    [House Hearing, 111 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 111-111]

                          AFGHANISTAN: THE RESULTS OF

                          THE STRATEGIC REVIEW, PART I

                                   __________

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                                DECEMBER 3, 2009

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                       HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                         One Hundred Eleventh Congress

                        IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman
    JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina          HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
    SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas                  California
    GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi             ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
    NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii             MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
    SILVESTRE REYES, Texas               WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
    VIC SNYDER, Arkansas                 W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
    ADAM SMITH, Washington               J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
    LORETTA SANCHEZ, California          JEFF MILLER, Florida
    MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina        JOE WILSON, South Carolina
    ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania        FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
    ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey           ROB BISHOP, Utah
    SUSAN A. DAVIS, California           MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
    JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
    RICK LARSEN, Washington              MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
    JIM COOPER, Tennessee                TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
    JIM MARSHALL, Georgia                BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
    MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam          CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
    BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana              K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
    PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania      DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
    HANK JOHNSON, Georgia                ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
    CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire     MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
    JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut            DUNCAN HUNTER, California
    DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa                 JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
    JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania             MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
    GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona          THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
    NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts          TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
    GLENN NYE, Virginia
    CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
    LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
    MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
    FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland
    ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York
    BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
    SCOTT MURPHY, New York
    WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York
    DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
                        Erin C. Conaton, Staff Director
                     Mike Casey, Professional Staff Member
                    Roger Zakheim, Professional Staff Member
                        Caterina Dutto, Staff Assistant

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                         CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
                                      2009

                                                                       Page

    Hearing:

    Thursday, December 3, 2009, Afghanistan: The Results of the
      Strategic Review, Part I.......................................     1

    Appendix:

    Thursday, December 3, 2009.......................................    47
                                  ----------

                           THURSDAY, DECEMBER 3, 2009
            AFGHANISTAN: THE RESULTS OF THE STRATEGIC REVIEW, PART I
                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
      California, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services........     3
    Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
      Committee on Armed Services....................................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Gates, Hon. Robert M., Secretary of Defense......................     4
    Lew, Hon. Jacob J., Deputy Secretary of State for Management and
      Resources, U.S. Department of State............................     9
    Mullen, Adm. Michael G., USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff....     7

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Gates, Hon. Robert M.........................................    51
        Lew, Hon. Jacob J............................................    60
        Mullen, Adm. Michael G.......................................    55

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. Bright...................................................    89
        Mr. Coffman..................................................    77
        Mr. Conaway..................................................    75
        Ms. Giffords.................................................    82
        Mr. Heinrich.................................................    88
        Mr. Jones....................................................    71
        Mr. Loebsack.................................................    78
        Mrs. McMorris Rodgers........................................    73
        Mr. Nye......................................................    86
        Mr. Shuster..................................................    72
        Mr. Smith....................................................    72
        Ms. Tsongas..................................................    84
        Mr. Wittman..................................................    75

           AFGHANISTAN: THE RESULTS OF THE STRATEGIC REVIEW, PART I

                                  ----------

                              House of Representatives,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                            Washington, DC, Thursday, December 3, 2009.
        The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:05 p.m., in room
    210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the
    committee) presiding.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
            MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

        The Chairman. Our hearing will come to order.
        I might state first that we have some votes that may come
    up very quickly. I hope we can get them over with and back here
    just as soon as possible, and I ask our witnesses to bear with
    us. We have no control over those.
        I would also urge our members to strictly follow the gavel
    on the five-minute rule so as many people can ask questions as
    possible.
        Today, the House Armed Services Committee meets to receive
    testimony on ``Afghanistan: Results of the Strategic Review.''
    Our witnesses are the Honorable Robert Gates, Secretary of
    Defense; Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff; and the Honorable Jacob Lew, Deputy Secretary of State
    for Management and Resources.
        We welcome each of you, and thank you for being with us
    today.
        Let me begin by commending the President for his decision
    to commit an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to carry out a
    strategy for success in Afghanistan. In a lengthy letter and in
    private conversations, I urged the President to listen to our
    military leaders, and he did. I am pleased that the President
    agreed to provide General McChrystal with the time and
    resources needed to get Afghanistan right.
        Al Qaeda was and continues to present a serious threat to
    the United States. Their most egregious attack was September
    11th, but it was hardly the only one. While the threat posed by
    al Qaeda has been lessened by our actions in Afghanistan and
    Pakistan, it has hardly dissipated. In the long term, I do not
    believe that we can disrupt and defeat al Qaeda if we cannot
    deny them the use of Afghanistan as a safe haven.
        Unfortunately, shortly after deposing the Taliban regime
    and forcing al Qaeda out of Afghanistan in this war we were
    forced to wage, the previous administration took our eye off
    the ball, choosing to invade Iraq. Due to the preoccupation
    with Iraq, the war in Afghanistan was under-resourced, with
    essentially no strategy for seven years. Unsurprisingly, the
    threat came back.
        President Obama's decision to deploy another 30,000 troops
    in addition to the troops he ordered to Afghanistan earlier
    this year demonstrates that he understands the seriousness of
    the threat and the importance of the mission.
        In January 2009, there were about 33,000 U.S. troops in
    Afghanistan. In about seven months, there will be three times
    that. Media reports have focused a lot on these numbers, but
    more important than numbers is strategy. As General McChrystal
    pointed out, without a change in strategy, all the troops in
    the world won't matter.
        President Obama conducted a rigorous review of the
    situation in Afghanistan, and it resulted in a realistic
    strategy designed to seize the initiative from the insurgency,
    build the Afghan capacity, and ultimately to allow the Afghan
    government and security forces to take the lead in fighting
    this war.
        The President has appropriately called for additional
    troops from our allies. This is not just America's war, and we
    must not allow it to become that. Perhaps more importantly, the
    President has put the burden of reform squarely on the Afghan
    government, laying out clear expectations of performance and
    promising support for those ministries and local leaders that
    perform.
        The President has also rightly acknowledged the importance
    of Pakistan. That country remains a challenge, playing a key
    and often contradictory role in the region. Pakistan, by
    assisting in the pursuit of the al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban
    leaders, could help bring the war in Afghanistan to an end.
    Conversely, if Pakistan were to return to its old habits of
    supporting the Afghan Taliban, the war may be almost impossible
    to win. More concerning, the continued ascendency of militant
    movements in the region could destabilize Pakistan, a country
    with nuclear weapons. This could be a disaster for all of us.
        I believe that we have a good strategy, but we must be
    mindful that implementing this counterinsurgency strategy will
    be extremely complex and far from easy. Just the task of
    deploying an additional 30,000 troops will be difficult. Supply
    lines to Afghanistan are long and difficult. Bases are austere,
    and there is a shortage of every sort of infrastructure. And
    the job our troops will have to do once they get there will be
    even harder.
        Every member of this committee will have questions about
    the strategy and how it can be accomplished. For my part, I
    have numerous questions: What do we believe must be
    accomplished in the next 18 months? How will we move this
    substantial number of troops so quickly? How will we mitigate
    strains on the force? How will we convince the Pakistanis that
    their interests lie with us? How will we measure progress over
    time? And how will we help the Afghan people build the sort of
    legitimate government that can end the insurgency?
        But while I do have questions about implementation, I do
    not have any doubt that we must succeed in Afghanistan, that
    the President is right to order the deployment of an additional
    30,000 troops on top of the troops he has already approved, and
    that the new strategy provides a good path for success.
        I hope our witnesses today can help us fill in the details
    of how the difficult but realistic goals of the strategy can be
    accomplished. At the end of the day, I believe we are all
    working for the same thing: the safety of the American people
    and the end of the threat from al Qaeda.
        Now I turn to my good friend, the gentleman from
    California, Buck McKeon, the ranking member, for comments he
    might care to make.

     STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE
      FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

        Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, after months of waiting for a decision on
    Afghanistan, I am hopeful we have finally turned the corner and
    have a strategy in place to succeed in Afghanistan.
        On Tuesday night, the President agreed to provide General
    McChrystal most of the forces he needs to execute a
    counterinsurgency strategy. This is a positive step,
    particularly the President's commitment to deploy these forces
    as fast as possible. This will assist General McChrystal to
    take the fight directly to the Taliban in southern and eastern
    Afghanistan, while helping train and mentor the Afghan national
    security forces at the same time.
        Yet, the President's speech left me unconvinced that his
    plan goes far enough to ensure victory. I worry that our
    enemies will see the President's announced date for withdrawal
    as more of a commitment to leave Afghanistan than a declaration
    that al Qaeda will be defeated and the Taliban routed.
    Certainly this is what our allies in the region believe.
    Today's headline in The New York Times reads, ``Afghans and
    Pakistanis Concerned Over U.S. Plan.''
        All Americans want to see our troops leave Afghanistan as
    soon as possible, but only after successfully completing their
    mission. In our view, any redeployment should be based on the
    events and conditions on the ground, not the Washington
    political clock. Setting a date certain to begin withdrawing
    U.S. forces, I believe, risks undermining the very mission the
    President endorsed on Tuesday night. This deadline seems to fly
    in the face of basic counterinsurgency doctrine. I think
    Senator McCain said it best yesterday: ``Success is the real
    exit strategy.''
        Admiral Mullen, when you testified before the Congress in
    September, you said, ``The Afghan people are waiting on the
    sidelines for how committed we are.'' I fear that the President
    may have deepened the doubts of the Afghan people.
        My other concerns reside more in what the President did not
    say on Tuesday night, so I would like our witnesses to address
    the following questions over the course of this hearing: First,
    are 30,000 additional forces enough to win decisively? As
    General McChrystal stated in his assessment, resources will not
    win this war, but under-resourcing could lose it. Given the
    many leaks that General McChrystal requested, at a minimum,
    40,000 additional forces, I would like our witnesses to explain
    why the President is not under-resourcing his own strategy.
        The President should be commended for expediting the
    deployment of these forces. Is it our position that it is
    better to get 30,000 troops to Afghanistan as soon as possible
    than to get 40,000 spread out over the next 15 months? When do
    you expect these forces to arrive in theater?
        While we have heard top line numbers, we have not heard
    discussion of the composition of these forces. How many combat
    brigades will deploy? How many will be trainers? Will each
    combat brigade receive all its enablers?
        As we learned in Iraq, effective counterinsurgency requires
    effective host-nation partners. With all the talk of an exit
    date, the only credible narrative for redeployment is the
    effective buildup of Afghan National Security Forces. According
    to General McChrystal, a fundamental pillar for achieving
    success is developing a significantly more effective and larger
    Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF), with radically
    expanded coalition-force partnering at every echelon.
        Both the President's speech and your testimony today do not
    address the requisite size of the ANSF. Do you believe we need
    to double the size of the Afghan National Security Forces in
    order to transition security responsibility to the Afghan
    government? General Caldwell and others have the number at
    400,000. Do we need to have this force in place before we begin
    transitioning?
        Finally, I think one of the costs of the three-month
    deliberation was the absence of a strong voice promoting our
    mission and our strategy. While the executive huddled, public
    opinion and support lagged. This needs to be corrected. I hope
    the President will travel to communities throughout the United
    States to rally the American people and Congress behind his
    strategy, much as he has done on health care and other issues.
        I thank you for being here today. I know that you have had
    a busy last couple of days, and I appreciate your patience and
    appreciate your being here. And I look forward to a candid
    discussion on these important issues. Thank you again.
        I yield back.
        The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
        Again, I urge everyone to heed the five-minute gavel. We
    will, as you know, break for votes and get back just the minute
    we can.
        As I understand it, our witnesses have a drop-dead time at
    4:30, and we will do our very best to abide by your schedule.
        With that, we call on Secretary Gates. Welcome.

        STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

        Secretary Gates. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, Mr. McKeon, members of the committee, thank
    you for inviting us to testify today.
        By now, you are aware of the details of the President's
    announcement of our renewed commitment and more focused
    strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. I would like to provide
    an overview of the strategic thinking and context behind his
    decisions, in particular the nexus among al Qaeda, the Taliban,
    Pakistan, and Afghanistan, and our objectives and how the
    President's strategy aims to accomplish them.
        As the President first stated in March and reemphasized
    Tuesday night, the goal of the United States in Afghanistan and
    Pakistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its
    extremist allies and prevent its return to both countries. The
    international military effort to stabilize Afghanistan is
    necessary to achieve this overarching goal.
        Defeating al Qaeda and enhancing Afghan security are
    mutually reinforcing missions. They cannot be untethered from
    one another, as much as we might wish that to be the case.
    While al Qaeda is under great pressure now and dependent on the
    Taliban and other extremist groups for sustainment, the success
    of the Taliban would vastly strengthen al Qaeda's message to
    the Muslim world that violent extremists are on the winning
    side of history.
        Put simply, the Taliban and al Qaeda have become symbiotic,
    each benefiting from the success and mythology of the other. Al
    Qaeda leaders, in particular, have stated this explicitly and
    repeatedly. The lesson of the Afghan Taliban's revival for al
    Qaeda is that time and will are on their side. With a Western
    defeat, al Qaeda could regain its strength and achieve a major
    strategic victory as long as its senior leadership lives and
    can continue to inspire and attract followers and funding.
    Rolling back the Taliban is now necessary, even if not
    sufficient, to the ultimate defeat of al Qaeda.
        At the same time, one cannot separate the security
    situation in Afghanistan from the stability of Pakistan, a
    nuclear-armed nation of 175 million people, now also explicitly
    targeted by Islamic extremists. Giving extremists breathing
    room in Pakistan led to the resurgence of the Taliban and more
    coordinated, sophisticated attacks in Afghanistan. Providing a
    sanctuary for extremists in southern and eastern Afghanistan
    would put yet more pressure on a Pakistani Government already
    under attack from groups operating from the border region.
        Indeed, the Pakistan Taliban, in just the last year or so,
    has become a real threat to Pakistan's own domestic peace and
    stability, carrying out, with al Qaeda's help, escalating
    bombing attacks throughout the country. Failure in Afghanistan
    would mean a Taliban takeover of much, if not most, of the
    country and likely a renewed civil war. Taliban-ruled areas
    could in short order become once again a sanctuary for al
    Qaeda, as well as a staging area for resurgent military groups
    on the offensive in Pakistan.
        Success in South and Central Asia by Islamic extremists, as
    was the case 20 years ago, would beget success on other fronts.
    It would strengthen the al Qaeda narrative, providing renewed
    opportunities for recruitment, fundraising, and more
    sophisticated operations.
        It is true that al Qaeda and its followers can plot and
    execute attacks from a variety of locations, from Munich to
    London to Denver. What makes the border area between Pakistan
    and Afghanistan uniquely different from any other location,
    including Somalia, Yemen, and other possible redoubts, is that
    this part of the world represents the epicenter of extremist
    jihadism, the historic place where native and foreign Muslims
    defeated one superpower and, in their view, caused its collapse
    at home. For them to be seen to defeat the sole remaining
    superpower in the same place would have severe consequences for
    the United States and the world.
        Some say this is similar to the domino theory that
    underpinned and ultimately muddied the thinking behind the U.S.
    military escalation in Vietnam. The difference, however, is
    that we have very real and very recent history that shows just
    what can and will happen in this part of the world when
    extremists have breathing space, safe havens, and governments
    complicit with and supportive of their mission. Less than five
    years after the last Soviet tank crossed the Termez Bridge out
    of Afghanistan, in 1993 Islamic militants launched their first
    attack on the World Trade Center in New York. We cannot afford
    to make a similar mistake again.
        The President's new strategic concept aims to reverse the
    Taliban's momentum and reduce its strength, while providing the
    time and space necessary for the Afghans to develop enough
    security and governance to stabilize their own country.
        The essence of our civil military plan is to clear, hold,
    build, and transfer. Beginning to transfer security
    responsibility to the Afghans in the summer of 2011 is critical
    and, in my view, achievable. July 2011, the time at which the
    President said the United States will begin to draw down our
    forces, will be the beginning of a process, an inflection
    point, if you will, of transition, where Afghan forces assume
    greater responsibility for security.
        The pace and character of that drawdown, which districts
    and provinces are turned over and when, will be determined by
    conditions on the ground. It will be a gradual, if inexorable,
    process. It will be similar to the gradual but steady
    conditions-based drawdown that began to take place in Iraq
    about 14 months after the surge there began.
        As with so many issues in the national security and defense
    arena, the real challenge in Afghanistan is finding the right
    balance. The prompt dispatch of some 30,000 U.S. combat troops
    on top of the 21,000 already ordered by President Obama earlier
    this year sends a sure message of the President's resolve to
    both our partners and adversaries in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
    When this buildup is complete, total U.S. force levels in
    Afghanistan will have more than doubled under President Obama's
    orders, to 100,000 troops. Whether you agree with what we are
    doing or not, there should be no doubt at home or abroad about
    this President's commitment to the success of this mission.
        On the other hand, we need to send an equally strong
    message to the Afghan Government that, when all is said and
    done, the U.S. military is not going to be there to protect
    them forever, that the Afghans must step up to the plate and do
    the things necessary that will allow them to take primary
    responsibility for defending their own country, and do so with
    a sense of purpose and urgency. This is the balance we are
    trying to achieve, and I believe the President's plan provides
    both the resources and flexibility to do so.
        Making this transition possible requires accelerating the
    development of a significantly larger and more capable Afghan
    army and police through an intensive partnering with
    International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), especially in
    combat. Even after we transfer security responsibility to the
    Afghans and draw down our combat forces, the U.S. will continue
    to support their development as an important partner for the
    long haul. We must not repeat the mistakes of 1989, when we
    abandoned the country, only to see it descend into chaos and
    then into Taliban hands.
        Let me offer a couple of closing thoughts. The President
    believes, as do I, that in the end we cannot defeat al Qaeda
    and its toxic ideology without improving and stabilizing the
    security situation in Afghanistan. The President's decision
    offers the best possibility to decisively change the momentum
    in Afghanistan and fundamentally alter the strategic equation
    in Pakistan and central Asia, all necessary to protect the
    United States, our allies, and our vital interests.
        As always, the heaviest burden will fall on the men and
    women who have volunteered and re-volunteered to serve their
    country in uniform. I know they will be uppermost in our minds
    and prayers as we take on this arduous but vitally necessary
    mission.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Gates can be found in
    the Appendix on page 51.]
        The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, we thank you.
        Admiral Mullen.

       STATEMENT OF ADM. MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, CHAIRMAN, JOINT
                            CHIEFS OF STAFF

        Admiral Mullen. Mr. Chairman, Congressman McKeon,
    distinguished members of this committee, thank you for your
    time today.
        In September of 2008, I testified here and said in
    Afghanistan we are doing what we can. I believe in November of
    2009 in Afghanistan we need to do what we must.
        I support fully and without hesitation the President's
    decision, and I appreciate the opportunity to contribute to
    what I believe was a healthy and productive discussion. I have
    seen my share of internal debates on national security issues
    over the course of these last two years, and I can honestly say
    that I do not recall an issue so thoroughly or so thoughtfully
    considered as this one. Every military leader in the chain of
    command, as well as those of the Joint Chiefs, was given voice
    throughout this process, and every one of us used it.
        We now have before us a strategy more appropriately matched
    to the situation on the ground in Afghanistan and resources
    matched more appropriately to that strategy, particularly with
    regard to reversing the insurgency's momentum in 2010. And
    given the stakes in Afghanistan for our own national security,
    as well as that of our partners around the world, I believe the
    time we took was well worth it.
        Secretary Gates has discussed many of the larger policy
    issues in question, and I will not repeat them. But from a
    purely military perspective, I believe our new approach does
    three critical things.
        First, by providing more discrete objectives, it offers
    better guidance to commanders on the ground about how to employ
    their forces. They will still work to disrupt, dismantle, and
    defeat al Qaeda and prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe
    haven. They will still strive to protect the Afghan people, who
    remain the center of gravity. They will still pursue major
    elements of the counterinsurgency desired and designed by
    General McChrystal, which, as we all know, involves at least
    some measure of active counterterrorism operations.
        But now they will tailor this campaign and those operations
    by focusing on key population areas, by increasing pressure on
    all of al Qaeda's leadership, by more effectively working to
    degrade the Taliban's influence, and by streamlining and
    accelerating the growth of competent Afghan National Security
    Forces.
        At its core, our strategy is about providing breathing
    space for the Afghans to secure their own people and to
    stabilize their own country. It is about partnering and
    mentoring just as much, if not more so, than it is about
    fighting. Where once we believed that finishing the job meant
    to a large degree doing it ourselves, we now know it cannot
    truly or permanently be done by anyone other than the Afghans
    themselves. Fully a third of the U.S. troops in theater today
    are partnered with Afghan forces, and I expect that number to
    rise significantly through 2010.
        Secondly, but not insignificantly, this new strategy gives
    the commanders on the ground the resources and the support they
    need to reverse the momentum of the Taliban insurgency and to
    accomplish these more limited objectives. I have said it before
    and I believe it still today: This region is the epicenter of
    global Islamic extremism. It is the place from which we were
    attacked on 9/11, and, should we be hit again, it is the place
    from which I am convinced the planning, training, funding, and
    leadership will emanate.
        Al Qaeda may, in fact, be the architect of such an attack,
    but the Taliban will be the bricklayers. Though hardly a
    uniform body, Taliban groups have grown bolder and more
    sophisticated. We saw that just a few months ago in the
    Korengal Valley, where Taliban forces attacked coalition
    outposts using what I would call almost conventional, small-
    unit tactics. Their fighters are better organized and better
    equipped than they were just one year ago. And that trend,
    which started in 2006, has continued through today.
        In fact, coalition forces experienced record-high violence
    this past summer, with insurgent attacks more than 60 percent
    above 2008 levels. And through brutal intimidation, the Taliban
    has established shadow governments across the country, coercing
    the reluctant support of many locals and challenging the
    authority of elected leaders and state institutions. Indeed, we
    believe the insurgency has achieved a dominant influence in 11
    of the 34 provinces.
        To say there is no serious threat of Afghanistan falling
    once again into the Taliban's hands ignores the audacity of
    even the insurgency's most public statements. And to argue
    that, should they have that power, the Taliban would not at
    least tolerate the presence of al Qaeda on Afghan soil is to
    ignore both the recent past and the evidence we see every day
    of collusion between these factions on both sides of the
    Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
        The cost of failure is, then, very grave. That is why the
    President's decision for an extended surge to Afghanistan of
    30,000 additional forces is so important. It gets the most U.S.
    force into the fight as quickly as possible, giving General
    McChrystal everything he needs in 2010 to gain the initiative.
    In fact, it is everything he asked for.
        It validates our adherence to a counterinsurgency approach,
    and it offers our troops in Afghanistan the best possible
    chance to set security conditions for the Afghan people to see
    our commitment to their future; for the Karzai government to
    know our strong desire to see his promised reforms; for the
    Afghan Taliban to understand they will not, they cannot take
    back Afghanistan; and for those beyond Afghanistan who support
    the Taliban or would see the return of al Qaeda to realize the
    futility of their support.
        I should add that these reinforcements come on top of the
    21,000 troops the President ordered shortly after taking
    office, troops which have already made a huge difference in the
    southern Helmand Valley and in the training and partnering with
    Afghan security forces.
        But, as I have testified before, Mr. Chairman, no amount of
    troops and no amount of time will ever be enough to completely
    achieve success in such a fight. They simply must be
    accompanied by good governance and healthy public
    administration. This, not troop numbers, is the area of my
    greatest concern. Like everyone else, I look forward to working
    with the Karzai government, but we must have the support of the
    interagency and international communities as well.
        That brings me to my final point. The President's new
    strategy still recognizes the criticality of a broad-based
    approach to regional problems. He does not view Afghanistan in
    isolation any more than he views the ties between al Qaeda and
    the Taliban as superficial. He has called for stronger and more
    productive cooperation with neighboring Pakistan, which is
    likewise under the threat from radical elements and whose
    support remains vital to our ability to eliminate safe havens.
        He has pledged, and we in the military welcome, renewed
    emphasis on securing more civilian expertise to the effort,
    more contributions by other North Atlantic Treaty Organization
    (NATO) nations, and a realistic plan to transition
    responsibilities to the Afghans. His is a more balanced, more
    flexible, and more achievable strategy than what we have had in
    the past, one based on pragmatism and real possibilities.
        Speaking for 2.2 million men and women who must execute it
    and who, with their families, have borne the brunt of the
    stress and the strain of eight years of constant combat, I
    support his decision and appreciate his leadership.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen can be found in
    the Appendix on page 55.]
        The Chairman. Admiral, we thank you.
        I think, Secretary Lew, we can get your testimony in before
    we must break. A vote has been called, but I think we are in
    pretty good shape to make it.
        Secretary Lew, please.

     STATEMENT OF HON. JACOB J. LEW, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
           MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

        Secretary Lew. Chairman Skelton, Congressman McKeon,
    distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the
    opportunity to testify here today.
        And I would begin by sharing Secretary Clinton's regrets
    that she was not able to be here at this hearing. As I think
    you know, she is traveling right now to Brussels to join the
    NATO ministerial, which provides an important opportunity to
    further consult with some of our closest allies on a number of
    important topics, including allied support for the Afghanistan
    policy that we are here to discuss today.
        Tuesday evening, President Obama presented the
    Administration's strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
    Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen have
    further testified on the details and national security
    importance of our revised strategy. I will try to limit my
    remarks today to providing additional details on the civilian
    components of our revised strategy and to augment those
    presentations.
        As the President made clear, the duration of our military
    presence will be limited, but our civilian commitment must
    continue even as our troops begin to come home. Accomplishing
    our mission and ensuring the safety of the American people will
    not be easy. It will mean sending more civilians, troops, and
    assistance to Afghanistan and significantly expanding our
    civilian efforts in Pakistan.
        In the past eight months, I have made two visits to the
    region, which provided me increased firsthand understanding of
    the challenges we face and a deep appreciation for our men and
    women who are carrying out our nation's policy. These brave men
    and women, civilians as well as military, are making
    extraordinary sacrifices on behalf of our security. I want to
    assure the committee that we will do everything we can to make
    sure that their efforts make our nation safer.
        The situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan is serious, but
    there is reason to be hopeful. In his inauguration speech last
    month, President Karzai pledged to combat corruption, improve
    governance, and deliver for the people of his country. In his
    words, ``Words now must be meshed with action.'' The Afghan
    people, the United States, and the international community will
    hold the Afghan government accountable for making good on these
    commitments.
        The State Department, United States Agency for
    International Development (USAID), and other civilian agencies
    will help by working with our Afghan partners to strengthen
    institutions at every level so they are ready to take
    responsibility when our combat troops begin to depart. The
    President has outlined a time frame for transition to Afghan
    responsibility. As the President said, we will execute the
    transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on the
    ground.
        This time frame for transition provides a sense of urgency.
    It should be clear to everyone, unlike in the past, the United
    States will have an enduring commitment to Afghanistan,
    Pakistan, and the region. Our resolve is reflected in the
    substantial commitment of troops and civilian resources that
    the President has made since taking office and will continue
    long after our combat troops have departed.
        Our civilian effort is already bearing fruit. Civilian
    experts are helping build capacity in government ministries,
    providing development assistance in the field, and working in
    scores of other roles. When our Marines went into Nawa this
    July, we had civilians on the ground with them the next day.
        When I traveled to Helmand in September, I heard firsthand
    from local officials and U.S. and allied military personnel how
    our civilian-military coordination is growing stronger and
    stronger. We are on track to triple the number of civilians in
    Afghanistan to 974 by early next year. On average, each
    civilian leverages 10 partners, ranging from locally employed
    staff to experts with U.S.-funded non-governmental
    organizations.
        As Secretary Clinton said yesterday, it is a cliche to say
    we have our best people in these jobs, but it also happens to
    be true. When the Secretary was in Kabul a few weeks ago, she
    heard from an American colonel that, while he had thousands of
    outstanding soldiers under his command, none had 40 years of
    agricultural experience or rule-of-law or government expertise
    like the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and
    State Department civilian experts serving alongside his
    battalion. He told her that he was happy to supply whatever
    support these valuable civilians need, and he said we need more
    of them. The President's strategy, with congressional support,
    will make that possible.
        Not only do we increasingly have the right people to
    achieve our objectives, we also have a sound strategy. We are
    delivering the high-impact economic assistance and bolstering
    Afghanistan's agricultural sector, the traditional core of the
    Afghan economy. This will create jobs, reduce funding that the
    Taliban receives from poppy cultivation, and draw insurgents
    off of the battlefield.
        We will support an Afghan-led effort to open the door to
    Taliban who abandon violence and want to reintegrate into
    society. We understand that some who fight with the insurgency
    do not do so out of conviction but due to coercion or the need
    for the money that they are provided. All Afghans should have
    the choice to pursue a better future if they do so peacefully,
    respect for basic human rights of their fellow citizens, and
    renounce al Qaeda.
        Our regional diplomacy compliments this political approach
    by seeking to mitigate external interference in Afghanistan and
    working to shift the calculus of neighboring countries from
    competition for influence to cooperation and economic
    integration.
        We also believe that a strong and stable democratic
    Pakistan must be a key partner for the United States. People in
    Pakistan are increasingly coming to the view that we share a
    common enemy. I heard this repeatedly during my visits there.
        We will significantly expand support to help develop the
    potential of Pakistan and its people, to bring our people
    closer together. Our assistance will demonstrate our commitment
    to addressing problems that affect everyday lives of
    Pakistanis, but it will also bolster Pakistan against the
    threat of extremism. A village where girls can get an education
    will be more resistant to extremism. A young man with a bright
    future in a growing economy is unlikely to waste his potential
    in a suicide bombing.
        We share this responsibility with governments around the
    world. Our NATO allies and other international community
    partners have already made significant contributions of their
    own in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Secretary and Ambassador
    Holbrooke are working now in Brussels to secure additional
    commitments.
        The task we face is as complex as any national security
    challenge of our lifetime. We will not succeed if this effort
    is viewed as the responsibility of a single party, a single
    agency, or a single country. We owe it to the troops and
    civilians who face these dangers to come together as Americans,
    and together with our allies and partners, to help them
    accomplish the mission.
        I thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Lew can be found in
    the Appendix on page 60.]
        The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, we thank you.
        We will break for the votes. There could very well be
    another motion to recommit, so it will be a short while. We
    will recess.
        [Recess.]
        The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
        I will begin by asking a question or two, and hopefully we
    can proceed with everyone staying well within the five-minute
    rule.
        Afghanistan, Mr. Secretary and Admiral Mullen, is
    undoubtedly the epicenter for terrorism in the world. So I ask
    you, are you fully comfortable with the President's strategy,
    including the target date to begin redeploying troops out of
    Afghanistan?
        I ask each of you.
        Secretary Gates. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I am very
    comfortable with the President's strategy.
        I believe that each of these conflicts that we are engaged
    in needs to be assessed individually. There are some parallels,
    and there are some areas where they are different.
        I have been adamantly opposed and continue to be opposed to
    deadlines, but I regard the July 2011 date as the beginning of
    a process. And it has required balancing between signaling our
    commitment, which certainly should be signaled by this
    President's approval of some 52,000 more troops this year, and
    lighting a fire under the Afghans to give them a sense of
    urgency that they have to be prepared and preparing to take
    over responsibility for the security of their country.
        My hope is that, as that process goes forward and we draw
    down our troops, they can sustain the level of security that
    then allows us to continue a more purely counterterrorist
    mission until al Qaeda is defeated, as the President has said.
        So it is a balance, but I think it is a good balance. I
    think it is important to see July 2011 as an inflection point,
    as the beginning of this process. And, for that reason, I am
    comfortable with it.
        I would just add one other thing. When people say that it
    may embolden the Taliban, it is not clear to me what that
    means. It seems to me that the Taliban is pretty bold right
    now. They have been very aggressive over the last year or so,
    the last two or three years. It is not clear to me they could
    be any more aggressive than they are now.
        And, frankly, if they want to lie low either in Afghanistan
    or Pakistan, I think that would give us a huge opportunity.
    Obviously, it would cut down on the number of innocent Afghans
    they are killing, and it would give us an opportunity to move
    forward with the Afghan security forces' growth and improvement
    in capability, as well as development in the country and
    governance.
        So I think that--I mean, they read our newspapers. They
    read our newspapers on Iraq, when the surge started in Iraq,
    and they knew the pressures against continuing it for a
    protracted period here in Washington. So it seems to me that
    signaling a beginning of a process of transitioning, province
    by province, district by district, with a firm date, actually
    serves our interests.
        The Chairman. Before I ask Admiral Mullen, can you honestly
    characterize that date as a goal?
        Secretary Gates. I would tell you, Mr. Chairman, I think
    that date is fixed. I think the President is committed to that
    date. In theory, obviously, the commander-in-chief can always
    change his mind, but I would tell you he feels very strongly
    about it. And I think it is not, in his mind, a goal but, in
    fact, a fixed starting date.
        The Chairman. Admiral.
        Admiral Mullen. First of all, Chairman, I support the
    strategy wholeheartedly.
        And then, secondly, the only thing I would like to add--I
    agree with Secretary Gates on the discussion around July of
    2011. I just would like to add one comment about that.
        It has been described by some as an arbitrary date. It is
    not an arbitrary date. In fact, those of us in the military
    believe that that date is a date where we will know certainly
    whether we are succeeding or not in Afghanistan with this
    strategy.
        There is an assessment, a major assessment, which will
    occur about a year from now. That will start to look at,
    obviously, what has happened over the next 12 months and start
    to focus on what the changes or adjustments might be over the
    following year, which would certainly encompass July 2011.
        But the reason that date was picked is because we added
    10,000 Marines this year in Helmand; they immediately had a
    positive impact, particularly from the counterinsurgency
    standpoint. And so, in the middle of 2011, we will have had
    three summers, if you will, 2009, 2010, and 2011, where we have
    had those kinds of forces--or the Marines will have been there
    three years. And we will be able to assess--for three seasons,
    I mean--we will be able to assess how they are doing and where
    this is going.
        That is, obviously, enhanced with the additional forces
    that the President has committed to. And I, too, believe that
    his decision to commit the forces is one of very, very strong
    resolve to turn this around. And, two, there needs to be a hook
    out there that incentivizes the Afghans that they have to take
    the lead in lots of areas--in particular, in the area of
    security.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Admiral.
        Let me mention to the Members that, in case you don't have
    the opportunity to ask a question, questions can be submitted
    to the witnesses for the record.
        Mr. McKeon.
        Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, it seems to me that the start of the
    drawdown now has been clarified. It is definite; the President
    set the date. No matter what, we are starting to withdraw in
    July of 2011. But the pace, the scope, the duration is
    uncertain or even conditions-based. Is that correct?
        Secretary Gates. Yes.
        Mr. McKeon. If yes, who determined the July 2011 start
    date? Was it you or anyone in the military chain of command?
    And why does that start date make any sense? Or is it just
    semantics?
        Secretary Gates. Well, we were--both I and Admiral Mullen,
    General Petraeus, General McChrystal were all involved in the
    discussions and the recommendations to the President that
    included this date. And the date was chosen essentially for the
    reasons that Admiral Mullen just described. It is two years
    after the Marines went into Helmand, three fighting seasons.
    And we will have a very good idea by that time whether this
    strategy is working and what successes we have been able to
    have.
        I think something that is important to clarify is that this
    is going to be a gradual process of transition. And the
    transition to Afghan security responsibility will start,
    presumably, in the least contested areas, some of which,
    perhaps, could happen now. And it will involve not just the
    Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police, but local
    authorities, local police, tribal groups, and various other
    security units.
        And it will be our commanders on the ground, in my view,
    who make the decision, who make the recommendation, that a
    district or a cluster of districts or a province is ready to
    transition to Afghan security responsibility, just as they did
    in Iraq.
        Mr. McKeon. Mr. Secretary, I think all of us say things,
    probably, that we would change given different circumstances,
    but let me just read a quote that you said on September 27th of
    this year.
        ``I think that the notion of timeliness and exit strategies
    and so on, frankly, I think would all be a strategic mistake.
    The reality is, failure in Afghanistan would be a huge setback
    for the United States. Taliban and al Qaeda, as far as they are
    concerned, defeated one superpower. For them to be seen to
    defeat a second, I think, would have catastrophic consequences
    in terms of energizing the extremist movement, al Qaeda
    recruitment, operations, fundraising, and so on.''
        Let me ask, based on what we just talked about, that we are
    going to have a review about a year from now, Secretary Gates,
    in the same exchange with Senator McCain yesterday, you
    indicated that in December 2010 the administration will conduct
    another review. And here is what you said: ``The President has
    indicated that we will have a thorough review of how we are
    doing in December of 2010, and I think we will be in a position
    then to evaluate whether or not we can begin that transition in
    July.''
        Am I correct that the administration will conduct another
    review only six months or so after all the surge forces arrive
    in Afghanistan? In Iraq, the surge forces were on the ground
    for 12 to 18 months before we turned the tide. Why is this
    enough time in Afghanistan? Why do this review in December of
    2010? Will this review also be one that could possibly take
    three months and once again put the entire strategy in
    question?
        Secretary Gates. No. First of all, it won't. It won't do
    that.
        The surge in Iraq lasted 14 months. The first troops went
    in in January of 2007, and I think General Petraeus would tell
    you that, by summer, six or seven months later, he had enough
    indications of things happening on the ground that he could
    tell that this effort was going to work, even though that was
    the period when we had the highest casualties that we suffered
    over the last two or three years in Iraq.
        I am adamantly opposed to deadlines, and I am opposed to a
    timeline in terms of completion of a withdrawal of U.S. forces,
    other than in general terms, of a period of three years or
    something like that. But I do not have a problem with setting a
    timeline for the beginning of a process.
        Again, we had to balance the question of how do you signal
    resolve and, at the same time, signal to the Afghans that we
    are not going to be there to protect them forever. I think this
    is one of the differences between Iraq and Afghanistan.
        Once it was clear the surge was working in Iraq, the Iraqis
    wanted us out as quickly as possible. There are some in
    Afghanistan, perhaps in the government, perhaps in the elites
    or whatever, probably not the general population, who would
    probably very much like to have the United States Army and the
    United States Marine Corps stay in Afghanistan indefinitely.
    They live in a rough neighborhood.
        We need to signal that is not going to happen, and they
    need to buy into this war. They need to take ownership of this
    war in their country against somebody trying to overthrow them.
    And trying to incentivize them and get them to be more
    aggressive in recruiting and retaining their soldiers and
    police and getting them into the fight is very important to the
    success of this strategy.
        Leaving it open-ended--we have not had any timelines or
    guidelines like this in Afghanistan for eight years. So the
    question is, how do you get them to take this seriously and
    that they are going to have to step up to the plate? I think
    this is the proper balance.
        Mr. McKeon. Both the President's speech and your testimony
    today do not address the requisite size of the Afghan National
    Security Forces.
        According to General McChrystal, a fundamental pillar for
    achieving success is developing a significantly more effective
    and larger ANSF, with radically expanded coalition-force
    partnering at every echelon. His assessment also stated that
    coalition forces must provide a bridge capability to protect
    critical segments of the population.
        General McChrystal's assessment recommended to grow the
    Afghan security forces to 400,000. Admiral Mullen, in your
    professional military judgment, do you believe that an ANSF of
    400,000 is both necessary and feasible?
        Admiral Mullen. Sir, we spent a lot of time on this in the
    review, and I think it was time very well-spent. It is very
    clear in that examination that the highest-risk area is the
    development of the Afghan police. The Afghan army we evaluate
    as moderate risk, but key to local security is clearly going to
    have that police force.
        We know how to do that. We recognize the challenges
    associated with that. And while that 400,000 is an aspirational
    goal out several years from now, the decision has been made to
    look at this literally year-to-year based on how we are doing.
        Right now--and General McChrystal has fundamentally shifted
    how we do this since he has gotten there, into this
    partnership, this radically different partnership. Prior to his
    arrival, essentially what we did--and we weren't resourced
    well, but what we did was we mentored or we had training teams.
    And it was just too small, it couldn't do that, which is why we
    are so far behind.
        So, each year, we have a goal. And so, for instance, right
    now, on the army side, we are 96,000. Not enough of that 96,000
    are in the field. We have to improve that from a reduction of
    overhead, get them out into the field and partner with them.
    And next year, by this time next year, about October first next
    year, that 96,000 will go up to 134,000. To achieve that, we
    have to reduce the attrition rate, increase the retention rate
    and the recruiting. And those are pretty strong goals, with
    respect to both the army and the police.
        The analytical side of this, from what we have been able to
    do, is that aspirational goal looks about right, but it is also
    going to depend on how security is going. If we are able to
    turn this around from a momentum standpoint, that will provide
    the breathing space, the opportunity to recruit more, bring
    more in, train more, develop them more quickly. So it is all
    very much linked.
        And I am confident this approach, as we go year to year,
    having that aspirational goal out there a few years from now,
    is the right approach. But right now we have to focus on what
    we have directly in front of us and make sure we succeed over
    the next 12 months.
        Mr. McKeon. The authorized force now is 134,000?
        Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, 134,000.
        Mr. McKeon. And that is the goal to be at a year from now?
        Admiral Mullen. Right. But, again, we will assess it and
    move it up each year, but generally on that glide slope out to
    400,000. But we have to see where we are.
        Mr. McKeon. Could we maybe get from you what that goal
    would be, or should we ask General McChrystal that, what the
    goal would be a year from now? You say it is 134,000. What
    would the goal be by July of 2011?
        Admiral Mullen. Can I say, it is the thirtieth of
    September, 2011, for the army it is 171,000. I mean, we have
    each goal to get out there. But that 2011 goal, I think, will
    be tied to the realities of what we experience over the next 12
    months.
        Mr. McKeon. Is it fair to say, do you have a target date
    set for what the date should be by the time we start the
    redeployment in July of 2011.
        Admiral Mullen. I think that is very much a part of the
    assessment. We know approximately what will be--where we will
    be based on the assumptions that I have talked about. But,
    again, we have got to have an impact on attrition, retention,
    recruiting. We have got to incentivize them to come in and to
    stay. We have got to raise their pay. And General McChrystal is
    doing that because the Taliban are making more money right now
    than the Afghan Security Forces.
        We have got to get at the corruption side on the police
    side. So there is a significant amount of work right up front
    that we have got to get right that we just haven't had the
    people there for. And it is not just us; it is Coalition forces
    to train them and equip them and make sure they are qualified
    to assume the mantle of their own security.
        Mr. McKeon. What would the number be for the police at the
    same time, the goal?
        Admiral Mullen. I have got that in here. Roughly 130,000. I
    am at 92,000 today. So, in about another year, it is about
    97,000. And in 2011, at the end of fiscal year 2011, so
    September of 2011, it is about 130,000.
        Mr. McKeon. So that, instead of 400, we are looking at 300
    now?
        Admiral Mullen. That is what we think the goal should be
    for each year, and we are going to have to reassess that, and
    then to look at the longer-term requirements of what it needs
    to be.
        Mr. McKeon. I am just still kind of hung up on the number
    400----
        Admiral Mullen. I understand.
        Mr. McKeon. General McChrystal said we needed, and we are
    talking about leaving or starting to leave when we are at about
    three-fourths of that.
        Admiral Mullen. I think you said it very well, starting to
    leave. Transition. No decisions yet on the size of that
    transition. If security is going really well, it will probably
    be bigger. If it is not, it will probably be smaller. From the
    challenges that we have in developing the security force
    itself, really, I think argue for these very near-term goals to
    see how well we can do.
        Mr. McKeon. One of the concerns I have is I am afraid that,
    in our rush to leave, we might adjust our goals downwards so
    that we can claim success and leave.
        Admiral Mullen. That is certainly not the intent that I
    see.
        Mr. McKeon. I appreciate that.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        John Spratt.
        Mr. Spratt. Mr. Secretary, you testified yesterday that the
    build-up of 30,000 troops would cost an additional $30 billion
    to $35 billion, I believe.
        Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Spratt. I have a hard time on the back of my envelope
    trying to drive that figure. It seems to me to be awfully high
    for the 35,000 troops or 30,000 troops we are talking about. We
    will need to pay for these deployments, after all only part of
    2010. If you assume a deployment of a brigade every two months
    beginning in late January until force levels increase to
    30,000, the average level of boots on the ground for the year
    will be 17,500. Therefore, a cost of $30 billion to $35 billion
    would imply that the yearly cost to maintain each troop in
    Afghan is $1.7 million to $2 million, which is an awfully high
    figure. Could you explain to us what is in the 30 to $35
    billion estimate that you gave? Does it include, for example,
    maintaining the Afghan army and police force? Are we going to
    be picking up a substantial part of the tab for these security
    forces, especially as they grow from their present size to
    400,000 ultimately?
        Secretary Gates. Since we only receive the President's
    decision on Monday, our folks with their pencils haven't sat
    down to go through the specifics. I would tell you that some of
    the upfront costs that we are looking at, for example, that go
    beyond the troop costs, is that right now we have the money in
    the budget, I believe, for 5,000 or 6,000 Mine Resistant Ambush
    Protected (MRAP) all-terrain vehicles. With the additional
    forces that are being sent in, we are probably going to
    recommend increasing that number to protect those troops to
    about 10,000. So that is several billion dollars in and of
    itself just for force protection with the MRAPs. But we will
    certainly get you the specifics. Now that we know the numbers
    and we have a pretty good idea of the timelines of when they
    are going in, we can now refine the numbers and get those to
    you. The 30 to 35 billion was basically a ballpark figure, and
    we now need to get down and get the details.
        Mr. Spratt. Does it include a substantial payment, subsidy,
    in effect, of the Treasury, our resources, for the Afghan
    forces?
        Secretary Gates. I don't think so, Mr. Spratt.
        I think that there is money to help pay for the training
    and equipping of the Afghan National Army and police in the
    $130 billion Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) budget
    request that you already have, that the Congress has before it.
    I don't think there is additional money for that in the money
    we are talking about that would be on top of the 130.
        Mr. Spratt. Does the latest proposal, 18-month proposal,
    the change in time frame imply a change in tactics? Will there
    be an increase in ops tempo, an increase in certain
    commitments, certain forces as a result of this compressed time
    frame?
        Admiral Mullen. As far as our overall force levels, our
    deployed force levels, there is obviously a big piece tied to
    the drawdown in Iraq, which is still very much on plan and on
    schedule. We expect to start that in the March timeframe and
    come down from roughly 115,000 there to 50,000 or so by the end
    of August, and then complete that withdrawal by the end of
    2011. So these forces won't--it won't pick up our overall op
    tempo period. We will still be able to have on the Marine Corps
    side dwell time move out towards two to one fairly
    significantly, a little more slowly on the Army side. So it
    hasn't increased our op tempo, based on where we are right now,
    dramatically. Clearly, adding these forces is going to impact
    the op tempo. But as far as where we are right now, overall, it
    will actually come down just a little bit for the Army.
        Mr. Spratt. Could I quickly ask Jack Lew, does the State
    Department have an interest in the $35 billion? Do you expect
    to get substantial, a significant sum of additional money for
    foreign aid and assistance?
        Secretary Lew. Mr. Spratt, there will be additional
    requests on the civilian side, both for some additional
    civilians that will be deploying because there will be
    additional areas that we are going to be partnering for the
    civilian-military (civ-mil) plan, and also because there will
    be an increased amount of the country where we can be having
    our civilian program operate effectively. We are also working
    since Monday to put together the precise numbers, but there
    will be a civilian component as well.
        Mr. Spratt. If you could get us clarification along these
    lines, we would very much appreciate it.
        Thank you very much.
        The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Bartlett.
        Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
        I know that, in the military, theirs is not to reason why;
    theirs is just to do and die. But, Mr. Secretary, when I stand
    by that coffin with that young widow, I have to ask, why? And I
    feel compelled to voice once again the question of an
    increasing number of my constituents: Why is our involvement in
    Afghanistan not the ultimate exercise in futility? Since, sir,
    if we are successful in doing what no one else has ever done,
    the British Empire, the Soviet Empire, and we win, what will we
    have won? Since the bad guys will simply find refuge in
    Pakistan, and then if we invest who knows how many years and
    how much blood and treasure in driving them out of Pakistan,
    they will go to places like Yemen and Somalia; I am not sure,
    sir, that the American people can be convinced that denying
    them privileged sanctuary in Afghanistan when they can find
    sanctuary in places like Yemen and Somalia is worth the
    enormous cost in blood and treasure.
        If the reason, sir, that we have to be there is because a
    destabilized Afghanistan would destabilize Pakistan and nuclear
    weapons would come loose, then, sir, we need to make that
    argument.
        In this connection, let me ask you a specific question. Is
    the model of a national Afghan government, a national army,
    futile, since it is contrary to Afghan's 300-year history of a
    nation of tribes bound by social conventions? Under Karzai's
    three-time ratified national government army model, the Taliban
    now controls 11 of 34 provinces. The Afghan National Army
    controls one, I think. And I believe that the National Security
    Forces probably control none of those provinces. And they are
    seen as being ineffective, incapable of being effective for a
    number of years.
        Secretary Gates. Mr. Bartlett, one of the concerns that I
    had after the President's decisions in March was that they were
    interpreted as the United States supporting a full-scale
    nation-building in Afghanistan and also the creation of a
    strong centralized government. As you point out, the latter has
    not existed in all of Afghan history. And one of the elements
    of the dialogue that we have had inside the administration for
    the last three months is, how do you narrow that mission and
    make it more realistic? How do you communicate that what this
    is all about is really our security, and what we are looking at
    is enabling the Afghan government and the local authorities to
    be able to reassert security control in their own areas?
        One of the pieces of this that has not been discussed is
    the fact that about 60 percent of Afghanistan is not controlled
    by them, by the Taliban, or where they have no significant or
    they don't have predominant influence. What we have to do, and
    a piece of the President's strategy is, working with the
    subnational parts of Afghanistan, working with the tribal
    suras, working with the village elders, working with the
    district governors and leaders and as well as those in the
    provinces, and in fact a good bit of the security that may come
    as part of this transition will be local security, local
    police, as we have seen develop in parts of Wardak province.
    And so it won't be necessarily that we turn over security
    responsibility to the Afghan National Army but rather to local
    authorities who have established control, reestablished control
    of their own areas from the Taliban. So it is a combination of
    all of these things that we will work with. And I think that
    our view is that what we have to do is try and figure out--
    well, not try and figure out. But what we have to do is
    strengthen again the local and traditional governance systems
    in Afghanistan that in fact can reestablish local control and
    deny the Taliban the authority. So I think that--and I also
    would say that, as we partner with the Afghans, you get a mixed
    picture. But the reality is, for all of the comments about
    corruption and everything else, more than 2,000 Afghan police
    have died in the line of duty for their country. About 1,000 of
    their soldiers have died. And so I think that this picture is
    not focused strictly on creating something in Kabul that has
    never existed before, but also figuring out at the subnational
    level how to re-empower local authorities, because they will be
    perhaps our most essential partners in denying the Taliban
    control.
        Mr. Bartlett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Mr. Ortiz.
        Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, thank you for taking
    the time to make this appearance before our committee. Though
    it is always a difficult decision to make putting our young men
    and women in harm's way, I feel that answering the much needed
    request of our commanders on the ground was the best response
    to the current situation in Afghanistan. I have a few questions
    that I will be asking of you gentlemen today and as we look
    forward to the movement of additional troops into Afghanistan.
        First, I would like to see about, will forces be rotated
    directly from Iraq to Afghanistan? And, if so, how will the
    Department of Defense (DOD) ensure that they receive the
    training that they need, because, as we all well know, the
    environment is totally different?
        And, second, what analysis has DOD done on its ability to
    provide the key enablers, such as support forces in
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and which
    are already in high demand, to currently support the drawdown
    in Iraq and troop increases in Afghanistan? We are drawing down
    here and increasing there.
        And, lastly, given the many logistical challenges in
    Afghanistan, how is DOD able to synchronize the arrival of the
    troops with their equipment? And the reason I ask is because we
    just made a little tour of some of our military and some of our
    young men and women who are deploying, and as I mentioned to
    you earlier, Mr. Secretary, you will probably be getting a
    letter from us about some of the equipment that they feel is
    inferior to what they need.
        So maybe if you can answer those three questions, because I
    am concerned of putting somebody in harm's way if they don't
    have the--there are a lot of things that worry me. When we
    increase the troop levels from maybe, you were saying from
    300,000 to 400,000 if we have to, are we going to have enough
    non-commissioned officers (NCOs)? Do we have enough captains?
    Are we producing enough of them to carry out these duties? I
    yield to both of you.
        Admiral Mullen. Sir, let me actually try to answer that
    last question first.
        I see monthly from General Casey a lengthy report on the
    overall assessment of various measures of how the Army is doing
    in terms of things like that. And right now we are. So the
    retention of our captains, the retention of our majors, meeting
    the needs that we have, and, in fact, have seen over the last
    year the overall recruiting and retention numbers for all our
    services, but particularly for the Army, go up. A great
    statistic as far as I am concerned is that a year, year and a
    half ago, the overall percentage of high school graduates that
    were entering the Army was about 80 percent, 81 percent, which
    is low. We like it in the nineties. Over this last year, it has
    been 95 or 96 percent.
        There is nobody that has been more dedicated to making sure
    that our men and women in harm's way have the right equipment
    than Secretary Gates. And I can and I personally attest to
    that. I watch him do that all the time. And I know you have
    spent a great deal of time on this as well, and I really
    appreciate that.
        With respect to your questions, largely, forces will not be
    moving from Iraq to Afghanistan. There are some enabling
    forces, critical enablers that we have moved in very small
    numbers literally on a deployment, but it is a very small
    number. There are forces that were headed for Iraq that are now
    being re-missioned to go to Afghanistan, first of all.
        Secondly, we have recognized for some time that Afghanistan
    was coming, and so our training has been very focused on that
    in ways that we hadn't before. And, in particular, we are
    focusing on culture and language, things we learned in Iraq we
    had to get right. They are the same issues, but it obviously
    takes a different skill set, if you will, in Afghanistan. So we
    are very focused on that as we transition. But we have been in
    transition now for the better part of the last year, year and a
    half, the Marine Corps specifically, as the first ones that
    really put significant additional forces there.
        We are very focused on the enabling pieces. This gets to
    your second question. We are short in some of those. In fact, I
    worry more about their op tempo, their dwell time staying at
    one-to-one than I do some of our bigger units. And we are very
    focused on both buying that, distributing it, and focusing on
    the fight. And General Odierno has been very supportive of this
    overall effort to give up some enablers that he had in order to
    support Afghanistan.
        And then just lastly, logistically, focused on this for
    months. The unsung heroes, and many of them are in logistics
    and transportation, and they are performing magnificently. We
    know the challenge, and we think we are going to be able to
    support getting them there as fast as possible.
        Mr. Ortiz. I want to thank both of you for your service.
    Thank you so much.
        The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Thornberry.
        Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, the press reports today indicate that you
    initially resisted a timetable; that it was the White House
    that came up with the idea of setting a date, but that you were
    persuaded once you got some additional flexibility to adjust it
    according to the situation on the ground. Is that true?
        Secretary Gates. Well, not entirely. I think that all of us
    learned as part of this dialogue, it was also reported that--
    and accurately--that I am opposed to troop increase because I
    was worried about the footprint on the ground. I was, over this
    process, persuaded by General McChrystal that it is less the
    size of the footprint than what the soldiers are doing in terms
    of how the Afghans react to them.
        As I said earlier, I have in the past been adamantly
    opposed to deadlines. And I think that, and where I was
    persuaded in this case, was the importance of incentivizing the
    Afghans and finding the right balance, and my concerns were
    mitigated by, frankly, our military's view of when they were
    convinced they would be able to say with some confidence
    whether the strategy was working. So I would say that most--I
    would say virtually everybody involved in this dialogue in
    front of the President learned something, changed their
    positions, adjusted their positions, and at the end of the day
    all came out unanimously supporting the recommendations that
    went to the President and that he decided on.
        Mr. Thornberry. Have you heard any evidence, or is there
    something that you think is particularly persuasive that says
    setting this date will be effective in getting the Afghans to
    do something that they would not do otherwise?
        Secretary Gates. Well, again, I go back to what I said a
    little earlier. We had eight years without any timelines,
    without any pressure on the Afghans to perform. And it seemed
    to me that, you know, as we go into this and with this size of
    American commitment, and don't forget, we are talking about
    really a two-year period starting last July when we began to
    put additional resources into Afghanistan beyond what had been
    approved in the last administration. And I was persuaded by--I
    have been persuaded by General McChrystal and by General
    Petraeus and others that this beginning of a period of
    transition on a date certain will in fact incentivize the
    Afghans. And this is one of the things that we will be
    watching.
        Mr. Thornberry. A few weeks ago we had General Keane here
    testifying. He testified that it is critical that tribal
    insurgent leaders sense our commitment to see this through to
    the end. War is always about breaking the will of your
    opponent.
        That seems to resonate with me, I guess. You talk about
    this balance between sending a message to the Afghans and
    sending a message to adversaries and friends about our
    commitment there. I guess my thought is, the more important
    conveyance is to make sure that tribal sheik in Afghanistan and
    that Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) officer in Pakistan has
    no doubt that we are going to stick with this through thick and
    thin; otherwise we won't get the information, we won't get the
    loyalty and so forth, that we need to be successful. Are you
    concerned about today's reaction in Afghanistan and Pakistan
    that seems to question, I guess, somewhat this date where the
    troops are going to be there for such a short time before the
    withdrawal is required?
        Secretary Gates. First of all, it is up to us to sit down
    with them, as we have in the course of our discussions over the
    last several months, and explain what we are talking about.
    Again, I think the important aspect of this is that July 2011
    is the beginning of a process, and the pacing of that process
    and where it will happen will be conditions based on the
    ground, as the President said.
        But the reality is, look, another audience here is the
    American people. And we have been at war for eight years. This
    is the longest war in our history. And the American people, I
    think--and you all are the elected representatives. But it
    seems to me the American people, American people want to know
    that this isn't going to be just another 10 years of commitment
    at $100 billion a year and with our troops committed to the
    degree that they are now. I think there is plenty of
    flexibility in this process in terms of the pacing of the
    drawdown and the conditions based that it certainly has left
    our military commanders feeling comfortable about it.
        The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Taylor.
        Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you, Mr. Gates and Admiral Mullen.
        Let me start by saying our Nation is very, very lucky to
    have both of you where you are. If I ask you tough questions,
    it is because I think it is my job.
        In Colombia, we have spent billions of dollars and over the
    course of the past decade sent thousands of advisers to help
    the Colombians keep their nation from turning into a narco
    state. It is common knowledge that Karzai's brother is one of
    the biggest narcotics dealers in Afghanistan. It is common
    knowledge that a lot of the warlords on our side are in the
    narcotics business. The testimony before this committee said
    that if we went after the narcotics trade, those warlords would
    turn against us.
        And I realize that you have been dealt a tough hand, and I
    am not trying to make it any harder, but I think this is a fair
    question. Why do we spend billions in Colombia and risk the
    lives of thousands of Americans trying to keep that from
    becoming a narco state when we are apparently willing to accept
    the fact that the Karzai government is a narco state, and in
    Iraq, at some point, the oil revenues paid the sheiks to get
    people to quit shooting at us. And I am glad that happened.
    That started about last April.
        But all I can see in Afghanistan is a future where the
    major source of revenue is narcotics. And do we really want to
    establish a government with American dollars and, more
    importantly, American blood that is just nothing more than a
    narco state because they are not the Taliban?
        Secretary Gates. Well, I think Secretary Lew probably has
    some things to say on this, but I would make a couple of
    points. First of all, ISAF changed its strategy with respect to
    the narcotics trafficking about a year ago and aggressively
    began to go after labs, drug lords, and the traffickers. The
    eradication----
        Mr. Taylor. Does that include the president's brother? I
    want to make it clear, President Karzai's brother.
        Secretary Gates. I understand. Let me just say that, as
    Secretary Clinton testified in the last day and a half, we
    understand the importance of this corruption and how corrosive
    it is. And the truth of the matter is there is a heck of a lot
    more money going into corrupt pockets that is coming from us
    and the international community than is coming from the narco
    traffickers. We are putting tens of billions of dollars into
    Afghanistan, and too much of it is ending up with sticky
    fingers along the way. And so we are putting in place some
    procedures in terms of certifying ministries, certifying
    ministers, governors, and others that we have confidence are
    not corrupt. And we won't do business with the ones that are
    corrupt at the same time that we are going after the narcotics
    guys.
        So we do understand the nature of this problem. We do
    believe it is a serious problem. Narcotics, we think,
    represents about a quarter of the $12 billion gross domestic
    product (GDP) of Afghanistan at this point.
        And the good news is one of the big pieces of this program
    is, frankly, our agriculture program to give these guys an
    alternative. I mean, for the farmer, the poppy is not a
    particularly great crop. He has got one customer who doesn't
    negotiate on the price, and you can't feed your livestock these
    things or your family. So we have some pretty expansive
    programs as part of the strategy going forward to try and deal
    with this and give them an alternative. And the truth of the
    matter is there was a significant reduction in narcotics
    production this year in part because the price of wheat became
    competitive.
        Mr. Taylor. Mr. Secretary, what about President Karzai's
    brother?
        Secretary Gates. I am just not going to talk about that in
    an open session. We are dealing with a sovereign government.
        Mr. Taylor. Someone from our State Department before this
    committee admitted that it was true.
        Secretary Gates. Well, we have problems with him. There is
    no question about that.
        Mr. Taylor. But, again, don't you think it ought to start
    with the president's brother abiding by the rule of law? Is
    that not one of the things----
        Secretary Gates. We understand the problem.
        Mr. Taylor. Mr. Secretary, again, we as a nation are lucky
    to have you where you are. You have got a tough job.
        The Chairman. I thank the gentleman from Mississippi.
        Mr. Jones.
        Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
        And, gentlemen, thank you for being here and the leadership
    to our country that you provide. The day that the President
    made his announcement, in the Jacksonville paper, which is the
    home of Camp Lejeune Marine Base, the heading of the local
    article, ``Obama Expected to Send 30,000 More Troops to
    Combat.'' In the introductory of the article, I will just read
    this part: Local military are reacting to the news with
    skepticism and concern. The article interviews three Marines
    and one Navy corpsman.
        Mr. Secretary, you have tried for many years, and I applaud
    you for this effort, to get North Atlantic Treaty Organization
    (NATO) to understand that this war in Afghanistan is their
    responsibility as much as it is ours. My question to you would
    be, if NATO is counted on to provide, I was thinking the number
    of 7,000 troops, more troops, would these troops be trigger
    pullers? Would they be involved in combat with the Taliban and
    al Qaeda?
        Secretary Gates. Our hope and expectation is--what we would
    like to do is have our ISAF partners, other than those who are
    partnered with us in the Regional Command South, basically take
    total responsibility for the north and the western parts of the
    country so that we could concentrate our forces in the south,
    in the southern and eastern parts of the country. So our
    expectation is that the additional forces, as with many of the
    forces they have there now, would in fact be prepared to engage
    in combat as necessary.
        Obviously, the security situation in the north and the west
    is not as difficult as it is in the south and the east, and we
    think that they should be able to take responsibility for that.
    And we have some commitments that give us confidence that we
    are in fact going to get another 5,000 to 7,000 troops. And I
    would point out that, as we have increased our numbers, so have
    our ISAF partners. When I took this job, there were 17,000
    Europeans and other ISAF partners in Afghanistan. If we get
    this additional 5,000 to 7,000, there will be about 50,000. So
    they have tripled the number of troops that they have. And I
    would say, also, they have removed a lot of the caveats that
    used to limit what their troops could do.
        Mr. Jones. Mr. Secretary, Admiral Mullen, I have this
    second question.
        Again, I like many on this committee, maybe all on this
    committee, worry about the stress on the force and how many
    times we can continue to ask these brave men and women to keep
    going back and back.
        And I do want to thank you, Mr. Secretary, and Admiral
    Mullen, for taking the time you did to try to figure out what
    is the right policy for Afghanistan.
        The question is, of the 30,000 that will be going to
    Afghanistan, how many of the 30,000 can you give us, if not
    today, maybe to the committee, the number of deployments that
    each one of the 30,000 have been on? Do you know now how many
    deployments the 30,000 have been on? Has it been half the
    30,000 have not been to Afghanistan or Iraq and the other half
    a number of times? Can you answer that, or would you like to
    submit that to the committee?
        Admiral Mullen. Mr. Jones, let me take a shot at it. I
    can't give you a complete answer, but I think it is an
    important question. On the Marine Corps side, I think nobody
    knows this better than you, we have rotated basically every
    seven months with respect to deployments. And the expectation
    is, for the major units, that will continue in the Marine Corps
    even as we shift from--as we have shifted from Iraq to
    Afghanistan. What I can't tell you is, for these units--there
    are sort of two measures--for these units, how many deployments
    this unit, a unit, has been on. And then, in that, how many
    deployments on average have the individuals in that unit seen?
    And that is what I would need to get back to you for.
        Although the Marine Corps has managed this in a way--and
    the growth of the force to 202,000 has been incredibly
    important here, so that actually General Conway, even with
    these deployments, is going to get over the next year to twice
    as long at home as deployed. And, as you may remember, it
    wasn't that long ago we were at one-to-one.
        The Army is more challenging. And the major units, the
    brigade combat teams for the Army, typically a unit is on its
    third or fourth deployment. There is plenty of change-out in
    the units between deployments, and the Army is going to get to
    its two-to-one goal in a couple of years as opposed to the
    Marine Corps.
        I just want to tell you that it is something the Secretary
    and myself, the service chiefs, General Casey and General
    Conway spend an awful lot of time on, recognizing the stress
    that they have been under. But that is where we are right now.
        Mr. Jones. Thank you, sir.
        The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Reyes.
        Mr. Reyes. Thank you, gentlemen.
        Gentlemen, thank you for being here. I know it has been a
    tough several days. I just want to go on record as supporting
    the President and his decision, and particularly the thoughtful
    process that he used to come to that decision. And I know he
    stated the other night that we are not alone in this effort in
    Afghanistan. I believe he said 43 other nations are involved.
        My question--and I will ask it to Secretary Lew. My
    question is, I know we have ongoing efforts to try to elicit
    additional cooperation from other nations besides the 43. If
    you can give us a status report on that, how successful are we?
        And the other question I have for any or maybe all of you
    is the following: How are we working to ensure that
    developmental funds will reach the intended recipients? Because
    one of the--I think one of the critical issues here is
    reassuring the nations we are trying to recruit to help in
    addition to the 43 to support in an effort that is going to be
    successful. So how are we doing that? How well are we doing?
    And what is your anticipated success?
        Secretary Lew. Mr. Reyes, the partners are participating in
    different ways. Some are providing troops; some are providing
    development assistance. Part of the President's plan called for
    allies to provide troops. The responses have been very
    positive. Secretary Clinton is in Brussels, and we are
    confident that we are going to get commitments that will be
    very much in line with what was expected.
        On the development side, our partners are doing the same
    kind of work we are doing. They are doing the kind of
    development work in agriculture and rule of law, and we are
    working very cooperatively both to provide programs in the
    areas that we control, to share best practices, and to work
    with the Afghan ministries to build capacity.
        The very important question you ask on how to make sure the
    money gets to where it is intended, that is a challenge, and we
    have made it clear that it is not something that has just one
    answer. We are going to work with Afghan national ministries
    that have the capacity to get the money where it goes. Some of
    them have done very well.
        In the agriculture area, which is central to the issue that
    Mr. Taylor was asking about, we have a lot of confidence that
    the agriculture minister has a plan, that the money is getting
    to the areas, to the farmers to give them seeds to plant legal
    crops. And for most Afghan farmers, if they can plant and sell
    legal crops, they don't want to grow poppies. So it is part of
    the counternarcotics policy as well as the general development
    policy.
        We have to work at the subnational level. We need to work
    with provincial governors. We need to help build governance in
    areas where it hasn't been. When I was in Helmand right after
    our military moved in to make that area a place where we could
    do development work, it was almost overnight that we had
    development workers helping build an air strip so that farmers
    could get their crops out of Helmand, giving them seeds so they
    can plant legal crops, and working in communities to try to get
    local leaders to meet with their people sometimes for the first
    time. I know the governor of Helmand has said that it was
    incredibly important that the civilians were there with the
    military from day one.
        Secretary Gates. Part of what I think is important in this
    is that we not take the Soviet approach and focus too much on
    big signature projects that take years to complete. What we
    need are, I think, principally small-scale efforts that reach
    individual Afghans pretty quickly and where they see their
    lives change for the better almost immediately after U.S.
    forces and our partners and the Afghans clear an area. And I
    think you can find ways through using these provincial
    reconstruction teams and the other civilians that are with our
    troops to do that. And I think that a one-room school, an all-
    weather road, a small bridge, a well, these are the things that
    matter to the individuals and that will make them want to be
    our partners in this.
        And I think that, frankly, one of the things that Secretary
    Clinton and I talked about in the House Foreign Affairs
    Committee yesterday is that the State Department and AID and
    our civilians out there need the same kind of flexibility in
    terms of the way they are able to commit funds for these kinds
    of things that our commanders have with the Commander's
    Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds so that they can be
    there the next day and commit and provide some dollars for
    people to do that work.
        Mr. Reyes. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
        The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Forbes.
        Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And as Congressman Taylor said, I am going to ask some
    tough questions, but I do appreciate you being here.
        There was a time in our country when words mattered, when
    laws and statutes mattered.
        Mr. Secretary, Title X, Section 231 of the U.S. Code
    required that you submit to us, to this committee, a
    shipbuilding plan when you sent your budget over so that we
    would know where the money was going to be spent on our ships,
    and that you certified that the budget you sent over complied
    with that shipbuilding plan. You just refused to do it this
    year.
        Title X, Section 231(a) required that we have an aviation
    plan sent over to us and that you certify or have an assessment
    that the budget comply with it, and you just refused to do it.
        House Resolution 477 was unanimously approved by this
    committee on both sides of the aisle requiring that you would
    submit to us that shipbuilding plan that the law required by
    September 15. You just refused to do it.
        H. Res. 478 required an aviation resolution, and that
    assessment that you would just comply with the law and submit
    it to us by September 15. You just refused to do it.
        Title 50, Chapter 15, Subchapter one, Paragraph 404(a)
    required that we have a national security strategy submitted to
    us by the President within 150 days after he took office. We
    didn't get it.
        The Guantanamo Executive Order issued on January 22, 2009,
    said that Guantanamo Bay would be shut down no later than one
    year from the date of this order, which would have been January
    22, 2010. We know that is not going to happen. I disagreed with
    that order, but that is what it said.
        So my question, Mr. Secretary, to you today is this: If we
    are not going to comply with Title X, Section 231; Title X,
    Section 231(a); H. Res. 477; H. Res. 478; Title 50, Chapter 15,
    Subchapter one, Paragraph 404(a); Guantanamo Executive Order,
    what confidence do our allies and our troops and our citizens
    have that the words we are hearing now are words that have
    meaning and are not just semantics?
        And as you think about that question, Admiral, I would ask
    you this question. You testified earlier today that General
    McChrystal got all he wanted, everything he wanted when he
    asked for 30,000 troops. And the question I would ask you--I
    have never known a general to get all he wanted. I have known
    them to get all they formally requested but not all they
    wanted. And I would just ask you, are you saying to this
    committee that all General McChrystal ever wanted was 30,000
    troops to wage the war that he is having to wage now?
        Mr. Secretary, I give you that time, and then Admiral
    Mullen.
        Secretary Gates. First of all, with respect to the 30-year
    aviation plan and shipbuilding plan, it was important for us to
    be able to get a five-year defense plan from the administration
    so that we had some predictability, and we are in the process
    of doing that. The five-year defense plan has been put forward.
    It was not for fiscal year (FY) 2010.
        I can provide you that kind of--I can provide you a list.
    It will be meaningless, because we don't know. We don't know
    what the resources will be until we get the five-year plan.
        Mr. Forbes. Mr. Secretary, and again, I don't mean to
    interrupt you, but that is not what the law says. And the law
    says that you submit whatever plan you are working on. If we
    have no plan, we need to know it when we are voting on budgets,
    that we have don't have a plan. We are waiting for it.
        But the reason that the law requires it is because it is
    important that we know that, one, we have a plan, and what this
    budget is trying to reach in that plan. So, with all due
    respect, I would have appreciated and I think this committee
    would have appreciated at least some response back as to why we
    weren't complying with the law on doing that.
        And I yield back.
        Admiral Mullen. What I thought I said earlier about General
    McChrystal, what I meant to say, was that the strategy that the
    President has executed and made the decision on with respect to
    the 30,000 troops is, General McChrystal is going to get what
    he asked for in 2010. He is going to get those troops in some
    cases more quickly than he had originally asked for them. And,
    to me, that is significant, because that will give him the
    thrust to turn the momentum around, turn this insurgency
    around, which is his number one concern. And outside that,
    longer term, there----
        Mr. Forbes. And I appreciate that. I only have got eight
    seconds. And I will just say this. It is a difference to us
    when we say he got all he wanted than all he officially
    requested.
        Admiral Mullen. I would agree there are very few, if any,
    commanders that have ever gotten everything that they wanted,
    myself included.
        The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
        Dr. Snyder.
        Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, as we anticipate this influx of troops into
    Afghanistan, the normal flow and plan that goes on with moving
    large numbers of troops around, there are some pretty good
    restrictions set in law by Congress on the role that women can
    play. I am not asking for an administrative position. But would
    it be helpful if those restrictions, those legal restrictions,
    were removed so that you were free to move troops around
    better, given the nature of counterinsurgency in both Iraq and
    Afghanistan?
        Secretary Gates. I think Admiral Mullen is probably more
    familiar with these restrictions than I am. But certainly, on
    the logistics side of it, I am not aware of any restrictions
    with respect to moving the troops to Afghanistan and out of
    Iraq and so on.
        But, Admiral.
        Admiral Mullen. I guess, Mr. Snyder, where I would go with
    that is I am not aware of any major restrictions which are
    really hurting us in terms of constraining our ability to do
    that.
        But I do think it may be worthwhile, on a little larger
    level, to look at what we have learned over the last seven or
    eight years of war and assessing that. In fact, I have talked
    specifically with General Casey about maybe it is time for us
    to review that to see if there are some changes that we should
    make that may not be applicable directly to what we are doing
    right now or that could be in the next couple of years but
    would be applicable based on what we have learned in the long
    term.
        Dr. Snyder. Secretary Gates, over the last few years, you
    have had some pretty strong statements about some of the
    difficulties we have had on the civilian side of government, of
    having the civilians following the surge into Iraq. Are you
    confident that we will be able--that the civilian side of
    government will be able to do what Admiral Mullen needs it to
    do to accomplish the missions in both Afghanistan and Iraq?
        Secretary Gates. This is clearly not a problem that can be
    solved in the short term. I think that--I have confidence that
    every effort possible is being made to get more civilians into
    Afghanistan. And there have been a lot of changes in policies
    and practices at the State Department. Secretary Lew can talk
    to that.
        But the problem overall is that the State Department--and
    this is my old song. The State Department, AID, other civilian
    agencies involved in national security have been starved of
    resources for decades. You can't turn that around overnight.
    When I left the government in 1993, there were 16,000 people
    working in AID. They were deployable. They were expeditionary.
    They had the languages. They were prepared to live in
    rudimentary conditions and even dangerous conditions. AID, when
    I came back to government, had 3,000 people, and they were
    mainly contracting people.
        So building that cadre of people, building a larger cadre
    of Foreign Service officers, getting the kind of agricultural
    experts that we need for this task is something that where the
    groundwork laid today may not pay dividends for five years or
    more, but it is important to start.
        But as I say, just to repeat, I think everything that can
    be done right now to get people into the field as quickly as
    possible, civilians, is being done. And, frankly, it is a whole
    of government effort, as Jack would tell you. They have got
    people from the Department of Agriculture and the Justice
    Department and various other departments of government
    participating in this.
        Dr. Snyder. Mr. Chairman, I have about a minute and a half
    left.
        Mr. Owens of New York, if you would like to ask one
    question, I would be glad to yield the remainder of my time to
    you.
        Mr. Owens. Thank you very much.
        I do have a question. Early in the testimony there was a
    reference to the fact that if we pulled out now, we would
    likely see a civil war occur in Afghanistan. What do you
    believe will cause that not to occur as we begin the pullout in
    2011 given the history in that region?
        Secretary Gates. The key is reestablishing traditional
    forms of governance at the local level in the districts and the
    provinces. It is having a credible government where we have at
    least been able to strengthen the capacity of key ministries,
    such as defense and interior, where we have high-quality people
    in charge of them.
        The thing to remember is that a very high percentage of the
    Afghan people, based on all the polling and all the information
    available to us, like 80 to 90 percent of the Afghan people do
    not want to see a return of the Taliban. But the Taliban
    intimidate. They murder. And until we can provide a security
    environment where people know that they will not be subject to
    that kind of retribution, we will have the danger that the
    Taliban will be able to continue the kind of momentum that they
    have had for the last year or two.
        Mr. Owens. Thank you.
        The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
        Before I call Mr. Miller, let me ask you a quick question.
    Has it been made known as to what troop increase, if any, the
    NATO countries are willing to proffer?
        Secretary Gates. A number of countries are talking about
    making commitments. We have received some firm commitments in
    two telephone calls. Day before yesterday, I received firm
    commitments of upwards of 2,000 troops. But these countries
    haven't announced their willingness to do this to their own
    people, so we can't preempt them. I also think that a number of
    countries will wait until after the London conference in
    January that Chancellor Merkel and Prime Minister Brown have
    called on Afghanistan, and I think that some countries will
    wait until then.
        But the efforts that Secretary General of NATO Rasmussen
    and the rest of us have made, Admiral Mullen, the Secretary of
    State, National Security Adviser, and so on, I think give us
    pretty high confidence that we will meet the numbers that we
    have set forth.
        The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Miller.
        Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, one of you in your testimony just a few minutes
    ago--and I don't recall which one it was, but both of you can
    respond, if you would. I think the comment was that there has
    been no pressure for the Afghans to perform over the last eight
    years. Is that a true statement?
        Secretary Gates. I think that there has been--there has
    been verbal pressure, but I think there has not been a serious
    exercise of leverage.
        Mr. Miller. You were Secretary of Defense. I mean, you
    didn't pressure the Afghan people to perform?
        Secretary Gates. Every meeting that I had with the minister
    of defense, every meeting that I had with President Karzai, the
    subject of recruitment, retention, strengthening their military
    capabilities came up.
        But the leverage is more in the kinds of assistance that we
    have been offering, not military assistance but civilian
    assistance, subsidies and so on. And I think there is some real
    opportunities for that leverage.
        Mr. Miller. Well, and is part of that leverage bypassing
    the Karzai administration with the funds and going to some of
    the local provinces and areas instead of giving them the money?
        Secretary Gates. Well, I will defer to Secretary Lew.
        But I think that--as I said earlier, I think that we are in
    the process of developing some procedures in terms of trying to
    tackle this corruption problem where we will not deal with
    ministers and ministries that we believe are corrupt. We will
    not deal with agencies or organizations that we believe are
    corrupt. And, as I said just a few minutes ago, I think that
    the more we can get the money directly to villages and local
    authorities, the more successful we are likely to be.
        Mr. Miller. And to Mr. Taylor's point earlier, I hope that
    also means that we will not deal with governors or mayors that
    are corrupt, either, even if they are the brother of the
    president of the country.
        Secretary Gates. I think that we have to make very--there
    are certain provinces and certain ministries that are critical
    to our success, and I think we have to be willing to use
    whatever leverage is at our disposal to ensure that the people
    who lead those ministries and who are the governors of those
    provinces are competent, honest people we can work with.
        Mr. Miller. Yesterday you had an exchange with Senator
    McCain where you explained how the U.S. forces would begin
    withdrawing in July of 2011, and this was your response: I
    think it is the judgment of all of us in the Department of
    Defense involved in this process that we will be in a position
    in particularly uncontested areas where we will begin to
    transition by 2011.
        Is that a correct statement?
        Secretary Gates. That sounds right.
        Mr. Miller. So if this is correct, the drawdown occurs only
    when the areas are uncontested. So, in other words, we redeploy
    when we have accomplished clear holds and build. Correct?
        Secretary Gates. Correct.
        Mr. Miller. Can you name one province in Afghanistan where
    we have U.S. forces or intend to send U.S. forces that is
    currently uncontested?
        Secretary Gates. I would have to look at the intelligence
    reports and get that back to you.
        Mr. Miller. Admiral Mullen.
        Admiral Mullen. General McChrystal's plan overall is to
    send the bulk of U.S. forces to the east and to the south,
    which are very contested. We have got forces out in the west
    where there well could be--where there is not that significant
    of an insurgency, for instance, some forces out there and
    coalition forces as well.
        Mr. Miller. I think it is safe to say that we have very few
    troops, if any, in places where they currently are uncontested.
    And so I guess what I am driving at is that 2011, it is going
    to be very, very difficult to find an area where our troops are
    going to be that is uncontested, thereby beginning the
    withdrawal process.
        Admiral Mullen. I mean, we see in Helmand right now in some
    of the districts or provinces, you know, it is pretty Helmand
    quiet in a place called Nawa where it was really tough before
    the Marines showed up. Now, we have got to build and transfer
    after the clear and hold, which is where we are right now. And
    by quiet, I mean the bazaar is open and there is a significant
    amount of economic activity there in a place that a few months
    ago there was virtually none. So what we have got to do is
    connect that with the rest of Helmand. For example, that is
    going to take additional troops.
        So would you say that is contested or uncontested? I mean,
    right now we have got--right now, it isn't. But we have got to
    be able to assure that we can build and transfer it so that
    that can be sustained, and that is where the Afghan Security
    Forces come in.
        Mr. Miller. Thank you.
        I have got five seconds left. Can either of you tell me why
    the President did not use the word ``victory'' in his speech
    the other night?
        Admiral Mullen. He writes his own speech.
        The Chairman. Ms. Sanchez.
        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, again for being before us today.
        Let me just paraphrase something that the last time I was
    in Afghanistan, which was less than a year ago or sometime
    earlier this year or late last year, that one of our people on
    the ground said to me. They said, we give dollars to the
    Afghanis to do something, to build a school, make a community
    center, et cetera, and then we check in with them, and nothing
    is done. And we say to them, you know, what happened to the
    school you were supposed to build, or what is going on? And
    they say to us, yeah, we need a school. You build it.
    Meanwhile, all the money is gone. And what this gentleman was
    saying to me was basically, if we want something done, we are
    building it for them. And, secondly, we are paying for it
    twice. This was the comment he made to our group.
        So my question for you is that, despite eight years of
    combat and billions in foreign aid and investment, the
    situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated to a point where
    President Obama has already ordered troop increases that have
    almost doubled the size of the U.S. force there in the first 10
    months of his presidency, a 100 percent increase in force
    levels.
        And yet, Admiral, you just testified that the Taliban has
    dramatically increased in size and tactical proficiency in the
    past 12 months. And apparently nothing we have done so far has
    prevented the Taliban from growing back in strength and
    effectiveness.
        So I have no doubt that we will have a new campaign plan
    for the military operations and that additional troops will
    actually increase our tactical effectiveness against the
    growing Taliban threat. But, Admiral, you also testified that
    increasing the size of our force is an exercise in futility
    unless corruption is eradicated in the Karzai government. You
    stated that no number of troops will ever win this war unless
    the Afghani people have better government and less corruption.
        And, for example, it was said that the American forces in
    Vietnam won every tactical battle, and yet we lost in part
    because the South Vietnam had plagued and weak and corrupt
    governments. So there are a lot of parallels to Vietnam; some
    substantiated, some not. But one lesson that I think we learned
    is corruption and bad government is bad government.
        So I believe that we will lose this war and that the
    deployment of these additional troops will be in vain unless
    and until we have a strong and respective government in Kabul.
        So, why should any of us believe that Karzai will fight
    corruption or significantly improve the effectiveness of his
    government? Karzai has been in power for five years. He just
    got another five years. I want to know from you what changes he
    has actually implemented this year that would persuade you that
    he has the will and the capability to eliminate corruption and
    improve governance there. And I am not asking what he has
    promised to do. I am not asking what we intend to do. I want to
    know what he has done, and I want specific examples, concrete
    evidence. Corruption prosecutions, increased transparency,
    high-level firings, putting his brother in jail.
        What good governance has happened in the last 18 months?
    What makes you think that he is going to change his stripes and
    that things will turn around?
        I would like the evidence because, as you know, hope is not
    a strategy.
        Secretary Lew. Ms. Sanchez, I think if you look, there is
    clearly a lot of work to be done.
        Everyone in the administration from the President on down
    has recognized that we need to keep the pressure on the
    government of Afghanistan to deal with the problem of
    corruption.
        But there has been progress. You look at the ministries in
    the government. They are not all great. I am not going to sit
    here and say that they are all where they should be, but there
    are quite a number of them which have tackled corruption in
    terms of firing people, in terms of trying to instill a
    different kind of culture in their ministries. We work closely
    with those ministries, ministries like the ministry of finance,
    the ministry of agriculture. We have to recognize that that is
    significant progress.
        Ms. Sanchez. Well, I would like a report on the specifics
    of what has happened, actually, because I haven't seen much
    change.
        Secretary Lew. And we are happy to provide additional
    information.
        And at the inaugural, I think it is important to note that
    the idea of tackling corruption, naming a major crimes task
    force, is an action. We have to keeping pressure on to make
    sure that that is followed by further actions. But it was a
    different message than had been the message before.
        Ms. Sanchez. Talk is cheap, as they say in this town.
        Secretary Lew. The major crimes task force is not just
    talk. It is putting in place a mechanism to do something. A lot
    of work to be done.
        Ms. Sanchez. I will just remind you, we have had task force
    after task force about changing Social Security in this city,
    and nothing has been done. So a task force sounds good, but I
    want concrete examples.
        So if you will please send that to me in writing, I would
    appreciate it.
        The Chairman. We thank the gentlelady.
        Mr. Wilson of South Carolina.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank all three of you for being here this afternoon.
        Admiral Mullen, in order to win in Afghanistan, I believe
    withdrawal of troops must be based on conditions, not an
    arbitrary date. What conditions do you hope to achieve by July
    of 2011, and what will be the course of action if we do not
    meet those victory milestones? Which is most crucial,
    conditions or an arbitrary date?
        Admiral Mullen. This is not an arbitrary date. It is a date
    actually that those of us in the military looked at what we
    need to do over the next couple of years, from summer 2009 to
    summer 2011. General McChrystal specifically has said that we
    have to turn this thing around in the next two years or we very
    possibly can't win under any circumstances. We will have had,
    as I said before, the Marines there for three summers at that
    point in time. We think it is the right strategy. We think the
    force levels are about right, and we think we can succeed with
    respect to that.
        So it is a date at which we will start to transition. There
    is no size associated with that. There is no deadline. There is
    no withdrawal date associated with that. And it is important--
    and I believe this. It is important that the Afghan Security
    Forces recognize they have got to grab this as well, so that
    they are both motivated to train and equip as rapidly as they
    possibly can. And that decision, the decisions that surround
    that, where, how much, will be done, one, responsibly, and,
    two, based on conditions.
        Mr. Wilson. And I want to thank you. I think that is
    reassuring to our troops, to military families, and also our
    Afghan allies and other coalition forces. So thank you for your
    response. I think that was very clear.
        And, General, Secretary Gates, it is hard to imagine, but
    you are getting to the point of your second anniversary of
    being in service. December 18 will be----
        Secretary Gates. Third.
        Mr. Wilson. Oh, my God. Well, anyway, this is good.
        Secretary Gates. That is exactly what I would say.
        Mr. Wilson. Well, thank you. I believe you are placing
    troops where they should be.
        Under your watch, there has been over a 90 percent
    reduction in the number of attacks in Afghanistan. There were
    1,400 when you came in to office; now, there are
    significantly--almost to a 100. Sadly, in Afghanistan, you are
    placing more troops because there has been an increase to
    nearly 200 attacks a week. But I believe that you are placing
    the troops where they are needed.
        In terms of training, I know what can be been done with the
    Afghan forces. My former National Guard unit, the 218th Brigade
    of South Carolina led by General Bob Livingston, worked with
    the Afghan police and army units. They developed a close
    relationship with their Afghan brothers, and they saw the
    capabilities of the Afghan Security Forces.
        With that in mind, I understand that the training program
    for the Afghan National Police is being transferred from the
    State Department to the Department of Defense, which will
    involve a transition on the ground. How confident are you that
    the training program will not be disrupted? Does this transfer
    put the mission of the Afghan Security Forces at risk?
        Secretary Gates. No, I don't think it does. And I think
    that, as Admiral Mullen has testified and I would invite him to
    comment, we have put new people in, in all of these training
    programs.
        But the reality is, both with the police and the army, that
    working together and partnering is the key to their
    effectiveness. They can go through basic training, but what we
    found in Iraq and what General McChrystal is intending to do in
    Afghanistan is, once those people get out of basic training,
    once those units show up, that they will live together, work
    together, plan together.
        That hasn't happened before, and that is how you build
    trust between these people. But it also is the way you give
    them competence and confidence. And we saw it in Iraq, and that
    is certainly General McChrystal's approach on all the security
    services on the Afghan side.
        Mr. Wilson. And actually, I have seen it myself in visiting
    in Kabul--I have been there nine times. Visiting with the 218th
    Brigade, it was always extraordinarily encouraging to me that
    they were not just at Camp Phoenix; they were spread throughout
    the country in a mentoring program. And it is and can and shall
    be successful. And I want to thank you for your service. All of
    you. And I just appreciate your efforts to protect American
    families by defeating the terrorists overseas.
        And I yield the balance of my time.
        The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
        Mrs. Davis.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you to all of you for being here. We certainly
    appreciate, I certainly appreciate the deliberate process that
    you have used. And I know that it has been difficult. It is
    difficult for us, too. I feel quite conflicted around this.
        Could you help us understand how you won over some of your
    own skepticism and others in looking at a few issues? And I
    guess I have a--Pakistan, for example. We have made the
    assumption that adding 30,000 troops in Afghanistan and
    partnering with a new, hopefully more, Afghanis in the services
    and in the law enforcement will make and help stabilize
    Pakistan. And yet, we read in the press and we know that in
    many ways there will be a flow of Taliban likely into Pakistan.
    How does that help to stabilize Pakistan?
        I think the other assumption that is being made is that we
    will be able to recruit the number of Afghanis that are
    required through their tribal leaders. And I am wondering,
    where do we see that happening in such numbers that you have
    the confidence to believe that that is the case? I haven't seen
    that indication.
        And then I think, finally, the whole issue in terms of the
    civilian, quote, surge that we have talked about, and yet I
    think, Secretary Gates, particularly you said that, I mean,
    that is going to be years before we really have the kind of a
    force that is required to do that. And I am wondering, are
    there plans already to have the civilians partnering and
    training with our military that are going over there together?
        And then, finally, are we focusing largely on our reserves
    and our National Guard as well as our active duty troops that
    will be deployed to Afghanistan?
        Secretary Lew. If I could start with the civilian question
    that you asked. Secretary Gates' comments about the long-term
    need to rebuild USAID and State, we all believe that.
        But notwithstanding that, there is a very large effort
    under way to get civilians to Afghanistan. We are tripling the
    number of civilians in place. By early next year, we will have
    almost 1,000 people on the ground. They are leveraged ten to
    one because local nationals are hired either directly or
    through contract or non-governmental organization (NGO)
    arrangements. So that is a fairly substantial number of people.
    You are talking about 10,000 civilians. Civilians don't come in
    battalions; they come in ones and twos. You have a half a dozen
    civilians in a district, and they are able to--U.S. civilians--
    and they can organize an awful lot of activities. They can
    handle the disbursement of monies. They are on the ground, and
    they can deal with some of these corruption issues because they
    are there to supervise the way the monies are being given out
    in terms of the projects being funded.
        This is very hard work. I wouldn't sit here today and say
    that it is going to be easy to get enough civilians in to do
    all the work that we have to do in Afghanistan. But we are
    getting the numbers there with the specialization that we need,
    with agriculture specialization, with rule of law
    specialization, for each of the functions that are identified
    by military and civilian planners working together.
        Mrs. Davis. And just, do they have the staying power? How
    long are they required to stay? And when will you know that
    perhaps you are not going to have those?
        Secretary Lew. When we started at the beginning of the
    year, there were just over 300 people, most of whom had
    commitments that were less than a year, three months, six
    months. We are bringing a thousand people in, the vast majority
    of who are making the commitment of a year or more. That is a
    very big difference and a very important difference and one of
    the major changes that we have had made.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
        Admiral Mullen. Let me first quickly piggyback on Secretary
    Lew. He would never say this, but I have watched him work this
    problem over the last many months, and he personally and his
    people have had a huge impact on getting the right skilled
    people there; not just a body, which is a problem we had in
    Iraq, but the right skilled people into the right job.
        And the multiplier is just huge. Because I was with the
    Marines right after they went into Helmand, and the one
    civilian that rolled in with them literally the next day had a
    huge immediate impact. And so the leverage that he talks about
    just, you can't say enough about that. And I really appreciate
    that effort.
        With respect to Pakistan, an awful lot of work going on
    with Kayani and the Pakistani Military (PAKMIL). Kayani--and I
    give General Dave McKiernan credit for this. He started, we
    started this tripartite, Afghan, Pakistan, as well as ISAF U.S.
    meet, that continues, and General McChrystal has met with
    General Kayani several times. We are working to synchronize the
    campaign, if you will, so that we don't have the kind of
    impact. We sent the Marines into Helmand. Not that many
    insurgents went back across the border.
        And then, lastly, just very quickly, we recognize the
    recruiting, retaining and retention problems that we have on
    the ANSF. And not unlike we have to incentivize that, we also
    have to create a security environment in which they can be
    recruited, trained, and sustain that environment over time.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
        The Chairman. I thank the gentlewoman.
        Mr. Turner.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, I appreciate all of you for being here
    today. I think one of the things you can tell is that members
    of this committee are struggling, and they are struggling
    because they are hearing a lot of things that are contrary to
    policies that we have heard before. You, yourself, had said
    that in the past you were adamantly opposed to deadlines, and
    yet today we are dealing with a July 2011 deadline that,
    Admiral, you said: By then, we will know whether or not we are
    succeeding or not by that date. We will know whether or not we
    are succeeding by that date.
        But there is no trigger with respect to the date. It
    doesn't matter when you get to that date how you are doing.
    There has been a date set for drawdown. This is not a date for
    assessment. This is not a date to determine whether or not this
    strategy that you are currently implementing is something that
    needs to be changed. This is the beginning of a drawdown.
        Now, Secretary Gates, you tell us, well, but it is how the
    drawdown is done that will be the evaluation. But nonetheless,
    it is a date where we are saying, July 2011, whether or not we
    are succeeding, as you have said, Admiral, that we are going to
    begin to draw down.
        And I am really troubled, Mr. Secretary, by your statement
    of, for over the past eight years, we haven't exerted enough
    leverage. And you acknowledge that three of those eight are
    your own. And I am not comfortable with your conclusion that
    setting that date, which is an arbitrary date of July 2011, is
    going to provide you with that leverage.
        And you turn to us and you said, well, you know, I think
    that the American people want to know that there is going to be
    an end, having eight years of this. Mr. Secretary, I think what
    the people want to know is, are we going to be safe? I mean,
    the reason why we are in Afghanistan is because we were
    attacked on 9/11, and we lost the World Trade Center from
    perpetrators that originated from Afghanistan. This isn't an
    issue of whether or not we want an end. It is how we want an
    end.
        And that is really what I was looking for today, was some
    answers as to how we are going to get that end, not an
    arbitrary deadline. And what concerns me, again, with arbitrary
    deadlines, I mean, you look to Guantanamo. This is an
    administration that said, we are closing Guantanamo in 12
    months, which is something I opposed. But now we are going to
    be drawing down from Afghanistan in 18? We couldn't accomplish
    closing Guantanamo, where there are a handful of terrorists and
    we have complete control, but in Afghanistan, where there
    certainly is an innumerable amount, and we are going to begin a
    drawdown in 18 months.
        Now, Admiral, you said that--I believe I got this right--
    that the Taliban are making more than the Afghan army. Several
    members have asked you questions about the drug trade, and I
    have a chart I want to hold up, Mr. Secretary.
        This is looking at the drug trade from 1995 to 2009. I
    think this is important for us to look at, because every time
    we take up the issue of, what are we going to do, how is the
    Taliban being funded, how is al Qaeda being funded, and we talk
    about the drug trade, it should not be an issue of this
    esoteric concept of drug trade. It is actually the increase
    from the drug trade.
        Now, this chart goes from 1995 to 2009. I am going to fold
    it back so that we look at the highest numbers going away since
    1995. And what do we find? We find the last four years being an
    astronomical amount that is off the charts with respect to what
    has occurred in Afghanistan before. Three of those four, Mr.
    Secretary, as you just said, are the time periods where you
    have served as Secretary of Defense.
        Now, we all know that the Afghan National Army is competing
    against the Taliban, from which this funding is coming from.
    Now, I, like other members of this committee, I am a member of
    the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA). And in their last
    meeting, they had a resolution that was brought up with respect
    to addressing the drug trade, and actually, the Russians came
    forward with a resolution calling on NATO and the NATO PA as a
    policy perspective to address the issue of the drug-related
    illegal activities. There were members of parliament from NATO
    who said that it wasn't NATO's responsibility to address the
    drug trade.
        Now, again, we know that there has been in the last four
    years an astronomical increase, and we know that it is funding
    what we are fighting. I would hope that your strategy includes
    addressing this issue. And perhaps you could give us some
    information today that would give us confidence that this,
    which is funding what we are fighting, might be something that
    you can address.
        Secretary Gates. You are correct about the reluctance of
    other ISAF nations to tackle this problem. I would tell you
    that NATO's policy on this, the ISAF policy, to which the
    governments have acceded--I wouldn't say they supported
    enthusiastically. But the ISAF rules of engagement in terms of
    going after drug traffickers, drug lords, and the drug labs was
    changed about a year ago. And so ISAF, the commander of ISAF
    now can deploy forces and engage forces in trying to deal with
    these groups.
        The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Andrews.
        Mr. Andrews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Mullen in his testimony says that South Asia is the
    epicenter of global Islamic terrorism. And I think this
    decision will have tremors well beyond that epicenter. My
    friend from Ohio just mentioned Guantanamo. I would want to ask
    Admiral Mullen and Secretary Gates if they would still stand by
    their earlier statements, which I believe are correct, that
    closing Guantanamo removes a symbol that is a valuable
    recruitment device for the jihadists whom we are fighting;
    would you still agree with that?
        Secretary Gates. Yes, I do.
        Admiral Mullen. I said that in 2005, and I believe it
    today.
        Mr. Andrews. And so the relationship of the Guantanamo
    question to this one is it makes it more difficult for those
    whom we are fighting in Afghanistan otherwise to recruit those
    to fight against us.
        I wanted to ask you about Pakistan and the tremors that it
    involves in relationship to this. If we are successful in this
    military mission in substantially degrading al Qaeda and the
    Taliban in and near the Afghan-Pakistani border, what impact do
    either of you think or any of you think that that would have on
    the stability of the Pakistani government?
        Admiral Mullen. I think it would have a significant impact.
    I think the Pakistani government and the Pakistani people pay
    an awful lot of attention to their neighbors, and their
    strategy is designed around what kind of governments and what
    kinds of threats they have next door. So I think a stable,
    supportive Afghanistan would have a significant impact on how
    Pakistan would look at its future. And I think the opposite is
    true as well.
        Mr. Andrews. To what extent is the rising tide of terrorist
    violence against civilians in Pakistan attributable to the
    resurgent Taliban?
        Secretary Gates. I would say that it is a result of the
    growth in the last year to 18 months of the Tehrik-i-Taliban
    Pakistan, the TTP, the Taliban in Pakistan, or the Pakistani
    Taliban, I should say. We have evidence that al Qaeda is
    helping them pick targets, do operational planning, helping
    them in their effort to try to destabilize the Pakistani
    government.
        The other piece of this that does not include the Taliban
    or that is apart from the Taliban is we also know that al Qaeda
    is helping the Lashkar-e-Taiba, the terrorist group that
    carried out the bombings in Mumbai. Al Qaeda sees using the
    Taliban in Pakistan and groups like LET as ways to destabilize
    Pakistan and even try to provoke a conflict between India and
    Pakistan that would inevitably destabilize Pakistan. So this is
    all tied together.
        Mr. Andrews. I think Admiral Mullen implicitly answered
    this question. But if the opposite were true, if we were either
    to fail in this offensive mission against the Taliban and al
    Qaeda in Afghanistan or not embark upon it, what would the
    impact then be on the stability of the Pakistani government, in
    your opinion?
        Secretary Gates. Well, let me comment and then just ask
    Admiral Mullen. First of all, we have seen what happens. When
    the Pakistanis made deals with the tribes and various groups on
    its northwestern frontier, it created a sanctuary and safe
    haven in which Taliban, which had been knocked back on its
    heels and nearly destroyed in 2001-2002, had the space in which
    it could reconstitute itself to the point where it could become
    a major problem for the United States and a number of our
    allies.
        If, given the same kind of space in eastern Afghanistan and
    southern Afghanistan, the TTP in Pakistan could use it to
    strengthen itself and expand its ranks and be even more
    effective in its efforts to destabilize the government.
        Admiral Mullen. I have spent a lot of time in Pakistan, and
    each time I go, I learn how much I still have to learn. And one
    of the messages that comes from there is a message of lack of
    trust. And that is based on not just what happened in 1989 but
    in fact what happened as early as the 1960s. They recall we
    have betrayed them three times. The question is, are we going
    to do that again?
        Mr. Andrews. I certainly hope not.
        Admiral Mullen. And I think the worst case is that that
    government does get destabilized; they are nuclear capable.
        Mr. Andrews. If we may, we certainly I think have a
    consensus that we don't want a nuclear weapon Iran. If, God
    forbid, we had one, what is the greater threat to the United
    States, a nuclear weapon Iran or a nuclear weapon Pakistan
    under a jihadist government?
        Admiral Mullen. I think they are both pretty, I mean,
    dramatic threats to us and to other nations in the world.
        Mr. Andrews. Thank you.
        The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Kline.
        Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for being here and for your service.
        Admiral Mullen, in response to a couple of questions, you
    have affirmed that the 30,000 troops is what General McChrystal
    wanted for 2010. I guess we don't know what he wanted in total,
    and perhaps when we see him next week, we can see what that
    total number is, unless you can tell us what his total request
    was. But, in the meantime, we have 30,000 that we are looking
    at.
        Can you help us understand what the makeup of that 30,000
    is? How many combat brigades? How many people will be trainers?
    What kind of enablers are going with it? And particularly,
    because you have already talked about the stress on enablers
    and the difficulty of moving some from Iraq to Afghanistan and
    their quick turnaround, can you give us some idea of the makeup
    of that 30,000? Is the strategy complete enough for that?
        Admiral Mullen. Actually, with the decision as recent as it
    is, the details out through the 30,000, the further you get to
    the right in the timetable, we have got some more precise work
    to do. But up front, it is clearly a regimental combat team
    from the Marine Corps specifically that would be at the front
    end of this. There is also a package in there similar to the
    Fourth, B-82nd that is a training brigade. So focused
    exclusively on training, although in a combat environment, and
    this goes to the partnership piece, we have got one we sent in;
    we are going to send another.
        With respect to the enablers, we are looking at other
    brigade combat teams. And, actually, one of the things that the
    President gave General McChrystal was the flexibility to put
    together the forces as he best sees fit. And so we are working
    with him now to really look at the details of that, and we just
    don't have that at this particular point in time. I would
    expect certainly at least one more brigade combat team, if not
    a second one. Everybody has got a training mission and a
    partnering mission as they go in.
        And then we are very concerned about the enablers, the
    kinds of things the Secretary talked about earlier, those that
    protect our people. It's medical. It's ISR. It is helicopters,
    engineers, improvised explosive device (IED) related. And we
    are focused--we have been focused on that for many, many months
    now to do two things: One, make sure we can get as many of them
    there as possible, and they are a significant part of the
    30,000. And it is not just having them in the 30,000; it is,
    where do we get them, to your point, Mr. Kline, because they
    have been turning pretty quickly. And we are very aware of that
    as we look at their turnaround ratios.
        But all of it--I believe all of it is doable in terms of
    what he needs, what he has asked for, what he needs and our
    ability to get them there, particularly over the next six,
    eight, six to eight months.
        Mr. Kline. Admiral, I am a little bit concerned that we
    don't have more clarity into what the makeup of this would be,
    because we have set on 30,000, but I don't know how we got the
    30,000 if we don't know how many of those are going to be
    combat teams and how many of those are going to be enablers. It
    seems to me that that 30,000--I hate to use the word arbitrary
    again, but I don't understand how we know what that number is
    if we don't know what the makeup is going to be.
        Admiral Mullen. It is not arbitrary. And I would only
    repeat, since that word keeps coming up, that July 2011 is not
    an arbitrary date, either. I mean, we certainly have a broad
    view of what this should be. The closer that they will deploy,
    the more specific it is. General McChrystal has some
    flexibility that is tied to that, and we are working the
    details of how those packages get put together.
        Broadly, they are brigade combat teams. They are enablers.
    They are trainers. They are the kinds of things that we know we
    will typically need. It becomes a question of identifying them,
    making sure they are available, and then literally putting
    ourselves in a position to be able to deploy them in a timely
    way.
        Mr. Kline. All right. Admiral, we will be looking forward,
    I am sure, in this committee to those details, and of course,
    we are anxiously awaiting General McChrystal's arrival to
    testify here. I am very concerned about those enablers. I am
    very interested to see what kind of medical support we are
    going to have for this, how much increase there is going to be.
    Are we going to build a hospital? There are a number of issues
    in terms of the force makeup that I am really looking forward
    to getting details on, and I know that other members of the
    committee are.
        Just one other point. I think my colleague from Florida
    asked why the President didn't use the word ``victory.'' And,
    as you said, you didn't write the speech. Are we looking for
    victory in Afghanistan?
        Admiral Mullen. And I, certainly in our discussions--and we
    believe that this strategy is a strategy that will allow us to
    succeed.
        Mr. Kline. Is that victory?
        Admiral Mullen. And that is to allow us to succeed. To get
    us to a level where we can turn this over to the Afghans.
        The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
        Before I call on Mr. Langevin, let me make an observation.
    In both Iraq as well as in Afghanistan, we have Navy and Air
    Force personnel doing virtually Army type of work, is that not
    correct?
        Secretary Gates. Correct. Some of these enablers, very
    important enablers, are from the Navy and the Air Force.
        The Chairman. Well, is that part of the 30,000?
        Secretary Gates. I don't know the answer to that.
        Admiral Mullen. Well, I mean, I don't know specifics, but,
    certainly, I think it would be. They have been a significant
    part of what we have done in Iraq and Afghanistan and will
    continue to be.
        Secretary Gates. And, particularly, I would say the Air
    Force, in terms of the intelligence, surveillance and
    reconnaissance.
        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Langevin.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentleman, I want to thank you for being here, for your
    testimony. I know you have had a busy week, but we are
    certainly appreciative to have you here today to clarify some
    of the issues surrounding the President's decision to increase
    troop levels in Afghanistan.
        We all recognize, obviously, that there are serious
    security challenges ahead, both in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
    And I am certainly glad that the President's new strategy was
    really developed after thorough deliberation and careful
    assessment of the conditions on the ground.
        And, while the President has answered many of the questions
    on Tuesday night, there obviously are many that remain, some of
    which are going to require time and patience and others that
    are going to require deeper investigation and continued
    oversight by Congress as the war moves on.
        I am struggling with a few things. As the President
    discussed in his speech, with the domestic challenges that we
    face at home, we simply can't commit our armed forces to a
    prolonged and costly attempt at nation-building. And, in terms
    of where we are right now and the way forward, I am struggling
    with a couple of things. One centers around the footprint; the
    other is the counterinsurgency versus counterterrorism
    strategy.
        You know, clearly, the Taliban--and, Secretary, I probably
    am now where you were, and I haven't heard a whole lot to
    really convince me or move me yet. But, clearly, the Taliban
    are not over-

    whelming us with their numbers or their firepower, but yet they
    have been able to increase their influence significantly in
    Afghanistan.
        And I need to drill down more on that. Because what I see
    is that, as our troop levels have increased, we have been seen
    more by the Afghan people, perhaps, as occupiers. And that is
    the real nexus which has allowed the Taliban to increase their
    influence. So I need to have you drill down more on that and
    explain that a little more, in terms of how you got to where
    you are.
        And on the counterinsurgency/counterterrorism strategy,
    after having reviewed the available options, I would like to
    hear a little more about what the President felt could be
    gained strategically from a counterinsurgency approach that
    couldn't be obtained by following a more counterterrorism-
    focused effort.
        Secretary Gates. First of all, in terms of the footprint,
    the first point that General McChrystal made to me when I
    raised this concern is that it is not so much the number as
    what those troops do. And I think this also ties in with issues
    relating to civilian casualties. It ties in to the heretofore
    largely absent partnering with the Afghans, so that when we
    would go into a village, the person knocking on the door, or
    knocking the door down, was an Afghan and not an American.
        These are all things that General McChrystal has changed,
    in terms of how he is going to use the forces he has been
    given, the ones that are already there and the ones that are
    coming in. And if the Afghans are truly partnered with us, as
    is his intention, the civilian casualties are dramatically
    reduced since he issued new orders on this, and that is having
    a difference.
        The reality is, in part, the reason that the Taliban have
    been successful is that they are so ruthless and they
    intimidate a lot of people. As we have said several times, this
    has long been an under-resourced effort on our part, and we
    haven't had the troops or the partnership with the Afghans to
    give Afghans in villages and rural areas, where most of the
    people live, the confidence that when they get a night letter
    saying, if you cooperate with ISAF or the Afghan Government,
    you will be killed and your entire family will be killed.
        So the key to getting the Afghans who are hedging because
    they are not sure who is going to win is to give them the
    confidence that what we are trying to do is the winning side.
    But our behavior, the behavior of our troops, the way we use
    those troops, and the way we partner with the Afghans, I think,
    have a huge amount to do with this reducing-the-footprint
    issue.
        The other side of it is, I think this is an area where
    people misuse history. The Soviets did get defeated in
    Afghanistan, but it is important to remember that they were
    trying to impose an alien culture and political system on the
    country. They murdered about one million Afghans. They made
    five million more into refugees. And they were virtually
    isolated internationally in that effort. None of those
    conditions apply to what we are trying to do in Afghanistan and
    where we are.
        And with respect, very quickly, to counterinsurgency (COIN)
    and counterintelligence (CI), the reality is you cannot do--
    counterterrorism, rather--you cannot do effective
    counterterrorism unless you have a presence on the ground and
    are able to collect intelligence that informs your targeting.
    And the only way you can do that is to provide some minimum
    level of security for the population so that you can operate
    there.
        So this is not a fully resourced COIN in the original
    sense. We have tried to narrow and refine the mission so there
    are major aspects of COIN associated with this but also major
    aspects of counterterrorism and, I would say, having forces
    also outside the protected areas, where we are protecting the
    population that are, in fact, out and about, disrupting the
    Taliban and making them feel very uncomfortable.
        The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
        We have time for one question from Mr. Rogers, and then the
    witnesses will turn to pumpkins.
        Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        My question deals with metrics. Mr. Secretary, you talked
    about transferring authority over, starting the process in July
    of 2011. And, in August of this year, you talked about
    beginning the process of building these metrics by which we are
    going to measure success over there.
        Can you tell me where that process is now?
        Secretary Gates. Well, we have a very detailed set of
    metrics that I think have been shared with the Congress that
    came out of the March endeavor. We have tried to narrow those
    and make them more precise in terms of our expectations of the
    Afghans, our expectations of the Pakistanis and of ourselves
    and our allies. And those have been worked in the interagency,
    and I will go back and see if we cannot provide those to the
    Congress.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Shuster. Mr. Chairman, I don't have a question, but if
    I could just reread back something, I think the most important
    point made by the Secretary, if I could just reread it again?
        The Chairman. Without objection.
        Mr. Shuster. Mr. Secretary, you said here today--I think
    this is the most important point today in the whole process.
    And you said, ``This part of the world represents the epicenter
    of extremist jihadism, the historic place where native and
    foreign Muslims defeated one superpower and, in their view,
    caused collapse at home. For them to be seen to defeat the sole
    remaining superpower in the same place would have severe
    consequences for the United States and the world.''
        I think that is the point we all need to remember as we go
    forward here, and I appreciate your saying that.
        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        Let me first compliment and thank the members of the
    committee for staying within the time limits for questions.
        And a special thanks to the witnesses for being with us. It
    has been very, very helpful. We wish you success in this most
    difficult endeavor. We couldn't have a better team, couldn't
    have a better team. And we know that, and you have our
    confidence.
        Without objection, Members have five legislative days to
    submit their statements into the record.
        And, with that, gentlemen, thank you.
        [Whereupon, at 4:34 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

    =======================================================================

                                A P P E N D I X

                                December 3, 2009

    =======================================================================

                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                December 3, 2009

    =======================================================================

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    =======================================================================

                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                December 3, 2009

    =======================================================================

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JONES

        Mr. Jones. Mr. Secretary, Admiral Mullen, I have this second
    question. Again, I like many on this committee, maybe all on this
    committee, worry about the stress on the force and how many times we
    can continue to ask these brave men and women to keep going back and
    back. And I do want to thank you, Mr. Secretary, and Admiral Mullen,
    for taking the time you did to try to figure out what is the right
    policy for Afghanistan. The question is, of the 30,000 that will be
    going to Afghanistan, how many of the 30,000 can you give us, if not
    today, maybe to the committee, the number of deployments that each one
    of the 30,000 have been on? Do you know now how many deployments the
    30,000 have been on? Has it been half the 30,000 have not been to
    Afghanistan or Iraq and the other half a number of times? Can you
    answer that, or would you like to submit that to the committee?
        Admiral Mullen. Mr. Jones, let me take a shot at it. I can't give
    you a complete answer, but I think it is an important question. On the
    Marine Corps side, I think nobody knows this better than you, we have
    rotated basically every 7 months with respect to deployments. And the
    expectation is, for the major units, that will continue in the Marine
    Corps even as we shift from--as we have shifted from Iraq to
    Afghanistan. What I can't tell you is, for these units--there are sort
    of two measures--for these units, how many deployments this unit, a
    unit, has been on. And then, in that, how many deployments on average
    have the individuals in that unit seen? And that is what I would need
    to get back to you for.
        Total Service--The Military Services have not yet identified all of
    the 30,000 Service Members as support for the plus-up. The remaining
    Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors, and Marines will continue to be sourced as
    requirements are finalized and the full sourcing process is completed.
    As of 27 Jan 10, 26,470 of the 30,000 have been identified.
        Of the people we have identified and can track their deployments
    (Army, Air Force, Marine Corps), 14% have deployed 3 or more times to
    Afghanistan or Iraq. 40% have not deployed to Afghanistan/Iraq; this
    would be their first deployment to one of these locations.
        Army--The Army has identified 16,186 Soldiers as support for the
    plus-up.
        Of that number, 10,627 have participated in one or more
    deployments:

                                                          Army
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                      3 or more
        Afghanistan/Iraq          0 Deployments         1 Deployment          2 Deployments          Deployments
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                              5,559                 6,010                 3,150                 1,467
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Air Force--The Air Force has identified 393 Airmen as support for
    the plus-up.
        Of the 393 Airmen 144 participated in one or more deployments:

                                                        Air Force
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                      3 or more
        Afghanistan/Iraq          0 Deployments         1 Deployment          2 Deployments          Deployments
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                              249                   100                   32                    12
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Navy--The Navy has identified 1,391 Sailors as support for the
    plus-up.
        Navy is unable to provide requested data on individual OIF/OEF
    deployment history. The Navy does not have a corporate-level system in
    place to effectively track and report repeat deployments to a specific
    named operation.
        Marine Corps--The Marine Corps has identified 8,500 Marines as
    support for the plus-up.
        Of that number, 3,995 Marines have participated in one or more
    deployments:

                                                         Marines
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                      3 or more
        Afghanistan/Iraq          0 Deployments         1 Deployment          2 Deployments          Deployments
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                              4,505                 2,635                 1,020                 340
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                     ______

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH
        Mr. Jones. In your prepared testimony you stated: ``General
    McChrystal intends to use these additional U.S. troops to conduct more
    focused counterinsurgency operations that enhance population security
    against the Taliban in south and east Afghanistan. As in Iraq, our
    troops will live among the population. Thus--and as General McChrystal
    has successfully emphasized since his arrival as COMISAF last June--we
    will continue to make every effort to eliminate civilian casualties,
    not just because this is the right thing to do, but because these
    casualties work against our goal of Afghan population security.
    Although we must expect higher Alliance casualties in coming months as
    we dedicate more U.S. forces to protect the population and mentor the
    ANSF, our extended security presence must--and will--improve security
    for the Afghan people and limit both future civilian and military
    casualties.'' How do you envision limiting civilian and military
    casualties? Can this be accomplished solely by a change in tactics? Or
    can technology assist us in achieving this?
        Admiral Mullen. With regards to limiting civilian casualties, the
    Tactical Directive issued in July 2009 states:
        `` . . . I expect leaders at all levels to scrutinize and limit the
    use of force like close air support (CAS) against residential compounds
    and other locations likely to produce civilian casualties in accordance
    with this guidance. Commanders must weigh the gain of using CAS against
    the cost of civilian casualties, which in the long run make mission
    success more difficult and turn the Afghan people against us.
         . . . The use of air-to-ground munitions and indirect fires
    against residential compounds is only authorized under very limited and
    prescribed conditions.''
        The above quotes deal directly with ROE and troops using CAS in
    self-defense. The Tactical Directive does not prevent troops from
    protecting themselves as a matter of self-defense but makes them
    determine whether CAS is the only option available to them.
        Limiting civilian casualties cannot be limited by changes in
    tactics or technology as separate entities. The changes in tactics are
    addressed in the Tactical Directive. Technology enhances the ability of
    the troops to determine appropriate levels of force and identification
    of hostile forces before engaging, thereby limiting the possibility of
    inadvertent civilian casualties.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER
        Mr. Shuster. I have concerns that the Administration approached the
    Afghanistan situation without putting the most robust effort forward.
    We have heard in the media report of low-, medium-, and high-risk
    recommendations. 1) Did General McChrystal request 30k? 2) Who provided
    that number to the President? 3) Based on all the options that were
    presented to the President, was that his lowest risk/highest chance of
    success option? 4) Are 30,000 forces enough to win decisively? Please
    describe those risks that this President is willing to take by going
    with a force package of 30k.
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The initial resource request
    remains a classified document, so we are unable to go into complete
    detail. However, we can cover the process undertaken by General
    McChrystal.
        Once his initial assessment was complete, he developed a classified
    resource analysis. In that analysis, he identified different force
    packages with associated risks based upon his assessment. Following
    this process, a direct recommendation was submitted through the chain
    of command to the President.
        The commitment of 30,000 additional U.S. forces, along with
    additional coalition forces and growing Afghan national security force
    numbers, is a significant step toward expanding security in critical
    areas and in demonstrating resolve. The President's force package
    provides U.S. forces as quickly as possible, giving General McChrystal
    the combat power he needs in 2010 to gain the initiative. In addition,
    our Allies and partners have committed to more than 7,000 additional
    forces through the NATO/ISAF Force Generation Process.
        The President's decision rapidly resources our strategy,
    recognizing that the next 18 months will likely be decisive and
    ultimately enable success. Rolling back the Taliban is a prerequisite
    to the ultimate defeat of al Qaeda. The mission is not only important;
    it is also achievable. We can and will accomplish this mission.
                                     ______

                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. MCMORRIS RODGERS
        Mrs. McMorris Rodgers. It should be in our country's best strategic
    interest to protect Pakistan from al Qaeda. Reports indicate that these
    terrorists might be receiving money from members of the Pakistani
    Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Our country and the
    world cannot afford to have Pakistan taken over by terrorists due to
    its nuclear capabilities. What are we doing to protect the strategic
    interest in Pakistan? Will Pakistan fall if Afghanistan falls?
        Secretary Gates. The core goal of the President's strategy is to
    disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda in both Afghanistan
    and Pakistan and to prevent their return to both countries. This
    strategy also recognizes that the security situation in Pakistan is
    inextricably linked to that of Afghanistan. Pakistan's security,
    especially along its Western border, cannot be separated from
    developments in Afghanistan.
        Taliban sanctuaries in the south and east of the country would be
    profoundly disruptive to Pakistan, especially if the Taliban-ruled
    areas become a staging area for resurgent military groups to attack
    Pakistan. By deploying an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan,
    the President's strategy aims to deny such sanctuaries by degrading the
    Taliban's momentum and denying the Taliban the ability to overthrow the
    Afghan government.
        Another key part of the current strategy is reinforcing Pakistan's
    understanding that active opposition to extremist groups within its own
    borders is essential to its strategic interests. Recent military
    operations in South Waziristan, Swat, and other areas of Pakistan
    reflect Pakistan's increasing recognition of the extremist threat. We
    work closely with Pakistan on a range of counterterrorism and
    counterinsurgency efforts, with a focus on strengthening its
    capabilities as it seeks to root out extremists in border areas and
    interdict terrorist attacks in settled areas. We also provide
    substantial resources--$1.5 billion annually for the next five years
    through the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (the Kerry-
    Lugar legislation) for example--to enhance Pakistan's democratic
    institutions and encourage prosperity among the broader populace.
        Mrs. McMorris Rodgers. The stability and security of Pakistan
    depends on the success in Afghanistan. Moreover, with the tensions high
    in India, the region is ripe for chaos. How does the President's
    strategy affect our relationship with Pakistan and India? Will this
    enhance stability?
        Secretary Gates. As you note, the outcome of our efforts in
    Afghanistan and Pakistan have serious implications for the entire
    region. The President's strategy aims to address the challenges we face
    on both sides of the border, because we cannot allow violent extremists
    to gain access to the very same safe havens they used before 2001. Al
    Qaeda continues to use extremist groups as a way to destabilize
    Pakistan and attempt to provoke a conflict between Pakistan and India
    that would inevitably destabilize the entire region. This is why the
    President is committed to long-term strategic partnerships with both
    Pakistan and India that benefit both parties. We recognize that long-
    term regional stability will be unattainable without a solution that
    involves both nations.
        The President's new strategy recognizes the importance of a
    comprehensive approach to regional problems. This approach seeks to
    mitigate external interference in Afghanistan and works to encourage
    neighboring countries to shift their efforts from competition for
    influence to cooperation and economic integration. We have an array of
    programs that aim to achieve these goals through building and
    strengthening our relationships with regional actors. Ultimately, we
    will work diligently to encourage stability in the region, because
    doing so is fundamental to our national security.
        Mrs. McMorris Rodgers. There are terrorists harboring in the
    northwest part of Pakistan. These Al Qaida members are slowly taking
    over this area. What are we doing to not have these terrorists take
    over the entire country?
        Secretary Gates. As President Obama stated repeatedly, our goal is
    to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda. In recent months, the
    Pakistani military has made significant efforts to address the
    extremist threat within its borders. We must encourage and aid
    Pakistan's fight against the extremists in South Waziristan and Swat,
    and across the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
    Additionally, we must help Pakistan begin to expand its objectives to
    include seeking out and eliminating all forms of violent extremism and
    terrorism--those who threaten not only Pakistan, but also Afghanistan,
    the wider South Asia region, and the world.
        The U.S. withdrawal from the region in the early 1990s, followed by
    a severing of military-to-military relations as a result of Pakistan's
    test of a nuclear weapon, contributes to Pakistan's skepticism that the
    United States is not a reliable, long-term strategic partner. We are
    deepening ties with the people of Pakistan, as well as with their
    security forces, in order to overcome this ``trust deficit.'' Our
    security assistance programs, such as the Pakistan Counterinsurgency
    Fund and the symbolically and tactically important F-16 program, are
    vitally important to this effort. We also provide substantial
    resources--$1.5 billion annually for the next five years through the
    Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (the Kerry-Lugar
    legislation) for example--to enhance Pakistan's democratic institutions
    and encourage prosperity among the broader populace. We must continue
    to make efforts to show that we view our long-term relationship with
    Pakistan as vital to our national security interests and to ensure
    Pakistan has the capability to defeat terrorists and insurgents.
        Mrs. McMorris Rodgers. What role will the NATO forces play in this
    surge? What are you doing to get commitments from our NATO allies? What
    commitments have you already received? What limitations do you see NATO
    coming up with (where they will fight and how)?
        Secretary Gates. NATO will play the same role that U.S. forces will
    play--to secure the country and train the Afghan National Security
    Forces (ANSF) in preparation for the eventual assumption of
    responsibility by the Afghans themselves. We are working with NATO
    Brussels to reach out actively to all Allies and partners to seek to
    meet all requirements, and we are hopeful that contributing nations
    will announce their commitments at the upcoming International Security
    Assistance Force (ISAF) Force Generation Conference on December 7,
    2009, the London Conference on January 28, 2010, and the NATO Defense
    Ministers meeting in Istanbul on February 4, 2010. Since we just
    recently announced our Afghan strategy, we are working within NATO
    channels to secure commitments. Although some NATO nations do place
    limitations on national contributions, many do not. We are working with
    our Allies and other troop-contributing nations to seek the greatest
    flexibility possible in ISAF forces for General McChrystal's
    (COMISAF's) command and control.
        Mrs. McMorris Rodgers. Are we thinking of a plan to send more
    American troops if other countries do not live up to the President's
    request?
        Secretary Gates. The President authorized 30,000 additional forces,
    in addition to granting me a modest amount of flexibility for an
    additional 10 percent. We will continue to assess conditions as we move
    forward.
        The President has already welcomed the announcements of U.S. Allies
    and partners to increase substantially troop and training contributions
    to Afghanistan in 2010; approximately 7,000 additional forces through
    the NATO/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Force
    Generation Process, with more likely to come in tandem with the London
    Conference on January 28. These new commitments demonstrate strong
    support for the President's decision on Afghanistan and Pakistan and
    the firm resolve of NATO Allies and ISAF partners to succeed in our
    shared mission.
        Mrs. McMorris Rodgers. After President Obama announced the
    deployment of 30,000 additional troops, the surge of forces bring the
    total American commitment to nearly 100,000. I understand most of these
    troops will come from the Army and Marines. Will the Navy and Air Force
    play a role in augmenting these taskings? How many brigades, trainers,
    and support troops do we expect to deploy during this surge? What
    impact will this be on the Guard and Reserves?
        Admiral Mullen. The composition of the entire 30K is still being
    determined by COMISAF. As of the 14 Jan 2010, 27,442 U.S. Service
    Members have been ordered against the President's additional
    authorization of 30K. Of these, the Navy and the Air Force are making
    contributions to the increased augmentation of Afghanistan
    Headquarters. The Navy is filling 129 positions and the Air Force is
    filling 240 positions.
        The composition of the entire 30K is still being determined by
    COMISAF. As of the 14 Jan, 27,442 U.S. Service Members have been
    ordered against the President's additional authorization of 30K.
    Specific capabilities ordered include:
          One Marine Corps Regimental Combat Team (Full Spectrum
    COIN)
          Two Army Brigade Combat Teams (Full Spectrum COIN)
          One Army Brigade Combat Team
          One Combat Aviation Brigade
          One Division Headquarter
          1,250 Joint Individual Augmentation Plus-up
        Of the 27,442 ordered as of 14 Jan 2010, the National Guard is
    filling 3,489 positions and the Reserves are filling 1,390 positions.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY
        Mr. Conaway. It has been reported that the minimum number of troops
    General McChrystal had requested was 40,000. General McChrystal has
    said he will focus on the population centers. Can you tell us the
    population centers that will be left unprotected as a result of the
    reduced number of 30,000? And in addition, can you tell us the
    cumulative number of people (Afghan) that will be impacted by sending
    30,000 instead of 40,000?
        Admiral Mullen. The President's decision deploys the combat
    brigades needed to achieve population security in all of General
    McChrystal's priority centers. The President's decision appropriately
    strikes balance between too many and too few forces, and provides what
    General McChrystal needs to achieve success. It provides the balance
    needed to avoid being perceived as occupiers. It also provides the
    trainers needed to support the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF)
    growth plan and partnering. Importantly, it sets the conditions that
    will enable us to transition Afghanistan responsibly into the hands of
    an Afghan government capable of providing long-term security.
        The force levels considered during the strategic review represented
    a range of options with associated levels of risk. The force
    commitments announced by the President, augmented by the expected
    contributions from NATO allies, fall squarely within the range of
    capability and risk that General McChrystal recommended. The additional
    30,000 U.S. troops combined with the expected additional NATO
    commitments gives General McChrystal everything he needs to reverse the
    Taliban's momentum, and accelerate the growth and development of the
    ANSF.
        General McChrystal has been given the flexibility to employ forces
    in the specific locations and sequence as he sees fit to best achieve
    his operational and tactical objectives. We are confident that the
    resources the President has committed to Afghanistan will enable the
    commander to achieve the campaign's objectives. General McChrystal's
    plan will protect all the key population centers necessary to reverse
    the insurgency's momentum and enable the ANSF to provide the long-term
    stability to prevent the return of al Qaeda.
        Mr. Conaway. The Afghan government cannot or does not currently pay
    for the ANSF. With the increase in ANSF that is part and parcel to the
    President's Plan, can you tell us who will fund these forces for the
    near term and as well as the long term?
        Secretary Gates. Currently the U.S. Government funds most of the
    expenses associated with the development of the Afghan National
    Security Force (ANSF). In accordance with the London Compact, the
    Afghans apply 34% of their GDP to security force development. In FY09,
    they contributed approximately $350 million. The United States
    continues to work with the Government of the Islamic Republic of
    Afghanistan (GIRoA) to increase its ability to generate revenue.
        Additionally, we are pressing international Allies and partners to
    contribute to the development of the ANSF and its long-term
    sustainment. Allies and partners have pledged approximately $300
    million to the NATO Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund. Regarding
    the police, the international community provided just over $600 million
    to the Law and Order Trust Fund since 2002. The international community
    also donated equipment to the ANSF.
        Over time, we will continue to press the international community to
    fund more of the ANSF and to assist the GIRoA in increasing its ability
    to generate its own revenue. Still, the United States is likely to be
    the major funder of the ANSF for the foreseeable future.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
        Mr. Wittman. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, thank you for the
    investment of your time on the second day of testimony on Capitol Hill.
    I'm pleased that the President has come to a decision on the future
    strategy of our forces in Afghanistan and I fully support the
    deployment of additional troops and resources to aid in the fight
    against extremists that continue to threaten our country and way of
    life. I do however remain concerned with the mention of any sort of
    hard and fast timetable. I hope that the tension generated by the
    articulation of a timetable generates the intended results. Secretary
    Gates, I understand that you're not necessarily in favor of the
    timeline and I can appreciate that. Admiral Mullen, I have full trust
    and confidence in our military leadership and our troops. I know that
    you will successfully complete this mission and I hope that my
    colleagues here and in the administration will continue to fully
    resource your efforts. Admiral Mullen, I'd like your help on a somewhat
    separate issue. I'd like to get a clear understanding for what our
    Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) are asking for in terms of ships--
    aircraft carriers and amphibious ships specifically. Without discussing
    the assumption of risk, will you provide my staff with the raw COCOM
    numbers requested for aircraft carriers and amphibious ships over the
    last few years?
        Admiral Mullen. As of 21 Jan 10 the following requests for Navy
    Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships have been registered in the last
    three years (FY 09, 10, 11)
        1. USAFRICOM:
            Three Amphibious Ships (1-FY09, 1-FY10, 1-FY11).
            1.92 Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG) (0-FY09, 92-FY10, 1-
    FY11).
        2. USCENTCOM:
            Three Amphibious Ships (1-FY09, 1-FY10, 1-FY11).
            Three ARGs (1-FY09, 1-FY10, 1-FY11).
            3.55 Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) (1.2 -FY09, 1.2 FY10,
    1.15-FY11).
        3. USEUCOM:
            2.08 Amphibious Ships (.08-FY09, 1-FY10, 1-FY11).
            Three ARGs (1-FY09, 1-FY10, 1-FY11).
            Two CSGs (.5-FY09, .5-FY10, 1 FY11).
        4. USJFCOM (Global Response Force (GRF), all contingency sourced
    upon SecDef order).
            Two ARGs in FY11.
            Twelve CSGs (4-FY09, 4-FY10, 4-FY11).
        5. USNORTHCOM:
            Four Amphibious Ships in FY10, all contingency sourced
    if required.
        6. USPACOM:
            4.2 ARGs (1.4-FY09, 1.4-FY10, 1.4-FY11).
            4.5 CSGs (1.5-FY09, 1.5-FY10, 1.5-FY11).
        7. USSOUTHCOM:
            2.13 Amphibious Ships (.5-FY09, .83-FY10, .83-FY11).
                Includes 2 ARGs supporting Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE.
            .22 CSG in FY10.
                Includes 1 CVN supporting Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE.
        Mr. Wittman. I'm not sure what type of force package fits squarely
    beneath the 30,000 number. Can you help me understand what we may see
    in terms of Brigades, Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs), and the required
    enablers?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The composition of the entire
    30K is still being determined by General McChrystal, Commander,
    International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF). As of 14 January
    2010, 27,442 U.S. Service Members have been ordered against the
    President's additional authorization of 30K. Specific capabilities
    ordered include:
          One Marine Corps Regimental Combat Team (Full Spectrum
    COIN)
          Two Army Brigade Combat Teams (Full Spectrum COIN)
          One Army Brigade Combat Team
          One Combat Aviation Brigade
          One Division Headquarter
          1,250 Joint Individual Augmentation Plus-up
        Mr. Wittman. I'm concerned that in an effort to maximize combat
    troops we may overly complicate the command and control, and supported/
    supporting unit relationships to where we actually reduce a unit's
    effectiveness. As we know, Marines fight as a Marine Air Ground Task
    Force (MAGTF) and come as a task organized warfighting package
    including sustainment capability. Should the Marines in Regional
    Command South (RC-South) expect to have to rely on perhaps an army
    sustainment brigade even though they fight most effectively as a MAGTF?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. General McChrystal and
    Lieutenant General Rodriguez are currently looking at the structure and
    command relationships throughout Afghanistan. The aim is to ensure
    unity of effort and unity of command that best support the combat
    forces on the ground. With the addition of 30,000 U.S. troops, it is
    crucial that these forces are employed to maximize their effectiveness.
    Specifically on RC-South, I am confident that General McChrystal and
    Lieutenant General Rodriguez will take a comprehensive look at the best
    way to employ forces in that area and ensure that each element in their
    inherent structure and maximizes each unit's effectiveness.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN
        Mr. Coffman. I have read General McChrystal's Initial Assessment of
    August 30, 2009, both the redacted and the un-redacted versions. In
    neither version does he make a specific troop request. Open source
    documents (i.e. published newspaper stories) have stated that the
    request is 40,000. However, I have since learned that the 40,000 number
    was a midrange option and that there was also a low- and high-range
    option with commensurate probabilities of success associated with them.
    General McChrystal acknowledged to me that the three options exist but
    would not relay to me what the upper range was for obvious political
    reasons. The President has now selected a number that appears to be
    beneath the midrange option. How does that translate in terms of
    probability of success?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The initial resource request
    remains a classified document, so we are unable to go into complete
    detail. However, we can tell you that the President's decision to
    deploy an additional 30,000 forces provides the most U.S. forces as
    quickly as possible, giving General McChrystal the combat power he
    needs in 2010 to gain the initiative and succeed according to our
    Afghanistan strategy as outlined on 1 December 2009. In addition, our
    Allies and partners have committed to more than 7,000 additional forces
    through the NATO/International Assistance Force (ISAF) Force Generation
    Process.
        Mr. Coffman. According to open source media reports, U.S. and
    Afghan officials have begun helping several anti-Taliban militias that
    have independently taken up arms against insurgents in several parts of
    Afghanistan, prompting hopes of a larger scale tribal rebellion against
    the Taliban. When I was in Afghanistan last week I asked General
    McChrystal's staff about expanding this aid beyond supplies and
    training and utilizing these tribal militias as we had done in Iraq.
    The response was that the Karzai government was not in favor of the
    U.S. arming tribal militias. (The Maliki government in Iraq was equally
    opposed when the U.S. began arming former Sunni Arab insurgents through
    the Sunni Awakening program.) I believe Afghanistan has a warrior
    culture and many of the tribes have been fighting for the last 2,500
    years. In 2001, the Northern Alliance defeated the Taliban on the
    ground with tribal militias and without the assistance of U.S. ground
    troops--only air, advisory, and logistical support. Shouldn't we be
    more focused on supporting Afghanistan militias in the manner that they
    are familiar with versus a conventional military organization that is
    alien to them?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. It is important to note that
    the United States is not backing tribal militias. There currently are
    several initiatives to promote community security and development. The
    major program is the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3), which is
    currently a pilot program in Wardak province. The program works with
    the village shura (i.e., meeting) to nominate personnel to provide
    security for the community. These personnel are representative of all
    ethnic groups and tribes in the community, and they receive three weeks
    of training as well as equipment. They are formally part of the
    Ministry of Interior Forces. Currently the pilot program has produced
    over 500 members of the Afghan Public Protection Force, and we have
    heard largely positive comments about their ability to improve security
    in the communities that they work in.
        Additionally, the United States is working with the Government of
    Afghanistan on several Local Defense Initiatives. Through these
    programs, the United States is providing some development support and
    training to communities that have been willing to step up and provide
    additional community security, similar to a community watch program.
        The United States' focus in terms of securing the population of
    Afghanistan is on developing the Afghanistan National Security Forces
    and growing them so that they can eventually take over the security of
    Afghanistan.
        Our counterinsurgency strategy provides our forces in Afghanistan
    the best possible approach and resources to set the security
    conditions: for the Afghan people, to see our commitment to their
    future; for the Karzai government, to be supported as it seeks to
    implement promised reforms; for the Afghan Taliban, to understand they
    will not and cannot take back Afghanistan; and finally, for those
    beyond Afghanistan who support the Taliban or would like to see the
    return of al Qaeda, to realize the futility of their pursuit.
        Mr. Coffman. A fixed schedule to begin the withdrawal of our forces
    from Afghanistan seems ridiculous. There should be a flexible time
    schedule based on the conditions on the ground. Was there such fixed
    withdrawal schedule given prior to the surge in 2007 in Iraq? Or wasn't
    it only after the surge in Iraq was successful that a schedule for a
    drawdown of our forces was negotiated between Coalition Forces and the
    Iraqi government?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The circumstances in Iraq and
    Afghanistan are different. While the addition of more than 20,000 U.S.
    troops to Iraq announced in January 2007 did not include a withdrawal
    schedule, President Bush said, ``America's commitment is not open-
    ended.'' The security situation produced by the surge's success enabled
    the U.S. and Iraq to jointly sign the U.S. Security Agreement, which
    required that all U.S. forces withdraw from Iraq no later than December
    31, 2011.
        For Afghanistan, the President has made it clear that July 2011 is
    when we will begin to transition to an Afghan lead. This date was not
    chosen arbitrarily, but is based on careful analysis of when we will be
    able to responsibly begin transitioning. However, it is imperative to
    understand that July 2011 is the beginning of a process. It is not when
    we rush for the exits; rather, the pace and character of that drawdown
    will be determined by conditions on the ground. There is no
    determination of how long this will take and there is no withdrawal
    date set for after July 2011. It is important to balance signaling
    resolve in the fight against al Qaeda and showing our enduring
    commitment to stability in the region with ensuring the Afghans take
    primary responsibility for defending their own country with a sense of
    purpose and urgency.
        Mr. Coffman. Was the strategy of consolidating our forces around
    the population centers and the central river valley in Helmand Province
    envisioned before or after the development of General McChrystal's
    Initial Assessment of August 30, 2009? Does this strategy require fewer
    troops than he thought in that Assessment?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. As the Taliban resurgence
    gained momentum since 2003, most notably in the south, it became
    increasingly clear that the Coalition's efforts must be focused on
    addressing the insurgency where it lives and grows. Although the
    Taliban has been expanding its influence throughout the country,
    Kandahar is the Taliban's birthplace and Helmand Province lies at the
    intersection of the insurgency and the thriving narcotics trade.
    Therefore, the insurgency's roots are most deeply planted in the south.
    General McChrystal's initial assessment during his first months of
    command allowed him to closely examine the environment. His assessment
    confirmed that a population-centric approach that protects the key
    population centers and reverses the insurgency's momentum where the
    insurgency is most threatening would provide our best chance of
    success.
        The force levels considered during the strategic review represented
    a range of options with associated levels of risk. Importantly, the
    internal deliberations considered many other aspects of the strategy,
    which involve much more than the application of additional resources.
        The President's decision appropriately strikes balance between too
    many and too few forces and provides what General McChrystal needs to
    achieve success. It provides the balance needed to avoid being
    perceived as occupiers, and it deploys the combat brigades needed to
    achieve population security in all of General McChrystal's priority
    centers. It also provides the trainers needed to support the Afghan
    National Security Force growth plan and partnering. Importantly, it
    sets the conditions that will enable us to transition Afghanistan
    responsibly into the hands of an Afghan government capable of providing
    long-term security.
                                     ______

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK
        Mr. Loebsack. What I believe our Service Members, military
    families, Iowans, and all Americans need to hear is a clear-cut
    description of the civil-military strategy that will be implemented to
    achieve that goal. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, can you please
    provide me, in 50 words or less, a concise description of that
    strategy? As clearly and concisely as possible, how you will accurately
    measure the success of this strategy?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The overarching goal of the
    President's strategy is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in
    Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten
    America and our allies in the future. This will be achieved by a civil-
    military effort to reverse the Taliban's momentum and increase the
    capacity of Afghanistan's government and security forces; a civilian
    surge that will work with the Afghan government to help consolidate
    security gains through governance and development; and a long-term,
    strategic partnership with Pakistan.
        Success will be measured by progress towards a stable security
    situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan--one that is sustainable over the
    long term by their governments. We will present a report to Congress in
    March outlining our metrics.
        Mr. Loebsack. I have long been concerned about the impact that
    multiple combat deployments are having on our military readiness, our
    Service Members, and on our military families. Will the deployment
    ordered by the President--and the pace of that deployment--affect our
    readiness to respond to emergencies at home and other contingencies
    abroad? Will it affect dwell time ratios and the overall health of the
    force? What will be the long-term impact of this deployment on our
    military and our military readiness?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. As we have reported in our
    quarterly readiness reports to Congress, our deploying forces'
    readiness for ongoing counterinsurgency mission is high; however, we
    lack the dwell time required to train ground forces for the complete
    range of military operations we may be asked to respond to. But as the
    recent deployments to Haiti have shown, we can still respond rapidly
    and professionally when our nation calls. The additional deployments
    ordered by the President, when viewed in light of force adjustments
    made in other ongoing contingencies, are not expected to significantly
    alter our readiness posture or health of the force. We must continue to
    balance the force for an uncertain future while remaining focused not
    only on dwell time but on restoring and repairing equipment to levels
    that support training and response capability for a full range of
    missions. We partially mitigate our ground forces' risk through
    investments in capacity and capability, as well as by the significant
    capability inherent to our air and maritime forces. Nonetheless, our
    limited ability to generate additional ground forces constitutes a
    concern that we continue to focus attention and resources on.
        Mr. Loebsack. How does U.S. Central Command plan to meet the
    tremendous logistical, supply, and infrastructure requirements
    necessary to deploy 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan at such a
    rapid pace? How will the Afghanistan ramp-up be balanced with the
    complexity of simultaneously drawing down our troops, equipment, and
    infrastructure in Iraq?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. We have a large number of
    professionals who are balancing the demands of both operations. Their
    greatest challenge is overcoming the differences that exist between
    Iraq and Afghanistan. Iraq's infrastructure is more accommodating and
    CENTCOM is leveraging the infrastructure and the drawdown from Iraq to
    help equip forces in Afghanistan. Additionally, CENTCOM is moving as
    much cargo as possible via surface modes and recently conducted an
    assessment of Afghan airfields in order to maximize throughput. I
    remain confident that our professionals will continue to adapt and
    execute the mission we have assigned them.
        Mr. Loebsack. What are the civilian goals of this strategy? Does
    the President's plan include an increase in the number of civilian
    experts on the ground in Afghanistan beyond the number that was
    committed this past spring? How will the civilian goals be integrated
    and coordinated with the military goals?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The President's strategy is an
    integrated civil-military strategy. Both military and civilian efforts
    will support the President's core goal to disrupt, dismantle, and
    defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its
    capacity to threaten the United States and our allies in the future. As
    Secretary Clinton described during her testimony, civilian efforts will
    include building the capacity of Afghan institutions to withstand and
    diminish the threat posed by extremism, and delivering high-impact
    economic assistance--especially in the agricultural sector--to create
    jobs, reduce the funding that the Taliban receives from poppy
    cultivation, and draw insurgents off of the battlefield. As Secretary
    Clinton also mentioned, the Department of State will be seeking
    additional resources, including additional civilian personnel in
    Afghanistan, in order to implement the President's strategy. The State
    Department, in coordination with our military commanders, is currently
    examining the requirements for additional personnel to complement our
    military force increase. I believe that an increase in civilian
    expertise is an essential element of this strategy's success.
        In order to coordinate these civilian activities with our military
    efforts, Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal published an
    ``Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to
    Afghanistan'' in August 2009 that provides guidance from the U.S. Chief
    of Mission and the Commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan to U.S.
    personnel in Afghanistan.
        U.S. Government senior civilians have been established and
    integrated at each level of the military chain of command to serve as
    counterparts to military commanders and coordinate civilian efforts.
    This newly established U.S. Government integrated civil-military
    decision-making chain in-theater allows for planning and coordination
    of activities at all levels from the district/company level to the
    national/embassy level. Although new, this structure has already
    exhibited vast improvements in the coordination of civilian and
    military activities.
        Mr. Loebsack. How does the President's strategy assure that
    military actions in Afghanistan will not further inflame or entrench al
    Qaeda and other extremist groups in Pakistan? The President's speech
    indicated that part of his strategy includes further engagement with
    Pakistan. Has a new assistance package or strategic plan been discussed
    with the Pakistan Government?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The President's strategy aims
    to address challenges we face on both sides of the border. Afghanistan
    and Pakistan, bound by ties of tribe and faith, share a porous border
    of more than 1,500 miles. The presence of extremist sanctuaries in
    Pakistan led to the resurgence of the Taliban and more coordinated,
    sophisticated attacks in Afghanistan. Permitting a sanctuary for
    extremists in Afghanistan would put even more pressure on Pakistan's
    government, which is already under attack from groups operating in its
    border region.
        The President believes that a strong, stable, democratic Pakistan
    must be a key partner with the United States and an ally in the fight
    against violent extremism. People in Pakistan are increasingly coming
    to view that they share a common enemy with the United States. Our
    relationship is anchored in our common goals of civilian rule; robust
    economic development; and the defeat of those who threaten Pakistan,
    Afghanistan, and the peace of the world. We will significantly expand
    support intended to help develop the potential of Pakistan and its
    people. Last year, the United States committed $7.8 billion to support
    economic and social development, and our defense relationship has never
    been stronger. Our assistance will demonstrate the U.S. commitment to
    addressing problems that affect the everyday lives of Pakistanis and
    will bolster Pakistan against the threat of extremism.
        Mr. Loebsack. Do the additional NATO troop commitments that have
    been reported in the press since the President's speech come in
    addition to already scheduled NATO troop increases? In other words, are
    these truly new additions from our NATO allies?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Of the approximately 7,000
    forces pledged by Allies and partners at the International Security
    Assistance Force (ISAF) Force Generation Conference on 7 December 2009,
    35 percent of the offered forces were already in Afghanistan in a
    temporary capacity for election security. These forces were extended by
    the troop-contributing nations so they do in fact represent a new
    enduring commitment of forces, and thus all 7,000 forces should be
    considered new commitments. We are also hopeful that certain Allies and
    partners will use the London Conference on Afghanistan on 28 January
    2010, and the meeting of NATO Defense Ministers in Instanbul on 4
    February to announce increases in both financial support and additional
    forces.
        Mr. Loebsack. What are the civilian goals of this strategy? Does
    the President's plan include an increase in the number of civilian
    experts on the ground in Afghanistan beyond the number that was
    committed this past spring? How will the civilian goals be integrated
    and coordinated with the military goals?
        Secretary Lew. The civilian goals of our strategy are intended to
    advance the larger strategic goals of disrupting, dismantling, and
    defeating al-Qaeda by helping the Afghans develop effective governance
    and promoting sustainable economic development. Our goals are:
          Promoting good governance and connecting the Afghan
    people with their government by helping make Afghan government
    institutions more visible, effective, responsive and accountable at the
    local level. This includes capacity building programs at the national,
    provincial and district levels in the health and education sectors, and
    supporting programs that give Afghans a greater stake in their own
    government. A key emphasis will be assisting Afghan efforts to reduce
    corruption;
          Promoting the rule of law and justice delivery,
    consistent with the Afghan constitution, by strengthening the formal
    justice system across Afghanistan, and creating space for traditional
    dispute resolutions mechanisms;
          Assisting with reconstruction and development aimed at
    job creation, creating links to cross-border trade, and enhancing the
    Afghan Government's ability to secure its borders and increase customs
    revenue;
          Sapping the insurgency of foot soldiers and income from
    the narcotics trade by implementing a new civilian-military
    agricultural redevelopment strategy;
          Supporting Afghan government efforts to reintegrate
    Taliban and other insurgents who renounce al-Qaeda, cease violence and
    accept the constitutional system;
          Redoubling international efforts to target illicit
    financial flows to the Taliban;
          Countering al-Qaeda and Taliban propaganda, while also
    empowering Afghans to challenge the insurgents' narrative by improving
    access to mobile phones, radio and television;
          Improving the coordination of international assistance
    through regular consultations with Allies and partners to strengthen
    the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, and to enhance
    civilian coordination among ISAF partners;
          Regional diplomacy aimed at shifting the calculus of
    Afghanistan's neighbors from competition in Afghanistan to cooperation
    and economic integration; and
          Advancing the rights of Afghan women and girls across all
    lines of effort, with particular focus on expanding economic
    opportunities, improving access to justice, improving basic service
    delivery in education and health, and increasing women's participation
    in the political process.
        Accompanying an increase in civilian assistance will be a
    significant increase in civilian subject matter experts--beyond the
    tripling of deployed U.S. civilians that occurred over the past year,
    from 320 civilians on the ground in Afghanistan in January 2009, to
    nearly 1,000 on the ground today. We plan to increase that staff of
    1,000 by another 20 to 30 percent by the end of 2010. These civilians
    will partner with Afghans to enhance the capacity of government
    institutions and help rehabilitate Afghanistan's key economic sectors.
        The integration and coordination of civilian and military goals
    occurs at all levels in Afghanistan. At the Provincial and District
    level, we have civilian employees who work for USAID, USDA and the
    State Department on their agencies' respective governance and
    development projects. Based in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
    and District Stabilization Teams (DSTs), each team has a `lead
    civilian' representative, who serves as the commander's civilian
    counterpart. The lead civilians coordinate closely with the military
    commanders of the PRTs and DSTs to ensure that civilian and military
    projects reinforce one another.
        The net effect of this is that we have developed synchronized
    civilian-military chains of command, to ensure coordination at each
    level: district, provincial, regional, and national. At the national-
    level we have also created a dozen civ-mil working groups to improve
    coordination on key issues and to support work in the field. So far,
    our experience has been that this has promoted coordination on
    development and other issues. But as our military and civilian demands
    keep increasing over the coming months, we will need to further adapt
    our mechanisms to ensure our work is linked together across civ-mil and
    U.S.-Afghan lines, both at the Afghan national and sub-national levels.
        Mr. Loebsack. How does the President's strategy assure that
    military actions in Afghanistan will not further inflame or entrench
    al-Qaeda and other extremist groups in Pakistan? The President's speech
    indicated that part of his strategy includes further engagement with
    Pakistan. Has a new assistance package or strategic plan been discussed
    with the Pakistan Government?
        Secretary Lew. Our efforts in Afghanistan are inextricably linked
    to the situation in Pakistan. We remain committed to working with both
    the Afghans and Pakistanis to defeat violent extremism. As we disrupt
    and dismantle al Qaeda, we believe it will make other extremist groups
    less likely to carry out attacks within Pakistan. We have a robust
    security assistance program that promotes our strategic interests in
    Pakistan, fosters stability in civil-military relations, enhances U.S.-
    Pakistani military interoperability, and improves capacity in areas
    critical to COIN and counter-terrorism operations.
        Ambassador Robin Raphel, the Coordinator of Economic Assistance at
    Embassy Islamabad, has held discussions regarding our civilian
    assistance strategy with the Government of Pakistan at the national,
    provincial and district level. At all levels, the Government of
    Pakistan has expressed support for the strategy, which aims to:
          Improve the capacity of the Government of Pakistan to
    address the country's most critical infrastructure needs, with an
    initial focus on energy and agriculture, to help Pakistan recover from
    its energy and water crises.
          Help the Government of Pakistan address basic needs and
    provide improved economic opportunities in areas most vulnerable to
    extremism.
          Strengthen Pakistan's capacity to pursue economic and
    political reforms that reinforce stability.
        As is consistent with best practices in international development,
    U.S. assistance will be directed increasingly through a broad range of
    Government of Pakistan institutions, as well as local non-governmental
    organizations (including the private sector) with the capacity to
    implement programs effectively and accountably. This approach will help
    increase host country ownership, and U.S. commitment to building a
    long-term partnership with the Government of Pakistan and the Pakistani
    people.
        Mr. Loebsack. Do the additional NATO troop commitments that have
    been reported in the press since the President's speech come in
    addition to already scheduled NATO troop increases? In other words, are
    these truly new additions from our NATO allies?
        Secretary Lew. While some of the approximately 7,000 additional
    forces pledged by Allies and partners at the ISAF Force Generation
    Conference on 7 December include the long term extension of troops that
    were already in Afghanistan in a temporary capacity, more than 65
    percent of the offers were new additions. We are also hopeful that
    announcements of additional troop contributions will follow the 28
    January London Conference on Afghanistan and the 4 February NATO
    informal Defense Ministerial.
                                     ______

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. GIFFORDS
        Ms. Giffords. Thank you all for your time and your service and for
    your deliberate attention to this process. We have a tremendous
    responsibility anytime we commit the young men and women of our country
    to war, to ensure they are properly equipped during the fight and taken
    care of when they return home, and those are the two areas I want to
    address today. As the only Democrat that serves on both the Foreign
    Affairs Committee and Armed Services Committee, I approach this new
    strategy from a unique perspective. First I want to talk a little bit
    about resourcing these new requirements and then about how we are
    planning to care for the Service Members and civilian support staff
    once they return home. Every day in my District in Arizona, I see the
    physical and mental stresses we put on our forces and their gear,
    specifically the low density-high demand specialties unique to this
    type of conflict. As we require more of these assets in-theater, what
    is the plan to fully resource them from both a manpower and equipment
    perspective? Specifically I am talking about ground intelligence, ISR
    (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), Combat Search and
    Rescue, UAVs and Electronic Warfare assets that are all stretched
    extremely thin across Afghanistan and at training locations here at
    home.
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Taking care of our people is of
    the utmost importance to us. As you stated, we have placed our force
    under tremendous pressure in order to assure success. I assure you that
    the health of the force figures prominently in our calculus to develop
    a successful strategy in Afghanistan. You accurately touched on several
    essential warfighting areas and systems that are indeed in high demand
    and short supply. The Fiscal Year 2010 Overseas Contingency Operations
    Supplemental Appropriations request we are developing will fully
    resource the President's Afghan Strategy to include these low density-
    high demand assets. Secretary Gates and I look forward to presenting
    this request to the Congress in the very near future.
        Ms. Giffords. How do we plan to fund the specific equipment needs
    we will have in these low density-high demand specialties?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Maintaining military equipment
    in good working order, whether it is for low density-high demand
    condition, or for other requirement, requires the Department to
    delicately balance a range of needs within the context of available
    resources. Depending on anticipated mission demand and tempo, specific
    equipment requirements are adjusted annually to compensate for
    operational changes which contributed to washouts, stress, or
    operational losses. These factors influence what particular items are
    to be procured in any given fiscal year. To do this, Military
    Departments maintain lists of equipment, along with inventory
    objectives, designed to fulfill the National military strategy. Those
    objectives are then reviewed in the context of whether the optimal
    solution would be to procure new equipment or refurbish what we already
    have. It is recognized that it is a delicate calculation to decide
    which critical item is put in the budget. I can assure you that when
    calculating our procurement funding requests, the Department takes into
    account, demand requirements, and how equipment inventories impact the
    total force.
        Ms. Giffords. What incentives will be sought to ensure we can
    retain the skilled troops in these areas where retention has been
    problematic in the last few years due to recurring deployments?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The low density/high demand
    skills that are constantly needed for operations are monitored at the
    Department through a formal balanced scorecard forum chaired by the
    Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.
        Through this process, the Department monitors critical skills
    personnel and recommends incentives to improve recruiting and
    retention. Some of these critical skills include explosive ordnance
    disposal, linguists, intelligence and counterintelligence analysts,
    para-rescue operators and contracting specialists.
        The Department finds that the statutory authorities to encourage
    highly skilled and technical officers and enlisted personnel to remain
    in the Service are crucial to maintaining capabilities in these skills.
    The Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) and the Critical Skills
    Retention Bonus (CSRB) authorized by 37 U.S.C. 308 and 37 U.S.C. 355
    respectively, are among the most effective incentive tools to attract
    and retain qualified personnel in critical military specialties. The
    Department uses these authorities with appropriate oversight and rigor.
        Despite the overall strength of enlisted retention over the last
    few years, there remain critical shortages in these skills and other
    ``hard-to-retain'' skills that justify the continuation and application
    of the statutory bonus authorities. Current bonus authorities, along
    with the special and incentive pay consolidation authority granted in
    the FY 2008 NDAA to be phased in over the next few years, give the
    Department ample monetary incentive flexibility and agility to retain
    skilled Service Members in critical areas.
        Ms. Giffords. On my second line of questioning, I am extremely
    concerned with our ability to care for our Service Members and civilian
    staff when they return home. How is the Department of Defense budgeting
    for the future care needs of returning Service Members?
        Secretary Gates. Beginning with the development of our Fiscal Year
    (FY) 2010 budget request, I placed great emphasis on identifying and
    providing for future care needs of our returning Service Members. The
    Department has a well-established Wounded, Ill, and Injured Senior
    Oversight Committee, which is engaged with all emerging requirements.
    The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, along with
    each of the Services, identified requirements in support of the future
    care needs of returning Service Members and we fully funded those
    requirements. The details of the FY 2011 Defense Budget will be
    submitted to Congress by the President.
        Ms. Giffords. On my second line of questioning, I am extremely
    concerned with our ability to care for our Service Members and civilian
    staff when they return home. How have efforts between the Department of
    Defense (DOD) and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) progressed from
    the perspective of digital records transfer and continuity of care?
        Secretary Gates. DOD and VA share a significant amount of health
    information and continue to spearhead interagency data sharing
    activities that deliver information technology solutions to
    significantly improve the secure sharing of appropriate electronic
    health information. These initiatives enhance healthcare delivery to
    beneficiaries and improve the continuity of care for those who have
    served our country. Today, VA has access to DOD electronic health
    information on more than 5 million individuals. Exchange of outpatient
    pharmacy data, laboratory results and radiology reports began in 2001,
    with more health data increasingly made electronically available to VA.
    VA and DOD are working collaboratively to upgrade and enhance the
    technical framework that supports data sharing, and improve that
    framework's capability to handle increasing amounts of shared data.
          Since 2001, DOD has provided VA with one-way historic
    information through the Federal Health Information Exchange (FHIE) for
    separated Service Members. On a monthly basis DOD sends laboratory
    results; radiology reports; outpatient pharmacy data; allergy data;
    discharge summaries; consult reports; admission, discharge, transfer
    information; standard ambulatory data records; demographic data; pre-
    and post-deployment health assessments (PPDHAs); and post-deployment
    health reassessments (PDHRAs).
            -  As of November 2009, DOD transmitted health data on more
            than 5 million retired or discharged Service Members.
            Approximately 1.8 million of these patients have presented to
            VA for care, treatment, or claims determination. The number of
            individuals with data available to VA grows monthly as health
            information on recently separated Service Members is extracted
            and transferred to VA.
            -  DOD also transmits data for VA patients being treated in DOD
            facilities under local sharing agreements. As of November 2009
            more than 4.4 million health data messages have been
            transmitted to VA for patients treated in DOD facilities.
          For shared patients being treated by both DOD and VA, the
    Departments maintain the jointly developed Bidirectional Health
    Information Exchange (BHIE) communications system for transferring data
    for use in another's application. Implemented in 2004, BHIE allows DOD
    and VA clinicians to access each other's health data in real-time.
    Available information includes: allergy; outpatient pharmacy; inpatient
    and outpatient laboratory and radiology reports; demographic data;
    diagnoses; vital signs; family history, social history, other history;
    problem lists; questionnaires; and Theater clinical data, including
    inpatient notes, outpatient encounters, and ancillary clinical data
    such as pharmacy data, allergies, laboratory results and radiology
    reports.
            -  As of November 2009, there are more than 3.5 million shared
            patients (including and more than 150,000 Theater patients)
            available through BHIE.
            -  To increase the availability of clinical information on a
            shared patient population, VA and DOD have further leveraged
            BHIE functionality, allowing bidirectional access to inpatient
            discharge summaries from DOD's inpatient documentation system.
            Access to DOD discharge summaries is operational at some of
            DOD's largest inpatient facilities, representing approximately
            61 percent of total DOD inpatient beds.
          Since 2006, VA and DOD have been sharing computable
    outpatient pharmacy and allergy data through the interface between
    DOD's Clinical Data Repository (CDR), and VA's Health Data Repository
    (HDR). Exchanging standardized pharmacy and allergy data on patients
    enhances patient care and safety through the ability to conduct
    automated drug-drug and drug-allergy interaction checks using data from
    both repositories. As of November 2009, computable outpatient pharmacy
    and medication allergy data on over 47,900 patients receiving
    healthcare from both DOD and VA has been exchanged.
          To support our most severely wounded and injured Service
    Members transferring to VA Polytrauma Rehabilitation Centers for care,
    DOD sends radiology images and scanned paper medical records
    electronically to the VA Polytrauma Centers.
        Initiatives underway to further support and enhance the
    Departments' ability to share electronic health records include the
    Virtual Lifetime Electronic Record (VLER) and the DOD/VA Multiple
    Network Gateways.
          VLER: Sharing of electronic health information with DOD
    and VA private sector partners is the primary focus of the VLER and the
    Nationwide Health Information Network (NHIN) initiatives. DOD, VA, and
    Kaiser Permanente (KP) began a proof-of-concept for the three-way
    exchange between the electronic health records systems of DOD, VA, and
    KP in the San Diego area in January 2010. The collaboration marks the
    first time a computerized patient-records system operated by a federal
    agency will be linked to one operated by a private organization.
          Network Gateways: In 2008, a DOD/VA team defined
    functional, infrastructure and policy interoperability requirements
    that yielded a DOD/VA Multiple Network Gateway concept of operation.
    The Departments developed and implemented an enterprise architecture
    infrastructure solution and established a series of strategically
    planned network gateways for secure, redundant connectivity between
    facilities and to facilitate seamless transfer of health data. DOD and
    VA have established four gateways to receive migrated network traffic
    for data exchange. The target for migrating all data existing is FY
    2010.
        Ms. Giffords. On my second line of questioning, I am extremely
    concerned with our ability to care for our Service Members and civilian
    staff when they return home. When we talk about the costs associated
    with surging additional troops forward, are you also including within
    that figure the anticipated costs of future care?
        Secretary Gates. Beginning with the development of our FY 2010
    budget request, I placed great emphasis on identifying and providing
    for future care needs of our returning Service Members. We have a well-
    established Wounded, Ill, and Injured Senior Oversight Committee, which
    is well engaged with all emerging requirements. The Under Secretary of
    Defense for Personnel and Readiness, along with each of the Services,
    identified requirements in support of the future care needs of
    returning Service Members and we fully funded those requirements in our
    baseline budget request. During the FY 2011 Program Review process, we
    will continually assess our progress and resource implications.
        Within our Overseas Contingency Operations request, we have
    included funding for the health care requirements associated with the
    increased forces, both Active and Reserve, for planned operations. The
    baseline budget includes funding for anticipated costs of future care
    for all returning Service Members.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS
        Ms. Tsongas. It seems to me that we can do everything right in
    Afghanistan but the success of our efforts greatly depends on the
    commitment from Pakistan. How does the current Pakistani offensive in
    Waziristan fit into our strategic plan? What is the desired end state
    of this offensive for both Pakistan and the U.S.? How are we able to
    verify Pakistani claims of success? Finally, as we approach July 2011,
    how will you take into account Pakistan's progress and how will this
    progress influence the 2011 assessment?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Our success in Afghanistan is
    inextricably linked to our partnership with Pakistan. We share a common
    enemy and a common goal: disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al
    Qaeda and its extremist allies in Afghanistan and Pakistan. To
    accomplish this goal, we are working to strengthen Pakistan's capacity
    to target extremist groups that threaten other countries and have made
    it clear that we cannot tolerate a safe haven for terrorists whose
    location is known and whose intentions are clear. The Pakistan military
    has been involved in sustained, committed, deliberate military
    operations against extremists in South Waziristan and Swat, and across
    the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) for the last several
    months--its largest successive offensives in years. The goals of these
    operations are to eliminate insurgent-controlled safe havens, restore
    the writ of the State, and provide security to the Pakistani populace.
    Since 2001, Pakistan has lost thousands of its soldiers and civilians
    in this fight. We continue to interact constantly with the Pakistani
    military leadership to determine the efficacy of their efforts, and we
    agree that, although much remains to be done, their efforts in 2009
    have reduced safe havens and degraded militant capacity.
        Progress in both Afghanistan and Pakistan will be measured and
    assessed by the U.S. Government on a regular basis using a mix of
    quantitative and qualitative measures, intended to capture objective
    and subjective assessments. This assessment will look at past progress
    and start to focus on changes or adjustments that might be made over
    the following year. A description and assessment of U.S. Government
    efforts, including those of the Department of Defense, the Department
    of State, the USAID, and the Department of Justice, in achieving the
    objectives for Afghanistan and Pakistan is due to Congress in March
    2010.
        Ms. Tsongas. If we do not see the desired results by July 2011, or
    even by December 2010, is there a scenario in which you would ask for
    more troops beyond the 30,000? Do you have an existing plan for a troop
    increase above 30,000 and what events on the ground would trigger this
    request?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The President has authorized
    30,000 additional forces, in addition to granting us a modest amount of
    flexibility for an additional 10 percent. We will assess conditions as
    we move forward. Based on those assessments, the President will
    determine the scope and pace of a gradual and responsible drawdown of
    U.S. combat forces.
        Ms. Tsongas. What does the commitment of an additional 30,000 U.S.
    troops do to the support structure that is currently in place in
    Afghanistan? How many contractors will we need to send to Afghanistan
    to support the increase of 30,000 troops and the civilian surge? I
    believe that we will need more contractors and support personnel to
    provide life support for our troops. If this is true, is the
    President's estimated cost of 30 billion dollars to support this surge
    accurate?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Contractors are a critical
    enabler in Afghanistan and will continue to provide a wide range of
    tasks essential for operations including logistics, maintenance,
    construction, transportation, security and base life support. There are
    currently 104,000 contractor employees supporting our forces in
    Afghanistan. Based on current troop-to-contractor ratios, we anticipate
    an additional 50,000 contractor employees will be required to support
    the troop increase. The President's estimated cost included the
    associated increase in contractor support, to include compensation,
    deployment and sustainment. More than 75 percent of the additional
    contractor employees will be Afghan citizens. Employing Afghan citizens
    in support of the surge provides a boost to the local economy, reduces
    labor costs, and will contribute to a stable, sovereign Afghanistan
    supporting the theater commander's counterinsurgency strategy. Hiring
    local individuals further mitigates the cost of increasing the number
    of contractors. As local hires, Afghani contractor employees do not
    incur the life support and sustainment costs of U.S. or third-country
    nationals. Lastly, contractors are a subset of the operational and
    maintenance costs necessary to support the force, which are included in
    the President's estimate.
        Ms. Tsongas. The $30 billion does not include costs of replenishing
    equipment and addressing long-term health and mental health care costs.
    Do you have or are you in the process of developing the long-term
    personnel and readiness costs of sending an additional 30,000 troops to
    Afghanistan? If so, please provide them to the Committee.
        Secretary Gates. Beginning with the Fiscal Year 2010 budget
    request, we included funding for all requirements identified
    Department-wide to provide for long-term health and mental health care
    costs. We continue to refine requirements and are working to improve
    all health care processes related to long-term health and mental health
    care needs of our Service Members. This is one of my top priorities,
    and the Department will continue to include the necessary resources to
    provide the best possible health care for all of our Service Members,
    who deserve nothing less.
                                     ______

                         QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. NYE
        Mr. Nye. America's key goal of disrupting and defeating al Qaeda in
    South Asia is largely dependent on the action of the Pakistani forces.
    What plans do you have to incentivize the Pakistani government to
    continue its counter-insurgent operations in the areas bordering
    Afghanistan and to expand their operations to excise al Qaeda forces
    from Pakistan? What are failback options if the initial plan does not
    succeed?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. As the President stated in his
    address on 1 December 2009, our core goal is to disrupt, dismantle, and
    eventually defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan and prevent
    their return to both countries. In recent months, the Pakistani
    military has made significant efforts to address the extremist threat
    within its borders against extremists in South Waziristan and Swat, and
    across the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)--its largest
    successive offensives in years. The goals of these operations are to
    eliminate insurgent-controlled safe havens, restore the writ of the
    State, and provide security to the Pakistani populace. Since 2001,
    Pakistan has lost thousands of its soldiers and civilians in this
    fight.
        We must continue to encourage and aid Pakistan's fight against the
    extremists; we must also continue to make efforts to show that we view
    our long-term relationship with Pakistan as vital to our national
    security. To accomplish our objectives, we are strengthening Pakistan's
    capacity to target extremist groups, and have made it clear that we
    cannot tolerate a safe haven for terrorists whose location is known and
    whose intentions are clear. We must also help Pakistan widen its
    aperture in seeking out and eliminating all forms of extremism and
    terrorism--those who threaten not only Pakistan, but also Afghanistan,
    the wider South Asia region, and the world. Pakistan's greatest
    incentive to accomplish this goal is its own security interests. We are
    deepening ties with the people of Pakistan as well as with their
    security forces. We see progress with our Pakistani partners as
    paramount to the way ahead. The United States is also providing
    substantial resources to support Pakistan's democracy and development
    to demonstrate that we are a reliable, long-term strategic partner. We
    believe, based on the significant incremental progress we have seen in
    2009 with our Pakistani counterparts, that the President's revised
    strategy will succeed.
        Mr. Nye. On the White House's website, in regards to the
    President's new plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan, it states: ``The
    United States will focus on working with Pakistani democratic
    institutions. We have reaffirmed this commitment by providing $1.5
    billion per year for five years to support Pakistan. This assistance
    addresses: Helping Pakistan address immediate water, energy, and
    economic crises; Supporting broader economic reforms; Helping Pakistan
    eliminate extremist sanctuaries.'' As you mentioned in your testimony,
    Pakistan is a nuclear-armed nation of 175 million people. A stable
    Pakistan is critical in its own right and for success in Afghanistan.
    However, there have been many examples of clear corruption and misuse
    of support funds in the Pakistani government. What mechanisms are in
    place to properly oversee the military funds Pakistan will receive as
    we escalate our support to the country?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. We are committed to a long-term
    strategic partnership with Pakistan that is built on a foundation of
    mutual interest, mutual respect, and mutual trust. For FY 2009 and FY
    2010, DOD will execute the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF),
    appropriated to the Department of State and transferred for execution
    to DOD. This funding provides assistance to Pakistan's security forces
    to support train and equip programs and other enablers that enhance
    Pakistan's ability to conduct counterinsurgency operations that
    complement the U.S. Government's efforts in Afghanistan. Given the
    priorities of the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy, the United States will
    ensure the delivery and integration of warfighting capabilities rapidly
    and efficiently, with appropriate attention and adherence to
    accountability and end-use monitoring (EUM) requirements. Proper
    financial management, fiscal controls, and accountability in accordance
    with statute and DOD policies, including the DOD Financial Management
    Regulation (FMR) and any additional guidance that the Under Secretary
    of Defense (Comptroller) may provide, are being followed. Additionally,
    quarterly execution reports will be submitted to the appropriate
    Congressional Committees.
        Mr. Nye. Pakistan all too often allocates vital defense resources
    on protection from India, instead of focusing on the Pakistani Taliban
    and al Qaeda terrorists operating in their country. How will you ensure
    U.S. dollars are not used to resource any kind of military defense
    operations against India but instead are utilized to fight Pakistani
    Taliban and al Qaeda factions? Do you intend to have U.S. military or
    civilian personnel on the ground in Pakistan to provide oversight?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Although the Department of
    State is the lead agency for overall security assistance, the Office of
    the Defense Representative to Pakistan (ODR-P) in Islamabad oversees
    and monitors all military assistance provided to the Pakistani armed
    forces. The purpose of direct DOD assistance programs is to build
    Pakistan's counterinsurgency capabilities and to provide Pakistan with
    equipment that enables operations along its western border. ODR-P's
    security assistance team provides the oversight to ensure that DOD
    funding is used for the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism purposes
    intended.
        Furthermore, we believe that Pakistan's ongoing operations on its
    western border and recent shifts in Pakistani public opinion show the
    degree to which the Pakistani people, their government, and the
    military take the extremist threat seriously. I believe that supporting
    the Pakistanis in their struggle against the extremist threat within
    their borders is in the long-term best interests of the United States.
    We will continue our oversight toward that end.
        Mr. Nye. With the increase in troop deployments, our military
    personnel and their families will face an added strain. What steps is
    the Department of Defense (DOD) taking to prepare to meet the medical
    care, mental health, and transition needs of the additional personnel
    who will be deployed?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. A broad range of programs are
    in place to sustain the health and well-being of Active and Reserve
    Component Service Members and their families before, during, and after
    deployment.
        The Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Military
    Community and Family Policy offers several state-of-the-art programs
    for Service Members and their families. The Military and Family Life
    Consultant (MFLC) and Military OneSource (MOS) programs offer
    confidential, non-medical, short-term counseling support to members of
    the Active and Reserve Components and their families to prevent the
    development or exacerbation of conditions that may detract from
    military and family readiness. These services are available throughout
    the deployment cycle.
        MFLC services are flexible to meet emerging needs. MFLCs deploy to
    installations for up to 90 days to provide non-medical counseling
    support. In many locations installation MFLCs are embedded with units
    to offer counseling support specific to that unit. Large groups of
    MFLCs may also be mobilized and deployed to provide ``surge''
    counseling support to Brigades returning from combat. Child and Youth
    Behavioral (CYB) MFLCs are assigned to child development centers, youth
    centers, DOD Education Activity, and military connected schools to
    support staff, teachers, parents, and youth confronting deployment-
    related issues and transitions. CYB-MFLCs also deploy to numerous
    summer program activities to support youth who have a parent deployed.
    Finally, the Joint Family Support Assistance Program (JFSAP) augments
    existing family programs to provide a continuum of support and services
    based on Service Member and family strengths and needs and available
    resources. The primary focus of support is families who are
    geographically dispersed from a military installation. JFSAP
    specifically supports National Guard and Reserve members and their
    families. Services are delivered in local communities through
    collaborative partnerships with Federal, State, and local resources.
        Once deployed, Combat and Operational Stress (COSC) teams support
    Service Members and commanders in theater. These teams are available
    24/7 while Service Members are deployed. COSC promotes Service Member
    and unit readiness by enhancing adaptive stress reactions, preventing
    maladaptive stress reactions, assisting Service Members with
    controlling COSRs, and assisting Soldiers with behavioral disorders.
        Additionally, the Services have each developed garrison and
    training programs to mitigate the effects of combat-related stress. The
    Army recently launched the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program, the
    Air Force uses the Landing Gear Program, the Navy has an Operational
    Stress Control program, and the Marine Corps uses a program called
    Operational Stress Control and Readiness. Each of these programs seeks
    to prepare Service Members to cope better with combat and deployment
    stress.
        To enhance access to mental health care, the Department has
    actively recruited new, qualified mental health providers, both to
    military treatment facilities and the TRICARE network. The Public
    Health Service is also providing mental health providers to work with
    the Department.
        Each Service also has a comprehensive program to address the
    reintegration needs of the wounded, ill, and injured, including the
    Army Wounded Warrior Program, the Marine Wounded Warrior Regiment,
    Navy's Safe Harbor Program, and the Air Force Wounded Warrior Program.
    The DOD Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program was established to address
    the needs of the Reserve Component members and their families, and
    facilitates access to support and reintegration services throughout the
    deployment cycle.
        Mr. Nye. Much debate has been given to the number of, and timeline
    for, military personnel who will be sent to Afghanistan. What role will
    civilian agencies play and will they too be ``surged''? Civilian-
    military coordination is crucial to the fight in Afghanistan and
    Pakistan. How will the President's surge affect this relationship? Will
    there be enough civilian personnel to support our warfighters on the
    ground?
        Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The Department of Defense
    strongly supports civilian increases in Afghanistan as a critical
    element of our strategy and as an essential element to improve civil-
    military integration. In 2009, we saw significant improvements,
    including a substantial increase in civilian experts in-country (nearly
    triple from the previous year), and the establishment of a U.S.
    Government senior civilian structure, whereby a U.S. Government
    civilian counterpart is established at each level of the military chain
    of command to coordinate civilian efforts. We are aware that military
    force increases will likely require the deployment of additional
    civilian experts. Secretary Clinton and Deputy Secretary Lew testified
    that they expect additional civilian increases of 20 to 30 percent in
    2010-2011. The Department of State and Embassy Kabul are working with
    our military commanders to identify additional civilian requirements.
    We refer you to the Department of State for further details.
                                     ______

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HEINRICH
        Mr. Heinrich. Thank you and the Administration's full national
    security team for conducting a serious and comprehensive review of the
    War in Afghanistan. In order to allow our troops to come home, I
    believe we need to aggressively pursue the training of effective Afghan
    Security Forces so that we can ultimately transfer this important
    responsibility; an immediate, increased U.S. and allied presence can
    make this possible. I am concerned, however, about a number of elements
    that complicate this strategy. Please expand on the following: The
    Afghan government has not been a reliable partner and I believe
    correcting this will be critical to our success. Please expand on what
    specifically we will be doing to combat corruption and ensure greater
    accountability from the Afghan government? How will we enforce such an
    approach? British Prime Minister Gordon Brown recently said the Afghan
    government ``will be expected to implement . . . far-reaching reforms
    to ensure that, from now on, all 400 provinces and districts have a
    governor appointed on merit, free from corruption, with clearly defined
    roles, skills, and resources.''
        Admiral Mullen. The United States has been working closely with the
    Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) on the issue
    of corruption, and we are encouraged by recent steps taken by President
    Karzai to ensure greater accountability. At the January 28 London
    Conference on Afghanistan, President Karzai announced to the
    international community that fighting corruption will be the key focus
    of his second term in office and that he will strengthen the High
    Office of Anti-Corruption through additional resources and new powers.
    I fully support these efforts to combat corruption and end a culture of
    impunity.
        The U.S. is also taking steps to fight corruption. Currently, the
    State Department is working on a process to certify Afghan ministries
    to receive direct funding from the U.S. Government based on their
    financial and human resources management capabilities and transparency.
    The Departments of Defense and State are also reviewing our contracting
    processes to find ways to improve the responsiveness of our resources
    directly to the needs of the Afghan people, reducing avenues for
    potential corruption. This includes smaller contracts, more local
    procurement, and more contracting officers in the field to oversee
    contracts and partner with Afghans.
        Mr. Heinrich. Please expand on the following: Can you please
    elaborate on the enhanced ``strategic partnership'' with Pakistan--what
    does this mean specifically, and what will the United States be
    committing to ensure we have a critical ally to help eliminate
    terrorist cells inside Pakistan as well as within the mountainous
    Afghan-Pakistan border area?
        Admiral Mullen. The President's strategy recognizes that the
    security situation in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to stability
    in Pakistan. Action on both sides of the country's shared border is
    necessary to ultimately disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its
    extremist allies and prevent its return to both countries. As such, the
    President's commitment to a long-term, strategic partnership with
    Pakistan is a critical component to his overall strategy. As General
    McChrystal stated in his recent testimony before the House Foreign
    Affairs Committee, ``Our strategic partnership with Pakistan and the
    Government of Pakistan, I believe, is the critical long-term way to
    help reduce al-Qaeda.''
        By demonstrating our commitment to the region, recognizing our
    shared enemy, and providing significant resources for democracy and
    development, as well as counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, the
    President's strategy enhances our ability to work with the Government
    of Pakistan and build Pakistani capacity to address the insurgent
    threat within its borders. The Government of Pakistan has already taken
    promising steps in this regard with the military operations that it has
    conducted over the past year against insurgent forces in South
    Waziristan, Swat, and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. We must
    encourage and aid Pakistan's fight against extremists in these areas.
    Additionally, we must also help Pakistan begin to expand its objectives
    to include seeking out and eliminating all forms of extremism and
    terrorism--those who threaten not only Pakistan, but also Afghanistan,
    the wider South Asia region, and the globe.
        However, this partnership with Pakistan will go well beyond
    military cooperation. It will be a whole-of-government approach
    focusing on the long-term security and prosperity of the country. For
    additional information on these efforts, I suggest that you contact our
    counterparts at the Department of State.
        Mr. Heinrich. Please expand on the following: In terms of
    developmental and civilian assistance, what has changed from the
    President's strategy announced in March 2009, and how will we encourage
    alternative agricultural products other than opium poppy?
        Secretary Gates. This question is best addressed by the Department
    of State, which has responsibility and authority for coordinating our
    civilian efforts in Afghanistan. Since March 2009, the President has
    further underscored the need to focus civilian assistance on those
    ministries, governors, and local leaders that combat corruption and
    deliver assistance to the Afghan people. The Department of State will
    certify ministries for assistance and align our assistance more closely
    with priorities outlined by the Afghan government. In addition, U.S.
    Government civilian assistance will be implemented through small and
    more flexible contracts, supported by more civilian expertise in the
    field to supervise and advise on our efforts. As for development
    priorities, immediate impact on the lives of the Afghan people is the
    critical consideration. Therefore, our top reconstruction priority is
    implementing a civilian-military agriculture redevelopment strategy to
    restore Afghanistan's once vibrant agriculture sector. This effort will
    also target key Afghan populations for assistance with alternatives to
    growing poppy, as opposed to a previous focus on eradication efforts.
    Although many of these changes were launched in March 2009, they have
    been further focused and refined following the President's decision in
    December 2009.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BRIGHT
        Mr. Bright. Providing the lift capabilities our soldiers require is
    of the utmost importance to me and I look forward to working closely
    with both of you on that issue moving forward. However, I'm also
    concerned about existing programs that have been used to procure
    Russian-made Mi-17 airframes for the Iraqi and Afghan militaries. Let
    me be clear: I personally believe that any American taxpayer dollars
    used to procure equipment for these militaries should be spent on
    American-made equipment. You may disagree with that point. But, at the
    very least, we should ensure that there is a full, open, and
    competitive process for procuring airframes in Afghanistan. Can you
    tell me if we are still purchasing Russian Mi-17s on a sole-source
    basis and whether you have plans to let American companies compete for
    these contracts?
        Secretary Gates. The Department of Defense supports building
    partner-nation capacity in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq to meet
    strategic goals including host country participation in coalition
    stability operations and improvement of regional security.
        There are no known plans for Iraq to procure additional Mi-17s. As
    the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and their sustaining institutions have
    grown more comfortable with U.S. equipment and the Foreign Military
    Sales (FMS) program, the Government of Iraq has expressed increasing
    interest in U.S. helicopters and, in fact, has already purchased 24
    Bell helicopters.
        The Commander of U.S. Central Command decided to continue to
    support the Mi-17 for the Afghan National Army Air Corps due to the
    Afghans' experience with the platform dating back to the 1980s, the
    operational suitability and reasonable cost, and the ease of
    maintenance. The Department is assessing the potential need to expand
    the fleet in Afghanistan in the short term, with an eye toward
    identifying alternative platforms in the longer term.
        Subsequent to the date of this hearing, the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics designated the non-
    standard rotary wing aircraft as a special-interest acquisition and
    designated the Army to set up a dedicated project management office.
    The Department is committed to ensuring effective program management
    and oversight.
        In this effort, an Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint
    Staff-led study team has been formed to assess the Department's
    enduring requirements for rotary wing aircraft such as the Mi-17, as
    well as to develop a strategy for building partner-nation capacity that
    is less reliant on foreign sources of supply.
        Mr. Bright. Finally, I mentioned my concern about a sole-source
    procurement for helicopters in Afghanistan but I think we may end up
    considering a far more costly sole-source procurement here at home. The
    draft RFP for the KC-X tanker, as it is currently written, demonstrates
    a clear preference for a smaller, less capable tanker than the one the
    Department requested in previous rounds. We all know that this will
    ultimately favor one bidder over the other. We also learned on Tuesday
    that one of the bidders may decide that unless changes are made to the
    RFP, this company may not be able to make an offer.
        Secretary Gates--This is a serious development and something many
    of us would like to discuss with you further. By forcing one bidder out
    of the competition, we risk jeopardizing a process that's supposed to
    ensure best value for our military and the taxpayer. No matter which
    tanker a Member favors, I can assure you that Congress has no appetite
    for a sole-source bid to the tune of $35 billion dollars. Secretary,
    what steps are you taking to ensure that we get a fair and impartial
    final RFP?
        Secretary Gates. The Request for Proposal (RFP) requirements will
    clearly state the Warfighter's needs for a tanker that is ready to go
    to war on day one and will be a more capable tanker than our current
    tanker fleet. We believe the source selection strategy is crafted to
    favor no one except the Warfighter and taxpayer. The Department is
    committed to ensuring the competition is fair, open and transparent. We
    believe that both of the principal competitors are highly qualified,
    and we would like to see competition continue in this process. However,
    we cannot compel industry to participate.