[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PROPOSED CHANGES TO NASA'S EXPLORATION
PROGRAM: WHAT'S KNOWN, WHAT'S NOT,
AND WHAT ARE THE ISSUES FOR CONGRESS?
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 24, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-91
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.science.house.gov
______
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chair
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois RALPH M. HALL, Texas
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California Wisconsin
DAVID WU, Oregon LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
BEN R. LUJAN, New Mexico RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
PAUL D. TONKO, New York BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
JIM MATHESON, Utah MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
BARON P. HILL, Indiana PETE OLSON, Texas
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
KATHLEEN DAHLKEMPER, Pennsylvania
ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
SUZANNE M. KOSMAS, Florida
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
JOHN GARAMENDI, California
VACANCY
------
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
HON. GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona, Chair
DAVID WU, Oregon PETE OLSON, Texas
DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio Wisconsin
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BARON P. HILL, Indiana FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
SUZANNE M. KOSMAS, Florida
BART GORDON, Tennessee RALPH M. HALL, Texas
RICHARD OBERMANN Subcommittee Staff Director
PAM WHITNEY Democratic Professional Staff Member
ALLEN LI Democratic Professional Staff Member
KEN MONROE Republican Professional Staff Member
ED FEDDEMAN Republican Professional Staff Member
DEVIN BRYANT Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
March 24, 2010
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Gabrielle Giffords, Chairwoman,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 19
Written Statement............................................ 22
Statement by Representative Pete Olson, Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 23
Written Statement............................................ 25
Witnesses:
Mr. Douglas Cooke, Associate Administrator, Exploration Systems
Mission Directorate, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
Oral Statement............................................... 26
Written Statement............................................ 28
Mr. A. Thomas Young, Lockheed Martin (Ret.)
Oral Statement............................................... 37
Written Statement............................................ 39
Discussion
Use of FY 2010 Funds for Constellation Termination............. 43
Status of Constellation Project................................ 44
Funding Termination of Constellation........................... 45
NASA's Inspirational Mission................................... 46
Future of NASA Workforce....................................... 46
Cost of Ares I................................................. 47
Net Change in Workforce........................................ 47
Benefits of Privatization...................................... 48
Space as a National Security Asset............................. 51
Collaboration on Budget........................................ 52
Weaknesses of Privatization.................................... 53
Protecting NASA's Acquired Expertise........................... 54
Funding Termination of Constellation........................... 55
Status of Tiger Teams.......................................... 56
Filling the Human Spaceflight Gap.............................. 57
Delays to the Constellation.................................... 57
Incremental Transition to Commercial........................... 58
Planning for Termination....................................... 59
Transitioning Constellation Infrastructure..................... 59
Status of Commercial Cargo..................................... 60
Termination of Orion Capsule................................... 60
Contractor Response............................................ 61
Composition of Future Panels................................... 61
Government Inadequacy at Technology Development................ 62
Human Rating Requirements...................................... 62
Efficiency of Government Plan.................................. 63
Technology Development in Constellation........................ 64
Constellation PDR.............................................. 65
...............................................................
Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Mr. Douglas Cooke, Associate Administrator, Exploration Systems
Mission Directorate, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration................................................. 68
Mr. A. Thomas Young, Lockheed Martin (Ret.)...................... 77
Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record
Letter to The Honorable Gabrielle Giffords from Gary P. Pulliam,
Vice President, The Aerospace Corporation...................... 80
PROPOSED CHANGES TO NASA'S EXPLORATION PROGRAM: WHAT'S KNOWN, WHAT'S
NOT, AND WHAT ARE THE ISSUES FOR CONGRESS?
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 2010
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics,
Committee on Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gabrielle
Giffords [Chairwoman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
hearing charter
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Proposed Changes to NASA's Exploration
Program: What's Known, What's Not, and
What Are the Issues for Congress?
march 24, 2010
2 p.m.-4 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
I. Purpose
On March 24, 2010 the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics will
hold a hearing on the administration's proposed changes to the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) exploration program. At
this hearing, the Subcommittee will examine:
The key elements of the proposed changes to the
exploration program, including: (1) cancellation of the
Constellation Program, (2) investment in the development of a
new ``commercial crew'' space transport industry, (3) provision
of additional funding to commercial space cargo demonstration
[COTS] providers; (4) establishment of a new research and
technology program in support of human exploration; and (5)
plans to develop and conduct precursor robotic missions.
The status of the Constellation Program, including
the results of the recent program level Preliminary Design
Review;
The workforce, industrial base, and contractual
implications of the administration's proposed changes to NASA's
exploration program, were they to be implemented; and
The applicability of work completed by NASA,
including activities carried out in the Constellation Program,
to exploration options available to the Nation.
II. Scheduled Witness:
Mr. Douglas Cooke
Associate Administrator
Exploration Systems Mission Directorate
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Mr. A. Thomas Young
Lockheed Martin (Ret.)
III. Overview
While NASA has stated an overall rationale for changing its
exploration program and has identified the key elements of its strategy
in the FY 2011 budget request, many specifics on the proposed
redirection have yet to be established. For example, at this point in
time, NASA cannot provide detailed explanations and associated
supporting analyses with regards to:
Where the redirected exploration program will lead
the Nation to, in terms of goals, destinations, and timetable;
What key assumptions were used to formulate the
proposed commercial crew strategy, e.g., projected cost and
pricing; market scope; industry cost-sharing; when such service
will be operational; government fall-back options if providers
are unable to meet NASA's safety requirements, schedule needs,
or their cost commitments; and net number of jobs that will be
created;
The need for additional commercial cargo incentives
to Commercial Orbital Space Transportation (COTS) partners in
light of their progress in meeting agreed-to milestones;
The analytical basis NASA used to justify canceling
the Constellation Program, such as an analysis of alternatives,
and a comparative assessment of the relative probabilities of
each of the alternatives to Constellation being able to assure
survivable crew escapes;
The basis for the priorities and funding levels for
proposed exploration technology development projects, precursor
robotic missions, and heavy lift propulsion research;
The impact of canceling Constellation on NASA's
workforce, the Nation's industrial base, and on existing
contracts and what mitigating actions would be taken; and
The strategy for international engagement in human
spaceflight activities and exploration under the proposed plan.
At this hearing, members will have an opportunity to examine these
issues in greater detail. Mr. Douglas Cooke, NASA's Associate
Administrator for Exploration Systems Mission Directorate, the
organization responsible for managing the Constellation Program and
transitioning to the proposed redirection, will be a witness at the
hearing. In addition, Mr. A. Thomas Young, who has had extensive
experience in both the public and private space sectors, can provide
insight into issues raised by the proposed changes to NASA's
exploration program that Congress should consider in its deliberations
on the president's FY 2011 budget request for NASA.
IV. Background Information
Key Changes to NASA's Human Space Flight Program Proposed in the FY
2011 Budget Request
NASA proposes, in its FY 2011 budget request, to (1) cancel the
ongoing Constellation Program; (2) extend operations of the
International Space Station (ISS) until 2020 and possibly beyond; (3)
cultivate an expanded space exploration industry through a new
commercial crew transport program and rely on that industry for access
of its astronauts to the ISS; (4) invest in research and technology
development and demonstrations including heavy lift and propulsion
technology, that will enable human exploration beyond Earth; and (5)
conduct precursor robotic missions.
Cancel the Constellation Program
Citing that the Constellation Program was ``trying to recreate the
glories of the past with the technologies of the past'', the
administration proposes to terminate the program and initiate closeout
activities. NASA indicates that the FY 2011 budget request funds:
Termination and liability for existing contracts
(including severance pay);
Closeout costs of content and property disposition;
Costs to render safe facilities no longer in use,
mothballed, or targeted for demolition;
Potential environmental remediation of agency direct
and support contractor facilities no longer in use; and
Coverage for transitional civil servants as new
programs are being initiated.
$1.9 billion is allocated for these activities in FY 2011; NASA
plans to request $600 million in FY 2012. A detailed breakdown of
funding has not been provided. Such detail would help Congress better
understand the NASA Chief Financial Officer's (CFO) reported
characterization of the $2.5 billion in NASA's Fiscal 2011 budget
request to terminate the Constellation Program as being probably
``oversubscribed.'' According to the CFO's reported remarks, some
termination-related items are not included in the $2.5 billion figure.
Extend ISS Operations until 2020 and Beyond
The administration proposes to extend use of the ISS beyond 2016,
likely through 2020 or beyond, in order to utilize the orbiting
facility as a basic research facility and a test bed for exploration
technology development and demonstrations. NASA is requesting $2.78
billion in its proposed FY 2011 budget to support these efforts and to
initiate activities to increase ISS functionality; a total of $15.3
billion is projected for the period of FY 2011 through FY 2015.
No funding was identified in prior NASA budget requests for ISS
operations beyond 2015. Funding for future human space flight-related
activities in prior projections assumed that operations would be
terminated by the end of 2015 to help defray Constellation Program
costs.
Rely on Commercial Cargo Services and Cultivate a Crew Services
Industry
When the Space Shuttle is retired, NASA anticipates that crew
access to the ISS will be provided by acquiring seats on Russian Soyuz
spacecraft until the 2016 timeframe.
Under the president's proposal, the agency plans to cease using
Soyuz spacecraft at that time and anticipates using commercially
provided crew transport services instead. Under the ISS international
agreements, NASA is responsible for providing crew transport for four
U.S. and International Partner astronauts to and from the ISS twice a
year, as well as providing a crew rescue capability at the ISS for the
four astronauts. NASA plans to rely on commercially provided cargo
transport services for ISS resupply starting in the 2011 timeframe
using its Commercial Resupply Services (CRS) contract. Funding in FY
2011 for ISS cargo/crew services is about $857 million; a total of
$5.77 billion is projected for the period of FY 2011 through FY 2015.
The FY 2011 budget request also proposes a significant investment,
spread over five years, that NASA says is intended to spur America's
space industry. According to NASA, it will build on ``established
partnerships with the emerging commercial space sector through the
Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) effort and expand the
market to include a range of both cargo and crew vehicles.''
Regarding the existing COTS effort, NASA proposes to allocate $312
million in FY 2011 for ``incentivizing NASA's current commercial cargo
program to improve the chance of mission success by adding or
accelerating the achievement of already planned milestones, adding
additional capabilities, or tests that may ultimately expedite the pace
of development of cargo flights to the ISS.'' According to NASA, the
two COTS program's funded partners, SpaceX and Orbital, are progressing
toward flight demonstrations that involve docking at the ISS, in early
CY 2011 [The COTS Program has two unfunded partners in PlanetSpace and
SpaceDev]. The $312 million requested for FY 2011 is in addition to the
$500 million NASA had already planned to spend on the COTS
demonstration effort and represents a 62% increase in the cost of the
COTS program. In addition, NASA has already paid $214.3 million to
Orbital and SpaceX under the follow-on CRS contract, with the payments
being described by NASA as ``in support of post-demonstration
missions.''
According to NASA's budget justification, ``The Commercial Crew
Program will provide $6 billion over the next five years to support the
development of commercial crew transportation providers to whom NASA
could competitively award a crew transportation services contract
analogous to the Cargo Resupply Services contract for ISS. These funds
will be competed through COTS-like, fixed-price, milestone-based Space
Act Agreements that support the development, testing, and demonstration
of multiple commercial crew systems.'' The budget justification also
states that ``As with the COTS cargo program, some amount of private
investment capital will be included as part of any Space Act Agreement
and NASA will use this funding to support a range of higher- and lower
programmatic risk systems. Unlike the COTS program, which exclusively
funded entirely new and integrated systems (launch vehicles plus
capsules), this program will also be open to a broad range of
commercial proposals including, but not limited to: humanrating
existing launch vehicles, developing spacecraft for delivering crew to
the ISS that can be launched on multiple launch vehicles, or developing
new high-reliability rocket systems.''
NASA has provided no information as to whether the $6 billion
requested is the government's total share needed to complete the
proposed demonstrations or just represents the five-year total in the
agency's budget runout. It is also unclear whether NASA plans to award
crew transportation service contracts following completion of the
demonstrations or whether the agency would plan to award contracts
before the companies had ever demonstrated their systems, as was done
with the CRS contracts for cargo delivery to the ISS. No estimate of
the cost of these follow-on contracts is provided. Finally, no
information has been provided as to the percentage of the development
and demonstration cost to be borne by the commercial participants
[e.g., 50%, 80%, 0%].
Invest in Research and Technology Needed for Human Exploration
The FY 2011 budget request proposes a major shift in emphasis from
building human space flight systems to technology development. In
describing this change, NASA stated that:
``We believe that the technology shortfall we face is so
fundamental that incremental changes or tinkering on the margins will
not be sufficient to address current and future needs. Rather, a
fundamental `re-baselining' of our Nation's exploration efforts is
needed. We must invest in fundamentally new innovations for space
technology, and new ways of doing business, if we are to develop a
space exploration and development program that is truly sustainable
over the long term.''
The budget request provides no explanation as to why investing in
new technologies cannot be undertaken in addition to--rather than in
place of--the planned exploration flight program.
According to NASA, activities aimed at advancing technologies
needed to expand human exploration opportunities, reduce mission costs,
and contribute NASA innovation to broader national challenges and
applications will be funded in and managed by the Exploration Systems
Mission Directorate (ESMD). The agency's budget justification indicates
that this will be accomplished through investment in the demonstration
of flagship technology projects, as well as enabling technology
development and demonstration. ESMD's Exploration Technology and
Demonstrations activities are proposed to be funded at $652.4 million
in FY 2011; a total of $7.82 billion is projected for the period of FY
2011 through FY 2015.
NASA states that it believes that projects selected as in-space,
Flagship Demonstrations will be significant in scale, and offer high
potential to demonstrate a new capability and reduce the cost of future
exploration missions. NASA officials have told the Subcommittee that in
FY 2010, the agency plans to develop long-term roadmap and approach for
near-term missions. According to NASA, the evaluation of highest
leverage demonstrations is underway and a ``Mars destination is a
driving case for high leverage demonstration and technology.'' The
first three primary technology targets for single or combined missions
are proposed to include in-orbit propellant transfer and storage;
lightweight/inflatable modules; and automated/autonomous rendezvous and
docking. The fourth flight program would include candidates such as
aerocapture/entry, descent and landing; advanced life support; and
advanced in-space propulsion. In FY 2011, NASA proposes to initiate
several Flagship Technology Demonstrators, each with an expected
lifecycle cost in the $400 million to $1 billion range, over a lifetime
of five years or less, with the first flying no later than 2014.
Smaller scale development and testing of key, long-range
exploration technologies are proposed to be pursued as part of the
Enabling Technology effort. Projects range from laboratory experiments
to Earth-based field tests and in-space demonstrations and will be
aimed at transitioning relevant technologies from lower to higher
technology readiness levels. In FY 2011, NASA proposes to initiate
demonstration projects leading to flagship/precursor missions in the
areas of in-situ resource utilization; autonomous precision landing and
hazard avoidance, advanced in-space propulsion, and tele-operation of
advanced robotic systems. In FY 2012, NASA proposes to conduct other
potential long-range technology development projects such as radiation
shielding; high-efficiency space power systems; and entry, descent, and
landing technology.
According to NASA, ESMD will also lead research and development
(R&D) activities related to space launch propulsion technologies. The
agency proposes in its budget justification that this propulsion R&D
effort include development of a U.S. first-stage hydrocarbon engine for
potential use in future heavy lift (and other) launch systems, as well
as basic research in areas such as new propellants, advanced propulsion
materials manufacturing techniques, combustion processes, and engine
health monitoring. NASA says that advanced in-space propulsion
technologies may include nuclear thermal propulsion, solar and nuclear
electric propulsion, plasma propulsion, and other high-power and high-
efficiency propulsion concepts. The proposed FY 2011 funding level for
heavy lift and propulsion technology is $559 million; a total of $3.1
billion is projected for the period of FY 2011 through FY 2015. The
level of detail justifying this funding level and selected technologies
has not been provided by NASA. The budget request eliminates the
development of a heavy lift launch vehicle planned as part of the
Constellation Program [Ares V].
Conduct Precursor Robotic Missions
Another new initiative included in the FY 2011 budget request
relates to the conduct of precursor robotic missions. According to
NASA, it will send precursor robotic missions ``to candidate
destinations for human exploration such as the Moon, Mars and its
moons, Lagrange points, and nearby asteroids to scout targets for
future human activities, and identify hazards and resources that will
determine the future course of expanding human civilization into space.
Projects will make critical observations, test approaches and
operations concepts, and identf specific target destinations directly
beneficial to future human space activities. Instruments, destinations
and missions will be prioritized based on their utility to future human
activities.''
According to information provided to Congress, NASA proposes to
initiate at least two mission formulations in FY 2011, (1) lunar
mission demonstrating tele-operation capable of transmitting near real-
time video to Earth, investigations for validating availability of
resources for extraction, and (2) additional candidate missions that
may include landing on near-earth asteroids or on the moons of Mars
(Phobos and Deimos) and landing in-situ resource utilization capability
to process lunar or asteroid materials into fuel and/or other
exploration enabling materials.
It is worth noting that NASA's Science Mission Directorate's
Advanced Composition Explorer (ACE) Explorer mission, launched in 1997,
has been orbiting the Lagrangian L1 libration point since that time. In
addition, the Science Mission Directorate has placed the STEREO (Solar
TErrestrial RElations Observatory) spacecraft at a Lagrange point and
plans to send a spacecraft to a Lagrangian point again in 2014 when the
James Webb Space Telescope is launched. Finally, the ability to
transmit real-time video from the Moon to Earth is similar to that
projected to be demonstrated as part of Google Lunar X Prize
activities.
Status of the Constellation Program and Recent Accomplishments
The Constellation Program, which the administration proposes to
cancel, consists of the Ares I crew launch vehicle and Orion crew
exploration vehicle, the Ares V heavy-lift launch vehicle, associated
ground systems, and lunar systems. Constellation was the architecture
established to deliver Americans to the ISS and later to the Moon and
other destinations in the solar system following the retirement of the
Space Shuttle. As of the end of February 2010, NASA reported that it
had spent a total of about $9.7 billion on Constellation. If the $2.5
billion NASA has requested for proposed transition costs (including
close-out of Constellation activities) is accurate, that will mean that
approximately $14.5 billion will have been expended on the
Constellation Program upon the program's termination, if that occurs.
This figure includes the amount appropriated for FY 2010 and that
provided for exploration activities by the Recovery Act.
Limitations on the Use of FY 2010 Appropriations
In the Statement of Managers accompanying the FY 2010 Consolidated
Appropriations Act, ``The conferees note that the Constellation program
is the program for which funds have been authorized and appropriated
over the last four years, and upon which the pending budget request is
based. Accordingly, it is premature for the conferees to advocate or
initiate significant changes to the current program absent a bona fide
proposal from the Administration and subsequent assessment,
consideration and enactment by Congress.'' The Statement of Managers
also states that ``Funds are not provided herein to initiate any new
program, project or activity, not otherwise contemplated within the
budget request and approved by Congress, consistent with section 505 of
this Act, unless otherwise approved by the Congress in a subsequent
appropriations Act. Funds are also not provided herein to cancel,
terminate or significantly modify contracts related to the spacecraft
architecture of the current program, unless such changes or
modifications have been considered in subsequent appropriations Acts.''
Similar language was included in the Act itself. According to NASA, the
Constellation Program is currently proceeding per the enacted FY 2010
appropriation.
According to NASA, all work that is currently under contract for
Constellation will continue. The Administrator has instructed the
Constellation Program to refrain from initiating new work not currently
under contract, and also to refrain from expanding the scope of any
work that currently is under contract. As of March 11, 2010, NASA has
canceled five planned procurements, including planned studies: the
Exploration Ground Launch Services (EGLS) solicitation at the Kennedy
Space Center (KSC); the Vehicle Assembly Building High Bay modification
solicitation at KSC; the Water Basin construction solicitation at the
Langley Research Center; the Altair Conceptual Design Contracts
solicitation at the Johnson Space Center; and the Ares V heavy-lift
design trades solicitation at the Marshall Space Flight Center.
In terms of activity in FY 2010, NASA ESMD officials told
Subcommittee staff during a FY 2011 budget request presentation that
the Directorate and the Constellation Program are currently proceeding
per the enacted FY 2010 appropriation, specifically:
The program is working to complete Preliminary Design
Review and major tests scheduled for FY 2010 (e.g. Pad Abort
1); and
The Directorate will continue incremental funding of
contracted tasks for existing contracts;
As of January 2010, the Constellation Program has spent close to $1
billion of FY 2010 funding in execution of the Program. This includes a
multitude of contracts and other procurement instruments with over 400
companies, universities, and other government entities.
Constellation Program Accomplishments as of November 2009
Staff members from the subcommittee were briefed by NASA officials
in November 2009 on the status of the Constellation program. At that
time, they were told that:
NASA's near term plan remained the same, that is, to
maintain March 2015 as the goal for the first crewed Orion/Ares
flight to the International Space Station, subject to any
impact from potential funding changes as a result of
Congressional Continuing Resolutions.
Constellation had been executing the program for
about four years and was well into the development phase.
Technical progress to date, NASA officials said, was
substantial:
Preliminary Design Reviews (PDR) for the Initial
Capability had been concluded for Ares I and Orion and
PDR checkpoints were completed for Ground Operations,
Mission Operations and Constellation Program;
[Subsequent to the November 2009 briefing, NASA
informed the Subcommittee that the technical portion of
the program's PDR board was completed on March 5, 2010]
Ares I had successfully completed its Thrust
Oscillation Technical Interchange Meetings in support
of the Constellation Program PDR scheduled for March
2010;
Initial Capabilities major development contracts
were active and underway for both Orion and Ares I;
Constellation Space Suit Systems Contract re-award
occurred in March 2009 and definitization was expected
soon;
Ares I-X test flight successfully launched in
October 2009;
Ares I DM-1 ground test was successfully completed
in September 2009; and
Orion Attitude Control Motor Development Motor Test
was successfully completed in December 2009.
According to NASA's list of planned Constellation Program events
dated March 12, 2010, an interim Critical Design Review (CDR) is
scheduled for July 2010.
What is Not Known and What Issues Congress May Wish to Consider
While NASA has provided its overall rationale for moving in another
direction and has identified the key elements of its strategy in its FY
2011 budget request, the proposed change in the agency's exploration
program is not accompanied by specifics. As such, the absence of detail
contributes to a number of issues Congress may wish to consider.
Specifics on Exploration Goals and Destinations
What are the projected dates and destinations in the
proposed human exploration program?
In his prepared statement submitted for the Committee's
February 25, 2010 hearing on NASA's FY 2011 budget request, the
NASA Administrator said:
``Since the introduction of the budget, many have asked what
the destination is for human space flight beyond low Earth
orbit under the president's plan. NASA's exploration efforts
will focus not just on our moon, but also on near-Earth
asteroids, strategic deep space zones called Lagrange points,
and the planet Mars and its moons. For me, the ultimate
destination in our solar system at present is Mars.
While we cannot provide a date certain for the first human
visit, with Mars as a key long-term destination we can identify
missing capabilities needed for such a mission and use this to
help define many of the goals for our emerging technology
development.''
The Administrator provided another perspective while
speaking before the Washington Space Business Roundtable,
Satellite 2010 Conference on March 16, 2010. At that event, the
Administrator said:
``I often hear the criticism that under the President's plan
we have no destination. This is also not true. The ultimate
destination in our solar system for our exploration efforts is
Mars, but we don't have the technological where-with-all to
safely get humans there yet. In order to reach this
destination, we need a robust research and development program
to help us provide the capabilities that will make this goal
attainable.''
The proposed strategy would eliminate any specific human
space flight program destinations or timetable. Congress had
provided direction on destinations and timetable in the past
two NASA Authorization Acts, and the content of NASA's budget
requests reflected that direction. The NASA Authorization Act
of 2005 directed the NASA Administrator to manage human space
flight programs to strive to achieve ``Returning Americans to
the Moon no later than 2020'', and ``Enabling humans to land on
and return from Mars and other destinations on a timetable that
is technically and fiscally possible.'' NASA's FY 2008 budget
request submitted in February 2007 acknowledged that ``The
President and Congress committed the Nation to a journey of
exploration; returning to the Moon in the next decade, then to
Mars and beyond'' and proposed initiating the Constellation
Program to implement that commitment. The administration's FY
2010 budget request reiterated the goal of ``returning
Americans to the Moon by 2020.''
In the NASA Authorization Act of 2008, Congress affirmed its
support for ``the broad goals of the space exploration policy
of the United States, including the eventual return to and
exploration of the Moon and other destinations in the solar
system and the important national imperative of independent
access to space'' and ``activity related to Mars exploration''.
Extent of Consultations Prior to the Proposed Redirection
How did the president go about this decision, who did
he reach out to, and who was brought in to make the decision?
According to the Administrator's response to Subcommittee
Chairwoman Gabrielle Giffords at the Committee's February 25,
2010 hearing, he consulted with the president but characterized
his discussion as pre-decisional, adding that he was ``not at
liberty to share that.'' The Administrator did not indicate
whether NASA made any specific recommendations, when they may
have been made, or whether they were adopted.
Did the NASA Administrator or the president consult
with the Department of Defense on the impact to the industrial
base before the announcement of the Constellation Program's
cancellation?
According to the Administrator's response to Rep. Rob Bishop
at the Committee's February 25, 2010 hearing, he had informal
conversations with senior persons in DOD, and that while not
talking specifically about the impact of the cancellation of
the Constellation program, the Administrator said he asked for
information on impacts on the industrial base, particularly
with reference to solid rockets. He agreed to provide the names
of DOD officials he spoke to for the record.
It is worth noting that, according to a recent Air Force
Times article, the Air Force's Deputy Under Secretary of the
Air Force for Space Programs said at a recent Senate hearing
that ``the Obama administration had not asked the Air Force to
examine the effects of canceling NASA's Constellation program
before the Feb. 1 announcement.''
Basis for the Proposed Commercial Crew Strategy
Were market studies of commercial human spaceflight
used by NASA and the administration independently conducted?
According to his response to Chairman Gordon at the
Committee's February 25, 2010 hearing, the NASA Administrator
said that NASA had not done any market surveys nor had he been
asked to. Consequently, he said that he is ``depending upon
surveys and information that has come from the industry
themselves.''
According to a summary of a March 8, 2010 meeting at the
National Research Council by Spacepolicyonline.com, staff from
the Office of Science and Technology Policy said that a 2002
study by the Futron Corporation entitled ``Space Tourism Market
Study: Orbital Space Travel & Destinations with Suborbital
Space Travel'' was one of the main inputs that gave the
administration confidence in the potential non-governmental
market for commercial crew services. The study included the
analysis of a survey by Zogby International that sought to
identify the market size, potential for growth, and the
characteristics of the market's customers. The Futron study
forecasted the market demand for orbital and suborbital flight
over the 20 year period from the time the study was conducted.
The study stated that for orbital space travel, ``Given the
current ticket price of US$20 million per person, affordability
is the major barrier to becoming a viable customer for orbital
space travel.'' According to the Futron report, ``at a current
ticket price of US$20 million for an orbital trip, the
potential customer's minimum net worth would have to be US$200
million.'' The Futron study characterized customers meeting
such net worth levels as ``super-affluent.''
The Futron study forecasted that from 2002-2009, 23 tourists
would fly on the Soyuz. Space Adventures, Ltd., which states on
its website that it is the only private space exploration
company to have sent paying passengers into space, has sent 7
paying passengers via the Soyuz in the 2002-2009 period--30
percent of Futron's forecasted market for that period. Taking
into account the analysis of the Futron/Zogby market survey,
the Futron report provided a base forecast that assumed ``the
current ticket price of US$20 million at the beginning of the
forecast [in 2002], linearly decreasing to US$10 million in
2012, and further declining to US$5 million by 2021'' which at
a $5 million per seat charge would expand the pool of potential
passengers to those with net worth levels of at least $50
million. Assuming that a commercial crew company or companies
provide the price reductions predicted in the market study,
Futron forecasted that a total of some 500 passengers would fly
commercially over the next twenty years. However, at a March
18, 2010 Senate subcommittee hearing, SpaceX's CEO quoted a
price of ``less than $50 million a seat'', while Orbital's
Senior Vice President estimated that the cost of an individual
mission for Orbital's system would be ``probably around three
or four hundred million dollars''. In September 2009, an
Orbital spokesman indicated their commercial crew system would
be capable of carrying three to four astronauts.
NASA's FY 2011 budget justification states that, ``Once
established, these [commercial crew] services will not only
allow astronauts to travel to the International Space Station,
they will ultimately open space travel to many more people
across the globe.'' Considering the analysis conducted by
Futron Corp., which was used to inform the administration's
plans for human spaceflight, taxpayer funding for the
development of commercial crew services--$6 billion for the
years FY 2011 through FY 2016 as identified in the FY 2011
budget request--would in essence be supporting a market for
orbital space travel forecasted to be limited to a total of
about 500 U.S. and non-U.S. individuals over a twenty year
period who have net worth levels ranging from a minimum of $50
million to in excess of $200 million. Whether the reallocation
of Federal funding from the government's existing Constellation
Program to enable such a market is the best use of those
taxpayer dollars is a public policy issue for Members to
resolve. No information has yet been provided to the
Subcommittee to indicate the Administration's rationale for
assigning such a priority to enabling that market.
What is the rationale for the decision not to include
a government-led crew transport system development program as a
``fallback option?''
The rationale is not identified in NASA's budget
justification. It is worth noting that the Augustine Committee
report, in commenting on NASA's need for a fallback option,
said that:
``While there are many potential benefits of commercial
services that transport crew to low-Earth orbit, there are
simply too many risks at the present time not to have a viable
fallback option for risk mitigation.''
How was the estimate of $6 billion for development of
commercial crew derived? Does this represent the totality of
the government's share of development and demonstration costs?
The basis for the $6 billion is not included in NASA's
budget justification, including detail on whether this
represents the totality of the government's share of
development and demonstration costs. The Augustine Committee
had estimated that the cost to NASA of creating an incentive
for industry to develop a commercial transport capability for
crew was about $5 billion. However, that cost was based on
estimates provided by would-be commercial providers and the
assumptions behind the estimates were not provided.
What amount of cost-sharing by potential commercial
crew transportation providers did NASA assume in determining
its $6 billion partnership contribution?
The budget justification states that ``As with the COTS
cargo program, some amount of private investment capital will
be included as part of any Space Act Agreement and NASA will
use this funding to support a range of higher- and lower
programmatic risk systems.''
Documents provided in conjunction with NASA's FY 2011 budget
justification do not identify what level of cost-sharing by
industry was assumed in deriving the $6 billion figure.
What is the basis for cost savings assumed to be
accrued from commercial crew services? Was an independent cost
estimate analysis performed?
NASA's reference to cost savings is couched in terms of
affordability. In his statement of February 1, 2010 introducing
NASA's FY 2010 budget, the NASA Administrator said:
``NASA will accelerate and enhance its support for the
commercial spaceflight industry to make travel to low Earth
orbit and beyond more accessible and more affordable. Imagine
enabling hundreds, even thousands of people to visit or live in
low Earth orbit, while NASA firmly focuses its gaze on the
cosmic horizon beyond Earth.''
At the Committee's February 25, 2010 hearing, the
Administrator said in his prepared statement:
``This investment [5-year investment totaling $6 billion]
funds NASA to contract with industry to provide astronaut
transportation to the International Space Station as soon as
possible, reducing the risk of relying solely on foreign crew
transports, and frees up NASA resources to focus on the
difficult challenges in technology development, scientific
discovery, and exploration. We also believe it will help to
make space travel more accessible and more affordable.''
Documents provided in conjunction with NASA's FY 2011 budget
justification neither reference how projected savings were
derived, nor whether an independent cost estimate was
performed.
What contingencies are in place should a commercial
crew provider's business fail and shut down?
In response to Subcommittee Ranking Member Pete Olson's
question at the February 25, 2010 Committee hearing on what
backup NASA would use if commercial crew companies failed to
deliver, go bankrupt, or could not perform, the Administrator
said:
``The backup is actually--puts us in a better situation than
we would have been with Constellation"
``As it is right now, I have two companies that are bidding
on or competing to handle access to low Earth orbit. I am
hopeful that both of them will be successful. We are also
intending to go out and reopen the competition to see if we can
add even more companies into the mix. So conceivably there
could be multiple companies that we recognize as having met the
safety criteria for what we want to do, and then we are much
better off than we would have been with a NASA designed and
built system in a single Ares I.''
It is unclear what companies the Administrator was referring
to in his response, since NASA has not yet issued any
solicitations for commercial crew transportation demonstrations
or services.
Notably, the Augustine Committee's report said, regarding
this issue of contingency: ``[T]he commercial community may
fail to deliver a crew capability in mid-program, and the task
would revert to NASA. This could be caused by either a
technical failure or a business failure--a failure to obtain
financing, changes in markets or key suppliers, re-alignment of
business priorities, or another non-technical reason. Either
type of failure would require NASA intervention, and the
possibility that NASA would either have to operate the system,
or fall back to an alternative.''
In addition, there is no information available as to what
the cost to the government would be to sustain two or more
companies. The Department of Defense's experience with the
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) Program where the
services from the two initial companies were merged into a
single joint venture [United Launch Alliance or ULA] is
illustrative of the challenge of assessing future government
funding requirements based on assumed future commercial
markets. Last week, the CEO of ULA told a Senate subcommittee:
[T]he consolidation to form ULA was done in part because the
commercial market projected in the late 1990s did not
materialize as was originally expected and the remaining market
was insufficient to sustain two healthy launch service
providers. Therefore, we believe the nation's human access to
space should not be dependant [sic] on the success of a future
adjacent commercial market.
On what basis does NASA estimate that commercial crew
services will be available by 2016?
At the February 1, 2010 teleconference where NASA and Office
of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) officials, including
NASA's Deputy Administrator, briefed the media on NASA's budget
request, the latter said that for planning purposes, NASA
expected a commercial crew transport system to be ready to go
in 2016.
Documents provided in conjunction with NASA's FY 2011 budget
justification do not indicate how the 2016 date was
established. It should be noted that the NASA Administrator
said during his February 6, 2010 press conference that he was
not in his position long enough to warrant his taking potential
commercial crew providers' cost and schedule estimates ``to the
bank'' and consequently is asking to talk to them on issues of
schedule and cost and whether they can still deliver within the
time horizon they presented to the Augustine Committee, and if
so, under what assumed conditions.
Who assumes the liability for astronauts or
researchers transported on commercial crew vehicles?
NASA has not indicated who would assume the liability for
astronauts or researchers transported on commercial vehicles.
The Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 put an
initial regulatory framework in place for commercial human
space flight. The intent of the law was to support the
development of this private sector effort while also protecting
the safety of the uninvolved public on the ground. The law
established an ``informed consent'' regime for carrying space
flight crew and participants (passengers). As part of the
``informed consent'' regime, FAA regulations require an
operator to inform in writing any individual serving as crew
that the United States Government has not certified the launch
vehicle and any reentry vehicle as safe for carrying flight
crew or space flight participants. Similarly, the operator must
inform each space flight participant in writing about the risks
of the launch and reentry, including the safety record of the
launch or reentry vehicle type. NASA has not established
whether its astronauts or funded researchers would be flying
under the ``informed consent'' regime.
How will NASA ensure that commercial crew
transportation systems meet its safety requirements?
The Administrator has stated that he is confident that
commercial crew vehicles will be safe. In introducing NASA's FY
2011 budget request, he said:
``Commercial launch vehicles have for years carried all U.S.
military and commercial--and most NASA--satellites to orbit.
Now, as 50 years ago when we upgraded existing rockets for the
Gemini program, NASA will set standards and processes to ensure
that these commercially built and operated crew vehicles are
safe. No one cares about safety more than I. I flew on the
space shuttle four times. I lost friends in the two space
shuttle tragedies. So I give you my word these vehicles will be
safe.''
Documents provided in conjunction with NASA's FY 2011 budget
justification indicate that NASA plans to complete its
definition of human rating requirements in FY 2010.
In establishing the human rating requirements for commercial
crew vehicles, NASA needs to consider the following:
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP)
has expressed concerns about the safety of potential
commercial crew vehicles. In testimony before the
Subcommittee on February 3, 2010, VADM Joseph Dyer, the
Chairman of ASAP, said in his prepared statement:
``For these reasons, the Panel stated, ``To abandon
Ares I as a baseline vehicle for an alternative without
demonstrated capability nor proven superiority is
unwise and probably not cost effective. The ability of
any current COTS design to ``close the gap'' or even
provide an equivalent degree of safety is
speculative.''
At the Subcommittee's hearing on human space
flight safety in December 2009, Joseph Fragola, a
safety specialist and former member of NASA's
Exploration Systems Architecture Study, said in his
prepared statement regarding the Constellation
Program's Ares I launcher:
``It is my belief that the Ares I vehicle, because
of its inherent focus on being as safe as achievable
from the very start, has the best chance to be an
outstandingly safe crew launcher. There is no way to
insure safety, and spaceflight will always be a risky
endeavor, but a launcher that is designed to be safe
from the start, at least to me, is a good way to
begin.''
Recently, in response to the administration's
proposal for commercial vehicles to provide astronaut
transportation to the ISS, NASA's Astronaut Office in a
March 2010 memorandum made several recommendations for
``the transition to a commercial-crew vehicle to the
ISS which leverages the experience gained in the
operation of the Space Shuttle, the ISS, and in the
design of Constellation.'' The Chief Astronaut, Peggy
Whitson, said in the memorandum:
``Memorandum CB-04-044, Astronaut Office Position on
Future Launch System Safety, was released in May 2004
by the Astronaut Office after the Columbia disaster,
precipitated by a reexamination of all operational
aspects of human spaceflight and focusing on launch
vehicle safety for any next generation of human rated
spacecraft. Although flying in space will always
involve significant risk, an order of magnitude
improvement during ascent compared to Space Shuttle, is
achievable with current technology and represents a
minimum safety benchmark for future systems. It is
highly recommended that any human-rated launch system
include a booster with ascent reliability at least as
high as the Space Shuttle's and an abort system which,
together with the booster, yield a predicted Loss of
Crew (LOC) number of 1/1000. This number assumes a loss
of one vehicle per 100 launches and a crew escape
system providing a 90% probability of survivable crew
escape.''
``Some boosters are designed to highly loft their
ascent trajectory to optimize the capability of their
propulsion system and the amount of mass the booster
can deliver to orbit. For expendable vehicles, these
trajectories are efficient and transparent to the
payload. For a crewed vehicle however, aborting from a
lofted trajectory puts the crew at a significant
survival risk in some scenarios due to high G loads and
heating. These pans of the trajectory, where an abort
is nonsurvivable, are called black zones. A
commercially crewed vehicle must have full envelope
abort/escape capability with no black zones.'' [A
``black zone'' is a time period during launch when the
crew would be unable to safely escape or abort in the
event of a failure of the launch vehicle.]
In the absence of an alternative government system,
what recourse will the government have if commercial crew
vehicles are unable to attain the safety standard set by NASA?
Documents provided in conjunction with NASA's FY 2011 budget
justification do not indicate what recourse the government will
have in the absence of an alternative government system if
commercial crew vehicles are unable to meet NASA's safety
requirements.
In the absence of an alternative government system,
how will the pricing of the commercial crew transport services
be set and enforced?
Documents provided in conjunction with NASA's FY 2011 budget
justification do not indicate how such pricing will be set or
enforced in the absence of an alternative government system.
How many net jobs is NASA assuming will be created by
the proposal to seek commercial crew services to support the
ISS coupled with the cancellation of the Constellation Program?
What is the basis of those assumptions?
At the Committee's February 25, 2010 hearing, the NASA
Administrator said in his prepared statement:
``An enhanced U.S. commercial space industry will create new
high-tech jobs, leverage private sector capabilities and energy
in this area, and spawn other businesses and commercial
opportunities, which will spur growth in our Nation's
economy''.
``NASA will cancel the Constellation Program in favor of a
bold new approach that invests in the building blocks of a more
capable alternative to space exploration. This new investment
in NASA and the corresponding reorientation of the human space
flight program will create thousands of jobs nationwide,
offsetting the job losses that may be associated with the
cancellation of Constellation.''
Documents provided in conjunction with NASA's FY 2011 budget
justification do not indicate how or whether NASA independently
determined the number of jobs that would be created by an
enhanced U.S. commercial space industry or when they would
materialize, nor do they provide a calculation of net number of
jobs created nationwide when the cancellation of the
Constellation is taken into account.
Has NASA determined what skills its civil service
workforce will need to conduct effective oversight of and
validation of human-rating, to ensure safe on-orbit operations,
and to enable ``smart-buyer'' practices of any potential
commercial crew service? Has NASA determined how that skill
base will be preserved?
Documents provided in conjunction with NASA's FY 2011 budget
justification do not indicate the extent of oversight NASA will
apply on potential commercial crew service providers or how
human space flight skills will be maintained in the absence of
new NASA flight programs.
Basis for Requesting New Commercial Cargo Incentives
What is the basis for proposing a $312 million
``incentive'' for the COTS program, given that the companies
involved already have the incentive of a total of $3.5 billion
in revenue from the follow-on contract?
According to the NASA Administrator's response to a similar
question Chairman Gordon posed at the Committee's February 25,
2010 NASA budget hearing, the Administrator committed to
providing the Committee with an answer for the record.
How will the proposed additional funding [the $312
million cited above] be used?
According to NASA's budget justification, the $312 million
will be used for ``incentivizing NASA's current commercial
cargo program to improve the chance of mission success by
adding or accelerating the achievement of already planned
milestones, adding additional capabilities, or tests that may
ultimately expedite the pace of development of cargo flights to
the ISS. Risk reduction activities may include adding
milestones to complete the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)
to identify early risks. Accelerating enhanced capabilities may
include adding milestones for early development of items such
as the high energy engine for Orbital's Taurus II upper stage,
and Block 2 engine upgrades SpaceX's Falcon 9; a demonstration
flight may be added to validate the upgrades. NASA will
continue to evaluate the Cargo Resupply Services (CRS) contract
to determine if funds can be used to accelerate hardware
fabrication and assembly of the CRS vehicles.''
NASA has not provided further details on what specific
activities will be conducted or what the consequences of not
funding such an increase would be. It should be noted that the
requested funding represents a 62% increase over the funding
NASA and its funded partners had previously agreed to as being
sufficient to complete COTS demonstrations. Given the
additional complexity of a commercial crew transportation
system, the percentage increase in cost for commercial cargo
transport reinforces the importance of determining a credible
cost estimate for commercial crew transport development before
committing to that approach.
Basis for Cancelling the Constellation Program
What evidence has been provided that shows that the
alternative to the Constellation Program is better? Was an
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) performed?
The Office of Management and Budget fact sheet accompanying
NASA's FY 2011 budget request said:
``NASA's Constellation program--based largely on existing
technologies--was based on a vision of returning astronauts
back to the Moon by 2020. However, the program was over budget,
behind schedule, and lacking in innovation due to a failure to
invest in critical new technologies. Using a broad range of
criteria an independent review panel determined that even if
fully funded, NASA's program to repeat many of the achievements
of the Apollo era, 50 years later, was the least attractive
approach to space exploration as compared to potential
alternatives. Furthermore, NASA's attempts to pursue its moon
goals, while inadequate to that task, had drawn funding away
from other NASA programs, including robotic space exploration,
science, and Earth observations. The President's Budget cancels
Constellation and replaces it with a bold new approach that
invests in the building blocks of a more capable approach to
space exploration.''
At his hearing before the Committee on February 24, 2010
regarding the administration's FY 2011 Research and Development
budget proposal, the OSTP Director said in his prepared
statement:
``The new approach--which adds $6 billion over the next five
years for NASA--includes a vigorous technology development and
test program that will begin to reverse decades of under-
investment in new ideas. By extending the life of the
International Space Station, it increases the number of U.S.
astronauts who will be working in space over the next decade;
by supporting the development of private sector capabilities to
lift astronauts into low Earth orbit it will shorten the
duration of our reliance solely on Russian launchers for this
purpose; and by investing in new, game-changing technologies it
gives promise of getting our astronauts to deep space
destinations sooner, faster, safer, and cheaper than what could
realistically have been achieved under the old approach.''
OSTP has provided no information to support this statement,
nor have any studies, including an analysis of alternatives,
been identified to Congress that demonstrate that the new
approach ``gives promise of getting our astronauts to deep
space destinations sooner, faster, safer, and cheaper than what
could realistically have been achieved under the old
approach.''
At the Committee's February 24, 2010 hearing on the
Administration's FY 2011 Science Programs, the Director of OSTP
told Ranking Member Ralph Hall:
Each component of it [Constellation] was very seriously over
budget. So, we think that what we are proposing is a program
that has a better chance of success than Constellation did and
delivering what the American people want and expect from their
space program, which is innovation, which is the forward
leading program with exciting vision, exciting ideas, the
possibility of ultimately taking Americans into deep space
beyond the earth moon system with better technology, more
efficiently, more safely than Constellation would ever have
been able to manage. And we're doing it in a budget that we can
afford.
The Director did not provide specific examples of any
Constellation elements that were ``seriously over budget.''
At the Committee's February 25, 2010 hearing on NASA's FY
2011 budget request, Rep. Lincoln Davis asked the NASA
Administrator to convince him that the program proposed was
``better than what we have with Constellation'', to which the
Administrator replied:
``I promised the Chairman that, you know, we are not
prepared at this time, and I apologized at the very outset of
the hearing because we do not have the type of detailed program
outline that one would normally expect when we are making a
change like this, but we are working on it.''
Did NASA conduct independent cost analyses to
determine costs associated with Constellation cancellation,
termination of workforce, disposition of property and
infrastructure, and environmental clean-up?
Documents provided in conjunction with NASA's FY 2011 budget
justification do not indicate that NASA conducted such
independent cost analyses.
What is the plan for the disposition of facilities
constructed to support and develop the Constellation Program?
Documents provided in conjunction with NASA's FY 2011 budget
justification do not indicate that such a plan has been
completed.
Basis for Exploration Technology Development Priorities and Funding
Needs
What is the basis for the exploration technology
development priorities in the FY 2011 budget request?
Documents provided in conjunction with NASA's FY 2011 budget
justification do not provide specifics on how priorities for
propulsion R&D and exploration technology development were
established.
What is the basis of the budget requests for
propulsion R&D and exploration technology development programs?
Documents provided in conjunction with NASA's FY 2011 budget
justification do not provide specifics on how requested funding
levels for propulsion R&D and exploration technology
development were established.
What is the basis of the precursor robotic missions
projected by NASA?
Documents provided in conjunction with NASA's FY 2011 budget
justification do not provide specifics on why NASA must send
precursor robotic missions to specific destinations. It is
worth noting that NASA has already sent robotic missions to
Lagrangian points, asteroids and Mars and continues to plan
such missions as part of its Science programs. Also, the Google
Lunar X Prize, which is a private activity, has nearly
identical objectives as that proposed for the robotic precursor
mission to land a robot on the Moon that can be remotely
operated and that can transmit near realtime video.
Impact of Cancelling Constellation on NASA's Workforce
Has NASA determined the impact of cancelling
Constellation on NASA's workforce?
At the Committee's February 25, 2010 hearing on NASA's FY
2011 budget request, the NASA Administrator said in his
prepared statement:
``NASA recognizes that this change will personally affect
thousands of NASA civil servants and contractors who have
worked countless hours, often under difficult circumstances, to
make the Constellation Program successful. I commend the
investment that these dedicated Americans have made and will
continue to make in our Nation's human spaceflight program.
Civil servants who support Constellation should feel secure
that NASA has exciting and meaningful work for them to
accomplish after Constellation, and our contractor colleagues
should know that NASA is working expeditiously to identify new
opportunities for them to partner with the Agency on the new
Exploration portfolio.''
Specifics on workforce impacts are not yet developed and the
basis for the NASA Administrator's statement that ``Civil
servants who support Constellation should feel secure that NASA
has exciting and meaningful work for them to accomplish after
Constellation'' is unclear. In his response to a question from
Rep. Michael McCaul, the Administrator said:
``I wish I could give you definitive programs that we are
going to have now, but we are 2 weeks, 3 weeks after the
rollout of the budget, and we have not gotten those types of
answers. But I promise you that within months, because I have
asked for studies to be brought to me to help us determine
which programs we are going to do. Within months we will be
able to put some meat on the bones, if you will, because I
realize there is a lack of detail, and that is disturbing to
everybody. It is disquieting and discomforting to me, but we
are going to get some answers for you. We will have some
programs defined.''
In addition, NASA has not provided any information on how
the redirection will affect the types of skills it will need.
This is important because it is likely that skills needed under
the original plan which assumed NASA's direct involvement in
the design of space launchers and vehicles will not be the same
under a scenario where the agency procures crew transportation
services.
Impact of Cancelling Constellation on the Nation's Industrial Base
What implications does the proposed cancellation of
Constellation have for other Federal agencies, such as the
Department of Defense's space industrial base?
At a March 10, 2010 hearing by the Senate Armed Services
Committee's Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, the Deputy Under
Secretary of the Air Force for Space Programs said in his
prepared statement that:
``Factors contributing to rising launch costs are the
depletion of inventory purchased in prior years, reduced number
of annual buys increasing unit costs, and a deteriorating
subcontractor business base without commercial customers. These
industrial base factors will also be affected by the decision
to replace NASA's Constellation program with a new, more
technology focused approach to space exploration, which will
likely reduce the customer base for solid rocket motors and
potentially increase demand for liquid engines and strengthen
the liquid fuel rocket industrial base. We have initiated
several efforts to examine the severity of these business base
issues and identify potential mitigation steps.''
This issue was also addressed in a recent Air Force Times
article:
``The Air Force and National Reconnaissance Office could
face major increases in the cost of launching satellites as a
result of the Obama administration's decision to cancel NASA's
shuttle replacement program, a top Air Force official said.
Gary Payton, deputy undersecretary of the Air Force for
space programs, told Members of Congress that the Obama
administration had not asked the Air Force to examine the
effects of canceling NASA's Constellation program before the
Feb. 1 announcement.
The military and intelligence community rely on the same
manufacturers as NASA to build the rockets that launch their
satellites, but the White House plans to turn to commercially
owned rockets to launch astronauts following retirement of the
shuttle later this year.
Early information shows the price of rocket propulsion
systems for the military and NRO `might double' as a result,
Payton said.''
At that same hearing, according to the same Air Force Times
article, Senator David Vitter asked Mr. Payton if the Air Force
was explicitly asked the impact on the service of canceling
Constellation before the decision was made:
`` `No sir,' Payton said. Six studies are now underway
together with NASA and NRO to examine price questions,
workforce issues and reliability concerns, he said.''
Impact of Cancelling Constellation on Existing NASA Contracts
What is the basis for the $2.5 billion for transition
costs associated with cancelling the Constellation Program?
Documents provided in conjunction with NASA's FY 2011 budget
justification do not provide specifics on how the $2.5 billion
figure for Constellation transition costs was established.
According to a recent article in Aerospace Daily & Defense
Report, the comprehensiveness of that figure has recently been
called into question. The article reported that NASA's Chief
Financial Officer characterized the $2.5 billion in NASA's
Fiscal 2011 budget request to terminate the Constellation
Program as probably ``oversubscribed'' and that NASA is
developing a plan for managing the requested funds and handling
contract termination liability whose costs are not included in
the $2.5 billion figure.
International Space Collaboration
What is the U.S. strategy for international
engagement in human spaceflight activities and exploration
under the proposed plan?
According to a February 6, 2010 article in Space News, the
Administrator indicated plans for expanded international
collaboration in space:
``Flexible Path says we're going to multiple destinations
and we're going to go there as we develop the capability to do
it, ' Bolden said, adding that Obama instructed him to expand
NASA's involvement with international partners to accomplish
such missions, including collaborative development of a heavy-
lift launcher.''
`` `We're going to put international partners in the
critical path, which means they may develop a system that we
know how to do, but we don't know how to do it as well as they
do,' he said.''
``Bolden said greater reliance on international partnerships
would be one of the biggest changes NASA would see under his
leadership.''
NASA's FY 2011 budget justification does not provide
specifics on NASA's plans for international engagement in human
spaceflight activities and exploration other than through
potential international involvement in some of the proposed
advanced technology development programs. How such potential
technology development activities would be affected by
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) restrictions
is also unclear.
Chairwoman Giffords. This hearing will come to order.
Before we get started we have had some interest from other
members from outside committees that would like to attend, and
I would like to remind folks that non-committee members are
only recognized for questions after the full subcommittee
members get a chance to speak.
So without objection, Ms. Jackson Lee, Mr. Perlmutter, and
Mr. Posey will be allowed to participate if they so choose.
Good afternoon, everyone. Thank you for being here. I would
like to welcome our witnesses today. Both Mr. Doug Cooke and
Mr. A. Thomas Young have long and distinguished careers in
aerospace, and we look forward to gleaning from their decades
of knowledge on the subject.
Mr. Cooke has very generously agreed to give us answers to
the many questions that have been raised concerning the
President's budget proposal, but it is important for members to
understand that Mr. Cooke is not the architect of the proposal.
I have called this hearing today because we have very
serious issues to address; the future of America's human
spaceflight program and the Congress and the President needs to
get this one right. The clock is ticking. It is now almost two
months since the Administration's fiscal year 2011 budget
request for NASA was submitted to Congress, and there are still
too many unanswered questions surrounding it.
We are here today because the President's budget has been
found deficient by this Congress and by the American people. It
proposes drastic changes in the future of NASA with tremendous
impact to high-skilled jobs and high-tech manufacturing
capabilities. It could leave our country with no human
exploration program, no human-rated spacecraft, and little
ability to inspire the youth of America. The budget proposed
does all this with very few details to support this new
direction.
This hearing is but the latest in a series that have been
held by the full committee on Science and Technology and also
the subcommittee. It is our job and the responsibility to
ensure that American taxpayer dollars are spent wisely. We must
be certain that existing programs are worthwhile and well
managed, and we must be fully informed of the impact of
cancellations of programs.
Over the past few months we have held many hearings to
address safety concerns for human spaceflight, the competition
of international space programs, and the impact of NASA's
programs on the skilled aerospace workforce and industrial
base. We have also heard from the Government Accountability
Office and NASA's Inspector General, and just last month NASA's
Administrator, General Charlie Bolden, testified on the fiscal
year 2011 budget proposal.
Unfortunately, the NASA Administrator was unable to satisfy
many of the members of this subcommittee. Today we are going to
continue to take a closer look at the elements of the proposed
plan and try to get additional information to the extent that
that information exists. We are also going to examine the
impacts and consequences that would flow from its adoption.
Some of those impacts are quite profound and quite troubling.
Today we are going to try to review the status of the
current Constellation Program with just passed--we have just
passed a significant design milestone, and we will determine
whether the intent of Congress expressed in the fiscal year
2010 Appropriations Act is being met. This oversight is the
purpose of this subcommittee hearing, and we intend to be
thorough.
The fact of the matter is that Congress is being asked to
support a budget request that proposes the cancellation of the
Constellation Program; cancellation of a successful program
that has been underway over the past five years, cancellation
of a program that has met significant milestones and would keep
the United States of America as a world leader in aerospace. We
have been asked to support a budget request that will leave
this country without a government system to access low-earth
orbit and beyond.
In canceling this program we would write off $14 billion in
taxpayer money with no apparent plan to make any significant
use of the results of that investment. We would make this
country dependent on yet-to-be-developed commercial crew
services of unknown costs and safety with no government backup
system available. We would be very likely to be forced to rely
on other nations to access LEO and for the International Space
Station for the foreseeable future. We will be left without a
concrete plan, destination, time table for exploration beyond
LEO.
Additionally, this cancellation would negatively impact the
Nation's defense industrial base and would eliminate the
program that would ease the transition from the Space Shuttle
workforce and help retain key human spaceflight skills and
industrial capabilities needed for our future.
In place of good explanations and solid rationale for such
sweeping and frankly puzzling changes, we have been given a
combination of unpersuasive arguments, and ``we are working on
the details'' responses.
For instance, the commercial crew proposal is lacking all
of the basic information that a would-be investor would demand
before committing their funds to such a project. For example,
what is the proposed cost to the government to develop these
systems, how much, if any, of the development costs will be
shared by the companies, how much will it cost NASA to buy
these services, what else will NASA have to provide to make and
keep these companies' operations viable? When can we credibly
expect these services to be operationally available, and will
they meet our expectation of what is safe enough? What recourse
will NASA have if the companies fail to meet safety standards,
costs, schedule, and performance? And finally, is there any
significant, non-NASA market for these services? It is a viable
one, and is it one that we should use scarce taxpayer dollars
to promote?
Congress is being asked right now to invest our money in a
commercial crew venture without providing us with reasonable
expectations for success, and as part of my efforts to find out
whether there was a solid factual or analytical basis in last
year's Augustine Committee report for the Administration's
plan, I directed a series of basic questions to the Aerospace
Corporation, the organization that was asked to support the
Augustine Committee in this review.
Aerospace's responses, which I am entering into the record
as of today's hearing, make it clear that such a basis is
lacking in many important areas. There is not a criticism--this
is simply not a criticism of Aerospace. It is a distinguished
organization, but it does call into question the depth of
analysis that the Administration proposes--proposals received
before it was sent here to Capitol Hill.
In today's hearing we will address the outstanding
questions in the proposed budget regarding human exploration.
We ask for clear, fact-based answers. The American people
deserve no less.
And as a final note, I would like to share something that I
received in the mail recently. I hold in my hand the picture
that was sent to me by a seven-year-old boy. He wrote here his
name is Noah, and he is seven, and in it he has one of these
incredible spacecraft that he has imagined, and it looks like
it is about to land on another celestial body. And on it he
writes, ``We love space.'' When Noah is grown and considering a
career in the area of space, will or will not NASA be that
shining light that inspires the youth of America to actually
think about the future and the dreams?
Noah is not alone. This committee has made science and math
education a priority for young people, and under the leadership
of our Chairman, Bart Gordon, we will be reauthorizing the
America COMPETES legislation that aims to boost our stem
education and workforce in order to keep our country
economically competitive. And in hearing after hearing we are
informed that one of the biggest components necessary to get
young kids inspired and interested in engineering is
inspiration.
I believe, and I believe that members of this subcommittee
and full committee believe that NASA has been the greatest
source of inspiration for our Nation, this world--and this
world has ever seen.
The most troubling aspect of the President's proposal in my
view, and I believe in the view of my colleagues, is the lack
for a real solid plan for human exploration, and this is the
pinnacle of inspiration. We expect more from the Administration
and frankly from NASA, an organization filled with some of the
most brilliant analytical minds on the planet that have come
before us today and are here before us today. We expect more
than a vague list of hypothetical destinations. We deserve and
demand a comprehensive human exploration program that details
where we will go, when we will get there, and how we will get
there. Only by first determining the mission can we determine
the necessary technologies and the time table for development.
It is my firm belief that America should not sit idly by
for another 20 years before embarking on an expedition to Mars.
I want to see a plan that includes human exploration beyond LEO
by the end of this decade, not the following decade. Nothing in
this budget gives any indication that that would occur, and I
think that is unacceptable. We have the technology. Let us make
it happen.
Thank you very much, and now I yield to our Ranking Member.
[The prepared statement of Chairwoman Giffords follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairwoman Gabrielle Giffords
Good afternoon. I want to welcome our witnesses today. Both Mr.
Doug Cooke and Mr. A. Thomas Young have long and distinguished careers
in aerospace, and we look forward to gleaning from their decades of
knowledge on the subject. Mr. Cooke has agreed to give us answers to
the many questions that have been raised concerning the President's
budget proposal, but it is understood that he is not the architect of
this plan.
I have called this hearing today because we have a serious issue to
address--the future of America's human space flight program--and we
need to get it right.
The clock is ticking. It is now almost two months since the
Administration's FY 2011 budget request for NASA was submitted to
Congress, and there are still too many unanswered questions surrounding
it.
We are here today because the President's budget has been found
deficient by this Congress and by the American people. It proposes
drastic changes in the future of NASA with tremendous impact on high
skill jobs and high tech manufacturing capabilities. It could leave our
country with no human exploration program, no human rated spacecraft,
and little ability to inspire the youth of America. The budget proposal
does all this with few details to support its new direction.
This hearing is but the latest in a series that have been held by
the committee on science and technology and this subcommittee. It is
our job and responsibility to ensure that American taxpayer dollars are
spent wisely. We must be certain that existing programs are worthwhile
and well managed, and we must be fully informed of the impacts of the
cancelation of programs.
Over the past few months we have held many hearings to address
safety concerns for human spaceflight, the competition of international
space programs, and the impact of NASA's programs on the skilled
aerospace workforce and industrial base. We have also heard from the
Government Accountability Office and NASA's Inspector General. And just
last month NASA Administrator, General Charlie Bolden testified on the
FY 2011 budget request.
Unfortunately, the NASA Administrator was unable to satisfy many of
the Members of this Committee. Today we are going to continue to take a
closer look at the elements of the proposed plan and try to get
additional information--to the extent that such information exists.
We are also going to examine the impacts and consequences that
would flow from its adoption--some of those impacts are quite profound
and troubling.
Today we're also going to review the status of the current
Constellation program, which just passed a significant design
milestone, and we will determine whether the intent of Congress
expressed in the FY 2010 appropriations act is being met.
This oversight is the purpose of this subcommittee hearing, and we
intend to be thorough.
The fact of the matter is that Congress is being asked to support a
budget request that proposes cancellation of the Constellation program.
Cancellation of a successful program that has been underway for the
past five years. Cancellation of a program that has met significant
milestones and would keep the United States as the world leader in
aerospace. We have been asked to support a budget request that will
leave this country without a government system to access low Earth
orbit and beyond.
In canceling this program, we would write off $14 billion in
taxpayer dollars spent, with no apparent plan to make any significant
use of the results of that investment. We would make this country
dependent on yet-to-be developed ``commercial crew'' services of
unknown cost and safety, with no government-backup system available; we
would very likely be forced to rely on other nations to access low
Earth orbit and the International Space Station for the foreseeable
future. We would be left without a concrete plan, destination, or
timetable for exploration missions beyond LEO. Additionally, this
cancellation would negatively impact the nation's defense industrial
base and would eliminate the program that would ease the transition for
the Space Shuttle workforce and help retain key human space flight
skills and industrial capabilities needed for the future.
In place of good explanations and solid rationales for such
sweeping and frankly puzzling changes, we have been given a combination
of unpersuasive arguments and ``we're working on the details''
responses.
For instance, the commercial crew proposal is lacking all of the
basic information that a would-be investor would demand before
committing funds to a project. For example:
What's the proposed cost to the government to develop
these systems?
How much, if any, of the development cost will be
shared by the companies?
How much will it cost NASA to buy these services?
What else will NASA have to provide to make--and
keep--the companies' operations viable?
When can we credibly expect these services to be
operationally available and will they meet our expectation of
what is safe enough?
What recourse will NASA have if the companies fail to
meet safety standards, cost, schedule and performance.
Finally, is there any significant non-NASA market for
these services; is it a viable one; and is it one we should use
scarce tax dollars to promote?
Congress is being asked to invest taxpayer dollars in a commercial
crew venture without providing us with a reasonable expectation of
success.
As part of my efforts to find out whether there was a solid factual
or analytical basis in last year's Augustine committee report for the
Administration's plan, I directed a series of basic questions to
Aerospace Corporation, the organization that was asked to support the
Augustine committee in its review.
Aerospace's responses, which I am entering into the record of
today's hearing, make it clear that such a basis is lacking in many
important areas. That is not a criticism of Aerospace--a distinguished
organization--but it does call into question the depth of analysis that
the Administration's proposals received before they were sent to
Capitol Hill.
In today's hearing, we will address the outstanding questions in
the proposed budget regarding human exploration. We ask for clear,
fact-based, answers. The American public deserves no less.
As a final note, I would like to share something I received in the
mail recently. I hold in my hands a drawing sent to me by a seven year
old boy scout named Noah. It depicts a spaceship landing on a heavenly
body with the accompanying caption, written in the bold script of a
child, ``We Love Space.'' When Noah is grown and considering a career
or an area of study, will NASA still be that shining light that
inspires the nation? Noah is not alone. This committee has made the
science and math education of young people one of its highest
priorities. Under the leadership of Chairman Gordon, we will be
reauthorizing the America COMPETES legislation that aims to boost our
STEM education and workforce in order to keep America economically
competitive.
In hearing after hearing we are informed that one of the biggest
components necessary to get young people interested in science and
engineering is a source of inspiration. I believe that NASA has been
the greatest source of inspiration that this nation, this world, has
ever seen, and I aim to keep it that way.
The most troubling aspect of the President's proposal in my view,
and I believe in the view of many of my colleagues, is the lack of any
real plan for human space exploration--the pinnacle of inspiration.
I expect more from the Administration and frankly more from NASA,
an organization filled with some of the most brilliant and analytic
minds on the planet, than a vague list of hypothetical destinations. We
deserve and demand a comprehensive human exploration plan that details
where we will go, when we will go, and how we will get there. Only by
first determining the mission can we determine the necessary
technologies and development timeline.
It is my firm belief that America should not sit idly by for
another 20 years before embarking on an expedition to Mars. I want to
see a plan that includes human exploration beyond low Earth orbit by
the end of this decade. Nothing in this budget gives any indication
that this would occur, and I find that unacceptable. We have the
technology. Let's make it happen.
Thank you, and I now yield to Ranking Member Olson.
Mr. Olson. Madam Chairwoman, thank you very much for
hosting this hearing today. I would like to thank our witnesses
for their appearance today. Both of these men bring years of
valuable experience and perspectives. I would like to,
especially like to commend Mr. Cooke in particular for his
service during what must be to say the least an interesting
time in the agency's history, especially for your mission
directorate. And as the Chairwoman said, I understand you are
not responsible for the budget proposal. I will re-holster my
Blackberry. Can't get the Texas kid out of Texas, can't get the
Texas out of the boy.
Anyway, Madam Chairwoman, I applaud you for your leadership
in organizing this committee's examination of NASA's proposed
changes in its human spaceflight program. There are many
questions to be asked and information yet to be provided about
such a major redirection.
Frankly, from my perspective, too many people are behaving
as if these changes outlined in the budget proposal are a fait
accompli. That is far from the truth, and no matter what you
feel about the ultimate choice that should be made, there are
still too many unknowns, too many issues that must be evaluated
before Congress can make an informed decision.
And make no mistake about it, that decision is Congress's
to make, and this hearing will go a long way toward
contributing to that debate.
The President may or may not provide additional details at
his appearance on April 15 down at the Kennedy Space Center,
but until then in the absence of mission-specific goals and
strategies, perception becomes reality. Perception, the
perception is that Constellation is dead, and in that regard
rests many of my concerns. Let me share with you a couple of
them as examples, what I experience when I go back home to the
Johnson Space Center.
On March 11 a memo was sent out by NASA halting
solicitation of outside design submissions for a future lunar
lander. This procurement activity was not a cancelled contract
but a cancellation that conflicts with the spirit of current
law. It does lead me to question the agency's desire to go
beyond low-earth orbit. It is the kind of judgment call that is
demoralizing to the workforce. The message we are sending to
the workforce, march on. The message we need to send is march
on with Constellation as planned. It is the program of record,
and until Congress changes it, that is their program that they
should follow.
One other concern I have about the workforce is that I am
increasingly hearing from civil servants who feel that debate
and dissent when they are talking about upcoming Shuttle
flights, ISS, or Constellation, they are being squelched within
the agency, and this is not directed at you, Mr. Cooke, but the
message of principles, they are important to the agency. We
can't take them back. We have got to have them throughout the
leadership of NASA, an atmosphere where questions, informed
dissent, or well-intentioned alternative approaches are not
welcome. If that atmosphere is created where they are not
welcomed, that is going to lead to a fractured, distracted, and
above all else an unsafe environment.
Any onset of that kind of repressive management culture
must be avoided. Each upcoming Shuttle mission and the
continuous operation of the ISS are too important to the crews,
the agency, and the future of human spaceflight. NASA employees
must be confident that they can voice their concerns through
their management chain without fear of incrimination. They have
four Shuttle flights left to go. They are pros, but they are
humans, too.
Madam Chairwoman, with each day I have more questions and
more doubts about the reasoning behind the Administration's
proposed changes in our Nation's human spaceflight program.
Until better evidence is brought forward, I will state now that
I am not convinced that the abandoning of Constellation is in
our Nation's best interest, and I look forward to working with
you to seek out answers to those questions.
I thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and yield back the balance
of my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Olson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Pete Olson
Madam Chairwoman, thank you for calling this afternoon's hearing.
I'd like to thank our witnesses for their appearance today. Both of
these men bring years of valuable experience and perspective. I would
especially like to commend Mr. Cooke in particular for his service
during what must be, to say the very least, an interesting time at the
Agency, especially for his mission directorate.
Madam Chairwoman, I applaud you for your leadership in organizing
this Committee's examination of NASA's proposed changes in its human
space flight program. There are many questions to be asked--and
information yet to be provided--about such a major redirection.
Frankly, too many people are behaving as if the changes outlined in the
budget proposal are a fait accompli. That is far from the truth and no
matter what you feel the ultimate choice should be, there are still too
many unknowns and too many trades that must be evaluated before
Congress can make an informed decision. This hearing will go a long way
toward contributing to that debate.
The President may or may not provide additional details at his
appearance on April 15, but until then, in the absence of mission-
specific goals and strategies, perception becomes reality. And in that
regard rests many of my concerns. Let me share with you a couple of
them as examples.
On March 11, a memo was sent out by NASA halting solicitation of
outside design submissions for a future lunar lander. This procurement
activity was neither a cancelled contract nor a violation of current
law, but it does lead me to question the agency's desire to go beyond
low earth orbit. It's this kind of judgment call that can demoralize a
workforce.
And in regards to workforce, I increasingly am hearing from civil
servants who feel that debate and dissent--whether talking about
upcoming Shuttle flights, ISS, or Constellation--are being squelched
within the agency. This is not directed at Mr. Cooke, but a restatement
of principle for all leadership throughout NASA. An atmosphere where
questions, informed dissent or well-intentioned alternative approaches
are not welcome will lead to a fractured, distracted, and above all
else, unsafe environment. Any onset of that kind of repressive
management culture must be avoided. Each upcoming shuttle mission and
the continuous operation of the ISS are too important to the crews, the
agency, and the future of human space flight. NASA employees must be
confident that they can voice concerns through their management chain
without fear of recrimination.
Madam Chairwoman, with each day I have more questions--and more
doubts--about the reasoning behind the Administration's proposed
changes in its human space flight program. Until better evidence is
brought forward, I will state now that I am not persuaded to abandon
Constellation. I look forward to working with you to seek out those
answers. I thank you and yield back the balance of my time.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Olson. The Chair knows
that the Chairman of the full committee has entered the room
and want to just see whether or not the Chairman has any
comments that he would like to make.
Mr. Gordon. This is an important topic, and I am anxious to
listen to the testimony. Thank you for having this hearing.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Chairman Gordon.
If there are other members who wish to submit additional
opening statements, your statements will be added to the record
at this point.
At this time I would like to introduce our witnesses. As I
mentioned earlier, they have long and distinguished careers.
First up we have Mr. Douglas Cooke, who is the Associate
Administrator of the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate at
NASA. Mr. Cooke has had a long and distinguished career with
over 35 years of experience in Space Shuttle, Space Station,
and in exploration programs. He has led significant activities
in each of these areas and is widely recognized for his
leadership in carrying out the Exploration Initiative and the
development of the Constellation Program. He has received
numerous awards and commendations and is a true national asset.
I look forward to his testimony, and in that regard I would
also hope that my colleagues who have concerns about the
President's proposed direction will recognize, again, that Mr.
Cooke is not the President, nor is he the NASA Administrator or
the architect of this. He is a dedicated civil servant who is
trying to carry out the direction he has been given to the best
of his ability. Welcome. We are glad you are here, Mr. Cooke.
We are also fortunate to have as a witness today Mr. Tom
Young, who was the Executive Vice President of the Lockheed
Martin Corporation and former President of Martin Marietta, and
has a long and distinguished career also in aerospace. He has
served as Director of the NASA Goddard Spaceflight Center,
Deputy Director of NASA Ames Research Center, and has led
numerous reviews and taskforces on issues of national
importance in both civil and national security space, including
serving as Chair of the NPOESS Independent Review Team, Chair
of the Mars Independent Assessment Team, Chair of the
International Space Station Management and Cost Team, Chair of
the Taskforce on the Acquisition of National Security Space
Programs, and Chair of the Independent Panel on the
Organization and Management of National Security Space among
others.
In short, Mr. Young is someone the Nation has come to
depend on for wisdom based on experience and on analysis. We
had the benefit of his counsel at last December's subcommittee
hearing on workforce and industrial-based issues, and we look
forward to his testimony again today. Welcome.
As our witnesses should know you each have five minutes for
your spoken testimony. Your written testimony, of course, will
be included in the record for this hearing, and when you have
completed your spoken testimony, we will begin our first round
of questions, and each member will have five minutes for their
questions for the panel.
I would like to begin this afternoon with Mr. Cooke.
STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS COOKE, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR,
EXPLORATION SYSTEMS MISSION DIRECTORATE, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS
AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Cooke. Thank you. Chairwoman Giffords and members of
the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today
to discuss the President's fiscal year 2011 budget request for
NASA's Exploration Systems Mission Directorate.
NASA and I personally are grateful for the support and
guidance we have received from this subcommittee over the years
and look forward to working with you on the enactment of the
fiscal year 2011 budget.
In your invitation you asked me to address three matters;
the new exploration elements in the fiscal year 2011 budget
request, status of the Constellation Program, and the
responsibilities and reporting schedules of Tiger Teams that
have been established to identify the needed transition efforts
and budget planning for new programs and requests following the
proposed cancellation of NASA's Constellation Program.
My written statement provides more detailed answers to your
questions, therefore, in the few moments I have let me provide
you with an overview of the fiscal year 2011 budget request for
the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate.
In this budget request for fiscal year 2011 the United
States will pursue a new approach to human exploration through
the development and demonstration of transformative
technologies and systems capabilities and also robotic
precursors to scout potential destinations. This budget
challenges us to develop the necessary capabilities to send
Americans to places humans have not been before, including
longer stays at exciting places we haven't been on the moon,
near-earth objects, strategic deep space zones called Lagrange
points, and the moons of Mars and Mars itself.
We have not sent people beyond low-earth orbit in 38 years,
and this budget gives us the opportunity to focus on scouting
and learning more about destinations, to further explore our
solar system, and to develop the game-changing technologies
that will take us there.
It is important that we pursue these objectives to continue
leading the world in human spaceflight exploration. Within our
current horizon the ultimate destination for human exploration
is, of course, Mars. While we cannot provide a date with
certainty for the first human visit to Mars, we can identify
essential capabilities needed for such a mission. These are
outlined in the programs that are within this budget request.
They are capabilities that have been recommended
consistently for over 24 years, and national-level reports of
committees and commissions addressing the future human space
exploration. In short, the 2011 budget request for exploration
includes funding for three new robust programs that will expand
the capabilities of future human space explorers far beyond the
capabilities that we have today.
NASA will embark on these initiatives by partnering with
the best in industry, academia, and other government agencies,
as well as with potentially-expanded set of international
partners. All of these types of partnerships have been integral
to much of NASA's previous success, and they will be vital to
ensuring the success of our exploration program.
Our commercial cargo and commercial crew partners will also
be vital to the success of the new exploration program. That is
why the 2011 budget request provides significant funding for
the development of commercial human spaceflight vehicles. Doing
so will free NASA to focus on the new work we need to
accomplish for beyond low-earth orbit missions.
Additionally, the 2011 budget request includes a 40 percent
increase in the investment in human, in NASA's Human Research
Program. This increased funding will allow the agency to
significantly increase its research in the highest risk to crew
health and performance during long duration exploration
missions, especially those beyond low-earth orbit.
Lastly, the budget request cancels the Constellation
Program and in doing so includes funding for closeout
activities in fiscal year 2011 and 2012.
On a personal note, I have worked for NASA for over 36
years, and during that time I have served directly on several
program transitions. These have included the post-Apollo
development of the Space Shuttle, initiation of the Space
Station Program, the post-Challenger return to flight, Space
Station redesign, direct support to the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board, and the initiation of the current
exploration programs. So I speak from experience when I say
that change is never easy for those who have devoted so much of
their professional and personal time and energy to a program
they love.
But I also speak from experience when I say that the NASA
team, including our industry partners, will do any job asked of
us to implement our guidance with professionalism, diligence,
and pride. As Associate Administrator for NASA's Exploration
Systems Mission Directorate, I am committed to leading the team
through this period to develop the best outcome in our forward
path.
I know that cancellation of the Constellation Program will
personally affect thousands of NASA and contractor--civil
servants and contractors. It is difficult for all of us who
have worked countless hours, often under difficult
circumstances, to make the Constellation Program successful.
That work continues now and as we have and continue to work
through program and project milestones and major tests of
hardware.
I would like to publicly say that I sincerely appreciate
and commend the dedication and sacrifice of the skilled
Americans and their families who have diligently worked on the
Constellation Program and for their contributions to our
Nation's human spaceflight program. Civil servants who support
Constellation should feel secure that NASA has meaningful work
for them to accomplish after Constellation, and our contractor
colleagues should know that NASA is working to offer new
opportunities for them to partner with the agency on our
proposed exploration portfolio.
As I stated, my experience and many transitions helps me
understand that these large changes are never taken lightly and
that this experience also brings me to understand how important
it is to look to the future and that our incredible NASA and
contractor workforce will apply the skills and drive to
implement what the policy guidance and enacted budget
challenges us to do.
We look forward to developing the technologies to take us
beyond low-earth orbit, together with our industry, academic,
and international partners. Chairwoman Giffords, NASA looks
forward to working with the subcommittee on the fiscal year
2011 budget, and I would be pleased to respond to any questions
that your members of the subcommittee may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooke follows:]
Prepared Statement of Douglas Cooke
Chairwoman Giffords and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to appear today to discuss the President's FY 2011
budget request for NASA's Exploration Systems Mission Directorate
(ESMD). NASA is grateful for the support and guidance received from
this Subcommittee through the years and we look forward to working with
you on enactment of the President's new direction.
The President's FY 2011 budget request outlines an innovative
course for human space exploration, but does not change our goal--
extending human presence throughout our solar system. NASA's
exploration efforts will focus not just on our Moon, but also on near-
Earth asteroids, Lagrange points, and ultimately Mars. While we cannot
provide a date certain for the first human visit, with Mars as a key
long-term destination we can identify missing capabilities needed for
such a mission and use this to help define many of the goals for our
emerging technology development. The research and technology
investments included in this budget describe the many near-term steps
NASA will be taking to create the new knowledge and capabilities
required for humans to venture beyond low-Earth orbit (LEO) to stay.
ESMD will lead the Nation on this new course of discovery and
innovation, providing the technologies, capabilities and infrastructure
required for sustainable, affordable human presence in space. ESMD's
investment in gaining critical knowledge about future destinations for
human exploration, as well as transformational technology development
and demonstration will serve as the foundation of NASA's ongoing space
exploration effort, broadening opportunities for crewed missions to
explore destinations in our solar system that we have not been to
before.
At the highest level, the President and his staff, as well as NASA
senior leadership, closely reviewed the Augustine Committee report, and
came to the same conclusion as the Committee: The Constellation program
was on an unsustainable trajectory. They determined that, given the
current budget environment, Constellation's funding needs would have
required terminating support of the International Space Station (ISS)
in 2016 and ESMD would not have had sufficient resources to
significantly advance the state of the art in the technology areas that
would be needed to enable lowering the cost of heavy-lift access to
space, and developing closed-loop life support; advanced propulsion
technology; and radiation protection and other technologies on a faster
schedule. The President determined that what was truly needed for
beyond LEO exploration was game-changing technologies; making the
fundamental investments that will provide the foundation for the next
half-century of American leadership in space exploration. At the same
time, under the new plan, NASA would ensure continuous American
presence in space on the ISS throughout this entire decade, re-
establish a robust and competitive American launch industry, start a
major heavy lift technology program years earlier, and build a
technological foundation for sustainable beyond-LEO exploration of our
moon, near-Earth asteroids, Lagrange points, and ultimately Mars.
The FY 2011 budget request for Exploration is $4,263.4 million, an
increase of $483.6 million above the FY 2010 enacted level. Included in
this budget request is funding for three new, robust programs that will
expand the capabilities of future space explorers far beyond those we
have today. NASA will embark on these transformative initiatives by
partnering with the best in industry, academia and other Government
agencies, as well as with our international partners. These partners
have been integral to much of NASA's previous success and are vital to
our bold new vision.
NASA will encourage active public participation in our new
exploration missions via a new participatory exploration initiative.
Additionally, the FY 2011 budget request builds upon NASA's commercial
cargo efforts by providing significant funding for the development of
commercial human spaceflight vehicles, freeing NASA to focus on the
forward-leaning work we need to accomplish for beyond-low-Earth orbit
missions. The FY 2011 budget request also includes a 40 percent
increase over last year's investment in the Human Research Program, to
help prepare for future human spaceflight exploration beyond LEO.
Lastly, the budget request includes funding for the Constellation
Program close-out activities spread across FY 2011 and FY 2012.
In your invitation, you asked me to address three matters: the new
Exploration elements in the FY 2011 budget request; current status of
the Constellation Program; and responsibilities and reporting schedules
of ``tiger teams'' that have been established to support transition
efforts following the proposed cancellation of Constellation. The
remainder of my testimony provides answers to your questions.
Key Elements of the New Plan
The Exploration FY 2011 budget request includes three new robust
research and development programs that will enable a renewed and
reinvigorated effort for future crewed missions beyond LEO:
Technology Development and Demonstrations: This
effort will include two programs--a Flagship Demonstration
Program and an Enabling Technology Development Program--that
would invent and demonstrate large-scale technologies and
capabilities that are critical to future space exploration,
including cryo-fluid management and transfer; automated
rendezvous and docking, closed-loop life support systems; in-
situ utilization and advanced in-space propulsion. Once
developed, these technologies will address critical
requirements needed to send crews to a variety of exciting
destinations beyond LEO. The flagship projects will be funded
at $400 million to $1 billion over a period of up to five
years, including launch costs, while shorter-duration enabling
projects will be funded at $120 million or less and will focus
on near-term development and demonstration of prototype systems
to feed flagship and robotic precursor missions. Such projects
could include laboratory experiments, Earth-based field tests
and in-space technology demonstrations. By allowing for flight
demonstrations, some at a flagship scale, this Technology
Development and Demonstration effort resolves the achievement
gap between lab demonstration and flight testing that might
otherwise prevent NASA from implementing the capabilities that
are critical for sustainable human exploration beyond Earth in
a timely manner.
Heavy-Lift and Propulsion Research and Development
Program: ESMD will lead research and development activities
related to space launch propulsion technologies. This effort
would include development of a U.S. first-stage hydrocarbon
engine for potential use in future heavy lift (and other)
launch systems, as well as basic research in areas such as new
propellants, advanced propulsion materials manufacturing
techniques, combustion processes, and engine health monitoring.
Additionally, NASA will initiate development and in-space
testing of in-space engines. Areas of focus could include a
liquid oxygen/methane engine and potentially also low-cost
liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen engines. This work will build
from NASA's recent R&D experience in this area, and the test
articles will be viewed as a potential prototype for a
subsequent operational engine that would be restartable and
capable of high acceleration and reliability. These
technologies would increase our heavy-lift and other space
propulsion capabilities and significantly lower operations
costs--with the clear goal of taking us farther and faster into
space consistent with safety and mission success criteria. In
support of this initiative, NASA would explore cooperative
efforts with the Department of Defense and also develop a
competitive process for allocating a small portion of these
funds to universities and other non-governmental organizations.
This research effort along with many of our new technology
initiatives will be coordinated with the broader Agency
technology initiative led by NASA's new Chief Technologist.
Exploration Precursor Missions: An additional key
contributor to a robust exploration program will be the
acquisition of critical knowledge gained through the pursuit of
exploration precursor robotic missions. Led by ESMD, this
effort will send precursor robotic missions to candidate
destinations that will pave the way for later human exploration
of the Moon, Mars and its moons, and nearby asteroids. Like the
highly successful Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) and Lunar
Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) missions that
captured the Nation's attention last fall, future exploration
precursor missions will scout locations, gather key knowledge
and demonstrate technologies to identify the most compelling
and accessible places to explore with humans and validate
potential approaches to get them there and back safely. These
missions will provide vital information--from soil chemistry to
radiation dose levels to landing site scouting to resource
identification--necessary to plan, design and operate future
human missions. These missions will help us determine the next
step for crews beyond LEO, answering such questions as: Is a
particular asteroid a viable target for crewed mission? Do the
resources at the lunar poles have the potential for crew
utilization? Is Mars dust toxic? While there may be some
synergies between this program and the Planetary Science theme
within NASA's Science Mission Directorate, care will be taken
to avoid unnecessary duplication. While Science missions are
driven purely by science objectives set by the National Academy
of Sciences, the Exploration precursor missions will be driven
by the needs of human spaceflight. In many cases, there is a
synergy between these goals, and ESMD will leverage this
synergy when it exists, as we have done successfully for the
LRO/LCROSS missions. Dedicated precursor exploration missions
are planned to remain below $800 million in total cost, and
many will be considerably less expensive. NASA plans to begin
funding at least two dedicated precursor missions in 2011, and
to identify potential future missions to begin in 2012 and/or
2013. Additionally, a new portfolio of explorer scouts will
execute small, rapid turn-around, highly competitive missions
to exploration destinations. Generally budgeted at between $100
million and $200 million lifecycle cost, these missions will
allow NASA to test new and innovative ways of doing robotic
exploration of destinations of interest to future human
exploration. Selected projects may provide multiple small
scouting spacecraft to investigate multiple possible landing
sites, or provide means of rapid-prototyping new spacecraft
approaches.
Cross-Agency teams for each of these three areas are working to
develop plans that delineate key areas for research and development,
specify milestones for progress and set launch dates for relevant
missions. They will report to the Administrator over the coming months,
and the results of their efforts will be shared with the Congress when
they are complete. Additionally, NASA plans to embark on these
transformative initiatives by partnering with the best in industry,
academia and other government agencies, as well as with our
international partners. These partners have been integral to much of
NASA's previous success and are vital to our bold new approach.
To more fully engage the public in these transformative efforts,
NASA will establish a Participatory Exploration Office that will be
charged with encouraging public involvement and interaction in the
experience of discovery. Imagine how excited 11-year-old elementary
school students would be if they got to actually pilot a rover on the
lunar or Martian surface while they were learning about the planets in
science class. Or imagine college students helping to design
exploration payloads that will travel aboard the next-generation
exploration precursor robotic missions. This is the primary goal of
participatory exploration--empowering the general public to contribute
to the Agency's research, development and discovery activities.
With regard to commercial crew and cargo, the FY 2011 budget
request builds upon NASA's successful commercial cargo efforts by
providing significant funding for the development of commercial human
spaceflight vehicles, freeing NASA to focus on the forward-leaning work
we need to accomplish for beyond-LEO missions. Specifically, the budget
request includes $6 billion over five years to spur the development of
U.S. commercial human spaceflight vehicles. This investment funds NASA
to contract with industry to provide astronaut and international
partner transportation to the ISS as soon as possible, reducing the
risk of relying solely on foreign crew transports, and frees up NASA
resources to focus on the difficult challenges in technology
development, scientific discovery, and exploration. We also believe it
will help to make space travel more accessible and more affordable. An
enhanced U.S. commercial space industry will create new high-tech jobs,
leverage private sector capabilities and energy in this area, and spawn
other businesses and commercial opportunities, which will spur growth
in our Nation's economy. And, a new generation of Americans will be
inspired by these commercial ventures and the opportunities they will
provide for additional visits to space. NASA plans to allocate this FY
2011 funding via competitive solicitations that support a range of
activities such as human-rating existing launch vehicles and developing
new crew spacecraft that can ride on multiple launch vehicles. NASA
will ensure that all commercial systems meet stringent human-rating and
safety requirements before we allow any NASA crew member (including
NASA contractors and NASA-sponsored international partners) to travel
aboard a commercial vehicle on a NASA mission. Safety is, and always
will be, NASA's first core value. In addition, the budget request
includes $312 million in FY 2011 for incentivizing NASA's current
commercial cargo program. These funds--by adding or accelerating the
achievement of already-planned milestones, and adding capabilities or
tests--aim to expedite the pace of development of cargo flights to the
ISS and to improve program robustness.
Lastly, the Exploration FY 2011 budget request includes $1,900.0
million for Constellation Closeout requirements, and a total of
$2,500.0 million over the FY 2011-2012 timeframe. These funds would be
used for related facility and close-out costs, potentially including
increased costs for Shuttle transition and retirement due to
Constellation cancellation. The Agency has established senior planning
teams to outline options for Constellation close out expeditiously and
thoughtfully and to assess workforce, procurement and other issues,
which will report to the Administrator over the coming months, to
ensure that people and facilities are best utilized to meet the needs
of NASA's new missions. NASA will work closely with the Congress as
these activities progress.
Status of the Constellation Program
NASA recognizes that the cancellation of the Constellation Program
will personally affect thousands of NASA civil servants and contractors
who have worked countless hours, often under difficult circumstances,
to make the Constellation Program successful. I appreciate and commend
the dedication and sacrifice that these skilled Americans have made in
our Nation's human spaceflight program. Civil servants who support
Constellation should feel secure that NASA has exciting and meaningful
work for them to accomplish after Constellation, and our contractor
colleagues should know that NASA is working expeditiously to offer new
opportunities for them to partner with the Agency on our new
Exploration portfolio.
Consistent with the provisions of the FY 2010 Consolidated
Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117), NASA is continuing to implement the
programs and projects for the architecture of the Constellation
Program. NASA completed the Constellation Preliminary Design Review
earlier this month, and will complete documentation of the PDR this
year. In light of the FY 2011 budget request's proposal regarding the
Constellation Program, the Administrator has instructed the
Constellation Program to refrain from initiating new work not currently
under contract, and also to refrain from expanding the scope of any
work that currently is under contract. All work that is currently under
contract is continuing. These actions are prudent and necessary steps,
and are consistent with the provisions of P.L. 111-117.
Please see the attached charts, which provide a list of major
program acquisitions to date; the status of key milestones and program
activities planned for the Constellation Program in FY 2010; and a
brief overview of the accomplishments of the program to date.
``Tiger Team'' Responsibilities and Reporting Schedules
Although NASA is continuing Constellation Program activities in FY
2010, at the same time, NASA must plan for all likely budget outcomes
so that the Agency is ready to implement any new direction and
implement appropriate transition activities. This is consistent with
how the Agency plans to implement any pending budget in any given year.
Forward preparation and planning work is always necessary, even though
a budget has not become law.
Following the release of the FY 2011 budget request, NASA
established six study teams within ESMD to ensure we understand the
steps (and the implications of those steps) that would need to be taken
for an orderly transition of the Constellation Program and to plan for
the implementation of the new Exploration program. The work undertaken
by these teams is a necessary part of that planning. This is only an
evaluation of plans, and no termination action has been directed or
taken. The data assembled by the study teams will equip NASA with vital
and substantive information that we will need once the new fiscal year
begins and once NASA embarks on its efforts to implement the FY 2011
budget request.
The six study teams and their areas of planning are as follows:
Constellation Transition: The team is leveraging
expertise from across the Agency to develop a rapid and cost
effective ramp-down plan that will free the resources required
for new programs. As part of the early characterization and
integrated planning effort, this team has initiated a broad
survey of current workforce, contracts, facilities, property,
security, knowledge capture, information technology, and other
government agency interface issues to determine what
infrastructure and hardware could be used by the new programs
and projects. The transition plan will outline three phases as
part of an action plan for initial deliverables: Near-term
actions, cancellations of Constellation, and transition of
assets/resources to new Exploration focus areas and other NASA
programs, where appropriate.
Heavy Lift and Propulsion Technology: The team is
formulating plans for a program that will investigate a broad
scope of research and development activities to support next-
generation space launch propulsion technologies. This includes
foundational propulsion research and demonstrations of first
stage and in-space engines.
Commercial Crew: The team is formulating plans to
expedite and improve robustness of ISS crew and cargo delivery.
In addition, the team is developing a plan that supports the
development of commercial crew transportation providers to whom
NASA could competitively award crew transportation services.
Exploration Robotic Precursors: The team is
formulating plans for a series of candidate exploration robotic
precursor missions to scout targets for future human activity.
Potential destinations include the Moon, Mars and its moons,
Lagrange points and nearby asteroids.
Flagship Technology Demonstrations: The team is
formulating plans for a series of in-space demonstrations that
validate next generation capabilities key to sustainably
exploring deep space.
Enabling Technology Development and Demonstration:
The team is formulating plans for conducting smaller scale
development and testing of key, long-range exploration
technologies.
The teams are being led primarily by Headquarters personnel, but
include membership from the Centers, other Mission Directorates and
other Cross-Agency groups. Members were selected based on their subject
matter expertise. Each team has the ability to utilize resources
anywhere in the Agency, including tapping experts at all Centers.
With the exception of the Constellation Transition team, the teams
are engaged in pre-formulation activities: developing program strategy;
identifying needs and goals; exploring alternate implementation
strategies; and establishing high level milestones and a budget
profile. The focus is at the program level with identification of
potential projects or missions. Therefore, the teams will not engage in
workforce assignments nor will they define Center participation or
management of programs. The teams also will not develop or award new
contracts. Decisions related to team activities are made through normal
Agency approval processes.
It is expected that teams will complete a majority of their work by
the end of the 3rd quarter of FY 2010. As that effort is completed over
the next several months, NASA will share our findings with Congress and
engage with this Subcommittee on our planned next steps.
After assessing the current Constellation baseline status and
developing the action plan for a Constellation transition, and
receiving appropriate legislative direction, future implementation and
execution of the plan will be transferred to a Constellation Transition
and Closeout Project. Existing Agency infrastructure will be utilized
to the maximum extent possible to codify decisions and conduct reviews,
analysis, and integration of transition activities and plans, such as:
the ESMD Program Management Council; the Agency Program Management
Council; the Center Management Council; the Constellation Control
Board; the Systems Engineering and Integration Control Board; the
Budget Rollout Integration Team and the Transition Control Board.
Conclusion
Americans and people worldwide have turned to NASA for inspiration
throughout our history--our work gives people an opportunity to imagine
what is barely possible, and we at NASA get to turn those dreams into
real achievements for all humankind. This budget gives NASA a roadmap
to even more historic achievements as it spurs innovation, employs
Americans in fulfilling jobs, and engages people around the world as we
enter an exciting new era in space. NASA looks forward to working with
the Subcommittee on implementation of the FY 2011 budget request.
Chairwoman Giffords, thank you for your support and that of this
Subcommittee. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you or the
other Members of the Subcommittee may have.
Achievements of NASA's Constellation Program
The following are some of the Orion Project's key achievements:
The Orion PDR was conducted during the summer of
2009, and completed in August 2009. The PDR was an extensive
review of Orion's detailed subsystems and integrated systems
designs to date. The PDR board unanimously recommended
proceeding with detailed designs toward Critical Design Review
(CDR) in February 2011.
In 2009, NASA conducted preliminary capsule recovery
tests at both the Navy's Carderock facility in Maryland and in
the ocean near Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in Florida. Using a
mockup of the Orion capsule, these Post-landing Orion Recover
Tests involved search and rescue teams simulating stabilization
and recovery of the Orion capsule in a variety of sea state
conditions. Results were intended to lead to design features
for both the spacecraft and recovery equipment, as well as
contributing to development of the final recovery procedures.
Fabrication of the Orion Ground Test Article crew
module is progressing at the Michoud Assembly Facility in
Louisiana. Completion is estimated for the fall of 2010,
followed by completion of the service module and launch abort
system ground test article, currently scheduled for 2011. NASA
is using a friction stir welding technique on this ground test
article, and is hoping to demonstrate the longest continuous
friction stir weld ever attempted.
In May 2010, NASA plans to perform its first
developmental test of the Orion Launch Abort System (LAS) at
the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. Orion's Launch Abort
System (LAS) includes three newly designed solid rocket motors:
1) abort motor, 2) jettison motor, and 3) attitude control
motor. All of these motors have been successfully demonstrated
in static firings on the ground. The next step is the Pad
Abort-1 test, which will be the first integrated firing of all
three motors in a real flight environment.
The following are some of the Ares I Project's key achievements:
Having completed its PDR in 2008, the Ares I Project
is now working toward its CDR, which is scheduled for September
2011.
In September 2009, NASA and ATK conducted the first
successful test of the Ares I's five-segment development motor
in Promontory, Utah. Beyond validating the basic performance
characteristics of the stage, the test has enhanced modeling
and understanding of key attributes that have historically been
very difficult to predict analytically such as erosive burning,
thrust oscillations and thrust tail off. The next static test,
DM-2, is currently scheduled for September 2010.
In October 2009, the Ares I-X test flight took place
at Kennedy Space Center in Florida. Data from more than 700 on-
board sensors showed that the vehicle was effectively
controlled and stable in flight. Thrust oscillation frequencies
and magnitude data from the Ares I-X flight also were
consistent with measurements from recent Shuttle flights that
were instrumented, leading us to conclude that the oscillation
vibration on the Ares I would be within the bounds that the
Ares I is currently being designed to. In the end, this test
flight provided tremendous insight into the aerodynamic,
acoustic, structural, vibration, and thermal forces that Ares I
would be expected to experience.
J-2X Test Hardware Status: Having passed its CDR in
2008, development and verification testing at the component and
subsystem level continues. Current planning includes a fully
assembled engine, minus the full nozzle extension, to be
available the end of calendar year 2010, followed by receipt of
an additional developmental engine in 2011. Static fire testing
for engines is currently slated to begin in the February-March
2011 time frame.
The following are some of the recent infrastructure achievements
for the Constellation Program:
The Operations and Checkout building at KSC was
completed in January 2009, marking activation of High Bay
Facility. When outfitted, the O&C will support final assembly
of the Orion spacecraft.
The final 600-foot Lightning Protection Tower at
KSC's Pad B was completed in February 2009. This was where the
Ares I-X test flight launched from in October 2009.
Workers at KSC topped out the tenth and final segment
of the new mobile launcher (ML) after it was lifted by crane
and lowered onto the ninth segment in January 2010. When
completed, the tower will be 345 feet tall and have multiple
platforms for personnel access. Its base was made lighter than
Space Shuttle mobile launcher platforms so the crawler-
transporter can pick up the heavier load of the tower and a
taller rocket.
A-3 Test Stand at Stennis Space Center in
Mississippi: Construction of the long-duration altitude test
stand for the J-2X engine is nearly 75 percent complete. When
completed in 2012, the A-3 facility will provide a unique
critical capability to simulate environments at greater than
100,000 ft altitude necessary to demonstrate altitude starting
and perform full-duration hot-fire testing.
Space Environmental Test Facility (SET) at Glenn
Research Center's Plum Brook Station in Ohio: Construction
started in 2007 and is about 75 percent complete. SET is
planned for conducting qualification testing of the fully
integrated Orion spacecraft, including vibration, acoustics,
and EMI testing.
Biography for Douglas Cooke
Doug Cooke is Associate Administrator for the Office of Exploration
Systems Mission Directorate. The Exploration Systems Mission
Directorate is responsible for managing the development of flight
hardware systems for future support of the International Space Station
and the exploration of the moon, Mars and beyond. This includes
development of lunar robotic precursors, critical technologies and
human research to support future human spacecraft and exploration
missions.
Mr. Cooke has over 35 years of unique experience in the Space
Shuttle, Space Station, and Exploration Programs. He has been assigned
significant responsibilities during critical periods of each of these,
including top management positions in all three programs.
Mr. Cooke's first major challenge began in 1975 when he was tasked
with defining and implementing an entry aerodynamic flight test program
for the Space Shuttle. This program was successfully implemented during
the Approach and Landing Tests in 1977, and early orbital flights of
the Space Shuttle beginning in 1981 through 1984.
Mr. Cooke was asked to lead the Analysis Office when the Space
Station Program Office was first organized in 1984. He accepted the
challenge and led the work that defined the Space Station configuration
and many of its design details and technical attributes.
Following the Space Shuttle Challenger accident, Mr. Cooke was
assigned to the Space Shuttle Program Office. He helped lead a Civil
Service and contractor team to provide the system engineering and
integration function that resulted in the return of the Space Shuttle
to flight on September 29, 1988. He reached the position of Deputy
Manager of the NSTS Engineering Integration Office.
Mr. Cooke has played a pivotal role in planning for future space
exploration beginning in 1989. He helped to lead a NASA team that
produced the ``90 Day Study'' on lunar and Mars exploration. Mr. Cooke
was subsequently assigned to the Synthesis Group led by Lt. General Tom
Stafford, Gemini and Apollo Astronaut. The team produced a report for
the White House entitled ``America at the Threshold: America's Space
Exploration Initiative.'' Mr. Cooke was selected to be the Manager of
the Exploration Programs Office under then Exploration Associate
Administrator Michael Griffin, where he initiated and led NASA agency-
wide studies for the human return to the Moon, and exploration of Mars.
In March of 1993, the agency undertook the redesign of Space
Station Freedom. Mr. Cooke was assigned the responsibility of leading
the engineering and technical aspects of the redesign. He was
subsequently chosen to serve in the Space Station Program Office as
Vehicle Manager, leading and managing the hardware development and
systems engineering and integration for the International Space
Station. From April to December of 1996, Mr. Cooke served as Deputy
Manager of the Space Station Program.
Prior to his current appointment to NASA Headquarters, Mr. Cooke
served as manager for the Advanced Development Office at the Johnson
Space Center, Houston. Mr. Cooke provided leadership for the planning
of human missions beyond Earth orbit; including the Moon, Mars,
libration points, and asteroids. This team developed integrated human
and robotic mission objectives, defined investment strategies for
exploration technologies, and managed NASA exploration mission
architecture analyses. Mr. Cooke was detailed to NASA headquarters
during portions of this period to contribute to headquarters level
strategies for human exploration.
Mr. Cooke served as NASA technical advisor to the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board from the time of the accident to the publishing of
the report.
Prior to his current assignment Mr. Cooke served as Deputy
Associate Administrator for the Exploration Systems Mission
Directorate. He has made significant contributions to the structuring
of its programs, defining the program content, and providing technical
leadership. He initiated and led the development of the Global
Exploration Strategy activity that led to defined themes and objectives
for lunar exploration. International, science, industry, and
entrepreneurial communities were engaged, and they contributed to the
development and shaping of these themes and objectives. He has led and
guided the development of the planned lunar exploration mission
approach and architecture. Mr. Cooke has also led the efforts to define
long term NASA field center assignments for lunar hardware development
and operational responsibilities. He has been the Source Selection
Authority for the major exploration contract competitions. In this role
he has successfully selected the companies who will develop the next
human spaceflight vehicle, composed of the Orion spacecraft and Ares I
rocket.
Mr. Cooke is a graduate of Texas A&M University with a Bachelor of
Science degree in Aerospace Engineering.
Major Awards: SES Presidential Distinguished Rank Award--2006, SES
Presidential Meritorious Rank Award--1998, NASA Exceptional Achievement
Medal--2003, NASA Exceptional Achievement Medal--2002, NASA Outstanding
Leadership Medal--1997, NASA Exceptional Achievement Medal--1993, NASA
Exceptional Service Medal--1988, JSC Certificate of Commendation--1986,
JSC Certificate of Commendation--1983
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Cooke. Thank you for
your service and for your testimony.
Mr. Young.
STATEMENT OF A. THOMAS YOUNG, LOCKHEED MARTIN (RET.)
Mr. Young. Chairwoman Giffords, Mr. Olson, and committee
members, I am pleased to have the opportunity to present my
views on the United States Human Spaceflight Program.
The proposed NASA fiscal year 2011 budget represents a
significant departure from the current program and raises some
important issues worthy of debate prior to setting a course
that will define human spaceflight for many decades.
Continuation of the International Space Station and Mars as
the ultimate human exploration destination appear to be the
consensus. While Mars is not explicitly identified, subsequent
Administration statements suggest this conclusion. Areas with
significant differences in implementation approach are, one,
the method of transporting humans to earth orbit and
specifically to the International Space Station; two, the need
for a detailed plan for human exploration beyond earth orbit;
three, the development of a heavy lift capability to submit--
support missions beyond earth orbit; four, the development of a
capsule to support astronauts traveling to and beyond earth
orbit; and five, the definition of a technology program focused
on specific mission needs.
Approaches being discussed to provide transportation to
earth orbit are Soyuz, Space Shuttle, Ares I or a derivative
based on Ares I/V concepts, and commercial. Soyuz has been and
will continue to be a valuable space transportation system. I
do not believe Soyuz is a long-term solution. The United States
needs an indigenous system.
Space Shuttle has been the U.S. workhorse for three
decades. It has remarkable crew and cargo capabilities. I do
not believe Shuttle is the long-term solution.
Private and in some cases government investments have
created commercial enterprises focused on space tourism and
cargo transportation to the Space Station. These companies
should be encouraged, supported, and applauded for their
accomplishments.
NASA's proposed budget, if implemented, will result in the
United States being totally dependent upon commercial crew
space transportation for an indigenous capability to earth
orbit. I believe we are a long way from having a commercial
industry capable of satisfying human space transportation
needs. In my view this is a risk too high and not a responsible
course. The commercial crew option should not be approved, and
I would like to restate that. The commercial crew option should
not be approved.
The United States needs a transportation capability to
earth orbit that can be used for several decades. A system that
can be the basis for a heavy-lift capability would be
advantageous. Considerable resources have been expended, and
significant progress has been made in the development of Ares
I. I believe the most logical path forward is to commit to a
transportation system based upon the Ares I investment.
Consideration should be given to the ability to evolve the
system to a heavy-lift capability. NASA should be asked to
undertake a study to define the required system.
My interpretation of the fiscal year 2011 budget is that
the proposed Human Exploration Program is a technology endeavor
without an exploration plan. A technology program without focus
and identified missions can result in wasteful, non-productive,
hobby-shop activities. A detailed explanation--exploration plan
with destinations, dates, and implementation plans is needed.
Options were effectively identified in the Augustine Committee
report.
A factor requiring consideration is that a lunar lander and
facilities for extended stay on the moon are expensive, making
the lunar option a function of funding availability. I
personally am troubled by this observation since I believe
human exploration must have boots on the ground. An asteroid
landing may be less challenging and expensive than a lunar
landing. Again, NASA should be instructed to develop options
and recommend a specific exploration plan.
Human exploration beyond earth orbit will require a heavy-
lift launch vehicle. I do not believe we need a technology
program as a prerequisite. Available budget will determine the
heavy-lift implementation plan. NASA should be directed to
develop an integrated space transportation plan that will
result in the timely development of a heavy-lift launch
vehicle.
Human spaceflight requires a capsule for crew support.
Given my strong opinion that commercial crew should not be the
selected option, the logical starting point in selecting a
capsule concept is Orion. Significant investment has been made
in Orion, and it should be the basis of a capsule to support
Space Station operations and be the basis for initiating
exploration beyond earth orbit. A study by NASA to define the
crew support capsule is required. Cancellation, excuse me,
Constellation should not be cancelled. The NASA study most
likely will identify required Constellation modifications.
Deferral of a lunar option may be required depending upon
available budget.
The technology program identified in the proposed budget
lacks definition and focus. However, a technology program
largely directed toward resolving critical issues associated
with a detailed exploration plan and specifically a human Mars
mission is required. NASA, with appropriate outside support,
should define the required technology program.
I have cited the need for NASA studies for most of the
areas of discussion. A plan A is needed, which is absent from
the proposed fiscal year 2011 budget. The availability of plan
A will facilitate informed decisions relative to funding and
affordability of a human spaceflight program that will be in
place for decades.
I would start by applying the $6 billion commercial crew
funding, the funding for precursor robotic missions, a portion
of the technology funding, and the $2.5 billion allocated for
Constellation termination to plan A.
I was asked to comment on the most significant impacts of
the changes contained in the proposed fiscal year 2011 budget.
Changes as significant as those proposed cannot be implemented
without collateral impact. An example is the increased cost
identified by the Air Force in their programs.
I believe the most significant impact will be the
deterioration in the capabilities of the aerospace workforce.
We currently have a government, university, and industry
workforce that is a national treasure. Many of the best and
brightest are attracted by the excitement and challenge of
space exploration.
Decades of experience and investment have been instrumental
in building this extraordinary workforce. Without a challenging
and meaningful space program, this national capability will
atrophy. Assigning responsibility to the commercial sector for
earth orbit crew transportation will have a major adverse
impact on the NASA workforce.
The loss of capability that has been built over decades
will happen quickly. This is not a resource that can be turned
on or off. I suspect the uncertainty created by the proposed
NASA budget is causing people to evaluate their futures. Good
people always have a choice. Rebuilding lost capabilities will
take decades.
When the dust settles, I believe the United States must
have a space, a human spaceflight program worthy of a great
nation as suggested by the title of the Augustine Committee
report. In my view the human spaceflight program contained in
the proposed fiscal year 2011 budget fails this goal. I believe
a program can be developed that will put us on a responsible
course to Mars with exciting and challenging intermediate
destinations. A program that will utilize the capabilities of
the total aerospace workforce. A program of which the current
generation can be proud. A program of which the future
generations can be inspired. A program that I believe will
require some budget augmentation. A program that is worthy of a
great Nation.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Young follows:]
Prepared Statement of A. Thomas Young
Chairwoman Giffords and committee members, I am pleased to have the
opportunity to present my views on the U.S. human spaceflight program.
The proposed NASA FY 2011 budget represents a significant departure
from the current program and raises some important issues worthy of
debate prior to setting a course that will define human spaceflight for
many decades.
Continuation of the International Space Station and Mars as the
ultimate human exploration destination appear to be areas of consensus.
While Mars is not explicitly identified, subsequent Administration
statements suggest this conclusion.
Areas with significant differences in implementation approach are
1) the method of transporting humans to Earth orbit and
specifically to the International Space Station,
2) the need for a detailed plan for human exploration beyond
Earth orbit,
3) the development of a heavy lift capability to support
missions beyond Earth orbit,
4) the development of a capsule to support astronauts
traveling to and beyond Earth orbit and
5) the definition of a technology program focused on specific
mission needs.
Approaches being discussed to provide transportation to Earth orbit
are Soyuz, Space Shuttle, Ares I or a derivative based on Ares I/V
concepts and commercial.
Soyuz has been and will continue to be a valuable space
transportation system. I do not believe Soyuz is a long term solution.
The U.S. needs an indigenous system.
Space Shuttle has been the U.S. workhorse for three decades. It has
remarkable crew and cargo capabilities. I do not believe Shuttle is the
long term solution.
Private and in some cases government investments have created
commercial enterprises focused on space tourism and cargo
transportation to the Space Station. These companies should be
encouraged, supported and applauded for their accomplishments. NASA's
proposed budget, if implemented, will result in the U.S. being totally
dependent upon commercial crew space transportation for an indigenous
capability to Earth orbit. I believe we are a long way from having a
commercial industry capable of satisfying human space transportation
needs. In my view, this is a risk too high and not a responsible
course. The commercial crew option should not be approved.
The U.S. needs a transportation capability to Earth orbit that can
be used for several decades. A system that can be the basis for a heavy
lift capability would be advantageous. Considerable resources have been
expended and significant progress has been made in the development of
Ares I. I believe the most logical path forward is to commit to a
transportation system based upon the Ares I investment. Consideration
should be given to the ability to evolve the system to a heavy lift
capability. NASA should be asked to undertake a study to define the
required system.
My interpretation of the FY 2011 budget is that the proposed human
exploration program is a technology endeavor without an exploration
plan. A technology program without focus and identified mission uses
can result in wasteful, nonproductive, ``hobby-shop'' activities. A
detailed exploration plan with destinations, dates and implementation
plans is needed. Options were effectively identified in the Augustine
Committee report. A factor requiring consideration is that a lunar
lander and facilities for extended stay on the moon are expensive
making the lunar option a function of funding availability. I am
troubled by this observation since I believe human exploration must
have ``boots-on-the-ground.'' An asteroid landing may be less
challenging and expensive than a lunar landing. Again, NASA should be
instructed to develop options and recommend a specific exploration
plan.
Human exploration beyond Earth orbit will require a new heavy lift
launch vehicle. I do not believe we need a technology program as a
prerequisite. Available budget will determine the heavy lift
implementation plan. NASA should be directed to develop an integrated
space transportation plan that will result in the timely development of
a heavy lift launch vehicle.
Human spaceflight requires a capsule for crew support. Given my
strong opinion that commercial crew should not be the selected option,
the logical starting point in selecting a capsule concept is Orion.
Significant investment has been made in Orion and it should be the
basis of a capsule to support Space Station operations and initiate
exploration beyond Earth orbit. A study, by NASA, to define the crew
support capsule is required. Constellation should not be cancelled. The
NASA study will most likely identify required Constellation
modifications. Deferral of the lunar option may be required depending
upon available budget.
The technology program identified in the proposed budget lacks
definition and focus. However, a technology program largely directed
toward resolving critical issues associated with implementing plan A
and specifically a human Mars mission is required. NASA, with
appropriate outside support, should define the required technology
program.
I have cited the need for NASA studies for most of the areas of
discussion. A plan A is needed which is absent from the proposed FY
2011 budget. The availability of a plan A will facilitate informed
decisions relative to funding and affordability of a human spaceflight
program that will be in place for decades. I would start by applying
the 6B$ commercial crew funding, the funding for precursor robotic
missions, a portion of the technology funding and the 2.5B$ allocation
for Constellation termination to plan A.
I was asked to comment on the most significant impacts of the
changes contained in the proposed FY 2011 budget. Changes as
significant as those proposed cannot be implemented without collateral
impact. An example is the increased cost identified by the Air Force in
their programs.
I believe the most significant impact will be the deterioration in
the capabilities of the aerospace work force. We currently have a
government, university and industry work force that is a national
treasure. Many of the best and brightest are attracted by the
excitement and challenge of space exploration. Decades of experience
and investment have been instrumental in building this extraordinary
work force. Without a challenging and meaningful space program, this
national capability will atrophy. Assigning responsibility to the
commercial sector for Earth orbit crew transportation will have a major
adverse impact on the NASA work force.
The loss of capability that has been built over decades will happen
very quickly. This is not a resource that can be turned on and off. I
suspect the uncertainty created by the proposed NASA budget is causing
people to evaluate their futures. Good people always have a choice.
Rebuilding lost capabilities will take decades.
When the ``dust settles'' I believe the U.S. must have a human
spaceflight program worthy of a great nation as suggested by the title
of the Augustine Committee report. In my view, the human spaceflight
program contained in the proposed FY 2011 budget fails this goal. I
believe a program can be developed that will put us on a responsible
course to Mars with exciting and challenging intermediate destinations.
A program that will utilize the capabilities of the total aerospace
work force, a program of which the current generation can be proud and
by which future generations can be inspired. A program that I believe
will require some budget augmentation. A program that is worthy of a
great nation.
ATTACHMENT
COMMERCIAL CREW
I believe the commercial crew option is a risk too high, not a
responsible course and it should not be approved.
The U.S. space industry is second to none and has been instrumental
in the extraordinary accomplishments of the U.S. space program. My
concerns about the commercial crew option are not caused by
reservations about the industry capabilities. My concerns are that the
space industry alone is not adequate to successfully implement an
endeavor as challenging as human spaceflight.
Continuity of the nation's human spaceflight expertise resides
within NASA, not an industrial enterprise. NASA has been continuously
leading our human spaceflight program for almost five decades. Several
companies have been partners with NASA, but not on a continuous basis.
I can make the same case for JPL relative to planetary exploration and
the Air Force and NRO for national security space.
In my opinion, there is no logic that supports having an industrial
enterprise totally responsible for crew transportation to Earth orbit
with NASA defining safety requirements and general oversight.
We actually tried a similar approach in the 1990s. The Air Force
implemented a program called ``Acquisition Reform.'' System
responsibility for national security space programs was ceded to
industry under a contracting approach called Total System Performance
Responsibility (TSPR.) Air Force and NRO project managers were told to
step back, to not interfere and to let industry have total
responsibility. Additionally, the Air Force and NRO essentially
eliminated their system engineering capabilities since the
responsibility would reside with industry.
The results were devastating and the adverse impact is still with
us today. Good project managers and project management personnel left
and an exceptional systems engineering capability was eliminated.
Projects were a disaster and TSPR was judged by all to be a total
failure.
Problems were not isolated to one project or to one company, the
impact was systemic. As examples, FIA managed by Boeing was cancelled
after the expenditure of about 10B$. SBIRS High, managed by Lockheed-
Martin, has been referred to as ``a case study in how not to execute a
space program.'' NPOESS, managed by Northrop Grumman, is a story that
is still evolving. On average, programs implemented using this approach
resulted in half the intended program for twice the cost and six years
late.
NASA implemented a similar approach called ``Faster-Better-
Cheaper.'' Mars '98 is the most significant example of this approach.
Mars '98 was a total failure with the loss of the orbiter, lander and
two probes. The orbiter managed by Lockheed-Martin, under contract to
JPL, failed because of confusion between metric and English units. This
confusion resulted in errors large enough during Mars orbit insertion
to cause the spacecraft to enter the atmosphere and be destroyed. These
same errors were prevalent during midcourse corrections implemented on
the trip from Earth to Mars without a cause being determined. Had the
JPL institutional navigation capability been applied to understand
these midcourse errors, I believe they most likely would have found the
cause and implemented corrections to prevent the failure. They were
excluded from the management of Mars '98 because of the ``give the
contractor the responsibility'' concept. This is an example of how
NASA's continuity of expertise could have been applied to an important
and challenging project.
An Aerospace Corporation study documented 11.2 B$ of total mission
failures during the 1990s.
NASA is supporting new industrial enterprises to provide cargo
transport to the Space Station. This commercial cargo approach has the
potential to develop new commercial space enterprises. While this is a
reasonable concept, performance has yet to be demonstrated. The
proposal that this cargo capability, which has yet to be proven, can be
extrapolated to include commercial crew is not credible.
An argument is made that NASA will specify human safety
requirements for use by potential commercial crew companies. This is
necessary but far from sufficient to assure mission success. Today,
space projects do not fail because of the items that would be contained
in the safety requirements document. I doubt the requirements would say
``don't confuse metric and English units,'' or ``don't write down a
wrong number to be used in the guidance equations,'' which resulted in
a Titan IV failure, or ``don't let the foam hit the Shuttle wing
leading edge.'' Because humans are involved, errors will happen.
Success results when problems are successfully managed. I believe
successful management occurs when the continuity of expertise of NASA
or the Air Force or the NRO is combined with the implementation
capability of industry. The application of this combined capability
with the resulting checks and balances and constructive technical
debate is the foundation of our extraordinary success.
There is much discussion as to whether commercial crew is cheaper
or, in the end, will cost more. Similar debates are occurring relative
to schedule. These cost and schedule issues deserve resolution;
however, I believe the most important issue is ``Will the commercial
crew concept be successful?'' I do not believe the probability of
success is sufficiently high to justify commercial crew as a
responsible option. It is an option, that if not successful, will
result in the U.S. having no space transportation for two decades or
longer.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Young. We appreciate
your service and your testimony today as well.
Votes will be called in a couple of minutes, but we do have
time get in a couple of questions, and we are going to bring
our first round, and the Chair recognizes herself for five
minutes.
Use of FY 2010 Funds for Constellation Termination
Mr. Cooke, I would like to read an excerpt from the 2010
Consolidated Appropriations Act, and I quote, ``None of the
funds provided herein and from prior years remain available for
obligation during fiscal year 2010 shall be available for the
termination or the elimination of any program, project, or
activity, underscore or activity, of the architecture for the
Constellation Program.''
I would like to go through a short list of some of the
actions that NASA has recently undertaken or maybe I should say
activities that NASA has terminated. NASA cancelled the Ares V
Phase I Concept Definition and Requirements Development RFP,
NASA cancelled the Altair Lunar Lander Concept Design Contract
RFP. NASA cancelled the Kennedy Space Center Exploration Ground
Launch Services RFP, NASA has stopped allowing Ares prime
contractors to make planned hardware subcontract awards for
both the Ares Instrument Unit production and Ares Upper Stage
production contracts.
So, Mr. Cooke, I would like you to explain if you can how
NASA's actions are not in direct contravention with the
unambiguous intent of the Congress and in some cases the direct
law and the prohibition of the termination of any Constellation
activities.
Mr. Cooke. Yes. I can address these. We actually are
continuing with the major work on the contracts and are
making--and have--we have had a number of decisions where we
were asked whether we continue or not. We do--we are continuing
to work. There are a number of things that we have not started,
some of which have become outdated in terms of how we started
them out.
Others--we also have the effect of the enacted 2010 budget
and some budget changes in 2010, that--for one we had a $50
million budget, general budget reduction, we had actually an
internal NASA rescission that was to fund needed infrastructure
investments. We also had a tentative agreement with one of the
contractors for cost sharing that actually we ended up not
being able to put in place.
The continuing resolution that we started with this year
did not allow us to get things started, for instance, on some
of the lead items, so we were not able to start those when we
would have. So there are some that are in that category, and we
are reassessing the budget reductions that we have seen. So
that is a part of things that we have not started.
We--in terms of the Altair and Ares V study contracts, we
did have proposals in on those, and we actually had them on
hold since last year before--when we were going through the
transition period and learned of the upcoming Augustine
Commission, we thought that we should hold those at that time.
So we have been holding those for a year.
And we just a little while back we got to the point where
we felt that they were--because we didn't have funding to
support lunar investments, we stopped the Altair, and in terms
of the Ares V, it--because of studies that have gone on over
the last year, we have evolved in our thinking and felt that we
should re-look at what we went out with. So we think that in
the coming, actually in the coming months that we will put out
another request for proposals on studies, study contracts for
heavy lift.
Chairwoman Giffords. Mr. Cooke, we have had the
Administrator state to us that there haven't been changes, that
NASA is complying with the direct law, but obviously we have
examples where that is simply not the case, and there is a deep
concern, and Congress put that language in there specifically
for a purpose. We wanted time to allow for careful and
deliberate review of any Administration's proposal that was
going to significantly change or--basically we have a program
of record. We wanted to make sure that that program was allowed
to be carried through and that we could analyze that record
based on the information that Congress had intended.
And, you know, and we are deeply concerned. We have brought
it up a variety of times with, you know, leading officials at
NASA, and I guess, I think before I am going to turn the floor
over to Mr. Olson, but I would just suggest that NASA spend a
little less time figuring out ways to wiggle out of some of
these contracts and to figure out how to negotiate this without
thinking that we are going to notice and more on following what
the direction of the Congress and the United States people had
in mind.
So with that, Mr. Olson.
Status of Constellation Project
Mr. Olson. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
In its justification of the fiscal year 2011 budget the
Administration's painted the Constellation Program as
hopelessly behind schedule and over budget, and I think there
is an analysis that suggests that the goal of landing on the
moon by 2020 was in jeopardy. Both the goal of Ares I, taking
Orion to the ISS, NASA always asserted that it could be
achieved by 2015.
Mr. Cooke, would you speak to the basis of the allegations
that the Constellation was over budget.
Mr. Cooke. I can speak to the budget numbers and
predictions of the program that I have been--that I am
responsible for. Until the 2010 enacted budget, we felt that we
were on a course. Although we had schedule risks, we felt we
were on a course to March, 2015. Since--mentioned in the last
response, my last response to a question that we had had some
reductions in 2010 that would--at this point the March, 2015,
is probably not possible but--and we have just been through
preliminary design review and have in front of us based on that
data the work to develop costs and schedule that goes with that
baseline to understand exactly where we are in terms of where
we would end up.
Mr. Olson. And just to confirm I understand what you are
saying, Mr. Cooke, so that NASA was on track for Ares I by
2015, but then budget reductions last year got them off track.
Was that--is that a fair assumption or fair understanding of
what you said?
Mr. Cooke. That is our assessment, and of course, you know,
there are other assessments and other evaluations, but that was
the program's assessment.
Mr. Olson. Thank you very much, and Mr. Young, would you
give us your perspective on the ability of NASA to develop Ares
I and Orion to accomplish just the ISS mission?
Mr. Young. First I should be clear, I have not done a
review of the program and did not participate in that, but I,
you know, have been a close watcher, I guess, of the activity
maybe is the way to say it. I think that it is reasonable to
assume that having invested $9 billion in Ares I and Orion, and
I am setting the lunar aside because I think that is a tough
challenge. I don't want to--I want to be clear about that, but
only talking about Ares I and Orion, having invested 9 billion,
having successfully had a PDR, not being terribly far from a
CDR, would give--and Mr. Cooke is the right person to answer
this, but not having--seeing great problems that have come out
of the PDR, then I think it is reasonable to assume that there
is credibility to the Ares I/Orion approach and concept and
design.
And I think, again, even if you use some of the larger
numbers that were in the Augustine report or other locations,
it is not a stretch to believe that an Ares I/Orion system can
be made to work in close to the current budget. So in my view
when I have thought about it a lot and looked at the
alternatives, no alternative strikes me as being credible, as
credible as Ares I/Orion as the basis for a space
transportation system to low-earth orbit and to the Space
Station.
So I think deviating from that course until we have maybe
done all of the studies the Doug Cooke is talking about would
just be a significant mistake.
Funding Termination of Constellation
Mr. Olson. Thank you for those comments, Mr. Young, and I
have one final question that is for you, Mr. Cooke.
I understand that NASA is requiring Constellation
contractors to fund termination liability out of existing
fiscal year 2010 funds. This would be a blatant violation of
the fiscal year 2010 Appropriations Law.
I also understand that insufficient funds were included in
the fiscal year 2011 budget request for the Constellation
contractor termination liability. Can you assure me that NASA
will not seek to use existing appropriations for termination
liability unless specifically authorized by Congress?
Mr. Cooke. This is an area that is very sensitive. It is--
there are laws that we are working with and anti-deficiency is
one of them. We are not changing our contracts, and we have not
directed anything other than what is in the contracts to our
contractors.
Mr. Olson. I know I am over my time but just one final
question for you, Mr. Cooke. Can you assure me that should
Congress agree to the termination of any Constellation Program
or activity that NASA will provide sufficient termination
liability funding at that time?
Mr. Cooke. I am sorry. I didn't understand that.
Mr. Olson. Okay. Should we agree to the termination of the
Constellation and all the program activities there, can you
assure me that NASA will provide termination liability funding
at that time?
Mr. Cooke. We have--we are not, as in the appropriations
language and law, we are not terminating contracts, and we--but
we are funded at the levels we are for our contracts at this
time.
Mr. Olson. Thank you very much. I just want to follow up on
my Chairwoman's comments. I mean, we are having a great debate
here about the future of our human spaceflight program, but the
marching orders now are Constellation, and that is what the
appropriations bill language is in there, and until that
changes some time later this year, that is it. I mean, from my
perspective Constellation, Constellation, Constellation.
I yield back my time.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Olson.
The Chair recognizes Ms. Kosmas.
NASA's Inspirational Mission
Ms. Kosmas. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you,
gentlemen, for being here today.
While I certainly appreciate the need to identify and
develop the missing capabilities for going to Mars, I am very
concerned that in the meantime we are giving up our current
capabilities to reach space without any plans for the next
mission, and that this downtime will not only affect our
workforce but also our national security. And I want to echo
the comments made by the Chairwoman with regard to this being
unique in its inspirational aspect.
I, too, received a letter from a constituent. She is nine
years old. Her name is Hero, and she has been wanting to be an
astronaut for many years and is concerned about the loss. This
echoes, I think, throughout the community of young folks who we
want desperately to encourage to be interested in science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics. So I am greatly
concerned about it.
More currently, however, I am concerned about the job loss
at Kennedy Space Center.
Future of NASA Workforce
So, Mr. Cooke, at the February 25 hearing with this
committee the NASA Administrator stated that civil servants who
support Constellation should feel secure that NASA has exciting
and meaningful work for them to accomplish after Constellation,
and you repeated this in your testimony, but I need to ask you
why should they feel secure? Can you provide any specifics on
work that human spaceflight proposals currently before us will
have waiting for these, for this unique workforce if
Constellation is cancelled? What about the Space Shuttle
operations personnel who are planning to transition to
Constellation, and what work will be waiting for them?
Mr. Cooke. Representative Kosmas, the--as I stated, there
is funding and will be funding to support civil servants, and
there--in our particular budget and explorations budget next
year we have 483 million more than we have this year. It a
shift in direction, and it is a shift in the work that will be
done, but the civil servants will be----
Ms. Kosmas. I think that is the question that I am trying
to get to the bottom of, Mr. Cooke, is aren't you allocating
funds that will be used for a different set of skills perhaps
than those people whose jobs I am worried about as we speak?
Mr. Cooke. Skills are always part of the discussion when
there is a shift in the type of work being done. There is
significant technology work that is possible at KSC and has
been done there in the past in terms of cryo management and
resource utilization. There are skills there.
Ms. Kosmas. Okay. I am going to have to move on because I
am going to run out of time, and I want to make sure I get this
question in.
Cost of Ares I
There seems to be, and this follows up on the questions
asked to you by Mr. Olson, there seems to be a good deal of
confusion on what it would cost to launch an Ares I once it is
developed. In other words, the marginal cost. This is something
I just wanted to get on the record, so a yes or no from you,
Mr. Cooke, is all that is required.
NASA stated last year that when Ares I is operational in
fiscal year 2016, its marginal costs based on a rate of two
flights per year will be about 176 million per flight. Now that
you have completed the Constellation Program preliminary design
review, has that number changed significantly, or is it still a
reasonable estimate?
Mr. Cooke. In terms of marginal cost it is still a
reasonable estimate.
Net Change in Workforce
Ms. Kosmas. Okay, and then my last question is how many net
jobs could you guarantee would be created by NASA's decision to
procure commercial crew services given the nationwide job
losses that will result from the retirement of the Shuttle
Program and the cancellation, proposed cancellation of
Constellation? We have heard numbers proposed by the commercial
industry, but have you independently validated those estimates,
and can you tell me how many Constellation jobs will be lost,
including those additional jobs that would be created if
Constellation continues? Congress needs this information if we
are going to properly assess the Administration's proposals.
Mr. Cooke. Yes, and I would like to follow up with those,
with more detail on those. I don't have all those numbers at
hand, but I would say that I don't know, I don't have an
assessment of what jobs would be created with the commercial
approach to this. Until we had competed and had chosen or
selected for--in agreements with specific companies. So I don't
have that number.
In terms of contractors nationwide, there are over 8,600
contractors working on Constellation.
Ms. Kosmas. Okay. I just want to say that for the record it
seems to me that the current plan, not only does it lack
vision, destination, and architecture, but it seems to lack--
and inspiration, but it seems to lack the attention and respect
of the workforce that we were promised we would get from NASA
and from the Augustine Commission and frankly never received.
So from my perspective it is obviously a very significant
issue as we move forward.
Thank you.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Ms. Kosmas.
Mr. Rohrabacher.
Benefits of Privatization
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, and
this debate is a bit perplexing. It just seems to me that there
are different role reversals going on here in terms of what
people actually believe is the best way to structure our
society and our society's goals and obtaining those goals. I
always thought that it was the Republicans and others who
depended on the private sector rather than a government
workforce to achieve certain ends, and it was the Democrats
that wanted to socialize different services. It seems to me was
have a role reversal here.
Let me just note that we have faced these decisions before
as to whether or not we would rely on commercial enterprise
versus government-run operations. The building of the
railroads, for example, Abraham Lincoln wisely decided that we
would be providing land to the railroads for building the
railroads. He did not create a government railroad company that
was actually--or a government railroad agency that decided to
develop railroads and the railroad transportation in our
country.
Similar, when we came to the airplane age, there were
contracts that were given for delivering the mail to private
companies rather than having a government agency that became
the government airline agency.
And today we are now on the verge, I believe, of actually a
huge step forward into space where the large numbers of people
can be engaged in enterprise in space, and we have the argument
instead that, no, this must be a government-based operation
because basically it might hurt the NASA workforce.
And I went down, Madam Chairman, I went down to see Space X
a couple of weeks ago just to see how far they were along on
their private commercial alternatives to Ares, and let me tell
you, I was shown around the plant by one employee, but he had--
he was actually the manager there on the floor of getting these
jobs done. And I remember when I visited NASA facilities, they
have about a dozen people walking around you trying to
basically curtsey to you and pat you on the back and do
everything they can, and none of them have any other
responsibility except to promote the NASA workforce or the NASA
job there versus any line responsibility.
And maybe that is why when you have NASA doing something it
costs $9 billion to produce no new technology and over at Space
X they have built their own rocket engines, they have had a
whole new system, all new technologies, and they have done it
on just a miniscule amount compared to what NASA has already
spent on the Ares Project.
Listen. If we are going to be in space, we had better do it
cost effectively, and cost effectively is not relying on the
government. We have learned that over and over again, whether
it was the railroads or private airlines. It is better to go
with commercial and private people than a Federal bureaucracy,
and it is not efficient the other way.
Now, people say we can't be sure of anything. Well, there
is nothing for sure. One thing is for sure, that we built the
Shuttle, we built the Shuttle, and I remember when that debate
came down, and that has cost us $1 billion every time we put it
up. Every single time when we put it up. There might have been
some other transportation systems that have proved more
effectively in the idea of getting people up into orbit rather
than the Space Shuttle System.
Chairwoman Giffords. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Rohrabacher. As long as it doesn't----
Chairwoman Giffords. Well, I would just--I would like to
get--if the witnesses----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Actually, we need to get their responses.
Chairwoman Giffords. Well, yes, we would like to hear from
the----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Absolutely.
Chairwoman Giffords. Absolutely.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I am sorry.
Chairwoman Giffords. The Chair recognizes Mr. Young.
Mr. Rohrabacher. It is just that I am the only one who
seems to be presenting these arguments.
Chairwoman Giffords. And this is why we have them. Mr.
Young.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Young, let us go to you to answer this
basic philosophical question. You were involved with a private
company. Does--is Atlas missiles, are they--rockets. Are they
so limited that they are not going to be able to pick up some
of this weight that we need to put up into space? Is--was your
company less competent than NASA to move forward and run some
sort of operation that could put human beings into space?
Mr. Young. Let me see if I extract a question out of that.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right.
Mr. Young. Let me comment because it is an important issue
that you are identifying. First off, let me tell you Atlas is
not commercial, and I will come back to that in a minute. Bear
with me. I will come back. You know, I am a product of the
aerospace industry, so I have a teensy bit of knowledge about
the aerospace industry.
My--I am strongly against commercial crew, and let me tell
you why. Okay. I am not--I believe our aerospace industry is
second to none. I--my issues are not with aerospace industry,
either the more mature or the developing. My issue is that I do
not believe the aerospace industry alone can successfully
execute a program as challenging and complex as human
spaceflight.
And let me see if I can give you a little bit of why I say
that. The continuity of expertise that we have in this country
as to how you do human spaceflight is with NASA. Not with any
company. Companies, you know, different companies come in and
out on the programs, and they do well, but they do well as a
partner with NASA, not when we turn the total responsibility
over to the industry.
Now, let me give you an example. We tried this in the '90s.
We actually tried it wholeheartedly, and the Air Force
implemented something they called Acquisition Reform.
Fundamentally what they did was they took system responsibility
for national security space programs, and they ceded it to
industry, and they did it contractually. They did it with
something that was called Total System Performance
Responsibility or TSPR, and in essence they told their program
managers, look. You stand back, get out of the way, sit in the
back of the room, don't ask questions. We are turning this over
to industry. They went further than that. The government had an
enormous systems engineering capability. We terminated it, and
we went about implementing a collection of the most important
NASA security space programs that this country has.
The results were devastating, and the adverse impact is
with us today. In essence what happened was good project
managers left because if they can't influence what they are
doing, they don't want to do the job. As I mentioned earlier,
good people have a choice. The systems engineering capability
was eliminated, which was a horrible item, and the projects
were a disaster, and I don't think there is anybody who
believes that TSPR was anything other than a total failure.
And let me give you some examples. This was not isolated.
It was systemic. Boeing, FIA, $10 billion cancelled. SBIRS,
program with Lockheed Martin, there is a quote, ``If you wanted
to find out how to not manage a space program, this is it.''
NPOESS is one, and actually, I went back and looked at it. Of
these programs for the 1990s not one of them except Wide Band
Gapfiller has been launched. These all started in the late '90s
and not one has been launched to date.
And in essence, if you take and average those programs,
which you will find is the following, today we are getting half
of the program content for twice the money six years late. So
you say, now why do I think--and I could go on with NASA,
different--but I want to make it short, the Aerospace
Corporation actually documented, there is a report, that there
were $11.2 billion worth of total mission failures in this time
period. I think you can trace it to this, and the reason is
that the industry is not constituted to do these things by
themselves. We have a technique where if you take the expertise
of NASA and the implementation capability of industry, and I am
not in favor of a NASA arsenal, but if you take the
institutional capability of NASA and you take the execution or
implementation capability of industry, you have got kind of the
beginnings of the keys to success.
What this results in good checks and balances, good debate,
good mission assurance practices, and I think she is trying to
stop me but----
Chairwoman Giffords. It is a great debate. Hold that
thought.
Mr. Young. Okay.
Chairwoman Giffords. We are going to--votes have been
called, so----
Mr. Young. Okay.
Chairwoman Giffords. --we are going to call on Mr. McCaul.
We are going to--if we have enough time, we are going to call
on Ms. Jackson Lee. Then we are going to recess and then come
back, but I want to make sure that we get the members when we
have them, if we have enough time.
Mr. Young. Okay.
Chairwoman Giffords. Yes, and a second round.
Mr. McCaul.
Space as a National Security Asset
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Madam Chair, and let me follow up on
this because that is excellent testimony. You make great points
about the Air Force trying to do this and it didn't work. This
is a national security asset. I don't think you can completely
turn it over to commercial spaceflight. It has national
security aspects to it, military aspects to it. I don't see the
transition here either. I mean, and Mr. Cooke, maybe you can
educate me or enlighten me as to how or when this gets turned
over to commercial spaceflight. I don't see a transition
period, something that we have invested 8, $9 billion in, and
then we are going to just hand it off to commercial spaceflight
as if it is going to be a seamless transition. I don't think
that is going to happen.
And the other question I had was was the Department of
Defense consulted on this decision? Because it seems to me we
are putting the United States in grave danger here, at risk by
this decision.
Mr. Cooke. Representative McCaul, I have not personally
been in discussions on that. I know that my Administrator has
been in some conversations. I don't know the extent of those.
Mr. McCaul. Well, and I think the answer is that they
weren't, and I think we have had several people from the
Department of Defense come out and say, you know, we would have
liked to have been at the table talking about this because it
does impact our defense capabilities and the national security
of this country, and I think that was a big mistake.
Mr. Young, do you have any comments on this transition
period and also on the national security, you know, aspects?
Mr. Young. I honestly don't know any of the details of the
deliberations. As I made in my comment, I do know that anything
as sweeping is what we are talking about, has significant
collateral impacts, and so, you know, it is important to
understand those impacts.
Relative to the transition, see, I am not convinced that
transition is anywhere in the near future because I think that
we have a formula for how to make these things successful, and
it is a NASA-industry partnership. It is not a turn-it-totally-
over-to-industry kind of a solution. So I don't look at a
transition, you know, down the line but when we talk about NASA
doing it, you know, NASA does it fundamentally with using the
strengths of our aerospace industry to implement these
programs.
Mr. McCaul. So do you think that there is going to be a gap
in human spaceflight now? Certainly we will have to rely on the
Russians and the Chinese far more than we do today.
Mr. Young. Well, if--my personal opinion, yes, because I do
not think there is a sufficiently high probability that
commercial crew will be successful. So I think we are looking
at decades with no, you know, with no exploration.
I shouldn't take your time, but I, too, have--I have a
seven-year-old grandson, and you mentioned Noah, named Spencer,
who has been to a Shuttle launch, who goes to the Air and Space
Museum with me, and to be honest with you if we implement this
budget, I hesitate saying this but being as it got introduced I
can build on that, I am worried how am I going to--and by the
way, whenever I go visit him, he is in Northern Virginia, his
father is a commander in the Navy. When I go visit him, he
always has another book on space for us to, you know, look at,
and I am really wrestling with, seriously, how do I tell him
that if this program is implemented, the next time NASA flies
in space he could well be 30 years old.
Mr. McCaul. Yeah. I think we are letting down our kids.
This has been a great program for, you know, science and math,
and the technology spin-offs that have come out of this--one of
the best investments of Federal dollars that we have had, and I
am concerned about our ability to compete globally, not only
from a defense standpoint but from a technology standpoint if
this decision goes forward.
And with that, Madam Chair, I yield back.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Mr. McCaul.
Unfortunately we only have about 3 minutes remaining until
we--the vote will be past due, so what I am going to hopefully
respect is--or request is if Ms. Jackson Lee and Mr. Perlmutter
would like to return, we will have a second round of questions,
and if our witnesses wouldn't mind waiting a few minutes, we
will go vote and hurry back as soon as possible.
And with that our committee is in recess.
[Recess.]
Ms. Edwards. [Presiding] The hearing will be in order, and
I thank you very much for waiting, and we will reconvene, and
we will begin with questions from our visitor today but no
stranger, Ms. Jackson Lee from Texas.
Collaboration on Budget
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Madam Chair, and it feels good
to be in this room again as a former member of the Science
Committee, and I thank the subcommittee and Chairwoman Giffords
for her courtesies and to the staff as well for your
courtesies. I thank the witnesses as well.
I will start with Mr. Cooke. I think you have gleaned from
the number of members who have been here that the majority on
both sides of the aisle have a strong commitment to NASA and
human spaceflight exploration. My question to you and I have
always felt that when the Administration and Congress works
together we are moving toward a home run, a home run for the
issue that we are working on and certainly a home run for the
American people.
Is there a sense that NASA would be welcoming to the ideas
and suggestions of Members of Congress who have oversight and
others who are advocates for NASA? Are we still in a realm--
there is a budget process moving forward, there is an
appropriations process that is still in play. Is the NASA
headquarters open to engagement and working with us?
Mr. Cooke. In very simple terms, yes, we are definitely
interested in pursuing engagement on this budget with Congress.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And I pretty much have listened to your
testimony, so Mr. Young, I am going to probe you and try to
glean some additional points.
First of all, I have introduced legislation, and I thank
you, Mr. Cooke. I, too, think that we are best when we are
collaborating. I think in hindsight we can look back on what
the analysis was to put forward the present budget, and I would
think that there was probably issues that drew and caused the
budget to be drawn as it is presently, but I will tell you as
we go through this process I think you will see more and more
issues, the Administration will see more and more issues that
will lean toward what I have seen as the bipartisan position on
this committee so far from listening to this testimony, that
Congress wants to move forward with the human spaceflight. It
is valuable to America.
Weaknesses of Privatization
But I do want to ask Mr. Young, I introduced legislation to
address the question of NASA as a national security asset. So
let me quickly have you assess, move into or merge into that
point and the point that you made that I thought was so potent,
and that is the start and stop of the commercial, private
sector, to no fault of their own. Companies go in and out of
business, but if we are to have a continuous stream of thought
and intelligence and commitment and if you will, the
continuation of knowledge, the holding of knowledge that is not
loss, is this not the government the best receptacle, if you
will, for that?
The second point if you can reflect, and Mr. Cooke, you
should as well, my enthusiastic friend of this committee
mentioned the whole commercial opportunities and there are, but
I am reminded tragically of some of the work that one private
entity did, Blackwater, compared to the military, and we all
have our ups and downs, but some things warrant not
privatizing, at least in its totality.
Would you comment on that, Mr. Young?
Mr. Young. Okay. Let me really come to your first question
first because it is quite a good question. I believe that the,
I am going to call it the continuity of expertise in human
spaceflight, resides with NASA. I could make a similar comment
about the continuity of our expertise in planetary exploration
is at JPL, and the continuity of our expertise in doing
national security space programs is in the Air Force NRO and
Aerospace Corporation.
These are organizations that the country has deliberately
established and invested in that have the full spectrum of the
successes and the problems, the lessons learned, and they go
forward.
Industry plays a very important role, and the thing I was
trying to make with Congressman Rohrabacher, I am--I think our
industry is second to none, so my comments have nothing to do
with the deficiencies in industry.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Absolutely.
Mr. Young. It is just if we take human spaceflight just as
an example, and I don't know how much I do from memory but Doug
could help me, but if we go to Mercury, it was McDonnell
Douglas, you know, if we go to Gemini, it was also McDonnell
Douglas. If we then go to Shuttle, it was North American
Aviation. If we go to Orion, I guess it is Lockheed Martin.
They are all extraordinary companies, but they don't have the
continuity, and I could do the same thing with the other
activities.
So it is my strong belief that the formula for making these
things successful is to take that--is to not have it a
government program and not have it a commercial program, have
it a national program, and that means that the continuity of
expertise that NASA has gets combined with the implementation
capability that industry has, and it is that combination
together that makes these things successful.
And none of us are smart enough that we don't need checks
and balances, and we don't need healthy technical debate about
how is the best way to do that or how is the best way to do the
other, and it is this integration of the activities that make
these things successful, and my personal belief is I don't
think that industry alone can make this program a success.
So I do not believe we will have a success if we, you know,
if we don't go in that particular direction. So, you know, the
Blackwater or what have you, I don't know enough of the details
there. I am, again, I am not in favor of, as I mentioned
earlier, a government arsenal where we do it all in-house, but
I really want to highlight the fact that in my view it is this
integration of these capabilities where the Doug Cookes have
healthy debate and interaction at the PDR with counterparts in
industry. And it is out of that process that we really make
these things to succeed, and I personally believe if we pursue
a commercial crew where it is basically turned over to
industry, I think we will be making a colossal error. I mean, I
don't think it is a close call.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Madam Chair, if you would indulge me just
one quick question, please.
Ms. Edwards. Very quickly.
Protecting NASA's Acquired Expertise
Ms. Jackson Lee. To Mr. Cooke, could you comment on whether
or not people who are associated with Constellation are being
terminated and whether or not there is now just a hold on those
positions or whether we are losing those positions, and just
quickly on that national security issue. Is there some value to
NASA intelligence that they have, knowledge that they have,
that it is an asset that we should protect.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Cooke. Yes.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, and then we will go to our second
round of questions.
Mr. Cooke. We are not--we at this point are not
terminating, and we certainly are going to continue with the
civil servant participation in our programs. In terms of that
we are--this year we are not terminating.
Ms. Jackson Lee. National security?
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Cooke.
Funding Termination of Constellation
We will go to our second round of questions, and I would
like to begin and continuing along that same line, Mr. Cooke,
at yesterday's House Appropriations Hearing NASA Administrator
Bolden was asked whether NASA was taking any actions in fiscal
year 2010 that would unduly delay or impact the Constellation
Program if Congress ultimately decides to continue
Constellation in the 2011 budget. At the hearing Administrator
Bolden assured the appropriators that NASA wasn't doing
anything in 2010 that would result in any significant delays or
impact to the Constellation Program.
However, now we are hearing and the Administrator didn't
disavow it at yesterday's hearing that NASA may be preparing to
send letters to Constellation contracts as soon as the end of
this week. Those letters would call on contractors to hold back
sufficient sums from their fiscal year 2010 funding to cover
termination costs in fiscal year 2010, despite the fact that
the 2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act specifically said that
no Constellation terminations could even take place until a
subsequent Appropriations Act is enacted.
So, Mr. Cooke, won't the impact of those letters be such
that in order to comply the contractors will still have to stop
or delay work on Constellation that was planned for FY 2010,
despite the Administrator's assurances to the contrary?
Mr. Cooke. In terms of communication with the contractors
on Constellation, we are not going to tell them anything that
isn't in their contract.
Ms. Edwards. But under what authority do you have to do
that if the--if this, you know, any such actions that would go
to the 2011 budget was not required or specified in the 2010
budget?
Mr. Cooke. We are not directing the contractors to take
actions.
Ms. Edwards. So what will be the content of the letter
then?
Mr. Cooke. I haven't seen the letter, so I don't--and I
don't know that they exist at this point.
Ms. Edwards. Are you aware of any human spaceflight, major
human spaceflight programs over the past 30 years that required
contractors to set aside each year the funds needed to cover
termination while the project is still underway and still
authorized and appropriated as now is being contemplated?
Mr. Cooke. The contracts that we write are not different
today as they have been. I probably ought to take that for the
record to make sure that we get appropriate procurement and
legal answers to the questions.
Ms. Edwards. Well, then we will expect then that we will
receive a response to this set of questions, though, on the--
for inclusion in the record.
I wonder if you could tell me whether the new requirement
is inconsistent with past practices with the fiscal year 2010
Appropriations Act?
Mr. Cooke. The--in going forward we are, once again, we are
not changing the contracts. I mean, these are the contracts
that have been in place, and so we are not directing changes.
Ms. Edwards. But if a contractor were asked for a--in
fiscal year 2010, to set aside a part of its contract for the
purposes of preparing for termination, where would that
authority come from? I mean, it didn't come from Congress.
Mr. Cooke. We are not directing them to do anything other
than what is in their contract. I mean, these are the contracts
that have been in place. I am sure I answered the question.
Ms. Edwards. Then let me just conclude by just requesting
that you prepare a full answer to this question for our
records.
Mr. Young, do you have any comments about that? Have you--
in your experience have you experienced a contract where you
were required under one appropriation or authorization to set
aside money in preparation for termination of the contract? Is
that something that you have experienced before?
Mr. Young. That is not an issue I have been thinking about
the last little bit, so I am going to beg off and tell you--it
is a good question, and I think you deserve a, you know, a
response to it. There is clearly--how it should be done is not
ambiguous. I mean, maybe I can say that. I mean, there are
clear, you know, statements in the FAR, and there is clear
contractual requirements as to how it should be done.
Being as I haven't really kind of let that wrestle through
my head I don't want to maybe get you off track.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you very much. Okay.
Status of Tiger Teams
Mr. Cooke, I want to go to, you know, following really
along the same lines, I would appreciate it if you would
provide any or you can provide any new information today on the
responsibilities and reporting schedules of the tiger teams
that have been established. I mean, one--that is helpful
because one sentence in your prepared statement sort of stands
out, in which you say that, ``The data assembled by the study
teams will equip NASA with vital and substantive information
that we will need once the new fiscal year begins and once NASA
embarks on its effort to implement the 2011, budget request.''
Your statement goes onto the project completion, to
project--to project rather the completion of a majority of the
team's work by the end of the third quarter of fiscal year
2010. So based on the fact that so much is still unknown and
will remain so potentially through the end of this fiscal year,
how can Congress be reasonably expected to evaluate the
appropriateness of NASA's exploration budget?
Mr. Cooke. We will--we are--we do have these teams in
place, and it is part of the budget planning process in terms
of laying out the processes and understanding how these
programs would be put in place. We can, I mean, we will share
information at logical points in that development as part of
the budget process.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you.
Mr. Olson.
Filling the Human Spaceflight Gap
Mr. Olson. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and Mr. Cooke, a
question for you, sir. Just prior to the decision to cancel the
Constellation in February, NASA was still on a path for the
Space Station by March, 2015. In fact, earlier in our first
round, I mean, you confirmed that that was still a good number.
At the February 1 teleconference brief to the media on NASA's
budget request, the Deputy Administrator Lori Garver said that
for planning purposes NASA expected a crew, commercial crew
transport system to be ready to go in 2016.
And all of us aren't interested in lengthening this gap
between human spaceflight services in the United States, and,
again, March, 2015, is what Ares would have done. Commercial at
best now we are hearing some time in March of 2016.
Can you resolve--how does that increase or--it sounds to me
like it increases, you know, our gap, and why is that in our
country's national interest, our security interest to increase
the gap when we have got a program of record that is working
right now?
Mr. Cooke. In terms of the comparisons, the, of course,
there was the Augustine Committee that delivered their
independent view of it, and their estimates were different than
the program's. In terms of the readiness of Ares and Orion, I
can only speak to my understanding of the program data that I
have seen, and that is why I said what I did on the 2015 date,
and that is based on development of data from the contractors
and evaluating our internal schedules.
And in the March, 2015 date there has been schedule risks
that I think we have talked about in the past. In terms of--I
would not want to speculate on what might come of commercial
crew because that will require that we put out solicitations
for that work, and really understanding the proposals and what
is possible for what amount of money is what is required in my
view to assess that.
Mr. Olson. Thank you for that answer. So kind of in summary
I think you would be saying that certainly with Ares I as part
of the Constellation you have got a much better comfort level
with what is capable as opposed to these commercial operators
who right now are unproven. Is that a fair statement?
Mr. Cooke. I can really only speak to my understanding of
the Constellation Program.
Delays to the Constellation
Mr. Olson. And, Mr. Young, one more question for you. Given
the agency's decisions for fiscal year 2010 to refrain for
initiating new work not currently under contract and to refrain
from expanding the scope of any work that is currently under
contract, what is the scale of the delay to reach IOC if
Congress were to direct continued development of Constellation?
Any thoughts on that, Mr. Young?
Mr. Young. Yeah. I don't have the, you know, the detailed
knowledge or study to really, you know, really comment on that.
I do think that there is one factor that, you know, one, the
circumstances have somewhat changed in that we said that we are
going to continue Space Station at least until 2020. So, you
know, one of the--and, in fact, I, you know, even read that out
of the International Partners meeting there was discussion of
2028 there. So we are talking about--and you would kind of have
the feel that if Space Station is productive, continuing to be
successful, it is going to be hard to not continue that to
operate.
So I think we are now talking about a system to support
transportation to and from the Space Station that is not
measured in the part of the next decade, what we are talking
about for a decade or even, you know, another decade beyond
that. So in my view that somewhat changes the equation as to
how you evaluate what is the best space transportation system
to go back and forth to the Space Station.
Mr. Olson. Yes, sir. Thank you for those comments because
as I read the report one of the main reasons why they were
skeptical of Ares I was the station was scheduled to be de-
orbited in 2015. The Ares I would come online 2015, 2017, by
their estimates on the committee. So, okay, that makes sense if
what we are using is going to be gone, but as you alluded to,
bipartisan agreement that we need to go to 2020, and there are
international partners interested in going beyond that.
Incremental Transition to Commercial
And then just one final question, and I just wanted to sort
of address my good colleague, my friend from California. I just
want to assure you that I am a supporter of commercial
spaceflight, but we have got to do this incrementally, and they
need to prove to us first that they can do the cargo mission,
and I think they, you know, if they can do that cargo mission,
that is a great first step. But as my colleague knows, there is
a huge difference in flying cargo and flying human beings. Just
the modifications to the vehicle, the redundant systems, the
backup to the backup to the backup that are required because a
human being, a man or a woman, is placed on that vehicle. It is
a much different equation. I have had many meetings with the
commercial contractors, and they are good people, they are very
capable, and they are doing the American dream. I mean, they
are out there developing, and the stuff that has made our
country great, but they are not ready yet for human
spaceflight. They are getting to the point where they are
getting ready for commercial, but they are not ready for human
yet, and that is my concern.
In talking to them, one of them in particular, one that you
are very familiar with, said, you know, we are complying with
NASA's requirements for human spaceflight, and we have had
Admiral Dyer come here and testify to us a couple months ago
who said no one can say that with a straight face in this world
because NASA hasn't published the requirements for human
spaceflight.
So just want to make sure for the record everybody knows
that I am a supporter of commercial spaceflight, but it has got
to be incremental. Cargo first and then human.
And I yield back my time. Thank you.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Olson. I would like to
recognize at this time Mr. Hall.
Mr. Hall. Thank you. Mr. Cooke, and by the way, I am glad
to see Mr. Young here, back here. I know some good days with
Norm Augustine and the services of the two of you and others
yielded to this Congress and to this country, and I thank you
for your part of that.
Planning for Termination
And I understand the question was asked of you if you had a
plan to how you are going to shut down something. I don't how I
would answer that. If I organize something, I don't think about
it shutting down. Now, if you are going to fight a war, I would
admit you need to have a way out if you are going to do that,
you know, to have a plan for retreating if you have to, but in
this I don't think you would think about shutting it down if
you are going into it. Maybe I am just not thinking enough, but
I started and finished several industries and never occurred to
me that I could fail until I failed one time, and I never
forgot that. You know, it is like in Vegas what you lose hurts
you a lot more than what you win helps you.
But I understand your not wanting to make an answer to that
question, but I guess you could think about it and give her a
letter on it later if that would help.
Transitioning Constellation Infrastructure
I wanted to ask Mr. Cooke, the Shuttle Program is carrying
a lot of the overhead costs associated with human spaceflight,
and a lot of that agency overhead cost was planned to be
assumed by the Constellation Program after the 2010.
Where will NASA--how will they account for that, for the
overhead cost under the commercial crew program? And will the
burden for maintaining America's human spaceflight capabilities
be shifted to the emerging so-called commercial entity since
they will clearly be beneficiaries of it?
Mr. Cooke. The transition of workforce, the transition of
facilities and hardware has been something that we have worked
between the Shuttle and the Constellation Program. We have had
an active effort in that, so now we will be working a
transition effort with some of what that content was as well as
from Constellation. That is forward work. We do have a
transition team that is working, building off of that
experience to understand how we do work through those
facilities and so on.
But we don't have an answer on what that will be yet. That
is underway.
Mr. Hall. Whatever happens to NASA's existing launch
infrastructure such as the launch pads or the processing
facilities, the mission control center? What happens to those?
Just shut them down?
Mr. Cooke. Sir, that is forward work, and certainly we will
be--and it is not in my budget but in the Space Operations
Mission Directorate budget to work the 21st Century Launch
Program down at the Cape, but we will be working with industry,
we will be working within NASA to understand the future of all
of that capability and perhaps----
Mr. Hall. Do you think there will be some benefit to that?
Mr. Cooke. There could well be. Should be.
Status of Commercial Cargo
Mr. Hall. Well, then what exactly is the purpose of the 312
million you are requesting for commercial cargo in FY 2011?
Mr. Cooke. That part of the budget is--we are working
through the details with the companies that we have onboard
now, which are Space X and Orbital Sciences, to understand how
we can reduce some risks in their schedules by--with additional
testing, potentially an additional flight test for one of them,
developing, enhancing some of their capabilities to provide
cargo to Space Station.
Mr. Hall. I thank you, and I yield back.
Termination of Orion Capsule
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Hall. I would like to recognize
Mr. Perlmutter, who is visiting with us today, for five
minutes.
Mr. Perlmutter. Yeah. From far away. My name is Ed
Perlmutter. I represent the suburbs of Denver, so we have a
substantial facility, Lockheed manages and operates, that is
building the Orion capsule, and this--I have to say that the
decision by NASA to cancel the program, cancel the entire
Constellation Program has sort of turned things upside down in
Jefferson County. It has been a very solid project, seems to
have been, you know, operating, you know, and passing all of
the tests that NASA and the Augustine Committee have talked
about.
So can you explain to me why Orion is a casualty in all of
this, too, or am I mistaken?
Mr. Cooke. The exact decisions are something that I was not
directly a part of. I made inputs during the Augustine
Committee, during the fall with NASA management on
possibilities and options given the Augustine deliberations,
and so I had input into that process, but I was not a part of
the final decisions. I can't speculate on that.
The--in terms of where we go from here in the budget
request there is the commercial crew part of the budget that is
$6 billion over the run-out, where these kind of capabilities
certainly could be involved in that future through proposals.
Mr. Perlmutter. I guess where I am coming from, I think Mr.
Olson, he and I are pretty much on the same wavelength with
respect to the Constellation Project and its many features, but
it is lots of jobs in my area, and they are great jobs and with
good people.
And I know the space industry, Lockheed, Raytheon, General
Dynamics, all of the, Northrop Grumman, it can be boom or bust
in that business, but here is one where, you know, you get to
the guts of the thing, which we--I believe in manned
spaceflight. I believe that it is sort of a component part of
American science. It is about exploration, it is about, you
know, our desire to be bigger than we are, to do things beyond
our reach, and then you get down to the real particulars, and
it is a lot of jobs.
So how does the program plan to deal, you know, as I am
trying to build jobs in Jefferson County and in the seventh
Congressional District, now I have got to deal with this hole.
Is there any kind of way that NASA or anybody else is planning
to backfill this stuff?
Mr. Cooke. I definitely understand your concern, and with
the new programs that we have and the technology development
and the commercial crew and in precursor missions that are in
our budget to scout out some of the destinations that are
possible with humans, as well as in flagship demonstrations and
technology demonstrations, there will be opportunities to
compete for those, and that is what is in our budget request.
Mr. Perlmutter. So you would then suggest that these folks
could just move straight into the commercial side and really
not have to be a project that is managed by NASA. It is just
let Lockheed do it itself.
Mr. Cooke. That is a potential. In terms of how we do that.
Contractor Response
Mr. Perlmutter. But let me ask a question. In dealing with
your contractors, do they want this? Does a--I mean, I haven't
asked Lockheed. I don't know whether Northrop Grumman, I don't
know whether some small company up in Boulder, Colorado,
because I know there are companies in Colorado that are
interested in the commercial side of this.
But this is so intensive in terms of the infrastructure and
the cost that I don't know how any company can do it. I mean,
maybe it is a rhetorical question. If you can respond, I would
appreciate it.
Mr. Cooke. Well, certainly it is a shift in direction for
exploration, and you know, what we will be doing is providing
these competitions and those opportunities.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you, and I appreciate the committee
allowing me to speak, and I yield back.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you. At this time I would like to
recognize Mr. Rohrabacher for five minutes.
Composition of Future Panels
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, thank you very much. I am sorry that
the Chairman had to step out or Chairwoman had to step out
because I would like to make a recommendation. This sounds like
a very significant issue that is being discussed, and maybe it
would be nice to have more than one person in the room who had
the other side of the argument to present, and I would suggest
to my colleagues that we might want to have an actual debate or
presentation to the committee in which sides could actually
make their points and discuss it openly and be on the record.
It might be nice to have a little real honest debate among
experts on this issue, and I do not pretend to be an expert.
Mr. Young, you, of course, are a much better expert at this
than I am, as is Mr. Cooke, but I would suggest that to the
committee.
Government Inadequacy at Technology Development
To my colleague who just said, hey, I can't conceive, it is
very hard to see how private sector can do these things, it is
really impossible to consider how the private sector could
build an airplane back early on in the last century, and what
we did and the same way--it was almost impossible to conceive
how we were going to have railroads and how they were going to
provide transportation to the country. And the fact is the
government did not do the job. That was left to the private
sector in both airlines as well as in railroads. Otherwise it
would have been ten times as costly.
Let us just note that the Ares Project was $9 billion and
not one new piece of technology was developed for that $9
billion yet. That--when they took off, there was no new piece
there that they said, the engines or anything else, that there
was a brand new piece of technology. I went down to Space X,
and they have invested about $300 million, and they have got
brand new technology, and of course, they don't have as many PR
men working for them, they don't have all the other government
things that are guaranteed to companies that make things more
expensive, but if the private sector can do something for half
as much or even 1/5 as much as what the public sector can do,
we are limiting what our accomplishments are going to be in
space by insisting that the government or the bureaucracy is
the only one who can really be trusted to get the job done.
I would note that we also--there was also a colleague
suggested, well, this is like Blackwater. We can't contract
with Blackwater. Well, we do contract with Blackwater for some
important jobs, and they have done a good job, but let me note
maybe the better comparison would be when our government
contracts with a private airline to take our troops someplace.
We are talking about setting up a space transportation system,
just like we had a system of railroads and an airline system.
Would it be better to have the government run it and have
an agency dominate all the decisions? No. No, it wouldn't have
been, and I believe that is the same way and the same truth for
what we are setting up now as a space transportation system.
But we need the government to set standards as they do for
aviation, et cetera, and help in developing technology as they
do for aviation.
Human Rating Requirements
Mr. Cooke, how long will it be before NASA develops human
rating requirements and qualifications and verifications for
the process for--in terms of commercial crew? How long is that
going to take NASA?
Mr. Cooke. We are working on that right now. We have a
draft set of requirements and processes that we will be putting
out at the end of April for comment by industry with responses
back by the end of May, and we are due to vet those within
the--within NASA and be complete with that process by the end
of this fiscal year.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. So by the end of the year we are
going to know what NASA believes are the actual prerequisites
for human spaceflight and what requirements for various
vehicles?
Mr. Cooke. That is our plan.
Efficiency of Government Plan
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay, and Mr. Cooke, do you think that it
would be more expensive to--of course, we don't know what those
requirements are yet, the government part hasn't done their job
yet to see what those requirements are, but once they do, do
you think it will be more costly or less costly to proceed with
having Delta and Atlas meet some of those qualifications and
meet those requirements versus the $9 billion that we have
already spent on Ares and Orion that hasn't gotten us anywhere?
Mr. Cooke. I really can't speculate until we do
solicitations and get proposals.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Well, see, Mr. Young should answer
that, too.
Mr. Young. If I could answer a couple of your questions if
the Chair would allow.
I have got to go back--allow me. You mentioned airplanes, a
good analogy. I am a big admirer of our airplane industry. Even
today airplanes is a very mature industry. Airplanes land every
day with problems that would be catastrophic in the human
spaceflight program. Every day. They probably have done it
while we have been having this hearing.
So I think the analogies, you know, are interesting but not
directly applicable. If we come back to the requirements, and I
think what Doug Cooke said of NASA levying the requirements for
safety is a good thing to do, but I will remind all of us that
the reason things fail today won't be in those requirements
documents. In other words, the requirements will not say don't
confuse English and metric units, which is the reason Mars '98
failed. It won't say don't write down the wrong number in the
guidance equation for a Titan IV which is why a Titan IV
failed. It won't say don't let the foam hit the leaning edge of
the wing, and the only thing I really--the point I am really
trying to make is the requirements, the safety requirements are
important, and they should be done, but they won't get the job
done. What will get the job done, repeat it again, is the
strength of NASA and the incredible strength of industry, you
know, working together to make these items happen.
You mentioned the EELV. Two comments. First off, the EELV
started out as a commercial enterprise as you know as well as I
do obviously.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yeah.
Mr. Young. There were a large number of space system
failures. I chaired a review for Lockheed Martin, Sheila
Widnall chaired one for Boeing, looked into that, and Larry
Welch chaired a Presidential Commission to look into the launch
vehicles.
And out of that the Presidential Commission's basic
conclusion was that EELV proceeding as a commercial system when
the commercial market fell apart and didn't really happen, were
following practices that were not consistent with the practices
that we knew were necessary to make these things have a
sufficient and high probability of success.
So the EELV Program was changed, and it was changed to
implement techniques that we have experience with that we know
how to make these things work. So EELV is no longer, you know,
really a commercial system, and your other comment about we
could certainly take the EELV, and we could human rate it.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
Mr. Young. Aerospace did a study. They said it would take
between 5-1/2 and 7 years----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
Mr. Young. --to do that. I must admit, I am kind of struck
by it being that long to be honest, but that is what they said.
They identified no basic cost advantage, and in addition to
that what I know about it is that if you what you would like to
do is to take your initial space transportation system that you
went back and forth to Space Station, and you would like to be
able to grow that to--and I am not working your economic
equation. You would like to be able to grow that to a heavy-
lift, you would like not to have two systems, and there is no
question in my mind and Doug could certainly comment, no
question in my mind you can grow something like an Ares I into
a heavy-lift capability much more efficiently than you can grow
an EELV into a heavy-lift capability.
And I think, again, if you go back and look at the details
of that Aerospace study, you know, it will kind of support
that.
So, again, the point I, you know, that you and I have
really been discussing, and I always enjoy my discussions with
you I should say----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you.
Mr. Young. And by the way, it is a terrific example of what
I am trying to say is I end up with better thoughts having
debated with you, and I hope maybe you have debating me.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Absolutely. Thank you.
Mr. Young. And that is really what I am talking about is
how NASA and industry works together.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes, sir.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Young, and thank you, Mr.
Rohrabacher.
Technology Development in Constellation
We are going to about draw to a close and because we are
expecting votes shortly, but I want to just ask as we close
here, Mr. Cooke, in reference to Mr. Rohrabacher's point, what
new technologies has Constellation developed?
Mr. Cooke. In the Constellation Program we actually have
some technologies we have been working that will be potentially
migrated into our technology programs. Automated rendezvous and
docking is one that we are working on the Orion. In the upper
stage we are making further progress on the technology of
friction stir welding. We are working composite structures. We
have made some advances in lightening protection on space
vehicles, advanced batteries. We are using advanced solar
arrays on the spacecraft. We are making advances in guidance,
navigation, and control and other avionic software that will be
possible.
We have actually in an advanced development work out at
Ames we have developed technology in thermal protection system,
advanced thermal protection systems for spacecraft. We are
working in closed life support, and we have--we are actually
charting some new territory in modeling of the environments and
characteristics of the spacecraft during launch and entry
through new modeling techniques and software.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you. I mean, as you described a number
of new technologies developed in that little government-
supported program.
Mr. Cooke, just as we do close, by the end of the
authorization and appropriations process I hope that we and the
Administration can craft a productive path forward for NASA's
human spaceflight program, and given the concerns expressed by
members both on and off the committee over the suitability and
sustainability of the proposed redirection, we are going to be
looking at this investment that we have already made in the
Constellation Program, significant investment to see whether it
and how it can be part of the solution.
Constellation PDR
And in that regard, I mean, you have just completed the
Constellation Program's PDR. What is the status of
Constellation? Does it have any fundamental problems, or is it
on track technically, and just a yes or no answer would be good
for that.
Mr. Cooke. Just briefly, the Board for the preliminary
design review did recommend its advance toward critical design
review, which, I mean, we are working issues as all programs
do, but they are being worked.
Ms. Edwards. And is there--on the commercial side are they
anywhere near that?
Mr. Cooke. Well, at this point we are not developing the
commercial crew yet, and that is what this new program is for.
Ms. Edwards. Exactly. Thank you, and just finally, though,
you know, I hope that part of what you have heard here today is
that we don't believe, many of us on this committee don't
believe that the--that NASA either has the authority or either
through appropriations or authorization to terminate programs
at this stage. This is a work in progress, and so I hope you
will go back to your superiors and urge them to rethink any
approach in dealing with Constellation during the remainder of
the fiscal year that might impact it and the full program for
the future given that we haven't closed out the conversation
yet. This is of deep concern to many Members of the Committee.
It is a concern that I have as we have heard it over and over
again, both in terms of the impact on the workforce but also
the impact on the program given that Congress hasn't weighed in
yet on the President's budget proposal.
I want to thank our witnesses for testifying before the
subcommittee today. The record will remain open for two weeks
for additional statements from members and for answers to any
follow-up questions the subcommittee may ask witnesses, and the
witnesses are excused, and the hearing is now adjourned.
Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 4:45 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix 1:
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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Mr. Douglas Cooke, Associate Administrator, Exploration
Systems Mission Directorate, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
Questions submitted by Chairwoman Gabrielle Giffords
Q1. NASA's FY 2011 budget request states that commercial human
spaceflight services ``will ultimately open space travel to many more
people across the globe.'' Yet a 2002 market study on space tourism
that the administration used in support of its decision to fund the
development of a commercial crew transport industry concluded that a
private citizen would have to have a net worth of at least $200 million
to afford a ticket for commercial orbital space travel under current
ticket price projections.
a. Is this small percentage of the world's wealthiest people
the population that NASA is aiming to support as it funds the
development of this commercial crew transport industry?
b. If so, given current budgetary constraints, why does NASA
consider that to be the best use of scarce taxpayer dollars?
A1a, 1b. NASA is not aiming to support any specific population. The
vision of commercial human spaceflight to Low Earth Orbit (LEO) is a
robust, vibrant, profit-making commercial enterprise with many
providers and a wide range of private and public users. NASA hopes to
develop a framework for this initiative that accommodates a diversity
of people (e.g., astronauts, international partner personnel,
scientists, spaceflight participants) for a variety of reasons (e.g.,
science, research, station operations, tourism).
NASA's FY 2011 budget request for commercial crew will help develop
a critical capability that is needed by the Agency. NASA's primary
objective is to invest in commercial access to space and take advantage
of it for transportation of U.S. astronauts to and from the
International Space Station. By investing in commercial crew efforts
over the next five years, NASA can focus on the forward-leaning work we
need to accomplish for beyond-LEO missions. Additionally, this
investment will:
Reduce the risk of relying solely on Russia to
transport astronauts to the ISS following the retirement of the
Space Shuttle;
Free up NASA resources to focus on the difficult
challenges in technology development, scientific discovery, and
exploration;
Make space travel more accessible and more
affordable.
Build an enhanced U.S. commercial space industry that
creates new high-tech jobs, leverages private sector
capabilities, spawns other businesses and commercial
opportunities, and spurs growth in our Nation's economy.
Inspire a new generation of Americans by these
commercial ventures and the opportunities they will provide for
additional visits to space.
Q2. In light of continuing accounts regarding other countries' plans
to undertake human lunar exploration missions in the future, how
adaptable is the administration's approach, which would result in the
elimination of all ongoing human spaceflight vehicle development
programs, to a shift in the geopolitical landscape and subsequent
renewal of interest in a U.S. Moon landing? For example, would it allow
us, if necessary, to accelerate development and recover in time to
perform a lunar landing in the early 2020s?
A2. The Administration developed the FY 2011 budget request based on
what it believes is the best long-term strategy for human space
exploration; it did not develop the budget based on an estimate of the
geopolitical landscape now or in the future. For its part, NASA looks
forward to implementing whatever policy direction is given to us, now
or in the future. NASA is capable of accelerating work on the vehicles
required to reach the lunar surface if that became a national priority
and adequate funding were to be appropriated.
Q3. A January 2010 article in Spaceflightnow.com quoted the NASA
Administrator as saying ``Whether it be future human voyages beyond low
Earth orbit, or complex sample return missions from Mars and deep space
objects, or building future large space telescopes, NASA must pursue a
new era of international cooperation, a relationship where partners are
treated as equals.''
a. What is the U.S. strategy for international engagement in
the human spaceflight activities and exploration beyond low-
Earth orbit proposed in the FY 2011 budget?
A3a. NASA initiated a multilateral dialogue with thirteen international
space agencies in 2006 that resulted in the May 2007 release of the
``Global Exploration Strategy--The Framework for Coordination.'' The
GES ``Framework Document'' articulated common themes and a shared
vision of globally coordinated human and robotic space exploration. The
Framework Document also recognized the need to establish a voluntary,
non-binding international coordination mechanism through which
individual agencies may coordinate their respective exploration
interests. The International Space Exploration Coordination Group
(ISECG) was established in late 2007 for this purpose. In addition to
this very effective multilateral approach, NASA anticipates continuing
to build both on its established as well as emerging bilateral
relationships. Consistent with the U.S. Space Policy, the President's
proposed budget affords increased opportunities for NASA to serve as a
global leader and to establish early, critical cooperative
opportunities with our international partners.
Q3b. How will we cooperate with our international partners and engage
other nations in human exploration if we are uncertain about what we
will be doing and what the architecture will be?
A3b. The GES Framework Document recognizes that each participating
agency will maintain the flexibility to pursue its national exploration
interests, yet the ISECG provides a forum for agencies to identify
common interests from which meaningful cooperation could be achieved.
The GES framework process was designed to be flexible and to adapt to
changing circumstances and national priorities. In creating the
framework document and the ISECG, significant progress was achieved in
learning how to coordinate common exploration goals and architectures
that respond to those goals. NASA anticipates utilizing these processes
to develop global architectures for destinations in addition to the
Moon, including Near Earth Objects and Mars.
Q3c. If we are seeking to maintain our international leadership in
human space exploration, what is it we bring to the table?
A3c. Consistent with the more than 50 years of NASA leadership in human
spaceflight, the proposed 2011 budget makes significant investments in
a number of areas which are of great interest to our international
partners:
Extension and increased utilization of the
International Space Station to test and demonstrate key
enabling technologies and capabilities vital to further
exploration;
Transformative technology development and flagship
technology demonstrations to pursue new approaches to space
exploration;
Robotic precursor missions to multiple destinations
in the solar system;
Research and development on heavy-lift and propulsion
technologies;
Education and Participatory Exploration, including
focus on STEM.
The level of proposed investments is substantial and serves as a
catalyst for cooperation and its significance, compared to the
investments being made by our international partners, sets a strong
tone of leadership within a context of cooperation. Accordingly, NASA
has already received significant interest in these areas from our
partners. We are currently working with them to define our common long-
term exploration interests, as well as near-term cooperative activities
in several areas of the proposed 2011 budget. In particular, precursor
robotic missions may be a fruitful area for near-term collaboration
with other nations.
Q3d. Under the proposed FY 2011 budget plan, the U.S. government
wouldn't be able to offer a launch vehicle, a crew exploration vehicle,
or a lunar lander. How influential could this country expect to be in
the international space community without such assets?
A3d. The FY 2011 budget request provides NASA with significant
influence in the international space community because it opens and
enables many more opportunities for international collaboration and
partnerships. Under the previous plan, much of our program was off
limits to international participation, including important roles on
critical elements. As a result, there was some discontent among the
international community and there were fewer options for significant
strategic partnerships that could substantially increase the
affordability and sustainability of the program. The 2011 budget
request positions NASA to be the global space technology leader and
invites international partners to participate in the development of
transformational new technologies in areas such as heavy lift and in-
space propulsion, flagship technology. At the same time, the new plans
create a more robust industrial and technical base from which to
leverage the new capabilities in key mission systems that will open
greater opportunities for human space exploration. The net result could
be substantially greater and more robust international participation
and cooperation to allow more challenging missions sooner, all of which
is consistent with our new U.S. Space Policy and national objectives,
and precursor robotics missions to multiple destinations in the solar
system.
Questions submitted by Representative Pete Olson
Q1. What is the requirements rationale for attempting to develop a
high-energy engine for Orbital's Taurus II upper stage?
A1. A high-energy engine for Orbital's Taurus II upper stage has always
been part of Orbital's development plan for Taurus II. In fact, the
third mission under the CRS contract incorporates greater cargo
carrying capability of the Taurus II provided by a high-energy upper
stage. The plan and proposal was negotiated with Orbital as part of
Federal Acquisition Regulations part 12 fixed price procurement.
Q1a. What is the expected cost to the Government to proceed with that
development?
A1a. If NASA includes a high-energy upper stage for the Taurus II as
part of its COTS Cargo augmentation items to support multiple missions
including non-CRS uses, then NASA would only fund a portion of the
upper stage development costs. This is consistent with the COTS Cargo
Program philosophy of the commercial partner also providing capital.
While NASA has not negotiated its share of the development costs, it is
anticipated that NASA may contribute approximately $30M-$35M for this
development effort, if deemed appropriate.
Q1b. If Congress does not appropriate money to pursue this work will
Orbital Sciences be unable to fulfill any of its existing commitments
under the CRS contact?
A1b. The $312M in the NASA FY 2011 budget request for commercial cargo
is for incentivizing current commercial cargo providers to improve the
chance of mission success by adding or accelerating the achievement of
already-planned milestones, adding additional capabilities, or adding
tests that may ultimately expedite the pace of development of cargo
flights to the ISS. However, whether or not the funds are appropriated
and used in this manner, OSC is legally required to meet its milestones
and deliver services under the terms of the CRS agreement.
Q2. What is the requirements rationale for attempting to develop a
Block 2 engine upgrade for SpaceX's Falcon 9?
A2. The Block 2 engine upgrade for SpaceX's Falcon 9 would reduce the
cost associated with the Falcon 9 first stage and provide engine
commonality with the Falcon 1e. This commonality would increase the
engine's overall production and flight rate, further reducing cost and
potentially increasing the engine's reliability. While NASA is
confident in SpaceX's ability to develop a Block 2 engine upgrade for
the Falcon 9, this development activity does carry risk.
With the Administration's decision to extend the life and enhance
the utilization of the ISS, cargo transportation services are more
critically important to NASA. Thus, providing an investment to assist
with the development of a Block 2 engine upgrade for the Falcon 9
reduces the risk associated with the development of this planned
capability, potentially reduces NASA costs for cargo transportation
services, and potentially increases the reliability of the Falcon 9
cargo transportation flights to the ISS.
Q2a. What is the expected cost to the Government to proceed with that
development?
A2a. NASA has not negotiated its share of the development costs
associated with the Falcon 9 Block 2 upgrade. Thus, exact costs to the
Government are not known at this time. However, as an estimate, NASA
may contribute approximately $40M-$45M for this development effort.
Q2b. If Congress does not appropriate money to pursue this work, will
SpaceX be unable to fulfill any of its existing commitments under the
CRS contract?
A2b. Whether or not funds are appropriated and used to develop a Block
II upgrade for Falcon-9, SpaceX is legally required to meet their
milestones and deliver services under the terms of the CRS agreements.
Q3. What changes to the existing CRS contract milestones and/or
schedule would be necessary if Congress does not appropriate the $312
million requested for commercial cargo in the FY 2011 budget?
A3. No changes would be necessary because the CRS contract/schedule
would remain the same should the additional funding not be
appropriated. However, there is greater risk to NASA and the ISS
Program.
Q4. If Congress does not appropriate the $312M requested in the FY
2011 budget for commercial cargo, how will that impact SpaceX's ability
to successfully fulfill its CRS contract obligations?
a. Which milestones would not be performed?
A4a. Whether or not the $312 million requested in the FY 2011 budget
for commercial cargo is appropriated, SpaceX is legally required to
meet all of its currently negotiated milestones and deliver services
under the terms of the CRS contracts.
Q5. If Congress does not appropriate the $312 million requested in the
FY2011 budget for commercial cargo, how will that impact Orbital
Sciences ability to successfully fulfill its CRS contract obligations?
a. Which milestones would not be performed?
A5a. Whether or not the $312 million requested in the FY 2011 budget
for commercial cargo is appropriated, Orbital Sciences is legally
required to meet its currently negotiated milestones and deliver
services under the terms of the CRS agreements.
Q6. What is the underlying requirements rationale for proposing to
initiate development of a first stage hydrocarbon engine?
a. What requirements would be satisfied that cannot be
satisfied with solid rocket motors?
A6. The underlying requirements rationale for proposing to initiate
development of a first stage hydrocarbon engine is lower development
and operations costs, with the potential that NASA may not be the only
user of the engine. When NASA is the only user of a rocket, NASA alone
must support the industrial base required to build that rocket, which
can greatly add to the cost of a vehicle.
NASA plans to continue heavy lift launch vehicle studies in
partnership with the Department of Defense (DOD) to continue to mature
the LOX/Hydrocarbon concepts and to assess potential commonality
between NASA, DOD, and potential commercial needs with the primary
figure of merit as affordability and operability. The underlying
requirements rationale for proposing to initiate development of a first
stage hydrocarbon engine is lower development and operations costs.
However the trade studies outlined above will confirm this assertion.
Q7. What is the requirements rationale for the proposed LOX/CH4 engine
development?
a. What has changed since the ESAS decision not to pursue the
development of such an engine?
A7a. As part of the FY 2011 President's budget request, NASA will
initiate development and engine testing with a focus that could include
a low cost, high performance ``green'' liquid oxygen/methane (LOX/CH4)
engine and potentially also low-cost liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen
(LOX/LH2) engines. This work builds from NASA's recent R&D experience
in this area, using existing test articles and results to develop a re-
startable engine capable of high acceleration and reliability.
One of the options for the in-space engine is a LOX/Methane engine.
The objective of this LOX/Methane development effort is the
demonstration of key operational performance characteristics of a range
of new space engines, compatible with future use of in situ resources
that can eventually lead to the development of a low cost, high
performance ``green'' service stage to be used with in-orbit fuel
stations, with large payload and crewed vehicles or as an In-Situ
Resource utilization (ISRU)-compatible planetary ascent stage.
During ESAS, the choice of LOX/Methane instead of hypergolic fuels
for the Service Module and Lander ascent engines was made and was
supported by several factors such as a higher performance engine with a
lower overall system mass as well as ground operations at the launch
site should be simpler. In addition, a more compelling factor was that
LOX/Methane opened up the possibility using In-situ Resource
Utilization (ISRU) techniques of using Martian resources for fuel. The
Constellation program moved away from LOX/Methane due to development
risk impeding the schedule as well as available budget resources.
Q8. According to NASA's testimony, the marginal cost of an operational
Ares 1 based on two flights per year would be about $176 million per
flight and have the capability to carry approximately 5 metric tons of
cargo to the ISS orbit. This implies a cost to ISS of about $35,200 per
kg. NASA's initial CRS contracts (prior to the FY 2011 budget request)
totaled $3.5 Billion to deliver a total of approximately 40 metric tons
to the ISS. This implies a cost to ISS of about $87,500 per kg. In
order to resolve this huge discrepancy and provide NASA's justification
for pursuing a policy that is so costly to the American taxpayer,
please provide the following:
a. The fully-burdened cost estimate per flight, and the fixed
and marginal cost per flight, of the Ares 1/Orion. Please
provide these estimates for flight rates between one and six
flights per year.
A8a. NASA does not have a full burdened cost-estimate per flight
because NASA does not commit to development estimates prior to
completion of Key Decision Point C, where the project transitions from
Formulation phase (A/B) to Development phase (C/D). Ares I has not
completed KDP-C.)
With regard to the fixed and marginal costs, NASA recognizes that
there is often confusion with regard to publicized flight cost
estimates associated with the Ares projects, largely because those
estimates often include different assumptions. One key point of
confusion, for example, comes from the fact that the Ares I and Ares V
share significant fixed costs for vendor production base and sustaining
engineering, since both vehicles would use similar solid rocket
boosters, upper stage engines and avionics. Therefore, there are two
ways to consider the cost of an Ares I flight--one, where the Ares I
fixed costs are lower because it is assumed that certain fixed
operational costs would be shared with the Ares V, and another, where
the Ares I fixed costs are higher because the current shared-cost
scenario is not assumed.
In general, NASA does not budget by flight, but rather by fixed and
marginal costs expected on an annual basis. The fixed cost (i.e. prime
and non-prime support labor, costs of facilities) would be the cost
that must be incurred whether one rocket or multiple rockets are built.
In other words, the fixed cost is absorbed by the first annual flight
and is not counted again that year. The marginal costs, on the other
hand, are those costs that can be cleanly attributed to the production
of one unit, and that cost is generally the same, unit by unit. So for
each subsequent annual flight, NASA adds on only the marginal cost,
given that the fixed cost has already been absorbed into the first. It
is important to note, however, that NASA's formula of calculating the
cost of an Ares I flight (or subsequent annual flights) does not
include the project costs for the associated support elements, such as
ground operations, mission operations, EVA and program integration.
Those costs would be book kept under their respective project lines.
With regard to the cost per flight, NASA currently estimates that
both Ares I and Orion account for $69M each in marginal costs for a
flight unit, thus totaling $138M in marginal costs for each flight
since each flight would be assumed to have a capsule and a rocket.
However, the fixed cost per flight would vary based on whether Ares I
and Ares V shared operational costs were assumed.
For example, the FY 2010 budget request assumed that Ares I and
Ares V would share some operational costs--approximately $700M per
year, which would, in turn, equate to lower fixed costs for the Ares I.
Therefore, under that scenario the total cost for the first flight
would be $919M ($781M in fixed cost plus $138M in marginal costs) with
each subsequent flight costing $138M extra in marginal costs, as
outlined in the chart below:
However, if the assumption is that Ares I and Ares V would not
share operational costs, it is equally true to say that the cost of an
Ares I flight is nearly $1.6B. Under this scenario, all operational
costs would be carried by Ares I--which would account for an
approximate $700M increase in the fixed cost for Ares I. Thus, under
this scenario, the total cost for the first flight would be $1.461B in
fixed cost plus $138M in marginal costs, with each subsequent flight
costing $138M extra in marginal costs, as outlined in the chart below:
Q8b. The fully-burdened cost estimate per flight, and the fixed and
marginal cost per flight, of the SpaceX Falcon 9/Dragon. Please provide
these estimates for flight rates between one and six flights per year.
A8b. Specific launch cost data for Falcon-9/Dragon and Taurus II/Cygnus
are considered procurement and competition sensitive, and their
provision would compromise the commercial environment for these launch
activities. We respectfully recommend that you contact Space
Exploration Technologies and Orbital Sciences Corporation regarding
this information.
Q8c. The fully-burdened cost estimate per flight, and the fixed and
marginal cost per flight, of the Orbital Sciences Taurus II/Cygnus.
Please provide these estimates for flight rates between one and six
flights per year.
A8c. Specific launch cost data for Falcon-9/Dragon and Taurus II/Cygnus
are considered procurement and competition sensitive, and their
provision would compromise the commercial environment for these launch
activities. We respectfully recommend that you contact Space
Exploration Technologies and Orbital Sciences Corporation regarding
this information.
Q9. NASA's budget request states that, ``some amount of private
investment capital'' will be part of any Space Act Agreement.
a. Does NASA intend to solicit any evaluations from outside
financial analysts before issuing new Space Act Agreements?
A9a. NASA ensures that any selection criteria associated with
competitive awards are appropriately evaluated. To the extent NASA
determines that it does not have the appropriate expertise resident
within the Agency to evaluate any aspect of a competitive award, NASA
has the ability to engage outside experts prior to making awards. This
will be decided as NASA develops and finalizes its acquisition
strategy.
Q9b. Has NASA determined what level of private investment will be
required to supplement the federal government's commitment?
A9b. Currently, NASA intends to ask proposers to specify the level of
private investment they have available to support their development
efforts if selected to receive NASA funding.
Q9c. Is there a minimum threshold, or will NASA simply enter into
agreements with entities offering the best price without specifying a
minimum percentage or a minimum amount of private capitalization?
A9c. NASA does not currently intend to prescribe the level of company
investment required to supplement the federal funding commitment.
Similarly, NASA does not expect any company to be in a position to
propose a ``price'' for the commercial space transportation ``services
phase'' as an element of its proposal to participate in NASA's
commercial crew transportation development effort. The level of
investment will be assessed as part of the overall business plan and
will be a risk-based consideration in the portfolio of companies
selected for award. This will be decided as NASA develops and finalizes
its acquisition strategy.
Q9d. What criteria will NASA use to evaluate whether an entity has the
appropriate level of private capitalization?
A9d. NASA is still finalizing a strategy to support the development
commercial crew transportation services so that the Agency is prepared
to proceed if funding is provided in the final FY 2011 budget.
Selection evaluation criteria will be established as NASA develops and
finalizes its commercial crew acquisition strategy.
NASA plans to evaluate the business plans, including financing and
sources of funds, as part of the overall portfolio selection. The
amount of private capitalization is just one of several factors planned
to be evaluated.
Q9e. What penalties will NASA incorporate in Space Act Agreements to
protect the government in the event of non-performance by the
commercial entities?
A9e. NASA is still finalizing a strategy to support the development
commercial crew transportation services so that the Agency is prepared
to proceed with competitive awards if funding is provided in the final
FY 2011 budget. NASA will ensure that the taxpayer interests are
protected.
Q9f. What organization within NASA will be responsible for evaluating
the satisfactory amount of private investment capital?
A9f. A NASA source evaluation board or equivalent will review the
proposed business and financial plans, and the source selection
authority will determine how much Government funding to award the
winner(s) and how much Government funding should be allocated among
awardees. It is expected that this source evaluation board will be
established by the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate.
Q10. Developing the human rating requirements for the Ares/Orion
system was the product of a long process of negotiations between ESMD
and OSMA.
a. Under the commercial crew proposal, how long does NASA
estimate it will take to produce new human rating requirements,
and once that step is completed, what will be the process to
ensure the U.S. Government has the necessary insight and
oversight to determine whether vehicles and systems comply with
the standards?
A10a. NASA is still finalizing a strategy to support the development of
commercial crew transportation services. Such a strategy will include
planning for applicable technical requirements, certification process
and the role of the Government versus the industry partners in terms of
insight, oversight and potential Government-furnished equipment. Also,
on May 21, 2010, NASA issued a Request for Information (RFI) seeking
information that will help NASA formulate plans for Commercial Crew
Transportation (CCT) as proposed in the FY 2011 budget request. The
purpose of this RFI is to collect information from industry to help
NASA plan the overall strategy for the development and demonstration of
a CCT capability and to receive comments on NASA human-rating technical
requirements that have been drafted as part of this initiative.
Responses to the RFI and the accompanying draft human rating document
were due to the Agency on June 11, 2010. NASA hopes to finalize the
human rating document by the end of the calendar year.
Q10b. Will it be an iterative process similar to what occurred with
Ares/Orion?
A10b. The development of commercial human rating requirements has been
an iterative process with NASA safety, engineering, and health and
medical technical authority participation, among others. NASA will
continue the iterative process via the aforementioned RFI soliciting
comments from industry.
Q10c. Once the commercial human rating requirements are published by
NASA, what is your estimate of how long it will take for a commercial
crew provider to build, certify and flight test its launch system?
A10c. Based on the President's FY 2011 budget request for commercial
crew development, NASA is currently planning for the demonstration
phase to be complete in 2015 with actual missions starting in late 2015
or early 2016. As way of comparison, the Review of U.S. Human
Spaceflight Plans Committee estimated that a commercial crew launch
service could be in place by 2016. This estimate was based on estimates
from providers ranging from three years to five years from the present,
and an assumption for one year of program realignment with a start in
early FY 2011.
Actual proposals from industry, however, will supply the best
estimate, once they are available.
Q10d. What is the basis of that estimate?
A10d. When developing schedule estimates, NASA reviewed previous
proposals received from industry in response to past COTS cargo
solicitations--solicitations that also offered bidders to offer
proposals for commercial crew capabilities.
Q10e. If there is no estimate, how was the budget derived?
A10e. Budget formulation documents and discussions are of a pre-
decisional nature and thus cannot be provided.
Q11. Since the two COTS companies are significantly behind their
schedules, why hasn't NASA re-competed the COTS cargo contracts?
a. At what point would NASA deem the contractor's performance
unacceptable and re-compete?
A11a. Both commercial cargo development partners continue to make
steady progress in achieving their cargo demonstration milestones.
While each has experienced some milestone delays, this is not
unexpected, since both partners have aggressive, success-oriented
schedules, and are facing challenges typical of a spaceflight
development program. As such, NASA sees no reason to doubt either
company's ability to achieve its desired objectives--that of
demonstrating commercial cargo delivery to and from the International
Space Station in the 2011 timeframe.
NASA will not pay for a milestone until it is achieved. However, we
reserve the right to continue working with a partner if we deem it is
in the Government's best interest and that they are continuing to make
acceptable progress toward their demonstration goals. NASA has invested
significantly in the success of these cargo demonstration efforts and
we are depending on both partners to develop commercial cargo services
for delivery to/from the ISS. We want to help them succeed and we need
for them to succeed. NASA consistently reviews each company's progress,
and if their progress was deemed unacceptable, we reserve the option to
terminate the agreement and to seek alternate partners. We would do so
at the point when a partner stops making technical progress developing
their system and assessments indicate the partner cannot be expected to
complete the milestones in the agreement within a reasonable time
period. This criterion was used when RpK, one of NASA's original COTS
partners, was terminated when it ceased progress on its technical
milestones as a result of the failure to meet its negotiated financial
milestones.
Q12. During his speech at the Kennedy Space Center on April 15, 2010,
president Obama directed NASA to begin developing a rescue vehicle
using the Orion crew capsule.
a. What is the cost estimate for such a development?
A12a. NASA will endeavor to develop revised cost estimates as the
Administration works with Congress to determine how Orion should be
restructured, consistent with direction outlined in the NASA
Authorization Act of 2010 and the final FY 2011 appropriations for the
Agency.
Q12b. Where in the budget will the funding come from?
A12b. The funding for this restructuring will come within NASA's top-
line request released in February, consistent with direction outlined
in the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 and the final FY 2011
appropriations for the Agency. The out year funding profile will be
refined as part of the President's FY 2012 budget submission.
Q12c. What previous programs will be displaced by this new change?
A12c. The Administration and Congress will continue to work to develop
a plan that balances a restructured Orion project with the other
priorities in NASA's FY 2011 budget, consistent with direction outlined
in the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 and the final FY 2011
appropriations for the Agency.
Q12d. How would such a vehicle get to the International Space Station?
A12d. An Orion crew emergency return module could launch un-crewed as a
payload on a yet-to-be determined expendable launch vehicle, and then
utilize autonomous rendezvous and docking technology similar to the
European Space Agency's Automated Transfer Vehicle and Russian Progress
spacecraft, or autonomous rendezvous with Remote Manipulator System
capture/berthing such as the Japanese HII Transfer Vehicle and as
planned for the COTS cargo vehicles.
Q12e. Given that NASA will have to use the Russian Soyuz capsule for
crew access to the International Space Station, what additional
capability would an Orion-based crew lifeboat provide?
A12e. An Orion-based crew lifeboat would enable an American crew escape
capability that will increase the safety of our crews on the Space
Station, reduce our dependence on foreign providers, and simplify
requirements for other commercial crew providers. This effort would
also help establish a technological foundation for future exploration
spacecraft needed for human missions beyond low Earth orbit and will
preserve some critical high-tech contractor jobs in Colorado, Texas,
and Florida.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Mr. A. Thomas Young, Lockheed Martin (Ret.)
Questions submitted by Chairwoman Gabrielle Giffords
Q1. In your prepared statement, you state that ``A detailed
exploration plan with destinations, dates and implementation plans is
needed.'' What, in your view, is involved in developing such a good
plan?
a. What can be held up as a model?
b. What would you recommend Congress do in the absence of such
a plan from NASA?
A1. There are many examples of NASA programs with excellent plans.
Apollo and the Mars robotic programs are two superb models. Most
successful programs are characterized by detailed plans that focus the
efforts of diverse organizations required to work together to
accomplish a defined objective. A primary responsibility of leadership
is to establish a detailed implementation plan with all the definition
needed to provide program direction. Destinations, dates, etc. and
required elements of the plan.
Failure to provide a detailed implementation plan is a failure of
leadership and will result in a failed or highly inefficient program.
A budget without a detailed implement plan is an oxymoron. Congress
should refuse to approve a budget without first having and approving a
detailed implementation plan.
Q2. As a seasoned aerospace professional who has led and overseen the
development of many complex, expensive military and civilian
spacecraft, what, from your perspective, are the most significant
challenges in implementing NASA's proposed plan for purchasing
commercial crew services for access to low-Earth orbit?
a. Does the administration's estimated price tag of $6 billion
and estimated 5-year time horizon to establish commercial crew
capabilities across multiple commercial providers make sense?
b. What further information would you want to see in order to
develop confidence in the proposed timeline and budget for this
type of development project?
A2. Space projects are hard. Even with the application of our best
capabilities all are not successful. We have developed a methodology
that maximizes the probability of success. This methodology utilizes
NASA's extraordinary leadership and continuity of human spaceflight
expertise and the implementation capability of industry which is second
to none. This partnership is a model that is tested, proven and
continuously improved. Why would anyone make a drastic, unproven change
to this methodology? Risk of such a change are enormous and involve
mission, schedule, cost, workforce and space program risks.
I do not believe the $6B cost or 5 year schedule are realistic or
supported by experience. I have seen no analysis that support these
budget and schedule numbers.
I would not approve commercial crew without extensive proof of
capabilities with flight performance. Commercial cargo can be a first
step followed by non-NASA commercial crew demonstrations. I do not
believe this can be accomplished on a schedule that will allow
repetitive commercial crew flights to space stations prior to 2020.
Q3. The FY2011 request proposes $3.1 billion over five years for
research in heavy-lift and propulsion technology. One of the areas this
budget line is to emphasize is development of a first stage engine, and
in particular, a hydrocarbon engine that would be used for a future
heavy-lift vehicle. The congressional budget justification also
indicates the projected level of funding is anticipated to lead to an
operational engine by the end of the decade.
a. How important is the development of a new first stage
engine, and in particular a hydrocarbon engine to development
of a future heavy-lift vehicle?
b. Does the proposed budget and timeline make sense, in your
view?
A3. The budget and timeline do not make sense to me. I am a strong
supporter of technology development and I believe a human spaceflight
technology program with mission focus is needed. However, I believe we
have the capability to start heavy-lift today. Heavy-lift is dependent
upon funding authority not a 5 year technology program. The $3.1B would
be better utilized to start the heavy-lift development.
Q4. How will the absence of a specific exploration goal, timeline, and
mission affect the advanced technology programs that the Administration
is proposing?
a. Are there any lessons learned from previous technology
programs that Congress should consider?
b. In your statement, you noted that ``NASA, with appropriate
outside support, should define the required technology
program.'' What type of outside support would be involved and
from what institutions?
A4. A technology program without mission focus often results in an
inefficient, ``hobby shop'' approach. The technology developed in such
an environment results in technology that satisfies the technologist
but not the mission need.
The Mars robotic program has been a highly effective and focused
technology endeavor. Rover, atmospheric entry, landing, electronics,
etc., technology development have all supported a highly successful
program.
I believe the best source of outside support is the National
Academies. The Academies National Research Council (NRC) has the
capability to make available extraordinary individuals to conduct
reviews of NASA's technology program. Emphasis should be given to
individuals with space project experience to assure the focus factor is
not lost. I should note, I am a member of the National Academy of
Engineering and the NRC Space Studies Board.
Appendix 2:
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Additional Material for the Record
Letter to The Honorable Gabrielle Giffords from Gary P. Pulliam, Vice
President, The Aerospace Corporation