny did
in first grade. That is difficult for the human mind to do. You
do not have the time that we used to have, that we had when we
came back from Southeast Asia just to kind of heal and get back
into the flow.
It is a different kind of stress, and so that is why I
think we have to watch our folks from all aspects, but
appreciate the contributions they make.
And I want to put in a pitch for the Guard and Reserve.
Many people still think of the Guard and Reserve as a strategic
reserve; and in fact, we have lost all the people who I think
signed up for the 39 days a year and the education benefits
they could get for it. Folks coming in today know that if they
are going to be working in the Guard or Reserve it is going to
take more time than 39 days a year, and they are willing to do
it. If we meet their needs, they meet ours. And this is true of
the employers as well.
We did not talk about employers. Very, very critical to
this huge part of our family. And yet after eight years in this
war on terrorism, the employers, the Guardsmen, the Reservists,
their families as well as our active duty people keep coming
back, coming back, coming back.
I am astounded, frankly. I thought we were going to go off
a cliff years ago. We did not go over that cliff. It is amazing
that these people still come, and it is a tribute to some very
good programs that I think we have going.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you very much. And I just want to
conclude my part with what our illustrious chairman always
says. We are in the appropriating business. We want to make
sure that we appropriate to meet the needs that you have. And
so it is up to you to let us know what needs you have. And
again, our assumption is going to be that the 2010 budget
submission addresses all the needs that you have. And if not,
you will let us know.
Mr. Kingston.

SERVICE ACADEMIES

Mr. Kingston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I was at West Point this summer, and one of
the things I was shocked to learn is that there are 18 Members
of Congress who do not utilize appointments to West Point.
Is that number, 18, also true for the Air Force Academy.
Mr. Duehring. I do not know the exact number, but I know
this is a topic of discussion at our Board of Visitors
meetings. And what they did--I am in an oversight position, so
it is up to them to do--is, our members--I think you could talk
to Congressman DeFazio, Congresswoman Sanchez, would be good
people to talk to, they and their staffers are working
laterally within the organization, within Congress, because we
found that in many cases the staffers do not understand the
program.
And they are the first people that someone would come to
look for information. How do I do this? I am interested. Where
do I go? And to make sure that they are aware of it. Because we
found at the last meeting that the Members are interested, but
you get involved in a lot of other subjects, a lot of other
priorities. And so they have instituted a program to kind of
help give a boost, the input.
And this touches on the diversity issue that Congresswoman
Kilpatrick talked about earlier, too, which is a big concern
for us at the Academy. So I would perhaps mention that those
people are available to whittle down that number.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Jack, would you yield?
Mr. Kingston. Yes.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I serve on the Board of Visitors for the
Naval Academy. And they have turned the whole issue around.
They have gone after, you know, I think in a very comprehensive
way, all those Members of Congress that for one reason or
another have not been, you know, fulfilling their appointment
obligations. They have a very comprehensive plan. And I assume
most of the service academies are doing something similar.
But I feel a lot better, certainly, on the diversity side.
Mr. Kingston. I wanted to give you an opportunity to make
sure everybody in the room realized that was going on, that
there are 18 Members, and yet people have--you know, will stand
up and smack you around. I cannot believe a Member of Congress
would not know about this or would--let staffers get away with
not knowing the process.
So Members of Congress need to step forward and say, Look,
I disagree with the whole system, and that is why I am not
going to do it instead of feigning ignorance about the process.
But I am glad you guys are taking steps forward, because I
think it is just something people need to know here as we talk
about recruitment, that we have Members that are not giving
young men and women in their own district an opportunity to
participate in one of the best educational opportunities in the
world. And it is not necessarily a career in the Air Force. And
so if you do not want to go full-time career, you can still get
that education.

LASIK SURGERY

But the second question I had on LASIK surgery. You know,
we are all taught from youth on that you have to have great
eyes to be a pilot. Has LASIK surgery changed that for those of
us who do not have that gift?
Mr. Duehring. I know that there is a difference in the
accession policy for pilot training between the Air Force and
the Navy, and it may well be on this. I am getting into a gray
area that I do not know a whole lot about.
Would you like for us to give you the latest policy on
that? I am sure that is readily available.
Mr. Kingston. I think people it would be good for us to
know, because I am assuming that if Air Force or Navy pilots
are allowed to have corrective eye surgery, then it is really a
strong endorsement of the procedure, and that is why I am
asking it.
Mr. Duehring. I would be guessing at this point, sir. And I
would like to just give you a straight answer, if I could, by
going back to our Surgeon General.
Mr. Kingston. There is probably a lot of data out there now
that was not out there 10 years ago, I would imagine.
Mr. Duehring. We could look at it. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kingston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The information follows:]

The USAF-Refractive Surgery (USAF-RS) Program permits both advanced
surface ablation (ASA) and intra-stromal ablation (ISA) procedures in
eligible Air Force active duty and Air Force Reserve Component members
including pilots and pilot applicants. ASA approved procedures include
photorefractive keratectomy (PRK), laser in-situ epithelial
keratomileusis (LASEK), epi-LASIK and wave-front guided photorefractive
keratectomy (WFG-PRK). ISA approved procedures include standard laser
in-situ keratomileusis (LASIK) and its variants, wave-front guided
laser in-situ keratomileusis (WFG-LASIK), and technological advances in
the basic LASIK procedure, such as femtosecond technology. The
incorporation of WFG treatments into refractive surgery is expected to
improve visual outcomes, particularly in low light and low contrast
situations.
Other refractive surgery procedures, such as a radial keratotomy,
intracorneal rings, hyperopic (>+0.5 diopters) PRK and hyperopic LASIK
are less predictable, are associated with more complications and may
not achieve acceptable levels of stabilization. Therefore, these
procedures are not allowed for either trained flight personnel or
applicants. In addition, monovision treatments (one eye corrected for
distance and the other eye corrected for near) are not allowed for
aircrew.
The Air Force Medical Service can authorize both PRK and LASIK for
aircrew. PRK is currently preferred due to its proven track record and
issues regarding corneal flap healing. The Navy allows both LASIK and
PRK. Pre-refractive surgery refractive error limits are similar for
both Air Force and Navy, though the Navy will accept a greater degree
of far-sightedness (most refractive surgery candidates are near-
sighted).
Data from the USAF-RS Registry to date shows the clinical results
after PRK have been excellent with nearly 100% of flying duty personnel
returned to full operational activity. Following PRK, about 1% of
pilots and 5% of other aircrew are required to wear spectacles to
achieve distant 20/20 vision. Only 1% cannot achieve pre-op best
corrected level of vision after surgery. Average duty not to include
flying time is currently 13 weeks for PRK. Statistics on LASIK are not
available due to the few numbers of aircrew that have undergone this
treatment.

Mr. Rothman. Ms. Kaptur.

SUICIDES

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for the second
round.
I wanted to go, General Newton, back to my interest, one of
my interests here. Out of the 208,000, according to your
testimony, total force Airmen, do I read it correctly that 189
committed suicide since 2003? Is that right, based on the
numbers that are in your testimony?
General Newton. Yes, ma'am. I would have to refer to the
written record.
Ms. Kaptur. One hundred fifty--it is page 14. Do I just add
those up and I get the total? Is it 39--from 2003 to 2008, 39
suicide victims had deployed in the previous 12 months, but 150
victims had never deployed?
Is that a subset of the total or is that the total if you
add those two numbers together, please?
My question is, since 2003, how many Airmen have committed
suicide.
General Newton. Let me get back to you take that for the
record.
[The information follows:]

Since 2003 the Air Force has had a total of 234 active duty
suicides through the end of 2008. This equals an average of 39 suicides
per year and an average rate of 11 per 100,000. This compares to an
average rate from 1987 to 1996 of 13.5 per 100,000.
Suicides/Suicide Rate: Calendar Year 2008: 39/12.1* (rate per
100,000)
Calendar Year 2007: 34/10
Calendar Year 2006: 42/12.1
Calendar Year 2005: 31/8.9
Calendar Year 2004: 49/13.1
Calendar Year 2003: 38/10.2
* Calendar Year 2008 data has changed since original report to
Congress as the Armed Forces Medical Examiner recently determined a
death in July 2008 to have been a suicide.

RETENTION OF HEALTH CARE PERSONNEL

Ms. Kaptur. All right.
In your testimony on another page you talk about the Air
Force's inability to retain experienced health care personnel.
For the 10-year point minus 27 percent for physicians; minus 40
percent for dentists, page 11; minus 31 percent for nurses;
minus 33 percent for biomedical; am I reading that correctly?
General Newton. I think that is not necessarily a negative
factor. I think that is short of our goals that we are trying
to--either from recruiting or retention. We are only retaining
at the 10-year point is approximately 27 percent for
physicians, approximately 40 percent for dentists, 31 percent
for nurses and 33 percent, biomedical; within the health
professionals.
Ms. Kaptur. So if they leave, you hire someone else? You
are just saying they are not staying 10 years; is that what
that says?
General Newton. We would like to retain more. And again, we
are only meeting 27 percent of our retention goals for
physicians over that 10-year period.
Ms. Kaptur. Would nurses be your largest category of total
personnel? Physicians, dentists, nurses, biomedical science,
administrators, what would be your largest category there?
General Newton. It may be administrators, but let me take
that back. But nurses would be a significant part.
Ms. Kaptur. Pretty high?
General Newton. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Kaptur. Could you get back to me on what percentage of
those would be psychiatric nurses?
General Newton. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Kaptur. And specifically with that training?
General Newton. Yes, ma'am.
[The information follows:]

The Air Force Medical Service consists of five corps. After
training numbers are removed, the largest is the Nurse Corps at 3,132
personnel. Of the personnel identified in the 2008 Health Manpower and
Personnel Data System (HMPDS) Report, 1.7% (55 personnel) of the Nurse
Corps is identified to have specialized training as ``psychiatric
nurses''. This designation includes two specialties, the ``Mental
Health Nurse'' and the advanced practice ``Psychiatric Nurse
Practitioner''. The ``Mental Health Nurse'' primarily works as a mental
health provider in the outpatient setting.

Ms. Kaptur. Then on page 18 of your testimony you state
that there is a central database that you maintain that tracks
suicide events and facilitates the analysis of potential risk
factors.
Do you maintain such a database for PTSD, for other
neuropsychiatric conditions? For flashbacks? What kind of
database do you maintain for neuropsychiatric conditions?
General Newton. Let me get back with you on that because
again I think that has a lot to do with how we prevent and
treat and so forth. And that is very essential.
Ms. Kaptur. What data are you collecting and how have you
interacted with it? What is it teaching you?
General Newton. And perhaps what you do with the data.
Ms. Kaptur. What you are collecting, and then how are you
interacting as a service with that.
And then I am very interested in the architecture at DoD,
because we have been fighting to get it, and I am not sure we
are there yet. We met with the Surgeons General; and frankly,
the Navy was the most articulate of all the services we met
with. We will see what they are like this year when they come
up before us.
But to try to get all of you to work together--you know,
what is your overarching perspective on this subset of
illnesses as a part of total force, and what are you doing
about it? It seems to be different in each department. And do
you assign someone to participate in an agency-wide, a
department-wide approach to dealing with this set of illnesses?
General Newton. Actually, we do participate with the other
Services. And as I refer to my comments earlier, I personally
met with the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for their personnel.
As you have heard, I am sure, the Army has gone through
some challenges, as well, with regard to suicides. He and I
have had lengthy conversations and discussions and interacted
directly in terms of the programs that they are putting forth
in terms of what we can share amongst our Services. That is
absolutely essential, the integration of the data, the
understanding of the nature of what the data is telling us, how
it is not necessarily just kept within one Service, but we
integrate that with the other Services is important.
Ms. Kaptur. I know my time has expired, but I would very
much appreciate an answer back explaining to me how Air Force
participates at DoD with the other services, at what level you
participate in discussions about this set of illnesses, and
what kind of architecture currently exists at the Department of
Defense for these illnesses.
General Newton. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Newton. Thank you.
Mr. Rothman. Ms. Granger?
Ms. Granger. I have no questions.
Mr. Rothman. Mr. Bishop?
Mr. Bishop. Nothing.
Mr. Rothman. The Committee is adjourned until 10:00 a.m.
tomorrow.
I want to thank you, Mr. Secretary, and you, General
Newton. A wonderful presentation.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the
answers thereto follow:]
Missions and Requirements
Question. The Air Force is now embracing a collaborative and
supportive role in the types of operations being conducted in Iraq and
Afghanistan. In general, Air Force leaders are attempting to change the
Service's culture to meet new challenges. While the Air Force has
always provided mission support in the struggle against extremism,
these missions were designated ``In Lieu Of'' (ILO). ILO is defined as
a standard force and equipment that is deployed to execute missions and
tasks outside of its core competencies. The Air Force now views these
missions as core responsibilities and now refers to ILOs as Joint
Expeditionary Tasking (JET). However, to support all JET requirements
there are some fundamental realities associated with the impact of
increased deployment tempo and requirements. These requirements are
filled at the expense of traditional missions.
General Newton, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force has stated he
wants to change the Air Force's culture. Please elaborate what types of
changes we can expect to see in the Air Force?
Answer. The Air Force is committed to the Joint fight. We are an
equal member of the Joint team as indicated by our common ethic ``Send
me.'' In December 2008 the Air Force used Joint Expeditionary Taskings
as an all-inclusive action and term connoting the spirit of ``All in''
and denotes our role as joint partners. Additionally, we reinforce
newly established Air Force Priorities as a part of the culture shift:
1. Reinvigorate the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise; Accountability,
precision, and reliability in Air Force processes
2. Partner with the Joint and Coalition team to win today's fight;
joint capabilities, interoperability, trust (C2, ISR, non-traditional
roles)
3. Develop and care for Airmen and their families; reinforce our
Warfighting Ethos, expeditionary combat mindset
4. Modernize our aging air and space inventories; reset and build a
balanced force for the future...no litmus tests
5. Recapture Acquisition Excellence; process, people, performance
Question. General Newton, what new missions and requirements will
the Air Force take on as we move forward? Of those, how many were once
performed by the Army and Marine Corps?
Answer. The Air Force has been involved in the performance of joint
expeditionary tasking (formally termed In-lieu Of) missions since 2002.
The Air Force began with approximately 1,500 total requirements. We
have experienced an increase in such taskings by 10 percent per fiscal
year up to a total of 6,500 in Fiscal Year 2008. The majority of the
original non-standard taskings were Army shortfalls; however, more
recently the growth in these requirements has been for training teams.
While these teams don't require the Air Force to work out of its core
competencies none of the Services actually organize, train, and equip
to perform this mission. While the Air Force does expect some continued
growth in training team requirements, we don't anticipate any new
missions.
Question. Mr. Duehring, how many Airmen are currently
deployed in the Central Command Area of Responsibility, and of
that, how many are used for Joint missions?
Answer. The Air Force currently has 27,119 Airmen deployed
to the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility. Of those,
4,240 Airmen are deployed in support of Joint Expeditionary
Taskings.
Question. General Newton, the mission to conduct
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance for combatant
commanders is vital. It is our understanding that the Air Force
is currently playing a critical role in this mission, a role
that is expected to continue expanding to match 50 unmanned
Combat Air Patrols. Will this expanded role affect Air Force
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance manning
requirements and, if so, how is the Service addressing these
needs?
Answer. The Air Force is working with Office of Secretary
of Defense on the Fiscal Year 2010 President's Budget request
to fund active duty end strength to just over 332,000 to
support new/emerging missions and robust existing missions,
such as providing manpower to increase Predator/Reaper/
Distributed Common Ground Systems operational capability to 50
Combat Air Patrols.
Question. Mr Duehring, since the ISR mission is a growing
field, are there plans to provide a special pay for this?
Answer. No. The Air Force does not plan to offer a special
pay for the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
mission. A majority of the career fields within the
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance mission already
receive additional compensation through existing special and
incentive pay programs (e.g., Selective Reenlistment Bonus,
flight pay, etc).
Question. Gentlemen, what is the Air Force's nuclear
manning requirement and how are they sourced? Are you able to
fully source all your requirements for this field? If not, what
are your shortfalls?
Answer. The Air Force manning requirements to support the
nuclear mission differ from the Joint Expeditionary Taskings,
in that nuclear mission requirements are funded permanent party
authorizations. The Air Force sources these requirements from
core career fields. We actively manage the career fields to
ensure we're able to meet mission requirements.
Currently, the only career fields supporting the nuclear
enterprise which are projected to have chronic shortages are
the bomber pilots and combat systems operators. However, these
shortages are part of larger rated management issues and not
limited to the nuclear force.

Air Force Suicide Prevention

Question. To prevent suicides the Air Force relies on the
Air Force Suicide Prevention Program (AFSPP). The Air Force
believes the AFSPP has highlighted community awareness of
suicide and suicide risk factors. In addition, it has created a
safety net that provides protection and adds support for those
in trouble. This program is a population-oriented approach to
reducing the risk of suicide. In addition, the program has
implemented eleven initiatives aimed at strengthening social
support, promoting development of social skills, and changing
policies and norms to encourage effective help-seeking
behaviors. AFSPP's eleven initiatives include: Leadership
involvement, Suicide prevention in professional military
education, Guidelines for use of mental health services,
Community preventive services, Community education and
training, Investigative interview policy, Critical incident
stress management, Integrated delivery system (IDS), Limited
privilege suicide prevention program, Behavioral health survey,
and Suicide event surveillance system.
Mr. Duehing, does the Air Force have any program for Airmen
and their families to prepare them for the stressors of war?
Answer. The Air Force supports Airmen and their families
from the front line to the home front. At home, information and
referral services are offered directly to spouses and families.
Over the past year, the following programs and services
were offered: Pre-deployment briefings for 100,000 members and
families; free weekly morale calls to keep families connected
and help reduce their sense of isolation; reintegration
briefings for military spouses that prepared them for changes
during the separation; free oil changes for each deployed
family; and non-medical counseling sessions for families.
Airmen are also kept informed through Professional Military
Education where suicide is addressed as a leadership issue with
a focus on knowing, recognizing, coping and dealing with pre-
and post-deployment stressors.
The Airmen Center in Al Udeid, Iraq provided numerous
consultations on financial readiness, reintegration, and
reunion. Air Force provides 16,000 hours of free child care
each month to assist Airmen with longer hours on evenings,
overnight, and weekends. Air Force also partners with the Air
Force Aid Society to provide free child care to parents during
circumstances such as deployments, remote tours of duty, and
extended hours. The Youth Camping Program offers camp
experiences for military children annually. The Air Force
Reserve Command also hosted a deployment camp for children of
guard and reserve members.
Additionally, the Air Force united with the National
Military Family Association Operation Purple Camps to provide
free, week-long camps to help military kids experience fun
while learning coping skills to deal with war-related stress.
Question. What screening process does the Air Force use to
detect possible mental health issues before and after
deployment? In addition, please explain what services are
available to Airmen in theater.
Answer. All Airmen are screened for mental health concerns
upon accession and annually via the Preventive Health
Assessment. Before deploying the Pre-Deployment Health
Assessment is conducted and the mental health clinic screens
medical records for those who may require a personal interview.
While deployed there are combat stress facilities that are
available to monitor the health of deployed Airmen and assist
when needed. The Air Force operates two large combat stress
facilities and has many other smaller clinics attached to our
medical facilities in deployed locations. All of these teams
are active in prevention and outreach while taking self-
referrals and primary care referrals when treatment is
required. At the end of the deployment Airmen are again
screened using the Post-Deployment Health Assessment and
appropriate referrals are made in theater or upon redeployment.
After returning home Airmen are screened once again with the
Post-Deployment Health Re-Assessment.
Recruiting and Retention
Question. In fiscal year 2008, overall active duty Air Force
retention rates finished below annual retention goals, while the Air
Guard and Reserve officer and enlisted rates met or exceeded all
aggregate retention goals. Active duty retention should trend slightly
upward due to the poor state of the economy during fiscal year 2009.
However, the Air Force will still continue to see shortfalls in
critical and stressed specialties in officer and enlisted career fields
of security forces, combat control, operations intelligence, and air
field operations. To address this problem the Air Force has targeted
retention bonuses to include Selective Reenlistment/Initial Enlistment
Bonuses and Critical Skills Retention Bonuses for officers. Selective
Reenlistment Bonuses are the most effective, responsive and measurable
tool for targeted retention. Additionally, the Air Force has instituted
voluntary and involuntary retraining for officers and enlisted
targeting career fields with overages into career fields with
identified shortages.
Gentlemen, since the Air Force is very close to its planned end
strength goal what force shaping measures will the Air Force use to get
the right mix of personnel it needs?
Answer. The Air Force will adjust accession levels by career field,
offer initial enlistment bonuses (to recruit into particular career
fields), retrain from skills with inventory surpluses to skills with
inventory deficits, and offer Selective Reenlistment Bonuses to skills
where we need to boost retention.
Question. General Newton, now that the Air Force is embracing a
role in ground combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, will you
start to recruit more for ground combat forces or will you retain the
current recruiting model?
Answer. The Air Force is substantially increasing authorized
strength levels and therefore recruiting for 1C4X1 (Tactical Air Patrol
Party) Airmen who are embedded with Army ground troops to call in air
strikes and for 1T2X1 (Pararescue) Airmen.
Question. General Newton, what areas are causing challenges (i.e.,
stressed career fields) and what specific efforts are being undertaken
to address them? What bonus programs are in place?
Answer. We currently have nine enlisted and seven officer
specialties that we characterize and monitor as stressed career fields.
The stressors for each of the specialties are unique to each specialty
leading to a tailored approach to aid them to mitigate the stressing
factors. The initiatives, programs and bonuses we use to help these
stressed specialties include increased accessions, cross-training,
special duty assignment pay, enlistment/reenlistment bonuses, critical
skills retention bonuses, aviator continuation pay, and increased
promotion opportunity. The following is our current list:
Enlisted Stressed Specialties
1C2 Combat Control
1C4 Tactical Air Control Party
1T2 Pararescue
3E2 Pavement/Construction Equipment
3E3 Structural
3E6 Operations Management
3E8 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
3P0 Security Forces
6C0 Contracting
Officer Stressed Specialties
12S Special Operations Navigator
13D Control & Recovery
13M Airfield Operations
31P Security Forces
32E Civil Engineer
35P Public Affairs
64P Contracting
Question. Gentlemen, the Committee understands that the Air Force
has instituted voluntary and involuntary retraining for officers and
enlisted targeting career fields with overages into career fields with
indentified shortages. Can the Airmen decline this retraining?
Answer. Retraining of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) is in two
phases. Phase I is purely voluntary, but NCOs are advised of their
vulnerability for selection in Phase II so that they may decide to take
advantage of the wider selection of available specialties. In Phase II,
NCOs in specific specialties, grades and years of service are directed
to submit retraining applications for remaining retraining
opportunities. They may decline retraining, however, doing so makes
them ineligible to reenlist and they will be required to separate at
the completion of their current enlistment.
Retraining of first-term Airmen is voluntary in connection with
reenlistment for a second term--as an incentive to reenlist.
Retraining of commissioned officers is voluntary at this time.
Current requirements are small enough to satisfy with voluntary
retraining.
Question. Please explain how the Air Force chooses the personnel to
retrain. Is there a screening process to determine skills and aptitude
for their new specialty?
Answer. Retraining of commissioned officers is currently only
voluntary. This is because the requirements are small enough to satisfy
with voluntary retraining. Officers in overage specialties and year
groups are solicited to apply for available specialties.
Retraining of first-term Airmen is voluntary in connection with
reenlistment for a second term--as an incentive to reenlist. As they
near the end of their first enlistment, the Airmen may submit
applications for published retraining opportunities.
Retraining of non-commissioned officers is in two phases. Specific
eligibility requirements are established--grade, years of service,
current specialty--along with disqualifying factors from their record
like disciplinary actions. NCOs in targeted overage specialties are
individually identified based on these criteria and informed of their
vulnerability for retraining. They may apply for available specialties
in Phase I or wait to see what requirements remain in Phase II. If
directed to apply for retraining in Phase II, they must apply for an
available specialty or become ineligible to reenlist, separating at the
end of their current enlistment.
All officer and enlisted Airmen are screened to ensure they meet
the qualifications of the specialty for which they apply, including a
physical examination if necessary. Enlisted Airmen may also retake the
Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery to try to improve their
scores so as to increase the number of specialties for which they are
qualified.
Question. Mr. Duehring, what is the average cost to the Air
Force to retrain these Service members?
Answer. The total cost per Airman is on average $3,500 for
specialties with short training pipelines (approximately $2,700
in travel and per diem plus approximately $800 in schoolhouse
operating costs), not including military personnel costs, base
operating support tail, construction of facilities and
acquisition of major training systems. Specialties with longer
training pipelines also require a permanent change of station
for training, with associated costs. The relative proportion of
retraining requirements with short and long training pipelines
varies from year to year, but in Fiscal Year 2009,
approximately 1,750 out of 2,600 have short pipelines.
Question. The Committee remains concerned regarding the
recruiting and retention for mission-critical occupational
specialties. What steps are being taken to fill the specialty
occupations?
Answer. Once a mission critical specialty is identified
with manning or retention issues, steps are taken to increase
accessions, modify or introduce enlistment and reenlistment
bonuses and cross-training to help mitigate the problems.
Roughly 65 percent of recruits enter the Air Force with
guaranteed specialties in their enlistment contracts. The other
35 percent are enlisted in one of four aptitude areas--
mechanical, administrative, general, or electronics. The
aptitude areas provide the Air Force flexibility to classify
these recruits into a specific field just before they graduate
from Basic Military Training, allowing for attrition in Basic
Military Training and changes in the accession plan. We are
currently on track to fill 100 percent of all enlisted
specialty occupations for Fiscal Year 2009.
Question. Mr. Duehring, has the Air Force analyzed why
these occupational specialties have consistently been under
filled? What is the operational impact of these shortages? What
resources are needed to fill these positions?
Answer. Yes. The Air Force has analyzed why these
occupational specialties have consistently been under filled.
High operational demand, rapid mission growth, and technical
training constraints are common reasons. The operational
impacts of these shortages are; increased work tempo and
potential for mission degradation. To address these shortages
increased end strength to 332,000 is focused on supporting
emerging mission growth and existing mission critical
shortages.
Question. Mr. Duehring, recruiting and retention goals are
often relayed to Congress in the aggregate providing little or
no visibility into how each occupational specialty is staffed.
Please provide the Committee on recruiting and retention by Air
Force specialty code.
Answer. The Air Force is on track to complete Fiscal Year
2009 at 100 percent in each enlisted specialty (Tab 1).
Line officers are not recruited by specialty. Our
commissioning sources produce officers in rated (pilot, combat
systems operator, air battle manager), technical (scientists,
engineers and weather officers), non-technical (non-rated
operations, logistics, support and acquisitions), and judge
advocate categories, who are then classified to meet Air Force
needs. For Fiscal Year 2009, we expect to meet or exceed
requirements for all line officers except electrical engineers,
special tactics officers and combat rescue officers (Tab 2).
The Air Force reclassifies eliminees from other training
pipelines (for example, pilot training) and solicits officers
who have completed initial assignments in other specialties to
fill shortfalls in these areas.
Non-line officers (health professions and chaplains) are
recruited by specialty and continue to be a recruiting
challenge (Tab 3).
Retention is better than expected and healthy for most
specialties (Tab 4 and Tab 5).
Tab 1--Enlisted Accessions
Tab 2--Line Officer Accessions
Tab 3--Health Professions/Chaplains
Tab 4--Enlisted Retention

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Enlistment and Retention Bonuses

Question. The military services offer a variety of
enlistment and re-enlistment bonuses to attract new recruits
into the military specialties that are considered ``hard to
fill,'' as well as to encourage experienced military members in
``shortage jobs'' to stay in past their first enlistment
period.
Mr. Duehring, what was the total dollar amount spent on Air
Force recruiting and retention bonuses for Fiscal Year 2009?
Answer. Bonuses are payments the Air Force makes to
individuals in exchange for a commitment to multiple years of
service or to encourage enlistment or commissioning in specific
skills. For recruiting purposes, we expect to spend $27.7
million in new bonuses and $7.4 million in anniversary payments
for previous multi-year contracts, for a total of $35.1
million.
For retention purposes, we expect to spend $200.2 million
in new bonuses and $71.8 million in anniversary payments, for a
total of $272 million.
Question. Mr. Duehring, what is the range of individual bonuses for
recruiting? For retention? Please explain why there are differences.
Answer. The differences in bonus amounts are based on Air Force
assessment of what it takes to recruit and retain the various
specialties.
Initial enlistment bonuses are provided for nine Air Force
Specialty Codes. They range from $1,000 to $3,000 for 4-year and $2,000
to $13,000 for 6-year enlistments.
Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRBs) are a monetary incentive to
encourage reenlistments in certain skills to sustain career force
objectives. SRBs are offered in certain skills by zones (based on years
of service) when retention factors indicate a need. Based on retention
health, a multiplier (0 to 7) is assigned to determine the dollar
amount of the bonus. Bonuses are computed by multiplying one month base
pay by the SRB multiple and the number of years reenlisting. Currently,
individual bonuses range from $1,000 to $90,000. Individuals receive 50
percent of the bonus upon reenlistment and the remaining balance is
paid in equal installments on the anniversary of the reenlistment over
the contract period.
Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRBs) is an Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD)-driven requirement geared at retaining
eligible Airmen in specific skills and supplements the SRB program. The
goal is to increase retention and facilitate an increase in Special
Forces. OSD has designated two Air Force specialties (Combat
Controllers and Pararescue) to receive the CSRB. Individuals must have
at least 19 years, but not more than 24 years, and reenlist or extend
for a period of 1 to 6 years to qualify for the CSRB. The contract
period (number of years) of the reenlistment/extension determines the
individual amount of the bonus, but ranges between $8,000 and $150,000.
Question. Gentlemen, have you found any imbalances or inequities in
your recruiting and retention bonus structure?
Answer. No. Our initial enlistment bonus program is meeting the
intended purpose of attracting qualified applicants into ``hard-to-
fill'' Air Force specialties. Our retention bonus programs are
continuously reviewed in order to target the right population and to
combat retention problems. These reviews ensure the structure of our
programs remain equitable and balanced within the Air Force.
Question. Mr. Duehring, does the Air Force plan to review its
recruiting and retention bonus program?
Answer. Yes. Initial enlistment bonuses are reviewed and adjusted
annually based on Air Force requirements and difficulty to recruit. We
continuously review all retention bonus programs to ensure we are
targeting the correct skills and years of service. Adjustments to the
program are made when retention needs dictate and/or when affected by
budgetary constraints.
Question. Mr. Duehring, is the Air Force going to promote non-
monetary bonuses such as tuition assistance and the new G.I. Bill?
Answer. The Air Force continues to use non-monetary incentives,
such as tuition assistance and the Post-9/11 GI Bill, to attract and
retain highly qualified applicants, to include those in ``hard to
fill'' and ``shortage'' career fields. The Air Force promotes military
tuition assistance and the various GI Bill programs at numerous points
in an Airman's career.
Recruiters brief potential applicants on these programs as they
compete with the other Services, civilian employers, and academic
institutions for the same eligible population of Americans. During
Basic Military Training and Officer Training School, Airmen are briefed
on the military tuition assistance and GI Bill programs. Additionally,
when enlisted Airmen arrive at their first duty station they are again
briefed on tuition assistance and GI Bill programs during the mandatory
First Term Airmen Course. Officers are also required to receive
counseling and to make a Montgomery GI Bill election within 14 days of
arriving at their first permanent duty station. As an Airman continues
in his/her career, the installation Career Assistance Advisor and
Education and Training Section personnel provide follow-up counseling
on education options to include military tuition assistance and GI Bill
programs. It is also mandatory that Education and Training Section
counselors brief all Airmen who are registering for courses on
applicable tuition assistance and GI Bill programs and policies. The
Air Force has also created the Air Force Virtual Education Center to
reach our Internet-savvy Airmen. Airmen can research benefit policy,
identify academic institutions, and apply for tuition assistance on-
line. Finally, education is inculcated in our Air Force culture and
commanders and supervisors at all levels stress the benefits of the
tuition assistance and GI Bill programs. This focus on education helps
explain the fact that Air Force enlisted personnel have earned
approximately 69 percent of all degrees awarded to the Department of
Defense enlisted personnel since Fiscal Year 2001.
The Air Force is also aggressively preparing for the August 1,
2009, Post-9/11 GI Bill effective date. Subject matter experts on the
Air Staff and at the Air Force Personnel Center are developing and
executing a Strategic Communication plan as the Department of Veterans
Affairs and Office of the Secretary of Defense make details available.
Base Education and Training Sections are currently conducting Post-9/11
GI Bill spread the word briefings. These same briefings, along with
frequently asked question and answers, are posted on the previously
mentioned Air Force Virtual Education Center. Finally, Air Education
and Training Command and Basic Military Training subject matter experts
are updating the current lesson plan to ensure the Post-9/11 GI Bill is
briefed to all trainees starting on the August 1, 2009 effective date.
Question. Mr. Duehring, can you provide the Committee with a
complete list of all recruitment and retention bonuses for each
specialty code that is eligible for a bonus? Can you also provide the
average bonus for each specialty code?
Answer. Initial Enlistment Bonus: Bonuses are offered in nine Air
Force Specialty Codes with options for six or four year contracts.
1A8X1--Airborne Linguist ($12K 6/YR/$3K 4-YR), 1N3XX--Crypto Linguist
($12K 6-YR/$3K 4-YR), 1C2X1--Combat Controller ($13K 6-YR/$3K 4-YR),
1C4X1--Tactical Air Command and Control ($10K 6-YR/$3K 4-YR), 1T2X1--
Para Rescue ($13K 6-YR/$3K 4-YR), 1T0X1--Survival, Evasion, Resistance,
Escape ($12K 6-YR/$3K 4-YR), 1W0X2--Special Operations Weather Team
($5K 6-YR/$1K 4-YR), 3E8X1--Explosive Ordnance Disposal ($13K 6-YR/$3K
4-YR), 3PDX1--Security Forces ($2K 6-YR)

------------------------------------------------------------------------
SRB Average
Title ------------------------------------------
Zone A Zone B Zone C Zone E
------------------------------------------------------------------------
In-Flight Refueling.......... -- 26.5K 25.5K --
Flight Engineer.............. 20K 26.5K 12.2K --
Aircraft Loadmaster.......... -- 52.9K 12.2K --
Airborne Mission System...... 9.5K 30K 12.2K --
Airborne Battle Mgt System... -- 33.9K 25.5K --
Aerial Gunner................ 47.3K 49.5K 12.2K --
Airborne Cryptologic Linguist 57.3K 71.2K 59.5K --
Aviation Resource Mgmt....... 9.5K 11.6K -- --
Air Traffic Control.......... 57.3K 74.5K 76.2K --
Combat Control............... 68.5K 77.4K 83K --
Command Post................. 9.5k 11.6K -- --
Tactical Air Control Party... 68.5K 77.4K 83K 35.5K
Aero Con & Warn Sys.......... 37.1K 26.5K 25.5K --
Space System Operations...... 42K 11.6K -- --
Airfield Management.......... 47.3K -- 25.5K --
Operations Intelligence...... 44.5K 74.5K 68.3K --
Imagery Analysis............. 57.3K 77.4K 80.1K --
Comm Signals Intelligence.... 30.2K -- -- --
Cryptologic Linguist......... 47.3K 71.2K 25.5K --
Network Intelligence Analysis 20K 59.1K 25.5K --
Elect Signals Intel -- 49.5K 24K --
Exploitation.
Surv, Evas, Res, Escape...... 42K 49.5K 59.5K 52.2K
Pararescue................... 68.5K 77.4K 83K --
Weather...................... 30.2K 26.5K 12.2K --
Combat Operations Weather.... 30.2K 26.5K 12.2K --
Av Test, Comp, Av Sens Sys & 9.5K -- -- --
Elec War (shreds only).
A-10, F-15 & U-2 Avionic 42K 26.5K -- --
System.
Tactical Aircraft Maintenance 15K -- -- --
Aerospace Maintenance (shreds 26.3K -- -- --
only).
Int Av Sys, Comm, Nav, Misn.. 20K -- -- --
Int Av Sys Inst & Flt Control 30.2K 11.6K -- --
Int Av Sys, Elec Warfare..... 30.2K -- 12.2K --
Int Av Sys, Air Surv Rad 9.5K -- -- --
Systems.
Acft Fuel Systems............ -- 26.5K -- --
Acft Hydraulics Sys.......... 9.5K 11.6K -- --
Aircraft Metals Technology... 9.5K 26.5K 12.2K --
Nondestructive Inspection.... -- 11.6K 12.2K --
Aircraft Structural -- 11.6K 12.2K --
Maintenance.
Low Observable Aircraft -- 11.6K 12.2K --
Structural Maintenance.
Ground Radar Systems......... 26.3K -- -- --
Logistics Plans.............. 20K 33.9K -- --
Msl & Space Sys Elect -- -- 12.2K --
Maintenance.
Msl & Space Sys Maintenance.. -- -- 25.5K --
Msl & Space Facilities....... 9.5K -- -- --
Precision Meas Equipment..... 20K 17K -- --
Maintenance Mgmt Analysis.... 20K -- -- --
Maint Mgmt Production........ 9.5K -- -- --
Material Mgmt................ 9.5K -- -- --
Vehicle Operations........... 9.5K 11.6K -- --
Air Transportation........... -- 11.6K 12.2K --
Vehicle & Equip Maintenance.. 9.5K -- -- --
Vehicle Mgmt & Analysis...... 26.3K 26.5K -- --
Munitions Sys................ -- 26.5K -- --
Comm--Computer Sys Ops....... 20K -- -- --
Comm--Computer Sys Cont...... 30.2K 11.6K 12.2K --
Heat, Vent, A/C & Refrig..... 15K -- -- --
Pavement & Const Equipment... 44.5K 52.9K -- --
Structural................... 44.5K 52.9K 12.2K --
Utilities Systems............ 9.5K 26.5K -- --
Pest Management.............. 9.5K -- 12.2K --
Engineering Assistant........ 9.5K -- 12.2K --
Operations Management........ 30.2K -- 25.5K --
Explosive Ord Disposal....... 64.5K 71.2K 68.3K 80.5K
Emergency Management......... -- 26.5K 45.4K --
Public Affairs............... 9.5K -- -- --
Elect Signals Intel -- 49.5K 24K --
Exploitation.
Surv, Evas, Res, Escape...... 42K 49.5K 59.5K 52.2K
Pararescue................... 68.5K 77.4K 83K --
Weather...................... 30.2K 26.5K 12.2K --
Combat Operations Weather.... 30.2K 26.5K 12.2K --
Av Test, Comp, Av Sens Sys & 9.5K -- -- --
Elec War (shreds only).
A-10, F-15 & U-2 Avionic 42K 26.5K -- --
System.
Tactical Aircraft Maintenance 15K -- -- --
Aerospace Maintenance (shreds 26.3K -- -- --
only).
Int Av Sys, Comm, Nav, Misn.. 20K -- -- --
Int Av Sys Inst & Fit Control 30.2K 11.6K -- --
Int Av Sys, Elec Warfare..... 30.2K -- 12.2K --
Int Av Sys, Air Surv Rad 9.5K -- -- --
Systems.
Acft Fuel Systems............ -- 26.5K -- --
Acft Hydraulics Sys.......... 9.5K 11.6K -- --
Aircraft Metals Technology... 9.5K 26.5K 12.2K --
Nondestructive Inspection.... -- 11.6K 12.2K --
Aircraft Structural -- 11.6K 12.2K --
Maintenance.
Low Observable Aircraft -- 11.6K 12.2K --
Structural Maintenance.
Ground Radar Systems......... 26.3K -- -- --
Logistics Plans.............. 20K 33.9K -- --
Msl & Space Sys Elect -- -- 12.2K --
Maintenance.
Msl & Space Sys Maintenance.. -- -- 25.5K --
Msl& Space Facilities........ 9.5K -- -- --
Precision Meas Equipment..... 20K 17K -- --
Maintenance Mgmt Analysis.... 20K -- -- --
Maint Mgmt Production........ 9.5K -- -- --
Material Mgmt................ 9.5K -- -- --
Vehicle Operations........... 9.5K 11.6K -- --
Air Transportation........... -- 11.6K 12.2K --
Vehicle & Equip Maintenance.. 9.5K -- -- --
Vehicle Mgmt & Analysis...... 26.3K 26.5K -- --
Munitions Sys................ -- 26.5K -- --
Comm--Computer Sys Ops....... 20K -- -- --
Comm--Computer Sys Cont...... 30.2K 11.6K 12.2K --
Heat, Vent, A/C & Refrig..... 15K -- -- --
Pavement & Const Equipment... 44.5K 52.9K -- --
Structural................... 44.5K 52.9K 12.2K --
Utilities Systems............ 9.5K 26.5K -- --
Pest Management.............. 9.5K -- 12.2K --
Engineering Assistant........ 9.5K -- 12.2K --
Operations Management........ 30.2K -- 25.5K --
Explosive Ord Disposal....... 64.5K 71.2K 68.3K 80.5K
Emergency Management......... -- 26.5K 45.4K --
Public Affairs............... 9.5K -- -- --
Radio & TV Broadcast......... 20K 11.6K -- --
Security Forces--Only Slick.. 9.5K -- -- --
Security Forces Mil Work Dog. 30.2K 11.6K -- --
Security Forces Combat Arms.. 30.2K 11.6K -- --
Medical Materiel............. -- 11.6K -- --
Bioenvironmental Engineer.... 9.5K -- 12.2K --
Mental Health Services....... 30.2K 26.5K -- --
Public Health................ 9.5K -- -- --
Cardiopulmonary Lab.......... 15K 11.6K -- --
Physical Medicine............ 9.5K -- -- --
Aerospace Medical Services... 9.5K -- -- --
Aerospace Med Serv, Neurology 9.5K -- -- --
Aerospace Med Serv, IDMT..... 20K 26.5K -- --
Surgical Services, Urology... 9.5K 11.6K -- --
Surgical Services, 9.5K 11.6K -- --
Orthopedics.
Surg Serv, 9.5K 11.6K -- --
Otorhinolaryngology.
Diagnostic Imaging (shreds 26.3K -- -- --
only).
Dental Laboratory............ 20K 26.5K -- --
Paralegal.................... 9.5K -- -- --
Contracting.................. 57.3K 59.1K 68.3K 35.5K
Financial Mgt & Comptroller.. 9.5K 26.5K -- --
Special Investigation........ -- 30K 45.4K --
Interpreter/Translator....... 47.3K 59.1K 38.1K --
Technical Applications 9.5K 11.6K -- --
Specialist.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
21 months to 6 years in service
6 to 10 years of service
10 to 14 years of service
18 to 20 years in service
*** All avgs based on current FY takers

Air Guard and Air Force Reserve Issues

Question. General Newton, describe the Air Guards' participation in
Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) mission. What percent of the air defense
mission is being flown by the Air Guard?
Answer. There are currently eighteen designated steady-state Air
Sovereignty Alert sites in the United States. The Air National Guard
provides personnel and equipment at sixteen of the eighteen Air
Sovereignty Alert sites while the active duty Air Force provides
personnel and equipment at the remaining two sites. Although exact
numbers are not readily available, the mission percentage share for Air
National Guard and Air Force is relative to this break-out. In keeping
with the recommendations of the Congressional Commission on the
National Guard and Reserves, the Air Force emphasizes the total force
aspect of Air Sovereignty Alert mission and every other operation
supported by the Air Force to prevent any institutional prejudice for
duty status that might arise from disparate designations.

Personnel TEMPO

Question. The increase of deployments in the past few years for
domestic disasters, contingency operations, or Military Operations
Other Than War (MOOTW), clearly stresses military personnel and their
families.
Gentlemen, what is the average time Airmen are away from home
during the year for training, exercises or deployments other than Iraq
and Afghanistan?
Answer. Our Airmen averaged about 72 days temporary duty in Fiscal
Year 2008 to places other than Iraq/Afghanistan (100,405 Total Force
Airmen). Airmen attending training for various reasons to maintain
readiness in addition to deployments averaged about 28 days temporary
duty in Fiscal Year 2008 (combat skills training, civil affairs, mobile
training teams, etc.) (7,176 Airmen--most of these Airmen deploy to the
U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.
Question. Mr. Duehring, please explain how the Air Force manages
personnel tempo so it does not have an adverse impact on individual
unit readiness and training. What systems are in place to track
perstempo information?
Answer. Air Force personnel tempo policy is that ``A day away is a
day away''. The Air Force Personnel Center maintains a secure web site
that hosts all Air Force personnel tempo data. Personnel tempo data is
a collection of TDY time regardless of purpose (deployment,
Professional Military Education, etc) and is captured from Travel and
Military Personnel Data Systems. Data is collected by individual but
aggregated by unit, specialty and weapon systems. Collectively this
data helps commanders at all levels manage readiness, determine
equitable distribution of TDY days, and/or identify capability
limitations.
Question. General Newton, are there certain units or mission skills
that are being continually stressed with either normal deployments,
training, exercises, or for contingency operations? If so, describe
which skills or units are being ``stretched thin''.
Answer. Yes. We have mission skills (capabilities) that are heavily
in demand for operational and other deployments. Air Force operations
in support of global combatant commander requirements have required the
surge of numerous capability areas since late 2001. Several of our
capability areas may be considered ``stretched thin'' or worse. We
manage these in-demand capabilities through a series of ``tempo-bands''
that set their operational deployments based on dwell--time away versus
time at home.
The specialties that are more severely effect are: Aerial Port
Operations, Air Field Operations (Air Traffic Control & Combat Airspace
and Senior Supervision), B-1 Squadrons, Chaplains (Islamic), Civil
Engineering (Prime Beef and Red Horse), Combat Weather, Command Post,
Communications (Airlift Systems and Communications Officers),
Contracting, Explosive Ordinance Disposal, Intelligence, Logistics
Readiness Officers, Medical (Behavioral Health), OSI, Para rescue,
Public Affairs Officers, Security Forces, Space Weapons Officers,
Supply, Theater Space Operations, Traffic Management and Vehicle
Operations and Management.
We also track total force operational demand that considers seven
individual measures aggregated into a single tool (Operations Demand
Meta metric) to express overall operational demand, vice just
deployment dwell. Besides the specialties listed above, the
capabilities with very high ops demand are: Helicopter Pilot, Special
Operations Navigator, Control & Recovery, Civil Engineering (Pavement &
Construction and Structural), In-Flight Refueling, Tactical Air Command
& Control and Operations Management.
Question. General Newton, personnel tempo also affects those
personnel who remain behind at the home station when units deploy.
Describe some of those impacts? For instance, are they working more
hours per week?
Answer. Personnel tempo does have an effect on those not deployed.
In some instances it does mean that home station personnel are working
longer to make up for those who are deployed, especially in mission-
critical areas. In other instances, lower priority work simply gets
deferred until deployed members return; this is more often the case for
less critical areas. Either situation increases anxiety and frustration
among home station personnel.
Question. Mr. Duehring, please explain the personnel policies that
are in place which minimize the redeployment of an individual or a unit
soon after returning to their home stations.
Answer. The Air Force relies on the Air & Space Expeditionary Force
(AEF) force generation construct to establish a predictable,
standardized battle rhythm ensuring rotational forces are properly
organized, trained, equipped, and ready to sustain capabilities while
rapidly responding to emerging crises. Air Force capabilities are
postured in blocks/pairs scheduled for utilization during specific
periods; Airmen are assigned a corresponding AEF indicator. While the
baseline AEF postures capabilities at a 1:4 deploy-to-dwell (120-days
deployed/480-days dwell), modifications were made to the construct to
meet Secretary of Defense planning objectives for sustainable
utilization of capabilities at 1:2 deploy-to-dwell for Active Component
personnel (179-days deployed/365-days dwell) and 1:5 mobilization-to-
dwell (up to 1-year mobilized/5years dwell) for Reserve Component
personnel. Capabilities with limited supply or high-demand can be
utilized at a 1:1 deploy-to-dwell (179-days deployed/179-days dwell).
Air Force policy directs that ``Airmen will only deploy during
their assigned vulnerability period except for reaching forward.'' The
need to 'reach forward' is a function of combatant commander
requirements exceeding postured capability in any given vulnerability
period. We also have policy in place to preclude an Airman's deployment
vulnerability being increased when they move from base to base. Upon
arrival to a new unit, Airmen are to be assigned to a position
providing appropriate time to train/reconstitute prior to their next
AEF deployment opportunity.
Question. General Newton, can you please explain the current C-17
aircrew personnel tempo and the reasons behind the C-17 personnel
tempo?
Answer. C-17 line qualified aircrews were TDY an average of 99.4
days over the last 12 months as of December 2008. This number includes
days TDY for contingency/deployed operations. The highest TDY average
is for Travis AFB, CA pilots at 155.4 due to their recent return from a
desert rotation. The C-17 deploy-to-dwell ratio is currently 1:6.7.
This deploy-to-dwell ratio does not include non-contingency TDYs.
AMC is using C-17s in both intra-theater and inter-theater airlift
roles. C-17s fly inter-theater missions globally and sometimes pass
through the area of operations. C-17s forward deployed to bases in
theater normally operate within the area of operations and provide
direct, intra-theater support.

Operation NOBLE EAGLE

Question. Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) is a North American Aerospace
Defense Command (NORAD) initiative to aid in the defense of North
American skies. The ongoing operation began September 14, 2001, in
response to the September 11 terrorist attacks. ONE includes air
patrols over and around cities and the mobilization of thousands of
National Guard and Reserve troops to perform security missions on
military installations, airports, and other potential targets such as
bridges.
Mr. Duehring, what is the status of Operation NOBLE EAGLE? To date,
how many combat air patrol missions supporting Operation NOBLE EAGLE
has the active Air Force flown?
Answer. Operation NOBLE EAGLE (ONE) is a continuing Secretary of
Defense approved air defense mission conducted by the North American
Aerospace Defense Command and US Pacific Command for the protection of
the United States and Canada. The Air Force has employed a variety of
aircraft to fly over 54,000 ONE missions since September 11, 2001. Of
the 54,000 ONE missions, the active Air Force has flown approximately
25% of these missions while the National Guard and Reserve have flown
the remaining 75%.
Question. What is the monthly personnel cost of this operation? Is
this consistent each month, or do changes to the mission cause the cost
to fluctuate?
Answer. Monthly military personnel costs for Operation Noble Eagle
for October 2008-March 2009 have been between $3.3 million to $3.88
million, so the majority is consistent with slight fluctuations
depending on North America Aerospace Defense Command taskings. In
addition, the Air National Guard's Air Sovereignty Alert steady-state
personnel costs average an additional $16.1 million per month.
Question. General Newton, the Committee understands that the Air
National Guard is not flying these patrols, but is on alert status at a
number of installations. What are those installations, and what is the
mission of the Air National Guard? Is this on a rotational basis? If
so, what is the amount of time for the rotation?
Answer. There are currently 18 designated steady-state Air
Sovereignty Alert sites supporting Operation NOBLE EAGLE. The Air
National Guard provides the personnel and equipment at 16 of the 18 Air
Sovereignty Alert sites while the active duty Air Force provides the
personnel and equipment at the remaining 2 sites. The alert site
requirement is normally fulfilled by specific tasked units. However,
when these units fulfill deployment missions in other operations, the
alert site requirement is satisfied by another unit. All of these
operations fall under the global force management construct process
which the Joint Forces Command created to ensure force availability
based on national priorities. The amount of rotation varies by unit
mission, aircraft type and operational tempo. The Air Combat Command
and Air National Guard cooperate to provide the Joint Forces Command
with air forces to fulfill worldwide commitments, and Operation NOBLE
EAGLE assignments are a part of that larger construct. While the alert
sites provide coverage for the entire United States, during National
Security Special Events, additional coverage may be directed by
Commander, NORAD and then combat air patrols may be flown at various
locations over and around cities. In keeping with the recommendations
of the Congressional Committee on National Guard and Reserve, the Air
Force continues to emphasize the total force aspect of this and every
mission to erase any institutional prejudice for duty status that might
arise from disparate designations.
Question. Mr. Duehring, what is the cost of the homeland defense
mission to the Reserve components?
Answer. The total projected Fiscal Year 2010 Air National Guard
cost (manpower and operations) to support Operation NOBLE EAGLE and Air
Sovereignty Alert is $307.7 million. This total can be broken out
between command and control and execution costs. The cost for command
and control (which includes 1st Air Force, Headquarters Air Force
staff, Air Operations Center, Western Air Defense Sector, Eastern Air
Defense Sector, and the Alaska and Hawaii regions) is approximately
$204 million. The cost for executing the Air Sovereignty Alert portion
of the Operation NOBLE EAGLE mission for the Air National Guard (e.g.,
the 24/7 ground alert) is projected to be $103.7 million for Fiscal
Year 2010. That cost covers the manpower requirements for the mission
at the Air National Guard bases currently selected by the North
American Aerospace Defense Command. Of that $103.7 million, $12.5
million is funded in the Future Years Defense Plan for those units that
were already executing a smaller version of ground alert missions
before September 11th, 2001. The remaining amount of $91.2 million is
the amount of money requested in the budget for fiscal year 2010 to
continue the increased post-September 11th, 2001 alert requirement.
Question. General Newton, how is Operation NOBLE EAGLE different
from the Air Sovereignty Alert mission?
Answer. The Air Force supports the commander of North American
Aerospace Defense Command in the execution of the Operation NOBLE EAGLE
and Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) missions. ASA operations consist of
ground operations that take place before fighter aircraft take off,
including those activities that may take place after a unit receives an
alert from North American Aerospace Defense Command but before the
aircraft are airborne. Once aircraft take off, the ASA operation ends
and becomes a homeland defense air mission under Operation NOBLE EAGLE.

Mission Training

Question. During a recent interview, several Army non-
commissioned officers (NCOs) advised that they believe sub-
standard soldiers end up in units and cannot be utilized,
making it harder on that unit to accomplish its mission. In
addition the NCOs indicated that some new recruits are unable
to pass a physical readiness test. The NCOs feel that basic
training course needs to be updated to provide the recruits
skills they will need upon deployment to theater. Now that the
Air Force is embracing a collaborative and supportive role in
the types of operations being conducted in Iraq and
Afghanistan, the Air Force training must meet the new mission
requirements. Airmen need to be properly trained and ready for
combat.
General Newton, please explain Initial Entry Training (IET)
for Airmen. What are the basic skills that Airmen learn while
at IET? What training is required beyond IET? Are Airmen coming
to units fully trained to meet the needs for deployment or does
training take place there as well?
Answer. The basic skills Airmen learn while at Initial
Entry Training (IET) are designed to mirror an Air
Expeditionary Force cycle; prep, train, deploy, and
reconstitute. More specifically, M-16 trainer weapons are
issued at the start of Basic Military Training (BMT) to
reinforce the warrior identity. Airmen receive substantial
warrior-expeditionary classroom training (e.g., Role of
Warrior, Mental Prep for Combat, Combat Recovery, Basic
Situational Awareness, etc.) and small field training rehearsal
exercises with key classes taught during field training. In
addition, Airmen gain knowledge on joint warfare, M-9 pistol,
public relations and the media, information protection and the
Code of Conduct.
In November 2008, BMT was lengthened by two weeks in order
to incorporate additional expeditionary training through a
concept titled ``Basic Expeditionary Airman Skills Training''
(BEAST). BEAST affords trainees a mentally, physically and
skills challenging expeditionary experience, promoting trainee
teamwork, responsibility, and leadership. Beyond IET, Airmen
receive expeditionary training through a tiered training
approach:
Tier 1: Foundational Expeditionary Skills Training: Airmen
gain foundational expeditionary skills through accession venues
and, to some degree, Initial Skills Training. Completion of
this training alone does not produce a deployable Airman. Once
an Airman reaches his/her unit they continue to build upon
foundational expeditionary skills development.
Tier 2: Deployment-Ready Expeditionary Skills Training:
Completion of this training is a requirement to maintain
mission-ready status to produce a deployment-ready Airman, up
to and including a major combat operation. All Airmen must
complete tier 2 training.
Tier 3: Advanced Expeditionary Skills Training (Mission
Specific): Training for select Airmen as determined by factors
such as deployment location, threat assessment, specific
mission, duty assignment, role, operation, or special
requirement.
Tier 4: Advanced Expeditionary Skills Training
(Expeditionary Center Assigned): Advanced training programs
that are unique to a specific major command and/or functionally
specific.
Question. General Newton, if an Airman is deploying to Iraq or
Afghanistan, does he train with the same equipment he will use when
deployed?
Answer. The Air Force is dedicated to providing Airmen with the
appropriate training and equipment they need to accomplish the mission
at home station and when deployed. In many cases, our Airmen train with
the exact equipment they carry with them to their deployed location.
This primarily includes Airmen expected to have significant exposure to
the ground combat threat in their deployed environment. In other cases,
though Airmen may not train with the exact equipment with which they
will deploy, much of our equipment is pre-positioned at deployed
locations so Airmen are issued identical equipment of the same type,
make and model of that used for training immediately upon arrival--this
saves on transportation costs. When identical equipment is unavailable,
then similar equipment is issued--the differences are not significant
and do not require additional training. We continue to implement
strategies and improve our processes to minimize equipment and training
inconsistencies.
Question. What sort of physical conditioning is done to prepare
Airmen for deployment?
Answer. Pre-deployment physical conditioning includes unit physical
training programs and personal fitness training programs. These
programs include cardiovascular training such as sprint work, running,
as well as using cardiovascular fitness equipment, such as treadmills,
elliptical machines, and stationary cycles. Unit and personal physical
training also includes a focus on muscular strength, muscular
endurance, and agility conditioning using free weight equipment, weight
machines, calisthenics, agility drills, and small fitness apparatus
such as fit balls, jump ropes, and balance boards. Each Airman is
assessed annually through a physical fitness test that includes a 1.5
mile run, push-ups, sit-ups and waist measurement.
Question. How is physical fitness maintained once the unit has
deployed?
Answer. Physical fitness is maintained in a variety of ways,
tailored to the environment and bed-down. In hostile environments,
outside running is limited; therefore, fitness-related activities are
conducted indoors. To support personal and unit fitness training,
fitness facilities in many deployed locations have cardiovascular and
strength conditioning equipment and fitness programs comparable to
those available in garrison/home station. Depending on the location,
unit mission and individual duty schedules, Airmen maintain their
physical fitness through a combination of unit and/or individual
fitness workout routines.
Question. How does the Air Force prepare for high altitude
operations as those those will perform in Afghanistan?
Answer. The Air Force does not currently offer any specialized
training to prepare members deploying to Afghanistan. It is an Airman's
professional obligation to ensure they are physically fit and prepared
for duty at all times. However, specialized career fields may have a
specific requirement and training opportunities based on their unique
mission as within the Special Operations, Para-Rescue or Tactical Air
Control-Party.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.]
Wednesday, March 18, 2009.

MILITARY PERSONNEL--ARMY

WITNESSES

HON. RONALD JAMES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, MANPOWER AND
RESERVE AFFAIRS
LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL ROCHELLE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED
STATES ARMY, G1

Introduction

Mr. Murtha. We want to welcome General Rochelle, Deputy
Chief of Staff of the Army for Personnel, and Secretary James,
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs.
I just visited Ft. Carson and Ft. Benning. I got some
pretty different views on what I get sometimes from up here in
Washington, and so I'm looking forward to hearing your
testimony and then asking some questions about some of the
problems that they're having out in the field.
I know I think we got this stop loss thing worked out, at
least Secretary Gates tells me he's going to make an
announcement this week about it. We're going to take care of
the problem down the road, and this year we are going to put
the amount in the supplemental. The Subcommittee is already way
ahead of the military on that issue. We're concerned about the
stress that is impacting our Soldiers, and you just told me
that by April of this year or next year, the 15-month
deployments will end.
General Rochelle. We think all of our 15-month deployers
will be back, the latest by June, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Okay. Well, we welcome you to the Committee.
Look forward to hearing your testimony. Mr. Young.
Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I just
wanted to say welcome to our guests. We expect an awful lot out
of our troops, and they have a right to expect a lot out of us,
and so that is what we are here for. We are here to do whatever
we can to support our troops. Thank you for being here today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Can you summarize, and I understand the
Secretary is the only one who will have a statement, is that
right, or both of you will have a statement?
Mr. James. Sir, we both have statements, but they will be
very, very brief.
Mr. Murtha. If you will summarize then, and we will get
right to the questions, thank you.

Summary Statement of Secretary James

Mr. James. Thank you, sir. Chairman Murtha and members of
the Committee, I want to thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today, and I am particularly proud to be here
with General Rochelle on behalf of America's Army and the 1.1
million men and women who are proudly serving our Nation around
the globe.
As the Army is growing to meet today's demands, we are
grateful to this Committee for the authorities, for incentives
and bonuses that have helped us attract and retain the very
best Soldiers. As the stewards of the Army's all-volunteer
force, I am proud of this source and all of its
accomplishments.
As I speak today, over 167,000 soldiers are currently
deployed in support of the global war on terrorism. Soldiers
from every State and territory, Soldiers from every corner of
this country serve the people of the United States with honor
and distinction. We are one Army with active and Reserve forces
serving together around the globe. We are truly Army strong.
Our recruiting and retention success is directly
attributable to the support gained from Congress. The most
effective retention incentive for junior officers in fiscal
year 2008 was the cash bonus. Over 94 percent of the 15,000-
plus officers who took the incentive last year opted for the
cash bonus. DoD analysis of the survey data showed that most
officers intended to separate or were uncertain about staying
in the service took the incentive and committed to further Army
service.
We are committed to supporting our Soldiers, civilians and
families, wounded warriors, recognizing critical contributions
to the all-volunteer force. To maintain a high standard of
living, the Army is caring for Soldiers and their families
through several initiatives, which include the Army soldier
family action plan, Army family covenant, as well as the
transportability and transferability of portions of the GI
benefits to family members.
We have, on direction of the Secretary of the Army and the
Chief, implemented a new suicide intervention program,
including but not limited to a stand-down for the entire Army.
Even one suicide is too many. We are grateful to the Congress
for your concern and attention paid to soldiers.
I ask you for your continued support to encourage all who
are qualified to answer the Nation's call to duty, and once
again thank you for the opportunity to appear before this
Committee today, and I look forward to a dialogue and answering
your questions, sir.
Mr. Murtha. General Rochelle.

Summary Statement of General Rochelle

General Rochelle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished
members of the Committee. I will summarize my oral statement
and ask that the joint written statement on behalf of Mr. James
and myself be accepted for the record, and I will summarize my
oral statement with 3 points.
First of all, I am deeply honored to, once again, appear
before this committee representing the men and women of the
United States Army. They are proud, they are strong, and they
are proud and strong largely due to the phenomenal support that
this committee has ensured America's Army has received in the
appropriations side, most especially for the care for our
wounded. On behalf of those wounded men and women, several of
whom we hosted in the Pentagon last Friday, I say thank you to
the members of this Committee.
I look forward to your questions.
[The joint statement of Secretary Jams and General Rochelle
follows:]

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BODY ARMOR

Mr. Murtha. Well, let me start off. We have a few people
here so a couple of things that I found and I just want to make
it clear. I went to Ft. Carson and asked to meet with 12
enlisted people and I went to Benning and did the same thing.
Almost unanimously, the first complaint was the heaviness
of the armor, and this committee's been concerned about the
armor being so heavy for a long time. I know you are working on
it. At Carson, they were almost willing to do without armor
because in Afghanistan in particular, they felt like it was so
cumbersome. One woman said she will have a handicap the rest of
her life because the armor is so heavy that it jammed her
spine. That is only one story. There are a lot of people who
have been saved because of the armor, but that was the single
biggest complaint that I got with both places.

LENGTH OF DEPLOYMENTS

The second complaint was the length of the deployments and
the fact that they didn't have enough dwell time. And I know we
have talked about this over and over again, and rightly you say
about this committee, there is no question we have done
everything we could. When Bill Young was chairman, when Jerry
Lewis was chairman, we have always worked in a bipartisan way
to make sure the troops had what they needed, and we have added
billions of dollars to the budget to make sure that you had
what you needed. Even though in many cases there was inadequacy
when you started out, you didn't have the equipment you needed,
and we made sure we put it in and got it out there.

MRAPS

MRAP is a perfect example. Now, I had some complaints about
the MRAP is not working well in Afghanistan and I know they are
not working well in Afghanistan, because there are no roads. I
found out there is no railroad at all in Afghanistan, which
surprised me. So we have obviously got a lot of problems that
are different in Afghanistan than anyplace else.

UNIFORMS

The other thing that came up in Benning and not in Carson
is that the uniforms are completely inadequate, not only the
ones who are wearing them not only the 12, 13 enlisted people I
talked to, but also the sergeant major agreed that the uniforms
were inadequate.

QUALITY OF THE FORCE

The other thing that every one of them complained of--they
are all NCOs--the quality of the force--you say you have
increased the recruiting, but the quality of force is less than
it should be. We are taking people in who are inadequate. High
school graduates are down. They mentioned physically not fit,
and when they finish basic school they are not fit. I am
telling you what they told me.
I know I saw some figures where it is a little bit better
than it was last year, but what worries me is we are going to
get back to the same situation in the seventies and eighties
where we had to get rid of a lot people that were inadequate
and then rebuild the whole Army and then the long term
consequences of taking people who are inadequate means they are
going to have more PTSD. We are going to have more health
problems down the road. There are going to be more emotional
and physical problems for the military, and it is going to be a
lot more expense for the military.

DISTRIBUTION OF BONUSES

The bonuses have always been a bone of contention with me.
I always think people enlisted in the military in order to
defend this great country, to serve this great country. The
bonus program is up over $1 billion now. I think the only
service giving bonuses now is the Army. I think all the rest of
them have quit doing it.
But the balance you should look at because they are saying
that the enlisted people getting in, in some cases, getting
more than the ones who have been in combat and reenlisting. I
don't know if that is true, but that is what some of these
folks said. So I would appreciate if you would give the
committee a report on how you distribute the bonuses and how
that works.
[The information follows:]

The Army allocates bonuses based on Army requirements, the strength
and criticality of the skill, and the recruiting or retention
difficulty with the particular Military Occupational Specialty (MOS).
Some specialties are extremely difficult to recruit but are more easily
retained; in addition, more senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) tend
to stay until retirement without cash bonus incentives. As a result, it
is entirely possible that a new recruit may have a higher bonus than a
Soldier in a higher pay grade in the same specialty. Bonuses are used
only as needed to fill MOS vacancies at the skill level needed. NCOs
with over 10 years of service have a higher tendency to reenlist than
those with less than 10 years of service or Soldiers serving on an
initial term of service and thus typically receive little or no bonus
money. The necessity to manage the force, by MOS and level of
responsibility requires a detailed process that is further impacted by
outside factors such as the economy, quality targets, and ongoing
global mission requirements.
All enlistment and reenlistment bonuses are evaluated at a minimum
of once per quarter. Each MOS is scrutinized by level of responsibility
to determine if an enlistment or reenlistment incentive is necessary to
attain MOS targets that support readiness and mission requirements. In
January 2009, the Army achieved its authorized end strength and bonuses
were reduced in order to stay within authorized strength ceilings.
Currently, only 45 of 161 entry level skills have a bonus for new
recruits. The Army anticipates further bonus reductions based on the
economy and the demonstrated increased propensity to enlist or
reenlist.

EQUIPMENT

One other thing they talked about: night vision goggles.
They say the 14s are much better than the sevens and that most
of the people only have the sevens. M-4's are unreliable. Now,
I heard two stories about the M-4s and the M-16. One is that it
was unreliable from all the troops there, and they were
unanimous down at Benning about that, but the sergeant major
said they just don't clean them. I don't know--I don't know
about that. I don't know what the problem is but each--all the
enlisted people were upset about the M-4 which I have heard so
much about when they first deployed it.
They all said the equipment that they train on is not the
same equipment that they have when they go to combat. They have
to be retrained on different equipment when they go to combat.
They say resupply in Afghanistan is horrible. Soldiers have
limited training time between missions because of ammunition
shortages. That is what these 12 people are telling me.
A unanimous comment was that the POR, which is the
counseling they get before they go overseas, should be extended
to the families. They thought because there is so much more
money they are making overseas and some of the families spend
it, and then when they come home, the money's not available,
and they were pretty unanimous about that the families ought to
all have the same support.
But those are basically what I found and I would be
interested in hearing not necessarily--well, in hearing from
either of you about the complaints that I have gotten from
people. I didn't pick them. You folks--you know, your folks
gave me the NCOs that I talked to.
General Rochelle. First of all, thank you, Mr. Chairman,
for the opportunity to comment on a number of those and I will.
First of all, we can always count on our great Soldiers,
men and women to tell it just like it is. That is one reason
why the American people respect them so highly and that respect
has continued, if not risen. It has continued very solidly.
On the aspect of armor, the Chief of Staff for the Army,
the Sergeant Major of the Army, the Secretary of the Army, the
weight of the armor, that is, have heard the same plea from our
Soldiers, and as you stated in your comment, we are looking at
that to try to lighten it without of course jeopardizing safety
for our soldiers at the same time.
We clearly know that the length of deployment on the second
point, if I may, the length of deployment is longer than our
Soldiers would like them to be. This Committee fully
understands that that is a function first and foremost of the
demand for Army boots on the ground around the globe, not just
in the OIF and OEF theaters of war.
The Chief just this morning mentioned that he was receiving
from Special Forces Soldiers in particular comments, adverse
comments or negative comments on the uniform and we are looking
at that.
But the final point I would like to make is, perhaps, in my
estimation, the most critical one certainly for this Committee,
and that is the quality of the force. We can measure the
quality of the force in multiple ways and there is an ongoing,
and has been an ongoing, debate in my more than six years
involved with recruiting with accessioning and now as the Army
G1. You can measure it on the front end by the somewhat
abstract notions of high school degree completion, one to three
A, whether they score in the upper middle category of the same
Armed Services vocational aptitude battery Elvis Presley took,
or one can measure it on the output side, once completed
training, notwithstanding the comments of non-commissioned
officers that you mentioned, Mr. Chairman.
I submit two points in closing. One, that the quality of
the force has really never been better because every young man
or woman who raises his or her hand today realizes that they
are doing so with almost a certainty of going into combat in
today's environment.
The second point and final point is simply that when we
take a look at how these young men and women are stepping
forward, less than one percent of American society, according
to the Census, fewer than one percent, we should give them
credit not only for that as an aspect of quality but for their
patriotism. I think my comment also, in some ways, alludes to
your discussion earlier, Mr. Chairman, about bonuses and
incentives, with only three out of ten young people eligible to
serve today without a waiver, once again, it is a question of
supply and demand and that demand is Army boots on the ground.

ATTRITION RATE

Mr. Murtha. The only thing I would add to my comments was
the fact that your attrition rate has dropped significantly in
the basic training, which means you're either keeping people in
that should--traditionally you lose 14 or 15 percent. It is
down to 8 percent. So I think you need to look at this. I know
General Casey is out in the field. You are out in the field.
But you really need to sit down with these young NCOs and find
out how serious is this problem of quality because in the end,
we are all going to pay a heavy price if the quality has
dropped.
No question about it, you folks do a marvelous job. All of
us have the greatest respect for the people in the military. I
am inspired by the families and the people who are serving, but
that doesn't mean we don't have to continue to look at the
quality. So you need to take a look at it.
General Rochelle. Wise counsel, Mr. Chairman, and your
numbers are correct in terms of historical attrition and
current rates of attrition and I acknowledge that.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Young.

OFFICER RETENTION

Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I think the
Army's to be congratulated on the ability to reach your end
strength, your increased end strength, and I think it is
important that the issues that Mr. Murtha has mentioned, I
think we all agree those are areas of concern to us, and I am
satisfied they are to you as well.
But as the Army grows and you maintain your retention and
recruitment goals for enlisted personnel, where do we stand
with officers? I mean you have got to have your officer you
have to have your leaders and I am just wondering I am hearing
that there is a little bit of a problem in the Army retaining
officers. Could you comment on that, sir?
General Rochelle. I would be happy to comment on that,
Ranking Member Young. The Army's shortfall in officers is first
and foremost attributable to modularity which increased the
total requirements for officers. The most significant point I
would like to make is that our ten-year average for officer
retention remains unchanged. We are not hemorrhaging officers.
We have some small specialties where we are challenged in
retaining that higher average rate among those being aviation
for which there is a significant demand. Significant demand and
a significant growth I might add.
In recent years, however, we have increased our officer
retention through, as Mr. James mentioned in his oral
statement, an officer selection critical skills retention
bonus. Over 15 thousand officers agreed to retain with the Army
out beyond to fiscal year eleven as a result of that program. I
think our officer requirements are reasonable given a modular
force. I think our retention rates are extraordinary given the
stress that our total force is under.
Mr. Young. And General, you had a program that expired in
November of 2008 called the ``captain's retention incentive
menu pilot program.'' Is that why you have been successful in
retaining officers?
General Rochelle. That is the--officer critical skills
retention bonus by another name that I just addressed,
Representative Young. That is one of the factors. One of the
other factors, of course, and we don't want to misconstrue this
nor give it an insignificant level of emphasis. Army officer
just like Army non-commissioned officers are exceedingly proud
of what they are contributing on behalf this Nation today and
more than anything else that represents the reason why our
retention rates remain at high levels. I would also like to
just comment, though, that the captain's retention bonus that
you referred to or the officer critical skills retention bonus
did yield us 15,000 officers who are going to stay with us
beyond fiscal ten and the authority for that program was given
to us by the Congress as a pilot authority to allow us to apply
innovative techniques to be able to for both officer and
enlisted retention, a critical capability, sir.
Mr. Young. Why do we allow it to expire?
General Rochelle. Sir, we actually hit the number that we
were able to, the population that we were targeting in
captains, we don't think that we will need that going forward.

ROTC PROGRAMS

Mr. Young. What about ROTC programs? I understand that most
of your officers come through ROTC as opposed to going to the
Academy. That is accurate, isn't it?
General Rochelle. That is accurate, Representative Young.
Mr. Young. Are the ROTC programs as robust today as they
need to be?
General Rochelle. Interestingly, I had a session with two
outstanding RAND analysts yesterday on this very subject, a
fairly lengthy session with them. For the foreseeable future,
we will continue to receive most of our officers, the majority
of our officers as you said, through the Army ROTC program. We
do find that we are not receiving what we are looking for in
terms of the diversity from that program, both in terms of
ethnicity, language diversity, et cetera, and the Congress once
again has given us some pilot authorities there with which we
are exercising aggressively.
We will continue to receive the majority of our officers
from the Army ROTC program. We are studying whether or not,
with the help of RAND, whether those programs are located
geographically speaking, optimally, to be able to give us the
talent and the officers we need for the future, diversity being
one of the factors.
Mr. Young. I would like to give you something to think
about and offer an invitation. A couple of years ago, we
established a program at the University of South Florida
because we have Army ROTC, Air Force ROTC and Navy ROTC. In
view of all of the joint activities that we have seen in recent
combat, with all of the services working together and actually
putting sailors and airmen on the ground as infantry, we
started this program of having joint training to teach the ROTC
students how they would work together in a joint operation and
it worked very well, and one of the incentives was the fact is
we were so very close to MacDill Air Force base with central
command and Special Operations command, and those folks are
very, very helpful and very cooperative, and they really like
the program.
I would like to invite you to come take a look at it. I
think you would be impressed with what this is doing, not only
to maintain the spirit of the ROTC students but also to give
them a great understanding of the importance of working
together. I know when we stood this up, I spoke to the
assembled crowd and said look, it is really important that you
maintain the pride of your service and the identity of your
service, but it is also important to understand you guys have
to work together when you get into the battle, you are going to
be working together. Well, I can suggest that you take a visit
there and if you need something else to do while you are there,
you have MacDill Air Force Base, Central Command and Special
Ops. So I think you would be impressed with this program.
General Rochelle. I will pay it a visit.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Dicks.

COMPREHENSIVE SOLDIER FITNESS EXAM

Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to talk a little
bit about the increase in the suicide rate. The figures were
released recently, January. The new figure of more than 128
compares to 115 in 2007, 102 in 2006 and is the highest since
recordkeeping began in 1980. The Army's report calculates to a
rate of 20.2 per 100,000 Soldiers, which is higher than your
adjusted civilian rate for the first time since the Vietnam
War.
In addition to the suicide data being released, the Army
has plans for units to conduct a stand-down within a 30-day
window between February 15th and March 15th, 2009. The stand-
down will include training for peer level recognition of
behaviors that may lead to suicidal behavior and intervention
at the buddy level. The stand-down will follow, will be
followed by a chain teaching program focused on suicide
prevention from March 15th to June 15th, 2009.
Can you give us a little--can you explain what the Army is
trying to do here?
Mr. James. Yes, sir. The Secretary and the Chief of Staff
have insisted that the entire enterprise, that the entire Army,
get involved in the stand-down in order to raise awareness. In
addition to that, the Vice Chief of Staff has been put in
charge of the senior review group to take a look at this. In
addition to that, the Surgeon General has been developing what
we call a physical health exam that takes into account the
mental side of these issues. It is called a Comprehensive
Soldier Fitness Exam. Clearly, suicide is something that we
need to learn more about. We need to do better in this regard.
We have contracted with the National Institutes of Mental
Health to do a longitudinal study to take a look at some of the
other underlying causes or at least get better understanding
about how we can be more effective in intervening early. How we
can, in fact to use my previous life's jargon, how we can get
the frontline supervisors, the sergeants, the battle buddies,
the specialists, in fact, to be aware and to also to get the
families to be sensitive to the issue about how to identify the
warning signs because we are convinced that this is a public
health tragedy. It is an issue that can be prevented, and the
Army is aggressively taking steps to do this, and we have not
done enough. We plan to do more, but I would be happy to invite
General Rochelle to give any additional comments.
Mr. Dicks. Can I just add one point, does the Army believe
this is a crisis or not?
Mr. James. The Army believes that this is unprecedented,
and the reason why I am not going to respond to that because,
as we have looked at this, we have tried to figure out whether
there is a correlation between multiple deployments. As we have
looked at these we have been trying to find trends, and
basically the kind of trends we have found is issues like
financial issues, marital issues, divorce issues, relationship
issues. Are deployments a factor? I cannot sit here and tell
you that the deployment is the but-for factor. We hope that the
National Institutes of Mental Health can, in fact, help us get
the answers so that we can make policy decisions based not on
my speculation but based on some factual information and from
public health experts.
Mr. Dicks. We understand this is a very sensitive matter,
and I think the Army takes it very seriously. I know out at Ft.
Lewis and Madigan, I know they take it very seriously, and it
sounds like these sessions that you are going to have over the
next few weeks will help. You know, it seems to me that we
ought to keep talking to General Chiarelli about this, but we
ought to be looking at other possibilities and doing pilot
projects.
Our Committee provided resources last year and we find that
they are using yoga and they are using Reiki and they are using
this and that, but trying to let the troops go online to get
help if they felt they needed it, or is this especially for the
Guard and Reserve where they don't have--they don't come back
to a place and they disband and go back into the community--
might be something that--and we have had outside people come in
and talk to us about this. But you know, we have to go through
all the competitive rules and all the other things that are and
it takes quite a long while to get, to finally ever get
something done.
And we had General Sutton in here the other day and
everything seems to be a study, and you know, when the people
are losing their lives, I just hope there is, and I know and I
am certainly not putting any of this on you all, but to me,
there needs to be a sense of urgency here, and if there are
options that haven't been utilized or considered, let's do
pilot programs, let's at least look at these things to see if
they make any difference and try to find see if question find
some answers you know rather than just doing studies that will
give us something 5 years from now.
We had the same issues in, I remember in Desert Storm,
Desert Shield, about all the illnesses and the people came,
witnesses came up and said well, we don't think there is
anything to this, you know, and then years later, we find out
oh, yes, there was problems there in exposure to things that go
back to Agent Orange. I mean, it doesn't do any good to have a
study that comes in 5 years from now, I guess it will help the
people and I know there are some people who it takes a year or
so before these signs become apparent.
But I just hope there is a sense of urgency. I feel that we
should be doing more and it sounds like you are really getting
to it now but I hope we just don't do studies. That kind of
leaves me cold.
General Rochelle. Sir, if I may, I would never be able to
forgive myself if I didn't--if I allowed the Committee or
anyone to think that we were standing still in the blocks here
on this. Let me point to one aspect. On the fourth of March,
the Vice Chief of Staff, General Pete Chiarelli, convened a
worldwide secure VTC with every commander, senior commander who
lost a Soldier in the month of January. That session was a 2-
hour session, which included senior leaders from Iraq,
Afghanistan, the Military Academy and installations flung far
and wide. And he reviewed in detail some 35 critical items that
he constructed that he wanted the field commanders to report
out to him on. It was not accusatory. It was not a
condemnation, but it was an attempt to absolutely demonstrate
the focus at the senior level of the Army on this matter, is it
a crisis? Sir, I would tell you, one suicide is a crisis. That
would be my response. We are absolutely moving out on this. And
we have, we are investing $50 million in the National Institute
of Mental Health effort, which is the largest in the history of
NIMH to help us get after this, at the same time.
Mr. Dicks. Will there be interim reports, not just a report
from 5 years from now, where will there will be interim reports
like a year from now or six months from now? Here's what we
know now, here's what we are looking at?
General Rochelle. There is a draft report right now, sir.
Mr. James. Sir, if I could just emphasize, this is an issue
we are, in fact, taking very seriously, and I want to clarify.
We view the study and the initial stand-down as critical
courses. In addition to the stand-down, we see that there will,
in fact, be a chain teach second phase. We were hoping that
chain teach--that the Soldiers on the ground, the sergeant
NCOs, in fact, once they are given a curriculum and once they
are given some parameters, that they will, in fact, experiment
and try to reach out and try to do things that are, in fact,
innovative and try to identify and look for best practices. So
at the time we are doing the study we will, in fact, be doing
the chain teaching.
The third phase of the program, which the Secretary has
admonished us and the Chief of Staff has weighed in on, is
absolutely critical is sustainment, is that there has to be a
sustainment period with or without the study to continue the
sensitivity, and we have talked about issues like doing this
every six months or doing it for every new group of inductees
into the Army or graduates of basic training courses or
graduate of the NCO schools.
A lot of that is still to be planned, but we want to give
the folks on the ground a place like Ft. Carson the maximum
flexibility, in fact, to do the chain teaching phase two, do
the sustain phase three, and do it around a core competency
that is incorporated, and at the same time, in fact, be able to
use their experiences to improve on the ground and then share
that across the enterprise.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you.

SUICIDE

Mr. Murtha. Seems like some of the suggestions Mr. Dicks
was talking about when you talk about divorce, marital problem,
financial problem, fits in line with what these enlisted men
and women suggested to making sure you counsel the spouses
before people go overseas so that when they are overseas
they'll know exactly what is going on.
And the one thing, the stigma which we place on a person
that has an emotional problem I think we have gotten to the
general officers. I think we have gotten to the Secretaries.
I brought this up to the group at either Carson or Benning,
this guy said, well, I ran into that in Iraq, and he said--the
guy said he wanted to commit suicide. I said I gave him a gun.
I said go commit suicide. Well, you can see we have got some
work to do. That obviously wasn't the appropriate reply, and
none of us would expect that to happen. The guy didn't commit
suicide. He thought he was a malingerer. It is a delicate
thing. We know that. We appreciate what you are doing, but it
is a big problem. It is going to be a big problem down the
road.
Mr. James. Mr. Chairman, I will personally take your
counsel to heart about the need for the counseling. It is an
issue that we are grappling with, and we may need to get back
to you for some help, because with regard to our geographic
disbursed workforce, particularly the Guard and the Reserve,
that is a difficult issue. We are doing a much better job on
both posts, camps and stations issue, but I will tell you in
candor with regard to those folks who are in the hinterlands,
we are not doing as well as we should.
Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, if you will yield on that issue,
just a quick story. My son served in the military and during
his time there he said you know, Dad, a lot of these kids could
use some counseling. He said there are some serious issues out
here and they are not being dealt with. But after his time was
up and he got out, he went back to school and he became a
psychologist.
Well, he--he will be a psychologist in, I think, 4 weeks
from now. You are all invited to the graduation and he said his
motivation was to get this degree to get this certification to
be a psychologist and go back into the military to help with
these kids because he said there were so many just in his unit
that needed that kind of help. I am just wondering if we have
enough qualified personnel available to counsel in a case like
this and the issue that the chairman raised about here is a gun
go do it, that is something wrong with that and the suicide
rate has gotten us all really concerned. The Subcommittee on
Military Construction and Veterans Administration had a number
of hearings already this year on that issue and it is
frightening, and so I just raise that issue.
I am not sure you have got the qualified personnel to do
what has to be done.
Mr. Murtha. What Mr. Young is saying if you need money, you
know, make the suggestion because that is a perfect fit for the
supplemental, if you need money to expand this program. Mr.
Frelinghuysen.

FORCE GENERATION PROGRAM

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Most of our
States have sent National Guard units to Iraq and obviously are
prepared to do it into Afghanistan. New Jersey has 3,200 in
Iraq, around the Baghdad area. It is the single largest
deployment since, I think, in New Jersey's history and half of
our Guard is overseas.
General Rochelle--first of all, thank you for your service.
You mentioned supply and demand. I understand what that is, but
what happened to the Army force generation program? Where does
that stand? We know these Soldiers are ready to do whatever
they need to do. But what happened to the whole plan of one
year deployed, five years back, you know, in States? What
happened to that plan? Where are we?
It has a lot to do with obviously issues of psychology and
moral and your ability to retain soldiers.
General Rochelle. General Casey has said that the Army will
be back in balance in fiscal 2011. The shorthand definition of
what that means is that the Army will be at its rotational
balance under Army force generation model of one year deployed
three years back for a total of four on the active component,
one year back, one year deployed, four years back for a total
of five for the Reserve components. We are not there. That is
the equation of supply and demand that I mentioned. The demand
right now for Army forces will not permit us to achieve that
level of balance. The objective is to be there in fiscal 2011,
and lots of energy is being placed into getting us there.

GUARD DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Frelinghuysen. So the Guard units that are over there
now, and come back in the case of our Guard from New Jersey,
what would be their potential for going out again? Obviously
there could be, we could considerably raise the stakes and in
Afghanistan. That might sort of change the overall equation but
what would be the likely scenario for a Guard unit that is
finishing up what would be the likelihood of their going back
again what would be the rotation.
General Rochelle. With the exception of very low density
and high demand Guard and Reserve units, military police as an
example, with the exception of those, the likelihood that they
would deploy in less than three-years dwell, beginning in
fiscal ten is low fray, and how about the capability of some of
those coming back? I mean, you know, we obviously don't deploy
people unless they are fully capable but there have been
obviously some evidence when some of these soldiers come back,
their units are less than fully capable.
Obviously there will be a period of reset for reserve
component units, no different, except in length, than the reset
period for active component units. That includes the post
deployment health assessment, post deployment health risk
assessment. That includes an infusion of equipment, training
and people and then back into the four General cycle ideally
which is your question to deploy in about three or four years.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. So this continues to be a work in
progress?
General Rochelle. Very much a work in progress.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. So even though you have set a goal of
2011, it is very much subject to change?
General Rochelle. Well, it is, yes, absolutely subject to
change.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I understand that, but in reality, we
sort of set forth here a goal to give the soldiers some feeling
that they would have, you know, a good idea what their
obligation would be on the battlefield.
General Rochelle. Indeed, and Soldiers tell us in surveys
that we conduct routinely that this one thing they are seeking
is predictability and our fortune is the vehicle.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. It is the vehicle but we are not there.
General Rochelle. We are not there.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. There is not the degree of
predictability.
General Rochelle. That is a correct statement.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. The model is there, but in reality, we
are far from fulfilling it.
General Rochelle. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Visclosky.

CONTRACTORS

Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
you very much. I want to ask about contractors. In October of
last year Nelson Ford, the Under Secretary of the Army, said we
really don't know the number of contractors to that we have,
and the quote goes on. What steps is the Army taking to
understand the role of the contractors, to understand how many
contractors you have and what the right mix is? Contractors
aren't inherently bad, but it does seem like the Army doesn't
have a good handle on it at that point.
General Rochelle. Sir, I am vaguely familiar with Secretary
Ford's comment. I have read it. Your question about what is the
Army doing, the one thing I can speak to authoritatively is
that the Army is attempting to account for our contractors in
much the same way that we account for Soldiers, with an
information technology system that is, today, under the
auspices of our Army materiel command, the largest deployer of
our contractors, to account for contractors both in theater as
well as in other deployed environments, Korea, et cetera.
Beyond that I am afraid I can't--elaborate on the Secretary's
comment.
Mr. Visclosky. In the 2007 budget, more moneys were spent
on contract services than military and civilian pay combined in
the Army, and again, I don't want to be judgmental. That may
not be bad. But that is not the way it was seven years ago. You
are continuing to see this increase of payment to contractors
as to opposed to what you are actually paying people in uniform
and civilian. Is that trend going to continue unabated? Is
there a change in the composition of the types of contractors
you are hiring? Was it food services before? Is it security
personnel now? I would just like to have some sense of why that
has continued to escalate. What is different today than 2000?
General Rochelle. Well, I think a number of things are
different. First of all, I can't validate the numbers that you
mentioned in terms of the relative pay for contractors versus
military personnel. But among other things that have changed is
the demand, back to the dialogue with Representative
Frelinghuysen, the demand is such that the forces, all the
forces are inadequate to address the level of the demand.
Therefore, the contractors are a viable alternative.
I should add, though, that in a number of instances, we are
in-sourcing those contractor support requirements with
Department of the Army, and I will only speak for the Army,
Department of the Army civilians, and I would offer for the
record a clearer view of just what that looks like.
[The information follows:]

To date, the Army has in-sourced 1,164 positions formerly performed
by contractors to an average savings of $46,000 per position per year.

Mr. Visclosky. Okay. General, if I could follow up some
more, I mean, I would not argue the point that you are
underforced, or the demands that are placed on the Army, and I
absolutely agree with that. To the extent a lot of the
contractors who are serving next to military or civilian
personnel are paid multiples of what that person in uniform is
being paid, I guess you'd have the tension between well, if you
are in uniform, you are a member of the Army, we are paying you
to fight as opposed to doing some type of logistical duty. But
if money is part of the problem and we are paying contractors
much more per person than we are somebody in uniform, wouldn't
it still be more cost effective if somebody is in a uniform to
pay them and pick up more people? Are we paying somebody in
that depot two, three, four times than we are paying that
military personnel, couldn't I pick up some more personnel and
get the job done?
General Rochelle. That may be----
Mr. Visclosky. Oversimplied?
General Rochelle. Thank you, sir. I was trying not to be
disrespectful. That may be an overly simplistic analogy, I
think one that would require a little bit more study.
Mr. Visclosky. I am very concerned about it. Mr.
Frelinghuysen and I serve on Energy, and again, you are the
Army. You are not Energy, but we are running nine to one
contractors versus Federal employees and contractors running
the Department. And we have had hearings previously here as far
as the ability of various departments, including the Army, to
control the contractors. And in the end, you are in charge.
They are not, and that is one of my great concerns over and
above the money is making sure we are running the government.
So it is an area of deep concern for me.
General Rochelle. I understand, sir.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I understand that
the Army has found an average savings of $44,000 per person for
in-sourcing.
General Rochelle. I have seen that figure. I do not know
what is behind the figure.
Mr. Dicks. Would that be a civilian worker or a military
worker?

CONTRACTORS

Mr. Murtha. Let me clarify this whole thing. You have
144,000 contractors in Iraq, 274,000 in Central Command. It
costs an average of $44,000, according to the study that you
folks have given to us, per person. Last year, this committee
tried to increase direct hires so that you could hire civilians
to do the same job these contractors are doing because you not
only pay the contractor, you have to pay the contracting people
a percentage and so forth and so on, and so that is where the
$44,000 comes in. We cut 5 percent out of contracting. We added
$1 billion for direct hire. It fell by the wayside in the
Senate because the Defense Department objected to it.
Now, I asked the President himself. I said, Mr. President,
what is the schedule for reducing the contractors in Iraq? How
are we going to get them out while we are getting the troops
out? Well, he turned to the Secretary of the Defense and
Admiral Mullen, and none of them could give me an answer. We
are asking the Defense Department to give us an answer so that
we have some semblance of order. The troops are coming out. Are
the contractors coming out because it costs more to keep the
contractors there.
Now, I see Ronald Marrow says okay, we are going to reduce
the contractors. Well, we ought to know. He shouldn't be making
an announcement. We should find out what is going on over there
about these contractors.
So this Committee, the first hearing we had was on
contractors. So we are concerned about the number of
contractors we have. So we need up to speed on contractors and
there is no more important part of readiness than contracting.
Mr. Rothman.

IN-SOURCE SAVINGS

Mr. Rothman. Gentleman, I notice on the written testimony
of the gentlemen that on page 6, it says of their testimony
that the results are $48,000 per person in-source saving. This
is your written testimony?
General Rochelle. That is correct.
What I said was I do not have the details--the depth of
details behind that statement. I am unfamiliar with it.
Mr. Murtha. Let me just say we have got to get this under
control. We have got to find--when we put money in for direct
hires and we take money out of contracting, the Defense
Department objects to it because we did it because it wasn't
something we thought this thing through. Now this year, we are
going at it a little differently but you should think about
this for the base bill so we can save some money here, how we
get these contractors out. Mr. Kingston.

ATTRITION

Mr. Kingston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Rochelle, I
wanted to follow up on conversation we had with the Air Force
yesterday about some observations of NCOs that a lot of the
soldiers were physically up to where they needed to be and I
see that in June of 2003, the initial entry training attrition
rate was almost 15 percent, but by 2007, it had dropped to
about 8-1/2 percent. What do you attribute that change to?
General Rochelle. Well, among other things, I attribute the
change in the attrition, the initial entry attrition rate to a
concerted effort on the part of our training and doctrine
command to assist every single individual to make it through
basic training. That is not reducing standards, but it is a
change in philosophy. If I may, back in 2001, 2001 to be
precise, there was a similar change in philosophy under
leadership in the then-recently activated accessions command.
Rather than crossing one's arms and saying to a young recruit
prove to me that you are good enough to be a soldier, the
philosophy in 2001 was let me assist you in meeting the
standard, and what I attribute the rate and the decrease you
are referring to is that--revisiting that philosophy.

RECRUITING

Mr. Kingston. Well, these NCOs also are saying that the
Army needs to get harder and the new recruits lack discipline.
General Rochelle. First of all, I accept that. I accept
that statement on the part of our non-commissioned officers. We
see that, a similar statement in our surveys that we do of non-
commissioned officers and their perceptions. The interesting
phenomenon, though, sir, is that the further one moves away
from the immediate soldier, the better one's perception meaning
elevated in rank and elevated in distance from the immediate
soldier, that perception changes. So perhaps the sergeant major
would give you a different perspective than would the buck
sergeant than would the staff sergeant.
One other point, if I may----
Mr. Kingston. Well, General, I want you to finish that
point, but I want to revisit that because just because the
perception changes that doesn't make it factual.
General Rochelle. No, sir, it doesn't. It doesn't, nor does
it add significant credibility to the other perception would be
my point.
Mr. Kingston. Well, what was your other point because I
interrupted you?
General Rochelle. My other point is that today we have to
realize that again, as I mentioned to the chairman, only three
out of 10 young people are eligible to serve in our Army today,
for one of three reasons, the absence of academic credentials,
a high school diploma, overweight and obesity is becoming
epidemic in America; and then third, the background, the
ability to pass a background screen to serve in our force. When
you extrapolate that to what is the correlation for officers,
the number becomes even more startling. It is one out of 10 are
eligible.
So there is a problem. And even before this very committee,
Mr. Chairman, I believe you would recall, I have said in the
past, there is a challenge and there is a problem and it is a
national problem.
Mr. Kingston. In terms of that obesity rate, do you have
any recommendations, some of us have served currently or in the
past on the Agriculture Committee and we are always studying
school nutrition and exercise and one of the frustrations is
that the nutrition school lunch program is the USDA and the
Department of Education really does the physical education
stuff and they are almost seems to be a firewall in terms of
the two talking to each other and sharing data and I was
wondering if the Department of Defense or the Army had any
observations or any clues to put in that.
General Rochelle. Sir, I am unqualified to comment on that,
grossly unqualified to comment on that, but I will offer a
bright spot and that is that as a Nation, we appear to be
addressing the issue of obesity openly and in a national way
with respect to a debate on this subject that I see is
encouraging.
Mr. Kingston. But obesity is the number two reason,
academics and the obesity were the first two? Were these all in
an order or----
General Rochelle. Obesity would be the second or third. The
first would be behavioral or disciplinary issues in terms of
waiver reasons, reasons for a waiver.
Mr. Kingston. Thank you.
Mr. Murtha. Ms. Kaptur.

OFFICER SHORTAGE

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen, for your service to our country. This has been a
most interesting hearing.
I wanted to comment on page three of your testimony.
General you mentioned officer shortage in the Army continues to
keep the officer corps out of balance. I am wondering if your
own experience you think there is any relationship between the
officer shortage and the exponential rise in the number of
contractors serving in the Armed Forces? Serving the Armed
Forces and the pecuniary interests that seem to drive
involvement in military matters today, as opposed to patriotic?
General Rochelle. I would attribute no rise in the number
of contractors to the current officer shortage. The current
officer shortage grows out of a decision in the 1990s to
downsize the Army, and we put the Army on that track toward a
much, much smaller level force. We are still living with the
consequences of that decision in the 1990s to this very day.
The second contributing factor, as I mentioned earlier in
my comments, is modularity, which brings a higher concentration
of officers with it.
But point number one, the pecuniary issues you mentioned, I
don't really have a notion about that. I am not, I don't
believe there is a relationship.

BUDGET

Ms. Kaptur. Do you know how much the Army has spent on
bonuses in the current budget that is being submitted? What are
we spending, compared to 10 years ago?
General Rochelle. I can't tell you where it is relative to
10 years ago, but our recruiting and retention costs for fiscal
09, I am speaking the current year budget, not 10,
$2,029,000,000. This includes recruiting and retention bonuses,
education incentives, marketing and advertising and recruiter
support costs for the Army Active Component.
Ms. Kaptur. And I think for the record, it would be very
interesting how that compares to 5 years ago and then 10 years
ago. That is a sizeable, my guess that is on an ascending path.
General Rochelle. That would be true if one looked, I am
confident that that trend would prove accurate ma'am, if you
want to look back five years ago, but in the recent years, 2008
to 2009 and what we are projecting for 2010, it would begin to
turn downward.
Ms. Kaptur. All right. Can you provide for the record a--
the enlistment bonus, the--when they are reenlisted in theater,
whatever, all these different bonuses that have been tacked on,
maybe I am not aware of some of them, that would accrue to the
individual soldier.
General Rochelle. We would be happy to.
[The information follows:]

Specifically focusing on the recruiting and retention bonus
programs for the Army Active Component, we spent or anticipate
spending:

[In millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2000 FY 2005 FY 2008 FY 2009
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
$200.3 $671.5 $1,206.8 $1,170.2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

SUICIDE PREVENTION

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you very much. I want to turn to your
testimony and Congressman Dicks did a great job on this this
morning, the whole issue, you have got suicide prevention, page
10 of your testimony and other issues relating to soldier well-
being and health, and I am interested in the way that the
architecture of what you have presented in your testimony. I
think it is very interesting you focused on suicide as opposed
to Soldier well-being. For example, the issue of PTSD in this
type of, the types of engagements we are in you have 98 percent
of your time is total boredom and 2 percent of your time is
utter terror. We know that the nature of PTSD is that you know
upwards of five different incidents like that, and you have got
it, 20 percent of your Soldiers also have it.
If America had consciousness of this, we would be better
able to articulate it in testimony. Half the homeless in our
country are veterans. They are testifying testimony to our
failure to have understood this in prior conflicts. Hundreds
and hundreds of thousands of people wandering all over this
country and they are veterans.
This tells us in living color that we failed in the past. I
am really glad to hear that you are thinking about this, but
only to address suicide, which is the ultimate act of
hopelessness doesn't deal with the reality of what the rest of
the force is dealing with. And my concern is, as hard as we
have worked to try to get a service, a department wide, every
single department, Army, Air Force, we had Air Force in here
yesterday, Navy and Marine Corps, to get them all to have a
coordinated program in this. I can't tell you how difficult it
has been to deal with the Department of Defense on this issue.
If our chairman hadn't taken a leadership role on this, if Mr.
Young hadn't been a strong partner in the efforts we wouldn't
be anywhere but I am concerned that other issues you don't
address, you don't address fully the PTSD, you don't really
report back on what has been done today, you just talk about
the study with NIMH.

MENTAL HEALTH

One of the other Members discussed Guard and Reserve. I
come from a nonbase community. The problems of PTSD with our
returning Guard and Reserve are huge and as a result over the
last five cycles, I have put money in this bill and forced it
down the throat of DoD, and they wanted to spit it out, they
tried to spit it out every year and what we are trying to do in
Ohio and we had the agreement of our Adjutant General to
examine every returning vet to Ohio, including the majority
that don't go back to a base and there are many Army MPs in
that group and combat engineering units and what have we
learned? We have learned that working with DoD is an
impossibility. That as hard as we try to roll out this
assessment of our returning troops, one of the key elements
which is a genetic profiling of predisposition to some of these
illnesses, and in a certain part of the brain, somewhere
between the units in Ohio, the Adjutant General and the
Secretary of Defense, genetic profiling, the testing that they
need to do on a volunteer basis has been rejected.
We are trying to find out who did that, all right. What I
would really appreciate and I know my time has expired, Mr.
Chairman, I would appreciate your helping me, and I said this
to the Air Force yesterday, to find me the genius over there at
DoD, that is, in charge of mental health, and all they do is
bring us, this service has this one, that service has this one,
it is not well coordinated, and I want to sit them down with
the researchers and with our Adjutant General and I want to
solve this problem so we can do the assessment and treatment of
our veterans. It is really frustrating.
And we don't deal--Congressman Dicks talked about a study.
We want to look to your study in Ohio. We want to be a part of
the whole. It shouldn't be this hard, and it tells me that
something is really messed up over at DoD. One of our top
research doctors, brilliant human being, said to me, Marcy, in
my whole life, my worst experience with any Federal department
is with the Department of Defense, what is wrong over there.
This is one of the neuropsychiatrists. This guy could win a
Nobel Prize with what we are trying to do, and he keeps running
into these walls at DoD.
So can you help me solve this problem of the assessment we
want to do in Ohio by connecting our Guard to whoever is in
charge over there and it is Army by the way, over at DoD so we
can get this done right?
Mr. Murtha. I think I could probably answer this better
than they can, Ms. Kaptur. I think Secretary Kasells and Dr.
Emery have been working this. We gave them money to do this. In
January of this year, they just started to come up with a plan,
which they briefed me on. We had a hearing about it, but they
aren't far enough along to give us the details. But the Guard
is still--I had a young fellow commit suicide that was in Iraq,
came home and worked for a year and then committed suicide. So
we aren't there yet, but I do think the Defense Department is
addressing it because of the direction we gave them, and I
think we are starting down a trail. We told them to hire
psychologists and psychiatrists. We told them to go in that
direction and to counsel troops that needed it.
We changed the sensitivity of people. I think it is a very
complicated process, but I think that Dr. Emery's the one to
talk to, and I think she can help you with the Guard. She's
just not there yet, even with the Defense Department, let alone
the Guard. But if you talk to Sarah, and Sarah Young and Dr.
Emery, I think you can get to where you want to go.
Ms. Kaptur. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I would
hope that our study could understand there is something going
on in Texas. I read about it in some magazine article. Mr.
Chairman, I think a number of us have pieces of the whole but
we can't seem to connect it. We need an architecture to do
that.
Mr. Murtha. We haven't gotten there yet. That is the
problem. As you say it takes so long for them to get anything
done, but we are I think moving step-by-step in the right
direction, we hope.
The gentlewoman's time has expired. Ms. Granger.

EDUCATION

Ms. Granger. Thank you. General, I want to return to your
response about the requirement of a high school diploma and I
will admit, I have got a bias: I am a former high schoolteacher
and may not have been something I taught in my class that made
some someone a better Soldier, but there is often a commitment
and a discipline coming from finishing something, but my main
experience which as a mayor when we were trying to recruit
companies to come in my city or maintain those companies and
time and time again, the CEO or the training director would
say, we have to have a basic level of education and knowledge
in order to train those employees, oftentimes for entry level
jobs, but became very good jobs, and we wanted to keep them.
Today's Army, I mean, this is the Committee that funds the
equipment and the technology and it is very sophisticated
technology and equipment, and I am proud to serve and be a part
of that but to be able to train, I think that that is extremely
important. So I have some questions around that.

WAIVERS

One thing you talked about waivers, and I want to know how
many waivers are granted to recruits, but you talked about you
said the number one, the most common waiver, the way I
understood was a--had to do with discipline and behavior and
three was obesity.
General Rochelle. I believe that is correct.
Ms. Granger. So where does--where do they drop out and what
kind of waivers are allowed having to do with education or
learning? Second, what is the attrition rate for recruits
without a high school diploma and the third one would ask you
to say how does this economy affect your recruiting? There are
a lot of well-trained good people that are without jobs or will
be without jobs that will be wonderful to serve in the
military, and how do you think that will be affected?
General Rochelle. First of all, let me take the latter
question first, if I may. How does the economy affect it? It
affects it very positively in terms of the numbers of
individuals seeking entrance into the military. I commanded
U.S. Army recruiting command from January of 2001 until October
of 2005 and relative to that period, we are currently in a
heyday in terms of individuals seeking to serve in the
military. The difference is, and this is why twice I hit the
qualifications because none of the effects of the economy
impact the number of individuals who are qualified. So out of
the those who are coming to the front door of a recruiting
station still, three out of ten are qualified to serve without
a waiver, still only one in ten is qualified to be commissioned
as an officer. That doesn't change.
On the point of waivers, in 2008, let me make two points.
In 2008, our waivers decreased over the previous year. Total
waivers, 17,079 out of 80,000 assessions. In 2007, that number
was 18,234. And comparing fiscal year 2009 current month to
date to fiscal year 2008, we see a 4.5 percent decrease in the
number of total waivers. So we are using this as an opportunity
to elevate the quality, two more data points, if I may.
As a former high school teacher, the total number of
enlistees that we categorize as DoD would categorize as tier
one, high school diploma, not a GED, but a high school diploma
and are able to score in the upper half of the Armed Services
vocational aptitude battery increased 2008 over 2007 by 2.1
percent, at the same time that for that very same period, the
total number of lowest mental category we are allowed to enlist
decreased by 1.2 percent.
Ms. Granger. You gave me, you gave me total numbers but
what I asked for is those without high school diplomas, and I
think you are giving me total numbers.
General Rochelle. Of waivers, I gave waivers.
Ms. Granger. Were you giving me total waivers or waivers
without high school education?
General Rochelle. I gave you total waivers.
Ms. Granger. Do you have those without a high school
education?
General Rochelle. I do not have those.
Ms. Granger. Can you get them to me?
General Rochelle. I can get those for the record.
Ms. Granger. And the other thing, in giving this and you
say it is still the same percentage or the same numbers but
when you are talking about there is total, you are choosing
from a larger group now because of the economy.
General Rochelle. We are.
Ms. Granger. So is it possible to raise those standards
back to where they were as far as a high school diploma, given
the numbers?
General Rochelle. If, indeed, my point about the increase
in the numbers of high school tier 1 did not communicate that
that is precisely what I was attempting to communicate, that we
are raising the bar.
Ms. Granger. And you will come back to me with the numbers?
General Rochelle. I will.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
[The information follows:]

1. Below are the annual number of non-prior service (NPS) recruits
enlisted in the Army's Active Component who did not possess a Tier 1
Education Credential (typically a high school diploma) and required an
enlistment waiver:

Fiscal Year Non-prior service recruits without a tier 1 ed
credential requiring a waiver
FY03.................................................... 1,196
FY04.................................................... 751
FY05.................................................... 1,545
FY06.................................................... 4,374
FY07.................................................... 5,308
FY08.................................................... 5,043
FY09 YTD................................................ 1,400
--------------------------------------------------------
____________________________________________________
Total............................................. 19,617

2. During this period, the Army enlisted more than 464,400 new
Soldiers into the Active Component resulting in approximately 4.6% of
its new recruits falling into the above mentioned category.

Mr. Murtha. Mr. Rothman.

POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER (PTSD)

Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to speak
to my colleague and friend, Ms. Kaptur, because I did want her
to know that and you gentlemen, Secretary General as well, that
I respectfully disagree with her on the notion of DNA testing.
Either of you gentlemen could you tell me the percentage of
soldiers who return from service with PTSD.
General Rochelle. I cannot tell you that percentage.
Mr. Rothman. Is it 1 percent? Is it 99 percent? Somewhere
in between?
General Rochelle. I would not speculate. I have heard
different--I have heard different estimates from our Surgeon
General who is testifying here today. And I would like to take
that for the record in order----
[The information follows:]

The Army's ground-breaking Mental Health Advisory Teams have found
that 15-20% of Soldiers redeploying from Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF)
and Enduring Freedom (OEF) have symptoms of post-traumatic stress,
anxiety, and/or depression. However, not all of these cases develop
into post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). According to the Military
Health System's medical data repository, 4.8% of all Soldiers (all
Components) ever deployed to OIF/OEF have been diagnosed with PTSD. We
recognize, however, that some Soldiers with PTSD do not seek treatment
within our Military Health System. Thus, although 4.8% of Soldiers are
diagnosed with PTSD, we acknowledge that a larger number of redeploying
Soldiers likely suffer from the disorder we are working hard to reduce
the stigma associated with seeking help for behavioral health concerns.

Mr. Rothman. What are the different estimates you have
heard?
General Rochelle. They vary. They vary.
Mr. Rothman. Mr. Chairman, you don't know whether it is 1
percent or 99 percent of your forces who are returning who have
PTSD, General?
General Rochelle. No, sir. What I am saying, sir, is that I
don't wish to speculate.
Mr. Rothman. Well, give me a ballpark, sir.
General Rochelle. No, I don't think I would like to do
that, sir.
Mr. Murtha. The figures that the committee has are 300,000
or more that they project. Now I don't know how accurate those
are, but why we need to know this obviously is we have to
prepare for the future and prepare for the health care costs,
which have increased so significantly. So that is the figure
that we have.
General Rochelle. I clearly understand, Mr. Chairman, and
as I believe you pointed out, those numbers and the estimates
change because we are constantly finding out that individuals
who have shown no post-traumatic stress or traumatic brain
injury subsequently will indeed----
Mr. Rothman. So the number is probably higher? I find it--
--
Mr. Dicks. If the gentleman would yield just to make a
point briefly, I think and I heard Mr. Young say that a lot of
times this doesn't show up until a year after the person is
back.
Mr. Rothman. No, but I am saying I am looking for the
bottom line, the lowest figure you have, and then we can assume
it comes up. I will tell you why. If we start testing for DNA,
there is lots of brave new world fears and realistic fears and
concerns that I have about that--brave new world being the name
of a book--if for example 20 percent of our forces come back
with PTSD or then in the future have PTSD, if we have a genetic
test that prevents these people from serving, that means the
force structure will be 20 percent less.
Now, the general tells us the force is out of balance and I
believe that it is. So do we remove 20 percent or we change the
circumstances of the service? I think probably addressing the
circumstances and nature of the service would be more important
but I don't believe that the Army could sustain 20 percent cut
in forces right off the top, plus there are other dangers to
society in ruling people ineligible to serve because of a
psychiatric weakness as it would be undoubtedly described or
worse.
General, you talk about behavioral or discipline
deficiencies in the, in those that you are seeing as, who are
applying to be members of the force. Could you describe what
those behavioral, as the father of five to my own and three
step kids, I think they are almost all out of danger, God
willing, but tell me what those behavioral and logistic
problems are. Is it they smoke marijuana? Is it that they have
committed armed robbery? What is the nature of the behavioral
or discipline problems that they present to you?
General Rochelle. Thank you for the question, sir. It runs
the gamut, everything from petty theft up to possession of
controlled substances, all the way up to individuals who
present and who are not admitted into the military for crimes
that would be categorized as felonies, given the level of
punishment that would attribute to it.

RETENTION

Mr. Rothman. Felonies? That is significant. There is a
figure that I saw that the captain retention program were $443
million was spent. This is from your written testimony.
General Rochelle. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rothman. Produced an increase in retention from 88
percent to 89 percent. So basically that 1 percent arguably got
us or--rather, $443 million got us a 1 percent improvement in
officer retention. Do you think that is a good use of that
money?
General Rochelle. I do. I think it is an extraordinarily
good use of the money. Department of Defense estimates of the
numbers of the individuals who were uncertain or had already
indicated a desire to leave the military, up to 50 percent of
that number were actually retained by that bonus. That is a DoD
estimate and study.
Second point, we don't know what retention would have
looked like in that, over that 18-month period had we not
employed using the authorities granted us by this committee, to
offer that incentive pilot and it was a pilot and it is a very
successful one.
Mr. Rothman. Does a percentage of 50 percent square with
your figure that it was only a 1 percent increase in retention?
General Rochelle. It does. We are measuring two different
things. The 1 percent gain was over basic historical
projections of retention. So we moved the needle by 1 percent.
The 50 percent is a survey given to individual officers, what
is your potential.
Mr. Rothman. I get it.
Mr. James. If I may, let me just add that when you talk
about the 15 thousand captains, we are talking about four years
of college by and large. You are talking about four to six
years of experience. To replace that human capital, the price
General Rochelle is absolutely correct, the price was
absolutely on the money. To replace ten years of, to rebuild
that and to retain and to be able to retain that clearly was
worth the money.
Mr. Rothman. I think what the General is saying--which I
understand, is that the 1 percent increase may seem modest but
given the tremendous historical pressures and stresses on the
force, not only wouldn't have gone up at all it would have
dropped significantly. So that.
General Rochelle. Yes.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Let me get this clear. Why would only 50
percent get the bonuses?
General Rochelle. No, Mr. Chairman, that is not what I
said. 50 percent of the individuals surveyed by DoD, captains
in the Army who were surveyed by DoD who indicated their intent
to either separate from the military or uncertain of their
intent to remain in the military, changed their minds as a
result of that incentive program, 50 percent.
Mr. Murtha. When----
General Rochelle. And were retained.
Mr. Murtha. I am sitting here and I am saying to myself, I
am going to stay in, but I might as well say I am getting out
so I get a bonus.
General Rochelle. I can't account for that phenomenon.
Mr. Murtha. You see what I am talking about.
General Rochelle. That is the potential, Mr. Chairman. I
can't account for that phenomenon, nor the DoD.
Mr. Murtha. And what other percentage of officers get a
bonus?
General Rochelle. May I take that for the record, Mr.
Chairman?
Mr. Murtha. Yes. Mr. Bishop.
[The information follows:]

The recent Army officer retention bonus program for Regular Army
captains targeted officers in the Army Competitive Category and select
administrative Medical Service Corps specialties. Of the 23,000
captains eligible for the program, we had 14,500 who accepted bonuses,
which equates to an acceptance rate of over 65%. We have offered no
bonus to Army Competitive Category officers at any grade other than
captain. These numbers do not include officers serving as medical
health care professionals in the Army Medical Department or attorneys
in the Judge Advocate General's Corps, who may be eligible for other
incentives.

ANTIDEFICIENCY ACT

Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome gentlemen,
General Rochelle and Mr. James. I want to ask you about
something that was somewhat disturbing to me as I was reading
through the notes here, and it has to do with the
Antideficiency Act exiting fiscal year 2008. I am looking at my
materials here, and it says in September of 2008, the Army
obligated $200 million more of military pay than was available
in the Military Personnel, Army account, and that it
subsequently asked to transfer funds in the account to cover
the difference.
Of course, the committee staff is of the opinion that the
Army violated the Antideficiency Act, and of course, we are
told that the Army lawyers say that that is not the case. But
the Antideficiency Act makes it clear that an officer or
employee may not make an obligation exceeding the amount that
is available in the appropriation.
On what basis did the Army determine that the obligation of
the $200 million did not violate the Antideficiency Act? And I
don't know if you can give us what your general counsel said on
it, whether that was an investigation and who conducted it and
what kind of findings there were, but if the money was
available in the military personnel account, why was a
subsequent reprogramming request of that $200 million made in
the personnel account.
And we are also told that for fiscal year 2008, and we are
looking at 2010 now, that the Army is going to send up a
reprogramming request of up to $2.3 billion for the fiscal year
2008 appropriation, and if that is true, how is it possible and
how is that not a violation of the Antideficiency Act? Do you
have any internal controls to detect this kind of
overbudgeting, and if you don't, if you do now, how is that
going to be prevented in the future?
General Rochelle. I would be happy to address that,
Representative Bishop. First of all, Army lawyers had ruled
that and general counsel has ruled that there was not an
Antideficiency Act in that $200 million underestimation, which
is exactly what it was. It was a technicality that required us
to come back to the committee for reprogramming and I will
describe that technicality very simply. The obligations on the
military personnel account for fiscal 2008 were closed at the
end of the fiscal year and they were based on known obligations
at the time for all manpower costs to include transportation,
promotions, pay raises and salaries, of course. Once that is
closed, we realized then that other obligations, not known at
the time, came in higher and we estimated too low. It is a
technicality that requires us to then come back to the
committee to request a reprogramming, in spite of the fact that
the military personnel account for Army in fiscal year 2008
still had sufficient funds in it to cover those additional
costs.
Mr. Bishop. If it had sufficient funds, why would you need
to get reprogramming and does that relate to what the
committee's been concerned about with regard to the failure to
pay the stop loss payments that the committee had authorized
and had appropriated.
General Rochelle. Well, the stop loss payments were in
fiscal year 2009, sir, and no, the fiscal year 2008
underestimation does not represent neither a failure on the
part of the Army to be responsible with the funds appropriated
by this committee nor to have the appropriate controls in
place.
I might add one final point if I may. We have also asked
the AAA, the Army Audit Agency, to look into in addition to the
ruling on the part of the general counsel, look into our
estimating processes and procedures to make sure that we don't
have a repeat of this.
Mr. Bishop. Okay, and because at the close of fiscal year
2007 the MPA appropriation had a surplus, and at the close of
2008, you were projected to have exhausted all your funds, and
of course, it was a second budget cycle in a row that this had
occurred and so that is troubling to the subcommittee and
certainly to our staff and we want to have some attention
placed on that so we don't have to deal with this on a
recurring fashion.
General Rochelle. Well, please allow me to assure the
committee that we are concerned as well, hence the review by
the AAA, the Army Audit Agency.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you.
Mr. Murtha. Ms. Kilpatrick.

CONTRACTORS

Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,
General, Mr. Secretary. The Chair mentioned 144,000 contractors
in Iraq. What percent of those are Army or are they all Army?
Are they from other branches of service? Do we know?
General Rochelle. I don't. If we assume speaking all of
Iraq, they are clearly not all Army.
Ms. Kilpatrick. How many are Army going there?
General Rochelle. I am going to have to take that for the
record, if you don't mind, ma'am.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Do you know what percent of those are
compact infantry on the ground sort of soldier with ours? Do
you know what percent of them would be?
General Rochelle. None. None would be performing that type
of function.
[The information follows:]

CURRENTLY DEPLOYED CONTRACTORS FOR CONTRACT AGENCY U.S. ARMY
[As of 4/22/2009]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percentage
of U.S.
Army
LN/FN/US U.S. Army Total against
Total
Personnel
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Local National................... 13,937 24,686 56.46
Foreign National................. 55,329 80,373 68.84
United States.................... 42,165 55,184 76.41
--------------------------------------
Total........................ 111,431 160,243 69.54
------------------------------------------------------------------------

(Please note that this is a head count as opposed to a full-time
equivalent calculation.)

Ms. Kilpatrick. So they'll be servicing in some other kind
of capacity?
General Rochelle. Services, maintenance, logistics,
transportation, there are some security as the chairman
mentioned.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Yes, yes, okay. That helps a bit. Are you
familiar with the common access card?
General Rochelle. I am quite familiar with the common
access card.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Has the Army seen any problems with that
card? This committee, we have had much testimony on it this
year, and this Member's not sure that it is really safe or that
it is 100 percent sure. Is the Army experiencing any
improprieties with it?
General Rochelle. Well, I am aware that there is a problem
with accountability with common access cards in theater, and I
think that is a matter that is being investigated, or, I should
say, looked into by the Inspector General of the Army.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Okay. Contractors issue common access
cards--are you familiar----
General Rochelle. They are, they issue.
Ms. Kilpatrick. And contractors are not monitored. We want
an Army-Army, or military-military. We don't want a
contractors' military, particularly----
General Rochelle. I understand your point, ma'am.

SEXUAL ASSAULTS/SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Ms. Kilpatrick. Okay. There is been a lot of discussion in
the last 24 hours about the sexual assaults that are occurring,
and in your testimony, you mentioned a bit about it on page 10
and 11. I am familiar with the programs, the I Am Strong,
Intervention Act, and motivate--I like that. Sounds good--
Sexual Harassment Assault Response Program, which is the SHAR
program, how effective are they? And I do understand that
probably being a female and have been reported, you don't get
100 percent of the people responding to being sexually
assaulted, be it a man or woman. Do we know what percent do
respond and these programs service? Do we know what percent--I
guess you have to speculate if you don't know, if it doesn't
come to you. Any idea?
General Rochelle. In fact, there has been a great deal of
study done on this in the public sector. Sexual assault is the
most underreported crime in America.
Ms. Kilpatrick. In America? Not only in the military.
General Rochelle. Not just the military. The estimates are
that 30 to 40 percent of victims actually report.
Ms. Kilpatrick. You are speaking Army, not U.S.--not
country?
General Rochelle. U.S.
Ms. Kilpatrick. It is higher than that in the military, I
assume.
General Rochelle. Perhaps. Now we don't have data to
actually peg it as lower reporting than the national average,
nor higher, but two points I would like to make.
The Army's strategy, which was rolled out last April by the
Secretary of the Army and General Casey, is the envy right now
of all of DoD because it does, as you say, focus on----
Mr. Murtha. What is that, envy--something's the envy of all
the rest of the service? What is this now?
General Rochelle. I am very proud to repeat that. The
Army's sexual assault strategy, which was rolled out last April
by the Secretary Geren and--General Casey, is the envy of all
of DoD, unquestionably so. And it is because it focuses on our
Army corps values and the absolute inconsistency, the absolute
intolerability of those core values with the simple act of
sexual assault or sexual harassment.
Ms. Kilpatrick. And by your own numbers, the Army's numbers
are going up?
General Rochelle. They are. This may surprise you, but when
the strategy was rolled out, phase one of the strategy which
was to secure senior leader conviction and then publicize
across the entire Army the commitment to this from the top all
the way down, our numbers would go up and that is a measure of
success of the strategy, because women are more inclined to
come forward.
Ms. Kilpatrick. I assume that for men as well. You have
men?
General Rochelle. Men as well, indeed.
Ms. Kilpatrick. And then do they have the health services
necessary even while in the military, as well as out, to deal
with that, which goes back, I think, to suicides. My last point
was going to be the multiple tours, the time home, back
touring, suicides, all of that, is anything done where we can
take a look at that to see what else we need to do help it?
General Rochelle. Well, make no mistake about the fact that
our medical forces and our medical capabilities are stretched
pretty thin after seven years of combat, but we have placed
into position collateral duty sexual assault response
coordinators who serve in a counseling role. That addresses one
aspect of it. Unit victim advocates who assist in reporting,
who assist in guiding a victim, man or woman, through the
process for reporting and, of course, seeking help, but to your
fundamental question, our medical facilities behavioral health
in particular are stretched pretty thin.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Not only Army, but I remember Jane Harman
brought this to my attention earlier about sexual assault. I
went to Admiral Mullen. He's very interested. So you are
absolutely right. I just didn't hear what the subject was but
the Army has done a good job.
General Rochelle. I appreciate your repeating that, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Dicks.

CIVILIAN CORPS

Mr. Dicks. Let me ask you--Mr. Chairman, thank you for
yielding.
Civilian personnel in your statement on page 5 says
currently Army civilian core is over 313,000 strong. I mean is
that all civilians that work for the Army in total?
General Rochelle. That is correct, sir. That does not
include contractors.
Mr. Dicks. Then, of those, over 4,000 are serving in harm's
way in the U.S. Central Command area of operations. According
to the chairman, we have 144,000 contractors and 274,000
contractors working in Central Command, and why is it that we
only have 4,000 of these civilians in harm's way? Is this the
same problem that the State Department has of getting people to
go, to go to the theater or why would we use contractors when
you have $48,000--why wouldn't we increase our civilian force
and then send more of the civilians there and less of the
contractors in order to save money?
General Rochelle. There is a slight relationship with the
challenge that the State Department has, but ever so slight,
and I simply say that because at the point----
Mr. Dicks. They are all volunteers?
General Rochelle. They are all volunteers. And at the point
when State Department was asked to provide cultural change--
civilians to support cultural change it was DoD through its
volunteers, many of them among those that you just cited, who
stepped up to the plate. There is a relationship, but it is not
the same issue.
Mr. Murtha. Wait a minute. You are talking about the CERT
teams, they are IRR. They pulled Navy people in from IRR. What
are you talking about?
General Rochelle. I am not talking CERT teams, sir. I am
talking transition, civilians on transition teams, police--
military police teams and the like--cultural, teams.
Mr. Dicks. Now, you called this the Army's civilian corps.
Now, what is the plan for the Army's civilian corps? Are you
going to build it up?
General Rochelle. Sir, the Army civilian corps speaks to
the team of 313,000 civilians in its entirety.
Mr. Dicks. Only which 4,000 are deployed.
General Rochelle. That is correct. The term civilian corps
refers to the larger population.
Mr. Dicks. Well, you talk about the Army's civilian
university. Can you tell us about that?
General Rochelle. The Army civilian university was
activated last year, 2008, beginning of 2008 as the central
coordinating element and coordinating body for all leader
development and civilian human resource development training
and education for the civilian corps, 313,000. It resides
within our training and doctrine command.
Mr. Dicks. Where it is located physically?
General Rochelle. Ft. Belvoir.
Mr. Dicks. Go ahead, I didn't mean to interrupt.
General Rochelle. That is it, sir.
Mr. Dicks. The ACU will prepare civilians for new demands
and fully engage the Army in meeting the objectives of the
Department of Defense civilian human capital strategy plan. I
guess my question is why--are we going to try to get more of
the civilians to go to Iraq and Afghanistan so that we can
reduce the number of contractors? Or has anybody thought about
that?
General Rochelle. Well, I am certain----
Mr. Dicks. I mean, it would be like in-sourcing, wouldn't
it, if we were going to turn this over to civilians?
Mr. Murtha. Direct hire is what we call them.
Mr. Dicks. Or direct hire as the chairman calls it, so
there is no strategy to do that.
General Rochelle. In point of fact, the number of civilians
who are currently serving in Iraq are all volunteers.
Mr. Dicks. But I would like to see if we could get more
volunteers and then use that as a way to reduce the
contractors. Now, wasn't it one of the Generals Nelson Ford,
then the Under Secretary then I am certain, who stated, We
really don't know the number of contractors that we have, and
we really haven't thought about the appropriate role of
contractors on the battlefield. We still don't understand that.
That is October of 2008. That is not a very reassuring comment
from the Under Secretary. Is that still the case? We still
don't have handle on this.
Mr. James. I serve with--Dr. John Anderson with our force
management group is, in fact, looking at that. We have, in
fact, reported and I want to take this for the record, but I
believe that to date we have confirmed that we have 139,000
contractors working State side, and as the chairman has already
noted we have a number of other contractors working in CENTCOM.
Let me be absolutely clear. The number I get you will be
computed in ``person years'' so that 139,000 means there is
actually more in terms of bodies more than 139,000, but I will
get that for you for the record.
Mr. Dicks. You say there is 139,000 contractors in the
United States?
Mr. James. I am saying there is the equivalent, sir--and I
want to confirm the number--there is the equivalent of 139,000
man-year contractors in the Pentagon, yes, for the Army.
[The information follows:]

The Army's Contractor Manpower Reporting Application (CMRA)
inventory of service contracts indicates that there are 82,929
contractor manpower equivalents (CMDs) in theater (Afghanistan, Iraq,
Kuwait, Qatar, and UAE), and 128,280 CMEs outside theater--both inside
the continental United States and outside the continental United
States.

CONTRACTORS

Mr. Murtha. One of the things that we thought contractors
was supposed to be was be temporary for a surge. Now, I see
contractors on gates. I see contractors out at Bethesda
Hospital admitting--not admitting people but showing people
around and so forth. They certainly could be direct hire. I
mean, they are going to be there permanently as far as I can
see. I think we ought to get this contracting thing under
control. I mean the budget is, we have been harping on it we
are trying to get figures and even Secretary Gates and Admiral
Mullen haven't been able to give us a plan for how we hire
people rather than contract out. I know there is guards on the
gates. Somebody, they are not only paying them, they are paying
the contractor a percentage so we have got to look at this
thing.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. If the gentleman would yield, Mr.
Chairman, in the theater, and we did have testimony I don't
know last week, differentiating the number of foreign
nationals, just the single--I mean the figures are in some ways
so high and even as we sort of have a larger footprint in
Afghanistan, I assume we are hiring up all sorts of contractors
that sort of work under the control of the Army Corps of
Engineers on these bases, but it would be good to sort of know
you know whether these are foreign nationals of that country
that we hire, as well as other foreign nationals and if each
person is a contractor, I mean that would certainly spike the
figures up. There are contractors and there are contractors.
Mr. Murtha. What Mr. Frelinghuysen is talking about, food
service and so forth, we understand that. But what we are
concerned about is the person that could be direct hire, which
would save us a lot of money and give people a permanent
position, rather than going to a contractor. I see they got rid
of one contracting outfit there in Iraq, and said they are
going to reduce them, but it is money, as well as direct hire
working for the government. We appreciate your testimony very--
--
Mr. Bishop. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Bishop.

ROTC/JROTC

Mr. Bishop. May I just ask one question. I ask them to
provide for the record. With regard to the quality of recruits,
one of the concerns that has been raised, I think I have
mentioned it to you, General Rochelle, previously, is the lack
of ROTC units and junior ROTC units. You mentioned the lack of
discipline, the lack of physical fitness as problems for the
people who are being recruited and those who are even offering
themselves.
Again, do you agree that an increase in the number of
junior ROTC units in high schools as well as ROTC units in the
colleges would help the Army as well as the other services in
getting high quality recruits.
General Rochelle. Well, I would certainly agree, sir, that
junior ROTC is a program that more than pays for itself in
terms of citizenship, patriotism, and at least an understanding
of what military service across all the branches really is. It
is a wise investment. And there is pent-up demand as you and I
have spoken of in recent past. There is pent-up demand across
America, every State, for more representation of junior ROTC.
It is just, it is expensive.
Mr. Bishop. But you say that more than pays for the
investment, are you exploring the possibility of expanding the
number of junior ROTC units? I know.
General Rochelle. Continuously under review, continuously.
Mr. Bishop. What is it that you need, do you need more do
you need us to put in an appropriation to increase
appropriation for that purpose.
General Rochelle. Let me come back to you with a more
comprehensive answer to that part of the question, sir.
[The information follows:]

Army JROTC is a proven citizenship program, but there is no
expectation that JROTC cadets will necessarily serve in the military--
either as a cadet joining the SROTC program at the college level or as
an enlisted member joining the ranks of the US Military. The quality of
the recruits joining the Army is not a function of JROTC/SROTC, but of
the overall quality of students leaving our high schools.
Additional Army JROTC units, as well as other service JROTCs, will
result in better quality high school students, but should not be
considered as the solution to improving military recruits. Any
improvement in the quality of high school students, regardless of the
source of that improvement, will improve the quality of military
recruits.
Section 548 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2009 (FY09 NDAA) required the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Secretaries of the military departments, to
develop and implement a plan to establish and support not less than
3,700 JROTC units by September 30, 2020. As a result, the Army plans to
expand the number of Army JROTC units over the next three years from
the current count of 1,645 to 1,910; an increase of 265 units. In order
to reach the stated goal of 265 new units, Army JROTC will establish 86
units in FY10, 86 units in FY11, and 93 units in FY12.
Currently, there are over 259 schools with applications on the U.S.
Army Cadet Command's Order of Merit List (OML) from schools requesting
an Army JROTC unit. On average, the command receives three applications
a month from schools seeking JROTC units. Given the number of
applications received each month, the command expects there will be 86
schools ready to open in FY10 and 86 more in FY11. Due to the current
financial constraints impacting state and local school districts, the
command will aggressively market and campaign the Army JROTC program in
order to meet the FY12 goal of an additional 93 units.
In February 2008, U.S. Army Cadet Command requested program
objective memorandum (POM) funding to establish 265 new schools
starting in FY10. The Army's FY10 budget submissions adequately support
the expansion of the JROTC program. Therefore, no further adjustments
are necessary.
The National Defense Act of 1916 established ROTC on college
campuses. Army ROTC is the largest officer-producing organization,
having commissioned more than half a million second lieutenants since
its inception. Today, Army ROTC has a total of 272 programs located at
colleges and universities throughout the 50 states, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico with an enrollment of more than 20,000
cadets. It produces approximately 60 percent of the second lieutenants
who join the active Army, the Army National Guard, and the U.S. Army
Reserve. More than 40 percent of current active duty Army General
Officers were ROTC commissionees. The purpose of this program is to
produce officers, not enlisted recruits, for the US Army. As a result,
there is no direct relationship between the number of SROTC programs
and the quality of recruits.

Mr. Kingston. If you will yield a minute, you said junior
ROTC. What about college level?
General Rochelle. Well, sir, the question was would the
junior ROTC and Army ROTC--senior ROTC contribute to more
recruits for the military.
Mr. Bishop. High quality recruits.
General Rochelle. High quality recruits. Senior ROTC,
probably not. That is why I didn't address it. Junior ROTC for
all services, I think it would help, and quite frankly, junior
ROTC is not a military recruiting vehicle. It is a citizenship
vehicle.
Mr. James. If I could just add, I think one of the places
where the committee could be of invaluable assistance in terms
of making ROTC more competitive and helping us attract more
officers is to think about if we could make the bed and board
portion of the scholarship system much, much more attractive,
because currently we are so much handicapped----
Mr. Bishop. You are talking about the senior ROTC now?
Mr. James. Yes, sir, the senior ROTC, yes, sir.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Visclosky.
Mr. Visclosky. General, you had mentioned there is about
4,000 civilian employees in Iraq, if I remember your figure
correctly, and they are all volunteers. Is there a problem as
far as number of people you can get to volunteer on a civilian
side? Is there some ceiling that necessitates more contractors?
General Rochelle. I am not aware of any difficulty we are
having with our Department of Army civilians willing to
volunteer to serve in Iraq, none whatsoever.
Mr. Visclosky. Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. General, I can see you are recruiting great
because you are adamant about these bonuses. Bonuses up to $2
billion. I can tell that you defend the bonuses with passion
and I appreciate that. What I can't understand is why everybody
doesn't. Don't we have categories where we say, okay, this
certain category gets a bonus, this category doesn't?
General Rochelle. We absolutely do, and I made a commitment
to Ms. Kaptur to provide that, and I will provide that.
Mr. Murtha. Thank you very much. The Committee will adjourn
until tomorrow at 10.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the
answers thereto follow:]

Involuntary Service

Question. There are several means that the Armed Forces use to
retain personnel including stop loss authority. Stop loss is a
management program that retains servicemembers beyond their
contractually agreed-to separation date. Stop loss is most often
invoked to stabilize unit integrity until the end of a combat tour.
There are currently over 12,000 soldiers in the Army, Army Reserve and
Army National Guard who remain on active duty beyond their scheduled
separation date as a result of stop loss. To help ease the burden of
those affected by stop loss, the FY2009 Defense Appropriations Act
established and funded a new special pay of $500 per month for all
servicemembers extended by stop loss during FY2009. To date no payments
have been made and DOD officials concede that the Army will need to
continue using stop loss through the end of 2009 or longer. Another
method to retain personnel is the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). An
individual assigned to the IRR receives no pay and is not obligated to
drill, conduct annual training, or participate in any military
activities (except for periodic Muster activities) until activated by
Presidential Reserve Callup Authority. Upon being called up,
servicemembers will usually be screened for their medical and personal
status in order to qualify or disqualify them for activation. During
the process, IRR members who seek to delay, defer, or exempt their
activations have the opportunity to present their case to the
mobilization authority for a decision. The Army has used this policy as
well.
Mr. James, Secretary Gates has been quoted several times stating
that he would like to end stop loss completely. What policy steps are
being taken to meet this goal?
Answer. The Army has recently announced its plan to reduce and
eventually discontinue the use of Stop Loss. Key components of this
plan include the following:
Active Army units deploying on or after 1 January 2010 will not be
subject to Stop Loss. Army National Guard units mobilizing on or after
1 September 2009 will not be subject to Stop Loss. U.S. Army Reserve
units mobilizing on or after 1 August 2009 will not be subject to Stop
Loss.
Effective with units redeploying on or after 1 July 2009, the post-
deployment stabilization period for Active Army units will be reduced
from 90 days to 60 days. Soldiers will be released from Stop Loss 60
days after redeployment.
Units currently deployed and deploying prior to the above dates
will remain subject to Stop Loss until they return from deployment and
complete the post-deployment stabilization period. Soldiers subject to
Stop Loss will be eligible for Stop Loss Special Pay, at a rate of $500
per month, once they are past their contractual Expiration Term of
Service or approved retirement/separation date. Stop Loss Special Pay
will be paid monthly until the Soldier is released from active duty,
the Soldier is retired or separated, or the Soldier takes action to
reenlist or extend his or her service obligation. These payments began
on October 1, 2008.
Question. Mr. James, in addition to the use of stop loss there was
a recent article in the Washington Post (3/03/2009) regarding a mother
who was recalled to active duty four years after separation from
service. How many times has the Army used the Presidential Reserve
Callup Authority in the past 5 years?
a. Mr. James, how many Soldiers has the Army recalled to service
and what is their time commitment?
Answer. The Army has not used the Presidential Reserve Callup
Authority in the past 5 years. The Army is mobilizing Reserve Soldiers
under the Partial Mobilization Authority (10 U.S.C. 12302).
a. The Army has issued involuntary mobilization orders to 955
Soldiers as Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA). Additionally, the
Army has issued involuntary mobilization orders to 13,718 Soldiers in
the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Of these, 9,710 have reported for
duty. The remaining Soldiers are waiting to report, have been granted a
delay, have an exemption case pending, or have failed to report. The
Army has not recalled any retired members to active duty involuntarily.
IMA Soldiers may be mobilized for 90 to 365 days, depending on the
mission requirement. Prior to December 2006, the Army mobilized IRR
Soldiers for a maximum length of 545 days. Beginning in December 2006,
the Army reduced the maximum period of mobilization for IRR Soldiers to
365 days, which was then consistent with the Secretary of Defense's
formal January 2007 mobilization guidance.
Question. Mr. James, do stop loss and IRR Soldiers count towards
the end strength goal?
a. If so, what is the Army's current end strength minus those
Soldiers?
Answer. Stop Loss Soldiers generally count against the overall
strength for all components, unless they are members of a reserve
component who have been called to active duty involuntarily.
IRR Soldiers who are mobilized involuntarily pursuant to 10 U.S.C.
12302 do not count against the active duty end strengths for any
component; however, IRR Soldiers who are voluntarily ordered to active
duty pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 12301(d) count against the maximum number of
reserve component Soldiers who are permitted to be on active duty at
any given time for the purpose of providing operational support. In
addition, IRR Soldiers who are voluntarily ordered to active duty will
count against the active duty end strengths if they are mobilized for a
period of greater than three years or they serve cumulative periods of
active duty that exceed 1,095 days in the previous 1,460 days.
a. As of the end of March, the active component strength was
548,894, with 6,420 Soldiers in a Stop Loss status. The Army's end
strength minus these Soldiers is 542,474.
The United States Army Reserve (USAR) had strength of 204,716, with
685 Soldiers in a stop loss status and 4,262 involuntarily mobilized
IRR Soldiers. The USAR's end strength minus these Soldiers is 199,769.
The Army National Guard (ARNG) had strength of 368,379, with 4,417
Soldiers in a stop loss status. The ARNG's strength minus these
Soldiers is 363,962.

Anti-Deficiency Act Violation Exiting FY 2008

Question. In September 2008, the Army obligated $200 million more
of military pay than was available in the Military Personnel, Army
(MPA) account, and subsequently asked to transfer funds into the
account to cover the difference. The Committee staff believes that the
Army violated the Anti-deficiency Act (31 USC 1342). However, Army
lawyers have opined that this is not the case.
The Anti-deficiency Act states:
``An officer or employee of the United States Government or of the
District of Columbia government may not--(A) make or authorize an
expenditure or obligation exceeding an amount available in an
appropriation or fund for the expenditure or obligation.''
In September 2008, was $200 million more obligated than available
from the military personnel account?
Answer. There was no time, including September 2008, when
obligations exceeded funds available in the fiscal year 2008 military
personnel account. This determination is based on accounting reports
prepared by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service.
Question. The Anti-deficiency Act is clear. It states that an
employee may not make an obligation exceeding an amount available in an
appropriation. On what basis did the Army determine the obligation of
$200 million did not violate the Anti-deficiency?
a. What has your General Counsel written on this matter?
b. Has there been an investigation into this matter? If so, who
conducted the investigation and what were the findings?
Answer. The Army did not make an obligation exceeding the amount
available in the appropriation.
a. At no time did obligations exceed funds available in the fiscal
year 2008 military personnel account. Consequently, there is no need
for an Anti-deficiency Act investigation or General Counsel comment on
this matter. The Army's internal review office reviewed bonus payments
paid during the first quarter of fiscal year 2009 charged to the fiscal
year 2008 account, and determined the charges were correct. These bonus
payments were not visible to the Army Budget Office (ABO) through any
automated system because payment procedures for enlistment bonuses are
paper-driven and rely on soldiers to present proper paperwork upon
arrival at the first duty station. This process resulted in some
lagging payments that did not obligate and disburse until after 30
September 2008. The Army Audit Agency is currently performing an audit
to determine the propriety of permanent change of station (PCS)
obligations charged to the account. Audit results will be available in
June. Similar to enlistment bonuses, PCS disbursements, in some cases,
are not visible until after close of the FY. Although ABO recorded
miscellaneous obligation documents (MODS) each month for PCS charges
based on the number of moves anticipated multiplied times historical
execution rates, actual charges from household goods vendors came in
higher than anticipated starting in September 2008. Disbursement
patterns closely mirrored FY 2007 levels until September 2008, at which
point charges spiked and continued to remain above anticipated levels
for several months. This spike was not visible until September
accounting results posted in October 2008.
b. As there were no indications a violation occurred, an
investigation has not been conducted; however, the Army is fully
cooperating with the Surveys and Investigations Staff of the House
Committee on Appropriations, which is making an inquiry into this
matter.
Question. If the money was available in the Military Personnel
account, why did the Army require a subsequent reprogramming of $200
million into the Military Personnel account?
Answer. Our outlay model assumed the 26 September payroll file
contained all bonus payments, and pay-related adjustments applicable to
the fiscal year 2008 account; however, payrolls processed after 26
September continued to include fiscal year 2008 bonus payments and pay
adjustments. Additionally, the actual cost of permanent change of
station (PCS) travel claims exceeded previous estimates. Although funds
were available to cover outlays in the near term, these unanticipated
charges required that an additional $200 million be provided to
maintain the appropriation's solvency beyond December 2009.
Question. Gentlemen, the Committee hears that the Army will send a
reprogramming request of up to $2.3 billion for the MPA appropriation
for FY 2008. Is this true? If so, how is this possible? How is this not
an ADA violation?
Answer. No. While the MPA appropriation may require an additional
modest reprogramming for FY 2008 related to permanent change of station
charges, a $2.3 billion reprogramming request has no factual basis.
Question. At the close of fiscal year 2007, the MPA appropriation
had a surplus of funds and at the close of fiscal year 2008 the MPA
appropriation was projected to exhaust all available funding. This was
the second budget cycle in a row where the Army has failed to properly
estimate its resource needs while preventing waste. Please explain the
Army's budgeting practices and internal controls to monitor
disbursements across the MPA appropriation.
a. Why were these internal controls unsuccessful in detecting this
over obligation?
b. What actions is the Army taking to ensure that there is not a
reoccurrence?
Answer.
a. There was no over obligation in FY2007 or FY2008. The surplus in
FY 2007 was primarily attributable to the subsistence-in-kind account,
which had no automated system in place to properly obligate food
requisitions.
b. Since then, the Army has implemented the Army Food Management
Information System (AFMIS) to obligate food requisitions at the point
of order; however, there is still some risk in this account as AFMIS
has not been deployed to theater sites. We manage this risk using a
workaround process to manually obligated food orders received from
theater. The issue in FY 2008 was unrelated to the subsistence-in-kind
account. Rather, payroll cost modeling efforts failed to properly
capture payments made during the 5th and 6th quarters (after fiscal
year-end-close). The payroll cost model now has been properly adjusted.
The MPA appropriation strives to close each fiscal year with as little
unexpended balance as possible.
Question. The Army admitted recruits in 2005 through 2007 that were
below standard. Interviews with Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO)
revealed that they believe sub-standard soldiers end up in units and
cannot be utilized, making it harder on that unit to accomplish its
mission. In addition, the NCOs indicated that some new recruits are
unable to pass a physical readiness test. The NCO's feel that the basic
training course needs to be updated to provide the recruits skills they
will need upon deployment to theater. Essentially, the NCOs believe the
Army needs to get ``harder'' as new recruits lack discipline. In
addition the NCOs feel that their influence to train and shape recruits
has eroded. Data supports the NCOs assessment of overall quality. In
June 2003 initial entry training (IET) attrition rates were 14.78%. In
December 2007 the attrition rate for IET was 8.49%. In addition, for
fiscal year 2008 only 83% of the Active Army recruits had high school
diplomas, up from 79% the previous year. All recruit quality benchmarks
were met by the active duty Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.
General Rochelle, please describe the training process for new
Soldiers. At what point do Soldiers start to prepare for their combat
mission?
a. Please explain the role of the NCOs in shaping Soldiers?
b. What recourse is available to Non Commissioned Officers (NCO)
when Soldiers fail to reach the minimum standard?
Answer. Soldiers go through a training program that prepares them
for duties in their first unit of assignment. The majority of Soldiers
attend Basic Combat Training (BCT) or One Station Unit Training (OSUT)
at one of four training centers within the Training and Doctrine
Command. While at BCT, the individual receives physical training,
military indoctrination, and training in universal Soldier skills, such
as small arms and crew-served weapons, small unit tactics, combatives,
and combat life saving measures. BCT is followed by Advanced Individual
Training (AIT) to develop the Soldier's Military Occupational
Specialty. AIT is branch specific skill training for a specialty, such
as artillery, military police, signal, ordnance, personnel management,
transportation, medical, or quartermaster. OSUT is unique because it
combines both BCT and AIT at one training center and is focused on the
combat arms branches, such as infantry, armor, or combat engineers.
Soldiers with recent prior military experience do not attend BCT or
OSUT. Instead, these Soldiers attend the Warrior Transition Course at
Ft. Sill, Oklahoma, where the skills they previously learned and used
are refined, updated, and oriented toward current Army tactics,
techniques, and procedures.
Soldiers begin to prepare for combat in the institutional training
base where they are taught basic individual Soldier skills. When they
arrive at a unit, they continue to prepare themselves for future combat
missions by maximizing their opportunities for self-development in
terms of mental, physical, and professional development. Additionally,
Soldiers continue to train on the required individual skills and begin
to train on collective tasks.
Soldiers prepare for their combat mission as part of a unit, based
on their unit's Core Mission Essential Task List and/or Directed
Mission Essential Task List, ultimately attaining the status of being
ready for their combat mission.
a. Our non-commissioned officers are the linchpin in the
development of our young Soldiers as individuals, as team or squad
members, and as junior leaders. They mentor young Soldiers, inspire
leadership, and instill discipline and professionalism. Non-
commissioned officers are the principle trainers in our units. They
take our young Soldiers from OSUT, BCT and AIT and transform them into
members of teams and squads.
b. It is incumbent on NCOs to train their Soldiers to the
established standards required for success on the battlefield. NCOs are
required to counsel and administer corrective training to a Soldier who
does not attain or maintain these standards. If a Soldier is unable to
overcome performance shortfalls, the NCO can recommend to the chain of
command that the Soldier be separated from the service or reclassified
to another military occupation specialty. In some instances, retraining
or disciplinary action may be sufficient to assist the Soldier in
attaining and maintaining the minimum standards.
Question. Mr. James, what is the current percentage of Army
recruits with high school diplomas?
a. How many waivers were granted to recruits and what is the most
common waiver granted?
b. What is the attrition rate for recruits without high school
diplomas?
c. Mr. James, has the Army performed any analysis on the conduct of
these recruits? Are discipline issues more frequent in this group?
Answer. In FY08 the percentage of Regular Army Non-Prior Service
recruits with Tier I (High School Diploma Graduate) credentials was
82.8%.
a. In FY08 the Army granted 19,202 Regular Army Non-Prior Service
waivers; the most common waivers granted were for conduct (9,229). When
reviewing waiver requests, the Army considers evidence of the
applicant's character and potential for service. This evidence might
include employment history, school records, and references from
teachers, coaches, clergy, or others who know the person well. Most
waivers are needed to address a single instance of immaturity that the
applicant has overcome. Evidence of remorse and changed lifestyle weigh
heavily in waiver decisions.
b. A recent Tier II Attrition Screen (TTAS) report completed by the
United States Army Accessions Command indicated the Tier II (Non-High
School Diploma Graduate/Alternate Credential Holder) 36-month attrition
rate was 33.5% and the Tier I 36-month attrition rate was 20.1% for the
FY05 cohort.
c. A longitudinal study is being conducted. In general, recruits
granted waivers are high quality and perform well. Their education and
aptitude are higher on average. Soldiers who enlisted with a conduct
waiver in recent years train and perform better than those without
waivers initially. Indiscipline rates and first term attrition are
slightly higher for recruits with conduct waivers.
Question. General Rochelle, please explain Initial Entry Training
(IET) for soldiers. What are the basic skills that soldiers learn while
at IET?
a. What training is required beyond IET?
b. Are Soldiers coming to units fully trained to meet the needs for
deployment or does training take place with the unit as well?
Answer. Soldiers go through a training program that prepares them
for duties in their first unit of assignment. The majority of Soldiers
attend Basic Combat Training (BCT) or One Station Unit Training (OSUT)
at one of four training centers within the Training and Doctrine
Command. While at BCT, the individual receives physical training,
military indoctrination, and training in universal Soldier skills, such
as small arms and crew-served weapons, small unit tactics, combatives,
and combat life saving measures. BCT is followed by Advanced Individual
Training (AIT) to develop the Soldier's Military Occupational
Specialty. AIT is branch specific skill training for a specialty, such
as artillery, military police, signal, ordnance, personnel management,
transportation, medical, or quartermaster. OSUT is unique because it
combines both BCT and AIT at one training center and is focused on the
combat arms branches, such as infantry, armor, or combat engineers.
Soldiers with recent prior military experience do not attend BCT or
OSUT. Instead, these Soldiers attend the Warrior Transition Course at
Ft. Sill, Oklahoma, where the skills they previously learned and used
are refined, updated, and oriented toward current Army tactics,
techniques, and procedures.
A few of the basic skills taught include warrior skills, such as
marksmanship, communications, urban operations, small unit tactics/
techniques/procedures, first aid, hand-to-combat, basic survival
skills, and battle drills. Other tasks include drill and ceremony, how
to wear a uniform, physical training, values and ethos training,
leadership cooperation, chains of command, equal opportunity, and
Military Occupational Skill specific training.
a. Usually, no additional training is ``required'' after IET before
assigning Soldiers to units. However, certain specific duty positions
may require additional training after IET before a Soldier is assigned,
e.g., airborne duty positions.
b. Soldiers departing the Training Base for their first unit of
assignment possess most of the basic universal and technical skills
necessary to begin the process of integrating into any unit across the
Army, refining their individual skills, and learning their collective
tasks. No matter how good a new Soldier is when he or she arrives at
the Soldier's first unit, training must take place to integrate the new
Soldier into the unit and make the Soldier a part of a team before
deployment. This process occurs with every move that a Soldier makes
between units.
Question. General Rochelle, if Soldiers are deploying to Iraq or
Afghanistan do they train with the same equipment they will use when
deployed?
Answer. Soldiers generally train with the same equipment they will
use when they deploy, provided that the items were already assigned to
the unit. However, there are instances where certain low-density, high-
demand items specific to Iraq or Afghanistan, or unique to particular
missions in theater, were fielded directly to theater. In these
instances, either new equipment training teams conducted training with
the incoming unit as it took possession of equipment, but before it
began conducting missions with the new equipment, or the incoming unit
received training on the new equipment from the outgoing unit prior to
assuming the mission. Examples of equipment that was fielded directly
to theater include mine-resistant armored protected vehicles, special
armored security and route-clearing vehicles, vehicle-mounted counter
remote-controlled improvised explosive device systems, special radios,
the most recent versions of the Army Battle Command system (Command
Post of the Future), and intelligence and biometric systems.
To the extent supportable, the Army brings newly fielded items back
to home stations and Combat Training Centers to make them available to
units prior to their next deployment.
Question. What sort of physical conditioning is done to prepare
Soldiers for deployment?
Answer. The Army Physical Fitness School at Fort Jackson, South
Carolina, has researched our physical fitness doctrine and found our
current model, which emphasizes aerobic and muscular endurance, does
not correlate well with the physical fitness requirements of current
combat operations. To address this shortcoming, the Physical Fitness
School drafted a new doctrine called Army Physical Readiness Training
(Field Manual (FM) 3-22.20) that aligns with our current operations and
training doctrine. The Army's Training and Doctrine Command has already
posted the draft manual on the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) website for
use by our leaders and Soldiers, and expects final approval to occur
later this year.
The new Army Physical Readiness Training focuses on improving
Soldiers' aerobic endurance, muscular strength, muscular endurance
(anaerobic endurance), power, and movement proficiency, which
physically prepares Soldiers and units to meet the physical demands of
full spectrum operations. As this new doctrine is inculcated throughout
the Army, we will adjust our physical fitness test to reflect this
change.
Prior to the release of our new doctrine, many units across the
Army, with the assistance of subject matter experts, have adopted a
variety of injury prevention and performance enhancement programs. For
example, Special Forces and several Brigade Combat Teams have
implemented programs that, in addition to traditional aerobic exercise,
emphasize core strengthening, short term bursts of power, and speed and
agility drills. Army training policy continues to highlight that
commanders are the primary training managers and trainers for their
organization, and are responsible for building readiness for mission
requirements. Although the Army no longer designates a unit fitness
trainer, unit commanders rely on non-commissioned officers (NCOs) as
primary unit fitness trainers since they are the primary trainers of
enlisted Soldiers, crews, and small teams. This responsibility is also
outlined in our new doctrine.
Additionally, prior to deployment, Soldiers actually wear their
gear with increasing frequency to build physical endurance and
fortitude for long-duration missions.
Question. How is physical fitness maintained once the unit has
deployed?
Answer. Many Soldiers maintain fitness through the routine
execution of rigorous combat operations on difficult terrain and under
various, often heavy loads. Physical Training (PT) programs vary by
location and mission. Most locations offer access to a variety of
physical fitness equipment and facilities. Units have a variety of PT
plans based on mission, time, and troops available. Soldiers have also
demonstrated remarkably innovative methods of constructing PT equipment
and facilities in austere conditions. In addition, much of the Army's
Physical Fitness Training Manual (FM 21-20) is dedicated to exercises
that can be performed without the use of equipment, such as partner
resisted exercises and calisthenics.
Question. How does the Army prepare for high altitude operations
such as those they will perform in Afghanistan?
Answer. The Army prepares Soldiers to conduct high-altitudes
operations by ensuring they are in the best physical condition possible
prior to deploying to Afghanistan. Soldiers conducting rigorous and
holistic physical fitness training will more readily adapt to the
demands of high-altitude operations. While units may not have the
opportunity to train in mountainous areas, Soldiers can and do conduct
physical training wearing their combat gear, conduct road marches over
uneven terrain, and negotiate obstacles while wearing their equipment.
High-altitude oxygen levels are difficult to replicate prior to
arriving in theater, but the Soldiers adjust their physical
conditioning activities upon arrival in theater to further improve
themselves prior to assuming their mission.
Question. What sort of physical conditioning is done to prepare
Soldiers for the heavy loads they will have to carry in Afghanistan and
Iraq during home station training?
Answer. Mission and mission circumstances vary considerably. The
Army relies on unit leaders to prepare their Soldiers for the demands
of their assigned missions. To condition Soldiers for the rigors of
carrying heavier loads, most units will invest additional time in more
comprehensive physical fitness opportunities, such as weight training,
obstacle courses, combative activities, and timed distance marches over
uneven terrain with equipment. For example, Special Forces and several
Brigade Combat Teams have implemented programs that, in addition to
traditional aerobic exercise, emphasize core strengthening, short term
bursts of power, and speed and agility drills. Army policy (Army
Regulation 350-1) directs unit commanders to conduct regularly
scheduled (at least 3 to 5 times per week), vigorous physical fitness
training during the unit's normal duty day. Army policy also requires
that exercise periods be conducted with sufficient intensity,
frequency, and duration to maintain adequate cardio-respiratory
endurance, muscular strength and endurance, flexibility, and body
composition. Additionally, rather than just emphasizing aerobic and
muscular endurance, the new draft Army doctrine, Army Physical
Readiness Training (FM 3-22.20), which is already posted on Army
Knowledge Online (AKO) website, focuses on improving Soldiers' aerobic
endurance, muscular strength, muscular endurance (anaerobic endurance),
power, and movement proficiency, which physically prepares Soldiers and
units to meet the physical demands of full spectrum operations.

Grow the Army

Question. In January 2007, the President requested, from Congress,
an increase of 74,200 in Army end strength across the Active, Guard and
Reserve components. The main goal of ``Grow the Army'' was to provide
additional ground forces to meet strategic demands and mitigate
persistent capability shortfalls, and reduce stress on soldiers and
their families due to ongoing combat operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. With the Committee's support ($2.1 billion since 2007
(including both Army and Marine Corps funding), the Army has been
extremely successful in achieving this growth. The Army anticipates
that this growth should be achieved two years ahead of schedule.
However, recent news articles have reported that the Army believes it
needs an additional 30,000 troops to meet the current demands. This is
a daunting number since the fiscal year 2009 personnel costs (all
services) are a staggering $153 billion.
What is the number of Army National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers
currently on active duty in support of the mobilization and what is the
Army's current mobilization cap?
Answer. As of 31 March 2009, the USAR had 25,527 Soldiers in a
mobilized status. Of this total, the USAR had 9,542 Soldiers in an
Active Duty for Operational Support (ADOS) status, with a statutory cap
of 13,000. The ARNG had 62,944 Soldiers in a mobilized status. Of this
total, the ARNG had 17,562 Soldiers in an ADOS status, with a statutory
cap of 17,000.
Question. Currently, what is the monthly ``burn rate'' for your
personnel costs?
Answer. The MPA appropriation burn rate for October 2008 through
March 2009 is $3.9 billion. The burn rate from January 2009 through
March 2009 is $4.1 billion, which includes pay raises.
Question. When do you anticipate the military personnel accounts
will exhaust all funds?
Answer. The base and bridge MPA appropriations has adequate funding
to cover payroll that will disburse on 1 July 2009; however, we do not
expect to have adequate funding to cover payroll that will disburse on
15 July 2009.

Recruiting and Retention

Question. A key principle of the U.S. Armed Forces is to attract
and retain competent personnel to assure readiness and operational
effectiveness. The Army has generally met its aggregate recruiting and
retention goals. In some cases, the Army has lowered recruiting
standards and increased the amount of enlistment and reenlistment
bonuses. However, with the deteriorating economy many troops are
electing to stay in the Army and more civilians are looking to join the
Army. Recruiting always remains a challenge, but a tighter job market
provides more opportunities for the Army to appeal to young men and
women. Many factors beside bonuses are appealing to soldiers and
recruits, such as a 32 percent increase in military pay since 2001,
compared to 24 percent for the general population, the new GI bill and
job security. This appears to be a good time to reduce enlistment and
reenlistment bonuses as well as return standards back to higher levels.
The Committee remains concerned regarding the recruitment and
retention for mission-critical occupational specialties. Has the Grow
the Army recruitment helped fill the critical specialties.
a. If not, what steps are being taken to fill the specialty
occupations?
Answer. The Grow the Army initiative has had a minimal impact on
filling critical specialties. The Army has garnered its greatest
success using targeted incentives to fill critical specialties.
Incentives help the Army channel quality recruits to required critical
MOS's by offering seasonal and targeted bonuses to fill training seats
at the right time. With OSD approval, the Army recently launched a
pilot program entitled Military Accessions Vital to the National
Interest (MAVNI), which could prove beneficial in filling critical
shortages in health care professions and language specialties.
Question. Has the Army analyzed why these occupational specialties
have consistently been under-filled? What is the operational impact of
these shortages? What resources are needed to fill these positions?
Answer. The Army routinely analyzes the health of every Military
Occupational Specialty and the determinants affecting our ability to
recruit and retain. Recruitment and Retention incentives are
periodically adjusted to influence fill rates of critical specialties.
The protracted conflict has resulted in shortages in certain critical
occupational specialties, which impacts our ability to offer optimal
levels of dwell time to our troops. To remedy this, the Army will
require continued funding of enlistment bonuses and educational
incentives to attract quality applicants into critical occupational
specialties.
Question. Recruiting and retention goals are often relayed to
Congress in the aggregate, providing little or no visibility into how
each occupational specialty is staffed. Please provide the Committee
with details on recruiting and retention by Military Occupational
Specialty (MOS).
a. Can you also provide the average bonus of each MOS?
Answer:
Recruiting: The model the Army uses to determine staffing levels of
the 149 occupational specialties the Army currently recruits for, are
staffed based on priority. Priority is largely driven by propensity for
deployment and utilization. Not all specialties are filled to 100% of
authorizations. Some are filled above 100% to support the ongoing
contingency operations. The attached report provides specifics on each
MOS. Specialties, strength and organizational structure drive the level
of staffing; this in turns drives recruiting, retention and training
requirements. The average enlistment bonus for a minimum term of
service in each named skill at the start of fiscal year 2009 is
attached.
Retention: The Army's retention mission is not based on MOS; Army
missions by category*. The mission is distributed among eighteen
separate commands according to their percentage of the eligible
population. The Army utilizes individual career branches at Human
Resources Command to manage MOS strength in conjunction with
nonmonetary and monetary reenlistment options.
* The three categories are:
Initial Term: Soldier serving on an initial term of active federal
military service, or a Soldier who has previously served less than 180
cumulative days on active duty.
Mid Career: Soldier on a second or subsequent period of active
Federal military service who will have 10 or less years of active
federal military service on his or her separation date or at ETS.
Careerist: Soldier on their second or subsequent enlistment who
will have more than 10 years active federal military service at ETS or
on their separation date.
The Army's FY09 Retention mission by category and command is:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Command Initial Mid Career Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AMC......................................................... 2 14 22 38
ARCENT...................................................... 31 66 65 162
ARSOUTH..................................................... 19 49 30 98
ATEC........................................................ 0 3 8 11
CIDC........................................................ 25 56 65 146
EUSA........................................................ 293 609 333 1,235
FORSCOM..................................................... 12,561 13,796 6,395 32,752
INSCOM...................................................... 403 515 203 1,121
MDW......................................................... 151 134 57 342
MEDCOM...................................................... 641 1,359 723 2,723
NATO........................................................ 7 62 48 117
NETCOM...................................................... 345 607 257 1,209
TRADOC...................................................... 397 1,837 2,481 4,715
USAREUR..................................................... 1,693 1,754 762 4,209
USARPAC..................................................... 1,608 1,253 546 3,407
USASOC...................................................... 1,071 978 650 2,699
USMA........................................................ 3 8 5 16
OTHER....................................................... 0 0 0 0
ARMY........................................................ 19,250 23,100 12,650 55,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Average reenlistment bonus by MOS:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MOS Avg SRB MOS Avg SRB MOS Avg SRB MOS Avg SRB
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
09L........................... $12,833 19D $9,828 35G $15,392 68W $10,257
11B........................... 10,533 19K 10,028 35H 13,140 74D 10,384
11C........................... 10,235 21b 10,215 35L 12,522 79R 11,905
13B........................... 9,862 21C 11,765 35M 17,373 89A 9,700
13D........................... 10,312 21D 15,500 35N 15,304 89D 15,029
13F........................... 10,423 21P 14,068 35P 14,828 92F 9,417
13M........................... 9,576 21Y 8,432 35S 16,153 92W 10,085
13P........................... 10,049 25B 10,864 37F 17,433 94A 11,517
13R........................... 11,479 25L 9,092 38B 19,290 94H 10,533
13S........................... 7,878 25N 10,238 42R 9,628 94S 14,938
14J........................... 10,115 25P 12,388 46Q 8,907 94T 12,714
14S........................... 11,505 25Q 11,012 46R 9,579
15D........................... 7,780 25R 10,550 51C 9,500
15J........................... 10,215 25S 13,188 62B 9,935
15Q........................... 10,344 25U 10,261 63H 10,372
18B........................... 18,963 25V 8,865 63J 9,256
18C........................... 17,625 27D 10,392 63M 9,881
18D........................... 17,813 31D 18,371 68K 13,245
18E........................... 18,691 31E 12,146 68S 9,689
18F........................... 20,000 35F 13,612 68T 9,395
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ave ENL BONUS MOS Title
------------------------------------------------------------------------
20000................................ INTERPRETER/TRANSLATOR FT.
JACKSON
2000................................. INFANTRY RECRUIT
10000................................ CANNON CREWMEMBER
20000................................ FIELD ARTILLERY AUTOMATED
TACTICAL DATA SYSTEM SPECIALIST
2000................................. FIRE SUPPORT SPECIALIST
2000................................. (MLRS) HIGH MOBILITY ARTILLERY
ROCKET SYS (HIMARS) CREWMEMBER
10000................................ MULTIPLE LAUNCH (MLRS)
OPERATIONAL FIRE DIRECTION
SPECIALIST
20000................................ FIELD ARTILLERY FIREFINDER RADAR
OPERATOR
2000................................. FIELD ARTILLERY SURVEYOR
FA METEOROLOGICAL CRMBR
15000................................ PATRIOT FIRE CONTROL ENHANCED
OPERATOR MAINTAINER
10000................................ AIR DEF CMD, COMMO, COMPUTER,
INTEL TAC OPS CENTER OPER/
MAINTAINER
AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE (AMD)
CREWMEMBER
10000................................ PATRIOT LAUNCHING STATION
ENHANCED OPERATOR/MAINTAINER
AIRCRAFT POWERPLANT REPAIRER
AIRCRAFT POWERTRAIN REPAIRER
AIRCRAFT ELECTRICIAN
AIRCRAFT STRUCTURAL REPAIRER
AIRCRAFT PNEUDRAULICS REPAIRER
10000................................ OH-58D ARMAMAENT, ELECTRICAL,
AVIONIC SYS REPAIRMAN
AVIONIC MECHANIC
AVIATION OPERATIONS SPECIALIST
10000................................ AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL OPERATOR
AH-64 ATTACK HELICOPTER REPAIRER
OH-58D HELICOPTER REPAIRER
UH-60 HELICOPTER REPAIRER
CH-47 HELICOPTER REPAIRER
AH-64D ARMAMENT, ELECTRICAL,
AVIONIC SYSTEMS REPAIRMAN
20000 SPECIAL FORCES RECRUIT
CAVALRY SCOUT
2000................................. M1 ABRAMS ARMOR CREWMAN
2000................................. COMBAT ENGINEER
2000................................. BRIDGE CREWMEMBER
DIVER
4000................................. HEAVY CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT
OPERATOR
PLUMBER
FIREFIGHTER
INTERIOR ELECTRICIAN
TECHNICAL ENGINEERING SPECIALIST
CONCRETE AND ASPHALT EQUIPMENT
OPERATOR
CARPENTRY AND MASONRY SPC
15000................................ TERRAIN DATA SPECIALIST
4000................................. NETWORK SWITCHING SYSTEMS
OPERATOR/MAINTAINER
CABLE SYSTEMS INSTALLER
MAINTAINER
MULTIMEDIA ILLUSTRATOR
4000................................. NODAL NETWORK SYSTEMS OPERATOR
25000................................ MICROWAVE SYSTEMS OPERATOR
MAINTAINER
20000................................ MULTICHANNEL TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS
OPERATOR MAINTAINER
5000................................. VISUAL INFORMATION EQUIPMENT
OPERATOR/MAINTAINER
25000................................ SATELLITE COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
OPERATOR/MAINTAINER
15000................................ SIGNAL SUPPORT SYSTEMS SPECIALIST
COMBAT DOCUMENT PRODUCTION
SPECIALIST
10000................................ PARALEGAL SPECIALIST
MILITARY POLICE
RADIO OPERATOR-MAINTAINER
2000................................. INTERNMENT RESETTLEMENT
SPECIALIST
2000................................. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS
MANITAINER/INTEGRATOR
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE OPERATOR
4000................................. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
SPECIALIST
HUMAN RESOURCES SPECIALIST
HUM RES INFO SYS MGT SPEC
BAND MEMBER
METAL WORKER
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT TECHNICIAN
MACHINIST
SMALL ARMS ARTY RPMN
4000................................. FIRE CONTROL REP
ARMAMENT REP
20000................................ JOURNALIST
5000................................. BROADCAST JOURNALIST
UTILITIES EQUIP RPMN
POWER GENERATOR EQUIPMENT REPAIR
CHAPLAIN ASSISTANT
CONSTRUCTION EQUIP REP
ABRAMS TANK SYSTEM MNTNR
LIGHT WHEELED VEHICLE MECHANIC
SP FLD ARTY SYS MECH
TRACKED VEHICLE REPAIRER
10000................................ QM AND CHEM EQUIP REPAIR
10000................................ BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE SYSTEM
MAINTAINER
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SPECIALIST
2000................................. CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL RADIOLOGICAL
AND NUCLEAR (CBRN) SPECIALIST
CARGO SPECIALIST
WATERCRAFT OPERATOR
WATERCRAFT ENGINEER
20000................................ MOTOR TRANSPORTATION OPERATOR
TRANSPORT MGMT COORD
AMMUNITION STOCK CNTRL
AMMUNITION SPECIALIST
25000................................ EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE SPEC
BIOMEDICAL EQUIPMENT SPECIALIST
OPERATING ROOM SPECIALIST
DENTAL SP
PATIENT ADMINISTRATION SPECIALIST
OPTICAL LAB SPC
MEDICAL LOGISTICS SPECIALIST
5000................................. MEDICAL LABORATORY SPECIALIST
NUTRITION CARE SPECIALIST
RADIOLOGY SP
PHARMACY SPECIALIST
VETERINARY FOOD INSP SPEC
PREVENTIVE MEDICINE SP
ANIMAL CARE SPECIALIST
4000................................. HEALTH CARE SPECIALIST
MENTAL HEALTH SPECIALIST
AUTOMATED LOGISTICAL SPECIALIST
20000................................ PETROLEUM SUPPLY SPECIALIST
10000................................ FOOD OPERATIONS SPECIALIST
PETROLEUM LAB SP
MORTUARY AFFAIRS SP
10000................................ PARACHUTE RIGGER
SHOWER, LAUNDRY AND CLOTHING
REPAIR SPECIALIST
2000................................. WATER TREATMENT SPECIALIST
UNIT SUPPLY SPECIALIST
20000................................ LAND COMBAT EL MSL SYS RP
ATC EQUIPMENT REPAIRER
20000................................ RADIO COMSEC REPAIRER
15000................................ COMPUTER DETECTION SYSTEMS
REPAIRER
5000................................. TMDE MAINT SUPPORT SPEC
4000................................. APACHE ATTACK HEL SYS REP
10000................................ AVIONIC COMM EQUIP REP
5000................................. RADAR REPAIRER
4000................................. MULTIPLE LAUNCH ROCKET SYSTEMS
REPAIRER
AVIONIC AND SURVIVABILITY
EQUIPMENT REPAIRER
20000................................ PATRIOT SYSTEM REPAIRER
AVENGER SYSTEM REPAIRER
10000................................ INT FAM TES EQUIP OPER
2000................................. INTELLIGENCE ANALYST
2000................................. IMAGERY ANALYST
15000................................ COMMON GROUND STATION (CGS)
ANALYST
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR
10000................................ SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE ANALYST
30000................................ ELECTRONIC WARFARE SIGNAL
INTELLIGENCE RECRUIT
2000................................. SIGNALS COLLECTOR ANALYST
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Enlistment and Retention Bonuses

Question. The military services offer a variety of enlistment and
re-enlistment bonuses to attract new recruits into military specialties
that are considered ``hard to fill,'' as well as to encourage
experienced military members in ``shortage jobs'' to stay in past their
first enlistment period . The Army has more enlistment incentives than
any of the other military services. Programs include Enlistment,
Overseas Extension, and Reenlistment bonuses. Bonus levels are in
constant flux.
Mr. James, what was the total for Army recruiting and retention
bonuses for FY 2009?
Answer. The Army anticipates $2.2 billion in FY09 Recruiting and
Retention for all three Components.
Question. Mr. James, what is the range of individual bonuses for
recruiting?
a. For retention? Please, indicate why there are differences?
Answer. Recruiting bonuses range from as low as $2,000 up to the
statutory limit of $40,000. Bonuses for skills vary greatly depending
on shortages in the particular skill and mission requirements. As of
March 1, 2009, 45 of 149 skills receive a cash incentive.
a. The Army uses monetary incentives to retain quality Soldiers in
critical and hard-to-fill skills as a means to manage and shape the
force. Bonus amounts are adjusted based on the criticality of an MOS.
The Army currently uses the following bonuses as part of the Army's
Retention Program:
Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB): Currently the SRB is used for
skills identified as critical Army-wide. The program offers from $1K to
$12K for Soldiers in select skills, while Soldiers in special critical
skills can receive up to $27K.
SRB-Deployed: The SRB Deployed program offers Soldiers deployed to
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kuwait up to a maximum of $9.5K.
Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB): The CSRB currently targets
seasoned, combat veterans to stay in the ranks beyond retirement
eligibility offering a lump sum bonus based on the Soldier's length of
commitment to serve. The program is currently paying Soldiers in SOF
skills a maximum payment of $150K for a six-year commitment. 6
additional skills can receive a maximum payment of $50K to $100K for a
six-year commitment (The total number of CSRB takers averages less than
700 per year).
Question. Gentlemen, have you found any imbalances or inequities in
your recruiting and retention bonus structure?
Answer. The Army has not identified any inequities or imbalances in
our recruiting and retention bonus structure. The recruiting incentives
structure is reviewed quarterly to determine if imbalances or
inequities exist and to correct any problems found. The Army makes a
concerted effort to target high quality recruits and to insure
marketing efforts are targeted to diverse populations of potential
applicants in urban, suburban and rural areas.
The Army continually measures the effectiveness of retention
incentives offered and makes adjustments as necessary. As the strength
of a critical MOS improves, bonuses tend to be reduced. While Soldiers
who reenlist may perceive inequities between recruiting and retention
bonuses, it is important to keep in mind that the Army uses recruiting
and retention incentives to shape the force and improve strength in
critical MOSs. The SRB Program is reviewed quarterly to adjust
retention incentives as necessary. The end result is an effective and
efficient balance of resources to support the retention mission and
manpower requirements.
Question. Gentlemen, since the Army is about to reach the Grow the
Army end strength goal and more people seem to be willing to join the
Army because of the state of the economy, will the Army reduce the
amount it provides for bonuses?
Answer.
Recruiting: Through refinement of the Active Army enlistment bonus
payment schedule, bonuses for specialties that had received bonuses
during fiscal years 2005-2007 were reduced approximately 20% for fiscal
year 2009 and 2010. The savings resulting from this precision bonus
management tool will be approximately $65M per year through fiscal year
2011. Reliance on seasonal bonuses which were required to fill short
term training seats has been curtailed in favor of building a long term
Delayed Entry pool. Seasonal bonuses, which previously ranged up to
$20,000 per new recruit have been cut nearly in half and will be used
less frequently. The savings from this change will result in nearly
$35M per year in expected bonus savings in fiscal year 2010 and beyond.
Retention: The Army continues to measure the effectiveness of
retention incentives offered. While the economy plays a part in a
Soldier's decision to reenlist, it is not the only reason. The
reenlistment bonus not only provides an incentive to Soldiers in
shortage critical skills MOSs to reenlist; it also encourages them to
reenlist earlier and for longer periods of service. Accordingly, the
Army has steadily decreased the SRB amounts paid per Soldier for the
past year that reenlistments increased. The Army has reduced maximum
SRB payments from a high of $40,000 to $27,000. The average SRB payment
has been reduced from $12,900 to $10,387. The Army's newest SRB message
reduces bonus amounts by 23% across all bonus zones and removes an
additional 15 skills form the bonus list.
Question. Mr. James, at a time when the Army is having
unprecedented success at retaining its soldiers, especially in view of
the new, flexible GI Bill and the job security that military service
holds, is the Army reviewing its recruiting and retention bonus
program?
Answer.
Recruiting: The Army, with the assistance of researchers from RAND
and the Army Research Institute is working to refine and integrate
bonus prediction models that will enhance current bonus payment
procedures. The goal is precision recruiting in key critical skills and
demographic areas needed to effectively man the force. Existing
internal models are also undergoing revision to provide a more precise
and cost effective methodology in filling critical training seats and
to attract prospects in higher mental and educational categories. The
Army expects to implement the new and refined methodology in late
fiscal year 2009 for fielding during fiscal year 2010 and beyond.
Retention: Reenlistment options and bonuses are used as incentives
to shape the force. Current incentives are achieving mission success in
every category. The Army conducts quarterly reviews of retention
incentives. The strength and criticality of each MOS is reviewed in
detail during the quarterly reviews. Current and projected strengths,
as well as future requirements, are carefully considered. While the
strength and criticality of each MOS is reviewed in detail, the overall
retention incentive program is also reviewed to ensure the Army is
leveraging all available incentives to achieve cost savings while at
the same time meeting Army requirements. The Army will fully
incorporate the transferability aspect of the Post 9/11 GI Bill into
all retention incentive reviews.
Question. Mr. James, is the Army going to promote non-monetary
bonuses such as tuition assistance and the new G.I. Bill?
Answer. The Army plans to fully promote the new GI Bill, tuition
assistance, and other non-monetary incentives to the maximum extent
feasible.
Question. Mr. James, can you provide the Committee with a complete
list of all recruitment and retention bonuses for each MOS that is
eligible for a bonus?
Answer.
Recruiting: Current Recruiting Bonuses:
The Army pays enlisted recruiting bonuses at 4 bonus levels. Each
bonus level varies by years of service.

Level 1
3 Years: $15K, 4 Years: $20K, 5 Years: $25K, 6 Years: $35K
MOS: 09L, 13R, 25P, 25Q, 25S, 35W, 89D (7 MOS)

Level 2
3 Years: $10K, 4 Years: $15K, 5 Years: $20K, 6 Years: $25K
MOS: 13D, 13P, 35H, 46Q, 88M, 92F, 94A, 94E (8 MOS)

Level 3
3 Years: $3K, 4 Years: $10K, 5 Years: $15K, 6 Years: $20K
MOS: 13B, 13F, 13S, 14E, 14J, 14T, 21Y, 25F, 25U, 27D, 35N, 42R, 94M
(13 MOS)

Level 4
3 Years: $2K, 4 Years: $4K, 5 Years: $5K, 6 Years: $10K
MOS: 11X, 18X, 19K, 21E, 25N, 35G, 35T, 63J, 63M, 68K, 92G, 92R, 92W,
94D, 94F, 94S, 94Y (17 MOS)

Retention. Current Retention Bonuses: The Army pays reenlistment
bonuses by zone and grade.

SELECTIVE REENLISTMENT BONUS
------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Up to $9,500........................... Deployed SRB: Soldiers
regardless of MOS or ETS
serving on active duty in
Afghanistan, Iraq, or Kuwait
in support of Operation
Enduring Freedom or Operation
Iraqi Freedom.
$12,000................................ Critical Skill SRB: Soldiers in
the following MOS: 11B, 11C,
13B, 13D, 13F, 13M, 13P, 13R,
13S, 14J, 14S, 15D, 15J, 15Q,
19D, 19K, 21B, 21C, 21D, 21Y,
25B, 25L, 25N, 25P, 25Q, 25R,
25S, 25U, 25V, 27D, 31D, 31E,
35F, 35G, 35H, 35M, 35N, 42R,
46R, 62B, 63H, 63J, 63M, 68K,
68S, 68T, 68W, 74D, 79R, 92F,
92W.
$15,500................................ Location SRB: Soldiers
reenlisting for all Airborne
Positions, Special Ops
Command, 75th Ranger Regiment,
160th SOAR, Guantanamo Bay
Cuba, 4TH BCT 25ID, and in the
following MOS: 11B, 13F, 15U,
25B, 25C, 25N, 25R, 25U, 27D,
31E, 35F, 42A, 46R, 56M, 68S,
68W, 74D, 88M, 92F, 92G, 92Y.
$27,000................................ Special Critical Skill SRB:
Soldiers in the following MOS:
09L, 11B, 18B, 18C, 18D, 18E,
18F, 21D, 21P, 25L, 25R, 25S,
27D, 35G, 35H, 35L, 35N, 35P,
35S, 37F, 38B, 46Q, 51C, 79R,
89A, 89D, 94A, 94H, 94S.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

CRITICAL SKILLS RETENTION BONUS
------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Up to $50,000 21P, 25S, 37F, 38B.
Up to $100,000 35P (AD, AQ, AZ, DG, CM, PF, JN, PU, PV,
PW, RU), 89D.
$150,000 18B, 18C, 18D, 18E, 18F, 18Z, SQI ``T''.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Army Experience Center/Virtual Army Experience

Question. There are two entities where the Army uses video games to
attract recruits: the Virtual Army Experience (VAE) and the Army
Experience Center (AEC). The VAE is a traveling exhibit that has been
touring the country stopping at amusement parks, air shows and county
fairs. The AEC is located in Philadelphia and is a two-year pilot
program focused on transforming the Army's marketing and recruiting
business model. The AEC opened its doors on August 29, 2008. The Army
uses both the VAE and the AEC to collect information from people who
play the games. The Army believes this is an innovative way to reach a
new audience. But critics do not like the idea of the military using
videogames as a recruiting tool.
To participate in the VAE and AEC, visitors must be at least 13
years old, which is 4 years below the legal recruitment age of 17. Many
of the gaming activities are rated T for Teen by the Entertainment
Software Rating Board (ESRB). Visitors must register and provide their
age and basic contact information which the Army says will be used to
send information about upcoming AEC and VAE events. What is not clear
is whether these updates include recruitment information to those who
register.
Gentlemen, the AEC is a two year pilot. Does the Army have plans to
make the AEC permanent?
a. What has the AEC done to help recruiting?
Answer: The Army will continue to evaluate the AEC over the
remainder of the pilot period to determine which elements are most
appropriate for wider deployment. We intend to retain the AEC in
Philadelphia as an experimental marketing and recruiting platform.
a. The AEC is designed as an experimental platform to pilot
alternative marketing and recruiting techniques and tools. There are
many innovations developed at the AEC, including interactive touch
screen career and benefits exploration displays; a state of the art
recruiter automation software application that promises to improve
recruiter productivity while substantially reducing IT costs; and a
blended civilian/military workforce that relieves Army Soldiers of
administrative workload, resulting in significantly improved recruiter
productivity. These innovations have the potential to significantly
change the Army's recruiting business model to make it less labor
intensive and more efficient. In addition to these business process
improvements, the AEC has developed innovative community outreach
programs that may have potential for replication in other locations.
For example, the AEC hosts a high school credit recovery program in
partnership with the School District of Philadelphia. The program is
currently at capacity with 96 students enrolled and hundreds more
waiting for space. The AEC also hosted an African American History
Month leadership forum that brought 150 inner city youths into dialogue
with African American leaders from the community and the Army. The AEC
is also piloting the use of social networking to build a community of
interest in a local market.
Question. The minimum age requirement for both the AEC and VAE is
13. What steps are taken to verify the age of those who wish to take
part in the activities?
Answer. The AEC requests photo identification to verify age. If
photo ID is unavailable the AEC requests parental verification, either
in person or telephonically.
Question. The VAE and AEC both collect information from those who
visit for updates regarding the VAE and AEC. Please explain how the
Army uses this information?
a. How is the information provided by those under the recruitment
age used?
b. Please explain what type of information is included in the
updates that are sent to those who are registered.
Answer. The VAE and AEC operate under the same procedures as all
Army recruiting activities. All visitors register to enter the VAE or
AEC. This registration data is forwarded to Army Accessions Command
where registration information for visitors age 17 and older may be
employed, depending upon visitor interests and attributes, as contact
information for a mailing, phone contact or email regarding Army career
opportunities. In some cases, this information may also be used to
forward visitor photos or other visitor requested information.
a. Information for visitors age 13 to 16 is saved until visitors
reach age 17, at which time this information may be used as discussed
above. The AEC has recruiters on staff, but they do not operate
according to traditional recruiting business practices. The AEC tests
the hypothesis that raising awareness of Army opportunities is
sufficient to generate enlistments so the recruiters in the AEC do not
engage in traditional telephone or face-to-face prospecting. They only
follow up with prospects who specifically request additional
information. For those who are under the recruitment age, their
information is used strictly to notify registrants of upcoming
activities in the AEC.
b. During registration at the AEC we ask visitors if they would
like to receive information about upcoming events, such as technology
displays, guest speakers, or Local Area Network (LAN) tournaments.
Those registrants who indicate a desire to receive such communications
will typically receive an email notifying them about upcoming
activities. They will not be contacted by a recruiter.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.]

W I T N E S S E S

__________
Page
Amos, General J. F..............................................47, 139
Chiarelli, General P. W.........................................47, 139
Duehring, C. W................................................... 281
Flynn, Lieutenant General G. J...................................1, 191
James, Ronald.................................................... 367
Newton, Lieutenant General R. Y., III............................ 281
Rochelle, Lieutenant General Michael............................. 367
Thompson, Lieutenant General N. R., III.......................... 191
Thurman, Lieutenant General J. D................................. 191