[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PASSENGER SCREENING R&D: RESPONDING TO PRESIDENT OBAMA'S CALL TO
DEVELOP AND DEPLOY THE NEXT GENERATION OF
SCREENING TECHNOLOGIES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 3, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-74
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.science.house.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chair
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois RALPH M. HALL, Texas
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California Wisconsin
DAVID WU, Oregon LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
BEN R. LUJAN, New Mexico RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
PAUL D. TONKO, New York BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
JOHN GARAMENDI, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
JIM MATHESON, Utah BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri PETE OLSON, Texas
BARON P. HILL, Indiana
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
KATHLEEN DAHLKEMPER, Pennsylvania
ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
SUZANNE M. KOSMAS, Florida
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
VACANCY
------
Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation
HON. DAVID WU, Oregon, Chair
DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
BEN R. LUJAN, New Mexico JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
PAUL D. TONKO, New York W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
JOHN GARAMENDI, California
BART GORDON, Tennessee RALPH M. HALL, Texas
MIKE QUEAR Subcommittee Staff Director
MEGHAN HOUSEWRIGHT Democratic Professional Staff Member
TRAVIS HITE Democratic Professional Staff Member
HOLLY LOGUE Democratic Professional Staff Member
MELE WILLIAMS Republican Professional Staff Member
VICTORIA JOHNSTON Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
February 3, 2010
Page
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative David Wu, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Technology and Innovation, Committee on Science and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 6
Written Statement............................................ 7
Statement by Representative Adrian Smith, Ranking Minority
Member, Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation, Committee on
Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.......... 7
Written Statement............................................ 8
Statement by Representative John Garamendi, Member, Subcommittee
on Technology and Innovation, Committee on Science and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 16
Statement by Representative Ben R. Lujan, Member, Subcommittee on
Technology and Innovation, Committee on Science and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 42
Witnesses:
Mr. Bradley I. Buswell, Deputy Under Secretary, Science and
Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement............................................... 9
Written Statement............................................ 11
Biography.................................................... 16
Dr. Penrose C. Albright, Principal Associate Director for Global
Security, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Oral Statement............................................... 17
Written Statement............................................ 19
Biography.................................................... 23
Dr. Bert Coursey, Program Manager, Coordinated National Security
Standards Program, National Institute of Standards And
Technology
Oral Statement............................................... 23
Written Statement............................................ 25
Biography.................................................... 32
Dr. Sandra L. Hyland, Senior Principal Engineer, BAE Systems
Oral Statement............................................... 32
Written Statement............................................ 35
Biography.................................................... 39
Appendix: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Bradley I. Buswell, Deputy Under Secretary, Science and
Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security........ 60
Dr. Penrose C. Albright, Principal Associate Director for Global
Security, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory............... 65
Dr. Bert Coursey, Program Manager, Coordinated National Security
Standards Program, National Institute of Standards And
Technology..................................................... 69
Dr. Sandra L. Hyland, Senior Principal Engineer, BAE Systems..... 70
PASSENGER SCREENING R&D: RESPONDING TO PRESIDENT OBAMA'S CALL TO
DEVELOP AND DEPLOY THE NEXT GENERATION OF SCREENING TECHNOLOGIES
----------
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 2010
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation,
Committee on Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:19 p.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. David Wu
[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
hearing charter
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION
Passenger Screening R&D: Responding to President Obama's Call to
Develop and Deploy the
Next Generation of Screening Technologies
wednesday, february 3, 2010
2:00-4:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
1. Purpose
On Wednesday, February 3, 2010, the Subcommittee on
Technology and Innovation will hold a hearing to review the
airline passenger screening-related research, development,
testing, and deployment activities of the Department of
Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate, the DHS
University Centers of Excellence, the National Institute of
Standards and Technology, and the Department of Energy National
Laboratories.
2. Witnesses
LMr. Brad Buswell is the Deputy Undersecretary of the
Science and Technology Directorate at the Department of
Homeland Security.
LDr. Penrose Albright is the Principal Associate
Director for Global Security at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory.
LDr. Bert Coursey is the Program Manager of the
Coordinated National Security Standards Program at the
National Institute of Standards and Technology.
LDr. Sandra Hyland is a Senior Principal Engineer at
BAE Systems.
3. Brief Overview
In remarks made after the December 25th airplane bombing
attempt, President Obama called for a review of the current
screening systems and an expansion of the development of new
technologies, stating:
``. . . we need to protect our airports--more baggage
screening, more passenger screening and more advanced
explosive detection capabilities, including those that
can improve our ability to detect the kind of explosive
used on Christmas.. . . And today, I'm directing that
the Department of Homeland Security take additional
steps, including:. . . working aggressively, in
cooperation with the Department of Energy and our
National Labs, to develop and deploy the next
generation of screening technologies.''
The hearing will focus on the advancement of new passenger
screening technologies, testing methods used to evaluate
screening machines, and issues encountered during deployment of
new screening systems.
4. Background
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was
created in 2001 to act as a centralized Federal authority to
manage transportation security efforts in the United States.
Moved to the Department of Homeland Security in 2006, TSA
oversees security for highways, railroads, buses, mass transit
systems, pipelines, ports and airports. The majority of TSA's
work is in airport security, heading up screening efforts for
passengers, checked luggage, and commercial cargo.
The Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) became part of
the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology
Directorate (DHS S&T) in 2006 and provides support for TSA's
mission through research, technology development, testing and
evaluation, and technical support for deployed technologies.
The bulk of TSL's work is the validation of explosive detection
systems for passengers, luggage, and cargo. TSL tests explosive
detection systems submitted by private industry vendors against
specifications provided by TSA. Once systems pass the
validation phase, they are placed on the Qualified Products
List, indicating their efficacy and deployment readiness. In
addition to TSL's validation activities, DHS S&T conducts
research in imaging, particle physics, chemistry, material
science, and advanced algorithms to develop enhanced explosive
detection and mitigation capabilities.
The National Explosives Engineering Sciences Security
Center (NEXESS) was established by DHS S&T in 2006, combining
expertise from three National Labs: Lawrence Livermore National
Lab, Los Alamos National Lab, and Sandia National Lab. This
center studies the performance characterization of homemade
explosives (HME) and understanding vulnerability of aircraft to
HME threats.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
is a non-regulatory agency of the Department of Commerce.
Founded in 1901, NIST's mission is to promote U.S. innovation
and industrial competitiveness by advancing measurement
science, standards, and technology in ways that enhance
economic security and improve our quality of life. MST supports
the passenger screening mission of DHS S&T and TSA by
developing measurement methods, standards reference materials,
and new measurement technologies for passenger screening
systems and reference data on explosives. This underlying
information is critical to the development of new technologies
that can detect and identify the current and future generations
of explosives in the most efficient, safe, and reliable manner.
5. Issues and Concerns
Does the current research and development portfolio of DHS
S&T, its University Centers of Excellence and the National Labs
adequately meet the needs of the TSA and fill existing
capability gaps? How are priorities set for future research
projects and do these priorities allow a balanced portfolio of
basic research, applied research, and technology transition?
TSA is responsible for setting research and technology
priorities at TSL through the Capstone Integrated Product Team
(IPT) process. There are thirteen IPTs in DHS S&T that provide
input into the research plans based on their needs in the
field. The Transportation Security IPT consists of
representatives from agencies such as TSA, U.S. Coast Guard,
Customs and Border Patrol and U.S. Secret Service. The IPT
process is designed to meet the short-term needs of the
customer and can lead to research that is improperly weighted
toward flash-in-the-pan areas, such as liquid explosives. DHS
S&T, its University Centers of Excellence, and the National
Laboratories must coordinate a balanced research agenda that
does not overly prescribe reactive research and maintains a
proactive view of future passenger screening technologies.
How does TSL develop the testing metrics and methods used
to evaluate passenger screening technologies? What are the
criteria for success and are technologies that are tested by
TSL ready for deployment? If not, what additional efforts are
necessary to bring technologies to full readiness? TSL takes
technology specifications from TSA and evaluates passenger
screening devices submitted by manufacturers. A successful
evaluation places the device on the ``Qualified Products List''
indicating that it is suitable for use by TSA. Although most
machines are evaluated successfully, there have been recent
examples of missteps, such as the Explosive Trace Portals, or
``puffers.'' These machines use puffs of air to dislodge trace
amounts of explosive material from a passenger for detection.
Despite passing qualification tests, the extensive pilot study
was discontinued due to maintenance issues that arose when the
puffers encountered dirt and humidity common in any airport
environment. TSL, TSA, and N1ST must work together to ensure
that testing metrics and methods not only reflect the minimum
requirements for detection, safety, and usability, but can
predict performance levels in a realistic environment.
Does DHS S&T adequately consider the social science impact
of new technologies (e.g. passenger convenience, safety, and
public acceptance due to privacy) when developing new passenger
screening devices? What research is being done to develop
technologies or techniques that can mitigate concerns over
privacy and safety? The newest, most accurate and most
efficient passenger screening devices are useless if a
passenger refuses to walk through them. TSA and DHS S&T must
work to understand how these technologies will affect the
people being screened and develop the devices from the start
that appropriately minimize these concerns. Congress has
recently seen legislation that bans the use of full-body
scanners due to privacy concerns. While R&D is currently being
done to develop technologies and techniques that minimize
privacy concerns, it is reactive in nature to a problem that
should have been anticipated.
Chairman Wu. This hearing will now come to order. Good
afternoon. I would like to welcome everyone to today's hearing
on passenger screening research and development.
The attempted bombing on a Christmas Day 2009 flight
revealed gaps in our current airport security measures. We are
grateful that this attempt was, like several other prior plots,
unsuccessful. At the same time, these attacks have exposed
vulnerabilities in current passenger screening technologies
which must be addressed. Moving forward, we have to make sure
that Department of Homeland Security [DHS] research is actively
closing the gaps in our capabilities, producing security
methods that the public will accept, and increasing our ability
to keep Americans safe.
In response to the failed Christmas Day attempt, President
Obama called on the DHS to work with the Department of Energy
[DOE] to develop and deploy the next generation of airport
screening technologies. The purpose of today's hearing is to
learn how DHS and other federal agencies will respond to the
President's challenge to develop improved screening
technologies.
In addition, I am deeply troubled by the lack of attention
DHS has paid in the past to important public acceptance issues.
In 1997, about 13 years ago, the National Academy of Sciences
[NAS] identified the need to pay more attention to public
acceptance issues in the deployment of passenger screening
technologies. Ten years later, in 2007, and I note that this is
on either side of September 11, the NAS concluded again that
this is important and also concluded that nothing had changed
and these acceptance issues were still being ignored. So it is
little wonder the deployment of body-scanning technologies has
proven to be such a dramatic public failure. The relevant
agencies did not do their homework and follow-up on the NAS
recommendations in a serious way. Two reports, ten years apart,
both ignored.
Therefore, it concerns me that in the written testimony,
other than passing comments on the privacy aspects of deploying
airport screening technologies, the agencies before us today
still do not have a robust and comprehensive plan for
conducting and using effective public acceptance research, nor
do they seem to have a plan to allow for input from crucial
stakeholders, such as the public, airport officials, or the
participating airlines. I want to assure everyone in this room
that I am committed to ensuring that legitimate public concerns
are adequately addressed in the development of any next-
generation airport screening technologies. Of course the
screening process must protect the public, but it must be
accepted by the public as well in order for it to work.
Finally, I look forward to hearing how NIST [National
Institute of Standards and Technology] and DHS will work
together to address technical standards, accreditation and
certification of these new technologies. Without these pieces
in place, new technologies cannot be deployed effectively.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here. We plan to
act on your information.
Chairman Wu. I now recognize our Ranking Member and
colleague, Mr. Smith, for his opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Chair Wu follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chair David Wu
Good afternoon. I'd like to welcome everyone to today's hearing on
passenger screening research and development.
The attempted bombing on a Christmas Day 2009 flight revealed gaps
in current airport security measures. We are all thankful that this
attempt was, like several other previous plots, unsuccessful. At the
same time, these attacks have exposed vulnerabilities in current
passenger screening technologies that must be addressed. Moving
forward, we must make sure that Department of Homeland Security
research is actively closing the gaps in our capabilities, producing
security methods that the public will accept, and increasing our
ability to keep Americans safe.
In response to the failed Christmas Day attempt, President Obama
called on the Department of Homeland Security to work with the
Department of Energy to develop and deploy the next generation of
airport screening technologies. The purpose of today's hearing is to
learn how DHS and other Federal agencies will respond to the
president's challenge to develop improved screening technologies.
In addition, I am troubled by the lack of attention DHS has paid in
the past to public acceptance issues. In 1997, the National Academy of
Sciences identified the need to pay more attention to public acceptance
issues in the deployment of passenger screening technologies. Ten years
later the Academies concluded that nothing had changed and these issues
were,still ignored. No wonder the deployment of body-scanning
technologies has proven to be such a public failure: the relevant
agencies did not do their homework and follow-up on the Academies'
recommendation in a serious way.
Therefore, it concerns me that in the written testimony, other than
passing comments on the privacy aspects of deploying airport screening
technologies, the agencies before us today still do not have a robust
and comprehensive plan for conducting and using effective public
acceptance research. Nor do they seem to have a plan to allow for input
from stakeholders, such as the public, airport officials, or airlines.
I want to assure everyone in this room that I am committed to ensuring
that legitimate public concerns are adequately addressed in the
development of any next-generation airport screening technologies. Of
course the screening process must protect the public, but it must be
accepted by the public as well.
Finally, I look forward to hearing how NIST and DHS will work
together to address technical standards, accreditation, and
certification of these new technologies. Without these pieces in place,
new technologies cannot be deployed effectively.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here. We plan to act on
their guidance.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Chairman Wu, and thank you to our
witnesses today for taking time for this hearing on developing
and deploying the next generation of passenger screening
technologies.
The attempted Christmas Day bombing on Northwest Airlines
flight 253 was yet another reminder that Al Qaida and its
affiliates continue to pursue all means to attack innocent
Americans and that we must continue using all means available
to us, military, intelligence and technological, to remain
ahead of this threat.
I would also like to join the Chairman in welcoming today's
distinguished panel. You are all at this forefront of this
necessary research, and I look forward to learning more about
the ongoing research and expected developments in the field as
well as the potential positive and negative implications of
this work for all Americans.
While it is vital we continue seeking the most effective
technological means to ensure Americans remain safe from
attack, we must ensure that new technologies don't needlessly
intrude on passengers' privacy. There are more than 700 million
airline passenger boardings in the United States every year,
and we must find the best possible means to ensure the
interdiction of all those who would do us harm, while
continuing to protect the privacy of the vast majority who are
obviously innocent.
One particular technology which has received widespread
coverage in light of the Christmas incident and which I have
heard concerns from numerous constituents about is whole-body
scanners which allow airport screeners to see concealed
contraband beneath passengers' clothes. While the desirability
of this technology is understandable from a security
standpoint, I look forward to learning how technological
advances in other fields such as explosives detection and
behavioral sciences will mitigate the need for intrusive
scanners.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of
my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Adrian Smith
Thank you, Chairman Wu, for calling today's hearing on developing
and deploying the next generation of passenger screening technologies.
The attempted Christmas Day bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253
was yet another reminder that Al Qaeda and its affiliates continue to
pursue all means to attack innocent Americans, and that we must
continue using all means available to us--military, intelligence, and
technological--to remain ahead of this threat.
I would also like to join the Chairman in welcoming today's
distinguished panel. You all are at the forefront of this necessary
research, and I look forward to learning more about ongoing research
and expected developments in this field, as well as the potential
positive and negative implications of this work for all Americans.
While it is vital we continue seeking the most effective
technological means to ensure Americans remain safe from attack, we
must also ensure that new technologies don't needlessly intrude on
passengers' privacy. There are more than 700 million airline passenger
boardings in the United States every year, and we must find the best
possible means to ensure the interdiction of all those who would do us
harm while continuing to protect the privacy of the vast majority who
are innocent.
One particular technology which has received widespread coverage in
light of the Christmas incident, and which I have heard concerns from
numerous constituents about is whole-body scanners, which allow airport
screeners to see concealed contraband underneath passengers' clothes.
While the desirability of this technology is understandable from a
security standpoint, I look forward to learning how technological
advances in other fields such as explosives detection and behavioral
sciences will mitigate the need for these intrusive scanners.
Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of my
time.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Smith. If there are
other Members who wish to submit additional opening statements,
your statements will be added to the record at this point.
And now it is my pleasure to introduce our distinguished
witnesses. First, Mr. Brad Buswell is the Deputy Undersecretary
of the Science and Technology Directorate at the Department of
Homeland Security [DHS S&T]. Dr. Bert Coursey is the Program
Manager of the Coordinated National Security Standards Program
at the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Dr.
Sandra Hyland is the Senior Principal Engineer at BAE Systems,
and Dr. Albright, for right now, we are going to skip your
introduction until Governor Garamendi can come by.
For each of the witnesses, you will have five minutes for
your spoken testimony. Your written testimony will be included
in the record in their entirety. And when you complete your
testimony, we will begin with questions, and each Member will
have five minutes to question the panel.
Mr. Buswell, please begin.
STATEMENT OF MR. BRADLEY I. BUSWELL, DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY,
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Buswell. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Wu,
Congressman Smith, and distinguished Members of the Committee.
It is my pleasure to be here. Once again, I commend you on the
assembly of this panel, and I am humbled to be among them. I am
honored to appear on behalf of the Department today to discuss
with you this critical issue of airport passenger screening
technology.
I also want to thank the Committee and the staff for your
continuing support of DHS S&T and our mission to enable and
deliver technology to protect the American people.
S&T is charged with providing technical support and tools
to the major DHS operating components and our Nation's first
responders, all of whom are on the front lines of homeland
security every day. DHS S&T funds basic research and technology
development, and supports the Department's major acquisitions
through testing, evaluation and the development of standards.
The Transportation Security Administration [TSA] has the
lead role in DHS in defining the performance specifications of
equipment that are installed at airports as part of their
security measures. DHS S&T and TSA coordinate closely on
research efforts and equipment test and evaluation to ensure
the Department is investing in technologies that meet TSA's
operational needs to protect the traveling public.
As you are aware, Mr. Chairman, the Department's research
and development priorities are primarily driven through our
Capstone IPT [Integrated Product Teams] process. The customers
and the stakeholders in this process play a lead role in
informing DHS S&T's decision making about research and
development investments. The customers chair the Capstone IPTs
and establish their desired capability priorities based on
their assessment of the risk in their respective mission areas.
TSA leads the transportation security Capstone IPT, and based
on their desires, our research priorities in aviation security
have been, and continue to be, first to improve the capability
of currently fielded screening equipment and procedures in the
near term, and then in the longer term, develop and deploy new
equipment and procedures to improve the security of air travel.
All three of the DHS S&T portfolios, the Product
Transition, which is near term, the Innovation portfolio which
is led by the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects
Agency, or HSARPA, and the Basic Research portfolio participate
in the IPT process. While the IPT members drive the selection
of the transition products, the near-term needs, the expressed
needs that arise from this process also inform the selection of
projects in our Basic Research portfolio and similarly in our
higher-risk/higher pay-off HSARPA portfolio.
The Capstone IPT process is effective at identifying high-
priority technology needs, but we are constantly looking for
better ways to meet those needs. Partnering with the National
Laboratories, for example, is not new to us. Since its
inception, DHS has worked in close collaboration with the DOE's
National Laboratories in the pursuit of technology, supporting
the operational needs of the Department.
In response to the President's direction, we have taken a
number of actions, one of which is to recently establish the
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Energy
Aviation Security Enhancement Partnership as an Under Secretary
level governance mechanism for managing the partnership between
DHS and the DOE National Laboratories, specifically to advance
technical solutions to key aviation security problems. This
governance will allow us to extend and leverage this
longstanding relationship with a focus on the utilization of
the National Laboratories to deliver key advanced aviation
security technologies and knowledge.
As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, development of effective
passenger screening technology must meet legal and regulatory
requirements and take into account other constraints which
could limit our ability to deploy it. These constraints could
include physical and performance constraints, such as footprint
and through-put, and also more subjective measurements as you
mentioned such as public acceptance. To that end, we work
closely with TSA and other DHS offices such as the Chief
Privacy Office and Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
to ensure the research we are doing has a clear path to
deployment. To mitigate the risk of excessive travel or
resistance to screening technologies, S&T uses the Community
Perceptions of Technology panels that include informed experts
from industry, public interest and community-oriented
organizations to identify potential acceptance issues, and I
would be delighted to discuss that more in the question-and-
answer period if you want to go into that further.
We also play an important role in the test and evaluation
of equipment in advance of major acquisition decisions. For
aviation security technologies, this testing is led by the
Transportation Security Laboratory [TSL] in Atlantic City. TSL
conducts independent verification validation tests, and
depending on the maturity and type of detection equipment does
either certification, qualification, or laboratory assessments.
Finally, a word about standards. As you said, Dr. Coursey
is representing NIST here. He also happens to work on the same
floor that I do in DHS S&T as he has been detailed to us to
make sure we have a close cooperation with NIST for a number of
years, and he has forgotten more about standards that I will
ever know. So I will leave the standards discussion to him
except to say that we work closely and we guide the NIST
standards development for aviation security.
Aviation security is obviously an activity of national
importance, and as I mentioned, in response to the President's
direction, we have initiated a new governance with the National
Laboratories and have done a number of other things as well.
Within the government, we are working with the Technology
Support Working Group, the Department of Defense, the
Department of Justice. We have academia engaged through our
university-based Centers of Excellence. We are engaged with
industry, have a broad agency announcement out to solicit
technological solutions for countering this and other threats
across the broad spectrum of Homeland Security. And
additionally, we are engaged with our international partners to
ensure we are capturing the best technologies possible and also
to help improve their security capabilities.
So in closing, thank you for your dedicated efforts to
improve the safety of air travel to all Americans. I appreciate
the opportunity to meet with you and look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Buswell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bradley I. Buswell
INTRODUCTION
Good afternoon, Chairman Wu, Congressman Smith, and distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee. I am honored to appear before you today on
behalf of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to report on the
Science and Technology Directorate's (S&T) research, development, test
and evaluation (RDT&E) efforts relating to airport passenger screening
technology.
Passenger Screening Capability Development
S&T provides technical support and tools to the major DHS operating
components and our nation's first responders who face risk on the front
lines of homeland security. S&T funds basic research and technology
development, and supports the Department's major acquisitions through
testing, evaluation and the development of standards.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) protects the
nation's transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for
people and commerce. TSA has the lead role at DHS in defining the
performance of equipment that airports install as part of their
security measures. DHS S&T and TSA coordinate closely on research
efforts and equipment test and evaluation to advance capabilities to
protect the traveling public. These efforts have yielded numerous
technical improvements that enhance the effectiveness of screening
techniques and technologies while moving increasing numbers of people
more quickly through security.
The Department's research and development priorities are primarily
customer-driven through our Capstone Integrated Product Team (IPT)
process. DHS customers chair the Capstone IPTs and establish their
desired capability priorities based on their assessment of risk in
their respective mission areas. Three IPTs--Transportation Security,
Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED), and People Screening--are
dedicated to identifying and delivering technological solutions for
detecting and countering threats to the safety and security of the
traveling public. Our Transportation Security IPT, led by TSA with
support from DHS S&T's Explosives Division, strives to identify and
deliver technologies to improve our layered approach to aviation
security. TSA is also an integral member of the People Screening IPT,
providing valuable input as a user of proposed screening technologies.
Finally, the Counter-IED IPT works to identify and develop trace
detection and standoff imaging technologies that will impact the next
generation of checkpoint technologies.
All three DHS S&T portfolios--Product Transition, Innovation/
Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA), and Basic
Research--participate in the IPT process. While the IPT members drive
the selection of Product Transition projects, the expressed needs that
arise from this process also inform the selection of projects in our
Basic Research portfolio and similarly inform the higher-risk/high pay-
off initiatives undertaken by our Innovation/HSARPA portfolio. The more
insight we gain regarding current and future threats and the capability
gaps of our stakeholders, the better positioned we are to identify
promising areas of research and explore innovative solutions that are
outside the development timeframe for the nearer term-focused Product
Transition portfolio.
In addition to the Capstone IPT process, we have recently
established the DHS--Department of Energy (DOE) Aviation Security
Enhancement Partnership to advance technical solutions to key aviation
security problems in support of priorities announced by the President
following the failed Christmas Day bombing attempt While DHS has always
worked in close collaboration with the DOE National Laboratories, we
have now agreed to create a senior-level (at the Under Secretary level)
governance mechanism to manage ways to extend and leverage this
relationship with a focus on improving aviation security by:
Delivering key advanced aviation security
technologies and knowledge;
Conducting analyses to assess possible
vulnerabilities and threats and support/inform technology
requirements, policy, planning, decision-making activities; and
Reviewing the use of existing aviation security
technologies and screening procedures, and the impact of new or
improved technologies using a systems analysis approach to
illuminate gaps, opportunities and cost effective investments.
This testimony will primarily address three areas of interest
expressed by the Subcommittee: the passenger screening research and
development priorities including current and planned research efforts;
the physical, social and resource constraints on passenger screening
and its impacts on technology; and the testing process that implements
passenger screening technology.
Research and Development Priorities
There is no single technological solution to aviation security. A
layered security approach to passenger screening features multiple
passenger and baggage screening tools and integrates human factors
considerations, metal detectors, Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) with
X-rays and millimeter waves, trace explosives detection and canines.
S&T's R&D Program is focused on improving the performance of currently
deployed screening equipment and procedures in the near-term, and
developing and deploying new technologies and procedures in the long-
term. Future improvements aim to screen passengers and carry-on baggage
for an increasing range of threats and streamline travel by easing
certain restrictions, such as the need to remove shoes during screening
or limits on carrying liquids onto the plane.
We develop technologies and techniques that maximize our
operational flexibility to ensure the privacy, civil rights and civil
liberties of our citizens are protected. Our screening research
programs are developed and executed in close cooperation with the DHS
Chief Privacy Officer as well as the Office of Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties to ensure that we consciously consider and address their
impacts or risk to the public. S&T conducts in-depth analyses of such
efforts through ongoing dialogue with the DHS Privacy Office and the
DHS Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and related
documentation (i.e. Privacy Impact Assessments or Civil Liberties
Impact Assessments).
Through the Checkpoint Program, we continuously evaluate and
improve the capabilities of currently deployed technologies against new
threats and seek to develop state-of-the-art threat detection
technology for TSA passenger checkpoints to screen out evolving threats
while improving the passenger experience with higher throughput and
minimal restrictions. The highest-priority effort in this area is
improving detection software algorithms, including effective automatic
target recognition, in our currently deployed imaging systems,
particularly AIT and Advanced Technology (AT) X-ray screening devices.
AIT is one of the most promising technologies for detecting non-
metallic weapons and small quantities of explosives concealed on
individuals. AT X-ray provides an enhanced detection capability with
multi-dimensional visual screening and improved image resolution of
carry-on bags. Both of these technologies would greatly benefit from
algorithm improvement and other systems research and engineering
approaches that consider human factors to optimize security officer
performance in threat detection and identification. The President's
Budget Request for this work in Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 is $22.3 million
and includes the Checkpoint Program, home-made explosives research and
systems research and engineering related to human factors.
Efforts dedicated to suspicious behavior detection could also
provide near-term benefit in passenger screening. The Suspicious
Behavior Detection Program strives to improve screening by providing a
science-based capability to identify unknown threats indicated by
deceptive and suspicious behavior. This program addresses operational
needs for real-time, non-invasive detection of deception or hostile
intent that are applicable across the DHS mission. The President's
Budget Request for this work in FY 2011 is $8.9 million and includes
the Human Factors Counter-IED Program and its Suspicious Behavior
Detection Program.
In the longer term, a continuing, robust RDT&E program across the
three S&T portfolios is necessary.
The Explosives Research Program funds multidisciplinary basic
research in imaging, particle physics, chemistry, material science and
advanced algorithm development to develop enhanced explosive detection
and mitigation capabilities. The President's Budget Request for FY 2011
includes $9.1 million for this work.
The transition program, guided by the Capstone IPT process, is
comprehensive and encompasses:
Automated imaging systems to screen for weapons,
conventional explosives, and homemade explosives (HME) in
carry-on bags;
Trace explosives detection capabilities for
identifying explosives on people and in carry on baggage;
A next generation fully automated checkpoint for
detecting weapons and explosives on people for aviation, mass
transit, public gathering venues, or other potentially high-
risk buildings;
Human performance research and technology development
for increased security officer efficiency and effectiveness;
A science-based capability to derive, validate, and
automate detection of observable indicators of suicide bombers;
A science-based capability to identify known threats
and facilitate legitimate travel through accurate, timely, and
easy-to-use tools for biometric identification and credential
validation;
Technologies and methods for identifying insider
threats.
The President's Budget Request for FY 2011 is $31.1 million for
Counter-IED efforts applied to checkpoint screening for explosives.
The innovation program, managed by HSARPA, is looking at ``leap-
ahead'' technologies such as:
Future Attribute Screening Technology (FAST) to
determine if it is possible to detect malintent (the mental
state of individuals intending to cause harm) by utilizing non-
invasive physiological and behavioral sensor technology,
deception theory, and observational techniques. Though we have
established an initial scientific basis for the technology,
this project is still in the early stages as we work on both
the science and theory to support the concept.
MagViz is looking at the possibility of using
technology similar to hospital MRI machines to look for and
identify liquids. The magnetic fields in MagViz are much lower
power than its medical counterparts, allowing operation without
the restrictions and high costs of traditional MRI. We
demonstrated this technology with a small scale prototype at
the Sunport Airport in Albuquerque, NM in December 2008. MagViz
was successful at identifying a dangerous liquid in a small
bottle among many non-hazardous liquids in a standard TSA
checkpoint bowl. The project is still in the research phase,
and we are now trying to prove the technology using a larger
size container and a broader array of both non-hazardous and
potentially hazardous liquids.
The President's Budget Request for FY 2011 is $11 million for these
projects.
Acknowledging Constraints
Development and the eventual deployment of effective passenger
screening technology must meet legal and regulatory requirements. S&T
works closely with TSA and other DHS offices to ensure the work we are
doing has a clear path to deployment.
In addition to meeting the letter and intent of laws and
regulations, public acceptance and perceptions of technology are
important factors that cannot be overlooked. S&T uses Community
Perceptions of Technology Panels that include informed experts from
industry, public interest, and community-oriented organizations to
identify potential acceptance issues.
S&T Role at the Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL)
Test and evaluations activities at the TSL encompass two
independent functions. First, the Independent Test and Evaluation
(IT&E) function is responsible for evaluating mature technology that
may meet TSA's security requirements and is suitable for piloting or
deployment. Second, the research and development function has
responsibilities ranging from applied research, to prototype
development, to technology maturation that produces prototypes suitable
for evaluation by the Independent Test and Evaluation Team.
The IT&E group works closely with TSA's Office of Security and
Technology to determine and discuss testing requirements, priorities
and results of evaluations. IT&E activities at TSL include
certification, qualification, and assessment testing and generally are
performed to determine if detection systems meet customer-defined
requirements. Results support decisions of DHS operating elements (such
as TSA) for field trials and production or deployment, as well as key
program milestones, benchmarking, and investment strategy. RDT&E
activities are designed to verify that a prototype or near-commercial
off-the-shelf system has met performance metrics established within the
R&D program such that it can proceed to the next R&D stage.
The Certification Test Program is reserved for detection testing of
bulk and trace explosives detection systems (EDS) and equipment under
statutory authority 49 U.S.C. Sec. 44913 for checked baggage. Before
mature EDS are deployed, it must be certified that salient performance
characteristics are met.
Qualification Tests are designed to verify that a security system
meets customer-defined requirements as specified in a TSA-initiated
Technical Requirements Document. This test, along with piloting (field
trials) generally results in a determination of fitness-for-use. This
process is modeled after the certification process and is defined
within the Qualification Management Plan. Unlike the Certification
Test, the requirements of the Qualification Management Plan typically
expand beyond detection functions to include operational requirements.
The result of Qualification Testing is a recommendation of whether
candidate systems should be placed on a Qualified Products List (QPL).
Laboratory Assessment Testing is conducted to determine the general
capability of a system. These evaluations of candidate security systems
are carried out in accordance with interim performance metrics, and the
results drive future development efforts or operational deployment
evaluations. While the IT&E group practices best scientific principles
in test design, execution, and evaluation of data, assessment criteria
are determined by the DHS component's needs.
Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) is performed by the R&D
team at the TSL and involves testing in controlled environment to
ensure that all system or product components meet technical
specifications. These tests are designed to ensure that developmental
products have met major milestones identified within the R&D project.
DT&E testing at the TSL assesses the strengths, weaknesses, and
vulnerabilities of technologies as they mature and gain capability. The
primary focus is to ensure that the technology is robust and ready for
Certification or Qualification tests.
S&T Role in Standards
The S&T Test & Evaluation and Standards Division guides the
National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) standards
development efforts for aviation security. These efforts are directed
toward development of voluntary consensus standards and associated test
methods by the private sectors standards bodies (e.g. Institute of
Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE); American Society for
Testing and Materials International (ASTM International); the National
Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA); InterNational Committee
for Information Technology Standards (INCITS); and the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO).
Chief test engineers from TSL and TSA are actively engaged with
NIST on standards development, ensuring that U.S. national standards
reflect the need for enhanced aviation security.
Conclusion
Aviation security is critical. As I've described, we will leverage
the resources of the National Laboratories to bring needed capabilities
to the forefront, and we will continue to collaborate with other
Federal partners, academia and industry. We have a Broad Agency
Announcement in place to solicit technological solutions for countering
the threat across a broad spectrum. Additionally, we are engaging our
international partners to ensure we are capturing the best technologies
possible and to help them improve their security capabilities.
Thank you for your dedicated efforts to improve the safety of air
travel for all Americans. I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you
today to discuss research initiatives to strengthen passenger screening
and I look forward to answering your questions.
Biography for Bradley I. Buswell
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Buswell. Mr.
Garamendi, I want to commend you on an impeccable sense of
timing. Would you care to introduce Dr. Albright?
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much, Mr. Wu. I don't know
that I have the sense of timing but good fortune. I finished my
work on the Floor and was able to get here to introduce Dr.
Albright.
I have never ceased to be amazed at all the things that are
done at our National Laboratories, and particularly the most
important of all National Laboratories, the one in my district,
Lawrence Livermore National Lab. Every time I delve into that
lab, I find some fascinating, new things that are going on and
things that are very, very important.
Dr. Albright is really into something that is important to
all of us. He is the Principal Associate Director for Global
Security at the lab. He is responsible for applying the labs'
multi-disciplinary science and technology to anticipate,
innovate, and deliver responsive solutions to our Nation's
complex global, national, homeland and energy security
challenges, which is a complex way of saying he is going to
make sure we are prepared. And in that context, he comes with
extraordinary background, both in the public sector as well as
in the private sector, in the private sector with Civitas
Group, an organization that kind of put these pieces together
on the private side in matching innovation with needs and the
money to make it all happen. And he was also the Assistant
Secretary in the Department of Homeland Security where he
achieved several remarkable goals, the most important of which
was he took the budget from $700 million to $1.6 billion. We
are ready to learn from you how we might do it in the context
of today's hearing.
In any case, we now move onto his testimony and the work
that is being done, and I look forward to hearing that. Dr.
Albright, welcome.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, and I do want to commend
the gentleman. We are watching your fine work on the Floor on
this little monitor here, and scuttling over here was a good
piece of work, and I am sure the amendment was a very fine
piece of work also. Thank you.
Mr. Garamendi. It was extraordinarily necessary.
Chairman Wu. Very good. Dr. Albright, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF DR. PENROSE C. ALBRIGHT, PRINCIPAL ASSOCIATE
DIRECTOR FOR GLOBAL SECURITY, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL
LABORATORY
Dr. Albright. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Smith and I want to
particularly thank Mr. Garamendi. Thank you for that wonderful
introduction. And thank you for the opportunity to testify at
this important hearing today on research and development
activities aimed at improving aviation security.
Let me make just one quick comment about Mr. Garamendi. He
may not know that I just became a constituent only two months
ago, and so I am a native actually of this area for most of my
career but got lured out to come to Livermore and am very, very
happy to be there and proud for you to be my Representative.
So what I want to do--as you said, I am the Principal
Associate Director of Global Security at Lawrence Livermore
Labs, one of the National Laboratories that is managed by NNSA
[National Nuclear Security Administration] within the
Department of Energy. We do an awful lot of work on aviation
security at large, but what I want to focus my comments on
today specifically are in those efforts associated with
passenger screening at the checkpoint.
The NNSA laboratories have long been and continue to be
fully committed to contributing their capabilities in systems
analysis, explosives, high-performance computing, and other
resources to work with the Department of Homeland Security and
other partner agencies to protect aviation and combat terrorist
threats. In fact, it was in recognition of the particular
capabilities of the Department of Energy National Laboratories
that specific language was inserted in the enabling legislation
for the Department of Homeland Security to permit a special
relationship to exist between DHS S&T and the National
Laboratories. I know, I actually wrote that language.
On explosives, this is actually a very, very hard problem.
Current events show that explosives continue to be the weapon
of choice for terrorists worldwide. The threat is evolving. The
internet has provided the terrorists with information to
manufacture homemade explosives using readily available
chemicals. They are also very, very, very difficult to detect.
In some cases, billionths of grams are what is available for
sampling, and it must be detected in the presence of other
potentially confusing but benign materials. TSA officers only
have a short time to detect explosives and assess the situation
before they allow the passage of people if they are to maintain
the flow of people and goods.
So concentrated research and continuous research and
development is fundamental to understanding the threat and
creating the tools that will give our Nation the capability to
decrease our vulnerability.
The technical capabilities of the National Laboratories,
and very importantly their status as federally funded research
and development centers, which brings with it unquestioned
objectivity and independence and unfettered access to
government data and proprietary information, for example, air
frame structural data from the air frame manufacturers like
Boeing and Airbus, is crucial to improving the security of
aviation and providing the necessary and enduring focus to this
problem.
So the National Labs have been involved in high explosive
research development since the very beginning. Most of you on
this Committee don't need to be educated on the role that high
explosives plays in the design and testing of nuclear weapons.
And so we have now, over time and for a long time, been
applying that expertise to the needs of the Department of
Energy of course, the Defense Department, the Departments of
Justice, the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration], and most
recently, the Department of Homeland Security.
The laboratories combine cutting-edge computer simulation
codes, state-of-the-art diagnostics, and an environment where
both theoretical and experimental chemists, physicists,
engineers, materials scientists, can work together to provide a
detailed understanding of the science of energetic materials,
their effect on aircraft structures, their impact on existing
detection systems at the passenger checkpoint, and how systems
might be improved to enhance aviation security. As part of that
effort, the Department of Homeland Security brought together
the three NNSA labs, Sandia, Los Alamos and Livermore, in 2006
to create a program called the National Explosives Engineering
Sciences and Security Program which capitalized on the FFRDC
[Federally Funded research and Development Center] model,
utilizing the expertise of those labs to develop and implement
cutting-edge engineering in science-based methods aimed at
reducing risk to aviation. That effort has included the
evaluation and characterization of explosive formulations, the
assessment of catastrophic damage, rapid assessment of
technical and performance of emerging detection systems and
their applications.
Our future efforts include more focused effort on homemade
explosives, on extending the vulnerability analysis to the full
panoply of commercial air frames. We are also taking on a
substantial effort to perform systems analysis of aviation
security to include both the people who would do us harm, their
vulnerabilities they are trying to exploit, and the means by
which they conducted the attack. And under the President's
initiative, near-term improvements to existing deployed systems
will be examined and potentially new and revolutionary
technologies will be vetted and tested.
I will conclude my remarks by saying there is much work to
be done in aviation security. The threat is enduring, smart and
adaptive to what we do. The NNSA laboratories have extensive
experience in conducting the kind of analysis needed to reduce
our vulnerabilities, and we are committed to working closely
with the DHS, with NIST and with our partners across the
federal government to mitigate that threat.
Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today.
I will be pleased to answer any questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Albright follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Penrose C. Albright
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify at this important hearing to explore research
and development activities aimed at improving aviation security. I am
Parney Albright, Principal Associate Director for Global Security at
the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), one of the National
Laboratories managed by the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) within the Department of Energy (DOE).
My comments today will focus specifically on those efforts
associated with passenger screening at the passenger checkpoint. I will
begin my comments with an overview of our current efforts and where
those efforts are headed in response to President Obama's directive on
aviation security R&D with its specific mandate to involve the DOE
National Laboratories. I will then discuss how our efforts are
currently coordinated with the Department of Homeland Security, Science
& Technology Directorate (DHS S&T), the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), and the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST). Finally, I will make some brief comments on the
social science aspects of passenger screening.
Current Aviation Security Programs & Response to the President's
directive
In response to the December 25, 2009 terrorist attempt to destroy
Northwest Flight 253, and the President's subsequent directive, the
NNSA National Laboratories (LLNL, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)
and Sandia National Laboratory (SNL)) continue to be fully committed to
contributing their capabilities in systems analysis and engineering,
explosives science and technology, high performance computing, modeling
and simulation, and other resources to support the President, and work
with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other partner
agencies to provide aviation security and combat terrorist threats.
This is a hard problem. Explosives have long presented the most
prevalent threat to transportation security, to critical facilities,
and to individuals. Current events show that explosives continue to be
the weapon of choice for terrorists worldwide. The threat is evolving,
and the increased access worldwide to the internet has provided the
terrorists with information to manufacture homemade explosives (HME)
using readily available chemicals. Explosives are very difficult to
detect--in some cases, only trace evidence (billionths of grams) are
available for sampling, and bulk quantities of explosive mater must be
detected in the presence of other potentially confusing, but benign,
materials. TSA officers only have a short time to detect explosives and
assess the situation if they are to maintain the flow of people and
goods.
Continuous and concentrated research and development is fundamental
to understanding the threat and creating the tools that will give our
nation the capability it needs to decrease our vulnerability. In order
to provide that enduring focus on hard problems, the government created
a unique type of organization to fill this gap: the Federally Funded
Research and Development Center (FFRDC). Objectivity and independence
are ensured by the legal structure of the FFRDC, which requires it to
refrain from competition with the private sector, be free from
organizational conflicts of interest, and provide full disclosure of
its affairs to the primary sponsoring agency. In turn, an FFRDC has
access beyond that which is common to the normal contractual
relationship-to Government and supplier data, including sensitive and
proprietary data. They are depended upon to effectively craft solutions
to our nation's toughest problems and to anticipate and mitigate future
challenges. The technical capabilities, and FFRDC status of the
National Laboratories, their objectivity and independence, and the
unfettered access to government data and proprietary information such
as, for example, airframe structural data, is crucial to improving the
security of aviation.
Current Efforts
The National Laboratories have been involved in high explosives
research and development since their inception, and apply that
expertise to the needs of the Defense Department, the Department of
Justice, the Federal Aviation Administration, and more recently, to
DHS. Laboratory researchers combine cutting edge computer simulation
codes, state-of-the-art experimental diagnostics, and an environment
where theory- and experiment-based chemists, physicists, engineers, and
material scientists can work together to provide a detailed
understanding of the science of energetic materials, their effect on
aircraft structures, their impact on extant detection systems at, e.g.,
the passenger checkpoint, and how systems might be improved to enhance
aviation security.
The National Explosives Engineering Sciences Security (NEXESS)
Center, established by DHS S&T in 2006, has capitalized on the FFRDC
model, utilizing the expertise of the National Laboratories to develop
and implement cutting-edge engineering and science-based methods aimed
at reducing the risks to aviation. The main focus of NEXESS work has
been on performance characterization of homemade explosives (HME) and
understanding vulnerability of aircraft to HME threats. The NEXESS
Center has provided an important science base for aviation security,
including:
Evaluation and characterization of explosive
formulations including, emerging (e.g. homemade) explosive
threats, the determination of detonability, methods of
initiation, detonation velocity, and impulse energy;
Assessment of the catastrophic damage threshold for
aircraft as a function of explosive amount, location, and
flight conditions (initial work has been focused on a specific
narrow body airframe) using a combination of highly
sophisticated computer modeling in concert with small and large
scale experiments;
Rapid assessment of the technical performance of
emerging detection systems and their application to aviation
checkpoint security; including one particular example that
involved working with L3 to determine the utility of active
millimeter wave technology for the detection of concealed
liquid explosives on a person.
Due to acquisition priorities, the NEXESS Program has recently been
centered on developing system requirements for the procurement of the
next generation of checked baggage screening systems. Of particular
interest is the LLNL Image Database Development (IDD) Project, which
aims to provide a sound basis for standards for next-generation
screening equipment. The project, which is sponsored by DHS S&T, is
executed in close coordination with DHS S&T, the Technical Support
Working Group (TSWG), Explosive Detection System (EDS) system
developers, advanced algorithm developers, the Transportation Security
Laboratory (TSL), and TSA.
The IDD Project collects raw x-ray data and images for the various
EDS and emerging digital radiography (DR) machines to stimulate
commercial development of next-generation systems that provide the
``best value'' combination of performance and affordability for
screening checked and carry-on baggage. Performance is measured by a
number of criteria, including probability of detection, level of false
alarms, signal-to-noise ratio, figure of merit, and throughput.
Compiled from both industry and government-laboratory sources, the
data are stored in a common nonproprietary database located at LLNL.
This information is used to assist both government and industry in
developing a new performance standard for screening checked and carry-
on baggage, and for determining needed modifications to future hardware
and software to provide higher performance in detecting an increasing
portfolio of explosives risks. Working with the NEXESS team, the IDD
project is currently supporting DHS/TSA efforts to develop systems
specifications and test plans for the $1-billion EDS procurement to be
completed in FY 2010.
A similar activity, conducted at Sandia National Laboratory,
involves the characterization of threat objects as seen by whole body
imaging systems. This effort compiles the variety of images seen by
various imaging systems, thus making available a library against which
new detection algorithms can be developed and tested.
Los Alamos National Laboratory is investigating the use of ultra
low field magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) for detecting harmful
materials inside sealed containers. MagViz works by manipulating and
detecting hydrogen atoms with small magnetic fields. Pattern-matching
software compares the detected signature with a database of dangerous
materials.
Future Efforts
Under the President's R&D initiative, the NEXESS effort plans to
accelerate the evaluation and characterization of a rather long list of
explosive formulations. In addition, the National Laboratories will
create a ``Threat Matrix'' that characterizes these explosives not just
in terms of their effects on aircraft, but also in the range of
signatures they present to deployed and new detection technologies,
thus allowing this effort to more fully inform enhancements to existing
systems and the design of future ones.
As part of the vulnerability analysis, we will accelerate the
assessment of the susceptibility of the full panoply of commercial
aircraft airframes to the variety of explosives represented in the
threat matrix, using computer analysis as well as subscale and large
scale testing.
In addition, under the President's initiative, substantial efforts
will be placed on the systems analysis of aviation security-
understanding the various paths that might be exploited by a terrorist
to create an aviation catastrophe, the points where government
capabilities might be brought to bear to intervene and disrupt an
incident, and the alternative architectures of capabilities that serve
to mitigate the risk to aviation security. This effort, to be
successful, should be focused on addressing all the contributors to
risk-the people who would do us harm, the vulnerabilities they try to
exploit, and the means by which they conduct the attack. Concepts
developed by the National Laboratories for DHS Policy-in support of the
development of planning guidance-serve as a very useful model for
understanding the most productive approaches to accomplishing our goals
for mitigating risk. The systems analysis effort will also consider the
implications to the concept of operations of deploying new and improved
screening technologies and combinations of technologies.
Furthermore, under the President's initiative, near term
improvements to extant deployed systems will be examined. For example,
methods for automated anomaly detection in whole body imagers will be
explored and tested, perhaps allowing these systems to be deployed at
the primary passenger checkpoint-due to the ability of one operator to
now supervise multiple machines. Methods for automating secondary
inspection-for example, the use of high frequency probes to rapidly
ascertain whether or not a threat is posed by detected anomalies-
present the possibility for increasing throughput and perhaps even
obviating privacy concerns.
Finally, under the President's initiative, new, potentially
revolutionary technologies will be vetted and tested. For instance,
prospective technologies for determining whether a liquid within carry-
on baggage in fact represents a threat will be assessed for use. If
successful, it might allow the flying public to again carry duty-free
purchases or their accustomed toiletries.
While the NNSA National Laboratories have a long history of
combining science and systems analysis with innovation and engineering,
they do not create production lines and manufacturing facilities.
Hence, over the years, the National Laboratories have worked closely
with our government sponsors and with industry to commercialize those
innovations, including explosive detection capabilities for aviation
security. The currently deployed millimeter wave (mmW) whole body
imaging technology uses a licensed technology from Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory (PNNL). LLNL has commercialized first generation
colorimetric devices, such as the Easy Livermore Inspection Test for
Explosives (ELITE), which is sensitive to more than 30 different
explosives and provides immediate results. The National Laboratories
continue to work on advanced algorithms to simultaneously address false
alarms, enhance sensitivity to the expanding panoply of threats, and
protect individual privacy.
Coordination with DHS S&T, TSA, and NIST
The primary source of funding for Aviation Security Programs at the
National Laboratories is DHS S&T and TSA. In addition to our regular
interactions with the DHS and TSA program managers and routine peer
reviews conducted at the National Laboratories (by academic and
industry experts), the NEXESS program has also established a Blue
Ribbon Panel chaired by TSA and includes members from DHS S&T, TSL, the
private sector, and academia. This panel provides assistance in
evaluating and redefining the explosives detection and certification
standards for a range of automated screening systems.
The National Laboratories also support the DHS Explosive Standards
Working Group (ESWG), which is chaired by DHS S&T, and includes broad
membership across the DHS Components, the NIST and other Federal
agencies. LLNL and other National Laboratories are members of the
National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) team, which has
been chartered by DHS to write a new standard for airport security
called Digital Communication in Security (DICOS). The standard will
enable prevention, detection, and response to explosive attacks by
standardizing the screening of checked bags as well as other threat
risk detection attributes at airports and other security areas. While,
the current focus is on x-ray equipment, there are plans for future
work in whole body imaging technologies.
Over the last 10 years, the National Laboratories have broadly
engaged the scientific community in aviation security. LANL, LLNL, and
SNL scientists have participated in numerous National Academy studies
and co-authored several reports, including a report entitled, Airline
Passenger Screening, New Technologies and Implementation Issues.
Social Science Impact of New Technologies
Commercial deployment of new and improved technologies to meet the
threats of today as well as anticipated future threats will require a
robust scientific research program to meet the required technical
performance and effectiveness. However, we must be mindful that
successful deployment of these technologies requires the acceptance of
the people required to use it (e.g., airport screeners) and people
affected by it (e.g., passengers and crews). Public concern related to
passenger screening technologies has been persistent over time and
includes health, legal, operational, privacy and convenience issues.
It is my firm belief that the acceptance of a technology-such as
whole body screening-will be strongly influenced by the public's
perception of the benefits in relation to the loss of privacy. These
trades are made all the time by the public, and in the absence of a
clearly defined benefit (in terms of enhanced security), the lack of
public support should surprise no one. If government regulators mandate
such an approach (or an optional full body ``pat down'' in lieu of the
image) without defining in clear terms the benefits to the public in
terms of security, or perhaps convenience (e.g. coat removal is no
longer required), and in a manner that does not pay due respect to the
cultural sensitivities and social concerns of society, then the public
will resist. Hence, along with the development of new technical means,
it is important to research the social science issues associated with a
technology that maybe deemed necessary due to the evolution of the
threat or the improvement of capability. Such social science efforts
should address the multicultural issues surrounding modern air travel-
and address questions like why a socially conservative country like
Saudi Arabia accepts full body imaging, while the U.S. public is
seemingly less inclined.
There is much work to do in this area. Understanding the complex
interaction between threat and defense requires system-level modeling
and analysis across the entirety of the problem. When dealing with the
public in such a direct manner on a 24/7/365 basis, the traditional
technical performance metrics, cost effectiveness, and the integration
issues must stand alongside an appreciation of the human factors
associated with deployment. The National Laboratories have extensive
experience in conducting this type of analysis for a broad range of
national security applications.
Conclusion
As I have demonstrated through a number of examples, the NNSA
National Laboratories have long engaged in a wide range of Aviation
Security Programs to prevent terrorist use of high explosives. Lawrence
Livermore, Sandia, and Los Alamos National Laboratories have worked
with DHS since 2006 in aviation security, working closely with DHS S&T
and TSA. The President's directive on Aviation Security specifically
challenged the Department of Energy, and in particular it's National
Laboratories, to respond to the need for innovation in this arena. We
look forward to accepting the President's challenge, and applying the
full power of these laboratories-multi-disciplinary science and
engineering, high performance computing, and (importantly) the core
mission to serve the Nation without any real or perceived conflict of
interest, as a partner to the government in the context of our special
relationship as an FFRDC--to secure our Nation's aviation and our
freedoms. In pursuing this effort, we will work closely with DHS, which
has been the primary funding source of many of our aviation security
projects, and other partner agencies to meet this vitally important
challenge to national security.
Biography for Dr. Penrose C. Albright
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Dr. Albright. Dr.
Coursey, please proceed, five minutes.
STATEMENT OF DR. BERT COURSEY, PROGRAM MANAGER, COORDINATED
NATIONAL SECURITY STANDARDS PROGRAM, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY
Dr. Coursey. Chairman Wu, Ranking Member Smith and Members
of Subcommittee, I am Bert Coursey, the Program Manager,
Coordinated National Security Standards Program at NIST. Thank
you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
NIST's work relevant to passenger screening and our
relationship with components of the Department of Homeland
Security, including the Transportation Security Administration,
the Science & Technology Directorate, and the Transportation
Security Laboratory, TSL.
Since 2003 NIST's unique capabilities in measurement
science have been leveraged in a coordinated way with DHS to
help address critical challenges in multiple areas relevant to
homeland security. Today I will focus my remarks on NIST's
efforts relevant to passenger screening technologies.
Let me quickly highlight the work that NIST is engaged in
relevant to passenger screening in the following areas.
Additional information about each of these is contained in my
written statement. NIST is involved in measurement standards in
the following areas, trace explosive detection, X-ray
explosives detection, use of canines for explosives detection,
standoff imaging or millimeter wave systems, reference data for
explosives, metal detectors, biometrics to enhance screening of
travelers, and conformity assessment support for passenger
screening technologies.
In each of these areas, NIST is working in collaboration
with scientists and engineers from DHS components, with our
industry and academic partners, end users and the Nation's
voluntary standards organizations to set the baseline for
standards and test methods for explosives detection. Several of
these projects lead to national voluntary consensus standards,
and some of these efforts are leading to international
standards. However, in many other projects the test data, test
materials and new test methods are being provided directly to
DHS, TSA, S&T, U.S.-VISIT [U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status
Indicator Technology] and to our and our other federal partners
for their immediate use.
NIST has been involved since 2003 in a multi-year effort
with the Transportation Security Laboratory in Atlantic City to
engage in research that supports standards and measurement
needs for trace explosives screening. The research is designed
to improve the reliability and effectiveness of current systems
as well as support the development of next generation detection
technologies. This work is also providing valuable tools to TSA
in the form of test kits and training methods that allow them
to optimize the sampling of explosives by the TSA operators.
NIST has recently facilitated the development of a suite of
national X-ray performance and radiation safety standards that
cover the gamut of aviation and transportation venues where
explosives are screened. These American national standards are
finding increasing use in national and international settings
through close cooperation between NIST, DHS agencies and our
industrial and foreign partners.
The NIST Standard Reference Data Program is a world-class
resource for reference data for thermal, physical and
spectroscopic properties of materials for the science and
engineering communities. There are serious gaps in the
reference data for explosives. NIST has several projects using
state-of-the-art systems to acquire new physical and chemical
measurement data and also to provide data sets of critically
evaluate data from the literature.
NIST scientists have developed a world-class reference
facility for measuring the performance of metal detectors, both
the hand-held and the walk-through types. Using this facility,
NIST developed rigorous and exacting performance standards, one
each for the hand-held and for the walk-through metal detectors
for the National Institute of Justice as the standards
organization. These NIJ standards are used as the basis for
procurement for other federal agencies including the Federal
Bureau of Prisons and the Transportation Security
Administration.
NIST helps lead the development of many biometric standards
used to support the screening of travelers. These standards
support data sharing and interoperability between points of
encounter and centralized biometric services such as the DHS
IDENT [Automated Biometric Identification System] and the FBI
IAFIS program.
When screening travelers, it is important to deploy
technology and processes that provide the highest level of
security while keeping the traveling public moving efficiently
through checkpoints. To facilitate that, NIST conducts
biometric usability studies that help ensure that screening
systems are easy, efficient, and intuitive for travelers and
inspection agents alike.
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for your dedicated
efforts to improve the safety of air travel for all Americans.
I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you today,
participate in this panel and to discuss the role of national
standards in strengthening passenger screening. I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Coursey follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Bert Coursey
Chairman Wu, Ranking Member Smith, and Members of the Subcommittee,
I am Bert Coursey, the Program Manager, Coordinated National Security
Standards Program, at the Department of Commerce's National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST). Thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss NIST's work relevant to passenger
screening and our relationship with components of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), including the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), the Science & Technology Directorate (S&T), and
the Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) of S&T.
Since 2003 NIST has had a coordinated relationship with the DHS
where NIST's unique capabilities in measurement science have been
leveraged to help address critical challenges in multiple areas
relevant to homeland security including chemical and biological agent
detection, biometrics, first responder communications, and a number of
other areas. Today I will focus my remarks on NIST's efforts relevant
to passenger screening technologies, but before I get into the
specifics of the work I would like to highlight the unique role that
the NIST research efforts play in the larger DHS, TSA, and S&T/TSL
research, development, testing, and evaluation enterprise.
As a non-regulatory agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce,
NIST's mission is to develop and promote measurement, standards, and
technology to enhance productivity, facilitate trade, and improve the
quality of life. To fulfill this mission, NIST scientists and engineers
continually refine the science of measurement, making possible the
ultra-precise engineering and manufacturing required for today's most
advanced technologies. They also are directly involved in standards
development and testing done by the private sector and government
agencies.
It is this focus, and the unique capabilities which result, that
make NIST an important partner in DHS's science and technology efforts.
The measurement methods, standards reference materials, and new
measurement technologies produced by NIST are used to both improve the
reliability and effectiveness of current passenger screening systems,
as well as support the development of next generation detection
technologies. The importance of this work to DHS efforts and the
recognized need for close collaboration was formalized in a 5-year MOU
between NIST and DHS signed in 2003 and renewed with a follow-up MOU in
2008.
In the remainder of my testimony, I would like to highlight the
work that NIST is engaged in relevant to passenger screening in the
following areas:
Trace explosive detection
X-ray explosives detection
Canine explosives detection
Standoff imaging systems
Reference data for explosives
Metal detector standards
Biometrics standards to enhance screening of
travelers
Conformity assessment support for passenger screening
equipment
In each of these areas, NIST is working in collaboration with
scientists and engineers from DHS components, with our industry and
academic partners, end users and the nation's voluntary standards
organizations to set the baseline for standards and test methods for
explosives detection. Several projects lead to national voluntary
consensus standards through ASTM International, IEEE, INCITS and
others, and some of these efforts are leading to international
standards promulgated by ISO and IEC. However, in many other projects
the test data, test materials and new test methods are being provided
to DHS (TSA and S&T) and our other Federal partners for their immediate
use in testing current and future detection systems.
Trace Explosives Detection
Working closely with the Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL),
NIST has been involved since 2003 in a multi-year, DHS funded research
program that supports standards and measurement needs for trace
explosives screening. The research is designed to improve the
reliability and effectiveness of current systems as well as support the
development of next generation detection technologies. NIST has
developed the necessary infrastructure critical to the task by
establishing connections with key stakeholders, purchasing an extensive
collection of currently deployed trace explosives detection systems,
and developing unique measurement capabilities and standard test
materials. This infrastructure allows us to understand and test trace
detection technology, including the critical front-end sampling
process.
Fundamental Measurements and Sampling Studies
Through our ongoing interaction with stakeholders, including the
TSA, we identified that a primary limitation in detecting trace
explosives in real world scenarios is the inability to efficiently
collect the sample. This resulted from a lack of fundamental
understanding of the physical and chemical nature of the explosive
residue, and the best mechanisms to collect the explosive particles. We
have conducted intensive research in this area with the goal of
understanding and improving the sampling process. This work encompasses
explosive sample collection by physical swiping, aerodynamics (puffer
systems) and direct vapor sniffing. We have developed new measurement
science tools to understand these processes and test their efficiency.
Working with other standards organizations, such as the American
Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), we are developing methods
that allow both manufacturers and instrument users to determine the
sample collection efficiency of their systems. In addition, we have
developed prototype sampling training aids that can be used to test
screeners in the field and that provide useful feedback to improve the
process. These standard protocols and materials allow for unbiased
determination of the effectiveness of the sampling process. Because the
standards are developed from a fundamental understanding of the
sampling process, they serve as benchmarks for continual improvement in
instrument and sampling design.
Some examples of NIST's outputs in this area have been 1)
development of a method to determine sampling efficiencies of sample
wipes used for trace detectors, 2) development of a prototype training
kit to test and improve screener abilities, 3) research articles on the
physical nature of explosives residues, identifying specific sample
characteristics to target when designing collection strategies.
Optimization of Trace Explosives Detection Equipment Performance
In addition to improvements in the sampling process, further
improvements can be made in the trace explosive instruments themselves.
Systems can be optimized for detection of current threats, and
modifications can begin for detection of emerging threats. NIST has
worked to develop a series of unique measurement tools that allow us to
study the operational characteristics and fundamental physics that
underpin the operation of commercially deployed explosive trace
detectors. By understanding each step of the analysis process in detail
we are able to make recommendations for improvements in procedures and
instrument setup for optimized detection performance.
For several years, NIST has been studying the fundamental science
of detecting trace explosives by aerodynamic, non-contact sampling.
Typical implementations of this approach include portal-based (puffer)
systems. Methods that we have used to study these systems include laser
imaging, high-speed videography, and bulk flow tracking, all of which
allow real-time visualization of how the air moves around a person's
body. These methods, in turn, give NIST researchers insight into how to
sample explosive material from a person's shoes, hands, and body.
Results typically lead to a better understanding of how these systems
work, and may offer valuable information on how to improve the current
technology. NIST has also been actively pursuing advanced sampling
research with the TSL, developing technologies capable of evaluating
sampling systems that may be five to 10 years in the future.
Aerodynamic particle sampling is a key concept for these future
technologies and likely to be implemented in shoe and cargo sampling
which is gaining importance because of the potential for non-contact
high-throughput sampling. We have a prototype shoe screening system in
our laboratory provided by the TSL.
Standard Test Materials for Tabletop Swipe Based Detectors
Our standards development activities include new types of standard
test materials and sampling test methods. The NIST test materials are
being developed to test not only the performance of the detection
technology but also screener performance. A series of NIST Standard
Reference Materials (SRM's) have been produced that allow evaluation of
bench-top explosives detectors. We have also developed a novel approach
for making explosive test materials using inkjet printing to dispense a
known and well-characterized amount of explosives onto special test
coupons. This is a cost-effective way of producing a large number of
well-characterized and field deployable test materials. We currently
produce test materials of the major explosives including RDX, TNT,
PETN, and AN. These materials could be used in a variety of scenarios
including covert testing, predeployment equipment verification as well
as validation and calibration of already deployed systems. Our goal is
to make inkjet printing technology readily available to any other
Federal agencies that may desire to produce their own test materials.
Transferring the technology to end users has been greatly facilitated
by the commercialization of all of the inkjet systems currently
developed and in use at NIST.
NIST has a long history of working with industry and other
government agencies through need-based efforts to develop standard test
and reference materials and to work closely in voluntary standards
organizations such as ASTM and ISO (International Organization for
Standards) where standard methods are written. Standard methods and
standard reference materials go hand-in-hand in assuring accuracy and
reproducibility across technical communities; in this case verification
and calibration of trace detection instrumentation. To document the use
of the NIST standard test materials, an ASTM standard method has been
developed: ASTM E2520-07 Standard Practice for Verifying Minimum
Acceptable Performance of Trace Explosive Detectors.
Particle-Based Standard Test Materials
Due to the low vapor pressure of most explosives, the majority of
deployed trace explosive detection systems utilize sampling of particle
residues. Because sampling of these particles is highly dependent on
screener performance, testing of sampling efficiencies and procedures
requires the use of standard test particles with known chemical and
physical properties. Over the last several years we have also developed
a robust protocol for fabricating polymer encapsulated explosive test
materials that can be used to test both aerodynamic and swipe based
explosives detection systems. These particles are being used in
prototype screener testing kits.
Vapor-Based Standard Test Materials
Trace vapor detection is a recent addition to the national strategy
and investment in aviation security. Vapor sampling is far easier and
less intrusive than particle sampling from surfaces, but suffers from
the vanishingly small chemical signals emanating from explosive
devices. Trace vapors from explosives are typically mingled with a wide
variety of benign compounds in the environment, which can mask or cause
false alarms. Reliable vapor-based standard test materials are needed
to validate the performance of trace vapor detectors, and to improve
the technologies on which they are based.
NIST is developing several systems for performance verification at
laboratory and operational sites. We have developed a vapor generator
based on inkjet technology, where microdrops containing trace levels of
explosives are evaporated and mixed with calibrated air flows. This
system, in fact, is capable of reliably generating trace vapors below
current detection limits, which provide future validation for next-
generation vapor detection technologies.
Field-deployable systems are also being considered and developed.
For simple pulsed delivery, there are metered dose inhalers adapted
from the health care industry, and encapsulated scents adapted from the
fragrance and flavor industry. For simple continuous delivery, there
are vapor permeation and saturation devices (similar to smelling salts
and room fresheners).
Next-Generation Trace Explosives Sensors
In an effort that highlights the unique capabilities that can be
found at NIST, researchers are adapting frequency comb technology--
which originated from Nobel Prize winning research at NIST aimed at
producing ultra-precise atomic clocks at NIST--into a sensor that can
detect the trace gases of explosives. The detection of trace gases that
come from explosives is an extremely challenging problem both because
the vapor pressure of many common explosives are extremely low, and
because many interferents will also be present in any realistic
situation. Through a program funded by DHS S&T, NIST is pursuing a
detection technique, known as frequency comb spectroscopy (FCS), with
the potential to overcome these challenges, providing high sensitivity
AND broad spectral coverage. The challenge posed by the interferents
can be met through the broad spectral coverage of the combs; this
spectral coverage permits FCS to generate a full spectral fingerprint
of the trace gases and therefore achieve the required selectivity. The
adaptation of this fundamental measurement science research could
ultimately lead to a game-changer detection technology that won't
require time consuming sampling methods.
National X-Ray Standards for Bulk Explosives Detection
National X-ray standards are necessary to insure that security
screening systems for bulk-explosives detection meet the surveillance
challenge while properly handling all radiation safely considerations--
i.e., they provide the measurement tools to insure that minimum
performance and safety requirements are met.
Through funding from DHS S&T Test & Evaluation and Standards
Division, NIST has recently facilitated the development of a suite of
national x-ray performance and radiation safety standards that cover
the gamut of aviation and transportation venues where explosives are
screened: checkpoint, checked luggage, cargo, vehicle, and whole-body
imaging. These American standards are finding increasing use in
national and international settings through close cooperation between
NIST, DHS agencies, industrial partners and foreign partners.
In the area of security systems for screening of humans using X-
rays and/or Gamma rays, DHS and NIST collaborated in the development of
an American National Standard for measuring imaging performance--IEEE
ANSI N42.47-2010. This National standard provides standard methods for
measuring and reporting imaging quality characteristics and establishes
minimally acceptable performance requirements for security-screening
systems used to inspect people who are not inside vehicles, containers,
or enclosures. Specifically, this National standard applies to systems
used to detect objects carried on, or within, the body of the
individual being inspected. It covers the use of both, backscatter X-
ray systems (i.e., detect the X-rays reflected back from the individual
being inspected) and transmission x-ray systems (i.e., detect the X-
rays passed through the individual being inspected).
As performance is not the only consideration in the use of these
security-screening systems, DHS and NIST have also collaborated on the
development of National standards for radiation safety for personnel
exposed to them. IEEE ANSI/HPS N43.17-2009 applies to security-
screening systems in which people are intentionally exposed to primary
beam x rays, gamma radiation, or both. The standard provides guidelines
specific to the ionizing radiation safety aspects of the design and
operation of these systems. This standard was developed under the
sponsorship of IEEE ANSI National Committee on Radiation
Instrumentation by a 35-member Working Group with the following Federal
representation: 4 NIST employees, 7-DHS (including TSA, DNDO, CBP,
USSS, S&T), 1-FBP, 2-OSHA, 2-FDA, 1-NRC, and 2-U.S. Army.
IEEE ANSI/HPS N43.17-2009 was influential in the development of a
new international standard on this topic, EEC 62463-2010, which is
scheduled for publication in August 2010. This international standard
is expected to be more comprehensive covering standard requirements,
specify general characteristics, general test procedures, radiation
characteristics, electrical characteristics, environmental influences,
mechanical characteristics, and safety requirements. It will also
provide examples of acceptable methods, in terms of dose to the whole
or part of the body, for each screening procedure and their required
times. In particular, the standard addresses the design requirements as
they relate to the ionizing radiation protection of the people being
screened, those in the vicinity of the equipment, and the security-
screening systems operators.
In the area of checkpoint cabinet X-ray imaging, NIST and DHS have
collaborated in the development of an American National standard for
the performance and evaluation of checkpoint cabinet X-ray imaging
security-screening systems--IEEE ANSI N42.44-2008. This standard
describes the criteria, test methods, and test objects used to evaluate
the performance of cabinet x-ray imaging systems. The standard
addresses systems use to screen items with cross sections smaller than
1 m 1 m, at security checkpoints and other inspection venues (e.g.,
entrances to Federal buildings). The standard also establishes
minimally acceptable imaging performance values for a specified set of
image quality metrics and specifies operational characteristics deemed
essential for checkpoint x-ray system performance.
In the area of X-ray computed tomography (CT) security screening of
checked baggage, DHS and NIST are collaborating on the development of
an American National Standard for evaluating the image quality of X-ray
CT security-screening systems--IEEE ANSI N42.45-2010. CT security-
screening technology is currently been used to screen all checked
luggage at U.S. airports and the quality of data for automated analysis
is of primary concern. This standard provides standard test-methods and
-artifacts for measuring and reporting the image quality of CT
security-screening systems. This standard is likely to be considered by
TSL as a part of their comprehensive verification and certification of
CT security-screening systems.
The above described, and jointly developed, standards and test
objects not only guide grants and procurement, but also provide ongoing
quality assurance for aging security-screening systems in the field.
The uniform application of standard test methods and artifacts allows
comparison of the imaging performance of novel systems and prototypes
of competing vendors as well as, provides objective quantitative
measures of systems claims for a particular technical implementation of
explosives detection.
All of these x-ray performance and safety standards continue to be
under spiral development as threats and technical countermeasures
evolve.
Canine Explosives Detection
NIST is working to develop test materials and documentary protocols
for the reliable evaluation of trace explosives and bomb dog detection.
SRMs may be used to evaluate performance prior to procurement and
during field service. The goal is to provide a suite of materials for
evaluation of both the instrumental trace explosives detectors and bomb
dogs. For canine performance materials, advanced metrology has been
developed that permits the accurate measurement of the primary odors in
numerous explosives. Prototype materials have been prepared that mimic
the real explosives odor profile and are about to be tested in
certified bomb dogs. These canine SRMs will provide substantial
monetary savings as well as greater trainer safety by eliminating the
current requirement for training aids based on real explosives. NIST
also takes a leading role in the development of consensus standards
through organizations such as ASTM and SWGDOG that provide best
practice protocols for testing detection systems and canines. This work
is funded by the S&T Test & Evaluation and Standards Division, and
partners in the standards development activities include scientists in
S&T and the NPPD Office of Bombing Prevention.
Standoff imaging systems
NIST research has improved the ability to assess claims on the
performance of a wide variety of technologies designed to detect
explosives, and other weapons, concealed on persons in high-traffic
areas such as airports, railway stations, sports arenas, and similar
public venues. The work, which is funded by DHS S&T and DOJ National
Institute of Justice, includes studies of the reflectance/transmittance
of human skin, fabrics, and threat objects when examined from a
distance using ultraviolet, visible, infrared, millimeter wave or
microwave radiation. A key performance goal for these standoff
technologies is the ability to detect hidden IEDs with high probability
under various standard scenarios. NIST scientists are also working with
DHS to develop a standard to quantify the body coverage of whole-body
imagers, such as x-ray backscatter and millimeter wave systems. These
recent efforts leveraged longer-term NIST projects in passive and
active millimeter-wave and terahertz sensing for security applications.
These projects funded by DHS, DARPA, and DOD, made pioneering
contributions to active and passive millimeter-wave imaging security
applications. The research led to advanced millimeterwave and THz
imaging systems, calibration targets that have been distributed to some
20research groups, and a database to guide the development of portal
sensors for screening liquids and solids. NIST and DHS, along with
other Federal agencies and industry partners, are working with
standards development organizations to develop standards, test
artifacts, and test methods for imaging systems for the detection of
explosives and other threats.
Reference data for explosives
NIST Standards Reference Data program is a world-class resource for
reference data for thermophysical and spectroscopic properties of
materials for the science and engineering communities. NIST has several
projects using state of the art systems to acquire new data from
physical and chemical measurements, and to provide data sets of
critically evaluated data from the literature. Because of the wide
range of new technologies under development for explosives detection,
there are serious gaps in the reference data. DHS S&T and NIST funding
are directed at filling in some of these gaps. One example was driven
by the potential of a technique known as Dielectric spectroscopy to
detect hazardous liquids in containers. NIST work showed that this
technique is capable of clearly differentiating dangerous liquids, such
as gasoline and bleach, and innocuous liquids, such as water and milk.
The results thus far have been limited to special test holders and work
is being undertaken to determine the effect of container typically used
to hold these liquids. The results of this effort yielded reference
data, which can be use by researchers to develop new airport scanning
equipment for liquid containers.
A second data project is directed toward thermophysical properties
of explosives. Concealed explosives can be detected through the
chemical or physical ``signatures'' that they leave behind. Timely and
reliable physical and chemical property information for explosives is
therefore essential for the successful development and implementation
of new detection techniques. But, the properties of explosives are
widely dispersed in the technical literature and are often discordant
with poor characterization of data quality (i.e., poor estimates of the
uncertainty of the chemical-physical properties of the explosive
compound).
With support from DHS S&T, NIST is developing software tools for
on-demand, critically-evaluated physical and chemical properties of
existing and conceptual explosive compounds. For this project, primary
experimental information on the properties of explosives is collected,
critically evaluated, and provided to DHS in the form of expert-system
software. The NIST expert system includes state-of-the-art property-
prediction tools that allow many evaluations for conventional
explosives as well as those that have not yet, or cannot yet, be
studied experimentally.
Metal detector standards
NIST scientists have developed a world-class reference facility for
measuring the performance of metal detectors, both hand-held and walk-
through types. This facility uses a computer-controlled robot to
reproducibly position and move specially designed test objects through
or by a metal detector. The test objects are fabricated using defined
metal parameters to ensure consistency from measurement to measurement
and between different test facilities. The methods developed to test
the pertinent electromagnetic properties of these test objects have
been used to support similar test object development for the S&T TSL
facility. The NIST facility also uses a human electromagnetic phantom
to emulate the effect of a person on metal detector performance; the
materials comprising this phantom were developed in collaboration
between NIST and industry scientists. Using this facility, NIST
developed rigorous and exacting performance standards, one each for
hand-held and walk-through metal detectors, for the National Institute
of Justice (NIJ). These NU standards are used as a basis for
procurement by other agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Prisons
(BOP) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). The methods
used in these standards have been emulated by other groups developing
other checkpoint security standards and/or test and evaluation methods.
Biometric Standards to Enhance Screening of Travelers
NIST helps lead the development of many biometric standards used to
support the screening of travelers. For example, NIST serves as the
Standards Developing Organization (SDO) for two documentary standards
(ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2007 and ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2008), which facilitates the
interchange of electronic biometric data including fingerprint, and
face and iris images. These standards support data sharing and
interoperability between points of encounter (e.g., a port of entry)
and centralized biometric services provided by DHS US-VISIT/IDENT and
other screening partners such as the FBI IAFIS. NIST also participates
in the development and deployment of national and international
standards, such as INCITS-M1 and ISO/IEC-SC37, which focus on data
formats, performance testing, and image quality. With many biometric
standards to choose from, NIST also chairs the group that develops the
Registry of USG Recommended Biometric Standards.
Ensuring the high quality of collected biometric data is key to
improving the use of biometrics. To that aim, NIST pioneered a publicly
available and interoperable algorithm known as the NIST Fingerprint
Image Quality (NFIQ). Building on its expertise, NIST also works to
test algorithms for assessing image quality of iris and faces. For
example, NIST created the Image Quality Evaluation and Calibration
(IQEC) program to evaluate quality factors and metrics that impact
iris-recognition accuracy. IQEC is one of a growing list of NIST
evaluations for testing and informing biometric standards. Other
notable tests include the Minutiae Exchange Test (MINEX) which tested
the interoperability between standard fingerprint template generators
and matchers; and the first Iris Exchange Test (IREX 1) which tested
the matchability of standard compact iris image formats.
When screening travelers, it is important to deploy technology and
processes that provide the highest level of security while keeping the
traveling public moving efficiently through checkpoints. To facilitate
that, MST conducts biometric usability studies that help ensure that
screening systems are easy, efficient, and intuitive for travelers and
inspection agents alike. As an example, MST conducted a positioning
study to determine the best installation of fingerprint readers on
counters at ports of entry. The results of this study were used by TSA
in designing checkpoints and placement of the new 10 finger slap
readers. In addition, NIST has developed and tested language-
independent, international biometric symbols that will help guide
travelers efficiently and effectively through the biometric acquisition
process. This work was supported by DHS S&T and products were delivered
to US VISIT and TSA.
Conformity assessment support for passenger screening equipment
Non-intrusive Inspection Systems
In collaboration with DHS and standards development committees,
NIST has enabled the development of performance standards for non-
intrusive inspection systems that cover aviation and transportation
venues where explosives are screened to include critical
characteristics such as electromagnetic compatibility, fire and
electrical safety. These standards facilitate the deployment and use of
these technologies in environments where passenger/operator safety and
performance degradation from electromagnetic interference are key
concerns.
NIST has also assisted the TSA Atlantic City Technical Center in
enhancing their technical requirements documents for x-ray inspection
equipment by identifying appropriate standards references and testing
requirements.
Biometrics
NIST assisted TSA in identifying appropriate standards and
conformity assessment procedures for a Qualified Products List (QPL)
for Airport Access Control biometrics equipment based on the
requirements of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004.
Following a request and funding from DHS, NIST developed a
laboratory accreditation program for testing of biometrics products to
support the TSA Airport Access Control QPL program; the NIST National
Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) will establish an
accredited lab network for third party testing to standards for
biometrics equipment. This program is available for use by other DHS
and other Federal labs--a major step toward providing uniformity of
testing for commercial cards, readers and other biometrics equipment
purchased by the Federal and jurisdictional agencies.
Summary
Members of the Subcommittee, aviation security is an activity of
national importance. The scientific and technological tools that will
enhance our security are complex, and major investments are being made
by DHS to develop and refine these tools for emerging and evolving
threats. Measurements and standards are essential--both to the current
generation of security technologies and to next generation S&T
approaches. NIST scientists and engineers are proud to accept the
challenges and opportunities presented by our colleagues in the other
Federal agencies charged with improving our aviation security.
Thank you for your dedicated efforts to improve the safety of air
travel for all Americans. 1 appreciate the opportunity to meet with you
today to discuss the role of national standards in strengthening
passenger screening and I look forward to answering your-questions.
Biography for Dr. Bert Coursey
Dr. Bert Coursey, Program Manager, Coordinated National Security
Standards Program, at the Department of Commerce's National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST).
Bert M. Coursey received his B.S. degree in Chemistry in 1965, and
the Ph.D. in Physical Chemistry in 1970, from the University of
Georgia. He served as an Officer in the U.S. Army in 1969-71 in the
Army Engineer Reactors Group at Fort Belvoir, VA. He joined the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) (formerly the
National Bureau of Standards) in 1972 and for the following 15 years
worked on radioactivity standards for environmental radioactivity and
nuclear medicine. More recently he has held management positions in
radiation dosimetry and served as Chief of the Ionizing Radiation
Division in the NIST Physics Laboratory. He is a member of the Senior
Executive Service. He is a recipient of the Bronze (1987) Silver (1997)
and Gold (2002) Medals of the Department of Commerce, past president of
the International Committee for Radionuclide Metrology, and past
president of the NIST chapter of Sigma Xi. He is a Fellow of the
American Association of Physicists in Medicine. Dr. Coursey has ninety
publications on radioactivity standards and applied radiation
dosimetry. Dr. Coursey has served for 30 years as editor of the journal
Applied Radiation and Isotopes.
Since March 1, 2003, Dr. Coursey has been on assignment to DHS as
Director for Standards in the Test & Evaluation and Standards Division
in the Science & Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland
Security. In 2004 he was appointed the Standards Executive for the
Department. His office is responsible for the design and implementation
of a national program for standards for homeland security. A partial
listing of the DHS standards projects underway includes performance
standards and testing and evaluation protocols for personal protective
and operational equipment, chemical and biological detectors for
emergency responders, explosives detection equipment, and performance
standards for information technology (IT) to include credentialing,
biometrics and cyber security.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Dr. Coursey. Dr. Hyland,
please proceed.
STATEMENT OF DR. SANDRA L. HYLAND, SENIOR PRINCIPAL ENGINEER,
BAE SYSTEMS
Dr. Hyland. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the
Committee. My name is Sandra Hyland and I served as the study
director for the 1996 NRC [National Research Council] study
``Airline Passenger Security Screening: New Technologies and
Implementation Issues'' as well as vice chair for the 2007 NRC
study ``Assessment of Millimeter-Wave and Terahertz Technology
for Detection and Identification of Concealed Explosives and
Weapons'', technology more commonly known as full-body or
whole-body scanners. The NRC, National Research Council, is the
operating arm of the National Academy of Sciences, the National
Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine of the
National Academies, chartered by Congress in 1863 to advise the
government on matters of science and technology. I would like
to clarify that I am not representing my employer, BAE Systems,
but am here to discuss work I have done as an employee and a
volunteer with the NRC over the past 16 years.
The FAA and the TSA have sponsored numerous NRC studies on
various aspects of aviation security in order to obtain expert,
independent guidance on technology priorities and approaches,
and we are pleased to continue this positive relationship. My
testimony today will center on the earlier reports, in
particular, the committee's discussion related to
implementation issues associated with new technologies.
The 1996 NRC Report on Airline Passenger Security Screening
described not only the technical advances in security screening
but also the more practical side of that screening. It is
important to understand that no technology, no matter how
promising, will work unless it can be successfully implemented
within the aviation security infrastructure. To this end, the
committee addressed both the legal issues associated with
passenger screening as well as the more-difficult-to-quantify
issue of public acceptance. And although the report was written
prior to 9/11, it is my opinion that the committee's message
that it is important to assess the public's reaction to, and
acceptance of, the screening technologies remains relevant.
The committee reached its conclusion and developed its
recommendations based on briefings from the FAA and other
government entities on their security screening approaches and
by holding a workshop attended by representative groups, such
as airport personnel, that would be affected by changes in
passenger screening approaches. My written testimony includes a
complete list of workshop attendees.
During the course of the study, the committee held one
underlying assumption. The level of inconvenience and invasion
of privacy that people are willing to tolerate is associated
with their perception both of the severity of the threat and
the effectiveness of the screening in averting that threat.
The 1996 committee identified four issues most relevant to
the public acceptance of technologies, health, privacy,
convenience and comfort. People will differ in terms of the
importance they place on these issues and their level of
acceptance of passenger screening technologies. Aside from
considering the reactions new technologies may elicit, TSA will
have to determine an acceptable level of opposition.
I will now briefly discuss the areas of concern identified
by the committee. Health. Issues related to health are more
related to the perception of health consequences than any
actual risks. Specifically, the committee noted that while the
technologies were safe, there are public concerns related to,
for example, the potential consequences of exposure to the
radiation used in scanning technologies. It will be important
then to be proactive in education relating to the minimal
exposure levels and convey this information so that it is as
accessible to a wide audience.
Privacy. Privacy is probably the most significant factor in
terms of whether the public will accept a new technology. In
the case of the full body imagers described in the 2007 report,
there are significant concerns as this technology can display a
person's anatomical features. As the committee noted in 2007,
at a resolution of one centimeter, the images have enough
detail to be embarrassing to many people and can reveal such
personal information as the use of an ostomy bag or the
presence of breast implants. It will be important then that if
this technology is adopted, it is done in such a way that it
acknowledges the public's concerns about privacy and carefully
balances them against the technology's benefits. In 1996, the
committee noted that this technology would most likely only be
accepted if the perceived threat level were high and the
technology proven to be effective at averting the threat, but
that would be difficult to quantify just how high that threat
would need to be. In my opinion, given the reaction to the to
the attempted bombing of the Northwest Airlines Flight on
Christmas, this may be the time to revisit the question of the
effectiveness of this technology in airport use, and whether
given the threats the flying public would accept it.
The 1996 report also identified steps that may improve
public acceptance of body imaging technologies and trace
explosive detection, both of which are in my written testimony.
Convenience is largely a matter of time. The 1996 committee
noted that screening technologies that impose delays will also
have problems with public acceptance.
Issues related to comfort arise when a technology requires
that the person being screened to be in close contact with
either with the equipment or another person or a technology
that requires a person to be in a confined space.
While there are ways to minimize this discomfort, it can
lead to a trade-off with technological effectiveness. For
example, using airflow to collect samples for explosives
detection may ameliorate the concerns of a passenger that does
not want to be touched, but may not be as effective as direct
contact.
The 1996 committee found that there had been very little
study of the public acceptance of screening technologies, and
when this topic was revisited relative to the committee's work
on the whole-body imagers in 2007, that had not changed. The
committee identified a number of intangibles that go into the
public's willingness to accept inconvenience, and I have
provided a description of those in my written testimony.
However, the committee stated that there is no better way
to gauge public acceptance of new technologies screenings than
field tests. The committee strongly encouraged that in addition
to performance data, information related to the acceptance of
this technology be collected. People find it difficult to
provide reactions to abstract, hypothetical situations compared
to here-and-now machines. So the most accurate reading of the
public's reaction to a scenario will be by conducting testing
as closely as possible to the proposed implementation.
I would like to conclude my remarks with some personal
views based on the input from the participants in the
committee's workshops. Several representatives from airport
operations and air carrier groups were concerned that the FAA
would impose new screening technology without sufficient
consideration of passenger acceptance. Air carriers are acutely
aware that travelers make trade-offs, and increasing the burden
on passenger security screening can potentially push those
trade-offs away from air travel. Including the air carriers,
airport operators, and other industry representatives in the
assessment and deployment of new passenger screening technology
will help ensure the successful implementation.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I would
be pleased to address any questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Hyland follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Sandra L. Hyland
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. My name
is Sandra Hyland and I served as the study director for the 1996 NRC
study Airline Passenger Security Screening: New Technologies and
Implementation Issues as well as vice chair for the 2007 NRC study
Assessment of Millimeter-Wave and Terahertz Technology for Detection
and Identification of Concealed Explosives and Weapons (the form of
imaging more commonly known as full-body scanners). The NRC--National
Research Council--is the operating arm of the National Academy of
Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of
Medicine of the National Academies, chartered by Congress in 1863 to
advise the government on matters of science and technology. I would
like to clarify that I am not representing my employer, BAE Systems,
but am here to discuss work I have done as an employee and a volunteer
with the NRC over the past 16 years.
The FAA and, following the events of September 11, 2001, the TSA
have sponsored numerous studies with the National Research Council in
order to obtain expert, independent guidance on technology priorities
and approaches, and we are pleased to continue this positive
relationship. My testimony today will center on the earlier reports,
and in particular, the committee's discussion related to the
implementation issues associated with these technologies.
The 1996 NRC Report, Airline Passenger Security Screening: New
Technologies and Implementation Issues, described not only the
technical advances associated with security screening, but also the
more practical side of that screening. It is important to understand
that no technology, no matter how promising, will work unless it can be
successfully implemented within the current aviation security
infrastructure. To this end, in the 1996 report, the panel addressed
both the legal issues associated with passenger screening--most of
which are related to the concepts of search, the expectation of
privacy, and implied consent--as well as the more-difficult-to-quantify
issue of public acceptance.
Although this report was written prior to the events of September
11, 2001, and during a time when the internet was in its infancy and
``blogosphere'' was neither a word nor a concept, it is my opinion that
the panel's underlying message--that it is important to assess the
public's reaction to, and acceptance of, the screening technologies--is
still relevant. Critical differences between the passenger screening
approach of today compared to that in 1996 include the federalization
of the screening workforce and the assumption by the U.S. government of
the security screening operations. Compared to the ``arms-length''
responsibility the FAA had for passenger screening in 1996, the TSA is
now mostly directly responsible for the purchase, deployment, and
operation of security screening equipment and for the security
screening personnel. This change in the role of the U. S. government in
passenger screening does not obviate the need for TSA to assess the
public acceptance of a specific security screening approach to strike a
balance between security and a robust air travel business.
In their review of some specific potential passenger screening
scenarios, the panel relied on this underlying assumption: people
relate the level of inconvenience and invasion of privacy that they are
willing to tolerate to their perception of the severity of the threat
being averted and the effectiveness of the screening efforts at
averting that threat. In airline passenger security screening,
``people'' refers not only to the passengers themselves, but to all the
other air carrier and airport personnel exposed to the screening
process--including flight crews and air carrier and airport employees
who work inside the sterile area of the airport.
The panel developed their recommendations through briefings from
the FAA on potential technologies for screening passengers and from
other government entities on their security screening approaches, and
by holding a workshop attended by representatives of groups that would
be affected by changes in passenger screening approaches. These groups
included those representing airport management, consumer interests, and
air-carrier employees. I have included a complete list of workshop
attendees at the end of this document.
In 1996, the panel identified four categories of issues most
relevant to the public acceptance of these technologies:
health
privacy
convenience, and
comfort
People will differ in terms of the importance they place on the
various concerns, and will also differ in their level of rejection of
passenger screening technologies. Aside from considering the types of
reactions new technologies may elicit, TSA will have to determine an
acceptable level of opposition.
I will now briefly touch on each of the areas of concern identified
by the panel.
Health
Issues related to health are more related to the perception of
potential health consequences than they are to any actual risks.
Specifically, the panel noted that while the technologies themselves
were safe, there are public concerns related to, for example, the
potential consequences of exposure to the radiation used in active
scanning technologies. For this reason, it will be important to be
proactive in education related to the minimal exposure levels--and it
will be important to convey this information in such a way that it as
accessible to the widest audience.
Privacy
Issues related to privacy are probably the most significant in
terms of whether or not the public will accept a new technology. For
example, in the case of the full body imagers described in the 2007
report on millimeter-wave and terahertz technology, there are
significant concerns when it comes to technology that can display a
person's anatomical features.
As the committee noted in the 2007 report related to this
technology, even images with a resolution of 1 cm have significant
detail to be embarrassing to many people, as can be seen in the example
image shown above. These concerns may be exacerbated when the person
being screened is a member of a culture for which modesty is important.
Concerns also exist relative to the technology's potential to reveal
such personal information as the use of an ostomy bag, or the presence
of breast implants. For this reason it will be important that should
this technology be adopted, it is done in such a way that the public's
concerns about privacy are acknowledged and carefully balanced against
the benefits of this technology's use. At the time the report was
written, the panel noted that this technology would most likely only be
accepted if the perceived threat level were high and the technology
effective at averting that threat, but that quantifying just how high
the threat would need to be would be difficult. In my opinion, given
the reaction to the attempted bombing of the Northwest Airlines Flight
on Christmas, this may be the time to revisit the question of the
effectiveness of this technology in identifying this kind of threat in
actual airport use, and the level of threat at which the flying public
would accept this technology as a primary screening approach.
The 1996 report identified five steps that might be taken to
improve public acceptance of body imaging technologies:
masking portions of the displayed image or distorting
the image to make it appear less ``human"
using operators of the same gender as the subject to
view the images
ensuring that images are displayed in such a way as
to be viewable only to the screener
providing guarantees that images will not be
preserved beyond the brief screening procedure, except when
questionable objects are detected, and
offering alternative screening procedures-such as a
``pat down'' for those who object to imaging.
The committee noted in its 2007 report that many of these
approaches have already been implemented in other countries. In
particular, a field trial of one imaging system at Gatwick Airport in
the United Kingdom found that the public response was favorable, and
that the system was also successful in detecting concealed metal and
ceramic weapons.
A second category of technology that has the potential to raise
privacy concerns is that of trace explosives detection. As other
technical experts have already likely explained, this technology allows
for a sample to be taken from a subject (either by walking through a
portal or by means of a hand-wand device). This sample is then analyzed
for the presence of a chemical signature that would indicate the
subject had been in contact with explosive material.
In this case the privacy concerns stem either from the potential
for disclosure of information the passenger would rather be kept
private (for example, the use of nitroglycerin for a heart condition),
or the aversion that some people have to being touched. As with current
``pat down'' screenings, some of this can be ameliorated by ensuring
that the person is screened by someone of the same gender and out of
the immediate public view.
Convenience
Convenience is largely related to time. In 1996, the panel noted
that screening technologies that impose delays will also have problems
with public acceptance.
Speaking from my own perception rather than as a member of the
committee, the public has grown to grudgingly accept the need to arrive
at the airport well-ahead of their anticipated departure to accommodate
not only longer lines at security screening, but also the uncertainty
in how long that screening might take. However, there may also have
been some backlash as, for example, train ridership has gone up, with
Amtrak recording record ridership each year from 2002 through 2008.
Comfort
Issues related to comfort often arise when there is a technology
that will require the person being screened to be in close contact
either with the equipment or with another person. In some cases,
comfort issues can also arise for technology that will require a person
to be confined space--such as some trace explosives detection equipment
and full body scanners do. In particular, trace detection portals--
which also involve directed airflow--have to potential to raise comfort
issues.
While there are ways to minimize this discomfort, in some cases
this may result in a trade-off with technological effectiveness. For
example, the use of airflow to collect samples for explosives detection
may ameliorate the concerns of a passenger that does not want to be
touched, but may not be as effective as the sampling that comes from
direct contact.
In addition to reviewing potential public acceptance of new
screening technologies, the panel noted that current screening
technology could be made more effective by a better integration of the
screening personnel into the system. The inability to maintain a high
level of operator performance is a principal weakness of existing
passenger screening systems and a potential weakness of future systems.
Improving current technologies and developing new technologies both
require determining the optimum integration of technological
development and human operators into the overall security system.
To ensure an effective screening system, it is imperative to assess
the public acceptance of technology and balance that against its
benefits before making any decisions about the course to be used. The
final part of my statement will review the ways in which the panel
discussed how that may be done.
Assessing Public Acceptance
In 1996, the panel found that there had been very little work done
to study the public acceptance of screening technologies, and when this
topic was revisited relative to the committee's work on the whole-body
imagers in 2007, that had not changed. Yet, it's clear that the public
perception and acceptance can have a large impact on the behavior of
travelers (as I noted with increased use of passenger rail in the
northeast corridor).
Additionally, the panel identified a number of intangibles that go
into the public's willingness to accept inconvenience, including:
the nature, extent, and likelihood of the actual
threat and the associated risk (Certainly, this changed between
1996 and September 11th)
the degree of understanding and the perception of the
actual threat and the associated risks
personal beliefs, habits, and cultural mores
the physical, mental, and emotional state of an
individual
the extent and degree of public understanding of the
screening objectives, technology, and procedures
public perception of the effectiveness of the
screening system
public understanding and perception of the health
risks associated with the screening system, and
the nature and frequency of air travel.
The panel also identified two ways in which the public acceptance
of this technology might be measured:
by surveying the population most likely to be
affected by passenger screening, which has the potential to be
of limited value due to the self-selective nature of the survey
and the likely introduction of sampling error, and
by identifying similar or analogous circumstances in
the past and studying available information related to the
public reaction to-or acceptance of-these circumstances. In
this case, reaction to metal detectors and baggage scans might
provide insight.
However, the panel stated that there is no better way to gauge
public acceptance of new screening technologies than by way of field
tests. For this reason the panel strongly encouraged that in addition
to performance data, information related to the public acceptance of
this technology also be collected.
I would like to conclude my remarks with some personal views
regarding the input from the participants in the panel's workshops.
Many of the representatives from airport operations and air carrier
groups expressed the concern that the FAA would impose new screening
technology without sufficient consideration of passenger acceptance.
Travel by air is a largely voluntary activity--people can choose to
take the family to Disney World by air, or they can drive to a nearby
attraction. Even business people have a wide variety of tools that can
help them minimize air travel, including web-based meetings and other
internet-enabled communications. Air carriers are acutely aware that
travelers make these types of trade-offs regularly, and increasing the
burden of passenger security screening can potentially push those
trade-offs in favor of travel by car, train, or bus. Including the air
carriers, airport operators, and other industry representatives in the
assessment and deployment of new passenger screening technology is
likely to be the best way to ensure the successful implementation of
new security technologies.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I would be pleased
to address any questions the subcommittee may have.
Biography for Dr. Sandra L. Hyland
Sandra Hyland, Ph.D. has 25 years experience in program management
in both for- and nonprofit organizations. She is currently a senior
semiconductor engineer at BAE systems. Prior to that, she served in
various positions at Tokyo Electron. She has also served as a staff
officer at the National Research Council's National Materials Advisory
Board and an advisory engineer at IBM. Dr. Hyland has a Ph.D. in
materials science and engineering from Cornell University, an M.S. in
electrical engineering from Rutgers University, and a B.S. in
electrical engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. Dr.
Hyland is a member of the American Vacuum Society, Electrochemical
Society and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers. She
is a fellow of the Society of Women Engineers, and previously served as
vice chair of the National Research Council Committee on Technologies
for Transportation Security.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Dr. Hyland, and thank you
for your contributions to the information gathered by this
committee.
It is now in order to open for our first round of
questions, and the Chair recognizes himself for five minutes.
Before we even get to the question of response or lack of
response to the 1996 and 2007 reports, I want to ask the panel
a threshold question of whether our concern about public
acceptance is real or whether it is theoretical. Have you
actually determined that the traveling public, that is
passengers at airports, are actually concerned about the things
we think they are concerned about? The reason why I am saying
this is because I spent four hours knocking on doors in
Tualatin, Oregon, this past Saturday. I got an earful, but I
think that the earful that I got in that neighborhood is very
different from the earful that I would get in another
neighborhood in my congressional district. Choice of sample and
what you ask is absolutely crucial. Are we speculating about
passenger concern or do we have direct evidence that these are
actual concerns of the flying public? Whoever wants to go
first.
Dr. Hyland. Thank you. That is a question that the 1996
panel struggled with quite a bit. We had experts in how people
make decisions to do things they know are risky, like smoking
and so----
Chairman Wu. Well, did they ask the traveling public what
they thought?
Dr. Hyland. In that case, we recommended that the traveling
public be asked, but the question----
Chairman Wu. Have they been asked?
Dr. Hyland. Not as far as I know, but the most important
thing----
Chairman Wu. This town is filled with pollsters, right? I
mean, it is just filled with pollsters. And I am not
necessarily recommending that, but it seems like--you know, you
don't go and sell cookies in the market without doing a focus
group and sampling the public and so on, and we are deploying
millions of dollars of equipment, we are betting lives on
airplanes.
Dr. Hyland. Yes, I would like to----
Chairman Wu. Have we polled? Have we asked the traveling
public? Have we actually asked the question?
Mr. Buswell. I don't know.
Chairman Wu. Dr. Albright?
Dr. Albright. I don't know, either.
Chairman Wu. Dr. Coursey?
Dr. Coursey. I don't know, either.
Chairman Wu. So we are sitting in this hearing room
engaging in rank speculation about a problem which may not
exist? I mean, you read about it in the newspaper, but they are
not citing their statistical evidence. I asked this question of
staff several days ago, and I was shocked that they didn't have
an answer and I am even more shocked that you don't have an
answer because you all are in charge of our national research
effort. And how do you know that we have a problem without
having asked the question?
Mr. Buswell. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I think when it comes
to public acceptance of these kinds of technologies, aviation
securities, passenger screening technologies being one example,
we have to assume----
Chairman Wu. Why do you have to assume?
Mr. Buswell. Because it is prudent to do so----
Chairman Wu. Whoa. Look, you can assume that the sky is
blue, you can assume the sun rises in the east, but I think
that Mr. Smith and I would agree that it is dangerous to make
very many assumptions and bet a whole lot on that.
Mr. Buswell. I know, but if I may finish, sir, we have to
assume that there could be public acceptance issues.
Chairman Wu. Well, the question is why? I mean, what makes
it safe to make that assumption? And it is a simple thing to
ask the question. I mean, all you have to do is throw it in a
battery of questions and then also ask the question, have you
flown in the last 12 months.
Mr. Buswell. Sure. There are certainly scientific----
Chairman Wu. And if the answer is yes, the follow-up
question is, how many times have you flown. And then you do a
simple read of the cross-tabs and you realize, I mean, you have
easy data on crossing the number of times flown versus their
attitudes about screening technology, right?
Mr. Buswell. Sure. Absolutely. And there are scientific--
Chairman Wu. So why----
Mr. Buswell. --approaches----
Chairman Wu. --hasn't that be done?
Mr. Buswell. I am not saying that it hasn't, but I don't
know that. We haven't done it in S&T that I am aware of.
Chairman Wu. You know, as far as I know, I am the only
person who has asked that question thus far. The staff was
surprised, and they didn't have an answer. You all don't have
an answer. This is a really quick thing to do, you know. Like
if this were a campaign and this were my campaign, I would ask
my pollster to ask that question, and I would have data
tomorrow. They run it by telephone tonight.
Mr. Buswell. Mr. Chairman----
Chairman Wu. So the follow-up question is when are you
going to get it done?
Mr. Buswell. Well, I will take that for action, sir. And
let me go to----
Chairman Wu. Give me a date. Give me a date.
Mr. Buswell. Let me go to TSA and find out what they have
done, and then I will get back to you with a specific date as
to how we are going to approach this. They may have data that I
am not aware of.
Chairman Wu. You know, in what we do, it is kind of a
winner-take-all kind of thing, and you know, you live or die by
the data that guides you. And I am not necessarily recommending
that anybody else live that way. But the thing is, you all are
engaged in a very, very important enterprise, the public safety
is at stake. A whole economic sector, a whole transportation
sector is at stake. And the trust of the public in what their
own government does is at stake, and you are telling me that
one of the most fundamental questions to our collective
knowledge has not been asked. So I am encouraging you in the
strongest way possible to either find out that we have the data
and get it here or to get that battery of questions asked and
get it here. And it shouldn't take very long because Mr. Smith
and I and every other elected up here knows that we can get an
answer to questions like that by midnight tonight and have a
rough analysis by 8:00 a.m. tomorrow and have the thorough
analysis within a day after that. That is the threshold
question. I will get to the underlying question in the next
round.
Mr. Smith, you are recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Several of you touched
on the issue of passenger safety when interacting with the
radiation emitted by screening technologies. I was wondering if
you could address the radiation levels currently faced by
airline passengers and how much increased exposure they can
expect in the future. Anyone wishing to respond?
Mr. Buswell. Yes, sir. I would be pleased to give you some
numbers there. Dr. Coursey can pipe in, too, because I know
there are American National Standards Institute [ANSI]
standards on the radiation exposure, general radiation exposure
from things like screening technology. So to the extent that he
wants to comment on that, he can.
So let me put some things in perspective with regard to
radiation doses to start with, just so we are all sort of
calibrated and we are speaking the same because to me, micro-
rem doesn't mean very much unless you understand what you are
talking about.
So a low-dose dental X-ray, the dose that you get is about
four million micro-rem, or about four rem of exposure. The
average annual--I grew up in Colorado, at high altitude. The
average annual exposure that you get at high altitude just from
the sun, really, is about 4,000 micro-rem. So about 1/10 of
what a dental X-ray would be. In one hour on a commercial jet,
your dose is about 1,000 micro-rem. In one screening by a back-
scatter X-ray body scanner, the dose is about 6 micro-rem. So
in other words, if you take a flight from New York to Los
Angeles, the dose that you receive would be about 1,000 times
what you would get while you are on the airplane compared to
what you would get standing in the whole-body imaging passenger
screener.
And Dr. Coursey, correct me if I am wrong, but I think the
ANSI standard is 25,000 micro-rem per year. So 6 micro-rem is
below the threshold that we even have to keep track of how many
times you go through the screening process in the airport, if
that puts some perspective on the exposure.
Mr. Smith. Anyone else? Dr. Coursey?
Dr. Coursey. Yes. I spent most of my career at NIST working
in radioactivity and the radiation physics group there. So NIST
has been involved for many years in working with the regulatory
agencies on dose health effect relationships. But the NIST
measurement sciences deal with how accurately can you measure
the radiation. The health effects aspects are regulated by the
Food and Drug Administration [FDA], and OSHA [Occupational
Safety and Health Administration] and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. So, the federal guidance in this country for health
effects comes from the National Council on Radiation Protection
and Measurements. And those of us in the Federal agencies
follow that guidance. So, this is not guidance coming out of
NIST or TSA. There is an American National Standard ANSI N4317
which was developed. And, I think this is a great example of
the cooperation here because it had four members from NIST,
seven from different parts of DHS, two from FDA who actually
participated in writing that standard. And, that is the
standard for the safety aspects of the deployment of these X-
ray scanners.
I might also point out that a lot of folks are pushing for
the millimeter-wave scanners, because there are essentially no
radiation affects associated with the millimeter-wave.
Mr. Smith. Anyone else wishing to comment? If not, that is
fine.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will wait for the next round.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Lujan, five minutes.
Mr. Lujan. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and thank you
to everyone that is here today.
As we talk about these technologies, I appreciate the fact
that I read about MagVis technology that was developed at the
Los Alamos National Laboratories discussed in a few of the
testimonies. And more than just MagVis, is the ultimate
objective for our work with Homeland Security is to get the
Department to establish a longstanding running relationship
between the NNSA laboratories and the Department of Science and
Tech Directorate.
Currently I think that you work with them from time to time
when there is an issue specifically to identify such as if
there is a terrorist threat that they may use liquid
explosives, and what will the damage be to the airplane as
opposed to how can we make sure that we are getting that
molecular footprint so that we can identify and prevent any
liquids that even have a notion of being used to move forward
in that way.
So with that being said, Mr. Buswell, although we focused
today on passenger screening, I have been impressed with the
briefings I have received from the scientists and researchers
associated with the MagVis technology, proven technology that
has already been demonstrated in a pilot. Your predecessor,
Under Secretary Cohen, saw the pilot demo at the Albuquerque
Sunport. Can you describe what DHS's plans are for the rapid
implementation of this proven technology and what DHS's plans
are for further applying the National Labs to this challenge,
specifically, the NNSA facilities?
Mr. Buswell. Yes, sir. I would be pleased to, and you know,
MagVis is one of those emerging success stories I think from
our partnership with the National Laboratories. For those who
may not be familiar with the technology, MagVis is short for
magnetic visibility, and it is looking at the possibility of
using technology similar to a hospital MRI machine to look for
and not only find but identify liquids. The difference would be
the magnetic fields in MagVis are at a much lower power which
would allow operation without the restrictions and high costs
of traditional MRIs. Getting back to the footprint issue at the
screening sites, as Mr. Lujan said, we demonstrated this
technology in Albuquerque a year ago last December, I guess. In
December of '08 was that demonstration. It was very successful
in identifying dangerous liquids in a small bottle among non-
hazardous liquids in the standard TSA-size screening bowl that
you would put your coins or wallet into.
So now the next step in this risk management development is
can we do that with an entire tray size application? If that is
successful, can we be successful in doing that with the regular
baggage, you know, full baggage, carry-on baggage size?
So we are looking at this in a phased increment, and we are
confident enough now that the technology has great potential
for success that we are looking for commercial partners because
at the end of the day, the commercial partners are who we need
to get these things deployed en masse. So it is an excellent
success story.
And so let me talk a little bit more about your broader
question of partnership with the National Labs, and I will go
into a little more detail than I did just in my oral comments
on this DHS/DOE aviation security partnership.
We have recently established this, it is off and running.
It is going to provide a senior-level Under Secretary level
governance mechanism to focus the utilization of the National
Labs on this very important problem. Right now we are looking
at three--you can do all the governance you want, but if you
don't get down to the working groups and the people that
actually know how to bring solutions to the table, you are
never going to get anywhere.
We are looking at three areas to focus on. One, as Dr.
Albright mentioned, is this systems analysis of aviation
security, both from an aviation security as a system of systems
and then from an engineering standpoint. When you get to the
passenger checkpoint screening for example, what is the optimal
configuration? What are the trade-offs among the technologies?
The National Labs, with their modeling capabilities, are
uniquely positioned, I think, to help us there. That effort
will be co-led by Sandia National Laboratory.
Mr. Lujan. Mr. Buswell, if I may, and Mr. Chairman, I want
to make sure we get a chance to explore these a little bit
going forward with some other questions, but one thing that I
just want to point out is, one thing that we learned from the
failed attempt on Christmas Day of this last year is that metal
detectors didn't do the job. And there has been an investment
and commitment going forward with metal detectors. We need to
make sure that we are looking at these technologies to be able
to identify these materials, that you understand how we take
into consideration the complexities associated with chemistry
and the value of getting that molecular footprint so that way
we can prevent them from getting forward, from moving forward
and from identifying people that have them on their body, on
their persons, or on materials in a way that is very safe to
the individual and the traveling public.
And Mr. Chairman, I will pursue that line of questioning as
we go forward as well, but I certainly hope that we can get to
that point. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Lujan, and we will
return for further rounds of questions.
Mr. Garamendi, please proceed, five minutes.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much. Was it 25,000 micro-
rems a year?
Mr. Buswell. Yes, that is the----
Mr. Garamendi. And it is 1,000 a flight across the country?
Mr. Buswell. That is right.
Mr. Garamendi. We better stop going home, Mr. Wu.
Mr. Buswell. It is actually 1,000 per hour at altitude.
Mr. Garamendi. We have already----
Mr. Buswell. I hope you have short flights.
Mr. Garamendi. I am not going home this weekend. The
question here is what is the status of explosive detection? Dr.
Albright, you discussed this in generality, do we really--how
long do we have to wait? What is the status or will it ever be
possible?
Dr. Albright. Okay. So that is a great question. I think it
was pointed out by Mr. Lujan, to date, most of our technology
at passenger checkpoints has revolved around metal detection.
The thing that you walk through is looking for metals, and that
may have made a lot of sense in the day when we were worried
about people bringing guns on board aircraft, but it doesn't
check for explosives. That is just a fact of life.
Even with the carry-on baggage systems that we have
deployed, without going into classified details, they have
utility in detecting explosives, but they are certainly not at
the performance point that I think anybody, either any of you
or anybody here sitting at the table, would like.
So we have tried to move on to other ideas. Whole-body
imaging is certainly one that has been put in play. By the way,
as an aside, that was technology that was developed at Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory and was then transitioned into
the private sector. The difficulty with explosives at the end
of the day is that they are--there are two problems. One is
that they are not volatile. That means they don't put out a lot
of vapor, which is the kind of thing you would detect in a
remote environment. You would sniff for the explosive. And they
are not very volatile, and frankly for obvious reasons, you
would not want to have an explosive that rapidly turns into a
vapor and mixes with the atmosphere. That would not be a very
stable environment to operate in. So they tend to be very, very
hard to detect. You have to actually detect the solid somehow,
which is, by the way, the basis of those scanning systems that
they use in secondary inspection.
The second difficulty is confusers. You have a lot of--many
of you have probably gone through secondary, have been scanned,
had your luggage hand-swiped, and it has come back positive. My
guess is the first question you were asked was, did you play
golf today because if you did, you picked up possibly
fertilizer and that will sometimes confuse these systems. And
there are lots of confusers. For the checked baggage systems,
for example, it is a well-known fact that peanut butter is
something that looks very much like an explosive to those
systems.
So those kinds of issues, the confusers are a real problem.
And then finally, what has changed a lot, particularly over the
last few years, is the plethora of explosives that we have to
deal with. You know, we originally had a fairly short list of
explosives that we were concerned about in aviation security
and at the checkpoints. Now there are dozens that show up on
the internet that have to be or are in books that people sell.
You can get them off of Amazon, that tell people how to make
homemade explosives, and the list is fairly long and getting
longer, and these have to be evaluated and I think as was
pointed out, the signatures then, what they look like to our
chemical systems, to the whole-body imagers, to this collection
of sensor systems that we are trying to deploy, that all has to
be worked through. This is again an enduring, long twilight
struggle that we are going to be faced with.
So anyway, the point is that the current status is not what
we would like it to be, but it is a very, very hard problem,
but nevertheless, there is a lot of ideas for how to improve,
you know, a variety of technologies.
Mr. Garamendi. If I might, I won't have time to go into all
these other questions, but it seems to me that has this whole
explosive thing has really gone to the dogs and that is where
we are, rely upon dogs?
Dr. Albright. Well, you know, but here is the thing.
Actually, that came up after the December 25 incident, and
there are two issues. The first is there aren't enough dogs.
These dogs have to be trained----
Mr. Garamendi. Presumably we could deal with that issue.
Dr. Albright. Well, you know, it takes a long time to train
these dogs. I think there are maybe three sites in the country,
maybe four, I have forgotten the exact number, that actually
train these dogs. They get tired easily. They are not
necessarily as reliable as people think they are. So when you
work all that through----
Mr. Garamendi. Do OSHA standards apply to dogs?
Dr. Albright. Yeah, we will have to get NIST to go evaluate
dogs for us. But people have been working very hard on
artificial dog noses, for example, and none of these ideas have
particularly worked out particularly well.
Mr. Garamendi. I am going to just open two other subjects,
and my five minutes is up. One is on the social science side of
it. We were talking earlier about social science. But it seems
to me that the visual screening, that is to look at somebody
and say, well, maybe we will take another look at this
individual has a role, and there are those in other countries
that actually do that to a great extent. And I would be
interested in the social science piece of that, does that
really work. And the final question that I would like to get to
is that the Christmas issue really was more about databases,
was it not, and the compatibility and the interaction of
databases. And the question arises as to computer science and
the ability for computer science to deal with the multiple
databases and integrating them.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Garamendi. Before I
get onto my next set of questions, I want to finish up with
some further information on the last question.
After my discussion with Committee staff two days ago, the
Cracker Jack staff went into the archives and found two
surveys, both done after this Christmas incident and both
released January 11, just a few days ago. And one survey by CNN
finds that full-body scanners should be used, 79 percent,
should not be used, 20 percent, no opinion, 2 percent. But
there are no backup numbers on that, so we don't know what the
opinion of the traveling public is as opposed to a non-
traveling sample. And the Gallup/USA Today organization found--
well, there are a variety of findings here. The majority, 67
percent, say they would not personally be uncomfortable with
undergoing such a scan. That is the full-body scan that we are
talking about. Close to half, 48 percent, saying they would not
be uncomfortable at all. Ten percent say they would be very
uncomfortable if subjected to such a search, and I have to add
that the prior preferences were comparing full-body scan versus
a complete pat-down. And there is a difference between men and
women, and what they found is also in their sample--let me take
a moment here to find the sample information because I think it
is very important to our consideration--results based on the
total sample of National adults, 95 percent confidence. Results
based on a sample of 542 adults who have taken two or more air
trips in the past year. Maximum margin of error is plus or
minus five percent, but there are no data about how the
frequency of flying correlates with the opinions about
intrusiveness, and in the CNN survey, the frequency of flying
was really quite disparate. About 50 percent flew either
frequently or occasionally, and the other 50 percent flew never
or rarely. And so you can fit all the frequent passengers into
the don't-screen-me category, or you can fit the 50 percent
that flies into the I-don't-care category. And I think it is
pretty important to determine what it is, whether we are
addressing a real problem or not. So Mr. Buswell, I guess
before you come back you are going to have that information
broken out for us, aren't you?
Mr. Buswell. Yes, sir. I will take that for action. Thank
you.
Chairman Wu. Terrific. Thank you very much. Now, let us
assume that this is a problem, that public acceptance is a
problem. The 1996 National Academies Study on Airline Passenger
Screening discussed the importance of understanding the health,
privacy, convenience and comfort impacts of screening
technologies, and the report eleven years later, the 2007
report, said very little work had been done in these areas. And
I want to ask first our three witnesses from NIST and DHS and
the labs, why have these recommendations been in one sense or
another ignored by your respective agencies in doing your work?
Mr. Buswell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess I would
respectfully disagree that the recommendations have been
ignored, and I think there are a number of recommendations that
in fact have been adopted. For example, the recommendation that
we consider privacy filters to mask portions of the images,
whether those be private areas of the body or faces so that
those wouldn't be displayed together. The fact that images are
not stored. Images of the traveling public are not stored,
again a recommendation of that report which was adopted.
Putting the screener out of sight of the individual was one of
the recommendations, and that was adopted by TSA. The fact that
automatic target recognition which is in fact our highest
resource priority for TSA would allow images not to be viewed
at all unless in response to an alarm is one of those things
that we are pursuing. And I think the most important
recommendation that we have adopted is the recommendation to
assess as early in the development process as possible the
potential for community resistance to the implementation of
some of these technologies. We have in place a formal process
to understand and incorporate community perceptions in the
development and deployment of critical technologies. We call it
the Technology Acceptance and Integration Program, and they
look at things like privacy, civil rights, perceptions, whether
that be intrusiveness or invasiveness. They look at convenience
and comfort, complexity, usability and the perception of threat
risk or safety.
Chairman Wu. Mr. Buswell, before my time expires, I am
going to give Dr. Hyland an opportunity to comment because you
know, I am a generalist. I work here in a legislative body. It
is one thing to disagree with me, but Dr. Hyland's written
testimony states in 1996 the committee found that there had
been very little work done to study the public acceptance of
screening technologies, and when this topic was revisited
relative to the committee's work on the whole-body imagers in
2007, that had not changed.
Dr. Hyland, would you care to comment about how much work
has been done on the public acceptance front?
Dr. Hyland. Certainly. I would like to say that when we
said that in 2007 we found no updates, so as Mr. Buswell says,
perhaps there is information being done internally at DHS and
TSA that was not in the published realm. So we may have not
seen it, but it was of concern to us that there was nothing in
the publications that we would see that had addressed these.
Chairman Wu. Dr. Coursey?
Dr. Coursey. Yes, you wouldn't expect NIST to have a large
role in this because we are basically in the measurement
science, but we do have a very effective group in usability in
our information technology.
Chairman Wu. I am never surprised at what NIST is involved
in. I can't think of a single area that NIST is not involved
in.
Dr. Coursey. This is a very exciting project that is
partially supported by DHS S&T, and that is to look at the
usability of fingerprint readers as passengers are approaching
a checkpoint. So, this is work funded by S&T that is now being
used by US-VISIT. But it basically comes to the idea of
affordance. When you come up to a piece of equipment, do you
instinctively understand what you are being asked to do, or do
you have to have some long instruction in doing that?
So I think the public acceptance to some extent will hinge
on these usability studies. This one particular one was very
helpful for US-VISIT.
Chairman Wu. Did you ever compare a Mac with an IBM? Just
kidding. Mr. Lujan?
Mr. Lujan. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much and just to
pick up a little bit where we left off, Dr. Albright, modeling
simulation, computing capabilities, supercomputers especially
within our National Laboratories, can you just speak
specifically to how valuable those are as we move forward with
talking about how this can be incorporated into looking at
deploying these technologies and creating a safer flying
environment for passengers?
Dr. Albright. Sure. Let me focus on one specific example.
One basic concern you have when you are thinking about
deploying a next generation of any kind of system, what is the
minimum amount of explosive you really need to detect, and
clearly we are not very much interested in, you know, very,
very small amounts. So the question is, what do these systems
really have to be able to do? And the only way to really know
that is to ask yourself, what is the vulnerability of the
aircraft to various explosive formulations placed at various
parts on the aircraft? There are sort of two ways you can do
this. One way is you could go out and buy a whole bunch of air
frames and just start blowing them up, and we actually do a
little bit of that. But that is obviously not a very efficient
or cost-effective approach. The other approach is to use some
of the exquisite modeling and supercomputing capability that
exists at places like Los Alamos and Livermore and Sandia and
to do structural modeling of the air frames and then ask
questions, like, if I put, you know, so much explosive at this
point in the passenger compartment, you know, am I going to get
a rupture, a whole rupture, and what would the consequences of
that for an airplane under flight conditions.
That is actually pretty hard to do, and it does require
validation through some subscale experiments which again, all
the laboratories have the ability to do and do in support of
this program, and yes, it does every once in a while, if for no
other reason than to make people confident that we actually
know what we are doing, we actually occasionally go out and
blow up an airplane and show that we got the right answer. But
nevertheless, that is a fairly broad campaign. Every air frame
is different. There are differences between even different
embodiments of the--you know, you have 757 stretches, you have
757s. They all have different structural responses, and so you
have to have an understanding of that so that you can
ultimately set requirements for what that explosive detector
has to be able to find when you get to the passenger
checkpoint.
Mr. Lujan. Thank you, Dr. Albright. Mr. Chairman, I think
we have seen the importance of making sure that we are looking
at simulation, modeling, supercomputing capabilities to assist
us moving in that endeavor as we identify the molecular
footprint of some of these chemicals, these very destructive
weapons-based materials to do harm. And I also appreciate, Mr.
Buswell, that the Department of Homeland Security has moved
forward to engage in a more senior level working relationship
with our NNSA laboratories. I think it is important that we
identify that technologies like MagVis are an important step in
identifying where we were weak during this December 25
incident, this horrible failed attempt that we saw come
forward. But as we identify the importance about modeling and
simulation that we take into consideration the aspects of
rendering the whole system. And specifically, Mr. Buswell, if
we can get a commitment from DHS that this is one area that we
can work with our National Laboratories as well, building into
this relationship, to truly understand the importance of
evaluating the whole systems-level approach to identify
weaknesses so we can have systematic approaches to solve them
before we identify a weakness that comes forward from a failed
attempt like this.
Mr. Buswell. I couldn't have said it better myself. That is
exactly the focus of the systems analysis portion of that I
started to describe in your last round. And just so you know,
Sandia National Lab will be leading that effort. The aircraft
vulnerability assessment portion of it will be led by Lawrence
Livermore, and then the third area is this idea of emerging
technologies. What do we not know is out there? As you said,
every time I visit a National Lab, I am amazed at the treasure
chest of technologies and science that is going on there. So
how do we bring that to bear to this problem and other homeland
security problems and national security problems? That work
will be co-led by PNNL, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
and Los Alamos. So there is real work to be done there and real
profit to be made, I think.
Mr. Lujan. Mr. Chairman, just another example of tech
transfer and looking to our brightest and best across the
country, to identify solutions to problems where given the
ability and the necessary environment to support that R&D can
solve complex issues when it comes to homeland security,
energy, even economic equations so we can understand the
complexity of some of the algorithms that were used by
financial markets, with the devastation that those have caused
us as well.
Again, thank you for bringing this to a hearing, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Lujan, and thank you
for your contributions to this Subcommittee. I think Sandia has
had good fortune in many different respects, and you are one of
them.
Mr. Lujan. And Mr. Chairman, we hope Los Alamos will as
well.
Chairman Wu. Yes. Mr. Buswell, I have asked you before and
I have also asked your counterpart at the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office about the role of comprehensive risk
assessment. At one point or another there was some concern that
technologies were being developed and risks were being
addressed based on how the Vice President was feeling that day,
and I think the prior Vice President and the current Vice
President might assess those things very, very differently. And
one hopes that in our research endeavor for DHS that we have a
steady hand and guided by real risk assessments. So I would
like to ask you to address the role of comprehensive risk
assessment in creating a multi-tiered detection/prevention
approach and how this dovetails into using different
approaches, such as using canines as Mr. Garamendi suggested,
using personal interviews and behavioral detection as well as
this technologic approach.
Mr. Buswell. I would be pleased to. The first assessment
process--first of all, I think the last time that I was here we
discussed the importance of an overall risk assessment, and I
am pleased to see in the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review
Report that was released earlier this week that the need for a
national risk assessment framework was identified as one of
those highly important things that we need to go forward with.
So I know the Secretary understands that, and she is
engaged in that broader, you know, national risk assessment
that we discussed earlier.
Chairman Wu. Mr. Buswell, can you send back a report to
this Committee on the progress of implementing the systematic
risk assessment methods?
Mr. Buswell. I would be pleased to. The systematic risk
assessment is led by NPPD [National Protection and Programs
Directorate], the Office of Risk Management in NPPD. So I will
be happy to work with them and get you that information.
Chairman Wu. Thank you.
Mr. Buswell. When it comes to the aviation security risk
assessment, TSA has done a lot of work in this regard. You
know, we are not shooting blind here in the screening
technologies and the screening approaches that were taken.
Likewise, I would be pleased to coordinate with TSA to bring to
the Committee that risk assessment that they do regularly and
they revisit regularly, based on the threats that are emerging.
You know, as Dr. Albright said, at one time there were very few
things that we were worried about, people bringing guns and,
you know, commercial grade or military grade explosives onto
airplanes, now that list is quite long, and prioritizing the
list of things that we have to look for and prioritizing the
amounts of or establishing the amounts of these various
substances that we need to look for is high on the list of
things that we need to do and is fundamental to that risk
assessment. So I would be pleased to coordinate that engagement
with the Committee. TSA has done some work in this area that I
think you would be pleased with.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Buswell. I want to
return to Mr. Garamendi's point because we have a society that
really focuses on technology, and it has served us well in so
many different ways. But Dr. Albright mentioned in several
different ways why detection technology is very challenged by
the very nature of the current threat. Mr. Garamendi asked
about dogs, somewhat seriously and somewhat humorously. I
remember being at an airport in Canada and having this friendly
little dog come along, and I was kind of disappointed that it
just went right by me. But I think in retrospect that was a
good thing. It sat down and looked expectantly at this nice
young man, and the nice young man was promptly taken away by
the Mounties, to do what, I don't know. I doubt that it was
explosives. I suspect that it was something more fragrant and,
you know, the dog was up to the task. But it is not just, you
know, our brethren north of the border that do this. Right
here, if you drive your car over to the Capitol, they will stop
you. First, they run a mirror to look on the underside of your
car. And then a dog comes, and my kids and I refer to that as
getting your car dogged. I don't know how effective that dog
is. What I do know is that that dog works in day time, night
time, low temperature, high temperature, when it is dirty, when
it is snowing, et cetera.
Now, the puffer machines that were deployed on an
experimental basis, I believe 100 of them were deployed around
the country on a trial basis, and the figures that we have say
that those were $150,000 or more each. And I am told, I mean I
haven't seen the puffers in a while, but I am told the reason
why the puffers were pulled is because humidity and dust caused
puffer breakdown or puffer confusion. I am not sure that a dog
would have the same problem, and my impression is that $500
buys you a pretty good dog. Now, granted, you have to feed the
dog, you have to train the dog, et cetera. But the puffer
machine was difficult to maintain. Why are we building an
artificial dog nose when we have pretty good dog noses? Dr.
Coursey.
Dr. Coursey. We actually have chemists at NIST working on
both of those problems closely with the DHS S&T, and
specifically with dogs the interesting thing I found talking
with the DHS office of bombing prevention is the range of
different threats that the dogs are being trained to. It can be
different in a mass transit environment than it is in the
aviation. And as you mentioned, some dogs are trained for
narcotics, others are trained for money and others are trained
for cadavers. So, there is actually a group called SWGDOG
[Scientific Working Group on Dog and Orthogonal detection
Guidelines] that has a series of committees that look at the
standards for training methods for these dogs. I think there is
a lot of basic science still to be done here because we don't
know if a dog is reacting whether he is reacting to the
particles or to some of the vapors that are associated with
solvents that were used.
Chairman Wu. You know, a lot of life is kind of empirical,
you know? And we need to work out how a dog does this, but I
think the rubber hits the road in finding whether dogs can
detect explosives, the kind of explosives that we are concerned
about on a reliable basis because my arithmetic indicates that
if you have a $500 puppy, which is a pretty expensive one, you
get 300 of them for a puffer machine. And the question is
whether 300 dogs in an airport is more useful than one puffer
machine. Dr. Albright, you addressed the technical issues a lot
earlier, and perhaps you could try to address this a little bit
more.
Dr. Albright. Sure. Let me just reiterate the fact that
first we don't really understand very well why the dogs are as
good as they are.
Chairman Wu. Yeah, but the question is are they good?
Dr. Albright. That is a good point, and in fact, it
sometimes depends a lot on the testing methodology. I won't go
into it here, but I could regale you off line about my
experiences when I was at the White House reviewing the
anthrax-smelling dogs. And it turned out that the test
procedure was totally biased. I mean, they couldn't do the job.
Chairman Wu. Well, look, if I were a dog, I wouldn't want
to be sniffing anthrax, either. Maybe these dogs were just
brighter than you were giving them credit for.
Dr. Albright. Well, yeah, yeah. No, it wasn't me. I was
just the evaluator. I was not the proponent for this. That is a
whole other story.
But nevertheless, they do tire very easily. The dog is only
good for I think about three or four hours before they start
to----
Chairman Wu. That is why I said you get 300 dogs for one
puffer machine.
Dr. Albright. And it is going to cost you--and the training
regimen they have to go through----
Chairman Wu. I realize that.
Dr. Albright. --is months. And then finally, there is a
range of explosives that--it is not known how broad a range,
including these homemade explosives that we are concerned
about, that they can actually--so you are right. There are some
science questions that have to be dealt with, but the
investment that would have to be made in order to really
populate our explosive detection infrastructure or dogs to the
numbers that we would need to do it at is----
Chairman Wu. Well, you know, we haven't done a very good
job of populating airports with usable detection technologies
you know, that cost $100,000 or $200,000 each. Now, I realize
that there are challenges in acquisition and maintenance and
you know, on and on. But you know, sometimes in our society,
and you know, I serve on the Science and Technology Committee,
but we have an absolute love affair with whiz-bang gadgets, and
sometimes it turns out that something simple and inexpensive
and deployable is being overlooked because we have made
assumptions. I mean, it was in this complex of buildings that a
Nobel physicist dumped an O ring into a glass of cold water and
said, well, you know, this might be why the Space Shuttle blew
up.
So sometimes we need to review our assumptions and our
inclination toward complexity. So you know if I should be
worried that the dogs guarding the U.S. Capitol or sniffing
cars out there, that they are not doing a good job and they are
not reliable and that they are going to get tired, I mean, you
ought to tell me that that is the case. But it seems to me that
those dogs are out there 7/24, and I know that the Capitol is
not, you know, several thousand airplanes flying around the
U.S.A., but you are not going to tell me that a country that
can deploy millions of troops overseas during World War II
cannot deploy a few hundred dogs in civilian airports in the
continental United States if this is truly the long twilight
struggle that some folks would want us to believe that it is.
Dr. Albright. No, the only point I wanted to make is that I
think a lot of that systems analysis that you were referring to
has been done, and it was done in the early days when we were
concerned about, you know, right after Lockerbie and that era
were really looking for solutions. I have to confess that I
haven't looked at it in a while. As to what are the trades
between the thousands of dogs you would have to deploy in an
airport environment, and the technologies that we are
deploying. I would point out, and I think you made the point
yourself, that the operating environment out here driving into
the Capitol is a very different environment than one at the
passenger checkpoint. But nevertheless, the point is a good
one, and it is probably a good idea to go back and dust off
some of those system studies and ask the question whether or
not maybe we are missing something.
Chairman Wu. Yeah, you know, I think it is really important
to try to review some of these assumptions and test them again
and, you know, the operational test is, does it work. And you
know, it is really nice to understand the how and the why, but
you know, if you have got to understand the how and the why
before you deploy something that works, you may not win some
struggles that you might otherwise be able to win.
Now, I have never been a conspiracy-type person. I do think
that as a society we naturally favor technology, and sometimes
it is more expensive than simpler things. I do want to, on this
record, make the observation that these technologic means are
also, well, they keep the National Laboratories occupied, they
keep the producers of the technology occupied, and you know,
some of these manufacturers have representatives in Washington,
D.C., and I don't think the Kennel Club is very well-
represented here. And I don't know if that has anything to do
with it, but I sure would like to have some of these easy
assumptions revisited or else I would like to have puffer
machines at the U.S. Capitol, you know, rather than what they
are currently doing.
Let us shift now to one of the challenges here for you all
is that we fly a lot. You know, congressmen fly a lot, and so
we think we know everything there is to know about flying and
being a passenger at least. And we have all had experiences
where something that is detected at one airport or on one given
day is not detected on another day. You know, you try to take
everything out of the bags, but you have a four-ounce bottle of
fluid and the limit is 3.5, and on some days it is spotted and
you have to remove it and on other days it is not. I don't
always travel with a laptop, but sometimes I do. And every once
in a great while I forget to take it out of the pocket of my
carry-on bag, and as often as not, I don't know if they just
wave it through. It seems to me when they catch it, they make
you pull it out. But sometimes it seems like they don't catch
it. And if I am in a hurry, I am grateful and it is
unintentional that that happened but most of the time I also
feel a little concerned that what they say is important isn't
caught. Can the panel try to account for this disturbing
variability in the screening process at our airports?
Mr. Buswell. I am the science guy, so I don't have the
operational insight to know, you know, the facts about these
things. I know anecdotally I have heard the same sorts of
things, and what I would tell you is that what we are looking
at from the research and development----
Chairman Wu. Mr. Buswell, let me jump in right here because
this is a really important point. You said, I am the science
guy, and I don't know some of the operational things. That is a
very important problem that we are trying to address because
you are not producing stuff into a vacuum. It is not about the
gizmo, it is about the effective service that that gizmo
provides. So you really do have to account for all the
operational factors. I mean, if you produce a great weapon but
the operators don't know how to operate it, or like the Russian
tank that is manually loaded but you can only manually load it
with a short Russian who is left-handed, you know, that causes
a real problem. So you know, what we are trying to hook up here
is a technology that is actually implementable in the real
world.
Mr. Buswell. Sure, and my point with that was that the
operational requirements that TSA establishes or what we do our
research and development to meet, to field technologies and
other operating procedures to meet, you bet there is a
variability across a range of things. And one of the things we
are working with TSA to do as I mentioned is this idea of
automatic target recognition so you are not relying so heavily
on the screener who may have been there for some period of time
and is fatigued and may miss something. So what we are trying
to do is we are trying to develop these kinds of technologies
that will help us help the screeners be more effective. We are
trying to look at from a behavior detection standpoint, can we
identify people who intend to do harm before they ever get into
the screening process. We are looking at things like--and you
make a very good point with the dogs. I mean, TSA is a system
of systems. There is no silver bullet here, which is why TSA
employs 700 dog teams. You know, they believe that that
capability is real, too, and training occurs at both ends of
the leash. And one of the problems as Dr. Albright cited is
there is no way to calibrate the device prior to use. So you
know, if the dog is having a good day or a bad day, you know,
there are limitations and we have to understand those
limitations and build them into the system of things that----
Chairman Wu. You said there is no way to calibrate. Is that
true? I mean----
Mr. Buswell. It is absolutely true.
Chairman Wu. I mean, can't you walk the dog by experiment
and placebo and----
Mr. Buswell. Absolutely. Training of the dog is clearly
important.
Chairman Wu. No, I am saying like you could calibrate the
dog on site and determine whether the dog is tired or not and
ought to be pulled off line.
Mr. Buswell. If you have a training device on site with
which to do that. And so one of the things that TSA has asked
us to do is develop some low-cost training devices that we can
use in the field where we don't have to take the dogs back to
the training center so we can more frequently train the dogs to
do these sorts of things.
There is research and development going on in all of these
areas that try to mitigate or try to minimize the probability
that things will slip through, and this is a system of systems.
This is a layered approach to security that includes dogs and
technology and people and all of those things that make it
maximally effective.
Chairman Wu. Well, I think the core concern is that based
on individual experience and then what is reported in the news
media, the American people have a legitimate concern about
whether all this inconvenience is producing a result that we
all want. And you know, that really is the core inquiry.
Let me go on to one last question. I know that Mr. Smith
told me long ago that he had to attend to certain things at a
certain time. The transportation security and passenger
screening IPTs apparently consider the needs of DHS offices
such as TSA but I am told not the concerns of other customers
such as the traveling public, airlines and airports. Is this
true, and if it is, would considering these other concerns such
as customers, the traveling public, air carriers, the ports
that operate airports, would this surface some of the problems
earlier resulting in different technologies being deployed,
different research efforts?
Dr. Hyland. I would like to say yes, I think that taking
into account the public's perception, but the operators of the
machine are also involved in the whole aviation security and
technology. So designing the machine so that they get as Mr.
Buswell says specific information about what they are looking
for as opposed to here is a bag, do you see anything different
in there. That has been driving the TSA activities. It is only
one part, and the traveling public has come to kind of expect
that variability, which I think is an unfortunate acceptance of
non-standard performance.
Mr. Buswell. I would just further elaborate on the
Community Acceptance of Technology panels that I mentioned
earlier. We run these panels based on technologies that will
have to be accepted by the public. So we have done a series of
these with some pretty good results, and we intend to do more.
So let me give you a couple of examples. We held a panel on
microwave vehicle stopping, in other words, law enforcement or
others who need to stop vehicles, whether those are cars or
boats, can you use a microwave device in order to do that and
what would be the concerns that people would have with that.
The panels include sociologists, behavior scientists, consumers
and public interest representatives, civil liberty sorts of
groups and privacy groups, ethicists, and also for each of
these technologies, we will include specific subject matter
experts. For example, on the vehicle stopping technology, we
had a member of the American Automobile Association as part of
the panel. And of course, the Coast Guard, CBP [Customs and
Border Patrol] and others, law enforcement entities that would
be interested in using the technology. So a series of these, we
have done several on screening technologies, we have done
several on the mobile biometrics, and they allow us to
understand and to modify the technology development in a way
that makes it more likely that it will be able to be deployed
by the operators at the end of the development process. So I
think we have got a real success story there with these public
acceptance efforts, and this gets to the point that was in the
National Academies, engage early in assessing the public
acceptance of technology.
Chairman Wu. Well, Mr. Buswell, I hope that you are able to
come back in a month or two and first of all tell us that you
have the data in hand about what problems actually do exist and
what people will accept and what they view as overly intrusive.
You know, to the extent that you actually involve passengers in
your groups, that is commendable. To the extent that you are
counting on the opinions of folks who are opining about people,
you know, that is a risky thing to do, and apparently there are
at least two surveys here where they actually asked people and
got answers. And I don't have the granularity in this data to
unpack the significance of these preliminary results about the
traveling public and the really frequent flyers versus the
never flyers versus the sometime flyers, and there really is no
substitute for asking. There is no substitute for accurate
data, and I think that is true in a whole bunch of fields in
science and it is true in your field and it is true of mine
also.
I really want to express my deep appreciation to each and
every one of the witnesses here today. We are engaged in a
very, very important collective endeavor. It is about
convenience and public acceptance and economics for airlines
that if you sum up all their financial activity over the
history of airlines, it is not clear that there is one dollar
of profit in there. So you know, they are living on the edge,
and if we want to have a privately owned air transit system,
then we ought to help them do their job rather than put
unreasonable constraints in their way. But the endeavor that we
are engaged in is even more important because it is about
public safety, and we face all sorts of different risks. But
currently, you know, folks are very much focused, and
appropriately so, on this terrorism threat and the threat of
human-made incidents on airplanes, and we need to address that
as aggressively as the American people want us to. But I think
most fundamentally, this is about whether this government can
do a job, can do any job, can do a job well because what is
most corrosive is that experience at the airport that there is
incredible variation in the service at that security
checkpoint. If any other business entity had that much
variability, I mean, you know, McDonald's has a hamburger you
so that you don't get a different burger at every McDonald's
that you go to and that you don't get a different burger,
depending on whether you went in the morning or the afternoon.
We need to, at a more elevated level of conversation, we
need to do this task well because it is important for its own
sake, but ultimately we need to do it well because it is the
only reason ultimately why there is a bond between ourselves
and the government. Some believe that it does well. I think
John Kennedy said if I wanted to make a difference in the way
people perceive the Federal government, I would start by
changing the Postal Service, and that is with all respect to my
friends in the Postal Service. And I have a riff on that which
is, if I were governor of Oregon, the first thing that I would
do to change the public perception is work with DMV to brighten
up the service there. The American people come into contact
with the federal government as much through the TSA and at
airports as any other place. Let us do our best to get it
right.
Thank you very much, and written questions will be
submitted by the staff and by Members. Again, thank you for
being here, and we really want to work with you to make sure
that you have the legislative support and the fiscal support to
get these very, very important tasks right, so we will come
back to this in due course. Thank you all very much. This
hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:58 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix:
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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Bradley I. Buswell, Deputy Under Secretary, Science and
Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security
Questions submitted by Chairman David Wu
Q1. DHS S&T uses the Capstone IPT process to set the priorities for
short and midterm research programs, but how are priorities set for
long-term basic research and research programs at University Centers of
Excellence, DOE National Labs, and NIST? How are these priorities
coordinated?
A1. The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate defines research in
the context of its portfolios: ``Product Transition,'' ``Innovative
Capabilities,'' and ``Basic Research.'' The efforts within the Basic
Research portfolio enable future paradigm changes. These efforts
emphasize (but are not limited to) university research and governmental
lab discovery and invention.
The S&T established Basic Research Focus Areas, generated by the
Research Leads in the Directorate's six divisions with input from the
research community and vetted through S&T's Research Council. These
focus areas represent the technological areas in which S&T seeks to
create and/or exploit new scientific breakthroughs and help guide the
direction of its Basic Research portfolio, within resource constraints,
to provide long-term science and technology advances for the benefit of
homeland security.
Each of S&T's divisions sponsors basic research in those areas and
coordinates closely with our Office of University Programs (OUP),
Office of National Labs (ONL), and International Cooperative Programs
Office (ICPO) to ensure effective collaboration of the research
efforts.
OUP is responsible for establishing and managing S&T's university
research and education efforts. OUP has facilitated the establishment
of a network of multidisciplinary universities that support the
Department and other members of the homeland security enterprise. OUP
develops and manages grants and cooperative agreements, to support
targeted research and education projects with the COE lead universities
and their partners.
ONL enhances the interaction and coordination between the various
S&T research divisions and the DOE National labs, primarily through
establishing a research community for homeland security and maximizing
opportunities for all DOE assets and capabilities involved in the
homeland security mission, including conducting crosscutting workshops
that allow the S&T research divisions and the National Labs to present,
exchange, and establish research priorities. Additionally, by serving
as the primary point of contact on the utilization of National
Laboratories, ONL is able to develop, sustain, and expand a coordinated
network of DHS and DOE National Laboratories and other Federal labs and
centers.
The S&T's Office of Standards funds and coordinates standards
development for equipment used and purchased by DHS. Working with
scientists, the Standards Thrust Area identifies standards needs and
funds initial standards development through a variety of performers_
most notably research scientists at the Nation's measurement lab, the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Once the
measurement science is solid, the office works with numerous standards
development organizations to finalize homeland security standards in a
consensus environment_a forum which includes users, manufacturers and
the government.
Q2. At the hearing, the Subcommittee called for DHS S&T to study the
issue of public acceptance of full body imagers and to provide data on
the public response to these machines. What is the status of this
study?
A2. The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate and the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) have taken into consideration the results
of a Gallup poll on full body scanning of passengers, reported by
Gallup.com on January 11, 2010 in the article ``In U.S., Air Travelers
Take Body Scans in Stride.'' According to the Gallup poll, 78 percent
of respondents said they approve of the use of full body scanning
machines at airports and 84 percent said full body scanning machines
would help stop terrorists from carrying explosives onto planes.
Also, in March 2009, TSA conducted passenger acceptance of advanced
imaging technology (AIT) testing at six airports. The testing captured
statistics on passenger acceptance of AIT during the course of testing
millimeter wave AIT in the primary position. During this testing, over
98 percent of passengers chose AIT over other screening options in the
primary position, such as a physical pat down.
Q3. Why do the Transportation Security and Passenger Screening IPTs
only consider the needs of DHS offices, such as TSA, and not the
concerns of other customers such as passengers, airlines, and airports?
If DHS had considered these customers' concerns, would development
priorities have addressed key privacy concerns earlier in the process?
A3. The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate's Transportation
Security Capstone Integrated Product Team (IPT), other Capstone IPTs,
and supporting project level IPTs do consider the concerns of the
traveling public, airlines, and airports when prioritizing and
developing technology. As an example, inputs from the surface
transportation industry, intermodal venues, and trade associations are
provided through several means to Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) general managers for each of the venues (such as
mass transit, freight rail, highway/motor carrier)_including the
Government Coordinating Councils and Sector Coordinating Councils.
Those inputs are included in the TSA capability gaps submissions
provided through the IPT process each year.
If there are privacy issues relative to a new technology, TSA and
S&T coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Privacy
Office to ensure privacy requirements are met and the technology is
properly evaluated for its impact on the privacy of the traveling
public. As an operating component, TSA understands the need to balance
security and the introduction of new technologies with the need for
movement of commerce and the efficient flow of the traveling public.
Many of the priorities set by the Capstone IPT are for screening
technology that improves flow and efficiency while maintaining or
improving security. Once the Capstone IPT prioritizes a technology
development, TSA and S&T work at the project level to ensure the
technology and supporting concept of operations take into consideration
the traveling public, airlines and airports. This is done through a
variety of means, focus groups on the technology, demonstrations and
experimentations at airports, and working with the airlines and
airports on the more detailed requirements. The considerations and
concerns of the traveling public, airlines, and airports are considered
from day one within the process.
Q4. In your testimony, you mention the Technology Acceptance and
Integration Program and Privacy Impact Assessments. Please describe
these programs and provide examples of their input into all stages of
the research, development, and deployment of passenger screening
technologies, including full body imagers.
A4. The Technology Acceptance and Integration Program researches public
perceptions of new technologies and processes to: 1) identify factors
that can advance or impede technology deployment and 2) to identify
adjustments to technologies and processes that make them more effective
in achieving their intended purposes. This research generates knowledge
that drives process improvement and guides the development and
deployment of technologies to optimize public acceptance.
In particular, the Technology Acceptance and Integration Program
sponsors the Community Perceptions of Technology (CPT) Panel Project,
which brings together representatives of industry, public interest
groups, community organizations, and citizens with subject-matter
experts to understand and integrate community perspectives and concerns
in the development, deployment, and public acceptance of technology. In
FY 2009, the project coordinated three panels. One panel focused on
Acoustic Non-Linear Standoff Threat Detection; the second, in
conjunction with the Canadian government, examined Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID) vehicle registration and LowResolution Imaging
for improved Northern Border Security; and the third panel focused on
Standoff Imaging technologies. Panel responses work to ensure
acceptance of the technologies within affected communities and aid
program managers in technical design for deployment to an operational
environment. In FY 2010, the program will coordinate two to four
panels. In FY 2011, the project plans to conduct another two to four
panels, and deliver expert assessments of public perceptions of
national security measures in relation to factors such as civil rights
and civil liberties, health and safety, convenience, property damage,
and privacy issues.
Pursuant to Section 208 of the E-Government Act of 2002 and Section
222 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, a Privacy Impact Assessment
(PIA) is required when: (1) developing or procuring any new
technologies or systems that handle or collect personally identifiable
information (PII); (2) revising or altering such a technology or system
to impact PIT; and (3) issuing a new or updated rulemaking that entails
the collection of PIT. S&T conducts PIAs when it funds or conducts
research, development, testing, and evaluation activities that collects
or impacts PII. Examples of PII include individual names, contact
information, biometric information, and images. S&T has conducted PIAs
for research projects involving screening technology, such as the
Future Attributes Screening Technology Project and the Standoff
Technology Integration and Demonstration Program (formerly the Standoff
Explosives Detection Technology Demonstration Program).
The PIA demonstrates to the public and stakeholders that program
managers and system owners have consciously incorporated privacy
protections throughout the research and development life cycle of a
system or project. The PIA addresses a wide range of privacy issues,
including what information is collected, why the information is
collected, how information is going to be used and shared, how
information is properly secured and protected, whether individuals are
provided with sufficient notice prior to data collection, and how
individuals can access or correct their information. The PIA also
considers privacy risks associated with the research and data
collection, and how program managers propose to mitigate such risks. An
example of a privacy risk associated with the collection of individual
images during the testing of screening technologies is that individuals
are not aware that their images are being captured. To mitigate such
privacy risks, program managers ensure that proper notice is provided
either by posting signs or getting informed consent from individuals.
Individuals may also be given the opportunity to ``opt out'' of having
their images collected. Such analyses are documented in the PIA.
Q5. In your testimony you mentioned the new DHS and DOE Aviation
Security Enhancement Partnership. What impediments is this partnership
supposed to remove and how will our traveling constituents benefit from
this agreement?
A5. The Aviation Security Enhancement Partnership is a senior executive
level effort to solve the most immediate aviation security issues by
leveraging the power of the national laboratories. The Partnership
provides a road map for the national laboratories to use while pursuing
solutions to aviation security gaps. This guidance clarifies,
coordinates, eliminates duplication, avoids stovepipes and directs work
across the national laboratories. Travel sector stakeholders benefit
from advanced screening technologies that increase security while
improving the effectiveness and efficiency of screening processes.
Q6. President Obama directed DHS and the National Labs to develop and
deploy the next generation of passenger screening technologies. How do
you plan to coordinate this effort with NIST given their expertise in
sensors, biometrics, and technical standards?
A6. The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate is coordinating
directly with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
in multiple technical areas related to passenger screening.
Interactions include close cooperation at the program manager level and
several Interagency Agreements (IAAs) in technical areas that include
development of standards and measurement methods for biometrics and
usability, trace explosives sensors, canine olfactory detectors and
advanced imaging technologies. NIST and Department of Energy (DOE)
laboratories are partners in the DHS Explosive Standards Working Group.
The S&T's primary contact with NIST is via our Office of Standards
in the Test, Evaluation & Standards Division (TSD). We have long-
standing programs in explosives detection standards and are
capitalizing on those as well as strong relationships with the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Transportation
Security Laboratory. Our joint DHS/NIST standards programs in bulk and
trace explosives detection have produced documentary standards,
standards reference materials, test objects and best practices. Our
biometrics standards programs, in partnership with S&T's Human Factors
Division, are closely linked with NIST and US VISIT_we have funded
standards in face, fingerprint and iris identification, standards for
exchange of biometric data, as well as human factors standards to
increase passenger throughput with the best possible data collection.
Questions submitted by Representative Ben R. Lujan
Q1. Dr. Albright from Lawrence Livermore has done a nice job in his
submitted testimony of walking through the broad capabilities of the
national labs in the area of passenger screening. Can you describe for
us, Mr. Buswell, what DHS's plans are for further applying the national
labs to this challenge?
A1. The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate maintains an
established and extensive partnership with the National Laboratories.
The S&T's Explosives Division has involved the labs in every aspect of
its aviation security technology programs. Examples of established
research with Sandia, Los Alamos, and Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratories (LLNL) include characterization of homemade explosives and
the Manhattan II program. Sandia, Los Alamos and LLNL, as part of the
National Explosives Engineering Sciences and Security Center (NEXESS)
effort, are working to characterize homemade explosive (HME) threats
and determine explosive effects on aircraft structures. Sandia National
Laboratory (SNL) has been working on the Manhattan II Program,
examining next generation carry-on baggage technologies. Over several
years, SNL has been evaluating commercial advanced imaging technology
systems to acquire data with which to accomplish automatic target
recognition.
As an on-going practice, the National Laboratories share the data
accumulated among the national laboratory network and universities
through such institutions as the S&T Directorate's Explosives Center of
Excellence, co-chaired by the University of Rhode Island and
Northeastern University. This has been ongoing in the area of algorithm
development where the work requires knowledge of how well current
systems can differentiate threats from non-threats and their realistic
promise in maturing into true. threat detection capability (as
contrasted with anomaly detection).
The S&T has identified prospective research and development with
the National Laboratories. For example, how to optimally fuse
technologies for passenger screening to obtain the best performance,
measured by probability of detection of an ever increasing list of
plausible threats and lower false alarm rates.
An additional critically important effort in which the National
Laboratories, especially LLNL, have been involved is the industry
process to derive a consensus interface standard, DICOS, based upon the
medical interface standard, DICOM. This interface standard will permit
hardware and software development activities to be independently
pursued and then drawn together in a combination of best hardware and
best software for the superior performance required in all security
applications including passenger screening. While emphasis has been
upon application of DICOS to explosives detection systems checked
baggage applications, the effort will be extended to passenger
screening technologies in the future.
* DICOS: Digital Imaging and Communications for Security
* DICOM: Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine
Q2. Mr. Buswell, although we are most focused today on passenger
screening, I have been particularly impressed with the briefings and
demonstration of Los Alamos National Laboratory's MagViz technology,
which uses ultra low-field magnetic resonance imaging to identify
liquids in carry-on bags. This is a proven technology that has already
been demonstrated in a pilot. Your predecessor Under Secretary Cohen
saw the pilot demo at Albuquerque's airport. Can you describe what
DHS's plans are for the rapid implementation of this proven technology?
I ask this in particular in the context of your recent budget
submission that called for more than $700M to be spent on new types of
metal detectors. It seems to me this is reactive, old thinking. The new
challenge today is not metal--it's liquids and other materials that we
currently have a hard time detecting.
A2. While the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
responsible for decisions related to the fielding of technologies in
the operational environment, the Science and Technology (S&T)
Directorate recognizes the need for new technologies to address
emerging challenges. Since 2006, TSA procedures have required
passengers to put liquids or gels (e.g., certain toiletries and
medicines) in containers that are 3.4 ounces or smaller, and pack the
containers into one quart-sized, clear plastic, zip-top bag (3-1-1
rule). The December 2008 demonstration of a prototype at the
Albuquerque Sunport Airport showed that MagViz could successfully
distinguish between safe and hazardous materials, overcoming challenges
that could affect its sensitivity.
MagViz is still a research and development effort. Various
technological hurdles need to be overcome before MagViz can be fielded.
These hurdles include reducing the footprint, eliminating the use of
liquid helium, and improving the scanning speed. Recognizing the
potential value of MagViz, and the demanding technical challenges that
remain, the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency
(HSARPA) added additional funding to the project in fiscal year 2010.
We accelerated our plan to demonstrate the capabilities of a new
research prototype to handle a larger TSA tub and a broader array of
both non-hazardous and dangerous liquids in July 2010. Responding to a
formal requirement by TSA for bottled liquid scanner (BLS) systems to
screen 3-1-1 rule exemptions, S&T is also spinning-off MagViz
technology to develop a BLS prototype and expect to demonstrate it at
Albuquerque Sunport Airport in the fall of 2010. To facilitate the
transition of this technology to industry_which must qualify their
screening systems through the Transportation Security Laboratory_we are
supporting a MagViz Commercialization Workshop being hosted by Los
Alamos National Laboratory in March 2010.
Q3. Further, Mr. Buswell, on the point of detectors, all of the
briefings I have had from the scientists at Los Alamos indicate that
what we need to be focused on is the whole system. We need a systems-
level approach to working this threat. I think MagViz is part of that
system because we all know that the traveling public would like to go
back to taking their bottled water and other liquids onto a plane. So,
MagViz is a good start. However, I think DHS and TSA need to go further
to really apply the labs to study the whole system of protecting the
traveling public. Let's tap into their expertise, their supercomputing
capabilities. Can you walk me through what DHS's plans are in this area
to pursue with the NNSA labs a systems-level approach?
A3. The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate is performing systems
analysis in conjunction with the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) and Sandia, Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, Oak Ridge, Idaho,
Argonne, Pacific Northwest, and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratories
in the Aviation Security Enhancement Partnership. While supercomputing
capabilities are well suited to modeling complex nuclear physics
problems, computational requirements for systems analysis are modest. A
systems perspective requires the fusion of complementary technologies
that cover the limitations of any single technology and are practical
in the real operating circumstances presented where passenger screening
occurs. We are determining the optimal combination of technologies to
accomplish these ends. The National Laboratories are key partners in
this work because they bring both knowledge of the threats,
particularly homemade explosive threats through their characterization
activities, and detailed knowledge of x-ray, millimeter wave, radar-
and terahertz technologies, which are candidates for sensor fusion. The
S&T will continue to analyze the aviation checkpoint system in
partnership with the National Laboratories and others in order to best
apply the capabilities of each.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Dr. Penrose C. Albright, Principal Associate Director for
Global Security, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Questions submitted by Chairman David Wu
Q1. DHS S&T uses the Capstone 1PT process to set the priorities for
short and midterm research programs, but how are priorities set for
long-term basic research and research programs at University Centers of
Excellence, DOE National Labs, and NIST? How are these priorities
coordinated?
A1. The thrust of this question, as I understand it, is to understand
how does the Department of Homeland Security Science & Technology
Directorate (DHS/S&T) develop priorities for long term R&D, and the
creation of revolutionary new capabilities. As implied by the question,
the S&T Capstone IPT process is not well suited for that purpose. IPTs
are commonly used for executing projects, such as acquisition programs
(e.g., satellites, ships), where it is critical that the various
organizations responsible for part of the project's execution (e.g.,
major subsystems, test & evaluation, requirements, system trades) are
working closely together, and where it is critical that a forum exist
to allow disciplined vetting of major decisions. The aim of such a
traditional IPT approach is to deliver, in a cost effective manner as
possible, a defined capability. The needed capability is usually
determined through a separate process where either:
A need articulated by an operational entity is turned
over to the technical community for solution, or
(Importantly) the technical community's vision for
the ``art of the possible'' creates new opportunities for the
operators.
The former typically leads to evolutionary R&D and the latter to
revolutionary capabilities. IPTs, again, are not generally useful for
defining a project, but rather for assisting in its execution.
The DHS/S&T Capstone IPT process is used entirely as a means for
defining the content of various portfolios of activity. A particular
concern is the IPT process is driven by requirements pull from the
operators, rather than technology push informed by the state of the
art. This is a noteworthy concern given the general lack of history
(and culture) within the DHS operational components for technical
innovation. An additional issue is that members of the Capstone IPTs
are usually senior leaders within the operational agencies, not
obviously attuned to the actual problems as seen in the field, and
bound by prior decisions, and ways of doing business. Finally, a
portfolio of activities driven by the operational requirements
articulated by senior operational managers is almost certainly going to
be evolutionary in nature, less reliant on technical innovation, and
short term in its deliverables. All of this is exacerbated by DHS/S&T
policy (at least as promulgated by the prior leadership) for only
funding those efforts that originate from the IPT process. Hence,
although the DHS/S&T IPT construct can in fact be useful for defining
projects addressing clear gaps in capability generally with short term
projects, it is hard to see how, in a consistent manner, revolutionary
new ideas, requiring greater innovation and longer duration, can be
systematically brought to bear in defense of the public. It is worth
noting that ``operator pull'' R&D has been the model used by the
Military Services with their laboratories for many years now, with
consequent degradation of that infrastructure; the consequent lack of
sustained, high quality technical focus on hard problems; and a heavy
reliance on ad hoc private sector initiatives.
An alternative concept, successfully exercised in the early days of
DHS/S&T, is to deploy technical staff to the field, working with and
observing the operators in their daily missions, and seeing where
technology can be deployed in an environment where real operational
constraints are taken into account, as opposed to artificial
constraints (e.g., ``the way we have always done it''). Exposing in a
sustained manner technical staff to operations, and to homeland
security as a discipline, is far more likely to lead to innovative,
game-changing projects than is attempting to educate senior operations
managers on science and technology. That sustained focus on issues by
technically trained people is a hallmark of the FFRDC concept, and of
the DOE National Labs, in particular, Of course, once a portfolio of
such projects has been assembled, the senior leadership of the
operational agencies would convene with their counterparts in DHS/S&T
to adjust and approve the overall effort.
Aside from issues surrounding the suitability of the IPT process
for generating innovative projects, analysis and prioritization of the
generated needs within the budgetary constraints of the Directorate has
been in the past few years lacking. There is a natural desire to
address all needs generated by the users, but there are far more needs
than the S&T annual budgets can support and the previous S&T leadership
did not provide adequate multi-year strategic planning to prioritize
R&D investments. There is no evidence that technology road mapping has
been performed to ensure appropriate time and resources are allocated
to projects, driven by risk and complexity as opposed to often ill-
informed operator desires (regarding, e.g., schedule) expressed within
the IPTs. The DOE National Labs have urged the use of technical experts
to help with prioritization and road mapping of solutions, and that
these roadmaps be used by Congress and the operating units to measure
the success and commitment of S&T to the IPT-generated needs.
Finally, there needs to be continued attention given to technology
transition from S&T to operational components--even though the IPT
construct is dominated by operator ``pull'', that is no guarantee of an
operator-funded procurement. Product maturation mechanisms should be
strengthened and concepts akin to advanced technology demonstrations
programs used in the DOD might be considered for this purpose.
The new DHS/S&T Undersecretary brings to the table a strong
scientific background and an understanding of how science, technology,
and engineering can be developed and deployed to address mission
issues. Her approach to the President's aviation security directive
indicates a thoughtful recognition of the need to address long term
foundational issues, the need to deploy the DOE National Labs in a
manner that will provide the sustained attention the problem demands,
while also addressing near term urgent needs. I look forward very much
to working with her to address the Nation's security problems.
Balancing Near-Term and Long-Term S&T
The need for substantial near term, evolutionary research and
development applied to the DHS mission is substantial; however the DOE
National Labs have become increasingly concerned that DHS has not given
adequate attention to long term research. Truly hard problems are not
being attacked with sustained focus by the best minds in the Nation.
Instead, well-defined, short-term, low-risk projects are being funded-
as noted above, that is a natural consequence of the extant IPT
process. In this environment, creative breakthroughs will not be
realized and hard problems are not likely to get addressed. Examples of
the types of challenges that require sustained, high quality focus are
real-time detection and assessment of extant, advanced, and emerging
biological threats; ability to non-intrusively detect nefarious intent
of people; real-time consequence analysis of large-scale natural
disasters; and the ability to detect and protect cyber networks at the
National scale from attacks.
Even in those areas where the needs are clearly understood by the
operators, the balance between near term issues and longer term
foundational needs is problematic. For example, in aviation security,
the analysis of emerging threats, vulnerability of air frames, and
development of improved technical capabilities, while part of the
overall program, has been underfunded at the expense of supporting near
term operator needs (in this case, an imminent TSA acquisition); while
the near term issue is critical, the lack of funding for the
foundational science reflects at least a potential concern regarding
the relative prioritization of short and long term research. We
strongly urge the establishment of a formal process aimed at the
development of long term research priorities and roadrnaps, informed by
the expertise resident in the relevant research communities, that drive
the creation of programs that are of the proper size and length to
address long term issues, and to create a foundational base for the
homeland security mission.
The Centers of Excellence have historically set their priorities in
the context of the research interests of the members, and to a large
degree by the priorities expressed in their original proposals.
Clearly, a process aimed at the development of long-term research
priorities and roadmaps would, as a consequence, allow for the
allocation of research to the academic communities, as well as to other
government agencies and laboratories, as appropriate. Such a process
does not exist to date.
Q2. In your testimony you mentioned the new DHS and DOE Aviation
Security Enhancement Partnership--What impediments is this partnership
supposed to remove and how will our traveling constituents benefit from
this agreement?
A2. The U.S. Government needs an enduring research and development
program that systematically addresses current and future threats to the
aviation transportation system. DHS/S&T has been working in close
collaboration with the TSA and three of the DOE NNSA National
Laboratories (Lawrence Livermore (LLNL), Los Alamos (LANL), Sandia
(SNL)) in an attempt to render a comprehensive understanding of the
range of explosive threats that could be used to compromise an
aircraft. The Aviation Security Enhancement Partnership (ASEP) has put
in place a governance structure to further enhance the DHS and DOE
ability to advance technical solutions to key aviation security
problems. Three working groups, co-chaired by DHS and DOE National
Laboratory personnel are tasked to recommend a strategy and work plan
to:
Deliver key advanced aviation security technologies
and knowledge.
Conduct analyses to asses possible vulnerabilities
and threats and support/inform technology requirements, policy,
planning, decision-making activities.
Review use of existing aviation security technologies
and screening procedures and the impact of new or improved
technologies using a system analysis approach to illuminate
gaps, opportunities, and cost effective investments.
This governance model is intended to be fully consistent and
congruent with a broader interagency national security science,
technology and engineering strategic governance model.
Q3. President Obama directed DHS and the National Labs to develop and
deploy the next generation of passenger screening technologies. How do
you plan to coordinate this effort with NIST given their expertise in
sensors, biometrics, and technical standards?
A3. As stated in my written testimony, the primary source of funding
for Aviation Security Programs at the DOE National Laboratories is DHS/
S&T and TSA. In addition to our regular interactions with the DHS and
TSA program managers and routine peer reviews conducted at the DOE
National Laboratories (by academic and industry experts), the NEXESS
program has also established a Blue Ribbon Panel, chaired by TSA that
includes members from DHS S&T, TSL, the private sector, and academia.
This panel provides assistance in evaluating and redefining the
explosives detection and certification standards for a range of
automated screening systems.
The DOE National Laboratories support the DHS Explosive Standards
Working Group (ESWG), which is chaired by DHS/S&T, and includes broad
membership across the DHS Components, the NIST and other Federal
agencies. LLNL and other DOE National Laboratories are members of the
National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) team, which has
been chartered by DHS to write a new standard for airport security
called Digital Communication in Security (DICOS). The standard will
enable prevention, detection, and response to explosive attacks by
standardizing the screening of checked bags as well as other threat
risk detection attributes at airports and other security areas. While,
the current focus is on x-ray equipment, there are plans for future
work in whole body imaging technologies.
Over the last 10 years, the DOE National Laboratories have broadly
engaged the scientific community in aviation security-including NIST.
Scientists at LLNL, LANL, and SNL have participated in numerous
National Academy studies and co-authored several reports, including a
report entitled, ``Airline Passenger Screening, New Technologies and
Implementation Issues''.
Questions submitted by Representative Ben R. Lujan
Q1. Dr. Albright, can you describe for the Committee what NEXESS is
and what role each of the labs play? I want to be clear for the
committee that this exciting initiative, which has been underfunded in
the past, provides an already existing framework and strong expertise
to address this problem of securing the flying public. And, this is an
initiative that involves the close collaboration of all three NNSA
labs--Los Alamos, Livermore and Sandia.
A1. The NEXESS Center was established by DHS Science & Technology in
2006 to build new and to support existing engineering and science-based
methods for explosives countermeasures. The NEXESS Center is a
cooperative tri-lab program, leveraging the explosives, systems
analysis, and structural modeling expertise at LLNL, LANL, and Sandia.
The NEXESS Center includes 4 elements: Intelligence Assessments,
Explosive Engineering Science & Technology, Explosive Detection Science
& Technology, and Advanced Concepts.
The goal of NEXESS is to improve our nation's ability to
anticipate, and deter/defeat threats from energetic materials. To date,
emphasis has been on performance characterization of homemade
explosives [HME] and understanding vulnerability of aircraft to HME
threats through the application of NNSA structural and blast models.
The studies and information produced by the NEXESS Center informs DHS
aviation security decisions. NEXESS is currently funded at
approximately $10M/year. As you note in your question, up to this point
the analysis of emerging threats, vulnerability of air frames, and
development of improved technical capabilities, while part of the
overall program, has been underfunded at the expense of supporting near
term operator needs (most recently, an imminent TSA acquisition of new
checked baggage systems); while the near term issue is critical, the
lack of funding for the foundational science reflects at least a
potential issue regarding the relative prioritization of short and long
term research. It is hoped that the recent emphasis placed on aviation
security by the President and the senior leadership of DHS and DOE will
address the funding issue, and allow the needed foundational research
to occur while also accommodating the near term priorities.
The Aviation Security Enhancement Partnership recognizes the
contributions of the NNSA Labs. Each of the three working groups are
co-chaired by an NNSA Laboratory:
Systems Analysis--Sandia National Laboratory
Aircraft Vulnerability Assessment--Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory
Emerging Technologies--Los Alamos National Laboratory
& Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Q2. Dr. Albright, I have seen the modeling and simulation capabilities
at Los Alamos and I was wondering, with the three NNSA Labs being world
leaders in supercomputers and visualization how do you see those
capabilities applied to aviation security?
A2. The National Explosives Engineering Sciences Security (NEXESS)
Center, has capitalized on the FFRDC model, utilizing the expertise of
the DOE National Laboratories to develop and implement cutting-edge
engineering and science-based methods aimed at reducing the risks to
aviation. The NEXESS Center has provided an important science base for
aviation security, including:
Evaluation and characterization of explosive
formulations including, emerging (e.g. homemade) explosive
threats, the determination of detonability, methods of
initiation, detonation velocity, and impulse energy;
Assessment of the catastrophic damage threshold for
aircraft as a function of explosive amount, location, and
flight conditions (initial work has been focused on a specific
narrow body airframe) using a combination of highly
sophisticated computer modeling in concert with small and large
scale experiments;
Rapid assessment of the technical performance of
emerging detection systems and their application to aviation
checkpoint security; including one particular example that
involved working with L3 to determine the utility of active
millimeter wave technology for the detection of concealed
liquid explosives on a person.
Reducing aircraft vulnerability to explosives will require using
the best available advanced computer simulations to model the damage
caused to an aircraft by an on-board explosion from a wide range of
conventional and homemade explosives. The goal is to provide as
parsimonious a set of models as is possible to meet the government's
needs for accuracy and error bounds. Model improvement and validation
will include conducting physical experiments, as well as computational
exercises, to ensure the accuracy, stability, and precision of these
computer models; expansion of the types of aircraft for which these
models can be applied, including new composite-based structures; and
uncertainty quantification. A further goal is to develop fast running
models for use in large-scale assessments and rapid turnaround
estimates of aircraft vulnerability.
As you point out, the DOE National Laboratories are uniquely
positioned to apply the best computing and visualization capabilities
on the planet to this problem. It is also important to note that it is
not just the computing hardware--the National Laboratories bring world-
class multidisciplinary teams of scientists, engineers, computer
scientists, operations analysts, and mathematicians together in the
same room to bring innovative and creative approaches to these
problems, leveraging the hardware and the significant software
investments in, e.g., structural analysis and visualization. You can
only find this at the DOE National Laboratories.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Dr. Bert Coursey, Program Manager, Coordinated National
Security Standards Program, National Institute of Standards And
Technology
Questions submitted by Chairman David Wu
Q1. DHS S&T uses the Capstone IPT process to set priorities for short
and mid-term research programs, but how are priorities set for long
term basic research and research programs at University Centers of
Excellence, DOE National Labs and NIST? How are these priorities
coordinated?
A1. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) sets
priorities for investments in long-term research programs in
measurements and standards to support explosives countermeasures in
consideration of White House level planning, investments from other
Federal agencies and synergy of the programs with other NIST laboratory
directions. White House level planning includes the National Science &
Technology Council (NSTC) report Research Challenges in Combating
Terrorist Use of Explosives in the United States (December 2008), as
well as Homeland Security Presidential Directive 19 (HSPD-19), February
2007. NIST also has long-term research projects funded by the DHS S&T
in the areas of trace particle behavior and transport, and frequency
comb spectroscopy. This science will inform the next generation of
trace explosives detectors. Finally, NIST looks at the synergy of other
agency investments in understanding particle behavior and in limits of
explosives detection with related NIST investments in fundamental
measurements and standards for diagnostic health care, pharmaceuticals
and environmental measurements. NIST priorities for long-term research
are coordinated with DHS S&T and the interagency Technical Support
Working Group (TSWG).
NOTE: This response is for NIST only, not DOE, DHS or Universities.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Dr. Sandra L. Hyland, Senior Principal Engineer, BAE
Systems
Questions submitted by Chairman David Wu
Q1. DHS S&T uses the Capstone IPT process to set the priorities for
short and midterm research programs, but how are priorities set for
long-term basic research and research programs at University Centers of
Excellence, DOE National Labs, and NIST? How are these priorities
coordinated?
Answer to question about funding priorities
A1. I have no expertise in the area of determining basic research
priorities and coordination and prefer not to speculate in this area.
There are some groups within the National Academies, such as the
Laboratory Assessment Board or the Standing Committee for Technology
Insight-Gauge, Evaluate & Review (which is specifically focused on the
intelligence community's needs), that could be a good resource for
comparing the various approaches to research and development funding.
Follow up to discussion during the hearing
In the 1996 report, the NRC committee specifically recommended
against polling the travelling public about potential screening
technologies without being very specific about the potential
implementation within the security system. For example, asking
travelers if they object to the invasion of privacy posed by the full-
body scanners is unlikely to produce information that would be useful
to predict the actual response to these systems being implemented in
the airport. Gathering information about future travelling behavior is
more likely to be productive if very specific scenarios are posed, and
if those being polled are chosen to represent a wide variety of users
including passengers, operators, airport managers, airport security
personnel, etc. Sociologists and others whose expertise is predicting
how people will behave in given situations should be involved in how to
present the information, what questions are likely to produce actual
predictive responses, and how much detail is needed to describe a
specific implementation scenario. Test beds inserted into actual
stream-of-commerce passenger flow, such as the one set up at Gatwick
Airport, will be invaluable in getting accurate and predictive feedback
on specific implementation of new screening technology.