    [House Hearing, 111 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

            IRAN SANCTIONS: OPTIONS, OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSEQUENCES

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
                              AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                                     of the

                             COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
                             AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                               DECEMBER 15, 2009

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 111-43

                                   __________

    Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

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                  COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

                       EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York, Chairman
    PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania      DARRELL E. ISSA, California
    CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York         DAN BURTON, Indiana
    ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland         JOHN L. MICA, Florida
    DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio             MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
    JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts       JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
    WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri              MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
    DIANE E. WATSON, California          LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
    STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts      PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina
    JIM COOPER, Tennessee                BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
    GERRY E. CONNOLLY, Virginia          JIM JORDAN, Ohio
    MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois               JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
    MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio                   JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
    ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of   JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah
        Columbia                         AARON SCHOCK, Illinois
    PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island     BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri
    DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois             ANH ``JOSPEH'' CAO, Louisiana
    CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
    HENRY CUELLAR, Texas
    PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire
    CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
    PETER WELCH, Vermont
    BILL FOSTER, Illinois
    JACKIE SPEIER, California
    STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio
    JUDY CHU, California

                          Ron Stroman, Staff Director
                    Michael McCarthy, Deputy Staff Director
                          Carla Hultberg, Chief Clerk
                      Larry Brady, Minority Staff Director

             Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs

                    JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts, Chairman
    CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York         JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
    PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island     DAN BURTON, Indiana
    CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland           JOHN L. MICA, Florida
    PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire         JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
    CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut   MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
    PETER WELCH, Vermont                 LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
    BILL FOSTER, Illinois                PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina
    STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio                 JIM JORDAN, Ohio
    STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts      JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
    HENRY CUELLAR, Texas                 BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri
    MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois
                         William Miles, Staff Director

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on December 15, 2009................................     1
    Statement of:
        Maloney, Suzanne, senior fellow, the Brookings Institution;
          George Lopez, professor of peace studies, University of
          Notre Dame; Robin Wright, Jennings Randolph fellow, U.S.
          Institute of Peace; and Ambassador James Dobbins, director,
          Rand International Security and Defense Policy Center......    10
            Dobbins, Ambassador James................................    45
            Lopez, George............................................    22
            Maloney, Suzanne.........................................    10
            Wright, Robin............................................    32
    Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
        Dobbins, Ambassador James, director, Rand International
          Security and Defense Policy Center, prepared statement of..    48
        Lopez, George, professor of peace studies, University of
          Notre Dame, prepared statement of..........................    25
        Maloney, Suzanne, senior fellow, the Brookings Institution,
          prepared statement of......................................    14
        Tierney, Hon. John F., a Representative in Congress from the
          State of Massachusetts:
            Letter dated December 11, 2009...........................     8
            Prepared statement of....................................     4
        Wright, Robin, Jennings Randolph fellow, U.S. Institute of
          Peace, prepared statement of...............................    36

            IRAN SANCTIONS: OPTIONS, OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSEQUENCES

                                  ----------

                           TUESDAY, DECEMBER 15, 2009

                      House of Representatives,
         Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign
                                               Affairs,
                  Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in
    room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John F. Tierney
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Present: Representatives Tierney, Lynch, Quigley, Foster,
    Duncan, Flake, Jordan, and Leutkemeyer.
        Staff present: Mariana Osorio, Daniel Murphy, Matt Ploszek,
    Aaron Wasserman, and Robyn Russell, legislative assistants;
    Andy Wright, staff director; Elliot Gillerman, clerk; Talia
    Dubovi, counsel; Adam Fromm, minority chief clerk and Member
    liaison; Tom Alexander, minority senior counsel; Christopher
    Bright, minority senior professional staff member; and Brien
    Beattie, minority professional staff member.
        Mr. Tierney. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on
    National Security and Foreign Affairs' hearing entitled, ``Iran
    Sanctions: Options, Opportunities and Consequences,'' will come
    to order.
        I ask unanimous consent that only the chairman and ranking
    member of the subcommittee be allowed to make opening
    statements. Without objection, so ordered.
        I ask unanimous consent that the hearing record be kept
    open for 5 business days so that all members of the
    subcommittee be allowed to submit a written statement for the
    record. Without objection, it is so ordered.
        Good morning, particularly to our witnesses, who were kind
    enough to come here and share their testimony with us today.
        We are going to examine an important and timely national
    security issue in the options and effectiveness of sanctions
    against the Islamic Republic of Iran.
        2009 has been a turbulent year in U.S.-Iran relations. Last
    January we inaugurated a President ready to pursue diplomatic
    engagement, and this past April marked the 30th year of the
    Islamic Republic's history. In November we remembered the 30th
    anniversary of the Iran hostage crisis, and the June 12th
    Presidential election and its tumultuous aftermath shook Iran's
    government like no other event in the last 30 years. In
    September, United States and Iranian officials held direct
    bilateral talks at the highest level since Iran's Revolution;
    yet Iran and its nuclear program still present significant
    challenges to the United States and to the international
    community.
        Nearly a year after President Obama extended a hand to Iran
    in his inaugural address, we have yet to see Iran unclench its
    fist. Instead, Iran continues to develop its nuclear program in
    the shadows. It claims that its nuclear program is designed for
    peaceful civilian purposes; yet, it refuses to cooperate fully
    and transparently with the International Atomic Energy Agency
    and its inspectors. That raises significant concerns about the
    true nature and intent of Iran's nuclear ambitions.
        Last September, the United States, along with its allies,
    disclosed that Iran had long been building a secret nuclear
    reactor in Qom. This revelation was followed last month by an
    official U.N. resolution condemning Iran's failure to disclose
    the site, as required under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
    Treaty. The resolution was approved with strong international
    support by a 25 to 3 vote, with both Russia and China voting in
    favor of condemning Iran.
        There are many strong options, both within the United
    States and around the world, on how best to manage the many
    challenges that Iran presents. I think that many of us support
    the President's strategy of engagement, but if that fails to
    bear fruit, then a lot of us are contemplating what must be the
    next step, and that is what brings us together here today. We
    have assembled a distinguished panel of experts to share with
    us their thoughts on the vital national security question at
    hand.
        Just on the personal side of this, I just want to make a
    couple points. I don't think that anybody condones the fact
    that Iran has nuclear weapons or is moving in that direction,
    and we think that Iran with nuclear weapons is a major threat
    to American interests. It is a threat to Israel, a threat to
    peace and stability in the Middle East. Any program to which
    they may have a right, as a party to the Nuclear Non-
    Proliferation Treaty, must be peaceful, civilian, open,
    transparent, and subject to inspection by the International
    Atomic Energy Agency.
        Disclosure of previously secret nuclear facilities, as we
    have seen, and the threat to replicate that 10 times over, and
    a general unwillingness to reasonably engage with the
    international community, obviously, all of those behaviors
    exhibited by Iran cause concern. The United States and the
    international community has made, I think, a considerable
    effort to negotiate and engage, which has yet to be
    reciprocated. That was a test for Iran's leadership. If it was
    serious about its claims that only a civilian nuclear program
    was being pursued, there was no reason it should not have
    agreed to export to Russia or elsewhere and allow the IAEA
    inspections.
        So what are our options? Governments and intelligence
    agencies and other experts agree, or disagree, I should say, on
    how close Iran is to developing a bomb. Also, many of them
    agree that any military strike on facilities would likely only
    delay development by only 1 or 2 years and cause other
    repercussions. There is considerable disagreement and debate on
    the value, effect, nature, impact, or usefulness of sanctions.
    Arguably, sanctions should be used to support, not replace,
    diplomatic efforts. Should Iran delay negotiations, or if the
    negotiations should fail, then many feel that strong
    multilateral sanctions by the international community would be
    in order, if they were targeted and effective in that regard.
        Now, with respect to the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions
    Act of 2009, which the House will be considering this week,
    personally, I have considerable concerns. The hardliners are in
    some disarray presently. New sanctions could allow them to
    consolidate their hold on power and get bolstered support from
    the Iranian people. Sanctions could heighten support from Mr.
    Ahmadinejad out of some nationalistic feeling or resentment for
    how devastating the effect of sanctions might be on the
    civilian population. It is notable that the two main opposition
    leaders have spoken against imposition of sanctions,
    particularly with regard to refined petroleum products.
        The restriction on refined oil products could probably be
    assumed to affect the poor and the middle class in Iran, but it
    is unlikely that the elites and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
    Corps, in particular, would be deprived of the use of any
    gasoline or other refined products that would come in. And, in
    fact, they might control any market that existed in them.
        So we have a large question here to answer. I think Jeff
    and others may have a different opinion on that, but I could
    only support the IRPSA if I was assured that its current
    language--which I read to mandate the sanctions, as opposed to
    provide the flexibility of the President to implement them--
    would either be delayed to a more appropriate time on the
    diplomatic pressure process that the administration is
    following or if they will be modified, prior to passage, to
    provide the President more flexibility. If we get those
    assurances, then we may get it through the House so that it can
    go to the Senate and be modified in conference there, if
    necessary.
        Only with more flexibility in exercising sanction authority
    might the President secure greater cooperation from our
    partners in taking effective action and ultimately facilitate a
    change in Iranian policies. Now is a critical stage in the
    intense diplomatic process, as we seek to impose significant
    international pressure on Iran. I think the legislator ought to
    take care not to harm those prospects as they go forward.
        So it is with interest that we listen to our experts on the
    panel here today. We want to make sure that we move in the
    proper way and the most effective way, and we welcome you and
    thank you for your testimony.
        [The prepared statement of Hon. John F. Tierney follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Tierney. With that, I defer to Mr. Flake for his
    opening remarks.
        Mr. Flake. I thank the chairman. I look forward to today's
    hearing.
        I, myself, am not a fan of economic sanctions, particularly
    those imposed unilaterally, so it has to be a pretty high bar,
    in my view, to go this direction. I share the chairman's
    concern about the refined petroleum sanctions. I note that
    there is not a virulently anti-American feeling in Iran among
    the population, and I hope we can keep it that way; and I am
    concerned about changing that. I think that we can all agree--
    and in reading your testimony I think we all agree--that these
    sanctions will only be really effective if they are
    multilateral, if we convince our international partners to come
    with us. My concern is, and my questions will be surrounding,
    whether or not moving ahead on a unilateral basis is more
    likely to bring our partners along, or if simply giving the
    President more flexibility in this regard would be a better
    option.
        I hear all the time we are simply leading on this, we are
    simply expressing our feelings, that this doesn't tie the hands
    of the administration. Sometimes you don't start that way, but
    within months or the next year you are tying the hands of the
    administration, and I would point to Cuba as a perfect example.
    When you have the Helms-Burton Act and other legislation, the
    President's hands are tied; there are very severe limits on
    what the President can do in response to action on the part of
    the Cubans or in any other direction. So while this may not
    start out as an attempt to tie the President's hands, it may
    quickly evolve into something that does, and that concerns me
    as well.
        So thank you all for being here and I look forward to the
    testimony.
        Mr. Tierney. Thank you very much.
        I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record the Deputy
    Secretary of State's letter to Senator Kerry, the chairman of
    the Committee on Foreign Relations in the U.S. Senate, on this
    issue. Basically, the letter indicates that he is following up
    on a conversation that James Steinberg, the Deputy Secretary of
    State, had with Senator John Kerry, the chairman of the Senate
    Foreign Relations Committee, regarding Iran and possible
    sanctions legislation to be taken up in the Senate; and that
    bill, S. 2799, is very close to the IRPSA bill that we are
    looking at here.
        ``The Administration shares Congress's concerns on Iran and
    its nuclear program and the need to take decisive action. One
    of the top national security priorities for the Obama
    Administration is to deny Iran a nuclear weapons capability. As
    we discussed, we are pursuing this objective through a dual
    track strategy of engagement and pressure; and we are engaged
    in intensive multilateral efforts to develop pressure track
    measures now. It is in the spirit of these shared objectives
    that I write to express my concern about the timing and content
    of this legislation.''
        ``As I testified before the Congress in October, it is our
    hope that any legislative initiative would preserve and
    maximize the President's flexibility, secure greater
    cooperation from our partners in taking effective action, and
    ultimately facilitate a change in Iranian policies. However, we
    are entering a critical period of intense diplomacy to impose
    significant international pressure on Iran. This requires that
    we keep the focus on Iran.''
        ``At this juncture, I am concerned that this legislation,
    in its current form, might weaken rather than strengthen
    international unity and support for our efforts. In addition to
    the timing, we have serious substantive concerns, including the
    lack of flexibility, inefficient monetary thresholds and
    penalty levels, and blacklisting that could cause unintended
    foreign policy consequences.''
        ``I have asked the Department staff to prepare for and
    discuss with your staff revisions that could address these
    concerns on timing and content. I am hopeful that we can work
    together to achieve our common goals.''
        ``I hope the consideration of this bill could be delayed to
    the new year so as not to undermine the Administration's
    diplomacy at this critical juncture. I look forward to working
    together to achieve our common goals, and I will stay in close
    contact with you as our diplomatic efforts proceed,'' by James
    Steinberg, the Deputy Secretary of State.''
        I ask that it be entered into the record with unanimous
    consent. So ordered.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Tierney. Now we will receive our testimony from the
    panel before us today. I will just give a brief introduction of
    our witnesses as they appear on the panel.
        Dr. Suzanne Maloney is a senior fellow with the Brookings
    Institution's Saban Center for Middle East Policy. Her work
    there focuses primarily on Iran and also on other Persian Gulf
    security and energy issues. From 2005 to 2007, Dr. Maloney
    served on the staff of the State Department's Office of Policy
    Planning. She has previously held positions with the Council on
    Foreign Relations and the Exxon Mobil Corp. Dr. Maloney holds a
    Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts
    University.
        Dr. George Lopez currently serves as a senior fellow at the
    U.S. Institute of Peace, where he focuses on international
    sanctions and post-sanctions economies. He is also professor
    and chair at the Kroc International Institute for International
    Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, where he has
    taught since 1986. Dr. Lopez has published several books on the
    implementation of international sanctions, arms embargoes, and
    other non-military means of countering terrorism. Dr. Lopez
    holds a Ph.D. from Syracuse University.
        Ms. Robin Wright also currently serves as a senior fellow
    at the U.S. Institute of Peace, where she focuses on Iran, the
    Middle East, and the broader Islamic world. Ms. Wright has
    reported from more than 140 countries on six continents for a
    wide range of publications, including, most recently, the
    Washington Post. She is also a regular contributor to Time
    Magazine on the topic of Iran. Ms. Wright is the author of
    several books on Iran and the Middle East, including, most
    recently, Dreams and Shadows: The Future of the Middle East.
    She holds a B.A. and an M.A. from the University of Michigan.
        Ambassador James Dobbins is the director of International
    Security and Defense Policy Center at the RAND Corp. He has
    held a number of positions in government, including U.S.
    representative to the December 2001 Bonn Conference, where he
    worked directly with Iran in helping to reestablish a
    government in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban.
    Ambassador Dobbins also formerly served as Assistant Secretary
    of State for Europe and as Special Assistant to the President.
    He holds a B.S. from Georgetown University.
        So thank you, to all our distinguished witnesses, for
    making yourselves available today. I know at least Dr. Maloney
    and Ambassador Dobbins have testified before this subcommittee
    before, so we welcome you back.
        It is the policy of this committee to swear in all
    witnesses before we begin our testimony, so I ask that all of
    you please stand and raise your right hands.
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Mr. Tierney. The record will please reflect that all of the
    witnesses answered in the affirmative.
        I tell you what I think you already know, that all of your
    written statements will be entered in the record by unanimous
    consent. We try to limit the testimony to about 5 minutes, if
    possible, so that we will have time for questions and answers
    after that.
        Dr. Maloney, if you would be kind enough to start with your
    testimony.

      STATEMENTS OF SUZANNE MALONEY, SENIOR FELLOW, THE BROOKINGS
        INSTITUTION; GEORGE LOPEZ, PROFESSOR OF PEACE STUDIES,
       UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME; ROBIN WRIGHT, JENNINGS RANDOLPH
    FELLOW, U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE; AND AMBASSADOR JAMES DOBBINS,
    DIRECTOR, RAND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY CENTER

                      STATEMENT OF SUZANNE MALONEY

        Dr. Maloney. Thank you very much, Chairman Tierney,
    Congressman Flake, and members of the committee for this
    opportunity to discuss the prospects and implications of using
    sanctions to influence the behavior of the Islamic Republic of
    Iran. I will summarize my testimony, which has been submitted
    in longer written form.
        I find it predictably ironic that, less than a year after
    the Obama administration began its efforts to engage the
    Iranians in a comprehensive diplomatic dialog, the discourse in
    Washington and around the world has already shifted toward an
    enthusiastic embrace of punitive measures. The search for
    alternative mechanisms for influencing Iran is completely
    understandable given the current context both in terms of the
    increasing crackdown within Iran, as well as Iran's repeated
    rebuffs of the offers of the Obama administration and the rest
    of the international community to engage in a serious dialog.
        At the same time, I think it is unfortunate that the track
    record for sanctioning Iran is really not an auspicious one,
    and the key prerequisites for a successful sanctions-oriented
    approach--protracted duration and broad adherence--are almost
    certainly unattainable today with respect to Iran. There are
    some more promising indications of a more conducive context,
    but that is no guarantee of success.
        In my testimony, I will speak briefly about that track
    record, but I will conclude by laying out a series of
    principles that should guide our consideration of any new
    coercive measures.
        We have had 30 years of U.S. unilateral sanctions on Iran,
    and there should be no illusions that the likelihood of a more
    rigorous and more broadly-implemented sanctions regime will
    produce a reversal of Iran's nuclear calculus quickly or
    easily. Thirty years of sanctions have not accomplished their
    primary objective, which is the moderation of Iran's security
    and foreign policy. This has largely been a function of the
    lack of international consensus.
        Moving forward today, despite tough talk from various
    European leaders, and the new cooperation between Washington
    and Moscow on Iran, the prospect for expanding the playing
    field on sanctions will still prove daunting, largely because
    of our divergent perspectives. In Washington, we tend to see a
    direct relationship between economic pressure and eventual
    moderation of the target leadership. Many of our allies have
    exactly the opposite perspective: they fear that, once isolated
    from the international community, Tehran will be further
    radicalized and may retaliate either by a direct action against
    governments that have supported sanctions, or by accelerating
    their nuclear efforts or withdrawing from the NPT.
        The irony is that neither the American nor the European
    perspective on sanctions is actually borne out by Iranian
    history. Iran's response to the repeated use of sanctions by
    Washington has neither involved capitulation to demands or
    radicalization. Instead, the regime typically seeks refuge in
    denial, while expanding a great deal of effort on trying to
    mitigate the impacts of sanctions through smuggling, through
    promotion of substitute industries, and through economic
    diplomacy. Specifically with respect to IRPSA, Iran has been
    preparing for a possible embargo on imports of gasoline and
    other refined petroleum products through a variety of official
    schemes to minimize gasoline consumption and to establish
    strategic stockpiles of gasoline.
        More broadly, Iran's post-Revolutionary experience
    contradicts the underlying American argument in support of
    sanctions. The Islamic Republic has experienced a number of
    episodes of severe economic pressure, but none has generated
    the kind of foreign policy moderation that the sponsors of
    IRPSA or the other manifold punitive measures against Tehran
    tend to forecast. Instead, in the past, when Iran has been
    under economic pressure, this has facilitated the coalescence
    of the regime and the consolidation of public support. Economic
    constraints have enhanced cooperation among Iran's factions.
    Tight purse strings have in fact forced some moderation of its
    economic policies, but not of its foreign policy, and I think
    that is particularly important to remember today as we move
    forward with new pressure.
        Obviously, sanctions have to be a component of our overall
    integrated diplomatic strategy toward Iran and one that has
    both a short-term and a long-term perspective. It is one of the
    few tools that remains at our disposal and, therefore, I set
    forth the following five principles that should be uppermost in
    our minds in assessing new sanctions:
        The objectives need to be clear, limited, and achievable,
    particularly sanctions that have potential for influencing
    important constituencies that have some say in Iran's nuclear
    policies, measures that target the economic interests of the
    Revolutionary Guard Corps and other critical elements of Iran's
    hardline power structure. This is a particular uncertainty, I
    think, with respect to IRPSA. I am not sure what the scenario
    that the sponsors of IRPSA have in mind--that the Iranian
    public, under great economic constraint, begins to go to the
    streets and voice its anger and frustration with its regime,
    and the regime, somehow capitulates or moderates its policy
    toward the international community? It is really a scenario
    that doesn't bear any resemblance to the likely behavior of the
    Iranian leadership.
        It is also suggested we need to be careful about our
    rhetoric when we talk about crippling sanctions that will break
    the back of the regime. Again, we need to be clear about the
    intended objective of our sanctions. We are not trying to bring
    down the regime; that is not within the capacity of the United
    States of America. What we are trying to do is reverse their
    position on the nuclear issue, and that means persuading them
    that their security is better served through another approach
    to the world.
        Second, we need to integrate sanctions within the continuum
    of U.S. diplomacy. I am glad that the Obama administration has
    dropped the sort of talk about carrots and sticks, but, still,
    the rhetoric of dual track seems to suggest that sanctions are
    an alternative to diplomacy. That is not, in fact, the case.
    Sanctions need to be a part of an integrated approach that
    actually uses sanctions to persuade Iran to come to the
    negotiating table, because that is simply the only way we are
    going to get the Iranians to understand that their security
    interests are better served by cooperation rather than
    confrontation.
        Third, we need to have that kind of broad international
    consensus and implementation that has been lacking for most of
    the past 30 years. Getting and keeping our allies on board with
    a sustained sanctions approach is important because so long as
    there are outliers--so long as there are hesitators like Russia
    and China--historically, that make it easier for others to sit
    on the fence and to avoid full implementation of the sanctions.
    In this respect, reset of the U.S.-Russian relationship has
    been a necessary condition for improving the prospects for
    sanctions, but it is not going to be sufficient. To generate
    sufficient international support for sustaining meaningful
    economic pressure, we are going to have to make a credible case
    to our allies that our measures can actually impact in a
    positive fashion the nuclear calculus.
        Fourth, we need to focus on those measures that have the
    best prospects for direct and immediate cost. This is, of
    course, the secret of the recent Treasury measures to restrict
    Iran's access to the financial system. They have actually hurt
    existing business, business that tends to be pursued by regime
    elites that have some influence over its behavior. Any sorts of
    sanctions that hit at prospective projects, at pipeline
    projects that are many years away from being implemented, are
    likely not to have much impact on Iran's behavior, largely
    because its regime retains a certain degree of denial about its
    economic prospects.
        Finally, we have to think very carefully about the
    prospects of any sanctions to influence Iran's emerging
    opposition movement. There have been varying calls within that
    opposition. Certainly, the political leadership of the
    opposition has suggested that sanctions would not help its
    position. There are others who have suggested, in fact, that
    new economic pressure might galvanize Iranians against the
    regime. I think both of these arguments have a certain degree
    of validity, but we have to recognize that measures that target
    the burgeoning economic role of the regime's repressive
    capacity that are specifically identified with its human rights
    abuses can serve a double purpose in pressing the regime, both
    in moderating its nuclear course, and in improving its
    treatment of its people at home. And here we should be
    leveraging the interest in Europe.
        But we have to be careful in assuming that somehow,
    Iranians, if the price of gasoline goes up, if they can't
    access home heating oil in the middle of a cold winter, are
    likely to vent their anger against the regime rather than at
    the United States. The regime is quite skilled at deflecting
    the impact of sanctions and clearly its rationing programs and
    its access to smuggling networks will permit the regime to
    implement its core constituencies from the impact of reduced
    supplies. The notions that Iranians would welcome American
    efforts to cutoff supplies of heating oil and gasoline to me
    sounds like the same kind of logic that suggested that Iraqis
    would greet us as liberators after we violently removed their
    regime.
        The reality is that the Iranian domestic climate is
    complicated and uncertain. There are no simple solutions. And,
    frankly, the cost of failure when it comes to applying
    sanctions is real and significant. If we move forward with a
    sanctions approach that does not work, the alternatives,
    specifically military options, are far worse in terms of
    advancing U.S. diplomatic interests in the region, and for that
    reason we need to use sanctions, but use them within a larger
    diplomatic framework.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Maloney follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Doctor.
        Dr. Lopez.

                       STATEMENT OF GEORGE LOPEZ

        Dr. Lopez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am honored and
    grateful to have the opportunity to share with the committee
    this morning some of the findings that I think have emerged
    from over a decade of research that my colleagues and I have
    done and submitted in much more detail and written testimony
    about the probability of success of sanctions under these
    conditions.
        I think the Congress and the committee face a kind of
    bitter irony. The sanctions you have before you will no doubt,
    if implemented, take a big economic bite out of Iran. The
    dilemma, of course, is they will not produce the political gain
    in concessions that are important for the interests of the
    United States. In fact, I would suggest that there are four or
    five basic principles we have learned from the history of
    implementation of sanctions that lead us to be quite cautious
    about the legislation that lies before us.
        First and foremost, generally, sanctions only have about a
    one-third track record. If you are a baseball player, this is a
    good batting average. If you are making economic policy or
    political policy at the foreign policy level, you would like a
    great deal higher percentage. The smart sanctions that we
    developed over the last decade have a strong success rate. We
    have been able to use them astutely under certain kinds of
    conditions, particularly Libya being one of the best examples.
    On the other hand, trade sanctions, of which a major component
    this package is, really have a worse ratio over time, and I see
    nothing in the sponsored legislation that increases the
    possible success rates as applied to Iran under these
    conditions.
        Second, if sanctions are to be imposed for the kind of
    multiple violations that we know Iran is engaged in--whether it
    is uranium enrichment, human rights issues, or support for
    terrorist groups--those have been most successful under
    conditions of multilateral imposition, particularly with regard
    to the U.N. framework. So Congressman Flake's observations
    before, I think, are important to note. We have a group of
    partners who have been very successfully committed to what we
    will do in terms of nuclear regulation over the last 3 years,
    in 2006, 2007, and 2008, with strong regulations and
    resolutions out of the Security Council. I am not necessarily
    sure we should jeopardize that by unilateral action that is
    likely to have less and less success.
        Third, pure and simple, we cannot punish the Iranians into
    a nuclear deal. No state, even the United States, has ever been
    able to do that before, and I don't see the conditions for
    success here. Only an astute mix of continued engagement,
    narrowly-conceived sanctions applied at the appropriate time,
    and versatile incentives will prompt the Iranians, hopefully,
    to change their nuclear posture. This is not the time for
    adding sanctions to the mix of that engagement diplomacy. If
    imposed now, as Suzanne has mentioned, Iran will react with
    particularly negative consequences for the prospects of future
    engagement with the IAEA or with the five critical partners
    with which they are engaged. The ultimate leverage we have,
    over time, is the continued coalition of support that we have
    built in the United States with the P-5 states and with states
    in Europe who believe that continued diplomatic engagement, at
    least for a while, is the way to proceed.
        Fourth, in nations with the kind of internal disarray that
    we see currently in Iran, we have seen a rally round-the-flag
    effect that creates very, very difficult conditions. In fact,
    at its worst, sanctions would play into the Ahmadinejad
    government's insecurity and passion for repression of its own
    political groups. Why we would cast to them this kind of
    ``apres vous'' is strange to me. We need to build and sustain
    coalitions in Iran that will see the United States as its
    friend, and we must listen very adeptly to the kinds of
    reactions we have gotten from Iranians about the sanctions.
    Remember, we were able to sustain and have successful sanctions
    in South Africa over time because the opposition groups were
    saying that this was the appropriate strategy, and I think that
    is important for imposing sanctions.
        Now, with a sanctions expert being so negative on the
    possibility of imposing sanctions through this legislation,
    what do I offer you? I think there are some ways forward in
    which the United States can continue the engagement with the
    Iranians, but I state very clearly a number of particular
    postulates. The first is that the American people and the
    Iranian people can be brought together around the notion that
    no nation in the future should or could seek its security
    through nuclear weapons. We should state to the Iranians that
    they should see the relationship we are building with Russia
    and the treaty we are about to submit to the Senate sometime in
    the next year, which will lead to massive reductions in our
    nuclear arsenals. We are trying to lead the way through a
    particular kind of leadership by example, and we encourage
    states that are thinking about the nuclear threshold to pay
    attention to this.
        Aggressive diplomacy of the first order--in which we
    invite, embarrass, cajole, and incentivize the Iranians to
    think about the Geneva deal that they have left on the table as
    being at least a model for the way forward--is the way to
    astutely use our leadership, rather than future sanctions. It
    seems to me that we can go to the Security Council in the near
    term with a package of tightly-conceived, smart and targeted
    sanctions which look at the entities and individuals that have
    violated prior Security Council resolutions. Then we can call
    upon our P-5 partners and the rest of the Security Council to
    add another resolution to the strong mix of the three we have,
    and continue the multilateral framework that will penalize the
    Iranians for IAEA dismissal of regulations and an unwillingness
    to come forth transparently with the progress of their program.
        Are there incentives we can offer the Iranians? Yes. I
    think we should move forward with a picture of what life may be
    like in a post-sanctions environment for them. The first and
    most important might be a recharacterization of the existing
    sanctions from 2006, that would guarantee a right of the
    Iranians to enrich uranium up to a particular level and
    reaffirm their independence as a particularly strong state
    dependent on nuclear energy and medical technologies derived
    from nuclear technologies. This cannot be so in an environment
    that is not fully transparent and open to international
    inspection.
        We should hold open to them the prospect for membership in
    trade and other organizations, which current sanctions now
    prohibit. The best incentive one can offer a sanctioned country
    is the removal of those sanctions. But we haven't specified
    exactly how that will look in a step-by-step reciprocation of
    Iranian actions.
        I have contributed more in my testimony, but my time has
    come to an end. I do believe that the administration's approach
    to engagement has to be understood as 1 year in a 30-year
    framework with the Iranians, in which the turnaround in
    correspondence we seek from them may not have yet gone far
    enough down the road; but we have the strength, versatility,
    and energy as a diplomatic community to continue to exert that
    pressure in a positive way, and hold sanctions as keeping the
    powder dry for at least another 6 to 9 months in case the
    dilemma continues to manifest that we will need them.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Lopez follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Doctor.
        Ms. Wright, I understand that you are going to give us a
    PowerPoint presentation, and I understand that it is a good
    PowerPoint presentation. I had some reservations I was sharing
    with my staff that we went to Afghanistan, and how the military
    just loves to do PowerPoint presentations. I asked General
    McKiernan to not do that, that we wanted a dialog on that, and
    he answered back what if he just had one slide? So we relented
    and we thought that was a good compromise, only to find out
    that he had put everything that he possibly could for 50 slides
    onto 1 slide, so we had our show anyway. But please proceed.

                       STATEMENT OF ROBIN WRIGHT

        Ms. Wright. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mine is all pictures.
        Mr. Tierney. Then we will all be able to understand; that
    is good.
        Ms. Wright. That is right.
        The uprising launched after a disputed Presidential
    election in June has evolved into the most vibrant and
    imaginative civil disobedience campaign in the 57 nations of
    the Islamic world, and maybe the world generally. For all the
    physical force used against the Green Movement, it has, so far,
    remained nonviolent in response. The Green Movement is a very
    broad coalition that includes former presidents and clerics, as
    well as people who have never voted at all; and millions of
    students in one of the youngest populations in the world; and
    women in one of the most politically active female populations
    in the Islamic world, both young and old.
        But these diverse sectors of society also see the core
    issues through very different prisms. The new Green Movement
    has managed to mobilize Iranians for public protests every few
    weeks since the election 6 months ago. It exploits
    anniversaries, commemorations, and holidays, when the public is
    normally urged to demonstrate for government causes. They
    communicate in messages like this one, on the Internet,
    Facebook, and Twitter, or even in graffiti spraypainted on
    public walls, to turn government events into protests against
    the regime.
        The public demonstrations are when we hear their messages.
    At the November 4th commemoration of the U.S. embassy takeover,
    Iranians normally are urged to shout ``Death to America'' and
    ``Death to Israel.'' This time many shouted ``Death to No
    One.'' More pointed, others shouted ``Obama, you are either
    with us or with them.'' This is a message now heard often.
        The demonstration last week on National Students Day was
    the largest since the summer. It erupted on several campuses,
    and additional protests are expected later this month to mark
    the religious holiday of Ashura, and again during the first 2
    months of next year on various anniversaries of the
    Revolution--the same period when the United States and its
    allies will be debating new international sanctions.
        In policy debates on Iran, there is a lot of talk about
    clocks: Iran's clock on its suspected nuclear program; the slow
    clock of diplomacy and U.N. sanctions; and Israel's impatient
    clock. To that should be added a new one: the opposition clock.
        What the opposition does is more important than anything
    this august body will ever consider. After 6 months, the Green
    Movement has proven that it has reached critical mass and has
    proven its durability. Since June, the Green Movement has
    shifted its agenda from disputes over the election of President
    Ahmadinejad to the role and powers of Iran's Supreme Leader and
    the very definition of an Islamic state. ``Death to the
    Dictator'' is now a common chant, with mounting anger over the
    militarization of the regime and the growing role of the
    Revolutionary Guards. This cartoon recently made the rounds,
    calling for the Supreme Leader to be booted from office.
        Yet, the Green Movement does not speak with one voice; it
    is united in opposition only. Its many different factions take
    different positions and have very different goals. Dozens of
    factions under the Green banner can be sorted into at least
    three general categories. Each represents a different side of a
    sometimes unlikely alliance.
        The first layer is the public campaign of civil
    disobedience, which extends well beyond the demonstrations.
    Iran's currency has become a medium for the message. Some stamp
    pictures and slogans on the Riyal, this one of Ahmadinejad,
    along with the slogan, ``People's Enemy.'' Most lash out
    angrily at the regime. Others reproduce pictures like this one
    with the famous picture of the female student, Neda Sultan, who
    was shot at a street protest in June. This picture is from the
    cell phone video that captured her dying.
        The graffiti is usually in green. Some slogans merely
    appeal to others who might get that note to write slogans on
    other bank notes. The bank notes even carry protests against
    the regime's foreign policy, this one against Iran's ties with
    Venezuela's Chavez, and here, against Russia. The regime
    reportedly tried to take the graffiti money out of circulation,
    but found there was too much to destroy.
        Another civil disobedience campaign calls on the opposition
    to boycott all goods, from food to cell phones, advertised on
    state-controlled television. Civil disobedience includes
    individual, uncoordinated acts. Mahmoud Vahidnia is a math
    student who was invited to a meeting between Iran's Supreme
    Leader and the academic elite. He went to the mic and, instead
    of asking a question, warned the Supreme Leader in a 20 minute
    tirade that he lived in a bubble and didn't understand what was
    happening in Iran. Iranian television, which was broadcasting
    the program lived, turned it off, but not before it was taped
    by the BBC and others and is now a very popular item on You
    Tube.
        The growing signs of dissent show in many ways: on public
    buses and on building walls, public spaces used to give notice
    about protests when the regime closes down cell phones or slows
    the Internet. Posters often appear overnight issuing new
    demands; many call for the release of political prisoners who
    are now part of show trials reminiscent of the Soviet show
    trials of the 1930's and the Chinese cultural revolution of the
    1960's. The slogans are often in Farsi and English because they
    want to get their message to the outside world.
        Even sports teams have become involved. Iran's national
    team wore green during a match abroad in June. Inside the
    country, some opposition have dared to attend games wearing
    green, which has reportedly led the government to broadcast the
    games in black and white.
        The Green Movement has generated some lively new art. This
    is the famous cell phone video of Neda Sultan, the young woman,
    again, shot in June. That gruesome photo has become a popular
    posture in the technique used for the Obama campaign. The same
    image has been blended into the artwork of the Iranian flag so
    her face takes the place of the religious symbol in the middle.
    The blood pattern has also been imposed on the Supreme Leader's
    face, an implicit message that he is responsible for her death.
        The reaction by the first category, or layer, is the most
    important sector when it comes to sanctions. Two key points:
    Many in the opposition support sanctions against the
    Revolutionary Guards or specific members of the regime, but
    adamantly oppose sanctions that will hurt the people at a time
    of serious economic problems and a time when many in the
    opposition already face losing their jobs, students face losing
    their places in universities and, as a result, their future.
    Second, Persian nationalism is among the strongest forces in
    the world. If you know a Texan, add 5,000 years and you have
    Persian nationalism.
        The Revolution was in trouble in the 1980's, when Saddam
    Hussein invaded, but millions of people who didn't like, trust,
    or support the Revolution rallied to the regime in the name of
    Persian nationalism.
        Public sentiment on sanctions is complicated by the nuclear
    issue, and, again Persian nationalism plays a role. Reliable
    polls indicate that Iranians, almost universally, support
    nuclear energy as the key to modern development. Shirin Ebadi,
    the Iranian Nobel laureate human rights lawyer, said of the
    program, ``Aside from being economically justified, it has
    become a cause of national pride for an old nation with a
    glorious history. No Iranian government, regardless of its
    ideology or democratic credentials, would dare to stop the
    program.''
        The second layer is the traditional political elite, which
    has struggled to develop a viable strategy. There are, as yet,
    no Mandelas, Havels, or Walesas in Iran. The opposition has
    been a body looking for a head since the beginning. The reform
    movement latched on to former President Khatami in 1997 because
    he talked about opening up the system. But they also abandoned
    him when he failed to do so. This time, the opposition rallied
    around Mousavi not because they liked him the best, but because
    they thought he was the only one who could stand up to the
    Supreme Leader, as he had in the 1980's when they were in
    different jobs. But Mousavi is an accidental leader. He
    occasionally issues statements and visits families of political
    detainees, but he has failed to create a plan of action or even
    to appear much in public.
        Mehdi Karroubi, the former speaker of parliament and
    another Presidential candidate in June, is more of a maverick.
    He first publicized claims of rape and torture of dissidents in
    jail and has tried often to join the protests. The traditional
    political elites in the opposition would also like to see the
    regime punished under sanctions, but, again, no sanctions that
    might further hurt the people and undermine the opposition.
        Mousavi has complicated the situation for both the regime
    and the outside world by rejecting the recent Tehran reactor
    deal. It is widely believed that this is merely internal
    politics, objecting to any initiative that might strengthen
    Ahmadinejad's claim to legitimacy. Iran's nuclear program has
    basically become a political football at home, with its own
    internal dynamics that could deeply complicate diplomacy.
        The third layer, very briefly, is the debate among the
    clerics, which is least visible, but quite intriguing and very
    important to understand. Ayatollah Montazeri is the most
    outspoken and credible opposition cleric, but there are many,
    many, many others. Montazeri was originally selected as
    Ayatollah Khomeini's heir, but was stripped of the title when
    he began to criticize the regime for its injustices. Since
    June, he has been scathing toward the government, at one point
    warning Iran's security forces not to take actions that they
    would someday have to justify before God.
        Montazeri issued a fatwa in October against nuclear weapons
    on grounds that they are against God's will and will inevitably
    kill civilians, as well as the military. He urged Muslims
    worldwide to take the lead in campaigning against nuclear arms.
        Among themselves, the clerics are now intensely debating
    what constitutes good governance, what an Islamic state should
    do and be, and even whether an Islamic state is good long-term
    for Islam. The clergy I have spoken with over the years--and I
    have been going to Iran almost every year since 1973--actually
    care about the nuclear energy issue, but, like the public, they
    feel the regime has pushed the nuclear issue too far, at great
    cost to the nation's standing, its future potential, and with
    millions of Iranians paying the price.
        As a result of the debate, Iran's Supreme Leader is
    increasingly standing alone among his own. Many clerics have
    long been wary of theocratic rule for fear that the human
    shortcomings of a modern Islamic state would taint Islam. As
    they hear vast numbers of protestors challenging Khamenei or
    see opposition messages on Iran's national currency, the debate
    among them has intensified.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Wright follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Tierney. Thank you. That was quite good. I appreciate
    that.
        Ambassador Dobbins.

                 STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JAMES DOBBINS

        Mr. Dobbins. Well, that is going to be hard to top. I am
    afraid, after the multimedia excursion, we are back to boring
    Washington long-talk.
        I think all the witnesses, including myself, agree that
    further international sanctions will probably not compel a
    change in Iran's nuclear policies. Nevertheless, I think there
    are good reasons to pursue additional sanctions. There are, in
    fact, at least five distinct rationales for further sanctions.
    The obvious one is to influence Iranian policy. A second would
    be to promote positive change in the nature of the Iranian
    regime. A third objective is to degrade Iranian military and
    power projection capabilities. A fourth is to set a deterrent
    example for other aspirant proliferators. And, finally,
    whatever may be the hoped-for effect of sanctions, such
    measures provide an irresistible alternative to the other two
    options, which are even less desirable: the options of either
    doing nothing to respond to Iranian nuclear program, or going
    to war to prevent it.
        Historically, sanctions have seldom forced improved
    behavior on the part of targeted regimes. Sanctions did not
    compel the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan, Pakistan
    to halt its nuclear weapons program, Saddam to evacuate Kuwait,
    the Haitian military regime to step aside, Milosovic to halt
    ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo, or the Taliban to expel
    Osama Bin Laden. Stiff sanctions were applied in all of these
    cases, but it took either a foreign military intervention or
    violent domestic resistance, or both, to bring about the
    desired changes.
        Now, while none of the above-named regimes altered their
    behavior in response to sanctions, all but one of them
    eventually fell. And sanctions may have contributed to their
    fall, but more as a gesture of solidarity with those seeking to
    change the regime, often by violent means, than as the prime
    cause. Universally supported sanctions in support of human
    rights in Iran might make a similar contribution, as they did
    in South Africa, in Haiti, in Serbia, in Iraq, and in
    Afghanistan. However, at the current moment, there is not much
    prospect of getting universally supported sanctions against
    Iran based on democratization as an objective.
        The objective for additional sanctions in Iran is rather
    under consideration, in order to try to force Iran to abandon
    its nuclear aspirations. Sanctions so directed are unlikely to
    encourage, and could even diminish, domestic resistance to the
    regime. Most Iranians, as has been noted, including the
    democratic supporters, support Iran's efforts to master the
    nuclear fuel cycle. Sanctions that are applied for this purpose
    could well increase support for the regime, rather than the
    reverse.
        Now, sanctions can definitely degrade the economic
    performance of the targeted state and thereby limit its
    military and power projection potential. That was certainly
    true in Saddam's Iraq. It was also true with respect to Haiti,
    Serbia, and Afghanistan. In each case, comprehensive and
    universally enforced sanctions made an eventual American
    military intervention even easier than it otherwise would be.
    So sanctions as a prelude to invasion and occupation have a lot
    to recommend them.
        Even unilateral American sanctions, for instance, against
    Cuba and Iran, have had some impact on the targeted country's
    economy and capacity to project power. Unfortunately, these
    unilaterally applied sanctions also have tended to bolster the
    targeted regimes and increase their domestic political support.
    Thus, paradoxically, unilateral American sanctions have both
    moderated and perpetuated the threat that such regimes present.
        The exemplary deterrent effect of sanctions is hard to
    measure, but is probably the best reason for going ahead with
    further sanctions against Iran. If the international community
    failed to respond to the Iranian program, it would be giving a
    green light to other countries, including a number of countries
    in the region, to go down the same path. So that is certainly a
    reason to continue to sanction Iran.
        Finally, we have the political imperative to not just stand
    there, but to do something. In situations where inaction is
    unacceptable and preemptive military attack unappealing,
    sanctions may provide the only alternative; and this is
    certainly one of the reasons that many outside the government
    and many of you will end up supporting sanctions.
        While sanctions may offer an irresistible political fix to
    a policy dilemma, they are not cost-free. Virtually every
    country that has ever been sanctioned eventually had a
    revolution, changed the regime, and became an American aid
    recipient; and American aid to countries like Iraq,
    Afghanistan, the Balkans, and Haiti, has in large measure been
    directed to undoing the effect of sanctions. So, in effect, the
    American taxpayer does end up paying a certain proportion, and
    a not negligible proportion, of the cost of sanctions as they
    are applied over time. One can only imagine how much money the
    United States is going to provide a democratic Cuba to reverse
    the effect of 50 years of embargo.
        To recapitulate, further sanctions against Iran are not
    likely to alter its nuclear policies. They will weaken the
    state economically and even militarily. Sanctions against Iran
    will serve, to some degree, at least, as a deterrent to other
    proliferators. Further sanctions are almost inevitable for the
    reasons I have suggested. The next question, therefore, is what
    kind of sanctions make sense.
        We have heard from Robin and from others about the nature
    of the internal dynamic. There is basically a competition
    between the Islamic tendency in the regime, personified by the
    Ayatollahs; the republican nature of the regime, personified by
    elected politicians; and the revolutionary nature of the
    regime, personified by the Revolutionary Guard. And for 30
    years these have been in some equilibrium. That equilibrium has
    been broken as a result of the fraudulent election and the
    popular reaction to it, and you are now moving increasingly
    toward a police state. But that is not necessarily a stable
    condition, and it could go in a number of different directions,
    including toward more democratization, toward a greater police
    state, or back toward some equilibrium.
        It seems likely that sanctions that targeted Iranian
    society as a whole would promote the least desirable of these
    results; that is to say, the consolidation of a police state
    under the Revolutionary Guard. Such would be particularly the
    case if the sanctions were to restrict the flow of consumer
    products, of which gasoline is probably the commodity most
    widely consumed. Such a ban would hit hardest those who own
    automobiles; that is to say, the urban middle class, precisely
    those whose pictures we have seen protesting against the regime
    and risking their lives to do so.
        So an internationally opposed ban on the sale of gasoline
    would probably penalize the population, particularly the most
    politically progressive element of the population, and
    strengthen the most regressive elements in the regime. A
    unilateral American ban would be meaningless, as the United
    States does not export any gasoline to Iran. A unilateral
    American ban with extraterritorial application would seem to
    offer the worst combination of effects: penalizing the
    population, strengthening the regime, embroiling the United
    States in endless disputes with its allies, and disrupting the
    current international solidarity in opposition to Iran's
    nuclear aspirations.
        So what to do? Strengthened sanctions are needed to reduce
    Iran's capacity to threaten its neighbors, to deter other
    aspiring nuclear powers, and to provide an alternative to even
    less productive courses of action. To achieve these results
    while minimizing negative consequences, such sanctions should
    be international. They should be targeted on the regime and on
    its nuclear potential. Such measures would include a
    comprehensive embargo on arms sales and on transfer of nuclear
    technology, financial sanctions focused on the military, on
    power projection capabilities, and on the internal security
    apparatus, and an international travel ban on those associated
    with all of these institutions. Sanctions would single out the
    leadership and impose even symbolic penalties on them, further
    delegitimizing that leadership in the eyes of the Iranian
    people. Sanctions designed to impoverish the country as a whole
    probably would have a reverse effect.
        Finally, any sanctions need to be rapidly reversible.
    Admittedly, there seems little immediate prospect that the
    Iranian regime will alter its behavior in the near term.
    Nevertheless, on two occasions over the last 8 years, the
    Islamic Republic has made far-reaching overtures of cooperation
    and accommodation with Washington. Those offers were made in
    the immediate aftermath of the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan
    and then, a year later, its invasion of Iraq. In the mood of
    national hubris which prevailed in this country back then,
    Washington chose to ignore both overtures. We cannot predict if
    and when another such opportunity will arise, but we should
    ensure that our President is in a position to respond rapidly,
    if and when it does. This argues for including in any
    legislation broad authority for the President to waive or
    terminate sanctions in response to changing conditions.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Dobbins follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
        Thanks to all of you. I think your testimony was very, very
    helpful, and enlightening, as well. Let me start the
    questioning aspect of this.
        I heard, Dr. Maloney, and I see in your written testimony,
    a statement saying the Supreme National Security Committee,
    which is one of the key institutions of the state, is
    responsible for nuclear negotiations and overall foreign policy
    coordination, but it appears to be functioning in crisis mode
    because of the bitter differences among the principals.
        So, Ambassador, you have had as much direct contact with
    Iranians as anyone here, so let me ask you: is it at all the
    case that their failure to respond to the diplomatic overtures,
    so far is because there are various conflicting groups that you
    all testified to are just frozen right now politically, inside,
    and they are unable to agree on a way forward to even react to
    international overtures?
        Mr. Dobbins. I think that is likely the case. The regime
    clearly is both weakened and distracted by the reaction to the
    election. I was actually quite surprised that they were able to
    engage as quickly as they did and initially to agree to the
    proposals that the international community had put to them, but
    that rapidly degenerated into a national debate in which the
    reformers, among others, began to criticize the regime for the
    possible accommodation with the international community; and I
    think that does mean that as long as this degree of
    uncertainty, turmoil, weakness, and distraction continue, it is
    going to be very difficult to constructively engage the regime.
        Mr. Tierney. I think [remarks off mic] blame them for
    exacerbating an already bad situation, or they feel that the
    world community is sort of ganging up on them and making their
    life worse, and they better get together and rally around the
    national flag. Do all of you come down on one side or the other
    of that argument, thinking that it is going to be a bad idea? I
    know, Ambassador, you just testified to that effect, and I
    think I heard that in the flavor of the others, that imposing
    refined petroleum sanctions and things of that nature would
    probably have the adverse effect of driving the general
    populous of Iran toward the current regime, and maybe
    buttressing them.
        Dr. Maloney, we will start with you.
        Dr. Maloney [remarks off mic]. the population responds.
    Certainly, Iranians can walk and chew gum at the same time.
    They can detest their regime and also resent the international
    community for making their life more difficult. And, frankly,
    that has always been the historical reaction to the American
    sanctions regime among Iranians when you walk the streets; they
    want to know why they are being punished for the misdeeds of
    their own government.
        I think the current conditions are chaotic and fluid enough
    that it is possible that Iranians may turn more toward the
    Green Movement in the aftermath of increased economic pressure,
    but it will not, in fact, persuade the regime to be more
    accommodating internationally. They will see themselves under
    greater threat and they will certainly be more difficult to
    deal with. Just as Ambassador Dobbins has suggested, the
    current situation is making it difficult for them to come to
    the table in a serious way and negotiate over a sustained
    period of time with a clear and coherent position. If the
    internal temperature becomes that much more inflamed, then I
    think it will be that much more difficult to have a serious set
    of nuclear negotiations in the near future; and, as Robin has
    suggested, there is a time urgency to the nuclear dilemma.
        Mr. Tierney. Dr. Lopez, you agree with that?
        Dr. Lopez. Yes, I do. I would go one step further: the
    imposition of sanctions permits the regime to shift attention
    to a new level of competition, if not conflict, with the United
    States, and takes the eyes off what ought to be the main focus,
    and that is what is wrong with the Geneva Accord. We seemed, in
    early October, to have a reasonable degree of consensus with
    the Iranians. We want to keep our focus on that as a template
    around which we negotiate, and there may be ways in which the
    threat of sanctions over the next 3 to 6 months gives us much
    more leverage with the Iranian leadership than the imposition,
    because it doesn't permit the leadership to focus on new
    actions by the United States taken under conditions of new
    hostility; it keeps our eye on the central focus of what is
    wrong with this existing nuclear deal, that on paper looked
    fairly good to all concerned in early October.
        Mr. Tierney. The statement I took out of Ambassador
    Dobbins' statement on this was the political imperative to not
    just stand there, but to do something. And I think you
    mentioned in your testimony that it seems to be driving a lot
    of Members, as well as anybody else; and it is a strong and
    powerful situation when you feel that somebody is not
    responding. Can we effectively target sanctions, say on the
    Revolutionary Guard or on some of the elites there, in such a
    way that it doesn't adversely affect the general population?
    Are there things left to be done that do not already exist in
    the current sanctions regime that we have?
        You have the same problem that I have with the mic; we have
    to turn it on. Ambassador, we have to turn the mic on.
        Mr. Dobbins. Sorry. I think that things like international
    travel bans, financial sanctions directed at individuals, named
    individuals, targeting companies that are owned by the
    Revolutionary Guard, and, frankly, just labeling those
    individuals and those organizations as pariahs. And this has to
    be international to be effective. International sanctions that
    do that will further delegitimize the regime, encourage
    domestic opposition, and make the regime feel uncomfortable;
    and they won't like it, and that in itself can provide a
    certain degree of satisfaction, even if it doesn't produce the
    desired results.
        Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
        Mr. Flake, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Flake. I thank the chairman and thank all the
    witnesses. This has been one of the most informative hearings I
    have been a part of for a long time and I thank the chairman
    for arranging it.
        Dr. Maloney, you mentioned that the Iranian regime is
    already preparing to deal with IRPSA, for example. What
    examples can you give? How are they preparing?
        Dr. Maloney. In the summer of 2007, they instituted a
    nationwide gasoline rationing program that, despite some early
    tremors of unrest, was largely accepted by the population. It
    has been abused, it has been exploited, but, in fact, there is
    now a very systemized rationing program, as well as a black
    market price for gasoline, which did not exist prior to that
    period. They have, in addition, put major investments into
    transferring most of the public vehicle fleet away from
    gasoline toward compressed natural gas, which, of course, they
    have vast quantities of. So they have sought additional sort of
    conservation measures; and they have, at least reportedly, been
    trying to stockpile gasoline, as well as activate some of the
    smuggling networks and craft deals with allies, including
    Venezuela, and possibly also China--there are conflicting
    reports on this--to expand their gasoline imports from those
    countries. Finally, they have also been investing in a major
    program of expanding and upgrading their own refinery capacity
    so that they will not be as vulnerable in the future to this.
        Mr. Flake. Thank you.
        Dr. Lopez, you have studied this a lot and we hear from the
    proponents of sanctions, particularly the petroleum sanctions,
    that other countries and companies that are dealing with Iran
    will simply have to make the choice: do they want to exclude
    themselves from the U.S. market, or the Iranian market. And we
    think they will choose to go with the United States. Is that
    necessarily the case, is it that simple?
        Dr. Lopez. No, I don't think it is that simple. I think
    what has to come along with that assertion is what then is
    going to be the cost and the logistics of implementing and
    enforcing that. Imagine a world in which U.S. tankers in the
    Persian Gulf are confronting Venezuelan ships, who see
    themselves in solidarity with the Iranian people, trying to
    deliver refined petroleum.
        Which crisis do you want to manage? I think we would want
    to manage a crisis with our Russian, Chinese, and other allies
    at the Security Council of a defiant Iranian regime that wants
    to throw out the IAEA, because we are on the stronger ground
    there, rather than shifting the terms of enforcement of an oil
    embargo, which has many, many routes for undercutting it. We
    have never had any success with secondary sanctions, that is,
    with those who have tried to participate in a sanctions regime
    by sometimes honoring it diplomatically, but undercutting it
    economically. That takes us, in a sense, on a side road that is
    only going to be a very, very long and difficult road for the
    United States to undo; it really becomes a sideshow that is not
    at all in our interest.
        Mr. Flake. All right. Thank you.
        Ms. Wright, you mentioned that some of the protestors were
    shouting, ``Mr. Obama, you are for us or against us.'' What do
    you mean by that? If you say that they are not in favor of what
    is on the table right now in terms of what the United States is
    proposing, do you mean sanctions that will target or impact the
    population in general? What do they want the President to do
    that he is not doing, is it simply rhetorically getting behind
    them, or what?
        Ms. Wright. I think there is a particular focus or desire
    for the United States to take a much stronger role or stronger
    position on human rights. They are not looking for the White
    House to come out and support the Green Movement; in fact, that
    would end up tainting them and giving the regime grounds on
    which to prosecute more of them for being spies for the United
    States or agents of the United States.
        But they do want to have a sense that the world, the United
    States, as the most powerful spokesman for the Free World, is
    willing to take a stand on behalf of them. The President's
    reference in his Nobel acceptance--the announcement was made
    about his Nobel Peace Prize and he referred just a little bit
    to Neda Sultan--not by name, but a situation resembling--he
    mentioned the situation when she died, and that resonated in
    Iran in enormous ways. It doesn't take very much.
        Mr. Flake. Thank you.
        In my remaining time, all of us up here have one of these,
    and we are going to be asked to go to the floor later today and
    use it: it is a voting card. With regard to IRPSA, if you had
    one of these and you were going to vote this afternoon, how
    would you vote? I realize arguments can be made this way, but
    we only have this card and we only have this vote today.
        If we could start with Dr. Maloney, how would you vote?
        Dr. Maloney. I would vote against it.
        Dr. Lopez. I would vote against these sanctions.
        Ms. Wright. I think there are a lot of problems with these
    sanctions and they could backfire.
        Mr. Dobbins. I would vote against them unless I got the
    kind of assurances that the chairman was talking about.
        Mr. Flake. Thank you.
        Mr. Tierney. The assurances, I don't know if you know what
    they were. They are either not to be implemented until the
    White House and the President, during the diplomatic
    initiatives, think it now essential to move to that point, or
    that he be given the flexibility to use them, but not be
    mandated to use them.
        Mr. Flake. Those assurances are not within the legislation
    right now.
        Mr. Tierney. Those are not in the legislation. The
    assurances that I am going to receive are that they will be in
    any final bill that we vote on after conference on that.
        Mr. Lynch.
        Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First of all, I want to thank our witnesses. I think the
    testimony here has been very, very helpful in us making our
    decision. My only regret is that the other 430-something
    Members of the House are not here to hear your testimony as
    well, and I want to associate myself both with the remarks of
    our chairman and his conditions, as well as the concerns raised
    by the ranking member. You know, this could be a case where
    there is significant and courageous opposition right now in
    Iran, as Ms. Wright has so articulately presented. This could
    be a case of us snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. Just
    when there may be an opportunity here for an internal change
    within Iran, we may be doing something that defeats all of
    that.
        I have very limited experience in this, you are the bona
    fide experts, but I look at the situation in Cuba and I have
    had an opportunity to review that firsthand. The support, the
    rallying around the flag effect, as Dr. Lopez has described it,
    it is a real phenomena, and I think that is what has kept
    Castro in power in Cuba, because he stood up to America and he
    also had a ready excuse: the embargo, for anything that went
    wrong in Cuba. He blames tropical storms, he will blame that on
    the embargo, and it gives him great cover.
        I have been to Gaza a couple times and the embargo there in
    Gaza has caused great rallying around Hamas, regardless of
    their incompetence and inability to deliver for their people.
    And I have a fear that we are going to--this is the best thing
    that could possibly happen to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. I think that
    he is welcoming this. This will cause the Iranian population to
    rally around him.
        So I agree with basically everything that has been said
    here this morning.
        The one question I had was around the mechanics.
    Ambassador, you might be the best person to answer this. To
    really limit, to implement the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions
    Act, it would seem to require a naval embargo of some sort, and
    a land embargo to prevent refined petroleum from coming back
    into Iran; and I guess I am asking is this a proxy vote for
    military action here? Because I understand it is going to need
    approval by the U.N. Security Council, but this is a first step
    in that direction. So how would this work out in practice?
        Mr. Dobbins. Well, if such a measure were to get Security
    Council approval, the Security Council could also authorize
    enforcement measures, as was the case with Iraq, for instance,
    when it was even more--Iraq was forbidden from exporting its
    oil, for instance, which was an even more effective means of
    sanctions.
        Mr. Lynch. You are referring to the Iraq Oil for Food
    Program?
        Mr. Dobbins. No. I am saying that, the Iraq Oil for Food
    Program came later as an effort to ameliorate the effect of the
    earlier sanction, which was simply to ban Iraq from exporting
    its oil. And there were enforcement provisions that prevented
    Iraq from exporting its oil: we were allowed to overfly the
    country, we were allowed to bomb Iraq periodically, we could
    stop ships. And this was all authorized by U.N. Security
    Council. So, theoretically, you could do that.
        First of all, you are not going to get a Security Council
    measure in support of an embargo on gasoline or refined oil
    products; that is not going to happen. Second, even if you did,
    you probably wouldn't be able to get authorization for those
    kinds of enforcement measures. So what we are talking about
    here is a unilateral U.S. measure with some extraterritorial
    application; that is, we will penalize foreign companies for
    engaging in this behavior by denying them access to our market.
        I don't think that either the Congress or the
    administration would intend to use military forces to enforce
    that, so I don't think there is a danger that this would
    precipitate the administration is authorizing military action
    to enforce this. I think the enforcement mechanisms, if they
    were approved, would be legal mechanisms designed to penalize
    firms from, say, Great Britain or France or Germany, who sell
    products to Iran, from selling products in the United States;
    and we would get into endless legal hassles and diplomatic
    disputes with those countries.
        Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
        Mr. Duncan, you are recognized.
        Mr. Duncan. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
    for calling a very interesting and informative hearing. First
    of all, I want to associate myself with the opening remarks of
    my ranking member, Mr. Flake; I thought he made a good summary
    of what I wish was our position. I also agree with Mr. Lynch
    that it is unfortunate that all the Members couldn't have heard
    the presentation that has been made here this morning, because
    I think all of us know that this afternoon we will in the
    House, at least, pass this sanctions legislation by an
    overwhelming margin, and I think that is unfortunate because I
    think the witnesses have made a pretty convincing case that
    these sanctions, or this legislation, is not a good thing to
    do, at least at this time.
        I think that we need a more neutral foreign policy toward
    the Middle East. I think we need to try very hard to be friends
    with Israel, but we also need to try harder and do more to be
    friends with other countries in the Middle East. I read, a year
    or so ago, an interesting book called All the Shah's Men, about
    Iran and some of our activities there. Unfortunately, in many
    other countries some of our activities to intervene in
    political or religious or ethnic disputes have created almost
    more enemies than friends for our country.
        Basically, that is all I really have to say. I don't know
    if you have any suggestions as to how, ever, when we pass this
    sanctions legislation, how we could do that and still--if there
    is something more we can do to show the Iranian people that it
    is not really aimed at them, but really toward their top
    leadership, and almost even more toward one man at the top. If
    you have any comments or anything you wish to add, feel free to
    comment.
        Dr. Lopez. Well, I would suggest, Mr. Duncan, that it is
    very, very important to get the extra rider in this bill out of
    conference that gives the White House some degree of
    flexibility on this: that the executive branch would judge when
    implementation, and under what conditions, would occur. And I
    think we ought to be much further down the road before that
    implementation occurs.
        Mr. Duncan. Well, I think that is a good suggestion.
        Ms. Wright.
        Ms. Wright. I was just going to add, very briefly, that
    there has always been a struggle on public relations on these
    initiatives and we never have been able, over 30 years, to
    explain ourselves and what our goals are to the Iranian people.
    Sometimes the White House or the State Department will come out
    with a statement simply saying ``our target is not the people
    of Iran,'' but that doesn't go very far. The Iranians, of
    course, with their media monopoly, can spin this in a way, not
    just this bill, but any action taken by the United States, as
    something designed to hurt all Iranians. Any effort to portray
    the alternative, that this is designed to, in the end, help
    them could make a difference.
        Mr. Duncan. All right.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Duncan.
        Mr. Quigley, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Quigley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As the relatively new
    person on the block, this is quite an education for me as well.
    And I appreciate the remarks that my colleagues have made about
    the reservations that the panel seems to have about the
    effectiveness of sanctions, but I can't help read the obvious
    in the news recently, in the Times of London, about the Iranian
    nuclear weapon system being farther along than we had
    anticipated and, in recent news, much larger than we
    anticipated. So I hear that either sanctions don't work--and
    not just from this panel--or that they take a long time to
    work, or they must be specifically targeted with a lot of
    coalition assistance.
        They haven't worked yet, with the exceptions and the
    limitations that the Ambassador has talked about, and they
    probably won't work in this set of circumstances, but we don't
    have a lot of time. And, with the greatest respect, I would
    suggest that it is not going to do the Iranian people, who we
    want to be friends with, a whole lot of good if they achieve a
    nuclear weapon or two, and they certainly have enough material.
    And that makes them, more than anyone else, a target for
    reprisal and for destabilization of the entire region, and a
    threat not just to Israel, but to our other allies and our
    troops.
        So I guess I am saying Monty Hall isn't pointing to door
    No. 3; there is door No. 1 or door No. 2. If we are in a short
    timeframe, tell us the options then if you would vote against
    this.
        Dr. Maloney. I will take an opening crack at that. I don't
    think there are any good options, and that is something that
    Secretary Gates has been saying for many years now. It is
    something that most of us who work on Iran deal with every day.
    There are no silver bullets to a regime that has been in power
    for 30 years, that has survived endless crises, and will
    probably even see this one through, at least for the short to
    medium term.
        I would raise just one point about the timeframe. The
    Iranian nuclear program is an urgent dilemma, but we are not
    yet at a stage where Iran has either a nuclear weapon or the
    capacity to deliver one--we are several years away from that
    period. And we need to give diplomacy some time to work. That
    means diplomacy using sanctions, using the combined weight of
    the international community working in coordinated fashion, for
    perhaps the very first time since the Iranian Revolution, to
    deal with this government. It means giving the Iranian
    democratic opposition some time to actually bring itself
    together, find a strategy, develop a leadership that can truly
    confront the regime.
        But I am quite confident that, in fact, we can, over a
    period of several years, deal in a much more coordinated, much
    more effective fashion with Iran. Yet that needs to involve
    both diplomacy and economic pressure and, in particular, very
    strong coordination with the international community.
        Mr. Quigley. Well, wouldn't you acknowledge, Doctor, that
    the timeframe that we thought we were working with has
    compressed already? You are talking about taking a pretty big
    risk if we are assuming it is not going to contract again.
        Dr. Maloney. I am making no assumptions whatsoever, because
    I think, obviously, we don't know everything that there is to
    know about the Iranian nuclear program--and we were surprised
    in 2002 about the extent. We have been surprised by the
    regime's willingness and determination to push forward despite
    the threat of international pressure and sanctions.
        But I think we also recognize that there have been
    technical problems with the program; that, in fact, despite the
    massive investment that the regime has made, they have not yet
    achieved a weapons capability. There is fuel that has been
    amassed, but there are ways that the international community
    can deal with that, and one of them, the very good, I think,
    proposal by the administration to export the LEU is one that
    can be continued to be pursued.
        There are at least some signs that there are some within
    the Iranian regime who would support a revised review of that
    deal, and I think that is one of the aims that sanctions ought
    to be directed toward, rather than simply punishing the country
    as a whole, rather than simply trying to reap the highest
    economic price against Iran, because we know from past history
    that won't succeed.
        Dr. Lopez. May I, Mr. Chairman, respond to this in that I
    think it really focuses us on what is a medium term goal; and
    the highest order of a medium term goal, it seems to me, is to
    create an environment in which it becomes far too costly for
    the Iranians to continue to reject IAEA guidelines and IAEA
    inspections. Let's remember that the Natanz Plant is still
    under IAEA guidelines. The primary generator of enriched
    uranium is still under international inspection and control.
        One of the great advantages of the Iraqi sanctions over
    time was that we had a nice linkage between the pressure of
    sanctions and the maintenance of inspections. If you wanted the
    sanctions lifted, you had to be continually forthcoming with
    inspections. And I think to the extent to which there is
    pressure on this government to worry about a longer-term time
    clock, and sanctions is the answer, well you then targeted
    limited sanctions against key component entities that supply
    high level components to the regime or elements of the
    Revolutionary Guard--identifiable people who are in charge of
    the nuclear program, to the extent that they can be targeted,
    sends the appropriate message of urgency but also doesn't risk
    the possibility of the Iranians expelling the IAEA or
    withdrawing from the NPT.
        So we want to keep this tense synergy between those, and
    there is a way in which the greatest dilemma that Congress
    faces is that all the available tools seem to be a toy store
    that we can mobilize. In fact, you have to be very astute and
    selective about how to do that with a medium-term goal being
    continued dialog and inspection by the IAEA.
        It may be that the end point--2011, 2012, or 2013--puts us
    in the same position as the one we were in with Libya. I would
    make the case that sanctions were very successful in turning
    around Libyan commitment to terrorism and to its weapons of
    mass destruction program. We had to go past the eleventh hour
    and, fortunately, we didn't sacrifice constructive engagement--
    even when they went beyond the threshold that we hoped they
    would not. They woke up 1 day and realized that a nuclearized
    state is not all it is cracked up to be.
        We may have to go through that entire threshold with the
    Iranians. I hope we do not, but I think only a strategy of
    constructive engagement and a step-by-step approach to medium
    goals will get us to where we want to be.
        Mr. Tierney. Sure.
        Ms. Wright. If you are looking for impact, the kinds of
    sanctions that have had the biggest impact on the regime are
    the banking sanctions imposed by the Treasury Department. This
    is something that has mobilized the international community
    because of laws passed after 9/11 that make every bank
    responsible for knowing their origin of the flow of money that
    they have in their banks and, as a result, the five largest
    banks in Iran have been crippled from doing international
    business. Expanding that avenue, that type of sanctions, even
    though it does have impact on the people, makes the regime sit
    up and notice, and it ends up paying a real price because it
    can find alternatives, but at a much higher price.
        Mr. Quigley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to know,
    as you say, though, that sanctions worked and they did, as you
    suggest, hurt the Iranian people at the same time. I mean, it
    is very complicated and difficult, but you challenge us not to
    use the only tool we have right now, to a certain extent, if
    you start limiting what sanctions we can use.
        Ms. Wright. You asked what works, and this is something
    that, very quickly, has had an impact. I lived in Africa for 7
    years: the last 7 years of sanctions against Rhodesia and
    sanctions during Apartheid, and it takes a very long time for
    sanctions to work. The impact of banking sanctions has been
    almost unprecedented of any case around the world in terms of
    how quickly it has made a regime sit up and notice; how big a
    price, literally and politically, it has exacted.
        Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
        Mr. Jordan.
        Mr. Jordan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank
    our witnesses, as well, for being here and their testimony.
        In today's Post, Danielle Pletka, and I believe I am
    pronouncing that name right, has a piece in there--a pretty
    compelling piece--and the writer talks about this. She believes
    the administration has kind of resigned itself to a nuclear-
    armed Iran and is moving in the direction of a ``containment
    policy.'' I would like to get your reactions to the premise of
    the piece. And then, also, kind of moving into what Ms. Wright
    pointed out in her opening statements, if in fact that is the
    case, that this containment policy is what is being pursued,
    the implications that has for our country to support the reform
    or democracy movement that is in Iran.
        So we can just go down the list and you can fire away.
        Dr. Maloney. I would disagree that the administration, at
    this stage, has settled on containment. I think that really
    belies everything that has been done, particularly the very
    creative and positive proposals that were put forward and
    originally agreed to by the Iranians to export the LEU and
    support the Tehran research reactor deal.
        So I just don't see that evidence. I think that we need to
    be planning for that eventuality, simply because we can't
    predict the way these sorts of things play out, as we learned
    from both India and Pakistan. There may be drivers that force
    this regime to move forward more quickly that, in fact, produce
    a nuclear-armed Iran more quickly than we anticipate, and we
    should be prepared for containment if and when that comes. That
    needs to be done quietly and discreetly, but I would hope that
    planning is already underway.
        I do not see that as in any way contrasting or undercutting
    the very strenuous diplomacy that we have had, resetting the
    relationship with Russia, putting forward serious proposals
    toward the Iranians, and actually, I think, very quietly
    mobilizing at least some international support for the kinds of
    multilateral sanctions that would be effective--because I think
    no one on this panel has said that sanctions should never be
    used, but simply that they need to be used only where and how
    they are most effective.
        In terms of how that coordinates with our support for the
    Iranian opposition, I would say, quite frankly, that the
    Iranian opposition is a force that we neither created nor
    anticipated, and our support--while important because we are a
    moral leader, because we have a certain responsibility given
    our history, given our ideals--to voice those sorts of ideas,
    our support is not going to be what changes the future for the
    Iranian opposition. Iran is a proud country that resents the
    interference of foreigners very deeply. Fifty years later, they
    still deeply resent, as one of the other representatives
    suggested, the involvement with the Mossadeq affair in 1953. I
    don't believe, at this stage, that anything other than moral
    support for the opposition would be useful or welcome from that
    side, and I do believe that opposition, in fact, will succeed
    over time, simply because it represents the view of the large
    swath of the Iranian people.
        Mr. Jordan. Mr. Lopez.
        Dr. Lopez. Thank you. It is a very, very important
    question. I detect, through dealing with people on the National
    Security Council and elsewhere, no resignation to the
    containment strategy. In fact, I believe that the good example
    here is the way we are dealing with the North Korea
    nuclearization problem; that is, we are going to find every
    diplomatic and, in the North Korean case, sanctions-based way
    to roll this back. So I detect a strategy that--on the one
    hand, counter to where I think we have been for the last
    decade--rejects the notion that there is an immediacy to the
    ability to apply increased pressure and then somehow arm twist
    the Iranians into changing their behavior. The new realism I
    detect in town now is that we know we are dealing with a very
    determined regime which has domestic, cultural, and other
    reasons to move only straight ahead with nuclear development.
        Now, how do we show them that is a choice that has
    consequences without immediately imposing penalties? How do we
    hold before them a vision of be careful what you wish for, when
    you get it, as you deal in your neighborhood and as you deal in
    the rest of the global community? How do we find a way for them
    to match their own rhetoric with a responsible participation in
    the global community's concerns about nuclearization? I think
    the contingencies will be there for dealing with this, but I
    like the notion that this current approach sees a very, very
    long road ahead, and if the measures we don't take result in
    the desired turning back away from the program and an export of
    uranium, if they go nuclear, we have models for which to deal
    with that, as we have executed in Libya and in North Korea;
    that is, in a sense we are playing, if you will excuse the
    sports analogy, with two game plans: one for regulation time,
    and one for if we have to go to overtime.
        Ms. Wright. I don't have much to add except that
    containment is the end of the process, and we are still at the
    beginning.
        Mr. Dobbins. Well, I think, first of all, you have to
    understand it is perfectly logical for Iran to be pursuing
    nuclear weapons; they are surrounded by other nuclear powers
    and they are at a level of sophistication and capability which
    allows them to achieve a nuclear capability. If Barack Obama or
    George W. Bush were elected president of Iran, they would be
    pursuing a nuclear capability; any leader in that geopolitical
    context would be. The question is can you, first of all, move
    toward a regime that is not threatening its neighbors
    ideologically, so that people are more relaxed about it and,
    second, create incentives and disincentives that persuade them
    that a nuclear capability is not in their interest.
        We have already seen North Korea cross a nuclear threshold,
    and the current policies are to roll it back; and there are
    fairly massive sanctions that are in place, and also some
    fairly substantial inducements that are being offered to try to
    roll that back. So Iran crossing the nuclear threshold is not
    necessarily the end of the world and it doesn't mean, even if
    it happens, that you are going to live with it indefinitely or
    try to live with it indefinitely.
        One of the reasons, as I have said, for substantial and
    mounting sanctions against Iran is to persuade other countries
    that they don't want to do the same thing. So keeping Iran in
    its pariah status, even if it achieved nuclear weapons or
    nuclear capability, would be sound policy, in my judgment. So I
    don't think we should set an absolute deadline here.
        That said, we are not going to physically prevent Iran from
    getting nuclear weapons by anything short of invasion and
    occupation. Bombing might delay it, but not indefinitely.
    Therefore, we are going to have to continue to pursue a track
    which involves mounting sanctions, continued engagement, and
    international solidarity in an effort to arrest, slow, or
    eventually, if necessary, roll back this program.
        Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
        Mr. Luetkemeyer.
        Mr. Leutkemeyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the
    witnesses for their testimony; it has been very compelling.
        I happened to have the opportunity to go to Israel back in
    August, and our group, both Democrats and Republicans, met with
    the leadership, both there in Israel, as well as in Palestine,
    and they were adamant in their analysis of the situation that
    Iran would have the nuclear capability by the end of the year.
    If that is the case, I think it is being very naive, from the
    testimony we have heard this morning, that we have plenty of
    time with which to deal with this. I think that a sense of
    urgency is necessary in order to be able to confront this, have
    a plan ready to confront it. I haven't heard that plan yet this
    morning. I have heard some ideas, but I haven't heard that
    plan. And if we are going to be ready for this, we need to have
    a sense of urgency belying an ability to contain this or deal
    with it, as the Ambassador just said.
        One of the concerns I have is that sanctions are only part
    of one of the layers of ways to deal with this, and diplomacy
    is one of the ways. But the folks in the Middle East don't seem
    to be able to understand that with diplomacy comes commitment;
    and they don't seem to be willing to live up to commitments. We
    can get commitments from them, but they are just ignored; it is
    just a statement that they can throw away. There doesn't seem
    to be any willingness to complete their commitment.
        So, in that light, knowing we have a sense of urgency,
    knowing we have a difficult group to deal with, knowing that
    they probably, if they don't have it already, will have nuclear
    capabilities very shortly, where do we need to go with our
    sanctions and our diplomatic efforts? Because if we get another
    North Korea, which ignores diplomacy, which ignores the
    international community, how do we deal with those folks?
        Ambassador, would you like to start?
        Mr. Dobbins. Well, first of all, I think that deadlines and
    a sense of urgency may tend to work against us, rather than for
    us. They don't feel a sense of urgency. If we feel a sense of
    urgency, then we are the ones under the gun and we are the ones
    who are constantly pressured to come up with new ideas, new
    proposals, new diplomatic offers.
        Mr. Luetkemeyer. Yes, but don't you feel we need to be
    ahead of the curve on this? Don't you feel we need to be
    proactive, rather than reactive?
        Mr. Dobbins. I am not arguing that we shouldn't be. I am
    arguing that we need a sustainable policy, a policy that will
    continue to penalize Iran, will continue to make it, over the
    longer term, unattractive for Iran to either gain or retain a
    nuclear capability. We need to maintain international consensus
    which isolates Iran and penalizes them in that regard. And to
    the extent we become fixated on a particular deadline, we are
    the ones who then become under pressure; we are the ones who
    then find our position weakened by that kind of time pressure.
        So I understand the apparent urgency. Now, I am not sure
    you said the Israelis thought they would have a nuclear weapon
    by the end of the year. I don't know what year that refers to.
        Mr. Luetkemeyer. This year.
        Mr. Dobbins. Well, they are certainly not going to have one
    by the end of this year, so I think we can dismiss that
    possibility. I don't think they are likely to have a nuclear
    weapon by the end of next year, either.
        Mr. Luetkemeyer. Well, with all due respect, Mr.
    Ambassador, here is an article from the Times online, December
    14th, Secret Document Exposes Iran's Nuclear Trigger. They have
    their final component of the nuclear bomb; they are working on
    it as we speak.
        Mr. Dobbins. If Iran has nuclear materials for a weapon,
    they have a facility we don't know about and can't bomb,
    because we don't know it exists and we don't know where it is.
    So if Iran could develop a nuclear weapon at this point, they
    would do it in a way that we would have absolutely no way of
    stopping, unless we invade and occupy the entire country.
        The uranium they do have, which we know about, is not
    capable of creating a bomb, and wouldn't be capable of creating
    a bomb for several years because it requires extensive further
    enrichment, which the Iranians do not, at the present, have the
    capability to do, but which they could do over an extended
    period of time.
        So it is possible they have nuclear material we don't know
    about, but, if so, then our options are pretty limited.
        Mr. Luetkemeyer. Well, not to belabor the point, but Dr.
    Maloney made the point in her testimony that gave at least two
    examples where we had underestimated what was going on in Iran.
    To me, if we have already underestimated twice, it would seem
    logical that it is very possible we underestimated them again;
    and when you are dealing with a nuclear bomb and a regime such
    as that, to underestimate those folks is very, very dangerous.
        Anybody else like to comment on the discussion?
        Dr. Maloney. You also posed in your question the idea of
    where do we go next, and I think that needs to be the focus of
    the deliberation at this stage, and particularly with respect
    to IRPSA. Where we go next is not more unilateral measures that
    have limited or counterproductive impact within Iran. Where we
    go next is to the U.N. Security Council; test how successful we
    have been in changing the dynamic with the Russians, test how
    serious the Chinese are, as they have suggested, at least, in
    some rhetoric, about applying new pressure to Iran, and test
    the Europeans and see if they are finally willing, for perhaps
    the first time since the Revolution, to put their money where
    their mouth is when it comes to Iran.
        I think that is the route that we go. And we will not
    succeed fully, but I think that we can have some real impact in
    crafting the kind of measures that, as Robin suggested, have
    already begun to make important elites within Iran, people who
    really do have some influence over the future of its policies
    on core security issues, stand up and take notice; and that is
    the sort of thing that can pay off, but it will take time.
        Mr. Luetkemeyer. I appreciate your responses and I would
    love to ask more questions, especially with regards to how in
    the world we can get the rest of the world to go along with us
    when half the world sides with Iran right now, but I realize my
    time is up.
        I appreciate the chairman's indulgence. Thank you.
        Mr. Tierney. Ms. Wright.
        Ms. Wright. I just have one brief thought. Implicit in your
    statement is some knowledge that we have about where Iran is,
    and the bottom line is you think we knew too little about what
    was going on in Iraq, try Iran--we know even less. And that is
    a sobering reality when it comes to figuring things out down
    the road.
        But I will also say that if you thought Iraq was a
    complicated war, try Iran. The military option is not just an
    issue of using strategic bombing of suspected targets, which
    would clearly backfire and clearly galvanize the population
    around the regime, however much they hate it, but, because of
    the nature of conflict in our own deployment of troops in both
    neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan, force the United States to
    engage in something that was far broader and would look like an
    open-ended war with Iran.
        So I think that when we talk about these options, yes,
    sanctions are frustrating. But the military option is one that
    is so costly, and we make assumptions about being able to go in
    and having some impact, that could be, in many ways, the worst
    thing to do, because it would also encourage people to think
    they need the bomb to protect themselves.
        Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
        Mr. Luetkemeyer, I can offer two things. You weren't yet a
    member of this committee last session when we had a hearing on
    the war gaming of just what would be entailed in having a
    military response and what would be the ramifications, so the
    committee staff would be more than willing to make those
    materials available to you if you think they are useful at all,
    with the testimony of the various witnesses on that. I think
    there were graphs and charts and all of that.
        The other thing you might find useful, although I suspect
    we are a little late for the vote today, you might find it
    useful if we can arrange for the Intelligence Committee to give
    you a briefing on what it is that we do know. I think everybody
    acknowledges we don't know everything on that, but it is just
    as dangerous to overestimate their capacity as it is to
    underestimate it; and if you want to raise that directly, it is
    fine. If we can be helpful in that, we will certainly try to do
    that with you.
        Mr. Luetkemeyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Tierney. You are welcome.
        Mr. Flake.
        Mr. Flake. I ran out of time before I could ask Ambassador
    Dobbins first, and maybe the others if they want to comment,
    with regard to the mentioned advisability of the sanctions
    route, the economic sanctions route, of international
    cooperation and getting our allies on board. Does it make it
    more difficult, or do we help by leading, imposing our own
    unilateral sanctions?
        And there may be a mix of both, I understand, but let's
    take today's action in the House with IRPSA. Does this
    complicate the likelihood of getting our international allies
    on board on other, perhaps more effective sanctions, or some
    variant of these sanctions? How does that impact us moving
    ahead, the fact that we are going to impose these in the House?
    The Senate may not go there, it may look different in
    conference, I understand, but I just want you to talk to the
    advisability of leading on this. Is it something that our
    international partners are looking for our guidance on or is it
    more useful, and I tend to think, and I want to see if you
    agree, to move in concert with them?
        Ambassador Dobbins.
        Mr. Dobbins. I think that the element of the bill that you
    face, as I understand it, that would disrupt international
    solidarity and make agreement more difficult, is the
    extraterritorial elements, the effort to use U.S. law to impose
    sanctions on foreign companies for doing something that is
    perfectly legal in their own country and perfectly legal
    internationally. We have done that in the past and we have
    ended up backing away from it because of the virulently
    negative reaction of our closest allies to being manipulated in
    that fashion.
        Mr. Flake. If I could interrupt for a minute. Within IRPSA,
    that is precisely what we are doing, is it not?
        Mr. Dobbins. Right. Exactly.
        Mr. Flake. Dr. Lopez, do you have a comment on that?
        Dr. Lopez. I am in agreement with you on this and I think I
    would just add two layers to this. One is in terms of the
    multilateral versus unilateral dynamic, it needs to be more
    widely understood in the Congress how the Russians and the
    Chinese share very much our view that a nuclear Iran is in no
    one's interest.
        And if we believe we have to march down the road of leading
    with economic coercion so that we persuade the Russians and the
    Chinese, we are already on the same plain on this; and I think
    that is what pushes us to think about more astute arrangements
    than are built into this legislation.
        Second, I believe we have a new era of good feeling around
    the Security Council table that has been hard earned over the
    last 2 years, and that concerns, particularly in this town,
    that the Security Council is either inept or the environment is
    not right there for us. In fact, within this week I think the
    United States has shown remarkable leadership in the Security
    Council, in the reformulation of the 1267 guidelines with
    Russian and Chinese partners.
        I think we are at a unique moment in which the multilateral
    may need to lead the domestic, and we would be much better off
    in a technical sense saying the United States has in its
    holster, if you will, a set of punishing sanctions, but because
    our highest order of priority is changing Iranian behavior in
    concert with its region and in concert with the globe, we are
    keeping that powder dry. But it is very clear what we can do
    technically and economically, but at this moment we choose not
    to because we believe this is a global concern of which we are
    pleased to play a part.
        Mr. Flake. Dr. Maloney.
        Dr. Maloney. Let me just add one final point. Under IRPSA,
    as I understand it, currently formulated without flexibility or
    waiver authority, we would have to sanction Chinese companies.
    And if you think that is going to make it easy to bring the
    Chinese on board with the kind of sanctions at the Security
    Council that would actually have an impact in Iran, I think
    there is some obvious conflict there. The Chinese have an
    enormous interest in investment in Iran, and if we can in any
    way encourage them or coerce them to use that leverage with
    Iran, that would be far more valuable. They are unlikely to do
    that if we are involved in the business of sanctioning their
    energy firms.
        Mr. Flake. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Tierney. Mr. Foster, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Foster. Well, thank you. And my apologies for not being
    present for all of your testimony here. But I am specifically
    interested in the possibilities for further micro-targeting of
    financial sanctions toward different segments of society that
    might actually provide us with some leverage to try to
    encourage the developments that we want to happen in government
    there. Obvious targets would be individual institutions and
    banks, or maybe sections of the ruling class that might realize
    that their hold on power is a little bit shaky and they may be
    shoveling their assets offshore, or elements that we think
    might be friendly toward developments we want to encourage and
    making their financial lives easier.
        I was wondering if there is anything that we are missing,
    anything Congress can do to encourage or enable that sort of
    better targeting of financial sanctions.
        Dr. Lopez. I am willing to respond. I think this particular
    leadership in Treasury has examined this in detail and I have
    great confidence in Mr. Levey for knowing what that is; and
    there have been a number of discussions, as you know, about
    that. I think the focus of this should be on those entities
    whose activities are most auspiciously in violation of the U.N.
    Security Council resolutions passed in 2007 and 2008, which
    restricted higher levels technologies and the movement of
    moneys to support the nuclear program.
        I think with the revelations that the Congressman has noted
    earlier--of the possibility of trigger devices, the movement of
    scientists, etc.--I think we have possibilities of looking into
    new areas where this kind of micro-targeting would be very
    effective. It has a combination of sending a very, very strong
    message that our intelligence is state-of-the-art; that there
    are ways in which we are trying to focus on the nature of the
    problem, which is nuclear development, and not the whole
    economy; and it also has the ability to be voided very quickly
    if we need to reward compliant behavior.
        Dr. Maloney. Can I just add to that? I think, in addition
    to micro-targeting and looking for the most important
    constituencies within the regime to influence, we also need to
    think about the way that we are implementing sanctions; and one
    of the, I think, existing holes--and it is well known--is
    Iranian economic interests in Dubai. To the extent that we can
    get the UAE, the Dubai Emirate in particular--to step up its
    scrutiny and make its financial transactions with the Iranians
    more difficult, that will have, I think, some significant
    impact on the regime elites who currently support the nuclear
    strategy.
        Mr. Foster. Is there any detailed knowledge about segments
    of Iranian society moving their assets offshore, into places
    where we might or might not be able to see? There are a lot of
    things happening in the financial services bill that is
    intended to give us leverage to pry open places like
    Switzerland, and I was just wondering if that is a source of
    frustration in understanding what is really going on there and
    where we could apply leverage.
        Ms. Wright. There has been an enormous drain of capital in
    Iran by both people in the regime and others. As Suzanne
    mentioned, Dubai's economy is now fueled significantly by the
    inflow of Iranian businesses that have basically set up shop
    there to get around sanctions. So they bring their goods, or
    whatever their office is involved in, to Dubai, running out of
    Dubai, and then they ship things across the Gulf or use that as
    their backup office. But Dubai, at the moment, is also looking
    for any source of income it can get, so how much pressure we
    can actually put on Dubai is very tricky.
        Mr. Foster. OK. Well, thank you, and my apologies again for
    only covering part of it.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
        Mr. Luetkemeyer, do you have any further questions?
        Mr. Luetkemeyer. Yes, I just have one, Mr. Chairman. Thank
    you.
        We talked about the opposition many times. How strong is
    the opposition? How well organized is it? Where do you feel
    that it is going to grow to?
        Ms. Wright. There has been a reform movement that has been
    vibrant since the early 1990's in Iran; it took root officially
    with the election of President Khatami in 1997, but it never
    had critical mass. Today it does and it crosses all sectors of
    society. You have people who were among the original
    revolutionaries, as well as people who have never been involved
    in politics and hate the system. It has all aspects of societal
    life. I had some of the slides, I think before you arrived, of
    women old and young; you have taxi drivers, as well as
    professionals. This is something where everyone has been
    affected.
        And I know we talk a lot about the Revolutionary Guards and
    kind of lump them together, but one of the things you need to
    remember is that even within the military, including the
    Revolutionary Guards, there is dissent. In 1997, the Iranian
    polls found that 84 percent of the Revolutionary Guards voted
    for President Khatami, the reform president. Every young man
    has to do service in the military and many opt to do the
    Revolutionary Guards because their training is better, it helps
    get them entry to university, and, most of all, because they
    get off at 2:30 p.m., and then the young men can go off and get
    a second job, as many young men have to do to support their
    families in this bad economy.
        So we need to be very careful in looking at lumping any
    sector of society in one basket. There are even confirmable
    reports from some of the housing compounds from the
    Revolutionary Guards that there were people shouting from the
    rooftops at night, you know, ``Allahu Akbar'' and ``down with
    the system,'' so forth.
        Mr. Luetkemeyer. What percentage of the people do you
    believe either belong to or strongly support these efforts?
        Ms. Wright. I would be dishonest if I told you I had an
    exact number, but I think that there are vast numbers who
    either support the opposition, or are disillusioned with the
    regime because of their treatment of Iranian society over the
    last 6 months. Do I think it is the majority? I can't honestly
    tell you, but I think that to brave the kind of repercussions,
    whether it is going to jail, facing torture, potential rape,
    and that people still get out in the streets, still engage in
    civil disobedience in very imaginative ways is stunning, and
    there is nothing like it anyplace else in the world today.
        Mr. Luetkemeyer. OK, you made an excellent point with
    regards to how some sanctions would hurt the people in this
    group, and they are very politically oriented toward their own
    world and very defensive and very protective of it. What do you
    think, if we could have them write our policy, what would they
    like to see us do to hurt the regime, and yet be able not to
    hurt their people? What do you think the suggestions would be
    from them?
        Ms. Wright. Well, as I tried to suggest earlier, I think
    that the one common denominator among all three layers of
    categories of activism is a desire to see the regime pay the
    price: the specific individuals, the Revolutionary Guard
    leadership, the Basij, the head of the young religious
    vigilantes. But they also know that there are lots of little
    loopholes, so that in the case of an individual who may be
    sanctioned, his kid may be in Europe in school. The head of
    household may be affected by the limitations, but it doesn't
    affect their broader life and the ability of them to generate
    players in society down the road.
        So they are interested in seeing us support human rights
    issues, give greater attention, acknowledge what is happening
    without saying, you know, we are going to allocate $400 million
    to support the Iranian opposition. That is not what they are
    looking for. In fact, they don't want any American money for
    fear that it will taint them.
        Mr. Luetkemeyer. OK. Very good. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
        Mr. Flake.
        Mr. Flake. I just have one other question.
        Ms. Wright and others have mentioned the more effective
    sanctions or efforts to disrupt or impact the regime have been
    financial banking regulations. OFAC, or the Office of Foreign
    Assets Control, currently does that. Do they need any more
    authorization or authority from Congress to do things that they
    aren't doing now? I would like to see them be more active, not
    chasing Americans with suntans coming back from Cuba. Rather,
    they should do what might benefit us more. Do they need more
    authority from the U.S. Congress in that regard?
        Dr. Maloney, do you have thoughts on that?
        Dr. Maloney. I think, in contrast, the Treasury Department
    has been very creative in using the existing authority, and
    particularly some of the regulations passed after 9/11 that
    specifically target financial support for terrorism and
    proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and using those
    kinds of measures in ways that they probably weren't originally
    envisioned to target Iran, to make it more difficult for Iran
    to continue to do business with the international community.
    The big dilemma of applying pain to Iran is that as long as
    they sell oil, they are making tens of billions of dollars a
    year as a regime, and I don't think that there is currently
    international support for a full-fledged oil embargo on Iran.
    But we can make what they do more difficult, more painful, and
    more expensive; and to the extent that we do that, it tends to
    hurt those who have some influence over regime policy.
        Mr. Flake. But OFAC has the authority that they need?
        Ms. Wright. I think that they have a lot, and they have
    used it very well lately.
        Mr. Flake. Thank you.
        Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
        One of the interesting things is, in Treasury, they have
    quite a defined list of Iranian Revolutionary Guard, other
    people on that from which we can choose to apply or not apply
    certain sanctions on, and they refined it quite well to move
    forward on that.
        Let me just ask one last question from me to Ms. Wright,
    whose slide show was great. Thank you very much for sharing it
    with us. There is a bill that was filed either yesterday or
    today that would seek to remove technology like Twitter or
    Google, from sanctions in Iran things like that, for non-
    governmental aspects on that. What are your thoughts about
    that? What impact would it have? Would you be favorably
    disposed to it, or not?
        Ms. Wright. I think the opposition would be stunned and
    pleased that the Congress was enlightened enough to understand
    something like that. The regime would probably use it for its
    own ends, but if it would actually--and I don't know the answer
    to this question--if it would actually change the accessibility
    of technology to the opposition. This has been one of the big
    obstacles. Just like the Revolution in 1979 was the most modern
    revolution in the use of the fax machine and the tape cassette,
    what these kids have done is really unbelievable given that
    they don't have the same kind of access that we do, and how
    they have gotten around the bans by the government. So it is a
    very creative idea.
        Mr. Tierney. I didn't mean to imply to our other three
    panelists that they couldn't Twitter or Google on that, just
    that you had done the presentation. I thought that you
    probably, with your background, had a better insight into it.
        Are there any members of our panel who have a comment that
    they want to share with us, one they feel that they wouldn't
    have told us all that they need to tell us before they leave if
    we don't cover that area?
        [No response.]
        Mr. Tierney. Then I want to thank all of you very, very
    much. You were terrific witnesses; you helped us get a focus on
    this and we appreciate your time and your information. Thank
    you very much.
        Meeting adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:02 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
        [Additional information submitted for the hearing record
    follows:]

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