[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
FAA'S OVERSIGHT OF ON-DEMAND AIRCRAFT OPERATORS
=======================================================================
(111-97)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
AVIATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
March 17, 2010
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
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55-535 PDF WASHINGTON : 2010
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman
NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, JOHN L. MICA, Florida
Vice Chair DON YOUNG, Alaska
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
Columbia VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
JERROLD NADLER, New York FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
CORRINE BROWN, Florida JERRY MORAN, Kansas
BOB FILNER, California GARY G. MILLER, California
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi Carolina
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania SAM GRAVES, Missouri
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York Virginia
MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois CONNIE MACK, Florida
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia
JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio
TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
HEATH SHULER, North Carolina MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York VERN BUCHANAN, Florida
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky
JOHN J. HALL, New York ANH ``JOSEPH'' CAO, Louisiana
STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin AARON SCHOCK, Illinois
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee PETE OLSON, Texas
LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
PHIL HARE, Illinois
JOHN A. BOCCIERI, Ohio
MARK H. SCHAUER, Michigan
BETSY MARKEY, Colorado
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York
THOMAS S. P. PERRIELLO, Virginia
DINA TITUS, Nevada
HARRY TEAGUE, New Mexico
JOHN GARAMENDI, California
VACANCY
(ii)
Subcommittee on Aviation
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois, Chairman
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin
PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
Columbia JERRY MORAN, Kansas
BOB FILNER, California SAM GRAVES, Missouri
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania Virginia
MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii CONNIE MACK, Florida
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
JOHN J. HALL, New York JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California VERN BUCHANAN, Florida
JOHN A. BOCCIERI, Ohio, Vice Chair BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky
NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia
CORRINE BROWN, Florida
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
MARK H. SCHAUER, Michigan
THOMAS S.P. PERRIELLO, Virginia
JOHN GARAMENDI, California
DINA TITUS, Nevada
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
(Ex Officio)
(iii)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ vi
TESTIMONY
Bolen, Edward M., President and Chief Executive Officer, National
Business Aviation Association.................................. 4
Coyne, James K., President, Air Charter Safety Foundation........ 4
Gilligan, Margaret, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety,
Federal Aviation Administration................................ 4
Scovel, III, Calvin L., Inspector General, U.S. Department of
Transportation................................................. 4
Zuccaro, Matthew S., President, Helicopter Association
International.................................................. 4
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Carnahan, Hon. Russ, of Missouri................................. 23
Costello, Hon. Jerry F., of Illinois............................. 24
Mitchell, Hon. Harry E., of Arizona.............................. 31
Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota............................ 32
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Bolen, Edward M.................................................. 36
Coyne, James K................................................... 48
Gilligan, Margaret............................................... 75
Scovel, III, Calvin L............................................ 98
Zuccaro, Matthew S............................................... 111
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Bolen, Edward M., President and Chief Executive Officer, National
Business Aviation Association, PowerPoint presentation......... 46
Gilligan, Margaret, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety,
Federal Aviation Administration................................
PowerPoint presentation.................................... 86
Response to request for information from Hon. Garamendi, a
Representative in Congress from the State of California.. 18
Response to request for information from Hon. Hirono, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Hawaii...... 95
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
HEARING ON FAA'S OVERSIGHT OF ON-DEMAND AIRCRAFT OPERATORS
----------
Wednesday, March 17, 2010,
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Aviation,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m. in
room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Jerry
F. Costello [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Mr. Costello. The Subcommittee will come to order.
The Chair will ask all Members, staff and everyone to turn
electronic devices off or on vibrate.
The Subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony
regarding the FAA's oversight of on-demand aircraft operators.
I will give a brief opening statement, call on Mr. Petri, the
Ranking Member, to make any comments or give a statement, and
then we will immediately go to witnesses.
I understand everything is subject to change around here,
but I understand that we have votes right away, so we will wait
and see.
I welcome everyone to the Subcommittee hearing today on the
FAA's oversight of on-demand aircraft operators. On-demand
aircraft operators represent a segment of the aviation industry
that operates aircraft on a for-hire, on-demand basis. Their
flights include air tours and sightseeing flights, air medical
flights, flights for passenger business or personal travel, and
helicopter flights to offshore oil rigs.
Part 135 of the Federal aviation regulations govern on-
demand operators. In 2003, the FAA initiated an Aviation
Rulemaking Committee to evaluate and make suggestions to update
the regulations related to part 135. The ARC sent 124
recommendations to the FAA in 2005, many of which were related
to the on-demand industry. To date, the FAA has not issued any
final rules based on the ARC's recommendations.
In 2007 and 2008, there were 33 fatal on-demand accidents
resulting in 109 deaths. In 2007, due to concerns about the
fatal accident rate in the on-demand industry, Chairman
Oberstar and I requested the Department of Transportation's
Inspector General to review the on-demand industry and evaluate
the FAA's oversight activities.
Specifically, we requested that the I.G., one, evaluate the
differences between the FAA's regulation and on-site or on-
demand operators versus larger commercial air carriers.
Secondly, to identify specific issues that may hinder the FAA
in its oversight responsibilities. And three, provide
recommendations to improve the FAA's oversight of these
operators.
The I.G. issued the first part of its report in July of
2009, and I understand the second report will be issued very
shortly. Today, I look forward to hearing from the I.G. on its
ongoing work in this area.
The first report raised a number of important issues. The
I.G. found that on-demand operators operate in a high risk
environment. This Subcommittee heard similar testimony last
year concerning helicopter air ambulance operations, which
often fly in challenging conditions such as poor weather,
nighttime and to unfamiliar landing sites.
The bottom line is that on-demand operators fly very
different missions than scheduled commercial airlines, and in
many cases they do not have the same infrastructure as
scheduled commercial airlines. For example, on-demand pilots
often fly without the assistance of an air traffic controller
to ensure aircraft separation and to provide weather and safety
advisories.
The I.G. also found that on-demand operators had less
stringent safety-related regulatory requirements than large
commercial airlines.
Some of the ARC's 2005 recommendations for on-demand
operators related to icing and pilot fatigue. These are issues
that this Subcommittee has examined with regard to scheduled
commercial airline operations. The FAA has commenced
rulemakings related to icing for large commercial airlines,
although we still are waiting for the FAA to issue several
final rules. We need to ensure that the on-demand community is
not left out of the process as we go forward.
In addition, the report stated that the FAA lacks a risk-
based oversight strategy for on-demand operators. The FAA does
not require that on-demand operators report any data to the
agency, but instead conducts a voluntary survey. It is
difficult to have a risk-based oversight system without data to
show where risks are. Again, this is a problem similar to what
this Subcommittee found with regard to helicopter air ambulance
operations.
After I requested a study on the subject, the GAO issued a
report in 2007 recommending that the FAA identify and collect
data to better understand the air ambulance industry. Today, I
hope to hear from the FAA on steps that it intends to take in
the interim to ensure risk-based oversight for the entire on-
demand industry.
I also look forward to hearing from the industry on steps
that it has taken to improve the safety and oversight of its
operators.
We address many of the problems that the DOT I.G., the GAO
and the National Transportation and Safety Board identified
relating to helicopter air ambulances in H.R. 915, the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2009, which is currently pending in the
Senate. Our bill also deals with issues relating to pilot
fatigue in both the on-demand and commercial airline
environment. I hope to move to Conference on this bill very
shortly after the Senate acts, as we understand that they are
doing as we speak.
Before I recognize Mr. Petri for his opening statement or
any remarks, I ask unanimous consent to allow for two weeks for
all Members to revise and extend their remarks and to permit
the submission of additional statements and materials by
Members and witnesses.
Without objection, so ordered.
The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the
Subcommittee, Mr. Petri, for his statement or any comments that
he would like to make.
Mr. Petri. Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this
important hearing on the safety of air charter and on-demand
operations, commonly referred to as part 135 Operations.
Air charter and on-demand operators, including tourist
sightseeing flights, agricultural missions, business charter
flights and helicopter rescue flights play an important role in
our economy. Air charter and on-demands air taxi operators
conduct flights under different regulations than large
commercial carriers due to the wide variety of flight and
mission profiles of part 135 operators.
Commercial airlines, on the other hand, operate under
fairly uniform flight and mission profiles. They are generally
flying scheduled flights from one airport to another with a
great deal of consistency.
According to industry experts, the part 135 industry has
shown a declining accident rate over the last 10 years.
However, a recent Department of Transportation Inspector
General review has indicated that there are potential safety
risks and shortcomings in FAA oversight of this complex
industry.
So I am interested in hearing an assessment of the safety
of the part 135 industry and what steps might be taken to
improve risk-based safety oversight of the industry. I would
also like an update from the FAA and other witnesses on the
regulatory efforts that grew out of the 2005 Aviation
Rulemaking Committee recommendations specific to this segment
of the aviation industry.
Finally, safety experts have testified before this
Subcommittee that the key to improving aviation safety is to
address threats based on defined risk. Safety data from both
mandatory and voluntary reporting mechanisms have helped the
FAA to achieve a remarkable safety record.
According to the Inspector General's report, there is a
lack of safety data available to regulators and auditors to
pinpoint safety risks within the part 135 industry. So I am
interested in hearing from the witnesses which data sets, if
collected, would help to improve safety without causing undue
cost burdens on small mom and pop operators.
And this is always a problem between larger and smaller
entities, and we don't want to drive small people out of
business because they are often servicing major parts of our
economy. In my part of the Country, we have a lot of people
flying crop dusting and doing other flights, in addition to the
emergency health flights and the like.
I thank the witnesses for their participation in today's
hearing and I look forward to your testimony.
Mr. Costello. I thank the Ranking Member.
And now we will recognize the panel of witnesses: first,
the Honorable Calvin Scovel, III, who is the Inspector General
for the U.S. Department of Transportation; Ms. Margaret
Gilligan, who is the Associate Administrator for Aviation
Safety with the FAA; Mr. Ed Bolen, who is the President and
Chief Executive Officer of the National Business Aviation
Association, and Mr. Bolen was the co-chair of the ARC; Mr.
Matthew Zuccaro, who is the President of the Helicopter
Association International; and Mr. James Coyne, who is the
President of the Air Charter Safety Foundation.
I welcome all of our witnesses here today. I would ask
Members to give their statements in five minutes or less, and
would advise all of our witnesses that your entire statement
will appear in the record. And we will ask you to abide by the
five minute rule so that we have time, hopefully, to ask
questions of our witnesses.
The Chair now recognizes Inspector General Scovel.
TESTIMONY OF CALVIN L. SCOVEL, III, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; MARGARET GILLIGAN, ASSOCIATE
ADMINISTRATOR FOR AVIATION SAFETY, FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION; EDWARD M. BOLEN, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, NATIONAL BUSINESS AVIATION ASSOCIATION; MATTHEW S.
ZUCCARO, PRESIDENT, HELICOPTER ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL; JAMES
K. COYNE, PRESIDENT, AIR CHARTER SAFETY FOUNDATION
Mr. Scovel. Chairman Costello, Ranking Member Petri,
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here
today to testify on FAA's regulatory framework and oversight
challenges for on-demand aircraft operators.
On-demand operators are a vital part of our Nation's air
transportation system and economy. In addition to conducting
passenger flights and cargo operations, on-demand operators
provide critical services such as emergency medical transport
and access to remote communities. Over the last 10 years,
however, on-demand operators have been involved in 155 fatal
accidents.
At the request of this Subcommittee, we completed a review
and issued a report last July that identified differences in
regulations and oversight applied to on-demand operators versus
large commercial carriers. We are completing a second review,
which focuses on specific challenges in FAA's oversight of this
industry. My testimony today is based on this body of work.
I would like to discuss three areas in which we have
focused our efforts: one, the risks surrounding on-demand
operators; two, the need for an updated and effective
regulatory framework given these risks; and three, challenges
facing FAA in moving from compliance-based oversight to risk-
based approach.
On-demand operators typically fly in an inherently risky
environment. They tend to have short flights with more takeoffs
and landings, the most dangerous part of a flight, and they may
fly to and from small airports that may not have air traffic
control towers or emergency equipment. They may also operate at
altitudes vulnerable to weather and terrain hazards.
At the same time, on-demand pilots are often unfamiliar
with the flight route due to the many different destinations
that they service. Maintaining the varied and often older
aircraft types and models adds to the complexity of operations
and FAA oversight.
The 22 operators we reviewed had 321 registered aircraft,
comprised of 65 different makes or models ranging from small
Cessnas to Gulfstream jets and Sikorsky helicopters.
Despite these risks, FAA's current oversight of on-demand
operators is based on compliance with outdated regulations that
lack rigor in key areas such as flight crew training
requirements and maintenance inspections for aircraft. For
example, most on-demand operators are not required to provide
pilots with leadership in cockpit decision-making training,
CRM, even though the NTSB concluded that such training might
have prevented several fatal on-demand accidents between 2001
and 2004.
In regard to maintenance requirements for on-demand
operators, we found that about 60 percent of the on-demand
passenger and cargo fleet is over 20 years old. FAA, however,
does not require aging aircraft inspections for on-demand
operators.
Further, while many key maintenance requirements for on-
demand aircraft seating 10 or more passengers are similar to
those for large commercial aircraft, these requirements do not
apply for on-demand aircraft seating nine or fewer passengers
which make up 85 percent of the industry.
FAA also needs a better regulatory framework for segments
of the on-demand industry that have even greater operating
risks such as helicopter air ambulance and air tour operators.
Air ambulance operations are frequently conducted in poor
weather, low visibility and high stress. Air tour operations
are usually conducted at low altitudes in high traffic areas
and with pilots conversing with passengers.
FAA efforts to improve helicopter air ambulance safety have
focused on voluntary actions with little results. For example,
in 2008, air ambulance operators were involved in eight crashes
resulting in 29 fatalities. FAA has a rulemaking effort
underway for helicopter emergency medical services, but to date
has not issued a proposed rule.
While FAA issued a new rule for air tour operators in
February, 2007, the rule continues to allow some air tour
operators to fly under less stringent general aviation
regulations. As a result, many of the standards in place for
part 135 operators, such as pilot training programs, more
stringent maintenance policies, and crew rest restrictions, are
still not required for many air tour operators.
In 2005, FAA's Aviation Rulemaking Committee made 124
recommendations for strengthening on-demand regulations. The
recommendations address concerns such as crew rest, flight and
icing conditions, and the lack of cockpit voice recorders and
operational data. To date, however, FAA has not issued final
rules addressing the committee's recommendations and many of
these issues are also the focus of 39 open NTSB recommendations
related to on-demand operations.
FAA plans to implement a risk-based safety approach for
safety oversight for on-demand operators in 2013. However,
given the number of accidents associated with on-demand
operations, we believe it is imperative that FAA implement an
interim process that considers the risk factors unique to this
industry.
We will continue to monitor FAA's progress as it strives to
provide one level of safety for all commercial aviation
operations.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy
to answer your questions or other questions posed by Members of
the Subcommittee.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you, Mr. Scovel, and now
recognizes Ms. Gilligan.
Ms. Gilligan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And we have a few
slides that we would like to use to accompany this
presentation.
I want to thank you and Mr. Petri and the Members of the
Committee for inviting me to discuss FAA's oversight of the on-
demand operators. I would like us to look at the nature, scope
and, importantly, the value of these operations.
We are talking about these kinds of aircraft operating to
these kinds of airports, including Alaska, where you may find a
polar bear on the tarmac, and oil rig in the middle of the Gulf
of Mexico or the rooftop of a hospital.
On-demand operations aren't anything like the commercial
operations we are usually called here to discuss. Those
operations, operated under part 121 of our regulations, are
what most people experience when they fly. They buy a ticket
and fly from one major airport to another, using only about 10
percent of the airports throughout the Nation.
But if you live in Alaska or if you need emergency medical
service in a remote locations or more quickly than surface
transportation can provide it; if you are handicapped or
elderly, but want to see the vast beauty of the Grand Canyon or
the amazing sight of the only active volcano in the U.S. while
traveling in Hawaii, you need the kind of services provided by
an on-demand operator.
We think comparing these operations to part 121 operations
is like comparing apples and oranges. These operations are not
predictable, but we and the Congress have acknowledged that
they are valuable. They take passengers and packages to places
you can't get to from here. They serve remote location, mostly
in Alaska, but also throughout the U.S., and they land on
everything down to grass and gravel strips.
They serve needs that cannot be met in any other way. That
is why it is important to identify the risks in each of the
various types of operations and identify safety improvements
that address those risks.
I want to be clear. The accident rate for these operators
is higher than we want. No accident is acceptable to the safety
professionals at the FAA. And that is why we have engaged in
continuous efforts to increase the level of safety throughout
the industry.
The data shows that over the last 10 years, we have
continually put pressure on the number of total accidents and
the number of fatal accidents in this industry. The actual
number of accidents, as well as the accident rates, are
trending down. I would like to look at the data for several
parts of this industry.
Congress has acknowledged the value of air tour operations.
You have given us direction to enhance the safety and reduce
the environmental impacts of these operations, but you have
never suggested these operations should be eliminated. At FAA,
we have taken specific actions to improve safety of air tours
in Hawaii, and in 2007 established a specific set of safety
standards, part 136, that applies to all air tours. And in this
case, the numbers of accidents continues to trend down.
Emergency medical service is a vital public safety and
health demand, but the service must be provided safely. We have
identified safety improvements and have gotten voluntary
implementation from many operators. We saw great improvement in
2007, but we saw another spike in accidents in 2008. And while
the accidents continue to trend down over the last 10 years, we
know we can make even more improvements. We have started what
Congress will be directing in the FAA reauthorization, a
rulemaking that sets specific safety standards for these
valuable operations.
Thousands of employees and tons of equipment are moved to
and from oil rigs every day, and there is no way to do it
except by air. This inhospitable environment was very hard for
us to conquer since there was no way to establish radar service
over the water. But technology advances give us the chance to
change that, and the Gulf of Mexico is one of the first places
where we are implementing ADS-B. By providing air traffic and
other services to operators in the Gulf, we will continue to
push down the accident rate.
And finally and perhaps most importantly, Congress has
recognized the unique role aviation plays in everyday life in
Alaska. From funding the FAA's Capstone Program that provided
ADS-B technology throughout the State, to supporting the
Medallion Foundation's efforts to improve pilot training and
implement other safety enhancements, Congress has invested in
safety and we see the results in the constant improving
accident trends.
But we are not finished. We agree with the Inspector
General that we can improve our oversight of this diverse
industry. We have provided our inspectors a tool to improve
their focus on high risk areas. About 70 percent of the
inspector teams that are assigned to these operators are
already using that tool, and we will require that it be used by
all inspectors by the end of the year.
And in accordance with Congressional direction, we have
developed a staffing model that will help us better estimate
the staffing we will need in the future, and we will use that
model for our 2012 budget.
Congress, FAA and the on-demand industry have made
measurable safety improvements over the last 10 years. We
intend to continue that success and we would be pleased to
respond to any questions.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you, Ms. Gilligan, and now
recognizes Mr. Bolen.
Mr. Bolen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Petri and the
Committee for holding this important hearing, giving us an
opportunity to testify today.
As you know, the National Business Aviation Association
represents over 8,000 companies that rely on business aviation
for some portion of their transportation challenges. This
includes both part 91 operations and part 135 operations. As
all of you know, these have been very challenging times for the
business aviation community. Nevertheless, it remains a very
important industry for the United States economy.
Here in the United States, business aviation represents
over 1.2 million jobs--including manufacturing jobs, service
jobs, good paying jobs that we can keep here in the United
States. Business aviation also serves as an economic lifeline
to those communities with little or no airline service. During
this economic turndown, over 100 communities have lost all air
service. So general aviation is a vital link for America.
General aviation also helps companies be productive and
efficient, help them do more with less, and also provides
assistance in our Nation's humanitarian efforts. Since the
Haiti crisis, for example, business aviation operations have
flown over 700 operations into Haiti. They have transported
over 1,200,000 pounds of supplies. They have moved over 3,500
people, doctors, humanitarian relief efforts. So it is a
critical part of our Nation's aviation infrastructure.
I think one of the things that has already come out today
is that part 135 operations, which are very much a part of the
business aviation community, are enormously diverse, with
diverse aircraft flying diverse operations into often
challenging and sometimes unique places.
It is also what makes part 135 operations so important in
the United States. And there is a concern as we have some of
these conversations that people will mistake why we have
different regulations for schedule operations, for on-demand
operations, and for noncommercial operations. But it gets to
the point that these are very different operations which need
to have appropriate interventions and regulations, which
understand, facilitate the operations, and enhance the safety.
Our goal should not be to have identical regulations. It should
be to reach equivalent safety opportunities.
With that in mind, the Aviation Rulemaking Committee that
the Chairman has referenced in his opening remarks was convened
I 2003. We have not had a major rewrite of part 135 since 1978,
and so beginning in 2003, large numbers of people from the
community dedicated hundreds of hours in a sustained effort to
try to understand the diversity of the operations and to
propose thoughtful, tailored enhancements to the safety net
which is in place.
These recommendations, as you have mentioned, dealt with
issues including fatigue, icing, cockpit resource management.
We think that they were appropriate when they were submitted to
the FAA in 2005. And I have gone back and reviewed them, and I
do not believe the intervening five years has changed what the
community would recommend as we go forward.
Five years feels like a long time to wait for a rulemaking,
but we also recognize that during that time the FAA has had
multiple administrators. And so we have approached the 135 ARC
recommendations with some degree of patience, but we feel it is
important that we move forward. The community put a tremendous
amount of time and effort into this. We think it represents the
best thinking from the community and we would urge the FAA to
move forward with that.
We also recognize in the interim period there are
educational programs and international standards such as the
International Standard for Business Aviation Operations, or
ISBAO, which can facilitate these operations, and there is
probably more that can be done in terms of reporting, training,
and inspector prioritizations of resources.
But Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, MBAA
stands ready to assist you as we try to move forward to build
on the very special on-demand operations which are so
fundamental to our Nation's job base and our transportation
system as we work to enhance safety.
Thank you.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you, Mr. Bolen, and now
recognizes Mr. Zuccaro.
Mr. Zuccaro. Thank you, Chairman Costello and good
afternoon, Ranking Member Petri and Committee Members. I
appreciate the opportunity to come before you.
The original issue seems to be based on the perception of a
safety disparity between scheduled 121 and on-demand 135. That,
as you accurately pointed out, that is kind of a skewed
comparison at this point, based on the fact that there is no
actual data of flight hours or mission-specific performance in
the on-demand market, certainly not in the helicopter industry.
We believe that simple action of getting that accurate data
and mission profile would increase or enhance our safety
profile, based on 100,000 hours flown. It still is not
acceptable and it still is not on a par with the scheduled air
carriers, but it would give an accurate comparison.
I know the issue does not really relate to regulatory
oversight per se. As was mentioned, the regulations are
pertaining to the specific mission profile. Case in point in
the helicopter industry, which is kind of unique, 121 air
carriers basically comply in fact with 121, which is an
extensive, complex regulation based on their operating
environment and their equipment.
If I am a typical helicopter operator and I want to go out
and do multi-missions, and we have 50 of them, and plus, I have
to make sure that my operation is in compliance with FAR part
61, in compliance with FAR part 91, in compliance with FAR part
119, and compliance with FAR part 135. And if you're flying
HEMS, there is specific flight duty rest time limitations in
there.
Let's say I actually also do some air tour operations. I
have to make sure I am in compliance with FAR part 136. Within
that regulation, it has further requirements for Grand Canyon
and the State of Hawaii. If I want to do external load
operations, I have to make sure I comply with 133 rotocraft
external load. And if I should happen to be doing aerial
applications, I have to make sure I am complying with part 137.
This is an extensive regulatory oversight that exists and
we think it is proper. And if you want to enhance it or tweak
it, we are up for that, but it shouldn't be replaced by a
duplicate 121.
I think the other issue in terms of maintenance is
important, that helicopters are maintenance-intensive and we
basically do in fact have extensive maintenance comparable to
the airlines because of the nature of the equipment and the
manufacturer's recommendations.
If I can get the slide up here? This is a slide prepared by
the FAA out of the Safety Office a while back. And you can see
that this is factors over 1946 to 2002 that led to a drastic
reduction of the 121 air carrier accident history. It brought
it down to almost zero, which is a goal that we aspire to, and
we have the utmost respect for the 121 operators and the people
that run that operation and the achievement they have made.
But what is important is take a look at the things that
triggered the reductions. They are either infrastructure
improvements or technology advancements. They are not increased
regulations and it is not surveillance increase. And it is also
on the bottom, the important box on the bottom indicates a
cooperative safety agenda between the FAA and the industry
drove this train.
We respect that and we are trying to duplicate that in the
helicopter industry through the International Helicopter Safety
Team. And the next slide indicates basically what it would be
like possibly if the helicopter industry achieved this,
introduction to a scalable safety management system, insurance
safety incentives, night vision goggle utilization and TOZ,
ADS-B implementation, which is now taking place in the Gulf of
Mexico, and eventually as a vision in all IFR operations
similar to the airlines, with a cooperative effort between the
industry and the FAA and the NTSB and the Committee.
So we think that is really the key to make this thing
happen and not really focusing on the particular regulations.
If you take a look at the mission profiles that have been
mentioned. A typical airliner, obviously, travels certified
airport IFR to certified airport. Take an EMS mission where you
depart in the middle of the night off of a trauma center in
undesirable weather and over a possibly less than desirable
terrain, without communications and without surveillance from
air traffic control, and you are going to land someplace that
nobody's been before.
We want our environment to be improved to equal or get up
to the status of the 121 air carriers. We think that that is
the way to go. Give us a similar operating environment with
their controls and their oversight in the environment and the
technological advancements, and we think we can duplicate their
information in terms of safety history.
We are not against regulations. We have supported
regulatory initiatives as appropriate in the HEMS. Our
recommendations actually have exceeded the NTSB recommendations
and the FAA, so it is not a matter of not wanting more
regulations. We want the right ones that are applicable to our
situation.
That being said, we are going to maintain our policy of
safety first. One accident is one too many, and we look forward
to working with the Committee, the FAA and the NTSB to achieve
that.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you, Mr. Zuccaro, and now
recognizes Mr. Coyne.
Mr. Coyne. Well, thank you very much, Chairman Costello,
Ranking Member Petri and Members of the Subcommittee.
My name is James Coyne. I am the President of the Air
Charter Safety Foundation, which was founded in 2007 as a
501(c)(3) non-profit foundation established to improve safety
in air charter and shared aircraft ownership operations.
A lot of the important comments that I was going to be
making have already been made, so with your permission I would
like my comments put into the record, and really address some
of the concerns we have about the I.G. study directly to you.
First off, the I.G. study concludes that the FAA's
oversight produces less stringent safety requirements on part
135 operations. And I am here to say that in fact that is
probably a misstatement. I used to be a college professor many
years ago and I know how hard it is for the I.G. to track young
people and have them do studies like this on short notice
without really fully understanding an industry. But if I had to
give this study a grade as a professor in my days, I probably
would give it a C minus because it really overlooked some of
the most important things that you need to do to evaluate the
safety of the air charter industry.
They say they want to look at the risk factors in the
industry, and I certainly agree with everything that they said
about the risk factors in air charter. We in the industry have
known from the day of our very first air charter operation, we
have always known that this is a different business than the
airline business and has very different risk factors. So I
congratulate the study for producing a report that says the
obvious. We have known this for a long, long time.
But what they don't say, what they do not research is how
has the community, how has the air charter community responded
to these very different risk factors that we have to face? And
the answer is we have done over the last 50 years hundreds and
hundreds of things, many of them with the FAA's encouragement
and guidance and many of them without.
And I would like to focus just on six of those items that
we have achieved in just the last few years. First is the
implementation of rigorous audits across the industry. This is
probably one of the most important things to have happened in
the last 10 or 15 years. These did not exist in the charter
industry as recently as 15 years ago, and now virtually all of
the major charter operators in this Country voluntarily subject
themselves to aggressive audits to ensure that their operation
manuals that they have to submit to the FAA before they can be
approved to operate an aircraft, that they are living up to the
letter, the spirit of those operation manuals and those
guidelines and the FAA regulations.
We at the Air Charter Safety Foundation undertake audits
for our members at great expense, and we do it regularly, and
we hope that all of the charter operators in the Country will
continue to move in this direction.
And one of the reasons that they will, we think, is because
of the second item I would like to mention, the development of
what we call safety management systems. This is something,
frankly, that we have copied from the military and from the
airline industry. But in the last five years, across the entire
135 industry, there has been an understanding that we are
moving in the direction of safety management systems in our
industry.
In fact, the ICAO, the International Civil Aviation
Organization, is mandating that SMS, or what we call safety
management systems, become a part of air charter around the
globe. And the FAA is moving with this community to have this
SMS mind set developed and turned into regulatory demands.
The third thing I would mention is the development of
safety data development systems. Again, five or 10 years ago,
there was really no sophisticated way for the industry to
develop safety data or to track safety data. The Air Charter
Safety Foundation has produced a program called AVSiS. It is a
free safety data tracking system for our operators or any
operator in the Country. And this will allow us to begin to
develop the data that we need to really find out what are the
things that we are doing wrong? Because you don't want to wait
for the accident to happen. You want to start mining the data
of your operations to find out where you have to invest new
resources and attention.
Fourth, the Air Charter Safety Foundation has just recently
released something we call a risk assessment tool. This allows
every charter operator in the Country before a flight to
determine what are the special risks associated with this
special flight. If you are taking off at night in rain, if it
is going into an airport you are unfamiliar with, if there is
snow on the runway, all sorts of factors can be put into this
risk assessment tool so that the aircraft operator can
determine whether he has to take or she has to take special
steps or perhaps even cancel the flight so that the operator
can go to the passenger and say, I am sorry, but the risk
assessment that I have just done on this flight is so high that
I am not willing to do the flight now. We are going to wait
until tomorrow morning, things like that.
This is something that even the airline industry doesn't
have as well developed as we are developing in the charter
industry.
Third, we have produced for our community something we call
IC-Check, which is a computerized system so that every operator
can assure himself that before the flight is taken, the flight
is fully consistent with every single FAA requirement, that we
fully in compliance with everything. This fulfills the role of
a dispatcher, perhaps, for a larger airline, but allows a
smaller operator to have this online tool to achieve the same
kind of assurance that they are meeting all of the regulatory
requirements for a flight.
And finally, we have developed, in conjunction with the
Port Authority of New York, an online training program for
complicated airports, so that a pilot going into an airport
that he has never flown into before can go online and see a 20
or 30 minute video as though he was being briefed by someone
who has been flying into that airport for 20 years, get the
benefit of somebody really familiar with that airport, and get
it online for free. So this is something that we think is going
to be very important to give pilots who are going into airports
where they don't have a lot of experience really a good
opportunity to train for that particular flight.
So I don't see how the I.G. can do a study of what the FAA
should do in terms of aviation safety for this industry unless
they study what is the community already doing itself. It is
trying to look at one hand without the other. And frankly, it
has already been mentioned that this is apples and oranges.
This is far broader than apples and oranges. If the airlines
are an orange, this community is hundreds and hundreds of other
kinds of apples, and we deserve to have a flexible adaptive
regulatory system. And I submit that the one that we have today
is flexible. It is adaptive, and it is not certainly less
stringent than is needed.
Thanks very much.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you, Mr. Coyne.
Mr. Scovel, I have to ask you to follow up on Mr. Coyne's
statement that, one, he doesn't see how the Inspector General
can ask the FAA to proceed without first seeing what the
industry is doing. Do you have a comment about that?
And secondly, I think Mr. Coyne said in his former career
as a professor that he would give the report a C minus. And I
am wondering, one, can you grade the report for us? Mr. Coyne
gives it a C minus.
Mr. Scovel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A couple of comments,
if I may.
First, I would like to acknowledge Mr. Bolen's superb
contributions to the 2005 Aviation Rulemaking Committee. The
committee has come up with some superb recommendations for FAA
and for the Congress to consider in order to increase the
safety posture for the on-demand carrier industry.
Mr. Zuccaro, about a month ago I put my son on a helicopter
air ambulance to take him from one Northern Virginia hospital
to another. He is recovering from a bone marrow transplant. I
am very thankful to you and to the pilots of that bird and
everyone in that industry.
Mr. Coyne, my aviation safety team I thought was on track,
frankly, to make it into Phi Beta Kappa because they are the
same team that two years ago reported on Southwest Airlines, so
that has appeared frequently before this Committee regarding
repair station oversight, FAA oversight of repair stations. We
have also done extensive work recently on American Airlines and
their maintenance procedures.
I guess we will have to go back to remedial study hall if
all we are going to get from this one is a C minus.
Mr. Chairman, I would put this one a lot higher than that.
And if I could echo a couple of comments that you made in your
introductory remarks. First, let me remind everyone here that
we responded to your request and to Chairman Oberstar's request
when we prepared this report.
You asked us to look at the characteristics of both part
121 and 135 segments of the industry, their regulatory
differences, FAA's varying safety oversight programs, and
keeping in mind my mission under law to keep this Congress and
the department fully and currently informed. When I have two
Committee Chairmen tell me what they would like to be informed
about, we answer the mail. And we have done that here.
In the course of doing that, we consulted extensively with
the FAA and with industry representatives, to include those
sitting here at the table with me today. They had a chance to
look at all of our facts and we have incorporated their
comments where we considered appropriate in our report to the
Committee.
Secondly, I interpreted, sir, your direction to us to
compare 135 with 121 merely as a request to use part 121 as a
frame of reference, not as a yardstick against which we should
measure part 135 with the intent ultimately to recommend that
one set of regulations become the mirror image of the other.
Our July, 2009 audit report and my testimony today report
on undeniable safety challenges faced by the on-demand
industry, resulting from, as we have all agreed in our
introductory remarks today, the diversity of operators and
aircraft in the challenging environment in which they fly.
I think an objective reading of our work will show that we
have never recommended that 135 regulations be revised to
mirror part 121. We know our lane and we stay in it. FAA is the
policy maker, not OIG. Our role is to provide data so that the
Congress, the department and FAA can get their decisions right.
We are not NTSB either. NTSB is acknowledged worldwide as
the aviation safety experts. That is not my role.
What we have done over the course of many years now, not
only while I have been the Inspector General, but also under my
predecessors, has been to derive long experience with our
examinations of FAA's safety oversight programs. And FAA is our
jurisdiction, not the industry. And I would like to keep that
uppermost in mind, too.
In fact, industry and we, once all the smoke clears I think
from this discussion, have to recognize that we are essentially
on the same page thanks to the intimate involvement of industry
in the Aviation Rulemaking Committee over the course of more
than two years, from 2003 to 2005.
The Congress and FAA have an outstanding blueprint, a road
map on how to improve safety conditions within the 135 industry
and that is the report from the ARC. And again, an objective
reading of our 2009 report and our testimony today will show
that essentially our recommendations boil down to this. FAA
needs to move out on the ARC recommendations. FAA needs to
institute an interim oversight measure, risk-based oversight
measures to bridge the gap between where we are today until
2013 when its new risk-based long-term safety oversight system
is supposed to come on line.
Mr. Costello. I thank you, Mr. Scovel.
At this time, the Chair would recognize the distinguished
Chairman of the full Committee, Mr. Oberstar, who has to leave
shortly, as do I and Mr. Petri, to go to the floor to manage a
bill.
So Chairman Oberstar?
Mr. Oberstar. Manage two bills, in fact, one a reiteration
of a bill we passed last week or the week before. Hopefully the
other body has risen from its slumber and been affected by an
earthquake, prodded into movement, and do the right thing by
the furloughed employees.
But I want to thank Inspector General Scovel for splendid
work and quick response to the request Mr. Costello and I made
to inquire into this particular issue. It has been a long time
concern of mine, higher inspection standards for aircraft, the
aging aircraft, the challenges of that segment and the
incidence, rising apparently, incidence of fatal accidents with
on-demand air services, which I rely on in my district. My
district is the size of the Eastern Seaboard from here to
Connecticut, and without charter operations, I couldn't serve
the people of my district, but it has to be safe.
And the issues raised and questions provoked by the
Inspector General's report are of great importance, and the
testimony from all the witnesses. I have skimmed through it, as
I usually do for all these hearings, and I would love to spend
a little more time with you, but unfortunately the Floor calls
and we have to leave.
But thank you very much for your presentation.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks Chairman Oberstar.
And now, Ms. Gilligan, if you would, you state in your
testimony that the FAA is optimizing its oversight resources on
demand operations. Do you want to elaborate on that?
Ms. Gilligan. Yes, sir. As always, FAA is faced with
setting priorities. And as we look at the Inspector General's
recommendations, for example, on providing risk-based
oversight, we have worked, as you know, for more than the last
five years to enhance the risk-based oversight that we provide
to part 121 operations. In fact, the Inspector General and I
and others in my position have testified before this Committee
several times about the need for FAA to continue to improve the
risk-based oversight system that we use for 121 operators and
for our part 145 repair stations.
As we have continued to try to improve that system, we have
not been able to put the same kind of focus on the risk-based
approach for the on-demand operators. That is a piece that we
are moving toward, and as I mentioned in my testimony, we do
have a tool that is available to the inspectors responsible for
on-demand operators right now.
We know 70 percent of those teams are using that, and we
are putting out the guidance to mandate the use of that tool as
the Inspector General suggests, as a way to fill an interim gap
until we can have a more robust system available for these on-
demand operators. But again, we focus on the commercial 121
operators and the part 145 repair stations because we believe
that is where our highest priorities need to remain.
Mr. Costello. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Petri. But before I do, let me say
that I will have to leave to go to the Floor and Mr. Boswell
has agreed to sit in as the Chair and preside over the rest of
the hearing.
Let me, Mr. Scovel, thank you, as Chairman Oberstar did,
for your quick response to our request and we intend to follow
up on this and to work with you and the FAA.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Petri.
Mr. Petri. Thank you, and I apologize, too, because I will
have to be over shortly to keep an eye on my colleagues.
I just wanted to observe, we were talking a little bit on
Jim Coyne's grading. There has been a lot of grade inflation
since he taught school, so it probably would be a B plus today
in any event.
But I wonder if anyone on the panel, particularly the
representatives of the private industry involved, had any
comment? The Federal role clearly is to protect the traveling
public and people who are being dealt with. You have many
segments of the industry where they are actually not doing
that. They are doing agricultural work. They are flying out to
oil rigs. They are monitoring traffic patterns for radio
stations. It seems to be a little different category than
protecting the traveling public.
And also, those tend to be in many cases smaller operations
where too much regulation would reduce the service to the
consuming public, people traveling on the road or buying food
in the store or one thing or another. So is that a fair point
to make?
And I was particularly impressed by Mr. Zuccaro's
discussion of all the different segmented specialized types of
thought that is in place to try to tailor procedures to the
different nature of segments of the industry, and then Mr.
Coyne's discussion of the things the industry or pieces of it
are doing to protect or to help the pilots and others involved
do a better job.
Mr. Zuccaro. Yes, Congressman, all the missions that you
just mention are predominantly helicopter-type oriented
missions, and they fall into that 50-plus mission diversity
that we were speaking about.
There are those type of scenarios. I would say something
like flying off to the offshore oil, those are done under 135
regulations and they are highly regulated and they are surveyed
on an ongoing basis by the FAA. The FAA inspectors are at those
operators' locations on a regular basis. They do fam rides out
to the oil rigs and inspect the facilities.
Absolutely, something like electronic news gathering or
traffic reporting would fall under part 91. They are not really
required because they are not doing passenger-carrying
missions. But the other type of services in terms of
surveillance with the FAA where you have small operators, that
is an excellent point because I know in the helicopter
industry, 85 percent of the operators are in fact small
operators, one to five helicopters. They have one base location
and they usually only conduct VFR operations in the local area.
So the surveillance on that type of an operation and
oversight is going to be dramatically different than obviously
a large air carrier with hundreds of aircraft in international
and domestic locations, but it is tailored accordingly as the
case may be.
I would point out one interesting thing that has frustrated
us is that senior FAA management and executives, and the same
on the NTSB side, have taken the initiative and in a very
professional manner and a dedicated, committed focus on safety,
have come out to the field and actually try to survey and look
at the operations themselves.
On numerous occasions, they were provided the opportunity
to fly in the aircraft and go out and see the operating area.
Unfortunately, they weren't able to do that. Their legal
departments would not allow them to take those flights because
of a potential conflict of ethics issue, which befuddles us,
quite frankly. They took the time. They came out and they
showed their interest and dedication, and yet the legal arm of
those agencies told them you can't go on that flight and go see
those areas and see what is going on. They are regulators. They
are investigators and make recommendations. Who better to go
out and to see the environment and to fly in it?
So I don't know if there is anything that can be done with
that, but we would love to take them out and show them those
operations. And that is one of the idiosyncrasies that we run
into out there.
Mr. Boswell. [Presiding] Thank you.
The gentlewoman from California, did you have questions?
Ms. Richardson?
Ms. Richardson. My question was for Mr. Bolen.
Mr. Bolen, you reference in your testimony that the
Aviation Rulemaking Committee submitted over 100
recommendations to the FAA to update part 135 regulations. You
stated that you are hopeful about the renewed interest in these
recommendations.
Could you tell us a little bit more and what confidence you
have that you think it is going to be more than an interest and
get done?
Mr. Bolen. Well, I think there are a couple of different
things that have come together, not the least of which is we
have a new Administrator with a new five year term that can
provide some stability and predictability. One of the reasons
that we went to a five year term for an Administrator was to
provide that kind of long range guidance. When we delivered our
recommendations, we were at the tail end of one Administrator.
We went through a long interim period. We now have a new
Administrator.
And I think there is also a renewed commitment to enhancing
safety of all operations as we have collectively, as a
community, made safety and continue to make safety a number one
priority.
Ms. Richardson. Have you had any conversations with the
Administrator yet of a commitment to do that?
Mr. Bolen. We have talked about promoting safety generally.
We have not talked specifically about the ARC recommendations.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. Would you be opposed to supplying
with them what your request is?
Mr. Bolen. Sure.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Boswell. Thank you.
I am going to announce that we are going to probably finish
this today at 3:20 because of other things that are happening.
But I do want to recognize Mr. Garamendi for any questions he
might have, but we are going to try to wrap this up at about
3:20. That is our goal at least.
Mr. Garamendi?
Mr. Garamendi. I will not stand in the way of your desired
departure because I, too, have to leave.
The report that we have before us really speaks to what the
FAA has or has not done, and so questions for Ms. Gilligan. And
I just want to go through the specifics of the report one at a
time, and if you could respond on what the status of the FAA is
with regard to each of these.
Crew training. The report suggests that the crew training
requirements and regulations are inadequate. Where is the FAA
on that matter?
Ms. Gilligan. We have issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking for what we call crew resource management. The
comment period is closed and we are working on that final rule.
Mr. Garamendi. Expectation of completion is when?
Ms. Gilligan. I believe it is the fall, but I can get you
the data that we are working against. I am sorry.
Mr. Garamendi. If you would, please.
Ms. Gilligan. Sure.[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Garamendi. Just moving right along. Maintenance
requirements?
Ms. Gilligan. We will look closely at the Inspector General
recommendations, but I think as you have heard from much of the
testimony, these aircraft are very different from the aircraft
that are used in the part 121 operations, and we think that
there are appropriate differences in some of the maintenance
requirements.
As Mr. Zuccaro pointed out, there are several sections of
our rules currently applicable to these operations that do set
a requirement for approved training programs and maintenance
programs, and we do provide oversight of those. But we will
certainly look again at those areas the Inspector General has
highlighted to see if there is something additional that should
be included.
Mr. Garamendi. So there is no new rulemaking proposal
underway?
Ms. Gilligan. There is nothing underway yet.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Bolen, of your 100 recommendations, are
there anything in the maintenance?
Mr. Bolen. My recollection is that there is some of the
primary recommendations were in the area of pilot fatigue. And
I think those recommendations are very consistent with some of
the latest thinking, including circadian rhythms and so forth,
and then icing, cockpit resource management were among the
priorities here.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay. So the maintenance issue remains open.
That is what I heard.
Ms. Gilligan. We, again, will certainly look at that. We
always look closely at whatever the Inspector General suggests.
Mr. Garamendi. And yet the fleet is both new and very old.
Ms. Gilligan. Yes, sir, it is.
Mr. Garamendi. So maintenance would seem to be an issue of
some significance.
Ms. Gilligan. It is, and that is why we do, in fact, have
programs in place for maintenance oversight for these aircraft,
but we will look to see if we need to enhance that.
Mr. Garamendi. I note, and I suppose the Committee notes,
that the Inspector General thinks this is something you ought
to look at.
Ms. Gilligan. Yes.
Mr. Garamendi. The emergency helicopter operations, Mr.
Zuccaro, you spoke to that. What is the FAA doing about that?
Ms. Gilligan. We are drafting a set of standards that will
apply specifically to emergency medical services. That notice
has not yet been issued, but it is in draft and it is, as I
mentioned in my testimony, a part of what we know Congress is
very interested in in our reauthorization bill as well. So we
are well along on meeting that expectation.
Mr. Garamendi. Two more to go, and thank you. I will be
done within five.
The level of safety for air tour passengers?
Ms. Gilligan. We implemented an air tour-specific set of
standards in 2007 and we have seen an improvement in the
accident rate in that industry as well. We will continue to
monitor that, and if there are changes that appear to be
necessary, we will pursue additional rulemaking if necessary.
Mr. Garamendi. And Mr. Bolen, any of your 100
recommendations in that area?
Mr. Bolen. Were not specific to air tour.
Mr. Garamendi. And finally, recommendations to strengthen
part 135, just generally, I guess, that issue. We covered it.
Ms. Gilligan. Yes.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Boswell. Thank you.
And I think that probably brings us to closure. Mr.
Chairman Costello had a short exchange before he left, said
that he felt like we had a good exchange today and good
information, and was pleased for the effort that you have all
put into it, and be sure and thank you for taking the time to
do this.
And Mr. Boccieri now decides he would like a question. I
had it down that he didn't want to have any.
Mr. Boccieri. Thank you. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, but
those are very thought provoking questions.
Mr. Boswell. There is a good possibility we will recognize
you at this point, and then I will finish my remarks.
Mr. Boccieri. Last one standing. Thank you.
To Ms. Gilligan, there was some testimony that talked about
the surveillance priority index that is assisting inspectors
and prioritizing surveillance of part 135 operators. What
exactly is going to be the process by which inspectors are
going to be--what type of surveillance are we talking about?
Ms. Gilligan. It is actually an automated tool that allows
an Inspector who has more than one certificate for these kinds
of operations to determine where he or she might better spend
their time, based on the level of risk in the operation. So it
is actually an automated tool where the inspector will fill in
information, provide certain numerical values to that
information, and the help tools he or she come up with a way to
better prioritize where they spend their work, so that we don't
have inspectors who are sort of just repeating what they have
done everywhere. They are really looking at those operators
where there may be higher risk and at those particular areas
where there may be higher risk.
Mr. Boccieri. So sort of a risk assessment?
Ms. Gilligan. Yes.
Mr. Boccieri. Okay. And to the panel, I don't know who
would be more appropriate to answer this, but it has been noted
that the on-demand operators have a significantly higher
accident rate than commercial carriers, at least that is what
is being purported by the I.G. However, the FAA data shows that
the number of on-demand fatal accidents has declined since
2000. How do you strike the balance on those two assessments?
Mr. Bolen. Well, I will say that we have very good numbers
in terms of the absolutes. We know that. Understanding the rate
relates a little bit more to hours flown, which have not been
as clear. And that is one of the reasons that the general
aviation community has historically worked to try to strengthen
the understanding and the gathering of data related to flight
hours.
Today, we rely on a survey and the survey results help us
make a guess-timation of flight hours. But in terms of actually
getting to rate, we would need more precise information on
that. And that is one of the reasons why our community is we
have worked to improve general aviation safety, have tried to
focus on absolute numbers because they are clear, concrete and
understood. The rate is a little bit more squishy.
Mr. Boccieri. Judging on what you just said, Mr. Bolen, are
you suggesting that perhaps that this oversight does not jive
with the data that is coming in, since accidents are going
down? I just want to be clear how the Inspector General is
coming to these conclusions.
Mr. Coyne. Well, the Inspector General was comparing the
levels in part 135 primarily to the 121 community. And I don't
think he was really focused on the more recent results that
have been so positive in our industry. In fact, the even more
recent results from 2009 show that the air charter industry had
the lowest fatal record ever, in 2009.
So we have seen good news. Maybe that was one of the
reasons I gave him a C minus, you know. They didn't jive up
with the data that we see in the industry as being so positive.
Mr. Zuccaro. I think to clarify just a little, quickly, the
data that is being kind of tossed around is really nebulous,
and everybody focuses on there were X number of accidents in
on-demand and X number of accidents in 121. That is not a
comparison. All it says is what happened in that industry. But
then you have to take a look at how many per 100,000 hours
flown.
There is empirical data for the airline industry. There are
estimates at best. The magic to this is that I think everybody
agrees the numbers being reported for on-demand are
underestimated. There are really more hours being flown by on-
demand than is truly on the record. If, in fact, we knew that
real number and it raised the number of hours flown, it would
improve. By doing nothing else, it would improve the rate per
100,000 hours just by knowing the real number. So that is a
deficiency right there when you are throwing these numbers
around.
Mr. Boccieri. Are there reporting requirements for the
number of hours flown?
Mr. Zuccaro. No, and that is a deficiency that we have gone
on record saying there ought to be a requirement for aircraft
owner-operators on an annual basis to report their gross hours
flown per aircraft, and we would have that number, but there is
no requirement right now.
Mr. Boccieri. Well, too, it might be argued, too, that
flying through Niagara Falls and around the falls and the sorts
of high risk flights are somewhat dangerous, too. Mr. Scovel,
maybe you want to comment that that was taken into
consideration.
Mr. Scovel. Thank you, Mr. Boccieri. A couple of comments
about data gathering.
The panel is absolutely correct when they say that the data
is squishy, and that has been one of the recommendations for
some time is to improve FAA's data survey. It is now voluntary
with about a 63 percent participation rate among the industry.
It needs to be much, much higher in order to give the Congress
and the FAA assurance that its oversight efforts are properly
focused.
If I could, sir, respond to your point on part 135 on-
demand fatal accidents. We looked at the years using NTSB data
from 2000, when there were 22 such accidents, drifted down as
the panel has said, the next several years at 18 per year;
bumped up in 2003 to 23 fatal accidents, and then took a sharp
drop down, down to 11 and 10 and 14; up again in 2008 to 19. In
2009, preliminary NTSB estimates were two fatal accidents in
that year. We aggregated the number and came up with, of
course, 155 total accidents during the past decade for part
135.
Mr. Boccieri. Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Boswell. Thank you. I appreciate that exchange.
And back to where we were, thank you to each one for
coming. Again, Chairman Costello appreciated you being here. I
do, too. And I think that as we work together, we will make
things better, and so we will continue to do that.
I won't repeat what he said in the opening, and we will go
to standard procedure for the time lines that we do things to
wrap up.
Thank you for your being here today. Thanks for your work.
We appreciate it.
This meeting will be adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:08 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
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