[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-76]
RAISING THINKING FROM THE TACTICAL
TO THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
JPME I AND JPME II AT THE
SERVICES' AND JOINT COMMAND
AND STAFF COLLEGES
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JUNE 25, 2009
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
JIM COOPER, Tennessee CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
GLENN NYE, Virginia TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
John Kruse, Professional Staff Member
Thomas Hawley, Professional Staff Member
Trey Howard, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2009
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, June 25, 2009, Raising Thinking from the Tactical to
the Operational Level: JPME I And JPME II at the Services' and
Joint Command and Staff Colleges............................... 1
Appendix:
Thursday, June 25, 2009.......................................... 35
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 25, 2009
RAISING THINKING FROM THE TACTICAL TO THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL: JPME I AND
JPME II AT THE SERVICES' AND JOINT COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGES
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Snyder, Hon. Vic, a Representative from Arkansas, Chairman,
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee...................... 1
Wittman, Hon. Rob, a Representative from Virginia, Ranking
Member, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee.............. 1
WITNESSES
Cardon, Brig. Gen. Edward C., USA, Deputy Commandant, Army
Command and General Staff College.............................. 8
Damm, Col. Raymond C., Jr., USMC, Director, U.S. Marine Corps
Command and Staff College...................................... 13
Jackson, Brig. Gen. Jimmie C., USAF, Commandant, Air Command and
Staff College.................................................. 10
Kasun, Brig. Gen. Katherine P., USA, Commandant, Joint Forces
Staff College.................................................. 3
Wisecup, Rear Adm. James P., USN, President, Naval War College... 6
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Cardon, Brig. Gen. Edward C.................................. 109
Damm, Col. Raymond C., Jr.................................... 140
Jackson, Brig. Gen. Jimmie C................................. 131
Kasun, Brig. Gen. Katherine P................................ 44
Snyder, Hon. Vic............................................. 39
Wisecup, Rear Adm. James P................................... 79
Wittman, Hon. Rob............................................ 41
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Dr. Snyder................................................... 159
RAISING THINKING FROM THE TACTICAL TO THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL: JPME I AND
II AT THE SERVICES' AND JOINT COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGES
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Thursday, June 25, 2009.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:08 a.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vic Snyder
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
Dr. Snyder. The hearing will come to order.
Good morning and welcome to the Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations' third formal hearing on in-residence
officer Professional Military Education. In our previous
session, we looked at the role of the senior schools, that is
the war colleges, and the Industrial College of the Armed
Forces in educating strategists.
Today we have the commandants and directors of the
intermediate schools representing the individual services'
command and staff colleges and the Joint Forces Staff College.
These schools are focused on taking competent tacticians and
raising their thinking to the next higher level, that of the
``operational art.''
In our next hearing, we will hear from the commandants and
directors of the service academies and career schools, and at a
subsequent hearing we will also invite those responsible for
setting overarching Department of Defense joint and Service
guidance on Professional Military Education.
Mr. Wittman, any opening comments you would like to make,
please?
[The prepared statement of Dr. Snyder can be found in the
Appendix on page 39.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ROB WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA,
RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Wittman. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you so much to Chairman Snyder, and good morning to
our witnesses. And we appreciate you being here today,
especially Admiral Wisecup who is here making his second
appearance. And you are logging some frequent flier miles with
us. We appreciate that.
Today's hearing focuses on the first level of Joint
Professional Officer Education, which comes after an officer is
well-grounded in his or her service, selected for field grade
rank and is ready for broader responsibilities.
More importantly, completion of the intermediate level of
education, or Joint Professional Military Education I (JPME 1),
is expected of all majors and lieutenant commanders. Therefore,
unlike the war colleges, these schools are the only schools
which educate all officers attaining the rank of O-4 and are
thus an important touchstone of the Joint Professional
Education System.
While concentrating on operational matters of their
respective services, the schools provide an important early
joint education through more than the subjects taught. The use
of other service faculty and attendance by other service,
international, and interagency students in these seminar-based
courses provide a broadening perspective.
The witnesses will understand, then, our interest in
questions of faculty quality and diversity of experience and
the ability of the services to support each other with
excellent faculty and students.
Without a solid mix of other service and agency faculty and
students, none of your institutions can provide a credible
joint education. I would appreciate hearing both your success
stories and your obstacles in attaining these goals as you
testify today.
Our preliminary research indicates that the Army and Navy
programs are in transitional periods. In fact, it seems that
the Army may believe it overreached in its stated goal of
sending all majors to an in-residence intermediate education in
Fort Leavenworth and may scale back these plans.
It would be useful to have on record the reasons the Army
determined to educate all majors in residence and the
difficulties it has faced in reaching the goal.
I am less concerned with service differences and school
organization and placement in the service bureaucracy. What is
important is getting the right people, both faculty and
students, and funding to do the job.
Mr. Chairman, since I would like to hear from our
witnesses, I am mindful that our defense--or, excuse me, our
National Defense Authorization bill is being debated on the
floor. I will stop here and thank you for your time and
leadership.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the
Appendix on page 41.]
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.
Our witnesses today are Brigadier General Katherine Kasun,
United States Army, Commandant of the Joint Forces Staff
College; Rear Admiral James Wisecup, United States Navy,
President of the Naval War College; Brigadier General Edward
Cardon, Deputy Commandant, Army Command and General Staff
College; Brigadier General Jimmie Jackson, United States Air
Force, Commandant of the Air Command and Staff College; and
Colonel Raymond Damm, U.S. Marine Corps, Director of the United
States Marine Corps Command and Staff College.
And before we begin, General Cardon, don't you have a guest
here with you today?
General Cardon. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I have my son,
Specialist Chris Cardon.
Dr. Snyder. Stand up for us please, if we won't embarrass
you terribly.
Thank you. We are pleased to have you here. Appreciate your
service, too.
Specialist Chris Cardon. Thank you.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you.
We will start with General Kasun. We are going to put the
five-minute clock on, but it is more just to be kind of a speed
bump for you. If you decide to go rapidly over the speed bump,
that is your business, too.
But if you have that thing it is good to say beyond the
five minutes, just feel free to go ahead, but just to give you
an idea of where the time is.
We will begin with you, General Kasun.
General Kasun. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I probably will go over that speed bump today----
Dr. Snyder. Yes, that is fine.
General Kasun [continuing]. A couple of minutes----
Dr. Snyder. Yes, that is fine.
General Kasun [continuing]. Because I have two schools.
Dr. Snyder. Right.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. KATHERINE P. KASUN, USA, COMMANDANT,
JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
General Kasun. All right, sir. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to come before you to discuss Joint Professional
Military Education at the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC).
The Joint Forces Staff College is a unique institution
championed by General Eisenhower and Admiral Nimitz over 60
years ago.
In 1946, General Eisenhower emphasized that our college was
the only institution in the military educational system where
the basic mission will be to give instruction on the theater
and major joint task force level.
Despite many changes in the world since then, this
statement still holds true. Our enduring mission is to educate
national security professionals to plan and execute joint,
multinational, and interagency operations. We accomplish this
important mission through four major schools and a host of
short courses.
Today I will discuss four points concerning our two primary
schools which provide resident JPME: our intermediate level,
10-week Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) and our
11-month intermediate and senior level Joint Advanced
Warfighting School (JAWS).
For the first point, allow me to reemphasize JFSC's
uniqueness. We are a joint institution which focuses on joint
planning at the operational level of war. Our military faculty
is almost equally divided between the Army, Air Force and Navy
with a representative number of Marines.
Our student body is also divided proportionately among the
services.
Since 1993, when the congressional review of the Skelton
Panel's recommendation was conducted at JFSC, the two schools
have graduated approximately 3,500 Army officers, 4,400 Air
Force officers and 3,400 Navy and Marine Corps officers,
numbers which illustrate our true joint nature.
All JFSC students study in a joint learning environment.
JCWS students are also required to share housing with officers
from other services during their 10 weeks on campus. Our
curriculum assumes the officers arrive with a solid
understanding of their service competencies from their service
staff colleges. We build upon this service expertise to create
planners who are strategically minded critical thinkers and
skilled joint warfighters.
The second point that I wish to make is how our curricula
on academic methodologies excel in supporting the joint
multinational interagency planning community. Both JCWS and
JAWS immerse our students in academically rigorous programs
using active and collaborative learning techniques.
Students engage in active learning in over 90 percent of
their classroom time and are required to demonstrate their
skills by practical application, case studies, research,
writing, and examinations.
The Joint and Combined Warfighting School conducts four
graduate-level JPME Phase two classes a year. They focus on
joint planning at the operational level, ensuring that
graduates are prepared for duty in a joint environment and can
quickly become a productive leader of a joint planning group.
We have agreements with 15 colleges which grant our JCWS
graduates anywhere from 3 to 19 graduate-level credits. Joint
Advanced Warfighting School, JAWS, continues to fulfill the
vision of an advanced joint program as first recommended by
Congressman Skelton and the HASC panel in 1989.
JAWS students earned 36 graduate-level credits while
completing a rigorous 11-month curriculum designed to create
master joint planners. The curriculum uses military history and
theory to lay the foundation for the study of national strategy
and an in-depth focus on Joint Operational Campaign Planning.
The course of study culminates with the completion of a
thesis, a three-hour oral comprehensive examination and the
awarding of a Master of Science degree in Joint Campaign
Planning and Strategy.
Both curricula are designed to be relevant and current with
continuous updates that include compelling planning issues and
other special areas of emphasis such as theater campaign
planning, irregular warfare, building partnership capacity,
strategic communications and defense support to civil
authorities.
Our faculty and curriculum developers maintain constant
communication with subject matter experts in the joint,
multinational, and interagency commands and staff in order to
evolve the curricula to meet the most pressing needs of the
planning community.
Our methodologies and techniques have been validated over
the years. The Middle States Commission on Higher Education has
awarded full accreditation to JFSC through National Defense
University since 1997. Last year, under the chairman's Process
for Accreditation of Joint Education, JAWS met all the
standards required for 6-year accreditation.
Dr. Snyder. Ignore those bells. I have never heard that
before in my life. [Laughter.]
I don't know what that was. [Laughter.]
General Kasun. I still get my minutes. [Laughter.]
Dr. Snyder. You still get your minutes. [Laughter.]
General Kasun. During the same evaluation, JCWS was
reaffirmed for the third time and met all accreditation
standards with the exception of the required student-to-faculty
ratio.
Since then, National Defense University funded 10
additional civilian Title X billets to alleviate that
situation, although gaps in the military billets continue to be
a problem.
I would like to close this second point by noting that we
routinely hear suggestions that the JCWS course could be
shorter. However, the increasing complexity of modern warfare
is such that we effectively use the entire 10 weeks to execute
a very rigorous academic program with very little white space
left on the calendar.
Given that joint warfare has grown more complex and the
operational environment is more challenging than ever before,
we fully support the Skelton Panel's conclusion that we must
resist pressures to shorten the length of this school any
further.
My third point involves educating the right student at the
right time. Ideally, JCWS students should arrive to the college
en route to or within 12 months of being assigned to a joint
command. Unfortunately, only about \1/3\ of the JCWS student
meet this criteria.
Moreover, if other officers do not come en route, joint
commands are frequently unwilling to lose their officers for 10
weeks. Based on surveys of former students and their
supervisors, those officers who attend our course are more
productive earlier in their Joint assignment if they are able
to attend JCWS en route to or earlier in their tour.
For JAWS, having the right students means having one who
can fill a joint planning billet immediately following
graduation. However, we have noticed that the service struggled
to ensure that over half of our graduates go to joint
assignments immediately following their graduation.
Annual selection decisions and assignments policies limit
the number of graduates reaching JAWS-coded joint billets. To
date, JAWS graduates have filled less than 20 percent of
available coded billets, and some billets have never received
one of our graduates.
As the combatant commanders become more familiar with the
skills of our graduates, we are convinced the demand for our
graduates will grow exponentially.
My fourth and final point concerns the future.
Mr. Chairman, while we are successful in attracting
international students, efforts to increase the number of
interagency students remain a challenge. We need to increase
the number of interagency students to expose more mid-level
government professionals to an effective whole-of-government
approach to solving complex problems.
We must also increase the number of Reserve and National
Guard students attending JCWS. The need to educate the reserve
component in joint matters is essential since they are
deploying as individual augmentees and populating joint staffs
with increasing frequency.
Finally, we must continue to encourage services to provide
the right education to the right person at the right time.
Mr. Chairman, I am very proud of our college. The quality
of our faculty and staff and students are unsurpassed.
Jointness permeates everything we do. We play a vital role in
preparing the military to fight today's enemies as well as
those yet unknown of tomorrow.
Thank you for this opportunity to be here with you today.
[The prepared statement of General Kasun can be found in
the Appendix on page 44.]
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, General.
Admiral Wisecup? We will see if you get the same squeaking
thing. [Laughter.]
Normally, this system breaks. We have never actually had it
100 percent work before.
It was your lucky day, General. [Laughter.]
STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. JAMES P. WISECUP, USN, PRESIDENT, NAVAL
WAR COLLEGE
Admiral Wisecup. Good morning.
Chairman Snyder, Representative Wittman, distinguished
ladies and gentlemen of the Oversight and Investigation
Subcommittee, I am Rear Admiral Phil Wisecup, President of the
Naval War College, and I thank you for the opportunity to speak
with you again.
Let me begin by assuring you the Navy now has a distinct
curriculum for the intermediate-level course as recommended by
the Panel on Military Education of the 100th Congress headed by
Representative Ike Skelton.
Today, our intermediate courses focus on building
operational-level expertise, a key emphasis of Admiral Gary
Roughead, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). The college's
intermediate-level graduates are skilled in applying
operational art through the Navy and joint planning processes
and are critically thinking leaders with operational-level
perspectives.
They are familiar with a range of challenges of operating
in the maritime domain and are competent in employing Naval
capabilities in conjunction with other services, other agencies
and partner nations to achieve strategic objectives in war and
peace.
Further, the Chief of Naval Operations determined that
unrestricted line Navy officers in the grade of commander must
have completed an intermediate-level professional military
course with embedded JPME Phase I before assuming command.
Likewise, most staff and restricted line officers must have
also completed that level of PME before assuming command
equivalent positions.
This CNO decision requires nearly all Navy officers to
complete intermediate level PME and ensures those with the
greatest potential will complete it.
The intermediate-level course, resident and non-resident,
consists of three academic programs. The National Security
Decision-Making Course instructs in theater strategic planning,
the economic, political, organization and behavior factors
affecting selection, command, and the use of military forces
and the operational level critical thinking skills essential to
the work of complex national security organizations.
The course's capstone exercise requires each seminar to
produce an executive-level strategic estimate of the future
security environment, a theater strategic vision that advances
U.S. national interests and a prioritized list of new or
improved concepts capabilities necessary to advance the
strategy.
The strategy and war course, as opposed to the senior
course, which is strategy and policy, is designed to develop a
deeper understanding of the interaction of strategy and the
operational use of military force. The course sharpens the
students' ability to assess how alternative operational courses
of action best serve to achieve overall strategic objectives.
After reviewing the classical theories, the 11-week course
explores a different war weekly, each with a discrete political
purpose, normally examined through the lens of a theater of
operations. For this academic year, for example, the maritime
domain dominates in 5 of the 10 cases. Irregular warfare was
the focus of three cases and a substantive part of three
others.
The longest course of study is the 17-week Joint Maritime
Operations Course. In it students study the operational level
of war throughout the range of military operations with an
emphasis on the maritime environment.
Once firmly grounded in operational art, students use Navy
and joint planning processes to develop alternatives for
applying Naval, U.S. and partner nation capabilities toward
strategic objectives. A major planning exercise requires each
seminar to develop alternative courses of action supporting
operational orders including the Joint Force Maritime
Commanders.
The course's capstone war game involves a crisis
development and deployment planning phase, a humanitarian
assistance phase, and a transition phase, all using
collaborative technology tools in a distributed environment.
Together, these courses develop an operational knowledge
base and perspective required to contribute on a major staff.
The resident curriculum is the basis for the four non-resident
programs.
We are confident our educational approach, which uses an
executive perspective in a seminar-centered environment,
requiring an appreciation of alternative viewpoints and the
synthesis of complex ideas using multidisciplinary tools
remains on target.
We expect application of principles to case studies of real
events and issues and require our students to provide written
analysis of complex open-ended issues. Grading clearly sustains
the academic rigor.
Through such endeavors, we believe we can well judge if our
students are achieving the required educational outcomes.
I have found the college to be a place where morale is
high, faculty and staff members are satisfied they are doing
meaningful work that makes a difference, students are highly
motivated professionals, many coming right off the front lines,
who take their duties seriously.
They continue to challenge themselves and me every day.
On behalf of the students, faculty and staff representing
each of our armed services, many of our international partners,
and numerous Department of Defense and other federal
activities, we thank you for your continued support within
Congress and your commitment to professional military
education.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Wisecup can be found in
the Appendix on page 79.]
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Admiral.
General Cardon.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. EDWARD C. CARDON, USA, DEPUTY
COMMANDANT, ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
General Cardon. Chairman Snyder, Congressman Wittman and
honorable members of the committee, I would like to extend to
each of you a warm welcome from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Thank
you for this opportunity to speak about professional military
education at the Army's Command and General Staff College.
I came to the position of deputy commandant from 5 years of
service in Third Infantry Division with 29 months in Iraq
between 2003 and 2008. This experience directly influences how
I view my job today.
First, for my personal experience and observation, our
graduates are doing well in supporting the operations around
the world, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq. I recognize that
their state of readiness is a combination of their experience,
training and education, but it is clear that the college is
contributing to the success of these majors.
Second, there is more we can do to prepare this next
generation of leaders. We often say we train for certainty but
we educate for uncertainty. This concept is more important than
ever given the unknowns of the future environment.
We must broaden our focus, planning and executing
operations in environments that include extended operations
over time. We need a richer, joint interagency,
intergovernmental, multinational experience. And we need to
continue to focus on ill-structured problems.
And we need to educate our officers on comprehensive
soldier fitness to preserve the force.
A considerable amount of the current success of military
education is directly attributed to the implementation of
recommendations on the report of the Panel of Military
Education. We strive and will continue to strive to meet your
intent for rigorous, quality education that prepares our
officers to operate in an ever-changing environment.
Strategic leaders develop over time. We are an important
stop in this journey as our students, who are already confident
in tactics, will understand operational art, and will be
educationally prepared to start or build on a strategic study.
Numerous thoughtful questions have been raised that we
attempted to address in our written statements, but I just want
to highlight a few points.
Education: We believe leaders develop though education,
training and experience. Training is great if it is the right
training. Experience is great if it is the right experience,
and education provides the intellect to see the difference.
Educating for uncertainty allows us to operate in these
complex environments, to work on these ill-structured problems,
and to operate in a more decentralized environment with
increasing interaction to coalition and non-military partners.
For our students, the Army adopted the concept of universal
resident intermediate-level education for all active-duty and
select reserve component majors, which continues to be an
intriguing debate for our Army.
This concept is under stress today due to the operational
demands of the force. The Army needs all of its majors to be
successful, and the increasing complexity of the environment
makes education even more important.
One of the greatest values to resident education--is the
interaction between Army officers, district service officers,
international officers and a growing number of interagency
officers.
For curriculum, we have an integrated curriculum based on
educational outcomes using an adult education model that
includes time to reflect while providing rigor in upholding
graduate standards and evaluating student work. It is possible
to fail.
We incorporate history and history studies in the curricula
of students in an appreciation for examining the past to
prepare for the future. Our task is to provide the best
education we can offer to every officer attending the college
and we are very fortunate to have a select number of students
attend a second year of study in operational art at the School
of Advanced Military Study.
The faculty has changed dramatically, going from a
predominantly military faculty to a current faculty construct
that consists of approximately 65 percent civilian with more
than 95 percent of the civilians having active-duty experience.
Our number of Ph.D.s is growing. Our military faculty,
including the joint military faculty, is critical. They are the
role models who coach and mentor, bring recent operational
experience to the classroom, and provide context in our current
military environment.
The challenge is balancing the needs of the college with
the personnel pressures on all our formations and organizations
and we need our sister service officers to receive joint credit
as the current system negatively influences officers from other
services in their interest to serve as an instructor at Fort
Leavenworth.
For the future, I want to highlight three initiatives.
Historically, interagency participation in education has been
minimal, whether they were civilians from the Army or outside
agencies. We have had minor faculty support from some agencies
but almost no civilian students attending.
The need to add interagency faculty, students and
curriculum is paramount. Over the last two years, we have
talked to dozens of agencies and done our best to market this
program. The story is uniformly the same.
These agencies understand and support the initiative, but
lacked the education and training account of people to support
the efforts. We have developed an intern program for Army
officers to help mitigate the manning issues of participating
agencies, but we need additional help to better attract
interagency students.
We also have interagency faculty from the Department of
State, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and the Central
Intelligence Agency. It is a great start, but there is more to
be done. This is an area we can also use your support.
Our current policy sets standards for joint representation
within the student body. We feel a similar system to support
interagency participation at the intermediate level is
appropriate.
The second initiative I want to showcase is the Student
Health Program, which has been added to the college. It saves
lives. Three years ago, the leadership began to see signs and
symptoms of stress in the student population, and upon further
investigation, we discovered that the majors were in worse
physical condition than our colonels.
The program was developed and resourced. We have a complete
wellness program for our majors. But the next step is to
implement the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program, including
resiliency programs to help our students deal with the stress
of today's and tomorrow's environment.
And the final initiative I want to highlight is our
emphasis on preparing our majors to use information. Every
student must write for publication, must be interviewed by the
media, complete a public speaking engagement and touch the
blogosphere.
Early results of having our students engaged with the
public are inspiring. There are great stories to tell and
important messages that they bear I think people should hear.
This is having an immediate impact on our Army.
In closing, we are unbelievably proud of the men and women
who serve at Fort Leavenworth, both in the military and our
dedicated civilians. We are extremely grateful for the
committee for the support to Professional Military Education.
We strive and will continue to strive to meet your intent for
rigorous, quality education. Both teaching and learning is
strong and will remain strong.
We will continue to evolve and adjust to meet the needs of
the future. We have a sacred trust to ensure our education
prepares our officers, our leaders to lead our soldiers in
formation.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Cardon can be found in
the Appendix on page 109.]
Dr. Snyder. Thank you.
General Jackson.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. JIMMIE C. JACKSON, USAF, COMMANDANT,
AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
General Jackson. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee,
thank you for this opportunity to appear and testify about the
Air Command and Staff College (ACSC). I would like to submit my
written statement as a part of the official record and look
forward to addressing any questions you may have after my
opening remarks.
Dr. Snyder. All written statements are a part of the
record.
Thank you.
General Jackson. I understand the focus of your current
efforts is on the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and the House
Armed Services Committee (HASC) Panel on Military Education
Report from 1989, and what their influence has been shaping
Professional Military Education.
I can personally attest to the influence they have had on
Air Command and Staff College. I was a faculty member at ACSC
during the 1998-1999 timeframe, and in September 2007 returned
as the ACSC commandant.
What I found in 2007 is significantly different than when I
left in 1999. ACSC is a programs that is academically rigorous,
steeped into our operations and a college that educates airmen
who are agile, critical thinkers prepared to meet any
challenge.
Unique to ACSC with respect to other PME institutions is
its air-centric operational focus. But this service perspective
is balanced by a comprehensive curriculum that stresses joint,
interagency and multinational planning and operations.
ACSC does not rest on its past laurels but continues to
address key faculty, curriculum and resource challenges to
sustain this level of success. I want to emphasize that we
consider our faculty as our center of gravity.
Faculty make or break our institution.
I believe, and student feedback supports, that ACSC has a
well-prepared, motivated faculty and staff. However, we must
continue to focus on faculty and faculty development to sustain
these qualifications and credentials.
ACSC faculty considerations include the mix of Air Force,
sister service and civilian instructors. When I was on the
faculty, we had two civilian faculty members. Today we have 31.
Congressman Skelton's support in attaining Title X authority
was key to this effort.
The increased civilian faculty has been a significant
factor in creating a more academically rigorous program. In
addition, all Air Force Officer Professional Military Education
schools are co-located within the Carl A. Spaatz Center for
Officer Education at Maxwell Air Force Base.
We are able to draw upon the synergies of the seven
colleges and schools, their civilian and military faculty
members, to interagency advisors, to mentors assigned to every
person.
It is important that the college establish the right mix
with its military faculty. The right mix begins with Air Force
sister service ratio. Sister services have been very supportive
in providing outstanding faculty members, but an issue is joint
credit for faculty duty at Air Command and Staff College.
I believe there is justification for all military faculty
members at the service intermediate level colleges to receive
joint credit. Your subcommittee may be able to help us with
this effort.
We are working to address both the quantity and the mix of
Air Force military faculty expertise. We must continue to
emphasize that PME faculty duty is valued in an individual's
career in the Air Force.
As I referenced in the written comments, ACSC recognizes
the need to invest in the professional development of its
entire faculty as teachers, scholars and practitioners. The key
is maintaining the currency and relevancy of the curriculum and
remaining on the leading edge of teaching methodology.
The ACSC resident class forms a diverse, uniquely-
experienced population. The class contains a mix of operational
and functional expertise from the non-host military department,
air reserve components, international officers, Department of
Defense (DOD) civilians, and representation from other
agencies.
The caliber of the students attending ACSC has remained
high. The move in 1994 to integrate the international officers
for the full academic year has had a significant positive
impact on the ACSC program, especially as we increased our
regional and cultural emphasis.
The ACSC curriculum today is very focused on operational
art. One challenge I face as the commandant are frequent
requests for insertions into the curriculum. ACSC has
established the context of a core curriculum that serves as the
basis for curriculum changes, insertions and additions.
The Air Force has also established an Air Force Learning
Committee to screen these recommendations similar to the
process used by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over
insertions into joint PME.
The joint approach serves as a good model for the
curriculum change by the Air Force.
Every element of the core is reviewed and updated to ensure
that each is relevant to the needs of today's warfighters and
prepares those warfighters for the challenges they will face
tomorrow.
Examples of ACSC's adaptability include institutionalizing
jointness across the curriculum, embracing a robust regional
and cultural studies program, embedding concepts and ideas
about operational-level warfare throughout our core courses and
reemphasizing irregular warfare and the nuclear enterprise.
Another improvement I noted upon my return was a stronger
emphasis on focused research. ACSC student papers are read by
senior military leaders generating ideas affecting operations
and military strategies.
We have already had reports that academic year 2009 student
research is being used to change the way DOD handles field
distribution, how Congress may view weather control, and how
intelligence operations may be executed.
In summary, there has been broad sweeping change at ACSC
since the initial implementation of joint education. ACSC has
matured from the joint track approach in 1998 to full
integration and the use of jointness as our primary language.
Process changes mandated in the Goldwater-Nichols Act and
by the panel have now been institutionalized. Our students are
receiving the education necessary to critically reflect upon
today's issues while preparing to address the unforeseen
challenges of the future.
Mr. Chairman, I again thank you for the opportunity to
testify and the chance to talk about Air Command and Staff
College. I have been honored to serve as the commandant for the
past two years, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Jackson can be found in
the Appendix on page 131.]
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, General Jackson.
Colonel Damm.
STATEMENT OF COL. RAYMOND C. DAMM, JR., USMC, DIRECTOR, U.S.
MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
Colonel Damm. Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Wittman,
distinguished subcommittee members, good morning. On behalf of
General Gardner, Marine Corps University president, thank you
for allowing me to tell you about the accomplishments of your
Marine Corps Command and Staff College.
Informed by the study of history and culture, the college's
present mission is to educate and train its joint,
multinational and interagency professionals to overcome diverse
21st century security challenges.
We teach warfighting and the context in which that
warfighting occurs. We rely heavily on a combination of
seminars, practical applications, case studies and student
self-direction.
As its director, my intention is to create an atmosphere of
professional excellence by employing a world-class faculty and
staff, working with energetic, motivated students in a
supportive, challenging and forward-looking educational
environment.
Our graduates are regarded by operational commanders as
outstanding planners, accomplished communicators, both orally
and in writing, innovative thinkers and sound decision makers
who have raised their thinking above the tactical level.
They should be adept at solving the complex problems of an
inherently ambiguous and dangerous world and to perform
effectively at the operational level of war. In short, we seek
to produce graduates who can think creatively, reason
critically and act decisively.
Our students are accomplished professionals, aggressive,
bright, savvy and, in this year's class, more than 80 percent
combat veterans. Knowing they will soon return to the fight,
they are eager to learn.
Our task is to continue to challenge them professionally
and intellectually. To do this requires a first-class faculty
and a challenging and relevant curriculum. The college is
blessed with both.
Let me talk about our faculty for a few moments.
The faculty is the college's center of gravity. Our unique
combination of military officers and civilian academics, paired
as faculty teams, create the learning environment in the
college. Congressman Skelton's panel over 20 years ago found
much about which to be concerned.
Our faculty of only 24 had just a single Ph.D. We had
limited operational and academic credentials among the military
faculty. That has changed.
Just this month, we said good-bye to 12 of our 19 military
faculty. More than half departed because of promotion to
colonel or to take command. All of our military faculty have
advanced degrees. Our civilian faculty, including the one Ph.D.
resident at the time of the Skelton Panel, are a mix of variety
of specialties and backgrounds.
Some are former military. Others have no military
background. All 19 civilian faculty are Ph.D.s.
Our core curriculum consists of four courses. Our newest
addition to the curriculum is Culture and Interagency
Operations. This course improves the understanding of culture
in today's security environment and looks at interagency
operations as ways to employ all the instruments of national
power.
Our electives program provides additional depth to the
curriculum and responds to student interests. Among our
electives are courses on armed groups, insurgency from an
insurgent's perspective, and religion and violence.
The Defense Language Institute supports our survival-level
language instruction and our negotiations practical exercise.
Next year, we will offer five languages: Arabic, French,
Chinese and two Afghan dialects, Dari and Pashtu.
Students examine matters of professional significance
through the college's accredited Master of Military Studies
program. Also noteworthy is the college's exercise program,
designed both to enhance the planning skills of our students as
well as to increase their cultural and interagency awareness.
Our vision for the college is to remain closely attuned to
the needs of the operating forces, to retain and hire higher
quality faculty without sacrificing that quality and to
increase the sophistication of the technologies that support
our curriculum.
Our graduates face enormous challenges in the operating
environment that awaits them once they leave us.
The college is committed to doing all we can to assist them
in their professional and intellectual development to become
more skilled at their craft and mentally agile to adapt to un-
anticipated situations.
As Lieutenant General John Allen, Deputy Commanding
General, Central Command (CENTCOM), told our graduating class
earlier this month, ``you may have 35-year-old bodies, but
education is about having a 5,000-year-old brain.''
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the chance to speak with you
today. I welcome the subcommittee's questions.
Semper Fidelis.
[The prepared statement of Colonel Damm can be found in the
Appendix on page 140.]
Dr. Snyder. Thank you all for your opening statements, and
thank you for your service. This subcommittee greatly values
what you do, and that is why we are spending as much time on
this topic as we have.
And as you all know, full committee Chairman Ike Skelton
feels very strongly about the work that you do. We are not
trying to replicate the work that the Skelton panel did 20
years ago. It is not that extensive of a--we don't have that
level of staffing, and the situation is different now.
But it is very important that we provide the kind of
oversight and constructive help that, you know, the country
wants and that you all want. And so we appreciate your presence
here today.
I go back to the days of Easter egg hunts--I am going to
use a metaphor here--you know, now you get that they do Easter
egg hunts with plastic eggs, and so when June comes if you
still find the plastic egg, the dollar bill inside is still
good.
I am old enough when you actually hid real eggs, and if you
found that missing egg in June, you really didn't want to be
anywhere near it. Like if you are doing some gardening and hit
it with a shovel.
Your opening statements, those were very good. It was a bit
like the old-time Easter egg hunt. It is a little bit
challenging to find those places where you are actually
acknowledging you have got some problems and challenges. So I
am going to run through these quickly, and tell me if--I want
you to respond and amplify on them and then any other issue
that you have.
General Kasun, you specifically mentioned the timing--I
think your phrase was while no education is a waste, the timing
of it--it is page 25 of your statement--the issue of sending
the officers to JCWS at the right time. You also, on page 28 of
your statement, discuss this issue about the billets.
Just because a graduate is--to date, JWS graduates have
filled less than 20 percent of available coded billets, and
some billets have never received one of our graduates. I want
you to amplify on that.
On the next page, you talk about you have got some aging
facilities. And then on page 30 you talk about the importance
of outreach, making sure your faculty stays current. Those are
four of the points that I picked up where you thought you
perhaps needed some work. I want you to amplify on those.
And then, Admiral Wisecup, you have mentioned faculty, I
think it was on page 22 of your statement, where you say the
challenges in attracting the very best Navy officers and again
because this issue of jointness and where that fits into a
career. I would like you to amplify on that.
General Cardon, you specifically brought the issue of the
majors, how many majors are being educated and what that does
to the long-term goals of your mission. And page 11 you talk
about--let us see here--oh, yes, again the issue of jointness
with regard to faculty in attracting faculty and this, on page
17 and 18, you talk about the--getting both students and
faculty from the interagency, that that continues to be a
challenge.
I think there are some creative things that can be done
there, or have been done there.
General Jackson, you mentioned specifically, on page three,
faculty. And I think the one thing I picked up from your
statement, Colonel Damm, was, although it was not necessarily a
problem, the fact the high turnover, which represents both the
good and the bad.
Those are the kind of the Easter eggs I picked up from your
all statements and, I am sorry, General, we need to go ahead
and start the clock. But if I could get each of you to maybe
amplify on those a little bit, but also, this is your time. We
need to hear where you all see problems.
And I think sometimes while we want you to be upbeat about
what you are doing, this is your chance to lay out where your
needs are because we are trying to find out where things could
be improved.
So, General, we will start with you and amplify those.
General Kasun. Sir, it keeps buzzing when it is my turn.
[Laughter.]
Dr. Snyder. That means we are 15 minutes away from going
into session.
General Kasun. Okay, sir. I won't----
Dr. Snyder. So you don't have anything to worry about,
here. Okay. [Laughter.]
General Kasun. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your time and
your comments and your questions. I will try to do this very
succinctly.
Bringing the students in at the right time--I have
mentioned a couple of times that it is a difficulty. We only
have about \1/3\ of the students that show up for JCWF, our 10-
week program, that are on their way to joint assignment. Fifty
percent of them are on the backside of their Joint assignment.
So when they come to our school, at that point, they are on
their way to another service assignment or a regular command.
My opinion, sir? Is that what you are asking for?
Dr. Snyder. Yes. Yes.
General Kasun. What to fix?
Dr. Snyder. And how to fix it and whose responsibility it
is to fix.
General Kasun. Okay, sir.
Well, there is legislation already there basically stating
that students need to be educated prior to going to a Joint
assignment. And I think just enforcing that legislation would
make a difference.
Dr. Snyder. Some of us might say that that would, you know,
be like going to medical school, that I think it is generally a
good idea to have completed medical school before you practice
medicine, but--that is just--we didn't think we would really
have to legislate that, but go ahead. [Laughter.]
General Kasun. Sir, we do find that on our surveys, like I
mentioned during my point, that the graduates that have
actually gone to the school prior to or that within the 12
months have gained a lot more----
Dr. Snyder. A lot more----
General Kasun. And it is truly an investment in our
officers' education.
So the 20 percent of JAWS students--we have about 41
students that come through a year. Thirty-six of them are
military. They are based on the \1/3\, \1/3\, \1/3\, air, land
and sea forces that come through. But that is an even balance
of O-4s and O-5s.
However, only 20 percent of them have actually been
assigned to JAWS-coded billets. About 60 percent of them have
actually gone to the different joint forces--I mean, the joint
billets, but not necessarily in a JAWS billet.
So they may not be planners. They are master planners, but
they are not actually going into planning billets. And again,
sir, I would suggest that communication, working with the
services and trying to put that up front when they are assigned
to JAWS, they have a following.
Dr. Snyder. Because you are creating a valuable asset.
General Kasun. Yes. Yes, sir.
Dr. Snyder. And that valuable asset, I suspect, wants to be
used to their fullest capacity, and yet too often, in your
opinion, they are not being used to that capacity.
Thank you.
General Kasun. That is correct, sir.
And, one other point on that specifically, we are both an
intermediate and a senior-level college--I mean, a senior-level
course there. So we have the O-4s to O-6s, predominately O-4s
and O-5s, but there are O-6s, and because it can be either
Intermediate Level Education (ILE) or Senior Level Education
(SLE), which was an agreement made when JAWS started 5 years
ago, and that was in order to provide the services with
flexibility, currently it is a single-phase JPME. They get JPME
I and II.
But depending on the service decision, which one they get,
whether they get ILE or SLE. So my point with that is that it
is an advanced warfighting school equivalent to our services,
and I believe that the O-4s and O-5s actually making them
master campaign planners is much more useful.
I see a point where there are O-6s coming through, but they
are more on the high side of the position rather than the
actual workers.
Sir, you asked about the aging--I had mentioned about the
aging buildings. We have buildings that have been there
actually since the 1940s, but the majority of the ones that we
have are about 47, almost 50 years old. And it costs over $1
million a year for maintenance and upkeep. We are refurbishing
the exterior of the existing buildings to support more classes,
and we had some issues with post-9/11 security.
We are putting a gate in and, of course, funding. We are
still working on getting funding for that. We have the human
capital. We are sending students through, about 255 students,
every 10 weeks through our school, and we have them 4 times a
year for our JCWS.
We have just enough faculty--actually, we are just a few
short--basically, we have just enough faculty, sir, to be able
to teach those students over and over and over and there is
about a week and a half in between, there is no white space for
the faculty.
So that our human faculty, we have some outstanding
faculty. We have \2/3\ military and \1/3\ civilian, but there
is no time to do any research. And we are working on getting
another manpower increase but, again, it is going to have to be
built in to make sure that that is authorized.
Because currently, right now, for the ratio, the 3.5-to-1--
I am not sure which student gets \1/2\ a leg--but the ratio of
3.5-to-1 students-to-faculty, we are about 4-to-1. So the
faculty is working all the time.
We actually have several of our faculty who have gone down
range. Since 2003, we have had 18 faculty and staff that have
deployed in support of a variety of outreach operational
missions in the following areas: the Horn of Africa, Iraq,
Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia and we also have other
faculty members working specifically on teams to help develop
political and military policy in Bulgaria, the Ukraine and
Georgia.
We have frequent opportunities for billets out working for
the COCOMs, and that is one of my missions or one of my visions
that I plan to continue that. But again, that is taking faculty
out of the class when they need to do the research.
When they do come back, when the faculty comes back,
whether they are the Title X's or the military, they bring that
new freshness to the students. Of course, our student
population being joint with all services, almost everyone has
gone downrange either one, two and even three times.
So to keep that freshness within the students--I mean, the
faculty with the students is very, very important.
The interagency attendance, I don't know, sir, if you
mentioned that, but I know I did. It is difficult at best. I
know that the 10-week course, it makes it very difficult to
sell to the interagency. My two brother schools at Indy U,
National War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces
(ICAF), have a great following. They can actually attract more.
But they are in the D.C. area.
And we find ourselves down in Norfolk in a hub with a great
deal of experience. We have tradeoff. We have all the different
services at the operational level, but for the 10-week course,
we have some difficulty attracting interagency because the
interagency looks at it as a gap when it is 10-weeks.
But they look at it when they come to the JAWS course or
11-month course, they get a Masters degree, and it is an
investment.
I find that both courses are an investment in their people.
Thank you, sir.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Wittman, I have run out of time. My
suggestion is we let them respond to this, and then I think
that we have got a five-person panel. We will let you take as
much time, if that is all right with you, sir.
Mr. Wittman. That is fine. Yes.
Dr. Snyder. So Admiral Wisecup, if you would continue that
discussion?
Admiral Wisecup. Yes, sir.
You asked about the issue about attracting the very best
Navy officers to join the faculty since you are not credited
with joint duty.
This is an issue that I have seen now as I have only been
here seven months, and this is one of those things that I am
becoming aware of. You know, we did have one of our officers
screened to be carrier air group commander, which I thought was
a very good development, okay?
But JDAL, the Joint Duty Assignment List issues is a policy
issue I probably need to work on as I have not yet really made
the case on the quality versus the joint assignment. So what
happens is naval officers look at the broad range of duties
they can go to, come into the Naval War College, a Navy guy,
you don't see the jointness. You don't see the joint
experience.
I could probably make the case, and I need to do that,
okay, that they're actually getting a joint experience there.
And we have, for example, 35 faculty members from other
agencies and other services, of course, an Army officer coming
to the Naval War College will very easily get joint credit on
the JDAL, the Joint Duty Assignment List.
But it is probably harder to make the case for a naval
officer to get Joint Duty Assignment credit coming to the Naval
War College. But that is something that I will work to try to
make that case.
Dr. Snyder. I mean, because it is a real problem if you
have some of your, you know, kind of the folks that you want to
be faculty members if they don't think coming to your place
helps their career.
Admiral Wisecup. Sure.
Dr. Snyder. I mean, it sure is a problem.
General.
General Cardon. Sir, I will just carry on there first with
the joint faculty.
It used to be that sister service officers who came to the
Command and General Staff College received joint credit. Now
they don't. They have to apply for it. And as the admiral said,
the problem with that is it is a quality cut because you have
to be joint-qualified to advance. Officers know that.
And because that is not seen as an automatic joint
qualification, it is not seen as desirable of an assignment
which brings a degree of negativeness.
Sir, on the ILE issue, universal ILE for the majors, a
number of reasons why this was formed. I will just highlight
two.
One is we used to have a 50-percent cut on the majors. So
50 percent went to the resident course, 50 percent did the box
of books. The challenge is that the 50 percent that did not go
viewed themselves as disadvantaged. At the same time, we are
trying to retain them to do important jobs for the Army.
So the Army said if they are majors in the United States
Army, they should all receive quality educations.
What has complicated this has been the wars and the----
Dr. Snyder. I am sorry, has been the----
General Cardon [continuing]. The wars and the rotational
Army. Because of the demands on the force now, not all of the
majors are coming to ILE and we have a significant backlog
already.
So now the question is are we sending the right majors,
because what is happening is as majors stay out and the
captains then get promoted to major and stay out, and even if
we actually have a couple of hundred majors that are in the
primary zone for lieutenant colonel who have not been to any
form of intermediate-level education.
Now, half of those are probably our best officers serving
as operation officers, executive officers, in both our
battalions and brigades today. And so the Army is trying to
address how to do this.
But the complexity of the environment, I think, almost
demands that we have to have--the officers need more education,
not less. Because if you look to the future, it doesn't look
like anything is becoming more clear. It is more complex. You
need to educate to do that.
Sir, interagency, 10 years ago when I was a young field
grade officer, I had no involvement with the interagency to
speak of. Nowadays, our captains are dealing with the
interagency with the guards and things like the Provincial
Reconstruction Teams out on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq
and, even more importantly, heavy integration with the
intelligence agencies to the levels that I have never seen
before.
But we do nothing to help them operate in this environment
and, you know, General Caldwell has started a number of
initiatives to try and bring interagency to the college. And we
are moving in the right direction, but we need help in and, as
I said in my statement, the agencies do not have a pool of
officers from which they can choose.
So we have tried to give the interagency officers, but
every major we give them in exchange for a major to come back,
that is a reasonable level, but to grow to the 96 seminars we
want, to have 96 interagency officers at the Command and
General Staff College, I think, we are going to need some
additional help.
Sir, for military officers, the challenge is with the--and
I think you are referring here to the--to confirm that you are
talking about military faculty--there is no floor on military
faculty. And what I mean by that is as the numbers--as the
demands of the war increased, the number of military officers
in the college have continued to drop.
And General Caldwell and I are trying to hold the line at
about 30 percent. But there is nothing written and I am not
sure anything has to be written. But the challenge is how do
you ensure you get the best military officer and have the right
number of military officers?
We think the military officers are critical for role
modeling current experience and--well, it is role modeling and
current experience being most important.
So we don't need help. But I would say it is a challenge if
the demands for majors continue. Why is the demand for majors
continuing to increase? An example is the Security Force
Assistance Missions that the Army is taking on, which is very
officer-heavy, has put another levy of demands on our captains
and majors, which directly impacts, now, availability to go to
school and availability for majors assignments worldwide.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you.
General Jackson.
General Jackson. Sir, thanks for the opportunity to talk
about our faculty.
Sir, I view the faculty as my weapons system. And, as a
result, I spend a lot of time resourcing, rewarding them and
making sure that they are recognized for the great things they
do.
Chairman Skelton then was very, very instrumental in Title
X authority that allowed us to hire great civilians. In fact, I
had two different phenomena. On my civilian side, I have great
quality, not necessarily quantity, but it is a product of our
success.
As I mentioned in my opening remarks, we have reorganized
that area of our university to put all our officer PME under
one center. That means from lieutenants all the way through
colonels. But as a result some of my Ph.D.s are moving as a
natural progression to the other seven colleges and schools.
So it is a never ending piece, but the quality of the
civilian faculty is actually exponentially better than when I
was there 20 years ago.
For my military faculty, we have the quantity, but quality
is what I am trying to instill in. We have some initiatives
that we are undertaking from the Air Force and their university
to instill the idea that being a faculty member at their
university is valued in your Air Force career.
Jointness would help us as an incentive. We are also trying
to get the word out. We have been able to promote our folks
from major to lieutenant colonel exceeding the Air Force rate
for the last 4 years. And on Tuesday of this week, four of my
active members were selected for O-6.
So we have a good process, but in terms of getting
volunteers and people with the right degrees, we still have a
little bit of challenge that we are working at without----
Dr. Snyder. Colonel.
Colonel Damm. Mr. Chairman, you asked a specific question
on the turnover rate. Sir, I see that as a challenge and not a
detractor. We are very excited about hiring faculty that have
one, commanded, two, have Masters degrees, and then the third
iteration is Top Level School (TLS).
So, occasionally we don't get the TLS, but we want
upwardly-mobile, good faculty members and the backside of that
is that we lose them. As I say, we had six up for O-6 this year
and we had five selected. So immediately when they are
selected, they leave.
The analogy I will use is that as I start off as an F-4
pilot and I moved from that analog airplane to F-16s for an
exchange tour with the Air Force, and as a guy who had somebody
in the back seat helping me out, an F-4's to a guy who was
doing it all by myself in F-16's for the first iteration of
students, I was about a step and a half ahead of them.
So it causes our instructors to work a little harder for
the first month of school. We will get them here in about two
weeks. But we like having good people. We like having people
who are upwardly mobile and we think they fit perfectly with
that.
One of our challenges I think is our building was built in
1919. It was renovated in 1997. It is not digital-friendly and
we are working through that right now, sir, and that is
probably one of the bigger challenges we have that--to make
that better as we go along with the students.
Dr. Snyder. When you say work through that, does that mean
trying to find money?
Colonel Damm. Some, sir. We can try to do wireless, which
is not that expensive. When we do one of our exercises, we run
wireless throughout the system. But right now with Navy, Marine
Corps Internet (NMCI) that can't work all the time.
Now, our students can go over to our Gray Research Center
facility and they are much better at their digital connecting
than we are and the college itself.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Wittman, as much time as you need.
Mr. Wittman. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am going to ask some specific questions and then go into
a suite of general questions for each of you. I will begin with
General Kasun.
The Joint Forces Staff College obviously is your purview,
but I wanted to ask are you adequately being resourced for the
Joint Advanced Warfare School and, if not, is there a plan for
that to happen or how do you think that should happen?
Secondly, when you talked about aging facilities, is there
currently a military construction (MILCON) in place or is this
on the unmet needs list? I am just wondering where that is in
the process if we are identifying that as something that needs
to be addressed. Where are we in that process?
And then what I will do is just put some general questions
out there for the rest of the panel members.
I wanted to get a sense from you about how you survey
students and graduates to assess quality and how you use that
to manage and adjust your programs.
Secondly, as we talked about keeping faculty, and I think
that goes to not only--actually, in two areas, recruiting and
retaining. And I wanted to get your ideas about how you think
we should recruit and retain top-tier civilian faculty. I want
to focus a little bit on that. You talked about uniformed
faculty there, but civilian faculty and what do you have in
mind as the definition of top-tier and what are the things that
go into that effort to attract those folks?
And then, lastly, we have heard a lot about this in some of
our previous hearings about how do we, at this level, identify
promising officers with the potential for high-level strategic
thinking at this particular point in their career? And how do
we do that?
And then, how do we take that information and use that to
develop these officers to their full potential, and is there
something after the intermediate schools where these officers
can be tracked and monitored to make sure that we have the best
and brightest making their way into these key, critical
leadership positions.
And I know that is a lot, but I wanted to try to go ahead
and get at that and----
General Kasun. Sir, I was just trying to make sure I got
all those notes.
Mr. Wittman. Sure. Absolutely. [Laughter.]
Thank you.
General Kasun. You want me to start out and then pass it
and then come back?
Mr. Wittman. Yes. That will be great.
General Kasun. I will answer one that way. It won't bog
down the deal here.
Are we adequately being resourced? That is a good question,
sir. I believe that, at this point, we have for our 41, 42
students that arrive, we have just enough. We have 10 faculty,
and so we have three seminars.
Currently, we are going to get another faculty member and
we have intent to increase to four seminars, but that is not
another 12 people because right now we have 14 in each. We are
dropping it down. So it's really about seven or eight
additional students.
Again, my intent would be to increase the JAWS school to
approximately 60, if that was going to be possible. We are
looking for master campaign planners out in the field. The
COCOM and the Joint Staff have asked for approximately 120
billets, JAWS-coded billets. We can't do that, sir.
At this rate, the way they are being assigned, certainly,
like I mentioned in my speech, we are not even meeting some of
those. They are not even being touched because they are being
put into different jobs. We have one JAWS graduate who is a
speech writer. A great writer. He does very well.
So, we have them all over, but they are not in the right
billet. So if we determine to do that, then I would suggest
that we expand it. Like I said, again, it is on the equation of
the other advanced warfighting schools.
So I believe that it would be a good point to see if we can
do that. That would take more funding. Yes, sir. More
resources, both faculty as well as support in the classrooms as
well.
Our aging facilities. Sir, we are working on a MILCON
request. But right now because we have our air conditioning
system in the buildings, they are very antiquated, we are
looking at getting them refurbished. We had funding. It has now
been bumped. We have to make a determination if we need to
build new buildings by putting in a new air conditioning system
because there is still the asbestos issue.
So, that is something, yes, sir, that I believe that we
could look at and probably could utilize your help on.
Mr. Wittman. Okay.
Admiral.
Admiral Wisecup. I am sorry, sir, if one of the questions
was directed at me, I missed it entirely. I apologize.
Mr. Wittman. No, no. That is all right. I just kind of gave
that suite of questions and wanted to try to get everybody's
thoughts on that about how to attract top-tier civilian
faculty, how do you survey your students about quality, and
then also how do we use the process to identify those high-
level strategic thinkers and make sure that that follows them
through their career so that each branch is getting the best
and putting them into positions where they can succeed and do
the most for each branch.
Admiral Wisecup. Sir. No, I am sorry.
Mr. Wittman. That is all right.
Admiral Wisecup. We recently had an opening in our strategy
and policy department, and I will tell you we had 60 applicants
for the position. In the end, this is civilian faculty, of
which you know we have a good number. We have about I want to
say 63 percent of our faculty is civilian.
I think, in those terms, the only difficulty is the fact
that we are a war college which is a little off-putting, but we
are working on that. We are reaching out, we are coming more on
line, we are shining a light on ourselves so that others
understand.
We also use our network. I mean, we have a very, very good
network with Fletcher School, Yale, others, people who are
faculty know and we use that network hard on the civilian side.
With respect to the survey system, frankly, our students
actually complain that they are over-surveyed. Each course at
graduation, graduates, alumni at the two-year mark and five
years post-graduation, and then what we call our academic
policy council reviews those results.
I feel confident that, you know, we are getting the kind of
feedback that we need to keep the curriculum current and fresh.
And then, I am sorry, I can't remember the last point.
Mr. Wittman. The last one is just how do we identify high-
level strategic thinkers and then what do we do to nurture them
to make sure that they get further advancement and get tracked
and monitored to make sure we are getting the best out of them
and putting them into positions where they can succeed?
Admiral Wisecup. Yes, sir.
Our, I mean, our graduates are all earmarked in the
personnel system. For me, having thought about this for a while
now since I have been there and also having talked with
Representative Skelton, that is one of the places I want to
zero in because trying to identify these people early is really
the challenge.
And sometimes, you know, even before they come to the War
College that is part of getting the right people also to the
War College. But in the end, what I find is that our faculty
who actually touches these students are in a very, very good
position to be tapped and so what I am shooting for is George
Marshall's little black book so that we know who these people
are, of course, there are ways to get that into the system
formally.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Admiral.
General Cardon.
General Cardon. Sir, we also do extensive surveys on our
students and the faculty also does an assessment and we assess
post--once they leave. And we just finished another survey. The
stack of data is about this thick and that goes back into our
curriculum.
We feel pretty good that we got an assessment means to fix
it. Some of the data that comes back is rather interesting. For
example, we have a rotational model that we are using now. The
force generation was not seen as value-added then, but I think
it is seen much more as value-added now.
So, there is some assessment that has to be done there as
well.
Recruiting and retaining top faculty. We have tried to--we
have three previous points. One is we have tried to implement a
chair program. That needs money. And we are trying to do that
with our foundation.
The second way that we attract top faculty is to try and
get the niche areas such as history, strategic studies or
ethics, et cetera, that has a draw where it can influence, this
year it will be up to 1,500 majors. So there is a draw on that.
We do have a challenge with top-tier faculty because of our
location at Kansas City or Fort Leavenworth, which is a lot
different than many of them living around the top universities.
However, we are doing a lot more with the University of Kansas.
All of our faculty have to teach, and that is the other
thing that goes against top-tier faculty, because a lot of them
want to write as well, and we are not set up that way right
now. It is something that Dr. Ping and I will have to look at
here in the future.
And, sir, the last thing for identifying promising
officers, I think there are three ways we are doing that. One
is they self-select. We have the School of Advanced Military
Studies (SAMS) that celebrated its 25th anniversary, well-
known, but that is a self-select program. But it is very
demanding to get in.
The second is there is an elective program that gives you
what we call a six Zulu identifier which identifies you as a
strategist. We are looking for two parts. We actually have a
functional area in the army for strategists, but they don't
command. And then we have commanders that we want to be
strategists. I think we need both.
And so both programs work in those directions.
Now, are we getting absolutely the best officers to be our
strategists? The Army now has what they call a Leader
Development Panel which, as captains, tries to identify those
officers that have specific skill sets in certain areas that we
want to further develop.
I don't think that it is working as well as it could be
because of the demands on the force, that we have a lot of
opportunities out there, but we have a lot of requirements that
have to be filled by the combatant commanders.
That is all I have.
Mr. Wittman. Okay.
General Jackson.
General Jackson. Sir, to maintain a great curriculum, we
need to stay relevant and current. As such, we must listen to
our external and internal customers. We do that with a myriad
of survey initiatives like a few of my other colleagues have
mentioned--as we look at it lesson by lesson, daily comments
from the students and the faculty, we have focus groups,
interviews and special surveys as needed. And of course, at the
end of the course all of the students will compile a survey and
highlight the good things that happened.
At the end of the year, all of the students that are doing
the graduation week complete a survey that will allow us to
prepare for the next upcoming point. Our alumni and alumni
supervisors will be contacted 12 months after graduation to
ensure that we are instilling the right skills with our
customers as they receive our services.
And we have a variety of external sources, the Process for
Accreditation of Joint Education, operational readiness, the
president of the Southern Association of Schools and Colleges,
our own POV and our command board of advisors who are the vice
commanders of our major commands.
We ask their inputs to see if we are actually producing the
kinds of folks that they would like.
With respect to recruiting and retaining students and
faculty, I look at faculty development as a great investment.
For every dollar I put into the program, I will get a return of
about 10. And as such, we send our civilian faculty to various
professional symposia. We recruit from those means.
We try to attract and develop relationships with great
schools like the University of Denver or Gonzaga so that we can
identify some folks that may want to come to our school. Once
they get identified to the school, we review their C.V.'s to
see if they are the kind of folks that can bring the tools that
we would like to have to instill and develop in front of our
students.
We have a very good program. We also have a sabbatical.
Since we are all located at Maxwell Air Force Base, we have the
Maxwell Research Institute, which will allow our Ph.D. folks to
do the things that are important to maintain their academic
credentials, and that is publish, research.
We have an opportunity for them to take a 1-year sabbatical
to work issues that are of interest to them or to the United
States Air Force and the joint community at large.
Sir, to identify high-level thinkers, last week we
graduated the 18th class of the School of Advanced Air and
Space Studies. This is similar to the SAMS program. This is
where we identify our best intermediate-level majors,
lieutenant colonels, or international officers. We steep them
in another year of academic rigor to filter that.
We will look at where the special experience identifier for
them and continue on with a possibility of establishing a Ph.D.
program at our school that will allow us to continue the
opportunity but also be very sensitive to the command
opportunities so that we can develop a true warrior-scholars.
Colonel Damm. Congressman, thank you for your questions.
Mr. Wittman. Sure.
Colonel Damm. With our students, all of our students are
board-selected. I have sat on a couple of those boards myself
throughout my career. And so we consider about \1/3\ of the
Marines can go to resident course. So, we select those and to
attend the other schools as well.
On the survey issue, we survey our students throughout the
year. We survey them at the end of the year for the entire
class, and then we survey them about six, eight months after
they have been out. And that is kind of important for us
because I talked about our cultural interagency operations
course. They hated it last year--it was one of the newer
courses--and then six months after they were out in the fleet
said that was the best thing we could have gotten.
So, we read all those surveys. We try to apply them to our
curriculum review board and make changes where changes apply,
but we don't change everything because of that.
We also survey the commanders. It is very important for us
to know whether the commanders are getting the graduates that
they want. And that is where we come up with the fact that they
want them to be able to read, write, speak and make decisions.
Our civilian faculty, when we went to the Title X hiring
process, it made it a much better process for us because we can
hire and pay world-class faculty. And we believe we have gotten
that opportunity.
We were looking for four for the next year. We had 31
applicants. Those applicants came from referrals. Those
applications came from personal networking of our own faculty
that we had and then also via an electronic system that the
request goes out.
How do we retain them? I think some of our faculty will
come and tell us that I will be here for four or five years,
and I would like to move on. Some of our faculty come because
they get tired of academia. Some of our faculty come--they are
former military--they come for the reputation of the school and
where we are, 30 miles south of D.C. And then some faculty come
just because they love Marines and they love teaching.
We have Dr. Bittner who is starting his 35th year with us
this year. And how we keep them? We have another one, Dr.
DiNardo, he is publishing his sixth book I think this fall. He
has been here for a while.
As you know, we bridge the tactical to the operational and
then we bridge to the strategic and the school.
How do we I.D. our tactical--or our strategic thinkers,
excuse me. We have the same process and our School of Advanced
Warfighting (SAW) program was modeled after SAMS at Fort
Leavenworth. We actually board-select--it is voluntary--but we
board-select them to go to the school and it is one of the nice
things is we have recently opened it up about three years ago
to non-resident courses because not every Marine can get to a
resident course.
So, but they still have to interview and get themselves in.
We also tag them with a Military Occupational Specialty, 0505,
so you can find them amongst the 200--almost 200,000 Marines,
now. You can figure out who they are.
We also look at the published papers through the year for
our thinkers and we look at those who are outstanding teachers
we think become the strategic leaders of the future.
As for the college itself, we have had a wonderful thing.
As you know, General Gardner, today I will head back south and
attend his retirement ceremony. But he has been there for 5
years, 54 years of service in the Marine Corps. And the nice
thing about having him there was he has given us a strategic
vision for the school and that is where our fiscal vision, our
strategic vision has come from.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Colonel.
General Kasun.
General Kasun. Thank you, sir.
As for the surveying the students, we actually do queries
as well. We do the surveys during the school time, but
afterwards we send out surveys to both the students as well as
the graduates as well as their supervisors to find out if they
are--just like some others--are getting what they want.
And we have been getting very, very good feedback as long
as the students came to them already educated or if they have
gone and let them go to come back. If they have actually
invested--and I use that word because I believe it is investing
in education and the people--if they have invested their time
to let it go, let that person go for a bit, then they are very,
very happy with the quality and what they are getting.
However, many of our surveys that go out, they go out to
the supervisors, and they are the service supervisors, and it
is ``thank you very much, but he is a commander, doing a great
job.'' Or as a planner, if they are on staff, they are not
necessarily a planner, but, yes, he understands joint. She
understands joint.
But that is how that works.
On the flipside with our JAWS graduates, everybody is
extremely happy when they have a JAWS graduate on their staff
no matter where they are at. Again, we prefer to put them in
the planning position where they are supposed to be or a JAWS-
coded billet, but they are very satisfied with the education
that they are getting through the JAWS.
And the students, the graduates, are very happy for the
most part.
The senior officers that are coming through, all of the O-
6s that are coming through certainly because now there are not
more waivers, most of them have been joint, in joint billets
and joint staffs many times, so when they are coming by to get
their education way back after the backside of their careers,
it is okay. They say yes. Good training. Good education.
Civilian faculty. How do we recruit and retain? We actually
advertise in every possible venue to make sure that everybody
across the board has the opportunity, and then we go through a
very rigorous matrix and a hiring process.
So I feel that we do get the highest quality and we can
attract them there in the Norfolk area. It is only three-and-a-
half hours away from the big city.
Their main concern, any faculty that we do hire on the
civilian side is that there is very little white space for them
to do any thinking outside the box, any stopping and working on
research and publishing. However, we have had many published
papers from some of our faculty, but they are doing it on their
own time because truly there is no white space there.
We are looking to fund and establish a writing program. We
have found through the JCWS and the JAWS that the students need
a writing refresher. And that is through the thesis as well as
the papers that they are writing. People aren't doing that
well.
So, that is what we need to look forward as well. We are
looking to a Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for a couple of
additional people. Of course, that is going to build out the
need for some space and time, or space and equipment. But we
are looking to hopefully pull on two more people to get that
set up.
Identifying the high level of strategic thinkers. We have
to defer to our service, our brothers and sisters in the
services to actually choose the planners. They are the ones who
actually send the students to our college. As a joint college,
we don't choose who comes.
They choose who comes, how they are vetted, how they get
there to the JAWS and there is not always the same boarding as
they are sent to the war colleges. And I find that just a
little bit disconcerting because I feel that we do need just as
strong a vetting process.
For the placement, again, the services choose where they
are placed. So, it would be great if we can get that kind of
fixed up and online, but it is not much different than the
service schools. When they choose the--to go to these schools
and specifically the SAMS and SAWS and the Advanced Warfighting
Schools, they have a plan.
But the services each, as I understand it, tag their
service personnel differently. So, they will follow them, and
if you are a planner, some of them will follow. But they don't
necessarily tag them, or tag them as joint planners.
So, thank you.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.
How often do the five of you get together, and when was the
last time you were all together?
Sorry?
Colonel Damm. Mr. Chairman, we were at the Military
Education Coordination Council (MECC), and then we had a pre-
MECC meeting in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas about 3 months before
that. Twice this year, sir.
Dr. Snyder. Do you all formally try to get together on a
regular basis? Is that helpful or not? It sounds like you have
some similar issues. At least give you a chance to poach each
other's faculty, I would think. [Laughter.]
Is it something you find helpful, or do you meet on a
formal basis to sit down with each other, or is it more kind of
random?
General Kasun. Sir, I would say that it would be very
helpful to get together more often, but we have, with our
schedules, sir, we haven't been doing that.
Dr. Snyder. You have some similar concerns.
Colonel, I am going to start with you and go the other way.
How are you chosen for this job and where does it fit into
your career? Will you retire out of this job, or how does your
service view your service or how were you selected?
Colonel Damm. Sir, I am probably a little bit of a
different case because, at this point, I just passed my 29th
year. So, I will retire out of this job, next year.
What happens in the schools is the school is actually a
requisition that goes up to the commandant, he will pick some
folks, and then the commandant will choose that person.
But I think the lead-up to me coming to be the director of
the school was I was at our Marine Air-Ground Task Force
(MAGTAF) staff training program just before I came there, which
goes around, and it is another model after the Army's Battle
Command Training Program, which I also had the pleasure of
spending two years on.
They go out and they train staffs, we train staffs before
they went out to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF). So, I was there for two years as a
deputy, and then my name went up and the commandant approved it
for me to go down to the college.
So, besides that, sir, I have taught Air Force guys how to
fly F-16s. I spent two years teaching youngsters how to fly F/
A-18s, which was a wonderful experience, down at Oceana. And,
so, I had a lot of opportunity to teach people.
I have to teach them how to think now, not how to fly,
though.
Dr. Snyder. General Jackson.
General Jackson. Mr. Chairman, I will retire from the Air
Force in 19 days, but that is a good thing--I think our process
works. Of course, our chief gets involved. We view, as you
know, sir, military education is very, very high importantly. I
think I was a little unusual. I am the 40th commandant of
former commandant at Air Command and Staff College but the
first that has been on the faculty.
I bring a different perspective to the school and, as I
mentioned in my remarks, it has changed exponentially better
from the late 1980s when I was there as a student and as a
faculty. It is a very, very focused program.
I think about it a little bit because I had seen things out
there that we are doing. I have also considered that the
faculty needs to be looked at very, very strongly. We have that
look from our interuniversity commander and our former
interuniversity commander was promoted to four-star, and he is
now a commander of the Air Education and Training Command, so
we did a lot of focus on ensuring that we have the right
resources and the faculty to do our job for the United States
Air Force and the joint community, sir.
Dr. Snyder. General Cardon.
General Cardon. Sir, I know the secretary and the chief had
something to do with this. I am not exactly sure how I was
selected. I was told 3 months before I arrived back from my 15-
month tour there in Iraq.
I am not retiring. I am trying to stay in the Army a while
longer, and I think the Army did look pretty hard because the
three previous deputy commandants have retired. And that is not
the trend that has been in this position, which, if you look at
the wall of previous deputy commandants, they have all gone on
into much more senior positions in the Army.
Admiral Wisecup. Sir, I can honestly say that, you know, I
got the call from Admiral Roughead asking me to come and be
president of the Naval War College. I came off Operational
Fleet Command. I was out at the Carrier Strike Group 7 in
charge of the Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group.
So, operationally, very current, and that is necessary for
background, credibility with the students and the war gaming
piece of the Naval War College.
But as you look down our corridor which, you know, now has
portraits of presidents over 125 years, it is mixed. So, in the
end, I come into this job, and I tell everyone I am on a day-
to-day contract, and I am just going to work as hard as I can,
and I don't know what the future holds.
But if you look over time, many of these presidents have
gone on to other positions after. Stansfield Turner, for
example, in the 1970s went on to be Director of the CIA. Those
kinds of things.
But in terms of Navy, I can't answer that question, sir.
Dr. Snyder. General.
General Kasun. Sir, I have a somewhat unique background. I
was the Deputy Commanding General of the Intelligence Security
Command at Fort Belvoir as an Individual Mobilization
Augmentee. As a reserve officer, I was called up and said that
my name is being put into the hat as the nominee for the Army
Reserve to be the Commandant for the Joint Forces Staff
College. That was sometime in June.
In August, I was somewhere over Australia on Capstone, and
I got an e-mail saying that you are now the Commandant of the
Joint Forces Staff College. And so about one month later I took
the staff and thrilled to be there. I believe that I am at the
right place at the right time.
For my future, sir, I am in a two-star billet. I am very
honored to be there. It is up to the chairman as well as my
Chief of the Army Reserve what happens to me now. [Laughter.]
Dr. Snyder. Thank you.
You all may have touched on this when Mr. Wittman was
asking about looking for strategists, but I hope I am not
asking you something repetitive, but do you all look for
potential Ph.D. candidates and, if so, what mechanisms do you
have for considering, you know, calling to somebody's attention
or shepherding them into a program.
Again, Colonel Damm, I will start with you.
Colonel Damm. Mr. Chairman, no, I would say that we
probably do not do that. But they can be identified generally
through our faculty. As my dean sits behind me, he was an Army
officer, a graduate at West Point, that type of thing. And we
can point them in the right direction to do that.
But I will say that the Marine Corps does not look at our
program as a pre-Ph.D. program.
Dr. Snyder. General Jackson.
General Jackson. Sir, we have a couple of opportunities for
our faculty and also our students. I currently have 10 folks
that are in Ph.D. pipeline. We normally get between three and
four of our faculty members to go to a school to get a Ph.D.--I
currently have 11 military faculty members that are products of
that kind of organization.
We have looked to build strategists and Ph.D.s in
particular. Once they finish Air Command and Staff College they
are vetted to a board, get selected for a slew of advanced air
and space higher studies.
We have looked at the possibility of increasing the rigor
in that program to get them all but dissertationed, and then
allow them to go back to the field to get operational command
or things to fill up their portfolio professionally and then
bring them back as a research fellow at senior development
education, probably at Air War College, and allow them to write
their dissertation so that we can allow them to think
strategically, get an operational pause, command, and an
operational opportunity and then come back and become the
strategist of the future, sir.
Dr. Snyder. General Cardon.
General Cardon. Sir, we don't do it that way.
When we met in Fort Leavenworth, when we heard about what
the Air Force was doing with their advanced program, we are
looking at that for our SAMS program. But we have no--we do not
use the school to identify strategists for Ph.D. programs at
this time.
Dr. Snyder. And when I mentioned Ph.D., I don't
specifically mean in strategy in terms of Ph.D.-quality people.
General Cardon. Sir, Ph.D.s for the Army are really in
two--I would say two places. One is you do it as a junior
officer, in other words as a captain where you have a lot of
time, so by the time they come to the school, that time has
already passed. Or they are going to go to a job that requires
a Ph.D.
For example, they are going to go teach at West Point and
the decision is that they want you to go to a Ph.D. program.
So, I think once you get past major, there is little
opportunity for a field-grade officer to attend school for that
amount of time without going in to a very specific billet.
Dr. Snyder. Right.
Admiral Wisecup. Sir, what I have seen in my short time is
that there is a very nice, informal network managed centrally
in the Officer Personnel Information System (OPINS) staff, that
is Admiral Doug Crowder's folks who manage things like Federal
Executive Fellowships, graduate programs and things like that,
Arthur Morrow scholarships up to Fletcher, those types of
things.
But I think that we have the possibility to keep our eye
open for good talent and, like one of the gentlemen said the
faculty is very helpful in identifying those people. And I talk
to a lot of students, too.
You can tell when you talk to some of these folks that not
only are they bringing operational experience and they are
going to be the big thinkers, okay, but you read some of their
papers and you know immediately that these are the kind of guys
we want to keep our eye on.
For me, personally, it is, right now, it is an informal
feedback network to talk to the people who are actually trying
to keep their eyes out on their staff.
Dr. Snyder. General Kasun.
General Kasun. Sir, for the Joint Forces Staff College, we
just went through a large surge, and not all of them were
Ph.D.s, so we are not going out exclusively for them. But,
however, within the actual hiring contract, they have to roll
within a Ph.D. program within the 3 years.
There are eight universities, local universities, that have
doctorate courses that they can actually enroll in, or, of
course, there are others.
So, yes, sir, we need it for the JAWS as well as for our
accreditation.
Dr. Snyder. For the faculty. I got you.
Colonel Damm, I had just one specific question for you. You
all have been perhaps more aggressive about language, formal
language training, and what kind of feedback do you get from
your graduates as far as whether that language training has
been helpful or not, in terms of trying to get specific
language skills, and where they are going to end up and how it
has worked out for them?
Colonel Damm. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question.
We kind of have come to the realization on the language
that we have looked at a couple of different things, sir. We
have looked at a full year program. We have found that that is
not really cost effective. What we should probably do for a
language, if we truly want Marines to have that language skill,
is to start it at TBS, at The Basic School, and then have them
followed.
They are already doing some tagging with foreign area
officer stuff where they actually get tested on that language
and use it and have some cultural program that they are part
of.
What we have figured out is that if we give them a year at
school it doesn't work very well. So, what we have gone to is
the negotiation exercise where last year was the first year we
did it this way. We used to do it all in one block. Last year,
we just finished. Excuse me sir.
We had the Defense Language Institute (DLI) come out in the
fall, give them instruction for a couple weeks on specific
languages. We only had four this year. Korean was part of it
last year. And next year, as I told you, we are going to switch
to the Afghan dialects.
Then we give them Rosetta Stone and have them practice that
throughout the year, and then in the spring we come to the
negotiation exercise where we just want them to have survival-
level language training where they do the niceties of the
cultural, hello, you know, how are you, who is that, who is the
big guy around here, that type of thing, and then turn it over
to a negotiator.
So, the feedback from this year, and as I talked about the
cultural piece, I am going to--I would like to see what it is
eight months from now. But the feedback was good, but that was
about the right amount for them.
We also involve our international students a little bit in
that as part of the negotiator or the negotee that they are
talking to. So, it works now. I would like to see, and I think
the commandant would like to see, much more of the language
piece that follows a Marine through his entire career.
But I don't think we can do it in the 10 months that we
have them.
Dr. Snyder. Right.
Doesn't have any of the--I don't remember if you and I have
ever talked about it, Colonel Damm, but I have always thought
is that when we are not talking enlisted now that it ought to
start the first day of Marine Corps boot camp. That you have
a--you don't get to relax very much at Marine Corps boot camp
from enlisted, but like at either--like lunchtime that you
would have a foreign language, perhaps, native speaker that
would let the lunchtime be a relaxed thing if people spoke in
that language and learned to talk. That it would just be a way
of making it part of--wouldn't take any much more time away
from the rifle range or the obstacle course or anything.
But we would just bring home, you know, this may actually
help you sometime. Because it has got to start early. And then
you would identify the people that you think are important or
that value the language.
I think we have probably kept you all here long enough. I
am sure we will have some formal questions for the record and
probably some informal phone calls and so on as time goes by. I
hope you will feel free to share with us any thoughts you have,
if you think of something after you leave here, and just send
us something or call us up.
We are going to continue to look at this over the next
several months and we continue to value your input.
General Jackson, seeing as how you have got, like, 18\1/2\
days to go, this is your last chance to say anything you want
to say to the Congress. [Laughter.]
General Jackson. I just appreciate the opportunity to serve
and what the committee and Congress has done for our United
States, sir.
Dr. Snyder. Well, we appreciate your service.
Thank you all. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:47 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
June 25, 2009
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
June 25, 2009
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
June 25, 2009
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SNYDER
Dr. Snyder. Please provide your school's mission statement.
General Kasun. The mission of the Joint Forces Staff College is to
educate national security professionals to plan and execute joint,
multinational, and interagency operations to instill a primary
commitment to joint, multinational, and interagency teamwork,
attitudes, and perspectives. Its vision is to be the premier
institution for educating national security professionals in planning
and executing joint operations.
The mission of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) is
to produce graduates capable of creatively and effectively planning
operational level warfighting for joint and combined military forces
while integrating the effects of the United States Government, non-
governmental organizations, and international organizations to ensure
the success of Combatant and Joint Task Force Commanders operating
within an uncertain operating environment.
The mission of the Joint Advance Warfighting School (JAWS) is to
produce graduates who can create campaign-quality concepts, plan for
the employment of all elements of national power, accelerate
transformation, succeed as joint force operational/strategic planners
and be creative, conceptual, adaptive and innovative.
Dr. Snyder. How have ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
affected the quality of military faculty members? What is your average
tour length for military faculty members? Have the credentials of
military faculty in terms of graduate degrees and JQO qualifications
diminished during this period? What is the percentage of military
faculty who are fully JQO qualified?
General Kasun. Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have
increased the quality and credentials of military faculty members
assigned to JFSC. Seventy-seven percent (77%) of the JAWS and seventy-
eight percent (78%) of the JCWS military faculty have combat/
operational experience. The vast majority of these military faculty
members have been deployed in support of current operations. Many have
been deployed on multiple occasions. This battlefield experience
increases their understanding of planning and executing operations in
complex contingencies and enhances their ability to facilitate the
dialogue with students in the learning environment during planning
exercises. The percentage of U.S. military students with combat/
operational experience over the past two years in the JAWS/JCWS classes
is seventy-nine percent (79%)
The typical military faculty is ordered to the College for a three
year tour. Some faculty retire prior to completion of their tour; in
accordance with DoD regulation, they must spend at least one year on
board before retiring. Others extend beyond the three years to bring
them up to their retirement date.
The credentials of military faculty in terms of graduate degrees
and JQO qualifications have improved. The JAWS and JCWS military
faculty members have a wealth of operational experience. Three of the
four JAWS military faculty are currently enrolled in PhD programs and
all four are fully-JQO qualified. A greater percentage of JCWS military
faculty have graduate level degrees and there has been an increase in
the number who are fully JQO qualified from 59% to 68% during this
period.
As shown by the data below, faculty is more qualified now than they
were several years ago in terms of education and joint qualifications.
Military faculty assigned to JFSC without JPME II completion are
normally enrolled as students in a JCWS JPME II class immediately upon
arrival. On occasion, at the discretion of their Service, JAWS and JCWS
instructors may receive credit for completing Phase II after teaching
the course twice and demonstrating mastery of the entire curricula.
Therefore, by the time they depart most faculty are eligible to be
designated a JQO.
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y.epsDr. Snyder. Are the services and agencies filling their
assigned billets for faculty? What are your gaps?
General Kasun. While Services fill the billets, there are often
gaps between the time a person detaches and the next one reports.
Service representative are actively working to get faculty members
ordered into the College.
When officers report, they may be placed in either the Joint and
Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) or the Joint Advanced Warfighting
School (JAWS) depending on their qualifications. We currently have
eleven gapped billets, all at the O-5 (LTC/LtCol/CDR) level affecting
these two schools. JCWS is authorized 64 billets which achieves the 4:1
student to faculty ratio for 256 students. JFSC does not have any
assigned agency billets. However, through Memorandum of Agreements
Academic Chair billets are currently available with the Department of
State and the National Security Agency. The State Department Academic
Chair detached on 7 AUG 09; his relief is not yet identified but the
Department of State is actively contacting potential personnel. The
National Security Agency Academic Chair is filled.
Dr. Snyder. To what extent has the curriculum enhanced its coverage
of Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR)
Operations given that DOD has put them on a par with combat operations?
General Kasun. The Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS)
curriculum includes Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction
(SSTR) Operations throughout contingency and crisis action planning
lessons and exercises. SSTR is addressed as part of military support
for whole-of-government approaches to national security issues. There
is an increased emphasis on planning operations that set the conditions
for SSTR implementation during the early phases of war. Students also
study the considerations and concepts necessary for successful post
conflict/disaster operations and practice planning SSTR phases in a
number of scenarios that are described in the answer to question five.
SSTR Operations are discussed throughout the Joint Advanced
Warfighting School (JAWS) curriculum. In the TH6100 Theory and History
of War block of instruction SSTR Operations are looked at in the
historical context of the Post WWII era in comparison with the
occupation of Iraq beginning in 2003. During the ST6300 Strategic
Foundations block of instruction SSTR Operations are discussed in the
broader context of national strategy, defense strategy and State
Department strategy. During the student visit to the State Department
they are given a brief by the Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization on the role of S/CRS.
Throughout the OP6500 Operational Art/Campaign Planning block of
instruction in JAWS, SSTR Operations are emphasized. Practical
exercises which entail approximately 60 total classroom days commence
with phase 0 and work through phases 1-5. Specially, SSTR Operations
are discussed in the context of Campaign Design in OP6504. In OP6509,
the students take an in-depth look at operational plans for OIF with
emphasis on the SSTR Operations. During the deliberate planning portion
of the curriculum (OP6517-6538), SSTR Operations are incorporated into
phase 3, 4 and 5 planning as appropriate to the planning scenario.
Finally, the students engage in two Crisis Action Planning exercises,
OP6543 and OP6547, where SSTR Operations are again considered across
the spectrum of the plan with particular emphasis on the transition and
return to civilian control phases. OP 6543 and OP6547 scenarios are
based on potential real-world complex SSTR issues with only minor
traditional warfare components.
Dr. Snyder. Describe the scenarios that you use for your simulation
exercises and war games. To what extent do they incorporate SSTR and
irregular warfare concepts?
General Kasun. Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction
(SSTR) and Irregular Warfare (IW) concepts are woven throughout the
Joint and Combined Warfare School (JCWS) and Joint Advanced Warfare
School (JAWS) curricula. SSTR is addressed as part of military support
for whole-of-government approaches to national security issues. IW is
addressed during lessons about the nature of anticipated operations.
JAWS executes Joint Operational Planning for three distinct
scenarios under the current curriculum. The first two scenarios
incorporate detailed aspects of traditional, irregular, catastrophic
and disruptive threats represented by complex sets of state and non-
state actors in weak or failing state scenarios. Careful emphasis is
placed on the thorough assessment of and response to these complex
``Hybrid'' threats in a coherent balance. SSTR activities are fully
addressed by balanced analyses and courses of action, with direct
application of contemporary lesson learned in Iraq and Afghanistan.
They also reflect consideration of the published Joint Operating
Environment (JOE) and Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO),
both of which consider future environmental and threat trends.
The final scenario is not established far in advance of the
exercise, but typically derives from real-world emerging crises which
involve less traditional and conventional military employment. The
emphasis remains the same although this scenario is usually much more
strongly balanced toward SSTR than the previous two scenarios.
The Wargaming section of the Information Technology Division
provides role-playing Computer-Assisted Exercises (CAX) for both JAWS
and JCWS. The following scenarios are used:
PURPLE ECLIPSE (JCWS)
A five day role-playing exercise that presents the students with a
daunting political-military crisis in northern Africa that includes
significant multinational and interagency issues. Although the scenario
involves regular force engagements, IW aspects are threaded throughout.
The students not only construct a detailed Operation Plan for Phases IV
(Stabilize) and V (Enable Civil Authority) but set the conditions for
SSTR during Phases I, II and III (Deter, Seize Initiative, Dominate) to
ensure success of SSTR during Phases IV and V. In this exercise,
students are required to apply Crisis Action Planning (CAP) procedures
during a time-sensitive scenario. This exercise highlights the
collaborative planning as the Combatant Commander and Joint Task Force
(JTF) Headquarters staffs are conducting parallel planning in support
of the objective. This is the capstone exercise in the JCWS (JPME II)
course.
PURPLE LIGHTNING (JCWS)
A faculty guided practical exercise involving a humanitarian crisis
brought on by religious strife, terrorism, and an insurgency in a
central African country. This scenario gives the students the
opportunity to develop solutions using U.S. and coalition forces and
coordinating with U.S. agencies, private humanitarian organizations and
other nations to employ the SSTR and IW concepts. Specifically students
are asked to apply an understanding of the relationships and activities
of governmental agencies, and non-governmental agencies (NGOs); prepare
a concept of operations for integrating the governmental, non-
governmental, and private volunteer organizations into provision of
humanitarian assistance to the people of Nigeria; and plan to transfer
control of the humanitarian assistance from coalition military to the
NGOs.
PURPLE GUARDIAN (JCWS and JAWS)
A one day simulation-model assisted, student role-playing exercise.
The exercise is designed to provide students with an opportunity to
explore the unique intricacies and special demands of the homeland
security/homeland defense mission. It involves a number of domestic
homeland security threats in which the military provides support to
federal, state, and local government agencies. Although not normally
described as SSTR, these support activities and capabilities can be
related to SSTR. Role playing as a member of the USNORTHCOM Standing
Joint Force Headquarters, students experience the challenges of
establishing relevant situational awareness while simultaneously being
faced with tough decision-making scenarios in an unfamiliar
environment. A certain level of ambiguity, fog, friction, and
uncertainty is desired in this fast paced exercise.
The scenarios consist of two terrorist attacks within CONUS
requiring the Standing Joint Force Headquarters to assess potential
tasking. Command and Control relationships and the actions required to
pre-empt future attacks are stressed. The third vignette of the
exercise consists of a LNG tanker approaching the U.S. that may have
been taken over by a group of terrorist crew members. The seminar uses
this inject to compare and contrast Homeland Security and Homeland
Defense, the roles of the Navy and USCG, and the interagency
relationships between DoD, DHS, and the other federal agencies.
Dr. Snyder. Please provide the most recent survey results from your
graduates and their supervisors.
General Kasun. The answer to this question is being provided for
both the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) and the Joint and
Combined Warfighting School (JCWS).
JAWS Graduate and Supervisor Surveys (Class 07-08, graduated June
2008)
Process: Approximately nine months after graduation in June 2008,
each of 41 07-08 JAWS graduates and their supervisors were contacted
individually via a Commandant-signed letter with a link to an
electronic survey.
Questions asked: In addition to demographic and general program
questions, graduates and supervisors were asked questions that related
to the 10 Graduate Competencies. This report will focus on the
responses to the Competencies.
Graduates were asked to assess their level of preparation for their
current assignments as measured by the following 10 JAWS Graduate
Competencies. Available responses were Strongly Disagree, Disagree,
Agree, and Strongly Agree:
1. I am able to communicate cross-culturally in a joint
environment, while fostering trust internally and externally. Others
will find me versatile at tailoring communication to audiences.
2. I am confident and at ease making decisions in the absence of
complete information, responding quickly, effectively and proactively
to emerging and ambiguous conditions and opportunities.
3. I am able to effectively communicate and build teams through
persuasive influence, collaboration, negotiation, and consensus
building. Through active listening, I modify my communications in
response to feedback.
4. I am able to recognize patterns and changes, and am
comfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity.
5. Others find me versatile and creative and able to develop
innovative solutions, thinking in time and context within the complex
environment.
6. I habitually think in terms of systems/linkages (effects) and
function as an expert learner.
7. I am able to conduct campaigning and statecraft and understand
the role of war and politics. Maintaining an integrated understanding
of globalization and its effects on defense, domestic and foreign
policy, I use this understanding to inform strategic visioning.
8. I am capable of integrating joint, interagency and multi-
national capabilities within physical, virtual and human domains in
time, space and purpose in terms of operational art. I demonstrate a
broad understanding of battle-space systems and their
interdependencies.
9. I understand and employ Service core competencies,
demonstrating this expertise through integrating and leveraging Service
and joint doctrine.
10. I maintain an understanding and awareness of Service-centric
biases and tendencies (in myself and others) that may compromise
mission success. Exercising this awareness, I work to eliminate biases
and tendencies such as self-interest-careerism and Service
provincialism or parochialism.
Supervisors were asked to respond to 10 questions related to the
graduate's preparedness in terms of the 10 JAWS Graduate Competencies.
Available responses were Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Agree, and
Strongly Agree.
1. This graduate is a cross-cultural communicator in a joint
environment, able to foster trust internally and externally. The
graduate is versatile at tailoring communication to audiences.
2. This graduate is self-confident and at ease making decisions
in the absence of complete information, responding quickly, effectively
and proactively to emerging and ambiguous conditions and opportunities.
3. This graduate effectively communicates and builds teams
through persuasive influence, collaboration, negotiation and consensus
building. As an active listener, the graduate modifies communications
in response to feedback.
4. This graduate is able to recognize patterns and changes, and
is comfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity.
5. This graduate is versatile and creative, and is able to
develop innovative solutions, thinking in time and context within the
complex environment.
6. This graduate thinks in terms of systems/linkages (effects)
and functions as an expert learner.
7. This graduate is able to conduct campaigning and statecraft
and understands the role of war and politics. Maintaining an integrated
understanding of globalization and its effects on defense, domestic and
foreign policy, the graduate uses this understanding to inform
strategic visioning.
8. This graduate is capable of integrating joint, interagency,
and multi-national capabilities within physical, virtual and human
domains in time, space, and purpose in terms of operational art. The
graduate demonstrates broad understanding of battle-space systems and
their interdependencies.
9. This graduate understands and employs Service core
competencies, demonstrating this expertise through integrating and
leveraging Service and joint doctrine.
10. This graduate maintains an understanding and awareness of
Service-centric biases and tendencies (in self and others) that may
compromise mission success. Exercising this awareness, the graduate
works to eliminate biases and tendencies such as self-interest-
careerism and Service provincialism or parochialism.
End process: Our review of the 07-08 graduate and supervisor survey
data found many similarities with the two previous graduated classes.
The surveys suggest strong post-graduate benefits, particularly in the
data from graduates who are currently assigned to planning billets. The
results were provided to the JAWS Director for use in ensuring the
curriculum remained current and relevant.
Survey results: For 41 JAWS students of Class 07-08, the response
rate was 63% for the Graduate Survey and 68% for the Supervisors.
The percentage of graduates indicating they agreed or strongly
agreed that they had been prepared in the following competency areas is
shown below:
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The percentage of supervisors indicating they agreed or strongly
agreed that graduates demonstrated the competencies is show below:
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JCWS Graduate and Supervisor Surveys (all four 2008 JCWS classes)
Process: Approximately six months after graduation, graduates were
contacted via email with a link to an electronic survey. The email also
contained a link to the supervisor survey and asked the graduate to
forward the email to their immediate supervisor. The most recently
completed report was based on survey data was for all four classes from
Academic Year 2008 (1 October 2007-30 September 2008).
Questions asked: In addition to demographic and general program
questions, graduates and supervisors were asked 14 questions related to
Learning Objectives (LOs)
Graduates were asked 14 questions related to the LOs in terms
of applicability and usefulness.
Supervisors were asked 14 questions related to the usefulness
of the JCWS program in terms of the LOs.
Questions asked to both Graduates and Supervisors:
Apply appropriate strategic security policies and guidance used in
developing joint operational plans across the range of military
operations to support national objectives.
Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in
achieving strategic objectives. Focus on the proper employment of the
military instrument of national power at the joint force level both as
a supported instrument and as a supporting instrument of national
power.
Synthesize the capabilities and limitations of all Services (own
Service, other Services--to include SOF) in achieving the appropriate
strategic objectives in joint operations
Analyze the capabilities and limitations of multinational forces in
achieving the appropriate strategic objectives in coalition operations.
Analyze the capabilities and limitations of the interagency
processes in achieving the appropriate strategic objectives in joint
operational plans.
Comprehend the attributes of the future joint force and how this
force will organize, plan, prepare and conduct operations.
Value a thoroughly joint perspective and appreciate the increased
power available to commanders through joint, combined, interagency
efforts and teamwork.
Analyze the principles, capabilities, and limitations of
information operations across the range of military operations--to
include pre- and post-conflict operations.
Analyze the use of information operations to achieve desired
effects across the spectrum of national security threats.
Synthesize examples of campaign/theater planning and operations.
Focus on the use of planning concepts, techniques and procedures as
well as the integration of battlespace support systems.
Analyze complex contingency operations for use of appropriate
planning principles.
Apply current technology, modeling, simulation and wargaming to
accomplish the synchronization, employment, support and transportation
planning of the joint force.
Analyze the appropriate mix of battlespace support systems and
functions to develop joint operational plans.
Apply an analytical framework that incorporates the role that
factors such as geopolitics, geostrategy, society, culture, and
religion play in shaping the desire outcomes of policies, strategies,
and campaigns in the joint, interagency, and multinational arena.
End Process: Survey data for all four classes was aggregated,
analyzed and reported to the Director of the JCWS for use in ensuring
the curriculum remained current and relevant.
Survey results: There were 1,008 graduates from the four JCWS
classes in 2008; 339 completed the survey for a 34% response rate.
Forty-seven supervisors completed their survey, an increase from last
year's thirty-three respondents.
The percentage of graduates indicating that they agreed or
strongly agreed that the learning objective was relevant to
their current job is shown below:
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The percentage of graduates indicating that they agreed or
strongly agreed that the learning objective was useful in their
current job is shown below:
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The percentage of supervisors indicating that they agreed or
strongly agreed that the learning objective information was
useful for the graduate in his or her current job is shown
below:
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x.epsGraduates were also asked to list any areas they believed were
important for their joint job, but not taught at JFSC. The two areas
most repeatedly listed were (1) the POM/Budgeting Process and (2)
Interagency Focus/Communication.
When graduates were asked if attending JFSC was a valuable and
worthwhile experience, 94 percent responded positively (agreed or
strongly agreed). This compares favorably with last year's 90 percent
positive rating to the same question.
Dr. Snyder. The intermediate level schools lost Joint Duty credit
for their non-host service military faculty in the 2007 National
Defense Authorization Act. We know that the tours of those who were
grandfathered are ending. What will the effect of this be? How will it
affect the quality of your faculty? How important is it that these JDAL
positions be restored? Do the instructors truly get a joint experience?
General Kasun. Neither JAWS nor JCWS are impacted by this
restriction. However, faculty billets in the Joint Command, Control,
and Information Operations School (JC2IOS) were removed from the JDAL
even though, as with JCWS and JAWS, the subject matter, faculty, and
student body are innately joint. Though not a Joint Professional
Military Education qualifying school, the JC2IOS faculty provide
specialized instruction to JCWS and JAWS.
JC2IOS courses are chartered by the Joint Staff, built from joint
doctrine and policy, and prepare students for assignments to Joint Task
Force and Unified Combatant Command staffs. As a result of the billets
being removed from the JDAL, it is more difficult to get quality
faculty assigned to the school and retain them for a controlled (three-
year) tour. These instructors, as those assigned to JCWS and JAWS,
truly get a joint experience. These billets should be restored to the
JDAL.
Dr. Snyder. Describe your school's use of historical case studies
to teach strategy.
General Kasun. The Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS)
uses several historical case studies to examine strategy and the
enduring principles of military operations. Historical case studies are
used to reinforce strategic concepts and principles, bringing students
from the knowledge level to the analysis level of education. JCWS cases
studies include:
Yorktown, 1781
Gettysburg, 1863 (Optional)
Operation Torch, North Africa 1942
Operation Overlord, 1944
Operation Iceberg, Invasion of Okinawa, 1945
Beirut, 1983
Liberia, 2003
Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003-Present
The Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) has a 137 contact hour
block focused on history. It is a broad, conceptual survey of classical
through contemporary theories of the nature of conflict and the
application of armed force in the land, sea and air domains. This block
focuses on developing critical thinking skills with a distinct focus on
analyzing the art, science and nature of war and its evolving character
and conduct--past, present, and future. A series of historical case
studies provides the opportunity to analyze and evaluate techniques for
leading strategic change and building consensus among key
constituencies, including Service, multinational, and interagency
partners within the changing nature of conflict and national security.
This course requires students to synthesize techniques and skills
necessary for leading and sustaining effective organizations in a
complex joint, interagency, and multinational environment. The
curriculum includes a study of timeless patterns of force application,
investigation of engines of transformation, analysis of the
relationship between national security strategies and warfighting
concepts, and the importance of personality and leadership at
strategic-operational levels. A module exploring three tectonic
cultural clashes is included in the curriculum and specifically
addresses Islam, Russia, and China as well as contemporary lessons from
the War on Terror. A highlight of the first portion of this curriculum
is a week-long staff ride/field research visit to the Gettysburg
battlefield to explore the confluence of the human dimension of warfare
with other intangibles at the strategic and operational levels of war.
Specific cases studies in the JAWS curriculum include:
Yorktown, 1781
Gettysburg, 1863
Post WWII to include Korean War
Mao's Insurgency Campaign, 1933-1949
Beirut, 1983
Panama, 1989
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 1990-1991
Somalia, 1993-1994
Bosnia, 1994-1996
Kosovo, 1999
Afghanistan, 2001-Present
Iraq, 2003-Present
Additional current case studies which focus on the history of the
conflict as a part of mission analysis include Nigeria, Darfur, Congo,
and Zimbabwe.
Dr. Snyder. What is the process for renewal and non-renewal of the
faculty? How transparent is the system? In a tenure system people think
the faculty members have all the power, in a non-tenure system it
appears that the school has unlimited power. How do you avoid these
extremes?
General Kasun. The NDU-P has the sole authority to approve renewal
or non-renewal of Title 10 employees (faculty). In accordance with NDU
Policy 690-4 paragraph 8b:
Subsequent consecutive terms of employment, that is renewals,
will normally be for periods not to exceed three years,
although the NDU-P may authorize longer renewals in exceptional
circumstances. No faculty member is entitled to renewal. Non-
renewal at the expiration of an employment term is not an
involuntary termination of employment. . . . The Commandant/
Component Director may make a recommendation to renew an
employee based upon demonstrated exceptional professional
experience and competence. When hired or renewed, the employee
understands that his/her experience, expertise and skills are
the basis for his/her employment and that the extent to which
he/she sustains his/her currency in the field (i.e. continues
to maintain and improve their expertise) and their performance
of their duties will be considered in any decision to renew. .
. . If the determination [for non-renewal] is made, based on
the reasons provided below, the Commandant submits a
recommendation to the NDU-P to either terminate the Title 10
appointment or request the appointment not be renewed. The
employee would be notified, in writing, as early as possible.
NDU 690-4, paragraph 12b(2) addresses other reasons for non-
renewal:
The Commandant/Director has the authority to recommend
termination of the employment of Title 10 employees prior to
the expiration of their employment terms for the following
reasons:
(a) Change in mission, resources, workload or organizational
changes, or other similar and compelling reasons may require a
change in the number of Title 10 civilian positions.
Commandants/Directors, with the concurrence of COO/VPA, will
decide which positions shall be abolished. If practicable and
possible, at least six months notice of termination will be
given to the individual(s) affected, but in no event will the
notice be less than 60 days.
(b) Loss of Security Clearance. Any faculty member who for any
reason fails to obtain and maintain a security clearance (if
required) for his/her position will be terminated from that
position.
(c) Termination for Cause: A Title X employee may be terminated
for misconduct or unsatisfactory performance. Proposed
termination actions will be initiated by the Commandant/
Director/Vice President by providing a ``Notice of Proposed
Termination'' to the employee in writing setting forth the
grounds for the proposed termination. The employee will be
given a reasonable opportunity to respond to the proposed
termination. After consideration of the employee's response,
the Commandant/Director/Vice President will make a
recommendation through proper channels to the NDU-P.
Commandants and Directors should seek both UGC and Director,
HRD guidance and assistance. NDU-P is the final decision maker
in all termination cases. This includes those that may require
terminating a Director or a Vice President.
The Joint and Combined Warfighting School and Joint Advanced
Warfighting School faculty are generally retained on three-year
contracts, which are renewed if they have demonstrated satisfactory
performance. During this time, the faculty member must prepare a
portfolio of their accomplishments in the areas of teaching, research,
and outreach with specific outcomes. While Title X employees are not
tenured, there does appear to be a long-term commitment between JFSC
and these faculty members. Only two faculty members since 1997 have not
had their contract renewed, which prevents the appearance of the school
having unlimited power.
Dr. Snyder. What is your school's role in identifying promising
officers with the potential for high-level strategic thinking at the
appropriate point in their careers?
General Kasun. Joint Forces Staff College provides an equal
educational opportunity to all students sent to the school by the
Services. We do not specifically identify promising officers; however
certain officer's academic achievements are recognized via our awards
program. This information is provided back to the services for their
further consideration and evaluation of the officer's potential.
Dr. Snyder. How do you specifically measure the quality of the
faculty and staff in the PME environment?
General Kasun. Each military and civilian faculty member is
evaluated at least annually by his/her Director. The Director takes
into account the person's contribution to the college, student
evaluations, outreach, and research activities. The contributions of
military personnel are documented using their Service process with the
Commandant being the Senior Rater. The contributions of civilian
faculty are documented using the Title X evaluation system.
Staff members are evaluated at least annually by their supervisor,
who takes into account the effectiveness of their contributions to the
College as defined in their position description. As with faculty
members, the contributions of military personnel are documented using
their Service process. The contributions of civilian staff are
documented either using the Title X evaluation system or the National
Security Personnel System as appropriate.
Dr. Snyder. How were you chosen to be school's commandant? How was
your dean chosen? Will you be retiring from this job? What background
should the Chief of Naval Operations be looking for in selecting
individuals for these positions? Should the focus be on operational
leadership skills or academic and teaching experience (not instructing
in a training institution) background or both?
General Kasun. The current Commandant was notified by the U.S. Army
reserve General Officer Management Office (GOMO) in June 2008 that she
was being nominated for the vacancy as the most qualified candidate for
the Army Reserves by the Chief, Army Reserve (CAR) to the Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). She was notified in August 2008 that she
had been selected as the first Reserve general/flag officer to fill
this position. Further questions on how she was selected should be
directed to GOMO and/or CAR.
BG Kasun is filling a two star position. Her future will be decided
upon by a board of senior Active Duty and Reserve general officers and
the Chief, Army Reserve.
The Commandant should have both extensive operational experience
and joint senior level education commensurate with the authorized
billet. The Commandant needs a minimum of a master's degree, should be
fully joint qualified, and have had some exposure to adult education.
The Commandant should have experience in managing a large dynamic
organization.
The Academic Dean was selected through the Title X competitive
process. The Academic Dean plans to retire in 2012 after 33 years of
federal service.
The Academic Dean should have a doctorate in a relevant field such
as education or national security studies, have attained the academic
rank of full professor, have had exposure to the military environment,
have experience in higher education and administration, and have an
extensive background in managing and supervision of large dynamic
organizations.
Dr. Snyder. How should intermediate schools attract top-tier
civilian faculty? How do you specifically define top-tier? What are the
elements that would attract the highest quality of faculty--tenure,
copyright, resources, pay, ability to keep their government
retirements, research and administrative assistance, etc.?
General Kasun. Top tier faculty are those who are nationally
recognized by their peers as experts in their field of study. Teaching
faculty are attracted by the promise of high-quality, motivated
students, the freedom to teach the subject assigned by any appropriate
means, and a sufficient compensation package including pay, vacation
time, and retirement. The flexibility of the Title X pay scale, through
which exceptional performers may be appropriately recognized, is also
an incentive. To help ensure we attract the best faculty, we advertise
for openings at multiple educational and employment institutions as
well as the on the government web site.
Currently, we have superb faculty, but just enough to cover
classroom requirements without any in reserve, which stresses both the
teaching and curriculum development faculty. The problem is exacerbated
by gaps when filling military billets as well as by the time needed to
qualify some military faculty to teach the curriculum. Increased
funding would allow us to attract additional highly qualified civilian
faculty, which in turn would allow those on board to conduct research
and publish, another important incentive for top-tier civilian faculty.
Dr. Snyder. What are the policies at your school regarding academic
freedom? What is its proper role in a PME setting without tenure?
Describe how your faculty may be called upon to respond to press
inquiries in the field of expertise and whether and how they are
allowed to respond in a timely manner.
General Kasun. The Joint Forces Staff College fully supports
academic freedom as outlined in the National Defense University's
policy below:
NDU policy states that we subscribe to the 1940 American
Association of University Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom
and Tenure
``freedom to pursue research and publication in concert
with other academic duties, freedom in the classroom to discuss his or
her subject, and the right to speak on nonacademic issues just as an
ordinary citizen''
``faculty members also have the responsibility to uphold
the reputation of their profession and institution''
``freedom to discuss relevant subject matter in
classrooms, even if controversial with attendant responsibility to
remain on the subject and consciously and consistently avoid intruding
material that has no relation to the subject they are teaching''
For reference to the statement itself: http://www.higher-ed.org/
resources/AAUP_1940stat.htm
Recent controversies regarding academic freedom have led to a
recent AAUP Report:
Freedom in the Classroom (2007): Response to help faculty with what
they can and can't say in the classroom . . . .especially on
controversial or political issues. ``We out to learn from history that
the vitality of institutions of higher learning has been damaged far
more by efforts to correct abuses of freedom than by those alleged
abuses. . . . We ought to learn from history that education cannot
possibly thrive in an atmosphere of state-encouraged suspicion and
surveillance. . . The essence of higher education does not lie in the
passive transmission of knowledge but in the inculcation of a mature
independence of mind.''
Middle States Accreditation Standard 6: Integrity, ``In the conduct
of its programs and activities, involving the public and the
constituencies it serves, the institution demonstrates adherence to
ethical standards and its own states policies, providing support for
academic and intellectual freedom.''
Academic freedom, intellectual freedom, and freedom of expression
are central to the academic enterprise. These special privileges,
characteristic of the academic environment, should be extended to all
members of the institution's community. . . .''
Academic and intellectual freedom gives one the right and
obligation as a scholar to examine data and to question assumptions. It
also obliges instructors to present all information objectively because
it asserts the student's right to know all pertinent facts and
information. A particular point of view may be advanced, based upon
complete access to the facts or opinions that underlie the argument, as
long as the right to further inquiry and consideration remains
unabridged.
To restrict the availability or to limit unreasonably the
presentation of data or opinions is to deny academic freedom.
Intellectual freedom does not rule out commitment; rather it
makes it possible. Institutions may hold particular political, social,
or religious philosophies, as may individual faculty members or
students; but both individuals and institutions should remain
intellectually free and allow others the same freedom to pursue truth.
``At NDU we seek to understand issues, policies, and
strategies so we can, as scholars, future leaders, and current
advisors, best articulate, assess, defend, critique, and improve those
policies and strategies over time.'' (former NDU president Paul
Gaffney)
Legal standing:
Based on constitutional protection of 1st amendment to the U.S.
Constitution--academic freedom as a special concern of the 1st
amendment
Adler v. Board of Education (K-12) ``there could be no academic
freedom in an environment where teachers are under surveillance and
feared for their jobs''
Sweezy v. New Hampshire (higher education) ``to impose any straight
jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities
would imperil the future of the nation'' (Chief Justice Warren). Four
essential freedoms of the university (Justice Frankfurter): who may
teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, who may be admitted
to study.
Regents of the University of Michigan v Ewing ``Academic freedom
thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas
among teachers and students . . . but also, and somewhat
inconsistently, on autonomous decision-making by the academy itself
Faculty members' academic freedom in the classroom is limited by
the academic freedom of the institution to determine what shall be
taught (establishing curriculum, relevance to mission) and how it shall
be taught (setting teaching standards) multiple cases
Faculty in private institutions do not have constitutional
protection and must rely on contracts with the institution to protect
academic freedom (i.e. the AAUP statement)
Ethical Considerations
Central to the values of education is the ``search for truth''
Academic freedom is necessary for discovery
``Truth seeking and discovery are facilitated when professors and
their institutions remain free to pursue scholarship, wherever it may
lead''
``Scientific and scholarly progress cannot be made if so-called
heretical views are not brought to light to be subjected to the
scrutiny of others through observation, research, and whatever
objective, scientific method is appropriate to the subject matter at
hand.''
NDU Non-Attribution/Academic Freedom Policy
1. Academic Freedom is defined in the university's values as:
Providing the climate to pursue and express ideas, opinions, and issues
relative to the university purpose, free of undue limitations,
restraints, or coercion by the organization or external environment. It
is the hallmark of an academic institution.
2. The National Defense University subscribes to the American
Association of University Professors' statement on academic freedom,
issues in 1940. That statement defines academic freedom in terms of:
a. Freedom of research and publication of results
b. Freedom of classroom teaching
c. Freedom from censorship when faculty speak or write as
citizens
3. The statement also includes faculty responsibilities in
academic freedom:
a. Faculty, when action as private citizens, should make
every effort to indicate that they are not institutional
spokespersons.
b. Controversial issues not pertaining to the subject should
not be introduced.
c. Peer review is vital and encouraged.
d. Institutional missions could limit academic freedom.
4. Free inquiry is essential to the National Defense University
because the senior officers and government officials who are educated
here will assume a variety of roles in their future assignments, as
future policy makers, advisors, and leaders. NDU graduates must be
ready to discuss, challenge, question, and determine national policy.
5. So that guests and university community members may speak
candidly, the university offers its assurance that presentations will
be held in strict confidence. Our policy on non-attribution provides
that, without the expressed permission of the speaker, nothing will be
attributed directly or indirectly in the presence of anyone who was not
authorized to attend the lecture.
APPLICABLE REGULATION: Title 10, United States Code; DoD Directive
5230.0, Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release; NDU Reg. 360-
1, Academic Freedom and Public Information
Press inquiries are directed to the Public Affairs Office, who
determines whether or not current faculty or students have expertise in
the field/areas of the inquiry. PAO will inform the school director of
the faculty/student member. If the faculty/student member is available/
willing to respond, the response will be reviewed by the PAO who will
then forward the response to the entity making the inquiry.
Dr. Snyder. Acquisition reforms all call for more of the general
purpose forces to be educated and trained in understanding contracting
and contractors. Civilians, contracting, and contractors on the
battlefield--how much do officers, outside the acquisition workforce,
need to know?
General Kasun. The battlefield is comprised of military, civilians
and contractors. It is imperative that officers are familiar with the
contracting process. When working with contractors, they must
understand the appropriate interactions and legal constraints that
affect working relationships.
In 2009, at the recommendation of the MECC, the Chairman designated
``Operational Contract Support Education for Non-Acquisition DoD
personnel'' as a JPME Special Area of Emphasis. Additionally, the
October 2008 issuance of a relevant Joint Doctrine publication (JP 4-10
``Operational Contract Support'') is available to underpin efforts.
Dr. Snyder. What level of support do you receive from your
University? The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs? JCS/J7? The Secretary of
Defense? OSD? Who advocates for your budget requirements in what
forums?
General Kasun. NDU provides us with our allocation of the budget
and POM's our issues. They provide us with policy guidance. They also
provide us with our manpower allocation and maintain hiring authority.
They provide our legal support and select subject matter experts. We
also share library databases and the IT system. We have our regional
accreditation under NDU. We are satisfied with the level of support
provided by NDU.
The Chairman provides us with curriculum guidance via the Officers
Professional Military Education Program (OPMEP). The Faculty Education
Conference provides yearly training to the faculty on key joint issues
and new joint doctrine. Any guidance provided by the SECDEF/OSD to NDU
applies to JFSC. Both NDU and OSD advocated for our budget requirements
in the POM cycle.
Dr. Snyder. Are you being adequately resourced for the Joint
Advanced Warfare School? If not, what is your plan for becoming so?
General Kasun. The Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) is
adequately resourced. There are no significant budget issues at this
time. JAWS has dedicated classrooms which have the most advanced
technology of any at JFSC. The school has adequate faculty to meet the
mission; however there is no redundancy to allow for seamless turn-over
of faculty or additional tasking of faculty to include research and
writing time. Additionally, the Director must teach in order to meet
the student to faculty ratio of 3.5:1.
Dr. Snyder. Describe any IT challenges you may have. What are your
other resource challenges, if any?
General Kasun. Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) requires the
replacement of critical network servers that provide all of the
required services to the command. Critical services such as electronic
mail, network security, database management, Continuity of Operations
Program (COOP), and file storage are supported by the servers. A total
of 40 servers currently support the College. The cost to replace these
servers is $210,000.
JFSC also requires the replacement of critical network switches
that provide the infrastructure to support the College's local area
network. The switches provide the connectivity needed to extend the
network to the entire College and allow users access to network
services such as electronic mail, file storage/retrieval, and database
management systems. The JFSC network infrastructure currently has
approximately 75 access switches and 7 distribution switches. Through
lifecycle replacement, the cost to replace these switches is $150,000/
year.
The classified JFSC SIPR network should be utilizing a tape backup
system. The current system was purchased in FY00 and requires
replacement. Security requirements specify that a backup system must be
in place that will allow the College to be able to backup vital data on
external media and store it in an offsite location in case of emergency
or catastrophic loss to a system which is onsite. The cost for such a
system is $25,000.
In addition to the SIPR network, JFSC uses a Storage Area Network
that provides approximately three terabytes of unclassified information
storage. The Storage Area Network provides the ability to address
continuing user storage requirements. Network size has continued to
grow and it is more economical to purchase a Storage Area Network than
to purchase the servers that would be needed to meet our growing
requirements. This type of solution enables a backup solution that is
faster than tape backup solutions. The Storage Area Network could not
be used for classified information because doing so would make the
entire system classified. The cost for a Storage Area Network is
approximately $93,000.
The JFSC backbone relies on a central Core switch which acts as a
traffic cop for all network data. The Core switch controls connectivity
to all devices within the College, including all user workstations, war
gaming suites, and seminars. All computers that try to gain any
information from the internal or external network are routed through
the Core switch. All outlying switches/pc's/hubs/LAN drops/etc. attach
to this central Core switch. The current Core switch was replaced in FY
07, and should be replaced every 3 years. The cost for a replacement is
approximately $63,700.
The audio visual infrastructure and equipment are aging and in need
of modernization. As an example, the infrastructure in the war game
suites in Okinawa Hall and the Distance Learning Center in Normandy
Hall is over 10 years old. The systems are heavily used to conduct
exercises, provide video teleconferencing links, and enable distance
learning with combatant commands to enhance the education of our
students. All are well beyond their life-cycle. Internal equipment in
these facilities is no longer supported by the manufacturer and
consequently it requires an increased amount of time and money to keep
them at minimal operational levels. The cost for this update is
approximately $5,169,000.
The College is designing its classroom of the future that will be
incrementally implemented over the FYDP. The current classroom
structure has five computers being shared by up to twenty students and
three faculty members. The classroom of the future will need to provide
computer access for all students and faculty. The front-end assessment
has identified critical requirements for computing capability for the
individual student, classroom flexibility, and interactive display
devices. The solution will incorporate laptop computers to serve as
both an electronic reader and IT asset. A wireless network for both
Normandy and Okinawa Halls will enable the flexibility required for
these classrooms and have a significant impact on network
infrastructure. Interactive whiteboards will enable students and
faculty to electronically capture application-level educational
experiences in the classroom. In addition, the Joint and Combined
Warfare School (JCWS) has 355 electronic readers (eBooks) that the
students and faculty use to access the curriculum and reference
materials. These readers will need to be replaced with a newer version
of an electronic reader or laptop computers. The cost for JCWS
classroom modernization is $5,400,000 over four years. The cost for the
wireless network $1,200,000. Each electronic reader or laptop will cost
$330-$450.
An additional challenge is outside access to computer files. Many
students and faculty take work home. Due to concerns for system
security, people are currently unable to use thumb drives or access
files from outside the college. Issuing government owned laptops to
each student and faculty member may be the only way to restore homework
access capabilities. The cost to do this is approximately $1,270 per
person.
Dr. Snyder. Is the Joint Advanced Warfighting School going to be
ILE or SLE? We have heard conflicting stories.
General Kasun. The Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) was
established in 2004 for O4 and O5 officers. In 2005 the program was
expanded to allow O6 officers to attend. The CJCSI 1800.01C Officer
Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) listed JAWS as both ILE
and SLE. As such students received either ILE or SLE credit depending
on their rank. The Director, Joint Staff signed an update to this
policy on 15 July 2009. In CJCSI 1800.01D Officer Professional Military
Education Policy (OPMEP) JAWS is now listed as only SLE. The current
class which graduates 18 June 2010 will be the last class to have
students who receive ILE credit for JAWS.
Dr. Snyder. Please provide your school's mission statement.
Admiral Wisecup. The mission of the Naval War College is to:
(1) Develop strategic and operational leaders: The College shall
provide professional military education programs that are current,
rigorous, relevant, and accessible to the maximum number of qualified
U.S. officers and Navy enlisted personnel, civilian employees of the
U.S. Government and non-governmental organizations, and international
officers. The desired effect is a group of leaders of character who
have trust and confidence in each other and are operationally and
strategically minded, critical thinkers, proficient in joint matters,
and skilled naval and joint warfighters.
(2) Help CNO define the future Navy and its roles and missions: The
College shall conduct research, analysis, and gaming to support the
requirements of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval
Operations, the Combatant Commanders, the Navy Component Commanders,
the Navy's numbered fleet commanders, other Navy and Marine Corps
commanders, the U.S. Intelligence Community, and other departments and
agencies of the U.S. Government. The desired effect is a program of
focused, forward-thinking and timely research, analysis, and gaming
that anticipates future operational and strategic challenges; develops
and assesses strategic and operational concepts to overcome those
challenges; assesses the risk associated with these concepts; and
provides analytical products that inform the Navy's leadership and help
shape key decisions.
(3) Support combat readiness: The College shall conduct training,
education, leadership and assessment activities to support the ability
of the Navy's Joint Force Maritime and Navy Component Commanders to
function effectively as operational commanders. This effort shall
include supporting the needs of the Combatant Commanders, Navy
Component Commanders, and the Navy's numbered fleet commanders for
operational planning, analysis, and war gaming to respond to emerging
operational requirements. The desired effect is to improve the
capability of Navy commanders to lead maritime, joint and combined
forces and their staff members to plan, execute and assess and function
cohesively as a maritime headquarters organization.
(4) Strengthen maritime security cooperation: The College shall
bring together senior and intermediate level naval officers from other
countries to develop leaders for high command in their navies; promote
an open exchange of professional views; encourage friendship and
cooperation; and study operational planning methods. The desired effect
is to build and strengthen national and international maritime
relationships and to improve the ability of U.S. and partner nations to
operate together in the maritime domain.
Status and Command Relationships. The Naval War College is a shore
activity in an active, fully operational status under the command of a
President who reports to the Chief of Naval Operations for mission
accomplishment, broad policy guidance and governance. The Deputy Chief
of Naval Operations for Total Force serves as the College's Resource
Sponsor and Budget Submission Office.
Dr. Snyder. How have ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
affected the quality of military faculty members? What is your average
tour length for military faculty members? Have the credentials of
military faculty in terms of graduate degrees and JQO qualifications
diminished during this period? What is the percentage of military
faculty who are fully JQO qualified?
Admiral Wisecup. Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have
clearly enhanced the quality of those military faculty members at the
U.S. Naval War College who have had this experience. Recent combat
experience provides instant credibility and enables our military
faculty members to connect with students who have recently returned
from combat operations. Recent faculty combat experience is also
instrumental in making sure that our curriculum is current and
relevant. We have used the individual augmentation program periodically
as a professional development opportunity for selected military faculty
members. The challenge is that combat operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan only cover one aspect of the range of military operations
and we must teach the full spectrum.
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have also affected the
perception among students especially those with combat experience that
such experience is a discriminator. Those military faculty members
without combat experience must work to build that credibility and prove
their value in the classroom.
However, there were problems with gapped billets for military
faculty members especially during periods with the highest tempo of
operations.
The average tour length for military faculty is between two and
three years, with most seasoned officers staying for a full tour and
the more junior commanders/lieutenant colonels or junior captains/
colonels often departing closer to the twenty four-month mark. Clearly,
the full tour allows these officers to contribute significantly in both
teaching and curricula development. Most of the faculty members who
depart after only two years are on the fast track to promotion and
command and these are exactly the officers that we want to have in the
seminar with both our intermediate and senior level students.
The credentials of military faculty in terms of graduate degrees
and JQO qualifications have not diminished at all during this period.
Forty-seven percent of S&P's military faculty members have held O-5
command. All have the requisite PME and hold a master's degree with
eighteen percent having a PhD or enrolled as doctoral candidates.
Among the JMO Department's military faculty, sixty-nine percent
have held O-5 command, and over ninety four percent are graduates of an
intermediate or senior level service college and hold a master's
degree; forty-one percent hold multiple master degrees. Sixty percent
of the NSDM military faculty has had O-5 command and sixty-seven
percent hold multiple master's degrees.
Approximately 20% (13/66) military faculty members are fully JQO
qualified. In fact, the percentage of JQO faculty has remained steady
over the past ten years.
Dr. Snyder. Are the services and agencies filling their assigned
billets for faculty? What are your gaps?
Admiral Wisecup. Yes, the military services and agencies are
filling their assigned billets at the Naval War College. Moreover, each
of the other military departments have provided military faculty
members who provide the skills, professional experiences, and generally
the education outlined in the Memorandum of Agreement on Assignment of
Military Faculty at the Service Senior Level Colleges dated 30 December
2005.
That Memorandum of Agreement covers the portion of the other
Service faculty at the Naval War College which meets the CJCS
definition for PME faculty, those who ``teach, prepare, or design PME
curriculum or conduct research related to PME.'' Faculty members
assigned to NWC's College of Operational and Strategic Leadership, the
Center for Naval Warfare Studies, the Naval Command College, and the
Naval Staff College do not fully meet this definition and are not
counted as PME faculty unless they actively teach in the Elective
Program. The information below is in reference to the PME faculty which
is related to this Subcommittee's inquiry.
For the upcoming academic year, the following billets for teaching
faculty are currently gapped with no replacement yet identified:
CIA--none (1 of 1 billets filled)
Maritime Administration--none (1 of 1 billets filled)
NCIS--none (1 of 1 billets filled)
Royal Navy--none (1 of 1 billets filled)
U.S. Air Force--1 of 11 billets (9%)
U.S. Army--1 of 13 billets (8%)
U.S. Coast Guard--none (1 of 1 filled)
U.S. Marine Corps--none (5 of 5 billets filled)
U.S Navy--3 of 42 billets (7%)
U.S. State Department--none (2 of 2 billets filled)
The Army had problems with timely fills in Academic Years 2006-2007
and 2007-2008, but rectified them last academic year. As with all shore
stations, Navy manning is less than 100%, but the College, as a matter
of practice, places high priority on filling the PME faculty positions
and absorbs the manning decrement with the research and gaming faculty
and staff positions.
Dr. Snyder. To what extent has the curriculum enhanced its coverage
of Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR)
Operations given that DOD has put them on a par with combat operations?
Admiral Wisecup. Stability, Security, Transition, and
Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations are an important part of the curricula
at the U.S. Naval War College. The College has held fast to the belief,
first articulated by its Founding Father, Rear Admiral Steven B. Luce,
USN that ``The War College is a place of original research on all
questions relating to war and to statesmanship connected with war, or
the prevention of War.'' For the past 125 years, our focus has never
been solely on conventional wars or high-intensity conflicts. We have
examined the full spectrum of combat operations. Since the fall of the
Berlin Wall and subsequent end of the Cold War as we know it, the
College has increasingly emphasized both SSTR and irregular warfare.
Failing and low-performing states are a perfect environment for
these difficult operations. Our students have read and studied about
operations in Beirut and Panama since the early 1990s. We continue to
study operations in the Balkans that occurred during the Clinton years.
Clearly there is a linkage between unstable environments like these and
irregular war and insurgencies. We see this complexity as a part of the
comprehensive whole.
The NSDM Capstone Exercise asks students to look into the future
security environment (6 years) to develop a seminar presentation that
addresses creation of a future national security strategy, national
military strategy, a regional strategic estimate, a theater strategic
vision, and a list of new or improved concepts/capabilities necessary
to advance the regional strategic vision. This exercise requires
students to carefully consider all kinds of potential future
operations, including SSTR operations.
In addition, NSDM uses several case studies that touch on past
events related to SSTR operations including:
The use of Marines in Beirut in the early 80s
Darfur
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles
The Strategy and Warfare course includes a diverse assortment of
case studies. SSTR concepts are clearly discussed in many of these case
studies. Consequently, it is often an area that students discuss on
their final examination.
During the Joint Maritime Operations (JMO) course, students are
required to complete a major research paper. There are many topic
suggestions that include SSTR subjects; 36 students this past academic
year chose SSTR topics.
In the session on Introduction to Operational Art, students explore
the application of operational art not only in conventional force-on-
force constructs, but ask the questions, ``Can operational art be
applied across the range of military operations?'' extending the
consideration through the traditional Phase 4 and Phase 5 construct. In
the lesson on Military Objectives and the Levels of War, exploration of
the desired end state leads students into consideration of SSTR issues.
Specific to naval operations, one question students entertain in
the lesson on the Employment of Naval Forces Across the Spectrum of
Conflict, is ``Discuss the type and range of missions conducted by
maritime forces in time of peace?'' Discussion leads to many roles for
naval forces within SSTR. Another question in the session asks students
to consider the application of naval forces to peace keeping and peace
enforcement, two elements that have roles within SSTR.
Interagency coordination and cooperation get consideration in
several seminar sessions. In the lesson on the Department of State and
the Country Team, the interaction between a Joint Task Force and the
DoS/Country Team are considered specifically in SSTR operations. The
JMO session on military decision making and planning continue the theme
by asking students to consider planning not only for conflict but also
for post-conflict operations.
Many sessions in contemporary operations look at SSTR
considerations. These include Failed States; a session devoted to a
lecture on SSTR, Security Cooperation Planning, Interagency
Coordination, and a panel discussion featuring representatives from
nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations and civilian
contractors. The Post-Conflict Operations seminar looks at three SSTR
case studies, Post-WWII Germany, Post-Operation Just Cause in Panama,
and stability operations in Kosovo. The class on Civil-Military
Operations features the investigation of establishing relationships
early in an operation with a mind to ensuring coherent action in SSTR.
The session on Peace Operations also includes SSTR considerations.
Likewise, sessions on insurgency, counter-insurgency, and complex
irregular warfare explore the gap between where a region or country is
where it needs to be, and how it gets there through the lens of SSTR
considerations. A seminar on Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations
concludes the seminar series and through analysis of Operation Unified
Assistance looks to identify lessons relevant to SSTR concerns.
Overall, the JMO course weaves SSTR operations and considerations
throughout the sixteen week course with concentrations interspersed.
There are also several electives and workshops that cover SSTR and
an Area of Studies with electives devoted to Irregular Warfare. These
include:
Employment of Special Operations Forces: A Case Study Approach
Advanced Studies in Special Operations Forces
Directed Research in Special Operations Forces
Small Wars: An Introduction to Insurgency, Counterinsurgency,
Guerilla and Partisan Warfare Colonial Wars, 1846-1902
Irregular Warfare
Homeland Security and Counter Terrorism Technological and Policy
Foundations
Confronting Armed Groups: 21st Century Challenges to U.S. National
Security
Iraq: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency
Contemporary Experiences in Counterinsurgency and Counter-Terrorism
Also, our resident faculty members have recent experience and
expertise with SSTR especially the military faculty that have recently
returned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Faculty members in
the Wargaming Department work closely with the teaching faculty to
remain current and share their experiences.
In addition, in 2008, the Naval War College created a Center on
Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) in order promote and support
research and teaching on irregular warfare and armed groups. The Center
also helps to fund research projects on irregular warfare and armed
groups. CIWAG hosted a conference that brought U.S. and international
scholars together with military scholars and practitioners to analyze
the national and international security challenges posed by armed
groups and irregular warfare. CIWAG is taking a complex and rapidly
evolving problem and exploring ways to help scholars and military
leaders develop a sufficient understanding of the unique challenges
posed by armed groups and irregular warfare.
Dr. Snyder. Describe the scenarios that you use for your simulation
exercises and war games. To what extent do they incorporate SSTR and
irregular warfare concepts?
Admiral Wisecup. At the Naval War College, our seminar-based
educational methodology requires students to demonstrate mastery of
theory and concepts through analysis, application, synthesis, and
evaluation throughout the academic year through a variety of means
including comprehensive case studies, exercises and simulations, and
war games.
In the National Security Decision Making course, the final exercise
requires students to look into the future security environment (6
years); they create their own scenario based on their assessment of the
global and regional trends affecting their assigned geographic area of
responsibility. The exercise requires the seminar to develop a
presentation that addresses creation of a future national security
strategy, national military strategy, a regional strategic estimate, a
theater strategic vision, and a list of new or improved concepts/
capabilities necessary to advance the regional strategic vision.
This exercise requires students to carefully consider all kinds of
potential future operations, including SSTR operations and irregular
warfare and determine the likelihood and risk of them to the security
of the region and the United States.
NSDM also uses two case studies involving SSTR operations and
irregular warfare concepts:
The use of Marines in Beirut in the early 80s
Darfur
The Strategy and War course includes a diverse assortment of case
studies focusing on irregular warfare (IW) and the challenges of
countering belligerents that utilize irregular strategies. IW is
defined as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for
legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations and encompasses
insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and counterterrorism. IW
theory and practice is analyzed by students using historical and
contemporary cases studies. Students read the famous study On
Protracted War by Mao, perhaps the most successful fractioned and
celebrated theorist of IW. A number of case studies involving IW and
hybrid wars--the role of armed groups and militias in determining the
outcome of the American War for Independence, the Huk Rebellion, the
Malayan Emergency, Vietnam, the insurgencies in Iraq after the fall of
Saddam Hussein's regime, and current operations in Afghanistan--receive
in-depth examination. Moreover, the Strategy and War course emphasizes
the importance of understanding how and why superiority in conventional
military capabilities do not automatically translate into strategic
success, when weaker adversaries adopt asymmetric, irregular methods of
warfare to protract the fighting and diminish the will of their
opponent. It is important to note that IW is taught in context so that
the geopolitical, economic, historical, social, and cultural
environments surrounding the conflict are also assessed in order to
develop realistic strategies and counter-strategies.
In the examination of IW, culture and religion figure prominently
in the strategy courses. A conflict studied is the Algerian war to gain
independence from France. This struggle raises troubling questions
about the strategic effectiveness of a major western power--in this
case, France--fighting in another cultural and religious setting
against an adversary employing terrorism and insurgency.
In addition, IW in the joint and interagency environment is
exhaustively studied. On Vietnam, for example, students read
Bureaucracy Does its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN
Performance in Vietnam, the classic study authored by Robert Komer, who
headed the most successful phase of the United States pacification
effort during the Vietnam War. Meanwhile, Andrew Krepinevich's
provocative study The Army and Vietnam provides insights into the
problems facing armed forces in adapting to strategic realities.
Students examine institutional constraints that hamstrung the
performance of the United States on the civil and local security
aspects of the war. These include the faulty coordination of our
diplomatic and military instruments, the lack of unified plans, the
misuse of AID tools, poorly equipped staffs on several agencies that
also could not understand each other's perspective or mission, and
above all the lack of unified management both across civil and military
functions and within each sphere.
Students also examine the arguments made by the eminent Harvard
academic, the late Samuel Huntington that the terror war is a
culturally or religiously driven ``clash of civilizations.'' (That,
indeed, is how Al Qaeda has been predisposed to portray the war.) The
Strategy and Policy Department provides a valuable reading, entitled In
the Eyes of Your Enemy: An Al-Qaeda Compendium, consisting of primary-
source documents, which allows students to engage in ``cultural
intelligence'' by assessing first hand AQAM's ideological view of the
world, peculiar version of history, and image of the United States, as
well as their political objectives, strategies, information operations,
and internal divisions and debates. In addition, Usama Bin Laden's
speech, ``Come to Jihad: A Speech to the People of Pakistan,'' covering
a substantial change in AQ's strategic rhetoric, is examined. In it,
Bin Laden formally calls for war against the Pakistani state in a
fashion which may mark another turning point in the Long War's
evolution. Readings by well-known experts on the Middle East Fawaz
Gerges and Gilles Kepel provide astute analyses of the cultural roots
of current-day conflicts. Other readings and lectures provide an
ethnographic break-down of tribal society along the Pakistan-
Afghanistan frontier, and some of the key ``cultural terrain'' features
in it that effect military operations.
AQAM has exploited the revolution in information technology to
craft and control their messages to an unprecedented degree of
sophistication and to make possible tactical training, operational
planning, and strategic debate in a decentralized organizational
framework. Another reading by Bruce Hoffman, a longtime RAND
Corporation expert on terrorism, analyzes the ``virtual battleground of
cyberspace'' and the different ways in which AQAM leaders and
operatives have used the internet to advance their cause. AQAM has used
new means of communication to try to impel a wide range of Muslim
audiences to transcend their multiple national, ethnic, and tribal
sources of identity and embrace a single, extreme, religious identity
as a global umma (community) in mortal confrontation with infidels.
AQAM also addresses Western audiences with words as well as propaganda
of the deed. Its package of terrorism and strategic communication seeks
to achieve psychological, economic, and political effects that, it
presumes, will bring an end to the Western presence in the Muslim
world. The deep attention paid to Al Qaeda's world-view, messages, and
efforts in the strategy courses also provides a solid backdrop against
which to compare and evaluate the United States' own efforts.
Two major scenarios consider SSTR within the Joint Maritime
Operations course. The first is a notional case study of a conflict on
the island of Borneo. Within it, students are exposed to a
conventional, maritime-based conflict with irregular warfare concerns.
Within it, students are expected to plan for U.S. and coalition
operations, including SSTR operations. The second and capstone exercise
looks at the implosion of the DPRK in the year 2012. The entire
exercise centers on conflict avoidance and SSTR efforts. As a result of
years of food shortages and repression of the people, the DPRK
leadership is unable to provide either security of basic human
services. DPRK infrastructure is incapable of supporting the population
and the U.N. estimates that, as winter approaches, up to 2 million DPRK
citizens may starve or freeze to death. The U.S.-led Combined Task
Force (CTF) Morning Calm conducts humanitarian assistance operations to
assist DPRK government in maintaining order and restoring basic human
services in order to ease human suffering and prevent regional
instability. This exercise was designed as an SSTR/Irregular Warfare
exercise to synthesize the course learning objectives.
In addition, in 2008, the Naval War College created a Center on
Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) in order promote and support
research and teaching on irregular warfare and armed groups. Part of
its mission is to hold a series of conferences that bring scholars,
both American and international, together with military scholars and
practitioners to analyze the national and international security
challenges posed by armed groups and irregular warfare. CIWAG
contributes to curriculum development in the strategy, joint military
operations, and electives courses taught at the Naval War College. This
focus on increasing the faculty's expertise on SSTR and IW extends to
our War Gaming Department, which executed a number of other SSTR and IW
wargames over the past year involving faculty throughout the College.
These include:
1. NAVCENT BILAT Game Series. Classified, scenario-based war game
explored the irregular warfare threat to maritime infrastructure in the
NAVCENT AOR. This war game served as a theater security cooperation
instrument for NAVCENT to build partnership capacity among oil-
producing coalition partners.
2. Navy-Marine Corps Command Relationship Game. Scenario-based
war game explored the issues and problems associated with various
command relationship constructs for employing embarked Marine Forces. A
range of scenarios from low-intensity conflict to MCO were analyzed.
3. Global 08. Four different alternative future scenarios used:
``Made in East Asia,'' ``Global Chaos,'' ``United We Stand,'' and
``Tri-Polar''.
4. Global 09. Classified scenario addressing Sea Control in an
anti-access environment against a capable adversary.
5. Force Design Workshop. Scenario focused on high-end anti-
access and irregular maritime warfare across the most stressing Defense
Planning Scenarios.
6. Final Destination 2 Game. SECRET-NOFORN level, included
multiple, asymmetric attacks on the U.S. homeland and U.S. forces
abroad.
7. U.S.-Australia Electronic Warfare Interoperability Game.
Designed to identify gaps, deficiencies, and issues with respect to
U.S. and Australian Electronic Warfare actions in combat conditions.
Two scenarios were presented, the first of which focused on Major
Combat Operations against a near-peer competitor. The second scenario
explored the challenges of conducting EW operations in later-phasing
(e.g., post-major combat, stability and rebuilding operations) in a
Counter-Insurgency (COIN) environment.
8. Maritime Infrastructure Protection Symposium Scenario-Based
Planning Activity. The scenario presented simulated attacks on a
variety of physical infrastructure assets (i.e., oil platforms,
agricultural experiment station, LNG holding facilities, and commercial
assets). participants were divided into four multi-national groups, and
explored the events from the specific lenses of indications and
warnings, analysis and assessment, mitigation, and incident response.
9. Maritime Homeland Security/Homeland Defense War Game Series.
Focus of all scenarios is on asymmetrical threats coming from the
maritime environment (VOI, COI, POI threats). The series incorporates
robust play from U.S. maritime forces as well as both the Canadian
military and civilian senior leadership and an advancing Mexican
involvement. Scenarios included: maritime assault teams inbound to
Vancouver Olympics, small boat threat to oil platforms in GOMEX, VBIED
inbound to Hampton Roads, and transiting vessel exhibiting personnel
with radiation poisoning declaring force majeure for a U.S. Port.
10. Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) War Game Series.
The game includes significant U.S. interagency participation with the
overarching goal of creating and implementing a single, unified U.S.
government approach to an emerging irregular warfare threat. Scenarios
included: suspected WMD being shipped to U.S. waters, chemical weapons
shipments inbound through St Lawrence Seaway, and POI onboard vessels
transiting through U.S. waters.
11. Office of Defense Cooperation/EUCOM Theater Engagement. The
scenario based war game reinforced the concepts of joint operational
planning. All scenarios focused on IW threats to critical energy
infrastructure and WMD in a joint maritime environment.
12. Deterrence and Escalation Game and Review 09. The objectives
for this game were to explore escalation dynamics after an adversary's
first use of WMD. The game was conducted primarily at the operational
and strategic levels of war.
Dr. Snyder. Please provide the most recent survey results from your
graduates and their supervisors.
Admiral Wisecup. The U.S. Naval War College routinely surveys
graduating students, alumni, and naval and joint leaders. With the
significant change of intended educational outcomes and the
corresponding curriculum revision implemented in academic year 2006-
2007, surveys to our alumni and senior leaders regarding the outdated
intermediate-level course would have served no useful purpose. We have
begun to solicit feedback on the revised course, but have not yet
collected all of the data. Likewise, the College has not yet analyzed
the data from our graduating students for the last academic year.
However, the analysis from Academic Year 2007-08 follows.
[The information referred to is retained in the committee files and
can be viewed upon request.]
Dr. Snyder. The intermediate level schools lost Joint Duty credit
for their non-host service military faculty in the 2007 National
Defense Authorization Act. We know that the tours of those who were
grandfathered are ending. What will the effect of this be? How will it
affect the quality of your faculty? How important is it that these JDAL
positions be restored? Do the instructors truly get a joint experience?
Admiral Wisecup. Billets at the U.S. Naval War College remained on
the JDAL because our military faculty members teach both intermediate
level PME with JPME I and Senior level PME with JPME II. To date,
officers in these billets have received joint credit. However,
previously the Joint Staff queried whether our faculty should receive
full joint credit since they also teach the intermediate level JPME
course.
The long-term concern is that a bureaucratic decision may affect
our teaching billets. Therefore we fully support returning these
billets to the JDAL.
Discussions with the Bureau of Naval Personnel indicates that a
lack of joint credit makes it more difficult to assign commanders still
competitive for promotion and recently promoted captains to faculty
positions at the other intermediate level colleges. However, these
billets are filled by more experienced officers, who do not absolutely
require joint duty credit. Returning those faculty billets to the JDAL
would be most beneficial.
Dr. Snyder. Describe your school's use of historical case studies
to teach strategy.
Admiral Wisecup. The study of history has formed a part of the
curriculum since the founding of the Naval War College. The College's
first President, Stephen B. Luce, argued: ``Naval history abounds in
materials whereon to erect a science, and it is our purpose to build up
with these a science of naval warfare.'' (Stephen B. Luce, ``On the
Study of Naval Warfare as a Science'' Proceedings, 1886) Historical
case studies provided the foundation for frameworks of strategic
thought that could guide the making of strategy and operations. Alfred
Thayer Mahan used historical case studies to develop his concepts of
sea power and grand strategy in the lectures delivered to students
attending the College. These lectures, transformed into his famous book
The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, Mahan stated: ``It is . . .
particularly in the field of naval strategy that the teachings of the
past have a value.'' (p. 9) Mahan's famous history remains a part of
the College's courses on strategy. Historical case studies, then, have
long formed a vital part of the curriculum on strategy at the Naval War
College.
Mahan's works on naval history, and those of his near contemporary
Sir Julian Corbett, have lost none of their power for spurring critical
thought on strategy. The noted policy commentator Robert Kaplan
believes that an understanding of the current-day and future strategic
environment ``requires an acquaintance with two books published a
century ago: Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783
. . . and Julian S. Corbett's Some Principles of Maritime Strategy.''
(Robert D. Kaplan, ``America's Elegant Decline,'' Atlantic Monthly,
November 2007) The historical case studies drawn upon by Mahan and
Corbett, as well as their acute strategic analyses, remain an integral
part of the education on strategy provided by the Naval War College.
The study of strategy is an integral element of the Naval War
College's intermediate-level education programs, resident and non-
resident. Through the core curriculum, students examine the formulation
and implementation of strategy, assess its execution and effectiveness,
and evaluate the subsequent adaptation and revision of strategy. For
intermediate-level students, our focus remains at the operational level
emphasizing the application of operational art and operational level
leadership. The nexus of strategy and operations is then a major
emphasis of the core curriculum. While our students analyze the
national level strategies, their studies require them to synthesize and
evaluate theater strategies and the corresponding campaigns,
operations, and activities.
Historical case studies are a significant element of the College's
educational methodology, especially so in our study of strategy covered
mostly by the National Security Decision Making (NSDM) and the Strategy
and Warfare (S&W) courses. NSDM uses historical case studies
extensively to teach both the development and implementation of
strategy and policy, though the faculty has found case studies to be
more effective in examining how strategy was implemented than in how it
was developed. NSDM also uses historical case studies extensively to
teach leadership.
Most of the historical case studies used were developed by NSDM
faculty members to illustrate various course concepts. Historical case
studies related to strategy and policy development and implementation
that have recently been used include:
Use of Marines in Lebanon between 1982 and 1984
The United States and Russia--Rekindling the Cold War
The Cuban Missile Crisis
North Korea
A Time of Our Choosing: Confronting Saddam
Darfur
The 1973 Arab-Israeli War
All midterm and final exams involve student analysis of
case studies.
These cases are used in conjunction with other required readings as
necessary preparation for graduate-level seminar discussions. Those
discussions are important to developing course concepts and applying
the three general analytical frameworks offered by the NSDM course. The
first conceptual framework considers how national interests, national
strategies, and the security environment affect the ways and means
combatant commanders develop and execute theater strategy cooperation
activities. The second conceptual framework is designed to prepare
students to lead and effectively participate in a dynamic staff
environment, applying management and leadership skills to
organizational assessment, strategy formulation, strategy
implementation, and measurements. The third conceptual framework
describes the environment with and external to the staff ensuring
leadership styles, staff structure, organizational behavior and culture
as well as the influence on the staff of U.S. government higher
authority, and elements of the international community are considered
during the strategic process. Through seminar discussions, a 14-17 page
analytical essay exploring an existing strategy, a military strategic
concept, or an emerging security challenge, and examinations involving
student analysis of case studies, the NSDM course teaches strategy.
The Strategy and Warfare course examines the complete strategic
process through the use of historic case studies. This course uses
required historic readings and faculty lectures to provide the baseline
for exploration through seminar discussions and two analytical essays
of 8-10 pages each. Students are provided nine interrelated course
themes as a starting point for undertaking critical strategic thinking.
Those themes are applied repeatedly via the historic case studies, the
essay papers, and often the course's written final examination.
A hallmark of the courses developed by the Strategy and Policy
Department, including Strategy and Warfare, is the many different types
of wars and the wide range of operations covered in historical case
studies. By using historical case studies, the students have an
opportunity to evaluate and discuss the ways in which political
leaders, military and interagency planners in the real world have
successfully (or unsuccessfully) grappled with the strategic challenges
associated with the use of force to attain national objectives. The
historical case studies in strategy examine diverse types of wars,
featuring a variety of operations and different keys to success. The
strategy courses show how success in one type of war may be followed by
failure in another. An important aspect of strategic leadership is the
ability to adapt to different types of wars. The curriculum analyzes
the strategic success and failure of leading great powers and non-state
actors over long periods of time. The goal in using historical case
study is to expand the horizons of the officers studying at the
College. Admiral Stansfield Turner argued for the value of this method
for the study of strategy: ``Studying historical examples should enable
us to view current issues and trends through a broader perspective of
the basic elements of strategy. Approaching today's problems through a
study of the past is one way to ensure that we do not become trapped
within the limits of our own experience.''
These historical cases lead up to the strategic problems
confronting today's decision makers and emerging security challenges.
In each case study, the students can study the actions of famous
strategic leaders--such as, Washington, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin,
Marshall, Eisenhower, Mao, and others. The case studies on strategy,
then, are concerned with strategic leadership that can effectively deal
not only with current problems in policy and strategy but also those
that might emerge in the future.
The study of history is also essential so that our students know
about the books influencing the Nation's top decision makers. A recent
example is provided by former President George Bush, who studied the
historical case study of the Algerian war for independence against
France. Henry Kissinger recommended that President Bush read Alistair
Horne's book Savage War of Peace. This book shaped President Bush's
views about the problems facing outside great powers fighting in the
Middle East. This book, too, is part of the core curriculum on strategy
at the College. In the courses offered by the Strategy and Policy
Department, historical case studies give students an awareness of what
is read by the country's leadership. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
highlighted in the journal the importance of Robert Komer's book
Bureaucracy Does Its Thing for grasping the institutional impediments
standing in the way of strategic effectiveness in fighting an
insurgency. (Foreign Affairs, January-February 2009). The historical
case study in the strategies of the Vietnam War employs this book with
great effect. Many students returning from service in Afghanistan and
Iraq have commented on the value of reading this book that captured
some of the salient lessons of the hard-won experience of the long war
in Vietnam.
Our adversaries, of course, also turn to the past to make strategic
sense current-day conflicts. We at the Naval War College must equip our
students with an understanding of our enemies' construction of the
past. For example, Osama bin Laden, in a famous speech delivered in
2004, drew upon the experience of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan to
explain why he remained confident of ultimate victory over the United
States in the terror war. ``[We have] experience in using guerrilla
warfare and the war of attrition to fight tyrannical superpowers, as
we, alongside the mujahidin, bled Russia for 10 years, until it went
bankrupt and was forced to withdraw in defeat. . . . So we are
continuing this policy in bleeding America to the point of
bankruptcy.'' (October 29, 2004) Understanding the strategy of our
Nation's enemies requires an examination of history and the enemy's
interpretation of it. The Naval War College's curriculum thus uses
historical case studies to understand the ends, ways, and means
employed by adversaries, as well as the role of cultural and religious
considerations in the making of strategy.
The strategy courses also examine the part culture played in the
major conflicts fought in East Asia in the twentieth century. The study
of these wars shows the violent interaction between the peoples within
the region and with outside powers. In particular, students examine the
Pacific theater in World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War.
In the strategy courses, students examine the rise of Japan as a major
power, the growth of Japanese nationalism during the first half of the
twentieth century, and Japan's collision with China, Russia, and the
United States. The students also examine the rise of China. In recent
years, the strategy courses have sought to give more prominence to the
history of conflicts in South Asia. This historical background is an
essential element of cultural literacy and for understanding today's
dangerous flashpoints in Asia.
An education in strategy entails an understanding of our own
Nation's past. Cultural studies must begin with knowing about one's own
history. The Strategy and Policy Department's courses provide an in-
depth examination of the evolution of the American way of war and
strategic thought. The late Russell Weigley's landmark study The
American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and
Policy provides essential background on how the United States has waged
war. The history of the United States' interaction with the world and
its wars offers invaluable background on the evolution of the
international strategic environment as well as our own country's
history. The Strategy and War Course examines the founding of the
Republic in the midst of a highly competitive international environment
and great-power wars. The victory at Yorktown is examined as a case
study in successful joint and combined operations. The Strategy and War
Course also follows the rise of the United States as a world power. The
strategy courses examine as well the strategic challenges that have
confronted the United States and the way our country's institutions
have changed and adapted over time to provide for the Nation's
security. Historical case studies provide the opportunity to delve into
the topic of service cultures and civil-military relations. History,
then, provides a rich vein of experience to understand the making of
strategy in a joint and interagency environment and the barriers that
can thwart strategic effectiveness.
The courses on strategy offered by the Strategy and Policy
Department thus employ in-depth examination of historical case studies.
Strategic theory is put to the test offered by the hard reality of
history. The study of history can hone the skills of critical analysis
that are essential for understanding principles of war, the
interrelationship of ends, ways, and means, and the dynamics of
strategic interaction.
Dr. Snyder. What is the process for renewal and non-renewal of the
faculty? How transparent is the system? In a tenure system people think
the faculty members have all the power, in a non-tenure system it
appears that the school has unlimited power. How do you avoid these
extremes?
Admiral Wisecup. The process of retaining faculty at the U.S. Naval
War College is an open, orderly and fair one. Though the College does
not employ a system of tenure and has no intention of doing so, it
accords its faculty reasonable contractual security consistent with the
College's mission and its quality standard for faculty. As a practice,
the College renews contracts as early as 364 days in advance prior to
their expiration. All faculty members are notified at least six months
prior to the expiration of their contract. As highlighted in the
Faculty Handbook, in all but extraordinary circumstances, notification
of non-reappointment will be given by 1 December prior to the
expiration of the contractual term.
Faculty members with more than six years of continuous employment
at the Naval War College have the right to request a peer review of
their non-reappointment. (Six years is the typical length of time it
takes to make tenure at a civilian university.) A Non-Reappointment
Review Committee will be appointed to consider their appeal. This
process is delineated in the Faculty Handbook. There has only been one
request for peer review of a non-reappointment since the original
Skelton Report was published in 1989. Non-reappointment of faculty
members who have served more than six years is rare.
The College is well aware of the unique governance system under
which it operates. The Chief of Naval Operations essentially serves as
the governance board for the College. Faculty members have neither
tenure system nor a faculty senate. The formal voice of the faculty is
represented by the departmental chairs who are members of the Academic
Policy Council, the President's advisory body on academic policy,
practices, procedures, and resources. While there are a number of
institutional practices and procedures to provide the faculty's voice
formally and informally, they are simply not the same as their
counterparts at civilian universities and colleges. But neither is our
multi-disciplinary approach to education, our faculty-built and taught
single curriculum, or our bias toward faculty teaching teams. Faculty
members must work together much more closely at NWC to accomplish
departmental curriculum development. Faculty members must become
collegial, team players to a much greater extent than their colleagues
at civilian educational institutions. Individual faculty members who
have difficulty adjusting to our unique approach to curriculum
development and teaching a shared curriculum or simply chose not to
adjust are generally identified in their first contractual term, well
before they would normally qualify for tenure at a civilian college or
university, and depart on their own terms.
Our current educational paradigm dates from 1972, when Admiral
Stansfield Turner instituted the graduate-level case-study based,
seminar model and expanded considerably the number of civilian scholars
on the NWC faculty. Admiral Turner believed the faculty was the
critical cog in a quality educational experience. To this day, we still
contend our faculty is our center of gravity. As the College's
``Guiding Principles'' from our Strategic Plan 2008-12 state ``The
Naval War College's true strength lies in the creativity, energy, and
intellectual capital of our people.'' And our values in that same plan
include ``Academic Responsibility'' which ``means that one of our key
duties as an academic institution is to `seek and state truth without
bias.' Our faculty enjoys full freedom of dispassionate inquiry with no
limitations other than adherence to security classification. Within
this context, faculty members are expected to extend and transmit
knowledge to their respective fields of expertise.'' In the ensuing
thirty-seven years since Admiral Turner transformed NWC, this critical
value of the faculty is ingrained in the culture of the College.
This value placed on the faculty also imparts great responsibility
to them. They take pride in their ownership of the curricula and the
academic programs. They drive themselves relentlessly to ensure what we
teach remains challenging, current, and relevant. Our culture of self-
assessment begins with the faculty and permeates the institution.
Continual improvement is the unspoken motto. First and foremost, we
continue to thrive because the faculty knows the trust and confidence
placed in them by the College's leadership. They accept fully the
responsibility and are self-driven to excel. Continued mission success,
not tenure, provides them job satisfaction and security. They, in turn,
place their confidence and trust in the College's leadership to be fair
and judicious in its actions toward them and the College's mission.
Dr. Snyder. What is your school's role in identifying promising
officers with the potential for high-level strategic thinking at the
appropriate point in their careers?
Admiral Wisecup. Students in the College of Naval Command and Staff
take the Strategy and War course, which comprises 28% of the core
academic curriculum. This course is designed to teach students to think
strategically. Aside from building a baseline for growth in strategic
analysis and thought in every student, this also serves as an
opportunity for the faculty to discern truly exceptional students with
potential in this area. Faculty members often use their informal
networks to identify and introduce these talented leaders. On the rare
occasion where a student is truly exceptional, he or she is formally
identified with remarks on their fitness reports upon graduation. In
many cases, faculty members identify superb students and request that
they consider a tour of duty at the College in the following years.
Departments communicate and track these students for potential
assignments at the College.
The U.S. Naval War College also has a number of selective programs
to enable students and faculty to work closely on strategic issues.
These include the Advanced Research Program, Mahan and Halsey Scholars.
The Advanced Research Program offers highly qualified students the
opportunity to participate in one of several collaborative research
groups as well as substitute an in-depth research project for some
other segment of the academic program. Selected students may join an
already established research group and at the direction of the group's
faculty mentors, participate in the development research and analysis
products of that group. Alternatively, select students can either
develop a topic or chose from a list of pre-approved topics from which
a major research paper is completed in place of one of two core
courses.
The Warfare Analysis and Research (WAR) Department conducts
relevant research into current and future war fighting issues using
select Naval War College students working under the mentorship of
experienced research professionals. Collaborative research efforts are
coordinated through student participation in one of the Halsey or the
Mahan Scholars research groups while individual research work is guided
by faculty from not only within the WAR department but also by faculty
throughout the college as appropriate. This analysis is used to inform
key policymakers, commanders and other defense and security
professionals.
Students in these programs work closely with faculty members for
the duration of their year at the College. As a result, they receive
higher contact time and significantly more mentorship than normal
studying a variety of issues with strategic implications. The two major
benefits of these programs are:
1. They yield an Additional Qualification Designator (AQD) for
Navy students which identify them for their expertise. The AQD is a
personnel code which identifies a skill set that can be matched to
billet requirements throughout the Navy and Joint force.
2. These professors each have continuity with these research
topics and have developed a network within the Navy and the Department
of Defense that enables them to identify outstanding students to other
subject matter experts.
Dr. Snyder. How do you specifically measure the quality of the
faculty and staff in the PME environment?
Admiral Wisecup. CJCS PME standards for faculty members establish
certain qualifications. The Naval War College aims for incoming faculty
members to meet or exceed those qualifications. We then have high
expectations for our qualified faculty members to continue to learn and
grow as an integral element of their professional development.
Regarding qualifications we expect our uniformed faculty to have
expertise in their area of specialty (i.e., submarines, infantry,
surface ships, aviation, logistics, etc.). We seek officers who have
commanded as commanders or lieutenant colonels or held equivalent
positions in the restricted line or staff communities and prefer
officers who have also commanded as a captain or a colonel. We seek
combat experience or operational experience in the recent conflicts in
Iraq and Afghanistan. We seek experience at the strategic or
operational levels. We expect them to be intermediate-level school
graduates with JPME Phase I and expect most of them to also be senior-
level graduates. We seek officers with joint experience, preferably
Joint Qualified Officers. For civilian education, we expect them to
possess a master's degree at a minimum. Although a majority of our
faculty have advanced degrees in international relations, history,
political science, or military or political history, the discipline is
not as important as their teaching ability. Our faculty has advanced
degrees in a variety of disciplines and this diversity adds to the
richness of our education.
As stated in our Faculty Handbook, ``The Naval War College expects
all civilian faculty members whose primary duties are not primarily
administrative to engage in professional research and exhibit a
sustained commitment to scholarship. It expects most of them to publish
at least some of the results of their research. Military members are
not expected to publish, but are encouraged to do so in their areas of
expertise.'' For civilian professors teaching in the three core
academic departments, there are common elements in every faculty
member's performance appraisal; teaching performance, curriculum
development, research and publication, and service to the College's
larger mission. Individual faculty members meet with their departmental
Chairs and establish personal plans annually to develop more specific
criteria for those common areas and any distinct areas relevant to the
professor's performance. Additionally, the Faculty Handbook established
criteria for consideration for promotion to the ranks of Associate
Professor and Professor which includes research and publication
expectations. Thus, their annual appraisals, their potential for
promotion, and ultimately their reappointment rest, in part on their
productive scholarship. Military faculty members are expected to
research and contribute to curricula development and are judged in
their appraisals accordingly.
For PME faculty members, teaching and curriculum development are
the priorities. During their first year, the primary focus is on
teaching responsibilities within the core curriculum. Once their
teaching is mastered, they expand into other areas. Perhaps the best
published indication of our expectations for faculty quality is
expressed in our Faculty Handbook's section on qualifications for
promotion, which are cited below:
(a) From Instructor to Assistant Professor. The most basic
criterion for promotion from Instructor to Assistant Professor is
completion of the terminal degree when required or the attainment of
sufficient professional expertise to warrant the higher rank. Those
eligible for this promotion will also be evaluated on the basis of
teaching and service done while an Instructor and promise shown of the
ability to be a productive contributor to the work of his or her
Department and the mission of the Naval War College.
(b) From Assistant Professor/Assistant Research Professor to
Associate Professor/Associate Research Professor. The key criteria for
promotion to Associate Professor/Associate Research Professor are
continued improvement and maturation in the faculty member's
performance of his or her duties; initial evidence of professional
productivity, including first curricular products, research,
publications, or other outputs relevant to the faculty member's duties
and area of expertise; clear evidence of further promise of scholarly
or professional achievement, as defined by the leadership of the
relevant department or unit of the College; and a demonstrated
commitment to understanding and considering issues of jointness (to
include interagency and multinational as well as interservice
collaboration) in the faculty member's teaching and/or research,
analysis and gaming activities at the College.
(c) From Associate Professor/Associate Research Professor to
Professor/Research Professor. This is an especially significant step
for both the faculty member and the College. The criteria here include
excellence in teaching or research, not simply a satisfactory level of
performance; significant contributions to either the NWC's educational
mission or the NWC's research, analysis, and gaming function; active
engagement and visibility in the faculty member's academic or
professional community; significant productivity in scholarly
publication or professional research; a consistent commitment in the
faculty member's teaching and/or research, analysis, and gaming to
fostering critical thinking from a joint perspective and cultivating
the ability of students/officers to function effectively in a joint,
interagency, and multinational environment; a demonstrated commitment
to teamwork with other faculty members across the departments and codes
of the Naval War College; and the ability to develop or advance new
ideas that enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of both the faculty
member's department and the College as a whole.
Faculty members undergo two regular types of evaluation in the
course of an academic year at the Naval War College. After each term of
instruction, the teaching performance of faculty members who have
taught in a core course and/or an elective will be evaluated by their
students. At the end of each year of instruction, the overall
performance of faculty members will be evaluated by their Department
Chairs or program directors. In addition, on occasion, and as
coordinated between the faculty member to be evaluated and his/her
Chair or Director, the teaching of a faculty member will receive a
formal or informal evaluation by another faculty member after
observation of classroom performance.
(1) Civilian Faculty Members
(a) Teaching Evaluations. The Academic Departments, the Electives
Program, the Naval Staff College, and the College of Distance Education
each use somewhat different mixes of methods for evaluating teaching
proficiency. All make use of questionnaires, critiques, or surveys
filled out by students, but the items included and questions asked may
vary from course to course. In addition to written forms of evaluation,
direct observation of teaching performance takes place as well. The
College of Distance Education, with its extensive program of periodic
Site Visits to Fleet Seminars, makes the most formal use of direct
observation of one faculty member's teaching proficiency by another
faculty member, although in residential departments that use a team-
teaching approach there is much informal observation by faculty
colleagues. On occasion, a lecture or a seminar may be visited by
Department Chairs or Executive Assistants, Division or Deputy Division
Heads, directors of programs, other senior administrators or the
President. Such monitoring is not meant to encroach upon academic
freedom and is not used simply for purposes of evaluation; it serves to
aid curriculum development, enhance pedagogical skills, and otherwise
help maintain the high quality of the instructional environment at the
Naval War College. Department Chairs and the Director, CDE, may elect
to incorporate the results of teaching evaluations into the annual
overall appraisal of a faculty member's performance.
(b) Performance Appraisal and Review System. Civilian faculty
members are evaluated annually in accordance with standard procedures
established in the Performance Appraisal and Review System (PARS). The
PARS annual appraisal period is 1 July to 30 June or, in the case of
initial appointments, from the beginning date of appointment until 30
June. At the beginning of the appraisal period, faculty members are
apprised of the ``job elements'' and ``performance standards'' by which
they will be assessed--for example, curriculum development, research
and publication, teaching performance, and extra-departmental service
to the Naval War College. Toward the middle of the year there is a
``progress review.'' At the end of the year, Department Chairs,
Directors, or other supervisors make full written assessments of the
performance of each of their faculty members. Faculty members have the
right to grieve performance appraisals and other matters relating to
the appraisal program in accordance with NWCINST 12430.1 (series).
(2) Military
(a) Teaching Evaluations. All military officers on the teaching
faculty participate in the same teaching evaluation process that
civilian faculty members do.
(b) Fitness Reports. Fitness Reports on military faculty members
are submitted periodically and upon detachment of officers or reporting
senior. Normal due dates are specified by individual Service
directives. The appropriate Dean is responsible for coordinating and
processing Navy reports. The Service Advisors coordinate preparation of
faculty and staff evaluations for the members of their respective
services, in conjunction with the Department Chair.
The College collects data on faculty performance from graduate and
alumni surveys. The feedback continues to be very positive about the
quality of the education, the performance of the faculty, and the
relevance and currency of the curriculum.
Dr. Snyder. How were you chosen to be school's commandant? How was
your dean chosen? Will you be retiring from this job? What background
should the Chief of Naval Operations be looking for in selecting
individuals for these positions? Should the focus be on operational
leadership skills or academic and teaching experience (not instructing
in a training institution) background or both?
Admiral Wisecup. Selection of the President of the NWC is
accomplished through a highly competitive administrative slating and
nominative process, and ultimate appointment by the Secretary of the
Navy.
There are four parts to the institution's mission:
(1) Develop strategic and operational leaders.
(2) Help CNO define the future Navy and its roles and missions.
(3) Support combat readiness.
(4) Strengthen maritime security cooperation.
If Rear Admiral Wisecup were selecting the College's President, he
would select based upon an assessment of the Navy's flag officers who
could fulfill all four parts of this mission statement. Rear Admiral
Wisecup believes in addition to strong leadership the President needs
expertise at the operational level of war, a comprehensive
understanding naval and joint warfighting, strategic level experience,
experience in the international area, and credibility with the Navy's
senior leadership,
Rear Admiral Wisecup does not plan to retire at the completion of
this tour although he serves at the pleasure of the CNO and the
Secretary of the Navy. In fact two of the last three Presidents have
not retired from this job.
The Naval War College employs both a Provost, who is the chief
operating officer and dean of faculty, and a Dean of Academics. Those
positions provide the necessary educational and teaching expertise for
the College's successful mission accomplishment. Thus, it is not
essential that the president have academic or teaching experience.
We recently conducted a selection process to select both the
Provost and the Dean of Academics. Both executive positions were
advertised in a number of scholarly journals including The Chronicle of
Higher Education. Well qualified candidates were invited to undergo the
interview process here at the College. The selection boards included
retired senior flag and general officers, faculty members, and
distinguished scholars from local colleges and universities.
Dr. Snyder. How should intermediate schools attract top-tier
civilian faculty? How do you specifically define top-tier? What are the
elements that would attract the highest quality of faculty--tenure,
copyright, resources, pay, ability to keep their government
retirements, research and administrative assistance, etc.?
Admiral Wisecup. Since the U.S. Naval War College PME faculty teach
both the intermediate and senior courses, it is very difficult to
answer this in simply an intermediate-level context. We believe we
possess a top-tier civilian faculty consisting of a balance of academic
scholars and retired professionals with superb experience supported by
solid academic credentials. We believe both are necessary, especially
at the intermediate-level, to perform the educational focus especially
that required by USC Title X and CJCS Officer PME Policy.
Many of our faculty's stalwarts today have invested most of their
professional life in this College and its mission. We hired most of
them as younger scholars of great promise, retained them, and nurtured
them wherever possible. They grew into seasoned, top tier faculty
members. What attracted most of them was the opportunity to intermix
with a faculty replete with esteemed scholars and the concentrated
expertise of their colleagues. We believe the lure of teaching
graduate-level courses to unique professional students (rather than
introductory courses to college students) was a major consideration for
faculty interested in job satisfaction. Our competitive pay and
generous benefits certainly contributed to their hiring. Accreditation
also proved significant because it meant their professional time at NWC
generally met established academic standards, offering opportunity to
retain their professional path of development as a professor. Our
emphasis on teaching and curricula development as our principal mission
vice publishing is a bit of an impediment, but for younger scholars
there is clear evidence that publishing while at NWC is not only
possible but encouraged. In order to continue to attract and retain
top-notch scholars, it is vital that we continue to allow faculty to
copyright their work under the conditions that currently prevail at NWC
and other top PME institutions.
Attracting top tier, full professor faculty members from other
civilian institutions has it challenges. Pay can be an issue. Likewise,
the teaching and curriculum development responsibility can be an issue
as it may compete with time for writing and research. For top tier
civilian faculty members who have been practitioners, like retired
State Department personnel, they must forfeit their annuity to join our
faculty. Rectifying that would be most helpful in our continued search
for such talent.
Our current educational paradigm dates from 1972, when Admiral
Stansfield Turner instituted the graduate-level case-study based,
seminar model and expanded considerably the number of civilian scholars
on the NWC faculty. Admiral Turner believed the faculty was the
critical cog in a quality educational experience. To this day, we still
contend our faculty is our center of gravity. As the College's
``Guiding Principles'' from our Strategic Plan 2008-12 state ``The
Naval War College's true strength lies in the creativity, energy, and
intellectual capital of our people.'' And our values in that same plan
include ``Academic Responsibility'' which ``means that one of our key
duties as an academic institution is to `seek and state truth without
bias.' Our faculty enjoys full freedom of dispassionate inquiry with no
limitations other than adherence to security classification. Within
this context, faculty members are expected to extend and transmit
knowledge to their respective fields of expertise.'' In the ensuing
thirty seven years since Admiral Turner transformed NWC, this critical
value of the faculty is ingrained in the culture of the College.
This value placed on the faculty also imparts great responsibility
to them. They take pride in their ownership of the curricula and the
academic programs. They drive themselves relentlessly to ensure what we
teach remains challenging, current, and relevant. Our culture of self-
assessment begins with the faculty and permeates the institution.
Continual improvement is the unspoken motto. First and foremost, we
continue to thrive because the faculty knows the trust and confidence
placed in them by the College's leadership. They accept fully the
responsibility and are self-driven to excel. Continued mission success,
not tenure, provides them job satisfaction and security. They, in turn,
place their confidence and trust in the College's leadership to be fair
and judicious in its actions toward them and the College's mission. As
stated in our Faculty Handbook, ``The Naval War College expects all
civilian faculty members whose primary duties are not primarily
administrative to engage in professional research and exhibit a
sustained commitment to scholarship. It expects most of them to publish
at least some of the results of their research. Military members are
not expected to publish, but are encouraged to do so in their areas of
expertise.'' For civilian professors teaching in the three core
academic departments, there are common elements in every faculty
members' performance appraisal; teaching performance, curriculum
development, research and publication, and service to the College's
larger mission. Individual faculty members meet with their departmental
Chairs and establish personal plans annually to develop more specific
criteria for those common areas and any distinct areas relevant to the
professor's performance. Additionally, the Faculty Handbook established
criteria for consideration for promotion to the ranks of Associate
Professor and Professor which includes research and publication
expectations. Thus, their annual appraisals, their potential for
promotion, and ultimately their reappointment rest, in part on their
productive scholarship. Military faculty members are expected to
research and contribute to curricula development and are judged in
their appraisals accordingly.
When the College revised its criteria for assignment of civilian
professorial ranks and the criteria for promotion and published it in
the Faculty Handbook, we publicly identified our key indicators of
quality at each professorial rank. The specific criteria for promotion
to the rank of professor best describe our standard for top-tier
faculty. The criteria are ``excellence in teaching or research, not
simply a satisfactory level of performance; significant contributions
to either the NWC's educational mission or NWC's research, analysis,
and gaming function; active engagement and visibility in the faculty
members academic or professional community; significant productivity in
scholarly publication or professional research; a consistent commitment
in the faculty member's teaching and/or research, analysis, and gaming
to fostering critical thinking from a joint perspective and cultivating
the ability of students/officers to function effectively in a joint,
interagency, and multinational environment; a demonstrated commitment
to teamwork with other faculty members across the departments and codes
of the Naval War College, and the ability to develop or advance new
ideas that enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of both the faculty
members department and the college as a whole.''
Dr. Snyder. What are the policies at your school regarding academic
freedom? What is its proper role in a PME setting without tenure?
Describe how your faculty may be called upon to respond to press
inquiries in the field of expertise and whether and how they are
allowed to respond in a timely manner.
Admiral Wisecup. The practice of academic freedom by faculty
members at the U.S. Naval War College is robust. While the Congress,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, and
CNO are rightfully involved in professional military education policy
and engaged in determining professional educational standards, the
College's executive leadership has been successful in preserving the
autonomy of the College and its faculty in deciding what to teach and
how to teach it. Faculty members are allowed great scope for
experimenting with different teaching methods and for expressing
different points of view in the classroom. Aside from projects assigned
to researchers in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, faculty members
have been free to choose the subjects of their research and writing.
The Naval War College endorses the key elements of the 1940
statement of principles on academic freedom issued by the American
Association of University Professors, as quoted in the following three
items:
``(a) Teachers are entitled to full freedom in research and in the
publication of results, subject to the adequate performance of their
other academic duties. . . .
(b) Teachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing
their subject, but they should be careful not to introduce into their
teaching controversial matter which has no relation to their subject. .
. .
(c) College and university teachers are citizens, members of a
learned profession, and officers of an educational institution. When
they speak or write as citizens, they should be free from institutional
censorship or discipline, but their special position in the community
imposes special obligations. As scholars and educational officers, they
should remember that the public may judge their profession and their
institution by their utterances. Hence they should at all times be
accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect
for the opinions of others, and should make every effort to indicate
that they are not speaking for the institution.''
(d) As employees of an educational institution in DoD, faculty
members have obligations that go beyond those incumbent upon professors
in civilian educational institutions. While the leadership of the Naval
War College encourages faculty members to write, make speeches, and
give interviews in any forum, they shall not reveal classified
information. In expressing opinions they must issue explicit
disclaimers that they do not speak for the U.S. Government, the
Department of Defense, the Department of the Navy, or the Naval War
College. Faculty members who are active-duty military officers are
subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and must refrain from
speech that is disparaging or contemptuous of public officials,
insulting toward superior officers, harmful to good order and
discipline in the military, or harmful to the interests of the United
States.
Hardly a week passes without Naval War College professors publicly
expressing opinions and offering expertise on current political and
military issues in a wide variety of mass media--television, radio,
newspapers, magazines, and journalistic websites. Individual faculty
members ensure this material contains a disclaimer identifying it as
the opinion of the author and not the College. The College prides
itself on respect for academic freedom; at the same time, the idea that
the exercise of academic freedom should be informed in practice by a
sense of responsibility is widely accepted among faculty members
dealing with issues of great national and international importance.
There have never been any allegations that a faculty member's contract
was not renewed because of his views or opinions.
Faculty members inform their departments when they have provided or
are about to respond to press inquiries, interviews or expert advice.
Individual faculty members know they can respond timely, but must, as
with their written work, provide a verbal disclaimer to the interviewer
that the opinions and positions represent the individual and not the
College, the Navy or DoD. Previously, faculty members had to travel to
Providence to appear on local or national television stations for
interviews. Within the last few years, the College built a television
studio on campus in which we now facilitate such interviews. The
College has recently funded the appropriate equipment to send high-
quality broadcast audio from campus to support faculty radio interviews
with the likes of National Public Radio or BBC.
Dr. Snyder. Acquisition reforms all call for more of the general
purpose forces to be educated and trained in understanding contracting
and contractors. Civilians, contracting, and contractors on the
battlefield--how much do officers, outside the acquisition workforce,
need to know?
Admiral Wisecup. Civilians, contracting, and contractors on the
battlefield are an important part of the curricula at the U.S. Naval
War College. Operational Contract Support was recently approved as one
of the 2009 Joint Professional Military Education Special Areas of
Emphasis. For planning and conducting military operations through the
full spectrum of conflict, contractors on the battlefield are an
integral part of the planning process and are included in our
curricula. Contractors have been on battlefields during every major
conflict of our nation's history.
In the Joint Maritime Operations course, there is a specific
session on contractors, Nongovernmental and Intergovernmental
Organizations/Contractors in the Operating Environment. The focus of
the session is getting students to know that an operational commander
cannot ignore the presence of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs),
Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), and contractors in the
contemporary operating environment. Objectives for the session include
comprehending the differences in culture between military, NGO/IGO, and
contractor communities. Students analyze the impact these differences
may have on building unity of effort throughout the phases of an
operation. In seminar they explore the capabilities and requirements
for NGO/IGOs and contractors operate under in the joint environment.
This session also addresses the practical challenges and risks
associated with civilian contractors in the contemporary operating
environment. Students come to understand that contractors are employed
by most U.S. government agencies, as well as by IGOs and NGOs. NGOs may
also be contractors. All of them may also employ contracted security
providers. This is nothing new or unusual--contractors in one form or
another have almost always been present on the battlefield and at sea.
In the seminar we note there is limited service doctrine (Army
doctrine, largely addressing logistics contractors) and less joint
doctrine governing contractors (only those accompanying U.S. armed
forces). Nevertheless, no joint force commander can hope to plan and
execute operations effectively without carefully considering
contractors; especially with respect to their consequences for key
operational functions, including command and control, operational
security, force protection, and logistics. The presence of contractors
in an area of operations also raises complex and mostly not yet
resolved legal issues concerning Status of Forces Agreements, Rules of
Engagement, and the Law of Armed Conflict, not to mention problems of
fiduciary responsibility. Adding contractors to the mix makes the
problem of maintaining unity of effort with other U.S. government
agencies, NGOs, and IGOs even more challenging for the JFC. We ask
students to consider, among others, these questions:
What can a joint force commander do to mitigate the risks posed by
contractors, NGOs and IGOs?
What considerations must be made for loss of capabilities provided by
contractors?
What are the responsibilities of the joint force commander for
contractors in his area of operations (e.g., force protection)?
How do contractors affect the management of operational security?
In what ways do contractors alter the level of risk for the joint
force commander? Is the risk military, political, or both?
Dr. Snyder. Explain the Naval War College's civilian tenure
program.
Admiral Wisecup. Though the U.S. Naval College does not employ a
system of tenure and has no intention of doing so, it accords its
faculty reasonable contractual security consistent with the College's
mission. The process of retaining faculty is an open, orderly and fair
one. The College continues to sustain its quality standard for faculty.
As a practice, the College renews contracts as early as 364 days in
advance prior to their expiration. All faculty members are notified at
least six months prior to the expiration of their contract. As
highlighted in the Faculty Handbook, in all but extraordinary
circumstances, notification of non-reappointment will be given by 1
December prior to the expiration of the contractual term.
The retention rate at the College is quite high for faculty beyond
the six year mark, when many colleges and universities begin to grant
tenure. In fact, the College identified just the opposite problem, a
graying faculty, several years ago. Job satisfaction is high among our
faculty members who know they possess the significant responsibility of
curricula ownership for a Navy's profession of arms and the obligation
to prepare the future military leaders of this nation for the
challenges ahead.
Dr. Snyder. Have the Navy intermediate (College of Naval Command
and Staff) and senior (College of Naval Warfare) courses been
differentiated enough? Should they have been? They share a faculty.
What are the challenges and benefits of that? Students also start at
various times throughout the school year and are integrated with other
students who have been there longer. What are the benefits and
challenges of that?
Admiral Wisecup. Yes, the Navy intermediate (College of Naval
Command and Staff) and senior (College of Naval Warfare) at the U.S.
Naval War College have been differentiated enough. Today, the
intermediate courses taught by the Naval War College focus at the
operational level of war and operational-level leadership. Building
operational level expertise in the Navy is one of the key focuses of
Admiral Gary Roughead, the Chief of Naval Operations. The College
contributes by producing intermediate-level graduates who are planners
skilled in applying operational art through the Navy and Joint planning
processes, leaders with operational-level perspectives who have honed
their critical thinking skills through a rigorous, academic program,
and effective maritime spokespersons familiar with the range of
challenges of operating in the maritime domain and are competent in
employing naval capabilities in conjunction with other Service, other
agencies, and partner nations to achieve strategic objectives in war
and peace.
The intermediate-level course, resident and non-resident, consists
of three core academic programs: National Security Decision Making,
Strategy and Warfare, and Joint Maritime Operations. Together these
courses focus on developing the operational knowledge base,
operational-level perspective, critical thinking skills, and leadership
required to contribute on a major staff. The senior course focuses at
the strategic level examining national strategic and theater strategic
perspectives, issues, and challenges.
One of the most significant challenges with a single faculty
teaching both intermediate and senior level courses is that it takes
much more time than previously to do curriculum development because the
two courses are so different. In the past, because of their parallel
nature, there was more time available for faculty professional
development or other teaching responsibilities. Additionally, the
learning curve for new faculty members is higher since they have to
learn to teach two different courses.
The chief benefit with a single faculty is that both courses are
aligned well and changes to the curriculum can be made easily. Both the
senior and intermediate courses complement each other and there are
efficiencies created with a single faculty. It allows the faculty to
provide a progressive education experience. Our faculty must also meet
the higher CJCS and U.S.C. Title X standards required to teach the JPME
II curriculum. As a result, our service mix for military faculty is
more robust than required for schools and colleges teaching
intermediate-level PME with JPME I. Moreover, the faculty has a more
comprehensive appreciation of the joint educational requirements for
both JPME I and JPME II and how they work together.
Before September 11, 2001, it was only the Navy and Marine Corps
students who started three times per year, a schedule devised to meet
their Services routine rotational deployments. These options offered
flexibility for school assignment within tight and demanding career
paths built on a culture of command and operational expertise.
Subsequent to September 11, 2001, all Services found that their
operational tempo has driven the assignment process. Now all Services
avail themselves of the opportunity to align student academic years
with their operational tempo and start the academic year at different
times. Students rotating back from Iraq and Afghanistan are not forced
to wait until the next summer rotation to start the academic year. It
provides efficiency of personnel assignment without markedly affecting
educational effectiveness.
There are challenges with students starting at various times during
the school year. In most schools, reading and writing ability and study
skills are honed during the first 8-10 weeks of the academic year. We
do this on an ongoing basis since there are always students that have
recently started the curriculum. Additionally, there is an
administrative overhead incurred with three different starts. The Dean
of Students conducts three orientations and three graduation ceremonies
as opposed to a single orientation and graduation ceremony at most
other institutions. The departments must also distribute the students
equitably to ensure that a single seminar does not have all new
students.
In terms of curriculum, the faculty must develop stand-alone
courses for each trimester. In terms of curriculum development, faculty
must be very aware of the incoming student foundational knowledge base
and must on occasion provide succinct foundational material to
facilitate transition into the course. Faculty must guard against
redundancy especially since the curriculum is only progressive within
each finite trimester. Having worked this educational model for nearly
three decades, the faculty has most of the kinks out and the systematic
means to assess and keep the core curriculum distinct, aligned and
complementary.
There are also benefits with students starting at various times
during the school year. One of the main benefits is that students have
an opportunity to master and synthesize the curriculum reinforcing
concepts during each trimester. The exchange between students is high
as often incoming students learn from the other students in a variety
of informal venues and forums. In fact, it closely parallels the
paradigm of our civilian higher education system so students readily
adjust. Acculturation is an integral aspect on an in-resident
education. The daily interaction builds trust and confidence and
establishes career-long and life-long associations and networks. Since
our students change seminars each trimester, they closely associate
with more of their fellow students as seminar mates extending their
network of personal associates significantly more than their peers at
other institutions. This process also enables them to meet three times
as many their international and interagency classmates. Further,
student gouge on courses and faculty passes readily between classes
creating a sustained student memory not present in other PME schools
and colleges. This lingering reputation positively affects the faculty
and the staff who work hard to maintain positive reputations.
Dr. Snyder. Please provide your school's mission statement.
General Cardon. The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
(CGSC) educates and develops leaders for full-spectrum joint,
interagency, and multinational operations and advances the art and
science of the profession of arms in support of Army operational
requirements.
Dr. Snyder. How have ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
affected the quality of military faculty members? What is your average
tour length for military faculty members? Have the credentials of
military faculty in terms of graduate degrees and JQO qualifications
diminished during this period? What is the percentage of military
faculty who are fully JQO qualified?
General Cardon. Faculty either returning from combat or enroute to
combat operations are not always sent to the Command and General Staff
College (CGSC). The same can be said of students. The typical tour
length is three years; it has shortened since 9/11 with the average
tour being around two years. Military faculty continue to arrive with
the appropriate credentials and experience, but some aspects of their
preparation have changed. The officers we receive now have
significantly greater experience based upon more time in service (more
lieutenant colonels versus majors) and repetitive combat tours. They
almost universally have graduate degrees, but because of past
reductions in the Army's Advanced Civil Schooling programs fewer of
them have experience in a residential graduate program. The one area of
greatest change is with senior faculty members. A decade ago most of
our department directors were former brigade commanders, but that is
becoming the exception now rather than the norm.
Approximately 7% of the ILE/JPME-I military faculty are JQOs. While
this number may not be as high as we would like it, many of the
officers returning from the combat zones have worked in a joint,
interagency, multinational environment due to the demands of these
wars. This means that while only 7% of our uniformed faculty are
formally qualified, a much greater percentage has hands-on experience
with joint, interagency, and multinational operations that can
transferred into the classrooms.
We are working very diligently to achieve a 30:70 ratio of military
to civilian faculty at the Command and General Staff College. The true
benefits of a mixed faculty entail differing perspectives to broaden
the learning aperture of our students. While many of our civilian
faculty are indeed retired military, we also hire purely academic
faculty as well to ensure our academic credentials demonstrate our
commitment to excellence. Two challenges affect the quality within this
target ratio. First, the current demands of the war preclude the
sustained assignment of our best and brightest officers. Second is the
challenge of recruiting and retaining the top tier faculty because of
our commitment to teaching. Publishing and research are more difficult
with the teaching loads required at military schools, and restrictive
copyright laws make us less attractive to many scholars.
Dr. Snyder. Are the services and agencies filling their assigned
billets for faculty? What are your gaps?
General Cardon. The Services are providing as many faculty and
staff as they can spare because most are in the Contemporary Operating
Environment. The personnel provided are qualified, dedicated
professionals who take the mission of educating officers seriously.
A current snapshot shows we currently have 275 civilian faculty
members, 249 of which have active duty experience that sums to more
than 4,700 years of service. The military faculty projected for this
summer consists of 90 Army and 17 sister service (10 Air Force, 4 Navy,
and 3 Marine). Within our civilian faculty, 32 served in our sister
services, which yields a comparable joint representation in the
civilian faculty.
Our sister services, to their credit, continue to send highly
qualified officers to the Command and General Staff College as faculty,
for they also see a clear benefit to the joint force in doing so. The
recent selection of the Air Force Element and Navy Element Commanders
for command is indicative of this level of quality. However, there are
indications the services cannot sustain this effort and still meet
service and joint requirements. Further, this creates a second order
effect by decreasing the number of viable career officers with
potential for further promotion, thus degrading the quality of faculty.
When the issue of the JDAL position changes in the NDAA is added to the
other stresses that our sister services face, this could lead to the
assignment of officers at the Command and General Staff College who are
not promotion eligible and don't represent the best their service has
to offer. This will be discussed in more depth in question #7.
We currently have three Interagency faculty members who serve full
time on our faculty. Representatives from the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Department of State, and the National Geospatial Agency
occupy exchange billets with the College and act as subject matter
experts for our students and faculty, along with providing a conduit
for information to and from the agencies they represent. This
capability has shown great potential and our faculty would be greatly
strengthened if more agencies would build in the capacity for a regular
exchange at the intermediate level staff colleges.
Dr. Snyder. To what extent has the curriculum enhanced its coverage
of Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR)
Operations given that DOD has put them on a par with combat operations?
General Cardon. The Command and General Staff College (CGSC) has
enhanced its curriculum in regards to SSTR (Stability Operations).
CGSC's U.S. Army Full-Spectrum Operations (FSO) Curriculum balances
combat operations and SSTR doctrine and application exercises. The
course curriculum is presented in two major portions: Intermediate
Level Education (ILE) Common Core and the Advanced Operations Course
(AOC).
ILE COMMON CORE
The Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations
(DJIMO) introduces the concept of SSTR in its Joint Functions and
Capabilities lessons (C302/4/5/7/8). These lessons review the functions
and capabilities of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Special Ops, and
Multinational Ops.
The Center for Army Tactics (CTAC) conducts a 3 hour class--C422
Full Spectrum Operations (3 hours)--dedicated to studying the Army's
role in SSTR. The Department of Command and Leadership (DCL) curriculum
includes 6 hours using case studies from contemporary full spectrum
operations to prepare leaders to operate effectively in complex,
uncertain operational environments.
AOC
This course provides greater emphasis on FSO and the balance
between combat operations, SSTR, and the important transitions between
them. Specific areas of instruction include:
Campaign planning (67 hours). This area focuses at the operational
level of war and includes SSTR planning and execution. The block
concludes with a four day planning exercise totally focused on Phase IV
Stability Operations and includes multinational, interagency, and joint
force interactions.
Full-Spectrum Operations (150 hours). This area focuses on land
operations at the tactical level of war. This block includes 64 hours
devoted to SSTR in a complex operational environment. The remaining 86
hours are focused on conventional operations, but includes transitions
and stability operations planning as a part of full spectrum
operations.
Force Generation (36 hours). This area focuses on how Army forces
are generated, trained, readied, and prepared to conduct full-spectrum
operations including both combat operations and SSTR.
Historical analysis (16 hours). The Department of Military History
(DMH) modified its H300 Block, Roots of Today's Operational
Environment, to study several historical SSTR related events/periods.
Leadership Case Studies (6 hours). The DCL curriculum uses case
studies from contemporary operations (FSO) to prepare leaders to
operate in the contemporary environment.
Dr. Snyder. Describe the scenarios that you use for your simulation
exercises and war games. To what extent do they incorporate SSTR and
irregular warfare concepts?
General Cardon. The ILE Common Core Course culminates with two
application exercises that provide basic insights into Full Spectrum
Operations, including Stability, Security, Transition, and
Reconstruction (SSTR) and irregular warfare. The main focus of these
exercises is on planning skill development using both Joint and Service
doctrinal planning tools. They are foundational in nature. The
instructional operating environment is hybrid, but the focus is on the
skills needed in any environment.
The Advanced Operations Course (AOC) O199 exercise is a ``whole of
government'' approach. It is a 24-hour Joint Operational Level Planning
exercise entirely focused on planning for actions, after major conflict
operations have ended, through the transition to local national civil
control. This exercise simulates the actions of a Joint Force Land
Component staff planning SSTR operations in an environment where hybrid
warfare (irregular warfare in which some of the insurgent fighters have
technologically advanced systems) is occurring. The challenge for the
students is to visualize what the operational environment will be based
on a post conflict scenario, where there are remnants of conventional
forces operating as well as insurgent activities and large displaced
populations. The compound and complex situation includes a weak to non-
functioning infrastructure, environmental concerns, a large number of
non governmental agencies as well as cultural and social challenges
between all the various players. The students are to develop a ``whole
of government'' approach to the situation where there are multiple
levels of transition from military to civilian control of operations as
well as local to national level host nation transition of authority and
control. The students face a resource constrained situation where they
must plan to work with local authorities to restore the rule of law,
provide essential services and train and prepare the host nation forces
to work without significant outside support. The exercise is not
computer supported, but rather a planning exercise developing a
workable resourced-constrained concept in a limited timeframe.
The AOC O399 exercise is a 36-hour practical exercise entirely
focused on planning and executing actions envisioned during the O199
exercise. This exercise simulates the actions of a Brigade Combat Team
planning and executing SSTR operations in a hybrid warfare environment
that is facing and reacting to the challenges identified in the O199
exercise, including those of the integration of ``Other U.S.
Governmental Agencies'' (Whole of Government) as well as local official
and unofficial leadership and non-governmental agencies. The College is
piloting with several possible computer support tools and simulations
but no decision has been reached. The simulation exercises for both of
these courses are supported by Interagency faculty resident at the
College, augmented by personnel from their agencies. Our Distinguished
Professor of National Intelligence Studies, a CIA position, provides
support to these exercises in the operational and strategic use of
intelligence and the exchange faculty member from NGA, along with
augmentation from his agency, supports student requests for imagery and
geospatial data. Other Interagency partners are being solicited to
provide support to these exercises in the future.
Dr. Snyder. Please provide the most recent survey results from your
graduates and their supervisors.
General Cardon. In January 2009, the U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College (CGSC) surveyed 9,910 Intermediate Level Education (ILE)
graduates from academic years 2006-2008. The number of respondents was
3,476 graduates. Graduates indicated that CGSC met ILE purposes and
missions; the 31 ILE-Common Core learning objectives; the six common
Advanced Operational Warfighting Course (AOWC) learning objectives; the
four Joint Advanced Warfighting Seminar (JAWS) track learning
objectives; and the three W300 (Brigade Combat Team Operations)
objectives.
The summary report of our most recent graduate survey is attached
for the committee's use.
CGSC has not done a supervisor survey in the last year.
[The information referred to is retained in the committee files and
can be viewed upon request.]
Dr. Snyder. The intermediate level schools lost Joint Duty credit
for their non-host service military faculty in the 2007 National
Defense Authorization Act. We know that the tours of those who were
grandfathered are ending. What will the effect of this be? How will it
affect the quality of your faculty? How important is it that these JDAL
positions be restored? Do the instructors truly get a joint experience?
[Question #7, for cross-reference.]
General Cardon. We recognize the value of the civilians teaching at
the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), but also must convey the
essentiality of military faculty. Army officers with the right
education and experience are the lifeblood of the College. The Officer
Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) process has provided
CGSC the joint service officers critical to infusing the joint service
perspective into the Army's school house. However, with the NDAA of
2007 a change was made to the rules for granting joint credit to non-
host faculty teaching at CGSC. These billets were previously on a list
of assignments receiving joint duty credit (JDAL) and from the
College's standpoint this was both necessary and appropriate. This JDAL
listing made teaching at CGSC attractive for sister service faculty
because it assured them joint credit. There is now a different system
in place which removes the JDAL status for our sister service slots.
The new process does allow officers assigned to CGSC to apply for this
credit after the fact, but joint officers consider the previous system
much better, which influences their interest in coming to Ft.
Leavenworth. The second related issue is more critical. Because our
sister service faculty positions were dropped from JDAL status they are
a much lower fill priority for the Air Force, Marines, and Navy. They
are not `must fill' jobs. Recommendation 2 from the Skelton Report
emphasized the criticality of recruiting and retaining a high quality
faculty; having these positions on the JDAL better achieves this goal
than the changes made with the NDAA of 2007. The Military Education
Coordination Council (MECC) unanimously supports returning all sister
service joint teaching billets to the JDAL.
We truly appreciate the opportunity to address the impacts of
change in rules for joint duty authorization list credit for non-host
military in joint professional military education schools. This change
directly impacts the quality of instruction for our officers attending
Intermediate Level Education. This is all the more relevant given that
all Command and General Staff College equivalent PME rates Joint
Professional Military Education I accreditation. As discussed at the
Military Education Coordination Council chaired by the Director of the
Joint Staff, all members agreed that we need to revisit this critical
issue. The impact from revising National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) of 2007 on joint duty authorization list credit is two-fold.
First, this change eliminates a powerful incentive for officers from
these services to view this assignment as both developmental and career
enhancing, thus narrowing the aperture of highly qualified officers.
Second, because our sister service faculty positions were dropped from
joint duty authorization list status they are a much lower fill
priority for the Air Force, Marines, and Navy. They are not `must fill'
jobs. Therefore, given the current strategic environment and its
inherent joint, interagency, and multinational nature, we request
Congress authorize joint credit for non-host faculty positions in joint
professional military education schools.
Dr. Snyder. Describe your school's use of historical case studies
to teach strategy.
General Cardon. The Department of Military History teaches a
required 60-hour military history curriculum designed to contribute to
historical consciousness, critical thinking, and problem-solving skills
at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war for Field
Grade Officers. This curriculum consists of three discrete blocks that
address, respectively, the evolution of the Western Way of War,
Military Innovation and Transformation, and the Roots of the
Contemporary Operating Environment. Each block focuses on history,
theory, doctrine, and application within the three main themes
addressed, using history to illuminate and inform the contemporary
challenges that the Officers will face when they graduate and go back
into the field. In addition to the Military History curriculum required
of all students, the Department of Military History also offers a slate
of 36 electives.
The Department of Joint, Interagency and Multinational Operations
(DJIMO) teaches a 34-hour block of instruction on the Strategic
Environment. The block includes a case study on the 1956 Suez Crisis.
The case study addresses the political background and military planning
leading up to and including the July-November 1956 crisis. The actions
by Egypt, France, Britain and Israel resulted in an uncoordinated
series of attacks, with frequent disconnects between national political
authorities and their military subordinates as well as between the
vital interests of different nation states. This lesson has three
purposes: (1) enhances student understanding of the complexities and
ambiguities at the strategic level of war and the inter-relationships
between decisions made at the strategic and operational levels; (2)
reinforces an appreciation of the value of military history as a
professional tool, developed throughout the H100, History block of
instruction; and (3) serves as an opportunity to apply the concepts of
ends-ways and means. The lesson further challenges the students to
assimilate much of what they learned throughout the Strategic
Environment block of instruction.
Dr. Snyder. What is the process for renewal and non-renewal of the
faculty? How transparent is the system? In a tenure system people think
the faculty members have all the power, in a non-tenure system it
appears that the school has unlimited power. How do you avoid these
extremes?
General Cardon. Title 10 faculty members are initially appointed to
two year term contracts, with the first year being a probationary
period. Upon successfully meeting the requirements of the probationary
period, faculty members are eligible for reappointment at the end of
their initial contract to term contracts of greater lengths, depending
on their level of performance. Term contracts can be from 1-5 years,
with 3 years being the standard contract for those that meet College
requirements.
Title 10 faculty members who do not meet the performance standards
set by their immediate leadership team may not be eligible for standard
term contracts and may be offered contracts of lesser duration or no
contract at all. This can be true at the completion of the initial two
year contract or at the conclusion of any successive term contract.
Contracts of lesser duration than the standard indicate performance
that is below the expected level and carries with them the assumption
that performance must be brought up to standards by the next renewal
period. Failure to meet performance standards by the end of the non-
standard contract may result in non-renewal of Title 10 employment and
termination. Contracts of greater duration than the standard indicate
performance that is above the expected level and carries with them the
distinction of superior performance.
Title 10 faculty members apply for reappointment not earlier than
nine months and not later than six months before the end of their
current contract. The application for reappointment is staffed
beginning with the faculty member's immediate leadership and through
the appropriate channels to the Deputy Commandant, who approves all
reappointment actions.
If an initial appointment is not renewed, the school director will
make a reasonable effort to provide three months advance written notice
of the decision to the affected faculty member. If a subsequent
appointment is not renewed, the director will make a reasonable effort
to provide six months advance written notice of the decision to the
affected faculty member.
These procedures are outlined in our Faculty Manual (dated 2008),
so that every member of the faculty knows the policies and procedures
for contract renewal early on in their employment. The process allows
for remediation with short duration contracts if the leadership
believes a faculty member has shortcomings that must be addressed to
meet College standards. Final decisions on all renewals or non-renewals
are made by the College's Deputy Commandant, after detailed review and
recommendation of the academic leadership up through the Dean of
Academics.
Our mix of faculty includes military, Title 10, and Title 5
civilians. The military provide us currency and are not truly involved
in the renewal discussion. The Title 5 civilians are the closest thing
we have to tenured faculty members. Serving at the GS-12 through 14
grades, they do not require contract renewal and have provided academic
continuity for the College for many years. There are less than 10 of
these individuals left on the faculty, but they continue to serve as
senior faculty members in both Intermediate Level Education (ILE) and
the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). The bulk of our faculty
are Title 10 civilians, the population that this question mainly
addresses. They are contract faculty, similar to many faculty members
at civilian institutions, who serve 1-5 year contracts. By law, they
can be released at the end of their contract, but by custom at the
College they serve as long term members of the faculty. There is
occasionally consternation from some Title 10 faculty members as to
their status whenever the Army looks at possible changes to the ILE
program, but the majority of these faculty members get on with their
duties confident that if they perform well in the classroom they will
be given the continuing opportunity to serve. One step that has been
taken to try and relieve any faculty consternation and avoid the
extremes mentioned in the question is to also hire the senior academic
civilians in the College using the Title 10 authority. The Dean of
Academics and Associate Dean of Academics are both Title 10 faculty
members, as are the Directors of the Department of Command and
Leadership and Department of Military History. By creating a single
system through which the faculty and their civilian academic leadership
are all in the same renewal process, the College avoids the perception
of a have and have-not system of extremes within the institution.
Dr. Snyder. What is your school's role in identifying promising
officers with the potential for high-level strategic thinking at the
appropriate point in their careers?
General Cardon. The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS)
mission is to educate future leaders of our Armed Forces, our Allies,
and the Inter-Agency at the graduate level to be agile and adaptive
leaders who think critically at the strategic and operational levels to
solve complex ambiguous problems. The School runs two programs. One is
a Senior Service College (SSC) Fellowship titled the Advanced
Operational Art Studies Fellowship (AOASF) with the role to educate
future leaders of our Armed Forces, our Allies, and the Inter-Agency at
the graduate level to be agile and adaptive leaders who think
critically at the strategic level to solve complex ambiguous problems.
The second program is the Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP)
which educates future leaders of our Armed Forces, our Allies, and the
Inter-Agency at the graduate level to be agile and adaptive leaders who
think critically at the operational level to solve complex ambiguous
problems.
The military officers who attend the AOASF must have been selected
through their service's process and board for senior service college
(SSC) attendance. SAMS recruits for AOASF students from the published
SSC list. Military officers who volunteer to attend the AMSP compete in
a rigorous selection process which concludes with a local Command and
General Staff College (CGSC) board. After volunteering, the individual
competes in a selection process which begins with the Intermediate
Level Education (ILE) Staff Group Advisors (SGA) preparing an
evaluation of the student's potential. Applicants also take an entrance
exam composed of objective questions and essay questions. The SGA
evaluation and applicant's exam results are then reviewed by SAMS
senior leaders, who subsequently conduct personal interviews with each
applicant. This initial effort produces a board file with: Officer
Record Brief, individual's application & goals statement, entrance exam
score and essay, SGA evaluation, applicant interview sheet, and letters
of recommendation. The CGSC board, composed of colonels and civilian
PhD faculty, conduct an objective review of each file over a week, to
produce an Order of Merit List (OML). This overall effort is similar to
formal Department of the Army selection boards and enables the command
to identify and select the most qualified officers for SAMS. The OML is
subsequently forward from the Commandant, CGSC to HQDA G1, G3, and the
Human Resources Command CG for final approval.
Dr. Snyder. How do you specifically measure the quality of the
faculty and staff in the PME environment?
General Cardon. In response to this question, let us first deal
with the quality of faculty. The Command and General Staff College
(CGSC) monitors the quality of its faculty both systemically and
individually. From a systemic point of view, CGSC adheres to Joint
Professional Military Education (JPME) guidance to ensure the requisite
number of instructors from the other services and complements that mix
as possible with selected specialists from other agencies. In addition,
CGSC also employs a small number of exchange instructors from other
armies such as Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom. The range of
mixture of requisite faculty specialties and credentials figures
directly in the hiring process in order to yield a composite faculty
that meets institutional needs.
CGSC manages the quality of individual faculty in two distinct
stages based on initial hiring and subsequently on performance. Initial
hiring is based upon the requirements for each specific faculty
position. Some teaching positions, such as in the Department of
Tactics, place a premium on relevant experience in the field but also
require at least a master's degree. Other positions, such as those in
the Department of Military History, place more emphasis on formal
academic credentials. Accordingly most of our historians hold a
doctoral degree and have a track record of research and publication.
Measurement of faculty quality performance after hiring is shaped
by our Faculty Manual. The Faculty Manual identifies four domains of
performance for faculty members and lays out the expectations of
faculty members based upon their academic rank. The four domains that
we use would look very familiar to faculty members at most academic
institution and consist of Teaching, Scholarship, Service, and Faculty
Development. First of all, because CGSC is foremost a teaching
institution, excellence in classroom instruction is paramount. CGSC
employs peer observation of teaching as well as student surveys to gage
the performance of faculty in the classroom. Input from each of these
sources offers instructors constructive advice on how to improve. While
teaching makes up the largest part of any faculty member's performance
evaluation, the other three domains require attention. Faculty members
are expected to contribute to the scholarly and professional body of
knowledge in their discipline, be it tactics or history. As faculty
progress through the ranks towards Associate Professor or Professor of
Discipline, publication will become a more important part of their
evaluation. In the same vein, all faculty members are evaluated in the
areas of service and faculty development, as defined in the Faculty
Manual, but these requirements grow as faculty members become more
senior.
In turn, the measurement of staff performance corresponds to the
specific requirements of each position as well as to the rules under
which each hiring action occurred, whether under General Schedule, the
National Security Personnel System (NSPS), or Title 10. Senior staff
positions requiring some knowledge of the functioning of academic
institutions may demand a combination of academic as well as
administrative or managerial experience. Each staff job description
specifies performance career criteria in the form of job objectives
against which results can be evaluated on an annual basis.
Dr. Snyder. How were you chosen to be school's commandant? How was
your dean chosen? Will you be retiring from this job? What background
should the Chief of Naval Operations be looking for in selecting
individuals for these positions? Should the focus be on operational
leadership skills or academic and teaching experience (not instructing
in a training institution) background or both?
General Cardon. The Deputy Commandant is chosen as part of the
general officer assignment process lead by the Army Chief of Staff. I
will not be retiring from this job. The Dean of Academics was chosen
after a nationwide academic search. A hiring panel, made up of senior
members of the College leadership and members from the Army War
College, interviewed final candidates and recommended a candidate to
the Deputy Commandant and Commandant. The final decision was made by
the Commandant, at that time GEN Petraeus. The Dean's position is
focused on the academic and teaching experience; in this case the Dean
spent over 15 years on the faculty at the United States Military
Academy and had an outstanding national reputation as a scholar and
administrator. The Deputy Commandant's position requires less of a
focus on academic expertise and more on the operational leadership
skills and experience. The Deputy Commandant is responsible for the
content of the programs at the College and, as such, must have the
recent experience necessary to guide the modification and maturation of
the curriculum in relation to the Army's mission. While the Dean
provides advice and counsel on the systems and methods of curriculum
change and faculty management, the Deputy Commandant must be the
guiding force at the College who represents the Chief of Staff and the
Commandant in forming the right programs to meet the Army's current and
future needs.
Dr. Snyder. How should intermediate schools attract top-tier
civilian faculty? How do you specifically define top-tier? What are the
elements that would attract the highest quality of faculty--tenure,
copyright, resources, pay, ability to keep their government
retirements, research and administrative assistance, etc.?
General Cardon. The ongoing challenge for the Command and General
Staff College (CGSC) is to attract top-tier faculty who meet highly
specific institutional needs. Overall, CGSC is successful in
identifying and hiring highly qualified faculty members due both to
actively advertising position openings and its reputation across the
military community as a good place to work.
CGSC defines top-tier according to position requirements. Top-tier
for a tactics instructor may well mean that the individual has
experience in battalion command or as a brigade-level staff officer. In
addition, the individual should have earned at least a master's degree
sometime during his or her career. Most CGSC faculty positions fit this
general paradigm and require significant experience as an officer in
one of the armed services. Thus, the competition for their services
will come less from civilian academia than from other Intermediate
Level Education (ILE) institutions or civilian contractors. The pool of
individuals with the requisite mix of career experience and academic
credentials is limited. Tenure, pay, and retirement benefits all figure
heavily in successful recruitment.
Of course, there are some positions, especially those related to
military history, international security, or strategy, in which CGSC
must often compete with civilian academia. In such instances, the
relative importance of tenure, research opportunities, or the ability
to copyright and publish one's work increases. CGSC has generally found
that its salaries, especially at entry level, are quite competitive
with those in civilian academia. However, in contrast to a typical
system of civilian university tenure, the Title 10 system for faculty
hiring provides only for renewable, term appointments. Nevertheless,
CGSC has a commendable record to date of keeping the overwhelming
majority of high-performing teaching faculty.
Another challenge in hiring and retention stems from the higher
classroom teaching loads generally expected of CGSC faculty.
Accordingly, the time available to focus on research is less than it
would be at typical civilian research universities. Therefore,
expectations concerning publication align more closely with those of
small liberal arts or teaching-focused colleges. As a result, CGSC
considers top-tier faculty in these fields to be outstanding teachers
who have proven their ability to research and publish and are
recognized in their respective fields. The opportunity to publish has
remained a bit problematic because federal law denies federal employees
the right to copyright work that has been accomplished during
government duty time. In other words, in order to retain the freedom to
dispose of a given work as the author wishes, it is necessary for him
or her to complete this work outside of duty hours and not use any
government facilities or equipment. Not surprisingly, this rule clashes
with the expectations of many faculty in civilian academia who are
accustomed to the unencumbered right to publish freely.
Dr. Snyder. What are the policies at your school regarding academic
freedom? What is its proper role in a PME setting without tenure?
Describe how your faculty may be called upon to respond to press
inquiries in the field of expertise and whether and how they are
allowed to respond in a timely manner.
General Cardon. Like most civilian academic institutions, the
Command and General Staff College (CGSC) subscribes to the American
Association of University Professors (AAUP) official statement on
academic freedom. In practice, CGSC determines the general
configuration and learning objectives of the curriculum, but leaves it
up to individual instructors to shape all classroom dialogue. CGSC
remains wholly committed to an environment of open, critical
discussion.
As for dealing with the press, CGSC invites all faculty members to
respond to press inquiries, as well as to submit letters to the editor
or participate in online discussions. The College asks only that
faculty members observe federal law with respect to the release of
sensitive or classified information and that they apprise the Public
Affairs Office of formal interviews with members of the press.
Dr. Snyder. Acquisition reforms all call for more of the general
purpose forces to be educated and trained in understanding contracting
and contractors. Civilians, contracting, and contractors on the
battlefield--how much do officers, outside the acquisition workforce,
need to know?
General Cardon. The officers' education should cover all aspects of
operational contracting support as it relates to the requirements of
being a Field Grade Officer. This education should include his/her
understanding on how to manage Logistics Civilian Assistance Program
(LOGCAP) operations. They first need to understand why the Gansler
Commission Findings were initiated and what was found to be an issue
throughout the force. Each student should be educated on the different
``colors'' of money and how they are allocated by law, such as
Operations, Maintenance, and Acquisition (OMA), Commanders Emergency
Response Program (CERP), and specific funding lines. Additional
education in the contracting arena is required to understand
contracting from the perspective of how to manage contracting officers
and contracting representatives in their respective units. This would
include: Joint and Army Contracting command and control architecture;
Theater contracting command and control architecture; understanding how
the joint acquisition review process and the Coalition Acquisition
Review Board (CARB) validates requirements; how to interpret a
contracting support annex in a theater; understanding the intrinsic
aspects of Money as a Weapons System; CERP; understanding the
contracting process in a theater of operations; being able to develop a
performance work statement (statement of work); how to develop an
Organizational Needs Statement (ONS) and finally how to manage
contracting support of our Brigade Combat Team (BCT) which would
include hiring, accounting for funds and managing the Brigade
Contracting Officers Representatives (CORs).
Dr. Snyder. The Universal Intermediate Level Education program has
put a strain on the other services to provide sufficient instructors
and students. Has this initiative watered down the joint experience for
those officers attending?
General Cardon. The resident faculty mix of Army and other Military
Department Faculty meets the requirements of Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01B, Officer Professional
Military Education Policy (OPMEP). The Command and General Staff School
(CGSS) teaches in staff groups (seminars) of 16 students. Under the
CGSS model which is based on the OPMEP rules, each staff group should
include one sea and one air service officer. Resident Class 09-02
currently in session and Class 10-01 scheduled to begin 10 August,
include a total of 92 staff groups. Class 09-02 is short two sea
service officers and 10-01 will be short one Air Force officer and
eight sea service officers. CGSS mitigates shortages to the extent
possible. No staff group is without both sister service students and
all staff groups short a sister service officer have an interagency
student. This helps ensure diversity and different perspectives during
seminar discussions. Also, to the extent possible, sister service
faculty members are assigned to the staff groups without sister service
students. Although we know service mix is vitally important, we believe
mitigation efforts have reduced the impact of shortages. For a number
of reasons the policy Universal Intermediate Level Education is
currently being reexamined by the Army. Our ability to meet the OPMEP
standards at CGSS is certainly important concern for the Army, but
there are other issues within the current operation tempo that also
must be addressed to assure that the Army is providing its future
strategic leaders the best possible education.
Dr. Snyder. What opportunities do your students have to study
language and culture?
General Cardon. We at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC)
have begun our analysis of what are the needs for officers over the
next ten years. As a product of our self-assessment, there are a number
of initiatives in military education ongoing at CGSC, one of which is
the teaching of language and culture. The Army now has a strategy for
addressing the development of culture and language skills within the
service. CGSC has already added more cultural education and created
language opportunities. Culture is part of the foundation curriculum
required for all Army majors. Further, of eight required electives,
every student must take at least one from a list of approved cultural
electives, usually a regional studies course. After this initial
volley, culture becomes a component of the integrated curriculum
discussed in my previous testimony. Students learn to conduct cultural
analysis to address the impacts of culture on military operations,
particularly as they practice or exercise their planning skills using
scenarios crafted to require cultural understanding.
Teaching language as an additional subject in a 10-month
warfighting course is an educational challenge. Consider that Defense
Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLI) courses to bring
students to a rudimentary working level of proficiency are all
immersion experiences lasting from nine months to over a year,
depending on the relative difficulty of the language. Language
instruction is needed at CGSC, but must be prudently implemented. In
January 2006, CGSC implemented Iraqi and Pashto language
familiarization programs for students who upon graduation would join
units deploying in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). CGSC developed these programs with
the support of DLIFLC. They helped develop the concept and provided
native-speaking instructors. Currently, CGSC offers operational
language familiarization classes in Iraqi dialect Arabic and Dari.
These are the prominent languages used in current operations and are
consistent with Military Training Team (MiTT) language training
conducted at Ft Riley, KS. The 48 hour mandatory courses prepare
students for OIF/OEF deployment assignments. The courses not only
introduce students to Iraqi and Dari languages, but also Arab and
Afghan interpersonal cultural. The course increases awareness of
cultural norms, values, customs and events. Since the 2006 elective
term, all students can enroll in self-study language electives to study
a language of their choice (self development) using Rosetta Stone,
available through Army Knowledge Online (AKO). Students may choose from
any of the languages offered in Rosetta Stone online through Army E-
Learning (Arabic, Chinese, Danish, Dutch, Farsi (Persian), French,
German, Greek, Hebrew, Hindi, Indonesian, Italian, Japanese, Korean,
Dari, Polish, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, Swahili, Swedish, Tagalog,
Thai, Turkish, Vietnamese, Welsh). In April 2008, CGSC developed a
strategic language program that allows students to study Chinese,
French, Spanish or Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) in a modified year-long
program employing directed self-study, distance learning, and resident
instruction conducted by DLIFLC instructors. Students acquire basic
knowledge of the language in listening, speaking, reading and writing,
to include the basic grammar, syntax and cultural information.
Dr. Snyder. What is the impact of not being able to hold copyright,
especially on civilian faculty?
General Cardon. The inability to hold copyright has in some
instances acted on a constraint on faculty publication. For example, a
faculty member who intends to publish with an academic press must do
the writing on his or her own time. Alternatively, work done on duty
time must be offered to a government press for first right of
publication. Whether or not a government press chooses to publish the
work in question, the inability to copyright is an impediment to
outside publication since all academic and commercial publishers expect
to copyright the works they publish. Thus, in order to meet legal
requirements, a work initially authored on duty time must undergo
substantial revision outside of duty time to be considered
copyrightable. Needless to say, many civilian faculty chafe under this
restriction and consider it a deterrent both to research and
publication. While we have no specific evidence of this affecting the
employment decisions of prospective civilian faculty has been noted, it
could be perceived as a deterrent if we are in competition with a non-
government academic institution.
Dr. Snyder. What expanded Title 10 authorities are needed?
General Cardon. Current Title 10 authority has, thus far, been used
extensively in Intermediate Level Education (ILE) to meet our mission
requirements. For Professional Military Education (PME) overall, the
largest problem with Title 10 authority is the requirement in the law
that a course be 10 months in length to qualify for Title 10 faculty. A
relaxation of this requirement would permit a broader use of the Title
10 authority to meet faculty needs.
Dr. Snyder. Please provide these two documents: 1) CGSC Student
Text 2010, Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) Research and
Thesis, August 2007 and 2) Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS)
Program Information, August 2007.
General Cardon. The latest version of the two referenced documents,
updated for the class beginning in February 2009, is attached for your
use.
[The information referred to is retained in the committee files and
can be viewed upon request.]
Dr. Snyder. Please provide your school's mission statement.
General Jackson. Air Command and Staff College's (ACSC) current
mission statement is to prepare field-grade officers to develop, employ
and command air, space and cyberspace power in joint, combined and
multinational operations. ACSC reviews the mission statement as a part
of its strategic planning processes to ensure it is focused on
producing agile, critical thinkers to meet future challenges. Based on
the latest review the statement is being changed to prepare field-grade
officers to develop, employ and command air, space and cyberspace power
in joint, multinational and interagency operations. The minor change
more accurately reflects the environment in which ACSC graduates will
be operating.
Dr. Snyder. How have ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
affected the quality of military faculty members? What is your average
tour length for military faculty members? Have the credentials of
military faculty in terms of graduate degrees and JQO qualifications
diminished during this period? What is the percentage of military
faculty who are fully JQO qualified?
General Jackson. Current operations have actually increased the
quality of military faculty members. First hand operational experience
provides instant credibility with students. The experience is an
excellent source of real-world examples/cases and contacts that can be
exploited for curriculum material and faculty development
opportunities. Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) now has a high
percentage of faculty members who have had experience, either in
command or in staff positions, who have dealt with the challenges of
combat, stabilization, and reconstruction. The challenge is getting
faculty members from the highly stressed career fields. ACSC works
closely with the Air Force Personnel Center to minimize the impact of
deployments on faculty manning. Coordination and timing of 179-day and
365-day deployments are keys to minimizing impact.
Tour lengths for our military faculty members are typically 3
years. We often allow shorter tours to support members selected for key
command and leadership positions. This flexibility and support is an
incentive for making faculty assignments more attractive.
Credentials of military faculty in terms of graduate degrees have
not diminished. The ACSC Advanced Academic Degree (AAD) program has
been instrumental in increasing the academic credentials among the
military faculty members. These are Air Force-sponsored programs that
select highly qualified military faculty members for funded study at
civilian institutions to acquire advanced (doctoral or master's level)
degrees in fields directly applicable to the ACSC curriculum. Most ACSC
faculty members have joint operational experience; however, only three
percent are fully JQO qualified.
Dr. Snyder. Are the services and agencies filling their assigned
billets for faculty? What are your gaps?
General Jackson. Sister services have been very supportive in
providing outstanding faculty members but an emerging issue is joint
credit for faculty duty at Air Command and Staff College (ACSC).
Faculty requirements for ACSC are outlined in the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01, Officer Professional Military
Education Policy (OPMEP). The mix of military faculty members whose
primary duty is student instruction of Joint Professional Military
Education should be a minimum of 5 percent from each non-host Military
Department. ACSC's current requirement based on this policy is 7 Army,
5 Navy, and 2 Marine faculty members. ACSC does not have faculty
billets for other agencies. Faculty and advisory positions from the
other agencies are assigned at the Spaatz Center for Officer Education
or Air University and ACSC draws upon these resources for interagency
expertise. ACSC is currently short two Naval faculty members with one
projected fill in November 2009. A significant contributing factor is
the Navy Fiscal Year 09 Permanent Change of Station funding shortfall.
Dr. Snyder. To what extent has the curriculum enhanced its coverage
of Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR)
Operations given that DOD has put them on a par with combat operations?
General Jackson. Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) recognizes
that the planning and conduct of post-conflict operations are as
important as combat operations. Accordingly, the college has added both
lectures and seminars that pertain specifically to SSTR. Draft revision
to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01,
Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) includes a
Learning Area Objective that specifically requires Intermediate Level
Colleges to address the topic. The wording of the objective in the
draft states that students should ``comprehend the role and perspective
of the combatant commander and staff in developing various theater
policies, strategies, and plans to include Weapons of Mass Destruction/
Effect (WMD/E), irregular warfare, information operations, Stability,
Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) and strategic
communication.'' The International Security Studies course covers weak
and failing states and the problems surrounding stability operations.
The course examines not only military options, but diplomatic (i.e.
international/multinational to include nongovernment organizations and
intergovernmental organizations) and economic resources and strategies
related to this topic. The Warfare Studies course has curriculum time
devoted to war termination and conflict resolution, with focus on
operations in Kosovo. The course also includes curriculum time directly
focused on stability operations in Afghanistan. The Joint Campaign
Planning course devotes a lecture and seminar to planning
considerations for conducting SSTR operations in irregular warfare.
Dr. Snyder. Describe the scenarios that you use for your simulation
exercises and war games. To what extent do they incorporate SSTR and
irregular warfare concepts?
General Jackson. Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) principally
uses two scenarios to support educational objectives concerning SSTR
and irregular warfare operations. These scenarios also support SSTR and
irregular warfare educational objectives in the Joint Advanced Warfare
Elective Series (JAWES). The first scenario is the Georgia, Azerbaijan,
Armenia and Turkey (GAAT) scenario and the second is the Joint Forces
Command/North Atlantic Treaty Organization (JFCOM/NATO) Zoran Sea
scenario. The GAAT scenario is used during the annual Intermediate
Level Education Exercise with the Army Command and General Staff
College and a variant of the GAAT scenario is incorporated into the
Joint Planning Exercise of the Joint Planning course and the Joint Air
Exercise during the Joint Air and Space Operations course.
Dr. Snyder. Please provide the most recent survey results from your
graduates and their supervisors.
General Jackson. The Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) executes
an aggressive closed-loop feedback process to assess quality and
constantly improve our program. While any student can critique any
event, each week during the academic year we task one fourth of the
ACSC class in rotating groups to provide feedback for the lectures,
seminars, readings, and guest speakers delivered that week. These
surveys provide a method to detect and influence immediate trends. At
the end of each of our 11 courses, all students and the faculty who
taught the course are asked to provide feedback on the effectiveness,
structure, relevance, and workload of the course as well as whether the
course achieved its stated educational objectives. Just prior to
graduation, we survey the students on the overall program, soliciting
their feedback on whether the program achieved our published
educational outcomes, the proportion of curriculum devoted to various
topics, the variety and quality of instructional methodologies
employed, the support, the value, and so on. Satisfaction rates are
over 85 percent positive in virtually all categories surveyed, and
return rates give us a 95 percent confidence that the survey results
accurately reflect the opinion of the student population within 5
percent. Finally, surveys are sent to graduates and the graduates'
supervisors approximately one year after graduation. The survey to our
graduates consists of questions dealing with broad areas such as
mission effectiveness, program value, career institutional impact, and
areas that reflect how well the curriculum helped them in their current
duties. Results from the last two classes on these surveys showed
satisfaction levels of over 85 percent in every area measured. In fact,
most areas exceeded 95 percent satisfaction. Supervisor results on
questions that parallel those we ask the graduates were unanimously
(100 percent) positive. A remarkable trend that we've observed is that
the already-high satisfaction levels on the exit surveys are even
higher on the post-graduate surveys. This further substantiates the
lasting value of the resident professional military education
experience. All survey data are used to inform decisions of the
curriculum builders and is briefed to the commandant as part of the
course approval process.
In addition to the routine graduate and supervisor surveys ACSC
seeks feedback from the Command Board of Advisors (CBOA). The CBOA is
chaired by the Air Education and Training Command vice commander and
consists of the vice-commanders of the major commands. This body
includes the key stakeholders in the ACSC educational program. The CBOA
provides information about the educational needs of the commands and
their level of satisfaction with ACSC (and other Air University
schools) graduates and programs. At the last meeting of the CBOA
members indicated Air University programs (including ACSC) perform well
in meeting the needs of Airmen, developing warrior-leaders for the Air
Force and providing education in the right eight areas prescribed by
the Air Force Competency List.
Dr. Snyder. The intermediate level schools lost Joint Duty credit
for their non-host service military faculty in the 2007 National
Defense Authorization Act. We know that the tours of those who were
grandfathered are ending. What will the effect of this be? How will it
affect the quality of your faculty? How important is it that these JDAL
positions be restored? Do the instructors truly get a joint experience?
General Jackson. NOTE: Brigadier General Jackson has retired.
Answer is provided by Air Command and Staff College.
The long-term effect of restricting JPME I institutions from adding
billets to the Joint Duty Assignment List has yet to be determined.
While having the joint duty designator for faculty member positions is
a selling point when soliciting volunteers, there are a number of
assignment policies that can positively impact the quality and number
of candidates. The Department is exploring these options in concert
with the Military Services. In addition, the Department has indicated
no objection to the withdrawal of the statutory prohibition provided
that these positions are vetted along with all other potential joint
qualifying assignments. It is possible that given the right mixture of
duties and responsibilities, faculty members can meet the statutory
definition of joint matters. If the statutory prohibition is lifted,
these positions can be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Dr. Snyder. Describe your school's use of historical case studies
to teach strategy.
General Jackson. NOTE: Brigadier General Jackson has retired.
Answer is provided by Air Command and Staff College.
Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) is focused at the operational
level of war and the strategy taught is operational strategy from the
joint force commander's (JFC's) perspective. The entire Warfare Studies
course deals with the concepts of operational warfare and strategy, the
factors that influence and have led to changes in operational art and
strategy, and examines in great detail the differences between regular
warfare and irregular warfare strategies. Case studies include the
attrition warfare on the Western Front in World War I, mechanized
warfare in World War II, airpower operations in Kosovo, irregular
warfare and stability operations in Afghanistan, T.E. Lawrence in the
Middle East, and counterinsurgency operations in Iraq. The Air, Space
and Cyberspace course specifically examines strategies for the
development and employment of air, space and cyberspace power. This
involves study of classical and contemporary air power theory, and the
evaluation of historical air power strategies as well as air, space and
cyberspace strategies in ongoing operations. Through historical case
studies of air power in the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the Balkans, Iraq
and Afghanistan, students analyze the evolution of U.S. air power
strategies since WW II. Coalition air power strategy is examined
through lessons on Operations Deliberate Force and Provide Promise,
along with operations in the Persian Gulf and the Balkans. Lessons on
Chinese and Soviet air power in the Korean War and Israel's recent
conflict with Hezbollah provide insight into air power strategies
employed by other countries. These historical studies encourage
assessment of the effectiveness of diverse air power strategies in
different geopolitical and military contexts. Students are prompted to
take lessons from these historical cases and apply them to the
development of effective air power strategies for future operations.
Dr. Snyder. What is the process for renewal and non-renewal of the
faculty? How transparent is the system? In a tenure system people think
the faculty members have all the power, in a non-tenure system it
appears that the school has unlimited power. How do you avoid these
extremes?
General Jackson. NOTE: Brigadier General Jackson has retired.
Answer is provided by Air Command and Staff College.
The initial appointment of faculty is based on the applicant's
meeting the minimum criteria for each academic grade established as
described in Air University Instruction 36-2314, Academic Rank. All
civilian faculty members new to federal service serve a one-year
probationary period. The reappointment process normally begins 12
months prior to the expiration of a faculty member's current
appointment. Air University (AU) policy requires that any non-renewal
decision must be communicated to the faculty member in writing at least
12 months before the effective date for those on an appointment of 2
years or longer. The faculty member's supervisor prepares a staff
summary sheet which details the faculty member's current appointment
data and the requested reappointment terms. The faculty member's vita
or resume is attached as supporting documentation and forwarded to the
Dean of Academic Affairs and the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC)
Commandant for review. The ACSC Commandant signs the staff summary
sheet and sends the renewal package to the AU Commander for approval.
Once approved, the faculty member's supervisor explains the terms of
reappointment approved by the AU Commander to the faculty member.
Faculty members are reappointed for a period of 1 to 5 years.
Reappointment occurs when significant contributions to AU and ACSC are
expected for the term of the reappointment. Any member of the faculty
may be removed for cause (such as misconduct or poor performance)
regardless of academic tenure, faculty status, or length of appointment
according to applicable statutory and regulatory provisions governing
federal employment.
The renewal and non-renewal process is very transparent.
Information and processes related to reappointment and termination/non-
reappointment are included in Air Force and Air University instructions
(AFI 36-804, Civilian Faculty Pay Plan for Air University and the USAF
Academy and AU Supplement 1) and the Air University Faculty Handbook.
Each publication is posted on the Air University website. Individuals
are briefed on the processes as a part of their initial faculty
orientation.
AU and ACSC avoid the extremes and arbitrariness through
transparent personnel policies and the involvement of faculty in
administrative and curriculum development processes. For example, the
ACSC curriculum is created, reviewed, and approved by the full-time
faculty members through a rigorous, academic, corporate process.
Curriculum guidance is strategic in nature with primary responsibility
for the content, quality, and effectiveness of the curriculum placed
with the faculty. This strategic guidance ensures ACSC remains focused
on the mission of the college while providing flexibility for the
faculty to design courses to achieve the strategic objectives.
Dr. Snyder. What is your school's role in identifying promising
officers with the potential for high-level strategic thinking at the
appropriate point in their careers?
General Jackson. NOTE: Brigadier General Jackson has retired.
Answer is provided by Air Command and Staff College.
Air Command and Staff College's (ACSC) primary role in identifying
promising strategic thinking officers rests in providing opportunities
for academic preparation. The school's Joint Advanced Warfare Elective
Series (JAWES) focuses on preparing U.S. and international students for
second year programs such as the School of Advanced Air and Space
Studies (SAASS), School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), and the
School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW). During Academic Year 2010, ACSC
will expand the number of students participating in JAWES from 85 to
102. The mission statement of SAASS is to produce strategists through
advanced education in the art and science of air, space, and cyberspace
power to defend the United States and protect its interest. One of the
means of identifying officers with the potential for high-level
strategic thinking is through the highly competitive selection process
for the school. ACSC also has a Distinguished Graduate program that
identifies the top 10 percent of the graduating class. This indicates
the individual has excelled in a program that is focused on producing
critical and strategic thinkers. This designation is entered into the
individual's training report that becomes a part of the permanent
personnel record.
Dr. Snyder. How do you specifically measure the quality of the
faculty and staff in the PME environment?
General Jackson. NOTE: Brigadier General Jackson has retired.
Answer is provided by Air Command and Staff College.
Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) measures quality based on
credentials at the time of appointment/assignment and performance on
elements or factors in the faculty member's work plan. We measure the
quality of faculty members in three distinct areas: teaching, research
and publication, and service. A strong faculty development program is
key in developing and sustaining a high quality faculty.
The college's unique mission requires a distinctive mix of faculty
qualifications and credentials. Traditional civilian academics provide
the depth and breadth of subject-matter expertise to guarantee the
academic rigor of the college's offerings while simultaneously ensuring
adherence to validated teaching theory and practice. Military officers
contribute unparalleled currency and expertise in the operational
topics so critical to the college's success.
ACSC sets high standards for its military faculty members to ensure
its high standards for educational excellence are never compromised.
Military faculty requirements are communicated to the Air Force
Personnel Center (AFPC) for use in assignment of individuals to faculty
duty at ACSC. With the unique hiring process (non-volunteers) for
active duty AF faculty members, we use their level of educational
credentials and prior professional experience to determine if they are
academically qualified (terminal degree) and/or professionally
qualified (graduate degree plus applicable professional experience).
Military members must have completed the appropriate levels of
professional military education (PME), functional-area education and
training, and offer expertise relevant to the College's core
curriculum. In addition, ACSC strives to ensure that 75 percent of its
military faculty members have completed intermediate or senior level
PME in residence or earned qualification as a Joint Specialty Officer
(JSO).
Our civilian faculty members are hired as academically qualified;
we recruit civilians based on their terminal degree and research
experience/interests in areas of expertise applicable to the ACSC
educational program. We expect all faculty members to continue their
professional development through professional activities such as
conference attendance, research and publications/presentations.
To ensure a continuous level of improvement in the execution of the
educational program (instruction) we use several feedback methods
including student assessment of instruction and peer/supervisor
observation and evaluation. Additionally, through our faculty
development colloquia, faculty members inform each other regarding
current events, classroom best practices and re-emphasize successful
instructional techniques.
Military faculty members are evaluated through the Air Force
personnel evaluation system and through annual instructional reviews
within the college or when a change in reporting official occurs. These
performance reports are completed in accordance with established Air
Force (or other Service) personnel policies using the appropriate
official form. Each civilian faculty member is evaluated based on three
primary criteria: teaching effectiveness; research, scholarship, and
publication; and service. Assessment of these criteria is based on the
work plan established for the individual at the beginning of the
appraisal cycle. Civilian faculty members' merit pay and cash/time off
awards are based on this assessment.
Dr. Snyder. How were you chosen to be school's commandant? How was
your dean chosen? Will you be retiring from this job? What background
should the Chief of Naval Operations be looking for in selecting
individuals for these positions? Should the focus be on operational
leadership skills or academic and teaching experience (not instructing
in a training institution) background or both?
General Jackson. NOTE: Brigadier General Jackson has retired.
Answer is provided by Air Command and Staff College.
The commandant and all military faculty members are selected
through the Air Force assignment system. The Air Force General Officer
Management Office works to ensure that a highly qualified individual is
selected to lead Air Command and Staff College (ACSC). There is no
academic qualification for the commandant (O-7 position). The
recommendation is coordinated with the Commander, Air Education and
Training Command, and presented to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force
for approval. The group reviews leadership, operational, and
educational experiences to identify an individual with appropriate
credentials to lead an educational program that is academically
accredited, steeped in joint operations, and that graduates students
who are agile, critical thinkers prepared to meet any challenge.
The ACSC Dean of Academic Affairs is coded in the personnel system
as an O-6 position requiring an advanced academic degree. The ACSC
Commandant, Spaatz Center Commander, and Air University Commander work
with the Air Force Colonel Management Office to identify Air Force O-6s
with advanced academic degrees who are eligible for reassignment. This
list is reviewed and bids placed for officers with credentials that
most closely align with the ACSC requirements and desires.
Brig Gen Jimmie C. Jackson, Jr., retired from the job after serving
2 years as the commandant. He was only the second commandant to retire
from the position over the last 30 years. The position is viewed as a
command-level position and individuals normally serve for a 2-year
period similar to other Air Force command assignments and move on to
other positions in the Air Force or Joint community.
The Chief of Staff of the Air Force should look for an individual
with strong leadership credentials and operational and educational
experiences that complement other Air University senior leadership.
This is important because of the synergies gained in having all officer
professional military education collocated in one location and
organization. At ACSC, the Commandant and Dean of Academic Affairs are
viewed as military leadership assignments. Focus should be on a balance
of operational leadership credentials and academic/military education
experience. Because of the diversity of the student body it is
important that the commandant articulate his/her leadership perspective
and share operational experience with the class.
Dr. Snyder. How should intermediate schools attract top-tier
civilian faculty? How do you specifically define top-tier? What are the
elements that would attract the highest quality of faculty--tenure,
copyright, resources, pay, ability to keep their government
retirements, research and administrative assistance, etc.?
General Jackson. NOTE: Brigadier General Jackson has retired.
Answer is provided by Air Command and Staff College.
Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) uses Title 10 U.S. Code
authority to hire civilian faculty members. Strategies for recruiting
and retaining civilian faculty members depend on ACSC's needs at the
time. The search must be comprehensive, transparent and consensus-
driven. In all aspects of the hiring process the objective should be a
comprehensive search of the best available candidates and a transparent
and inclusive hiring procedure that encourages maximum participation.
Comprehensive and rigorous recruitment and screening processes are used
to obtain civilian faculty members, assisted by the Civilian Personnel
Office in recruiting advertisements in USAJobs.Com, Chronicle of Higher
Education, and targeted professional journals. ACSC also directly
targets respected higher education institutions, professional
organizations and centers of excellence related to the discipline or
professional area of focus. ACSC also encourages current faculty
members to become recruiters at professional conferences and in their
research collaboration efforts. General criteria used for evaluating
candidates for initial appointment include professional competence, as
evidenced by educational achievement and experience (degrees earned or
other professional recognition); academic activity and service;
publishing record; evidence of effective teaching; reputation in a
field of academic or professional specialization; and promise of
significant contribution to the mission and operation of Air University
(AU) and its schools.
Defining ``top-tier'' faculty occurs within the relevant
disciplines and within the academic rank level being focused. Each
discipline and rank has its own specific criteria, but they always
involve a combination of scholarship, teaching and service. Top-tier
definition for young first-time faculty members are based more on
presumptive potential for effective teaching, research, and
consultation while those more mature in the discipline it is based on
demonstrated evidence. ACSC defines a top quality civilian faculty as
those who have: experience in the subject matter sought in the vacancy,
evidence of academic activity and service, a record of publication in
peer-reviewed outlets in the subject matter sought or related fields,
and evidence of outstanding teaching. Top tier faculty members within
professional military education are multi-role professionals who
possess military and/or civilian education credentials, are capable of
research and publishing, and effective teaching.
Degree-granting authority and regional accreditation play an
intrinsic role in attracting top-tier civilian faculty members.
Accreditation signifies high standards and serves as a common
denominator among academic institutions. High-caliber professors are
more likely to seek out teaching and research opportunities at
accredited institutions. Air University's accreditation has been a key
factor in enabling ACSC to continue to attract and retain top-tier
civilian faculty. Attracting top-tier faculty also requires a wide
range of incentives. No single incentive can be solely relied upon to
attract the quality of faculty required to educate intermediate-level
students. The best quality faculty members necessarily want to achieve
prominence and respect within their disciplines; therefore the elements
that attract the highest quality faculty are those elements that enable
them to achieve excellence in their discipline. Tenure is an issue for
some faculty candidates. There have been in the past some candidates
vying for vacant faculty positions who have either voiced their
concerns or withdrawn themselves from consideration after discovering
we do not have a tenure track. The most often cited benefits of a
tenure system would be to protect faculty members from the vagaries of
faculty management policy changes and to provide additional
reassurances on the promise of academic freedom. Academics respond to
attractions of pay and benefits no differently than other job seekers.
Support for research travel, technology support and flexibility in
establishing an individual's research agenda are important in
attracting some civilian faculty members.
Dr. Snyder. What are the policies at your school regarding academic
freedom? What is its proper role in a PME setting without tenure?
Describe how your faculty may be called upon to respond to press
inquiries in the field of expertise and whether and how they are
allowed to respond in a timely manner.
General Jackson. NOTE: Brigadier General Jackson has retired.
Answer is provided by Air Command and Staff College.
Air University (AU) has a clearly articulated policy on academic
freedom which is an amended form of the American Association of
University Professors (AAUP) definition of academic freedom. AU
Instruction 36-2308, Academic Freedom states:
``Air University faculty, students, and staff are members of a
learned profession, and members of their respective educational
organizations. The free exchange of opinions and ideas is
essential to the educational process and, to the greatest
extent possible, faculty, students, and staff are encouraged to
speak and write freely. Even in this academic setting, however,
the importance of the University's military mission requires
limits on some types of expression. For example, in accordance
with the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), commissioned
officers, officer trainees, and cadets may not use contemptuous
words toward the President, Vice President, Congress, the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force, and
others. In addition, military members may not make
disrespectful remarks about a superior commissioned officer,
nor may an enlisted member make a disrespectful statement
toward a superior noncommissioned officer. In addition to these
specific restrictions on military members, faculty, students,
and staff should remember that the public might judge the armed
forces or Air University by their spoken or written statements.
In any public forum, Air University faculty, students and staff
members should make every effort to indicate clearly that the
opinions they express are personal to the member, and do not
represent the official views of their organization, Air
University, the United States Air Force, the U.S. government,
or any other government or academic community.''
Academic freedom is further enhanced and safeguarded though AU's
policy of ``non-attribution.'' ACSC encourages guest lecturers, faculty
and students to state their opinions and support or offer critical
opinion of any objective, policy, strategy, or tactic while pursuing
knowledge, understanding, and improvement of the military profession.
In the articulation and defense of ideas and positions on issues,
individuals should endeavor to be accurate, should show respect for the
opinions of others and should make every effort to indicate they do not
speak for the university. It is acceptable to say ``a previous
speaker'' made a particular statement, but the speaker's identity may
not be divulged without permission.
The role of academic freedom is equally important in tenure and
non-tenure environments. Although ACSC civilian faculty members do not
receive tenure ACSC ensures procedures are in place to safeguard and
protect academic freedom. This is foundational to the full freedom of
research and the publication of the results. Academic freedom is
fundamental in producing students who are agile, critical thinkers
capable of leveraging new ideas in the complex and fast-paced
environment of military operations. Freedom for faculty to discuss
their subject in the educational setting is key to the critical thought
process.
AU faculty members are called upon to respond to the press
regarding matters in their respective field(s) of expertise and they
are encouraged to respond in a timely manner. The only limitation to
any response concerns discussions of sensitive subjects and, depending
on the scope of the request, coordination with senior-level Public
Affairs staff may be appropriate. In addition, notifying supervisors
and leadership of the press inquiry is standard practice. How faculty
respond depends on the manner in which a request is made; for instance,
whether through direct contact with the faculty member or through a
request to Public Affairs. Faculty members may respond independently or
may request Public Affairs facilitation. All requests are handled with
utmost awareness of press deadlines and every effort is made to respond
in a timely manner.
Dr. Snyder. Acquisition reforms all call for more of the general
purpose forces to be educated and trained in understanding contracting
and contractors. Civilians, contracting, and contractors on the
battlefield--how much do officers, outside the acquisition workforce,
need to know?
General Jackson. NOTE: Brigadier General Jackson has retired.
Answer is provided by Air Command and Staff College.
A general understanding of the acquisition and budgeting processes
is appropriate because of the staffing and leadership roles that Air
Command and Staff College (ACSC) graduates fill. ACSC addresses the
acquisition reforms/issues through readings, lectures, and seminar
discussion. The key focus is the impact of having the right equipment,
at the right time to fly, fight, and win in air, space, and cyberspace.
Discussions of the impact of civilians and contractors on the
battlefield are included in our warfare studies courses and the
leadership and command lessons. These discussions are incorporated into
the learning area objective related to the role and perspective of the
combatant commander and staff in developing various theater policies,
strategies and plans, and building partnerships.
Dr. Snyder. Regarding languages, regional studies, and cultural
competency--how much can be taught at the intermediate level and for
what purpose? What feedback have you been receiving from your students
on your foreign language training? What changes have you effected on
the basis of that feedback?
General Jackson. NOTE: Brigadier General Jackson has retired and
the answer is provided by Air Command and Staff College.
Modern leaders need to grasp the broader context of modern military
operations, comprehending both the challenges and opportunities that
confront the United States in the 21st Century. They must also
understand the security policies, national planning systems and
resulting strategies through which the U.S. will employ instruments of
power to engage regionally and globally. This involves regional
studies, development of cultural competency and a familiarization or
understanding of the nuances of languages in a region.
Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) responded to the Chief of
Staff of the Air Force initiative to introduce language training into
the college's curriculum in Academic Year 2007. During the first 2
years of implementation the program consisted of completing an assigned
number of language software modules in Rosetta Stone in one of the four
strategic languages (Spanish, French, Mandarin Chinese or Arabic).
Students were required to take the Defense Language Aptitude Battery
Test as a data point in determining which languages students were
vectored to. Students were offered optional use of Defense Language
Institute's (DLI) mobile training teams. The program for Academic Year
2010 will shift to a mandatory program of 30 hours of face-to-face
mediated instruction with DLI instructors. Software tools will be
available to students to supplement classroom instruction.
Surveys of students conducted at the end of the language
familiarization program and at graduation revealed some of the lowest
levels of satisfaction of all the areas measured. ACSC's assessment of
the program indicated that it is very difficult to gain language
proficiency within the time allotted for the program without
significantly impacting the critical time needed to focus on the core
curriculum. The college now uses the term ``language familiarization''
and ``language enhancement'' to describe the language program. The Air
Force vision is to focus language capability development and
proficiency earlier in an individual's career and provide enhancing
opportunities throughout the career. The Air Force Culture and Language
Center located at Air University provides the strategic leadership and
guidance for the language program.
ACSC's Regional and Cultural Studies course focuses specifically on
regional and cultural competencies. Tools for understanding and
interacting with and within other cultures and the broad regional
differences are a major component of the course. ACSC has introduced
culture-general and culture-specific concepts and skills and integrated
them into the existing curriculum. This course has also improved the
integration of the over 70 International Officer students into the
educational process of understanding regions and cultures.
Dr. Snyder. Please provide your school's mission statement.
Colonel Damm. Informed by the study of history and culture, Command
and Staff College (CSC) educates and trains its joint, multinational,
and interagency professionals in order to produce skilled warfighting
leaders able to overcome diverse 21st Century security challenges.
Dr. Snyder. How have ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
affected the quality of military faculty members? What is your average
tour length for military faculty members? Have the credentials of
military faculty in terms of graduate degrees and JQO qualifications
diminished during this period? What is the percentage of military
faculty who are fully JQO qualified?
Colonel Damm. How have ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
affected the quality of military faculty members? I would say that the
ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have positively affected the
quality of military faculty members. We now have a generation of field
grade officers with multiple deployments in combat environments--
nothing beats experience and the subsequent ability to pass along that
knowledge to the next level of warfighter.
What is your average tour length for military faculty members? The
average tour length for military faculty members is two years. Over the
last several years the tour length for the majority of Marine faculty
has been only one year, but it is a good news story. This is because
the rate of selection for promotion to O-6 and selection for Command
has been very high among our Marine faculty and, once they are
selected, they are reassigned. The College and Marine Corps University
have made the conscious decision to accept capability over continuity;
we ``hire'' highly competitive Officers as our Instructors. As long as
the level of quality among the Marine faculty remains high, we will
live with the fact that some may be leaving earlier than they otherwise
are slated.
Have the credentials of military faculty in terms of graduate
degrees and JQO qualifications diminished during this period? No, the
credentials of military faculty in terms of graduate degrees and JQO
qualifications have not diminished as the services, and the Marine
Corps in particular, has continued to promote officer professional
military education during this period of high operational tempo.
What is the percentage of military faculty who are fully JQO
qualified?
Fifty percent of our Military teaching faculty are JQO.
Dr. Snyder. Are the services and agencies filling their assigned
billets for faculty? What are your gaps?
Colonel Damm. Yes, the sister services and agencies are fulfilling
their assigned billets for our faculty. At present we have two United
States Air Force (USAF) officers, two United States Army (USA)
officers, two United States Navy (USN) officers, and one International
Military Officer (IMO) from Norway on staff here at CSC. This is in
addition to the twelve United States Marine Corps (USMC) officers,
eighteen Terminally Degreed civilian faculty members, and a number of
adjunct Marine Corps University (MCU) chair faculty available to our
student population.
At present, I would not say that we have any identifiable gaps
within our faculty as we are as strong as we have ever been in the
history of our school.
Dr. Snyder. To what extent has the curriculum enhanced its coverage
of Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR)
Operations given that DOD has put them on a par with combat operations?
Colonel Damm. Prior to 2005 approximately 17% of the curriculum was
dedicated coverage of Irregular Warfare subject matter. Beginning with
Academic Year 2005-2006, Marine Corps Command and Staff College began
implementing a comprehensive redesign of its curriculum in response to
emerging lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq with the objective of
maintaining the highest degree of currency and relevancy with regard to
the challenges and opportunities of the contemporary security
environment. Now in its fifth year, this effort has yielded impressive
results as they relate to the coverage of irregular warfare, to include
both counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and Stability, Security,
Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations. In the Operational Art
(OpArt) and Culture and Interagency Operations (CIAO) lines of
operation, fully 47% of total curriculum hours (164 of 348) are
dedicated to these subjects for AY09-10. This coursework provides
students with extensive exposure to the historical, social, and
cultural factors that influence the application of all instruments of
national power during operations. Likewise, our leadership line of
operation provides coverage in 144 out of 318 total hours (45%)
including courses in negotiations, ethics in a COIN environment, and
strategic communications. Finally, the Warfighting . . . from the Sea
(WFTS) line of operation dedicates 237 of 563 hours (42%) to these
topics, to include an entire, seminar-based block of instruction on
Irregular Warfare, complemented by two major practical application
exercises focused on campaign planning for long-term stability and
security. The first of these, COINEX, is based on an historical
scenario set in the Long An Province of South Vietnam during the period
1969-1972. The second, more comprehensive, ``living'' exercise (NINE
INNINGS) is based on current events in a country in the SOUTHCOM area
of responsibility and involves the development of a ``whole of
government'' interagency campaign plan that fosters stability and
security and advances U.S. strategic interests in the region. Overall,
Marine Corps Command & Staff College dedicates 545 of 1229 curriculum
hours (44%) to irregular warfare-related subject matter. This total
does not include the electives block, which also includes a number of
electives that deal directly with these subjects.
Dr. Snyder. Describe the scenarios that you use for your simulation
exercises and war games. To what extent do they incorporate SSTR and
irregular warfare concepts? [Question #5, for cross-reference.]
Colonel Damm.
BARBARY DAGGER OVERVIEW
COURSE DESCRIPTION. As the second block of instruction (of eight)
Warfighting . . . From the Sea (WFTS) practical application Exercise
BARBARY DAGGER provides students with an opportunity to employ the
Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP) in a relatively simple scenario
against an opponent employing ``traditional'' methods. The focus of
this exercise is on the planning process itself, with the goal of
ensuring that all students have a grasp of the Marine Corps' approach
to planning, and of the basic planning ``toolkit'' as outlined in the
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Planning lesson within the MAGTF
Operations block. Employing a ``crawl, walk, run'' approach, this
exercise begins to lay the intellectual foundation for the more
sophisticated planning exercises that follow. Though this exercise
scenario exists in a ``traditional'' setting the student will be
exposed to and discuss how to deal with challenges associated with a
locally displaced or disrupted population that may be hostile or
belligerent to the U.S. military presence. 69 hours are dedicated to
this block of instruction with basic incorporation of SSTR and
irregular warfare concepts.
PACIFIC CHALLENGE OVERVIEW
COURSE DESCRIPTION. As the fourth block of instruction (of eight)
WFTS practical application Exercise PACIFIC CHALLENGE provides students
with an opportunity to build upon the knowledge obtained during
Exercise BARBARY DAGGER to employ the MCPP in a more complex, MEF-level
operational planning scenario against an opponent employing
``traditional'' methods. The focus of this exercise is not only on the
continued refinement of student understanding of the planning process
itself, but also on the viability and sophistication of the proposed
solution(s). As the last ``traditional'' planning problem for AY09-10,
it provides students with a thorough test of their understanding of the
Marine Corps' approach to planning and of the basic planning
``toolkit'' as outlined in previous coursework. Future planning
exercises will require the adaptation of these basic tools to meet
irregular challenges. 93 hours are dedicated to this block of
instruction with basic incorporation of SSTR and irregular warfare
concepts.
COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN) EXERCISE OVERVIEW
COURSE DESCRIPTION. Building on previous coursework and practical
application exercises on the Marine Corps approach to planning and the
MCPP, and augmented by the lessons provided during WFTS Block 5
(Irregular Warfare) and related Culture and Interagency Operations
(CIAO) and Operational Art (OpArt) seminars on Vietnam, this sixth
block of instruction (of eight) WFTS practical application (COIN
Exercise) provides students with an opportunity to adapt the basic
planning ``tool kit'' to address the unique characteristics and
challenges of irregular operations. The COIN Exercise introduces
students to the seminal problem of our day: the conduct of ``whole of
government'' campaign design and planning to address an unstructured
problem posed by an enemy employing irregular methods. The objective is
the ``hearts and minds'' of a contested population rather than terrain
captured or enemy units destroyed; more precisely, the challenge
centers on the establishment and maintenance of the mechanisms of
political control over a population--all in competition with similar
mechanisms that define the political and social alternative offered by
a thinking enemy. 54 hours are dedicated to this block of instruction
with thorough incorporation of SSTR and irregular warfare concepts.
NATIONAL RESPONSE TO CATASTROPHIC AND DISRUPTIVE THREAT EXERCISE
OVERVIEW
COURSE DESCRIPTION. WFTS Block 7, National Response to Catastrophic
and Disruptive Threats (NRCDT) block of instruction, is designed to
educate mid-career professionals in the myriad of threats to the
homeland, the organizations and plans in place that drive DoD support
in these scenarios, and the challenges associated with joint crisis
action planning to support a national response to a catastrophic
incident. Developed in partnership with the Joint Staff J-8 (Joint
Requirements Office-CBRN), United States Joint Forces Command's Joint
Warfighting Center, and Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS), this
experience familiarizes students with the military's role in domestic
consequent management planning and execution. The methods used to
achieve these educational objectives include lectures, seminars, and
selected readings, all of which lay the intellectual foundation
necessary to conduct the culminating event of the block--a student
practical exercise involving interagency representatives from the
state, local and federal levels. The end state is to prepare students
to serve as future commanders and staff officers in units that may be
called upon to support USNORTHCOM in responding to a natural or man-
made disaster. Though this scenario takes place within CONUS the
students are required to think through how to support USNORTHCOM in
dealing with security and stability type situation that might occur due
to a disaster within the borders of the United States. 39 hours are
dedicated to this block of instruction with aspects similar to SSTR.
NINE INNINGS OVERVIEW
COURSE DESCRIPTION. Building on all previous seminar-based
coursework and practical application exercises within the WFTS line of
operations (LOO), and augmented by the material covered in the CIAO,
Op-Art and Leadership LOOs, the final WFTS practical application
exercise (Exercise NINE INNINGS) is designed to test student
understanding of all of the material covered during the Command & Staff
College academic year . . . and then some. Students will be challenged
to think critically about, and to develop viable solutions for, a
myriad of problems that fall well outside of the typical officer's
intellectual comfort zone; to demonstrate their ability, to use General
Petreaus' words, to serve as `` `pentathlete leaders'--individuals who,
metaphorically speaking, are not just sprinters or shot putters but can
do it all.'' The exercise affords an opportunity, in an unclassified
venue and working with our counterparts from within the interagency, to
develop a ``whole of government'' plan for confronting a range of
issues centered on a country within SOUTHCOM AOR, to include the loss
of U.S. influence in the region, transnational terrorism, multiple
insurgencies, the potential for civil war, and the threat of a broader
regional conflict with emerging powers. It is a ``living exercise'' in
that it relies on existing conditions/events--as gleaned from various
open source venues--rather than a pre-scripted, canned scenario.
Students will serve as planners in a Joint Interagency Planning
Group (JIPG), co-chaired by Senior Mentors playing the roles of the
U.S. Ambassador and the Commander of the Combined Joint Interagency
Task Force (CJIATF). The mission of the JIPG is to design a four-year,
``Phase 0'' interagency campaign plan that fosters stability and
security in the country and advances U.S. strategic interests in the
region. A number of resources will be made available to the students to
support the accomplishment of these daunting tasks, to include the
large-scale participation of Subject Matter Experts from a wide variety
of joint, combined, interagency, NGO, media, think tank, and academic
organizations. However, all of these resources merely supplement the
issue at hand--one final opportunity to apply critical and creative
thinking to a challenging, contemporary operational problem. 115 hours
are dedicated to this block of instruction with thorough incorporation
of SSTR and irregular warfare concepts.
Dr. Snyder. Please provide the most recent survey results from your
graduates and their supervisors. [Question #6, for cross-reference.]
Colonel Damm. The raw data collected by our Marine Corps University
survey section from graduates and supervisors is included as an
enclosure following these questions.
[The information referred to is retained in the committee files and
can be viewed upon request.]
Dr. Snyder. The intermediate level schools lost Joint Duty credit
for their non-host service military faculty in the 2007 National
Defense Authorization Act. We know that the tours of those who were
grandfathered are ending. What will the effect of this be? How will it
affect the quality of your faculty? How important is it that these JDAL
positions be restored? Do the instructors truly get a joint experience?
Colonel Damm. The requirement for Joint Duty in the National
Defense Authorization Act is an important one for the growth and
training of our forces. As we have added this necessary requirement, we
need to realize the benefits of a well-rounded Officer as we find ways
to allow them to fulfill the requirement. To understand your own
warfighting culture, you must experience it first; only then can you
represent your service position as you branch out into the other
services. To do that, you need time. My own example would be I had to
learn how to fly my own aircraft before I could shift my focus to
training others how to fly. If we let Officers get joint credit at
other service institutions, we satisfy a requirement for them to attain
Flag Officer rank without requiring another tour outside their
respective service. In the Marine Corps, we look at an Officer file and
check for credibility in his own Military Occupational Specialty before
we promote that Officer or send them to school. The effect of not
receiving joint credit as an ``exchange'' instructor is that the
quality of the Officers may suffer as there is no incentive other than
wanting to learn more about another service. It is very important to
restore joint credit so we can continue to attract high quality
Officers to our respective programs.
Officers do get joint experience. First they must immerse
themselves in other service culture to learn and then teach in each
curriculum. As an example, one of the first things in our program of
instruction is the Marine Corps Planning Process; it is our baseline.
We have Army, Navy and Air Force Officers teaching that process. The
absolutely best way to learn is to teach. They are also inculcated with
our culture beginning with faculty development in the weeks before the
students arrive. Development included visits to an amphibious ship and
a wing to not just talk about a Marine Air Ground Task Force, but to
show a Marine Air Ground Task Force. The year is truly a joint
experience.
Dr. Snyder. Describe your school's use of historical case studies
to teach strategy.
Colonel Damm. The Command and Staff College is an intermediate-
level school within the hierarchy of professional military education.
As such, it is expected to educate its students in matters relating
primarily to the Operational Level of War, that is, the level that
forms the bridge between strategy and tactics. The level at which
campaigns are planned. The level of the Combatant Commander. The
College's mission is not focused primarily on teaching strategy. In the
course of establishing and examining the context in which campaigns are
planned and executed it is necessary to examine both strategy and
strategic issues and tactics and tactical issues. In all of these areas
case studies play an important educational role. Marine Corps Doctrinal
Publication 1-1, Strategy (Italics), broadly defines strategy as the
process of interrelating ends and means. Through a series of lectures
and seminars, reinforced by case studies and practical applications,
the College requires the students to examine the relationships between
ends and means. Students read and discuss the National Security
Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, the National Military
Strategy, among other strategic issues, as part of their understanding
of the context of the current operating environment. The planning
processes they learn and employ in practical exercises during the year
are all about defining the ``ways'' in which ends and means will be
reconciled. The precise character of the various exercises conducted at
the College are explained in response to Question #5. In the
Operational Art and Culture and Interagency Operations courses they
examine historical and contemporary situations ranging from, for
example, the British experiences confronting the Malayan Emergency from
1948-1960, or the French Experience in Algeria, 1954-1962, or the
American experiences in Operations DESERT STORM, ENDURING FREEDOM or
IRAQI FREEDOM, or the Allied dilemmas in defining the modern Middle-
East in the aftermath of World War I, the challenges of bringing
stability to post-War Japan and Germany in 1945, the responses to
insurgency in the Huk rebellion in the Philippines, or the interagency
challenges of the current array of overseas contingency operations. In
these and other cases the questions associated with reconciling ends,
ways, and means are central to seminar discussion. So the College
contributes to the development of strategic thinkers and the College
does teach strategy, although not in quite the structured way that the
sub-committee's question suggests.
Dr. Snyder. What is the process for renewal and non-renewal of the
faculty? How transparent is the system? In a tenure system people think
the faculty members have all the power, in a non-tenure system it
appears that the school has unlimited power. How do you avoid these
extremes? [Question #9, for cross-reference.]
Colonel Damm. Civilian faculty members are hired under Title 10
authority granted to the President of Marine Corps University by the
Secretary of the Navy. Civilian faculty members are offered a one, two
or three-year appointment based on the needs of the college and the
individual's qualifications. New civilian faculty members undergo a
one-year probationary period during which their performance is
evaluated. During the period, they are supervised and counseled on a
periodic basis regarding their performance by the Director and the Dean
of Academics.
The faculty evaluation and renewal system is extremely transparent
to the individual. He/she will receive periodic counseling as well as
an annual performance appraisal. Renewals can be for periods of one,
two, or three years. The College's informal policy has been to offer
three year renewals. At least seven months prior to the end of the
faculty member's appointment, the Director of the College recommends to
the President of the University whether the faculty member's
appointment should be renewed and for what period of time. If the
University does not intend to retain an individual, the individual will
be formally and informally counseled regarding his/her substandard
performance and be given the means to improve. If he/she fails to
improve, his/her performance appraisal will document the fact and state
the reason for termination.
To avoid arbitrariness, the College leadership manages the civilian
faculty in an upfront and forthright manner, providing maximum
transparency while maintaining open, two-way lines of communication.
First, the College ensures that all rules governing policies and
procedures are clearly delineated and equitably applied. Each faculty
member is provided a College Faculty Handbook and Marine Corps
University Title 10 Faculty Handbook which outlines the policies for
the handling of reappointments, terminations, appeals, and grievances.
Second, demonstrating its long-term commitment to its faculty,
despite the absence of a formal program of tenure, the College invests
time and funds into an aggressive faculty development program. The
program seeks to advance faculty members' abilities through
participation in functional area and academic meetings, panels,
conferences, symposium, field studies, courses, and classes. By
investing in each faculty member's development, the College develops a
stronger cadre of instructors while recognizing the symbiotic and
mutually supportive relationship between the individual and the
institution.
All but one of the College's civilian faculty members possess a
Doctorate degree. The sole exception is the Deputy Head of the
College's Warfighting Section. The individual is a former career
officer in the Air Force whose professional background and experiences
made him the ideal choice to fill this newly created position. He has
multiple Master's Degrees but it is his professional military expertise
that made him the proper individual for this non-teaching position.
The benefits or pitfalls of a tenure system have never been issues
at the College. During the interviews for prospective faculty, the
process of hiring and renewals is explained to applicants so they
understand how the system works. Since 1992, when the Title 10 faculty
began to be hired, only one faculty member has been released prior to
the completion of an appointment. Currently there are several civilian
faculty who left tenured positions in civilian academic institutions to
join the College faculty because of the opportunity to work in the kind
of forward-looking and supportive educational environment that we have
been able to establish and maintain over the past 17 years.
Dr. Snyder. What is your school's role in identifying promising
officers with the potential for high-level strategic thinking at the
appropriate point in their careers?
Colonel Damm. During our Academic year we identify students with
the potential for strategic thinking as candidates for the School of
Advanced Warfighting. They must go through an interview process and be
selected to attend this resident follow-on school. A notable graduate
of this school is LtGen John Allen, currently the Deputy Commanding
General of CENTRAL COMMAND, hand selected by General Petraeus to be his
Deputy. We also acknowledge superior performance in our students
through our Distinguished Graduate and Writing Programs. Many of these
students are indentified as potential future instructors by our Faculty
(both Military and Civilian). The corporate memory resides in our
civilian instructors as many have been here for many years, as names
come up for military faculty, we use them as the ultimate litmus test.
Dr. Snyder. How do you specifically measure the quality of the
faculty and staff in the PME environment?
Colonel Damm. I think this question may be asked incorrectly . . .
the Faculty, both military and civilian, are ``hired'' because of their
quality. That quality is measured by looking into their professional
and academic experiences. Then we ``measure'' their quality by how they
impart our constantly evolving curriculum to our student body. The
``measurement'' is how the student body does; papers, exercises, and
outside accolades of their work (one of our students has been the
recipient of the Secretary of Defense writing award two years running).
We monitor each other through our Director, Deputy and Academic Dean as
we attend seminar. Another method of measurement is through student
surveys, something included in this document at question #6. We read
every word of those surveys and after deliberation, implement changes
when necessary.
Dr. Snyder. How were you chosen to be school's commandant? How was
your dean chosen? Will you be retiring from this job? What background
should the Chief of Naval Operations be looking for in selecting
individuals for these positions? Should the focus be on operational
leadership skills or academic and teaching experience (not instructing
in a training institution) background or both?
Colonel Damm. The Academic Dean came from the Civilian Faculty as
delineated in the next paragraph. I was chosen by the Commandant of the
Marine Corps from a number of names submitted by Manpower to the
President of Marine Corps University. From that list, Active Duty
Marines are recommended by the President and forwarded to the
Commandant for his approval. My view is that individuals should be
chosen for the important responsibility of training future leaders of
all of our services and agencies based on both their operational and
educational background. It is not just an academic responsibility. The
Director should have a professional pedigree students can relate to and
admire. In my case, although an aviator, I have commanded a squadron in
combat and have attended both resident intermediate level education and
top level school. I am also JPME II qualified and have joint credit.
The only service I have not served personally with is the Coast Guard,
although I have attended resident school with Coast Guard Officers. The
Commandant should look at well rounded Officers who have shown a
penchant for life-long learning and are credentialed in their Military
Occupational Specialty as Commanders and operators; they will command
the respect of their students.
My intention is to retire out of this position merely due to
service limitations and non-selection to O-7. Promotion to Flag Officer
has happened from this position and from some of our other schools, but
not in my case; but, the selection rate to General Officer in the
Marine Corps is a very small percentage of the O-6's eligible so that
is not an indictment of the system at all, it is just the way it is.
The benefit is my career brings 29 years of leadership and learning to
this billet, and I am still excited about being a part of the Marine
Corps.
The current dean of academics was hired as an associate dean in
1992, after a career of 24 years of active service in the United States
Army. That service included considerable time in operational
assignments, but also included service on the faculties of both West
Point and the Army's Command and General Staff College in teaching,
curriculum design and development, and leadership positions. He also
possessed a terminal degree from an outstanding university. The dean of
academics of the college at that time was an active duty Marine O-6. In
1998, when the College was about to name its 5th military dean in 6
years, the Director named the civilian associate dean previously
described to assume the position of dean of academics. In other words
he promoted from within. Subsequently the position has been validated
as a civilian, Title 10, GM-15 (Colonel equivalent) position and the
Marine Corps University has put the active duty O-6 billet to use
elsewhere.
Dr. Snyder. How should intermediate schools attract top-tier
civilian faculty? How do you specifically define top-tier? What are the
elements that would attract the highest quality of faculty--tenure,
copyright, resources, pay, ability to keep their government
retirements, research and administrative assistance, etc.?
Colonel Damm. Our definition of a ``top quality'' civilian faculty
member is a scholar and educator who possesses 1) expertise in his/her
respective field of study, 2) operational experience in curriculum-
related areas, 3) a general knowledge of adult educational methodology
and most importantly, 4) a passion for developing curriculum and
teaching our unique type of student. Such an individual should possess
a terminal degree, yet remain a life-long student of his/her craft,
continuously pursuing greater understanding of the subject through
reading, research, reflection, and participation in scholarly form. He/
she should be proficient in written and oral communications, able to
translate complex issues into understandable terms applicable to any
audience--students or scholars.
The principal attractions for top notch people to join the College
faculty are intangible. There is much to be said for being paid a fair
and equitable salary and participating in a good retirement program.
The University is committed to doing that so that we do not under value
those who we hire. There is also much to be said for being located in
the area of the Nation's capitol with the attendant access to
organizations and people that further research and enrichment in
academic disciplines. Tenure is a topic already addressed in response
to Question #9. But the most compelling attractions for top-tier
faculty have to do with three things. The first and foremost reason is
our experienced, aggressive, and motivated professional students.
Having the privilege of being involved with their professional and
intellectual development is enormously attractive to top notch faculty.
Second, the quality of faculty, both military and civilian, is
compelling to those who perhaps have not worked in such a collegial
environment. Third, the combination of the two previous factors has
created over time a well deserved reputation for excellence that makes
people want to be part of who the College is and what the college does.
Dr. Snyder. What are the policies at your school regarding academic
freedom? What is its proper role in a PME setting without tenure?
Describe how your faculty may be called upon to respond to press
inquiries in the field of expertise and whether and how they are
allowed to respond in a timely manner.
Colonel Damm. All candidates for positions at the College are asked
their definitions of academic freedom during their interviews. They are
also asked whether or not they believe they will have any difficulty
reconciling their sense of what academic freedom means in a military
environment. The definition of academic freedom commonly expressed is
couched in terms of being able to state judgments, do research, publish
the results of that research, based on evidence, without fear of
retribution or sanction. Faculty recognize that there are, and should
be, boundaries defined by professional courtesy, common decency, and
security classifications. Otherwise they are free to stimulate free and
open discussion. Our faculty have never expressed any concerns about
being limited in their academic freedoms. In fact, those who have more
recent experience in the civilian academic world have testified that
the environment at the College is more conducive to true academic
freedom than the institutions where they previously taught, which might
have cloaked particular agendas in the garb of academic freedom.
Lack of tenure does not affect the ``academic freedom'' enjoyed by
the faculty of the College. We believe that ``academic freedom'' is
fostered by a positive organizational culture, not guaranteed
employment. It springs from an academic environment in which faculty
and students alike are encouraged to voice their judgments on any
relevant subjects in open, scholarly debate without risk of rebuke or
reprisal. Such judgments should be expressed in a well-researched,
well-reasoned, and rationale manner, based on valid, empirical data and
devoid of emotion. The College's strict non-attribution policy also
safeguards academic freedom. It allows faculty, students and guest
speakers voice their thoughts without fear of further dissemination.
As an institution manned by a number of leader scholars, we have
continuous requests for our faculty to join seminars or respond to the
press. We endeavor to allow them to do as much as possible as long as
it does not interfere with their primary responsibility of teaching our
students. We are now blessed with a large enough quality faculty to
cover down if there is a requirement for one of our Conference Group
leaders to be out. As for requests from the press, we just ask that a
disclaimer be added that their comments reflect their own opinions and
not those necessarily endorsed by the school. We consider requests for
our faculty as part of our outreach program, necessary for the academic
growth of our faculty as well as a good news story about our
University.
Dr. Snyder. Acquisition reforms all call for more of the general
purpose forces to be educated and trained in understanding contracting
and contractors. Civilians, contracting, and contractors on the
battlefield--how much do officers, outside the acquisition workforce,
need to know?
Colonel Damm. We approach this problem from the view that
contractors on the battlefield come in all shapes and forms. They can
sometimes be lumped in to the interagency or non-governmental groups we
have turned to for many of the day to day requirements our forces need
to operate. It is most prevalent on our final exercise NINE INNINGS
where we have our students build a campaign plan for engagement using a
real country and real time unclassified information. During that
exercise, we bring in numerous subject matter experts (including
contractors) to expand the students understanding of the operational
environment before them. As a side note, this academic year we will be
partnering with SOUTHCOM to set two hundred minds loose in their area
or responsibility, in the Central American countries of Guatemala and
Honduras (we actually chose this area before the current coup).
Dr. Snyder. Regarding languages, regional studies, and cultural
competency--how much can be taught at the intermediate level and for
what purpose? What feedback have you been receiving from your students
on your foreign language training? What changes have you effected on
the basis of that feedback?
Colonel Damm. Our language program has undergone a number of
changes due to our looking at the program and realizing we were not
reaping the benefits we desired. The options are either a full year
language course as part of the curriculum, or some other language
program tied in to a cultural immersion program. The first program
would be the best as long as it was tied to an Officers career, as
studies show one year of language without continuous practice after the
fact is a poor investment. It would also, if the program wasn't tied to
past language capability, require us to drop something from our
curriculum. The Marine Corps is looking at tying a young Lieutenant to
a specific area as a life long area of expertise, to include language
training. That is under review at this time. The benefit of a language
and cultural immersion is where we believe we can do the most good for
the Marine Corps and the individual Marines as language is a tremendous
component of culture. We bring in the Defense Language Institute (DLI)
(the teaching specialist in language indoctrination) in the beginning
of the year and immerse our students in a particular language.
Throughout the year, students are expected to practice their skills
through different available language training software. In the Spring,
we bring back DLI and refresh our students, and then have them engage
in a Negotiation exercise. In the exercise, students must communicate
in a rudimentary fashion to a non-English speaker in the chosen
language and eventually turn over the negation to an interpreter. Last
academic year was our first using this methodology. The initial
feedback was very positive, but we would like to check that feedback
against a later survey after things have sunk in for a little while.