[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION'S CALL TO
ACTION ON AIRLINE SAFETY
AND PILOT TRAINING
=======================================================================
(111-62)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
AVIATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 23, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman
NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, JOHN L. MICA, Florida
Vice Chair DON YOUNG, Alaska
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
Columbia VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
JERROLD NADLER, New York FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
CORRINE BROWN, Florida JERRY MORAN, Kansas
BOB FILNER, California GARY G. MILLER, California
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi Carolina
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania SAM GRAVES, Missouri
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York Virginia
MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois CONNIE MACK, Florida
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia
JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio
TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
HEATH SHULER, North Carolina MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York VERN BUCHANAN, Florida
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky
JOHN J. HALL, New York ANH ``JOSEPH'' CAO, Louisiana
STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin AARON SCHOCK, Illinois
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee PETE OLSON, Texas
LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
PHIL HARE, Illinois
JOHN A. BOCCIERI, Ohio
MARK H. SCHAUER, Michigan
BETSY MARKEY, Colorado
PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York
THOMAS S. P. PERRIELLO, Virginia
DINA TITUS, Nevada
HARRY TEAGUE, New Mexico
VACANCY
(ii)
Subcommittee on Aviation
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois, Chairman
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin
PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
Columbia JERRY MORAN, Kansas
BOB FILNER, California SAM GRAVES, Missouri
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania Virginia
MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii CONNIE MACK, Florida
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
JOHN J. HALL, New York JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California VERN BUCHANAN, Florida
JOHN A. BOCCIERI, Ohio BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky
NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia
CORRINE BROWN, Florida
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
MARK H. SCHAUER, Michigan
VACANCY
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
(Ex Officio)
(iii)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ vi
TESTIMONY
Babbitt, Hon. Randolph, Administrator, Federal Aviation
Administration................................................. 4
Brady, Dr. Tim, Past President, Aviation Accreditation Board
International.................................................. 4
Cohen, Roger, President, Regional Airline Association............ 4
Loftus, John Michael, Father of Madeline Loftus, on behalf of the
families of Continental Flight 3407............................ 4
May, James C., President and CEO, Air Transport Association...... 4
Prater, Captain John, President, Airline Pilots Association
International.................................................. 4
Skiles, Jeffrey, Vice President, Coalition of Airline Pilots
Association.................................................... 4
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Carnahan, Hon. Russ, of Missouri................................. 96
Cohen, Hon. Steve, of Tennessee.................................. 97
Costello, Hon. Jerry F., of Illinois............................. 98
Mitchell, Hon. Harry E., of Arizona.............................. 108
Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota............................ 109
Richardson, Hon. Laura, of California............................ 115
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Babbitt, Hon. Randolph........................................... 117
Brady, Dr. Tim................................................... 126
Cohen, Roger..................................................... 146
Loftus, John Michael............................................. 157
May, James C..................................................... 172
Prater, Captain John............................................. 177
Skiles, Jeffrey.................................................. 188
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Babbitt, Hon. Randolph, Administrator, Federal Aviation
Administration:................................................
Response to question from Rep. Richardson, a Representative
in Congress from the State of California................. 36
Response to request for information from Rep. Richardson, a
Representative in Congress from the State of California.. 39
Brady, Dr. Tim, Past President, Aviation Accreditation Board
International, rebuttal to Jeffrey Skiles' testimony........... 139
Cohen, Roger, President, Regional Airline Association, responses
to questions from Rep. Costello, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Illinois..................................... 152
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HEARING ON THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION'S CALL TO ACTION ON
AIRLINE SAFETY AND PILOT TRAINING
----------
Wednesday, September 23, 2009
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Aviation,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jerry F.
Costello [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Mr. Costello. The Subcommittee will come to order. The
Chair will ask all Members, staff, and everyone to turn
electronic devices off or on vibrate.
The Subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony
regarding the FAA Call to Action on Airline Safety and Pilot
Training. I will give a brief opening statement and then call
on the Ranking Member, Mr. Petri, for his opening statement or
any remarks that he may have, and then we will attempt to go
directly to our witnesses.
I welcome everyone to the Aviation Subcommittee hearing on
the Federal Aviation Administration Call to Action on Airline
Safety and Pilot Training. I think it is important that as we
discuss airline safety and improving pilot training standards
that we remember one of the important reasons why we are here
today.
On February 12, 2009, Colgan Air, doing business as
Continetal Connection Flight 3407, crashed en route to Buffalo
Niagara International airport. All 45 passengers and the four
crew members died, as well as one person on the ground. Mr.
Mike Loftus, his daughter Madeline was a passenger on Flight
3407. I am pleased he is here again with us, joining us today
to offer his testimony, and the Subcommittee extends our
sincere condolences to you, as well as other family members and
friends who lost loved ones in this tragic accident.
While the NTSB continues to investigate the cause, the 3-
day public hearing on the accident clearly identified the need
to closely examine the regulations governing pilot training and
rest requirements and the oversight necessary to ensure their
compliance with a particular focus on regional airlines.
At the outset I would like to commend you, Administrator
Babbitt, for your leadership and your quick response to these
safety issues. You acknowledged early on that the practices in
the regional airline industry are not acceptable, and you
acted. Soon after our Subcommittee hearing on June 11, an
airline safety and pilot training call to action was announced
to help us gather information from the airlines and labor
organizations to determine industry best practices and seek
volunteer compliance with a number of safety initiatives. I
believe that the call to action has helped focus the regional
air carrier safety discussion in the aviation community, in
Congress, and with the public.
Today's hearing is the first of many oversight hearings on
the status of the FAA's call to action. Over the past several
months the FAA held 12 regional safety forums around the
country. I understand that all were well attended.
While there are positive indicators that the FAA and the
stakeholders have made progress, there is also a lot that we do
not know about the results of these efforts. One of the reasons
we have raw and incomplete data is because the FAA did not
impose or suggest firm deadlines for labor or industry to
complete the recommended action items.
On June 24, Administrator Babbitt wrote 105 airlines and
eight unions asking for commitments to specific action items.
Three months later less than half have responded to your
request. As a result, we only have preliminary information
regarding what specifically these organizations have committed
to do. A response of less than 50 percent to the FAA is exactly
why we cannot rely on voluntary compliance.
I don't believe at this point you, Mr. Babbitt, nor the
airline industry or the labor groups can tell us with any
degree of confidence what the substance of the voluntary
commitments are. That is why Congress must enact comprehensive
safety legislation that will increase safety across the board.
I know that we are expecting a more comprehensive report from
the FAA on what progress that you have made sometime in
December, by the end of the year. And the Subcommittee will
convene another hearing to review what the FAA has proposed in
order to measure your progress.
Meanwhile, we intend to uphold our commitment to the
families of Flight 3407 and the American public. This
Subcommittee will continue aggressive oversight to strengthen
airline safety and pilot training qualification standards.
Congress has the ability to improve aviation safety standards,
and that is exactly what we intend to do with H.R. 3371.
As you will recall after the June 11 hearing on regional
air carriers and pilot work force issues, Chairman Oberstar,
Ranking Member Mica, Mr. Petri, and I made a commitment that we
would work together to address many of the safety issues that
were raised in the hearing. Based upon the input we received,
which included ideas from Members of Congress and additional
meetings with the FAA, the pilots unions, the airlines, and
others in the aviation community, we introduced bipartisan
legislation, H.R. 3371, in July. We had a specific goal in
mind, to raise the bar on the minimum level of safety to ensure
there is one level of safety across the industry.
To address pilot qualifications the bill increases the
minimum flight hours required to be hired as an airline pilot.
There is a consensus among pilots and many in the aviation
community that 250 flight hours is simply not enough, and that
safety would be improved by raising these standards. Under H.R.
3371, all prospective airline pilots would be required to
obtain an airline transport pilot license, which is currently
needed to be an airline captain. It requires a minimum of 1,500
flight hours. Our goal is to ensure that both the first officer
and the captain have the same minimum level of experience,
training, and skills to transport passengers and crew safely.
The ATP license also requires additional aeronautical
knowledge, crew resource management training and greater flight
proficiency testing. Some in the aviation community have
expressed concerns with the provisions to require an ATP
license. I think Administrator Babbitt had it right in his
speech to the Airline Pilot Association, and I quote you, Mr.
Babbitt, in that speech. If you think the safety bar is set too
high, then your standards are set too low.
Our bill is a comprehensive effort to consolidate what we
know industry wide about aviation safety to improve safety
performance going forward. That is why the call to action is so
important. From the airlines, we need to know if they are using
FOQA and ASAP and if they are working in partnership with the
regional partners on specific and concrete ways to ensure the
regional airlines adopt and implement the most effective safety
practices. From the pilots, we need to know if they established
and published a code of ethics to set expectations for
professional behavior or have professional standards and an
ethics committee. This is all valuable information and data
that we need in order to evaluate pilot training and
qualification programs.
Before I recognize Mr. Petri for his opening statement, I
would ask unanimous consent to allow 2 weeks for all Members to
revise and extend their remarks and to permit submission of
additional statements and materials by Members and witnesses.
Without objection, so ordered.
At this time the Chair recognizes the Ranking Member of the
Subcommittee, Mr. Petri.
Mr. Petri. Mr. Chairman, thank you for scheduling this
important follow-up hearing to our June 11 hearing on air
carrier safety. Well, as we all know, statistically, U.S.
commercial aviation is very safe. Accidents remind us that
there are improvements that still may be made and that there
are lessons to be learned in these tragic losses.
With today's hearing, we continue our focus on the common
goal of improving that safety record even further. As the
families of victims of Flight 3407 remind us, we can and must
do everything in our power to ensure that what happened on the
day that they lost their loved ones must never happen again. I
believe we are all committed to that shared goal.
In the aftermath of the tragic loss of Continental Flight
3407 on February 12, 2009, this Subcommittee explored many
issues relating to safety of the airline system with special
emphasis on regional air carriers. In addition, Mr. Mica, Mr.
Costello, Mr. Oberstar, and I introduced the bipartisan Airline
Safety and Pilot Training Improvement Act of 2009 to address
the critical safety issues considered at our hearing.
At roughly the same time the FAA launched a call to action
on air carrier safety, and I would like to join in thanking the
Administrator for that effort and for joining us this morning
and look forward to hearing his update on the progress of the
wide-ranging initiatives concluded in the FAA's plan. I am
interested in learning about the ongoing regulatory effort at
the FAA to address pilot training, record availability,
professionalism, and fatigue. Additionally, we will explore
what improvements can be put in place to improve air carrier
hiring practices and training oversight.
I would especially like to thank Mr. Loftus, who is with us
here today testifying on behalf of the families of Continental
Flight 3407. Welcome back. I appreciate you and the other
family members' insights and contributions to the discussion of
how to best improve aviation safety. Your efforts here on
Capitol Hill have been very helpful.
In three of the five recent fatal regional air carrier
accidents, the National Transportation Safety Board cited pilot
performance as a potential contributory factor. In Flight 3407
pilot performance seems to have played a role. I look forward
to hearing from the Administrator and the pilots union what
specific actions they are talking to improve peer auditing and
professional conduct.
Again, I want to thank the witnesses for their
participation and yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the Ranking Member and now
will recognize and introduce the witnesses. The first witness
that will be testifying is the Honorable Randy Babbitt, who is
the Administrator for the Federal Aviation Administration; Mr.
John Loftus, who is the father of Madeline Loftus, and he is
here testifying on behalf of the families of Continental Flight
3407. And I know that a number of family members and loved ones
are in the audience here today at this hearing. Captain John
Prater, who is the President of the Airline Pilots Association
International; Mr. Roger Cohen, who is the President of the
Regional Airline Association; Mr. James May, who is the
President and CEO of the Air Transport Association; Dr. Tim
Brady, who is the past President, Aviation Accreditation Board
International; and Mr. Jeffrey Skiles, Vice President,
Coalition of Airline Pilots Association.
Gentlemen, I would ask you--we have a 5-minute rule. I
would ask you to summarize your statements so that we have
plenty of time for questions and a discussion about many of
these issues. So the Chair now recognizes Administrator
Babbitt.
STATEMENTS OF THE HON. RANDOLPH BABBITT, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION; JOHN MICHAEL LOFTUS, FATHER OF
MADELINE LOFTUS, ON BEHALF OF THE FAMILIES OF CONTINENTAL
FLIGHT 3407; CAPTAIN JOHN PRATER, PRESIDENT, AIRLINE PILOTS
ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL; ROGER COHEN, PRESIDENT, REGIONAL
AIRLINE ASSOCIATION; JAMES C. MAY, PRESIDENT AND CEO, AIR
TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION; DR. TIM BRADY, PAST PRESIDENT, AVIATION
ACCREDITATION BOARD INTERNATIONAL; AND JEFFREY SKILES, VICE
PRESIDENT, COALITION OF AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION
Mr. Babbitt. Chairman Costello, and Ranking Member Petri,
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here
today to discuss the FAA's Call to Action on Airline Safety and
Pilot Training. As you are aware, on June 15, we made this call
to action to promote a renewed and robust safety discourse
within the aviation community.
History has shown that we can implement safety improvements
far more quickly and effectively when we work together to
identify the problems and develop solutions. We have received a
wealth of information from the call to action, and we are
committed to using it to make the industry and the traveling
public safer.
To summarize our efforts here, as part of the Call to
Action, I did send a letter to all part 121 operators and their
unions requesting written commitments to adhere to the highest
professional standards while this discourse was beginning. My
letter also sought specific comments on several key topics,
including pilot records, establishment of programs to monitor
safety of flight operations and safety, and the development of
professional standards and ethics committees by labor
organizations.
I can tell you that the responses that we received have had
an overwhelming willingness shown to make these commitments.
And while we haven't heard from everyone at this point, as I
told them and Members of this Committee, I will use my bully
pulpit going forward to gain their cooperation. And so I am
prepared to make those who were unresponsive known to the
public by the end of September.
We also have prioritized the creation of new flight and
rest rules based on fatigue signs as part of our Call to
Action. An aviation rulemaking committee charged with making
recommendations began meeting in July and completed its work by
our September 1 deadline. I am extremely pleased that this ARC
acted quickly and reached consensus on a broad philosophical
framework for addressing this critical subject. Our experts are
now reviewing the ARC's recommendations, and we have an
aggressive timeline for completing the NPRM and we are on
track.
Recognizing the urgency of proposals in the call to action,
we also directed our inspectors to do a focused review of air
carrier crew member training, qualification, and management
oversight. This two-part program met its first deadline on July
15 and is on track to meet the final deadline set for the end
of September.
We are also moving forward aggressively with our proposed
changes to the airline safety and pilot training NPRM. We have
received over 3,000 pages of comments to this proposed rule,
and we are reviewing those carefully and anticipate that we
will continue to meet our deadlines on this project. And
although the FAA's leadership and guidance is critical to
safety, the most effective safety culture is not one that is
merely imposed by orders and notices from Washington. No, it is
one that encourages buy-in and participation from the entire
aviation community.
And so we took our show on the road, if you would, holding
12 regional forums across the country during the months of July
and August. And these forums allowed the FAA to discuss the
Call to Action and all the initiatives associated with it. The
opportunity was there for us to receive stakeholders' feedback,
to engage with aviation professionals, and to seek new ideas to
improve industry safety, all of these being equally important.
In addition to hard work, we have also applied a dose of
common sense to this Call to Action. As we work through our
plan we realize that some of our deadlines might actually
shortchange our results. Our original intent was to develop
guidance materials for conducting comprehensive training
reviews by July 31. But we realized that this deadline actually
predated the completion of our focused inspection initiative
and the conclusion of our regional safety forums. With that in
mind, we realized that we ought to take those two sources of
information into account before putting forth any
recommendations, and also recognizing that our commitment to
safety can only be served by prioritizing quality results over
a rigid timeline.
So with that in mind, I extended the July 31 deadline to
December 31. This will give our team time to analyze and
incorporate the valuable input that we received and continue to
receive from the aviation community.
While I am pleased to discuss the important steps that we
have taken and will be taking, I believe we should also
acknowledge the biggest factor affecting aviation safety,
professionalism in the workplace. No amount of safety
procedures, rules or task forces can replace the central role
that individual professionalism plays in keeping the skies
safe. And whether one has a wrench in his hand or her hand or
sits at a yoke or carries a clipboard or wears a headset or
works in the galley, doesn't make any difference. Safety is
everyone's responsibility. And although professionalism
prevails in the majority of the work force and throughout the
industry, the standards are the same, the training is the same,
but unfortunately, the mentality is not the same. And this is
what we need to change.
We must develop a culture where the hand of experience
guides and mentors the inexperienced members of our community.
We must find a way to nurture a culture where individuals know
they can speak up about weaknesses in system without
punishment. We must create a culture where professionalism and
individual accountability it demands is both a job requirement
and a point of pride. Despite the work that remains to be done,
we know that safety is a shared priority throughout the
aviation community and because this is true, we are confident
that our efforts will succeed.
Mr. Chairman, Congressman Petri, this concludes my remarks.
I will be happy to answer any questions should we have the
time.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you, Administrator Babbitt.
And let me say that I am pleased to hear that you are going to
identify the airlines and anyone who did not respond to your
letter, that you will publicly address that and make not only
the Congress but the American people aware of who did not
respond. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Loftus.
Mr. Loftus. Chairman Costello, Ranking Member Petri, and
Subcommittee Members, I would like to thank you for inviting me
to speak today before your Committee. I am here today
representing not only my immediate family, but also my new
family, the families of Continental Flight 3407. My 24-year-old
daughter, Madeline, was on board 3407 that wintry night outside
of Buffalo. She, along with 49 others, and an unborn baby,
perished that night in February.
This past August 28, my family, gathered at my daughter's
grave in the pouring rain to sing happy birthday. Not quite the
celebration I would wish on anybody. Since that tragic night in
February, birthdays, anniversaries, graduations, family events,
simple everyday life seems as though they have lost their
luster. Nothing for us will ever be the same. The only thing we
are left with is the past, the memories.
More than any other issue we can spotlight or debate at
this hearing, I feel the most importance mission for me to
accomplish today is to keep the oh so painful human side of
this accident fresh in the minds of the important people, both
in our government and the aviation industry. I have included at
the end of my testimony 23 impact statements that have been
submitted by family members of our group letting you know the
pain and sadness that we still struggle with on a daily basis
over 7 months later.
I would like to share one from Nirmal Sidhu, who lost her
son, Dipinder, that fateful night. She writes, how can I ever
forget those Sundays when Dipinder would ask me to stay in bed
as he would whip up a scrumptious breakfast and serve it with
aplomb, or the special way he would pick up our 10-year-old
shiatsu and cuddle him every day upon entering the house after
work, or the sound of the Wheel of Fortune playing religiously
on the TV in the evening. I can still here the relentless
teasing of my niece, Simmar, by my son, who treated her like a
younger sister. He was instrumental in getting her admission
into India into medical school after her graduation. How we
missed sharing the joy just a week back when Simmar passed the
first year of medical school in a new environment with a
different educational system with flying colors. I can still
feel the exuberance in his voice when he talked about the girl
in whom he felt that he had found a true soul mate. I can still
see him joking and laughing with his father on most evenings. I
can visualize his smile when he talked with pride about his
sister, Natasha. It is all gone forever. If I only knew that I
would never see, hear or feel all of this, if I just knew that
he was just given to me for only 28 years, I would never have
let him out of my sight for a second. How I wish I could hear
him just one more time so that I could say one more time to
him, I love you. We are all here with one goal in mind and that
is to prevent a tragedy like Continental 3407 from ever
happening again. The simple question we and everyone else must
ask is what measures will make this a reality.
And that brings me to the FAA's call to action plan
unveiled in June. In response to the findings revealed by the
NTSB hearings in May, I want to acknowledge Administrator
Babbitt and his staff who have met with the group on multiple
occasions keeping us informed of ongoing development and, most
importantly, not waiting till the NTSB's final report to move
forward on a quest to make critical improvements to our
aviation system.
We have a simple message for the FAA. As a former pilot,
when I look at the initiatives detailed in the call to action,
they address three critical areas, training, fatigue, and an
increased emphasis in investment in safety at the regional
airline level. Clearly, our accident revealed deficiency in
both stall recovery and cold weather training in the industry.
Since 2004 the FAA has been working on a rule making geared
towards improving the airlines crew training program. The
comment period on this proposed rule making closed last month.
As we reviewed the submissions to the FAA we came across quite
a few negative comments from the industry. For me, they echoed
the all too familiar complaints of the changes being too great
of an economic burden and a complacent attitude of what we are
currently doing is sufficient. That mindset is exactly what got
us into this predicament that we find ourselves in today.
At the same time, the FAA is moving forward on rule making
that would lead to a revised flight and duty regulations which
former pilots like myself and Administrator Babbitt can testify
are long overdue. This would be an enormous stride toward
making airline travel safe.
One area that our group would like to see kept in the
spotlight is the problematic area of commuting. With pilots
flying cross country to report for duty, we cannot continue to
look the other way and pretend that we do not have issues
associated with commuting not to be addressed. So, in terms of
eliminating deficiencies related to training and fatigue, our
group challenges Administrator Babbitt and the FAA to stand up
to the industry, to stick up for our loved ones and the flying
public, and see these new regulations through enactment in the
course of the next year.
Next, I want to touch on the FAA effort to identify
industry wide best practices and secure voluntary commitments
to all part 121 carriers to implement them. What it really
speaks to is the inconsistencies of how regional carriers
approach training, safety in all phases of their operation.
When I flew, when it came to best practices in terms of safety
and training, what was good enough for Continental was good
enough for Continental Express. Sadly, our accident revealed
that this is no longer the case. Instead we watched as
Continental does everything to lay the blame for the
shortcomings at Colgan and at the feet of the FAA for its lack
of oversight. Instead of looking to shift the blame, we feel
that everyone needs to come together to accept responsibility,
from the regional carriers to the major carriers to the pilots
union to the FAA and Congress, to figure out what went wrong
and work together to fix it. If parent carriers take
responsibility for the regional partners, will allow for safer
operations, then that is what should happen.
So for the regional airlines it all comes down to investing
in safety and in your pilots and doing everything you can to
set them up for success. There should be no corner cutting when
it comes to providing the very best training and the most state
of the art safety management tools. Yet, as we look at the
operations of Colgan this is exactly what was allowed to
happen. The FAA has gotten the ball rolling in many of these
areas with recent summit and regional safety forums, but I know
too well from my time in the industry that voluntary
commitments to best practices now can certainly go away quickly
in the future if the economics change or if Administrator
Babbitt is not at the helm of the FAA to keep the industry
honest.
And so this is where we need you, our representatives in
Congress, to come in and mandate some of these changes. There
are numerous important initiatives that have been put forth by
both the House and the Senate for consideration with the FAA
reauthorization. But I would like to spotlight three that we
consider must haves.
First, we must move forward with the comprehensive pilot
training record database for use in the hiring process. Let us
never have another accident where the carrier has the excuse
that they did not know everything there was to know about the
pilot when they hired him or her.
Secondly, we need to lock in mandatory safety management
programs, FOQA, ASAP, LOSA, with privacy protections that the
pilots are asking for. We cannot leave the regional carriers
with any temptations to save money at the expense of safety,
which we glaringly saw in the case of Colgan. And lastly, we
need to achieve one of the key provisions put forth in the
Subcommittee's recent introduced legislation; namely, that all
commercial pilots must have an ATP rating, with the requirement
of 1,500 hours prior to being hired to fly commercially. The
demographics of the pilot work force has changed, moving
towards a younger, more inexperienced pilot while the
technology has gotten more advanced. When I was hired by
Continental Express I had an ATP and 5,000 hours flight time,
and the captains with whom I flew with had twice as much time
as me. As I said in my previous testimony before this
Committee, there is no substitute for experience in the air. As
a veteran of the industry, I know that this provision will
require entry level pilots to build up additional hours by
flight instructing, cargo hauling and crop dusting before they
can be hired commercially. Many years ago that is exactly the
route I took, and all those experiences made me a better pilot
when I got to Continental Express and had human lives in my
hand.
So we ask the regional and major carriers, the pilot
unions, and flight training schools to support this initiative.
It means a lot to our group.
In conclusion, I would like all the key players in this
room to look at the families here with me today, the Mellets,
the Eckerts, the Maurers, the Kausners, the Tolsmas and the
Pettys, and all the other families who were not able to come to
Washington but are here with us anyway. For us, what matters is
not a well crafted public relation strategy while our accident
is still fresh in the spotlight, what matters to us is
implementation and follow-through. When it comes to the FAA
reauthorization, the call to action, and the NTSB final report
and safety recommendations, we ask that you do everything you
can to make sure the tragic mistakes of Continetal Flight 3407
are never repeated again.
Thank you.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you, Mr. Loftus, and now
recognizes Captain Prater.
Mr. Prater. Thank you and good morning, Mr. Chairman,
Ranking Member Petri, and Members of the Committee. Captain
Loftus, Captain Babbitt, and you have our commitment to work to
prevent another Continental 3407.
You may recall that ALPA testified before this Committee on
June 11. At that time we described the economic reality that
has set the stage for many of the safety issues we are
discussing here today. Code share and fee for departure
agreements mean that main line carriers exert enormous pressure
on regional airlines to provide their flight operations as
cheaply as possible.
What do many airlines do to win this race to the bottom?
They replace experienced pilots with low experienced pilots who
fly for low paying operators marketed under the main line
brand. They consider short staffing to be standard practice,
and pilot pushing it is the result. Fewer pilots flying for
days compromises safety. With the industry's intense focus on
the lowest possible operating cost and the practice of airlines
outsourcing their routes to the lowest bidder, I would like to
review our observations following the FAA's 12 call to action
meetings.
I led a dozen ALPA representatives to the FAA's industry
summit on June 15, and served as the pilot moderator at the
first call to action, and participated in the event in St.
Louis. ALPA provided pilot moderators at six of the meetings,
and nearly 70 of our pilots participated in those 12 events. I
would like to offer examples of ALPA's actions that illustrate
our union's commitment to assist the industry and the FAA in
recognizing the serious safety issues raised during the call to
action.
ALPA's code of ethics, adopted in 1956, provides standards
of conduct for airline pilots. I have directed the leaders of
our 36 pilot groups to work with their managements to do even
more to incorporate our code of ethics into initial and
recurrent pilot training.
Nearly all ALPA represented pilot groups have professional
standards committees charged with maintaining the highest
degree of professional conduct. Where management supports them,
professional standards committees enhance safety.
Unfortunately, we continue to see managements that refuse to
allow their pilots to participate in ALPA professional
standards and safety efforts.
Today, ALPA is releasing a new white paper on pilot
candidate screening, hiring, training, and mentoring. We have
asked our 50,000 members to participate in building those
standards.
Our union has also created a professional development
committee to enhance our work with the aviation community, the
colleges, the universities to foster professionalism in new
pilots.
On a related issue, nearly all of ALPA airlines have an
ASAP program, and about half have a FOQA program. ALPA has
worked to help airlines establish these critical initiatives to
detect and resolve safety issues before accidents occur. Sadly,
we continue to encounter managements and sometimes even FAA
inspectors who remain convinced that the way to deal with
safety issues is to punish employees for their mistakes. I have
said it before, I will say it again. ASAP and FOQA programs
will fail if they are used as discipline measures rather than
as intended to advance safety.
Based on our extensive participation in the call to action
meetings, we believe that they identified some of the best and
certainly some of the worst practices in our industry. But what
has yet changed? The action we believe to be absolutely
essential from the regulated parties and the agency was
noticeably absent. Clearly, the voluntary programs that are
working need to be supported. Many of the best practices must
be mandated and the worst practices must be eliminated through
regulatory or legislative action.
For just one example, look to recent news headlines
exposing onerous sick leave and fatigue policies at some of our
regional airlines. Despite the hearings earlier this year
substantiating this egregious behavior, our members continue to
present evidence that some of these companies haven't changed.
They continue to punish pilots who call in too sick or too
fatigued to fly. In fact, approximately one-third of the pilots
at one airline are reprimanded for sick leave or fatigue
related absences annually.
This shocking number illustrates the flaws in the staffing
and scheduling practices at too many airlines and demonstrates
the urgent need to update the archaic flight and duty time
regulations that continue to allow these unsafe practices to
exist.
Main line management often refuses to intervene, despite
the fact that these other airlines carry their passengers, the
managements at the name brand airlines that sell the tickets to
the traveling public and should be held responsible refuse to
intervene, saying that these vendor airlines meet FAA
standards.
As part of my commitment to the Administrator's call to
action, I am reaching out to every CEO of main line and
regional airlines where we represent the pilots to ask if each
will work with ALPA to address the safety issues raised by the
call to action. Safety requires the investment of both time and
money. The race to the bottom fails to deliver the safest
possible service across an entire airline network.
We urge Congress to act swiftly to pass this Committee's
bill, H.R. 3371, into law. Thank you.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you, Captain Prater, and now
recognizes Mr. Cohen.
Mr. Cohen. Chairman Costello, Ranking Member Petri, and
Members of the Subcommittee, our thoughts and prayers continue
for the families of Continental 3407 as we focus all of our
efforts to doing everything possible to make sure that an
accident like that never happens again.
Regional airlines have become vital to the Nation. We fly
more than 50 percent of the scheduled passenger flights and 75
percent of the Nation's communities are served exclusively by
regional airlines. But most importantly, regional airlines are
committed to safety. I am proud to announce today that
virtually all of RAA's members, airlines that transport 98
percent of the passengers carried by our member airlines,
either have established or have committed to establishing in
the near term a FOQA, Flight Operations Quality Assurance
Program. For ASAP the results are similar. Virtually all of our
members have implemented this valuable safety tool for their
pilots, some of them having done so up to a decade ago.
In June, we responded immediately to the FAA call to
action. And for the record, all the RAA member airlines
responded in writing to the Administrator's June 24 letter. On
short notice, seven RAA member airlines were invited to attend
that first meeting. Every one sent its senior executives,
including six CEOs, demonstrating what Chairman Oberstar has
commented, that safety begins in the boardroom. That meeting
featured a candid discussion of critical issues leading to a
safety agenda that included a dozen similar town hall meetings
across the U.S. Each of those meetings was cochaired by a
regional airline executive.
RAA also played a key role in the 9-week flight duty and
rest ARC. And let me state, the members of the Regional Airline
Association are committed to this rulemaking, to adopting the
new science-based regulations that arise from the process, and
doing so in a prompt and timely manner.
In addition to being participants actively in the FAA
efforts, RAA has embarked on our own strategic safety
initiative that aligns with the FAA's efforts and the goals of
this Committee. Our initiative includes, number one, forming a
task force comprised of regional airline safety directors and
operations officials to review all of the procedures and NTSB
recommendations that could help prevent accidents.
Number two, we will be working with the Washington State
University Sleep and Performance Research Center. We will study
the fatigue risks associated with regional airline pilot
operations.
Third, we will be working with the Flight Safety Foundation
and will study the feasibility and practicality of developing
an industry fatigue risk management system. And these elements,
the following elements I am going to may require some
legislative or regulatory action, and we look forward to
working Congress and the FAA to identify these needed safety
tools.
These include establishing a single database of pilot
records, extending the background check time frame to 10 years;
third, improving the tracking and analysis of check runs;
fourth, exploring the use of random fatigue tests for pilots;
and fifth, considering the use of cockpit voice recorders for
accident prevention.
Please let me also address commuting. The ARC did not deal
with commuting, so we do not expect the rulemaking to address
it. But commuting must be conducted in a responsible manner.
Each of our member carriers has a nonpunitive policy in place
and reserve crews on call to allow a pilot to drop a trip if
that pilot feels incapable of flying alertly.
Mr. Chairman, safety is a never ending effort and one that
necessitates collaboration and cooperation among all
stakeholders, the airlines, our employees, and the government.
We in regional aviation are committed to ensuring that the U.S.
air transportation system remains the safest mode of travel.
Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity, and we welcome
any questions you might have.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you, Mr. Cohen, and now
recognizes Mr. May.
Mr. May. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Petri.
While it is no consolation to the families devastated by the
Colgan Air tragedy, our members are taking action to make our
aviation system, which is already the safest in the world, even
safer. Before I discuss some of those initiatives, I would like
to emphasize three points in particular.
First, I think we all need to accept that until the NTSB
concludes its investigation of the Buffalo accident we are not
going to have a complete understanding of that accident.
Second, safety improvements today result from careful
collaborative evaluation of operational data and practices.
Safe aviation has an empirical disciplined approach to safety.
Third, the bedrock principle in civil aviation is that the
entity to which the FAA has issued a certificate is ultimately
responsible and solely responsible for its activities. Whether
that entity is an air carrier, an airman or a dispatcher, that
responsibility can't be delegated or assumed by others.
That principle avoids confusion about who is ultimately
responsible, an absolutely essential consideration in promoting
one level of safety. One level of safety, one level of
enforcement. While this principle of individual accountability
is critical, improving safety is a shared commitment.
We work closely with other aviation community members,
including our regional partners in this never ending collective
effort. For that reason, we welcome the FAA's June 15 call to
action meeting. And at that meeting the FAA worked with our
carriers and regional carriers and pilots to develop common
strategies for reducing risks. We also welcome the opportunity
to join with regional airlines, labor representatives, and the
FAA in a series of 12 regional forums around the country to
communicate the results of that call to action meeting.
With the indispensable leadership of Administrator Babbitt,
several important initiatives have already been undertaken.
They include creation of an aviation rulemaking committee to
develop recommendations to revise flight and duty time
regulations for flight crew members. Our industry
representatives were very active main participants in that
process. These recommendations, I think, are importantly
science-based to accommodate various operating models, align
with international guidelines, and reflect the vast and varied
operating experience of U.S. carriers.
Number two, our commitment to adopting what labor and
management have identified as most effective practices for
improved safety. Those commitments were reflected in the air
carrier letters to the administration. And like my partner from
the regional airlines, I can assure you that every single ATA
carrier has, in fact, replied in depth to administrator. And we
covered the following topics: Asking pilots to voluntarily
disclose their FAA records, including adverse actions. If not
already using flight operations quality assurance, FOQA, and
Aviation Safety Action Programs, ASAP programs, to establish
them. I want to underscore that all of our ATA members already
have those programs, have had them in place for many, many
years, along with a number of other safety related and training
programs like AQP; holding periodic meetings between main line
carriers and their regional codes share airlines to review
safety programs, share safety information and share most
effective practices.
Number three, FAA's focused training inspection initiative
in which the FAA is reviewing flight crew member training
programs. As we all know, our union partners are crucial to any
effort to improve safety. Labor organizations have committed to
several initiatives focused on ensuring professional behavior
and further strengthening voluntary safety programs such as
ASAP and FOQA. I certainly agree with Captain Prater, they
can't be used in a punitive way. Equally important, the
industry recognizes the importance of mentoring, transferring
experience from seasoned flight crew members to those with less
experience.
We also believe that the Inspector General's review of FAA
safety oversight of regional airlines is going to provide
significant insights. The IG is focusing on three essential
issues, pilot certification, training and qualifications, as
well as commuting and compensation issues.
And finally, I want to reiterate the creation of a central
pilot database would significantly improve airlines ability to
vet pilot applicants.
In closing, we commit to continue to work diligently with
other stakeholders and to follow through with the various
commitments during the FAA call to action. We also look forward
to evaluating and responding to the results of the NTSB
investigation and to the IG's assessment of FAA regulatory
oversight. Those actions are already taken. Those are underway,
and those yet defined are and must continue to be driven by
expert analysis of facts and data. It is in this informed
context that further action to improve safety should be
examined.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you, Mr. May, and now
recognizes Dr. Brady.
Mr. Brady. Chairman Costello, Members of the House Aviation
Subcommittee, thank you for allowing the aviation educators of
the Aviation Accreditation Board International and the
University Aviation Association the opportunity to be heard. If
I were to place a caption on this testimony I would title it,
quality, not quantity. This I hope will become clear as my
testimony progresses.
The combined institutional membership of both AABI and the
UAA is 115 colleges and universities who represent almost
11,000 students involved in academic preparation to become
professional pilots and to create a significant percentage of
the professional pilot work force. A single member institution
alone provides one in four of the professional pilots flying
air carrier aircraft today in the United States. One in four.
These numbers are not insignificant.
We applaud the Committee, the Subcommittee for focusing on
the safety of the airline industry. We, the aviation educators,
have studied H.R. 3371 and find that most of its provisions are
sound and will likely achieve the objective of improving air
safety. There is one requirement, however, that causes us deep
concerns. I am referring to the Airline Transport Pilot, ATP-
only provision described in section 10 requiring a pilot to
achieve an ATP before being allowed to enter the cockpit of a
part 121 air carrier. For a pilot to acquire the ATP, he or she
must be at least 23 years of age and have flown at least 1,500
hours. Graduates from colleges and university programs
typically have earned the private commercial instrument multi-
engine and perhaps a certified flight instructor
qualifications, have about 250 to 350 hours of flying time, and
may not yet be 23 years of age. This bill would require these
graduates to spend an unnecessary number of years building
their flight time so as to qualify for an entry level first
officer position. The ATP requirement is a quantity driven
requirement that requires little improvement in skills.
Quantity, not quality.
So what do we know about quality? A 2008 pilot yield study
examined the performance of all 452 new hire first officers for
a large regional airline who started air carrier training
during 2006 and 2007. The results were eye opening. The first
officer new hires that performed best were those who had 500
hours of flight time or less and were graduates from AABI
accredited institutions. Committee Members, that is quality. We
have identified it and we know what it is.
Further, I submit that there is a direct relationship
between quality and safety. The higher the quality of the
entering pilot work force the higher the level of safety. But
the ATP-only provision in this bill would close the cockpit
doors to these high quality entry level first officers. So we
are asking you today to remove this provision from the bill or
to modify it so that graduates of high quality programs that
meet AABI outcomes are able to enter the cockpit as entry level
first officers at a much lower flight time requirement than the
ATP requirement of 1,500 hours.
What are the results if you allow the ATP only provision to
remain unchanged in the bill? The quantity driven ATP
requirement would cause potential students who would normally
enter a high quality university program to now seek the
shortest route to the first officer's seat. Why would they
spend 4 years at a college or a university paying tuition and
flight fees, when at graduation they still need to fly for
another 2 years to be qualified to enter the air carrier as a
first officer trainee? They probably wouldn't. They would seek
out local flight training providers, acquire the necessary
ratings and spend the next year or two flying cheap, 30-year
old single engine airplanes to build their flight time. They
would repeat the same flying hour 1,000 times over and add
little value to the scant knowledge they gained from the
earlier training. At the end of it, the pilot would take the
ATP written and flight exams and be eligible to enter the air
carrier training program. These are the types of pilots who
scored the worst on the pilot yield study. On the other hand,
graduates from AABI university programs who enter the air
carrier cockpit as first officers at say 500 hours, total time,
and spend the next 1,000 hours being mentored by a seasoned
captain flying the line are learning more each day. At the
1,500 hour point these first officers are superbly prepared air
carrier professionals and are far superior to those who simply
built flight time by flying nonproductive hours just to get to
the magic number.
This ATP-only provision will fill the cockpits of air
carriers with poor quality first officers and decimate the
robust high quality flight education programs found at
universities all across the country. For example, the aviation
degree program at St. Cloud State University in Minnesota would
cease to exist, just as the program at Southern Illinois
University in Carbondale would. Half the students at Embry-
Riddle at its campuses in Florida and Arizona would disappear.
Auburn's program would close, as would the one at Kent State in
Ohio, the program at Central Texas College also. The excellent
program at Middle Tennessee State University would go away, and
so would those at Western Michigan University and Eastern
Kentucky University.
These are just a few examples. In total, the programs at
colleges and universities across this great country which now
enroll 11,000 students in flight education programs would close
or would suffer. We aviation educators know this. We are the
ones closest to the future of aviation education in this
country, and we are sounding the alarm. Please don't kill the
source of the highest qualified entry level first officer
pilots entering the air carrier work force. To do so by
retaining the ATP-only provision in this bill will diminish the
safety of the entire system, cripple aviation higher education,
and achieve the exact opposite of the intended outcomes of this
bill.
Thank you, Chairman Costello and Committee Members, and I
am prepared to answer any questions you might have.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you, Dr. Brady, and now
recognizes Mr. Skiles.
Mr. Skiles. Thank you. I would like to thank Chairman
Costello, Ranking Member Petri, and the Members of the House
Aviation Subcommittee for accepting my testimony here today.
First, let me acknowledge the tremendous loss suffered by
the families of the Continental Connection Flight 3407. I
cannot begin to imagine the pain and loss suffered by the
victims' families, and I know that my fellow pilots will keep
them in their thoughts.
It is good to reflect on the reasons why we are all here
today. On February 12 of this year, Continental Connection
Flight 3407 crashed into a Buffalo, New York neighborhood,
causing the terrible loss of all onboard. In the aftermath the
spotlight has been placed on pilot experience, pilot fatigue,
and industry compensation levels. It is apparent from the
available information at the NTSB hearing that the actions of
the Continental connection pilots during the performance of
their normal duty led to this tragedy.
But I would submit that they were as much victims of the
state of the Nation's airline industry as the passengers who
entrusted their lives to Continental Airlines. They were simply
asked to fly a sophisticated aircraft in challenging conditions
for which their limited experience had not prepared them for.
Over the past several years, there has been a dramatic drop
in the experience levels of new hire pilots in our Nation's
cockpits as our airlines sacrifice experience for the bottom
line. The first officer of Continental Connection Flight 3407
drew an annual salary of $16,200 a year. In an effort to
attract pilots at poverty level wages, minimum hiring
qualifications have dropped to the lowest bar possible. Many of
our Nation's experienced pilots are now unwilling to accept
employment for such wages and regional airlines need to fill
their cockpit seats with lesser qualified pilots.
The Airline Safety and Pilot Training Improvement Act of
2009 calls for all airline transport pilots to possess an
airline transport pilot's license. The ATP would increase the
experience base of U.S. commercial pilots as it would require
flight experience commensurate with the responsibilities of the
position. Today every major airline recognizes the value of
experience by requiring, at a minimum, 1,500 to 3,000 hours of
flight experience. Yet, in a few short years, regional
airlines, who now fly over 50 percent of our domestic flights,
have lowered their requirements to the absolute minimum in an
effort to fill their cockpit seats at the lowest possible cost.
The experience level of the Continental connection pilots is an
example of this negative trend.
Experience matters. The flight hours that the FAA requires
to qualify for an airline transport pilot's license allows the
pilot the opportunity to develop judgment and critical decision
making skills that simply aren't possible in a tightly
controlled training environment. Airmanship skills are only
developed from exposure to challenging conditions and honed
over time. Architect, engineers, CPAs and even real estate
brokers are all examples of careers that have experienced level
requirements before attaining full recognition or licensing.
The responsibilities of an airplane pilot should demand no
less.
My testimony would not be complete without addressing pilot
fatigue. This is an issue that has long been a contributing
factor in aviation accidents, and the NTSB has recommended
changes in flight duty time rules for 2 decades.
This summer, Administrator Babbitt called for an aviation
rulemaking committee to discuss changes in current regulations.
While Administrator Babbitt has promised changes in regulation,
the current discussion at the ARC is trending towards
increasing the number of hours a pilot can fly in a duty
period. We need prompt action to lower, not increase the amount
of time a pilot can fly and a reduction to the 16-hour workday
currently permitted by FAA regulations. We don't fix the pilot
fatigue problem by allowing airlines to schedule more flight
hours in a day, nor do we fix the pilot experience program by
allowing any inexperienced pilots in our Nation's cockpits.
While Administrator Babbitt has shown a willingness to
attack these problems, history shows that the FAA has never
been an agent for change. We fully endorse H.R. 3371. It is a
positive first step that puts in place a timeline for solutions
and enhances the pilot experience level in our Nation's
transport category aircraft.
Pilot leaders of ALPA, CAPA, and the IBT, representing
90,000 front line pilots, came before this Subcommittee in July
as a united front in support of the airline transport pilot's
license as the minimum standard in the cockpits of our Nation's
airliners. Administrator Babbitt was instrumental in improving
safety 20 years ago when he advocated that all scheduled
transport be conducted under FAR part 121 regulations. He did
this to create, in his words, one level of safety. We ask him
to continue advocating for one level of safety by supporting
the initiatives of H.R. 3371.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you, Mr. Skiles.
Captain Prater, as you know from roundtable discussions
with many of the people on the--witnesses on the panel, our
goal in H.R. 3371 was to--one of the goals was to raise the
minimum standards so that you would have the first officer and
the captain at the same minimum level of experience and
training, and that, of course, would require an ATP license.
But in addition to the ATP license requiring 1500 hours in the
cockpit, there is also aeronautical knowledge, crew research,
management training, a lot of other training that goes along
with it.
I would ask you, Dr. Brady has raised an interesting
question and feels that both the 4-year institutions that are
accredited--there are 26 I understand. I have two in my
congressional district in southern Illinois, University in
Carbondale, and St. Louis at Parks Airport, and of course, Dr.
Brady, who offers his testimony today.
Do you believe that these institutions are at a
disadvantage if in fact we require that the first officer
receive an ATP license as opposed to just a commercial pilot's
license.
Mr. Prater. I do not believe that they will be
disadvantaged. In fact, I agree with them that they are
producing very good pilots who can go out and become airline
pilots, but the problem is the airlines have become the
introductory spot. It used to be the final spot for an aviator,
you went out and you earned your time before you became an
airline; now it is a transitionary job. You go to work for an
airline and fly the public around so that you can get a good
job with a corporation, or you can get a good job with one of
the freight operators that pay.
Think about that. We are taking young aviators who have got
a good education, some have gone through the university
program, their first job as a commercial pilot is hauling 50,
70, 90 passengers; that is what is unacceptable. So we support
the foundations of the airline transport pilot to be hired.
Now the bill that we have seen and looked at and support
allows for some breathing room in here. We certainly have a
time for the breathing room. We can work with the FAA's and the
schools to find a way to ensure that that level is brought up.
But I agree with all the pilots at this table, that you
cannot replace time in the air. That is what earns you
experience. Experience is learning what you don't know,
recognizing what you don't know. We can't take these young
pilots with just 250 hours and turn them into airline pilots
unless the airlines are willing to give the amount of training
that say the military gives. Look at the vast difference. The
military gives about a year of intense training. The airlines
give currently 6 weeks of training to take that 250 or 300-hour
pilot to become an airline pilot you had better be prepared to
dedicate more resources to training. Thank you.
Mr. Costello. Dr. Brady, would you like to respond.
Mr. Brady. I would disagree that all of the pilots seated
here agree with that statement he just made. I happen to be a
pilot myself with the ATP, so I certainly don't agree with
that.
I think in terms of who is entering the cockpit, as I
mentioned, it is the quality issue that is important that we
certainly think there are flight training providers throughout
who are turning out pilots of lesser quality, but the quality
of the pilots being turned out by the university is
significantly higher than anything else in the country. And I
would add that the statement made a moment ago was that the
military provides excellent training for air carrier pilots,
which is true. But in the pilot yield study, the military
pilots who had come from the military and into the regional
carrier were, although they scored very well in terms of being
able to accommodate training for the air carrier, they didn't
score as well as a 500-hour pilots coming out of college and
universities.
So I think there needs to be some measure of quality of the
product coming into the air carriers and not just say some
magic number that is going to bless everyone and paint them
with the same brush. The quality of training is not the same
throughout the system.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Skiles, would you like to comment?
Mr. Skiles. Yes, I would. I did see what was submitted from
the AABI, and I would like to comment, first of all, that is
not an independent appraisal; it was done by Embry-Riddle
University. Secondly, it is not a complete transcript of the
study; they were carefully culled conclusions to support their
positions. The leap in logic they came to illustrate that the
ATP pilots require extra training is particularly disturbing,
but let me tell you.
I have 33 years of experience, 20,500 flying hours and ATP
three type ratings and I have been through many, many initial
and recent training events, and I have never failed a check
ride and I have never required even one period of additional
training.
When the airlines used to hire qualified pilots that was
the norm. According to its own study, some 30 percent of AABI
graduates require extra training events right out of the box,
right out of school at their first initial--at their new
airline, and they are bragging about that fact in the study.
The AOPA Nall report identifies some issues relevant to the
continental connection crash. The Nall report stated that
commercial pilots are three times more likely to be in an
accident than a pilot that is possessing an ATP. That is three
times the accident rate. I think the American people demand
more. Thank you.
Mr. Costello. Administrator Babbitt, would you want to
comment?
Mr. Babbitt. Yes, sir. Thank you. I would only make the
observation, I may well have begun to accelerate this debate if
the Subcommittee and the members of the panel will recall,
before there was ever a move to suggest we should have this
rating. We were already proceeding with preparations for an
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that acknowledged the
fact that we felt within the FAA that there was a need for
additional training and an additional rating, if you would, and
had suggested that that would be rating would be required to
become a first officer.
So the distinction would be that if a commercial pilot
wanted to go to work for an airline, you would have to have an
additional skills and additional training that would be
applicable to the mission. And one of the things that I point
out to people, and I agree with Dr. Brady in one sense, the
actual accumulation of more flight time, while it is
experience, we don't know what kind of experience it is.
I was hired with a pilot that had 7000 hours, but he was a
SAC (Strategic Air Command) pilot, and he flew 12-hour legs
with four pilots, which meant every 40 hours he got one
landing. That was not the kind of experience you want in a high
traffic area with high exposure to approaches. I would point
out that the two Air Florida pilots in a terrible tragedy that
happened right here in Washington, were military-trained. Both
of them had thousands of hours, but the first officer had never
seen an airplane deiced before.
So I am suggesting to you that perhaps we should
consolidate some of our thinking here and make certain that we
don't just accept that quality is thrown out or quantity is the
only answer. I think a meld of the two, which is what we expect
to propose in our Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking might
be a better solution. So those are my observations.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Loftus.
Mr. Loftus. Again, I'll state it one more time there is no
substitute for experience in the air. However, I agree that I
have flown with many entry-level pilots and university educated
pilots and they turn out to be very good pilots eventually, but
the airlines are not entry level position. I go back and say
that again, they need to earn their way up to it. It is not an
entry level. They shouldn't be flying people in the back as
their first job.
Mr. Costello. Administrator Babbitt, you heard Mr. Cohen's
testimony that all of his member airlines have responded to
your letter. Is that a correct statement?
Mr. Babbitt. I can't--I won't fault him. I want to be
straightforward here and be candid. I think in the request that
we made to the carriers, and I'll take some responsibility for
this, we weren't crystal clear as to the vehicle as to how to
respond, and I am of the belief that several people attempted
to respond to us to different locations, some by U.S. mail and
so forth. I am comfortable that we had a much larger
percentage. I have some numbers here. They are a lot closer to
what Mr. Cohen's suggested than what we originally gave you a
few weeks ago.
We have gone back, we have checked with the airlines; we
have reached out to the unions and asked that if they did send
something please resend it to us. We should have updated
numbers for you. But I think the responses have been very
positive. I think we'll take some of the blame for not being
clear as to where and how they should have responded to us.
Mr. Costello. Again, by the end of September, though, you
will release those who have not responded.
Mr. Babbitt. Yes, sir they will fall into one of three
categories. They will have responded that they, in fact, have
an ASAP or FOQA program, explain their willingness to adopt a
program. If they don't, and those who didn't respond at all. I
would make note for the record there are some cases, we have
carriers that have operated under a 121 certificate because
they operate a large aircraft. There is no point in asking
someone to have a FOQA program of one airplane. The logbook is
the data. So we do have to recognize that there will be some
cases that it is perfectly okay not so are have FOQA program if
you had just the minimum number of aircraft.
Mr. Costello. Thank you. Mr. May, you heard Mr. Cohen's
testimony, and as I am looking at his testimony now he says
that our commitment to the value of this safety program is
demonstrated by the fact that more than twice as many RAA
members have ASAP programs for their flight attendants as do
the main line carriers. Is that a correct statement that you
would like to comment?
Mr. May. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't, I don't have
specifics of how many have, how many have his regional carriers
have flight attendant ASAP programs. I do have some data on our
carriers and their ASAP programs. They are 171 in place and the
vast majority of our carriers and I say that because we have
got some small cargo operators in our membership, but all of
our passenger carriers have extensive ASAP programs with their
pilots, their flight attendants, their dispatchers, some of
them have them with ground maintenance and others. So I can't
give you a qualified answer comparing one to the other.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Cohen, you believe that is an accurate
statement? And how do you--what do you base that on?
Mr. Cohen. Mr. Chairman, the FAA keeps a database of ASAP
programs, and I believe that the most recent figure was 7 and 3
for flight attendant ASAP programs.
Mr. Costello. You also say, Mr. Cohen, in your testimony,
and I quote, it is the professional responsibility of every
professional pilot, if he or she does not feel sufficiently
well rested, to say so and not fly. Each of our member carriers
has a nonpunitive policy in place to allow a pilot to drop a
trip if the pilot feels incapable of flying alertly. You heard
Captain Prater's testimony that punitive actions have been
taken with the regional carriers for those who have either
refused to fly or did not want to fly. Do you want to comment,
are you ware of any regional carrier that is taken punitive
action against one of their pilots for not accepting a flight
or refusing to fly.
Mr. Cohen. Mr. Chairman I am not aware of any specific
instances.
Mr. Costello. Captain Prater, you want to comment?
Mr. Prater. Yes, sir. I would hate to go down the list
right now and I tried to keep it generic, but the managements
at Pinnacle and Colgan have not changed their ways; the
management at Trans States Airlines have not changed their
ways. Do I need to go further? I have got a big book. I have
been asking our pilots to report the type of pressures that
management has placed on them threatening their job, giving
them discipline, giving them time off for not just fatigue or
sick calls but for basic things that call in to a captain's
decision to write up an airplane, a maintenance item. Those are
the worst practices that we have identified, and yet some
managements are still insisting that they are going to beat
their pilots into submission.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you and now recognizes the
Ranking Member, Mr. Petri.
Mr. Petri. Thank you. I wonder if could provide Dr. Brady
with the chance to respond or comment on the different comments
on your testimony. There seems to be a difference between
quantity and quality or quality hours as opposed to sterile
hours. And clearly you want to have quality hours and maybe
lots of them. So could you comment on all this.
Mr. Brady. Thank you, sir. I appreciate the opportunity to
comment.
I think that the--and all the aviation educators feel that
the quality issue of a degree program and all that rests behind
each of the flight hour is very important to providing someone
with an appropriate level of experience. It is experience in
the classroom but it prepares them for greater
responsibilities, and if someone just went out to a local
operator fixed base operator and achieved all of their
certificates and ratings. That is the point that we are making
is that the students that are graduates of these college
programs are very structure they get a lot of background way
beyond the FARs, Federal Aviation Regulations, in terms of what
the requirements are for, what say, even for an ATP. They get
way beyond that in the classroom.
So the pilots who are coming out of collegiate programs are
very capable of handling the responsibilities of the right
seat, and they are mentored in the right seat. And after a
time, they become much more capable than officers--first
officers who not have gone through that type of training.
I think it is interesting, too, that many of us sitting
here at the table were products of the military system that
provided us the proper training, and our government felt
comfortable in placing us in command of an aircraft at less
than 1,000 hours. I know in my case, I was being mentored at
350 hours on the right seat of a cargo aircraft in combat, and
when the time came for me to upgrade to aircraft commander, I
did it at 1,000 hours.
So I don't think that the time is the issue. It is how the
time is spent, and I still maintain that the type of level of
education that is being provided through AABI is a peer review
process where we bring and industry to help create what the
criteria are that these programs have to meet and then we go
out and visit these institutions and make sure they are
maintaining the standards that they say they have. So the
pilots coming out of these very highly regulated institutions
are very high quality.
Mr. Petri. We have been hearing a lot of talk about the
restructuring of the airline industry and the pressure on wages
and entry level wages, the feeder airlines and the wealth of
the very low wages that they are paying. Has this affected the
college programs? You think people are partly leaving training
because of looking at job prospects, and if they are going to
make $20,000 a year working for a feeder airline, why would
they pay $120,000 to go to Purdue or something like that.
Mr. Brady. The passion to fly is, is very compelling, sir,
and the pilots who are coming into these programs have that
passion, that is what they want their profession to be. I wish
that it were different. I wish that entering first officers and
the regional air carriers were paid $40,000 a year.
Unfortunately that is not the way it is and our graduates have
to react to that reality. They have debts they have that they
have to pay off. At some point, they will begin to move and
start to make some money, but I agree that the wages are way
too low in the air carrier industry. I am just not sure what
can be done to affect that in terms of what a congressional
activity might be.
The pilots that are in our programs understand that they
are going to start out in some fairly low wage situations. In
fact, some of our instructor pilots, when they go into an air
carrier, take a pay cut. So they understand that and are
willing to--are willing to still take that job. They would be a
lot more willing if it was 40,000 instead of 16,000, but still,
they are willing to take those jobs because they know in the
long run that the higher paying jobs are there once they get
beyond first years with the air carrier.
Mr. Petri. Mr. Skiles, could you comment on that? In your
testimony, you say that airline flying is not a desirable
career for experienced professional pilots. You certainly are
such, and I wonder if you could just elaborate on that comment
and explain what has been happening. I know in my own State,
and you are familiar, too, Midwest airline has been taken over
and a lot of the experienced pilots are experiencing layoffs
and having to go into second carriers as truck drivers and
things of that sort. So could you comment on what is happening?
Mr. Skiles. Yes, I would like to comment on that. You know,
in our industry, what we are finding is that as Captain Prater
alluded to the airline pilot position is now an entry level
position in the industry. What happens is people are gaining
experience and then they are going to fly commuters--not
commuters--they are going to fly for corporate, for
fractionals, for any of the other possibilities out there in
the aviation world, or they are simply leaving the industry all
together. And that is a real problem that we are finding with
retaining people in our industry, retaining experienced people
in our industry. If you could fix that part, you would fix the
experience problem.
For instance, I read a book of a man named Peter
Buffington, who wrote a book about his experiences trying to
survive on $12,000 a year as a regional first officer. He
eventually left the industry. He now is an engineer with Garmin
in Kansas. I called him up. And he said if he could make a
living wage to support his family, he would be back flying
airplanes because as Dr. Brady alluded to, that was his first
love. Not only that, but he could give the eight names of
people just like him who would be back in the industry,
experienced professional pilots with ATP licenses.
Mr. Costello. Chair thanks the Ranking Member and now
recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Carnahan.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank
the panel for their insights and testimony today. I want to add
my condolences to the families and friends that were lost in
flight 3407. It is indeed another tragic reminder that more
must be done to strengthen the safety in our aviation system,
that we must have one level of safety throughout the industry
and I want to thank Chairman Costello for his leadership in
promoting the bill to do just that.
It is also clear from listening to you that experience
matters, that fatigue matters and that standards matter. And
all of us need to be working in that direction.
I want to start with a couple of questions first to
Administrator Babbitt. One of the things you mentioned with
regard to experience that was the most important, but also
challenge was setting up these mentoring programs and I would
like you to really expand upon that in terms of how we can
address some of those challenges to actually get those programs
in place.
Mr. Babbitt. Based on our regional safety forums that we
conducted around the country we have a tremendous amount of
feedback and throughout that several uniform elements came
clear, thoughts on better training, scenario based training for
example. Experience is certainly good, but experiences that
actually enhance your decision making are very important to put
forward before a pilot.
And so the idea was we should be thinking about modifying
our training scenarios where pilots are exposed more not to
check items where you go through prescribed procedures, but
instead put pilots in scenarios that they have not been exposed
to before. Let them gain the experience, let me see what
happens in a nonvolatile environment where nobody is going to
get hurt. But you are going to learn in these and we have the
robust capabilities for simulation today to do that.
We also have incredibly experienced pilots that are
available and we have new pilots coming into the industry. How
do we arrange for that experience transfer? What forum do we
create so that someone with Captain Prater's experience, or
Jeffrey Skiles who is an incredible display of professionalism
with the landing in the Hudson can impart that experience to a
young pilot? I don't care if that pilot has 1500 hours, 2500
hours. They haven't seen the things that some of the pilots at
this table have seen.
So where do we create these forums? One of the thoughts was
that at major carriers we would have a forum bringing together
the leadership from all of the code sharing partners: the
pilots, the chief pilots, the safety folks from the unions.
Bring them together, let them have quarterly reviews; let them
design these scenarios for experienced transfer. There is
nothing we can do to regulate it. There is just no way to get
there. So those are the some of the things we are looking at,
and I want to applaud everyone who contributed to these, the
APA certainly participated, all of the unions participated. We
have gotten a great deal of information out of these forums.
Mr. Carnahan. Let me ask Captain Prater to comment on that
as well.
Mr. Prater. Thank you, Congressman Carnahan, I agree with
Administrator Babbitt, but there is one more basic problem. The
pilot seniority list is a tool to allow experience to be gained
before you advance into the captain's position. At every main
line airline, there is one seniority list. If I were to get
hired at Continental Airlines tomorrow or U.S. Airways tomorrow
or United Airways tomorrow, I would fly the first officer for a
good 8 to 10 to 12 years before I assumed command. I would fly
with hundreds of experienced captains. I would probably have 8
or 10 years of experience to be hired, but each one of those
main line carriers operate, if you will, or control what goes
on in another 6, 8, or 10 regional carriers, and they move the
flying from one to the other. As we negotiate a standard or a
decent contract, they take the flying away and give it to
somebody else who will run it cheaper. We have another eight or
10 seniority lists, so what happens is if they give to it the
cheapest operator and they have got two hundred pilots and
overnight they have got four hundred pilots the least
experienced co-pilot who has been flying for maybe a year is
now captain. We have got the address that situation of moving
that flying back and forth because the experience is never
gained and all of the sudden you are sitting there in the left
seat making decisions thank you.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you.
Mr. Costello. Chair thanks the gentleman from Missouri now
recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have got several
questions, but Mr. Babbitt, in all these many materials we were
given, there was one mention that you gave a speech a couple
weeks ago in which you said you are not seeing consistent
professionalism among aviation workers. What did you mean by
that? I am a little curious.
Mr. Babbitt. What I meant by that, and thank you
Congressman. Nice to see you.
Mr. Duncan. Nice to see you, too.
Mr. Babbitt. What I meant by that was I am quite proud and
I think the industry should be quite proud of the high level of
professionalism but what we have, anytime we have one person
not living up to the standards, not producing the
professionalism that is expected across the industry that is a
potential point of risk. That is where the system breaks down
and when we look across the industry--I have had several
instances--they are not all pilots. I had reason recently to
listen to an exchange of a controller who was very
disappointing the lack of professionalism that I heard,
contrast that against the controller in the Hudson accident
that First Officer Skiles was aboard, that was one of the most
professional handlings from everybody involved. That was
professionalism. It was personified right there.
But we just can't tolerate any gap and so what we are
looking to do is ferret out those areas, the weak areas. If you
have, I mean the classic chain, 99 strong links and one weak
one, that is where the chain breaks we have got to find those
weak links.
Mr. Duncan. Okay, thank you very much. I would like to ask
Mr. Cohen and/or Mr. May, first of all, are most of your
airlines hiring pilots at this time, and do they hire, are they
hiring many people that have just the minimum 250 hours or are
you finding many of them, people who are leaving the military
or other people with experience, are there a lot of experienced
pilots out there that you are hiring? And secondly, another
question on this, do you think the fatigue rules right now are
sufficient or is that, do you see that as a problem? I know on
the 121 operations, pilots are limited to 30 hours a week in
any 7 consecutive days. Do most of your pilots fly that much in
a 7-day period? I am just curious about those kinds of things.
Mr. Cohen.
Mr. Cohen. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Duncan, so that most of our
carriers right now are not hiring, and think that is
industrywide, I think it is reflective. This industry once had
overall 600,000, more than 600,000 employees. It is 300 and
something now.
Mr. Duncan. Right.
Mr. Cohen. Very, very difficult time and----
Mr. Duncan. That is what I assumed.
Mr. Cohen. --most are not hiring now. And most of the
carriers right now are member airlines. To my knowledge, I
don't believe anybody is at a 250 level. Most are at 500,000,
or 1500 maybe even.
Mr. Duncan. That is sort of what I assumed, that because
there are so many employees or potential employees out there
that generally you can find people with a lot of experience, is
that correct?
Mr. Cohen. I think the other witnesses have, have
characterized a very significant and long term problem, that
the qualifications for all aviation professionals going forward
in a very, very difficult industry. I know Mr. May can speak
extensively to the kind of disruptions that the industry has
always gone through, and maybe as bad as ever now and again,
just a number of employees right across all levels, this is all
true.
Mr. Duncan. Mr. May.
Mr. May. Congressman, we are very proud of the
qualifications of our pilots and our crews. We think we have
some of the finest people in the world flying our aircraft. The
vast majority of our pilots are ATP qualified. We have advanced
qualification programs that are in place at the majority of our
carriers. We continue to work to upgrade the professionalism of
our pilots. We have mentoring programs that are currently
aggressively in place for pilots and so we think the world of
the professionalism and.
Mr. Duncan. What about the fatigue question, is there, do
you see that as much of a problem?
Mr. May. We participated actively in the ARC that the
administrator called. There were a series of recommendations
made to the ARC. I think I am safe to say that the vast
majority of those recommendations were those that Captain
Prater's outfit and our team agreed upon. In some instances,
they were longer duty days where they made sense, some much
shorter where it made sense, but the key is they were all
science-based and that is what is important. So I know that the
administrator intends to come out with a rulemaking following
the ARC, and we will all look forward to participating in that
rulemaking process.
Mr. Duncan. All right. Thank you very much.
Mr. Costello. Chair thanks the gentleman and I might add on
the issue of fatigue if my notes are correct, and Mr. Cohen, I
will get to this later, but you make a statement in your
written statement that commuting is a lifestyle choice, not a
necessity dictated by economics. Regional airlines have crew
bases in dozen attractive communities throughout the country,
and it is kind of an incredible statement to me that it is
lifestyle choice.
And when I look at First Officer Shaw on the Colgan crash,
she left Seattle on February the 11th at 10 o'clock eastern
time, arrived in Memphis after getting on a FedEx flight, a
jump flight, and arrived at 2:30 eastern time in the morning,
a.m., left Memphis for Newark at 4:18 eastern time in the
morning, a.m. Arrived in Newark at 6:23 a.m. Eastern time, and
then the flight left Newark at 9:19 p.m. Eastern time, 24 hours
later. She was commuting most of that time.
It is hard for me to believe that that is a lifestyle
choice and it's not driven by economics. The Chair now
recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Johnson.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I apologize
for being a little late. I had a markup in another Committee.
I met Monday with about 50 or 60 pilots and I was
personally a little concerned about what they consider to be
their highest priorities. I was talking about outdated
technology and they were talking about the human kind, what the
pilots have concerns about as relates to safety and I want to
make some of these statements that I wrote here, and I would
like all of you to comment on them.
For overseas travel especially, they desire to have
marshals, but there has not been any change in the funding, so
therefore, many times if they want them, the pilot has to pay
for them himself from personal funds and they feel that they
are having to use vacation time for their training because they
are not given time off for that, time to train.
And the 8 hours that they are limited to flying continually
ends up being sometimes 12 to 14 hours actually because they
have to leave one place, go to another one, wait 3 or 4 hours,
and then fly that 8 hours and over water flying can be very
tiring for international travel.
But they usually have to leave late in the evening and they
are headed for Heathrow, which is the busiest airport, I think,
in the world. After trying to sleep all day they are very, very
tired by the time they get that flight to Heathrow. There is
concern about extending this time and they feel that if they
are going to move it at all it needs to be reduced.
This one I didn't really understand, so clearly, it is my
writing. There is a loophole called the deadhead that is
causing many hours and then deregulation of airlines on--gave
them no deregulation. They have been much more regulated. That
concerns me. Let me tell you why. I have flown from Washington
to Dallas and Dallas to Washington for 17 years just about
every weekend. I have been very, very proud of the record of
the pilots that are on those airlines. So I am very concerned
about not only their training, but also their rest. Could you
comment on any attention that might be given to these concerns?
Yes.
Mr. Babbitt. Absolutely, let me--your questions essentially
fall into two categories as I heard them, and please correct me
if I misunderstood. The first I think has to do with Federal
Flight Deck Officers and their ability to carry weapons on
board aircraft. That is a little different area for us-- that
is a voluntary program. I think Captain Prater could probably
speak to that better than I, so I will let him.
The second category of issues you raised has to do with the
on-duty times, and flight times, and we do need to make a
distinction. There are two limits. One is the amount of time
that a flight pilot can be on duty, that means go to work,
maybe fly, maybe not fly; just be on duty, prepared to fly.
Sometimes maintenance delays occur, so we track that time.
There is maximum amount of time that you can be on duty. The
second limit is the amount of time you can actually fly the
aircraft. Today's current rules limit that to 8 hours of
flying. Can that be extended? The actual 8 hours cannot under a
normal circumstances unless obviously you are in the air and en
route and delays occur then you would have to go over.
But let me tell you where we are going, at least what the
ARC as reported to us. The aviation rulemaking committee has
addressed some of these things. Number one, duty time in the
future, in fact, counts--I am sorry, deadheading time would
count as duty time so that it is recognized. That is important.
Secondly, science comes into this. Flying 8 hours with one
landing is one scenario. Flying 6 hours with eight landings all
of them approaches to 200 feet is an entirely different
scenario. We now recognize that. Currently, there is only one
duty period of time. It has a maximum. It doesn't matter
whether you show up at midnight or at noon, it is the same.
The new recommendations recognize that people have
circadian rhythms, and it takes into account when you go to
work. When normal people go to work, 8 or 9 o'clock in the
morning you are well rested, that is fine. Go to work at
midnight. Would you be prepared to stay on duty for 15 hours?
Of course not. So the new recommendation takes into account all
of these things, hopefully, to address them.
I would note for the record there were 18 people, 18 inputs
to this Committee from a variety of cross sections in the
industry, including scientists and doctors who have made
fatigue studies, that I know essentially came to consensus with
few exceptions.
Ms. Johnson. Any other comments?
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentlelady, and now
recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Dr. Ehlers.
Mr. Ehlers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and this has been very
interesting and useful hearing.
I would like to get back to Dr. Brady and some of the
comments he made. And also relate that to some of my
experiences. First of all, how many of the students that go
through your university wash out or try to go through your
university actually wash out because there is a judgment made
that they simply will not be able to make the grade to
commercial pilot?
Mr. Brady. Yes, sir, our attrition is about 40 percent on
this particular professional pilot degree for the entire 4
years.
Mr. Ehlers. 40 percent.
Mr. Brady. 40 percent of the entering class yes, sir.
Mr. Ehlers. Is that typical for all the other universities?
Mr. Brady. That is pretty typical because it is a self-
select coming into the program so the process that they go
through to determine whether or not and we determine whether or
not they are a good professional pilot material is a process
that takes time. It takes them to interact with the curriculum
and then determine, and we determine whether or not they can
successfully do that. So it is about 40 percent, and that is
pretty standard for a 4-year degree.
Mr. Ehlers. And for what reason do they typically wash out?
Is it lack of intellectual ability to make the types of
calculations that pilots have to make? Conceptual difficulties,
or is it a matter of physical inability to manage controls and
so forth?
Mr. Brady. If you ask them, they usually relate some
personal issue, but many cases it is because of funds because
they have don't have the funds to continue in a professional
pilot program. The flying costs a good deal of money to get all
of those ratings. So many of them wash, they wash themselves
out because they move into another program simply because they
run out of funds, but we have students that are simply
incapable of mastering the curriculum and those of course we
have to move out of the program.
Mr. Ehlers. And what about physical ability?
Mr. Brady. Not too often no, sir, because coming into the
program they have to have--be able to pass an FAA--what is
called an FAA class 2 medical. So if they can't do that, they
can't enter the program even though that is not required at
that point later on, they are going to have be able to pass
that. So we use that as an entry requirement, and many of our--
and I am speaking now from my own university--that many of the
universities have that same issue. They come in with an
appropriate medical qualification before they enter the program
or they don't enter the program.
Mr. Ehlers. Well, I would, frankly, I would have been
delighted had I been able to attend your university or one of
the others as instead over a period of quite a few years of
taking flying lessons from a number of different instructors
and different locations across the country, and I have been
really struck by the variability in the ability of the
instructors to communicate to a student and also to train a
student properly. So frankly, I would feel rather uncomfortable
hiring pilots who don't experience a good curriculum, but just
take pot luck with whatever instructors they might get. That is
just a side comment, and Mr. Babbitt, you can take it for what
it is worth.
Turning to you, Mr. Babbitt, are you satisfied that the FAA
can set standards that can assure that the pilots that are
flying are capable pilots and how does this system work? If you
have a number of pilots who take lessons from different
instructors and just gradually work their way in, do you have
any good measures of their ability to fly? Do you have
standards that are easily quantified beyond argument so that
you can make good judgments as to whether or not this person is
safe to fly?
Mr. Babbitt. Yes, sir, I think we do. We are focusing here
on a tragedy, but I would note that today we are going to have
70,000 operations in the air and you will have the same thing
again tomorrow. Every day we are going to carry 800 million
people. For 29 months we were without an accident and then we
had a tragedy. If we never had another one that would be fine
with me. One is too many. But the standards I think have shown
themselves to be awfully good and while we can argue about some
criteria, what I think is wholesome in this debate that you are
hearing right here at this panel is we are trying to find the
best way. Is it more curriculum? Is it more academia? Is it
more actual experience? Is it checking? Is it better simulation
and training?
But at the end of the day we have standards and those
standards are reinforced over and over again. Then you think
about what an airline pilot does once they have risen to the
level where they are flying passengers for a living. They take
several check rides a year, they take line checks, they fly
with other pilots, they have professional standards programs,
FAA inspectors make spot checks all the time. Air carrier
inspectors can arrive and ride the jump seat and do so. So
these are unannounced random tests. No other profession--I
literally would defy you to find another profession that has
professionals that are as well checked as the airline pilots
that fly the passengers of this country, and I think the
product of that is an incredible safety record.
Mr. Ehlers. I was impressed in reading all the materials
and listening to some of the transcripts of the flight and of
the accident in Buffalo and I was just appalled. I wondered how
these individuals ever got into a cockpit. That is why I asked
the question, are the standards tight enough to detect this at
some point?
Mr. Babbitt. Well, your observation is a good one and I
made a challenge at a recent safety forum where I told every
pilot in the room and there were 600 of them, that if any of
them listened to that transcript and didn't just hang their
head, they didn't deserve to be professional pilots.
Mr. Ehlers. Yeah, I agree with that. Well just one last
comment. In the good old days before 9/11, members of this
Committee were allowed to fly in the jump seat. I found that
extremely useful for my work here on this Committee because
having never flown anything with more than one engine and not a
very powerful engine at that. I was also struck in doing that
at how some pilots were absolute--absolutely magnificent in
their control of the airplane. They seemed to be at one with
the airplane and they knew what was happening before the
airplane even knew what was happening. It was just astounding
and I saw what a high standard they had. Not all of them were
in that category but the others that were there were certainly
competent. Some people just seemed to have the magic touch. As
I say they really become one with the airplane and that is
really what you are looking for I think, someone with that
capability, not just intellectual knowledge, but the
coordination that is necessary to handle an airplane. And it is
just very impressive. It was very impressive for me to fly
there and see the quality of the pilots that operate the
airplanes in this country. Thank you very much. I yield back.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentleman from Michigan,
and now recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Boccieri.
Mr. Boccieri. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
convening this meeting today and for the panel assembled. Let
me just first start by saying that I agree with the belief that
experience does matter and Mr. Brady suggested in his testimony
and his further subsequent remarks that time doesn't constitute
quality, that time in the airplane doesn't constitute quality,
but my argument is how to you obtain that quality? How do you
obtain that quality I know from my military training, as well
as those who have gone through military training that the most
intensive part of your training happens before you even put
hands on the airplane, through simulator, through the
instruction that you received on the ground, and we find that
that has been a robust part of our training.
However, what is missing from this discussion right now, we
are talking about fatigue and we are talking about number of
hours, but we are not talking about the training that these
individuals received because the combination of suspect
training and low hours leads to tragic consequences like we are
realizing right now.
If you will indulge me, Mr. Chairman, just to read a couple
of quips from the NTSB report, the FDR indicates that the crew
moved the flaps to 10 degrees. Two seconds later, the stall
warning stick shaker activated. The autopilot disconnected the
same time the stick shaker activated. The crew added power to
75 percent torque. The airplane began a sharp pitch motion up
accompanied by a left flow, followed by the stick pusher being
activated.
In that NTSB report, they suggest that Colgan pilots who
are trained on the Q 400s, those that were interviewed, had
received a pusher demonstration or instruction in the Q 400.
Some asked for that, but Q-4 check pilots interviewed that
demonstrational instruction of the aircraft pusher system is
not part of the training syllabus or recurrent training on the
Q 400.
So you are telling me that these pilots that climbed in
that airplane on that fatal day were not trained how to recover
from a full stall, from a full stall and we are talking about
hours. You could take the most, you could take the most
qualified pilot with thousands of hours and put him in an
airplane, not adequately trained, and I would argue that they
would not be able to recover from that sort of scenario. So we
need to include in this discussion the type of training that
these individuals are receiving prior to climbing into a
cockpit and flying so many folks around.
Now I want to be clear about this, the NTSB, since 1978,
has been pushing the FAA to include in their training not only
stall recognition, but stall recovery procedures and forcing
airlines and their respective companies to incorporate this
kind of training syllabus in their training and they have not
done that. The NTSB says because of these examples, the NTSB
advises that training in stall recovery should go beyond the
approach to a stall and include training in the recovery from a
full stall condition. These folks on that day did not know how
to recover from a full stall condition, and that is
unacceptable, in my opinion. And this panel today, I want Mr.
Babbitt to commit to me and to the members of the panel, I know
you just got here, sir, but I want you to commit to me that you
are going to listen to the NTSB's recommendations and force
these air carriers that are taking low houred pilots, low
houred aviators and putting them in training conditions that
are suspect and we are going to incorporate that into this
discussion.
Mr. Babbitt. Thank you for your observations and I
certainly have that commitment. We certainly move forward on
that commitment. I think you may have missed some of the
dialogue here earlier, but we have a proposed revision to
training today. There are a couple of things if I could, you
don't get a private pilot's license without having demonstrated
the ability to recover from a stall and you don't get a private
pilot's license without recognizing an approach to a stall. A
commercial license requires the same thing. It actually
requires complicated recovery from a complicated stall. Every
airline teaches approach to stall and recovery. What went wrong
in 3407, is that they failed to recover from the warning of a
stall. So a lot was missed here.
The shortcoming here was a lack of actual simulation in
training and that was a shortcoming, one that needs to be
overcome. We need to revise the training so that anything that
can possibly happen in an airplane, the pilot has seen before,
has been demonstrated to him over and they understand the
techniques to recovery and the path way back to safe flight.
So yes, we are addressing those issues. They are
complicated and as I indicate in my testimony earlier, our
training revisions received some 3,000 pages of comments which
we have to digest in by our Federal procedures rules, but we
will.
Mr. Boccieri. Thank you, Mr. Babbitt. There was a series of
complications that led to this. They were flying at air speeds
that were not indicative of flying into icy conditions, almost
34 knots below what the book recommended they fly. That could
have been a part of experience or quality perhaps and arguably,
but this--just the aircraft pusher system is not part of the
training syllabus for Colgan, and I just want to be clear about
that, that this is not even part of their training syllabus,
how to recover from a full stall. Of course they should have
never gotten into a stick shaker condition which is a stall
first indication of a stall recognition that you are going to
approach a stall, but after they misapplied the procedures or
they didn't do this correctly, there was no training beyond
that. So once they crossed their line, that line of the stick
shaker in my opinion they were in uncharted area.
Mr. Babbitt. I don't disagree. Starting with situational
awareness there was an incredible lack of situational awareness
in that accident. The professionalism lapsed--that we
discussed. There isn't a pilot on this panel that if the stick
shaker went off, I can tell you the only thing that would have
stopped those paddles for me was the firewall, and I think that
is true all the way across the board. Why full power wasn't
applied is a question that looms with every professional pilot,
but the fact remains we learn from this now and we make sure
that this never happens again.
Mr. Boccieri. Just to close, Mr. Chairman, there were 5,623
flying hours on that airplane that day. That seems to me like
that is a very experienced crew, but without the proper
training. Without the proper training it doesn't matter how
many hours you have and that has got to be a part of this
discussion. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentleman from Ohio. And
he knows and we want you to know that in H.R. 3371, the safety
bill that we had discussed earlier and introduced many of these
issues have been addressed and even since the legislation was
introduced they have been strengthened and worked out at the
staff level. When we go to the floor, they will be contained in
the safety bill, and we thank you not only for your comments
and questions, but for your contribution to putting the bill
together as well.
Chair now then recognizes the gentleman from Arkansas, Mr.
Boozman.
Mr. Boozman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Babbitt, the
sterile cockpit rule violations have been notable factors in
both the Lexington and the Buffalo plane crashes. I guess the
question for us is very difficult. How is the FAA going to step
up enforcement of the rule? How do you actually enforce that
rule?
Mr. Babbitt. The sterile cockpit rule and for
clarification, that is from the, you know, the time of taxi out
until 10,000 feet, and then returning, all conversation in that
zone is limited to operational conversations only. That is a
very difficult for us to enforce. Currently we do not monitor,
however we do have several vehicles today, as I indicated,
airlines have check pilots that ride. They make spot checks.
Every pilot gets several line checks a year. The FAA itself
again, air carrier inspectors ride. If a bad habit is noticed,
they are going to bring it to their attention. But again, there
are so many things that you simply can't legislate. It does go
back to the call I have made to the industry and to the pilot
unions to revisit professionalism. The way we are going the
monitor that is when one pilot begins talking at 8000 feet, the
other pilot says we are in a sterile environment, I am sorry,
we are going to talk about this on the ground. That is the way
we are going to enforce it.
Mr. Boozman. Let me ask you, Captain Prater, would you guys
support the development of an audit system for pilot
professionalism on the flight deck?
Mr. Prater. I missed the first part of the question, sir.
Mr. Boozman. Would you all support the development of an
audit system for pilot professionalism on the flight deck? In
other words, would you support something in that nature to help
with this problem?
Mr. Prater. Well, I am not exactly sure what the proposal
would be, but we believe that----
Mr. Boozman. I guess that is up for grabs in a sense that,
as Mr. Babbitt said, you know, how do you do that? We do have
the--we have the regulation now, so it is easy to regulate
these things, but the enforcement. How do, how do you develop a
system so that that the co-pilot or the pilot does say that?
Mr. Prater. Well, that is basically the system that we do
have today. Now does that system break down? Do the human
failings of two aviators come out at the wrong time? It is
possible. We saw it in 3407. But I am going to back up just a
second if I may, sir. Those airmen, those aviators were
certified by the FAA. They had passed every check ride given by
their company check airman. The result of that flight was, yes,
on their shoulders and they bore the brunt of it, but they did
pass the systems check rides. They had been certified.
Their time in the cockpit, unfortunately, did not come
together as the highest in professionalism. We can monitor each
other and that is what you normally see. If somebody gets out
of line on the cockpit, the other guy, and it may not be the
captain, it may be the first officer say, let's get back to
business here. You break the chain that leads to an accident.
We refer to it all the time. I am saying it happens 99 percent
of the time, unfortunately, the consequences of that 1 percent
is brutal.
Mr. Boozman. How about you, Mr. Skiles?
Mr. Skiles. I would echo Captain Prater's comments on that,
but I would also like to add that once again, it is matter of
professionalism in the cockpit. If you get professional,
trained qualified aviators who understand the value of their
training, of rules such as this, the sterile cockpit below
10,000 feet, you solve all of these problems that we are
finding in the industry today. It is a matter of getting
professionals back in the cockpit. Thank you.
Mr. Boozman. Thanks. I agree, you know you have
professionals playing football and you have professionals
playing, you know, basketball and whatever but you do, even
though they are very professional, they have gotten to a very
high degree of skill, they break the rules and you have a
referee to call them down and you move on. So I guess, you
know, the question is, you know, how do we, working together,
not, we have already got the mandate there, but working
together we do see a situation where in two cases it broke
down, you know, that that was going on when it shouldn't have
gone on. So again, hopefully we can work together and do a
little bit better job of enforcing that. So thank you very
much.
Mr. DeFazio. [Presiding.] The Chair recognizes the
gentlewoman from California, Ms. Richardson.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman my first question
is for Mr. Babbitt. Mr. Babbitt, in Mr. May's testimony on page
4, he lays out several recommendations. In Mr. Cohen's
testimony in section four he lays out five recommendations and
then again also on Mr. Cohen's testimony on page two. Have you
read their testimony, are you familiar with the recommendations
that they have provided?
Mr. Babbitt. Thank you. I did, in fact. However, I don't
have them in front of me and I don't recall the specific
recommendations. Were they operational?
Ms. Richardson. Yes. And first of all, sir, I have got 4-1/
2 minutes, and I need to ask several questions so we have got
to go quick. You are acknowledging, yes, you have them. Have
you read them and what are you going to do to implement them?
Mr. Babbitt. Well, I have read their testimony. I don't
have them in front of me, I am sorry. If you could be specific
with just a general quick recap of the recommendations.
Ms. Richardson. We have limited time. On page 4 of Mr.
May's testimony, at the very top, it talks about implementing a
policy of asking pilot applicants to voluntarily disclose FAA
records and so on. In Mr. Cohen's testimony, recommendations to
Congress, he lays out four or five key points. Let me just
suffice to say we would ask of this Committee that you would
take into account the testimony that is been provided and
address the recommendations.
Mr. Babbitt. Yes, and we have.
Ms. Richardson. And if you could get a response back to
this Committee.
Mr. Babbitt. Okay. We will certainly do that. Currently we
have already suggested to every carrier that they ask that
question of any future hire; and secondly, that they would
essentially give a raised eyebrow to anyone who refused to
offer that access because of the Privacy Act you can't demand
that however if the pilot won't give you the authority to check
his pilot records that should raise a question in and of
itself.
Ms. Richardson. Okay, but Mr. Babbitt, what I am asking is
in the testimony today you have several members here who have
supplied you with very good recommendations of things that
should be considered. Do we have your commitment to read them,
to follow up with them with this Committee of the responses of
what is going to be done?
Mr. Babbitt. You absolutely do.
Ms. Richardson. Okay, thank you, sir. Also it says that
there was a meeting, and Mr. Cohen's testimony said they worked
closely with the major airplanes, the FAA, the labor
organizations, to discuss openly and candidly the safety issues
most affecting our industry and to set a near term safety
agenda. Are you familiar with that agenda?
Mr. Babbitt. I am.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. Can you give it to this Committee?
Mr. Babbitt. Yes. We set forth in the Call to Action a
series of steps which included FAA inspections of training,
which we laid out in a two-step scenario. We had other safety
initiatives and the Call to Action brought together a number of
groups across the Nation. We have started an aviation
rulemaking committee to study the flight time and duty time
issues and fatigue. I would suggest to you that in the Olympics
of regulatory procedures we just set a 3-minute mile. That
Aviation Rulemaking Committee has come back to us with a draft.
We will get our rule out for its executive review probably as
quickly as any rule that has come out of the FAA in recent
history. So we have a number of initiatives underway we will
continue to work with the industry, and of course, welcome your
input and the committee's input.
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Ms. Richardson. Okay. My input would be, Mr. Babbitt, that
we need things to be done now. And when you say, you know,
record of FAA, that doesn't seem very positive to me. We have
people like myself and many people here in this room that are
traveling every single day. So as far as I am concerned, it is
things that need to be done now, not, you know, as we are
working through it. So that would be my feedback.
Mr. Babbitt. I wouldn't disagree. However, I am bound by
the Administrative Procedures Act, and as much as I wish I
could make rules instantaneously, there are rules and
procedures that require us to go through a number of steps in
the regulatory process, and we are working as quickly as we can
within that framework.
Ms. Richardson. Are you saying, sir, that the procedures do
not allow, if you know that we have lost lives and things have
occurred, you don't have a process in place of where you can
move forward to expedite to get this stuff done?
Mr. Babbitt. We took the steps that we could as quickly as
we could in terms of advisories, and we have the capability of
putting out safety action items for operators. We have taken
advantage of those where we could. That is why the call to
action was made. However, to change a rule there are
constraints on that that I do not have the ability to override.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. Could you supply to this Congress
what those constraints are?
Mr. Babbitt. Surely.
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Ms. Richardson. Thank you. Captain Prater, we have
programs, aviation safety action programs, flight operations
quality assurance programs that provide invaluable
opportunities to uncover mistakes and to avoid catastrophes
that might happen. What could we do to encourage greater
participation, and how can we better help you?
Mr. Prater. Actually, I believe that the focus that this
Committee, the Subcommittee, as well as the FAA is actually
motivating the industry to get on board and see the value of
this. We have seen some positive changes from some of our
operators who want to make these programs work, and our
commitment, the commitment I have made to the CEOs is we will
make those programs work. We will get the information from
pilots, from mechanics, and we will apply it to the system.
That is our commitment.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, sir. My time is expired. I will
submit one other question into the record for Mr. May and a
final one for Mr. Babbitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank the gentlelady. Mr. Schauer.
Mr. Schauer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would also like to
thank Chairman Costello for his leadership. First, Mr. Loftus,
I would ask you to accept from my constituents in the Michigan
seventh district on behalf of all of the families of Flight
3407 our sympathies and best wishes. My district, my hometown
is Battle Creek, Michigan. It is the home of Western Michigan
University's College of Aviation. Mr. Brady mentioned that in
his testimony. I want to focus on quality. And Dr. Brady, I
would like to ask you some follow-up questions to your
testimony. I couldn't be more pleased and agree more that a
focus in all of our training programs should be on quality.
You cite that a very high percentage of commercial airline
pilots come from collegiate programs. That is what I know in my
hometown. I see the Bronco aircraft flying around our skies
regularly. I have sat in their flight simulator, and they
really do a fabulous job. And I think we are here to talk about
preparation for industry. And so I have read your testimony and
studied it and I guess I want to ask you about whether there is
a difference between meeting the educational goals for
accreditation versus meeting the rigors of commercial airline
operations. Specifically, the transfer of knowledge in high
tech aircraft is something that Western Michigan University's
program is focused on. I know they feel that they can meet that
technologically advanced aircraft or TAA standard which is
required by the airline industry. I understand it isn't
necessarily required for accreditation or for completion of
collegiate programs. Can you talk about that difference and
whether you agree that collegiate programs should meet that
industry standard?
Mr. Brady. Yes, sir, I do. I do agree with that, that those
programs should have those kind of systems and processes. I
would like to also compliment Western Michigan on its
performance in the National Intercollegiate Flying Association
Meet. They did very well. Most of our programs that are
accredited have some form of high tech environments that the
pilots are able to interact with. Many of them have aircraft
that are equipped with glass cockpits, for example. Many of
them have simulators that, if the actual aircraft doesn't have
it, many of them have simulators that are equipped with glass
cockpit procedures. And all of them will go way beyond what the
FAA requires in terms of a minimum set of performance criteria
in meeting their curriculum outcomes.
The whole process of AABI accreditation goes way beyond
what the FAA would require as minimums. And all of the programs
that are accredited have access, and most of them have high
tech glass cockpit opportunities. So the pilots that are coming
out of these programs are very highly skilled. And that is part
of my issue here is that the ATP-only requirement is a one size
fits all, and it doesn't work.
One size doesn't fit all because there are different levels
of quality coming out of flight education programs from an FBO
all the way up to, and I say up because that is the way it is,
up to institutions of higher learning that produce professional
pilots.
Mr. Schauer. Thank you. Would anyone else on the panel like
to comment?
Mr. Prater. I will take just a brief shot at it. I believe
that the universities are producing very good, basic commercial
airline pilots. But they are not making them into an airline
pilot. We are missing a step for that lack of experience. And I
think that is where Administrator Babbitt has focused on. That
is where we are focusing on. What is that next step to turn
somebody who has had that basic 200 hours worth of training
into somebody who can face the rigors of real life scheduled
flying service?
Mr. Schauer. Captain, in follow-up, would training in
technologically advanced aircraft, TAA, help address that
shortcoming?
Mr. Prater. I don't believe so. It is not all about
technology. It is about basic airmanship. Until you have seen
what a mammatus cloud looks like or a lenticular cloud from the
air, because you are not going to see that in the simulator,
you are not going to know what it is until you see it.
Hopefully you will see it with a more experienced aviator who
will mentor you and say we are not going that way, we are going
that way. That is the value of experience.
Mr. Schauer. Great. Captain, thank you. Thanks to the
panel. I will take those comments back to Dean David Powell at
Western Michigan University. Thank you.
Mr. Costello. [Presiding.] The Chair thanks the gentleman,
and now recognizes the gentleman from Oregon, Mr. DeFazio.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to refer
particularly to Captain Prater's testimony. And it causes
tremendous concern. Mainline airlines are frequently faced with
pressures on their marketing plan resulting in the use of
regional feed codesharing partners further down. Codesharing
that will result in the mainline carrier exerting a great deal
of pressure on the regional airlines to provide their service
at the lowest possible price. The regional carriers have to
reduce their costs to prevent being replaced by another air
line at the end of their contract. Now we have larger regional
carriers subcontracting with smaller regional airlines, and
then you go on say, in some extreme cases airlines have
outsourced the majority of their routes to regional airlines
with pilots having as little as 250 hours of experience because
a main line carrier furloughed its own pilots with more than a
decade of experience. Another cost cutting tactic used by
regional vendor airlines is endemic short staffing which leads
to pilot pushing, fewer pilots flying more and more hours per
month and a resultant reduction in safety. And then finally, it
is not uncommon for training at such carriers to be conducted
only to FAA required minimums. This raises a number of
extraordinary issues, issues that I have been raising on this
Committee for well more than a decade, and that would be the
low minimums required by the FAA, which I believe leads to a
lowest common denominator mentality, which leads to
subcontracting or contracting with regional airlines who
subcontract with other regional airlines, and at every step
along the way, the people get paid less, they have less
experience, and there is less integrity to the training
programs of those extremely small, low budget carriers.
Additionally, there is the issue of pay, or the ``lifestyle
choice'' as we heard one of the witnesses refer to it. A woman
living with her mother as an adult because she can't afford an
apartment on her own. It is a ``lifestyle choice''. Yeah, the
lifestyle choice is she wanted to fly an airplane and she isn't
being paid anywhere near a living wage. I don't call that a
lifestyle choice. I call it exploitation by a profit making
entity. And then finally, the whole issue of the minimums. Here
is a question. What if we raise the minimums? Now, wouldn't
that resolve at least some of these issues of you know, chasing
the least experienced person who will work for the lowest wage?
Captain Prater?
Mr. Prater. We believe that it would be a start on the
system. We have identified what we consider the marketplace or
systemic problems of outsourcing and its effect on having
experience in the cockpit. In this specific accident, the fact
that Continental Airlines had laid off their main line pilots,
people who had 10 or 12 years of experience who could have been
flying that airplane, the fact if there weren't so many vendors
working off so many different seniority systems, this specific
crew, with their level of experience and training, would have
never flown together. The captain would have had 6 or 8 years
of experience. That experience is out there. But here is the
economic fix.
We have asked the main line carriers. They are charging $25
for your bag, they are charging $50 for your second bag or
$100, to take 5 minutes to change your reservation. For $1 an
hour, per passenger, we can fix these economic problems. So if
you are going from here to St. Louis, if you would pay $2 for
the captain and $2 for the copilot, we could pay a decent wage.
We can't get that out of the main line carriers. And the
regional partners, their managements have no control over
revenue. All the decisions are made by the main line managers.
And that is what it would take to fix those problems, so you
wouldn't have to live with your parents when you are 30 years
old.
Mr. DeFazio. So $1 per hour. That means I fly weekly to the
West coast, 4-1/2, 5-hour flight, depending on weather
conditions, let's say it was 4-1/5 yesterday. So it would have
cost me an extra $9 to have the most experienced best trained
pilots. Do you think there is anybody up there who wouldn't pay
an extra 9 bucks flying across the country or 2 bucks or 4
bucks for a short flight to get there alive? I don't. Now, the
question is, how do we break this vicious cycle, the lowest
common denominator? What happens is we have some very
responsible regional carriers who are doing a great job. But
their problem is they are competing so-called with these low
budget folks. I think the way to solve that is to raise the
minimums and raise them dramatically. Administrator Babbitt,
what do you say to that?
Mr. Babbitt. When we talk about raising the minimum, I am
presuming you are talking about the requirements to be hired as
a first officer. And that is the subject of an advanced notice
of proposed rule making that we are considering and we may
suggest just that. Before this debate started and so forth, we
came out and recognized that there needed to be some additional
or at least in the FAA's belief, there needed to be some
additional qualifications, training and experience and what our
proposal would do would be to add all three of those
components. The panel, in some discussion here, has taken some
exception. Some of them believe experience should carry a
higher value. Others, quality. That is why we have proposed
rule makings. That is why we put out those notices and that is
why we will take their input and craft a rule.
Mr. DeFazio. But Administrator Babbitt, didn't you testify
to the same issue back in the mid nineties, when you were in a
position with the airline pilots association? And it has been
more than a decade and now we have an advanced notice of a
proposed rule making. How long is that going to take?
Mr. Babbitt. Well, hopefully not long. During that interim
time I wasn't the administrator. Now that I am involved, we are
proposing a change in the flight time and duty time rules. That
one has languished for 35 years. We are going to have a rule by
the end of the year. So we are really aggressively trying to
move some of these issues forward. We haven't touched the
commercial pilot rating and ATP rating rules. The only
difference was to add 300 hours. I got mine when I had 1,200
hours. That was the requirement in 1968. It changed from 1,200
to 1,500. That is the only change that has been made in 40
years.
So while people might take a little exception that it is
taking a little too long, the fact is we are moving it and I
will accelerate it as quickly as I can.
Mr. DeFazio. Okay. I turn then now to Mr. May who was
preceded some time ago by a guy named Bolger, and I had the
same conversation with Mr. Bolger back in the early 1990s. And
at that point he represented that, you know, he didn't think
that we wanted to incur these costs in the system. And I said,
well, sir, I think that you have a large and diverse group of
airlines you represent. But aren't you putting the better ones
who have higher standards at a disadvantage if you are
representing the views of the ones who are the most cost
competitive, or we might say cost cutting, or we might say some
of the things we talked about earlier in the terms of the
problems they are causing.
What if we had a level playing field where we raised the
bar a little bit? And yeah, we have heard how expensive it
would be. Are you telling me there is that much price
sensitivity, that someone won't fly, pay an extra buck to have,
you know, an experienced pilot and another buck for an
experienced copilot? I just, I don't buy it. If you are going
to say, gee, any upward price pressure, as opposed to this
relentless downward price pressure, is going to be detrimental
to the industry when everybody has to play by the same rules,
so no one is going to be at a competitive disadvantage.
You are bringing up the bottom. The people who are already
above them are now in actually a stronger position, and the
ones at the bottom, yeah, they are going to have to suck it up
a little bit and do better.
Mr. May. Mr. DeFazio, I would put the qualifications of our
main line carrier pilots and crews, copilots, up against any in
the world.
Mr. DeFazio. Sure. I got that. But they are driving the
system and they are using more and more regionals, and some of
the regionals are now using more and more sub regionals. They
are driving that system with their code sharing arrangements.
So yes, certainly they have very qualified pilots, and that is
not what I am talking about here. I am talking about the system
we have set up which they are facilitating, which is becoming
more and more the public is flying on one regional carriers
than they are on the mainline carriers.
Mr. May. And I think Administrator Babbitt has talked about
a number of rulemaking procedures that are underway to
significantly elevate the qualifications.
Mr. DeFazio. Great. Will the Association support those?
Mr. May. Yes, we will, and we have. We participated in the
ARC and made a series of recommendations, some of which have
been referred to here today. And look, we are all in favor of
having the opportunity to maintain what is still the safest
system in the world.
Mr. DeFazio. Right. But the one time when it doesn't work
right is unfortunate, it is catastrophic and we want to prevent
that if possible.
Mr. May. I don't think any of us----
Mr. DeFazio. And I see a bad trend here. It reminds me of
the trend we had when Value Jet had outsourced and outsourced
the outsourcing of their maintenance, and you got to a level
where some people didn't know that mixing oxygen canisters and
tires in the hull of the aircraft was a bad idea. And I worry
that the system is driving that way now with the way these
regional and subregional contracts are going out. I am pleased
to hear the Association supports the higher standards, and I
look forward to Administrator Babbitt expediting it so I am not
back here in 16 more years talking to yet a future
administrator about the same issue. I hope not to be here and I
hope we have resolved the issue by then. Thank you. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Costello. The Chair would say to my friend from Oregon
that we are not going to wait on rulemaking. That is the reason
that we have introduced H.R. 3371 and we are going to proceed.
There are things that we can do that we can put into law that,
we can pass through the House and hopefully through the Senate,
and we will work with the FAA along the way. But we know what
has happened in the past as far as rulemaking is concerned. It
takes a long period of time.
I would join others in commending Administrator Babbitt in
expediting some things already since he has been in his
position, and I trust that he will continue to move forward
with this issue.
I have a final question for some of the members of the
panel. We have talked about, as Dr. Brady indicated, his
concern about the disadvantage of the 26 accredited schools
versus the flight training schools. Let me talk a little bit or
ask a little bit about the value of classroom time versus time
in the cockpit, time in the cockpit versus time in the
simulator, time in the classroom versus time in the cockpit
versus being in the cockpit over in the southern California
airspace or the New York airspace. And I want to start with Mr.
Skiles, and then I will work my way through the panel. If you
would comment, the value of time in the classroom versus time
in the cockpit versus time in the simulator.
Mr. Skiles. Well, I would like to first of all say that we
are very happy, we think that the AABI accredited schools do a
great job of training our future airline pilots. But we argue
that education is only part of what makes a complete airline
pilot. While gaining the experience to qualify for an ATP, a
pilot is exposed to challenging and unpredictable circumstances
which are just not possible in a classroom. This gives them the
opportunity to develop airmanship skills we call them. And I
would like to define that for you a little bit.
You know, flying is as much a skill as it is just
knowledge. You don't become a virtuoso on a cello after a few
lessons. Even adept training can't prepare a pilot for everyday
line flying. You take away the auto pilot, the glide slope, the
auto throttles and you are left with basic flying skills that
you have developed, the ability to plan a descent to a certain
point and be there at a certain altitude, the ability to fly a
perfect glide profile by eye alone, the ability to judge wind
drift on a base leg and adjust your bank angle to roll out
perfectly aligned with the runway. These are airmanship skills.
And this is what we find is, I think, sorely lacking in our
industry today. They can only be achieved by experience in the
cockpit.
So once again, we think that education is part of the
equation. But once again, you need the experience that you are
going to attain as you are getting the requirements for the ATP
license to develop those critical airmanship skills that are
going to come to play in circumstances that you encounter in
your everyday airline flying career.
Thank you.
Mr. Costello. So the bottom line is you strongly support
the ATP?
Mr. Skiles. Absolutely. The ATP requirement is the absolute
minimum requirement that we should be seeing for admittance to
our airline cockpits.
Mr. Costello. Captain Prater.
Mr. Prater. I would concur, but go just a little bit
further. I think there are different ways of gaining valuable
experience. I do think that there should be a more intense
focus on the educational aspects, the ground school, if you
will, provisions of becoming a pilot. We do support the
requirement for the ATP. However, we also feel that there are
some interim steps that can bridge the gap of just flight time
experience. There is very little bad flight time experience. It
all adds to one's total amount of experience. And it is not
just in a training environment. You have to go out there and
sometimes do it to get better.
So we would like to see an increase in ground school,
whether it is in the basic airmanship, private, commercial
instrument ratings, and we would like to see it go beyond that.
There is no real ground school for ATP. You can take--you can
buy a $5 Acme exam and learn the answers. I would like to get
around that. I would like to increase those requirements to get
an ATP.
Thank you.
Mr. Costello. Thank you, Captain Prater. Mr. Loftus.
Mr. Loftus. Again, I will agree with both of the pilots,
professional pilots here at the table. I agree that there is no
experience, other than the experience in the air there is no
substitute for what you learn in the classroom, or the other
way around. The classroom is a needed environment. The pilots
that come out of the colleges and the universities are
extremely good pilots. They turn out to be very good first
officers and captains.
But, again, the airlines are not an entry level position, I
don't believe. I think that it has got to be earned. There is
knowledge there that can't be taught in a classroom. It can
only be learned in a plane and a simulator. I think the
simulators are an important part of the training process. But,
again, there is no replacement for that, all the classroom
learning you can have, but until you fly the airplane you don't
know how to land it. You can talk about it all day.
Mr. Costello. Thank you, Mr. Loftus. Finally, Dr. Brady, if
you would like to comment.
Mr. Brady. Thank you, Mr. Costello. All of these things are
important, blended together, to produce the ideal professional
pilot. There is a level of classroom that is needed, and we
believe that the academic experience in a college or university
is the best means to attain those levels. The simulator,
integrated with the aircraft, if it is the right kind of
simulator, if it simulates the aircraft and there is a transfer
of training between the two, we fully support.
At my institution, for example, we train under what is
called part 142, which allows simulation, the maximum amount of
simulation, and we actually have very high level simulators for
the Cessna 172 and the Seminole and the Canadair regional jets,
so our pilots get trained on all of those boxes and all those
opportunities. And you can do things in a simulator you can't
do in an aircraft. So we very much support that.
As far as the ATP is concerned, we don't believe that one
size fits all. We believe there needs to be some modification
of that so that the high quality programs are not disadvantaged
by the low quality programs. We believe there needs to be some
measure taken so that the ATP is not the determinant, is not
the determining item to put the pilot into the cockpit of a
part 121 carrier. We believe it is an inappropriate measure.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you. And I thank all of our
witnesses for participating and testifying in our hearing
today. As I said from the outset, this Subcommittee intends to
uphold our commitment not only to the families of Flight 3407,
but to the American people, that we will continue aggressive
oversight. We will pursue bringing our safety bill to the floor
of the House of Representatives to move it through so that we
can--and we will be working with Administrator Babbitt and our
stakeholders in the process.
We think we have a good bill. We think it does many things
that we learned from our hearing in June and again from meeting
with many of the stakeholders represented here today. So we
look forward to continuing to work with you. And as I said, we
are committed to aggressive oversight to make certain that we
improve the safety standards for the future.
With that, the Subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
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