    [House Hearing, 111 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                       DEVELOPING RESEARCH PRIORITIES AT
                          DHS'S SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
                                  DIRECTORATE

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                   SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION

                      COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                OCTOBER 27, 2009

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 111-60

                                   __________

         Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology

         Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.science.house.gov

                                     ______

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                      COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

                       HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chair
    JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois          RALPH M. HALL, Texas
    EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas         F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
    LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California              Wisconsin
    DAVID WU, Oregon                     LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
    BRIAN BAIRD, Washington              DANA ROHRABACHER, California
    BRAD MILLER, North Carolina          ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
    DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois            VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
    GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona          FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
    DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland           JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
    MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio                W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
    BEN R. LUJAN, New Mexico             RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
    PAUL D. TONKO, New York              BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
    PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama             MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
    STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey        MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
    JIM MATHESON, Utah                   BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
    LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee             ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
    BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky               PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
    RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri              PETE OLSON, Texas
    BARON P. HILL, Indiana
    HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona
    CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
    KATHLEEN DAHLKEMPER, Pennsylvania
    ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
    SUZANNE M. KOSMAS, Florida
    GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
    VACANCY
                                     ------

                   Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation

                          HON. DAVID WU, Oregon, Chair
    DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland           ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
    BEN R. LUJAN, New Mexico             JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
    PAUL D. TONKO, New York              W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
    DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois            PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
    HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona
    GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
    BART GORDON, Tennessee               RALPH M. HALL, Texas
                     MIKE QUEAR Subcommittee Staff Director
            MEGHAN HOUSEWRIGHT Democratic Professional Staff Member
                TRAVIS HITE Democratic Professional Staff Member
                HOLLY LOGUE Democratic Professional Staff Member
                 DAN BYERS Republican Professional Staff Member
                      VICTORIA JOHNSTON Research Assistant

                                C O N T E N T S

                                October 27, 2009

                                                                       Page
    Witness List.....................................................     2

    Hearing Charter..................................................     3

                               Opening Statements

    Statement by Representative David Wu, Chairman, Subcommittee on
      Technology and Innovation, Committee on Science and Technology,
      U.S. House of Representatives..................................     5
        Written Statement............................................     6

    Statement by Representative Adrian Smith, Ranking Minority
      Member, Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation, Committee on
      Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives..........     6
        Written Statement............................................     7

                                   Witnesses:

    Mr. Bradley I. Buswell, Acting Under Secretary, Science and
      Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
      (DHS)
        Oral Statement...............................................     8
        Written Statement............................................    10
        Biography....................................................    19

    Dr. Phil E. Depoy, Vice Chairman, Homeland Security Science and
      Technology Advisory Committee (HSSTAC) Assessment Panel
        Oral Statement...............................................    19
        Written Statement............................................    21
        Biography....................................................    23

    Mr. David J. Berteau, Senior Advisor and Director, Defense-
      Industrial Initiatives, Center for Strategic and International
      Studies, Washington, DC
        Oral Statement...............................................    24
        Written Statement............................................    26
        Biography....................................................    28

    Dr. Cindy Williams, Chair, Panel on the DHS Science and
      Technology Directorate, National Academy of Public
      Administration; Shapiro Visiting Professor of International
      Affairs, The Elliott School of International Affairs, George
      Washington University; Principal Research Scientist, Security
      Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
        Oral Statement...............................................    29
        Written Statement............................................    30
        Biography....................................................    37

    Discussion.......................................................    37

                  Appendix: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

    Mr. Bradley I. Buswell, Acting Under Secretary, Science and
      Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
      (DHS)..........................................................    50

    Dr. Phil E. Depoy, Vice Chairman, Homeland Security Science and
      Technology Advisory Committee (HSSTAC) Assessment Panel........    52

    Mr. David J. Berteau, Senior Advisor and Director, Defense-
      Industrial Initiatives, Center for Strategic and International
      Studies, Washington, DC........................................    53

    Dr. Cindy Williams, Chair, Panel on the DHS Science and
      Technology Directorate, National Academy of Public
      Administration; Shapiro Visiting Professor of International
      Affairs, The Elliott School of International Affairs, George
      Washington University; Principal Research Scientist, Security
      Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.........    54

        DEVELOPING RESEARCH PRIORITIES AT DHS'S SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
                                  DIRECTORATE

                                  ----------

                           TUESDAY, OCTOBER 27, 2009

                      House of Representatives,
             Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation,
                           Committee on Science and Technology,
                                                        Washington, DC.

        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:08 p.m., in
    Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. David Wu
    [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

                                hearing charter

                   SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION

                      COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

                         U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                       Developing Research Priorities at

                    DHS's Science and Technology Directorate

                           tuesday, october 27, 2009
                              2:00 p.m.-4:00 p.m.
                       2318 rayburn house office building

    1. Purpose

        On Tuesday, October 27, 2009 the Subcommittee on Technology and
    Innovation of the Committee on Science and Technology will hold a
    hearing to review activities at the Science and Technology Directorate
    of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS S&T).

    2. Witnesses

    Mr. Brad Buswell is the Acting Under Secretary of the Science and
    Technology Directorate at the Department of Homeland Security.

    Dr. Phil Depoy is the Chairman of the Homeland Security Science and
    Technology Advisory Committee.

    Mr. David Berteau is the Senior Adviser and Director of the Defense
    Industrial Initiatives Group at the Center for Strategic and
    International Studies.

    Dr. Cindy Williams is the Chair of the Committee on the DHS Science and
    Technology Directorate at the National Academy of Public
    Administration. She is also the Shapiro Visiting Professor of
    International Affairs at the Elliot School of International Affairs at
    George Washington University.

    3. Brief Overview

        The hearing will have witnesses assess and discuss various elements
    of DHS S&T including the strategic planning process, stakeholder
    involvement in setting research priorities, and the role of basic
    research in the DHS S&T portfolio. Many of the questions posed to
    witnesses are ongoing concerns that Members of the Technology and
    Innovation Subcommittee have expressed in past hearings. It is the goal
    of the Subcommittee to highlight these issues for the benefit of the
    incoming Under Secretary of the Science and Technology Directorate.

    4. Background

        The Department of Homeland Security's research and development
    portfolio is concentrated in the Science and Technology Directorate and
    the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). With an FY 2010 budget
    request of $968 million, DHS S&T is responsible for carrying out
    research on behalf of federal homeland security agencies and
    coordinating this research with other federal research entities. DNDO
    conducts research on the detection of nuclear devices and has a FY 2010
    budget request of $366 million.
        DHS S&T is currently organized in a matrix style management
    structure. There are three research directors that oversee portfolios
    containing long-term basic research, shorter-term applied research, and
    technology transition. These portfolios stretch across DHS S&T's six
    divisions:

             Chemical and Biological: detection and mitigation of chemical
            and biological weapons threats

             Explosives: detection of and response to conventional (non-
            nuclear) explosives

             Human Factors: social science research to improve detection,
            analysis, and understanding of threats posed by individuals as
            well as how communities respond to disasters

             Infrastructure and Geophysical: identifies and mitigates
            threats to critical infrastructure

             Border and Maritime: develops technologies for monitoring land
            and maritime borders

             Command, Control, and Inter-operability: research and
            development support for inter-operable communications and cyber
            security R&D

    5. Issues and Concerns

    Science and Technology Directorate Strategic Plan
        Witnesses will discuss the methods and criteria used to develop
    research and development priorities at DHS S&T and how these may be
    improved. Witnesses were asked to discuss the need for a comprehensive
    threat assessment accounting for the impact and likelihood of potential
    threats. The concern is that the DHS S&T strategic plan does not
    provide a justified roadmap for future research, but only describes
    ongoing projects. Homeland security experts contend that a true
    strategic plan should be grounded in comprehensive threat assessments,
    detailed in how research priorities align with the needs of the
    customer, and coordinated with the research plans of other federal
    research entities.

    Integrated Product Teams
        There are thirteen Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) in DHS S&T that
    provide input into the research plans based on their needs in the
    field. The IPT members are almost entirely made up of representatives
    from the various operational divisions within DHS (Coast Guard,
    Transportation Security Administration, Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement, etc.). Some examples of the corresponding IPTs include:
    First Responder, Border Security, Cyber Security, and People Screening.
    In past hearings, the Members of the Technology and Innovation
    Subcommittee voiced concerns about the fact that the Nation's local
    first responders are a critical recipient of DHS S&T work, but were not
    represented in the research planning process. As a result, DHS S&T
    formed a First Responder IPT to address the needs of the police,
    firefighters, and rescue personnel.
        For this hearing, witnesses will assess the IPT process and discuss
    whether the IPTs are fulfilling their intended role as vehicles for
    stakeholder input in research priorities. There are concerns over
    uneven levels of organization, representation, and impact of the IPTs.

    Basic Research at the Centers of Excellence
        DHS S&T allocates 20 percent of its spending to basic research and
    supports twelve university-based Centers of Excellence. The
    Subcommittee has asked witnesses to discuss the role of basic research
    in the S&T portfolio and how this research is executed at the Centers
    of Excellence. Homeland security experts have expressed concern that
    the basic research work is not properly integrated into later phases of
    DHS S&T's research. There is also concern over how basic research
    priorities are set without the guidance of a true strategic plan.
        Chairman Wu. This hearing will come to order this
    afternoon. I want to welcome everybody to this afternoon's
    hearing on the Department of Homeland Security's Science and
    Technology Directorate (DHS S&T). Research and development
    efforts at the Directorate are critical to supporting not just
    the missions of the agencies within DHS, but our country's
    first responders all over this Nation and the world. This
    subcommittee continues to do all it can to assist the
    Directorate in its mission to deliver quality technical
    solutions to all of its stakeholders.
        In past hearings, this subcommittee has made many
    recommendations to the Directorate, and I am very pleased to
    see that some of these recommendations have been acted upon. In
    response to stakeholder and Subcommittee requests, the
    Directorate has added a 13th Integrated Product Team to give
    local fire, rescue, and police workers a direct voice in
    federal research priorities.
        I am also pleased to see that funding for basic research is
    now 20 percent of the Directorate's portfolio. As you know,
    this subcommittee firmly believes that basic research plays a
    critical role in the R&D (research and development) process. By
    increasing the presence of basic research at the Directorate,
    it has shown a commitment to not only solve today's problems
    but also to position itself to meet future challenges.
        While there have been many improvements at the Directorate,
    I continue to have some concerns. Although the Integrated
    Product Teams (IPTs) now include all of the major stakeholders,
    there seems to be some inconsistency with how efficiently and
    effectively the IPTs operate. I would like to hear from the
    witnesses about ways we can ensure that the IPTs are properly
    organized to enable the highest levels of collaboration between
    the Directorate and its stakeholders.
        Finally, there is one area of great concern that has yet to
    be addressed by the Directorate. Over the course of multiple
    hearings, this subcommittee has expressed concern about the
    lack of a comprehensive threat assessment as a foundation for
    determining research priorities. The current strategic plan
    does little to define the direction of research activities and
    is not grounded in a formal threat assessment. I do not find it
    acceptable. I think this subcommittee has trouble with the
    thought that plans are made without reference to a proper
    analysis of threats and the dangers they pose, especially when
    considering that we rely on the Directorate's plans to protect
    our country from all future threats.
        While I am encouraged by progress in many areas of the
    Science and Technology Directorate, I am somewhat frustrated at
    the lack of such a crucial element in the effectiveness of
    almost a $1 billion dollar research enterprise. I am eager to
    hear the witnesses' expert opinions on these concerns and
    moreover would strongly encourage the incoming Under Secretary
    to address these issues with utmost urgency.
        And at this point, I would like to recognize my friend and
    colleague, the gentleman from Nebraska, for his opening
    statement.
        [The prepared statement of Chairman Wu follows:]
                    Prepared Statement of Chairman David Wu
        I want to welcome everyone to this afternoon's hearing on the
    Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate.
    Research and development efforts at the Directorate are critical to
    supporting not just the missions of the agencies within DHS, but our
    country's first responders. This subcommittee continues to do all it
    can to assist the Directorate in its mission to deliver quality
    technical solutions to all stakeholders.
        In past hearings, this subcommittee has made many recommendations
    to the Directorate and I am very pleased to see that some of these
    recommendations have been acted upon. In response to stakeholder and
    Subcommittee requests, the Directorate has added a 13th Integrated
    Product Team--the First Responder IPT--to give local fire, rescue, and
    police workers a direct voice into federal research priorities.
        I am also pleased to see that funding for basic research is now 20
    percent of the Directorate's portfolio. As you know, this subcommittee
    firmly believes that basic research plays a critical role in the R&D
    process. By increasing the presence of basic research at the
    Directorate, it has shown a commitment to not only solve today's
    problems, but position itself to meet future issues head-on.
        While there have been many improvements at the Directorate, I
    continue to have many concerns. Although the Integrated Product Teams
    now include all of the major stakeholders, there seems to be an
    inconsistency with how efficiently and effectively the IPTs operate. I
    would like to hear from witnesses about ways we can ensure that the IPT
    process is properly organized to enable the highest levels of
    collaboration amongst the Directorate and its stakeholders.
        Finally, there is one area of great concern that has yet to be
    addressed by the Directorate. Over the course of multiple hearings,
    this subcommittee has expressed the need for a comprehensive threat
    assessment to use as a foundation for determining research priorities.
    The current strategic plan does little to define the direction of
    research activities and is not grounded in any formal threat
    assessment. It is unacceptable that plans are made without a proper
    analysis of threats and the dangers they pose, especially when
    considering that we rely on the Directorate's plans to protect our
    country from future threats.
        While I am encouraged by progress in many areas of the Science and
    Technology Directorate, I am increasingly frustrated at the lack of
    such a crucial element to the effectiveness of an almost one billion
    dollar research investment. I am eager to hear the witnesses' expert
    opinions on these concerns and more, and would strongly encourage the
    incoming Under Secretary to address these issues with the utmost
    urgency.

        Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this
    hearing today to examine the activities of the Department of
    Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate.
        In 2002, this committee played a key role in shaping the
    creation of DHS, specifically calling for the establishment an
    S&T Directorate within the new department to fund R&D and
    advised the Secretary on S&T related policies.
        While agency growing pains always present a challenge, in
    the seven years since its creation, the Directorate has
    demonstrated respectable progress refining its roles and
    responsibilities in instituting a sound organizational
    structure and operating processes.
        However, one of the critical policy challenges the
    Committee recognized in 2002 still remains, development of a
    true strategic plan to inform, prioritize and guide the work of
    the Directorate.
        In one sense, the absence of a strategic plan reflects the
    magnitude of the challenge inherent in the Department's
    mission. From our transportation and infrastructure to our food
    and agricultural system to our land and seaports of entry, just
    to name a few, the diversity of potential terrorist threats and
    targets to the homeland is certainly endless. This makes the
    management and policy issues associated with quantifying and
    prioritizing risks and associated S&T activities a monumental
    task. But the high degree of difficulty doesn't make it any
    less important. Without an effective strategic plan, the
    Directorate has no foundation from which to systematically
    guide development of priorities and measure performance toward
    objectives.
        So I hope and expect the Directorate will expedite such a
    plan in the coming months. I also look forward to hearing from
    the Administration and other witnesses regarding a number of
    other, more specific issues which are important to the success
    of the Directorate and the Department going forward. Among
    these are the evolution of the S&T Directorate's integrated
    product teams and the balance of and focus on activities across
    the R&D pipeline from basic research to technology development.
        I certainly thank the witnesses for taking your time today,
    and I do look forward to the discussion. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]
               Prepared Statement of Representative Adrian Smith
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing today to examine
    the activities of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and
    Technology (S&T) Directorate. In 2002, this committee played a key role
    in shaping the creation of DHS, specifically calling for establishment
    of an S&T Directorate within the new department to fund R&D and advise
    the Secretary of Homeland Security on S&T-related policies.
        While agency ``growing pains'' always present a challenge, in the
    seven years since its creation, the S&T Directorate has demonstrated
    respectable progress, refining its roles and responsibilities and
    instituting a sound organizational structure and operating processes.
    However, one of the critical policy challenges the Committee recognized
    in 2002 still remains: development of a true strategic plan to inform,
    prioritize, and guide the work of the Directorate.
        In one sense, the absence of a strategic plan reflects the
    magnitude of the challenge inherent in the Department's mission. From
    our transportation and infrastructure to our food and agricultural
    system to our land and sea ports of entry--to name a few--the diversity
    of potential terrorist threats and targets to the homeland is seemingly
    endless. This makes the management and policy issues associated with
    quantifying and prioritizing risks and associated S&T activities a
    monumental task.
        But the high degree of difficulty doesn't make it any less
    important. Without an effective strategic plan, the Directorate has no
    foundation from which to systematically guide development of priorities
    and measure performance toward objectives. So I hope and expect the
    Directorate will expedite such a plan in the coming months.
        I also look forward to hearing from the Administration and other
    witnesses regarding a number of other, more specific issues which are
    important to the success of the Directorate and the Department going
    forward. Among these are the evolution of the S&T Directorate's
    Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) and the balance of and focus on
    activities across the R&D pipeline, from basic research to technology
    development.
        I thank the witnesses for being with us today, and I look forward
    to a productive discussion.

        Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Smith. If there are
    any other Members who wish to submit opening statements, the
    statements will be added to the record at this point.
        And now I would like to introduce our witnesses for this
    afternoon. First, Mr. Brad Buswell is the Acting Under
    Secretary of the Science and Technology Directorate at the
    Department of Homeland Security. Dr. Phil Depoy is the Chairman
    of the Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory
    Committee (HSSTAC). Mr. David Berteau is the Senior Advisor and
    Director of the Defense Industrial Initiatives Group at the
    Center for Strategic and International Studies. And finally,
    Dr. Cindy Williams is the Chair of the Panel on the DHS Science
    and Technology Directorate of the National Academy of Public
    Administration, and she is also the Shapiro Visiting Professor
    of International Affairs at the Elliott School of International
    Affairs at George Washington University and a principal
    research scientist at the Securities Studies Program at MIT.
        Each of you will have five minutes for your spoken
    testimony. Your written testimony will be included in the
    record in their entirety, and when you complete all of your
    testimony, we will begin with questions, and each Member will
    have five minutes to question the panel.
        Mr. Buswell, please proceed.

     STATEMENT OF MR. BRADLEY I. BUSWELL, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY,
    SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
                             SECURITY (DHS)

        Mr. Buswell. Thank you very much, Chairman Wu, Ranking
    Member Smith, and other Members and staff. It is an honor to
    appear here before you here today, and it is an honor to appear
    with such a distinguished panel. I commend you on the assembly.
    I look forward to talking to you today about the progress that
    we have made in developing the Science and Technology
    Directorate and placing ourselves in a position to provide
    advanced technological solutions to protect the American people
    and to protect the critical infrastructures that we depend on.
    As you said, Mr. Chairman, the Directorate is charged with
    providing technical support and tools to the DHS operating
    components and as importantly or perhaps even more importantly,
    to our nation's first responders, those brave men and women who
    are on the front lines of homeland security every day.
        Let me just start by saying I am grateful for the strong
    leadership of Secretary Napolitano. She has emphasized
    consistently the importance of science and technology and
    securing our nation and has also repeatedly underscored the
    importance of strengthening the relationships with the State,
    local, tribal and territorial agencies, and I think S&T is
    making significant inroads in that regard, as you mentioned in
    your opening statement. Also, I greatly appreciate the
    leadership of the Congress and this subcommittee's support. The
    informed counsel of both Members and staff has been invaluable
    to our efforts to position the Directorate for accountability
    and tangible results.
        The Subcommittee is familiar with the S&T Directorate's
    efforts over the past three years to realign the structure,
    portfolio and business operations in an effort to expedite the
    delivery of advanced technological solutions to our customers,
    and I am pleased to report that that restructuring has been
    fully implemented, and we are wholly engaged in responding to
    the near- and the long-term technology capability needs of the
    components and other customers.
        You specifically asked that I address three areas of
    interest to the Subcommittee. First of all, our priorities in
    developing the research and development portfolio, the role on
    the caps on integrated product teams in determining those
    priorities, and the role of basic research, both in the overall
    S&T portfolio and specifically at the university-based Centers
    of Excellence.
        The first two are really closely intertwined. The research
    and development priorities of the Directorate are primarily
    customer driven through our Capstone integrated product teams,
    or IPTs. The IPTs provide direct stakeholder input into the
    selection and prioritization of our research investments, and
    our customers chair those IPTs. So they establish their
    capability priorities based on their assessment of risk in the
    mission areas for which they are responsible. This gets a
    little bit to your point of a comprehensive threat assessment.
    We rely on our customers to incorporate the threat as they see
    it into their overall risk assessment and identify technology
    gaps in a priority way to address those risks.
        The customer-driven Capstone IPT process directly drives
    about 50 percent of our overall investment, but it also
    importantly informs the rest of the portfolio's basic research
    and innovation. What we learned from our stakeholders through
    the process about their operations and about their future
    capability needs help influencing those other investments that
    we also make with the innovation and the basic research
    portfolio.
        For those reasons, all three of the portfolio members,
    basic research, innovation and transition, are participants in
    the IPT process. As I said, the more insight that we gain, the
    better we understand and the better we are positioned to
    identify promising areas of research and explore innovative
    solutions that are outside the development timeframe or risk
    tolerance of the near-term focused IPT process.
        While there is room for improvement in any process, I am
    pleased with the progress we have made in implementing and
    institutionalizing the Capstone IPTs. As you said, I am
    especially proud of the addition this year of the 13th Capstone
    IPT in support of the first responders. I am happy to provide
    more information on that during the Q&A session if you are
    interested.
        Let me talk quickly about, briefly, the basic research
    portfolio. Basic research really fulfills two very important
    roles in the S&T Directorate. First, it lays the foundation for
    future technology development. It is what we use to keep the
    technology pipeline full. We invest in projects that are
    addressing capability needs for which we have no near-term
    solution or with existing or near-existing technologies or the
    solutions are of too high a risk for the customers to be able
    to rely on. It also allows us to make investments based on what
    science has to offer. So with a small investment, we may be
    able to cultivate a promising technology that would yield a
    significant life-saving capability.
        Secondly, our investment into basic research which is
    conducted primarily at our national laboratories and our
    university-based Centers of Excellence also serves to develop
    the scientific workforce that this country will need to
    continue developing scientific understanding and technology in
    the homeland security area, specifically as far as we are
    concerned but in all areas well into the future.
        And given the broad spectrum of science and technology
    requirements associated with the Homeland Security mission, we
    value our relationship with the Department of Energy (DOE)
    National Laboratories and with their renowned interdisciplinary
    capabilities as well as the university-based Centers of
    Excellence.
        Let me conclude by addressing the topic that Congressman
    Smith raised about the development of a strategic plan. The
    last strategic plan that we published was in June of 2007
    following a major reorganization of the Directorate and the
    research portfolio. As was appropriate at that time, that plan
    was focused on establishing the business practices that were
    necessary to make the S&T Directorate relevant to the homeland
    security enterprise. Based upon the strategic goals and
    objectives that are being identified in the forthcoming
    Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, we will be updating that
    strategic plan over the next few months. And this update will
    be more in line with the guidance published by OMB (Office of
    Management and Budget) and GAO (Government Accountability
    Office) for effective strategic planning.
        So again, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for all
    you do in support of our mission, and thank you for the
    opportunity to meet with you today and I look forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Buswell follows:]
                    Prepared Statement of Bradley I. Buswell

    INTRODUCTION

        Good afternoon, Chairman Wu, Congressman Smith, and distinguished
    Members of the Subcommittee. I am honored to appear before you today to
    report on the progress of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS)
    Science and Technology Directorate (S&T Directorate) in advancing
    technological solutions to protect the American people and the critical
    infrastructures our society depends upon.
        The S&T Directorate is charged with providing technical support and
    tools to the major DHS operating components and to our nation's first
    responders--the brave men and women who routinely face risk on the
    front lines of homeland security. I appreciate the Subcommittee's
    support of the S&T Directorate as it continues to mature and grow in
    areas critical to our mission of enabling technology applications to
    address critical gaps in homeland security. Toward this end, the
    Directorate provides technical support and tools to the major DHS
    operating components, and to our Nation's first responders--the brave
    men and women who routinely face risk on the front lines of homeland
    security.
        I am very grateful for the strong leadership of Secretary
    Napolitano, who not only has emphasized the importance of science and
    technology in securing our nation, but has also repeatedly underscored
    the importance of strengthening relationships with State, local, tribal
    and territorial agencies--an area where the S&T Directorate continues
    to make significant inroads.
        I greatly appreciate the Subcommittee's support of the S&T
    Directorate as it pursues its mission. I appreciate the leadership
    Congress has shown in supporting the S&T Directorate's endeavors. I am
    thankful for the engaged and non-partisan nature of our relationship.
    Our collaboration with both Congressional Members and their staffs has
    been invaluable to the Department's efforts to position the S&T
    Directorate for accountability, tangible results, and success.
        The Subcommittee is familiar with the S&T Directorate's efforts
    over the past three years to realign its structure, research portfolio,
    and business operations in an effort to expedite the delivery of
    advanced technological solutions to our customers. I am pleased to
    report that the restructuring plan has been fully and successfully
    implemented. The S&T Directorate is now wholly engaged in responding to
    the near- and long-term technological capability needs of the DHS
    components and their customers.
        This testimony will primarily address three areas of interest
    expressed by the Subcommittee: the S&T Directorate's research and
    development (R&D) priorities and planning; the role of Capstone
    Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) in determining research priorities; and
    the role of basic research, both in the overall S&T research portfolio
    and specifically at the Homeland Security Centers of Excellence. I will
    also discuss some of the S&T Directorate's recent accomplishments and
    ongoing activities in these and other significant areas.

    S&T DIRECTORATE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES AND PLANNING

        The research and development priorities of the S&T Directorate are
    primarily customer-driven through our Capstone IPTs, a process
    described in detail later in this testimony. The customers and
    stakeholders in this iterative process play an important role in the
    informing the S&T Directorate's decisions about its research and
    development investments.
        The S&T Directorate's Basic Research projects are initiated in one
    of two ways. First, DHS components can express a technological need for
    which we have no near-term solutions with existing or near-existing
    technologies. Second, Basic Research projects may also originate from
    what science has to offer. With a small investment, DHS can help
    cultivate a promising technology that could ultimately yield a
    significant life-saving capability.
        The S&T Directorate last published a Strategic Plan in June 2007.
    This plan focused on establishing the business practices by which the
    S&T Directorate would address the research and development needs of the
    homeland security enterprise. Based upon the forthcoming Quadrennial
    Homeland Security Review, we will be updating our strategic plan to
    support the strategic goals and objectives determined by the Review.
    This update will be in accordance with the guidance outlined in the OMB
    Circular A-11, Part 6.
        The S&T Strategic Plan is a separate document from the National
    Homeland Security Science and Technology Strategy that the S&T
    Directorate is developing as directed by the Homeland Security Act of
    2002, Section 302(2), which states that the Secretary of Homeland
    Security, through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, shall
    develop ``in consultation with other appropriate executive agencies, a
    national policy and strategic plan for, identifying priorities, goals,
    objectives and policies for, and coordinating the Federal Government's
    civilian efforts to identify and develop countermeasures to chemical,
    biological, radiological, nuclear, and other emerging terrorist
    threats, including the development of comprehensive, research-based
    definable goals for such efforts and development of annual measurable
    objectives and specific targets to accomplish and evaluate the goals
    for such efforts.''
        The S&T Directorate's 2008 report, ``Coordination of Homeland
    Security Science and Technology,'' was an important step toward
    establishing a national strategy. The report laid out the role and
    responsibilities of federal agencies as well as the initiatives
    underway to counter threats to homeland security. The S&T Directorate
    is currently revising this 2008 effort in conjunction with the QHSR.

    Strategic Coordination: External and Internal

        The S&T Directorate's Strategic Plan provides the business
    framework that S&T uses to carry out its mission. A key aspect of the
    plan involves formal efforts to coordinate homeland security research
    and development with other federal agencies and the private sector.
    This coordination is extensive--for example, the S&T Directorate has 30
    chairs and members of relevant National Science and Technology Council
    committees, subcommittees, and working groups.
        Through the use of formal processes, the S&T Directorate limits
    unnecessary duplication of effort and leverages the valuable skills,
    experience and resources of other government agencies and the private
    sector. These formal processes include participation in interagency
    groups that work to coordinate research and development across Federal,
    State, local and tribal governments and in the private sector.
        Inputs from the S&T Directorate's interagency and private sector
    coordination efforts are reflected in the Directorate's 2008-2013 Five-
    Year Research and Development Plan, which lays out the blueprint for
    its investment portfolio and outlines the S&T Directorate's research
    emphasis, programs, and key milestones.
        The following table provides examples of participation by S&T
    Directorate divisions and offices in formal interagency coordination
    groups.

        In addition, the S&T Directorate facilitates coordination with
    customers and technology providers across its divisions and offices.
    For example:

              The S&T Directorate's Transition Office coordinates
            with all S&T divisions to minimize duplication and ensure that
            the S&T Directorate is leveraging technology available in both
            the government and private sectors. The Transition Office
            facilitates 13 customer-led Capstone Integrated Product Teams
            (IPTs) to ensure visibility into customers' capability gaps and
            technology needs. Two formal Capstone IPT reviews are conducted
            each year to provide customer visibility into the S&T
            Directorate's cross-functional programs and facilitate
            discussion on available DHS-external technologies/capabilities.

              S&T has an Interagency and First Responder Program
            Division (IAD) to leverage other government research and
            development efforts. IAD coordinates closely with the
            Transition Office and participates in the Capstone IPT reviews.
            With knowledge of customer technology needs identified through
            the Capstone IPT process, IAD coordinates with other government
            entities to explore and/or leverage alternative technologies
            available through other government entities.

              S&T's Commercialization Office is responsible for the
            identification, evaluation and rapid commercialization of
            technology directly from the private sector to meet the
            operational requirements of our customers. Since the
            Commercialization Office is part of the Transition effort, they
            have firsthand knowledge of customer technology needs
            identified through the Capstone IPT process and the supporting
            S&T Directorate efforts. The Commercialization Office works
            closely with S&T divisions to ensure there is no duplication of
            effort and that S&T Directorate efforts are focused only in
            areas where no rapid commercialization solution exists.

              The 1401 Technology Transfer Program, which is also
            housed in the Transition Office, identifies and transfers DOD
            technology, items and equipment of use to the federal, State,
            tribal, territorial and local first responder community. This
            program strengthens coordination.

    International Research Coordination

        In accordance with Title 6, United States Code, Section 195c
    (``Promoting anti-terrorism through international cooperation
    program''), the S&T Directorate's International Cooperative Programs
    Office facilitates and supports international cooperative activity
    through mechanisms such as formal agreements with nine partner nations:
    Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, Singapore, Sweden, Mexico,
    Israel, France, and Germany. Under these agreements, the S&T
    Directorate is conducting coordinated and joint research projects,
    technical demonstrations, scientific workshops, and exchanges of
    scientific and technological information.
        Through its academic grant program for International Research in
    Homeland Security Mission Areas, the S&T Directorate has sponsored 22
    international research efforts since 2007. These efforts involve
    cooperation between U.S. academic institutions and those in each of the
    S&T Directorate's nine formal partners as well as Italy, Kenya, and
    Peru.
        Each of these projects requires the participation of at least one
    U.S. and one foreign institution. To ensure relevance to DHS and S&T
    Directorate requirements, these institutions coordinate directly with
    S&T's technical divisions and, as appropriate, with customers.
    Customers include U.S. Customs and Border Protection (for tunnel
    detection), the Transportation Security Administration (for protection
    of mass transit infrastructure), and the U.S. Coast Guard (for improved
    maritime surveillance using teams of unmanned aerial vehicles).
        During the past year, the S&T Directorate conducted numerous
    successful proofs-of-concept. One proof-of-concept, in cooperation with
    Australia, involved an entirely new form of blast-resistant glass. With
    Mexico, the S&T Directorate developed novel approaches to determine
    hurricane intensity using underwater acoustic sensors. The S&T
    Directorate also worked with Canada on a proof-of-concept for detection
    of clandestine tunnels using seismic waves.

    ROLE OF INTEGRATED PRODUCT TEAMS IN DETERMINING PRIORITIES

        The Capstone Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) are designed to, and
    have proven to fulfill, their intended purpose of providing direct
    stakeholder input into S&T Directorate research investments. The
    customer-driven Capstone IPT process informs research across the entire
    S&T Directorate and directly guides approximately 50 percent of our
    investment. DHS customers chair the Capstone IPTs and establish their
    desired capability priorities based on their assessment of risk in the
    mission areas for which they are responsible.

        Within the S&T Directorate's Transition portfolio, the stakeholders
    directly drive investment based upon their needs and solutions
    recommended by the S&T Directorate. In addition, what we learn from our
    stakeholders about their operations and future capability gaps helps
    influence our own investment decisions in our longer-range Basic
    Research and Innovation/Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects
    Agency (HSARPA) portfolios. The more insight we gain regarding current
    and future threats and the capability gaps of our stakeholders, the
    better positioned we are to identify promising areas of research and
    explore innovative solutions that are outside the development timeframe
    for the nearer-term-focused Transition portfolio.
        Within the S&T Directorate, we need to continue our efforts to put
    stakeholders at the head of the table--they are the experts on their
    operations and capability gap priorities. We also need to continue to
    mature our internal processes for delivering the technology to our
    stakeholders. This includes developing program manager tools, the
    execution of Technology Transition Agreements to ensure we are
    synchronized with the end-users, and continued dialogue with
    stakeholders to ensure that the S&T Directorate's effort remains
    aligned to their needs.
        Externally, the S&T Directorate needs to work with the stakeholders
    to develop a more uniform methodology across DHS for identifying and
    prioritizing capability gaps. We will work with stakeholders to arrive
    at a consistent, analytic approach to identifying capability gaps and
    developing operational requirements documents. This will help further
    ensure that our scientists and technologists develop solutions that
    meet the highest-priority needs of the stakeholders.
        All three S&T portfolios participate in the IPT process. While the
    IPT members drive the selection of Transition projects, the needs
    expressed at the IPTs also inform the selection of projects in our
    Basic Research portfolio and similarly inform the higher-risk/high pay-
    off initiatives undertaken by our Innovation/HSARPA portfolio.

    IPT Example: Working Group Deliberations Inform First Responder IPT

        The First Responder Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation
    (RDT&E) Working Group is composed of 38 voting positions that encompass
    major first responder associations and practitioners that include
    firefighters, emergency managers, law enforcement officers and
    emergency medical services providers. The Working Group practitioners
    represent State, local and tribal first responders from across the
    country. The S&T Directorate is seeking a territorial representative to
    ensure the full complement of governmental voices is represented.
        The First Responder RDT&E Working Group convened most recently at
    the S&T Directorate offices on September 22, 2009. Members of the DHS
    First Responder Integrated Product Team were invited to observe and
    contribute to the Working Group deliberations.
        During the meeting, the Working Group identified four major cross-
    cutting capability gaps that were deemed to affect all first responder
    disciplines while Working Group subgroups identified sector-specific
    capability gaps. For example, major cross-cutting capability gaps were
    identified as the lack of a standard common operating platform to link
    communication and data systems across the country; improved respiratory
    safety/protection; and the need for better tools for end-to-end
    incident management.
        The Working Group has completed its initial task of identifying
    current capability gaps. Next, its members will develop detailed
    operational requirements to ensure the gaps are clearly defined. The
    First Responder IPT will meet as well to prioritize the capability gaps
    and begin to review potential RDT&E programs designed to solve existing
    problems and field solutions.
        The overarching goal of the First Responder IPT is to use the
    process to close the capability gaps that exist in this community by
    putting viable solutions into the hands of our responders.
        S&T's IPT process is new to the first responder community. Members
    of the First Responder RDT&E Working Group have expressed support for
    the process and a willingness to help the S&T Directorate develop it in
    the first responder community. The process will mature as the IPT, the
    S&T Directorate and the Working Group continue our collaboration to
    refine identified capability gaps and develop concrete operational
    requirements to drive new science and technology development or
    applications.

    ROLE OF BASIC RESEARCH: CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE AND DHS S&T

        In September 2009, the S&T Directorate issued its Basic Research
    Strategy to guide long-term homeland security research investments.
    This will inform the development of the next iteration of the S&T
    Directorate Strategic Plan.
        The overall basic research vision for the S&T Directorate is:

             Developing and accessing an internationally recognized
            scientific workforce creating new knowledge and scientific
            understanding in focus areas of enduring relevance to the
            homeland security enterprise.

        Given the broad spectrum of science and technology requirements
    associated with the homeland security mission, the Department of Energy
    (DOE) National Laboratories provide unique, renowned interdisciplinary
    capabilities, as well as world-class research facilities. In FY 2009,
    eight DHS components and offices, including S&T, utilized the DOE
    National Laboratories and the in-house S&T labs for homeland security-
    related research and development as well as technology transition. This
    R&D includes developing advanced screening and detection technologies;
    designing multi-scale and simulation capabilities in the event of a
    biological attack or a disease outbreak; and designing resilient
    electrical grid technologies to ensure better protection of our
    nation's critical infrastructures. We anticipate the continued use of
    the DOE laboratories to address the cross-cutting, long-term basic
    research challenges of the S&T mission.
        In addition to our laboratories, the S&T Directorate sponsors 11
    university Centers of Excellence (COE). While these COEs are managed by
    our Office of University Programs, the key to their success has been
    the close involvement with each of the S&T Directorate's six divisions.
    Through their active engagement in the selection and management of the
    COEs, divisions are well positioned to ensure that their research
    initiatives are closely aligned with the S&T Directorate's overall
    research strategy.

    DHS S&T-Sponsored Research at the COEs: From Research to Reality

        The DHS COEs, with over 350 current projects, deliver results along
    the entire research and development spectrum, from basic research
    results published in prestigious scientific journals to practical
    research-driven tools that DHS components and local and State first
    responders are already using. Even looking at a single COE program
    proves the benefit of this cost-effective model. For example, a single
    project at the National Center for Food Protection and Defense
    identified the source of a Salmonella St. Paul outbreak as jalapeno
    peppers from Mexico, and may have saved Florida tomato growers up to
    the equivalent of six years of S&T's COE budget.
        Now five years old, the COEs are increasingly producing usable
    results for S&T Directorate customers. As evidence, the COEs have
    generated over $50 million in additional funds for customer-directed
    research. As planned by the S&T Directorate, the COEs are well on their
    way to being self-sufficient within a decade. The COE customer base has
    grown rapidly over the last couple of years--so rapidly, in fact, that
    we have had to develop more efficient financial mechanisms for our
    customers to access the COEs expertise, facilities and products.
    Additionally, now that some of the COE projects are ready, we are
    piloting ``research-to-reality'' university research transition
    approaches in several law enforcement venues. These approaches will
    disseminate applicable research results to many law enforcement
    agencies. Below is a sampling of the S&T Directorate's successful
    transition of COE results to our federal, State and local partners.

    National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
                        Terrorism (START) (University of Maryland)

              START developed the Global Terrorism Database (GTD),
            the most comprehensive unclassified database on terrorist
            events in the world. The GTD includes more than 80,000 events
            stretching from 1970 through 2007 and is continuously being
            updated. START has provided GTD data and access on request to
            several different offices within DHS alone (e.g., S&T Human
            Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division, Office of Intelligence
            and Analysis and the Transportation Security Administration).

              START is studying how communities can enhance their
            resilience to a potential terrorist threat in the United States
            through two additional products: (1) the Community Assessment
            of Resilience Tool (CART), which is a tool for communities to
            conduct self-assessments on core components of community
            resilience; and (2) the Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI)--a
            county-level mapping of the United States and its
            infrastructure and potential vulnerabilities to all types of
            catastrophic events. Local planners throughout the country are
            using CART and SoVI to set priorities for enhancing resilience.

    Command, Control and Inter-operability (CCI) COE (Rutgers and Purdue
                        universities)

              The CCI COE has transitioned several visual and data
            analytics technologies to end-users in partnership with the
            Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, START and a vendor
            partner. This COE-led team developed and deployed law
            enforcement information analysis tools to the Port Authority of
            New York and New Jersey Police Department, enabling analysis of
            crime incident data in conjunction with other sources,
            including START's GTD. A similar visual and data analytics
            system is being deployed to the New Jersey State Police.

              The Command, Control and Inter-operability Division's
            ``Research to Reality'' technology transition model, which
            engages directly with industry partners to commercialize
            research results, is bringing visual and data analytics
            technologies to a wider group of law enforcement agencies. The
            specific technologies involved are known as LEIF (Law
            Enforcement Information Framework) and FADE (Fused Analytic
            Desktop Environment). Both involve upgraded features first made
            available in the ComStat II application developed specifically
            for the Port Authority and described directly above. The
            agencies include the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey,
            San Diego's Automated Regional Justice Information System, the
            Seattle area police departments, the New Jersey State Police,
            and the Lehigh Valley (PA) Police. New efforts are being
            initiated with in the Baltimore-Washington area including the
            Maryland State Police, Baltimore County Police, Baltimore City
            Police and several other agencies in the region.

    Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease (FAZD) COE (Texas A&M University)
                        and the National Center for Food Protection and
                        Defense (NCFPD) (University of Southern
                        Mississippi)

        These two COEs develop, advance and share customizable technologies
    with DHS and customers working to protect our food and agriculture
    lifelines.

              FAZD worked with the CCI COE to develop the Dynamic
            Preparedness System (DPS) and Biosurveillance Common Operating
            Picture (BCOP) technologies that will serve as decision support
            tools for incident commanders for health emergencies across the
            country. DPS and BCOP also act as customizable training
            programs for users. Following rigorous testing, the DHS
            National Biological Information Center is transitioning BCOP
            into an operational environment where it will provide critical
            and up-to-date health emergency information to thousands of
            DHS' federal, State and local partners, hospitals and medical
            and veterinary practitioners.

              FAZD's Rift Valley Fever candidate vaccine, derived
            from the MP12 antigen developed for human use, is currently
            moving to commercial production trials in sheep. This product
            is being enhanced in further research with a genetic marker
            that allows the immunity resulting from vaccination to be
            distinguished from that associated with active disease, thereby
            allowing immunized animals to safely move through interstate
            commerce.

              NCFPD has established itself as a nationally and
            internationally renowned R&D center for food protection and
            defense. The Center is developing expertise and tools to
            identify and reduce vulnerabilities to the Nation's food system
            from terrorist or natural causes.

              NCFPD has provided over 25 congressional testimonies,
            responded to over 700 requests for assistance or advice from
            DHS, Federal, State and local government agencies, and
            matriculated over 100 students in relevant disciplines.

              NCFPD's FoodShield is a research-based communication-
            sharing portal for use by DHS, FDA, and USDA during food
            related incidents. FoodShield is linking agencies to improve
            communication during food events, and enabling all levels of
            government to share resources during food recall and response
            events.

              NCFPD's and BT Safety's Consequence Management System
            (CMS) serves as an integrative tool across the breadth of NCFPD
            projects to provide an advanced visual model for predicting,
            tracking, and assessing the public health and economic impact
            of a catastrophic food system incident.

              NCFPD has provided expert advice to both food
            importing and exporting nations in order to keep commerce
            moving and food supplies safe. The Center is working with
            Chinese officials to restructure the country's food export
            system and with Chilean officials to obtain data on production
            chain models. NCFPD hosted an exercise on food supply
            protection for G8 nation participants from Japan, Canada,
            France Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. The
            exercise aimed to strengthen coordination, cooperation, and
            communication between G8 nations in the event of an intentional
            contamination of the food supply.

    Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE) COE
                        (University of Southern California)

              The HS-ANALISER (Homeland Security-Analytical,
            Modeling, Integrated and Secured Environment and Repository) is
            a software tool for policy decision-makers and risk analysts.

              Assistant for Randomized Monitoring Over Routes
            (ARMOR) software provides a methodology and tool for creating
            randomized plans and schedules for monitoring, inspecting, and
            patrolling, so that even if an attacker observes the plans,
            they cannot predict its progression, thus providing risk
            reduction via deterrence while guaranteeing a specified level
            of protection quality. ARMOR was deployed at the Los Angeles
            International Airport (LAX) in August 2007 to randomize
            checkpoint deployment and canine unit allocation. Police
            officers attending the six-month evaluation of ARMOR declared
            it a success, leading to its permanent deployment at LAX.

              In coordination with the S&T Command, Control and
            Inter-operability Division and the Federal Air Marshal Service
            (FAMS), CREATE developed the Intelligent Randomization in
            Scheduling (IRIS) software which builds upon the ARMOR concept
            and was adapted for use in the FAMS operational domain. Drawing
            upon the principles of game theory, which analyzes behavioral
            decisions, IRIS will systematically prevent observers from
            recognizing patterns in FAMS security procedures--with a goal
            of interrupting terrorist planning cycles. IRIS allows for
            randomization of international flight coverage while limiting
            or eliminating predictability and will place FAMs in locations
            where they will prove most effective. IRIS was transitioned to
            the FAMS in September 2009 and is being operationally tested on
            a select subset of international flights. An additional
            adaptation of the ARMOR program, called GUARDS, is being
            piloted by TSA in the coming weeks.

    CONCLUSION

        I am pleased to report that the Science and Technology Directorate
    has made significant strides during the past year in establishing our
    research priorities and enabling technological capabilities for those
    on the front lines of homeland security.
        Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for all you do in support of
    our mission. I thank you for the opportunity to meet with you today,
    and I look forward to answering your questions.

                        Biography for Bradley I. Buswell
        A native of Durango, Colorado and a graduate of the United States
    Naval Academy, Bradley Buswell is a retired submarine officer who has
    served in numerous posts at sea and in Washington, DC.
        His Washington assignments have included serving as Congressional
    Liaison for Navy Research and Development Programs in the Navy Office
    of Legislative Affairs; Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations for
    Force Transformation; and Executive Assistant to the Chief of Naval
    Research, among other positions on the Navy staff.
        Mr. Buswell joined the private sector following his retirement from
    the U.S. Navy, working for General Electric as Manager of Government
    Relations for GE Global Research in Washington, DC.
        He joined the Department of Homeland Security's Science &
    Technology Directorate in October 2006.
        Mr. Buswell holds a Bachelors of Science in Systems Engineering
    from the U.S. Naval Academy and a Masters of Business Administration
    from The George Washington University.

        Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Buswell. Dr. Depoy,
    please proceed.

        STATEMENT OF DR. PHIL E. DEPOY, VICE CHAIRMAN, HOMELAND
      SECURITY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE (HSSTAC)
                            ASSESSMENT PANEL

        Dr. Depoy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Smith. In 2008,
    HSSTAC, as we call the Homeland Security Science and Technology
    Advisory Committee--I don't know how that pronunciation comes
    from that acronym--but established an assessment panel in
    response to tasking from the Under Secretary, and in the
    initial tasking, the panel was asked to review the S&T
    programs, especially as related to the successful transition of
    technologies into the ultimate user communities.
        Consequently, the panel concentrated its review on the S&T
    transition projects and the newly introduced Capstone IPT
    structure for management of these efforts. The panel completed
    its review in the fall of 2008 and published its findings in a
    report to the Under Secretary. Briefly, the panel concluded
    among other things that during the previous two years, the S&T
    Directorate had done a very commendable job of providing
    structure and direction, had developed processes to define and
    collect capability gaps, and established an organization to
    enable a customer interface, that is, the Capstone IPT
    structure.
        The panel also commended the Directorate for the expansion
    of the University Centers of Excellence Program which performs
    basic research and trains students in research areas of
    interest to Homeland Security.
        Among its findings, the panel reported that although DHS
    S&T had promulgated a strategy in 2007, it was very broad and
    was not adequate for establishing priorities among the many
    projects and programs within the S&T Directorate. The Capstone
    IPT structure had made improvements but was still immature and
    untested, and at that time only one IPT, the chem bio IPT had
    actually completed the entire cycle of the process. Contact
    with first responders was very limited among the S&T projects.
    Further integration of the university Centers of Excellence
    into the overall work of S&T was inconsistent among the
    divisions, and the Directorate had only made a limited review
    of the legacy projects, that is, projects that were initiated
    before the Capstone IPT structure was adopted. They had not
    made reviews to ensure that they were still relevant and still
    had a customer.
        After the completion of the initial review, the panel was
    tasked to conduct a broader review of the Directorate's
    programs to include basic and applied research and to again
    examine the IPT process since another cycle of collection,
    prioritization and funding had occurred after the first review
    was completed. The panel has not completed its work on this
    tasking, so the remainder of my observations are not the
    observations of the panel but my own opinions based on our
    discussions with many members of the Directorate, customers
    within the operating components of DHS, and some scientists in
    other agencies who have been members of working groups
    supporting these IPTs.
        In the year between our two reviews, very significant
    progress was made in the Directorate. The Centers of Excellence
    were aligned with divisions within the Directorate and are now
    kept much better informed as to the existing projects and
    issues. And as stated, the 13th Capstone IPT was established to
    bring first responders into the system. A systems engineering
    FFRDC (Federally Funded Research and Development Centers) was
    added to the Directorate which will be a great asset in the
    determination of requirements, system design and in development
    testing and evaluation. And all the Capstone IPTs have
    completed at least one complete cycle of the process at this
    time and have made a lot of recommendations for further
    improvements.
        It is my opinion that first there is continued strong
    support for the Capstone IPT structure, both within the
    Directorate and among most of the IPT customers. However, there
    are still significant differences in processes for the
    prioritization of capability gaps among the IPTs and even among
    different working groups within each IPT. The lack of an
    adequate S&T strategy results in each working group making its
    own rules for determining the relative importance of capability
    gaps.
        Secondly, although the major advantage of the IPT structure
    is that it brings customers into the process, some of the
    customers still do not fully understand their roles in the
    prioritization of the gaps.
        And third, one of the major irritants for customers is the
    continued existence of legacy projects. These projects consume
    a significant fraction of the resources allocated to the IPTs.
    The panel was given an estimate of 30 to 40 percent of the
    total resources, and they are not part of the annual
    prioritization process. The Acting Under Secretary has recently
    tasked the panel to add a review of these legacy projects to
    its current tasking.
        And finally, it is my opinion that the Capstone IPT
    structure and processes have resulted in major improvements in
    the work of the Directorate, and further improvements will be
    made as the structure and processes are refined.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Depoy follows:]
                      Prepared Statement of Phil E. DePoy
        Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. My
    name is Phil DePoy, and I have been a member of the Homeland Security
    Science and Technology Advisory Committee (HSSTAC) since August 2007.
    In 2008, the HSSTAC established an Assessment Panel in response to
    tasking from the DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology (S&T),
    and I was appointed as the Vice Chairman of the Panel. In the initial
    tasking, the Panel was asked to review the DHS S&T programs, especially
    as related to the successful transition of technologies into the
    ultimate user community. Consequently, the Panel concentrated its
    review on the S&T transition projects and the newly introduced Capstone
    Integrated Process Team (IPT) structure for management of these
    efforts.
        The Panel completed its review in the fall of 2008 and published
    its findings in a HSSTAC report (``Program Assessment--1'' of 1
    December 2008). Briefly, the Panel concluded that during the previous
    two years the S&T Directorate had done a commendable job of

            --  Improving morale

            --  Providing structure and direction

            --  Developing processes to define and prioritize capability
            gaps

            --  Establishing organizations and methodologies for customer
            interface, principally by adopting the Capstone IPT structure

            --  Expanding basic research through the establishment of
            University Centers of Excellence (COE)

            --  Creating international outreach and

            --  Improving relationships with Congress.

        Among its findings, the Panel also reported that:

            --  Although DHS S&T had promulgated a strategy, it was very
            broad and was not adequate for establishing priorities among
            the many projects and programs within the S&T Directorate.

            --  The Capstone IPT structure had made improvements but was
            still immature and untested.

            --  Contact with first responders was very uneven among the S&T
            Divisions.

            --  DHS S&T did not have adequate systems engineering or
            Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) capabilities and had
            no Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) capability.

            --  Integration of the University Centers of Excellence into
            the overall work of S&T was inconsistent.

            --  The Directorate had made only limited reviews of legacy
            projects (i.e., projects that were initiated before the
            Capstone IPT structure was adopted) to ensure that they were
            still relevant and had a customer.

        After the completion of the initial review, the Panel was tasked to
    conduct a broader review of the Directorate's projects, to include
    basic and applied research, and to again examine the IPT process since
    another cycle of collection of capability gaps, prioritization, and
    funding had occurred after the first review was completed. The Panel
    has completed about half the work on this tasking, so the remainder of
    my observations are not the observations of the Panel, but are my own
    opinions based on our discussions with many members of the S&T
    Directorate, customers within the operating components of DHS, and some
    scientists in other agencies who have been members of working groups
    supporting the IPTs.

             Prioritization Process: There is continuing strong support for
            the Capstone IPT structure, both within the Directorate and
            among most of the IPT customers. However, there does not appear
            to be convergence on the standardization of processes for the
            definition or prioritization of capability gaps among the IPTs.
            Prioritization is obviously a very difficult process,
            especially in those IPTs which are large and have a long list
            of capability gaps to be considered. In most cases, this
            process is carried out by working groups, and it is not clear
            that some of the working group members have the experience or
            vision to determine priorities. The lack of an overall S&T
            strategy results in each IPT forming its own rules for
            determining the relative importance of capability gaps. At this
            time, there appears to have been only limited consideration
            given to prioritization across IPTs.

             Customers' Role: Although the major advantage of the IPT
            structure is that it brings customers into the process, many of
            the customers do not fully understand their roles. Some
            customers feel that they do not have any control over
            prioritization of capability gaps and that they have to accept
            the priorities established by the working groups. Obviously,
            the establishment of priorities should be one of the major
            roles of customers.

             Legacy Projects: One of the major irritants for customers, as
            well as for many members of the S&T Directorate, is the
            continued existence of legacy projects. These projects consume
            a significant fraction of the resources allocated to the IPTs
            (the Panel was given an estimate of 30 to 40 percent), and they
            are not part of the annual prioritization process. One working
            group participant offered the opinion that twenty percent of
            the projects in the transition portfolio ``relate to things we
            would like to know as opposed to things we need'' and further
            stated that in their opinion, many of those ``are not
            knowable.''

             Centers of Excellence: Obviously, the early strategy of the
            Directorate was, first, to fund technologies that could be
            transitioned rapidly into the hands of responders, and
            secondly, to create University Centers of Excellence, not only
            to perform basic research but also to train students in areas
            that were important to DHS. This strategy has created a
            `valley' between basic research and transition projects, and
            fewer resources are being allocated to applied research than is
            desirable in the longer-term. Although the Panel has not
            reached a definite conclusion, it appears that some of the
            transition projects might have benefited from more applied
            research before the transition decision was made.

             Requirements Process: Partially due to the lack of direct
            communication with responders, the requirements and
            specifications for some transition projects are considered by
            many to be inadequate. The establishment of requirements and
            specifications is very difficult (e.g., DOD has tried many
            techniques for the determination of requirements over many
            decades and has never found the perfect solution), but it is so
            critical that it deserves more study. The Panel was told that
            the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) has developed a
            field panel of users to assist in the determination of
            specifications for their programs. This approach should be
            investigated further for possible DHS S&T application.

        Since the first review was completed in 2008, it appears that
    interaction between the Centers of Excellence and the S&T Divisions has
    improved a great deal. The Centers were aligned with the Divisions,
    i.e., each Division was given the responsibility to communicate with
    one or more of the Centers. It is important that there be good
    communications, not to over-control the work of the COEs, but to keep
    the COEs informed of areas in which new technologies are needed.
        Overall, it is my opinion that the adoption of the Capstone IPT
    structure within the S&T Directorate has been very beneficial,
    principally by bringing the customers from the operating components
    into the decision processes. Although the IPT processes are still
    immature, they are improving rapidly. In the year between the two
    HSSTAC Panel reviews, there was very noticeable improvement. A
    thirteenth Capstone IPT was established to bring first responders into
    the S&T system, a deficiency reported in the Panel's first review. A
    systems engineering FFRDC was added to the S&T Directorate, which will
    be a great asset in the determination of requirements, in the design of
    systems and systems-of-systems, and in Development Testing and
    Evaluation. The Centers of Excellence were aligned with the Divisions
    within S&T, and already the communications have improved markedly. All
    the Capstone IPTs have completed one complete cycle of the process and
    one IPT (Chem/Bio) has completed two cycles, so there have been many
    recommendations for improving the processes for the determination of
    capability gaps, prioritization of the gaps, and the improvement of
    communications among the projects, divisions, and customers.
        In response to the Chairman's specific questions:

    Discuss the methods and criteria used to develop research and
    development priorities at DHS S&T and how these may be improved. How
    should comprehensive threat assessments help set research and
    development priorities and does DHS S&T utilize this resource? Does DHS
    S&T coordinate its research and development strategic plan with other
    federal research entities and private industry?

        We have not completed our review, and I can provide only partial
    responses to these questions. It appears that each IPT uses a somewhat
    different process to develop priorities. For the most part, the
    priorities are established by working groups with participation by
    members from S&T, the operating components of DHS, and other agencies.
    As the Capstone IPT process matures, I expect that the process will be
    more standardized among divisions. Certainly, the development of an
    overall S&T strategy would be a major improvement to this process.
        I cannot respond to the question of whether all the Capstone IPTs
    utilize comprehensive threat assessments in establishing priorities.
    Threat assessment should obviously play a role in setting priorities,
    but since the Panel has not yet met with the working groups, we do not
    know how each working group assigns priorities to the individual
    capability gaps. In some of the S&T Divisions, we have seen excellent
    coordination with other agencies. The Chem/Bio Division, for example,
    holds an annual three-day meeting in which they review all their
    projects with stakeholders from many agencies.

    Are the IPTs fulfilling their intended role as vehicles for stakeholder
    input in research priorities? If not, what are the barriers keeping the
    IPTs from operating at their full potential?

        I do not believe that the stakeholders have yet achieved their
    intended role, but based on the progress within the past year, I
    believe that they will be able to acquire this role in the near future.
    I believe the major barriers are the lack of a strategy and the
    continued existence of legacy projects, which consume a significant
    part of the resources. If an S&T strategy is developed, I would hope
    that the stakeholders play a major role in its evolution.

    What role does basic research currently play in the DHS S&T portfolio?
    What is the role of the Centers of Excellence in performing this
    research? Ideally, how should basic research and the Centers of
    Excellence be integrated into the research portfolio and strategic
    plan?

        It is gratifying to see that basic research is a significant part
    of the DHS S&T portfolio. As you are aware, there must be a delicate
    balance between basic research and research involved with the
    transition of programs. On one hand, it is easy to absorb the basic
    research resources into the later development processes. On the other
    hand, the basic researchers need to know the areas in which new
    technologies are needed. On our first review, the Panel felt that the
    Centers of Excellence were too isolated from the Divisions. With the
    recent changes, it appears that the Centers are receiving more
    information from the Divisions, but it is probably too early to
    determine if they are in a reasonable balance.

                          Biography for Phil E. DePoy
        Dr. Phil E. DePoy retired from the Naval Postgraduate School in
    2005, where he served as the founding director of the Meyer Institute
    of Systems Engineering. From 1992 to 2000, Dr. DePoy was the President
    and CEO of the National Opinion Research Center at the University of
    Chicago. From 1959 to 1992, he was employed by the Center for Naval
    Analyses (CNA) and its predecessor organization, the M.I.T. Operations
    Evaluation Group. He held many positions at CNA including President and
    CEO from 1984 to 1990.
        Dr. DePoy holds a BS degree in Chemical Engineering from Purdue
    University, an MS degree in Nuclear Engineering from M.I.T., and a
    Ph.D. in Chemical Engineering from Stanford University. He presently
    serves on the CNA Board and is Chairman of the Board of Wolf Park (a
    research and education organization) and a member of the Advisory Board
    of the Applied Physics Laboratory (University of Washington) and the
    Council on Foreign Relations.

        Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Dr. Depoy. Mr. Berteau,
    please proceed.

    STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID J. BERTEAU, SENIOR ADVISOR AND DIRECTOR,
       DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL INITIATIVES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
                 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC

        Mr. Berteau. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Congressman
    Smith. It is a great privilege to be here today, and I echo Mr.
    Buswell's comments. I feel honored to be in the company of the
    panel that I am sitting with here, so I am extremely grateful
    to you.
        I note that my statement today and my responses to any
    questions you may have are my own views and do not necessarily
    reflect the views of the institution for which I work. I would
    also note that I am not sure that they don't reflect those
    views, either, but that is neither here nor there.
        This committee, of course, as has been noted, played a key
    role from the beginning in S&T, and I note in my statement the
    dichotomy that apparently exists inside the enabling statute to
    this day, that on the one hand, the S&T Directorate is
    responsible for R&D that supports any and all elements of the
    Department, and on the other hand, they are to have a focus
    both from a strategic planning point of view and a
    prioritization point of view on chemical, biological,
    radiological and nuclear, ``CBRN'' elements. I say that not
    because I think there is actually confusion in the Department
    in this regard. I don't actually think there is. What I think
    that shows is it reflects still a very strong emphasis on the
    terrorist threat as the driver behind R&D when, in fact, a
    legitimate assessment of all threats and risk would say that
    there are risks that are much broader than, and in some cases
    overlap significantly with, what we would define as terrorist
    threats. And I think I come from a background that says an all-
    hazards, an all-risks, an all-threats assessment process is
    inherently important to any strategic plan, not just simply
    that which is defined in the statute.
        We know from the history of management that strategic plans
    do set agendas for agencies but only if they are actually
    incorporated into the budget. Resources drive policy way more
    than policy drives resources, and as a result of that, I think
    it is important to pay attention not only to the plan but to
    look at the execution of that plan as it is reflected in the
    budget and in the implementation of that budget.
        There is one problem that I would note that is a little bit
    of an example in that regard of the difficulty of integrating
    across the Department. Since the creation of the Domestic
    Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), there is a little bit of a
    potential dichotomy with responsibility for S&T funding in the
    Department with radiological and nuclear being dictated more by
    DNDO than by S&T, and that I think makes it harder to have an
    integrated S&T plan. I believe actually DHS itself can fix this
    problem, but it is something that I would note that may be
    worthy of the Committee's attention down the road.
        I have three comments on your three questions, first from a
    strategic planning perspective. It is really critical that a
    strategic plan be connected to the larger homeland security
    enterprise. It is impossible for an S&T strategic plan by
    itself to have the validity necessary to say that we are
    spending our money on the most important priorities. I think it
    has to flow from a broader homeland security enterprise-wide
    strategic plan linked in turn to a DHS-level strategic plan
    because there is so much of Homeland Security that is outside
    DHS or even outside the Federal Government.
        But there are two other elements that have to come into
    play. One is those plans have to be assessed against current
    capability in order to identify capability gaps and capability
    shortfalls and be able to prioritize what you need to do to
    fill those gaps. And then in turn, the budgets have to be built
    reflecting some kind of a judgment of where the risks are and
    where the benefits are of filling those gaps or addressing
    those gaps in the budget. This is not only prudent management,
    it is essential for risk reduction and threat reduction. And I
    think this committee can encourage DHS toward that broader
    planning process tied to capability assessments.
        With regard to the IPTs, I certainly echo what my colleague
    to the right has said. They are playing a very useful role.
    They are not a substitute for a formal prioritization and
    strategic planning process, however. I think they augment it
    rather than replace it.
        With respect to basic research, I think there are two
    important questions. One is how much is done, but the second is
    how do you manage that so it eventually leads to useful
    homeland security applications that tie to threats, that tie to
    risks and that tie to first responder needs? My own view is
    that it needs to be linked to solving some kind of a capability
    gap that has been identified or some kind of a strategic
    shortfall. And so far, that is difficult in part because the
    DHS process for determining requirements is fragmented and in
    some cases nonexistent with most DHS components unable to
    execute a rigorous requirements process.
        And then finally, I think it is important to focus on the
    transition from research into programs or into outcomes and
    results, whether that be incorporation and production of
    hardware or systems that are fielded or the provision of
    standards or intellectual property or even technical assistance
    that makes people smarter buyers, whether in DHS or in the
    broader community. And I think that kind of planning for
    transition needs to occur up front.
        The process that I lay out here, of course, is not easy. It
    is hard to develop broad plans. It is hard to have a structured
    planning process. It is hard to do the capability assessments.
    It is hard to show how they reflect in the budget, but I think
    it is important for you to lay that out as what your desired
    outcome is and try to get that from the government.
        With that, sir, I will conclude my remarks and will stand
    ready for your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Berteau follows:]
                     Prepared Statement of David J. Berteau
        Mr. Chairman, Congressman Smith, and Members of the Committee,
    thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today in the company
    of my distinguished fellow panel members. My statement addresses the
    overall question of establishing research priorities in the Science and
    Technology Directorate (S&T) of the U.S. Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS). It also responds to each of your three specific
    questions, as noted in the invitation letter.

    My Background

        It may be useful for the Committee to know a bit about my
    background in order to gauge the value of the comments I make today. As
    shown on the attached biographical statement, most of my career in
    national security and homeland security issues has been here in
    Washington. However, in my younger days, I was also a firefighter and
    an emergency medical technician volunteer, and I still maintain ties to
    those communities, so I try to apply the first responder perspective as
    well as the Washington perspective to these questions.

    Overall Role of S&T

        It is also useful to review the legislative history of the creation
    of the Science & Technology Directorate. As I recall, this committee
    played a key role in ensuring that the role of Science and Technology
    was properly incorporated into the final Homeland Security Act of 2002.
    Initial legislative proposals included a narrow focus on research and
    development, tied most closely to requirements in the areas of
    chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, or CBRN. This
    committee appropriately supported a broader definition of homeland
    security R&D, and ultimately the Act (Section 302 (4) ) stated that the
    Under Secretary for Science and Technology would be responsible for
    ``conducting basic and applied research, development, demonstration,
    testing, and evaluation activities that are relevant to any or all
    elements of the Department'' (emphasis added).
        However, with respect to the establishment of priorities both
    within DHS and for the Nation, the enabling legislation was more
    specific. It states in Section 302 (2) and again in Section 302 (5)
    that the Under Secretary shall be responsible for ``developing, in
    consultation with other appropriate executive agencies, a national
    policy and strategic plan for, identifying priorities, goals,
    objectives and policies for, and coordinating the Federal Government's
    civilian efforts to identify and develop countermeasures to chemical,
    biological, radiological, nuclear, and other emerging terrorist threats
    (emphasis added), including the development of comprehensive, research-
    based definable goals for such efforts and development of annual
    measurable objectives and specific targets to accomplish and evaluate
    the goals of such efforts.''
        Thus, the originating Act for DHS set up two parallel
    responsibilities for S&T. The first was to conduct R&D for all elements
    of the Department. The second was to support a national strategy that
    focused on terrorist threats, primarily in the areas of CBRN. In
    addition, the legislation includes a requirement for ``annual
    measurable objectives,'' but that requirement focuses on CBRN. These
    parallel responsibilities, in my opinion, set up a competition for
    emphasis in the DHS S&T program. That competition is at the heart of
    today's hearing questions.

    Strategic Planning in the Homeland Security Enterprise, DHS, and S&T

        The critical question for the S&T budget in DHS is the matter of
    the priorities that are used to develop and execute that budget. As
    noted above, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 requires the S&T
    Directorate to develop a plan for prioritizing S&T research on CBRN.
    Such a plan requires a clear link to DHS S&T budgets and spending.
    There have been a number of plans developed and released in accordance
    with this requirement, most recently in 2007 and 2008. In keeping with
    the S&T responsibilities for ``all elements of the Department,'' the
    plans to date have been broader than CBRN, and I believe that is
    appropriate and necessary. Such plans are worthwhile for guiding
    funding and justifying budgets.
        However, from a strategic planning perspective, this process to
    date has been insufficient and inadequate. The ongoing Quadrennial
    Homeland Security Review, mandated by Congress, includes the charge to
    examine the homeland security strategic planning process. In fact, the
    DHS web site refers specifically to QHSR studies on Strategic
    Management and on Planning and Capabilities, and the questions
    submitted for the ``National Dialogue'' related to those studies can be
    found in links at http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/
    gc-1208534155450.shtm#0. I cannot speculate on the results
    of the QHSR, but I would like to share with the Committee some of my
    personal observations about strategic planning and its relationship to
    the DHS S&T budget.
        First, strategic planning needs to be the result of a rigorous
    planning process. This process would incorporate risk and threat
    assessment, the Administration's priorities, legislation, existing
    strategies, and involvement of stakeholders into strategic guidance.
    Such guidance needs to encompass more than DHS--it needs to span the
    homeland security enterprise, beyond DHS to include the rest of the
    Federal Government as well as State and local levels, including first
    responders.
        Second, strategic plans need to be assessed against existing
    capabilities to determine where there are gaps in capabilities and how
    those gaps can be addressed. In some cases, capability gaps can be met
    by changes in procedures or training or policy. In other cases,
    resources will need to be allocated to fill capability gaps. In still
    other cases, new technology or new applications of existing technology
    will fix those gaps.
        Third, budgets need to address capability gaps or shortfalls. Some
    of this could be in the DHS budget, some elsewhere in the federal
    budget, and some in State and local budgets.
        Ultimately, the S&T strategic planning process should have the
    following attributes:

            --  it needs to flow from a broader Homeland Security
            Enterprise-wide Strategic Plan, linked in turn to a DHS-level
            Strategic Plan

            --  plans at each level (enterprise, DHS, and S&T) need to be
            assessed against current and projected capabilities, with the
            resulting identification of capability gaps and shortfalls

            --  those capability gaps and shortfalls need to be linked to
            the budget and to risk assessments of the consequences of
            failing to address the shortfalls.

        Such an S&T strategic plan would have significantly more value to
    DHS and homeland security than today's process. A broad strategic
    planning process and capability assessment will illuminate real
    priorities that reduce risk to America and produce more robust
    responses to catastrophic threats and events. It is important to
    recognize, though, that S&T cannot create these attributes; that can
    only be done at the DHS level.

    IPTs and First Responders

        The use of Integrated Process Teams or IPTs in the Federal
    Government has grown substantially in the past two decades. Such teams
    provide a mechanism for providing input to and assessing the status of
    government actions across an array of organizations and institutions.
    In the S&T process, they provide useful input, but they are not a
    substitute for the results of prioritization that the strategic
    planning and capability assessment process described above. In
    addition, IPTs can create a false sense of a rigorous process when in
    reality there is only rigorous involvement.

    Basic Research

        As the Members of this committee know well, the role of research in
    DHS was debated long and hard at the time the Act was passed in 2002. A
    review of the legislative history shows diverse views over the types of
    research appropriate for DHS and who should conduct them. While the
    legislation settled some of this debate, there are still two important
    questions that need further resolution.
        One is the issue of how much basic research should be done by DHS.
    The second is how to manage that research so that it eventually leads
    to useful homeland security applications. My own view is that the
    answers to these two questions need to tie back to the original point
    of a broader strategic plan and capability assessment process. If
    research cannot be linked to solving some strategic shortfall or
    capability gap, then we need to keep working before we assign it a high
    priority. Basic research sponsored by other Federal Government agencies
    can be the feeding ground for DHS S&T programs, but basic research in
    DHS should, in my judgment, be tied to identified requirements and
    shortfalls and not be driven by any quota or budget target.

    Transition from Research to Programs

        One additional question warrants this committee's attention, in my
    view. The first responder community cares about research to the extent
    that it produces results that help them do their jobs or prepare for
    contingencies. This means that DHS S&T needs to pay close attention to
    the transition from research into programs that will produce results.
    In some cases, this would mean the production of hardware or systems
    incorporating research results. In other cases, it might be the
    provision of standards or intellectual property to a broad array of
    vendors or suppliers. In still other cases, it might produce assistance
    to internal DHS components or first responders at the State or local
    level.
        Across the board in S&T research, therefore, there needs to be
    planning for transition as part of the initial prioritization process.
    That planning has to include funding in the budget. This planning is
    easier for some activities than for others, particularly when the
    ultimate customer or user of the research is inside DHS. It's harder
    when the end-user is outside DHS or even the Federal Government.
    Decades of experience at DARPA in DOD shows, however, that research
    dollars have more value and produce better results when consideration
    is given up front to plans for transitioning research into real, funded
    programs. This is a feature of the S&T strategic planning process that
    other homeland security strategic plans will not have, and it makes the
    S&T planning and budgeting challenge more complex, but it has high
    payoff for return on investment.

    Closing

        Chairman Wu, Congressman Smith, I would like to conclude by noting
    that the process I have advocated here is not easy. It is hard to
    develop broad strategic plans, hard to conduct such a planning process,
    and hard to do the capability assessments that lead to priorities in
    the budget. Failure to undertake an enterprise-wide strategic planning
    process will, however, ensure that we don't spend our scarce budget
    dollars where they will do the most good. I recommend that this
    committee endorse the creation and support for a broad strategic plan
    across the Homeland Security Enterprise and the clear linkage of S&T
    strategic plans to that larger enterprise-level work.
        Sir, this concludes my remarks, and I stand ready for your
    questions.

                         Biography for David J. Berteau
        David J. Berteau is Senior Adviser and Director, Defense-Industrial
    Initiatives, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in
    Washington, DC, where he is a resident scholar on acquisition,
    industrial base, programs, budget, and management for national security
    and homeland security. Recent and ongoing studies include projects on
    interagency resource management, federal services contracts, defense
    acquisition reform, transatlantic defense trade, and complex program
    management.
        Mr. Berteau is a Fellow of the National Academy of Public
    Administration and chaired their panel on Joint Land Use Studies for
    the Defense Department. He is a member of the Defense Acquisition
    University Board of Visitors, a Director of the Procurement Round
    Table, and an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University. He chaired
    the National Research Council's 2005 study of printed circuit boards
    for national security. Mr. Berteau served on the Secretary of the
    Army's Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in
    Expeditionary Operations and on two recent Defense Science Board task
    forces, on the defense industrial structure and on integrating
    commercial systems into defense.
        Prior to coming to CSIS, he was Director of National Defense and
    Homeland Security for Clark & Weinstock, where he still consults. He
    was the Director of Syracuse University's National Security Studies
    Program and served as a Professor of Practice at the Maxwell School of
    Citizenship and Public Affairs. Mr. Berteau was a Senior Vice President
    for Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) until early
    2001.
        Mr. Berteau served in the Defense Department for 12 years under
    four Defense Secretaries, including four years as Principal Deputy
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics. He was
    responsible for weapons production readiness, the defense industrial
    base, military base closures, defense logistics, installations and
    military construction, defense procurement, and environmental matters.
    He testified before Congress more than 100 times, led numerous defense
    management reform initiatives, oversaw the Defense Logistics Agency,
    and was instrumental in creating two new agencies, the Defense Contract
    Management Agency and the Defense Commissary Agency. He twice was
    acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for nearly a year, in 1990 and
    1993. As Chairman of the 1992 government-wide Defense Conversion
    Commission, Mr. Berteau's report to the Secretary of Defense, Adjusting
    to the Drawdown, developed ways to address the impact of defense
    reductions on the U.S. economy, on military and civilian defense
    personnel, and on communities. Nearly all of the commission's
    recommendations were implemented.
        In the late 1980s, Mr. Berteau was the Deputy Assistant Secretary
    of Defense for Resource Management & Support, responsible for all
    defense military and civilian manpower and personnel requirements. He
    chaired the Federal Economic Adjustment Committee. He was acting
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel for
    eight months in 1989.
        Mr. Berteau was the Packard Commission's Executive Secretary in
    1985-86 (President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management).
    Earlier, he was Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Executive
    Secretary of the DOD Council on Integrity and Management Improvement
    and the Defense Resources Board, and Special Assistant to the DOD
    Comptroller. He entered DOD in 1981 as a Presidential Management
    Intern.
        Mr. Berteau graduated from Tulane University in 1971 and received
    his Master's degree in 1981 from the LBJ School of Public Affairs at
    the University of Texas. Mr. Berteau received the Secretary of the Army
    Exceptional Public Service Medal in 2007 and the Secretary of Defense
    Medals for Distinguished Public Service in 1991 and Outstanding Public
    Service in 1987 and 1989. A native of Louisiana, he lives in Derwood,
    Maryland, with his wife, Jane Berteau; they have two grown children.

        Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Berteau. Dr.
    Williams, please proceed.

       STATEMENT OF DR. CINDY WILLIAMS, CHAIR, PANEL ON THE DHS
    SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC
      ADMINISTRATION; SHAPIRO VISITING PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL
     AFFAIRS, THE ELLIOTT SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, GEORGE
     WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY; PRINCIPAL RESEARCH SCIENTIST, SECURITY
         STUDIES PROGRAM, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

        Dr. Williams. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Smith.
    It is a real pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the
    research priorities in the S&T Directorate of the Department of
    Homeland Security.
        Between June 2008 and June 2009 I chaired a panel of the
    National Academy of Public Administration, or NAPA, that
    conducted a study of the S&T Directorate. I am joined today by
    Rick Cinquegrana and Laurie Ekstrand, who led the work of
    NAPA's staff on the study. Some copies of the panel's report
    have been provided to your staff, and the report is also
    available online.
        The Academy panel offered findings and recommendations in
    several areas. My remarks today focus on three of them:
    strategic plans, the establishment of research priorities in
    the Directorate's transition portfolio and the Directorate's
    role in basic research.
        Let me start with strategic plans. The S&T Directorate is
    responsible for two distinct strategic plans: an internal plan
    to guide its own work and a federal-wide plan for civilian
    efforts to counter chemical, biological and other emerging
    terrorist threats. The Directorate published an internal
    strategic plan, as Mr. Buswell mentioned, in June 2002. That
    plan describes the Directorate's structure, the roles of its
    integrated product teams, or IPTs, its mechanisms for reaching
    out to other organizations, and its plans for workforce
    development. But it does not meet the criteria of the strategic
    plan as the term is generally applied today across Federal
    Government.
        Among other things, the plan's mission statement
    understates the Directorate's range of responsibility, the plan
    itself lacks a statement of long-term goals, and it does not
    discuss key external factors that could affect progress.
        We also found process weaknesses with regard to strategic
    planning, including a lack of involvement by key external
    stakeholders and the lack of a systematic scan of the
    environment. The panel recommended that S&T follow a strategic
    planning process outlined by the Government Accountability
    Office and OMB to develop a plan that can guide its work toward
    a set of specified goals.
        We found that the Directorate has not made progress on the
    strategic plan for the wider federal effort at all. To be fair,
    among federal departments, DHS has only the third-largest
    budget for homeland security research and development, after
    the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department
    of Defense. To produce a federal research strategy with any
    teeth, S&T would need White House support. We recommended that
    S&T work with the White House Office of Science and Technology
    Policy and other federal departments to develop that broader
    plan.
        Let me turn now to the establishment of priorities in the
    transition portfolio. S&T's IPTs bring the Directorate's staff
    together with customers to establish priorities for projects.
    The IPTs appear to be useful vehicles for involving DHS's
    internal stakeholders in setting research priorities and for
    stimulating information exchange across the Department.
    Nevertheless, we identified several problems. As an example, it
    appears that when the IPTs were formed, little guidance was
    provided on how to operate them. Each IPT devised its own
    structure and processes through trial and error. Earlier this
    year, S&T was beginning to develop some standardized practices,
    but we still found substantial variation in structure,
    processes, customer satisfaction and accomplishments among the
    IPTs.
        And finally, let me turn to S&T's role in basic research.
    Basic research is the seed corn for the development of future
    technologies, and no other organization in Federal Government
    has the mandate or the wherewithal to sponsor basic research in
    key areas related to homeland security such as border
    protection, immigration, and aviation security. That said, our
    panel found several potential weaknesses in this area. I will
    highlight just one, that is, many of the Directorate's basic
    research projects are awarded without competition and without
    external scientific peer review. Other federal research
    organizations routinely use competitive processes, including
    external peer review to good effect. Our panel recommended that
    DHS S&T follow suit.
        Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared remarks, and I
    look forward to any questions.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Williams follows:]
                      Prepared Statement of Cindy Williams
        Mr. Chairman, Congressman Smith, and Members of the Subcommittee,
    thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
    development of strategic plans and research priorities and the role of
    basic research in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Advances
    in science and technology and the deliberate transition of those
    advances into usable systems are crucial to the Nation's efforts to
    prevent and disrupt future terrorist attacks, protect people and
    critical infrastructure in the event of an attack or a naturally
    occurring disaster, and prepare to respond and recover should such
    events occur. The Directorate of Science and Technology (S&T) is
    charged with implementing the science and technology effort for much of
    DHS as well as orchestrating the planning for key S&T activities across
    the many federal departments and agencies involved in homeland
    security.
        Under mandate from the DHS Appropriations Act for fiscal year (FY)
    2008, the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) conducted a
    study of DHS S&T between June 2008 and June 2009.\1\ I served as Chair
    of the expert panel that guided the study. I am joined today by Rick
    Cinquegrana and Laurie Ekstrand, the Program Area Director and Project
    Director who led the work of NAPA's staff on the study.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2008,
    is Division E of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY 2008 (P.L.
    110-161). The report of the Committee on Appropriations of the U.S.
    House of Representatives (H.R. 110-181) accompanying the House version
    of the Act directed DHS to contract with NAPA to conduct the study.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The panel's report, Department of Homeland Security Science and
    Technology Directorate: Developing Technology to Protect America, was
    published by NAPA in June 2009. Some copies of the report have been
    made available to your staff. The report is also available on-line at
    http://www.napawash.org/pc-management-studies/
    DHS-ST/
    DHS-ST-Directorate-June-2009
    .pdf.
        In addition to serving as chair of the NAPA panel, I am a member of
    the research staff of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts
    Institute of Technology (MIT) and, for the current academic semester,
    the J.B. and Maurice C. Shapiro Visiting Professor of International
    Affairs at the Elliott School of the George Washington University. At
    MIT, I have conducted independent research over a four-year period on
    the state of strategic planning and resource allocation for homeland
    security within the DHS and other federal departments, in the Executive
    Office of the President, and in the Congress. Today I will discuss
    findings and recommendations of the NAPA study in my capacity as Chair
    of the Academy Panel. My views are also informed by my experience in
    the context of my own research.

    Findings and Recommendations of the NAPA Panel

        The NAPA panel offered findings and recommendations in eight areas:

              The organization of and communications within DHS
            S&T;

              The customer focus of S&T's transition portfolio;\2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ S&T has grouped its projects into three portfolios: transition,
    research, and innovation. The transition portfolio is meant to deliver
    technologies to DHS components or first responders within three years;
    it makes up about one-half of the organization's budget. The research
    portfolio, aimed at basic research, accounts for roughly 20 percent of
    S&T's budget. The innovation portfolio is meant to identify and fund
    potential ``game changing'' technologies--long shots that could lead to
    ``leap-ahead results.'' Innovation constitutes roughly five percent of
    S&T's budget.

              The allocation of funds and selection of research
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            projects across S&T's basic research portfolio;

              S&T's exercise of its statutory role in guiding
            federal-wide science and technology efforts in homeland
            security;

              S&T's internal strategic planning effort;

              The practice of performance measurement in S&T;

              The question of unnecessary duplication in the
            activities of the federal departments and agencies engaged in
            homeland security-related science and technology; and

              The question of opportunity costs: whether increases
            in homeland security-related research during this decade have
            resulted in reduced funding for other significant science and
            technology endeavors.

        Before turning to the specific questions posed by the Subcommittee
    for this hearing, let me summarize briefly the panel's findings and
    recommendations in each of these areas.

    Organization and communications. The panel found that DHS S&T is better
    organized than it was during its early years, but that today's matrix
    organization and the large number of direct reports to the Under
    Secretary for S&T pose communications challenges across the management
    team and between management and staff. We recommended that S&T
    management engage staff in a process of identifying communications
    problems and implementing solutions. We also suggested that web-based
    technology would be a valuable tool to initiate that process. We also
    recommended that S&T's leadership reconsider the structure of the
    Directorate to ensure a reasonable number of direct reports and a
    cohesive structure for managing first responder interaction.

    Customer focus of the transition portfolio. We found that through the
    Integrated Product Team (IPT) approach that S&T now uses for the
    transition portfolio, the Directorate has made strides in engaging its
    customers within DHS. Progress is uneven across the various IPTs,
    however. We also found that first responders at the State and local
    levels often feel left out, but that the addition of a new first
    responder IPT is unlikely to prove an effective solution. We
    recommended that S&T refine and institutionalize the structures and
    procedures across the IPTs and that including first responders into
    existing IPTs as appropriate is likely to be more effective than adding
    the new first responder IPT.

    Allocation of funds and selection of research projects. The broad
    allocation of funds across the basic research portfolio appears to rest
    on the budget shares that were extant among DHS's legacy components
    before they were brought into the consolidated department in 2003, and
    many basic research projects are awarded without competition or peer
    review. We recommended that S&T take steps to rationalize decision-
    making about the broad allocation of basic research funds, and that
    funds be awarded on a competitive basis based on scientific peer review
    except in cases when that is clearly not feasible.

    Guiding federal-wide science and technology efforts. Although S&T is
    charged by statute to take a leadership role in guiding federal efforts
    in homeland security-related research, other federal organizations
    enjoy wider roles in and have larger budgets for homeland security
    research than does DHS S&T. Thus S&T is in a relatively weak position
    to carry out its leadership role. S&T officials are active participants
    in many interagency task forces and committees, and they coordinate
    with other agencies on numerous projects. Nevertheless, in the nearly
    seven years since DHS was created, S&T has not been successful in
    guiding the development of a federal strategic plan for homeland
    security S&T. The panel recommended that S&T work with the White House
    Office of Science and Technology Policy and the array of federal
    agencies engaged in homeland security-related research to develop a
    comprehensive national strategic plan for such research.

    S&T's internal strategic planning. The NAPA panel found that the
    strategic plan that S&T issued in June 2007 is a useful document in
    describing the ``what'' of S&T's programs, but it fails to describe the
    ``why.'' We recommended that S&T follow the guidance provided by the
    Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Government Accountability
    Office (GAO) to formulate a strategic plan that will effectively guide
    its work toward specified goals.\3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ OMB Circular No. A-11, Part 2; GAO, Executive Guide:
    Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act
    (GAO/GGD-96-119, June 1996).

    Performance measurement. S&T uses milestones to measure progress, but
    those milestones may not be meaningful indicators of progress. There
    also appears to be little or no consequence for missing milestones. The
    panel recommended that S&T systematically collect and analyze
    information about milestones met and missed, adopt appropriate
    consequences, and provide clear guidance for setting valid initial and
    subsequent milestones. We also recommended that S&T adopt peer review
    of their overall portfolio, as is the practice of other federal science
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    and technology organizations.

    Unnecessary duplication. The panel found no instances of unnecessary
    duplication within S&T or among the other agencies engaged in homeland
    security research. Nevertheless, the panel was concerned that the
    weaknesses in strategic planning and the lack of systematic mechanisms
    to evaluate the relative merits of competing priorities for science and
    technology efforts related to homeland security put the community at
    risk for such duplication.

    Opportunity costs. The panel surfaced no evidence to indicate that the
    increases in spending for homeland security-related research has led to
    reduced funding for other significant research areas.

        The remainder of my statement addresses in more detail the issues
    related to the development of strategic plans, stakeholder involvement
    in setting research priorities, and the role of basic research in the
    DHS S&T portfolio.

    The Development of Strategic Plans

        Like other federal organizations, DHS S&T bears a responsibility
    for developing a strategic plan to guide its own work. In addition, the
    Homeland Security Act of 2002 requires the Directorate to develop, ``in
    consultation with other appropriate executive agencies, a national
    policy and strategic plan'' for federal civilian efforts to identify
    and develop countermeasures to chemical, biological, radiological,
    nuclear, and other emerging terrorist threats.\4\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ P.L. 107-296, November 25, 2002, Title III Sec. 302.

    S&T internal strategic planning
        In June 2007, the Directorate published an internal Strategic Plan,
    Science & Technology Strategy to Make the Nation Safer. The plan
    describes the structure of the organization and the roles of the IPTs,
    its mechanisms for reaching out to other organizations and players, and
    its plans for workforce development. It does not adhere to the criteria
    of a strategic plan as generally applied across the Federal Government.
    Simply put, the plan can be said to detail the ``what'' of S&T, but it
    lacks the focus on the ``why'' that is the hallmark of successful
    strategic planning. The NAPA panel also found weaknesses in the process
    through which the plan was developed.
        GAO's guide to strategic planning recommends that strategic plans
    include six components.\5\ The table on the next page assesses the
    content of S&T's strategic plan in the context of GAO's required
    components. The table reveals several weaknesses of the June 2007
    document: a mission statement that understates the range of
    responsibilities assigned to the organization, including those related
    to coordinating and collaborating with other federal agencies; the lack
    of specific long-term goals and objectives; the lack of discussion of
    key external factors that could affect the achievement of goals; and
    the lack of a foundation to establish annual performance goals and
    metrics to assess progress toward goals.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
    Performance and Results Act (GAO/GGD-96-119, June 1996.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        One challenge confronting DHS S&T is that DHS itself and the wider
    federal homeland security community are generally lacking the clear
    assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and risks and the prioritized
    goals from which S&T might derive its own statement of goals and
    objectives. Better assessments of threats, risks, and vulnerabilities
    and a clearer consensus on homeland security goals, objectives, and
    priorities at the national, federal, and departmental levels would
    indeed provide a foundation on which S&T could build its next strategic
    plan. Nevertheless, the NAPA panel felt that the DHS Strategic Plan
    released in September 2008 offers the department-level perspective that
    can guide the Directorate's planning efforts. We recommended that S&T
    move forward to develop a strategic plan that more closely reflects the
    GAO guidance.

        In strategic planning, the process is often as important as the
    product. The GAO guide highlights three practices that are critical to
    successful strategic planning:

              Stakeholder involvement, including Congress and the
            Administration, State and local governments, third-party
            providers, interest groups, agency employees, fee-paying
            customers, and the public;

              Assessment of the internal and external environment
            continuously and systematically to anticipate future challenges
            and make future adjustments so that potential problems do not
            become crises; and

              Alignment of activities, core processes, and
            resources to support mission-related outcomes.

        Stakeholders were not specifically involved in drafting the S&T
    strategic plan. In addition, a systematic environmental scan was not
    conducted to inform the plan. The NAPA panel recommended that S&T
    follow the process as outlined by GAO, and particularly that it involve
    stakeholders in the development of its next plan. Other federal science
    and technology organizations have engaged in sound strategic planning,
    and their practices provide models that could inform an improved
    process in DHS S&T.

    Development of a federal strategic plan
        DHS S&T has not made progress in developing a strategic plan for
    the overall federal civilian effort to identify and develop
    countermeasures to emerging terrorist threats. To be fair, S&T may not
    be in the best position to lead that development, because it is a
    relatively small player within the federal homeland security research
    community.
        Even within DHS, the S&T Directorate is not the only player in S&T.
    When the Department was formed, the Coast Guard and Secret Service both
    retained jurisdiction over their own science and technology work. The
    Department's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) now holds
    separate responsibility for research and development related to nuclear
    detection.
        Moreover, among federal departments, DHS has only the third-largest
    budget for homeland security-related research and development, after
    the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of
    Defense (DOD).\6\ The National Science Foundation, NASA, Department of
    Energy, Department of Commerce, Environmental Protection Agency, and
    Department of Agriculture also play significant roles.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ FY 2008 funding for homeland security-related research and
    development in HHS was $1.9 billion; in DOD, $1.3 billion; in DHS,
    including R&D funds for the DNDO, $1.0 billion.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        DHS S&T has little direct authority to direct or influence the
    research agendas of the science and technology organizations in those
    other departments and agencies. To produce a comprehensive research
    strategy that would be supported across the Federal Government, S&T
    would have to seek and rely on White House support to obtain active
    participation from the other federal research organizations, some of
    which are far stronger players by virtue of their own budgets as well
    as the institutional heft of their respective departments and agencies.
    I believe that it makes more sense for the White House Executive Office
    of the President to orchestrate this interagency effort.
        Within the Executive Office of the President, there are two
    organizations that could take charge of an overall federal strategic
    plan for homeland security-related science and technology. One is the
    newly merged National Security Staff, which integrates the former
    National Security Council Staff with the Homeland Security Council
    Staff that was established shortly after 9/11.\7\ That staff carries
    out the day-to-day coordination of domestic and international security
    activities across the interagency and is in a good position to work
    with all the departments and agencies involved in homeland security to
    pull together a coherent strategic plan and ensure its implementation.
    The National Security Staff lacks budgetary responsibility, however. To
    ensure budgetary realism of the strategic plan, the National Security
    Staff should work closely with budget experts from the national
    security division and the homeland security branch of the Office of
    Management and Budget.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ President Obama decided to merge the two staffs in accordance
    with recommendations made under his first Presidential Study Directive.
    See the White House Office of the Press Secretary, ``Statement by the
    President on the White House Organization for Homeland Security and
    Counterterrorism,'' May 26, 2009.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Another choice is the White House Office of Science and Technology
    (OSTP). OSTP holds responsibility for leading the interagency effort
    with regard to science and technology policies and budgets. The NAPA
    panel recommended this option. Specifically the panel recommended that
    DHS S&T work with OSTP and the other federal departments engaged in
    homeland security-related research to develop a comprehensive strategic
    research plan.

    Stakeholder Involvement in Setting Research Priorities

        DHS S&T groups its projects into three portfolios: transition,
    research, and innovation. The transition portfolio is meant to deliver
    technologies to DHS components or first responders within three years.
    The research portfolio is aimed at longer-term basic research
    endeavors, expected to take five to eight years or more. The innovation
    portfolio is meant to identify and fund potential ``game changing''
    technologies--long shots that could lead to ``leap-ahead results.''
        In recent years S&T organized IPTs that bring the Directorate's
    staff together with its customers to establish priorities for projects
    in the transition portfolio. During 2008, there were twelve ``capstone
    IPTs,'' each of which focused on one of twelve areas of science and
    technology: border security, cargo security, maritime security,
    chemical/biological defense, cyber security, information sharing and
    management, inter-operability, counter-IED, transportation, people
    screening, infrastructure protection, and incident management. Each
    capstone IPT is co-led by member of the S&T staff and a representative
    from one of DHS's other components, and includes participants from S&T
    and its customers inside DHS. Each sets priorities for projects within
    its purview.
        It appears that when the IPTs were initiated, little guidance was
    provided on how to operate them. Lacking such guidance, members of each
    IPT devised their own structure and processes through trial and error.
    At the time our study was conducted, S&T was beginning to develop some
    standardized practices, but we still found great variation in structure
    and processes among the IPTs.
        Priorities and projects established through the IPT process are
    reviewed by a Technical Oversight Group (TOG), which exercises
    oversight of the transition portfolio. The TOG is chaired by the Deputy
    Secretary of Homeland Security and includes the Under Secretaries for
    National Protection and Programs, Management, and S&T. To ensure that
    S&T's transition projects are aligned with DHS priorities, the TOG
    makes the final decisions on the list of transition projects. Although
    customers are invited to TOG meetings, some of them told the NAPA staff
    that last-minute invitations prevented them from attending, and that
    they did not understand the basis of the TOG's decisions.
        Projects in the transition portfolio are meant to fill gaps in a
    customer's capability and to be integrated into an acquisition program
    or commercialized after the S&T work is completed. To that end, the
    Directorate asks customers to enter into a Technology Transition
    Agreement (TTA) for each project. TTAs are intended to describe the
    capability gap that the S&T project will fill, the project deliverable,
    the technical requirements and parameters, and the project plan,
    including schedule, funding, and transition approach. At the time the
    NAPA study was conducted, however, few TTAs had been signed, thus
    calling into question their usefulness.
        The IPTs appear to be useful vehicles for involving DHS's internal
    stakeholders in setting research priorities. The NAPA study found that
    customers generally characterized the S&T staff as accessible and
    responsive to their concerns. We also found the IPT process to be
    flexible enough to accommodate any changes needed to respond to new
    threats or other circumstances, and to encourage information exchange
    among DHS's components.
        Nevertheless, the NAPA study identified several factors that keep
    the IPTs from fulfilling their intended role. These include:

              The IPTs are not adequately institutionalized, and
            may not be able to withstand changes in leadership.

              The customer focus of the IPT process may obscure
            important opportunities inherent in innovation, gaps in
            knowledge, or opportunities that cut across S&T's divisions.

              The roles and responsibilities of participants are
            not explicitly defined, and the lack of clear definition has
            caused confusion among customers and frustration among some S&T
            staff.

              TTA agreements largely go unsigned, and since IPT
            budgets are fixed separately from the TTA process, there is no
            incentive for customers to sign them.

              Customers do not fully understand the TOG process.

              There is no standard mechanism for collecting input
            from non-DHS customers, including first responders at the State
            and local levels.

              Processes and procedures for running the IPTs are not
            adequately standardized.

              Customers lack incentives for investing the time and
            effort needed to make the IPTs maximally effective.

        Two other factors stand in the way of rational priority-setting
    across S&T. First, the process of allocating budgets among the various
    IPTs is not transparent, but seems to be based broadly on the share of
    homeland security-related science and technology funding held by the
    components before they were consolidated into the department in 2003.
    Thus, the broad allocation of money among the IPTs does not necessarily
    reflect DHS-wide priorities or allow for taking advantage of the most
    promising opportunities. Second, the transition portfolio managed
    through the IPTs accounts for only about one-half of Directorate
    funding. The mechanisms for establishing priorities for a substantial
    share of its work, particularly those for the basic research portfolio,
    are less clear.

    The Role of Basic Research in the DHS S&T Portfolio

        Basic research accounts for a bit more than 20 percent of S&T's
    budget. Of that, some 31 percent is performed by universities; 31
    percent by industry; 26 percent by the National Laboratories; ten
    percent by other federal laboratories; one percent by federally funded
    research and development centers; and one percent by other not-for-
    profit enterprises.
        Basic research is the seed corn for the development of future
    technologies that could ultimately protect the Nation more effectively
    and at lower cost, and no other organization in Federal Government has
    the mandate or the wherewithal to sponsor basic research in key
    homeland security-related areas such as border protection, immigration,
    or aviation security. The budget share that S&T devotes to basic
    research appears generally consistent with the practice in other
    security agencies, particularly the DOD.
        That said, the NAPA panel found potential weaknesses in DHS's
    allocation of basic research funds among projects, the integration of
    research among its various research performers, and the processes used
    to select research projects and monitor their performance. We thus
    offered the following recommendations:

              Develop and implement clear and transparent processes
            and criteria for identifying basic research needs, prioritizing
            projects, and selecting performers.

              Ensure S&T builds on current efforts to integrate
            research across the National Laboratories, Centers of
            Excellence, and other performers.

              Make competitive processes that include external
            scientific peer review the norm for basic research.

    Concluding Remarks

        When the panel report was released in June 2009, the leadership of
    the DHS S&T Directorate readily accepted the panels recommendations and
    agreed that these issues require attention. The absence of a confirmed
    Under Secretary to head the Directorate has no doubt limited the
    ability of the Directorate to respond fully to the recommendations. The
    Academy and the panel believe that their implementation would
    significantly improve the effectiveness of S&T, and are ready to assist
    the organization as appropriate.

                          Biography for Cindy Williams
        Cindy Williams is serving as the J.B. and Maurice C. Shapiro
    Visiting Professor of International Affairs at the Elliott School of
    International Affairs of the George Washington University for the fall
    2009 semester. She is currently on leave from the Massachusetts
    Institute of Technology, where she is a Principal Research Scientist of
    the MIT Security Studies Program. Her work at MIT includes an
    examination of the processes by which the U.S. Government plans for and
    allocates resources among the activities and programs related to
    national security and international affairs and an examination of the
    transition to all-volunteer forces in the militaries of European
    countries.
        Previously, Dr. Williams was an Assistant Director of the
    Congressional Budget Office, where she led the National Security
    Division in studies of budgetary and policy choices related to defense
    and international security. She has also served as a Director and in
    other capacities at the MITRE Corporation in Bedford, Massachusetts; as
    a member of the Senior Executive Service in the Office of the Secretary
    of Defense at the Pentagon; and as a mathematician at RAND in Santa
    Monica, California.
        Dr. Williams holds a Ph.D. in mathematics from the University of
    California, Irvine. She is a co-author, with Gordon Adams, of Buying
    National Security: How America Plans and Pays for Its Global Role and
    Safety at Home (Taylor and Francis, forthcoming December 2009). She is
    the editor of two books: Holding the Line: U.S. Defense Alternatives
    for the Early 21st Century (MIT Press 2001) and Filling the Ranks:
    Transforming the U.S. Military Personnel System (MIT Press, 2004), and
    the co-editor, with Curtis L. Gilroy, of Service to Country: Personnel
    Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries (MIT Press 2006).
    She is a member of the board and an elected fellow of the National
    Academy of Public Administration and a former member of the Naval
    Studies Board of the National Academies. She is a member of the Council
    on Foreign Relations and of the International Institute of Strategic
    Studies. She serves on the editorial board of International Security
    and the advisory board of the Scowcroft Institute of International
    Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service of Texas
    A&M University, and is on the advisory committee of Women in
    International Security (WIIS).

                                   Discussion

        Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Dr. Williams. And now it
    is in order for Members of the Committee to ask questions, and
    the Chair recognizes himself for five minutes.
        Mr. Buswell, I want to commend you and Vice Admiral Cohen
    for the job that you all have done. I believe that Admiral
    Cohen's goal was to increase basic research to 20 or 21
    percent, and you have hit that metric. I think that on the
    basic research front, there may be some further discussion
    about how well that research is linked to the missions of DHS,
    but I think that overall, it is very, very important and
    commendable that you all have achieved that metric.
        I also think that it is very commendable that you have
    improved the IPT process significantly, and this panel may want
    to return to that topic. But there has been dramatic
    improvement on that front.
        The area of concern which I would like to discuss with you
    and the panel is whether a systematic risk assessment and a
    strategic plan based on at least in part on that risk
    assessment would be helpful to the S&T Directorate and helpful
    to DHS? I think that there was some concern from outside that
    perhaps the Vice President's Office drove priorities by a
    tremendous amount. I am gratified to hear that it has become a
    more customer-driven process, and I think that is commendable,
    but a completely customer-driven process may not hit the risks
    that you want to hit. And I would like you to tell this
    subcommittee what has prevented the S&T Directorate in engaging
    in a more systematic risk assessment, and then I would like to
    encourage the rest of the panel to address what a more
    systematic, strategic plan and also use of risk assessment,
    particularly an all-hazards approach, how that might benefit
    the S&T Directorate and DHS overall. Mr. Buswell, would you
    like to start this?
        Mr. Buswell. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. Thanks very much. The
    answer to your question, you know, does a systematic or
    comprehensive risk assessment help us in prioritizing our
    technology development is absolutely. And the way that I think
    that it helps us do that is it helps the components whom we
    serve to identify their priorities in a more systematic way.
    Let me just say that as I am part of the QHSR (Quadrennial
    Homeland Security Review) steering committee. I don't want to
    get out in front of the headlights and usurp the Secretary's
    prerogative on the QHSR, but there is a substantial effort
    within that organization to address this risk assessment
    process and to define the scope with which the Department ought
    to address that. And I think we will be hearing more about that
    over the coming months, and S&T is delighted to provide input
    to that risk assessment, whether it be scientific modeling
    input or other kinds of capability gap identification processes
    that we have in place. And I think that over the long-term,
    that will be a very valuable tool for the Department at large
    in identifying the operational requirements that it needs to
    address, both with technology and other ways. As Mr. Berteau
    said, though, this is a difficult thing to do, but we are
    committed to doing it because it is the right thing to do and
    it is the only way to get the best return for the investment.
        Chairman Wu. Well, prior hearings on this topic have been
    somewhat contentious. It is rewarding to see that there has
    been progress made on the basic research front, on the IPT
    front, and I look forward to a report a year or two down the
    pike that we will be making--that we have made progress on
    systematic risk assessment and a strategic plan.
        Mr. Berteau, Dr. Depoy, Dr. Williams, would you care to add
    to this discussion about the strategic plan and about risk
    analysis?
        Dr. Williams. I would like to.
        Chairman Wu. Please.
        Dr. Williams. It strikes me that the assessment or threats,
    risks and vulnerabilities is crucial to the development of
    goals and priorities, and that has to be the thing that starts
    the ball rolling on any strategic plan. Only with a firm
    strategic plan will the organization be able to decide on
    whether it should prefer this over that, this transition work
    over some other transition work, possibly in a completely
    separate part of the Department of Homeland Security.
        Now, one of the problems the S&T Directorate has faced in
    the past was that it didn't have that threat and risk
    assessment coming down from the top of the Department, or even
    from across the Federal Government. And I can understand that
    that is an issue for them, and they are hoping that the
    Quadrennial Homeland Security Review will produce a threat and
    risk assessment that they will be able to work with to
    establish their own internal goals. If that should not happen,
    if for some reason the threat and risk assessment that comes
    down from the top appears to be lacking, it strikes me that
    they still need to do something on their own to establish the
    threats and risks that they believe they are working to, even
    if it is dead wrong over the long-term, even if it is not what
    they want five years from now. They need something internally
    to start the ball rolling and to be part of their strategic
    planning.
        Chairman Wu. Mr. Buswell, are you waiting for the
    Quadrennial Review to supply you with a plan from on high or
    risk assessment also?
        Mr. Buswell. We are working in parallel with the
    Quadrennial Review on our own S&T strategic plan. What I want
    to emphasize though is we are not the tail wagging the dog
    here. We want to make sure that we are providing the
    technologies that are of the highest importance to the
    Department, and that is the way we intend to approach this. I
    am confident that the Department will be able to establish
    strategic goals and objectives out of this strategic review,
    this Quadrennial Review. The risk assessment is a longer-term
    effort, and the risk assessment part of that will take--and
    will be iterative over a number of years and really will never
    be an ending effort because the threat constantly changes.
        So I am confident that we will have some input into our
    strategic plan. Now, keep in mind, you know, from my
    perspective, science and technology should be not the end of
    the whip but the handle of the whip, and as the strategy
    changes, we ought to--our long-term focus ought to result in
    smaller changes within the S&T portfolio assuming that we are
    investing in things that are relevant to homeland security,
    then maybe some other things, some other strategic initiatives
    might that can offer near-term solutions, you know, policy
    changes and tactics changes and those kinds of things that can
    be implemented more quickly than technology can be developed.
        Chairman Wu. Before we move onto Mr. Smith, if either you,
    Dr. Depoy, or you, Mr. Berteau, have something to say about
    risk assessment, threat assessment and this strategic plan, I
    want to open it up to you all.
        Mr. Berteau. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would note two
    things that I think are in addition to the comments that my
    colleagues have made here today. One is that we have a tendency
    to evaluate the efficacy of planning by how well it predicts
    the future, and that is the wrong metric to determine whether
    or not planning was of any value to us. Its real value is in
    how well it prepares us to deal with the future that we can't
    predict.
        And so it is possible under that kind of a rubric to look
    like you are fully compliant with OMB circular A-11's
    requirements for strategic plans and you give GAO something
    that they can check or not check everything that you have or
    have not done, and yet it has done nothing to actually prepare
    you better to deal with a future that you can't predict. So we
    need to be careful that we don't get caught up into a checklist
    mentality for the value of strategic planning.
        The second is that a big element of that value comes from
    the process itself, and threat assessment and risk assessment
    as well as incorporating existing legislation and existing
    strategies and stakeholder input, all of that comes into play.
    But what that process needs to produce is something that looks
    like strategic guidance, something that says to everybody
    involved in the homeland security enterprise, this is what is
    important. This is what you need to spend your time and effort
    on. This is where you spend your marginal dollars when they
    become available. This is how you know how to prioritize. That
    strategic guidance is a clear and important element of this
    process, and if it is not present, people have to make
    assumptions, and the assumptions may not be consistent, either
    across the enterprise or over time.
        Chairman Wu. Thank you, Mr. Berteau.
        Dr. Depoy. I would just emphasize the point that Mr.
    Berteau made earlier that this does have to be an enterprise-
    wide effort, and certainly the operating components must be a
    part of this plan. It can't be produced in the Directorate by
    itself.
        Chairman Wu. Thank you very much. Mr. Smith.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Williams notes in
    her testimony that the NAPA review of DHS Science and
    Technology found that many basic research projects funded by
    Science and Technology are done so without competition or peer
    review and that the Directorate should work to make peer review
    and competition standard unless it is clearly not feasible.
        Mr. Buswell, do you agree with the finding and
    recommendation, and if so, how would you say it is being
    addressed?
        Mr. Buswell. Well, thank you, sir. I generally agree that
    competition is good and that peer review is certainly one means
    of selecting--ensuring that we are selecting high-quality
    projects and that those projects are being executed in a high-
    quality way.
        Peer review using both internal and external reviewers as I
    said is a valuable way to do that. As Dr. Williams' panel
    noted, we have had quite a bit of success in the Centers of
    Excellence selection process which fundamentally does select
    some of the projects, a good number of the projects, that are
    conducted in the basic research portfolio through both internal
    and external review in series. And I think, you know, as I said
    the goal is to make sure we are getting out of the investment
    what we think we should.
        Let me also say that all proposals that come in through the
    broad agency announcement process are in effect peer reviewed.
    Those proposals are reviewed by a panel of experts, subject
    matter, and perhaps stakeholder kinds of--you know,
    practitioner kinds of review to make sure that the proposal is
    sound and that it is executable and scientifically feasible. So
    in general, yes, I think that more competition is good. We
    establish a lot of that competition through the selection of
    the Centers of Excellence, university-based Centers of
    Excellence, and we intend to continue to do that. We have been
    very successful in that realm. And then the other part of this,
    you know, as I said, the two pillars of basic research are the
    Centers of Excellence and the DOE National Laboratories, and we
    have started a renewed effort within the Directorate to ensure
    that the investments that are going to the national
    laboratories are being done to the best effect of the taxpayer
    dollars, or you know, in the best interest of the government.
        And I look forward to strengthening that process with the
    national laboratories over the coming year. I think that is one
    of the things that we can improve Directorate-wide.
        So short answer to your question, yes, I agree with their
    recommendation, and to the extent feasible, we should encourage
    competition to make sure that we get the most benefit for the
    taxpayer dollar.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you. And Dr. Williams, you noted in your
    testimony about milestones to track programs and that they may
    not be meaningful indicators of progress, and there appears to
    be little or no consequence for missing them. Could you
    elaborate on the finding and certainly your recommendation, and
    then Mr. Buswell, if you could provide reaction from the
    Department's perspective?
        Dr. Williams. One of the things the panel looked at was
    whether the Directorate has processes in place to know what is
    going on inside of its projects. Have they established
    milestones? Are the projects meeting their milestones? And we
    noticed that there are milestones established, but it seemed as
    though the majority of projects were missing their milestones,
    and there was very little consequence--at the time that we
    looked at the Directorate--for missing a milestone. In fact,
    the main consequence seemed to be to renegotiate the milestone
    and start fresh with a new milestone on the same project.
        We found that, for one thing, there wasn't a good record of
    what is going on that is causing so many projects to miss their
    milestones? Is there one thing that is happening continually?
    Are the milestones just not realistic from the beginning? And
    so we suggested that DHS S&T do some systematic effort within
    the Directorate to pull together what is known about the
    milestones and why projects are missing them, and see if they
    can start to identify any patterns in that regard.
        Mr. Smith. Mr. Buswell.
        Mr. Buswell. That was an excellent observation by the
    panel, and we appreciated their input on that. We have done a
    number of things. First of all, let me say that the milestone--
    using milestones as a metric of success and program management
    is only as good as the milestones that you establish. So we
    have taken a two-pronged approach to this. One, we are looking
    at milestone development. You know, what is a meaningful
    milestone and what isn't a meaningful milestone? What are we
    actually using to decide at some point in the process whether a
    project should go forward or not? I mean, is this actually
    going to result in a technology that will be of benefit to the
    Department or of benefit to the first responder community? And
    so what are the key decision points? What are the key phase
    gates that we want to meet in managing those projects? So that
    is the first area that we focused on is in establishing good
    milestones.
        Second, you know, in response largely to the review that
    NAPA did and some input that we had gotten from the Department,
    program analysis and evaluation, I have tied the six division
    heads' performance evaluations to their division's meeting of
    milestones. And so it is tracked very carefully. They watch
    their program managers. Their program managers are evaluated on
    meeting those milestones, and that is an effective tool I think
    to making sure that that happens.
        Now, there is always unintended consequences. Our goal is
    to get technological capabilities to our customers. Our goal is
    not to properly manage projects. So I need to make sure that I
    am not disincentivizing the program managers who may come
    across a technology that leaps their program of record, you
    know. They would have no incentive to abandon the program of
    record because they are getting measured on whether they are
    meeting the milestones in that program or not in order to adopt
    this leap-ahead technology.
        So there is a balance here that I need to make sure I keep
    which is, you know, maybe meeting 75 percent of the milestones
    is a reasonable number. I don't know. That is where we started.
    We started with setting the goal of 75 percent of milestone
    completion. We achieved that metric this year. So if those are
    good milestones, then maybe we are there, but at the same time,
    I want to continue to reward those program managers who
    abandoned their program of record because they found something
    that will actually deliver a capability sooner than their
    program would have.
        Mr. Smith. Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Smith. Mr. Tonko,
    would you prefer to defer your questions right now?
        Mr. Tonko. Yes.
        Chairman Wu. Ms. Biggert, you are recognized for five
    minutes.
        Ms. Biggert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would direct this
    question to Mr. Buswell. Anthrax has been mentioned as DHS's
    number one terrorist threat, a threat supported by the findings
    of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass
    Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism's recent progress
    report titled The Clock is Ticking. Could you tell us about or
    explain for us the role of the Directorate in addressing this
    threat and the focus of science and technology in bio
    preparedness?
        Mr. Buswell. Yes, ma'am. Let me start by saying that the
    principle role of the Directorate in the National bio defense
    effort has to do with the threat assessment and determination
    process. So what are the highest threats, what are the threats
    that we have to worry about above all others, whether that is
    due to the likelihood that a terrorist could get a hold of this
    material, whether it is due to the consequences of a successful
    attack using the particular pathogen, and there are a lot of
    things that go into that threat assessment. So one of our major
    efforts is this bi-annual, bioterrorism risk assessment that
    has been delivered to the Federal community and drives the
    investment priorities across the Federal Government in bio
    defense, whether those investment priorities are in
    surveillance, bio surveillance, environmental, or other kinds
    of surveillance, whether that is in the prioritization of
    vaccine development within DHS enterprise, or other kinds of,
    you know, intelligence community activities that might occur.
    So the threat assessment is fundamental to the activities of
    biodefense across the government.
        The second thing that we do within the S&T Directorate that
    really isn't done anywhere else in the government and so is a
    unique mission that we have has to do with the bio forensics
    aspect of things. What if there should be a successful attack
    such as happened in 2001? We now have the National Bio
    forensics Laboratory at Fort Detrick that DHS S&T operates in
    order to attribute the attack in a way that is meaningful from
    a law enforcement standpoint. In other words, we have got--we
    have partnered with the FBI such that we maintain chain of
    evidence, we do those kinds of things that will eventually
    result in successful attribution and prosecution of folks who
    do that kind of thing.
        Ms. Biggert. Thank you. Then just one other question on
    cybersecurity research. It seems like the bulk of the
    activities are operational focused and are in the national
    protection and programs, their Directorate. However, our
    Committee has consistently emphasized the importance of R&D to
    successfully addressing cybersecurity over the long-term. With
    that in mind, could you talk about the Directorate's
    cybersecurity R&D portfolio and if there is any new
    technologies like the SmartGrid that are being included in
    research assessments?
        Mr. Buswell. Yes, ma'am. Our investment in cybersecurity
    over the last three years has essentially tripled, much to the
    credit of highlighting the importance by committees such as
    this subcommittee and then the identification within the
    President's own agenda. So the input function, if you look at
    funding that way, is going the right direction in my opinion.
    And we are about where we should be for the near-term. The key
    then becomes how do you link the priorities of that research to
    the overall priorities of both the Department and the Nation?
    And that is an area that we can improve significantly, and I am
    working closely with the folks over at NPPD (National
    Protection and Programs Directorate), Phil Reitinger who is the
    Deputy Under Secretary at NPPD and is really responsible for
    the Department's cybersecurity effort. We meet biweekly in a
    steering group that identifies not just the R&D priorities but
    what are the cybersecurity priorities for the Department and
    how, from a collective effort within the Department, can we
    best advance those priorities?
        So I will tell you that there is a lot of work to be done
    in cybersecurity, but there is a lot of people doing work as
    well. So the integration of all the efforts going on, both in
    the public and the private sector, is fundamental to the
    success of cybersecurity. Dr. Depoy's panel did an excellent
    report for us on cybersecurity and has established a number of
    recommendations. I don't know if you have time to expand upon
    that, but we do have a number of priorities, and SmartGrid
    technology, for example, to the extent that we can prevent
    attacks on the grid from cyberspace fundamental to the
    continuity of those systems which are important to the security
    and the stability of the country. We will invest in those, in
    cooperation with the Department of Energy who also has
    responsibility for the reliability of the electric grid.
        Ms. Biggert. Thank you. Thank you very much. I yield back.
        Chairman Wu. Thank you. Mr. Tonko.
        Mr. Tonko. Yes. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Perhaps to
    Mr. Buswell but anyone on the panel might have some input here.
    I do understand that at DHS you have to some degree on a
    limited basis resorted to that turnaround of program managers
    in your S&T operation, and it seems to be a practice that is
    resorted to by DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects
    Agency) and NSF (National Science Foundation) quite frequently.
    Is there a way to stretch that concept over a greater number of
    programs? How would you expand that practice within DHS to
    perhaps utilize that rotation more frequently?
        Mr. Buswell. Thank you. That is a great concept. The
    Congress in its wisdom in the Homeland Security Act of 2002
    gave S&T specifically the Homeland Security Advanced Research
    Projects Agency, HSARPA, the authority, same authority as that
    DARPA has, to hire technical experts out of the private sector
    or other civil service on a term basis, and that term is five
    years. It can be extended up to two more years under certain
    circumstances. We have the authorization to hire 20 such of
    these folks. We currently have 11. They are tied to the HSARPA
    portfolio primarily. It is about a $44 million a year
    portfolio, 11 is about the right number to manage programs in
    that funding area. You know, to stretch that beyond what we are
    doing right now, we would need to increase the innovation
    portfolio funding level which I would be delighted to do. But
    for right now, we are about at the right place I think with
    that. And you are right, it is a valuable tool. It gives us
    special hiring authority, special compensation authority so
    that we can get really top-quality people out of the private
    sector and out of other areas of government to manage these
    kind of programs. It is paying off very well for us.
        Mr. Tonko. Any particular way to expand that program, there
    would be certain focus to where you would use these three- to
    four- to five-year assignments?
        Mr. Buswell. The focus that I would use on is in the highly
    innovative kinds of research, in the things that are very high
    risk, higher risk than we typically address in the Capstone IPT
    process. But that is what the innovation portion of the
    portfolio is for. It addresses the high-risk prototypical
    demonstrations that again, because they are high risk with a
    significant probability of failure, customers can't rely on us
    to provide that solution in the time that they might need it.
    So the analogy that is sometimes used is the Capstone IPTs
    provide the three megapixel camera to the five megapixel camera
    to the ten megapixel camera while we are looking in the
    innovation portfolio at the gigapixel camera. What can we do
    with a gigapixel camera that we can't do with the incremental
    improvement that would tend to pursue lower risk in the
    Capstone IPT process?
        So that is the area I think that those--and that is the
    area that we have the authorization to do that kind of hiring,
    and to me that makes the most sense because you want to get
    people in that are fresh out of the technology development
    arena, you know, to manage those kinds of cutting-edge
    programs.
        Mr. Tonko. Thank you. Mr. Berteau.
        Mr. Berteau. Yes, sir. I would like to add one additional
    thought to your question of opportunities for expanding what I
    think is a very useful potential to augment and enhance the
    capability of the government workforce here.
        When the S&T Directorate was originally established, I
    think it was envisioned that it would have a more substantial
    and more powerful role in the acquisition side of the
    Department of Homeland Security than has evolved over time. I
    think we have an opportunity with a new Administration to
    reevaluate and reconsider that. When I go back to the point I
    made about there needs to be better planning for transition of
    research into programs, that is one of the areas where I think
    not only could the S&T Directorate play a better role across
    the Department but where in fact the opportunity for the term
    appointments and the capability that they bring both at the
    individual and the collective level would offer tremendous new
    capability for the entire homeland security enterprise.
        Mr. Tonko. Anyone else? Mr. Chair, I yield back.
        Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Tonko. I want to
    follow up on Mr. Tonko's inquiry because you know, this has
    become a topic of great interest to me that some federal
    agencies do a very good job of rotating people in and out of
    Washington, D.C., whether it is for a multi-week internship or
    for a few months or in some instances for a few years for
    positions as significant as being a program manager. DARPA does
    this, NSF does this, NIH (National Institutes of Health) does
    this and integrates scientists from, in the NIH instance,
    integrates scientists from around the country into the grant
    review and peer review process. And I would like the panel to
    comment on how useful this might be. And Mr. Buswell, I would
    like you to respond. You know, outside of the formal program of
    20, what impediments do you see to DHS and the S&T Director
    implementing a broader program of linkages to academic centers,
    think tanks, the private sector for bringing people in and out?
    Because it is not just for the benefit of the S&T Directorate.
    I think the residual benefit for the rest of the country is an
    appreciation for how the agency works and indeed how Washington
    works in some respects. And I would like to the extent any of
    you are interested in commenting on this, all of you to comment
    on it. Mr. Buswell, would you like to start?
        Mr. Buswell. I would love to, yes, sir. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman. There are a number of other opportunities besides
    the--we call it the 1101s because it comes from the Defense
    Authorization Act, Section 1101. So these 11 employees that we
    have are affectionately termed 1101s. There are also a number
    of fellowship opportunities that we taken advantage of,
    Presidential Management Fellows, AAAS (American Association for
    the Advancement of Science) Fellows, those kinds of things that
    I think are very valuable in getting people into the
    understanding of the Federal Government research and
    development community.
        Our scholars and fellows program within the Centers of
    Excellence is also one of the fundamental things that I think
    we are doing to improve that understanding and to get that
    rotation. We have funded over the last six years over 400 of
    these scholars and fellows across the country in areas of
    academic development that we think are fundamental to homeland
    security. They do internships in the summertime with the
    national laboratories and other federal research and
    development entities, and we think that that is really
    valuable. We don't have enough statistical information yet on
    the graduates to understand whether or not they are pursuing
    careers in the Federal Government at least to start with, but
    we are hopeful that it will result in, you know, a 10 to 20
    percent perhaps participation of our scholars and fellows
    graduates in long-term federal employment.
        The other area that we can utilize and we do utilize to a
    certain extent is the Intergovernmental Personnel Act
    authorities where we are able to bring on folks from State and
    local governments or from non-profit organizations that can
    then work--they have really all the authorities of a federal
    employee with certain limitations dealing with their parent
    organization, you know, conflict of interest limitations as you
    would expect. But to a large extent, they are able to gain a
    great understanding of the way that we work within DHS, and
    they can take that back to their parent organization at the end
    of a two-year period and utilize that to the benefit of their
    organization and to the benefit of our organization as well.
        Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Buswell. Comments
    from the rest of the panel in general or specifically, whether
    DHS is sufficiently linked to the relevant research community.
    Dr. Williams.
        Dr. Williams. We used the word insularity in our report,
    and that may have changed over the past few months. But we were
    concerned that the Directorate wasn't reaching out enough to
    the outside world and that that caused two potential problems.
    One is that that limits the access to the ideas and innovations
    that are going on on the outside for those who are working
    inside the Directorate. But secondly as you pointed out, it
    limits the ability of the community, the wider community, to
    learn what is going on inside the Department of Homeland
    Security and to start thinking about the problems that that
    department has.
        We noticed it particularly in our discussions of the need
    for a peer review process. In several interviews we were told
    explicitly by members of the staff in the Directorate that peer
    review from outsiders wasn't needed because the program
    managers themselves were the world's experts in the area where
    they were reviewing projects.
        Now, I doubt that they are the only world's experts, but if
    they are the only world's experts, it tells you that we are
    desperately in need as a Nation of getting their thinking,
    their expertise out to a wider community, so that they won't be
    the world's only experts in the future. And that thought built
    value for us into the notion of having much more external peer
    review.
        Chairman Wu. Thank you, Dr. Williams. Dr. Depoy.
        Dr. Depoy. Yes, I saw one very good example of this kind of
    connectivity last summer and the summer before. The chem bio
    IPT annually holds a three-day meeting in which they invite a
    lot of people from throughout government and academia, and they
    review nearly all their projects each year and ask for their
    comments and certainly suggestions, as well as where similar
    projects are going on in other agencies. And it was one of the
    best meetings like that I have attended anywhere in the
    government. But I believe that is the only IPT that has done
    that as far as I know. But I think they have done it now for
    several years.
        Chairman Wu. So a model for emulation?
        Dr. Depoy. Yes, absolutely.
        Chairman Wu. Mr. Berteau.
        Mr. Berteau. Thank you, sir. I think there is one other
    potential advantage to an expansion such as Mr. Tonko has
    offered and you have continued in the discussion here and that
    is the benefit back to the user community. I think one of the
    real challenges in homeland security S&T is that the users
    often do not know the art of the possible. They are trying to
    set a request or a requirement based on what they think they
    need without having really defined the problem and without
    knowing the art of the possible. And I think one of the
    downstream benefits of expanding this kind of involvement with
    people is the benefit upon return and going back to where they
    have come from. And if we build that into the process there
    could be some additional advantages downstream.
        Chairman Wu. Thank you very much. I think this will be a
    topic of continuing interest to the Subcommittee.
        Do we have any further inquiries on this side? Mr. Tonko? I
    understand that you all have worked very hard on your
    testimony. I would like to offer you a moment to comment on any
    other aspects of the topics that we have been delving into that
    we have not covered in Q&A or in your written testimony. I want
    to offer you an opportunity to expand on any thoughts that you
    think would be helpful for this subcommittee's inquiry. Mr.
    Berteau.
        Mr. Berteau. I do have one final thought for you to keep in
    mind as you are evaluating DHS's performance in this regard. It
    has been my observation from my time in Washington that much of
    the Federal Government tends to do its research work, and the
    beneficiary or the customer is outside the government. It is
    the general population or some subset of the general
    population. They may not know who they are at the time the
    research is done, but that is the goal of those programs.
        In some agencies, the Defense Department being perhaps
    being the primary one here, the beneficiary of the research is
    actually internal. Most of the research that the Defense
    Department does it does for itself. It is the ultimate consumer
    of that research, and that tends to have a different focus, a
    different validation process, maybe even a different peer
    review process.
        DHS is a hybrid of the two, and in some cases, that makes
    it much more complex and much more difficult for all of those
    elements to be welded together. And I think it is useful as you
    set your bar of how DHS is performing to keep that in mind,
    that it really is a hybrid. Much of what it does it does for
    itself or at least for the broader first responder community.
    Much of what it does it also does for the external community.
    And sometimes those are two different processes and two
    different standards. So I would leave that just for your
    thought.
        Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Berteau. Dr.
    Williams.
        Dr. Williams. If I could bring up one other point. We
    talked about how important the internal process is once you are
    inside an IPT, for making sure that the priorities that are set
    within an IPT have something to do with the customer's needs
    and what the customer is asking for. But one of the astonishing
    things we found was that there is no transparent mechanism at
    all to compare priorities and reallocate the transition funds
    among the various IPTs. And that means the broad allocation of
    money across the Directorate doesn't necessarily reflect key
    priorities or allow for taking advantage of emerging
    opportunities that may happen in one area as opposed to the
    other. It also means that the bottom of the funded projects in
    one IPT may be significantly less important to DHS as a whole
    than something that is close to the top of the unfunded
    projects, again because there is no comparison and work across
    the IPTs for setting priorities.
        Now, some of this goes back to the fact that there is no
    strategic plan. With no genuine strategic plan, there is no
    established goals that everybody agrees to, and that makes it
    hard to try to divide the money up any different way among the
    IPTs than the way it was divided last year. But it struck us
    that something needs to be done about that. They need an
    explicit mechanism within the Directorate for dividing money
    among the IPTs.
        Chairman Wu. Thank you very much, Dr. Williams, and thank
    you all very much for contributing to our consideration and
    contributing to Mr. Buswell and the Department's consideration.
    I think it is fair to summarize that much progress has been
    made since this series of hearings began. We will continue this
    series of hearings, and we look forward to making additional
    progress with the S&T Directorate and with DNDO. We do face
    some different challenges as Mr. Berteau pointed out that this
    is a hybrid organization with significant consumption within
    the Department but also a large customer base for its products
    outside the Department, and that presents some special
    challenges.
        I want to thank all the witnesses for appearing this
    afternoon. The record will remain open for two weeks. I expect
    that there will be some submitted questions about the IPTs and
    consistency. And Members and the staff may seek answers to any
    follow-up questions that the Committee may ask.
        Again, I want to thank you for your testimony and your
    presence here today. The witnesses are excused, and the hearing
    is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
                                   Appendix:

                                  ----------

                       Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

                       Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
    Responses by Bradley I. Buswell, Acting Under Secretary, Science and
            Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
            (DHS)

    Questions submitted by Chairman David Wu

    Q1.  Currently the roles and responsibilities of IPT participants are
    not explicitly defined. What effect has this had on DHS customers and
    DHS S&T staff? How can DHS S&T better define these roles and
    communicate them to the participants?

    A1. I agree with the need to formalize the Capstone IPT process roles
    and responsibilities. The S&T Directorate now has the experience to
    recommend standardized best practices based on its work with the
    Capstone IPT Process over the past two years. The timing is right to
    develop a Management Directive that formalizes the Capstone IPT
    alignment to DHS enterprise goals, priorities, and processes, and
    formalizes Capstone IPT roles and responsibilities. As with the
    initiation of the Capstone IPT process, we will brief all components
    and participants on the roles and responsibilities being formalized in
    the Management Directive.
        Capstone IPT roles and responsibilities will also be re-enforced
    during Technology Oversight Group (TOG) meetings, which are chaired by
    the Department's Deputy Secretary, and during the semi-annual Under
    Secretary for Science and Technology Technology's Capstone IPT Review.
        Internal to the S&T Directorate, we are developing a phase gate
    process. The phase gate process provides program managers with a
    program management roadmap for project execution. Various gates are
    established for project review to ensure all documents are complete and
    on schedule. We are also developing program manager training to further
    instill the process. Additionally, we hold weekly meetings with the
    transition managers embedded in each of the six S&T Directorate
    technical divisions. During these meetings, the IPT process is refined
    and discussed for further dissemination to the program managers in the
    divisions.

    Question submitted by Representative Ben R. Lujan

    Q1.  National Laboratories, such as the two Department of Energy
    National Labs in New Mexico, conduct a substantial amount of basic
    research. Can you elaborate on how the National Laboratories can stay
    tied into the basic research that is a part of the DHS S&T portfolio?

    A1. The Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratories provide a
    unique, world-renowned, interdisciplinary research capability that is
    of tremendous value to the Nation in general and to the Department of
    Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate (S&T)
    specifically. S&T, through both the DHS Office of National Laboratories
    (ONL) and S&T's technical divisions, works closely with DOE and its
    national laboratories to identify opportunities for DHS to harness the
    capabilities of the national laboratories to address the near- and
    long-term technological needs in homeland security research. In
    addition, DHS and DOE work together closely to develop and streamline
    processes for collaboration and placement of work at the laboratories
    once the work is identified, given DHS's special access to DOE's
    national laboratories.
        The Office of National Laboratories, established by the Homeland
    Security Act of 2002, routinely leads and participates in meetings and
    teleconferences with representatives of DOE and its national
    laboratories to discuss S&T research priorities and laboratory
    capabilities to meet those needs. ONL also holds and participates in
    workshops and other events that provide opportunities for basic
    research leads within each S&T technical division to discuss their
    research portfolios with representatives of the research community,
    including representatives of the DOE laboratories. ONL is planning
    additional workshops that will focus on specific research areas of
    interest. The DOE labs will be important participants in those
    workshops, which are also intended to help form a research community
    for homeland security technologies and maximize opportunities for the
    application of capabilities, resources, and technologies, including
    those of DOE's national laboratories, in addressing DHS's homeland
    security mission.
        One specific instance of collaboration of benefit to both agencies
    and the national laboratories is DOE's invitation to representatives of
    ONL and S&T's program divisions to participate in the DOE meetings
    relating to its review of the national laboratories' Laboratory
    Directed Research and Development (LDRD) activities. This collaboration
    provides the opportunity for DHS to leverage the outcomes of LDRD
    efforts by the national laboratories and offers the laboratories
    opportunities to align portions of their LDRD portfolios to research
    and development activities that can satisfy DHS homeland security
    needs.
        The Science and Technology Directorate also collaborates with DOE
    and its national laboratories in aligning the best capabilities of the
    laboratories to the needs of S&T's six program divisions. This
    alignment provides S&T program managers a high quality resource in
    leveraging the S&T research mission.
        In its commitment to find the best technologies available to
    address homeland security research and development needs, the S&T
    publishes a brochure, Basic Research Focus Areas, which identifies gaps
    in homeland security technologies that, if solved, could result in
    scientific breakthroughs for the benefit of the Nation. The brochure is
    provided directly to the DOE national laboratories and is available at
    http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
    st-basic-research-focus-area
    s-may-2009.pdf
                       Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
    Responses by Phil E. Depoy, Vice Chairman, Homeland Security Science
            and Technology Advisory Committee (HSSTAC) Assessment Panel

    Questions submitted by Chairman David Wu

    Q1.  Currently the roles and responsibilities of IPT participants are
    not explicitly defined. What effect has this had on DHS customers and
    DHS S&T staff? How can DHS S&T better define these roles and
    communicate them to the participants?

    A1. In response to your question about the effect of the lack of
    definition of roles and responsibilities of IPT participants, I
    mentioned in my testimony that each of the IPT working groups has
    developed their own processes for reviewing and prioritizing capability
    gaps. Each of the processes which the HSSTAC has reviewed have their
    own advantages and disadvantages, but I believe that it now time to
    review the processes developed by all the working groups, select the
    best practices, and document and standardize them across all IPTs. Each
    of the six Divisions within S&T has its own Transition Lead who works
    directly with the IPTs. These Leads should be responsible for
    communicating the standardized processes to the IPT participants and
    insuring that they are properly applied.

    Question submitted by Representative Ben R. Lujan

    Q1.  National Laboratories, such as the two Department of Energy
    National Labs in New Mexico, conduct a substantial amount of basic
    research. Can you elaborate on how the National Laboratories can stay
    tied into the basic research that is a part of the DHS S&T portfolio?

    A1. In response to Vice Chairman Lujan's question about the National
    Laboratories being tied into the S&T basic research portfolio, the
    National Laboratories do receive basic research projects, but I
    understand that they are given more specific tasking than that which is
    given to the University Centers of Excellence. I mentioned in my
    testimony that within the past year, the Directorate has taken steps to
    increase the interaction of the Divisions with the COEs. The
    Directorate has accomplished this by aligning the COEs with individual
    Divisions and giving the Division Directors responsibility for
    communicating with the Directors of the COEs on a regular basis. The
    Division Directors are expected to keep the COEs informed about the
    work of the Divisions and in particular, about capability gaps for
    which no existing technologies are adequate. This appears to be working
    reasonably well with some of the University COEs, but to my knowledge,
    it has not been practiced with the National Laboratories, even though
    they are already aligned with specific Divisions. If my understanding
    is correct, it would seem to be relatively straightforward to extend
    this practice to include the National Laboratories. Also, the FFRDCs
    sponsored by the S&T Directorate are responsible for identifying
    requirements that no available technologies can fill. Perhaps a more
    direct tie can be made between the National Laboratories and the FFRDCs
    so that this information is available to them.
                       Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
    Responses by David J. Berteau, Senior Advisor and Director, Defense-
            Industrial Initiatives, Center for Strategic and International
            Studies, Washington, DC

    Questions submitted by Chairman David Wu

    Q1.  Currently the roles and responsibilities of IPT participants are
    not explicitly defined. What effect has this had on DHS customers and
    DHS S&T staff? How can DHS S&T better define these roles and
    communicate them to the participants?

    A1. The breadth of topic areas covered by the S&T IPTs dictate against
    a single set of roles and responsibilities across all IPTs. I believe
    that DHS S&T should have each IPT, as part of its participant
    determination process, lay out participant roles and responsibilities
    at that time.

    Question submitted by Representative Ben R. Lujan

    Q1.  National Laboratories, such as the two Department of Energy
    National Labs in New Mexico, conduct a substantial amount of basic
    research. Can you elaborate on how the National Laboratories can stay
    tied into the basic research that is a part of the DHS S&T portfolio?

    A1. As I noted in both my statement and in my responses to questions
    during the hearing, basic research is most valuable when it targets
    specific capability shortfalls. I believe that the DOE labs need to tie
    their research proposals to those specific shortfalls. This of course
    requires DHS to specify those shortfalls, which in turn depends upon a
    better strategic planning process and abetter capabilities assessment
    process within DHS.
                       Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
    Responses by Cindy Williams, Chair, Panel on the DHS Science and
            Technology Directorate, National Academy of Public
            Administration; Shapiro Visiting Professor of International
            Affairs, The Elliott School of International Affairs, George
            Washington University; Principal Research Scientist, Security
            Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

    Questions submitted by Chairman David Wu

    Q1.  Currently the roles and responsibilities of IPT participants are
    not explicitly defined. What effect has this had on DHS customers and
    DHS S&T staff? How can DHS S&T better define these roles and
    communicate them to the participants?

    A1. The roles and responsibilities of IPT participants are not
    explicitly defined. As a result, they vary substantially from one IPT
    to another. In some instances, the customers believe that their role
    should be to dictate the solution, instead of working with S&T to
    clarify their needs and letting S&T identify appropriate solutions. In
    other cases, S&T is overly involved in prioritizing the capability gaps
    for the customer. This lack of a clear, shared understanding of the
    roles and responsibilities of the various participants causes confusion
    among customers and frustration among the DHS S&T staff. It also means
    that some IPTs work far better than others.
        Because the work of the IPTs is a shared responsibility between DHS
    S&T and its customers, DHS S&T cannot define the IPT roles and
    responsibilities on its own. The National Academy of Public
    Administration (NAPA) Panel that I chaired found that some components
    took their work with S&T more seriously than others, and that the
    success of the IPTs correlated with the commitment of the customers to
    the IPT process. Defining roles and responsibilities jointly with the
    component customers could improve the components' levels of commitment
    to the process and the projects undertaken, thus strengthening the IPT
    process and improving S&T outcomes. The NAPA Panel recommended that the
    S&T Directorate work with its stakeholders to develop an IPT charter
    that delineates roles and responsibilities of participants, and
    establishes common terminology and standard operating procedures.
        At a minimum, I personally believe that such a charter should
    include descriptions of the roles and responsibilities of S&T staff and
    customer participants in identifying and prioritizing capability gaps,
    identifying potential solutions and estimating their costs, selecting
    solutions to pursue, developing transition plans for those solutions,
    developing schedules, milestones, and metrics for evaluating projects
    undertaken, evaluating and reporting on projects, and deciding when
    projects should be terminated.

    Question submitted by Representative Ben R. Lujan

    Q1.  National Laboratories, such as the two Department of Energy
    National Labs in New Mexico, conduct a substantial amount of basic
    research. Can you elaborate on how the National Laboratories can stay
    tied into the basic research that is apart of the DHS S&T portfolio?

    A1. In FY 2009, 26 percent of DHS S&T's basic research was conducted by
    the Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratories. (DOE's National
    Laboratories also play a significant, but separate role in the work of
    DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) ). The Homeland Security
    Act of 2002 authorizes DHS to draw on the expertise of all government
    laboratories, and particularly on DOE's National Laboratories, to
    achieve its mission.
        The NAPA Panel that I chaired found that whenever possible, funds
    for basic research should be awarded through competitive processes that
    include external scientific peer review. Evaluating the impact of basic
    research is not possible over the short-term, so ensuring quality in
    design and execution of the work is critical. Additionally, competition
    for funding is a major factor in expanding the pool of researchers
    interested in working in certain areas--in this case homeland
    security--and consequently, expanding the Nation's capacity for that
    research.
        The extent to which competition is used in S&T's award of projects
    to the National Laboratories is unclear. Division research leads and
    others in the S&T Directorate told NAPA staff that funding is often
    directed to a specific laboratory without competition. On the other
    hand, they indicated that at times the National Laboratories do compete
    for S&T funding.
        The NAPA Panel found a climate of insularity in the DHS S&T
    community. Such insularity can hamper the identification of fresh
    approaches and stifle innovation. The Panel found that the practice of
    designating a specific laboratory to carry out work may reduce
    competition, thereby fostering that insularity. The Panel recommended
    that the Directorate make competitive processes that include external
    scientific peer review the norm for basic research. Such processes will
    help to increase S&T's confidence and that of its clients that the
    extent and nature of its basic research is thoroughly vetted and that
    the research being conducted--whether in one of the National
    Laboratories or elsewhere--is of the highest standards of excellence.
        The National Laboratories have recognized expertise, and partnering
    with the Laboratories can help DHS capitalize on the Laboratories'
    substantial funding from other sources. In 2008, the Directorate began
    to align the National Laboratories with its six technical divisions,
    based on matches between the mission requirements of the divisions and
    the technical capabilities of the various Laboratories. The intent is
    for individual technical divisions in S&T to learn more about what the
    individual Laboratories have to offer and for the Laboratories to learn
    more about the technical divisions' needs, to inform future project
    development and performer selection. The NAPA Panel that I chaired
    found that such alignments have the potential to support more
    productive relationships, increase S&T's success in leveraging National
    Laboratory work related to homeland security, and increase efficiency.
    We also found, however, that such alignments, along with the practice
    of designating an individual laboratory to do work, may further reduce
    competition and foster insularity. I personally expect that this
    tension between the expedience of exclusive ties with individual
    laboratories and the benefits of greater openness and competition will
    persist into the future.