[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION PROGRAM AT SPRING VALLEY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL WORKFORCE,
POSTAL SERVICE, AND THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA
of the
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 10, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-20
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
http://www.house.gov/reform
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York, Chairman
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania DARRELL E. ISSA, California
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio JOHN L. MICA, Florida
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
DIANE E. WATSON, California JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JIM COOPER, Tennessee LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina
MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio JIM JORDAN, Ohio
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
Columbia JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah
DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois AARON SCHOCK, Illinois
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas
PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
PETER WELCH, Vermont
BILL FOSTER, Illinois
JACKIE SPEIER, California
STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio
------ ------
Ron Stroman, Staff Director
Michael McCarthy, Deputy Staff Director
Carla Hultberg, Chief Clerk
Larry Brady, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, Postal Service, and the District of
Columbia
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts, Chairman
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah
Columbia JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
William Miles, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on June 10, 2009.................................... 1
Statement of:
Davis, Addison, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Environment,
Safety, and Occupational Health, U.S. Army; Colonel Peter
Mueller, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; William C. Early,
Acting Regional Administrator, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency; and George S. Hawkins, Director, D.C.
Department of the Environment.............................. 123
Davis, Addison...........................................
23
Early, William C......................................... 141
Hawkins, George S........................................ 148
Mueller, Colonel Peter................................... 132
Kerwin, Cornelius M., president, American University; Nan
Shelby Wells, ANC commissioner 3D03; Thomas Smith, ANC
commissioner 3D02; Kent Slowinski, former member, Spring
Valley Restoration Advisory Board; Gregory A. Beumel,
chairman, Spring Valley Restoration Advisory Board; and
James Barton, president, Underwater Ordnance Recovery, Inc. 172
Barton, James............................................ 233
Beumel, Gregory A........................................ 226
Kerwin, Cornelius M...................................... 172
Slowinski, Kent.......................................... 214
Smith, Thomas............................................ 187
Wells, Nan Shelby........................................ 179
Mittal, Anu K., Director, Natural Resources and Environment,
U.S. Government Accountability Office; and Harold Bailey,
Garvey Schubert Barer...................................... 14
Bailey, Harold........................................... 37
Mittal, Anu K............................................ 14
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Bailey, Harold, Garvey Schubert Barer, prepared statement of. 39
Barton, James, president, Underwater Ordnance Recovery, Inc.,
prepared statement of...................................... 234
Beumel, Gregory A., chairman, Spring Valley Restoration
Advisory Board, prepared statement of...................... 228
Blumenauer, Hon. Earl, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Oregon, prepared statement of..................... 12
Chaffetz, Hon. Jason, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Utah, prepared statement of....................... 6
Connolly, Hon. Gerald E., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Virginia, prepared statement of............... 120
Davis, Addison, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Environment,
Safety, and Occupational Health, U.S. Army, prepared
statement of............................................... 126
Early, William C., Acting Regional Administrator, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, prepared statement of..... 143
Hawkins, George S., Director, D.C. Department of the
Environment, prepared statement of......................... 151
Kerwin, Cornelius M., president, American University,
prepared statement of...................................... 175
Lynch, Hon. Stephen F., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Massachusetts, prepared statement of.............. 3
Mittal, Anu K., Director, Natural Resources and Environment,
U.S. Government Accountability Office, prepared statement
of......................................................... 17
Mueller, Colonel Peter, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
prepared statement of...................................... 134
Norton, Hon. Eleanor Holmes, a Delegate in Congress from the
District of Columbia, prepared statement of................ 9
Slowinski, Kent, former member, Spring Valley Restoration
Advisory Board, prepared statement of...................... 216
Smith, Thomas, ANC commissioner 3D02, prepared statement of.. 190
Wells, Nan Shelby, ANC commissioner 3D03, prepared statement
of......................................................... 183
THE ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION PROGRAM AT SPRING VALLEY
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 10, 2009
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, Postal Service,
and the District of Columbia,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in
room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Stephen F. Lynch
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Lynch, Norton, Cummings, Kucinich,
Clay, Connolly, Chaffetz, and Bilbray.
Staff present: William Miles, staff director; Marcus A.
Williams, clerk/press secretary; Jill Crissman, professional
staff; Aisha Elkheshin, intern; Adam Fromm, minority chief
clerk and Member liaison; Howard Denis, minority senior
counsel; and Alex Cooper, minority staff member.
Mr. Lynch. Good afternoon. The Subcommittee on Federal
Workforce, Postal Service, and the District of Columbia will
now come to order.
Well, I welcome our ranking member, Mr. Chaffetz, members
of the subcommittee, hearing witnesses, and all those in
attendance. Today's hearing will examine the recent progress or
lack thereof of the restoration program at the Spring Valley
development. We will discuss the current and future criteria
that will be used in declaring the site clear of environmental
health contaminants and assess the level of transparency and/or
community engagement associated with the cleanup.
The Chair, ranking member, and subcommittee members will
each have 5 minutes to make opening statements. All Members
will have 3 days to submit statements for the record.
Ladies and gentlemen, again let me welcome you to the
second of what will be a series of oversight hearings on
federally related District of Columbia issues which the
subcommittee intends to hold during the first session of the
111th Congress. At the urging of the gentlelady from the
District of Columbia, Ms. Eleanor Holmes Norton, today's
hearing was convened to discuss the latest developments in the
cleanup and restoration of the Spring Valley formerly used
defense site located in the northwest quadrant of our city.
For decades, residents living in the community surrounding
Spring Valley and the campus of American University have had to
endure disruptions of their land and their livelihood as the
Department of Defense, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the
Environmental Protection Agency, and local D.C. governing
agencies have worked to remedy various environmental and health
hazards stemming from past usage of the 661 acre site by the
U.S. Army for the development and testing of chemical agents,
equipment, and munitions during World War I.
While wholly unacceptable by today's standards, the U.S.
Army closed the doors on the Spring Valley site immediately
following the conclusion of World War I. Instead of responsibly
disposing of these dangerous materials, the agency simply dug
holes in the ground, buried the site's remnants, and walked
away.
Well, nearly 90 years has passed since the days of the
American University Experimental Station and Camp Leach yet
even today ordnance, metallic debris, chemical agent
breakdowns, and unexploded munitions continue to be discovered,
investigated, and in most cases removed from the Spring Valley
site.
To their credit, since the 1993 discovery of buried
ordnance by a local utility worker and the premature
termination of field work in the 1995 site clean declaration,
the Corps and its partners have made substantial progress in
cleaning up and remediating Spring Valley. With over $170
million spent, the Corps has removed thousands of cubic yards
of arsenic contaminated soil, disposed of hundreds of munitions
and ordnance related debris, and identified and investigated
dozens of points of interest within Spring Valley, all while
attempting to keep the community informed of the project's
progress through the Spring Valley Restoration Advisory Board.
Despite the gains made over the past 15 years in restoring
Spring Valley, the fact of the matter is that a great number of
questions and concerns continue to persist around the Spring
Valley cleanup process: the methodology and science employed,
the level of transparency involved, and the Corps' proposed
timeline for field work and/or project completion. Today's
hearing is intended to get answers to some of these critical
questions and problems, and to bring about the ultimate
environmental restoration of Spring Valley and the reassurance
to its residents that the area no longer poses potential
harmful and hazardous health risks.
I appreciate the participation of today's witnesses and,
more importantly, having their assistance in helping the
subcommittee ascertain what future course of actions should be
taken with regard to the Spring Valley cleanup project.
I now yield for a 5-minute opening statement to the ranking
member, Mr. Chaffetz.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Stephen F. Lynch follows:]
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Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding this hearing today. In 2001 and 2002, the old District
of Columbia Subcommittee, then chaired by Representative Connie
Morella, held hearings on the status of the cleanup of
contaminated sites in the Spring Valley area. Today we will
revisit some of those issues discussed in those hearings to see
what sort of progress has been made and what the prospects are
for the future.
After the United States of America declared war against the
German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1917, the
Spring Valley area was used as a testing site by the Army for
munitions and chemical agents. It is now referred to as a
formerly used defense site. Today, Spring Valley is home to the
American University and to hundreds of homes first developed in
the 1920's.
In 2002, the GAO issued a report on the environmental
contamination and uncertainties which were continuing to affect
the progress of the Spring Valley cleanup. The report evaluated
the health risks associated with the hazards identified and
removed from Spring Valley, and evaluated the Corps' estimated
cost and cleanup schedule.
It is important for all to know and for the witnesses to
address whether or not there are remaining health risks and to
clarify the duration and costs of the cleanup. Clearly, the
Federal Government has a responsibility to make sure the
contaminants are removed in their totality.
I look forward to hearing about the status of the Spring
Valley cleanup from our distinguished witnesses. I thank you
all for your participation, your willingness to be here.
I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Jason Chaffetz follows:]
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Mr. Lynch. Thank you. Now I would like to recognize really
the person who has been the catalyst for the ongoing work,
someone who has spent far more time than I have on this issue.
She has really done a fantastic job, in my opinion, in
representing the people of Spring Valley and the entire
District. I must say that if I were someone living in D.C., if
I were someone living in the Spring Valley neighborhood, I
would be very happy with the way Ms. Eleanor Holmes Norton has
handled her responsibility. I would feel very reassured in the
way she has handled this issue and her absolute vigilance on
behalf of the people that she represents. It is heartwarming to
see. So with that, I recognize the gentlelady from the District
of Columbia for 5 minutes for an opening statement.
Ms. Norton. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for those
very gracious comments. I very much appreciate Chairman Lynch's
willingness to schedule this hearing early on our subcommittee
agenda. I listed Spring Valley as one of my top priorities in a
letter to the Chair as the legislative year began because of
the national and local importance of confronting Federal
responsibility for informing residents of toxic substances in
communities, particularly when the Federal Government itself
deposited them there and has an undisputed responsibility to
clean the area and to shoulder the burden of proof of showing
that the area is again safe.
I appreciate that, beginning in my early years in Congress
when I was in the minority, this committee has held every
hearing that I have requested to assure that the Spring Valley
neighborhood surrounding American University is cleared of
World War I chemical and other weapons by the Army Corps of
Engineers.
I ask my colleagues to put themselves in the position of my
Spring Valley constituents who have worked hard to purchase
homes in one of the District's most attractive neighborhoods.
By sheer happenstance a utility worker discovers a cache of old
weapons and in short order they are identified as buried
chemical ordnance left behind by the Army.
There are similar areas called formerly used defense sites
or FUDS around the country where munitions have been buried and
cleaning is necessary. However, they are usually far from
densely populated areas. We know of no other FUDS in a major
city where a residential area was developed around and on top
of the FUDS without the Government disclosing that it had
buried potentially harmful munitions.
Munitions were also buried in other areas in the District,
in northeast and southeast, but Spring Valley is the largest
uncleaned residential area here where munitions were buried.
Yet at the time there was no doubt, at the very time when this
testing was going on there could have been no doubt, that this
area where American University after all was already located
would be even more fully developed.
The history of Spring Valley is long and convoluted, but at
its core is the Army's decision during World War I to use this
area in the northwest of the District for the first dangerous
tests and experiments with its new and developing chemical
weapons program.
The decision to locate a major chemical testing facility
and then to bury the debris, unexploded ordnance, and chemicals
on the site here was no accident. The District had no local
government. Its citizens could elect no one to speak for them
in the city where they lived, and no one to represent them in
the Congress which collected their taxes. The Federal
Government itself ruled the city using federally appointed
commissioners. Thus the Army was free to do here what it could
not due in Maryland, Virginia, or any other State close to a
residential area.
As many as 800,000 District residents had no vehicle for
information on what the Army was doing in their city and no
right to know. The District of Columbia was for all these war
time chemical experiments what poorer nations are today when
they receive landfill garbage, scrap metal, and other waste
that Americans do not want in their communities.
As the Spring Valley community more fully developed, the
Army continued to fail to inform the District or the Spring
Valley residents of the munitions and the possible dangers they
might pose. In fact, during the 1950's and again in the 1980's
American University and others raised concerns about buried
munitions in Spring Valley, but it was not until 1993 that the
Army Corps finally declared the site a FUDS. That was only
after a utility worker accidentally stumbled upon buried
ordnance.
Since that discovery, the Corps has left Spring Valley
twice concluding that no large hazards remain. Both times, the
Corps had to return for more cleaning. Only the oversight of
this subcommittee has assured continuing cleanup of Spring
Valley. Now the Corps of Engineers has again announced to the
community that it intends to leave the area in 2 years.
However, Mr. Chairman, the Corps neither informed this
committee, despite our oversight over the years, or me, the
city's only elected congressional official. I learned of the
Corps' intention from my Spring Valley constituents.
The Corps had no right to announce its exit without more,
especially considering the many errors and mishaps so far and
in an absence of transparency over the years that borders on
suppression of information. Neither Congress nor the community
has seen the Corps' 2 year exit plan or any evidence that the
area has been cleaned. Appropriate oversight by the
Environmental Protection Agency has been in question. The
decision to destroy the munitions onsite raises a host of
additional issues. No objective evaluation has been done to
assure that this time there is no more ordnance in the area.
This hearing and any others that may be required seek and
must obtain the answers the District and the residents of
Spring Valley are entitled to have before the Army leaves the
Nation's only residential site it once used to develop chemical
munitions.
I thank our Spring Valley witnesses: Greg Beumel, Nan
Wells, Thomas Smith, Kent Slowinski, and Harold Bailey. I thank
the Army, the Army Corps, the EPA, the GAO, the D.C. Department
of Environment, our expert ordnance recovery expert Mr. Barton,
and President Kerwin of the American University. I very much
look forward to hearing from each and every one of you.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton
follows:]
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Mr. Lynch. Thank you. At this time I would like to ask
unanimous consent for the testimony of Congressman Earl
Blumenauer to be added to the record. Hearing no objections, so
ordered.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Blumenauer follows:]
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Mr. Lynch. Now I would like to welcome our first panel.
Oh, I am sorry. I am sorry; I am sorry. Before we go to
that--I apologize profusely--I would like to give 5 minutes to
the distinguished gentleman from California, my friend Mr.
Bilbray, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bilbray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I
noticed this hearing and it kind of caught my eye for a lot of
reasons, not just because we have a Spring Valley in San Diego
County, too.
I would like to inform the Delegate that this isn't the
only urban area where munitions are specifically an issue in a
residential neighborhood. In San Diego, if my memory serves me,
we actually in the 1980's lost some children to unexploded
munitions. In San Diego we have many locations that are now
residential that were active military operations with live
munitions in many different forms, and in a lot of forms we
don't understand.
Even though we have two Senators and a countless amount of
Congressman in California, the fact is that Federal
reservations tend to have that degree of autonomy that is
mandated by constitutional law. When those lands are turned
over for private development later, we do have these issues.
I would just note that one of these sites in San Diego is
actually the site of the University of California at La Jolla.
So I think this issue really kind of points out that this is
not just an issue of the disadvantaged and the poor. This is a
problem even the wealthy and the powerful can run into as we
have run into it in certain places in California. Obviously,
this is one of those neighborhoods that everybody would never
think would have a problem from looking at the homes. But I
think that we need to address that.
I will tell you, we still have discussions in San Diego,
watching the canyons after the major fires that just occurred a
few years ago, of utilizing those fires as a way of going down
and searching to see if there are any more munitions in the
neighborhoods where our children are playing.
So I just wanted to reflect the fact to the Delegate that
she is not alone on this. D.C. is not the only community that
has to face these challenges. It may have different challenges.
But I think the issue of post-military utilization of property
is going to be a challenge we have for a long time.
I want to make sure, though, that we approach this in a
manner that does not create an attitude, especially among our
military, that once property is used by the military you don't
dare allow civilian use in the future. I don't want this to
create a defensive mechanism, if not a downright paranoid
mechanism, that we can't allow it ever to be used again.
Because there are a lot of good uses after military use. It is
just appropriate handling and addressing the issues. Obviously,
eliminating the problem before civilian use is always the
preferred state but even then there is going to have to be a
sensitivity of constant monitoring.
Mr. Chairman, a good example is the fact that we recycle
sand in California. There was the issue of military munitions
that were laying at the bottom of a bay that no one knew about
being an issue to where we recklessly threw away millions of
metric tons of good recycle sand. It was because of the
paranoia, in my opinion, of the munitions rather than
addressing this appropriately.
Hopefully we will be able to move forward and address this
item in an appropriate manner. It has obviously been one that
has been on the front burner for a long time. I appreciate this
hearing.
I yield back.
Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentleman.
OK, now I would like to welcome our first panel. It is the
custom before this committee that all witnesses to provide
testimony before the subcommittee are sworn. Could I please ask
you each to rise and raise your right hand?
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Lynch. Let the record indicate that each of the
witnesses answered in the affirmative.
Just briefly, let me give some ground rules. The green
light in that little box in front of you in the middle of the
table will indicate you have 5 minutes to provide an opening
statement. The yellow light when it clicks will indicate that
you have 1 minute remaining. Then the red light indicates that
the time allotted for your statement has expired.
I would like to provide just a brief introduction of the
first two witnesses: Ms. Anu K. Mittal is Director with the
Natural Resources and Environment team of the U.S. Government
Accountability Office. She is responsible for leading GAO's
work in the area of water resources and defense environmental
cleanup.
Mr. Harold Bailey is currently assisting Washington, DC,
residents threatened by improperly disposed munitions. Mr.
Bailey's projects have involved the application and enforcement
of U.S. environmental laws such as the National Environmental
Policy Act, the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, and the
Endangered Species Act.
Ms. Mittal, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for an
opening statement.
STATEMENTS OF ANU K. MITTAL, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; AND HAROLD
BAILEY, GARVEY SCHUBERT BARER
STATEMENT OF ANU K. MITTAL
Ms. Mittal. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee,
thank you for inviting us today to provide some historical
context and a national perspective for the Spring Valley
cleanup.
As you know, Spring Valley was designated as a formerly
used defense site or FUDS in 1993 after ordnance was discovered
by accident. Further investigations at Spring Valley found
additional hazards including arsenic contaminated soil and lab
waste. By April 2002, the Corps had removed over 5,600 cubic
yards of soil, 667 pieces of ordnance, and 101 bottles of
chemicals. In 2003, the Corps also discovered perchlorate in
groundwater at the site and so installed over three dozen
monitoring wells for sampling. Since 2002, the Corps has
continued cleanup at the site and has removed large quantities
of contaminated soil, hundreds of lab related items and
munitions debris, as well as some in tact munitions and
containers.
In fiscal year 2002, the total cost to clean up Spring
Valley was expected to be about $147 million and take about 5
more years to complete. However, 7 years later, cleanup is
still ongoing and the estimated costs have increased to almost
$174 million.
Since we issued our Spring Valley report in 2002, we have
conducted several reviews of DOD's Environmental Restoration
Program nationwide for both active installations and FUDS. Our
work at the national level shows that the concerns identified
at Spring Valley are not unique and are in fact common to many
sites across the country. Four key themes emerged from our work
that we believe are directly relevant to the Spring Valley
cleanup.
First, shortcomings in the use of available data can lead
to poor decisionmaking. The Army's conclusions in 1986 and 1996
that there was no evidence of large scale hazards remaining at
Spring Valley were made without the benefit of all available
information. Our nationwide review of FUDS found similar
shortcomings in the Corps' use of available information for
making decisions at over 1,400 sites across the country. We
found that the Corps either did not obtain, overlooked, or
dismissed information that might have indicated the presence of
a hazard. Recently a major association of State regulators has
noted that these problems continue to persist.
Second, incomplete data onsite conditions and emerging
contaminants can interfere with the development of accurate
cost estimates and schedules, just as the cost estimates at
Spring Valley have increased almost eight and a half times
since the initial estimate of $21 million was developed.
Developing cost estimates for FUDS and active installations
across the country pose a similar challenge. This is because
DOD often has incomplete information onsite conditions when it
first makes cost estimates. As more information becomes
available or as new contaminants are discovered, estimates must
be revised and can thus vary significantly over the life of a
project.
Third, funding availability for a particular site may be
influenced by overall program goals and priorities. Spring
Valley is just one of the over 4,700 FUDS nationwide that DOD
is in the process of cleaning up. However, Spring Valley has
received priority funding due to its proximity to the Nation's
Capital and high visibility. This is usually not the case with
most FUDS, and they must compete for a slice of a relatively
small funding pie. Although funding for FUDS has been
relatively stable over the last decade, it is well recognized
that the level of funding available cannot meet all cleanup
needs.
Finally, better coordination and communication with
regulators and property owners can increase public confidence
and facilitate effective decisionmaking. In 2002, we reported
that the Corps, EPA, and the District of Columbia had made
progress on Spring Valley by adopting a partnership approach
and establishing a means of communicating with the public.
However, we have found that this kind of communication and
coordination does not always occur at other sites nationwide
and can significantly hinder cleanup progress.
In response to the findings and recommendations that we
have made over the last 6 years, DOD has taken actions to
modify its procedures and improve its guidance. While we have
not evaluated DOD's implementation of our past recommendations
in depth, we are reviewing some of these issues as part of our
ongoing work that will be issued later this year.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, experiences with DOD's
national cleanup program and the Spring Valley cleanup tell us
that environmental restoration is a daunting task. But there
are lessons that can be applied to the process that can make it
more effective as we move forward.
This concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Mittal follows:]
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Mr. Lynch. Thank you. Mr. Bailey, you are now recognized
for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF HAROLD BAILEY
Mr. Bailey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am here today on
behalf of several Spring Valley families who were unaware that
their children were playing in soil laced with arsenic or that
those children could find containers that once held poison
gases.
I am holding a piece of a container for phosgene gas found
by Frances Hansen's young child in their backyard in 2002. The
Army and American University had rented a house to Ms. Hansen
but failed to warn her and other Spring Valley families about
the potential exposure to AUES weapons of mass destruction
despite the historical, photographic, and physical evidence in
their possession.
My law firm assists government officials who are assessing
contamination left by the U.S. military. So let me explain why
I think the Army and AU need to do more research to locate and
remove WMD in Spring Valley. There is a 1918 photograph of the
American University Experiment Station taken by Sergeant
Maurer. It shows ceramic containers and metal drums near a
burial pit located near the current boundary of AU and
Glenbrook Road.
There was a criminal investigation into the Army's
activities in Spring Valley in 2000. EPA investigators learned
that the Army had obtained this Maurer photograph in 1993. So
for 16 years the Army has known approximately where the Maurer
Pit is but has not been able to locate its location.
In my experience, photographic evidence of a large burial
site with metal drums means that advanced geophysical devices
could locate that site. But as the ANC Commissioners will
indicate, the past geophysical detection methods used by the
Army didn't have the capability to locate burial sites at deep
depths or in hard to reach locations. Without these more
advanced geophysical methods to locate the Maurer Pit, Spring
Valley residents will always have a gnawing feeling that a WMD
site could be within several hundred yards.
One child in the Dudley family who played in the dirt in
this area experienced acute skin irritation similar to the
symptoms from exposure to lewisite. The Dudleys were never told
of the Maurer photograph and never warned that the Army had
found live shells on their property.
The May 1920 minutes of the AU Trustees record AU's
acceptance of a proposition by the U.S. Government to
compensate AU. Articles in the AU Courier newspaper explained
that the Army had dug a pit deeper than the one into which
Joseph was cast for the burial of $800,000 in chemical
munitions. There are three points that indicate that is not the
Maurer Pit, and neither have been found. There is no extremely
deep pit that has been found. The munitions valued at $800,000
in 1919 dollars have not been found. And burying large amounts
of explosively configured munitions along with mustard gas is
not exactly a safe practice even in 1919.
Particularly troubling is that the Army and AU knew about
the potential presence of WMDs since 1986 when an EPA
historical photographic analysis showed ground scars indicating
burial pits on or near AU. The 1986 report was credible
evidence of potential danger to Spring Valley families but this
report was not disclosed until many years later. It reflects a
pattern of failure to warn and failure to disclose material
information under legal standards.
Let me summarize the AUES lawsuits that Congresswoman
Norton asked me to cover: First, recovering compensation from
the U.S. Government for disposal of munitions is unlikely under
judicial interpretations of the Federal Tort Claims Act. The
AUES disposals are considered non-compensable discretionary
acts, regardless of the dangers that are created.
Second, AU is not protected by this discretionary act
exemption. AU in fact settled a lawsuit after a Federal judge
found that AU failed to disclose information about the burials
to a home buyer.
Third, the parties settling the various lawsuits have
sealed their court filings in many cases, thus preventing
public disclosure of what the litigants know about AUES
burials.
Finally, the lawsuits have been a blame game where the
protection of public health and the environment of Spring
Valley has not been addressed. The litigation is focused on
monetary compensation rather than claims involving the Army or
even EPA for failure to comply with Federal environmental
statutes that govern cleanups at FUDS. In July 2001, AU sued
the Army for $86 million. This lawsuit was an unsuccessful
attempt to shift legal liability, but the fact is that AU had
accepted the Government's 1920 propositions and compensation.
In conclusion, I believe that this subcommittee has the
authority to ensure that advanced scientific techniques are
used to locate the most dangerous WMD sites at Spring Valley. I
ask that Congress ensure that these techniques are used before
the Army stops its investigation or remedial activities.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bailey follows:]
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Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Bailey.
I will now yield myself 5 minutes for an opening question.
Ms. Mittal, in your testimony you indicated that at least the
first mistake, the first of several mistakes on the part of
DOD, is that they did not make a good assessment of the
likelihood that munitions, mustard gas, or any other harmful
substances were actually on the site. Yet they issued a ``no
action necessary'' and a rather clean assessment of the site.
Is that due to the fact that records that could have been
reviewed were classified, was it just a lack of initiative on
the part of DOD and the Corps, or was it an assumption made by
the DOD? Can you determine what was at the basis of that
significant error on their part?
Ms. Mittal. What we have seen when we have looked at the
Corps' decisions to claim that a site does not require further
action is that oftentimes they just don't look at all of the
information that they have available to them.
When they made the decision in 1986, they had actually sent
information to EPA. They had photographs that they had
contracted with EPA that they wanted EPA's technical input on.
Those photographs were not received by EPA until 1993. But the
Corps had already made a decision in 1986 that they were going
to go ahead and say that this site didn't need any further
action.
That was what we found at the national level as well. When
we looked at ``no action'' indicated sites across the country,
we found that in 38 percent of the cases the Corps either
didn't obtain the information it needed, it had incomplete
files, it did not conduct the site visits that it needed to do,
or it just ignored some of the information that it had
available to it.
What we found was that a large part of this was because the
guidance that the Corps had developed was not very explicit on
what investigators need to do in terms of looking at the
documents, what they need to document, and how they need to
assess the documentation. So that is why we recommended that
they definitely needed to improve their procedures and improve
their guidance.
Mr. Lynch. Mr. Bailey, you have been deeply involved in
this. Do you agree with that assessment? Is that sort of where
they went wrong?
Mr. Bailey. I do. I think there have been numerous examples
where there was information available. I mentioned this 1986
photographic analysis that I think should have been widely
shared. There was a great deal of information available that
didn't get to the right places. I agree with that.
Mr. Lynch. Let me ask you then, each of you, having been
involved in the process since 1995 and going forward, do you
think that DOD has changed their approach? You mentioned
inadequate guidance existing prior. Have we gotten our act
together here?
Ms. Mittal. Well, we know that DOD and the Corps have made
changes in response to our recommendations. We have not gone
back in and done an in depth evaluation to see if those changes
have resulted in positive action. Our concern is that recently
a State association of waste managers basically came out and
found that they are still very concerned about the decisions
that DOD and the Corps are making. So it sounds like the
problem still exists out there. We just have not gone back and
taken a look at it.
Mr. Lynch. Mr. Bailey.
Mr. Bailey. I have significant concerns that there are some
potentially serious burial sites that have not been thoroughly
looked at from the perspective of historical, eyewitness, and
other information. If we don't look at that information and
they close it, and it comes up again, then we will know we have
failed. So I would encourage the Corps and AU to use advanced
geophysical techniques, to use additional research techniques
to get to the questions that I have raised in my testimony. My
written remarks are of six sites that I think are important
that have not been properly analyzed as your question suggests.
Also, the destruction of chemical weapons that is going to
go on this summer, there is a question, I believe, in the
community about what exactly is going to go on with that
destruction. I recognize there are national security concerns
about destroying chemical weapons and that information. But I
think some of the ANC Commissioners who are going to be
testifying later have serious concerns about what chemicals are
coming into the District, what is being destroyed, what is
going to be leaving the District, and where the chemical
weapons after they are neutralized are going to be sent for
ultimate destruction.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you. At this time, I would like to yield 5
minutes to the ranking member, Mr. Chaffetz.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The GAO issued a
report on the Spring Valley cleanup and testified before a
subcommittee back on June 26, 2002. I recognize you may not
have participated in that. In the GAO's prior testimony before
Congress, it was stated that there was data on 58 properties in
the District of Columbia where ``hazards resulting from Federal
activities have been found.'' Is that still the case and how
much progress has been made on any of those cases?
Ms. Mittal. We currently are doing work looking at the
whole FUDS program. We are collecting information but we have
not completely analyzed that information yet. We would be happy
to share that with you as we develop the information that we
have.
Mr. Chaffetz. Yes. Given that there were 58 properties
within the District of Columbia that were identified
previously, we would certainly appreciate an update on the
broader scope of everything that is happening within the
District. We would also appreciate an update on what progress,
if any, has been made in terms of those cleanups, including the
locations of those outstanding sites.
Congress was also told by the GAO in 2002 that ``a number
of independent uncertainties continue to affect the program of
the Spring Valley cleanup.'' Can you give us further insight
into the specifics from your vantage point, Ms. Mittal,
regarding what has been cleaned up? Can the community be given
definitive answers about any remaining health risks or costs or
where your perspective is as to how far along this progress is?
Ms. Mittal. Unfortunately, we have not done a comprehensive
assessment of Spring Valley since 2002. Most of the work that I
have sited is at the national level where we have been looking
at the FUDS program and the overall Defense Environmental
Restoration Program.
Mr. Chaffetz. Is there something that is going to be
specifically done? Is there a target date as to when you think
it will be complete? Is it something that is close to
completion?
Ms. Mittal. At this point in time, we have not done a
thorough reassessment of the Spring Valley cleanup.
Mr. Chaffetz. Is there one in progress?
Ms. Mittal. There is not one in progress and we have not
been requested to do one. So I really can't give you the more
detailed information that you are requesting at this time.
Mr. Chaffetz. OK. Mr. Bailey, if you had to highlight your
biggest concern moving forward, if you had to really highlight
this is my No. 1 concern, what would that be?
Mr. Bailey. Congressman, the area at the corner of
Glenbrook Road and Rockwood Parkway--I am a Superfund lawyer
and I am used to dumps and messes--is a dump site. The trouble
is that there is credible historic evidence of burial pits that
could contain chemical weapons, containers of mustard gas, or
large amounts of explosively configured chemical munitions. If
the Corps never finds these very deep pits and dispels thoughts
of maybe there is nothing there, maybe it has all leaked out,
we will never know.
Those are inhabited places. The Korean ambassador's
residence is there. There are other residences around. So until
the day comes that the Corps can find these deep pits or
completely dispel the credible evidence that we have, that they
are not there, then we won't know. Like I said, there will be
the gnawing feeling that we would have after they left.
Mr. Chaffetz. As I recall, did you say that you thought
there were six of these?
Mr. Bailey. My written testimony goes through the six sites
that I think are the most important. Obviously, there are many
areas of concern that have been looked at over the years. In
terms of priority now, based on my experience of 10 years with
the project, those are the ones that seem to be the most
important ones.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. Lynch. The Chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from
the District of Columbia, Ms. Eleanor Holmes Norton, for 5
minutes.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Mittal,
do you agree with the new cost estimates for the Army Corps' 2
year plan that it is using as it proposes to exit?
Ms. Mittal. The numbers that we have, we got from the
Corps' report to the Congress. We have not gone back and
independently evaluated whether those numbers are accurate.
Ms. Norton. Well, I think that in light of your testimony
about how the Corps has underestimated the cost of cleanup,
that would seem to be important to do.
Mr. Bailey, I am concerned about your testimony about the
deepest burials. You say they were either buried and may no
longer, of course, be viable or were poured out. Where would
they have been poured out?
Mr. Bailey. Yes, Congresswoman. This is an example of a
container that at one time was in tact and probably contained a
phosgene gas. Over time, or even at the time, it was broken and
the contents were released.
Those of us familiar with chemical weapons know that
oftentimes when the chemical weapon is released, it is
neutralized and no longer harmful. But the trouble is that we
don't know. We don't know whether there are in tact containers
buried; we don't know whether there are explosive munitions
buried that we haven't found.
Ms. Norton. What did the Army give as the reason for not
finding the Maurer Pit?
Mr. Bailey. I concur that it is a difficult technical task
because some of these things could be down 20 or 30 feet. The
types of geophysical detection devices that I use in my
practice in Superfund might not reach.
Ms. Norton. What about the kind that the Army uses?
Mr. Bailey. Well, they are the same, by the way. The same
contractors that the Army used, I used.
Ms. Norton. So you are saying it doesn't exist, the
technology doesn't exist?
Mr. Bailey. The technology at the time did not exist. The
technology is getting better. One question I hope the committee
will explore is what are the most advanced techniques that
could be used to reach down further and see better.
Ms. Norton. So what would be the evidence then of whether
or not there was anything harmful there if it was buried that
deep?
Mr. Bailey. Well, unfortunately the only evidence you would
find that it is harmful would be in groundwater monitoring.
That, I know, is going to be discussed later. If you detect it
in groundwater monitoring wells, that would be one indication.
But if these things are in tact, as they have found in tact
shell elsewhere in this area, you won't know until you actually
dig it up what is there.
Ms. Norton. Is it clear that the perchlorate in the
groundwater is traceable to the ordnance?
Mr. Bailey. It is likely but not sure. One thing that we do
know is perchlorate was used in fuses, the fusing of artillery,
so it seems likely that it comes from there. I know other
Members have had perchlorate in their districts. It comes from
a wide variety of things. It is likely, Congresswoman, likely.
Ms. Norton. Given what you say about a site like this where
there can be ordnance buried so deep that it might never be
found, we are faced with the question of whether the Army Corps
should leave the site. How are we to know whether the Army
Corps should leave the site and engage in some lesser activity
such as, for example, monitoring?
Mr. Bailey. There are two criteria that Superfund types of
situations would suggest. One is if the groundwater wells that
are being dug and going to be dug show contaminants that are
below the risk based criteria set by EPA in Region 3. Then you
have some assurance that the groundwater that goes eventually
into the Potomac and other areas would not be a concern, and
that things aren't leaking into there. It is a much more
difficult question, Congresswoman, for buried munitions to find
out what the criteria for that are. But my personal criterion
is that advanced geophysical techniques are used in the spots
where historical evidence and photographic evidence show them
to be. If there is a finding of nothing----
Ms. Norton. But I thought you said that equipment was not
available.
Mr. Bailey. Not at the time. Most of this geophysical
activity took place 10 years ago. The number of new geophysical
investigations, I really don't know. But certainly a number of
the original geophysical mapping was with technology that is
fairly old.
Ms. Mittal. May I add to that?
Ms. Norton. Yes, Ms. Mittal.
Ms. Mittal. I really think there are three things you need
to consider based on our experience with sites nationwide.
One is the transparency of the decisionmaking. I think both
of you mentioned earlier that it is really important, now as
the Corps makes a decision to leave the site, that it shares
the information that it is using to make that decision with
regulators. One of the things that we have found nationwide was
that the Corps often doesn't involve the State regulators and
the EPA in that decisionmaking process. It is very important
that they do that because the State regulators and EPA can
ensure that the actions that the Corps has taken comply with
the regulatory standards. What we have found nationwide is
that, more often than not, it does not happen. So that
transparency is really important before the decision to leave
the site happens.
The second thing that we would strongly recommend is that
they should share with the community and the stakeholders a
long term monitoring strategy. Obviously, there are a lot of
things that we don't know about this site. We don't know where
they are buried. But in the event that some new hazard is
detected in the future, there should be a robust, long term
monitoring strategy for the site.
The last thing that I would recommend is that the Corps
really needs to do extensive outreach with the residents of
Spring Valley. One of the things that we found when we did our
nationwide work is that the Corps often doesn't contact the
property owners and tell them how and what they should do in
the event that additional contamination is discovered. So we
believe that before the Corps pulls out, they need to make that
outreach to the residents. Because it is a partnership. The
residents can help the Corps identify new hazards if they come
available, but they have to know who to contact and what to do
in that kind of situation.
So those are three things we would definitely recommend.
Ms. Norton. Thank you. I know I am over time. I just want
to clarify one thing in that answer if I may, Mr. Chairman.
What you have just said mentioning regulators suggests that
the Corps should not leave on the basis of its own evaluation,
but only after regulators have certified that in their
independent judgment it is safe to leave at this point. Is that
your testimony?
Ms. Mittal. We think that will add to the public's
confidence in what the Corps has done if the regulators are
involved in that decisionmaking process.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
Let me just again for further clarification ask a last
question. I know that in my own district back in Massachusetts
we had a similar situation, although it was private oil
companies that had caused the problem back then. Sometimes the
community views Federal agencies as the same. It is all the
Federal Government. So sometimes, unfairly or not, there is the
suspicion that there might be collusion there among the Federal
agencies, especially in cases like this where mistakes have
been made. The lack of trust can be pernicious.
We found that in at least one of those cases we were able
to appoint an independent licensed site professional to be
chosen by the local community, a licensed and qualified
professional to look behind all of the data and all of the
research to really give an extra level of approval to the
cleanliness or the remediation that had occurred. Is that
something that you might recommend here?
Ms. Mittal. I think it makes a lot of sense to do something
like that. In our work what we have found is that the State
regulators can oftentimes provide that balance as well. The
State regulators have a responsibility to ensure that whatever
cleanup has been done has been done according to State
requirements. So they can provide that distance between the
Federal entities and the community. They could function in that
form as well.
Mr. Lynch. Right. In closing, I do want to say I was happy
to hear your recommendations regarding ongoing monitoring. I
hope the agencies were listening closely to that suggestion
because I think it is a solid one.
At this time I would like to yield 5 minutes to the
gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Clay, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Clay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank you and
Delegate Norton for prompting this hearing, for bringing this
important issue to this committee. Delegate Norton is to be
commended for representing her constituents.
Ms. Mittal, let me ask you, would you characterize the
DOD's and the Army Corps' behavior in this issue as
irresponsible, as reckless, as one that endangers the lives of
citizens in this community and in others?
Ms. Mittal. That is a hard question to answer. What we have
found is that the Spring Valley site is actually one of the
better sites when you look at the national profile of FUDS
sites. The Baltimore District is one of the districts that we
have highlighted. It has been very proactive in reaching out to
the States that it works with.
The Corps, EPA, and the District established a partnership,
which is very rare across the country, to actually work
together on the site. The Corps also established a means of
communicating with the public. That is also very rare across
the country. The other thing that we have noticed is that this
has been a site that has received extensive funding. It is a
high priority site, and it receives funding before a lot of the
other sites nationwide.
So it is very hard to make that sort of statement knowing
that there are a lot of positive things that have happened at
this site which we don't see happening across the country.
Mr. Clay. Sure. I can certainly share an experience with
you that I had a couple of years back about a munitions site
that was active during World War II and was just left there
with contaminants. In the first congressional district of
Missouri, we had an environmental cleanup of a munitions plant.
The community still has some concerns in Saint Louis of
chemical contamination in the soil, groundwater contamination,
and the testing of residents for health reasons.
Could you supply us with documentation on the followup
testing and assessments that were done on the Saint Louis Army
Ammunition Plant? It is called the SLAAP site. Can you inform
me of the followup testing on groundwater and if it has been
done with the state-of-the-art isotopic analysis that will be
used in Spring Valley? Will we or do we already have a remedial
investigation report that summarizes all samplings and all
cleanup actions taken? Include a baseline human health and
environmental risk assessment. Could you help me with that?
Ms. Mittal. I can tell you, sir, that we probably don't
have that sort of detailed information. We only end up
collecting that kind of information from the agency when we are
asked to review a particular site in detail. We have not looked
at the Saint Louis site in detail, so we would not have that
information available to us right now. I am sure that the Corps
could provide that information to you much faster than if we
went to the Corps and then got the information. So I would
strongly recommend asking the Corps for that information.
Mr. Clay. OK. I am asking you, here, in this hearing. I am
going to ask the Corps next when they get up here.
Ms. Mittal. We will be happy to work with you.
Mr. Clay. The experience in Saint Louis has been that they
did some cleanup of the site and quickly rushed to transfer the
property to the State of Missouri, who is now trying to peddle
it off to the city of Saint Louis. That is irresponsible
behavior when you think about it. This site sat there for 60
years and they didn't have the decency to clean it up, to make
it safe for the surrounding community. And now they want to
peddle it off to the State and to the local community.
I think it is reckless behavior. I think it is
irresponsible. You show no respect for health and safety of
that community. You do have a responsibility when you
contaminate a community. You need to clean it up. Clean up your
mess. Clean up your waste that you leave there. Don't just
leave it for somebody else. It is tragic.
I can't wait to get to the next panel. I yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Clay. The Chair now recognizes
the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Kucinich, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members
of the committee. My questions go to Ms. Mittal. Did you have
access to the records of the Department of Defense going back
to 1916 or 1917?
Ms. Mittal. When we did our original Spring Valley review,
we had access to all of the Department's records on the site.
Mr. Kucinich. When you said onsite what did you mean?
Ms. Mittal. For the site. Whatever was in the file for the
site, we had access to that information.
Mr. Kucinich. Are you confident that you looked at each and
every record that was available through the Department of
Defense? There weren't any records that were shielded from your
attention based on what may have been at that time national
security concerns that may have continued to exist even though
it was so many years ago?
Ms. Mittal. I am quite confident that if we were aware that
something existed that we would have had access to it and that
we would have been able to obtain it. I did not personally work
on the project at that time so I can't confirm everything we
looked at. But I am quite confident that if we were aware that
a document existed, we would have obtained it.
Mr. Kucinich. There weren't any projects labeled top secret
at that time? I would assume that if you have a munitions and a
chemical weapons facility that was operating at that time that
it may have been top secret. Is it possible that any
information that may exist has not been seen by the GAO that
might be relevant to this investigation?
Ms. Mittal. I will double check and get back to you on
that, sir.
Mr. Kucinich. I think that would be good if you did that
with the idea that it may be a separate classification. It
could have been for just the knowledge of a few people only,
and because so much time has passed, it may still be there. The
reason I raise this question is this: Have you had access to
any longitudinal studies or any epidemiological studies
relative to people who are in the Spring Valley area and who
have been in the Spring Valley area since it has been built up?
Ms. Mittal. When we did the 2002 work, a lot of the studies
that have happened have happened after that. So we did not. We
did look at the earlier work that had been done, but not at the
ones that have been done subsequently.
Mr. Kucinich. Were students at American University who may
have been in and around the grounds there over the period of
time that we have knowledge that this existed, were students
surveyed or canvassed to see if they may have any adverse
health effects as a result of coming into contact with some of
the sites?
Ms. Mittal. Do you mean as part of our study? No, we did
not do that.
Mr. Kucinich. Do you know of any public health studies that
have been done that go beyond the testing that the University
testifies to? They tested defined campus populations for
arsenic poisoning.
Ms. Mittal. I believe the ATSDR did a study where they
sampled students that had been around the American University
Campus at the Children's Development Center. So there was a
comprehensive study done by ATSDR.
Mr. Kucinich. But have there been any other studies in
terms of long term studies? Because some of these chemicals are
bioaccumulative and you may see effects later on in life and
not see them immediately.
Ms. Mittal. I am not aware personally of any of those
studies.
Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Chairman, I just call it to your
attention. You have been doing much more work on this and are
much more familiar with it than I am, but I just wanted to
raise the attention of the Chair and members of the committee
that it might be helpful to find out what other kinds of public
health studies relate to the population in the Spring Valley
area, including the students at American University over a
period of time and people that are graduates of the University.
Just kind of take a long period of time and see if any
particular types of incidents show up of certain kinds of
diseases or ailments.
My time has almost expired. I am grateful for the work of
this committee and for GAO's continuing interest in this. The
fact that this was discovered by accident in 1993 should give
all of us on this committee pause about other sites that are
formerly used defense and military munitions sites. So Mr.
Chairman, thank you very much for this.
Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentleman. We will followup on the
health information as to what might be available.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from northern
Virginia, Mr. Connolly, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the Chair. I particularly want to
thank the chairman for holding these hearings that are clearly
of importance to all of us in the National Capital Region,
especially those who live in the District of Columbia.
I have an opening statement, Mr. Chairman, and I would ask
unanimous consent that it be entered into the record at this
point.
Mr. Lynch. Without objection.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the Chair.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Gerald E. Connolly
follows:]
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Mr. Connolly. Ms. Mittal, how many such sites might there
be that we know of throughout the United States where we have
either unexpended ordnance or testing grounds that could
negatively affect residential communities?
Ms. Mittal. I would have to go back and double check on how
many affect residential communities. I do not have that
information. I do know that there are 4,700 sites that are
considered formerly used defense sites in the Corps' data base.
Mr. Connolly. Are you aware of anybody who has segregated
those 4,700 sites in terms of who they impact?
Ms. Mittal. I am sure that information can be derived.
Mr. Connolly. If you could get it back to the committee for
the record, that would be very helpful because we need to look
at the scope of the problem.
If I could followup on something Congressman Clay was
asking about, when a property owned by the Federal Government,
any part of the Federal Government including the Army, if it is
discovered subsequent to the transfer to a local government or
to a private entity that in fact there is some kind of
environmental problem, legally who has the obligation to clean
that up?
Ms. Mittal. To clean it up? If it is determined that the
site was owned by the Government, controlled by the Government,
and that the activity that caused the contamination was a
result of Government activity, then it is the Federal
Government that has responsibility under CERCLA to clean it up.
Mr. Connolly. That is understood in whatever contractual
arrangement there is in the transfer, is that correct?
Ms. Mittal. I believe so.
Mr. Connolly. I had an experience locally, here at the
Lorton Prisonsite that was transferred to Fairfax County. When
we discovered certain environmental problems on the property,
it was the responsibility nonetheless of the Federal
Government, the transferring agent, to clean up that site. So I
assume similar provisions apply to any Federal agency that may
own such land.
Ms. Mittal. I am familiar with the CERCLA requirements but
Mr. Bailey might be----
Mr. Bailey. Congressman, this is a much more unique
situation. Here the American University Experimental Station
was leased by the Army from American University. Private land
owners around the area then conveyed their property to property
owners. And American University, of course, conveyed property
subsequently.
The problem, of course, is that there was a failure to
disclose a dangerous condition as the law requires. In D.C. law
and Federal law there is a requirement to disclose a dangerous
condition. That was never done here. That is the essence of the
entire problem.
Mr. Connolly. It is a very good point you are making. Mr.
Chairman, it sounds to me like this may be one of those areas
that needs to be clarified in the law. As Ms. Mittal said,
though we don't know how many impinge on or are connected to
residential communities, if there are 4,700 sites one can
imagine there could be other similar such problems.
Did I understand you, Ms. Mittal, to respond to the
gentleman's from Ohio query that there has not been a
comprehensive health assessment of nearby residents and
students attending American University with respect to this?
Ms. Mittal. No. There actually have been a couple of
studies done. One was done by ATSDR. Another one was done by
Johns Hopkins. What I think the Congressman was asking was
about long term studies. I am not aware of any long term
studies.
Mr. Connolly. Following the long term effects?
Ms. Mittal. Yes.
Mr. Connolly. OK, I understand. All right. Like my
colleagues, if I can, I am going to wait for other questions
for the next panel. I thank you both for being here.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentleman. There being no further
Members with additional questions, since we obviously did not
exhaust all areas of inquiry, I would like to give you each an
opportunity. You will have just 3 minutes each if there are
areas of your testimony that have not been touched upon
adequately, if you want to amplify a certain area that you
think is very important, or if there is an area that hasn't
been asked.
I appreciate the frank testimony by each of our witnesses
on this panel.
Ms. Mittal, I would like to allow you 3 minutes if there
are some areas of concern that you have that haven't been
touched upon yet at this hearing.
Ms. Mittal. I appreciate it. Thank you. I think the
important thing to remember is that these are not easy sites to
clean up. We do not have comprehensive information. The
contamination occurred 75 or 90 years ago in some cases. The
technological capacity that we need to detect, identify, and
then actually do the cleanup is not always there. We need to
recognize that this is a very complex and challenging process.
It is not always easy for the Corps to know everything that
they possibly need to know when they start cleaning up a site.
So I just want to emphasize that.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you. I appreciate that. Mr. Bailey.
Mr. Bailey. I would just add that the Congresswoman's point
about the lack of estate involved in this process is something
that I urge you to cover more. The amount of resources the
District of Columbia has had to devote to independent oversight
has been limited. I do sites all around the country, and this
is a unique site in the respect that other sites have great
resources--scientific, analytical, and legal--to employ
independent oversight and make sure that the Corps is doing the
right job. Unfortunately, that has been lacking in this case,
in my view. I would urge the committee to question other
witnesses on that particular point.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Bailey.
At this point I would like to dismiss our first panel.
Thank you for your willingness to come forward and help the
subcommittee with its work. We bid you good day.
With that, I would like to call up our second panel. Good
afternoon and welcome. We want to welcome our second panel and
thank you for your willingness to come forward and help the
subcommittee with its work.
It is the custom before this committee that all witnesses
providing testimony shall be sworn. May I please ask you to
rise and raise your right hands?
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Lynch. Let the record reflect that all the witnesses
have answered in the affirmative. As you saw with the first
panel, the green light will indicate you have 5 minutes to
summarize your written statements which have been accepted into
the record. The yellow light indicates that you have 1 minute
remaining to summarize your statement. The red light means that
your time for your statement has expired.
Let me introduce our second panel: Mr. Addison Davis
assumed his duties as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health in 2005.
Mr. Davis provides executive leadership for the Army
Environmental Policy Institute and the Army's four regional
environmental offices. He serves as the executive agent for a
number of critical Department of Defense activities.
Colonel Peter Mueller assumed command of the Baltimore
District on July 14, 2006. Colonel Mueller's major command and
staff experience include assignments as the Commander of the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Charleston District in South
Carolina. He is a registered professional engineer in the
Commonwealth of Virginia.
William C. Early was appointed Acting Regional
Administrator for the Environmental Protection Agency in April
2009, temporarily leaving his post as Regional Counsel. Mr.
Early has received several bronze medals for his efforts in
support of the regional Hazardous Waste Enforcement Program.
Mr. George S. Hawkins is the director of the Department of
Environment for the District of Columbia. He launched and now
chairs the Mayor's Green Team, which coordinates District
sustainability programs across more than 40 agencies.
With that, I would now like to open it up for opening
statements. Mr. Davis, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENTS OF ADDISON DAVIS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY, AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH, U.S. ARMY;
COLONEL PETER MUELLER, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS; WILLIAM C.
EARLY, ACTING REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY; AND GEORGE S. HAWKINS, DIRECTOR, D.C.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
STATEMENT OF ADDISON DAVIS
Mr. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee. I am Ted Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health. I am
pleased to have the opportunity to testify today on the Army's
activities at Spring Valley in Washington, DC. As one of my
other duties, I serve as the Department's of Defense executive
agent for the formerly used defense site program under which
Spring Valley is being addressed.
My testimony will briefly discuss the FUDS program and the
issues you identified in your recent letter. I would like to
say up front that the Army will not leave Spring Valley until
the work is done. Based on investigation results and ongoing
efforts, the Army anticipates completion of the majority of the
field work at Spring Valley at the end of calendar year 2010.
Although this means that there will be fewer visible signs of
Army activities like trucks and trailers onsite, the Army
remains committed to its efforts to protect human health and
the environment at Spring Valley.
We understand the concerns of the Spring Valley community
and assure you and the public that the Army will continue to
work with our partners, the D.C. Department of the Environment,
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, as well as the
community, to ensure that the work is completed in accordance
with prescribed regulatory standards and with the intent to
ensure the health and human safety of the entire community. We
will continue to work hard to keep our activities related to
this site as open and transparent as possible.
I would also like to acknowledge the role that Congress has
played in availing the funds necessary to discharge our
responsibilities at Spring Valley and at other FUDS sites
around the country. Funding for the FUDS program has stayed
relatively level for the last several years with approximately
$11 million a year at the Spring Valley site. However, the
program has received annual plus ups from Congress that have
allowed us to accelerate work at high priority sites including
Spring Valley, which received $4 million above the original
allocation for fiscal year 2009. So essentially for 2009, we
had $15 million of funding.
The FUDS program is part of the overall Defense
Environmental Restoration Program [DERP], established by the
Congress in 1986. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers executes the
program under my supervision as DOD's executive agent for the
FUDS program. This program is responsible for more than 9,000
sites transferred from DOD control prior to 1986.
Given available resources, the Army uses a risk based
prioritization approach based onsite specific conditions. The
Army first addresses those sites with the highest relative
priority before addressing sites of a lower priority. At this
point in time, the top priority within the FUDS program is the
Spring Valley site.
The Army complies with the Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation and Liability Act [CERCLA], for site
characterization and remedy implementation at FUDS. We actively
work with regulators who set and enforce the appropriate
standards necessary to ascertain the cleanup is protective of
human health and the environment. Further, the Army engages the
community to ensure its concerns are understood and that their
concerns are considered as well in the process.
The Spring Valley FUDS encompasses the former American
University Experimental Station where during World War I the
Army tested chemical agents. It presents, as was mentioned
already before, the challenge of investigating and remediating
legacy chemical weapons materials in a densely populated
metropolitan area.
Emphasizing safety, accountability, and transparency, the
Army invited the D.C. Department of Health, later the D.C.
Department of the Environment, as well as the EPA to enter a
working partnership with the Army for the Spring Valley
cleanup. I firmly believe, Mr. Chairman, that our partnership
at Spring Valley to date is a strong factor in the success of
our efforts at this FUDS project.
As previously stated, the Army is nearing a key milestone
at Spring Valley. Based on the Army's investigative efforts and
site data collected using the best technology and expertise
available, the Army developed a cleanup plan that was carefully
reviewed and agreed upon by those partners. The plan projects
that the majority of field work will in fact be completed by
the end of 2010. We will then begin an extensive data review
and report writing phase which may last up to several years.
Further, the Army is committed to working collaboratively with
the community to respond to discoveries of contamination caused
by past military activities that may pose a threat to human
health or the environment.
Last year the Army planed to use the explosive destruction
system to neutralize chemical munitions and conventional
munitions that contain a non-chemical agent. We will probably
be able to go into more detail on that process during our
discussions.
In closing, the bottom line from the Army's perspective and
that of DOD is doing the right thing with regard to the Spring
Valley site. That has always been our intent and will continue
to be so in the future. The Army has acted responsibly at this
complex site. It continues to coordinate actions with its
partners and strives to keep the community informed on project
progress.
I welcome the opportunity to be with you all today for this
important hearing. We are committed, and look forward to
working with members of this committee as we continue the
cleanup efforts at Spring Valley. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Davis follows:]
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Mr. Lynch. Thank you, sir. Colonel Mueller, you are
recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF PETER MUELLER
Colonel Mueller. Good afternoon, Chairman Lynch and members
of the subcommittee. I thank you for inviting me to address you
today on the Spring Valley formerly used defense site located
in Washington, DC. I am Colonel Pete Mueller, Commander and
District Engineer for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
Baltimore District. We serve as the Army's executive agent for
Spring Valley cleanup activities, and we are responsible for
managing and overseeing the successful remediation of this
site.
Spring Valley, as we have heard, consists of 661 acres in
northwest Washington that was used by the Army from 1917 to
1920 to conduct chemical warfare research. It is currently
occupied by approximately 1,300 residential homes, 22 embassy
properties, American University, schools, churches, and a small
number of businesses.
The Corps began investigating Spring Valley in 1993 to
address hazards left over from past Department of Defense
activities. During this time we recovered chemical warfare
material, munitions, and explosives of concern.
The technical and stakeholder involvement challenges
inherent in a chemical warfare material, munitions, and
explosives of concern investigation within a residential
community require active planning and communication between the
Corps, the Environmental Protection Agency, the D.C.
Departments of Health and of the Environment, and the
community. As the decisionmaking agency responsible for
accomplishing this mission, our end goal is to achieve
agreement between our Spring Valley partners and the community
to identify, investigate, and safely remove or remediate
threats to human and environmental health and safety resulting
from DOD activities.
Today I will summarize the key aspects of achieving the
successful mission, and describe our ongoing and future tasks
at the site.
A crucial element to successfully clean up any FUDS site is
learning and understanding its history. Spring Valley is the
most comprehensively researched site in the history of the FUDS
program. Our historical research includes interviews with those
most familiar with its past DOD activities and a 1993 review of
the American University Experimental Station records, which
yielded approximately 14,000 line entries of data.
Another critical component of the project includes the
array of tools and methods that the partnership uses to
effectively communicate with the public. First, our project
team follows the congressionally mandated process that requires
public input from key partners, stakeholders, and community
members at each critical decision point. Second, we have
implemented additional methods that include among others
establishing a Restoration Advisory Board, tours and regular
face to face meetings with individual community members,
mailings, as well as an active Web site.
As part of our ongoing cleanup activities, we continue to
test for and remove arsenic contaminated soil from the property
sites. Today, we have cleaned a total of 106 properties and
removed more than 24,000 tons of contaminated soil. Over 98
percent of the approximately 15,000 property owners have agreed
to the testing and removal program. We expect to finish the
residential soil removal effort by the end of this calendar
year.
We also are managing a very active program to search for
and recover military munitions. In March 2009, we completed a
high probability portion of the investigation and removal of
Pit 3 in the Glenbrook Road area, an area known to contain
buried chemical munitions. This removal is an important
accomplishment. As a result of the investigation of Pit 3, we
have recovered munitions that contain chemical agents. We plan
to safely treat and neutralize the chemical munitions at the
Spring Valley Federal property later in 2009 using a mobile
treatment system. That same technology was used at Spring
Valley in 2003 to safely destroy 15 chemical munitions. Our
planned work at this property should conclude later this
summer.
We continue to collaborate on and actively investigate
groundwater in two areas where perchlorate levels exceeded
guidelines. We have completed two phases of the investigation
and currently are on our third. The results so far indicate
that the Dalecarlia Reservoir is not at risk from the
perchlorate in the groundwater. In phase 3 we will install an
additional 8 groundwater sampling wells to join the 43 wells
already in the network.
While we do have planned milestones for completion of these
elements of field work, I want to assure the subcommittee that
there is nothing that prevents us from discussing with the
partnership the need for additional work. If the partnership
believes that more needs to be done, then more work will occur.
With that said, we are planning on completing most of the
remaining field work by the end of calendar year 2010.
Though our field work may come to a close, we will continue
to advance in the congressionally mandated process by
completing a remedial investigation and feasibility study which
is collected from our field work and involves consultation with
stakeholders and the public. We will allow the facts and the
data to guide future work.
I assure the committee that we will remain committed to our
purpose for as long as it takes to get the job done. I am
highly confident in our ability to achieve our mission for the
Army and, most importantly, the community of Spring Valley.
I thank the committee for the opportunity to speak. I am
prepared to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Colonel Mueller follows:]
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Mr. Lynch. Thank you, sir. Mr. Early, you are now
recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM C. EARLY
Mr. Early. Chairman Lynch, Representative Norton, and
members of the committee, I am Bill Early. I am the Acting
Regional Administrator for EPA Region 3 in Philadelphia, which
includes the District of Columbia. With me today is Steven
Hirsch, the Senior Remedial Project Manager assigned to the
Spring Valley site cleanup. I am here to provide the committee
with EPA's perspective on the ongoing efforts to clean up the
formerly used defense site in the Spring Valley neighborhood in
the District and to address current issues which are of concern
to the committee and the public.
EPA has been providing technical support to the U.S. Army
for its work at the Spring Valley site since the initial
discovery of munitions in 1993. Because the area is categorized
as a FUDS, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has been and
continues to be the Federal agency with responsibility for the
cleanup.
The EPA, the Corps, and the District of Columbia have
developed a partnership management team to work together on the
Spring Valley cleanup. This partnership continues to function
effectively with each partner's organization maintaining its
respective role and mission in the cleanup of the site.
EPA's participation in the Spring Valley site has been and
continues to be significant. EPA has expended over $2.6 million
conducting technical support activities at the site. EPA has
brought expertise and capabilities which the other partners
either do not possess or were not able to employ in a timely
manner.
EPA has extensive experience in cleaning up contaminated
soils in residential areas at numerous sites across the
country. Contaminants of concern at these sites include a
variety of hazardous substances including arsenic. The
technical issues presented by Spring Valley soil contamination
may be challenging but they are not unique.
The investigation and cleanup work at this site has
progressed steadily over the years, addressing three primary
areas of concern: arsenic contamination in soils, buried
munitions and disposal pits, and potential groundwater
contamination. However, there are many other tasks yet to be
completed.
The partners have developed their priorities with community
and stakeholder input with the goals of investigating
contamination and eliminating unacceptable risks to human
health and the environment in Spring Valley. All significant
cleanup areas requiring investigation and cleanup have a
project management schedule. The partners' Spring Valley
cleanup schedule is a living document which has been amended as
necessary over the years based uponsite conditions and
discovery of new information.
Associated with contaminated soil removal is EPA's issuance
of letters to residents. These letters explain to home owners
that all necessary contaminated soil removal actions have been
completed on their properties. The letters are important to
home owners, particularly when real estate transactions occur.
The partners have agreed to give priority to ensuring that each
home owner affected will receive a letter as soon as possible
after the work on their property is completed.
Currently, the Corps is conducting geophysical surveys of a
large number of properties to investigate the possibility of
buried munitions and other remnants of the Army's activities
during World War I. The Corps, EPA, and the District have
agreed upon a method to determine which properties will be
geophysically investigated. Unlike the arsenic sampling
program, geophysics is not planned for every property at this
site. The partners anticipate that the residential geophysical
and followup investigations will be completed in 2010.
The groundwater investigation is continuing. This year the
Corps will be installing additional shallow wells to better
understand the nature and extent of perchlorate and other
chemicals in the groundwater. In addition, the Corps is
planning to install deep monitoring wells, something not
previously done at the Spring Valley site.
Last, I want to address the issue of community involvement
in the Spring Valley cleanup. As you have heard, the partners
hold a large number of regularly scheduled meetings. The Corps,
EPA, and the District are always available to talk or meet with
residents on an individual basis.
Besides being investigated and remediated in accordance
with the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
Contingency Plan, there are specific processes the Corps will
follow in developing documentation that presents all of the
previous cleanup activities and assessments in a single
document. As required by the NCP, the Corps intends to prepare
a remedial investigation report. This document will summarize
all sampling and cleanup actions taken at the site and will
include a baseline human health and environmental risk
assessment.
The risk assessment is a key document in determining if all
necessary cleanup actions have been conducted or what
additional cleanup actions need to be completed to address
unacceptable risks. The document and the proposed remedial
action plan will be available for public comment and will be
the subject of one or two public meetings.
In closing, EPA believes that the Spring Valley cleanup is
progressing in a positive manner. Community and stakeholder
concerns are heard and are being addressed.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak before the
committee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Early follows:]
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Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Early. Mr. Hawkins, you are now
recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF GEORGE S. HAWKINS
Mr. Hawkins. Good afternoon, Chairman Lynch; Congressman
Chaffetz; my Congressman, Congressman Norton; and members of
the committee. My name is George Hawkins. I am the director of
the District Department of the Environment. Thank you for the
opportunity to present testimony at this oversight hearing on
the Environmental Restoration Program at the Spring Valley
formerly used defense site. I am joined by Alex Bako, who is
the division director for our Toxic Substances Division, as
well as Jim Sweeney, who is the branch chief of our Site
Remediation Branch.
My objectives this afternoon are to describe from our
perspective the manner in which the District Department of the
Environment works in association with the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to
facilitate the ongoing planning and execution of work
activities at Spring Valley. Furthermore, I would like to
emphasize some of the recent and ongoing efforts that DDOE, the
District Department of the Environment, has established to
foster and encourage communication with District residents.
As you may know, the District of Columbia works to resolve
this matter under a 1994 agreement with the Department of
Defense. This agreement provides reimbursement to the District
for providing technical review and guidance at installation
restoration projects at both active military facilities and
formerly used defense sites within the District. Our goal under
this review process is to ensure that restoration work is
performed in compliance with District of Columbia environmental
laws and regulations and that work is protective of the
environment and human health. Currently, our attention is
mainly focused on three sites: the Washington Navy Yard, which
is the only Superfund site in the District; Bolling Air Force
Base; and, of course, Spring Valley.
The District's environmental program has been involved with
the Spring Valley project since June 1995 when two
environmental specialists in our agency were hired after a
record decision was issued stating that no further action was
needed at the site. It was the work of these two District staff
members that ultimately resulted in the Army Corps returning to
Spring Valley and that has brought us to where we are today.
Since the Corps' return, we have been involved in a
partnering process with them and the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency to ensure that the highest quality of work is
done to investigate and remediate the contaminants left behind
by the Army after World War I testing in Spring Valley. The
partners meet on a monthly basis and no work is initiated, no
work is initiated, unless or until all three partners agree on
how to proceed. If either the District, the EPA, or both
disagrees with the proposed plan or procedure, the action will
not and does not occur. Currently, there are two major issues
on which our attention is focused: the ongoing groundwater
study and the planned onsite destruction of chemical weapons.
We have been in discussions for some time concerning plans
for the next phase of groundwater investigation. The District
has absolutely been at the table and has had strong views about
how this should be conducted. Recently, we have come to an
agreement on how this work will in fact be accomplished. We
expect that a new round of groundwater sampling will occur
later this summer or in the early fall. The District is
interested in the groundwater results for two principal
reasons: The first is the obvious need to determine if
contamination, particularly perchlorate, is potentially
affecting the Dalecarlia Reservoir, which supplies drinking
water to the entire District of Columbia. Even though sampling
so far has indicated that the reservoir has not been affected,
we have been concerned that perchlorate contamination may reach
the deep aquifer. For that reason, we have insisted that the
Corps conduct deep well sampling, as has been noted, for the
first time at this site.
The second reason to continue groundwater sampling is
hopefully to assist in locating the source of the perchlorate
that has been detected in the groundwater at higher levels near
the American University campus. Locating the source of the
perchlorate might help us in locating one or more yet to be
discovered burial pits that have been mentioned in some of the
historical archives.
In response to the proposed onsite destruction of chemical
weapons, DDOE has been briefed on the Corps' of Engineers
conceptual plan for this activity. Clearly, the use of
explosives for onsite destruction of munitions requires the
cooperation of several District agencies besides the Department
of the Environment. The District's Homeland Security and
Emergency Management Agency, the Metropolitan Police
Department, the Fire Department, and the Health Department have
all been briefed by the Corps of Engineers and all agencies are
currently reviewing the plans for this event. District
government sign off on this plan will occur after reviews have
been completed by all agencies. If any agency has concerns on
the plan, then approval will not occur until all uncertainties
or questions have been satisfactorily addressed.
While these are two major issues right now, there are
several other efforts at Spring Valley which appear to be near
completion. We believe it is premature to suggest that work is
complete. What will be completed in 2010 is planned field work.
Our view is that there is likely to be more work suggested in
the future as the result of sampling that has not yet been
conducted. It is planned field work that will be completed, not
any additional field work that is indicated as necessary either
by the next round of groundwater sampling or additional site
reviews done near the Dalecarlia Reservoir.
We have thought it is prudent, however, to look at what
ought to be the criteria to close the site. The issue of
closure criteria was asked once before in 1995. As I mentioned,
it was D.C.'s environmental program that determined additional
work was necessary and the Corps returned.
Since then, tremendous work has been done. Burial pits and
chemical weapons have been found. Tens of thousands of samples
have been analyzed. Scores of properties have been remediated.
Additional scores of properties have been geophysically
surveyed. Many of these properties have been dug up in the hope
of finding munitions.
Still, work needs to be done. This is a unique site. There
are tough questions and it is complicated. We asked the right
and tough questions in 1995 and we will continue to ask those
questions before there is any decision to walk away.
The Department of the Environment pledges to continue to
act aggressively as the environmental advocate for the citizens
of Spring Valley. We devoted many resources to the cleanup of
the site. We have planned activities bringing specialized
groundwater and hazardous waste personnel and have just hired a
toxicologist who will bring new resources to bear on decisions
for this site.
I realize I have used my time. We have continued to also
work more with the citizens. We are planning additional
meetings one on one with the neighborhood Commissioners near
the site. We have devoted a new part of our Web site to this
site specifically to make sure all information that is needed
for the site is available to the citizens.
I am here to answer any questions.
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Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Hawkins. Let me begin by saying
that I think the community has sounded some measure of alarm
over the idea that planned field work is concluding. I think
the reaction is actually born in the experience they have had
already. There was a clean bill of health given to the site and
then they found more contamination, significant contamination.
A thorough job hadn't been done in the original analysis so
there is a lack of trust. But it is probably well deserved.
Let me ask, from a technological standpoint, are we using
every state-of-the-art technology to investigate the site that
might be available? Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis. I would say yes we are. In fact, some of the
technology that was discussed earlier was tried and used
unsuccessfully based on the interference in the local area. The
ground penetrating radar that was discussed was in fact tried
at the site. Again, that is one of the challenges we have, Mr.
Chairman.
When you go from one site to another, you try to adapt the
technologies that are available, to include emerging
technologies, that might be used on that site based on the
source and types of contamination that we are looking for. But
we don't have blinders on. We are continuing to look for new
technologies that we can bring to bear.
I think that in our groundwater monitoring plan that we are
going to maybe talk about a little bit later, we are bringing
in some things there that will enhance our ability to better
determine if there is any groundwater contamination.
The only other thing I would tell you is that we have a
National Defense Center for Energy and the Environment, which
really does a lot of research and development projects for the
DOD. Projects associated with cleanup at many of our sites,
both our active sites and our formerly used defense sites, are
part of that process. So we are continuing to look at new
technologies.
We are also partnering with the private sector. I think
many of you may know that in many cases the expertise that we
bring to these sites is done by private contractors. So we seek
to get the best of those contractors and the best technology
available to bring to these sites.
Mr. Lynch. Colonel, do you feel comfortable with that
assessment in terms of all the technology that is available
being used?
Colonel Mueller. Yes sir, I do. In fact, I think it also
goes back to the partnership and the discussions that we can
have where each of our agencies will bring different ideas and
different experiences to help seek the best alternatives.
We will tend to use industry standards. One thing that we
have hesitated to do is to use something that is going through
research and development because we want to use proven
techniques.
One example where the community involvement I think drove
us to another technology was with the arsenic removal. The
community indicated they wanted an alternative to digging up
yards. So we went back to our engineering and research
laboratory in Mississippi where they have been using phyllo
remediation. They had had proven tests where phyllo remediation
using plants could actually extract arsenic from the soil. This
was one application that was fairly modern that we used. And we
have actually used that to clean up 19 properties.
Mr. Lynch. OK. I believe in reading the testimony last
night that as recently as a year ago we have discovered
munitions. That is fairly recent, and we have been on this site
for a while. It just seems to me premature to say, OK, we are
done with our planned field work and we are going to move on. I
just think that there is a need to provide further activity
here. I know you have a lot of points of interest, and you have
a lot of monitoring wells. I am just concerned whether or not
this decision to conclude field work is premature given the
recent findings.
So I did like the testimony offered by Ms. Mittal from GAO
earlier in this hearing about a very aggressive and robust
monitoring process that would continue on the site at least in
the near future. Let me ask you, is that something that you
envision?
I also want to know about destroying some of these
munitions onsite. That must cause a considerable amount of
anxiety in the neighborhood that you are operating in. Is there
not a better technology? I know transporting chemical weapons
is a dicey proposition in any circumstances. You have a heavily
populated neighborhood here. Is there not a better way to do
this than destroying them onsite, notifying the neighborhood,
and scaring the heck out of them? There has to be a better way
than this, guys.
Mr. Davis. Yes, sir. If I could maybe address the EDS, the
explosive detonation system, that we are going to use for the
destruction first? This is a technology that has been proven.
We have used it throughout the country. We have had over 1,500
documented uses of this system to destroy chemical munitions at
different sites throughout the country. We currently have in
storage on Federal property adjacent to Sibley Hospital the
munitions that would be destroyed during this destruction
process.
Mr. Lynch. Are they conventional or are they chemical
weapons.
Mr. Davis. They are a combination of both, sir. In the 2003
destruction, a similar system was brought in and set up using
all the safety control mechanisms that are available. We will
be doing something similar. We have some enhanced monitoring
devices now that are newer than the ones we used back in 2003.
But the site will be set up.
Again, and this was mentioned by my colleagues here at the
witness table, a tremendous amount of coordination has already
gone into and will continue to go into planning for and
conducting this process using all of the existing technologies
that are available and then some. I think also the safety
procedures will be in place as well as working with the local
first responders within the District to be onsite and to
provide their assistance.
We again have done this at locations throughout the
country. We currently do not make a habit of transporting
chemical munitions from one State or from one jurisdiction to
another for destruction. That is one of the reasons why this
exportable system was developed in the first place. We could
bring it into a site, safely set it up, destroy the munitions
on site, and then minimize the risk associated with that
particular activity.
Mr. Lynch. OK. My time has expired. I just might offer the
possibility that the committee may want to go out and visit the
site and look at that operation because I am not entirely
convinced. OK?
Mr. Davis. Sir, normally when we do these around the
country we have a Leaders' Day set up once the site is
completely set up. We will coordinate with the committee so
that they can come out. We will walk them through the system
and explain all the procedures and protocols that we will have
in place before we actually begin the destruction process.
Mr. Lynch. All right. I have abused my time. Thank you, Mr.
Secretary.
I am going to yield 5 minutes to our ranking member, Mr.
Chaffetz.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Early, if I can
start with you, are the residents and those who work in Spring
Valley safe?
Mr. Early. That is something I think we are continuing to
address----
Mr. Chaffetz. So you can't say yes?
Mr. Early. Well, I think we are moving to address the
concerns that the citizens have. There were a number of things
that had been pointed out at that particular site that we have
been, as a result of the partnership here, addressing. There
are a number of concerns, soil contamination, groundwater
contamination, and explosives, that I think we have been
looking at.
Mr. Chaffetz. So the answer is not yes. Is that correct?
Mr. Early. Well, I think we are moving to make them safe. I
think we, as a result of the partnership that we have developed
here at this site, which I think is unique to this type of
situation, are moving to diligently address all of the hazards
that are present at this site and to address them in a
responsible manner.
Mr. Chaffetz. Colonel Mueller, are the residents and people
who work there safe? Yes or no.
Colonel Mueller. Sir, they are getting safer every day. We
would not be there if the site was totally safe. Obviously, we
are looking to make sure that we find everything that we
possibly can that is left over from that time. I am comfortable
that we have all the controls and measures in place to make
that community as safe as it can be until we complete the
study.
Mr. Chaffetz. Would you live there right now?
Colonel Mueller. If I had a paycheck that would allow me to
live there, yes sir, I would.
Mr. Chaffetz. Let me ask Mr. Hawkins here, have the
residents been exposed to contaminants that would increase the
risk of disease or dysfunction?
Mr. Hawkins. It is possible that they have been exposed to
contaminants that could cause a health problem. As you have
heard, there have been a series of short term health studies in
the past. In the past D.C. Council session, $250,000 has been
allotted to our agency in fiscal year 2010 to do a more in
depth health study that had been suggested by Johns Hopkins.
That is not enough to do the full study that had been
envisioned by the previous Johns Hopkins effort. We think it is
well worth it and are searching to determine whether other
funding sources are available.
The question of whether anyone has been harmed, my guess
would be is that there are health consequences to the
contaminants that have been at the site as there are in many
sites around the country. I believe we are taking the steps
necessary to eliminate those threats.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you. Secretary Davis, this has taken
certainly considerably longer than anybody wished. What went
wrong? Why is this taking so long?
Mr. Davis. I would say that I don't think anyone has done
anything wrong when you look at the program that is in place
right now. I share your concerns, just like everyone else,
about the time that it is taking. But as you go around the
country, as I get the opportunity to do, and look at a variety
of sites, in many cases you see the same thing.
Mr. Chaffetz. That is not very reassuring. Is there a flaw
in the procedure? On the one hand you admire a group and an
agency to take an estimate. The risk is always that you aren't
going to meet that estimate. But now, reflecting back, what
went wrong? Why is it taking so long? Is it a procedural
failure? If this is happening above and beyond Spring Valley,
why is this a flaw that continues to happen all across the
country?
Mr. Davis. Again, I don't see it as a flaw. But what I
would tell you is that a lot of these sites that we are dealing
with like Spring Valley go back 60, 70, or 80 years. You are
dealing with incomplete information. For instance, we have
misperceptions today. We watch shows like NCIS or some of these
other shows where they solve three different crimes in the span
of 45 minutes with perfect information. In many cases, we are
dealing with imperfections here. We are dealing with
information that no longer exists or records that were not kept
to begin with.
So as we go back through our archival efforts to try to
piece together everything that happened, that forms the basis
for the initiation of efforts at these sites. I can assure you
that it is a comprehensive effort that includes records; it
includes, if they are still alive, actual interviews with
people who were on these sites; overhead photography; and a
whole host of things that have taken place and provided
documentation. From that, we develop the initial estimate on
what work needs to be done based on the nature and type of
contamination at that site. Then we proceed with the cleanup
effort.
Once you start digging in the dirt, you find different
things. All these munitions that have been found at different
locations throughout the country, we will go out and do
geophysical mapping to try to identify various anomalies that
might be there. When you go out and you actually start digging
things up, you may not dig up what you thought was there. So it
may take a little bit longer than you had originally
anticipated.
So it is a deliberate process. In many cases, as we are
going through that process, we are continuing the archival
research, we are continuing to engage people that might have
been there, adding new information into the situation to
develop it as precisely as we can to guide the effort forward.
The other consideration, if I might add, sir, is that we
also continue our concern for those people that are working at
the site and those people that are in the local community. In
some cases, we just can't go out and start our work. We have to
get a right of entry to go into that property. In some cases,
as we have seen here at Spring Valley, for whatever reason the
residents or the owners of some of those properties are
reluctant to provide us a right of entry so we can go in there
and do the investigative work and the follow on cleanup if
needed.
So there are a lot of different variations here that impact
the timetable and our ability to get the work done.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate the extra time.
Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes
the gentlelady from the District of Columbia, Ms. Eleanor
Holmes Norton, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Norton. I recognize the position, particularly that the
Corps is put in, in dealing with their own munitions very
deeply buried. So the only thing we can judge, it seems to me,
is what standards or criteria are being used to determine when
to leave and when the job is done.
Let us take the 2-year work plan. Who has seen the 2-year
work plan, since you have said that you believe the job will be
done in 2 years? Where is the 2-year work plan?
Colonel Mueller. Ma'am, the work plan is one that is built
by the partners. The work plan is developed by the partners. I
would have to step back a minute to describe exactly where we
are. I will try to do that quickly.
The Area of Interest Taskforce that involved all the
partners looked at all the issues, everything that we had
characterized. That taskforce came up with 28 areas of
interest. To date, we have analyzed 14 of those. There are 14
areas of interest still to be evaluated. All the partners, as
we go through the findings and the results of what has been
investigated, then take a final look at what else may need to
be done. So really the area of interest evaluation for the
overall site is what has driven that.
But there is a different process for the arsenic. Then
there are also geophysical surveys of properties that are a
part of that work plan.
Ms. Norton. Are you using the work plan now? Is that what
you are saying? I am trying to determine what it is that makes
you know that in 2 years you will be through. What is the exit
plan that you are using?
Colonel Mueller. OK. Yes, ma'am. Based on where we are
today, we have analyzed firstly the historical studies and then
we have analyzed everything we can't identify, items of work
that need to be done. Once we complete this work there will be
a remedial investigation feasibility study that is published.
We will analyze all the work that has happened to date. That
gets vetted with each of the agencies including D.C., the EPA,
and the community. It will include a 30 day review by the
public. That document will characterize all the work that has
been done.
Ms. Norton. When will the material be available to the
public?
Colonel Mueller. Ma'am, that would not be complete until we
complete the physical work onsite. So as we mentioned, that
current work plan identifies actions that we are taking by
people on the ground, contractors and workers cleaning and
investigating the site. The feasibility study and the final
remedial investigation is a document that will characterize the
whole site and will then also go out for public review and
agency review. That will determine, again, if there is
additional work or if we have completed.
Mr. Davis. Ma'am, if I could add one quick comment on that?
The work that is being done now has in fact been work that was
vetted with the partners and developed in consultation with the
regulatory agencies to drive the way forward. It has been
briefed to the community via the Restoration Advisory Board
meetings that take place on a monthly basis. So it is more of a
work in progress now where we have goals and objectives that
have been established.
Ms. Norton. It is a work in progress that is public?
Mr. Davis. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. If the community or the District wanted to know
what weapons you have discovered onsite, would you give them a
list of such weapons? In fact, why hasn't a list of these
weapons been given to the community?
They are old. There has been some sense of a national
security concern. Indeed, those words have been used. It is
very difficult to know how there could be national security
concerns about World War I munitions.
Mr. Davis. I think it goes back to the fact, ma'am, that
there are chemical agent related activities that we are dealing
with here. These are procedures that were set in place back
prior to the 2003 destruction period. We had required
individuals who were part of the partnership and other
stakeholders in the community, to include the Restoration
Advisory Board, to sign non-disclosure statements so that there
was an opportunity to provide that information to selected
members within the community and within the agencies involved
in the cleanup. We would be more than happy to provide the
community with a list.
Ms. Norton. I don't understand the national security
concerns at all about World War I weapons. I don't understand
that this is anything but a way to keep the information from
the public. We are not dealing with weapons that are in use
today. Maybe the Army would be embarrassed that these weapons
were ever used. But I don't understand national security
concerns. What is the national security concern about a World
War I munition that certainly isn't anywhere used today? It
certainly has not been used for decades.
You are dealing with the most advanced Army and the most
advanced scientific country in the world where these would be,
if anything, antiques. So why not let us know what the antiques
are, Mr. Davis?
Mr. Davis. Ma'am, if I could do two things? One, let me
provide the members of the committee with that list. And two,
let me take that back with us and review it internally and get
you an answer as quickly as we can.
Ms. Norton. I very much appreciate it. I understand the
District even signs off on didactic materials; that is signing
off on nothing. The notion of not even providing between
agencies the names of what the materials are and what the
weapons are this long after the fact, we are almost a century
later.
Mr. Davis. I understand your point completely. In the
spirit of transparency, let me take that one on personally to
go back and see if we can work that.
Ms. Norton. I very much appreciate that.
You have said, Mr. Mueller, you just testified that the
work plan is available. But the community tells us that they
have not been able to get to see the work plan. See, this is
why there is continuing distrust in the community. If there is
a work plan, if we are now supposed to be in an era of
transparency, why not share it? In fact, put it online. What is
the secret here?
Colonel Mueller. Ma'am, there is no secret. The work plans
that are analyzed by the partners take place at the partnering
meetings on a monthly basis. That is reviewed.
Ms. Norton. With only some people being able to see them in
the community and others not?
Colonel Mueller. Members of the community through the
Restoration Advisory Board are the members that are able to
attend those.
Ms. Norton. No, you are in a community where this
information was withheld for decades. You are now about to
leave. As you leave, surely we could get the greatest
transparency possible so that the community would finally have
confidence in the work that the Corps has done.
Now, I don't understand. I would like you to tell me why
only some members of the community can see the work plan. What
is secret about the work plan so that you have to have a
security clearance to see it?
Colonel Mueller. Ma'am, I will verify that. I have no
knowledge of anybody that is required to have a security
clearance to enter discussion.
Ms. Norton. Have you seen it, Mr. Hawkins?
Mr. Hawkins. There is more than one document that you are
talking about. There are work plans of the actual physical
work, what sites are being looked at, where monitoring is being
done. That, as far as I know, is accessible.
There is information about the munitions that have been
found and how it would be remediated that, since I do not have
a security clearance and I refuse to sign a non-disclosure that
says I could not report information to the Mayor, I don't see.
However, the Metropolitan Police Department and the Fire
Department do see that.
Ms. Norton. That is what I want to know. Maybe we are
dealing with truly dangerous chemicals here. Because this is a
city official and he can't even disclose it to his principal.
And no one can see it but people you designate.
Mr. Davis. Yes, ma'am. Like I said, we will take that on
and go back and see if we can't work through it.
Mr. Hawkins. Congresswoman, I also wanted to make a comment
on the District's view of this concept that in 2010 we will be
walking away or anyone will be walking away from this site.
That is certainly not the District's intention. My experience
is, and I have to say, Mr. Chair, that I was an EPA Superfund
lawyer in Boston, in New England, when the license site
professional program was introduced so I have done these sites
as an enforcement lawyer, that they are often iterative. Our
view as to what will be completed in 2010 is currently planned
work based on the data that is currently in hand.
We know that as of today another round of groundwater
sampling, including deep groundwater that has not been done
before, is about to commence. There is an entire area next to
the reservoir that is going to be geophysically surveyed as
well as an intrusive review done if needed. That data hasn't
been collected yet. That may generate an additional round of
work that is not currently contemplated.
Our view is that work generated by monitoring that is
currently planned does not need to wait if it is so indicated
until a full RIFS is done. That is a very standard process to
take all the information that has been collected, put it into
one document, and prepare the investigation and the study of
what is necessary. That is a standard Superfund step. That is
unusual in this case because it is being done much nearer to
the end of the process.
Ms. Norton. But all we want to see is what we can see now.
I am not asking to see what you haven't completed yet. I
understand what you are saying.
Mr. Hawkins. Our view is that there is nothing completed in
2010 except for existing projects that are planned.
Ms. Norton. There is a work plan which some people have
seen and some people have not. That has been the testimony
here, Mr. Hawkins. That has been the testimony that some
members of this Board have seen it and some members have not.
Colonel Mueller. Ma'am, if I may? Every active work plan is
available at the repository at the Palisades Library in the
community. So the work plans are all available to the public.
There is no requirement for a security clearance to be able to
see those work plans.
Mr. Lynch. With all due respect, I couldn't find that
library with a map.
Let me just formalize what has just happened here. First,
we need to have the subcommittee informed, so we need to have
any reports. Right now I don't believe there is requirement
that you notify Congress, so I am going to make that request
formally on the record. Second, you will receive that request
in writing. Third, we are going to file a request to declassify
the information that might be in your repository with respect
to the history of this site and what weapons, chemical or
otherwise, might be stored on the site. That way, it will
actually save you, Mr. Secretary, from making some decision
that might not be in line with your superiors. Maybe we will
just do it that way.
You could short circuit that process greatly for us if you
voluntarily offered information that would address Ms. Eleanor
Holmes Norton's request. We would welcome that. But we want to
be notified fully and promptly of any activity on the site and
any information that might be available.
I share Ms. Holmes Norton's concerns that we are dealing
with World War I armaments. So the declassification should be a
fairly simple matter with the passage of time. Although I do
know that in some countries they still store mustard gas as an
active munition. But anyway, we want that information.
I would like at this point to recognize the gentleman from
Missouri, Mr. Clay, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Clay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me start with
Secretary Davis. Mr. Davis, we have a site in Missouri called
the SLAAP site, which stands for the Saint Louis Army
Ammunition Plant. Could you help me with the followup testing
on groundwater? Let me know if it has been done with the state-
of-the-art isotopic analysis that will be used in Spring
Valley. Will we or do we already have a remedial investigation
report that summarizes all samplings and all cleanup actions
taken, and that includes a baseline human health and
environmental risk assessment? Would you be able to provide
that to this committee for me?
Mr. Davis. Sir, what I will do is go back and do research
on that particular location and provide the information that we
have available to you as expeditiously as we can. If we need
to, we can come over and brief you and your staff.
Mr. Clay. I would appreciate that.
Reading the GAO's study about the primary threats at the
site, there were buried munitions, elevated arsenic, and the
laboratory waste. Perchlorate was also found onsite. Normally,
what should happen? How should we deal with this for a
community? What do we do to take them out of danger, to get
that exposure away from them? What should happen?
Mr. Davis. Well, what we have done here is to go through
first a detailed archival research effort to try to gain as
much information as we could about the site.
To get to the perchlorate issue that you brought up at the
end, we have a series of monitoring wells that are in place
right now. We are going to begin another monitoring period this
summer to draw samples from those wells. We are going to put in
an additional series of wells to give us a better indication of
how we can characterize the perchlorate.
The big issue of concern is whether or not it is going to
impact the drinking water supply for the District at the
Dalecarlia Reservoir. Our geophysical assessment right now
based on the hydrology of the site indicates that any
perchlorate is going to not go into the Dalecarlia Reservoir
but it may go into the Potomac. So we believe that by enhancing
the number of wells and by reinitiating our sampling program,
we will be able to determine better than we know right now what
the potential source of that perchlorate might be and where it
may be moving underneath the surface.
With regard to the arsenic remediation, that has been a
major effort on our part to go out and actually do soil
sampling at a multitude of properties on the site. Where we
have found levels that exceed the EPA standard, we have gone in
and removed that arsenic from those sites. In many cases, it
means disturbing existing landscaping, which we then go back
and work with the land owners to seek restoration.
As far as the munitions, in many cases we go through a
variety of techniques, digital geomapping systems, that we have
available that will help us go in and determine where specific
anomalies might be that will require excavation from the soil.
In other cases, we will look at other indicators from earlier
photographs of the site where we may have depressions or scars
in the ground that may give us an indication that there was a
burial there of some of these munitions or other munitions
related to constituents. Again, this is part of the ongoing
effort that we have right now, sir.
Mr. Clay. Thank you for that. Let me go to Colonel Mueller
real quickly. It was mentioned earlier that these cleanup
projects are in a pinch as far as budgeting concerns, that you
don't get enough money to do all of the projects. Is that
accurate?
Colonel Mueller. Sir, the requirements that we have had at
Spring Valley, from the Army Corps' of Engineers perspective we
have continued to receive adequate funding for the work plans
that we have in place.
Mr. Clay. No, I mean around the country. I guess there is
just so much money to go around.
Mr. Davis. Sir, if I could interject? Colonel Mueller has
the Baltimore District so he is dealing with those areas here
locally. But when you look at what we are dealing with
nationwide, as was mentioned by the GAO representative earlier,
we have about 4,700 sites out there that are being looked at
right now. Our annual budget for the FUDS program in its
entirety is about $250 million. With the amount of work that is
remaining to be done, the current cost to complete is in excess
of $17 billion based on our current estimates. So it is going
to be a while before we get the work completed that needs to be
done based on just what we know today.
Mr. Clay. Did FUDS receive any additional funding from the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act? FUSRAP did.
Mr. Davis. We did not receive anything from that.
Mr. Clay. FUSRAP got a bump but not FUDS?
Mr. Davis. That is correct. We received about $33 million
for fiscal year 2009 from the Congress as a plus up. As I
mentioned earlier, $4 million of that went directly to the
Spring Valley project.
Mr. Clay. OK. Thank you. Thank you and I yield back.
Ms. Norton [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Clay. I would like
very much to talk about the question of finality, criteria that
I have been trying to probe.
Mr. Hawkins, I very much appreciate your testimony about
the $50,000. Normally when there is such a situation, there is
access to a very large State agency. State budgets are larger.
I know that the District may be at some disadvantage.
What I am looking for is for all of you to work together,
but for all of you to monitor each other. Some of you are more
able to monitor than others. That is what I am getting at. I
appreciate that the EPA, as noted in the testimony Mr. Early
gave, has worked in partnership with the Corps, the community,
and of course our own agency.
At the end of the day, who is the regulator? Who signs off?
Who decides that the area is clear and safe?
Mr. Early. Well, as I said in my initial testimony, because
this is a FUDS, the Corps is responsible and the Army is
responsible for taking the lead. EPA is a support agency here.
Ms. Norton. This really compounds my question. I don't mind
the Corps, the District Department of the Environment, in fact,
I think there is some good to be said for the technical support
and I appreciate that, and EPA all being in bed together. But,
you see, when it comes to someone deciding in an independent
fashion that the work is done, I am having trouble finding an
independent agent here especially if the Corps is the lead for
its own investigation.
Mr. Hawkins. I would have two comments on that score.
Ms. Norton. That is what Mr. Early just said. The Corps is
the lead.
Mr. Hawkins. The Corps is the lead in the cleanup. The
District's view is that the cleanup will not be done until the
District agrees that it is done, first. Second, my experience
on all cleanups is there is no such thing as a done site.
Ms. Norton. No, I accept that, Mr. Hawkins. That has been
the testimony here, the monitoring and the testing. I accept
that. So please forgive our layman's sense of done. But the way
we are coming to done is the community has come to us and said
they are going to be done in 2 years. They are going to be done
digging. They are going to be done doing the work they were
doing on the site. After that, you say there will be something
but it is different.
I am trying to put myself in their position. I appreciate
that you have made us understand that there is no leaving, no
exit in that sense. But somebody had to decide that in 2 years
what is being done now will no longer be necessary. That is
what I am trying to understand. How did that decision get made?
On what basis was that decision made? How do we know? Why not 2
years ago? Why not 4 years from now? How did that decision get
made? How will we know, once you go to the other phase of what
you do, that you should have left at that time? Who will tell
us?
Colonel Mueller. Ma'am, that is a complicated question
because of the different aspects of the project. Clearly, there
is an answer for that for the arsenic that we are removing and
have removed from 106 properties. There is an answer for the
munitions and explosives of concern based on the partners
agreement on the 28 areas of interest that we are
investigating, and there is another answer for the geophysics
that we are using to look for other anomalies on properties. So
ma'am, I don't have an easy answer for that.
Ms. Norton. I don't understand why that is even a problem.
Whoever is the decider can in fact get the information. I am
not asking you about the different kinds of information. My
question is very simple. It is a very common sense question
that a citizen would ask. Who has the independence to make the
judgment that the time to quit the phase you are in is over?
Who is that entity, particularly given that the Corps has left
twice and had to be called back?
Mr. Hawkins, the fact that they won't go until you say so,
it is just the way the supremacy clause works? This is a
Federal agency. They have left before. So the District will
continue to say we find x, y, and z here. But this is a Federal
agency. Therefore, I have to find what Federal entity or
independent entity is going to be responsible for making a very
critical decision. After more than 15 years of work that has
been very controversial, where there is still great
dissatisfaction with transparency, where people still don't
know what the weapons are, where you are in a residential
community, it is fair to ask who is going to make that decision
and how independent is that entity?
Mr. Davis. Ma'am, could I add two points to that question?
First and foremost, as far as the work that is being done and
the planning that goes into that work, I think it has been well
stated here in terms of the partnership that has been
undertaken between EPA, D.C., and the Corps of Engineers, the
work that is done by the Corps is in fact done to the
appropriate standards established by EPA.
Ms. Norton. So at EPA, Mr. Early, you then do an
independent evaluation yourself as to whether or not the Corps
has met those standards?
Mr. Early. Yes. EPA is responsible for reviewing the
actions that are proposed and determining the applicable
standards both at the Federal and the State level to figure out
if there are more stringent standards that the State has
applied that are applicable to the site. Then in our role in
terms of concurring, we either concur with what is being
proposed in terms of the finality of the action or we would say
that there are some additional things that need to be made to
meet the standards that are applying at both the Federal and
the State levels.
Ms. Norton. So the State has higher standards, in this case
the District of Columbia, that could be adopted?
Mr. Early. They can. They could have higher standards that
could go beyond and be more stringent than what the Federal
standards are.
Ms. Norton. And EPA would adopt those standards?
Mr. Early. Well, we would make sure in terms of any cleanup
activities that are being undertaken that those would be
complied with over and above the Federal standards.
Ms. Norton. Would the partners have an objection to an
independent study? The silence is deafening. You have been
working very hard.
Mr. Davis. If I could just jump in on that one? We have an
independent representative that provides input to the community
on behalf of the Restoration Advisory Board.
Ms. Norton. Who is that?
Mr. Davis. I don't have his name but I can provide that to
you all.
Ms. Norton. I am sorry, I am looking for somebody above it
all who will look at the work and say that the work has been
done or not.
Mr. Davis. Yes, ma'am. If I could just continue? When the
work that has been determined and the work plan gets to a point
in time when it is completed, if you will, the investigative
work and the removal work is done, and any long term monitoring
is in place, that is when this process that was mentioned
earlier, this remedial investigation feasibility study, is
done. That basically is a very all-encompassing document that
will go back and look at all the work that has been done up
until that point in time, determine what it achieved or, as Mr.
Early said, did not achieve. From that document it will give us
an indication as to whether or not we need to continue work in
certain areas where there may be gaps in the work that had been
done.
That document will go out for public review and comment. We
will again take onboard the comments from the partners and from
the community and then go back and do any additional work that
needs to be done that was either not done or that was
identified that needed to be done as part of this process.
Ultimately though, getting to the answer to your question,
once we reach that agreement and the work is completed, then
the Corps of Engineers as the lead agent will issue a record of
decision. That will again document what work was done to ensure
health and human safety.
Ms. Norton. Did you issue such a decision the two times you
previously left the site?
Mr. Davis. I believe at least on one of those occasions one
was in fact issued. I will go back and verify that.
Ms. Norton. Who evaluated that decision? Did the EPA
evaluate that decision--it seems to be its job--when they left
twice before?
Mr. Early. I am not sure based on my consultation whether
or not we concurred on the RAD [phonetic] back in 1995 when it
happened.
Ms. Norton. I can see the position. We have the EPA here.
We look to the EPA as the Federal agency for environmental
matters. I see the relationship of course with the State, in
this case the District. It does seem to me that some of the
problems raised here have been problems about whether or not
the EPA, at least now, is intent upon doing its job as a
Federal regulatory agency. Ultimately, they can do their plan
and their decision to leave as just described all they want to.
But the Corps has no jurisdiction to declare an area
environmentally safe at all. They are being regulated as far as
we are concerned. So we have to look to the EPA, which doesn't
have the best reputation in this Spring Valley episode, to do
its job.
I cannot say to you that I have been convinced yet, we have
some time to go, that an independent evaluation will not be
necessary. The reason that anybody would even think of that is
the sad story of the lack of transparency all this time,
including what the chairman had to say about finding out what
the weapons are, weapons that are so old and obsolete that they
cannot possibly be matters of national security. Yet people
have been told that is why they can't know what the weapons
are.
You see, when you hear that kind of thing, you lose
confidence in process. You think there must be something secret
here. You had better find out more. They really are hiding
things. That is why I think what the chairman has done to clear
the air there is going to be very important to do unless you
can yourself do it. Because it is going to be necessary for
everything to come out.
We don't see any reason why, when we are talking about
weapons that are a century old, anybody with a straight face
would use the term national security concern. We just don't
understand it. I am on the Homeland Security Committee and I
hear legitimate national security concerns all the time, but I
haven't heard any explained here today.
Let me go on to a few more questions. Are there any other
areas of the District of Columbia where the Army has either any
intelligence or any suspicion that there are chemical weapons
buried?
Mr. Davis. Ma'am, while there are other FUDS sites in the
District itself, there are no other sites at this point in time
that we believe have chemical munitions.
Ms. Norton. I know there were some weapons in northeast. I
know they were in southeast where the Giant now is. I know that
has been cleaned up or the Giant wouldn't be there. I just want
to know for the record, are there any more sites where there
are weapons? You say there are none? That is your testimony?
Mr. Davis. That is correct. Not to my knowledge. There is
one other site that we have in the District that has long term
monitoring underway. It is one of the sites I think that you
mentioned that have been previously cleaned up. But other than
that, no, there are no other sites that we know of at the
present that contain chemical munitions.
Ms. Norton. Has the Corps ever had to use the equipment you
propose to use in Spring Valley to destroy weapons in a
residential community before or close to a residential
community?
Mr. Davis. Ma'am, the technology we are going to use for
the destruction is similar to the technology that was used in
Spring Valley in a residential setting back in 2003 when we
destroyed 15 chemical munitions.
Ms. Norton. So you are using the same equipment to destroy
this ordnance that you have all along been using or have used
before here?
Mr. Davis. That is correct. We have done over 1,500
destruction missions without incident.
Ms. Norton. Finally, could I ask you, Mr. Early, why Spring
Valley has not been on your National Priorities List?
Mr. Early. It is our position that it hasn't at this point
in time been necessary to put Spring Valley on the National
Priorities List, although that is an option that we continue to
look at. Based upon the experience that the agency has had with
Spring Valley, the partnership that we have developed in terms
of the checks and balances that I think we have developed, and
the fact that the Spring Valley site has been given priority
funding with regard to the cleanup at the Army as well as
sufficient funds being provided by EPA to make sure that the
work is done in an appropriate manner, we haven't seen fit to
list the site on the NPL.
Ms. Norton. So it is not dangerous enough at this point so
far? We would be pleased to know that.
Mr. Early. Well, we think this site is being adequately
addressed in terms of the funding and the resources that are
being devoted to the site at this point in time. As I said,
this is something that we continue to monitor in the event that
we think that is not the case. That is an option that the
agency is prepared to consider.
Ms. Norton. The final question for me, the one unanswered
question that I certainly do not understand, has to do with the
troubling levels of perchlorate that have been found in the
groundwater. I do not believe a source has been identified. It
is hard to understand how you are leaving the area with
perchlorate having been found in the groundwater, and we don't
even know where it is coming from. Could you explain?
Mr. Davis. Ma'am, if I could just elaborate on that a
little bit? Of all the wells that we have in place there, we
did have two detections. One was at about 144 parts per
billion, which was in the vicinity of Glenbrook Road monitoring
well in the AU area.
Ms. Norton. I am talking about a source.
Mr. Davis. Right. First and foremost, the wells are helping
us detect where the perchlorate might be located. Then from
that we have procedures that we will use.
Ms. Norton. Wait a minute. Stop so I can understand,
please. So the wells are helping us to understand where it is
located? We don't know where the perchlorate comes from?
Mr. Davis. Not at the present. That is the purpose of the
additional monitoring procedures that we will undertake this
summer with the placement of some additional monitoring wells.
Some of these wells are going to be at a deeper depth. Again,
what we are really trying to do is to determine what is the
source. But at the same time, we want to try to map underneath
the surface where we think the perchlorate is moving and where
it came from.
Ms. Norton. Is that the most serious problem you will have
to continue to monitor?
Mr. Davis. At this point it will be.
Ms. Norton. Yes, Mr. Hawkins?
Mr. Hawkins. I was going to agree that the reason that our
view is that it is premature to say that activities at the site
are at a closing point is because this second round of
monitoring for perchlorate that has been planned, including
deep wells, is exactly, as you have suggested, the attempt to
find the source. If a source is found, there are new steps of
work that will be needed to remove that source. We just do not
know that.
Ms. Norton. You mean we don't even know if it is ordnance
or if it is from sources that the Army Corps has been trying to
rid us of? You don't even know that? They could be from
something else?
Mr. Davis. That is correct.
Ms. Norton. Well, that is obviously very disturbing because
this is when we found it.
Finally, could you tell me how the members of this Board
are chosen? This Residential Advisory Board has been very
controversial in the community, yet it was established in order
to establish communication with the community. How are the
members appointed? How are they chosen?
Colonel Mueller. Ma'am, the community chooses their
representatives for the committee. They have 14 community
members.
Ms. Norton. What do they do, have an election?
Colonel Mueller. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. They have an election to choose who the members
of the Residential Advisory Board would be? I thought you had
something to do with that.
Colonel Mueller. Ma'am, the Army Corps of Engineers is a
member of the RAB, a non-voting member, but the community
maintains or obtains 14 of their own members.
Ms. Norton. I am just trying to find out who appoints them.
I know where they come from. Who appoints them?
Colonel Mueller. Ma'am, the Army Corps of Engineers does
not appoint members of the RAB.
Ms. Norton. All right. Somebody tell me who appoints them.
Somebody has to be the appointing authority. I am just trying
to find who that is.
Colonel Mueller. Ma'am, when the Restoration Advisory Board
was originally established in 2001, we did recruit the initial
members. We asked for community members who were interested.
But after that initial time in 2001, they identify their own.
Ms. Norton. So you appointed the first ones. As people
left, then who was the decisionmaker?
Colonel Mueller. The RAB members themselves.
Ms. Norton. Oh, I see. It is from inside the Board itself.
Colonel Mueller. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much. We have kept you a long
time because this is a complicated issue. We have appreciated
your patience in answering questions. The panel is dismissed.
We ask for the next panel to come forward. We will swear
you in quickly because it is the committee's policy that all
witnesses are sworn in. Would you all raise your right hands?
[Witnesses sworn.]
Ms. Norton. Please be seated. This the final panel. It is
an important panel. It comes from the community and those who
have been most affected and most involved. President of
American University, Cornelius Kerwin is the first alumnus to
serve. He focuses on public policy. Chairman Greg Beumel, the
community co-chair of the Residential Advisory Board, became
co-chair in 2005 and has served since 2002. Nan Wells, advisory
neighborhood commissioner, represents a community of 2,000
residents living in Spring Valley. Thomas Smith, a 30 year
resident of Spring Valley, represents the Spring Valley
American University and Westover Place neighborhoods. Kent
Slowinski is a founding member of the Environmental Heath
Group, which of course investigates environmental health
problems. Finally, James Barton is president of Underwater
Ordnance Recovery.
I am going to ask us to proceed forthwith with President
Kerwin first.
STATEMENTS OF CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY; NAN SHELBY WELLS, ANC COMMISSIONER 3D03; THOMAS
SMITH, ANC COMMISSIONER 3D02; KENT SLOWINSKI, FORMER MEMBER,
SPRING VALLEY RESTORATION ADVISORY BOARD; GREGORY A. BEUMEL,
CHAIRMAN, SPRING VALLEY RESTORATION ADVISORY BOARD; AND JAMES
BARTON, PRESIDENT, UNDERWATER ORDNANCE RECOVERY, INC.
STATEMENT OF CORNELIUS M. KERWIN
Mr. Kerwin. Thank you, Congresswoman Norton. I will be
brief. My name is Neil Kerwin. I have been president of
American University for 4 years, serving as interim president
from August 2005 to July 2007, and president from July 2007
until now. I have been a member of the American University
community for nearly 40 years.
We appreciate this committee's ongoing interest in this
project, knowing as we do that it is motivated by a concern for
the safety and well-being of everyone in northwest Washington.
American University participated in hearings on the Corps'
of Engineers project that were held in July 2001 by the House
Subcommittee on the District of Columbia. At that time, we
provided a substantial number of historical documents and
communications dating from 1917 through 2001 on the use of our
campus by the U.S. Government and the U.S. Army. The compendium
is a valuable resource of project background and information
provided by American University, which was one of 10 properties
in Spring Valley used by the U.S. Government in an effort to
support the Nation during wartime.
Fundamental to our action and our position on these matters
are a few overarching truths. American University did not
produce, test, bury, nor conceal chemical munitions. The war
material produced, tested, and buried around Spring Valley and
American University are the responsibility of the U.S.
Government, the U.S. Army, the Corps of Engineers, and now the
partners with which it works. American University has made
available all information to the Army Corps of Engineers
regarding the cleanup.
The University has endured years of dislocation, suspended
operations, business interruption, unreimbursed costs in the
millions of dollars, and periodic safety concerns as the Army
Corps has conducted its multi-year effort to find and remove
items from that era.
It has been our consistent position to act with an
abundance of caution to ensure the safety of all. Senior
members of the University have been assigned to work with the
Army Corps and to monitor their activity. We have hired outside
expertise to independently assess the Army Corps' work, to
fully protect our campus, and to ensure the safety of the
surrounding area.
To assess risk, we hired Dr. Paul Chrostowski almost 10
years ago as an advisor to the University to review the
recommendations and the work performed by the Corps and their
contractors. He is an environmental engineer, an applied
toxicologist, and a chemist whose expertise has benefited the
University and the surrounding community on matters ranging
from the establishment of a stringent arsenic cleanup standard
to recommending additional safety measures on the Corps'
containment structure on Glenbrook Road.
AU's ongoing information sharing efforts have expanded over
the past 20 years and have included campus memoranda, open
meetings, new articles, materials posted electronically, and
historical documents in the University archives. The University
Web site devoted to the Army Corps' activity has been an
information resource with links and, we believe, helpful
information. That site now includes more than 80 communications
that have been posted with project updates since the year 2000.
As risks have warranted, we have targeted specific
populations with pertinent information and taken additional
measures over the past 10 years such as hosting forums,
meetings, and discussions; instructing our staff, faculty, and
students how to shelter in place; suspending operations on high
use athletic fields for 2 years; closing our Child Development
Center, which serves as a daycare center and educational
facility for our faculty's and staff's children, for 9 years;
and testing defined campus populations for arsenic poisoning.
These are only a few examples.
Every outreach that we have done has been based on the
nature of a particular situation and the potential risk at
hand. A high probability occurrence might require a rapid
response with specific safety protocols while a low probability
occurrence might prompt a general sharing of information.
AU's archives are open and accessible to anyone and have
been used extensively by journalists, government agencies, and
community members to learn more about the history of these
activities in northwest Washington. The only archived documents
not publically available are Board of Trustees materials that
deal with the American University as a private corporation and
include confidential information related to governance,
personnel matters, third party, and financial information.
To respond to questions whether these private records might
contain pertinent information, in April 2005 AU Counsel made
these records available to independent parties from the
Environmental Protection Agency. They reviewed Trustee minutes
and information from that period and agreed there is no
information included that might help the Corps locate
additional burial sites or to assist in the cleanup and
remediation. This was reported to the Restoration Advisory
Board [RAB], in May 2005 and in a partnering meeting.
We want to thank you for your help, Congresswoman Norton,
over the years to help ensure the affected areas in northwest
Washington are completely cleaned of all World War I debris and
byproducts and are fully and safely restored. We will, we have,
and we continue to do all we can to assist in that effort.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kerwin follows:]
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Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Kerwin. We are going
to go to Ms. Wells. Before we do, would everybody shift to the
left a little bit? The expert witness just arrived so we have a
little crowded table there. Ms. Wells.
STATEMENT OF NAN SHELBY WELLS
Ms. Wells. Thank you so much, Congresswoman Norton. I just
want to thank you again for organizing the hearing today. Your
leadership on behalf of the Spring Valley residents has been
crucial in presenting our concerns and making certain that the
cleanup is thorough and complete before the Army Corps of
Engineers leaves the area again. My comments today will be
brief.
As the ANC commissioner for a large part of Spring Valley
extending to Dalecarlia Parkway, I have joined with my fellow
Commissioner Tom Smith in working with the local and Federal
officials responsible for the ongoing effort to remove World
War I munitions, chemical weapons, and other contamination from
the community in which we live.
The project schedule which was attached to my testimony and
which we have discussed indicates that the Army plans to finish
in fiscal year 2010, which ends September 30, 2010. That is
only about 16 months from now so we have less than 2 years. In
2011, the Army would complete reports on the status of the
cleanup and the level of remaining contamination. However, it
is not clear that they will continue any of the more active
investigations.
Furthermore, ongoing project activities and remediation
have been limited by insufficient funding. I realize there has
been testimony to the contrary here but I base that on my
participation in the partnering meetings where I know that
things have been set aside or things have been put to a lower
priority, even though in my view they should be followed up.
There is considerable concern that the Army will end the
active investigations before the final reports that contain the
required information on the cleanup are completed and reviewed
by independent experts. I want to say how important it is, and
I totally agree with you, that we have independent experts
verify the accuracy and thoroughness of the effort.
In order to successfully complete this project, we need the
following: No. 1, I would recommend an independent and expert
review of the project's methods and data by the National
Academy of Sciences.
No. 2, we need additional funding sufficient to complete
these necessary investigations and the remediation activities.
I might add that American University was able to get an earmark
to complete some of the work on their area. I think it was in
fiscal year 2008.
Then No. 3, we need disclosure of all environmental data to
the public. I will note later on that while we can participate
now in the partnering meetings and we are now able to speak to
our fellow commissioners and to other public officials, we
cannot release any information from the partnering meetings to
the public until it has been specifically sort of declassified.
No. 4, and this follows along with this, we need increased
transparency, accountability, and oversight from all of the
participating agencies and involved institutions including the
D.C. Department of the Environment, the EPA, the Army Corps,
and American University. We need to work together on these
issues.
The Army began the cleanup, as everyone has stated, 16
years ago but there was no organized exploration of the extent
of the contamination until the accidental discovery of the
munitions and chemical filled weapons in the Spring Valley West
section. There is, however, evidence that various institutions
and the Army Corps knew at least as early as 1986 that there
were possible burial sites.
The AUES site and operations were extensive. Some of the
written sources I have seen say that Camp Leach involved as
many as 100,000 soldiers and 1,200 chemists and engineers. It
has also been described as the world's second largest poison
gas facility in 1917 and 1918.
As has been stated before, the Army Corps declared Spring
Valley safe and left. Again in 1995 they declared it safe. But
the D.C. Department of Health and the dedicated professionals
in that Department contested that decision. Following that, the
large toxic sites on Glenbrook Road were located in 1998.
However, the Army withdrew from a part of that site in 2002
after 4 years when the contractor who owned the property
withdrew permission for access to his property. They left the
site unfinished. I might note that this has been an issue on a
variety of properties. Looking for various bunkers and other
sources, they have not used their walk in authority. We have a
recent case in which they wanted to place a groundwater well, a
deep well, and they went through 5 years of negotiations with
the property owners until EPA threatened to march in. The
family finally agreed to allow some monitoring to go on. So I
would argue that this has delayed the project because they have
been unwilling to use the authority they have.
There is also concern about the Army's plans to destroy
chemical munitions in the neighborhood as I understand just now
in August of this year. Although the Army has destroyed
munitions using this same technology before, it is my
understanding, and I am pretty certain about this, this will be
the first time the process will be used to destroy explosively
configured munitions that could release arsene gas.
It is a highly toxic chemical for which there is no
antidote. The Army currently plans to destroy the munitions and
neutralize the chemicals left behind in an area just behind
Sibley Hospital, near the Grand Oaks Retirement Residence, near
the D.C. reservoir, and next to a Spring Valley residential
neighborhood. We have urged that the destruction be undertaken
at a Federal facility, of which there are many in D.C. and the
surrounding area.
Similar destruction, I believe, in the past has only been
done on military bases or was done once in a very lightly
populated area of Arkansas. But they have never destroyed
munitions, explosively configured, containing arsene gas. Now
they do have and have set up special conditions to contain the
release of gas but nonetheless you have a hospital, a
retirement home, and a residential neighborhood.
I might point out some of the inconsistencies that we face
as ANC commissioners. On the one hand, we are told that the
storage and destruction of these materials, explosively
configured arsene, are so safe that the process can take place
in this location. However, we are told that the materials are
so dangerous that we cannot know exactly what they are. This
inconsistency doesn't inspire confidence.
In 2007, when I asked for a report on the results of the
prior investigations carried out on Glenbrook Road from 1999 to
2002, I was told that report had never been completed and
therefore could not be released so I could not see it. It is
still not available. That investigation ended in 2002.
Groundwater monitoring is critically important both in
determining the levels of contamination and in locating
potential sites of contamination, as the Congresswoman has
stated. The project has installed a large number of groundwater
monitoring wells around the reservoir and the University.
However, groundwater in these wells has not been tested since
2007, almost 2\1/2\ years ago. There are plans to test the
wells in 2009, but it is June and to date no testing has been
done. Additional groundwater wells are scheduled to be
installed this year in order to further determine the flow of
groundwater near the reservoir. However, still no regular
schedule for testing groundwater has been proposed.
My experience, contrary to some of the testimony of the GAO
representative, is that too much of the information on the
contamination discovered thus far has been restricted, often
for reasons that don't make sense. National security is
frequently cited as the reason data and other information
cannot be shared, that we cannot share it with others, and that
indeed much of it can't be shared with us. We are told that the
information would be useful to terrorists.
I am well aware of national security concerns. I held a
secret clearance while I worked for the Armed Forces
Radiobiology Research Institute. I understand security needs,
but I have never seen the kind of security excuses, if you
will, that we have been receiving for the information we need.
When I first began attending the meetings of the partnering
group which you have heard much about, the agencies and
whatnot, that was only when I became an elected ANC official.
Only local officials, members of the agencies, or members of
the RAB are able to attend the partnering meetings. I was not
allowed to discuss at first any of the information, when I
first did this, that I learned with my fellow ANC
commissioners, including Tom Smith, other public officials, or
members of the public. Even agency representatives were not
allowed to share the information they were given at the
meetings with their supervisors.
Sometimes it appears that the partnership serves to
restrict challenges to Army plans and to delay progress of the
plans.
In addition to concerns about health and safety, the
location of a major D.C. reservoir near the area of
contamination leads to questions about the possible impact on
residents in other areas of the city. In testimony presented on
April 12, 2006 to the D.C. Committee on Public Works and
Environment, Colonel Robert J. Davis, Commander, Baltimore
District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, described why the
testing of groundwater especially for contaminants like
perchlorate is so important.
Colonel Davis stated the following at the hearing: ``As
discussed at the Spring Valley RAB meeting last night, our
groundwater elevation data does suggest that some limited
groundwater is likely seeping into the reservoir at specific
locations. However, we expect this volume of groundwater to be
minute compared to Potomac River water entering the reservoir
every day, and we have had no significant detections in
groundwater wells closest to the reservoir. Our phase 2
investigation later this year and next year will provide much
more information as to whether any Spring Valley groundwater
contamination detected upgradient of the reservoir could pose a
future risk.''
While Tom Smith and I now have the ability to discuss
information with public officials and they can discuss
information with others in the agencies, agency and public
access to information remains limited. The D.C. Department of
the Environment is not allowed to know the chemicals that will
be brought into D.C. for use in the destruction of the
munitions this summer, nor have they been given the identity of
the chemicals in the hazardous waste that will be produced.
Our concerns in Spring Valley are not that different from
many FUDS communities. Having spent most of my professional
life working with scientists and with universities in support
of science, I am not here to criticize or complain. It is
crucial that all the parties and agencies work together to
complete the successful remediation of this site which my
neighbors and I call home. We must make certain that public
health and safety are protected and that the data verifying the
cleanup is released to the public.
Thank you very much for this opportunity to appear before
the committee.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Wells follows:]
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Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Ms. Wells.
I want to alert this panel that in 20 minutes to a half
hour even the voteless Delegate from the District of Columbia
gets to vote. There is a vote in the committee and I wrote a
memorandum that has resulted in my being able to vote there. So
I would like to get this hearing completed before then. I am
going to ask everyone to briefly summarize their testimony so I
can make sure we get to everybody before I have to leave
myself.
Mr. Smith, I am very glad to hear from you now.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS SMITH
Mr. Smith. Good afternoon. My name is Thomas Smith. I have
lived in Spring Valley for nearly 30 years, as you mentioned.
For the last 3, I have served as an ANC commissioner
representing Spring Valley and part of the American University
campus.
Few if any residents knew that the AU campus was used as
the second largest chemical weapons research and testing
facility in the world during World War I until munitions were
discovered in 1993 during new home construction. Only then did
residents learn that weapons had been found previously during
construction on the AU campus and that the Army was aware of
the potential dangers that existed in our neighborhood.
Whatever their reasons, both American University and the Army
kept this information concealed. This pattern of non-disclosure
by both institutions continues today.
The decision by the Corps to leave the community
prematurely in 1995 along with the way the Corps has interacted
with the community since returning to the neighborhood,
including the operations of the Army-created RAB, has cast a
long shadow of doubt on the credibility of the Corps. These
concerns are heightened when reviewing the experiences of so
many other communities across the country dealing with similar
problems.
The Corps has not yet finished assessing various areas of
interest in the community or dealing with the serious
groundwater problem. Decisions are being made about whether
certain areas of interest thought to be possible sites of
contamination, burial, or anomalies are worth additional
investigation. The new 2010 deadline is an incentive to
neglect, as before, the type of investigation that is needed to
ensure our community is safe.
The team charged with the responsibility of searching for
and identifying potential areas of interest, the Area of
Interest Taskforce referred to earlier by Colonel Mueller, has
been disbanded, according to the Army because one of the
members has retired.
Much information about this project is hidden from the
public on the basis of national security, enabling the Corps to
escape the public scrutiny and accountability that should be a
routine part of this cleanup process. Too often we are forced
to play the role of amateur sleuth and be laser precise in our
language even to learn the most basic of information about this
cleanup.
There are too many unanswered questions to limit the
investigation at this time. We have the high levels of
perchlorate in the groundwater. The groundwater has not been
monitored for 2 years, unlike in some other States dealing with
the military's pollution of the groundwater. The nearly 30 jugs
of mustard gas near a burial site in the archival photographs
and said to be a deep burial site have never been found. There
are questions about whether an upcoming investigation at the
Dalecarlia Woods will cover a large enough area.
Additional questions are being raised about the limits of
the equipment used to conduct the geophysical investigations of
key sites in the community and whether more sophisticated but
expensive technology might provide the information of what is
underground at deeper levels. There is historical evidence of
another burial pit near the campus, known as the Courier or
Osborne Pit, thought to contain the nearly $800,000 worth of
chemical weapons in 1918 dollars. And there is no indication
that an aggressive effort is in place to locate this pit.
Residents have long sought testing of the air in their
homes, especially given the high concentration of arsenic in
the soil and the presence of arsene gas in munitions. The Corps
has said that such testing was not technologically feasible,
yet the Army conducted such air testing in containment
structures when investigating a recent burial pit. The State of
Wisconsin has mandated indoor air testing for homes near
groundwater that is contaminated with perchlorate because of
threats to the health of home owners. But there are no plans to
conduct indoor air testing at homes in Spring Valley where the
groundwater runs at basement level.
Although our surface soil has been tested for arsenic, why
is the Corps not testing for manganese and mercury which also
have been found in high concentrations in our neighborhood?
Recently there was a new find of mercury at the AU Public
Safety Building.
I welcome the comments today of Mr. Hawkins, especially
since DDOE acknowledged in a public roundtable convened by the
D.C. Council just last month that it was playing a ``passive
role'' in the cleanup.
Recently some residents indicated an interest in using land
once owned by AU for a playground. This area was thought at one
time to include a bunker that has not been ``pinpointed''
according to the Corps. There is no additional investigation of
this site planned even though in recent years part of this land
also has been slated for future development. Can the Corps
assure us that this land is safe for children and that new home
construction will not unearth the kind of munitions that were
found 16 years ago? Our questions to the Corps and AU about
this site have so far gone unanswered.
Are there risks that we must learn to live with in our
community? Absolutely. But these should be informed decisions,
not circumstances forced upon us.
Two weeks ago I learned from a friend of mine that a
college buddy of hers had died recently of a brain tumor in his
middle 50's. He was one of three who had died of cancer in
recent years at roughly the same age. All three lived at a
fraternity on campus that now houses the AU Child Development
Center. There was an obituary in the Washington Post just this
week of a former resident of Spring Valley who had been
diagnosed with a brain tumor but died at 50 from complications
of pulmonary fibrosis, a disease thought rare for that age. We
hear almost routinely of residents or former residents with new
diagnoses of peripheral neuropathies, a common manifestation of
arsenic poisoning. There are many more health related stories
that could be told but a comprehensive health care study has
never been conducted within our community.
So there is a lot at stake for us. Cleaning up the
community is not just a matter of safeguarding the environment
in which we live. It is also about protecting the health and
well-being of multiple generations of residents.
When weapons were found in our community by accident in
1993, they were helicoptered out and sent elsewhere to be
stored and destroyed. Today, those weapons are stored and
destroyed in our community, the only residential community
where toxic chemical weapons are destroyed, in this case less
than 1,000 feet from a hospital. At least that is the
information that we were provided by the Army Corps at a
community meeting last March. We know that the AUES was----
Ms. Norton. Mr. Smith, we are going to run out of time.
Mr. Smith. I have one more sentence.
Ms. Norton. All right.
Mr. Smith. OK? I promise you, one more sentence.
Each of our residents in Spring Valley and throughout the
city has a right to know that military pollution left over from
this chemical research conducted in D.C. poses no danger to
current or future residents. That is our responsibility to the
people who elected us. It is one that I and others here today
are more than ready to share with this subcommittee and any
other elected or appointed official in D.C.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]
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Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Smith. Mr. Slowinski.
STATEMENT OF KENT SLOWINSKI
Mr. Slowinski. My name is Kent Slowinski. I grew up in
Spring Valley in the 1950's and 1960's. Since the 1970's, I
have worked in Spring Valley as a landscape crew member,
contractor, and architect. I am also a former RAB member.
As the Army Corps likes to say, bottom line up front. The
current process is just not working. Over the past 16 years we
have had to endure flawed sampling, secret sampling, sampling
that never took place, incomplete historical research, attempts
to rewrite history, several uninvestigated burial pits, no
cumulative health risk assessments, a dysfunctional RAB, and
more recently a 1-year backlog in posting partnering meeting
minutes to the Spring Valley Web site.
If the Army Corps can't even post minutes in a timely
manner, can we trust them with destroying chemical munitions
less than 1,000 feet from the District's water supply? Davis
Robertson, one of the original RAB members, said if the Army
Corps was a private contractor they would have been fired a
long time ago.
The Spring Valley issue became personal for me in 1995 when
my mason found a Stokes mortar while working on a house on
Sedgewick Street. The current owners are dealing with serious
health problems and one of the previous owners developed a
brain tumor. On the same block were two cases of aplastic
anemia in the same house, 20 years apart. Both were fatal. One
was a 7-year old girl; the other was a 70 year old man.
Aplastic anemia is very rare. Just one case raises red flags.
On three adjacent properties were three cases of multiple
myeloma, again each one fatal. On another adjacent property was
one case of pernicious anemia. That individual, Camille Saum,
survived. She and her sister, Beth Junium, collected anecdotal
health information from their neighbors.
This was the beginning of the Northwest Current's Spring
Valley Disease Survey. You don't have to be a Harvard trained
epidemiologist to know that something is terribly wrong here.
We have been living with this toxic brew of more than 600 AUES
chemicals for 90 years now. To date, we know of more than 200
residents, students, and workers with health problems
associated with chemical exposure. My name, as well as several
friends and family members, is on that list.
The 2007 Johns Hopkins Scoping Study, not a health study,
found that residents' anecdotal health problems were consistent
with the existing scientific literature on exposure to chemical
warfare agents and agent breakdown products. Unfortunately, the
followup health study has been delayed and is only partially
funded. We need another $500,000 to fully fund the study. We
need to include some of the early and longtime Spring Valley
residents in that study.
Little is being done to educate people about the symptoms
of exposure or to assist residents, students, and workers who
may have been exposed. We will likely need additional funding
for medical monitoring and for independent sampling of soil,
air, and water to determine if the Army Corps' cleanup is truly
complete.
I don't know how you can conduct a thorough cleanup when
the historical research is incomplete and a conceptual site
model for Spring Valley has never been developed. These are the
first two steps of any cleanup. It makes you wonder if the Army
Corps really wants to be here and do the work.
It is clear that the current process is not working, but
what do we do? One solution is to put Spring Valley on the
Superfund National Priorities List and have EPA take the lead
along with a more proactive D.C. Department of the Environment.
Another possibility is to ask the National Academy of Sciences
to do a study on the thoroughness of the cleanup.
Looking at the bigger picture, at current Pentagon funding
levels of just $250 million annually, it will take 80 to 160
years to clean up the known contamination at 3,000 to 5,000
formerly used defense sites. If annual FUDS funding was
increased to $2 billion, these sites could be cleaned up in a
much more reasonable 10 to 20 years.
To conclude, one, we need more transparency and oversight.
Two, we need to a better job at researching, investigating, and
cleaning up Spring Valley. Three, we need to do a better job
protecting the health and safety of the citizens of the
District of Columbia. And four, we need your help. It is time
for a change.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Slowinski follows:]
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Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Slowinski. Mr. Beumel.
STATEMENT OF GREGORY BEUMEL
Mr. Beumel. Congresswoman Norton and members of the
committee, I want to thank you for the invitation to speak to
you today. I am Greg Beumel, the community co-chair of the
Spring Valley Restoration Advisory Board [RAB]. I began serving
on the RAB in June 2002 and became co-chair in 2005. I have
also served on the Science Task Group of the RAB and am Chair
of that group. I am joined today by Dr. Peter deFur, the
science advisor of the RAB.
To answer some previous questions, the Restoration Advisory
Board was established by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers under
DOD regulations to obtain community input into the
Environmental Restoration Program at Spring Valley. Members
come from two categories, residential and institutional.
Residential members are volunteers who must live or work within
the boundary of the FUDS. Institutional members represent the
major institutions in Spring Valley and include AU, the Horace
Mann Elementary School, the D.C. Department of the Environment,
the U.S. EPA, and the Army Corps of Engineers. When voting to
provide advice to the Army, only residential members are
counted.
Briefly, I am a toxicologist with 20 years experience in
human health risk assessment, quantitative and qualitative
analysis of chemical data, regulatory support, data base
management, communications, and program and project management.
I performed more than 50 risk assessments at Federal facilities
nationwide ranging from baseline risk assessments to toxicity
assessments.
This statement is my own evaluation and comment on the
cleanup at Spring Valley. It is based on a meeting with the
Science Task Group of the RAB, consisting of Dr. David Feary, a
geologist on the staff of the National Research Council, and
Dr. Peter deFur, the technical advisor to the RAB who is a
Research Associate Professor at Virginia Commonwealth
University and a full time private consultant. Much of this
testimony was presented by Dr. deFur at a meeting called by
Councilmember Mary Cheh of the District of Columbia City
Council.
Jumping ahead to save time, an upcoming project concern is
the plan to destroy military munitions recovered during the
investigations that are now ending. The plan to destroy the
munitions in an especially designed and constructed mobile
facility located on the Federal property makes sense and
presents the lowest risk situation, in my professional opinion
and that of the members of the RAB Science Task Group. Our
conclusion is based on risk factors identified for destruction
activities, the design and operation of the destruction
equipment, and the characteristics of the known threats to
human health.
Two of the greatest risk factors are the handling and the
transport of such items. Each handling increases the
probability that a mistake can result in an accident.
Transportation not only requires special permits from any State
through which the items must move but increases the probability
for accidents and unexpected events.
In terms of special actions and risks onsite, the risks are
lowered by the fact of two containment systems, air handling
systems, well tested equipment, experienced operators, distance
from the facility to any residents or commercial facilities,
and a plan to monitor local weather and proceed only when safe
conditions prevail. Given all the specific risk factors, I
agree with the decision to proceed with onsite destruction
using this equipment.
In 1993, the Army dramatically flew Spring Valley munitions
out of the neighborhood via helicopter. Those days have ended
as communities realize that they do not want to become a
secondary dumping ground for highly dangerous materials
recovered in another community.
In 1999, the Army completed fabrication of a usable
prototype of the mobile explosive destruction system that has
allowed for the destruction of chemical munitions closer to the
location of discovery. Since then the EDS has been used at a
number of communities throughout the United States, including
Spring Valley, with great success.
In the look for independent oversight, I don't claim to
have independent oversight. But we do have a technical advisor
who works for the RAB and has been represented in most of the
technical discussions and deliberations. They have taken his
input and contributions on par with other agency input.
According to Army policy, this TAPP grant is supposed to
last for 5 years with a $25,000 limit on each year. On two
occasions I have requested that the Baltimore District
Commander of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ask the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Army to waive caps on the TAPP
grants for Spring Valley. In both cases my request has been
granted. We continue to receive funding and continue to have
this outside technical expertise available to the community.
He attends the monthly technical partnering meeting when
available. He also attends calls and meetings on groundwater,
soil sampling, determining the list of chemicals to sample,
special site investigations, etc. He was part of the group that
investigated other areas that may have been overlooked, the
Area of Interest Taskforce. And he helped arrange a site visit
by Rick Woods, who had discovered munitions more than 10 years
ago.
I am going to jump to the end because I know you are out of
time. The purpose of these investigations is to find other
World War I era items if they exist so I will be surprised if
additional discoveries are not made. The current schedule
leaves time for additional discoveries of the size made this
past May of World War I 75 millimeter munition items and pieces
of grenades. If there is a major discovery such as a new burial
pit, the schedule will need adjustment. At this point, we will
need to see the resolve of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to
complete the project.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Beumel follows:]
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Ms. Norton. Thank you. Mr. Barton, let us take as much of
your testimony as we can. That is the 15 minute bell. It
usually lasts more than 15 minutes but I would like you to
summarize your testimony, please.
STATEMENT OF JAMES BARTON
Mr. Barton. Yes, ma'am. Thank you. We haven't found
everything that is at Spring Valley and we are not going to the
way we are doing it. A new methodology is called for, one that
is not being used anywhere else in the country, that uses the
latest science and technology and brilliant minds to detect the
presence of and map trace amounts of these toxins.
We need third party oversight. We need somebody who is not
currently at the table, I think. But we definitely need a new
approach of doing it.
There are new and emerging technologies that are non-
invasive and allow us to take atmospheric, surface water,
runoff water, and groundwater samplings quicker, faster,
smarter, and more effectively which can direct our remedial
efforts in the right direction. If your house, for instance,
has gas coming in it, we will do what we can do then because we
know where it is coming from. If we can't eliminate it, perhaps
that house has to go. But at lease we now have a focused look
using the latest technology. And we are not doing it. We are
using standard protocols as you would anywhere else in the
country.
There is nothing normal about this particular site. This is
the birth of our chemical weapons program for this country and
it is in unrestricted residential use. Oh my God, you know?
They were mixing and matching everything here. And you can find
it everywhere. And we haven't found it everywhere. We haven't
even begun to find a lot of this stuff.
But what is most important is finding what is coming into
your homes, finding what is killing us. Why are there people in
the ground? Why are there professionals who are not in their
offices anymore and don't have a job anymore because they rub
somebody the wrong way?
There are a lot of things we can do better than what we are
doing right now. I would like to help do that if I could.
Incidentally, and forgive me for not introducing myself, my
name is James Barton. I am the president of Underwater Ordnance
Recovery. I am a subject matter expert on munitions. I have
been diving on piles of bombs for 34 years and because of the
nature of my business, I am quite familiar with these.
Science is the answer, the new technologies and the science
to detect and track trace amounts of toxins.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Barton follows:]
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Ms. Norton. Thank you very much. Let me say that the
purpose of this testimony was not to, forgive me, cross examine
the community, as it were. You are not the responsible parties.
Of course, the RAB members have some responsibility but, again,
they are not public officials. The point was to hear from
people within the community, essentially a critique of what has
been done. Now that has to be weighed alongside what the Army,
the Army Corps, the EPA, and the officials said.
I want to express my appreciation for the Corps and the
Army for remaining to hear you out. I had wanted to hear the
community first because in fairness I thought the Army should
be able to, for example, respond to some of what we heard. I
think they would have felt better about responding since the
whole point here is to solve a problem and to be truly
transparent. But I appreciate that you regarded the testimony
of the community important enough so that, as late as it is,
you have stayed to hear it.
I must say, when we hear testimony, for example, and he had
to give it this way, this is Mr. Beumel's testimony with some
boiler plate in here, I have signed a confidentially agreement,
one of the rest of you said that, too, speaking to a Member of
Congress, speaking to a committee of Congress, I have signed a
confidentiality agreement about some munitions that are 100
years old, and so I can't tell you what the weapons are, and I
can't tell the community what the weapons are, that is a
problem.
This community is going to know what those weapons were
when this is all over. And I use the word were advisably
because they were. I think what we have already found out in
the 16 years you have been there is that most of what was there
has withered away in some way or the other.
The health study notions are important. This is very
controversial because after health studies nobody is ever able
to say, when it comes to cancer, that this was the cause. You
are able to see certain kinds of trends and make certain kinds
of conclusions, and then I am not sure what you do about them.
But the remaining problem in this period is, as far as we
are concerned, the Army's self declaration that it is leaving.
Nobody leaves until the Congress of the United States says yes,
we think it is time to go. We will have to see what these 2
years bring us. Much will depend on the transparency of the
effort. We begin with transparency of what in the world we are
talking about and what we have been talking about for 16 years.
We don't even know that.
It makes many in the community, and it certainly makes this
Member of Congress, feel that we are at ground zero because we
don't even know what we have been digging about all this time.
It is an absurdity, of course, but it is a bureaucratic
absurdity that has been put upon everybody, including the
public officials who are here. Because it is obviously above
their pay grade. We are going to find out whose pay grade it
is.
It would be impossible for this subcommittee and this full
committee to authorize the end of this effort without knowing
what we were ending and without the community knowing what we
were ending.
The testimony has been very important. We have been taking
notes and then we remembered that we will have it in writing in
any case. So these questions can be presented to the first
witnesses who have been kind enough to stay so that they can
have the opportunity to respond to them.
The subcommittee remains most interested in how we are
going to reach agreement that the time has come to go. We are
fully aware that we are dealing with ongoing issues and that
they may come again. Mr. Beumel, I think your point was well
taken. When we are talking about things that are hidden so
deeply that we don't even know where they are, we can't say
that nothing will ever happen again. That is why the nature of
the monitoring and the nature of the testing frankly looks like
testing and monitoring that is going to have to be permanent.
As long as you tell me that there are places that you will
never get to because they are buried so deeply and you don't
even know where they are, I don't know that in that sense this
site will ever be vacated as far as the Government is
concerned.
I want to thank all of the witnesses, particularly for this
testimony which has been invaluable to this committee. Of
course as I indicated, this is the beginning. We don't mean to
subject everybody to a continuous round of hearings but we have
to answer the questions that you have very appropriately raised
and have been raised throughout this hearing.
I thank you very much for this testimony. The hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Additional information submitted for the hearing record
follows:]
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