[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HEARING AND BRIEFING ON: U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE RESPONSE TO
PAKISTAN'S HUMANITARIAN CRISIS: THE SITUATION AND THE STAKES
=======================================================================
HEARING AND BRIEFING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
of the
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 16, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-39
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York, Chairman
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania DARRELL E. ISSA, California
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio JOHN L. MICA, Florida
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
DIANE E. WATSON, California JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JIM COOPER, Tennessee LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
GERRY E. CONNOLLY, Virginia PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina
MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio JIM JORDAN, Ohio
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
Columbia JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah
DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois AARON SCHOCK, Illinois
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas
PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
PETER WELCH, Vermont
BILL FOSTER, Illinois
JACKIE SPEIER, California
STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio
------ ------
Ron Stroman, Staff Director
Michael McCarthy, Deputy Staff Director
Carla Hultberg, Chief Clerk
Larry Brady, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland DAN BURTON, Indiana
PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire JOHN L. MICA, Florida
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
PETER WELCH, Vermont MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
BILL FOSTER, Illinois LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts JIM JORDAN, Ohio
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois
William Miles, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
HEARING
Hearing held on June 16, 2009.................................... 1
Statement of:
Ahmed, Samina, South Asia project director for the
International Crisis Group; Sherry Rehman, former Federal
minister for information and broadcasting, and member,
National Assembly, Pakistan People's Party; and Kenneth
Bacon, president, Refugees International................... 6
Ahmed, Samina............................................ 6
Bacon, Kenneth........................................... 34
Rehman, Sherry............................................... 14
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Ahmed, Samina, South Asia project director for the
International Crisis Group, prepared statement of.......... 8
Bacon, Kenneth, president, Refugees International, prepared
statement of............................................... 37
Rehman, Sherry, former Federal minister for information and
broadcasting, and member, National Assembly, Pakistan
People's Party, prepared statement of...................... 18
Tierney, Hon. John F., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Massachusetts, prepared statement of.............. 3
BRIEFING
Briefing held on June 16, 2009................................... 59
Statement of:
Gabaudan, Michel, Regional Representative to the United
States and Caribbean for the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees.................................. 59
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Gabaudan, Michel, Regional Representative to the United
States and Caribbean for the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, prepared statement of........... 64
U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE RESPONSE TO PAKISTAN'S HUMANITARIAN CRISIS:
THE SITUATION AND THE STAKES
----------
HEARING
----------
TUESDAY, JUNE 16, 2009
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign
Affairs,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:44 p.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John F. Tierney
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Tierney, Van Hollen, Welch, and
Flake.
Staff present: Andy Wright, staff director; Elliot
Gillerman, clerk; Talia Dubovi and Scott Lindsay, counsels;
Brendan Culley, Alex McKnight, and Steven Gale, fellows; Adam
Hodge, deputy press secretary, full committee; Dan Blankenburg,
minority director of outreach and senior advisor; Tom
Alexander, minority senior counsel; Dr. Christopher Bright,
minority senior professional staff member; and Glenn Sanders,
minority Defense fellow.
Mr. Tierney. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on
National Security and Foreign Affairs hearing entitled, ``U.S.
Contributions to the Response to Pakistan's Humanitarian
Crisis: The Situation and the Stakes,'' will come to order.
I ask unanimous consent that only the chairman and the
ranking member of the subcommittee be allowed to make opening
statements. Without objection, so ordered.
I ask unanimous consent that the hearing record be kept
open for 5 business days so that all members of the
subcommittee will be allowed to submit a written statement for
the record. Without objection, so ordered.
We will proceed to the opening statements. Before I do, I
want to welcome our guests who are here, Mr. Bacon, of course,
and our guests who are coming quite a distance. And we really
appreciate it, for your help and for your patience.
I apologize for the fact--you know, Sherry Rehman, how
legislators can be and how the votes come, and they take a
while. So we apologize to both you and Samina Ahmed for the
period of time that took us well beyond the 2 o'clock start
period. Thank you for your patience.
I am going to waive most of my opening statement in
deference to the time that the witnesses have already spent and
just say--and set the table a little bit here for the fact that
over the past 7 weeks, the Pakistani military has, of course,
been involved in an intensive offensive. The long and short of
it has been, of course, that a lot of people, because of the
tactics used and the artillery, the air strikes, have had a
sizable effect on the civilian population and led to the
displacement of many, many people. The estimates of how many
vary, but I know Samina Ahmed's estimate, I think, was about
2.8 million. About 1.9 million have been registered and
verified, and there are a number of others who are there.
Obviously one of the issues is some are in camps, others in
various other types of establishments and homes where they are
receiving hospitality from family members and friends.
This is obviously a situation for those who are still in
the areas where fighting rages, where curfews and land mines
and other conflict issues leave those people frozen or not able
to get out and avoid being caught in the middle of what is
happening there. There are a number of NGO's who are working to
ensure that people have food and shelter and adequate medical
supplies, but obviously we need more help and more people on
that.
So this is a fundamental challenge. There's a lot of work
to be done in the short term dealing with people's needs, but
also we would like our witnesses to address what needs to be
done in the long term and who should be responsible for it and
all of the aspects going forward.
This is obviously a dangerous opportunity for extremist
groups to get in and help people and try to win them over to
their perspective, but it is also a chance for the Pakistani
Government to step in and organize a relief situation, win the
trust of the people there and a long-term relationship, and
gather some support back from the people in this area of
Pakistan.
I want to stop at that point in time, and I will allow Mr.
Flake to make an opening statement if he wishes, and then we
will just go to our witnesses for testimony before we get back
to the questions and answers. I know Members will want to ask
some questions.
Thursday, both--all of you will want to know that we have
Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, Under Secretary of Defense
Michele Flournoy, who will be here discussing a number of
related issues. So the things that you say here today may well
help us inform some of the questioning that will go on in
Thursday's hearing as well.
[The prepared statement of Hon. John F. Tierney follows:]
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Mr. Tierney. Mr. Flake.
Mr. Flake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the interest of
time, I will just submit my statement for the record.
I want to thank the witnesses for their patience.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you very much.
Let me briefly introduce the witnesses we are going to have
here today. We are going to have this hearing, and then we are
going to proceed to a briefing--not a hearing, but a briefing--
from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, a
second panel.
The testimony we are about to receive will be from Dr.
Samina Ahmed, who is the South Asia project director for the
International Crisis Group. There she oversees the ICG's
operation in Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and Nepal. In that
capacity she analyzes the political, social, economic and
military factors that increase the risks of extremism, internal
conflict and war, and she makes policy recommendations to
overcome those threats.
From 1999 to 2001, Dr. Ahmed served as a research fellow at
Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. Prior to
that, from 1990 to 1997, she was a senior research analyst at
the Institute of Regional Studies. Dr. Ahmed holds a Ph.D. from
Australian National University.
Ms. Sherry Rehman serves as a Member of Parliament in the
National Assembly of Pakistan from the Pakistan People's Party.
From 2008 to 2009, she served as Federal Minister for
Information and Broadcasting. She currently serves as a member
of the Parliamentary Committee on National Security.
Prior to joining the National Assembly, Ms. Rehman worked
as a journalist, most notably as editor of the Pakistan-based
Herald News Magazine. She is a long-time activist, advancing
the cause of better access to health and educational resources,
particularly for women and children from the lower-income
sections of Pakistani society.
Ms. Rehman holds degrees from Smith College and the
University of Sussex.
Mr. Kenneth Bacon serves as president of Refugees
International, a position he has held since 2001. From 1994 to
2001, Mr. Bacon served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Public Affairs, where he was the Pentagon's chief spokesman.
Prior to that, he worked as a reporter, editor and columnist
for the Wall Street Journal's Washington bureau. Mr. Bacon
holds a B.A. from Amherst College, as well as an M.B.A. and an
M.A. from Columbia University.
So again, I want to thank all of you for sharing your
expertise and your insight, and I want to thank Ambassador
Patterson and her staff at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad for
their assistance in facilitating this hearing. We greatly
appreciate the help there.
It is the policy of the subcommittee to swear witnesses in
before you testify, so I ask you please to stand and raise your
right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Tierney. The record will reflect that the witnesses
answered in the affirmative.
I assume that your phone has been taken off of mute. Samina
and Sherry; is that correct?
Ms. Rehman. That's right.
Mr. Tierney. Great. Thank you.
Dr. Ahmed, would you be kind enough to start with an
opening statement?
STATEMENTS OF SAMINA AHMED, SOUTH ASIA PROJECT DIRECTOR FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP; SHERRY REHMAN, FORMER FEDERAL
MINISTER FOR INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING, AND MEMBER, NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY, PAKISTAN PEOPLE'S PARTY; AND KENNETH BACON,
PRESIDENT, REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL
STATEMENT OF SAMINA AHMED
Dr. Ahmed. Thank you very much, Chairman Tierney, and thank
you very much for holding this important meeting on a
humanitarian crisis of immense proportions in Pakistan. You
have laid out quite clearly the dimensions of the problem and
the reasons for it.
Let me just say this, that we in the crisis group have been
greatly concerned not just about the peace deal that led to
this particular crisis in the Malakand District of the
Northwest Frontier Province, because clearly it was again a
peace deal that allowed the Taliban to expand their control.
And once there was popular discontent and, of course, U.S.
pressure, the military took action, but that action, as you
point out, was hasty, it was ill-thought-out and has led to
this massive exodus of people.
We are as concerned as you, sir, about the threat that is
posed by the jihadi extremists in this area with their links to
al Qaeda and the potential that they could exploit this crisis
to gain access to more recruits to try to win hearts and minds.
That is why it is so important that relief, reconstruction, and
rehabilitation must take place in a way that meets the needs
and empowers the communities.
Let me say this, sir, that these are people who have fled a
brutal Taliban rule for practical purposes. They want to see an
end to the militancy, the presence of militants in their areas.
They want to lead normal lives. They want to go back home.
The United States and its assistance has been greatly
welcomed in Pakistan, but there is much more that can be done.
It's important for the United States to understand that this is
not just, and as it should be, a humanitarian operation and
meeting humanitarian needs, but it also serves U.S.
international security efforts. If we see the jihadis, as we
are already witnessing on the ground, taking advantage of this
situation, then we have a problem on our hands. We will see the
militants making a comeback. We will see them expanding their
control once again.
So it's equally important for us and for the Government of
Pakistan to understand the importance of not allowing band
organizations such as the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba's latest
reincarnation, the Falah-i-Insaniat Foundation, from operating
in these regions. It is equally important for the Government of
Pakistan to understand that for any effective rehabilitation
and reconstruction, there will be a need for civilian law
enforcement and the civilian intelligence agencies that can
best bring these militants to justice.
A reformed judiciary is essential, as are long overdue
political reforms in Malakand Division and in FATA. These IDPs
are not only from--let me stress that--from Malakand Division.
The 2.8 million or so are from Malakand, but there are 500,000
IDPs from FATA as well. Here is an opportunity for the United
States and the Pakistan Government to win hearts and minds, but
to do so it will be absolutely essential that the assistance
that's given is urgently provided, it is appropriate, it
supports a civilian-led process, and it prioritizes the needs
of noncamp IDPs, since a vast majority, more than 85 percent of
these IDPs, are, in fact, living outside of government-run
camps. They are living in communities that are hosting them,
among communities that are hosting them in shelters, in
schools.
It is important that we think outside the box on how this
assistance should be provided, as in our report. International
Crisis Group issued a report on this, on June 3rd, that said,
look, think about cash-based assistance. For income, for
education, for health, for vocational training, it pays
dividends.
Documentation is possible. There is less chance of
pilferage and wastage, and it would put a humane face by
empowering the communities concerned.
It's important that the United States also encourage the
civilian government's desire to enact political and
constitutional reform not just in Malakand Division, but also
in FATA.
Finally, and let me end with this, sir, it is equally
important that the United States warns the Pakistani military
from entering into yet another appeasement deal, such as the
deal that it signed with the Taliban and their supporters in
Swat, that have led to this crisis, and that will only, not
only undermine the security of the Pakistani state and its
citizens, but also gravely harm U.S. national security
interests.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Doctor. We appreciate that, and the
report that you did on June 3rd, that was extremely helpful as
well.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Ahmed follows:]
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Mr. Tierney. Ms. Rehman, we will be happy to hear your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF SHERRY REHMAN
Ms. Rehman. Thank you, Chairman Tierney and members of the
subcommittee, for taking notice of the magnitude and scale of
this humanitarian crisis that Pakistan is facing today. It is
certainly the largest transfer of refugees and human--people,
rather, from one place to another in the history of this
region. Pakistan has not encountered anything like this since
the migration of refugees from undivided India in 1947.
So clearly a response to the IDPs' challenge is of concern
to you, is more of concern to Pakistanis as well, because this
challenge has become, as I said earlier, a critical test of our
response and our ability, the Pakistan Government's ability, to
maintain public resolve and a sustained campaign against
militancy and terrorism in the name of religion.
Now, the principal challenge, Mr. Chairman, for the
Pakistan Government today is twofold: to provide urgent relief
for the frontier provinces' displaced millions, and also,
obviously, to obtain public support for our military operation
with high human costs. These two projects are inextricably
linked, as noted here. Any serious lapses in coordinated
relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts, which will
come later, will create and will endanger the fragile public
coalition and consensus needed for powering the morale so vital
for a sustained military operation and its successes.
Now, the stakes for us couldn't be higher, Mr. Chairman.
Pakistan is at a critical juncture today. Our government has
been able to use the public recoil generated by Taliban
excesses in the fallout of a flawed peace deal between the
Malakand militants and the provincial government to its
advantage. Before this specific episode, let me say that public
opinion on militancy was divided down the line, and it was
muddied by religious symbolism as well as partisan public
opinion.
Even today, as we speak, many religious parties and other
leaders have little hesitation--these are non-mainstream, but
they are very much in the public discourse--have little
hesitation in condemning the campaign against terrorism as an
American-sponsored strategy with little gain for Pakistan. And
they do conflate the suffering of the IDPs with the failure of
the state to reach a consensus through dialog with the
militants.
And, as mentioned already, the peace deals that have
resulted in the Taliban regrouping, jihadist forces gathering
space and momentum, have been fundamentally flawed, certainly
in the Pakistan experience, and have almost always generated
this kind of jihadist counterbalance to the state's writ.
Now, for us this is as much a project of reclaiming lost
territory, reinstalling the Pakistan flag, but also expanding
the writ of constitutional rule, guaranteeing fundamental
entitlements which were seriously endangered under the Taliban
rule, empowering state institutions to function in a sovereign,
democratic plurality.
Now, I have to state here at this point that time is as
much an enemy to this project as terrorism. Why I say this is
because the displacement of nearly 3 million people over a
period of 3 weeks has caused a huge overstretch on government
capacity on multiple fronts. In fact, the figure I have today
from government, which includes the earlier tribal area
refugees referred to from Bajur, numbers to a staggering 3.9
million. Now, this is unprecedented in the history of the
region, and I would think, probably, the world.
The equation is, again, very compelling and simple. If the
trauma of internal migration, subhuman camp conditions, of
curfews, casualties and lost family members is not mitigated
and relieved soon, we will see human anguish beginning to drain
public resolve for the military operation, which, I stated, is
very essential for reclaiming the writ of Pakistan in many
areas. So the longer this humanitarian crisis goes on, a space
for the larger existential battle against terrorism shrinks,
and public confidence in government also, obviously, goes down.
These camps remain hotbeds and sanctuaries for recruiting a
larger mindset toward terrorism, and we have to guard against
our--the states, right now, are overstretched and provide as
much assistance, both from civilian support and international
assistance, in terms of immediate relief and food security
operations.
A concern that is emerging now is that as the theater of
operations expands toward the tribal areas, which it has
already, the pressure of another wave of refugees may trigger a
fresh crisis. And a main issue of concern is that once
terrorists are flushed out, they will be able to or may be able
to escape through routes via the Iran border, especially by
Waziristan. And this prospect of a return and regroup of
Malakand, once they find sanctuary, perhaps in Afghanistan,
will reverse all gains made at such high human costs.
So this is something to think about, and we feel that the
United States can and should intervene and perhaps in the
Kabul--perhaps with Kabul in the Trilateral Commission to start
maximizing opportunities for border interdiction at this point,
because there is very little symmetry in terms of the effort
Pakistan is putting in on the border and the other side,
especially from, obviously, Kabul.
Now, the other thing that is of concern is the sense that
the international community has been slow to respond to the
crisis. Only a small amount of $430 million pledged has
actually been translated into goods and relief. And I cannot
help but reiterate the magnitude of the crisis and the ability
of government to cope at such notice and with overstretched
abilities.
The U.N. also has warned that its appeal of $543 million in
emergency aid is still unmet. And if by July, I would say in a
week or so, the deficit in international commitments continues
at 80 percent, which it is right now, food supplies to the
camps will be severely compromised. And, of course, this will
be--represent a fresh humanitarian disaster. Oxfam has
testified to this, and so has the World Food Programme.
The Government of Pakistan has allocated 50 billion rupees
in the budget for RRR efforts, but I feel these will be
diverted to food provisions and urgent supplies in terms of
relief, again taking away from the cash grants so badly needed
for refugees and the space needed for reconstruction and
rehabilitation.
The international community can certainly provide the
resources for the Pakistan State to emerge as a major welfare
agent--and obviously we are in a moment of opportunity here--to
put jihadist groups that have been using welfare activities as
a cover to funnel--to carry on their aid activities, to carry
on their proselytizing, as well as other activities. And we
must, obviously, use this opportunity in partnership with the
United States and other members of the international community.
But I must state here that there is a concern again on the
ground that while all governments in Pakistan have shown a
below-average ability and capacity to execute budget
allocations, there is no comparison to the aid reflux of U.S.
money when it is re-routed back through intermediaries and
earmarked contractors. Basically the sense here is that we are
getting something like 40 to 50 cents to each dollar of aid
money that comes through earmarked contractors, and that is
something that we need to look at.
I won't overlap with what already has been said. Clearly a
large-scale reform in FATA in the PATA areas, which is Malakand
Division, is also the order of the day. Reconstruction of
infrastructure is a critical concern. I am told that gas, water
and pipelines are being re-laid very urgently. But, again, we
must be very careful to ensure the security of the returning
refugees, returnees. When they go back to their homes, there is
an urgency, obviously, to return, because life in camps is
debilitating.
We must also look toward guaranteeing their security once
they return by insisting and working on and harnessing the
capacity at least to return back to Malakand Division, because
they had initially fled. And these civilian forces, as well as
Frontier Corps, levees, should form the bulwark of any future
security arrangements that are put in place for government
oversight and civilian security to the area.
One, again, area of concern that is being stated is that
there is little sense again of how much--what the cost Pakistan
has incurred in terms of this ongoing battle. The budget
recently announced $35 billion incurred by Pakistan. And, as
you know, Pakistan's society and urban centers most especially
have been transferred--transformed, rather, into battle zones,
particularly after the operation was launched. Peshawar itself,
the capital of the Frontier Province, has witnessed 18 bomb
blasts since this operation began.
So we are really concerned about enhancements of security
capacity and state abilities now to carry on with what will
clearly be a long-term sustained venture. I think there has to
be attention paid to giving serious, not just inputs, but aid
inflows not just to the refugees, because that is a clear and
present crisis, but also to the next step before we send
refugees back to an unprotected environment. This is essential
for us to look at.
And, last, I would like to say again, to avoid overlap,
there is a great deal of concern that we are paying, as I said,
a high human cost in this battle. And if there is a troop surge
in Afghanistan by the U.S. forces, which we know is imminent,
then how are we going to protect against pressure of the
Taliban coming in from Afghanistan again?
Once again, I would stress that the border must be
fortified if we are also to guard against sanctuaries on both
sides of the border, and this will address mutual concerns for
both countries using each other to launch attacks, to allow
attacks to be launched. And this is certainly something we
don't want to countenance in Pakistan. And we are hoping that
the United States will be able to use its good offices and
leverage in the Trilateral Commission to ensure that there is
not a return of a regrouped Taliban back into our areas.
We are looking, obviously, in the short run and medium
term, to enhance the Pakistan Government's capacity to deliver
on the basic obligations of governance, justice and social
service delivery--those are diminished as we speak because of
overstress--but on security fundamentals as well.
Finally, I would like to say that we must enable our
compact to renew a strong state-citizen relationship that
allows the government and civilian capacity more influence over
the regions that have earlier been exploited by non-state
actors because of the existing constitutional and political
gaps, which we feel must be filled.
I would be happy to answer questions as we proceed. I think
a lot more needs to be said, but, once again, thank you for
providing this opportunity for us to give our inputs.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you very much for your comments. Of
course, your written remarks and articles that you have written
have also been shared with the committee, and we will have some
questions for you after Mr. Bacon's testimony.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Rehman follows:]
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Mr. Tierney. Mr. Bacon, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH BACON
Mr. Bacon. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this timely
and important hearing.
The Obama administration has made clear that Pakistan is
one of America's most important strategic partners, and now
that partner is afflicted by one of the world's most rapidly
growing humanitarian emergencies. Refugees International, an
independent advocacy agency, has been surveying displacement in
Pakistan for more than a decade.
Pakistan generously hosted millions of Afghan refugees
during the Soviet occupation. This crisis is different because
it involves the displacement of Pakistanis, and because it has
arisen so quickly. Sadly, the current humanitarian challenges
are likely to get worse before they get better. The Government
of Pakistan is expanding its current campaign against the
Taliban into South Waziristan, which could trigger additional
displacement, and the monsoon rains are about to begin,
complicating the provision of supplies and raising new health
and sanitation challenges, such as cholera.
A Refugees International team recently returned from
Pakistan, where it surveyed internal displacement. It found
that, one, needs are enormous, as most have fled without
anything and sought shelter in camps or with relatives.
Two, the U.N. and aid agencies are struggling to respond to
the most pressing needs, but funding has been scarce.
Furthermore, the funding that has been pledged has not been
distributed expeditiously to meet the needs that have arisen,
nor in the most effective way.
Three, relief efforts have so far been focused on camps,
whereas the vast majority of the displaced, over 80 percent,
are staying with host families, who are quickly running out of
resources. One aid organization has reported that pockets of
starvation and trauma amongst the population remains a
protection priority. Women and girls are particularly
vulnerable.
Four, changes in the way the United Nations and the
Pakistani military are operating could reduce displacement and
improve humanitarian response.
Five, all parties, the United States, the U.N. and the
Government of Pakistan, must prepare for further displacement.
And, six, it is premature to expect internal refugees to go
home. An independent team should assess the sustainability of
returns.
To respond to this humanitarian emergency, the U.N. issued
at the end of May a $543 million humanitarian appeal. This
latest appeal includes emergency relief projects by all U.N.
agencies and a number of international NGO's, and calls on
donors to respond generously and immediately to one of the
largest displacement crises in the world.
Despite the urgency of the situation and the strategic
importance of the region, the response has been insufficient,
and the appeal remains severely underfunded with only 26
percent of it pledged to date. The appeal for food is less than
50 percent funded. The protection cluster of the appeal is only
1 percent funded.
To date, the United States has been by far the most
generous donor with $164 million during this fiscal year. A
further $200 million request was submitted by the Obama
administration to Congress for emergency funding to aid
organizations, as well as to meet traditional levels of the
U.S. funding to the U.N. refugee agency and the International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.
It is encouraging that the conference report for the
pending emergency supplemental has the House and Senate
agreeing to an emergency appropriation of $225 million. Equally
important, the funding should be directed toward the
International Disaster Assistance Account to assure that it is
distributed efficiently to meet the needs of internally
displaced people.
I hope that Congress will quickly approve this request. The
humanitarian community in Pakistan has praised the U.S. Office
of Foreign Disaster Assistance for deploying an emergency team
in the field and for responding quickly to funding requests
from NGO's. It is crucial that Congress support these efforts
and approve the supplemental request so that it can be quickly
distributed.
Despite having a donor coordination group, other donors
have been noticeably absent until now or have shown limited
generosity. The European Commission's Humanitarian Office just
announced a 22 billion euro contribution, while the U.K. so far
has provided 22 million pounds. But much more needs to be done
if the international community wants to respond effectively to
humanitarian needs.
Today Her Majesty Queen Noor Al Hussein, a member of the
Refugees International Board of Directors, and I are sending
letters to the Office of the Islamic Conference and to foreign
ministers, Ambassadors of Arabic countries urging their
generous support of the humanitarian appeals. I have attached a
copy of that letter for the record.
The lack of sufficient assistance to the displaced is
already having serious consequences. According to the UNHCR,
most of the new arrivals in the camps were previously staying
with host families. They can no longer afford to do so and are,
therefore, resorting to putting up with heat--the temperature
rises to about 110 degrees Fahrenheit during the day--and poor
living conditions in the camp.
The government started to distribute about 55,000 Pakistani
rupees, roughly the equivalent of $300, to each IDP family, but
now it is backtracking, saying it might only distribute the sum
of money to half of those registered, as it is unclear where we
will be able to get funds. This is both a humanitarian and a
security challenge.
In a development that Refugees International has witnessed
elsewhere, and which my fellow witnesses have commented on, the
vacuum in assistance is being filled by politically motivated
actors to gain popular support and allegiance. According to
international and national aid agencies, political parties
active in Pakistan have set up shop in the camps and amongst
host communities and provide various services from distributing
fans to providing mobile phone cards to the displaced.
The majority of international aid organizations and U.N.
agencies work through local partners because of their expertise
and their ability to access remote areas. Many Pakistani
organizations also obtain their funding from foundations and
donations in parallel to the U.N. cluster system. Local
organizations are a critical part of the overall relief effort
because they have in-depth knowledge of the environment and
sustained programs over an extended period of time. From a
financial perspective, they are also much more cost-efficient
than international NGO's as their overheads are much lower.
Once more, using local organizations helps to build local
capacity and strengthens Pakistan's humanitarian
infrastructure. I hope that the United States will work with
the U.N. to encourage greater participation and greater funding
by local NGO's.
In conclusion, while the displacement crisis in Pakistan is
nearly a year old, its magnitude, the scope of the needs and
its political implications of this crisis have not been fully
grasped in foreign capitals. The international response has
been far too slow. The ongoing humanitarian operation is only
the start of what will have to be a prolonged and massive aid
effort. Displaced families need immediate relief and in time
will require renewed confidence and support to return home in
safety and dignity.
The Obama administration has repeatedly stated the
geostrategic importance of the region, and it is seizing this
opportunity to show concern and leadership. It is not merely a
question of funding, though the humanitarian assistance and
reconstruction efforts will need robust financial commitments.
The United States has clear national objectives in Pakistan,
and these can be advanced by showing concern for the fate of
civilians and for helping Pakistanis to meet their needs and to
build a more peaceful, prosperous future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Bacon.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bacon follows:]
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Mr. Tierney. We are going to go into a period of
questioning here. We generally do 5 minutes for each Member and
then circle through again. There is almost more material here
than we can cover in one hearing, but we will do the best we
can.
In the International Crisis Group report that Dr. Ahmed
prepared, there are comments there about the relief organs, the
state relief organs, being overly centrally localized, and an
indication that the military continues to dominate key
institutions, and that undermines the civilian capacity.
The question I would have is does the civilian government
in Pakistan have the actual capacity to take charge of this
relief prospect both in the short term and in the long term,
planning for a return, and is there a willingness to try to
assign to the military a different role than that of running
the relief program and instead take that over on the civilian
side? Either of our witnesses in Pakistan might want to address
that in any order.
Dr. Ahmed. One of the problems lies in the fact that the
civilian institutions have, as a result of almost a decade of
military rule, certainly lost some of the capacity that they
originally had. This is not to say that the bureaucracy, the
civil bureaucracy, and the civilian government lacks the
capacity to plan, lacks the line ministries of the civilian
government, lacked the capacity to implement, and certainly--
and it's very important right now for us to understand--you
need a civilian face even more so because of the history of
this conflict and how it has unraveled.
To have the military run the show in terms of relief or
plan ahead, as it seems to indicate right now, on taking charge
of reconstruction is to talk about not just a centralized
approach, but to an institution that has very little knowledge
of and a very poor record of working with civilians and with
civilian institutions, this undermines that entire process of
ensuring that communities are empowered and that they are part
of the process.
As my fellow witness said, local NGO's exist. They have the
capacity. Local governments exist. They have the capacity.
Elected governments exist, and let's hope that we can build
that capacity as opposed to falling back on strengthening the
military's civilian roles, which serves neither the purposes of
that institution nor the interests of the IDPs.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Ms. Rehman, let me ask you this: Do you agree with Dr.
Ahmed's assessment? If you do, what is the Pakistani
Government, Parliament and the Prime Minister, doing in terms
of asserting leadership on the relief effort?
Ms. Rehman. Well, I think what is going on here is over the
last few weeks we have seen, again, realities literally
transform, and that really has been an effort of mostly local
government in the Frontier Province, which is done through the
emergency relief unit [ERU], and certainly there is room for
expanding the civilian component of all aid and relief and
rehabilitation activities. Perhaps in reconstruction
activities, yes, the military might be a better partner for the
heavy-lifting part.
[Note.--Video link signal lost to witnesses in Pakistan.]
Mr. Tierney. This is not good. Well, we will work on
correcting that.
While that's interesting enough, this morning we had a
hearing in the education field about technology in the
classroom, and the mics here didn't work, but they worked fine
in the classroom.
Mr. Bacon, let me ask you, while that's being corrected, do
you see the United States making any concerted effort to
actually focus its aid to local NGO's and more local
enterprises that have, perhaps, better, more knowledgeable
relationships, or are they still moving through the military
and Pakistan and other centralized aspects where we might run
into the danger of losing some 40 or 50 cents, as Ms. Rehman
said earlier?
Mr. Bacon. Well, it's my understanding from talking to
Ambassador Holbrooke and his staff that they are very aware of
the need to build civilian capacity. And they see this, one, as
a humanitarian challenge, but, two, as a great opportunity to
help build civilian infrastructure in Pakistan.
So my hope is that they would be paying attention to this.
Certainly USAID is clear on the need to deal with local NGO's.
And there are, as Dr. Ahmed said, many capable local NGO's in
Pakistan. Many of them did very good work during the
earthquake, after the earthquake in 2005. And we need to build
on that capacity and bring these people into the system in a
much more effective way.
Mr. Tierney. There's apparently a problem in Islamabad, so
they are trying to call and get that back on line. We will do
that as soon as we can.
Until we can, sir, you are in the hot seat. I am sure you
don't mind on that.
Mr. Bacon. OK.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Flake, why don't I let you ask some
questions of Mr. Bacon, and then we will allow the other
witnesses to come back.
Mr. Flake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
With this increase in humanitarian aid going, as an
increase--I mean, a lot of local contractors are recognized,
but there's going to be a greater U.S. presence, I assume. How
can we assure the safety of those who are acting on our behalf
without making it seem like a military effort, but with so many
military there to protect them? How do we strike a proper
balance, in your view?
Mr. Bacon. Well, that's precisely one of the reasons we are
using local NGO's, because they are Pakistanis who live in the
community, they know the people there, and they know the habits
and the risks that they face.
International contractors are harder to protect than local
people. So the advantage of the local NGO's is that they are
well-known quantities, they are seen as providing aid and help
to their neighbors, and they can do this usually with much less
cost than bringing in people from American contracting firms.
So security generally is easier for locals than it is for
internationals; not always across the board, but generally much
easier.
Mr. Flake. With that comes a risk that you don't know what
you are getting sometimes. I mean, you can vet those that you
contract with, but how do we ensure that we are not using or
contracting with some who may have sympathies with the Taliban
or working--I mean, that's an ongoing problem.
Mr. Bacon. Well, that's a very legitimate question. That's
a very legitimate question.
I think, as my fellow witnesses said, there's a great deal
of antipathy to the Taliban, and what people are looking for is
effective aid and help right now.
So, I think, again, we rely on local intelligence and local
capacity to inform us on who is good and who is bad. It's not--
it's not foolproof, but it's a way to start.
Clearly, they know better than we know, and we just have to
build trust in them and give them a little bit of operating
room and some money and clear guidance, clear goals, a ways to
evaluate their progress, metrics, and work with them as we do
with our own contractors.
Mr. Flake. We obviously put restrictions and directives and
mandates on the aid that we provide.
Mr. Bacon. Uh-huh.
Mr. Flake. Is there difficulty in aligning that with the
goals of other organizations that have broader, I guess,
participation, be it with the UNHCR or with the Red Crescent or
whomever else is operating there?
For example, with legislation that we just passed, is it
going to be a problem aligning the goals that we have laid out
with other aid organizations?
Mr. Bacon. I don't think it should be. I think that we and
UNHCR and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies share the same goals. We want effective
programs. We want displacement and we want poverty to end. We
want to find ways to work together.
So I don't think this should be an issue at all.
Mr. Flake. It was mentioned that most of those who are
displaced find refuge with family members and with others that
aren't necessarily in camps, and it's been advocated that we
put direction their way as well. But where is the most acute
need, in your view? Is it in these camps, or is it somewhere
else?
Mr. Bacon. Well, since 80 percent of the people aren't in
camps, we have to find an effective way to get aid to people
who are living with a local population.
This is both good and bad. Camps aren't a great place to
be, but it is easy to deliver aid, medical care, food, etc., to
people in camps when they are centralized. It's much harder to
do this in a dispersed population.
But through a good registration process, which the UNHCR
has set up, it's possible to do that, but it's more time-
consuming, it's more expensive, and it's not as easy as it is
in camps. On the other hand, people are generally much more
comfortable in private houses than they are in camps.
But there are reports of 25 people living in a room in some
of these houses, so these are not cushy conditions for the
displaced persons. It's very, very difficult for them to be
absorbed by generous host families.
Mr. Flake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Van Hollen [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Flake.
As you can see, the chairman had to go take a phone call.
He will be back shortly.
I welcome back our witnesses who are with us from Pakistan,
Dr. Ahmed and Ms. Rehman. Are you with us? We just want to make
sure it's all hooked up again.
Dr. Ahmed. Yes, sir, we are back.
Mr. Van Hollen. Very good. I apologize for actually joining
the hearing a little late after some of the testimony, but I
think that all of us see in recent events some positive
developments, but also, obviously, some dangerous developments.
When I speak of positive, obviously I am not talking about
the internally displaced persons, but I am talking about the
fact that the Government of Pakistan has taken the threat of
the Pakistani Taliban seriously and deployed their forces in a
meaningful way to try and address the threat. The unfortunate
consequence, of course, is you do have internally displaced
persons, you have lots of refugees within Pakistan.
And the challenge for all of us is to make sure that these
individuals, these families, get the support that they need
from the Government of Pakistan and from local NGO's as
appropriate. And, you know, we need to figure out the best way
of deploying those resources. Among the displaced persons, of
course, are many children. In fact, according to Save the
Children's rapid assessment of the IDPs, 54 percent are under
the age of 18, and more than 16 percent are below the age of 5.
Is there anything in particular being done to address that
population? Obviously that population is, you know, mixed in
with their family members, but I am interested in whether or
not special efforts are being made to help the most vulnerable
among them.
Mr. Bacon. Well, first of all, women and children are
always the most vulnerable in displaced populations, and there
is--there has been some progress. I know that the Pakistani
Ministry of Health has, in the midst of this crisis, been able
to vaccinate 500,000 children against polio, so there is
special attention being paid to the health needs of children.
They are also working on a program to improve maternal and
child health care in the midst of this as well.
So the government and its partners are paying a lot of
attention to meeting the health and nutritional needs of
children.
Mr. Van Hollen. And this is a question for all of you.
What's your best assessment right now as to how the Government
of Pakistan, with any help they are receiving from the
international community, how they are doing in terms of
providing support and resources that are needed.
And juxtaposed to that, how would you assess the extent to
which some of the components of the Taliban are able to take
advantage of this situation to try and provide social services
as well? Because as we all know, this is in some ways a race
for the hearts and minds and a fight for the hearts and minds
of people of these areas. And when you are hungry and
displaced, you will turn to services wherever you can get them.
So how would you evaluate, as of today, the extent to which
the government, through all its different mechanisms, is
providing those services? And to what extent did we have
information about whether or not the Taliban forces, the allied
forces are providing, are coming in to try and fill the vacuum
and whether or not they are successful at filling that vacuum?
Mr. Bacon. Well, it's a very comprehensive question, and
probably my Pakistani colleagues could better answer.
But first I would state that I hope that the Government of
Pakistan can find a less disruptive and intrusive way to launch
this military campaign, one that concentrates more on reducing
or limiting displacement.
Two, I think the government is doing a good job, but it is
not getting the support it deserves from the rest of the world.
And it needs far more resources than it has.
Three, I do believe that it is an opportunity to build
local capacity, and they should concentrate more on doing that.
And, four, in terms of the Taliban, it's my assessment--and
I have not been to Pakistan recently--that the government has a
great opportunity to show its concern for the people and, in
fact, to seizing that opportunity. And the Taliban is quite--
has created a lot of antipathy on the part of the people. So
this, again, is another opportunity for the government.
Mr. Van Hollen. Thank you.
Dr. Ahmed and Ms. Rehman, is the Government of Pakistan----
Ms. Rehman. Yes, the Government of Pakistan, as stated
earlier, is extremely overstretched, No. 1, because of the
magnitude of the crisis. It is very difficult to register and
even track down families that are outside camps. The UNHCR
certainly has set up a process. So has the data base, the
national data base in Pakistan. It is called NADRA.
The process is difficult. Pakhtun traditions also make it a
challenge for officials and a State administration, people to
go inside homes. Many may be more comfortable than they are in
the camps, but they are certainly not living in conditions that
are anywhere near optimal or what they were used to in their
homes.
They are mostly situated in homesteads and patios outside
on the ground in people's homes, 25, 50-plus are coming in to
be accommodated by each family. So this is a major issue, and I
think that there will about an overstretch even on the question
of hospitality. So we will--we may have to worry about a large
influx into school buildings and camps that we see overused.
Now, as far as health interventions are concerned, I think,
yes, the health ministry has been working very hard, both the
provincial and the central. But here we do need a great deal of
assistance. It's not just a question of vaccinations. Women
are--especially Pakhtun women remain inside their tents. They
are mostly not able to go out, except some girl children. And
the temperatures are very high. They are not--they don't have
access to lady doctors and lady health visitors, which are
sorely needed in much higher densities, certainly at the camps.
And the camps, you must understand, are a site also for daily
anguish on 51 channels of Pakistan's television. It really does
produce and refract an image of a state that is allowing its
citizens to suffer, whereas that is not the case.
But the point is that whatever the government is doing at
this point is not enough. And while civil society has stepped
up to the plate recently--and, again, the good news is that
every week you do see a change in the availability of services
in each of the camps. The pressure on the camps in terms of
sanitation and health care remains very high. Yes, there is at
least a week of food security guaranteed, but there is--there
is a much more--there is much higher need of organized health
interventions, as I said, as well as a community participation,
which is now, of course, becoming more and more available.
But we do need to coordinate these efforts better, avoid
duplication between international agencies and certainly not--
to avoid pileup and centralization in provincial hubs such as
Peshawar, where you see a lot of wasting of resources, even in
the international agency offices. They are unable to cope with
the numbers and the magnitude of the refugees coming in. So,
you know, to repeat the case that there is still a great deal
of assistance still required, and perhaps some management
emphasis on the ground also to be addressed in terms of
coordination.
Mr. Van Hollen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Flake.
Mr. Flake. Since I wasn't able to ask a couple of
questions, let me just ask, with regard to--I will ask kind of
the same question that I asked Mr. Bacon.
How do you balance the desire to use local groups and local
NGO's with the fear that some that you might be contracting
with might have sympathies with the Taliban? Are our partners
able to discern those links, or is that something we should be
concerned about?
Dr. Ahmed. I would like to answer that, because I think one
of the things we need to make very clear, when we look at the
potential of the jihadis exploiting this situation, is that the
IDPs have fled from Taliban-controlled areas where they
witnessed the most brutal attacks. There were murders, public
executions, women deprived of work, girl children not allowed
to go to school, public property seized. This population sees
the Taliban as criminals, and so they are.
What is important now for us is not whether local NGO's
have sympathies to the Taliban. Other than the jihadi groups
and parties that obviously have sympathies with the Taliban,
you don't see that either with the mainstream parties or with
mainstream local NGO's.
If anything, as Ms. Rehman stressed, there is at this point
in time in Pakistan a real opportunity, because not just in the
Northwest Frontier Province but countrywide there is now an
antipathy to the Taliban and a great desire to see the state
assert its writ, to see law enforcement, to see rule of law, to
see justice, and to see these criminals brought to justice.
What is important for us now is to make sure that this
opportunity that exists is exploited to the fullest, because if
we don't, the jihadis will.
Mr. Flake. On that point, if I might, are there some
jihadi-related relief efforts going on in some of these areas
at the moment? And I am assuming that is what we are trying to
get away from. How does the local population react when we try
to ban those jihadi-related relief efforts? Or is that not an
issue?
Dr. Ahmed. One of the jihadi groups that is operating there
is a banned group. This group was allegedly responsible for the
Mumbai attacks. This jihadi group was banned once by the
Musharraf government, re-emerged under a changed name, and it
has resurfaced again under a changed name.
It is the responsibility of the Pakistan Government, and I
think it is important for the United States to point that out
to the Pakistan Government, to make sure that a group that is
declared a terror organization by the U.N. Security Council,
that is banned as a terror organization by Pakistan under its
own laws is not allowed to operate.
But then, when we are talking about the NGO's and the local
community organizations, we are not talking about an organized
jihadi group such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba. It is important,
though, that Islamist political parties are also there and have
set up their own activities. And, you know, that is again an
exercise of attempting to win hearts and minds.
Have they succeeded thus far? I don't think they have. The
stories that are coming out--Ms. Rehman talked about the media
showing the face of the IDPs to Pakistanis every day, the human
tragedy that Pakistan is facing. But the stories that the IDPs
have come out with are also being heard countrywide about what
the Taliban are about and what the jihadis are about and how
much of a threat they pose and how un-Islamic they are.
The government's rhetoric also helps. It has changed
immensely under the civilian government, when the Taliban are
now being called criminals and murderers who should be brought
to justice as opposed to what we heard in the past, that they
are jihadis.
Mr. Flake. Ms. Rehman.
Ms. Rehman. Thank you. If I may just address this question
and reinforce what Dr. Ahmed has just said, there are obviously
some groups working on the ground, and most of them are also
religious parties. Like all other political parties, people
have set up camps. But it is nothing like the jihadist
intervention in terms of aide relief that we witnessed in the
earthquake of 2005. I would like to clarify that. That is not
happening.
And there are fewer and fewer takers for very overt Taliban
interventions or jihadist interventions in Islamic groups.
Certainly, there are welfare boxes and charities and tents
operating everywhere, and they sometimes take cover in
religious parties' tents and offices, as well. But it is
nothing like the effort you saw earlier.
This is mainly because it is swamped out by very organized
state and international aid agency efforts. Also, because
interventions are happening through the entry points of
specific camps. And there are 22 right now, mostly in the
Frontier Province, which are regulated by the ERU, which is the
Emergency Response Unit. And each camp has a different
complexion to it, which is, you know, dictated largely by how
the local community is partnering with the government and
international agencies.
But I must say that it is heartening to see the narrative
of anti-Talibanism take root in public discourse. However, I
would like to warn against complacency in accepting that,
because this is something that can tip very quickly if
successes on the battlefield are not translated into
sustainable relief and rehabilitation and resettlement efforts
for the refugees.
They are an anguished picture of human suffering every day.
And every time we see groups and television crews arriving at
the camps, we do see a blow to public consensus against
Talibanization, when women are seen as destitute and children
are seen running around wild-eyed in the sun without schooling.
So one does sense that there is a huge cost that the
Pakistani people are paying. Yes, there may have been fewer
intrusive ways to conduct military operations, and we must not
get complacent at this public opinion that is building up every
time.
As I said, there is public anguish over the IDPs' suffering
and the humanitarian crisis. Questions, and hard questions, are
asked in the public domain about the efficacy and long-term
gains that we can make and hold in terms of a military
operation, as well as the political gains we make from it.
So I think this is something we have to capture and
maintain without public momentum of looking at how we resettle
eventually and provide relief in their areas is very important
for the IDPs.
Mr. Flake. Thank you.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Let me ask each of our three witnesses a direct question
that probably doesn't require a long answer. But in the
International Crisis Group report, there was a recommendation
that so-called jihadi groups--that is the word Dr. Ahmed used--
be prohibited or banned under the anti-terrorism law from
participating in relief efforts.
Do all three witnesses believe that is a wise thing to do?
And if it is, what do you see as the impact of shutting off
that type of aid to people who may be now receiving it?
We will start with you, Mr. Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. I do think it is a wise thing to do. I accept
the recommendation.
Mr. Tierney. Ms. Rehman.
Ms. Rehman. I absolutely endorse that.
Mr. Tierney. OK. And I know how you feel, Dr. Ahmed. You
wrote it.
Dr. Ahmed. I endorse that.
Mr. Tierney. OK. Now, can they do it? Do they have the
power and will to do that?
Mr. Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. I think my Pakistani colleagues could speak more
about the will and the power than I could. But, yes, they
should have the power to do it.
And I think it is instrumental in building local rule of
law, as well. It fits in with that.
Mr. Tierney. Ms. Rehman.
Ms. Rehman. Yes, I think that this is a problem that we
will have to expand outside the Frontier Province. We will have
to take it to other provinces as well, mainly the Punjab.
And we will have to address provincial capacity and will to
do it. It is not something that we have been able to do
overnight. It will involve a complex interchange of
interventions in terms of legal as well as policing efforts,
which, frankly, I haven't seen our ability on the ground to do.
But this would be a move that we can consider as a next
step, and it is an important next step to take.
Mr. Tierney. And, Dr. Ahmed, I suspect that you feel it can
be done; that is why you recommended that it should be done.
Dr. Ahmed. Well, we absolutely believe it can be done.
The police in Pakistan, despite the fact that its
capabilities do need to be built on, we did a report on police
reform, and we were heartened when we talked to senior police
officials to find out that they really believed the only way to
go was to arrest these criminals and to prosecute them.
And that is, in fact, the only cure for militancy in
Pakistan: rule of law; you have to take them to the courts. You
have to actually, first of all, respect your own law because,
after all, these groups are banned under Pakistani law, and
they are responsible for acts of egregious violence against
Pakistani citizens.
Mr. Tierney. I am going to read some excerpts, and then I
have a question at the end--excerpts from the ICG report.
The first one is a statement that says, ``The scale of the
current IDP''--internally displaced person--``crisis is a
function of failed military policies that have enabled
militancy to spread for several years.''
The second statement is a quote by the head of the
Peshawar-based NGO, and it is, ``The military is trying to
improve its image by controlling the relief process. There is,
indeed, little reason to believe that the military will be
willing to work any more closely with civilian institutions and
elected representatives than it has in its counterterrorism
efforts.''
And last, ``The military's longstanding links to jihadi
networks and its appeasement deals with militants, the latest
with the Swat-based Taliban, have also understandably provoked
doubts about its intentions and the current operation. If there
is a peace deal, it is conclusive evidence that nothing has
changed.''
There are Members of Congress, I among them, who are
concerned about giving U.S. military aid to Pakistan without
conditioning that aid on the military's ability and will to not
cut another peace deal but, in fact, to continue to assert
themselves against the extremist forces on that basis so that
the public in Pakistan can have justifiable confidence in them;
condition it upon the military's allowing the civilian
government to extend the writ of law to FATA and the Northwest
Frontier Province and bring the justice system out there and
the rule of law on that basis. And Members of Congress thought
it was important enough to not vote for other items in the
supplemental bill because those conditions had not been put in.
Now that is juxtaposed, of course, with the $200 million
that is in the bill for relief. I hear from each of our
witnesses that they think both of those concepts are important.
Is there a reason to think that passing the money for
relief might not be money well spent if, in fact, the military
is going to cut another deal with the extremist elements and
not allow the civilian government to take over the relief
effort and, in fact, not do many of things that we talked about
here today?
Ms. Rehman. If I may address just one of those concerns, on
the ground, frankly, if you look at relief efforts, the relief
efforts are being run by the Emergency Response Unit and the
Frontier civilian government. There is a special support group
that is being run by a member of the military. We don't see
their operations as, at least in the field, very evident. We
see everywhere the downstream workings of the local community,
which is, again, going right through the ERU, as well as the
Frontier government.
But I do feel that we have to address this issue of peace
deals with not just banned outfits but all warlords that
control territory and cutting peace deals as a result of the
state's inability to maintain its executive writ in the area.
These always have shown opportunities for Taliban and jihadist
and non-state actors to amass, to find that they can regroup.
And they have always resulted in critical reversals for the
state, so I think these are experiments that we need to avoid.
And I must say at this juncture that the provincial
government of the Frontier was very much involved and very
forthcoming in recommending cutting a deal with the Malakand
militants. And I think this is something that we need to learn
from this experience, has shown the whole country that such
deals don't work. And I think we need to translate that
experience into other areas, as well.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Dr. Ahmed, how important do you think it is to condition
military assistance on a more committed military effort to go
after extremists and to allow the civilian government to extend
its writ and become the primary mover in relief efforts and in
the rule-of-law efforts?
Dr. Ahmed. I think conditionalities on military assistance
that are very clear and confined to military assistance, that
do not extend to economic/development/relief assistance would
be a signal sent to the Pakistani military.
You know, one of the things that we need to be clear about,
it is in the military's own interest. What we have seen happen
to this country in the past 8 years as a result of peace deals,
as a lack of resolve--because of the lack of resolve of the
military and because of its failure to then allow the civilian
law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies to act.
The groundswell of opinion that we see now against the
Taliban is an indicator that the Pakistani public doesn't
support this approach. The military has suffered casualties.
If clear conditionalities and a clear signal are sent by
the U.S. Government, I think it will benefit the Pakistani
military, benefit the Pakistani people, and benefit the United
States.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
I would just make note that one of the quotes in the report
was from an official indicating that in Gulabad, in the Union
Council in Lower Dir, there was a military check post and a
half a kilometer away a Taliban check post. And the question
obviously was, why doesn't the military just take a little trip
down the road and eliminate that situation? And things like
that continue to exist and continue on.
Let me ask one last question, at least, if Mr. Flake has
some more--the nature of assistance that is going right now. We
understand about the food and other commodities that have to be
brought to people immediately. But there was great emphasis in
the report--and Ms. Rehman also mentioned it, and I think Mr.
Bacon did, as well--about changing the nature of relief in some
respects to a cash basis for certain reasons, whether job
training or to start the economy or to allow people the self-
respect that is needed to continue on.
Doctor, would you speak briefly to that? And if the other
witnesses have a comment on it, that would be appreciated as
well. And particularly about the benefits of doing it and
whether or not we can have any accountability with respect to
it.
Dr. Ahmed. Absolutely. I think it is important that in the
Pakistani context, as opposed to perhaps other such similar
situations, it is possible to do it in such a way that will not
only empower the communities that we would want to address, but
also ensure that there is actually oversight and monitoring.
The registration process might be slow, but there is a
national identity card in Pakistan. And, in fact, it brings
these citizens into the mainstream because the identity card is
needed for all sorts of purposes. There are biometric features
that can be installed, not a problem at all.
And what can the card be used for? There are multiple
purposes it can be used for. It can be used as a debit card,
which is income support. Let's not forget, 85 percent of these
IDPs aren't living in the camps. They are living with host
communities who are, themselves, very poor. So just that
ability to support the community through simple access to find
the money that they need I think is one.
The children, we spoke about the children, half of the IDPs
being children, and half of these IDPs being out of school.
Parents don't have the money right now, but cash for education
is something that actually the United States has used
elsewhere. So cash vouchers for education, cash vouchers for
health, cash vouchers for vocational education.
Documentation is possible. There is a banking system in
these areas. It is not as though you cannot monitor this far
more carefully, in fact, than transferring goods to either the
camps or through civilian-military intermediaries.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you very much.
Ms. Rehman. Yes, I think cash transfers would be very
useful at this point, because it would empower the actual
communities, as Samina said, those especially living with host
communities, as well as those in the camps. There is a great
deal of anxiety about income opportunities being lost through
displacement of wealth. And there is danger of mass destitution
always at such crises points.
I would like to add that, yes, there is an income support
program and documentation process under way right now. But
that, too, needs support because we have an influx of refugees
all of the way down into the south, into the city of Karachi,
which has become the largest Pashtun city in the world. And
this is something we need to consider all of the way
downstream.
All reforms, all programs that we are looking at now must
now move outside the Frontier Province, as well, and bring into
their ambit refugees disbursing all over the country,
particularly the very volatile city of Karachi, which is
beginning to see ethnic community unrest, which is unfortunate.
But I would like to just take the opportunity to speak to
your question about conditioning aid. Yes, while the U.S.
experience has been obviously difficult with all military
funding and where your coalition support funds did go and there
have been issues of transparency in the past, I think right now
the atmosphere is politically very sensitive in Pakistan, with
the IDP crisis. And while no one can ignore the merits of
transparency and, obviously, better governance, I am sure some
structures can be built. But conditioning aid at any level
right now will be politically difficult for the government to
sustain in terms of engaging strategically and suggesting that
our strategic ally is conditioning aid at a very difficult time
for Pakistan.
Mr. Tierney. And, Ms. Rehman, does that go if we separate
out the civilian aid money and not put conditions on that and
condition only the military money, do you still feel the same
way?
Ms. Rehman. I think that this will become a major issue in
Pakistan. It will not be seen as separated, which is
unfortunate. And perhaps I would recommend some type of joint
monitoring system. Because this is a very sensitive political
strategic moment in our history, and that may just become--
there may be public recoil against any kind of conditioning.
And, obviously, it will be said that, here is an old
transactional relationship reasserting itself. It may be an
irrational public outcome, but this is what may be expected. I
would recommend some kind of monitoring mechanism that you
build in with the military.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you for that.
My last question, then, would just be, is there anything
that either of our witnesses would care to add, since you have
been kind enough to wait as long as you did to have a chance to
testify and you are coming such a long distance? Any thoughts
that you want to leave us with before we close out the hearing
that we might not have asked?
Ms. Rehman.
Ms. Rehman. Yes. I think we cannot stop reinforcing the
issue of the jihadists returning to these areas. I think that,
yes, we will be looking at police reform and capacity building,
and we can certainly go with flushing out militants in the long
run. But, again, the word ``flushing out'' implies that we
haven't been able to either decommission their arms or
reintegrate them into society. We have no programs for any such
thing. And right now I think our experience of the militants
has been that they are not able to decommission nor be
reintegrated in any significant numbers.
So it is important to look at how communities will re-form.
I think we should be very clear that, once the operations are
over and citizens resettle, even the social transformations in
these areas will need change. They will need institutional
accommodation. We may not be able to go back to, say, pre-
Taliban Malakand. We will have to integrate non-elite voices
and communities that have been marginalized, including women.
And the collective responsibility in the jirga system will have
to become more inclusive in terms of social justice
dispensation and perhaps even the PATA regulations, which is
Provincially Administered Tribal Areas, under which Malakand is
operated, will have to be reformed, if not incrementally then
slowly.
Also, I think we have serious concerns about border
interdiction. If Pakistan is going through all this and paying
such a high human cost, then there is a lot of fear about the
Taliban rejoining some of their colleagues, and some old
redoubts may be reinvigorated.
We feel that the escape routes through South Waziristan and
North Waziristan and all across the border agencies of Pakistan
and Afghanistan must really be strongly interdicted if we are
not to see a return of the Taliban and, again, reversals made
both on the battlefield and in the communities that we have
displaced today.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you very much for your testimony today
and for those comments.
Dr. Ahmed. May I add----
Mr. Tierney. Dr. Ahmed.
Dr. Ahmed. May I just add that I think it is really
important for us to remember that what we are seeing right now
is the result of a peace deal. The Taliban expanded their
control not because of the allies across the border but because
they were allowed to through a peace deal signed with the local
authorities devised by the military.
There is some indication that there will be operations
conducted in the Waziristans, but there are also indications
that some of the Taliban groups might be considered more
acceptable than others. I think this is a hugely dangerous
trend.
It is essential that the United States makes it clear that
no peace deal with any violent militant group that actually
believes in the jihad, not only within Pakistan but across
Pakistan's borders into Afghanistan, in India, and even beyond
India in the West, is acceptable.
I think it is equally important to remember the other
thing, the framework of this relief reconstruction effort. If
the United States and U.S. officials stress the negative, which
is, well, the civilians have capacity, then I think they will
lose the opportunity of helping to build that capacity.
If, again, there is doubt in some official quarters about
civilian capacity of enacting political, administrative, and
legal reforms, that will bring FATA and Malakand into the
mainstream, these are not helpful. It would be far more helpful
if the Obama administration and the U.S. Congress supports the
process of political reform that the Pakistan Government, a
young, nascent democracy, would want to see in its territory
because it sees it in the interest of the state and of the
global community.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you very much.
Mr. Bacon, do you have any final words of wisdom?
Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
I just would like to go back to one point I made, which is
that we need to guard against premature returns. All refugees
want to go home, and everybody wants them to go home. But we
have to make sure that, when they go home, they go home to
secure and sustainable communities. If they go home
prematurely, this problem will not end.
So what we have recommended is an independent verification
process to decide when it is safe for refugees to go home and
to follow that so we don't get premature forcebacks.
I know that this is a big issue for the Pakistanis, and it
is a big issue for the United States, as well. But I just think
in the past we have seen high costs from premature returns, and
I hope we can avoid that here.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Bacon, for your testimony today but also for
the work that you do and your organization does. We are all
indebted to you for that.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Tierney. Dr. Ahmed, thank you for the work that you do
in the International Crisis Group in various places throughout
the world. It is always helpful to have insightful facts and
information, and you provide that on a regular basis. And I
know members of parliaments and congresses around the world
rely on that work and appreciate it a great deal.
The Honorable Sherry Rehman, thank you for taking your time
today. I know things are very busy over there, and you were
very nice to take your time and give us your valued opinion and
insight as to what is going on.
I know that I speak for all of my colleagues, I would
suspect, when we say how sorry we are that you have such
difficult conditions in Pakistan at the moment. And we wish you
only the best in dealing with that situation, relieving the
suffering of so many people.
As you know, Congress has acted and is in the process of
acting again to try and add some relief to that. We know that
everybody working together can make it as comfortable as
possible for people in an already bad situation. And we only
wish you the very best in making that happen as quickly as
possible.
So, again, thank you all very, very much for your
testimony. Thanks again for all of our witnesses. Thanks to the
folks at the Embassy our in Islamabad for helping us with the
hookup on that.
And, with that, this hearing is adjourned, and we will now
proceed to our second panel, which is a related briefing.
[Whereupon, at 4:12 p.m., the hearing was adjourned and the
briefing commenced.]
BRIEFING
----------
Mr. Tierney. Good afternoon.
Mr. Gabaudan. Good afternoon.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you for joining us. I am sorry that
there was so much delay, with the votes earlier on. It pushed
you back a little bit. Now I want to make sure we get started
on this, because we have votes coming up in a little while and
I don't want to inconvenience you and make you have to wait
until after those votes.
So let me just briefly say that we are receiving a briefing
from Mr. Michel Gabaudan from the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees.
I would note that the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees staff member Mr. Aleksandar Vorkapic was killed in
last week's hotel bombing in Peshawar. On behalf of our
colleagues, certainly Mr. Flake and I and the staff here, we
want to express our condolences to his family and to his
coworkers at the UNHCR. It serves as a reminder that you have
many staff over there who are in dangerous conditions
repeatedly and have the bravery to put themselves in that
position and sacrifice of themselves and their families.
Mr. Gabaudan serves as a regional representative to the
United States and the Caribbean for the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees. His career with UNHCR spans more
than 25 years and includes service in Africa, Asia, Latin
America, America, and Australia. So the frequent flier miles
are building up.
He has worked in Pakistan as a field officer there and,
prior to his posting in Washington, served as a regional
representative for UNHCR in Beijing. He attended the University
of Bordeaux in France.
I want to thank you again, sir, for making yourself
available, and would appreciate it if you have a statement that
you would like to make, and then we will have a little colloquy
afterwards if that meets your approval.
STATEMENT OF MICHEL GABAUDAN, REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
UNITED STATES AND CARIBBEAN FOR THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES
Mr. Gabaudan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I am
really grateful for the opportunity given by your committee for
us to brief you on our activities in Pakistan on behalf of the
internally displaced people.
I would, at the outset, like to say that our work would not
be possible without the generous contribution we have had from
the U.S. Government to our activities, but also to the very
close interaction we have with Ambassador Patterson and her
staff in Islamabad and with our PRN colleagues here in
Washington. It is an excellent working relationship that I
think contributes to whatever success we may achieve.
We have been operating in Pakistan for almost 30 years,
starting with the Afghan refugees. And through these 30 years,
the success of the operation has been due, one, to the
tremendous welcome that the Pakistani population and Government
had given to the Afghans, but also to the very sustained effort
by the international community to support that project.
And throughout these years, our main implementing partner
in Pakistan was the Pakistani commissioner for Afghan refugees.
So to address myself to one of the questions you asked
previously, there is expertise in managing these sort of
situations in Pakistan, expertise that has been tested over
time.
We first got involved with IDPs in August last year, with
the movements of persons taking place out of the Bajaur agency
in the federally Administered Tribal Areas and, after that,
from the Mohmand agency. And, by April, we had registered some
550,000 people who had already left.
Since the end of April and early May, we have witnessed in
speed and size the largest population movement since the exodus
from Rwanda some 15 years--not for the same conditions, I am
not trying to compare the situations, but certainly in terms of
speed and size.
As has been said, we have now about 240,000 people living
in camps, so it is a little bit over 10 percent, out of the 2
million that have been confirmed by the verification of the
registration. We do have some 100,000 who live in camp-like
situations in schools or in public facilities that will have to
be given back to their normal use in July when the schools
resume. And we have an increasing number who are moving outside
of the NWFP area and moving into Punjab. And now it is
estimated that there may be up to 300,000 people moving in this
direction.
Our response is part of a broader U.N. response in which we
have assigned three responsibilities, which is protection,
shelter, and camp management. I would like to address very
quickly what we do under each of these chapters and then
address myself to the challenges we face in the coming months.
Protection is essentially registration. We are supporting
the government to register IDPs for those populations who are
living with local people in villages and towns. It is the
minister of social welfare who is doing the registration in the
camps. He is the commissioner for Afghan refugees.
And here I would like to stress something very important,
that for a population living in the conflict area, the
government has maintained registration in the hands of civil
authorities. We think this is essential. It is not especially
what happens in other areas of the world, and we value very
much this response by the Pakistani Government.
And we are all supporting NADRA in the verification
exercise to weed out double or triple registration, as may be
happening. Registrations allows us to give ID cards, to
identify vulnerable groups, to start working on family
reunification, particularly for children who have lost their
parents in the exodus, and to make a determination of who will
need what sort of assistance. So it is a very important
protection tool.
We are trying to look now at other issues of protection
that always happen when people flee these sort of conflicts,
which is gender-based violence, which is unfortunately
something that affects populations who suffer these sort of
conflicts in whatever continent we are. We have experienced
this in Europe, in Latin America, in Africa. And Pakistan would
not be exempt from these sort of issues. But we are just at the
beginning of looking into these particular delicate issues.
In terms of shelter, we have to remember that this is a
mountain population, which is coming back in low-land valleys.
They are not used to the heat, which actually is unbearable
right now. And one of our main approaches to shelter is to try
to, what we call, ``summerize'' the living conditions. We have
to make sure that you have shade over the tents. We have to
make sure that we double up electricity so they can have fans,
that we have lighting in the camps for security, and that we
have watercoolers. So, quite an adaptation of the conditions
for these people to suffer as little as possible from a rather
dramatic change of environment from the one they are used to.
We also have to develop a privacy system, which is
culturally required, the purdah mechanism, of putting walls
between the tents. But this is not just a respect for culture,
it also has an important protection impact.
The camp management function is basically identifying new
sites. Right now we have 21 camps. This is not enough. The
camps are quite congested, and we increasingly have people
moving out of the families with whom they found security in the
beginning because these families are poor and they cannot help
them anymore.
So we feel that, over the next weeks and months, the number
of people who want to reside in camps will just increase. And
we have to identify sites, prepare these sites, and also
develop a community approach to running the camps whereby the
communities themselves are consulted in the decisions that
affect the way assistance is given in the camps.
The challenge we will face in the immediate future is to
adjust very quickly to changing weather. The monsoon is coming.
With the monsoon, we will have flooding. We need to make sure
these places are properly drained. And with the floods will
come the scourge of malaria, again, something that this
mountain population are not used to and that can have a
devastating effect on this population.
And then, a few months after that, we will have the
beginning of winter, which will require the winterization of
the camps.
So we have quite a few challenges in terms of adjusting the
conditions in the camps to make life as bearable as possible
for these people who are in camps and who are very crowded.
The second challenge is that we need to develop a system to
distribute items to the people who stay with families. As we
say, it is a majority of them. We have developed about 80 hubs
so that food and nonfood items can be distributed. We are in
the process of responding to those people who have been
identified through the registration. We are far from reaching
them all at present. But this is certainly one of the
challenges we have, to make sure that the burden they bear on
the local population is as reduced as possible.
We want to register those who have left for Sindh and
Punjab. The government is not very keen for them to receive
assistance, I suppose because they don't want to generate the
full factor, but at least we want to be able to register them
so they have this ID and they further have a protection
mechanism. So that is another spread-out of our operations
further into Pakistan.
The next major challenge will be the preparation for
returns. And I cannot subscribe more to what Ken Bacon said
before: We all want people to go back. The sooner they go back,
the better, because life in camps is not something which is
wished for and could generate some symptoms of dependency. And
life in local families bears inordinate pressure on the local
population.
But returns have to follow certain series of principles.
They must be voluntary. They cannot be subject to political
expediency to just demonstrate that things are better. We will
have to look at issues of unexploded ordnance in areas of
return, questions of destruction of infrastructure, whether it
is roads or bridges that are required to make sure that people
can move back, and then see what support the Pakistani
Government needs to reestablish services for their health and
education and certainly the rule of law, as has been very
clearly identified by our colleagues.
All that is not necessarily under UNHCR, but we must make
sure that all of this is in place before we can really make
sure people go.
One of our roles in return will be to gather information to
make sure that displaced people have sufficient information on
what is happening down there, eventually help them to go and
see, etc., but not press and urge returns, as I said, as a
matter of political expediency. We must too often suffer these
sort of pressures, and this would be dramatic because it would
be reverting to the cycle that we have just witnessed.
In this context, we have two great difficulties to
overcome. One is funding. A lot has been said about that. The
response of the international community remains rather tepid.
We had initially, within the United Nations, made this appeal
for a little bit over $500 million. Our share of that was $105
million. We got funded for about 40 percent.
Right now we have reviewed our needs in light of the recent
figures of 2 million. We need, just for UNHCR, about $140
million. I suppose that the other agencies will send increments
of the same order. And that means we are funded to about 30
percent of our needs. And this is not counting on possible
additional outflows from Waziristan, where we understand that
an operation is just beginning, as was foreseen. So funding is
a dramatic constraint.
There is in this country, I think, a proper appreciation of
what is risk in Pakistan. There certainly is on the part of the
Pakistanis. I am not sure on the part of the rest of the
international community there is such a sense.
And in the very words of my High Commissioner this morning,
response to this crisis is not just a question of moral
obligation because of the dire suffering of the people, it is a
question of, as he put it, enlightened self-interest, because
our failure to respond carries out security implications for
Pakistan and the region which are quite severe.
And the second big challenge we have, you alluded to it at
the beginning, Mr. Chairman, security concerns are important.
And we are in the process of trying to balance how can we
develop a field presence that is efficient in responding to the
needs without exposing our colleagues to unnecessary risk. We
have to take some risk, but we have to make sure these risks
are not exaggerated. And we are right now in a review on how we
should operate to reduce risk to our staff and to make sure
that we can keep on working there. We are certainly not talking
about pulling out.
I will stop here because I think much has been said before.
And thank you very much, again, for your interest.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gabaudan follows:]
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Mr. Tierney. Well, thank you very much.
Mr. Flake, I would just invite you to jump in at any time,
too--we will just have a conversation here--with questions, as
you would like.
Do you see any evidence that the Pakistani Government has
actually started the planning that will have to be involved for
the return eventually of these folks? It would seem that they
can't be returning this summer or this winter, it is probably
likely that we are looking at next spring at the earliest, so
it gives them a fair amount of time.
But do you see anybody actually doing the planning for all
that will be necessary to bring people back in a safe
environment and one that gives them, as you mentioned, the
health care and the education and the jobs structure?
Mr. Gabaudan. At present, I think there is more talk about
returns than actual action. The government has committed
itself, and this is absolutely welcome, to re-establish public
services as a basic condition for return.
I think we have to realize that, in the past years,
civilian administrators of the government have suffered from
the insurgency tremendously--murders of doctors, professors,
mayors, etc. So there is a shortage of human resources that I
am not quite sure how they will address, but it will be a
constraint into the re-establishment of these services.
But if experience tells us anything, the people who moved
from Bajaur in August last year are still in the camps, and
there has been almost no return. So I think it is going to take
more time than we think, despite the talks.
Mr. Flake. Back on the security issue, with your colleague
being killed there just recently, do you employ private
security? And are they augmented by security from local police
forces? Or how does that work?
Mr. Gabaudan. Well, by definition, we want the relief
effort to be de-linked from the military operations. So we
cannot operate relief as part of a more militarized effort, and
we want these two things to remain quite distinct. So we have
usually private security guards in our office, etc. These are
very good against thieves; they don't tend to be so efficient
against more aggressive sorts of persons.
We have no evidence, I must say, that the bombing in the
hotel was directed at U.N. staff in particular. It is just a
place where international people do gather, etc., and it is
visible.
Mr. Flake. I have been to Peshawar. That is a particularly
hard place to secure, I am sure.
Mr. Gabaudan. One way we will respond--sorry, if I may--is
probably by having a lighter foot presence of international
staff and starting to work much more through Pakistani staff.
And thank God in Pakistan you do find competent and well-
trained people. So we have to review the way we operate
generally and the sort of proportion between internationals and
locals.
Mr. Tierney. I was going to ask you about that, because we
have had a lot of recommendations about the talent that is in
Pakistan, the quality of the people there who are able, capable
of doing this work.
So your organization is, in fact, reaching out to many more
of the domestic Pakistani population to try and help with your
efforts, as well?
Mr. Gabaudan. Yes. I think this is where we are going to
go. Our director for the Asian bureau, head of security, and
head of emergency services are currently in Pakistan to make a
review of our operation after the incident last week. And that
will be ready next week, but I think it is going to be in this
direction.
Mr. Flake. Just one other question. Talking about premature
return, guarding against that, unexploded ordnance or whatever
else are the issues, how do you enforce that? Or can you? I
know it is a difficult balancing act there.
Mr. Gabaudan. Well, if people want to go, of course this is
their choice, and there is nothing you can do. And the risk, of
course, is if assistance is not good enough and their situation
becomes terrible in the places where they have found refuge
right now and they go back because going back is the best
alternative, then we have a recipe for catastrophe. If they go
because they really feel they have their orchards to tend and
they want to rebuild their homes, etc., and we are convinced
that their return is voluntary, we have to help them.
What we must avoid is pressure for them to go back as a
sort of symbol that things are back to normal, when all of the
premises have not been ensured--security through the removal of
ordnances, establishment of services, recreation of
infrastructure, etc.
Mr. Tierney. How is the urgency going to become spread to
the international community? How are they going to be impressed
with the urgency of this so that they perhaps step up and fill
in some of the gap between what the United States is providing
and what the U.N. thinks is necessary?
Mr. Gabaudan. Well, I'm not quite sure. Right now, as I
said, the United States has been our main supporter. Europe is
not showing tremendous desire to respond. We are trying our
best to convince them. As I say, it is not just a question of
moral obligation, but that we all have broader interest in
helping Pakistan. And sometimes appealing to the self-interest
of a nation can help.
The High Commissioner will personally go to the Gulf States
I think in a week to try to also ask for their assistance. They
should also understand that they have immediate interest in
this situation not getting out of hand.
Mr. Tierney. But they haven't been overly responsive so
far, have they?
Mr. Gabaudan. No, they haven't.
Mr. Tierney. That is interesting.
You mentioned in your remarks about the reunification of
families. Can you tell us a little bit about the magnitude of
that issue? How many families are not just displaced but also
separated? Are you finding a high proportion of people in that
circumstance or not?
Mr. Gabaudan. I don't have these figures, Mr. Chairman. And
I can look into them and forward them to the committee when I
have them. We are still trying to sort out information.
What we found out recently, certainly with some of the
NGO's that we work with, like the International Rescue
Committee, there are lots of tents, for example, where you have
children only. Whether they just guard the tents while their
parents are doing something or whether they have been just left
there without any indication of where the family has gone we
are not sure.
And this is something that we have called the attention of
the government to, and we are working with the Commissioner of
Afghan Refugees to try to sort out these issues.
Mr. Tierney. As more and more people either leave their
host family because the burden has just become too high or exit
the school buildings because they are going to be put back to
educational use, and the hospitals or other buildings, what is
your estimate right now of how many additional camp sites will
need to be constructed over and above the 21 that exist now?
Mr. Gabaudan. I think we are looking at 10 additional
sites, but we have to make sure that these sites can be drained
properly, that we can bring electricity, etc.
So, again, I do not have the exact details, but I think we
are planning for a fairly substantial inflow from people who
have already left the conflict zones and are around Peshawar
and who will have to go into camps at some point.
Mr. Tierney. I want to thank you, Mr. Gabaudan. The work
you do is just incredible, and all your staff and the folks
that work with you. It is greatly appreciated around the world,
but particularly here, as well as the sacrifice and the risk
that we mentioned earlier, unfortunately evidenced by what
happened last week. It just brings it into too stark a relief.
Thank you for taking the time out of your day to come here
and brief us on that. This is information that we need to have
to share with our colleagues and make sure that we have the
proper response.
So, again, thank you very, very much.
Mr. Gabaudan. Thank you very much.
Mr. Tierney. The briefing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:33 p.m., the briefing was adjourned.]