AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: PERSPECTIVES ON U.S. STRATEGY, PART 3

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TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 2009

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING:

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING:

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: PERSPECTIVES ON U.S. STRATEGY, PART 3

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, November 17, 2009.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:03 p.m., in room 210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Vic Snyder (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Dr. SNYDER. The hearing will come to order.
I am going to dispense with any statement of my own so we can get right to the witnesses. Mr. Wittman, anything you would like to say?

STATEMENT OF HON. ROB WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. WITTMAN. No, Mr. Chairman, I would do the same. I would ask unanimous consent for my comments to be entered into the record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the Appendix on page 45.]

Dr. SNYDER. Your statement will be made part of the record. All of the witnesses’ written statements will be made part of the record, including the two articles by Dr. Kagan, two articles by Dr. Kagan, correct?

Dr. KAGAN. Correct.

Dr. SNYDER. And we are very pleased today to have you all here with us. This is our third in a series of hearings on directions in Afghanistan, of course in relationship with what is going on in Iraq also.

Our witnesses today are General Wesley Clark, a retired United States Army General, Chairman and CEO of Wesley K. Clark & Associates; Dr. Kimberly Kagan, the Founder and President of the Institute for the Study of War; Dr. Gilles Dorronsoro, Visiting Scholar at the South Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and Dr. Andy Krepinovich, the President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

We appreciate you all for being here. As some of you may know, Wes Clark lives like one block from me, and this is the only time I see him is when he is testifying in Washington.
We will turn the five-minute clock on for your oral statements, but more to give you an idea of the time. If you have more things you want to tell us, even when you see the red light go on, that is fine, too.

So, General Clark, we will begin with you.

STATEMENT OF GEN. WESLEY K. CLARK, USA (RET.), CHAIRMAN AND CEO, WESLEY K. CLARK & ASSOCIATES

General Clark. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, distinguished members of this committee. It is a pleasure to be here with you to talk with you about the important questions of national strategy and our military endeavor in Afghanistan. I have given you a prepared statement. Let me just summarize the key points from it.

First of all, I want to say up front I am greatly in sympathy with the military commanders, especially General McChrystal, who has asked for more troops. He needs them to provide for security for the population, to train the Afghan forces, to impede and constrain Taliban reinforcement and replenishment along the border with Pakistan. If I were in his position, I would have undoubtedly asked for more troops.

But that is not the principal question we should be addressing here today, however great the outcry is demanding an answer. What we should be talking about here is the purpose of our engagement, our specific mission, the strategy and its requirements for success in diplomatic, political, economic, and military terms. And only after these requirements have been established are we able to get into the specific troop requirements.

I want to say at the outset that I am very proud of the Obama Administration, because I think they are taking the time that is required to do the kind of in-depth strategic review. And this is not, as best I can determine, just a strategic review that is a bunch of number crunching and budget calculations and in and out between the Pentagon and across the Potomac. I think this is a searching examination of the basis for U.S. policy in the region and a thorough exploration of alternatives. I don't know when it is going to be concluded, I am not a part of that, but everything I see about it gives me assurance that we are asking the kinds of fundamental questions that need to be asked.

The legacy of Vietnam, and as someone who fought there and came home on a stretcher and who was deeply involved in thinking about the policy for my entire military career, it is particularly painful to me to see where we are in Afghanistan. I recall from the early- and mid-sixties similar issues being talked about when we were escalating our presence in Vietnam. The same pleading for more troops. The same diplomatic constraints hindering cross-border operations.

There was never any doubt the source of the war was North Vietnam, its military, its political leadership. And yet we were self-de-terred from taking the kind of appropriate actions against that, and we tried to fight the war in South Vietnam. We tried to balance military needs, strategic concerns outside of Vietnam, and political support in the United States. And in the case of Vietnam we mostly did it wrong. When we could have used decisive military
means early on, we were self-deterred. When we piecemealed and gradually reinforced, we lost public support anyway. And when we finally attempted to use decisive force, it was too late strategically.

Now every conflict is different, and Afghanistan is not Vietnam, but we got to learn from our experiences there. There are some worrisome similarities in both conflicts, including a local government that lacks legitimacy and of course the whole bureaucratic politics of military escalation, U.S. public support, that have changed little in 40 years.

So you have to begin by asking, “What is the purpose in Afghanistan?” Well, it is not to defeat al Qaeda because they are largely not there. It is not to create a functioning Western-style democracy, because that is clearly beyond our means in a nation that is 90 percent illiterate, imbued with a much different value system. So it must be something less. What it seems to me that we seek there is to prevent the emergence of a terrorist state that would physically harbor al Qaeda and use its diplomatic and legal authority as weapons against the very international system of which it is a member.

Now these are minimalist objectives. They could be met by diplomacy, by promoting economic development, regional economic integration, acting through allies, threats, preemptive strikes, and limited incursions. And of course you can strengthen your defenses at home. In principle our purpose there does not require the reconstruction of Afghanistan any more than reconstructing Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, and other locations where terrorist are or have found shelter.

We should have declared the war in Afghanistan over when we broke the back of the Taliban force and captured Osama bin Laden in the mountains of Tora Bora, but of course we didn’t take Osama bin Laden in the mountains of Tora Bora. He and the senior leadership of al Qaeda remain a threat, and so now together with our NATO allies we have about 100,000 troops, we are in Afghanistan, and we simply cannot abruptly reverse U.S. policy. We can’t abandon government in Afghanistan. We can’t withdraw promptly our forces there, however much we might want to, without having adverse consequences far beyond Afghanistan and especially impacting on the government of Pakistan.

We can see experience after experience with this. Al Qaeda would claim credit, terrorist recruitment would surge, subversion within states allied and friendly with us would intensify, Pakistan’s stability would be further undercut, and U.S. power and prestige would wane. We would be dramatically increasing the threat.

But on the other hand, the longer we stay, the larger our force, the more resistance and resentment that we might create by disruptive influences, by the casualties we inflict accidentally. We are a foreign element in a culture which doesn’t tolerate diversity. However appealing it is to us to say that we have got to be strong enough and resolute to stay there, that is not our problem. The United States is one of the most resolute of countries. Our problem is that we are dealing with an Islamic revival, a struggle to cope with the spiritual impact of modernization and globalism, and that revival draws energy from the antagonisms our presence creates.
So we need to find a way out, we need to seize credit for the successes we have achieved and then continue to deal with the region.

So the approach I am recommending is focused on understanding an exit strategy and working toward it. The best exit strategy would be after we have taken down the complete leadership of al Qaeda in Pakistan. Now I know we have the number three guy, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, going on trial in New York and he claims he is responsible for everything. If that were true, that would be great. I am not sure if it is true, but we do believe that there is still substantial al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan.

The discussion of this has been publicly suppressed and probably should remain so, but I hope it will be foremost in the minds of the Administration.

In the meantime, in Afghanistan we have to build an exit strategy around four factors: Attempting to reduce the level of violence by seeking a political amelioration of the conflict; greater assistance to the government of Pakistan in dealing with al Qaeda and the Taliban remaining in Pakistan; economic development in Afghanistan and Pakistan; and developing a more capable security structure for the Afghans.

Just to highlight some of the details, I think you have got to provide incentives to create a more representative, more legitimate government there.

You could frame these incentives around individual leaders, you could you talk about specific structural changes in the government, you could provide economic development opportunities. These could be positive or negative incentives. They have got to be worked, it has got to be a process. This is not about simply going to Hamid Karzai and say, “Oh, that’s it, Mr. Karzai, here is the five things you got to do and you got 24 hours to get them done.” So but he should be—he has to take the lead one way or another in this.

Your military strength, your reinforcements or your withdrawals, maybe that is an inducement to various parties, but I would say that additional troop reinforcements in spite of the strategy are not unreasonable. And if I were the commander I would sure be asking for them. You cannot achieve what you want to achieve there if you are forced off the battlefield. You have got to have a platform of military success to achieve the rest of it.

So as the political process moves forward, maybe you talk about an exit date, maybe you have it conditioned, maybe it is a specific timeline. I don’t rule anything out on the process. Maybe you have an outside presence like a United Nations umbrella as we did in Haiti in 1994–1995 with a U.S. Government advisory and assistance mission that works in parallel with that, but you have got to find a way to deal with the process in some way politically.

You have got to help Pakistan. They have got to be leased the additional hardware, provided access to intelligence, intelligence collection systems, given appropriate incentives to deal with al Qaeda. They have got to have the systems to strengthen their internal security. And at the same time we should be focusing on a very strong Pakistani economic development effort, and we should take credit for it publicly. One of the things that Pakistanis always tell me is, “You all don’t leave any monuments, you try to make
your assistance a secret, why don’t you build a monument and advertise what the United States has done there.”

But we must encourage and demand that Pakistan take direct action again the al Qaeda leadership. That won’t be easy because there must be someone in Pakistan who must believe that if it weren’t for al Qaeda being there, that we would be totally aligned with India. And so somehow we have got to disabuse the government of Pakistan of that suspicion. And it has got to be driven down through the ranks and we have got to have their wholehearted support to clean up their own internal security problems. For them it is not just a matter of teaching the Taliban a lesson and making them skedaddle back into the frontier areas, but it is a matter of their taking care of our principal threat for us so we don’t have to.

Afghan economic development needs to be promoted in the agricultural sector through providing an enhanced market for Afghan crops. If you don’t outbid the price for opium, you can’t compete in this market. Afghanistan should be a world granary for wheat and we should pay a premium to have the Afghans grow wheat, and we should export it. There are a lot of places in the world that need it. We should be encouraging and developing mineral and hydrocarbon resources in Afghanistan and promoting a long-range gas pipeline that connects India and Pakistan to Central Asian gas resources.

As far as security is concerned, we have got to give them the additional security forces they need, primarily the police and the militia that they need. We are never going to be able to walk away from U.S. responsibilities for the support for the intelligence, intelligence collection, the logistics. We tried to do it in Vietnam, and it failed.

So here are four elements of an exit strategy, and it is a dynamic process. I believe that what we have to do is work within these four elements and construct the exit strategy for Afghanistan. It is a multiyear effort, it may or may not entail at this point setting up the conditions or the timeline to do it, but the strategy has to be pointed towards getting us out of this conflict because there is no long-term, lasting role for Western military forces there.

These aren’t easy measures and there is no guarantee of success, but I think what we have to do is face the reality. We have done a lot already. We have been really pretty tough and pretty effective against the leadership of al Qaeda, but they are still around. Our obligations to Afghanistan are limited. We are not required to make them eligible for statehood. There will never be a complete and wholly satisfactory solution.

And so we have to meet our own security needs, and the principal security need in this region is to reduce the continuing threat of al Qaeda, which is reportedly based principally in Pakistan. It is their decisive defeat that we must seek.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Clark can be found in the Appendix on page 48.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, General Clark. Dr. Kagan.
STATEMENT OF DR. KIMBERLY KAGAN, PRESIDENT, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR

Dr. Kagan, Mr. Chairman, committee members, it is a great pleasure to talk with you today about Afghanistan and the strategy that the United States needs to adopt going forward. The mission of U.S. forces and indeed U.S. diplomatic engagement in Afghanistan is clear. We do need to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and see to it that neither the Taliban nor any other enemy group within Afghanistan is able to provide sanctuary and safe haven for the kinds of terrorist groups that threaten not only the United States, but also the region—Pakistan, India, and the countries surrounding Afghanistan. And our role in Afghanistan therefore is to neutralize the Taliban, perhaps to defeat the Taliban, to see to it that that organization which has historically been extremely supportive of al Qaeda is actually not capable of considering itself any longer the legitimate government of Afghanistan. And that is how the Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Omar sees itself. And that is how al Qaeda sees Mullah Omar: as the legitimate ruler of Afghanistan, the leader of the caliphate that is rightful and rightfully guided in terms of its vision of the Islamic tradition.

What we face inside Afghanistan, however, is more complex than simply al Qaeda or a Taliban group. Rather we face an indigenous insurgency within Afghanistan; that is to say, the people of Afghanistan are dissatisfied with their government and are fighting their government in order to establish some sort of alternative that suits them better than what it is that the government of Afghanistan is providing them. It is a classic insurgency. And when I say indigenous, I mean that most of the people fighting in Afghanistan are Afghans; they are not Pakistanis coming across the border but rather residents of Afghanistan with Afghan leadership, which happens to be sometimes dwelling in Pakistan as a government in exile.

That means that in order to succeed in Afghanistan we actually have to defeat the insurgency, neutralize it, reduce its capability to be effective within Afghanistan and create the conditions whereby some form of legitimate government can actually take root and ensure that that government does not support the Taliban, does not support al Qaeda, and does not support the network of insurgent and terrorist groups that are linked into al Qaeda and other groups and cells working in the Pakistani region.

How do we do this? Well, first, it is actually important to recognize who the enemy is and actually engage that enemy decisively. This is why more forces are required in Afghanistan, and not just a few more forces, a decisive amount of force, because in fact neither the United States nor its coalition partners have been able to engage the enemy decisively in key terrain; that is to say, terrain that is important to them, to the government of Afghanistan, and to us. Places like Kandahar, where we have essentially two battalions of Canadian forces and one battalion of U.S. forces operating in the spiritual heart of the Taliban insurgency, its location, its stronghold, and the spiritual capital of the Pashtun region.

We need in fact to engage in order to not only prevent the enemy from launching attacks against us, but to prevent the enemy
groups from actually intimidating the population of Afghanistan, compelling the population of Afghanistan in key areas such as Kandahar, Helmand, or Khost to deter them from actually participating and actively supporting enemy groups and to persuade those groups—those groups that they cannot win, and to persuade the population that we are there to safeguard them and support them. I have been to Afghanistan twice this year on battlefield circulations, and I can assure you that there are very few places in Afghanistan where we have the kind of force ratios that would allow the population to be protected from al Qaeda, to be protected from the Taliban, to be protected from the Haqqani network, and therefore the United States and its coalition partners are failing in Afghanistan in their fundamental mission of counterinsurgency.

And here we have many lessons that we can draw from our experiences in Iraq, not just our experiences in Vietnam, where we were successful at reducing an indigenous insurgency through decisive use of military force and also through a comprehensive civil-military program in which we actually reduced the malign capabilities of the government, reduced their bad behavior, and fundamentally increased the kinds of services that the population actually needs. We do not need to build a modern state in Afghanistan, but Afghanistan does have a history of governance, and what the people of Afghanistan want is something that we can build. They want security, and they want the provision of justice, particularly in dispute resolution, and those are services that can be provided by engaging intensively in a counterinsurgency campaign, using all instruments of U.S. and coalition power and leverage in order to jump-start local government, to connect the people with their government, to reduce the malign behaviors of government, those that actually accelerate the insurgency, and to develop an Afghan national army that is actually capable of securing the population of Afghanistan and meeting the national security needs of this important country situated as it is amongst great powers, many of whom have nuclear weapons, and many of whom in the instance where Afghanistan is insecure will continue to wage proxy engagements against one another in order to see to it that they have leverage and they have control.

This is something that the United States can do with its coalition partners. It is something that requires more force, it is something that requires a different kind of engagement by our civilian leaders. But it is something that we have to do, it is something that we have to do soon, and it is something that we have to do in order to meet our overarching strategic objective of preventing a kind of terrorist state from regaining control of Afghanistan, something that is dangerously close to transpiring right now.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kagan can be found in the Appendix on page 55.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Dr. Kagan. Dr. Dorronsoro.
STATEMENT OF DR. GILLES DORRONSORO, VISITING SCHOLAR, SOUTH ASIA PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

Dr. DORRONSORO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will address three points. One, the counterinsurgency strategy is not working in Afghanistan currently. My second point will be about what we should do; that is to say, a more focused strategy. And the third point will be about resources, what kind of resources we need to avoid the further deterioration of Afghanistan.

But the first point, the current shape, clear, or build strategy in Afghanistan requires that we control the territory and separate the insurgents from the population. As we have seen in Helmand Province, the strategy is not working for several reasons. The first reason, the relationship between the Taliban and the population is not what is generally said. The Taliban are local. It is impossible right now in the context of the south and east of Afghanistan to separate the insurgency from the population. Furthermore, there is no Afghan structure there to replace the coalition forces once the Taliban have been removed.

The coalition forces are not accepted locally. Actually they are quite unpopular in places where they are fighting, such as Helmand, Kandahar, Kabul, and so on. This is a key problem, the more we are sending troops, the more we alienate the local population.

The population's association with soldiers is counterproductive. Since they do not speak the language, they are constantly targeted by these ambushes, and they cannot do the kind of work for the population that could be a real counterinsurgency.

Moreover, Pakistan doesn't control its border. I don't think it is possible to defeat the Taliban when the old Pakistani-Afghan border is quite open and when the Taliban have reached support in Pakistan where they have a sanctuary.

The current offensive in Waziristan and the one before in Swat and the one before in Bajaur Agency were not directed at the Afghan Taliban. They were strictly directed against the Pakistani Taliban. So at this point I don't see any sign that the Pakistani Government is changing its policy of supporting the Afghan Taliban. That is a key element, and I don't think that we can defeat an insurgency in these conditions.

What should we do? What are the priorities? I think that in the longer perspective on exit strategy we should now focus our limited resources on urban center and strategic course. The poorest population in Afghanistan lives in urban centers, and sadly you don't see practical results of the Western presence in Afghanistan since many years now in the cities; for example, Kabul. Kabul, not a lot of development, and after the billions of dollars we sent to Afghanistan I think it is a very sad result.

Those cities are key because first, as I said, the poorest of the population lives there. Second, the Taliban are frightening more and more the cities. They are inside in city of Kandahar, inside most of the cities in the south and also in the east. I am thinking about Khost, Gardez, large parts of the towns in Lowgar Province. This is a natural strategic fight, because if we want to build Af-
ghan institutions, it will be in the cities. It is not going to be in the countryside.

So what the United States, and marginally the coalition, should do is to define three areas. First area: strategic zones, where the coalition should have total military control. It doesn’t mean that you don’t have some incidents from time to time, but it is under control. Main roads, cities, most of the towns when it is possible, it is not always possible, and that is where we must send most of our resources to protect this area.

Second area is what I would call a buffer area around the cities and the towns. In this area the idea is to have a place where the military intervention is focused avoiding civilian casualties and, whenever possible, to probably to use militia, mostly not tribal militia because tribal militia are very difficult to manage, but local militia in the village. There are a lot of caveats, some dangerous, but basically it is doable.

I would say that in the last territory, the opposition territory, that is the mountains, a large part of the countryside in the south and in the east. We don’t have the resources to roll back. We don’t have the resources to push the Taliban outside these territories. So the only thing to do is to have different strategy in the sense that the idea is not to put this under military control, but the proactive one in the sense that the U.S. forces must deter the opposition from launching operations outside these places against the strategic zone.

What are the advantages of this strategy? First: time. We need time to build an Afghan army that is able to defend at least the cities. We need probably more than 5 years, between 5 and 10 years. Currently the Afghan army is probably around—the real number is around 60,000. To double that number, to go, let’s say, to 150,000 we need minimum 5 years. We don’t have officers. We need—it is a very long-term project to build officers, petty officers as they are called, you know.

Second, we cannot go with this level of casualties. From 2008 to 2009 we are more than 50 percent increase in casualties for the coalition. So we are going from a little under 300 to probably this year over 500. If we do the same thing, if we extend the strategy we had in Helmand, to all south of Afghanistan it is going to be 700 or 800. I don’t think it is politically doable.

Another element, of course you have seen the results of the election in Afghanistan. We are now in the first democratic Afghanistan. People are cynical and I think they are right to be cynical about the current government, about the election, about the political process. We need a lot of time to build again some kind of Afghan regime able to survive the withdrawal of the Western countries. It is not doable with a high-level casualty strategy.

My third point is about resources. First, I don’t think we are suffering from underfunding, but there is a strikingly better location of resources in Afghanistan.

Should I stop?

Dr. SNYDER. No, we have a series of votes coming up, but if you can finish up in a couple or three minutes and give Dr. Krepinevich his time, then we will go vote and come back and start questions. As it were, we will just pick up where we left. Go ahead.
Dr. DORRONSORO. Contrary to what is often said, it is not a problem of underfunding, but bad location of resources. First, we are sending resources mostly to places that we do not control. Actually drugs are not the first source of finance for the Taliban. We are financing the Taliban because we are giving money to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) who are working the countryside. They are obliged to pay the Taliban when we are sending trucks from Karachi to Peshawar. They have to pay from Peshawar to Kabul, they have to pay from Kabul to Kandahar, they have to pay again. And this money for large part is going to the Taliban. So we have to focus aid on places where we have control, some provinces in the north, the cities, and so on.

Second, the troops are over-focused in the south. It was a major strategic mistake. Twenty thousand men in Helmand is exactly the kind of thing that is going to victory to the Taliban. We have lost control of Kunduz Province. We have lost control of part of Baghlan Province. We have lost control of Badghis Province. That is in the north, and the city of Herat is now directly threatened by the Taliban. We cannot spend all our resources in the south when the north is becoming the major, major problem.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Dorronsoro can be found in the Appendix on page 67.]

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Krepinevich.

STATEMENT OF DR. ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH, PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In summarizing my remarks, I will speak primarily to Afghanistan but also to Iraq, and then finally to our overall strategic posture.

To begin, I think if we are going to talk about strategy it is important to note that strategy in its basic terms is how you apply the means at your disposal to achieve the ends you seek. And as the definition suggests, the means to be employed, which include levels of troop strengths for example, are an integral part of crafting a strategy.

Clausewitz said the first and foremost thing that any leader needed to do before contemplating war is to understand the character and the nature of the enemy and the war that they were about to engage. I think in its March 2009 white paper, the Obama Administration demonstrated that it does have a good appreciation for the character of the war in which we are engaged and the nature of the threat—I didn't know I was going to bring my theme music with me today.

Second, to have a strategy it is necessary to set an objective. And in fact the Administration has: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to prevent their return to either country in the future.

The President, I think in line with this, improved—approved rather wisely a strategy that emphasizes traditional counterinsurgency principles.

I would say if you look at General McChrystal's leaked report a lot of the themes that are expressed in that are similar to the
themes that Dr. Dorronsoro just mentioned: an emphasis on security and on improved governance.

Based on the President’s statements as recently as August, he views the risks of failing to achieve our war objectives as quite high. He has declared this not a war of choice but a war of necessity and stated that if left unchecked the Taliban insurgency will make an even larger safe haven from which al Qaeda will plot to kill more Americans.

The core issue at present doesn’t seem to be a debate over the objective necessarily or the strategy for how to achieve it, but levels of troops that we are dispatching to Afghanistan, specifically General McChrystal's request for 40,000 troops over and above what he currently has to implement the strategy.

I will offer six observations or suggestions on how the committee might view that request. Three have to do with risk. Obviously there is a risk associated with not supporting the troop request. There is also a risk associated with sending those 40,000 additional troops.

One potential risk, and of course we have heard it, is the risk of—the term is “breaking the army.” In fact our Army will so be overstretched and—so overstressed that it risks becoming a non-functioning combatant force.

I would just offer two things here. One, it would appear with the ongoing drawdown in Iraq that even if we get to 30 to 40,000 troop level in Iraq, that combined a 40,000 troop increase in Afghanistan would still leave us significantly below the troop levels we had deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq during the surge. First point.

Second point is that thanks to the efforts of the previous Administration and this Administration over the past few years there has been an authorized increase in Army end strength of 65,000, plus 8,000 in the Reserves, 27,000 additional Marines, and then more recently an additional 22,000 temporary plus-up in the Army's end strength. So you are not only talking about relatively lower troop levels than what we saw during the surge, but also a larger ground force component by a substantial margin.

There is also the risk that such deployments might leave us unprepared for other contingencies. So that is sort of my second point. And again I think the questions here you have to address are, are these other contingencies likely to occur? If they did, for example in Korea or Iran, would we have a higher risk of failure? If we did fail would the consequences of failure be greater than those of failing in Afghanistan and Iraq? My only personal estimate, as outlined in my testimony, is that again those risks I think are workable right now, but again different people interpret risk differently.

I would say the third area having to do with risk is whether or not General McChrystal is, to use a phrase, “padding the force.” Is he requesting far more troops than he actually needs to begin to engineer a decisive turnaround of the kind that Dr. Kagan and Dr. Dorronsoro talked about?

His report, the one that was leaked, indicates that he is, for example, not looking to secure the entire country at once, but progressively over time, which is very consistent I think with the Administration's strategy and with traditional counterinsurgency strategy.
I do think though that it would be wise to find out specifically how the force is going to be used, what constitutes a decisive shift, what the campaign is, what the phases are, and how we would measure progress.

Apart from the risk of deploying this force is also the matter of the strategy itself, and there are three issues that relate to this. One is one might want to undertake a review of one’s strategy very shortly after one had put it in place if there were some dramatic change in the situation. There may be some dramatic change we are not aware of. I am not sure the Afghan elections really constitute that in the sense that to the extent there is corruption in Afghan that has pretty much been a known factor for some time now, almost since the advent of the Karzai administration.

Second, I think you might want to review your strategy if it was a failed strategy. Yet the strategy really hasn’t been fully implemented yet, and so it seems to me it is premature to say we have a failed strategy on our hands.

And the third would be is there a better strategy out there, one that was not evident to us when the Administration set its strategy in March that is now available. I think there is one that goes by the name the counterterrorism strategy with emphasis on over-the-horizon air strikes, special forces, covert operations, and a focused attempt to kill terrorist leaders, insurgent leaders.

My feeling here is we have tried this before, it has failed. The character of the conflict doesn’t really lend itself to kinetic kinds of operations. The current term for it is “whack-a-mole,” going after and using kinetic strikes to kill key leaders. In Vietnam we tried it on a broader scale. It was called “search and destroy.” Go find the enemy; kill the enemy. Kill enough of them, kill their leaders, and eventually we win. It was tried to some extent in the late 1990s. We had the cruise missile attacks on Afghanistan. Some people called it “therapeutic bombing,” others, “antiseptic warfare.” Obviously that didn’t do the job. We tried it early on in Iraq where the term “whack-a-mole” really originated in this iteration. And to a certain extent we tried in Afghanistan the last few years with our drone operations and our special forces operations.

We have succeeded in killing a lot of leaders of the Taliban and al Qaeda and other related groups, but as we have pretty much acknowledged here, the situation really hasn’t gotten better by emphasizing these kinds of operations. To make matters worse, they tend to alienate the population, which is the war’s center of gravity.

Final point on Afghanistan is: does a protracted review matter? Does it really matter? Obviously there is an advantage in taking your time and thinking things through carefully, getting all the facts, getting all the data. But there is also a down side, and the down side is that there are a lot of fence sitters, in this kind of war. Lawrence of Arabia once said that insurgencies are made of 2 percent of the population being active and 98 percent passive. To defeat them you need to mobilize the population on your side.

If there is a sense that we are not serious or a sense that we are waffling back and forth, I think that creates problems for us. In a sense it is almost ironic that some things, some of the problems we are really trying to tackle, the Administration is really trying to
focus on to some extent are undermined by a protracted strategic review in a sense that, if you want Karzai to seriously crack down on corruption, what he needs I think is a strong expression of American support. But it is support with conditions. The absence of that support really encourages him to strike deals with the locals, many of whom have to be paid off in forms of patronage and corruption.

Similarly the Pakistanis, their attitude is that they, at least some elements of the Pakistani Government, view the Taliban as their hedge against an American withdrawal from Afghanistan and Indian ascendance in that country. They essentially accept the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as the dominant external power in Afghanistan but are very reluctant, I think, to go after the Taliban if the feeling is that we may leave the path open for Indian ascendance in Pakistan.

With respect to Iraq, just a couple of points. One is the drawdown is continuing. I think we have to look at a significant residual force. General Clark talked about the need for such a force in Afghanistan. I think we also need one in Iraq. In terms of Iraq also I think we do need to have a sense of what happens the day after the drawdown to a minimum force. We never really thought through the day after we pulled down the statue of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad. I think it would be a mistake to assume that the situation there is inevitably going to remain as stable as it is now without some serious effort on our part.

My final point is to look at the broad picture. Again I commend the committee for taking a serious look at the strategy in Afghanistan and links in terms of the regional perspective. I would point out that if you look out over the coming decades and you look at key trends, whether they are economic, technical, demographic and so on, it is difficult to conclude otherwise than that the challenges to our security are increasing, they are going to continue to increase, the threats are going to become significantly more dangerous. And our ability to address them I think is eroding rather dramatically, not only in terms of the treasure we have poured into this conflict but our rather seriously eroding economic foundation and the similar difficulties that longstanding allies are experiencing in the same way.

So in closing, let me applaud the committee's determination to both raise the level of awareness on these important issues and also its efforts to raise the quality of the discourse as to how we might best resolve them.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Krepinevich can be found in the Appendix on page 79.]

Dr. Snyder. Thank you.

We have four votes. We hopefully won't be gone very long, and we will take up questions when we get back. We have been joined by Mr. Coffman, who will participate. We are in recess.

[Recess.]

Dr. Snyder. We will come back in session.

Mr. Wittman will be joining us here shortly, and we will put ourselves on the five-minute clock.
I think, General Clark, you have to leave 4:00-ish is that correct? And we will try to get a round at least once with all of the witnesses and then additional time with whoever is left.

The first question I wanted to direct is to General Clark and Dr. Dorronsoro.

Dr. Dorronsoro, at the end of your written statement, which I don’t think you mentioned in your oral statement, your very last sentence you said is, “The only solution to this problem is a political negotiation and the awareness of what is really at stake here: the credibility of NATO that is a military alliance.” And I met with a European diplomat a few weeks ago, I guess a couple weeks ago, who also espoused the view that the world’s perception of NATO’s success or failure should be an important consideration of what we do.

I would like to hear, General Clark, your response to that or what you think about that?

And, Dr. Dorronsoro, to amplify on that.

General CLARK. It sounds like something that would have been in my statement.

Dr. SNYDER. It did. I saw it, but it was in his.

General CLARK. But it wasn’t.

Dr. SNYDER. It wasn’t.

General CLARK. NATO is a problem because it is a one-strike-and-you-are-out organization. It has been successful thus far. We took it into Afghanistan without NATO demanding of us an effective strategy. And were we to simply fold our tent and go home, I think we would have a problem with NATO.

I think it is incumbent upon us to create an effective strategy that brings us success and an exit, and I think NATO can participate in that. But I think that the emphasis on troop contributions from other NATO countries has been a little misplaced over the years.

It is going to take a lot more than simply troops for NATO to be successful in Afghanistan. And I think we should be looking for economic contributions, police training contributions, that are broader. And we should do the best we can to require NATO countries to cough up the other contributions when they say they can’t provide those extra two helicopters that we wanted.

Rather than simply doing the pressure on the two helicopters give them some alternative means of contributing. We do need more contributions from all the NATO members right now. I don’t see this as—I see what we have to do is create a success strategy that is premised on leaving. And I think if you can build a strategy that is clear, that has some clear turnover points in it, that it is possible to keep NATO on board, give NATO the sense of success it needs and provide the sense of resolution that you need to resolve the problem on the ground in Afghanistan with the Pakistanis.

I know I am asking for a lot. But that is why I think that the Administration is doing the right thing by taking the time to get the strategy right. Because there is a lot of seemingly contradictory pieces that have to be put in place to make the strategy work.

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Dorronsoro.
Dr. DORRONSORO. I think, first, that we think is that NATO is failing as a major alliance in Afghanistan. It is a clear failure. It is a dangerous failure, and I am not sure that NATO could survive this kind of war.

Now, what to do about it. First, to be true, it is going to be extremely difficult for especially European governments to send more troops in Afghanistan. You have now over 70 percent of the British population who are supporting an exit from Afghanistan right now. So we are, politically speaking, on the verge of a real political point for all European governments.

The second—and I would say, why? Because there is no perception of threat, perception of threat from Afghanistan. European populations do not perceive Afghanistan as a threat. That is a very general thing, and that is important.

The second thing is, what to do about it. I would suggest, first, the truth that, in certain places, non-U.S. troops are not trying to do counterinsurgency or to do war. They cannot accept, for a political reasons, casualties. And we have a situation like Kunduz in the north or Mazar-e-Sharif, where the German army is not only inefficient against the Taliban but mostly counterproductive. I think we should offer an exit to the German troops, a means to use the German troops to train the Afghan army or to do something else. But I would prefer from my point of view to have 200 Marines in Kunduz than 5,000 or 6,000 German soldiers.

I think we are in the wrong way. We are putting always the political regiment first in NATO, and we are killing NATO in the long term because NATO is losing the war. We should be clear even if it is creating a political crisis inside NATO. We have to ask the question, why the Germans are not doing their work in the north? What is happening with the Italians in Herat, and so on and so on?

And I would say the last point, quickly, is that NATO is not working because there is no unified strategy in Afghanistan. You know, there is always this question how the Taliban is a unified movement. But honestly, if I had a very theoretical choice between leading the Taliban and leading the NATO, I would prefer to lead the Taliban. Much more simple, you know. NATO is really not able to produce a clear-on strategy at the national level in Afghanistan.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Wittman for five minutes.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you members of the panel for joining us today. We appreciate your patience and your indulgence with us as we move back and forth between votes.

General Clark, to begin with you, you made a statement in the beginning saying you are very proud of the Administration and the time they are taking to be very deliberative in this decision-making process. I want to kind of put that into perspective on the timeliness issue. I know there has been a lot of focus on the timeliness of a decision. Obviously, we want to make sure we get the decision right, but I am wondering, at what point does timeliness become a significant element in that decision-making process?

I know I have heard from a number of our men and women in uniform who are starting to get a little anxious about this. I am wondering what you see as the effect on our combatant com-
manders, men and women in uniform, and our allied partners as a decision continues to move on and on and on, and where do you think we are as far as the impact of timeliness on the effect on the effort there in our partners?

General CLARK. Well, I don’t know that there is any hard deadline. Obviously, everyone wants a decision sooner rather than later. I believe that we are getting much closer to a decision. And I am not on the inside of this process.

As I see it work from the outside, what I am looking at is a process in which all of the strategic actors are engaged, including the foreign governments in Afghanistan and Pakistan that we are working with. So I would go back to my own experience with things like the Dayton Agreement in which there was a war going on. We didn't have our troops on the ground at the time. But people were impatient for an agreement. And yet the trick was to be able to use the impending decisions as leverage in producing the overall process outcome that you sought.

And as best I can see, the Administration is in fact doing that. So there is a lot of impatience about this. I know the troops want to know what is going on. I know the military leaders are concerned about planning. But that should not drive the process. In fact, I think as best I can see, there is a lot of good coming out of this in terms of the work through the nations in the region. And that work cannot be done in a series of quick overnight phone calls, position papers. And I don’t think it is being done that way.

I think it is being done through back-and-forth over a period of weeks with the host nation governments. And I think that is a constructive process. So I think we should be patient. I think the Administration is going to wrap this up pretty quick. But I think it has been a very productive process, and I commend them for it.

Mr. WITTMAN. Dr. Kagan.

Dr. KAGAN. I disagree.

I do believe that there is a role for strategic deliberation, but I also believe that the extent and the time being taken for the strategic deliberation does actually impose risks within the theater of war, and we need at least to be cognizant of the risks that are being taken as this discussion protracts.

First and foremost, I do not actually agree with General Clark that it is possible or wise to use a decision about force levels as leverage, either with our allies or with our enemies or with the government of Afghanistan.

On the contrary, what we learned from Iraq and from other counterinsurgency efforts is that commitment and a strong statement of commitment early on is actually what changes the balance of calculations among political actors and among the population. And so what the people of Afghanistan are looking for and what the government of Afghanistan is looking for and what Pakistan is looking for is the statement of commitment and having that statement backed up with action.

Secondly, I do believe that we are starting to see a degree of pressure being put on our NATO allies, who are trying to be responsive to whatever the strategy is and will be but, because of the indeterminate nature of this process, are not being able to allocate
the forces and the resources because they will be guided not by their own assessment of their objectives but by the U.S. lead.

Thirdly, there are forces available for Afghanistan that could have been on the way and should be on the way by now. In particular, there could be a decision to commit the Ready Brigade of the 82nd. There could be a decision to accelerate the training of Afghan army and Afghan security forces, the funds committed in order to do that. All of those things could be under way.

And the delays that are now ongoing do shift the ability of our commanders on the ground to conduct decisive operations in 2010. In fact, I would say that, in fact, it is unlikely that our commanders on the ground will be able to accomplish a set of decisive operations in 2010, nor do I think that they will meet the 12- to 18-month turnaround timeline that President Obama initially gave to General McChrystal as sort of the bellwether for how fast he wanted to see results in Afghanistan. So we have to acknowledge those risks.

Dr. SNYDER. Mrs. Davis, for five minutes.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to all of you for being here.

Dr. Krepinevich, in your written remarks, you state that President Karzai should understand that our support is conditional on his willingness to remove ineffective or corrupt administrators. And I wonder if you could address, what if he doesn’t? I mean, what do you think we should be looking for, and others as well, and what if this doesn’t happen? I mean, there are a lot of people who just don’t believe that, even with what has occurred in terms of the election, that that is likely to change.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Again, I think if you look at, at least what the Administration’s strategy is, if you look at what General McChrystal has proposed to do, a significant part of that was not just helping the Afghan national army or the Afghan forces; it was beginning the work in a sense of embedding ourselves in the Afghan government, not only to help them to improve the efficiency and the effectiveness of governance but also as a good means of identifying those individuals who are competent or incompetent, corrupt or honest, and who are loyal or who have a different agenda.

And I think President Karzai has got to understand that, you know, that is a condition of our involvement. It serves his interest. It serves the interest of the country. And also conditional is our recommendations about people when we identify them as corrupt or incompetent or disloyal, that he has got to remove them. I think the incentive on his part goes up if he feels like the United States is engaged over time and that he has less of an incentive or less of a need to cut deals and to grant patronage, which of course is one step away from corruption, in government to play off different factions, one from the other.

Ultimately, I think if that fails, then what you are left with is a decision about whether the situation in Afghanistan is hopeless or whether Karzai is hopeless, and whether, in fact, there are other leaders within Afghanistan who can better represent the needs of the people and be more legitimate. I think we are a long way from that point, especially if we get buy-in on the conditions that the
Administration and General McChrystal seem to be intent on setting.

I would also say, a colleague of mine, Dr. Strmecki, testified I guess a few weeks back, and his point—he spent a lot of time over there early on after the Loya Jirga and the elections and so on. There are a number of things that have worked with Karzai in the past. And again, I think that involves not only commitment on our part but also a very effective country team. And at that time, we had a country team that seemed to be able to get productive output from Karzai. And I suspect it is not a lost cause.

And given the stakes that the President has said we have at risk here in terms of a war of necessity and concerns about not only instability in Afghanistan but a nuclear-armed Muslim state, Pakistan, and then in the broader region, and as General Clark says, the implications for the alliance and so on, I certainly think that it is worth a try, but again, I think it has got to be conditions-based.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

I don't know if anyone else wants to comment, especially in terms of any economic incentives or lack of thereof that you would like to address.

I guess the other piece just really quickly, because I think what you are saying, we need to depend on some type of a military-civilian partnership, and that also, I think, would involve certainly a certain number of troops.

And perhaps, General Clark, you could comment on that as well. Dr. Kagan.

Dr. KAGAN. Thank you very much.

The question of how it is that we use our leverage, vis-a-vis Karzai and the Afghan government, is really what is at hand right now, because we do have a lot of leverage. And that leverage comes in troops. It comes in money that the international community provides for the government of Afghanistan. It comes in terms of the training and support that we provide for the Afghan security forces, through our support of NGOs and other international elements working in Afghanistan.

That is to say, troops are one source of leverage; money is another. We have a lot of leverage that we can bring to bear.

The question is allowing our country team to bring that leverage to bear in the most productive way and in the most gentle way, or sometimes in the most effective way. And I really—I really do think that we have a lot of lessons that we have learned from our experience in Iraq in terms of how to apply that leverage. And I also think that it is essential that we not look at conditioning the troop levels going in as the only source of leverage.

Mrs. DAVIS. I appreciate that. Thank you. I think the chairman is going to gavel you down. Thank you.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Jones for five minutes.

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me read a paragraph and then I have got a couple of questions. “Yesterday,” reads the e-mail from Allen, a Marine in Afghanistan, “I gave blood because a Marine while out on patrol stepped on a pressure plate and lost both legs. Then another Marine was hit with a bullet wound to the head and was brought in.
Both Marines died this morning.” This is from the column by George Will, September, “America’s Unwinnable Afghan War.”

My question to General Clark as well as Dr. Kagan, two parts, is Afghanistan in our vital national security interest?

Second, I will be glad to repeat, if it is, what is our goal, secondly, our objective, the end state? What are we seeking?

General Clark.

General CLARK. Congressman, I think what is in our vital interest is the defeat of al Qaeda. And it is also in our vital interest not to be, not to have been defeated in Afghanistan. So, in my testimony, what I have tried to lay out is a somewhat realignment of our attention to where al Qaeda is primarily. They are primarily in Pakistan. The government of Pakistan must do more. It must be incentivized and assisted to do more. And what we must do is take the fight to al Qaeda.

Now, principally al Qaeda is not in Afghanistan. But as a necessary but not sufficient component of taking the fight to al Qaeda, we have got to clean up the mess in Afghanistan. That means building the Afghan security forces; not getting forced off the battlefield; creating a more legitimate government that reduces conflict; and leaving behind something that can sustain and prevent—sustain itself and prevent the takeover of the Afghan government by a group that would use the organs of state and the rights of a state to promote international terrorism.

Those are pretty minimalist objectives when they are stated that way. They don’t require us to bring statehood conditions of probity to Afghanistan, but they do require a sustained commitment there for some period of time, and they require a lot more attention by the government of Pakistan on its responsibilities.

Mr. JONES. Before Dr. Kagan, very quickly, how much longer can the military continue to go at this pace before we start seeing, because I have Camp Lejeune in the district, the number of post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) cases have gone up astronomically? And how much longer can we keep going without an end point to what we are trying to achieve militarily? Do you have any idea?

General CLARK. I can’t give you a time zone on it. But I would tell you this: that it is manifestly unfair to the men and women in uniform to have been sent back again and again and again on repetitive tours. So they are owed by their national command authority a strategy for success. That strategy hasn’t yet been adequately defined for the context of the region.

And that is why I am hopeful that the Obama Administration will do that now. And I think it will, and I think that is the purpose of the delay. And that involves intensive work with both the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

And then I think it is up to the—it is up to Congress to provide adequate support, including the right manning levels for the men and women in uniform so that we have a national security apparatus that can do that which we believe it is asked to do. And if we are not prepared to do that, then we as a nation have to adjust our objectives.

We don’t have enough men and women in the Army and Marine Corps to sustain the kind of commitment that—if we put the same
number of troops in Afghanistan that we had in Iraq for the next 10 years we are going to break this force. So that is not an option, not under the current conditions. Something has got to give.

Mr. Jones. General, thank you.

My time is about up. Dr. Kagan, I will go a round with you if we have another round.

But I wanted to say I am one of the few Republicans that have thanked the President for taking time to figure out what our policy should be.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Snyder. As I indicated earlier, we have been joined by Mr. Coffman, who is not a member of the subcommittee but a member of the full committee, and recognized for five minutes.

Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It appears already, and let me preface this with, I think there were nine soldiers recently lost in northeastern Afghanistan in a small forward operating base where it was hit fairly aggressively by the Taliban in a remote area that was pretty isolated. The tragedy is I think that they already had orders where they were going to withdraw in the next couple of days and abandon that particular forward operating base.

And it seems that General McChrystal has already come to a conclusion that we ought to have a bifurcated strategy of counterterrorism with counterinsurgency; with counterinsurgency in the populated areas, and counterterrorism in the rural areas. I wonder if you all could comment on, number one, do you think that that is accurate, and number two, how effective would that strategy be?

General Clark, why don't we start with you?

General Clark. Well, I haven't spoken to General McChrystal about the strategy. I am not on the inside of this debate.

I am worried about surrendering the border to the Taliban. You have got to maintain as tight a grip on the border region as possible. It is just that it is too big in relation to the forces. And I don't mean just forces on the ground; I mean the artillery that needs to be there in support, the Apache helicopters that come in. As one officer said to me, “this is fast-mover country.” I mean, you have got to have fighter planes in the air all the time to deliver ordinance because this is a big country.

So, you know, I really felt bad when I heard about the loss of the outpost, and I know that maybe there are tactical issues here that have to be worked, and maybe that was in the wrong place, and maybe it was going to be readjusted. But I hope that in the strategy we don't surrender that border to the Taliban. That will be a mistake.

And one of the things we have got to do is we have got to give the commander the resources he needs to fight and win. If we are going to hold him responsible for winning, we have got to give him the resources. So I don't know what the right number is. I don't know if it is 10,000, 20,000, 40,000 or 80,000. I do know that at this period of the war in Vietnam, when we were searching for objectives, we piecemealed the reinforcements. And we didn't provide enough to the military, and the military didn't ask for enough.

So I hope General McChrystal has asked for everything he has needed. But he is not the final authority. That is the President of
the United States. And he has got to put together the whole strategy. And again, I want to underscore, that is why it is important that we have taken the time to try to get this right.

Mr. COFFMAN. Dr. Kagan.

Dr. Kagan. In order to understand where to put our forces and how to use them, we have to understand where the enemy is and how it functions. And although we can talk very much about the enemy groups operating within the cities and the cities as being important to Afghanistan, what we actually see when we look specifically at the way the enemy behaves is that actually the enemy fights in and operates in essentially the suburban areas around cities, suburban perhaps is an overstatement, and uses safe havens in those areas to project force into cities, precisely because, in fact, fighting within cities is not a culturally acceptable way of conducting a campaign.

Therefore, although we can talk about the need to secure important cities, such as Kandahar or Khost, we have to be careful to differentiate between securing the cities and placing forces inside the cities, because the best way to secure an area such as Kandahar may be actually to deploy forces in the surrounding areas.

And the reason I raise that is that we have had a lot of conversations here in Washington about exactly where to put our forces and how to use them. And it is actually important to give the command some degree of leeway about where actually to use forces in a way that maximizes their contribution to the fight rather than pre-judging where the enemy is, how the enemy is operating, and whether we should put our forces in cities, countries, or on the border.

Secondly, on the border issue, we need to mitigate risks on the border which is too large for our forces to protect by a strong set of outposts through the use of special operations forces, other national assets, other technological assets. But the border is only one component of our strategy. We have an indigenous insurgency, and that is why, in fact, we need to be focusing on population centers within the country rather than trying to protect Afghanistan from infiltration from Pakistan.

Mr. COFFMAN. Would anyone else like to comment?

Dr. DORRONSORO. Yeah quickly, maybe. The border is out of control, and we don’t have the resources to control the border with Pakistan. It is absolutely impossible to control. It is a very long border. The terrain is absolutely terrible. So you are not going to make it anyway.

So what is happening is a more general phenomenon. The Taliban are now strong enough to—more than ambushes; it is really frontal attack on the isolated post. So it is a good idea to evacuate this kind of outpost. I think it is a good decision. And there is no way you can control Kunar and those places.

The second point is that here we have something that——

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Dorronsoro, I need you to get to your completing comment here.

Dr. DORRONSORO. It is a general phenomenon that Western outposts are totally isolated, cut from the population. It is through everywhere in Afghanistan. Ask the Spanish forces in Badghis, the
same thing. German in the north, same thing. French, same thing. So people they control what they see and no more.

Dr. Snyder. We have also been joined by Dr. Steve Kagen who is not a member of the Armed Services Committee, but wanted to participate today. Dr. Kagen for five minutes.

Dr. Kagen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I really appreciate the opportunity to sit in with you this afternoon on this very deadly serious subject.

I welcome General Wes Clark, who I have become friends with over a long period of time since he was moving from the military ranks into the civilian civil servant—well, he almost did. I appreciate your many years of service, and I appreciate your testimony.

I think perhaps the most pressing comments are in the statements that have been submitted. And Dr. Kagen presents us with this sentence, “the fact that we have not been doing the right things for the past few years in Afghanistan is actually good news at the moment.” I think I am just going to accept that statement from you to be agreeable to the idea that we really have not been doing the right things.

I have just three questions. Whatever the strategy is going to be, it must answer these questions.

First, will it work?

Secondly, can we afford it?

And thirdly, is it the right thing, is it the ethical thing to do?

I don’t see how the United States of America, without the full cooperation in every sense of the term from NATO, will be successful by anyone’s definition of what success is going to look like.

I am concerned, General Clark, because in a way you are expressing the Cheney philosophy that what he was seeking in Iraq was a “stable government that could take care of itself and its people.” Is that really what we are trying to do in Afghanistan? Are we trying to establish a government that can take care of itself and its people by training up some police and other military forces?

And to follow up on that, do you really believe that a military solution is possible within that region?

General Clark. Well, Congressman, in my opening statement, what I called for is a strategy based on an exit. And I did not call for a military solution. I called for a balanced strategy that required economic, diplomatic, and other work, and more emphasis on the government of Pakistan.

But I don’t think you are going to persuade the governments of NATO to suddenly mobilize and send tens of thousands of troops to Afghanistan simply because we ask it. So I think it is incumbent upon the Administration to craft the right strategy that can succeed, to explain it, to get the support of the American people, and to do it within a means that is affordable for us.

If I were in General McChrystal’s position, I probably would have asked for a lot more troops than he asked for, and I hope he has asked for enough to do the job. I think that amount is affordable within the context of the armed forces. But it won’t succeed on the basis of military action alone.

And in particular, I hope that we will reverse course from the Bush Administration, which wanted to ignore the presence of al Qaeda, or largely ignore it, in Pakistan. Look, the people that at-
tacked this country are in Pakistan. They are primarily not in Af-
ghanistan. And so we are asking our Marines to fight and our
Army people to fight a supporting battle in Afghanistan, while the
Pakistanis and our Predators take the main fight to al Qaeda.
Something is a little bit wrong with the distribution of resources,
and something is wrong with the understanding of this.

I realize the government of Pakistan is terribly conflicted about
this, but on the other hand, so have we been. So I think we need
to get our objectives thought through. We need to put the emphasis
where it is. I was delighted to see that the Administration, accord-
ing to the press, has put more pressure on the Pakistanis. I hope
we will give them the kind of leased military equipment, intel-
ligence support, training, and economic assistance they need. And
I hope that we will get al Qaeda out of there.

As for the Taliban in Afghanistan, there is a military component
and a security component to dealing with it.

So I am not sure what the Cheney solution ever was to Iraq, sir,
but I can't associate myself with it.

Thank you.

Dr. KAGEN. Thank you.

Dr. KREPINevich. I do think the—you have the three questions.
Can it work? I think, yes, it can work. Can we afford it? Yes, I
think we can afford it. Is it ethical? Again, I am not quite sure how
to answer that question.

With respect to whether the priority should be Afghanistan or
Pakistan, I think we have a situation now where, through a com-
bination of efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, we have reduced
the core of the problem to areas in western Pakistan.

I would agree with General Clark that it is not one or the other.
There has to be an effort in both areas. It has to be a significant
effort. I think a critical part of that effort is not just the current
troop levels. I think there has to be some sense of an American
commitment.

And of course, people in this part of the world remember that
when we thought our commitment had been met in 1989 when the
Soviets began to withdraw, we essentially abandoned that area
after having operated very successfully to get the Soviets out. We
set the conditions for the Taliban to come into power, for instability
in Pakistan.

Again, the Pakistanis look at the Taliban, at least some of them
do, as their hedge to have an influence in Afghanistan if we pull
out to preclude an Indian ascendency in Afghanistan.

You know, Karzai looks to dealing with warlords and other cor-
rupt elements as his hedge against our pulling out precipitously.

So I do think that part of our demonstration that, yes, we have
a workable strategy, yes, we have a way, a path to victory, which
I do think enables us to withdraw, as General Clark says, I think
that is important.

But again, why do we have troops in Afghanistan? Well, we know
why. Because of 9/11. Our troops have not been invited into Paki-
stan, and they won't be, and I don't think we should send any.
However, if you solved the problem in Pakistan and did not solve
the problem in Afghanistan, they would just migrate back to where
they were prior to 9/11. So really you need a holistic approach, and I think that is one of the reasons why Congressman Snyder is saying, let's not just look at Afghanistan in isolation; let's look at the larger issue.

And I just want to make one final point. In terms of this issue of the border/not the border, I think General McChrystal's strategy to me makes a lot of sense. If you look at the essence of insurgency warfare, it is all about intelligence. When I was in the Army in the Cold War, we always worried, do we have enough tanks, do we have enough artillery to stop the Soviets in Europe? We don't worry about firepower with these guys. We don't worry about our ability to win any battles. It is all about intelligence. If we know who these people are and where they are, we win.

Okay, who has that information? Primarily in Afghanistan, it is the Afghan people. How do you get them to give you that information? I think some of my colleagues will point out, it is going to take awhile. But it all starts out with security, providing an enduring level of security so you can enable reconstruction that can be sustained over time that shows these people that they have a better life, that shows them that local government officials aren't corrupt; they can actually provide justice and adjudicate disputes.

And that is what General McChrystal is saying; I need these 40,000 troops to begin to jump start that effort and gradually expand and essentially backfill with local Afghan police, Afghan national army. Over time, they are taking on greater and greater responsibility.

With respect to the sort of counterterrorism campaign, that is an economy of force. That is what people in the Pentagon call a cost-imposing strategy. That is not going to win the war for you. But, if by using drones, if by using special forces, we force more of al Qaeda's leaders and the Taliban leaders to spend more and more of their time and energy worrying about surviving as opposed to planning, organizing, and executing attacks in Afghanistan, in Pakistan, that is a worthwhile economy of force use.

With respect to controlling the border, in a sense, we have been at this rodeo before. We tried to control the border in Vietnam, didn't have enough troops; tried to control the border in Iraq, didn't have enough troops; found out in both cases, the enemy was really inside, not outside, primarily. And again, if you can deny them access to the population, it is like denying them oxygen in this kind of war. If you can convince the people that you are on their side, that they have a brighter future ahead of you, that they have a legitimate government, and that you are going to win; that is when they start providing the intelligence, that is where we really began to get the tipping point going in Iraq.

So, again, I think General McChrystal really has a good handle on things. Again, based on his report, it just makes a lot of sense in looking back over the history of insurgency warfare and a lot of our recent experiences, not just in Afghanistan but also in Iraq.

Dr. Snyder. I wanted to ask, I think, General Clark, you are about to slip out, and we may lose Dr. Dorronsoro here, too. But before you leave, I wanted to ask the following question. And I have asked this of other panels. We went into Afghanistan in October of 2001. We all made some pretty strong statements as a coun-
General Keane testified, and he was there at the time, I think number two in the Army, that toward the end of 2002, resources began being pulled out of Afghanistan and that the war has been under-resourced ever since, severely under-resourced. But my question is, given what we said for that first year and prior to going in and after we were there and the encouragement we gave to a lot of Afghan people to assist the coalition, where should the concept, the moral responsibility to the Afghan people, fit into this discussion?

And we will begin with you, General Clark. I know you have to leave fairly soon.

We will give each of you a chance to comment on that question.

General CLARK. Well, clearly we have a responsibility to the people who threw their lot in with us. Those are the people who are identified and committed and publicly committed to the United States. We have had that responsibility in every case where we have operated in insurgent-counterinsurgent warfare.

But I think our primary responsibility is to our own national security interests and to the men and women who serve in combat to meet those interests. And so we have got to get the strategy right. So I couldn’t in good conscience look at young men and women and say, you should join the Army because, and serve this country because we have a moral obligation in principle to the government of Afghanistan.

We did, we are doing and are going to do the best we can do, I think, and I think this Administration will do that. And we have a personal responsibility to the people that committed themselves to us. But our obligation is to get the strategy right and to take care of our own men and women in uniform and preserve our armed forces for the good of the country. So that is where I would put the priority on that.

Dr. SNYDER. And, Wes, I know you have to leave.

Dr. KAGAN.

Dr. KAGAN. This is a circumstance where the moral responsibility and the moral obligations that the United States has to the people of Afghanistan align with our national security interests, and so I do not actually think that we have a tradeoff here. We have a situation where, in order best to suit U.S. interests, to secure Afghanistan, to create an opportunity for it to be governed, to create an opportunity for it to survive as a state in a dangerous neighborhood, we need to conduct a counterinsurgency strategy. That is a strategy that helps the population of Afghanistan, protects them from intimidation, and uses our presence, the presence of our forces, as a way of conferring safety, security, and benefits to the people.

And so although I agree with General Clark that we have to ask the question about whether our national security interests and our moral responsibilities align, since in this case I do believe that they do, the ethics of the situation are very clear; the United States needs to continue to be involved in Afghanistan and needs to conduct a counterinsurgency strategy in accordance with its stated objectives and its stated objectives since 2001.
Dr. Snyder. Dr. Dorronsoro.

Dr. Dorronsoro. I would say that the first moral responsibility is to be sure that conducting the war, the United States and the coalition are reasonably fair. For example, avoiding civilian casualties, treatment of prisoners, and so on. That would be the first thing: how we do the war in Afghanistan. And there has been a lot of progress the last few months.

But let's remember that, let's say between 2002 or 2001 and 2006, there has been a perfect disaster. And in a lot of places people are hearing very bad stories about the behavior of the Western forces in Afghanistan. That would be my first remark about the moral responsibility.

Second, there are things we should absolutely not do. For example, to encourage people like Rashid Dostum or the warlords who are potentially extremely dangerous in Afghanistan. We should never play with ethnic groups, creating the condition of an ethnic conflict in Afghanistan. That is a huge moral responsibility.

And if the situation is worse next year, and I think it is going to be worse next year, a lot of people will say, “okay, we should arm the tribes; we should end the creation of the condition of an ethnic conflict.” And in the longer term, I would say the people in Afghanistan are extremely divided about the presence of the Western coalition. Note, you have a small minority, a small minority, supporting more troops in their own country, more foreign troops in their own country. I think that is a point we should think about. And there is a limit between foreign forces here to help and foreign occupation. And we should very well cross this border if we are sending more troops in Afghanistan.

Dr. Snyder. Dr. Krepinevich.

Dr. Krepinevich. Again, I think we do have a moral obligation to the people of Afghanistan. I think that moral obligation holds until such time as either we accomplish our objectives, or we see that it is impossible under the circumstances to accomplish our objectives, or the situation is such that our commitments that we have made to the U.S. people, to people in uniform, and also to other allies and partners around the world, that those become so compromised that we have to make a difficult choice.

In the past when we have had to make that choice, we have taken the people that General Clark said who have thrown their lot in with the United States, and we have done our best to make sure that they were able to leave the combat area and be resettled.

I just would like to say something very quickly. We have heard the phrase, “get the strategy right,” over recent months. And I must say, at some point, you begin to wonder about the strategic competence of the U.S. Government. And I don’t mean this particular Administration. It took us arguably four years to get the strategy right during the Vietnam War. It took us from 2003 to 2007 to get the strategy right in Iraq. How long have we been in Afghanistan?

Can you imagine President Roosevelt, halfway through 1942 in World War II, and we still don’t know what our strategy is? Or President Truman, in the wake of the invasion of South Korea, saying, well, give me eight months and I will get the strategy right?
If you look at President Truman, as a matter of fact, the famous National Security Council Report 68 (NSC 68) strategy that lays the foundation for the entire Cold War was done between January and April of 1950. Eisenhower’s famous Solarium Strategy was done six weeks.

And again, this isn’t Republicans or Democrats; this is the U.S. Government. Somewhere, somehow, along the way, we seem to have lost the facility for doing strategy. And there is a real issue here because time is a resource, just as well as bullets and soldiers and allies and so on. And it is not clear to me based on what has been said today that time is on our side. And so if this is a precious resource and if it is not on our side and if we are spending time, as we try to come up with the very best strategy we can, on the one hand, that is to be applauded, but on the other hand, I think it makes me scratch my head from time to time.

Dr. Snyder. Maybe we don’t have enough solariums, Dr. Krepinevich. Maybe we all need more solariums.

Dr. Krepinevich. Probably just one more.

Dr. Snyder. Mr. Wittman.

Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

An observation, we talked a lot over the past month in this committee with our folks that have come to testify before us concerning the strategy and what does that mean, increased troop presence. I think we all realize that whatever we are going to do, it is going to be increased contact with the Taliban, increased military activity, increased casualties, and in the end, that is going to create some negative impact here with the American public.

And we all know the issues we have gone through historically, as casualties begin to mount, the public’s appetite for conflict tends to wane. And I think that is certainly a potential with this particular scenario as we ramp up presence there if that is the course of action the President chooses.

Let me ask this. In that scenario, how do we as best we can counter that? In other words, how do we keep the American public engaged? How do we make sure that they know that the effort that it is going to take there is worthwhile, whether it is in resources, whether it is in human sacrifice, all those list of things that we know it takes to be successful there? How do we engage the public in a way to make sure that they are knowledgeable about that sacrifice and then again that we convey to them that there is a worth to that sacrifice? And that is really where the discussion boils down to. I would like to hear your thoughts on that.

Dr. Kagan.

Dr. Kagan. Congressman, I think that we have to recognize that, in a democratic country, obviously public opinion plays a role in shaping the way our leaders make decisions.

But we also have to acknowledge the fact that our leaders play a role in shaping public opinion. And I think that as we pursue whatever strategy the President should choose in Afghanistan, the President has a responsibility to explain to the American people what course he has chosen, why he has chosen that course, what the likely results are of that course of action on the ground, and how it is that he thinks that the campaign in Afghanistan will pro-
ceed, so that American expectations are correctly shaped on the basis of reality.

I am quite concerned that, in the formulation of this strategy, an overemphasis could be placed on what it is that the American people believe is the best course of action. We have strategic decision-makers to evaluate what is the best course of action in a military engagement and in our foreign policy. So in order to go forward, the President has to take leadership over his strategy and really explain it to all of us so that we can support it in the ways that we can and so that we can evaluate it in ways that are credible.

Mr. WITTMAN. Dr. Dorronsoro.

Dr. DORRONSORO. I would say that the first thing is that there is no credible narrative about Afghanistan right now. We cannot say, cannot explain that we are fighting for a new democracy in Afghanistan. That is not credible after the election of August, you know. So we have to define the narrative in a very narrow manner. It is a potential threat because al Qaeda is not in Afghanistan, so it has become extremely difficult to explain.

The second thing is that we have to lower the level of casualties. So we have, for example, to go from 500 this year to 400 next year, and to show people that we are building something that is an exit, that is a responsible exit. In the sense that we are taking our time, we should not, absolutely not negotiate with the Taliban while taking our time, while building Afghan army, but we are leaving. It must be sure. And doesn’t mean that we are not going to support the Afghan state for decades, and I mean decades, 50 years, possible, you know, but not with fighting troops.

And that is the only way to build a consensus, because if you ask people what are you—okay, you don’t want this war because of too many casualties, but what do you want to do? And then people are obliged to say, okay, we have to exit, but on the other hand, we have to protect the Afghan people. That is the moral responsibility. And it means that we have to be clear about an exit strategy.

Mr. WITTMAN. Dr. Krepinevich.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Again, I think the Administration has some really strong factors in its favor. As I said, I think the Administration has correctly diagnosed the character of the conflict. I think it has set clear objectives, and I think it has a strategy that can move you towards accomplishing those objectives.

We have a President who is a very persuasive, dynamic speaker, so the ability to convey this message to the American people is certainly there, a person to explain the narrative, as Dr. Dorronsoro says, to the American people.

And then I think, of course, one thing I mentioned earlier is, and this is something I think the committee ought to be interested in, is, okay, if we buy into this, if we buy into the 40,000 troops or whatever and the strategy, how do we know that we are moving toward achieving our objective and we are moving forward at a reasonable rate? And again, I think there are metrics.

In most counterinsurgency wars, there is the, they call the stoplight chart. You have got green for areas that are secure, yellow for areas that are contested, and red for areas that are controlled by the insurgents. Well, what does that snapshot look like today?
What does it look like 6 months from now, a year from now, 18 months from now?

And I think, again, the President, and he has already said this, he preaches patience, you know, this isn’t going to turn around in a day.

Other issues. What about economic growth in the country? What about employment in the country? Are people being removed from office because of issues of corruption? Are they being prosecuted? What about Taliban defectors? You know, we are beginning to see more and more defect from the ranks of the Taliban.

Are the Pakistanis becoming serious about cracking down on the Taliban? I mean, I have spoken to many American senior policymakers. They go to Pakistan, and it is almost routine; a day or two before they get there inevitably some Taliban guy is arrested and it is, “Aha, look, we are really cracking down.” And then you leave, and they would go back to business as usual.

The ring road, is the ring road secure? How often is the ring road attacked, is that becoming an avenue of commerce and an integrating function for the nation? Where are we in terms of substituting a different crop in a different economic base from the opium crop?

So again, I think, again, we have a President who is a very effective communicator. He has got a good strategy. There are metrics I think that the American people can understand and certainly the Congress can understand. So again, you are right to be concerned; this is going to cost more both in terms of lives and resources. People, I think, are willing to accept that cost as long as they can see a payoff and progress.

Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Snyder. Mrs. Davis for five minutes.

Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You know, I mean, this is really difficult. It is really tough. I think that is why we are struggling. It is obviously why the President is struggling as well.

The last time I came back from Afghanistan, having had an opportunity to actually sit down with women in the villages, which was quite impressive actually to hear their sense of even a possible future, I came away believing that if we provide that space, as you mentioned, that eventually, over time, training the troops, changing governance, that something that is defined as success with certain metrics, and I certainly have always wanted them to involve the building of some kind of civil society, not going as far as nation-building perhaps, but doing that.

But I have also had a chance lately to speak to some people who have really been on the ground and just believe, I think, that there are some ancient divisions there that we just can’t overcome, that are difficult to do that. And I think that we do talk strategy, which is appropriate, to try and understand that.

But the difficulty is that there may not be a real opportunity for reconciliation, that we are talking about people dividing along societal lines, longstanding Pashtun and non-Pashtun, et cetera, et cetera. And I just wish you would comment on that, and are we understanding that enough? Do you all understand that enough? I
mean, do we know enough to really know how to respond in some way?

Dr. Dorronsoro, please go ahead.

Dr. DORRONSORO. There are three main divides I am thinking of in Afghanistan. The first is an ethnic one. And obviously, the Pashtun, most of the Pashtun don’t feel very comfortable with Karzai. They have the feeling that they are alienated from the government. Plus the majority of the fight is in their region, so they are losing civilians, of course, property destruction and so on. So this part of the population clearly has a major problem with the way it is working in Kabul. Even if Karzai himself is a Pashtun. And this divide is, I mean, it is back to the 1980s, I mean, or the 1990s at least.

The second divide is a social one between people who are in the cities and people who are in the countryside. Kandahar is not really a city. It is something very special, but most of the cities, Jalalabad, Kabul, Mazar, Herat, have a special culture that is more open to foreigners, to modernity, and that is the only social asset we have in Afghanistan, basically. That is where we can have some kind of success that is not military.

But in the countryside, let’s say that people react very badly when they see foreigners with guns. And the idea that we are going to protect the population is somewhat naive. You know, you do not protect the Pashtun people. That is not historically what has been done. You can make a deal with them, but it is better to stay outside.

And the third divide is an ideological one between, first, people who welcome us and now are working with the coalition, and fundamentalist people who are sometimes working with the coalition but not very clearly, and of course the Taliban. So you have a very deep ideological divide.

And the fundamentalist movement is extremely strong in Afghanistan and is not committed to the Taliban. You have fundamentalist people in Kabul working with Karzai. You have fundamentalist people in the north. And that is why it is so difficult. You can speak with a woman in the village, you know, but at the same time, let’s be clear, the real social order in villages is not exactly what we would like in terms of the woman’s role and place in society. We cannot go against that. We cannot go because we are not very credible, speaking about human rights, for different reasons. And we just don’t have the control of the countryside. And we cannot enter their houses. It is very difficult to do something.

So, yes, we have all these divides in the Afghan society. And we must be extremely careful to play with it carefully so the situations don’t get out of control. I am thinking about the ethnic divide. If we are not careful, if we are giving arms to the wrong people——

Mrs. DAVIS. If I could just interrupt, I think part of the question is the ability, the capacity, in many ways, to do that, whether or not you can do it without the kind of civilian and, really, international kind of support that we have been seeking. That needs to be done on a whole different level than what it has done before.

Dr. DORRONSORO. We don’t have the resources to send civilians in the villages. We don’t have the resources to do that. It is clear that we tend to portray the Afghans as some kind of passive peo-
ple. No, no, they are taking charge of things. And the idea that we can remodel the Afghan society is wrong. We have to play with what we have. And we don’t have a very good hand.

Dr. Snyder. Mr. Coffman.

Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I guess my question is, let’s assume that the President gives General McChrystal the resources that he requires to have a high probability of success in Afghanistan. Can you give me an estimate of where you think what I would call the tipping point is?

In other words, in Iraq we had the surge in 2007, along with other factors, that led to success. And then, in 2009, we started a drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq. Clearly, what we want is—we don’t want to win the war, we want the Afghan army to win the war.

And so, can you tell me—I mean, can any of you give an estimate on where would that tipping point be where we would start being able to phase out our presence in Afghanistan?

Dr. Kagan.

Dr. Kagan. Congressman, thank you.

The complexity of Afghan society makes it more difficult for our command to deal with and means that we will not necessarily see in Afghanistan a grand bargain or a huge systematic effect as quickly as we saw in Iraq, where the combination of the troop surge, the new civil-military team, and the new strategy and the extraordinary engagement with the people of Iraq truly had a transformative effect in a short time, such that, in early 2007, we wouldn’t know what a Son of Iraq was and, by July, we were meeting them left and right in our visits to Iraq.

We can’t imagine that there is going to be a crescendo of sudden change in Afghanistan. So we have to set that expectation aside. Nevertheless, we can expect large change in Afghanistan and systemic change, just more slowly. What we ought to look for is, first and foremost, the securing of key areas such as Kandahar, Helmand River valley, Khost, in order to contain and, ultimately, neutralize the enemy systems.

The second thing that we ought to be looking for is a substantial increase, an exponential increase, in the size and capability of the Afghan national security forces. It is one of the reasons why we need more U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Because hitherto we have not had the kind of relationship, the partnering relationship, with the Afghan army that we have had with our counterparts in Iraq.

I have been to Iraq eight times since May 2007. And, since July 2007, I have rarely, if ever, met a U.S. battalion or brigade commander without his Iraqi counterpart. In Afghanistan, in my two visits this year, including with General McChrystal’s assessment team, I did not actually have the opportunity to meet an Afghan counterpart to a battalion or brigade commander. That tells you something about how we are doing our partnering and how we are increasing the size of the Afghan army.

So what we actually have to do is create a decisive situation on the ground. And I think that that will take several years. And it will also take several years to increase the strength of the Afghan army and the size of the Afghan army enough to be able to start handing over responsibilities to them.
That is to say, we should not expect a sudden change in 2010 the way we saw a sudden change in 2007 in Iraq. Rather, we should expect a two- to three-year process if General McChrystal gets what he wants, if those forces come into theater in a timely fashion, and then, finally, if those forces have the effect that he believes that they will have.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you so much.

I am short of time. Dr. Krepinevich, let me go to you next, because I had Dr. Dorronsoro, I think, before. So go ahead.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Just very quickly, I agree with Dr. Kagan.

I would also add that, again, to a great extent, it is not just what is going on internal to Afghanistan; it is, obviously, also what is going on in Pakistan. To the extent that the Pakistanis take a more active role in this effort, that could accelerate progress in Afghanistan.

Also, I wouldn’t rule out the consequences of what happens in Iraq. If, for some reason, our position in Iraq really begins to erode, I think that makes things just all the more difficult in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

And there are some metrics. Again, I think as Dr. Kagan said, you should be looking for some of the things I mentioned earlier: increased role on the part of the Afghan National Army; you know, what percentage of the overall effort has been assumed by them.

I think one intriguing metric that we looked at during the operations in Iraq were what percentage of contacts with the enemy are initiated by our side. And if that percentage is growing over time, what that means is we are getting better and better intelligence about who the enemy is and where the enemy is. And so that is one surrogate for identifying whether or not you are winning the intelligence war, which is a surrogate for where the center of gravity, the population’s disposition is.

But, again, as Congresswoman Davis said, it is difficult. And I think, whether you like Rumsfeld or not, his phrase, “long, hard slog,” just keeps coming back again and again to mind.

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Kagen.

Dr. KAGEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me just preface my questions with my own personal experience as a physician, having treated our veterans in military hospitals and Veterans Affairs hospitals (VAs) and my own clinics for a number of decades. And there is no greater national treasure than our veterans who have served. And for those that have come back damaged, not just mentally but physically, it is really hard to put Humpty-Dumpty back together again. Not just the soldiers, both men and women, but their families, their communities, the businesses that they had or that they worked for. So this is a deadly serious conversation that we are having, and I would like to share with you that perspective.

So, what the soldiers have told me for 33 years as their doctor about the region we are talking about is it is real easy to get into Afghanistan and real difficult to get out. It is easy to get in, and it is hard to get out.

And the Russians found that out when they went in. And when they left, they were being shot in the back end. And what did they win? What victory was theirs? Two thousand three hundred years
ago, when Ashoka conquered the region, Ashoka turned to become a pacifist because of the carnage and the destruction that he had led his people into.

So, is it possible for the United States—because that is who we represent—to align our own national goals with the existing tribal entities and groups that are present on the ground and allow those tribal entities to share their values, their goals with our strategic values about pushing back against and eliminating al Qaeda?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. That one is for me?

Dr. KAGEN. Take all three.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I would say that, in a sense, there are crosscutting goals. Obviously, the tribes in Afghanistan do not share every goal that we have, you know, given our different role in the world from theirs. I do think that there are some goals in common. I do think, if you look at the period immediately after 9/11 when we went into Afghanistan, the population there was very happy to be rid of the Taliban.

And I think, in an insurgency, you know, there is the old phrase, “You have to win the hearts and minds, but if you have to choose, win the minds.” In other words, it is more important to convince the population that you are going prevail than it is to convince them that they ought to like you. Because, whether they like you or not, they are going to have to make their peace with whoever prevails in the conflict. So I think that is an important element.

I think that, to a certain extent, we squandered a lot of the gains we made in the first couple of years. Their expectations were low, and we failed to meet them. In a sense, a very gradual slope, hoping things would get better. And, in effect, as was pointed out, resources were withdrawn toward the end of 2002, not only——

Dr. KAGEN. I would like to extend your answer also to the Pakistan region, because these are also—it is a mutual area; it is “Pashtunistan,” in my view.

So how do we align their interest with ours so that we don’t have to waste our national resources and our men and women?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Again, I think you are talking on a much broader plain over a much deeper or longer period of time. I am no expert on Pakistani ethnic groups, but, certainly, one area that has to be an area of enormous concern is the rise of madrassas that form a ready recruiting center for a lot of the young people who turn to radical Muslim agendas and so on.

And, you know, how do you cut that pipeline? Is it a case of where parents in Pakistan, if given a choice between sending their child to a madrassa or to a public school that gives you an education that you can really use in modern Pakistani society, if they had that choice to make, you know, which way would they make it, I guess.

There are huge issues in that country with respect to, for example, water resources. And I think solving that is key to essentially avoiding an even greater disaster and then potentially radicalizing even more people.

So, you know, this cuts so wide and cuts so deep. And, again, Congresswoman Davis’s point about, you know, this is certainly very difficult. I keep coming back to President Kennedy’s speech that he made down at Rice University in 1962. He talked about the
Cold War, in general, and the space race and so on. He ended up saying, “We choose to do these things not because they are easy but because they are hard.” And a sense that each generation is defined not by the easy challenges they surmount but the difficult and hard challenges that they are willing to take on and prevail in. Of course, the $64 question here is, is that challenge possible to prevail in?

Dr. KAGEN. Dr. Dorronsoro.

Dr. DORRONSORO. I would say that the values are very different between the Afghan people, generally speaking, except a few in the cities, but the values, our values, are very different.

The second point is that a minority of the population is tribalized in Afghanistan. So the tribes are not that important. You have two different things. People can have a tribal identity, but it doesn’t mean that they are organized with tribal institution. And the only place where you have tribal institution is in the east, actually, functioning tribal institution.

And there it would have been possible in 2002, 2003, 2004, to do something, but it is lost now, because the Taliban have undermined the tribal system in Afghanistan. They are revolutionary in local terms, and they are fighting the tribes very much but not enough to create the kind of social program you have in Iraq.

So I don’t see which tribe is going now to work with the United States against the Taliban. It is too late. One of the last tribes that wanted to do that, on the border, is not in a neutral position. So they do not attack anymore the Taliban when they cross their territory. So we have lost the tribal potential ally, you know. That is dead.

On the Pakistan side, I don’t see how we can really align our interests with Pakistanis’ interests, being the Pakistani army is totally obsessed by India. So their only problem is with India. So they want us out of Afghanistan and the Taliban back in Kabul for one reason, is that if the Taliban are back in Kabul, India will be no more in Afghanistan. And they think it is going to be good for their strategies there. At the same time, we can have other ideas about what would be the consequences on Pakistan if the Taliban are back in Kabul, but whatever.

So I don’t see any possibility to align our interests with Pakistan on this subject. But fighting al Qaeda could be a common interest with Pakistan—the Pakistani army, Pakistani Government. That is not a big deal. The big deal is the Afghan Taliban, specifically.

And let’s think, if we think about Pakistani tribes on the Pakistani side the border, it is hugely, hugely anti-American. I mean, it is just crazy. So there is absolutely no possibility to do anything on this side of the border.

Dr. KAGEN. Thank you.

Dr. KAGAN. Congressman, I think we need to look at this question at a micro-level and then at a macro-level.

We, at the Institute for the Study of War—I have a team of analysts who work with me doing open-source analysis—have been preparing a report on Kandahar city and its environs and, really, what the history of U.S. coalition force engagement in Kandahar has been and how that has interacted with local tribal family political structures. And we hope to release it next week.
What is very interesting, as we start looking at the most localized dynamics, is that the United States and its coalition partners have not gone out of their way to support those individuals, families, and tribes that have historically been pro-government or anti-Taliban. Rather, we have not really taken into consideration the leanings of a tribe, a family, or an area as we have deployed our forces and given our resources.

As a result, the Taliban has consistently been able to undermine those tribes, families, leadership structures that either actively support the government or actively detract from the Taliban; the Arghandab district of Kandahar Province being one key example that we explore in our paper.

So, at a microscopic level, what we can see is that the allocation of forces to specific areas can change the dynamics of the power structures at a local level and, actually, do so in ways that have national political ramifications. For example, because the Karzai family is from Kandahar, the effect that our troops will have in the Arghandab River and region will have an impact on how it is that the Karzai family is able to use its power not only within Kandahar but nationally.

And I think, as we start to look at the McChrystal strategy, we have to, again, be aware that these kinds of nuances, they are the kinds of nuances that our commanders on the ground make when they actually allocate the resources that they are given to objectives.

But when we ask the question at a macro level, can we align the interests of the government of Afghanistan with U.S. interests, or the government of Pakistan with U.S. interests, I would remind all of you that, of course, there are different interest groups within these governments, and they compete with one another.

Certainly, we have an opportunity under way in Pakistan right now, as a constituency within the Pakistani Government has decided actively to pursue common enemies, particularly the Pakistani Taliban, in not only Bajaur, Swat, and Waziristan, but that has ramifications, of course, in Afghanistan writ large. We have opportunities to harness these particular and somewhat transient alignments that are now under way.

But we do not actually have to align all of the government factions and all of their interests with ours. We just need to create an alignment that allows us to achieve the kinds of narrow objectives that we have. For example, a functional government in Kabul that can secure Afghanistan through its use of force, that can regulate disputes, and that probably won't get in the way of the average ordinary person much more than that.

So we can't, certainly, align all of our interests, but we can see to it that we accomplish those objectives by aligning those handful of interests that we really need to compel our friends and foes to put up with.

And I think, as Dr. Krepinevich stated earlier in this Q&A session, the best way to do that is through strength. You can try to persuade people that their interests have something in common with yours, or you can try to persuade them that it is not useful for them to have other interests right now. And that is one of the roles that force plays in a counterinsurgency conflict.
Thank you.

Dr. Snyder. Thank you.

Most congressional hearings, as they proceed through the hour or two that they endure, we gradually lose members. I think this is the first time I have been in one where we have gradually lost witnesses. But we appreciate the two of you being here.

I actually want to end, Dr. Krepinevich, with two military personnel-related questions for you, if I might have you put on your old Army hat.

At the end of—about a year ago, this subcommittee put out this report, "Building Language Skills and Cultural Competencies in the Military: DOD's Challenge in Today's Educational Environment." I will just read the first couple sentences from the executive summary.

"There is no doubt that foreign language skills and cultural expertise are critical capabilities needed by today's military to face the challenges of our present security environment. But only a small part of today's military is proficient in a foreign language. And, until recently, there has been no comprehensive, systematic approach to develop cultural expertise."

I was reminded of our report, the unclassified version of General McChrystal's assessment. On page 1–2, he says, "As formidable as the threat may be, we make the problem harder. International Security Assistance Force is a conventional force that is poorly configured for counterinsurgency, inexperienced in local languages and culture, and struggling with challenges inherent to coalition warfare."

That phrase, "inexperienced in local languages and culture," what does it say—maybe this is a bit related to the solarium question. What does it say, after eight years in a country fighting a war, that we still have to say one of the things that is holding us back is inexperience in local languages and culture? What does that say about us and how we are going about doing things?

Dr. Krepinevich. I think one aspect is the work of your committee and the fact that the services—I have talked to people in the Army and the Marine Corps. They really are beginning to emphasize issues like cultural awareness, in particular, and also language proficiency.

What it says, I guess, from my own observation, is that I think, for a number of years, some of the military services, the Army and Marine Corps probably most, were in kind of a state of denial. You know, there was this issue of, A, we just didn't understand. You know, the Army had gotten out of the counterinsurgency business after Vietnam.

When I went down to Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 2003, they said, "We don't have any counterinsurgency—we have this old thing that nobody ever read. And we are going to have to sit down and start rethinking it." This was General Byrnes and his staff. They were very candid, and at least they recognized the problem.

So, not even understanding what kind of conflict they were in, asking him, "Well, what is our campaign plan in Iraq?" And it was, well, brigade commanders—it is kind of the jazz era; brigade commanders kind of doing what that brigade commander thinks he
ought to be doing. So I think there was this lag in understanding just what the problem was.

And then came the issue—and I think it is one of the reasons why you didn't see Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs)—that this was a one-off. I mean, the strategy was, as President Bush said, as they stand up, we will stand down. Well, we are training these guys. If they are going to be ready to go in Iraq in 2005 and 2006, we don't need MRAPs. By the time we get them, we are going to be out of there. So there was this, "Well, we are getting out of town here, and this is really kind of a one-off." And I had an Army general tell me, "Look, we have had our hand on the stove for a while now," meaning we have been in Iraq and Afghanistan. "Once we take our hand off the stove, and it isn't going to be long, we are not going to do this again. The American people won't tolerate it. Look at all the dissension it is causing."

So I think there was a combination of just not knowing what we had gotten ourselves into. We had gotten out of that business, in a sense. And so there was a lag in understanding what exactly the requirements were. And then I think there was a bit longer of a lag as a consequence of a belief, at least on the part of many, that this was kind of a one-off. You know, "Okay, we understand what we are in, but we really aren't going to be in it much longer. We are going to turn it over to those guys, and then we will go back to business as usual."

And, you know, there is always the institutional resistance, you know, officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), trying to acquire these skills. I talked to Marines, and their attitude was, "Well, yeah, we will do it, but each Marine is going to do it on his or her time. We are not going to put any of this in"—you know, because Marines are just too darn busy. Well, you have to make that a priority. And so that became an issue.

So, again, it is very encouraging to see people like yourself and the Members pushing this issue. I know Congressman Skelton has been a long-time advocate of the importance of military education. And it is also encouraging to see some kind of a payoff. Because, obviously, when people like General McChrystal highlight it and are really banging the table on it, I think we have finally turned a corner.

Dr. SNYDER. The second question I want to ask—and any of you should feel free to punt on this one since you had no—this was not in McChrystal's report. But you mentioned earlier the increase in the size of the Army and the increase in the size of the Marine Corps. And I think all of you in some way have discussed the stress on the force and the numbers, that a large deployment can cause stress on the military families.

One of the issues that has been discussed through the years by the American people and this Congress is the role of women in the military. And they have played such an important role in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

We have some very convoluted and complex statutory restrictive language that, I would think, would be difficult for the military to comply with, although they assure us that they do, with regard to both Afghanistan and Iraq.
Is it time just to get rid of that legislative language and tell the Department of Defense that they need to do with the personnel what is in the best interest of the military, assuming there will be some units that they may conclude they are not going to have women in or there may be some military occupational specialties (MOS) they may conclude—but is it time just to say it needs to be up to the military to make that decision rather than Congress?

Dr. KREPINevich. Again, I am no expert, but my gut tells me that your gut instinct right.

I was out on an aircraft carrier a couple years ago. Admiral Stavridis invited me out. And you see these planes coming in. It is amazing, these 19- and 20-year-old kids basically running the entire operation. And this one Marine jet lands, F–14, this pilot gets out, and I think, “That is one heck of a small pilot.” The pilot takes her helmet off, and it is a “her.” And it is just—I mean, I have spent most of my life in the Army; it was dominated by men.

And you come to realize that, in so many jobs, combat and non-combatant jobs, that you don’t have to be a pro wrestler in order to do the job. If you are physically fit, you are probably qualified. And a lot of it involves mental agility and technical expertise. And that is not the domain, you know, purely of men, if it is in their domain at all. Sometimes I wonder. The other aspect is, obviously, there are a lot of women who are more physically fit than men, so the notion that only men can do this, I think, has certainly been proven wrong.

I would say the only concern—and it would certainly fall within the parameters of what you just defined—is anything that would be detrimental to good order and discipline. And I guess we are going to get a test when we have females on submarines. That is a very tough environment to be in, very closed, constricted, long periods of time.

But, again, I think you are right. I mean, if we try and eliminate common sense and the needs of the service out of this by being overly restrictive, I don’t think we help the soldiers and the other service members, I don’t think we help our military, and I don’t think we help our country. And, again, I am a big fan of common sense in those situations.

Dr. Snyder. I think all of us have participated in welcome-home events and award ceremonies, and the number of women that have been indispensable in the success of the missions has been very impressive.

And I think it has probably been brought home, just in the last two or three weeks. I think it may have been The New York Times that had the wonderful photograph of the four Marines sitting down taking a break, doing a classic military thing, which is a boot off and a sock off, trying to figure out what the hell is going wrong with that foot. And they were all four women Marines in Afghanistan.

Dr. KREPINevich. Well, the other thing is that, you know, there really are, in these wars, no front lines, no rear lines. It is not as though, if you are here, you are safe.

Dr. Snyder. Which makes it—and that is the beginning of my question. The difficulty, I think, the difficulty of trying to comply with the kind of statutory restriction we put on them that may
make sense in a Cold War scenario with a potential for a hot war, but I think it makes it very convoluted.

We appreciate both of you still being here. Thank you.

We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:48 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
Thank you, Chairman Snyder, and good afternoon to our witnesses – we appreciate your being here today.

Today marks our third subcommittee hearing on Afghanistan. At the time of our first hearing, October 22, I thought that the two months the President and his staff had had to review General McChrystal’s assessment was sufficient. Now another four weeks have drifted by, and we still don’t have a decision.

Those four weeks have been eventful, with the cancellation of the runoff presidential election and the release of Ambassador Eikenberry’s apparent recommendation to minimize the number of any additional troops because of his lack of confidence in President Karzai and his government. These events, while newsworthy, have not changed the fundamentals of the situation in Afghanistan, nor diminished in any way
the fundamental need for this nation to set a clear and enduring commitment to stability in south Asia.

While I have the greatest respect for Ambassador Eikenberry, I note we haven’t seen the text of his secret cable, which I expect reflects his real and deserved frustration with President Karzai. I have no doubt that each week will bring another revelation regarding Afghanistan. I have to point out again, however, that nothing has changed. Mr. Karzai has been in office five years, and now has another five year term. That was the expected outcome six months ago.

We cannot continue to hope for perfect information or a solid national government before making a decision. If things were going our way, we wouldn’t need more troops at all.

But things are not going our way. Something needs to change and change soon.

There are 68,000 American soldiers, Marines, Airmen, and sailors serving in Afghanistan today, doing the best they can. According to their commander, General McChrystal, they cannot succeed without help. No one disputes that assessment. We’ve already said we’re not
leaving. Given this set of circumstances, the President has no other choice but to provide General McChrystal with the resources he requested. I urge the President to announce his decision in support of General McChrystal’s plan the day he returns from his trip to Asia. The 68,000 American fighting men and women there now deserve no less. They’ve sounded the bugle call; it’s time to let the cavalry respond.

I look forward to the discussion today.
Testimony of General Wesley K. Clark (ret.) to the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on U. S. strategy in Afghanistan and how that affects strategy in Iraq.

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you on these important questions of national strategy and military endeavor in Afghanistan.

I must acknowledge first that I am greatly in sympathy with our military commanders, and especially General McChrystal, who has asked for more troops. No doubt he needs them to provide security for the population, to train the Afghan forces, and to impede and constrain Taliban reinforcement and replenishment along the porous border with Pakistan. Were I in his position, I would undoubtedly have asked for more troops, too. But this is not the principal question we should be addressing today, however great the outcry demanding some specific number of reinforcements.

Rather, we should be addressing the purpose of our engagement there, our specific mission, the strategy, and its requirements for success in diplomatic, political economic and military terms. Only after these have been adequately defined should we turn to the specifics of things like troop levels.

The legacy of Vietnam looms large over these discussions. I recall from the early and mid 1960’s similar issues in our escalating presence in Southeast Asia - the same pleading for more troops, the diplomatic constraints hindering cross-border operations to get at the source and sustainment of that conflict, the careful - and in retrospect misguided efforts - to balance military needs, strategic concerns outside of Vietnam, and political support in the United States.

In that case we did it mostly wrong. When we could have used decisive military means we were self-deterred. When we piece-meal and gradually reinforced we lost public support, and when we finally attempted to use decisive force, it was too late.

Every conflict is different. Afghanistan is not Vietnam. But we must nevertheless learn from our experiences. There are worrisome similarities in both conflicts, including a local government that lacks legitimacy, and of course, the bureaucracies and politics of military escalation and diminishing US public support are little changed across forty years.

In Afghanistan, what is our purpose? Not to defeat Al-Qaeda, for they are not largely there. Not to create a functioning, Western-style democracy, for that is clearly beyond our means in a nation 90% illiterate imbued with wholly different values. Something less.

We seek in Afghanistan nothing more than to prevent the emergence of a terrorist state that would physically harbor Al-Qaeda and use its diplomatic and legal authorities as weapons against the very international system of which it is a member. These are minimalist objectives. They could be met by diplomacy, by promoting economic development and regional economic integration, by acting through regional allies, and, if necessary, by our direct threat, by preemptive strikes and limited incursions. We can also defend against threats here at home, as we have learned since 9/11.
In principle, our purpose there does not require us to reconstruct the Afghan state, any more than we are reconstructing Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, or other locations where terrorists are or have found shelter. And therefore we have no inherent need to fight a comprehensive, counter-insurgent war there to do so.

The war in Afghanistan should have been declared over when we broke the back of the Taliban force and drove the Taliban from power. We failed, however, to capture or eliminate Osama bin Laden in the process. He and the senior leadership of Al Qaeda, believed to be located in Pakistan, remain a threat.

Now, together with our NATO allies, we have almost 100,000 troops in Afghanistan. Any abrupt reversal of existing US policy, including the abandonment of Hamid Karzai and his government, and the prompt withdrawal of US forces might have serious adverse consequences far beyond Afghanistan. Al Qaeda would claim credit, terrorist recruitment would surge, subversion within the states allied and friendly with us would intensify, the stability of democracy in neighboring Pakistan could be further undercut, and US power and prestige might be seen to wane.

On the other hand, the longer we stay, and the larger our force, the more resistance and resentment that we create, by our disruptive influence, by the casualties we inflict deliberately and accidentally. We are a foreign element there in a culture which doesn’t tolerate diversity. However appealing it is to us to say, we won’t quit, this mistakes American will as the potential weakness, whereas in actuality it is the strength of our resolution, our persistence and determination which cause difficulties in the region.

There is an Islamic revival underway, a struggle to cope with the spiritual impact of modernization and globalism, and that revival draws energy from the antagonism our presence creates. We need to find our way out, seizing credit for such successes as can be achieved, for the region is better dealt with from a distance than with our presence, and especially not with military presence.

The approach I would recommend is focused on an exit strategy. The best exit would be after the take down of the top Al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan. This is an objective about which discussion has been publicly suppressed, and it probably should remain so. But I hope it will be foremost in the minds of the Administration.

In the meantime, in Afghanistan, our exit strategy must be built around four factors: attempting to reduce the level of violence by seeking a political amelioration of the conflict. Greater assistance to the government of Pakistan in dealing with the Al Qaeda and Taliban remaining in Pakistan, economic development in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and developing a more capable security structure for the Afghans.

Details:

- Incentives must be provided to create a more representative, more legitimate government. These incentives could be framed around individual leaders, specific structural changes, or economic...
development opportunities. They can be positive or negative. President Karzai should take the lead in this process. US military reinforcements or withdrawals may factor in as inducements to various parties. Additional troops in the context of such a strategy are not unreasonable, (and we should also be discussing vastly enhanced economic development advice and assistance). But, we must be unmistakably clear on an endstate, and as this process of political engagement moves forward, it may even be desirable to establish a firm exit date by which we will end the US and NATO mission. We may need to reconstruct outside presence underneath a UN umbrella with a very limited US government advisory and assistance mission.

- Pakistan should be leased the additional military hardware and provided the access to intelligence and intelligence collection systems as well as given appropriate incentives to deal with Al Qaeda and the Taliban threat there and to strengthen security along its Afghan border. At the same time, the US should undertake a focused Pakistani economic development effort, and take credit for it publicly. And more must be done directly against the Al Qaeda leadership.

- Afghan economic development should be promoted in the agricultural sector through providing an enhanced market for Afghan crops. The goal would be to outbid farmer’s returns from growing poppies. In addition Afghanistan is wealthy in minerals and hydrocarbons. The US should encourage the development of these resources, and should also promote the long-discussed gas pipeline connecting India and Pakistan with Central Asian gas resources.

- additional Afghan forces must be organized, equipped and trained, but primarily they should be built on a militia model able to provide local, static security for the population as a complement to the police, with the existing Army enabled to provide a mobile reserve. A long term commitment to their logistics and intelligence needs will be required.

These measures are neither simple nor easy. There is no guarantee of success. In matters of strategy, there are only two kinds of plans, those that might work and those that won’t work. This approach might work.

But it is important to face the reality of the situation at this point: much has already been accomplished: our obligations are limited; there will never be a complete and wholly satisfactory solution, and we must focus on meeting our own - the US and NATO’s - security needs. And the real security need in the region now is to reduce the continuing threat of Al Qaeda, reportedly located principally in Pakistan. It is their decisive defeat that we must seek.
General Wesley Clark

Born in 1944 in Chicago, Illinois and raised in Little Rock, Arkansas, Wesley Clark distinguished himself early as an athlete and a scholar, leading his high school swimming team to a state championship and graduating first in his class from West Point. In 1966, he was awarded a Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford University, where he earned a Masters Degree in Politics, Philosophy and Economics.

During thirty-four years of service in the United States Army Wesley K. Clark rose to the rank of four-star general as NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. After his retirement in 2000, he became an investment banker, author, commentator, and businessman. In September 2003 he answered the call to stand as a Democratic candidate for President of the United States, where his campaign won the state of Oklahoma and launched him to national prominence before he returned to the private sector in February 2004.

In his final military command, General Clark commanded Operation Allied Force, NATO’s first major combat action, which saved 1.5 million Albanians from ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, and he was responsible for the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia.

In previous duty, General Clark was the Commander-in-Chief, US Southern Command, where he was responsible for all US military activities in Latin America and the Caribbean. And from April 1994 through June 1996, he was the Director of Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5, in the Joint Staff, where he helped negotiate the end to the war in Bosnia. His previous assignments include a wide variety of command and staff positions, including Command of the 1st Cavalry Division.

General Clark’s awards and honors include the Presidential Medal of Freedom, The State Department Distinguished Service Award; the US Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal (five awards), The US Army Distinguished Service Medal (two awards), The Silver Star, the Bronze Star (two awards), the Purple Heart, and Honorary Knighthoods from the British and Dutch governments.


General Clark joined UCLA as a senior fellow at the Burke Center for International Relations in UCLA’s International Institute in 2006, where he teaches seminars, publishes through the Burke Center and hosts an annual conference of government, corporate and opinion leaders from around the world on national security.

General Clark currently serves in leadership roles with a number of non-profit public service organizations, including Vote-Vets (Board of Advisors), Democrats Work (National Advisory Board), Project H.E.R.O. (Campaign Chairperson), the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Distinguished Senior Adviser), the Center for American Progress (Trustee), the International Crisis Group (Board Member), City Year Little Rock (Board Chair), the United States Institute of Peace (United Nations Task Force Member), and the General Accountability Office (Advisory Board Member).
DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S.
House of Representatives for the 111th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses
appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum
vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants
(including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous
fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is
intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in
complying with the House rule.

Witness name: General Wesley Clark, USA (Ret.)

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)
√ Individual
_ Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other
entity being represented: ________________________________________________

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Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

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Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

- Current fiscal year (2009): N/A
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List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

- Current fiscal year (2009): N/A
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Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

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Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2009): N/A
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Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

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List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

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Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

Current fiscal year (2009): N/A
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HOW NOT TO DEFEAT AL QAEDA

To Win in Afghanistan Requires Troops on the Ground


President Obama has announced his intention to conduct a review of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan from firm principles before deciding whether or not to accept General Stanley McChrystal’s proposed surge and request for more forces. This review is delaying the decision. If the delay goes on much longer, it will force military leaders either to rush the deployment in a way that increases the strain on soldiers and their families or to lose the opportunity to set the stage for the surge campaign. The president’s determination to make sure of his policy before committing the additional 40,000 or so forces required by General McChrystal’s campaign plan is, nevertheless, understandable. The conflict in Afghanistan is complex, and it is important that we understand what we are trying to do.

At the center of the complexity is a deceptively simple question: If the United States is fighting a terrorist organization—al Qaeda—why must we conduct a counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan against two other groups—the Quetta Shura Talibans and the Haqqani Network—that have neither the objective nor the capability to attack the United States outside Afghanistan? Shouldn’t we fight a terrorist organization with a counterterrorist strategy, customarily defined as relying on long-range precision weapons and Special Forces raids to eliminate key terrorist leaders? Why must we become embroiled in the politics and social dysfunctionality of the fifth-poorest country in the world? Surely, some surrounding Presidents Obama appear to be arguing, it makes more sense to confine our operations narrowly to the aim we care most about: defeating the terrorists and so preventing them from killing Americans.

This argument rests on two essential assumptions: that al Qaeda is primarily a terrorist group and that it is separable from the insurgent groups among which it lives and through whom it operates. Let us examine these assumptions.

Al Qaeda is a highly ideological organization that openly states its aims and general methods. It seeks to replace existing governments in the Muslim world, which it regards as apostate, with a regime based on its own interpretation of the Koran and Muslim tradition. It relies on a reading of some of the earliest Muslim traditions to justify its right to declare Muslims apostates if they do not behave according to its own interpretation of Islam and to kill them if necessary. This reading is actually nearly identical to a belief that developed in the earliest years of Islam after Muhammad’s death, which mainstream Muslims quickly rejected as a heresy (the Kharijite movement), and it remains heretical to the overwhelming majority of Muslims today. The question of the religious legality of killing Muslims causes tensions within al Qaeda and between al Qaeda and other Muslims, leading to debates over the wisdom of fighting the “near enemy,” i.e., the “apostate” Muslim governments in the region, or the “far enemy,” i.e., the West and especially the United States, which al Qaeda believes provides indispensable support to those “apostate” governments. The Q/J attack resulted from the temporary triumph of the “far enemy” school.

Above all, al Qaeda does not see itself as a terrorist organization. It defines itself as the vanguard in the
Institute for the Study of War  
works by our authors  
October 11, 2006

Lenninist sense: a revolutionary movement whose aim is to take power throughout the Muslim world. It is an insurgent organization with global aims. Its use of terrorism (for which it has developed lengthy and elaborate religious justifications) is simply a reflection of its current situation. If al Qaeda had the ability to conduct guerrilla warfare with success, it would do so. If it could wage conventional war, it would probably prefer to do so. It has already made clear that it desires to wage chemical, biological, and nuclear war when possible.

In this respect, al Qaeda is very different from terrorist groups like the IRA, ETA, and even Hamas. Those groups use or use terrorism in pursuit of political objectives confined to a specific region—expelling the British from Northern Ireland, creating an independent or autonomous Basque land, expelling Israel from Palestine. The Ulstermen did not seek to destroy Britain or march on London; the Basques are not in mortal combat with Spaniards; and even Hamas seeks only to drive the Jews out of Israel, not to reinstate them throughout the world. Al Qaeda, by contrast, seeks to rule the world’s 1.5 billion Muslims and to reduce the non-Muslim peoples to subservience. For al Qaeda, terrorism is a start, not an end nor even the preferred means. It goes without saying that the United States and the West would face catastrophic consequences if al Qaeda ever managed to obtain the ability to wage war by different means. Defeating al Qaeda requires more than disrupting its leadership cells so that they cannot plan and conduct attacks in the United States. It also requires preventing al Qaeda from obtaining the capabilities to wage real war beyond terrorist strikes.

Al Qaeda does not exist in a vacuum like the SPECTRE of James Bond movies. It has always operated in close coordination with allies. The anti-Soviet jihad of the 1980s was the crucible in which al Qaeda (under first bin Laden and then the Taliban) was forged. When the Taliban took power in 1996, they established al Qaeda’s base in Pakistan. Al Qaeda leaders deplored the Afghan war and established their network of couriers (mostly Afghan and Pakistanii) to carry messages between bin Laden and his lieutenants. They maintained contact with bin Laden and his lieutenants.

Bin Laden and al Qaeda could not have functioned as they did in the 1990s without the active support of Mullah Omar and the Taliban. The Taliban and al Qaeda leaders cooperated closely, and bin Laden and his men, both in Afghanistan and Pakistan, were instrumental in maintaining the presence of bin Laden and his lieutenants. The Taliban and al Qaeda cooperated closely in supporting and funding the Afghan war. They also provided a network of logistic, financial, and political support to the Taliban, which allowed them to continue their fight against the British and the West. In return, bin Laden provided financial and military support to the Taliban, which allowed them to continue their fight against the British and the West.
Ladies shared his wealth with the Taliban and later sent his fighters into battle to defend the Taliban regime against the U.S.-sided Northern Alliance attack after 9/11.

The relationship that developed between bin Laden and Mullah Omar was deep and strong. It helps explain why Mullah Omar refused categorically to expel bin Laden after 9/11 even though he knew that failing to do so could lead to the destruction of the Taliban state—as it did. In return, bin Laden recognizes Mullah Omar as Amir al-Muminun—the “Commander of the Faithful”—a religious title the Taliban uses to legitimize its activities and shadow-state. The alliance between al Qaeda and the Haqqanis (now led by Sirajuddin, successor to his aging and ailing father, Jalaluddin) also remains strong. The Haqqani network still claims the terrain of Greater Pakhto, can project attacks into Kohat, and seems to facilitate the kinds of spectacular attacks in Afghanistan that are the hallmark of al Qaeda’s training and technical expertise. There is no reason whatever to believe that Mullah Omar or the Haqqanis—whose religious and political views remain closely aligned with al Qaeda’s—would fail to offer renewed hospitality to their friend and ally of 20 years, bin Laden.

Mullah Omar and the Haqqanis are not the ones hosting al Qaeda today, however, since the presence of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan has made that country too dangerous for bin Laden and his lieutenants. They now reside for the most part on the other side of the Durand Line, among the midst of anti-government insurgent and terrorist groups that live in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the Northwestern Frontier Province of Pakistan. These groups—including the Tehrik-e Taliban-e Pakistan, led until his recent death by Fazlullah, the Tehrik-e Taliban-e Pakistan, the Lashkar-e-Talib, the Lashkar-e-Talib, and the Lashkar-e-Tauhid, each responsible for the Mumbaw attack—now provide some of the same services to al Qaeda that the Taliban provided when they ruled Afghanistan. Mullah Omar continues to help, moreover, by intervening in disputes among the more fractious Pakistani groups to try to maintain cohesion within the movement. All of these groups coordinate their activities, moreover, and all have voices within the Pashtun Share (central). They are not isolated groups, but rather a network of networks, both a social and a political grouping run, in the manner of Pashtunwala, by a number of names, of which that in Pashtunwala is theoretically preeminent.

All of which is to say that the common image of al Qaeda leaders flitting like bats from cave to cave in the badlands of Pakistan is inaccurate. Al Qaeda leaders do fit (and no doubt sometimes sleep in caves)—but they fit like guests from friend to friend in areas controlled by their allies. Their allies provide them with shelter and food, with warning of impending attacks, with the means to move rapidly. Their allies provide communications services—runners and the use of their own more modern systems to help al Qaeda’s senior leaders avoiding electronic footprints that our forces could use to track and target them. Their allies provide means of moving money and other strategic resources around, as well as the means of imparting critical knowledge (like expertise in explosives) in cadres. Their allies provide media support, helping to get the al Qaeda message out and then serving as an echo chamber to magnify it via their own media resources.

Could al Qaeda perform all of these functions itself, without the help of local allies? It probably could. In Iraq, certainly, the al Qaeda organization established its own administrative, logistical, training, recruiting, and support structures under the rubric of its own state—the Islamic State of Iraq. For a while, this system worked well for the terrorists: it supported a concerted terror campaign in and around Baghdad virtually unprecedented in its scale and viciousness. It also created serious vulnerabilities for Al Qaeda in Iraq, however. The establishment of this autonomous, foreign-run structure left a seam between Al Qaeda in Iraq and the local population and their leaders. As long as the population continued to be in open revolt against...
the United States and the Iraqi government, this same was not terribly damaging to al Qaeda. But as local
leaders began to abandon their insurgent operations, al Qaeda in Iraq became dangerously exposed and,
ultimately, came to be seen as an enemy by the very populations that had previously supported it.

There was no such seam in Afghanistan before 9/11. Al Qaeda did not attempt to control territory or ad-
minister populations there. It left all such activities in the hands of Mullah Omar and Jalaluddin Haqqani.
It still does—relying on those groups as well as on the Islamist groups in Waziristan and the Northwest
Frontier Province to do the governing and administrating while it focuses on the global war. Afghanistan had
very little interaction with al Qaeda, and so had no reason to turn against the group. The same is true in
Pakistan today. The persistence of allies who assist in governing and administrating, as well as simply con-
trolling territory from al Qaeda from those numerous day-to-day responsibilities and helps shield the organiza-
tion from the blowback it suffered in Iraq. It reduces the vulnerability of the organization and enormously
complicates efforts to defeat or destroy it.

The theory proposed by some in the White House and the press that an out-of-country, high-tech coun-
terterrorist campaign could destroy a terrorist network such as al Qaeda is fraught with erroneous assump-
tions. Killing skilled terrorists is very hard to do. The best—and most dangerous—of them avoid using
-cellphones, computers, and other devices that leave obvious electronic footprints. Tracking them requires
either capitalizing on their mistakes in using such devices or generating human intelligence about their
whereabouts from sources on the ground. When the terrorists operate among relatively friendly popula-
tions, gaining useful human intelligence can be extremely difficult if not impossible. The free-living the
population to the terrorists, the more able houses in which they can hide, the fewer people who even desire
to inform the United States or its proxies about the location of terrorist leaders, the more likely it is to
tell the terrorists about any such informants (and to punish those informants), the more people who can
help to cancel the movement of the terrorist leaders and their runners, and so on.

Counterterrorist forces do best when the terrorists must operate among neutral or hostile populations
while under severe military pressure, including from troops on the ground. Such pressure forces terrorist
leaders to rely more on communications equipment for self-defense and for coordination of larger efforts.
It greatly restricts the terrorists' ability to move around, making them easier targets, and to receive and
distribute money, weapons, and recruits. This is the scenario that developed in Iraq during and after the
surge, and it dramatically increased the vulnerability of terrorist groups to U.S. (and Iraqi) strikes.

Not only did the combination of isolation and pressure make senior leaders more vulnerable, but it posed
substantial problems as well. Attacking such individuals is important for two reasons: It disrupts the abil-
ity of the organization to operate at all, and it eliminates some of the people most likely to replace senior
leaders who are killed. Attacking middle management dramatically reduces the resilience of a terrorist
organization, as well as its effectiveness. The intelligence requirement for such attacks is daunting, however.
Identifying and locating the senior leadership of a group is one thing. Finding the people who arrange taxes,
distribute funds and weapons, recruit, run IED-cells, and so on, is something else entirely—unless the
counterterrorist force actually has a meaningful presence on the ground among the people.

The most serious operational challenge of the pure counterterrorist approach, however, is to eliminate bad
guys faster than they can be replaced. Isolated killings of senior leaders, spread out over months or years,
quickly do serious systemic harm to their organizations. The best-known example is the death of Abu Musab
al Zarqawi, founder and head of al Qaeda in Iraq, in June 2006, following which the effectiveness and
lethality of that group only grew. It remains to be seen what the effect of Baitullah Mehsud’s death will be—although it is evident that the presence of the Pakistani military on the ground assisted the high-tech targeting that killed him. Such is the vigor of the groups he controlled that his death occasioned a power struggle among his deputies.

One essential question that advocates of a pure counterterrorism approach must answer, therefore, is: Can the United States significantly accelerate the rate at which our forces identify, target, and kill senior and mid-level leaders? Our efforts to do so have failed to date, despite the commitment of enormous resources to that problem over eight years at the expense of other challenges. Could we do better? The limiting factor on the rate of attrition we can impose on the enemy’s senior leadership is our ability to generate the necessary intelligence, not our ability to put metal on target. Perhaps there is a way to increase the attrition rate. If so, advocates of this approach have an obligation to explain what it is. They must also explain why removing U.S. and NATO forces from the theater will not make collecting timely intelligence even harder—effectively slowing the attrition rate. Their argument is counterintuitive at best.

Pursuing a counterinsurgency strategy against the Taliban and Haqqani network—that is, using American forces to protect the population from them while building the capability of the Afghan Army—appears at first an indirect approach to defeating al Qaeda. In principle, neither the Taliban nor the Haqqani network pose an immediate danger to the United States. Why then should we fight them?

We should fight them because, in practice they are integrally connected with al Qaeda. Allowing the Taliban and the Haqqani network to expand their areas of control and influence would offer new opportunities to al Qaeda that its leaders appear determined to seize. It would relieve the pressure on al Qaeda, giving its operatives more scope to protect themselves while working to project power and influence around the world. It would reduce the amount of usable intelligence we could expect to receive, thus reducing the rate at which we could target key leaders. Allowing al Qaeda’s allies to succeed would seriously undermine the counterterrorism mission and would make the success of that mission extremely unlikely.
WHY THE TALIBAN ARE WINNING--FOR NOW

The last few years have been a strategic fiasco, but this war is still winnable. Here’s how:

By Kimberly Kagan, Foreign Policy Magazine, August 10, 2009

The war in Afghanistan has not been going well, and it is no surprise that Americans are frustrated. Many observers can rightly point to signs of progress: the functionality of specific Afghan government ministries and programs, the slow growth of the Afghan National Army, the building of major infrastructure such as roads and dams, and agricultural improvements. These accomplishments, however, have not created the conditions that the United States aimed to achieve: an Afghan state capable of governing its territory, and able to deal effectively with both regional and local insurgent groups. Indeed, as Gen. Stanley McChrystal, commander of coalition forces, recently suggested, the situation shows signs of deteriorating: Afghan enemy groups remain highly capable, have gained momentum, and have expanded their areas of operations. Violence against coalition forces is rising. The question is: Why haven’t we been winning in Afghanistan?

Although I served on McChrystal’s assessment team, I do not know how he would answer this question, nor could I speculate about his recommendations for the strategy going forward. But after much research, as well as two visits to Afghanistan this year, I personally think that the military operations themselves are failing because there has been no coherent theaterwide counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. Despite U.S. President Barack Obama’s newly announced “Af-Pak” strategy, the U.S. and coalition campaign this summer is a continuation of the poorly designed operations from 2008. And the sheer inertia of military operations means that it will be hard to turn this super tanker around for the better part of this year. But turn it around we must, starting with correcting the following flaws in the strategy that McChrystal and his team inherited from their predecessors.

1. Fighting in the wrong places

NATO forces are widely dispersed throughout Afghanistan, even in the Paktika areas in the south and east, rather than concentrated on one or two priorities. A possible exception is Helmand, the only province in which two brigades are deployed -- the British force and the recently activated U.S. Marine expeditionary brigade. In contrast, during the surge in Iraq, the United States concentrated about half of its forces in Baghdad and its suburbs. Baghdad was the center of gravity of the fight. If we controlled it, we’d win; if the enemy controlled it, we’d lose. So five brigade combat teams -- roughly 25,000 troops with their enablers -- protected the city of 8 million people. Four more teams protected Baghdad’s southern approaches, and at least one, sometimes two, additional teams protected the city’s northern suburbs.

There is no simple equivalent to Baghdad in Afghanistan. Instead, most of the population -- and the insurgency -- is dispersed in rural areas. Nevertheless, some areas, such as Kandahar city and the districts around it, are more important -- to the enemy, to the Afghan government, and to us -- than others. And yet, there are almost no counterinsurgencies whatever in all but two of the districts around Kandahar, and none in the city itself, just a scant footprint from the Afghanistan national security forces. Worse still, the ratio of
countering insurgents to the population in those two districts is approximately 1 to 4.5. Close to the minimum re-
required. A good evaluation of our priorities in Afghanistan would yield a significantly different, and more
effective, distribution of coalition forces. This is undoubtedly why McChrystal recently told reporters that he
will be concentrating forces around Kandahar city.

2. Fighting in the wrong ways

Another problem is that NATO forces have briefed countering insurgency doctrine better than they have prac-
ticed it. Almost all NATO units in Pashtun areas claim that they are protecting the population by engaging
in a sequence of military operations known as “shape-clear-hold-build.” But these forces move through the
sequence too rapidly. Based on recent experiences in Iraq, shaping an area requires 30 to 45 days, clearing
it requires three to six months, and holding it takes longer than that. With very few exceptions, NATO forces
in Afghanistan have never operated on such timelines. They tend to shape and clearing operations into
a few weeks, and then they transition prematurely into what they perceive as a build phase. As a result, NATO
forces rarely gain permanent control over areas – or if they do, those areas are so small as to have little effect
on the insurgency or the population. The enemy simply dissipates and then returns.

What’s more, coalition and Afghan forces are extensively focused on securing supply lines and reducing the
threat of improvised explosive devices through tactical efforts rather than by countering the insurgency. Con-
sequently, many forces – especially Afghan forces – are distributed along the ring road, the main corridor
that circles the country. Static positions such as these waste troops. Of course, our forces must be able to
maneuver along strategic corridors, but the best way to do that is by securing populated areas and maneuvering
off the ring road to defeat the enemy in its sanctuaries and support zones.

In other areas, combat forces are trying to do the right things but, again, in the wrong places. As the Iraq ex-
perience demonstrated, successful countering insurgency often entails distributing forces from larger to smaller
bases in order to live among the population. But in some remote areas of Afghanistan’s eastern theater, such
as Nusrat, where the enemy has little operational or strategic effect, combat forces have overextended them-
selves. They have moved off large forward operating bases, pushed into strategically insignificant areas, and
established small combat outposts that can barely sustain themselves. The units there are too tiny to do any-
thing but protect their outpost. A better approach is to concentrate forces for countering-insurgency operations
and run greater risks in places of lesser importance.

3. Fighting with the wrong assumptions

What too often determines where coalition forces conduct their shape-clear-hold-build operations is the
least urgent, the possible over the necessary. For example, major combat operations in the British area
of Helmand have been conducted in order to permit development. The Kajaki dam and the agricultural de-
velopment zone near Lashkar Gah have driven the concentration of forces within the province and, indeed,
within the southern region generally. In eastern Afghanistan, U.S. forces have conducted operations to build
roads, such as the Khost-Gardez Pass road. These projects are important for long-term development, but
they are only sometimes important for achieving our military objectives and should not be allowed to dictate
the disposition of scarce military resources.
Moreover, military and civilian efforts in Afghanistan make the wrong assumptions about development. Too often they emphasize the value of a development project as a model -- as a demonstration of Afghan government competence and Western goodwill. Completing a specific dam, for example, shows the population that the Afghan government can provide services in general. Clearing a specific village shows that the Afghan national security forces can secure the population in principle. But if the model is not replicated widely and rapidly, it's simply a demonstration of what might be accomplished. Demonstration effects will not defeat the insurgency. Either a vector is secure and has an operating government, or it does not. A good counterinsurgency plan succeeds by generating synergies among good, localized projects -- not by identifying a thousand points of light and hoping that they constitute an electrical grid.

4. Fighting successfully -- or failing?

Metrics are important in any war, and based on recent reports, the Obama administration is preparing a new set of indicators to measure whether the fight in Afghanistan is succeeding. As important as identifying good metrics is rejecting bad ones. Violence against coalition forces, for example, is an unreliable indicator of success or failure. For one thing, as we saw in Iraq, violence against friendly forces can increase at the start of a counteroffensive to regain control of areas that the enemy holds. No violence, in turn, might mean that an area is completely controlled by the enemy. The metrics of success are not simply statistics, and they cannot be determined independently of a campaign plan, which sets out a hierarchy of tasks and objectives.

5. Can we win?

Some answer simply and sharply in the negative: They claim that Afghanistan has never been centrally ruled (which is wrong) and that it has been the "graveyard of empires" (which is true in only a specific handful of cases). Failure is not at all inevitable. The war in Afghanistan has suffered least from the start from a lack of resources, especially the time and attention of senior policymakers. The United States prioritized the war in Iraq from 2007 until 2009, for strategically sound reasons. Some of this parsimony also comes from flawed theories of counterinsurgency. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, for example, misreads the Soviet experience in Afghanistan, which has consistently led him to argue incorrectly against expanding the size of the force there, claiming that it increases the risk of failure.

We can win in Afghanistan, but only if we restructure the campaign and resource it properly. Adding more resources to the military effort as it has been conducted over the past few years, without fundamentally changing its conception, design, and execution, would achieve little. This was also the case in Iraq before the surge, and the change in strategy and campaign plan that followed was as important to success as the additional resources. This explains why McChesney might adopt a different campaign design -- perhaps requiring additional military resources -- when he submits his formal assessment to the U.S. secretary of defense and NATO secretary-general sometime after the Afghan elections.

The fact that we have not been doing the right things for the past few years in Afghanistan is actually good news at this moment. A sound, properly resourced counterinsurgency has not failed to Afghanistan, it has never even been tried. So there is good reason to think that such a new strategy can succeed now. But we have to hurry, for as is often the case in these kinds of war, if you aren't winning, you're losing.

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Kimberly Kagan is the founder and President of the Institute for the Study of War, a non-profit, non-partisan think-tank in Washington, DC, that educates civilians about military affairs and provides strategic and operational analysis for America’s warfighters. Kagan is a military historian who has taught at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Yale University, Georgetown University, and American University. She is the author of The Eye of Command (University of Michigan Press, 2006), The Surge: a Military History (Encounter Books, 2009) and editor of The Imperial Moment (forthcoming from Harvard University Press, 2009). Dr. Kagan has published numerous essays including “Don’t Short-Circuit the Surge” in the Wall Street Journal, “How to Surge the Taliban” (co-authored with Max Boot and Frederick W. Kagan) in The New York Times, and "Why the Taliban are Winning--For Now" on the Foreign Policy Magazine website. She writes a monthly column about national security for the The Washington Examiner.

Dr. Kagan has conducted seven battlefield circulations of Iraq since May 2007 for the MNF-I Commanding General, and one of Afghanistan for CENTCOM. She has participated formally on the Joint Campaign Plan Assessment Team for Multi-National Force-Iraq - U.S. Mission-Iraq in October 2008, and as part of the Civilian Advisory Team for the CENTCOM strategic review in January 2009. Dr. Kagan served in Kabul as a member of GEN Stanley McChrystal’s strategic assessment team, comprised of civilian experts, during his strategic review in June and July 2009.

Dr. Kagan held an Olin Postdoctoral Fellowship in Military History at Yale International Security Studies in 2004-2005. She is an affiliate of Harvard’s Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, where she was a National Security Fellow in 2002-2003. She received her B.A. in Classical Civilization and her Ph.D. in History from Yale University.
DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 111th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in complying with the House rule.

Witness name: Dr. Kim Kagan

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

☑ Individual
☐ Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented:

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**Federal Contract Information:** If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

- Current fiscal year (2009): 0
- Fiscal year 2008: 0
- Fiscal year 2007: 0

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

- Current fiscal year (2009): NA
- Fiscal year 2008: NA
- Fiscal year 2007: NA

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

- Current fiscal year (2009): NA
- Fiscal year 2008: NA
- Fiscal year 2007: NA

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

- Current fiscal year (2009): 0
- Fiscal year 2008: 0
- Fiscal year 2007: 0

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Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2009): 0 
Fiscal year 2008: 0 
Fiscal year 2007: 0 

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

Current fiscal year (2009): 
Fiscal year 2008: 
Fiscal year 2007: 

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2009): 
Fiscal year 2008: 
Fiscal year 2007: 

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

Current fiscal year (2009): 0 
Fiscal year 2008: 0 
Fiscal year 2007: 0
Congressional Testimony

IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: PERSPECTIVES ON U.S. STRATEGY, PART III

Dr. Gilles Dorrorsoro
Visiting Scholar, South Asia Program
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Written Testimony
House Committee on Armed Services
Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations
17 November 2009

Carnegie Endowment
Chairman Snyder and distinguished members of the committee:

The International Coalition's main objective in Afghanistan is to protect its members from another attack on their own soil. Yet in fighting to eliminate the Taliban, with which it has no direct conflict of interest, the Coalition has been diverted from fighting al-Qaeda, its main enemy. What should have been essentially a policing operation, albeit on a large scale, became a major counterinsurgency war, the primary mistake being fighting the Taliban as if they were an arm of al-Qaeda. The United States expends far more blood and treasure fighting the Taliban than it does fighting al-Qaeda. The implicit idea that crushing the Taliban altogether is necessary to defeat al-Qaeda is dangerously mistaken.

The Afghan war does not make the United States safer. On the contrary, the war is not an answer to the al-Qaeda threat, and it does not diminish the risk of another attack on Western countries. The relationship between fighting local insurgents and a potential Coalition fight against al-Qaeda is very much disconnected from the war in Afghanistan. Coalition strikes against al-Qaeda are not connected to the war in Afghanistan, and cooperation with Pakistan is a much more important determinant of the success or failure of such operations. The continuing war in Afghanistan, in fact, is a major asset for al-Qaeda, which is not engaged there. Indeed, no important al-Qaeda members have been killed recently in Afghanistan, and its fighters stay in Pakistan. The Coalition could continue to do exactly what it is doing now against al-Qaeda without waging the distracting war against the Taliban in Afghanistan. That is why the Coalition must disconnect these two strategic issues. The Coalition presence in Afghanistan is not actually helping in the fight against al-Qaeda and is, in fact, protecting its sanctuary in Pakistan from local tribal backlash and from the Pakistani army and intelligence agencies. Without the war in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda would be under much more pressure from Pakistani and local forces. The Coalition presence in Afghanistan is the major element driving hitherto limited cohesiveness between the very different insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In addition, the war is an impediment to constructing a clear and efficient policy regarding Iran, because it would put the United States in a vulnerable position should Iran decide to support the Taliban.

The Coalition's best rationale for fighting the Taliban is to deny al-Qaeda the opportunity to create new operational bases in Afghan cities. The Coalition's strategy should start from that clearly defined interest. A more cautious strategy in Afghanistan, aimed at securing the urban centers in the Pashtun belt and Afghanizing the war, would allow the Coalition to fulfill its main objectives. It would deny al-Qaeda access to cities, a key point considering al-Qaeda's operating methods. Second, it would deny the Afghan war of its local appeal, making it more difficult for al-Qaeda to recruit volunteers. Third, the enormous resources devoted to this war could be directed toward what is known to be central to Coalition success: human intelligence and a focus on Pakistan. A defensive approach in the South and East of Afghanistan has no negative impact on operations against al-Qaeda, and would allow the Coalition to invest more resources into fighting its primarily enemy directly.

Who are the Taliban?

The Taliban have a strategy and a coherent organization to implement it. To believe otherwise, as some U.S. analysts do, is to dangerously underestimate the adversary. The
Taliban are a revolutionary movement deeply opposed to the tribal structure in Afghanistan. They promote mullahs as the key political leaders in the society and state they seek to create. More so than in the 1990s, the Taliban today also are connected to the international jihadist networks and seek political support by opposing foreign occupation. The objective of the Taliban today is the same as it was in the 1990s: to take Kabul and to build an Islamic Emirate based on Sharia. The diversity of the insurgency confuses many foreign observers. First, the Taliban are not the only party fighting against the Coalition and the Afghan government. The Hezb-i Islami, with a more local and limited following, has its own independent organization. In the North especially, the Hezb-i Islami can more easily recruit from non-Pashtun ethnic groups. Second, while it is true that the Taliban have multiple commanders, some with “star” quality that may suggest internal rivalry, this does not mean that the Taliban are inchoate or divisible.

The Taliban’s structure is resilient: centralized enough to be efficient, but flexible and diverse enough to adapt to local contexts. (In addition, the Taliban have been pragmatic in their use of criminal gang and opium resources.) Maulana Haqqani enjoys great prestige due to his bravery during the jihad against the Soviets and some autonomy in the day-to-day management of the war in the eastern provinces. But Haqqani’s network is not independent of the larger Taliban network and does not have an autonomous strategy. He does not appoint cadres on his own authority or have an autonomous strategy. Haqqani obviously is not competing with Mullah Omar for the Taliban leadership. His biography indicates a strong commitment to the Taliban and he comes from the same madrasa network as the Taliban leadership of the 1990s. Rather than a weakness, the local autonomy of Taliban commanders is necessary due to the nature of guerrilla warfare, and in fact, it constitutes a strength. The Taliban are not confused or in conflict over who is in charge in a particular district or province. Foreign observers recalling Iraq may wishfully imagine exploiting competition or infighting among Taliban commanders, but the fissures are not there.

Ironically, the Coalition is unwittingly helping the Taliban maintain its cohesion by killing those commanders in the field most capable of opposing the central shura. Prime examples are Mullah Akhtar Osmani, killed in December 2006, Mullah Berader in August 2007, and Mullah Dadullah in May 2007. Evidence of the resilient character of the Taliban’s structure is the fact that the Coalition’s killing of major leaders and its battlefield victories have not reversed the Taliban’s momentum. In fact, the Taliban have always been able to regroup after tactical setbacks due to the resilience of their political structure. Neither the deaths of senior Taliban military commanders, nor the severe losses in 2005 in the Arghandab Valley, stopped the movement. The Taliban’s military organization demonstrates a good level of professionalism in the regions where they dominate. Today’s Taliban are without question the best guerrilla movement in Afghanistan’s history. The insurgency is able to mobilize thousands of fighters nationwide. Since 2006, the Taliban have been using field radios and cell phones to coordinate groups of fighters. They are able to coordinate complex attacks, are mobile, and are improving their use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Their intelligence is good. Taliban sympathizers ensure that the moves of the coalition are known in advance if Afghan government forces are involved. Whether the Coalition wants to admit it or not, the Taliban soldiers are also courageous. The insurgency accepts heavy losses, which contradicts the claim that a majority of the Taliban are motivated by money. The British soldiers in Helmand were surprised in 2006 to find an enemy able to stop them in direct confrontation.
The Taliban has a strategy and a coherent organization to implement it, and a majority of the fighters are local to the South and East (the situation in the North is more complex). In addition, "The Taliban has created a sophisticated communications apparatus that projects an increasingly confident movement" and "the Taliban routinely outperforms the coalition in the contest to dominate public perceptions of the war in Afghanistan."

The Taliban build on the growing discontent of Afghans through a relatively sophisticated propaganda apparatus, which employs radio, video, and night letters to devastating effect. Videos—made in al-Sahab, the Taliban’s media center in Quetta, Pakistan—are readily available. Among the most popular are videos showing the seizure of NATO material in Khyber Agency (in 2008) and the August 2008 ambush of a French contingent. The Taliban have also used Internet websites to chronicle the advance of the jihad (with obvious exaggerations). Propaganda material, in the form of preachers calling for jihad against the Coalition, is often distributed through cell phones. In addition, the Taliban regularly monitor Afghan media and, less systematically, foreign outlets as well. Mullah Dadullah, a key Taliban commander, had invited Al Jazeera to meet him on several different occasions, allowing the Taliban to successfully create a hero-like persona from clips (his death in 2007 gave him the status of martyr). In this context, the conventional wisdom that the Taliban, being fundamentalists, are not open to new technologies has also been debunked by their sophisticated use of modern media for propaganda purposes.

The Flaws in COIN Strategy

In 2009 the coalition has tried to define a new strategy—aiming to marginalize the insurgency by regaining control of the countryside in the provinces most affected by the insurgency. Since the Iraq war, the U.S. Army has rediscovered classic counterinsurgency theory. The current “shape, clear, hold, and build” strategy requires control of territory and a separation of insurgents from the population. Troops clear an area, remain there, and implement an ambitious development program intended to gain the support of the population. The pertinent element is to stop thinking about territory—a mistake made during the first years of the war—and focus instead on the population. Yet the context in which these theories were created is quite specific: First, there was a state, albeit a colonial one; second, the insurgency was initiated by a group of nationalist intellectuals who, as far as the rural population was concerned, were outsiders. Two factors explain the failure of the current policy: the underestimation of the Taliban and the impossibility of "clearing" an area of insurgents.

The relationship between the Taliban and the population is one key element of the new strategy. A common misconception is that the insurgents are terrorizing the Afghan people and that the insurgents’ level of support among the people is marginal. This has led to the objective of “separating the Taliban from the population” or “protecting the population” from the Taliban. Yet at this stage of the war and specifically in the Pashtun belt, there is no practical way to separate the insurgency from the population in the villages, and furthermore there is no Afghan state structure to replace the coalition forces once the Taliban have been removed. In fact, this approach reflects a misunderstanding about just who the Taliban are. Even if it is possible to find examples where the Taliban are not local and oppressive to
villagers, the situation in the Pashtun belt is much more complex. The Taliban have
successfully exploited local grievances against corrupt officials and the behavior of the
foreign forces, framing them as a jihad. Moreover, the Taliban are generally careful not to
antagonize the population. They are much more tolerant of music and of beardless men than
before 2001, and Mullah Omar has repeatedly made clear that the behavior of the fighters
should be respectful (paying for the food they take, and so on). Most of the insurgents are
local and, especially in cases of heavy fighting, the local solidarities tend to work in favor of
the Taliban and against foreigners in a mixed of religious and nationalist feelings.

How do we control the supposedly cleared areas? Trust between coalition forces and the
Afghan people (especially the Pashtuns) simply does not exist, and, after eight years in the
country, the battle for hearts and minds has been lost. The coalition forces still have not
worked out how to be accepted locally. It is counterproductive to patrol villages with
soldiers who are ill-equipped to overcome linguistic and cultural barriers and whose average
stay is six months. This miscalculation has been compounded by the past poor behavior of
some coalition forces—the beating of prisoners, arbitrary imprisonment, aggressive behavior
on the road—and the unwitting bombing of civilians.

The absence of a state structure in the Pashtun belt means that military operations, other
than a token Afghan army presence, are predominately foreign in composition. Because the
police are corrupt or inefficient, there is no one left to secure the area after the “clear” phase.
And because the pro-government groups are locally based (tribal units mostly), they can go
outside their area only with great difficulty. The so-called ink spot strategy—subduing a large
hostile region with a relatively small military force by establishing a number of small safe
areas and then pushing out from each one and extending control until only a few pockets of
resistance remain—is not working because of the social and ethnic fragmentation: Stability in
one district does not necessarily benefit neighboring ones, since groups and villages are often
antagonists and compete for the spoils of a war economy. In this context, securing an area
means staying there indefinitely, under constant threat from the insurgency.

Finally, given the complexity of the strategy—one that requires a deep understanding of
Pashtun society—one must ask whether the coalition has the bureaucratic agility and
competence to implement it and outsmart the Taliban, who are obviously quite good at
playing local politics. I would submit that the coalition does not have that capacity and
therefore should stick with a simpler strategy in Afghanistan.

Three Zones for a Defensive Strategy

The central measure is to transform the political game by defining what areas are important
in the long-term, namely the cities. Why are the cities a major stake? First, the pro-Western
population lives there. This is a key political stake, for if the coalition is not able to protect
these people, there is no social base left for an Afghan partner. The June killing of at least
ten Afghan translators who were apparently targeted by the Taliban is an indication of how
difficult it is nowadays to work safely for the Coalition. Second, it is not only the cities that
are threatened, but also the major ways of communication that are indispensable for the flow
of people and goods. Most of the roads outside the largest cities (Kandahar, Herat, Kabul to
the south, among others) are not safe. The level of penetration of the insurgency in the cities
is becoming a threat. In the South, the Taliban have a constant presence in the cities and in some neighborhoods can even attack police stations at night. Kabul is more and more populous, with large areas of migrants or refugees and little, if any, state presence. The Taliban and Hezb-i islami penetration south of Kabul, in the Musawi and Chaharsoyab districts, is growing despite some police operations. The deterioration of the security in Herat and more generally in the West will pose an acute security threat over the next few months. The Herat urban area's geography makes it extremely difficult to secure the city, and the insurgents could easily penetrate the suburbs. In the 1980s, despite a major effort by the Soviets and the Afghan army, the Mujahideen were fighting very close to the urban area.

The U.S. must define three areas: strategic (under total control), buffers (around the strategic ones) and opposition territory. Policy should be strongly differentiated between these areas.

1) The strategic zone is defined as the part of the territory composed of urban centers and territories linked economically to them (oasis, etc.), main roads, and provinces in which the Taliban opposition is weak or non-existent (essentially part of the northwest). In these areas, military control must be total (or near total). The institution building process must be focused on strategic areas, mostly the cities, where the population is partially opposed to the Taliban. This is where the national institutions must be reinforced, schools, police, army etc. The control of the ANA must be reinforced in the cities, even if there is no short-term threat from the Taliban.

2) In the opposition territory, the use of force must be limited to preventing a military concentration of Taliban troops and all moves that could threaten the first two areas. In the opposition areas, mostly in the south and the eastern part of the country, the strategy must be a defensive one in the sense that these areas will not be put under military control, but a pro-active one in the sense that U.S. forces must deter the opposition from launching operations outside these places against the strategic zones.

3) The buffer area is a grey one, where militias can be used with a lot of caution and caveats. Military operations must be conducted on a limited level mostly to protect the area, avoiding civilian casualties as a priority. The war will be decided most probably in these buffer areas around the strategic ones. The use of militias is part of the possible means of protecting the strategic zones, but this must be very carefully managed and initiated in a conservative way. Three caveats are important. First, contrary to current thinking, the use of tribes is generally not a good idea. Once arms are given out there is no easy way to control the groups; the double game is the rule, not the exception. In the long run the territory is not under control and the level of violence could explode. Second, the militia must be territorially linked to the strategic zones, because the militia must be militarily under the protection of the army (ANA or foreign). The use of an isolated militia in opposition territory is a poor idea. Last, militias must never be allowed to fight (or even to cross) territory other than theirs to avoid destabilizing the local balance of power.

Reallocate Resources

Contrary to popular belief, the war in Afghanistan suffers not from underfunding but from a strikingly bad allocation of resources. First, aid is going mostly to areas where the level of
control is generally nonexistent and where integrity is largely recognized to be lacking.
Second, troops are not efficiently distributed: 20,000 troops are mobilized in Helmand province to no effect, when they are needed elsewhere (in Kunduz, for example) to fight or to protect cities. The troops currently deployed in the North are neither trained nor motivated to fight a counterinsurgency war, a priority now, since governments are implicitly demanding zero-casualty tactics.

**Development Resources**

Is there enough money for reconstruction and development, or is a civilian surge needed? Before any more resources are allocated, the priority must be to fix the current system, which is deeply flawed because of a serious lack of accountability and wrong geographical focus.

In addition to the military costs, the coalition has given billions for development in Afghanistan. According to the Afghan Ministry of Finance, more than 60 multilateral donors have spent about $36 billion on development, reconstruction, and humanitarian projects in the country since 2002, with little accountability or integrity. Since 2001, some $25 billion has been spent on security-related assistance to Afghanistan, such as building up the Afghan security forces. Donors have committed the same amount on reconstruction and development, yet some leading donors have fulfilled little more than half of their aid commitments. Only $15 billion in aid has been spent so far, of which it is estimated a staggering 40 percent has returned to donor countries in the form of corporate profits and consultant salaries. First, there are limitations on the amount of money that can be spent, especially because the territory under government control is rapidly shrinking. Second, any investment made in the countryside controlled by the Taliban will simply help finance the insurgency. Third, there is no easy and simple relationship between development and violence. As seen in other cases (the Basque and Kurdish insurgencies), more development and improved economic conditions do not necessarily translate into an improved political situation. Finally, a civilian surge would not address the heart of the problem: huge corruption and inefficiency in Kabul—a war economy.

In addition, the current allocation of resources is flawed. If Helmand province were a state, it would be the world's fifth-largest recipient of funds from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). These disparities are also reflected in the pattern of combined government and donor spending for 2007–2008. The most insecure provinces of Nimroz, Helmand, Zabul, Kandahar, and Uruzgan received more than $200 per person, while many other provinces got less than half that amount, and some, such as Sar Pul or Takhar, were allocated less than one-third of that amount. This irrational distribution of resources is partially due to the fact that part of the aid is coming from the 26 NATO-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Each PRT is headed by the largest troop-contributing nation in a given province (according to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force). Thus the U.S. and U.K. PRTs are investing in the most contested areas, with few significant results. The aid is part of the war economy, especially in the South, with insurgents taking a cut of almost every project implemented in the rural areas. The coalition must stop rewarding the most dangerous areas and focus on those where success is attainable. In addition, whatever the official line, the current policy is resulting in the transfer
of increasing levels of responsibility from the Afghans to the coalition, resulting in Afghan officials appearing powerless vis-à-vis the local PRT, especially in places where the Taliban dominate. Increasing levels of aid could backfire and accelerate the disintegration of local institutions.

The coalition then has to shift the focus of investment from war-torn areas to more peaceful localities where there is more accountability. Aid must go where there is control on the ground: cities, towns, and districts with local support for the coalition. The current system of cascading contractors and subcontractors is resulting in—if not technically corruption—inefficiency and dishonesty. The focus on narcotics should not distract the United States from its main responsibility: reforming the system, starting with USAID, toward more transparency. Reducing the number of overpaid experts and consultants and limiting the subcontractor system would be a start.

Reorganizing the Coalition

The new strategy I suggest requires a redistribution of troops. Two elements are critically wrong at present: the overemphasis on the South and the lack of sufficient troops in the North. The coalition is fighting where it is losing (in the South) and has no counterinsurgency troops where the Taliban could be beaten (in the North). This misallocation of resources is both the result of a flawed strategy and of NATO’s approach. Some 20,000 troops should be mobilized where there is a real need and a real prospect of success—not in the rural Pashtun belt or in Helmand, where coalition troops are fighting a losing battle with high casualties. In the North, the Taliban are locally strong in Kunduz, Badghis, and Faryab, but in most places the situation is still reversible. The problem here is that the main contingents, beginning with the Germans, are not able to fight the Taliban and protect the population. The only solution to this problem is a political negotiation and the awareness of what is really at stake here: the credibility of NATO as a military alliance.

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4 op.cit.: 3.
Gilles Dorronsoro, a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment, is an expert on Afghanistan, Turkey, and South Asia. His research focuses on security and political development in Afghanistan, particularly the role of the International Security Assistance Force, the necessary steps for a viable government in Kabul, and the conditions necessary for withdrawal scenarios.

Previously, Dorronsoro was a professor of political science at the Sorbonne, Paris and the Institute of Political Studies of Rennes. He also served as the scientific coordinator at the French Institute of Anatolian Studies in Istanbul, Turkey.

He is the co-founder and editor of *South Asian Multidisciplinary Academic Journal* and the *European Journal of Turkish Studies*. He is the author of *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present* (Columbia University Press, 2005), and *La révolution afghane, des communistes aux Taleban* (Karthala Publishers 2000), and editor of *La Turquie conteste. Régime sécuritaire et mobilisations sociales* (Editions du CNRS, 2005).

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**Education**

Ph.D., Political Sociology École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales; M.A., Contemporary History, Ecole des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales; M.A., International Relations, Paris 1 Sorbonne; Master in Law, Paris 1 Sorbonne.

**Languages**

English; French; Persian; Turkish
DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 111th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in complying with the House rule.

Witness name: Dr. Gilles Dorrionsoro

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)  
X Individual  
___ Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented:

FISCAL YEAR 2009

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**Federal Contract Information:** If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

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Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

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- Fiscal year 2008:___________________________;
- Fiscal year 2007:__________________________;

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

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- Fiscal year 2008:___________________________;
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Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

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Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2009): ____________________________;
Fiscal year 2008: ____________________________;
Fiscal year 2007: ____________________________;

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

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Fiscal year 2008: ____________________________;
Fiscal year 2007: ____________________________;

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

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Fiscal year 2007: ____________________________;

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

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Fiscal year 2007: ____________________________;

3
The War in Afghanistan in Strategic Context

Testimony before the

U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Armed Services
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation

Andrew F. Krepinevich

President
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

November 17, 2009
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, I welcome the opportunity to discuss our strategy in Afghanistan and to place it within the context of our overall strategic position.

**Background to the Current Situation**

In its March 2009 white paper on Afghanistan and Pakistan, the administration correctly identified the key aspects of the threat posed by the radical Muslim groups centered in western Pakistan. At that time, the president wisely announced a strategy centered on classic countersurgency principles, with emphasis on securing the Afghan population and enhancing the country's governance. This effort was to be matched by efforts designed to strengthen Pakistan and to insure its cooperation in confining the enemy groups to a progressively smaller area and eventually eliminating them as a serious threat. As President Obama declared at the time, "we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future. That is the goal that must be achieved."\(^1\)

As recently as August, the president noted that success in the conflict is critical to our nation's security when he stated that Afghanistan "is not a war of choice. It is a war of necessity." He went on to say that, "If left unchecked, the Taliban insurgency will mean an even larger safe haven from which al Qaeda would plot to kill more Americans."\(^2\) Clearly, the president believes the consequences of losing the war are quite high, and, from that, one might reasonably infer that he is willing to incur substantial risks to achieve his war aims.

In May the president named a new commander of the war effort in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, to execute this strategy and achieve his stated war objectives. Given that the general was hand-picked by the administration, it seems reasonable to assume that he shared its assessment of the threat's character and the strategy for defeating it. Moreover, based on those portions of the McChrystal report that were leaked to the public, the general's plan for implementing the administration's strategy appears both consistent with the strategy and militarily sound.

General McChrystal's review was followed by a request for additional troops to execute the strategy, and this request is being reviewed by the president. The decision on whether to honor this request would seem to center on the answers to two questions: first, "What level of force is needed to achieve our war objectives?" and second, "What risks do we incur in providing this level of support?" Put another way, if the risks of providing the support outweigh the benefits of achieving our objectives, or if some previously unknown major flaws in the strategy have emerged, then the strategy might have to be reconsidered.

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Risks Associated with General McChrystal's Request

Let’s address the second question first. Given the high stakes for which the president has stated we are fighting in Afghanistan, will the dispatch of 40,000 additional troops find the United States incurring even greater risks? These risks have been expressed in two general forms. First, the continued deployments of our ground forces—the Army in particular—risks "breaking" the Army (i.e., triggering a precipitous decline in unit combat effectiveness owing to soldiers being deployed too frequently, and too many times, into combat zones); and second, that the deployment of an additional 40,000 troops to Afghanistan will leave our military unprepared for other contingencies (i.e., without a strategic land force reserve).

Both, the current and former administrations have acted to address these legitimate concerns. The Obama Administration plans to reduce dramatically our troop presence in Iraq. Even if that drawdown in Iraq stabilizes with 30-40,000 US troops remaining in that country for an extended period, and even if General McChrystal’s request is honored by the president, the combined total of our forces in Afghanistan and Iraq would still be significantly below the levels reached during the Surge. Moreover, thanks to steps taken by the Bush and Obama Administrations, the Army and Marine Corps have each had their end-strength increased, by 65,000 soldiers and 27,000 marines, respectively, over the past few years. Recently the Army has been authorized a further temporary end-strength increase of 22,000 soldiers. The Army’s Reserve Component has also been modestly augmented. Increasing the size of our ground forces by over 100,000 troops further reduces the risk of our ground combat suffering a precipitous decline in its effectiveness.

To be sure, other contingencies might demand large numbers of ground combat forces, and one would always like to have a large strategic reserve. But no nation, however powerful, has ever had sufficient military capability to eliminate all risk to its security, and the United States is no different. Moreover, the two contingencies most often discussed as concerns—North Korea and Iran—do not appear to pose immediate threats to our security. Furthermore, in the case of North Korea, our principal source of advantage lies in our air and sea forces, which are far less stressed in Afghanistan and Iraq than our ground forces.3 While war in another theater of operations cannot be ruled out, the risk appears small, especially when matched against the prospective consequences if we fail to accomplish our objectives in Afghanistan.

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Why a 40,000 Troop Increase?

We now turn to the first question: What level of force is needed to turn the situation around in Afghanistan? As the administration has noted, a major reason for the deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan in recent years stems from our inadequate and incremental response to

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3 The terrain along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) in the Korean Peninsula heavily favors the defense. Furthermore, South Korea has over twice the population of the North, and far more resources to provide for the ground defense of its territory. Given the high priority Iran’s leaders give to the survival of their regime, and to their personal survival it seems unlikely they would risk war with the United States until they have fielded a significant nuclear capability.
the escalation of enemy activity in 2006. This implies a significant increase in the war effort is warranted. But it also begs the question: How much is enough?

To answer the first question we must have a sense of how these forces would be used. Both President Obama (in his March 2009 statements) and General McChrystal (in his leaked assessment) intend to employ these forces within the context of a counterinsurgency campaign plan. This is important, since if either the president or his field commander had very different ideas of how the war should be fought there could logically be significant differences in the size and shape of the forces required.

The plan differs in major ways from plans where our military is engaged in a conventional war against regular military forces, and apparently in significant ways from our recent operations in Afghanistan. In conventional warfare, the enemy’s military forces and major power centers are often considered its centers of gravity, meaning that losing either would spell defeat. In the two Gulf Wars, for example, the coalition concentrated on destroying Saddam’s Republican Guard and capturing key terrain, such as Kuwait (in the First Gulf War) and Baghdad (in the Second Gulf War). But the centers of gravity in counterinsurgency warfare are completely different, and focusing efforts on defeating the enemy’s military forces through traditional forms of combat is a mistake.

The current fight has two principal centers of gravity: the Afghan people and the American people. Our enemies understand this, and make them their primary targets. For the United States, the key to securing each one is winning “hearts and minds.” The Afghan people must believe that their government offers them a better life than the insurgents do, and they must think that the government will prevail. If they have doubts on either score, they will withhold their support. The American people must believe that the war is worth the sacrifice in lives and treasure that are involved in prosecuting the war, and they must believe that progress is being made toward achieving our war objectives. If these conditions cannot be met, Washington will be forced to abandon the fight before the Afghan government and people are capable of standing on their own. The enemy has a clear advantage when it comes to this fight: they only need to win one of the centers of gravity to succeed, whereas the United States must secure both. Making matters even more complicated, a “Catch-22” governs the fight against the insurgency: efforts designed to secure one center of gravity may undermine the prospects of securing the other. For example, increased troop deployments to Afghanistan might increase our chances of securing the support of the Afghan people, but erode support for the war among the American people, who must incur higher costs in lives and resources, at least in the near-term.

The key to securing the centers of gravity in the current war is to recognize that our forces have overwhelming advantages in terms of combat power and mobility but a key disadvantage in terms of intelligence. Simply stated, if coalition forces know who the insurgents are and where they are, they can quickly suppress the insurgency. The Afghan people are the best source of this intelligence. But this knowledge can only be gained by winning locals’ hearts and minds—that is, by convincing them that the insurgents’ defeat is in their interest and that they can share intelligence about them without fear of insurgent reprisals.

Toward this end, General McChrystal’s strategy, as best it can be divined from his leaked report, conforms closely to the criteria for waging a successful counterinsurgency, the key elements of which are:

- Providing enduring security to the population;
Undertaking economic reconstruction and development; and
Supporting efforts at responsible, effective—and legitimate—governance

As is evident, the successful execution of this strategy will depend on far more than military muscle. The military may create, by providing security, the conditions necessary for success in the economic and political dimensions of the conflict. But military force alone cannot create the end state the administration seeks.

With respect to securing the population, General McChrystal's assessment concedes that the "level of resourcing is less than the amount that is required to secure the whole country." This would seem to infer that the 40,000 troop request is designed to enable the administration's strategy, as put forth in March 2009, to be executed, rather than to minimize the risk that the strategy can be executed successfully. History shows that it is not necessary to secure the entire population at once to defeat an insurgency. General McChrystal's strategy focuses on securing certain key areas initially and, as these areas are secured and more Afghan forces become available, progressively expanding the effort into contested areas, securing an ever-greater part of the country over time.

A key element of this strategy involves fielding substantial numbers of Afghan security forces, which are the only forces that can credibly provide long-term security to the Afghan people. General McChrystal has presented a realistic estimate of the indigenous Afghan security forces needed to accomplish this objective, to include roughly a quarter million troops in the Afghan National Army (ANA). He correctly projects that it will take time to stand this force up, and for it to become effective. In addition to the training and equipping of the ANA, the general wisely plans both to embed advisors with Afghan units at every level, and to have them partner with American units. Not only will this enable Afghan forces to function with more confidence during their transition from training to conducting operations, but it will also provide opportunities for American commanders and advisors to better distinguish between Afghan officers who are capable and those who are incompetent, those who are honest and those who are corrupt, and those who are loyal to the government and those who have a different agenda. Most importantly, the process offers the best prospect of advancing the day when Afghan security forces can begin a large-scale substitution for the NATO forces currently bearing the brunt of the war effort.

This brings us to the matter of effective governance. It is no exaggeration to say that, in waging a counterinsurgency the objective is not to outfight the enemy but to "out-govern" him. A legitimate government responsive to people's needs is capable of both mobilizing the resources needed to defeat the insurgency and employing them in a way that denies the insurgent's claim to represent the true will of the people.

The Obama Administration is right to concern itself with the Karzai regime's ability to govern effectively. This argues for extending the partnering relationships that General McChrystal plans to implement beyond combat units to include the Afghan national government's ministries, as well as the provincial and district governments. President Karzai should understand that our support is conditional on his willingness to remove ineffective or corrupt administrators. Particular emphasis should be given to the interior ministry, which is responsible for the country's police forces, the front-line force in this type of insurgency warfare. Of course, the

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embedding of American and NATO coalition support personnel in this manner should also accelerate the development of more efficient and effective ministries and governance at the province and district levels. With unity of command, this approach facilitates the effective integration of the military, reconstruction, governance and intelligence elements of the counterinsurgency campaign.

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Matters of Concern

Given the preceding discussion, the Obama Administration’s ongoing strategy re-deliberation seems counterproductive. To be sure, any strategy merits adjustment as circumstances dictate; however, from General McChrystal’s report and his request it appears the strategy has yet to be fully implemented, making its effectiveness difficult, if not impossible to evaluate. To be sure, one might question the strategy’s prospective efficacy if circumstances had changed radically since March in ways that invalidated the strategy’s key assumptions. This does not appear to have occurred. While we rightly deplore the Karzai government’s blemished record when it comes to honest governance, it is hardly news that the political process in Afghanistan has been characterized by corruption almost since its inception. Thus the principal effect of this temporizing may be to raise in the minds of our Afghan and Pakistani allies doubts concerning our reliability.

This would be both unfortunate and ironic, as it has the unintended effect of undermining our ability to achieve important war objectives. If we seek to improve Afghan governance, the less confidence Karzai has in our reliability, the more compelled he will feel to engage in patronage and corrupt activities with his country’s power brokers. Similarly, if we intend to convince the Pakistanis that they should end their support for the Taliban as their hedge against our abandoning the field in Afghanistan and the rise of India’s influence in that country, then we must convince them that we are willing to sustain our role as the principal external power in Afghanistan.

In arriving at a decision on General McChrystal’s request, President Obama should avoid the temptation to pursue incrementalism, or to commit forces piecemeal. This approach typically offers defeat on the installment plan. Rather, the president should send a force that is capable of executing his strategy, and his field commander’s campaign plan.

Finally, there is the matter of an alternative strategy, advanced in various forms by analysts across the political spectrum. This strategy emphasizes over-the-horizon air strikes, Special Forces raids and other forms of covert actions against terrorist targets. This strategy would abandon efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and withdraw nearly all our forces from that country.

There is little evidence to suggest that this “whack-a-mole” strategy—the current term of art—would succeed. It has been tried before, and it has been found wanting. In Vietnam it went by the name “search and destroy”: success would be achieved by locating enemy forces and killing as many as possible. We experienced it again with what some called “therapeutic bombing” or “antiseptic warfare” in the period leading up to 9/11, when cruise missile strikes were conducted against al Qaeda sanctuaries in Afghanistan. It reappeared yet again in Iraq as a “whack-a-mole” approach in the period before our forces began conducting a national counterinsurgency
campaign during the Surge. Recently, we have employed Special Forces and drone (i.e., unmanned aerial vehicle) strikes against enemy leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Many have been killed. Yet, as in Vietnam, this attempt to succeed by generating a “body count” of enemy leaders has not prevented our position from deteriorating.

There is a good reason for this. As we have seen in the past, the air strikes and raids associated with this strategy inevitably produce casualties among innocent civilians because of inherent limitations in the quality and timeliness of intelligence. Consequently, such strikes often produce more insurgents from the alienation it produces among the local populations than they yield in terms of radicals killed. To place such operations at the center of our strategy will likely condemn us to an open-ended—and unsuccessful—military campaign.

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A Regional Strategy

Afghanistan is not the only major challenge to our security. Our response to this challenge must be placed with a broader context, one that extends beyond Pakistan as well. Given our current force commitments, Iraq and Iran must figure prominently in any strategic assessment. Clearly, our ability to sustain a major commitment in Afghanistan is dependent upon the continued move toward a stable Iraq. It is desirable to continue the drawdown of our forces in Iraq. However, for the foreseeable future we should try to avoid lowering our force levels there below 30-40,000 troops. There is an old saying regarding the creation of NATO that applies to Iraq, which states: “NATO is being created to keep the Soviets out, the Americans in [i.e., engaged in Europe], and the Germans down [i.e., from upsetting the stability of Europe].” Similarly, a significant and enduring American presence in Iraq is needed to “keep the Americans in, the predators out, and the factions down.” Only a significant and enduring American military presence offers a strong guarantee that a still-weak Iraq can withstand pressures from predators (e.g., Iran; al Qaeda) and avoid becoming a victim of conflict among its internal factions (i.e., the Sunni Arabs, Shi’a Arabs and Kurds). A stable Iraq also reduces Iran’s prospects for creating instability in the region.

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Needed: An Overarching Strategy Review

Those afflicted with too narrow a perspective on important issues are said to be “unable to see the forest for the trees.” Mr. Chairman, I commend the committee for its efforts to inscribe that the Congress does not suffer from strategic myopia. In this regard, a strategy that focuses narrowly on Afghanistan can be seen as focusing not on trees, but rather on acorns, with a near-term regional strategic focus representing the trees.

The view of the “forest” that we risk missing is driven by major and ongoing shifts in our relative economic standing in the world, by unprecedented demographic trends, by technology
diffusion and by the increasingly rapid erosion of our near-monopoly over certain key military capabilities.

Simply stated, the military foundation of our global dominance is eroding. For the past several decades, an overwhelming advantage in technology and resources has given our military an unmatched ability to project power worldwide. This has allowed it to guarantee our access to the global commons, assure the safety of the homeland, and underwrite security commitments around the globe. Our grand strategy since 9/11 assumes that such advantages will continue indefinitely. In fact, they are already disappearing.

Several events in recent years have demonstrated that our traditional means and methods of projecting power and accessing the global commons are growing increasingly obsolete—becoming "wasting assets" in the language of defense strategists. The diffusion of advanced military technologies, combined with the continued rise of new powers, such as China, and hostile states, such as Iran, are making it progressively more expensive in blood and treasure—perhaps prohibitively expensive—for the American military to carry out its missions in areas of vital interest, including the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf. Military forces that do deploy will find it increasingly difficult to defend what they have been sent to protect. Meanwhile, our military's long-unfettered access to the global commons—including space and cyberspace—is being increasingly challenged.

If history is any guide, these trends cannot be undone. Technology inevitably spreads, and no military has ever enjoyed a perpetual monopoly on any capability. We can either adapt to contemporary developments—or ignore them at our peril. There is, first of all, a compelling need to develop new ways of creating military advantage in the face of current geopolitical and technological trends. That means taking a hard look at military spending and planning and investing in certain areas of potential advantage while divesting from other assets.

All this must be accomplished in an environment of high budget deficits projected out as far as the eye can see, a skyrocketing national debt, and significantly diminished resources for a host of national priorities, including national defense. Making matters worse, our traditional allies' fiscal prospects are no better than our own, and, in some instances, substantially worse. We cannot expect more from them; indeed, we are likely to get significantly less.

In short, we confront what is likely to be a more dangerous world but with a diminished capacity to defend ourselves. Before questions about how to adapt military capabilities to future requirements can be considered coherently, there must be a strategic framework. We must develop a comprehensive strategy that addresses a far more formidable set of challenges to our security than that posed by Afghanistan alone. In recent years, whether it be 9/11, Afghanistan or Iraq, we have found ourselves reacting to emerging challenges rather than anticipating them. Ignoring growing challenges to our security will not make those challenges go away. Sooner or later, they will have to be confronted. A decline in our military's ability to influence events abroad may be inevitable; however, it should not be the result of indifference or lack of attention. There are important strategic choices that the United States must make. To avoid those choices now is simply to allow the United States' rivals to make them for us.

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5 For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Andrew F. Krepinevich, "The Pentagon's Wasting Assets," Foreign Affairs, July-August 2009.
In closing, let me again express my appreciation to the Committee for its efforts to raise the level of discourse and awareness on these important issues. I hope it will continue exercising its oversight responsibilities by supporting actions that encourage the administration to accord high priority to crafting an effective strategy for the war in Afghanistan, and a comprehensive strategy that addresses the full range of significant security challenges confronting us.
Andrew Krepinevich, President

Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. is President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, an independent policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking about defense planning and investment strategies for the 21st century.

Dr. Krepinevich is an accomplished author and lecturer on US military strategy and policy. In January, 2009, he released a new book 7 DEADLY SCENARIOS: A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century. In this book, Dr. Krepinevich offers narratives of seven plausible yet cataclysmic events that we may face in the not so distant future—the unraveling of the state of Pakistan; a nuclear attack on the United States with materials covertly transported across borders; a pandemic influenza sweeping across the globe; escalation of an Arab-Israeli conflict toward a nuclear showdown; a US standoff with China over Taiwan; the crippling of an increasingly fragile global economy; and a US withdrawal from Iraq gone bad. In constructing these unsettling visions of future, Dr. Krepinevich drew from his extensive strategic planning experience in national security and technology policy, including his military service in the Department of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment and on the personal staff of three secretaries of defense.


Dr. Krepinevich gained extensive strategic planning experience in national security and technology policy through his work in the Department of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment, service on the personal staff of three secretaries of defense, and as a member of the National Defense Panel in 1997, the Defense Science Board Task Force on Joint Experimentation in 2002-03, and Joint Forces Command’s Transformation Advisory Board. He has recently joined the Secretary of Defense Defense Policy Board. Dr. Krepinevich has testified on numerous occasions before the Senate and House Budget Committees, the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, and the House Government Reform Committee. He frequently contributes to both national and local print and broadcast media, including The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal, and has...
appeared on each of the major networks, National Public Radio, and The McLaughlan Group. Dr. Krepinevich has lectured before a wide range of professional and academic audiences, including those at Harvard, Princeton, Yale and Stanford, the U.S. Military Academy, the Air University, the Army and Naval War Colleges, Europe’s Marshall Center, and France’s Ecole Militaire.

Dr. Krepinevich has served as a consultant on military affairs for many senior government officials, including several secretaries of defense, the CIA’s National Intelligence Council, and all four military services, as well as the current U.S. Ambassador to Iraq. He has also advised the governments of several close allies on defense matters, including those of Australia, France, Japan, Singapore, and the United Kingdom.

He has taught a wide variety of national security and defense policymaking courses while on the faculties of West Point, George Mason University, The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and Georgetown University. Following an Army career that spanned twenty-one years, Dr. Krepinevich retired to become the president of what is now the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

A graduate of West Point, Dr. Krepinevich holds an MPA and Ph.D. from Harvard University. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 111th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in complying with the House rule.

Witness name: Andrew Krepinevich, President, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

X Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA)

FISCAL YEAR 2009

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**Federal Contract Information:** If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

- Current fiscal year (2009): 4
- Fiscal year 2008: 3
- Fiscal year 2007: 3

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held: Department of Defense

- Current fiscal year (2009): 1
- Fiscal year 2008: 1
- Fiscal year 2007: 1
List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.).

Current fiscal year (2009): Research and Analysis
Fiscal year 2008: Research and Analysis
Fiscal year 2007: Research and Analysis.

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2009): $3,300,000
Fiscal year 2008: $4,900,000
Fiscal year 2007: $5,700,000

Federal Grant Information:

CSBA has no grants with the federal Government in 2009, 2008, 2007