    [House Hearing, 111 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 111-57]

                                    HEARING

                                       ON

                       NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                              FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010

                                      AND

                  OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                     STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING

                                       ON

                         BUDGET REQUEST FOR DEPARTMENT

                            OF ENERGY ATOMIC ENERGY

                               DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                                  MAY 13, 2009

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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    20402-0001

                         STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

                    ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California, Chairman
    JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina          MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
    LORETTA SANCHEZ, California          HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
    ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey               California
    JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
    RICK LARSEN, Washington              TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
    MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico          DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
    SCOTT MURPHY, New York
                     Rudy Barnes, Professional Staff Member
                     Kari Bingen, Professional Staff Member
                          Zach Steacy, Staff Assistant

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                         CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
                                      2009

                                                                       Page

    Hearing:

    Wednesday, May 13, 2009, Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense
      Authorization Act--Budget Request for Department of Energy
      Atomic Energy Defense Activities...............................     1

    Appendix:

    Wednesday, May 13, 2009..........................................    29
                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, MAY 13, 2009
    FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUEST FOR
             DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O., a Representative from California,
      Chairman, Strategic Forces Subcommittee........................     1
    Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Ranking Member,
      Strategic Forces Subcommittee..................................     3

                                   WITNESSES

    D'Agostino, Hon. Thomas, Administrator, National Nuclear Security
      Administration, U.S. Department of Energy......................     5
    Podonsky, Glenn, Chief Health, Safety, and Security Officer, U.S.
      Department of Energy...........................................    10
    Triay, Dr. Ines R., Acting Assistant Secretary for Environmental
      Management, U.S. Department of Energy..........................     7

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        D'Agostino, Hon. Thomas......................................    33
        Podonsky, Glenn..............................................    94
        Triay, Dr. Ines R............................................    86

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        Mr. Heinrich.................................................   113

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin................................   117

    FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUEST FOR
             DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
                                 Strategic Forces Subcommittee,
                               Washington, DC, Wednesday, May 13, 2009.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in
    room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ellen Tauscher
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, A REPRESENTATIVE
        FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

        Ms. Tauscher. Good afternoon. This hearing of the
    Subcommittee on Strategic Forces will come to order. Today we
    will consider the Department of Energy's (DOE) fiscal year (FY)
    2010 budget request for Atomic Energy Defense Activities.
        Let me begin by welcoming our distinguished witnesses: The
    Honorable Tom D'Agostino, Administrator of the National Nuclear
    Security Administration (NNSA); Dr. Ines Triay, Acting
    Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management (EM),
    Department of Energy; and Mr. Glenn Podonsky, Chief Health,
    Safety, and Security (HSS) Officer for the Department of
    Energy.
        I want to thank each of you for being here today. I also
    want to welcome to the hearing the newest member of the
    subcommittee, Mr. Murphy, of New York, who is not here, but we
    welcome him anyhow, and we are delighted that he is going to be
    on this subcommittee.
        The fiscal year 2010 budget request for the Department of
    Energy is slightly more than $26 billion. The Armed Services
    Committee annually authorizes about two-thirds of this total
    for Atomic Energy Defense Activities. For fiscal year 2010, the
    request of $16.4 billion for these programs is an increase of
    about $147.9 million over the fiscal year 2009 appropriation.
        This committee is a strong supporter of the critical
    missions embodied in your respective program area: maintaining
    and ensuring the reliability, safety, and security of our
    nuclear deterrent; conducting the scientific research,
    engineering, and production activities necessary to support
    that deterrent; keeping our nuclear weapons and the weapons
    complex safe from physical, cyber, and other threats; see to
    the government's international nuclear nonproliferation
    efforts; and cleaning up the environmental legacy work of
    decades of nuclear stockpile work.
        We are eager to hear testimony for the fiscal year 2010
    budget request. I am especially interested in your thoughts
    about the following issues: first, does the budget adequately
    fund the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP)? As the
    Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United
    States just wrote in its final report, the Stockpile
    Stewardship Program has been ``remarkably successful.''
    Remarkably successful.
        But its continued success is not something we can take for
    granted. With world-class experimental tools like the National
    Ignition Facility (NIF), the Dual-Axis Radiographic
    Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) Facility, and the Z machine now
    available to the NNSA, the stewardship program is poised for
    even greater achievement. But for that to happen, we must
    continue to sustain and strengthen the stewardship program.
        That means supporting both the scientific tools and
    advanced computing capabilities that are coming on line, as
    well as the world-class scientists and engineers that use these
    tools to run the stewardship program. In this context, the
    committee needs to know whether the budget adequately funds the
    exercise of these physical and intellectual capabilities.
        Second--and this is a question I ask year after year--does
    the budget properly balance various safety and security
    priorities? What impact will the new Graded Security Protection
    strategy have on your security investment strategy?
        And third, does the budget for Environmental Management
    support the numerous commitments the Federal Government has
    made? With the approval of more than $5 billion in Defense
    Environmental Cleanup funds in the 2009 stimulus package, can
    the Department successfully manage three years' worth of
    funding in two years?
        Finally, this committee continues to be concerned about the
    relationship between plans for consolidation of special nuclear
    materials (SNM) and other national security activities,
    including the stockpile stewardship, complex modernization,
    nonproliferation, and environmental cleanup. I hope that you
    can shed new light on the efforts to coordinate materials
    consolidation and disposition among the stakeholder offices
    within the Department. These are the concerns we hope you will
    address in your statements and during your discussion that will
    follow your testimony.
        Before I turn to my ranking member, the distinguished
    gentleman from Ohio, let me welcome our newest member. We are
    happy to have Congressman Murphy with us.
        You bring a special kind of background, as a former
    investment banker, to a former investment banker--a business
    that is now no longer in existence, by and large--I welcome you
    to the committee. It is a very, very interesting committee, and
    we are happy to have you along, Mr. Murphy. Thank you for being
    here.
        And now I would like to turn to my Ranking Member, the
    distinguished gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Turner, for any comments
    he would like to make.

     STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO,
             RANKING MEMBER, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I want to
    acknowledge that we have our chairman with us pending her
    confirmation by the Senate to an appointment to the State
    Department. We are very glad to have her continued leadership
    while we are awaiting that confirmation.
        I am told that our opening statements are--somewhat echo
    common themes. I think that shows the bipartisan concern that
    you have on this committee for this issue, and I would also
    like to welcome Scott Murphy to the committee. We look forward
    to your added thoughts on what really is an important issue for
    national security.
        I would like to welcome back Mr. D'Agostino and Mr.
    Podonsky, and extend a warm welcome to Dr. Triay, who this is
    her first appearance before the subcommittee.
        As I look at this year's Atomic Energy Defense Activities
    budget request, I can't help but think that we are in a state
    of treading water. The science and engineering campaigns are
    stagnated. Key decisions on warhead refurbishment are avoided.
    A significant number of construction projects are halted. We
    understand that many NNSA program decisions are on hold pending
    the completion of the Nuclear Posture Review, the NPR. This
    review, and the stockpile and infrastructure decisions that
    follow, can not happen soon enough.
        Earlier this year, the Commander of the U.S. Strategic
    Command testified, ``The most urgent concerns for today's
    nuclear enterprise lie with our aging stockpile,
    infrastructure, and human capital.'' The Chairman of the
    bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission, Dr. William Perry, who
    appeared before this committee last week, stated, the key to
    maintain a credible, safe, secure, and reliable nuclear
    deterrent rests with ``robust, healthy, vigorous weapons
    laboratories, a strong stewardship program, and an effective
    Life Extension Program.'' However, the commission observed two
    worrisome trends: The intellectual infrastructure is in serious
    trouble, and lab funding is likely to be reduced by 20 to 30
    percent in the out-years.
        The fiscal year 2010 budget request substantiates these
    concerns. There is a net decrease in NNSA's Science and
    Engineering Campaigns. Four of the five campaigns experience
    zero growth. The fifth campaign, Readiness, decreases by 38
    percent. In the Future-Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP),
    these campaigns show decreases from 1 to 20 percent in a given
    year. Has the NNSA thought about these trends and their
    implications? How does NNSA continue to meet the demands of the
    Stockpile Stewardship Program with fewer people and decreasing
    scientific resources?
        Furthermore, there is a serious need to transform the
    physical infrastructure. The commission recognized this and
    recommends that Congress fund NNSA's complex transformation
    plan. However, this year's budget request halts a significant
    amount of construction activities, accounting for a $111
    million decrease in Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities
    (RTBF). And, top commission priorities--the Chemistry and
    Metallurgy Research Replacement, CMMR, facility at Los Alamos,
    and Uranium Processing Facility, UPF, at Y-12--are only
    modestly funded.
        On the part of some, there appears to be a perception that
    if the stockpile goes down, we don't need these facilities, and
    perhaps, the NNSA budget can go down as well. Mr. D'Agostino, I
    would like to have your thoughts on this.
        In addition, though the fiscal year 2010 budget request
    terminates the Reliable Replacement Warhead, RRW, and avoids
    making substantial decisions on the stockpile, I would like to
    solicit your thoughts on how NNSA is approaching its
    modernization, or as Dr. Schlesinger prefers to call it,
    ``refurbishment.'' The commission concluded that the current
    warhead Life Extension Programs (LEPs) could not be counted on
    indefinitely. They recommend that decisions about weapon
    modernization, or refurbishment, be made on a case-by-case
    basis that included consideration of a spectrum of options from
    component replacement to new design.
        Lastly, it strikes me that balance is the major challenge
    for NNSA in the years ahead--balancing recapitalization and
    modernization of the infrastructure, human capital, and weapons
    systems, all within an assumed flat or declining budget
    scenario.
        Shifting to other areas of the Department of Energy, Dr.
    Triay, I am concerned about the Department's nuclear material
    consolidation and storage plans. Can you update us on these
    plans and also discuss the implications of the President's
    decision to terminate the Yucca Mountain repository?
        Finally, Mr. Podonsky, physical security and the safe
    transport of our nuclear weapons and materials are top
    priorities for me. There is no margin for error. In the past
    year, the Department has replaced its Design Based Threat (DBT)
    security policy with the Graded Security Protection policy.
    What drove this change in policy, and what is the status of its
    implementation?
        The budget, and budget strategy, presented before us today
    may work for a single year, but it is not sustainable. Unless
    the placeholders we see in out-year funding are significantly
    changed based on the outcome of the Nuclear Posture Review, we
    risk losing our world-class intellectual talent and endangering
    our ability to successfully maintain and certify the stockpile.
        I would like to thank the chairman for calling this
    important hearing, and thank you for your leadership and
    service. I look forward to the testimony today.
        Ms. Tauscher. Thank you very much, Mr. Turner.
        We will begin with Mr. D'Agostino. Since we have received
    your prepared statement, and it has been entered into the
    record, I would like to simply have you summarize, if you can.
    We would welcome that.
        And let me also say that while the Armed Services Committee
    handles NNSA nonproliferation programs at the full committee,
    Chairman Skelton has agreed again this year to allow us to
    address the budget request for these programs as part of the
    hearing. So if you want to make some remarks about the fiscal
    year 2010 request for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (NN), we
    would welcome that, too.
        I just want to let the members know that we are expecting a
    series of three votes in a few minutes. At that time we will
    try to continue as best we can with our summarization of your
    testimony, and then we will take about a half an hour break and
    go back to the agenda as we have it.
        Mr. D'Agostino, the floor is yours.

     STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS D'AGOSTINO, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
       NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        Mr. D'Agostino. Thank you, Madam Chair, and members of the
    subcommittee.
        Hi, I am Tom D'Agostino, the Administrator for the NNSA,
    and I am accompanied here by Brigadier General Harencak, who is
    the--potential running defense programs for me, and Ken Baker,
    as well. They are seated behind me, over my left shoulder, and
    I am honored to have them here helping me out--not just here
    today, but running the programs with me. It was a very exciting
    year for us.
        We appreciate the opportunity to appear before the
    subcommittee, and sincerely thank the subcommittee's support
    for our programs. We think they are quite important.
        The NNSA is critical to ensuring the security of the United
    States and its allies. The President's fiscal year 2010 budget
    request for the NNSA is $9.9 billion. It is an increase of 8.9
    percent over the fiscal year 2009 appropriated level. The
    budget request provides funding to enable the NNSA to leverage
    science to promote U.S. national security objectives. NNSA
    programs are on the front of lines for the following national
    security endeavors: Maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable
    stockpile and the capabilities that support the stockpile;
    accelerating and expanding our efforts here and around the
    world to reduce the global threat posed by nuclear terrorism,
    nonproliferation, and unsecured nuclear materials; providing
    the United States Navy with safe, military effective nuclear
    propulsion; and supporting U.S. leadership in science and
    technology (S&T).
        The President has initiated both steps to put an end to
    Cold War thinking, to lead to a new international effort to
    enhance global security. The fiscal year 2010 President's
    budget request is the first step toward implementation of this
    strategy.
        For our nonproliferation programs, funding increases are
    requested to expand and respond quickly to opportunities to
    reduce global nuclear threats. Increases are also requested in
    the Naval Reactors Propulsion Program to begin development of
    reactor and propulsion systems for the next-generation
    submarine along with other activities.
        The programs and the Weapons Activities appropriation
    budget strategy is to maintain capabilities and activities at
    the current level until the strategic direction is established
    in the upcoming Nuclear Posture Review. In President Obama's
    speech in Prague, he indicated his commitment to maintaining a
    safe, secure, and reliable stockpile while pursuing a vision of
    a world free from the threat of nuclear weapons. The NNSA
    maintains the unique knowledge, capabilities, and skills that
    are critical to achieving both of these objectives which, in
    many cases, some people think are opposing. Quite the
    contrary--they are complementary to each other.
        Our nonproliferation programs are focused on securing the
    key ingredients of nuclear weapons, and that is weapons-usable
    materials and the related equipment and technologies.
    Supporting NNSA's efforts include the Elimination of Weapons
    Grade Plutonium Production (EWGPP), which has been working with
    Russia to shut down Russia's plutonium production reactors, and
    the Fissile Material Disposition program (FMD), which will
    provide a disposition pathway to eliminate at least 34 metric
    tons (MT) each for the United States and Russia of weapons-
    grade plutonium.
        The NNSA is a recognized leader on these and other
    nonproliferation initiatives to prevent proliferators or
    terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons. This includes our
    activities to secure and reduce weapons-grade nuclear materials
    at sites worldwide, but also, NNSA's efforts to detect and
    intercept Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) or related
    materials that are in transit.
        In addition, we also worked in fiscal year 2010 to support
    the President's call to strengthen the Nonproliferation Treaty,
    support the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and
    strengthen international safeguards and technologies that
    support inspections that are so important to a future--safer
    future. To implement this comprehensive nonproliferation
    strategy, we will expand our cooperation with Russia, pursue
    new partnerships, and work to secure vulnerable nuclear
    material around the world within four years. NNSA's Global
    Threat Reduction program and the International Material
    Protection and Cooperation (IMPC) program will have a major
    role in this four-year plan.
        The NNSA is actively participating in our national debate
    over our Nation's nuclear security and nonproliferation
    strategic framework. This debate is not just about warheads and
    the size of our stockpile. It includes the inescapable
    obligation to transform our Cold War weapons--nuclear weapons
    complex into a 21st century nuclear security enterprise that
    retains the capabilities necessary to meet emerging national
    security threats.
        In a future with fewer warheads, no nuclear tests, tighter
    controls on weapons systems and our weapons materials
    worldwide, and effective counteraction of nuclear terrorist
    threats, the NNSA's science and technology capabilities will
    play an ever-increasing role to address these challenges. We
    must ensure that our evolving strategic posture and our nuclear
    stockpile, nonproliferation, arms control, and counterterrorism
    programs are melded together into a comprehensive strategy that
    protects America and its allies.
        The Department of Defense (DOD) has initiated the Nuclear
    Posture Review, which is scheduled to culminate to report to
    Congress in early fiscal year 2010. We are actively
    participating in this review and all of the aspects related to
    nuclear security.
        As you are well aware, the Commission on the Strategic
    Posture was established by this committee and, in fact, by
    Congress, to identify the basic principles for reestablishing
    the national consensus on the strategic policy. The commission
    has examined the role of deterrence in the 21st century and
    assessed the role of weapons in our national security strategy.
    Its final report was issued--I have a copy here--and it
    includes a variety of recommendations. I am familiar with the
    report and, given the breadth and scope of the report, the
    Secretary and I are actively taking a look at the--finding the
    recommendations and are coming to some conclusions. We haven't
    quite finished yet, and I expect we have an opportunity, maybe,
    to discuss some of those things today.
        As you know, we have made tremendous progress in reducing
    the size of the stockpile. The stockpile will be less than one
    quarter of what it was at the end of the Cold War--the smallest
    stockpile in 50 years. These reductions send the right message
    to the rest of the world that the U.S. is committed to Article
    VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty, which will help create
    positive momentum into the 2010 Review Conference--will be
    happening next year.
        Each year since this stewardship program was developed, we
    have been able to certify the safety, the security, and the
    reliability of the stockpile with no need to conduct an
    underground test. Since 1993, we have acquired a whole suite of
    capabilities--tools, or facilities, if you will--that are
    necessary to maintain this effective stockpile, and most
    recently, the National Ignition Facility has come on line. We
    are applying these tools to help solve current stockpile
    reliability issues.
        There are challenges, though, and the main challenge for
    our program for the future will really be to make effective use
    of these tools and capabilities. Following completion of the
    Nuclear Posture Review, we will prepare a 5-year plan that
    recapitalizes our infrastructure, retains our scientific
    technology and engineering capability and expertise, and really
    makes full use of the experimental and super-computing
    capabilities that we have invested in so far over the last 10
    years.
        Madam Chairman, numerous external reviews have identified
    the fragile state of our expertise and capabilities that reside
    in our people. It is very clear to me, people are our most
    important resource. We need to retain those skills and
    capabilities and develop the next generation of scientists and
    engineers and technicians needed to perform work in
    nonproliferation; needed to perform work in nuclear
    counterterrorism and forensics; and needed to perform work to
    maintain our deterrent. We also need these skilled people for
    the foreseeable future, especially when we consider a world
    potentially without underground testing.
        Madam Chairman, that concludes my statement. I will be
    pleased to take your questions.
        I do have your comments, Mr. Turner, Madam Chair, and I
    will be glad to address them in the question and answer (Q&A)
    part of the committee.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. D'Agostino can be found in
    the Appendix on page 33.]
        Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Tom.
        Dr. Triay, welcome. I believe this is your first appearance
    before the subcommittee, and we welcome you. And the floor is
    yours.

    STATEMENT OF DR. INES R. TRIAY, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
          ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        Dr. Triay. Thank you.
        Chairman Tauscher, Congressman Turner, and members of this
    subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today and to address your
    questions regarding the Office of Environmental Management
    fiscal year 2010 budget request.
        The Office of Environmental Management's mission is to
    complete the environmental cleanup of the legacy left by the
    Cold War in a safe, secure, and compliant manner. Our goal is
    to complete this mission by keeping our projects on schedule
    and within budget. We will continue to proactively pursue our
    cleanup objectives and our regulatory compliance commitments.
    At the same time, we will continue to seek out sound business
    practices in order to maximize cleanup progress. We have put
    forth this effort to achieve the greatest environmental benefit
    by maximizing risk reduction while being good stewards of the
    taxpayers' money.
        To best achieve the Office of Environmental Management's
    cleanup mission, we have prioritized the cleanup activities
    that are conducted at the sites. High-priority cleanup
    activities include requirements necessary to maintain a safe
    and secure posture at each site: radioactive tank waste
    stabilization, treatment, and disposal; spent nuclear fuel
    (SNF) storage, receipt, and disposition; and special nuclear
    material consolidation, processing, and disposition. These
    activities represent the highest risks that the Environmental
    Management Office faces and make up a large portion of our
    fiscal year 2010 budget request.
        In more specific terms, we have made substantial progress
    in the areas of consolidating surplus special nuclear materials
    and stabilizing plant waste. To date, the Office of
    Environmental Management has eliminated 11 of the 13 highly
    secure nuclear material locations.
        At the Hanford site, the Office of Environmental Management
    has transferred pumpable radioactive liquid waste from leaking
    underground single shell tanks to more durable double shell
    tanks. Parallel to that effort, we are also pursuing tank
    cleanout at Idaho, Hanford, and the Savannah River Site (SRS).
        In addition, the Office of Environmental Management has
    nearly completed the transfer of spent nuclear fuel from wet to
    dry storage. Many of these storage areas were aging basins
    filled with radioactive water. At the Idaho National
    Laboratory, these basins were located over a groundwater
    aquifer, and at Hanford, these basins were located within a
    quarter-mile of the Columbia River.
        We continue to move forward with the design, construction,
    and eventual operation of three large tank waste processing
    plants. These processing plants will treat approximately 88
    million gallons of radioactive tank waste. The estimated total
    cost for construction of these three plants is $14.3 billion.
    The Office of Environmental Management remains devoted to
    building the capability for tank waste treatment and
    disposition. The Office of Environmental Management's fiscal
    year 2010 budget request fully funds these high-priority
    activities.
        We are also focusing on technology development in our
    fiscal year 2010 budget request. Technology development is
    instrumental in reducing the technical uncertainties that come
    with the construction and operating of these unique cleanup
    facilities. Because of these challenges, we have increased
    technology development and deployment funding to $105 million
    in fiscal year 2010. The Office of Environmental Management
    (EM) will target its science and technology investments on
    solving challenges associated with tank waste management and
    high-risk groundwater remediation. We are confident that with
    an increase in funding, the Environmental Management program
    will be better positioned to address science and technology
    uncertainties associated with these activities.
        The Office of Environmental Management will also continue
    to seek ways to maximize footprint reduction efforts. Footprint
    reduction activities include the decontamination and
    decommissioning of excess facilities, source and groundwater
    remediation, and solid waste disposition. Each of these
    activities has proven technologies and established regulatory
    framework. Footprint reduction makes laboratory facilities in
    the Department of Energy and other site infrastructure
    available for beneficial reuse. In fiscal year 2010, many of
    the footprint-reduction activities would have been deferred to
    fund higher-risk activities. However, because of the American
    Recovery and Reinvestment Act funding provided by Congress, the
    Office of Environmental Management was able to fund many of
    these footprint-reduction activities.
        Now that we have outlined our program priorities, I would
    like to discuss some key cleanup strategies. The Office of
    Environmental Management continues to have a strong commitment
    to safety first--the safety of our workers, the public, and the
    environment. Safe operations and cleanup is our overarching
    goal with every activity that is commenced.
        As the committee is aware, the Office of Environmental
    Management has come under considerable criticism for its
    execution of these projects. Aggressive efforts are underway to
    transform the Environmental Management program into a best-in-
    class project management organization. It will strengthen our
    project management capability and improve the skill set of our
    project management teams. This budget request supports 1,674
    full-time equivalent employees to assist in this effort. We
    have added over 300 mission-critical hires since 2007 to
    support both the best-in-class project management initiative
    and align the program with the human capital recommendations
    made by the National Academy of Public Administration.
        With these planned improvements in project management and
    acquisition, the Environmental Management program will move
    forward, will identify and manage the programmatic risks
    associated with start of construction during the early stages
    of the design phase. We will also integrate safety early in the
    design phases of all projects. We currently are instituting
    construction project reviews that are modeled after the reviews
    performed by the Department's Office of Science that have had
    great success in delivering projects on cost and schedule.
    These independent reviews will examine all detail aspects of
    our construction project. This process will include expert
    knowledge and experience of world-class engineers, scientists,
    and managers.
        With all of these improvements, we are confident that the
    Environmental Management program can succeed in its mission.
        Chairman Tauscher, Congressman Turner, and members of the
    subcommittee, I look forward to addressing your questions.
        And on a very personal note, within the Department of
    Energy, we really thank Chairman Tauscher. Your leadership has
    made all the difference for our program.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Triay can be found in the
    Appendix on page 86.]
        Ms. Tauscher. Thank you very much. Well, I am aided by my
    fabulous colleagues and great staff, so no one ever does
    anything alone, as she so well framed.
        Dr. Triay, thank you for your testimony.
        Mr. Podonsky, you are a veteran of appearing before the
    subcommittee, and we want to welcome you back. The floor is
    yours. We have been called for a vote, so if you could limit
    your time to about five minutes, then we will go take a vote.
        Thank you. The floor is yours.

    STATEMENT OF GLENN PODONSKY, CHIEF HEALTH, SAFETY, AND SECURITY
                   OFFICER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        Mr. Podonsky. Thank you, Chairwoman Tauscher, Ranking
    Member Turner, and members of the subcommittee, for inviting me
    to testify today on the fiscal year 2010 budget for the Office
    of Health, Safety, and Security. As you know, we are the
    Department's central organization responsible for the health,
    safety, security, and environment, designing policy, taking
    closed systems, training, and Department-wide enforcement and
    independent oversight.
        The brevity of my oral statement is not a reflection of our
    responsibilities, but a reflection of your limited time. So I
    will simply conclude and say that I look forward to answering
    your questions that you posed in your opening statements, and
    we look forward to continued support from the Congress, the
    Department, and our stakeholders, so that we can continue to
    strengthen the Department's health, safety, and security
    posture.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Podonsky can be found in the
    Appendix on page 94.]
        Ms. Tauscher. That is a true veteran. Thank you.
        Colleagues, we have three votes that will take about a half
    an hour on the clock, but about 40 minutes in real time. So we
    will adjourn for about 40 minutes. We will be back as soon as
    we can. We thank the witnesses for their forbearance, and the
    subcommittee is temporarily adjourned.
        [Recess.]
        Ms. Tauscher. The hearing will resume. I am going to begin
    our questions and our discussion by going back to the science-
    based Stockpile Stewardship Program. The Strategic Posture
    Commission discussed at some length the future of the nuclear
    security complex and the laboratories in particular.
        The commission noted that many of the best veteran
    scientists at the labs are taking early retirement, and many
    younger scientists are seeking employment elsewhere. The
    commission noted that the problem of maintaining the
    intellectual expertise necessary to execute the Stockpile
    Stewardship Program is ``aggravated'' by budget pressures;
    pressures that are made worse by the need to reduce spending on
    science and engineering in order to fund improvements in the
    physical infrastructure of the complex.
        But of the greatest concern to me, the commission also
    found that, ``The NNSA expects to reduce the number of
    laboratory personnel funded by the weapons program by 20 to 30
    percent. It is doing so without any understanding of what types
    of expertise to seek to retain or reduce. It does not know
    whether the results will be a weapons program too large or too
    small to meet its required purposes.'' Then, with a remarkable
    flair for the understatement, the commission said, ``This poses
    several risks.''
        Administrator D'Agostino, I want to know whether the NNSA
    has conducted any analysis of the staff reductions that have
    taken place at the nuclear security laboratories over the last
    two years, which total more than 4,000 at Livermore and Los
    Alamos alone? And secondly, do you plan, and does the fiscal
    year 2010 budget request entail, any additional staff
    reductions? And thirdly, what steps does the NNSA plan to take
    to ensure that we retain the intellectual capability needed to
    continue the success of the Stockpile Stewardship Program?
        Mr. D'Agostino. Okay. I will answer your questions in
    order, but I will maybe have to start off with a comment.
    Though I agreed in large part with most of the commission's
    report, I would argue with the details. The statement of a 20
    percent--20 to 25 percent reduction in the Weapons Activities
    account is a true statement, we think.
        One of our strategies--we have, actually, four main
    strategies: Change the stockpile, change the infrastructure,
    change the way we do business, and support the science and
    technology base. So those two middle strategies--change the
    infrastructure and change the way we do business--mean,
    basically, do things more efficiently. And we think we can
    drive out what I would call kind of inefficiencies that have
    built up over 30 or 40 years of the program, and in fact, as
    the laboratories have--rightfully, they have come down 4,000
    over the last couple years, and that is a very significant
    number. The majority of those changes happened in areas of what
    I would call administrative, technical support, operations
    support. In a new infrastructure, you don't need as many
    maintainers. Right now, we have a lot of people taking care of
    Cold War facilities, and that is very expensive, and we want to
    get out of that business.
        So in effect, this 4,000 reduction was an opportunity--and
    Director Miller and Anastasio took advantage of it--to shape
    the workforce for the future. So the short answer to your
    question, yes, we are very aware of--we did do a study; we took
    a look at the skills that we lost. It is never good to lose any
    skill, but where our focus was was to try to retain the skills
    that mattered the most to the core program.
        Second point is, that hasn't--unfortunately, 4,000 people
    is a significant part of the workforce, and that sends a signal
    and it really hurts morale. And that is an unfortunate part of
    reshaping the workforce--is there is kind of a spinoff effect,
    and we have lost a few folks. The 2010 budget plan is
    specifically crafted to avoid major changes in workforce. As
    Mr. Turner correctly pointed out, there are a lot of flat-line
    numbers when you look at our program, particularly into the
    out-years.
        I don't like the idea of having flat-line numbers in the
    out-years, because it sends a signal to your workforce that the
    country thinks this is just to keep on--it is just a flat
    program and it has got no future. But in reality, we made some
    changes in the last few months to actually add money to science
    and technologies to ensure that we didn't take any major
    reductions in that area. So our focus, ultimately, with the
    Weapons Activities account, which includes support for not just
    warheads but, quite frankly, nuclear counterterrorism, and
    incident response, and things that we think are very important
    for the future--specifically crafted to avoid layoffs.
        Your last question was, how would we put together a program
    to retain people----
        Ms. Tauscher. Correct.
        Mr. D'Agostino [continuing]. And I think it is done
    probably in a couple of fashions. One is, obviously, we need--
    we have elements of our program to fill the pipeline of young
    folks that are going to come in behind and get trained. And
    there is a program right now that we have to get folks from
    Historically Black Colleges and Universities and other minority
    institutions, as well as big schools--one from Washington--but
    the focus is to get those folks out into the labs. Each
    laboratory has their own undergraduate, graduate degree
    programs to bring people in.
        I think the best signal to send, quite frankly, will come
    in the form of, you know, a report like this Strategic Posture
    Commission report, whose ultimate aim is to drive this national
    consensus on where our programs are going out into the future;
    because our scientists and engineers look at these programs,
    they listen to these testimonies, they read the transcripts,
    they read the conference report language, and they want to get
    a sense that the country cares about this program.
        I care passionately about it. They need to see it in
    financial terms; they need to see it in the words from the
    Administration; and, they need to see it in the words from the
    Congress. I think we are on the way to turning the corner and
    getting that national consensus. In my view, that will send one
    of the best signals to getting the workforce confident that
    they are on the right track.
        Ms. Tauscher. I agree with you. I think that the--one of my
    first meetings with the Strategic Posture Commission, I asked
    them to have--provide us with a narrative, not only with
    results of their hard work, but to provide us with a narrative.
    And I asked them to make it readable and have it produced like
    the 9/11 book was.
        And I think that what that book does is provide every
    American with an opportunity to understand where their
    investment capital is going. And I think it also creates a
    raison d'etre for the scientific community, the innovative
    community, the technology community----
        Mr. D'Agostino. Right.
        Ms. Tauscher [continuing]. The academic community, to see
    that there is a big future for folks that want to go into this
    line of work. And that not only are they going to get rewarded,
    as everyone does, commensurate with their hard work, but this
    is a very patriotic way to serve your country.
        Mr. D'Agostino. Right.
        Ms. Tauscher. I have one more question.
        Dr. Triay, I would like to ask about the office's handling
    of the funding provided for the Defense Environmental Cleanup
    through the stimulus, basically, the American Recovery and
    Reinvestment Act. In addition to the $5.7 billion appropriated
    for the Defense Environmental Cleanup for fiscal 2009, the
    stimulus package provided $5.1 billion. The request for these
    activities for fiscal 2010 is $5.5 billion. This is essentially
    three years' worth of funding in two years.
        First of all, do you anticipate any challenges associated
    with finding the contractor workforce to carry the Recovery Act
    work without detracting from EM's program baseline activities?
    And second, will you be able to obligate the Recovery Act
    funding within two years and expend it within five years, as
    required by law?
        Dr. Triay. Thank you for the opportunity to talk about the
    Recovery Act funding for the Environmental Management program.
    We selected the portfolio of the Recovery Act in a very careful
    manner. Our portfolio is geared toward reducing the footprint
    of the environmental management legacy cleanup complex and, in
    particular, disposition of solid waste, decontamination, and
    decommissioning, and demolition of excess facilities, and in
    addition to that, dealing with soil and groundwater
    remediation.
        The reason we did that is because we wanted to actually
    maximize the jobs, while at the same time maximizing the
    cleanup progress that we can make. This area has proven
    technologies, has an established regulatory framework, the
    contract vehicles are in place. And the Environmental
    Management program, even though we have had issues associated
    mainly with our construction project performance management, in
    these areas associated with footprint reduction, we have had a
    proven track record of good performance. In addition to that,
    we have demonstrated that we can get great economies of scale
    and a substantial return on investments.
        In 2005, the Environmental Management program had an annual
    budget of $7.3 billion. Since 2008, our budget--annual budget--
    has not exceeded, essentially, $6 billion. So the Recovery Act
    funding actually addresses some deferred activities in these
    areas associated with footprint reduction, fully funds
    underfunded contracts that we already had for these three
    areas, and improves the compliance posture of the Environmental
    Management complex.
        In addition to that, it deals with some of the high-risk
    activities associated with the excess facilities not only in
    the Environmental Management program, but in NNSA, in Science,
    and in Nuclear Energy. In January of 2009, the Environmental
    Management program was required by Congress to send a progress
    report of the cleanup progress, and in that report and in a
    previous report, we delineated that there are 340 excess
    facilities and materials in NNSA, Science, and Nuclear Energy
    that were not part of the Environmental Management portfolio,
    that would increase the lifecycle cost of the Environmental
    Management program by $3 billion to $9 billion.
        So the Recovery Act fund has not only assisted us in
    dealing with those deferred activities already in the EM
    portfolio, but also deal with some of the high-risk excess
    facilities in other programs. In particular, for instance, in
    Y-12, as you know, there has been a significant issue with
    respect to the deterioration of some of those facilities, and
    this--substantial amount of this funding is utilized for
    programs in addition to EM.
        With respect to your question about whether we were going
    to utilize the entire five years that the Recovery Act
    delineates for execution of this program, our target--our
    goal--is to obligate the funds by the end of 2009 and finish
    our portion of the Recovery Act activities by the end of 2011.
    That is our goal, and the reason for that is, again, because we
    wanted to maximize the jobs that would be created.
        Chairman Tauscher, I have to tell you that at Oak Ridge,
    Tennessee, Washington State, South Carolina, when we have job
    fairs, we have on the order of 5 to 10 times the number of
    individuals showing up for jobs as the jobs that we have to
    give out. The Environmental Management program has very
    rigorous training processes to train workers that were
    previously construction workers to do work in decontamination
    and decommissioning; using very rigorous processes for handling
    radioactivity. So, we are confident that we can find the
    workforce and that we can train it appropriately and we can do
    this work safely.
        Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Dr. Triay.
        I have some questions for Glenn Podonsky, but I am going to
    wait until the second round. And I am going to yield time, now,
    to the distinguished Ranking Member, Mr. Turner, of Ohio.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Mr. D'Agostino, you, in your comments, acknowledged the
    President's statement of desiring to have a world free of
    nuclear weapons, and that is a very laudable goal. The
    Strategic Posture Commission, in their report, indicated that
    it would take political transformation unlike what is expected
    or foreseen in order for that to be accomplished. And then they
    go on to indicate that a significant investment needs to be
    maintained in order to ensure that we have our strategic
    deterrent.
        One of the interim steps, obviously, to the laudable goal,
    is stockpile reduction, and a recognition that, perhaps, the
    strategic deterrent can be satisfied with a lower number of
    weapons overall. As we do that--there are many who would like
    to see the goal of no nuclear weapons--I think even those who
    would support or desire the United States to have no nuclear
    weapons would want, and understand that the United States needs
    to have, nuclear capability, we need to have the conditions of
    an infrastructure that is capable, and that we need to engage
    in activities, research and development that can encourage the
    type of ingenuity that could perhaps lead us to even other
    greater discoveries.
        I know that you have a concern that as we look to reducing
    our stockpile, that there might be a misunderstanding that that
    would reduce, correspondingly, our overall costs in having
    nuclear capability--our labs, our infrastructure that supports
    the know-how and the weapons that we maintain. So, if you could
    speak for a moment about the size of the stockpile and the
    level of capability needed, size of facilities needed, and also
    discuss the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement
    facility at Los Alamos, the Uranium Processing Facility at Y-
    12--your thoughts about how stockpile reduction relates to
    savings, and also the issue of how do we ensure that we
    maintain our investment?
        Mr. D'Agostino. Thank you, sir.
        Absolutely, in my view there is a false view out--kind of
    out there--that says if you reduce your stockpile by half, you
    can reduce your budget by half, or your program by half, and
    consequently, your facilities by half, and just keep reducing
    everything by half or even smaller, quite frankly.
        But I think most people that spend time and ultimately have
    the responsibility for--and we are in positions of
    responsibility here on the committee, as well as in the
    Executive Branch--to making sure that the country's national
    security is maintained not only today, but more importantly,
    out into the future, because the future is uncertain. We don't
    know what that future holds.
        But one thing we do know is that we have been quite
    fortunate to have invested the amount of effort we have in the
    people and in the facilities that we currently have right now,
    because they are dealing with problems that 10 years ago, we
    would never have imagined we can deal with. So it is this
    question of capability versus capacity. And when we took a look
    at what we had called ``transformation from a nuclear weapons
    complex to a 21st century national security enterprise,'' we
    took a look at it with exactly that in mind: What capabilities
    do we need to maintain out in the future? When we look at
    reducing the size of the stockpile, what impacts does it have
    on our facilities?
        And what we found out is, we are at that point where we are
    at that bottom plateau. As you start reducing your--how much
    work you have to do, we are down at reducing--we think we are
    going to take our infrastructure to a point where it will
    either produce one of or up to a small number of what we think
    the country might need out in the future. For pits, for
    example, we are shooting at this 50 to 80 number, so a fifth
    per year. Not because we were going to plan on building 50 to
    80 weapons per year, but because the Nation needs the
    capability to do that in this uncertain future.
        I liken it to a garage that exists in the neighborhood. You
    know, the garage has a lift--most of them have two lifts--it
    has a mechanic, and it has a set of tools. And that garage can
    take care of 1 automobile for the whole year, or it can take
    care of X number, maybe 100 or something like that, for the
    whole year. But it provides you a range of capability. And that
    is where we are. That is where our plan is right now, is to do
    that. And to take care of that capability requires resources.
        With respect to CMRR, the Chemistry and Metallurgy
    Replacement facility, that facility is designed--again, as I
    mentioned to the chairman earlier, we are trying to change the
    way we do business and have a much less expensive
    infrastructure and much smaller infrastructure, one that is
    sized for the future. That capability that we would like to
    bring there will allow us to reduce the number of plutonium
    facilities in our infrastructure from nine down to two.
        Now, that is cheaper. That allows me to take that money I
    save there and invest it in scientists and engineers, and
    actually have them work in a facility that is designed with the
    future in mind, unlike the facilities we had built during the
    Cold War. So there is a lot of money to be drawn out of the
    program by consolidating. The Uranium Processing Facility at Y-
    12--building that structure will allow me to shift from 150
    acres of security footprint in very old Cold War facilities, to
    15 acres of security footprint in modern 21st century
    capabilities that allow me to drive my security costs way down.
    In fact, we think we can save over $200 million a year at Y-12
    alone. This is in a separate audit we did just on the basis of
    building that facility. That is almost a facility that builds
    itself--that pays for itself over a 15-year or less time
    period.
        So, my goal is, ultimately, when the--as we work the
    Nuclear Posture Review, which is actually happening today, and
    it has happened yesterday, and it is going to be happening very
    intently over the next three months or so--getting that output
    and having that shape this program in a cohesive manner for
    five years get a--and then send that right signal to our
    workforce that there is a future in doing nuclear security
    work. And when I say nuclear security, certainly the deterrent
    is in that, but also nuclear counterterrorism,
    nonproliferation, forensics, intelligence analysis, incident
    response, and that whole suite of things that I believe the
    country needs.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you.
        The Strategic Posture Commission also spoke a lot about our
    aging stockpile using the words--it concerns issues of
    modernization, or as Dr. Schlesinger says, refurbishment of our
    stockpile. Could you please tell us--give us a picture of
    trends that we are facing with our nuclear stockpile and what
    types of issues we are going to be facing with weapons
    capabilities and performance? What are we going to need to do?
    Even if we reduce our stockpile, with those that are left, what
    is ahead of us?
        Mr. D'Agostino. By reducing the stockpile, which is
    something that is clearly--that we are trying to do in this
    Administration, and not only reducing, but taking the warheads
    apart, ultimately, and dealing with the material that we have
    left, we have to--because we will have smaller numbers of
    warheads and because we still have an extended deterrent that
    we extend out to 30 of our allies in other nations, it places a
    real premium on the warheads that you have and on our desire to
    make absolutely sure we know exactly what is going on with
    those warheads.
        General Chilton has once called these warheads chemistry
    experiments kind of in action. That is a great way to describe
    that. You have got radioactive material radiating various
    organic materials and causing them to change over time. Many of
    these warheads have been out there for 20, 30 years or so. So
    what we are seeing is, from a trend standpoint, is that the
    aging--we are seeing problems that we did not expect to see.
    When we started the Stockpile Stewardship Program 10 years ago,
    we expected to see certain problems, and what we found out is
    that we aren't always that great at predicting the future. We
    have been able to address all the problems we have found, and
    there are problems that came up we didn't expect to see.
        But what is clear is that things are changing. I am very
    confident in the Significant Finding Investigation process and
    the accountability we have in there, and my briefs to the
    Secretary and tracking on the specifics. But if we don't change
    into a--what has been termed ``the spectrum of activities,''
    which I think is right--we don't look at changing the way we
    modernize, we are going to continue to run into more and more
    problems. And ultimately, my job is to make sure that we have a
    stockpile that will never need an underground test for the
    Nation.
        And so that is why I completely agree with the commission
    saying that these have to be done on a case-by-case basis,
    because every warhead is different. And I am very pleased to
    see that despite a--I mean, they have spent a lot of time
    looking at this topic. They came to the same conclusion that we
    in the--to a similar conclusion that we in the program have
    looked at over the last number of years.
        Mr. Turner. Very good.
        Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Turner.
        I am happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from
    Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        I thank the panel for testifying today, and if we could
    maybe continue on that line of questioning, looking at the
    Stockpile Stewardship Program.
        Can you talk about your highest priorities and areas of
    emphasis for NNSA science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program,
    and do you have the tools and the capabilities in place that
    you need, and what are the gaps, if any? And if you could
    also--mindful that we are in open session--could you also give
    examples of the challenges the stewardship program will
    confront in the coming years? And could you indicate the time
    outlines involved with those challenges? For example, when the
    challenges--when will the challenges manifest themselves?
        Mr. D'Agostino. Thank you, sir. My highest priority, quite
    frankly--well, probably kind of look at it in two ways. There
    is a tactical priority that I have right now, which are the
    people--sending the signal to the people in this infrastructure
    and program that the work they do is important, and making sure
    that message gets out. I think we have gone through, over the
    last few years, a pretty rough period, quite frankly, of lots
    of pressures from an infrastructure standpoint, uncertainty on
    where the program is going, and not so discreet trends with
    respect to investments in science and technology.
        I see that tactical problem landscape changing a little
    bit, from a challenge standpoint, because we are getting a bit
    closer, with the Nuclear Posture Review and with this report
    that we have, toward getting that consensus. So that will take
    care of that part of the tactical problem.
        I see us taking well over $100 million--about $130 million
    a show out of our infrastructure investments, so that creates
    another problem. But bringing it back in to support programs in
    computing and in high-energy density physics that are important
    for the future. So, we are dealing with that near-term tactical
    problem.
        The more strategic challenge I think we face after we get
    this national consensus is putting together an integrated
    program that deals with fully utilizing these tools that we are
    bringing onboard, that we have brought onboard. I am talking
    about the National Ignition Facility, the Dual-Axis
    Radiographic Hydro Test facility at Los Alamos, the Z machine
    at Sandia, the Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental
    Research (JASPER) facility, which is a Livermore facility but
    it is at the Nevada Test Site. In other words, now that we have
    invested a lot of the money here, well, let us get the
    experimental data out of that, and then let us make sure we
    have the scientists and engineers that can analyze that
    information to send us in the right direction out in the
    future.
        And we will have to reinvest in our infrastructure, and
    ultimately all those things are going to require additional
    resources. And it comes down to money, but I can't ask for the
    money unless I have the strategic context to put those
    resources in. And that is why I am anxious, quite frankly, to
    get past--I mean, the consensus and the strategy phase is the
    right thing. I am anxious to get past that and to get into
    developing that program, and that is what, in essence, we will
    be doing this summer.
        Timelines involved, I think, was the last part of that
    question. As we go through this next upcoming decade, there
    will be a few--if we can get the infrastructure facilities that
    we--Mr. Turner talked about, the UPF, or Uranium Processing
    Facility, and our plutonium capability back up to speed, I
    think we are going to start seeing some significant--it will
    allow me to shift some significant resources into the S&T
    program without changing the bottom line of the program. And
    that will happen mid to end of next decade. These are very
    complicated facilities to build.
        We have gotten a lot of use out of these Cold War
    facilities. We need to get our people out of them. That is one
    way we show respect, quite frankly, to the workforces: Put them
    in facilities so I don't have my good friend, Glenn Podonsky,
    you know, rightfully saying, ``Hey, we might have some safety
    problems here, Tom,'' or, ``We might have some security
    problems here.''
        So I am anxious. I think there is a great opportunity that
    we have over the next few years to shape this program the right
    way. I see it. My job ultimately is to put together that
    program for you, for the President, and ultimately to bring it
    here to you and explain it to you in more detail. And in
    effect, we are in a kind of a one-year budget scenario. We have
    put together a program to stop things from getting worse while
    we define what that better future is going to be. It is a
    little different than normal, unfortunately.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, sir.
        Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Langevin.
        I am happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from New
    Mexico, Mr. Heinrich.
        Mr. Heinrich. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Thank you all for being here today. I am going to jump
    right into a number of sort of specifics, and they deal with
    this issue that you have already alluded to of the general
    strategic context. And some of that I will infer from comments
    and speeches that the President has made regarding the
    Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the potential for
    additional negotiations in strategic arms reduction, and the
    need that you articulated to be able to have the adequate
    science and the adequate capacity to make sure we support the
    capabilities doing those things.
        I am very concerned with the proposed budget for Sandia's
    science and inertial confinement fusion campaigns. The NNSA's
    fiscal 2010 budget request represents a $19 million cut from
    fiscal year 2009--I think that is about 35 percent. And at the
    newly refurbished Z machine, your budget will cut the annual
    shot rate from 200 in 2009 to around 130 in 2010, even though
    the weapons in high-energy density physics user community have
    an operational requirement of over 400 shots, I believe. At a
    time when we are reducing the stockpile and must increase our
    investment in science-based Stockpile Stewardship Programs,
    aren't you concerned with such a dramatic cut to the operations
    of science facilities, for example, the Z machine and Sandia?
        Mr. D'Agostino. Yes. The answer to your question is, I am
    very concerned. The 400 shots that we had previously were kind
    of a two-shift operation, in effect, for the Z machine. We are
    down to about 80 percent of a one-shift--fully loaded one-shift
    operation. What we focused on doing were making sure that we
    had a minimal--I would say, is a minimal set of shots we needed
    to support the primary mission of the Z machine, which is the
    stockpile itself, and we are confident we have a program that
    does that.
        There is absolutely a lot more work we could do with the Z
    machine. You know, in the aggregate the Sandia budget is, in
    effect, flat, and there are decisions that we had to make--that
    my staff had to make--with respect to how much should go in
    this versus how much should go in that one. And we felt when we
    balanced across all of this, that keeping the lab--not hurting
    the lab population, doing some reprioritizations with respect
    to what we need to do in the future, was the right thing to do.
        It ended up having an impact on the Z machine. It is
    ultimately my responsibility. It is a decision that I made.
    With more money, we would have definitely put it there, but we
    definitely are in a situation where we are potentially--the
    term Mr. Turner used was ``treading water,'' I think was the
    term you used, sir, which is kind of where we are at.
        Mr. Heinrich. So do I understand you to say, sort of, that
    this is sort of the wait and see year? We develop a grander
    vision of what the strategic context is and maybe adjust in the
    following budget year? Is that what you are----
        Mr. D'Agostino. Absolutely. I mean, I do think, you know,
    whether we call it a ``wait and see year'' or a ``treading
    water year,'' I mean, the focus was, you know--priority number
    one for me, because many of you are aware that this budget was
    developed kind of fairly quickly in the last days of January
    and into the month of February. So what we ended up doing is
    saying, the priority is, we are going to focus on not having
    any reductions in staff across the complex in the aggregate.
    Try to preserve as much as possible the people and the program
    while the Administration gets its hands around what it wants
    its nuclear security posture to be.
        And, you know, because it is--in fact, it still isn't done
    yet. We are developing that posture. And so my expectations--I
    mean, I have spent a lot of time in this program; I know a lot
    of the people, I know Keith Matheson quite--very well, out at
    Sandia, running the Z machine. My expectation is that in order
    to drive this program into the future that supports the visions
    on CTBT and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), that we
    absolutely have to have a fairly significant increase in the
    science and technology in this program in the out-years. It
    just can't happen any other way. We have to have support for
    facilities upgrades out into the future. It just can't happen
    any other way. We have to send the signal that this is a
    nuclear security program, not a nuclear weapons program,
    because in fact, that is exactly what it is. It is a nuclear
    security program, not a nuclear weapons program--not completely
    a nuclear weapons program.
        And those messages have to get sent out by the
    Administration in an integrated five-year program that will
    look different than--I didn't bring a budget book with me, but
    it will look different than what we have in front of us today.
    So it is a one-year program right now.
        Mr. Heinrich. Jumping on to sort of the next thing in
    response to that is the Readiness in Technical Base and
    Facilities accounts. And sort of given the 16 percent decrease
    in Operations of Facilities, 28.6 percent in Program Readiness
    from fiscal year 2009 levels, how are some of those things
    going to play into this broader picture that you are talking
    about? I mean, those seem to be--those are kind of bread and
    butter sustainment----
        Mr. D'Agostino. Right.
        Mr. Heinrich [continuing]. Accounts.
        Mr. D'Agostino. Yes. The Readiness in Technical Base and
    Facilities and Program Readiness accounts are accounts that
    fund what we call our fixed costs--in effect, you know, lights
    burning, you know, roads working, roofs maintained, and that
    kind of thing. In parallel with what we have right now, which
    is a fairly--like it was said earlier--flat-budget scenario for
    the Weapons Activities account, we are driving changes in the
    way we do business.
        Probably the best example--and I have got numerous
    examples--but the best example is what we called ``supply chain
    management center.'' Something we started about a year and a
    half ago, it is to centralize procurement of commodities-type
    products. Every laboratory, every production site needs paper,
    paper clips, it needs a variety of commodity-type products, and
    they were all being purchased separately, and we felt that
    there was an opportunity to leverage our purchasing--you know,
    operate as an integrated organization instead of eight--seven
    separate sites, and in fact, there is opportunity, and we took
    advantage of it, and we have demonstrated $32 million worth of
    savings. That is one example.
        Another example is doing the same type of concepts with
    replacing roofs across the concept, and we saved money there.
    So a lot of the pressure--the negative budget pressure--you see
    in those fixed-cost accounts are due to our driving our lab
    directors individually, and the enterprise as a whole, toward
    being more efficient.
        Just one last point and I will stop, and that is, we have--
    about two years ago I chartered a group, and it is only
    contractor employees--lab--senior from each lab or production
    site--when we develop a Nuclear Security Enterprise Integration
    Council, and this integration council was set up so that I
    would put, potentially, operational efficiency pressure, and I
    say, ``You guys run this place. You are Management and
    Operations (M&O) contractors. You tell us what is a more
    efficient way to operate, and I would like to see specific
    results.''
        And that group meets, in fact, they met yesterday here in
    Washington, and they have a very well prioritized list of
    activities. In the essence of saving time, I would be happy to
    provide, if I could, to the committee examples of those types
    of projects and where they produce savings.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 113.]
        Mr. Heinrich. That would be helpful, I think. I wasn't
    surprised so much with the cuts as with the scale. You know
    28.6 percent is a lot of paper cuts and bruises.
        I am sure there is capacity there. I just thought--I mean,
    that is substantial. So I would be curious to look at some of
    those programs and see how they match up with the scale of the
    reductions that we are seeing.
        Mr. D'Agostino. Okay. Be glad to show you that, sir.
        Ms. Tauscher. Thank you.
        Mr. Podonsky, I wanted to go back to the one question I
    have. It is an issue that we discussed about a year ago. When
    HSS was established it was structured so that you were not
    responsible for any operational elements, with one exception:
    the DOE headquarters security. This exception, which gives your
    organization responsibilities for an operational unit, appears
    to represent what we considered, at the time, a conflict of
    interest.
        Last year, you agreed, and said that you were working with
    the past Administration to address the issue. But since then, I
    understand your office has conducted an oversight inspection of
    the security operations at the headquarters facilities, and we
    still think that is a conflict.
        Why don't you tell us where you think you are with this
    right now, and can you provide the subcommittee with an update
    on what you have done over the past year to address the concern
    we have?
        Mr. Podonsky. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question. And
    it is true, at the hearing that I testified last year that we
    talked about the inherent conflict for my office to be
    responsible for environment, safety, and health safeguards to
    security, cyber, emergency management, policy oversight
    enforcement, and then to have an operational arm; it has proven
    to be quite a challenge.
        We just had a vigorous inspection, as I mentioned, last
    year that we would conduct, and my operation did very poorly.
    And so I put myself on report and went to then-Secretary Bodman
    and talked about the corrective actions in the same way I would
    expect when I go to inspect any of my colleagues' to my right,
    here, operations.
        We did the corrective actions at the headquarters to make
    the improvements, but the Administration--the previous
    Administration at the time--did not want to make any wholesale
    changes because we were so close to the changeover with the
    upcoming election. Now, where we are, that we have all the
    corrective actions fixed, in place, we await the current
    Administration for what they are referring to as a resetting of
    the DOE organizational structure.
        So my recommendation will be to Secretary Chu and the
    Deputy Secretary designate that when they look at the
    restructuring of the Department, as they intend to do, my
    recommendation will be that even though we have taken every
    precaution to avoid any conflicts, the fact of the matter is
    that they exist. And quite honestly, I don't want to have to
    put myself on report again for poor performance.
        Ms. Tauscher. Well, we don't want you to either, so we are
    going to--I think that the subcommittee will write to Secretary
    Chu and we will ask exactly what the plan is to reset the
    organization and to take you out of that situation.
        Mr. Turner, do you have any further questions? I want to go
    to Mr. Thornberry.
        I am happy to go to Mr. Thornberry for five minutes.
        Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. And I apologize for being in and
    out during the testimony.
        Mr. D'Agostino, I know you said that you all are still
    digesting the commission report that came out last week, but as
    I have read that report and now I look at the future year
    budgets for Weapons Activities, seems to me the two things
    don't fit together. I mean, the Weapons Activities budgets go
    down, not even counting inflation under this budget, and it
    just seems to me, when you look at the challenges with people,
    facilities, the other things that were talked about in that
    report, this isn't all fitting together. Am I missing something
    here?
        Mr. D'Agostino. No, sir, you are not. They don't match up.
    Our focus, recognizing the report just recently came out--of
    course, I have been working this program for a number of
    years--and that what we have got, in essence, is inconsistency.
        In fact, you know, the report will inform--in fact, is
    informing--the Nuclear Posture Review groups that are meeting.
    I am one of those people that are on that group. The report
    helps me out, quite frankly, quite a bit in defining what I
    believe is the right path for the program.
        The out-year numbers for this program do not reflect what I
    think are important to do to maintain a stockpile, to do a
    CTBT, to take care of a variety of challenges we have coming
    forward. And, you know, granted--I mean, somewhere buried in
    the narrative of the actual President's budget submission, I do
    make it clear that what we are trying to do is first, do no
    harm and not reduce significantly the program between 2009 and
    2010; and second, set us up--you know, it is kind of like a--
    getting yourself ready for that next pitch that has to happen,
    getting the program set up so that it can move out smartly,
    given a strategic direction.
        The report actually sets the right tone, in my view, of
    where programs need to go. It endorses things that the
    committee has looked at for a number of years now with respect
    to stockpile, so----
        Mr. Thornberry. Well, my concern, among others, is that if
    we have this idea we are going to negotiate further reduction
    with the Russians, that means we can spend less money, and--
    when, in fact, that even puts greater necessity on making sure
    what the other things we do are done well, or else--and
    articulating that risk of not funding those other things well
    is something that does concern----
        Let me ask, on another topic: I know that you and Mr.
    Podonsky have, I believe, written a memo on the issue about
    whether the guard force should become federal employees or not.
    And my impression is that you are both in agreement that that
    is not a good idea. Could you briefly, each of you, tell me
    why?
        Mr. D'Agostino. I can start, and I would ask Glenn, maybe,
    to--because in essence there is a policy piece, and Glenn has
    that responsibility. My sense is, just as a program lead, that
    we can spend a lot of time and effort, I call it reorganizing,
    or making fairly significant strategic shifts. It has been my
    observation in the past in running programs that there is--the
    devil is in the details on many of these things--that the guard
    force may have a certain view that, ``hey, being a federal
    employee is a great thing because you get this, that, and the
    other,'' and actually there are some unintended consequences.
        So in my view, unless there is a hugely obvious benefit
    that seems to override a variety of things, reorganizing or
    restructuring are things that should only be done with very
    careful deliberation. I know Glenn has done the spade work on
    this, and I will ask you to follow up.
        Mr. Podonsky. If you will indulge me, Congressman, this
    actually stems with a conversation that started with former
    Secretary Spence Abraham, former Deputy Secretary Frank Blake,
    General John Gordon, myself, and Clay Sell was in on the
    conversation at one point, and what it was is, Secretary
    Abraham, at the time, said he wanted to take a look at how to
    improve security posture of the Department of Energy in a post-
    9/11 environment. This was 2003.
        And I had put on the table the option of looking at
    federalization of the guard force. And I put it on the table
    for the Department to take a serious look to see whether or not
    security posture of the Department would be improved by
    federalizing the force. And there were a number of joint
    studies done by both contractors in the field, managers, staff,
    and our staff at headquarters, and the conclusion was that
    security posture would not be improved.
        And the guard force unions, who I work with closely, saw
    this as an opportunity, and rightfully so, to create a career
    path for themselves, so as they got older they had a place to
    go, because maybe they were not any longer in physical
    condition to meet the standards of a security officer. So the
    conclusion that Under Secretary D'Agostino and I came with is
    that the federalization was not the answer.
        Well, what we have done is I have started another group to
    evolve the guard unions across the complex to involve my policy
    people, my overseers, to find the alternatives that would meet
    the challenge of improving the Guard security for their own job
    security, and also meet the challenge that we originally had in
    2003 to improve the security posture.
        One of the things we did was come up with what we called a
    ``security elite force,'' so that would help improve the
    security posture. But the federalization as a whole, our
    conclusion was that it would not improve the posture for the
    amount of money that would be spent to change the entire
    construct of the Department.
        Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
        Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Thornberry.
        Mr. Turner.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Mr. Podonsky, I don't think there has been a hearing where
    you have been present where I have been here where I haven't
    said something about my concern for security, but for our
    facilities and our weapons, so I just wanted to turn to that. I
    appreciate your diligence and your commitment, but I remain
    concerned and I would appreciate your continued efforts to keep
    us informed of ways that we can close any gaps that may exist.
    I know you are transitioning from a Design Based Threat
    security policy to a Graded Security Protection policy, and
    should in the future learn more of that, and also ways in which
    we can make a difference, because, as I said in my opening
    statement, we do not have a margin of error in the issue of
    security. And Mr. D'Agostino and I have also had that
    conversation, so thank you for your efforts there.
        Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Turner.
        We are going to go ahead and finish at 4:30, and I just
    wanted to see if Mr. Langevin or Mr. Heinrich had another round
    of questions.
        Mr. Langevin for five minutes?
        Mr. Langevin. Sure.
        Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Langevin for five minutes.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Going back on the stewardship program, if I could, one of
    the questions I wanted to get to was, would our ratification of
    a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty change any of the current plans
    for the program? If so, could you describe how?
        Mr. D'Agostino. Sure. Certainly. Yes, it would change our
    plans. It would, in fact, reinforce the fact that we need to
    bring our science and technology infrastructure, if you will,
    which--people facilities, experimental tools--actually start
    using our tools in the way they were meant to be used. Mr.
    Heinrich talked about the--we are doing about 80 percent of
    what we could do on one shift on the Z machine; we would want
    to do, quite frankly, two shifts' worth of shots on Z to get
    that experimental data out.
        If ratification of CTBT comes forward as we expect, we will
    be putting forward a program that will fully utilize these
    machines. So it will be increased effort. That will present
    some technical challenges because, you know, we are now going
    to be shifting from a ``build the capability'' to actually
    ``use the capability.'' and then the next step is analyze the
    results of that data and get ourselves down into this ability
    to do what has been termed ``predictive science,'' which is an
    art right now, and not quite yet at the science level. So----
        Mr. Langevin. I guess you kind of lost me. But why wouldn't
    you do that absent ratification of the treaty?
        Mr. D'Agostino. Well, what we are doing right now is, we
    would need to do that absent because right now we have to
    maintain that policy of no underground testing, but we are not
    getting--in other words, without the--the problem that we have
    had in the past, quite frankly, is this national consensus, you
    know, an agreement, in effect, between the Administration, the
    Executive Branch, the international community, and, you know,
    what I call nongovernmental organizations--that national
    consensus. And frankly, it goes to a global consensus in some
    respects, and the national consensus on our strategic posture.
        And not having that has made running this program very
    difficult. We have had greater than $600 million shifts, you
    know, as that program of record to submit up and gets debated
    in Congress, and whenever you have that kind of shift and you
    have those kind of deltas, it makes it very hard for the
    program to be successful. I think we have a real opportunity,
    frankly, to get to this national consensus. We are not quite
    there yet. I think we are on the cusp of it.
        I mean, there will be debates whether or not we took the
    stockpile size down too much or not enough, or whether our
    reserve capability on warheads is too big or too small, or
    whether we have too many scientists or engineers or not, and
    some people will debate that. But I go back to kind of the
    legwork that has happened here on this document, as it informs
    the Nuclear Posture Review, that will clearly demonstrate the
    need for reinvestment in our facilities and in our people and
    to fully utilize that.
        And I guess maybe I have been--I am going to call it
    stymied--in the past on getting these increases, but I see this
    as kind of like a running back. You know, a fullback--block
    fullback--in front, making sure that all issues are out on the
    table for us to debate, and then once the debaters are done
    then we move out, because frankly, the people, as we talked
    about earlier, are getting older; they are getting mixed
    signals. They are getting mixed signals. And they end up
    wondering, you know, ``What are we doing here?'' It strains
    budget, from that standpoint.
        Mr. Langevin. Before my time runs out, can you tell me--
    look into Russia, what is NNSA doing to ensure that as it
    expands the scope of its nonproliferation programs, existing
    programs with Russia remain a cooperative endeavor, and the
    U.S.-Russia nonproliferation partnership continues to address
    our remaining work in Russia and other possible opportunities
    for nonproliferation cooperation?
        Mr. D'Agostino. We are doing a lot in that area, sir. Mr.
    Baker, who is here behind me, just came back recently from a
    trip to reinforce, talk to his counterparts. We have a whole
    series of deputy directors. And we are also--Tom, in the
    Russian and customs service and in the military, where we have
    ongoing problems, to do security upgrades, do vulnerability
    assessments, to do sustainability projects. We are identifying
    not only those--making sure that those partnerships are--
    continue on, but we are looking at opportunities to develop new
    areas for work with Russia.
        I will give you some examples here on the research reactor
    conversion. Russia has a number of research reactors in country
    that have highly enriched uranium (HEU), so we are looking at a
    joint partnership where both U.S. and Russia have a domestic
    reactor conversion effort to take advantage of the fact that if
    we are going to have the rest of the world convert to research
    reactors from HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU), we ought to be
    doing the same thing.
        So in fact, I see expanded work with Russia out into the
    future, and I see our programs shifting a little bit toward not
    just the U.S. paying, but a cost-share approach. And we have
    examples of where Russia, in certain parts of our program, has
    picked up the load, quite frankly, on sustainability. Once we
    have done the upgrade, they have picked up the responsibility
    for doing the sustainability, or carrying it out for the
    future, and we get to check and see how they are doing. So I
    see a lot more work, sir, in that area.
        Mr. Langevin. Okay.
        Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Thornberry, do you have a second round?
        Mr. Thornberry. Madam Chair, may I follow up?
        I was a little confused in your testimony. At one point it
    says that the U.S. and Russia have reached agreement on
    disposition of excess plutonium; in another point, it kind of
    sounds to me like it is still in negotiations and expect to
    complete negotiations this summer.
        Mr. D'Agostino. Yes. We may have made it confusing,
    unfortunately. There is a joint technical statement where we
    have agreed in principle--I think it was in end of 2007 that--
    where we basically said, we agree on the--this is the 34 metric
    tons question----
        Mr. Thornberry. Right.
        Mr. D'Agostino [continuing]. And we agreed in principle on
    how each country was going to do it, but what we needed to do
    was upgrade what is known as the Plutonium Disposition
    Management Agreement, or, Plutonium Management Disposition
    Agreement. That agreement is one of the elements of what Mr.
    Baker's trip was to work out the exact words that the two
    presidents can sign in July.
        And so there is the technical piece of the program, where
    everybody that actually does the work says, ``It is a done
    deal. We are ready to go.'' We want the two presidents to sign
    the agreement in July, and then that actually commits both
    countries, frankly, to now let us follow up and do it.
        Mr. Thornberry. Okay. And are we paying for their plutonium
    disposition?
        Mr. D'Agostino. The commitment on behalf of the United
    States is, if appropriated, $400 million. This is money that
    was appropriated in the past. I think about $200 million or so
    that was appropriated in the past, most of that was retracted
    last year. But we are only paying for a portion of it, quite
    frankly, because the plutonium--they are going to have to do a
    lot--put out a lot more of their own capital to do it, and they
    are planning on doing it via their fast reactor disposition
    programs.
        So the $400 million the U.S. would be committed to would
    help but would not take it all the way. And frankly, I am okay
    with that because, you know, Russia is a different country now
    than it was 10 years ago when the agreement was----
        Mr. Thornberry. We have been dealing with this for 10
    years, so that is why I have--so the $400 million is a cap----
        Mr. D'Agostino. The $400 million----
        Mr. Thornberry [continuing]. On how much we would pay?
        Mr. D'Agostino. The $400 million is the amount we would
    pay, yes, sir.
        Mr. Thornberry. Okay. Okay. Thank you.
        Thank you.
        Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Heinrich for five minutes.
        Mr. Heinrich. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        I want to go to the B61, which I think was touched on a
    little bit in the report. But even given the uncertainties in
    our overall strategic posture, it seems like some sort of Life
    Extension Program or refurbishment program for that should be a
    priority. How does that fit into the next year's budget?
        Mr. D'Agostino. The way it fits in is to finish--it does
    fit in the next year's budget, for one. Two is, our focus in
    next year's budget is to do--I will use this term--it is called
    a ``phase 2-A study,'' which is a cost, scope, and schedule
    study on exactly what we are going to do by when and how much
    is it going to cost.
        It is actually the completion of an effort we started in
    2009, and on the--you know, again, when the strategic posture
    review comes out--the Nuclear Posture Review comes out, I am
    sorry--I am hoping that it has enough definition with respect
    to the B61, because General Chilton and I believe that this
    warhead--you know, whether ultimately, 15 years from now, it
    goes away, it is not on the good path between zero and 15
    years. I mean, I don't--you know, we have to do work on that
    warhead.
        Mr. Heinrich. Right.
        Mr. D'Agostino. And so the question will be, okay, let us
    say it goes away in 15 or 20 years, then that helps inform the
    study to say, ``Well, let us just do enough work to get us
    through that time phase, period.'' That is why we need to do
    the study in 2010.
        Once the study is completed----
        Mr. Heinrich. That will be done this fiscal year?
        Mr. D'Agostino. It will be done into the next fiscal year,
    because what we are going to be looking at is, you know,
    whether we just do a nonnuclear replenishment--just change out
    those nonnuclear parts--or whether we actually have to get into
    the nuclear package itself because of aging of components and
    other things. And there is also the desire, I think, on the
    part--certainly on my part, and I believe on the part of the
    subcommittee and others--that where we can insert improved
    safety and security without substantially changing, that we
    ought to take advantage of that opportunity. And in fact, that
    is where Sandia comes in, is it provides the details there.
        Mr. Heinrich. Right. Thank you.
        Dr. Triay, I want to ask you a quick question. I don't know
    if you remember us meeting in Santa Fe a few years ago----
        Dr. Triay. Absolutely, sir.
        Mr. Heinrich [continuing]. But I wanted to ask what you are
    doing to address the natural resource damage issues at DOE and
    NNSA facilities like Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)?
        Dr. Triay. I have been working closely with NNSA on this
    particular issue, and the reason is that--matter, I feel that
    while the cleanup is going on, to the extent that we can
    address some of the issues, that ultimately we will come out of
    assessing the damages after the cleanup is done, we actually
    can do a lot better. So I firmly believe that we have to work--
    NNSA and the Environmental Management program--need to work
    together to ensure that anything that can be identified while
    we are in the cleanup phase, that we work in partnership with
    the Tribal Nations, the state, so that we can get ahead of,
    ultimately, having to assess the damages at the end.
        So you have my commitment that, in my case, if confirmed, I
    will continue to work in a very close manner with NNSA on the
    Los Alamos issue.
        Mr. Heinrich. So you are saying you understand the
    advantage of a parallel track as opposed to a Rocky Flats
    situation where you do one and then try to figure out how you
    figure out the other one when you have changed the data and----
        Dr. Triay. Absolutely, sir. I definitely do understand
    that, and I am very committed to that approach.
        Mr. Heinrich. Great. Thank you.
        Ms. Tauscher. Thank you very much. We are about to be
    called for three votes--the last votes of the day.
        I want to thank our witnesses, Dr. Triay, Administrator
    D'Agostino, Mr. Podonsky, thank you very much, and the people
    behind you who do such great work for this country, and the
    people behind them, and the people behind them. [Laughter.]
        Thank you for your service. Thank you for informing the
    committee as well as you have, and we will look forward to
    talking to you again soon.
        Hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:28 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
    ?

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                                A P P E N D I X

                                  May 13, 2009

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                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                  May 13, 2009

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    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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                  WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                                  THE HEARING

                                  May 13, 2009

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                 RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. HEINRICH

        Mr. D'Agostino. The Nuclear Security Enterprise--Integration
    Council (NSE-IC) is a team of senior weapons contractor managers from
    the eight NNSA sites established to work on difficult projects/
    assignments that require more than one site to accomplish. The Council
    was chartered in August of 2006. The following are some of the
    accomplishments achieved during the last three years of operation:

          Successfully completed 90% of the Multi-site Targets
    identified by NNSA as critical mission essential milestones for the
    Stockpile Stewardship Program in fiscal year (FY) 2007, 100% in FY 2008
    and expect to complete 90% in FY 2009;

          Each year the council has identified initiatives that are
    not incentivized that enable additional collaboration and resultant
    improvements between sites. Some examples are:

              Establishing a ``Code Blue'' process across all sites to
            enable forming teams to address/solve difficult problems
            quickly;

              Performing a ``Macro-Baseline Benchmarking'' of each of
            NNSA's site management and operations contractors to enable
            identification of improvement opportunities at sites;

          During FY 2009, completed additional scope projects
    beyond those planned through increased efficiency of nearly $100M
    across the Nuclear Security Enterprise; and

          Chartered in FY 2009, the Nuclear Security Enterprise's
    Field Council, was built upon lessons learned from the NSE-IC to
    further enable changes/improvements. This Field Council has a chairman
    and the members are the eight NNSA Site Office Managers. These two
    councils have met several times to date and are jointly working to
    increase the overall operational efficiency and effectiveness of NNSA.

        [See page 21.]
    ?

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                  May 13, 2009

    =======================================================================

              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TAUSCHER AND MR. LANGEVIN

        Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. How would you characterize your
    confidence in the safety, security and reliability of the United
    States' nuclear stockpile? Please describe any issues that might erode
    that confidence over time.
        Mr. D'Agostino.  Overall NNSA's confidence in the safety, security,
    and reliability of the stockpile is adequate, but faces challenges as
    mentioned in the Annual Assessments to the President from the National
    Laboratory Directors and Commander, USSTRATCOM. Most of the stockpile
    weapons have greatly exceeded their originally expected in-stockpile
    lifetimes of 20 years. NNSA applies knowledge gained through
    surveillance and weapon assessments to identify issues and judge the
    stockpile's ability to meet the mission without nuclear testing.
        Safety and security features of the weapons continue to meet their
    original designed requirements. However, technological advances and
    less stringent military requirements since the end of the cold war have
    created opportunities to introduce safety enhancements into the weapons
    such as those recommended by the Drell Commission. The DoD and NNSA
    continue to maintain our highest standards of procedural safeguard to
    supplement each weapon's particular safety features. Security of
    nuclear weapons is confronted with an ever-evolving threat and
    capabilities that ever-improving technologies offer potential
    adversaries. The DoD and NNSA continuously respond by upgrading our
    site, facility, and transportation safeguards to counter the potential
    threat capabilities. However, upgrading the internal weapon safety and
    security features requires redesign and production of certain weapon
    components. The most effective safety and security implementation can
    be achieved through a comprehensive redesign.
        Many of our nuclear weapons have small performance margins as a
    legacy of the Cold War drive to maximize yield and minimize weight.
    This weapon design margin degrades with time. Furthermore, uncertainty
    in the reliability of components grows with time. This combination
    reduces our confidence in stockpile performance over time and can
    impose performance limitations. The DoD and NNSA work together to
    procedurally alleviate, to the extent possible, any resulting
    performance limitations until a warhead condition can be corrected by a
    weapon repair, alteration, or refurbishment. NNSA has put greater
    emphasis on the evaluation of aging-related degradation to performance
    margins; however, there remain many investment opportunities for new
    diagnostic capabilities to identify, characterize, and monitor the
    aging trends. Surveillance is essential to prevent uncertainty from
    eroding our ability to remain confident in the assessed health of the
    stockpile today and our ability to predict issues that would prevent a
    positive assessment in the future.
        Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. What steps does NNSA plan to pursue
    to maintain the safety, security and reliability of current stockpile?
        Mr. D'Agostino. The change in the global security environment and
    the manner in which nuclear weapons fulfill their deterrence role
    promotes introducing enhanced weapons safety, security, and reliability
    not possible during the Cold-War era. Rather than simply duplicate the
    manufacturing of the weapon as it was originally designed in the 1970s
    and 1980s, NNSA will seek to build a consensus with national leadership
    that investments in nuclear weapon safety and surety enhancements are
    in the best interests of national policy and the public. The 2009
    Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) will provide the most immediate
    opportunity to reflect this consensus. The weapons program budgets for
    that portion of the stockpile recommended for retention, which should
    also reflect this consensus. In addition, NNSA will continuously assess
    the health of the stockpile and identify critical performance
    parameters and knowledge gaps that require resolution. NNSA must make
    commensurate investments in science, engineering, and manufacturing to
    better understand these parameters and gaps and to implement design
    solutions when aging issues arise--ultimately producing the tools and
    capabilities to maintain the stockpile as it ages.
        As long as the United States requires a nuclear deterrent, we must
    maintain the capabilities required to sustain our deterrent. We need to
    recruit and sustain the skilled scientists, engineers, and technicians
    required to solve the key challenges in science-based stewardship, and
    we need to maintain the stockpile in a manner that ensures our ability
    to support the deterrent without testing. Life extension programs
    (LEPs) ensure confidence in long-term stockpile effectiveness
    (reliability and performance) and provide opportunities to increase
    weapon margin and incorporate enhanced safety and security features
    into warheads. Life extension activities will not create new military
    capabilities, do not require nuclear testing, do not require new
    production of fissile materials, and do not add impetus to others'
    proliferation. Our ability to enhance the margin, safety, and security
    of the stockpile, however, is limited by restricting LEP work to only
    warhead refurbishment. LEPs should be considered on a case-by-case
    basis as recommended by the Congressional Commission on the Strategic
    Posture of the United States. Effective stockpile management could
    allow policy makers to further reduce the size of the stockpile,
    particularly those warheads maintained in reserve as a hedge against
    risk. We must base each LEP on technical considerations regarding the
    best approach to meet stated objectives including assured long-term
    reliability and enhancing America's nuclear security. Furthermore, to
    meet these objectives, NNSA must recapitalize the infrastructure to
    provide modern, safe, secure, and efficient facilities.
        Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. Are there limits on Stockpile Life
    Extension Programs in terms of their scope, and ability to meet
    military requirements? Are these technical, operational, regulatory,
    statutory, or a combination? Please give examples.
        Mr. D'Agostino. Life extension programs (LEPs) ensure confidence in
    long-term stockpile effectiveness (reliability and performance) and
    provide opportunities to increase weapon margin and incorporate
    enhanced safety and security features into warheads. Life extension
    activities will not create new military capabilities, do not require
    nuclear testing, do not require new production of fissile materials,
    and do not add impetus to others' proliferation. Our ability to enhance
    the margin, safety, and security of the stockpile is limited by
    restricting LEP work to only warhead refurbishment.
        The current approach to legacy stockpile sustainment through
    refurbishment is focused on minimum excursions from the original design
    which imposes technical limits on what can be done to the weapons
    during refurbishment. A fundamental objective of the refurbishment
    approach is to meet the original military requirements that were
    established with the DoD. Most of the legacy warheads were highly
    optimized systems, trading margin for more yield and reduced weight,
    and all were validated by nuclear testing.
        Refurbishments are becoming increasingly more difficult and costly
    in order to replicate materials and outdated or non-operational
    processes and technologies that were used to meet original warhead
    specifications. In some instances, regulatory limits affect the LEP
    approach. Some materials or processes have been eliminated because they
    were hazardous and are not available in industry due to increased
    regulatory constraints and costs. Each refurbishment introduces changes
    that take the designs further from the tested configurations, with
    increases in uncertainty. As these designs continue to evolve, NNSA's
    ability to ensure confidence in the legacy stockpile's safety and
    reliability over the long-term will depend even more on a robust and
    successful stockpile stewardship program and a viable peer-review
    process.
        Some specific challenges include eliminating the use of beryllium
    due to health and environmental concerns and moving toward the use of
    insensitive high explosives or other safety enhancements. These provide
    significant technical challenges that will require considerable weapon
    redesign. Furthermore, replacing archaic electronics and other sunset
    technologies will inherently improve performance for certain
    components. Opponents of the nuclear weapons program have characterized
    these changes, which are essential to sustaining nuclear security, as
    new military capability even though the weapon continues to fulfill the
    same mission need. This further highlights the need for a national
    consensus on maintaining credible deterrent and improving nuclear
    security as long as nuclear weapons exist.
        Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. The NNSA has said it will rely on
    initiatives such as facility and staffing reduction and new business
    practices to pay for transformation of the existing nuclear security
    complex. In its final report, the Congressional Commission on the
    Strategic Posture of the United States expressed doubt that complex
    transformation could be funded without budget increases. The commission
    further argued that additional staffing reductions in the laboratories
    could erode the core competencies of the labs and the complex overall.
        To what extent do you believe that cost savings from facility and
    staffing reduction, business process improvements, and materials
    consolidation can help pay for complex modernization? If such
    reductions will pay only for part of modernization, from where will
    NNSA draw the remainder of the required funds?
        Mr. D'Agostino. The NNSA originally planned to implement
    transformation within our budget projections, assuming that savings
    from early transformation actions (e.g., supply chain management
    improvements, special nuclear material (SNM) consolidation, non-nuclear
    production transformation at our Kansas City Plant, and test facility
    consolidation) were available to be reinvested. This approach included
    paying for transformation through a combination of the following:

          Infrastructure savings through major footprint
    reductions, replacement of buildings that are long past their economic
    lifetimes, and updated cost-sharing models for work-for-others
    customers;

          Reduced overhead costs through contract reforms, improved
    risk management strategies, greater business practice uniformity,
    improvements in product assurance processes, and commodity purchase
    savings through a supply chain management center; and,

          Reductions in staff supporting weapons activities through
    attrition and possibly through reassignment to other national security
    missions.

        The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture articulates
    the current complex transformation funding condition in their report.
    The report states, ``The physical infrastructure is in serious need of
    transformation and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
    has a reasonable plan to do so but lacks the needed funding.'' Due to
    continued flat budgets (20% loss of buying power since 2005).
        Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. The NNSA has said it will rely on
    initiatives such as facility and staffing reductions and new business
    practices to pay for transformation of the existing nuclear security
    complex. In its final report, the Congressional Commission on the
    Strategic Posture of the United States expressed doubt that complex
    transformation could be funded without budget increases. The commission
    further argued that additional staffing reductions in the laboratories
    could erode the core competencies of the labs and the complex overall.
        To what extent are the design specifications for the Chemistry and
    Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) facility and the Uranium
    Processing Facility (UPF) facility dependent on the size of the nuclear
    weapons stockpile?
        Mr. D'Agostino. The CMRR and UPF facilities are designed to house
    the minimum equipment necessary to perform plutonium and uranium
    processes. Both facilities are ``capability based designs''. The size
    of the facilities and the amount of equipment is driven by the number
    of unique processing steps, operations and missions required, not by
    the size of the nuclear weapons stockpile. The same tools and equipment
    needed to make a single CSA in UPF, for example, could be used to make
    up to the planned number of CSAs per year and meet the non-production
    missions assigned to UPF. For CMRR, the same process equipment provides
    the scientific support functions for fabricating pits at the rate
    specified in the requirements for the facility. For both facilities,
    any reduction in this equipment would disable the ability to conduct
    some or all of the missions. CMRR and UPF also support other defense
    missions, such as weapons surveillance, certification, and quality
    assurance as well as non-weapons programs such as providing feedstock
    for making naval fuel and for supporting disassembly and disposition of
    highly enriched uranium for non-proliferation missions.
        Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. The National Defense Authorization
    Act for Fiscal Year 2008 requires the GAO and then the NNSA to examine
    alternatives for managing protective forces at all NNSA and Department
    sites with special nuclear material. The committee understands that the
    NNSA has concluded that federalizing protective forces is not
    desirable.
        What steps does the NNSA plan to take to improve and make more
    consistent the management of protective forces throughout the nuclear
    security complex?
        Mr. D'Agostino. On March 31, 2009, the Office of Health, Safety and
    Security (HSS) commissioned a study to examine realistic and reasonable
    options for improving the career opportunities and retirement prospects
    of protective force members while maintaining, within current and
    anticipated budgetary constraints, a robust and effective security
    posture. The Protective Force Career Options Initiative Study Group
    consisted of senior representatives from HSS, the Office of Defense
    Nuclear Security (DNS), and other Departmental organizations. The goal
    of this group was to find ways to overcome problems that prevent
    protective force members from working to a normal retirement age, and
    accruing reasonable retirement benefits. The study identified 29
    recommendations for consideration that the Department is currently
    evaluating. These recommendations addressed issues ranging from the
    classification of Security Police Officers (as ``offensive'' or
    ``defensive'' combatants), through the implementation of current
    physical and medical requirements, to proposals for a large-scale
    revamping of the retirement structure for both disability and age-
    related retirements. The recommendations included a number of measures
    aimed at increasing the employment options available for protective
    force members, who through age or injury, are confronted by a premature
    end to their protective force careers. The study also addressed a
    variety of ``quality of life'' issues for protective force members,
    including arrest authority, uniforms, and equipment. The first 14
    recommendations were viewed by the Study Group as being appropriate to
    existing budgets and structures, and the last 15 will require
    additional resources, change in governance, or both. A central theme
    emerged from the study: the expectations placed upon protective force
    personnel should be clearly related to job requirements, and wherever
    demands are placed upon an individual's tactical skills and physical
    capabilities, those demands should be matched by training opportunities
    sufficient to support the maintenance of those capabilities. The
    anticipated contribution of these recommendations will improve the
    longevity and career potential of individual protective force members
    and enhance the potential contribution to the Department and its
    programs. Every positive step toward improving the career environment
    of protective force members improves morale; and contributes to making
    our forces more efficient and effective. By creating incentives for
    individuals to enter a protective force career and then remain in the
    Department's security community for a lifetime of service, the
    Department minimizes the significant costs associated with hiring,
    vetting, and training protective force members.
        Additionally, DNS initiated a Zero-Based Security Review (ZBSR) of
    the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) physical security
    and management oversight programs, in partnership with HSS. The pilot
    effort of this review was conducted from July 7 through July 24, 2009,
    at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. The purpose of the ZBSR is to
    determine how NNSA meets its security obligations, with an emphasis on
    improving cost-efficiency while simultaneously maintaining an effective
    security posture that incorporates sound principles of risk management.
    The protective force portion of the ZBSR focuses on improving the
    implementation of Federal management and contractor oversight
    requirements. It also focuses on developing a solid methodology for
    driving cost and activity transparency, cross-site consistency, and
    comparability among the diverse sites throughout the Nuclear Security
    Enterprise (NSE) that have similar protection missions. This will lead
    to increased consistency and more effective management of protective
    force operations, as well as more effective allocation of the limited
    budgetary resources available to the safeguards and security (S&S)
    program. By balancing funding with performance expectations, DNS will
    improve the consistency, effectiveness, and efficiency of its security
    program in general, and within the protective force program in
    particular. The result will be a set of recommendations to improve the
    quality of oversight management functions and/or to realign oversight
    activities to achieve better balance of Federal responsibilities and
    contractor authority for execution of the NNSA site security program.
    Additionally, DNS will develop supplemental guidance to assist NNSA
    sites in implementing S&S directives in a cost-efficient and effective
    manner.
        DNS is also pursuing alternative ways to enhance and improve
    protective force operational efficiency and effectiveness, including:

          Enterprise-wide standardization of select S&S equipment

          Establishing a common sourcing and procurement mechanism
    to acquire protective force items

        NNSA is utilizing the Kansas City Plant's Supply Chain Management
    Center (SCMC), operated by Honeywell FM&T, which is a strategic
    sourcing organization that leverages NNSA's purchasing power across its
    contractor sites to obtain reduced pricing, better delivery, increased
    quality, and improved service. The objective of the SCMC is to
    transform the Management and Operating contractors' acquisition process
    to a strategically integrated function that ensures maximum value for
    every acquisition and will assist in protective force equipment
    standardization throughout the NSE.
        Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. The FY 2008 NDAA also directed NNSA
    to conduct an assessment of the physical and cyber security risks posed
    to the nuclear weapons complex and the security technologies employed
    against those threats, and prepare a report identifying the manner in
    which it prioritizes investments in physical and cyber security of the
    weapons complex. The report would be included in the annual Future
    Years Nuclear Security Plan (FYNSP).
        Is the NNSA working on this assessment and report?
        Mr. D'Agostino. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has
    completed a Physical Security Technology Management Plan that is in
    final coordination with DOE's Office of Health, Safety and Security
    (HSS). This plan was developed to address the physical security portion
    of the NDAA amendment. It describes the defined processes currently
    used by NNSA to identify, deploy, and sustain physical security
    technologies, along with supporting rationale for the physical security
    technology-related budget requests in the FYNSP submittal to Congress.
    The plan identifies existing physical security technologies currently
    deployed at NNSA sites; describes the prioritization process used by
    NNSA sites to request new or replacement technologies; and specifies
    the funding strategy to address the requests.
        The Cyber Security Technology Management Plan has been completed
    and is currently under review by NNSA leadership, HSS, and the DOE
    Chief, Information Officer. The plan was developed to address the cyber
    security section of the FY 2009 NDAA amendment. The content of the plan
    provides an overview of the current processes for the deployment and
    sustainment of cyber security technologies. The plan also provides
    information on future program technology enhancements which are
    requested as part of the FYNSP submittal to Congress. The plan covers
    existing and future cyber technologies, the prioritization of processes
    and procedures used by NNSA sites for the development, and enhancement
    of technologies and the funding strategy to address the requests.
        Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. What are NNSA's highest
    nonproliferation priorities? What are the primary areas of progress and
    the main challenges facing NNSA nonproliferation efforts?
        Mr. D'Agostino. What are our highest priorities? The overarching
    mission of NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation is to
    prevent the proliferation or use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
    including the necessary materials, technology and expertise. NNSA's
    comprehensive nonproliferation programs help to deny unauthorized
    access to fissile materials and nuclear weapons technology. Specific
    efforts include ensuring adequate nuclear material control and
    accounting, and physical protection, at nuclear sites worldwide,
    strengthening international safeguards and tightening controls on
    international transfers, and programs for removing, dispositioning, and
    monitoring excess nuclear materials.
        We have made much progress meeting these priorities through the
    cooperative partnerships that NNSA has developed with over 130 country
    partners across the globe that work in 19 specialized nuclear security
    activities. We have completed material protection, control and
    accounting upgrades at 93% of Russian nuclear material and warhead
    sites of concern; converted or shutdown 64 reactors in 32 countries
    from the use of highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium; and
    returned over 910 kgs of Russian-origin nuclear material and over 1,215
    kgs of U.S.-origin nuclear materials; and secured vulnerable nuclear
    and radiological materials at over 570 buildings worldwide.
        A primary challenge now will be ensuring the necessary resources,
    staff, and international partnerships required to help implement the
    President's nonproliferation strategy, including securing all
    vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide within four years, as outlined
    in the President's April 5, 2009 speech in Prague.
        Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. NNSA plans for fissile materials
    disposition have slowed in recent years, first as a liability dispute
    between the U.S. and Russia delayed work, and later as Congress
    expressed reservations about proceeding with construction of the U.S.
    MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility at the Savannah River Site. Most
    recently, the FY 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act reduced funding
    for the MOX facility and transferred funding for the facility from
    NNSA's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program to the Office of
    Nuclear Energy. However, the FY 2010 budget request restores funding
    for the MOX facility and reflects a transfer of all funding for the
    facility back to Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. What is the current
    status of construction of the MOX facility and what is the timeline for
    completion?
        Mr. D'Agostino. Overall the project is 35% complete and
    construction is 18% complete. Design, procurement and construction
    activities are proceeding on schedule and within budget. Eight of the
    seventeen auxiliary buildings needed to support construction and
    operation of the MOX facility have been finished, including the
    recently completed MOX Administration Building. At the MOX Process
    Building, more than 53,000 cubic yards of reinforced concrete, 50,000
    cubic yards of unreinforced concrete, and 11,000 tons of rebar have
    been installed. Operations are scheduled to begin at the MOX facility
    in 2016.
        Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. What is the status of outstanding
    issues with Russia relating to the Russian Surplus Fissile Materials
    Disposition program, and what are the plans to move the program forward
    in a manner that is consistent with the program's nonproliferation
    objectives?
        Mr. D'Agostino. The United States and Russia reached agreement in
    principle on the text of a Protocol to amend the 2000 Plutonium
    Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA). While this would update
    the PMDA for both sides' programs, the major change is that Russia's
    program will now be entirely (instead of partially) based on the use of
    ``fast'' reactors. This is the only program consistent with Russia's
    nuclear energy strategy, and the amendment accordingly adds appropriate
    nonproliferation conditions (e.g., that the BN-800 is operated as a
    plutonium burner and the plutonium breeding blanket is removed from the
    BN-600). The text of the Protocol is currently being confirmed and
    reviewed by both governments. No significant substantive issues have
    been raised to date, and both sides are seeking to complete approval
    for signature early this fall.
        Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. In recent years, the committee has
    emphasized its strong concern with the use of fast reactors under the
    Russian Surplus Fissile Materials Disposition program and has conveyed
    its expectation that NNSA pursue a disposition path for Russia's
    surplus weapons-grade plutonium which ensures that any reactors used
    under the program do not produce plutonium and include necessary
    monitoring and inspection controls. What is the status of NNSA's
    efforts in this regard?
        Mr. D'Agostino. As part of the agreement in principle on the text
    of a Protocol to amend the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition
    Agreement (PMDA), Russia will dispose of all of its surplus weapon-
    grade plutonium in fast reactors with certain nonproliferation
    conditions. These conditions include: the removal of the plutonium
    breeding blanket in the BN-600 fast reactor; the operation of the BN-
    800 fast reactor with a breeding ratio of less than one and;
    restrictions on reprocessing disposed plutonium and prohibition on
    creation of new stockpiles of separated weapons-grade plutonium from
    any other materials that will be irradiated in the reactors that will
    be used for disposition. With regard to monitoring and inspections
    (M&I), the United States and Russia have agreed in principle on the key
    elements of a PMDA M&I regime. Among other things, the M&I regime will
    confirm that each country is disposing of 34 metric tons (MT) of
    weapon-grade plutonium and that none of the 34 MT is being reprocessed
    during the disposition period or thereafter unless under agreed
    international monitoring. Once the M&I key elements have been approved
    by the governments, U.S. and Russian experts will begin consultations
    with the International Atomic Energy Agency about its willingness to
    participate in such a regime.
        Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. In recent years, the committee has
    conducted vigorous oversight of the Global Initiatives for
    Proliferation Prevention (GIPP) program. The GIPP program's engagement
    activities with former WMD scientists clearly serve important U.S.
    nonproliferation interests by helping to impede the transfer of WMD
    expertise and know-how to states of concern or terrorist entities. But
    the program has also been criticized in past years for contributing to
    national security risks involving Iran. In response, NNSA reports that
    it has taken various actions to strengthen the management,
    implementation and oversight of the program. Please elaborate on these
    recent actions.
        Mr. D'Agostino. As set forth in former Secretary Samuel Bodman's
    letter of October 2, 2008, DOE/NNSA conducted a thorough review of all
    project payments since GIPP's inception in 1994 and determined that the
    program has operated in conformance with U.S. law and policy and that
    there is no basis for the assertion that it has contributed to national
    security risks involving Iran. Furthermore, new management controls and
    new and strengthened interagency review procedures are now in place.
        In direct response to concerns raised by Congress, the U.S.
    interagency established a committee to review nuclear and missile
    technology-related scientist engagement proposals and projects under
    the guidance of the National Security Council. Chaired by the
    Department of State, the committee includes representatives of the
    Departments of Energy and Defense as well as the intelligence
    community. The committee establishes a unified policy for U.S.
    scientist engagement activities and is intended to prevent any work
    from being funded that is inconsistent with U.S. policy.
        With headquarters and national laboratory oversight, GIPP assesses
    each project for proliferation potential and monitors projects
    throughout their lifecycle in order to maintain project and program
    integrity. Moreover, the program has hired an additional national
    laboratory specialist specifically to enhance the review process for
    participating scientists and to improve documentation of the reviews.
        As the GIPP Report to Congress required by Section 3116 of the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 details, GIPP
    has refined its overall programmatic approach to: (1) focus on
    scientists at facilities rated as high priority, based on an
    interagency assessment of proliferation risk; (2) develop multiple
    avenues for scientist engagement, such as industry partnerships that
    foster sustainability and leverage private sector resources as well as
    cooperative research and development programs and training efforts, and
    (3) pursue cost-sharing activities for new projects in Russia. GIPP is
    also pursuing potential cost-sharing opportunities with Ukraine,
    Georgia and Kyrgyzstan for projects on nonproliferation nuclear
    forensics.
        Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. This committee has expressed its
    concerns regarding the proliferation risks associated with the NNSA's
    Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, or GNEP. What is the current status
    of this program?
        Mr. D'Agostino. DOE is no longer pursuing a domestic GNEP program
    that includes consideration of near-term demonstrations and GNEP
    facility construction. We have restructured GNEP-related research and
    development (R&D) work into a long-term, science-based R&D program
    within the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative. And, for FY 2010 we are
    proposing to incorporate this R&D under the Fuel Cycle R&D program.
        The United States continues to support the objectives of the
    international component of GNEP, which is comprised of 25 member
    countries and is dedicated to the use of civil nuclear energy in ways
    that advance safety, security and nonproliferation. The Department
    continues to participate in the GNEP international meetings while the
    subject of how best to achieve GNEP-international objectives undergoes
    interagency review. We believe that proliferation issues should be a
    priority in any discussions about the expanded use of civil nuclear
    energy and, in particular, in discussions that relate to development,
    deployment and operation of advanced fuel cycle technologies. Thus, the
    Department remains engaged in international meetings and activities
    that focus on developing strategies to ensure reliable nuclear fuel
    services and to provide management options for spent fuel in a manner
    that minimizes proliferation concerns.
        Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. How much more does NNSA need to do
    to secure and reduce all known and unsecured weapons-grade nuclear and
    radiological material around the world, and what is the cost of the
    remaining effort in this area? Please also submit something for the
    record on this in classified form if necessary.
        Mr. D'Agostino. Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) has made
    great strides in its threat reduction activities and continues to focus
    attention on locking down or removing vulnerable nuclear and
    radiological materials as quickly as possible. To this end, GTRI is
    working to:

          convert or shut down 200 research reactors by 2020 (32%
    completed to date--57 converted and 7 shut down)

          remove 4610 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) by
    2016 (50% completed to date--2,300 kilograms of HEU removed to date);
    and

          complete security upgrades for 3,950 buildings with
    vulnerable nuclear and radiological material by 2019 (14% completed to
    date--573 high-priority nuclear and radiological buildings)

        An additional $126.5 million above the current Future-Years Nuclear
    Security Program (FYNSP) would allow acceleration of removal efforts
    and support the President's goal to secure all vulnerable nuclear
    materials around the world within four years.
        The MPC&A Program has completed upgrades at all 73 Russian nuclear
    warhead sites, and has completed upgrades at 87% of buildings
    containing nuclear material in Russia and in several former Soviet
    states. We expect to complete upgrades to the remaining buildings by
    the end of 2012. The costs for the planned work are reflected in our
    out-year budget profile. Additional upgrade needs may arise should gaps
    in the protection strategies be identified or if new areas of
    cooperation are proposed by the Russian side. Cost estimates would be
    formulated subsequent to these circumstances.
        The MPC&A Program has limited cooperation with countries outside of
    the former Soviet Union. Since 2004, we have had a series of exchanges
    with China on best practices for securing nuclear material. The MPC&A
    Program is pursuing cooperation with India, but efforts to engage the
    Government of India on this subject have generated little interest to
    date. Given the uncertainty over whether cooperation will occur and its
    scope, it is very difficult to estimate the costs at this time.
        Canada is contributing to this effort by providing resources for
    secure transportation of nuclear materials in Russia. Germany and Great
    Britain are also working with Russia on physical protection of nuclear
    material at select sites. Finally, Russia is contributing directly to
    this effort by sharing the cost of securing their nuclear sites and
    committing to sustain those upgrades for the long term.
        Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. What is NNSA doing to expand and
    strengthen the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and the
    International Nuclear Materials Protection & Cooperation (MPC&A)
    programs?
        Mr. D'Agostino. NNSA is accelerating work where possible and
    reaching out to new and existing international partners.
        GTRI is accelerating the removal and disposition of spent HEU fuel
    in cases where there is no other reasonable disposition pathway.
    Approval of a Revised Record of Decision will allow GTRI to return up
    to 1,000 kilograms of HEU spent fuel not currently covered by other
    GTRI removal programs.
        In addition, GTRI has enhanced its ability to accelerate nuclear
    material removal by expanding its methods of transporting Russian-
    origin HEU spent nuclear fuel by air. Removal can now be accomplished
    by using a combination of air, land, and sea transport.
        The MPC&A Program has completed upgrades at approximately 80% of
    sites in Russia containing vulnerable weapons-grade nuclear material
    and at 12 sites in seven other former Soviet states. Additional
    upgrades are underway or planned at a number of sites that improve
    security further and address the evolving threat environment.
    Additionally, the program continues to focus on ensuring that these
    security upgrades will be sustained in the long-term through increased
    cooperation on nuclear security training, encouraging effective nuclear
    security culture, continuing education and regulatory development.
        To address concerns about the security of weapons-grade nuclear
    material in other parts of the world, the MPC&A Program has expanded
    its engagement to include other declared and undeclared nuclear weapons
    states on nuclear security best practices. Since 2004, the MPC&A
    Program has cooperated with China to discuss nuclear security best
    practices at civilian nuclear facilities to provide a first line of
    defense against nuclear material theft and diversion. The MPC&A Program
    is also pursuing MPC&A cooperation with India, but attempts to engage
    on this subject have thus far generated little interest from the
    Government of India.
        Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. The Nonproliferation and
    International Security (NIS) program offers opportunities for robust
    activity on major current WMD proliferation concerns, including:
    activities to address proliferation concerns in Iran; engagement on
    nonproliferation with Russia, China, India and other states; inter-
    agency participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI);
    assistance to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
    cooperation on international safeguards and export controls in South
    Asia and the Middle East; efforts to strengthen U.S. commitments to
    international agreements and regimes; and the establishment of a
    contingency fund for opportunities to prevent WMD proliferation and
    terrorism that may arise. What is NNSA doing to expand and strengthen
    this critical program?
        Mr. D'Agostino. The President's Prague speech outlined three key
    arms control and nonproliferation objectives: (1) a world free of
    nuclear weapons; (2) strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty;
    and (3) ensuring that terrorists are denied the materials, technology,
    and expertise required to build a nuclear device. The NIS program is
    making critical contributions to each of these areas:
        NIS is directly involved in the negotiation of the START follow-on
    treaty as it will be in talks on a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff
    Treaty. We also are supporting Administration efforts to achieve U.S.
    ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by
    ensuring a safe, secure and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile in the
    absence of testing and supporting the elements necessary to monitor
    compliance with the treaty.

          NIS is working to develop mechanisms to provide reliable
    access to nuclear fuel as a way to allow countries to benefit from the
    peaceful uses of nuclear energy without increasing the risks of nuclear
    proliferation associated with the spread of enrichment and reprocessing
    technologies.

          NIS is responsible for implementing a variety of programs
    that work in concert to reduce the threat of terrorists obtaining the
    materials, technologies or know-how necessary to develop nuclear
    weapons:

              NIS provides technical assessments of Iran's nuclear
            capabilities, supports interdiction efforts by reviewing
            foreign procurements and maintaining ``watch lists'' of
            sensitive items, supports public diplomacy efforts through
            targeted briefings, and develops tools and methods to
            strengthen international safeguards.

              NIS launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative
            (NGSI) in 2008 to develop the policies, concepts, technologies,
            expertise, and international infrastructure necessary to
            sustain the international safeguards system as it evolves to
            meet new challenges over the next 25 years.

              NIS is working within the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
            to strengthen its guidelines for transfers of enrichment and
            reprocessing (ENR) technologies based on a strong, criteria-
            based approach that would only allow transfers to states with
            impeccable nonproliferation credentials.

              NIS contributes technical expertise and reach back
            capabilities both to Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
            exercises and to possible interdiction cases.

              NIS supports the IAEA Office of Nuclear Security by
            providing physical protection training and guidance development
            for the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities
            worldwide. NIS is leading the USG efforts supporting revision
            of IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev.4.

              The NIS International Nonproliferation Export Control
            Program recently initiated new engagements with 10 countries
            and 4 international organizations to promote improved export
            control implementation, including the first-ever region-wide
            effort to support implementation of UN Security Council
            Resolution 1540 priorities on a regional basis.

              The International Nuclear Safeguards Engagement Program
            (INSEP) partners with approximately 20 countries globally, as
            well as with regional organizations such as the Brazilian-
            Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material
            (ABACC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) on
            (1) civilian nuclear infrastructure arrangements that emphasize
            safeguards and other nuclear security and nonproliferation
            obligations of a nuclear aspirant and (2) cooperative
            activities intended to strengthen the international safeguards
            system. In 2010, the program plans to initiate safeguards
            cooperation discussions with the Russian Federation,
            Kazakhstan, and South Africa, among others.

        Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. What is the status of NNSA's
    contributions to dismantlement efforts in North Korea given the pause
    in Six-Party Talks? What specifically is NNSA doing to prepare for
    dismantlement and verification activities?
        Mr. D'Agostino. Despite the current pause in the Six-Party Talks,
    DOE/NNSA continues to contribute to the USG process to evaluate future
    dismantlement and verification activities in North Korea. DOE/NNSA
    provides technically informed policy advice to USG decision makers in
    terms of the feasibility and appropriateness of various
    denuclearization options under consideration.
        DOE/NNSA also is continuing to develop tools and technologies and
    plans and assessments for the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean
    Peninsula not only for the verification of past DPRK nuclear activities
    but also for any future dismantlement of nuclear facilities.
        In order to be able to respond quickly to future denuclearization
    opportunities in North Korea, DOE/NNSA is continuing to work during
    this pause in the Six-Party process to further develop and refine our
    response capabilities to undertake this important national security
    objective.
        Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. The Nonproliferation and
    Verification Research and Development (R&D) program is the sole
    remaining U.S. government capability for long-term nuclear
    nonproliferation research and development and other critical work that
    helps keep the U.S. on the cutting edge of technology. The program has
    also been thinly staffed in recent years and supports many U.S.
    government entities outside of NNSA. What is NNSA doing to expand and
    strengthen this program, with a particular focus on increasing the
    qualified scientific workforce in this area and developing the capacity
    to direct nuclear material origin and uranium enrichment and plutonium
    reprocessing?
        Mr. D'Agostino. In the last year, we strengthened this program by
    making the following staffing additions: we created new programs for
    addressing emerging requirements for global nuclear safeguards and
    radiological source replacement, and designated a full-time federal
    program manager for these tasks; we created a new forensics program and
    hired a full-time federal program manager and a full-time federal
    supervisor for integrating proliferation detection programs; we took
    advantage of using fellows from the Nonproliferation Graduate Program;
    and we created a Chief Scientist position for better integration of
    efforts across the program. Our cutting-edge, fundamental research at
    the national laboratories attracts both experienced and new
    researchers, thus enhancing the qualified scientific workforce in this
    area.
        Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. The risk of terrorism involving WMD
    is certainly not limited to the United States, and the success of U.S.
    efforts is dependent in large part on whether our international
    partners share a common recognition of the threat and willingness to
    combat it. How is NNSA working with international partners to address
    these risks? How are our international partners contributing to our
    shared nonproliferation goals?
        Mr. D'Agostino. NNSA works to build self-sustaining indigenous
    capabilities. For example, the International Nonproliferation Export
    Control Program (INECP) works with over 50 countries to combat illicit
    trafficking through strengthened export controls and has successfully
    transferred indigenous Commodity Identification Training capabilities
    and responsibility to approximately 20 countries, which are now
    conducting a state of the art training program on a self-sustaining
    basis.
        Additionally, we continue to support multilateral efforts, e.g.,
    working with international partners to build capacities to support
    their obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540
    and other international agreements and arrangements; exchanging nuclear
    security best practices with Russia, the United Kingdom and China; and
    working with the IAEA to develop robust standards for ``appropriate and
    effective'' material control and physical protection of nuclear
    materials. NNSA's Office of Material Protection and Cooperation
    contributed $1.2M as a voluntary contribution in fiscal year 2009 to
    the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Nuclear Security Fund
    (NSF). The funding supports the continued development and
    implementation of the IAEA's efforts to mitigate insider related
    threats and address sustainability of nuclear materials security
    programs.
        The purpose of NNSA's cooperative engagement with the IAEA's NSF is
    to give impetus to the role that material control and accounting plays
    in protecting nuclear material from insider diversion. The funding will
    support activities such as establishment of a joint working group on
    material control and accounting (MC&A), establishment of an informal
    exchange on sustainability best practices, an `Insider Mitigation'
    course, and other technical projects.
        Another venue for exchanging best practices will be through the
    World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS). The goal of this effort,
    initiated by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), in partnership with
    the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), is to improve
    the security of nuclear materials through the establishment of a new
    organization for the exchange of information on and promulgation of
    ``best practices'' for the security of nuclear materials in nuclear
    facilities and for nuclear materials during transportation.
        The MPC&A Program is also promoting nuclear security through the
    Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. By committing to the
    Global Initiative, the United States and sixty-six other countries are
    urged to ``develop, if necessary, and improve accounting, control and
    physical protection systems for nuclear and other radioactive materials
    and substances.''
        The success of the Second Line of Defense (SLD) Program depends
    upon a common recognition of the threat of nuclear terrorism and a
    mutual commitment to long term successful operation of the systems
    provided. Under the SLD Core program, DOE/NNSA provides radiation
    detection equipment and training at border crossings, airports and
    feeder seaports in countries of the FSU, East Europe and Central Asia.
    Many countries with which the Core Program works do not have sufficient
    funds to purchase or install equipment. However, in Russia, the Federal
    Customs Service is funding the installation of radiation systems at
    approximately half of all crossing points, and SLD is funding
    installation at the other half. In Slovakia, SLD has provided
    equipment, and the Slovakians have paid for most installation costs.
    All countries bear the cost of manning and operating the equipment SLD
    has installed.
        Under the SLD Megaports Initiative, DOE/NNSA provides radiation
    detection equipment and training at major seaports throughout the world
    and employs cost sharing in the implementation process wherever
    feasible and appropriate. An important result from cost-sharing is
    often increased buy-in from the host government and terminal operator,
    which offsets potential cost sharing risks related to schedule and
    quality. Although no set formula for cost sharing is available, the
    terminal operator or port authority often pays for design,
    construction, engineering, installation, or a combination of those
    costs. Cost sharing arrangements are site specific and negotiated
    differently for each port.
        The best example of Megaports cost sharing to date is demonstrated
    by Dutch Customs in the Netherlands. In 2004, the Megaports Initiative
    installed four RPMs at the European Container Terminal (ECT) Delta
    Terminal at the Port of Rotterdam as part of a pilot demonstration for
    Dutch Customs to demonstrate the feasibility of monitoring container
    cargo. In 2007, Dutch Customs replaced the U.S. RPMs and installed 40
    sets of RPMs to monitor all import and export containers at the Port of
    Rotterdam. This $40M Dutch investment demonstrates the proof of concept
    for successful cost-sharing and is the model for which the program is
    striving. This cost sharing model has also proven successful in
    Belgium, Colombia, Panama, Mexico and Israel, and is now underway at
    two ports in Spain.
        In addition, several international partners have made monetary
    contributions to DOE/NNSA to support ongoing SLD projects in several
    countries. Through FY 09, DOE/NNSA has received over $10M (US) from
    international partners to support projects to deploy radiation
    detection systems in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Canada, the United
    Kingdom, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea have all contributed to
    SLD activities.
        NNSA programs continue to enjoy financial support of international
    partners (see chart of international donations below). International
    partners have contributed $59 million to date. NNSA increasingly relies
    on cost-sharing. For example, the Second of Line of Defense Program has
    cost-shared with Panama, Colombia, Mexico, Belgium, Spain and Israel to
    install radiation detection equipment. Cost-sharing can increase a
    partner country's buy-in and strengthen their commitment as well as the
    longer term sustainability of nonproliferation efforts.
        The Chart below lists all international contributions to these
    programs.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. With Russia's economic growth, has
    it taken on more responsibility in funding nonproliferation programs
    within its borders? How is NNSA working with our Russian partners to
    move them toward ``cost sharing'' models?
        Mr. D'Agostino. At every opportunity we encourage cost sharing of
    new projects with our Russian counterparts, and have a long list of
    successful examples. Furthermore, we recently developed a Joint
    Transition Plan with Rosatom that identifies specific timelines for
    each site to take over financial responsibility for sustainability-
    related activities such as human resources development, regulations
    development, performance testing and training.
        The Ministry of Defense (MOD) informed us that it will take over
    full financial responsibility for sustaining permanent warhead sites
    (11 sites with DOE-funded upgrades, 18 sites with DOD-funded upgrades),
    and that the Kremlin has promised necessary funds will be made
    available.
        Despite these positive developments, we can't be certain that
    Russia's nuclear security budget is increasing as a result of declining
    U.S. support because this budget is classified. Facilities may be asked
    to allocate additional funds to compensate for reduced U.S. support.
        Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. What is NNSA doing to address issues
    of limited staff capacity, capabilities and resources, which have
    created challenges for implementation of critical nonproliferation
    programs in past years?
        Mr. D'Agostino. The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
    (DNN) has generally been able to maintain staffing at roughly 90
    percent of its authorized manpower ceiling. DNN has also economized a
    bit on travel expenditures toward the end of the fiscal year. However,
    NNSA has also given priority to personnel hiring in the
    nonproliferation area, and has also provided additional funding for
    international travel when required. The Nonproliferation Graduate
    Program internships have provided an important pipeline of new Federal
    employees that are well-versed in international relations and national
    security studies, foreign languages and cross-cultural communications,
    international negotiations, program management and interagency
    coordination.
        Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. Some NNSA nonproliferation programs
    have carried relatively large uncosted and/or unobligated balances in
    past years. Do you expect any NNSA nonproliferation programs to have
    significant uncosted unobligated balances in FY 2009? If so, please
    describe the factors contributing to such balances. Please also
    describe any progress by NNSA to limit uncosted unobligated balances
    for nonproliferation programs and the rationale, if any, for
    maintaining a certain level of such balances for these programs.
        Mr. D'Agostino. Due to the fact that DNN works in 120 countries
    around the world, there are some unique budgeting requirements. DNN
    signs international contracts that typically take 18 to 24 months to
    complete. In order to ensure proper oversight, DNN does not settle
    invoices on international work until it has verified that the work has
    been satisfactorily completed. Even with this rigorous evaluation of
    completed work scope, at the end of FY 2008, the uncommitted balance
    for DNN Programs was 13%, which is consistent with the Department's
    threshold for uncosted balances. This positive trend is expected to
    continue for FY 2009.
        Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. In a January 2007 report to this
    committee, GAO found that among other security challenges at LANL, the
    Los Alamos Site Office lacked the security staff required to conduct
    oversight of the LANL contractor, and that in many cases site officials
    lacked proper training. From your perspective as Chief Health, Safety
    and Security Officer for all of DOE, does the Los Alamos Site Office
    have an adequate number of properly trained security officers?
        Mr. Podonsky. The Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS)
    conducts periodic inspections to determine the status of safeguards and
    security programs at DOE and National Nuclear Security Administration
    (NNSA) sites. During the conduct of these inspections, the HSS Office
    of Independent Oversight does not generally focus on the specific
    number of authorized staff but rather on the performance resulting from
    the utilization of available staff at the sites. This is especially
    true in regard to the assessment of Federal oversight of contractor
    performance in specific sub-topical areas.
        HSS Office of Independent Oversight reports in 2003 and 2007 did,
    however, point out shortfalls in the Los Alamos Site Office's (LASO)
    ability to effectively carry out its line management oversight
    responsibilities due to unfilled LASO vacancies. For example, staffing
    constraints played a large part in LASO's inability to conduct a
    required annual safeguards and security site survey, which is a key
    line management oversight mechanism for monitoring and driving
    improvements in contractor performance. These inspection results,
    coupled with the information provided to your committee by the 2007 GAO
    report, suggest the LASO security function has been chronically
    understaffed.
        A special follow-up review conducted by the HSS Office of
    Independent Oversight in February 2008 found that LASO had taken action
    to improve its line management oversight function, which included
    hiring a senior federal employee to serve as the manager of the
    security oversight function, reporting directly to the LASO Manager.
    LASO was also acting to expand its cyber security staff by hiring two
    Cyber Security Operations Mangers and by adding three cyber security
    support contractors.
        NNSA is conducting an exhaustive Federal Oversight Zero-Based
    Security Review to indentify where the consistency and quality of
    Federal oversight functions can be improved. The review was held at
    LANL and benchmarked LASO during its evaluation of Federal oversight. A
    team of subject matter experts from the NNSA Service Center, HSS, and
    several NNSA sites was formed to conduct the review. The team evaluated
    four topical areas: Oversight, Staffing, Communications, and Program
    Management. An evaluation of staffing resulted in an important
    recommendation that NNSA ``Determine and right size the Safeguards and
    Security staffing with appropriate number and capability/skill mix.''
    In addition, NNSA has recognized the need to augment site office staff
    with additional technical resources and has responded by forming a
    Field Augmentation Cadre (FAC). The FAC provides the site offices with
    access to security experts to assist in conducting surveys of
    contractor operations and other assessment and benchmarking services.
    HSS believes that NNSA is currently directing sufficient attention
    toward resolving this longstanding deficiency at LASO and across the
    NNSA Nuclear Security Enterprise.
        Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. The FY 2008 National Defense
    Authorization Act requires the GAO and then the NNSA to examine
    alternatives for managing protective forces at all Department sites
    with special nuclear material. Has the GAO contacted the Department
    about this review? Will the Department conduct a concurrent review, or
    wait for the GAO review, as the NDAA allows?
        Mr. Podonsky. Mr. Jonathan Gill, Assistant Director, GAO, conducted
    an entrance briefing concerning the FY 2008 National Defense
    Authorization Act (GAO Engagement 360953) on June 10, 2008. Mr. Gill
    and his team have been in frequent contact with the Department since
    then, and have conducted several field visits and conferences with the
    NNSA program offices and other key stakeholders. The Department is
    awaiting completion of the GAO review in accordance with the FY 2008
    NDAA and will not conduct a concurrent review.
        Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. The committee understands NNSA has
    established a new security policy--the Graded Security Protection
    policy--to replace the Design Basis Threat (DBT). What prompted this
    change in policy and how is it being implemented?
        Mr. Podonsky. The Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS), in
    coordination with the Department of Energy (DOE) Program Office and the
    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), established the Graded
    Security Protection (GSP) policy to replace the Design Basis Threat
    (DBT) policy. Two critical factors influenced the revision: the
    intelligence community's reassessment of the threat, and the need to
    analyze and base protection postures on a broad array of possible
    adversary attack scenarios as opposed to a focus on a single worst-case
    scenario. The collaborative annual DBT policy review highlighted the
    need to update the policy in terms of the risk management
    considerations, which include factors such as the consequence posed by
    the loss, theft, and/or unauthorized use of an asset; intelligence
    pertaining to the current and future objectives and characteristics of
    adversaries; and the effectiveness of the Department's and,
    collectively, the Government's security and intelligence programs
    relative to thwarting, providing early warning, and/or mitigating an
    attack.
        DOE/NNSA sites are currently analyzing their robust protection
    postures against the GSP policy to evaluate the security measures
    instituted at each site and identify any additional enhancements or
    changes in protection postures necessary to appropriately implement the
    2008 GSP. These detailed analyses will provide the basis for developing
    site-specific implementations plans. These GSP implementation plans
    will require the review and approval of the respective Program Office
    to ensure that each plan reflects the Department's commitment to
    developing protection postures that minimize the ``footprint'' of
    nuclear material holdings, minimize recurring costs; maximize security
    technologies; and provide for a highly survivable and dynamic tactical
    response force.

        BACKGROUND

          The DBT adversary planning numbers were strongly
    influenced by a single data point and did not reflect improvements in
    the Intelligence Community's analysis, detection, and reporting.
    Intelligence products supporting the DBT were no longer current based
    on observed terrorist activity. Therefore, the GSP restructures the
    adversary numbers based on intelligence and maintains a ``graded''
    security program on the basis of material attractiveness/consequence
    considerations.

          Interpretation of the Adversary Capability's List (ACL)
    led sites to include ``all'' capabilities from the ACL into a single
    attack scenario. These scenarios exceeded any known or anticipated
    terrorist threat. The binning (``representative'' and ``sensitive'') of
    adversary capabilities to reflect reasonable aggregate threats proved a
    viable solution.

          The lack of a specific policy or guidance requiring
    performance against intelligence reporting did not ensure that sites
    consider intelligence reporting (i.e., adversary Tactics, Techniques
    and Procedures [TTPs]). The GSP counters this by incorporating TTPs as
    intelligence-related ``tasks,'' with each site continuing to develop
    its own site-specific scenarios which demonstrate performance against
    adversary TTPs.

          The DBT allowed for compilation of capabilities and
    focused on a single ``worst-case'' scenario, which resulted in
    significantly over-designed protection postures. This was demonstrated
    by force-on-force exercises that indicated a potential significant
    weakness in the protective force response (i.e. ``looking/leaning in
    one direction''). To redress this weakness, the GSP requires sites to
    develop and analyze against a range of scenarios, evaluate the various
    elements of the protection posture (with appropriate credit for
    security technology), facilitate a dynamic tactical response force, and
    vary scenarios in terms of adversary TTPs, knowledge, role of the
    insider, pathway and threat objectives.

          The DBT did not incorporate the results of recent nuclear
    material technical studies and therefore required a denial strategy for
    all Category I special nuclear material quantities. With the
    integration of specific technical studies, a ``graded'' protection
    strategies approach is utilized.

          Inconsistent interpretation and application of the DBT
    led to sites with like assets protecting to different standards. The
    GSP includes the Scenario Development Review Team (SDRT) process, which
    provides consistent application of the GSP, ACL, and Threat Guidance;
    site-specific scoping agreements based on defensible standards;
    utilization of credible representative scenarios to evaluate system
    effectiveness; and increased confidence in vulnerability assessment
    (VA) results. The cognizant program office provides oversight of the
    SDRT reviews, which are conducted by diverse teams comprised of
    complex-wide VA analysts, subject matter experts, HSS and site office
    security representatives. VA analyst(s) from other sites being reviewed
    also observe and participate in the SDRT.

          The title DBT conveys threat assessment, rather than a
    security planning policy document. Therefore, the document was re-
    titled, ``Graded Security Protection'' policy to better delineate the
    scope and purpose of the policy.

        Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. The FY 2008 National Defense
    Authorization Act directed NNSA--in consultation with your office--to
    conduct an assessment of the physical and cyber security risks posed to
    the nuclear weapons complex and the security technologies employed
    against those threats, and prepare a report identifying the manner in
    which it prioritizes investments in physical and cyber security of the
    weapons complex. The report would be included in the annual Future
    Years Nuclear Security Plan (FYNSP). Is the NNSA working with your
    office in conducting this assessment and report?
        Mr. Podonsky. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
    has indeed been working with the Office of Health, Safety and Security
    (HSS) on initiatives that respond to the Fiscal Year 2008 National
    Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) direction. In the case of physical
    security, the HSS Office of Security Technology and Assistance has
    reviewed and provided comments on an NNSA Physical Security Technology
    Management Plan. This plan addresses the items in the NDAA direction.
    NNSA has also sent a representative, tasked with writing the report, to
    interview the Office of Security Technology and Assistance staff and
    obtain additional input and clarification of the comments HSS provided.
    NNSA is preparing a similar plan that addresses issues related to cyber
    security, and we expect that similar coordination will take place not
    only with HSS, but also with the Office of the Chief Information
    Officer.
        Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. The FY 2008 National Defense
    Authorization Act directed NNSA--in consultation with your office--to
    conduct an assessment of the physical and cyber security risks posed to
    the nuclear weapons complex and the security technologies employed
    against those threats, and prepare a report identifying the manner in
    which it prioritizes investments in physical and cyber security of the
    weapons complex. The report would be included in the annual Future
    Years Nuclear Security Plan (FYNSP).
        How does the Department prioritize investments among physical and
    cyber security?
        Mr. Podonsky. National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA)
    physical and cyber security are two separate subprograms within the
    Safeguards and Security Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA)
    Unit and managed separately by NNSA's Associate Administrator for
    Defense Nuclear Security and the NNSA's Chief Information Officer.
    Prioritization of investments for program and budget formulation is
    accomplished first by the individual program managers with respect to
    DOE, including NNSA, program guidance and multi-year program plans.
    Integrated corporate priorities are established in the annual
    programming phase of NNSA's Planning, Programming, Budgeting and
    Evaluation process in which all NNSA program priorities are evaluated
    and balanced within our five year funding targets. Using a risk
    management approach, NNSA makes its investment decisions on the basis
    of the potential adverse consequences associated with threats to the
    assets being protected. This ``graded'' approach works to ensure those
    assets with the highest adverse consequences, such as the loss of
    control of a nuclear weapon, receive the highest priority for resource
    allocation. While mitigation of adverse consequences has been the
    backbone of our prioritization approach, NNSA continues to balance the
    risks to information and cyber security against the heavy demands of
    physically protecting nuclear assets. This balanced approach provides
    the necessary funding, even at the expense of other missions, to ensure
    NNSA security programs provide an acceptable level of security in
    accordance with risk management principles.
        Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. Your office is the central DOE
    organization responsible for health, safety and security policy
    development, assistance, oversight and enforcement. What is the extent
    of your office's authority in establishing DOE security policies?
        Mr. Podonsky. The basis for the Department of Energy's (DOE)
    authority to establish security policies arises from the Atomic Energy
    Act (AEA) of 1954, which established the Atomic Energy Commission,
    DOE's predecessor agency. Section 161.b of the AEA states:

            ``establish by rule, regulation, or order, such standards and
            instructions to govern the possession and use of special
            nuclear material, source material, and byproduct material as
            the omission may deem necessary or desirable to promote the
            common defense and security or to protect health or to minimize
            danger to life or property; in addition, the Commission shall
            prescribe such regulations or orders as may be necessary or
            desirable to promote the Nation's common defense and security .
            . .''

        Today, the Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) has the
    responsibility to develop health, safety, and security policies for DOE
    and the National Nuclear Security Administration. Safeguards and
    security policies promulgated by HSS include regulations and directives
    in the topical areas of: Program Planning and Management, Physical
    Protection, Protective Forces, Information Security, Personnel
    Security, and Material Control and Accountability. It should be noted
    that the responsibility for cyber security policy resides in the Office
    of the Chief Information Officer. The development of all safeguards and
    security policy is achieved through collaboration and coordination with
    Program Offices, the National Laboratories, and field sites. The DOE's
    directive development and review process, as prescribed in DOE Order
    251.1C, Departmental Directives Program, ensures that proposed
    directives are reviewed and receive concurrence by the Headquarters
    Program Offices having responsibility for the Laboratories and field
    sites. A similar process is followed for regulations prior to the
    public comment period.
        Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. Your office is the central DOE
    organization responsible for health, safety and security policy
    development, assistance, oversight and enforcement. Does your office
    have the necessary authorities to execute its oversight mission?
        Mr. Podonsky. The DOE Office of Independent Oversight, within the
    Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS), derives its oversight
    authorities from DOE Order 470.2B, entitled Independent Oversight and
    Performance Assurance. This DOE Order, which applies to all DOE
    elements, including the National Nuclear Security Administration
    (NNSA), identifies the Office of Independent Oversight as the focal
    point for independent evaluation of DOE sites, facilities,
    organizations, and operations in the areas of safeguards and security;
    cyber security; emergency management; and environment, safety, and
    health. The DOE Order also delineates the requirements for inspected
    entities to provide comprehensive corrective action plans for all
    findings issued by the Office of Independent Oversight.
        The authorities granted to the HSS Office of Independent Oversight
    through this DOE Order are not founded in legislation and are advisory
    in nature. Independent Oversight's role is to provide information to
    DOE senior managers and contractor line managers. Decisions about
    accepting findings, correcting deficiencies, and managing risk are
    ultimately up to the responsible DOE line managers. As such, the
    Independent Oversight program complements the HSS Office of
    Enforcement, which derives its authorities for enforcement activities
    associated with worker safety and health, nuclear safety, and
    classified information security through 10 CFR Parts 851, 820, and 824,
    respectively. Historically, Independent Oversight has received a high
    level of support from DOE senior management; its findings have been
    widely accepted by DOE line management, and its oversight programs have
    contributed significantly to improvements in DOE security, cyber
    security, emergency management, and environment, safety, and health
    programs for more than 25 years.