- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2010

[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2010

_______________________________________________________________________

HEARINGS

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE
JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania, Chairman
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida
PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey
JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia TODD TIAHRT, Kansas
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio JACK KINGSTON, Georgia
ALLEN BOYD, Florida KAY GRANGER, Texas
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky
SANFORD D. BISHOP, Jr., Georgia
MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York
CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full
Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking Minority Member of the Full
Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees.
Paul Juola, Greg Lankler, Sarah Young, Linda Pagelsen, Paul Terry,
Kris Mallard, Adam Harris, Ann Reese, Brooke Boyer, Tim Prince, Matt
Washington, B G Wright, Chris White, Celes Hughes, and Adrienne Ramsay,
Staff Assistants
Sherry L. Young, Administrative Aide
________
PART 1
Page
Air Force Nuclear Enterprise..................................... 1
Contract Services and Acquisition Management..................... 55
Army Contracting................................................. 283
Outsourcing...................................................... 353
Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury Problems......... 431
Global Mobility.................................................. 515
________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations

PART 1--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2010
?

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2010

_______________________________________________________________________

HEARINGS

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE
JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania, Chairman
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida
PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio
JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio TODD TIAHRT, Kansas
ROBERT E. ``BUD'' CRAMER, Jr., ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
Alabama JACK KINGSTON, Georgia
ALLEN BOYD, Florida
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
SANFORD D. BISHOP, Jr., Georgia

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
56-232 WASHINGTON : 2010

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin, Chairman

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington JERRY LEWIS, California
ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky
PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia
NITA M. LOWEY, New York JACK KINGSTON, Georgia
JOSE E. SERRANO, New York RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New
ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut Jersey
JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia TODD TIAHRT, Kansas
JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts ZACH WAMP, Tennessee
ED PASTOR, Arizona TOM LATHAM, Iowa
DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama
CHET EDWARDS, Texas JO ANN EMERSON, Missouri
PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island KAY GRANGER, Texas
MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho
LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas
SAM FARR, California MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois
JESSE L. JACKSON, Jr., Illinois ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida
CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan DENNIS R. REHBERG, Montana
ALLEN BOYD, Florida JOHN R. CARTER, Texas
CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey KEN CALVERT, California
SANFORD D. BISHOP, Jr., Georgia JO BONNER, Alabama
MARION BERRY, Arkansas STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio
BARBARA LEE, California TOM COLE, Oklahoma
ADAM SCHIFF, California
MICHAEL HONDA, California
BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
STEVE ISRAEL, New York
TIM RYAN, Ohio
C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
Maryland
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida
CIRO RODRIGUEZ, Texas
LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania

Beverly Pheto, Clerk and Staff Director

(ii)
DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2010

----------

Wednesday, February 11, 2009.

AIR FORCE NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE

WITNESSES

HON. MICHAEL B. DONLEY, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
GENERAL NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Introduction

Mr. Murtha. Mr. Young.
Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, I move that those portions of the
hearing today which involve classified material be held in
executive session because of the classification of the material
to be discussed.
Mr. Murtha. Without objection.
You know, this is a closed hearing this morning. We have
had the room swept. And we are pleased to welcome two
distinguished veterans here of the hearings. We appreciate your
coming. I see you got a lot of backup there. I always get
concerned when you have got so many people back there ready to
answer questions.
But this is a serious concern of ours. I said to Secretary
Gates whenever I found out that we had nuclear weapons that
were flying around; I said, Mr. Secretary, they take our nail
clips away, they take our little scissors away at the airport,
and yet you have got nuclear weapons flying around, activated.
He did not laugh at that. He did not think that was funny.
And I know the Air Force took some strong action, good
friends of ours who were dismissed because of what happened
over there, as they should have been even though they were good
friends. I mean, there couldn't be anything more serious than
flying around with activated nuclear weapons.
So I appreciate it. We look forward to hearing what you
have to say about it, and in an addition to what you talk about
as far as what you have done to secure the nuclear weapons,
also what you think needs to be done as far as down the road
making sure they are taken care of. And I do not know that we
need any more, but we ought to make sure that they are ready to
go in case we would ever need them.
Mr. Young.
Mr. Young. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
And Chairman Murtha has, I think, pretty much explained the
position of the members of the subcommittee. I just want to say
that I appreciate the seriousness with how you, the Air Force,
are addressing this extremely important issue.
And we welcome your comments and your suggestions and your
advice on how we deal with this problem.
And thank you for being here.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Secretary.

Summary Statement of Secretary Donley

Mr. Donley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee for scheduling this hearing today to discuss a
critically important mission area for the United States Air
Force, stewardship of our nuclear deterrent forces. This is a
responsibility we take seriously, and one that is, as General
Schwartz has put it, among our most solemn obligations.
Mr. Murtha. Would you check to see that your microphone is
on?
Mr. Donley. Can do. Is that better?
Mr. Murtha. Yes.
Mr. Donley. Great. The nuclear deterrence mission assigned
to the United States Air Force is one of our most solemn
obligations to our Commander in Chief, to the Secretary of
Defense, our national leadership, and to the American people.
Nuclear deterrence operations and the sustainment
activities that ensure the integrity of the nuclear arsenal
entrusted to our care are core functions that the Air Force has
proudly accepted since our inceptions 24 hours a day, 7 days a
week for over 60 years America's Airmen have committed their
talent and their skill to delivering the Nation's strategic
backstop in a safe, secure, and reliable manner. Improving our
institutional performance in the nuclear area has held my
attention since my first day in office. It remains a top
priority in both policy and actionable terms. And whatever the
size or composition of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, I am
absolutely committed to ensuring that the Air Force meets its
solemn obligation, with the hallmark of professionalism and
discipline for which we are known the world over.
When I testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee
last July, I indicated that I had directed the Air Force to
establish a nuclear task force to synchronize corrective
actions underway across the major commands of the United States
Air Force. More importantly, however, I tasked the Air Force
nuclear task force to identify root causes and necessary steps
to mitigate these problems from an institutional and enterprise
perspective over the long term. Creation of that task force
raised the level of discussion to the top leadership team of
the Air Force about how our service can be the best steward of
our nuclear enterprise.
General Schwartz and I have invested significant personal
attention in enhancing our institutional performance. We have
demonstrated the same--we have demanded the same of our Air
Force assistant secretaries and the commanders of our major
commands, and all for whom we are responsible and who are
responsible for stewardship of our nuclear weapons. The output
of our analysis and discourse is the Air Force's Nuclear
Roadmap, a comprehensive assessment of root causes and required
actions. We published the roadmap in October. And I am pleased
to report that we are making good progress in its
implementation. Since nuclear matters are also interagency
matters, I want to assure you that the roadmap reflects
thoughtful collaboration and feedback from many outside the Air
Force, including our OSD and interagency partners.
The roadmap and its implementation have benefited greatly
from Dr. Jim Schlesinger's panel and their comprehensive and
detailed examination of Air Force nuclear operations and
sustainment. And I would like to thank Dr. Schlesinger for all
the good work his panel has done.
Among the most important changes we have instituted is the
enactment of several corporate governance changes that will
ensure the integrity of all aspects of the Air Force nuclear
enterprise, from the missile fields in America's northern tier
to our fleet of nuclear-capable bombers to the sustainment
activities that ensure the reliability of these forces on a
day-to-day basis.
We have established a provisional Global Strike Command to
prepare for the consolidation of nuclear operations, including
our missile forces and nuclear-capable bombers under a single
operational command. Additionally, we have worked to strengthen
our nuclear sustainment functions by assigning all nuclear
sustainment responsibilities to the Air Force Nuclear Weapons
Center, using a measured and phased approach over time that
will bring all the sustainment and support under one
organization.
Within our headquarters, we have established the Strategic
Deterrence and Nuclear Integration Directorate, an A10 office,
which reports directly to the Chief of Staff. So we now have an
office inside the Air Staff focused on the nuclear mission. We
have also established a Nuclear Oversight Board chaired by the
Chief and me that gets together quarterly to gather the senior
leadership of the Air Force with responsibilities for nuclear
matters and provide a focused forum for debating and deciding
policy matters, as well as resolving enterprise-level issues
confronting our nuclear forces.
Despite this progress, I want to caution the Committee that
reinvigorating the Nuclear Enterprise in the Air Force will
take not just months but years. But I am confident that we have
established a comprehensive and appropriate framework that
restores our institutional performance to a level consistent
with the high standards of precision and excellence synonymous
with the rest of the United States Air Force.
Thank you again for the continued support that this
Committee provides to our Airmen. I look forward to our
dialogue this morning.
Mr. Murtha. General Schwartz.

Summary Statement of General Schwartz

General Schwartz. Mr. Chairman, thank you, Members of the
Committee, for allowing us to testify on behalf of America's
Air Force. Thank you as well for your support for our
reinvigoration of the nuclear enterprise.
I would like to echo and reinforce Secretary Donley's
remarks by providing briefly my perspective on our nuclear
posture. The United States Air Force is fully committed as
stewards of the Nation's resources, those resources that the
Nation entrusts to us. And America's airmen will work
diligently each and every day, with precision and reliability,
to earn and preserve that trust that the Nation places in us.
We are grateful for the opportunity to serve the Nation by
providing critical capabilities in air, space and cyberspace,
capabilities that work in concert with our joint and
interagency partners to support America's strategic deterrence
policy.
We also recognize the magnitude of the role that we play
and the highest standards of accountability and performance
this role demands. America's nuclear capabilities remain an
indispensable part of our deterrence policy, and they are
important contributors to our efforts to limit and to dissuade
proliferation, as well as the threat of weapons of mass
destruction.
The Air Force is responsible for operating, maintaining,
sustaining, and securing a substantial portion of the Nation's
nuclear arsenal. We have devoted ourselves to performing this
mission with great pride and skill and precision since our
inception as a service, providing over 60 years of credible
nuclear deterrence for the Nation. We expect every Airman to
perform with precision and reliability each and every time.
Certainly excellence, even perfection, is the standard.
For all these reasons and more, Secretary Donley and I have
established Reinvigorating the Air Force Nuclear enterprise as
our number one priority. Today thousands of Airmen dedicate
their lives and talents to sustaining and safeguarding
America's nuclear capabilities. They operate America's on-alert
missile fields to provide vital, stable, and a ready force for
the Nation. This force stands ready to deter and dissuade any
potential aggressor from launching an attack on the United
States each and every day. These Airmen maintain bomber
capabilities that provide visible and flexible deterrent
effects around the globe and serve the vital role of reassuring
our allies. Your Airmen sustain our nuclear weapon and delivery
systems, providing life cycle cradle-to-grave support to ensure
the integrity of the Nation's most powerful weaponry.
Recent well-documented failures highlight the need to
improve institutional performance in several areas of this
crucial mission. Today I join Secretary Donley to give you my
word, we will not accept anything but the highest standards of
performance and accountability. We will not cease our
concentrated effort to reinvigorate the Air Force nuclear
enterprise, ensuring that our Airmen are fully committed to
demonstrating the highest standards of excellence, standards
that the American people, our national leadership, and our
allies expect of those who are entrusted with the solemn
obligation of America's nuclear capabilities. Your Air Force
and America's Airmen are all in. We will keep our promise to
the Nation to provide effective and uncompromising stewardship
and mission readiness.
Thank you for the committee's continued support of
America's Air Force and particularly its Airmen and their
contribution to nuclear deterrence.
Sir, if I may request that our prepared statement be
entered into the record.
[The joint statement of Secretary Donley and General
Schwartz follows:]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232A.001

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232A.002

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232A.003

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232A.004

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232A.005

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232A.006

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232A.007

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232A.008

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232A.009

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232A.010

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232A.011

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232A.012

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232A.013

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232A.014

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232A.015

Mr. Murtha. Without objection.
General Schwartz. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Murtha. Let me diverge a little bit from the subject
and just say how important it is, since the budget is going to
be late, that you folks get your act together and get the
information we need early. This is a bipartisan committee.
Whenever something comes out of this subcommittee, it does not
change until it goes to conference, and then there is very
minor changes. So the product we produce is a key to the
Defense Department's funding.
But we need to know numbers. We need to be able to plan
short term and long term about what needs to be done. And we
need to have it as soon as we can. Supplementals are going to
stop, and we are going to be in a bind as far as the regular
budget goes.
The budget this year is $387 billion plus whatever the
President adds to that. But the supplemental, we think, will be
about $20 billion more than the Defense Department sent 19
over. Whatever we can do in the supplemental is so important.
We tried to do a little in the stimulus. And the committee met;
it was almost too late by the time we found out the way it was
going. But we are going to get $4 billion or $5 billion there
for infrastructure and things like that.
But the sooner we know what the bottom line is, the sooner
we can stabilize and look not just short term but long term
about what needs to happen, and we can buy in quantities that
get the price down.
So the information we request is very important, and the
sooner you can get it to us, the better.
Mr. Young.
Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
And as I said, Mr. Secretary, General, thank you for being
here. We are discussing a pretty important issue here. And I am
curious if there have been any similar incidents in nuclear
weapons under the control of U.S. Air Force Europe.
General Schwartz. There have not, sir. There have been no
similar incidents or even major mistakes that I am aware of
that have occurred under the control of the United States Air
Forces in Europe.
Mr. Young. Well, are they under any different rules or
regulations?
General Schwartz. Sir, they operate under the same exact
criteria, now under unified supervision of, for example, the
Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center. Their policies and their
procedures apply in Europe as they do in the Continental United
States. Likewise, when Global Strike Command stands up, the two
major commands will interact and support one another in terms
of providing for nuclear deterrence.
But the key thing is that the standard is universal, and
the policies and procedures that we employ apply equally in
Europe as it does here. There is the nuance of the ally in
Europe. But in terms of the way the Americans execute the
mission, it is the same.
Mr. Young. Operational control of nuclear weapons has been
transferred from the Air Combat Command to the Air Force Global
Strike Command. Has that been accomplished? Is that already in
place?
Mr. Donley. It is not yet in place. We have stood up Air
Force Global Strike Command provisionally in early January to
begin the work to stand up that command at the end of this
year. But we have not transferred operational responsibility
for the ICBMs or for the bombers to that new command yet. That
will be something that happens further along in its evolution.
But we have established the new command in a provisional form.
It will grow this year. At the appropriate time in the future,
then we will transfer the responsibility into that command
section.
Mr. Young. Will the European-based nuclear weapons also be
transferred to that command or will they stay under U.S. Air
Force Europe?
General Schwartz. They will stay under U.S. Air Forces in
Europe in a supporting, supportive relationship. I might
reemphasize, Congressman Young, what the Secretary just related
is that this really is a wing-walking exercise. We will not let
go of one hand until we are ready to make the transition. It
will be seamless and continuous between the existing
organizations which are operating the machines and the weapons
and managing the people now to the new organization.
Mr. Young. A little different direction. We are hearing
that OMB is doing a study to transfer control of nuclear
weapons from the Department of Energy to the military. Back in
World War II, the Oppenheimer decision was to keep the control
or the development of nuclear weapons in the civilian control
as opposed to the military. Can you tell us anything about
this? Is this a real study? I know President Reagan tried to do
this during his administration. Is there a major effort under
way, or are we just hearing rumors?
Mr. Donley. I am not able to give you an update on the
Department's position on that subject. I am aware that it had
been discussed at the OMB level. Whether or not there are
Defense officials involved in that dialogue, I am not aware. It
has not worked itself down to the Navy or the Air Force at this
point.
Mr. Young. Mr. Chair, if I have time for one more question,
the Schlesinger report indicates that the Navy's control of
their nuclear responsibilities are somewhat frayed at the edges
but that they think that they are being managed properly. Do
you have any comment on that at all?
General Schwartz. Sir, we certainly understand that the
Navy has processes in place which we should model. In fact, we
are doing that. A case in point is our decision to consolidate
nuclear weapons related material that was in the inventory of
other DOD activities within a dedicated Air Force facility with
dedicated Air Force inventory control and management. That is
something which is exactly the way the Navy manages their
process, and one that is well proven.
Mr. Young. Well, I want to thank you very much. And despite
the fact that you had a couple of raps in the press on this
issue, I would not trade our Air Force for anybody else's,
believe me. So thank you very much for the good job you do.
Mr. Murtha. I assume this transition makes no difference in
the ability of us to respond to any attack.
General Schwartz. It does not.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Dicks. Secretary Gates appointed the Nuclear Weapons
Management Task Force to recommend necessary improvements and
measures to enhance deterrence and confidence in it. The task
force found an unambiguous and unacceptable decline in U.S. Air
Force commitment to the nuclear mission. In comparison, the
task force found the Navy maintained the commitment, though
there was evidence, as the chairman had just said, or Mr. Young
has said, fraying around the edges in the Navy's manpower
experience base as well as in maintaining the TLAM-N system.
The report concluded that the U.S. Air Force failed to properly
focus on the nuclear mission and identified six recurring U.S.
Air Force problem areas.
First is the U.S. Air Force has underinvested in the
nuclear deterrent mission. What are you going to do about that?
We are glad to have you here, by the way.
General Schwartz. Thank you.
Sir, I will take the lead on this for just a second.
Congressman Dicks, fundamentally, there are three major pieces
to what we have done. One is organizational. We talked about it
already with the stand up of the provisional Global Strike
Command. The other one is this unified sustainment channel so
we have a single center on the operations side and on the
sustainment side to work these matters. There were underfunded
elements in both areas, operations and in sustainment. We put
$300 million in 2009 into the program in order to remedy that.
Mr. Dicks. $300 million in what?
General Schwartz. Additional dollars in a range of
activities from sustainment to standing up a fourth B-52
squadron and so on, in order to----
Mr. Murtha. Was this a reprogramming, or was this new
money?
General Schwartz. Sir, it was new money. This was in the
process when producing the 2009 program.
Mr. Murtha. But there is also reprogramming money?
General Schwartz. There is some reprogramming dollars
involved.
Mr. Donley. I can give you just a quick lay down. But to
get back to the bigger point just so you understand, we had
been taking recommendations from 11 or 12 different reports set
in motion by the Secretary of Defense or the Air Force or
others. We rolled all those into our roadmap, and we used end-
of-year money in 2008 within our own--top line within our own
capability to get started on additional resources to put back
toward the enterprise. We bumped up our intentions for 2009 by
$320 million.
I will give you the breakout of that. Almost half of that
we realigned as priorities within our 2009 budget within
existing limitations so we are not coming to you for that.
Mr. Murtha. Limitations, is that a money limitation or
what?
Mr. Donley. O&M kind of funding, personnel realignments to
get dollars----
Mr. Murtha. What I am asking, do you have enough money to
realign this?
Mr. Donley. Well, of the $320 million, $145 million we have
done internally to the Air Force. We have come to you for $104
million in a reprogramming on top of that $144 million. So you
have in front of you----
Mr. Murtha. I do not mean to interrupt----
Mr. Dicks. As long as you do it on your time, Mr. Chairman,
that is fine with me. Go ahead.
Mr. Murtha. What I am worried, you are not limiting the
transition by not having enough money.
Mr. Donley. No.
Mr. Dicks. Okay. So you are working on that. Now it says
nuclear-related authority responsibility is fragmented. What
are you doing about that? You got your new command. But is
there one person in charge who can say, I know where every
single one of these nuclear weapons, cruise missiles is, and I
know for sure we are not going to go out there in the hangar
and get the wrong cruise missiles and send them to some place
and make a fool of ourselves. Is there somebody in charge of
that underneath you two?
General Schwartz. Absolutely.
Mr. Dicks. Who is it?
General Schwartz. It is a brigadier general who is the
commander of the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center at Kirtland
Air Force Base, New Mexico. He is the accountable party.
Mr. Dicks. He is the accountable party for all nuclear
weapons?
General Schwartz. Correct.
Mr. Dicks. Now this isn't the land-based missiles, too? Has
he got that, too?
General Schwartz. That includes the warheads associated
with the land-based missiles and those which are associated
with air-delivered munitions.
Mr. Dicks. So he knows where every one, and he is going
to--somebody is going to talk to him before any of these are
moved?
General Schwartz. There is coordination that occurs, yes,
sir.
Mr. Dicks. What happened here it seems to me is that
somebody went in and got the wrong missiles. That means that
somehow there was not an identification on those missiles that
would make it very clear, or a separate area where they were
that would make it very clear that these are nuclear weapons
and that--you know, it is almost incomprehensible.
General Schwartz. It is. Congressman, you are right. What
we did was we mixed both training devices, shapes, if you will,
with the real deal. Foolishly. Not consistent with procedure.
We did the wrong thing. When you allow that to occur, it
increased the risk. In fact, we made a terrible mistake. We
have structured this corrective action from the street level to
the very top in a way that will foreclose that chance of
happening again. People will make mistakes. But that is why we
have a two-man or two-person concept. The bottom line is we----
Mr. Dicks. It takes two people now to move these things?
General Schwartz. More than two. But at least two.
Mr. Dicks. Okay.
General Schwartz. So that if one person has, you know, a
bad day, not both of them will. This is the whole nature of
check, double check, precision, and reliability. You have the
right to expect that. We demand that of our own people. And
that is what our Airmen will deliver.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Frelinghuysen.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I serve with Mr. Visclosky; he is Chairman of the Energy
and Water Committee. And we have the responsibility for the
nuclear stockpile. I spent Thursday and Friday down at Savannah
River DOE site. And I must say, pretty tightly controlled. What
struck me, and maybe this is not politically correct, is how
old everybody is down there. And the gist of my question here
is, and let me give you a few quotations from the Schlesinger
report, you know, I see many of the people, there are a few
young people behind you, but there is quite a lot of gray hair.
Secretary Schlesinger said in his report, quote, the decision
that junior officers assigned initially to ICBMs will spend the
remainder of their careers in the space mission area, and thus
outside the broader Air Force, both devalue the mission area,
and have the effect of reducing the dept of the Air Force
nuclear experience, especially among mid-career and senior
officers, and that is all within quotation marks.
And then, on page 55 of the Schlesinger report, and
coincidentally I had hard about the report, but quite honestly
this hearing had not been scheduled, so I read it, and it was
an interesting comment here: And I quote, the task of providing
unambiguous employment guidance regarding an increasingly
complex plan has become more difficult with fewer nuclear-
qualified and experienced personnel. Moreover, U.S. STRATCOM
has difficulty filling positions designated for rated air crew
personnel with nuclear experience. As a result, these billets
are often filled by rated personnel without nuclear experience,
requiring the incumbent to invest a great deal of time and
energy to on-the-job training, hardly a satisfactory posture in
a mission with potentially little margin for error.
I know you are intimately familiar with this aspect. Can
you comment as to what we are doing relative to training,
should we say, the next generation of young people to work with
this, you know, vitally important area?
Mr. Donley. Well, sir, we have undertaken a number of
actions on the personnel side to rebuild the nuclear career
fields. So as we establish a new command, as we go out and find
the nuclear expertise in the Air Force and rebaseline what our
requirements are going forward, we are bringing all those
pieces together. We have already changed school house training,
sort of short-term changes in curriculum, to make sure
commanders get a full background on nuclear operations and
understand the importance of that mission. We are also working
on the career development issues that----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. How are you making it interesting
besides obviously exposing young people to perhaps your
greatest responsibility and making it interesting enough for
them to make it a serious career path?
Mr. Donley. The main thing we have done I think is to
highlight the importance of this mission to the United States
Air Force and to organize ourselves in the way that focuses on
that mission. So, as people go into that command, they will
know that their primary responsibility is to focus on the
safety, security, reliability, and operational support for
nuclear weapons.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. And I assume to be, you know,
knowledgeable about why nuclear weapons are nuclear weapons.
They are primarily a deterrent. Is this inculcated in what we
are--what you are setting up here as a curricula?
General Schwartz. It certainly is in an academic sense, but
I think from a policy point of view--it was not a small thing,
Congressman, that the Secretary of Defense, the first Secretary
ever to visit Minot Air Force Base back in November, he went in
part to remind the Airmen that what they are doing is valued.
Yes, we have two wars going on. And yes, the people that
are deployed down range are doing important things. But we have
young Airmen who are deployed in place providing the back drop
of deterrence for all the other activity that the Department
executes. The bottom line is what they are doing is important;
it has the support of the Nation's leadership; and we will work
the career paths so that youngsters know they can grow up to be
the commander of a Global Strike Command or 20th Air Force with
missiles or Eighth Air Force with bombers. That is part of the
institutional piece of this that is so vital. There is a path
that people can see their future and that they can have passion
in what they are doing.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Do we have any nuclear-trained people here with
you? Nuclear experts?
General Schwartz. Mr. Chairman, probably the quintessential
nuclear trained person is over my left shoulder, Major General
Don Alston.
Mr. Murtha. Okay. How about the person you said would be in
charge of the overall program?
General Schwartz. Mr. Chairman, the person we intend to
nominate is exquisitely qualified.
Mr. Murtha. So he is not in charge yet?
Mr. Dicks. You are talking about the brigadier general, Mr.
Chairman? He is not in place yet?
General Schwartz, No, he has been there certainly since I
arrived in the job, Congressman Dicks. So he has been there at
least six months, and probably longer.
Mr. Dicks. Why does he have to be confirmed?
General Schwartz. No, this is the command. Global Strike
Command will be a three-star commander. The brigadier is at the
Nuclear Weapons Center, two different positions.
Mr. Dicks. Okay.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Visclosky.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, welcome.
Secretary, welcome.
And I just want to make sure in the interest of full
disclosure, Mr. Secretary, I understand that you have two
degrees from the University of Southern California. I am a
Notre Dame grad. So I would make a couple of observations.
One, I would congratulate you on beating our football team
about 12 years in a row. It might be 13 or 14.
Mr. Dicks. And the University of Washington. We can throw
them in.
Mr. Visclosky. We can throw in a whole bunch of them.
Mr. Dicks. Except we got two of their coaches now coming to
Washington.
Mr. Visclosky. But also make the observation that my first
born male child just graduated from U.S.C. in December.
Mr. Donley. So you just got a pay raise then.
Mr. Visclosky. Right.
Mr. Secretary and General, as Mr. Frelinghuysen mentioned,
we both serve on the Energy and Water Subcommittee, and we have
an interest, obviously, with NNSA and the weapons program. Will
not have time, obviously, to get into great detail on all of
the issues of concern, but for the record, in particular on
pages 11, 12, 15, 18, 22 and 23, I certainly have a particular
interest.
And on this round, I do want to talk about the proposed
life extension program, the Mod 12. The first question I would
have is, my understanding is we have just spent $400 million on
a life extension and modification program. Could you explain
the necessity of Mod 12? And briefly, because I know I do not
have a lot of time and I have a couple of follow-up questions.
Mr. Murtha. I think this is very important. You take the
time you need.
Mr. Donley. Well, the Air Force operates 10 different
models of nuclear weapons. Without getting into the detail of
each weapon, but if you have questions, we will take them for
the record.
Mr. Visclosky. But this would be for the B-61.
Mr. Donley. The B-61 life extension.
Mr. Visclosky. Specifically B-61.
Mr. Donley. Okay. B-61, in all these weapons, but
especially B-61, we need to be looking at life extension issues
that focus on safety, security, and reliability of these
weapons going forward. There are real issues with the life
cycle of their components and where they are. Many of these
weapons need attention. We need investment to keep up on the
surety issues, safety, security, reliability, and we need to be
considering and having good debates as a country about the
future of these weapons and how we are going to sustain them
going forward.
Mr. Visclosky. If I could ask for the record, because I
want to proceed here, why, after the expenditure of $400
million on modification of some of the B-61s, there is now a
request for the Modification 12? But you had mentioned the
debate as far as the various components of these weapons as far
as surety and safety and use control. And I am with you on
that. But I would simply point out for the record that the
Committee, the full Committee, in the last 2 years in report
language has talked about the necessity of knowing where we
want to be in the end before we start down the road. And that
is to make sure----and I know that we have a stockpile posture.
But what we have talked about in our report language is a
strategy. Because you have, as I would understand it, in excess
of 900 warheads here. The question would be as you proceed, are
they all going to be modified?
[The information follows:]

The current B-61 Life Extension Program (LEP) will
consolidate 4 of the 5 B-61 variants B-61-3, 4, 7, 10) and
refurbish components that were not part of the recently
completed LEP (Alt 357). In particular, Alt 357 reworked the
canned sub-assembly on the B-61-7 and B-61-11 and did not
include the B-61-3, B-61-4, and B-61-10 which are deployed
outside the continental United States to support NATO. A two-
year B-61 LEP feasibility and cost study (Phase 6.2/6.2A) began
in September 2008. The cost of the LEP will be determined as
part of that study.

General Schwartz. And Congressman, if I may, sir----
Mr. Visclosky. Yes.
General Schwartz. I think what you addressed there is
really an issue for the nuclear posture review, which will
commence shortly and work through the middle part of this year
in terms of the strategy and so on. But I would like to
reiterate Secretary Donley's comments. It is important for us
to recognize that there are components that need to be
sustained or remanufactured in the existing stockpile: Fuses,
neutron generators, things that really influence the
reliability of the weapons we already possess. And so that is
where the focus of the Air Force is at, on those we currently
possess that allow us to maintain our deterrence posture and
where we will focus going forward.
Mr. Visclosky. Would you describe it, General, as a
modification or an alteration of the weapon?
General Schwartz. I would characterize it as sustainment of
the existing weapon. This is not dramatically changing the
characteristics and so on and so forth. It is making them
safer. It is maintaining their reliability and, in some cases,
improving their security.
Mr. Visclosky. And if I could look out to 2010, my
understanding is the first increment for the cost that you
would ask for is about $120 million, give or take? Or if you
could for the record, and that would be moneys that are
available under NNSA now, and then what the request would be
from the Air Force.
Mr. Donley. We will provide that for the record at the
appropriate time. Just to be clear, at least as I understand
our respective responsibilities here, DOE is responsible for
the weapon and the internal operations of the weapon. We are
responsible for the interface of the weapon to the platform. We
share responsibilities and we share funding costs as we go
forward to get this work done.
[The information follows:]

The cost of the B-61 LEP to the Air Force depends on the design
option selected and will be determined as part of the Phase 6.2/6.2A
study. The Air Force continues to evaluate funding options for LEP
engineering studies related to the weapon/platform interface. The Air
Force will address further LEP resource requirements in developing the
Fiscal Year 2010 Program Objective Memorandum.

Mr. Visclosky. Right, and I do just want to emphasize,
because after 2 years of language and hearings, particularly
with NNSA and others, there is a perception, and I speak only
for myself now, that I am opposed to doing or having any
changes made to any warhead. That is wrong. But I also would
not want to be misunderstood. I understand we have issues on
surety, safety, just use control. I am with you there but would
want to make sure, because, as you point out, General, we are
doing another posture review. What we are harping on, and I
would say harping, whining, whatever you want to call it, the
strategy, because in the end, you are looking at what changes
need to be made now for some sums of money after just spending
$400 million. Then the question is, to how many of those
weapons will you apply that change at what cost only to find
out later, well, we, because of a strategy that works, we do
not need to apply it to all of these weapons maybe we have now
applied it to. And obviously, we are talking about one system
here. But as you allude to, Mr. Secretary, there is a number of
them. So I would want to emphasize I would want to stay in
touch and appreciate the additional time from the Chairman. I
just want to be very cautious here and use every opportunity,
because my point then is, if you have a strategy, and not just
as far as the uses of the nuclear arsenal but nonnuclear,
nonkinetic, the role of proliferation, my upset in the past has
been that the weapons figure goes up, and I am not necessarily
again opposed to that, but the nonproliferation number in the
last several has gone down. And my sense is the greatest threat
this morning when we woke up is that person who cannot be
deterred; they can only be stopped. And after you, then, know
what the constitute weapons are, particularly it is important
to Mr. Frelinghuysen and myself and others, what does the
weapons complex look like? Because my fear is if we start down
a road without realizing or making a final determination of
what the rationalization size should be, we will never get
there. So I certainly do intend to, if you would, work with
you. And I just want to make sure we are very careful here.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Donley. Understood. Thank you.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Frelinghuysen, you have anything to add to
this conversation?
Mr. Frelinghuysen. No, I support the Chairman's questions
in this hearing.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Kingston.
Mr. Kingston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, General, I have a question about the
inventory in general. You have an inventory of every nuclear
weapon that is in the country or in the world owned by the
United States.
Mr. Donley. Yes, 4,961 are under Air Force custody (A total
of 8,938 are owned by the U.S.).
Mr. Kingston. How about lost nuclear weapons? Do we have an
idea of any that are unaccounted for going back to the 1940s?
General Schwartz. Sir, there are some, you know, that have
gone down in airplane crashes in those days gone by when we
actually flew missions and training missions with live nuclear
weapons. Decades ago, sir.
Mr. Kingston. And in those cases where we know one was lost
because it went down, what do we do about those? How are those
being monitored today? Because they would still be nuclear
capable, correct?
General Schwartz. In each case, there were concerted
efforts, and in one with which you might be personally
familiar, very concerted efforts, even in recent years, when
the possibility or new technology came along that would allow
us to reconfirm areas where the weapons may have been lost due
to accidents, we continued to do that work. And in fact that
occurred I guess two years--no, more like 4 years ago in the
effort down towards Savannah River where we used side-scanning
sonar and other new technologies to try to reassure ourselves
that if it was there, we were going to retrieve it even after
all these years. This never goes completely off the radar
screen to be sure.
Mr. Kingston. Okay. So, theoretically, it could be 10
years, 30 or 40 years from now we would eventually be able to
find these with the right technology?
General Schwartz. I think we never dismiss that as a
possibility, Congressman.
Mr. Kingston. All right. Thank you.
I have a question about the aging B-52s, just switching
subjects on dual capabilities and the bombers. We have nuclear
capable B -52, B-2s and then dual capability in the F-16 and
the F-15E. Has the Air Force thought about using Joint Strike
Fighters and making them nuclear capable? What is going on with
that?
General Schwartz. The short answer is yes. That decision,
given that the F-35 is an international program, we have a
steering group that talks about what is on the airplane. It
involves the international partners and when that goes on the
airplane. We believe in the Air Force that the F-35 should be
dual capable and that we will present that for consideration by
the steering group this summer.
Mr. Kingston. Okay. And also on the question of aging
fleet, the WC-135s do the atmospheric sampling on vital
intelligence after nuclear detonation. And is it correct that
there are only two of them and they are 50-years old or
approaching 50-years old? Have we thought about using the 737s
or moving in the direction of the C-40A frame I guess?
Mr. Donley. We have looked at that. We will continue to
look at it going down the road. Those airframes, while they are
very old, they still have a lot of life on them because they do
not take a lot of stress in the airframe like a fighter would.
They still have 20 years plus on the airframes left. We have
recently been asked by the Office of the Secretary of Defense
to go back and look at an analysis of alternatives. Going
forward, we would want to think about how we do this mission
out into the future. There may be other ways to do this,
different combinations of sensors and capabilities, but we have
time to work this.
Mr. Kingston. Well, all right.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Moran.
Mr. Moran. Mr. Chairman, I have some questions, but I 6
think it is only fair- to defer to those who have been waiting
longer than I to ask them. So I am willing to defer.
Mr. Murtha. Ms. Kaptur.
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Moran.
Welcome. I am interested in knowing how both of these
incidents first came to public attention. The Taiwan, I
remember reading it in the paper myself, and then also the
Minot situation. How did it first--both--come to public
attention, General?
General Schwartz. Ma'am, it preceded my arrival in town. I
was in a different position at the time that these situations
occurred. In general, they were reported through channels once
they were discovered all the way up to the Secretary of Defense
and ultimately the President, in both cases. Then institutions
within the Department swung into action.
Ms. Kaptur. So you are saying, there was a public
announcement by the Department?
General Schwartz. No. What I am saying is, once the
incidents were discovered, they were reported in command
channels within the Department of Defense. I was not in town at
the time, when an announcement occurred.
Ms. Kaptur. They announced it publicly?
General Schwartz. They did.
Ms. Kaptur. Could you please explain to me, on the first
incident where nuclear-related ICBM parts labeled as helicopter
batteries, so, first of all, there was a mislabeling, were sent
to Taiwan in 2006. All right. Do you separate in your parts
supply chain the nuclear-related parts versus others? Is there
a separate supply chain?
General Schwartz. The supply chain was goofed up
previously. We are improving but there is not a separate supply
chain. This is part of the solution I described to you where we
had multiple agencies responsible for different pieces of
material, the so-called nuclear weapons related material. We
are in the process of consolidating control of all nuclear
weapons material under Air Force dedicated supervision.
Ms. Kaptur. All right.
General Schwartz. Inventory management system is associated
with that as well. So that was one of the lessons learned from
this incident. We followed the Navy's lead on this of doing it
ourselves at one location.
Ms. Kaptur. So you have a separated supply chain. Are all
those components domestically sourced?
General Schwartz. Ma'am, I would have to take that for the
record.
Ms. Kaptur. I would be very interested in knowing that.
General Schwartz. Okay.
[The information follows:]

All assets defined as nuclear weapons-related materiel,
which is the class of materiel involved in the Taiwan incident,
are domestically sourced.

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you very much, General. Now on the 2007
incident, where the B-52 crew mistakenly flew six nuclear
weapons from one base to another, which nuclear weapons, I did
not find it in your testimony, exactly which nuclear weapons
were flown?
Mr. Donley. The weapons were attached to the bomb wing at
Minot Air Force Base, and they were mistakenly flown from Minot
Air Force Base to Barksdale Air Force Base.
Ms. Kaptur. Correct. But what type of weapon?
General Schwartz. Air-launched cruise missile.
Ms. Kaptur. They are cruise missiles?
General Schwartz. Right.
Ms. Kaptur. All right. How did that happen?
General Schwartz. This was an incident which involved
commingling of the real deal and training assets. The truth of
the matter is that----
Ms. Kaptur. Loaded missiles versus unloaded missiles? They
were not----
General Schwartz. We had pylons with training devices
loaded and pylons with real weapons in the same igloo, in the
same weapons storage space. There were multiple failures which
allowed the incorrect pylon to get put on the airplane and
flown from North Dakota to Louisiana.
Ms. Kaptur. That just seems so----
General Schwartz. I agree with you completely.
Ms. Kaptur [continuing]. Incredible.
General Schwartz. It is incredible. It is embarrassing. It
is profoundly unsettling, and it is why we are laser-focused on
correcting the underlying reasons that this occurred, not just
the superficial reasons that one or two people did not do their
jobs, but rather the underlying rationale, some of which is
culture-based, as Dr. Schlesinger outlined, some of which is
procedure and process.
Ms. Kaptur. General, can I be assured that every single
person who goofed was under the command structure and not in a
civilian contractor position? So it was a mess up internal to
the Air Force----
General Schwartz. With respect----
Ms. Kaptur [continuing]. With no civilian contractors were
involved in any aspect of this?
General Schwartz. With respect to the Minot incident, that
is true.
Ms. Kaptur. All right. But not necessarily----
Mr. Donley. But not the Taiwan incident.
General Schwartz. The Taiwan incident----
Mr. Donley. The Taiwan incident involved depot operations
at Hill Air Force Base, where there are both uniformed and
civilian depot employees working on nuclear-related matters. So
there is a mixture of uniformed and civilian personnel.
Mr. Murtha. Will that be changed under the new system?
Mr. Donley. Well, I do not believe so. All of that--what
has changed is the responsibility there, which was a mixture of
Air Force and DLA, has been moved to Air Force. The Air Force
and DLA have agreed to move that responsibility into the United
States Air Force. We still have a civilian-heavy workforce at
our depots. The civilian leadership has been changed in that
particular organization. But I believe we still have civilians
involved in our depot-related operations.
General Schwartz. But they are DOD employees.
Mr. Donley. They are DOD employees.
Ms. Kaptur. I would like to have some type of information
provided to the record to really look at who these--how they
are classified. And of those working in the nuclear programs,
how many are enlisted, how many are civilian contractors, if
there is a way one can easily do that. And I am interested, for
every single person under this new--is it three-star general?
General Schwartz. Yes.
[The information follows:]

The Department of the Air Force has many military,
civilian, and civilian contractors working nuclear programs.
The Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, located at Kirtland
AFB, MN, is the overall responsible agency for the operation of
safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapon systems to support
the National Command Structure and the Air Force war-fighter
and is led by an Air Force major general. The following two
units are subordinate to the Nuclear Weapons Center.
The 526th ICBM Systems Group, located at the Ogden Air
Logistics Center, UT, is responsible for inception-to-
retirement integrated weapons system management of Minuteman
and Peacekeeper weapon systems. The group develops, acquires
and supports silo based ICBMs and provides program direction
and logistics support as the single face to the customer. The
group is also responsible for acquisition, systems engineering
and depot repair; manages equipment spares; provides storage
and transportation; and accomplishes modifications and
equipment replacement to maintain silo-based ICBM systems.
The 498 Armament Sustainment Wing is a reporting unit of
the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center. It is responsible for
sustainment of nuclear munitions and cruise missiles, including
operation of two munitions maintenance and storage complexes
(at Kirtland AFB and Nellis AFB, Nevada).

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unit Officer Enlisted Civilian CME * Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ogden Air Logistics Center, UT
526 ICBM Group............................. 55 9 381 371 816
Nuclear Weapons Center, Kirtland AFB, NM
Headquarters, Nuclear Weapons Center....... 33 23 108 0 164
498 Armament Sustainment Wing.......... 66 259 241 37 603
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* CME=contract man-year equivalents.

Ms. Kaptur. All right. Do you have a ribbon if you are
working in a nuclear program? Are you separate from other
people in the Air Force? I do not have any such basis in my
area, but I would like to know if there is a culture of
teamwork that is built because of special designation for
persons working in this program regardless of what title you
might have in the chain of command.
General Schwartz. In the lingo that is known as what patch
you wear. That patch will be a Global Strike Command patch.
There will be a sense of community, a sense of mission, a sense
of belonging, which we lost over the last 15 or 20 years and
that we are bringing back.
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Murtha. Ms. Granger.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
In the report produced by Major General Alston, the
recurring thread or theme is the underinvestment in nuclear
enterprise. And my question is with the new corporate
restructuring about the A10 head or position, the advocate for
nuclear deterrent mission in the Air Force, with that sort of
emphasis, what sort of effect will it have on other major
programs within the Air Force like the F-22, the Joint Strike
Fighter and the personnel?
Mr. Donley. Ms. Granger, we have already taken steps to
realign resources inside the Air Force to get back additional
focus and additional manpower and additional dollars on the
nuclear mission. We started in 2008. We are it in 2009. We have
a string of dollars tied to 2010 and the out years where we are
beefing up the nuclear enterprise, both people and dollars. We
have added a B-52 squadron, a fourth B-52 squadron that will be
dedicated to One year's worth of alert time. So we have gotten
all this going as a result of our roadmap. We have a pretty
robust view of all the things that need to be undertaken from
an equipment point of view and from a people point of view, to
include operations, organization, and training. We are
identifying the resources that go with that. We are making
adjustments inside Air Force as we can to address this issue.
Ms. Granger. Right. And my question is, though, how does
that affect existing programs or programs that are being built,
like the F-22 and the F-35?
Mr. Donley. Right. I do not believe it has had any direct
impact on those investment programs. Probably the biggest
impact that it has had is on our total active duty manpower.
The Secretary of Defense made a decision in the summer to allow
the Air Force to grow manpower back up to about 332,000 active
duty end strength from a previously planned reduction down to
316,000. So one of the major resource decisions was to allocate
some of that manpower back into the nuclear enterprise.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
General Schwartz. 2,500 spaces.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Moran.
Mr. Moran. I am going to pass.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Boyd.
Mr. Boyd. I am going to pass.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Rothman.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary and General, thank you for being here, thank
you for your distinguished careers, and all of your years of
service and sacrifice for our country. And I am hoping that
your present positions will be the crowning jewel of your
lifetime's work.
Mr. Dicks. If you get the tanker thing right.
Mr. Rothman. General Schwartz, I wanted to just touch base
with you on something that I may have misunderstood in your
testimony, or in your response to a question, namely that there
would be two people responsible for--and remind me what those
two people would be responsible for.
General Schwartz. We have a policy, it is called the two
person policy, and in a number of situations that relate to
handling or processing of nuclear weapons that it takes two
people to do it. In other words, one person cannot move it from
place A to place B. It has to be done by two people. And
accountability purposes has to be done again by two folks, one
person and then verified by a second person.
Mr. Rothman. So if I understand it, the storage of the
materials in an igloo is done by two people?
General Schwartz. At least two people.
Mr. Rothman. At least two. Its location in the igloo is
done by two people?
General Schwartz. At least two people.
Mr. Rothman. So every step of the way, the loading onto the
aircraft by two people, the inspection of the aircraft before
it takes off from a base with nuclear weapons.
General Schwartz. In general, that is true, sir.
Mr. Rothman. Okay. You used the words, General,
``profoundly unsettling.'' And I do not think that that was an
understatement. Each of those 6 warheads, each of them had the
destructive power of up to 10 Hiroshima bombs; each of them,
flying over U.S. soil and unaccounted for, for 36 hours. Each
of the 6 have a destructive power of 10 Hiroshima bombs.
General Schwartz. Congressman, we should not--I am not
minimizing what happened. It is bad, but we shouldn't suggest
that these weapons, had they left the airplane, would have
detonated. Just allow me to make that caveat, that was not an
issue in this instance.
Mr. Rothman. Well, yes, I get that distinction, if you
will. But they were without a steward----
General Schwartz. Modest though it may be.
Mr. Rothman. Good. There was no special guard for these
weapons for 15 hours. So whether they could have been stolen by
some bad guys, and then armed, and then blown up would have
been extraordinarily catastrophic.
Mr. Murtha. If the gentleman would yield, would he explain
the arming process so we would know why they wouldn't have
detonated?
General Schwartz. Congressman, there is a--and I am not the
expert on this--but fundamentally there is a complex mechanism,
including codes, which have to be matched and done
electronically in order for the weapons to arm.
Mr. Murtha. From the ground or from the airplane?
General Schwartz. It is from the aircraft.
Mr. Dicks. But how do they know--if they think it is a test
missile and not a nuclear missile, how do they know that they
have to do that?
General Schwartz. There is a way to determine by looking
through a small window in the body of the weapon to determine
whether it is an actual weapon or not, or a training shape.
Regrettably in this instance, either that was not done
properly, or the person who executed that, the persons, didn't
know what the hell they were looking for.
Mr. Murtha. Well, what Mr. Rothman is asking is you say it
couldn't be detonated. No chance of it being detonated. In
other words, they would not have had the key, the electronic
key, to arm the weapon?
General Schwartz. Correct.
Mr. Rothman. If I may, Mr. Chairman, but we are very
concerned these days about loose nukes, and our loose nukes
would have been a disaster. And the fact that they were--they
were without a special guard for hours just sitting 18 there at
the base is obviously what has disturbed all of us.
But to move on, if I might, to--and the fact that those
four ballistic missile fuses that were unaccounted for for 17
months, you know, my understanding as a lay person is those
nuclear fuses are highly sought after and very important in the
building of a nuclear program, and yet we didn't know about
them for 17 months.
My last question, which is a little bit of a--may require a
little bit of an elaboration by each of you gentlemen, is how
did this happen? General, you used 15 to 20 years. Does it go
back longer than that? How did this culture develop? And I
don't ask it to assign blame of any individual or
administration, I ask it so that we can judge whether what you
are doing now is the right fix for what the problem was. So if
you can tell us the right fix and what the problem was at the
time.
General Schwartz. In the 1990s and the post-Cold War
setting, sir, we decided, for example, weapons systems bombers
that had been almost exclusively assigned to the nuclear role
would have a much broader conventional responsibility to
deliver conventional munitions.
In addition, there was a sense that perhaps the nuclear--
the relevance of deterrence had waned in a post-Cold War
situation.
Our service took on the mantra, properly, perhaps
excessively, but properly, to be expeditionary and to be able
to move out and take care of business wherever that might be
required, again, a conventional mission.
In the process of these things occurring over time, the
emphasis on the nuclear mission diminished. We go to war, and
naturally there is a compulsion to do that well, to devote the
resources to support the fight, to put good people and so on.
In fact, in our Air Force, the truth of the matter is that
being deployed forward was more valued than sitting in a
missile hole in Montana, Wyoming or North Dakota. This is
symptomatic of what Dr. Schlesinger identified, of a shift of
which we, as leadership, over time, didn't grasp the
significance. We do now.
In establishing the Global Strike Command--and, I mean, one
of the fundamental rationale for that is to have an institution
in our Air Force as a major command whose singular focus is on
nuclear stewardship and operations.
Mr. Donley. Right. If I could just add, just briefly, the
Chief has outlined this, I think, very well. To give you a
little bit more flavor and sort of color background to this, as
the wall came down at the end of the Cold War, we made national
decisions to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and forces in
our inventory. We made national DOD-level decisions to take
what used to be Strategic Air Command, focused on the nuclear
mission, rename it, reshape it, and give it more than just
nuclear missions. Within the United States Air Force, the
impact of those changes were to put the bombers under a command
that had other than nuclear responsibilities, Air Combat
Command, which has all our bomber aircraft responsibilities.
Mr. Rothman. But they are still dual use.
Mr. Donley. They are, but the command's focus was broader
than nuclear, and, in fact, started to be oriented toward
supporting joint warfighting and getting ready for other
conflicts.
The missiles went to Air Force Space Command, which has
responsibilities for oversight of space-related activities,
launch support, all of these other matters, some affinity with
nuclear missiles----
Mr. Rothman. Could I just follow up on that--all right,
never mind.
Mr. Donley. Different than a nuclear mission. I apologize,
sir.
Mr. Rothman. No, no, I just wondered--oh.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Bomber fleet, you got, what, 76 B-52s, and the age of that
fleet? What is the age of the B-52 fleet?
General Schwartz. Congressman, it is in the neighborhood of
50 years. It was first built in the late 1950s and the early
1960s.
Mr. Rogers. I am sorry.
General Schwartz. The aircraft were built in the late 1950s
and early 1960s.
Mr. Rogers. But are some of them newer than that, though?
General Schwartz. No.
Mr. Rogers. So all of them are approaching 50 years.
General Schwartz. Right.
Mr. Murtha. Let me interrupt, Mr. Rogers. Mr. Boyd has to
leave. I just wanted to give the subcommittee an idea what the
schedule would be towards April. Where is Paul? Is Paul here?
No. Well, that takes care of that. We are trying to get as many
hearings as we can get in by April 6.
Now, the problem we are looking at is people aren't
confirmed, won't be available to us, and the budget won't be
done until later. We will have a series of 22, 23 hearings up
until April 6, and then after we come back from our recess, we
will try to get the rest in.
The intelligence hearing, which we normally have first, we
are going to get as soon as we can.
The Secretary of Defense we won't get until probably after
the recess because we just won't have a budget by that time.
But as soon as we get a budget, we will get a lot of these
people back up at the end, but we will try to finish up. We
don't think we will have a product until June or July, and the
supplemental will have to be done, we think, by May.
I was telling leadership this. Let us get the supplemental
done as quickly as we can. It is about $20 billion short in
figures. We only have couple of pages, six pages, of
justification, but we will add to that because the cost of the
war is not included in the supplemental.
But we will do everything we can to get that done, and,
with some cooperation from the Defense Department, we will try
to do as much as we can on the supplemental, get it passed.
Now, if it goes past June, and you get into July, then you
really got a problem with the Army. The other services can get
by, but the Army really has a problem, too. We will try to work
it out as quickly as we can as long as leadership goes along.
So basically that is the schedule, and we will try our best
to adhere to it. I know that a lot of you, because of other
responsibilities, won't be able to come, but this is as good a
turnout as we will probably have the rest of the year because
all of you are such high-powered Members, so many different
areas. But I appreciate the turnout, and we will get a concrete
schedule to you as quickly as we can.
Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. At one point in time, at least, you had plans
for a replacement aircraft for the B-52s, correct?
Mr. Donley. Yes.
General Schwartz. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Do you still have such a plan?
General Schwartz. Yes.
Mr. Rogers. And what is the plan?
General Schwartz. It is an R&D effort at the moment. You
know the term, sir, that we use is next-generation bomber.
Mr. Rogers. When do you expect to have the next-generation
bomber in operation?
General Schwartz. The target for a developmental platform
would be in the late teens, 2018, 2019 timeframe. Fielding
would be later than that.
Mr. Rogers. So at least 9 years?
General Schwartz. Sir.
Mr. Rogers. Now, what do you plan to do in the meantime
with 50-year-old bombers that are getting older every day on
the chance that you will have a replacement bomber, next-
generation bomber, in 9 years?
Mr. Donley. We have continued to make modifications in all
our bomber equipment, so B-52s have had modifications. B-52s
have had many modifications over the years. We continue to
upgrade them as we can and modernize them.
General Schwartz. For example, Congressman, the B-52 used
to be an analog airplane. In other words, it did not have a
digital backbone. It does now, so we can deliver the new
digital weapons like the joint direct attack munition and so
on. These are the kinds of things, new sensors and global
positioning capabilities and what have you.
The airplanes are not static. They might be 50 years old,
but they are not static.
Mr. Rogers. I presume they have been reengined perhaps
several times.
General Schwartz. The B-52s have not been reengined.
Mr. Rogers. They have the original engines?
General Schwartz. If I am not mistaken. I will take that
for the record to reconfirm for you, sir.
[The information follows:]

The H model B-52, the only model still in the active inventory, is
equipped with its original Pratt & Whitney TF-33 engines. However, over
the years, the Air Force has completed several engine depot maintenance
modifications needed to replace the high wear components, extending the
service life of the engines and enhancing aircraft safety.

Mr. Rogers. Are there any plans to reengine those aircraft?
I mean, just from a lay point of view, just looking at that
plane, I can tell you that engine is not working very good.
Mr. Donley. Well, the engines get a lot of attention in the
depot process, so they get rebuilt on a regular basis. To my
knowledge, we have not had any catastrophic or engine
maintenance sustainment problems that has threatened the health
of the B-52.
Mr. Rogers. Well, here is my concern, and I share it with
you: making that plane last until the next generation is
operable, one; and, two, I am not even sure you are going to
get the next generation in the time frame, at least, you are
talking about. Secretary, Secretary Gates said before the
Senate Armed Services Committee in January that that plane may
not be on the schedule that he had first thought, right? And he
said--when he had talked about the importance of that plane
being available in 9 years, he said, ``I made that speech at a
time when the economic outlook was rather different than it is
now, and the prospects for the defense budget, perhaps,
differed accordingly.''
Tell us what he meant.
General Schwartz. I think it is pretty clear, sir, if there
are not sufficient funds to do all the things the Department
needs to do, we will make choices.
Your Air Force, however, would make the argument, in the
appropriate forum within the Department, that this is an
important initiative for the country. We will make the argument
as powerfully as we can, and we will see where it leads us.
Mr. Rogers. Well, just any commonsense reading of what he
said before the committee tells me that the plans for the next-
generation plane are off.
Mr. Donley. I don't believe that those plans are off. I do
think we are going to have a good discussion on the NGB this
year, probably not going to be finally decided in the next few
weeks as we put together the fiscal year 2010 budget, but
probably will get a lot closer and, I would say, broader
attention during the QDR and during the Nuclear Posture Review
that the Department and the administration have planned for
later this year. This will be in the mix, I think, for the NPR
discussion.
Mr. Rogers. Well, under your plans, what would be the first
fiscal year that you would need money toward the next-
generation bomber?
Mr. Donley. You have been supporting the R&D efforts for
several years now, and there is both a white world and a black
world classified dollars that go with that program. There have
been dollars supporting the effort.
Mr. Rogers. All right.
Mr. Murtha. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Moran.
Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Beyond the immediate concern about inventory control, that
is the fundamental issue, where do we go from here?
President Obama made several public declarations that he
was committed to substantially reducing our nuclear stockpile,
but there is resistance on the part of the Pentagon, as I
understand it. I don't want to put words in your mouth, I want
you to clarify and find the posture, if you would, that you
don't want to do that until we are well on our way to a
modernization of our weapons and particularly of the production
capability.
Now, I know part of our problem is that it is really DOE
that controls the production capability, and you distribute it
and implement it. But that really seems to be the critical
issue we are going to have to face.
This public commitment, which I think there is a fair
consensus that over time it has to be done, but there seems to
be a commitment to substantially and quickly reduce our
stockpile versus the Pentagon's position that we are not ready
in terms of the modernization that would make you feel
comfortable, particularly with regard to production capability.
So would you address that a bit, both of you, but
particularly General Schwartz?
General Schwartz. Congressman, we respond to policy. I
think this is why the Nuclear Posture Review is so important.
It has, both within DOD and outside DOD, implications, and in
the end we will accommodate to the national policy. If it is
the current number or lesser number or lesser than that, we
will do what policy dictates.
Mr. Moran. I understand that, but you will also make
recommendations, and that is what we are trying to get out of
you, what you would recommend, because the implementation of
that public policy has not been defined.
General Schwartz. Sir, my basic recommendation is whatever
the number is, they have got to be viable, they have got to be
safe, they have got to be secure, and there are some issues in
that regard, and I think that needs attention.
Mr. Moran. Well, let me pursue it a little more so that I
can get a more specific answer, if I could. By what percentage
are we really talking about? They are going to turn to you for
a recommendation, General, you know that. They are not going to
make it in a vacuum. I mean, he is going to want to say, well,
I am following the advice of the military on this, for
instance, you, with the Secretary.
So what would your recommendation likely be?
General Schwartz. Sir, the way this works is that the Joint
Chiefs will make a recommendation to the civilian leadership,
and I can't presuppose what that recommendation will be.
I can tell you, contrary to the implication that the
Department has already made a decision on this, that issue has
not come to the Joint Chiefs' tank for consideration. It has
not been teed up yet, and I don't think it is likely to be teed
up until the Nuclear Posture Review reports out its
conclusions.
The bottom line is I am not in a position, sir, to offer
you other than personal insights, which I have.
Mr. Moran. Well, personal insight.
General Schwartz. Personal insight is whatever the number
is--and I cannot give you a number now. I am not educated
enough at the moment to do that. But whatever the number is, we
have got to make sure that these things are viable, safe and
secure. As your colleague mentioned earlier, there needs to be
a strategy, it needs to be connected, and that is the purpose
of the Nuclear Posture Review. It will come to the tank, the
Chiefs will make their recommendations to the civilian
leadership, and then that clearly will be, you know, ready for
your consideration.
Mr. Dicks. Will the gentleman yield just briefly for a
comment?
Mr. Moran. Sure.
Mr. Dicks. The comment I would make is, you know, we have
all been talking about nuclear weapons today, and one of the
reasons for this whole discussion is with the advent of smart,
conventional weapons that were highly accurate, you know, these
things can be extremely effective and can be usable. I mean,
nuclear weapons are a weapon of last resort. It is a deterrence
weapon.
So I think that we ought to--when we look at our whole
capability, we ought to be first looking at the conventional
capability and what that gives us in order to make a decision
about how many nuclear weapons do you wind up with.
We have been coming down, and I think it has been done in
a safe and responsible way, but the thing that is different is
the advent of these smart, conventional weapons.
Mr. Moran. Well, reclaiming my time, even though there is
none of it left, I wholly agree with you, Norm, and there is a
certain irrelevancy to current and likely future threats in
terms of the nuclear option, if you will.
But I didn't want to prejudice the response. I wanted to
see if we could get any kind of specificity in terms of what
the recommendation might be.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. I have to say that was a masterful response by
General Schwartz, because he didn't really tell us anything at
all.
Mr. Dicks. It is premature.
Mr. Murtha. It is premature, too, but I think we have to be
careful interceding between what the recommendations of the
Armed Forces and what the President might do.
Mr. Hinchey.
Mr. Hinchey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman and Mr.
Secretary. Thank you for your very interesting answers,
although I couldn't hear every single word, interesting enough.
I think the attention recently in the context of this
hearing has been focused on the issue of global security, the
fact that we have seen a decline of global security over the
course of the last recent years, and that is something that is
going to have to be an increased focus of our attention,
generally, to improve that situation. And hopefully that is
going to happen, and we very much anticipate that, and, of
course, it is absolutely needed.
But just focusing on the situation that we are addressing
here, those two incidents that occurred, the transfer of the
nuclear fuses from Taiwan and then the airplane flying over the
country with nuclear weapons it, the transfer of the nuclear
fuses didn't show up, at least publicly, for about 18 months.
Was there an investigation going on in the course of those
18 months, or was that the situation generally, that no one
knew it for about that length of time?
General Schwartz. The latter, Congressman.
Mr. Hinchey. The latter, yes.
In the context of the investigations that had ensued on
both of these incidents, has anything else shown up, any other
problems that have popped up, maybe not as big as these two,
but any other circumstances that you are now focusing your
attention on?
General Schwartz. We have had nothing, certainly, of that
consequence, but we have identified--for example, in this
effort to sort of make sure that the inventory is right, we
have discovered ourselves that some items that should have been
on the inventory that are in stock are not, and that that
primarily is what has occurred.
This is the reconciliation of items with the inventory, and
those are the discoveries that have ensued since that time.
Going forward, we see that as positive. We are getting to
ground truth on inventory, location, numbers and so on, which
we did not have in sufficient measure before.
Mr. Hinchey. So in the context of the investigation, you
didn't see anything that was done here intentionally, or did
you; or was it mostly something that resulted from an increased
casuality in the way that these things were happening?
Mr. Donley. Inadvertence, lack of discipline, a lack of
adherence to the published technical orders, people 2
developing their own ways of doing business locally to
accommodate their work routine.
But, you know, this discussion about the two incidents is
helpful, but it also points to the broader underlying issues
that we need to address.
The main result of these investigations, and there were
many, is that we do not just have individual problems at Minot
Air Force Base and at Hill Air Force Base, we have an
institutional challenge here to reinvigorate our culture of
precision and discipline and reliability in the whole nuclear
enterprise, so that is where we have been focusing.
All the immediate corrective action, the discipline actions
on Minot, on the Taiwan fuses, those have been done. The local
corrective actions have all been taking place. That is behind
us. Now what we are after is getting back to the level of
performance across the Air Force that we need to rebuild to get
back to where we have been in the past.
Mr. Hinchey. And in the context of that, you are focusing
on the people who are involved, obviously, and the people who
do it. Most of them are in the military, but we know that some
are civilians. I think you said they were all Department of
Defense personnel?
General Schwartz. In the Air Force, that is true.
Mr. Hinchey. In the Air Force, and so they are overseeing
the proper security operations, very tight in a secure way?
General Schwartz. Of course.
Mr. Hinchey. Just one last thing I would like to mention.
This new triad, can you talk a little bit about that? What are
the circumstances surrounding?
General Schwartz. I think this, sir, this kind of relates a
little bit to what Congressman Dicks was referring to, is that
in--the sort of traditional triad was missiles, bombers, and
submarines. That was the sort of traditional, nuclear triad.
A subsequent version of that included missile defense,
properly, and included also the use of high-precision
conventional-type capabilities, which didn't exist, you know,
in the original sort of formulation.
The notion of the so-called new triad is just a recognition
that over the years, the decades, in fact, that technologies
and such have changed would suggest to us that we should be
more sophisticated about how we deter adversaries. It is not
just the traditional delivering a nuclear munition, but there
are other ways to effectively deter, too, and that we should
take advantage of those.
Mr. Hinchey. Thank you very much.
Mr. Murtha. Ms. Kilpatrick.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary, and
General. This has been very instructive here this last hour. I
feel a lot better than I did when I came in here in terms of
what you are now doing as well as how we got to this place.
Mr. Secretary, I understand you have been the Secretary
since October?
Mr. Donley. I have.
Ms. Kilpatrick. You anticipate that you will keep that job,
or is there any way to anticipate that?
Mr. Donley. I am awaiting the President's determination of
what he plans to do in terms of Secretaries. Secretary Gates
has asked that all senior officials remain in place until their
replacements are identified and in place.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you. I commend you for your service.
General Schwartz, how long have you been Chief of Staff?
General Schwartz. Since the 12th of August, ma'am.
Ms. Kilpatrick. And that would apply, Mr. Secretary, to
your positions as well?
General Schwartz. Yes, ma'am, the Chiefs of Staff service
positions are statutory four-year tours. They obviously can be
curtailed, as was the case, but that is typically a four-year
tour, ma'am.
Ms. Kilpatrick. And I appreciate your service and your
command of your responsibilities.
You were talking earlier about the three things that the
Air Force has done to get ready and to move forward. You
mentioned organizationally, unified sustainment, and I don't
know if you got interrupted or I missed it, but what is the
third leg of that?
General Schwartz. This is the headquarters representation
of having a champion who works for me and the Secretaries, not
embedded; he has direct access, or she has direct access, in
order to be the champion for the nuclear enterprise in our Air
Force. It is not filtered, it is not submerged, it has direct
access to us.
Ms. Kilpatrick. I served on the Air Force Academy Board
some years since I have been here, and the most outstanding
part of my tenure there was the young men and women you are
training, visiting Colorado and the school, and spending some
time there and watching them.
I mean, I feel better for our country because of the
academies, first of all, and then the dedication that you all
give the young men and women is something second to none.
General Schwartz. I would just say that this problem that
we had as an Air Force is not about the young Airmen. This, as
the Secretary suggested, was--this was an institutional
failure, and that is how we are approaching it.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you.
And then lastly, for me, how do we fare in the world? I
hate looking at the news anyway most of the time, but sometimes
you have got to look at it. How do we fare, our nuclear
capabilities, in terms of the world, our partners as well as
our enemies, with what is going on? How do we fit?
General Schwartz. Clearly we provide a deterrence
capability for more than just America. It supports allies and
other institutions, NATO, for example, and so on. We clearly
are a leader in this area, and it is why, when we make mistakes
like we have, that it harms the perception that others have of
our professionalism and the viability of our deterrent. That is
why this is so profoundly important. We will not goof it up
again.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Can't, can't afford to, unless--and I think
the Chairman and Mr. Rogers were talking about our--you know,
you have got to ask for what you want. We are the
Appropriations Committee. Sometimes you can't ask for it, and
some of our colleagues think we spend too much in defense. But
all of us, to a person, all 535 of us, wants to be equipped and
trained and educated and all of that.
So I appreciate what you do, and I yield back, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Murtha. I want to say I am impressed. You have all
those people with you, and you didn't have to turn to them. I
always measure the witnesses by how many times they have to
have the backup people answer questions, so I am impressed by
what you have said.
But Mr. Dicks has one additional question.
Mr. Dicks. Just so we don't get overly confident, data from
the report shows that the Air Force failed on 5 of its 22
surety tests, inspections, in 2008. It was the fourth time
since 1992 that at least five failing grades were issued, the
report said. And the most recent surety inspection failure took
place at the 90th Missile Wing at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in
Wyoming from December 2 to December 17.
The base is in charge of 150 Minuteman III missiles that
are on alert 24 hours a day. The Air Force official said the
90th was given failing grades by inspectors from Space Command
and Defense Threat Reduction Agency for not properly
documenting tests on missiles which require strict monitoring.
The two other nuclear surety inspections took place at the
341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, from
October 26 to November 10, 2008; and at the 91st Missile Wing
at Minor Air Force Base. This was earlier in the year, before
you all took over, from January 22 to January 2008. So here we
have five failures this year.
So where was our brigadier general when all of this was
happening?
General Schwartz. Congressman Dicks, these are not Santa
Claus inspections.
Here is the fundamental thing, we have deliberately, by
design, increased the intensity, the depth, the invasiveness of
our inspection process. The reason is, because what happened
earlier occurred in part because our evaluation and inspection
process did not alert commanders to problems, to symptoms that
they might well have dealt with had they been aware.
So part of the challenge, part of the reason that we failed
to perform was because our inspection processes were too
superficial.
So do I apologize for having five failures when we are
turning over every rock, when instead----
Mr. Dicks. But what about the people out there on the
bases? I mean, this is December. Haven't they gotten the
message they have got to do these things properly at this
point; there is no room for an inadequate report or not
reporting all the testing that has gone on? I mean, they should
have the word by now.
General Schwartz. No doubt about that. But we are not going
to paper it over it they haven't performed.
The reality is that, for example, in the prior inspection
regime, we used to sample paperwork. We don't do that anymore.
We do a 100 percent look at the paperwork. And in the case of
F.E. Warren we discovered that there were some discrepancies in
the paperwork. That is a major finding, because in this
business there is only one way to do it, Congressman, and that
is the Air Force way.
Mr. Murtha. Define ``failure.''
General Schwartz. There was a major finding, and this is
the situation on a nuclear surety situation.
Mr. Murtha. But from a technical standpoint are we talking
about a technical administrative mistake? What are we talking
about?
General Schwartz. These were, I would characterize, as
administrative errors. It still results in a failure of the
inspection. You know, this is a pass-fail scenario. If you have
a major finding, you fail.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Chairman, let me just give you what they say
here. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, you know, gave
them--marked them down for not properly documenting tests on
missiles which require strict monitoring.
General Schwartz. Right. But what they----
Mr. Dicks. That goes to your whole point about the
viability of these missiles.
General Schwartz. Yes, and in the case of those particular
missiles, it was not an issue of whether the maintenance had
been performed; it had, and that was confirmed. This was a
question of whether it was properly documented.
I am not saying that we should feel better about that
because this is a system issue, but what I am trying to
describe to you is that I personally am convinced that being
invasive, that turning over every single rock, is the way to
get us back up on step where you expect us to be.
Mr. Dicks. What about training? I am just going to ask him
this question. Are we going out and are we training these
people? I mean, when we are obviously seeing people fail time
and time again, it looks to me as if there is inadequate
training.
Can you tell us what you are doing? Do we have a day when
training stops, and we have focused on training these Air Force
people to do these jobs right?
General Schwartz. We certainly have done that. We have had
stand-downs. You know, the commands have been engaged on the
missile and the bomber side and in the sustainment channel as
well.
As the Secretary suggested earlier, this is not an
instantaneous fix. This will take some time, and we need your
patience. I am not suggesting----
Mr. Dicks. With nuclear weapons, I don't think we have a
lot of time. I mean, in other words, you know, I think there
ought to be a sense of urgency.
General Schwartz. There is. If we haven't communicated that
to you here today, Congressman, we flunked.
Mr. Rogers. Will the gentleman yield on that point?
Mr. Dicks. I yield.
Mr. Rogers. It was not just a simple administrative pencil
error, apparently, because the Defense Department Task Force
report issued in October warned that the Air Force was not
doing its job of securing and maintaining nuclear missile
forces. The report identified ``a serious erosion of senior-
level attention, focus, expertise, mission readiness, resources
and discipline in the nuclear weapons mission.''
General Schwartz. Guilty as charged.
Mr. Rogers. That is not a simple pencil error then. It is
not an administrative overlook.
Mr. Donley. We are all about rebuilding that discipline of
precision and reliability in the nuclear business. I hope we
have conveyed that 110 percent this morning. It is not about
Taiwan and Minot. Those are symptoms, symptoms of deeper
institutional problems that will take time to address.
We are working the local issues, each one as they come up.
The results of these inspections are reported to the Secretary
of Defense. We evaluate on these inspections whether or not the
officers or NCOs in charge need to be relieved, and there
continues to be disciplinary action in these as they go along,
depending on the situation. So we are deadly serious about how
we are approaching this and tightening down.
Mr. Dicks. You know, Admiral Rickover used to come out to
the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in Bremerton, Washington, where
we do overhauls on nuclear-powered ships and submarines. He
would come out and meet with the people who were burning the
nuclear part of the shipyard and to make certain and insist
that they were doing things safely.
Now, they are not perfect. They have had their problems,
too, over a long period of time, but the record of the nuclear
Navy is pretty amazing considering everything. That is the
level of attention that was given to the issue by the Navy, and
I think that is a good example.
General Schwartz. And still is, and it is the gold
standard, and we are doing our best to replicate it.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Frelinghuysen, do you have any other
questions?
Mr. Frelinghuysen. No, I don't, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. The committee is adjourned until this
afternoon--Mr. Visclosky.
Mr. Visclosky. Just a couple of quick comments and one
question on the B-61 again. One, I would agree with my
colleagues' interchange earlier, which probably we are all
wrong, but I would add nonkinetic, and I would add
nonproliferation as far as the strategy.
The second thing is--and I know there was already a
question asked about the possible transfer in jurisdiction of
the NNSA, and I know that question has been asked--but I am
opposed to losing that civilian control for the very reason the
Secretary is sitting here.
Third, and I appreciate your seriousness about these issues
and your urgency, and I do share that. What I am trying to
imbue the Department of Energy with is that same sense of
urgency, because 2 years ago, when we were talking about
another system--and I don't want to beat a dead horse, we were
talking about 2014--but the reorganization of the Department
was going to be in 2030, which means it would never happen, and
that is a DOE issue, not your issue.
The question I would just ask, very briefly, what is the
role of the Stockpile Stewardship Program and the facilities
involved in that as you do look at the modification for the B-
61?
General Schwartz. Sir, that is a major function within the
Department. The Nuclear Weapons Council, which is cochaired
both by the civilian leadership in OSD and the Vice Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs, deals with that specific matter, the
stockpile, its composition and its status.
I think, at least by my observation, that gets, you know,
considerable attention. You are aware that the Vice Chairman is
the former STRATCOM Commander, so he is clearly well-schooled
in these areas.
Mr. Visclosky. I appreciate what you do, too, and thank the
Chair for its indulgence.
Mr. Murtha. We are adjourned until 1:30.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the
answers thereto follow:]

Nuclear Security Incidents

Question. As a result of nuclear security incidents and the
subsequent lack of responsiveness from the Air Force, the Secretary of
Defense asked for the resignations from the Secretary of the Air Force,
Mike Wynne, and the Air Force Chief of Staff, Michael Mosley. After
taking their new positions, Secretary Donley and General Schwartz
disciplined six general officers and nine colonels for their roles in
various incidents.
Secretary Donley, given the nature and severity of the nuclear
incidents over the past couple of years, are you satisfied with the
accountability actions (concerning the disciplinary actions) taken
within the Air Force?
Answer. Yes, we are satisfied with the actions taken and we will
continue to hold leaders at all levels accountable. To successfully
reinvigorate the nuclear enterprise, leaders at every level must accept
responsibility and demand that subordinates, peers, and superiors
strive for excellence and precision.
Question. Secretary Donley, what changes has the Air Force made to
inventory control of nuclear components following the Taiwan incident?
Answer. The nuclear components involved in the Taiwan incident
belong to a class of materiel called nuclear weapons-related materiel
or NWRM. Following the Taiwan incident, the Air Force took immediate
action to gain positive inventory control of its NWRM, including
emphasizing and clarifying existing policy and procedures; conducting a
worldwide inventory of all nuclear weapons, nuclear components, and
nuclear weapons related materiel and increasing the awareness and
training of NWRM special handling procedures. The Air Force is now
transferring all NWRM from the Defense Logistics Agency to Air Force
controlled facilities. As part of that process, we are capturing the
serial numbers of all NWRM assets, marking the assets with a
corresponding tag or bar code and updating our legacy information
technology inventory systems to automatically track the assets by
serial number throughout the supply chain. Twice a year, the Air Force
will conduct a world-wide inventory of NWRM to confirm the condition
and location of the assets. We are also updating and consolidating our
nuclear logistics policy, developing an assessment program to verify
compliance with logistics policy and procedures and increasing the
expertise of our personnel in the nuclear logistics enterprise.
Question. General Schwartz, what changes has the Air Force made to
the handling and transporting of nuclear weapons following the Minot
incident?
Answer. Within 60 days of the incident, the Air Force and Air
Combat Command developed a formal process for coordinating, publishing
and changing maintenance schedules. Additionally, Air Combat Command
updated weapons loading technical orders and checklists mandating
payload verification, and we published a revision to Air Force nuclear
weapons maintenance procedures. This revision mandated specific
procedures to record, coordinate, track and brief deviations to
approved maintenance schedules. It further mandated maintenance teams
validate contents of each storage structure with munitions control.
This guidance prohibits co-mingling of nuclear and non-nuclear
munitions within same storage structure, cell or weapons storage vault
and we have mandated procedures to stanchion/cone, rope and placard all
non-operational weapons and non-nuclear munitions. Formal custody
transfer (signature) process for intra-area, logistics and operational
weapons movements has been implemented as well.
Question. General Schwartz, how is the Air Force re-instilling the
confidence of the American people that their nuclear arsenal is in safe
hands?
Answer. The Air Force has taken several significant steps to
reinvigorate the Air Force nuclear enterprise as we move forward
towards fully regaining the confidence of the American people in our
ability to safeguard our nuclear arsenal. We are creating a new major
command, Air Force Global Strike Command, which will place all nuclear
capable bombers and ICBMs under a single command. We are also
consolidating all weapons sustainment functions under the Air Force
Nuclear Weapons Center. Finally, we established the Assistant Chief of
Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration Directorate (AF/
A10). This change provides a single directorate that is focused day-to-
day on the nuclear mission and is responsible for the integration of
all nuclear related policy and issues across the Air Staff and major
commands. All three efforts increase the level of advocacy and repair
the fragmented lines of authority within the Air Force nuclear
enterprise. In addition, a comprehensive Air Force nuclear enterprise
roadmap has been developed that contains detailed action plans which
will restore the Air Force's world-class nuclear culture. This roadmap
provides the framework to maintain an effective, credible nuclear force
by strengthening our nuclear-related policies, inspections and
training. The roadmap also lays out the framework for increased rigor
and standardization within our nuclear inspection process and will lead
to increased precision and reliability throughout the nuclear
enterprise. Further, the roadmap provides a direct reporting link of
nuclear enterprise-level performance metrics that are reported to the
Secretary of the Air Force and me as co-chair of the Nuclear Oversight
Board: this board is comprised of the top general officers in the Air
Force nuclear enterprise and will ensure sustained institutional focus
for this critical mission area.

Training Our Nuclear Forces

Question. Secretary Donley, the Department of the Air Force is
responsible by statute to train our nuclear forces to ensure effective
nuclear deterrence and flawless nuclear security. The Air Force Blue
Ribbon Review of Nuclear Weapons Policies and Procedures Report, issued
in February 2008, observed the base of USAF personnel with nuclear
experience is diminishing, nuclear units are finding it difficult to
attract and train personnel with nuclear experience, and there is no
standardized system to track personnel with nuclear experience, with
the exception of the space and missile operations field. Further, the
team observed that the Air Force needs a surety program that develops
and supports a less experienced nuclear force and makes the nuclear
business the core business of those engaged in it.
In your view, what caused the reduction in the number of Air Force
personnel with nuclear experience?
Answer. The end of the Cold War necessitated changes in our
National Security Strategy which drove a restructuring of Air Force
priorities. Precision weapons became the weapons of choice both
militarily and politically. Efforts to minimize collateral damage began
to shift the focus of air power. With the changes in priorities,
resources diminished, the nuclear weapon inventory downsized, and
engagements in conventional conflicts increased. The Air Force
reorganization of 1992 and subsequent BRAC closures resulted in a
fragmented nuclear sustainment system, atrophy in the pool of nuclear
experienced Airmen, and an erosion in nuclear expertise as less time
and personnel were allocated to maintain nuclear systems proficiency.
The Global War on Terror and Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI
FREEDOM further shifted focus and institutional priorities away from
the nuclear mission.
In his report on Department of Defense Nuclear Management, Dr.
Schlesinger noted the post-Cold War environment, the implementation of
arms control treaties, attenuation of the nuclear alert posture, and
the priority assigned to the conventional and space missions led the
Air Force to give markedly less attention and fewer resources to the
nuclear enterprise. The result was five broad, accelerating trends: 1.
Nuclear missions became embedded in organizations whose primary focus
is not nuclear; 2. Overwhelming emphasis was given to conventional
operations; 3. The grade levels of personnel in line and staff
appointments whose daily business involved nuclear weapons were
lowered; 4. The nuclear mission and those who performed it were
generally devalued; and 5. There was no single command to advocate for
the resources required to support nuclear capabilities. Collectively
this meant that no one command in the Air Force had ``ownership'' of
the nuclear mission. These trends led to the state of the Air Force
that you described in your question.
Question. What action will you take to (1) identify the number of
personnel needed in the nuclear career field and (2) attract and retain
personnel with nuclear experience?
Answer. The Air Force has reviewed its nuclear personnel
requirements and added nuclear enterprise positions to its overall
endstrength. The Air Force has established a key nuclear billet list
which articulates the key positions in the nuclear enterprise and the
experience requirements needed to fill these positions.
The Air Force has strategic force management practices to ensure
the health of all Air Force career fields. The force management
practices rely on a sustainment methodology which ensures we annually
assess enough personnel into each career field to meet their
requirements and to account for the retention of each career field.
Additionally, the Air Force recently chartered the Nuclear
Enterprise Advisory Panel. This panel is focused on providing oversight
of the management and development of our officer, enlisted, and
civilian nuclear work force and will regularly review the health of the
career fields that support the nuclear enterprise.
At this time, we do not envision a bonus program to target the
accession or retention of strictly nuclear specialties but continually
evaluate bonus needs. The Air Force currently pays special and
incentive pays to some career fields in the nuclear enterprise as a
part of a larger force management practice not related to nuclear
issues. Aviator continuation incentive pay is paid to bomber pilots and
combat systems operators as part of an aviation incentive program.
Selected reenlistment bonuses are provided to enlisted career fields to
encourage retention. Enlisted career fields supporting the nuclear
enterprise are eligible for these bonuses as part of a larger force
management strategy. We continue to advocate for the special and
incentive pay programs currently in place and will make on-going
modifications to meet the Air Force's strategic force management
objectives.
Question. How long will it take to attract and retain a sufficient
number of personnel in the nuclear field?
Answer. The Air Force has reviewed its nuclear personnel
requirements and added nuclear enterprise positions to its overall
endstrength. The Air Force has just started evaluating the time needed
to retain a sufficient number of personnel and the force management
impacts of these additions. For now, the only career field supporting
the nuclear enterprise which is projected to have shortages are bomber
pilots and combat systems operators.
Question. What will it cost to implement programs to attract and
retain needed personnel? Where will the resources come from to cover
those costs?
Answer. At this time, we do not envision a bonus program to target
the accession or retention of strictly nuclear specialties but
continually evaluate bonus needs. The Air Force currently pays special
and incentive pays to some career fields in the nuclear enterprise as a
part of a larger force management practice not related to nuclear
issues. Aviator continuation incentive pay is paid to bomber pilots and
combat systems operators as part of an aviation incentive program.
Selected reenlistment bonuses are provided to enlisted career fields to
encourage retention. Enlisted career fields supporting the nuclear
enterprise are eligible for these bonuses as part of a larger force
management strategy. We continue to advocate for the special and
incentive pay programs currently in place and will make on-going
modifications to meet the Air Force's strategic force management
objectives.

Reliable Replacement Warhead

Question. The Reliable Replacement Warhead was originally
envisioned to ensure the aging nuclear stockpile could meet its long
term mission by improving the long term reliability, longevity, and
certification of the existing weapons and associated components.
However, the design effort led by Department of Energy has seemingly
led to the development of a whole new program. Last year the Committee
markup removed all funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program
which was consistent with the Energy and Water Subcommittee markup
which removed all Reliable Replacement Warhead funding from the
Department of Energy for weapons development.
General Schwartz, in light of the fact that there was no funding
appropriated to the Department for the Reliable Replacement Warhead, is
it the Department's intent to support further development of a new
nuclear weapon?
Answer. Capabilities of the existing weapons stockpile meet the
nuclear deterrence requirements of the nuclear combatant commanders.
The Air Force requires refurbished or replacement weapons to maintain
existing stockpile capabilities and to enhance weapon safety and
security.
Question. General Schwartz, has the Department of Defense defined
its nuclear stockpile needs?
Answer. The Department of Defense defines nuclear weapons stockpile
requirements annually in the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum to
the President. The plan for Fiscal Year 2009 was delivered to the
President on October 16, 2008 and approved on January 16, 2009. These
requirements will be reviewed in detail this year during the Nuclear
Posture Review that will begin shortly.
Question. General Schwartz, will the fiscal year 2010 budget
submission include any legislative proposals that would authorize
development of a new nuclear weapon?
Answer. The Fiscal Year 2010 budget submission is still in
formulation at this time, but we do not anticipate the submission will
include any legislative proposals that would authorize development of a
new nuclear weapon.
Question. General Schwartz, has the Department of Defense begun
working with the Department of Energy to develop a nuclear weapons
strategy for the 21st century as directed by the Appropriations
Committee in the prior year's legislation?
Answer. The Department of Defense and the Department of Energy
issued a joint white paper on nuclear strategy in 2008. The two
departments are conducting joint studies and analyses under the
auspices of the Nuclear Weapons Council that will support the Nuclear
Posture Review to begin shortly.

Nuclear Capable Aircraft

Question. The current Air Force inventory for nuclear aircraft
includes bombers and dual-capable fighters. Each of these platforms
that are capable of delivering nuclear weapons is aging and
recapitalization plans are unclear. As an example, the average age of
the B-52 is over 46 years old.
What are the Air Force's future plans with regard to these
aircraft?
Nuclear capable bombers (B-52, B-2)?
Dual-capable aircraft (F-16, F-15E)?
Dr. Schlesinger's report emphasized the NATO alliance
dependency on extended deterrence as provided by European and U.S.
dual-capable aircraft. Does the Air Force intend to make the Joint
Strike Fighter nuclear capable?
Answer. The Air Force is following the 2006 Quadrennial Defense
Review plan to update the nuclear capable bomber fleet in three phases.
Phase one will modernize the current bomber fleet of B-2s and B-52s to
improve sustainability and maintain combat relevance. The second phase
will field the Next Generation Bomber which will complement a
modernized legacy bomber force. The third phase will evaluate cutting
edge technologies for follow-on systems in the 2030 plus timeframe.
The dual-capable F-16 and F-15E aircraft will remain mission
capable beyond 2020 and will be gradually replaced by the nuclear
capable Joint Strike Fighter. We plan to fund the Joint Strike Fighter
Dual-Capable Aircraft modification in the Fiscal Year 2012 Program
Objective Memorandum.

Next Generation Bomber

Question. Mr. Secretary, you are investing a significant amount of
time, attention and money in a next generation bomber program to
recapitalize the Air Force's aging fleet of bombers, yet the Secretary
of Defense has noted the defense budget may not be able to sustain all
efforts.
In light of Secretary Gates' recent comments to the Senate Armed
Services Committee in January, what is your recapitalization strategy
for the next generation of bombers?
Answer. The Air Force is continuing to pursue its three phased
strategy for maintaining the Long Range Strike (LRS) capabilities
needed to support the national defense strategy and combatant
commanders' operational plans. Phase one will modernize the current
bomber fleet to improve sustainability and maintain combat relevance.
The second phase will field the Next Generation Bomber which will
complement a modernized legacy bomber force. The third phase will
evaluate cutting edge technologies for LRS inclusion in the 2035 plus
timeframe. However, as Secretary Gates has stated, the Department of
Defense will complete the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) over the
next few months with the purpose of identifying Department of Defense
and Service actions necessary to field the capabilities and force
required to realize our national security goals and objectives. The Air
Force's LRS recapitalization strategy, which will sustain and modernize
the bomber force, will be one of the many areas reviewed during the QDR
process.
Question. If not the Next Generation Bomber, how with the Air Force
sustain our bomber fleet in the future?
Answer. There are three phases to the Air Force's Long Range Strike
(LRS) strategy. Phase one will modernize the current bomber fleet to
improve sustainability and maintain combat relevance. The second phase
will field the Next Generation Bomber which will complement a
modernized legacy bomber force. The third phase will evaluate cutting
edge technologies for LRS inclusion in the 2035 timeframe. Under Phase
1 of LRS, the Air Force is investing over five billion dollars in
current bomber modifications over the Future Years Defense Program,
focusing on requirements needed to sustain and maintain an
operationally relevant force structure. Sustainment programs focus on
systems like avionics and radars to mitigate safety-of-flight issues.
Current modernization programs include advanced weapon and targeting
pod integration to improve lethality; satellite communications and data
links to increase responsiveness; and, defensive systems and stealth
materials to enhance survivability.

Resources to Reinvigorate the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise

Question. Under the leadership and culture recommendations of his
report, specifically recommendation number seven, Dr. Schlesinger
proposed that the Secretary of the Air Force should provide the
resources necessary for the initiatives required to upgrade and
revitalize the nuclear mission.
Mr. Secretary, Dr. Schlesinger's panel asserted the Air Force
underinvested in the nuclear mission. Do you agree? If so, what steps
have you taken to change these conditions?
Answer. Yes. Over the past two decades, an increased focus on
conventional operations due to continual air combat operations put the
nuclear mission at a competitive disadvantage with other Air Force
priorities, resulting in underinvestment in the nuclear deterrence
mission. We are continuing to review nuclear enterprise requirements
and match them against combatant commander requirements and
recommendations made in the various reports, including Dr.
Schlesinger's.
Question. Mr. Secretary, how do you define the Air Force's budget
for the nuclear enterprise? How has it changed since these incidents?
Do you feel training is adequately resourced to provide a force capable
of following through on the action items of your nuclear enterprise
roadmap?
Answer. For our Fiscal Year 2010 President's Budget preparation,
the Air Force looked at all aspects of the nuclear enterprise. Funding
for the Air Force's nuclear enterprise is defined as the Research,
Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E); Procurement; Personnel;
and Operations & Maintenance (O&M) funding that covers all aspects
regarding the development, operations, supporting infrastructure, and
sustainment of nuclear forces. This includes activities from Science
and Technology (S&T)--through development, fielding, and operations--to
retirement; for the equipment and personnel supporting Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), nuclear capable bombers (B-52s and B-2s),
and the Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA) fighters that are in U.S. Air
Forces in Europe (USAFE). The Air Force Nuclear Enterprise Roadmap
recommendations and action plans were used as a guide to focus
resources on those areas needing the most attention.
To define the nuclear enterprise budget, the Air Force evaluated
requirements for our nuclear capable bomber force (B-52 and B-2);
Minuteman III ICBM (including sustainment activities); nuclear security
for continental U.S. bases and European locations; and electromagnetic
pulse hardening requirements at certain Ballistic Missile Early Warning
System sites. The Air Force also reviewed numerous smaller requirements
to address recommendations and issues. All have been thoroughly
reviewed for inclusion in the Fiscal Year 2010 Air Force Budget
request. The Air Force believes this represents a critical step toward
reinvigorating the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise.
In addition, the Air Force requested nearly $170 million in Fiscal
Year 2009 research, development, test and evaluation, and procurement
funds be reprogrammed through Congressional action and we reallocated
resources to execute over $144 million in Fiscal Year 2009 operations
and maintenance funds to address immediate needs.
Training has been adequately resourced to address the Nuclear
Roadmap action items and recommendations. During requirements
validation, we included funding for any recommended additional and/or
complementary training. For example, in Fiscal Year 2009, included
within the $144 million of reprogrammed operations and maintenance
funds, $12 million will provide realistic weapons trainers for our
munitions Airmen, cruise missile trainers for increased technical
training, and tools for providing realistic training on tracking and
inventory systems. Of the $12 million, nearly $5 million will be
dedicated to help further nuclear career path development, develop
refresher courses and curriculum for nuclear specific and related
career fields.
Question. General Schwartz, in your internal Blue Ribbon Review
completed in February 2008, your team identified $100 million in
unfunded requirements. Do you feel this list of unfunded requirements
in all-inclusive? If not, what requirements are the most urgently
needed?
Answer. Reinvigorating the nuclear enterprise is the Air Force's
number one priority and we will ensure the proper resources are
provided to upgrade and revitalize the nuclear mission. We have
carefully examined all Blue Ribbon Review recommendations as well as
those of the Schlesinger Panel Review for funding requirements. These
are all being considered for funding in the Fiscal Year 2010
President's Budget submission.
We are confident the most pressing nuclear enterprise needs are
addressed. These include: Requested reprogramming authority for $39.7
million in Research & Development funds to establish positive inventory
control of our Nuclear Weapons Related Material and committed an
additional $500 million in Fiscal Year 2008-2009 for security,
training, sustainment and logistics requirements. In addition, the Air
Force is recommending even greater increases in the out-years which
will be identified in the Fiscal Year 2010 President's Budget
submission.

Sustaining the Nuclear Stockpile

Question. According to the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary
of Defense for Nuclear Matters' website, the U.S. produced its last
nuclear weapon in 1991 and performed its last Underground Nuclear Test
in 1992. The Presidential decision to stop testing and to terminate
weapons production resulted in a paradigm shift that required
significant adjustments in the U.S. approach to nuclear weapons
stockpile management.
Secretary Donley, with the U.S. producing its last nuclear weapon
in 1991, what is your assessment of the nuclear industrial base?
Answer. In regards to the weapon industrial base, the Air Force
looks to Department of Energy (DOE) as the lead agency. The National
Nuclear Security Administration under DOE is focused on research,
development efforts and long-term viability, while seeking to identify,
develop, and deliver new or enhanced processes, and technologies.
Air Force industrial base concerns are focused on delivery
platforms. Specifically, the Air Force supports the industrial base
activities to sustain Minuteman III while developing next-generation
strategic missile technologies to address future requirements.

Strategic Deterrence

Question. The latest National Security Strategy (2006) indicated,
``Safe, credible, and reliable nuclear forces continue to play a
critical role. We are strengthening deterrence by developing a New
Triad composed of offensive strike systems (both nuclear and improved
conventional capabilities); active and passive defenses, including
missile defenses; and a responsive infrastructure, all bound together
by enhanced command and control, planning and intelligence systems.
These capabilities will better deter some of the new threats we face,
while also bolstering our security commitments to allies. Such security
commitments have played a crucial role in convincing some countries to
forgo their own nuclear weapons programs, thereby aiding our
nonproliferation objectives.''
Secretary Donley, Please describe the strategic deterrence provided
by ICBMs, Nuclear-capable bombers, and dual-capable aircraft?
Answer. Our nuclear-capable ICBMs and aircraft (B-2s, B-52s, F-15Es
and F-16s), provide unique, yet complimentary, capabilities to our
nuclear deterrence mission.
Operationally deployed Continental United States (CONUS) based
ICBMs provide the President with a highly accurate, reliable, and ready
response capability with near-global range. The offensive and defensive
deterrence value of the ICBM force located in hardened facilities
spread over thousands of miles is a stabilizing force. Our fielded ICBM
forces are survivable in almost any attack scenario we can postulate.
It would take a large scale attack of unmistakable intent and origin to
defeat them. Operationally deployed ICBMs, while responsive, are under
positive control and can only be employed with approval of the
President.
Nuclear-capable CONUS-based bombers and Overseas CONUS-based
fighters provide visible deterrence and escalation control. This
flexible capability is deployable and recallable, and maintains a human
in the loop until the last possible moment. Furthermore, our nuclear-
capable fighters serve a vital role in our extended deterrence
commitment to our NATO partners.
Question. General Schwartz, do you believe the U.S. nuclear arsenal
enhances our nonproliferation efforts?
Answer. A safe, secure and reliable nuclear arsenal is critical to
providing a credible nuclear deterrence. This credible nuclear
deterrence is not only critical to our security, but to the security of
our allies and partners, thereby enhancing our non-proliferation
efforts. If our extended deterrence capability begins to falter, some
non-nuclear allies may perceive a need to develop their own nuclear
capability.
Question. General Schwartz, is ``hair trigger alert'' an accurate
way to depict our ICBM nuclear forces?
Answer. No. ``Hair trigger alert'' is not an accurate way to depict
our ICBM nuclear forces. A better way to depict the force is utilizing
a term that General Chilton stated during a February 27, 2009 media
engagement and that is that our ICBM force is analogous to a ``weapon
in a holster with two combination locks on it, requiring two people to
open the locks. They can't do it without authenticated orders from the
President of the United States.'' All U.S. nuclear forces maintain
rigorous discipline and operate under very strict and demanding nuclear
surety and command and control principles to insure that all weapons
remain safe, secure and reliable. In addition, ICBMs provide stability
in crisis by presenting any adversary a complex targeting solution
while providing the President survivable and flexible response options.
It is through this confidence that we plan and posture ICBM forces that
provide the President with the maximum decision time and flexibility.

WC-135 Aircraft

Question. The number of unstable countries with nuclear weapons
capabilities is likely to grow in the coming years, specifically when
considering what is happening in Iran, Pakistan, India, and North
Korea. The U.S. Air Force has two WC-135 aircraft that are used to
perform atmospheric sampling to collect vital intelligence following a
nuclear detonation. Approaching fifty years of age, these two WC-135s
are the oldest -135 airframes currently operated by the Air Force. The
age of these aircraft has a tremendous impact on their ability to
deploy quickly to hot-spots around the world. I understand that the Air
Force is considering spending tens of millions of dollars to re-engine
these nearly 50-year-old airplanes.
Have you looked at the possibility of utilizing a new aircraft like
the C-40A for the mission?
Answer. Yes. In 2006 the Air Force initiated a Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) funded study to analyze
alternatives to the WC-135. The study completed a functional area
analysis, functional needs analysis and functional solutions analysis.
The C-40 was one of the options. However, from January 2008 to January
2009 the WC-135 enjoyed a mission capable rate of 76.2 percent which
includes all maintenance and operations reporting, and we applied
resources to more pressing Air Force needs. Importantly, the aircraft
has flown every collection mission tasked. In 2009, Congress approved a
funding request for WC-135 cockpit upgrades. These upgrades will allow
the aircraft to continue to accomplish its mission viably beyond the
2025 timeframe.
Question. The Air Force currently operated a fleet of 737s under
the C-40 designation, and could realize two major benefits of going to
the 737--greatly increased reliability (and therefore greater ability
to deploy where necessary) and greatly reduced maintenance and
operation costs. Would it not make more sense to take the current
sensing equipment and install it on new C-40 airframes as opposed to
continuing to maintain and operate 50-year-old airframes that are not
adequately accomplishing their mission?
Answer. Although the WC-135 is one of our older aircraft, the Air
Force is mitigating risk with cockpit upgrades, keeping the platform
viable beyond 2025. In addition, the WC-135 has accomplished all
collection missions tasked and has an overall mission capable rate of
76.2 percent over the last year.
Question. Given our current expanding nuclear threat (Iran, North
Korea, unstable Pakistan), our nuclear sampling capability appears to
be more critical than ever, yet it remains on nearly 50-year-old
airframes. I understand that the current planes used for this mission
have extremely poor mission readiness and propulsion issues. What is
the Air Force's plan to ensure we have the capability to gather this
critical intelligence in the future?
Answer. The Air Force has looked at options to replace or upgrade
the WC-135, however, from January 2008 to January 2009, the WC-135
enjoyed a mission capable rate of 76.2 percent which includes
maintenance and operations reporting. Additionally, the aircraft has
flown every collection mission tasked.
In 2006, we conducted a functional area analysis, functional needs
analysis and functional solutions analysis which also explored the
option of WC-135 cockpit avionics upgrades. Given its mission capable
rate (76.2 percent) and the fact that it has met every collection
mission tasking, the cockpit upgrades were chosen as the best solution.
In 2009, Congress approved an Air Force/Deputy Undersecretary for
Defense (Intelligence) funding request for WC-135 cockpit avionics
upgrade. These upgrades permit the aircraft to use faster and more
economical flight paths appropriate for rapid deployment worldwide,
satisfying the air sampling mission. When coupled with continued
support for the jet engines and other maintenance, these upgrades
should allow for WC-135 operation beyond 2025.
At this time the Air Force does not seek to replace the WC-135 as
regards its current missions but does anticipate potential requirements
increase associated with national technical nuclear forensics. When the
national technical nuclear forensics requirements now in development
become available, Air Force will examine the need for possible
adjustments of the air sampling platforms.
Question. We understand that the State Department has stated that
this is a high priority mission for treaty verification and compliance.
Does the Air Force share this view?
Answer. The Air Force views this mission as a high priority and
will continue executing this mission as tasked by our national
authorities.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.]
Wednesday, February 11, 2009.

CONTRACT SERVICES AND ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT

WITNESSES

GENE L. DODARO, ACTING COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
KATHERINE V. SCHINASI, MANAGING DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND SOURCING
MANAGEMENT
MICHAEL SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT
CAROLE COFFEY, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT
TEAM

Introduction

Mr. Murtha. Welcome, Mr. Dodaro.
When Mr. Walker came before the Committee, I said to him,
when I was in Iraq, these contractors were falling all over
themselves. How many contractors do we have? He could not
answer that question. He did not know, he says, and I cannot
get the answer. I need you to help me get the answer.
Well, it turns out, Ann reminds me that we put fencing
language in and said, until you tell us how many contractors
you have, you are not going to get any money. So we got the
information. But when I look at the numbers, that we have
267,000 DOD contractors in CENTCOM; we have we think 190,000 in
Iraq; and the figures we have, the determination we have is if
we save--or if we hire them in-house, we save $44,000 per
person.
Now, last year, the Committee cut 5 percent out of the
contracting, $4.5 billion. We added a billion dollars so that
they could hire people. Because they would veto the bill, we
had to drop those provisions. And we were not able to implement
that cut. We did put a $650 million cut in the budget. But when
I look at the number of contractors and the cost overruns that
we have had over and over and over again, I think we have to do
something about contracting out. And I would ask you to look at
a couple things. One is to describe what a contractor is,
describe what their mission is, and so forth. Give us as much
information as you can. And then make recommendations to us how
we can get this under control. I think fencing the money may be
the only way. But certainly we have got to do something about
it. If it costs $44,000 per contractor more than it costs for a
person in-house, then it seems to me the direction to go is to
get rid of as many contractors as we can and hire as many
people as we can in-house. But I know the trend has been going
the other way. But this is just atrocious in my estimation, and
we need help trying to get it under control.
Mr. Frelinghuysen.

Remarks of Mr. Frelinghuysen

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am
substituting for Congressman Bill Young, who sends his best and
may be with us a little later in the afternoon.
I certainly would like to welcome you and the team behind
you here this afternoon for what is the first in a series of
three contracting hearings this year. I only point this out to
illustrate how important this issue is, as the Chairman said,
this issue is to all of us.
For years the contracting acquisition workforce was taken
for granted. They were on the receiving end of numerous
downsizing and outsourcing actions that left them barely
capable of handling today's global challenges. The acquisition
workforce now is a fraction of what it once was, yet their
responsibilities have grown exponentially.
It appears now, however, that we have arrived full circle
and must deal with the ramifications of this neglected
workforce. The Department has started to address this, but much
work remains to be done. In those regards, your testimony today
is very important.
I welcome you and look forward to your comments.
You know that Mr. Walker has gone onto greener pastures, I
might say much greener pastures, and you are left to, shall we
say, provide the Committee with the information that we tried
to secure during his period directing the GAO. So we look
forward to your testimony.
Mr. Murtha. Look forward to your recommendations.
Mr. Dodaro.

Summary Statement of Mr. Dodaro

Mr. Dodaro. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Congressman
Frelinghuysen.
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss
GAO's work as it relates to contracting at the Department of
Defense as it relates to weapons systems acquisition and
service contracting as well. We have had a number of concerns
and pointed out a number of challenges in both of these areas.
First, in the acquisition of weapons systems, as you
pointed out, Mr. Chairman, there has been considerable cost
growth in this area. When we last did a comprehensive
assessment of 95 weapons systems that were in the DOD portfolio
in 2007, we noted that there had been cost growth from the
initial estimates of close to $300 billion. In 44 percent of
those 95 programs, the cost growth had been over 25 percent
from the initial estimates. In addition to that, the average
schedule delay for bringing new weapons systems on line had
been up to 21 months, which was up 5 months over 16 months
previously in 2000 before that. So the cost growth is going up,
the schedule delays are there as well. And this has been a
problem.
We pointed out it is a problem at two levels. First is a
strategic level, which is where the Department is not making
clear priority choices across the Department on which weapons
systems to deploy. Still largely a process driven by the
services, and that needs to change going forward if you are
going to get that part of it under control. Then, at the
individual program level, we have noted that there is not
always a good business case for moving forward with the weapons
systems, from research and development into deployment. That
technologies are not always matured before they move forward
with decisions. And best practices are not employed. And we
think there needs to be more discipline at that process as
well. And we made recommendations on both of these fronts to
the Department.
Now, we were pleased in December 2008; DOD adopted some
changes in their guidance in these areas and put in place some
best practices, which we encouraged. I have also been
encouraged by the Secretary's recognition recently that this is
a big institutional challenge for them in terms of their
acquisition of weapons systems. But, ultimately, the policies
are not enough if they are not implemented very effectively.
And that is one area where we have consistently seen DOD have
some difficulties. So implementation of these new policies is
really paramount to bringing about change to bring costs down
and bring systems in on time.
Now, on the service contracting area, you have additional
concerns there. The amount of money for contracting, as you
point out, has doubled in real terms over the last 6 years to
$200 billion a year just in service contracting alone. We have
pointed out that the Department has used some risky contracting
vehicles, time and materials contracts, undefinitized
contracts, and they have not managed those very effectively.
Also there has not been enough training provided to
contracting personnel throughout the acquisition workforce. And
they really do not have enough people to be able to adequately
oversee the contractors. While the size of the contracting
budget has doubled during the last 6 years, the acquisition
workforce, contracting workforce rather, has only increased by
1 percent. So there really has to be better management and
control----
Mr. Murtha. Say that again.
Mr. Dodaro. It is in our statement, Mr. Chairman.
The contracting budget has doubled over the last 6 years, I
believe. But the acquisition or do the contracting workforce,
the acquisition workforce has only grown by 1 percent during
that period of time.
Mr. Murtha. Do you define that contracting workforce as
contractors or you define it as people working for the Defense
Department as government employees? Which one?
Mr. Dodaro. The latter. These are people that are working
for the Department and are responsible for overseeing the
contractors. You know, basically what I am saying is they are
using more contractors, money is going up, but the amount of
DOD people managing the contractors has stayed roughly about
the same.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Chairman, would you yield just on this point
for a second? What about--I mean, there was a period where we
cut back the acquisition force. Is not that correct?
Mr. Dodaro. That is correct. That was during the 1990s,
following the Cold War, end of the Cold War.
Mr. Dicks. I remember hearing a former chairman of the
Armed Services Committee saying these are shoppers; they are
not important. He demeaned and cut the budget for them. Now how
much was it cut?
Mr. Dodaro. Let me just----
Mr. Dicks. From say the middle of the 1990s forward.
Mr. Dodaro. I can provide that.
Mr. Dicks. Any idea?
Mr. Dodaro. How much was the acquisition workforce cut
during the 1990s? My staff tells me it was about in half during
that period of time.
Mr. Dicks. So it has been cut by 50 percent. Now we wonder
why we have a problem.
Mr. Dodaro. Right.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Dodaro. This is a key point that you are bringing out.
We bring it out in our report as well. And it is really very
important because regardless of how much you reduce the numbers
of contractors, you are still going to be relying on them to
some level. But the real key is to make sure you effectively
manage the contractors so we bring things in on time, within
cost, and we have the right outcome as it is received.
Now with regard to our recommendations on the service
contracting, DOD put some additional controls in place to
provide some additional training and established a focal point.
So they have reacted to some of our recommendations and put in
place some recent changes. But, again here, implementation of
the new policies is going to be very important.
Now, one of our main recommendations here, and just sort of
in closing, and I am happy to answer any questions you have,
there are really three things that we are recommending at this
point, particularly in light of DOD's recent adoption of our
recommendations: Number one, DOD has to translate these new
policies into practice. Implementation is paramount. Number two
is that there has to be follow-through to make sure that the
new policies are implemented and people are held accountable in
the Department for implementing these new policies and really
making sure that they happen. Then three, and this goes to the
heart of your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, we have
recommended that the Department do a comprehensive assessment
as to what should be done by contractors and what should be
done by employees. This is really a strategic decision that
needs to be made by the Department. What we have pointed out,
and they have recognized, is that we are where we are right now
at the Department of Defense because of the collection of
thousands of individual decisions that have been made to
contract out, but it has not occurred within a framework of a
strategic vision on where to take the Department over time and
then how to build in the necessary controls and the skills to
oversee that contractor workforce. And we think that is a very
important recommendation. I think it goes to the heart of your
concerns that whatever is done in terms of the balance between
the Federal employees and the contractors produces good
results. And right now, the current process does not do that.
[The statement of Mr. Dodaro follows:]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.001

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.002

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.003

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.004

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.005

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.006

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.007

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.008

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.009

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.010

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.011

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.012

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.013

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.014

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.015

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.016

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.017

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.018

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.019

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.020

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.021

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.022

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.023

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.024

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.025

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.026

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.027

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.028

REPORT ON CONTRACTORS

Mr. Murtha. Well, one of the worst examples I heard last
year was the budget for the Comptroller of the Defense
Department wanted to hire contractors to send a budget over to
us. You know, we stopped that. But the point was everybody was
looking for contractors. And part of this happened because the
Armed Services Committee cut the acquisition force so
substantially, and so they had to hire contractors who were not
as responsive.
But say again, it comes down to accountability and how do
we, for instance, how do we get the information? Okay, we can
fence the money and say, look, unless you come up with this
comprehensive report the GAO asked for, we are not going to
give you any money. How much time should they have in order to
come up with this comprehensive report?
Mr. Dodaro. I would think within the next year they should
be able to produce something.
Mr. Murtha. Can we not force the issue by, say our bill is
ready to go by June or July, cannot we get the information from
them that quick?
Mr. Dodaro. You would have to ask DOD that question. We
have had this recommendation on the books for a while now. I am
not sure how far along they are in that area. But I think it
would be a very important question to ask them. I mean, our
goal here would be to make sure that they do it correctly. They
could perhaps give you some short-term answers and then a
longer-term strategy that would cover more years down the road.
I would also point out here that there are two other
factors in addition to the cutback in the acquisition workforce
in the 1990s. One is the complexity of the weapons systems that
are being procured. You may want to ask for a strategy on
weapons systems acquisition apart from service contracting
because there are different levels of sophistication here. The
complexity of those weapons systems is a critical issue where
DOD is going to need to have the capability to manage. And it
could be more difficult to build all that in-house.
And the other area is the extent to which these demands
have been driven by the immediacy of the needs for the global
war on terrorism in the past few years. And particularly it is
going to be an issue if we are going to deploy additional
forces over to Afghanistan. It is important that the lessons
learned about training people before they are deployed to
manage contractors in Afghanistan is heeded as well.
Mr. Murtha. I just talked to the National Security Adviser,
and I told him how important it was to get us information to
this Committee as quickly as he could about what his plans are
so we would have some idea of what is going to happen.
Now, for instance, we do not know whether they are going to
take troops in by land or have to fly them in, which is going
to be a substantial additional expense. But what you say about
the acquisition system, we found LCS just all kinds of
problems. One of the worst examples is that helicopter one, the
Marine One. That thing increased so much. I had people in here,
and I said to them, we are not going to pay $500 million for
one helicopter, period. And there are 14 people sitting there.
And finally, they said, well, we will put off the decision
until the new administration comes in. I mean, it is just
frightening how they throw money around like it is out of
style.
Well, we will listen for any advice you have and try to
come up with some recommendations. But when I look through the
increased cost of the weapons systems, the increased cost of
doing business, and the personnel costs and so forth, it is not
sustainable in what it amounts to, particularly as we are going
to build down the budget. But I appreciate the work you folks
do. The staff tells me you are leaning forward on this issue.
And it is so important to us.
Mr. Frelinghuysen.

RETIREMENTS AND INSTITUTIONAL MEMORY

Mr. Frelinghuysen. I am sure there will be a lot of time to
talk about how long it took to develop the F-22, the Future
Combat System, the littoral combat ships. I just have a few
sort of basic questions. There has been a reduction in the
acquisition workforce. That is recognizable. You also have the
issue of retirements. Would you briefly comment on that?
And the complexity of the systems, it is great to say that
we want, you know, DOD personnel as opposed to private
contractors, but sometimes the complexity of the system calls
upon the very people who are familiar with how it was developed
to provide that information. Would you comment a little bit on
the potential retirement of what I would call institutional
memory, and also the issue of competition in the workplace for
people who would be qualified to make up the group that would
replace the diminished acquisition force?
Mr. Dodaro. All right. Yes. Those are both very important
issues.
First, on the retirement issue, that is a problem. And it
is not only a problem in DOD; it is a problem across the
Federal Government in terms of the age of the workforce and the
impending retirements. Now a lot of that is driven by
demographics and the Baby Boom generation, et cetera, but it is
a concern. I know in leading the GAO, I spend a lot of time on
this myself making sure we have good succession planning in
place to go forward. And it will be an issue that the
Department's going to have to confront, and it will be a
problem, particularly in having the numbers of people who have
the experience and the background to oversee contractors or
carry out some of the activities. The team and I were just
talking about this before we came to the hearing. We can
provide some additional information on that area.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I assume you have some information. I
mean, normally people have some information about how many
people are, you know, eligible to retire. Somebody must have
that figure.
Mr. Dodaro. I know we have it, and we can provide it. I do
not have it with me. But I can provide it.
[The information follows:]

According to DOD demographic data dated December 2008, about 11
percent of the department's 670,492 permanent employees covered by the
Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) and the Federal Employee's
Retirement System (FERS) are currently eligible for optional
retirement. As of December 31, 2013, about 30 percent, or 193,880
civilian employees will be eligible for optional retirement. Optional
retirement is available to federal employees who have reached the
required age and years of service necessary to receive an immediate
retirement benefit. For example, under CSRS, an employee who is 55
years of age with 30 years of service is eligible for optional
retirement An employee under FERS who is 60 years of age and has 20
years of service is eligible for optional retirement
DOD's demographic data also shows that, in addition to those
permanent employees eligible for optional retirement, about 15 percent,
or 100,605 civilian employees are currently eligible for early
retirement. Further, as of December 31, 2013, 32 percent, of DOD's
civilian workforce will be eligible for early retirement. Early
retirement is available to federal employees that meet special
requirements. For example, for an employee to take an early retirement,
his or her agency must be undergoing a major reorganization, reduction-
in-force, or transfer of function determined eligible by OPM.

Mr. Frelinghuysen. All right.
Mr. Dodaro. And on the complexity of the weapons systems,
that is a very important point. Things are becoming more
complex. I think the issue here is DOD, like a lot of agencies,
is going to have to rely on contractors to some extent. I mean,
there is just not going to be any substitute for a certain
portion of people will need to be contractors with the
appropriate technical skills. What DOD needs to make sure is it
has people that can oversee and manage the contractors. The
competition in the workplace is an important issue here. But
you need a certain cadre of people that have some technical
skills to oversee the contractors so you are not totally
relying on the contractors. So you need that core expertise
there. You are not going to ever be able to replace the full
complement of technical people that the contractors can bring
to the table. And an important issue here----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Some of these systems have been studied
for so long that some of the very people that are most
knowledgeable might have been there at the beginning, but I
would think would be heading out the door in a retirement
queue.
Mr. Dodaro. That could be an issue. But you also have a lot
of changes that take place.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. What about competition for good people?
Mr. Dodaro. I think the competition, particularly for the
highly skilled people, is an issue in the government. I mean,
it is hard to compete under some of our salary structures for
the really highly technical people. I know I face that at the
GAO as well. And so that is an issue. And I think we are going
to have to, if the government wants to build some of that
capacity, and we do it at some of our national labs and other
places, I mean, we have got a lot of technical people. We are
going to have to consider the proper salary incentive and
retention structures to be able to do something like that. But
I think the more practical and immediate need is to make sure
we have the capacity at the government with government people
to oversee the contractors. And that I think is where we need
to start.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. All right.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Dicks.

SUBCONTRACTORS

Mr. Dicks. You know, another part of this problem, you
know, you talk about the 95 weapons systems that I have noticed
in the things that I follow is that the prime contractors, the
big companies now, I am talking about Boeing, Lockheed,
Northrop-Grumman, Raytheon, all of them seem to have a major
problem monitoring the subcontractors. In other words, they get
the work, and then they subcontract it out to all these other
companies. And then, you know, on several major weapons
systems, we have had major problems with the subcontractors not
performing. And then that delays the whole program. And that
forces up the cost. Have you guys looked at that at all as one
of your things to take into account?
Mr. Dodaro. Yes.
Mr. Dicks. That is where, again, you are so right, if you
do not have the acquisition personnel who is not only
monitoring the prime contractor on these major weapons systems
but actually getting down to see what these subs are doing and
ensuring that the prime contractor is overseeing the
subcontractors. It is shocking to me to find out how sometimes,
until they get into major trouble, these prime contractors are
not monitoring their own subcontractors. And again, I think it
is the failure of having adequate government personnel there to
do their job to insist that that be done. And because of that,
we have these delays and escalations in cost.
Mr. Dodaro. I am going to ask Mr. Sullivan to elaborate on
this. But one point I would bring to your attention in that
area is it is not only, you know, adequately monitoring, but
there need to be intermediary metrics that people are held
accountable to, particularly for these long development
projects, where there can be discrete decision points made and
you either meet the decision point or you do not. A lot of
times things are let to continue on into the next phase when
they have not completed the prior phase. And so I think, you
know, holding people to metrics and monitoring is very
important in this regard. But Mike leads a lot of our weapons
systems work. And I would like him to elaborate on your
specific questions.
Mr. Sullivan. I think, just specifically to what you are
talking about, about managing----
Mr. Dicks. Pull that just a little closer.
Mr. Sullivan [continuing]. Managing major subcontractors as
well as the overall, I think, supplier base----
Mr. Dicks. Right.
Mr. Sullivan [continuing]. On a major weapons systems
program, we recently did a study that was focused on looking at
why the quality assurance problems that we always found at the
end of programs. And the study led to actually three key
findings, I think, that get at what you are talking about. And
in fact, it drives right up into the Department's workforce.
There is a lack of systems engineering knowledge, both in the
Department as overseers of these major weapons systems. I do
not have exact numbers, but I know that the systems----
Mr. Dicks. Systems engineering, what was the last word?
Mr. Sullivan. Knowledge.
Mr. Dicks. Knowledge.
Mr. Sullivan. Systems engineers as part of the acquisition
workforce that would be able to oversee requirements setting,
for example, understanding the requirements and if they are
doable given the resources that are available to the government
at both the government level as overseers and in the major
prime contractors and all the way down to probably through the
contracted workforce. That is an area that probably the private
sector is able to attract people a lot better than the
government can for the reasons that Mr. Dodaro was pointing out
earlier. And there are other things. You know, I would say the
requirements-setting process and oversight is the key thing to
that. But in addition to that, they do not have good supplier
management processes in place. The kind of contracting methods
they use, cost-reimbursable contracts, things like that make it
harder to incentivize people to do that and oftentimes the
designs. When designs on major weapons systems are not stable
because of their complexity, it makes it difficult to manage
that process.

ACQUISITION STRATEGY FOR MAJOR PROGRAMS

Mr. Dicks. The other point I want to make, and I think this
is something that we have to insist on, and I found this out as
we were going through, Mr. Chairman, the acquisition on the
tankers, that there are DOD acquisition regulations that
require it to examine the industrial base impacts in developing
the acquisition strategy for major programs. Now, I confronted
Secretary Young on this point. I do not think they are doing
this. They are supposed to be doing this. It is in the law that
they are supposed to be doing it. Do you have any idea that
they do an industrial base impact analysis on every major
weapons system before they start the acquisition? We have got
the--you got the information on this. We will get you the
information on where in the law it says you are supposed to do
this.
Mr. Dodaro. Okay.
[The information follows:]

10 U.S.C. 2440 requires the Secretary of Defense to prescribe
regulations requiring DOD to consider the national technology and
industrial base when developing and implementing acquisition plans for
each major defense acquisition program. DOD's existing guidance
requires that the contents of a written acquisition plan for a major
defense acquisition program include an analysis of the capabilities of
the national technology and industrial base to develop, produce,
maintain, and support the program including the consideration of
factors related to foreign dependency, requirements for efficient
manufacture of the systems to be procured under the program, and
methods to encourage investment by U.S. domestic sources in advanced
manufacturing technology production equipment and processes. This
guidance also requires the program to have an industrial capability
strategy that assesses the capability of the U.S. industrial base to
achieve identified surge and mobilization goals, or explain the
rationale for why no strategy has been developed. According to a DOD
official, the Department is revising its current guidance, in part to
require industrial capability assessments earlier in the acquisition
process and to require program managers to evaluate the impact of their
program's acquisition strategy on the competitive market place.

Mr. Dicks. But this would be something interesting to see
if GAO could find out whether in fact they are doing this or
not. I do not think they are. They say, well, we do not have
to. I do not think the law gives them any discretion. Do you
know anything about this?
Mr. Dodaro. We have not done any work on it, my team tells
me. But we would be happy to look at your citation and look
into the issue.
Mr. Dicks. Has your study of DOD acquisition found any
trends or results about how well, you know, I mean, I think the
industrial base issue is part of the problem here, where you do
not have as much competition. I mean, what have we got? Three
major companies, Lockheed, Boeing and Northrop-Grumman. I mean,
you know, they are all intertwined in these things. Somebody
wins the prime, and then, I mean the major contract, and the
other ones come in as subcontractors. I mean, is the lack of
having enough competitors part of the problem here in terms of
the raising costs and not getting these things built right?
Mr. Dodaro. The one thing I would say we know is that the
adequate management of whatever the original decisions are is
really probably the most difficult or most contributing factor
to the increase in cost growth. I am not sure, and I cannot
comment on the competition issue, you know, from a general
perspective.
Mr. Dicks. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Kingston.

ABILITY OF LOCAL CONTRACTORS TO WIN DOD CONTRACTS

Mr. Kingston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was wondering something that might be a little more
routine, and I am not sure if it comes into your purview or
not, but the ability of a local contractor to get military
construction-type jobs on military installations or to sell a
product to the military; it seems to me that it is really the
domain of large contractors and large vendors, and not the
small entrepreneurial local guy. Can you comment to that?
Mr. Dodaro. Let me ask Katherine to comment on that.
Ms. Schinasi. The ability of local contractors to win DOD
contracts?
Mr. Kingston. Yes.
Ms. Schinasi. Yes, there are. DOD has certain requirements
that it must provide, you know, award a portion of its
contracts to certain categories of business. Local is not one
of those, but small is one of those. Small and disadvantaged is
another one. So as an overall measure, DOD has a requirement at
the macro level to do that. But they do it in different ways
that might or might not capture someone in every locality.
Mr. Kingston. I have had the honor of representing Fort
Stewart, for example, for 16 years now. At the present level it
has about $500 million worth of military construction going on,
largely because of a lot of the good things this committee and
the other committee has done, and the Chairman has been down
there personally. But it is very frustrating to the local
vendors, painters, sheetrock guys, masonry, concrete workers,
heat and air, people who have been in business 10, 15 years,
who do a solid day's work and deliver a good product, but
because they are not really geared up for it, they cannot get
on the post. And it seems like the front end is an inside
track. What can we tell--and I have been working for years to
try to open it up more but have not had much success in that.
Ms. Schinasi. I do not have an answer for an individual
company. But I do know that the Department is required, at that
macro level. But it is up to the individual companies at each
location to compete for those contract awards.
Mr. Kingston. Well, who would be a point of contact within
your office that I could talk to, maybe bring down to Fort
Stewart and have a vendors and a contractors job fair, if you
will?
[The information follows:]

Congressman Kingston asked us to identify a person at Ft. Stewart,
Georgia who could be contacted regarding the process for small and
disadvantaged businesses to obtain contracts at Ft. Stewart.
Accordingly, we are providing the name and contact information for
Deborah Swindell, the senior person within the Office of Small and
Disadvantaged Business Utilization at Ft. Stewart. She may be contacted
at 912-767-8425.

Ms. Schinasi. We can get you that information. But I would
offer up the Department's own Office of Small and Disadvantaged
Businesses. They are the ones, OSDBU. That name might be more
appropriate for what you are looking for. Those are the
individuals who are on--their responsibility is to keep the
Department honest, if you will, in terms of meeting the
requirements that they have to give a certain amount of the
contract awards to small businesses. So that might be a more
helpful person for you.
Mr. Kingston. Okay. Mr. Chairman, if we have a second round
I wanted to follow up on this, but I will yield back. Thank
you.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Visclosky.

OVERSEEING THE CONTRACTORS

Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You had talked
earlier about the mix of Federal employee and contractor. And I
certainly would assume there is no set formula. And even within
a department, you have so many different missions and functions
taking place. But you do talk about the disparity as far as the
number of contractors and government employees----
Mr. Dodaro. Overseeing the contractors.
Mr. Visclosky [continuing]. Overseeing the contractors. And
not wanting to keep bringing up the Department of Energy, and I
know that is not part of the hearing, but the ratio is nine to
one. And I think just human nature, you got nine people and one
supervising, human nature takes hold. How are we supposed to
know what the right mix is? It seems like there is an
imbalance. But when do we know we are back in balance?
Mr. Dodaro. I think there are two parts to that equation.
One is the recommendation that we did make to figure out how
many contractors should you have to begin with versus
employees? And then I think one of the ways that you know is
whether or not what you are contracting out for is being
delivered on time, within budget, and you get the deliverables
you have. And then, secondly, the type of problems that we and
the Inspector General and others have found, you know, lack of
documentation in some of the contracts, the fact that the
people are not trained properly to be able to do it. So you
have the level of activity, but number one is you get what you
pay for without as much cost overruns as we have seen in the
period of time and you get it on time. And so those type of
metrics are the type of things that should be in place. And you
do not have as many problems that are identified by people in
your contracting activities. You know, those I think would be
the two things I would say off the top of my head that are
really important ways to gauge.
Mr. Visclosky. And I assume numbers are not everything.
Part of it is also the skill and talent of the people who are
doing the supervision.
Mr. Dodaro. Right.
Mr. Visclosky. I assume just from the questions and
statements I have been reading here that that also is a problem
that needs to be addressed as well.
Mr. Dodaro. Yes. Yes. Right now, the Department is going
through and identifying what competencies that they need for
some of their acquisition workforce and where they have skill
gaps. And there definitely is a qualitative component of this,
having not only the numbers properly but the right skills
necessary to be able to do it. You know, the main reason we are
bringing this up is to just show, why there continues to be
problems with many of the contractors. We are trying to get, at
some of the root causes here. And one of the root causes is the
fact that you have not had a comprehensive strategic decision
made on what to do. And then following from that, having the
right kind of workforce plan with the right skills and the
right numbers of people and then the right metrics to track it.
And so that all has to be, I think, recalibrated in a
comprehensive way.
Mr. Visclosky. And you are still asking DOD to provide a
clearer statement as to what an inherent governmental position
is versus a private sector position?
Mr. Dodaro. Well, that is part of the issue. Let me ask
Katherine to elaborate on that.
Mr. Visclosky. If I could, just, and again and from some of
the notes I have in front of me, it appears that the Army has
started down this road and identified at least a thousand
contract positions that are inherently governmental and moving
them back over, if you could.
Ms. Schinasi. The Office of Management and Budget was
directed last year to come up with a definition of inherently
governmental that would be more useful----
Mr. Visclosky. For everybody.
Ms. Schinasi [continuing]. For people making decisions
about whether or not to hire a contractor. They are in the
process, they are just starting that right now, they are in the
process of trying to determine by regulation what that means.
Mr. Visclosky. Are there standards today in place?
Ms. Schinasi. Yes, there are. The Federal Acquisition
Regulations lay out certain activities that are prohibited,
that are reserved for a government official. For example,
signing a contract must be done by a government official. But
in addition to the inherently governmental definition, there
are also a number of things that are associated with that or
closely associated with that that we would still want to have
more discussion about even after a regulation is put in place.
Because, for example, if you have the prohibition against a
contractor signing a contract, but how about the basis, how
about the analysis that he was given to make the decision
whether to sign it or not? Who performed that analysis for him?
So we are calling that closely associated with inherently
governmental function.
So you have not just the definition that OMB is working on
in a regulatory manner, but you also have a management
imperative to look at how those decisions are actually made.
What are the costs and risks associated with having a private
individual perform a function than having a government employee
perform that function?
Mr. Visclosky. Is there a timeline as to when OMB is
supposed to finish their----
Ms. Schinasi. They are just now starting.
Mr. Visclosky. And are the principles, are they more
principles as opposed to job classification definitions that
are in place today?
Ms. Schinasi. That is my understanding. And actions. Not
just principles, but actions.
Mr. Visclosky. So that would not necessarily be as helpful.
Ms. Schinasi. Not sufficient. Necessary, but not
sufficient.
Mr. Dodaro. Yeah. What I would say on this issue,
Congressman, is that, you know, for decades this issue about
inherently governmental, you know, the A-76 process and other
processes have been in place probably for over 50 years in the
government with this inherently governmental kind of
definition. But there is a narrow legal definition to it. But
as we have seen greater reliance on contractors at DOD and
other agencies, you know, the sphere of things that are
involved in being contracted out and management has grown
considerably. So I think, one suggestion I have is, while this
is an important issue, there is a broader issue as to what
management risk the government is willing to bear, whether it
falls in that narrow legal definition or not. And are we
getting the right type of service at the right type of cost? So
there are a lot of risks in making sure that the government is
properly using contractors that fall outside of that narrow
legal definition that are really important, too. And I think
they are ones that are a little easier to get to because they
are tied to mission and what kind of outcomes that you want to
achieve.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you for your work.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Moran.

Remarks of Mr. Moran

Mr. Moran. All right.
Mr. Chairman, this issue is not going to be a pleasant one
for the administration, even though some of the folks that will
be responsible were not initially responsible for creating this
situation. We know that we have always had mercenaries in the
Army. We did in the Revolutionary War. We always had contracted
with some support personnel. But it is way out of control right
now. And we look for the reasons.
I think part of it was ideological. But we have also seen
that while military pay went up by 26 percent in the last
decade, civilian pay went up by 10 percent. From what we can
gather, contractors went up by a hundred percent, even though
we do not have specific numbers. This subcommittee in almost
every single hearing has asked about contract personnel. And
now, 8 years later, we are talking about figuring out what the
definition of inherently governmental is. We have looked at
some of the situations that have arisen which boggle the mind,
really, and it goes to this definition. Now, we know that
military and civilian and even contract personnel have always
worked side by side. But the Pentagon has had contractors
manage other contractors and even manage other government and
military personnel. In March of this past year, the GAO found
that 42 percent of the Army's Contracting Center of Excellence
was staffed by contractors.
We also learned that the Comptroller had contracted for the
development of the budget justification for the fiscal year
2008 supplemental funding request. I used to work in the budget
office. I cannot imagine having contractors come in and
developing the budget justification. Well, I mean, seriously,
talk about how far we have gone, I do not think it has been in
the right direction. We found that we have had contractors
making decisions on the expenditure of government resources,
determinations of agency policy, directing and controlling
other Federal employees, the intelligence analysis, weapons
systems maintenance. I could go on and on.
The GAO found that poor planning, changing requirements,
and inadequate number of contract oversight personnel in Iraq
and Afghanistan led to an average 385 percent cost increase in
the service contracts that the GAO investigated. I mean, this
is unbelievable. And it is not for lack of concern expressed by
this subcommittee that has funded all this. They found that the
total acquisition cost for DOD's 2007 portfolio of major
programs under development or in production has grown by nearly
$300 billion over initial estimates. So, obviously, something
is wrong.
And here is an issue that the Chairman has been
particularly on top of, but apparently to no avail. We now find
out, CBO told us just in the last few months that there are
190,000 private personnel operating under U.S.-funded contracts
in Iraq alone; 150,000 of them are Defense contract personnel.
So who is fighting this war? The contractors. Now, the first
question, and you are probably wondering, is he ever going to
get to a question, the first question is what are your plans to
draw down contractors? If we have got----
Mr. Dicks. This is the GAO. This is not the Defense
Department.
Mr. Moran. Oh, this is Dodaro, I know it.
Mr. Dicks. They are just reporting to us what the issue is.
They do not run----
Mr. Moran. I know. I am just getting warmed up for the Army
that is coming. Thank you. It is true. But the question, let me
rephrase, the question I want you to ask of the military, what
plans exist for drawing down contract personnel when we draw
down the military? It just seems if you have got as many
contract personnel as uniform personnel, how are we ever going
to get them out? Now, have we asked that, Mr. Dodaro?
Mr. Dodaro. Yes. We issued a report for the planning for
the draw down in Iraq, where the status was with the DOD
planning. We listed a number of factors. We would be happy to
provide that to you. But we are now, at the request of the
Congress, looking at how that will ripple through the contract
draw down as well, because as you point out, there are as many
contractors in these areas as there are military personnel
right now.
[The information follows.]

During a discussion of DOD's planning for a draw down from Iraq
with Congressman Moran, I indicated that GAO had issued a report on
DOD's draw down planning efforts and promised to provide a copy of the
report. The report, GAO-08-930, is attached.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.029

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.030

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.031

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.032

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.033

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.034

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.035

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.036

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.037

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.038

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.039

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.040

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.041

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.042

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.043

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.044

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.045

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.046

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.047

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.048

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.049

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.050

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.051

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.052

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.053

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.054

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.055

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.056

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.057

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.058

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.059

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.060

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.061

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.062

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.063

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.064

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.065

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.066

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.067

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.068

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.069

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.070

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.071

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.072

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.073

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.074

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.075

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.076

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.077

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.078

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.079

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.080

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.081

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.082

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.083

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.084

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.085

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.086

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.087

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.088

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.089

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.090

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.091

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.092

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.093

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.094

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.095

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.096

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.097

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.098

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.099

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.100

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.101

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.102

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.103

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.104

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.105

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.106

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.107

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.108

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.109

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.110

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.111

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.112

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.113

Mr. Dicks. Was the surge military or contract?
Mr. Moran. That is the thing. The surge was----
Mr. Murtha. Let me interrupt.
Mr. Dodaro. But we are looking at that issue.
Mr. Moran. Well, thank you. The information we get is
coming from GAO. You are giving us this information. It is
unbelievable. But our frustration has just reached the level
of, you know, we are ready to pull our hair out on this. And I
am sure if you were to continue doing more investigations, the
information is going to be all the more compelling that
something needs to be done dramatically. I do not take fault at
your recommendations. But things continue to deteriorate. And I
think that we are going to have to continue to ask you to get
this information on even a more timely basis than you have been
able to, because we have got to change things very quickly. And
it sounds accusatory. I do not mean to be accusatory of you. I
do of the Army. The idea that the Pentagon is finally getting
around to coming up with a definition of what is inherently
governmental is just unbelievable, really.
And you know, you have got to be dispassionate about this,
but we do not have to be. And that is why this is as important
an issue as we are going to face. And we are going to have to
get to the bottom of it. We appreciate the effort you have made
to help us in that pursuit.
Mr. Dodaro. Thank you.
I would say, Congressman, also that while there are some
short-term issues that need to be dealt with, one of the
fundamental frustrations I have is looking at the quality of
strategic planning in the government over a period of time. And
we cannot move from one end of the spectrum to the other end of
the spectrum without having unintended consequences. And there
needs to be a plan to get there. And so a lot of our
recommendations go to having well-thought-out, well-crafted
plans and strategies at the Department. And I would hope that
the Congress provides adequate oversight to ensure that that
happens. That, I think, at the end of the day is really the, or
one of the, fundamental issues.
Mr. Murtha. Let me say, before Mr. Moran came in, we talked
about what we had done. When Mr. Walker came before the
subcommittee 2 years ago, he said he could not get the
information. So we fenced. I had forgotten this; the staff
reminded me. We fenced the money and said, you do not get any
money until you report to us how many contractors you have.
Well, they got the information pretty quick after that. So I
think we, as a subcommittee, we are going to have to fence the
money in order to get some movement out of them. We save
$44,000, according to the study we have, for every person we
hire in-house compared to a contractor. Now, last year, we cut
$4.5 billion out of contractors in this subcommittee. We added
a billion dollars to hire direct hires and of course lost it
because they were going to, the administration was going to
veto the bill. So we have got to get some guidance and some
recommendations, but they will not do it unless we tell them to
do it, unless we put some teeth into it. And I think that is
what----
Mr. Moran. They would not even spend the money you put in
for contract acquisition procurement personnel. You put money
in for that and Shay what's-his-name would not even spend it
this past year.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Chairman, I think the new administration
will be a little more forward leaning on your request.
Mr. Murtha. I hope so.
Mr. Dicks. I know it is sometimes hard to remember that----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. If not, we are in trouble, right?
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Tiahrt.
Mr. Tiahrt. I do not have any questions at this time, Mr.
Chairman.
I appreciate the work of the GAO.
Mr. Murtha. Ms. Granger.

PROJECT PURCHASING OFFICERS IN AFGHANISTAN

Ms. Granger. Let me follow up a little built on Mr. Moran's
questions and let me turn to Afghanistan.
According to the information I have got, according to GAO,
there are six Department of Defense warranted contracting
officers in Afghanistan, and they approve every contract valued
at $250,000 or above or the commander emergency response. If
there are six--so they are approving contracts. How does the
number come up? How does that make sense?
Mr. Dodaro. Yeah, Congresswoman Granger, we need to correct
the record. I mean, our staff says it is 60.
Ms. Granger. It is how many?
Mr. Dodaro. Sixty to seventy, not six. And that was our
communication issue. And so I would like to correct that.
Ms. Granger. Okay. Do you think that is the right amount?
Mr. Dodaro. Well, it depends on how things are going
forward. Our recommendation here is that we learn the lessons
on how we accelerated a contractor workforce in Iraq and that
contracting acquisition workforce people be trained, plus the
commanders in Afghanistan, so that whatever contractors go
there, there is adequate oversight structure in place to make
sure we do not have a repeat of the problems that we had in
Iraq.
Ms. Granger. If it is adequate oversight, then, according
to, again, to GAO, 97 percent of the commander's emergency
response projects are valued at less than $500,000. They are
awarded by the project purchasing officer, who has 1 hour's
training. Is that a mistake, too?
Ms. Coffey. No, that is correct.
Mr. Dodaro. That is correct.
Ms. Granger. Would you say that was adequate, 1 hour's
training to oversee 97 percent of those contracts?
Mr. Dodaro. We are supportive and have recommended
additional training.
Ms. Granger. How much additional training?
Mr. Dodaro. It depends on the position. I can give you some
information on it. Let me think that through.
[The information follows:]

GAO is currently reviewing the Commander's Emergency Response
Program (CERP) in Afghanistan. Our preliminary work raises some
concerns over the amount and type of training Project Purchasing
Officers (PPO) are currently receiving. PPOs are either officers or
senior enlisted personnel designated by the commanders to award
contracts for CERP projects or services up to $500,000. According to
military officials, generally PPO personnel have had little or no
contracting experience and do not undergo the same type of extensive
training that is provided to warranted contracting officers. Current
training for PPOs consists of a 1 hour briefing which is focused on the
CERP guidance and not the technical aspects of contract management or
administration such as writing statements of work, drafting contract
documents, ensuring that the project is completed to contract
specifications, and completing contract close out. For the past several
years GAO has reported on the need for better and more complete
training for those responsible for contract management in contingency
operations like those in Iraq and Afghanistan, to reduce the risk of
waste or mismanagement. While we are finalizing our work at this time,
our preliminary view is that PPOs do require more training than the one
hour that is currently provided.

Mr. Murtha. Would these folks identify themselves for the
reporter?
Mr. Dodaro. Okay. Yeah, I am sorry, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Coffey. I am sorry, I am Carole Coffey.
Mr. Murtha. Did you hear that, reporter?
And this young lady here.
Ms. Schinasi. Katherine Schinasi.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Murtha. How much time do you have? We have plenty of
time, because there is 224 that have not voted.
Mr. Rothman.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to lay out
some general concerns and then let you have it so I do not take
up all the time. You have talked about lack of strategic
planning, lack of management. And I am glad you are there to
discover these things and to make recommendations to address
them. Again, my concern is, why did this develop? Has this
always been the case in the history of our Defense
establishment since the founding of the Republic? And again,
not to identify an administration for that purpose, but to
identify what did we stop doing that was right and what did we
start doing that was wrong so we can know how to fix it? Will
you be addressing that in general terms? Was there a culture
change? Or, as has been alluded to, was the interest in
contracting out that expanded in the last 8 years, is it a
necessary consequence of contracting out that there will be
less accountability? Is that a consequence of contracting out?
And if so, then you should let us know. If not, let us know
that if not. Because I see in your statement you say that
reliance on contractors can create mission risk when
contractors are supporting deployed forces. And you say,
without understanding the depth and breadth of contractor
support, they will be unable to determine the right mix. And
you are concerned about, the urgency is because of our upcoming
increase in forces in Afghanistan. So goodness, we do not want
to increase mission risk upon our forces that we are bringing
or existing in Afghanistan because we do not know the impact of
contractors. So it is the philosophical or general principle,
what happened to the culture there? Does contracting per se
equal some less accountability? And number three, as quickly as
possible, how do we address what you call mission risk for
deployed forces caused by our contractor forces?
Mr. Dodaro. Okay. First, let me say that some of these
fundamental weaknesses have been present at the Department for
a long time. We have had weapons systems acquisition on the
high risk list that we keep for Congress of areas of potential
risk of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement since 1990 when
we first created the list. We added contract management in 1992
to the list. So there have been some fundamental needs for
improvement at the Department for a long time. What has
happened recently, however, though, is the decline in the
acquisition workforce at the same time you had a concomitant
huge increase in the use and reliance of contractors over a
period of time. Underlying all that has been the demographic
changes that are occurring throughout our society and the aging
of the Federal Government's workforce, and you had a natural
turnover of experience.
Mr. Rothman. And they were not being replaced on the
numbers.
Mr. Dodaro. Right.
Mr. Rothman. The numbers were not even being replaced.
Mr. Dodaro. Right. Right. But I would also say that we have
for the past several years, though, stepped up some of our
criticism of the Department's strategic planning that has been
taking place. But the situation in global war on terrorism and
other things have accelerated the need to have strategic
planning, not only within the Department but across the
agencies. But I would say the Department of Defense has more
areas on our high-risk list than any other Department in the
Federal Government. They are also one of the few departments
that have not yet been able to pass a test of a financial
audit. So that is why I think you have a lot of data problems
as well.
Now, to get to your point on recommendations, we have made
recommendations on the need to do a comprehensive study in
these areas to deal with and put in place best practices. And
so we have got plenty of recommendations. But the point that we
made, and the Department has been very willing to make some
policy changes, but implementation is really a key here. And I
cannot stress that enough.
Mr. Rothman. If I could get those for the record, that
would be great, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Congressman Rothman asked for copies of reports or testimonies in
which GAO has recommended or called for a comprehensive study of DOD's
use of contractors (see page 41 of the transcript). Please find copies
of three testimonies in which GAO called for a fundamental re-
examination of the use of contractors by DOD. Specifically, see GAO-08-
621T, page 13; GAO-08-572T page 30; and GAO-08-436T, pages 19 and 21.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.115

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.116

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.117

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.118

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.119

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.120

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.121

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.122

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.123

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.124

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.125

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.126

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.127

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.128

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.129

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.130

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.131

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.132

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.133

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.134

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.135

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.136

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.137

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.138

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.139

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.140

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.141

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.142

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.143

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.144

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.145

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.146

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.147

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.148

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.149

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.150

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.151

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.152

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.153

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.154

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.155

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.156

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.157

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.158

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.159

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.160

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.161

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.162

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.163

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.164

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.165

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.166

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.167

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.168

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.169

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.170

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.171

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.172

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.173

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.174

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.175

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.176

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.177

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.178

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.179

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.180

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.181

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.182

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.183

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.184

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.185

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.186

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.187

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.188

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.189

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.190

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.191

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.192

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.193

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.194

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.195

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.196

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.197

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.198

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.199

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.200

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.201

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.202

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.203

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.204

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.205

-Mr. Murtha. I think we have exhausted the information that
you have and recommendations you have. You have seen our
frustration and concern about contracting out. With your help,
and with our help, if you need help from us, ask, and we will
try to get you more information that they are hesitant to give.
You said to me before the hearing started that you did not
think they were hesitant to give us information; they just did
not have the information. Well, we are going to force them to
find the information, because we cannot make a legitimate
decision and recommendation on money until we get some idea of
what a government contractor is, what the government
responsibility is. And I think the idea of oversight is the
key. You said at least as you make the transitions you should
have somebody working for the government that is in charge of
the contractors. Well, we will see here. But as two examples
that Mr. Moran gave, they have got contractors in charge of
contractors. And one of my staff said, when he was in the Army,
they were cutting the grass at Fort Benning, they hired a
contractor to tell the contractors how to cut the grass. I
mean, we got a hell of a problem here. And we are going to have
to work together trying to get to the bottom of it.
We appreciate your coming before the committee.
Unless somebody else has any questions, we adjourn the
committee until 10 a.m. tomorrow.
Mr. Moran will be the Chair.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the
answers thereto follow.]

Question. Mr. Dodaro, do you think DOD has thought about its
workforce holistically in order to determine the right balance of
federal and contractor employees in performing DOD missions?
Answer. DOD has not conducted a comprehensive assessment of its
workforce needs particularly with regard to the roles and functions
contractors perform in supporting DOD's missions and activities. Our
work on strategic human capital planning and acquisition workforce
issues has encouraged DOD to conduct such an assessment.
Question. Mr. Dodaro, if DOD is not defining the proper balance
between federal and contractor workforce, what steps should DOD take to
better assure a balance?
Answer. DOD must engage in a fundamental reassessment of when and
under what circumstances the department should use contractors. As part
of this assessment, DOD needs to take several steps, including
developing a data collection system that will allow DOD to identify all
services currently being provided to DOD by contractors; detennine
which of those services being performed by contractors should be
performed by government personnel, taking into account the need to
ensure proper government oversight of contractors' efforts and the need
to develop or retain in-house sufficient institutional capacity to
perform core capabilities; develop a total workforce strategic plan to
identify and effect the appropriate mix, roles, and responsibilities of
contractor, civilian, and military personnel, to include plans for how
DOD will grow the in-house capabilities it has identified as lacking or
otherwise convert contractor performance to in-house performance;
developing budgets, both short and long term, that will support
implementation of DOD's total workforce strategic plan, to include
funding additional government personnel full time equivalents when
necessary to perform the services in-house. These steps are consistent
with the requirements contained in sections 324 and 807 of the Fiscal
Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act.
Question. Does the Department have the ability to report on the
number of contractors that they employ and their compensation costs?
Answer. Section 807 of the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense
Authorization Act directed the department to develop a department-wide
inventory of services being provided by contractors and the numbers of
contractor full time equivalents used to provide the service. The
inventory report is an annual requirement and is to be provided to
Congress by the end of the third quarter of each fiscal year. However,
DOD does not currently have the ability to report on the total number
of contractor personnel it employs or their compensation costs at a
department-wide level.
Question. Mr. Dodaro, DOD continues to deploy huge numbers of
contractors. Currently 267,000 contractors are deployed to the CENTCOM
area of responsibility. Would you comment on the consequences of having
more contractors than military personnel in CENTCOM's area of
responsibility?
Answer. Our work has noted that DOD's increased reliance on
contractors at deployed locations exacerbates long-standing challenges
regarding DOD management and oversight of contractors to support
deployed forces. These include an insufficient number of acquisition
workforce personnel, DOD's failure to systematically collect and
distribute lessons learned, and a lack of pre-deployment training for
military commanders and contract oversight personnel. Moreover, the
large number of contractors at deployed locations, particularly the
widespread use of third-country and host-country national contractor
employees, can increase the risk to military personnel due to the
limited background screenings of contractor personnel.
The fact that there are more contractors than military personnel in
Iraq further highlights the strains on DOD's ability to provide
appropriate contract management and oversight. As we have noted in the
past, DOD lacks adequate numbers of properly trained contract oversight
personnel in Iraq to oversee the large numbers of contractors there.
This is why we testified in January 2008 (see GAO-08-436T) that as part
of the DOD's efforts to increase the size of the Army and the Marine
Corps, the department should consider using a portion of its increased
force structure to expand its professional acquisition corps. DOD's
heavy reliance on contractors also underscores the need we identified
last year for DOD to carry out a fundamental reexamination of when and
under what circumstances the department should use contractors versus
civil servants or military personnel.
Question. DOD officials have stated that contractors will be
redeployed from Iraq in proportionate numbers to the redeploying
troops. How can DOD effectuate proportionate redeployment given that
the number for contractors in Iraq is a function of hundreds of
decentralized contract actions in contrast to military personnel
strength levels which are a function of a handful of centrally managed
deployment orders?
Answer. In September 2008, GAO reported that from late 2007 through
July 2008, planning for the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq did not
include a theater-wide plan for the withdrawal of contractors. It is
still unclear how DOD plans to manage and coordinate the drawdown of
contractors and military forces from Iraq. We have recently begun a new
review of DOD's plans for managing the drawdown and will review DOD's
plans for contractors as part of this effort. In addition, in October
2008, DOD released Joint Publication 4-10, Operational Contract
Support, which states that for each operation, the geographic combatant
commander should publish a contractor management plan and outline in an
appendix contractor management planning considerations.
Question. Does DOD have a good plan to account for assets, both
government and contract, when drawing down contractors out of Iraq?
Answer. As of August 2008, DOD had not established effective plans
and procedures to account for its assets--both government and
contractor-managed--during the drawdown process. As we noted above, we
have recently begun a new review of DOD's plans for managing the
drawdown and will review DOD's plans for plan to account for government
and contractor assets as part of that review.
DOD's management of the equipment retrograde process is hindered by
use of incompatible data systems that necessitate frequent manual
manipulation of data. This system incompatibility has resulted in
diminished visibility over equipment and materiel while it is in
transit. Furthermore, in addition to the incompatibility of the data
systems, the disposition process can be slow and cumbersome due to the
manual workarounds used to pass and manipulate the data. Although a fix
for this system incompatibility had been identified, the implementation
of the fix had not been enforced by DOD.
GAO also identified problems related to the accountability and
disposition of contractor-managed government-owned property in Iraq.
While there are ongoing efforts to plan for the disposition of
contractor-managed government-owned property in Iraq, several
challenges remain. The first challenge is determining the original or
fair-market value of contractor-managed government-owned property and
determining any security restrictions on its disposition. Second is the
time-consuming and labor-intensive task of accounting for and
determining the disposition of contractor-managed government-owned
property. Finally, the Defense Logistics Agency may not have sufficient
data to adequately plan capacity needs at the Defense Reutilization and
Marketing Offices--facilities in theater responsible for disposing of
surplus DOD property through reutilization, transfer, donation, and
sale.
Question. The Department reports that a great number of contractors
perform base support functions in Iraq. What exactly does ``base
support'' mean?
Answer. Base operations support is a term used to describe a
collection of day-to-day programs, activities, and services needed to
keep the bases and installations running. As we have previously
reported, base operations support is not a single, well-defined program
area but a collection of many diverse programs, activities, and
services. According to DOD budget documents, base operations support
provides the resources to operate DOD bases, installations, camps,
posts, and stations. According to the department, these resources
sustain mission capability, ensure quality-of-life, and enhance work
force productivity and fund personnel and infrastructure support.
Personnel support includes food and housing services for unaccompanied
and deployed forces; religious services and programs; payroll support;
personnel management; and morale, welfare, and recreation services to
military members and their families. Infrastructure support includes
utility systems operations; installation equipment maintenance;
engineering services including fire protection, crash rescue,
custodial, refuse collection, snow removal, and lease of real property;
security protection and law enforcement; and transportation motor pool
operations.
Base operations support at deployed locations, such as Iraq,
consists of providing food and housekeeping services on bases. This
includes many of these services described above such as food, laundry,
recreational, construction and maintenance, road maintenance, waste
management, fire-fighting, power generation, and water production and
distribution. While DOD estimates that over half of its contractors in
Iraq are engaged in providing base support GAO has not verified DOD's
estimates nor has GAO analyzed the data to determine what specific
services are categorized as base support in Iraq.
Question. How can the DOD become less reliant on contractors in
future military operations?
Answer. As noted in a February 2009 testimony, DOD officials have
stated that without a significant increase in military end-strength,
the department is likely to continue to rely on contractors to support
future operations. The testimony also noted that the department has yet
to conduct a fundamental reexamination of its extensive reliance on
contractors in order to identify what types of function and activities
should be contracted out. We called for such a reexamination in March
2008 (see GAO-08-572T). Until such an examination is completed, DOD may
not be totally aware of the risks it faces in using contractors and
will therefore be unable to mitigate those risks in the most cost-
effective and efficient manner.
Question. Mr. Dodaro, the DOD is required by law 10 U.S.C. 2464 to
have an in-house depot maintenance workforce able to respond to
national defense emergencies. Do you believe that DOD has sufficient
numbers of in-house personnel to meet all core maintenance functions to
respond to national emergencies?
Answer. On the basis of ongoing work, we believe the depots
currently have sufficient numbers of in-house personnel to handle their
workload. As a result of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the depots
have experienced a surge in workload over the past few years. Some of
this work relates to special projects, such as adding armor to
vehicles, and some is attributable to repairing battle damage and other
depot repair work associated with the military's high operations tempo.
To accommodate the surge of workload, the depots have added to their
total workforce over the last several years. Workforce data for the
Army and Marine Corps indicate that the number of permanent government
employees has remained steady, but the number of contract labor and
temporary workers has risen. Depot officials told us they hired
contractors and temporary workers in lieu of hiring permanent
government workers due to uncertainties about the duration of GWOT. In
the future however, there is a possibility that the depots could lack
sufficient in-house technical expertise if core capabilities for new
systems are not established at the depots.
Question. Mr. Dodaro, do you agree that current DOD policy
encourages the use of contractor logistics support?
Answer. While DOD policies call for the use of both the public and
private sectors to maintain weapon systems, DOD has moved toward
greater use of the private sector to perform maintenance and other
logistics support for new weapon systems. Our ongoing work on core
logistics capabilities and depot operations indicates that some program
managers prefer the original equipment manufacturers to provide long-
term logistics and maintenance support for new and modified systems.
Among the reasons cited for not considering the military depots is the
cost associated with purchasing technical data and providing equipment
to establish depot capability. In addition, DOD stated in 2001 that
performance based logistics (a form of contractor logistics support) is
its ``preferred weapon system support strategy.'' DOD's policy is that
performance based logistics arrangements shall make the best use of
public and private sector capabilities, and with support provided by
the government, the private sector, or a combination of both. Nearly
all of the performance based logistics arrangements we reviewed
recently were implemented directly with private sector contractors,
although some of the contractors subcontracted with government depots
to provide support either for economic reasons or to help the
government meet requirements for having a core logistics capability.
Question. If so, are we in danger of not having sufficient in-house
technical expertise?
Answer. There is a possibility that the depots could lack
sufficient in-house technical expertise in the future if core
capabilities for new systems are not established at the depots. Our
ongoing work on core logistics capability and depot operations raises
concerns about the ability of the depots to maintain core capability in
the future. Depot planners are concerned about the type and amount of
workload that will replace their existing workload if GWOT-related and
legacy system workloads decrease. Moreover, with the shift toward
greater use of contractors to provide logistics support for new
systems, depot planners are concerned that their permanent workforce
may not be equipped with the necessary technical expertise to support
core maintenance for new weapon systems. The depots have developed
recruitment and training programs to attract and retain skilled
workers, and they believe sufficient numbers of skilled workers are
currently available. However, uncertainties about the type and amount
of future workload hinder their ability to plan for future workforce
requirements.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.]
Thursday, February 12, 2009.

ARMY CONTRACTING

WITNESS

LIEUTENANT GENERAL N. ROSS THOMPSON, III, PRINCIPAL MILITARY DEPUTY TO
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS AND
TECHNOLOGY AND DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION CAREER MANAGEMENT

Introduction

Mr. Moran. Good morning to everyone.
This morning, the Committee will hold a hearing on the
Army's contracting services, often referred to as outsourcing.
More specifically, our private-sector contractors support
government functions and the policies and procedures to ensure
appropriate oversight.
We will also talk about the DOD acquisition workforce and
about acquisition management and oversight of contracts.
We are very pleased to welcome Lieutenant General Ross
Thompson, the Military Deputy to the Acting Assistant Secretary
of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology. General
Thompson is co-Chair of the task force to address the Army's
structural weaknesses and shortcomings in contracting, of which
there are many. He also shaped improvements to expeditionary
contracting activities.
We are very pleased that you are with us this morning,
General.
America has relied on contractors for national security
support and materiel since the founding of the Republic, but
that reliance has never been more pervasive than it is today.
The Army now spends twice as much on contract services than on
the pay of American military and civilian personnel combined.
For decades, it has been the policy to contract for all
functions and activities that are not inherently governmental.
But now it is impossible to define what that phrase
``inherently governmental'' means.
Further, after careful examination of some service
contracts, the Army discovered that it had contracted out some
of what we would consider--and most rational people would--
inherently governmental functions, with contractors evaluating
other contractors, building budget justifications and the like.
The Army is now bringing those jobs back in house.
This Committee has oversight of DOD funding, and under
Chairman Murtha's direction we focused considerable attention
on contracted services over the past 2 years. The Army spends a
lot of money on contracted services, and today we will hear
more about how the contracts are made, how requirements are
determined about the contracting workforce and how oversight is
accomplished.
General Thompson, thank you for the time and attention that
you have given to this problem and thank you for being here to
discuss this very important issue.
We welcome Vice Chairman Dicks, Mr. Frelinghuysen, Ms.
Granger and Ms. Kilpatrick to the hearing; and we are going to
hear now from the ranking member, Bill Young.
We appreciate your presence and leadership. Mr. Young, if
you would proceed.

Remarks of Mr. Young

Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I just want
to add my welcome to General Thompson, representing the Army in
this great, real challenge. We have had an opportunity to visit
and talk, and I feel very confident with him in charge of this
particular responsibility. So, General, thank you for being
here today. Welcome to the members of your team who are here.
Mr. Chairman, I just want to make a personal note that
sitting in back with the team is one of my constituents and a
former member of my staff like maybe 15, 18 years ago, Ky
Dughi, whose mother still lives in my district. And, Ky, she
keeps telling me to come home more often to see her.
General, welcome.
Mr. Moran. Let that be on the record.
General Thompson, you may proceed with your summarized
statement; and your entire statement will be placed in the
record.

Summary Statement of General Thompson

General Thompson. Thank you for inviting me here today,
Chairman Moran and Congressman Young and distinguished members
of the subcommittee. I really do thank you for the opportunity
to update you on the Army's progress, and I do mean progress,
in enabling the contracting mission to be agile, expeditionary
and responsive to our warfighters, while ensuring proper
stewardship of taxpayer dollars.
I have a written statement that I will respectfully request
be made part of the record of today's hearing.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, the Secretary of the Army
created a special commission on contracting, led by Dr. Jacques
Gansler and a number of distinguished members, to look at the
long-term strategic view of the Army's acquisition and
contracting mission in support of expeditionary operations. The
Army Contracting Task Force, which you alluded to, I co-chaired
with Kathryn Condon, who is the Executive Deputy at the Army
Materiel Command; and we looked at current contracting
operations and took immediate action steps where they were
necessary.
When our work was complete, we handed this off and created
a Army Contracting Campaign Plan Task Force. It was led by my
Assistant Military Deputy, Major General George Harris, who I
work with on a daily basis. We continued the review of the
Commission's recommendations and the other contracting
recommendations that came from audits and other sources to
determine the requirements and resources necessary to address
the systemic issues. The mandate of both these task forces has
been met, and their workload is being transferred to the
enduring organizations in the Army that are responsible for the
long-term contracting success, and we think our progress has
been steady and significant.
In all of our work, we were guided by Dr. Gansler's
Commission's overarching recommendation, which was to implement
the Commission's recommendations rapidly and then measure
success. Because if you don't measure success, you don't know
if you are going to get there.
The Commission outlined four supporting recommendations for
our success, and they included 40 actions to correct
discrepancies identified. Twenty-two of those were Army
specific actions; and the remaining 18 are within the purview
of the Office of the Secretary of Defense or are legislative
actions being addressed jointly among the services, with OSD in
the lead.
We have completed actions on 21 of the 22 specific
recommendations that came out of the Gansler report. The
remaining one, to increase the contracting workforce by 400
military and 1,000 civilians, is going to require more time to
ensure we have both the quality and the quantity necessary to
properly execute the contracting mission.
The initial recommendation from the Gansler Commission was
the 400 military and the 1,000 civilian. Our actual numbers
that we are pursuing in growing the contracting workforce are
446 military and 1,191 civilians. I will talk more about that
later depending on the question.
Mr. Moran. Are those on board?
General Thompson. No, sir, they are not. They are planned
in our structure. We are starting to grow those military and
civilian members this year. As I indicated yesterday when we
talked, it is going to be a multiple-year process; and I can
talk about the specific numbers. But about a third of those
numbers is the planned growth in each of the next 3 years.
Mr. Moran. But they are fully budgeted for. They are
included within the personnel ceiling?
General Thompson. Yes, sir, they are included both in the
military personnel accounts and they have been budgeted for in
our budget. And even though we may adjust the budget here, as
we resubmit it in the current schedule of April, they won't
fall out of that budget, I assure you.
We also want to thank the Congress for the five additional
general officer billets designated for acquisition. As of
September, 2008, even in advance of the authorization from the
Congress, we selected an additional general officer, a newly
promoted Brigadier General, as commander of our recently
established expeditionary contract command; and we will select
more acquisition general officers this year. That board has
already met, and the results are being reviewed appropriately
in the Defense Department, and those results will be announced
here over the next couple of months.
We have already established a two-star U.S. Army
contracting command as part of the Army Materiel Command and a
one-star-level mission and installation contracting command,
which does all of the contracting primarily for our bases.
These two billets are presently being filled by experienced
members--and I emphasize that--experienced members of the
Senior Executive Service; and it is our plan over time to
replace those two individuals with a properly qualified and
skilled general officer once those selections are done.
Let me also mention here that Brigadier General Bill
Phillips, who is really one of our best acquisition officers
with an extensive, extensive background in contracting, just
took command in the last couple of weeks of the Joint
Contracting Command in Iraq and Afghanistan. He is an excellent
choice to lead this Command. His in-depth contracting
experience and expertise will be instrumental in continuing our
efforts to improve Army contracting, and under his leadership
the Army intends to improve the management of large dollar
contracts in theater through reach-back to the Army Sustainment
Command in Rock Island, Illinois. This reach-back methodology
was largely successful in some of the issues that we had a year
and a half ago in Kuwait, and we want to expand on that success
by doing it for more of the large dollar contracts in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
As we have testified before, Mr. Chairman, the Army
acquisition workforce declined significantly in the last
decade, while the workload and the dollars associated with that
workload have increased significantly. To further improve
contracting, the Army is now participating in a defense
acquisition workforce 60-day joint assessment team to assess
and make recommendations regarding the component workforce mix,
the total force mix and future funding levels. I think
personally we are well ahead of that, so our participation is
going to just reinforce the path that we are already on.
A brief topic of interest to this committee and the U.S.
Army is insourcing. Insourcing implements congressional
direction to give special consideration to Federal Government
employee performance of contracted functions based on the
review and inventory process required by Congress for
identifying inherently governmental functions, those closely
associated with inherently governmental functions, and
unauthorized personnel services.
We have a comprehensive approach to comply with the
congressional direction. Insourcing is not simply a contracting
matter. It also involves civilian manpower authorizations, our
hiring processes and our budgets.
We have found that a practical insourcing schedule must be
established in order to ensure continuity of service. This
schedule may be affected by the timing of base realignment and
closure moves, the effect of headquarters head counts or
ceiling limits, and the ability and capacity of our civilian
infrastructure to hire people.
Most importantly, successful insourcing requires strategic
planning that looks at activities or functioning holistically
for the total work force, looking at the workforce balance
between military, Department of Army civilians and contractors
within the framework of a manpower requirements determination
process. Simplistically, what is the work that needs to get
done and what is the proper mix of the workforce in order to
get it done?
It also requires a contractor inventory and a process for
reviewing the contracted activities in that inventory. And,
again, we are well on the way; and I can talk more about that
subject to your questions. This was recently directed by the
Congress in the fiscal year 2008 National Defense Authorization
Act, but we started to put our arms around the contractor
inventory back in 2005. So we have got a very comprehensive
database, we know what that contractor inventory is, and we are
starting to make decisions around what is the proper mix of the
contractors in the workforce.
I have submitted for the record a detailed written
statement which describes how we are changing our culture in
this vital area specifically to ensure prompt compliance with
both the congressional intent and the Federal acquisition
regulation. To date, the Army is planning to in-source nearly
1,400 positions, of which 1,127 are programmed in fiscal year
2009 to 2011.
In light of the congressional interest, Dr. John Anderson,
who is sitting behind me, who is our expert in this area from
the Office of Manpower and Reserve Affairs, is leading our
efforts and has accompanied me today and is available to
provide additional details should you desire.
The other individual I would like to introduce behind me is
Mr. Ed Harrington, who is now the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
the Army for Procurement. This gets to one of my larger issues
on the acquisition workforce about having the right people.
Mr. Harrington left the Army as General Harrington in 2003
as Commander of the Defense Contract Management Agency. He has
a long history in the Federal Government and is really an
expert in the contracting area, and we convinced Mr. Harrington
to come back to work for us starting in December. We are
delighted to have him back on our team. I think he is delighted
to be with us to date.
But it is just an indication of hiring the right people in
order to help us get through these very challenging areas that
are of interest to the committee.
I am honored to be here today, and I will forthrightly--and
I mean that--answer your questions that fall into my area of
responsibility.
This concludes my opening remarks, Mr. Chairman; and I look
forward to your questions.
[The statement of General Thompson follows:]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.206

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.207

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.208

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.209

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.210

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.211

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.212

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.213

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.214

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.215

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.216

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.217

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.218

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.219

CONTRACT PERSONNEL

Mr. Moran. Thank you, General Thompson.
As difficult an issue as this is to deal with, we know that
you are not the problem, that you are part of the solution. I
would like to figure out how you got a guy like Harrington
back, because that is part of our problem. We get these
experienced people and they leave and we desperately need to
bring them back into the government, but a private contractor
is willing to pay him three times as much without harassment
from the Congress. So it is difficult to get them back. So if
you have any ideas on how that can be done, we need to know. I
don't know how you get the incentives to bring the people of
that caliber back into the government.
General Thompson. It is a good recruiting pitch, I think.
Mr. Moran. I suspect there has to be some substantive
incentives there, too. Whatever they are, I am glad you used
them.
We are here because contracted services has gone up by 183
percent in the last 8 years, while salaries for military
personnel have grown 5 percent. So we feel there is something
wrong. We want balance. We are not trying to eliminate contract
services, but it is out of balance now. I would like to hear
your views about that and what you are beginning to think might
be the proper balance.
One of the indications of the imbalance is what Chairman
Murtha continually references, the fact it appears we have more
contract personnel in Iraq than we do Federal employees,
whether it be military or civilian. I will never forget being
on one of those Congressional Delegations (CODELs) waiting in a
line that there were four or five of us, and we were doing what
we were told, we were waiting in line to get into the Green
Zone. By the time we got up to the end of the line, it didn't
take long because many people deferred to us, but I had been
looking over to our left and there was a group of people that
just walked right through, just waved and in they went.
So I asked the military police (MP), we don't mind waiting
in line, but what is with all of those folks who just walk in?
Who are they? This MP says they are from Halliburton. He said
``They run the place.'' This was the Green Zone, and somehow I
thought the U.S. military ran the place. So that is the
imbalance that has struck us.
Lord knows when we did the surge how many of those surge
personnel were actually contractors.

REDEPLOYMENT OF CONTRACT PERSONNEL

And that brings up another related issue that I think the
Committee would be interested in hearing. As we redeploy troops
out of Iraq, how are you going to redeploy those contract
personnel, who are at least as many? Are you going to do it
proportionally or whatever? That might be of interest to the
subcommittee.
If you might respond to some of those general questions,
then we are going to hear from the members of the panel and
their questions.
General Thompson. Well, let me answer the second one first
on the rebalancing as we reduce the force presence in Iraq. I
have seen and been briefed on the comprehensive plans as we
bring down the military structure that also appropriately
brings down the contract support structure that is in Iraq.
That is one of the things that is General Phillips', who just
went over there, prime responsibilities is to appropriately
bring that down.
So I don't know what the exact numbers will be, but they
will be proportional. So we should have fewer troops and a
smaller presence with the forward-operating bases. You will
need fewer support contractors to be able to support the troops
that are out there doing the mission.
The way I would look at this, Congressman, if you go back
strategically, there was a conscious decision at the end of the
Cold War to reduce the size of the military, the military force
structure. When we reduced the size of the military, it was to
keep as many of the warfighters in the force and look at the
reliance on some of the support functions that we had military
members performing such as cooks and truck drivers and supply
personnel.
In the Army, I know when we reduced from 780,000 in the
active component and a proportionate reduction in the reserve
components, we kept as much of the war fighting structure as we
could; and we eliminated not all but some of the structure that
was doing the support mission, with the thought that, if we
needed it, we could contract for it if necessary. And I think
that is what happened strategically from 2001 until today. When
we needed the base support structure and contracted support
primarily, we ended up contracting for it.
Is it too much? I don't know. I think it is a balance.
There is a defined amount of work that needs to get done in
order to support the troops. Some of it we do ourselves with
the military and the Department of Army civilians, but we have
elected to contract for it with a large proportion of it over
the last 6 years.
Mr. Moran. Thank you, General Thompson.
Again, we understand you are not the problem and didn't
make those decisions in terms of the proper balance of contract
versus in-house military personnel, but at this point let me
turn to ranking member and former chairman, Chairman Young.

DOD CONTRACT MANAGEMENT

Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
General, for a number of years, the Armed Services
Committee and especially its Chairman made the case that he
referred to them as shoppers. I am sure you know what I am
talking about. He was determined to reduce the number of people
in the contracting business at the Pentagon. Obviously, that
was not the decision on the part of the Congress, at least not
in a major way. But, today, apparently we have turned and gone
a different direction.
For example, GAO identified DOD contract management as a
high-risk area. Most recently, a senior DOD acquisition
official stated that the Department must increase the size and
capability of its civilian acquisitions workforce dramatically.
What does that mean, ``dramatically''? Does that mean an
additional 100 or 1,000 or 10,000? What does that mean? This
was GAO's recommendation, so what do you think it means?
General Thompson. Sir, what I think it means are the
numbers that I articulated in my oral statement at the
beginning and in the written statement. For us, we have gone
through our very deliberative process, and it is the 400-some
military and the nearly 1,200 civilians in the contracting
workforce, and we think that will get us to where we need to be
properly in balance with the right number of people doing this
critically important mission.
I do think the pendulum swung too far the other way. There
was a conscious decision to reduce the size of the acquisition
workforce, because we had statute at the time. We complied with
that statute, but we swung the pendulum too far, and we need to
swing it back in the other direction to an appropriate level.
I don't want one more person on my staff in any of my
organizations than I need to get the job down done. But, right
now, with the amount of contracted services we have and with
the complexity of a lot of the contract instruments, you need
to have a larger workforce. And you need to value that
workforce. You can't label them in a pejorative way. Because if
you do that, you won't get good people that want to do that
mission and function. You have got to value that contracting
workforce, make them feel like every day that they are a
valuable part of the team. Because they are. They are at the
forefront of guarding the taxpayer dollars and making sure we
get an appropriate service or product for those taxpayer
dollars.
So our numbers are there, very well thought out. We will
adjust those as we need to over time here. But, right now, I am
in a major recruiting effort, using some of the authorities
that have been given to us by Congress that we have now
implemented in policy in order to recruit the right people,
like Mr. Harrington, to come to work for the Army or the
Department of Defense in this critically important area.

ARMY CONTRACTING COMMAND

Mr. Young. General, the Committee understands you are
talking about raising the Army Contracting Command to 5,800
civilians and military personnel. Is that the right number?
General Thompson. That is about right.
Mr. Young. Where are you today?
General Thompson. We are a little over 5,000. We are about
800 short.
Mr. Young. Will that 800 be civilian or military or a
combination?
General Thompson. Primarily civilian, in the Army's
acquisition workforce as we define it. And it is not just
contracting. There are 12 different skill sets. Program
management, engineering, cost estimating are another couple of
examples as well as information technology. There are about
40,000 members roughly in the Army's acquisition workforce. We
are at about 1,500 military members today, and we will grow
that to around 2,000 over the next couple of years. The rest of
that 40,000 are all Department of the Army civilians.

WARRANT OFFICER CONTRACTING BRANCH

Mr. Young. Sir, where are you on the creation of the
warrant officer contracting branch?
General Thompson. Sir, that was a proposal to create a
career field in contracting for warrant officers. This is one
of the things that had just gotten started when Ms. Condon and
I led the early task force in 2007. We have noncommissioned
officers--NCOs--now that we are starting to recruit, and we now
have about 240 noncommissioned officers that have got
operational experience and other specialties that are now in
the contracting career field. We are looking through our
deliberate process. We call it a forced design process. Should
we have warrant officers involved in that mix between NCOs,
officers and warrant officers, which are a skill set? We
haven't come to a conclusion yet that we think warrant officers
are the right fit. They may be. But we are in the process of
evaluating that right now.
We do need the number of people, whether they are civilians
or NCOs, to do the mission; and we are evaluating whether
warrant officers would be more appropriately suited to do a
particular portion of the contraction mission, which is a broad
mission.
Mr. Young. Have you planned safeguards to make sure that we
just don't create a bloated bureaucracy that might not do any
better than what is being done today?
General Thompson. Yes, sir. And those safeguards are good
metrics and good performance plans for organizations and
individual performance plans for every individual in the
organization.
I will give you one metric that we use with the Program
Executive Officers who are direct reports to me, and there are
12 of them. We look at their overhead. So we evaluate the
percent of the dollars that they have responsibility for and
how much of that is in overhead; and we hold them to less than
5 percent, which is the high side, and in most cases it is far
less than that. So we do evaluate that very significantly in
the acquisition business. That is a key metric for me.
Mr. Young. Well, I wish you a lot of success, because this
is a real challenge, and it is a problem that is becoming more
and more obvious to the Congress and I think the general
public.
General, thanks for being here today. I appreciate your
testimony.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Young.
Vice Chairman Dicks.

NUMBER OF CONTRACTORS

Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Thompson, we are glad to have you here today.
In October of 2008, Nelson Ford, the Under Secretary of the
Army, stated, ``We really don't know the number of contractors
that we have, and we really haven't thought about the
appropriate role of contractors on the battlefield. We still
don't understand that.''
This is October of 2008. Where is all this action that was
outlined in your statement, General?
I was over in Iraq. I am sorry that Congresswoman Kaptur is
not here; she has been very interested in this. We have asked
witness after witness after witness how many contractors do we
have, and we never got an answer until we had to take out some
money and say you are not going to get your money until you
answer these questions forthrightly.
I think in my mind this was a deliberate attempt to keep
the information from Congress so that Congress wouldn't realize
the number of people that we have over there.
Now, as I understand it, when you look at the whole picture
in CENTCOM, we have currently 216,000 military personnel versus
267,000 contractors. The Under Secretary of the Army doesn't
have any idea about this? What is going on? Why was this
information withheld from the Congress? Were you ordered or did
somebody tell you not to present us the information when we
asked for it year after year after year?
We went over there to Iraq, and I met with the officials
there in Iraq, and I asked them these questions. They said, we
don't know. That was the official answer from the military
until this hearing today. Why didn't we know?
General Thompson. Sir, I don't know why that information
wasn't presented to you, but that information is available. I
remember Congresswoman Kaptur asking me those questions last
year, and I answered the questions very closely to what the
numbers actually were, and then we followed up on that in
response to the Committee. And I have got those numbers.
Mr. Dicks. Why does the Under Secretary still think we
don't know anything about this?
General Thompson. Sir, I don't know. Mr. Ford is no longer
the Under Secretary. I have a great deal of respect for Mr.
Ford.
Mr. Dicks. Is this one of the reasons?
General Thompson. For Mr. Ford? No, sir. I think it was
just the appropriate time because of the change of the
administrations.
Mr. Dicks. For a long time there was a difficulty within
the administration to come up with any numbers.
General Thompson. And we have those numbers today. I will
ask one of the guys here in the back to pull out the sheet, and
I will give you the latest numbers.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense now has a Senior
Executive Service member, Mr. Gary Motsek, who has put his arms
around this issue. We have monthly reports. I get a report
every day that accounts for the contractor workforce in the
theater. It comes on my BlackBerry every morning at 6 o'clock,
and we gather up those numbers on a monthly basis and report
them. I can give you the January figures in just a minute here.

SURGE IN CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES

Mr. Dicks. Was the surge really the surge in contractor
employees, or was it these additional five brigades? What are
these 267,000 people doing besides supporting the troops? Is
that basically what it is all about?
General Thompson. Well, it is supporting the troops. I will
give you the exact numbers in a minute here. But a lot of the
individuals that are over there are local nationals.
So here are the numbers as of the middle of January.
In the CENTCOM area of responsibility--that is Iraq,
Afghanistan, Kuwait, Qatar, that whole area--there are 266,678
contractors; 41,000 of those are U.S. citizens, 100,640 are
third-country nationals, and 125,000 are local and host-country
nationals. A lot of the local and host-country nationals are
being hired in order to create jobs, in order to rebuild their
own infrastructure in Iraq.
Those numbers are available. There is no reason why they
can't be shared with the Members of Congress.
Mr. Dicks. That is good. That was not part of your
testimony, I don't believe, was it?
General Thompson. It was not in the prepared statement that
I made.
Mr. Dicks. Are there any other reports like this that you
would like to present us? We would like to have that for the
record.
General Thompson. We can add that for the record. There is
no information here that should not be part of the public
record.
[The information follows:]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.220

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.221

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.222

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.223

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.224

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.225

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.226

Mr. Moran. If the gentleman will yield, this is the number
of deployed contractors, but we also wanted to know how many
contractors are working for the defense establishment. Do we
have that number? Can we even guess at what it might be?
General Thompson. I can tell you that number for the Army.
I don't know the number off the top of my head for the entire
Department of Defense. If you just give me one second,
Congressman.
Dr. Anderson, who as I said earlier is our expert in this
area.
Mr. Dicks. Do you want him to come up to testify?
General Thompson. I don't think it is necessary unless I
don't get this right. John will keep me straight.
But in the deployed infrastructure, which is not what is
overseas, the number is about 125,000 for the Army right now.
We started in 2005, before I had the job that I am in now, when
our former Secretary asked us to get our arms around this issue
because he wanted to understand the total workforce mix. So we
have gone out and gathered that information on how many
contractors we have working for us.
Mr. Dicks. 125,000 separate contractors.
General Thompson. Separate than the number I just gave you.
Mr. Dicks. This isn't people. This is contractors. He is
telling me you are wrong now.
General Thompson. Yes, full-time equivalent employees.
Mr. Dicks. Okay, but not 125,000 contractors who would have
500,000 employees.
General Thompson. It is 125,000 people that are part of the
multiple contracts we have got. I don't know what that number
is, but 125,000 full-time equivalents people.
Mr. Moran. So the answer to Vice Chairman Dicks' question
is there are about 400,000 contracted people working for the
Army alone in addition to the normal military and civilian
hired personnel?
General Thompson. If I can make a clarification, the
266,000 number in the CENTCOM area of responsibility are all
DOD, are all contractors, not just Army. The 125,000 number
that Dr. Anderson just gave us are the ones that work for the
Army here in the continental United States.

ACQUISITION

Mr. Dicks. The other point I would like to make, I think we
have to make a distinction--correct me if I am wrong--but this
contracting that is going on and sending those people over
there instead of government workers or whatever, there is a
whole separate thing here which is acquisition, right? The
acquisition thing is the Army's ability to go out and buy
equipment, which has not been one of your strong suits over the
years, just thinking of the six or seven billion dollars that
we lost on the Comanche helicopter. Acquisition hasn't been one
of the--since the '80s, when we did the tank, the Bradley and
the Infantry Fighting Vehicle and the helicopter. So we are
trying to get the acquisition thing straightened out.
I go back to what Mr. Young said. The former chairman of
the Armed Services Committee kept demeaning these acquisition
people as ``shoppers''. This is the people that go out and get
the weapons system, buying the equipment, doing this stuff. We
cut way back on the number of people we had there,
unfortunately.
Can you tell us just quickly what are we trying to do to
improve Army acquisition, to try to get beyond the period of
time when we have been not very successful in bringing in new
equipment?
General Thompson. The strategic thing, Congressman Dicks,
is the people and having the right number of people and having
the people with the right skill set. We have an excellent
acquisition workforce today. They have certification levels
that they have to achieve. They have required training.
Mr. Dicks. Are any of those people contractors?
General Thompson. The acquisition workforce that I referred
to, the 40,000 earlier, are all government.
Mr. Dicks. This is inherently government.
General Thompson. This is inherently government. They do
the inherently governmental things. They write and approve
contracts, they build budgets, they approve payments, they do
the final checks on everything that is required in the Federal
Acquisition Regulation and the Defense and the Army supplements
that go with that.
There are contractors that work in support of the
acquisition process, for example, in engineering. When we don't
have the engineer with the right skill set because of a
particular technical area, we will go out and hire that
engineer to work for us, and then they have the appropriate
checks on what they can and cannot do because they are a
contractor.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Moran. Well, thank you, Mr. Dicks.
The problem we are having up here is that for these
contracted services that you said are 125,000 working for the
Pentagon, basically----
Mr. Dicks. No, this is for the Army.
Mr. Moran. The Army.
Mr. Dicks. Not for the whole military.
Mr. Moran. That is right. We understand that. Just for the
Army. The number in the budget is $35 billion for contracted
services. It averages out to, what, 20 or 30 million per
person. So we are wondering if it isn't much larger than
125,000. That is something the staff is working on now, but you
may want to respond to that. Because the figure we have for
contracted services for the Army for 2007, that is the time
period that you gave us those numbers, is $35 billion. It was
an increase of $23 billion over 2000.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Chairman, is that just for personnel, or is
that buying stuff as well?
Mr. Moran. Well, it says contracted services. So it is just
contracted services, which is not products, it is not
equipment, it is not weapons. Maybe your people there, Mr.
Anderson, might give some thought to that, and you can respond
to us in a few moments.
Let's hear from Mr. Frelinghuysen for the time being.
Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, will you yield for a moment before
we leave this subject?

QUALIFICATIONS FOR CONTRACTING OFFICIAL

General, what qualifications do you require when you hire
someone as a contracting official? We are talking about large
numbers of people, adding large numbers of people. What kind of
experience do you expect, do you demand or do you get?
General Thompson. The minimum qualification is 24 college
credits in a business or a management or an economic area for
contracting, and then there are the certification levels as
they work through, they have a number of courses they have to
go to and a number of individual self-development things they
have to do. To be certified at level 1, it is 2 years of
experience on the job. To be certified at level 2, it is an
additional 2 years of experience at an appropriate job. And
level 3 just adds on top of that.
So, depending on the discipline, for engineering, you would
expect us to hire people with an engineering degree; and we do.
For cost estimating, somebody that has got an economics degree
or accounting degree. Those are the kind of people that we hire
for the different acquisition career fields.
Mr. Young. Do you hire them with personal interviews, or do
you just use this computer system that seems to be engulfing
the government where a person applies on line and they get a
response yes, no or maybe on-line, never having talked to or
had contact with a human being?
General Thompson. Well, I can't say categorically that it
is 100 percent done with interviews, but it is pretty close to
100 percent. My stump speech to people is the most important
thing you do is to hire the right people to work for you. And
if you can do that with a computer resume, more power to you. I
don't see how you do that. So the ones that I am involved in
the selection process with and all of the people that I
interact with at a more senior level typically go through an
interview process.
They will get, as an example, 10 resumes for a particular
job application. I forget the exact number for Mr. Harrington,
but it was over 20 people applied for his position. We
evaluated those, we picked what we thought were the top 7 or 8,
and I personally interviewed every one of those individuals, in
some cases more than once, in order to make sure we got the
right person for the job.
That is the typical way it is done. It is time-consuming,
yes, but it is also a critically important thing to do.
Mr. Young. Mr. Frelinghuysen, thank you very much for
yielding to me.

ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Young.
The Committee has focused on the issue of contractors in
Iraq and Afghanistan, and I assume we have quite a few
contractors in Kuwait, where we have a rather large footprint,
and much has been made of the fact that we have so many
contractors. But the figures you have given us here about
foreign nationals--and what was the other category?
General Thompson. Third country nationals.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Third country nationals. That puts the
picture in far greater focus.
In Vietnam, we had similar foreign national support. We had
large companies with a variety of different initials which ran
military bases large and small. So there is contracting, and
there is contracting.
I would like to just know sort of what you are doing in
terms of ratcheting up the acquisition workforce. It is a
little indefinite as to where you stand relative to your hiring
goals. But how are those goals impeded by issues of
retirements/loss of institutional memory and what are you doing
to sort of retain people, taking a look at a variety of
different incentives? Much has been made of the whole issue of
competition for people with core competency. Can you sort of
briefly touch on those issues dealing with issues of retirement
and retention?
General Thompson. Yes, sir. There has been lots of studies
done, Congressman Frelinghuysen, on the percent of the
government workforce--we are talking civilians primarily now--
who are retirement eligible or will be early retirement
eligible in the next 5 years; and those numbers are at the 50
to 60 percent level, typically, depending on the study that is
done. So when we take into account our necessary strategic
hiring plan, we take into account those retirement numbers.
We typically don't see nearly the number of people retire
in a year that could retire in a year. People typically stick
around longer than they could in order to draw retirement
benefits, which is a good thing for us because you do want to
keep that experience and skill set.
So when we look at the strategic hiring, how many we are
going to hire in 2009 and 2010 and out, we take into account
those numbers. We predict how many we need in order to keep the
numbers up against the authorization documents that are out
there. So in the acquisition workforce, again, if I can go back
to the 40,000, to try to stay at least at that steady state for
40,000, and as we grow by a couple of thousand over the next
few years how do we make sure that we don't fall further
behind.
The one thing that we have gotten from the Congress in the
2008 authorizations are the Section 852 permissions which were
designed to give us the right statute and mechanism to recruit,
retain, and train the acquisition workforce; and we are doing
that. We are using those tools starting in 2008. We got started
late in the year, but we are going to spend in the DOD nearly
$900 million out to 2013 in order to take care of the
government acquisition workforce.
As I mentioned yesterday to several of you, the mechanism
to do that is to tax the contracted services dollars. So to
meet the intent of Congress is to tax the dollars that we are
spending on contracted services and spend less there and to
take that nearly $900 million and apply it for the right
incentives for the government acquisition workforce. I am not
the best business person in the world, but that is a pretty
good way, I think, of meeting the intent of Congress and
accomplishing a number of objectives.

REACH-BACK TECHNIQUE

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Lastly, I think you somewhere made a
good choice with General Phillips being responsible for
contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Could you comment on the
whole issue, what you call the reach-back? Is this the issue
that was identified in the Gansler report of the Pentagon
actually talking to the commanders in the field as to what the
hell is going on and getting their take on things, rather than
on some other, shall we say, more traditional model?
General Thompson. Yes, sir.
When I use the term reach-back, the contracting process is
a broad process that starts with identifying what do you want
to do, what is the requirement. That process, the requirements
definition has got to be done with what the commander needs,
whether it is base support services or transportation services
or pick something that is a requirement. That part has got to
be done with the requiring activity of the commander in the
field.
But a lot of the contracting process, the detailed source
selection, the pricing, things like that, doesn't have to be
done in theater, and I would argue strategically, don't do
forward what you can do back here. With the tools that we have
got available today, if I can do the source selection process,
the evaluation, the pricing, the negotiation with the
contractors, if I can do all that at Rock Island, Illinois,
which we have done very successfully with the contracts we had
in Kuwait.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. So you have problem-solving teams back
here.
General Thompson. Back here. And what we did in Kuwait,
when Ms. Condon and I got that started, is we put the people at
Rock Island, Illinois, who were in support of the contracting
office in Kuwait, we put them on the same work schedule. So
they would start work at 7 o'clock Kuwait time, which was 3 or
4 o'clock in the afternoon here. They would run the same work
schedule. So they were in direct support. That has proved to be
very, very successful.
I can give you an example on one contract that we
negotiated because of the right expertise back at Rock Island
where we had an $18 million savings from what we would have
already spent, and a lot of other examples that way. General
Phillips is well aware of that. He is over there to do his
command mission for the joint contracting, but one of his
specific strategic objectives is to appropriately expand the
use of that reach-back technique for what we are doing in Iraq
and Afghanistan.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. And that is into Afghanistan as we move
a greater obligation there, expand that?
General Thompson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you.
General Thompson. Bill Phillips has got responsibility,
Congressman, for both the contracting in Iraq and in
Afghanistan.
Mr. Moran. Mr. Visclosky.
Mr. Visclosky. I will defer.
Mr. Moran. Ms. Kaptur.

COST OF CONTRACTORS

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, General. I am sorry I wasn't here a little bit
earlier. I had two other briefings and meetings I had to
attend.
I am very interested in the subject of contracting, and you
have a very difficult job.
I wanted to ask you for the record, do you have the most
recent numbers of the number of contractors employed in Iraq
versus--hired by our military--versus the number of individuals
who are, as you have, dedicated their lives to the military in
the regular force? Could you provide those numbers for the
record? And could you tell me off the top of your head are
those numbers of contractors increasing or decreasing at this
point as a percent of total budget?
General Thompson. We talked about those numbers before you
had the opportunity to join us, because that question came up
already. I can restate that, but I plan on leaving those
numbers behind with the latest DOD report.
Ms. Kaptur. All right. Are those numbers increasing?
General Thompson. I don't know. I will check before we
leave here and somebody go back and look at the notes. I don't
know what the trend has been in the last year, for example. I
want to give you the most relevant information.
My recollection is that they have been fairly steady for
the last couple of years, not increasing dramatically but
fairly steady over the last couple of years.
Ms. Kaptur. According to the numbers I have, from the
period of 2000 to 2007, the Army's spending on contracted
services grew by 183 percent in constant dollars while spending
on military and civilian personnel salaries grew by 5 percent.
The personnel salaries of the Army's budget were 31 percent,
had fallen to 15 percent of the total, and contracted services
from the year 2000 to date rose from 15 percent to now 20
percent of the total. And in October of 2008, Nelson Ford, then
Under Secretary of the Army, made this statement--I don't know
if others have put this in.
Mr. Moran. We have discussed it.
Ms. Kaptur. Okay. So my question is, what steps is the Army
taking to understand its reliance on contractors?
General Thompson. To the specific numbers, ma'am, having a
little bit of an operations research background, I always ask
what was the source of the information. And I think we probably
need to get with that and reconcile that with the committee
staffers to make sure of the numbers. But not arguing about the
percentages. I can say, no matter what database they came from,
that the spending on contracted services has grown faster than
the percent that we have spent on military pay.
As I indicated earlier, we started in 2005 to get our arms
around the number of contractors, full-time equivalents, that
work for the Army. Dr. Anderson, who I introduced earlier, has
built that database over time.
Our process right now is, as we look at our authorization
documents for the organizations in the Army, we don't just look
at how many military are there or Department of the Army
civilians. We also look at how many contract employees they
have and should they be contract employees.
Ms. Kaptur. Do you look at salary levels and compensation?
General Thompson. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Kaptur. That will be in this document or material given
to the committee?
General Thompson. It can be. We can come back to your
staffers or the professional staffers on the committee with Dr.
Anderson and show you our process to evaluate that.
But it is what is the work to be done, simplistically. What
is the right mix, military, government or civilian, to do that?
A lot of that is driven by the dollars available. So if I got
somebody that is picking up trash on an installation, we will
pay them an appropriate salary to pick up the trash that goes
through a justification process to make sure that is a fair
salary to pay, a fair contracted price to pay. All that is done
in conjunction with the proper auditors and the Defense
Contract Management Agency.
Ms. Kaptur. Well, I don't want to repeat what others may
have said earlier, but I am very, very interested in the costs
to the taxpayers of the United States of increasing reliance on
contractors, and I am very interested in contracted work force.
I have asked for that information in the past. I am still
interested in that. And I am interested in compensation levels.
So I would be very interested in the meals. I am interested
in the whole deal. But I am particularly interested in the
contracted forces and what has happened since the year of 2000
to date, and I am interested in those compensation and benefit
levels.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Moran. Thank you, Ms. Kaptur.
The $35 billion, which represents the 183 percent increase
in contract personnel, is comprised of almost 400,000 people.
But if that includes all the foreign nationals who are paid
virtually nothing in terms of U.S. dollars, $10,000, $15,000,
$20,000 at the most, which of course has much more purchasing
power in their country of origin, but it is an average figure
of $100,000 that probably masks some great disparities in terms
of compensation levels. So I think what Ms. Kaptur and the
Committee would like is to break some of those numbers down.
For example, what do the average American contract service
person get per person compensation? What does the foreign
national get? And maybe break them down by security or
professional category so that we can get our hands around this
to see what is a typical kind of compensation for these
personnel. Because just to say 400,000 and 35 billion, doesn't
really give us much insight into whether it is appropriate or
not.
General Thompson. I think that is definitely a fair
question. That is analysis we can do.
Again, it comes back to what is the source of the
information, and you've got to come to agreement on where the
data came from and how we pulled it. Otherwise, we could be
talking past one another.
But, back to the point, roughly half of the contractors in
theater are the local and host country nationals who do make a
salary at the lower end of the wage scale. And it is done not
just because we need the work done, but it is also done so that
they have jobs and they don't become insurgents themselves and
they begin to rebuild their own economy as well.
Mr. Moran. We are not arguing about that policy. I don't
think that is at issue.
Did you want to continue to pass, Mr. Visclosky?
Mr. Visclosky. I will keep passing.
Mr. Moran. Mr. Bishop.

INSOURCING/OUTSOURCING

Mr. Bishop. Thank you very much.
Let me also extend my welcome to you, General Thompson.
I want to talk about, at least inquire about, outsourcing,
about insourcing and also about some contingency contract
problems. The 2008 Defense Authorization Bill required that the
services take an inventory of the contracts; and, of course,
the Army did that and was fairly aggressive I think with some
push from our subcommittee; and I think you had some initial
findings.
As I understand it, you reviewed your contractor positions;
and you discovered there were a number of inherently
governmental functions that were in fact performed by
contractors. I want to ask you what do you as a military person
identify as the dangers of relying on contractors for
inherently governmental functions, and in your review were you
able to convert some of those positions thus far from contract
positions to government positions? And what are the financial
implications that you have been able to determine were the
result of either utilizing the contractors for governmental
functions or switching back and if that was a cost saving. And
what are the factors that you are using to determine what the
mission needs are with regard to governmental functions or for
contractors or government personnel?
General Thompson. Let me start, Congressman, and I think I
will get answers to all of those questions, and if I don't,
just remind me, and I will come back to it.
We have a very deliberate process, and I gave some of the
committee staffers the checklist ahead of time. This is a
checklist that we go through that has to be signed by a senior
official for service contract approvals. It starts with the
statute and works its way down; it is a yes/no checklist.
I will just give you an example looking at the checklist
for inherently governmental.
Here is an example: Does the function involve contractors
providing legal advice and interpretations of regulations and
statutes? Does the contract involve the direct conduct of
criminal investigations? Does it involve the conduct of foreign
relations? Determination of Federal program priorities for
budget requests.
Those are just examples of a very comprehensive checklist.
You must answer no to all of those, or you cannot contract it
out, because by the definition we determine that to be
inherently governmental.
That process is in place.
Mr. Bishop. How is that monitored? Is that left to the
discretion of the local commander? Who decides whether that yes
or no answer is sufficient or is accurate?
General Thompson. It is the appropriate level of approval
authority depending on the contract value, in most cases. For
example, I, for the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Acquisition who I work for, have the approval authority for
services contracts over a certain dollar threshold.
Mr. Bishop. What is that dollar threshold?
General Thompson. That dollar threshold is $250 million.
That is not just one year. That is multiple years in some
cases. So any request for a services contract that exceeds that
threshold has to come to me, and with that packet comes this
checklist.
Mr. Bishop. Okay. So if they do it incrementally and it
does not exceed that amount, it means who under you without
having to get your approval has the discretion to make that
decision, if they decide to do it, say, in $500,000 increments
or $250,000 increments or $1 million increments or $10 million
increments? What kind of checks and balances do we have there
so we know they are not done incrementally to get around the
approval of a sharp eye like yours?
General Thompson. It is against our policy to do things
incrementally because that is really not meeting the intent.
The approval authorities for those service contract thresholds
below me are depending on the dollar value.

INCREMENTAL CONTRACTS

Mr. Bishop. The Gansler commission found that there were a
number of incremental contracts, in fact, an excessive number,
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and they found that was a problem
because it caused unnecessary workload, inefficient operations,
and limited the contracting officer's ability to achieve a
better bargain. Now, apparently it may have been against your
policies to do it but the Gansler commission found that it was
very common practice that was being done. Some of them were
funded monthly, and some of them even on more shorter intervals
than monthly.
General Thompson. A couple of points. There is no threshold
on the checklist. Every services contract has got to have that
checklist gone through, and it is part of the contract file,
and so you make it part of the record on who approved that, it
could be a $2 contract or a $250 million contract. I don't have
any specific examples. If we had specific examples of somebody
that was trying to break apart a contract in multiple
increments to get underneath the threshold, we would deal with
that appropriately. We would deal with that appropriately
administratively or legally or criminally if it came to that.
Mr. Bishop. But the discretion is that the command level,
the unit level, brigade level?
General Thompson. It is typically at the general officer or
the SES equivalent level.
Mr. Bishop. That doesn't depend on an amount?
General Thompson. No, it doesn't. The principal assistants
responsible for contracting in the government are the senior
procurement officials who have the most expertise in compliance
with the Federal Acquisition Regulation and all of the policies
that exist.
Mr. Bishop. But all of that has been thrown out for the
most part with Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly at the
beginning of the effort with the no-bid, sole-source contracts.
General Thompson. Sir, I don't think it has been thrown
out, and to make sure we are complying with that, our Army
audit agency is doing an audit on that very issue just to make
sure we are in compliance. We have a team that works for Mr.
Harrington, a contract operations review team, that goes out
and reviews every one of our contracting organizations to make
sure that they are in compliance. That is in addition to the
Army Audit Agency, the DOD, the Inspector General.
Mr. Bishop. That is a relatively recent occurrence, though,
only after this Committee, through the language that we put in
our report, as well as the authorization committee required
that you be more accountable for that. You weren't doing it
before that, were you?
General Thompson. I would say that we have probably paid
more attention to it since the interest has been there, but it
is not something that we just started recently. It is part of
the process. The detailed checklist is relatively new because
of the emphasis there, and that has been put in place within in
the last year.
Mr. Anderson. Since June.
General Thompson. Within the last year.
Mr. Bishop. Since June, did I hear him say?
General Thompson. Yes.
Mr. Moran. That was 7 years on, but thank you very much,
Mr. Bishop, for your line of inquiry.
I would wonder, General, if you might pass that checklist
around. It appears to be the kind of checklist this Committee
was pursuing. And it is strange that it is the only Army that
has it, but it is the kind of checklist that we need so as to
define what should be inherently governmental work in terms of
classification. So if you would just pass that around to the
Members and give it to the staff at some point.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Mr. Chairman, could the staff get it and
copy it and see that we all get it?
Mr. Moran. Yes.
General Thompson. We did give a copy to Ms. Reese but we
will provide additional copies.
[The information follows:]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.227

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.228

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.229

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.230

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.231

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.232

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.233

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.234

Mr. Moran. Mr. Young, you had a request you wanted to make
at this point.
Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, what I discussed with you off the
record was whether or not it would be any advantage to the
Committee or if it would be a task so large that I shouldn't
ask for it to have a list of all of the contractors employed by
the Department of Defense and how many people they employ and
what they do. I just--I am seeing amazing numbers, and I am
just thinking of bloated bureaucracies all over the place.
General, if we were to ask you to provide that for the
record, would that be an insurmountable assignment?
General Thompson. From an Army perspective, again, going
back, Congressman, we started to gather that information
starting in 2005. So we have got a pretty good handle on that
information in the Army. I don't know if the other
organizations are as far along.
You have got the Web site?
Mr. Anderson. It is on our Web site in a PDF file.
General Thompson. That information for the Army is on a Web
site that is accessible?
Mr. Anderson. Yes, it is an M and RA Web site.
General Thompson. M and RA is the Manpower and Reserve
Affairs Assistant Secretary of the Army. So we have got that
information for the Army, it is not an onerous burden.
But, starting in 2005, I will tell you there was a lot of
pushback when Dr. Anderson and I sat with the Secretary of the
Army and said, we really need to do this, and he agreed because
he knew the importance of it to get our arms around this. But
it has been a couple of years of work to get this to where we
are right now. So if the committee would ask the Defense
Department to do it, I am not sure that other parts of the
Defense Department would be happy to have that analysis passed.
Mr. Young. Are you saying this would be available to the
Committee online?
Mr. Anderson. Yes, sir. We provided it to Congress last
fall, and it is also on our Web site so it is available.
Mr. Moran. You provided to the authorizing or
Appropriations Committee?
Mr. Anderson. To both. It was in a hard file, and then we
had electronic versions. It is a work in progress. We think it
is about 70 percent accurate. That is a guess.
Mr. Moran. Seventy percent accurate?
Mr. Anderson. Right. Because we compare it to the your
accounting system numbers. We have about 82 billion reported
associated with 125,000 and it is important to understand the
accounting system counts the total invoice amount of the
contract which includes other direct costs. We also have direct
labor amount, which is a portion of that.
General Thompson. You can't just divide the $82 billion by
125,000 and get a number. That is why it is important,
Congressman, to define the analysis task so we don't end up
with an average number that over or under represents the point
we are trying to make.
Mr. Moran. The 125,000 you are referring to, if it is not
82 I think----
Ms. Kilpatrick. Mr. Chairman----
Mr. Moran. I think that would result in 20 million per
contract person; so we know that is not accurate.
General Thompson. That is right.
Mr. Moran. The information our staff--she does not recall
our being in receipt of that, but if we could get that, I think
that would be helpful.
[The information follows:]

The contractors and the number of contracted full-time equivalents
providing services to the Army worldwide are listed in the Army FY2007
Report of Contracts for Services, which is available on the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs website at
http://www.asamra.army.mil/ref.htm. Included in the report is a list of
contracted functions with the number of contractor full-time
equivalents performing the functions and the total contract costs and
direct salary costs of the functions.

SEE ATTACHMENT: FY2007 Army Inventory of Contracting Contract Services

Ms. Kaptur.
Ms. Kaptur. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman for
yielding.
I just wanted to ask in the way that information is
organized, if one goes to that, which categories, how is it
arranged? Are we going to just look at an accounting list, or
are there headings for different functions within that? If I am
interested in contracted force, how easy is that to pick out
versus garage collection? What are we going to look at when we
look at this site?
Ms. Kilpatrick. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Moran. Ms. Kilpatrick.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Being the newest member on here and having
done some of the research, the Web site is very convoluted. It
is not an easy access; it is incomplete. And as he mentioned,
they are in the process of getting better in formulating. We
have been looking at it, and it is coming, but it is not what
you want yet. And as a teacher-- it takes a while. So we have
begun the process. There are several things you have to compare
in chart and form. It is not something you are quite looking
for, but it is a start, I think.
Mr. Moran. We will see if we can't perfect it. But as we
understand it, it is only the Army that is even trying to do
it.
Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Bishop. That is the point. What has made it so
frustrating for us is, with different accounting methods, with
different methods of organizing the data, it has been virtually
impossible for us as a Committee and for the auditors as well
as the Inspectors General to sort all of this information out
and sometimes we wondered if it was intentionally obfuscated so
we couldn't track it and of course up until the last couple of
years we were not allowed very much oversight, and we just
begun our serious oversight 2 years ago, and I think that
somehow we have got to make sure that we compare apples to
apples and originals to originals.
Mr. Moran. It is an appropriate line of questioning. So if
you could get it to us in a way we could get our arms around it
intellectually to understand what it is we are seeing, it would
be very helpful to this Committee.
General Thompson. And to all of the members of the
Committee, Mr. Chairman, if you would just define for us the
questions you think you want answered, we will go out of our
way to give you access to all of that information and to make
sure we are talking apples to apples, not passed from one to
another, because it is not helpful to you or to us if we are
throwing out numbers that we don't come from the same frame of
reference from the database perspective and accounting, et
cetera. We want to get this right because it is our
responsibility to get it right, and we owe that to you.
Mr. Moran. I think the staff may have done that. But the
staff will give you a clear list of questions that we would
like to have answered.

Remarks of Ms. Kaptur

Ms. Kaptur. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to place this
experience on the record. As someone who tried to understand
how our government had contracted with Blackwater security in
Iraq, and Mr. Dicks led us on a CODEL. We were in Iraq. We were
in Baghdad. And what I found was that the Blackwater contract
wasn't under DOD. It was over at the State Department. So even
when you produce your data set for us, one of my questions is,
who is contracting for force across this government, and can
this Committee access that information from other Committees?
Because we have people being paid in theater that one would
normally think would be under the purview of this Committee,
and all of a sudden, you find it is squished over somewhere
else inside the Government of the United States, and it was
extraordinarily frustrating to try to track contracting when it
was in other places in this government. So I don't know how you
deal with referral contracts that were over at State, for
example, and they were doing more than just guarding embassy
personnel. But I wanted to place that experience on the record
so we can get at the full extent of contracted force.
Mr. Bishop. Will the gentlewoman yield on that point?
Mr. Moran. This is getting a little out of order here, but
very quickly go ahead.
Mr. Bishop. If the gentlewoman will recall, I think it was
2 years ago that she was only able to get any information about
that contracting from Vanity Fair Magazine.
Mr. Frelinghysen. So the object here is to substitute our
military for whatever these people are doing in terms of
protective services? I sort of want to know where we are going
here. I am for full disclosure, but with all due respect, when
we go over there, would you rather have our soldiers doing
that?
Ms. Kaptur. Yes.
Mr. Frelinghysen. All right, I just sort of wanted to know
that so----
Ms. Kaptur. I want to understand who it is providing force,
certainly inside theater, but in any place relating to our
Department of Defense, I want to know who they are. And I found
with Blackwater, all of a sudden it vaporized, and it was over
at the Department of State. At least that is what we were told,
and it was very hard to find it inside of DOD and how all of
that happened.
Mr. Moran. The decision as to the allocation of security
personnel wasn't made by General Thompson, but what we are
trying to get here is a handle on the scope of contracting out,
the imbalance, et cetera. And we are really primarily talking
about the Army here. So if we could develop kind of a best
practices approach to at least providing the Committee with
relevant information, I think that would be helpful. And then
we can ask other military services to do the same so that we
can get our handle--our arms around the scope of this, and that
will yield to some policy conclusions. But at this point if we
can get information as to at least the Army's contracting, as
Mr. Young has suggested, in a way that we can understand, we
would very much appreciate that, General.
And at this time, let us turn to Mr. Kingston.
Mr. Kingston.

BECOMING PRIVATE CONTRACTORS

Mr. Kingston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I just want to say I represent the Third Infantry
in Hinesville, Georgia, Savannah, at Fort Stewart. I know a lot
of the retired soldiers actually are able to be effective by
becoming private contractors, and the ones I know are really
great, top notch people. Most of them didn't even want to get
out of the Army, but as you know, there is a kind of retirement
timeline. So it might be helpful for you for the record to
outline the advantages because I know of so many really young
people who are now out of the Army but want to stay involved in
Iraq, believe in the mission, are dedicated to the mission,
doing a great job, working side by side with soldiers right
now, and it could be good just for you to outline some of the
advantages of using contractors because I don't think we talk
about it that much. And there are mistakes that are made by
contractors, just as there are by men and women active duty in
uniform, but the ones that get the headlines are the mistakes,
not the good work. However, I actually wanted--so if you could
submit that for the record, that will be very helpful, I think.
General Thompson. A point would be that part of our
recruiting efforts for the Army are to look at those men and
women who have served in uniform that because of retirement
eligibility or just for personal reasons decided to not wear
the uniform anymore. We have active programs to recruit them if
they are good people, most of them are or they wouldn't get
through all of the wickets, to continue to work for us. I do
that personally. I have a lot of senior officers, for example,
in the acquisition workforce that, when they do decide it is
time to retire, I try to encourage them to look for the federal
civilian opportunities to continue to work for us because it
takes 20, 25 years to develop that kind of a skill set, and you
don't want to let that skill set go. So that is part of the
routine for us, not just in the acquisition workforce.
Mr. Kingston. And also when they return to service wearing
a contractor's hat, so to speak, they actually have some
flexibility which they did not have when they were in the Army.
And it also gives you flexibility that, if you don't need them,
you don't hire them. But there are a lot of people who actually
don't make colonel or general, and they are forced to retire,
and yet they have lots to offer, lots of good productivity.
General Thompson. I agree 100 percent.

PROCUREMENT SYSTEM

Mr. Kingston. Actually, my question, though, is in a
different direction. In terms of procurement, when we earmark
things--and I have been with lots of military procurement
people, and I will say--I will ask a rhetorical question, how
many of you think the Army or Navy or whatever procurement
system is in great shape? Zero hands go up.
And I understand everybody thinks there is room for
improvement. But when we earmark stuff in the budget, often it
is because of a frustration with procurement. And this
committee was known, I guess, as the one who really pushed for
the Predator, for example, and there are other weapons systems,
and I can tell you some other stories, as I am sure everybody
here can, but I think all of us really try to vet the earmarks.
There is this public perception that, oh, you know, you
like somebody, they are a supporter, you want to earmark. I
don't think anybody, Democrat or Republican, does that,
particularly on this committee. We vet it. We shop it around at
Pentagon. Is this really the gizmo that you want? Because there
is really only one private company that could supply it or
manufacture it or whatever, and we have to earmark it. Does
this help the system or does this undermine the system? And you
are kind of darned if you do and darned if you don't, but is
there a growing problem or a growing solution with DOD
earmarks?
General Thompson. Well, earmarks do indicate the intent of
the Congress, and we execute on those earmarks for the most
part. The strategic objective though is full and open
competition wherever we can do it. So roughly two-thirds of all
of our contract actions are full and open competition. They are
very strict. There are seven provisions that allow you to not
do full and open competition. Those things again have to be
approved all the way up to the Assistant Secretary level or the
DOD level in some cases so the arching principle is full and
open competition so that everybody out there has an opportunity
to compete for that product or services. And that is the
overarching objective in every acquisition decision we make,
and we only do not do full and open competition by exception.
Mr. Kingston. So are earmarks good or bad? I would never
ask you to answer that in a yes or no, General. But I can tell
you that----
General Thompson. It depends.
Mr. Kingston. We all have seen earmarks that have done
something very helpful.
General Thompson. That is true.
Mr. Kingston. Yet I think all of us would like to think,
hey, if this is a good system, it doesn't need an earmark
because the Army is going to go after it anyhow but the problem
is the Army doesn't, and many times these are your small
entrepreneurial inventors that come up with the idea and, it is
something that the soldiers on the ground actually do want.
But, again, I think most of us vet the heck out of this stuff
before we thrust it.
General Thompson. We do look for those small innovative
solutions. But it has to start with a need for that. And
sometimes you create a need when you have got an inventive
solution, but it has got to start with the need. And I get a
lot of people that talk to me at trade shows and things like
that, if I could just get you to buy this particular product,
my answer always is, go back and look at our solicitation
opportunities, which are open to everybody, and compete that
product. And I will say that the ones that are good are
successful, and the ones that are not good are not so
successful.
But I will say for the record, and this is a broad
statement and I hope it doesn't get me into too much trouble
here, a lot of people oversell the value of their product or
service. And when you bore into it and you look at it
objectively with set criteria that we do for all of our
contracts, the ones that are good come to the top, and the ones
that are not so good come to the bottom. And if somebody feels
like they haven't gotten a fair shot, they have appropriate
remedies to include a protest of our action that goes to GAO,
and we fairly adjudicate that. So I think the proper checks and
balances are in the system. The outcomes of those checks and
balances are not always in the government's favor or the
contractor's favor but they are fair.
Mr. Kingston. Well, we want to work with you if there is a
better way for us to do earmarks, something we should know, we
want to work closely with you because we don't want to be
embarrassed, and we don't want you to be embarrassed, and we
certainly don't want to waste taxpayers' money, but we also
philosophically believe in the legislative branch's prerogative
to put in an earmark because almost everyone understands in
Washington and almost no one understands outside of Washington
that the Pentagon budget is the President's budget, and whether
you are of his party or the other party, you may have some
disagreements as to that budget. So the equal branch of
government, the legislative branch, should be able to do
earmarks. But if there is anything we need to know that we can
do better, I think all of us would like to work with you on
that.
Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Kingston.
Mr. Hinchey.

Remarks of Mr. Hinchey

Mr. Hinchey. General, thanks very much.
I really appreciated the response that you have given to
these questions. And I think we are dealing with a very
difficult set of circumstances that has evolved over the course
of the, well, last several years, and there are a number of
examples of that. Yesterday I had a meeting with the Secretary
of the Army, Secretary Geren, at the West Point Board of
Visitors meeting. And one of the things that he was talking
about was the number of suicides that have occurred and how
that number of suicides has been at record proportions, last
year particularly, and how it even jumped up in January of this
year. So I assume that that is something that you and other
leaders in the Army are deeply concerned about, and I think
that we would appreciate any insight that you might be able to
give us with regard to that problem and how it can be dealt
with.
For example, and this is not the critical example, but I
understand that the investment in personnel in the military as
a matter of the function of the budget has dropped from 31
percent of the Army's budget to 15 percent of the budget over
the course of the years 2000 to 2007. Now, that is something
that I think ought to get some attention. So anything that you
and the other people in the Army who are focusing on that issue
can provide us with information so that we could be helpful, I
think would be something very significant, and I would
appreciate that very much, if you have any comment on that.
General Thompson. Sir, to your question on the suicides, it
is something that the entire Army takes very seriously, and
there are comprehensive plans in place. We are even increasing
the level of effort to make sure that the numbers don't go in
the wrong direction; they go down as they should be. From the
medical help that is there and the personnel community is doing
all the things they need to do to reach out to the right
psychologists and psychiatrists and social service providers, a
significant investment. This is not an area that is directly
under my purview, but it is something we take very seriously. I
know there are a number of plans in place, I am just not the
right person to talk about those plans.
To the question on the percent of the pay, again, it is,
how do those numbers get derived? I used to be the Army's
programmer in my former job, and that is the individual that
has got responsibility for the 5- or the 6-year plan and where
the Army puts all of its money; it balances its portfolio. So,
again I don't recognize that 15 percent number. My
recollection, and it is still pretty true today, is that about
42 or 43 percent of the Army's total dollars in its base
program are spent on military pay, but that military pay is not
just salaries. That is also retirement accrual and health
benefits and reenlistment bonuses, et cetera. I don't recognize
that 15 percent number. I have to determine how we got that,
and so that is the issue of defining the question we are asking
here.
Mr. Moran. General, that is just pay. It is not benefits;
it is pure pay.
General Thompson. Okay.
Mr. Hinchey. Anything further?
General Thompson. No, sir. Unless I have got something I
didn't answer that you asked me.
Mr. Hinchey. Well, I appreciate the answer and I appreciate
the focus of attention on it because it is something that has
to be----
General Thompson. It has to be addressed.
Mr. Hinchey. The Army's obligation on contracts has
essentially tripled over the course of the last several years.
It rose from 18 billion to 54 billion, just gone up three
times. What do you see happening in the future? Do you continue
to see that kind of thing to continue to develop or is it going
to change? Now, I know that there is a whole set of
circumstances relating to the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan
which promoted this kind of a set of circumstances. And while
those conditions there continue, while we continue to have to
deal with them, probably some of that is going to have to
change but not very much. But the situation here with
contractors, I think, is causing a great deal of concern, and I
am just wondering what you think about that and what you think
that this issue might--how it might change, how it might not
change, what will be the set of the circumstances over the
course of the next couple of years.
General Thompson. The number of contractors that we need in
order to get the work done, whether it is in the Middle East or
someplace else, it depends on the work that needs to get done.
As we draw down our presence in Iraq, we will have fewer
military and fewer contractors in Iraq. As we grow our presence
in Afghanistan, the number of military is going to go up; the
number of contractors is going to go up. It takes years to grow
the military. The Army is on a path to grow the size of the
active Army and the Reserve components. From the active
component, it is to increase to about 547,000. We are going to
get there quicker than we thought, but it was going to take us
a couple of years in order to grow that. So when you don't have
enough military to do the work that needs to get done, then you
need to appropriately contract for that in order to get the
work done.
Mr. Hinchey. Well, this is the first time that we have had
an alleged war and we didn't have the kind of active
recruitment that you normally have. You are just relying on
volunteers, and that is the basic problem. And in addition to
that broad analysis, you have also had to deal with the
situation of the decline in the quality and the value of the
people who were being recruited or absorbed into the Army,
taken into the Army, and I know that that has been a problem,
something that you have had to deal with; you and others have
had to deal with. So the situation with regard to the
contractors is the main focus of attention right now.
What is the kind of oversight that you have on the activity
of these contractors, the kind of oversight that they deliver
in places like Iraq, for example?
General Thompson. Every contract that we have got has got a
statement of work, duties that that contractor is supposed to
perform. And there is oversight. The contracting officer
doesn't always do that him or herself because that is too much
of a responsibility. The Defense Contract Management Agency has
a responsibility primarily for the weapons systems contracts,
but they are now doing quite a bit of the service contract in
theater. And then we have individuals that are not part of the
professional workforce that are contracting officer
representatives. And it is those people, as an example, if you
are on a forward-operating base in Iraq and a contractor is
there to pick up trash three times a day, somebody has got the
responsibility to make sure that contractor is picking up the
trash three times a day and not just once a day because that is
what the terms of the contract specify. And if they perform
satisfactorily to the terms of the contracts, they get paid
appropriately, and if they don't, there are remedies that are
taken. So there is a check and balance taking place.
Mr. Hinchey. Based on experience, what is the real outcome
there? What you are talking about is the general way that it is
supposed to behave, but we have seen a number of examples of
bad behavior on the part of the contractors, and this bad
behavior causing a host of serious problems.
General Thompson. The seriousness of the issue from 2003 to
2006 was because there was not contracting officer
representatives assigned to every contract. That was one of the
reasons that we had so many cases of fraud and abuse during
that timeframe. I can say today that, starting in Kuwait, there
is a contracting officer representative assigned to every
contract. So we do that. That is the way it should be done.
Nothing is ever 100 percent but damn near 100 percent that is
being done today in the theater.
Mr. Hinchey. But you know you have got more oversight on
the regular military personnel than you do on the contractors,
don't you?
General Thompson. Sure you do. You have got a uniform code
of military justice. But the change in policy in the last
couple of years is the contractors over there are subject to
the discipline as well.
Mr. Hinchey. Let me ask you one more small specific
question. Do you think it is appropriate to have contractors in
charge of security operations at places like West Point and
other military academies?
General Thompson. Yes, I do.
Mr. Hinchey. You do?
General Thompson. I do. As long as the government has got
the ultimate responsibility for that. But to pay a security
guard to check passes coming in and out of an installation like
West Point, you can't just compare the cost of that security
guard to the cost of a soldier doing that, because the soldier
has got nonsalary benefits. It has got retirement accrual
benefits and health care benefits. The cost of the security
guard as a contractor is a fully burdened cost. If you want to
compare that to the cost of a soldier doing that, you have got
to compare apples to apples with fully burdened cost. We make
those kind of business case analyses all the time.
Mr. Hinchey. Are you saying that the contractors do a
better job than a military personnel would do in security
operations?
General Thompson. I did not say that. I did not imply that.
You asked me if it is appropriate for them to do that, and I do
think it is appropriate with the right oversight. We set the
standards for the force protection aspects around West Point
and all of our installations. Some Department of the Army
civilian police, some contracted security force, some military
police on some installations--we expect them to do that.
Years ago, we had a lot of military police on our
installations doing traffic control and security. We don't have
as many today doing that because the demands of the operational
environment in the Middle East primarily have caused us to use
the military police in their military-only roles and not in a
role that could be done by a private security contractor.
Mr. Hinchey. Thank you very much.
Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Hinchey.
Mr. Young.
Mr. Young. Yes. Mr. Chairman, the conversation that we had
a little bit earlier on the list of contractors, Ms. Kilpatrick
makes a good point. What is on the Web, unless you have some
way to break the code, it is pretty hard to understand. So what
I would like to do is make a formal request for what we
discussed a few minutes ago, that you provide us for the record
a list of contractors that provide services to the Army
worldwide; identify the function for each contractor; in other
words, what they are doing for you, identify the total contract
cost; and break it down so that we know the number of employees
employed by the contractor and what the personnel cost is.
General Thompson. That is doable. I am just looking behind
here to the guy that is going to have to lead that work. He is
nodding, we can do that, so we will sign up for that as a team.
Okay, John?
[The information follows:]

SEE ATTACHMENT: FY2007 Army Inventory of Contracting Contract Services

Mr. Moran. Very well and within a timely timeframe.
General Thompson. No doubt, if we could have a little
leeway to negotiate that timeline with you, so that it is
reasonable for you and reasonable for us.
Mr. Moran. But it would be helpful to have those numbers
available for the 2010 budget consideration.
General Thompson. Right.
Mr. Moran. Mr. Visclosky.

PAY SCALE OF MILITARY PERSONNEL VS. CONTRACTORS

Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much.
In a sense, the question has been covered, and I know you
and Ms. Kaptur talked about it, too, but I have just a general
question about wage rates and understanding your interchange
with Mr. Hinchey that you have to factor in all of the cost of
that military personnel. Is there a broad differential as far
as what contractors in places like Iraq and Afghanistan are
being paid compared to military personnel?
I assume there is a variance position to position. But, of
course, we hear the exaggerated exception to the rule where you
have a military personnel doing a function and is getting paid
in the high 20s and a contractor in the same room with this
military getting $120,000. Is there a wide discrepancy? Because
at some point, you are still paying more for a contractor. And
will some of these tables that are being requested reflect
those salary levels?
General Thompson. We spend a lot of time with differences
of opinion. It would be easy to say, and I am making this up
and I am giving you an example, to say that Sergeant Thompson
gets $50,000 a year as salary and yet there is a guy--a
maintenance guy, I fix Bradleys or I fix helicopters, and there
is a contracted field service rep there that is making $150,000
a year. That is a fully burdened cost for that contractor. That
includes retirement benefits and the war differential they are
getting for being in harm's way. The soldier also gets danger
pay, and he also has health care benefits and a housing
allowance that is tax free. So you have got to make a fair
comparison. And it is easy to say this guy is making $150,000 a
year, and I am making $50,000, and that is not fair. You have
got to put it in context. For the same kind of work, you can
make a fair comparison, I think.
Mr. Visclosky. Can I ask it a different way? For the person
making $120,000 and, again we are talking hypothetically here,
that is cash in the pocket compared to the sergeant making
$50,000 plus benefits that may equal $120,000 but the
contractor employee, I assume, will have some health care
benefits and some type of thrift plan that the company will
provide for. He is probably getting some housing that is
allotted to him added onto that $120,000.
General Thompson. The operative question I always ask if I
have got a contracted employee working is what is the burden
cost for that employee.
Mr. Visclosky. And we are paying the contractor every penny
on that and the contractor is making a profit on that employee.
General Thompson. I will give you an example. On my
immediate staff, when I first got to the position that I am in
now, we had 11 different management support contract
instruments in place supporting the acquisition function at the
headquarters of the Department of the Army. I said, what are we
doing? We have now reduced that to two and on a glide-path to
go to one because I want to pay one set of overhead if I need
that kind of function and not 11. And I asked the operative
question, what is the burden cost of that?
So I may be paying somebody $150,000, but the profit and
the GNA and all of that that goes with that it may be $250,000.
And so the question to ask for everybody, not just the
Congress, but for everybody, is, am I getting a fair day's work
for a fair day's pay?
Mr. Visclosky. And I would ask two other questions related
to the salary because I want to make sure that person is
working for me and not loyal to somebody else. I am not saying
anybody who is working for a contractor isn't loyal to the
United States of America, but you have got somebody in a
uniform who, essentially, when they take that oath and put on
that uniform, they are risking their life, and they are making
less money. On the issue of the Gansler Commission, it is
suggested it is going to take 3 to 5 years to hire additional
personnel and training. If there is that pay differential, the
question is what about the retention of quality trained people?
I understand people make a career of the military. They retire,
and then they go over to contractor, but I assume we are losing
a lot of people on the front end of this, too, if I am sitting
in that room, and I am seeing somebody make 120,000 plus a
thrift plan plus health care plus housing plus a profit. It is
not just to get up to where we want to be in 3 and 5 years but
retaining people. And if I am paying $50,000 in cash, and
somebody else $120,000 in cash, and forgetting the benefits for
a second, who is going to attract somebody who may have that
additional skill set that I want as a Federal employee, as a
military employee, keeping an eye on the contractor? I want
somebody who has the same set of skills and more as the
government employee working for me keeping an eye on them.
General Thompson. I do, too.
Mr. Visclosky. How do we--is there a pay differential here
or something we have to look at as far as retention and the
issue of finding those quality people who will work for the
government?
General Thompson. We talked earlier, Congressman, about the
authorities that we have, and I refer back to the section 852.
We need to, one, value the acquisition workforce more than we
have, not put them under the spotlight and criticize them
constantly because they all are trying to do the best job that
they can, but we have got the right authorities, I think, to
recruit, retain, and train those people. We have a lot of
programs, for example, where we send people off to education
opportunities to get master's degrees, to pay back college
tuition loans because I want a smarter shopper than the other
person on the other side of the negotiating table for the
contract.
And there are a lot of people in this room, I will use Mr.
Harrington as an example, who could and do make more money on
the outside, but the level of responsibility and authority and
the service that you get, you can put a dollar value against
it, but that is the kind of person that I want both militarily
and the Department of Army civilian. And I say this to you
honestly, and I use this a lot when I talk to the workforce: I
like my contractors that are doing a fair day's work for a fair
day's pay. I love my government workforce, because they are on
my team. They have the same set of values. Their motivations
are more pure.
And contractors are not evil people, but they have a
different set of motivations. The ones, as Congressman Kingston
alluded to, that are former military. They have a different set
of allegiances, and I like those kind of people that are
working for us in a contracted capacity because they know what
it is like to be shot at and cold and hungry and dirty and in
harm's way. So I am giving you more a philosophical answer than
a specific one.
Mr. Visclosky. And I have nothing against contractors.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Moran. Good line of questioning. Thank you.
Ms. Kilpatrick.

BUSINESS REPRESENTATION

Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, General, for your service and your time.
This has been very instructive. I am a new member on the
Committee. It took an hour and 45 minutes for you to say you
love your troops. I sincerely needed to hear that. And I never
doubted it, but I need to hear you say that.
General Thompson. I mean that sincerely. But sometimes it
is tough love, ma'am.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Congress is tough. It is tough here. That
is the nature of who we are.
A couple of questions. Of the 266,600 plus troops who are
in theater overseas, in Kuwait and other places, how many
businesses are represented in the 267,000?
General Thompson. I would have to take that one for the
record. To the specific question that Mr. Young read out
earlier, the answer to that question will be in answer to your
question.
[The information follows:]

SEE ATTACHMENT: FY2007 Army Inventory of Contracting Contract Services
(Contractor Tab)

This list was compiled by Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

Ms. Kilpatrick. So, in that number and as you prepare that
document, we are to understand that, as you talk about the
contractors, as you have been doing this morning, those are
individuals you speak of rather than businesses; is that right,
for the most part?
General Thompson. That is correct. The number 266,000 is
individuals.
Ms. Kilpatrick. I know that is individuals. The discussion
this morning has been mostly about the individuals and not the
businesses themselves.
I think Mr. Visclosky, our chairperson, our cardinal from
Energy and Water was going where I went with the Gansler
report, which talked about what they found that contributed to
abuse and neglect perhaps, and you are on about fixing that in
the Army. We heard earlier from one of the other branches of
services this week who said their contractors did all of that
as well including the administrative things as well as
researching weapons, as well as monitoring those weapons, and
doing the reporting back. I heard you say a little while ago
that your report back of the monitoring of the monitor will be
an Army personnel; is that right? Or is it a contractor
monitoring their contracting obligation?
General Thompson. The way I would answer that, ma'am, is to
those things that are inherently governmental, there is a
government employee, military or Department of Defense civilian
that is at the head of that approval process.
Ms. Kilpatrick. But the report found some abuse there and
that contractors, they do government functions like programs,
financial management, intelligent analysis, policy making,
weaponry, researching. Those are contractor obligations you
have been using. Are you saying you are not going to use
contractors for some of those now in the Army?
General Thompson. We want to in-source those things that
should be done by the government. And if there are cases where
that is being done by a contractor today, we want to switch
that and make it done by a government employee.
Ms. Kilpatrick. So, over the last 7 or 8 years, where
contracting has increased tremendously and it seems like
military and civilian personnel has decreased, is it the view
of the Army that we do more contracting and less of those
dedicated Army civilian DOD employees? Is that the move----
General Thompson. The move is to bring more of that
capacity in-house but not let the government overhead get too
great because, again, it is swinging the pendulum back to what
is the right balance. I want enough government people to do the
job that needs to get done and not one person more than that.
Ms. Kilpatrick. I think that is what all of us want. And
from where I sit, I want more government employees. I want more
people who are dedicated and take that oath and wear that
uniform, civilians and military, to run and be operative in the
military. Of course, I am not opposed to contracting. I just
don't believe that they ought to have more of the $500 billion
that we spend. I have heard in my own district from soldiers,
who are next to and done their third deployment, an armed
uniform person side by side by the contractor who does get two
or three times the pay. You mentioned the fringe benefits that
they get. They don't think it is right. And you have not
mentioned it this morning, but you have got to feel some of
that as well.
I didn't like your opening remarks. I can read that, and I
am a reader; I can read those on the airplane. But what we have
been talking about for the last 2 hours is what I want you to
sit there and talk to us about because that is really the meat
of who we are as a Nation and what our military service--we
have got to understand what you do and who you are because many
of our colleagues think $500 billion for Defense, is too much,
and the Congress should cut it. I don't care what they are
doing. So I, as a new appropriator to this Committee and 10
years on the Appropriations Committee, I want the real
information.
We don't have a lot of time, and you have been pretty
straight with us, and I appreciate your staff. But as I sit
here and I try to learn, and I am like a CRS 101 just trying to
keep up; I need you to give it to me straight. And when I read
and have a question, I really want to know. And about those
267,000 contractors I do want to know if it is the top 10
companies--I have a list here of the top 20, and since 2003,
one particular company got $5 billion plus dollars, many of
them contractors. Why? There are men and women all over the
country, and we want to help you with a strong military
uniformed American force that will raise their hand and commit
their lives. We want you to help you with that, and I want you
to count on me.
General Thompson. Thank you.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Moran. Thank you very much, Ms. Kilpatrick.
We need to vacate this room within a few minutes. They are
going to need it for logistics of putting together the stimulus
bill. So we will conclude this hearing at this point.
We do want to thank the Army for being as responsive to the
subcommittee's questions and concerns as you have been. So we
thank you, General Thompson, and I think the best that we could
hope for is to get kind of a best practices approach to getting
a handle on how much is being spent and the manner which it is
being spent so that we can a apply that to the Air Force and
the Navy. They are not as far along as the Army is.
And it is not that there is any vendetta against
contracting. I would hope we have made that clear that there
needs to be a balance between in-force personnel and
contracted-out personnel. But at this point, we really haven't
had much control upon the way in which the money was being
spent, and when we realized that there were more contract
personnel in Iraq than there were uniformed and regular
civilian personnel, it naturally raised a great deal of concern
on the part of all the Members.
So, once we get that information, we can address it in the
2010 appropriations bill. And we appreciate you certainly
having this forum. That is the best step yet in terms of
helping us to define what is and should be inherently
governmental. And we appreciate your being willing to disclose
the information on what contractors this subcommittee is
funding, and we will move forward from here. So this has been a
very informative hearing. We appreciate your testimony, General
Thompson, and those of the fine professionals that backed you
up on it.
General Thompson. Congressman, I just want to say thank you
to the members of the committee. Every time I have been before
this committee, and it has been more than once, or dialogue
with the Members or the staffers related to issues, it has been
an honest exchange, and the committee has always been
supportive of the military and the Army, in particular. My
promise to you is to be forthright and share the information so
we can come to the best decisions for the country.
Mr. Moran. Very good. Thank you, General.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the
questions thereto follow.]

Contractor Service Providers

Question. Please list the contractors providing services to the
Army worldwide. For each:
List the number of contracted personnel in terms of full-
time equivalents.
Identify the contract function by describing the type of
work performed.
Provide total contract cost and identify direct salary
costs.
Answer. The contractors and the number of contracted full-time
equivalents providing services to the Army worldwide are listed in the
Army FY2007 Report of Contracts for Services, which is available on the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
website at http://www.asamra.army.mil/ref.htm. Included in the report
is a list of contracted functions with the number of contractor full-
time equivalents performing the functions and the total contract costs
and direct salary costs of the functions.

SEE ATTACHMENT: FY2007 Army Inventory of Contracting Contract Services

Some important caveats are in order: Because total contract cost
and direct labor cost are treated as proprietary information when
associated with either contract number or contractor name, these costs
are not listed with contractors providing services in the inventory. We
are still reviewing and validating the Fiscal Year 2008 data.
Question. Has Army done mission analysis and/or a study of roles
and missions that includes consideration of the role that contractors
should play?
Answer. The Army, the Joint Staff and DoD have engaged in a number
of working group efforts and studies to analyze the proper roles and
missions of contractors. Some of these efforts resulted in guidance,
such as the DoD Instruction 1100.22, Guidance for Determining Workforce
Mix; a 2005 RAND Study, How Should the Army Use Contractors on the
Battlefield; and a 2005 Secretary Harvey directive to establish a
contractor manpower inventory to be used for this kind of analysis. The
Army has used this inventory to comply with the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY 2008 mandate for such an inventory and is at
the very beginning stages of doing the kinds of reviews and analyses
required by that statute.

Contracting Oversight

Question. How does the Army headquarters achieve oversight of
contracting that is accomplished at Army field locations around the
world?
Answer. The Army has an overarching strategy that provides for the
oversight of contracting from formation to administration. The Army
recently mandated Solicitation Review Boards and Contract Review Boards
to implement the Office of Defense Procurement policy for Peer Reviews.
Standards for the boards are communicated through ``toolkits'' and
validated through Procurement Management Reviews. Metrics from the
approved acquisitions are reported annually back to the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Procurement) (DASA(P)). Army policy
stipulates that all service contracts contain quality surveillance
plans and all service contracts valued greater than $2,500 must have an
appointed Contracting Officer's Representative (COR) prior to contract
award. Moreover, the COR must complete the minimum training standard of
the Defense Acquisition University Continuous Learning Course ``COR
With A Mission Focus'' (CLC 106); over 19,000 Army civilian and
military employees have completed this training through Fiscal Year
2008. In addition to training, Army policy mandates that CORs are held
accountable for their responsibilities via their performance
objectives. Policy instituted in November 2008 also mandates oversight
performance objectives for contracting personnel. Compliance with the
Army's oversight policies is being monitored through routine reporting
to the DASA(P). All acquisition strategies for services greater than
$500 million are reviewed and approved by the Army Services Strategy
Panel, which is a multi-functional leadership team chaired by DASA(P).

Base Support

Question. The Army reports that a great number of contractors do
base support in Iraq. What exactly does `` base support'' mean?
Answer. Base Support refers to the resources involved with
operating and maintaining Army installations. Base Support accounts
fund installation functions such as administration; automation support;
family programs; morale, welfare and recreation services; real estate
leases; environmental conservation and compliance; pollution
prevention; facility support services; minor construction; maintenance
and repair; audiovisual and visual information production, acquisition
and support; demolition and disposal of excess facilities; base
communications; and other base operations support services.

Outsourcing

Question. While it may be appropriate to outsource activities when
they are to be performed at home station, this outsourcing may result
in the need to deploy contractors to contingency operations. What steps
does the Army take to factor the potential need to deploy contractors
into its outsourcing calculation?
Answer. The Department has preplanned certain capabilities such as
the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) which provides a wide
variety of logistics and base operations services for the combatant
commanders. This program has been effective in providing preplanned and
negotiated services. There is room for improvement in this area. Two
areas of note include contract logistics support (CLS) for major
weapons systems and certain shortage combat support and facility
engineering functions that are highly interrelated to tactical
operations. The Army is developing an enhanced manpower estimate
reporting (MER) process for acquisition systems to examine Contract
Logistics Support. Expanding the Army Total Army Analysis (TAA) process
to include both civilian and contractor requirements on the battlefield
will improve the latter.

Combatant Commanders Role

Question. What role should the combatant commanders play in
deciding what tasks should be contracted out, particularly for mission
essential skills that will be needed for a contingency?
Answer. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 164(b), the combatant commander is
responsible to the President and Secretary of Defense for the
performance of missions assigned to that command by the President and
pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 164(c)(1)(C) for organizing commands and forces
within that command as he considers necessary to carry out missions
assigned to the command. Additionally, according to 10 U.S.C. 3013(c),
the Secretary of the Army is responsible for ``carrying out the
functions of the Department of the Army so as to fulfill the current
and future operational requirements for the unified and specified
combatant commands.'' The combatant commander requests a particular
capability, and the source of labor to perform that mission is
determined by the size of the Army and the available force structure.
Therefore, the ultimate decision regarding what functions are
contracted is made by the Department of the Army, not by the Combatant
Commander.

Lead Systems Integrators

Question. The Army Future Combat Systems (FCS) Program has
contracted for a lead Systems Integrator (LSI) to assist in defining,
developing and integrating the programs. Employing an LSI was viewed as
the best option for program management due to the scope and complexity
of the FCS program. Why can't the Army manage all of its own programs
rather than use Lead Systems Integrators?
Answer. The Army has not contracted out the Program Management
functions for the FCS program. The Army has invested extensive
resources in managing the FCS Program. The FCS LSI is the prime
contractor for the FCS development effort. Just as with every other
prime contractor relationship within DoD, the prime contractor for the
FCS Program routinely subcontracts and manages efforts of its
subcontractors and suppliers for major components of the acquisition.
The FCS Program manager is responsible for and provides program
management and oversight to ensure government equities are protected.
This is evidenced by the assignment of a Major General as the Program
Manager, the assignment of three flag level (General Officer/Senior
Executive Service) Deputies, four 06 (Colonel) level Project Managers,
twelve 05 (Lieutenant Colonel) level Product Managers, a total of over
80 Army Acquisition Corps officers, and over 1,000 Army civilian
Acquisition Corps professionals. Every LSI senior position has an Army
leader as a counterpart. Program level decisions involving subcontracts
are coordinated and agreed to by both Army and LSI leaders.

Contracting Out

Question. Why does the Army need to contract out for program
management, in effect hiring a contractor to manage other contractors?
Answer. With respect to the FCS program, The Army has not
contracted out the Program Management functions for the FCS Program.
The Army has invested extensive resources in managing the FCS Program.
The FCS LSI is the prime contractor for the FCS development. Just as
with every other prime contractor relationship within DoD, the prime
contractor routinely subcontracts and manages efforts of suppliers for
major components of the acquisition. This does not take away from
government oversight and management of the program to ensure government
equities are protected. This is evidenced by the assignment of a Major
General as the Program Manager, the assignment of three flag level
(General Officer/Senior Executive Service) Deputies, four 06 (Colonel)
level Project Managers, twelve 05 (Lieutenant Colonel) level Product
Managers, a total of over 80 Army Acquisition Corps officers, and over
1,000 Army civilian Acquisition Corps professionals. Every LSI senior
position has an Army leader as a counterpart. Program level decisions
involving subcontracts are coordinated and agreed to by both Army and
LSI leaders.

Program Management

Question. Isn't program management an inherently governmental
function?
Answer. Yes, program management is an inherently governmental
function. Army has not contracted out program management.

Weapon Systems Programs

Question. Does the Army have any concerns about its institutional
capacity to manage its own weapon system programs given this degree of
contractor support?
Answer. Yes and we have taken steps to mitigate these concerns
through reducing our reliance on contractor support. The Army's in-
sourcing policy has allowed us to convert 150 contractor support
positions to government employees. We will continue to use in-sourcing
to reduce our reliance on contractor support.

In-House Program Management

Question. Specifically what has the Army done to expand in-house
program management capacity? What more should be done?
Answer. The Army has acquired and will continue to acquire and
train personnel in key areas such as systems engineering, network
engineering, and software development as well as sustaining program
management, contracting, and business management expertise.

Equipping the Force

Question. The committee understands that the traditional
requirements determination process is not responsive enough to provide
essential capabilities required by deploying units. The committee
further understands that the Army has expanded the number of ways a
unit can request a materiel capability and these are called the
``Operational Needs Statement'' and the ``10 liner''.
Isn't equipping the force the responsibility of the Chief of Staff,
Army and the Department of the Army and not the deploying unit?
Answer. The Secretary of Army has statutory responsibility for
equipping Army forces. As senior military advisor, the Chief of Staff,
Army supervises the execution of policies, plans, and programs to
include the ``traditional'' materiel requirements determination process
known as Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS).
This process is centered on the deliberate analysis of operational
concepts set 10-15 years in the future, representing the entire range
of military operations our Army may be asked to execute. If capability
gaps against potential enemies are identified, analysis of the
alternative solutions is conducted to determine operational
suitability, technical feasibility, and life-cycle affordability. The
selected solution is then described in sufficient detail to support
execution of an acquisition program and associated force integration
activities such as documenting required changes to unit equipment
authorizations, ensuring life-cycle sustainment capabilities are
emplaced, and establishing Army training plans for operators and
commanders that will employ the new capability. Deploying commanders
are not responsible for developing, introducing and sustaining new
capabilities to their own unit or to the Army force at large.
Commanders are responsible for conducting mission analysis and
requesting any additional resources such as manpower, equipment, direct
support affiliations, etc. that they determine are essential to mission
accomplishment or the safety of their soldiers.

Materiel Capabilities

Question. Why does the Army need three processes to provide
materiel capabilities for deploying forces?
Answer. The three processes cited are mutually supporting and not
redundant. The deliberate requirements determination process is used to
design Army units and develop the integrated capabilities that those
units will need to perform their missions over the full range of
potential military operations. There is risk inherent in this designed
force due to the difficulty in analyzing every possible scenario
against every potential type of enemy. Additional risk is introduced by
fiscal realities that preclude development of solutions for every
capability gap that can be identified. The Operational Needs Statement
(ONS) process provides a mechanism for the Army to adjust to a known
enemy and a narrower set of capability gaps. In that sense, the ONS is
part of the Army's risk mitigation strategy. Operational Commanders
conduct mission analysis using actual rather than theoretic
intelligence, environmental considerations, and assessments of the
strengths/weaknesses of their own units as well as coalition partners.
With this information, the Deploying Commander develops ONS requests to
fine-tune his unit to accomplish his assigned mission. The additional
equipment or ``new capabilities'' are provided for that specific
mission and they do not become a permanent addition to that unit's
authorization or design. The Army is constantly assessing and analyzing
current operations, to include the requests for additional
capabilities, to glean lessons learned that should be applied to the
designs of the future force. These potential future force improvements
are integrated and resourced through the deliberate processes. The
Army's Rapid Equipping Force (REF) provides a forward-deployed research
and development capability that is focused on finding quick solutions
to warfighter problems. Deployed soldiers describe these tactical
challenges in a simple ``10 Liner'' format. The REF methodology
capitalizes on market surveys to identify potential useful technologies
and rapid prototyping--unit evaluation of the initiatives. The REF does
not develop integrated solutions for large-scale application. REF
Initiatives are assessed for broader applicability to current
operations via the ONS process and the potential integration of
successful REF solutions with the future force is evaluated through
introduction to the deliberate requirements determination process.

Operational Needs Statement/10 Liner

Question. What is the difference between the Operational Needs
Statement and the ``10 liner''?
Answer. The Operational Needs Statement process is used by deployed
or deploying units to request: (1) additional quantities of Army
Standard equipment above the level they are already authorized, (2)
Army Standard equipment that is not normally authorized to that type of
unit, or (3) a ``New'' capability that doesn't currently exist in the
Army inventory. This last category can include commercially available
equipment or software, Other Service equipment, or a capability that
must be developed or prototyped because it does not exist in an
operational configuration. The Army's ability to provide training and
sustainment for the requested equipment is an element of the ONS
validation/approval process. An ONS request can be satisfied or
disapproved by any Commander in the chain of command. Validation of the
ONS at HQDA is essential to access Army resources but does not
automatically constitute approval to execute as resourcing priorities
may force a given request to be documented as an Unfunded Requirement
(UFR). Additionally, an ONS request for additional/improved capability
may be satisfied with a different solution than requested by the
Commander. Any proposed ``in lieu of'' capability is coordinated with
the requesting commander to ensure operational suitability. The ``10
Liner'' submitted by a deployed unit is used by the Rapid Equipping
Force (REF) to initiate rapid prototyping and/or expedient evaluation
of commercial products that have potential to solve that particular
unit's problem or ``capability gap''. REF is limited in the amount of
resources and the number of interested units that they can provide the
solution to for use and evaluation. If the initiative is deemed
successful by the deployed commanders, an ONS will be submitted to the
Army G-3/5/7 to expand the initiative to additional units and to
initiate Army integration and sustainment planning.
Question. Who approves each of these processes?
Answer. The Army's approval authority for the deliberate
requirements determination process (JCIDS) is delegated by the Army
Chief of Staff to the Vice Chief of Staff (VCSA) and the Deputy Chief
of Staff, G-3/5/7. The Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC)
process facilitates integration of Army Staff input to the VCSA and DCS
G-3/5/7 for each materiel capability proposal before it is submitted
for joint review in the (Joint Requirements Oversight Council) JROC
process. The approval authority to direct re-distribution of equipment
to satisfy Operational Needs Statement (ONS) requests exists at each
level of command for equipment organic to that organization. Approval
authority to apply Army resources for additional procurement as well as
to divert or re-distribute equipment at the Army-level, in support of
ONS requests is the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7. This approval
authority is delegated by the Army G-3/5/7 to his subordinate Flag
Officers and Colonels within resource thresholds. The Army Requirements
and Resources Board (AR2B) process facilitates integration of Army
Staff input for each ONS submitted by an Army Commander and also Joint
Urgent Operational Needs submitted by Joint Commanders that require
Army resources to resolve. The approval authority for a ``10 Liner''
submitted to the Rapid Equipping Force (REF) for limited prototyping
and procurement is the REF Commander (Colonel). REF initiatives are
briefed to the Army G-3/5/7 within the AR2B process to ensure Army
Staff visibility for potential expansion or integration opportunities.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.]
Thursday, February 26, 2009.

OUTSOURCING

WITNESS

HON. GORDON S. HEDDELL, ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Introduction

Mr. Moran [presiding]. All right. The Committee will come
to order. Mr. Young, we didn't want to start without you. Ms.
Granger, thank you for joining us. Let the record show that we
have Vice Chairman Dicks on hand here. This morning the
Committee will hear about the Pentagon's use of private sector
contracts to support government functions, often referred to as
outsources. We will also discuss the acquisition workforce
which has been a focus for many members of this Committee.
We are very pleased to welcome Mr. Gordon Heddell who is
DOD's acting inspector general, doing a fine job, as well as
two expert members of his staff, Mary Ugone and Charles
Beardall. We know both of them. They are long time pros and we
are very happy to have you with us. Mr. Heddell and his staff
have taken this topic very seriously. Their research is
thorough. And we are grateful that these folks are with us this
morning to answer some of our questions and concerns.

Remarks of Mr. Moran

As we all know, DOD has increasingly relied on contracted
services activities and functions provided by contract
personnel. In the year 2000, 26 percent of DOD's budget was
spent on contracted service, but today contracted services
account for 34 percent of the budget. Another indication of
DOD's increasingly large contracts is that contractor costs are
now greater than compensation costs. Prior to 2008, more was
spent on personnel compensation than on service contract, but
this year DOD will spend $43 billion more on service contracts
than on military and civilian compensation combined.
Despite this growth, the Secretary of Defense's Office has
yet to establish a chain of accountability and oversight. They
still cannot answer a fundamental question: How many
contractors has DOD hired with the funds that this committee
has appropriated? I know that the DOD IG has reviewed the
actions underway in the Pentagon to inventory the contracts for
services, identify functions that are inherently governmental,
and insource the inherently governmental positions.
This hearing will continue to help the committee better
understand the extent of the problems in contracting, but more
importantly, how we can solve those problems constructively.
The Congress has pressed for this and will be interested in
what you believe that DOD has accomplished, Mr. Inspector
General. We will also want to know what needs to occur to
ensure that there is an effective and cost-efficient mix of a
Federal and contracted workforce and DOD.
Mr. Heddell, thank you for the time and attention that you
have given to these issues. Before we hear your testimony, we
would like to call on the Ranking Member, Mr. Young, for his
comments. Bill.

Remarks of Mr. Young

Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I want to
add my welcome to our distinguished guests as we conclude the
third hearing in a series of hearings on contracting. The truth
is we could probably spend a lot more time on the issue because
it is a very major issue and it has a lot to do with the cost-
effectiveness of our programs.
We heard from GAO earlier this month and from the Army on
the subject of contracting. The challenges facing the
Department and contingency contracting are highlighted and may
be created by long-term neglect of the Department's contracting
and acquisition workforce.
Maybe it is because of this that we see reports of 87,000
weapons unaccounted for in Afghanistan. I don't know if that is
true or not, but we are probably going to ask you about that.
We are concerned, because rumored last year at a similar
hearing, we discussed 190,000 unaccounted-for weapons in Iraq.
So these are important issues and especially for those of us
responsible for providing the funding. So we look forward to
your testimony today.
And as an afterthought, I wanted to make a suggestion that
I made last year at the hearings. We have some very successful
business firms that keep track of everything they handle almost
minute by minute. And at a meeting with some UPS workers, I
made the comment that might be good if the Defense Department
would hire somebody like UPS or FedEx who know how to do this,
who don't lose packages, and they surprised me by introducing
me to a young man who was an Army reservist, who actually
worked in management control at UPS. And he had just been
called up to be deployed to go to Afghanistan to help with that
purpose.
So we need to get a handle on it. And I know that you all
feel that this is as important as we do. So we are looking
forward to your testimony and anxious to see what we can all do
together to work together to fix this problem.
Thank you for being here. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Young.
Mr. Heddell, you may proceed with your summarized
statement. Your entire statement will be placed in the record.

Summary Statement of Mr. Heddell

Mr. Heddell. Thank you very much, sir.
Congressman Moran and distinguished members of the
Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, thank you for this
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss challenges
regarding the management of acquisition and contract
outsourcing.
Effective and efficient contracting is an ongoing
challenge. Concerns related to overpricing, contractor fraud,
inadequate goods, and the lack of government oversight began
with the Revolutionary War. Today, that challenge has been
compounded by the global nature of Department of Defense
operations and the size of our military.
A great urgency has been placed to increase the speed of
procurement needed to meet urgent warfighter needs in both Iraq
and Afghanistan, and to support other efforts such as
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
Since the early 1990s, my office and the Government
Accountability Office have identified contracting as a high-
risk area within the Department. In 1998, then-Inspector
General Eleanor Hill, in testimony before Congress, expressed
her concern regarding the downsizing of the acquisition
workforce and the plan to increase the outsourcing of numerous
functions.
One thing is very clear: that adjustments to the
acquisition workforce should not be driven merely by personnel
reduction goals, but by management decisions based on sound,
reliable, and quantifiable analysis.
We also continue to be concerned about the lack of
oversight in services contracting. As we testified recently
before the Commission on Wartime Contracting, contract
administrators focus primarily on timely mission
accomplishment, sometimes, unfortunately, at the expense of
following traditional contract administration procedures, many
of which are designed to reduce the risk of fraud, waste,
corruption, and abuse.
When engaging in contingency contracting, administrators
may not always consider the increased risk of failing to apply
stringent controls and oversight of contracting practices.
Their priority is to provide goods and services to the
warfighters as quickly as possible. Very legitimate.
However, every acquisition dollar that is not prudently
spent is a dollar that is not available to fund other top
priorities of the Department of Defense. Because of the
magnitude of the Department's purchasing power and the global
presence of personnel and resources, we face significant
challenges relative to the absolute requirement for fair and
reasonable pricing, the importance of contract oversight and
administration, and the dangers of outsourcing inherently
governmental functions.
One example of pricing problems involves an investigation
by our Defense Criminal Investigative Service regarding C&D
Distributors, a company. C&D, beginning in 1997 and continuing
all the way into 2006, submitted electronic bills to the
Department to supply small hardware components, things like
plumbing fixtures, electronic equipment, and other items, as
well as claims for shipping costs.
These fictitious shipping costs ranged in the hundreds of
thousands of dollars, despite the fact that the value of the
items that were shipped rarely exceeded $100. In fact, in the
final transaction before this particular scheme was discovered,
C&D billed the Department almost $1 million to ship two flat
washers, two flat washers that cost 19 cents apiece.
Mr. Moran. Mr. Heddell, I want to make sure that everyone
heard that precisely. Two flat 19-cent washers and they charged
$998,000 for them?
Mr. Heddell. That is correct, sir. That is correct.
Mr. Dicks. Was that the only thing they shipped? Was that
the only thing?
Mr. Heddell. No, sir. In fact, over the period of----
Mr. Moran. For the $998,000, but----
Mr. Heddell. For that particular shipment, yes.
Mr. Tiahrt. Was there any engineering that went with it?
Mr. Heddell. Nothing except for two washers at the cost of
$998,000. And I will tell you that over the course of this
particular conspiracy, the defendants obtained approximately
$21 million in fraudulent shipping costs. Now, the surviving
sister in this particular company pled guilty and is today
pending sentencing.
In this instance, it is clear that the attempt to expedite
supplies into a war zone allowed pricing to be manipulated
through a vulnerability in an automated purchasing system that
lacked oversight and effective internal controls.
With regard to contract oversight and administration, we
reported in a recent audit that Regional Contracting Command-
Bagram contracting officials, accepted construction projects
that required extensive rework by another contractor. This
particular audit looked at 42 contracting actions totaling $1.9
million for construction, and of these 42 contracts, 2 contract
files were missing and 40 contract files lacked quality
assurance surveillance plans as well as contracting officers'
representative designation letters. Contracting personnel
further stated that there was often a lack of qualified
personnel available to serve as contracting officer
representatives.
Examples of rework that was performed included reinstalling
sewer lines for latrines and repairing flooring that was
improperly installed.
We have also identified many examples of outsourcing
inherently governmental functions, which are functions that are
so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate
performance by government employees in one example regarding
controls over what should have been government-issued
contractor Common Access Cards, also known as CACs. All DoD
employees carry one of these for access and identification. We
found that contractors were sponsoring other contractors to
obtain these cards. These Common Access Cards are the DoD
credential for obtaining physical and logical access worldwide,
to include facilities in Southwest Asia.
My office is also engaged in proactive initiatives to
improve acquisition and contracting practices. And these
include aggressive audit planning for contracts, depot
overhaul, maintenance of equipment, and spare parts in support
of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
We also maintain an active membership on the Panel on
Contracting Integrity and we have launched our own fraud
indicator Web site to assist oversight personnel in detecting
indicators of potential fraud.
This concludes my opening statement. I thank the committee
for this opportunity to testify on contracting and outsourcing
within the Department and I would be more than happy to try to
answer your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Heddell follows:]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.235

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.236

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.237

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.238

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.239

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.240

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.241

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.242

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.243

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.244

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.245

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.246

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.247

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.248

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.249

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.250

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.251

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.252

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.253

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.254

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.255

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.256

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.257

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.258

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.259

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.260

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.261

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED (MRAP)

Mr. Moran. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Inspector
General. I appreciate your testimony. I appreciate the work
that you have done.
I was concerned in your more extensive testimony about the
MRAPs. I saw that it appeared that we have paid for the same
vehicle very substantially different amounts; for example, it
has ranged from about $300,000 to over $1 million. Is this
truly for the same vehicle, the difference in prices that we
have been charged?
Mr. Heddell. Well, Mr. Chairman, there are a variety of
vehicles that we have contracted for, and it is a little more
complex than simply saying it was one particular kind of
vehicle. In fact, that actually in a way is the problem, in
that when the contracting process itself frequently ignored in
this particular case the type of vehicle that we were
contracting for. So you may have had, let us say
hypothetically, five or six different kinds of vehicles, and we
were just looking at whatever price the company was offering
that vehicle for without regard to it being one specific kind
of vehicle.
Mr. Moran. Well, at one point it looks like the Marine
Corps purchased 1,500 MRAPs and yet never asked for a quantity
discount; paid exactly the same price as if they had ordered
one individual vehicle. That is the kind of thing I was getting
at. Is that what you have determined?
Mr. Heddell. Absolutely. In fact, with regard to the audit,
one of two audits that we did regarding the MRAP, there was one
instance involving nine different contracts. There were two
problems with these contracts. One is that we never obtained
the underlying pricing data in order to determine what a fair
and reasonable price would be. The second problem is what you
alluded to, and that is that we never asked for volume
discounts from one contractor. And clearly in hindsight, we
realize that those would have been available had they been
asked for, and we know that in one case we very likely would
have saved had we asked for the volume discount. We would have
saved at least $45 million on that one particular contract.
Now, the two contracts that you are actually alluding to
involved contracts that exceeded the maximum of 1,500 vehicles
to be purchased in each of those. And the Marine Corps exceeded
that in one case by 300 to 400 vehicles and in another case by
as many as 2,800, and should have in fact, absolutely should
have asked for a volume discount, but did not. So we do not
believe that the Marine Corps has any assurance that the prices
that they paid for those vehicles were fair and reasonable.
Mr. Moran. There is just no particular relation between
price and cost?
Mr. Heddell. That is correct.
Mr. Moran. They are pricing whatever they can get away
with.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Chairman, on that point, was there a
competition here? No competition?
Mr. Heddell. Competition in the sense that the vehicles
that were offered for sale were different kinds of vehicles in
that--for instance, let me put it in U.S. terms. Ford,
Chevrolet, a Honda, a Saturn, and they were all different makes
and models, and we viewed those as one specific kind of vehicle
without regard to model and the bells and whistles and whatever
happened to be the best price; we looked at it as if it was all
for the same vehicle. We didn't go to the trouble to obtain
what we would call the underlying pricing data. For instance,
we didn't know what it cost these companies to build those
vehicles so that we knew where our foundation starting point
was.
Mr. Dicks. If I could just follow up. What I was trying to
get to, was there a competition by the services, the Marines or
the Army, amongst various companies to build the MRAPs? Was
this sole source?
Mr. Heddell. This was not sole source. There were five
contractors that were bidding for these contracts. There ended
up being nine contracts altogether. Am I correct on that, Mary?
Ms. Ugone. Yes.
[The information follows:]

The contracts were not sole-source. Nine contractors submitted
proposals (bids), and nine contracts were awarded. Subsequent to
contract awards, 2 contracts were terminated because their vehicles did
not pass testing. In addition, the Government decided not to order
additional vehicles from another contractor due to unfavorable
automotive and human factors; and one other contractor could not meet
contractual obligations and therefore was terminated. As a result, five
contractors remained in the competition and are producing MRAP
vehicles.

COMMON ACCESS CARDS

Mr. Moran. Mr. Dicks, I think I will reclaim my time,
because I would like for you to pursue that further. I think
this is an important issue.
I wanted to raise one other issue and then turn it over to
Mr. Young, and that is the matter of common access cards.
People get cards that give them access to military bases and to
Federal agencies. So this is a very important matter of
security. But from what I understood from your report, these
cards are issued by contractors, not by Federal Government
personnel. And they determine who they issue them to and
generally they issue them to employees of the same contracting
firm first. So if we are looking at security on military bases
and the like, it seems to me we could be compromising our
security if the determination of who gets access is made by a
contractor and not by the Federal Government.
Now, am I misreading this, or would you explain it further,
Mr. Heddell?
Mr. Heddell. Let me clarify that, Congressman Moran,
because we are very concerned about this and we have spoken
with the Department about it. But let me clarify it a little
bit and give a little bit of background here.
The Common Access Card and what we are talking now about is
the contractor Common Access Card. This goes back to HSPD-12,
the Homeland Security Presidential Directive, that established
a mandatory government-wide standard for secure and reliable
Federal identification. And out of that requirement, the
Department came up with this card. And it began issuing these
back in October of 2006. The Common Access Card is the
Department's credential for obtaining physical and logistical
access worldwide, not to mention--and also that includes
southwest Asia, not to mention the fact that you can get
Internet information access with it also. It gives a person
access to installations and to services such as dining
facilities, welfare and recreation facilities, and various
military exchanges around the world. It also, as I said, can
give access on the Internet.
[The information follows:]

Common Access Cards were not created in response to HSPD-12, but
were in use prior to the issuance of HSPD-12. However, a new generation
of HSPD-12-compliant Common Access Card was issued by the Department
beginning in October 2006, after the new requirement was established.

Now, what is significant about all of this is that as
services are outsourced in these contracts, contractors who
have a validated need to have access to our facilities, they
apply for these. A government official, a government-employed
official is responsible for overseeing the application and
approving the application, and then the card is issued to the
particular contractor.
Now, if these cards are not properly processed, if they are
not controlled throughout their life cycle, they pose a
potential national security risk, and that is why we are
concerned about it. And what we have found in the work that we
are doing--and we have done one audit which I can tell you
about this morning and we are in the process of doing an
additional audit, because we are so concerned about this--there
are several things we found. But one thing we found is that in
one instance, 303 out of about 10,000 Common Access Card
sponsors, in other words, the government employees--they are
supposed to be government employees that issue these--303 of
the sponsors were in fact contractors who had the authority to
issue these cards. So we found that when we looked at a sample
of about 10,000. That means that these 303 contractors had the
authority to issue these cards to other contractors, violating
what is essentially an inherently governmental function and
creating a national security vulnerability. We did inform the
Department and they did deactivate these 303 accounts.
We also found in another random sample of 30 KBR employee
Common Access Card applications that one of the KBR contractors
was authorized to approve access card applications for KBR
employees. In addition, we found that verification of
background checks was not always being performed on KBR
contractors. And this is very important because in order to get
one of these cards, you have to have a background investigation
conducted and it has to be certified as properly done by a
government employee. It is my opinion that, as of July 2007,
the Department of Defense did not have assurance that as many
as 25,428 KBR contractors who were deployed in Southwest Asia
had authorized access. That is my opinion based on----
Mr. Moran. They got cards, but they didn't have
authorization----
Mr. Heddell. No one at the Department can say with
assurance that those cards were properly issued. Now, the
reason for that, for the most part, is that the verification of
the background checks for criminal history, et cetera, were not
certified, not verified to have been done properly.
Now, we also have concerns about the possible
misidentification of United States and foreign national
contractors who have been issued these cards, because what we
found is that almost 10 percent of 421,000 contractor cards had
a General Schedule designation on the card. And what that means
is that that 10 percent were identified as U.S. Government
employees when, in fact, they were not. So that is another
concern of ours. And that 72 percent of 290,000 U.S.
contractors and 93 percent of 3,500 foreign national
contractors were misidentified as U.S. Government personnel in
e-mail addresses, which is included on this card.
So these are significant concerns and we are concerned
because of the lack of what we think are potentially extremely
weak internal controls. We estimate that about 90 percent of
40,000 contractors with these cards have inaccurate or
unsupportable expiration dates also. So in other words, we are
concerned that even the expiration dates on these are not
accurate, and we are also concerned that about 38 percent of
28,000 cards that have been revoked or terminated were never
recovered. So there are a lot of cards out there that possibly
have current--that are active and current that should have been
turned in and canceled that were not.
Mr. Moran. So 38 percent would be about how many?
Mr. Heddell. Thirty-eight percent would be about 7,000.
Mr. Moran. Seven thousand that are still out there and
should have been turned in, but in somebody else's hands. Thank
you very much, Mr. Young.
[The information follows:]

Thirty-eight percent of 28,000 would be about 10,600. Therefore,
approximately 10,600 cards are still out there and should have been
turned in, but could be in somebody else's hands.

COMMON ACCESS CARDS

Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, this last point was very
interesting, and let me follow up on that. Who has the
authority to call in those cards and have them canceled or
terminated or gotten out of the hands of the people that aren't
supposed to have them any longer?
Mr. Heddell. Under HSPD-12, Congressman Young, the
Secretary of Defense and his executive have the authority to--
or the responsibility to establish a system of cards that are
legitimate, and we have spoken with the deputy secretary about
this. And I could tell that he was very moved and----
Mr. Young. I get the feeling that nothing was done when you
notified them.
Mr. Heddell. Well, at this point, that is one of the
reasons we are doing a second audit because we--in fact, we are
going to do an audit in southwest Asia and also in Korea
because we want to look at what is happening more specifically
on the ground, whether anything is in fact being done with
these. So we also have suggested that one of the requirements
of having these cards is that when you no longer are justified
and validated to use it, it is a requirement that you should
have to turn it in. It can be a pretty simple procedure, to be
honest with you.

QUANTITY DISCOUNTS

Mr. Young. Sir, you were asked earlier about quantity
discounts, and your response was sort of disappointing because
we don't get a benefit for quantity buys. What about a lot of
the equipment we buy from our contractors, also sold to allies
overseas interests, do we get any credit for that? Or do they
pay the same thing that we pay, or do they get a discount of
some kind? Where do we stand on the foreign sales versus our
own purchases?
Mr. Heddell. Well, I actually don't know the answer to
that, Congressman Young. But, again, it seems to me just
reasonable that if we buy a product and if we buy it in
significant volume for our own people, that we should get some
kind of a discount for that. Did I answer that as best as I
could?

ACCOUNTABILITY OF WEAPONS

Mr. Young. Let me go back to one issue that I mentioned in
my opening comments. The 190,000 weapons that were unaccounted
for in Iraq, I expect that someone has looked into that and
investigated it. And I am just wondering--I see some heads
shaking yes. And I am just wondering what we found out. Did we
learn anything? Did we recover any of these lost weapons?
Mr. Heddell. I actually am very fortunate to have my
Principal Deputy who is sitting behind me today, who actually
led the team that went over and took a look at that. And the
short answer is, yes, we think we have had some impact here.
And you may want to take the opportunity to let my deputy
speak.
We recently spoke with General Petraeus and that was one of
the subjects we talked about, and General Petraeus knows the
results of our first effort in terms of weapon accountability
and has asked us to go back in, particularly now with regard to
Afghanistan, but to go back in and confirm that accountability
has improved.
But as I say, I have Mr. Gimble here, and he knows this
subject in tremendous detail since he actually was on the
ground. And I will be fine to allow him to answer your
questions, with your permission.
Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, is that----
Mr. Moran. Please. Again, you can identify yourself for the
record, sir.
Mr. Gimble. I am Thomas Gimble, Principal Deputy Inspector
General, of the Department of Defense.
The answer to the 190,000--there has been a lot of work
done on that. That was originally reported to SIGIR and also
GAO. And we took a team in led by General Kicklighter
initially, to look at the processes in place on the ground in
Iraq and to determine what kind of control and accountability
of weapons. And what we found is there were not adequate
policies and procedures in place to account for them. So we
made the recommendations and Central Command issued the
policies and procedures.
About a year ago, I led a team back in and we looked at
control and accountability of weapons, going down to the
warehouses, the depots, inventory, also sending teams out.
Another part of this is how do you control or account for the
weapons that we turn over to the Iraqi security forces, to look
at those controls. We thought there was a great deal of
progress being made in the--when arms in Iraq, to the country,
that they are being accounted for. The processes are pretty
much in place and working. There was a weapons cell put
together.
There are actually criminal investigators to try to
ascertain what happened to many of the 190,000 weapons. They
have, in fact, determined that they were recovered. We have
determined where some of the leaks were; for example, where the
Glocks were leaving out of Baghdad Police College. The Iraqis
had put together a number of very stringent controls for
basic--like if a weapon is issued to a police officer and it
turns up in the wrong hands and is recovered, or when it is not
accounted for, there is a substantial cost, like $5,000 U.S.,
which is about a year's salary that they levy on that police
officer.
So I personally went through two of the police colleges and
did the inventories on the weapons that they had on hand. And
in those 2 days that we were in Simone and Irbil, we had 100
percent accountability of the weapons that they had on hand,
which I thought was good progress.
I would just offer up that we have done the same type of
stuff in Afghanistan. We have a team scheduled to depart on a
follow-up visit next week, going back in. One of the topics
they will be looking at is control and accountability of
weapons and munitions in Afghanistan.
Mr. Young. Well, the situation is embarrassing, I would
say, to probably all of us. And I know that many of us are
called on to explain why we are paying for these things, and
these situations develop. Anyway, Mr. Chairman, I know the
attendance is good today and I know a lot of members have a lot
of good questions so I will yield back.
Mr. Moran. Thanks very much, Mr. Young. That is an ongoing
concern. We are glad that some progress is being made, but we
still have cause for concern. Mr. Dicks.

CONTRACTOR ACCESS CARDS

Mr. Dicks. On these cards, we have been working--my staff
and I have been working on trying to understand how we get
access to our defense bases in the United States. The problem
at Fort Dix is one of--where people got in, and we find that
there is just no understandable strategy between the services.
And we can't find out literally who is in charge of this
program inside the Department of Defense. They have different
groups that are doing different things, DBIDS and different
systems.
And I think it sounds as if what you are facing on the
international scene, and with these cards, is just part of a
total disaster. I have had at least seven or eight meetings in
my office, bringing over all the people that were involved,
trying to understand this. And we are still baffled by who, in
fact, is in charge, how do we get them to do it--have proper
security at these bases, some of which have nuclear weapons?
And I mean, we are finding where we do get proper checking of
the identification cards, that a lot of people are going on
these bases who are not supposed to be, people with criminal
offenses and other things. And we brought this to the attention
of each of the services, and yet--it is very hard to ask
questions when we have--thank you.
Anyway, can you give us any understanding of that?
Mr. Heddell. I think you make a very good point,
Congressman.
Mr. Dicks. This is a problem right here in the United
States.
Mr. Heddell. Keep in mind, I have been at the Department of
Defense for 6 months, but I think based on my travels and
having some of the same problems you just mentioned, I think
one of the concerns might be a very decentralized system that
has a lot of people at a very decentralized level that are
controlling different systems and processes for gaining access.
That is not an audit opinion; that is an observation of my own
at this point.
And I think that is part of the problem that we deal with
these contractor access cards. It is decentralized. There are a
lot of people who have responsibility at different levels
around the country, around the world; in some ways they develop
their own policies, they determine--they hire the security
forces, they train them on how they should review the
identification of people that want access. They issue the
access passes and cards in this case. And I think the system
just simply needs to be tightened up and it needs to start at
the top and work down. I think right now we are at the bottom
working up.
Mr. Dicks. It would seem to me that we need to get the
deputy to appoint somebody in charge of this. I mean, we still
couldn't find out who, in fact, has the responsibility. We had
brought in people from various--from the services, from DOD,
and they really couldn't tell us who is in charge.
Mr. Heddell. That actually was our recommendation to the
deputy secretary, that one person needed to take charge of this
problem. And that was--in fact, that was probably our central
recommendation.

CONTRACTING

Mr. Dicks. Let me ask you another thing. Is this just--are
these--I mean, these contracts going out to companies to do
work in the Department of Defense, outsourcing, is there any
plan here or is this just done service by service and by
Defense Department agencies without any strategy or
understanding of the cost or anything? How is it--it looks very
chaotic based on your testimony.
Mr. Heddell. Secretary Gates in fact testified on that very
question in January of this year, and he stated that the
Department, particularly with regard to the combatant areas,
had no holistic or strategic plan for how it handles
contracting. That was his statement and not--maybe not an exact
quote, but I think it is fairly close.
And there are literally thousands of people making
contracting decisions around the world. And our audits would
indicate that we are not always considering important issues of
pricing. We are not thinking about oversight and administration
of the contracts. We are not thinking about the dangers of the
issue of inherent government authority and accountability here.
And in some cases, it is because there are not enough
contracting officials. In some cases it is because, as you
know, the volume and the dollar value of contracting has gone
up so significantly over the years, over the last decade in
particular, and the level of contracting officials has actually
gone down or stayed the same.
Mr. Dicks. Well, the previous Chairman of the Armed
Services Committee would go on the floor and say, ``These are
shoppers, we don't need these people.'' And now we find that we
are understaffed in terms of acquisition on the weapons
systems, isn't that correct, and having enough program managers
to properly manage these weapons systems?
Mr. Heddell. Well, I can't address a specific weapons
system, but I think I can say generally that there are not
enough skilled, able contracting officials to handle all of the
high-dollar important contracting that is being done out there.
Mr. Dicks. Just one last quick--is there a difference--you
talk about all these contracts where they are actually doing
work that normally was done. That is different, isn't it, from
acquisition of weapons systems? Those are two separate----
Mr. Heddell. There is contracting to purchase materials and
services and contracting to purchase weapons systems. I mean, I
am not sure I am following what you are getting at.
Mr. Dicks. What I am trying to get at is, we understand
there is an acquisition group that works on each of the major
weapons, the F-22, the C-17. These are huge contracts, okay? I
am talking about all these service contracts where they are
doing work that used to be done by government employees. Is
that a different acquisition force that handles that?
Mr. Heddell. No. There are program managers for each major
weapons acquisition, and those program managers are supposed to
be knowledgeable and to be engaged and to follow those
acquisitions all the way through from beginning to end.
Depending on which particular acquisition you might be
referring to, it would be hard to know--to say, well, one is
good and one isn't. I think we are speaking in a general sense
here that we have concerns because of the kinds of problems
that we are identifying.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Dicks.
The reality is that the amount of contracting is almost
three times what it was 8 years ago, and yet the number of
acquisition officers is one half of what it had been. And that
seems to be an underlying problem in terms of oversight and
accuracy.
Mr. Frelinghuysen.

RECRUITING QUALIFIED PROCUREMENT OFFICERS

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Satisfy my
curiosity. Does the IG for the DOD do any outsourcing?
Mr. Heddell. We do contract for auditors to help us with
some of the work.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Your IT work?
Mr. Heddell. We do.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I just want to make sure if we are
talking about organizations that are assignment pure, I would
like to know.
Mr. Heddell. Absolutely. I think you will find that most--
--
Mr. Frelinghuysen. My questions are going to focus on how
we get qualified procurement officers. But I would just like to
know that in your own portfolio we are not contracting out jobs
that are inherently governmental. So can you----
Mr. Heddell. Excellent question. We at the Department of
Defense do contract out for work that we do on the financial
statement, for example.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. For your specific office, I am talking
about.
Mr. Heddell. That is correct, sir. And even though I am
Acting Inspector General at DoD, I am also the Senate-confirmed
IG of Labor right now. And I only mention that because at
Labor, most of the work that we do on the financial statement
is contracted out.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. My time is limited. I just raise that
issue.
I happened to see Joe Davidson's Federal Diary in the
Washington Post yesterday. It was ``Stimulus Contracts: Let's
Avoid Another Katrina.'' I commend it to your attention. It
points out, among other things, that answering the questions--
this is how we--all the many contractors will have to deal with
the stimulus package, he says, and I quote: ``Answering any
questions will fall to Federal staffers who work with the
contractors. Government data shows that the procurement
workforce, while increasing in recent years, remains short of
the 67,885 that the Federal Acquisition Institute said that
Uncle Sam employed in 1992.'' Somewhat apropos of the
Chairman's comments.
And he goes on to say, ``As of fiscal year 2007, the number
was 61,434, with more than half of those in the Department of
Defense.'' All of that within quotation marks.
I would like to focus--we had General Ross Thompson in here
the other day and a lot of my questions had to do with
education and training of Federal contracting personnel. How
should the Department of Defense be going out and locating,
recruiting and hiring, developing the needed professionals to
do the job? And then you add in perhaps the disincentive to go
to the war zone. What would you recommend that we should be
doing?
Mr. Heddell. Well, you know----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Or if we are doing something now, how
should we do it differently?
Mr. Heddell. This was also part of the work of the Gansler
Commission. Clearly there is a lot that needs to be done here.
But first I think you have to know what we are trying to get at
here with our contracting. It is very simple. We are trying to
purchase materiel and services that are safe, that have a high
level of quality and performance, and that are provided in
sufficient numbers and that are provided at a reasonable cost.
Once we do----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I am all for that. But I want to know
how we get the people on board that can do that. From your
perspective, I know you have been on the job for 6 months,
but----
Mr. Heddell. What I am saying sir, is that--I can tell you
just in terms of recruiting, all right, but I think it is a
bigger problem than that, and that is what I am getting at.
From a standpoint of just getting the right people, you know,
there are incentives. We need to go out and recruit people that
have the skills that can do this kind of work. There are
internship programs to get people into the government who are
interested in this. This is not an area that is of great
interest to an awful lot of people.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. It is of interest to this Committee
because we are focusing----
Mr. Heddell. But it isn't to young people coming out of
college. And that is what I am saying.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. So we are being thwarted from doing the
very things we need to do to provide oversight because we don't
obviously want----
Mr. Heddell. It is extremely important.
Mr. Frelinghuysen [continuing]. Valuable equipment walking
away.
Mr. Heddell. It is extremely important, sir. And we have to
find programs and incentives: internships, journeyman programs,
things that are going to cause young people coming out of
college to have an interest in this kind of work, get them
recruited.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Underlying your comments is the fact
that you don't seem to be too optimistic about that happening,
which is a nice way of saying it is a competitive environment
out there and it is pretty difficult to get people to join up.
Mr. Heddell. That takes me back to where I started. The
problem, in my opinion, if you sense a lack of optimism, it
isn't that we can't find people or encourage people to do this
kind of work, it is that we have to understand the need at the
very top. We have to understand at the very top of our
executive level of government why this is so important and what
the dangerous ramifications are if we do not do a good job of
contracting. We have been in----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. General Thompson, I think--and maybe you
are saying basically the same thing. You say we need to make
sure that the people we are trying to put in these positions
know that their job is considered to be valuable. It is a major
contribution to our national security.
Mr. Heddell. That is correct. But the people doing the
hiring, the people responsible for making the decisions have
to--that is where it really starts. They are the ones who have
to decide that it is important enough to have the right number
of people and to have people that are qualified and to find
ways to recruit them and then, once recruited, to keep them on
board and to raise the status of this kind of work because I
think--I think it is difficult----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Well, my time is limited. As you put
your oar in the water, which is an opportunity you have been
given today, you are in there pitching as IG, because obviously
you came up with a whole slew of recommendations, and obviously
in the war zone it is a particularly difficult task to get
people that are willing, to quote, ``volunteer,'' other than
the military.
Mr. Heddell. Well, I think it can be done. We have allowed
this to happen, unfortunately, over a period--I mean, this is a
230-year-old problem in our country. We have had----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. It has recently gotten a lot worse.
Mr. Heddell. It has gotten a lot more expensive. And that
is a factor of complexity. The more expensive it gets, the more
complex it gets, and it goes to these very sophisticated
warfighting systems that we purchase. And planning. Planning
contingency planning years in advance, being prepared for the
Southwest Asia event, knowing--unfortunately, we often focus as
a government on personnel reductions, when in reality our
management decisions should be based on sound, reliable,
qualifiable analysis. And it is not. It is simply based on how
do we reduce the workforce here or there.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Well, we have a new regime, so let us
see what happens under new leadership.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Frelinghuysen.
As the inspector general says, this has been around a long
time, although it is a particularly acute problem now. Larger
testimony cites how in the Revolutionary War, contractors were
supplying General Washington's troops with meat that was full
of stones and roots in order to make them look--make it look
heavier and fuller. And the troops found the stones and roots
in the meat. Isn't that true?
Mr. Heddell. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Moran. So apparently this is not a problem that just
cropped up but it is one that we need to do a better job of
addressing.
Mr. Young says he forgot about that.
Ms. Kaptur.

CONTRACTED SERVICES

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very interested
in the culture of the Department of Defense over a period of
actually centuries. But if one goes back to World War II and we
compare the amount of contracted services in World War II to,
let us say, the first Persian Gulf War and today, what can you
say about the culture of contracting in those eras? According
to some numbers we have here in material that has been provided
us, it states that today DOD's obligations on contracts rose
from 47 percent of total budget in fiscal year 2000 to over
half, 51 percent, in 2007. And then from that, it says,
contract costs, service contracts, grew from 26 percent of that
total to 27 percent.
I assume the difference between the service contract and
obligation on overall contracts must be hardware contracts or
something, as distinguished from service contracts?
Mr. Heddell. I don't know the answer to that specific part
of your question, although I think I can address the broader--
--
Ms. Kaptur. All right. But if one looks back at the amount
of contracting, my sense is that only until recently have we
had this level of contracted-out functions of the Department of
Defense. What about World War II? Can you compare it to that
era?
Mr. Heddell. I think that there--we must have faced very
similar issues. If you remember, after World War--or maybe it
was during--that the Truman Commission on Wartime Contracting,
clearly they were looking at the very same issues, I think,
that we are looking at today. Just different numbers and a
different war.
Ms. Kaptur. How difficult, Mr. Heddell, would it be for you
to get me those numbers? I am just looking for a percent.
Mr. Heddell. I will certainly do my best to get you those.
Ms. Kaptur. What about the first Persian Gulf War in 1991,
about how many contracted services would we have had back then
compared to----
Mr. Heddell. I will do my best to find those for you.
Ms. Kaptur. I just need a number. And I am particularly
interested in the contracted security forces. That is a number
that I am extraordinarily interested in.
Mr. Heddell. There has been--in fact, I think that the
National Defense Authorization Act asked the Department to tell
it how many contractors it had in theater, and it has not been
able to do that. But it has made efforts to begin to try and
obtain that kind of data.
[The information follows:]

The Congressional Budget Office issued a report, ``Contractors'
Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq,'' in August 2008, which addressed
these issues. The CBO report contains estimates of the number of
contractor personnel presence during U.S. military operations. This
report can be accessed at: http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/96xx/doc9688/08-
12-IraqContractors.pdf.

Ms. Kaptur. Contracted security officers, sir, did you say.
Mr. Heddell. Well, any kind of contractors, whether they
are contracting security officers, any contractors that we are
hiring to go into theater. Or am I misunderstanding your
question?
Ms. Kaptur. Well, I am just interested in----
Mr. Heddell. You are talking about service contracting?
Ms. Kaptur. As I understand the numbers--I am just trying
to get simple numbers, okay? If we look at DOD and we look at
all contracts, they now total over half your budget. Is that a
correct statement?
Mr. Heddell. That, I believe, is correct.
Ms. Kaptur. Right. If one were to go back to World War II
and look at what percent of the total overall DOD expenditures
were contracts, I would be interested in that number. I would
be interested in that number for the first Persian Gulf War.
Mr. Heddell. We are going to try to get the answer. But I
will tell you that because--I will be surprised because I don't
think there is a current inventory that would give you that
answer for today, much less in 1990 or in 1943.
Ms. Kaptur. And I guess what has got me concerned is
normally the recommendations that come to us are, well, because
we have so many more contractors, now just give us more
contract personnel and accountants to count those.
Well, my answer is, wait a minute, let's have fewer
contracts, and maybe I will give you more contract auditing
personnel. But if we cut back on the contracts, we don't need
as many--I don't want to grow it. I don't want to grow it. I
want to manage it.
Mr. Heddell. I mean, we know what has happened. We know
that in the last 7 years, the value of contracts--well, in 2008
it was $390 billion, and that is compared to $155 billion in
2001. And, at the same time, the number of contracting
officials to handle those has not kept pace. We know that.
Ms. Kaptur. I understand. Those are very helpful numbers.
Mr. Heddell. What we don't know is how many contractors are
out there.
Now, you know from the Army's testimony, I guess, General
Thompson addressed this as what they--you know, they have gone
from 10,000 contracting officials back--when was that, Mary?
1996 or 1997, I forget. Or, I am sorry, in the early 1990s from
around 10,000 contracting officials to 1996 when they were down
to 5,500. And it has stayed pretty level since that time. But
the amount and volume of the contracts that they have overseen
has gone up 331 percent. In fact, today the Army alone handles
over $100 billion in contracts every year.
Ms. Kaptur. I don't want to abuse my time here, but I am
interested in the culture change at a department that contracts
out over half of what it does. And I am especially interested
in the culture of the security forces. We have not been able to
pursue a line of questioning here as I want to regarding
deployed contractors involved in security.
According to the numbers I have for overall military
personnel as of January, there were 219,000 military personnel
versus 259,000 contractors deployed to CENTCOM. All right, of
those numbers, of those numbers, which are defined as security
personnel? And how much of that is a culture change from what
might have existed in the first Persian Gulf War and certainly
from World War II?
I don't remember contractors in World War II carrying guns.
I don't remember that.
Mr. Moran. It is a good line of inquiry, Ms. Kaptur. I am
not sure the Inspector General is going to be able to answer
that completely.
But perhaps you could solicit an answer from someone in the
Pentagon and provide it for the record.
Mr. Heddell. Yes, sir.
[The information follows:]

The Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Program Support
point paper, ``Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in USCENTCOM AOR,
Iraq, and Afghanistan'' released February 2009, reported 12,907 private
security contractor (PSC) personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan (9,218 Iraq
and 3,689 Afghanistan) as of the end of the 1st quarter FY 2009.

Ms. Kaptur. And we will provide specific questions to the
record.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Moran. Excellent. Thank you, Ms. Kaptur.
Mr. Kingston.

EDUCATION TRAINING OF CONTRACTING OFFICERS

Mr. Kingston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Heddell, on page 6 of your testimony, going back to the
MRAP for a minute, you talked about, and I quote, ``The current
leading contracting officer could not explain how the price
evaluation team concluded that prices were fair and
reasonable.'' And then it went on to say, ``The Marine Corps
did not obtain volume pricing discounts from two contractors.''
Now, it would appear to me that that is his job.
Mr. Heddell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kingston. And so the question would be, what was his
punishment for not doing his job?
Mr. Heddell. I don't have an answer to that, sir.
Mr. Kingston. Was he punished?
Mr. Heddell. I don't know.
Mr. Kingston. Is part of your recommendation to say, hey,
you guys aren't punishing bad behavior and incompetence or
neglect or however you want to classify it, call it?
Mr. Heddell. Mary, do you know? Do you want to shed light
on that?
Ms. Ugone. I can shed a little bit of light on that.
There is a fundamental--and it goes back to what Mr.
Heddell has stated. Our contracting officers, the skills of our
contracting officers, when they are faced against negotiating
these huge multi-billion-dollar contracts, they are not as
skilled as they should be. That is part of the problem. Part of
the problem is education and training, having a skilled
contracting officer facing very, very competent negotiators on
the other side of the table. That is one thing.
The second thing----
Mr. Kingston. I don't get that. Just a minute, if I could
reclaim my time for a second, and then I will get back to you.
That doesn't make any sense at all. You know, we all laugh
about how incompetent the government is. This--I mean,
everybody here is beating up on private contractors, and
rightfully so, but you are telling me that somebody for the
Marine Corps that is sitting in the seat of being a purchasing
officer, they don't do the obvious of a $306,000 to $1,089,000
difference and they don't question it? And then we say, ``Oh,
well, he is not trained''?
For example, Abu Ghraib, the general was fired who
probably, you could argue, had very little to do with it except
for the fact that it happened during his or her watch. I don't
remember who the general was. But the reality is, you know,
that is the message that you send, that it is your
responsibility.
And it would appear to me that this contracting officer
should have been potentially fired, certainly reprimanded, and
so should his superior and his superior. And that is the way it
is done in the field of active-duty combat, for example, or
something.
So I am hear hearing from you, ``Well, it is not his fault
because he is not trained.''
Ms. Ugone. I am not saying that, actually. I wanted to put
it in a little context before I actually answered the specific
question.
The Marine Corps didn't agree with us on our findings, and
that is part of it, is that they believe that there was price
competition and there was a disagreement about that as well.
But the contracting officer--there are corrective actions that
were undertaken with regard to this.
But I wanted to provide the context. And each individual
program or contract has--or each contract has a contracting
officer. We can find out whether or not this particular
contracting officer had any kind of administrative action
taken. But the response to our report was generally a good
response. But the dilemma there also is the Marine Corps does
not believe that there was, you know, necessarily a problem in
the price competition area.
Now, we had to go to Mr. Shay Assad, the director of
defense procurement, to weigh in on this. And he pretty much
indicated that we--he concurred with our position.
So we can follow up for you and get additional information,
but I wanted to provide the context, because this whole area of
pricing is not a very easy area. It requires a lot of skill and
training and attention at both the contracting officer level
and also senior levels.
Mr. Kingston. I would like to know, you know, if there was
punishment or what was the after action.
[The information follows:]

According to a responsible Marine Corps official, as of April 2009,
they were unaware of any administrative actions taken against the
contracting officer. The Marine Corps does not believe there was
necessarily a problem in the price competition area.

And I want to--you know, going to page 8 a minute, you are
saying here, ``We recommended that the Marine Corps contracting
officers be provided training on their authority and
responsibility and that the assistant Secretary of the Navy''--
blah, blah--``agreed with this recommendation.''
And then on page 25, you say, ``The statute requires the
Army Audit Agency, Naval Audit Service, and the Air Force Audit
Agency, in coordination with the OIG, to develop the plan to
audit equipment, maintenance, and spare parts. We are actively
developing this plan.''
Both those statements seemed to be stating the obvious.
And, you know, if this problem has been going on since George
Washington and here we are saying, ``We recommend that the
Marine Corps contracting officers be trained on their authority
and responsibility,'' oh, well, I feel better about government
now. And I am not being sarcastic towards you, but, I mean,
let's think about it in terms of stewards of taxpayer dollars.
Why in the heck wasn't that the case last year, the year
before, the year before, going back to General Washington? And,
you know, here it is, the same thing on page 25, that ``we are
actively developing a plan.''
And I am not pointing my finger at you. We are all
responsible here. But, you know, if you went out prime-time and
told this to the public, ``I want you to feel a lot better
about this because we are actively developing an audit plan,''
what the heck? I mean, I am sure in our individual offices, as
would be the case with somebody who runs a shoe store, a bike
store, or a barber shop, they are doing this kind of stuff
every single day. Why in the world would the military culture
start thinking that there was an option on doing audits?
Ms. Ugone. What you refer to on page 25 of the testimony is
section 852, which was legislated by Congress for the service
audit agencies to work with us, coordinate with us on a plan to
look at depot maintenance. Because when we draw down, there is
going to be an enormous amount of reset issues. Our depot
maintenance capability, which is a whole other arena that we
could probably talk about, they are a very complex issue.
So this audit plan is actually to be able to focus more
accountability and oversight of what we know will be heavy
contractor involvement, as well as in-house involvement, in
depot maintenance. I mean, this is a huge area as we reset our
equipment that return back from Iraq and also from the
standpoint of the proper mix of what is going to be in depot
maintenance. And that is an issue of proper mix of contractors
and government employees.
So this audit plan, as Congress recognized, is an important
piece of providing accountability over that side of the house.
Mr. Kingston. I appreciate it.
Mr. Moran. The gentleman's time has expired. But I might
mention, in this report, they do make the point that it has not
just a matter of lack of quantity; it is also of quality. Many
of the best government negotiators are scooped up by the
private sector to work on their behalf. And that is why we have
a constant need for training, promotion, and enhancement of the
quality.
Mr. Kingston. Absolutely.
Mr. Moran. Mr. Boyd.

PROCUREMENT AND ACQUISITION

Mr. Boyd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Panel, thank you for your service.
I think everyone here understands we have a serious problem
in procurement and acquisition in our Federal Government. And
probably everybody here understands that the Department of
Defense is the worst abuser of that procurement system. And I
think it is good that we try to understand what has happened in
the past. It leads us to where we go in the future.
But I want to shift gears, if I might, Mr. Chairman, and
talk about where we go in the future. And I know, relative to
Mr. Frelinghuysen's line of questions and Ms. Kaptur's, we
focused a lot on what has happen in the past.
And, Mr. Chairman, I know everybody here understands that,
as Mr. Frelinghuysen said, we do have a new sheriff in town--I
don't think you used exactly those terms, but something like
that--and the new administration understands this issue and is
focusing on it.
Now, there was a fiscal summit this week. And for those of
you who weren't there, you only read the press clips, and you
really didn't get into the guts of it. But there were five
particular issues, five issues, that that fiscal summit focused
on. The sexy ones are health care and taxes and budget reform
and stuff like that. But the fifth one was procurement. You may
not know that, but procurement and acquisition, Federal
procurement and acquisition.
And the President put together a team across the political
spectrum to deal with those issues. And Senator John McCain,
sort of, headed that team. And so I want to make sure everybody
understood that we are going to have an opportunity, as a
legislature, to delve into this, because the administration
clearly understands the gravity of this problem and will want
to help solve it.
So, Mr. Chairman, I wanted to make sure all the Committee
members knew that, and the Committee staff, that there will be
ample opportunity to work on these kind of problems to improve
the situation, not just look at what has been wrong in the
past.
Now, my question for you, Mr. Heddell, is--I have two quick
questions, and it won't take long. In the 2009 Defense
Authorization Act, the director of the OMB was required to
develop a single consistent definition of an inherently
governmental function. Now, the director was supposed to
address deficiencies with existing definitions and develop
criteria that each government agency, each department, could
identify positions that should not be contracted out.
In that act, in that law, he was given 1 year to report
back to Congress on the new definition. Now, obviously, we have
had a change in the OMB office, a change in the administration.
Can you, do you have any information as to the status of that
effort, the OMB's effort to help the heads of the agencies
better understand which positions are inherently governmental?
And what plans does the OMB have in place to ensure a smooth
transition of what has already been done?
Mr. Heddell. I can't answer that, sir.
Mr. Boyd. You can't answer that.
Mr. Heddell. No, sir.
Mr. Boyd. Okay. That is all I have, and maybe we could ask
that of another expert, Mr. Chairman.

AUDITS AND INVESTIGATIONS

Mr. Moran. Is it not true, though, Mr. Inspector General
that you do have some survey work going on, there are some
classifications that some agencies have used to determine what
is an inherently governmental role? We are working on that, are
we not?
Mr. Heddell. Well, it is something, Mr. Chairman, that, by
virtue of our audit and investigative work for one thing, we
are constantly addressing that issue when it comes up in our
audits and investigations with the Department. So we know that
they are constantly sensitized to our concern about that.
We know that the law--in fact, I think the laws are pretty
clear on that. I don't know that there is even any need for any
additional language in the law. If the law is followed, I don't
think there is going to be a problem with regard to that matter
of definition. I mean, I think it is fairly clear.
Mr. Boyd. Mr. Chairman, one quick follow-up question.
Do you know of any interaction or communication between the
OMB office and the Department of Defense relative to this
directive in public law in the Defense Authorization Act?
Mr. Heddell. No, sir, I am not personally aware of any. But
there may have been. I don't know of any.
Mr. Boyd. Okay, thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Moran. Thank you very much, Mr. Boyd.
Ms. Granger.

INHERENTLY GOVERNMENTAL

Ms. Granger. I am going to follow up on what Congressman
Boyd asked about, and it is not the definition--and this is
pretty simple, I am sure, for you. But, in making those
decisions, this is going to be inherently a governmental
position or contractor, then, in that comparison, we have
looked at national security, we have looked at cost, we have
looked at effectiveness, are we comparing, like, just paycheck
to paycheck and say it is cheaper to have a contractor? Are we
looking at all the benefits, all the entitlements? How do we
make a comparison of the actual cost, at that point?
Mr. Heddell. Your question absolutely gets to the core of
the entire problem, because we have thousands of contractor
officials and executives out there that are purchasing
materials and services, and there is no--we can't tell you what
they are doing, how they are doing it, or when they are doing
it. And we don't know what their motives are in terms of--for
instance, we don't know if they really understand the
definition of what is inherently governmental. We don't know
what their motives are when they purchase.
I mean, for instance, Congressman Kingston asked the
question, what has been done about this? But if a military
official were sitting here as a devil's advocate, they would
say, ``Look, we did our job. We got that material and those
services out there on the front line as quickly as we could. It
cost us, perhaps, but we got it out there. And we are saving
lives by doing it.''
This is not a simple issue, unfortunately. But what we have
learned is that, no matter how expediently you think it should
be done, it is not worth it to overlook the fiscal issues.
Because every dollar that we lose is a dollar that doesn't go
out there and support our troops.
There is a lot that we need to do to improve this whole
process. And, as I said earlier, it is not a simple matter of
making personnel decisions. It is a matter of balancing. It is
a matter of making sound, reliable, quantifiable analysis of
the entire issue regarding a particular product or service.
Ms. Granger. But as we are making a decision on that
personnel, part of that has to be, what is the real cost of
that person, whether that person is a contractor, whether that
person is a government employee. And is that his disability or
her disability, her retirement, her health care, are we looking
at that? And is that consistent? I think the answer is no.
Mr. Heddell. I don't know. In fact, I will defer to Mary.
She may be able to answer that a little better than I can. I
don't know the answer to that question.
Ms. Ugone. Let me see if I can try and answer.
When we look at this inherently governmental function, if
you look at the FAR, the Federal Acquisition Regulation
specifies what is inherently governmental, and then they give
examples of what is not inherently governmental. And I think
there is an education and interpretation issue of what we don't
think is inherently governmental.
Let me just give you an example. Assisting in preparing the
statement of work. Well, how much is ``assisting''? Assisting
could be doing, doing all of it, doing the first draft; that is
assisting.
So I think part of it is clearly an educational issue. I am
not sure people understand what they mean with ``inherently
governmental.'' It could be easy just to say it is a decision-
making process. But there are a lot of decisions we make.
So, if you look at the FAR, you could take what is not
inherently governmental and put your own interpretation to it.
And, you know, people in this room could probably interpret it
many different ways. So I think that is a fundamental issue
there, too.
And also I think the Department has recognized, by going
back to insourcing, trying to find ways where it makes sense to
bring those functions that really are inherently governmental,
bring them back in. And that is through section 324.
And that is also, in answering Congresswoman Kaptur, is
that there is no--when you really look at it and you look at
the total picture, there is no inventory of services
contractors. There is no inventory of how we are managing our
contracts at this level. How are we managing our contractors?
How do we manage the mix? What is the strategy? There is no
strategy.
So, I think there are a lot of interrelated issues,
inherently governmental, services contracting, pricing. If you
look at these contracting issues, they all interrelate--skilled
workforce--they all interrelate.
I hope I answered your question.
Mr. Heddell. You know, if I can just add, the Department,
on this whole issue of inherently governmental, I mean, does
have a policy. And they, in fact, they list numerous examples
of what inherently governmental is. I mean, they go way beyond
the definition. They go down to the----
Mr. Moran. So this goes to Mr. Boyd's question, as well,
and Ms. Granger's. There is work done. It is not that they are
mindless of the issue of the distinction. Excuse me for
interrupting.
Mr. Heddell. No, I think that they fully understand it is
an important issue. But I don't think that--I think every case
is separate, sir. And whether they even consider the issue is
maybe the first question. And then, if they do consider it, do
they really understand what ``inherently governmental'' means?
And then I guess you might even ask, do they care? I am not
sure I would go that far. I believe the Department of Defense
does care. I just think it is a matter, many times, of just not
knowing.
Mr. Moran. Well, what the Army did in having the list that
they made available was helpful because people could consult
that, as to what would normally be considered inherently
governmental. And then there is the issue of cost. If it is a
short-term responsibility where you can hire somebody without
having to pay them benefits and be responsible for them for the
rest of their career, there is that economic consideration.
This is a very good line of questioning. Thank you, Ms.
Granger.
Mr. Hinchey.
Mr. Hinchey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Moran. We have three votes, but I think we can finish
this up before we have to leave for the votes. But anybody that
wants to should feel free to.

CONTRACT OVERSIGHT

Mr. Hinchey. Thanks very much for your testimony and your
response to these questions. It is a fascinating set of
circumstances, and obviously a set of circumstances that has to
be dealt with effectively.
Based upon the questions, you remind us that the corruption
and incompetence involving military operations is not unique in
the context of the last several years. It has happened before.
But what we are dealing with now is also very serious and needs
to be dealt with effectively.
One of the numbers, for example, that I understand is that
the defense obligations and contract acquisitions increased
from somewhere around $190 billion in 1997 to up to about $430
billion in 2007. But at the same time it went up, the people
overseeing those contracts went down. More and more money is
being spent, more and more money is being spent wastefully,
incompetently, corruptly. And the number of people who are
obligated and responsible to watch that stuff have been reduced
significantly. It doesn't seem to be an accident; seems to have
been done intentionally.
What are your observations about that and about the way it
has been operated? And how many oversight employees do we have
right now focusing on the seriousness of this issue?
Mr. Heddell. Well, I can't say that it has been
intentional, Congressman.
Mr. Hinchey. No, I am going to say that. You don't have to.
Mr. Heddell. But I can tell you that it is a serious,
serious problem. I can tell you that, if this matter is not
addressed, probably not just within the Department of Defense,
I would bet government-wide, we are going to be in even more
serious trouble. It has to be addressed.
We have to make very clear, very intellectual decisions
regarding what we buy, what we are going to pay for it, and
what it is going to do for us. And then we have to decide what
is most important, because we don't have money to buy
everything. But we clearly don't have enough contracting
officials to do the work that is out there.
So it is either, don't buy as much, don't do as much
contracting, or find more people that can handle it.
Mr. Hinchey. So the problem, obviously, is in the context
of funding, all the money that we have lost, all the money that
has been misused, all the money that has been poured into
people for whatever the reason, whether it was intentional or
just sloppy.
But there is also a downgrade in security because of the
way in which military operations have been manipulated and the
way in which military materials have been lost.
Mr. Heddell. Well, we haven't even begun to talk about the
fraud issue, which Mr. Beardall could address at great length,
here today. That is a big concern of ours, also, because when
you don't have controls, the opportunity for fraud is there.
And we have many examples of that having occurred in recent
years as a result of poor contract oversight.
Mr. Beardall. It is the sad truth, but that is what it is.
And it gets worse and worse and more difficult.
And I think some of it goes back to the fundamental
struggle with, how big of an army do you want to have? And that
has been the issue, with the size of the military. And as you
cut down the size of the military, where people used to do
contract oversight--you used to have lawyers who were contract
law specialists and those folks who are now getting paid better
by contractors. It is that struggle where, once you are not
doing it yourself, where you have controls, you have a very
good structure in the military to oversee those things, and
then you have to then farm that business out because your
military is small, you will always then have: Now we are
farming it out, and then you get to the question of what is
inherently governmental. We wouldn't even have to ask that
question if we had our own folks to do the work internally.
Mr. Hinchey. If you make the military small because you
don't want to engage in actually requiring civilians to come in
and be involved in the military because you don't want to get
that as a political issue, well, then you have created another
part of the problem.
I just have one last question, if I may, Mr. Chairman.
In your written statement, you identify an important
potential security risk. And you noticed that there are 212,000
Department of Defense contractors with e-mail addresses. And
that classifies them as government personnel. So they have
access to huge amounts of information--not just information, a
whole host of other things as well.
How serious is this? What has happened? What are some of
the effects that have taken place? Have you had an opportunity
to look into that, or is this something that we are going to
have to do?
Mr. Heddell. We have only looked at the aspect of whether
or not people who have this access have gotten security
background checks done. Keep in mind that even if a person has
access to information, there are levels of classification, and
they would have to have additional access codes, et cetera, to
gain that access.
Are we concerned? Absolutely. We still are concerned.
Mr. Hinchey. Well, whatever recommendations you might have
on that I think would be very important because of the insight
that you have on it and the experience that you have had
investigating it. And what needs to be done additionally, that
kind of information would be very, very important to this
committee and to the Congress generally.
Mr. Heddell. We are doing additional work in both southwest
Asia and Korea. We will be. And we will make that one of the
things that we will----
Mr. Hinchey. Thank you very much.
Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Hinchey.
The Committee will want to be kept apprised of your
progress on that. It is a very serious concern.
Ms. Kilpatrick.

COMMON ACCESS CARD

Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am scared to death, sitting here. I have heard what you
said. I read your testimony last night. It is even more
flagrant when I hear you give it. And thanks to you and your
staff for being here and for your knowledge.
The Common Access Cards, first of all, did they start in
2006 or 2007?
Mr. Heddell. October of 2006. The current what is called
the Common Access Card was implemented as a result of HSPD-12.
[The information follows:]

Common Access Cards were not created in response to HSPD-12, but
were in use prior to HSPD-12. A new generation of the Common Access
Card was implemented as a result of HSPD-12, and the Department began
issuing the new HSPD-12-compliant Common Access Cards in October of
2006.

Ms. Kilpatrick. Right. I wanted to make sure I had the year
right. It sounds like it is totally inoperable, a security
breach, and anybody can get one.
Mr. Heddell. I would say this: As I said, we are concerned.
We do not believe that the Department can provide full
assurance that the people that are intended to have that card
are in fact the ones who have it. So we do have concerns.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Major. I mean, that right there is a start.
Because if we have contractors who are monitoring the
contractors and giving fraudulent cards, and it sounds like,
from what I read last night and hearing you today, it is out of
control and unable to monitor in its current state.
Mr. Heddell. Well, it is potentially much greater than just
a matter of the issue of inherently governmental.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Right. It is much broader. It is much
broader than that.
Mr. Heddell. It is a potential national security issue, and
we are concerned.
Ms. Kilpatrick. So, should we be handling it? If you tell
me it is being handled and we know it is out of order and you
have turned that over and Pentagon are now addressing that--can
you tell me that today?
Mr. Heddell. No, ma'am. That is why we are beginning two
new audits, one in southwest Asia and one in Korea, because we
are following up to determine what the new status of this is.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Okay. I know what you do, and you do it
well. I don't know if it is Congress's responsibility or our
Chairman--and I love how our two Chairmen work together--that
we have to do something with this. And it is not acceptable to
this Rep, and I am sure it is not to any of the congressional
people sitting here.
You alluded to the KBR employee. And this is another
fraudulent thing. I guess they are contractors; most KBRs are.
Mr. Heddell. Well, the KBR staff around the world have
these contractor Common Access Cards issued to them, yes.
Ms. Kilpatrick. And they also issue cards, some of them.
Mr. Heddell. Well, we found in use--we did a sample of 30,
and we found that one KBR employee had the authority to issue
other KBR employees----
Ms. Kilpatrick. It has to be centralized somewhere, and I
would rather that be a governmentally inherent responsibility
rather than a contractor doing it.
Mr. Heddell. It is not just a preference, it is a
requirement. It has to be a government employee to authorize or
sponsor the issuance of that card. It cannot be a contractor.
Ms. Kilpatrick. In this particular case, the employee
worked in Afghanistan. He was sentenced to 26 months in prison
and a $216,000 restitution. After receiving the gas, according
to your comments this morning, receiving it, selling it back,
making the bribe, taking--I mean, it is like six layers. And
all he got--I want him in jail longer, first of all, and I want
him to pay back all the money. So it seems like the military
court was too lenient, because it is an example to continue the
fraud and abuse.
Mr. Beardall. It was the Federal district court.
Ms. Kilpatrick. He must have known the judge.
Mr. Heddell. If it were a court-martial, it would be a lot
more than that.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Okay, then somebody has to say that.
Somebody has to say that. That is a very light fine, from what
I read last night and you reinforced today in your opening
comments.
I still want to believe we have the best military in the
world.
Mr. Heddell. I think we do.
Ms. Kilpatrick. That things happen, and from time to time
we will have to correct them. But all the IGs that do your
work, it is up to the Congress and the Executive Office to take
action. This that I have been reading in the last 24 hours is
very troubling to me. I commend you for the work you do.
Mr. Chairman, I am not sure where it goes from here. And I
heard all the comments from my colleagues this morning. This is
very serious. I don't know how you can fight two wars, and we
are about to expand in Afghanistan and do all this stuff, and
have all this going on.
If a contractor--and we already know, I would rather have
government employees. I want a larger military if that is what
it takes. I don't know where it came from; shrink the military,
cut off the monitors and hire all the contractors. It is very
dangerous. And I think we have to fix it sooner rather than
later.
Thank you for your testimony.
Mr. Moran. Thank you, Ms. Kilpatrick.
I think the committee staff is planning on having an
extensive section of the report on the bill dealing with this
subject area. So any member of the committee who would like to
contribute to that, I would hope they would.
Mr. Dicks had a quick question, and then Mr. Kingston if we
still have time.
Mr. Kingston. I will pass.
Mr. Moran. Okay. Fine, Jack. Thanks.

ACQUISITION PERSONNEL

Mr. Dicks. Let me ask you a question. When we were talking
about the personnel for the acquisition, in some departments I
understand that they have a private contractor with a Web
site--and I think DOD does this--to bring in the personnel. Is
that correct?
So it would seem to me to be an inherently government
function, you know, the hiring of personnel to do acquisition,
is being done through a contractor and a Web site. Is that
correct?
Mr. Heddell. I am not aware of that, sir. It may be
correct. I am not aware of that.
[The information follows:]

The Director of Defense Procurement responded that he was not aware
of any use of a private contractor with a website for hiring
acquisition personnel.

Mr. Dicks. Yeah, I think that is something you might want
to take a look at.
Also, the whole question on personal service contracts, I
don't know if you got into that.
Mr. Heddell. We have. Well, I mean, we have done work in
that area.
Mr. Dicks. Are we reversing that? Apparently, they went
beyond the legal authority to do this to services, and now we
are talking about insourcing some of this.
The other thing I would just point out, you know, under A-
76, they should be using the A-76 process, which I think they
are not doing, under pressure. And can you talk about that?
Mr. Heddell. I can tell you that we have completed audits
where we felt that there was a strong appearance of violating
the personal services contracting rules. And, in fact, one was
an audit that we recently did, and although I am pretty
familiar with it, I think it might be worth it to have Mary
explain that, if you have a moment. It is an interesting audit,
and it goes to your question.
Ms. Ugone. Personal services contracts, as I am sure you
are aware, Congressman Dicks, is not the preferred method. And,
in fact, I think it is not legal, except in certain
circumstances there are waivers for that. And that is a
situation in which we are having a government employee directly
supervising contractors to the point where it is a daily
ongoing supervision.
We had ``America Supports You,'' an audit report that we
issued that had to do with it. And we did not go as far to say
it was personal services, but it had some of the
characteristics of a personal services contract, which is
verbal direct communication to the contractor of how to
proceed, what to do. And that does trouble us, from that
standpoint.
We have not done a significant amount of work in personal
services contracting, but the area that we are focused--and it
is part of the overall services contracting area. I think the
whole area of services contracting is an area that needs
additional focus, because it is for services. It is not like
your traditional, you know, you buy an end item and you have a
deliverable that you can actually touch and feel. Services
contracting is a lot more problematic, where you are actually
having some sort of service done that you may not necessarily
touch and see and feel.
And so I think that, absolutely, personal services
contracts we should not be using. And, in fact, if we are, they
are illegal except under certain waivers circumstances.
Mr. Dicks. Do we have any idea on numbers of these personal
services contracts?
Ms. Ugone. We don't even have any idea of the number of
services contracts that we have. In fact, that is what the--I
think it was section 807, which Congress had asked that the
Department implement. And so there is a phased approach. I
think the Army is supposed to be identifying an inventory in
two phases, and the other services kick-in in, I believe, 2010,
yes, fiscal year 2010, and then other defense agencies will
kick-in in 2011 to report to Congress an inventory of services
contracts. We don't even currently have an inventory right now.
Mr. Moran. Mr. Dicks, we are out of time in the vote. We
are all going to have to run up there, unfortunately.
This has been a very good hearing. We thank you very much.
I have some questions that I will submit for the record. Any
other member who does, as well, will get them answered for the
record.
Thank you very much, Mr. Inspector General, and your very
competent staff. Thank you. Your colleagues were very good, as
well.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Moran and the
answers thereto follow:]

Advance Competition Notice

Question. Numerous defense industry representatives have discussed
with me the importance of the Government providing industry with
greater advance notice of when an existing contract (i.e. re-compete
with an existing incumbent contractor) or a new contract (i.e. new
start with no incumbent contractor) acquisition is to take place so
that it can align and allocate business development capture and
proposal resources to targeted procurements.
What is your perspective of the job the Department of Defense does
today at providing industry with such advance procurement notices,
which maximizes the potential for competition, thereby resulting in
reduced Government cost and are there opportunities for improvement?
Answer. During the past five years, we have issued 31 reports that
have addressed sole source or directed source awards. We have found
that sole source awards have occurred because of poor acquisition
planning rather than the urgency or uniqueness that have been cited as
the need for a particular source. We have also found problems with
advance notice to contractors on multiple award contracts. Contracting
officers have limited the amount of time for contractors to respond to
solicitations for proposals or have cited inappropriate exceptions to
competition to select a particular contractor.

Sole Source Contracting

Question. One area of contracting concern is sole source contracts.
Does the Department of Defense know how many active sole source
contracts there are by name, contract #, the period of performance, the
contract amount, the company awarded the sole source contract, the last
time the contract was competed, and the sponsoring organization and
their FAR rationale for the sole source contract award?
Answer. The Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) captures a
variety of information about DoD as well as other Federal contracts.
Similar information is also reported on the USAspending.gov website.
For instance, in FY 2008, a query of DoD contract dollars by
competition type shows that of $383 billion reported, only $131 billion
was fully and openly competed. The remaining contract awards were based
on more limited or no competition.

Appropriate Oversight

Question. It appears that in many federal agencies, both within and
outside of DoD, greater and greater emphasis is being placed on the
seamless and rapid obligation of appropriated funds. This transactional
focus manifests itself when acquisition management systems have been
subsumed into the agency's overall financial management solution. I am
concerned that the strategic importance of acquisition management (e.g.
contract writing) systems and the required checks and balances that
these systems historically have provided have been diluted tremendously
since they are now considered by many to be simply a ``back office''
non-core feeder system to the financial management system.
Please comment on what is being done to reinvigorate the necessary
checks and balances and the strategic importance of acquisition
management systems to combat waste, fraud and abuse, and maximize the
benefit that each taxpayer dollar is being spent wisely and in
compliance with federal law and regulation?
Answer. We have issued a number of reports that have cited problems
with attempts to rapidly award procurements. Our audits have found that
urgent awards are often improperly justified. Additionally, the Panel
on Contracting Integrity has taken on a number of contracting
initiatives designed to improve the contracting process and reduce the
risk of fraud, waste and abuse. The Panel established 10 subcommittees,
to include (1) the current structure of contracting integrity, (2)
sustained senior leadership, (3) capable contracting workforce, (4)
adequate pricing, (5) appropriate contracting approaches and
techniques, (6) sufficient contract surveillance, (7) contracting
integrity in a combat/contingent environment, (8) procurement fraud
indicators, (9) contractor employee conflicts of interest, and (10)
recommendations for change. The Panel identified 21 actions for
implementation in FY 2008 to improve contracting, and has identified 28
new actions for FY 2009.

Role of the DoD IG in Contracting

Question. There is some concern in the contracting industry that
DoD IG staff are now performing more roles during contract negotiations
between contractors and the GSA. Specifically, that these DoD IG
advisors are not participating in negotiations with rather than GSA
contracting officers.
What is the proper role of the DoD IG in instances where
contractors are negotiating GSA schedules contracts with the GSA?
Answer. My office has no role in negotiating GSA schedules between
GSA contracting officers and contractors. The GSA IG has primary
oversight of GSA contracting actions. Over the past several years, the
DoD IG was mandated to perform joint reviews with the GSA IG of
interagency direct and assisted contracting actions using DoD funds.
These audits have looked at contract actions that have already been
awarded and while we may have looked at issues related to the award of
these actions, none of our work was done during the actual pre award
phase for these actions.

Cleared Personnel

Question. One of the impediments to processing contracts and
execution of those contracts in a timely manner is the availability of
cleared personnel, both within the acquisition and contracting force
for the government and with the contracting industry.
Can you comment on the challenges that the current clearance
process presents to our contract management and execution?
Answer. The clearance process has become mired due to the failure
of federal agencies to rely upon clearances processed by other federal
agencies. This inability and several other inefficiencies are being
addressed through the development of a federal strategy to improve the
accessibility of federal investigative records. The Repository Reform
Implementation Team is working with the Office of Personnel Management
and the Joint Reform Team to remove obstacles to developing a fully
automated, end-to-end capability, which processes record requests and
record responses in optimal time. This would apply to reports of
background investigations and federal records of Executive Branch
agencies requested in support of those investigations. While the team's
long term goals will be accomplished by automation, short term goals
will be accomplished by agency accountability and incrementally
increasing performance standards.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Moran.
Questions submitted by Ms. Kaptur and the answers thereto
follow:]

Question. I am interested in the evolution of the culture of
contracting within the Department of Defense and its changing nature
over time and its impact on the ``Espirit de corps'' within the U.S.
military.
Answer. The DoD IG does not have a body of work to use as support
for responses to these questions. As such, in response to
Representative Kaptur, we utilized three publications that are in part
responsive to her questions.
Congressional Budget Office report, ``Contractors' Support
of U.S. Operations in Iraq,'' released August 2008 (http://www.cbo.gov/
ftpdocs/96xx/doc9688/08-12-IraqContractors.pdf)
Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Program
Support point paper, ``Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in
USCENTCOM AOR, Iraq, and Afghanistan,'' released February 2009 (http://
www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/docs/5A_Feb2009.doc)
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction report,
``Agencies Need Improved Financial Data Reporting for Private Security
Contractors,'' released October 30, 2008 (http://www.sigir.mil/reports/
pdf/audits/09-005-fpdf)
What was the total number of contractors during World War II?
Answer. The Congressional Budget Office report, ``Contractors'
Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq,'' released August 2008, estimated
that during World War II there were 734,000 contractors and 5,400,000
military.
Question. What was the number of contractors during the Persian
Gulf War?
Answer. The Congressional Budget Office report, ``Contractors'
Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq,'' released August 2008, estimated
that during the Gulf War there were 9,000 contractors and 500,000
military.
Question. What is the current number of contractors in the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. The Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Program
Support recently reported that as of the end of the 1st quarter FY 2009
there were approximately 259,400 contractor personnel working for the
DoD in the USCENTCOM AOR, broken down as shown in the following chart:

Iraq....................................................... 148,050
Afghanistan................................................ 71,755
Other USCENTCOM............................................ 39,616
---------------

Total............................................ 259,421

Question. What were the responsibilities and assignments of
contractors during those two conflicts?
Answer. The aforementioned reports do not address the
responsibilities and assignments of contractors during those two
conflicts, and the DoD IG does not have a body of work to address this
question.
Question. What are the current contractor responsibilities in the
current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. The Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Program
Support [ADUSD (PS)] recently reported the contractor breakdown by type
of service provided in Iraq as of the end of the 1st quarter FY 2009.
The contractor breakdown for Iraq is detailed below; the ADUSD(PS)
report did not provide a similar breakdown for Afghanistan.

Construction............................................... 20,729
Base Support............................................... 80,931
Translator/Interpreter..................................... 9,268
Transportation............................................. 6,685
Security................................................... 8,380
Communication Support...................................... 700
Other...................................................... 21,357
---------------

Total.............................................. 148,050

Question. Has there been an expansion of the missions contractors
are providing?
Answer. We cannot state for certain whether there has been an
expansion of the missions of contractors. However, all contractor
requirements are to be stated in the contract and any subsequent
contract modifications. Accordingly, any expansion of contract
requirements would be specified and approved by DoD.
Question. Provide a breakout by category of responsibility.
Answer. The Congressional Budget Office report, ``Contractors'
Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq,'' released August 2008, and the
Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Program Support point
paper, ``Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in USCENTCOM AOR, Iraq,
and Afghanistan,'' released February 2009, list the following types of
services as being provided by contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Professional, Administrative, and Management Support
Construction of Structures and Facilities
Fuels, Lubricants, Oils, and Waxes
Subsistence (Food)
Lease or Rental Facilities
Maintenance, Repair, or Alteration of Real Property
Utilities and Housekeeping Services
Maintenance, Repair, and Rebuilding Equipment
Research and Development
Architect and Engineering--Construction
Translator / Interpreter
Transportation
Security
Communication Support
Other
Question. Provide a breakout of contracts for contracted security
forces.
Answer. The Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Program
Support point paper, ``Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in
USCENTCOM AOR, Iraq, and Afghanistan,'' released February 2009,
reported the following distribution of private security contractors
(PSC) in Iraq and Afghanistan as of the end of the 1st quarter FY 2009:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Local/host
Total U.S. coalition Third country country
national national
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total DoD PSC in Iraq............................... 9,218 782 7,226 1,210
Armed DoD PSC in Iraq............................... 8,701 727 6,909 1,065
Total DoD PSC in Afghanistan........................ 3,689 15 23 3,651
Armed DoD PSC in Afghanistan........................ 3,184 12 18 3,154
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Question. Provide an analysis of Department of Defense and
Department of State contracted security forces.
What are the total dollars spent by both Departments?
Answer. The DoD IG does not have a body of work to support a
response to this question and we were only able to identify responsive
information related to Iraq. The Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction (SIGIR) in its report, ``Agencies Need Improved
Financial Data Reporting for Private Security Contractors,'' released
October 30, 2008, stated that as of September 2008, the obligations of
reconstruction funds for private security contracts by agency in Iraq
were as follows:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fund source (in millions) DoD DoS USAID
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Multiple Funds Used for Contract. $712.0 $1,443.3 $493.8
Operations and Maintenance 1,150.1 0.0 0.0
Account.........................
Iraq Relief and Reconstruction 310.7 422.4 127.1
Fund............................
Iraqi Security Forces Fund....... 244.1 254.5 0.0
Diplomatic and Consular Programs 0.0 97.7 0.0
Fund............................
Economic Support Fund............ 67.6 0.0 14.7
Development Fund for Iraq (Iraqi 71.9 0.0 0.0
funds)..........................
Fiscal Year 2007 Supplemental.... 0.0 71.6 0.0
Seized Assets.................... 16.8 0.0 0.0
Commander's Emergency Response 11.0 0.0 0.0
Program.........................
Iraq Freedom Fund................ 7.9 0.0 0.0
Fund Source Not Identified....... 331.2 0.0 105.1
--------------------------------------
Total........................ $2,923.3 $2,289.5 $740.7
------------------------------------------------------------------------

SIGIR further reported that as of September 2008, obligations for
private security services by agency in Iraq were as follows.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Security service (in millions) DoD DoS USAID
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Multiple Services Provided....... $962.9 $1,875.4 $314.7
Static........................... 893.4 414.1 108.5
Convoy........................... 185.9 0.0 0.0
Personal Security Detail......... 163.3 0.0 7.4
A & P Advice and Planning........ 17.7 0.0 0.0
Escort........................... 1.8 0.0 0.3
Security Service Not Identified.. 698.2 N/A 309.8
--------------------------------------
Total........................ $2,923.3 $2,289.5 $740.7
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Question. Who were the contracted security forces?
Answer. The DoD IG does not have a body of work to support a
response to this question and we were only able to identify responsive
information related to Iraq. The Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction in its report, ``Agencies Need Improved Financial Data
Reporting for Private Security Contractors,'' released October 30,
2008, provided the following chart for Total Obligations for
Contractors with Direct Contracts or Subcontracts for Private Security
Contractors (PSCs) by U.S. Agency since 2003 (in $ Millions):

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contractor name Direct Sub DoD DoS USAID
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Blackwater Worldwide.................................. 7 2 $27.740 $1,147.020 $31.290
Aegis Defence Services LTD............................ 19 2 798.621 0 0
DynCorp International LLC............................. 10 3 31.428 659.220 0
Triple Canopy, Inc.................................... 35 0 106.932 422.233 0.291
EOD Technology, Inc. (EODT)........................... 295 0 328.665 0 0
Sabre International Security.......................... 25 3 225.816 0 58.666
Special Operations Consulting-Security Management 35 2 271.856 0 0
Group (SOC-SMG)......................................
Agility Logistics..................................... 23 0 183.030 0 0
Unity Resources Group................................. 0 2 0 50.000 92.951
ArmorGroup............................................ 22 7 91.558 0 46.088
Erinys International.................................. 3 8 108.159 0 0
Sallyport Global Holdings............................. 0 3 0 0 101.526
Global Strategies Group............................... 7 1 83.797 0 0
Garda World........................................... 0 4 0 0 74.701
Kroll Associates, Inc................................. 2 2 8.969 0 38.386
MVM................................................... 21 0 38.382 0 0
US Investigations Services (USIS)..................... 10 0 35.511 0 0
Vance Global.......................................... 0 1 0 0 31.255
Falcon Group.......................................... 8 0 29.289 0 0
Hart Group............................................ 4 1 26.264 0 0
Olive Group FZ LLC.................................... 13 8 17.603 0 0
Control Risks Group................................... 8 3 17.213 0 0
Custer Battles........................................ 1 0 16.840 0 0
CSS Global, Inc....................................... 112 0 15.016 0 0
Total Defense Logistics............................... 13 0 12.710 0 0
Iraqi Contractor #4................................... 0 1 0 10.800 0
Reed Incorporated..................................... 8 0 9.235 0 0
Universal Security.................................... 86 0 8.523 0 0
Edinburgh International............................... 2 2 4.989 0 0
Raymond Associates.................................... 5 0 4.944 0 0
BLP................................................... 1 0 4.185 0 0
Rover Global Services, Ltd (RGS Logistics)............ 46 0 3.883 0 0
ISI Group............................................. 1 3 3.838 0 0
Securiforce International............................. 73 0 3.408 0 0
SAL Risk Group Ltd.................................... 63 0 1.861 0 0
American-Iraqi Life Support Solutions................. 1 0 1.614 0 0
Sandi Security Company................................ 1 0 1.575 0 0
Panalpina............................................. 0 1 0 0 1.137
Blue Hackle Middle East............................... 3 25 0.904 0 0
Overseas Security & Strategic Information............. 2 0 0.781 0 0
Threat Management Group............................... 2 0 0.500 0 0
BH Defence............................................ 1 0 0.179 0 0
Iraqi Contractor #1................................... 0 1 0 0.119 0
Iraqi Contractor #3................................... 0 1 0 0.054 0
Tetra International LLC............................... 3 1 0.053 0 0
Iraqi Contractor #6................................... 0 1 0 0.047 0
Iraqi Contractor #2................................... 0 1 0 0.034 0
Danubia Global........................................ 1 0 0.010 0 0
Iraqi Contractor #5................................... 0 1 0 0.008 0
Peak Group Inc........................................ 1 0 0.005 0 0
Cochise Consultancy Inc............................... 1 0 0 0 0
ECC International (ECCI).............................. 1 1 N/A 0 0
Operations Support Technologies....................... 1 0 N/A 0 0
OSSI-Safenet Security Services........................ 2 9 N/A 0 0
Janusian Security Risk Management Ltd................. 1 0 N/A 0 0
Paratus World Wide Protection......................... 1 0 N/A 0 0
Pesh--Kurdistan Army.................................. 1 0 N/A 0 0
Pilgrims Group Ltd.................................... 1 0 N/A 0 0
Iraqi Contractor #28.................................. 0 0 N/A 0 0
Askar Security Svcs................................... 2 14 N/A 0 0
Ronco Consulting Corporation.......................... 1 0 N/A 0 0
Innovative Technical Solutions, Inc. (ITSI)........... 2 0 N/A 0 0
Rubicon International Services........................ 1 0 N/A 0 0
Safe Security Limited (SSL)........................... 1 0 N/A 0 0
Babylon Gates......................................... 1 0 N/A 0 0
TOIFOR................................................ 12 1 N/A 0 0
Ellis World Alliance Corp. (EWAC)..................... 1 0 N/A 0 0
Britam Defence, Ltd................................... 1 0 N/A 0 0
Burhan Security Services.............................. 2 0 N/A 0 0
Wamar International, Inc.............................. 0 0 N/A 0 0
Whitestone Group, Inc................................. 1 0 N/A 0 0
Greystone Ltd......................................... 0 1 N/A 0 0
Centurion Risk Assessment Ltd......................... 1 0 N/A 0 0
Lakeshore Engineering Svc, Inc........................ 1 0 N/A 0 0
Iraqi Contractor #7................................... 0 1 N/A 0 0
Unity Logistics and Security.......................... 1 0 N/A 0 0
DS Vance Iraq......................................... 1 0 N/A 0 0
---------------------------------------------------------
Total............................................. ....... ..... $2,525.890 $2,289.530 $476.290
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Question. What is the breakdown by nationality of individuals
employed by contracted security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. The Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Program
Support point paper, ``Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in
USCENTCOM AOR, Iraq, and Afghanistan,'' released February 2009,
reported the following distribution of private security contractors
(PSC) in Iraq and Afghanistan as of the end of the 1st quarter FY 2009:

Question. Between 1997 and 2007 there has been a 331 percent
increase in the amount of dollars awarded to contractors.
What has been the increase in the number of contractors during that
time?
Answer. The DoD IG does not have a body of work to support a
response to this question. However, information on contractors is
available at the USAspending.gov website. A query from this website
shows that in FY 2008 there were 85,891 parent companies, and in FY
2000 there were 29,361 parent companies.
Question. Please provide a list of all current Department of
Defense contractors.
Answer. The USAspending.gov website has a search function to obtain
a list of contractor parent companies by agency, specifically the DoD.
The list of current DoD contractor parent companies can be printed from
the site.
Question. On page 5 of your written testimony you write, ``We saw
no comprehensive efforts by the Department to oversee or manage the
growth, costs, profits, or fees for services contracts. In just the
last decade, the value of services contracting more than tripled.''
Who in the Department of Defense is responsible for such oversight
and management? Who should?
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics is responsible for oversight and management and we
believe this is the appropriate office.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Ms. Kaptur.
Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto
follow:]

Inspector General Actions To Improve Contract Oversight

Question. On March 31, 2008, the Inspector General issued a Growth
Plan for Increasing Audit and Investigative Activities, as required by
the fiscal year 2008 Defense Authorization Act. Under that plan, the IG
will add 481 full-time positions to its Audit, Investigation, Policy &
Oversight, Intelligence, Administration & Management, and other staff
by the year 2015. The Defense Appropriations Subcommittee has supported
this planned growth by providing the DoD IG with an additional $63
million over the past two years:
Fiscal Year 2008: +$24 million
Fiscal Year 2009: +$24 million
Stimulus 2009: +$15 million
Mr. Heddell, how many staff have you hired with the additional $63
million provided to the IG by the Committee in the last two fiscal
years?
Answer. We increased our staff by 132 personnel over the last two
fiscal years, from 1,398 at the end of FY 2007 to 1,530 as of April 13,
2009, to include:
51 auditors;
23 investigators;
8 intelligence-related positions;
7 dedicated GWOT-related positions;
10 personnel in a new office of Special Plans and
Operations;
4 personnel in a new Office of Professional
Responsibility;
10 conversions of contracted IT positions;
1 ombudsman position; and
18 positions in administrative and support functions.
In addition to our current strength of 1,530, we have authorized a
total of 1,704 positions for FY 2009, to allow us to expand by up to
another 174 positions by the end of this fiscal year.
Question. Can you provide specifics about how additional staff has
enabled the IG to improve contract oversight?
Answer. The additional staff has been used to bolster our mission
effectiveness in priority oversight areas. Some of the additional Audit
positions have been used to augment our overseas presence in Southwest
Asia to ``get more boots on the ground.'' We have also augmented our
staff at headquarters and established new field offices to provide
coverage in areas where our coverage was limited in the past, and to
focus our resources where they are most needed. For example, within
Audit, our additional staff is performing oversight of the controls
over contractor common access cards within the Department, including
controls over common access cards provided to contractors in Southwest
Asia and Korea.
The additional funding was also used to establish the Special Plans
and Operations component. Its work to date includes assessments of the
accountability of weapons, ammunition, and night vision devices;
foreign military sales; building the logistics and medical
sustainability base for the security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan;
and the train and equip mission for the security forces of Iraq and
Afghanistan. Finally, the additional personnel allowed Defense Criminal
Investigative Service (DCIS) to deploy six additional agents for 6-
month rotations to Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This increase places
more investigators on the ground to conduct investigations of fraud,
waste, and abuse of DoD funds in the Southwest Asia area of operations.
Similarly, we increased agent strength in the U.S. as stateside agents
also support OIF and OEF efforts by investigating criminal activities
in the U.S. as well as supporting investigations that occurred in
Southwest Asia to ensure conclusion and prosecution.
Question. Do you have a plan in place to increase the number of
auditors and investigators working in Afghanistan to support the growth
in contracting there that will follow the expected increase in U.S.
force levels?
Answer. We do have a plan in place for increasing our oversight
presence in Afghanistan. In December 2008, I met with and received the
endorsement of the Commander, U.S. Central Command, to expand our
footprint in Southwest Asia, including Afghanistan. Overall, we plan to
increase our permanent presence to 36 (an additional 15 persons) in
Southwest Asia. In Afghanistan, our goal is to have 12 permanent
personnel for a total of 8 auditors (growth of 5) and 4 agents (growth
of 2). DCIS has already increased its presence in Afghanistan by one
agent for a total of three on the ground, and anticipates the fourth
agent by the end of FY 2009.
Our current personnel work out of our field office on Bagram Air
Base, which we established in June 2007. In February 2009, we sent
senior personnel to Afghanistan to brief the command on our growth plan
and negotiate office space for future field offices in Kandahar and
Camp Eggers. We plan to adjust our deployed strength as the DoD mission
in Afghanistan grows and we can better ascertain the requirement for
oversight personnel.
Question. Are the majority of the new staff relatively junior, or
are you finding experienced auditors and investigators who can hit the
ground running?
Answer. To ensure that we obtain a cadre of experienced staff for
our priority efforts, such as oversight of Southwest Asia operations,
we generally emphasize recruiting experienced, Government personnel
(current or retired)--both Federal and DoD--as well as retired military
members. For example, when establishing our Special Plans and
Operations component, we acquired several experienced, retired
Government oversight personnel as well as an Ambassador with experience
in Iraq/Afghanistan transition programs. Our DCIS teams consist of a
mix of junior and experienced agents, with every team consisting of at
least one senior experienced agent. We have found that the experienced
recruits augment our existing, experienced staff and our junior staff,
to create an effective balance in support of our Southwest Asia
oversight efforts.
Question. Are you competing for talent with DoD agencies, such as
the Defense Contract Audit Agency and the Defense Contract Management
Agency, who are also trying to beef up their contract oversight staff?
Answer. Yes. In addition to competing for auditors with DoD
agencies, such as the Defense Contract Audit Agency and the Defense
Contract Management Agency, we also compete with the DoD Service Audit
Agencies, other Federal Inspectors General, as well as the private
sector, CPA firms, and businesses to attract and retain talented staff
to support our oversight mission. And while having to compete with
other federal law enforcement agencies for talent is a normal
occurrence, our DCIS has no trouble recruiting and retaining special
agents.

Federal Employee vs. Contractor Mix

Question. Over the period 2000--2007 (the most recent year actual
financial data is available) spending on services contracted from the
private sector grew by 98 percent in constant dollars while spending on
total civilian personnel compensation grew by 13 percent.
However, there has been no study to establish the appropriate mix
of federal and contracted personnel.
Mr. Heddell, Do you think DoD has thought about its workforce
holistically in order to determine the right balance of federal and
contractor employees in performing DoD missions?
Answer. The Secretary of Defense testified in January 2009 that DoD
has not thought holistically or coherently about the use of
contractors, particularly when it comes to a combat environment.
Additionally, GAO recently conducted an assessment to determine the
sufficiency of the Department's acquisition workforce and its efforts
to improve its workforce management and oversight. GAO Report 09-342,
``Additional Actions and Data Are Needed to Effectively Manage and
Oversee DoD's Acquisition Workforce,'' March 25, 2009, found that DoD
lacks critical department-wide information to ensure its acquisition
workforce is sufficient (including the right number and appropriate mix
of civilian, military, and contractor personnel) to meet its national
security mission.
Question. How does DoD define a proper balance between federal and
contractor employees? How should they?
Answer. As previously mentioned, GAO issued a report in March 2009
that states, ``DoD lacks critical department-wide information to ensure
its acquisition workforce is sufficient to meet its national security
mission. First, in its acquisition workforce assessments, DoD does not
collect or track information on contractor personnel, despite their
being a key segment of the total acquisition workforce. DoD also lacks
information on why contractor personnel are used, which limits its
ability to determine whether decisions to use contractors to augment
the in-house acquisition workforce are appropriate. Second, DoD's lack
of key pieces of information limits its ability to determine gaps in
the acquisition workforce it needs to meet current and future missions.
For example, DoD lacks information on the use and skill sets of
contractor personnel, and lacks complete information on the skill sets
of its in-house personnel.'' GAO made recommendations aimed at
improving DoD's management and oversight of its acquisition workforce,
including the collection of data on contractor personnel. DoD concurred
with three of the recommendations and noted that implementing the other
requires careful consideration.
Question. Mr. Heddell, if DoD in your view is not defining the
proper balance, what steps should DoD take to better assure a balance
between federal and contractor employees in meeting DoD mission needs?
Answer. The first and most important step is to determine (1) what
workforce mix (civilian, military, and contractor personnel) currently
exists, and (2) what the appropriate workforce mix should be. Once the
appropriate balance has been established, the budget needs to be
aligned in support of the appropriate workforce mix.
Question. Has DoD done mission analysis and/or a study of roles and
missions that includes consideration of the role that contractors
should play?
Answer. GAO found that in its acquisition workforce assessments,
DoD does not collect or track information on contractor personnel;
lacks information on the use and skill sets of contractor personnel;
and lacks complete information on the skill sets of its in-house
personnel. However, Secretary Gates stated during an April 6, 2009,
press briefing, ``there is broad agreement on the need for acquisition
and contracting reform in the Department of Defense. There have been
enough studies. Enough hand-wringing. Enough rhetoric. Now is the time
for action.'' The Secretary concluded this statement with a final
recommendation to overhaul how defense organizations are staffed and
operated with regards to contractors versus full-time government
employees.
Question. Do you share the concern that there has been an erosion
of federal personnel control within the DoD?
Answer. Yes, we share the concern of the Secretary of Defense that
the correct mix of military, DoD civilian, and contractor personnel was
not thought out holistically. However, on April 6, 2009, the Secretary
of Defense announced key decisions that he will recommend to the
President with respect to the fiscal year 2010 defense budget, to
include a recommendation that will have a significant impact on how
defense organizations are staffed and operated. Under this budget
request, the Department will reduce the number of support service
contractors from the current 39 percent of the workforce to the pre-
2001 level of 26 percent and replace them with full-time government
employees. The Secretary stated that the goal is to hire as many as
13,000 new civil servants in fiscal year 2010 to replace contractors
and up to 30,000 new civil servants in place of contractors over the
next five years.
Question. Do you share the concern that there may be an over
reliance on contractors?
Answer. Contractor support has become an integral part of today's
execution of DoD's mission. However, with this comes a greater risk
that contractor's roles infringe on areas that are inherently
governmental. I highlighted an example of this during my testimony on
February 26, 2009; specifically, I described an incident in which a
contractor, rather than the military or other DoD entity, was
responsible for issuing Common Access Cards, which allowed the holder
to gain access to DoD facilities world-wide creating a national
security issue. As such, we agree with the Secretary of Defense's
recommendation as part of his FY 2010 budget to reduce the number of
support service contractors and replace them with full-time government
employees; specifically, up to 30,000 new civil servants in place of
contractors over the next five years.

Growth in Contractor Provided Services

Question. DoD's obligations on contracts rose from 47 percent of
the total budget in fiscal year 2000 to 51 percent in fiscal year 2007
(according to the 2009 President's Budget). Of the contract costs,
service contracts grew from 26 percent of the total budget billion in
2000 to 27 percent in 2007.
The GAO recently testified to this Committee that the transition to
contractor provided services was in no way the result of a strategic
decision but was a piecemeal response to downsizing that occurred
despite increasing workload. Have you seen any strategic thinking on
this issue from DoD?
Answer. We agree that the reliance on contractors to support DoD's
current mission was not the result of a strategic or deliberate process
but resulted from thousands of individual decisions to use contractors
to provide specific capabilities. Additionally, the Secretary of
Defense testified in January 2009 that DoD has not thought holistically
or coherently about the use of contractors particularly when it comes
to a combat environment.
Question. Does DoD have clear policy guidance on contracted
services?
Answer. In addition to the Federal Acquisition Regulation and the
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, DoD continues to
clarify and issue new guidance on aspects of service contracts in
response to findings in our audit reports and other information.
Question. Where in the Pentagon do you believe service contract
policy should emanate from?
Answer. Because spending for services accounts for such a large
portion of the Defense budget, policy should emanate from the highest
levels of the Department. Specifically, the Under Secretary of Defense
of Acquisition, Technology and Logistics is responsible for
establishing and publishing polices and procedures governing the
operations of the DoD Acquisition System and the administrative
oversight of defense contractors. In addition, since policy should be
based on informed decisions about the balance of in-house versus
contracted resources, policies should include senior officials
responsible for personnel and human capital decisions.
Question. Should contract service policy be a function of a human
capital plan?
Answer. It appears it would not be possible to appropriately
evaluate the Department's needs to contract for services without having
coordinated such an assessment against a human capital plan of overall
DoD resource considerations.
Question. Does DoD have a human capital plan?
Answer. Yes, the Department does have a Civilian Human Capital
Strategic Plan.

OMB Circular A-76

Question. The Executive Office of the President's policy on the
performance of commercial type activities, OMB Circular A-76, states:
``The longstanding policy of the federal government has been to
rely on the private sector for needed commercial services.'' Further
DoD has not defined or measured the value it seeks from contract
service dollars, in part because the roles of contractors are not fully
known or defined.
Mr. Heddell, it seems that federal policy encourages contracting
out of services, rather than determining the correct balance between
federal and contractor personnel. Do you agree?
Answer. We do believe that contracting out of services has been
encouraged. Commercial Services Management (formerly Competitive
Sourcing) has been a President Management Agenda item for the past 8
years. It was also encouraged through OMB Circular A-76 for years
without a study by DoD on the proper balance.
Question. Is there any evidence that once a government activity has
been outsourced to the private sector that there continues to be
savings to the taxpayer?
Answer. In our opinion, the savings are questionable. Examples of
questionable A-76 Competitions include:
In an audit of the DFAS military retired and
annuitant pay A-76 competition, we identified a $30 million
error in the in-house cost proposal, which caused the
Government to lose the competition to the contractor. We are
currently conducting an audit looking at the contractor's
costs.
In an audit of the Navy San Diego Public Works
Center environmental services A-76 competition, the contractor
won by proposing rates that were lower than the rates the
contractor actually charged once he began work on the contract.
We have a competitive sourcing strategic audit plan, and plan to
look at A-76 cost savings in the future. However, the recent
Congressional direction to freeze further competitions may alter or
delay our planned oversight. We will continue to monitor the guidance
and efforts to determine what oversight can be performed and be of
value given the potential changes to the overall efforts in the
Department.
Question. The previous administration held the assumption that
using contractors in place of federal employees will yield cost
savings. Does DoD, in making decisions to contract for services, have
sound decision-making processes to ensure that savings will result from
using contractors to meet a mission requirement? If not what should be
done by Congress to get DoD to put such safeguards into place?
Answer. DoD Instruction 1100.22, ``Guidance for Determining
Workforce Mix,'' implements policy for determining the appropriate mix
of manpower (military and civilian) and private sector support
necessary to accomplish Defense missions consistent with applicable
laws, policies, and regulations. However, GAO found in past oversight
efforts instances where converting functions from the Government to the
private sector was actually more costly. GAO Report No. 09-041,
``Improved Analysis and Cost Data Needed to Evaluate the Cost
Effectiveness of Performance Based Logistics,'' December 19, 2008,
gives several examples where contractor support costs are greater than
in-house maintenance costs. For example, the report states that FA-18
E/F contractor support would be $400 million more expensive than
Government support over the next 28 years.
Question. Is there evidence that services provided by the private
sector are in any way inherently less costly than the public sector?
Answer. It would not be appropriate to generalize regarding cost
effectiveness; each comparison should be done on a case-by-case basis
to ensure best value for the government.

Competitive Sourcing

Question. The DoD IG issued a report on January 13, 2009 that the
Defense Department is studying the outsourcing of nearly 9,000 civilian
jobs. The IG report was ordered by Congress to evaluate whether the
Pentagon is holding jobs competitions under orders from the Office of
Management and Budget. The fiscal year 2008 National Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 110-181) prohibited OMB from ordering DoD to
hold the competitions. The IG concluded the Defense Department's jobs
competitions were not being done under orders from OMB but the report
said some jobs competitions were being done under pressure from senior
Pentagon officials and that the competitions were hurting morale and
fueling turnover of staffs in some cases.
Mr. Heddell, please summarize the finding in the January 13, 2009,
DoD IG report that senior Pentagon officials pressured the Military
Services to compete 9,000 jobs with the private sector.
Answer. As of the April 22, 2008, date of our interim report, only
the Army was feeling extreme pressure from the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) to conduct public-private competitions. However, as of
December 15, 2008, the date of our final report, the Army was no longer
receiving pressure from OSD to conduct public-private competitions.
Question. Did you find inappropriate influence to compete
government jobs with the private sector?
Answer. No, we found no evidence of inappropriate influence to
compete government jobs. As of the December 15, 2008, date of our final
report, DoD competitive sourcing officials and headquarters-level
competitive sourcing officials for the three Military Departments all
stated that they were not directed by and did not feel any pressure
from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to conduct public-
private competitions. Major Command and Budget Submitting Office
competitive sourcing officials agreed with the statements made by
headquarters-level officials, and stated that the pressure to conduct
public-private competitions was not directly from OMB or OSD, but from
the chain of command.
Question. If so, who was it that exerted inappropriate influence?
Answer. We found no evidence of inappropriate influence to compete
government jobs.
Question. What is the impact on morale?
Answer. During our audit, installation-level officials within the
three Military Departments raised many concerns about the competitive
sourcing process, including staffing. Most of the officials we spoke
with expressed concerns about the strain public-private competitions
place on their workforce and the ability to meet their mission. They
stated that because a public-private competition puts a person's
livelihood at risk, it causes angst among the workforce and in turn,
management of that workforce becomes very difficult. Also, many
employees look for and accept other employment opportunities before the
completion of the competition, which creates vacant positions.
Officials stated that it is difficult to hire new employees during an
ongoing competition because most qualified personnel do not want to
take a temporary position. At a time when much of the workforce is
eligible for retirement, positions under public-private competitions
add to the difficulty of hiring, training, and transferring knowledge
to a younger workforce, which creates a struggle to maintain an
adequate workforce to meet the required level of performance.

Definition of Inherently Governmental

Question. The Office of Management and Budget's Office of Federal
Procurement Policy advocated ``competitive sourcing'' during the last
Administration. Competitive sourcing requires that federal government
work that is not ``inherently governmental'' go through a public-
private competition.
There have been numerous media reports that illustrate how private
contractors have been hired to perform contract oversight functions
that were traditionally reserved for federal employees. The GAO found
that of 52 major weapons programs, over 45 percent of the program
office staff were private contractors.
In the 2009 Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 110-417), the OMB
Director was required to develop a single consistent definition of an
``inherently governmental function.'' The Director was supposed to
address deficiencies with the existing definitions and develop criteria
so that the head of each department could identify positions that could
not be contracted out because they exercise an inherently governmental
function. The Director was given one year to report to Congress on the
new definition and put forward any legislative recommendations as may
be necessary.
What is the status of the OMB Director's effort to help the heads
of the Agencies better determine which positions are inherently
governmental and cannot be contracted out?
Answer. We are not aware of the current status of OMB's efforts.
The OMB could provide the best answer to this question.
Question. What plans does OMB have in place to ensure an orderly
transition of the existing work to the new administration?
Answer. We are not aware of OMB's plans. This question would be
best answered by OMB.

Inherently Governmental Functions

Question. An inherently governmental activity is an activity that
is so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate
performance by government personnel. These activities require the
exercise of substantial discretion in applying government authority
and/or in making decisions for the government.
For example, in March of last year, the GAO found that 42
percent of the Army's contracting center of excellence was staffed by
contractors. In other words, contractors were making decisions on
government contracting.
In another example, the OSD Comptroller had contracted for
the development of budget justification of the fiscal year 2008
supplemental funding request.
Inherently governmental functions are not to be performed by
contractors. Within the Department of Defense, are there any private
contractors performing inherently governmental functions?
Answer. We have identified instances of outsourcing inherently
governmental functions. For example, we identified that contractors
were used as contracting officer representatives for the Air Force
Second Generation Wireless Local Area Network contract. We believe that
the interests of taxpayers are not protected when we have one
contractor monitoring another contractor.
Question. Do you believe that the DoD should provide a clearer
statement of what constitutes inherently governmental functions?
Answer. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) defines inherently
governmental functions, not DoD. However, the definition is interpreted
differently and inconsistently by different people at different
agencies. As such, GAO has recommended that the DoD provide a clearer
statement regarding which positions are inherently governmental.
Question. Do you believe that there needs to be greater attention
on the types of functions and activities that should be contracted out
and which should not?
Answer. Yes, the Department needs to pay greater attention to the
types of functions that should be contracted out and provide training
to acquisition, contracting, and human capital officials for
appropriately contracting out personnel services.
Question. What are the dangers in relying on contractors for
inherently government functions such as program and financial
management, intelligence analysis, and policy making?
Answer. As GAO reported, the closer contractor services come to
supporting inherently governmental functions, the greater the risk of
contractors influencing the government's control over and the
accountability for decisions that may be based, in part, on the
contractor's work. We believe this may also increase the risk that
contractors can inappropriately influence government decisions to
provide the contractor a financial windfall, all of which may result in
decisions that are not in the best interests of the government and the
American taxpayer. Over-relying on contractors could also lead to
increased vulnerability of fraud, waste, and abuse (i.e. organizational
conflicts of interest might arise if an employee of a contractor
recommends an action that would benefit the contractor in a future
procurement).
Question. The line separating contractor from government employee
can be blurry and not well-defined on work that closely supports
inherently governmental functions. The Army has undertaken a review of
contracted positions and has discovered that inherently governmental
functions are often performed by contractors. Do you believe that this
may be the case in the Navy and Air Force as well?
Answer. This is certainly a possibility. The inventories that the
Navy and Air Force will be compiling in response to Section 807 of the
FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, ``Inventories and Reviews
of Contracts for Services,'' should assist them in determining whether
they have inappropriately contracted out inherently governmental
functions.
Question. What factors should DoD consider when making a decision
to use contractors to meet mission needs and what tradeoffs are
involved in considering such factors?
Answer. The factors and tradeoffs vary depending on the mission and
the needs of the requiring activity. However, whether a function is
inherently governmental, cost/benefit and human capital considerations
should be part of the process.

Personal Service Contracts

Question. A personal service contract is when the government
obtains the services of specific person by contract, rather than by
direct hire. It is legal in only a few specific instances, for example
when the need for services is short term or intermittent. However, GAO
has testified that the DoD may be using these contracts more
expansively than intended.
Mr. Heddell, personal service contracts are legal for very limited
circumstances. Do you believe that DoD confines its use of personal
services to only those that are legally allowable?
Answer. Not in all cases. DoD is required to comply with the
Federal Acquisition Regulation in relation to the use of personal
service contracts. However, we have identified concerns regarding the
appearance of a personal service contract in the America Supports You
Program, and GAO has reported concerns with the use of personal
services contracts by the Army Contracting Command.
Question. Mr. Heddell, could you comment on DoD's use of personal
service contracts?
Answer. DoD is required to comply with the Federal Acquisition
Regulation in relation to the use of personal service contracts.
However, we have identified concerns with the use of a personal service
contract in the America Supports You Program, and GAO has reported
concerns with the use of personal services contracts by the Army
Contracting Command.
Question. Mr. Heddell, how does the work that contractors perform
differ from the work that civilian employees perform?
Answer. Contractors can not perform tasks that require either the
exercise or discretion in applying government authority, which should
be performed by government employees.
Question. How do government ethics rules apply to personal service
contractors? Do the personal conflict of interest safeguards apply to
personal service contractors?
Answer. Contractor employees, including those performing personal
service contracts, are not subject to the same laws and regulations
that are in place to prevent conflicts of interest among federal
employees. As examples, 5 C.F.R. Part 2635, ``Standards of Ethical
Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch,'' and the Joint Ethics
Directive, DoD 5500.07 (November 29, 2007) do not apply to contractor
employees. Similarly sections of Title 18, United States Code are only
applicable to Government employees (207 and 208).
There are certain laws and regulations applicable to both federal
and contractor employees (i.e., 18 U.S.C. 201--Bribery or 41 U.S.C.
423(a) and FAR 3.104-4--protection of procurement-related information).
Specifically, contractors are bound to follow ``ethical rules'' set
forth in the FAR and DFARS (i.e., Part 3, ``Improper Business Practices
and Personal Conflicts of Interest,'' Part 9.2, ``Qualification
Requirements,'' Part 9.1, ``Responsible Prospective Contractors,'' Part
9.4, ``Suspension and Debarment and Ineligibility,'' Part 9.5,
``Organization and Consultant Conflicts of Interest,'' and Part 9.6,
``Contractor Team Arrangements''). Perhaps most importantly, the FAR
was recently amended to require that if the value of the contract is
expected to exceed $5,000,000 and the performance period is 120 days or
more, the solicitation and the contract shall contain FAR clause
52.203-13 \1\, ``Contractor Code of Business Ethics and Conduct.'' That
section requires the contractor to have a code of conduct and business
ethics, and to provide a copy of that code to each employee engaged in
performance of the contract. It does not set forth specific
requirements for what the code shall address.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Unless the contract is for the acquisition of a commercial item
or will be performed entirely outside the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. How can the Congress compel DoD to limit the use of
personal service contracts to only those few unique circumstances where
they are legal?
Answer. The Congress should not have to compel DoD because DoD is
obligated to follow the law and the rules delineated in the Federal
Acquisition Regulation on the use of personal services contracts. As
such, DoD is drafting guidance with regard to this matter in response
to Section 831, ``Development of Guidance on Personal Services
Contracts,'' of the FY 2009 National Defense Authorization Act.

Guidelines on Considering Civilians for New and Contracted Functions

Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008, required the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness (USD[P&R]) to develop guidelines and procedures to ensure
that consideration is given to using DoD civilian employees to perform
new functions or functions that are performed by contractors--and
required the DoD IG to review implementation.
Mr. Heddell, In July of last year, the DoD IG reported on the
actions underway within DoD to in-source new and previously contracted
functions. Would you give a general description of on DoD's in-sourcing
efforts?
Answer. DoD issued guidelines and procedures on in-sourcing new and
contracted functions on April 4, 2008. As of March 13, 2009, an
official from the DoD Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation stated
that the directive-type memorandum for the Full Cost of Manpower
Business Rules was submitted for formal coordination and the review was
expected to begin the week of March 23, 2009. Also, the costing
software contract was awarded and the contractor was developing a
timeline. We have not conducted any follow-up work to determine if
there has been any progress on DoD components beginning in-sourcing
actions under Section 324.
In addition, on April 6, 2009, the Secretary of Defense announced
key decisions that he will recommend to the President with respect to
the fiscal year 2010 defense budget, to include a recommendation that
will have a significant impact on how defense organizations are staffed
and operated. Under this budget request, the Department will reduce the
number of support service contractors from the current 39 percent of
the workforce to the pre-2001 level of 26 percent and replace them with
full-time government employees. The Secretary stated that the goal is
to hire as many as 13,000 new civil servants in fiscal year 2010 to
replace contractors and up to 30,000 new civil servants in place of
contractors over the next five years. Finally, the Secretary stated
that he would also recommend overhauling the acquisition workforce by
converting 11,000 contractors and hiring an additional 9,000 government
acquisition professionals by 2015--beginning with 4,100 in fiscal year
2010.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness (USD [P&R]) was to develop in sourcing guidelines. Did, the
USD (P&R), Dr. Chu, comply?
Answer. Yes, DoD complied. On April 4, 2008, Deputy Secretary of
Defense England issued the in-sourcing guidelines and procedures
prepared by the USD (P&R).
Question. Mr. Heddell, this Committee heard testimony from the Army
earlier this month on their in sourcing efforts. What, if anything,
have the Navy and Air Force done?
Answer. As of the July 23, 2008, date of our report, the Air Force
and Navy had not in-sourced functions under Section 324 of the 2008
National Defense Authorization Act. We have not conducted any follow-up
work on the in-sourcing efforts of the Air Force and Navy since our
final report was issued.
Question. What do you recommend to the Navy and Air Force?
Answer. As of the July 23, 2008, date of our report, the Air Force
and Navy had not in-sourced functions under Section 324 of the 2008
National Defense Authorization Act. We have not conducted any follow-up
work on the in-sourcing efforts of the Air Force and Navy since our
final report was issued. Therefore, we cannot make recommendations to
the Navy and Air Force until we have determined through our follow-up
efforts what actions the Navy and Air Force have taken under Section
324 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act.

Annual Inventories and Review of Contracts for Services

Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008, required The Secretary of Defense to submit annual inventories of
contracted services beginning in 2008. The Army has largely completed
an inventory. However, due to ``the magnitude of the task . . .'' the
Air Force and Navy cannot complete inventories until 2010.
Mr. Heddell, Why can't the Navy and Air Force submit the required
annual inventories of contracts for services?
Answer. DoD is not currently capable of tracking all service
contracts. We are not aware of one DoD system that exists to fully
capture the required information of Section 807 of the 2008 National
Defense Authorization Act. Additionally, some contract information is
tracked manually, making reporting even more difficult.
Question. Is it fair to assume that if the DoD cannot provide an
inventory of contracted services that it also cannot do meaningful
oversight and management of contracted services?
Answer. While DoD cannot provide an inventory of contracted
services and some contract information is tracked manually, we cannot
assume that meaningful oversight is not occurring.
Question. How can the Congress force greater visibility of the
contracted services workforce?
Answer. I believe the Congress has provided the Department with the
tools necessary for greater visibility. As GAO testified earlier this
month, ``DoD needs to ensure that existing and future guidance is fully
complied with and implemented. Doing so will require continued
sustained commitment by senior DoD leadership to translate policy into
practice and hold decision-makers accountable.''
Question. How can Congress compel better management and oversight
of contracted services?
Answer. I believe the Congress has provided the Department with the
tools necessary for better management and oversight. As GAO testified
earlier this month, ``DoD needs to ensure that existing and future
guidance is fully complied with and implemented. Doing so will require
continued sustained commitment by senior DoD leadership to translate
policy into practice and hold decision-makers accountable.''

Contractor Oversight

Question. In 2007 more than half of DoD's budget was obligated on
contracts. Of the contract costs, 27% of the total DoD budget was spent
on service contracts. Despite this very significant percent of DoD
resources, DoD does not know how many contractors and subcontractors
are employed, or what their average salary is. The responsibility for
acquiring services within DoD is spread among individual military
commands, weapon system program offices, or functional units on
military bases with no central oversight.
Does the Department have the ability to report on the number of
contractors and subcontractors that they employ and their compensation
costs?
Answer. While certain databases such as the Federal Procurement
Data System can provide information on awards to contractors, we are
not aware of any system that can report the number of contractors,
subcontractors, or their compensation costs.
Question. Has DoD considered or planned what part of the workforce
increase should be dedicated to contract oversight?
Answer. My understanding is that each Military Department and
Defense agency should provide its own oversight or include the Defense
Contract Management Agency in the oversight process. We are not aware
of a DoD-wide plan for oversight resources.
Question. Mr. Heddell, the DoD can report for both military and
civilian employees the number of employees, the pay costs, and the
total compensation costs. Why doesn't DoD track the number of
contractors and their compensation costs?
Answer. In response to Section 807 of the FY 2008 National Defense
Authorization Act, DoD is required to submit annual inventories and
reviews of contracts for services. The Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Technology has issued implementing
guidelines and stated that, because of the magnitude of the task of
conducting inventories and reviews for all service contracts, DoD will
implement this in phases. The Army will submit an inventory in FY 2009,
the Navy and Air Force in FY 2010, and all Military Departments and
Defense Agencies in 2011. We believe this effort will provide DoD
greater visibility over contractors and their compensation costs.
Question. Mr. Heddell, given that DoD does not know or track
contractors' average salaries, how can DoD make an informed decision on
obtaining ``contractor'' VS. ``in-house'' services--if the ``unit
costs'' can't be compared?
Answer. DoD cannot make fully informed decisions if unit costs
cannot be compared.

Gansler Commission Report

Question. In the November of 2007, a commission headed by the
former Undersecretary for Acquisition during the Clinton
Administration, Dr Jacques Gansler, found a number of key failures of
the Army's contract system which contributed waste, fraud and abuse.
The Commission examined business processes, the acquisition workforce,
and contract management and made 22 specific recommendations for the
Army and 18 for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. On December 14,
2008 the Secretary of the Army reported on the status of implementation
of the Commission recommendations.
Mr. Heddell, Do you believe that the Army has implemented all of
the actions called for by the Gansler Commission on Expeditionary
contracting?
Answer. Based on our interaction with the Army and work in this
area, we believe the Army is actively implementing or addressing the
recommendations made in the Gansler report. In addition, the Army
testified in February 2009 that they completed actions on 21 of the 22
specific recommendations from the Gansler report. The remaining
recommendation--to increase the contracting workforce by 400 military
and 1,000 civilians--will require additional time by the Army to ensure
the quality and quantity of workforce is obtained.
Question. How would you grade the Army expeditionary contracting
now?
Answer. As stated above, the Army is actively implementing or
addressing recommendations to improve expeditionary contracting, but it
is a work in progress and will take time.
Question. Mr. Heddell, the Gansler Commission recommended that Army
increase the status and size of the Army acquisition workforce. What's
been done and what is still needed?
Answer. The Army testified in February 2009 that they are pursuing
growth of their contracting workforce by 446 military and 1,191
civilians. The Army further testified that about one-third of those
numbers is the planned growth in each of the next three years.
Question. Mr. Heddell, the Gansler Commission recommended that the
Army elevate the authority for acquisition issues within the Army. How
has the Army done this? What obstacles did the Army face?
Answer. The Army established a 2-star billet to head the U.S. Army
Contracting Command and obtained five additional general Army officer
billets for acquisition; one of which will head the recently
established Expeditionary Contracting Command. The Army needed the
authority provided in the FY 2009 National Defense Authorization Act to
create the billets.

Deployed Contractors

Question. DoD has extensively used contract support in the conduct
of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Deployed contractors
continue to outnumber deployed U.S. military personnel. As of January,
219,000 Military personnel versus 259,000 contractors were deployed to
CENTCOM.
Mr. Heddell, DoD continues to deploy huge numbers of contractors.
Currently 259,000 contractors are deployed to the CENTCOM area of
responsibility. Would you comment on the consequences of having more
contractors than military personnel in CENTCOM area of responsibility?
Answer. While we cannot express a suitable ratio for the number of
contractors compared to military members in an area of operations, we
can state that contractors deployed to the CENTCOM area of
responsibility should be performing necessary work. In addition, for
the contracted efforts in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, it is
imperative that the number of contractors, type of contract vehicle,
scope of the contracted efforts, and complexity of the effort be
considered to ensure that the appropriate level of contract oversight
is also maintained in the area of operations.
Question. How does the CENTCOM commander control the number of
contractors in his area of responsibility?
Answer. Joint Publication 4-10, ``Operational Contract Support in
Joint Operations,'' October 2008, provides overall guidance to support
the CENTCOM Commander on contracting and contractor management in his
area of responsibility. The joint publication defines key personnel
involved in the contracting process and includes checklists to support
the Commander with proper contractor planning. The Contracting Support
Plan Checklist covers the key requirements associated with
orchestrating and managing contracting efforts in a joint operations
area, including a requirement to ensure that there are adequately
trained Contracting Officer Representatives and Contracting Officer
Technical Representatives to assist in managing contract performance.
The Contractor Integration Plan Checklist covers the key requirements
associated with managing contractor personnel in a joint operations
area and providing Government-furnished support, when such support is
required.
In addition to the Joint Publication, the CENTCOM Commander should
consider what magnitude of contractor efforts are sustainable, will
most likely achieve the desired outcomes, and are feasible given the
operational environment in his area of responsibility.
Question. Are there any particular lessons from the extensive use
of contract support in Iraq that DoD must consider as Military forces
are increased in Afghanistan?
Answer. DoD must consider that increased utilization of contractors
requires additional oversight on the part of the military and civilian
DoD components to ensure that contractors comply with relevant
contractual requirements and refrain from engaging in fraudulent
activity. Contractor oversight personnel must be properly trained and
deployed timely and in adequate strength to ensure proper oversight.
Our summary report of challenges impacting Operations Iraqi Freedom and
Enduring Freedom reported by major oversight organizations from FY 2003
through FY 2007 identified specific problems in contract management,
logistics, financial management and other areas, which should all be
considered before contracting functions in Afghanistan.

DoD's Panel on Contracting Integrity

Question. Panel on Contracting Integrity identified areas for
improvement all of which focus on acquisition workforce issues. Areas
that the Panel identified are reinforcing the functional independence
of contracting personnel, filling contracting leadership positions with
qualified leaders, determining the appropriate size of the contracting
workforce and ensuring that it has the appropriate skills; and
improving the planning and training for contracting in combat and
contingency environments.
Mr. Heddell, this Committee is interested in DoD's progress in
addressing the problems of the acquisition workforce based on the work
of DoD's Panel on Contracting Integrity.
What should this Committee be looking for from DoD to ensure that
DoD keeps focused on taking actions to resolve the long-standing
problems of DoD's acquisition workforce?
Answer. During 2008, DoD made significant progress in establishing
the framework to assure functional independence of contracting
personnel, Separation of Duties of senior acquisition and contracting
leaders, and leveraging of contracting officer training. In addition,
DoD has begun a workforce-wide competency assessment of 22,000 civilian
and military contracting professionals, and the Secretary of Defense
stated in a press conference on April 6, 2009, that his recommended
fiscal year 2010 defense budget is aligned to support the Department's
acquisition reform goals by increasing the size of defense acquisition
workforce, converting 11,000 contractors, and hiring an additional
9,000 government acquisition professionals by 2015 beginning with 4,100
in FY 2010. The Committee should expect periodic updates from the
Department on the implementation of its initiatives.
Question. What factors should DoD consider when making a decision
to use contractors to meet mission needs and what tradeoffs are
involved in considering such factors?
Answer. The most important consideration when determining whether
contractors should be used is whether it is essential that the function
be performed by government personnel (i.e. inherently governmental
functions). Once it is decided that a contractor could do the work,
there are a number of tradeoffs. One consideration is how well can the
work be defined? If it can be well-defined, fixed price contracting
would be appropriate to put the risk on the contractor and reduce the
need for surveillance. If the work cannot be well-defined, some form of
cost-type contract will likely be used, which puts more risk on the
government and requires more use of government personnel to oversee the
work. Other considerations include whether multiple contractors are
available to do the work or only one contractor. Multiple contractors
would allow for competition and require fewer resources for pricing the
contract. Whereas, detailed pricing evaluation would be needed in a
sole source situation.
Also, DoD needs to consider from recent wartime contracting
experience that it continues to have insufficient resources to monitor
contractor performance in an expeditionary environment. The inability
to enforce contract requirements and monitor contractor performance
remains a critical DoD problem because DoD lacks the trained resources
to award, monitor, and ensure that contractors provide services needed
by the warfighter.

Depot Maintenance

Question. Nearly a year ago GAO testified that the DoD lacks the
assurance that corps logistical capabilities were being maintenance as
needed to ensure timely and effective response to national defense
emergencies and contingencies (as required by 10 U.S.C. 2464). However,
the DoD continues to outsource much of these core depot maintenance
functions.
Mr. Heddell, the DoD is required by law to have an in-house depot
maintenance workforce able to respond to national defense emergencies.
Do you believe that DoD has sufficient numbers of in-house
personnel to meet all core maintenance functions to respond to national
emergencies?
Answer. This is a continuing challenge for the Department. We agree
with the GAO testimony that DoD lacks the assurance that core logistics
capabilities were being maintained as needed to ensure timely and
effective response to national defense emergencies and contingencies.
We will continue to assess DoD's progress in this area through our
reviews of the Department's efforts related to depot overhaul and
maintenance of equipment, spare parts, and in-house overhaul and
maintenance of military equipment for the forces in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Question. Mr. Heddell, do you agree that current DoD policy
encourages the use of contractor logistics support?
Answer. Yes. Current law encourages that at least 50 percent of all
depot work may go to contractors. Data shows that for FY 2009, about
$16 billion of $32 billion of depot work is planned for contracted
depot work.
Question. If so, are we in danger of not having sufficient in-house
technical expertise?
Answer. Yes, that is why we believe the Department must assess its
needs and skills requirements to determine the proper mix of military,
civilian, and contractors in its workforce.

Size of Federal Civilian Contracting Workforce

Question. DoD downsized the defense contracting workforce without
ensuring that it retained an adequate in-house workforce with the
specific skills and competencies needed to accomplish the DoD
contracting mission.
The Committee understands that from 1997 to 2007 obligations for
contracts and acquisition increased from $190 billion to $429 billion
per year, while the DoD acquisition workforce which oversees contracts
and acquisition was downsized significantly.
In your opinion, is the current DoD acquisition or contracting
workforce adequate to the task in terms of number of employees and the
skill level of those employees?
Answer. No. Several internal DoD panels, such as the Panel on
Contracting Integrity and the Gansler Commission, have found or
acknowledged the fact that the present DoD Acquisition workforce is
insufficient to fully meet wartime contract award, monitoring, and
performance oversight functions needed by the warfighter.
Question. How does the DoD contracting workforce compare with the
contracting workforce at large private sector companies, in terms of
the number of workers and the skill level of those workers?
Answer. I cannot comment on the quantity or skill level of the
private sector contracting workforce; however, a Defense Acquisition
University study published in early 2008 on Acquisition Structures and
Capabilities found:
The Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L)
workforce is the most experienced in DoD (Fifty percent of the
AT&L civilian workforce has more than 20 years of experience);
The AT&L workforce is highly educated, with 74
percent of civilians having bachelor's or advanced degrees; and
Sixty-six percent of the AT&L workforce is
certified, and 50 percent meet or exceed their position level
requirements.
Question. In your opinion, is the current DoD acquisition or
contracting workforce adequate to the task in terms of number of
employees and the skill level of those employees?
Answer. No. Several internal DoD panels, such as the Panel on
Contracting Integrity and the Gansler Commission, have found or
acknowledged the fact that the present DoD Acquisition workforce is
insufficient to fully meet wartime contract award, monitoring, and
performance oversight functions needed by the warfighter. In addition,
Secretary Gates acknowledged during an April 6, 2009, press briefing
that ``there is broad agreement on the need for acquisition and
contracting reform in the Department of Defense.'' The Secretary stated
that he would recommend overhauling the acquisition workforce by
converting 11,000 contractors and hiring an additional 9,000 government
acquisition professionals by 2015--beginning with 4,100 in fiscal year
2010.

Contracting Management Personnel

Question. DoD has acknowledged that it faces significant workforce
challenges that if not effectively addressed could impair the
responsiveness and quality of acquisition outcomes.
The Department of Defense workforce of contracting officials is
losing many of its most talented and experienced personnel to
retirement. In some cases the talent that remains does not match up
well with the types of services to be contracted.
How does the DoD go about finding, recruiting, hiring, and
developing the needed contracting professionals? What should be done
differently?
Answer. My office has long been concerned about the need to
maintain a trained and experienced acquisition workforce in DoD. We
have not performed any analysis of the Department's hiring practices
and have not offered any specific recommendations to the Department on
how it could improve its recruiting policies and procedures.
Question. What are the career education and training progressions
for DoD contracting personnel? What should be done differently?
Answer. The Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) Workforce
Desk Guide provides the DoD AT&L Education Training and Career
Development Program requirements. The intended audience is the
acquisition and contracting workforce and provides information about
certification, qualification, and tenure requirements.
Question. As private contractors increasingly are intertwined into
the work that civilian personnel perform in managing contracts, how can
the DoD ensure that private contractors have adequate skills to meet
the demands of the work?
Answer. As a contract management requirement, DoD must have metrics
in all contracts and hold contractors accountable for their
performance.
Question. How do you rate the DoD contracting workforce in
achieving the appropriate levels of skill certification?
Answer. GAO issued a report in March 2009 that states that the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics (AT&L) ``not only lacks information on contractor
personnel, but also lacks complete information on the skill sets of the
current acquisition workforce and whether these skill sets are
sufficient to accomplish its missions.'' The report further states that
AT&L is conducting a competency assessment to identify the skill sets
of its current acquisition workforce, and that while this assessment
will provide useful information regarding the skill sets of the current
in-house acquisition workforce, it is not designed to determine the
size, composition, and skill sets of an acquisition workforce needed to
meet the department's missions.
Question. How is the new training program for military non-
contracting officers intended to affect contract management and
oversight in forward areas?
Answer. It is intended to improve management of contracts because
non-contracting personnel will be aware of contract oversight
requirements.

Needed Improvements to the Acquisition Workforce

Question. For years numerous high level panels of experts found
that the acquisition workforce must be improved by filling contracting
leadership positions with qualified leaders, determining the
appropriate size of the contracting workforce and ensuring that it has
the appropriate skills; and improving the planning and training for
contracting in combat and contingency environments. Most recently the
DoD's Panel on Contracting Integrity made recommendations.
Mr. Heddell, this Committee is interested in DoD's progress in
addressing the problems of the acquisition workforce based on the work
of DOD's Panel on Contracting Integrity.
What should this Committee be looking for from DoD to ensure that
DoD keeps focused on taking actions to resolve the long-standing
problems of DoD's acquisition workforce?
Answer. During 2008, DoD made significant progress in establishing
the framework to assure functional independence of contracting
personnel, Separation of Duties of senior acquisition and contracting
leaders, and leveraging of contracting officer training. In addition,
DoD has begun a workforce-wide competency assessment of 22,000 civilian
and military contracting professionals, and the Secretary of Defense
stated in a press conference on April 6, 2009, that his recommended
fiscal year 2010 defense budget is aligned to support the Department's
acquisition reform goals by increasing the size of defense acquisition
workforce, converting 11,000 contractors, and hiring an additional
9,000 government acquisition professionals by 2015--beginning with
4,100 in FY 2010. The Committee should expect periodic updates from the
Department on the implementation of its initiatives.
Question. What factors should DoD consider when making a decision
to use contractors to meet mission needs and what tradeoffs are
involved in considering such factors?
Answer. The most important consideration when determining whether
contractors should be used is whether it is essential that the function
be performed by government personnel (i.e. inherently governmental
functions). Once it is decided that a contractor could do the work,
there are a number of tradeoffs. One consideration is how well can the
work be defined? If it can be well defined, fixed price contracting
would be appropriate to put the risk on the contractor and reduce the
need for surveillance. If the work cannot be well defined, some form of
cost-type contract will likely be used, which puts more risk on the
government and requires more use of government personnel to oversee the
work. Other considerations include whether multiple contractors are
available to do the work or only one contractor. Multiple contractors
would allow for competition and require fewer resources for pricing the
contract, whereas detailed pricing evaluation would be needed in a sole
source situation.
Also, DoD needs to consider from recent wartime contracting
experience that it continues to have insufficient resources to monitor
contractor performance in an expeditionary environment. The inability
to enforce contract requirements and monitor contractor performance
remains a critical DoD problem because DoD lacks the trained resources
to award, monitor, and ensure that contractors provide services needed
by the warfighter.
Question. It seems that ``blue ribbon commissions'' come to nearly
the same conclusions on what must be done to improve the acquisition
workforce. What inhibits these recommendations from being implemented?
Answer. Primary factors include funding and a trained, available,
professional workforce (i.e. available personnel). Also, the ``tone at
the top'' needs to show a continued commitment.

Types of Service Contracts

Question. Some types of contracts are:
Cost Reimbursement--Utilized for acquisitions when
uncertainties in contract performance do not permit costs to be
estimated with sufficient accuracy:
Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF) Cost Plus Incentive Fee
(CPIF)
Fixed Price--Optimal for acquiring commercial items
or other supplies/services with reasonably definite functions
or detailed specifications:
Firm Fixed Price Fixed Price Incentive
We often hear of apparent waste and abuse associated with sole
source contracts.
What other types of contracts are available for providing services?
Answer. Other than sole source contracts, there are competitive
contracts. However, you may be referring to the types of contracts
included under Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 16, where there are
many different variations of fixed-price and cost-type contracts.
Question. What are the advantages and disadvantages of each type
and how frequently are they used?
Answer. Cost-reimbursement contracts are suitable for use only when
uncertainties involved in contract performance do not permit costs to
be estimated with sufficient accuracy to use any type of fixed-price
contract. Cost type contracts place more risk on the Government and
require close supervision to oversee performance and costs.
Firm-fixed-price contracts provide for a price that is not subject
to any adjustment on the basis of the contractor's cost experience in
performing the contract. This contract type places upon the contractor
maximum risk and full responsibility for all costs and resulting profit
or loss. It provides maximum incentive for the contractor to control
costs and perform effectively and imposes a minimum administrative
burden upon the contracting parties.
Fixed price and cost type incentive contracts have many varieties,
which include fixed fees, incentive fees and award fees. For FY 2007,
cost type contract actions accounted for about $100 billion, which
represents about a third of the contract expenditures for FY 2007.
Question. Is ``Best Value'' contracting more difficult to
accomplish than ``Lowest Cost'' contracting?
Answer. Best value contracting involves more considerations than
lowest cost contracting so it would be more complicated and probably
more difficult. The contracting officer is required to evaluate
technical as well as cost considerations in making the selection.
Despite the difficulties, we support the best value contracting process
because cheaper is not always better.

Common Access Cards

Question. Your testimony points out that the DoD had contracted out
the inherently governmental function of issuing Common Access Cards
which permits the card holder to enter military bases and access
certain official information.
Did someone in the U.S. Military give KBR authority to decide who
would receive Common Access Cards.
Answer. The Army Materiel Command (AMC) and the Deputy Under
Secretary of the Army for Business Transformation (DUSA-BT) are
responsible for monitoring the CAC life cycle at the KBR Deployment
Processing Center. Because the KBR contractors were receiving CACs for
work under contract to AMC, AMC was responsible for CAC approval,
revocation, and recovery.
An Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness [USD
(P&R)] Memorandum required the use of the Contractor Verification
System (CVS), manned by a Trusted Agent (i.e. a Government sponsor),
for approving all contractors for CACs and did not authorize the
continued use of the DD Form 1172-2. However, AMC officials believed
they had a waiver to this policy because they received an e-mail from
the Defense Enrollment Eligibility and Reporting System/Real-time
Automated Personnel Identification System (DEERS/RAPIDS) Project Office
within the U.S. Army Human Resources Command. This e-mail stated that
AMC could continue using the DD Form 1172-2 to authorize CAC issuance
and that an official waiver from USD (P&R) was not necessary. According
to my Office of General Counsel, the U.S. Army Human Resources Command
had no authority to waive a policy issued by the USD (P&R).
DoD IG Report No. D-2009-05, ``Controls Over the Contractor Common
Access Card Life Cycle,'' October 10, 2008, recommended that the
Commander, AMC mandate the use of CVS at the KBR Deployment Processing
Center and appoint Government employees to sponsor KBR contractors; AMC
concurred with this recommendation. Further, we recommended that the
Adjutant General, U.S. Army Human Resources Command inform the DEERS/
RAPIDS Project Office that it is not permitted to waive DoD policy
unless explicitly delegated that authority. The Adjutant General
agreed, stating that corrective action has been taken to ensure that
the Project Office complies with DoD identity card issuance policies
and procedures.
Question. If so, who was that person?
Answer. The U.S. Army Human Resources Command DEERS/RAPIDS Project
Office (for additional information, see response to Question #72).
Question. When was the decision made?
Answer. The e-mail referred to in the response to Question #72 was
sent on Tuesday, March 27, 2007.
Question. Has anyone been reprimanded for this decision to hand
over the CAC vetting process to KBR?
Answer. The Adjutant General, U.S. Army Human Resources Command
stated that corrective action has been taken to ensure that the Army
DEERS/RAPIDS Project Office complies with DoD identity card issuance
policies and procedures. The Adjutant General also stated that the Army
DEERS/RAPIDS Project Office has been notified that any deviation from
DoD policy will not occur without prior coordination and approval from
the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Question. Are KBR employees still approving CACs independent of DoD
review?
Answer. DoD IG Report No. D-2009-05, ``Controls Over the Contractor
Common Access Card Life Cycle,'' October 10, 2008, recommended that the
Commander, AMC mandate the use of CVS at the KBR Deployment Processing
Center and appoint Government employees to sponsor KBR contractors. In
a response to a draft of this report, AMC agreed, and stated that they
would ensure compliance and use CVS by September 1, 2008. AMC also
stated that as of October 29, 2008, the Army had assigned a Government
employee as the Trusted Agent Security Manager within the acquisition
center and was in the process of hiring an additional person to assume
the responsibility of the alternate Trusted Agent Security Manager by
November 10, 2008. Those Trusted Agent Security Managers would be
responsible for assigning Trusted Agents to oversee the KBR contract
via CVS. We have not verified whether AMC's corrective actions have
been implemented.
Question. If no formal DoD decision was made to give KBR authority
to issue CACs, has anyone from KBR been held accountable for
overstepping their approved role in granting the cards?
Answer. As previously mentioned, AMC officials believed they had a
waiver to the USD (P&R) policy requiring the use of CVS because they
received an e-mail from the DEERS/RAPIDS Project Office authorizing the
continued use of the DD Form 1172-2 to authorize CAC issuance. AMC has
since stated that they would ensure compliance and use CVS by September
1, 2008, and assign Government employees to oversee this process by
November 10, 2008. We have not verified whether AMC's corrective
actions have been implemented.
Question. If KBR did not have DoD approval to decide who would
receive CACs, were DoD personnel in the field aware that KBR employees
were issuing the cards in violation of their contract and DoD security
guidelines?
Answer. As I mentioned during my testimony on CACs earlier this
year, one of the reasons we are doing audits in Southwest Asia and also
in Korea, is because we want to look at the impacts of weak controls
over CACs ``on the ground.'' As a result, one objective of our follow-
on audit of the Controls Over the Contractor Common Access Card Life
Cycle in Southwest Asia is to ensure the proper use of the Common
Access Card by contractors.
Question. If DoD personnel were aware of KBRs routinely
circumventing security protocol, have any of them been reprimanded or
punished for allowing it to take place?
Answer. See the response to Question #75. In addition, DoD IG
Report No. D-2009-05, ``Controls Over the Contractor Common Access Card
Life Cycle,'' October 10, 2008, recommended that the Commander, AMC,
verify that KBR contractors undergo background checks that meet
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 and Federal Information
Processing Standard 201-1 requirements prior to issuing these
contractors CACs, and maintain evidence of these background checks. AMC
agreed and explained procedures that they will implement to verify that
KBR contractors undergo background checks.
Question. Is there any discussion of rebooting the program and
issuing new Common Access Cards to appropriate military and non-
military personnel and making the old CACs obsolete?
Answer. DoD IG Report No. D-2009-05, ``Controls Over the Contractor
Common Access Card Life Cycle,'' October 10, 2008, recommended that the
Commander, AMC, implement procedures to recover CACs from KBR
contractors when the cards are expired or no longer needed. AMC agreed
and explained procedures that they will implement to recover
contractor-issued CACs. Additionally, we recommended that the USD
(P&R), the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information Integration)/
DoD Chief Information Officer: a. Designate within 90 days the lead
organization responsible for immediately developing and implementing a
recovery plan for contractor CACs showing improper pay grades and e-
mail addresses; and b. Implement the recovery plan for contractor CACs
showing improper pay grades and e-mail addresses. The USD (P&R) agreed
and stated that their office is the lead proponent for CACs, and the
plan for CAC recovery is to let current CACs be revoked and expire
according to the normal card life cycle, which will be completed in
conjunction with improvements to policy and issuance processes. The
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Networks and Information Integration)/DoD Chief Information
Officer also agreed and stated that they would work with the USD (P&R)
to implement a recovery plan.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.]
Tuesday, March 3, 2009.

PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH AND TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY PROBLEMS

WITNESSES

ELLEN P. EMBREY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR FORCE HEALTH
READINESS AND PROTECTION
BRIGADIER GENERAL LOREE K. SUTTON, M.D., DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CENTERS OF
EXCELLENCE FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH AND TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY

Introduction

Mr. Murtha. The meeting will come to order.
Let me welcome Ms. Embrey and General Sutton to the
committee.
And let me acknowledge Nick Buoniconti. He used to play for
one of those teams other than the Steelers. You know, I got my
Steelers tie on.
You notice that, Nick?
But he has been very involved in research with spinal cord
injury. He has done a marvelous job there, and we appreciate
the work that he has done.
But we appreciate the work that you two have done.
A couple years ago, this Committee realized, because we
visited the hospitals so often, that we had real problems with
PTSD and brain injuries. And we put $900 million in. And we
want you to talk about how you spent that money, talk about how
important it was. And then we put $1 billion, I think, for
PTSD, I think, last year.
I was just out to Fort Carson, and every place I go,
suicide rates are up. Homicide is up. Divorce rates are up. So
we have got a lot of problems, and much of it comes from PTSD.
In a book that a doctor friend of mine gave me, ``War and
Medicine,'' they talk about, it is going to cost, they quote,
``the trillion dollar war,'' and say it is going to cost $660
billion to treat PTSD after the Iraq war. I don't know if that
is accurate, but certainly we are certainly going in that
direction with the amount of money that we are spending.
And the sooner we get to it, the better off we are;
everybody that I have talked to. But to give you an example, I
was at one of the bases not long ago, and the commander
certainly recognized the problem. But in talking to some of the
enlisted men in a private conversation, one was telling me that
he was in Iraq, and this fellow said he was going to commit
suicide. And he said, well, here is a rifle, go out and shoot
yourself. You know, that is not the way we want to handle it.
And yet it will take a long time for that to get down to the
NCO level.
The other thing that I noticed is the quality, according to
them, is much less than it was. We have a tendency, those of us
that have been there, to say the ones coming in now aren't as
good as the old corps. But still we find that this is a real
problem, according to them. They call them sugar babies and so
forth. But what I worry about, if the quality has decreased, if
we are facing people with a lot more psychological problems
that come into the military just for the money or to get away
to get a job, we are going to have more PTSD. And so it is
something we have to really focus on.
And I know you folks are in the forefront, and we
appreciate it. This Committee has been in the forefront of
taking care of military medicine for a long time, and we have
increased the money substantially year after year.
Ms. Embrey mentioned to me that she was pleased to see that
her request for increase in research, for research, has gone up
substantially, advanced research. I am glad to hear that, and
we will look at it and maybe even put more money in if we can
see that, if you can persuade us that it is necessary.
And you two are very persuasive, so we appreciate your
appearing before the Committee.
And I ask Mr. Frelinghuysen if he has any comments.

Comments of Mr. Frelinghuysen

Mr. Frelinghuysen. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is an important hearing. And I am substituting for
Congressman Bill Young, who I may say would very much
associate, as would I, his remarks to those of the Chairman. I
think your work here is important.
Let me, first of all, and I think we all pay tribute to
those, obviously, who fight on our behalf in Iraq and
Afghanistan, but to the remarkable work that physicians and
medics do before you in fact, deal with the more substantial
parts of working to make their lives sufficient and better.
Really, what happens on the battlefield, compared to Vietnam, a
remarkable transformation of health care and support.
But to you, General, I have read of your distinguished
career; present at the creation of this new entity and have
seen it through. And we are particularly proud of your work,
your distinguished history of work in the military, and Ms.
Embrey, as well for your work in this important area. I am very
pleased that both of you are here, and we look forward to a
productive hearing.
Mr. Murtha. As Mr. Frelinghuysen said, Bill Young has been
in the forefront of military medicine when he was Chairman.
And this is a bipartisan Committee. When we send a bill to
the Full Committee, it is not changed. And when it goes to the
floor, it is not changed. And it goes to conference, and we
have some concessions and adjustments that we make, but as a
whole, the bill that comes out of here pretty well is the bill
that you will see at the end of the day.
But we appreciate your coming before the Committee and your
dedicated work in the field of medicine.
And Dr. Embrey, if you will lead off.

Summary Statement of Ms. Embrey

Ms. Embrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Frelinghuysen. I
thank you for the opportunity to bring you up to date on what
the Department of Defense is doing to improve the quality of
care for our warriors with psychological health needs or
traumatic brain injuries.
We are very pleased to be here, and we thank the Committee,
you especially, for the support that you have given us since
the war began, and we very much appreciate it.
We are committed to ensuring that every warrior, especially
those with psychological health or traumatic brain injuries,
receives consistently excellent care across the entire
continuum of care, from prevention, protection, diagnosis,
treatment, recovery and transition; from the Department of
Defense to the Department of Veterans Affairs or to the private
sector.
In 2007, the Department of Defense embarked on a
comprehensive plan to transform our system of care for
psychological stress and traumatic brain injuries. The plan was
based on seven strategic goals: first, to build a very strong
culture of health leadership and advocacy for these two topics;
the second was to improve the quality and consistency of care
around the country, as well as in locations where we have
personnel across the globe; third, to increase the timeliness
and frequency and quality of care regardless of where the
patient is located; fourth, to strengthen individual and family
health, wellness and resilience; fifth, to ensure early
identification and intervention for individuals who have
conditions, as well as concerns, which are not the same thing;
sixth, to eliminate gaps, particularly in the handoffs between
physicians as they move from location to location; and lastly,
to establish a very strong foundation of research, to address
gaps and to build new technologies and therapies for these two
topics.
Throughout 2008, as you will see in our statement for the
record, we made significant progress towards achieving those
strategic objectives. We established the Defense Centers of
Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury,
of which General Sutton is the director. She is leading the
effort to develop excellence in practice standards, training,
outreach, research and direct care for those with mental health
and TBI concerns.
We established clinical standards that incorporated lessons
learned and best practices to improve the quality of care and
introduced evidence-based care as the enterprise standard for
acute stress disorder and PTSD and depression as well as
substance abuse disorders.
To assess the likelihood of mild traumatic brain injury, we
introduced a military acute concussion evaluation tool and
published clinical guidelines for its management in field
settings. We implemented a standardized training curriculum for
medical providers, and we initiated a certification process for
TBI programs at military treatment facilities.
To improve access to care, regardless of location, we
funded additional mental health providers in contracts, as well
as civilians. We are also seeking ways to embed military
uniformed providers in our units in operational settings. We
also implemented a policy that requires first appointment
access within 7 days for psychological health issues.
To strengthen resilience to psychological stress and
traumatic events, we are implementing solid prevention and
health protection policies, mitigating organizational risk
factors and strengthening family wellness programs. To ensure
earlier identification and intervention, we enhanced post-
deployment health assessments and reassessments, modifying them
to include information that helps us understand and early
intervene problems as they occur. We are working to eliminate
gaps in care as patients transition throughout the various
systems or to different locations.
Lastly, we are establishing a strong foundation of research
that will improve prevention, detection, and diagnosis,
particularly for traumatic brain injury, and treatment.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you again for your
contribution. My comments are joint. A statement is provided
for the record. We stand by to answer questions.
[The joint statement of Ms. Embrey and General Sutton
follows:]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.262

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.263

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.264

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.265

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.266

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.267

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.268

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.269

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.270

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.271

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.272

Mr. Murtha. We talked earlier. Your statement is a joint
statement.
Are you going to say anything, General Sutton?

Summary Statement of General Sutton

General Sutton. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Frelinghuysen, good
morning, and thank you so much for your support and comments.
I would just say that, sir, I join Ms. Embrey in thanking
you for the privilege of being here this morning and to review
what we have done this last year. We have come a long way since
a little over a year ago and we started out with a title on a
paper and passion in our hearts for this effort.
Since then, today, Mr. Chairman, I am proud to report, we
have got five component centers. We have got a sixth center,
the National Intrepid Center of Excellence. We have Dr. James
Kelly, who just joined us from the University of Colorado. He
will serve as a director. We have a network of 20 and growing
sites. These are a mixture of the VA polytrauma centers, as
well as military treatment facilities, as well as civilian
facilities. Last month we opened up the pilot assisted living
program in Johnstown, where we have three families and soldiers
who are there recovering.
We have a number of training programs going on. We have
trained over 2,700 providers. We have launched, together with
the Department and the services, over 90 research studies, and
we are continuing that process with the fiscal year 2008
supplemental and the CSI.
We also, sir, in the process of working with the vice
chiefs to launch a public national educational campaign.
Because we can do all of these other things, Mr. Chairman; we
can become that open front door for the Department of Defense
working with the VA for all issues related to these concerns,
and we have done that. We can continue our unceasing efforts to
grab next-generation solutions and bringing them here and now
today. But fundamentally our challenge becomes that of
transforming the culture, transforming the culture to one of
transparency, resilience, accountability, candor, strength; one
which supports individuals and their family members and
recognizes that seeking support, seeking treatment, is an act
of courage and strength.
And so, Mr. Chairman, we will continue our efforts. We look
forward to addressing your questions. And of course, we are
committed to bringing excellence in all things on behalf of
those who are so deserving.
I would just close my opening comments, sir, with some
wisdom from a great, great preacher who started out his life as
a slave, and when looking back over the state of America at the
end of his life, he said this, he said: We ain't where we want
to be. We ain't where we ought to be. We ain't where we gonna
be. But thank God we ain't where we was.
I look forward to your questions Mr. Chairman.

Remarks of Chairman Murtha

Mr. Murtha. Well, you gave me a couple of articles which we
want to put in the record. And let me just read the titles of
the articles. A very poignant one was by Gabrielle Luera, L-U-
E-R-A, and the other is by a survivor of the war. And to me,
having been there, and one a Doonesbury cartoon, which I don't
know if we can put the cartoons in there, but it is very
poignant, products of people who know what it is all about in
being at the war.
[Clerk's note.--Articles are located at the end of this
hearing.]
But you mentioned the Intrepid. And Bill Young and I have
talked about this, and we are committed to putting the
additional money in, because we know the private sector, they
have done so much so many places all over the world, and
particularly in Fisher houses and so forth, that we are going
to, we will put the $20 million in the supplemental. We will
recommend it to the subcommittee, and we feel confident the
subcommittee will agree to fund the equipment and so forth.
The Guard and Reserve, I know with the unit you have in
Johnstown, you are addressing problems that the Guard and
Reserve have. And it is one of the things that has worried us
for a long time. I have had a number of people, and I have
talked about it before, one had a foot amputated, and he was
blinded, and he is struggling. In the early part of the war, we
didn't do near as good a job as we are doing now. One young
fellow lost both his hands and was blinded. So we have a lot of
them that get lost once they leave. And the sooner we get to
PTSD in particular, the better off we are.
And the work that has been done with prosthesis has just
been absolutely amazing. In this war, in medicine, when you
look back at the Crimean War and World War I, you see examples
of how difficult it was for them to be rehabilitated versus the
way we do it today. So it is like that former slave said, we
aren't where we want to be, but we are going to get there, and
we have got a ways to go, so I am impressed.
Now, one of the things I mentioned, General Mattis came to
see me. He says that, at Pendleton, they have a new process of
teaching the young people when they go to war about what it is
all about before they get there with all the sights, sounds,
and smells, and so forth. And I don't know if any medical
people have looked at it, but I would be very interested if you
would have somebody go out there and evaluate it from a medical
standpoint to see if there is anything in addition we should
do. I was supposed to go out there, and I just couldn't get out
there to look at it. But he claims, and having been in Iraq
himself for a long period of time, he claims that could be the
best type of thing to harden the mental aspect of this thing
before they go to war.
Two other points. One, transplants. I had some people in
that said they could transplant hands. And I know that Dr.
Embrey looked into it, and she feels that the cost is really
expensive, and the rejection process is so onerous. But we are
going to put some money in for that because we think we ought
to do more research on rejection. I know sometimes the
rejection medicine is so onerous that they feel like, well, I
wish I hadn't gone through it. I know a lot of members finally
say, well, take that leg off because it is causing such a
problem or take that arm off because it is just not getting any
better.
But we still think we ought to do research. So we will put
extra money in. And if somebody wants to have a hand transplant
or an arm transplant, you will certainly have that available. I
know it is expensive, but I think that is the kind of stuff we
need to do, especially if they lost both hands. And I have seen
a number of them that lost both hands. And they are in good
morale when they are in the hospital, but I know it has to
affect them when they go home. But I appreciate the work you
two do, because there are no better people to be in charge of
this field than you two are, so we appreciate it.
Mr. Frelinghuysen.

TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Either one of you, when you talk, give
us a few of the, or give the Committee a few of the statistics
that relate to traumatic brain injury.
General Sutton. Yes, sir.
What we are finding is we are finding that, of the
continuum of traumatic brain injuries, which of course
encompasses mild traumatic brain injury, or concussion,
moderate and severe, of the over 8,000 troops that we currently
have in our registry, between 80 and 85 percent of them
fortunately are mild concussion. But that doesn't mean that we
are not concerned about them. Clearly, much of our research is
aimed at better understanding what the impact of blast injury
is, for example, and the differences between the concussion
that may be experienced on a football field versus that which
occurs on a battlefield where you have such a mix of factors,
the life-threatening stressors, the very real physical risks,
the psychological risks, the morale, and the spiritual risks.
When we bring troops back home and do the screening, we find
that the incidence of traumatic brain injury, and again, most
of these are concussion, because if they were moderate or
severe, they would have come through our medical evacuation
system where we keep our arms around them and then have a care
coordination process for ensuring that we keep our arms around
their needs as well as their families, but for those who come
back with their units, it ranges between 10 to 20 percent of
those who screen positive for concussion or mild traumatic
brain injury.
This is very similar to what the RAND study, which used
different methodology, earlier last year reported; when those
individuals then get clinical evaluation, whether it be in the
VA system or within our own military treatment system----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Can you make the distinction here? You
know, I know that, according to the figures I have, of the
61,000 veterans that the VA has screened for TBI to date,
11,000, approximately 11,000 to 12,000, or as you said between
19 or 20 percent, screen positive for TBI. What is the hand-off
between the active DOD and the VA? You know, we like the notion
on this committee that the DOD and the VA are joined at the
hip, but in reality, how are they co-joined?
General Sutton. Well, sir, let me give you an example.
During this conflict, DOD has already transferred over 1
million records, those post deployment health assessment
records and postdeployment reassessment health records, so that
the VA providers will have those records when they see troops.
This a work in progress. But I will tell you that the hand-off,
the linkage between DOD and VA, it is at the level that I have
not seen in my 28 years in service. As an example of that would
be the fact that when Secretary Peake first got into office
last year, one of the first things he did was he sent one of
his best and brightest psychologists, Dr. Sonja Batten, to
become our deputy at the Defense Centers of Excellence. So this
is an ongoing partnership that continues to grow and develop,
broaden and deepen.
Ma'am, I don't know if you would like to add to that.
Ms. Embrey. I would like to talk a little bit about how we
engage with the Department of Veteran Affairs.
Back in 2007, the Deputy Secretaries of both Departments
determined that we needed to get together and to develop common
approaches for how we saw some of the challenges associated
with psychological health and traumatic brain injury
specifically. Together with the oversight of, and leadership
of, the top leaders in both Departments, we embarked on a
series of initiatives to include coming up with common
protocols for how we screen and assess for traumatic, mild
traumatic brain injuries. We have had a decade's worth of
partnership on traumatic brain injury with the DVBIC, the
Defense Brain Injury Center, Defense and Veterans Brain Injury
Center, sorry. We have had a whole series of updated clinical
practice guidelines and postdeployment health guidelines that
we have developed in partnership with the VA, and we apply
those to both of our health communities. So I would say that we
have unprecedented levels of collaboration and sharing across
the continuum of care.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Obviously, those that are severely, have
severe traumatic brain injury are wholly embraced by both the
DOD and the VA system.
But, obviously, there are obviously other soldiers besides
the regular military, Guard and Reserve, who are under, have
suffered concussions from IEDs. Well, what happens to, should
we say, the citizen soldier who is not hospitalized, but let us
say months down the road, and we have had plenty of discussion
in here, what happens to that man or woman who might suffer
psychological and certainly some symptoms of traumatic brain
injury?
General Sutton. Sir, I would note that the VA has completed
a Herculean effort in contacting over 500,000 troops. These
were troops who had gotten out of uniform or perhaps gone back
to their communities as guardsmen and reservists before the
screening had been implemented for TBI; contacted every one of
those troops directly, gave them the information on how to
enroll, checked in with them to see how they were doing, and
made that personal contact that is so important. Every
individual who gets treated at the VA gets screened, just as
our individuals in the DOD get screened.

POST-DEPLOYMENT REASSESSMENT

Mr. Frelinghuysen. There is a desire, obviously, of many
men and women in the service to get far away from the trauma
they experienced. And I am not talking about necessarily TBI
but obviously the war environment. And I assume that what you
are saying, you are giving them fairly high marks for the
follow-up.
Ms. Embrey. Sir, we use the same assessment tool. And in
addition to that, the Department implemented a postdeployment
reassessment 6 to 9 months following deployment. We engage the
VA in that screening process for all service members, whether
they are Guard, Reserve or Active Duty. And that is the time in
which we evaluate how they are doing. It is the point in time
where research tells us it is the optimum time to early
intervene, especially for mental health issues. So we have
partnered with the VA, and we conduct those assessment
processes with the VA for the Guard and Reserve specifically.
General Sutton. Sir, I know you will also be glad to know
that, during this transition period, there has been no momentum
lost with the actions of the Senior Oversight Committee that
Ms. Embrey addressed. Just last week we had our first Senior
Oversight Council meeting. It was chaired by Secretary Gates
and Secretary Shinseki. I was asked to give a briefing on what
the collaborative efforts are that are going on with the VA and
DOD joined by Dr. Ira Katz specifically aimed at suicide
prevention. I will say that the national lifeline, that 1-800-
273-TALK, the VA has gotten over 100,000 calls on that, many of
them from our service members who are either still active duty,
Guard or Reserve. And we are working closely with our outreach
center in all of the call centers to make sure that when an
individual calls in, we have the right processes in place to
make sure that we take care of their needs, get them back
plugged into the system. And there have been over 2,000 clear
saves already over the last 2 months.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. That is great progress. Thank you both.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SUICIDE RATES

Mr. Murtha. Yet suicide rates are up.
General Sutton. Yes, sir. This is an area that clearly is
demanding our greatest efforts and focused urgency. We are
focused, working on the far end of that continuum, to make sure
that our service members are aware of the danger signs who know
and know how to intervene. Each service has a program that is
geared towards that end.
But we also know how important it is to get what we say to
the left, to get to this side of writing the note or buying the
weapon or giving ones prized possessions away, and to address
all of those psychological health principles, both at the
individual, family and community level, that will build
resilience, that will foster post-traumatic growth, and yes
will, good Lord willing, reduce our suicide numbers, which as
you know, sir, in recent years, have gone up, within the Army
at any rate.

EVACUATION OF THE INJURED

Mr. Murtha. Well, you folks have done a magnificent job in
this book that I quoted. In the American Revolution, 41 percent
of the people died from injuries, and it goes, stays about the
same; the Civil War, it went up to 56 percent; 37 percent World
War II; 26 percent the Korean War. But it is now 11 percent in
Iraqi Freedom.
Now, Afghanistan, and this is something that we need some
advice on, we keep playing around with these helicopters which
we need to get these folks out. It is taking longer to get out
in Afghanistan. So I would assume that is one of the reasons
that the percentage of people who die from injuries or wounds
is higher. So you folks need to--you know, the military keeps
playing around with coming up with a helicopter that will work.
We put $100 million in to fix the one up because it couldn't
make a decision. We need a recommendation that you folks ought
to get on them a little bit because you can see the difference
there between the people in Afghanistan and Iraq; where they
can get them out in a hurry in Iraq, and Afghanistan, for one
reason or another, and I would assume it is because they don't
have the ability to evacuate them as quickly as they would
like.
Ms. Embrey. Sir, if I can address that a little bit. I know
the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Gates, and General Petraeus
both have identified this concern and have specifically asked
for a plan that distributes medical assets in such a way that
we can respond more effectively as we expand operations in
Afghanistan.
Mr. Murtha. Doctor, we don't get a decision. We keep
getting studies. That is the problem with the Defense
Department. They study it to death. In the meantime, people are
not making it because they don't have the equipment they need
out in the field. That is the frustrating thing to me. It is
like any decision over there; it takes them forever to make a
decision. In this particular case, we have been in front of
them in TBI. We have been in front of them in post-traumatic
stress, all these areas. So you need to urge them a little bit
to get better medical evacuation.
Mr. Visclosky.

PERIODIC HEALTH ASSESSMENT

Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Two lines of questioning. One is for individuals who do
have a problem who have been injured. Do you have a concern? Is
there a problem about identifying them before they leave
service? And we have had this discussion in previous hearings
about, hey, I just want to sign my papers, I am fine, I want to
get out. And are we losing people? And do you have programs in
place to do a better job to say, listen, there is no shame
here; we want to help; we are not trying to force you out to
deny you have got a problem. How are you dealing with that?
Ms. Embrey. The Department of Defense recognizes that we
need, it is part of our force health protection policy, and we
are focusing on maintaining and sustaining a healthy and fit
force. And we have set up several metrics to evaluate how
healthy the force is and how deployable, medically ready they
are to deploy. We instituted a series of assessments; some are
required by law, some of which are appropriate to ensure that
we are constantly evaluating the health and the fitness of a
person to serve.
We do that throughout their career. We do it on accession.
We do it every year at a periodic health assessment, and then
prior to deployment, and following deployment twice, we
evaluate the status of the health of the individual so that we
can appropriately intervene and sustain a healthy force.
When individuals do not come forward, we figure these
forced assessment processes allow us to maintain visibility. As
an individual separates, there is also a very elaborate
separation physical process involving the VA to evaluate
injuries that have occurred over a lifetime.
We have been evaluating a pilot to evaluate not only what
an individual has suffered as a result of military service, but
how compensable it might be from the VA perspective. We are
doing that with the VA, with VA providers, so we believe we
have improved the process significantly.

PROGRAMS FOR CHILDREN

Mr. Visclosky. And what about children? Could you describe
programs? And how do you identify which children may be having
a problem? Is it through school programs.
General Sutton. Yes, sir. Children certainly bear a good
share of the toll on the wear and tear of deployment stress. We
have a number of programs in place. The military family and
life consultants working within the school systems; we partner
with Military Child Education Coalition for example with their
Living in the New Normal program. We have also invested in the
National Child Traumatic Stress Network. The Uniform Services
University is the military site for this national network that
is working together to coordinate efforts to develop the
research strategy, to collaborate and to identify, particularly
building on the work of Dr. Steve Cozza, who, during his time
as the chief of psychiatry of Walter Reed, really pioneered a
lot of the research that has helped us better understand how to
support children who are part of wounded warrior families, as
well as now in a broader community-based effort, how can we
reach out and give the support that is developmentally
appropriate for children of military families, because we know
now, eight years into this conflict, that for the children who
were 6, 7, 8 years old when 9/11 happened, they are now in
their teenage years. And there are different issues that affect
them that we absolutely must continue to support them and their
parents in addressing.
So a number of programs. For example, the Mr. Poe program.
If you go to battlemind.org, they have developed a number of
videos using real military families and children to illustrate
some of the challenges as well as the strengths. We have
partnered with Sesame Workshop, who has now issued the second
of what will be a three DVD series. The first one is ``Talk,
Listen and Connect,'' focusing on the general deployment stress
issues for families, giving them a way to talk about it and to
make it approachable. The second one, which was launched last
spring, focused in on the changes caused by deployments, both
psychological, physical changes, and how families adapt to
those changes. This spring, we will be launching the third in
the series, which will address the issues of grief, trauma, and
loss due to losing a parent.
So we are continuing to focus our efforts on communities,
families. And we know that children, not only are they our
armed forces of the future; they are our precious, precious
treasure here and now. So we will continue our efforts in that
regard, as well as continue to invest in the research which
will help us to better understand their evolving needs.
Mr. Visclosky. Any particular unmet needs you have that we
can be helpful with, whether it is monetary or directive, to do
a better job?
Ms. Embrey. This Committee particularly has been
extraordinarily helpful to us with the $900 million provided
and then subsequent supplemental funds, as well as honoring and
increasing our budget requests over the last year. We are
challenged to make sure that we responsibly expend those
dollars, and we are learning from the infusion of those dollars
right now. I would say that you have helped us significantly,
and we would like to report back to you in future hearings or
briefings to let you know how we are doing with the money you
have provided, which is significant.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much for your work.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Moran.

MENTAL HEALTH CARE

Mr. Moran. Thanks Mr. Chairman.
And I want to thank Mr. Visclosky for raising the issue of
the children. It is almost 3,000 children who have lost their
parents in the war. I taught football, and I have coached
football and taught a class at Fort Devens after college for
awhile, and boy, you could immediately recognize kids' behavior
based upon the status of their parents, either overseas or
those who have lost parents and so on. We do need to extend
that. But the first priority is what the Chairman put in the
2007 supplemental for mental health care, and that is the
purpose of this hearing. It was $900 million. More than $1
billion has been provided now.
We were concerned last year that of that $1 billion, only
about $53 million was actually obligated. I know that that has
now been corrected, that there is a substantial amount of money
that is going into the purposes for which it was intended and
particularly looking at alternative means of providing mental
health care, breaking from the tradition.
One of the problems I think that we have encountered is the
military culture. As the Chairman and Mr. Frelinghuysen
mentioned, it is contrary to the culture to acknowledge that
you might have some kind of mental health concern, particularly
PTSD, yet you tough it out. But that is counterproductive in
terms of what we are seeing, and one of the contributing
factors to the fact that suicide rates are twice what they are
among the general population. One of the things we found is
that almost half of military families are using what is called
complementary medicine, integrative medicine, I guess that is
the term that you now use, again, contrary to the culture. But
they find that even meditation, yoga, all kinds of things that
you never would have imagined in the last generation, is
actually helpful in coping with the stress, the psychological
problems that PTSD generates. Are you encouraging that, or are
you running into any resistance?
General Sutton. Thank you so much for that question, sir.
We are absolutely encouraging that. We, in fact, last
spring, we published a request for proposals and were able to
fund ten projects specifically focused on complementary and
alternative forms of therapy, such as yoga, acupuncture, Tai
Chi, facilitated pet therapy. We are continuing that work. We
know that in places like Fort Bliss, places like Fort Campbell,
places like Camp Lejeune, as well as Camp Pendleton; and, sir,
I did have a chance two weeks ago to meet with General Lehnert
there at Camp Pendleton, and to review that program, which was
actually initiated through a partnership through our top
psychological health advisor Russ Schilling. And so we are
looking broadly. We recognize that this is a moment in history
that may not pass our way again, certainly not in this
lifetime. And so we see ourselves in a position where through
our efforts to transform military culture, we can perhaps even
serve as a model for the Nation at large. To that end, we are
working very closely with the Samueli Institute. Dr. Wayne
Jonas, as you know, has been a real pioneer in this area. As
well as with the RAND Corporation, this year now that we are
in, within the next month, we are launching the initial phases
of what we are calling the win-win network, the Warrior
Wellness Innovation Network. This will be a series of pilot
studies so that we can put program outcome metrics against some
of these promising practices. Whether it be the ones that we
have already mentioned or noninvasive neuromodulation, there
are a number of different biofeedback products and social
networking tools and Web 2.0 and 3.0 tools that really we are
so excited about. For example, last fall, we launched our
afterdeployment.org Web site, which now is getting 4,000 hits a
month, providing tools, providing interactivity. We have
invested in an Island on Second Life, and now we are working
with the VA so that we can make this truly a seamless
transition.
So, yes, sir, we will continue our efforts to both better
understand the potential efficacy and use of these kinds of
therapies, as well as to promote them as part of our culture of
resilience, performance and wellness.

MILITARY ONESOURCE PROGRAM

Mr. Moran. Well said.
I want to get in a couple of questions, so maybe you can
address that as well. I want your colleague to be able to speak
as well, General.
But I am also, there are two other things that I am
concerned about. You can choose which ones to emphasize in your
response. When soldiers call the hotline that VA has set up,
some people have suggested that they are much more likely to
talk, to listen, if the person on the other end has gone
through their experience, is a veteran themselves. And while
the hotline, that Military OneSource is a terrific program, I
wonder if we shouldn't complement it with volunteers, veterans,
who would be more than happy to do that, many of them, but it
might encourage other veterans to be more likely to call, even
though you have already gotten a lot of calls, I know that, and
I understand you have saved maybe a couple thousand lives. But
I would like for you to respond to that.
And then in terms of personnel, you had said that, actually
we put into the language of the bill that you needed to hire
more mental health providers; that for all the good intentions,
unless you have got the mental health providers out there, you
are very limited. I mean, you can do stuff on the Web and so
on, but you really need professionals dealing with PTSD
victims. And clients, I guess I should say. Have you found
them? Are you hiring them? And I don't know how you are doing
it, because Public Health Service has a great need as well, and
yet Public Health Service was supposed to provide the personnel
that you needed to implement this program. So those are three
things.

ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE/THERAPIES

And if you would like to, Ms. Embrey, maybe respond to the
alternative medicine as well, because it is very important for
us, if we are going to fund it, we have got to be able to show
objectively that it does work.
Thank you.
Ms. Embrey. Alternative medicine or alternative therapies
are often not considered by the medical community nor medically
reimbursable by insurance companies. Therefore, it is very
important that we, and the Center of Excellence, do not
``medicalize'' some of these approaches and address these
issues in ways that nonphysicians and that social workers and
other folks that aren't certified per se can engage. Studying
them and studying the metrics of their effectiveness is very
important. We believe very strongly that our leaders and our
commanders own this issue. We should not medicalize this. We
should make it a part of their normal day-to-day living. An
individual should view themselves as a person who is striving
to stay fit and healthy to perform their mission, and fitness
includes mind and body and spirit. Just as we send people to
the gym to be physically fit, we need to create an environment
where people can go to the psychological gym, and that we
develop, through research, the tools that will work to
strengthen our mental health. So that is in answer to your
first question.
Mr. Moran. Well put. Thank you.
Ms. Embrey. And secondly, I think the idea that the
Veterans Administration--the Department of Veterans Affairs--I
am sorry, I am an old-timer, I keep thinking of VA as Veterans
Administration, but it is the Department of VA.
Mr. Moran. We do, too, so it is okay.
Ms. Embrey. But I think the idea of having a veteran who
understands is the whole concept behind the veterans centers
that they stood up. I think that we are trying to embed and
engage our line leaders and outreach and education for the very
same reason, for our active duty service members. They are
creating mechanisms within their units, within their commands
and within their line structures that don't medicalize it, but
help people understand the signs and symptoms and to recognize
when medical intervention is appropriate and to refer them at
that time without penalty, without penalty.
And then to answer your question, are we hiring folks? Yes,
we are. Are we hiring enough? I don't think we could hire
enough at this point. But I think we should give a lot of
credit to the TRICARE community, our purchase care network.
They have expanded their outreach to hire mental health
providers to deal with our family members and beneficiaries,
including retirees, who are affected and stressed by this
environment as well. And they have hired more than 3,000 health
providers in our network since last year. The services have a
target of hiring 1,000 providers by this point in time. They
have actually been able to hire approximately 800 so far, so
they are not as successful as they would like. We have several
initiatives that are actually combining the energy of all of
the services to have a single way so that they are not
competing with each other and elevating the salaries. That is
one initiative that we are taking to try to improve that
national recruiting initiative.
And lastly, the Public Health Service is assisting us. They
are required by law to recruit a cadre, a fairly large cadre of
mental health professionals to deal with Katrina-like events,
to be prepared to deal with that. We realize that if we had
them on a string and they weren't being used, that that would
be a problem. And so what we asked in a Memorandum of Agreement
with them was to share those assets when they hired them to
help us in our time of need. We had a landmark agreement to
support that. And they are recruiting as best they can to meet
our specific needs as they recruit to meet their objectives
under the law.
Mr. Moran. Thank you very much, Ms. Embrey and General
Sutton. You are both very articulate, and I am glad you are
doing what you are doing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Frelinghuysen.

PERSONNEL SHORTAGES

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Could you put a little meat on the bone?
When Senator Dole and Secretary Donna Shalala did their work
with the Wounded Warrior Program at Walter Reed, the Army was
down 20 percent from its full complement of psychologists at
that point in time. The Air Force was missing 17 percent of its
235 authorized psychologists. It only filled, I think, 11 of
the 23 internship slots last year. And the Navy, which also
provides, correct me if I am wrong, psychological services for
the Marine Corps, was down 29 percent with only 87 of its 122
psychologists and nontraining positions on board. I know the
figures are a little bit outdated. Where do we stand now?
General Sutton. Sir, when the services came together as
part of the Red Cell that Ms. Embrey led last summer, they
identified what they approached their provider needs were going
to be. And that was the roughly 1,000 additional providers that
were identified, of whom approximately 80 percent have been
hired at this point, thankfully a year, year and a half later.
I think the other question though that your question raises
is the need for us to look at our uniformed provider
population, the authorized slots. Because we know that with the
needs on the home front as well as the needs on the battle
front, that there has been a tremendous load, an operational
and deployment load on our uniformed providers. And that is
why, as we get the results back from the Center for Naval
Analysis, the staffing study which we are currently working to
complete at this point, we will be able to take a look from a
risk-adjusted population health standpoint to look at the total
complement of our team, both our uniformed providers as well as
our government service civilian providers as well as our
contract providers. So it is a team effort, but your question
raises a number of different important dimensions that we are
continuing to pay attention to.
Ma'am.
Ms. Embrey. I would like to also add that one of the other
initiatives that Loree specifically has undertaken, excuse me,
General Sutton has undertaken is to recognize that our military
treatment facilities are not where all warriors need care.
General Sutton has in her Center of Excellence established a
specific center that is focused on telemedicine that will
provide a fairly extensive network to use expertise that is
resident in our system to provide consultative care in remote
areas. This is particularly to address the issues of guardsmen
and reservists who live in small towns who do not have access
to the kind of expertise that is needed. She has a staff that
is working those issues extensively and leveraging the already
excellent networks that were established with the VA.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Bishop.

HYPERBARIC OXYGEN THERAPY

Mr. Bishop. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you so much for what you ladies do for our
Defense health. PTSD and TBI are real challenges that we are
facing with this Committee and our force. And you have
indicated in your testimony that, well, let me just say that,
because of the challenges we face, recruitment and retention of
trained military personnel who are affected by TBI and PTSD is
difficult. And the replacement costs, which this Committee has
to be very concerned about, are very, very high. If you have
got a pilot or a Special Ops person who suffers from PTSD or
TBI, you are talking about hundreds of thousands of dollars per
soldier to replace that particular personnel.
In your testimony, you talk about the fact that, in fiscal
years 2007 and 2008, you executed research, development and
testing in the areas of psychological health and TBI, including
complementary and alternative medicine approaches to treating
PTSD and TBI, and yoga, even acupuncture. My question to you,
based on some information that I have recently seen, is, what
has the Department of Defense done in relation to hyperbaric
oxygen therapy treatment that has been used and which has been
found to be extremely effective and economical in treating TBI
as well as PTSD? There have been particular concerns where it
has been tried and utilized and results were given, but TRICARE
would reimburse the cost of the treatment. It is my
understanding you can get any of those treatments for about
$16,000 compared to hundreds of thousands of dollars to retain
or to train and recruit new military personnel. So tell me
about the hyperbaric oxygen therapy support that the Department
has given and whether or not you are going to pursue that,
whether or not you think it is something that we ought to
pursue, and if it would give results, would you please.
General Sutton. Thank you, sir, for that question.
Mr. Bishop. And explain for those who may not know what
that is, what that treatment consists of.
General Sutton. Yes, sir.
Hyperbaric oxygen is a treatment that has been around for
years. It has been used, for example, very effectively with
wound healing as well as divers, in terms of folks who have the
benz. There are a number of different uses for which there is
clearly sound evidence upon which to base that practice.
When it comes to traumatic brain injury, at this point,
although there are some very promising case studies, we have
not yet got the science in front of us that will allow us to
move forward and establish this as a standard of care.
Now, having said that, we are as hopeful as anyone that
this may be actually, may become a proven standard of care that
we can use on behalf of our troops who are experiencing post-
traumatic stress and TBI. We were looking forward to funding
research, quality research. In fiscal year 2007/fiscal year
2008 Broad Agency Announcement, there was one study proposal
that met scientific muster with our peer-reviewed process. We
funded it; a preclinical animal study. We have also worked with
Dr. Bill Duncan, who is here today; and his group, Dr. Harch at
Louisiana State University; as well as Dr. Cifu, who is at
Richmond; and Dr. Lynn Weaver at Utah, to name a few of the
experts in this area. And we brought together, understanding
that the research hadn't been done, and we didn't get the
proposals that would have allowed us to move forward, we said,
well, let us bring together the leading experts across the
services, across the government and across the Nation. So early
last December, we brought together approximately 60 individuals
and spent 2 days immersed in this. The individuals who had done
off-label work with hyperbaric oxygen brought their pilot study
data. We were able to lay that out on the table. And the
consensus was among that group that in fact there was enough
information, there was enough data, enough evidence that would
allow us to go forward to conduct a multi-site randomized
clinical controlled trial. And so that is the course that we
are on right now. We are working across those various studies
that I mentioned in terms of the individuals who are using it
for off-label uses at this point. And we are very eager to
bring that data into the randomized control trial data. We are,
at this point, compressing what is ordinarily a 12- to 18- or
even 24-month cycle of study preparation and development so
that we can launch with subject enrollment as early as this
April and launch a multi-site randomized controlled clinical
trial, so that within a year, we will have some definitive
evidence that will point us towards what the safe and
efficacious use for this modality may be.
Mr. Bishop. Do you think it is very promising?
General Sutton. It is very promising, sir.
Mr. Bishop. Do you have the resources now that you need to
move forward with it?
General Sutton. We do.
Mr. Bishop. There is nothing else that this committee needs
to do too?
General Sutton. Sir, we are, at this point, we have a
meeting schedule with the FDA at the end of this month. They
have been very helpful with us in helping us understand what
the requirements will be. In this case, it will be for an
investigational new drug registration. And we are moving full
speed ahead on this without squandering any of the scientific
rigor and safety and standards that, of course, are so
important and part of the integrity of any scientific research
process. But nothing more needed from this committee. We have
everything we need to move forward, and we are very much
looking forward to the outcome of this study.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you very much.
I understand that one of the people who participated in the
pilot was a general who had brain injuries and had miraculous
recovery as a result of this HBOT therapy and that it holds
great promise for treating this. And it will save our
government a lot of money in having to retrain people who are
discharged, who are well trained, as a result of TBI and PTSD.
General Sutton. Yes, sir. We are all united in that hope
that we can do whatever it takes to bring relief, health and
well-being to our troops who are suffering.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you.
General Sutton. Thank you.
Mr. Murtha. Ms. Kilpatrick.

DEFENSE CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE

Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And outstanding, as a new member of the Committee,
outstanding, first, that there are women in charge. I am most
impressed by that.
General, General Sutton, your passion, your understanding
and really the rigor that you use in presenting yourself and
the material is outstanding, to the both of you.
How long and how old is this Defense Center of Excellence?
General Sutton. Ma'am, thank you for your kind comments and
your words of support. The Defense Centers of Excellence opened
its doors on the 30th of November in 2007. At that time, we had
a receptionist, a phone number, a bank of empty offices, a
part-time chief of staff and two contractors, thanks to Ms.
Embrey's generosity. From that point forward, ma'am, we have
evolved the concept. We have grown the five component centers
that I mentioned. We have developed the design and concept of
operation for the National Intrepid Center of Excellence, which
will be the hub of our national and global network. We have
also recognized the importance of broadening our focus. You
will recall perhaps in the spring and summer of 2007, following
the Walter Reed tragedy, there was a lot of focus on PTSD and
TBI.

POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER

Ms. Kilpatrick. And how long has that been defined as such?
I mean, how old does it go back?
General Sutton. Post-traumatic stress disorder was actually
codified in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for the
American Psychiatric Association in 1980.
Ms. Kilpatrick. It has been evolving ever since.
General Sutton. But I will tell you, ma'am, and this is why
it is so important for us to learn from history, is that we
know from the beginning of time that these issues related to
the adversity of war and post-traumatic stress, everyone is
affected by combat. In fact, I would worry about an individual
who, going down range and experiencing what our warriors are
experiencing today, who would come back and say, you know, it
didn't affect me a bit. Of course, it does. In our own civil
war, we talked about it then as ``soldier's heart,'' which
remains to this day my favorite phrase for those struggles. But
of course, World War I, ``shell-shock.'' World War II, ``battle
fatigue.'' More recently, combat stress and post-traumatic
stress.
Ms. Kilpatrick. That is where I was kind of going. I have
an uncle, a World War II veteran, mental illness, then came
home looking fine but, for the next 60 years, was in and out of
mental health hospitals and lived there for a couple of years;
just died last year at 80-some years old, did not find it at
first. He came back looking normal, but he obviously had
battled something and lost his mind literally. I am happy to
see the innovations and how we have moved forward on that.
I have one of my staffers here, who is Riley Grimes, who
won the Purple Heart, won an award from the Purple Heart
Association just recently for his work in this area, so he has
been kind of updating me. He is a Marine himself, so he has a
certain passion for that. So I want to appreciate you for that.

MULTIPLE DEPLOYMENTS

Ms. Kilpatrick. Tour of duty. And we keep hearing they keep
going back again and again, some two, three, four-time
deployment. I just last weekend was with Chairman Dicks in
Washington State on a naval submarine, two of them, and one
aircraft carrier, talking to young sailors, I am told, sailors
not soldiers, sailors. And many of them have been out two or
three times. With the number of suicides and what you discussed
earlier with both TBI and PTSD, how does it all relate? How can
we help with that? What needs to happen?
It comes back to me that we are short military. Contractors
we talked about a little bit in this Committee, and we are
going to talk about it more, and we have more now than ever
before. Do we need--and this may not be your part, because I
know you are healthy. With the shortages that we are seeing in
the enlisted and the repeated tours of duties and TBI and PTSD,
how does it all intertwine and relate?
General Sutton. Thank you for that question, ma'am. It is a
serious concern.
I think once again, looking back to our history, never in
the history of our Republic has so much been placed on the
shoulders of so few on behalf of so many for so long. And so
there is an enormous challenge for us to both do some of the
things that are already under way in terms of expanding and
increasing the force strength as well as tailing back on the
tour lengths. Those are certainly factors, risk factors that we
are well aware of.
I think also there are the struggles--and you mentioned the
Navy. The Navy and the Air Force, those troops who have been
included as individual augmentees for units to go downrange and
to do things perhaps for which they had not been trained
initially, then they received training and go down as part of a
unit but not their home unit. That also carries significant
stressors related to it.
We know that in the history of warfare, actually, suicides
themselves, the suicide rate typically during high-intensity
warfare is not adversely affected; and that makes some sense
because when you are in high-intensity warfare, you are focused
on a goal. Operations are very fast, very intense, very deadly
at times certainly. But suicide doesn't seem to be affected
adversely in those conditions.
We know that when it becomes a lower intensity and more
protracted situation----
Ms. Kilpatrick. Like multiple tours of duty.
General Sutton. Like multiple tours, like the kinds of
stressors on families, like the physical, spiritual,
psychological, and moral wear and tear over a protracted period
of time, certainly that has its impact.
But I would like to also point out that while everyone is
affected by combat, the majority of individuals do not go on to
develop a disorder. The majority of folks who experience
concussion or mild TBI completely recover from that injury and
do well.
Now it is important for us to document it as we would any
other injury, and it is important for us to monitor and
evaluate to see, does this troop need to take a leave? Do they
need to take a few days before they get back into the battle?
And, of course, we have some of the same challenges that the
civilian world does with high-school-football-age and college-
age players who want to stay in the battle.
But those are all things that are important for us to
continue to monitor, to act, to develop those programs while,
at the same time, we ensure that we put the truth out in terms
of the fact that most folks will actually do very well; and in
fact many, despite the adversity of war, will go on to claim
what has been termed now post-traumatic growth. That is to say
that even, for example, the double-lower-extremity amputee that
I spoke with last week at the Canadian Embassy who told me,
ma'am, if someone offered to give me back my legs today, I
wouldn't take them. I have grown so much in this experience. I
know so much more about myself, my family, life, what my
purpose is.
Individuals, despite the most adverse and ugly of
situations, can develop a greater sense of purpose, of faith,
of meaning, of connection to others. And so it is important as
we go forward that we communicate accurately and balance not
only the tough reality of war but also ensure that individuals
understand that this is an experience like other traumatic
experiences from which individuals cannot only bounce back but
also grow stronger as a result.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, one more, based on what you just said.
So will we find in 5, 10 years RAND studies that show it is
not the combat itself but maybe the tour of duties or duty that
would cause the rates to increase?
General Sutton. You know, those are all questions that, as
we focus our longitudinal prospective studies now over the next
10 to 15 years, we will absolutely be able to understand more
about those factors. Right now, what we know is that each of
those factors has an additive effect, but we don't understand
completely the relationship between them as well as the various
factors that combine to make this such a tough experience for
both troops as well as family members. And I must also
recognize and I appreciate so much the Committee commenting on
the service and sacrifice of our health care professionals. It
is just phenomenal.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Sutton. And they deserve our care and concern as
well.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Right. Thank you very much.
General Sutton. Thank you.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Dicks.

HYPERBARIC OXYGEN THERAPY TREATMENTS

Mr. Dicks. I apologize for not being here for your
testimony. I have another Committee that I Chair, and we are
reviewing the conduct of the Department of the Interior this
morning.
There are two questions I wanted to ask. One, I had some
people come into my office. And I know you have discussed this,
but I want to discuss it a little bit further, on hyperbaric
oxygen therapy treatments. What they basically told me is that
they are having great difficulty--that because the Surgeon
General I think of the Navy somehow doesn't like this treatment
or thinks this treatment, you know, has to be studied further,
FDA, whatever--but there have been 16 instances where they use
I guess an off-label prescription; and in all 16 of these, the
people have been dramatically improved, in cases that were very
severe. And this is with traumatic brain injury.
So if you have had 16 successes--and I think this is 16 for
16--why would we then go have a study? I mean, what I am
concerned about--now General Corelli keeps telling me that we
are moving out, that we are going to get something in the
field. But I don't see that yet. Except I understand we are
doing yoga and massage and things like this. To me, that seems
as if a higher priority might be the hyperbaric oxygen
treatment if it is really helping these people beyond these
other things. I mean, I can't understand why it is, you know,
that it is taking us so long to come to grips with this and to
take action.
General Sutton. Sir, thank you for your comments and your
question.
First of all, let me just clarify, the Navy Surgeon General
has been enormously supportive of this endeavor.
Mr. Dicks. I am glad to hear that.
General Sutton. In fact, hosted a conference at his office
last August. All of the Surgeon Generals. And in fact, the vice
chief, the service vice chiefs--and you mentioned General
Corelli, but all of the service vice chiefs have come forward
and, in fact, are now serving as----
Mr. Dicks. So why are we going to study it? Why can't we
just implement it and let people get this treatment?
General Sutton. Sir, we brought together the 60 leading
experts in the country to advise us on this issue. Because--
yes, sir.
Mr. Murtha. Sixteen people were treated, and sixteen people
were successful? Is that accurate?
Dr. Duncan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. Who said, yes, sir, in the back? Are you a
witness or are you public?
Dr. Duncan. I am a doctor.
Mr. Dicks. Okay. Well that is good. So you know about this,
too.
Mr. Murtha. Is that accurate or not accurate?
General Sutton. I have seen some case reports----
Mr. Murtha [continuing]. People know whether it is accurate
or not?
General Sutton. I have not seen 16 case study reports, but
I have seen the five that Dr. Duncan has recently distributed.
Mr. Murtha. Does Dr. Duncan work with you?
General Sutton. He does not, sir. We certainly are
colleagues.
Mr. Dicks. Who does he work with?
General Sutton. I will let Dr. Duncan speak for himself.
Dr. Duncan. I am a pro bono lobbyist for the hyperbaric
community to get these men and women treated as quickly as
possible.
Mr. Murtha. Factually, we know that 16 have been treated;
and that is accurate?
General Sutton. We do not know, sir. I have not seen that
data. I will tell you that Dr. Jim Kelly, who was a member of
the consensus group study, the group of experts that met in
December, as was Dr. Duncan, when they looked at these
promising case studies--and that is what they are. They are
very promising.
Mr. Dicks. When was this?
General Sutton. Early December of 2008, sir.
Mr. Dicks. That is 3 months ago.
General Sutton. Yes, sir. When we came out of that
conference, the consensus of those national experts was that,
given these promising case study results, given the promising
off-label uses for this modality, that the time is now ripe for
us to proceed to what becomes the gold standard for scientific
evidence. And this is an opinion that is supported by the
leading experts across the Nation. We are being responsible
scientists and leaders in this area.
Mr. Dicks. How did these doctors, these 16 doctors decide
that they didn't need any further studies or analysis, that
they could go forward and prescribe this and then have it work
and yet we are still not--we are still not moving out on this?
This is what is very frustrating to me.
Ms. Embrey. Sir, off-label use, if the Department of
Defense were to establish a policy to direct doctors to a
standard of care that was off-label, not FDA-demonstrated in
science and evidence----
Mr. Dicks. The FDA has approved this, by the way.
Ms. Embrey. Not for this. The issue is we in the Department
of Defense have a long-standing policy that we do not direct
off-label practices without the evidence behind it. So any
doctor can talk to their colleagues and make a judgment based
on the particulars of that individual to use a therapy in an
off-label way. For instance, aspirin for heart, you know, for
heart, cardiac issues, that is an off-label use of aspirin.
Although aspirin isn't a prescribed drug, but it is a simple
way to understand it. The Department of Defense can't just make
a policy to go do this since it is an off-label application.
Mr. Dicks. Even though it has worked.
Ms. Embrey. Doctors can choose to do it on a case-by-case
basis. But as a department policy, we cannot direct it as a
standard of care without the evidence.
Mr. Dicks. All right. My time is running out.
I have another question. The other issue is----
Mr. Murtha. Excuse me. Tell us what this is. Tell us what
this encompasses, this process.
Ms. Embrey. Well, FDA----
Mr. Murtha. No. I mean, what is he talking about?
Mr. Bishop. Hyperbaric oxygen therapy.
General Sutton. Yes. Hyperbaric oxygen therapy involves a
series of usually 40 to 60 treatments where an individual is
exposed to increased atmospheric pressure of oxygen, and it is
certainly closely supervised medically. It has been proven to
be effective for conditions such as wound healing as well--
infection as well as certainly when divers, for example, get
the bends. The research, though, just simply has not yet been
done to establish its use for TBI.
Mr. Murtha. I want to know. You get in some sort of a----
General Sutton. A chamber, yes.
Mr. Murtha. Turn the atmospheric pressure up and adjust
that and so forth, and it is closely monitored?
General Sutton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bishop. They have increased oxygen, also.
Mr. Dicks. These off-label prescriptions were people with
traumatic brain injury who, because of the treatment, were
vastly improved and able to go back to their jobs. I mean, so I
think it is worth--I am glad you are at least looking at it. It
just takes so long. That is what is frustrating.
Mr. Bishop. They also generated new nerves. Nerves that had
been killed were regenerated in the brain.
Mr. Murtha. Well, I have to take the side with the Defense
Department. I argue with folks all the time about these things.
But we want to make sure it is safe, because there are always
effects that we don't recognize.
We were talking earlier, Norm, about transplants. And when
you transplant a hand, it is something that they haven't done a
lot of. But the rejection figure really causes a lot of
problems. So we have got to be careful here.
But, from what I am hearing is, we certainly ought to move
as quickly as we can studying this thing so that we know what
we are doing.
General Sutton. Absolutely.

WEB-BASED CLINICAL MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES

Mr. Dicks. If I could just finish up here. The other one I
wanted to ask you about, our Committee last year in the report
said to DOD, to establish and use a Web-Based clinical mental
health service program is a way to deliver critical clinical
mental health services to service members and their families,
particularly in rural areas. Now, I know that--and I talked to
General Corelli. I have talked to everybody about this. I know
you sent out a request for information, and now you are going
to have an RFP on this, and I have been told that a decision is
going to be made on this by April. Is that correct?
General Sutton. Actually, sir----
Mr. Dicks. I happen to think that for a lot of people who
are fearful that there is going to be recriminations, to have a
Web-Based system--I think you could even do this in country
where they would be able to go back, talk to a psychiatrist and
have it done privately and get the help that they need.
I think this--and especially for our Guard and Reserve
people who aren't at like Fort Lewis or a base, this is another
way of trying to reach out and help these people. And we see
these suicide numbers going up, up, up, and yet again there--we
put this in months ago, and we are supposed to get a report
back on March 16. It is frustrating that we can't move this
forward a little more expeditiously, because I think it is an
idea that is at least worth studying, and we should do it as
soon as possible.
General Sutton. Sir, I completely agree with you, and I
would like to inform you of some of the efforts that are
already under way.
For example, Military OneSource, an individual can get
counseling online, by phone or in person. The military mental
health tool, which was launched last year, develops the ability
for an individual in the safety and the privacy of their own
home to be able to assess their mental health and to get linked
up with those that can help them.
Last fall, we launched the afterdeployment.org. It is a Web
2.0, 3.0 socially interactive tool which likewise, again, is a
Web-Based, stigma-free opportunity for troops to get help.
Destress, which is a program that was developed in
partnership with Duke University and Dartmouth----
Mr. Dicks. Is this where the yoga comes in?
General Sutton. No, sir. Destress is a Web-Based treatment
program involving coaching and treatment for post-traumatic
stress as well as depression.
We also have a training module that is available for
providers, primary care providers; and we are embedding
behavioral health providers in our clinics across the services
and in concert with the VA.
All of this, sir, in addition to the request for proposal
that is feeding off of the 23 submissions for information--
there is a lot of interest in this area, and we share it. We
are excited about it.
All of these efforts, sir, will serve as a down payment, if
you will, for what I would say is possibly the most
revolutionary project that we are endeavored in right now; and
that has to do with the Sim coach. We are working with the
Institute for Creative Technology in southern California as
well as with Carnegie Mellon and DARPA. We are bringing the
best of artificial intelligence, the best of neuroscience
knowledge, the best of simulated conversation and expert
technology and voice recognition to provide a coach, an avatar
coach.
With this generation, virtual is as real as real is to us.
That will provide that opportunity to have a coach that they
can talk with who can bring in the most promising tools and
practices and, yes, providers no matter where one is stationed.
And we have launched the SBIR on that. We have got four
submissions. We are moving forward towards a Sim coach.
We will have as a down payment--yes, in the very near
future we will have providers who troops and their family
members can access online as well. Every avenue that we can
possibly use to connect with our troops and their family
members to provide them that help, that support, that
compassion that they need, we are committed to providing.
Ms. Embrey. Sir, I would also like to just clarify, too,
out of the over $1 billion that this Committee has provided to
us to study these topics, only $5 million was provided for the
study of alternative medicine, such as yoga.
Mr. Dicks. Have you asked for a reprogram?
Ms. Embrey. Well, it was also congressional direction to
engage in study of alternative medicine for these topics. It
was congressionally directed.
Mr. Dicks. This is where the yoga and the--what do you do
with the pinpricks?
Ms. Embrey. Acupuncture.
Mr. Dicks. Acupuncture, all that. What are the results? How
is that working?
General Sutton. Actually, sir, there is some very promising
results. A couple of months ago Dr. Kelly and I had a chance to
visit the Rehab Institute of Chicago where we funded some
research, in this case looking at the efficacy of using
acupuncture for sleep conditions. We know that sleep problems,
it is the number one factor that affects our troops coming
back. And of course when your sleep is not going well, nothing
goes well over the long term. And pain management as well.
So in talking with that particular research group, one of
the things that they are very hopeful about at this point, the
preliminary findings are looking good. But the possibility is
that we could--just as we have provided our frontline corpsmen
and medics a tourniquet to be able to perform life-saving
practices that will save lives for severely injured
extremities, we are looking at the possibility of having a very
basic acupuncture kit which could be used for sleep, for pain,
if the research continues to support it.
Our own deployment health clinical center has done some of
the pioneering work, looking at virtual cognitive behavioral
therapy and its use for post-traumatic stress. Also, the use of
yoga and acupuncture. We have got a program just up the road at
the Deployment Health Clinical Center that has a 3-week
regimen. They bring in referrals from all over the Department
of Defense, folks who just aren't getting better where they are
locally. And it is not clear why. We bring together the best of
eastern medicine, the best of western medicine.
As one officer last spring testified here on the Hill, he
said, I owe my life to this program, my family. We have had
continued testimonials as well as rigorous science that have
demonstrated the efficacy of some of these promising practices.
So it is on that basis, whether it be hyperbaric oxygen or yoga
or acupuncture or tai chi, we will continue to follow these
promising practices and learn everything we can on behalf of
our troops and their loved ones.
Mr. Murtha. The $5 million we put in was to study whether
alternative medicines were working, not for alternative
medicine but whether it works or not, $5 million. You can spend
any amount you want to on alternative medicine. We said, study
it and come up with a result.
Mr. Frelinghuysen.

THERAPEUTIC PROPOSALS

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Just so I understand it, you serve as a
clearinghouse. You should know that Members of Congress are
visited by a variety of different constituents, university-
based R&D, hospital-based R&D, which may not be university
connected, the private sector with a variety of therapeutic
proposals to deal with TBI. Just assure the committee that you
are the general clearinghouse for such proposals here. I mean,
the ingenuity that is out there is incredible, what people are
coming up with. But you are the gatekeeper.
General Sutton. It is absolutely phenomenal, sir. And as we
have gone across the country and visited with the leading
programs across the country, whether it be places like Mayo
Clinic, Cleveland Clinic, UCLA, Stanford, Cornell, Kessler
Institute, just these programs across the country who are doing
just incredible work, much of the time in partnership with our
own scientists, our own clinicians.
We are working right now, for example, with the NIH, their
Center for Information Technology. We are signing a memorandum
of agreement that will establish the same data analytic and
storage infrastructure as was developed for autism. This will
allow researchers around the country and around the world to
have visibility of the knowledge as we reap it, as we harvest
it from this research that will then advance and catalyze the
development of effective treatments and approaches for our
troops.
So we are absolutely joined at the hip with, for example,
our consortium, our research as well as our clinical
consortium, the leading minds not only in this country but
around the world. So we are absolutely committed to continuing
to develop those relationships, that network of networks, not
just in this country but in places like Canada, like Great
Britain, like Australia, Spain, any number of countries that we
have already been partnering with.
I would also mention, sir, is that as important as the
medical----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. You are going to give your stamp of
approval here?
General Sutton. Oh, yes, sir.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. This is obviously based on sound science
medicine. There are a lot of interesting people that come into
our lives, but we want to make sure that it is substantiated in
a way that it has veracity, that it is truly effective.
General Sutton. We adhere to excellence, yes, sir, in all
things. And that means that we cannot squander, we cannot
violate scientific rigor and integrity. So we will not do that.
But we certainly will relentlessly pursue leading and advanced
ways of treating, of diagnosing, of screening, of building
resilience, of supporting our troops and their loved ones with
a sense of focused urgency because we know time is not our
friend.
Thank you.
Mr. Murtha. One of the things we are still concerned about
is there is a number of Wounded Warrior programs. We don't
think that you have proved to this committee, who funds these
programs, that they are working.
We need you to give us some proof if there are gaps in the
program, overlapping programs, are we spending money in areas
where we shouldn't be spending it to--I am not convinced that--
you know, it sounds good. You know, you can get up here and
tell me apocryphal stories, but we want to see the proof. We
want to see that these are working. Because if there is
someplace else that we could spend the money, we would want to
spend the money there.
The Congress is anxious to spend money in the places where
it works. But, you know, many times when you get a name like
Wounded Warrior, that sounds good. But, you know, there is a
lot of programs in that category that we are not sure of that
merit funding. So you need to show us about that.
The other thing, simulation out there, you said you looked
at the simulation out there at Camp Pendleton. Do you think
that it hardens the mind, it helps with their mental attitude
when they go into combat?
General Sutton. Sir, the evidence points to the fact that
anytime that we can build resilience through the use of tough,
realistic and, yes, dangerous training that as closely as
possible approximates what a troop will encounter in battle,
that will much better prepare them for that experience.
Mr. Murtha. I want to you answer specifically. Does this
help? Because General Mattis wants me to fund that. He wants me
to recommend to the Committee we fund that and one at LeJeune.
Does that help? That is what I am asking you. Does this
particular program help toughen mentally the people going into
combat?
General Sutton. Sir, we have research that is undergoing
right now looking at those specific programs. The preliminary
results are promising. I will let you know in 6 months what my
opinion is on proliferating.
Mr. Murtha. We want you to let us know by May or June,
because that is when we will be funding the programs.
General Sutton. Okay, sir.
Mr. Murtha. Any other questions?
Mr. Bishop.

PTSD SCREENING

Mr. Bishop. Yes, sir.
Ms. Embrey, one of DOD's psychological strategic goals is
to ensure early identification and prevention for individual
conditions, but apparently this does not always occur. I have
got two soldiers from my district who were not properly
diagnosed on redeployment for PTSD, and they suffered
relationally, that is, ended up in divorce. And they suffered
professionally, ended up with some problems and ended up
getting busted.
The issue seems to be improper screening at the local unit
level. DOD has designed the National Intrepid Center of
Excellence to deal with PTSD nationally. What is being done to
rectify the issue of poor PTSD screening at the local unit
level? And how can our troops who are suffering from PTSD and
related mental health problems be properly screened so that
they don't suffer disciplinary actions, which are really a
function of their PTSD?
Ms. Embrey. I think that we have struggled to develop
sensitive and specific assessment tools that allow us to
understand through a dialogue of questions whether or not an
individual is at risk and needs referral and intervention for
PTSD and other traumatic stress. The challenge is is that some
individuals are in denial or they choose not to answer the
questions honestly; and, as a result, they make it through the
accessment without referral.
So what we are trying to do is a double-pronged process,
which is to address the issue through outreach with the line
leadership. We learned that individuals respond well to
traumatic stress with very strong leaders.
Mr. Bishop. Can I interrupt you for a second? I have got an
example right here where an individual says that on the 20th of
January he approached his first line supervisor with an issue
that he needed to see the chaplain, he was having mental
issues, and he needed to be dealt with. All the way through--he
was set up for an appointment. It was cancelled. He tried to
make it through. He was rescheduled. It was set up. It was
cancelled. All the way--and his next appointment is now set for
March 9. He has not gotten the support that he needed on the
unit level.
And that is to make my question short. But I have got a
narrative here on what this particular soldier had to go
through and still has not gotten his therapy. He has not gotten
to talk to a therapist.
Ms. Embrey. I misunderstood your question. I thought you
were talking about our assessment process.
Actually, when an individual seeks care--there is emphasis
from the very top of the department when a person approaches a
commander for a referral. It may well be that the culture has
not changed, and we need to further emphasize it further down
the line and make sure that people understand that when people
have identified a need that they are taken care of as quickly
as possible.

MEDICAL HELICOPTERS

Mr. Murtha. Let me just stress the last question here, the
CSAR thing. I just saw a classified report. The staff went down
and got me a classified report. You folks have to weigh in on
this. We can't let the budget drive the number of medical
helicopters we have. They don't want to announce the number
they have because it is inadequate, in my estimation. But the
amount of time it takes to get these people out of the field is
absolutely unacceptable. So I wish you folks would look at it
and then make a recommendation, to us in particular.
I went out to Nellis, and I was unhappy about--so we put
$100 million into refurbishing the ones. The RFP fell by the
wayside. Now Secretary Gates is himself involved. But sometimes
they get sidetracked by numbers.
You folks are the ones that use it, and you folks are the
ones who should make the recommendation. So I need to hear from
you about the numbers you need and see if there is anything we
can do.
It is a complicated problem. And with the altitudes they
have, with the outposts that are so isolated, it is a much
different situation; and the Afghans are a much more difficult
enemy than the Iraqis. So we have got some real problems here.
But we appreciate your coming before the Committee, your
dedication to the health of our soldiers.
The Committee will now adjourn until 10:00 Thursday, March
5.
Ms. Embrey. Thank you.
General Sutton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Ms. Granger and the
answers thereto follow.]

Question. Has the Defense Department estimated or studied the
impact of OEF and OIF on local community health systems, and in
particular the mental and behavioral health systems in regions where
the military is growing the force? More specifically, the north Texas
region?
Answer. Absolutely. The TRICARE Regional Office-South, with its
managed care support contractor, Humana Military HealthCare Services
(HMHS), has established the Warrior Navigation and Assistance Program
(WNAP) to support Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve warriors in
transition and their families with information and assistance with
TRICARE programs. WNAP offers these beneficiaries person-to-person
guidance and access to a new advocacy unit specially trained for the
unique challenges that many warriors face as it relates to access to
care or the need for information on all available resources. This
includes the Military Health System, Veterans Affairs, and local
community assets. Additionally, WNAP will also oversee education and
assistance initiatives for civilian providers caring for warriors and
their families.
In addition to WNAP, HMHS has partnered with ValueOptions to
provide behavioral assistance and services to beneficiaries in the
South region, which includes north Texas. They provide a behavioral
health provider locator and appointment assistance line.
Question. One of the biggest challenges faced by the behavioral
health care organizations in my region when trying to provide outreach
and treatment is the lack of knowledge as to the number of soldiers in
the region, specifically the reserve component, that need immediate
access to behavioral health specialists. Is there a reason that non-
military entities are not able to access information in the Millennium
Cohort Study to assist in planning and delivering of behavioral health
services? If not, why? Please explain.
Answer. We appreciate the outreach efforts of behavioral health
care organizations in your region. The best and fastest way to help our
beneficiaries is to have those organizations work with local military
treatment facilities, the TRICARE Regional Office-South and the managed
care support contractors for your region. Humana Military HealthCare
Services has partnered with ValueOptions to provide behavioral health
care. We expect all to work together to either provide or arrange for
health care for our beneficiaries.
In response to concerns about the health effects of deployments
following the 1991 Gulf War, Congress and the U.S. Institute of
Medicine recommended that the DoD conduct prospective epidemiological
research to evaluate the impact of military exposures, including
deployment, on long-term health outcomes. The Millennium Cohort Study,
the largest prospective health study in the military with more than
140,000 participants at present, meets this critical need. The
Millennium Cohort Study is poised to provide critical information
toward understanding the long-term health of future generations of
military members, thus contributing to force health protection, a DoD
priority. The DoD Center for Deployment Health Research currently
shares non-patient specific information collected with non-DoD
entities.
Question. How is the Department addressing behavioral health care
needs in large rural areas that consist of diverse populations?
Answer. Our military treatment facilities, TRICARE regional
offices, and our managed care support contractors work together to
provide or arrange for care. For TRICARE Prime enrollees, they work
together to provide the care within our written access standards,
regardless of location. Because we understand that access to behavioral
health services is a key component of TRICARE, we require our managed
care support contractors to offer beneficiary assistance to Active Duty
service members and Active Duty family members in locating behavioral
health care providers and making behavioral health care appointments.
We have asked our contractors to provide a dedicated toll-free
telephone number and have given them one of two ways to assist the
beneficiaries.
The first way the contractor will provide telephone numbers of
behavioral health care providers and call the beneficiary back within
three days to see if the beneficiary was successful, and to offer any
additional assistance needed. The second way, the contractor will
establish a three-way conversation between the beneficiary, provider's
office and the contractor. The contractor will only participate in this
three-way conversation long enough to confirm the provider is willing
to provide an appointment.
Question. How is the Department addressing behavioral health care
needs in large rural areas based on reserve components?
Answer. The Department has implemented many programs for our
Service members who reside in medically underserved areas and in
particular to meet the mental health care needs of our Reserve members.
We have been incrementally enhancing our capabilities from general
medical support to niche programs designed to support the specific
mental health challenges faced by the Reserve Component. Our vision is
for a robust system of mental health support across the entire
continuum of care. The following are highlights of different types of
programs currently offered along this continuum.
Prevention/Pre-clinical:
(1) An example of an internet-based mental health tool is
afterdeployment.org, online since August 5, 2008, which offers
anonymous access. Afterdeployment.org addresses the concerns of Service
members who do not seek in-person consultation for adjustment problems
because of barriers to care and concerns about stigma. Its behavior-
change strategies and educational materials span several content areas,
including combat stress; conflict at work; re-connecting with family
and friends; depression; anger; sleep problems; substance abuse; stress
management; kids and deployment; spiritual guidance; living with
physical injuries; and health and wellness.
(2) Another example of preclinical counseling support is Military
OneSource. This is an internet-based Service member and family
assistance program that offers personalized advice and support on many
kinds of issues, such as relationship problems, spouse employment, and
other mental health issues. Military OneSource offers the opportunity
for Active Duty, Reserve, or National Guard Service members or their
family members to speak to master's-level, credentialed healthcare
providers or social workers on many topics.
Diagnosis and Care: One of the most mature programs available to
the Reserve Component addresses both physical and mental health needs.
TRICARE Reserve Select (TRS) is offered to qualified National Guard and
Reserve members who are not otherwise qualified for TRICARE. It is a
premium-based plan and offers coverage similar to TRICARE Standard and
Extra. TRICARE Reserve Select allows the first eight behavioral health
visits per fiscal year without prior authorization. TRS members may
obtain this care from any TRICARE authorized mental health provider,
but we encourage these members to use existing TRICARE network
providers. Members choosing TRS are authorized to use military
treatment facilities on a space-available basis.
Screening/Assessments: The Post-Deployment Health Reassessment
(PDHRA) program is designed to identify and address health concerns,
with specific emphasis on mental health, that have emerged over time
following deployment. The reassessment is scheduled for completion
before the end of 180 days after return from deployment so that Reserve
Component members have the option of treatment using their TRICARE
health benefit. The PDHRA is required for all Service members who have
returned from operational deployment, including all National Guard and
Reserve members, as well as those who have separated or retired
following their return from deployment. The assessment includes
questions on behavioral health and traumatic brain injury.
Transition: The Transitional Support Program (TSP) has been
designed to bridge potential gaps in psychological health services that
can occur during periods of transfer that are typical to Service
members. The TSP uses an established behavioral health network with
national networking capabilities and scope. Through the program,
Transitional Support Facilitators provide a readily accessible (24/7),
knowledgeable specialists for Service members who are seeking expert
advice about mental health specialties, techniques, and modalities that
are typically used in therapy, as well as direction in obtaining
assistance and resources in their immediate area.
Question. It is my understanding that the Texas region is
underserved and if that is accurate, can the coalition of behavioral
health care providers led by University of North Texas Health Science
Center work effectively with the Defense Center of Excellence?
Answer. We are always interested in learning more about new and
innovative ways to assist Service members, Veterans, and their
families. As to this specific program, it sounds promising and
something the DoD would be interested in exploring. As a result, we
will be in contact with them, and hope to set up a meeting where we can
learn more about the program, and better determine whether it would be
of benefit.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Ms. Granger.
Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto
follow.]

Mental Health and Military Families

Question. Visits to military bases have confirmed the widespread
nature of this problem. Declines in school performance and increases in
disciplinary problems have surfaced at major bases throughout the
country. For example, last year alone the Children's hospital here in
D.C. had over 1,000 visits from children of military Service members,
many of which were suffering from mental health problems. Getting
information about the trends in children's illnesses related to the war
would serve as an important basis for potential additional action by
the Committee.
Of the amounts this Committee approved for PTSD and other mental
health programs, how much have you dedicated for children's programs?
What are there any notable trends in children's illnesses related to
the war?
Answer: In addition to robust family support systems at
installations and online, a step-up of $5,010,800 has been dedicated
for children's programming, with $4,710,800 for Sesame Street programs
and distribution of Sesame Street DVD's and online resources: (http://
www.sesameworkshop.org/initiatives/emotion/tlc/). Videos were developed
for children and adults covering: deployments, homecomings, and
changes. In addition, specialized outreach materials and guides for
using the videos were developed and distributed.
In addition, $300,000 went to the DoD Uniformed Services University
of Health Sciences' Child Trauma Network organization and affiliations,
supporting research into the effects of war on children. We have also
allocated $320,000 for the ``Signs of Suicide'' school-based suicide
prevention program in DoD middle and senior high schools and others
with high proportions of military dependents.
Significant trends from 2003 to 2008 have been noted for child and
adolescent use of DoD direct and purchased mental health care
resources. There have been increases in inpatient bed days for both 0-
14 and 15-17 age groups, as well as for ambulatory mental health visits
in both age groups.
Historically most information about the effect of war on the
children of Service members has been anecdotal and limited. DoD-funded
research is underway to more precisely define the relationship.
Question. If so, what initiatives have been funded by the
Department and what are potential future programs that should be
considered?
Answer. In 2006, the offices of Health Affairs and Military
Community and Family Policy jointly funded a specialized initiative to
establish the United States military site of the National Child
Traumatic Stress Network, based at the Uniformed Services University of
the Health Science's Center for the Study of Traumatic Stress. This
program develops knowledge related to military childhood experiences,
develops effective public education materials, and expands and studies
effective intervention strategies, all using a strength-based approach.
The Center for the Study of Traumatic Stress conducts research,
education, consultation, and training on preparing for and responding
to psychological effects and consequences of traumatic events. Program
scientists are recognized nationally for their expertise related to the
health and well-being of military children and have published and
presented extensively on the topic.
Signs of Suicide (SOS) is a school-based suicide prevention program
that teaches adolescents how to identify symptoms of depression and
suicidality, and how to respond effectively by seeking help from a
trusted adult. The SOS program is the only school-based program proven
to reduce suicide attempts in a randomized, controlled study. A future
program in development will supply SOS Booster Kits to high school
seniors to prepare them for mental health issues that may arise after
graduation.
In order to address the mental health of adolescent and teen
children of Service members, an online screening was added to the
existing online Mental Health Self-Assessment Program to help parents
assess their children for depression or suicidality.
Current research focuses on a comparison of the effects upon family
members of a Service member who returns from deployment wounded versus
those who were not injured. Congressionally mandated research funding
has been provided for research on the effects of deployments upon
children. Research consortium centers (hubs) for psychological health,
and traumatic brain injury are being established in three locations in
the United States: San Diego, San Antonio, and Houston. Each will be
affiliated with local study sites at major medical centers (spokes)
across the country engaging the finest scientific minds to fill gaps in
research, including research on families and children of Service
members who deploy.
Sustained research will more completely characterize the near- and
long-term effects of sustained war efforts upon our families, the
effectiveness of enhanced preventive family support, and clinical
interventions for those who experience severe distress and psychiatric
disorders.
Question. What does research tell us about the effects of post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) on children of military members
suffering from this disease?
Answer. Returning Service members may suffer from post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD), depression, substance use disorders, or other
mental health conditions that may have a significant impact upon their
spouses and children. The extent to which this occurs has not been
fully characterized for this war. Research regarding Vietnam veterans
described negative impacts, including reduced family cohesion,
interpersonal expressiveness, ability to problem-solve, and increased
interpersonal conflict. Vietnam veterans have reported that the PTSD
symptom of avoidance, in affiliation with co-morbid anger and
depression, negatively affected their family functioning, while their
spouses identified anger as the most damaging symptom. Thus,
identifying and treating PTSD early may reduce the potential negative
impact to families of struggling Service members and veterans.
Trans-generational effects of PTSD have been the focus of some
recent research. These effects merit more study but cannot be directly
inferred as relevant to the children of Service members with PTSD.
Due to more robust data systems now in place, the connections
between Service member PTSD and adverse effects, such as child neglect
and maltreatment, may potentially be better characterized during this
conflict.
Question. Is there a correlation between child and spouse abuse and
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)?
Answer. Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is not directly
related to child or spouse abuse, i.e., one is not always present with
the other. However, they can occur together. The same can be said of
substance abuse or depression, which are often seen with PTSD. All
children of parents with mental health conditions have some effects--
especially when the parent's condition is alcohol dependence, but
others as well. Researchers have recently examined the impact of PTSD
symptoms on family relationships, and on children in particular. Family
members of individuals with PTSD may experience numerous difficulties.
Children may experience cognitive or emotional symptoms related to
witnessing their parent's symptoms (e.g., having difficulty
concentrating at school because they are thinking about the parents'
difficulties). However, DoD family and child-oriented initiatives focus
on minimizing the negative effects on families and children of parental
mental health issues in general, not only of PTSD.
Child and spouse abuse are indicators of a stressed family that
needs help in coping with challenges. Child abuse, particularly
neglect, also can be seen in times of high deployment, not necessarily
with PTSD, but accompanying the demands of deployment and single parent
families that are a part of deployment. Many DoD programs are in place
to address these issues and there is ongoing attention to these family
needs.
A study describing the characteristics of neglect for substantiated
Army child neglect cases (2001-2006) is nearing completion to better
understand the key factors that lead to these conditions by
identifying:
child, parent, and family-based risk and protective
factors for child neglect cases;
possible military community risk and protective
factors for child neglect cases;
civilian community risk and protective factors for
child neglect cases; and
family-based factors (marital/relationship problems,
financial problems, substance use problems) and Service member
injuries (including PTSD).
We anticipate the findings of this study will serve to help us
develop programs to reduce risk and increase protective factors in our
military families.
Question. Of the amounts appropriated for post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD), could any of these funds be used to help children?
Answer. The Services and the TRICARE Management Activity are using
part of the funding appropriated to PTSD to implement programs
appropriate for children of Service members with PTSD and other mental
health conditions to help them understand the changes they see in their
parents. These programs will encourage their support and caring for
their affected parent, and to identify ways to help them cope with the
changes in the family dynamics that result. Additionally, by expanding
the number of clinical providers for mental health conditions,
including PTSD, there is more capacity to provide behavioral health
services to beneficiary children.

Defense Center of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic
Brain Injury

Question. It seems that the Department's ``Center for Best
Practices'' is a top-down solution to a bottom-up problem. Meaning,
that the center was created not by ``lessons learned'' from soldiers or
their families seeking care but by multiple outside panels comprised of
retired military officers and former secretaries. While there is a need
for a ``Center for Best Practices'' it may not address the immediate
concern about increasing access to services for individuals.
What action, not PROCESS, have you taken over 3 1/2 years?
Answer. The Defense Centers of Excellence (DCoE) for Psychological
Health (PH) and Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) was established in
response to the recommendations of seven panels and commissions, as
well as to the FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). In
November 2008, the Department reported in detail on the
responsibilities and actions of the DCoE in its report to Congress in
response to FY2008 NDAA, Section 1624. DCoE addresses the spectrum of
PH and TBI concerns of Service members with seven strategic goals:
Leadership and Advocacy. Reinforces the notion that taking care of
Service members is a leadership responsibility by developing training
and education programs, both career and just-intime, to raise leader
awareness of PH and TBI issues and intervention opportunities.
Access to Care. Enhances the ability of Service members and their
families to receive the resources they need--when and where they need
them--by evaluating PH and TBI resilience requirements and making
recommendations regarding future personnel, resources, and
capabilities.
Quality of Care. Ensures the highest quality of care through
research and evidence-based clinical practice guidelines and state-of-
the-art therapies.
Resiliency Promotion. Focuses on preventing or mitigating PH
conditions through research into risk factors and specific preventive
techniques.
Surveillance and Screening Systems. Promotes consistent, effective
PH and TBI assessment practices and new classification systems to
enhance diagnostic capabilities.
Transition of Care. Ensures the successful, standardized transition
between DoD, VA, and civilian health care systems.
Research. Fosters scientifically rigorous programs to address gaps
in current knowledge regarding PH and TBI conditions.
The design and concept of operations for the National Intrepid
Center of Excellence (NICoE), a component center of DCoE, is under
construction in Bethesda, MD. NICoE began with Mr. Arnold Fisher's
offer in September 2007 to build and equip the facility at the National
Naval Medical Center in Bethesda using private funds. The facility is
expected to open in the spring of 2010. DoD's plans to staff and
operate the NICoE are complete to ensure the best care for Service
members living with the effects of TBI or psychological health problems
such as depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder. The
NICoE concept is a ``hub-and-spoke'' model with the hub as the NICoE
state-of-the-art facility in Bethesda offering diagnostic planning and
treatment, along with research and education that would inform and
elevate the levels of care in military and civilian healthcare sectors.
The spokes in the model will be military medical treatment facilities
and civilian centers around the country that partner with NICoE in
caring for these injured Service members in locations near where they
live. The NICoE Director has already begun the process of visiting
treatment sites around the nation in an effort to identify those of
high quality and willingness to partner in this important mission.
Planning groups for the NICoE have involved both those with PH problems
and TBI, and their family members, to get the most complete stakeholder
input. The NICOE will add one more component of the DoD continuum of
care that increases access to healthcare services for individuals.
Question. How many mental health professionals will see patients in
the new Center?
Answer. The Defense Center of Excellence (DCoE) for Psychological
Health and Traumatic Brain Injury will not see patients. However, the
National Intrepid Center of Excellence (NICoE), one of the centers
associated with the DCoE will see patients once it becomes operational.
All of the 90+ staff members of the NICoE will be selected for their
experience in the diagnosis and treatment of human brain disorders from
both the neurological and psychological perspectives. The needs of each
individual patient referred will be assessed in a holistic fashion,
taking into account their physical, cognitive, psychological, and
spiritual well-being. There will be psychiatric, psychological,
substance abuse, and chaplaincy services as well as neurological and
neuropsychological assessment and rehabilitation with the full
complement of occupational, speech/language, physical and recreation/
art/music therapy.
Question. Will there be in-patient beds?
Answer. The National Intrepid Center of Excellence (NICoE) will be
an outpatient facility, although housing for the Service members and
their family members will be provided during the duration of their
assessment and treatment at NICoE. Inpatients will continue to receive
care at military medical treatment facilities and Department of
Veterans Affairs' hospitals and clinics around the country.
Question. What type of utilization capacity will the Center have?
Answer. On any given day, the National Intrepid Center of
Excellence (NICoE) will see approximately 20 patients in various stages
of the individualized diagnostic and treatment planning process. All
patients will be offered the opportunity to participate in clinical
research being performed in collaboration with the National Institutes
of Health, the Uniformed Services University for Health Sciences, and
other affiliated academic research programs. The NICoE will also host
education and training programs locally at the Bethesda facility as
well as broadcasting lectures and interactive training sessions from
its media room.
Question. How much of the funding provided will be designated for
the Center?
Answer. In FY 2008, the Defense Center of Excellence (DCoE) was
allotted $79.2M in Operations and Maintenance funding. In FY 2009, that
amount was $123M in support of the DCoE and its associated Centers to
include the National Intrepid Center of Excellence (NICoE). However,
since the NICoE is not scheduled to become operational until FY 2010,
very little funding has been allotted for it to date. A notable
exception is that a Director was hired in FY 2009.
Question. How much of the funding provided will be designated for
the Defense and Veterans Head Injury Center?
Answer. In FY 2009, $34.2 million (including $5 million transferred
from the Army) has been designated for the Defense and Veterans Brain
Injury Center.
Question. How will returning servicemembers and their families in
rural parts of the country access the new center?
Answer. Individual patients can be referred from anywhere in the
United States and abroad to the National Intrepid Center of Excellence
(NICoE) for its specialized assessment and interventions, or they can
be referred to partnering centers nearer home. Specialty centers in
each region of the country will be ``spokes'' of NICoE and will use
treatment plans established by NICoE to gather outcome data to measure
the effectiveness of the interventions. To target the needs of our
military and their families in rural regions, the Defense Center of
Excellence (DCoE) for Psychological Health (PH) and Traumatic Brain
Injury (TBI) has established a link to the nation's Area Health
Education Centers, which were created by federal statute to address the
educational and training needs of healthcare professionals in rural
America's underserved regions. This liaison will help elevate the
requisite knowledge of PH and TBI of the healthcare in underserved
areas.
The DCoE National Center for Telehealth and Technology also is
delivering multiple projects that address this need. The
www.afterdeployment.org program offers online self-help interactive
resources targeting those affected by deployment. A coordinated effort
with the Services is underway to develop robust telehealth capabilities
to better serve those for whom accessing services is difficult due to
distance or other factors. Finally, DCoE National Center for Telehealth
and Technology has embarked on a program to develop and deliver web-
based telehealth care that will further extend the reach of services to
our rural beneficiaries.
Question. What are the anticipated operating costs of the center
and how will they be funded?
Answer. Of the $600M Operations and Maintenance supplemental funds
received in FY 2008, $79.2M went to the Defense Center of Excellence
(DCoE) for Psychological Health (PH) and Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI)
to initiate operations of its headquarters and to fund specific ongoing
initiatives in the area of PH and TBI. Of the $575M supplemental funds
identified in FY 2009, $123M was allotted to the DCoE to fund its
headquarters and transition support to the subordinate centers. The
DCoE will receive additional funding in FY 2010. This will fully
support the headquarters and its subordinate centers.

Rand Report

Question. What, if any parts of the RAND study has the Department
incorporated in the Defense Center of Excellence for psychological
health (PH) and traumatic brain injury (TBI)?
Answer. The RAND study provided four recommendations, which the
Defense Centers of Excellence (DCoE) for PH and TBI has been
addressing:
1. Increase the cadre of providers who are trained and certified to
deliver proven (evidence-based) care, so that capacity is adequate for
current and future needs.
In FY 2008, trained 1178 providers in deployment care,
including Prolonged Exposure and/or Cognitive Processing Therapy for
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.
Trained providers at 13 sites in Virtual Reality Therapy.
Trained more than 1600 providers in evidence-based
treatment for traumatic brain injury (TBI) through joint DoD and
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) training courses.
Provided funding for development of training materials
(e.g., training Family Practice physicians to treat those with mild to
moderate mental health and TBI concerns).
Developed Courage to Care materials.
Offered clinician education and training through the
Deployment Health Clinical Center's site (www.pdhealth.mil).
2. Address the stigma that poses a barrier to seeking mental health
care.
In May, will launch the ``Real Warriors Real Battles Real
Strength'' campaign, a national outreach initiative that seeks to
combat the stigma around mental health conditions and treatment and
encourage psychological resilience. This public information campaign
will solicit the involvement of DoD, VA, and the general population to
foster a culture of support for psychological health.
Changed question 21 on Security Questionnaire related to
seeking mental health treatment for combat-related issues; limits
required disclosures for military members in counseling.
3. Deliver proven, evidence-based care to Service members and
veterans whenever and wherever services are provided.
Established clinical standards as well as researching,
refining, and distributing lessons learned and best practices
throughout the Military Health Services.
Developed education and outreach resources for leaders,
families, and communities.
Introduced evidence-based care as the enterprise standard
through VA/DoD clinical practice guidelines for mild traumatic brain
injury, post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and substance use
disorders.
Issued the Military Acute Concussion Evaluation tool,
which is based on the validated Standardized Assessment of Concussion
used in sports medicine, for accessing the likelihood of mild traumatic
brain injury after events in which the head may have been hurt.
In conjunction with the VA, published symptom management
guidelines for mild traumatic brain injury and established clinical
guidance for acute management of mild TBI in military operational
settings.
Implemented standardized training curriculum and content
for our medical providers, as we have initiated a certification process
for TBI programs in our medical treatment facilities.
Funded research to improve knowledge of evidence-based
treatment.
Assisted military members, veterans, and families with
deployment health concerns or military related exposures after
deployment
--Post-Deployment Clinical Practice Guidelines;
--Specialized Care Programs; and
--Web-based PTSD self-management tool (DESTRESS-PC).
Advanced quality care through education, research,
consultation and training.
Provided evidence-based training on deployment-related
behavioral health topics to military and civilian mental healthcare
providers.
Advanced TBI-specific evaluation, treatment and follow-up
care and conducted clinical research that defines optimal care and
treatment for individuals with TBI.
4. Invest in research to close information gaps and plan
effectively.
Expanded the research opportunities for PH and TBI to
establish a strong foundation of medical and cross-functional research,
including new and innovative treatments such as complementary and
alternative medicine techniques.
Initiated integrated individual and multi-agency research
efforts that will lead to improved prevention, detection, diagnosis,
and treatment of combat-related psychological health issues and
traumatic brain injury.
Will execute program funds to address targeted research
gaps in the area of psychological health and TBI. The goal of the
research program is to fund scientifically meritorious research to
prevent, mitigate, and treat the effects of traumatic stress and
traumatic brain injury on function, wellness, and overall quality of
life for service members and their caregivers and families. The program
strives to establish, fund, and integrate both individual and multi-
agency research efforts that will lead to improved prevention,
detection, diagnosis, and treatment of combat related psychological
health and traumatic brain injury.
Question. How do the percentages in the RAND report correlate to
the Departments? Are there any differences? If so what are the
differences?
Answer. The DoD-funded the Millennium Cohort Study has shown that
combat-exposed Service members are at significantly higher risk of
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The RAND report measured PTSD
using a screening instrument, not an actual clinical diagnosis, so we
do not know how many of those who screened positive in the RAND report
actually had PTSD. Thus, it is difficult to correlate the RAND data
with Service-level data derived from clinician-diagnosed PTSD.

Demonstration Projects and Outside Entities

Question. Psychological health is an overarching concept that
covers the entire multi-dimensional continuum of psychological and
social well being, prevention, treatment and health maintenance. An
approach of this type would be more complete by using new and
innovative companies and approaches.
How many outside entities, companies and individuals have you met
with outside the military that specialize in behavioral health
programs? Please discuss a few of the promising ones.
Answer. Over the past two years, staff from the office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) and in particular the
Director and staff of the Defense Centers of Excellence (DCoE), have
met with many companies and groups to solicit the best ideas for
consideration and possible implementation within the DoD. Several of
our collaboration efforts are addressed below.
1. The RESPECT-Mil is a project that in 2003 we did not have the
capability of doing but through contacts with subject matter experts,
we created a collaborative primary care program for detection and
management of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression.
This program was based on a MacArthur Foundation-funded program for
depression (``RESPECT-Depression'') and the outside collaborators were
all internationally respected experts funded under that program.
Within RESPECT-Mil, we needed the capability for a web-based care
management support system. We consulted with an internationally
respected primary care mental health expert at University of Washington
(Seattle) who modeled a prototype system used there. In consultation
with the expert, the Defense Health Clinical Center joined with a
contractor called Previdence from Salt Lake City, Utah, to build this
system and it is going on line at 43 primary care clinics later this
month.
2. DESTRESS is an online PTSD psychotherapy tool that with
investigators in the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) (Boston VA and
Boston University, Charleston VA and Medical University of South
Carolina) and in Australia (University of New South Wales), we
developed, tested, and published the results of the initial test in the
American Journal of Psychiatry in November 2007. Now, we are rolling
out and continuing to test it for use in primary care.
3. We funded one Small Business Innovation Research (topic
``Interactive Game-Based System for Psychological Health Education'')
to four businesses: Novonics, SOAR, Simmerson, and Total Immersion.
4. We co-sponsor a Common Data Elements Workshop for Research in
PH/TBI with the VA, the National Institute for Neurological Disorders
and Stroke (NINDS, which is a part of the National Institutes of Health
(NIH)), and the National Institute for Disability Rehabilitation
Research (NIDRR). Approximately 175 subject matter experts, 48
agencies, 21 universities, 8 NIH components, 4 rehabilitation centers,
6 international experts, 19 DoD entities and the 4 Services. The
purpose of this undertaking is to reach consensus on recommendations
for common data elements, standard definitions, metrics, outcomes and
instruments to facilitate for use in PH and TBI research for more
robust comparisons of research studies not only within the fields of PH
and TBI, but also between those fields. Involves both national and
international partners.
5. We have established a strategic scientific advisory group for PH
and TBI research, which includes both federal and civilian agencies.
6. We established regular Community Collaboration Days to allow the
community an opportunity to discuss their products.
7. The Center for Deployment Psychology partnered with Magellan to
provide content for web-based distance learning modules for mental
health care providers.
8. We partnered with the Institute for Creative Technology at the
University of Southern California to develop and research Virtual
Reality as a technology for use in the treatment of PTSD. Other
partners are from Emory University and Cornell.
9. In the area of virtual worlds, we have been working with the
Seattle Science Foundation and a development company along with key
partners at the University of Washington to advance potential
applications in this area.
Question. How many of these programs demonstrate capabilities to
which that the Department currently does not have access?
Answer. Quite a few of our collaborations are resulting in growing
and enhancing our capabilities. While we could develop some of these
capabilities within DoD, we often find it is faster or easier to rely
on the expertise or a capability already existing elsewhere and
importing it directly or shaping it to meet our particular need.
We rely on leveraged resources and collaboration with partners
(both federal and nongovernmental) to maximize our impact in addressing
clinical, research, and training needs associated with traumatic brain
injury and psychological health.
For instance, the Common Data Elements workshop hosted by the
Defense Center of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic
Brain Injury tap into expertise DoD does not have. The products of the
workshop will help inform and develop evidence needed to support future
projects, and will be of potential use to existing projects.
Additionally, our research program often partners federal resources
with outside resources--innovative technologies, infrastructure,
facilities, staff, and eligible study populations.
Question. Please list the mental health and behavioral health
demonstration and pilot project Requests for Proposal (RFPs) that the
Services or Force Health Protection have issued since the FY 2007
supplemental was enacted?
Answer. The following represents a list of Psychological Health
pilot projects identified by the Services and TRICARE Management
Activity. These projects are in various stages of planning and
execution.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Psychological Health Pilot Projects Service
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TeleHealth................................ Navy.
Caregiver Occupational Stress Control..... Navy.
Combat and Operational Stress Control for Navy.
Caregivers.
Families Coping with Deployment........... Navy.
Naval Special Warfare Resilience Navy.
Enterprise.
Outreach Coordination for USN Reserve..... Navy.
Promoting Resilience in the Face of Loss.. Navy.
Psychological Health Training for Family Navy.
Practice Physicians.
Adaptive Disclosure Training Program for Navy.
Marines.
Web Based Training for Combat Stress First Navy.
Aid Grief and Loss (USMC).
Assessment and Treatment of Wounded Navy.
Warriors Families.
Family Program Assessment................. Navy.
Outreach Call Center...................... DCoE.
DoD-wide Gap Analysis..................... DCoE.
Sesame Workshop........................... DCoE.
Child Trauma Network Support.............. DCoE.
RESPECT.MIL............................... DCoE.
Virtual Reality........................... DCoE.
Pro Resilience Campaign (Real Warriors)... DCoE.
South East Regional Medical Center Army.
Psychological Health Program.
Intensive Outpatient Program.............. Army.
Residential Treatment Facility............ Army.
Warrior Resiliency........................ Army.
Warrior Transition Intensive Outpatient Army.
Program.
Family Resilience Building................ Army.
Compassion Fatigue Program................ Army.
Medication Management..................... Army.
Soldier Wellness Assessment............... Army.
Virtual Reality........................... Army.
Transition Support........................ FHP&R.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Our headquarters data systems are not configured to identify if a
pilot is contracted out or if it is run internally to DoD. Therefore,
we have submitted a data call to the Services to collect this data and
will forward a more complete answer to the Committee staff as soon as
we compile the information from the Services.
Question. Are you engaging the States to assist in closing gaps
that exist?
Answer. We are working to develop relationships with the National
Guard Bureau's Directors of Psychological Health (PH) in order to
conduct training workshops across the United States.
In August 2008, DoD partnered with Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
to sponsor the ``Paving the Way Home'' conference, in which 10 states
identified policies and practices that would advance the continuum of
care and services for returning Service members in their states.
We are developing Military Family Toolkits, which identify federal,
state, and local resources that can help create a supportive network
for the mental health needs of returning service members.
In a separate effort, DoD will discuss military culture and
deployment issues and provide DoD resource training to the Arkansas
chapter of the National Association of Social Workers, many of whom
provide direct clinical care to Reserve Component beneficiaries in
local and rural communities. This effort may prove to be a viable model
or template for equipping local and rural providers with an important
cultural context and PH and traumatic brain injury (TBI)
familiarization to empower local and rural clinicians and encourage
their engagement as part of a community response and linkage with a
national collaborative effort to address the clinical and support needs
of our returning Service members.
Research partnerships exist at all levels of government and non-
governmental service. The post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)/TBI
Clinical Consortium consists of 10 study sites across the United
States, each focusing on unique aspects of research in PH and TBI.
Question. What is the Department doing to increase evidence based
and translation research instead of doing research that will not be
applicable to solving or assisting current mental health issues?
Answer. Evidence-based approaches to the treatment and prevention
of psychological health (PH) problems and traumatic brain injury (TBI)
rely on both basic science as well as translational research. As such,
the DoD--and its federal research partners--funds a portfolio of
research programs aimed at addressing expert-identified gaps in the
science relevant to current mental health issues.
We have initiated a program in Complementary and Alternative
Medicine ($45M from FY 2007 Supplemental Funds) to evaluate therapies
in non-traditional areas such as acupuncture, yoga, and meditation.
Defense Center of Excellence (DCoE) also has been supporting the
continued development of Virtual Realty Therapy for post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) treatment and encouraging additional
translational research. In FY 2009, we will develop mechanisms to
quickly evaluate therapies and promising practices to speed the ability
of transitioning new approaches to Service members and their families.
Through a collaborative research database of federated information-
technology systems, we find ways for researchers in the fields of PH
and TBI to gain access to data from previous or ongoing projects that
may contribute to new studies.
Current efforts investigate the feasibility of a social networking
tool for scientists in PH/TBI that will identify leaders in particular
areas of research.
A State of the Knowledge Summit will bring together researchers in
the field with policymakers and military leaders through a face-to-face
forum in which researchers and consumers dialogue and address
procedural challenges.
We are conducting a national gap analysis to determine where
additional efforts are needed.
The PH/TBI Clinical Consortium and the PTSD Multidisciplinary
Research Consortium (STRONGSTAR) are examples of DoD's efforts to
increase evidence-based and translational research. The research
underway and planned for the STRONGSTAR consortium involves the
application of evidence-based treatments to military and new veteran
populations.

Hotline for Mental and Behavioral Health Services and Counseling

Question. The suicide rate among Iraq and Afghanistan veterans is
almost twice that of the national average. That does not include
alcohol and drug abuse, spousal abuse and/or murder, not to mention the
effects on children. Can you provide the following information?
What action has been taken to ensure easy access to behavioral
health care to our service members and their families?
Answer. We consider access to care a top behavioral health priority
and have invested in it more heavily than other strategic goals. Within
the direct care system, we implemented strategies increasing behavioral
health staffing, primarily by increasing contract and government
service providers.
In 2007, a Health Affairs policy memorandum clarified the routine
access standard of 7 days for initial mental health specialty care for
PRIME beneficiaries. (For emergent conditions, care is to be provided
immediately; for urgent conditions, care is to be provided within 24
hours.)
Subsequent analyses of initial mental health specialty care for
PRIME beneficiaries seen in the direct care system demonstrated 96
percent of these visits occur without an appointment, when
beneficiaries present to a mental health clinic for care unannounced.
Four percent of initial care visits were scheduled by appointment. This
is due to the practice of most military mental health clinics that
designate rotating behavioral health specialty care providers as ``on
call'' for emergent, urgent, and walk-in patients every workday.
Additionally, the Services are increasing the degree to which
behavioral health providers function as consultants serving in primary
care clinics (integrated care), markedly reducing the stigma of
receiving specialty assistance. In addition, models of enhanced
screening and behavioral health consultation are being utilized in
populations where there is a higher risk of combat-related Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder and depression.
We have also improved mental health access under our managed care
support contracts. In addition to the substantive TRICARE PRIME benefit
of eight unmanaged behavioral health specialty visits a year without
referral (plus more visits as required), TRICARE contractors now
provide Behavioral Health Locators to assist beneficiaries in engaging
specialty care within 7 days from network providers. Locators will
assist by providing telephone numbers of behavioral health care
providers near beneficiaries' homes, or by establishing a three-way
conversation with the beneficiary and a provider's office staff. The
Locator will only participate in this three-way conversation long
enough to confirm that the provider is willing to provide an
appointment within access standards.
We have also implemented innovative programs in concert with the
line Commanders to improve resiliency and reduce stigma for seeking
mental health care. These programs range from training Chaplains to
assist with pre-clinical responses to mass disasters and trauma to
Military One Source, which is an anonymous call center where Service
members and their families can obtain support for a myriad of issues as
well as up to 12 free counseling sessions with licensed counselors per
year. We have also implemented web sites for Service members and family
members to access when they want to learn more about mental health
conditions, what symptoms they may have that are normal reactions to
stress or when symptoms might be such that they should seek
professional care.
Additionally, we have worked diligently to educate our Service
members and family members about the many resources currently available
to them. The TRICARE website describes all benefits and provides a
convenient list of specific Mental Health Resources. The Defense Center
of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury
maintains a call center to provide information. A particularly robust
asset developed by the Department of Defense (DoD) is the national
Resource Directory where anyone can seek available help by clicking on
a map showing where various services (including mental health) are
available to Service members and family members at the Federal, state
and local level.
Below is a Department information paper that reviews pre-clinical
psychological support resources provided by DoD and the Services.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.273

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.274

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.275

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.276

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.277

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.278

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.279

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.280

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.281

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.282

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.283

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.284

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.285

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.286

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.287

Question. What is the number of Service members, to include Guard
and Reserve members, and their family members that have used the
Military OneSource hotline for mental and behavioral health services
and counseling?
Answer. In FY 2008, service members and their families made over
2.8 million contacts with Military OneSource by telephone, e-mail or
through the web page for information, resources or referrals.
If the contact deals with a mental health issue, the master's level
Military OneSource consultant makes an assessment and a referral. If
the mental health issue is determined to be serious enough for medical
mental health services, the Military OneSource consultant stays on the
line and connects the caller to a Tricare consultant. For less serious
mental health issues, callers have several options for counseling; a
counselor in their community provided by Military OneSource, Chaplains
and Military Family Life Consultants are all options for Service
members and their families. In FY 2008, Military OneSource provided
approximately 105,475 counseling sessions to Service members and their
families.
Question. How many suicide calls have the Military OneSource and
the other services hotlines received? Please break down by component.
Answer. In FY 2008, Military OneSource received 93 Duty-to-Warn:
Harm-to-Self calls. Sixty-seven (67) of these calls came from Active
Duty, 14 from the National Guard and 11 from the Reserves. In the case
of a Harm-to-Self call, the Military OneSource consultant keeps the
caller on the phone and talking while another Military OneSource
consultant contacts local service providers. Only after help arrives on
the scene will the Military OneSource consultant end the call. The next
day, the Military OneSource consultant follows-up with the service
provider who responded to the call and asks what further resources or
services can be provided by Military OneSource.
Question. What is the mechanism for follow up with Service members
or their family members following a call to Military OneSource?
Answer. If the call is a Duty-to-Warn situation, local service
providers are contacted while the consultant keeps the caller on the
line. The call will only be released when help arrives at the location
of the caller. Within 24 hours, a follow-up call is placed by the
Military OneSource consultant to the local service provider to ensure
that any services that Military OneSource can provide are made
available to the Service member and their family.
Question. How many mental health TRICARE claims have been submitted
in the past 6 months?
Answer. While we do not have data readily available about the
number of mental health TRICARE claims submitted in the past six
months, we recently analyzed mental health care utilization by TRICARE
beneficiaries during FY 2008. The analysis revealed claims in the
private sector for: 372,432 days of inpatient mental health services,
5,556,594 outpatient mental health visits, and 4,629,865 pharmacy
prescriptions for mental health medicines.
Question. You are forming partnerships with the Public Health
Service to provide 200 uniformed public health service mental health
providers of all disciplines.
Has this happened?
Answer. Yes. The partnership was finalized through a memorandum of
agreement (MOA) that was signed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Health Affairs) on 15 April 2008. The MOA is in place for 10 years and
identifies that recruitment of mental health providers estimated at,
but not limited to, 200 officers. The Public Health Service works
directly with the Surgeons General of the military Departments to
identify and fill critical mental health gaps.
Question. If not, what is the time frame for contracting with these
200 health officials?
Answer. N/A
Question. How can Public Health Service commit to this number when
a shortfall exists across the United States?
Answer. The Commissioned Corps of the United States Public Health
Service (PHS) has advised the DoD that it remains confident of meeting
the goal of placing approximately 200 mental health PHS officers at DoD
military treatment facilities (MTFs) and other appropriate locations
within the next several years, in keeping with the Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) between DoD and the Department of Health and Human
Services signed April 15, 2008. PHS advised that, in summer, 2008, it
began quite an aggressive implementation response to the signed
agreement. Despite the constraints of its limited recruitment resources
at the time, PHS has already been able to provide DoD with more than 40
active duty PHS officers, including psychiatrists, psychologists,
social workers, nurses, and physician assistants, for deployment to
CONUS-wide MTFs. Since that successful early beginning, PHS expanded
its recruitment efforts for mental health professionals with the
assistance of additional funding from DoD for this purpose, including
funding support for salaries and benefits of the PHS officers assigned
to this DoD project. At present, nine additional mental health
professionals are being cleared and prepared for placement as PHS
commissioned officers in support of DoD MTFs, and some 25 additional
candidates are being processed through various stages of inquiry,
clearance, and preparation for commissioning.

Warrior Transition Units

Question. As part of its efforts to improve Wounded Warrior care,
the Army established 32 Warrior Transition Units to provide a unit in
every medical treatment facility that has 35 or more eligible service
members. Funding for Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) is both
supplemental and base bill funding.
Can you define what Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) are and how
they compare or augment other resources for counseling or services to
be provided by the Center of Excellence?
Answer. The delivery of care and treatment is provided by medical
and behavioral health professionals practicing primarily at the
military medical treatment facilities. WTUs provide the command,
control, and care management necessary to ensure soldiers receive this
care and information about other support services in an effective and
efficient manner. Currently, there are 36 WTUs with about 3,600
assigned personnel, located across the United States and in Germany.
WTUs are primarily staffed with combat-experienced officers and
noncommissioned officers.
The key to WTU success since they became fully operational in
January of 2008 is the ``Triad of Care'' concept where each soldier's
care and progress is closely managed by three individuals: a Primary
Care Manager (a physician), a Nurse Case Manager, and a Squad Leader.
These individuals develop and implement a multi-disciplinary
Comprehensive Transition Plan that identifies the courses of treatment
and goals to accomplish in the care, education, and training of
soldiers and their family, and then assure the soldiers receive the
care and assistance required during rehabilitation and transition.
Additionally, WTUs are staffed with behavioral health professionals to
provide care management; Medical Evaluation Board physicians to ensure
timely and comprehensive medical care, recovery, and medical
determinations; and legal professionals to counsel and advocate for
soldiers and families as they progress through the Disability
Evaluation System.
The Department of Defense Centers of Excellence (DCoE) for
Psychological Health (PH) and Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) assesses,
validates, oversees, and facilitates prevention, resilience,
identification, treatment, outreach, rehabilitation, and reintegration
programs for PH and TBI. It provides a clearinghouse of the latest
information pertaining to PH and TBI, making that information available
to WTUs. It also collects best practices to help standardize
consistently excellent PH and TBI care across all WTUs.
Question. Are Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) are as effective as
they can be given resourcing and other constraints?
Answer. The Army is committed to supporting the Warrior Care and
Transition Program, which includes the Warrior Transition Units (WTUs)
concept of care. The WTUs have significantly improved the
rehabilitation experience of Army wounded warriors and their families,
and they attribute that success to the ``Triad of Care'' concept where
each soldier's care and progress is closely managed by three
individuals: a Primary Care Manager (a physician), a Nurse Case
Manager, and a Squad Leader.
The Army established extensive metrics to assess the effectiveness
of WTUs. Senior Army leadership receives briefings regularly to enable
adjustments in resourcing when the situation changes to assure a
consistently effective level of operation.
Question. What are the Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) not doing
that they should be to assist soldiers and their families?
Answer. The Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) are doing what they
were designed to do. These units work in consonance with other non-
medical wounded, ill and injured support service organizations to
provide comprehensive support for their rehabilitation, recovery and
transition back to active duty or to civilian life. Mindful of the
changing needs of wounded warriors and their families, the Army revises
its operational procedures for WTUs whenever it identifies something
else that WTUs need to do. For example, the Army is currently focusing
on changing the mindset from a focus on disability to a focus on
achievement and aspiration. This approach, which we strongly endorse,
would promote resilience, self-reliance, and provide for re-education
and employment, while ensuring that soldiers and their families receive
the enduring benefits they so richly deserve.

Interfacing With The Local Community

Question. Some military installations are located in communities
that provide additional support beyond the walls of the base. There are
also installations in communities that resources are not available to
support the needs of an individual base. With the growth of mental
health issues in and around military installations:
Can the military health care system provide local communities with
the appropriate level of interaction and support for treatment of
psychological health issues?
Answer. We believe that through the expansion of our web-based
programs, online services, telehealth direct care and care partnered
with our managed care support contractors, we will be able to reach out
beyond the physical boundaries of our military bases and work closely
with our civilian counterparts to address the mental health needs of
our Service members and their families.
The findings of the DoD Task Force on Mental Health clearly suggest
that the military health system is challenged to provide resources in
the form of clinical providers sufficient to meet the mental health
care needs. It has been particularly challenging to address the mental
health needs of Reserve and Guard members who reside in remote or
smaller communities that are geographically distant from military
medical treatment facilities or TRICARE providers. We have been
actively involved in addressing these challenges by focusing on the
reintegration issues faced by returning Service members. The Defense
Centers of Excellence (DCoE) for Psychological Health (PH) and
Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) co-chairs (along with the VA) the Federal
Partners Priority Workgroup on the Reintegration of Returning Service
Members and their Families, which is a collaborative effort among DoD,
VA, and multiple federal agencies, to tighten the fabric of resources
to the benefit of our Service members and families. Through this same
venue, we are exploring ways to maximize outreach to service members
and their families in order to facilitate the connection, or bridge the
gap, between warrior needs and resources. DCoE has also formed a
collaborative partnership with the Department of Labor's ``America's
Heroes at Work'' campaign to help our returning Service members with PH
or TBI conditions succeed in the workplace. This initiative also
underscores the importance of employment in the reintegration process,
while also highlighting the vital role of collaboration across agencies
and government/private/public sectors in addressing such issues of
complexity.
Question. Does the military health care system provide for
coordinating efforts with the local level with education and training
programs to local and rural providers?
Answer. The Center for Deployment Psychology (CDP) provides
training on evidenced-based treatment of post traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) to local providers through the TRICARE network. This training
has been very well received and is continuing.
CDP provided training to civilian mental health care providers. The
training is also being offered to the National Guard Bureau's Directors
of Psychological Health in each State.
CDP is also developing online versions of training materials to
make them available to health care providers in all areas of the
country.
We are engaged in discussions with representatives of Area Health
Education Centers to establish bridge training to health care providers
the private sector, particularly in rural areas.
The Defense Centers of Excellence (DCoE) for Psychological Health
(PH) and Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) is leading a collaborative,
multi-agency effort to develop a toolkit that will support community
partnership building at the local level. This toolkit will be geared
primarily towards supporting the Guard and Reserve members who are
often geographically isolated from military support facilities.
In a separate effort, DoD is discussing military culture and
deployment issues and providing DoD resource training to the Arkansas
chapter of the National Association of Social Workers, many of whom
provide direct clinical care to Reserve Component beneficiaries in
local and rural communities. This effort may prove to be a viable model
or template for equipping local and rural providers with an important
cultural context and PH and TBI familiarization to empower local and
rural clinicians and encourage their engagement as part of a community
response and linkage with a national collaborative effort to address
the clinical and support needs of our returning Service members.
Question. What current non-governmental programs are currently
being used by the Department?
Answer. The American Red Cross developed a new course, ``Coping
with Deployments: Psychological First Aid for Military Families'' that
is now available. The course, offered free of charge, is open to
military family members of Active Duty Service members, Reserve and
National Guard forces, as well as veterans and their families.
Presently, the course is offered in sixteen states (AL, AR, CA, CO, FL,
HI, IN, MN, NE, NH, OH, OR, PA, TN, TX and WV) and Washington, D.C.
However, the Red Cross plans to make the course available across the
country in the summer of 2009. The Red Cross developed the course to
address the stress and strain of deployments on military family members
to include spouses, children, parents, siblings and significant others
of Service members and veterans.
The DoD announced October 1, 2008, that families of deployed
members of the National Guard and Reserve, Active Duty Service members
on independent duty and their families, and Active Duty Service members
and their families assigned to selected bases would be eligible for
free family memberships at participating YMCAs in their local
community. The new program was effective immediately. The free YMCA
memberships for Guard and Reserve families are available if the Service
member's deployment exceeds six months. The deploying Service member
also will be eligible for three months pre- and post-deployment
membership to help promote family participation. Active Duty families
assigned to independent duty stations, such as recruiting and Reserve
Officer Training Corps assignments and not currently receiving support
from the Service component also are eligible for free memberships at
participating YMCAs. Additionally, 32 hours a month of free respite
child care is available for families of deployed National Guard and
Reserve and geographically dispersed Active Duty Service members in 10
states with YMCA child care programs that have been preapproved by DoD.
Participating YMCAs have agreed to cap their monthly fees and waive all
joining fees so there is no cost for Service members and their families
for membership.
Inova Health Systems of Northern Virginia and the DoD have launched
a new partnership to train and support military spouses interested in
careers in healthcare. The new program provides military spouses with
streamlined access to training, career, and job opportunities in a wide
range of healthcare related fields at Inova facilities. Inova worked
closely with DoD to develop a formal plan to recruit, hire, and retain
military spouses. Inova hopes to set an example for corporations and
institutions all over the country to support military spouses in the
work force.
The National Military Family Association (NMFA), a non-profit
informational and educational organization, has been responsible for
producing two documents which have been important sources of data for
DoD program planning on issues relevant to families. The report,
``Serving the Home Front: An Analysis of Military Family Support from
September 11, 2001 through March 31, 2004'' (NMFA 2004), was based on
data derived from an online survey of 2,500 respondents (military
spouses), focus groups representing 14 Active and Reserve groups from
all military Services, personal interviews, anecdotal information
gleaned from periodicals, and information from congressional testimony
and military briefings. The second report, ``Cycles of Deployment: An
analysis of survey responses from April through September 2005'' (NMFA,
2005), presents data from another online survey. This survey had 1,592
respondents (military spouses) from both Active and Reserve components
of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine, Coast Guard and Public Health
Service, with half of the respondents having a Service member currently
deployed. The goal of the NMFA is to promote the interests of military
families by influencing the development and implementation of
legislation and policies affecting them.
Military OneSource introduced the video-sharing site ``TroopTube,''
designed to help military families connect and keep in touch while
miles apart. It is the only video-sharing site for military families
sponsored by the DoD. ``TroopTube'' extends the virtual military
community by enabling Service members and their families to connect
with each other and share videos wherever they may be.
Because members of the military and their families are stationed
worldwide and must often travel great distances for specialized medical
care, Fisher House^TM Foundation donates ``comfort homes,''
built on the grounds of major military and Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA) medical centers. These homes enable family members to be
close to a loved one at the most stressful times--during the
hospitalization for an unexpected illness, disease, or injury. There is
at least one Fisher House^TM at every major military medical
center to assist families in need and to ensure that they are provided
with the comforts of home in a supportive environment. By law, there is
no charge for any family to stay at a Fisher House^TM
operated by the VA. The Foundation uses donations to reimburse the
individual Fisher Houses operated by the Army, Navy, and Air Force. No
family pays to stay at any Fisher House.

Legislative Direction

Question. The Committee's language that directed DoD to increase
its reach and work with commercial entities to increase capacity of the
mental health system as well as the breadth of programs available to
individuals. It is unclear whether progress has been made, and whether
Service members have access to increased services.
As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan continue, how many certified
mental health providers will the Department require in the next 24
months to handle the increasing prevalence of psychological health (PH)
and traumatic brain injury (TBI)?
Answer. A 20+ population- and risk- factor based mental health
staffing model was developed by DoD in the summer of 2007. In the fall
of 2007, a contract was awarded to the Center for Naval Analyses for an
independent validation study of the model, which is now complete. The
validated model was rolled out to the Services on April 1, 2009, to
inform them regarding the optimal number and mix of mental health staff
providers to the installation level in the United States and to the
command level overseas. It includes several assumptions that can be
adjusted by the Services to accommodate their unique needs and access
to networks for additional purchased care, as required. Based upon the
current distribution of care provided directly, and TRICARE purchased
network services, a projection of requirements for each mental health
specialty has been made for the Services from 2009 through 2014,
including mental health specialty providers embedded into operational
units and integrated into primary care clinics.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.288

Question. Where do you intend to find certified mental health care
professionals?
Answer. Increased accession and retention incentives are being made
available to uniformed mental health care providers. Legislative
authority to incentivize civilian mental health provider trainees to
repay their obligation at Military Treatment Facilities as civilians
could potentially increase the availability of providers, as long as
incentives were not more than those for uniformed providers, which
could create higher attrition rates.
Services and local facilities engage local hires and contractors to
identify available resources, as well as establish government service
positions.
Public Health Service mental health providers are already assisting
DoD and up to 200 positions are approved and funded in a cooperative
agreement.
Question. How many has the Department and or the Services hired?
Answer. From January 2007 through October 2008, 845 civilian mental
health professionals were hired across the Services. For the same
period TRICARE Regional Office-West added 8,095, TRICARE Regional
Office-South added 213, and TRICARE Regional Office-North added 2148
mental health providers.
Question. How else has the Department increased services to
soldiers and their families?
Answer. Increased civilian mental health providers:
Funded more civilian mental health providers at military
medical treatment facilities (MTFs)
Created and deployed Military and Family Life Consultants
Developed an interim staffing model and hired 233 mental
health providers against it
Signed agreement with Department of Health and Human
Services to provide 200 Public Health Officers for MTFs
Implemented retention incentives such as incentive pays,
special pays, and bonuses
Established the Telehealth and Technology Center to
increase access of services in remote areas
Initiated multiple telemedicine pilot programs to provide
mental health services to Service members and their families,
regardless of geographic location
Integrated behavioral health with primary care:
--Army RESPECT-Mil
--Air Force Behavioral Health Optimization Program
--Navy Deployment Health Clinics
--Increased on-line capabilities to access care or recognize
when care is needed:
--Military OneSource
--Wounded Warrior Outreach Center
--AfterDeployment.org
--Established a 24/7 Outreach Center
--Established a National Resource Directory
Improved access through TRICARE
Implemented TRICARE Mental Health Care Finder System
Established monitoring of TRICARE Regional Offices
contractors' performance
Released policy requiring 7-day mental health access
standard; compliance with this new standard is over 95%
Developed the Family Caregiver Curriculum
Trained civilian mental health care providers in
appropriate care of military personnel and their families

Reporting Requirements

Question. The Committee put a lot of responsibility on the
Department to properly execute the funding provided with tangible
results. The Department has reported to the Committee on the spending
plan and current obligation of funds.
What reporting mechanisms have been put in place to ensure the
Services are executing funding properly?
Answer. The Services report to Chief Financial Officer monthly.
Their reports include execution of psychological health and traumatic
brain injury funds by strategic goal (access, transition, resilience,
quality, and screening/surveillance). The Services also have reported
quarterly on their execution of funding at the program and project
level, and have recently been asked to input status of implementation
and program execution through a web-based tool.
Question. How often are the Services required to report to the
Department?
Answer. The Services are required to provide both financial and
programmatic reports on a monthly basis.
Question. What difficulties have the Services or the Department
generally experienced implementing the new programs and pilot projects
as demonstrated by the reports?
Answer. While implementation of programs can be accelerated, steps
in the process can not be bypassed. In addition, certain processes just
take time. We need to implement pilots, evaluate them for best
practices, convert best practices to policies for implementation,
ensure we have enough providers and tools to implement the policy, and
train all the users in the new policy, after which we can evaluate the
program to continue the cycle. Managing expectations becomes critical
because a program may be successful under one set of conditions but not
another.
We also are experiencing a shortage of experienced trainers for the
large number of new and expanded training and education programs.
Communicating information about best practices, lessons learned,
and promising programs across the Services and (sometimes) across
facilities within a Service still needs improvement.

Obligation of Funding to The Services

Question. Of the funding provided for psychological health and TBI,
about 45% went to the Army, 15% went to the Navy, 10% went to the Air
Force, and 30% went to the TRICARE Management Agency for Joint Support.
Does the Department believe the distribution of funds was done
equitably or have other shortfalls been identified by the Services?
Answer. We distributed the funds to augment already on-going
initiatives to support psychological health and traumatic brain injury
needs of our Service members and families. The augmented initiatives
were to address gaps in capability and improve our ability to improve
access to care and quality of care. Each Service proposed programs to
address those gaps, so the distribution was based not on total
capability but on the areas of focused enhancement.
Question. What other programs or initiatives are the Services
looking at to improve access to care for soldiers and their families.
Answer. There are more than 325,000 providers in the TRICARE
network with over 1 million non-network providers accepting TRICARE
patients. The TRICARE Management Activity (TMA) conducts surveys to
determine the numbers of health care providers accepting new patients
under TRICARE. TMA's FY 2005-2007 surveys covered network/non-network
providers in various geographic areas nationally, including remote
areas. Together, the three-year findings across all states and health
care service areas reveal that approximately 87 percent of all
physicians surveyed are aware of the TRICARE program and about 81
percent of physicians accepting new patients would also accept new
TRICARE patients. We are in the process of re-surveying our
beneficiaries and civilian providers.
In areas where access to care is severely impaired because of low
reimbursement rates, TMA can use its authority to increase TRICARE
reimbursement rates by issuing locality waivers. Also, TMA can issue
network-based waivers that increase network civilian provider
reimbursements up to 15 percent above the maximum TRICARE reimbursement
rate to ensure an adequate number and mix of civilian network
providers.
TRICARE Regional Offices (TROs) also monitor the number and mix of
providers in their region. For example, TRO-West identified all
geographical locations with a TRICARE Standard beneficiary population
of 500 or more. There were 56 locations identified, and to ensure
access to care was on par with TRICARE Prime, a beneficiary population
sizing model was designed for each location. Using a Graduate Medical
Education National Accrediting Committee-based model, it established
provider requirements for 26 specialty categories and primary care.
They then identified network and non-network providers to see TRICARE
beneficiaries. Their experience was that providers are willing and
ready to see TRICARE patients even in remote and rural areas.
Question. Of the Army's 45%, the bulk of it is for access to care
for psychological health and traumatic brain injury.
How is the Army obligating the funding provided?
Answer. The Army has obligated the amounts for Access to Care in
the commodities mentioned below:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Obligations
Commodity ($000)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Civilian Personnel...................................... 5,790
Contracts............................................... 15,156
Equipment............................................... 38
Other................................................... 12
Supplies................................................ 89
Travel.................................................. 233
---------------
Total............................................... 21,318
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Question. How much has been obligated to date?
Answer. During FY 2009 the Service Medical Departments have
obligated the following amounts through February 2009:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Obligations
Service ($000)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Army Medical Department................................. 34,210
Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery..................... 12,101
Air Force Medical Service............................... 95
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Question. Are mental health professionals being hired in a timely
fashion?
Answer. The direct-hire authorities for the mental health
specialties have been assigned to the medical facility-level and local
hiring officials are using these to hire government mental health
professionals. The Services are establishing innovative hiring
programs, such as centralized recruitment and referral centers for
mental health professionals to maximize the use of the direct-hire
authorities.
Question. Are there any contracting issues with current hiring
policies?
Answer. Our primary issue continues to be a shortage of qualified
Mental Health providers in the locations where they are most needed. We
are attempting to accomplish this with a combination of government
civilian hires, expanded purchased-care network providers, and local
contracting for behavioral health providers to fill critical needs. Our
contracting offices have worked hard to satisfy our requirements but
they received no additional staff for the expanded workload, so they
are often understaffed and oversubscribed.
Question. Of the Navy's 15%, most of it is for access to care.
How is the Navy obligating the funding provided?
Answer. During FY 2009 for the Access to Care Initiative, the Navy
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery has obligated a total of $8.192 million
through the month of February 2009 for the commodities listed below:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Obligations
Commodity ($000)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contracts............................................... 8,050
Equipment............................................... 7
Travel.................................................. 135
---------------
Total............................................... 8,192
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Question. Are mental health professionals being hired in a timely
fashion?
Answer. The direct-hire authorities for the mental health
specialties have been assigned to the medical facility-level and local
hiring officials are using these to hire government mental health
professionals. The Services are establishing innovative hiring
programs, such as centralized recruitment and referral centers for
mental health professionals to maximize the use of the direct-hire
authorities.
Question. Of the Air Force's 10%, has the funding been used for
existing programs or new initiatives?
Answer. The Air Force Medical Service's FY 2009 funding has been
used to expand existing psychological health and traumatic brain injury
programs to support new requirements.
Question. Of the TRICARE Management Agency's (TMA) 30%, most of the
amount is for the Center of Excellence and for surveillance.
Has there been obligation of these funds for the intended programs?
Answer. Through the Defense Center of Excellence (DCoE) and its
associated centers, funding is programmed for multiple research and
surveillance initiatives. Examples of such initiatives include clinical
trials, longitudinal and epidemiological studies, the Suicide Risk
Management and Surveillance Office, neuro-imaging programs, and child
and family studies.
Question. What new initiatives has TMA been looking at for
enhancing care and treatment?
Answer. Examples of new initiatives include evaluating the efficacy
of a virtual reality exposure treatment for Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder, assessing a variety of alternatives for web-based
interventions, determining the standard of care to assure the effective
use of telepsychiatry services, investigating mind-body techniques for
provider resilience, developing and implementing an automated
behavioral healthcare record, and designing and executing Hyperbaric
Oxygen Therapy clinical trials.

Obligation of Funding

Question. The funds provided have been distributed to the services
and TRICARE Management Agency.
Please briefly explain what the Department has provided the Service
members and their families with the funds provided.
Answer. DoD funded a broad spectrum of mental health and traumatic
brain injury projects designed to support Service members and their
families across the continuum of care in both non-clinical and clinical
settings. These programs range in focus from preventive resilience
building to post deployment transitioning programs. Examples of
accomplishments include:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Area Major accomplishments
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quality of Care...................... Army--First Summit on Military
Child and Adolescent Behavioral
Health and Well-Being During
Wartime and Beyond was held June
2008 at McChord Air Force Base.
Attended by over 150 military
and community youth serving
professionals.
Defense Center of Excellence
(DCoE)--Assisted in the
development of educational tools
designed to help families,
especially children, cope with
having parents or loved ones on
deployment, including the Sesame
Workshop ``Talk, Listen,
Connect: Deployments,
Homecomings, Changes'' program.
DCoE worked with the nonprofit
educational organization behind
``Sesame Street'' to produce
over 700,000 DVD kits and to
date, DoD has distributed over
350,000 kits.
Resilience........................... Navy--Held Returning Warrior
Workshop training for over 1,000
Reservists and family members--
100% of attendees recommended
that others attend.
Navy--Over 25,000 families,
providers, and community members
have received proactive
outreach, education, and
training.
Army--Funded three psychological
health (PH) school based
programs that take a
preventative approach by
providing PH support to and for
school-aged children in the
school setting.
Army--Established the Child and
Adolescent Center of Excellence
to focus on the impacts of being
a child with a parent deploying,
wounded or killed, supporting
interventions, programs, and
policy assisting families
dealing with these unique
stressors.
Transition of Care................... Navy--Continuing to support and
expand Wounded Warriors Program,
a program for Soldiers who are
disabled, as found by the Army
disability system, to ensure
their families receive all the
benefits and support they are
entitled--741 Service members
have received outreach with 178
having been referred to
appropriate levels of care.
Air Force--Continuing to support
and expand the Air Force Wounded
Warrior (AFW2) Program which
takes a comprehensive approach
to helping wounded Airmen.
Family liaison officers are
assigned to hospitalized wounded
members and provide a wide range
of assistance to family members.
Screening and Surveillance........... Air Force--Screening and
Surveillance Conducted Community
Assessment and Survey which
provided anonymous data on post
traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), alcohol/drug use and
family maltreatment.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Question. What funds if any have yet to be obligated?
Answer. Obligation status as of the end of January 2009 is shown in
the following tables.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appropriated Appropriated Reprogrammed Reprogrammed
$ millions FY 2007/2008 O&M RDT&E RDT&E Procurement \1\ Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appropriated Amounts........... $600.0 $300.0 .............. ............... $900.0
Less: O&M Extended to FY08/09.. $(75.0) .............. .............. ............... $(75.0)
Less: O&M Reprogrammed to RDT&E $(70.5) .............. $58.8 $11.7 $--
and Procurement...............
Less: Statutory withhold for .............. $(7.5) .............. ............... $(7.5)
Small Business Innovation
Research (Small Business Act,
15 U.S.C. 638)................
Net Funding................ $454.5 $292.5 $58.8 $11.7 $817.5
Amount Obligated Through $416.0 $292.5 $51.8 $6.0 $766.3
January 31, 2009..........
Percentage of Net Funding 92% 100% 88% 51% 94%
Obligated.................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Procurement funds are FY 2007/2009 and will continue to obligate through FY 2009.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appropriated RDT&E
FY 2009 O&M funding funding \2\ Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2008 Supplemental Appropriation-- ........................ $107.3 $107.3
RDT&E (portion of $273.8
appropriated for Battle Casualty/
Psych Health Research)\3\.
FY 2009 Supplemental Bridge Funding-- $300.0 ....................... $300.0
O&M.
FY 2009 Appropriation............... $210.0 $90.0 $300.0
FY 2007/2008 Funding Extended to FY $75.0 ....................... $75.0
2008/2009 (from above).
Less: Army Suicide Study with $(10.0) ....................... $(10.0)
National Institutes of Health.
Total Funding................... 585.0 $197.3 $772.3
Amount Obligated Through $67.8 $-- $67.8
December 31, 2008.
Percentage of Net Funding 12% 0% 9%
Obligated.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ RDT&E projects are peer-reviewed before award of funds. RDT&E does not reflect withhold 2.5% for Small
Business Innovation Research (Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 638) pending final calculations.
\3\ FY 2008 Supplemental Appropriation--RDT&E is FY 2008/2009 funding.

Question. A large part of the funding provided was to hire
additional staff. Where are you in executing a hiring plan?
Answer. The Services have established internal staffing
requirements and received funding to support these Service-specific
conditions. Psychological health (PH) and traumatic brain injury (TBI)
FY 2009 staffing update as of March 3, 2009:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
TBI
Service PH funded PH hired funded TBI hired
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air Force................... 97 91 NA NA
Army........................ 890 444.3 * 250 149
Navy........................ 297 162 115 25
TMA......................... 200 ** 41 ......... .........
-------------------------------------------
Total................... 1484 732.3 365 174
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Some of Army's TBI dollars have been used to pay for existing staff
retasked to provide TBI care.
** Awaiting breakdown of how many are serving in TBI position versus PH
positions.
*** Navy numbers reflect: ``Funded'' = those positions being supported
and contracted in FY 2009 (including the FY 2009 continuation of FY
2008 positions), ``Hired'' = those positions previously contracted and
filled in FY 2008.

Question. What shortfalls or gaps exist in your staffing?
Answer. The Services have noted the following gaps:
1. Short supply of child and adolescent mental health
providers
2. Small number of available, qualified providers
3. Disparity of provider specialties depending on
regional locations
Question. What still needs to be accomplished?
Answer. We need validation of a population-based, risk-
adjusted staffing model for DoD that projects the staff
requirements by provider type, based on each Service policies
and needs. Upon validation and acceptance of the model, funding
requirements will be reviewed to implement efforts to meet the
population-based, risk-adjusted needs.

Spend Plan

Question. Can you update this Committee on your spend plan?
Answer. A Spend Plan summary is attached. Most of the funding is
pushed to the 4th quarter when contracts will come due.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.289

Question. Does the Department and the Service have the internal
capacity to obligate the funding provided? Please explain.
Answer. DoD has the internal capacity to obligate the funding. The
funds have been distributed to the Services and TRICARE Management
Activity for execution.
Question. What issues exist that are hindering the Department in
executing these funds?
Answer. The health care support requirements for the psychological
health and traumatic brain injury programs are labor intensive and
highly reliant upon the availability of civilian and contract providers
to accomplish the required functions. Given the limited number of
specialists available psychological health or traumatic brain injury
training and the competition by the private sector organizations who
concurrently seek to hire from the limited labor pool, the Department's
ability to execute all the appropriated funds for psychological health
and traumatic brain injury requirements may be hindered.
Question. What is still needed, whether funding or personnel to
continue this endeavor?
Answer. We are still looking at opportunities for technological
infrastructure, equipment for virtual therapy, research studies and
outcomes evaluations, personnel to provide empirically supported
treatments, and more mental health providers to be embedded in line
units.
Question. What shortfalls exist?
Answer. We are still working to improve connectivity and
collaboration between clinical and pre-clinical care (Military
OneSource, chaplains, etc.); enhance access to care in deployed
situations, especially for those in small units or at outposts; promote
evidence-based programs and treatment; and expand access to substance
abuse/dependence treatment, particularly for adolescents.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.
Articles referred to by Mr. Murtha follow:]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.290

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.291

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.292

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.293

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232B.294

Thursday, March 5, 2009.

GLOBAL MOBILITY

WITNESSES

GENERAL DUNCAN J. McNABB, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION
COMMAND
GENERAL ARTHUR J. LICHTE, COMMANDER, AIR MOBILITY COMMAND
MAJOR GENERAL RANDAL D. FULLHART, DIRECTOR OF GLOBAL REACH PROGRAMS,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION

Mr. Murtha's Opening Statement

Mr. Murtha. I will ask Mr. Young for a motion.
Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, I move that those portions of the
hearing today which involve classified material be held in
executive session because of the classification of the material
to be discussed.
Mr. Murtha. Without objection.
We are having, in my estimation, one of the most important
hearings that we will have this year. I have said over and over
again, we want to try to fit in some of these other programs so
that we can take care of mobility--tankers, mainly--down the
road. And so you two, with your experience, we appreciate your
being here.
We appreciate what you are going to say, but when we see
the CSAR program, the KC-X, all these programs being protested,
I worry. The President says you are going to reform the system.
Well, it takes forever to reform the system. So we have to get
something done. If we are going to get tankers out there, ready
to go, replaced, we have got get to get it done early; and of
course, these other programs which you have control over also.
As you know, we put the C-130s and C-17s in, which helped
alleviate some of the problems. We are going to try to do the
same thing.
We get all kinds of guidance from the White House. We are
the ones that finally make the decision. It is not that we are
fighting with the White House. We just don't agree with them on
some issues. We know more than they do about what needs to be
done.
So you folks have the recommendations. We know you have to
agree with the Secretary of Defense. I don't always agree with
the Secretary of Defense. And we sometimes, this committee--
this subcommittee changes, and we put in what we thinks need to
be done.
I will give you an example. We put in limiting language for
the Marine One long before Senator McCain or anybody else
recognized it. We said, we are not going to build this thing.
As a matter of fact, I had 14 people in here, and I told the
White House, You have got to quit increasing these requirements
because it is your fault that these costs have gone up. And we
want to protect the President, but we are not going to spend
that kind of money on one helicopter.
So they said, Well, we will put this off until the Obama
administration comes in. They did. And now we are trying to
convince the Obama--they need a helicopter, no question about
that, but they don't need the requirements for the one that is
so expensive. And we are willing to fund the other one--at
least I am going to recommend to the subcommittee that they
fund the other one.
We look forward to your testimony, and we know that we will
get some good questions from the members about what needs to be
done.
Mr. Young.

Mr. Young's Opening Statement

Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I want to
add my welcome to our very distinguished guests today. And as
we have discussed--and General McNabb and I had a very long
session, one-on-one, not too long ago and we discussed the fact
that you can't engage the enemy if you can't take your troops
and your equipment where the enemy is.
So the importance of our airlift, the importance of being
able to move personnel and material is just--you just can't do
it without it. And that is why this is so important and this
hearing is so important, because we do have some issues that
need to be resolved. And I think most everybody on the
committee would agree, we are here to help you resolve the
issues.
Thank you for being here today.
Mr. Murtha. We have 8,000 miles we have to travel to
resupply the people in Afghanistan, the most difficult terrain
in the world. You folks are as important as anybody. I used to
think, when I was in the infantry on the ground, these other
guys were just nothing. Well, I found out when you didn't have
the food, you didn't have the resources you needed, you damn
well needed everybody else.
So I appreciate your coming. And who is first here on this,
General McNabb?
General McNabb, we will hear from you first. Summarize the
statement. We will put the rest in the record.

Summary Statement of General McNabb

General McNabb. Chairman Murtha, Congressman Young,
distinguished members of the committee, it is indeed my
privilege to be with you today, representing USTRANSCOM and the
136,000 of some of the world's finest logisticians. This total
force team of active duty, Guard, Reserve, civilian contractors
and commercial partners enables the combatant commanders to
succeed anywhere in the world by providing them unmatched
strategic lift and end-to-end global distribution.
And this committee is well aware that it is our great
people that get it done. It is our total force air crews,
flying combat approaches on night vision goggles or air-
dropping supplies to our troops in Afghanistan. It is our air-
refueling crews who deliver 5 million pounds of fuel every day
at night in the weather, extending the reach of our joint and
coalition partners.
With the maintenance teams and aerial porters behind them,
these crews execute over 900 sorties a day, sometimes in the
most austere conditions, like Antarctica, and sometimes into
the most dangerous, like in a forward operating base under fire
in Afghanistan.
It is our merchant mariners and military and civilian port
operators, loading, offloading and sailing over 35 ships every
day to support the warfighter. It is our terminal operators
pushing thousands of containers, domestic freight and railcar
shipments, pushing warfighters--their vital supplies, and
making sure that they have what they need to fight.
It is our contingency response groups, port opening experts
arriving first, to open up the flow in a disaster relief
operation. And it is our commercial airlift and sealift
partners, standing beside us, opening up new routes through,
the north going into Afghanistan, or supporting the Nation in
times of surge.
And it is our medical crews and critical care teams,
tending to our wounded warriors, rapidly delivering them from
the battlefield to the finest world-class care on the planet,
saving lives and families at the same time. And it is our crews
bringing back fallen comrades, transporting heroes dressed in
our Nation's colors, Americans returning with dignity to our
country which owes them so much.
It is this logistics team, working from home and abroad,
that gives our Nation unrivaled global reach, committed to
serving our Nation's warfighters by delivering the right stuff
to the right place at the right time. Whether sustaining the
fight, providing disaster relief to friends in need or moving
six brigades simultaneously, we are there.
Chairman Murtha, your support and the support of this
committee has been instrumental in providing the resources our
team needs to win and support the combatant commanders, and I
thank you. You have given us the Large, Medium-Speed Roll On-
Roll Off ships and supported upgrades to the Ready Reserve
Fleet, all of which have been key to our success over the last
seven years; and the new joint High-Speed Vessels will give us
even greater flexibility.
The C-130J and C-17 have come of age since 9/11 and have
allowed us to change how we support the combatant commanders
from the air. The current C-5, C-130 and KC-10 modernization
programs will also make an enormous difference in our
capability to support the warfighter.
My top priority remains the recapitalization of our aging
tanker fleet. The KC-X will be a game changer. Its value as a
tanker will be tremendous. Its value as a multirole platform to
the mobility enterprise will be incomparable. It will do for
the whole mobility world what the C-17 did for theater and
strategic airlift. It will be an ultimate mobility force
multiplier.
Chairman Murtha and Congressman Young, I am grateful to you
and the committee for inviting me to appear before you today. I
respectfully request my written testimony be submitted for the
record, and I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Murtha. Without objection.
[The statement of General McNabb follows:]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.001

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.002

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.003

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.004

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.005

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.006

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.007

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.008

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.009

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.010

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.011

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.012

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.013

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.014

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.015

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.016

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.017

Mr. Murtha. General Lichte.

Summary Statement of General Lichte

General Lichte. Mr. Chairman and committee members, thank
you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
As the commander of Air Mobility Command, I am extremely
proud of the total force team of over 132,000 active duty,
civilian, and Air National Guard and Air Reserve mobility
Airmen. We stand ready as proud members of the United States
Transportation Command joint team, and we are privileged to
provide global reach to our Nation's warfighters through
airlift, air refueling and global patient movement.
I am extremely pleased by what the command has accomplished
as we continue our focus on winning today's fight as part of
the joint and coalition force, developing and caring for our
Airmen and families, enhancing the nuclear mission, optimizing
mobility partnerships and preparing the mobility forces for the
future.
And, although the process of recapitalizing our tanker
fleet could take more than three decades and will require a
long-term commitment, it is time that we take that first step
towards retiring our geriatric, Eisenhower-era KC-135s, a first
step that will posture future generations of mobility Airmen to
continue their great support of the joint warfighter and United
States Transportation Command's global mission.
Considering the critical role that the tanker plays in
today's joint and coalition environment, it is no surprise that
modernizing and recapitalizing today's tanker fleet is the Air
Force's number one acquisition priority. Without a modern
tanker capable of flexible and versatile operations and
response in this new century, our Nation's ability to respond
to the traditional spectrum of conflict is in jeopardy, as is
our Nation's ability to respond to future challenges.
Procurement of a new tanker is a matter of national
security, and that is why it is the Air Force's number one
acquisition priority. Tankers underpin the entire joint
mobility team's ability to project combat power or humanitarian
relief operations around the world. And while a decision on
source selection and acquisition strategy remains with OSD, my
goal remains to ensure that we procure a system that best meets
the warfighter's requirement now and well into the future. To
meet that end, Air Mobility Command is working closely with OSD
in their management of this program.
Air Mobility Command brings a unique tool to our Nation.
Through mobility forces our Nation can extend a clenched fist
to our adversaries or an open hand to those in need. Air
Mobility Command stands ready to assist at home or abroad to
save lives and alleviate human suffering in the aftermath of
any natural disaster or other crisis.
Although we still await the outcome of the mobility
capabilities and requirements study, we are making progress
with regards to recapitalization efforts. We are modernizing
our C-5s with the avionics upgrades that will allow us to
continue to operate in international airspace and foreign
airfields. Additionally, the C-5 reliability enhancement and
reengining program is making great strides. We recently
delivered the first C-5M to Dover Air Force Base and we look
forward to modernizing a total of 52 C-5s to enhance the
capabilities of our Nation's largest airlifter.
However, we are focused more on just modernization and
recapitalization. We continue to take care of airmen, not just
airmen, but soldiers, sailors, marines, as well. Through
airlift and precision airdrop, we continue to pull the supply
chain vertically up out of the threat, reducing the need to
place soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines in harm's way on
the roads of Iraq and Afghanistan.
For those who must be on the front lines to perform their
duties, Air Mobility Command has airlifted almost 4,000 Mine
Resistant and Ambush Protected vehicles, MRAPs, to Iraq on C-5s
and C-17s and contract carriers as part of the United States
Transportation Command's joint effort to rapidly deliver these
high-priority systems by both sea and air.
Air Mobility Command clearly offers an edge in irregular
warfare operations. When properly integrated with other
military and civil efforts, the mobility advantage enables the
infiltration, resupply and exfiltration of relatively small
ground units. By providing humanitarian assistance, medical
support and transportation for government officials to remote
areas, Air Mobility can promote the government's credibility
and improve the quality of life for its population. These types
of operations which directly affect and are immediately visible
to the population in question can have significant effects in
the overall campaign against insurgents.
The continued wear and tear on our airframes remains a
major concern. As our mobility Air Force's C-130 fleet shrinks,
the remaining fleet ages quicker, resulting in aircraft being
operationally restricted sooner. This, in turn, increases the
number of inspections required, which affects our aircraft
availability. And while our C-130 center wing box replacement
program is making great progress, we are beginning to see wear-
and-tear issues on other airframes as well.
The C-5 fleet has cracks appearing on the top of the
aircraft and in the structures near the forward cargo door
hinges. We are pressing ahead with fixes for these issues, but
others undoubtedly will appear in the future as the fleet
remains heavily tasked to meet mission requirements.
We also face looming deadlines to complete avionics
upgrades to meet global air traffic requirements and continue
to access congested airspace worldwide. Thus far, we have been
able to modify a considerable portion of our fleets, but we
have a lot to do before restrictions begin to impact operations
in the year 2015.
In conclusion, I am proud to be both a mobility airman and
a member of the United States Transportation Command's joint
team. From direct support of the warfighter on the battlefield
to humanitarian relief in response to natural disasters, our
air mobility fleet is and will continue to be a critical
component of America's strategy--strategic capability.
I am proud to wear the Air Mobility Command patch, and I am
humbled to represent the 132,000 Mobility Command Airmen as we
support the United States Transportation Command in
demonstrating our national resolve, delivering combat power and
saving lives.
Thank you very much for this opportunity, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of General Lichte follows:]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.018

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.019

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.020

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.021

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.022

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.023

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.024

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.025

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.026

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.027

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.028

Mr. Murtha. General Fullhart.

Summary Statement of General Fullhart

General Fullhart. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Young and
members of the committee, I am honored to be here this morning
to update you on the status of Air Force Mobility programs. I
will keep my remarks brief in order to provide additional time
to focus on issues of interest to the committee.
It is a privilege for me to be here with General Lichte
from Air Mobility Command and General McNabb from United States
Transportation Command. They are Air Force acquisition's
primary customers for mobility aircraft. They determine the
requirements and capabilities that are needed by the
warfighter; and it is my responsibility to work with those who
acquire aircraft platforms that meet those needs.
As the Director of Global Reach Programs, I oversee the
acquisition of nearly 30 airlift, refueling, training and
Special Operations Forces programs. I am proud of the
approximately 50 acquisition professionals who serve in the
Directorate of Global Reach. On a daily basis these individuals
work with industry, the Department of Defense, other services
and Congress to provide the warfighter with the capabilities
they need to accomplish their missions. Our job is to properly
execute the acquisition process so we can effectively equip the
warfighter.
We are successfully moving forward with the acquisition and
modification of our mobility aircraft. We are working with the
Office of the Secretary of Defense to release a draft request
for proposal for the KC-X air refueling tanker. We are
competing the combat search and rescue aircraft source
selection and anticipate awarding a contract this year.
We appreciate greatly the support that this committee has
provided to the C-17 and C-130J programs. Procurement of these
aircraft is on cost and on schedule.
Finally, the modernization programs for C-5 and legacy C-
130 fleets are under way and performing well.
The timely acquisition of critically needed platforms will
be an ongoing priority for our Air Force. The warfighter
depends on the Air Force's acquisition workforce to procure
these aircraft platforms so they can execute the mission that
they have been given. We will also continue to focus our
efforts on modernizing and recapitalizing our aging weapons
systems.
We appreciate Congress's ongoing support for Air Force
mobility programs.
Sir, I respectfully request my written statement be
included in the record. Thank you again for the opportunity to
be here. And I look forward to answering your questions.
[The statement of General Fullhart follows:]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.029

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.030

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.031

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.032

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.033

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.034

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.035

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.036

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.037

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6232C.038

Mr. Murtha. Without objection, all three statements will be
put in the record.
Because of the interest of our vice chairman in this
particular subject, we are going to allow him to go first with
his 5 minutes.

TANKER

Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to welcome
all witnesses, particularly General McNabb, whom I have worked
with for many years.
You know, last year we went through this tanker issue, and
the Air Force made a decision, which I strongly disagreed with.
General Handy, who doesn't work for Northrop Grumman or for
Boeing, writes a very good op-ed about, you know, somebody who
was both head of Air Mobility Command and TRANSCOM--like the
last person to have both hats--why a smaller tanker is better
and especially a tanker that would replace the KC-135.
And what the Air Force had testified to up until the very--
like weeks before we had this decision, is, they wanted a
medium-sized airplane.
And, you know, the question I have here is--one thing that
was not taken into account that I found out was not taken into
account was life cycle costs. And the evaluation they did was
very cursory, and was only 25 years. The JROC had said that the
life cycle of these planes is 40 years.
So the big issue to me is, if that had been properly
evaluated and you look at the difference in the fuel
consumption rate of an A-330--these are commercial airplanes;
we know how much fuel they burn. And the numbers that I come up
with--and let's say, at $100 a barrel, comparing the 767 and
the A-330, 750 planes for 40 years at 750 hours per year, the
difference in fuel cost between the two planes is $25 billion.
If it was 150--and we were almost at 150 last year; now it
has come back rather dramatically--the difference would be $35
billion. And that is enough to buy the 179 airplanes.
So if I can get one point across to my colleagues, bigger
isn't better. And that is why, General Lichte, I was so
disappointed in what you said. Now you have clarified it to me
today. You seem like a gentleman and a professional, so I am
going to give you the benefit of the doubt that maybe you had a
bad day.
But the reason I bring this up----
Mr. Moran. It is like this for all of us.
Mr. Dicks. I know you weren't part of the selection
process. I called Sue Payton immediately after I heard what you
said, because in the selection process there were certain
requirements, and if you met the requirements, you didn't get
any extra points for doing extra, because they were concerned
about getting too big an airplane. In fact, the testimony all
the way up to the last days was that we wanted a medium-sized
plane, which the 767 is.
The A-330 is a much bigger plane. It is even larger than
the KC-10s, much larger, and yet has less fuel capability than
the KC-10.
Now, on fuel offload, one other point I want to make, the
average fuel offload of these planes, these tankers, is 62,000
pounds per sortie. Now the Boeing plane--the KC-135E offloads--
has the capability of carrying 200,000 pounds of fuel; the 767,
205; the A-330, 245,000. So they are well in excess of the
average requirement, which is 62,000 pounds. It may be 62,000
to 69,000, somewhere in that range.
So, again, you see that having a bigger airplane is going
to wind up costing you more money not only in fuel, but you
have hangars, that more hangars have to be replaced with the A-
330 than the 767. They can't land at as many runways around the
world.
This is like the difference between a C-5 and a C-17. One
of the reasons why the C-17, a smaller airplane, but a very
capable airplane, was the Air Force choice over C-5 was because
you had more flexibility. In Europe, for example, I think you
can have two C-5s on one of these fields and it stops
everything. And you can have seven to nine C-17s.
This is the same issue here. You have more airfields that
you can use with the 767 versus the A-330.
So, again, you are the leaders of the Air Force. All I am
saying to you--and I am also very concerned on the acquisition
side of this thing, again, that the companies are not even
allowed to talk to the Air Force.
When is that gag rule going to be lifted? I think that is
wrong. I think the companies need to be engaging the Air Force
on the next RFP. When are we going to lift this we-can't-talk-
to-anybody rule?
General Lichte. Sir, that ruling, if you will, came out of
OSD, anticipating that as we await the arrival of the new Under
Secretary for Acquisition Technology and Logistics, that we
will be starting that engagement process soon thereafter.
Mr. Dicks. Okay.
I want you to address fuel consumption. I want you to
address some of the things that would have to be--you would
have to have more hangars, you would have to strengthen the
runways with a bigger airplane. Those costs weren't even taken
into account. Those costs were not even taken--I mean, it was
some general number, but not a real hard evaluation for the
National Guard.
The other thing, one other thing that is just as important
to our committee, we are going to have the Osprey, 439 Ospreys.
The A-330 cannot refuel the Osprey; the 767 can. That is a big,
additional benefit of having this smaller airplane, because the
other plane can't slow down to a speed where it can offload the
fuel to the Osprey.
I would like to hear you explain why you thought on the day
of this announcement that more was better when the requirements
said, if you meet the requirements, you shouldn't get extra
credit for more, and it isn't necessary; and it has got this
fuel--and it has got this weight problem that causes all this
extra fuel consumption.
Would you like to address that, General?
General Lichte. I would be happy to, Mr. Dicks. Thank you
for raising some of those issues, and perhaps I can clarify.
First of all, on February 29 last year, when I was at the
announcement, I, as the operator of Air Mobility Command, the
commander of Air Mobility Command, established the requirements
that were necessary to meet the new tanker requirements. And
then the acquisition world takes over and comes up with the
solution.
The day that I was standing there on February 29 was really
the first time that I found out which tanker won the source
selection; and so, when I made the comment about more, I was
talking in comparison to the KC-135. Either tanker really
provided more than the KC-135--more fuel offload, more
passengers carried, more cargo carried--and that was my
reference to when I made the comment that afternoon. Because,
quite frankly, I was very excited with the fact that we had
finally gotten a new tanker. We have been asking for a new
tanker for a long time.
These tankers were built in the Eisenhower era. As a matter
of fact, these tankers were designed and built before our
current President was even born. We need to get on with the
replacement for the tankers. And as the person who established
the requirements, either tanker met that requirement.
And so what I was trying to say is, I was very pleased that
we were taking the next step to start this process, because
even if everything had gone well--and as you know, we had the
protest--it is going to take some 30 years and a long-term
commitment to replace the tankers. And so when I made those
comments, it was really in regard to that.
When you talk about offload requirement, yes, the average
could be 62,000. I won't debate that. But there are B-52s,
there are C-5s and everything that will take 125,000-, 150,000-
pound offload which we are required to give them. And so, on
the average, it may be. All those other parameters that were
decided and reviewed by the acquisition world, that is how they
came out with which tanker was the winner. And so I was
expressing my gratitude and happiness with the fact that we
were finally taking a bite out of the elephant, finally trying
to get forward progress on an issue that we need to tackle.
And I am glad to see that at this committee you continue to
tackle that.
Mr. Murtha. The time of the gentleman has expired. We are
going to work this thing out, that is for sure. We know you
need tankers. We know it is the number one priority of the Air
Force, as far as I am sure it should be in the Department. When
we are going 8,000 miles to a battle area, we need to work that
problem out.
Mr. Young.

C-17 GLOBEMASTER

Mr. Young. Yeah, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.
And we have covered the tanker issue quite well, but I want
to tell you that having MacDill Air Force Base right on the
edge of my district--and, of course, I claim MacDill anyway and
we have invested a lot of time and a lot of taxpayers' money in
making MacDill the base that it should be.
But we have tankers there, and these tankers are KC-135s.
They are not even the oldest version of the KC-135s, but they
are old. And I want to tell you, your crews are amazing. As I
talk to these young men and women that are flying these
aircraft on missions, they tell me, Hey, this is old; I can't
believe that we are flying airplanes this old, but we will fly
them until there are no wings left on them. I mean, these guys
are determined.
But the wings are only going to last so long and the
aircraft is only going to last so long, and they are getting
very expensive to maintain. So we need to get a decision, and
we needed to get a contract, and we need to get the tankers in
the air.
And having said that, let me go to the issue of the C-17.
C-17 is pretty much a program that this committee basically
kept going when there was serious question about whether we
should even build a C-17. But once we had the C-17, there has
never been a question about its capability or its reliability
or what it can do for us that a C-5 can't do. And a C-5, of
course, has been just a tremendous airplane.
But now we are in a dilemma; we don't have a budget
request, and I don't think we are going to get one--I don't
know--for any new C-17s. We also don't have any indication that
there is going to be a budget request to close down the line.
Where do we go on C-17? The committee is going to need a
little bit of direction on what the Air Force really thinks we
should do on the C-17. Give us a good answer, we will find a
way to make it happen. But I think we should think really long
and hard before we do away with C-17.
General McNabb. Well, Congressman Young, thanks. Again,
your support has been superb. And the C-17, if you look at
where we sit, both as we were asked to get convoys off the road
in Iraq and going into Afghanistan, the C-17 has proven its
worth. Everything that we had hoped it would do, it has done.
I am checked out on the C-17, and I go down and fly with
those young folks at Altus. And those young captains put their
arm around me and say, ``Come on over here, son; let me show
you how we fly this airplane.'' And it is really tremendous
what we have done, and it has taken it to a whole different
level, and it has been great. So the support of the committee
has been superb, and we really do appreciate it.
I would say that I know, as you all know, as the new
administration has taken over, they are reviewing all of these
programs--the Secretary of Defense is personally in the middle
of that--to take a look at all of these things to see how it
will fit with all the requirements to include when the
President outlines his strategy for Iraq and Afghanistan. So
those are under review right now, and I know that there are a
lot of decisions and discussions that are going on right now.
I was in the middle of the Nunn-McCurdy discussion last
year when we said, how much does the C-5 reengining cost, and
coming back saying, here is what we think as a department. And
I would say that the current program of record of 205 C-17s, 52
modernized, reengined C-5s and 59 C-5As, which will have an
avionics modernization program, ends up giving you a fleet of
about 316. That meets the requirement, as TRANSCOM Commander;
and the 205 C-17s gives me the flexibility that I need to make
sure that I can deal with places like Afghanistan and others.
Again, that was brought together by everybody taking a very
good look at all of the options to include additional C-17s and
reengining more C-5s.
And we have a new study that is going to be due out in
December that is going to take into account the increased
ground strength of the Marines and the Army--look at how we are
employing the assets, look at the Future Combat System, the
fact that it has got to be carried by the C-17 vice the 130. If
there are any changes, we have flexibility.
Mr. Murtha. That doesn't help us because the budget--the
money that we are going to--in the supplemental and in the full
bill, this study is not going to help us a bit. We need to
know.
What are we going to do, shut down the line and then reopen
it? You know the expense of that.
General McNabb. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murtha. We need to know if you need additional C-17s.
General McNabb. Yes, Chairman. And what I would say is
that, right now, the budget is going to come to you in a couple
of weeks--3 weeks, I think--that is, the final decisions along
with the administration; and I think probably in discussions
with you all, will try to get their final hands around that.
So those are the things that are playing with it right now.
I am comfortable that the Nunn-McCurdy, as we came in with,
this is the overall solution on the airlift side, on that
portion of it. I would say, the tanker is, no question, my
number one priority; and as I look at that, that also helps us
deal with the overall mobility situation.
So that is kind of where I sit right now.

C-5 RE-ENGINING

Mr. Young. General, you mentioned that you reengined C-5s,
the C-5M. And I understand you have--some of those are deployed
to Dover Air Force Base.
General McNabb. Yes. The first two, Congressman Young.
Mr. Young. What kind of a success story do we have with the
C-5M? Is it a good story?
General McNabb. Yes. I think right now it is meeting the
test. I will let General Lichte, who actually flew the airplane
into Dover--the first airplane went into Dover. But--they will
test and evaluate, but right now the test and evaluation has
gone very well, or I would say, the parameters of meeting the
requirements that they have outlined.
We will do further tests now that it goes out in the
system, and we will see how that does. But right now not only
is it meeting all the parameters that we had asked it to do, in
fact, it is exceeding some of those.
I will also say that the cost seems to be good as long as
they keep that cost down. And right now that all looks good
from where I sit.
General Lichte. Right.
I would just add that the C-5M performs wonderfully. It
will be able to carry more cargo. It will be able to go longer
because of the new engines.
The engines were probably the biggest problem with the old
C-5s. So with the new engines--the time on the wing with the
old engines was about 1,000 hours. Now with the new engines, it
may last longer than the airplane does.
I think it has tremendous capability. It has got a mission-
capable rate now in the 50s. We expect that to be up around 75
percent as an absolute minimum; but what we have seen so far--
indications are that it is going to probably be about 81
percent. That allows us to get it out in the field and doing
well. It is doing well.
Two of them have arrived. The third one is on the way.
Mr. Murtha. General, what does it cost to refurbish those
airplanes, well over $100 million?
General Lichte. Right. You get about two C-5Ms for the
price of one C-17, roughly.
Mr. Murtha. And the infrastructure or the body of the
airplane is how old?
General Lichte. Well, we expect it to fly until 2040. What
we are going to have to deal with on the older A models, which
are the older ones----

C-5 RETIREMENTS

Mr. Murtha. But you see our problem, if you don't come up
with--to shut down the C-17 line is inconceivable. So we are
going to have to make the decision, what--you know, what we do
here. And we are sure as hell--I don't see us shutting down the
line because that would be so expensive to reorganize it.
General Lichte. All the studies indicate that about 205 C-
17s and 111 C-5s will meet the requirements that we have for
wartime. And so if more C-17s come, then we would need
permission to start retiring some of the C-5s, the older,
poorest-performing C-5s.

C-17 PROCUREMENT

Mr. Young. Just one last question on the C-17. Isn't it a
fact that the C-17 has been used far more extensively than we
ever intended in a short period of time, which means that the
maintenance requirements, means that the life span is being
used more rapidly than we had anticipated; isn't that a fact?
General Lichte. That is a fact.
General McNabb. Absolutely, Congressman. But you know, when
we talked about buying the C-17, we said, here are the kinds of
things that we may need it to do, and in fact, that is what we
have been doing with it both in Iraq and Afghanistan.
It is not the flying hours per se. It is the wear and tear
on the airplane, because we actually are tankering a lot more
fuel and doing a lot more of those assault landings than we had
programmed for its life cycle.
This committee helped us a bunch two supplementals ago by
giving us the 10 airplanes to make up for the wear and tear
that we had on the fleet. I can't tell you how much that meant
to us.
The 15 aircraft helps us do the same kind of thing. It
allows us to now spread that wear and tear over the overall
fleet because where that wear and tear is happening is in the
airplanes that are flying into Afghanistan and Iraq.
General Lichte. I will say, big picture-wise, we had
programmed to fly them about 1,000 hours a year. They are up
around 1,100. So, what we are doing is using fleet management,
taking some of those that have been at home, maybe at the Guard
and Reserve that haven't had the high rate of flight, using
those more. So we are trying to balance this out, coupled with,
as General McNabb pointed out, the result of getting some extra
aircraft to bring us up to higher numbers.
It is fleet management and we are controlling it very
closely.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Moran.

KC-X PROCUREMENT

Mr. Moran. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I may not get into quite
the prelude that my colleague got into in asking my question,
but I do want to get just a little bit into the tanker issue.
I understand that there was a review of the KC-X
procurement program just last week, and we are told that some
of the requirements in the RFP were reduced. I don't think you
mentioned that in your testimony, did you?
Is that true or false?
General Lichte. The initial stage is, we have not changed
our requirements. What we are looking at and where that comes
from is, how do you translate requirements into language? And I
am going to let the acquisition expert just give you the rest
of the story.
Mr. Moran. Okay. I don't want to get a long explanation.
Let me give you another question you can answer at the same
time.
I understand that they may be looking at low-cost versus
best value. I gather that is far more than just semantics. What
does it mean?
General Fullhart. Sir, I will try to give you the short
answer that you desire.
Mr. Dicks. Can you speak up? We are having a hard time
hearing you. Get a little closer.
General Fullhart. The green light is on. Is that all right,
sir?
There are two key documents in terms of requirements. The
capabilities development document is the core document. And
what General Lichte is referring to is, those are the
requirements levied by the warfighter and that are approved by
the AFROC and JROC, if I could use those acronyms with you;
those are the formal bodies.
Those requirements are translated into things that you then
put into a request for proposal. Those are the systems
requirements, document requirements. Those were the famous 800-
plus requirements that I think people have heard about. With
great credit to the warfighter to the acquisition community,
they have gone through a very extensive review of those
requirements to look at, how do you clarify them, how do you
make sure there are not redundancies. Because that was one of
the findings from the last----
Mr. Moran. So there is no substantive change in the
requirements, you are just making them clearer, more concise?
General Fullhart. Exactly.
Mr. Moran. It does seem to me to be a substantive change,
though, if the policy is to seek low cost versus best value.
General Fullhart. Yes, sir. And all those things are on the
table, because clearly, until we have, as the Secretary of
Defense has indicated, a new Under Secretary for Acquisition
Technology and Logistics, we haven't had a dialogue between OSD
and the Air Force on both the acquisitions strategy as well as
the source selection strategy.
Mr. Moran. You haven't had the dialogue?
General Fullhart. We have not, sir.
Mr. Moran. Let me ask you, there seems to be pushback
against the idea of having a mixed buy of tankers.
Do you have a policy or a clear issue with regard to the
idea of having two different types of tankers?
General Fullhart. Well, sir, as I think you know, the
Secretary of Defense is on the record both in testimony and in
public comments that, at this time, the fiscal realities are
that we think that one tanker program is the way to go.
Mr. Moran. And you agree with that? That is what I am
asking. Was that your recommendation?
General Fullhart. Well, sir, we haven't made a formal
recommendation. But all the indications that I have seen, or
the data that I have seen, do point out the fact that clearly
if you are acquiring two aircraft at the same time, the costs
are going to be higher. How you rationalize that in the fiscal
environment is a dialogue that certainly we want to have with
this committee and others.

MRAP TRANSPORTATION

Mr. Moran. Well, I know what Secretary Gates said. I just
wanted to hear what you might say.
Let me ask you about the transportation of MRAPs. You have
already sent 12,000 MRAPs to Iraq and Afghanistan in the last
year and a half or so. I want to know what you are going to do
with those MRAPs in Iraq. It is enormously expensive to move
them, but the DOD made the policy to transport them by air,
particularly into Iraq because you can't trust getting them
across land through Pakistan.
Can you tell us what your plan is and give us some sense of
the cost of moving these MRAPs out of Iraq, recapitalizing them
maybe, getting them back into Afghanistan?
General McNabb. Congressman, I will take that one.
What we initially did was--because lives were at stake, we
basically said, hey, if you needed to go by air so that we can
get those to the warfighter the fastest possible way, obviously
we took the initial ones in there.
It is about a tenth of the cost to take it by surface. You
are right about Afghanistan. We will take it, if we can, by
surface as far forward as possible, and then take it for the
last leg by air.
Obviously, we don't take that through a ground line of
communication (LOC) through Pakistan; we take that by air. We
will take MRAPs in that final leg into Afghanistan by air.
Whatever we can do by surface, we will as long as----
Mr. Moran. What surface is there? There is no surface
between Iraq--I mean, maybe some surface Iraq out to Saudi
Arabia. But you are using the port there, I guess, in the Basra
area anyway. So you are floating them, and then you are flying
them.
You are going to land them in Pakistan, so there is really
no surface that you can use, is there?
General McNabb. Right, in Afghanistan. If I am moving them
from Iraq to Afghanistan, pretty much you are exactly right.
But in many cases these are different types of MRAPs. They
are lighter. There are different types that they need in
Afghanistan. So primarily what we will do is, we will take
those in. Like I said, those last legs will come in by air to
make sure that we don't put them at risk as we take them
through the ground Loc.
So you are exactly right. It is about--again, about a tenth
of the cost to take it by surface. And again, whatever we can
do as far forward as we can by surface and do the last part by
air, that makes us money.
Currently, about 72 percent of the MRAPs have moved by
surface and, you know, roughly 28 percent by air, but that was
going into Iraq. Now we are going to Afghanistan.
Mr. Moran. The proportion is going change dramatically,
though, as you get into Afghanistan.
I am out of time so I am not going to ask a question, but I
just want to make a point.

FUEL LOGISTICS

Fuel logistics--we can ask a question on this for the
record--but they represent 70 percent of the materiel that the
Army ships into battle. It is something we need to look at.
That is an enormous cost, just fuel logistics, and it is going
to continue to be as we ramp up in Afghanistan.
So we will present a question for the record.
General McNabb. Congressman, I will be glad--as TRANSCOM
and especially as the J-4, obviously getting fuel into
Afghanistan has always been just really a key issue.
We try to make sure we have lots of options coming in from
different directions. A lot of our fuel, in fact, 65 to 70
percent comes in from the north; only 30 percent comes in from
the Pakistan side, to give you an idea. And the idea is you
want to have multiple ways of getting it in.
That is one of the big things--as we bring in additional
forces, is to make sure that we have got the fuel in place in
Afghanistan, something General Petraeus, something we watch
very closely with CENTCOM and also with DOA and DESC, who is
responsible for that. But we watch it every day to make sure
that we are keeping that fuel flowing.
Mr. Moran. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Chairman.

COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being with us this morning. I have
not forgotten my trip out to the Air Mobility Command several
years ago. The logistical footprint of what your young people
do across the world is amazing; and no matter what anyone
thinks about what happens in Iraq and Afghanistan, the support
and the operations under that command are truly remarkable,
night and day.
And it is amazing, of all the flights and tanker issues,
that you don't really hear of some of the problems that could
come from such aged tankers. It is truly remarkable.
Your second highest priority behind the tanker
replacement--and I know the chairman has been to Nellis Air
Base. And, you know, sometimes in life when you make a
promise--when I met with some of those crews, talking about the
combat search and rescue helicopters, those guys and gals that
are involved--and they are going to be, you know, really
involved in Afghanistan.
I learned yesterday--I guess this isn't confidential--there
is not 1 mile of rail in Afghanistan. You would think there
might have been.
General McNabb. Right.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. But the air support of getting our
injured--well, obviously getting our troops there, setting up a
whole new series of air bases, where does the CSAR contract
stand? I mean, what in the devil is going on here? Is there any
optimistic news on the horizon?
General Fullhart. Yes, sir, there is.
In fact, on the day of the Inauguration we received the
best and final proposals from the three vendors who are vying
for that contract. We are in source selection as we speak, and
we are on track for an April review by OSD in getting that
contract signed and getting started with production.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. So we are making some progress?
General Fullhart. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. The combat search and rescue, obviously
there have been situations where remarkable things have
happened----
General Fullhart. Absolutely.
Mr. Frelinghuysen [continuing]. In terms of rescuing.
What is the medevac component? Hasn't the Secretary of
Defense directed the use of CSARs for medevac?
General Fullhart. Sir, I can take that; that is an
operational question which I can take for the record.
[The information follows:]

The medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) component exists under the U.S.
Army for the specific mission of evacuating injured personnel. The
mission is performed by U.S. Army rotary-wing assets. Due to enduring
requirements for MEDEVAC capability, the Air Force has assisted the
U.S. Army in performing this mission in U.S. Central Command with HH-
60G Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) helicopter assets, which are
inherently capable of performing the MEDEVAC mission with their
advanced mission abilities.
The Secretary of Defense has recently directed additional Air Force
CSAR assets to enhance the MEDEVAC capability in Afghanistan. However,
this has not been the first time that Air Force CSAR assets have been
used for MEDEVAC operations in this theater. Since the initiation of
U.S. Central Command combat operations, deployed Air Force CSAR
helicopters have always performed MEDEVAC missions, when requested, due
to their inherent capability to execute missions in demanding
environmental and threat conditions, such as night low illumination
conditions. Starting in January 2006, Air Force CSAR helicopters were
also deployed solely to perform the MEDEVAC role in Afghanistan due to
shortages of available U.S. Army aircraft. In February 2009, to further
support the Secretary of Defense's MEDEVAC initiatives, all Air Force
helicopters located in Afghanistan were tasked to perform the MEDEVAC
mission, including those assigned for CSAR alert. In addition, to
further improve MEDEVAC response with more aircraft, the Air Force will
temporarily cease advanced tactics training at the HH-60G Weapons
School at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada in March 2009 to provide these
aircraft and instructors for combat operations in Afghanistan.

General Fullhart. But certainly they play in all those
roles. I have a colleague who is in that business, and his
story to me was that since 2001 in Iraq and Afghanistan alone
that they have been responsible for about 2,600-plus savings
out there. So there are a lot of mothers and fathers and
husbands and wives out there who are grateful.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. They don't have any roads. With all due
respect, the few roads that are out there, we have built.
General Fullhart. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. And these helicopters, one thing we know
about Afghanistan, high altitudes.
General Fullhart. Absolutely.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. How does that fit into the overall
equation? And how does it meet, should we say, other operations
that are important, Special Ops and----
General Fullhart. Certainly. The contract that we are going
to be letting for the replacement CSAR-X helicopter
specifically addressed the need for that platform to be able to
operate in higher altitudes and higher heat conditions because
that is a limitation that we are facing in places like
Afghanistan today.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. And satisfy my curiosity.
Afghanistan is not Iraq--obviously, a far more or less
hospitable terrain, horrendous situation. What sort of
evacuation procedures are you looking at, planning for? You are
obviously--we have a higher rate of injury and deaths in
Afghanistan now.
What are we doing relative to evacuations that are
different from Iraq?
General McNabb. Actually, we will end up--as you said, it
is that front end portion of how do you get the forces to the
hospital. And once we stabilize them, to get them aboard an
aircraft.
Once we get them aboard a C-17, KC-135, the new KC-X, then
that is going to be pretty much the same. We will bring them
pretty much the same into Landstuhl unless we need to bring
them all the way home, just like we do now using air refueling.
That, as you said, has been one of the greatest things we have
done in our promise to these great Americans that have raised
their hands.
Mr. Murtha. I think what Mr. Frelinghuysen is saying, we
had a hearing yesterday, or the day before yesterday, and they
talked about 72 minutes and the death rate is almost twice as
much in Afghanistan as it is in Iraq.
General McNabb. Right.
Mr. Murtha. That is because it takes so long to get them
in. We are in the business of trying to get the resources to
you, and we can't get an answer in many of these things.
CSAR is absolutely essential. And what Mr. Frelinghuysen is
talking about is, let's get these things out there, whether it
is tankers or CSARs or whatever it is, and--so we can reduce
the time it takes to get these troops to the hospital.
General McNabb. Absolutely.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. And do we have, quite honestly, enough
aircraft to do what we need to do----
General McNabb. On the aircraft side----
Mr. Frelinghuysen [continuing]. To shorten that period of
time?
General McNabb. It is really going to be that helicopter
movement that you are talking about.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Do we have shortfalls in these types of
helicopters? Do we, because of this mess-up or the delay with
the CSAR contract?
General Fullhart. Sir, what I will do is take that for the
record as an operational question.
But what I will tell you is that this contract is intended
to replace 101 of the current fleet with 141 of the new fleet,
which is meant to address the----
[The information follows:]

Yes, but not because of the delay with Combat Search and Rescue
(CSAR) contract. In 2003, the Air Force developed the Personnel
Recovery Vehicle Operational Requirements Document. In 2005, it was
converted the CSAR-X capability development document. This document
identified a base-line fleet of 141 aircraft. The current HH-60G fleet
stands at 101 from an original fleet of 112, a capability gap of 40
airframes.
The delay of CSAR-X is not causal in the shortfall of rescue
helicopters we currently face. Desired Initial Operational Capability
of CSAR-X was Fiscal Year 2013. Without an acceleration of this
original initial operational capability, CSAR-X would not have been
able to alleviate the shortfall in today's rescue assets.

Mr. Murtha. But you are only going to buy 10 a year, one a
month. I mean, we can't save any money when we buy that small a
fleet.
You guys have got to give us figures where we can save
money and get the stuff out in the field. That is the problem
we have, and there is no question, CSARs is something that fits
into a supplemental because it is so directly related to the
warfighting. You need to get that information to us so we could
put the money in to reduce the hazards to the troops out in the
field.
General Fullhart. Yes, sir. I will take that back.
And as we have indicated, there are meetings going on as we
speak to try to determine the future.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We have wounded soldiers, I assume,
still being flown into Balad. And then they go out from there.
I assume we have the same sort of logistical responsibilities
in Afghanistan. And are there shortfalls in aircraft assets for
the theater?
So we are going to get that information; we don't have it
now? That is unfortunate.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Hinchey.

STEWART AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE

Mr. Hinchey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Generals, thank you very much. In the context of this
hearing and your response to the questions, I even understand a
little more clearly the complexity and the difficulty of the
circumstances that you are dealing with in light of the new
political circumstances that we have with the new President. So
I can appreciate what is going on here.
But at the same time, as our chairman has been saying, we
need to know more information, as much as we can get from you
and as quickly as possible.
I just want to mention a situation that is a little local
in my context. The 105th Airlift Wing is located at the Stewart
Air National Base in New York; and it is a fairly large and
fairly active operation there.
They are pretty much dominated by the C-5As. And the C-5As,
as we know and has been discussed here, are running low. They
have been around a long time and there is increased concern
about the safety and security of the people who are operating
them and using them. But there is also a certain amount of
growing concern about some of the people who live in the area
around the airport, that there may be some problem that might
result.
In any case, the C-5As were supposed to be replaced by C-
17s in 2010, but that is now in the process of changing, or at
least potentially so. Well, we know that there are some
changes.
I would like for you, if you would, to just give us a
little clarity with regard to that. And in the short time that
I have, I just want to mention just a couple of things in the
context of this situation which you might be able to answer.

C-5A MODERNIZATION

Could you describe for us the challenges of modernizing the
C-5As, which are older than the C-5Bs, and I know that that has
been part of the problem because there is such a challenge to
modernize them. Can you give us some information about that?
If all of these C-5As need to be replaced, is there a
reason--what is the reason why we wait to do so? Why are we
putting it off if they need to be replaced? And it is pretty
clear that they do.
And just my own situation, when do you expect that the
changes at the Stewart Air Base are likely to be made? And when
will the mobility and capabilities requirements study, which
has focused on these issues, when is that going to be completed
and what do you think we are going to get as a result of that?
General Lichte. If I could take that, sir, I just visited
Stewart--twice in the last 6 months. I agree with you. They are
a fantastic group of folks. General Johnston has a great team
up there. Some of the things you talk about with modernizing
the C-5A, your folks are up there coming up with innovative and
creative ideas. One thing they showed me is, two of the NCOs
have figured out a new way of doing the landing gear panel on
the C-5. It is very complicated. The gears all have to spiral
and turn and everything all at the same time. They were able to
figure out a better way to do that, to test it without having
to launch an aircraft. They are trying to help with
modernization efforts.
But you point out that the C-5A is old. And when you put
new equipment on it, it is the digital interface with the old
round dials. And when you say, What is the challenge for
modernizing C-5s, it comes down to dollars. And as we have
looked at this over the years, it was cheaper to modernize C-5s
with new equipment, new engines to keep them going than to
afford new C-17s.
And so it has been a balance, and that is why we struck the
difference of 205 C-17s, 111 C-5s, fully modernized, all of
them get avionics upgrades and 52 of them get the new engines.
When will MCRS, the Mobility Capabilities Requirements
Study come out? We hope about a year--well, at the end of the
year we should have something for the results of that.
We have been doing a lot of studies over all the years. We
come out with about the same each time because it is based on
deliberate war plans; and we are waiting to see the results of
the MCRS because we did factor in some new items on this
Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study. So we are hoping to
get that.
The reason we held up on distributing the C-17s, as you
discussed about Stewart perhaps being in line for C-17s, was if
this study comes out with new requirements, higher
requirements, and we don't get permission to retire any C-5A
models, we are kind of stuck with, where do we put these
aircraft? And that is why we said, we are better off
distributing them among the C-17 bases we have right now until
we get the final decision and then we will go back and address
it.
We are certainly aware, very much aware of Stewart's
contribution, the fact that it could do the mission with C-17s
as well. We just want to make sure we get it right for the
taxpayers so we don't have to do this two or three times.
Mr. Hinchey. So are you looking at the possibility of the
danger, the increasing danger of the C-5As and the rate that
they have been used so steadily and effectively?
General Lichte. Right.
Mr. Hinchey. But the age and the aging, in spite of the
fact that the modernization process is----
General Lichte. The age is a factor that comes out, and
quite frankly, we put it back on our NCOs and airmen who are
fixing and repairing those aircraft. They do a marvelous job.
Just like Mr. Young said, those folks go out there and even
though they are working on aircraft sometimes twice as old as
them, they take great pride in launching those aircraft and
making them successful.
But that--for me and General McNabb and General Fullhart,
we want to make sure that that doesn't continue forever. We
want to get new requirements out there, we want to try to do
it. And again, we appreciate the great work that the committee
does to help us on it.
Mr. Dicks. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Hinchey. Just one last thing, if I could.
Mr. Dicks. What is the mission reliability rate of the C-5
and the C-17?
General Lichte. I will give it to you exactly. The C-5As
are--47.9 is the mission capable rate; C-5B is 57.8; and the C-
5M, we hope to go greater than 75 percent or higher; and for
the C-17, the C-17 is 86.4, to be exact.
Mr. Hinchey. I would just--if I may, one last thing.
I just hope, and I would expect that this is going to
happen, that the people who are putting this budget
recommendation together which is going to come to us, which our
Chairman has been so focused on, will understand your
understanding of the circumstances that we are dealing with,
with issues like the C-5A and how that issue has to be
addressed; and also to put it into context of the economic
development program in which we are engaged and the jobs that
are associated with the development of the new aircraft.
All of that, I think, is very important.
General Lichte. Yes, sir.
General McNabb. Congressman, I couldn't agree with you more
on that, to bring that all together.
There is no question that if you can't trust an airplane,
you have to treat it differently. In other words, you will have
to put in four to make two, three to make two. And you have to
build in--you can't carry cargo into places because--if you are
afraid that it will break.
So we have to manage the fleet differently because of that.
And I think that all plays--and again, I echo what General
Lichte says, it is amazing what our folks who are out there do.
Stewart has been instrumental across the C-5 fleet making
sure that when we--we put the C-5 into battle, they have been
ready to take care of anything we need done, to include
bringing in other airplanes to do heavy maintenance there at
Stewart.
So again I tell you a great unit that has been, and we
really do appreciate that.
Mr. Hinchey. Well, thank you very, very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. You have no choice is what it amounts to. The
same way with the line. We may have put enough money into this,
the C-17 line, but the subcontractor is going to run out. This
is the problem we are going to have down the road if you guys
don't make a decision there down the line before long.
Mr. Tiahrt.

TANKER REPLACEMENT

Mr. Tiahrt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Have we decided
whether the tanker competition is going to come out of OSD or
out of the Air Force? Has that decision been made?
General Fullhart. Sir, that is a decision that has not yet
been made.
Mr. Tiahrt. We don't yet know. I keep seeing ads for a KC-
45. Did we actually terminate the contract with Airbus and
Northrop Grumman?
General Fullhart. Yes, sir, we did.
Mr. Tiahrt. Was there a term liability clause in there that
was employed? And I would like to know how much was spent
there.
General Fullhart. I can provide that to you for the record.
Mr. Tiahrt. All right. Thank you.
[The information follows:]

The contract contained both the cost reimbursement
termination clause as well as the limitation of funds clause.
The contractor had billed for approximately $60 million prior
to the termination. The Air Force and the Defense Contract
Management Agency are currently in the process of negotiating a
settlement price to the terminated contract.

Mr. Tiahrt. We heard about low cost, best value. Mr. Moran
brought that up.

SUBSIDIES

How are you going to deal with these ongoing problems,
though, that were apparent in the previous proposals, like the
startup subsidies that the United States Trade Representative
says are illegal? Are we going to turn a blind eye to those
again, or will they be taken into consideration in the next go-
around?
General Fullhart. Sir, it is my understanding that those
are being adjudicated in the WTO, and so we await the outcome
of those.
Certainly, we are following whatever laws have been passed
by Congress in terms of our Federal acquisition regulations,
and we will certainly abide by those.
Mr. Tiahrt. So as far as the contract itself, it will have
no contractual consideration for these startup subsidies?
General Fullhart. Sir, it would be premature for me to know
at this point what the future contract----
Mr. Tiahrt. This is an ongoing problem. There needs to be
either some kind of reconciliation if it occurs after the
contract award, if there is an impact--a little late when it is
downstream. I think it should be taken into consideration as we
move forward, that this is an unfair advantage that some
corporations have in this process. And I don't know how you get
a true low cost if you don't take into consideration illegal
subsidies.
What about these regulations that are waived in the DFARS
for foreign suppliers, the things like Buy American Act, cost
accounting standards, international trafficking in arms
regulations, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the Berry
amendment? The DFARS waives these; Congress doesn't waive these
considerations.
In waiving those regulations, are you going to take into
consideration the difference in cost of employing these, or are
you going to waive them for American manufacturers as well as
the foreign manufacturers?
General Fullhart. Sir, I can take that one for the record.
My understanding of the Buy American Act is that there are
memorandums of agreement that have been signed that, in effect,
many of the countries in Europe and others are treated as an
equal.
[The information follows:]

No waivers have been processed with regard to the KC-X
competition. On any future KC-X source selections, offerors
will need to comply with current Defense Federal Acquisition
Regulation Supplement guidance for the Buy American Act, cost
accounting standards, international trafficking in arms
regulations, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and the Berry
amendment.
Specifically, the Buy American Act allows for acquisition
of commercial derivative supplies from qualifying countries to
include France. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2533, the Secretary of
Defense may enter into agreements with partners in national
security for the purposes of the Buy American Act. These
agreements are established through Defense Cooperation
Agreement letters signed by the Secretary of Defense.
The Department of Defense does not determine the
applicability of Cost Accounting Standards (CAS). That is the
prerogative of the CAS Board, a five member board, chaired by
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy and is comprised of
members of industry, academia, and government. The CAS Board
regulations allow for modified coverage for foreign concerns
and U.S. firms in certain circumstances. Most of our major
trading partners have financial systems requirements similar to
our cost accounting standards. However, modified coverage does
require the application of CAS 401 and 402, which provide for
consistency in estimating, accumulating, and reporting costs as
well as consistency in allocating costs incurred for the same
purpose. Also, CAS does not apply to commercial products
utilized in the manufacture of an end item being delivered to
the government and CAS does not apply to contracts and
subcontracts with foreign governments as set forth in Federal
Acquisition Regulation appendix 1 subpart 9903.2011. In this
case, the KC-X tanker contract is compliant with CAS
requirements.
The Air Force did not waive the requirements of the
international trafficking in arms regulations (ITAR). While
there are elements of the KC-X tanker acquisition which are
subject to ITAR restrictions, the KC-X program team verified
that the competing contractors complied with the ITAR
restrictions for the applicable elements.
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is designed to
impact the way U.S. firms do business in foreign markets. The
Department of Defense did not waive the FCPA, which applies
only to practices by foreign corporations. All offerors are
required by section K of the Request for Proposal/contract to
certify that they are in compliance with all laws and
regulations.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007
removed the specialty metals requirement from 10 U.S.C. 2533a
(the ``Berry Amendment'') and established a new specialty
metals requirement at 10 U.S.C. 2533b. The specialty metals
requirement flows down to subcontractors and it now applies to
procurement of ``end items, or components thereof', not just
specialty metals. As a result of extensive pressure from
industry, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2008 granted additional flexibilities in sections 804 and
844 to include and exception for commercial derivative military
aircraft.
This new exception for commercial derivative military
articles allows contractors to certify that the contractor or
its subcontractors have entered into agreements to purchase an
amount of domestically melted or produced metal, in the
required form, for use during the period of contract
performance in the production of the commercial derivative
military article.

Mr. Tiahrt. So you are going to waive them for the American
manufacturers as well as the foreign manufacturers?
General Fullhart. Sir, I have no idea.
Mr. Tiahrt. In order to treat them as equal, that would be
a fair thing to do. But that is an ongoing problem that I think
needs to be taken into consideration. Do you waive regulations
for foreign suppliers that have a significant portion of this--
I mean, the first five airplanes, according to the EADS
proposal will be built in France. So we are going to completely
waive those regulations for those five and maybe the subsequent
ones?
I think that is an ongoing problem that needs to be
addressed in this bid, because I don't know how you achieve a
low cost versus best value if you don't take that into
consideration.
Also, what about proposals that have false pretenses
employed in them? And I will tell you a little story because it
is Army that did this instead of the Air Force, but it is a
lesson learned that needs to be a OSD lesson learned.
The light utility helicopter contract was awarded to EADS
with a proposal that included work done in America to--it
managed to, with the proposals, to meet Buy American standards;
but then, once it was signed into contract, that work was
pulled back to Europe. The airframe was pulled back, the
avionics were pulled back, some of the fire walls were pulled
back around the engine.
And I know this because they were Kansas companies that
were part of a successful bid, part of a successful
manufacturing plan that, once it came into a contract, they
just kept that work over in Europe. So there was a false
pretense in obtaining the contract.
What mechanism will you put in place to make sure that
there are no false pretenses in their proposed manufacturing
plan? Because that has a great deal of--if you make a decision
based on the data in front of you, and then they change the
rules of the game afterwards--and in the clause of every
contract that I have looked at that comes out of EADS, there is
a paragraph that says, We are going to make manufacturing
decisions based on best economic principles for the company--
and I can understand that--but that is code that says, We are
going to keep this work in Europe.
And we know for a fact that what we saw in the last
proposal, the work was going to stay in Europe for at least the
first five.
And the same thing happened in the light utility helicopter
contract. The first five helicopters were built in Europe. And
then a letter came to Spirit Aerospace in Wichita, Kansas, that
said, you know, We have got this ongoing line in Europe; and we
are doing okay and we think it would cost a little extra money
to move this work to America, so we are just going to cancel
our contract with you. And there was no penalty.
And I asked the Army, what mechanism did you have in place?
Zero. Nothing. Nada. No way to go back and say, By the way, you
gave us a false premise, and there is a pretty good reason to
believe that you misled us.
So what mechanism do we have?
And this is an ongoing problem. There needs to be a
mechanism in place that promises made are promises kept.
Because promises build hope, but keeping promises builds trust.
And right now I don't trust the people that you awarded the
contract to last time.
So this is an ongoing problem. And I don't think you can
have a low cost, best value evaluation without these mechanisms
in place.
General Fullhart. Well, sir, I appreciate those views, and
I am certain that will be part of the discussion. It will be
ongoing as the OSD and the Air Force--when we finally get
together to talk about things, it will be part of the
consideration.
Mr. Tiahrt. You do hold them accountable for requirements.
This ought to be a requirement.
General Fullhart. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Dicks. Would the gentleman yield just briefly?
Mr. Tiahrt. Glad to.

INDUSTRIAL BASE

Mr. Dicks. We had a hearing with Secretary Young. One of
the things we brought out to him was, on every one of these
procurements, you are supposed to do an evaluation of the
impact on the U.S. industrial base.
As far as I am concerned, I don't think that study was ever
done. And since we are starting this acquisition again, I just
want to reiterate to General Fullhart that we have to do that.
That is a statute.
We will be glad to get that to you so that you know; I
don't think it was done last time; I think it was kind of
waived by the Air Force. But we need you to--it is a 10 U.S.C.
2440, implemented by FAR Part 34 and DOD instruction 5002,
which require development of a program acquisition strategy
which looks into the impact on the industrial base in the
United States.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Tiahrt. This illustrates my point, because if you had
done an industrial impact--what was the title of it again,
Norm?
Mr. Dicks. 10 U.S.C. 2440.
Mr. Tiahrt. If that had been conducted on the light utility
helicopter based on the proposal, based on what is happening
today, you would have two different scenarios.
So a decision was made based on the first one, which was a
false premise; and the impact is now felt with people who are
looking for a job here in America. I mean, this is hometown
stuff. This is stuff that we are all worried about.
There are intellectual property repercussions. There are a
whole lot of things that impact our industrial base that are
based on a document that may or may not be fulfilled. And
somehow we have to have the mechanism to say, Tell me anything
you want, but whatever you tell me, I am going to hold you
accountable for.
General Fullhart. Yes, sir. I understand. Thank you.
Mr. Tiahrt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Ms. Kilpatrick.

TANKER REPLACEMENT TIMELINE

Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, Generals. The awarding of the acquisition was
let, pulled back. I am assuming now it is somewhere in house
being relooked at. I understand the Secretary is very much
involved in it.
The first question from me is, will it harm our fleet, our
defense capabilities, or any of that as we wait for the
administration, the Congress, to act? I know that 40 years they
can operate. Are we close to that or do we have another 2, 3, 4
years to debate this?
General Lichte. Well, we hope that it will happen soon. I
can assure you that everyone has been involved with working
with the old administration, and now the new administration, in
laying everything out. As General Fullhart pointed out, the
Secretary of Defense is just waiting for his Under Secretary
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to be in place; and
then we hope it is going to go.
We have laid out the requirements from Air Mobility Command
side. We have been talking about the need for a new tanker for
a number of years. We have always known that because of the
length of time that it will take, it will take us out until
about 2040 before all the KC-135s are recapitalized; and we are
doing the best we can with what we have.
And so we just hope it accelerates. And we appreciate all
the support we have been getting.
Ms. Kilpatrick. So it must not be absolutely settled during
this 111th Congress. You would like it, but we can still----
General Lichte. No. It needs to be started because if it
doesn't--first of all, if everything goes right, we don't see
the first airplanes showing up until about 2015.
On the tanker side, we have a number of KC-135s, but we
also have KC-10s, 59 of them. They were supposed to be the
bridge to the new tanker, but we haven't modernized those as
well. So we have to get on or we will find ourselves at a
tremendous shortage of tanker aircraft.
General McNabb. Congresswoman, if I could add to that. I
say it is my number one priority. There is no question about
it. We need them sooner. We need them now. We needed them
yesterday, because as soon as we get on with that, we will have
a capability that I think will be essential to what we are
trying to do around the world.
Mr. Murtha. Would the gentleman yield? Go back to that
2015. Start when you said 2015.
General Lichte. 2015 is the time that, for air traffic
control management, we need new avionics in the KC-10;
otherwise, we are not allowed to fly in some of the sweet
airspace--first of all, primarily in Europe, and then it
expands around the rest of the world.
That was the KC-10 that I was talking about.
Mr. Dicks. The gentleman has a good point here.
Let's ask a question: When he has got it, when would be the
IOC if we got a decision in this year, when would be the
initial operating capability?
Mr. Murtha. We can work out a compromise in the
supplemental. When would you get your first airplane out there?
We tell you to buy the airplane.
General Lichte. Well, as you know, both companies had
different dates that they could get the aircraft out.
Mr. Murtha. What is the first one that we could get out in
the United States, built in the United States?
Mr. Dicks. Two or 3 years?
General Fullhart. Yes, sir, about 3 to 4 years; in that
range because you have the development period, the testing
period. Once you get through that, then you start delivering to
the warfighter.
Mr. Murtha. Is that because of the requirements you put on
that are absolutely essential to the thing? These airplanes
were already built, flying.
General Lichte. These first ones would go out to Edwards
Air Force Base and do the test to make sure that all our
aircraft can refuel behind them, to make sure it has
everything, and anything that was added or included--we have
the performance data to make sure that our air crews are ready
to fly them.
And so I would expect to see it--as quickly as it comes, it
is going to start flying. As soon as the aircraft arrives, we
will start flying it at the test program. And then usually it
is about close to 2 years of tests. And then it shows up--just
like with the C-5M with the reengining, it is going to take a
while.
It has been in tests for a while. It is going to go through
some operational tests, and then we put it on the line.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Chairman, it is much better if we did this
from scratch. It would be 20 years 15 years--much shorter by
having a commercial derivative.
Mr. Murtha. Ms. Kilpatrick.

MIXED FLEET

Ms. Kilpatrick. Never miss a plug. I like that, Chairman,
over there.
That was one thing. Then it talks about the mixed, which
means to reinforce or something, or new fleet. I didn't hear a
clear answer up here.
Which is better? The cost, yes, you considered it, but I am
not sure it is the only thing that you consider. Does it matter
to the Air Force?
And we are appropriators. And you all can't say much to the
President and OMB and SDD and all that--that was the wrong
acronym.
But you know, if you can't say it, just say the other
people make that decision.
General McNabb. Obviously, the Secretary of Defense has
been very clear on how he sees that. And obviously, Congressman
Murtha, the chairman, has come on and said, Here are some
different ways of looking at it.
I think they are looking at all ways. I know that is kind
of how I understand it. They are looking at every avenue and
mix and how you might do that.
I would also just say that from the standpoint of TRANSCOM,
both of the bidders when they came in with the tankers, they
came in with magnificent bids that would have met all the
requirements that we needed.
Ms. Kilpatrick. I don't want to go back to that.
General McNabb. I would say that as long as it meets the
requirements we have laid out, TRANSCOM is going to be happy.
And right now everybody is coming in with bids that have more
than met our requirements. So we are happy.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Let me ask one other thing.
I am going to leave that because we can go, in here, all
day on that one.

PIRACY

Piracy, I keep hearing it is in one part of the world. And
I know, General McNabb, it is also one of your priorities. What
is the status of it? Are we there? I know you work with a
coordinated effort here. Is it larger or smaller? Where are we
going with that?
General McNabb. Well, I do think that, as you say, it is a
global problem. It is a global transportation problem that has
to be dealt with. What we have done with our sealift fleet is,
we have worked tactics, techniques and procedures along with
the Navy to make sure that they have got a good concept of how
we escort our ships through.
We have gone out to industry and helped them with
assessments to make sure that they are able--you know, they
have got all the latest, here is how you deal with that. And I
think that is all working very well; there have not been any
attacks on our ships.
It is a constant problem. It is one that I think we will
have to live with and make sure that we are always thinking
ahead about how do we do this. Again, it is not necessarily our
Military Sealift Command ships. It is more our container ships
that our commercial partners are carrying our stuff with it.
We track that very carefully. We watch them. We have
special ways of working with the Navy to make sure that they
get escorted when required. All of those things are taking
place.
But it is one of those concerns I have every day.
Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The gentleman from Georgia.

INVENTORY, AIRCRAFT RETIREMENTS, CHINOOKS, C-130JS, AND C-5S VS C-17S

Mr. Kingston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen I have
four unrelated questions. And what I was going to do is just go
ahead and ask them; and whatever you can't get to, if you could
answer it for the record.
The first question has to do with the inventory, that we
often interfere with your ability to control in terms of
airplanes that you want to mothball. I think, actually,
Congress did make some progress and gave you more flexibility.
So I wanted to hear how that was going.
The second question actually has to do with Chinooks in
Afghanistan. I was talking to an Army Guard unit from Georgia
yesterday, who will be using them. But I was wondering what the
split was between Air Force and Army on Chinooks. Do we have
enough in theater there? Getting back to what Rodney was asking
in terms of transportation over there, and Guard versus regular
Air Force, I just wanted a comment on that. I just would be
interested in what you had to say.
And then on the C-130Js, there were 34 in the fiscal year
2008 supplemental. There were none requested in the 2009
President's budget, and I was wondering if there would be any
in the 2010 budget.
And the last question was following up on Mr. Dicks's
question about the reliability of the C-5 versus the C-17. And
if I heard you correctly, you said that C-17 was at 86 percent,
and the best C-5 was, I think, 46 percent. That is a huge
disparity, so I was wondering if you could maybe tell us more
about that difference. Because that being the case, it would
appear to be, you know, let's just use C-17s.
So those are my questions.
General McNabb. Congressman, how about I hit the first two?
On inventory, there is no question that as we get new
aircraft, we like to have permission to retire the old. What
really makes our system is the crews, the maintenance, the
facilities, all of those. And so our ability to say, Hey, if we
get new things, we need to retire the old because those crews,
we need to transfer them over to the new assets.
Many of the new assets can handle a higher utilization
rate. They are much better, much more valuable, and we can make
them much more useful by doing that. We need the maintainers to
do the same thing. If we don't retire the old ones, we can't
transfer them.
So I would say, that ability to retire the old is
absolutely essential.
Mr. Kingston. Isn't it something like $3 million a week to
maintain those soon to be, or hopefully to be, mothballed
airplanes? I know it is a big cost. Do you know what it is?
General McNabb. I can get that for the record. But, of
course, it depends on which fleet we are talking about, what
kind of storage we need to bring them in. But many times we are
required to keep them on the ramp and keep them crewed and with
maintenance and all of the others.
[The information follows:]

The initial in-processing cost for a C-5 aircraft entering
Type 1000 Storage is $49,000. Twice a year the aircraft is
inspected at a cost of $262/inspection (annually $524). Every
four years there is a re-preservation; estimated at $33,000 for
C-5 aircraft.

But we need to get those young airmen moved across to the
new assets so we take full advantage of the investment that is
made. There is no question about that.
The Chinooks, the Air Force, as far as I know, doesn't own
any Chinooks, so----
Mr. Kingston. It is all Army?
General McNabb. All Army.
And then I will let you all answer the 130J and the
reliability issue.
General Lichte. Let me circle back. Because the biggest
issue for us was KC-135 retirement, KC-135E models in
particular. This year we were granted permission to retire
them, so by the end of this year, all the E models will be
retired.
It did cost money to go out and rotate the tires once a
week, run the engines once a month. So that is where you were
coming up with that figure.
I don't think it was quite as high as $3 million, but when
you factor in how much money it also costs to put it into what
we call Type 1000 storage out in the desert--my term is a
``bubble wrap'' around the airplane--that was expensive. We
didn't think we needed to do that, but we were forced to do
that.
We have been given permission now to retire the rest of the
E models. Some of them will remain in Type 1000 storage. Some
of them have just been retired, so they will just sit in the
desert. Then we can use them for parts on other airplanes.
The same, by the way, for the 130 fleet, we are trying to
do that.
We still have restrictions on the C-5 fleet, which we can't
retire any.
With regard to the reliability, I will do that.
I will let you talk about C-130Js.
57.8 is the reliability for the C-5B, which is our youngest
C-5 and the most modern C-5; we are trying to push that up to a
reliability rate of 75 percent. And you are right, when you
compare that even to the 86 percent of the C-17, we are hoping
to get all the way up to 81 percent on the C-5. But still, the
C-17 is more reliable.
General Fullhart. Sir, with regards to fiscal year 2010,
that is part and parcel of the ongoing dialogue that OSD is
running. And I simply just don't have insights into that at
this time.
Mr. Kingston. We will know in 3 weeks.
General Fullhart. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kingston. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Mr. Rogers.

AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ, MANAS AIR BASE

Mr. Rogers. You are going to be given a lot more work to do
in the next few months with the anticipated buildup in
Afghanistan and the build-down in Iraq. Are you ready for that?
And number two, what does the closing of the Manas Air Base
in Kyrgyzstan do if that takes place to these needs?
General McNabb. Yes, sir.
What we have been doing to make sure that we have whatever
General Petraeus needs on the ground in Afghanistan: We have
been really working that hard with AMC and our own components
to make sure that we are set. The portions we are doing are to
make sure that we have more than one option on the ground and
make sure that we have the air robust enough so that if, in
fact, we have to take it in by air, we will be able to do that.
General Lichte has heard me say on a number of times, if we
had to do a Berlin airlift kind of deal tonight, you need to be
ready to do that; and his folks have been working very hard on
that. The way you do that is make sure that airfields--we make
sure that we can do very quick turns on aircraft, make sure
that if we can get parking ramp and you get the throughput
going on the different airfields there in Afghanistan.
We have been working that very closely with CENTCOM. And
those are the kinds of things we have been working on. I think
that the--we can provide this for the record.
But what we have done is increase the throughput at
Bastion, at Kandahar and Bagram specifically, in some cases
quadrupled the throughput there by working together, sending in
teams to be able to do that. And that is on the air side.
On the ground side, you all know that we have been working
on being able to come in also from the north, using what we
call the ``Northern Distribution Network,'' to make sure that
we can take commercial kinds of cargo through the north if we
can. We do that with fuel now. And I think that that is--we
have 800-plus containers in the Northern Distribution route
now. And we want to make sure that we take advantage of those
supply chains to get in there.
We are working very closely with CENTCOM to make sure that
we measure the flow that is going in there as they put the
17,000 troops in. And I think that from the standpoint of
making sure that we meter that and are thinking ahead of that,
that is all being worked very closely again with CENTCOM and
with the folks in the Pentagon.
My take is, we want to make sure that everybody understands
that they will not be slowed down because of our ability to
resupply.
I think when you brought up Manas, I say that Manas is
useful but not essential because we always have other options.
In some cases that may be a little more expensive but we have
them. And we don't want anybody to feel like they can slow us
down by holding an airfield hostage or saying, Hey, if you
don't have this, we can really take you out. We don't want
anybody to believe that because they can't. We have other
options to be able to do that.
Mr. Rogers. So you have no problem with the equipment and
the capability and the strategic capability of flying into
Afghanistan?
General McNabb. No, sir. In fact, I mentioned earlier my
thanks to this committee; because of what you have done in the
past, decisions that were made in the last 15, 20 years in this
committee, specifically supporting things like the 130J, like
the C-17, like Tunner loaders, that have allowed us to be able
to get the velocity and reliability on our aircraft up and to
be able to go into these smaller airfields. That has paid huge
dividends for us.

DEFENSIVE COUNTERMEASURES

Mr. Rogers. One last question. In Afghanistan especially I
would suspect that you would be susceptible to a lot of ground-
to-air attack. Are you equipped to handle that?
General McNabb. Again, this committee has been superb in
supporting us, our defensive systems and our tactics. We have
been flying in Afghanistan, as you know. Many of you, if not
all of you, have flown on our airplanes when they come in on
night vision goggles and random approaches to make sure that
every one is going to be a little bit different. So those kinds
of tactics are what have allowed us to be able to maintain that
flow that goes in there. My take is, that has really paid some
big dividends for us.
When I think about Afghanistan and I think about the
throughput, the C-17 is a perfect asset for that, something
Congressman Dicks--way back when we talked about that
throughput model. Afghanistan is that place. If you end up
saying, I have got only a small parking spot, but I am going to
have airplanes go through here, and they are going to leave the
engines running, dump the load in 15 minutes and be off again,
so I can bring the next airplane in. That is the CONOPS that we
have been working on.
I will let General Lichte jump in here. But I have asked
AMC. They have responded. They are all over this. But they know
that they may be asked; our ultimate guarantor that we can get
into Afghanistan and support General Petraeus is there. Again,
the defensive systems is a big part of that. And again, the
support of this committee has been huge.
Mr. Murtha. Do you have the airplanes to do it?
General McNabb. Yes, sir. As you said, the C-17, 130J, the
kinds of assets you have given us, the C-27.
You asked me, Chairman, earlier about how that would fit.
Given the more dispersed ops, the ability to have tails becomes
important as well. And, in fact, being able to bed down small
tails in that area also is important. There are places that
different assets really come of age. That is where the C-27
fits.

MEDEVAC HELICOPTERS

Mr. Murtha. CSAR takes 22 minutes to get somebody out of
Afghanistan because you don't have enough helicopters. I told
people, start lobbying for more helicopters and get them out in
the field.
Now, I know that the Air Force has stepped up some of their
resources there. You don't have the resources, so twice as many
people are dying in Afghanistan before they get to the
hospital. That is what we are talking about.
General McNabb. Right.
Mr. Murtha. You could do it, but do you have the resources
to do it? That is what this committee wants.
Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murtha. Let me talk about a couple things we have done.
We put the money in for the C-17. We put the money in for the
C-130 years ago. We put money in for SL-7. The 1991 war, if you
didn't have SL-7, you wouldn't get the equipment past where it
was. We put money in for ships, all those things.
So this Committee--and health care, we put money where we
see there is a need. But if we don't get the information, then
they give us hell on the floor. These guys get up here and they
say, you shouldn't do this, you shouldn't do that.
Well, our job is to appropriate money, but we have to have
figures in order to do that.
We can justify everything we put in this bill. Only 18
people voted against this bill. When it leaves here, it stays
the same until it goes to conference, and it doesn't change.
And they get all kind of railing against it. And the Senate
feels the same way. When we come to a compromise, the bills
pass very handily.
But information is the key, and we have got to have
information from you or we can't do the things that we need to
do to make sure the troops have what they need.
Mr. Young.

TANKER REPLACEMENT

Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I want to go
back to the tanker issue for just a minute.
A year ago when the tanker issue was really up in the air,
I had the audacity to suggest, why doesn't the Air Force
consider splitting the buy and having the two competitors both
build tankers? I was ridiculed everywhere. I took raps from
almost everybody who knew anything about the tanker issue. But
today we are talking about doing just that. So I have got
another weird suggestion that might not have any benefit today,
might not ever have any benefit.
Why not consider--when the Air Force decides what they want
in this tanker, why not have both companies build the same
aircraft, build the same tanker, the same suppliers for spare
parts, the same types of maintenance, same types of equipment
on the ground at airports? It is probably as weird as my first
suggestion last year. But this is something that has been going
through my own mind.
General McNabb. Let me let General Fullhart talk about that
from an acquisitions standpoint.
General Fullhart. Sir, it is definitely an innovative idea,
and I am not going to try to throw water on it.
I think some of the things that we would need to consider
in that kind of construct is, do we lose the savings that we
currently envision in terms of taking something that is already
established and having to create something out of whole cloth,
in other words, something that is new?
Certainly there is a business case to be made out there by
companies that might be reluctant to share some of their own
proprietary information. That is something they would have to
work through, obviously.
It is a fascinating idea. Perhaps as the time comes; we
will have to wait and see.
Mr. Dicks. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Young. Sure.
Mr. Dicks. I guess what I would say to the gentleman's
question--and I always have great respect for the gentleman. He
is always serious in trying to do the right thing.
The advantage of this program is that you have these
commercial planes already developed. So, I mean--you know, for
them to build a 767, which would mean they would have to go
through a whole development phase; or for Boeing to build an A-
330, they would have to go through a whole development. It
would raise the cost dramatically. It would be like building a
brand-new airplane.
As we were talking about earlier, if you are going to do a
brand-new airplane, it would take maybe 15 years to bring it
in. So the whole idea here is to take these commercial planes
off the shelf and then modify them for the military mission.
And that saves us a ton of money; you can do that for $6 or $7
billion.
Now the reason Gates is against this is because--I mean the
dual buy--is because, one, it would cost $6 or $7 billion to do
both of them, so that is another pot of money. Then you would
have to divide the buy.
I know the Chairman thinks we could double the buy. But it
would be better to double the buy on the low-cost, small,
correct airplane--you know who I am thinking of--and that would
drive the costs down.
But to buy two different planes--and I would just also say
to the gentleman, Pete Aldridge, when he made the first
decision, buy 80, lease 20, which was overturned because of the
scandal, he didn't even let Airbus compete because he said that
they didn't have a plane that met their requirements.
If you look at the GAO report on two important issues, an
Airbus can't meet the requirements. They had to be modified
under pressure from the other body in order to be able to even
compete.
So, again, I think the right thing to do is to stay with
the commercial buy, pick one airplane and if we can enhance the
spending for that, drive the cost down and buy more of them
soon, that would be, I think, the best solution.
Mr. Young. Well, I appreciate the gentleman's comments. And
as usual, he is probably always right.
Mr. Dicks. I am not necessarily right. I have been wrong
many times.
Mr. Young. I admitted that this was a strange suggestion
today, as the one I made last year that you are all talking
about now.
Mr. Dicks. Not all of us.
Mr. Young. If you are going to take an airplane off the
shelf, why couldn't two contractors take the same airplane off
the same shelf?
Mr. Murtha. Okay, folks, we are going to solve this
problem, and it is going to take a while, but we are going to
work it out.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Chairman, can I ask another question?
You are not going to end the hearing, are you?
Mr. Murtha. I was going to end the hearing.
Mr. Dicks. Can I just finish one thing?
Mr. Murtha. The gentleman from Washington.

TANKER FUEL USAGE

Mr. Dicks. You guys have your fuel charts up there. We sent
you up fuel charts.
Can you give them to them? We have got some more.
Now here is what bothers me. This is what I was trying to
say. But this is a Conklin & de Decker are a company that
evaluates fuel consumption for commercial airplanes. So these
are commercial numbers. These are not numbers that would relate
to the military plane.
But if you look at these numbers--let's just take the $100
per barrel and let's cut it in half to $50. If you have the
767-200ER versus the A-330, the difference in consumption--now
this is 179 airplanes. They fly 750 hours per airplane per year
and over a 40-year period.
Now, General Fullhart remembers that the acquisition people
made a mistake. They only had a 25-year life cycle. That is
what the JROC had, 40. Mr. Young had to admit that they had to
in the next go-round have a 40-year life cycle. So we are using
a 40-year life cycle.
The difference in fuel consumption at $100 a barrel is $25
billion. Let's cut that to $50; It would be $12.5 billion. I
mean, if that had been taken into account and evaluated, there
is no way the A-330 could have won the competition to have the
lowest cost. In fact, when the GAO redid the numbers, Boeing
had the lowest cost and should have been awarded the contract.
Do you have any comments? I mean, does this not make an
impression on any of you up there about this fuel consumption
thing, which was not taken into account?
They accepted the numbers of the two contractors and didn't
evaluate life cycle. And I have been given assurances that the
next go-round we will have a valid life cycle. In fact, Mr.
Murtha put language in the bill that says, you must do this and
you must have an outside authority verify that these are the
numbers.
I would like you to take these numbers. Mr. Murtha wants to
know what the numbers are on the KC-135E. I think you guys
could look at these numbers and then look at the KC-135E and
give us back what your assessment is. I mean, I think we have
to get this straightened out because last time they didn't even
evaluate it.
And I would like to hear from you on this.
Mr. Murtha. Let me say though, they don't make the decision
this time. OSD is making the decision. So we could talk----

TANKER REQUIREMENTS

Mr. Dicks. But they are developing their requirements and
they are giving all that information to OSD. That is what you
guys just said, that they are preparing information for the
Secretary about how to do this.
And the other thing, on those 800 requirements, Boeing
vastly beat Airbus on those 800 requirements. That was not even
looked at. And one of the criticisms of GAO was, you put out
800 requirements, one of the guys met most of them or a huge--
it was like two-to-one at least, and that wasn't even
evaluated. So that is another thing that bothers me.
And then, of course, I took the chairman out to Everett,
Washington, to see where they build 767s. Now that is a lot
different than an open piece of ground down in Alabama, you
know, where you haven't got any workers and you haven't got a
factory. And yet the Air Force evaluation said that was a
stronger proposal than Boeing with the 767 factory under way
and proven machinists.
And the other thing that bothers me--but I will stop here
for the fuel numbers. I would like your comments on the fuel
numbers.
General Fullhart. Well, sir, I appreciate that information.
And you are correct, we are looking at life-cycle costs. I am
sure that will be part of this next round. So I will certainly
take this back and appreciate your comments.
Mr. Dicks. I appreciate that.
[The information follows:]

Although the Government Accountability Office did not find
a basis to object to the Air Force's evaluation of fuel
consumption costs during the first tanker competition, the Air
Force is working with the Office of the Undersecretary of
Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) Defense
Procurement and Acquisition Policy Office to ascertain what
level of detail and specific methodology to evaluate fuel
consumption in the future competition.

Mr. Murtha. Mr. Tiahrt.
Mr. Tiahrt. We have heard a lot about a split buy, and last
year there was a lot of criticism because one--the Boeing plane
was supposedly not delivered yet. But today Boeing has
delivered their airplanes to Japan and Italy, and they have
flying booms that actually work. The KC-30 is delayed on their
flying boom to Australia.
And a boom is a complex piece of equipment. It is pretty
hard to handle that surge of fuel and absorb it. So when we
talk about a split buy, there are significant barriers for
having a split buy just based on the technology that has not
been proven yet today versus what has been proven today.
We have an airplane that has been flying, that has been
proven, that I think would be better to start more quickly like
we had proposed back in 2003. We could have saved this country
$15 billion had we moved forward back then.
I want to go on record saying that there is a better one
available.

VIP/SAM AIRCRAFT

Mr. Kingston. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to move the topic,
but I do have a question that is provincial. Gulfstream
Aerospace announced today a layoff of 1,200 people, and in
talking to their management, one of their concerns right now is
this kind of anti-corporate jet discussion that is going on in
the media. And I was wondering if--and I know that is happening
to other aircraft manufacturers. That is not the only reason.
I mean, the big reason, of course, is the recession. But
does this concern the Air Force in terms of losing some of the
manufacturing ability? And would that be of any consequence? Or
does this just sort of happen?
General Lichte. Certainly, over the years we have relied on
Gulfstream. In fact, we have a number of C-20 type aircraft
that are getting old, and we were planning on replacing them
with the C-37Bs, from Gulfstream.
You are right, there are a lot of comments out there on the
system right now that will affect. However, quite frankly, I
still think that the safe, comfortable and reliable
transportation----
Mr. Murtha. General, last year we tried to put three in. We
didn't hear a word from the Air Force. It was like dead
silence. I mean, you know, they are hurting, Gulfstream is. And
you know, anything you guys can speak up and put in the budget
helps.
General Lichte. Obviously, those types of aircraft are very
helpful, because I think it is very important for our leaders
to include----
Mr. Murtha. But it is not in the budget, General.
General Lichte. The problem becomes dollars available, sir.
What is more important? If you ask me what is more important, I
am going to tell you I need the tanker more than I need another
Gulfstream.
Mr. Murtha. I understand that.
But you see our problem. If we go through a budget, we want
to buy as many as we can, to get the price down. We have to
have information from you folks who are the experts in order to
make that buy.
So just keep in mind the problems we have because we are
going to be marking up long before these damn studies that you
guys are working on all the time come up.
But I appreciate your time and your frankness and the
committee will adjourn until sometime next week--10:00 a.m.
Tuesday. Thank you very much.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the
answers thereto follow:]

KC-135 Tanker Fleet

Question. The Air Force has previously expressed concern that the
KC-135 tanker fleet was suffering serious corrosion issues before the
Global War on Terror even began.
Has the Air Force evaluated what affect the high operations tempo
of the KC-135 tanker fleet and the adverse conditions of the
environment in theater had on the service life of these aircraft?
Answer. The KC-135R/T fleet has experienced an average annual
utilization (UTE) rate of 488 flying hours per aircraft between Fiscal
Year 2004-Fiscal Year 2008. This UTE has negligible service life impact
and negligible cost impact. However, certain specially configured KC-
135s (notably those with Multi Point Refueling System, Roll-On Beyond
Line-of-Sight Enhancement and Special Operations Air Refueling) have
recently experienced significantly higher utilization rates. These
aircraft make up a small percentage of the overall fleet and are
actively managed and monitored to minimize impact. Currently the data
does not reflect any adverse conditions that we can attribute to
environmental conditions in theater.

KC-135 R/T 5-YEAR UTE
(Avg Hrs/Yr)
------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY04....................................................... 479
FY05....................................................... 481
FY06....................................................... 475
FY07....................................................... 491
FY08....................................................... 513
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Question. Given the operations tempo of the tanker fleet, does the
Air Force still believe that the fleet is structurally viable to 2040,
as stated in the ``KC-135 Economic Service Life Study,'' of February
2001?
Answer. The 2040 projection was based on use of the average tanker
flying the fleet average flight hours until it reached the economic
life of 39,000 hours. Certain configurations of KC-135, notably the
Multi-Point Refueling System jets, have recently experienced
significantly higher utilization rates based on their operational
requirements. The Multi-Point Refueling System aircraft make up a small
percentage (20 aircraft) of the overall fleet and are being monitored
for any impact. If sustained at the current utilization rate without
any upgrades, these aircraft will reach their economic service life as
early as 2020.
Question. What is the mission capability rate of the KC-135?
Answer. The mission capability rate for the KC-135 fleet is
trending along at an even rate. In Fiscal Year 2006 the rate ended at
79.71 percent, in Fiscal Year 2007 at 79.35 percent and in Fiscal Year
2008 the rate was 80.04 percent. For the first two quarters in Fiscal
Year 2009 the rate is holding at 79.95 percent, which is the
established KC-135 mission capable standard.
Note. Mission capability rates only address unit possessed
aircraft. To get a better picture of the overall fleet we also track
aircraft availability (includes aircraft in depot status, etc). In
Fiscal Year 2008 the KC-135 availability was 61.5 percent.
Question. How many of the KC-135s cannot be deployed because of
flight restrictions or the lack of a capability to repair them if they
have problems in theater?
Answer. As of February 28, 2009, 22 KC-135E models are grounded.
All 37 KC-135E aircraft, including the 22 which are grounded, are
scheduled for retirement in Fiscal Year 2009. There are no other KC-
135s restricted due to condition. In theater repair capability is not a
limiting factor for any KC-135 deployment but because of operational
limitations we do not deploy KC-135Es to the theater.

KC-135 Tanker Maintenance

Question. The current fleet of KC-135 aircraft is almost 50 years
old. Based on the Air Force recapitalization plan of 12 to 15 aircraft
per year, some aircraft will be 80 years old by the time they are
replaced. In order to maintain the fleet, many upgrades will have to be
conducted leading to significant costs.
Just last week, you were quoted about the cost of re-skinning aging
KC-135s. When will this be started and at what costs?
Answer.
discussion of approach
KC-135 Skins Replacement has been manageable to date. Replacements
in Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) have been limited and there is a
reasonable amount of rework that can be accomplished before most of the
skins require replacement. However, the lack of a methodology that
accounts for the interaction of corrosion with fatigue generates
uncertainty in the ability to accurately predict the degradation to the
structure.
A future skin replacement program may be necessary. The following
assumptions were made to estimate the cost and schedule for replacing
the skins. The dates we have forecast for replacement were selected to
gain the most benefit from the work that may be accomplished, therefore
the initiation date was schedule and not technically driven.
Furthermore, to minimize the impact to aircraft availability, it was
assumed that no more than 12 aircraft would be down at any one time,
and the tasks were grouped to be accomplished concurrently. Each
estimate uses current year (FY09) dollars and is per aircraft.
aft body skins
Replacement of these skins is already programmed to be done as part
of PDM FY12-FY17.
Estimated cost per airplane: $0.3 million.
Schedule: FY12-FY17, 416 aircraft.
Max Aircraft Down: N/A-concurrent with PDM.
upper wing and horizontal stabilizer skins
These would be done concurrently, separate from PDM, in a speed
line, and include replacement of substructure components that are
important to continued use of the aircraft and accessible when the
skins are removed.
Estimated cost per airplane: $6.7 million.
Schedule: FY16-FY34, 416 aircraft.
Max Aircraft Down: 12 (at any one time)
crown and center wing (wing box) upper skins
This replacement is planned further in the future since recent
experience has not indicated significant problems with corrosion or
cracking. They are planned to be done concurrently in a speed line and
separate from PDM. We have accounted for planned retirements in this
increment.
Estimated cost per airplane: $4.6 million.
Schedule: FY26-FY34, 230 aircraft.
Max Aircraft Down: 12 (at any one time)
Question. What is the impact of fatigue cracking on the fleet and
how will the Air Force address these issues? Is the cracking driven by
usage or age? What are the costs of addressing the issue?
Answer. To date fatigue cracking has not been a serious issue on
the fleet. We continuously monitor the flying hours and use the
Aircraft Structural Integrity Program (ASIP) to identify and monitor
highly stressed areas of the aircraft and then repair or replace as
necessary.
Fatigue cracking is driven by usage.
ASIP inspections are performed during programmed depot maintenance
(PDM). As part of the ASIP program, individual aircraft receive a
tailored set of inspections that monitor the aircraft for fatigue
damage. The cost for the ASIP inspections during PDM runs from $75,300
to $125,500 (300 to 500 man-hours) per aircraft. Replacement of the aft
body skins is a fatigue issue and will begin in Fiscal Year 2012 at
estimated costs of 1,200 maintenance man hours ($301,200) per aircraft.
Note. Not asked in your question, but of significant concern, is
the issue of corrosion which is driven by age, environment and design.
In the coming years we will have to address major corrosion issues in
the wing and horizontal stabilizers upper skins, the fuselage crown
skins, landing gear trunnions, etc.
Question. The KC-135 was manufactured in the 1950s as basically a
handmade aircraft with minimal corrosion protection unlike the C-17
that today uses laser precision tools with extensive corrosion
protection.
How have manufacturing techniques impacted the corrosion on the KC-
135? How is manufacturing different today?
Answer. The KC-135 was manufactured with very little sealant
between mating surfaces, light but strong corrosion prone materials,
and fasteners were installed dry creating a corrosion cell. Spot welds
also eliminated fasteners and provided a way to attach the multiple
layers of skins. This combination of spot-welds and corrosion prone
materials creates an ideal corrosion environment.
Lessons learned have been incorporated as today's accepted industry
practices. This includes installing fasteners wet with sealant,
providing sealant on mating surfaces, chemical milled skins that
eliminate mating surfaces, and availability of corrosion and stress
corrosion resistant materials. Whenever possible, repairs performed in
PDM use the most corrosion resistant material along with the industry
standards for installation to prevent corrosion.
Question. Please discuss material degradation from exposure. Is KC-
135 maintenance increasing in time and cost?
Answer. Maritime environments, such as Kadena Air Force Base,
Japan, MacDill Air Force Base, FL, and Hickam Air Force Base, HI,
promote metal degradation due to the corrosive elements found in those
atmospheres. Because the locations increase the rate of corrosion
occurring to our aircraft, we typically rotate the aircraft out of
severe corrosion environments every two to four years. This ensures
impacts to any single aircraft are reduced. Additionally, to overcome
environmental impacts and to reduce the overall maintenance required on
the fleet, an aggressive corrosion control program was implemented.
This includes shorter wash cycles for severe environments and treating
the aircraft with corrosion preventative compounds. All new replacement
materials are less corrosion prone.
Programmed depot maintenance (PDM) hours have remained relatively
constant since 2003. While the hourly rate changes yearly, the man-hour
requirement for PDM has remained at approximately 28,000 maintenance
man hours.
Air Force cost models show that overall logistics costs for
operating the KC-135 have continued to climb in constant year dollars
and the models project continued growth in the future. Base level
maintenance costs, engine overhaul and PDM costs account for nearly all
the increases in logistics costs above inflation. PDM cost increases
are largely due to increases in direct material.
Question. Has the fleet experienced growth in depot possessed
aircraft? What are the main drivers?
Answer. Yes. The fleet has experienced growth in depot possessed
aircraft. Depot possessed aircraft consists of aircraft in programmed
depot maintenance (PDM), unprogrammed depot level maintenance (UDLM)
and aircraft modifications (Mods). The table below shows the recent
growth.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of A/C Depot Possessed
-----------------------------------------
FY06 FY07 FY08
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PDM........................... 39 44 47
UDLM.......................... 1 2 0
Mods.......................... 15 24 29
Totals.................... 55 70 76
------------------------------------------------------------------------

As indicated in the table above, there are a number of main drivers
for this recent growth.
PDM growth is driven by a couple of factors at the organic and
contract sources of repair. One factor in the PDM growth is due to a
change in the mix of major structural repairs (MSRs). While the overall
number of MSRs has decreased, the MSR mix has changed to repairs which
limit concurrent maintenance. Another factor in PDM growth is PDM flow
days have increased resulting in increased PDM depot possessions. Flow
days increased due to process changes, materiel support issues, and
contract PDM issues which impacted production. Lean process and
material supportability improvement efforts have been implemented to
improve flow days. Contract PDM issues are directly related to two
Government Accountability Office (GAO) protests and Court of Federal
Claims (CoFC) lawsuit on the September 2007 PDM contract award. GAO
ultimately ruled in favor of the Air Force, but the CoFC did not and
directed a re-solicitation of the contract.
Modifications growth is driven by two major modifications: Global
Air Traffic Management (GATM) and Control Column Actuated Brake (CCAB).
GATM was accelerated to more quickly provide this required capability
to the warfighter. CCAB was implemented with an aggressive schedule to
modify the KC-135 fleet as quickly as possible with this safety-
oriented modification. Though resulting in a short-term increase in
depot possessed aircraft, the modifications will be accomplished sooner
and in the long-term provide much needed capability.
Question. What are the costs and available forecasts for the KC-
135? What about the costs for the airframe, engines, and avionics
modifications? What about the availability due to programmed depot
maintenance?
Answer. Costs: The total funding associated with all KC-135
aircraft modifications currently in-progress is $1.636 billion. The
preponderance of this funding is associated with two major aircraft
modifications: Global Air Traffic Management (GATM) and KC-135
Communications Navigation Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM)
which is also known as Block 45. GATM began in 1999 and will complete
in 2011, with a total program cost of $967.1 million (including spares)
and modification of 419 C/KC-135 aircraft. Block 45 began in 2008 and
will continue through 2021, with a total program cost of $587.0 million
(including spares) and modification of 417 C/KC-135 aircraft. The
remaining funding ($82.2 million) is associated with 21 avionics and
airframe related modifications. Plans for two future avionics
modifications scheduled to begin in Fiscal Year 2010 are estimated to
cost $37.8 million.
Availability: The fleet has experienced growth in depot possessed
aircraft. Depot possessed aircraft consists of aircraft in programmed
depot maintenance (PDM), unprogrammed depot level maintenance (UDLM)
and aircraft modifications. The total number of aircraft in the depot
possessed category has grown from 55 in Fiscal Year 2006, to 70 in
Fiscal Year 2007, to 76 in Fiscal Year 2008. There are a number of main
drivers for this recent growth.
Growth in depot possessed aircraft is driven by two factors at the
organic and contract sources of repair. One factor in the PDM growth is
due to a change in the mix of major structural repairs (MSRs). While
the overall number of MSRs has decreased, the frequency of MSRs
limiting concurrent repairs has increased. The second factor in PDM
growth is increased PDM flow days. Flow days increased due to process
changes, materiel support issues and contract PDM issues which impacted
production. Lean process and material supportability improvement
efforts have been implemented to improve flow days. Contract PDM issues
are directly related to two GAO protests and Court of Federal Claims
(CoFC) lawsuit on the September 20 07 PDM contract award. GAO
ultimately ruled in favor of the Air Force, but the CoFC did not and
directed a re-solicitation of the contract. The CoFC decision is
currently under appeal.
Growth in depot possessed aircraft due to modifications is driven
by two major modifications, Global Air Traffic Management (GATM) and
Control Column Actuated Brake (CCAB).
GATM, an upgrade to the aircraft's communication and navigation
systems to enable free operation in civil airspace, was accelerated to
more quickly provide this required capability to the warfighter. CCAB
was implemented with an aggressive schedule to modify the KC-135 fleet
as quickly as possible with this safety-oriented modification. Though
resulting in a short-term increase in depot possessed aircraft, the
modifications will be accomplished sooner and in the long term will
provide much needed capability.

Fee-For-Service Refueling

Question. The 2008 National Defense Authorization Act directed the
Air Force to pursue a fee-for-service refueling capability over a five
year period.
What is the requirement for a contractor supplied capability?
Answer. In our KC-X Analysis of Alternatives, commercial refueling
services were evaluated. The analysis indicated that commercial
services were not a viable permanent solution to replace the organic
air refueling capability, but suggested the potential to augment the
organic tanker fleet. It could be used to fill any potential shortfall
that might occur while acquiring a new tanker.
Question. Is the Air Force today not able to meet its needs for
refueling?
Answer. The Air Force meets current requirements for air refueling.
Question. How would the Air Force structure the program?
Answer. The program would be executed in two parts. The first part
would be the preparatory period where the selected company or companies
would be responsible for the boom modification, integration and
certification of their chosen aircraft. We anticipate this would take
two to three years. Once the aircraft and boom are certified, we would
begin the service period of the program which is statutorily mandated
at five years.
Question. What is the cost of the pilot program?
Answer. We are currently evaluating the data we received from the
last request for information from industry. That data will help
determine our acquisition strategy and the overall cost of the eight-
year program.
Question. What type of aircraft do you foresee vendors attempting
to use?
Answer. Potential vendors who have responded to our requests for
information have indicated potentially using a wide range of aircraft
including the B-767, A-330, DC-10 and B-707.
Question. Do you anticipate vendors using new aircraft or used?
Answer. Potential vendors have indicated potentially using both new
and used aircraft.
Question. If the Fee-For-Service air refueling pilot program proves
beneficial to the warfighter and the taxpayers will you re-evaluate the
total number of KC-Xs required?
Answer. It is essential that we meet national security requirements
with an organic capability. The Fee-For-Service pilot program will help
determine if augmenting that organic capability with commercial air
refueling services is a good value to the taxpayer.
Question. Would the companies flying the contract aircraft
performing the refueling have the refueling boom and aircraft markings
consistent with current KC-135 and KC-10 configurations?
Answer. We will require markings to comply with currently accepted
standards necessary to safely refuel receivers.

Other C-5 Modernization Programs

Question. Due to the cost increases in the C-5 avionics
modernization program, the Air Force reduced requirements and deferred
some development activities to other programs. The Air Force waived 14
operations requirements and deferred the correction of nearly 250
deficiencies, to be addressed and funded in the re-engining and other
future efforts.
What is the status of waivers and deficiencies?
Answer. A portion of prioritized outstanding deficiencies will be
incorporated in the fielding of the next sustainment software build
expected in June 2009. In addition, the C-5 Reliability Enhancement and
Re-Engining Program Block Software Upgrade program and future
sustainment software builds will address the remaining deficiencies
dependent on the available funding and Air Mobility Command priority.
Air Mobility Command is not experiencing operational limitations and is
currently supporting the strategic airlift mission with over 49,000
operational avionics modernization program flight hours.
Question. How and when does the Air Force intend to fix these
issues and at what cost?
Answer. The Air Force will go through an iterative process and
address the deficiency reports based on the available funding and Air
Mobility Command priority. The effort will be scoped and the cost will
be determined as we go through this iterative process.
Question. Besides the avionics and re-engining modifications, what
other major modifications does the Air Force believe are needed for the
C-5? Why are they needed? When should these efforts start and what are
the expected costs?
Answer. There are several major modification efforts currently
needed for the C-5 besides avionics and re-engining modifications:
Structural repair initiatives and Large Aircraft Infrared
Countermeasures (LAIRCM). The structural repair initiatives being
addressed today are the repair/replacement of the C-5A/C Aft Crown Skin
and the C-5A/C Contour Box Beam Fitting. These modifications are needed
due to stress corrosion cracking (SCC) susceptibility of these
components, leading to unsafe operating conditions. The C-5A Aft Crown
Skin is projected to cost approximately $534 million if the Air Force
decides to pursue as a modification. There are currently two aircraft
participating in the validation/verification process. The C-5A Box Beam
Fitting is projected to cost approximately $150 million if the Air
Force decides to pursue as a modification. There is currently no
funding in the budget for either of these projects and are proceeding
on a ``repair as necessary'' basis. LAIRCM is needed due to the
requirement for the large aircraft like the C-5 to operate in infrared-
threatened airspace, as stated in the LAIRCM operational requirements
document 314-92, dated August 1998. The program was initiated in Fiscal
Year 2007 for 52 C-5B/M aircraft and operates under an indefinite
delivery, indefinite quantity contract for system acquisition/
installation. There are 15 funded aircraft in the Fiscal Year 2009
budget.
Question. How much does it cost today to maintain a C-5 that has
not been modernized, one that has only received the avionics
modernization, and one that has received both the avionics and
reengining modifications?
Answer. Operations and Support (O&S) costs are not available by
specific tail number, we can only make predictions on the fleet-wide
costs. The estimated O&S cost of the 111 C-5's if not modernized is
$73.1 billion from 2005 through 2040. C-5 fleet instrumentation must be
converted from analog to digital via modernization to provide
capabilities needed to allow continued operations in European and
Pacific airspace and address significant vanishing vendor issues.
The O&S cost of the 111 C-5's if they only receive the avionics
modernization is $84.4 billion from 2005 through 2040. The avionics
modernization program is a capability improvement not a reliability
improvement and allows access to ever-restrictive airspace. There are
significant costs associated with hardware/software updates and new
maintenance requirements for these capabilities.
The O&S cost of the 111 C-5 Fleet that received both the avionics
modernization and reengining modification is $66.6 billions from 2005
through 2040. The re-engining modification is a reliability improvement
and also increases fuel efficiency with new engines. It includes a mix
of legacy systems, avionics modernizations and re-engining
modifications aircraft following the production schedules that vary up
to steady state of 59 C-5As under the avionics modernization program
and 52 C-5Ms for the re-engining modifications.
Question. What are the expected gains in reliability,
maintainability, and availability of a modernized C-5?
Answer. Even though the C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP)
will realize some ``reliability, maintainability, and availability''
improvements, such improvements were not the program focus. The initial
intent of the program was to address issues with obsolete parts,
diminishing manufacturing source issues, the All-Weather Flight Control
System and Global Air Traffic Management compliance requirements. This
resulted in replacing the existing flight and engine instrument system
and the flight control system with integrated, state-of-the-art, and
cost effective systems. The C-5 AMP implemented the applicable emerging
Civil Aviation Authority requirements for communication, navigation,
and surveillance for operation in the global air traffic management
environment.

C-5 Oversized Cargo

The C-5 is the only U.S. aircraft capable of carrying some
oversized equipment such as generators and space launch systems.
Question. How many C-5s are required for this unique capability?
Answer. None. The C-5 program of record is not based on outsized
cargo requirements. The Defense Department organic airlift requirements
were studied and established in the 2000 Outsize/Oversize analysis of
alternatives, the Mobility Capabilities Study 2005, the C-5 Nunn-
McCurdy breach, and subsequent Joint Requirements Oversight Council.
The current combined C-5 and C-17 programs of record meet these airlift
requirements. There are 12 C-5 unique outsized cargo items which are
transported on an infrequent basis to support Department of Defense and
NASA requirements.
Question. Are there plans to retire equipment that must be carried
by C-5s? If so, when?
Answer. At this time, there are currently no plans to retire
equipment that must be carried by a C-5.
Question. Are there commercial carriers that could address this
requirement?
Answer. If the cargo delivery is not time sensitive, some outsized
C-5 unique cargo, (i.e., truck with 100 kilowatt generator and truck
with 475 BTU HVAC) could be moved via a commercial surface carrier. If
delivery is time-sensitive, the AN-124 (a foreign flag carrier) is of
similar size and would be able to carry some of the C-5 unique outsize
cargo. However, the AN-124 cannot carry NASA cargo which is transported
on our space cargo modified C-5Cs and it will not carry the outsized
cargo of special operations nor that of classified users.

C-17 Operations Tempo

Question. C-17s have been involved in a number of landing incidents
in the Central Command Area of Operations of late, most notably just a
couple of weeks ago when a C-17 landed at Bagram without its landing
gear down. The Committee understands investigations are ongoing and is
not looking for comment on the cause for each; however, the Committee
is concerned these incidents may indicate a more serious problem.
What can you tell us about the latest incident and what other
incidents have occurred in theater with C-17s?
Answer. Summarized below are a total of 12 C-17 landing incidents
that have occurred in theater since January 2005. The accident
investigation board for the latest incident is still in progress and
its findings have not yet been released.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mishap
Date Class Synopsis
------------------------------------------------------------------------
5 Jan 05 A Main landing gear lug assembly
failed on landing.
6 Jun 05 A Hard landing following low
visibility instrument
approach.
7 Jul 05 B Landing gear damaged when
aircraft encountered 4 to 5
inches of standing water
during landing rollout.
5 Aug 05 A Aircraft landed with right main
landing gear off the runway.
29 Aug 06 C Underside of fuselage damaged
during semi-prepared runway
operations (i.e., dirt field).
5 Sep 06 C Underside of fuselage damaged
during semi-prepared runway
operations (i.e., dirt field).
18 Dec 06 C Tire failed during landing and
damaged right main gear.
5 Jan 07 C Tire failed during landing and
damaged left main gear.
9 May 07 C Underside of fuselage damaged
during semi-prepared runway
operations (i.e., dirt field).
24 Jul 08 C Hot brakes caused fuse plugs to
deflate 6 tires.
23 Dec 08 C Aircraft veered off the runway
during landing, un-commanded.
30 Jan 09 A Aircraft landed with the
landing gear retracted.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Question. What is your estimate on how fatigued your crew is and
your aircraft fleet?
Answer. We have no indicators that lead us to believe the C-17 crew
force is chronically stressed or fatigued at this time. C-17
crewmembers have spent an average of 94.8 days TDY for the last 12
months through February 2009. This compares to 74 days for C-5, 91.3
for C-130, 122.8 for KC-10, and 118.9 for KC-135 crewmembers. The
average number of days TDY for C-17 crew members has actually decreased
by over 30 days annually in the past 3 years. Waivers are rarely ever
granted to time-tested crew duty day limits or cumulative monthly
flying hour limits. Air Mobility Command (AMC) leadership and aircraft
commanders proactively manage crew fatigue work/rest cycles to mitigate
the potential for fatigue. Furthermore, AMC uses an operational risk
management program to predict and proactively adjust missions to reduce
risk factors such as fatigue.
AMC, Air Force Materiel Command, and Boeing have a joint process in
place to analyze C-17 fleet equivalent flying hours (stress). Through
close tracking of aircraft hours and specific aircraft stress points,
plus appropriate fleet rotation, AMC maintains an active program to
predict and manage the wear and tear on the C-17 fleet. Based on that
analysis, we do not believe the C-17 aircraft fleet is currently
fatigued.
Question. Are some of the issues a result of young pilots that just
do not have experience in a war environment?
Answer. Pilot experience in a war environment is at the highest
levels in the last two decades due to the support to operations in
South West Asia. Air Mobility Command (AMC) uses an operational risk
management program to predict and proactively adjust missions to reduce
risk factors such as crew experience. For instance, operational risk
management analysis dictated that Bagram airfield be designated as a
``special aircrew'' airfield. This required aircrews with a higher
level of experience in order to fly missions to Bagram. The two primary
indicators of experience are the qualification levels of aircraft
commander and instructor aircraft commander. Aircrew must have
accumulated requisite amounts of flight experience, received a
recommendation from unit leadership, and successfully passed a rigorous
flight and academic training program to obtain these qualifications.
AMC's aggregate C-17 pilot force is healthy (over 100% manned) in both
these key instructor pilot and aircraft commander qualifications. Long-
term, the two prime factors that can erode pilot experience are poor
pilot retention and/or insufficient pilot flying rates. Currently, the
Air Force, AMC, and C-17s have near record pilot retention rates and
are regularly flying at rates that exceed programmed requirements due
to ongoing operations.
Question. Is the constant operations tempo weighing too hard on the
force?
Answer. No. We do not believe the C-17 crew force is overly
stressed at this time. C-17 crewmembers have spent an average of 94.8
days TDY for the last 12 months through February 2009. This compares to
74 day for C-5, 91.3 for C-130, 122.8 for KC-10, and 118.9 for KC-135
crewmembers.
We have also changed the way we utilize the C-17 to help reduce the
operations tempo of the C-17 crew force. We now provide two squadrons
of C-17s to the theater on a full time basis, negating the need to
continually move assets back and forth to support intra-theater
operations. This reduced the average TDY days for the C-17 crew force
by almost 30 days annually.
Question. What are your risk mitigation factors to combat a
fatigued force?
Answer. From an operational perspective, we use a multi-tiered risk
analysis process. The mission planners, the squadron leadership, and
the aircraft commander all analyze the risks of a given mission prior
to execution using Operational Risk Management. If an increased risk is
identified, it is mitigated either by changing the crew composition
(for example adding more experienced crewmembers) or by changing the
mission conditions (for example flying during daylight hours).
As highlighted above, there is leadership involvement throughout
the entire mission planning and execution chain to ensure we are
providing the best resource, whether it is aircraft or aircrew to
execute the mission.
Part of the leadership involvement includes monitoring aircrew
flying hours during the previous 30, 60 and 90 days. Regulations allow
a maximum number of hours during each of those periods to ensure we are
not overstressing the crew members.
We also let our aircraft commanders make a safety call. During
execution, if the aircraft commander deems that risk or fatigue may
possibly endanger the mission, he or she is empowered to either lower
the risk if possible or delay the mission until conditions improve.
Above all, Air Mobility Command instills a culture of safety at all
levels.
Question. Has the Air Force considered increasing the crew ratio
for strategic assets to address crew fatigue?
Answer. Currently, the operations tempo of the C-17 is such that
there has been no requirement to increase the crew ratio. We continue
to monitor the crew force and don't see any issue with crew fatigue
across the force. With additional C-17s coming on-line, the additive
effect of those aircraft should also continue to push down the
operations tempo on the entire C-17 fleet.
Also, the C-17 has the highest crew ratio in the Mobility Air
Forces (MAF) at 3.0 for the active component. Air Force Reserve Command
(AFRC) C-17 associate units are manned at a 2.0 crew ratio. AFRC and
Air National Guard unit equipped C-17 units vary between a 3.0 and 5.0
crew ratio. The next highest crew ratio in the MAF is 2.25 for active
component C-130s. The C-5 crew ratio is 1.8 for the active units, with
an equivalent 1.8 for their Associate Reserve Units.

Future C-17 Procurement

Question. The C-17 program of record has increased over the last
several years. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and the 2005
Mobility Capabilities Study both determined a need for 180 C-17s to
meet strategic airlift requirements; this number assumed that the
entire C-5 fleet received avionics upgrades and new engines. In 2008,
following a cutback in the C-5 modernization plans; officials stated a
need for 190 aircraft. The two mobility studies are expected to
identify airlift requirements and support decisions on future force
size and mix.
How do the ongoing mobility studies address the C-17s dual role in
providing both a strategic and tactical airlift capabilities?
Answer. The ongoing mobility studies utilize C-17s as either
strategic or tactical aircraft while ensuring that no assets are
utilized in both roles simultaneously. The studies are structured to
model aircraft throughout their entire mission capability spectrum. The
models themselves determine which role provides the maximum impact to
closure and will utilize them in that capacity.
Question. Will the studies quantify numbers expected to be used in
a tactical intra-theater role and are these numbers then not considered
available for meeting the strategic inter-theater requirements?
Answer. Yes. The studies will quantify the number of C-17s utilized
in a tactical intra-theater role. The studies are structured to model
cargo and personnel flow from end-to-end and thus capture any
platform's utility across the array of missions it can perform. The
end-to-end modeling structure ensures assets are not in use in more
than one mission simultaneously.

C-17 As Strategic and Tactical Airlift

Question. The C-17 is the only airlifter capable of providing both
strategic (inter-theater) and tactical (intra-theater) airlift.
How and to what extent is the C-17 currently employed in a tactical
role supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. Currently, approximately 50 percent of Air Mobility
Command's daily C-17 operations are directly supporting Iraq and
Afghanistan with 28 percent of the C-17 sorties supporting intra-
theater (tactical) missions. Of those, the tactical missions include
using the C-17 for airdrop to remote forward operating bases; airland
sorties to fully-improved runways, short-field (assault) runways and
semi-improved surface runways. The C-17 will also use night vision
goggles during both inter-theater and intra-theater missions. Based on
the threat, many of the C-17 missions also accomplish tactical arrival
and departures in combination with the use of defensive systems, such
as LAIRCM, to mitigate the potential threat.
Question. Are its tactical airlift responsibilities expected to
increase in the future?
Answer. The C-17 is an extremely versatile and capable aircraft. As
operations in Afghanistan increase, so will the requirement for air-
drop, semi-improved surface and air refueling operations. Airlift
operations in Iraq will still be required to support the remaining
forces in place, utilizing both intra-theater and inter-theater assets.
Ultimately, the future requirement of the warfighter will dictate
whether C-17s- will be needed to a greater extent in the tactical role.
On a daily basis, command and control decisions are made to optimize
the balance of C-17s and C-130s used in the tactical role.
Question. Is it the only aircraft capable of delivering Army
Stryker units today within the theater of operations and to more
austere fields?
Answer. The C-17 is not the only aircraft capable of delivering
Army Stryker units. The C-5 is also capable of delivering Army Stryker
units to theater airfields that can support it. The C-17, however, does
have access to more austere airfields than the C-5.
Question. What other equipment cannot be delivered intra-theater by
the C-130 fleet?
Answer. The C-130 can carry oversize equipment, bulk cargo, and
passengers, but it cannot carry outsize equipment. Examples of outsize
equipment include the Abrams M1 main battle tank, the AV8B Harrier
aircraft, and the CH-47 helicopter. The C-17 can carry outsize
equipment in addition to the equipment, cargo and passengers the C-130
can carry.
Bulk cargo can be loaded onto a 463L pallet and does not exceed 104
inches in width, 84 inches in length or 96 inches in height. Oversize
cargo cannot be loaded onto a 463L pallet but does not exceed 810
inches in length, 117 inches in width or 96 inches in height. Outsize
cargo exceeds 810 inches in length, 117 inches in width or 96 inches in
height, but can be loaded onto C-17 or C-5 aircraft.

Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) Missions

Question. The Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA), now designated the C-27J,
is a joint program between the Army and Air Force to procure, field,
and sustain a multifunctional fixed wing cargo aircraft.
Does the Air Force currently have a stated and validated need for
the C-27J? Is it expected to replace any aircraft currently in
inventory? What capability gap does it address? What is the analysis
behind the 24 aircraft in the Air Force program of record?
Answer. Yes. The Air Force has a Department of Defense validated
need for the C-27J to support the Time Sensitive/Mission Critical (TS/
MC) resupply of Army forces. The C-27J is not expected to replace any
aircraft currently in the Air Force inventory. However, the C-27J is
expected to replace the Army's fleet of C-23s. The C-27J addresses TS/
MC resupply capability gap approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council. The foundation of the analysis behind the Air Force program of
record is the May 2007 Department of Defense validated the JCA Analysis
of Alternatives for 75 aircraft to meet Army TS/MC resupply demand. The
Department of Defense directed this requirement would be met jointly by
the Army with 54 aircraft and the Air Force with 24 aircraft.
Question. Will the Air Force use the C-27J to perform intra-theater
airlift operations as part of their common user pool or will it be
dedicated to the Army's time sensitive cargo? Will Army aircraft be
available for common user pool requirements? In a theater of
operations, who will control scheduling and ownership of these assets?
Answer. The Department of Defense Quadrennial Roles and Missions
Review Report, dated January 2009, determined Air Force C-27Js will
conduct Army direct support missions when requested and the Army will
integrate its C-27Js into the common-user pool when available/
allocated. Scheduling control and ownership is done by the Deployment
Distribution Operations Centers within geographic combatant command
structures. It can better integrate and optimize distribution
operations.
Question. Will distributing the Air Force C-27J fleet among five or
six Air National Guard bases hamper or enable satisfying the Army's
time sensitive/mission critical missions?
Answer. The Army's time sensitive/mission critical requirement is
an in-theater need. Continental U.S. basing decisions should not affect
in-theater utilization.

Mobility Capability Studies

Question. The Department has two studies ongoing to help determine
the proper size and mix of future airlift forces, a congressionally-
directed airlift requirements study by the Institute of Defense
Analysis (IDA) and a mobility capabilities requirements study to
project force requirement in 2016. Results from these studies, the
timing, and use of information is crucial for making near-term
decisions on C-17 procurement or shutting down the production line, C-5
and C-130 modernizations, potential C-5 retirements, and future airlift
options. Some officials believe the studies indicate a need for more
airlift due to increased troop strengths, heavier Army equipment,
establishment of the African Command, and decreased forward presence of
U.S. forces.
What are the preliminary results of the studies that can be shared
at this time?
Answer. The Congressionally-directed airlift requirements study by
the Institute of Defense Analyses was submitted to the Congress in
March 2009. It found the current program of record for airlift is
adequate to meet the requirements identified in MCS for moderate
acceptable risk. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (PA&E) and U.S.
Transportation Command led Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study
2016 is in progress and there are no preliminary results available at
this time. The report from that study is expected in December 2009.
Question. Are there indications that more airlift or a different
mix is needed?
Answer. To date, there are no indications that more airlift or a
different mix is needed. The Congressionally-directed airlift
requirements study by the Institute of Defense Analyses (IDA) was
submitted to Congress in March 2009. It found the current program of
record for airlift is adequate to meet the requirements identified in
MCS for moderate acceptable risk. The Office of the Secretary of
Defense (PA&E) and U.S. Transportation Command led Mobility
Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 is in progress. The report
from that study is expected in December 2009.
Question. What kind and detail of information will be briefed, and
when?
Answer. The Congressionally-directed airlift requirements study by
the Institute of Defense Analyses (IDA) was briefed to U.S.
Transportation Command in December 2008 and submitted to Congress in
March 2009. It found the current program of record for airlift is
adequate to meet the requirements identified in MCS for moderate
acceptable risk. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (PA&E) and U.S.
Transportation Command led Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study
2016 is in progress. This study will assess the end-to-end Joint
Deployment and Distribution Enterprise to determine the mobility
capabilities and requirements needed to support the National Security
Strategy in 2016. The report from that study is expected in December
2009.
Question. When does the department expect to release its completed
findings?
Answer. The Department expects to release its findings in December
2009.

Mobility Capability Requirements Study Metrics

Question. It was reported last year that Department of Defense
officials had not yet decided on the metrics and plans for using
metrics to inform the 2016 mobility requirements study. The prior study
in 2005 lacked some important metrics and data to define and quantify
capacity requirements as a basis for computing the size and optimal mix
of airlift forces and for assessing the impacts of alternate force
levels on achieving warfighting objectives
(Has the Department of Defense decided which metrics to use in its
study? What are they? Do these metrics include a specific strategic
airlift requirement expressed in million ton-miles per day? What are
the primary metrics for evaluating tactical airlift requirements?
Answer. The Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study has a set
of 75 metrics arranged in three tiers. Tier I measures time definite
delivery of units and sustainment and has direct impact on the
warfighter. Tier II measures Availability of Joint Deployment and
Distribution Enterprise Assets and Infrastructure. Tier II assets are
watercraft, aircraft, ground transportation and infrastructure. Tier II
metrics inform Tier I metrics. Finally, Tier III metrics are the basic
measures that inform Tier II metrics and are used for analysis. Tails
used and Million Ton Miles per Day are Tier III metrics.
Question. Does TRANSCOM plan to use metrics, including a ton-miles
per day metric, for the study in describing any gaps, shortfalls, or
redundancies in capabilities for the C-17 and the C-5?
Answer. The Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study has a set
of 75 metrics arranged in three tiers. Tier I measures time definite
delivery of units and sustainment and has direct impact on the
warfighter. Tier II measures Availability of Joint Deployment and
Distribution Enterprise Assets and Infrastructure. Tier II assets are
watercraft, aircraft, ground transportation and infrastructure. Tier II
metrics inform Tier I metrics. Finally, Tier III metrics are the basic
measures that inform Tier II metrics and are used for analysis.
Tails used and Million Ton Miles per Day are Tier III metrics.
These metrics will be used to describe any gaps, shortfall, or
redundancies in capabilities for the C-17 and the C-5.
Question. How will the study address the C-17's dual role in
providing both strategic and tactical airlift capabilities? Do the
studies quantify numbers to be used in a tactical intra-theater role
and are these numbers then not considered available for the strategic
inter-theater role?
Answer. The study is structured to model cargo and personnel flow
from end-to-end and thus capture any platform's utility across the
array of missions it can perform. The end-to-end modeling structure
ensures assets are not in use in more than one mission simultaneously.
Question. To what extent will requirements include civil reserve
air fleet requirements expressed in terms of passenger-miles per day
metric and resulting overages and/or shortfalls expressed in the same
metric?
Answer. The Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study plans to
measure aircraft use in tails and Million Ton Miles per Day. There is
no specific plan to express the requirement in terms of Million
Passenger Miles per Day for civil reserve air fleet passenger aircraft,
but the tails measurement of this metric can be transformed into
Million Passenger Miles per Day.

Industrial Base

Question. In the past few years, defense policy makers have
expressed concern that further consolidation in the industry that
designs and manufacturers U.S. military aircraft, which now consist of
three prime contractors (in contrast to 11 in 1960), will cause the
Department of Defense to acquire aircraft that are designed and
produced in a far less competitive and innovative environment than they
were in the past.
Describe the military combat aircraft industry?
Answer. Today's military combat aircraft industry consists of
several tiers. The first tier consists of those few companies with the
resources to provide the overall design and integration of systems into
an airframe. The next tier consists of companies that produce major
components, such as engines and avionics. Supporting these tiers are
the firms that produce the various parts that make up the engines or
major structural elements of the airframe and subsystems, such as
integrated circuits, printed circuit boards, and metal or composite
parts. At the foundation of the industry are the suppliers of the raw
materials needed to fabricate all the parts.
Question. With the limited number of vendors, is the U.S. military
able to maintain a high level of innovation in the military aircraft
industry?
Answer. Yes. The U.S. military is able to maintain a relatively
high level of innovation in the military aircraft industry. Although
fewer in number today, vendors still have to compete for business in
the military aircraft arena and it is in their own self-interest to
attract and retain talented individuals capable of the creative
thinking that leads to innovative, new ideas. This talent is not
limited only to the design and development of new weapon systems;
rather, today's military aircraft industry has shown itself to be
adaptable at generating innovative ideas for incorporating new
technologies into existing aircraft as well. Innovation can also come
from sources outside the traditional aerospace industrial base as
evidenced by new developments in unmanned aerial systems and in
composite materials, both of which have military aircraft applications.
In this regard, the Air Force Science and Technology Program is
fundamental in funding and focusing innovative research with industry
and universities in areas directly feeding into the military aircraft
industrial base, such as turbine engines. In addition, programs such as
the University Research Initiative, Defense Acquisition Challenge, and
Small Business Innovation Research are another avenue by which
innovation is stimulated and rewarded. The Air Force does not depend on
a limited pool of vendors, but uses a variety of avenues to seek out
and encourage innovation.
Question. What are the prospects for innovation and competition in
the military aircraft industry?
Answer. Prospects for both innovation and competition in the
military aircraft industry are still viable despite today's smaller
number of prime contractors; however, when looking at the industry's
second and third tier suppliers, prospects are a bit less favorable.
The U.S. aerospace industry has been at the forefront of innovation
since the development of manned flight. The early stages of the
industry were marked by the rise of many competing firms with
innovations occurring at a rapid pace. As the technology and industry
matured, market forces resulted in some firms choosing to exit with
others consolidating to improve their ability to compete. Today's
operating environment for the U.S. aerospace industry is still marked
by innovation, while competition is now on a more global level--the
military aircraft industry, as part of this larger U.S. aerospace
industry, is subject to the same forces that act upon the entire
industry. It should also be noted that innovative technologies stemming
from the Air Force Science and Technology Program and its partnership
with industry feed into the military aircraft industrial base enhancing
its competitive edge. This is especially true in the area of turbine
engines.
Question. What policy options does the U.S. military have
concerning the consolidation of the U.S. aircraft industry?
Answer. There really are no specific U.S. military policy options
as regards the consolidation of the U.S. aircraft industry; however,
when there are concerns over the potential impact consolidation might
have on competition, the military can take actions such as funding the
development of competing prototypes to ameliorate those concerns. In
addition, early systems engineering and development of reliable cost
estimates position the U.S. military to better negotiate the best value
for its procurement dollars. Along these lines, a recent report by the
Defense Science Board titled, ``Creating an Effective National Security
Industrial Base for the 21st Century,'' recommended policy options to
maintain competitive sources to include funding competitive suppliers,
periodic competitions for system upgrades on major programs, and
selecting two suppliers who would continue to compete for a share of
the buy, among others. As long as the U.S. aircraft industry remains
capable of effectively and efficiently providing for the needs of the
warfighter, the focus of the U.S. military will be primarily on the
products provided rather than the organization of that industry. Future
Air Force warfighting capability needs and available funding will
define the U.S. military aircraft industry.
Question. What do you see as the future for mobility aircraft
production capability?
Answer. As in the past, the future capability to produce mobility
aircraft will remain closely tied to the health of the U.S. aerospace
industrial base as the military does not have the financial means to
meet its current requirements while paying companies to maintain a
``warm'' industrial capacity in terms of either engineering talent or
facilities. There are many areas where the commercial aerospace
industry and the military aircraft industry overlap. In the case of
fighter aircraft, the area of intersection is limited. In the case of
mobility aircraft, the area of intersection can be significant. Even a
cursory review of the various mobility aircraft used in the past would
reveal those uniquely designed and produced for the military, such as
the Lockheed C-141 Starlifter or the Boeing C-17 Skymaster III, and
those adapted by the military from a commercial aircraft design, such
as the Douglas DC-3 (C-47 Skytrain) or the McDonnell Douglas DC-10 (KC-
10 Extender). In each case, the military benefits from having a viable
commercial aerospace industry that can provide the engineering and
design talent, as well as the facilities and supporting infrastructure
of suppliers, to meet the infrequent demands of producing mobility
aircraft.
This is not to say that there are no areas of concern. Some aspects
of any military aircraft require different engineering design
considerations than those used for commercial aircraft and the military
operating environment tends to be more demanding. Until near the end of
the Cold War, the demands of the military enabled the aerospace
industry to develop and maintain a cadre of engineers conversant with
these military unique design considerations and to maintain the
facilities for production of those aircraft. The industry also included
a large manufacturing base upon which to draw. That operating
environment has changed. The current cadre of designers and engineers
is aging and there are few new military aircraft, either mobility or
combat, under consideration. The C-17 production line will soon close
with no replacement and, while the C-130 continues in production, it
has become its own replacement using the same production facilities. As
such, it is expected that the military will be more dependent on the
health of the U.S. aerospace industry than previously.

Large Aircraft Infrared Counter Measures (LAIRCM)

Question. LAIRCM is designed to counter the increasing threat that
large, slow-moving cargo aircraft face from shoulder-fired missiles and
missiles launched from vehicles. The system automatically detects the
heat-seeking missiles and puts out a signal to confuse its path and
direct it away from the aircraft.
What is the requirement for LAIRCM for the mobility fleet?
Answer. The current requirement for Large Aircraft Infrared Counter
Measures (LAIRCM) capability was defined in the 1998 Operational
Requirements Document and the 2001 Operational Requirements Document
Annex. Air Mobility Command previously established a requirement of 444
LAIRCM-equipped aircraft. LAIRCM quantities are currently being
readdressed in a Department of Defense-directed study. This study takes
into account revised major contingency operations plans and threat
progression since 2004, and results are due April 30, 2009.
Question. How is the Air Force addressing the requirement?
Answer. The Air Force is addressing the requirement through two
ways: Adequate funding and ensuring growing requirements are documented
within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Air Mobility Command
funds, and seeks additional funds, to provide the increased protection
of LAIRCM to as many aircraft as possible, ensuring enough aircraft
remain available on a daily basis to support the warfighter's needs.
LAIRCM quantities are currently being readdressed in an Office of the
Secretary of Defense-directed study. This study takes into account
revised Major Contingency Operations Plans and threat progression since
2004. The results of this study are due April 2009.
Question. How do you decide which aircraft will have this system
installed and how do you develop the installation schedule?
Answer. Air Mobility Command decides which aircraft will have
LAIRCM installed based on operational capability requirements. Mission
taskings into higher threat environments have driven the current
installation priority order of the C-17, followed by the C-130, C-5, C-
40, C-37, C-20, KC-135, and KC-10 aircraft. Installation schedule is
determined by the aircraft modification facility capacity and equipment
procurement lead times.
Question. What is the cost of the LAIRCM per aircraft?
Answer. There are 17 different LAIRCM configurations with final
costs depending on airframe type and configuration. The figures in the
table below represent the final configuration costs per airframe. There
have been lower costs based on ``lite'' configurations and/or use of
baseline equipment. Equipment costs depicted in the table include costs
for LAIRCM Line Replaceable Units, support, spares, and other costs.
The C-130J cost depends on work scheduled to begin this year.
Cost of LAIRCM per aircraft ranges between $4-$10 million

[Dollars in millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Platform Install Costs Equipment Costs Total Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C-17......................................................... $2.0 $5.8 $7.8
C-5.......................................................... 4.5 5.4 9.9
C-130 (various).............................................. 0.8 4.5 5.3
C-130J....................................................... 1-4 4-6 5-10
VIP Special Air Mission...................................... 2-5 2-3.3 4-8.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.]

W I T N E S S E S

__________
Page
Coffey, Carole................................................... 55
Dodaro, G. L..................................................... 55
Donley, M. B..................................................... 1
Embrey, E. P..................................................... 431
Fullhart, Major General R. D..................................... 515
Heddell, G. S.................................................... 353
Lichte, General A. J............................................. 515
McNabb, General D. J............................................. 515
Schinasi, K. V................................................... 55
Schwartz, General N. A........................................... 1
Sullivan, Michael................................................ 55
Sutton, Brigadier General, L. K.................................. 431
Thompson, Lieutenant General N. R., III.......................... 283