[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEVELOPING RESEARCH PRIORITIES AT
DHS'S SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
DIRECTORATE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 27, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-60
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.science.house.gov
______
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chair
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois RALPH M. HALL, Texas
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California Wisconsin
DAVID WU, Oregon LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
BEN R. LUJAN, New Mexico RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
PAUL D. TONKO, New York BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
JIM MATHESON, Utah BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri PETE OLSON, Texas
BARON P. HILL, Indiana
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
KATHLEEN DAHLKEMPER, Pennsylvania
ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
SUZANNE M. KOSMAS, Florida
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
VACANCY
------
Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation
HON. DAVID WU, Oregon, Chair
DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
BEN R. LUJAN, New Mexico JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
PAUL D. TONKO, New York W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
BART GORDON, Tennessee RALPH M. HALL, Texas
MIKE QUEAR Subcommittee Staff Director
MEGHAN HOUSEWRIGHT Democratic Professional Staff Member
TRAVIS HITE Democratic Professional Staff Member
HOLLY LOGUE Democratic Professional Staff Member
DAN BYERS Republican Professional Staff Member
VICTORIA JOHNSTON Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
October 27, 2009
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative David Wu, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Technology and Innovation, Committee on Science and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 5
Written Statement............................................ 6
Statement by Representative Adrian Smith, Ranking Minority
Member, Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation, Committee on
Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.......... 6
Written Statement............................................ 7
Witnesses:
Mr. Bradley I. Buswell, Acting Under Secretary, Science and
Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS)
Oral Statement............................................... 8
Written Statement............................................ 10
Biography.................................................... 19
Dr. Phil E. Depoy, Vice Chairman, Homeland Security Science and
Technology Advisory Committee (HSSTAC) Assessment Panel
Oral Statement............................................... 19
Written Statement............................................ 21
Biography.................................................... 23
Mr. David J. Berteau, Senior Advisor and Director, Defense-
Industrial Initiatives, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Washington, DC
Oral Statement............................................... 24
Written Statement............................................ 26
Biography.................................................... 28
Dr. Cindy Williams, Chair, Panel on the DHS Science and
Technology Directorate, National Academy of Public
Administration; Shapiro Visiting Professor of International
Affairs, The Elliott School of International Affairs, George
Washington University; Principal Research Scientist, Security
Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Oral Statement............................................... 29
Written Statement............................................ 30
Biography.................................................... 37
Discussion....................................................... 37
Appendix: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Mr. Bradley I. Buswell, Acting Under Secretary, Science and
Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS).......................................................... 50
Dr. Phil E. Depoy, Vice Chairman, Homeland Security Science and
Technology Advisory Committee (HSSTAC) Assessment Panel........ 52
Mr. David J. Berteau, Senior Advisor and Director, Defense-
Industrial Initiatives, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Washington, DC........................................ 53
Dr. Cindy Williams, Chair, Panel on the DHS Science and
Technology Directorate, National Academy of Public
Administration; Shapiro Visiting Professor of International
Affairs, The Elliott School of International Affairs, George
Washington University; Principal Research Scientist, Security
Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology......... 54
DEVELOPING RESEARCH PRIORITIES AT DHS'S SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
DIRECTORATE
----------
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 27, 2009
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation,
Committee on Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:08 p.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. David Wu
[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
hearing charter
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Developing Research Priorities at
DHS's Science and Technology Directorate
tuesday, october 27, 2009
2:00 p.m.-4:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
1. Purpose
On Tuesday, October 27, 2009 the Subcommittee on Technology and
Innovation of the Committee on Science and Technology will hold a
hearing to review activities at the Science and Technology Directorate
of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS S&T).
2. Witnesses
Mr. Brad Buswell is the Acting Under Secretary of the Science and
Technology Directorate at the Department of Homeland Security.
Dr. Phil Depoy is the Chairman of the Homeland Security Science and
Technology Advisory Committee.
Mr. David Berteau is the Senior Adviser and Director of the Defense
Industrial Initiatives Group at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies.
Dr. Cindy Williams is the Chair of the Committee on the DHS Science and
Technology Directorate at the National Academy of Public
Administration. She is also the Shapiro Visiting Professor of
International Affairs at the Elliot School of International Affairs at
George Washington University.
3. Brief Overview
The hearing will have witnesses assess and discuss various elements
of DHS S&T including the strategic planning process, stakeholder
involvement in setting research priorities, and the role of basic
research in the DHS S&T portfolio. Many of the questions posed to
witnesses are ongoing concerns that Members of the Technology and
Innovation Subcommittee have expressed in past hearings. It is the goal
of the Subcommittee to highlight these issues for the benefit of the
incoming Under Secretary of the Science and Technology Directorate.
4. Background
The Department of Homeland Security's research and development
portfolio is concentrated in the Science and Technology Directorate and
the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). With an FY 2010 budget
request of $968 million, DHS S&T is responsible for carrying out
research on behalf of federal homeland security agencies and
coordinating this research with other federal research entities. DNDO
conducts research on the detection of nuclear devices and has a FY 2010
budget request of $366 million.
DHS S&T is currently organized in a matrix style management
structure. There are three research directors that oversee portfolios
containing long-term basic research, shorter-term applied research, and
technology transition. These portfolios stretch across DHS S&T's six
divisions:
Chemical and Biological: detection and mitigation of chemical
and biological weapons threats
Explosives: detection of and response to conventional (non-
nuclear) explosives
Human Factors: social science research to improve detection,
analysis, and understanding of threats posed by individuals as
well as how communities respond to disasters
Infrastructure and Geophysical: identifies and mitigates
threats to critical infrastructure
Border and Maritime: develops technologies for monitoring land
and maritime borders
Command, Control, and Inter-operability: research and
development support for inter-operable communications and cyber
security R&D
5. Issues and Concerns
Science and Technology Directorate Strategic Plan
Witnesses will discuss the methods and criteria used to develop
research and development priorities at DHS S&T and how these may be
improved. Witnesses were asked to discuss the need for a comprehensive
threat assessment accounting for the impact and likelihood of potential
threats. The concern is that the DHS S&T strategic plan does not
provide a justified roadmap for future research, but only describes
ongoing projects. Homeland security experts contend that a true
strategic plan should be grounded in comprehensive threat assessments,
detailed in how research priorities align with the needs of the
customer, and coordinated with the research plans of other federal
research entities.
Integrated Product Teams
There are thirteen Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) in DHS S&T that
provide input into the research plans based on their needs in the
field. The IPT members are almost entirely made up of representatives
from the various operational divisions within DHS (Coast Guard,
Transportation Security Administration, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, etc.). Some examples of the corresponding IPTs include:
First Responder, Border Security, Cyber Security, and People Screening.
In past hearings, the Members of the Technology and Innovation
Subcommittee voiced concerns about the fact that the Nation's local
first responders are a critical recipient of DHS S&T work, but were not
represented in the research planning process. As a result, DHS S&T
formed a First Responder IPT to address the needs of the police,
firefighters, and rescue personnel.
For this hearing, witnesses will assess the IPT process and discuss
whether the IPTs are fulfilling their intended role as vehicles for
stakeholder input in research priorities. There are concerns over
uneven levels of organization, representation, and impact of the IPTs.
Basic Research at the Centers of Excellence
DHS S&T allocates 20 percent of its spending to basic research and
supports twelve university-based Centers of Excellence. The
Subcommittee has asked witnesses to discuss the role of basic research
in the S&T portfolio and how this research is executed at the Centers
of Excellence. Homeland security experts have expressed concern that
the basic research work is not properly integrated into later phases of
DHS S&T's research. There is also concern over how basic research
priorities are set without the guidance of a true strategic plan.
Chairman Wu. This hearing will come to order this
afternoon. I want to welcome everybody to this afternoon's
hearing on the Department of Homeland Security's Science and
Technology Directorate (DHS S&T). Research and development
efforts at the Directorate are critical to supporting not just
the missions of the agencies within DHS, but our country's
first responders all over this Nation and the world. This
subcommittee continues to do all it can to assist the
Directorate in its mission to deliver quality technical
solutions to all of its stakeholders.
In past hearings, this subcommittee has made many
recommendations to the Directorate, and I am very pleased to
see that some of these recommendations have been acted upon. In
response to stakeholder and Subcommittee requests, the
Directorate has added a 13th Integrated Product Team to give
local fire, rescue, and police workers a direct voice in
federal research priorities.
I am also pleased to see that funding for basic research is
now 20 percent of the Directorate's portfolio. As you know,
this subcommittee firmly believes that basic research plays a
critical role in the R&D (research and development) process. By
increasing the presence of basic research at the Directorate,
it has shown a commitment to not only solve today's problems
but also to position itself to meet future challenges.
While there have been many improvements at the Directorate,
I continue to have some concerns. Although the Integrated
Product Teams (IPTs) now include all of the major stakeholders,
there seems to be some inconsistency with how efficiently and
effectively the IPTs operate. I would like to hear from the
witnesses about ways we can ensure that the IPTs are properly
organized to enable the highest levels of collaboration between
the Directorate and its stakeholders.
Finally, there is one area of great concern that has yet to
be addressed by the Directorate. Over the course of multiple
hearings, this subcommittee has expressed concern about the
lack of a comprehensive threat assessment as a foundation for
determining research priorities. The current strategic plan
does little to define the direction of research activities and
is not grounded in a formal threat assessment. I do not find it
acceptable. I think this subcommittee has trouble with the
thought that plans are made without reference to a proper
analysis of threats and the dangers they pose, especially when
considering that we rely on the Directorate's plans to protect
our country from all future threats.
While I am encouraged by progress in many areas of the
Science and Technology Directorate, I am somewhat frustrated at
the lack of such a crucial element in the effectiveness of
almost a $1 billion dollar research enterprise. I am eager to
hear the witnesses' expert opinions on these concerns and
moreover would strongly encourage the incoming Under Secretary
to address these issues with utmost urgency.
And at this point, I would like to recognize my friend and
colleague, the gentleman from Nebraska, for his opening
statement.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Wu follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman David Wu
I want to welcome everyone to this afternoon's hearing on the
Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate.
Research and development efforts at the Directorate are critical to
supporting not just the missions of the agencies within DHS, but our
country's first responders. This subcommittee continues to do all it
can to assist the Directorate in its mission to deliver quality
technical solutions to all stakeholders.
In past hearings, this subcommittee has made many recommendations
to the Directorate and I am very pleased to see that some of these
recommendations have been acted upon. In response to stakeholder and
Subcommittee requests, the Directorate has added a 13th Integrated
Product Team--the First Responder IPT--to give local fire, rescue, and
police workers a direct voice into federal research priorities.
I am also pleased to see that funding for basic research is now 20
percent of the Directorate's portfolio. As you know, this subcommittee
firmly believes that basic research plays a critical role in the R&D
process. By increasing the presence of basic research at the
Directorate, it has shown a commitment to not only solve today's
problems, but position itself to meet future issues head-on.
While there have been many improvements at the Directorate, I
continue to have many concerns. Although the Integrated Product Teams
now include all of the major stakeholders, there seems to be an
inconsistency with how efficiently and effectively the IPTs operate. I
would like to hear from witnesses about ways we can ensure that the IPT
process is properly organized to enable the highest levels of
collaboration amongst the Directorate and its stakeholders.
Finally, there is one area of great concern that has yet to be
addressed by the Directorate. Over the course of multiple hearings,
this subcommittee has expressed the need for a comprehensive threat
assessment to use as a foundation for determining research priorities.
The current strategic plan does little to define the direction of
research activities and is not grounded in any formal threat
assessment. It is unacceptable that plans are made without a proper
analysis of threats and the dangers they pose, especially when
considering that we rely on the Directorate's plans to protect our
country from future threats.
While I am encouraged by progress in many areas of the Science and
Technology Directorate, I am increasingly frustrated at the lack of
such a crucial element to the effectiveness of an almost one billion
dollar research investment. I am eager to hear the witnesses' expert
opinions on these concerns and more, and would strongly encourage the
incoming Under Secretary to address these issues with the utmost
urgency.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this
hearing today to examine the activities of the Department of
Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate.
In 2002, this committee played a key role in shaping the
creation of DHS, specifically calling for the establishment an
S&T Directorate within the new department to fund R&D and
advised the Secretary on S&T related policies.
While agency growing pains always present a challenge, in
the seven years since its creation, the Directorate has
demonstrated respectable progress refining its roles and
responsibilities in instituting a sound organizational
structure and operating processes.
However, one of the critical policy challenges the
Committee recognized in 2002 still remains, development of a
true strategic plan to inform, prioritize and guide the work of
the Directorate.
In one sense, the absence of a strategic plan reflects the
magnitude of the challenge inherent in the Department's
mission. From our transportation and infrastructure to our food
and agricultural system to our land and seaports of entry, just
to name a few, the diversity of potential terrorist threats and
targets to the homeland is certainly endless. This makes the
management and policy issues associated with quantifying and
prioritizing risks and associated S&T activities a monumental
task. But the high degree of difficulty doesn't make it any
less important. Without an effective strategic plan, the
Directorate has no foundation from which to systematically
guide development of priorities and measure performance toward
objectives.
So I hope and expect the Directorate will expedite such a
plan in the coming months. I also look forward to hearing from
the Administration and other witnesses regarding a number of
other, more specific issues which are important to the success
of the Directorate and the Department going forward. Among
these are the evolution of the S&T Directorate's integrated
product teams and the balance of and focus on activities across
the R&D pipeline from basic research to technology development.
I certainly thank the witnesses for taking your time today,
and I do look forward to the discussion. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Adrian Smith
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing today to examine
the activities of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and
Technology (S&T) Directorate. In 2002, this committee played a key role
in shaping the creation of DHS, specifically calling for establishment
of an S&T Directorate within the new department to fund R&D and advise
the Secretary of Homeland Security on S&T-related policies.
While agency ``growing pains'' always present a challenge, in the
seven years since its creation, the S&T Directorate has demonstrated
respectable progress, refining its roles and responsibilities and
instituting a sound organizational structure and operating processes.
However, one of the critical policy challenges the Committee recognized
in 2002 still remains: development of a true strategic plan to inform,
prioritize, and guide the work of the Directorate.
In one sense, the absence of a strategic plan reflects the
magnitude of the challenge inherent in the Department's mission. From
our transportation and infrastructure to our food and agricultural
system to our land and sea ports of entry--to name a few--the diversity
of potential terrorist threats and targets to the homeland is seemingly
endless. This makes the management and policy issues associated with
quantifying and prioritizing risks and associated S&T activities a
monumental task.
But the high degree of difficulty doesn't make it any less
important. Without an effective strategic plan, the Directorate has no
foundation from which to systematically guide development of priorities
and measure performance toward objectives. So I hope and expect the
Directorate will expedite such a plan in the coming months.
I also look forward to hearing from the Administration and other
witnesses regarding a number of other, more specific issues which are
important to the success of the Directorate and the Department going
forward. Among these are the evolution of the S&T Directorate's
Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) and the balance of and focus on
activities across the R&D pipeline, from basic research to technology
development.
I thank the witnesses for being with us today, and I look forward
to a productive discussion.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Smith. If there are
any other Members who wish to submit opening statements, the
statements will be added to the record at this point.
And now I would like to introduce our witnesses for this
afternoon. First, Mr. Brad Buswell is the Acting Under
Secretary of the Science and Technology Directorate at the
Department of Homeland Security. Dr. Phil Depoy is the Chairman
of the Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory
Committee (HSSTAC). Mr. David Berteau is the Senior Advisor and
Director of the Defense Industrial Initiatives Group at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies. And finally,
Dr. Cindy Williams is the Chair of the Panel on the DHS Science
and Technology Directorate of the National Academy of Public
Administration, and she is also the Shapiro Visiting Professor
of International Affairs at the Elliott School of International
Affairs at George Washington University and a principal
research scientist at the Securities Studies Program at MIT.
Each of you will have five minutes for your spoken
testimony. Your written testimony will be included in the
record in their entirety, and when you complete all of your
testimony, we will begin with questions, and each Member will
have five minutes to question the panel.
Mr. Buswell, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF MR. BRADLEY I. BUSWELL, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY,
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY (DHS)
Mr. Buswell. Thank you very much, Chairman Wu, Ranking
Member Smith, and other Members and staff. It is an honor to
appear here before you here today, and it is an honor to appear
with such a distinguished panel. I commend you on the assembly.
I look forward to talking to you today about the progress that
we have made in developing the Science and Technology
Directorate and placing ourselves in a position to provide
advanced technological solutions to protect the American people
and to protect the critical infrastructures that we depend on.
As you said, Mr. Chairman, the Directorate is charged with
providing technical support and tools to the DHS operating
components and as importantly or perhaps even more importantly,
to our nation's first responders, those brave men and women who
are on the front lines of homeland security every day.
Let me just start by saying I am grateful for the strong
leadership of Secretary Napolitano. She has emphasized
consistently the importance of science and technology and
securing our nation and has also repeatedly underscored the
importance of strengthening the relationships with the State,
local, tribal and territorial agencies, and I think S&T is
making significant inroads in that regard, as you mentioned in
your opening statement. Also, I greatly appreciate the
leadership of the Congress and this subcommittee's support. The
informed counsel of both Members and staff has been invaluable
to our efforts to position the Directorate for accountability
and tangible results.
The Subcommittee is familiar with the S&T Directorate's
efforts over the past three years to realign the structure,
portfolio and business operations in an effort to expedite the
delivery of advanced technological solutions to our customers,
and I am pleased to report that that restructuring has been
fully implemented, and we are wholly engaged in responding to
the near- and the long-term technology capability needs of the
components and other customers.
You specifically asked that I address three areas of
interest to the Subcommittee. First of all, our priorities in
developing the research and development portfolio, the role on
the caps on integrated product teams in determining those
priorities, and the role of basic research, both in the overall
S&T portfolio and specifically at the university-based Centers
of Excellence.
The first two are really closely intertwined. The research
and development priorities of the Directorate are primarily
customer driven through our Capstone integrated product teams,
or IPTs. The IPTs provide direct stakeholder input into the
selection and prioritization of our research investments, and
our customers chair those IPTs. So they establish their
capability priorities based on their assessment of risk in the
mission areas for which they are responsible. This gets a
little bit to your point of a comprehensive threat assessment.
We rely on our customers to incorporate the threat as they see
it into their overall risk assessment and identify technology
gaps in a priority way to address those risks.
The customer-driven Capstone IPT process directly drives
about 50 percent of our overall investment, but it also
importantly informs the rest of the portfolio's basic research
and innovation. What we learned from our stakeholders through
the process about their operations and about their future
capability needs help influencing those other investments that
we also make with the innovation and the basic research
portfolio.
For those reasons, all three of the portfolio members,
basic research, innovation and transition, are participants in
the IPT process. As I said, the more insight that we gain, the
better we understand and the better we are positioned to
identify promising areas of research and explore innovative
solutions that are outside the development timeframe or risk
tolerance of the near-term focused IPT process.
While there is room for improvement in any process, I am
pleased with the progress we have made in implementing and
institutionalizing the Capstone IPTs. As you said, I am
especially proud of the addition this year of the 13th Capstone
IPT in support of the first responders. I am happy to provide
more information on that during the Q&A session if you are
interested.
Let me talk quickly about, briefly, the basic research
portfolio. Basic research really fulfills two very important
roles in the S&T Directorate. First, it lays the foundation for
future technology development. It is what we use to keep the
technology pipeline full. We invest in projects that are
addressing capability needs for which we have no near-term
solution or with existing or near-existing technologies or the
solutions are of too high a risk for the customers to be able
to rely on. It also allows us to make investments based on what
science has to offer. So with a small investment, we may be
able to cultivate a promising technology that would yield a
significant life-saving capability.
Secondly, our investment into basic research which is
conducted primarily at our national laboratories and our
university-based Centers of Excellence also serves to develop
the scientific workforce that this country will need to
continue developing scientific understanding and technology in
the homeland security area, specifically as far as we are
concerned but in all areas well into the future.
And given the broad spectrum of science and technology
requirements associated with the Homeland Security mission, we
value our relationship with the Department of Energy (DOE)
National Laboratories and with their renowned interdisciplinary
capabilities as well as the university-based Centers of
Excellence.
Let me conclude by addressing the topic that Congressman
Smith raised about the development of a strategic plan. The
last strategic plan that we published was in June of 2007
following a major reorganization of the Directorate and the
research portfolio. As was appropriate at that time, that plan
was focused on establishing the business practices that were
necessary to make the S&T Directorate relevant to the homeland
security enterprise. Based upon the strategic goals and
objectives that are being identified in the forthcoming
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, we will be updating that
strategic plan over the next few months. And this update will
be more in line with the guidance published by OMB (Office of
Management and Budget) and GAO (Government Accountability
Office) for effective strategic planning.
So again, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for all
you do in support of our mission, and thank you for the
opportunity to meet with you today and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Buswell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bradley I. Buswell
INTRODUCTION
Good afternoon, Chairman Wu, Congressman Smith, and distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee. I am honored to appear before you today to
report on the progress of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS)
Science and Technology Directorate (S&T Directorate) in advancing
technological solutions to protect the American people and the critical
infrastructures our society depends upon.
The S&T Directorate is charged with providing technical support and
tools to the major DHS operating components and to our nation's first
responders--the brave men and women who routinely face risk on the
front lines of homeland security. I appreciate the Subcommittee's
support of the S&T Directorate as it continues to mature and grow in
areas critical to our mission of enabling technology applications to
address critical gaps in homeland security. Toward this end, the
Directorate provides technical support and tools to the major DHS
operating components, and to our Nation's first responders--the brave
men and women who routinely face risk on the front lines of homeland
security.
I am very grateful for the strong leadership of Secretary
Napolitano, who not only has emphasized the importance of science and
technology in securing our nation, but has also repeatedly underscored
the importance of strengthening relationships with State, local, tribal
and territorial agencies--an area where the S&T Directorate continues
to make significant inroads.
I greatly appreciate the Subcommittee's support of the S&T
Directorate as it pursues its mission. I appreciate the leadership
Congress has shown in supporting the S&T Directorate's endeavors. I am
thankful for the engaged and non-partisan nature of our relationship.
Our collaboration with both Congressional Members and their staffs has
been invaluable to the Department's efforts to position the S&T
Directorate for accountability, tangible results, and success.
The Subcommittee is familiar with the S&T Directorate's efforts
over the past three years to realign its structure, research portfolio,
and business operations in an effort to expedite the delivery of
advanced technological solutions to our customers. I am pleased to
report that the restructuring plan has been fully and successfully
implemented. The S&T Directorate is now wholly engaged in responding to
the near- and long-term technological capability needs of the DHS
components and their customers.
This testimony will primarily address three areas of interest
expressed by the Subcommittee: the S&T Directorate's research and
development (R&D) priorities and planning; the role of Capstone
Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) in determining research priorities; and
the role of basic research, both in the overall S&T research portfolio
and specifically at the Homeland Security Centers of Excellence. I will
also discuss some of the S&T Directorate's recent accomplishments and
ongoing activities in these and other significant areas.
S&T DIRECTORATE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES AND PLANNING
The research and development priorities of the S&T Directorate are
primarily customer-driven through our Capstone IPTs, a process
described in detail later in this testimony. The customers and
stakeholders in this iterative process play an important role in the
informing the S&T Directorate's decisions about its research and
development investments.
The S&T Directorate's Basic Research projects are initiated in one
of two ways. First, DHS components can express a technological need for
which we have no near-term solutions with existing or near-existing
technologies. Second, Basic Research projects may also originate from
what science has to offer. With a small investment, DHS can help
cultivate a promising technology that could ultimately yield a
significant life-saving capability.
The S&T Directorate last published a Strategic Plan in June 2007.
This plan focused on establishing the business practices by which the
S&T Directorate would address the research and development needs of the
homeland security enterprise. Based upon the forthcoming Quadrennial
Homeland Security Review, we will be updating our strategic plan to
support the strategic goals and objectives determined by the Review.
This update will be in accordance with the guidance outlined in the OMB
Circular A-11, Part 6.
The S&T Strategic Plan is a separate document from the National
Homeland Security Science and Technology Strategy that the S&T
Directorate is developing as directed by the Homeland Security Act of
2002, Section 302(2), which states that the Secretary of Homeland
Security, through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, shall
develop ``in consultation with other appropriate executive agencies, a
national policy and strategic plan for, identifying priorities, goals,
objectives and policies for, and coordinating the Federal Government's
civilian efforts to identify and develop countermeasures to chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and other emerging terrorist
threats, including the development of comprehensive, research-based
definable goals for such efforts and development of annual measurable
objectives and specific targets to accomplish and evaluate the goals
for such efforts.''
The S&T Directorate's 2008 report, ``Coordination of Homeland
Security Science and Technology,'' was an important step toward
establishing a national strategy. The report laid out the role and
responsibilities of federal agencies as well as the initiatives
underway to counter threats to homeland security. The S&T Directorate
is currently revising this 2008 effort in conjunction with the QHSR.
Strategic Coordination: External and Internal
The S&T Directorate's Strategic Plan provides the business
framework that S&T uses to carry out its mission. A key aspect of the
plan involves formal efforts to coordinate homeland security research
and development with other federal agencies and the private sector.
This coordination is extensive--for example, the S&T Directorate has 30
chairs and members of relevant National Science and Technology Council
committees, subcommittees, and working groups.
Through the use of formal processes, the S&T Directorate limits
unnecessary duplication of effort and leverages the valuable skills,
experience and resources of other government agencies and the private
sector. These formal processes include participation in interagency
groups that work to coordinate research and development across Federal,
State, local and tribal governments and in the private sector.
Inputs from the S&T Directorate's interagency and private sector
coordination efforts are reflected in the Directorate's 2008-2013 Five-
Year Research and Development Plan, which lays out the blueprint for
its investment portfolio and outlines the S&T Directorate's research
emphasis, programs, and key milestones.
The following table provides examples of participation by S&T
Directorate divisions and offices in formal interagency coordination
groups.
In addition, the S&T Directorate facilitates coordination with
customers and technology providers across its divisions and offices.
For example:
The S&T Directorate's Transition Office coordinates
with all S&T divisions to minimize duplication and ensure that
the S&T Directorate is leveraging technology available in both
the government and private sectors. The Transition Office
facilitates 13 customer-led Capstone Integrated Product Teams
(IPTs) to ensure visibility into customers' capability gaps and
technology needs. Two formal Capstone IPT reviews are conducted
each year to provide customer visibility into the S&T
Directorate's cross-functional programs and facilitate
discussion on available DHS-external technologies/capabilities.
S&T has an Interagency and First Responder Program
Division (IAD) to leverage other government research and
development efforts. IAD coordinates closely with the
Transition Office and participates in the Capstone IPT reviews.
With knowledge of customer technology needs identified through
the Capstone IPT process, IAD coordinates with other government
entities to explore and/or leverage alternative technologies
available through other government entities.
S&T's Commercialization Office is responsible for the
identification, evaluation and rapid commercialization of
technology directly from the private sector to meet the
operational requirements of our customers. Since the
Commercialization Office is part of the Transition effort, they
have firsthand knowledge of customer technology needs
identified through the Capstone IPT process and the supporting
S&T Directorate efforts. The Commercialization Office works
closely with S&T divisions to ensure there is no duplication of
effort and that S&T Directorate efforts are focused only in
areas where no rapid commercialization solution exists.
The 1401 Technology Transfer Program, which is also
housed in the Transition Office, identifies and transfers DOD
technology, items and equipment of use to the federal, State,
tribal, territorial and local first responder community. This
program strengthens coordination.
International Research Coordination
In accordance with Title 6, United States Code, Section 195c
(``Promoting anti-terrorism through international cooperation
program''), the S&T Directorate's International Cooperative Programs
Office facilitates and supports international cooperative activity
through mechanisms such as formal agreements with nine partner nations:
Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, Singapore, Sweden, Mexico,
Israel, France, and Germany. Under these agreements, the S&T
Directorate is conducting coordinated and joint research projects,
technical demonstrations, scientific workshops, and exchanges of
scientific and technological information.
Through its academic grant program for International Research in
Homeland Security Mission Areas, the S&T Directorate has sponsored 22
international research efforts since 2007. These efforts involve
cooperation between U.S. academic institutions and those in each of the
S&T Directorate's nine formal partners as well as Italy, Kenya, and
Peru.
Each of these projects requires the participation of at least one
U.S. and one foreign institution. To ensure relevance to DHS and S&T
Directorate requirements, these institutions coordinate directly with
S&T's technical divisions and, as appropriate, with customers.
Customers include U.S. Customs and Border Protection (for tunnel
detection), the Transportation Security Administration (for protection
of mass transit infrastructure), and the U.S. Coast Guard (for improved
maritime surveillance using teams of unmanned aerial vehicles).
During the past year, the S&T Directorate conducted numerous
successful proofs-of-concept. One proof-of-concept, in cooperation with
Australia, involved an entirely new form of blast-resistant glass. With
Mexico, the S&T Directorate developed novel approaches to determine
hurricane intensity using underwater acoustic sensors. The S&T
Directorate also worked with Canada on a proof-of-concept for detection
of clandestine tunnels using seismic waves.
ROLE OF INTEGRATED PRODUCT TEAMS IN DETERMINING PRIORITIES
The Capstone Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) are designed to, and
have proven to fulfill, their intended purpose of providing direct
stakeholder input into S&T Directorate research investments. The
customer-driven Capstone IPT process informs research across the entire
S&T Directorate and directly guides approximately 50 percent of our
investment. DHS customers chair the Capstone IPTs and establish their
desired capability priorities based on their assessment of risk in the
mission areas for which they are responsible.
Within the S&T Directorate's Transition portfolio, the stakeholders
directly drive investment based upon their needs and solutions
recommended by the S&T Directorate. In addition, what we learn from our
stakeholders about their operations and future capability gaps helps
influence our own investment decisions in our longer-range Basic
Research and Innovation/Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects
Agency (HSARPA) portfolios. The more insight we gain regarding current
and future threats and the capability gaps of our stakeholders, the
better positioned we are to identify promising areas of research and
explore innovative solutions that are outside the development timeframe
for the nearer-term-focused Transition portfolio.
Within the S&T Directorate, we need to continue our efforts to put
stakeholders at the head of the table--they are the experts on their
operations and capability gap priorities. We also need to continue to
mature our internal processes for delivering the technology to our
stakeholders. This includes developing program manager tools, the
execution of Technology Transition Agreements to ensure we are
synchronized with the end-users, and continued dialogue with
stakeholders to ensure that the S&T Directorate's effort remains
aligned to their needs.
Externally, the S&T Directorate needs to work with the stakeholders
to develop a more uniform methodology across DHS for identifying and
prioritizing capability gaps. We will work with stakeholders to arrive
at a consistent, analytic approach to identifying capability gaps and
developing operational requirements documents. This will help further
ensure that our scientists and technologists develop solutions that
meet the highest-priority needs of the stakeholders.
All three S&T portfolios participate in the IPT process. While the
IPT members drive the selection of Transition projects, the needs
expressed at the IPTs also inform the selection of projects in our
Basic Research portfolio and similarly inform the higher-risk/high pay-
off initiatives undertaken by our Innovation/HSARPA portfolio.
IPT Example: Working Group Deliberations Inform First Responder IPT
The First Responder Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation
(RDT&E) Working Group is composed of 38 voting positions that encompass
major first responder associations and practitioners that include
firefighters, emergency managers, law enforcement officers and
emergency medical services providers. The Working Group practitioners
represent State, local and tribal first responders from across the
country. The S&T Directorate is seeking a territorial representative to
ensure the full complement of governmental voices is represented.
The First Responder RDT&E Working Group convened most recently at
the S&T Directorate offices on September 22, 2009. Members of the DHS
First Responder Integrated Product Team were invited to observe and
contribute to the Working Group deliberations.
During the meeting, the Working Group identified four major cross-
cutting capability gaps that were deemed to affect all first responder
disciplines while Working Group subgroups identified sector-specific
capability gaps. For example, major cross-cutting capability gaps were
identified as the lack of a standard common operating platform to link
communication and data systems across the country; improved respiratory
safety/protection; and the need for better tools for end-to-end
incident management.
The Working Group has completed its initial task of identifying
current capability gaps. Next, its members will develop detailed
operational requirements to ensure the gaps are clearly defined. The
First Responder IPT will meet as well to prioritize the capability gaps
and begin to review potential RDT&E programs designed to solve existing
problems and field solutions.
The overarching goal of the First Responder IPT is to use the
process to close the capability gaps that exist in this community by
putting viable solutions into the hands of our responders.
S&T's IPT process is new to the first responder community. Members
of the First Responder RDT&E Working Group have expressed support for
the process and a willingness to help the S&T Directorate develop it in
the first responder community. The process will mature as the IPT, the
S&T Directorate and the Working Group continue our collaboration to
refine identified capability gaps and develop concrete operational
requirements to drive new science and technology development or
applications.
ROLE OF BASIC RESEARCH: CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE AND DHS S&T
In September 2009, the S&T Directorate issued its Basic Research
Strategy to guide long-term homeland security research investments.
This will inform the development of the next iteration of the S&T
Directorate Strategic Plan.
The overall basic research vision for the S&T Directorate is:
Developing and accessing an internationally recognized
scientific workforce creating new knowledge and scientific
understanding in focus areas of enduring relevance to the
homeland security enterprise.
Given the broad spectrum of science and technology requirements
associated with the homeland security mission, the Department of Energy
(DOE) National Laboratories provide unique, renowned interdisciplinary
capabilities, as well as world-class research facilities. In FY 2009,
eight DHS components and offices, including S&T, utilized the DOE
National Laboratories and the in-house S&T labs for homeland security-
related research and development as well as technology transition. This
R&D includes developing advanced screening and detection technologies;
designing multi-scale and simulation capabilities in the event of a
biological attack or a disease outbreak; and designing resilient
electrical grid technologies to ensure better protection of our
nation's critical infrastructures. We anticipate the continued use of
the DOE laboratories to address the cross-cutting, long-term basic
research challenges of the S&T mission.
In addition to our laboratories, the S&T Directorate sponsors 11
university Centers of Excellence (COE). While these COEs are managed by
our Office of University Programs, the key to their success has been
the close involvement with each of the S&T Directorate's six divisions.
Through their active engagement in the selection and management of the
COEs, divisions are well positioned to ensure that their research
initiatives are closely aligned with the S&T Directorate's overall
research strategy.
DHS S&T-Sponsored Research at the COEs: From Research to Reality
The DHS COEs, with over 350 current projects, deliver results along
the entire research and development spectrum, from basic research
results published in prestigious scientific journals to practical
research-driven tools that DHS components and local and State first
responders are already using. Even looking at a single COE program
proves the benefit of this cost-effective model. For example, a single
project at the National Center for Food Protection and Defense
identified the source of a Salmonella St. Paul outbreak as jalapeno
peppers from Mexico, and may have saved Florida tomato growers up to
the equivalent of six years of S&T's COE budget.
Now five years old, the COEs are increasingly producing usable
results for S&T Directorate customers. As evidence, the COEs have
generated over $50 million in additional funds for customer-directed
research. As planned by the S&T Directorate, the COEs are well on their
way to being self-sufficient within a decade. The COE customer base has
grown rapidly over the last couple of years--so rapidly, in fact, that
we have had to develop more efficient financial mechanisms for our
customers to access the COEs expertise, facilities and products.
Additionally, now that some of the COE projects are ready, we are
piloting ``research-to-reality'' university research transition
approaches in several law enforcement venues. These approaches will
disseminate applicable research results to many law enforcement
agencies. Below is a sampling of the S&T Directorate's successful
transition of COE results to our federal, State and local partners.
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism (START) (University of Maryland)
START developed the Global Terrorism Database (GTD),
the most comprehensive unclassified database on terrorist
events in the world. The GTD includes more than 80,000 events
stretching from 1970 through 2007 and is continuously being
updated. START has provided GTD data and access on request to
several different offices within DHS alone (e.g., S&T Human
Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division, Office of Intelligence
and Analysis and the Transportation Security Administration).
START is studying how communities can enhance their
resilience to a potential terrorist threat in the United States
through two additional products: (1) the Community Assessment
of Resilience Tool (CART), which is a tool for communities to
conduct self-assessments on core components of community
resilience; and (2) the Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI)--a
county-level mapping of the United States and its
infrastructure and potential vulnerabilities to all types of
catastrophic events. Local planners throughout the country are
using CART and SoVI to set priorities for enhancing resilience.
Command, Control and Inter-operability (CCI) COE (Rutgers and Purdue
universities)
The CCI COE has transitioned several visual and data
analytics technologies to end-users in partnership with the
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, START and a vendor
partner. This COE-led team developed and deployed law
enforcement information analysis tools to the Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey Police Department, enabling analysis of
crime incident data in conjunction with other sources,
including START's GTD. A similar visual and data analytics
system is being deployed to the New Jersey State Police.
The Command, Control and Inter-operability Division's
``Research to Reality'' technology transition model, which
engages directly with industry partners to commercialize
research results, is bringing visual and data analytics
technologies to a wider group of law enforcement agencies. The
specific technologies involved are known as LEIF (Law
Enforcement Information Framework) and FADE (Fused Analytic
Desktop Environment). Both involve upgraded features first made
available in the ComStat II application developed specifically
for the Port Authority and described directly above. The
agencies include the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey,
San Diego's Automated Regional Justice Information System, the
Seattle area police departments, the New Jersey State Police,
and the Lehigh Valley (PA) Police. New efforts are being
initiated with in the Baltimore-Washington area including the
Maryland State Police, Baltimore County Police, Baltimore City
Police and several other agencies in the region.
Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease (FAZD) COE (Texas A&M University)
and the National Center for Food Protection and
Defense (NCFPD) (University of Southern
Mississippi)
These two COEs develop, advance and share customizable technologies
with DHS and customers working to protect our food and agriculture
lifelines.
FAZD worked with the CCI COE to develop the Dynamic
Preparedness System (DPS) and Biosurveillance Common Operating
Picture (BCOP) technologies that will serve as decision support
tools for incident commanders for health emergencies across the
country. DPS and BCOP also act as customizable training
programs for users. Following rigorous testing, the DHS
National Biological Information Center is transitioning BCOP
into an operational environment where it will provide critical
and up-to-date health emergency information to thousands of
DHS' federal, State and local partners, hospitals and medical
and veterinary practitioners.
FAZD's Rift Valley Fever candidate vaccine, derived
from the MP12 antigen developed for human use, is currently
moving to commercial production trials in sheep. This product
is being enhanced in further research with a genetic marker
that allows the immunity resulting from vaccination to be
distinguished from that associated with active disease, thereby
allowing immunized animals to safely move through interstate
commerce.
NCFPD has established itself as a nationally and
internationally renowned R&D center for food protection and
defense. The Center is developing expertise and tools to
identify and reduce vulnerabilities to the Nation's food system
from terrorist or natural causes.
NCFPD has provided over 25 congressional testimonies,
responded to over 700 requests for assistance or advice from
DHS, Federal, State and local government agencies, and
matriculated over 100 students in relevant disciplines.
NCFPD's FoodShield is a research-based communication-
sharing portal for use by DHS, FDA, and USDA during food
related incidents. FoodShield is linking agencies to improve
communication during food events, and enabling all levels of
government to share resources during food recall and response
events.
NCFPD's and BT Safety's Consequence Management System
(CMS) serves as an integrative tool across the breadth of NCFPD
projects to provide an advanced visual model for predicting,
tracking, and assessing the public health and economic impact
of a catastrophic food system incident.
NCFPD has provided expert advice to both food
importing and exporting nations in order to keep commerce
moving and food supplies safe. The Center is working with
Chinese officials to restructure the country's food export
system and with Chilean officials to obtain data on production
chain models. NCFPD hosted an exercise on food supply
protection for G8 nation participants from Japan, Canada,
France Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. The
exercise aimed to strengthen coordination, cooperation, and
communication between G8 nations in the event of an intentional
contamination of the food supply.
Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE) COE
(University of Southern California)
The HS-ANALISER (Homeland Security-Analytical,
Modeling, Integrated and Secured Environment and Repository) is
a software tool for policy decision-makers and risk analysts.
Assistant for Randomized Monitoring Over Routes
(ARMOR) software provides a methodology and tool for creating
randomized plans and schedules for monitoring, inspecting, and
patrolling, so that even if an attacker observes the plans,
they cannot predict its progression, thus providing risk
reduction via deterrence while guaranteeing a specified level
of protection quality. ARMOR was deployed at the Los Angeles
International Airport (LAX) in August 2007 to randomize
checkpoint deployment and canine unit allocation. Police
officers attending the six-month evaluation of ARMOR declared
it a success, leading to its permanent deployment at LAX.
In coordination with the S&T Command, Control and
Inter-operability Division and the Federal Air Marshal Service
(FAMS), CREATE developed the Intelligent Randomization in
Scheduling (IRIS) software which builds upon the ARMOR concept
and was adapted for use in the FAMS operational domain. Drawing
upon the principles of game theory, which analyzes behavioral
decisions, IRIS will systematically prevent observers from
recognizing patterns in FAMS security procedures--with a goal
of interrupting terrorist planning cycles. IRIS allows for
randomization of international flight coverage while limiting
or eliminating predictability and will place FAMs in locations
where they will prove most effective. IRIS was transitioned to
the FAMS in September 2009 and is being operationally tested on
a select subset of international flights. An additional
adaptation of the ARMOR program, called GUARDS, is being
piloted by TSA in the coming weeks.
CONCLUSION
I am pleased to report that the Science and Technology Directorate
has made significant strides during the past year in establishing our
research priorities and enabling technological capabilities for those
on the front lines of homeland security.
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for all you do in support of
our mission. I thank you for the opportunity to meet with you today,
and I look forward to answering your questions.
Biography for Bradley I. Buswell
A native of Durango, Colorado and a graduate of the United States
Naval Academy, Bradley Buswell is a retired submarine officer who has
served in numerous posts at sea and in Washington, DC.
His Washington assignments have included serving as Congressional
Liaison for Navy Research and Development Programs in the Navy Office
of Legislative Affairs; Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations for
Force Transformation; and Executive Assistant to the Chief of Naval
Research, among other positions on the Navy staff.
Mr. Buswell joined the private sector following his retirement from
the U.S. Navy, working for General Electric as Manager of Government
Relations for GE Global Research in Washington, DC.
He joined the Department of Homeland Security's Science &
Technology Directorate in October 2006.
Mr. Buswell holds a Bachelors of Science in Systems Engineering
from the U.S. Naval Academy and a Masters of Business Administration
from The George Washington University.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Buswell. Dr. Depoy,
please proceed.
STATEMENT OF DR. PHIL E. DEPOY, VICE CHAIRMAN, HOMELAND
SECURITY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE (HSSTAC)
ASSESSMENT PANEL
Dr. Depoy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Smith. In 2008,
HSSTAC, as we call the Homeland Security Science and Technology
Advisory Committee--I don't know how that pronunciation comes
from that acronym--but established an assessment panel in
response to tasking from the Under Secretary, and in the
initial tasking, the panel was asked to review the S&T
programs, especially as related to the successful transition of
technologies into the ultimate user communities.
Consequently, the panel concentrated its review on the S&T
transition projects and the newly introduced Capstone IPT
structure for management of these efforts. The panel completed
its review in the fall of 2008 and published its findings in a
report to the Under Secretary. Briefly, the panel concluded
among other things that during the previous two years, the S&T
Directorate had done a very commendable job of providing
structure and direction, had developed processes to define and
collect capability gaps, and established an organization to
enable a customer interface, that is, the Capstone IPT
structure.
The panel also commended the Directorate for the expansion
of the University Centers of Excellence Program which performs
basic research and trains students in research areas of
interest to Homeland Security.
Among its findings, the panel reported that although DHS
S&T had promulgated a strategy in 2007, it was very broad and
was not adequate for establishing priorities among the many
projects and programs within the S&T Directorate. The Capstone
IPT structure had made improvements but was still immature and
untested, and at that time only one IPT, the chem bio IPT had
actually completed the entire cycle of the process. Contact
with first responders was very limited among the S&T projects.
Further integration of the university Centers of Excellence
into the overall work of S&T was inconsistent among the
divisions, and the Directorate had only made a limited review
of the legacy projects, that is, projects that were initiated
before the Capstone IPT structure was adopted. They had not
made reviews to ensure that they were still relevant and still
had a customer.
After the completion of the initial review, the panel was
tasked to conduct a broader review of the Directorate's
programs to include basic and applied research and to again
examine the IPT process since another cycle of collection,
prioritization and funding had occurred after the first review
was completed. The panel has not completed its work on this
tasking, so the remainder of my observations are not the
observations of the panel but my own opinions based on our
discussions with many members of the Directorate, customers
within the operating components of DHS, and some scientists in
other agencies who have been members of working groups
supporting these IPTs.
In the year between our two reviews, very significant
progress was made in the Directorate. The Centers of Excellence
were aligned with divisions within the Directorate and are now
kept much better informed as to the existing projects and
issues. And as stated, the 13th Capstone IPT was established to
bring first responders into the system. A systems engineering
FFRDC (Federally Funded Research and Development Centers) was
added to the Directorate which will be a great asset in the
determination of requirements, system design and in development
testing and evaluation. And all the Capstone IPTs have
completed at least one complete cycle of the process at this
time and have made a lot of recommendations for further
improvements.
It is my opinion that first there is continued strong
support for the Capstone IPT structure, both within the
Directorate and among most of the IPT customers. However, there
are still significant differences in processes for the
prioritization of capability gaps among the IPTs and even among
different working groups within each IPT. The lack of an
adequate S&T strategy results in each working group making its
own rules for determining the relative importance of capability
gaps.
Secondly, although the major advantage of the IPT structure
is that it brings customers into the process, some of the
customers still do not fully understand their roles in the
prioritization of the gaps.
And third, one of the major irritants for customers is the
continued existence of legacy projects. These projects consume
a significant fraction of the resources allocated to the IPTs.
The panel was given an estimate of 30 to 40 percent of the
total resources, and they are not part of the annual
prioritization process. The Acting Under Secretary has recently
tasked the panel to add a review of these legacy projects to
its current tasking.
And finally, it is my opinion that the Capstone IPT
structure and processes have resulted in major improvements in
the work of the Directorate, and further improvements will be
made as the structure and processes are refined.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Depoy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Phil E. DePoy
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. My
name is Phil DePoy, and I have been a member of the Homeland Security
Science and Technology Advisory Committee (HSSTAC) since August 2007.
In 2008, the HSSTAC established an Assessment Panel in response to
tasking from the DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology (S&T),
and I was appointed as the Vice Chairman of the Panel. In the initial
tasking, the Panel was asked to review the DHS S&T programs, especially
as related to the successful transition of technologies into the
ultimate user community. Consequently, the Panel concentrated its
review on the S&T transition projects and the newly introduced Capstone
Integrated Process Team (IPT) structure for management of these
efforts.
The Panel completed its review in the fall of 2008 and published
its findings in a HSSTAC report (``Program Assessment--1'' of 1
December 2008). Briefly, the Panel concluded that during the previous
two years the S&T Directorate had done a commendable job of
-- Improving morale
-- Providing structure and direction
-- Developing processes to define and prioritize capability
gaps
-- Establishing organizations and methodologies for customer
interface, principally by adopting the Capstone IPT structure
-- Expanding basic research through the establishment of
University Centers of Excellence (COE)
-- Creating international outreach and
-- Improving relationships with Congress.
Among its findings, the Panel also reported that:
-- Although DHS S&T had promulgated a strategy, it was very
broad and was not adequate for establishing priorities among
the many projects and programs within the S&T Directorate.
-- The Capstone IPT structure had made improvements but was
still immature and untested.
-- Contact with first responders was very uneven among the S&T
Divisions.
-- DHS S&T did not have adequate systems engineering or
Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) capabilities and had
no Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) capability.
-- Integration of the University Centers of Excellence into
the overall work of S&T was inconsistent.
-- The Directorate had made only limited reviews of legacy
projects (i.e., projects that were initiated before the
Capstone IPT structure was adopted) to ensure that they were
still relevant and had a customer.
After the completion of the initial review, the Panel was tasked to
conduct a broader review of the Directorate's projects, to include
basic and applied research, and to again examine the IPT process since
another cycle of collection of capability gaps, prioritization, and
funding had occurred after the first review was completed. The Panel
has completed about half the work on this tasking, so the remainder of
my observations are not the observations of the Panel, but are my own
opinions based on our discussions with many members of the S&T
Directorate, customers within the operating components of DHS, and some
scientists in other agencies who have been members of working groups
supporting the IPTs.
Prioritization Process: There is continuing strong support for
the Capstone IPT structure, both within the Directorate and
among most of the IPT customers. However, there does not appear
to be convergence on the standardization of processes for the
definition or prioritization of capability gaps among the IPTs.
Prioritization is obviously a very difficult process,
especially in those IPTs which are large and have a long list
of capability gaps to be considered. In most cases, this
process is carried out by working groups, and it is not clear
that some of the working group members have the experience or
vision to determine priorities. The lack of an overall S&T
strategy results in each IPT forming its own rules for
determining the relative importance of capability gaps. At this
time, there appears to have been only limited consideration
given to prioritization across IPTs.
Customers' Role: Although the major advantage of the IPT
structure is that it brings customers into the process, many of
the customers do not fully understand their roles. Some
customers feel that they do not have any control over
prioritization of capability gaps and that they have to accept
the priorities established by the working groups. Obviously,
the establishment of priorities should be one of the major
roles of customers.
Legacy Projects: One of the major irritants for customers, as
well as for many members of the S&T Directorate, is the
continued existence of legacy projects. These projects consume
a significant fraction of the resources allocated to the IPTs
(the Panel was given an estimate of 30 to 40 percent), and they
are not part of the annual prioritization process. One working
group participant offered the opinion that twenty percent of
the projects in the transition portfolio ``relate to things we
would like to know as opposed to things we need'' and further
stated that in their opinion, many of those ``are not
knowable.''
Centers of Excellence: Obviously, the early strategy of the
Directorate was, first, to fund technologies that could be
transitioned rapidly into the hands of responders, and
secondly, to create University Centers of Excellence, not only
to perform basic research but also to train students in areas
that were important to DHS. This strategy has created a
`valley' between basic research and transition projects, and
fewer resources are being allocated to applied research than is
desirable in the longer-term. Although the Panel has not
reached a definite conclusion, it appears that some of the
transition projects might have benefited from more applied
research before the transition decision was made.
Requirements Process: Partially due to the lack of direct
communication with responders, the requirements and
specifications for some transition projects are considered by
many to be inadequate. The establishment of requirements and
specifications is very difficult (e.g., DOD has tried many
techniques for the determination of requirements over many
decades and has never found the perfect solution), but it is so
critical that it deserves more study. The Panel was told that
the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) has developed a
field panel of users to assist in the determination of
specifications for their programs. This approach should be
investigated further for possible DHS S&T application.
Since the first review was completed in 2008, it appears that
interaction between the Centers of Excellence and the S&T Divisions has
improved a great deal. The Centers were aligned with the Divisions,
i.e., each Division was given the responsibility to communicate with
one or more of the Centers. It is important that there be good
communications, not to over-control the work of the COEs, but to keep
the COEs informed of areas in which new technologies are needed.
Overall, it is my opinion that the adoption of the Capstone IPT
structure within the S&T Directorate has been very beneficial,
principally by bringing the customers from the operating components
into the decision processes. Although the IPT processes are still
immature, they are improving rapidly. In the year between the two
HSSTAC Panel reviews, there was very noticeable improvement. A
thirteenth Capstone IPT was established to bring first responders into
the S&T system, a deficiency reported in the Panel's first review. A
systems engineering FFRDC was added to the S&T Directorate, which will
be a great asset in the determination of requirements, in the design of
systems and systems-of-systems, and in Development Testing and
Evaluation. The Centers of Excellence were aligned with the Divisions
within S&T, and already the communications have improved markedly. All
the Capstone IPTs have completed one complete cycle of the process and
one IPT (Chem/Bio) has completed two cycles, so there have been many
recommendations for improving the processes for the determination of
capability gaps, prioritization of the gaps, and the improvement of
communications among the projects, divisions, and customers.
In response to the Chairman's specific questions:
Discuss the methods and criteria used to develop research and
development priorities at DHS S&T and how these may be improved. How
should comprehensive threat assessments help set research and
development priorities and does DHS S&T utilize this resource? Does DHS
S&T coordinate its research and development strategic plan with other
federal research entities and private industry?
We have not completed our review, and I can provide only partial
responses to these questions. It appears that each IPT uses a somewhat
different process to develop priorities. For the most part, the
priorities are established by working groups with participation by
members from S&T, the operating components of DHS, and other agencies.
As the Capstone IPT process matures, I expect that the process will be
more standardized among divisions. Certainly, the development of an
overall S&T strategy would be a major improvement to this process.
I cannot respond to the question of whether all the Capstone IPTs
utilize comprehensive threat assessments in establishing priorities.
Threat assessment should obviously play a role in setting priorities,
but since the Panel has not yet met with the working groups, we do not
know how each working group assigns priorities to the individual
capability gaps. In some of the S&T Divisions, we have seen excellent
coordination with other agencies. The Chem/Bio Division, for example,
holds an annual three-day meeting in which they review all their
projects with stakeholders from many agencies.
Are the IPTs fulfilling their intended role as vehicles for stakeholder
input in research priorities? If not, what are the barriers keeping the
IPTs from operating at their full potential?
I do not believe that the stakeholders have yet achieved their
intended role, but based on the progress within the past year, I
believe that they will be able to acquire this role in the near future.
I believe the major barriers are the lack of a strategy and the
continued existence of legacy projects, which consume a significant
part of the resources. If an S&T strategy is developed, I would hope
that the stakeholders play a major role in its evolution.
What role does basic research currently play in the DHS S&T portfolio?
What is the role of the Centers of Excellence in performing this
research? Ideally, how should basic research and the Centers of
Excellence be integrated into the research portfolio and strategic
plan?
It is gratifying to see that basic research is a significant part
of the DHS S&T portfolio. As you are aware, there must be a delicate
balance between basic research and research involved with the
transition of programs. On one hand, it is easy to absorb the basic
research resources into the later development processes. On the other
hand, the basic researchers need to know the areas in which new
technologies are needed. On our first review, the Panel felt that the
Centers of Excellence were too isolated from the Divisions. With the
recent changes, it appears that the Centers are receiving more
information from the Divisions, but it is probably too early to
determine if they are in a reasonable balance.
Biography for Phil E. DePoy
Dr. Phil E. DePoy retired from the Naval Postgraduate School in
2005, where he served as the founding director of the Meyer Institute
of Systems Engineering. From 1992 to 2000, Dr. DePoy was the President
and CEO of the National Opinion Research Center at the University of
Chicago. From 1959 to 1992, he was employed by the Center for Naval
Analyses (CNA) and its predecessor organization, the M.I.T. Operations
Evaluation Group. He held many positions at CNA including President and
CEO from 1984 to 1990.
Dr. DePoy holds a BS degree in Chemical Engineering from Purdue
University, an MS degree in Nuclear Engineering from M.I.T., and a
Ph.D. in Chemical Engineering from Stanford University. He presently
serves on the CNA Board and is Chairman of the Board of Wolf Park (a
research and education organization) and a member of the Advisory Board
of the Applied Physics Laboratory (University of Washington) and the
Council on Foreign Relations.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Dr. Depoy. Mr. Berteau,
please proceed.
STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID J. BERTEAU, SENIOR ADVISOR AND DIRECTOR,
DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL INITIATIVES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Berteau. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Congressman
Smith. It is a great privilege to be here today, and I echo Mr.
Buswell's comments. I feel honored to be in the company of the
panel that I am sitting with here, so I am extremely grateful
to you.
I note that my statement today and my responses to any
questions you may have are my own views and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the institution for which I work. I would
also note that I am not sure that they don't reflect those
views, either, but that is neither here nor there.
This committee, of course, as has been noted, played a key
role from the beginning in S&T, and I note in my statement the
dichotomy that apparently exists inside the enabling statute to
this day, that on the one hand, the S&T Directorate is
responsible for R&D that supports any and all elements of the
Department, and on the other hand, they are to have a focus
both from a strategic planning point of view and a
prioritization point of view on chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear, ``CBRN'' elements. I say that not
because I think there is actually confusion in the Department
in this regard. I don't actually think there is. What I think
that shows is it reflects still a very strong emphasis on the
terrorist threat as the driver behind R&D when, in fact, a
legitimate assessment of all threats and risk would say that
there are risks that are much broader than, and in some cases
overlap significantly with, what we would define as terrorist
threats. And I think I come from a background that says an all-
hazards, an all-risks, an all-threats assessment process is
inherently important to any strategic plan, not just simply
that which is defined in the statute.
We know from the history of management that strategic plans
do set agendas for agencies but only if they are actually
incorporated into the budget. Resources drive policy way more
than policy drives resources, and as a result of that, I think
it is important to pay attention not only to the plan but to
look at the execution of that plan as it is reflected in the
budget and in the implementation of that budget.
There is one problem that I would note that is a little bit
of an example in that regard of the difficulty of integrating
across the Department. Since the creation of the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), there is a little bit of a
potential dichotomy with responsibility for S&T funding in the
Department with radiological and nuclear being dictated more by
DNDO than by S&T, and that I think makes it harder to have an
integrated S&T plan. I believe actually DHS itself can fix this
problem, but it is something that I would note that may be
worthy of the Committee's attention down the road.
I have three comments on your three questions, first from a
strategic planning perspective. It is really critical that a
strategic plan be connected to the larger homeland security
enterprise. It is impossible for an S&T strategic plan by
itself to have the validity necessary to say that we are
spending our money on the most important priorities. I think it
has to flow from a broader homeland security enterprise-wide
strategic plan linked in turn to a DHS-level strategic plan
because there is so much of Homeland Security that is outside
DHS or even outside the Federal Government.
But there are two other elements that have to come into
play. One is those plans have to be assessed against current
capability in order to identify capability gaps and capability
shortfalls and be able to prioritize what you need to do to
fill those gaps. And then in turn, the budgets have to be built
reflecting some kind of a judgment of where the risks are and
where the benefits are of filling those gaps or addressing
those gaps in the budget. This is not only prudent management,
it is essential for risk reduction and threat reduction. And I
think this committee can encourage DHS toward that broader
planning process tied to capability assessments.
With regard to the IPTs, I certainly echo what my colleague
to the right has said. They are playing a very useful role.
They are not a substitute for a formal prioritization and
strategic planning process, however. I think they augment it
rather than replace it.
With respect to basic research, I think there are two
important questions. One is how much is done, but the second is
how do you manage that so it eventually leads to useful
homeland security applications that tie to threats, that tie to
risks and that tie to first responder needs? My own view is
that it needs to be linked to solving some kind of a capability
gap that has been identified or some kind of a strategic
shortfall. And so far, that is difficult in part because the
DHS process for determining requirements is fragmented and in
some cases nonexistent with most DHS components unable to
execute a rigorous requirements process.
And then finally, I think it is important to focus on the
transition from research into programs or into outcomes and
results, whether that be incorporation and production of
hardware or systems that are fielded or the provision of
standards or intellectual property or even technical assistance
that makes people smarter buyers, whether in DHS or in the
broader community. And I think that kind of planning for
transition needs to occur up front.
The process that I lay out here, of course, is not easy. It
is hard to develop broad plans. It is hard to have a structured
planning process. It is hard to do the capability assessments.
It is hard to show how they reflect in the budget, but I think
it is important for you to lay that out as what your desired
outcome is and try to get that from the government.
With that, sir, I will conclude my remarks and will stand
ready for your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Berteau follows:]
Prepared Statement of David J. Berteau
Mr. Chairman, Congressman Smith, and Members of the Committee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today in the company
of my distinguished fellow panel members. My statement addresses the
overall question of establishing research priorities in the Science and
Technology Directorate (S&T) of the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). It also responds to each of your three specific
questions, as noted in the invitation letter.
My Background
It may be useful for the Committee to know a bit about my
background in order to gauge the value of the comments I make today. As
shown on the attached biographical statement, most of my career in
national security and homeland security issues has been here in
Washington. However, in my younger days, I was also a firefighter and
an emergency medical technician volunteer, and I still maintain ties to
those communities, so I try to apply the first responder perspective as
well as the Washington perspective to these questions.
Overall Role of S&T
It is also useful to review the legislative history of the creation
of the Science & Technology Directorate. As I recall, this committee
played a key role in ensuring that the role of Science and Technology
was properly incorporated into the final Homeland Security Act of 2002.
Initial legislative proposals included a narrow focus on research and
development, tied most closely to requirements in the areas of
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, or CBRN. This
committee appropriately supported a broader definition of homeland
security R&D, and ultimately the Act (Section 302 (4) ) stated that the
Under Secretary for Science and Technology would be responsible for
``conducting basic and applied research, development, demonstration,
testing, and evaluation activities that are relevant to any or all
elements of the Department'' (emphasis added).
However, with respect to the establishment of priorities both
within DHS and for the Nation, the enabling legislation was more
specific. It states in Section 302 (2) and again in Section 302 (5)
that the Under Secretary shall be responsible for ``developing, in
consultation with other appropriate executive agencies, a national
policy and strategic plan for, identifying priorities, goals,
objectives and policies for, and coordinating the Federal Government's
civilian efforts to identify and develop countermeasures to chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and other emerging terrorist threats
(emphasis added), including the development of comprehensive, research-
based definable goals for such efforts and development of annual
measurable objectives and specific targets to accomplish and evaluate
the goals of such efforts.''
Thus, the originating Act for DHS set up two parallel
responsibilities for S&T. The first was to conduct R&D for all elements
of the Department. The second was to support a national strategy that
focused on terrorist threats, primarily in the areas of CBRN. In
addition, the legislation includes a requirement for ``annual
measurable objectives,'' but that requirement focuses on CBRN. These
parallel responsibilities, in my opinion, set up a competition for
emphasis in the DHS S&T program. That competition is at the heart of
today's hearing questions.
Strategic Planning in the Homeland Security Enterprise, DHS, and S&T
The critical question for the S&T budget in DHS is the matter of
the priorities that are used to develop and execute that budget. As
noted above, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 requires the S&T
Directorate to develop a plan for prioritizing S&T research on CBRN.
Such a plan requires a clear link to DHS S&T budgets and spending.
There have been a number of plans developed and released in accordance
with this requirement, most recently in 2007 and 2008. In keeping with
the S&T responsibilities for ``all elements of the Department,'' the
plans to date have been broader than CBRN, and I believe that is
appropriate and necessary. Such plans are worthwhile for guiding
funding and justifying budgets.
However, from a strategic planning perspective, this process to
date has been insufficient and inadequate. The ongoing Quadrennial
Homeland Security Review, mandated by Congress, includes the charge to
examine the homeland security strategic planning process. In fact, the
DHS web site refers specifically to QHSR studies on Strategic
Management and on Planning and Capabilities, and the questions
submitted for the ``National Dialogue'' related to those studies can be
found in links at http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/
gc-1208534155450.shtm#0. I cannot speculate on the results
of the QHSR, but I would like to share with the Committee some of my
personal observations about strategic planning and its relationship to
the DHS S&T budget.
First, strategic planning needs to be the result of a rigorous
planning process. This process would incorporate risk and threat
assessment, the Administration's priorities, legislation, existing
strategies, and involvement of stakeholders into strategic guidance.
Such guidance needs to encompass more than DHS--it needs to span the
homeland security enterprise, beyond DHS to include the rest of the
Federal Government as well as State and local levels, including first
responders.
Second, strategic plans need to be assessed against existing
capabilities to determine where there are gaps in capabilities and how
those gaps can be addressed. In some cases, capability gaps can be met
by changes in procedures or training or policy. In other cases,
resources will need to be allocated to fill capability gaps. In still
other cases, new technology or new applications of existing technology
will fix those gaps.
Third, budgets need to address capability gaps or shortfalls. Some
of this could be in the DHS budget, some elsewhere in the federal
budget, and some in State and local budgets.
Ultimately, the S&T strategic planning process should have the
following attributes:
-- it needs to flow from a broader Homeland Security
Enterprise-wide Strategic Plan, linked in turn to a DHS-level
Strategic Plan
-- plans at each level (enterprise, DHS, and S&T) need to be
assessed against current and projected capabilities, with the
resulting identification of capability gaps and shortfalls
-- those capability gaps and shortfalls need to be linked to
the budget and to risk assessments of the consequences of
failing to address the shortfalls.
Such an S&T strategic plan would have significantly more value to
DHS and homeland security than today's process. A broad strategic
planning process and capability assessment will illuminate real
priorities that reduce risk to America and produce more robust
responses to catastrophic threats and events. It is important to
recognize, though, that S&T cannot create these attributes; that can
only be done at the DHS level.
IPTs and First Responders
The use of Integrated Process Teams or IPTs in the Federal
Government has grown substantially in the past two decades. Such teams
provide a mechanism for providing input to and assessing the status of
government actions across an array of organizations and institutions.
In the S&T process, they provide useful input, but they are not a
substitute for the results of prioritization that the strategic
planning and capability assessment process described above. In
addition, IPTs can create a false sense of a rigorous process when in
reality there is only rigorous involvement.
Basic Research
As the Members of this committee know well, the role of research in
DHS was debated long and hard at the time the Act was passed in 2002. A
review of the legislative history shows diverse views over the types of
research appropriate for DHS and who should conduct them. While the
legislation settled some of this debate, there are still two important
questions that need further resolution.
One is the issue of how much basic research should be done by DHS.
The second is how to manage that research so that it eventually leads
to useful homeland security applications. My own view is that the
answers to these two questions need to tie back to the original point
of a broader strategic plan and capability assessment process. If
research cannot be linked to solving some strategic shortfall or
capability gap, then we need to keep working before we assign it a high
priority. Basic research sponsored by other Federal Government agencies
can be the feeding ground for DHS S&T programs, but basic research in
DHS should, in my judgment, be tied to identified requirements and
shortfalls and not be driven by any quota or budget target.
Transition from Research to Programs
One additional question warrants this committee's attention, in my
view. The first responder community cares about research to the extent
that it produces results that help them do their jobs or prepare for
contingencies. This means that DHS S&T needs to pay close attention to
the transition from research into programs that will produce results.
In some cases, this would mean the production of hardware or systems
incorporating research results. In other cases, it might be the
provision of standards or intellectual property to a broad array of
vendors or suppliers. In still other cases, it might produce assistance
to internal DHS components or first responders at the State or local
level.
Across the board in S&T research, therefore, there needs to be
planning for transition as part of the initial prioritization process.
That planning has to include funding in the budget. This planning is
easier for some activities than for others, particularly when the
ultimate customer or user of the research is inside DHS. It's harder
when the end-user is outside DHS or even the Federal Government.
Decades of experience at DARPA in DOD shows, however, that research
dollars have more value and produce better results when consideration
is given up front to plans for transitioning research into real, funded
programs. This is a feature of the S&T strategic planning process that
other homeland security strategic plans will not have, and it makes the
S&T planning and budgeting challenge more complex, but it has high
payoff for return on investment.
Closing
Chairman Wu, Congressman Smith, I would like to conclude by noting
that the process I have advocated here is not easy. It is hard to
develop broad strategic plans, hard to conduct such a planning process,
and hard to do the capability assessments that lead to priorities in
the budget. Failure to undertake an enterprise-wide strategic planning
process will, however, ensure that we don't spend our scarce budget
dollars where they will do the most good. I recommend that this
committee endorse the creation and support for a broad strategic plan
across the Homeland Security Enterprise and the clear linkage of S&T
strategic plans to that larger enterprise-level work.
Sir, this concludes my remarks, and I stand ready for your
questions.
Biography for David J. Berteau
David J. Berteau is Senior Adviser and Director, Defense-Industrial
Initiatives, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in
Washington, DC, where he is a resident scholar on acquisition,
industrial base, programs, budget, and management for national security
and homeland security. Recent and ongoing studies include projects on
interagency resource management, federal services contracts, defense
acquisition reform, transatlantic defense trade, and complex program
management.
Mr. Berteau is a Fellow of the National Academy of Public
Administration and chaired their panel on Joint Land Use Studies for
the Defense Department. He is a member of the Defense Acquisition
University Board of Visitors, a Director of the Procurement Round
Table, and an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University. He chaired
the National Research Council's 2005 study of printed circuit boards
for national security. Mr. Berteau served on the Secretary of the
Army's Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in
Expeditionary Operations and on two recent Defense Science Board task
forces, on the defense industrial structure and on integrating
commercial systems into defense.
Prior to coming to CSIS, he was Director of National Defense and
Homeland Security for Clark & Weinstock, where he still consults. He
was the Director of Syracuse University's National Security Studies
Program and served as a Professor of Practice at the Maxwell School of
Citizenship and Public Affairs. Mr. Berteau was a Senior Vice President
for Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) until early
2001.
Mr. Berteau served in the Defense Department for 12 years under
four Defense Secretaries, including four years as Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics. He was
responsible for weapons production readiness, the defense industrial
base, military base closures, defense logistics, installations and
military construction, defense procurement, and environmental matters.
He testified before Congress more than 100 times, led numerous defense
management reform initiatives, oversaw the Defense Logistics Agency,
and was instrumental in creating two new agencies, the Defense Contract
Management Agency and the Defense Commissary Agency. He twice was
acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for nearly a year, in 1990 and
1993. As Chairman of the 1992 government-wide Defense Conversion
Commission, Mr. Berteau's report to the Secretary of Defense, Adjusting
to the Drawdown, developed ways to address the impact of defense
reductions on the U.S. economy, on military and civilian defense
personnel, and on communities. Nearly all of the commission's
recommendations were implemented.
In the late 1980s, Mr. Berteau was the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Resource Management & Support, responsible for all
defense military and civilian manpower and personnel requirements. He
chaired the Federal Economic Adjustment Committee. He was acting
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel for
eight months in 1989.
Mr. Berteau was the Packard Commission's Executive Secretary in
1985-86 (President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management).
Earlier, he was Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Executive
Secretary of the DOD Council on Integrity and Management Improvement
and the Defense Resources Board, and Special Assistant to the DOD
Comptroller. He entered DOD in 1981 as a Presidential Management
Intern.
Mr. Berteau graduated from Tulane University in 1971 and received
his Master's degree in 1981 from the LBJ School of Public Affairs at
the University of Texas. Mr. Berteau received the Secretary of the Army
Exceptional Public Service Medal in 2007 and the Secretary of Defense
Medals for Distinguished Public Service in 1991 and Outstanding Public
Service in 1987 and 1989. A native of Louisiana, he lives in Derwood,
Maryland, with his wife, Jane Berteau; they have two grown children.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Berteau. Dr.
Williams, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF DR. CINDY WILLIAMS, CHAIR, PANEL ON THE DHS
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION; SHAPIRO VISITING PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, THE ELLIOTT SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, GEORGE
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY; PRINCIPAL RESEARCH SCIENTIST, SECURITY
STUDIES PROGRAM, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Dr. Williams. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Smith.
It is a real pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the
research priorities in the S&T Directorate of the Department of
Homeland Security.
Between June 2008 and June 2009 I chaired a panel of the
National Academy of Public Administration, or NAPA, that
conducted a study of the S&T Directorate. I am joined today by
Rick Cinquegrana and Laurie Ekstrand, who led the work of
NAPA's staff on the study. Some copies of the panel's report
have been provided to your staff, and the report is also
available online.
The Academy panel offered findings and recommendations in
several areas. My remarks today focus on three of them:
strategic plans, the establishment of research priorities in
the Directorate's transition portfolio and the Directorate's
role in basic research.
Let me start with strategic plans. The S&T Directorate is
responsible for two distinct strategic plans: an internal plan
to guide its own work and a federal-wide plan for civilian
efforts to counter chemical, biological and other emerging
terrorist threats. The Directorate published an internal
strategic plan, as Mr. Buswell mentioned, in June 2002. That
plan describes the Directorate's structure, the roles of its
integrated product teams, or IPTs, its mechanisms for reaching
out to other organizations, and its plans for workforce
development. But it does not meet the criteria of the strategic
plan as the term is generally applied today across Federal
Government.
Among other things, the plan's mission statement
understates the Directorate's range of responsibility, the plan
itself lacks a statement of long-term goals, and it does not
discuss key external factors that could affect progress.
We also found process weaknesses with regard to strategic
planning, including a lack of involvement by key external
stakeholders and the lack of a systematic scan of the
environment. The panel recommended that S&T follow a strategic
planning process outlined by the Government Accountability
Office and OMB to develop a plan that can guide its work toward
a set of specified goals.
We found that the Directorate has not made progress on the
strategic plan for the wider federal effort at all. To be fair,
among federal departments, DHS has only the third-largest
budget for homeland security research and development, after
the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department
of Defense. To produce a federal research strategy with any
teeth, S&T would need White House support. We recommended that
S&T work with the White House Office of Science and Technology
Policy and other federal departments to develop that broader
plan.
Let me turn now to the establishment of priorities in the
transition portfolio. S&T's IPTs bring the Directorate's staff
together with customers to establish priorities for projects.
The IPTs appear to be useful vehicles for involving DHS's
internal stakeholders in setting research priorities and for
stimulating information exchange across the Department.
Nevertheless, we identified several problems. As an example, it
appears that when the IPTs were formed, little guidance was
provided on how to operate them. Each IPT devised its own
structure and processes through trial and error. Earlier this
year, S&T was beginning to develop some standardized practices,
but we still found substantial variation in structure,
processes, customer satisfaction and accomplishments among the
IPTs.
And finally, let me turn to S&T's role in basic research.
Basic research is the seed corn for the development of future
technologies, and no other organization in Federal Government
has the mandate or the wherewithal to sponsor basic research in
key areas related to homeland security such as border
protection, immigration, and aviation security. That said, our
panel found several potential weaknesses in this area. I will
highlight just one, that is, many of the Directorate's basic
research projects are awarded without competition and without
external scientific peer review. Other federal research
organizations routinely use competitive processes, including
external peer review to good effect. Our panel recommended that
DHS S&T follow suit.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared remarks, and I
look forward to any questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Williams follows:]
Prepared Statement of Cindy Williams
Mr. Chairman, Congressman Smith, and Members of the Subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
development of strategic plans and research priorities and the role of
basic research in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Advances
in science and technology and the deliberate transition of those
advances into usable systems are crucial to the Nation's efforts to
prevent and disrupt future terrorist attacks, protect people and
critical infrastructure in the event of an attack or a naturally
occurring disaster, and prepare to respond and recover should such
events occur. The Directorate of Science and Technology (S&T) is
charged with implementing the science and technology effort for much of
DHS as well as orchestrating the planning for key S&T activities across
the many federal departments and agencies involved in homeland
security.
Under mandate from the DHS Appropriations Act for fiscal year (FY)
2008, the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) conducted a
study of DHS S&T between June 2008 and June 2009.\1\ I served as Chair
of the expert panel that guided the study. I am joined today by Rick
Cinquegrana and Laurie Ekstrand, the Program Area Director and Project
Director who led the work of NAPA's staff on the study.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2008,
is Division E of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY 2008 (P.L.
110-161). The report of the Committee on Appropriations of the U.S.
House of Representatives (H.R. 110-181) accompanying the House version
of the Act directed DHS to contract with NAPA to conduct the study.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The panel's report, Department of Homeland Security Science and
Technology Directorate: Developing Technology to Protect America, was
published by NAPA in June 2009. Some copies of the report have been
made available to your staff. The report is also available on-line at
http://www.napawash.org/pc-management-studies/
DHS-ST/
DHS-ST-Directorate-June-2009
.pdf.
In addition to serving as chair of the NAPA panel, I am a member of
the research staff of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT) and, for the current academic semester,
the J.B. and Maurice C. Shapiro Visiting Professor of International
Affairs at the Elliott School of the George Washington University. At
MIT, I have conducted independent research over a four-year period on
the state of strategic planning and resource allocation for homeland
security within the DHS and other federal departments, in the Executive
Office of the President, and in the Congress. Today I will discuss
findings and recommendations of the NAPA study in my capacity as Chair
of the Academy Panel. My views are also informed by my experience in
the context of my own research.
Findings and Recommendations of the NAPA Panel
The NAPA panel offered findings and recommendations in eight areas:
The organization of and communications within DHS
S&T;
The customer focus of S&T's transition portfolio;\2\
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\2\ S&T has grouped its projects into three portfolios: transition,
research, and innovation. The transition portfolio is meant to deliver
technologies to DHS components or first responders within three years;
it makes up about one-half of the organization's budget. The research
portfolio, aimed at basic research, accounts for roughly 20 percent of
S&T's budget. The innovation portfolio is meant to identify and fund
potential ``game changing'' technologies--long shots that could lead to
``leap-ahead results.'' Innovation constitutes roughly five percent of
S&T's budget.
The allocation of funds and selection of research
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projects across S&T's basic research portfolio;
S&T's exercise of its statutory role in guiding
federal-wide science and technology efforts in homeland
security;
S&T's internal strategic planning effort;
The practice of performance measurement in S&T;
The question of unnecessary duplication in the
activities of the federal departments and agencies engaged in
homeland security-related science and technology; and
The question of opportunity costs: whether increases
in homeland security-related research during this decade have
resulted in reduced funding for other significant science and
technology endeavors.
Before turning to the specific questions posed by the Subcommittee
for this hearing, let me summarize briefly the panel's findings and
recommendations in each of these areas.
Organization and communications. The panel found that DHS S&T is better
organized than it was during its early years, but that today's matrix
organization and the large number of direct reports to the Under
Secretary for S&T pose communications challenges across the management
team and between management and staff. We recommended that S&T
management engage staff in a process of identifying communications
problems and implementing solutions. We also suggested that web-based
technology would be a valuable tool to initiate that process. We also
recommended that S&T's leadership reconsider the structure of the
Directorate to ensure a reasonable number of direct reports and a
cohesive structure for managing first responder interaction.
Customer focus of the transition portfolio. We found that through the
Integrated Product Team (IPT) approach that S&T now uses for the
transition portfolio, the Directorate has made strides in engaging its
customers within DHS. Progress is uneven across the various IPTs,
however. We also found that first responders at the State and local
levels often feel left out, but that the addition of a new first
responder IPT is unlikely to prove an effective solution. We
recommended that S&T refine and institutionalize the structures and
procedures across the IPTs and that including first responders into
existing IPTs as appropriate is likely to be more effective than adding
the new first responder IPT.
Allocation of funds and selection of research projects. The broad
allocation of funds across the basic research portfolio appears to rest
on the budget shares that were extant among DHS's legacy components
before they were brought into the consolidated department in 2003, and
many basic research projects are awarded without competition or peer
review. We recommended that S&T take steps to rationalize decision-
making about the broad allocation of basic research funds, and that
funds be awarded on a competitive basis based on scientific peer review
except in cases when that is clearly not feasible.
Guiding federal-wide science and technology efforts. Although S&T is
charged by statute to take a leadership role in guiding federal efforts
in homeland security-related research, other federal organizations
enjoy wider roles in and have larger budgets for homeland security
research than does DHS S&T. Thus S&T is in a relatively weak position
to carry out its leadership role. S&T officials are active participants
in many interagency task forces and committees, and they coordinate
with other agencies on numerous projects. Nevertheless, in the nearly
seven years since DHS was created, S&T has not been successful in
guiding the development of a federal strategic plan for homeland
security S&T. The panel recommended that S&T work with the White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy and the array of federal
agencies engaged in homeland security-related research to develop a
comprehensive national strategic plan for such research.
S&T's internal strategic planning. The NAPA panel found that the
strategic plan that S&T issued in June 2007 is a useful document in
describing the ``what'' of S&T's programs, but it fails to describe the
``why.'' We recommended that S&T follow the guidance provided by the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to formulate a strategic plan that will effectively guide
its work toward specified goals.\3\
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\3\ OMB Circular No. A-11, Part 2; GAO, Executive Guide:
Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act
(GAO/GGD-96-119, June 1996).
Performance measurement. S&T uses milestones to measure progress, but
those milestones may not be meaningful indicators of progress. There
also appears to be little or no consequence for missing milestones. The
panel recommended that S&T systematically collect and analyze
information about milestones met and missed, adopt appropriate
consequences, and provide clear guidance for setting valid initial and
subsequent milestones. We also recommended that S&T adopt peer review
of their overall portfolio, as is the practice of other federal science
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and technology organizations.
Unnecessary duplication. The panel found no instances of unnecessary
duplication within S&T or among the other agencies engaged in homeland
security research. Nevertheless, the panel was concerned that the
weaknesses in strategic planning and the lack of systematic mechanisms
to evaluate the relative merits of competing priorities for science and
technology efforts related to homeland security put the community at
risk for such duplication.
Opportunity costs. The panel surfaced no evidence to indicate that the
increases in spending for homeland security-related research has led to
reduced funding for other significant research areas.
The remainder of my statement addresses in more detail the issues
related to the development of strategic plans, stakeholder involvement
in setting research priorities, and the role of basic research in the
DHS S&T portfolio.
The Development of Strategic Plans
Like other federal organizations, DHS S&T bears a responsibility
for developing a strategic plan to guide its own work. In addition, the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 requires the Directorate to develop, ``in
consultation with other appropriate executive agencies, a national
policy and strategic plan'' for federal civilian efforts to identify
and develop countermeasures to chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and other emerging terrorist threats.\4\
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\4\ P.L. 107-296, November 25, 2002, Title III Sec. 302.
S&T internal strategic planning
In June 2007, the Directorate published an internal Strategic Plan,
Science & Technology Strategy to Make the Nation Safer. The plan
describes the structure of the organization and the roles of the IPTs,
its mechanisms for reaching out to other organizations and players, and
its plans for workforce development. It does not adhere to the criteria
of a strategic plan as generally applied across the Federal Government.
Simply put, the plan can be said to detail the ``what'' of S&T, but it
lacks the focus on the ``why'' that is the hallmark of successful
strategic planning. The NAPA panel also found weaknesses in the process
through which the plan was developed.
GAO's guide to strategic planning recommends that strategic plans
include six components.\5\ The table on the next page assesses the
content of S&T's strategic plan in the context of GAO's required
components. The table reveals several weaknesses of the June 2007
document: a mission statement that understates the range of
responsibilities assigned to the organization, including those related
to coordinating and collaborating with other federal agencies; the lack
of specific long-term goals and objectives; the lack of discussion of
key external factors that could affect the achievement of goals; and
the lack of a foundation to establish annual performance goals and
metrics to assess progress toward goals.
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\5\ GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
Performance and Results Act (GAO/GGD-96-119, June 1996.
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One challenge confronting DHS S&T is that DHS itself and the wider
federal homeland security community are generally lacking the clear
assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and risks and the prioritized
goals from which S&T might derive its own statement of goals and
objectives. Better assessments of threats, risks, and vulnerabilities
and a clearer consensus on homeland security goals, objectives, and
priorities at the national, federal, and departmental levels would
indeed provide a foundation on which S&T could build its next strategic
plan. Nevertheless, the NAPA panel felt that the DHS Strategic Plan
released in September 2008 offers the department-level perspective that
can guide the Directorate's planning efforts. We recommended that S&T
move forward to develop a strategic plan that more closely reflects the
GAO guidance.
In strategic planning, the process is often as important as the
product. The GAO guide highlights three practices that are critical to
successful strategic planning:
Stakeholder involvement, including Congress and the
Administration, State and local governments, third-party
providers, interest groups, agency employees, fee-paying
customers, and the public;
Assessment of the internal and external environment
continuously and systematically to anticipate future challenges
and make future adjustments so that potential problems do not
become crises; and
Alignment of activities, core processes, and
resources to support mission-related outcomes.
Stakeholders were not specifically involved in drafting the S&T
strategic plan. In addition, a systematic environmental scan was not
conducted to inform the plan. The NAPA panel recommended that S&T
follow the process as outlined by GAO, and particularly that it involve
stakeholders in the development of its next plan. Other federal science
and technology organizations have engaged in sound strategic planning,
and their practices provide models that could inform an improved
process in DHS S&T.
Development of a federal strategic plan
DHS S&T has not made progress in developing a strategic plan for
the overall federal civilian effort to identify and develop
countermeasures to emerging terrorist threats. To be fair, S&T may not
be in the best position to lead that development, because it is a
relatively small player within the federal homeland security research
community.
Even within DHS, the S&T Directorate is not the only player in S&T.
When the Department was formed, the Coast Guard and Secret Service both
retained jurisdiction over their own science and technology work. The
Department's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) now holds
separate responsibility for research and development related to nuclear
detection.
Moreover, among federal departments, DHS has only the third-largest
budget for homeland security-related research and development, after
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of
Defense (DOD).\6\ The National Science Foundation, NASA, Department of
Energy, Department of Commerce, Environmental Protection Agency, and
Department of Agriculture also play significant roles.
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\6\ FY 2008 funding for homeland security-related research and
development in HHS was $1.9 billion; in DOD, $1.3 billion; in DHS,
including R&D funds for the DNDO, $1.0 billion.
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DHS S&T has little direct authority to direct or influence the
research agendas of the science and technology organizations in those
other departments and agencies. To produce a comprehensive research
strategy that would be supported across the Federal Government, S&T
would have to seek and rely on White House support to obtain active
participation from the other federal research organizations, some of
which are far stronger players by virtue of their own budgets as well
as the institutional heft of their respective departments and agencies.
I believe that it makes more sense for the White House Executive Office
of the President to orchestrate this interagency effort.
Within the Executive Office of the President, there are two
organizations that could take charge of an overall federal strategic
plan for homeland security-related science and technology. One is the
newly merged National Security Staff, which integrates the former
National Security Council Staff with the Homeland Security Council
Staff that was established shortly after 9/11.\7\ That staff carries
out the day-to-day coordination of domestic and international security
activities across the interagency and is in a good position to work
with all the departments and agencies involved in homeland security to
pull together a coherent strategic plan and ensure its implementation.
The National Security Staff lacks budgetary responsibility, however. To
ensure budgetary realism of the strategic plan, the National Security
Staff should work closely with budget experts from the national
security division and the homeland security branch of the Office of
Management and Budget.
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\7\ President Obama decided to merge the two staffs in accordance
with recommendations made under his first Presidential Study Directive.
See the White House Office of the Press Secretary, ``Statement by the
President on the White House Organization for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism,'' May 26, 2009.
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Another choice is the White House Office of Science and Technology
(OSTP). OSTP holds responsibility for leading the interagency effort
with regard to science and technology policies and budgets. The NAPA
panel recommended this option. Specifically the panel recommended that
DHS S&T work with OSTP and the other federal departments engaged in
homeland security-related research to develop a comprehensive strategic
research plan.
Stakeholder Involvement in Setting Research Priorities
DHS S&T groups its projects into three portfolios: transition,
research, and innovation. The transition portfolio is meant to deliver
technologies to DHS components or first responders within three years.
The research portfolio is aimed at longer-term basic research
endeavors, expected to take five to eight years or more. The innovation
portfolio is meant to identify and fund potential ``game changing''
technologies--long shots that could lead to ``leap-ahead results.''
In recent years S&T organized IPTs that bring the Directorate's
staff together with its customers to establish priorities for projects
in the transition portfolio. During 2008, there were twelve ``capstone
IPTs,'' each of which focused on one of twelve areas of science and
technology: border security, cargo security, maritime security,
chemical/biological defense, cyber security, information sharing and
management, inter-operability, counter-IED, transportation, people
screening, infrastructure protection, and incident management. Each
capstone IPT is co-led by member of the S&T staff and a representative
from one of DHS's other components, and includes participants from S&T
and its customers inside DHS. Each sets priorities for projects within
its purview.
It appears that when the IPTs were initiated, little guidance was
provided on how to operate them. Lacking such guidance, members of each
IPT devised their own structure and processes through trial and error.
At the time our study was conducted, S&T was beginning to develop some
standardized practices, but we still found great variation in structure
and processes among the IPTs.
Priorities and projects established through the IPT process are
reviewed by a Technical Oversight Group (TOG), which exercises
oversight of the transition portfolio. The TOG is chaired by the Deputy
Secretary of Homeland Security and includes the Under Secretaries for
National Protection and Programs, Management, and S&T. To ensure that
S&T's transition projects are aligned with DHS priorities, the TOG
makes the final decisions on the list of transition projects. Although
customers are invited to TOG meetings, some of them told the NAPA staff
that last-minute invitations prevented them from attending, and that
they did not understand the basis of the TOG's decisions.
Projects in the transition portfolio are meant to fill gaps in a
customer's capability and to be integrated into an acquisition program
or commercialized after the S&T work is completed. To that end, the
Directorate asks customers to enter into a Technology Transition
Agreement (TTA) for each project. TTAs are intended to describe the
capability gap that the S&T project will fill, the project deliverable,
the technical requirements and parameters, and the project plan,
including schedule, funding, and transition approach. At the time the
NAPA study was conducted, however, few TTAs had been signed, thus
calling into question their usefulness.
The IPTs appear to be useful vehicles for involving DHS's internal
stakeholders in setting research priorities. The NAPA study found that
customers generally characterized the S&T staff as accessible and
responsive to their concerns. We also found the IPT process to be
flexible enough to accommodate any changes needed to respond to new
threats or other circumstances, and to encourage information exchange
among DHS's components.
Nevertheless, the NAPA study identified several factors that keep
the IPTs from fulfilling their intended role. These include:
The IPTs are not adequately institutionalized, and
may not be able to withstand changes in leadership.
The customer focus of the IPT process may obscure
important opportunities inherent in innovation, gaps in
knowledge, or opportunities that cut across S&T's divisions.
The roles and responsibilities of participants are
not explicitly defined, and the lack of clear definition has
caused confusion among customers and frustration among some S&T
staff.
TTA agreements largely go unsigned, and since IPT
budgets are fixed separately from the TTA process, there is no
incentive for customers to sign them.
Customers do not fully understand the TOG process.
There is no standard mechanism for collecting input
from non-DHS customers, including first responders at the State
and local levels.
Processes and procedures for running the IPTs are not
adequately standardized.
Customers lack incentives for investing the time and
effort needed to make the IPTs maximally effective.
Two other factors stand in the way of rational priority-setting
across S&T. First, the process of allocating budgets among the various
IPTs is not transparent, but seems to be based broadly on the share of
homeland security-related science and technology funding held by the
components before they were consolidated into the department in 2003.
Thus, the broad allocation of money among the IPTs does not necessarily
reflect DHS-wide priorities or allow for taking advantage of the most
promising opportunities. Second, the transition portfolio managed
through the IPTs accounts for only about one-half of Directorate
funding. The mechanisms for establishing priorities for a substantial
share of its work, particularly those for the basic research portfolio,
are less clear.
The Role of Basic Research in the DHS S&T Portfolio
Basic research accounts for a bit more than 20 percent of S&T's
budget. Of that, some 31 percent is performed by universities; 31
percent by industry; 26 percent by the National Laboratories; ten
percent by other federal laboratories; one percent by federally funded
research and development centers; and one percent by other not-for-
profit enterprises.
Basic research is the seed corn for the development of future
technologies that could ultimately protect the Nation more effectively
and at lower cost, and no other organization in Federal Government has
the mandate or the wherewithal to sponsor basic research in key
homeland security-related areas such as border protection, immigration,
or aviation security. The budget share that S&T devotes to basic
research appears generally consistent with the practice in other
security agencies, particularly the DOD.
That said, the NAPA panel found potential weaknesses in DHS's
allocation of basic research funds among projects, the integration of
research among its various research performers, and the processes used
to select research projects and monitor their performance. We thus
offered the following recommendations:
Develop and implement clear and transparent processes
and criteria for identifying basic research needs, prioritizing
projects, and selecting performers.
Ensure S&T builds on current efforts to integrate
research across the National Laboratories, Centers of
Excellence, and other performers.
Make competitive processes that include external
scientific peer review the norm for basic research.
Concluding Remarks
When the panel report was released in June 2009, the leadership of
the DHS S&T Directorate readily accepted the panels recommendations and
agreed that these issues require attention. The absence of a confirmed
Under Secretary to head the Directorate has no doubt limited the
ability of the Directorate to respond fully to the recommendations. The
Academy and the panel believe that their implementation would
significantly improve the effectiveness of S&T, and are ready to assist
the organization as appropriate.
Biography for Cindy Williams
Cindy Williams is serving as the J.B. and Maurice C. Shapiro
Visiting Professor of International Affairs at the Elliott School of
International Affairs of the George Washington University for the fall
2009 semester. She is currently on leave from the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, where she is a Principal Research Scientist of
the MIT Security Studies Program. Her work at MIT includes an
examination of the processes by which the U.S. Government plans for and
allocates resources among the activities and programs related to
national security and international affairs and an examination of the
transition to all-volunteer forces in the militaries of European
countries.
Previously, Dr. Williams was an Assistant Director of the
Congressional Budget Office, where she led the National Security
Division in studies of budgetary and policy choices related to defense
and international security. She has also served as a Director and in
other capacities at the MITRE Corporation in Bedford, Massachusetts; as
a member of the Senior Executive Service in the Office of the Secretary
of Defense at the Pentagon; and as a mathematician at RAND in Santa
Monica, California.
Dr. Williams holds a Ph.D. in mathematics from the University of
California, Irvine. She is a co-author, with Gordon Adams, of Buying
National Security: How America Plans and Pays for Its Global Role and
Safety at Home (Taylor and Francis, forthcoming December 2009). She is
the editor of two books: Holding the Line: U.S. Defense Alternatives
for the Early 21st Century (MIT Press 2001) and Filling the Ranks:
Transforming the U.S. Military Personnel System (MIT Press, 2004), and
the co-editor, with Curtis L. Gilroy, of Service to Country: Personnel
Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries (MIT Press 2006).
She is a member of the board and an elected fellow of the National
Academy of Public Administration and a former member of the Naval
Studies Board of the National Academies. She is a member of the Council
on Foreign Relations and of the International Institute of Strategic
Studies. She serves on the editorial board of International Security
and the advisory board of the Scowcroft Institute of International
Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service of Texas
A&M University, and is on the advisory committee of Women in
International Security (WIIS).
Discussion
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Dr. Williams. And now it
is in order for Members of the Committee to ask questions, and
the Chair recognizes himself for five minutes.
Mr. Buswell, I want to commend you and Vice Admiral Cohen
for the job that you all have done. I believe that Admiral
Cohen's goal was to increase basic research to 20 or 21
percent, and you have hit that metric. I think that on the
basic research front, there may be some further discussion
about how well that research is linked to the missions of DHS,
but I think that overall, it is very, very important and
commendable that you all have achieved that metric.
I also think that it is very commendable that you have
improved the IPT process significantly, and this panel may want
to return to that topic. But there has been dramatic
improvement on that front.
The area of concern which I would like to discuss with you
and the panel is whether a systematic risk assessment and a
strategic plan based on at least in part on that risk
assessment would be helpful to the S&T Directorate and helpful
to DHS? I think that there was some concern from outside that
perhaps the Vice President's Office drove priorities by a
tremendous amount. I am gratified to hear that it has become a
more customer-driven process, and I think that is commendable,
but a completely customer-driven process may not hit the risks
that you want to hit. And I would like you to tell this
subcommittee what has prevented the S&T Directorate in engaging
in a more systematic risk assessment, and then I would like to
encourage the rest of the panel to address what a more
systematic, strategic plan and also use of risk assessment,
particularly an all-hazards approach, how that might benefit
the S&T Directorate and DHS overall. Mr. Buswell, would you
like to start this?
Mr. Buswell. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. Thanks very much. The
answer to your question, you know, does a systematic or
comprehensive risk assessment help us in prioritizing our
technology development is absolutely. And the way that I think
that it helps us do that is it helps the components whom we
serve to identify their priorities in a more systematic way.
Let me just say that as I am part of the QHSR (Quadrennial
Homeland Security Review) steering committee. I don't want to
get out in front of the headlights and usurp the Secretary's
prerogative on the QHSR, but there is a substantial effort
within that organization to address this risk assessment
process and to define the scope with which the Department ought
to address that. And I think we will be hearing more about that
over the coming months, and S&T is delighted to provide input
to that risk assessment, whether it be scientific modeling
input or other kinds of capability gap identification processes
that we have in place. And I think that over the long-term,
that will be a very valuable tool for the Department at large
in identifying the operational requirements that it needs to
address, both with technology and other ways. As Mr. Berteau
said, though, this is a difficult thing to do, but we are
committed to doing it because it is the right thing to do and
it is the only way to get the best return for the investment.
Chairman Wu. Well, prior hearings on this topic have been
somewhat contentious. It is rewarding to see that there has
been progress made on the basic research front, on the IPT
front, and I look forward to a report a year or two down the
pike that we will be making--that we have made progress on
systematic risk assessment and a strategic plan.
Mr. Berteau, Dr. Depoy, Dr. Williams, would you care to add
to this discussion about the strategic plan and about risk
analysis?
Dr. Williams. I would like to.
Chairman Wu. Please.
Dr. Williams. It strikes me that the assessment or threats,
risks and vulnerabilities is crucial to the development of
goals and priorities, and that has to be the thing that starts
the ball rolling on any strategic plan. Only with a firm
strategic plan will the organization be able to decide on
whether it should prefer this over that, this transition work
over some other transition work, possibly in a completely
separate part of the Department of Homeland Security.
Now, one of the problems the S&T Directorate has faced in
the past was that it didn't have that threat and risk
assessment coming down from the top of the Department, or even
from across the Federal Government. And I can understand that
that is an issue for them, and they are hoping that the
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review will produce a threat and
risk assessment that they will be able to work with to
establish their own internal goals. If that should not happen,
if for some reason the threat and risk assessment that comes
down from the top appears to be lacking, it strikes me that
they still need to do something on their own to establish the
threats and risks that they believe they are working to, even
if it is dead wrong over the long-term, even if it is not what
they want five years from now. They need something internally
to start the ball rolling and to be part of their strategic
planning.
Chairman Wu. Mr. Buswell, are you waiting for the
Quadrennial Review to supply you with a plan from on high or
risk assessment also?
Mr. Buswell. We are working in parallel with the
Quadrennial Review on our own S&T strategic plan. What I want
to emphasize though is we are not the tail wagging the dog
here. We want to make sure that we are providing the
technologies that are of the highest importance to the
Department, and that is the way we intend to approach this. I
am confident that the Department will be able to establish
strategic goals and objectives out of this strategic review,
this Quadrennial Review. The risk assessment is a longer-term
effort, and the risk assessment part of that will take--and
will be iterative over a number of years and really will never
be an ending effort because the threat constantly changes.
So I am confident that we will have some input into our
strategic plan. Now, keep in mind, you know, from my
perspective, science and technology should be not the end of
the whip but the handle of the whip, and as the strategy
changes, we ought to--our long-term focus ought to result in
smaller changes within the S&T portfolio assuming that we are
investing in things that are relevant to homeland security,
then maybe some other things, some other strategic initiatives
might that can offer near-term solutions, you know, policy
changes and tactics changes and those kinds of things that can
be implemented more quickly than technology can be developed.
Chairman Wu. Before we move onto Mr. Smith, if either you,
Dr. Depoy, or you, Mr. Berteau, have something to say about
risk assessment, threat assessment and this strategic plan, I
want to open it up to you all.
Mr. Berteau. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would note two
things that I think are in addition to the comments that my
colleagues have made here today. One is that we have a tendency
to evaluate the efficacy of planning by how well it predicts
the future, and that is the wrong metric to determine whether
or not planning was of any value to us. Its real value is in
how well it prepares us to deal with the future that we can't
predict.
And so it is possible under that kind of a rubric to look
like you are fully compliant with OMB circular A-11's
requirements for strategic plans and you give GAO something
that they can check or not check everything that you have or
have not done, and yet it has done nothing to actually prepare
you better to deal with a future that you can't predict. So we
need to be careful that we don't get caught up into a checklist
mentality for the value of strategic planning.
The second is that a big element of that value comes from
the process itself, and threat assessment and risk assessment
as well as incorporating existing legislation and existing
strategies and stakeholder input, all of that comes into play.
But what that process needs to produce is something that looks
like strategic guidance, something that says to everybody
involved in the homeland security enterprise, this is what is
important. This is what you need to spend your time and effort
on. This is where you spend your marginal dollars when they
become available. This is how you know how to prioritize. That
strategic guidance is a clear and important element of this
process, and if it is not present, people have to make
assumptions, and the assumptions may not be consistent, either
across the enterprise or over time.
Chairman Wu. Thank you, Mr. Berteau.
Dr. Depoy. I would just emphasize the point that Mr.
Berteau made earlier that this does have to be an enterprise-
wide effort, and certainly the operating components must be a
part of this plan. It can't be produced in the Directorate by
itself.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much. Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Williams notes in
her testimony that the NAPA review of DHS Science and
Technology found that many basic research projects funded by
Science and Technology are done so without competition or peer
review and that the Directorate should work to make peer review
and competition standard unless it is clearly not feasible.
Mr. Buswell, do you agree with the finding and
recommendation, and if so, how would you say it is being
addressed?
Mr. Buswell. Well, thank you, sir. I generally agree that
competition is good and that peer review is certainly one means
of selecting--ensuring that we are selecting high-quality
projects and that those projects are being executed in a high-
quality way.
Peer review using both internal and external reviewers as I
said is a valuable way to do that. As Dr. Williams' panel
noted, we have had quite a bit of success in the Centers of
Excellence selection process which fundamentally does select
some of the projects, a good number of the projects, that are
conducted in the basic research portfolio through both internal
and external review in series. And I think, you know, as I said
the goal is to make sure we are getting out of the investment
what we think we should.
Let me also say that all proposals that come in through the
broad agency announcement process are in effect peer reviewed.
Those proposals are reviewed by a panel of experts, subject
matter, and perhaps stakeholder kinds of--you know,
practitioner kinds of review to make sure that the proposal is
sound and that it is executable and scientifically feasible. So
in general, yes, I think that more competition is good. We
establish a lot of that competition through the selection of
the Centers of Excellence, university-based Centers of
Excellence, and we intend to continue to do that. We have been
very successful in that realm. And then the other part of this,
you know, as I said, the two pillars of basic research are the
Centers of Excellence and the DOE National Laboratories, and we
have started a renewed effort within the Directorate to ensure
that the investments that are going to the national
laboratories are being done to the best effect of the taxpayer
dollars, or you know, in the best interest of the government.
And I look forward to strengthening that process with the
national laboratories over the coming year. I think that is one
of the things that we can improve Directorate-wide.
So short answer to your question, yes, I agree with their
recommendation, and to the extent feasible, we should encourage
competition to make sure that we get the most benefit for the
taxpayer dollar.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. And Dr. Williams, you noted in your
testimony about milestones to track programs and that they may
not be meaningful indicators of progress, and there appears to
be little or no consequence for missing them. Could you
elaborate on the finding and certainly your recommendation, and
then Mr. Buswell, if you could provide reaction from the
Department's perspective?
Dr. Williams. One of the things the panel looked at was
whether the Directorate has processes in place to know what is
going on inside of its projects. Have they established
milestones? Are the projects meeting their milestones? And we
noticed that there are milestones established, but it seemed as
though the majority of projects were missing their milestones,
and there was very little consequence--at the time that we
looked at the Directorate--for missing a milestone. In fact,
the main consequence seemed to be to renegotiate the milestone
and start fresh with a new milestone on the same project.
We found that, for one thing, there wasn't a good record of
what is going on that is causing so many projects to miss their
milestones? Is there one thing that is happening continually?
Are the milestones just not realistic from the beginning? And
so we suggested that DHS S&T do some systematic effort within
the Directorate to pull together what is known about the
milestones and why projects are missing them, and see if they
can start to identify any patterns in that regard.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Buswell.
Mr. Buswell. That was an excellent observation by the
panel, and we appreciated their input on that. We have done a
number of things. First of all, let me say that the milestone--
using milestones as a metric of success and program management
is only as good as the milestones that you establish. So we
have taken a two-pronged approach to this. One, we are looking
at milestone development. You know, what is a meaningful
milestone and what isn't a meaningful milestone? What are we
actually using to decide at some point in the process whether a
project should go forward or not? I mean, is this actually
going to result in a technology that will be of benefit to the
Department or of benefit to the first responder community? And
so what are the key decision points? What are the key phase
gates that we want to meet in managing those projects? So that
is the first area that we focused on is in establishing good
milestones.
Second, you know, in response largely to the review that
NAPA did and some input that we had gotten from the Department,
program analysis and evaluation, I have tied the six division
heads' performance evaluations to their division's meeting of
milestones. And so it is tracked very carefully. They watch
their program managers. Their program managers are evaluated on
meeting those milestones, and that is an effective tool I think
to making sure that that happens.
Now, there is always unintended consequences. Our goal is
to get technological capabilities to our customers. Our goal is
not to properly manage projects. So I need to make sure that I
am not disincentivizing the program managers who may come
across a technology that leaps their program of record, you
know. They would have no incentive to abandon the program of
record because they are getting measured on whether they are
meeting the milestones in that program or not in order to adopt
this leap-ahead technology.
So there is a balance here that I need to make sure I keep
which is, you know, maybe meeting 75 percent of the milestones
is a reasonable number. I don't know. That is where we started.
We started with setting the goal of 75 percent of milestone
completion. We achieved that metric this year. So if those are
good milestones, then maybe we are there, but at the same time,
I want to continue to reward those program managers who
abandoned their program of record because they found something
that will actually deliver a capability sooner than their
program would have.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Smith. Mr. Tonko,
would you prefer to defer your questions right now?
Mr. Tonko. Yes.
Chairman Wu. Ms. Biggert, you are recognized for five
minutes.
Ms. Biggert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would direct this
question to Mr. Buswell. Anthrax has been mentioned as DHS's
number one terrorist threat, a threat supported by the findings
of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass
Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism's recent progress
report titled The Clock is Ticking. Could you tell us about or
explain for us the role of the Directorate in addressing this
threat and the focus of science and technology in bio
preparedness?
Mr. Buswell. Yes, ma'am. Let me start by saying that the
principle role of the Directorate in the National bio defense
effort has to do with the threat assessment and determination
process. So what are the highest threats, what are the threats
that we have to worry about above all others, whether that is
due to the likelihood that a terrorist could get a hold of this
material, whether it is due to the consequences of a successful
attack using the particular pathogen, and there are a lot of
things that go into that threat assessment. So one of our major
efforts is this bi-annual, bioterrorism risk assessment that
has been delivered to the Federal community and drives the
investment priorities across the Federal Government in bio
defense, whether those investment priorities are in
surveillance, bio surveillance, environmental, or other kinds
of surveillance, whether that is in the prioritization of
vaccine development within DHS enterprise, or other kinds of,
you know, intelligence community activities that might occur.
So the threat assessment is fundamental to the activities of
biodefense across the government.
The second thing that we do within the S&T Directorate that
really isn't done anywhere else in the government and so is a
unique mission that we have has to do with the bio forensics
aspect of things. What if there should be a successful attack
such as happened in 2001? We now have the National Bio
forensics Laboratory at Fort Detrick that DHS S&T operates in
order to attribute the attack in a way that is meaningful from
a law enforcement standpoint. In other words, we have got--we
have partnered with the FBI such that we maintain chain of
evidence, we do those kinds of things that will eventually
result in successful attribution and prosecution of folks who
do that kind of thing.
Ms. Biggert. Thank you. Then just one other question on
cybersecurity research. It seems like the bulk of the
activities are operational focused and are in the national
protection and programs, their Directorate. However, our
Committee has consistently emphasized the importance of R&D to
successfully addressing cybersecurity over the long-term. With
that in mind, could you talk about the Directorate's
cybersecurity R&D portfolio and if there is any new
technologies like the SmartGrid that are being included in
research assessments?
Mr. Buswell. Yes, ma'am. Our investment in cybersecurity
over the last three years has essentially tripled, much to the
credit of highlighting the importance by committees such as
this subcommittee and then the identification within the
President's own agenda. So the input function, if you look at
funding that way, is going the right direction in my opinion.
And we are about where we should be for the near-term. The key
then becomes how do you link the priorities of that research to
the overall priorities of both the Department and the Nation?
And that is an area that we can improve significantly, and I am
working closely with the folks over at NPPD (National
Protection and Programs Directorate), Phil Reitinger who is the
Deputy Under Secretary at NPPD and is really responsible for
the Department's cybersecurity effort. We meet biweekly in a
steering group that identifies not just the R&D priorities but
what are the cybersecurity priorities for the Department and
how, from a collective effort within the Department, can we
best advance those priorities?
So I will tell you that there is a lot of work to be done
in cybersecurity, but there is a lot of people doing work as
well. So the integration of all the efforts going on, both in
the public and the private sector, is fundamental to the
success of cybersecurity. Dr. Depoy's panel did an excellent
report for us on cybersecurity and has established a number of
recommendations. I don't know if you have time to expand upon
that, but we do have a number of priorities, and SmartGrid
technology, for example, to the extent that we can prevent
attacks on the grid from cyberspace fundamental to the
continuity of those systems which are important to the security
and the stability of the country. We will invest in those, in
cooperation with the Department of Energy who also has
responsibility for the reliability of the electric grid.
Ms. Biggert. Thank you. Thank you very much. I yield back.
Chairman Wu. Thank you. Mr. Tonko.
Mr. Tonko. Yes. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Perhaps to
Mr. Buswell but anyone on the panel might have some input here.
I do understand that at DHS you have to some degree on a
limited basis resorted to that turnaround of program managers
in your S&T operation, and it seems to be a practice that is
resorted to by DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency) and NSF (National Science Foundation) quite frequently.
Is there a way to stretch that concept over a greater number of
programs? How would you expand that practice within DHS to
perhaps utilize that rotation more frequently?
Mr. Buswell. Thank you. That is a great concept. The
Congress in its wisdom in the Homeland Security Act of 2002
gave S&T specifically the Homeland Security Advanced Research
Projects Agency, HSARPA, the authority, same authority as that
DARPA has, to hire technical experts out of the private sector
or other civil service on a term basis, and that term is five
years. It can be extended up to two more years under certain
circumstances. We have the authorization to hire 20 such of
these folks. We currently have 11. They are tied to the HSARPA
portfolio primarily. It is about a $44 million a year
portfolio, 11 is about the right number to manage programs in
that funding area. You know, to stretch that beyond what we are
doing right now, we would need to increase the innovation
portfolio funding level which I would be delighted to do. But
for right now, we are about at the right place I think with
that. And you are right, it is a valuable tool. It gives us
special hiring authority, special compensation authority so
that we can get really top-quality people out of the private
sector and out of other areas of government to manage these
kind of programs. It is paying off very well for us.
Mr. Tonko. Any particular way to expand that program, there
would be certain focus to where you would use these three- to
four- to five-year assignments?
Mr. Buswell. The focus that I would use on is in the highly
innovative kinds of research, in the things that are very high
risk, higher risk than we typically address in the Capstone IPT
process. But that is what the innovation portion of the
portfolio is for. It addresses the high-risk prototypical
demonstrations that again, because they are high risk with a
significant probability of failure, customers can't rely on us
to provide that solution in the time that they might need it.
So the analogy that is sometimes used is the Capstone IPTs
provide the three megapixel camera to the five megapixel camera
to the ten megapixel camera while we are looking in the
innovation portfolio at the gigapixel camera. What can we do
with a gigapixel camera that we can't do with the incremental
improvement that would tend to pursue lower risk in the
Capstone IPT process?
So that is the area I think that those--and that is the
area that we have the authorization to do that kind of hiring,
and to me that makes the most sense because you want to get
people in that are fresh out of the technology development
arena, you know, to manage those kinds of cutting-edge
programs.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you. Mr. Berteau.
Mr. Berteau. Yes, sir. I would like to add one additional
thought to your question of opportunities for expanding what I
think is a very useful potential to augment and enhance the
capability of the government workforce here.
When the S&T Directorate was originally established, I
think it was envisioned that it would have a more substantial
and more powerful role in the acquisition side of the
Department of Homeland Security than has evolved over time. I
think we have an opportunity with a new Administration to
reevaluate and reconsider that. When I go back to the point I
made about there needs to be better planning for transition of
research into programs, that is one of the areas where I think
not only could the S&T Directorate play a better role across
the Department but where in fact the opportunity for the term
appointments and the capability that they bring both at the
individual and the collective level would offer tremendous new
capability for the entire homeland security enterprise.
Mr. Tonko. Anyone else? Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Tonko. I want to
follow up on Mr. Tonko's inquiry because you know, this has
become a topic of great interest to me that some federal
agencies do a very good job of rotating people in and out of
Washington, D.C., whether it is for a multi-week internship or
for a few months or in some instances for a few years for
positions as significant as being a program manager. DARPA does
this, NSF does this, NIH (National Institutes of Health) does
this and integrates scientists from, in the NIH instance,
integrates scientists from around the country into the grant
review and peer review process. And I would like the panel to
comment on how useful this might be. And Mr. Buswell, I would
like you to respond. You know, outside of the formal program of
20, what impediments do you see to DHS and the S&T Director
implementing a broader program of linkages to academic centers,
think tanks, the private sector for bringing people in and out?
Because it is not just for the benefit of the S&T Directorate.
I think the residual benefit for the rest of the country is an
appreciation for how the agency works and indeed how Washington
works in some respects. And I would like to the extent any of
you are interested in commenting on this, all of you to comment
on it. Mr. Buswell, would you like to start?
Mr. Buswell. I would love to, yes, sir. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. There are a number of other opportunities besides
the--we call it the 1101s because it comes from the Defense
Authorization Act, Section 1101. So these 11 employees that we
have are affectionately termed 1101s. There are also a number
of fellowship opportunities that we taken advantage of,
Presidential Management Fellows, AAAS (American Association for
the Advancement of Science) Fellows, those kinds of things that
I think are very valuable in getting people into the
understanding of the Federal Government research and
development community.
Our scholars and fellows program within the Centers of
Excellence is also one of the fundamental things that I think
we are doing to improve that understanding and to get that
rotation. We have funded over the last six years over 400 of
these scholars and fellows across the country in areas of
academic development that we think are fundamental to homeland
security. They do internships in the summertime with the
national laboratories and other federal research and
development entities, and we think that that is really
valuable. We don't have enough statistical information yet on
the graduates to understand whether or not they are pursuing
careers in the Federal Government at least to start with, but
we are hopeful that it will result in, you know, a 10 to 20
percent perhaps participation of our scholars and fellows
graduates in long-term federal employment.
The other area that we can utilize and we do utilize to a
certain extent is the Intergovernmental Personnel Act
authorities where we are able to bring on folks from State and
local governments or from non-profit organizations that can
then work--they have really all the authorities of a federal
employee with certain limitations dealing with their parent
organization, you know, conflict of interest limitations as you
would expect. But to a large extent, they are able to gain a
great understanding of the way that we work within DHS, and
they can take that back to their parent organization at the end
of a two-year period and utilize that to the benefit of their
organization and to the benefit of our organization as well.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Buswell. Comments
from the rest of the panel in general or specifically, whether
DHS is sufficiently linked to the relevant research community.
Dr. Williams.
Dr. Williams. We used the word insularity in our report,
and that may have changed over the past few months. But we were
concerned that the Directorate wasn't reaching out enough to
the outside world and that that caused two potential problems.
One is that that limits the access to the ideas and innovations
that are going on on the outside for those who are working
inside the Directorate. But secondly as you pointed out, it
limits the ability of the community, the wider community, to
learn what is going on inside the Department of Homeland
Security and to start thinking about the problems that that
department has.
We noticed it particularly in our discussions of the need
for a peer review process. In several interviews we were told
explicitly by members of the staff in the Directorate that peer
review from outsiders wasn't needed because the program
managers themselves were the world's experts in the area where
they were reviewing projects.
Now, I doubt that they are the only world's experts, but if
they are the only world's experts, it tells you that we are
desperately in need as a Nation of getting their thinking,
their expertise out to a wider community, so that they won't be
the world's only experts in the future. And that thought built
value for us into the notion of having much more external peer
review.
Chairman Wu. Thank you, Dr. Williams. Dr. Depoy.
Dr. Depoy. Yes, I saw one very good example of this kind of
connectivity last summer and the summer before. The chem bio
IPT annually holds a three-day meeting in which they invite a
lot of people from throughout government and academia, and they
review nearly all their projects each year and ask for their
comments and certainly suggestions, as well as where similar
projects are going on in other agencies. And it was one of the
best meetings like that I have attended anywhere in the
government. But I believe that is the only IPT that has done
that as far as I know. But I think they have done it now for
several years.
Chairman Wu. So a model for emulation?
Dr. Depoy. Yes, absolutely.
Chairman Wu. Mr. Berteau.
Mr. Berteau. Thank you, sir. I think there is one other
potential advantage to an expansion such as Mr. Tonko has
offered and you have continued in the discussion here and that
is the benefit back to the user community. I think one of the
real challenges in homeland security S&T is that the users
often do not know the art of the possible. They are trying to
set a request or a requirement based on what they think they
need without having really defined the problem and without
knowing the art of the possible. And I think one of the
downstream benefits of expanding this kind of involvement with
people is the benefit upon return and going back to where they
have come from. And if we build that into the process there
could be some additional advantages downstream.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much. I think this will be a
topic of continuing interest to the Subcommittee.
Do we have any further inquiries on this side? Mr. Tonko? I
understand that you all have worked very hard on your
testimony. I would like to offer you a moment to comment on any
other aspects of the topics that we have been delving into that
we have not covered in Q&A or in your written testimony. I want
to offer you an opportunity to expand on any thoughts that you
think would be helpful for this subcommittee's inquiry. Mr.
Berteau.
Mr. Berteau. I do have one final thought for you to keep in
mind as you are evaluating DHS's performance in this regard. It
has been my observation from my time in Washington that much of
the Federal Government tends to do its research work, and the
beneficiary or the customer is outside the government. It is
the general population or some subset of the general
population. They may not know who they are at the time the
research is done, but that is the goal of those programs.
In some agencies, the Defense Department being perhaps
being the primary one here, the beneficiary of the research is
actually internal. Most of the research that the Defense
Department does it does for itself. It is the ultimate consumer
of that research, and that tends to have a different focus, a
different validation process, maybe even a different peer
review process.
DHS is a hybrid of the two, and in some cases, that makes
it much more complex and much more difficult for all of those
elements to be welded together. And I think it is useful as you
set your bar of how DHS is performing to keep that in mind,
that it really is a hybrid. Much of what it does it does for
itself or at least for the broader first responder community.
Much of what it does it also does for the external community.
And sometimes those are two different processes and two
different standards. So I would leave that just for your
thought.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Berteau. Dr.
Williams.
Dr. Williams. If I could bring up one other point. We
talked about how important the internal process is once you are
inside an IPT, for making sure that the priorities that are set
within an IPT have something to do with the customer's needs
and what the customer is asking for. But one of the astonishing
things we found was that there is no transparent mechanism at
all to compare priorities and reallocate the transition funds
among the various IPTs. And that means the broad allocation of
money across the Directorate doesn't necessarily reflect key
priorities or allow for taking advantage of emerging
opportunities that may happen in one area as opposed to the
other. It also means that the bottom of the funded projects in
one IPT may be significantly less important to DHS as a whole
than something that is close to the top of the unfunded
projects, again because there is no comparison and work across
the IPTs for setting priorities.
Now, some of this goes back to the fact that there is no
strategic plan. With no genuine strategic plan, there is no
established goals that everybody agrees to, and that makes it
hard to try to divide the money up any different way among the
IPTs than the way it was divided last year. But it struck us
that something needs to be done about that. They need an
explicit mechanism within the Directorate for dividing money
among the IPTs.
Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Dr. Williams, and thank
you all very much for contributing to our consideration and
contributing to Mr. Buswell and the Department's consideration.
I think it is fair to summarize that much progress has been
made since this series of hearings began. We will continue this
series of hearings, and we look forward to making additional
progress with the S&T Directorate and with DNDO. We do face
some different challenges as Mr. Berteau pointed out that this
is a hybrid organization with significant consumption within
the Department but also a large customer base for its products
outside the Department, and that presents some special
challenges.
I want to thank all the witnesses for appearing this
afternoon. The record will remain open for two weeks. I expect
that there will be some submitted questions about the IPTs and
consistency. And Members and the staff may seek answers to any
follow-up questions that the Committee may ask.
Again, I want to thank you for your testimony and your
presence here today. The witnesses are excused, and the hearing
is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix:
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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Bradley I. Buswell, Acting Under Secretary, Science and
Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS)
Questions submitted by Chairman David Wu
Q1. Currently the roles and responsibilities of IPT participants are
not explicitly defined. What effect has this had on DHS customers and
DHS S&T staff? How can DHS S&T better define these roles and
communicate them to the participants?
A1. I agree with the need to formalize the Capstone IPT process roles
and responsibilities. The S&T Directorate now has the experience to
recommend standardized best practices based on its work with the
Capstone IPT Process over the past two years. The timing is right to
develop a Management Directive that formalizes the Capstone IPT
alignment to DHS enterprise goals, priorities, and processes, and
formalizes Capstone IPT roles and responsibilities. As with the
initiation of the Capstone IPT process, we will brief all components
and participants on the roles and responsibilities being formalized in
the Management Directive.
Capstone IPT roles and responsibilities will also be re-enforced
during Technology Oversight Group (TOG) meetings, which are chaired by
the Department's Deputy Secretary, and during the semi-annual Under
Secretary for Science and Technology Technology's Capstone IPT Review.
Internal to the S&T Directorate, we are developing a phase gate
process. The phase gate process provides program managers with a
program management roadmap for project execution. Various gates are
established for project review to ensure all documents are complete and
on schedule. We are also developing program manager training to further
instill the process. Additionally, we hold weekly meetings with the
transition managers embedded in each of the six S&T Directorate
technical divisions. During these meetings, the IPT process is refined
and discussed for further dissemination to the program managers in the
divisions.
Question submitted by Representative Ben R. Lujan
Q1. National Laboratories, such as the two Department of Energy
National Labs in New Mexico, conduct a substantial amount of basic
research. Can you elaborate on how the National Laboratories can stay
tied into the basic research that is a part of the DHS S&T portfolio?
A1. The Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratories provide a
unique, world-renowned, interdisciplinary research capability that is
of tremendous value to the Nation in general and to the Department of
Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate (S&T)
specifically. S&T, through both the DHS Office of National Laboratories
(ONL) and S&T's technical divisions, works closely with DOE and its
national laboratories to identify opportunities for DHS to harness the
capabilities of the national laboratories to address the near- and
long-term technological needs in homeland security research. In
addition, DHS and DOE work together closely to develop and streamline
processes for collaboration and placement of work at the laboratories
once the work is identified, given DHS's special access to DOE's
national laboratories.
The Office of National Laboratories, established by the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, routinely leads and participates in meetings and
teleconferences with representatives of DOE and its national
laboratories to discuss S&T research priorities and laboratory
capabilities to meet those needs. ONL also holds and participates in
workshops and other events that provide opportunities for basic
research leads within each S&T technical division to discuss their
research portfolios with representatives of the research community,
including representatives of the DOE laboratories. ONL is planning
additional workshops that will focus on specific research areas of
interest. The DOE labs will be important participants in those
workshops, which are also intended to help form a research community
for homeland security technologies and maximize opportunities for the
application of capabilities, resources, and technologies, including
those of DOE's national laboratories, in addressing DHS's homeland
security mission.
One specific instance of collaboration of benefit to both agencies
and the national laboratories is DOE's invitation to representatives of
ONL and S&T's program divisions to participate in the DOE meetings
relating to its review of the national laboratories' Laboratory
Directed Research and Development (LDRD) activities. This collaboration
provides the opportunity for DHS to leverage the outcomes of LDRD
efforts by the national laboratories and offers the laboratories
opportunities to align portions of their LDRD portfolios to research
and development activities that can satisfy DHS homeland security
needs.
The Science and Technology Directorate also collaborates with DOE
and its national laboratories in aligning the best capabilities of the
laboratories to the needs of S&T's six program divisions. This
alignment provides S&T program managers a high quality resource in
leveraging the S&T research mission.
In its commitment to find the best technologies available to
address homeland security research and development needs, the S&T
publishes a brochure, Basic Research Focus Areas, which identifies gaps
in homeland security technologies that, if solved, could result in
scientific breakthroughs for the benefit of the Nation. The brochure is
provided directly to the DOE national laboratories and is available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
st-basic-research-focus-area
s-may-2009.pdf
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Phil E. Depoy, Vice Chairman, Homeland Security Science
and Technology Advisory Committee (HSSTAC) Assessment Panel
Questions submitted by Chairman David Wu
Q1. Currently the roles and responsibilities of IPT participants are
not explicitly defined. What effect has this had on DHS customers and
DHS S&T staff? How can DHS S&T better define these roles and
communicate them to the participants?
A1. In response to your question about the effect of the lack of
definition of roles and responsibilities of IPT participants, I
mentioned in my testimony that each of the IPT working groups has
developed their own processes for reviewing and prioritizing capability
gaps. Each of the processes which the HSSTAC has reviewed have their
own advantages and disadvantages, but I believe that it now time to
review the processes developed by all the working groups, select the
best practices, and document and standardize them across all IPTs. Each
of the six Divisions within S&T has its own Transition Lead who works
directly with the IPTs. These Leads should be responsible for
communicating the standardized processes to the IPT participants and
insuring that they are properly applied.
Question submitted by Representative Ben R. Lujan
Q1. National Laboratories, such as the two Department of Energy
National Labs in New Mexico, conduct a substantial amount of basic
research. Can you elaborate on how the National Laboratories can stay
tied into the basic research that is a part of the DHS S&T portfolio?
A1. In response to Vice Chairman Lujan's question about the National
Laboratories being tied into the S&T basic research portfolio, the
National Laboratories do receive basic research projects, but I
understand that they are given more specific tasking than that which is
given to the University Centers of Excellence. I mentioned in my
testimony that within the past year, the Directorate has taken steps to
increase the interaction of the Divisions with the COEs. The
Directorate has accomplished this by aligning the COEs with individual
Divisions and giving the Division Directors responsibility for
communicating with the Directors of the COEs on a regular basis. The
Division Directors are expected to keep the COEs informed about the
work of the Divisions and in particular, about capability gaps for
which no existing technologies are adequate. This appears to be working
reasonably well with some of the University COEs, but to my knowledge,
it has not been practiced with the National Laboratories, even though
they are already aligned with specific Divisions. If my understanding
is correct, it would seem to be relatively straightforward to extend
this practice to include the National Laboratories. Also, the FFRDCs
sponsored by the S&T Directorate are responsible for identifying
requirements that no available technologies can fill. Perhaps a more
direct tie can be made between the National Laboratories and the FFRDCs
so that this information is available to them.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by David J. Berteau, Senior Advisor and Director, Defense-
Industrial Initiatives, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Washington, DC
Questions submitted by Chairman David Wu
Q1. Currently the roles and responsibilities of IPT participants are
not explicitly defined. What effect has this had on DHS customers and
DHS S&T staff? How can DHS S&T better define these roles and
communicate them to the participants?
A1. The breadth of topic areas covered by the S&T IPTs dictate against
a single set of roles and responsibilities across all IPTs. I believe
that DHS S&T should have each IPT, as part of its participant
determination process, lay out participant roles and responsibilities
at that time.
Question submitted by Representative Ben R. Lujan
Q1. National Laboratories, such as the two Department of Energy
National Labs in New Mexico, conduct a substantial amount of basic
research. Can you elaborate on how the National Laboratories can stay
tied into the basic research that is a part of the DHS S&T portfolio?
A1. As I noted in both my statement and in my responses to questions
during the hearing, basic research is most valuable when it targets
specific capability shortfalls. I believe that the DOE labs need to tie
their research proposals to those specific shortfalls. This of course
requires DHS to specify those shortfalls, which in turn depends upon a
better strategic planning process and abetter capabilities assessment
process within DHS.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Cindy Williams, Chair, Panel on the DHS Science and
Technology Directorate, National Academy of Public
Administration; Shapiro Visiting Professor of International
Affairs, The Elliott School of International Affairs, George
Washington University; Principal Research Scientist, Security
Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Questions submitted by Chairman David Wu
Q1. Currently the roles and responsibilities of IPT participants are
not explicitly defined. What effect has this had on DHS customers and
DHS S&T staff? How can DHS S&T better define these roles and
communicate them to the participants?
A1. The roles and responsibilities of IPT participants are not
explicitly defined. As a result, they vary substantially from one IPT
to another. In some instances, the customers believe that their role
should be to dictate the solution, instead of working with S&T to
clarify their needs and letting S&T identify appropriate solutions. In
other cases, S&T is overly involved in prioritizing the capability gaps
for the customer. This lack of a clear, shared understanding of the
roles and responsibilities of the various participants causes confusion
among customers and frustration among the DHS S&T staff. It also means
that some IPTs work far better than others.
Because the work of the IPTs is a shared responsibility between DHS
S&T and its customers, DHS S&T cannot define the IPT roles and
responsibilities on its own. The National Academy of Public
Administration (NAPA) Panel that I chaired found that some components
took their work with S&T more seriously than others, and that the
success of the IPTs correlated with the commitment of the customers to
the IPT process. Defining roles and responsibilities jointly with the
component customers could improve the components' levels of commitment
to the process and the projects undertaken, thus strengthening the IPT
process and improving S&T outcomes. The NAPA Panel recommended that the
S&T Directorate work with its stakeholders to develop an IPT charter
that delineates roles and responsibilities of participants, and
establishes common terminology and standard operating procedures.
At a minimum, I personally believe that such a charter should
include descriptions of the roles and responsibilities of S&T staff and
customer participants in identifying and prioritizing capability gaps,
identifying potential solutions and estimating their costs, selecting
solutions to pursue, developing transition plans for those solutions,
developing schedules, milestones, and metrics for evaluating projects
undertaken, evaluating and reporting on projects, and deciding when
projects should be terminated.
Question submitted by Representative Ben R. Lujan
Q1. National Laboratories, such as the two Department of Energy
National Labs in New Mexico, conduct a substantial amount of basic
research. Can you elaborate on how the National Laboratories can stay
tied into the basic research that is apart of the DHS S&T portfolio?
A1. In FY 2009, 26 percent of DHS S&T's basic research was conducted by
the Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratories. (DOE's National
Laboratories also play a significant, but separate role in the work of
DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) ). The Homeland Security
Act of 2002 authorizes DHS to draw on the expertise of all government
laboratories, and particularly on DOE's National Laboratories, to
achieve its mission.
The NAPA Panel that I chaired found that whenever possible, funds
for basic research should be awarded through competitive processes that
include external scientific peer review. Evaluating the impact of basic
research is not possible over the short-term, so ensuring quality in
design and execution of the work is critical. Additionally, competition
for funding is a major factor in expanding the pool of researchers
interested in working in certain areas--in this case homeland
security--and consequently, expanding the Nation's capacity for that
research.
The extent to which competition is used in S&T's award of projects
to the National Laboratories is unclear. Division research leads and
others in the S&T Directorate told NAPA staff that funding is often
directed to a specific laboratory without competition. On the other
hand, they indicated that at times the National Laboratories do compete
for S&T funding.
The NAPA Panel found a climate of insularity in the DHS S&T
community. Such insularity can hamper the identification of fresh
approaches and stifle innovation. The Panel found that the practice of
designating a specific laboratory to carry out work may reduce
competition, thereby fostering that insularity. The Panel recommended
that the Directorate make competitive processes that include external
scientific peer review the norm for basic research. Such processes will
help to increase S&T's confidence and that of its clients that the
extent and nature of its basic research is thoroughly vetted and that
the research being conducted--whether in one of the National
Laboratories or elsewhere--is of the highest standards of excellence.
The National Laboratories have recognized expertise, and partnering
with the Laboratories can help DHS capitalize on the Laboratories'
substantial funding from other sources. In 2008, the Directorate began
to align the National Laboratories with its six technical divisions,
based on matches between the mission requirements of the divisions and
the technical capabilities of the various Laboratories. The intent is
for individual technical divisions in S&T to learn more about what the
individual Laboratories have to offer and for the Laboratories to learn
more about the technical divisions' needs, to inform future project
development and performer selection. The NAPA Panel that I chaired
found that such alignments have the potential to support more
productive relationships, increase S&T's success in leveraging National
Laboratory work related to homeland security, and increase efficiency.
We also found, however, that such alignments, along with the practice
of designating an individual laboratory to do work, may further reduce
competition and foster insularity. I personally expect that this
tension between the expedience of exclusive ties with individual
laboratories and the benefits of greater openness and competition will
persist into the future.