EFFECTIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY:
THE ADMINISTRATION'S PERSPECTIVE
ON THE FUTURE OF THE U.S.-PAKISTAN
MILITARY PARTNERSHIP

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BEFORE THE
FULL COMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING:

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

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[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
EFFECTIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY: THE ADMINISTRATION’S PERSPECTIVE ON THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED STATES–PAKISTAN MILITARY PARTNERSHIP

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 29, 2009.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:02 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Good afternoon. Today we have with us the Honorable Michele Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense; Vice Admiral James Winnefeld, Junior, Director of the Strategic Plans and Policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Ambassador Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for the South and Central Asian Affairs for the Department of State. We thank you for being with us and being willing to address the future of American and Pakistan relationship. We are expecting votes in the very near future. And I am hopeful we can get most of your testimony in before we have to leave to vote. And we ask your indulgence while we are voting. This, however, will be the last series of votes today, as I understand it.

So maybe we can expedite the hearing when we get back. This is an extremely important, and, of course, very timely hearing, and follows last week’s hearing before this committee on this same topic with the outstanding panel of Pakistani experts, including General David Barno, who testified that Pakistan presents the U.S. with its greatest global strategic challenge. It also follows the release of the administration’s latest Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy, as well as the administration’s supplemental budget request for a new Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund (PCCF). Moreover, this hearing comes at a time when there is legislation pending in Congress that seeks to both expand U.S. assistance for Pakistan as well as impose limitations and conditions on U.S. security assistance to Pakistan. And as we are here today, it appears security conditions in Pakistan have become even more worrisome, given the Taliban’s recent eastward advance from the Swat Valley to Buner, only 60 miles or so from Islamabad.

I agree with General Barno, Pakistan may well pose the greatest strategic challenge facing us today, with serious implications for U.S. national security in Afghanistan as well as the entire region. I am pleased that Congress and the region have both prioritized
issues involving Pakistan, and are committed to strengthening the U.S.-Pakistan partnership. But these issues are complex. Progress is not likely to come easy. I believe the administration's recent Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy is a step in the right direction. However, strategy alone does not guarantee success. The administration continues to request significant resources from Congress and the American people for efforts in Pakistan.

Following 9/11, Pakistan has received almost $12 billion from our country, including about $6.4 billion in Department of Defense (DOD) Coalition Support Fund (CSF) reimbursements. I hope the witnesses will elaborate on the fund, that is the Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund, and tell us what military objections it will receive and why it should fall under the authority of the Department of Defense rather than under the authority of the State Department. With that, I turn to my friend, the gentleman from New York.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. McHUGH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. McHugh. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will try to do this as quickly as possible. I would ask unanimous consent my entire statement be entered in the record. Let me very quickly welcome our very distinguished panelists, particularly Madam Secretary. This is, I think, your third appearance in the first 100 days. You must be going for a record. And you are probably well on your way to setting that. But we thank all of you for being here to discuss what the chairman rightfully described as a very important issue. And certainly this hearing is timely, as the security situation in Pakistan sadly continues to be at best volatile.

And as you look at, as the chairman mentioned, the movement of Taliban elements eastward towards Islamabad, some of their activities on the streets of Lahore, we can all understand why in her recent testimony, Secretary of State Clinton noted that the Taliban, in her judgment, and I couldn't agree more, pose an existential threat to that Nation. In the meantime, here on Capitol Hill, there has been what I will call a House version of the so-called Kerry-Lugar legislation that was recently introduced by the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. I think it is fair to say that unlike its Senate counterpart, this particular bill calls for what can be fairly described as heavy limitations and conditions on U.S. security assistance to Pakistan.

Some have expressed concerns that I share, that this proposal as currently drafted is disrespectful of Pakistan's sovereignty, it would unnecessarily constrain the Department of Defense amidst what is fairly described as an already fluid and dynamic situation in Pakistan. We are also in the process of scrubbing the President's fiscal year 2009 wartime emergency supplemental request, which includes Coalition Support Funds to reimburse partner nations such as Pakistan for their efforts in the war on terrorism. This measure also provides a new authority and funding stream called the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund, or PCCF, which is a tool, very ably designed in my judgment, to improve the capacity and capabilities of Pakistan's security forces to deny safe haven
and defeat Al Qaeda, Taliban, and other extremist groups within the Pakistan territory.

Given all these events, as I noted, this committee is rightly focused on Pakistan and the challenges before us. I would just refer everyone who has some strange interest in my comments of the past week, where we outlined my support of the President’s strategic direction for Pakistan, and some of the questions and challenges that I hope we can explore that lie ahead. With that, Mr. Chairman, as I said, let’s get to the testimony, and I will again welcome our panelists here today, and I look forward to their comments and yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much. The Honorable Michèle Flournoy, would you please lead off? And again, I know we are asking a lot of you in your testimony before us, but it is always so helpful. We welcome you back.

STATEMENT OF THE HON. MICHÈLE FLOURNOY, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Secretary Flournoy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Congressman McHugh. It is good to be back and see you again. And thank you for inviting us here today. I am glad to have the chance to discuss efforts to strengthen the U.S.-Pakistan military partnership, which is a vital component of the Administration’s Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy. Let me start by laying out the strategic context. In our recent strategy review, we went back to the most basic question, what are our national interests in Afghanistan-Pakistan, in that region? We concluded that we have a vital interest in defeating Al Qaeda and its extremist allies in the border region. We must deny them safe havens from which to launch attacks against the United States and our allies. You all know that the situation in Pakistan is deteriorating.

The insurgency along Pakistan’s western border has been steadily expanding, and militants are increasingly in a position to threaten the Pakistani heartland. In the Swat Valley, extremists have already exercised effective control. And last week militants established bases in Buner, only 60 miles from Islamabad. With instability increasing, many Pakistani civilians and political leaders fear violent retaliation if they openly oppose extremist groups. Meanwhile, opportunities are growing for Al Qaeda and its associates. From safe havens within Pakistan, they can plan and stage attacks against our troops in Afghanistan, and potentially against the United States itself.

Events on the ground are unfolding rapidly. With attacks in the Pakistani heartland increasing, Pakistan’s civilian government has come under urgent pressure to address this growing crisis. And they are taking steps to do so, in part by launching the recent military offensives.

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me, could you get just a little bit closer to the microphone, please?

Secretary Flournoy. I am sorry. In this context, further strengthening our partnership with Pakistan, including our military partnership, is absolutely critical. The Pakistani Government is undertaking concrete actions to demonstrate their commitment
to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. We must show our Pakistan partners that if they take decisive action against extremists, we will give them the support they need. As you know, Mr. Chairman, forging an effective partnership with Pakistan’s military has not always been straightforward. Despite our efforts to reduce tension between Pakistan and India, the Pakistan security forces have historically viewed India, and not the militants, as Pakistan’s most existential threat. And they have focused their resources accordingly. There has also been something of a trust deficit in U.S.-Pakistan relationships.

From Pakistan’s perspective, U.S. support has been inconsistent over the years. We have oscillated between treating Pakistan as a pariah and as a credible ally. There is mistrust on our side too. After years of investment in Pakistan’s military, we have seen some progress in countering violent extremism, but we have also seen many setbacks. Forging an effective military partnership with Pakistan has also been hampered by a relative lack of counterinsurgency capabilities on the Pakistan side. Nonetheless, Mr. Chairman, we believe that right now it is more important than ever to strengthen our military partnership with Pakistan. We share common interests. If the militants were to cause the Pakistani Government to falter, this would be as devastating to the Pakistani people and security forces as it would be for us. It also bears emphasizing that Pakistan’s security forces have made many sacrifices in their efforts to combat insurgency. Thousands of military personnel as well as thousands of civilians have lost their lives. And we have had some notable successes when we have worked closely with them. For instance, our work with the Frontier Corps has resulted in improved cross-border coordination, has increased their effectiveness and operations in many agencies. But the Pakistan military still has only limited capacity to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations. Unless we provide them with better equipment and training, such operations will continue to lead to short-term progress, but not necessarily enduring results.

Last week, Mr. Chairman, you heard testimony from three experts, all underscoring the urgency of the situation in Pakistan. We share that sense of urgency. It is vital that we act now to provide Pakistan with the capabilities they so critically need. The proposed title 10 Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund is absolutely crucial to this effort. The PCCF would give General Petraeus, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) combatant commander, the authority and funding required to effectively build the Pakistan military’s counterinsurgency capabilities in the kind of time frame required. Title 10 PCCF will bring responsibilities, authorities, and funding into alignment. The PCCF is a critical tool that will allow our military assistance in Pakistan to be flexible, focused, and fast, providing resources when and where they are most needed in an urgent and rapidly evolving situation.

With the PCCF, we can fully fund, plan, train, and equip efforts involving Pakistan’s paramilitary Frontier Corps, its Special Forces, and expand assistance to the Pakistani Army. Establishing a dedicated funding stream will also signal our seriousness and our commitment to Pakistan, which is vital at this moment when again, Pakistan is demonstrating its commitment to taking asser-
tive action against insurgents. I want to make clear that we see PCCF as complementing existing authorities and funding streams, not replacing them.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) continues to strengthen U.S.-Pakistani bilateral relations over the longer term, but beyond the urgent needs the PCCF is designed to meet. Similarly, Coalition Support Funds remain vital to sustaining Pakistan’s military tempo of operations in the border region. We must also address the historic imbalance in funding to Pakistan by increasing nonmilitary forms of assistance. We fully support the establishment of Reconstruction Opportunity Zones in Pakistan, and we are hopeful that the Kerry-Lugar bill will help boost rule of law and sustainable economic development efforts. Nonetheless, the title 10 PCCF is crucial to our strategy. As General Petraeus, Ambassador Holbrooke, and Ambassador Patterson have all noted, it is through the PCCF that we can provide our commanders on the ground the flexibility they need to assist the Pakistani military.

Given the rapidly changing situation on the ground, Mr. Chairman, we do oppose rigid conditionality, such as that which is proposed in H.R. 1886. While we applaud the goal of increasing accountability, we believe that the bill as currently drafted is too inflexible, and would reduce our ability to adapt quickly as circumstances require. We are committed to continuously evaluating our own performance as well as that of our Pakistani partners. And to that end, we are developing measures of effectiveness that will allow us and you to hold us and our Pakistan partners accountable.

Mr. Chairman and other distinguished members, terrorism and insurgency in Pakistan are growing, increasing the urgent threat to our troops in Afghanistan and to Americans here at home. The proposed PCCF is vital to increasing the effectiveness of our partnership with Pakistan’s security forces at this critical moment in time.

Thank you very much for having me here today.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you again.

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Flournoy and Admiral Winnefeld can be found in the Appendix on page 35.]

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Winnefeld.

STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN, DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Admiral WINNEFELD. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Congressman McHugh. I would like to also thank you for the opportunity to come testify today on ways to improve Pakistan’s counterinsurgency capability. Under Secretary Flournoy has already covered the goals and the challenges that we face in Pakistan. From our point of view, this is really boiling down to a matter of Pakistani will and capability. While we use diplomacy to build trust and buoy Pakistan’s will in this very important fight and defeating the extremist threats, our ability and our efforts to build Pakistani counterinsurgency capability in the middle of an ongoing fight are also a key element of our new strategy. The Pakistani military knows that it is a largely conventionally-based force fighting in a very nonconventional environment.
And we have been down this road, as you very well know, ourselves. For Pakistan, as it was for us, change has not been easy in this type of fight or immediate. And it requires resources. And thus Pakistan needs the equipment and the training and the changes in doctrine that reflect the difficult lessons that we have learned over the last eight years. Thanks to your support, we have made some progress in our efforts to enable Pakistan's Frontier Corps and their other forces, including Special Forces and conventional forces, but both the pace and the scope of our efforts need to be increased.

One way of doing this, as Under Secretary Flournoy mentioned, is through the PCCF. This is Title 10 authority that General Petraeus has requested, that Ambassador Patterson has endorsed, and that the President has submitted as part of his supplemental as essential to quickly and effectively building Pakistan's counter-insurgency capabilities, again, in the middle of a fight. It is urgently needed in this fight that is going on right now. We believe that it will be responsive and immediate, enabling our combatant commander General Petraeus, who has the authority and the responsibility for this fight on both sides of the border, to capitalize quickly on opportunities and to plug emergent capability gaps that we might discover.

I would say that it will support U.S. troops who are in an ongoing effort in Afghanistan, because this threat clearly does not respect borders in this fight. And it will complement the other authorities that Under Secretary Flournoy mentioned that are designed to reimburse Pakistan for their operations, that are designed to build its long term defense capability both in the counter-insurgency (COIN) and other environments, and to improves its governance and development. It is very complementary.

As I mentioned a moment ago, the Pakistanis also have to have the will, in addition to the capability, to use the COIN capability we give them. And in this light, I would like to make two points. First, we believe that with increased capability should come increased will. Current events, as we are all watching them unfold in Buner, will be a real test for Pakistani capability and will. And that only highlights the need for the kind of flexible authorities that PCCF would give to General Petraeus. We want to be prepared if there is some emergent, unanticipated requirement that would pop up that we need to fulfill, or if a new opportunity arises for us to be able to work even more closely with the Pakistani security forces. And PCCF will enable that.

Second, we believe that publicly attaching conditions to our support will be detrimental to building Pakistani will to fight. And it will ultimately erode the trust that we are trying to build between our two nations. Rather, we believe that private engagement between our senior leadership is really the key to encouraging our partners, the Pakistanis, to use the assistance that we give to them wisely.

So we appreciate the committee's willingness to consider this sort of unusual enactment of authority. We believe we can't afford to wait until next year to obtain the flexibility and agility that it provides to General Petraeus. And accordingly, we ask for your support in accelerating its implementation, and we will ensure that the accountability measures are in place so that these funds go ex-
actly where they are intended to go, and that is into the COIN fight. Again, I would like to thank you and the members of the committee for your ongoing support for our troops and their mission, and I look forward to both your questions and your comments. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, thank you very much.

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Winnefeld and Secretary Flournoy can be found in the Appendix on page 35.]

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Boucher, why don’t we go ahead and ask you for your testimony, and then we will break for the votes. I might say that the lack of full attendance here is due to the fact that there was a caucus for the House regarding the swine flu challenge that we have. People will be coming in shortly after we vote. Ambassador.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD A. BOUCHER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador BOUCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Congressman McHugh——

The CHAIRMAN. Get real close.

Ambassador BOUCHER [continuing]. Distinguished members of the committee, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Get real close. Way up there. Way up there. Come on.

Ambassador BOUCHER. I am about as close as I can without tasting it. Thank you. It is a great pleasure to be here today with you. And thank you for holding this hearing. I have a slightly longer version of my remarks, but let me make a few comments at the beginning, because my colleagues, I think, have already laid out the context and the importance of this program. In the strategy that the President laid out last month for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the approach that is taken was an integrated, comprehensive approach that involves stabilizing Pakistan and building up Afghanistan.

Overall, our success in building institutions, strengthening governance, and ensuring economic growth is what will produce that kind of long-term stability. But we also all recognize that success in those areas hinges on helping Pakistan secure itself from the dangers of spreading Al Qaeda and Taliban insurgency. Our role in this effort is to support a Pakistani effort to defeat Al Qaeda and successfully shut down the safe havens in Pakistan.

We have an active dialogue with Pakistan’s civilian and military leaders. We hear from them consistently of their commitment to take on this threat, to take on the terrorist threat in Pakistan. But it is an ongoing effort, I think, to see how they can carry that out and to make sure that we are partners with them in carrying it out. And that is where programs like this become very important. Cooperation on the counterinsurgency has to proceed on two tracks, first by improving the ability of Pakistani security forces to defeat and dismantle terrorist groups, and second by extending the reach and the legitimacy of the Pakistani Government to all parts of their territory.
So to accomplish these goals, we are looking for this new train and equip program, the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund. And as my colleagues have expressed, this is designed to be a program that can deal with the urgent problems, that can deal with them quickly and flexibly, and give the combatant commander the ability to deal directly with these difficulties on both sides of the border. The State Department is fully supportive of this fund, fully supportive of the request for this authority to reside with the Pentagon and the Department of Defense in the 2009 supplemental.

We think that this new authority will complement Foreign Military Financing, which remains the foundation of long term security assistance with Pakistan. We believe the new authority is necessary because of the unique and extraordinary nature of the situation we face at this moment in Pakistan. The fund would be dual key, meaning the Secretary of State would concur in its use. It would be time limited in order to address immediate needs. We don't think it sets a longer term precedent for the issues of authorities from one department to the other, which we know we are all discussing now.

We want to do the other things that are necessary to make this program succeed in the counterinsurgency effort. We are proposing also to step up our assistance to strengthen police and governing institutions in the most vulnerable areas around Pakistan so that Pakistanis can also work on the hold part of a clear, hold, and build strategy. So security assistance, this kind of security assistance is only one component of a much larger strategy. And those efforts are designed towards creating the kind of modern, vibrant, and democratic state that Pakistanis desire and that the U.S. looks forward to working with as a partner in advancing stability in a key region of the world. So I will conclude with that and be glad to take questions.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Boucher can be found in the Appendix on page 42.]

The Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much. Rather than begin questions now, I think it is best that we proceed to the floor to vote, and then we will return forthwith and carry on. So we will be in recess.

Recess.

The Chairman. The hearing will resume and questions will begin. Let me ask a couple of opening questions.

Madam Secretary, there is a growing sense, at least here in the House of Representatives, that the Coalition Support Fund construct is not serving the interests of either our country or Pakistan very well and the time is right to begin moving away from that mechanism as it is. Can you recommend any alternative constructs that can achieve the same goals and objectives and be equally or more effective?

Secretary Flournoy. Sir, the Coalition Support Funds have been absolutely critical to providing reimbursement that enables the Pakistan military to maintain its operations tempo along the border with Afghanistan. Those operations are critical to helping secure the lines of communication going into Afghanistan, supplies
supporting our troops, et cetera. They are also critical in other ways.

So I think it is a very important mechanism. We have been sending teams over to work closely with the Pakistanis to make the process go better in terms of how the reimbursement gets made, while maintaining all of the necessary accountability measures to make sure that we in the executive branch and you here in Congress know how the money is being spent.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Secretary Boucher, excuse me, Ambassador Boucher, what do you want to be called?

Ambassador Boucher. You can call me anything you want to, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Ambassador, you mentioned that the State Department is supportive of the PCCF fund being used through Title 10 in the Department of Defense. Am I clear?

Ambassador Boucher. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There is some debate here in Congress about whether this authority should be granted to the Department of Defense or the Department of State. Could you elaborate a bit on what is important by way of this authority to ensure that it can be used to make a difference on the ground in Pakistan quickly?

Ambassador Boucher. The issue of which authority to use and for which stream of funds is, of course, something that is being discussed on the Hill and in the administration as well. The new administration said they want to sort out some of these authorities and funding streams. But when we looked at this immediate program, the decision was made to go for the route that we felt most suited the program in the present circumstance and most suited the need to get urgent approval for a flexible funding mechanism that would accomplish what this program could accomplish, meaning just get it up and running quickly, and so this was the preferred route was to do it under Defense Department authority. We thought that was the best way to go about it.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the administration is in favor of it, and the State Department is in favor of this fund being used through Title 10 in the Department of Defense; is that correct?

Ambassador Boucher. That is the way we made the request.

The CHAIRMAN. Not the Department of State; is that correct?

Ambassador Boucher. That is the way we made the request and we support that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not for it to be in the Department of State, right?

Ambassador Boucher. We are for it the way we asked for it, I guess.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. Defense Department, right?

Ambassador Boucher. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Good. Thank you. Mr. McHugh.

Mr. McHugh. Given the importance of the issue I am tempted to get a clarification of the Ambassador’s statement, but I think it was pretty well established. I am going to make a comment about it, however. It may seem we are very closely focused on—this is a critical issue. And I appreciated the admiral’s comments about the fact of the matter is—and I spoke to General Petraeus yesterday—
our commanders, starting with General Petraeus, view the control and flexibilities embodied both in the Coalition Support Funds and the PCCF as absolutely essential and absolutely essential they be controlled through the Department of Defense, without State Department or any other department's filters.

And I think the fact that President Obama, as has again been clarified—not clarified, but reaffirmed here today by our witnesses—has to his credit listened to the commanders on the ground and, along with the endorsement and support of Ambassador Patterson, has asked for these funds in this fashion is a message that cannot be overemphasized. I am deeply concerned about rumblings coming from the Appropriations Committee that regardless of what Congressman Berman, Chairman Berman's bill may or may not do, there are very significant voices on that committee working, as we speak, to put those kinds of State Department filtering conditions on our commanders.

So just to kind of put the cherry on the sundae, if you will, I assume beyond Chairman Berman's bill, Madam Ambassador, you would also oppose any similar constraints imposed to the appropriations process? Simply put.

Secretary FLOURNOY. I am sorry sir, you said Madam Ambassador, so I am not sure if it should be for me or him.

Ambassador BOUCHER. I think we can answer in unison.

Secretary FLOURNOY. We agree with the perspective.

Mr. MCHugh. You are an ambassador of goodwill, Madam Secretary, I apologize.

Secretary FLOURNOY. We would—I would agree with your perspective sir.

Mr. McHugh. Thank you. Let me ask another question. There has been discussion, media reports, Secretary Lindsey Graham—oh, boy—Senator Lindsey Graham and I—I am just kicking people from one department to another here today. Senator Lindsey Graham and I have been trading phone calls. There has been discussion about advancing some significant moneys to the Pakistanis prior to the development and passage of the supplemental.

Obviously both President Karzai and Zardari are going to be in town in the very near future, and this was looked at both as a confidence-building measure, but also something to free up funds more quickly to get supporting dollars into Pakistan and begin the work that I think the administration has done a pretty good job in detailing in their proposal. Does the administration have any position on that initiative at this time?

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think this has been discussed, and I think there is a desire for getting this funding as quickly as possible. I think within the administration, I think the preference is probably to accelerate the entire supplemental, to have an earlier decision on that, and to keep these moneys as a coherent sort of package. But I think there is definitely a desire to have this as soon as possible. And I think it is open for discussion.

I don't know if there is a different view on the State Department side.

Ambassador BOUCHER. Sir, the view is essentially the same from the State Department. Our hope is the whole package can move expeditiously in the supplemental. The supplemental contained a
number of elements on Pakistan economic assistance, security assistance and some operational things that we need to get on with right away. And I think our view is it is best if the whole package can move quickly.

Mr. McHugh. I thank you both. Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Dr. Snyder.

Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I share the concerns of Governor McHugh—excuse me—of Representative McHugh. I think his term was “unwelcome signals” that we could send if we include language in the legislation that is not as helpful to the work that you all are trying to do.

I wanted to ask, it seems like, Madam Secretary, Ambassador, that we also need to have some positive signals that we send to the Pakistani people. As I look ahead, I don’t know how far off, 15 years, 20 years, 8 years, I can foresee a time when we will look at our relationship with Pakistan as being one of the really strong economic cultural relationships. I mean it has that kind of potential. I am always reassured when I pull out those pictures of those lawyers in coats and ties demonstrating for the rule of law in the streets of Pakistan. It seems to me that we have a lot of common shared values.

And my question is, what other things can we be doing to send positive signals that this is more than just our desire to have a military ally at a time that we need military help?

Ambassador Boucher. Sir, that is a very important point. I think part of it is the strategy that is the administration presented and that you see in the Kerry-Lugar bill and the House bill as well, that we know that we need to beef up, do more on the economic and institutional side so that we can help Pakistan modernize its institutions of government, modernize its education system, modernize its economy so that people see the benefits of this.

There is a group I talked to not too long ago. One of the Pakistani colonels in the group said, you need to offer people something more than war. And we need to offer them peace. We need to offer them prosperity. And indeed if you look at the whole region strategically, the opportunities that a stable Pakistan that is free from terrorism opens up economically, in terms of relations with India, in terms of access rights to Central Asia, in terms of stability between the Middle East and the Far East, are enormous. And I think we do have that long-term interest in Pakistan and in the people of Pakistan. We just need to make that part of our rhetoric, but also part of our programs.

Dr. Snyder. As you look back in the relationship in the last few years, I had occasion to talk with some Pakistani friends a few weeks ago, and they were going back far enough, I didn’t know what the details were, but it was like in the last year, two or three, and they expressed concerns that they felt like we had not followed through on some things that we had told them we would do as far as military equipment or those—something like that.

Do they have some merit to the fact that we didn’t follow through like perhaps we had led them to think we would?

Ambassador Boucher. I guess I would say we probably did follow through, but we didn’t necessarily follow through as fast as they wanted. I look at the challenges that they face, and especially
that the new democratic government has faced since last March when they came into place. They are dealing with an economic crisis, a political crisis of stabilizing democracy, and a huge security crisis all at the same time. Every single one of these needs is urgent.

And we have tried to come through for them in a lot of ways, but some of these things take time to fund and procure and deliver. And so I think they are right in saying, hey, we need it now. And that is one reason why we are coming to you with this program because this is a way to get now to the people who are out there fighting the insurgency. Pakistan's military just this week is pushing back against these encroachments.

Dr. Snyder. I would encourage them if they think that we have made some promises—like our constituents, let us know if they think there is a problem.

The last question is, it seems like if I were a Pakistani military leader, it would be very difficult for me to figure out how to be as involved as perhaps we would like to be in the area along the Afghanistan border, given their great concern with the potential tension with India. Is there a way that the Pakistani-Indian relationships can improve, apart from what is going on in this war against terrorism, or do they go hand in hand? I address that to you, either one of you.

Ambassador Boucher. I think there are a lot of ways that the Pakistani-India relationship can improve. And, one, we have seen a lot of progress over the last few years, Pakistanis and Indians both pushing forward new ideas in trying to solve some of the issues. The issue of terrorism, though, is central to this.

The Mumbai bombings carried out by a group that was based in Pakistan really disrupted the progress that was going on. And one of the best ways to improve Pakistan's relations with India is to see Pakistan carry through on what they have started, and that is to prosecute and disband, eliminate the group that was responsible for the Mumbai bombings.

India is going through an election right now. But I hope that when the new government comes in, that they will see the progress on terrorism and they will be able to work with Pakistan to try and reestablish some of that broader progress. Reduction of tensions, improvement of economic ties, people-to-people ties, all that I think would benefit not only stability in the region but also the fight against terrorism in the region.

Dr. Snyder. Thank you.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Before I ask Mr. Coffman, let me ask the fact that Taliban forces have seized an area. I think some 60 miles from Islamabad, is that of great concern to you, Madam Secretary?

Secretary Flournoy. It is of concern and it is an example of some of these militant groups moving out of the northwest territories and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and into what I refer to as the Pakistani heartland. I think the attacks against the cricketers, the attacks on Lahore, we have seen a number of these examples, are part of what is contributing to a shift in the level of concern and the determination to do something
about this on the part of both Pakistan’s leaders and ordinary Pakistani citizens.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coffman.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My first question is, I have seen analyses that show that 80 percent of the Pakistani military is focused on its border with India, in the Kashmir area, that that is their orientation.

One question is, has that changed? And the second is, what initiatives does the United States have to defuse the situation between India and Pakistan over Kashmir so that we can get them to focus in on the Taliban?

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, if you don’t mind, I will defer the military lay-down question to my colleague and just note that I think on the India-Pakistan question, I think part of the strategy that we laid out is very much of an intensive diplomatic engagement not only with Afghanistan-Pakistan, but also all the countries in the region, to try to reduce tensions where they exist, to enable some shifts in resources to deal with this problem of extremism on the border. But I will let my colleagues comment on the details.

Admiral WINNEFELD. First, to comment on the exact number of troops and whether they are shifting or not inside Pakistan, in this unclassified forum, would probably be unwise. But I will say that the Pakistanis do have around 100,000 troops in the western area. And it is my sense from talking with my boss, who does an awful lot of military diplomacy with his counterparts in the region, that there is a desire on the part of Pakistan to move to the west. And it is just about building trust, which is clearly a public diplomacy and a military diplomacy task that we are taking on and we have been taking on, and we believe we are gradually building that trust.

It is sort of two steps forward, one step back sometimes. And there are setbacks when things like Mumbai occur, which sort of tend to make people fix in place or even add troops and other pieces of military equipment in the areas we would rather not see them.

But our sense is the Pakistani military “gets it,” that they understand where the real threat to their nation’s stability exists, but they continue to be worried about their perennial concern, which is India. Yes, sir.

Mr. COFFMAN. We have had testimony before this committee that seems to suggest that funding institutions, such as the police and the Frontier Corps, are more effective than funding the regular Army in counterinsurgency. And in this funding, do we have the ability to be specific as to what entities we fund, or are we simply giving it to the Pakistani Government?

Admiral WINNEFELD. That is one of the great things about this authority, is that it really leaves the determination in our hands and General Petraeus’ hands, with Ambassador Patterson clearly having a very, very important input, along with the Office of the Defense Representative to Pakistan (ODRP) commander, Admiral LeFever, as to us funneling this money specifically towards counterinsurgency capability, with specific equipment, that we determine what will be purchased for the Pakistanis and also the training side as well. Yes, sir.
Secretary FLOURNOY. If I could just add, PCCF as a Title 10 authority, is available to support the Frontier Corps, the special operations forces, and we would propose also expanding to the army forces that are in that border region. But critical to a broader counterinsurgency strategy is also building police capacity, but that would be done under separate authorities and funding streams that are in the State Department’s purview through their International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) program.

Ambassador BOUCHER. In the supplemental request that we have presented, there is another $65 million for the police and Frontier Corps, about $40 million specifically for the police. And that would be added to some other programs that we have this year, and we hope next year, to really focus on building a stronger police capability in that area because what we are—part of the counterinsurgency is to allow the government to maintain control in areas that the military has been able to clear out, and that is a very important priority for us and, I have to say, for the Pakistanis as well.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Smith, please.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Following up a little bit on the counterinsurgency piece and our strategy there, first of all, tell us a little bit about how we get the Pakistani military and police to the point where we feel confident in their ability to engage in counterinsurgency. How far off are we? What do you see as the main challenges there? Because it certainly seems critical. It is the cornerstone of counterinsurgency, by, through, and with the local population and the local law enforcement, as opposed to our hand. And that is particularly true in Pakistan, given how the Pakistani people feel about us.

What is the path forward in terms of getting them to the level of capability they need to be effective everywhere, including the FATA, throughout the whole region?

Secretary FLOURNOY. Let me start and the admiral may want to add. I think there are many dimensions to this. The first is equipment. They have focused most of their equipment acquisitions on their deterrent capacity vis-a-vis other neighbors, particularly India. They have not focused their equipping efforts on counterinsurgency. And there are some different kinds of capabilities that they need there.

But, as important, is training and you know as we have learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, these operations require different mindsets, certainly different doctrine, different skill sets sometimes, different kinds of leadership ability. So I think the training and education piece is just as important as the equipment piece, and giving them the ability to do population-focused military operations where securing the population is really at the heart of what they do.

Mr. SMITH. On that point, sorry to interrupt, but how confident are we in our intelligence or in Pakistani intelligence on getting to know those critical populations, to know who the community leaders are, who the tribal leaders are, who we can work with? Because certainly that was the key in Iraq, was finding members of the local population who were willing to turn on Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
I am not as confident that we have that same level of knowledge, or even necessarily that we are working towards that level of knowledge in the critical areas in the lawless regions of Pakistan. What is our plan for dealing with that?

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think historically—I don’t think that there has been a deep understanding of the sort of cultural demographics, if you will, of that area. I think that certainly as with the Frontier Corps there with Pakistan, the government moving more, starting to focus more on that region, move people and resources into that region, that is starting to improve. They are gaining knowledge as they go and so forth. But I think that is an area where improvement could be made.

Mr. SMITH. And is that an area where within DOD or within our Intel Community we are planning to ramp up our efforts to gather information on our side, either supply——

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, sir, I can’t really comment on the Intel side of it because it is sort of out of my purview.

Mr. SMITH. We had testimony last week on this subject with some outside experts, including Mr. Kilcullen who is very much an expert on these issues. And he basically, he made the statement that the Predator strikes were counterproductive; that basically you are going for counterinsurgency, building support with the population.

I don’t think I agree with that, but certainly there is a point at which if we are doing counterinsurgency correctly, if we are building sufficient support within the local population to confront the problem that way, they do become counterproductive.

Is that something that you have contemplated in terms of our strategy there, our unilateral actions, and ramping that down to build up population support and to build up the Frontier Corps’s strength in that area?

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, I don’t mean to be unresponsive, but I don’t feel—I don’t think it is a good thing for me to comment on in an open session. But we would be happy to talk to you in a closed session on that.

Mr. SMITH. Fair enough. Last question has to do something with what Mr. Snyder was raising, and that is sort of the trust gap between Pakistan and the United States. And I guess this would be for the Ambassador.

What are the most important things we can do to try to build up the Pakistani trust? There has been excessive focus on our side, with our lack of trust in them, which of course only exacerbates the other problem. But in terms of exchanges, in terms of different things our government could do to try and build and strengthen our relationship with Pakistan, are there suggestions that you would have for us?

Ambassador BOUCHER. I guess I would say that the most important thing is to come through on a broad program that actually does improve education and help them economically and help them meet their energy needs and help them build institutions of government that they need and help the police provide security for people. If we can help the Pakistani Government deliver what its people want, then I think that builds the level of public as well as govern-
mental trust between the two countries. And so that is one of the thrusts of the program.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Franks.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of you. I know that it is always difficult to speak to kind of theoretical questions. But related to any possibility that there being a breakdown in Pakistan's military hierarchy, whether it is Taliban or whoever it might be, that could either gain through a loyalty breach or through a force of arms, control of some or all of Pakistan's military weapons, especially their nuclear weapons. And I am not sure what you can say in this venue.

But, Admiral, what do you think should be our greatest concern there, our greatest focus?

Admiral WINNEFELD. First of all, I would tell you that we believe that the Pakistani military is a very stable organization that is well led. General Kiyani has a very good relationship with Admiral Mullen, and vice versa, and you know that he has been over there many times over the last year. I have lost count; I think it is up to nine. And he has gotten, he has built a very deep sense for this organization and an affinity for it as well.

And I think he would be the first to say that he is not concerned about the Pakistani military breaking down per se in the face of a Taliban influx or an assault upon the military organization itself.

So I think that the thing we need to make sure that we continue to do is to build the trust that we do with the Pakistani military. And we do that in many ways: through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which is absolutely critical—as you know, we had a 12-year gap there and we are trying to recover from that—by coming through on what we agreed to deliver to them, by also holding them accountable in private, by continuing our training programs that we do for them. And it is really across a broad spectrum of building trust and buttressing their military to (a) be a good strong COIN force and (b), be a very responsible actor inside Pakistan. Those are the things we need to concentrate the most, I think.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, sir. And thank you for your service to this country, to say the least.

Ms. Flournoy, I guess I will put the question to you in a little different way, because obviously you have even the same goal that the admiral does, but just a different mechanism.

Secretary Clinton stated this week, and I am quoting, she said, one of our concerns which we have raised with the Pakistani Government and military is that if the worst, the unthinkable were to happen and this advancing Taliban encouraged and supported by Al Qaeda and other extremists were to essentially topple the government for failure to beat them back, then we would have to—they would have the keys to the nuclear arsenal of Pakistan, unquote.

And then she goes on to say, we can't even contemplate that, we cannot let this go on any further, which is why we are pushing so hard for the Pakistanis to come together around the strategy to take their country back. And unquote here again.

What is the Department, from your perspective, doing about the, quote, unthinkable, and specifically understanding and controlling
Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile? And what are we doing to contemplate and come up with a strategy to ensure nuclear weapons don’t fall into the hands of Al Qaeda?

It is a little twist on the question I asked the admiral but, of course, some of the diplomatic approaches are obviously different from the military. What are we doing there to really make sure that we are protecting this country, and essentially the world, from those weapons falling into the hands of the bad guys?

Secretary FLOURNOY. First of all, I would say I think we have to be concerned anywhere where there is a potential for instability in a nuclear armed state, be it Pakistan or anywhere else. I think the first thing we are doing is, as Admiral Winnefeld described, is we are raising the issue, we are talking about it, we are emphasizing the importance of Pakistan’s responsibility for the security of its weapons. And as the admiral said, I think they are focused on this and they take it very seriously and they have actually invested a substantial amount of resources and time and effort in recent years to improve the security of their arsenal.

So I think that it is something that we focus attention on, on our side, in our thinking about contingencies and such. But it is also something that we consistently raise in dialogue with them, and we try to ensure that we are there to work with them to make sure that that focus remains. But I think that it is definitely in everybody’s mind and there is no lack of attention being paid to it.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Marshall.

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For some time now, we have been underfunding State’s activities generally, worldwide, that are important to us as far as maintaining relationships, developing intelligent sources, et cetera, is concerned.

Frankly, funding to the State Department is an easy target politically. It is easy to cut that stuff and say that we need to be spending money here at home as opposed to abroad for any number of different reasons.

I have suggested for some time that perhaps we think about funneling money through DOD to State Department-type activities as perhaps a mechanism to have a sustained, politically sustainable over the long haul way of addressing long-term security needs that can only be met by developing the right kind of partnerships, the right kind of relationships worldwide.

We can’t do this ourselves. We have got to have our partners like the Pakistanis furthering our strategic interests and securing nukes basically in this instance and pursuing Al Qaeda generally. And I kind of see it heading in that direction and, in that sense, positive.

I am a little worried, though, that you seem to be pretty adamantly opposed to H.R. 1886 because of rigid conditionality, I think is the term that one of you used in testimony. What are the conditions in H.R. 1886 that have been proposed that would somehow constrain your ability to act in a way that you find unacceptable?

Obviously, everybody would like to just have a free hand, you know. Congress, give us the money, we will do the right thing with that money, trust us. Congress has the obligation, though, to make sure that money is to be spent appropriately, so some conditions
were apparently proposed that you all don’t find acceptable. And I am curious to know what those conditions would be.

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think that our concern was that the wording of some of the Presidential certification requirements was—to our reading, it seemed very absolute and inflexible. So that if we are making progress but we weren’t at the end state yet, we are still not at the end state, so no assistance. We are worried about the way things were worded.

Mr. MARSHALL. If I could interrupt. Have you already, in writing, let the bill’s authors know what your concerns are? Does the committee to which it has been assigned know what your concerns are?

Secretary FLOURNOY. Secretary Gates and Chairman Mullen have written a joint letter, actually, to Chairman Skelton and to Mr. McHugh, expressing our concerns about the bill; applauding the bill for its desired increased assistance to Pakistan, and to do so in a comprehensive and integrated way, but voicing concern about some of the specifically inflexible language on conditionality and so forth. So we are supportive of the spirit but have concerns about how it is actually operationalized in the bill.

Mr. MARSHALL. I see it is in writing, so I don’t need to further pursue that line of questioning. I will just read what you have written. I appreciate that.

We are going about this business, once again, taking the lead. And it may be that we are the sole actor that is doing this, and as a consequence it will be American tax dollars and American personnel executing this.

Who are we teaming up with? Obviously, Pakistan’s stability is of interest to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the entire world, really. And Nunn-Lugar proposes 1.5 billion of additional dollars for the next 5 years. It just seems to me we ought to have a lot of international partners working with us.

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, we do. And you may want to elaborate on this, Ambassador. But at our urging, our allies, the Japanese actually just hosted a donors conference for Pakistan in Tokyo that raised—I think it was $5.6 billion in international pledges. So we are not alone in this.

Coming out of the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy review, we really sought to rally others around our desire to strengthen the Pakistani Government and to offer various assistance efforts. I don’t know if you want to elaborate on that.

Ambassador BOUCHER. Sir, I think there is a lot of international concern about Pakistan. And the conference in Tokyo did over-pledge the amount that was required. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) identified a shortfall of about $4 billion that was going to be needed for balance of payments, budgetary and program support for Pakistan, to get them through the economic crisis. And in Tokyo we came in for $1 billion, the Japanese came in for $1 billion; the Saudis were in for $700 million; the rest of the Gulf Emirates was 300-plus. So $1 billion from the Gulf. Europeans were substantial.

Some of the other countries that didn’t pledge anything new, like China, are already fairly substantial supporters to the Pakistanis. So I think there was very broad international support, final number. I think the way the IMF counted it was $5 1/4 billion against
an original target of $4 billion. So I think there is substantial support as well as international concern, and the two go together.

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Wittman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, members of the panel, for joining us today. I wanted to follow up a little bit on the letter that was sent to Admiral Mullen and Secretary Gates concerning the whole Pakistani issue. But I want to focus in on the international military education and training aspect of that. And I also want to include in that a conversation I recently had with General Zinni, who was former CENTCOM commander, and looking at the utility of that particular program. And it was pointed out by both the Secretary and Admiral Mullen that has been critical in the past and they see it as being important into the future.

I wanted to get your viewpoints about will these programs be increased? Will they be enhanced? How will we apply these to try to make sure that we have that sort of training, integration of thought process with U.S. forces and Pakistani forces? And what we are seeing today are officers at the junior grade that haven’t been through those training programs. And we are seeing now a difference between the senior officer corps and the junior officer corps. And I am wondering what your thoughts are on where this is going. Where do we look to enhance that, and what utility will that have on our success there in Pakistan?

Admiral WINNEFELD. Yes, sir. Without using up too much of your time with specifics, I will tell you that Admiral Mullen is an extremely strong supporter of the IMF program. He came back from one of his trips one time, really energizing the staff to pour more attention and time into buffing that program up essentially so that it would accomplish more of the things that you are describing.

I think we have 37, if I am not mistaken, Pakistani IMET students in the United States right now. That is sort of a long-term program in the sense they come over for an extended period of time. And in order to get more leverage and more exposure to the exact group of Pakistani officers you are speaking about, we would like to get some of them and some of their noncommissioned officers over for shorter periods to expose them. And we believe we are going to start seeing some success in doing that. And there are other programs that we are trying to ramp up in order to get that done.

So I think the short answer is we understand this. We really want to get at that—particularly that tranche of officers that did not have the exposure. And it is a very important program for us.

Secretary FLOURNOY. If I could just clarify, the PCCF authority proposal does not at all affect IMET. In fact, we are increasing our request for IMET. PCCF will allow more operational types of training but it is a complementary effort, not a replacement to IMET.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you. Secretary Flournoy, a question about the integration of different efforts there in Pakistan. We know there has been a lot of talk, and we had a panel that testified before us last week suggesting that there has been maybe an over-reliance on the military strength through the U.S. intervention there in the region, and that maybe we ought to look at some addi-
tional efforts along the development side or the implementation of what they call soft power.

I just wanted to get your thoughts about how do you integrate both of those efforts to be successful in those regions, to make sure that we not only provide security but we look at security in sustainable ways as it relates to the other aspects of Pakistan and its economy?

Secretary FLOURNOY. Well, when we came up with a budget proposal that is in the 2009 supplemental, and then also what is in 2010, we very much came at it from a holistic perspective. And so you see the bulk of the assistance on the civilian side to do things like rule of law assistance, economic development assistance, police, et cetera. The military piece is a portion of that. And it comes in several flavors.

But I think we do have a holistic perspective. We in Washington have worked the interagency process very hard to get coherence. And then in the person of—combination of Ambassador Holbrooke, who will be looking at a regional perspective, and Ambassador Patterson and our folks on the ground, they will be very much looking to ensure those things work together.

Secretary FLOURNOY. I can tell you that the military piece is very much designed to help create the security environment in which the governance and development assistance can be more effective.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Taylor, please.

Mr. TAYLOR. Madam Secretary, thank you very much for being with us, Admiral, Ambassador. I am just curious, I do come from a part of the world where $400 million is still a lot of money. What is it you think we accomplish with that 400 million? What is your level of confidence at the end of the day it has made a difference, that anything has changed favorably our way? Or is this just a very small down payment on something we are going to be asked to provide a heck of a lot of money for in the very near future?

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, I think that as the Pakistan leadership, both civilian and military, become more focused on this threat and more willing to deal with it, I think our ability to help them develop the capabilities to be effective is going to be that much more crucial. And so what we are talking about is, in the PCCF, is moneys that can help train and equip the Frontier Corps, the Special Operations forces, but now expand also to the Army forces in the area. And that can give them very specific capabilities, equipment and training that they lack that are essential to effective counterinsurgency.

So I think this is something that we have been working piecemeal by putting together a patchwork of authorities and trying to take little bites out of the apple. What the PCCF will allow us to do is take much more concerted and coherent approach to getting further down this road much faster.

Ambassador BOUCHER. Sir, if I could just add to that, because I have gone out to the border areas a number of times, and I remember a trip I was down south in the area across from Helmand, where the U.S. forces are going in, working with some people from the Frontier Corps, going out to visit forts that we had actually
built along various infiltration routes. And talking to the com-
mander of one of these forts, I said do you have night vision gog-
gles? Do you have body armor for your troops? And he said we have
a very small amount, and we switch it between different places,
different forts on different nights depending upon where we think
the smugglers or the infiltration might occur. And I think what
this program is designed to do is to sort of make sure they can all
have their body armor, that they can all get out there and do what
has to be done in a more coherent and concerted way. So it is really
trying to do this in a systematic way, and not just as the Under
Secretary said, sort of the hodgepodge that we have done before.

Mr. TAYLOR. And again, I will presume you have spent years in
that area and I haven’t stepped foot in Pakistan. But from every-
thing I read, it seems to me that Pakistani Government considers
India their primary threat, Taliban not to be a threat. So that runs
counterproductive to what you just said. Night vision goggles to
protect themselves from what, the people they don’t consider a
threat?

Ambassador BOUCHER. These are people that are on the infiltra-
 tion routes in and out of Afghanistan.

Mr. TAYLOR. Right, but they don’t consider that infiltration route
to be a problem.

Ambassador BOUCHER. No, they do. It is just they are not
equipped to deal with the problem. And I think what this program
tries to do is equip them to deal with it.

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, I think what you describe is histori-
cally accurate. I think there really is a shift taking place as these
attacks come into the heartland of Pakistan, and as, you know,
they threaten the Punjabi territory and so forth. I think it is also
very important to see this in the context of the fact that, you know,
this is an integrated theater, this border region. And we have tens
of thousands of troops on the Afghan side. Part of preventing at-
tacks coming from Pakistan across that border is helping the Paki-
stanis to be more effective in securing the border, denying that
area as a safe haven, establishing security for the population in
those areas, and securing the lines of communication. That has a
direct impact on our forces in Afghanistan. And now that there is
greater willingness on the Pakistani side to address this, I think
we have to support them in being more effective because it will af-
fect us in very concrete ways.

Mr. TAYLOR. In the short time I have remaining, has anyone in
the Pakistani Government actually asked for this money, and if so,
whom?

Admiral WINNEFELD. To our knowledge, they are not asking for
the money, they are asking for us to help them with their capa-

Mr. TAYLOR. Who? What is the name, what is the title?

Admiral WINNEFELD. General Petraeus is asking for——

Mr. TAYLOR. No, no, in the Pakistani Government, who in the
Pakistani Government, the name and the title, is asking for this?

Admiral WINNEFELD. General Kiyani. General Kiyani, sir, is ask-
ing for us to dramatically enhance his Armed Forces, the Frontier
Corps, the Special Forces that he has, and in fact, the Eleventh
Corps, their ability to do counterinsurgency. He has lost 1,400
killed in action along the border region. He has lost a lot more people out west than he has against India, and he knows it. He realizes, and the entire government is beginning to realize more and more that this is the real immediate threat. At the same time, they are still worried about India. And we would love for them to worry less about India and more about the west, but they are definitely raising their awareness of and their concern about what is happening in the west.

Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Wilson.

Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for being here today. I agree with Dr. Snyder. I am hopeful for Pakistan. I visited the country a number of times. And the people I have met there are very dynamic. There are 30 million, possibly 40 million middle class people, significant high level of education. I have had the opportunity to meet with parliamentarians on my visits there. And also we have a number of members of the parliament from Islamabad come and visit here. Every time I am really impressed at the dedication of the people that I have had the opportunity to meet. I have also had the opportunity, with the earthquake relief in 2005, to visit with U.S. Marines who were working with the Pakistani military. And the military impressed me as very professional, very well organized.

And so I am just again hopeful, but I have also seen tragedy. I had the opportunity, sadly, to have breakfast at the home with Benazir Bhutto a month and a day prior to her murder. And so I want the best for that country. And Admiral Winnefeld, last week when we had a hearing, there was concern expressed that Pakistan is actually on a trajectory toward becoming a failed state. In general, we have been discussing this the whole time, but what specifically can we do to develop a strategic partnership with that country to succeed? Actually, any of you if you would like to.

Secretary Flournoy. I think those words are very important, strategic partnership. I think one of the things we have got to do is move out of a very transactional relationship to investment in a strategic partner and a long-term program to invest in strengthening Pakistan’s political and social institutions, strengthening their military, and their ability to provide security within their own borders, strengthening their economy and so forth. The stability of that country is so important to our interests and to the region. I think that we have to engage as a priority at all levels, using all instruments, from diplomacy to assistance to military engagement and so forth. And I think, again, this is one of the primary insights that has come out of the strategy. And I think we are trying to move out in that direction. But we do need help. We do need the tools to be effective in doing that.

Mr. Wilson. And I have served twice as the co-chair of the India caucus. And I have made the points to our friends of India and our ally of India that the country that would benefit most from a stable Pakistan is India. And Secretary Boucher, you have indicated that there have been steps towards a better relationship between the two countries. What can we do to promote an improvement in relations between two countries that it would be in their mutual interest that each be successful?
Ambassador Boucher. I think U.S. encouragement helps them achieve the kind of progress that they have made in the past. There are more concrete things that we do. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has been involved in the follow-up to the Mumbai bombings on both the Indian side and the Pakistani side to try to get the facts out, try to get the prosecutions under way, try to help them deal with this problem, eliminate the further threat of terrorists from these people and move on. And then I think, frankly, the more we do to help Pakistan deal with the terrorist problem, the more we open up opportunities for India and Pakistan to cooperate.

Mr. Wilson. What is the status of trade relationship between the two countries?

Ambassador Boucher. It is open for a slightly increasing list of goods. There is a lot of potential there should we say. There is probably a lot of trade that goes in and out of the gulf. But there is, I think, very identifiable trade opportunities that both would like to take advantage of.

Mr. Wilson. And what is the status of assisting in any way education? Are we helping in any way the educational—the schools in Pakistan?

Ambassador Boucher. We are. It has been a priority for previous programs. We have done a lot of it for many years through budget support. Last year we moved this into specific projects that we were funding. But I think in terms of the new budgets, the new amounts that are being requested, that would be a very high priority.

Mr. Wilson. And in the past, that has been a real problem of the lack of education and extremists taking over the system. So thank you all for your service.

Ambassador Boucher. Exactly. If I could just say the goal is to create a good public education sister testimony so it draws kids out of madrassas and into the modern sector of life and society and the economy.

Mr. Wilson. Thank you.

The Chairman. Before I call on Mr. Kissell, let me ask is it not true that the key to success in Afghanistan is full cooperation with Pakistan? Or I should say by Pakistan?

Secretary Flournoy. I do think that cooperation with Pakistan is critical to our success in Afghanistan. And I think that enabling them to help apply pressure on their side of the border in dealing with this extremist threat is absolutely crucial to success over the long haul.

The Chairman. We don't want to even speak of Pakistan becoming a failed state, but what if they become as fully ineffective in helping us with the Al Qaeda and the Taliban and the criminal element? What about our conflict in Afghanistan under those circumstances?

Secretary Flournoy. I think the more that either side of the border becomes a safe haven for Al Qaeda and other extremists, the more difficult it is for us—the more difficult it will be for us to achieve stability and security in our objectives on either side of the border.
The CHAIRMAN. At what point do we say since you are not helping us as much as you can, we will not allow a safe haven to exist?

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, I don’t know how to answer that question. I think it is——

The CHAIRMAN. But it is a real question.

Secretary FLOURNOY. It is a real question. And I think our job is to try to avoid getting to that point. We have opportunities I think to make that a more remote possibility by investing in the capacity and capability of Pakistan to avoid the kind of outcome that you are describing. And I think that is the primary course of action that we should be taking.

The CHAIRMAN. Bottom line, doesn’t it amount to the will of the Pakistani Government to get their house in order?

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think there is a will component and a capability component. And I think the more effective we help them to be in addressing the insurgency when they choose to address it, which they are doing right now, the more that will build political will to keep on down that path.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Kissell.

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for being here today, Madam Secretary and Mr. Ambassador, recently in Afghanistan, I had a chance to visit. And numbers given to us for polling numbers independent of the government or military, this came from evidently media, listed support for the Taliban in Afghanistan being below 10 percent, single digit numbers. How strong is the support for the Taliban not in Pakistan in general, but in the region where they have recently been so active? How strong is the local support for these people? And also I saw a news account this weekend that indicated that parts of the Pakistan Government said here, you can have this, just leave us alone over here. How true was that and how—what does that mean to us?

Ambassador BOUCHER. I think probably support for Taliban groups in this area, in the border areas of Pakistan is probably higher than it might be in Afghanistan. They are rooted in tribes, culture, and history, in traditional opposition to governing authority. At the same time, when you talk to people up there, you hear they want schools for their kids, they want hospitals, they want roads, they want job opportunities. And I think if the government can deliver those, people want to side with the government. Now, it has been dangerous to do that. There have been hundreds of tribal leaders who have stood up over the last year or two in various meetings and supported the government, trying to get rid of the Taliban, and they have been killed. The Taliban have killed at least 200, I think last year, tribal leaders. So it is very dangerous to stand up and side with the government. But there are substantial portions of the population that want to do that. The idea that maybe, well, you know, if we just left them alone, they could stay up there and not cause us any trouble, that kind of goes back on and off to British days. And it has never worked.

It didn’t work for the British, hasn’t worked for this government. And particularly right now when you see these groups trying to push into other areas and take over other parts of the country, the government I think is feeling that they really do have to assert
governmental authority. And that is what this is all about in many ways.

Mr. KISSELL. Admiral, we had a group last week and I asked this question to them, as we are successful in Afghanistan does that help or hurt Pakistan in terms of its ability to fight the Taliban? Would it mean that the Taliban would concentrate more there? Just what would it mean?

Admiral WINNEFELD. That is a very difficult—we are looking through a glass darkly when we are trying to foresee the answer to that. But I think we can safely say that as we are successful in Afghanistan, it is possible that some of the Taliban will be driven back over the border, which the Pakistanis are very concerned about.

I would add, as a side note, that having authority like PCCF to enable us in an agile way, enable General Petraeus to help enable the Frontier Corps, for example, and we are going to move that effort into the south eventually where we are going to try to strengthen the capability of the Frontier Corps in the south, and the Ambassador alluded earlier to how really poor they are in just the basic needs, just being able to move from point A to point B somehow other than being on foot down there is very difficult for them.

So strengthening them down there will help Pakistan, and it will help sort of sandwich the Taliban who might be tempted to leave Afghanistan if they are losing in the south, as we are confident that they will be this summer and this fall once we get additional forces in place. On the other hand, anywhere we can beat the Taliban we are going to beat them. And we believe that we wouldn't want to let up at all in southern Afghanistan in order to prevent, you know, them from going back across the border. That is why we want to work closely with Pakistan, we want to use authorities like PCCF to strengthen them and get this job done.

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the panel. The first question kind of ties into what Chairman Skelton said in the very beginning. He just mentioned that the Taliban are 60 miles outside of the Pakistani capital. And I have heard the words trust, diplomacy, good will, strategic partnership, but I haven't heard much, maybe the Admiral can answer this, about closing with and destroying the enemy through firing and close combat as the Marines do, which is what they need right now. The $400 million isn't going to do anything for that, nothing, about what is going on now. So what is going on now? What are we doing right now to help them? If you can talk about it in this venue.

Admiral WINNEFELD. Yeah, I think in the most unclassified manner of speaking, the Pakistanis, as you can read in the press, are moving into that area in an attempt to eliminate the Taliban presence, the extremist presence in Buner. That is going to be a difficult job for them, partly because we believe that it is possible the insurgents are trying to entrench themselves in that area and they are going to be hard to root out like insurgents are anywhere, as you well know. And what we are doing is listening to the Pakistanis. If they are going to ask for a request for support we are
going to listen very carefully. And again, having authority like PCCF would help us respond to requests like that very quickly. If they were to request—if there were an unanticipated need that were to emerge, whether it be training—

Mr. HUNTER. Are you saying you can't do that now, you can't fulfill those needs without the PCCF right now?

Admiral WINNEFELD. We are less able do it now than we can if we have the PCCF, that is correct.

Mr. HUNTER. Not to belabor the PCCF, but we are talking about that a lot. General Petraeus said that the PCCF, in a letter that I have here, is integral to the success of Enduring Freedom because it enables the commanders on the ground to do what they need to do when they need to do it. And this is for all of you. Do you think that if the State Department had control of this that it would be inserting the State Department into the military chain of command, which is so integral to have quick, efficient operations on the ground?

Admiral WINNEFELD. I wouldn't want to paint it in that negative of a light. I think it is appropriate that for an ongoing combat operation, where General Petraeus is responsible, has the authority and responsibility on both sides of that border, for whatever we can do to make that fight go the way it needs to go. A real no kidding, ongoing fight, that it is appropriate for the military from ODRP to General Petraeus up through the chain to have the responsibility, and therefore the resources in order to do that. I would add that Ambassador Patterson is a very important piece of this, and that she is the chief of mission, she understands what is going on on the ground, and she will have a direct influence on how a PCCF would be employed. But we believe that General Petraeus should have the authority to use these funds.

Mr. HUNTER. Unilaterally, through his chain of command.

Admiral WINNEFELD. I think “unilaterally” is the wrong word.

Mr. HUNTER. The Department of Defense down from the President, with that military chain of command.

Secretary FLOURNOY. The way I would say it is that the best way to align the authorities, responsibilities, and funding is to make PCCF a title 10 authority. And I don't think there is any disagreement between the Department of Defense and Department of State on that at this time, particularly in the urgent period of the 2009 supplemental. And I think everybody recognizes that alignment is what is needed to be operationally responsive on the ground, particularly in a battle zone. The closest analogy is the kind of authorities we have provided to build and support the Afghan National Security Forces and the Iraqi Security Forces. We need something comparable here on both sides of the Afghan border to be effective.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador BOUCHER. I think I would agree with the way Under Secretary Flournoy put it. The reason we approached this in this manner was to provide a more direct route to have an urgent, because of an urgent need. I do have to say that all these programs are carried out with a lot of consultation, a lot of effort between the departments, and it comes together in the country team that Ambassador Patterson runs in Pakistan. So I don't think we——
Mr. HUNTER. Not when it comes to buying things like Naval Beach Groups (NBGs) or getting them Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). There is no State Department involved with buying magazines for AK–47s for them.

Ambassador BOUCHER. No.

Mr. HUNTER. No, there isn’t. And should there be?

Ambassador BOUCHER. No, I don’t think so. There is one place to buy those, and that is the people who make them.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you.

Ambassador BOUCHER. Our job, I think, is just to say, look, as we approach counterinsurgency, here is how we need to work it with the government, and we all work it together.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, panel.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Loebsack.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Loeb.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the three of you for being here today. I appreciate your service, and certainly what you are trying to do with respect to Pakistan. I have a very simple question at the outset. Can you lay out, and Madam Secretary, that might be your job to do this, can you lay out what is our strategy as it stands today?

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think our strategy is to invest in strengthening the civilian government of Pakistan and the institutions of Pakistan so that they can meet the basic needs of their people and render Pakistan a secure, stable country that is inhospitable to insurgency and terrorism. It is about building the Pakistanis’ capacity to address their own challenges. They cannot do it alone. They need our help. And they need our help urgently. And when they start to take—when they take steps in the right direction, we should be there supporting them to the fullest extent possible.

Mr. LOEBSACK. And to what extent does the strategy then include components that are beyond Pakistan’s borders, Pakistan’s relationship to India and to other countries around Pakistan? How does that play into the strategy, if you will?

Secretary FLOURNOY. It is very much a regional approach. We, as the Ambassador suggested, we have an important role to play in trying to help reduce tensions between Pakistan and its neighbors, Pakistan and Afghanistan. We are about to hold another trilateral session in Washington with the President coming soon, Pakistan with India. Hosting things like the donors conference. Getting regional stakeholders to realize that they have a stake in a stable and prosperous Pakistan.

Mr. LOEBSACK. There is mention in your testimony, and I was not here for your oral remarks, I apologize, you may have mentioned it, Reconstruction Opportunity Zones. Can you elaborate on what that is? Is this something similar to the PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan? And I should mention, too, that Congressman Marshall and I agree that in Afghanistan they shouldn’t probably be called reconstruction zones, because they start from scratch more often than not. Is this what we are talking about PRTs, but in the case of Pakistan something different, a little bit different?

Ambassador BOUCHER. No, this is a different, it is a regional trade benefits program for border areas of Pakistan and all of Af-
ghanistan so that products that they make in those areas would be able to enter the United States duty free. It is to create an opportunity for businesses to set up there, manufacturing to set up there, and basically to get kids not to pick up a gun and pick up a job or a wrench instead. Legislation has been introduced in both the House and the Senate, the bill on the House side sponsored by Congressman Van Hollen and I think several others. I am sorry, I don't know the whole list. But we are hoping that the Congress will pass this legislation. The Pakistanis have been looking forward to this. And feasibility studies say there are actually real manufacturing opportunities in these border areas, opportunities to get kids jobs, and get them out of the fighting business.

Mr. LOEBSACK. So you are talking about the FATA, you are talking about the border areas with Afghanistan?

Ambassador BOUCHER. Exactly.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Okay. And one last question on interagency coordination, that dreaded phrase that no one likes. What is happening with respect to—because we have had a number of questions already. That is one advantage I have of being among the last to ask the questions, I get to hear a lot of my colleagues' questions and your responses. But it seems as though that has not been resolved yet perhaps, the whole idea of interagency coordination. Is there any one particular individual, or how is that working with respect to Pakistan and our strategy?

Secretary FLOURNOY. Well, as someone who is in the middle of it, I will actually say it is working quite well. At the Washington level, you know, the deputies committee, the NSC process is putting a lot of time and attention. I mean, I am very pleased to say that when we finished the strategy review we didn't just put it on a shelf. We immediately turned to, okay, how are we going to get this implemented? And that is why we are here today. This is part of getting the strategy implemented.

Mr. LOEBSACK. So it is in the NSC principals?

Secretary FLOURNOY. At the policy, sort of grand policy oversight level, yes. But then if you go down a level, Ambassador Holbrooke has developed a very close relationship with the ambassadors in the region, with General Petraeus as the regional combatant command (COCOM). He is working this interagency coordination piece at the regional level. And then when you go down on the ground and you look at the embassies, in Afghanistan there is a direct coordination between the ambassador and the military commander on the ground. In Pakistan you have an interagency country team that is working these issues. So it is happening at multiple levels. And for the most part, I have been actually quite impressed with how well it is working so far.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Okay. Thank you. I see my time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Langevin will be the last questioner unless there is someone that has additional questions on a second round. Mr. Langevin.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Secretary Flournoy and Admiral Winnefeld and Ambassador Boucher for your testimony here today. There have been many news reports about the troubling level of support that the Pakistani intelligence serv-
ices, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has given to Taliban forces. If part of our strategy is to end violence in the region is to help train the Pakistani Army on how to develop and fight counter-insurgency-style warfare, how does the ISI’s close relationship to Taliban forces affect the trust and ability of our forces to train and support their Pakistani partners? And furthermore, what steps is the U.S. taking to reduce the ISI’s support of Taliban forces? And what challenges does the U.S. face with ending their relationship?

Admiral WINNEFELD. The ISI is an organization like any organization, and it has a hard time changing. I can speak from personal experience in my own Department that we have gone through many changes over the years that have been difficult and painful. And they are going through a difficult and painful change right now. And I believe that they are going to succeed. I think we are seeing them succeed. General Kiyani brought in a new ISI chief, General Pasha, who has quickly replaced all except two of his two star subordinates inside the ISI headquarters. And we are starting to see the changes filter down throughout that organization. Now, does that mean they have completely changed? No. We do not necessarily believe that. It is going to take time for change to penetrate all of the different corners of that organization. But our sense from them is that they understand the need to change, the need to make a strategic shift away from some of their past policies. And we are confident that they are going to move in the right direction. Never as fast as anybody would ever want them to, but we believe that through the personal diplomacy that we have experienced between Admiral Mullen and General Kiyani and other interchanges between the U.S. Government and the Pakistani Government that they are going to get moving in the right direction.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. Now, there are reports today, some-one discussed this already, that Pakistan is planning major troop movements from its borders with India to help fight the militants near the border with Pakistan. And while this of course is welcome, the Pakistani Army still remains really unprepared to fight counterinsurgency-style war. And throwing people at the problem isn’t necessarily going to make it go away. So the question I have is does this move reflect a broader shift in the Pakistani military organization towards a more counterinsurgency-focused mission? And also what are we planning on doing beyond training to help Pakistan bring a whole government approach to its security efforts?

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think this is exactly the kind of moment that makes the argument for the PCCF authority, in that it is a specific situation where we are getting specific requests for assistance, and we would like to be able to respond urgently, quickly, to say, yes, here is the equipment, training, whatever you need to be more effective. Part of the PCCF authority is specifically designed to help train the Pakistanis in the civil and military aspects of counterinsurgency, not just the clear piece, but the hold and build. What do you actually need to do with and for the population to actually consolidate security gains once you have cleared an area to protect the population, to get them on your side so that the insurgents don’t return to that area. That is very much part of what this program would enable us to do. So I think the particular situation
now is very much an argument for trying to get this kind of program in place.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. That is all the questions I had. I am hopeful that we can provide the right support to make these things reach fruition as we intended. I think ironically, the Taliban moving into Buner was a real wake-up call to the Pakistani Government, and also the population as a whole. And we may have seen, hopefully, the shift that will allow some of our efforts, in coordination with the Pakistani Government, to be successful in turning this thing around in undermining the Taliban. So thank you very much for your testimony. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Is there any further questions? If not, for the panel we thank you for being with us, for your excellent testimony. We look forward to seeing you again.

[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX

April 29, 2009
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

APRIL 29, 2009
Testimony of
the Honorable Michèle Flournoy
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
U.S. Department of Defense
and
Vice Admiral James A. Winnefeld, Jr., USN
Director of Strategic Plans and Policy
Joint Chiefs of Staff
before the
Committee on Armed Services
U.S. House of Representatives
April 29, 2009
USDP Pakistan Testimony (for 4/29)

Mr. Chairman and Congressman McHugh, thank you for inviting us to testify before you today. I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify about the U.S.-Pakistan military partnership, which is an important component of the Administration’s recently announced Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy review.

Let me start by laying out the strategic context. In our recent Afghanistan-Pakistan review, we went back to the most basic question of all: what is our national interest in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region? Why spend money and put American lives at risk in a troubled region that is far from home, especially during a time of economic crisis?

You all know the answer to that question. We care about this region first and foremost because we must defeat al Qaeda and its extremist allies. We must ensure that they will have no safe havens from which to attack us or our allies.

9/11, the bombings in London, Madrid, Islamabad, Mumbai—we have all learned painfully that in our globalized world, we cannot ignore the spread and growing lethality of violent extremist groups.

Right now, the situation in Pakistan is dire. The insurgency along Pakistan’s western border has been steadily expanding. Supported by a well-financed transnational network, Pakistan’s militants are entrenched in growing swaths of territory.

In the Swat Valley, extremists already exercise effective control. And just last week, militants established bases in the neighboring district of Buner—only 60 miles from the capital, Islamabad.

With instability and violence increasing, many Pakistani civilians and political leaders fear violent retaliation if they openly oppose extremist groups.

As a result, opportunities for Al Qaeda and associated terrorist groups are increasing. From safe havens within Pakistan, these groups have demonstrated a growing ability to plan and stage deadly attacks against U.S.,
coalition and Afghan forces operating across the porous border. Within Pakistan, the government is increasingly at risk. It is, therefore, imperative that we do whatever we can to prevent further instability.

At this critical time, our military partnership with Pakistan is crucial. Pakistan is a vital partner in the fight against Al Qaeda. Pakistan, though fragile, is a sovereign and democratic state. The Pakistani security forces have linguistic, cultural and geographic knowledge we cannot hope to match, and we need their active cooperation to defeat the extremist groups that operate within their borders. Yet the Pakistani forces lack the equipment and training they need to be effective in counterinsurgency operations.

But as you know, forging an effective partnership with the Pakistani military has not been a straightforward matter, and our efforts have been hampered by several problems. One is a matter of threat perception. Another is a “trust deficit.” And a third relates to their capabilities.

Start with the problem of threat perception. The Pakistani military has historically viewed India, not internal extremist groups, as the most existential threat to Pakistan. As you know, we are energetically seeking to reduce tensions between Pakistan and India, both of which are our strategic partners. But despite recent confidence-building efforts, it has often been difficult to persuade our Pakistani counterparts to shift resources towards dealing with extremist militants in the western border regions.

There is also something of a trust deficit between the U.S. and Pakistan. From Pakistan’s perspective, U.S. support has been inconsistent and lop-sided over the years: we have oscillated between treating Pakistan as a pariah and as a critical ally. We now face a legacy of mistrust.

There is mistrust on our side, too. After years of investment in Pakistan’s military, we have seen little progress in countering violent extremism, and too many setbacks. Some have raised concerns that elements within the Pakistani military and intelligence services may be sympathetic to militant groups, leading to increased caution on our part.

Finally, forging an effective military partnership with Pakistan is hampered by relative lack of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capabilities on the Pakistani side. The Pakistani security forces are often called upon to undertake sustained counterinsurgency operations in areas
where they have not historically operated, where they face terrain and cultural challenges as daunting as the ones our forces face in Afghanistan — and our forces have the best training and equipment in the world. If we want our Pakistani partners to succeed, we need to make sure that they too have the appropriate training and equipment for the job.

Mr. Chairman, some of these issues can be addressed through diplomacy and other tools. Others will be harder to get at. But notwithstanding these challenges, we continue to believe, more strongly than ever, that our military partnership with Pakistan is a critical component of our overall strategy in the region.

We share common interests: if militants were to topple the Pakistani government, this would be as devastating for the Pakistani people, including its security forces, as it would be for us. Both Pakistan’s civilian leadership and its military leadership increasingly recognize this, and have demonstrated growing political will for the fight against extremism. It bears emphasizing that Pakistan’s security forces have made many sacrifices in their efforts to combat internal militancy: thousands of military personnel and civilians have lost their lives to violent extremism.

Notwithstanding the challenges, we have also had some notable successes when we have worked closely with the Pakistani military. Our work with the Frontier Corps has resulted in improved cross-border coordination and has increased the effectiveness of Frontier Corps operations in Bajaur, Mohmand, and Khyber Agencies. In addition, the Pakistani special forces leadership has noted a significant difference between soldiers who have trained with the U.S. and those who have not — measured by mission success and number of casualties. Further, we note that helicopter units we have trained are now capable of conducting emergency medical evacuation of Army and Frontier Corps personnel from the FATA.

To build on those successes and prevent catastrophic instability, we must deepen our partnership with the Pakistani security forces, and provide them with the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capabilities they so urgently need. While overcoming divergent threat perceptions and a history of mistrust will take time, building Pakistan’s capabilities to take on insurgents is something we can and must begin doing now.
The proposed Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) is critical to that effort. The PCCF will give the Secretary of Defense with the concurrence of the Secretary of State the funding required to effectively build the Pakistani military’s counterinsurgency capabilities. With PCCF, our commanders can apply resources when and where they are most needed in urgent and rapidly evolving situations.

Mr. Chairman, as you know, one of the key conclusions of our recent review of Afghanistan and Pakistan strategy was that Afghanistan and Pakistan must be viewed as a single theater. Events in Pakistan profoundly affect events in Afghanistan, and vice versa. But even as we acknowledge this in our regional strategy, we recognize that the specific challenges we face in Pakistan are not identical to the challenges we face in Afghanistan, although they are deeply intertwined.

The PCCF, a temporary authority, will help us implement the Administration’s strategy, by giving us enhanced flexibility in responding to the needs of Pakistan to match the flexibility we have in Afghanistan, through the Afghan Security Forces Fund. With the PCCF, we can fund train-and-equip efforts involving Pakistan’s paramilitary Frontier Corps and special forces, and expand assistance to the Pakistani Army. Flexibility has been crucial to the progress we have made in Iraq, and we want to capture that lesson as we strive for success in Pakistan as well.

I want to make it clear to the Committee that we see the PCCF as temporary and complementing, not replacing, existing authorities and funding streams. Foreign Military Financing and Section 1206 funding continue to be critical to strengthening the U.S.-Pakistan bilateral relationship over the long-term. Similarly, Coalition Support Funds, which reimburse Pakistan for military operations conducted in support of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, remain vital to sustaining the operational tempo of the nearly 100,000 Pakistani troops deployed in the North West Frontier Province and the FATA.

We also believe we must address the historic imbalance in our funding to Pakistan by increasing non-military forms of assistance. Eliminating terrorist safe-havens and defeating extremist insurgent groups requires us to go beyond military means, and address the root causes of violent extremism. We are firmly committed to taking a “whole of
government” approach, and we strongly support the broad expansion of non-military assistance to Pakistan.

We are hopeful that the Kerry-Lugar bill will provide the needed boost to rule of law and sustainable economic development efforts, with appropriate measures to ensure accountability. Moreover, we also support the establishment of Reconstruction Opportunity Zones in Pakistan and view them as a vehicle to help Pakistan in the development phase of the counterinsurgency process.

Nonetheless, PCCF is vital to the Administration’s strategy. We understand that some in Congress worry that PCCF represents a further encroachment by DoD on the Secretary of State’s authorities. We understand this concern, but do not think that is the case here. As you know, Secretary Gates and I strongly support a “whole of government” approach to complex security issues such as those we face in Pakistan, and that must include building capacity at the State Department. But the threat in Pakistan is urgent, growing, and constantly evolving, and the PCCF offers vital flexibility and resources our commanders will need to adapt our near-term military assistance efforts to the Administration’s new strategy.

The PCCF will align authorities and funding to develop Pakistan’s capability in current counterinsurgency operations with DoD’s responsibility to implement the security portion of the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy, including our own current operations.

All that said, let me emphasize that the PCCF is no panacea. The challenges we face in Pakistan are complex. As we increase the resources we put into counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, we may see an increase in violence and instability in the short run. As in Iraq, things may get worse before they get better.

Given this rapidly changing and complex environment, Mr. Chairman, we oppose rigid conditionality, such as that we see in the proposed H.R. 1886, the “Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement Act of 2009.” While we applaud the goal of increasing accountability, we believe that HR 1886 is too inflexible, especially with regard to the conditions and limits it would place on the equipment we provide to our Pakistani partners. In our view, H.R. 1886 would severely constrain the
Executive Branch and reduce our ability to adapt to the fluid situation on the ground.

We are committed to continuously evaluating our own strengths and weaknesses, as well as those of our Pakistani partners. We support the approach to accountability as set forth in the Biden-Lugar Bill introduced in the last Congress. Independently, the Administration and Defense Department are also in the process of developing robust measures of effectiveness that will allow us—and you—to hold us and our Pakistani partners accountable. These measures of effectiveness will allow us to measure our progress over time, and will inform future decisions on resources, force levels and tactics.

We believe, however, that the measures of effectiveness we use to evaluate our progress must be tightly linked to the President’s strategy for the region, and that such measures of effectiveness are preferable to those that stem from legislation. We understand, Mr. Chairman, the importance of transparency and accountability, and you can feel confident that we will continuously and rigorously evaluate both our own efforts and those of our Pakistani partners. If what we do does not work, Mr. Chairman, we will retool our strategy. The last thing we want to do is continue to pour resources into ineffective programs.

Mr. Chairman, terrorism and insurgency in Pakistan are growing, and threaten regional stability and our national security. But with the proposed PCCF, we believe we can take immediate steps to increase the effectiveness of our partnership with Pakistan’s security forces, something that is vital to defeating terrorism and extremism in the region.

I want to once again thank you and members of the Committee for allowing us this opportunity to testify today. I look forward to your questions and comments.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McHugh, and Distinguished Members of the Committee:

I would like to thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss U.S. security assistance to Pakistan. As I’m sure you can imagine, no other policy priority has consumed more of my attention over the past few years than how the United States can best support the Government of Pakistan in its efforts to combat terrorism and build a moderate, democratic, Muslim nation committed to human rights and the rule of law.

Last month, President Obama announced the new U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, focusing on the strategic importance of Pakistan to the United States and the rest of the world, and the need for increased security, governance and development assistance to this strategy. After 9/11, the core al-Qaeda leadership was ousted from Afghanistan only to find a new refuge along Afghanistan’s shared border with Pakistan. These al-Qaeda terrorists, foreign insurgents and Pakistani militants have taken advantage of the hospitality of the local tribes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and expanded and secured their safe havens in this border area. They now use this space as a base from which to launch attacks in Afghanistan, facilitate the movement of weapons and narcotics, plan operations worldwide, train and recruit followers, and disseminate propaganda. We must work with the Government of Pakistan to close these safe havens to win in Afghanistan.

As al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their allies creep from the Tribal Areas into the provinces of Pakistan, as we have seen them do in Swat and Buner in the Northwest Frontier Province, it is becoming increasingly evident that the Government of Pakistan is at war with a violent minority. Extremists led by Baitullah Mehsud and other al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorists have spread north from North and South Waziristan throughout the Tribal Areas and have built a presence
in Bajaur and Khyber Agencies. Mehsud formed the Tehrik-i-Taliban in Pakistan in December 2007 as a loose alliance of militants, and by 2008, the Tehrik-i-Taliban had become the most public signal of broad local militant coordination aimed at attacking Pakistani security forces. Other extremists use the area as a safe haven and share short-term goals of eliminating the Coalition presence in Afghanistan. They exploit those locals who are sympathetic and coerce other groups to recruit, train, and conduct cross-border raids and bombings in Afghanistan.

The core objective of the President's strategy is to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. To do so, it is clear that we must focus on economic development and strengthening both Pakistan and Afghanistan's nascent democracies. The United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan all understand that there is no military-only solution. However, our success in building institutions, strengthening governance, and ensuring economic growth, hinges on securing Pakistan from the dangers of the spreading al-Qaeda and Taliban insurgency.

Successfully shutting down the safe havens in Pakistan will require consistent and intensive engagement with Pakistan's civilian and military leadership. The Pakistani Army has traditionally been arrayed in a conventional deployment in the east, against India. We must work with Pakistan so that it has the resources and training to recalibrate from its current conventional threat posture to one that addresses the threat emanating from Pakistan's Western frontier. It is vital to strengthen our efforts both to develop and operationally enable Pakistani security forces so they are capable of succeeding in sustained counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in the West.

We anticipate that our cooperation with Pakistan on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency programs will proceed on two tracks: first, improving the ability of Pakistani security forces to defeat and dismantle terrorist groups; and second, extending the reach and legitimacy of the Pakistani government to areas that have essentially become ungoverned spaces, the hold and build portion of the clear, hold, build strategy. On the first track, we will seek to sustain and expand the current training programs for Pakistani military forces, including the Special Service Group, and for the paramilitary Frontier Corps. We will also broaden our assistance to the regular Army to eliminate the sanctuary enjoyed by al-Qaeda and other extremists.
Pakistan currently does not have sufficient capacity to undertake counterinsurgency operations effectively or implement the clear, hold, build strategy that will be required to address the insurgent threat. Given this critical gap and the need to address it, the Administration is requesting a new train and equip authority, the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, that will empower the Combatant Commander, General Petraeus, to address the operational needs in the integrated Afghanistan-Pakistan theatre, similar to authority he already has in Afghanistan through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund. This new authority will complement Foreign Military Financing, the foundation of our security assistance relationship with Pakistan. We believe this new authority is necessary because of the unique and extraordinary nature of the situation in Pakistan, where neither war-time nor peace-time authorities are sufficiently adequate. The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund would be dual-key, requiring Secretary of State concurrence, time-limited to address immediate needs, and is in no way precedent-setting for additional Department of Defense authorities.

We are currently in the last year of a five-year, $3 billion assistance pledge (FY 2005-2009) to Pakistan, which includes $300 million annually in Foreign Military Financing assistance. Our assistance has been used to maintain and modernize Pakistan’s AH-1F Cobra helicopter fleet, which the Pakistan Army uses to provide persistent close air support to Army troops engaged in counterinsurgency operations in the tribal areas; procure tactical radios to allow the Pakistan Army to conduct counterinsurgency operations more effectively; provide mid-life updates to enhance Pakistan’s F-16 fleet to make it a more valuable counterterrorism and counterinsurgency asset for missions along the rugged Afghan-Pakistan border; procure TOW-2A missiles, which are used extensively in the tribal areas in support of Operation Enduring Freedom; and to update and refurbish P-3Cs, which enable Pakistan to participate in Maritime Intercept Operations, which are U.S.-led and supported. A continued robust Foreign Military Financing program is a long-term investment serving as the lynchpin for fostering Pakistan’s institutional capacity so that Pakistan may eventually become fully responsible for its own security and enhanced regional security.

At the request of the Government of Pakistan, we are providing training to Pakistan’s Special Service Group and the paramilitary Frontier Corps operating in the frontier region. Since FY 2006, Pakistan has received approximately $90 million in funding under Section 1206, as amended, of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2006. In Fiscal Year 2008, Pakistan received approximately $53 million and was the largest recipient of Section 1206 funding. Through 1206 money, the United States engaged in projects focused on enhancing
the Pakistan Army Special Services Group’s capability to conduct counterterrorism operations; helicopter maintenance, which would improve the combat readiness of Pakistan’s AH-1F Cobras and Bell 412s in order to conduct and sustain counterterrorism strikes more effectively; and Mi-17 support to the 21st Quick Reaction Squadron.

There is also a separate authorization under Section 1206, as amended, of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2008, to provide up to $25 million in Fiscal Year 2009 to enhance Frontier Corps counterterrorism capabilities through the provision of equipment such as personal soldier equipment, vehicles to help provide medical attention to those wounded in action, and communications equipment to help improve the Frontier Corps command, control, intelligence and surveillance capabilities. In Fiscal Year 2008, $75 million was provided to the Frontier Corps through this same authority to help establish Frontier Corps training centers, raise 12 new Frontier Corps wings (battalion equivalent), and support Border Coordination Centers, which will allow Pakistan’s regular Army to share intelligence and coordinate engagement of enemy targets with the Frontier Corps.

Additionally, we are seeking to expand military-to-military engagement (exchanges and education, offers of training and equipment, exposure to modern counterinsurgency doctrine) with the intent to modernize the Pakistani military’s ability to fight an insurgency and enhance the professionalism and leadership of Pakistan’s current and future military leaders. We must continue to increase Pakistan’s International Military Education Training funding to help build relationships, linkages and understanding between our two militaries. To this end, we anticipate providing Pakistan with more than $2.3 million in Fiscal Year 2009 International Military Education Training funds and hope to continue to expand this program in Fiscal Year 2010. Admiral Mullen is a staunch supporter of IMET and is working with us to gain more spots for Pakistan officers in military staff colleges, as is Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Kayani. In fact, General Kayani was a recent inductee into the International Hall of Fame at the Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, an institution he attended in the 1980s through the International Military Education and Training program. At his induction, General Kayani stated that his time at the Staff College helped him learn a great deal about how the U.S. Army and Armed Forces operate. We must continue to focus on these types of programs which expose Pakistani military officers to the United States and seek to build long-lasting, personal relationships.

Pakistan's military and paramilitary organizations must bear the brunt of the hard fighting needed to clear areas of local and foreign militants and extremists.
who have established safe havens, training grounds, and bases of operation on Pakistani territory. But the long-term solution for holding these areas rests with civilian law enforcement agencies. Current funding is aimed at enhancing the mobility and capacity of Pakistani law enforcement and border security forces operating in the Northwest Frontier Province and the tribal areas. We are currently working to finance a $65 million police training program through the 2009 supplemental, including purchase of additional U.S. Government-owned helicopters, and hope to continue to expand this program in 2010.

We propose to step up our assistance to strengthen police in the most vulnerable areas around Pakistan. The areas of most urgent concern are along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. U.S. programs will include basic law enforcement training; advanced courses for special units; equipment to improve police survivability; construction of modern police posts capable of withstanding attacks by militants; improved communications; investigative and intelligence-gathering skills; and incident management, for example, during post-blast investigations and to learn bomb disposal techniques.

All of our efforts in Pakistan are geared toward creating the vibrant, modern, and democratic state that Pakistanis desire and U.S. policy envisions as a partner in advancing stability and development in a key region of the world. One tool that we are using to achieve this goal is security assistance. However, as the President noted, “We must focus our military assistance on the tools, training and support that Pakistan needs to root out the terrorists.” As the President has stated, “we will not and cannot provide a blank check. Pakistan must demonstrate its commitment to rooting out al Qaeda and the violent extremists within its borders.” Tools to measure the progress made with our assistance may be appropriate, and we look forward to discussing those with Congress.

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for inviting me today. I look forward to taking your questions.