EFFECTIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY:
THE FUTURE OF THE U.S.-PAKISTAN MILITARY PARTNERSHIP

HEARING
BEFORE THE
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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FIRST SESSION

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING:

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING:

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
EFFECTIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY: THE FUTURE OF THE U.S.-PAKISTAN MILITARY PARTNERSHIP

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Thursday, April 23, 2009.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:28 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Good afternoon. Today, we have with us an outstanding panel of experts to discuss the future of the United States-Pakistan military partnership.

I am pleased to welcome our friend, General David Barno, Director of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, a National Defense University; Dr. David Kilcullen, former advisor to General Petraeus, and author of the recent book, "The Accidental Guerrilla"; Mr. Shuja Nawaz, Director of the South Asia Center at The Atlantic Council. And we certainly welcome you.

I might mention at this outset—I said that the next hearing we would begin, and have our questioners come from the bottom row, backwards, using the same general format. However, I will take advantage of asking a question or two, as Mr. McHugh will, and then we go to the bottom row, and come back.

Our hearing could not be more timely. This Congress, this Administration, are committed to developing a mutually beneficial long-term and consistent relationship with the country of Pakistan. Pakistan may well pose the most complex security challenge facing us. The terrorist havens continue to thrive in Pakistan's border area, providing refuge to Al Qaeda, and negatively impacting stability in Afghanistan. Terrorist and insurgent forces on Pakistan's territory also contribute to Pakistan's own internal instability, which is further compounded by the country's economic crisis, and civilian government, with limited powers.

At the same time, Pakistan continues to possess enough fissile material for about 55 to 90 nuclear weapons, and tensions with its nuclear-armed neighbor, India, have increased.

So how do we strengthen the U.S.-Pakistan military partnership to better address these challenges? In my opinion, the Administration's recent Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy is a step in the right direction. However, the strategy alone does not guarantee success. Implementation of the strategy, benchmarks to measure progress,
and accountability are all critical, as well as close cooperation with our Pakistani partners in all of these areas.

Accountability is particularly important, given the significant resources the Administration is requesting from Congress and the American people for efforts in Pakistan. Following 9–11, Pakistan has received almost $12 billion from our country, including about $6.4 billion in the Department of Defense Coalition Support Fund reimbursements and $2.3 billion in security-related assistance.

The recent supplemental budget request for the fiscal year 2009 also includes $400 million for a new Pakistani counterinsurgency capabilities fund.

Does the current U.S. approach regarding reimbursements and security assistance for Pakistan make sense? Or does need to change in a way to better achieve its objectives and ensure a measurable return on investment? And do we have the right balance between security assistance and assistance for economic development?

You should know there is legislation pending in Congress that seeks to increase U.S.-Pakistani cooperation on security matters by specifically conditioning U.S. assistance for Pakistan on such cooperation.

I look forward to your thoughts, your recommendations.

Now, I turn to my good friend, the ranking member, John McHugh, for comments he may wish to make.

And then we will hear our panel, and then go to questions. And as I said before, we will begin our questions after Mr. McHugh and I ask our questions, with the bottom row, using the same procedure as we have from the top row, in recent days.

Mr. McHugh.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. McHugh. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me join you in welcoming—a belated welcome, I might add, to our distinguished panelists. And knowing some of you personally, and all of you professionally, and admired your work, we are deeply appreciative of your effort to be here, and your efforts to stay here. We all apologize for the timing involved. But I know you understand we really had no control over that.

As the chairman correctly noted, Washington—in fact, much of the United States—has been, shall we say, abuzz over this Nation's Pakistan policies. Certainly, the President helped to increase the discussion on this very urgent issue when he introduced a strategy for both Afghanistan and Pakistan just a short time ago.

And a fundamental element of the plan is its call for expanding our partnership with the Pakistani military, through building counterinsurgency capabilities, and promoting closer cooperation across the Afghan-Pak border.

Right after the legislation was dropped, the House had a bill introduced before it, calling for an increase limitation and conditions on U.S. security assistance to Pakistan, to include Title 10 reimbursement, and building partnership and capacity programs.
And some have expressed—I think understandably so—concern that this proposal would unnecessarily constrain the Department of Defense amidst what is already a very fluid and dynamic situation, to say the least, in Pakistan.

That was capped off, during our recently concluded Easter recess, when the Administration submitted its fiscal year 2009 Wartime Emergency Supplemental Request, which includes funding to reimburse the Pakistan military for its counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts. As I understand, the measure also includes a new authority and funding stream that would build the capacity and capabilities of Pakistani security forces, called the “Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund,” or the PCCF.

Clearly, there has been a lot of activity. And we appreciate our panelists’ efforts here, today, to help us sort through all of it.

And let us just start for a moment, briefly, with the President’s new strategic direction for Pakistan. It would seem to me there is little debate that Pakistan rests in a critical region, and is a central front on the War on Terror. They are an essential partner.

But it is a complex nation, with its own set of challenges, including internal political uncertainty; an economic crisis; a rugged western border area that provides sanctuary to Al Qaeda, Taliban and other extremist groups, who are expanding very dramatically, in some instances, their reach eastward; and ongoing tension with India, which was reignited following the Mumbai attacks.

In this light, in my opinion, I believe the President’s strategic direction understandably focused on Pakistan. While I agree that Islamabad must be part of the solution in the region, I disagree with some who have implied that solving Pakistan necessarily solves Afghanistan.

We can help make a true partner—will require elements within Pakistan to make the strategic choices necessary to sever ties with extremist groups who threaten both their own internal security, as well as stability, in Afghanistan, and the region as a whole. And a key to accomplishing this aim will depend on our ability to understand and exploit Pakistan’s regional concerns, motivation and interest.

To that end, I believe Pakistan requires a strategy that employs goals and requirements which support a long-term respectful strategic partnership, instead of one that is merely transactional in nature. This is where Congress must play an important role.

As I stated earlier, I am concerned that efforts to limit and condition existing security assistance in building partnership-capacity efforts are counterproductive and, in fact, cut against our overall long-term strategic objectives in Pakistan. Moreover, such initiatives send mixed signals to Islamabad.

Let me be clear: These programs demand oversight and scrutiny. Still, I believe that intelligent application of funding conditions should complement, not restrain, our strategic interests.

And, finally—which leads me to the current security environment in Pakistan. I am of the opinion the traditional peacetime framework for security assistance—I am—sure, I am.

I am of the opinion the traditional peacetime framework for security assistance is inappropriate and no longer works. The scale, nature and frequency of violence in Pakistan, whether it be the Red
Mosque incident, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, or the conflict raging against Al Qaeda and the Taliban on its western border, makes that nation more appropriately comparable to a combat zone, like Iraq and Afghanistan, than like a Central European country seeking foreign military financing.

That is why, in response to a question from Chairman Skelton during a recent hearing, General Petraeus said, “The correct analogy for our train-and-equip forces in Pakistan should be what we are currently executing in Iraq.” The general further testified, “We need an organization similar to our security-transition command in Iraq.” And I would remind everyone that this is organization that successfully built the Iraqi security forces.

In short, the Administration is militarizing foreign assistance to Pakistan very rightfully, because the enemy has a vote. The conflict, as the Administration's strategy concludes, is in Pakistan, too; for our Pakistan partner requires—is military capability for counterinsurgency and more.

As such, I feel that advocates of using peacetime paradigms to deal with wartime problems simply fail to recognize the profound security challenges Pakistan face, and the scope and tools required to solve those problems.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing. With that, I would yield back to balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman very much.

A word of apology to our panel: We got here just as quickly as we could, after the series of votes. We thank you for your patience. We look forward to your testimony.

Without objection, any written testimony you may have is reserved for the record. We will remind the members here that they were strictly under the five-minute rule.

And, General, we will start with you.

And, again, we thank you all for being with us.

General.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. DAVID W. BARNO, USA (RET.), DIRECTOR, NEAR EAST SOUTH ASIA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

General BARNO. Thanks, Chairman Skelton, and Congressman McHugh, and members of the Committee on Armed Services. Thanks very much for the invitation to speak on the future of the U.S.-Pakistan military partnership.

As the chairman noted, I am still working for the Defense Department. But the views that I will offer today will be my own.

In addition to my 19 months serving as the overall commander of U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan from late 2003 to 2005, I stayed very engaged on these issues in my current job, taking approximately two dozen trips to Pakistan over the last five or six years. And I recently returned from a trip earlier this year, to Afghanistan, to the southern part of the country, and visited several provinces there.

On a more personal note, my youngest son just returned from a 12-month combat tour in Afghanistan, where he served as an air cavalry scout platoon leader in the 101st Airborne Division. So we are very proud of him. We are grateful to have him home safe. And
we pray every day for his fellow young Americans that are still in harm’s way.

So this is a personal issue for me, as it is for so many of the members, I know, and for those that have young ones serving in harm’s way there.

I would like to summarize some of my written comments today, as briefly as I can. First, I would note that I believe Pakistan, today, presents the United States with its greatest global strategic challenge.

As the second-largest Islamic country in the world, with a population exceeding 160 million people, and a nation armed with nuclear weapons. A meltdown of the government and society in Pakistan would rapidly become the preeminent national security threat facing the United States.

Events in Pakistan today are spiraling out of control. And our options in reversing this downward trend are limited, at best. I would say that a struggle for the very soul of Pakistan has begun. And the state of Pakistan has a very weak hand to play in this conflict.

A key role that the United States and our international friends and allies has to play is to help strengthen this hand.

Compounding the challenge in the Pakistani state is the internally conflicted nature of Pakistan, regarding this extremist threat. The Pakistani military and intelligence services are no longer the secular organizations that they were 10 or 15 or 20 years ago. In many ways, they have become much more anti-American in their internal dynamics, and they have growing sympathies, culturally, with the insurgents in this fight.

Moreover, I think that the security services remain convinced that their prime enemy continues to be India. No experienced senior Pakistani military or, I believe, political leader, truly believes in the depth of their heart, that the U.S. is a long-term partner in this region, much less a long-term partner to Pakistan.

The U.S.-India nuclear-power agreement cemented this mistrust in Pakistan. And reversing this widely held belief in the country will be difficult, if not impossible.

From this perspective, all decisions in Pakistan now tend to be based upon the idea of what the region will look like the day after the United States leaves—their so-called lack of confidence and trust in a future that includes the U.S.

I believe that the senior Pakistani military leadership remain convinced that soon after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the U.S. give up on Afghanistan, that their long-term struggle with India will resume once again, and that they have to maintain capabilities for that next phase of this war.

That is a very controversial outlook. But I think it underlies much of the Pakistani decision-making.

I believe there are few realistic positive outcomes that are imaginable for Pakistan over the next several years. But I can outline three possible scenarios. And, of course, there are others.

One scenario would be a state-failure scenario. This is the worst-case option, where a combination of accelerating economic decline and terrorist violence, fueled by ineffective governance, could destroy the economic and political viability of the country.
Some movement towards an internal revolution, led by the hard-
line Islamist factions could take place in this setting. And, of
course, this would be the most dangerous scenario for us, given the
nature of the military capabilities that Pakistan has today.

A second option might be a continued stalemate, where the mili-
tary and intelligence services restore some amount of control over
the insurgents, and gain more proficiency in counterinsurgency, but
there is continued weak political leadership, as governance capacity
grows; but the same approach to cutting peace deals with the in-
surgency continues. This is essentially a continuation of what we
see today.

And then a third—perhaps a more optimistic scenario—would be
a scenario of gradual improvement, where Pakistan achieves some
sort of political rapprochement with India; its economy reaches
some degree of precarious stability; and the civilian leadership that
is still new in power gains a foothold, and is supported and but-
tressed by U.S. and international aid.

This, of course, is an outcome that we all seek. And we are look-
ning for remedies to move towards.

Some possible prescriptions in moving in this direction: I would
argue, first of all, that Pakistan requires its own strategy with the
U.S., and it is not simply part of a single so-called Af-Pak strat-
egeny—that there are distinct differences culturally, politically, eco-
nomically, socially, between the nations of Pakistan and Afghan-
istan. And Pakistan deserves a full-forced, focused, strategic appro-
priate in U.S. thinking for that nation alone.

The U.S. must assist Pakistan in managing change—economically,
militarily, perhaps even societally, as it deals with these
huge problems that have been brought on by a deadly combination
of factors.

I think the U.S. has to assess what factors are required to cause
positive change in Pakistani decision-making, to abandon this so-
called double game—this hedging approach that is expecting a fu-
ture without the United States, and without the international com-

munity; this idea that the resumption of the cold war with India
will be the long-term paradigm for the region.

And I think a key part of that is that the U.S. has to build a
vision of a long-term strategic partnership between Pakistan and
the United States; one that is not simply based upon fighting ter-

rorists in the tribal areas, but is a parallel to the emerging stra-
tegic partnership that many in the region point to, between the
United States and India; that we have to grow this long-term, con-
fident, mutually respectful strategic partnership between the U.S.
and Pakistan in the same way we have begun to do that with their
next-door neighbor, India.

And regarding Pakistan’s relationship to the conflict in Afghan-
istan, reversing the decline of our fortunes there, and achieving suc-
cess, would leverage our ability to influence events in Pakistan.

I think the Pakistani approach to Afghanistan, which, in some
ways, is schizophrenic, would be changed if the U.S. demonstrated
success there, and that we move towards a resolution of that con-

flict on our own terms, to meet our policy objectives there. That
would give us immense leverage against our mutual adversary and,
I think, with the Pakistani government.
And, finally, continued and expanding resources for the civil government of Pakistan and their security sources, conditioned—although, perhaps, lightly conditioned to performance, but also respectful of Pakistani sovereignty, I think, is an essential step.

Pakistan, as a state, is on a trajectory heading towards failure. And the U.S. must prevent this outcome, perhaps, at almost all costs. That said, American aid that is not connected to performance by the Pakistani government and military has proved relatively fruitless.

Reasonable benchmarks of Pakistani progress in using American aid is a reasonable price for the willingness of American taxpayers to underwrite the future of Pakistan as a state, and as a partner. Pakistan is not fighting for the West. It is a nation fighting for its own survival. And we cannot allow it to fail at this task. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Barno can be found in the Appendix on page 39.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much.

Dr. Kilcullen.

STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID KILCULLEN, PARTNER, CRUMPTON GROUP, LLC, SENIOR FELLOW, EASTWEST INSTITUTE, MEMBER OF THE ADVISORY BOARD, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY

Dr. KILCULLEN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for having me.

I have submitted written testimony on the details of the bill that you are currently considering, which includes benchmarks. I won't go through that testimony again, unless you want to ask me about it.

What I thought I would do is briefly outline why I think the—we are facing the problems we currently are facing in Pakistan, which is—if you would like a diagnosis of the problem—which is going to allow us to, then, move forward toward a solution.

After 9/11, the United States pushed Pakistan to do more in the Fatah, and on the frontier against Taliban and Al Qaeda. And this was largely an enemy-centric approach, which saw the Pakistani army moving into areas where it had never operated on a war-footing before, and conducting armed activity against tribes and the civilian population, in order to find and deal with a small enemy element. It was an approach that was focused on chasing and killing bad guys.

Since that time, 90 percent of U.S. assistance to Pakistan has been military, and even within the realm of military assistance, about 99.4 percent of our assistance has gone to the Pakistani military, rather than the Pakistan police.

So, for example, in 2007, we spent about $730 million on the Pakistani army, and $4.9 million on the Pakistani police. I will come back to that as an issue, in a moment.

The Pakistani military have taken a highly kinetic and coercive approach in what they have done in the Fatah, and on the frontier. That kinetic approach has alienated local populations, tribal groupings and communities, and has empowered local extremists, and also foreign extremists.
Those extremists, in turn, have leveraged popular anger and alienation to create a large and diverse movement that you could describe as a coalition of the angry in the western part of Pakistan. That movement has now contributed to a pulling-back of Pakistani civilian authorities away from large parts of Pakistan's population and territory. And we have seen the spread of violence and instability through most of Pakistan, including its largest cities.

And in my written testimony, I have given 24 examples, over the last 5 years, of egregious breakdowns in security, and of complicity by certain elements of the security forces, with efforts to seize control of Pakistan's people and territory to extremists.

What I am saying here is that the whole approach has been flawed right from the outset. Doing more of the same will not make things better. It will make things worse. We need a fundamental change of approach if we are going to turn the situation around.

We need to focus on protecting the population, not on chasing the bad guys. And we need to do a much greater amount to build up civil authorities and the police service, rather than the military.

Now, I say “we,” but, of course, we can't do that. And what we are looking for is a search for leverage, which is why we are having this discussion about benchmarks.

As Bob Comer wrote after the end of the Vietnam War, “No amount of know-how and motivation on the part of an outside intervening partner can substitute for lack of motivation on the part of a local government.” And that is the situation that we are dealing with now.

I support the use of benchmarks and accountability measures to ensure that the people that we are assisting are actually doing the job that we have paid them $12 billion to do. But I think I support the idea that we need to move well beyond a transactional approach here, and make a long-term commitment.

But I think American taxpayers and legislators are entitled to ask, you know, “Why should we give more money, and keep throwing good money after bad to the same people, until we get a firm commitment to actually stop supporting the enemy, and start protecting the Pakistani population?”

I will save the rest of my time, because I am sure there will be questions that will come up in relation to that.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kilcullen can be found in the Appendix on page 49.]

The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, thank you very much.

Mr. Nawaz.

Please flip the—

Mr. Nawaz. Chairman Skelton—

The CHAIRMAN. Could you get a little closer to the microphone, please?

STATEMENT OF SHUJA NAWAZ, DIRECTOR, SOUTH ASIAN CENTER, THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. Nawaz. Chairman Skelton, Ranking Member McHugh, members of the committee, I am honored to be here to speak about this important issue before your committee today.

We, at The Atlantic Council, recently produced a report on Pakistan that offers very detailed suggestions on aid for that country.
The United States and Pakistan have had a rollercoaster relationship, marked with highs of deep friendship, and followed by estrangement.

The two countries now are partners again in an attempt to roll back the tide of obscurantism and militancy that grips Afghanistan and Pakistan today.

Yet, a deep distrust marks this relationship, arising out of the pattern of engagement. And this distrust is rooted in both perceptions and reality.

The United States befriended Pakistan most often when it had autocratic rulers, and provided the most aid to Pakistan during periods of autocratic rule, when Pakistan was seen as an ally of U.S. strategic interests in the region.

The intervening periods of civilian rule often were marked by distance and coolness. And the strong perception was created over time, in Pakistani minds, that the United States did not understand or care for Pakistan's domestic needs or security concerns.

Mr. Chairman, Pakistan lives in a tough neighborhood. It is in the shadow of India, a major nuclear power to the east, and powerful neighbors such as China, Iran, and an unstable Afghanistan. Internally, it is racked by a rising militancy that is attempting to force its convoluted view of Islam on a largely moderate population.

Pakistan has suffered repeated military rule and corrupt civilian governments that, often, were in the hands of the feudalistic elite or family-run political parties.

Today, the United States and Pakistan are at a new crossroad. There is an opportunity to forge a new relationship between the people of the two countries, and to overturn the historical patterns. Civil society in Pakistan is on the rise, and deserves support.

The chief of army staff of the Pakistan army is publicly committed to withdrawing the army from politics, and the new administration in Washington is committed to a strategy to help build Pakistan via a long-term assistance program that will strengthen its defense, while improving the economy.

If Washington succeeds in these efforts, it will help break the yo-yo pattern of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. But, Mr. Chairman, there are challenges to overcome.

The U.S. must ensure that its aid is not seen solely in support of its battle in Afghanistan, and directed largely towards the border region of Pakistan. This aid must not be seen by the people of Pakistan as short-term, and aimed at propping up any single person, party or group.

The U.S. and its allies must attempt to reduce the causes of regional hostility between India and Pakistan. Pakistan needs to ensure that its government prepares viable and practicable plans for using economic aid effectively and efficiently, and controls corruption so aid reaches the poorer segments of society.

The government of Pakistan also needs to craft a broad consensus in support of a strategy to fight the militants, and strengthen the hands of the silent and moderate majority.

Pakistan also needs to accelerate the doctrinal shift from conventional military thinking to counterinsurgency, and build its capacity to reclaim the areas of militancy. The civilians can then hold and rebuild those areas.
In this regard, certain key elements of U.S. aid will be needed. First, there must be a focus on building up police and paramilitary capacity to isolate militants from within the communities. Second, community-based assistance and a heavy investment in infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, are needed to help aid reach target communities directly. The current system of aid flows must change so aid money is not soaked up by expensive overheads in Washington, Islamabad, or provincial capitals.

Third, the ability of the Pakistan army to fight a mobile militancy should be enhanced by providing it more early lift capability, helicopter gun ships, transport and night-vision goggles.

Fourth, the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program for Pakistan’s military needs to rise dramatically. And additional training needs to be organized in the country, and in the region, to expose larger numbers of officers at all ranks, to new thinking on counterinsurgency.

Finally, I suggest strongly that the current coalition support fund model of reimbursement for Pakistani operations in the border region should be ended. This is a cause of deep resentment in the army and civil society, since it makes the Pakistani army “hired force,” and makes this America’s war, not Pakistan’s own war.

Let both sides agree to the objectives, benchmarks and indicators of success, and let the U.S. provide aid for those broad objectives, without detailed accounting. We need to rebuild trust between these two allies; questioning reimbursement claims has the opposite effect.

Mr. Chairman, I do not believe in blank checks. Mutually agreed conditions of aid, rather than unilaterally imposed conditions, are the best way of endangering trust. We have to make sure that we set targets that help Pakistan achieve its potential, while ensuring its security and integrity. Creating a safe neighborhood in South Asia will help towards that end.

Mr. Chairman, thank you. I am prepared to answer your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nawaz can be found in the Appendix on page 54.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Let me ask one question to each of you, please.

Reference was made to Pakistan becoming a failed state. Briefly, what must we do to help ensure that it does not become a failed state, and that it be a strong partner in the fight against those terrorists that occupy its border region?

General.

General BARNO. I think a comprehensive whole-of-government look at the needs of Pakistan, and how the U.S. could assist in meeting some of those needs would be a first step.

I think the primary one may be—counter-intuitively—to begin with—would be ensuring that the economic health of Pakistan remains solid. Because an implosion of the Pakistani economy, a—really, a dissolution of the middle class, you know, widespread shortage of electricity, a breakdown of the economic order, I think, would upend the country and threaten its potential failure quicker than anything else.
I think we have to ensure that Pakistan remains on a solid economic footing first. And then, I think, beyond that—to look at—along the lines of what some of my colleagues have just suggested—how we can improve the security capabilities of the Pakistani military, their frontier core, their intelligence services, so that the encroachment of the Taliban from the remote areas, into the urban areas, does not continue.

So I think those are two areas I would suggest.

The CHAIRMAN. Doctor.

Dr. Kilcullen. I think we need to step back from the frontier, where we are currently conducting a military-focused operation of the bad guys, back to the east of the Indies, and start focusing on police work and civil-authority work to secure the parts of Pakistan that still remain under government control, which are shrinking week by week.

We need to stop the rot and hold that area, which we are currently in danger of losing. And, then, once we have stabilized—then start expanding back out.

What we are doing in the frontier region now, particularly with drone strikes and some of the other kinetic activity that is going on, is creating such outrage that it has led to a huge spike in Punjabi militant activity, both in the Punjab itself, and in the western part of Pakistan.

The current path that we are on is leading us to loss of Pakistani government control over its own population. So we need to step back, control what we can control; and, then, once we have stabilized, being a process of moving forward again.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Nawaz.

Mr. Nawaz. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the U.S. can help by creating an enabling environment, because Pakistan has a strong civil society. It has a middle class of 30 million people, with a per capita income of $10,000 on a purchasing-power parity basis. And it has the institutions that can pull the country back from the brink.

We shouldn’t confuse a state of chaos in a fledgling civilian government with the failure of the state in Pakistan. I believe that the military still is a disciplined and an organized institution. But I agree with my colleagues on the panel today that building up civil capacity and building up policing capacity to protect the communities and—so that when the military does clear the areas where it is used, that those areas can be held. It is very critical.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. McHugh.

Mr. McHugh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentleman, I mentioned in my opening comments about H.R. 1886, which is a bill that has been introduced that, from my perspective, conditions and limits security assistance to Pakistan that, I think, from the administration perspective, is unnecessarily limiting and, certainly contradictory.

I think, as well, that if you look at the kinds of processes that are put into place under that legislation—that it tends to further, rather than limit, the transactional nature of the relationship, which, I think, most of us could agree, is not the proper way.
Still—and as a number of you commented—the American taxpayer does deserve some sort of benchmark, some sort of metric, by which to measure where the money is going, and how it is being utilized, and how effectively.

How can we find a path forward that allows this long-term commitment—not an overregulated, over-pontificated approach by the U.S. government upon the Pakistanis, that makes it less transitional—but we can still have some sort of accountability? Have any suggestions as to how we could, perhaps, construct those measurements?

General, you want to start?

General BARNO. I am not sure I can give specifics, but in broad terms, I think we have to be very careful that we don't instill this idea that, somehow, this is a pay-for-performance partnership. The transactional performance—that we are paying the Pakistanis to do this, therefore, they should deliver.

I think that is utterly wrong in terms of the psychological outlook there, and it undercuts any notion of mutual respect between the two nations, and the idea of developing some sort of a long-term partnership beyond what is required out there today.

So, I do think that some conditionality is appropriate. I would suggest that there would be some value in having more private conditionality and less public conditionality, whether that is done through closed hearings or done through some mechanism between the U.S. government and the Pakistani government that is done behind closed doors, as opposed to being an overt, perhaps even legislated in part, of any approach to, you know, the aid that is falling into Pakistan.

I think that will simply undercut entirely the idea that this is a respectful partnership between two nations that have many mutual interests out there.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you.

Doctor.

Dr. KILCULLEN. I actually think that the emphasis on benchmarks and accountability in H.R. 1886 is not necessarily a bad thing. In fact, I quite support that.

The part of the bill that gives me a little bit of concern is where it essentially pretends that Pakistan is a weak-but-willing ally against extremism. Whereas, the fact is that fairly substantial portions of the intelligence service, smaller elements within the army, and some other elements, are actively or passively supporting the enemy.

So I don’t think it is in anyway unreasonable to expect Pakistan to make a commitment to cease supporting the enemy, before we give it more of the same money that has resulted in no improvement, and, in fact a dramatic deterioration since 2001.

I agree with you that we shouldn’t be taking a transactional approach. But I don’t think that the solution is to take off any constraints, and just keep on handing over money. I think that we need to push for a genuine change of heart among certain elements within Pakistan.

I think it is also pretty clear that the Pakistani civilian democratically elected leaders do not enjoy full control over their own national security establishment. And that is another reason why,
I think, challenging funding to the military, through elected civilian authorities, is a positive step, because it strengthens the groups within the Pakistani government structure that support the United States, and do have a genuine relationship of trust. And it limits the power of some of those elements that have, in fact, been working against that relationship.

So it is a pretty complex picture on the ground. But I think it is relatively straightforward in terms of assistance. If we keep pretending that Pakistan is a weak-but-willing ally, we are going to get the wrong answer. We need to recognize that some parts of the Pakistani state are on our side, and others are not.

Mr. McHugh. Mr. Nawaz.

Mr. Nawaz. In my view, it is not a good idea to frontload conditions, as much as getting to a discussion on indicators of success by defining the end goal—mutually agree upon those end goals.

In that sense, a lot of what my colleague, Dr. Kilcullen, has said makes sense—that you agree on the objectives. And then, I personally believe in what is known as a results-based budgeting, where you give the money to people who decide what the metrics will be. And then you agree upon those metrics, rather than imposing conditions up front.

I think it will be much more effective that way, and won’t create the impression that this is a pay-for-hire scheme, as General Barno said.

Mr. McHugh. Thank you all.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.

By virtue of the previous agreement, we will begin toward the front.

Mr. Kissell, you will lead off. And I will ask the gentleman from Mississippi to assume the gavel.

Mr. Kissell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the panel for being here today. There is so many questions that come to mind, and—as we look at this issue.

How do we get the forces within the intelligence community, whatever, in Pakistan, that are working for the enemy—how do we get them either through their government cracking down or whatever—how can we get that to stop? And whoever feels free, jump in on this one.

General Barno. I think I would, maybe, re-characterize that a little bit. My judgment is not that there are elements inside the Pakistani intelligence service and military that are working for the enemy. I think there is very strong evidence that the intelligence service, especially, has maintained contacts with the enemy for various reasons over the last many years—has a relationship with many of these groups, and has significant influence, at a minimum, with any of these groups.

That is the least—I think I would say—and there is, potentially, a lot more there. But I think it is done out of what is perceived as national interest.

There is a belief that if the ultimate enemy of the state of Pakistan is India, next door, that these groups provide a weapon in that toolbox to use against India—not today, but for the day after tomorrow, when the front in Afghanistan opens up again, when there
is not necessarily an international force there, or to use as an irregular force in other parts of the conflict with India.

So I think, ultimately, that many of these decisions aren’t made for reasons that we might suspect. They are made in what are viewed as the national interests of the people that are making the decision; that they are hedging against a different future than the one that we see.

Mr. Kissell. If we have success in Afghanistan—and I have just returned from over there. And I heard so many times that, “We could do everything perfect in Afghanistan, and that could be all negated by what happens in Pakistan.”

If we have success in Afghanistan—General, you mentioned something about that—that could help bolster Pakistan. I could see, perhaps, it might hurt Pakistan if the Taliban is forced to stay over there, and they start looking for success there.

I wonder if you could elaborate on that possibility.

General Barno. It is my belief that if we defeat the Taliban insurgency inside of Afghanistan—if that is an inhospitable place for them, and if the population is dead-set against them—if there is economic growth, if the security forces are much more effective, and that we are winning two years from now in Afghanistan—that that is going to be a very difficult pill to swallow for the Taliban inside of Pakistan.

It is going to weaken them considerably. It is going to take away, in effect, their rear area—if you want to look at Afghanistan as their rear area.

So I think that we do have the ability to turn the situation around in Afghanistan. And we actually have far more tools at our disposal in Afghanistan, because of all the forces we have there, because of our access to the Afghan army, and all the territory and all their security forces there, and the amount of international support.

So we have a huge range of things we can do in Afghanistan to turn that around. And I think doing that will put us in a much better position vis-a-vis Pakistan, and put the enemy in a much worse position.

Mr. Kissell. The other two gentlemen—do you all disagree with that?

Dr. Kilcullen. I think I would just offer some guiding points, out of my written testimony, about the behavior of certain elements within the Pakistani military, and intelligence services.

July 2008, the India embassy in Kabul was destroyed in a large bomb attack. Afghan intelligence concluded that it was sponsored and supported by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Pakistani intelligence service, and carried out by the Haqqani Network, which is an organization that has close ties to ISI.

In November last year, there was a very large-scale terrorist attack in Mumbai, in India, launched from the Pakistani port of Karachi, and carried out by terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which was sponsored and set up by the Pakistani intelligence and military service.

The only surviving attacker claimed that he had training for more than a year from retired members of Pakistani special forces, and the intelligence service.
There have been numerous incidents where Pakistani forces on the frontier have fired on our troops as they attempted to prevent the Taliban from withdrawing back into Pakistan. Last year, we lost over 400 NATO vehicles on a route through Pakistan that is, supposedly, protected by the Pakistani military.

So I agree that we shouldn’t be paying for service. If we are paying for service, we are not getting anything for our money, anyway. What we should be doing is stepping back, and trying to recreate this relationship on a completely different basis, because it is simply not working as it currently stands.

Mr. Nawaz. If I could add, sir—there was a relationship between the ISI and the LeT. And this has been written about and spoken about quite often.

There doesn’t seem to be any evidence linking the ISI or the government of Pakistan to the Mumbai attacks. And if that evidence had been available, it would have been provided to Pakistan by India, where an exchange is taking place.

Indeed, the LeT, the Jaish-e-Mohammad, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi—have all now aligned themselves with the Tehreek-e-Taliban of Pakistan, as well as with Al Qaeda, as a kind of franchise arrangement. And in a substantial number of the attacks that occurred in 2008, inside Pakistan, through suicide bombings, the targets were the Pakistan military themselves.

So if anything, this kind of a break off the Frankenstein’s monster that was created at one time, by the ISI, for use against India and Kashmir, is likely to, now, turn the military into rethinking that relationship. The question is how soon that thinking can begin.

Mr. Kissell. Thank you, gentlemen.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Taylor. [Presiding.] The gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Fleming, for five minutes.

Mr. Fleming. Can you hear me? Oh, okay. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Yes, I have a question for the general.

What type of government would Pakistan end up with if there was—you mentioned how unstable things are there. Obviously, we worry about an Islamic theocracy, such as what we have in Iran today.

What is your understanding, based on what you see and the elements you observe, that we may end up with if that were to occur?

General Barno. Well, again, this is a worst-case scenario. And we absolutely hope nothing like this transpires. But I think there is some risk of this happening.

My guess would be it would look somewhat like what we saw when the Taliban took over Afghanistan—that they would simply, you know, seize all the organs of power. Afghanistan and Pakistan are two very different nations. They have got very different levels of development. They have very different kinds of militaries on—it is not clear in my mind how that would lay out in Islamabad—again, just a horrific scenario.

But I think that this idea of a popular uprising—someone suggested that it might look something like the Iranian revolution in 1979—that that type of a nationwide uprising could sweep across
Pakistan. Again, I don’t think that is a high-probability outcome, but I think it is possible.

And—and I think the outlook at that, at the end of the day, would look very much like what the Taliban rules—their mechanisms of ruling Afghanistan—that same philosophy of rule, I think, would be in effect, if they were to take power.

Dr. Kilcullen. Could I just add—I just want to say, whatever the political characteristics of that regime, that it would be a nuclear-armed regime, with about 100 ballistic missiles. And that is a factor we should be considering, irrespective of its politics.

Mr. Fleming. And the reach of that ballistic missile would be what?

Dr. Kilcullen. I don't have the technical details, but it covers the bulk of South Asia, and out into Iran. So we would have to ask ourselves what India’s response would be to that circumstance.

Mr. Fleming. Right.

Okay. Thank you.

Dr. Kilcullen, you mentioned that you feel like it would be better to assist the police, or provide aid to police, rather than military. And, of course, the police vary in terms of locale, as to what level of corruption may exist, what their sentiments might be—Taliban—pro or against.

Do you see problems there, you know? Or would we really get into the same kind of problems we have in Africa today, where we provide aid and it ends up in the bad guys’ hands?

Dr. Kilcullen. There are a number of different police forces in Pakistan. The principal police service is run at the provincial level. But there is also a Pakistani police service, and the Rangers, which are a paramilitary organization operation. It is in Singh and the Punjab. And then, there is the Frontier Constabulary, and the Frontier Corps, in the Northwest Frontier Province in Balochistan. So there are a number of different police forces.

There has not been the same level of complicity between the police and militants, as there has been in the history of Pakistan, between the military and the intelligence services, and militants. They have a number of problems, as you rightly said: corruption; lack of equipment; lack of evidentiary capability, like forensics; lack of protected mobility. They are intimidated. Their families aren't protected. They are not unconnected with the fact that we have hardly given any assistance to the policing and judiciary sector in Pakistan. They are one of the weakest elements of the Pakistani Security Service.

But, you know, as a counterinsurgency specialist, I can tell you there has never been a successful counterinsurgency in which there was not a very substantial role for a capable police force. We can’t expect to defeat these insurgents until we have a police force that actually protects, and lives with, and looks after, its own population.

I would also say that, from a policy standpoint, increasing our age of the police would actually have four substantial benefits, which are listed in my written testimony. It would improve the protection we are giving to the Pakistani people, which is one of the big weaknesses we have. It would improve counterinsurgency per-
formance. It would enhance the rule of law. It would also weaken the political power of the army vis-a-vis the civilian leadership.

The police are the only element of the Pakistani national-security establishment that is more interested in preventing state collapse and extremist takeover than they are in fighting India. So they have got to be a prime candidate for our assistance.

Also, it is much more difficult to turn police assistance against us than it would be to turn military assistance against somebody else. So it is a safer form of assistance than providing high-tech military assistance.

I just think that you could double or triple the amount of assistance we are giving to the Pakistani police, and it still would only be 1.5 percent of what we are giving to the army.

So I think, you know, there is scope there for doing a lot more, without necessarily cutting back on other forms of assistance.

Mr. TAYLOR. Chair thanks the gentleman, now recognizes the gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Loebsack, for five minutes.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

And I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. I seemed to have heard a lot of common threads; the basic one being, I think, that we need a change in strategy, and how America approaches this part of the world and, in particular, how America approaches Pakistan.

And I couldn’t agree more. And I do want to echo a concern that Mr. Kline had at our last hearing on these issues, where he—and I don’t know if any others feel this way—but to refer to what we have there now as an Af-Pak strategy might be somewhat insulting to many in Pakistan. If you want to comment on that, that is fine.

But I do want to ask you, General Barno—you mentioned that, really, what we need—and I think everyone probably agrees on this—at least, on the panel—is some kind of a long-term strategic partnership with Pakistan.

And all of you have been kind of addressing that without, perhaps, laying out three or four or five aspects to what that strategic partnership ought to be. And I would like to ask each one of you to do that. I know, maybe, I am catching you a little unawares. Maybe you have all this in your written testimony already. And that is fine, if you want to repeat it.

But what is that strategic partnership? What should that strategic partnership, in your view, look like, taking into account not only our relationship with Pakistan per say, but India and any other countries’ interests in that region as well?

General, would you like to start?

General BARNO. That is a very good question. And I have not thought this through all the way; so just, perhaps, some initial thoughts about it.

I think one of the parallel elements that has to be part of this idea of a long-term U.S.-Pakistan strategic partnership is that we have to—without directly getting involved, we have to encourage both Pakistan and India to continue their confidence-building to reduce the tensions between those two countries.

In my judgment, the biggest factor that undermines any of our goals and objectives with Pakistan right now—and would undermine a long-term partnership—is their almost, you know, funda-
mental, unalterable belief that India is their permanent enemy, and that enemy is an existential threat to Pakistan, and India will always be a force that they have to be postured against.

If we can break that down, if we can help that cold war to go away, much like our own Cold War with the Soviets went away, then all things from that point are possible, and all changes are possible. It changes the entire paradigm in the region. So I think that has got to be a parallel effort.

In terms of the U.S.-Pakistan bilateral relationship, I think we have got to have an approach that has a—and an economic interdependence. And there may be some things we can do with trade, there, to facilitate the two nations being linked better together in that department.

I think exchange of educational opportunities would be very important. And, you know, we have got the best university system in the world that is the envy of every country in the world. Having more Pakistanis come to that and, perhaps, eventually, more Americans going to Pakistan, would be very useful to break down some of those barriers.

There is currently a military dimension. I think we could do much more in terms of international military education and training with Pakistanis. We had a nearly 10-year period, where we had no Pakistanis at all coming to the United States for training. That lost generation of Pakistani officers, now, are among the most anti-American in their military, because they had no exposure, you know, to our schools and our war colleges, and our service schools, here, which is a terrible thing, a terrible mistake; and we have to try and rebuild that.

Then, I think, clearly, there is an equipment and doctrine-and-training correlation there, on the military side as well.

So, those would just be some preliminary ideas. But I think all of these help instill some confidence that we are not just interested in Pakistan for the next three years. That is the outlook right now. It is all about killing terrorists and going after Al Qaeda, in their view of our relationship with them. And we have got to deepen that far beyond what it is today.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Right. And everyone seems to agree that the whole transactional approach, as you call it, that we had in the past—it is not the right way to go.

Dr. Kilcullen.

Dr. KILCULLEN. I agree with the general. But I want to comment on another category of issue, which is the multilateral security guarantee, or the regional security architecture.

A number of other original players have very substantial interests in the stability of Pakistan. China has a very substantial port facility at Gwadar, in the southern part of the country, and plans to open a north-south route in to Western China, which will be extremely important to the future economic development of Western China. They have had a very strong economic and geopolitical interest in a stable Pakistan not owned by extremists.

Iran—there were 30 million Shia in Pakistan. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and other militiants in Pakistan are currently carrying out what I would call a slow-motion genocide of Shia in the western part of Pakistan, with men, women and children being killed in an incred-
ibly gruesome fashion. If you go talk to Pakistanis, there is imagery of this being passed around Pakistan day by day. The Iranians have as strong interest in preventing that kind of killing.

The Russians are extremely worried about the situation in Pakistan, and its possible effects on the former Soviet Central Asian Republics. The European Union (E.U.) has millions of Pakistani citizens living inside of its borders, and has an interest in a stable Pakistan.

India and the U.S., obviously, have interest. So it is entirely possible that we have a relationship with the Pakistanis, where there is not a lot we can do. But multilaterally, there is an enormous amount that we can do, diplomatically, to give the Pakistanis a feeling of security that allows them to feel they can stop using support for militancy as sort of an unconventional counterweight to Indian regional influence.

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair thanks the gentleman, now recognizes the gentleman—

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. TAYLOR [continuing]. From Colorado, for five minutes.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me make a statement, and would love your response to it.

In just an observation of our current situation—and it seems to be that the United States finds itself, at this time, stumbling into an ever-widening war.

And when we look back at the policy, it seems that the first phase was brilliant in Afghanistan. President George Bush gave air advisory logistical support to the Northern Alliance, who defeated the Taliban on the ground. And then, we pushed them aside and superimposed a political process that gave the Afghan people the government that we wanted them to have.

And now, in fighting for stability for that government, that doesn't have a lot of legitimacy outside of Kabul—that, perhaps, our policy is destabilizing Pakistan in recruiting the Pakistani government to fight the Taliban, who are not their natural enemies—and now they are enemies.

And so we are there now. We have to do our best to, obviously, make this policy work. I think extricating ourselves is going to be difficult from this.

In terms of support for Pakistan, it doesn't seem that there are any initiatives by the United States to be an honest broker in the situation with Kashmir, which is the focus of the Pakistani military.

And I certainly like the idea of, instead, giving aid, perhaps, to the police, civil elements, and the Frontier Corps, that could, hopefully, contain the spread of militancy from the Fatah.

And so, could you—anybody—respond to those observations?

Yes?

Mr. NAWAZ. If I may—just to go back to the broad issue of what conditions would help stabilize Pakistan to begin with, and prevent it from being destabilized has an unintended consequence of the war in Afghanistan.

There are key roles that the region can play as an economic unit. There are plans already on the drawing boards that were discussed, and in very advanced stages of preparation for linking Cen-
tral Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, and also for linking Iran and Pakistan and India—the IPI pipeline. Then, there is the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-and-India pipeline.

We have covered a lot of these possibilities, as the practicable measures, in the report of The Atlantic Council. So I would definitely refer the members to that document.

But the key point in all of this is that if you create vested economic interests on both sides of the India-Pakistan border that see it to their advantage to trade, and for there to be a traffic of populations across that border, it will make it impossible for the two countries to go to war.

The two countries, according to Economics 101, should be each other’s major trading partners. But the U.S. is a major trading partner of Pakistan, and also of India. They don’t trade much with each other.

The United States sanctions against Iran also imposed an impediment to the creation of the IPI, the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline, because Indian multinationals do not want to run afoul of U.S. laws.

So there are these other conditions that the United States can quite seriously change in the region, which would allow the region to prosper by itself, without the infusion, necessarily, of large amounts of aid. And I think that is the critical part, because both India and Pakistan have a youthful population, very productive. They will be very productive for the next 20, 30 years. They can take advantage of these opportunities, also, by lowering tariff barriers to textile imports from these regions.

You can help them help themselves.

Dr. Kilcullen. I would just pick up something you talked about in terms of our success in Afghanistan in 2001, and build on that.

The last Taliban stronghold in Afghanistan to fall was Kandahar. It fell on the seventh of December, 2001. At that time, there were 110 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officers, and about 400 coalition special forces operating in the south of Afghanistan. But we had 50,000 Afghans, fighting on our side, against the Taliban.

The reason we defeated the Taliban so swiftly in 2001 wasn’t the sheer brilliance of our air power or our high-technology weaponry, or anything like that. It was the fact that we had Afghans on our side.

We still have the bulk of the Afghan population on our side. The approval rating for U.S. forces in Afghanistan is 64 percent, which is about 5 percent better than President Obama’s approval rating, here in the United States. So there is a lot of support for our presence in Afghanistan.

We don’t have anything close to that kind of support in Pakistan. But large parts of the Pakistani population do not like the extremists, are opposed to them. We have tribal leaders in Swat and Waziristan raising their own groups to fight the Taliban. We have community leaders turning against them.

A friend in Pakistan told me that 70 percent to 90 percent of people in the Swat Valley are appalled by the Taliban takeover of the area. There is a lot of groundswell against the enemy. If we can successfully build a partnership with the Pakistani people—not necessarily the government, or the army, or the intelligence serv-
ices that we have been talking about, but the Pakistani people—
I think that is the key to turning some of this around.

You know, as Mr. Nawaz said, it is not a matter of aid and pater-
nalistic development. It is a matter of equal partnership.

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair thanks the gentleman.

The chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from Massachusetts, 
Ms. Tsongas.

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you all very much.

And I have appreciated your testimony. And I have heard several 
themes from all of you, one of which is the trade deficit that we 
have with the country of Pakistan, and also an emphasis on sort 
of development—the economy, civilian capacity—all of which takes 
time to address.

And my sense is that we are running out of time; that we are 
trying to change the dynamic on a dime, when we really—it will 
take much longer than that.

So I am really wondering: Are there some strong signals we can 
send that would communicate that message while we go about the 
long-term process of addressing these very complicated issues? To 
all of you—whichever wants to go first?

General BARNO. Well, I do think there is a recognition with a 
new U.S. Administration that there is a tremendous amount of en-
ergy being put on thinking through revamping our relationship 
with Pakistan right now.

I think Pakistanis recognize that. You know, we have—Admiral 
Mullen is back out there this week, the second time in two weeks.
You know, we have had senior delegations going through there. It 
is on the front page of American newspapers. And there is a lot of 
money being looked at, not only here, in terms of legislation on the 
Hill, but what the Administration is proposing.

So I think there is an understanding that this is a time of major 
focus and change, and that it is moving at a relatively rapid rate.
We are still only in—right at the edge of the first 100 days of this 
Administration. So there is quite a bit going on.

I think we could probably communicate that better in our infor-
matio strategy inside of Pakistan. I do think we do very badly 
communicating to the Pakistani people. That might be an area, 
whether it had done here, from Washington, or done better in the 
region—that we would see something successfully, because we are 
doing that, I think, quite poorly right now. And it could better con-
vey what our real goals are, and how much interest we have in this 
partnership with Pakistan, over the long haul.

Dr. KILCULLEN. I think one of the things we could do that could 
send a strong message right now is we could call off the drone 
strikes that have been mounted in the Western part of Pakistan.

I realize that they do damage to Al Qaeda leadership. Since 
2006, we have killed 14 senior Al Qaeda leaders using drone 
strikes. In the same time period, we have killed 700 Pakistani civil-
ians in the same area. The drone strikes are highly unpopular. 
They are deeply aggravating to the population. And they have 
given rise to a feeling of anger that coalesces the population around 
the extremists, and leads to spikes of extremism well outside the 
parts of the country where we are mounting those attacks.
Inside the Fatah itself, some people like the attacks, because they do, actually, target the bad guys. But in the rest of the country, there is an immense anger about them. And there is an anger about them in the military, and the intelligence service.

I realize that it might seem counterintuitive, but we need to take our foot off the neck of these people so they feel that there is a degree of trust. Saying we want to build a permanent relationship of friendship with them, whilst continuing to bomb their population from the air, even if you do it with robot drones, is something that they see through straightaway.

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you.

Mr. NAWAZ. I would suggest that something that can be done rapidly and visibly is heavy investment in infrastructure, starting off with Fatah, where, if you—the United States will support, first, the Pakistan army, engineering battalions, as well as their Frontier Works Organization, in building roads and bridges and small dams, and erecting tube wells, to get the economy going and integrated into the rest of Pakistan.

It would be seen visibly as something useful to the local population; then, you will see a spontaneous growth of the information sector of the economy around those roads. And in economics, the most immediate and maximum returns are to roads, in terms of rates of return.

The U.S. could also consider helping with some of the major infrastructure projects, similar to what China has done in Pakistan. That would show that it is there to stay, that it is building for the long run. And one idea is to look at the right bank of the—a highway that could connect Gwadar, all the way up to the north of the country, and then through Afghanistan, a road-and-rail link to Central Asia.

These are the kinds of heavy, long-term investments that would yield some immediate employment, as well as a clear signal that the U.S. was there to stay.

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you all.

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair thanks the gentlewoman.

And we now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Hunter, for five minutes.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

Could you go into a little bit—Dr. Kilcullen mentioned it over and over—why don’t we copy the success we had in—I understand, in Iraq and Pakistan and Afghanistan—are totally different places. Why don’t we copy the success we have in the Sunni triangle, with the Marine Corps, working at the tribal level, in both Afghanistan—and I understand, too, all the different things we are talking about—Pakistan—they have to allow us to do that.

If we want to do certain things in Pakistan, the one thing that they—they have to let us do it, because we haven’t invaded Pakistan, obliviously, and we can’t do what we want to do. So they have to allow all of these different things that you are talking about. In a perfect world, they would have to allow us to do all those things.

So how do we get down to that tribal success that we had in Iraq, because Afghanistan and Pakistan are very tribal? And there are certain areas cut off from other places, and they are very family
and tribally oriented there. So how do we really bypass that top level, and start pushing from the ground up, as opposed to the top down, and copy the success that the Marine Corps had in the Sunni triangle.

Dr. Kilcullen. I might pick that up initially.

Pakistan and Iraq and Afghanistan, as you said, are very different. And we don't have the leverage in Pakistan that we had in Iraq, or that we have in Afghanistan. But I think the history of the Pakistani army's relationships with the tribes is instructive here.

The Pakistani army first went into the tribal areas during the tour of Zawar Kili campaign of 2002. That was the first time the regular Pakistani military had ever operated on a war footing inside the Fatah. The reason they hadn't been there before was because there was, basically, an agreement that had been in place since the British period, whereby the tribes essentially agreed to sit down quietly, under the political agents—the Malik, the Frontier Corps, and the other elements of the Frontier Crimes Regulation—and provided they were quiet, they would be left to govern their own affairs.

The unstated section was, "If you step out of line, the army will come in and kick your ass." In 2002, the military went into the Tirah Valley, and lost.

And so they called their own bluff. And the tribes lost respect for the army. The army, then, negotiated the Shakai Agreement in 2004, where Nek Mohammad, who was then the leader of the local Taliban, was essentially treated as an equal by a Pakistani general. And the tribes further saw the extremists being empowered, the traditional tribal leaders being sidelined, and the army looking powerless.

So the basic system of how the frontier was governed has broken down.

Mr. Hunter. I appreciate the history of it. And you know a lot more about it than I do. But you also said in Swat, for instance, 90 percent of the people there don't like Taliban.

And I am not talking about the Pakistan army coming in and trying to assert authority with each tribe. I am talking about us helping them, or them allowing us to work with them on a tribal level, where we go in and empower the actual people to want to get the Taliban and Al Qaeda out of their area.

And they will understand that we will protect them if they do that.

Dr. Kilcullen. Last year, we started to see the Pakistani army do that, and we saw a lot of success in the campaigns in Malukan and Abuja, where they started to actually work with the tribes, instead of against them. So we know the Pakistani military, or some elements of it, is capable of that. I don't think that we have the leverage to directly engage with the tribes at this time. And the environment is probably too dangerous for Western Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) or civil authorities to operate in there.

I think we are going to have to work on the ability of Pakistani civil servants and the political agents, and the elements of the Pakistani civil service, and their local law enforcement, doing a sort of similar tribal bottom-up approach.
Mr. HUNTER. But let me ask you this, then: All of these things, that included, requires the Pakistanis do what we would like them to do. So how do you make that happen?

Dr. KILCULLEN. I don't think you can.

Mr. HUNTER. Right. So there is a whole—the whole crux of all of this—all these are great ideas, but how do you make them do it? I don't understand how you make them do what we want them to do, without doing pay-for-play, right?—which you said we don't want to do.

There is no way to make them do anything.

General BARNO. I think we have to convince them that this is in their best interest, and this is the only way to solve the encroaching threat of the Taliban seizing control of even larger parts of the country.

You know, there is never going to be American Marines in Swat Valley, and American soldiers in Swat Valley that—to do what occurred in Anbar. And the reason, in large measure, that Anbar worked is that the tribes finally believed that the Americans were staying. And the Americans, rightfully, convinced the tribe—I had an American brigade commander tell me that the tribes came with us when we changed our message from, “Don't worry; we are leaving,” to a message that said, “Don't worry; we are staying.”

We are not going to be able to give that message in Swat, or anywhere else in Pakistan, I don't think. But the Pakistanis can. And they can do it, probably, best, in some ways, through their Frontier Corps. Now, Swat—it is a bit outside of that territory, but the rest of the Fatah in the Northwest Frontier Province—that could be an approach that the Frontier Corps could take, and the U.S. could very much help advise that, provide information on how to approach that, help them work with the tribal structures, and understand the tribal structures, from a bit of a distance.

We have some ability to do that today, although the Pakistanis are very resistant to having us present out there. But it is never going to be—I don't think American forces—they can do that there.

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair thanks the gentleman.

The chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from California, Mrs. Davis—five minutes.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

Thank you all for being here.

You were talking about this change in strategy—I think, the message that we have to send. And I am just wondering, are there some things that you see right now, that are not being helpful, that, somehow counter this change in approach, that we should be thinking about?

General BARN. Let me jump into that, because I disagree with my good friend, David, here, on this. And he has mentioned one, which I think he will bring up again—the drone attacks.

But I have a different perspective on that. And I think my judgment is that even though that is disruptive in the minds of many Pakistanis right now, I think that that has to continue, in some ways, because it is the only pressure that the insurgent groups in those denied areas, in those tribal areas, are feeling—you know, I have seen open-source reports that say that there is people living in orchards, now, because they are afraid to live inside of com-
pounds, and they are constantly on the move. And it is having a very significant disruption effect on the terrorist organizations that are there, because they are not feeling any pressure from any ground component from inside of Pakistan.

And I have heard, off the record, some Pakistanis say that, “If that is the only way that we can strike at the elements that are out there, and have success, then it should continue, even though it is painful.”

So I think there is mixed reporting on that. From my perspective, I think that there is value in continuing that.

I think the public proclamations of the Pakistani government on that are not terribly helpful for us. So I would like to throw a preemptive counter in front of Dave on that one, first.

Mrs. Davis. Okay.

Dr. Kilcullen, could you also comment on—I think, in your book, we talk about our not understanding the environment. Or, at least, one of the experts that you spoke to had said that.

And do we understand the environment? Clearly, it is a multifaceted environment. And I am just wondering whether we are taking the state—the steps to understand what we are really working with today.

Dr. Kilcullen. I would make two points. One, on the joint strikes: I agree that they are doing a lot of damage to the bad guys. It is us doing that damage. So, let me just review. We are paying the Pakistani military to protect our vehicles, which they are not doing. We are paying them to conduct counterinsurgency in the Fatah. And the only damage we are doing to the enemy is to our own strikes, which they are being able to say, “Oh, the bad Americans are striking the Pakistani population.”

It is not a sound way to do business. There are other ways to disrupt the terrorist movement than using robots from the air. And I would suggest that, in a tribal culture like the Pashtun culture—that, to a certain extent, looks both cowardly and weak. There are other ways to do it.

I don’t want to talk about that in an open hearing, but it is pretty clear that drones are not our only option.

Secondly, in terms of understanding the environment, I don’t believe that we have listened enough to local people in Pakistan. And I think one of the clearest examples of that is that we have had a tendency to look back to how things used to be under the Raj, and try and recreate a structure of sort of paternalistic, internal colonialism inside the Fatah.

And we have repeatedly pushed back on the idea of elections. And we have said, “Well, we support the idea of the political parties not being able to operate up in the frontier, and the local people not having a vote.”

I spoke in detail with a Darabandi religious leader up in the Fatah, who said, “Look, why are you supporting this anti-democratic stance towards the people of the Fatah. Just let us vote for our own leaders.” And, of course, the counter to that is we say, “Well, extremists will be elected.”

And that is maybe true. But if they do a bad job, they will be unelected, as Mr. Nawaz just said earlier. And, also, in the elections that we had in 2008, up in that area, it wasn’t extremists
who were elected. It was the Awami National Party, which is a secular group.

So I just think we overstate our ability to influence, and we don't listen enough to local people.

Mrs. Davis. Mr. Nawaz, would—you want to concur with that, or do you have——

Mr. Nawaz. I agree with that. And, in fact, there was a commitment by the prime minister of Pakistan to change the local legal system, as well as to integrate the Fatah into the rest of Pakistan. And we are still waiting for action on that.

But quite important, I think, is the fact that a lot of the discussions between the United States and Pakistan that are now taking place through the media need to take place behind closed doors.

And on the drones, there is clearly a Kabuki theater, of sorts, going on, because there is some kind of tacit understanding. And the people of Pakistan haven't been brought into it. So it is very important to bring them into the picture.

One way of continuing the drone attack, because they are successful, is by allowing Pakistan to sit side-by-side with the U.S., and take credit for the actual kill shots—then let that be the approach; although, I agree with David, that there are much better ways of doing it on the ground. And you can train people to do it much more effectively, without the kind of publicity that drone attacks generate.

Mr. Thomas. The chair thanks the gentlewoman.

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson, for five minutes.

Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you all, for being here.

General Barno, thank you very much for your leadership at Fort Jackson, your success in Iraq and Afghanistan, your son's service in Afghanistan.

As we consider Pakistan, I know we all want the best for the people of Pakistan.

I had the opportunity to visit and see firsthand, near Muzaffarabad, the earthquake recovery and relief efforts—the U.S. Marines working with the Pakistani military. And I was very, very impressed by the talented military—the very professional conduct that they had.

Additionally, very sadly, I had breakfast at the home of Benazir Bhutto a month and a day prior to her murder. And so, again, I am just so concerned for the country.

And, General, you have indicated that we need a long-term strategic partnership. How can that best be shown to the people of Pakistan—that we have a long-term interest in their success?

General Barno. We touched on a few points to that, I think, earlier, but I think it has to be a—not simply a military relationship. And it can't be a relationship that is focused on the crisis of the moment, which is terrorism in the tribal areas of Pakistan, on the border areas, with Afghanistan.

It has to be a serious—looking across both governments, and how both governments and the United States, and in Pakistan, can find shared interest in the areas of trade and the area of economics, and
the areas of justice, perhaps in border, perhaps in counter-narcotics.

There is a huge range of common interests that we could bridge between the two governments of Pakistan and the United States, to develop some type of a framework relationship that really projects for the people of Pakistan that we are going to work with them in multi-dimensions—not just a security dimension, but in a multiple of dimensions to connect these two nations together over the next 20 or 30 years.

That just simply doesn’t exist today. And everything is focused on this morning’s newspaper headlines. So I think that there would be a lot of utility in having enterprise that looks at how we can pull that together into—whether it is a formal agreement, or simply, you know, a series of meetings that begins to bridge the two nations together. I think we would make a lot of money by doing that.

Mr. Wilson. And Mr. Nawaz, I appreciate you pointing out that Pakistan is an advanced country, with 30 million persons in the middle class. This is not at all comparable to Afghanistan. And in my visits there, the people I have met are—it has just been very hopeful.

And the young students—I mean, it is just a positive experience.

I have concluded four years as the co-chair of the India Caucus. I made it very clear that it is my view the country that benefits most from a stable Pakistan—and you have alluded to this—is India.

And, then, as I have tried to work with the people of India—one of the biggest criticisms is they feel like the United States has been a strong ally and supporter of Pakistan for 60 years. So there is a disconnect there.

But how can we promote the relationship between India and Pakistan?

Mr. Nawaz. I think the United States, obviously, now, is a friend of India. And, for the first time in six decades, of life of India, for the first time, we actually had Ambassador Holbrooke pronounce India one of the major allies with the United States on his last visit.

At the same time, the United States is a major ally of Pakistan. And these are not mutually exclusive.

Mr. Wilson. Yes.

Mr. Nawaz. So it is very critical for the United States, now, to use this leverage on both sides of the India-Pakistan border to help them see the possibilities that exist for peace, rather than war, in that region.

In effect, the U.S. has to take the lead, now, in helping wage peace in the region, rather than siding with one country against the other. And, in that, the economic relationships between the countries of the region—and not just India and Pakistan, but, as I said earlier, with Central Asia and Afghanistan—the whole region has a network that needs to be established, in which U.S. firms can play a huge role, because many of them already have plans on the books for setting up pipelines, for setting up rail links or roadways and so on.
All this can be done to pull these countries together, which would make it impossible for them to go to war.

Mr. Wilson. And I appreciate your point. And I would even extend it. I have been to Western Siberia, in Novosibirsk, Chelyabinsk.

It would seem like, to me—and through the “Stans,” too—that that whole region of Central Asia should be doing very well economically, socially, and—so I appreciate your positive view, and—however, I can be hopeful. I see great hope throughout the region. So I now yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Taylor. The chair thanks the gentleman from South Carolina.

We now recognize the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Bartlett, for five minutes.

Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.

I was here for your very illuminating testimony. Thank you very much.

I had to be gone for part of the question-and-answer period. Maybe it is the scientist in me, but when I am dealing with options, I am always more comfortable when I have some probabilities associated with those options.

And so, if you would humor me, and each take a piece of paper and write down the three potential outcomes that the general mentioned—a failed state; a status quo or stalemate, for number two; and gradual improvement, for number three. And so that you are not influenced by others’ prognostications, if you would write down some percentages there that add up to 100—what probability do you think that it would be a failed state? What probability do you think that it will simply continue the status quo, or a stalemate? And what probability do you think that there will be gradual improvement?

General, do you have your prognostications?

General Barno. I actually did this before we started, because I thought I might get that question. It is a very interesting question, and, of course, one that we can’t really give good answers to.

Here is the way I would key it up, Congressman. I said: Failed state, 15 percent—one-five percent——

Mr. Bartlett. Okay.

General Barno [continuing]. Stalemate, six-zero—60 percent——

Mr. Bartlett. Okay.

General Barno [continuing]. And gradual improvement, 25 percent. And I really hope those add up to 100. I didn’t do my math check, here, so——

Mr. Bartlett. They do.

Okay.

Dr. Kilcullen.

Dr. Kilcullen. I am afraid I have a slightly different view. I am making the assumption that there is no change in U.S. policy, and there is no change in the attitude of the Pakistani state. On that assumption: 75 percent, failed state; 0 percent, status quo—things simply cannot go on as they are; 25 percent, turnaround. That is on the assumption that we don’t change anything.

Mr. Bartlett. Very interesting, thank you.

And Mr. Nawaz.
Mr. Nawaz. In my book, the failed state would be 15 percent probability. The stalemate, or what I would call “muddling through,” would be 55 percent. And gradual improvement, 30 percent.

Mr. Bartlett. Thank you all very much. That is very helpful.

I kind of have the feeling that unless we get halfway through number three—and there is a fairly low probability that we are going to get halfway through number three, if your prognostications are correct—that what we are doing in Afghanistan is the ultimate exercise in futility.

Even if we are able to do there what no one else has ever done—Alexander the Great failed, the British Empire failed, the Soviet Empire failed—and even if we are able to do what no one else has ever done, it will amount to nothing, because the bad guys will simply go to Pakistan, unless we are at least halfway through number three, gradual improvement.

Is that not true?

Dr. Kilcullen. I think—

General Barno. Go ahead, David.

Dr. Kilcullen. Well, I think there is quite a good chance that we will do better in Afghanistan, because we do have something that none of those other empires—

Mr. Bartlett. But, sir, even if we are completely successful—I am allowing that we will be completely successful in Afghanistan, and do what no one else has ever done. Even so, I don’t think we will accomplish anything, because our goal is to get rid of the bad guys. And the bad guys will simply go to Pakistan, unless we get halfway through number three. And you, collectively, believe there is a fairly low probability we are going to get halfway through number three.

Dr. Kilcullen. If you articulate the sole goal as “dealing with the bad guys,” then I would agree with you. But that is not our sole goal in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The fact that we have treated that as our sole goal is one of the problems that we have had since 2001.

General Barno. I think I would agree with that. And I would say that the growth of success in both of those states eventually marginalizes the bad guys.

I watched, during my time in Afghanistan, increasingly, for a period of time, the Taliban becoming more and more irrelevant to the people of Afghanistan. No one had any interest in being in the Taliban, after the Afghan presidential election. The economy was doing better, security was improving significantly. No one had any interest in that outcome. But that is certainly not the case today.

So I think if we can set those conditions so that the—becoming a terrorist and insurgent is an irrelevant long-term goal for any reasonable Pakistani of Afghan, then we have established some enduring prospects for success.

Mr. Nawaz. Congressman, I would choose an analogy from economics. After all, I spent 31 years at the International Monetary Fund. And this is called the J-curve hypothesis, which is when things grow worse before they start getting better.

And so what may appear to be a 70 percent probability, in David’s view, may be those kind of exogenous shocks that will turn
the population and the government and the leadership of Pakistan around, into concentrating their efforts so that they can, then, use the resources of the country, the inherent strengths of the society, and the institutions that exist, to pull the country out of the hole that it seems to be heading into.

Mr. BARTLETT. I hope, sir, that that is the outcome. My hopes and my expectations are frequently different. In this case, they are different.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair thanks the gentleman from Maryland.

Gentlemen, I very much have found this very enlightening.

On the near term—and I forgot which of you mentioned the large number of casualties that the steam-ship companies that the American military has contracted with to transport goods through Pakistan, going to Afghanistan—it is my understanding, about 130 drivers for one of the contractors have been killed, about 15 drivers for another contractor.

Entire convoys have been hijacked, and entire convoys have been destroyed, just transiting Pakistan.

It is my understanding that we will get sending about 130 to 150 trailer-equivalent units a day, just to re-supply the troops we have now. Safe to assume that will be increased by at least half again, with the additional troops on their way to Afghanistan.

I say all this, and that you all have done, I think, a really good job of telling us some of the things we need to be doing, and what you expect could happen—hopefully, favorably.

My question to you, given the immediate escalating of American troops, and the need to re-supply them, is: What is the probability in your minds that, during the next three years and nine months that President Obama has been elected by the American people to serve—that the Pakistani government, either bowing to pressure from the Islamic fundamentalists, or because of a change in their attitude themselves, within the internal government—what are the chances that they deny passage through Pakistan of goods bound for the American troops in Afghanistan, in the next three years, nine months——

General BARNO. I think my perspective would be, unless there is a state failure in Pakistan, that that is—that won't happen. And, again, we are—my handicapping of that was in the 15 percent range. So I think as long as the state of Pakistan remains functioning and remains, you know, in, essentially, alliance with the U.S., and we are mutually supporting each other's goals and objectives—if those lines of communications can stay open.

As you know, there are also a series of other possible lines—the Northern Distribution Network——

Mr. TAYLOR. None of which are very pretty options.

General BARNO. So, at least there is some redundancy in that. But I don't think there is an extraordinarily high risk to the Pakistan supply lines, unless there is a major change in the state situation there.

Mr. TAYLOR. Doctor.

Dr. KILCULLEN. I would just say it depends on what you are actually talking about.
Those supply lines were cut and closed six times last year already, and——

Mr. TAYLOR. I would talk about a hard closure.

Dr. KILCULLEN. As in "permanent closure"?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes.

Dr. KILCULLEN. I think that is reasonably low, unless the Pakistani state loses control of that main north-south route from Karachi, up into Peshawar, and west, to the Khyber Pass.

It is very, very hard to keep that open permanently. But having it closed permanently, I think, is a reasonably low possibility.

But I don’t share the positive prognosis of, you know, a low chance of state failure. I actually think, unless we turn around the policies that we have in place, and unless the Pakistani military, rapidly, gets a lot better at doing this, we are going to see an increasing loss of control.

So, over three years and nine months, you know, that probability drops away.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mister—I hope I would say this properly—Mr. Nawaz?

Mr. NAWAZ. Yes, you did, sir.

I agree that the probability is low. I don’t agree that even, given the further attacks within the country, as well as the challenges faced by the military—that the military, as an institution, would collapse to the extent that it would allow a permanent stoppage to this.

However, there is always a possibility of a serious breakdown of relationships between governments, in the U.S., and in Pakistan. And if that were to occur, for whatever reason, then, of course, we would face this possibility.

I have, unfortunately, like many of my colleagues—have not been able to get clearance to go to Pakistan. I have flown over it a number of times going to Afghanistan.

I am amazed that on the western side of the country, it just strikes me as amazingly sparsely populated.

And, again, I am going to open up to you, General. Would there be any value to trying to route the traffic through the western part of the country, where there are fewer people and, therefore, fewer people to shoot at you?

Would there be any value of trying to work with the Pakistani government to establish such a route, or would that be—how would that be perceived, and is it even necessary?

General BARNO. To clarify, Congressman, are you thinking through Balochistan, or toward the Iranian border?

Mr. TAYLOR. Over closer to——

General BARNO. Well, there is obviously a route up through Karachi, through Spin Boldak, that comes out of Kandahar, and then could come in that way. And there is some traffic there. But my understanding is the majority of the traffic does come through the Khyber Pass.

Mr. TAYLOR. Right.

General BARNO. So my sense would be that it—that is an excellent second option to have, in that route coming up through the south. But that is also an area where most of the military analysts are saying—and I agree—is the center of gravity of the fight right
now—the southern portion of Afghanistan, on the Afghan side of the border.

So there is no particular good answer on this, in terms of security for our route right now, I don’t think.

Mr. Taylor. Is there anything—and, again, I am asking this in the form of a question: Is there anything from the Pakistani government’s point of view that would make that beneficial for them?

Mr. Nawaz. We have talked about the port of Gwadar. It was also featured in a long article in the Atlantic Monthly this month. And that was one of the ideas that I had presented, which was to have a very heavy investment in infrastructure development, linking Gwadar to Afghanistan and, potentially, to Central Asia.

That kind of investment would yield immediate benefit in providing employment for people in Balochistan, because they have very little chance of employment otherwise. And you could also bring into safeguarding that, because of the benefits of transit fees that—and other economic benefits arising from a road and a rail link that could link up to the Afghan border first, and then, perhaps, beyond that.

Mr. Taylor. Do you think a significant number of Pakistani individuals would think that is for the better for their country?

Mr. Nawaz. If you were to give ownership to the provincial population, yes. If it were done as a central, federally controlled enterprise, and contractors brought from outside, then, no.

Mr. Taylor. Okay.

Would any of you—either gentleman—care to comment on that?

Dr. Kilcullen. I agree with that.

Mr. Taylor. Okay.

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, the ranking member, Mr. McHugh.

Mr. McHugh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am going to be very brief. These folks have been extraordinarily patient. And I should preface my comment by saying that, in most ways, I am a supporter of the Administration’s recently released plan for Pakistan and Afghanistan.

I do think there are some concerns with respect to questions—vacuums—that exist in it, that can be filled in less-than-helpful ways. But, nevertheless, I do think that, to his credit, the President and his advisors have laid out a plan forward.

As we have heard here today, obviously, there are other things we can and can, perhaps, should be considering.

But, nevertheless, I have to ask, Mr. Nawaz: This week on National Public Radio, you gave a very interesting interview regarding the Administration’s recent engagement in Pakistan.

I am going to read your quote. And I just would be very interested in your refinement of these very—I guess it is fair to say—strong words.

And I quote, “This is probably the worst-ever visit by an American team. It was a complete disaster. And if this is how you want to win friends, I just wonder how you want to create enemies.” And that is the end of the quote.

Can you help those of us who, obviously, we’re not privy to the details of that visit—what so concerns you about what went on?
Mr. Nawaz. Yes, sir. To paraphrase Orden, “Words have no words that are out of context.” The discussion was about the lead-up to the visit. This was a very critical visit, following the release of the bill in the House, as well as the release of the strategy.

And so there were tremendous expectations. And I began by saying that the heart was in the right place, meaning that the United States was saying and planning on doing a lot of very good things for Pakistan.

Unfortunately, the public message that was conveyed before the visit, through newspaper articles and leaks, created a very serious public backlash within Pakistan.

So it ended up overshadowing whatever positive results may have emerged in the closed-door meetings. And so the public commentary in Pakistan, as well as private feedback that I received, and many others received, was that, you know, “The U.S. is only focused on destroying the Pakistan army, and destroying the ISI.”

And these are very powerful assets of Pakistan.

It just totally took away from the positive message that was contained in the strategy, as well as the many great attributes of the bill that is now being looked at by Congress.

So it was in that context that the opportunity was missed. And I, in fact, compared it to the visit of Prime Minister Nehru, to the United States, in the 1950s, which was also, you know—it was preceded by tremendous expectation. And it didn’t come through. And then, the result was many years of estrangement.

And as a supporter of U.S.-Pakistan friendship, as a supporter of the President’s new approach, I feel that somehow that message got lost.

Mr. Mchugh. Thank you, sir.

Unless one of our other two panelists want to comment on that question, I would yield back, with a final word of deep appreciation to our three distinguished guests, both for their endurance, but more importantly, for their perspective and expertise.

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

Mr. Taylor. The chair thanks the gentleman.

Gentlemen, it is the tradition of Chairman Skelton to limit our witnesses to five minutes. That was in an effort to give every member an opportunity to ask their questions. Since we are still shy of the appointed 4:30 hour that we said we would adjourn, if there is anything that any of you would like to say for the record, before we adjourn, I would welcome your thoughts.

General Barro. I think the only thing I would add would be that, I think, in the dialogue today, it is clear to everyone in this room that this is a very serious problem—perhaps, the most serious security problem that the U.S. is facing over the next several years.

If things go awry, if any of these perspectives on worst-case scenarios begin to accelerate, and become more probable, then there is a great risk that we are going to have an extraordinarily dangerous situation in this part of the world.

And I think, based upon that alone, that the amount of attention that the U.S. is giving this across the government right now, needs to be extraordinarily high—that this could become a crisis very quickly, and I think that, even though we are—and I have person-
ally been highly engaged in the Afghanistan side of the—the
drawn-line aspect here—this particular challenge with Pakistan
could escalate into an extraordinarily serious crisis in a very short
period of time.
And I think it deserves very, very serious attention. And I am
seeing indications that it is certainly getting that right now.
Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, General.
Doctor.
Dr. KILCULLEN. Nothing to really add, sir. But I just want to
summarize, I guess, briefly—my main points.
I think we need to develop, rapidly, a sense of urgency. I am very
courageous by this hearing, and I think that is a good sign. We
need to put somebody in charge of Pakistan policy, one person, and
give them the right staff and authorities to actually come up with
a comprehensive plan.
And that may seem like an obvious statement, but we haven't
yet done that.
We need to hold the Pakistani military and intelligence service
accountable. And I think benchmarks are part of that. But they are
not the full story, because we don't want to get into that pay-for-
performance approach.
We need to dramatically increase support to policing and rule of
law in Pakistan, including civil authorities. And, finally, we need
to call off the drones.
Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you very much, sir.
Mr. Nawaz.
Mr. NAWAZ. Yes, sir.
I would reiterate the issue of partnership; that it is very critical
that there be discussions; that if there are differences, that they be
resolved privately; and that Pakistan understand that it will re-
cieve assistance; that it must be prepared to do its bit to make sure
that it has policies and plans that are not only workable, but that
it will follow through on, so that there are results that it will
achieve for its own purposes, and not solely because the U.S. wants
it to, or the U.S. Congress is looking for those results.
I think this is part of the critical friendship between the two
countries. And in the long run, the more the U.S. is seen as an ally
of the people of Pakistan, and not allied with any single group or
individual, the better it will be for the relationship. Thank you, sir.
Mr. TAYLOR. Again, we want to thank all of our witnesses. I
think you all have done a really great job this afternoon. We appre-
ciate that you have traveled some distance to be here.
The committee now stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

April 23, 2009
NEAR EAST SOUTH ASIA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

David W. Barno
Lt. General, USA (Ret.)
Director

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE TESTIMONY

April 23, 2009

(39)
*Note – The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Department of Defense.

Pakistan – “The War Within”

“At an increasingly alarming rate, the writ of the state and the ability of its organs to uphold fundamental rights of citizens are being eroded. And yet we remain in a state of denial...” -- Najmudoin Shaikh, former Pakistani Foreign Secretary

Pakistan today arguably presents the Unites States with its greatest global strategic challenge. The second largest Islamic country in the world with a population exceeding 160 million – and one armed with nuclear weapons – a meltdown of government and society in Pakistan would rapidly become the preeminent national security threat facing the United States. Events in Pakistan are spiraling out of control, and our options in reversing the downward acceleration are limited at best.

Denial and Disbelief

Often hidden by the shadow of the war in Afghanistan during much of the past eight years, Pakistan has in the last year paradoxically transformed itself into both a democratically elected civilian-led state after nearly a decade of military rule, and yet one now under siege from extremist militants who threaten to upend the very existence of the state itself. Whereas less than four years
ago, Taliban and Al Qaeda extremists were largely confined to the most remote areas bordering Afghanistan, today a creeping “Talibanization” is threatening to encroach into every segment of Pakistani territory and society.

The bloody ending to the 2007 siege of the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in the heart of Islamabad gave notice that violent extremism was no longer containable by Pakistani security forces, and that even the most secular and modernized regions of the country were at risk. For years, the Pakistan intelligence and security services have viewed the Taliban and associated extremist groups as their tools in the long term struggle with India – forces that could be generated, shaped and directed to serve the interests of the Pakistani state. That day is now irrevocably over. A struggle for the very soul of Pakistan has commenced, and the state of Pakistan has a fatally weak hand to play in this conflict. A key role of the United States and our international friends and allies must be to strengthen this hand.

Compounding this challenge to the Pakistani state is the internally conflicted nature of Pakistan regarding the extremist threat. Extremist forces exemplified by the Taliban but also including such disparate but associated groups as the Haqqani network, Al Qaeda, Laskar e Taiba, TNSM, or the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan have successfully cloaked themselves in the piety of the Islamic faith, while taking on roles and actions that violate many of Islam’s basic precepts. Tragically, there are no substantive moderate voices representing more moderate views of
Islam and its teachings; the field is wholly uncontested. Where such voices speak out, they are intimidated or killed by those who are simply co-opting conservative Islamic belief to buttress their positions of power. The recent so-called “peace agreement” signed by the Pakistani government that permits the province of Swat to be governed by extreme Sharia law exemplifies this trend. Perversely, that very province voted last year for strongly secular political leadership in an election that resoundingly rejected Islamist parties. The outcome of that election has been effectively reversed by Taliban power exercised solely through the barrel of a gun – an ominous trend that is inexorably moving from tribal areas toward the settled regions of Pakistan.

The Pakistani Security Services

The Pakistani military and intelligence services today find themselves on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, the extremists groups that are now beginning to threaten directly the writ of the central government are groups of their own creation – created both to prosecute the conflict with India in Kashmir (and more indirectly, Afghanistan) and at one time to fight the Soviets at the behest of the U.S. The fundamental premise of the Pakistani security services has long been: “we can control these forces.” Unfortunately, the viral and burgeoning forces unleashed today can no longer be controlled, and the Pakistani military has been slow to grasp this change.
On the other hand, the Pakistani military is profoundly ambivalent about fighting Islamist militants on Pakistan’s soil. Whereas the Pakistani Army of the late 20th Century was a solidly secular institution, the Army of today is both far more religious and more anti-American. 12 years of sanctions had the unintended consequence of depriving a generation of Pakistani junior officers – the “Lost Generation” – of exposure to U.S. military education and an appreciation for our respect of human rights, civilian control and a host of doctrinal fundamentals. Fighting fellow Islamic “miscreants” is deeply unpopular among the rank and file of the military, especially since such combat is often viewed as simply fighting “America’s war.” There remains a strong conviction (which contributes to Pakistani denial of the threat) that the spiraling terrorist attacks spreading across Pakistan would somehow end if Pakistan stopped supporting the United States in its war in Afghanistan.

Most centrally, the Pakistani military and intelligence services remain convinced that the prime enemy of Pakistan continues to be India. No experienced Pakistani security or political leaders truly believe in the depth of their hearts that the United States is a long-term player in the region, much less a reliable partner to Pakistan. The U.S. – Indian nuclear power agreement cemented this mistrust in Pakistan, and reversing this widely held dogma will be extraordinarily difficult if not impossible. In this perspective, all decisions must be reached based upon how those decisions will look the “day after” the United States leaves – again. Memories of 1989 remain fresh and painful
on both sides of the Afghan – Pakistan border, and the best American intentions and policies of today have difficulty competing with the unalterable recent U.S. history in the region.

Many of our emerging U.S. remedies for helping Pakistan counter their increasing internal terrorist threat (and by extension, support our aims in Afghanistan) revolve around improving the counter-insurgency capabilities of the Pakistani Army and Frontier Corps. This is an admirable goal for both forces, but we should remain coldly objective about its prospects for success.

At root, neither the Army nor the paramilitary Frontier Corps has serious incentive to improve its ability to fight against the very people who, in reality, comprise the recruiting ground for many of its rank and file soldiers. In a military socialized from day one to see India as the existential threat to the nation, stepping away from that ingrained outlook (and the weaponry, formations and doctrine that accompany it) is an immense and unwelcome change. Moreover, in an Army that has become more religious, more culturally sympathetic to the extremists and more anti-American, simply receiving more American training equipment and advice is unlikely to change the dynamics of battlefield success on the ground. Indeed, sometimes the Army’s senior leadership does not even allow the U.S. to provide the training, fearing that perhaps it will result in an expansion of the U.S. presence. The Pakistani military has both problems of “will” as well as “skill.” Pakistani corps commanders have embraced
terrorist leaders (e.g., Nek Muhammed) in signing feckless peace agreements designed to remove the Army from that which they were blatantly losing.

Senior Pakistani military leadership remain convinced that soon after NATO and the U.S. give up on Afghanistan, their intractable battle with India will once again resume – and that they must retain both the conventional (Army, nuclear weapons) and unconventional (counter-terrorist) capabilities to fight this next phase of the war. This sober estimation of Pakistani national interests after the expected withdrawal of international military forces from neighboring Afghanistan demands that they as professional military men be prepared to prepare for what comes next – in their view, a resumption of the cold (and occasionally hot) war with neighboring India.

Outcomes

There are few realistic positive outcomes imaginable for Pakistan over the next few years. Three possible scenarios frame the many possibilities:

**State Failure:** A combination of accelerating economic decline and terrorist violence fueled by ineffective leadership in Islamabad destroys the economic and political viability of the country. A return to military rule in an attempt to stabilize the situation leads to nation-wide protests and a popular revolt, led by hard-line Islamist factions. A radical Islamic revolutionary government emerges mirroring the 1996 Taliban takeover in
Afghanistan. Elites and the major portions of the middle class flee.

**Stalemate:** The descending spiral continues with some staunching of the economic bleeding by international financial supports. The military and intelligence services restore some degree of control over the insurgents and gain some counterinsurgency proficiency to gain leverage. Insurgent gains in Afghanistan provide depth to the Pakistani Taliban and other extremists. Weak political leadership continues with some growth of governing capacity. Peace deals with insurgents continue, but are limited to elements of the border provinces where the insurgents consolidate control.

**Gradual Improvement:** Pakistan achieves a political rapprochement with India. The economy is precariously stabilized. Civilian leadership gains a foothold and is buttressed by non-lethal U.S. and international aid. The Army recognizes that it no longer has political or financial support for major capabilities designed to fight India. In order to preserve force structure and military aid, it reorients key portions of the force to fight insurgents although actual combat actions are rare. Grudging support is provided for continued drone attacks. Allied success against the insurgents in Afghanistan weakens their leverage in Pakistan. Intelligence cooperation improves leading to more arrests of Al Qaeda leaders.

**Prescriptions**
Within a new overarching U.S. policy approach to “Af-Pak,” Pakistan requires its own strategy and its own solutions separate from but related to Afghanistan. The U.S. must assist Pakistan in managing change—economically, militarily, perhaps even societal—as it deals with immense problems brought about by a deadly combination of both internal and external factors.

First and foremost, the U.S. must objectively assess what factors are required to cause positive change in Pakistani decision-making regarding their internal extremist threat, and their relations with the United States. Altering the Pakistani Calculus—the “double game”—must be our first objective. Without demonstrable success on that front, any combination of U.S. leadership, new strategies or carefully targeted growth in resources is doomed to failure. The U.S. must lend its weight to a India-Pakistan rapprochement to deepen and make permanent the nascent effort of the Musharraf years.

The U.S. must also partner with the Pakistani government to develop a vision of a long-term strategic partnership between Pakistan and United States—not one simply based upon today’s transactional relationship anchored in fighting terrorists in the tribal areas. Much like the U.S. has evolved the idea of a long-term strategic partnership with India, commensurate effort must be invested into a parallel track with Pakistan—but not as a zero sum game. We can not continue to provide Pakistan with assistance and hope that simply they will take action against extremists. Pakistan must show its own commitment to the long-term
relationship by no longer hedging their relationships with us.

As to Pakistan’s relationship to the conflict in Afghanistan, U.S. success in reversing the decline in Afghanistan and achieving success would increase our leverage with Pakistan. Arguably, much of the schizophrenic Pakistani approach to the Afghan conflict today is based upon their expectation that the U.S. and our allies lack staying power – and will move rapidly for the exits if failure is imminent. Success in Afghanistan might reverse that perception and lend much greater credibility to U.S. statements of long-term commitment.

Finally, continued and expanded resource support for the civil government of Pakistan and the security services – conditioned “lightly” to performance, but respectful of Pakistani sovereignty – is essential. Pakistan as a state on a trajectory leading toward failure – and the U.S. must prevent this option at almost all costs. That said, American aid detached from performance by the Pakistani government and military has proved fruitless. Reasonable benchmarks of Pakistani progress in using American (and other international aid) is a reasonable price for the willingness of American and other taxpayers to underwrite the future of Pakistan as a state. Pakistan is not fighting for the West – it is a nation fighting for its very survival. We cannot allow it to fail at this task.
Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Hearing on HR 1886, the
Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement (PEACE) Act 2009

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on one of the most pressing national security issues facing the United States anywhere in the world today. I'll keep my initial remarks brief, but would like to set the scene with a concise review of the situation in Pakistan, some general comments on the bill, benchmarks and accountability.

Review of the situation

Since 2001 the United States has spent about $10 billion on assistance to Pakistan, including between $80 and $120 million per month on coalition support funds relating to Pakistani support for operations in Afghanistan.

Most of this assistance has been focused on the Pakistani military, while we have provided an extremely small amount of help to the Pakistani police and judiciary system – Pakistani police funding, for example, has been running at about 0.6% of military funding. I'll come back to this point in a moment.

During the same timeframe, we've seen a severe deterioration in security in Pakistan, a major increase in violence, extremism and insurgency, a progressive loss of government control over population and territory, a spread of insurgency and terrorism, and continuing complicity by some elements of the Pakistani military and intelligence services with terrorists and insurgents in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and elsewhere.

In my view, American taxpayers and legislators are entitled to ask what we have gotten for our $10 billion dollars, and whether doing more of the same is likely to produce a better result. Some highlights (or perhaps low points) of developments in Pakistan include:

- The 2004 Shakal agreement, where the Pakistani army surrendered to militant demands after losing a campaign in Waziristan, and negotiated directly with Pakistani Taliban leaders, empowering them over local community leaders and ceding control of parts of Waziristan to them.
- The subsequent takeover by Pakistani Taliban of large portions of the FATA, the Malakand Division, the Northern Areas, and parts of Baluchistan.
- The September 2006 North Waziristan agreement, which again was signed directly between militants and the military (after another failed campaign), and led to a seasonally-adjusted spike in Taliban infiltration into Afghanistan of 400-600% over the fall and winter of 2006-7.
- The July 2007 Lal Masjid incident, where the army suppressed a militant takeover of a major mosque in downtown Islamabad, Pakistan's capital, mounting a lengthy siege then killing hundreds of people and leading to numerous subsequent retaliatory suicide bombings all over Pakistan.
- The December 2007 assassination of Benazir Bhutto in Rawalpindi, close to Pakistani Army headquarters, after she had publicly expressed concern that members of the military and intelligence services were trying to kill her.
- The July 2008 Indian embassy bombing in Kabul, which Afghan Intelligence concluded was supported by ISI, the Pakistani intelligence service, and was allegedly carried out by members of the Haqqani
Network, a Pakistan-based terrorist organization that operates in Afghanistan, targets US forces in Regional Command – East, and has close ties to ISI.

- The September 2008 bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad, the most prestigious hotel in the city, which was frequently used by diplomats and visiting US officials, an attack that killed or wounded 230 people and almost totally destroyed the hotel.

- The large-scale terrorist attack on Mumbai in November 2008, which was launched from the Pakistani port of Karachi, killed hundreds and was allegedly carried out by members of Lashkar e-Tayyiba, a militant group sponsored and trained by the ISI and Pakistani military, and after which the sole surviving attacker, Mohammed Ajmal Kasab, admitted to receiving training for approximately one year before the attack from retired or active-duty Pakistan military and intelligence personnel.

- The closing of the US/NATO line of communications through Pakistan to Afghanistan at least 6 times in 2008, including the destruction of hundreds of NATO vehicles and other equipment along a route that is supposedly protected by the Pakistani military.

- The March 2009 attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore, which left 6 Pakistanis dead.

- Ongoing relationships between militants, terrorists and members of the Pakistani military and intelligence service, which were acknowledged by senior Pakistani officials in interviews with the New York Times in March 2009.

- The killing of hundreds of local officials, mauls and non-Taliban religious and community leaders across NWFP, Baluchistan and other parts of the country.

- The imposition of sharia law and Taliban vigilante "justice" across much of the FATA, the Frontier Regions, and most recently in Swat, to the exclusion of Pakistani law and government judicial system.

- Numerous incidents in which Pakistani military or Frontier Corps posts have allegedly fired on US forces inside Afghanistan, preventing them from chasing Taliban who were withdrawing from Afghanistan into Pakistan, and allowing the Taliban to escape back to their sanctuaries in Pakistan.

- Several incidents of Taliban allegedly setting up firing positions for mortars or rockets, either next to or in clear view of Pakistani military bases on the frontier, without interference from the Pakistani army.

- Incidents where Taliban targets within Pakistan allegedly moved or disappeared after details of their locations were passed to Pakistani authorities.

- The rioting and unrest in Lahore and other major cities in March 2009.

- The Swat Agreement of March and April 2009, which ceded control over Swat, along with other parts of the Malakand division of NWFP, to Taliban and TNSM militants, and the imposition of Sharia law.

- The continuing insurgency in Baluchistan which has resulted in parts of the province becoming a no-go area for Pakistani forces, and the maintenance of Taliban headquarters and base camps in and around Quetta and in refugee camps in the province.

- The creation of militant safe houses and operational cells in major Pakistani cities such as Peshawar, Quetta, Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad.

- The increasing severity of attacks on Pakistan’s Shia population, with beheadings, torture and gruesome killings of Shia men, women and children by militants across large areas of Western Pakistan, a problem that is approaching a slow-motion genocide in some areas.

- Desertions, defections and cooption of Pakistani military, police, frontier corps and civil officials in large numbers across much of western Pakistan, as well as the intimidation of security forces so that many troops remain in their garrison areas and over-react when provoked.
- The increasing presence of foreign fighters, and large numbers of Punjabi militants, in the FATA and NWFP over the past year.

I could go on at even more length; suffice to say that there is overwhelming evidence of:

- a Pakistani civilian government that does not control its own national security establishment,
- security services that have been complicit in allowing the takeover of parts of the country by militants,
- direct or indirect sponsorship of international terrorism by elements of the Pakistani national security establishment,
- ongoing support by the same national security establishment for Insurgents who are killing Americans in Afghanistan, and
- a militant movement that is growing in reach and intensity week by week.

This has occurred during the same time period when we have given the Pakistani military $10 billion dollars for what this bill describes as “invaluable” assistance and partnership against extremism and terrorism. I would respectfully submit that members of Congress ought to feel entitled to ask why, given this performance, we propose to now increase assistance to the same people, and what new measures we propose to ensure that the new bill won’t simply throw good money after bad.

I’m extremely heartened by the emphasis on benchmarks, accountability and conditionality in section 206 of this bill, but I wonder whether even this will be enough without a wholesale political change of heart in Pakistan. Given how long-standing and ingrained the support for militants has become within some elements of the Pakistani national security establishment, and how weak the civilian government is, members of Congress may decide that what is required here is fundamental, root-and-branch reform of the Pakistani military, and bringing it firmly under the authority of civilian elected officials, before we are likely to see any substantive improvement in the situation.

General Comments on the bill

Section 2 of the bill defines counterinsurgency, but there are many different approaches to counterinsurgency, some of which work and some of which do not. Members of Congress might decide to go further in specifying what types of counterinsurgency activity we seek to see in Pakistan – rather than the heavy-handed violent tactics that have alienated the people and lost ground, we need to see the evidence-based best practices that we have seen in successful counterinsurgency campaigns elsewhere.

There is a certain amount of wishful thinking in the bill – Pakistan’s behavior does not match the bill’s description of Pakistan in Section 3 as a weak but willing partner who needs assistance. Pakistan is weak, but large parts of the Pakistani security establishment are also unwilling to accept our help, to do more against the Taliban and other militants, or are even actively supporting the enemy or complicit in allowing extremist takeover. The attitude of the Pakistani military establishment, and the whole tenor of civil-military relations in Pakistan, needs to change, otherwise additional assistance will ultimately help the enemy.

In my personal view, the bill gives insufficient attention, and insufficient funding, to reforming and building up the Pakistani police, including the Frontier Constabulary and the regular police. The police are a critically important element in any counterinsurgency, and I am not aware of any successful campaign in which police reform, police capability-building, police intelligence and the use of police to protect the population and uphold
law and order, were not key components. Pakistan needs a much larger, much better equipped, better trained, better supported and better paid police force. The fact that it doesn’t have one is partly because the police are a major institutional rival to the army, and we have funneled the vast majority of our aid to, and through, the military. From a policy standpoint, increasing police reform and assistance efforts would thus serve four purposes at the same time – it would protect the Pakistani people, improve counterinsurgency performance, enhance the rule of law and weaken the stranglehold of the army over the civilian leadership of Pakistan.

The Pakistani police need better training in counterinsurgency, better communications, better protected mobility, better weapons and equipment, personal protective equipment, better intelligence and Special Branch capabilities, better accommodation and defensible living quarters to protect their families, a capability for constabulary (or paramilitary) policing, a capability for police Special Operations and counterterrorism, better training in investigative and community policing techniques, and access to better support from the legal and judicial system, which the bill rightly identifies as a key area for assistance.

We should also note that unlike the army and ISI, the police force is the only element of the Pakistani security forces which, as an institution, has a greater stake in upholding law and order, preventing state collapse and combating extremism, than in preparing to fight India. The police also lack the institutional tradition of cooperating with extremists that exists in the army and intelligence service.

Furthermore, unlike military capabilities which can easily be diverted into other purposes or turned against other regional countries or forces, police capabilities are harder to misuse and less threatening to outside players including the United States.

My professional judgment is that our assistance to Pakistan needs to include a very substantial increase in the amount of attention and funding given to the police, and to police reform. Of course, Police without functioning local civil authorities, district officers, political agents, courts, prisons, attorneys, judges, legal codes and all the other components of a functioning administrative and judicial system are likely to be ineffective, so this needs to be included also as part of a comprehensive approach.

Section 4 of the bill mentions the need to “prevent any territory of Pakistan from being used as a base or conduit for terrorist attacks in Pakistan, Afghanistan, or elsewhere”. I would respectfully submit that we are way past the prevention stage. Dealing with safe haven was the problem in 2003. Since the Army moved into the FATA in strength in 2004 we have seen a spreading and increasing militant movement that now threatens most of Pakistan. Rather than prevention, in 2009 (and probably 2010 also) Pakistan needs to focus on rollback – preserving and protecting those parts of Pakistan that are still reasonably secure, restoring Pakistani government control and security in these areas, focusing on protecting people rather than fighting the Taliban, and then beginning to roll back the insurgency in subsequent years.

**Benchmarks**

None of this will happen without a change of heart in the Pakistani military and intelligence services that currently support the enemy, or without a substantial increase in Pakistani civilian political control over their own national security establishment. For this reason, I find the bill’s focus on benchmarks, accountability, conditionality and assessment very encouraging. I especially support the requirement to channel all funding to the Pakistani military through civilian authorities. In particular, unless or until the Pakistani military
demonstrates that it is no longer supporting or acting in complicity with militants, Congress might consider it appropriate to allocate the bulk of that funding to the Pakistani police.

Congress may wish to consider the additional of further benchmarks, currently not included, which might include:

- a requirement for Pakistan to improve its performance in protecting NATO/US lines of communication and supply routes that pass through its territory,
- a requirement for Pakistan to demonstrate increased obedience by its military and intelligence services to direction given by the civilian government,
- an improvement in police capability,
- a drop in incidents of assassination and intimidation of community leaders and civilian officials,
- a drop in civilian non-combatant casualties inflicted by the military on the civilian population of Pakistan, thereby demonstrating a commitment to humane treatment and protection of the population.

**Bottom Line**

The United States Government has spent $10 billion dollars supporting Pakistan since 9/11, and in that time we have seen a dramatically worsening situation across the whole country. More of the same will not help, and indeed may make the situation worse. I fully support the benchmarks in the bill and would like to see an even greater emphasis on rule of law, policing and civilian administration, with even greater conditionality and stringency placed on continued assistance to the Pakistani military, unless and until it demonstrates a genuine commitment to cease supporting the enemy and begin following the direction of its own elected civilian government.

Rather than continuing to pretend that Pakistan is a weak but willing ally against extremism, we need to recognize that while some elements in Pakistan — some elected civilian political leaders, the majority of the Pakistani people, many tribal and community leaders and some appointed administrative officials — are genuinely committed to the fight against extremism, substantial parts of the Pakistani security establishment are complicit with the enemy, whether through incompetence, intimidation or ill intent. Our approach in assisting Pakistan should be to strengthen our friends and limit the power of our enemies, while helping Pakistan stabilize itself and govern its people responsibly and humanely. Increasing assistance to the police — making the police, in effect, the premier counterinsurgency force — while channeling all military support through civilian authorities and ensuring greater accountability and conditionality on military assistance, is the correct approach. We are way past prevention in 2009, and need to focus on stopping the rot and stabilizing the situation in 2009-2010, then rolling back extremism and militancy thereafter.
Testimony before the House Armed Service Committee
“The Future of the US-Pakistan Military Partnership”
April 23, 2009

Shuja Nawaz
Director, South Asia Center
The Atlantic Council of the United States

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, Members of the Committee, I am honored to be asked to speak about this important issue before your committee today. We at the Atlantic Council recently produced a report on Pakistan that offers detailed suggestions on aid for that country.

The United States and Pakistan have had a roller-coaster relationship, marked with highs of deep friendship followed by estrangement. The two countries now are partners again in an attempt to roll back the tide of obscurantism and militancy that grips Afghanistan and Pakistan today. Yet, a deep distrust marks this relationship arising out of the pattern of engagement. This distrust is rooted in both perceptions and reality.

The United States befriended Pakistan most often when it had autocratic rulers and provided the most aid to Pakistan during periods of autocratic rule when Pakistan was seen as an ally of US strategic interests in the region. The intervening periods of civilian rule often were marked by distance and coolness. And a strong perception was created over time in Pakistani minds that the United States did not understand or care for Pakistan’s domestic needs or security concerns.
Mr. Chairman, Pakistan lives in a tough neighborhood. It is in the shadow of India, a major nuclear power to the east, and powerful neighbors such as China, Iran, and an unstable Afghanistan. Internally it is wracked by a rising militancy that is attempting to force its convoluted view of Islam on a largely moderate population. Pakistan has suffered repeated military rule and corrupt civilian governments that often were in the hands of a feudalistic elite or family-run political parties. Over shadowing all this is a powerful and well organized Pakistan army that repeatedly used its coercive power to take charge of the country.

Today, the United States and Pakistan are at a new crossroads: there is an opportunity to forge a new relationship between the people of the two countries and to overturn the historical patterns. Civil society in Pakistan is on the rise and deserves support. The Chief of army staff of the Pakistan army is publicly committed to withdrawing the army from politics, and the new Administration in Washington is committed to a strategy to help build Pakistan via a long-term assistance program that will strengthen its defence while improving the economy. If Washington succeeds in these efforts, it will help break the yo-yo pattern of the US-Pakistan relationship.

But there are challenges to overcome:

- The US must ensure that its aid is not seen solely in support of its battle in Afghanistan and directed largely toward the border region of Pakistan
- This aid must not be seen by the people of Pakistan as short-term and aimed at propping up any single person, party, or group.
• The US and its allies must attempt to reduce the causes of regional hostility between India and Pakistan.

• Pakistan needs to ensure that its government prepares viable and practicable plans for using economic aid effectively and efficiently and controls corruption so aid reaches the poorest segments of society.

• The government of Pakistan also needs to craft a broad consensus in support of a strategy to fight the militants, and strengthen the hands of the silent and moderate majority.

• Pakistan also needs to accelerate the doctrinal shift from conventional military thinking to counterinsurgency and build its capacity to reclaim the areas of militancy. The civilians can then hold and re-build those areas.

Certain key elements of US aid will be needed in this regard:

• First, there must a focus on building up police and para-military capacity to isolate militants from within the communities.

• Second, community-based assistance and a heavy investment in infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, are needed to help aid reach target communities directly. The current system of aid flows must change so aid money is not soaked up by expensive overheads in Washington, Islamabad, or provincial capitals.

• Third, the ability of the Pakistan army to fight a mobile militancy should be enhanced by proving it more heli-lift capability, helicopter gunships, transport, and night vision goggles.
• Fourth, the IMET training program for Pakistan’s military needs to rise dramatically and additional training needs to be organized in the country and in the region to expose larger numbers officers at all ranks to new thinking on counterinsurgency.

• Finally, I suggest strongly that the current Coalition Support Fund model of reimbursement for Pakistani operations in the border region should be ended. This is a cause of deep resentment in the army and civil society since it makes the Pakistani army a “hired force” and makes this America’s War not Pakistan’s own war. Let both sides agree to the objectives, benchmarks, and indicators of success and let the US provide aid for those broad objectives without detailed accounting. We need to rebuild trust between these two allies. Questioning reimbursement claims has the opposite effect.

Mr. Chairman, I do not believe in blank checks. Mutually agreed conditions of aid, rather that unilaterally imposed conditions are the best way of engendering trust. We have to make sure that we set targets that help Pakistan achieve its potential, while ensuring its security and integrity. Creating a safe neighborhood in South Asia will help toward that end.

Thank you Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and Members of the Committee. I am prepared to answer your questions.