[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
OPTIONS AND ISSUES FOR NASA'S
HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT PROGRAM: REPORT
OF THE ``REVIEW OF U.S. HUMAN SPACE
FLIGHT PLANS'' COMMITTEE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 15, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-51
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.science.house.gov
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chair
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois RALPH M. HALL, Texas
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California Wisconsin
DAVID WU, Oregon LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
BEN R. LUJAN, New Mexico RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
PAUL D. TONKO, New York BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
JIM MATHESON, Utah BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri PETE OLSON, Texas
BARON P. HILL, Indiana
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
KATHLEEN DAHLKEMPER, Pennsylvania
ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
SUZANNE M. KOSMAS, Florida
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
VACANCY
C O N T E N T S
September 15, 2009
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Bart Gordon, Chairman, Committee on
Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.......... 29
Written Statement............................................ 30
Statement by Representative Ralph M. Hall, Minority Ranking
Member, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 31
Written Statement............................................ 33
Prepared Statement by Representative Jerry F. Costello, Member,
Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 34
Prepared Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson,
Member, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 35
Prepared Statement by Representative Gabrielle Giffords,
Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on
Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.......... 35
Prepared Statement by Representative Harry E. Mitchell, Member,
Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 37
Panel I:
Mr. Norman R. Augustine, Chair, Review of U.S. Human Space Flight
Plans Committee
Oral Statement............................................... 37
Written Statement............................................ 39
Biography.................................................... 42
Discussion
Constellation Program Status................................... 43
Future Options for NASA........................................ 45
Closing the Shuttle/Ares Gap................................... 45
Evaluating Crew Safety......................................... 46
Viability of the Commercial Sector to Support NASA Human Space
Flight....................................................... 48
Importance of Funding Human Space Flight....................... 50
Should the Columbia Accident Investigation Board Findings Apply
to All Human Space Flight?................................... 50
Concerns About Commission's Findings........................... 52
Finding Extra $3 Billion for NASA.............................. 54
Implications of Canceling Ares I............................... 56
Consequences of Not Increasing NASA's Budget................... 56
ISS and Mars................................................... 57
Comments on Commission's Findings.............................. 59
Determining the $3 Billion Increase............................ 60
Risks of Commercial Ventures................................... 61
NASA Skills and R&D............................................ 62
Workforce Sustainability....................................... 64
Space Shuttle Recertification.................................. 65
Possibilities Without $3B Increase............................. 66
Inspiring Students With NASA's Current Budget.................. 66
Serving President Kennedy's Vision for the Space Program....... 67
Has NASA Ever Been Fully Funded?............................... 69
International Cooperation for Human Space Flight............... 70
American Leadership in Space................................... 71
Current State of NASA.......................................... 72
Panel II:
Vice Admiral Joseph W. Dyer, USN (Ret.), Chair, Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel, NASA; President, Government & Industrial Robots
Division, iRobot Corporation
Oral Statement............................................... 74
Written Statement............................................ 76
Biography.................................................... 79
Dr. Michael D. Griffin, Eminent Scholar and Professor, Mechanical
and Aerospace Engineering, University of Alabama, Huntsville
Oral Statement............................................... 79
Written Statement............................................ 81
Discussion
Shuttle Extension.............................................. 87
Constellation Program With Budget Augmentation................. 87
Effect of NASA Budget Cuts..................................... 88
Commercial Transportation to the ISS........................... 90
Transforming NASA Expertise to Private Industry................ 92
Continuation of Constellation Development...................... 93
Budget Limitations and Miscalculation.......................... 94
Methodology of Cost Assessments................................ 96
Completion Dates for Constellation............................. 96
Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Mr. Norman R. Augustine, Chair, Review of U.S. Human Space Flight
Plans Committee 100
Vice Admiral Joseph W. Dyer, USN (Ret.), Chair, Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel, NASA; President, Government & Industrial Robots
Division, iRobot Corporation 110
Dr. Michael D. Griffin, Eminent Scholar and Professor, Mechanical
and Aerospace Engineering, University of Alabama, Huntsville 113
Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record
Letter to The Honorable Gabrielle Giffords from Gary P. Pulliam,
Vice President, The Aerospace Corporation, dated March 19, 2010 119
OPTIONS AND ISSUES FOR NASA'S HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT PROGRAM: REPORT OF THE
``REVIEW OF U.S. HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT PLANS'' COMMITTEE
----------
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 2009
House of Representatives,
Committee on Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in Room
2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bart Gordon
[Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
hearing charter
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Options and Issues for NASA's
Human Space Flight Program: Report
of the ``Review of U.S. Human Space
Flight Plans'' Committee
tuesday, september 15, 2009
2:00 p.m.-4:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
I. Purpose
To examine the summary report of the Review of U.S. Human Space
Flight Plans Committee that was established by the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) under the direction of the Office of
Science and Technology Policy, and to consider implications and related
issues for NASA.
II. Witnesses
Panel I
Mr. Norman Augustine, Chair, Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans
Committee
Panel II
Vice Admiral Joe Dyer USN (Ret.), Chair, Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel, NASA
Dr. Michael Griffin, Eminent Scholar and Professor, Mechanical and
Aerospace Engineering, University of Alabama in Huntsville
III. Key Issues for the Hearing
How was the review committee able to compare options
that differ significantly in terms of technical and
programmatic maturity, understanding of risk, and fidelity of
cost estimates? What are the limitations of the review
committee's approach, and how should Congress and the
Administration assess the options in light of those
limitations?
Given the differing degrees of technical,
programmatic, and cost estimation maturity of the various
options, what level of confidence can Congress and the
Administration have that any of the alternative options can
actually fit into the enhanced funding envelope proposed by the
review committee in its summary report?
Since the Constellation program is the program for
which funds have been authorized and appropriated over the last
four years and for which design, development, and test
activities have been underway over that same period, did the
review committee attempt to develop an option that would
maintain the Constellation program development path but that
would fit into the enhanced funding envelope proposed by the
Committee by rephasing of milestones, initial exploration
destinations, etc.? If so, why was it not included in the final
set of options contained in the summary report?
The same historical cost risk factor [1.51] appears
to have been applied by the review committee to all of the
options regardless of their level of technical and programmatic
maturity. Does it make sense to apply the same risk factor to a
program that has completed design reviews and hardware testing
activities that is applied to options for which no comparable
milestones have yet been achieved and for which the fidelity of
the original cost estimate is correspondingly low?
How can Congress and the Administration meaningfully
compare the safety implications of the Constellation program of
record and the other options in light of the review committee's
decision not to attempt to distinguish between the levels of
safety of the various options?
What was the review committee's assessment of the
technical maturity, program management, and cost control of the
Constellation program? Did it find it to be a well executed
program within the resources available or a flawed program?
How high should the threshold be for a decision to
scrap the existing Constellation program that has been under
development for four-plus years? What circumstances would
justify abandoning the program at this point in its
development?
If the Administration and Congress were to maintain
the outyear budget plan that accompanied the FY 2010 NASA
budget request and not provide enhanced funding, how should
those funds be allocated?
To what extent do the options presented by the review
committee address the goals and objections for exploration that
Congress has authorized in the NASA Authorization Acts of 2005
and 2008?
How would the review committee rank the various
options each other and against the Constellation program?
What driving assumptions (e.g., cost, programmatic,
risk) steered the review committee in determining its final
options? How, if at all, are the assumptions that guided the
conclusions in the Summary Report different from those
discussed during the review committee's last meeting on August
12, 2009?
How did the review committee develop measures and
criteria by which to evaluate the options and their ability to
meet the direction set by the Office of Science and Technology
Policy for the review?
How does the sustainability of the workforce and
expertise needed to pursue the review committee's human space
flight options differ under each of the options proposed?
How should the review committee's finding that
``interim reliance on international crew services'' is
``acceptable,'' be interpreted in terms of the gap in the
Nation's ability to launch humans into space? What, if any,
strategic implications of the gap did the review committee
consider? How, if at all, does the gap affect implementation of
any of the options presented by the review committee?
When making a decision on an option, how do Congress
and the Administration reconcile the review committee's
statements that it treated human safety as a ``sine qua non''
while also stating that it was ``unconvinced that enough is
known about any of the potential high-reliability launcher-
plus-capsule systems to distinguish their levels of safety in a
meaningful way''?
What are the implications of the recommended options
on NASA's ability to sustain a balanced portfolio of science,
aeronautics, human space flight and exploration?
How, if at all, do the options presented by the
review committee contribute to the development and evolution of
international collaboration for human exploration over the
long-term? How do the options compare in that regard? How did
the review committee assess the international capabilities that
could be potentially leveraged for each option?
To what extent do the integrated options require
technologies and operational techniques or other research and
development that can only be conducted on the International
Space Station? How did the review committee assess the time
needed to achieve such R&D into its estimates of the timeline
for each of the proposed options?
What is the basis for the review committee's estimate
that commercially provided crew service could be available a
year earlier than the currently planned Ares/Orion program?
Stimulating a ``vigorous and competitive commercial
space industry'' as the review committee suggests would seem to
depend on a robust government-sponsored exploration program.
What did the review committee assume about the existence of a
commercial market that would allow the government to be a
marginal user of commercial services?
To what extent do the options recommended require
major technology developments, breakthroughs, or demonstrations
of advanced technologies? For example, how critical is the
capability to provide in-space refueling to enable the
implementation of the options presented by the review
committee? Are the vehicles and pathways for achieving
technology advancements in place? What level of programmatic
risk is introduced if an option is dependent on achieving such
advancements in advance?
How did the review committee assess the extent to
which each option could engage the public and the younger
generations on whom the Nation will depend to carry out human
exploration plans into the future?
What is the basis of the $3 billion increase above
the FY 2010 budget profile for exploration that the review
committee concluded was needed to support a meaningful human
space flight program? What does that $3 billion include and
what is the increase each year that the review committee
thought was needed to reach that level of investment?
IV. Overview of Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans
On May 7, 2009, the Office of Science and Technology Policy,
Executive Office of the President, announced the ``launch of an
independent review of planned U.S. human space flight activities with
the goal of ensuring that the Nation is on a vigorous and sustainable
path to achieving its boldest aspirations in space.'' According to the
press release, John P. Holdren, Assistant to the President for Science
and Technology and Director of the Office of Science and Technology
Policy stated: ``President Obama recognizes the important role that
NASA's human space flight programs play in advancing scientific
discovery, technological innovation, economic strength and
international leadership.'' He went on to say that ``The President's
goal is to ensure that these programs remain on a strong and stable
footing well into the 21st Century, and this review will be crucial to
meeting this goal.''
Charter and Scope of the Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans
Committee
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration chartered the
``Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee'' as a Federal
Advisory Committee Act (FACA) committee, which requires that meetings
and information presented to the review committee be accessible to the
public.
The Charter for the review committee states the following Scope and
Objectives:
``The Committee shall conduct an independent review of ongoing
U.S. human space flight plans and programs, as well as
alternatives, to ensure the Nation is pursuing the best
trajectory for the future of human space flight-one that is
safe, innovative, affordable, and sustainable. The review
committee should aim to identify and characterize a range of
options that spans the reasonable possibilities for
continuation of U.S. human space flight activities beyond
retirement of the Space Shuttle. The identification and
characterization of these options should address the following
objectives: a) expediting a new U.S. capability to support
utilization of the International Space Station (ISS); b)
supporting missions to the Moon and other destinations beyond
low Earth orbit (LEO); c) stimulating commercial space flight
capability; and d) fitting within the current budget profile
for NASA exploration activities.''
``In addition to the objectives described above, the review
should examine the appropriate amount of research and
development and complementary robotic activities needed to make
human space flight activities most productive and affordable
over the long-term, as well as appropriate opportunities for
international collaboration. It should also evaluate what
capabilities would be enabled by each of the potential
architectures considered. It should evaluate options for
extending ISS operations beyond 2016.''
The review committee reports to the NASA Administrator and the
Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP),
Executive Office of the President. The review committee was given 120
days, following the date of its first meeting, to submit a report.
Members of the Review Committee
The review committee is comprised of nine members, including the
Chair, with background and expertise in launch and aerospace systems,
engineering, space science, human space flight, and management. The
review committee is chaired by Mr. Norman Augustine, Chairman and CEO,
Lockheed Martin Corporation (retired). Mr. Augustine is also a former
member of the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology
under Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush and chaired the National
Academies study, Rising Above the Gathering Storm. The full list of
review committee members, as presented in a NASA Press Release dated
June 1, 2009, is provided in Attachment D.
Review Committee Meetings and Materials
The review committee held six public meetings, beginning with its
first meeting held on June 17, 2009 in Washington, D.C. and near NASA
Centers involved in human space flight, held fact finding meetings, and
conducted site visits to NASA facilities that support the human space
flight and exploration programs. The material presented to the review
committee, including statements from Members of Congress and analyses
and syntheses prepared by the review committee members, are available
to the public at the Review of Human Space Flight Plans committee web
site
Results and Options Presented by the Review Committee (Excerpts from
the Summary Report)
A summary report of the Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans
Committee was released publicly on September 8, 2009. The review
committee is preparing a final report.
In its Summary Report, the review committee stated that ``The U.S.
human space flight program appears to be on an unsustainable
trajectory. It is perpetuating the perilous practice of pursuing goals
that do not match allocated resources. Space operations are among the
most complex and unforgiving pursuits ever undertaken by humans. It
really is rocket science. Space operations become all the more
difficult when means do not match aspirations. Such is the case
today.''
In its direction from OSTP, the review committee was tasked to fit
the options for a U.S. human space flight program into the existing
budget profile for NASA's exploration activities. With respect to that
direction, the review committee ``found two executable options that
comply with the FY 2010 budget. However, neither allows for a viable
exploration program. In fact, the Committee finds that no plan
compatible with the FY 2010 budget profile permits human exploration to
continue in any meaningful way.''
The review committee also received approval from OSTP to present
options that exceed the FY 2010 budget profile for NASA's exploration
activities. In that regard, the review committee stated that ``The
Committee further finds that it is possible to conduct a viable
exploration program with a budget rising to about $3 billion annually
above the FY 2010 budget profile. At this budget level, both the Moon
First strategy and the Flexible Path strategies begin human exploration
on a reasonable, though hardly aggressive, timetable. The Committee
believes an exploration program that will be a source of pride for the
Nation requires resources at such a level.''
The review committee's key findings are as follows:
Summary of Key Findings
``The Committee summarizes its key findings below. Additional
findings are included in the body of the report.
The right mission and the right size: NASA's budget should match its
mission and goals. Further, NASA should be given the ability to shape
its organization and infrastructure accordingly, while maintaining
facilities deemed to be of national importance.
International partnerships: The U.S. can lead a bold new international
effort in the human exploration of space. If international partners are
actively engaged, including on the ``critical path'' to success, there
could be substantial benefits to foreign relations, and more resources
overall could become available.
Short-term Space Shuttle planning: The current Shuttle manifest should
be flown in a safe and prudent manner. The current manifest will likely
extend to the second quarter of FY 2011. It is important to budget for
this likelihood.
The human space flight gap: Under current conditions, the gap in U.S.
ability to launch astronauts into space will stretch to at least seven
years. The Committee did not identify any credible approach employing
new capabilities that could shorten the gap to less than six years. The
only way to significantly close the gap is to extend the life of the
Shuttle Program.
Extending the International Space Station: The return on investment to
both the United States and our international partners would be
significantly enhanced by an extension of ISS life. Not to extend its
operation would significantly impair U.S. ability to develop and lead
future international space flight partnerships.
Heavy-lift: A heavy-lift launch capability to low Earth orbit, combined
with the ability to inject heavy payloads away from the Earth, is
beneficial to exploration, and it also will be useful to the national
security space and scientific communities. The Committee reviewed: the
Ares family of launchers; more directly Shuttle-derived vehicles; and
launchers derived from the EELV [Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle]
family. Each approach has advantages and disadvantages, trading
capability, life cycle costs, operational complexity and the ``way of
doing business'' within the program and NASA.
Commercial crew launch to low Earth orbit: Commercial services to
deliver crew to low Earth orbit are within reach. While this presents
some risk, it could provide an earlier capability at lower initial and
life cycle costs than government could achieve. A new competition with
adequate incentives should be open to all U.S. aerospace companies.
This would allow NASA to focus on more challenging roles, including
human exploration beyond low Earth orbit, based on the continued
development of the current or modified Orion spacecraft.
Technology development for exploration and commercial space: Investment
in a well-designed and adequately funded space technology program is
critical to enable progress in exploration. Exploration strategies can
proceed more readily and economically if the requisite technology has
been developed in advance. This investment will also benefit robotic
exploration, the U.S. commercial space industry and other U.S.
Government users.
Pathways to Mars: Mars is the ultimate destination for human
exploration; but it is not the best first destination. Both visiting
the Moon First and following the Flexible Path are viable exploration
strategies. The two are not necessarily mutually exclusive; before
traveling to Mars, we might be well served to both extend our presence
in free space and gain experience working on the lunar surface.
Options for the Human Space Flight Program: The Committee developed
five alternatives for the Human Space Flight Program. It found:
Human exploration beyond low Earth orbit is not
viable under the FY 2010 budget guideline.
Meaningful human exploration is possible under a less
constrained budget, ramping to approximately $3 billion per
year above the FY 2010 guidance in total resources.
Funding at the increased level would allow either an
exploration program to explore Moon First or one that follows a
Flexible Path of exploration. Either could produce results in a
reasonable timeframe.''
Options
In its Summary Report, the review committee presented five
integrated options for a human space flight program. Those options,
along with a summary table of the options as presented in the review
committee's Summary Report, are provided below.
``The Committee was asked to provide two options that fit within
the FY 2010 budget profile. This funding is essentially flat or
decreasing through 2014, then increases at 1.4 percent per year
thereafter, which is less than the 2.4 percent per year used to
estimate cost inflation. The first two options are constrained to that
budget.
Option 1. Program of Record as assessed by the Committee,
constrained to the FY 2010 budget. This option is the Program of
Record, with only two changes the Committee deems necessary: providing
funds for the Shuttle into FY 2011 and including sufficient funds to
de-orbit the ISS in 2016. When constrained to this budget profile, Ares
I and Orion are not available until after the ISS has been de-orbited.
The heavy-lift vehicle, Ares V, is not available until the late 2020s,
and worse, there are insufficient funds to develop the lunar lander and
lunar surface systems until well into the 2030s, if ever.
Option 2. ISS and Lunar Exploration, constrained to FY 2010 budget.
This option extends the ISS to 2020, and it begins a program of lunar
exploration using Ares V (Lite). The option assumes Shuttle fly-out in
FY 2011, and it includes a technology development program, a program to
develop commercial crew services to low Earth orbit, and funds for
enhanced utilization of ISS. This option does not deliver heavy-lift
capability until the late 2020s and does not have funds to develop the
systems needed to land on or explore the Moon.
The remaining three alternatives are fit to a different budget
profile--one that the Committee judged more appropriate for an
exploration program designed to carry humans beyond low Earth orbit.
This budget increases to $3 billion above the FY 2010 guidance by FY
2014, then grows with inflation at a more reasonable 2.4 percent per
year.
Option 3. Baseline Case--Implementable Program of Record. This is
an executable version of the program of record. It consists of the
content and sequence of that program--de-orbiting the ISS in 2016,
developing Orion, Ares I and Ares V, and beginning exploration of the
Moon. The Committee made only two additions it felt essential:
budgeting for the fly-out of the Shuttle in 2011 and including
additional funds for ISS de-orbit. The Committee's assessment is that,
under this funding profile, the option delivers Ares I/Orion in FY
2017, with human lunar return in the mid-2020s.
Option 4. Moon First. This option preserves the Moon as the first
destination for human exploration beyond low Earth orbit. It also
extends the ISS to 2020, funds technology advancement, and uses
commercial vehicles to carry crew to low Earth orbit. There are two
significantly different variants to this option.
Variant 4A is the Ares Lite variant. This retires the Shuttle in FY
2011 and develops the Ares V (Lite) heavy-lift launcher for lunar
exploration. Variant 4B is the Shuttle extension variant. This variant
includes the only foreseeable way to eliminate the gap in U.S. human-
launch capability: it extends the Shuttle to 2015 at a minimum safe-
flight rate. It also takes advantage of synergy with the Shuttle by
developing a heavy-lift vehicle that is more directly Shuttle-derived.
Both variants of Option 4 permit human lunar return by the mid-2020s.
Option 5. Flexible Path. This option follows the Flexible Path as
an exploration strategy. It operates the Shuttle into FY 2011, extends
the ISS until 2020, funds technology development and develops
commercial crew services to low Earth orbit. There are three variants
within this option; they differ only in the heavy-lift vehicle.
Variant 5A is the Ares Lite variant. It develops the Ares Lite, the
most capable of the heavy-lift vehicles in this option. Variant 5B
employs an EELV-heritage commercial heavy-lift launcher and assumes a
different (and significantly reduced) role for NASA. It has an
advantage of potentially lower operational costs, but requires
significant restructuring of NASA. Variant 5C uses a directly Shuttle-
derived, heavy-lift vehicle, taking maximum advantage of existing
infrastructure, facilities and production capabilities.
All variants of Option 5 begin exploration along the flexible path
in the early 2020s, with lunar fly-bys, visits to Lagrange points and
near-Earth objects and Mars fly-bys occurring at a rate of about one
major event per year, and possible rendezvous with Mars's moons or
human lunar return by the mid to late 2020s.
The Committee has found two executable options that comply with the
FY 2010 budget. However, neither allows for a viable exploration
program. In fact, the Committee finds that no plan compatible with the
FY 2010 budget profile permits human exploration to continue in any
meaningful way.
The Committee further finds that it is possible to conduct a viable
exploration program with a budget rising to about $3 billion annually
above the FY 2010 budget profile. At this budget level, both the Moon
First strategy and the Flexible Path strategies begin human exploration
on a reasonable, though hardly aggressive, timetable. The Committee
believes an exploration program that will be a source of pride for the
Nation requires resources at such a level.''
Ground Rules and Assumptions on Affordability
According to its analysis presented during the review committee's
last meeting held on August 12, 2009, the review committee articulated
the following ground rules and assumptions that were followed in its
analyses.
``Aerospace [Aerospace Corporation was the contractor
used by the review committee to perform cost analyses in
support of the review committee's work] used a 1.51 historical
risk factor on all element development costs of all scenarios
on the cost to go. A lower (1.25) historical risk factor was
used on productive/operations
An additional $200 million was added to the COTS
[Commercial Orbital Transportation Services] cargo baseline in
FY 2011 to incentivize current COTS cargo demonstrations
Except for international partner agreements already
assumed for the ISS, all elements were fully costed (for
costing purposes only)
For all scenarios, except the Program of Record,
assume a technology program starting at $500M in FY 2011 and
ramping up to $1.5 billion over five years. Maintain the $1.5
billion annually thereafter. (Assume double counting in other
ISS and ESMD [Exploration Systems Mission Directorate] lines,
so funding is one-half of that.)
For scenarios that assume commercial crew, assume a
$2.5B NASA investment over four years beginning in FY 2011
Use Aerospace contract termination/restart model and
actual contract termination costs in Cx [Constellation]
programs
For all scenarios that include refueling, assume
technology line funds development and add a $1B one-time cost
to flight certify the fuel transfer kit
For all scenarios assuming lunar sorties/outpost, use
the Cx [Constellation] estimate for the Altair lander and lunar
surface system; for the Deep Space options, assume a commercial
lunar lander, but a government furnished ascent stage
For options using EELV heavy-lift launch vehicles,
cost as if NASA does not build the system and uses NASA
infrastructure and workforce only when required to conduct
operations
For the Shuttle Derived Systems scenario, assume
Side-mount costs (provided by NASA) for the cargo only version
Current program elements (ISS and STS):
For scenarios with ISS de-orbit in 2016, assume
additional $1.5B cost beyond current estimate
For scenarios with existing Shuttle manifest, assume
fly-out to March, 2011.''
Discussion
There are multiple aspects of the review committee's assumptions
and analyses that Congress will need to understand in order to make an
informed judgment about the options presented in the summary report.
Costs of Deviating from the Congressionally-authorized Program
Congress authorized the exploration initiative, including the
Constellation Program, in the NASA Authorization Acts of 2005 and 2008
and encompassing a stepping-stone approach to exploration beginning
with robotic and human exploration of the Moon in preparation for
exploration missions to other destinations in the solar system. In
addition, the 2008 Authorization directs the NASA Administrator to
ensure that the ISS remain a viable laboratory through at least 2020.
The Summary Report did not include an option that accounts for this
Congressionally-authorized scenario, and therefore does not present the
President with the option and costs of the program that matches what
Congress has authorized by law. The absence of this scenario also makes
it difficult to compare the program authorized by law against the
alternatives presented by the review committee.
In addition, the summary report did not outline the costs and risks
associated with terminating the program of record (or various elements
of the Program) or how the review committee weighed those termination
costs and risks against the costs and risks of undertaking an
alternative architecture.
Cost Assumptions
In materials presented at its last meeting held on August 12, 2009,
the review committee used cost analyses conducted by the Aerospace
Corporation to compare the costs of various options, including the
program of record (Constellation). The Aerospace Corporation used a
historical risk factor of 1.51 in assessing the costs. NASA has
indicated that it already budgeted the Constellation program at a level
for which there is a 65 percent confidence that the program will meet
its schedule and budget projections. In addition, the Constellation
program has reached a level of maturity that would argue risk
uncertainty has been reduced. Congress will need to understand whether
or not the costs-to-go for the Constellation program have been
essentially double-counted costs required for Constellation given that
a risk factor was applied on top of NASA's estimates.
In addition, there are different levels of maturity in the options
for human space flight systems that the review committee considered,
ranging from options that are the concept and view-graph stage to
designs that have been studied in depth. Congress will need to
understand how the review committee went about estimating and comparing
the costs for designs that have such a wide range of maturity levels.
Safety
One the one hand, the review committee noted that throughout its
report, human safety ``is treated as a sine qua non.'' It also notes
that ``Ares I was designed to a high standard in order to provide
astronauts with access to low Earth orbit at lower risk and a
considerably higher level of reliability than is available today.'' On
the other hand, regarding the alternative human space flight systems
reviewed, the report stated that the review committee ``was unconvinced
that enough is known about any of the other potential high-reliability
launcher-plus-capsule systems to distinguish their levels of safety in
a meaningful way.'' The report also states that ``New human-rated
launch vehicles will likely be more reliable once they reach maturity .
. .'' At issue is how the review committee reconciled the emphasis it
gave to human safety in its report with the uncertainties the report
introduces about how to rate the safety of potential alternative crewed
launch systems that exist at very different levels of maturity. Even
for a potential human-rated EELV system, which was studied by the
Aerospace Corporation, ``Aerospace did not perform estimates of loss of
mission (LOM) and loss of crew (LOC) probabilities for the HR Delta IV
H options studied . . .. To allow an equitable comparison of HR Delta
IV HR Delta IV H to Ares I LOM/LOC a new study . . . would be needed.''
The review committee's approach to ascertaining the safety of
alternative systems also needs explanation, and in particular the
relationship assured by the review committee between reliability and
safety. There are many uncertainties regarding safety that Congress
will need to understand in assessing the review committee's proposed
options.
International Cooperation
The review committee's summary report refers to the benefits of an
international exploration program, including strengthening of
geopolitical relationships, leveraging of resources, and enhancing
exploration. However, the report does not discuss the extent to which
each option would contribute to or benefit from international
cooperation, how international cooperation would evolve over the long-
term as part of the options presented, and what international
capabilities could potentially be applied to each of the options. In
addition, the review committee states, in its summary of key findings,
that ``If international partners are actively engaged, including on the
`critical path' to success, then there could be substantial benefits to
foreign relations . . ..'' Having international partners on the
``critical path'' would be a significant shift from current approach to
partnerships. This leads to questions about the types of risks would
this new approach would introduce; how, if at all, the review committee
assessed those risks; and the extent to which the review committee
found that those risks would be outweighed by the additional benefits
from the international collaboration that could be realized.
Crew Access to Low-Earth Orbit
The review committee's summary report states that ``There are two
basic approaches [to crew access to low Earth orbit]: a government-
operated system and a commercial crew-delivery service.'' This seems to
suggest that the review committee considered crew-access to LEO in an
either-or binary fashion, which differs from the congressionally-
authorized program to support commercial development of commercial crew
services to low Earth orbit, while also retaining the government
capability. The review committee suggests, in its summary report that
``it is an appropriate time to consider turning this transport service
over to the commercial sector.'' It is unclear, however, whether the
review committee is suggesting that government capability to launch
humans into low Earth orbit be abandoned in favor of as-yet-undeveloped
commercial systems--as some of the options suggest--or whether it
simply thinks commercial development should be stimulated in parallel
to the government program and phased over once the commercial systems
have matured. It is also unclear whether or not the review committee
considered the strategic implications of not having a government system
to launch humans into low Earth orbit. These issues warrant
clarification.
Commercial Services and Potential Cost Savings
The summary report states that providing human access to low Earth
orbit by using commercial crew services ``creates the possibility of
lowering operating costs for the system and potentially accelerates the
availability of U.S. access to low Earth orbit by about a year, to
2016.'' If this is the review committee's rationale for a commercially
provided service in lieu of a government-provided service to low Earth
orbit, there are several issues that need to be clarified. The Summary
Report does not discuss the technical analysis that led the review
committee to indicate that commercial services could potentially reduce
the gap by about a year or the review committee's level of confidence
in that date. In addition, because commercial crew systems are largely
conceptual at this stage, it is unclear what assumptions about their
potential to meet NASA's human safety requirements that the review
committee assumed.
In addition, the summary report states that ``Establishing . . .
commercial opportunities could increase launch volume and potentially
lower costs to NASA and all other launch-service customers.'' The
Summary Report does not discuss the level of activity that would be
needed to lower the costs of crew transport for the government, when
would the government would be able to benefit from those savings, and
how much the government could expect to save from using commercial crew
services in lieu of government-provided services. Congress will need to
understand these issues it evaluates the options presented by the
review committee and any decision by the Administration on the future
course of the Nation's space flight program.
$3 Billion Increase
In establishing scenarios that reflected increases in budget,
characterized in the summary report as a ``Less Constrained'' budget,
it is not clear why the $3 billion figure was chosen. No factual basis
can be ascertained from the summary report for why $3 billion is the
appropriate amount rather than some other amount. Furthermore, to make
meaningful comparisons, Congress will need to know whether the $3
billion is phased similarly across all applicable options, what how
mission capabilities funded by the increase differ relative to one
another, and what the review committee assumed the annual increases
would be to reach the $3 billion level by FY 2014.
V. Background
In January 2004, President George W. Bush introduced a Vision for
Space Exploration that would:
``Implement a sustained and affordable human and
robotic program to explore the solar system and beyond;
Extend human presence across the solar system,
starting with a human return to the Moon by the year 2020, in
preparation for human exploration of Mars and other
destinations;
Develop the innovative technologies, knowledge, and
infrastructures both to explore and to support decisions about
the destinations for human exploration; and
Promote international and commercial participation in
exploration to further U.S. scientific, security, and economic
interests.''
According to the Bush initiative, the goals would be achieved
through retiring the Space Shuttle as soon as the International Space
Station is completed, using the ISS to support exploration goals,
carrying out human and robotic lunar exploration activities to enable
science and exploration goals, and developing a new crew exploration
vehicle to support missions beyond low Earth orbit (with an operational
capability to be demonstrated no later than 2014).
Congress authorized the space exploration initiative in two
authorization laws, the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-155)
and the NASA Authorization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-422). (Attachment A
provides the Authorization language.) In addition, the 2008
Authorization Act authorized an additional $1 billion to accelerate
development of the Ares I crew launch vehicle and the Orion crew
exploration vehicle. Ares I and Orion are part of the Constellation
Program, which also includes development of an Ares V heavy-lift
vehicle needed to carry a lunar lander beyond low Earth orbit that
would dock with Orion and transport the crew and cargo to the Moon and
other potential destinations. The 2008 Act also directed that the
Administrator ``take all necessary steps to ensure that the
International Space Station remains a viable and productive facility
capable of potential United States utilization through at least 2020 .
. ..''
Although NASA was directed by the President to carry out the plan,
the Bush Administration did not request a budget adequate to implement
the Vision for Space Exploration while also maintaining a balanced
portfolio of science and aeronautics programs, returning the Shuttle to
flight following the Columbia accident, and completing the
International Space Station. Attachment B depicts the mismatch between
the original budget estimates required for NASA to implement the Vision
and the Administration budget requests.
According to information that NASA provided to the Subcommittee on
Space and Aeronautics in May 2009, NASA's Exploration Systems
Architecture Study (ESAS), which formed the basis of the Constellation
Program, assumed a total of about $34.4 billion would be required for
the program through 2013. According to NASA, funding for Constellation
from FY 2007 President's Budget Request through the FY 2009 President's
Budget Request covering a period of FY 2006-FY 2013 has remained at
about $31.7 billion. The FY 2009 President's budget request for
Constellation through 2013 is $2.6 billion less than what ESAS' funding
projection for Constellation, according to NASA. In addition, the
budget analyses presented by review committee members at the last
meeting held on August 12, 2009, state that the President's FY10 budget
submittal ``significantly reduces planned funding available to the
Constellation program; more than $1.5B (FY09) per year starting in
FY13.''
In 2009, President Obama signed into law, the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5), which appropriated $1 billion in
Recovery Act funds for NASA. Of that total, $400 million was provided
for NASA's exploration activities. In his statement to the Subcommittee
on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies on April 29, 2009,
NASA Acting Administrator Scolese testified that NASA has allocated
$250M of the exploration Recovery Act funds to Constellation Systems
and the remaining $150M to Commercial Crew and Cargo. On August 10,
2009, NASA announced a request for proposals and its plans to use $50
million of Recovery Act funds ``for the development of commercial crew
space transportation concepts and enabling activities.''
With its release of the top-line FY 2010 budget request for NASA in
February 2009, the Administration, cited several highlights, including
``a robust program of space exploration involving humans and robots,''
``return Americans to the Moon by 2020,'' ``safe flight of the Shuttle
through the vehicle's retirement at the end of 2010,'' ``the
development of new space flight systems for carrying American crews and
supplies to space,'' and the ``continued use of the International Space
Station,'' among other objectives.
Later, with the release of the full, detailed FY 2010 budget
request for NASA in May 2009, the Administration ``announced the launch
of an independent review of NASA's human space flight activities'' and
the summary report of that effort is the focus of today's hearing. The
FY 2010 budget proposal reduced outyear projections for the
Constellation Program by roughly $3.5 billion from that projected in
the FY 2009 budget proposal for the FY 2011-FY 2014 period. The FY 2010
budget request also stated that ``Following the human space flight
review, the Administration will provide an updated request for
Exploration activities reflecting the review's results.'' The FY 2010
budget request retained the goal of returning humans to the Moon by
2020, despite the fact that the request would reduce funding for work
on lunar related activities required to reach that goal. The FY 2010
budget request for the Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle ($25 million) and
its runout budget for FY 2011 through FY 2014 ($100 million total) is
insufficient to initiate full scale development of the heavy-lift
launch vehicle that is designed to support exploration missions beyond
low Earth orbit. In addition, the five-year budget plan contains no
significant funding for the Altair lunar lander. A summary of the
President's FY 2010 request for NASA is provided as Attachment C.
In its appropriation bill for FY 2010, H.R. 2847, as discussed in
the House Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Bill, 2010, Report 111-149, the House Appropriations
Committee provided appropriations for NASA's exploration program at a
level $212 million less than that of the FY 2009 enacted budget and
$670 million less than the President's FY 2010 request for NASA's
exploration programs. In his statement for the House consideration of
H.R. 2847, Subcommittee Chairman Mollahan said: ``Funds are provided in
this bill to continue investments in human space flight at the level of
last year. Reductions from the budget request should not be viewed by
this body as any diminution of certainly my support or the Committee's
support in NASA's human space flight activities. Rather, it is a
deferral. It is a deferral taken without prejudice. It is a pause. It
is a timeout. Call it what you will, it is an opportunity for the
President to establish his vision for human space exploration looking
at the Augustine report when it becomes available in August, and then
for his administration to consider what their vision will be, and then
most importantly, certainly for the Committee, Mr. Chairman, to come
forward with a realistic future funding scheme for the human space
exploration program. We hope it is a vision worthy of the program, and
we look forward to realistic funding levels, which we have never had,
or haven't had for many, many years, for human space flight.''
The Senate Departments of Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2010, Report 111-34 , stated the
following:
``Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans.--The Committee
directs that NASA shall not use the operating plan or
reprogramming process as the method of implementing the
recommendations of the review. The opportunity for directing a
well constructed and thoughtful approach to manned space flight
should be as a budget amendment to the 2010 budget request that
is received in a manner that is timely for consideration by the
Committee, or as part of the 2011 budget request.
Ares I and Orion.--The Committee provides the full budget
request of $1,415,400,000 for Ares I, the new Crew Launch
Vehicle, and $1,383,500,000 for Orion, the Crew Exploration
Vehicle.
Ares V.--The Committee believes that the Ares V cargo launch
vehicle will be a critical national asset for carrying
exploration and scientific payloads beyond low Earth orbit to
the Moon and beyond. To facilitate the earliest possible start
of the development of the Ares V, the Committee recommends a
funding level of $100,000,000.''
Status of Constellation Program
The Constellation Program, including the Ares I crew launch vehicle
and the Orion crew exploration vehicle, the Altair Lunar Lander, and
the Ares V launch vehicle, has continued its work during the course of
the human space flight review, as directed by the Administration.
However, as a result of the review, NASA officials reported that
contracts for initial work on the Ares V vehicle--the heavy-lift
launcher planned to ferry astronauts and cargo to the Moon--were put on
hold pending the results of the Review of U.S. Human Space Flight
Plans.
At the time the Administration released the FY 2010 budget request
for NASA, the Constellation Program had completed most major
procurements, undertaken hardware design, development and test
activities, constructed key facilities, completed initial reviews for
ground and mission operations, continued preparation for the first
flight test of the Ares rocket (Ares I-X), which is scheduled for the
end of October 2009, and continued work in preparation for a test of
the Orion Pad Abort system. In September 2008, the Ares I rocket passed
the preliminary design review, a key milestone that assesses the
vehicle's design to ensure its safety, reliability, and alignment with
NASA's requirements. In November 2008, the J-2X engine, which is
designed to be used as the upper stage of the Ares I and the Earth
departure stage of the Ares V launch vehicles, passed the critical
design review and proceeded to fabrication and full-testing of the
engine. On September 10, 2009, the five-segment rocket motor that will
be used on the Ares I rocket was successfully test-fired. In addition,
on September 1, 2009, NASA announced the successful completion of the
preliminary design review for Orion.
As of early September 2009, NASA reported that $7.7 billion has
been spent on the Constellation Program, of which $3.1 billion has been
spent on Orion and approximately $3 billion on Ares I. The remainder
has been spent on ground and program integration, space suit
development, and other activities. According to NASA, the projected
budget for Ares I and Orion through 2015 is $35 billion.
Status of Space Shuttle Program
The Space Shuttle Program is now entering its 28th year of service.
Three orbiters are now left to carry out the remaining launch schedule
of six flights, all to the International Space Station. These flights
will be providing the remaining nodes, experiments, and spare parts
which will enable the station to be utilized as a U.S. National
Laboratory. The Space Shuttle is slated to be retired in 2010, with the
last flight currently scheduled for September 2010. The FY 2009 budget
for the program is $2.98 billion and the FY 2010 budget request is
$3.15 billion. The Shuttle program will be completely unfunded by FY
2012, according to the President's FY 2010 request.
International Space Station Program
The International Space Station (ISS)'s partners include the United
States, nations of the European Space Agency, Russia, Japan, and
Canada. The first module of the Station was developed by Russia and
placed into orbit in 1998. Shortly thereafter, in 1998, the U.S.
launched its first module, which was attached to the Russian node.
Since that time, U.S., Russian, European, and Japanese modules, among
many other systems, instruments, and equipment have been delivered and
assembled as part of the ISS. The Station has been crewed since the
year 2000. During the first eight years of ISS operations, scientific
research has helped lead ``advances in the fight against food
poisoning, new methods for delivering medicine to cancer cells, and
better materials for future spacecraft,'' according to a NASA report,
``International Space Station Science Research Accomplishments During
the Assembly Years: An Analysis of Results from 2000-2008.'' In 2009,
the size of the crew doubled from three to six persons, enabling
additional crew time to be available for research activities. In its
current configuration, NASA characterizes the ISS as 83 percent
complete. Six Shuttle flights are manifested to complete the assembly
of the Station, which is currently planned to be operated and utilized
through 2015. According to NASA, the U.S. has invested approximately
$44 billion in the ISS, while combined investment of the U.S. and its
partners is valued at over $54 billion.
Historical Trends of Federal Government Spending on NASA
According to historical budgetary data, NASA's annual budget
authority, on average between FY 1976 and FY 2008, was 0.80 percent of
the total federal budgetary authority. For Fiscal Year 2009, NASA's
percent of the total federal budget authority is estimated to be 0.43,
its lowest in over three decades. The total federal budgetary authority
in FY 2010 is estimated to be $3.42 trillion. If one applies the
average percentage of total annual budgetary authority for NASA through
FY 2008 (.80 percent) to the estimated total budgetary authority for
Fiscal Year 2010, the NASA funding level would be $27.5 billion [Versus
the FY 2010 request of $18.7 billion].
In terms of discretionary budget authority, on average between FY
1976 and FY 2008, NASA's total budget authority was 2.07 percent of
total federal discretionary budget authority. According to the
President's budget request, total federal discretionary budget
authority in FY 2010 is estimated to be $1.24 trillion. Applying the
2.07 percent historical average of discretionary budget authority for
NASA to the $1.24 estimated total federal discretionary budget
authority for FY 2010 would result in a NASA funding level of $25.8
billion.
Previous Studies and Reviews of Human Space Flight and Exploration
There have been numerous studies and reviews of potential
directions and goals for the Nation's human and robotic exploration
program dating back to the early years of the space program, including
the report of a 1969 Space Task Group, The Post-Apollo Space Program:
Directions for the Future,'' chaired by Vice President Spiro Agnew, to
the 1990 Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle
Challenger Accident (aka the Rogers Commission report), the ``90-Day''
study that accompanied President George H.W. Bush's Space Exploration
Initiative, and the 1990 Synthesis Group report that studied ideas
relevant to accomplishing the Space Exploration Initiative, and the
report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space
Program, chaired by Norman Augustine. Those reports appear to be
consistent in highlighting the importance of a direction for the
Nation's human exploration activities beyond low Earth orbit. The
Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), which issued its report
in 2003, also called attention to the lack of a program for exploration
beyond low Earth orbit when it said: ``Review committees . . . have
suggested that the primary justification for a space station is to
conduct the research required to plan missions to Mars and/or other
distant destinations. However, human travel to destinations beyond
Earth orbit has not been adopted as a national objective.'' Then, in
2004, President George W. Bush announced the Vision for Space
Exploration (VSE) referenced earlier in this charter.
Attachment A
NASA Authorization Acts of 2005 and 2008
Provisions Related to the Exploration Initiative
P.L. 109-155, NASA Authorization Act of 2005
(b) VISION FOR SPACE EXPLORATION.--
(1) IN GENERAL.--The Administrator shall establish a program to develop
a sustained human presence on the Moon, including a robust precursor
program, to promote exploration, science, commerce, and United States
preeminence in space, and as a stepping-stone to future exploration of
Mars and other destinations. The Administrator is further authorized to
develop and conduct appropriate international collaborations in pursuit
of these goals.
(2) MILESTONES.--The Administrator shall manage human space flight
programs to strive to achieve the following milestones (in conformity
with section 503)--
(A) Returning Americans to the Moon no later than 2020.
(B) Launching the Crew Exploration Vehicle as close to 2010 as
possible.
(C) Increasing knowledge of the impacts of long duration stays in space
on the human body using the most appropriate facilities available,
including the ISS.
(D) Enabling humans to land on and return from Mars and other
destinations on a timetable that is technically and fiscally possible.
P.L. 110-422, NASA Authorization Act of 2008
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
. . .
(7) Human and robotic exploration of the solar system will be a
significant long-term undertaking of humanity in the 21st century and
beyond, and it is in the national interest that the United States
should assume a leadership role in a cooperative international
exploration initiative.
(8) Developing United States human space flight capabilities to allow
independent American access to the International Space Station, and to
explore beyond low Earth orbit, is a strategically important national
imperative, and all prudent steps should thus be taken to bring the
Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle and Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle to full
operational capability as soon as possible and to ensure the effective
development of a United States heavy-lift launch capability for
missions beyond low Earth orbit.
. . .
(10) NASA should make a sustained commitment to a robust long-term
technology development activity. Such investments represent the
critically important ``seed corn'' on which NASA's ability to carry out
challenging and productive missions in the future will depend.
(11) NASA, through its pursuit of challenging and relevant activities,
can provide an important stimulus to the next generation to pursue
careers in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics.
(12) Commercial activities have substantially contributed to the
strength of both the United States space program and the national
economy, and the development of a healthy and robust United States
commercial space sector should continue to be encouraged.
SEC. 401. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that the President of the United States
should invite America's friends and allies to participate in a long-
term international initiative under the leadership of the United States
to expand human and robotic presence into the solar system, including
the exploration and utilization of the Moon, near-Earth asteroids,
Lagrangian points, and eventually Mars and its moons, among other
exploration and utilization goals. When appropriate, the United States
should lead confidence building measures that advance the long-term
initiative for international cooperation.
SEC. 402. REAFFIRMATION OF EXPLORATION POLICY.
Congress hereby affirms its support for--
(1) the broad goals of the space exploration policy of the United
States, including the eventual return to and exploration of the Moon
and other destinations in the solar system and the important national
imperative of independent access to space;
(2) the development of technologies and operational approaches that
will enable a sustainable long-term program of human and robotic
exploration of the solar system;
(3) activity related to Mars exploration, particularly for the
development and testing of technologies and mission concepts needed for
eventual consideration of optional mission architectures, pursuant to
future authority to proceed with the consideration and implementation
of such architectures; and
(4) international participation and cooperation, as well as commercial
involvement in space exploration activities.
SEC. 403. STEPPING STONE APPROACH TO EXPLORATION.
In order to maximize the cost-effectiveness of the long-term
exploration and utilization activities of the United States, the
Administrator shall take all necessary steps, including engaging
international partners, to ensure that activities in its lunar
exploration program shall be designed and implemented in a manner that
gives strong consideration to how those activities might also help meet
the requirements of future exploration and utilization activities
beyond the Moon. The timetable of the lunar phase of the long-term
international exploration initiative shall be determined by the
availability of funding. However, once an exploration related project
enters its development phase, the Administrator shall seek, to the
maximum extent practicable, to complete that project without undue
delays.
SEC. 404. LUNAR OUTPOST.
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.--As NASA works toward the establishment of a lunar
outpost, NASA shall make no plans that would require a lunar outpost to
be occupied to maintain its viability. Any such outpost shall be
operable as a human-tended facility capable of remote or autonomous
operation for extended periods.
(b) DESIGNATION.--The United States portion of the first human-tended
outpost established on the surface of the Moon shall be designated the
''Neil A. Armstrong Lunar Outpost.''
(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.--It is the sense of Congress that NASA should
make use of commercial services to the maximum extent practicable in
support of its lunar outpost activities.
SEC. 405. EXPLORATION TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT.
(a) IN GENERAL.--A robust program of long-term exploration related
technology research and development will be essential for the success
and sustainability of any enduring initiative of human and robotic
exploration of the solar system.
(b) ESTABLISHMENT.--The Administrator shall carry out a program of
long-term exploration-related technology research and development,
including such things as in-space propulsion, power systems, life
support, and advanced avionics, that is not tied to specific flight
projects. The program shall have the funding goal of ensuring that the
technology research and development can be completed in a timely manner
in order to support the safe, successful, and sustainable exploration
of the solar system. In addition, in order to ensure that the broadest
range of innovative concepts and technologies are captured, the long-
term technology program shall have the goal of having a significant
portion of its funding available for external grants and contracts with
universities, research institutions, and industry.
SEC. 406. EXPLORATION RISK MITIGATION PLAN.
(a) PLAN.--The Administrator shall prepare a plan that identifies and
prioritizes the human and technical risks that will need to be
addressed in carrying out human exploration beyond low Earth orbit and
the research and development activities required to address those
risks. The plan shall address the role of the International Space
Station in exploration risk mitigation and include a detailed
description of the specific steps being taken to utilize the
International Space Station for that purpose.
(b) REPORT.--The Administrator shall transmit to the Committee on
Science and Technology of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate the
plan described in subsection (a) not later than one year after the date
of enactment of this Act.
SEC. 407. EXPLORATION CREW RESCUE.
In order to maximize the ability to rescue astronauts whose space
vehicles have become disabled, the Administrator shall enter into
discussions with the appropriate representatives of space-faring
nations who have or plan to have crew transportation systems capable of
orbital flight or flight beyond low Earth orbit for the purpose of
agreeing on a common docking system standard.
SEC. 408. PARTICIPATORY EXPLORATION.
(a) IN GENERAL.--The Administrator shall develop a technology plan to
enable dissemination of information to the public to allow the public
to experience missions to the Moon, Mars, or other bodies within our
solar system by leveraging advanced exploration technologies. The plan
shall identify opportunities to leverage technologies in NASA's
Constellation systems that deliver a rich, multimedia experience to the
public, and that facilitate participation by the public, the private
sector, non-governmental organizations, and international partners.
Technologies for collecting high-definition video, three-dimensional
images, and scientific data, along with the means to rapidly deliver
this content through extended high bandwidth communications networks,
shall be considered as part of this plan. It shall include a review of
high bandwidth radio and laser communications, high-definition video,
stereo imagery, three-dimensional scene cameras, and Internet routers
in space, from orbit, and on the lunar surface. The plan shall also
consider secondary cargo capability for technology validation and
science mission opportunities. In addition, the plan shall identify
opportunities to develop and demonstrate these technologies on the
International Space Station and robotic missions to the Moon, Mars, and
other solar system bodies. As part of the technology plan, the
Administrator shall examine the feasibility of having NASA enter into
contracts and other agreements with appropriate public, private sector,
and international partners to broadcast electronically, including via
the Internet, images and multimedia records delivered from its missions
in space to the public, and shall identify issues associated with such
contracts and other agreements. In any such contracts and other
agreements, NASA shall adhere to a transparent bidding process to award
such contracts and other agreements, pursuant to United States law. As
part of this plan, the Administrator shall include estimates of
associated costs.
(b) REPORT.--Not later than 270 days after the date of enactment of
this Act, the Administrator shall submit the plan to the Committee on
Science and Technology of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate.
SEC. 409. SCIENCE AND EXPLORATION.
It is the sense of Congress that NASA's scientific and human
exploration activities are synergistic; science enables exploration and
human exploration enables science. The Congress encourages the
Administrator to coordinate, where practical, NASA's science and
exploration activities with the goal of maximizing the success of human
exploration initiatives and furthering our understanding of the
Universe that we explore.
Attachment D
Members of the Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee
-- Norman Augustine (Chair), retired Chairman and CEO,
Lockheed Martin Corp., and former member of the President's
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology under Presidents
Bill Clinton and George W. Bush
-- Dr. Wanda Austin, President and CEO, The Aerospace Corp.
-- Bohdan Bejmuk, Chair, Constellation program Standing Review
Board, and former manager of the Boeing Space Shuttle and Sea
Launch programs
-- Dr. Leroy Chiao, former astronaut, former International
Space Station commander and engineering consultant
-- Dr. Christopher Chyba, Professor of Astrophysical Sciences
and International Affairs, Princeton University, and member,
President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology
-- Dr. Edward Crawley, Ford Professor of Engineering at MIT
and Co-Chair, NASA Exploration Technology Development Program
Review Committee
-- Jeffrey Greason, co-founder and CEO, XCOR Aerospace, and
Vice-Chair, Personal Spaceflight Federation
-- Dr. Charles Kennel, Chair, National Academies Space Studies
Board, and Director and Professor Emeritus, Scripps Institution
of Oceanography, University of California, San Diego
-- Retired Air Force Gen. Lester Lyles, Chair, National
Academies Committee on the Rationale and Goals of the U.S.
Civil Space Program, former Air Force Vice Chief of Staff and
former Commander of the Air Force Materiel Command
-- Dr. Sally Ride, former astronaut, first American woman in
space, CEO of Sally Ride Science and Professor Emerita at the
University of California, San Diego
Attachment E
Statements to the Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee
By Chairman Gordon and Ranking Member Hall
Committee on Science and Technology
U.S. House of Representatives
Statement to the Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee
Hon. Bart Gordon
Chairman, Committee on Science and Technology
U.S. House of Representatives
July 17, 2009
Thank you for the opportunity to submit this statement. I regret
that I was unable to participate in your June 17th meeting due to prior
congressional commitments, and I look forward to meeting with you in
person at a later date if you are interested in doing so.
You have asked for a congressional perspective on the human space
flight-related policies of the NASA Authorization Acts of 2005 and 2008
[P.L. 109-155 and P.L. 110-422, respectively]. I think that the most
appropriate way to view the human space flight-related provisions of
both Acts is in the context of the overall goals of the legislation,
namely, to promote a balanced and robust program of space and
aeronautics initiatives at the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration and to authorize funding levels commensurate with the
tasks that NASA is being asked to undertake. It was the consensus of
Congress in its consideration of those Acts that human space flight and
exploration is an important component of a balanced NASA portfolio, as
well as being in the national interest for geopolitical, technological,
scientific, and inspirational reasons. In that regard, I would quote
Finding #1 of P.L. 110-422: ``NASA is and should remain a multi-mission
agency with a balanced and robust set of core missions in science,
aeronautics, and human space flight and exploration.''
With respect to human space flight and exploration, both the 2005
and 2008 Authorization Acts represent a congressional consensus on the
importance of completing the International Space Station [ISS] and
ensuring its productive utilization in support of research and
development activities required for exploration beyond low Earth orbit,
as well as basic and applied R&D that could have terrestrial benefits.
With respect to the question of what the operational lifetime of the
ISS should be, Congress states the following in Section 601 of the NASA
Authorization Act of 2008:
``(a) In General.--The Administrator shall take all necessary
steps to ensure that the International Space Station remains a
viable and productive facility capable of potential United
States utilization through at least 2020 and shall take no
steps that would preclude its continued operation and
utilization by the United States after 2015.''
In addition, Sec. 601(b) emphasizes the importance of effective
utilization of the ISS by directing that the NASA Administrator submit
``. . . a plan to support the operations and utilization of the
International Space Station beyond fiscal year 2015 for a period of not
less than five years.'' Thus, while Congress does not explicitly
mandate the continuation of the ISS program past 2015 in P.L. 110-422,
I believe that the aforementioned provisions reflect a congressional
consensus that the productive utilization of the ISS is an important
national goal, and the ISS program should not be constrained to an
arbitrary termination date.
That said, Congress recognizes that productive operation and
utilization of the ISS will be challenging once the Space Shuttle is
retired following the completion of its flight manifest. While Congress
is very supportive of NASA's plans to use commercial cargo resupply
services once they are developed, Congress also wants NASA to have
contingency arrangements in place, including international partner
resupply capabilities, so that the Nation's utilization of the ISS is
not jeopardized. Thus, Sec. 603 of P.L. 110-422 includes a provision
that states:
``The Administrator shall develop a plan and arrangements,
including use of International Space Station international
partner cargo resupply capabilities, to ensure the continued
viability and productivity of the International Space Station
in the event that United States commercial cargo resupply
services are not available during any extended period after the
date that the Space Shuttle is retired.''
One of the great accomplishments--and strengths--of the
International Space Station program has been the durable international
partnership that has developed over the program's lifetime, and we
believe that anything that can be done by the partnership to increase
the post-Shuttle resiliency of the ISS should be encouraged.
It is an unfortunate policy failure that there will be a gap
between the retirement of the Space Shuttle and commencement of
operations of the follow-on Constellation space transportation system.
However, at this point there do not appear to be really good options
available that would obviate such a gap. Congress in the NASA
Authorization Act of 2008 makes clear that it considers the most
appropriate approach to be development of the follow-on Constellation
systems as soon as possible with the goal of providing a system that
can both service the ISS until other capabilities become available and
support human exploration beyond low Earth orbit. As is stated in
Finding #8 of P.L. 110-422:
``Developing United States human space flight capabilities to
allow independent American access to the International Space
Station, and to explore beyond low Earth orbit, is a
strategically important national imperative, and all prudent
steps should thus be taken to bring the Orion Crew Exploration
Vehicle and Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle to full operational
capability as soon as possible and to ensure the effective
development of a United States heavy-lift launch capability for
missions beyond low Earth orbit.''
In support of that position, Congress authorizes an additional $1
billion dollars in P.L. 110-422 above the President's FY 2009 request
to accelerate the initial operating capability of the Orion Crew
Exploration Vehicle and Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle. Congress is
committed to the success of those development projects and wants to
ensure that they are brought to operational status in an effective and
efficient manner. I thus believe that the threshold for any decision to
deviate from the projects of record at this point in their development
should be high, e.g., major technical feasibility issues, prohibitive
cost growth/schedule delays, or unacceptable safety risk.
It is important to note that both the 2005 and 2008 Authorization
Acts make clear that Congress does not view the primary objective of
the human space flight program to be just having the capability for
Americans to access low Earth orbit, or the two pieces of legislation
would not place the emphasis that they do on developing systems to
support human missions beyond low Earth orbit, as referenced in both
the above-mentioned sections and in Title IV of P.L. 110-422. Thus, if
is determined that adjustments are required to the Constellation
program of record, priority should be given to timely development of a
transportation capability for enabling human missions to the Moon and
other destinations beyond low Earth orbit and for ensuring NASA's
ability to access the ISS as needed.
Furthermore, while Sec. 902 of P.L. 110-422 seeks to stimulate the
development of a commercial crew transportation capability in the
United States, the congressional motivation for development of such a
capability was not elimination of the post-Shuttle ``gap'' over the
near-term--there was no consensus on that matter when the legislation
was being considered by Congress. In addition, Congress is quite clear
in Sec. 902(b) of the Act as to the relative priority to be given to
federal support of a commercial crew initiative versus funding for
NASA's Constellation program:
``(b) Congressional Intent.--It is the intent of Congress that
funding for the program described in subsection (a)(4) [i.e.,
COTS crewed vehicle demonstration program] shall not come at
the expense of full funding of the amounts authorized under
section 101(3)(A), and for future fiscal years, for Orion Crew
Exploration Vehicle development, Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle
development, or International Space Station cargo delivery.''
It is clear from the NASA Authorization Acts of 2005 and 2008 that
a durable congressional consensus has been achieved on goals and
objectives for the Nation's human and robotic exploration of the solar
system, as well as on the overall approach to be taken. That is a
significant accomplishment, and I would hope that your panel will
resist the temptation to propose major departures from that hard-won
consensus. It should be noted that Congress's direction for the
Nation's exploration initiative is consistent with the broad goals and
objectives of President Bush's Vision for Space Exploration, a Vision
that unfortunately was not accompanied by resources sufficient to
realize it as originally articulated without doing damage to other
important NASA missions.
The congressional consensus on exploration is summarized by the
following provisions from P.L. 110-422:
Finding #7 ``Human and robotic exploration of the solar system will be
a significant long-term undertaking of humanity in the 21st century,
and it is in the national interest that the United States should assume
a leadership role in a cooperative international exploration
initiative.''
The legislation elaborates on that Finding in Sections 401 and 402
of the Act:
Sec. 401: ``It is the sense of Congress that the President of the
United States should invite America's friends and allies to participate
in a long-term international initiative under the leadership of the
United States to expand human and robotic presence into the solar
system, including the exploration and utilization of the Moon, near-
Earth asteroids, Lagrangian points, and eventually Mars and its moons,
among other exploration and utilization goals. When appropriate, the
United States should lead confidence building measures that advance the
long-term initiative for international cooperation.''
Sec. 402: ``Congress hereby affirms its support for--
(1) the broad goals of the space exploration policy of the
United States, including the eventual return to and exploration
of the Moon and other destinations in the solar system and the
important national imperative of independent access to space;
(2) the development of technologies and operational approaches
that will enable a sustainable long-term program of human and
robotic exploration of the solar system;
(3) activity related to Mars exploration, particularly for the
development and testing of technologies and mission concepts
needed for eventual consideration of optimal mission
architectures, pursuant to future authority to proceed with the
consideration and implementation of such architectures; and
(4) international participation and cooperation, as well as
commercial involvement in space exploration activities.
With respect to the implementation of the Nation's exploration
initiative, both the 2005 and 2008 NASA Authorization Acts emphasize
the importance of the Moon as a stepping-stone for exploration as well
as a potential venue for utilization activities. In that regard,
Section 403 of P.L. 110-422 states:
``In order to maximize the cost-effectiveness of the long-term
exploration and utilization activities of the United States,
the Administrator shall take all necessary steps, including
engaging international partners, to ensure that activities in
its lunar exploration program shall be designed and implemented
in a manner that gives strong consideration to how those
activities might also help meet the requirements of future
exploration and utilization activities beyond the Moon. The
timetable of the lunar phase of the long-term international
exploration initiative shall be determined by the availability
of funding. However, once an exploration-related project enters
its development phase, the Administrator shall seek, to the
maximum extent practicable, to complete that project without
undue delays.''
In addition, while Congress is on record in the 2005 NASA
Authorization in support of development of a sustained U.S. human
presence on the Moon, Congress wants to maintain flexibility and
resiliency with respect to the Nation's lunar activities. Thus Section
404(a) of P.L. 110-422 states:
``As NASA works toward the establishment of a lunar outpost,
NASA shall make no plans that would require a lunar outpost to
be occupied to maintain its viability. Any such outpost shall
be operable as a human-tended facility capable of remote or
autonomous operation for extended periods.''
While there are a number of other important provisions related to
human space flight and exploration contained in the NASA Authorization
Acts of 2005 and 2008, I will not dwell on them here and instead would
refer you to those Acts. However, among them are four considerations
that I would highlight that Congress believes need attention in the
Nation's conduct of its human exploration initiative. First, as Section
405 of the 2008 Act concludes: ``A robust program of long-term
exploration-related research and development will be essential for the
success and sustainability of any enduring initiative of human and
robotic exploration of the solar system.'' Such non-flight project-
specific technology development activities have withered at NASA and
need to be revitalized. They should be viewed as intrinsic to NASA's
exploration effort and its mission as a cutting-edge R&D agency, and
they should be robustly funded.
Second, Congress believes that a well-executed exploration program
can have significant inspirational and educational benefits. However,
the public needs to become engaged for those benefits to be realized.
Section 408 [``Participatory Exploration''] of P.L. 110-422 represents
an initial attempt by Congress to encourage increased public engagement
in the Nation's human and robotic exploration activities by leveraging
technologies in the Constellation systems that can deliver a rich
multimedia experience to the public. In addition, Congress believes
that the ISS can provide additional opportunities for educational
outreach.
Third, Congress believes that NASA should coordinate, where
practical, its science and exploration activities to capture the
synergies between them. The goal of the coordination should be to
maximize the success of the human exploration initiative and to further
our understanding of the universe.
Fourth, one of the broad benefits to the Nation of a robust
exploration program can be the engagement and encouragement of the
commercial sector to the extent practicable. NASA is already
undertaking initiatives in that regard in its overall human space
flight program, but Congress is encouraging NASA to also look for
opportunities to support its planned activities beyond low Earth orbit,
such as with respect to the lunar outpost.
In conclusion, there now exists a broad congressional consensus on
appropriate goals, objectives, and implementation strategies for NASA's
human space flight and exploration activities, as reflected in the NASA
Authorization Acts of 2005 and 2008. It is now time to ensure that all
appropriate steps are taken to maximize the probability of success in
achieving those goals and objectives through the projects that are
currently under development. That will require a steadfastness of
purpose, and I am encouraged that Congress has achieved a durable
consensus that I hope will be matched by the Administration once your
review has been completed. It will also require resource commitments
commensurate with the tasks that the Nation is asking NASA to
undertake--we should not pretend that such challenging goals can be
achieved ``on the cheap.'' That approach has already been tried, and it
has been proved wanting. I hope that your review will provide a clear
understanding of what will be required if America is to retain its
leadership in human space flight by undertaking the challenging
initiatives called out in the NASA Authorization Acts of 2005 and 2008.
I would be happy to discuss any of these matters in further detail
if you would like to do so.
STATEMENT OF
THE HONORABLE RALPH HALL (R-TX)
Ranking Member, U.S. House Committee on Science and Technology
U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee
Wednesday, June 17, 2009
Carnegie Institution for Science
I want to thank the Members of this committee for the important
work you are doing on behalf of our nation. I also want to thank you
for the opportunity to share my views on the human space flight-related
policies of the NASA Authorization Acts of 2005 and 2008 (P.L. 109-155
and P.L. 110-422 respectively). The views expressed here are primarily
mine but I know they are shared by a number of my colleagues.
America must be the Preeminent Space-faring Nation
I think it is important to note that the first Authorization Act of
2005 (P.L. 109-155) was the product of a Republican-led Congress and
the second Authorization Act in 2008 (P.L. 110-422) was the product of
a Democratically-led Congress. Yet, in both cases the intent was the
same, to enable NASA to succeed on its current path toward completion
of the International Space Station, utilize the Station to carry out
world-class research, retire the Space Shuttle after completing its
remaining flights without the constraint of a predetermined date, and
develop a new launch system capable of taking humans beyond low Earth
orbit--a feat the Shuttle cannot do--for the first time since the
1970s. In both of our Authorizations we allocated more money than the
Administration requested because in our opinion NASA was being asked to
do too much with too little. I am concerned that we cannot continue to
be the preeminent space-faring nation without adequate Administration
support and appropriate funding.
One of the most important issues facing NASA, and indeed our
nation, is the impending retirement of the Space Shuttle, and the
subsequent five year gap in independent U.S. access to the $100 billion
International Space Station. With the NASA Authorization Act of 2005,
Congress endorsed the development of the new spacecraft and launch
vehicles (and I stress launch vehicles plural) with the goal of
launching the new system ``as close to 2010 as possible.''
In the NASA Authorization Act of 2008 Congress established the new
system as a priority by stating, ``Developing United States human space
flight capabilities to allow independent American access to the
International Space Station, and to explore beyond low Earth orbit, is
a strategically important national imperative (emphasis added), and all
prudent steps should thus be taken to bring the Orion Crew Exploration
Vehicle and Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle to full operational capability
as soon as possible, and to ensure the effective development of a U.S.
heavy-lift launch capability for missions beyond low Earth orbit.'' As
a result, the Act sought to accelerate the development of the new
system by authorizing an additional $1 billion in FY09.
Looking longer-term we are very concerned that the current budget
request has eliminated funding for the Ares 5 heavy-lift launcher, and
the Altair Lunar Lander, without which America is unable to explore
beyond low Earth orbit.
The NASA Authorization Act of 2008 also recognized the Space
Shuttle's critical role in completing and utilizing the International
Space Station, and added one additional mission, if it could be done
safely, to deliver the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer (AMS). As
Authorizers, we are concerned that NASA may be unable to complete the
remaining Shuttle missions, including the AMS flight, before the end of
2010. Unless the Administration and the Congress provide funds
commensurate with extension, the Agency could be forced to take
resources away from the development of Orion and Ares, adding delays
that could further jeopardize the 2015 availability, and contribute to
further losses of our highly-skilled aerospace workforce.
I, along with many of my colleagues, am not in favor of excessive
government spending. But in this time of economic turmoil and growing
international technological competitiveness, many of us are in
agreement that America's space program is well-established on a path
that, if sustained, will ensure our role as the world leader in space
exploration and exploitation for decades to come. By pursuing human
space flight we challenge our industry and inspire America to dream big
and succeed. That is what leadership is all about.
Other countries recognize the strategic importance of the soft
power we gained in the world through our audacious leadership in human
space flight. The political and technological stature America has
earned through our space program is now sought by other nations eager
to demonstrate their hard-won capabilities to the world. The
International Space Station in orbit today is a remarkable achievement,
bringing together the scientific and engineering talents, and resources
of many nations. That achievement would not have been possible without
American leadership. But such leadership is built on trust that we will
keep our commitments to our international partners. If we continue to
under-fund our space program we risk losing the international trust and
credibility that is vital for long-term success.
Today, nearly 70 percent of the world's population was not alive to
see Neil Armstrong walk on the Moon. Their opinions will be shaped by
what happens in the future, not what happened in the past. We should
not be in a race with China or any other country. We are the preeminent
leader in space. But leadership is temporary. We should ensure that we
take the necessary actions to remain the leader in human space flight.
I want to thank the Committee once again for this opportunity to
share our minority views.
Chairman Gordon. This hearing will come to order. Good
afternoon. I want to welcome our witnesses to today's hearing.
And let me also say to our audience, and we are glad to see so
many folks here today, that we may very well have some votes on
the Floor. We are not sure what is going to quite happen later
on. My partner, Mr. Hall, and I have agreed that we are going
to try to send someone over as soon as the bell rings so that
they can vote and then maybe will be able to come back in so
that we can sort of keep things going. I am afraid that some of
our witnesses won't be available again for some time, so we
need to be able to try to run this through today. So if it gets
a little--lots of bells, we are going to try to work our way
through that.
And so to the witnesses, let me say you bring significant
experience to this afternoon's deliberations, and we look
forward to your testimony.
Today's hearing marks the first congressional examination
of the summary report of the Review of U.S. Human Space Flight
Plans Committee, which was released just last week. We will
have two panels of witnesses appearing before us today.
The first panel consists of someone who is no stranger to
this committee, Mr. Norman Augustine, an individual with many
years of experience in the aerospace field. Mr. Augustine
chaired the Human Space Flight Review Committee, and he will
present the findings of that review in his testimony today.
The second panel will consist of two witnesses. The first,
Admiral Joseph Dyer, is the Chair of the congressionally-
established Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel. I believe that as
we consider the potential paths of our nation's human space
flight program, we need to make sure that we keep safety
uppermost in our deliberations, and Admiral Dyer is well-
equipped to help us understand the safety issues that need to
be considered. The second, Dr. Michael Griffin, currently
serves as a Professor at the University of Alabama in
Huntsville, and before that, he served the Nation as NASA
Administrator. Dr. Griffin was heavily involved in the
formulation of the Constellation architecture that has been
authorized and for which funds have been appropriated by
Congress over the past four years.
Fundamentally I believe what this hearing should be about
is determining where we go from here.
I have made no secret in recent years of my belief that the
resources given to NASA haven't kept pace with the important
tasks that we have asked NASA to undertake. That has caused
significant stresses in recent years, and we cannot continue to
go down that path.
We either have to give NASA the resources that it needs or
stop pretending that it can really do all that has been put on
its plate.
So as we proceed today, my focus is on the future. In that
regard, I want our witnesses to help the Committee address a
number of important questions. First, NASA has been working for
more than four years on the Constellation program, a
development program in support of which Congress has invested
billions of dollars over that same period. As a result, I think
that good public policy would tell us that there needs to be a
compelling reason to scrap what we have invested our time and
money in over these past four years. Thus we will need to know
whether or not the review panel found any major problems with
the Constellation program that would warrant its cancellation,
such as technical showstoppers, improper cost controls, or
mismanagement.
Second, I have no interest in buying a pig in a poke, and I
don't think anyone else in Congress or the White House will
want to, either. Thus we need to know how we can credibly
compare options proposed by the review panel that are still
immature.
Do we just pick an option and hope for the best, or will we
need to bring our exploration program to a halt for a year or
more while the options are fleshed out and then re-evaluated
once the specific implications of each are better understood?
And third, safety has to be a significant determination in
what we do. The review panel's summary report is largely silent
on safety. How do we meaningfully compare the safety
implications of the various options proposed by the review
panel?
And finally, while the review committee proposed a number
of options that it asserted could be done with enhanced
funding, what if the Administration or Congress determines that
there will be no enhanced funding? Is there any path forward
that makes sense in this situation?
Well, we have quite a lot to discus today, and I again want
to thank our witnesses for their testimony.
Before closing I should note that while we initially sought
the participation of NASA Administrator Bolden at today's
hearing, we determined that it would be premature for him to
appear until the Administration has developed its proposal to
the Augustine Committee's report.
We look forward to having Administrator Bolden later, and
we certainly will.
With that said, I will now recognize Mr. Hall for any
opening remarks he might like.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Gordon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Bart Gordon
Good afternoon. I want to welcome our witnesses to today's hearing.
You each bring significant experience to this afternoon's
deliberations, and we look forward to your testimony.
Today's hearing marks the first congressional examination of the
summary report of the Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans
Committee, which was released just last week. We will have two panels
of witnesses appearing before us today.
The first panel consists of someone who is no stranger to this
committee, Mr. Norman Augustine, an individual with many years of
experience in the aerospace field. Mr. Augustine chaired the human
space flight review committee, and he will present the findings of that
review in his testimony today.
The second panel will consist of two witnesses. The first, Admiral
Joseph Dyer, is the Chair of the congressionally-established Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel. I believe that as we consider the potential
paths for our nation's human space flight program, we need to make sure
that we keep safety uppermost in our deliberations, and Adm. Dyer is
well equipped to help us understand the safety issues that need to be
considered. The second, Dr. Michael Griffin, currently serves as a
Professor at the University of Alabama in Huntsville, and before that,
he served the Nation as NASA Administrator. Dr. Griffin was heavily
involved in formulating the Constellation architecture that has been
authorized and for which funds have been appropriated by Congress over
the past four years. As such, he will be able to help this committee
better understand the considerations that go into developing a mature
human space exploration architecture, which should aid our
deliberations as we work to determine the best path forward.
Because that's fundamentally what I believe this hearing should be
about--determining where we go from here.
I have made no secret in recent years of my belief that the
resources given to NASA haven't kept pace with the important tasks that
we have asked NASA to undertake. That has caused significant stresses
in recent years, and we can't continue down that path.
We either have to give NASA the resources that it needs or stop
pretending that it can do all we've put on its plate. That's especially
true for NASA's exploration program, and it's true for the rest of its
important missions too.
So as we proceed today, my focus is on the future. In that regard,
I want our witnesses to help the Committee address a number of
important questions. First, NASA has been working for more than four
years on the Constellation program, a development program in support of
which Congress has invested billions of dollars over that same period.
As a result, I think that good public policy argues for setting the bar
pretty high against making significant changes in direction at this
point--that is, there would need to be a compelling reason to scrap
what we've invested our time and money in over these past four years.
Thus we will need to know whether or not the review panel found any
major problems with the Constellation program that would warrant its
cancellation, such as technical ``showstoppers,'' improper cost
controls, or mismanagement. If it didn't, logic would argue that our
focus should be on ensuring the success of the current approach, not
walking away from it.
Second, I have no interest in buying a pig in a poke . . . and I
don't think anyone else in Congress or the White House will want to
either. Thus we need to know how we can credibly compare options
proposed by the review panel that are immature technically,
programmatically, and from a cost estimation standpoint--especially
relative to the current program.
Do we just pick an option and hope for the best, or will we need to
bring our exploration program to a halt for a year or more while the
options are fleshed out and then re-evaluated once the specific
implications of each are better understood?
Third, safety has to be a significant determinant of what we do.
The review panel's summary report is largely silent on safety. How do
we meaningfully compare the safety implications of the various options
proposed by the review panel?
And finally, while the review committee proposed a number of
options that it asserted could be done with enhanced funding, what if
the Administration or Congress determines that there will be no
enhanced funding--is there any path forward that makes sense in that
situation?
Well, we have quite a lot to discus today, and I again want to
thank our witnesses for their testimony.
Before closing I should note that while we initially sought the
participation of NASA Administrator Bolden at today's hearing, we
determined that it would be premature for him to appear until the
Administration has developed its response to the Augustine Committee's
report.
We look forward to having Administrator Bolden testify at a later
date.
With that said, I will now recognize Mr. Hall for any opening
remarks he may care to make.
Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding the hearing
today. I want to welcome my good friends, Mr. Augustine, Mike
Griffin, and Joe Dyer who have agreed to testify before us
today. America's space program owes you a great debt of
gratitude for the important roles each of you play and continue
to play and the amount of your time you have given to this
appointment, and I want to thank you for coming and sharing
your wealth of knowledge and experience with us today.
In the aftermath of the Columbia tragedy, we did some
national soul-searching. The Columbia Accident Investigation
Board admonished us for a ``failure of national leadership''
that it said contributed to the accident and to NASA's
inability to finish earlier programs deemed as hoped-for
replacements for the Space Shuttle. The CAIB acknowledged that
human space flight is a risky endeavor and observed, ``The
design of the system should give overriding priority to crew
safety, rather than trade safety against other performance
criteria, such as low cost and reusability.'' Crew safety has
always been my number one priority, and I worked toward that,
had petitions for it, we have had money set aside for it. Some
of it John Glenn used to make a trip, but I was for that
because he is one of my fellow senior citizens up here. I don't
think that we would be where we are in space today if America
hadn't paid so much attention to this very vital concern:
safety.
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board also encouraged
us to clarify our goals in space so it would be worthy of the
risks. I was encouraged in February of 2004 when the Bush
Administration unveiled the Vision for Space Exploration
because it gave NASA a clear direction, with measurable goals
that had long been lacking. NASA was directed then to complete
the International Space Station so it could be used by all the
international partners for microgravity research into new
vaccines and other promising bio-medical research, as well as
research the long-term effects of space flight on humans and go
down that road. That Vision also promised to move us beyond low
Earth orbit by reestablishing our capabilities that have been
lost since 1972 allowing us to return to the Moon, our nearest
neighbor in space. It is my opinion that NASA has the greatest
chance of success if given a clearly defined destination and
the clearly defined design requirements that go with it.
The Congress held many hearings after the Vision was
announced, and in the end agreed with the goals and direction
of the plan proposed. I think it is important to note that both
the 2005 and the 2008 NASA Authorization Acts reflect broad,
bipartisan, bicameral support for the elements that original
Vision. Any administration should carefully consider how
difficult that level of consensus is and how difficult it could
be to reestablish. Our greatest concern then as well as now has
been the inadequate level of funding being requested and the
gap between the retirement of the Space Shuttle and development
of the follow-on Constellation system. In the ensuing years,
these problems have only gotten worse.
I am not a fan of increased spending, but I have always
thought our human space flight program gives the United States
so much to be proud of and carries within it the promise of
significant breakthroughs in health care, defense, and
alternative energy technologies.
Mr. Chairman, in many ways it is hard for me to understand
why the President is seeking new options at all when there has
been an agreed-upon plan for several years. Why don't we just
fund the program we have all agreed to? Why should multi-
billion dollar bailouts of banks and insurance companies come
at the expense of our talented scientists, engineers, and
technicians who make the impossible look easy? It might be an
impact on our national defense some day. I think many of us
think that it would take a very small fraction of our federal
budget, just tenths of one percent, to make a significant
difference in our human space flight goals. But if even that
level of funding is not forthcoming, we have to be very careful
how we proceed because we have a lot at stake, and crew safety
should be paramount.
Mr. Augustine's panel reports that commercial launch
services hold some promise, and our committee has supported the
development of several commercially-based ideas such as NASA's
Commercial Orbital Transportation System and ISS Cargo Resupply
Services, but commercial services should not be considered a
cheap substitute for lack of national leadership in human space
flight. Our NASA Authorization Acts and other legislation of
the FAA Office of Commercial Space Transportation have
encouraged prize competitions designed to inspire smaller
private companies to develop innovative technologies. Just this
past Saturday, Armadillo Aerospace of my home town and the
smallest county of Texas, Rockwall County, become the first
company to qualify for the $1 million top prize of NASA's
Northrop Grumman Lunar Lander Challenge at Caddo Mills
Municipal Airport. I applaud John Carmack and his team for
their innovative and creative thinking. These are exciting and
useful ventures, but in our desire to save money, let us not
forget that you get what you pay for, and when it comes to
transporting humans into space, our overriding priority should
be crew safety, not lowest cost or reusability.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the hearing today, and
thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Ralph M. Hall
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding today's important hearing on
Options and Issues for NASA's Human Space Flight Program. I want to
welcome my good friends Norm Augustine, Mike Griffin and Joe Dyer who
have agreed to testify before us today. America's space program owes
you a debt of gratitude for the important roles each of you have
played, and continue to play. I want to thank you for coming and
sharing your wealth of knowledge and experience with us.
In the aftermath of the Columbia tragedy, we did some national
soul-searching. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB)
admonished us for a ``failure of national leadership'' that it said
contributed to the accident and to NASA's inability to finish earlier
programs deemed as hoped-for replacements for the Space Shuttle. The
CAIB acknowledged that human space flight is a risky endeavor and
observed, ``the design of the system should give overriding priority to
crew safety, rather than trade safety against other performance
criteria, such as low cost and reusability.'' Crew safety is my number
one priority. I do not think we would be where we are in space today if
America had not paid so much attention to this vital concern.
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board also encouraged us to
clarify our goals in space so they would be worthy of the risks. I was
encouraged in February of 2004 when the Bush Administration unveiled
the Vision for Space Exploration, because it gave NASA a clear
direction, with measurable goals, that had been lacking. NASA was
directed to complete the International Space Station so it could be
used by all the international partners for microgravity research into
new vaccines and other promising bio-medical research, as well as
research the long-term effects of space flight on humans. That Vision
also promised to move us beyond low Earth orbit, by re-establishing our
capabilities that have been lost since 1972, allowing us to return to
the Moon our nearest neighbor in space. It is my opinion that NASA has
the greatest chance of success if given a clearly defined destination
and the clearly defined design requirements that go with it.
The Congress held many hearings after the Vision was announced, and
in the end agreed with the goals and direction of the plan proposed. I
think it is important to note that both the 2005 and 2008 NASA
Authorization Acts reflect broad, bipartisan, bicameral support for the
elements of that original vision. Any Administration should carefully
consider how difficult that level of consensus is, and how difficult it
could be to re-establish. Our greatest concern then-as-well-as-now, has
been the inadequate level of funding being requested, and the gap
between the retirement of the Space Shuttle and development of the
follow-on Constellation system. In the ensuing years those problems
have only gotten worse.
I am not a fan of increased spending, but I have always thought our
human space flight program gives the United States so much to be proud
of, and carries within it the promise of significant breakthroughs in
health care, defense, and alternative energy technologies.
Mr. Chairman, in many ways it's hard for me to understand why the
President is seeking new options at all when there has been an agreed
upon plan for several years. Why don't we just fund the program we've
all agreed to? Why should multi-billion dollar bailouts of banks and
insurance companies come at the expense of our talented scientists,
engineers and technicians who make the impossible look easy? I think
many of us agree that it would take a very small fraction of our
federal budget, just tenths of one percent, to make a significant
difference in our human space flight goals. But if even that level of
funding is not forthcoming, we must be very careful how we proceed
because we have a lot at stake, and crew safety should be paramount.
Mr. Augustine's panel reports that commercial launch services hold
some promise, and our committee has supported the development of
several commercially-based ideas such as NASA's Commercial Orbital
Transportation System and ISS Cargo Resupply Services, but commercial
services should not be considered a cheap substitute for lack of
national leadership in human space flight. Our NASA Authorization Acts
and other legislation for the FAA Office of Commercial Space
Transportation have encouraged prize competitions designed to inspire
smaller private companies to develop innovative technologies. Just this
past Saturday, Armadillo Aerospace of Rockwall, Texas became the first
company to qualify for the $1 million top prize of NASA's Northrop
Grumman Lunar Lander Challenge at Caddo Mills Municipal Airport. I
applaud John Carmack and his team for their innovative and creative
thinking. These are exciting and useful ventures, but in our desire to
save money let us not forget that you get what you pay for, and when it
comes to transporting humans into space our overriding priority should
be crew safety, not lowest cost or reusability.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to today's hearing, and I yield back
my time.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Hall. If there are other
Members who wish to submit additional opening statements, your
statements will be added for the record at this point.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Jerry F. Costello
Good afternoon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today's
hearing to review and discuss the summary report of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Review of U.S. Human Space
Flight Plans Committee.
I am pleased the review committee completed its survey of NASA's
human space flight program in a timely and effective manner. In
reviewing the summary report, I identified three areas I look forward
to hearing the witnesses address.
First, the review committee concluded that human space flight will
not be sustainable under NASA's current budget, and I understand the
review committee's view that an increase of $3 billion over several
years will allow NASA to continue human space flight programs. However,
I would like to know if the review committee considered Congress'
frequently cited concerns regarding NASA's budget management abilities
when determining that such an increase in funding would be necessary. I
believe Congress and NASA should work together to ensure that these
funds are appropriately and efficiently used.
Second, as a strong supporter of Science, Technology, Engineering,
and Math (STEM) education programs, I was concerned to see NASA's cut
its budget request for STEM programs by $43 million for Fiscal Year
2010. I would like to hear if the review committee considered other
measures to prepare the next generation of astronauts and aerospace
engineers. It is vitally important for our nation to attract new
engineers and scientist to ensure the U.S. remains competitive in the
21st century. Does the review committee have any recommendations to
provide Congress on how we can work with NASA and the Administration to
fulfill those needs?
Third, as Chairman of the Aviation Subcommittee on the
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, I was interested in the
review committee's findings regarding commercial entities and low Earth
orbit travel. I would like to hear from our witnesses how the
involvement of commercial carriers would be more efficient than a
government program and how Congress can assist NASA in bringing about a
commercial space program, should such an option be considered.
I welcome our two panels of witnesses, and I look forward to their
testimony. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, distinguished witnesses.
Mr. Augustine, I am delighted to see you here. I would like to
commend your leadership on the U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee.
Your work is, and has been, well-respected by Congress. I look forward
to your presence next week at my Science and Technology Brain Trust.
Your words will inspire many young people, who will be in the audience.
The American public has been inspired by manned space flight since
the space program was created, in the 1950s. Generations of young
people have seen video footage of a man walking on the Moon and have
said to themselves, ``I want to do that!'' Thousands of American
children aspire to go to Space Camp. Others take professional paths
toward engineering to work in the space industry.
Aeronautics and space research have yielded unimaginable benefits.
From lasers to Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) technology, from
satellites to water purification systems, NASA research has touched
many aspects of our daily lives.
I want to thank the U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee for its
120-day review of feasibility and options for space flight into the
next decades. The Committee brought different perspectives and
specialized expertise together, into one package, to help guide policy-
makers as they make decisions about federal funding into space flight.
As I have said before, NASA is incredibly important to Texas. The
Johnson Space Center, just south of Houston, is a major economic engine
for our state.
In reviewing some of the Committee's perspective on short-term
Space Shuttle planning, it recommends that, ``the current Shuttle
manifest should be flown in a safe and prudent manner.''
However, the Committee also surmised that, ``The U.S. human space
flight program appears to be on an unsustainable trajectory.
It is perpetuating the perilous practice of pursing goals that do
not match allocated resources. . . . Space operations become all the
more difficult when means to not match aspirations.''
The Science Committee makes great efforts to make budget and
funding recommendations that align with a responsible expenditure of
public resources. With a deep recession, many federally-funded programs
have also suffered from budget cuts. It seems to me that goals should
be revised as anticipated funding streams change.
The Committee is right. Grand plans mean little if the financial
support is not present. During tight economic times, it is better to
focus on safety first, then on a NASA program that may be more modest
in scope, but is efficient and goal-oriented.
As Michael Griffin stated in his testimony, ``the Commission didn't
find anything wrong with the current program, didn't find anything
safer, more reliable, cheaper, or faster. The roots are healthy. So,
why throw away four years and $8 billion pulling up the flowers?''
I agree. We must not undo strides made in a healthy program. I look
forward to more study of the Committee's recommendations as human space
flight moves forward.
[The prepared statement of Chairwoman Giffords follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairwoman Gabrielle Giffords
I want to join Chairman Gordon in welcoming our distinguished set
of witnesses, and I look forward to their testimony. Today we will be
discussing no less than the future of America's human space flight
program--the program that I think every politician in Washington and
across the country points to when we talk about America's great
innovation and technological superiority. I know that each of our
witnesses today will bring important insights to our deliberations.
Yet as we start this hearing, I have to say that I am extremely
frustrated, in fact, I am angry. With all due respect to Mr. Augustine
and his panel, I have to say that I think we are no further ahead in
our understanding of what it will take to ensure a robust and
meaningful human space flight program than we were before they started
their review. In fact, I'd argue that we have lost ground.
Let's review the facts.
Probably the most important finding of the Review of U.S. Human
Space Flight Plans is the panel's determination that there is a serious
mismatch between the challenges that we have asked NASA to meet and the
resources that have been provided to the agency. In other words, we
can't get anywhere worth going to under NASA's projected budgets. Well,
we certainly didn't need an independent commission to tell us that.
That's been painfully obvious for some time now. And the impact of that
shortfall is that the good work being done by NASA's civil servants and
contractors risks being undone.
I'm glad they highlighted the problem, but it's not exactly news to
anyone who has been involved in the budget battles of recent years.
Don't get me wrong. I'm not denigrating the work done by Mr. Augustine
and his panel. Mr. Augustine has an excellent reputation and I know
that he has put a lot of work into this commission.
They have given us a sobering reminder that our position as the
world's leading space-faring nation is not a given--we continually need
to re-earn that preeminent position through our actions, and we can't
just rest on past laurels. The rest of the world has discovered space
too, and we are seeing the emergence of impressive capabilities in
other countries that we need to take seriously.
That said, I think the men and women of NASA have demonstrated that
they are up to the challenge. Over the past four years, they have moved
from initial concepts into design and development of the Constellation
systems. They have successfully completed a number of important design
reviews, have undertaken test activities--including test-firing just
last week the five-segment booster that will power the Ares I rocket
into space and planning for a test flight of the Ares I-X rocket at the
end of next month. And they've done all of this even though the
budgetary sands keep shifting under them, taking away resources that
they thought they could count on and forcing them continually to replan
and rephase even while they are trying to complete the hard technical
and programmatic work that has to be done if Constellation is to
succeed.
So when it was announced that Mr. Augustine would be leading an
independent review of the Nation's human space flight program, I
thought that they would take a hard look at the Constellation program
and tell us what should be done to maximize its chances for success.
But that's not what they did. Instead of focusing on how to
strengthen the exploration program in which we have invested so much
time and treasure, they gave only glancing attention to Constellation--
even referring to it in the past tense in their summary report--and
instead spent the bulk of their time crafting alternative options that
do little to illuminate the choices confronting Congress and the White
House.
And so where does that leave us? Well, in place of a serious review
of potential actions that could be taken to improve and strengthen the
Constellation program, we have been given set of alternative
exploration options that are little more than cartoons--lacking any
detailed cost, schedule, technical, safety or other programmatic
specifics that we can be confident have been subjected to rigorous and
comprehensive analysis and validation.
So, I have to ask my colleagues on the Committee--what are we to do
with this report? In the absence of evidence of mismanagement or
technical or safety ``showstoppers''--none of which the Augustine panel
has indicated has occurred in the Constellation program--can any of us
in good conscience recommend canceling the exploration systems
development programs that Congress has funded for the past four years
on the basis of the sketchy alternatives contained in the panel's
report?
I know that I can't justify doing so, and I would suspect that you
can't either. Hoping that ``maybe things will work out'' if we try
something new is no substitute for the detailed planning and design and
testing that has been the hallmark of successful space flight programs
in the past. Nor do we gain anything by confusing hypothetical
commercial capabilities that might someday exist with what we can
actually count on now to meet the Nation's needs. We've made that
mistake in the past, and we've suffered the consequences.
So I have to say that I just don't get it. I don't see the logic of
scrapping what the Nation has spent years and billions of dollars to
develop in favor of starting down a new path developed in haste and
which hasn't been subjected to any of the detailed technical and cost
reviews that went into the formulation of the existing Constellation
program.
For the Nation's sake, I hope that we can break this cycle of false
starts in our nation's human space flight program. It does not serve
America well. As far as I can tell, the Constellation program's only
sin is to have tried to implement a very challenging program with an
inadequate budget. Yet, some would now advocate walking away from that
program, not because it is not performing, but because we are unwilling
to face the truth that, as Mr. Augustine said in testimony before our
Committee more than five years ago, ``it would be a grave mistake to
try to pursue a space program `on the cheap'.''
I hope that the Administration and this Congress finally take those
words to heart and do the right thing. The future of America's human
space flight program is at stake.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mitchell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Harry E. Mitchell
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
On May 7, 2009, the Office of Science and Technology Policy,
Executive Office of the President, launched an independent review of
planned U.S. human space flight activities with the goal ``of ensuring
that the Nation is on a vigorous and sustainable path to achieving its
boldest aspirations in space.''
Today we will examine the summary report of this review as well as
discuss the implications and related issues for NASA.
NASA conducts vital research and development projects that help us
learn about our surroundings.
Arizona State University, which is located in my district, is home
to researchers who work on many of these important NASA research
projects.
To maintain America's competitiveness in science and technology, we
must do more than merely keep up. We must lead, and commit ourselves to
providing the resources necessary to keep us at the forefront of this
kind of cutting edge research and development.
I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses about the
findings of this report.
I yield back.
Panel I:
Chairman Gordon. First up is Mr. Norman Augustine who is
currently servicing as the Chair, Review of the U.S. Human
Space Flight Plans Committee and is the former CEO of Lockheed-
Martin and was the lead author of the National Academies 2005
Report, Rising Above the Gathering Storm, which was the
foundation for the first major legislation that this committee
passed last year. And again, our country will be forever
grateful to you I think as years go along. Your report and our
legislation will be thought of as landmark legislation and will
help our country do just what it says, compete.
So Mr. Augustine, you are now recognized.
STATEMENT OF MR. NORMAN R. AUGUSTINE, CHAIR, REVIEW OF U.S.
HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT PLANS COMMITTEE
Mr. Augustine. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Hall,
Members of the Committee, I would with the Committee's
permission like to submit a written statement for the record
and just briefly summarize it here.
Chairman Gordon. Without objection.
Mr. Augustine. To begin with, I should acknowledge the
colleagues on this committee who have devoted a remarkable
amount of time and effort to putting together the findings that
I will be describing today. I would also like to thank NASA for
the terrific support they have given to our committee. That
support has been invariably straightforward, responsive, and in
the can-do spirit of NASA. Also I should acknowledge the
Aerospace Corporation which our committee hired to work
directly for the Committee to give us an independent arm to do
more detailed analysis of costs and schedules, programmatics,
technical issues than we could perform ourselves.
Our committee had 10 members. It included scientists,
engineers, educators, business executives, astronauts, former
presidential appointees, retired general officer. In other
words, it was a rather diverse committee that has come to what
I believe to be a unanimous set of findings.
As you know, we were only allowed 90 days to conduct our
work, and the reason for that is that we were trying to match
the budget cycle with which this committee is so familiar.
Having said that, you should be aware of the limitations that
are placed on our work because of that amount of time.
It is very important for me to emphasize that we were not
asked to make recommendations, and we have not done so. We were
asked to offer options or alternatives and assessments, and
that is what we have done and so that is what I will talk about
today.
First of all, when seeking a destination for the Human
Space Flight Program, it was our view that above all else, Mars
stands out, a human landing on Mars because Mars more closely
matches the Earth than any other planet. It is physically
reachable, a solid surface. It has materials on the surface of
the planet. It has an atmosphere of sorts, and it is clearly
the goal to be sought. But having said that, it is our view,
and I realize that many don't agree with us, that from a safety
standpoint we are not prepared to undertake a program to go
directly to Mars at this point in time. There is a great deal
of additional homework to be done, some of a rather fundamental
nature before we set out on a mission directly to Mars.
The various parameters our committee considered led to over
3,000 possible options for us to consider. We sought to narrow
that down to a manageable group, and in so doing obviously
everyone's favorite option isn't there. But we do have five
families of options that we think are broadly representative of
the choices before our nation, and one can modify those options
in some cases with relative ease. One of those options of
course is the current plan that is now being pursued. That plan
we have called the Program of Record and is our baseline
option. We define the plan as being the program that NASA has
told us it is pursuing and the budget that goes with it. We
have used the budget that the Office of Management and Budget
has told us is appropriate to that plan.
I would note in echoing your views, Mr. Chairman, that
ongoing programs should only be changed for compelling reasons,
and we have tried at each of our alternatives to cite the
strengths and the weaknesses of each of the alternatives, and
each has both strengths and weaknesses. I won't because of lack
of time in this statement describe the other four options, but
they are in the report we published or on the internet, and I
am sure you have copies of them. They are listed in my written
statement that you have.
The reluctant bottom-line conclusion of our committee, if
you will, is that the current program as it is being pursued is
not executable, that we are on a path that will not lead to a
useful, safe human exploration program, and the reason for
that, the primary reason, is the mismatch between the tasks to
be performed and the funds that are available to support those
tasks. It also came as a considerable disappointment to this
committee that we were unable to find any alternative space
program, a human space flight program, that would be worthy of
this country that could be conducted for the funding profile
now in place. We examined one derivative, a number of
derivative programs based on one additional budget, and we
found that by adding approximately $3 billion to the budget
over the years and accounting for inflation over time in
realistic fashion, that America could have a choice of a number
of exciting, challenging, important, inspirational human space
flight programs.
I will close with three quick observations, one is that we
have sought to be relatively conservative in our estimates of
cost, schedule and performance, and we do that because it
reflects our dissatisfaction with the record of our profession
at doing these things in the past, estimating that is.
Secondly, we believe that NASA has too long been placed in a
position of been trying to accomplish more than the resources
that it is given permit. We believe that to be wasteful and
worse yet, very hazardous when dealing with such a challenging
field as human space flight which is highly unforgiving. And
finally on that point, human space flight is obviously, as
everyone in this room knows, very risky. We place people in
danger. We place the Nation's reputation on the line, and it is
our belief that if we hope to be a space-faring nation over the
years, that we have to recognize that there will be setbacks,
and we should do everything we can to prevent them. But this
is, in the vernacular, a risky business.
Finally, on behalf of the Members of the Committee, I would
like to thank you and the Administration for the confidence
that they have placed in us to review what has truly become a
symbol of America's leadership in the world.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Augustine follows:]
Prepared Statement of Norman R. Augustine
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for this
opportunity to share with you the principal findings of the Review of
the U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee. I will speak on behalf of
the members of our committee and will do my best to reflect our
consensus views. As you are aware, our final report has not yet been
published; however, our decision-making deliberations were all
conducted in public under FACA rules so I believe what I have to say
will come as no surprise to anyone.
First, I would like to acknowledge the contributions and
extraordinary effort of each of my colleagues on the Committee. Their
names and primary affiliations are appended to this statement. I would
also like to acknowledge the forthright, responsive and highly
professional support we received from NASA as well as from the
Aerospace Corporation, the latter of which the Committee employed to
provide independent technical and cost assessments.
The Committee was comprised of ten members having highly diverse
backgrounds. It included astronauts, scientists, engineers, former
presidential appointees, business executives, educators and an Air
Force retired General Officer--each with considerable space experience.
Due to the exigencies of the budget process we were asked to complete
our task in ninety days--which we did, with the exception of finalizing
and printing our report. The latter will be available soon.
Our assigned task was to identify alternative courses that the U.S.
might pursue in the area of human space flight. One such alternative,
of course, is to continue the present program. As noted in the
Committee's report, changes to ongoing programs are generally warranted
only for compelling reasons. Each alternative identified by the
Committee is accompanied by a discussion of its strengths and
weaknesses.
It was agreed that at least two of the alternatives would be
compatible with the FY '10 budget plan extended through FY '20. We were
also asked to examine the current plans for the Space Shuttle and
International Space Station and, if appropriate offer alternatives
thereto. It is important to note that we specifically were not asked to
make a recommendation as to a future course of action. That decision
is, of course, the purview of the President and the Congress.
Before addressing destinations and architectures the Committee
sought to identify appropriate goals for human space flight. There are
many possibilities that can be cited: strengthening the economy,
conducting science, repairing and upgrading spacecraft on orbit,
promoting international ties, protecting against asteroids and comets,
encouraging science education, and more. It is, however, the
Committee's view that although each of these benefits is important in
its own right, none can, by itself, justify the cost and risk of human
space flight. Rather, the raison d'etre for such activity must, and in
our view can, be founded upon charting a course for the expansion of
civilization into the solar system. In so doing, one derives the
leadership benefits of being among the world's space-faring nations--a
nation that is committed to exploration, seeking knowledge, advancing
engineering capabilities, inspiring its citizens, and motivating its
young people to consider careers in science and engineering. To a not
inconsiderable degree it is intangibles that justify the human space
flight program, intangibles such as those that today help maintain
America as a leader among the world's nations. The Apollo Program is an
appropriate example.
In carrying out the charge to identify options the Committee
narrowed over 3,000 theoretically possible outcomes to a set of five
alternative integrated space programs. These can be thought of as
representative families, since one can interchange certain elements
among the individual alternatives. The Committee's attempt was, of
course, to keep the number of nominal options to a manageable size.
The alternatives offered include the ongoing program,
Constellation--that is, the Program of Record and the Budget of
Record--and four primary alternatives, some having derivatives or
``sub-cases.''
Two of the five alternatives were in fact constrained to the
current budget profile for human space flight. The first of these was
the Program of Record; that is, today's program, modified to fly-out
the Shuttle in 2011 rather than 2010 and including sufficient funds to
de-orbit the International Space Station (ISS) in 2016 according to
plan. Under this existing approach the Ares I launch vehicle and Orion
capsule are unlikely to become available until after the ISS has been
de-orbited. The heavy-lift vehicle, Ares V, would, in our judgment,
become available in the late 2020s; however, there are inadequate funds
to develop the exploration systems the Ares V is intended to support.
The Committee concludes that this is not an executable option due to
the incompatibility of the budget plan and the program plan.
The Committee's review noted that the Constellation Program has
encountered technical difficulties of the type not unexpected of
undertakings of this magnitude--problems which, given adequate funds
and engineering attention, should be solvable. This was not, however, a
significant factor in the overall conclusion with respect to the
viability of the Program of Record.
The second of the options, also constrained to the current budget
profile, flies-out the Shuttle in FY '11, but extends the use of the
International Space Station for five years, to 2020. This option
includes a robust technology development program--something the
Committee believes has been lacking at NASA in recent years--and relies
on commercial firms to launch cargo and crews to the ISS as soon as
demonstrated capabilities exist. It includes development of a somewhat
less capable version of the Ares V, known as the Ares V (Lite). This
option is deemed capable of execution but cannot provide the space-
borne hardware required to support a viable exploration program. In
fact, the Committee could find no program within the current budget
profile that would enable a viable exploration effort.
Given these findings, the Committee examined three options that
exceeded the present budget plan. The most defensible funding profile,
purely from a program execution standpoint, is one that linearly
increases to $3B above the FY '10 guidance by FY '14 and then increases
by an estimated annual inflation rate of 2.4 percent.
The first of these budgetarily less constrained options is termed
the Baseline Case. It is the present Program of Record with funds added
to extend Shuttle operations into 2011 and, as now provided in the
budget plan, to de-orbit the ISS in 2016. This program would permit a
human return to the Moon in the mid '20s and begin laying the
groundwork for a flight to Mars.
The second of the budgetarily less constrained cases is actually a
family of variants that would extend ISS operations to 2020, provide
funds for its de-orbit, and fund a strong technology program in support
of ISS utilization and an eventual human landing on Mars. It would use
commercial launch services for new access to low Earth orbit. There
are, however, significant differences between the two variants under
this option. The first of these variants would develop the Ares V
(Lite) to support a human lunar landing in the mid 2020s--after which
focus would turn to a human Mars landing. The second variant would
extend the use of the (recertified) Space Shuttle to 2015 and be
accompanied by the development of a Shuttle Directly-Derived heavy-lift
vehicle in place of the Ares family--with the eventual possibility of
in-orbit refueling. This is the only practicable option the Committee
could find to close the at least five-year gap during which the U.S.
will, as currently planned, rely upon Russian launch services to lift
U.S. astronauts to the International Space Station.
The third budgetarily less constrained case follows a rather
different path of exploration from that heretofore pursued by the U.S.
The Committee terms this option the ``Flexible Path'' and defines it as
achieving periodic milestones prior to a Moon or Mars landing. These
initial accomplishments could include a lunar fly-by, a Mars fly-by, a
visit to a Lagrange point, an asteroid rendezvous, and possible
landings on the moons of Mars, Phobos and Demos.
In summary, with the existing budget plan it would be reasonable to
extend the use of the ISS for five years and to conduct a robust
technology development program. The Committee concludes that no
rational exploratory program can be funded under the existing funding
constraint and that plans for America's space exploration program would
de facto be halted and human operations limited to low Earth orbit.
With the less constrained budget option, requiring approximately
$3B per year in additional funding, a sound exploration program could
be conducted. The reason for this seemingly ``dead space'' between the
two budget options is, simplistically stated, that for sixty percent of
the needed funds, one cannot go sixty percent of the way to Mars.
Each of the implementable options that was identified has its own
set of benefits and liabilities that the Committee has sought to
address. The findings of this effort are discussed in the Summary
Report. The assessment gives overarching priority to safety and, as is
noted in the Summary Report, the Committee believes considerable
caution is in order when comparing analytical results in this area with
flight results. Similarly, the Committee has sought to be conservative
in its cost estimation practices--reflecting dissatisfaction with
historical experience on a broad spectrum of programs. Finally, in
defining a ``Program of Record'' the Committee has relied upon NASA's
current program plan and the President's budget profile, the latter as
provided by the Office of Management and Budget.
In the opinion of this committee, as well as that of most of the
persons with whom the Committee has had contact, NASA has for too long
sought to operate in an environment where means do not match ends. In
the unforgiving arena of human space flight this is a particularly
hazardous policy to embrace.
The Committee also notes that NASA has become a mature
organization, an organization long protected from restructuring
Centers, facilities and personnel cadres. The consequence is an
organization with high fixed costs of the type that make budgetary
options highly limited. While NASA is unarguably the finest space
organization in the world and a great national asset, it is overdue for
a thorough management assessment of the type the aerospace industry
underwent at the end of the Cold War.
The Committee's report will contain more detailed information that
it hopes will prove of value. On behalf of my colleagues, I thank you
for the trust that has been placed in us to review a pursuit which for
decades has come to be a symbol of America's leadership.
U.S. HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT PLANS COMMITTEE MEMBERS
Mr. Norman R. Augustine
Retired Chairman & CEO
Lockheed Martin Corporation
Dr. Wanda M. Austin
President & Chief Executive Officer
The Aerospace Corporation
Mr. Bohdan I. Bejmuk
Chair, NASA Constellation Standing Review Board
Dr. Leroy Chiao
Former Astronaut, Former International Space
Station Commander and Engineering Consultant
Dr. Christopher F. Chyba
Professor of Astrophysics Sciences and International Affairs
Princeton University
Dr. Edward F. Crawley
Ford Professor of Engineering
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Mr. Jeffrey K. Greason
Co-founder & Chief Executive Officer
XCOR Aerospace
Dr. Charles F. Kennel
Director and Professor Emeritus
Scripps Institution of Oceanography
University of California, San Diego
General Lester Lyles
United States Air Force (Retired)
Dr. Sally Ride
President & Chief Executive Officer
Imaginary Lines
Biography for Norman R. Augustine
NORMAN R. AUGUSTINE was raised in Colorado and attended Princeton
University where he graduated with a BSE in Aeronautical Engineering,
magna cum laude, and an MSE. He was elected to Phi Beta Kappa, Tau Beta
Pi and Sigma Xi.
In 1958 he joined the Douglas Aircraft Company in California where
he worked as a Research Engineer, Program Manager and Chief Engineer.
Beginning in 1965, he served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
as Assistant Director of Defense Research and Engineering. He joined
LTV Missiles and Space Company in 1970, serving as Vice President,
Advanced Programs and Marketing. In 1973 he returned to the government
as Assistant Secretary of the Army and in 1975 became Under Secretary
of the Army, and later Acting Secretary of the Army. Joining Martin
Marietta Corporation in 1977 as Vice President of Technical Operations,
he was elected as CEO in 1987 and Chairman in 1988, having previously
been President and COO. He served as President of Lockheed Martin
Corporation upon the formation of that company in 1995, and became CEO
later that year. He retired as Chairman and CEO of Lockheed Martin in
August 1997, at which time he became a Lecturer with the Rank of
Professor on the faculty of Princeton University where he served until
July 1999.
Mr. Augustine was Chairman and Principal Officer of the American
Red Cross for nine years, Chairman of the Council of the National
Academy of Engineering, President and Chairman of the Association of
the United States Army, Chairman of the Aerospace Industries
Association, and Chairman of the Defense Science Board. He is a former
President of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics and
the Boy Scouts of America. He is a current or former member of the
Board of Directors of ConocoPhillips, Black & Decker, Proctor & Gamble
and Lockheed Martin, and was a member of the Board of Trustees of
Colonial Williamsburg. He is a Regent of the University System of
Maryland, Trustee Emeritus of Johns Hopkins and a former member of the
Board of Trustees of Princeton and MIT. He is a member of the Advisory
Board to the Department of Homeland Security, was a member of the Hart/
Rudman Commission on National Security, and served for 16 years on the
President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology. He is a
member of the American Philosophical Society and the Council on Foreign
Affairs, and is a Fellow of the National Academy of Arts and Sciences
and the Explorers Club.
Mr. Augustine has been presented the National Medal of Technology
by the President of the United States and received the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Distinguished Public Service Award. He has five times received
the Department of Defense's highest civilian decoration, the
Distinguished Service Medal. He is co-author of The Defense Revolution
and Shakespeare In Charge and author of Augustine's Laws and
Augustine's Travels. He holds 23 honorary degrees and was selected by
Who's Who in America and the Library of Congress as one of ``Fifty
Great Americans'' on the occasion of Who's Who's fiftieth anniversary.
He has traveled in over 100 countries and stood on both the North and
South Poles of the Earth.
Discussion
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Augustine. At this point,
we will begin our round of questions, but before we proceed, I
would like to make a unanimous consent request at the behest of
our distinguished witness, Mr. Augustine has asked that Dr.
Edward Crawley, a member of the panel that he chaired, be
allowed to join him at the witness table to help answer
questions the Committee may have. If there are no objections,
then Dr. Crawley, please join us here.
I also have one other unanimous consent. We have other
Members of Congress who are not currently Members of the
Science Committee that would like to join us today. They have
been reminded that any questions they might have will be after
the current Members of this committee. And so without
objection, Mr. Culberson, Mr. Posey, Ms. Jackson Lee will be
allowed to participate if they choose. With no objections, they
will be.
Mr. Augustine, I could have saved you some time and money
and told you that there weren't enough funds to carry out the
existing program if you had asked or had been to any of our
meetings.
Mr. Augustine. We should have changed jobs, sir.
Chairman Gordon. We unfortunately--it is not funny, but we
have been pointing out for some time and I think that this is a
worthwhile timeout. We cannot continue to kick the can down the
road. We have got to decide as a nation what are we willing to
pay for and need to move forward. So I thank you for again
bringing these topics to the surface. They don't need to be
under the rug any longer.
Constellation Program Status
So one of the questions that we expected your panel to
address was the status of the existing Constellation program,
but the Summary Report actually says very little about it. So
let me ask you, what is your panel's assessment of the
Constellation Program? Is it technically sound and effectively
managed within the resources available or is it fatally flawed?
If there are areas that need improvement, what are they?
Mr. Augustine. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to try to
answer that. Certainly with the resources available, the
program is I think we would say fatally flawed. It will take so
long to do the things that need to be done to develop the
hardware that is needed, it will be well beyond many of our
lifetimes before we are able to have a really active space
flight program. That is with the current budget.
With regard to the program itself----
Chairman Gordon. Excuse me, but would that be the same with
any of the alternatives, though?
Mr. Augustine. That would be.
Chairman Gordon. Okay.
Mr. Augustine. With regard to the--what was the other point
you had? I forgot.
Chairman Gordon. Is it technically sound, effectively
managed?
Mr. Augustine. Oh, yes. Thank you. We did review the
program, its management. We believe it to be soundly managed.
Technically the program has some significant problems,
technical problems, and this is not to be unexpected in a
program of this difficulty and this magnitude. We saw no
problems that appear to be unsolvable given the proper
engineering talent, the attention, and the funds to solve them.
Having said that, I would like to turn to my colleague, Dr.
Crawley, and the reason I ask that he be permitted to join me,
our committee divided into subcommittees, one of which devoted
its attention to putting together these integrated options, and
Professor Crawley chaired that subcommittee. Ed, if you would
care to add anything to my summary remarks?
Mr. Crawley. No, I think, Norm, you have summarized this
quite well at the highest level. There were on our committee a
number of people who had actually built space flight hardware,
and their general consensus on the assessment of the
Constellation Program technically is, as Norm said, that it has
problems. All real programs, where you are really building
hardware, encounter problems, developmental problems, but we
didn't see any of them including some of the famous vibration
problem in the Ares I or the vibrocoustic environment, the
noise environment, around the Orion that were not surmountable
with proper engineering talent and skill which we believe NASA
could bring to bear.
So in short----
Chairman Gordon. Sir, do you think in short are the
problems with Constellation greater than the other options? And
how would you really be able to evaluate the other options
since they are at what you would call an immature level in
contrast to this more mature level?
Mr. Crawley. Well, Mr. Chairman, that was in fact one of
the most difficult challenges that the Committee faced. We were
asked to consider and propose a set of alternatives which we
faithfully tried to do, but we were very conscious of the my-
rocket-in-your-view-graph problem that we called, it, you know,
it is always easy for something to look better on a set of view
graphs or in a proposal than when you are in the midst of a
real development program. Other than to say we were very
conscious of this and we tried to the greatest extent to be
aware of it in the assessment of the options and the costing of
the options, I think that that was basically the judgment
process of the Committee.
Chairman Gordon. So as I mentioned earlier, we do have a
program that has been authorized we have spent billions of
dollars on. And so I don't think you trade what you know for
what you don't know if it is equal or a little bit better. So
are you prepared to say that one or all of the other options
are substantially better than Constellation and worth having a
major turn now?
Mr. Augustine. I think it would be our view just what you
said, that there should be a compelling reason to change an
existing program, and we believe that the existing program,
given adequate funds, is executable and would carry out its
objectives. The existing program, just like other programs,
does have its difficulties. Some of the other programs rely
heavily on existing hardware, for example, closely Shuttle
derived hardware, more closely derived.
But the fact remains on the negative side that since for
example the Ares I program began, several years have passed,
and at this point, we believe it's quite unlikely that the
Space Station, the ISS, International Space Station, will have
just about completed its useful life, even an extended life, by
the time the Ares is available. And so clearly you could do the
Ares I. You could do the Ares I and the Ares V. You could close
the gap by keeping the Shuttle flying, and you could keep the
ISS in space. And the problem gets to be you have to give up
some things early on if you want to have benefits later on. And
in our view, the real need of this country is a heavy-lift
vehicle, Ares V type or something like that and that that
should be the first priority. But to answer your question, Mr.
Chairman, given additional funds such as we have identified, we
believe the existing program would be a fine program.
Chairman Gordon. Well, that really wasn't the question.
Mr. Augustine. I am sorry.
Chairman Gordon. Once again, I think we all agree that
there is no option that was presented that can be successful
with the funds at the current level. So that is the premise. So
then we get to, again, the fundamental question is, if we are
going to trade in what we have been doing for something new,
then I think that the new has to be substantially better. Would
everybody agree with that? Is that a fair statement?
Mr. Augustine. I think we would.
Future Options for NASA
Chairman Gordon. Okay. So are you prepared to say some of
these other programs are substantially better than
Constellation and worth making that change?
Mr. Augustine. Well, we have tried very hard not to end up
being in a position where we make a recommendation as to a
program, but we have pointed out, and we have done that out of
fairness to the President and to you not to make it harder for
you to make a decision here. So we have been asked to do it
this way. But each of the options does have liabilities
including the current program. All the others have them, too.
Each has their benefits. We have cited those benefits and those
liabilities, and it is really up to the decision-maker to make
a judgment as to how to weigh those.
Chairman Gordon. You mentioned that there was more
documentation on your discussion about Constellation. I assume
this is available for us so that we can--more than was in your
report?
Mr. Augustine. I probably should have mentioned that at the
outset, Mr. Chairman. We are in the process--you have our
summary so far.
Chairman Gordon. Right.
Mr. Augustine. And we are hard at work preparing the rest
of the final report which will be over 100 pages long, and it
is close to being written and it is our intent to have it out
by the end of the month.
Chairman Gordon. Good. Thank you very much. Mr. Hall, you
are recognized.
Closing the Shuttle/Ares Gap
Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, I thank you. Mr. Augustine, your
panel noted that the Constellation program had encountered
technical difficulties, and you also noted that the problems
were no worse than any other large program, that problems could
be solved with time. And you also found the current program had
been underfunded and that none of the options you looked at
gave NASA more capability or close the gap. What would it take
to close the gap?
Mr. Augustine. In our view, we looked at a lot of different
cases. Maybe I should define for those in the room who aren't
familiar with what the gap is. The gap refers to, Mr. Hall, the
time after the shut down of the Space Shuttle when the only way
the U.S. will have of putting astronauts into orbit is relying
on buying seats on Russian launch vehicles, basically. And we
looked at various options to close that gap, and absent huge
influxes of funds and the willingness to accept more safety
risk than we believe is appropriate, there is only one way to
close that gap and that is to continue to fly the Space Shuttle
beyond the currently planned shut down at the end of 2010.
Mr. Hall. And that amount?
Mr. Augustine. The cost, sir?
Mr. Hall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Augustine. The cost of continuing to fly that Shuttle,
if you were to do so, has a couple of factors that have to be
entered. The first is that in our work we discovered that the
Space Shuttle is currently bearing a huge amount of the
overhead of NASA, and if the Space Shuttle is shut down, that
overhead is going to shift to some other program, probably the
Constellation. And so some of the savings numbers one has heard
from shutting down the Shuttle are really accounting numbers.
On the other hand, there are real savings that we wouldn't have
to buy Russian launches if we kept flying the Shuttle. Our
belief is that the net cost of continuing to fly the Shuttle a
couple of times a year, once or twice, is about $2.5 billion a
year. That is the cost issue. I just have to briefly say that
there are also safety issues. There have been commissions that
have said that we should not continue flying the Shuttle. It is
our belief from what we were able to learn that if one were to
recertify the Shuttle, very importantly, and it would have to
be recertified, then probably it could continue to fly. But the
launch rate would be so low that, based on my experience,
launching rockets at a very low rate is like doing heart
surgery at a very low rate. It is a dangerous thing to do.
Ed would you like to briefly?
Mr. Crawley. No, I think that is substantially correct. We
looked at a number of options of accelerating the Orion, Ares,
of going to alternatives, putting emphasis on commercial
launches to LEO for crew, and really none of them substantially
closed the gap from above, as we say. It brought the human
capability in earlier. The time to close the gap was with
investments in 2008 and 2009 and 2010. Now, here we are on the
verge of 2010 and really no expenditure will accelerate
significantly a new U.S. capability much earlier than 2015,
'16, '17.
Evaluating Crew Safety
Mr. Hall. Well, we have been told and it has been said
that, quote ``it couldn't be accomplished under the current
budget''. I guess what we really would like to know, under what
type budget could it be accomplished and from a crew safety
point of view since we are talking about that, your report
seems to treat all the potential launch options the same, and I
guess how did the panel evaluate the crew safety aspect of any
option other than the Constellation?
Mr. Augustine. Well, the safety issue was the number one
issue for us to consider, obviously. Our committee had two
astronauts that had flown six missions in space. So they were
not uninterested in being sure that we all paid attention to
the subject of safety. As I said earlier, we thought the right
thing to do, the real goal, was to go to Mars, and we discarded
that over safety issues. Each of the options we have offered we
believe meets a threshold of safety, and I can define that if
you want. But we are skeptical of comparing analytical safety
calculations with proven safety calculations or reliability
calculations and are related to but different from safety. We
are skeptical because most of those calculations turn out to
not even include factors that have led to most of the failures
in the past.
So a great deal of judgment and scar tissue comes into
deciding. You could look at the drawings, you could look at the
redundancy, you could look at the processes, you could look at
the escape capsules and so on, but in the end, a degree of
experience and judgment is very helpful. Our committee of
course has combined hundreds of years of launching humans into
space, and we have tried to exercise that judgment.
Ed, I would ask you to briefly add anything you would like.
Mr. Crawley. Mr. Hall, what we say in our report first is
that safety is paramount and that NASA should not go forward
with any technical plan that doesn't meet the stringent safety
requirements far in excess of the Shuttle's demonstrated
safety.
Mr. Hall. Don't you think the Chair makes a lot of sense
that we look at safety with that attitude, and in light of the
practice of the last year here on Capitol Hill, money is
different. It used to be when a million dollars was a lot of
money, and then a billion dollars was a lot of money, and now
they throw away trillions of dollars and a bailout of $800
billion and immediately threw away about $350 billion to AIG
for toxic stock that they ought to work something in to help us
span that four-year gap in there and say this because I even
consider it a national defense issue.
Mr. Crawley. Unfortunately, our principal finding in this
issue of closing the gap, going back to the gap, is that this
is really paced by the pace of technical development, that to
build a new rocket will take a new human-rated rocket from
either where we are in the Ares V, or any fresh start of any
type will take at least another five or six years. And I hate
to say that, but on this specific point, you know, we examined
several acceleration plans and found that they could increase
the confidence that we could do it in five or six more years
but none of them actually brought the date of likely
availability by more than half-a-year or so.
Mr. Hall. Is it that physically it could not be done or it
could not be financed?
Mr. Crawley. No, it physically can't be done. There just
are pacing items in the development of a new rocket.
Mr. Hall. I thank both of you very much.
Mr. Augustine. Thank you, Mr. Hall.
Chairman Gordon. And now, appropriately from the Kitty Hawk
State, Mr. Miller.
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm glad that you do
recognize that North Carolina is the home of flight, not Ohio
as some claim from time to time.
Mr. Augustine, the report, the inquiry into the last
Shuttle disaster concluded that one of the problems was an
excessive reliance on contracting out, on contractual employees
rather than those folks in-house, that there was a lack of a
kind of critical mass of expertise that came when scientists
and engineers worked in the same hall and could kind of hover
at the doorway of each other's offices and talk it through.
When they are scattered, you lost something. And despite that
criticism, I actually asked Sean O'Keefe at a hearing if he
embraced that finding because it did not seem consistent with
the dogma of the Agency at that time. I didn't get a straight
answer, which that really could have been true of any question
I ever asked Sean O'Keefe. But since then, NASA has continued
to rely upon outside contractors more than just about any other
government agency. I think actually the findings are more than
any other government agency, including where NASA has developed
the technology and has the equipment and has the trained
employees and still contracts it out. Parabolic flight, zero-
gravity flight that is important in training developed by NASA,
we have got the planes sitting on the tarmac, we have got the
pilots who know how to fly the planes, who know how to fly
parabolic flights to achieve zero gravity for training
purposes, and yet we still contract it out, and it is not at
all clear why we do that. It is very clear we would save money
if we didn't.
Viability of the Commercial Sector to Support NASA Human Space
Flight
I was surprised that one of the findings in the summary
report or suggestions is that by relying on the commercial
sector, we might shorten the gap, we might close the gap some.
What was the basis for thinking that the commercial sector
would do it differently from the way NASA would do it if NASA
just did it themselves?
Mr. Augustine. Well, let me deal with that first at sort of
the philosophical level you raised, and Ed if you want to add,
I will try to be brief to leave you time. I guess I would
respectfully not accept that it is true in all cases that the
government can do things more cheaply or better than could be
done in the private sector. I spent 10 years in government
myself. I know what the government can do. I have spent much of
my career in the private sector. As I travel around the world,
I think that there are many things that the private sector does
much better than the government does. At the same time, I think
there are many things that only the government can do, and
where we get in trouble I believe is when the government tries
to do things that the private sector does best or when the
private sector does things that the government does best. In
this regard, I think the government is best at advancing
technology, taking major risks with technology at systems
engineering, designing architecture, overseeing programs,
assessing their progress at the top-level management of them.
But when the government gets to where it is making engineering
drawings as is in fact happening in NASA today in some cases,
second stage of Ares I being an example, NASA is hiring
subcontractors to make engineering drawings which NASA will
then take and give to Boeing to build in Boeing's factories,
the material the drawings will be made for. In my experience,
it is hard to take something from one of our factories to
another, let alone from a subcontractor to NASA to Boeing. I
think we should watch that very carefully.
So my answer to your question is there are important things
that each can do, and it is a real mistake to assume carte
blanche that everything should be done in industry or
everything should be done in the government.
Mr. Miller. And I assume the same thing, Mr. Augustine.
What I am questioning is whether the bias is so clearly the
other way in favor of having something done commercially that
is something that traditionally NASA has done itself or had
overall supervision of, I mean, we have always relied upon
private contractors, but how did you envision the commercial
crew transportation working?
Mr. Augustine. Okay. I will turn to Ed. Let me refer to the
bias issue. I think you would find that it is our view that
NASA would be better served rather than trucking hardware and
people at the low Earth orbit to be pursuing energy exploration
program. Let the private sector deliver the mail, if you will,
much as the government put the airlines in the business by
hauling mail. NASA has an opportunity and is doing this right
now with the support of this committee to let the commercial
industry grow in the space case. Do you want to speak to our
particular case?
Mr. Crawley. Sure. First, Mr. Miller, I want to make it
clear in the options we presented, in all of them we continued
the work on the Orion capsule that is the primary Crew
Exploration Vehicle. We think that that should be continued.
And the question really is, should that be also the way that we
continue to get to low Earth orbit, to the Space Station, for
example, until 2020 as we suggested might be extended.
What we tried to do is to create a second option available
for the government to choose, should it choose to, which is to
further invest in development in a robust domestic/commercial
space industry, and one of the potential services that such a
space industry could provide, not without risk, is the delivery
of crew to orbit, and particularly to the Space Station in the
next decade or so. The potential advantages of this would be
that we would be able to build a simpler capsule to go to the
Space Station, rather than the very sophisticated and capable
Orion's capsule. For reference, in current year dollars, a
Gemini capsule is $60 or $80 million. An Apollo capsule is
several hundred million dollars, and the Orion recurring cost
is about $600 million. So by building a system that is designed
just to go to low Earth orbit, it is possible that the
recurring cost of the system and the development cost of the
system could be significantly less.
The other argument is that in a commercial system, there
are other customers than NASA. NASA will be the only customer
of the Orion and Ares. In a commercial system, the rocket could
be used for NASA science payloads, national security space
payloads, we have provided for other possible markets, and the
capsule, less obviously there are other markets, but other
governments will choose to fly astronauts to the International
Space Station in the next decade. The possibility of proving
that as a commercially provided service to other governments is
also another potential market.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Dr. Crawley. And now the
Ranking Member of our Aviation Subcommittee, Mr. Olson, is
recognized.
Importance of Funding Human Space Flight
Mr. Olson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I greatly
appreciate that. I would like to thank Mr. Augustine, you and
Dr. Crawley, for all your hard work putting this report
together. I remember, Mr. Augustine, we met with Mr. Hall back
when you first got this assignment, and we asked you to call
balls and strikes. I thank you. I think you did a very, very
good job with that. I appreciate what all of you did because
basically from my opinion, you threw cold water on our face and
got us to look at this program realistically and say, if we
want to go forward, we need to develop the resources.
And my question for you, Mr. Augustine, is you have been in
this business a long time. This is a much more esoteric
question, but what, in your opinion, is the importance of human
space flight to the Nation because that is a question all of us
in this room are going to have to answer soon if we don't find
the resources to keep up and develop the manned space flight
program as it is envisioned?
Mr. Augustine. Well, thank you for that question, and that
is actually the question we began with. Too often in the past
we have said, what destination do we want to go to rather than
why do we want to go there, and it is a question in our view we
probably have not answered correctly in the past. There are
currently many important things the human space flight program
permits. It permits the conduct of science, of exploration,
inspiration, it has important economic benefits, it impacts
education and motivates young people to study math and science
and so on and so on. In our judgment, none of those by
themselves can justify the cost of human space flight today,
that spinoffs into the commercial world or science by itself
per se from a human space flight standpoint don't justify these
programs. The programs have to be justified we think to a large
degree on a tangible basis which makes it no less important,
namely to lay the path forward to humans to move into the Solar
System. In so doing, who we establish our nation as a leader in
an important and challenging area. And it gives our nation the
sort of recognition that we get from the Apollo program which
had many other benefits, including science and engineering and
so forth. But the raison d'etre I think could not be those
other issues. It has to be the intangible of showing that
America has the spirit and the ability to play a leadership
role in one of the most challenging tasks ever undertaken.
Should the Columbia Accident Investigation Board Findings Apply
to All Human Space Flight?
Mr. Olson. Thank you for that answer. I couldn't agree
more. Shifting gears, we have talked a lot about safety, and I
just want to ask, do you think the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board recommendations regarding safety should
apply not just to the Shuttle but to all future human-rated
systems?
Mr. Crawley. Absolutely. I think the broad national
consensus that emerged from the Columbia tragedy is that going
to space is a dangerous business. We should do it very
carefully and as safely as we possibly can, and that when we
put our Americans at risk, we should do it in a way that really
goes someplace and does something, really explores the solar
system and goes away from the Earth. It is important to
actually read carefully the recommendations of the CAIB report
to make sure that one understands, for example, that they were
very careful about pointing out that crews should not be
required for the delivery of cargo. However, they did not
actually say the reverse, that it was not allowed to have crew
accompany cargo into space. So we actually read the CAIB
report, Sally Ride, one of the members, was on the CAIB, and we
tried to stay very truthful to the guidance it gave us.
Mr. Olson. Thank you for that answer. One final question,
what can we do to ensure that we don't have another Augustine
Commission, 10, 15, 20 years down the road? I mean, we can't
continue to second-guess or change course. I know that is a
big, loaded question, but I would just like to get your
perspectives on that. Thank you.
Mr. Augustine. I think, first of all, I am 74 years old, so
the odds are----
Mr. Olson. We would love to have you come back.
Mr. Augustine. Thank you, sir. My mother lived to be 105,
so you might see me again.
Mr. Olson. I will mark it down.
Mr. Augustine. I think that this committee, as the Chairman
has said, had the answer to that question, and that is we need
to have goals that are commensurate with the resources we are
willing to devote, and obviously the two of us at this table
and our colleagues are fans of the space program. But if we
can't afford to do it right, then we shouldn't do it. We should
back off. It is unfair to the astronauts, it is unfair to the
nation, and it is unfair to the people who work at NASA. So we
need to get a program that matches, whether it is a big program
which most of us would like, or a smaller program, whatever it
is, I think you can get to where you won't need to see me again
if we could get that match made.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Augustine.
Mr. Augustine. Thank you.
Chairman Gordon. I hate to start with you, Pete. We are
going to be a little more crisp with our time because I want to
be sure everybody has a chance, so I don't mean to be
discourteous if I have to get in. If Mr. Augustine rope-a-dopes
you, you will get a little more time, but otherwise I am going
to try to keep it to five.
Now, the Chairman of our Space Aviation and Aeronautics
Committee, Ms. Giffords, is recognized.
Ms. Giffords. Thank you, Chairman Gordon, Ranking Member
Hall. Both of you have been at this a lot longer than I have,
particularly Mr. Hall, so I appreciate your comments, and Mr.
Augustine, thank you, Dr. Crawley as well.
It is not every day that we have a chance to discuss the
future of America's human flight program, our space flight
program. And I take this day very seriously. I don't think
there is any politician in the Congress, in Washington or
across the country that doesn't point to America's success in
our manned space flight program when we talk about the genius
of our country, the innovation and our ability to tackle any
challenge that is put ahead of us.
Concerns About Commission's Findings
That being said, the discussion today in this committee
doesn't track directly with what I was able to read in the
summary report. I am frustrated by what I read. In fact, I am
pretty angry. With all due respect to Mr. Augustine and this
panel of experts, and I know you have worked very long and very
hard on this and the cumulative expertise that was represented
on this panel was strong, but I feel that we were going to
receive some recommendations that were going to put us farther
ahead than before we received the report, and I think that we
have lost some ground. So I would like to review some of the
facts.
Probably the most important finding with the review is a
panel determination that there is a serious mismatch between
the challenges put out in front of NASA and the resources that
have been provided to this agency. And as our Chairman so
eloquently stated, we all knew that. Those that have been in
Congress for a long time see that year after year after year.
In other words, we know that we can't get to where we want
to go with NASA's funding at the current level. The impact that
that shortfall has has certainly undermined the work of NASA,
the civil servants, and the contractors that have undertaken
these really Herculean challenges. I am glad that you have
highlighted this problem, but again, I am not denigrating the
work that has been done. I know of your reputation, Mr.
Augustine, and the reputation of the panelists. It is important
I think for this country to have a sobering reminder that our
position as the world's leading space-faring nation is not a
given, and we have to continually re-earn that reputation by
prominent positions that we take through real actions.
The rest of the world, of course, has discovered space,
too. We see countries that are moving with some impressive
capabilities. The Chinese, of course, come to mind but other
countries as well.
I think that the men and women of NASA frankly have
demonstrated they are up to the challenge. Over the past four
years they have moved from initial concepts into design and
development of this Constellation program. They have
successfully completed a number of important design reviews,
have undertaken test activities including test-firing just last
week, the five-segment booster that will power the Ares I
rocket into space, and planning for a test flight of the Ares
I-X rocket at the end of next month. And they have done all
this even through the times with the budgetary sands that are
shifting constantly underneath them, taking away resources that
they thought they could count on, and forcing them to
continually replan and rephase, even while they are trying to
complete some of the hardest technological work ever done in
the lifetime, programmatic work that is obviously required if
Constellation is going to succeed.
So that is when it was announced, Mr. Augustine, that you
would be leading this independent review of the human space
flight program. I thought that we were going to take a hard,
cold, sobering look at the Constellation program and tell us
exactly what we needed to do here in Congress with our budget
in order to maximize the chances of success. But that is not
what I see. Instead of focusing on how to strengthen the
exploration program in which we have invested so much time,
four years, billions of dollars, we have a glancing attention
to Constellation, even referring to it in the past tense in
your summary report, and instead, spending the bulk of the time
crafting alternative options that do little to illuminate the
choices that I think are really confronting the Congress and
the White House. So where does that leave us?
I think in place of a serious review of potential actions
that could be taken to improve and strengthen the Constellation
program, we have been given a set of alternatives that in some
sense look almost like cartoons, lacking detailed costs,
schedule, technical, safety, other programmatic specifics, that
we can't be confident and can't be subjected to the rigorous
and comprehensive analysis and validation that NASA is required
to go over.
So I guess I ask my colleagues on this Committee, what are
we going to do with this report? And I know we are going to see
more details. But in the absence of mismanagement or
technological showstoppers that the Chairman talked about, none
of which the Augustine panel has indicated has occurred in this
program, can any of us in good conscience recommend canceling
exploration system development programs that Congress has
funded and supported over the past four years? I know that I
can't justify doing this, and I know this is going to be a
discussion that Members on this committee are going to have to
discuss.
So, Mr. Chairman, just a couple more minutes. I know I am
up against my time. Hoping that maybe things will somehow work
out someday if we try something new is not a substitute for the
detailed planning and design and testing that has been the
hallmark of successful space flight programs of the past. These
are successes that all of us as Americans are extraordinarily
proud of. Nor do we gain by confusing hypothetical commercial
capabilities that might someday exist with what we can actually
count on today to meet our nation's needs. We have made that
mistake in the past, we don't want to make it again. So I don't
see the logic of scrapping what the Nation has spent years and
billions of dollars to develop. And for the Nation's sake, I
hope that we can break this cycle of false starts that was
mentioned by many of my colleagues before. The future of
America's human space flight is really at risk, and I am hoping
before the panel is dismantled that we can get some real, solid
numbers, questions that were asked by some of my colleagues
back to this Committee and to the Congress so that we can make
decisions as to what to do with our future in manned space
flight.
Mr. Hall. Will the gentlelady yield?
Ms. Giffords. Absolutely, Mr. Hall.
Mr. Hall. Would you add to your statement, your great
statement, how fair is it to our international partners that
are never going to have anymore faith in us and how fair is it
to those series of engineers and the workforce at NASA that
have worked generation after generation and bet their future on
NASA that are going to be unemployed? And why is it that we
have been scratching and clawing to get a little more R&D
budget? And why the hell don't we have a march on Washington?
Chairman Gordon. Mr. Augustine, time is running over, but I
think that Ms. Giffords has presented you with the threshold
question here, so certainly we would like to hear from you.
Mr. Augustine. I would like to respond to that. First of
all, I would remind you again what we were asked to do. We were
asked to offer options to the current program, and we have done
that. You suggested that the options we have suggested take a
step backwards. Four of the six options are a clear step
forward. You have spoken as if we have decided to stop the
existing program. We have made no such recommendation. One of
the options, Option 3 if you look at it, is to continue the
existing program but to fund it adequately. So I respect your
feelings, but I must question your facts.
Ms. Giffords. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Augustine, I think what
this committee would like to see is really the full range of
options, you know, continuing to fly the Shuttle, the menu of
options, fully funding Constellation, where is that going to
take us, not that some day that the commercial space sector is
going to step in and be able to create something that they have
yet to be able to create. And you know, we can talk a little
bit later and go over some of those options. I don't know. It
is probably not the right time to be doing this, but I would
really like to be able to and I think Committee Members would
really like to be able to see with additional funding with
Constellation, where does that take us? And I don't see that
laid out in this.
Mr. Augustine. Fully funding the Shuttle is Option 4-B.
Fully funding the Constellation program is Option 3. And so the
data is there.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Augustine, and we will, as
you say in a couple of weeks, we will have the full report. And
I am sure that we will have some additional question at that
time, and hopefully we will shed more light on some of Ms.
Giffords' questions.
Mr. Rohrabacher is recognized.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes, thank you very much. And let me
congratulate Chairwoman Giffords for getting right to the point
and hitting some very important elements that need to be
discussed.
Chairman Gordon. I am glad you agree because she took some
of your time.
Finding Extra $3 Billion for NASA
Mr. Rohrabacher. Might I remind Mr. Augustine, heart
surgery is expensive, and they now have found other ways to do
things rather than open-heart surgery. They have endoscopic
surgery which is much cheaper and quite frankly, sometimes some
people say better than the old, more expensive approach. What
we were expecting from your report was something that might be
cheaper or more cost-effective, and we didn't get it. And from
what I am gleaning from what is being said and what I have been
presented that everyone agrees that there is a $3 billion
shortfall in what we need to accomplish our goals. Of what you
have suggested as alternatives, other options, are any of those
accomplishable without that shortfall?
Mr. Augustine. You want to deal with that?
Mr. Crawley. No.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. There you go. So Ms. Giffords'
observations that you are just saying this off the top of your
heads, not to say that you don't have years of experience
behind you as compared to years of action and research on this
very issue, you're presenting us something that doesn't have
anywhere near the depth of what NASA has already put into this
analysis, isn't that correct?
Mr. Augustine. Well, sir, I think if your point is, is
there as much analysis on a future program as on a program in
being, the answer is always no.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, I would just suggest this. If you
guys didn't come up with a new idea that in and of itself
appears to be heading toward a solution which is not that we
aren't--Constellation is a perfectly good program. It is just
that we are $3 billion short. Now, you didn't come up with
anything--all of us know, where are we going to come up with
the money? That is really the question here. Are we going to
borrow it from China simply by increasing the level of federal
expenditures, borrow it from China and pay it back with
interest? I, for example, think that it might be--we are
throwing money around here in Washington by the hundreds of
billions of dollars. Maybe we should take the $150 billion that
we gave to AIG and consider that to be income and tax it at a
35 percent tax bracket. That would give us plenty of money,
plenty of those $3 billion a year that we need. Yeah, we have
been throwing a lot of money around in this city, but we are
shortchanging our space program. That is what it is all about.
And I was hoping, frankly, that we would be getting more
creative alternatives from you folks rather than just
alternatives that would leave us in this same situation, $3
billion short of being able to accomplish it.
Mr. Augustine. We think we have given creative
alternatives, and I will ask----
Mr. Rohrabacher. But not to solve the basic problem, which
is we are short $3 billion.
Mr. Augustine. Sir, the problem is to put it very simply,
that with 60 percent more money, you can't go 60 percent of the
way to Mars and declare victory. It takes a certain amount of
money. This comes in chunks, and the chunks are large and
unfortunately we are in a situation where absent going to
technology that we think would be very unsafe at this point in
history, there are no good programs in exploration for this
amount of money.
Mr. Rohrabacher. We have made mistakes in the past, long
before a lot of these people were here. I remember advocating a
single-stage orbiter which could have gone into two-stage orbit
which we believe could have dramatically brought down the cost.
We put our money in what, the X-33 and I am sure you are very
aware of what happened to the X-33 program. And we ended up, it
turned up a total waste of dollars as compared to--we had an
option then, the DC-X which was there and according to what you
have already told us today, it is much better to have something
where you have something solid rather than just something on a
view screen. And we made that incredible, historic mistake back
in 1996, I believe it was. Well, we were hoping maybe in this
round that you might come up with some other alternatives that
would give us some creative approaches.
Mr. Crawley. What we actually uncovered was what we called
in the Committee the fundamental NASA conundrum, that it
doesn't have enough money to operate its space systems and
build a new one.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, but then you had to come up with
other options that still don't have enough money for your
options. So really, the basic problem is we don't have the
money, and you are using that also to come up with your own
suggestion by casting dispersions on the hard work that NASA
did already on the Constellation program. I find Ms. Giffords'
criticism to be totally justified.
Mr. Augustine. I would respectfully say that I believe that
this committee does not cast dispersions on NASA in any way. We
offered alternatives. That is what we were asked to do. Each
has pros and cons.
Chairman Gordon. Ms. Fudge is recognized.
Implications of Canceling Ares I
Ms. Fudge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both. I have
a two-part question. The first one is because I am new at this
I want to be sure I am clear.
As I look at your report, are you actually recommending
that NASA--or proposing that NASA consider canceling the Ares I
Project, which in--from my understanding is significantly safer
than the Space Shuttle and replace it with something else? Help
me understand that part first.
Mr. Augustine. Yeah. We have offered a number of options,
some of which did not include Ares I, some of which do include
Ares I, and with regard to the safety issue, Ares I has had
enormous emphasis placed on safety. There is good reason to
believe it will be a very safe vehicle.
But, again, this time we are in the reverse position. We
know the Shuttle's safety record. We still don't know Ares I.
Ms. Fudge. So again, are you recommending that we stop with
Ares I?
Mr. Augustine. At least one of our options recommends or
contains that.
Consequences of Not Increasing NASA's Budget
Ms. Fudge. Okay. Then let me just ask the second part of my
question. If, in fact, and we have all talked about the lack
of--or that we don't have enough money to fund the programs we
have. Let us just for sake of discussion say that we don't get
the $3 billion or get the increase that we have been talking
about we need. Tell me in your opinion what, in fact, will
happen to NASA, just NASA overall, the various centers, the
contractors, the workforce, and this country if we don't fund
it at a different level? What--tell me what you see happening.
Mr. Augustine. Well, that is a very good question. If we
don't get additional funding, one option is to continue doing
what we are now doing, continue the present program until
frankly it falls off the cliff eventually for lack of money,
and by that I mean we will build Ares I, we may build Ares V,
but we won't have a Lunar Lander and so on or the equipment we
need on the Moon or Mars or wherever we end up.
NASA as a whole will continue, I would think, with a very
strong robotic program, science program, unmanned. The Human
Space Flight Program will basically be confined to the lower
orbital Space Station as long as that stays up, and it could
have a very strong technology program to lay the groundwork for
future human flight into space, things like fuel transfer in
orbit, a better understanding of long-duration effects on
humans in orbit. But it will be a program I think that would
inspire very few people and impact on NASA's workforce would be
very large.
Ms. Fudge. All right. Let me just conclude with this, Mr.
Chairman, is that I find, too, that that is unfortunate because
I do support very strongly NASA's mission and various U.S.
space flight programs. So I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Ms. Fudge.
Ms. Fudge. I yield back.
Chairman Gordon. Dr. Ehlers is recognized.
ISS and Mars
Mr. Ehlers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am not from Texas or
California or Florida, and I am not married to an astronaut, so
I will try to be as objective as I can.
First of all, Mr. Augustine, I just want to thank you for
the work you have done. I am afraid some of my colleagues have
given you a rough time which you don't deserve, and I think you
have done good work here. The program is not yours or not
caused by your work or your committee's work. The problem is
caused by the United States Congress, which is not willing to
appropriate enough money to fulfill the dreams that we
continually talk about having. And I think you have done the
government's work under very difficult circumstances.
I was pleased to hear your comment about taking Mars off
the table. I have been sitting here for a long time over the
years wondering why are we even talking about going to Mars. It
is such an incredible expense, particularly if we wish to send
someone there and bring them back. It would bleed our entire
space program dry of money and remove all other possibilities
if we decide we are going to Mars fairly soon. I think we have
to look very hard at other types of propulsion which would get
us there and possibly bring someone back or resign ourselves to
that whoever we send there is going to stay there. And our job
from then on is to just send supplies there so that they can
survive.
I fail to understand why we should go to the Moon again. We
have been there. We know a good deal about its structure. It
just seems to be a very expensive venture. Again, is that
really, you know, people seem to think that we are going to the
Moon to have a launching pad to go to Mars. I don't see that
that is particularly feasible either.
Another question is what role should the Space Station
play. I mean, it is--I don't think it is a white elephant as
some do, but it is not at all clear that its scientific mission
is worth the money we are putting into it compared to the other
things NASA could do with those funds.
My special concern is what about multi-nation effort. When
I first came to the Congress at the request of Speaker
Gingrich, I spent two years--almost two years writing a science
policy paper, which has guided our efforts to a certain extent.
But I pointed out in there that many of the big efforts in
science and technology are--have become so expensive that they
of necessity are going to have to be multi-nation efforts. We
are following that track. We killed the Super-Conducting Super
Collider, and instead we combined with CERN on the Large Hadron
Collider. We have also taken other steps, for example, in the
Space Station we have involved other nations, and we are only
happy to take their money and their astronauts. The ITER
Reactor has been revised by Japan and France, and we are now
joining them in trying to keep that going. We just didn't have
the money or weren't willing to allocate the money to develop
the ITER.
And so we are following that path in other areas, and I
think NASA should be following that same path. I think the era
of bragging rights by virtue of being first to do something, I
think that era is no longer with us, and I think if we want to
go to the Moon, I would like to see it become a multi-nation
effort, where we get a lot of contributions from other
countries, and they can provide some of the people who would go
there as well.
Mars is going to take a lot more work and a lot more money
than anyone seems to realize or at least say out loud, but
until we get other sources of funds or the Congress is willing
to really pay what it is going to cost, I don't see us making
the steps that everyone has expressed here, that we would like
to take. And I don't think we should berate you for what you
are saying when we, in fact, are the major part of the problem
because we are simply not allocating the funds that will allow
us to do what everyone says we want to do.
I would appreciate your reactions to those comments.
Mr. Augustine. Well, thank you, Mr. Elhers. A couple of
observations.
You raised a point about the International Space Station.
We have not talked about that much. I would like to address
that briefly and then ask Professor Crawley to talk about the
flexible path option that has--is of interest, I think.
With regard to the International Space Station, we did--I
think we share your views down the line, particularly with
regard to the importance of international programs. The early
space, Human Space Flight Program was one of competition. Today
it is one of partnership, and one of the options that we have
offered and that I think we fairly seriously believe in is that
we should extend the ISS for another five years. We say that
because we think there is a great deal of important technology
to be gained. We believe that if we invested some money in
science as opposed to just operations and building the station,
which incidentally we could now do, that we would also get
science benefits.
The--but the bottom line on the International Space Station
from our standpoint is that for us to withdraw from that
according to the current plan would totally undermine our
position in the international space community and undermine
really the overall effort to carry out space activities.
Let me ask Professor Crawley to address----
Chairman Gordon. Quickly if you have something to add.
Mr. Crawley. Yes. Norm has just asked me to sort of fill in
one bit of detail. In the area of destinations for exploration
we were careful to point out that Mars is not the place we
should go to but the place we should go towards as a long-term
goal, and that in order to get there there are really two paths
we have to follow. We have to learn how to work on a planetary
surface as we would at the Moon, and we have to learn to work
in free space and to spend longer and longer moving away from
the Earth, exploring the near-Earth objects passing by Mars and
so forth.
And, in fact, if we spent a decade going to the Moon and
then came back to you and said, well, should we now go on a
900-day mission, never having been more than three and a half
days away from the Earth, it is unlikely that we would take
that step. So we have--in terms of destinations we provided
this option of the so-called flexible path of going
progressively beyond the Earth's sphere of influence, up to and
including into Martian orbit, alongside the option of going
back to the Moon and that we should really create a program and
an architecture for it that allows us to do both of these
things in the future.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you. Dr. Ehlers, Mr. Hall wanted me
to let you know he does not hold it against you that you were
not born in Texas, just against your parents.
And Dr. Griffith from----
Ms. Giffords. And Mr. Chairman----
Chairman Gordon.--Huntsville, Alabama, is recognized.
Ms. Giffords. Mr. Chairman, and let me just add that my
husband is taken.
Mr. Ehlers. I am also not interested.
Chairman Gordon. Okay. Dr. Griffith.
Comments on Commission's Findings
Mr. Griffith. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Hall, and
Committee Members, thank you. I am actually the District 5 in
Alabama Marshall Space Flight.
I actually read this report, and I am hearing that we are
disappointed that the Committee did not reach a conclusion for
us. It sounds like the uncertainty that we were left with has
bothered us, and maybe we are expressing that in a way that is
coming out in a difficult manner.
It sounds to me as though we have made a decision. It
sounds to me as though we are--we are a country can look in our
checkbooks and see what we believe in, and the commission is
pointing out to us that right now we are not believing in
manned space flight. They are saying to us that unless we are
adequately funded, we can't do this on the cheap, pull back, it
is not fair to our scientists, our young men and women who are
interested in science. It is not fair to the country. It can't
be done on the cheap. It is clear that it can't be done. If we
had the $3 billion and we started over again, we are five years
behind.
It seems to me that the Committee report was very, very
lucid. It basically said we started this whole thing because of
safety, the Ares I, the Ares V, our heavy-load vehicle was
essential. The Orion is to be kept, the Lunar Lander might be
modified, but it certainly doesn't need much, and that what we
need as a people, as an American people is that are we willing
to accept the challenge from China, India, Russia, and others.
And so we can do this. The technical difficulties are
surmountable. We are on the road to success unless we decide we
don't want to open our checkbooks and fund it. And so the point
was made by Ranking Member Hall that if we can spend or we can
afford a $787 billion Stimulus Package but we can't afford $3
billion to meet the challenge of China and respectfully I
disagree that we will not always be in a partnership with
China, Russia, or India. And I respectfully would submit that
this is, in fact, national security, that the future of space
is in its infancy, and so those who take the challenge, and it
is amazing to me that we are sitting here in this room talking
to some major scientists about we cannot afford to meet the
challenge after what we have done over the last seven months.
So I think the report is clear. I think we have got enough
information here to draw the conclusion, and as a cancer
specialist I have had to make decisions based on incomplete
information all my life, and we will never have the complete
information to draw the certain conclusion that allows us to
sleep well every night. We must take the chance. We are on the
way. Ares I is on the way, Orion is on the way. We know that
the heavy-load vehicle, Ares V, is not an option for America.
It is an essential for America.
And so I appreciate very much the commission's report, and
I think it gave us options and the decision is will America
step up as it did in the '50s, or do we want to lay back and
watch China from our living rooms, their equivalent of Walter
Cronkite, talk to us about how they landed on the Moon.
So I appreciate very much you being here and thank you.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Dr. Griffin--Griffith, and Mr.
McCaul is recognized.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with the
comments made just now. We do have a challenge, and I think
this commission has thrown the challenge right at Congress, and
it is a funding challenge, and we have been saddling our
children with tremendous debt over the past year, and in my
view not investing enough in their future: innovation,
technology, science, national security.
One thing the Committee--point the Committee asserted I
think is a very bold assertion that no plan compatible with the
FY 2010, budget permits human exploration to continue in any
meaningful way, and that was really at the outset. I think that
is a challenge the Committee has thrown at the Congress.
Determining the $3 Billion Increase
My question is when you get to the $3 billion assessment,
how did the Committee arrive at that level of funding, and
would NASA be able to support and sustain a credible Human
Space Flight Program, including the Constellation Program at
that level of funding?
Mr. Augustine. We----
Chairman Gordon. If I could add, also, that is not--that is
$3 billion over a period of time. You might want to also----
Mr. McCaul. 2010. Yeah.
Chairman Gordon.--you might want to clarify that, too.
Mr. McCaul. Yes.
Mr. Augustine. I used $3 billion shorthand. We looked at a
number of alternative profiles of building up budgets, and I
should say that our original instructions in our charter was to
abide with the current budget, period, and we went back and got
latitude. We couldn't do our job without looking at alternative
excursions. We looked at various families. The one that made
the most sense to be rather specific was to increase through
2014, literally up to an additional $3 billion per year and
beyond that 2.4 percent, which we believe is a more realistic
estimate of inflation, out through 2020, and beyond.
The--we do think NASA could conduct a sensible program with
that amount of money. We also think that it is very important
that the human space flight part of that program be separated
from the Science Program, because the Human Space Flight
Program being so large and having so many risks, when problems
occur, it tends to eat up the Science Program, and that would
not be constructive in our view.
So an additional $3 billion is about 15 percent increase
overall for NASA, and we think that--I think both Dr. Griffith
and yourself have said it extremely well, and that is this is a
budget question, and we are trying to lay it out openly that we
are on a path that is going nowhere.
Mr. McCaul. And what we want to know as the authorizing
committee, and I think the gentlelady from Arizona put it very
well also, is what--is this $3 billion figure the amount
recommended by this commission to fully fund the Space Flight
Program, including--would that also include the Constellation
Program?
Mr. Augustine. It would--one option is to do the
Constellation Program, and the answer is yes, it could do that.
In our view.
Risk of Commercial Ventures
Mr. McCaul. Okay. I think that is very helpful.
Also, you mentioned the commercial crew services could
provide an earlier capability at a lower initial and life cycle
cost than the government could achieve, but recognizing the
maturity of the design and detail in the Ares and Orion systems
already, the amount of infrastructure, capital investment that
has been put in these programs--doesn't it seem kind of a
stretch to assert that a credible commercial option at this
point in time would achieve lower costs and reduce schedule in
time?
Mr. Augustine. Let me ask my colleague to address that.
Mr. Crawley. Well, I think our best assessment, sir, is
that it would be comparable in the schedule and at lower costs
but not without risk to the government, and one of the obvious
risks to the government it would have is the fact that it would
be a commercial venture, and commercial ventures don't always
deliver, not necessarily for technical reasons but for business
reasons.
So one of the other findings in the report is that even if
we pursue a commercial crew path, that the government should
always reserve a capability to deliver a crew to orbit as well,
and there are various ways of doing that by building different
families of rockets, but we thought it would be irresponsible
of us to propose that we solely base the future of low Earth
orbit access for crew on a commercial venture.
Mr. McCaul. My time is about ready to expire. Just in
conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I hope we take a look at this
commission's report and the amount that is recommended in terms
of authorization dollars to fully fund the Space Flight
Program. I think that is one of the strongest recommendations
we have out of this. Thank you.
Chairman Gordon. Mr. McCaul, I will assure you, this
discussion will continue over--as we go through our
authorization.
Ms. Edwards is recognized.
NASA Skills and R&D
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our
witnesses today.
First let me just say that I share in our Subcommittee
Chairwoman's comments that I expected something different all
summer, and I haven't been on this committee long but just been
waiting almost with bated breath for the report so that we
could move forward, and I feel like we are now in this kind of
nowhere land. And although I don't really have an interest in
necessarily being the first to do something, I do think it is
important that we are concerned that the something that we do
is significant, that we have outlined a purpose, and then we
say what is the budget that it takes to get us there. And I
feel like we were working--the Committee in some ways was
working backwards. Here is the money, and this is what we can
do with it instead of setting--saying, here is the vision, and
this is what we want to achieve.
And it isn't a destination. It is not a place. It is kind
of bigger than that. You know, is it--what are the research and
technology and scientific goals, and if it is the Moon first
and then Mars that gets us to that goal, that is a really
different set of questions than just saying we want to go to
the Moon, and we want to go to Mars and setting forth a
destination.
I really do worry that although you may believe that, you
know, that what you have outlined here or a set of options,
every single headline that I have read over the last couple of
weeks, you know, basically is saying we are going to ditch the
Human Space Flight Program, and so that is the message that has
gone out to a public that is already invested in the direction
that we are heading now with Constellation. That is the message
that goes out in a very tough economic environment. It is the
message that goes out to our scientists and researchers, the
civilians at NASA and our contracting community.
And I think it is really hard now, in fact, to regroup and
to recoup some of the positive moving direction that many of us
felt when the President, upon his inauguration, actually spoke
positively about the need to invest in this kind of scientific
research and technology and to carry out, you know, a vision,
even a boiler plate one that was laid out by President Bush and
setting another vision, and there is this degree of uncertainty
now.
Now, I know that as a Congress and as an authorizing
committee we are going to have to come back and really digest
this to figure out how to move forward, but just as I close,
Mr. Augustine, I wonder if you could comment to us your
assessment about the sustainability of the workforce and the
skills to carry out human space flight given the options that
you laid out. And whether the Committee really looked at the
implications for the workforce in terms of being able to
sustain it, both our civilian capacity within NASA but also in
our outside contracting community that might say, wow. They
don't really know what they want to do with this program. Let
us figure out some other business models.
And I wonder as well if you could comment about the
research and scientific and technical capacity with each of the
options and how, you know, one or two of them, if we pursue
those directions, might maintain those over the course of the
next several years as we get some of these systems back on
line.
Mr. Hall. The gentlelady yield?
Ms. Edwards. Yes.
Mr. Hall. You know----
Ms. Edwards. Of course, Mr. Hall.
Mr. Hall.--I sure agree with what you are saying. I just,
you know, I don't think it hurts to have one old geezer in the
United States Congress who remembers, and you don't remember
because you were probably in grade school at the time the
United States of America bypassed its chance to be the
technological leader in the entire world when we turned down a
$500 million investment in the Super Collider. And as I look
back on that that day, that $500 million, if I can--I am not
much on math, Mr. Chairman, there is three things I couldn't do
in math, that is add and subtract, so I am not sure about--but
isn't 500 million a half of one billion, and we need $3 billion
for several years here.
If we just--if we can't say that and get more of the R&D
percentage, we are letting this Congress down, and when we
point our finger at this commission here, at anybody else and
don't know that there is three fingers pointing back at the
United States Congress, we are the ones that haven't
appropriated that money. We are the ones that haven't stepped
forward to fund the Space Station the way we should have funded
it, and our children are the losers.
Now, we ought to take that on, and I am not joking about a
march on Washington, and it would be handled mostly by high
school and college youngsters, because they are the ones that
really know what they are losing.
I yield back my time.
Chairman Gordon. Mr. Augustine.
Mr. Augustine. Yes. I will try to be very brief. You raised
a number of good points that we should address, Ms. Edwards.
The--with regard to the skills question, we viewed that in
two contexts. One is the overall workforce and then just a
basic employment issue. We also addressed it from the
standpoint of unique skills that the Nation needs to maintain
if it wants to be in the Human Space Flight Program. Each
option has a different impact in those areas just as it does in
most other areas. Some options have relatively little impact.
Some have very large impact. For example, continuing the Space
Shuttle has the least impact in that area. Other options not
so.
The--with regard to the research and science community
issue, I have testified before this committee before, so I
won't repeat other than to say that in my view that is one of
the most important issues that we are dealing with here is how
to preserve that capability in this country.
And finally, I would just note that, again, we have been
asked to offer alternatives. We have offered only one
conclusion, and the only conclusion we have made is that the
current program doesn't have enough money to be completed.
Beyond that we have offered choices for you and for the
Administration to make decisions. So you have got the tough
job.
Chairman Gordon. But all of those also need more money. Is
that correct?
Mr. Augustine. All the viable ones do. Yes.
Chairman Gordon. Okay. Thank you, Ms. Edwards, and Ms.
Kosmas.
Workforce Sustainability
Ms. Kosmas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr.
Augustine, for being here and Dr. Crawley. I appreciate your
hard work as well. Many of the sentiments you have heard today
are echoed by me, and I also appreciate the opportunity of
having chatted with you prior to the appointment of the
Committee in the conference call where we discussed what you
would be looking at over that time period and your acceptance
of my comments since I wasn't able to be there when you were at
Cocoa Beach near the Kennedy Space Center.
I have sort of a practical question. I am like everyone
else, bemoaning the fact, quite frankly, that we didn't fund
over the years the program that we have been assigned to do and
that NASA was either unable to or unwilling to get the funding
necessary to move forward with the parallel programs that made
up the most current vision for manned space exploration.
But I wanted to ask something fairly specific. My colleague
alluded to it, but I am not sure that we actually got a
specific answer in light of the way it unfolded. But I wanted
to suggest that the original criteria that you identified, was
part of your review, was going to include an assessment of
workforce, and a summary of your review included no specific
reference to workforce issues.
So as you probably know, I serve as the representative for
the Kennedy Space Center, and I am very concerned about the
need to preserve the highly-skilled workforce that we have
there. I think this has an immense impact, not only on our
local economy but also across the Nation as many other
communities are affected by the Space Program. And I personally
believe that it is essential that we maintain a professional
and viable workforce in order that we can ensure the leadership
of this nation and our innovation and competitiveness, which I
think is also critical to national security as we move forward
in space exploration.
So if you can suggest to me why--originally it was, as I
say, one of the criteria that you suggested you were going to
address, but the summary does not speak to the workforce. So
can you discuss how the sustainability of the workforce and the
expertise needed to pursue your human space flight options
differs under the options that are proposed. And also of the
options that you have forwarded to the Administration, which
one in your opinion offers the best protection for the human
space flight workforce and the industrial base that we
currently have?
Mr. Augustine. Ed, would you like to address that?
Mr. Crawley. Yes. Thank you for the question. Let me
explain that in the final report there will actually be an
evaluation of these options against 12 parameters which were
just briefly mentioned: science, the contributions to
technology, the preparation for exploration, the potential to
involve internationals, the stimulation of the commercial
community, the public engagement, the degree to which it
engages the American people, the cost, the safety, the
schedule, and the workforce----
Ms. Kosmas. Uh-huh.
Mr. Crawley.--so that in--without going into all of that
detail in the summary report, it will be forthcoming. Now,
specifically on the question of workforce, what we did is we
looked at what the key skills that are needed for our future in
space and how the options would preserve them or not--or allow
them to atrophy. And there--the problem is that the options,
the difference of the options tend to do different things. So,
for example, the ones that continue to use the solid rocket
boosters like Ares I and Ares V, preserve that aspect of our
national capability and workforce skills. Some of the other
options tend to preserve other aspects of the workforce skills.
The one piece that does come through, however, is the
options that have some variance or another that preserve, that
extend the Shuttle or Shuttle Heritage Systems, do tend to
preserve the workforce capabilities preferentially.
Space Shuttle Recertification
Ms. Kosmas. Okay. I appreciate that. It doesn't seem to be
one of the ones that you have highlighted, however, as--I know
you tried to come with a balanced approached of these are the
options and not really to suggest necessarily which one would
be your first choice, but I didn't notice in the recommendation
or in the review that you had made any specific comments with
regard to recertification of the Shuttle Program or extension
of the Shuttle Program, which as you say, would preserve the
workforce to the best, to the maximum amount possible.
So did you investigate the option of recertifying the
Shuttle Program for a complete recertification?
Mr. Augustine. We did look at that. That is option 4B, and
the recertification that we pointed to is the one that followed
the recommendations of the Challenger failure analysis.
Mr. Crawley. The CAIB.
Mr. Augustine. The CAIB and that option is present, and it
is, as my colleague says, is the one that is probably the least
disruptive to the ongoing workforce. And it is also the only
option that closes the gap.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Augustine. Ms. Johnson is
recognized.
Ms. Kosmas. Thank you.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Possibilities Without $3B Increase
Mr. Augustine, let me thank you for the report and also
thank you for agreeing to be a part of my science and tech
brain trust next week. You did not make a specific
recommendation, because that depends on a lot of things, the
money, but of course, I have read somewhere that we had
exhausted much of the research possibilities in the Space
Station. I don't know how true that is, but I do know that the
space exploration has given us more results than any other type
of research that we can use.
What is possible without that injection of money? What do
we have in the budget? Have we put something together for NASA
already? Okay.
Not being--I am certain that we don't have it but we still
might do it, but without the $3 billion and say 1, what would
be possible to do to continue the program?
Mr. Augustine. The--we looked at an option at 1-1/2 billion
add-on, and the--it does not permit you to conduct an active
exploration program. It does permit you to continue the
International Space Station out through 2020, it permits you to
add some additional funds so that you can make more use of the
Space Station while it is there. One of the problems so far is
that the money has gone to constructing the Space Station and
maintaining it and not to using it. We now have an opportunity
to use it.
With that amount of money you also have the opportunity to
rebuild the technology program at NASA, which has atrophied a
great deal over the years. And so you could have a very strong
science and technology program, you could continue the
International Space Station, but there would be no exploration.
We would still be trapped 368 miles above the Earth.
Inspiring Students With NASA's Current Budget
Ms. Johnson. We would be able to continue to involve
students now, that is, having a great effect as to their
directions for the future?
Mr. Augustine. I think clearly that is one of the things we
would like to see done.
Ms. Johnson. Are we--well, I know that high school students
especially are involved in a lot of the space exploration
activity. What about future staff? Would you have to lay off
people and they go someplace else and get grounded, and what
would that do for encouraging young people to continue in
science and engineering?
Mr. Augustine. With the current program I guess it would
probably require some layoffs, but if we kept spending the same
amount of money we are now spending, we might need different
kinds of people but presumably you could have more or less a
comparable workforce. The--one of the challenges that NASA has
today is that the--so much of their cost is fixed. Their
overhead is fixed, and there is very little latitude to make
these trades. A major layoff at NASA would be a very great de-
motivation to young people considering going into the Space
Program. I think it would be a very unfortunate thing.
At the same time I think it is our view that NASA really
does need to address its overhead, is its overhead too large so
that it doesn't have the latitude to do some of these exciting
things. I would--I lived through the restructuring of the
aerospace industry at the end of the Cold War when our industry
lost 680,000 employees, dedicated people who made great
contributions, but the industry had to do that in order to
survive. And NASA may have to do some restructuring of its
workforce to survive.
Ms. Johnson. You know, the Johnson Space Station is
extremely important to the State of Texas, and I just imagine
wherever we have portions of it, it is just as important to
them. If we have to make a reduction, do you have a
recommendation as to how we do that, what levels of activity
and----
Mr. Crawley. We don't actually--no is the simple answer.
That was a layer of detail that we didn't get into.
Ms. Johnson. Uh-huh.
Mr. Crawley. But we do have a finding in the report which I
think we would all strongly support on the Committee is that
NASA really needs to be given some latitude to do its job. It
needs to be able to allocate the resources and assign the tasks
and develop the capabilities to prepare itself for going
forward, and I think there is an important role in the Congress
in working with the Administration and with the new
Administrator of NASA to realign the agency such that its
skills and knowledge base are aligned with its goals.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Ms. Johnson, and Mr. Grayson is
recognized.
Serving President Kennedy's Vision for the Space Program
Mr. Grayson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
On September 12, 1962, President Kennedy said words that I
think we are all familiar with, but I am going to repeat them.
He said, ``We choose to go to the Moon. We choose to go to the
Moon in this decade and do the other things not because they
are easy but because they are hard. Because that goal will
serve to organize and measure the best of our energies and
skills, because that challenge is one that we are willing to
accept.''
Let us assume that President Kennedy was right about the
purpose of the Space Program. He was right to say that the
purpose of it is to organize and measure the best of our
energies and skills so that we push the envelope, we find out
what human beings are capable of, and in doing so we learn more
about the universe, about science, and about ourselves. If that
is correct, which of these five options best serves that
purpose?
Mr. Augustine. I believe I would say that any of the last
three options, three, four, or five, would satisfy that
purpose. Each would have somewhat different costs, somewhat
different risks, somewhat different objections.
One option that we have raised that has generally not been
raised in the past and that I don't want to endorse but I point
out only because it is different, is the last option called the
flexible path option, and Ed, I would ask you to describe it. I
think it would be of interest to the Committee.
Mr. Crawley. I think I would agree with Norm. One of the
things we struggled with, frankly, was the perception on the
part of the American people, and we ran a very open process in
this committee. We allowed postings, e-mail communication, we
twittered and so forth. Difficulty as one of the Members
mentioned of explaining why it is that we are going back to the
Moon and the options which structurally aren't very different,
you wouldn't build very different boosters, you wouldn't build
very different capsules, but frame the program in the sense
that we are exploring space, that we are going ultimately to
Mars, that we are going to follow a flexible path and learn how
to work in space to go beyond the sphere of influence of the
Earth, to visit the asteroids that might cross our paths and
someday damage our planet, to go and do a fly-by of Mars while
also some time in the '20s setting foot again on the Moon.
It created a context and a message that would really
inspire people, I think Americans, to do the hard things as the
famous Rice University speech you quoted inspires us to think
about.
Mr. Grayson. All right. Tell me more. Tell me more
specifically about why you think that the last three options
and particularly Option 5 would do so much to measure the best
of our energies and skills, teach us more about ourselves and
about the Universe.
Mr. Crawley. Well, we go into space for many reasons. One
is to understand our place in the Universe, the common people,
the American people to understand our place, and we think that
if we go progressively deeper into space, visiting on every
opportunity new places, circling the Moon once just to show our
friends and competitors that we can do it, going and visiting
places on the beginning of the super highway through the inner
Solar System, going and visiting the asteroids, doing swing-bys
of Mars, demonstrating that we can go deep into space and
repair scientific observatories, much as the Hubble Space
Telescope repair missions did in low Earth orbit, that these
things will create both the image and the reality that our
Space Program is doing new, challenging, hard things.
Now, the reality is going to the surface of the Moon is
also hard, and we will find out how hard it was when we try to
do it in 40 or 50 years, and we will frankly find out how lucky
we were in going six times to the surface of the Moon and
returning the astronauts safely as the President, President
Kennedy also said.
So it is--the challenge is more apparent. The scientific
return is more real when or if we will visit places we have not
been, we will work with robotic spacecraft in a new way by
circling planets and sending down probes and interacting with
them.
So we really think that we did create some part of a new
vision for the program in what we call option five, the
flexible path at about the same expenditure and with about the
same equipment that you would use in the other ones.
Mr. Grayson. Mr. Augustine, do you want to add anything to
that?
Mr. Augustine. No. I think he has covered it very well.
Thank you.
Mr. Grayson. Thank you, too. By the way, in the same speech
the President asked why does Rice play Texas, and I was
wondering if the Ranking Member could address that.
Chairman Gordon. Dr. Baird is recognized, Baird is
recognized.
Has NASA Ever Been Fully Funded?
Mr. Baird. Thank the Chairman. I thank our witnesses for
your outstanding work. I think you have performed a real
service to the country as you have done before, Dr. Augustine,
with the----
Mr. Augustine. Thank you.
Mr. Baird.--Above the Gathering Storm report. I need, I
think, to take just a second to observe that one of my
colleagues said a moment earlier, we have been doing a lot of
deficit spending over the last year. My recollection was that
the deficit was near zero. In fact, there was a surplus when
President Clinton left office and that the national debt
doubled and the foreign borrowing of this country doubled
during the Administration of President Bush. So just--I think
records matter.
And I just have to say I am a passionate supporter of human
space flight, but I think we have to pay for it, and I find it
rather interesting that so many of my colleagues on the other
side of the aisle who have entertained folks over the last few
weeks who have screamed about federal spending and the federal
deficit, et cetera, are now saying, well, just, I mean, it is
just $3 billion. It is just $3 billion.
I would just ask, first of all, did the prior
Administration ever fully fund or the prior Congresses ever
fully fund the Space Mission to meet the objectives laid out by
the Bush Administration?
Mr. Augustine. That is a difficult question we spent a lot
of time trying to understand, and it is probably a good
question for the GAO to investigate and not for us. My
understanding as best as we could draw it, is that when the
Constellation Program was put together, the then Administrator
of NASA I think made a genuine effort to find out what funds
that NASA should be able to expect in the future and made a
decision for a program based upon that honest attempt. Whatever
the reasons there is not that much money available today, and
but there is a sub-plot to this, and that is for the Ares
Program and the Ares I Program and the Orion Program, in the
near years those programs will receive basically all the money
that they were expected to get in the first place. So they
didn't take a cut. NASA as a whole did take a cut.
Mr. Baird. Did it receive sufficient money to enable us to
achieve the goal of landing a man on Mars and returning them
safely to Earth?
Mr. Augustine. If you take the number that the then
Administrator of NASA was using, and I am not going to try to
argue whether he had a reason to believe that or not, he could
speak to that, but you would have had enough money in our
opinion. As it has turned out, there is not that much--enough
money.
Mr. Baird. Okay.
Chairman Gordon. The problem also is the balloon mortgage.
There may have been enough money a long time, but it
ballooned----
Mr. Baird. I understand that well, and that was the next
point. You know, the near costs. I mean, we saw the sketches of
those missions and astronauts happily working under large
geodesic domes that were somehow transported up there by
massive vehicles and landed softly and then constructed in a
non-friendly atmosphere. It was, you know, as if we had
transported these giant cranes up, and that is a significant
lift capacity that I don't think we have.
But I commend you for being honest with this body, and I
wish this body would be honest with itself and say, we can't on
the one hand decry federal deficits and then on the other hand
say, oh, it is just $3 billion.
And which brings me to my next point. Would you support
repealing tax cuts to fund this?
Mr. Augustine. Sir, that is beyond my pay rate. I am sorry.
Mr. Baird. Maybe I should ask some of my colleagues on the
other side of the aisle who decry the spending. Mr. Griffith,
Dr. Griffith had it right, and I think you gentlemen have it
right. We got to fish or cut bait, and I believe passionately
that it is the mission of our species to explore and to
actually leave the solar system at some point, but it is going
to cost us, and we have to decide whether we want to spend
that.
And I believe it is the mission of this country to lead the
world in that. We are going to fall behind. I think it is very
likely that my kids are going to watch somebody from another
country walk on the Moon, whereas I watched Americans walk on
the Moon. But we can't have it both ways. We can't have
multiple unfunded wars, continued expansion of entitlement
programs, continued tax cuts, and then say we want a few
billion dollars here or there to expand our science effort. We
can't have it. We are going to have to decide what is worth
paying for, and I think you have done this nation a great
service by owning that and saying--and making us look in that
mirror and I applaud you for it. I think it is worth spending,
and if it is worth spending, it is worth paying for, and we
have to decide how to do it. But it is not worth saying we are
going to add another $3 billion in debt to our kids so that we
don't have to pay the taxes today. That is not worth doing.
I thank you, and I yield back.
Chairman Gordon. Mr. Wu, you are recognized.
International Cooperation for Human Space Flight
Mr. Wu. Thank you very much. Mr. Baird, I thought you were
a psychologist, not an economist. That is a dismal analysis but
economic reality. Yeah.
I--perhaps it is in the spirit of continuing human space
exploration at levels we can afford that I want to ask this
question or this set of questions. I know that you all would
prefer not to recommend between the different options that you
have laid out in the report, but I would like to ask you about
the different consequences that the different options have for
international--in two ways, competition, and cooperation.
I think that there is some--there is tremendous potential
for real competition developing between the different space-
faring nations, and there is some prospect for cooperation
also, and therefore, in sharing some of those costs and having
a true human space effort. If you all could both address the
consequences of the different options for cooperation and
competition internationally.
Mr. Augustine. Mr. Wu, let me address the basic point and
then ask my colleague to address the specific options. I think
the basic point is that there are many, many advantages we
think to international cooperation. We believe that the ISS has
been extremely successful in setting up a management structure
that involves a very large number of nations, I think it is 17
now, that works. And that management structure we believe could
be broadened to go pursue exploration programs beyond Earth
orbit, low Earth orbit. And so we believe the basis if there if
we don't destroy it by shutting down the Space Station
suddenly.
Turning to the individual options briefly----
Mr. Crawley. Yes. I would agree with Norm. The--what we
very clearly heard was that the basis for any real
international venture in space was to deliver on our
obligations on the Space Station, that this was an essential
step in the future, and to dedicate the Space Station in the
decade or so which we imagine it to operate in the future, to
addressing many of the technical issues that we will have to
face in exploration and developing the technologies and
demonstrating them on the Space Station.
With respect to the specific options, I don't think that
the options that we have presented really distinguish
themselves greatly by the degree to which we could involve
international partners in them.
American Leadership in Space
Mr. Wu. Let me just jump in. If you look at the other
nations' priorities, don't some of them emphasize say a landing
on the Moon rather than not going deeply into the gravity well?
Mr. Crawley. I think that we didn't see a strong indication
of that. We saw that they were looking for America to provide
leadership, that they are comfortable with American leadership
in an international space endeavor, and that they look for us
to sort of at least initially lay out a course but involve them
very early in that process. And structure the program,
whichever one of the options is chosen, so that they can play
real meaningful roles. We heard this very frequently from the
international partners, and you know, there are real assets
there. If we look at the combined space agency budgets of even
just we will call it our traditional allies, they represent now
a substantial fraction of the NASA budget collectively.
Mr. Wu. Now, does that include India and China, or both
India and China are outside----
Mr. Crawley. No.
Mr. Wu.--the 17 nation----
Mr. Crawley. They are not involved in the Space Station
now, although there is some interest in extending to them, but
if you just look at the budgets of the European Space Agency
and its member states, its principle member states, France,
Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Canada, and Japan, you
would already have about 60 percent of the budget of NASA, and
you would have real capability. I mean, the robotic capability
of the Canadians, the propulsive capability of the Europeans,
the on-orbit robotics and laboratory capability of the
Japanese. One could craft a global enterprise here which
America could lead.
Mr. Wu. And if you added India and China to that budgetary
mix, would you be coming up close to 100 percent?
Mr. Crawley. Well, the next principle one is the Russian
program, which, of course----
Mr. Wu. But they are in.
Mr. Crawley. They are in now.
Mr. Wu. Yeah.
Mr. Crawley. It is a little bit more difficult to assess
because of buying power parity. The Indians still have a modest
program. The Chinese it is a little hard to define exactly how
large their program is as you might know because of the way
they budget or don't budget for the--reveal the budgetary
details.
Mr. Wu. They do work with non-Arabic numerals.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Wu, and Ms. Jackson Lee,
you were patient, and you will be our clean-up hitter.
Current State of NASA
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, allow me to thank both you
and the Ranking Member for your courtesies as well as the
Members of this very, very fine committee. I am an alumna of
the Committee, but my heart is very much engaged in this
process. And I would like to think that I am not from
California or Texas, or I am not from Florida, but I am from
America, and I believe this is an American question about where
we stand as relates to our next steps.
I note, Mr. Augustine, and you are very right, reading from
your opening statement that you were assigned the task, the
Committee was assigned to task to identify alternative courses
that the U.S. might pursue in the area of human space flight.
Were you directed early on about how you should conclude? Did
your tasks include the elimination of human space flight, and
here is where we would like you to find yourself? Were you
given those kinds of instructions?
Mr. Augustine. We were given no direction of any kind like
that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So there was no bias that you felt that
came from in particular the Administration or anyone that you
had to report to?
Mr. Augustine. I need to say that we were told--I was given
no bias of any kind except that in our initial job description,
if you will, we were told to abide by the budget run out
through 2020, that we were given, and we were told to phase out
the Shuttle in 2010. And when I saw that, I went back to the
Administration and said that, you know, we can't do our job if
we are given that kind of constraints, and they very quickly
said, fine. Go ahead.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Excellent, and I----
Mr. Augustine. We had total freedom.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I am going to be rapid fire with my
questions. In your travels to our different centers, did you
find qualified and competent staff, degreed individuals,
capable and competent in terms of research and cutting-edge
technology?
Mr. Augustine. Absolutely. I have worked with those
people----
Ms. Jackson Lee. So we have some positive assets in the
respective centers.
Mr. Augustine. Without question.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I would just want to put on the record a
quote by the President, President Kennedy that said, ``We do
these things not because they are easy but because hey are
hard.'' So here is my overall question. It seems as if we have
nailed the--we have got the hammer, we are hitting the nail,
and the nail now is this $3 billion, that if we were to be
given that $3 billion right as we speak, and we then follow one
of your other instructions, which is the possibility of
restructuring in terms of looking closely at our overhead,
recognizing the human resources that we have, do we have a
viable program in the Constellation?
Mr. Augustine. Yes, I think so. I think our committee
believes so.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So then in essence we have a roadmap. I
would like to suggest that a roadmap that includes failure is
not an option, and when I say that, I believe that we may
possibly as we move forward in space have to go it alone. I am
a big believer without collaborators. I have worked on this
committee without collaborators. We are very active,
particularly the International Space Station.
Do you perceive us having the present skill set of NASA
employees and supporting--support staff, academicians and
others, to be able to design a 21st century, 22nd century space
program?
Mr. Augustine. There are some unknowns yet that have to do
with the effects of cosmic radiation on the human body, long
duration exposure to zero-G's and the moving into a gravity
well. So there are some unknowns, but the general answer would
be, yes, we have the talents available to have a fine
exploration program.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And a quick question. Is there value in
the American Space Program, the Human Space Program in
particular?
Mr. Augustine. The simple answer to that is yes. Before I
think you were able to join us we talked a little bit about the
reasons we feel that way, but it would seem to us there is
value, and I have to caution, of course, that all ten of us
come from the world of the space programs.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And I understand, and I was here when you
said inspiration education. I would rather focus on, as I
conclude, I do believe this is going to be a national security
issue, and I am now on homeland security. I would rather we be
the leaders in space for a variety of reasons because of the
values of this nation, because we are kind, because we believe
in, if you will, an attitude of peace as opposed to aggressive
actions, in this instance against Earth, and frankly with the
talent that you say is present in our space centers around
America, it would be a shame to recreate the max movies, where
we go to Florida and Alabama and Texas and other places and see
rusting space centers.
I think you have given us a roadmap. I think the President
and the White House have something to work this, and I believe
this Congress has an obligation to the American people to find
$3 billion. Whether or not we do it in a bipartisan manner,
which I think we absolutely can, I think it is an absolute
imperative that we encourage the brilliance and the scientific
abilities of those who are working in space exploration now to
continue their work, to be funded, and to use some of the
instruction that you have given us to make it the most solid
world space program that the world has ever seen.
And, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for allowing me to be an
American today and at the same time being a Texan because we
sure want the Space Station and the Space Program and Human
Space Flight to survive.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank you and yield.
Chairman Gordon. You are always welcome back here, and so
in conclusion let me say, Mr. Augustine and Dr. Crawley, thank
you for spending the afternoon with us. More importantly, thank
you for the work that you put into this report.
This committee has a very serious responsibility this year
of providing a NASA authorization, which will really lay the
foundation for the future of NASA, if not for the coming
decade, a couple of decades. So we want to continue with this
discussion. We are going to try to get it right, and we
appreciate you helping us.
And so we will now call up our second panel.
Mr. Augustine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Crawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Recess.]
Panel II:
Chairman Gordon. We are on a timeframe here, so I would
hope everybody would make their well wishes crisp, and the
second panel will take their seat, and we will get started as
soon as Dr. Griffin takes his seats. Thank you.
Okay. Thanks for your patience, and I think hopefully you
found the first panel as informative as we did, and as we
introduce our witnesses here, first, Vice Admiral Joseph W.
Dyer, who is the Chair of NASA's Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel and the President of the Government and Industries Robots
Division at iRobot Corporation. Thank you for joining us.
And also we have Dr. Michael Griffin, who served as NASA
Administrator from 2005 to 2009, and now has the glamorous
title of Eminent Scholar and Professor for Mechanical and
Aerospace Engineering at the University of Alabama in
Huntsville.
So welcome you both, and Admiral Dyer, you know the rules
here. Won't you proceed?
STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JOSEPH W. DYER USN (RET.), CHAIR,
AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL, NASA; PRESIDENT, GOVERNMENT &
INDUSTRIAL ROBOTS DIVISION, iROBOT CORPORATION
Admiral Dyer. Thank you very much, Chairman Gordon, Ranking
Member Hall, distinguished Members. Thank you for the
opportunity to be with you today. I respectfully request to
submit a written statement and would note that in that written
statement that we reference the 2008 ASAP report submitted to
this panel earlier this year.
Chairman Gordon. Without objection.
Admiral Dyer. I represent the views of the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel today, and I will emphasize the remarks we also
shared, the panel shared via--with the Augustine Committee on
the 14th of July of this year. I will restrict my remarks to
safety and safety-related opportunities and issues.
In general, we are very respectful and appreciative of the
work that Mr. Augustine and the panel have done. We do note
that the tempo and time limited their consideration of safety,
and we think that additional focus and energy in that arena is
important.
The summary report does as we discussed in the first panel
reference current plans for the Constellation Program against a
number of conceptual alternatives, and here we would offer a
word of caution that you have heard already. That is that
PowerPoint will always outshine programs of record, but perhaps
it is worth pausing for a minute and looking at why is that the
case? Why is that true?
I would submit, sir, that it is that professional, peer,
and public reviews during the accomplishment of real work of
program of records highlight technical challenges, they
discover cost stress, they reveal the realities of conducting
high-risk business in an unforgiving environment, and
highlighted and publicized are all the challenges of carrying
out a program.
Future concepts, conceptual concepts do not yet have the
benefit of this reality testing. Therefore, we believe that any
new design must be substantially better to justify starting
over.
Speaking of starting over, we believe that doing so surely
and substantially would extend the gap of the Nation's ability
to transport humans into space. The ASAP does not, I will
emphasize that again, does not support extending the Shuttle
beyond its current manifest.
Also discussed in the report of the Augustine Committee is
the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services Project. We
believe that NASA needs to take a more aggressive role in
articulating human rating requirements to the COTS Project.
There is--the project, COTS Project are not currently subject
to human rating standards. There is no proven ability to
transport--that they will be able to transport NASA personnel
in a satisfactory function as of yet, and there is no
indication that it could close the gap between Shuttle and a
future program.
We do agree strongly with the panel in two areas, and that
would be both budget and unmanned systems. The imperative to
achieve a better harmony among requirements, resources, and
acquisition strategy is something that should be undertaken
with great speed and great interest. Without it there is an
inevitable pressure to shortcut good process in the face of
budget shortfall, and it is the most damning infliction upon
proper safety and good design.
We also agree that unmanned systems have a strong role to
play both stand-alone and integrated with astronauts.
Historically, the scientific community has been the user of
unmanned systems, much so manned space. NASA will be better
served, we believe, by developing a better process by which
manned and unmanned systems are integrated, and undertakings as
diverse as construction and mining we believe demands the case.
We would like to see more emphasis on the next major
program, be it a continuation of Constellation or an
alternative to have strong, strong emphasis on safety, and we
note that major change is most often--rides on the back of
dedicated people with a major program and a strong role to
play.
Mr. Chairman, perhaps the most important message I would
like to share with you today is that the panel would make a
case or would hope to champion a broader discussion of risk.
Let us be honest. Lives will be lost in the human exploration
of space. We are lucky to have brave men and women that are
willing to undertake that challenge, but the panel believes
that there is a need for greater dialogue about risks and that
NASA, the White House, and the Congress must all shoulder the
burden of risk and the necessity of being more transparent with
the citizens of our country regarding that risk.
In closing, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Hall,
distinguished Members, we would note that the new NASA
Administrator, Charlie Bolden, has been a member of our panel
for the last several years. We take great comfort and great
confidence in his stand of the watch at this time and look
forward to his leadership.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Dyer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral Joseph W. Dyer
Chairman Gordon, Ranking Member Hall and distinguished Members,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. As requested,
I would like to present the perspective of the NASA Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel with regard to the Options and Issues for NASA's Human
Space Flight Program.
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) was originally
established under Section 6 of the NASA Authorization Act, 1968 (42
U.S.C. 2477). In 2005, the ASAP authority was modified under Section
106 of the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-155).
The ASAP's charge is, among other things, to advise the NASA
Administrator and the Congress with respect to the hazards of proposed
or existing facilities and proposed operations with respect to the
adequacy of proposed or existing safety standards, and with respect to
management and culture related to safety.
My goal this afternoon is to share with the Committee much of the
same information I shared with the Review of U.S. Human Space Flight
Plans Committee on 14 July of this year. I shall restrict my remarks to
safety and safety-related opportunities and issues.
In general, the ASAP is both respectful and appreciative of the
summary report released by the Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans
Committee. They quickly conducted a broad and far reaching review of
current plans and potential alternatives. The ASAP does believe the
tempo and time available prevented the thorough consideration of risks
and safety challenges that we would have liked to have seen.
We note that the Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee
summary report compares current plans for the Constellation program
with a number of conceptual alternatives. Here, we offer a word of
caution--PowerPoint presentations addressing future programs will
always out-shine current programs of record. Why is that the case? It
is because current programs have garnered the professional peer and
public review during the accomplishment of real work. Technical
challenges will have been discovered, cost stress will have been
revealed, and the reality of conducting high risk business in an
unforgiving environment will have been highlighted and publicized.
Future concepts do not yet have the benefit of this reality testing.
This experience led to one of the ASAP's prime recommendations
presented to the Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee.
Specifically, the ASAP believes that if Constellation is not the
optimum answer, then any other new design must be substantially
superior to justify starting over.
``Starting over'' would surely and substantially extend the gap in
the Nation's ability to transport humans into space. As it is directly
related, I want to share the ASAP's strongly held position regarding
the Shuttle: ASAP does not support extending the Shuttle beyond the
current manifest. The substantiation of this recommendation is
addressed in the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 2008 Annual Report,
which I respectfully request be included in the hearing record.
The ASAP's 2008 Annual Report also addresses the NASA Commercial
Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) Project. The Panel noted NASA
needs to take a more aggressive role articulating human rating
requirements for the COTS Project. COTS vehicles currently are not
subject to the Human-Rating Requirements (HRR) standards and are not
proven to be appropriate to transport NASA personnel. There is no
evidence that the COTS vehicles will be completed in time to minimize
the gap between Shuttle and the follow-on program. Additionally, we
note that NASA, and at least one of the COTS funded partners, hold
widely divergent views as to what is required for human-rating.
An area where the ASAP and the Review of U.S. Human Space Flight
Plans Committee are in strongest possible agreement is with regard to
budget. The ASAP has noted the need for NASA and the Congress to
address an imperative to achieve better harmony among requirements,
resources and acquisition strategy. The inevitable pressure to shortcut
good process in the face of a budget shortfall is THE most damaging
infliction upon a proper safety culture and the conduct of good design.
Making better use of robots is another area where the Review of
U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee and the ASAP have made similar
recommendations. The ASAP believes unmanned systems--both stand alone
and integrated with astronauts--offer potential to reach farther and to
improve safety. The ASAP has highlighted the role of unmanned systems
in support of human exploration in the next decade requires
clarification by NASA. Historically, NASA robots have been embraced
mostly by the scientific community and to a much lesser extent by human
space flight programs. NASA will be well served to better develop the
process by which manned and unmanned systems are integrated.
Undertakings as diverse as construction and mining demand coordinated
manned and unmanned systems design.
Given good direction, consistency of purpose, and sufficient
resources, Constellation, or an alternative program, offers a one-time
opportunity for safety to be better hard-wired into overall NASA
processes. Experience shows one of the best ways for a large
organization to advance the state of art of its processes is to
institutionalize procedures developed by a major new program that is
highly motivated and staffed with the best and brightest. We would have
liked for the Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee to have
more strongly highlighted this point as well.
Lastly, the ASAP would like to champion a broader discussion of
risk. Lives will be lost in future human exploration of space. We are
lucky to have brave men and women willing to undertake exploration in
support of mankind even in the face of these risks. We believe there is
need for greater dialogue about risk and that NASA, the White House and
the Congress must all shoulder the burden of risk and the necessity of
being more transparent with the citizens of our country regarding that
risk.
Chairman Gordon, Ranking Member Hall, and distinguished Members, in
closing I would like to note that the new NASA Administrator, Charlie
Bolden, has been a member of the ASAP for the last several years. We
know him very well and take strong comfort in his ability to lead the
Agency during these challenging times. I thank you again for the
opportunity to appear today.
Biography for Vice Admiral Joseph W. Dyer
Joe Dyer leads the Government and Industrial Robots Division. He
comes to iRobot from a career in the U.S. Navy. Dyer last served as the
Commander of the Naval Air Systems Command, where he was responsible
for research, development, test and evaluation, engineering and
logistics for naval aircraft, air launched weapons and sensors. His
naval career also included positions as naval aviation's chief
engineer, commander of the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division
and F/A-18 program manager. Earlier in his career, he served as the
Navy's chief test pilot. Dyer holds a Bachelor's degree in chemical
engineering from North Carolina State University and a Master's degree
in finance from the Naval Post Graduate School in Monterey, California.
He is an elected fellow in the Society of Experimental Test Pilots and
the National Academy of Public Administration. Dyer chairs NASA's
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel.
Chairman Gordon. I think that our confidence will be well-
founded.
Dr. Griffin, is recognized.
STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL D. GRIFFIN, EMINENT SCHOLAR AND
PROFESSOR, MECHANICAL AND AEROSPACE ENGINEERING, UNIVERSITY OF
ALABAMA, HUNTSVILLE
Dr. Griffin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Gordon,
Ranking Member Hall, Members of the Committee, thank you for
inviting me here today for this important discussion. If there
is anywhere in Washington where I feel at home, it is in front
of this committee.
You have asked for my perspective on the report of the
Committee to review U.S. human space flight plans or their
summary report and the issues that you should consider as it
deliberates the future of U.S. human space flight.
Now, I addressed many of those technical and programmatic
concerns in the summary report in my written testimony, which I
would like to enter for the record.
Chairman Gordon. Without objection, so ordered.
Dr. Griffin. And I would be happy to answer any questions I
could during your later question and answer period, but I want
to focus a few thoughts in my opening statement on other
matters.
The future direction of our nation's space enterprise
matters greatly to everyone here, and that was obvious from the
prior discussion that you really care. Well, we really care as
well. As the Committee pointed out, as the Augustine Committee
pointed out, human space flight is fundamentally about the
strategic goal of human expansion into the Solar System. The
last time human beings contemplated decisions with such a
momentous future impact the result was the settlement of the
new world by Europeans.
We are here today because they made the decisions that they
made, and I think we want to create the kind of a world where
our remote descendants will be able to say the same thing.
At least that was the path we were on until the release of
NASA's 5-year budget ran out projection this last May, and at
this time a year ago as I discussed with this committee, the
original budget for exploration they put forth had already been
eroded by some $12 billion to pay for other things. Now, the
budget submitted this past May erodes that further to the point
where some $30 billion has been now--if those plans were to go
forward, removed from space exploration plans in the future.
This has been amply noted in the hearing so far. I won't
comment further. The issue is money. That issue renders mute
all other debate as to whatever destinations we might pursue,
whether they are the Moon, the near-Earth asteroids, Mars, or
any debate about how we might get there. On the 40th
anniversary of Apollo 11, this is a sobering thought. Coming so
soon after the Columbia accident and two authorization Acts by
the Congress to set NASA on course to carry out worthy and
inspirational endeavors, I hope I am not the only one who finds
it shameful that we are in this position.
I am reminded of the warning made by the young President
Kennedy before a joint session on Congress on May 25 of 1961,
when he called upon our nation to go to the Moon. ``If we were
to go only halfway or to reduce our sights in the face of
difficulty, in my judgment it would be better not to go at
all.'' The Congress and the Nation then responded, but with the
budget in front of us we are poised to behave not like the
Kennedy Administration but the Nixon Administration, where
after spending literally a fortune to develop the spaceships of
Apollo, we threw them away. We spent 80 percent of the money
building them, 20 percent of the money using them, and they are
gone.
So do today's leaders want to be remembered like John
Kennedy or Richard Nixon? That is the choice before us. Which
choice best serves America? I think that is a rhetorical
question.
So I believe the recommendation that matters most from the
Augustine Committee is this. ``Meaningful human exploration is
possible under a less-constrained budget, ramping to
approximately $3 billion a year above FY 2010, guidance and
total resources.'' Well, while this may seem like a lot of
money, I think I would like to put it in perspective.
If we had just kept NASA level in constant dollars since
1993 across two Presidential Administrations, no gains and no
cuts, we would have more money in the NASA budget today than
the Augustine Committee is recommending be put there now.
Can anyone tell me, can anyone here tell me what as a
nation we bought with the money we supposedly saved by cutting
the budget for NASA in the last 15 years? I know what we bought
with Apollo, and I can tell you what has been lost from NASA in
the last 15 years as a result of those cuts.
So the question is does this Congress believe strongly
enough in the direction that it set into law with the NASA
Authorization Act of 2005 and 2008? I hope so. Time is of the
essence. OMB starts making decisions, concrete decisions in
November, and they become very hard to reverse. The NASA
Administrator is simply one voice among many when asking for
resources from the Administration. The stronger voice comes
from you ladies and gentlemen, speaking with one voice that
NASA's budget needs an increase.
Back in 1994, we embarked upon an experiment of cutting the
NASA budget by 20 percent in real dollars. I think we are here
today because we didn't like how that experiment turned out. Do
we want to keep doing it?
I will conclude by saying again that the question before
us--pardon me. I will close by saying that that comment which
was first asked in the Halls of Congress 48 years ago. ``If we
are to go only halfway or to reduce our sights in the face of
difficulty, in my judgment it would be better not to go at
all.''
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Griffin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael D. Griffin
Chairman Gordon, Ranking Member Hall, and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for inviting me to appear before this committee to
discuss our nation's plans for human space flight, and the findings of
a highly respected Commission chartered to review those plans. For this
Hearing, I have been asked to provide my perspective on the
Commission's summary report, especially as it relates to NASA's
Constellation Program and the issues that Congress needs to consider as
it deliberates the future of U.S. human space flight. I am honored to
have been asked.
I will begin by acknowledging my own gratitude to the Commission
for highlighting, front and center, many issues with which I grappled
for four years during my term as Administrator. The Commission has
offered many observations with which I most strongly agree. Among these
are:
the reaffirmation of the fundamental strategic goal
of human expansion outward into the solar system;
the explicit enunciation of both intangible and
concrete reasons--what I once labeled `real' vs. `acceptable'
reasons--for human expansion into space;
the absolute criticality of stable policy direction
to the success of such an effort, and the resources to
implement that direction, across presidential administrations;
the recognition of the impact of substantial,
consistent, long-term real-dollar budget cuts at NASA (more
than 20 percent in the last 15 years);
the plain acknowledgement that more money is required
if worthy goals are to be attained, and that without such
funding, worthy goals in human space flight beyond the
International Space Station (ISS) will not be achieved;
the identification of a specific amount for a
proposed increase, $3 billion annually, rather than merely
stating a requirement for ``more money'';
the value of U.S. leadership in a program of human
expansion into space, while still embracing strategically
critical contributions by international partners;
the distinct but complementary natures of scientific
discovery and human space flight in the expansion of the human
frontier;
the requirement to implement this expansion with a
transportation infrastructure designed to last decades and
enable numerous destinations;
the importance of heavy-lift launch systems to that
implementation scheme;
support for the continuation of ISS operations
through 2020 (and I would add ``at least 2020'');
the need for and benefit of a focused effort in
technology development and maturation as part of the overall
space exploration enterprise.
The Commission is to be further congratulated for its forthright
willingness to engage some of the more contentious questions in what
has been a long-term but still unsettled policy discussion. There are a
number of ``hot-buttons'' in the report that have been and will
continue to be debated passionately until finally settled by decisions
and actions. Among these questions are:
whether or not there is a need for independent U.S.
Government human access to space, and if not, the
identification of those entities upon which we are willing to
depend for such access;
whether or not it is in the larger interests of the
United States to invite international partnerships in regard to
capabilities which are on the so-called ``critical path'' to a
desired common goal;
the degree to and roles in which the U.S. Government
should foster the development, and embrace the capabilities, of
``commercial space'' in the furtherance of national goals;
the proper role of NASA in guiding the human
expansion into space, and in particular NASA's disparate
functions as `innovator and technology developer' vs.
`designer/developer/smart buyer' of new systems, and `system
operator' vs. `service customer.'
I have my own opinions on these matters, as do many others in the
space policy community, and am pleased to share them if asked. Some of
those opinions I hold in common with some members of the Commission; in
other cases `not so much.' But the larger point is that these matters
of national policy remain unsettled. I am truly gratified to see such
substantive matters being raised by the Commission. They deserve
correspondingly substantive debate, followed by decisive action.
So, at the strategic level, I believe that the Commission has done
an excellent job of raising issues that matter and providing clear
indications as to what the worthy and proper course for the Nation's
future in space should be.
At the same time, however, the Commission also addresses numerous
tactical issues concerning how to go about achieving the goals they
support, and offers views as to the merits of various implementation
approaches considered during their deliberations. I think it is fair to
say that I am less enamored of their treatment of these tactical issues
than I am of their strategic assessments.
I believe that this is an important distinction to make, and that
both strategy and tactics are important. Non-specialists will, and
should, place great weight on the findings of this Commission. Where
key tactical assessments and findings are at variance with those of
knowledgeable and experienced practitioners, it can result in a level
of public discord such that it becomes difficult for policy-makers to
know how to proceed. Thus, it will be important to consider carefully
many specific points which were addressed by the Commission before
decisions are made by the President and finally codified into law--or
not--by the Congress.
The Commission notes, correctly, that NASA's Constellation program
followed a design-to-cost strategy according to the budget profile of
FY 2005. NASA's budget as stipulated in 2005 was essentially constant
in real dollars, with only a slight increase above inflation. Since
then, it has since suffered some $30 billion of reductions to the
amount allocated to human lunar return, including $12 billion in just
the last five fiscal years.
The Commission notes that ``Given the funding originally expected,
the Constellation Program was a reasonable architecture for human
exploration.'' In an earlier public statement, Commissioner Sally Ride
noted that, ``the program comes pretty close to performing as NASA
advertised it would. . . . NASA's planning and development phase of
Constellation was actually pretty good.'' A veteran of the
investigations of both the Challenger and Columbia accidents, Sally has
seen her share of troubled programs, and so this comment was one I
found telling.
Thus, one wonders why the Commission failed to recommend as its
favored option the simplest one possible--providing the funding
necessary to do the job. Of all the options considered, this is the
most straightforward. Yet it was not recommended. Other options are
possible, of course, and the Commission would have been remiss not to
explore them as well. But not to include this one is, in my view,
simply wrong.
I say this because the civil space policy of the United States;
e.g., ``what NASA does,'' has been a matter of law since the passage in
December 2005 of the NASA Authorization Act. This came about only after
a full 23 months of fulsome, healthy, and productive debate on the
merits of President George W. Bush's announcement of the ``Vision for
Exploration'' in January 2004. The ``Vision'' itself was a response to
another presidential commission, the Columbia Accident Investigation
Board, which noted as a root cause of the Columbia accident the lack of
a long-term strategic vision for NASA--a finding which I supported then
and support now. In my view, the Congress extended and improved upon
the original ``Vision'' in passing that Act, and did so again in 2008.
On both occasions Congressional support for NASA's direction was
heavily bipartisan.
Thus, when President Obama took office in January 2009, he
inherited a civil space policy which had, in its essentials, survived
six years of vigorous scrutiny, a space agency which had transformed
itself to execute that policy, and could do so in a reasonable (if not
very aggressive) timeframe on a constant-dollar budget as stipulated in
2005. The Commission itself speaks of the need for stability in
direction and funding, if NASA is to make reasonable progress and to be
accountable for so doing. In my view, then, the most important question
that Congress could ask of the new Administration and its Commission is
this: exactly why does the policy which we have established in law--
twice!--need to be changed?
We cannot discuss the civil space budget, budget stability, or
future plans for human space flight without also addressing the future
of the ISS. Certainly, the Commission fully recognized this point in
their deliberations and in their Summary Report. However, the report
devotes considerable attention to the issue of potentially
decommissioning the ISS in 2016, trading the funds required for its
extension against those required for the expansion of human space
flight beyond LEO.
I must be clear. In my opinion, any discussion of decommissioning
and de-orbiting the ISS is irrelevant to the consideration of serious
programmatic options. While it is certainly true that the Bush
Administration did not provide funding for ISS past 2015, it was always
quite clear that the decision to cancel or fund the ISS in 2016 and
beyond was not within the purview of that administration to make. In
the face of strong International Partner commitment to ISS and two
decades of steadfast Congressional commitment to the ISS, it has never
been and is not now realistic to consider decommissioning it in 2015,
or indeed on any particular date which can be known today. The United
States will not take unilateral action to cancel an international
program which is the centerpiece of human space flight in every one of
its fifteen participating nations, just because a particular date
arrives on the calendar.
It has long been known that some $3+ billion per year will be
required to sustain ISS operations past 2015. Failure to plan for this
is, and has been, a glaring omission in the Nation's budgetary policy.
Thus, sustained funding of the ISS as long as it continues to return
value--certainly to 2020 and quite likely beyond--should have been
established by the Commission as a non-negotiable point of departure
for all other discussions.
The United States is now the majority owner of a 450 ton laboratory
in space, a facility without compare. The fact that it took too long to
build and that we spent more money on it than we should have is
irrelevant to future decisions. We have it. We should use it to the
maximum possible extent, for as long as we can make it last. But we
must also go beyond ISS. The existence of future exploration programs
cannot be traded against sustenance of the ISS on an ``either-or''
basis, as if that were a realistic option. If the Nation is to have a
viable human space flight program, the requirement to sustain ISS while
also developing new systems to go beyond low Earth orbit is the
minimally necessary standard. If the Nation can no longer meet that
standard, then it should be so stated, in which case any further
discussion of U.S. human exploration beyond LEO is moot for the next
two decades.
The Commission correctly addresses, front and center, concerns
about the looming ``gap'' in independent U.S. access to LEO and to the
ISS after the Space Shuttle is retired. To deal with this problem, the
preference for ``commercial'' options for cargo and crew delivery to
low Earth orbit appears throughout the Summary, together with the
statement that ``it is an appropriate time to consider turning this
transport service over to the commercial sector.'' It must be asked:
what commercial sector?
At present, the only clearly available ``commercial'' option to
lift Orion as designed is the European Ariane 5, designed from the
outset to be human rated. Even so, Arianespace has estimated that
several years would be required to prepare the Ariane 5 and its
processing infrastructure to meet the demands of human space flight. I
believe this to be correct. Launching a redesigned Orion crew vehicle
on Ariane 5 is certainly a valid choice in the context of an
international program. However, as an alternative to an independent
U.S. Government capability for human transport to LEO, it is a valid
choice if, and only if, the U.S. is willing to give up independent
access to low Earth orbit, a decision imbued with enormous future
consequences. Are we really ready to take that step?
With an appropriately enlightened U.S. Government policy there may
one day be a domestic commercial space transportation sector. Such a
policy could, as the Commission correctly notes, follow along the path
laid out by government sponsorship of commercial air transportation in
the last century (for cargo, by the way, not passenger traffic). No one
in the space community wants that capability to exist more than I. But
it does not presently exist, and will not exist in the near future;
i.e., substantially prior to the expected availability of Ares I and
Orion, if properly funded.
The key point is this: the existence of a guaranteed U.S.
Government option for cargo and crew delivery to ISS is what allows
government to take prudent risks to help bring about the development of
a viable commercial space sector.
The Commission acknowledges the ``risk'' associated with its
recommendation, but is not clear about the nature of that risk. If no
government option to deliver cargo and crew to LEO is developed
following the retirement of the Space Shuttle, the U.S. risks the
failure to sustain and utilize a unique facility with a sunk cost of
$55 billion on the U.S. side, and nearly $20 billion of international
partner investment. The Russian Soyuz and Progress systems, even if we
are willing to be dependent upon Russia and are willing to pay whatever
is required for their use, simply do not provide sufficient capability
to utilize ISS as was intended. Further, they represent a single point
failure in regard to such utilization. In my view, to hold the support
and utilization of the ISS hostage to the emergence of a commercial
space sector is not ``risky,'' it is irresponsible.
The Commission claims that safety ``is not discussed in extensive
detail because any concepts falling short in human safety have simply
been eliminated from consideration.'' Similarly, the Commission was
``unconvinced that enough is known about any of the potential high-
reliability launcher-plus-capsule systems to distinguish their levels
of safety in a meaningful way.'' For those of us in the human space
flight community, this is a ``hot button.'' The Commission has
dismissed out of hand the extensive work that has been done to assure
that Constellation systems offer the safest approach in comparison to
all other presently known systems. This is simply unacceptable. Work of
high quality in the assessment of safety and reliability has been done,
and independently validated discriminators between and among various
system options do exist, whether the Commissioners believe so or not.
Further, the Summary Report is confusing as regards the distinction
between ``reliability'' and ``safety,'' where it is discussed at all.
The former is the only criterion of interest for unmanned systems; for
manned systems, there is an important difference due to the existence
of an abort system and the conditions under which that abort system can
and must operate. Nowhere is this crucial distinction discussed.
The Commission recommends consideration of a lunar mission
architecture featuring a dual-launch of the Ares V Lite vehicle,
instead of the Ares I/Ares V Constellation baseline. The rationale for
this recommendation is difficult to understand, because economic
considerations favor Ares V over Ares V Lite. Ares V costs 12 percent
more to develop than Ares V Lite, but carries 14 percent more payload
to LEO and 20 percent more payload to the Moon (50 mt vs. 60 mt). Even
more importantly, the operations cost for the dual-Ares V Lite lunar
mission concept is several hundred million dollars higher than the
baseline plan, for the same reference program of two human and two
cargo missions to the Moon each year.
The Commission agrees that a heavy-lift launcher is needed for
human space exploration beyond LEO. Because of the economies of scale
inherent to the design of launch vehicles, the cost-per-pound of
payload to orbit nearly always improves with increasing launch vehicle
size. Thus, a heavy-lift vehicle should be designed to be as large as
possible within the constraints of the facilities and infrastructure
available to build and transport it. This provides the greatest
marginal capability at the lowest marginal cost.
The use of ``fuel depots'' as recommended in the Summary Report is
equally difficult to understand. The Ares V offers the lowest cost-per-
pound for payload to orbit of any presently known launch vehicle
design. An architectural approach based upon the use of numerous
smaller vehicles to stock a fuel depot is inevitably more expensive
than putting the necessary payload up in larger pieces. Further, a fuel
depot requires a presently non-existent technology--the ability to
maintain cryogenic fuels in the necessary thermodynamic state for very
long periods in space. This technology is a holy grail of deep-space
exploration, because it is necessary for both chemical- and nuclear-
powered upper stages. To embrace an architecture based upon a non-
existent technology at the very beginning of beyond-LEO operations is
unwise.
Finally, there are a number of concerns as to the methodology by
which the Commission reached some of its conclusions.
When trying to assess the relative merits of multiple options for
an engineering design--in this case the design of space flight
architectures--the core requirement to allow meaningful comparisons is
to fix the goals and constraints so that these ``boundary conditions''
are common for all. In the Commission's report, various options are
presented which are not linked by common goals and constraints.
Instead, differing options with different constraints are presented to
reach disparate goals, rendering it impossible to develop meaningful
cost/schedule/performance/risk comparisons across them. These options
possess vastly differing levels of maturity, yet are offered as if all
were on an equal footing in regard to their level of technical, cost,
schedule, and risk assessment.
Significantly, no trade study was performed to assess how well each
of the options considered by the Commission performed in meeting the
goals and constraints of the existing U.S. civil space policy, as it is
governed by the NASA Authorization Acts of 2005 and 2008.
The Commission cites ``independent'' cost estimates for
Constellation systems. There is no acknowledgement that these are low-
fidelity estimates developed over a matter of a few weeks, yet are
offered as corrections to NASA's cost estimates, which have years of
rigorous effort behind them.
As one example, it is common in cost analysis to apply a large
historical cost growth factor to preliminary estimates for new designs.
The size of the factor depends on the nature of the work being done and
the maturity of the original estimate. Work done by Aerospace
Corporation to model cost growth in certain classes of robotic space
systems suggests that a growth factor of about 50 percent might be
appropriate for the design and development of a new system. Hence, that
factor was applied to the assessment of ``clean sheet'' options offered
to the Commission. However, the same factor was also applied to NASA's
Constellation element designs. This is, effectively, ``double
counting.'' Historical growth factors were incorporated into
Constellation costs from the very first, and are reflected in delivery
schedule projections for the various system elements, Ares I, Orion,
etc. To apply a new ``growth factor'' on top of those in the original
models is misleading.
The Commission does not acknowledge NASA's commitment to
probabilistic budget estimation techniques for Constellation, at a 65
percent cost-confidence level--higher than has ever been the case in
the past. This is a fundamental break from past practice at the agency,
a key to providing more realistic information on program status to
agency managers and external stakeholders.
If the Commission believes that NASA is not using state-of-the-art
methodologies to estimate costs, or is misrepresenting the data it has
amassed, it should document its specific concerns. Otherwise, the
provenance of NASA's cost estimates should be accepted, as no evidence
has been supplied to justify overturning them.
``Technical problems'' with Ares I are cited several times in the
Summary Report, without further discussion. Knowledgeable observers in
and out of NASA would disagree strongly as to the severity of such
problems. Constellation's ``technical problems'' are on display because
actual work is being accomplished. Other options have no problems
because no work is being done. There are never any technical problems
on viewgraphs.
To this point, in The Rickover Effect: How One Man Made a
Difference, Theodore Rockwell recalls a priceless observation by Adm.
Hyman Rickover. When confronted with a situation in which a variety of
alternative concepts were being advocated to--and around--Rickover in
place of the pressurized water reactor design he favored for the
nuclear navy, Rickover noted that there were two kinds of reactors,
``paper reactors''; i.e., new reactor concepts, and ``real reactors.''
A paper reactor has the following characteristics:
It is simple.
It is small.
It is cheap.
It is lightweight.
It can be built very quickly.
Very little development is required; it can use off-
the-shelf components.
It is in the study phase; it is not being built now.
In contrast, a real reactor has the following characteristics:
It is complicated.
It is large.
It is heavy.
It is being built now.
It is behind schedule.
It requires an immense amount of development on
apparently trivial items.
It takes a long time to build because of its
engineering development problems.
Does any of this sound familiar?
Finally, the Commission did not do that which would have been most
valuable--rendering a clear-eyed, independent assessment of the
progress and status of Constellation with respect to its ability to
meet the goals which have been established in two successive NASA
Authorization Acts, followed by an assessment of what would be required
to get and keep that program on track. Instead, the Commission sought
to formulate new options for new programs, treating these options as if
their level of maturity was comparable to that of the baseline upon
which NASA has been working now for more than four years. This ignores
the established body of law which has guided NASA's work for the last
four years and which, until and unless that body of law is changed,
must serve as the common standard for any proposed alternative to
Constellation as the ``program of record'' for the Nation's existing
human space flight program.
With the above having been said, where do we go from here? In the
end that is the only important question. Let me be as clear as possible
on a further point. When I noted above that the best option is to
restore funding, I do not want to mislead this committee. It is not
possible to recover fully, in terms of schedule, personnel morale, and
programmatic decisions, from the damage which has been done to NASA and
to Constellation by reductions in funding, particularly in the last
couple of years, when the program has moved into full-bore execution.
Past decisions and actions are a form of sunk cost. So I do not propose
to render the program somehow magically ``whole'' by restoring past
funding cuts. That cannot be done. But NASA does know--or can shortly
assess--what is necessary to get Constellation back on track with
regard to the best achievable schedule, from where we are today, for
regaining access to LEO, returning to the Moon, exploring some of the
near-Earth asteroids, and eventually voyaging to Mars.
The details will, as I say, best come from NASA. However, I can
suggest what I think might be the most viable alternative if we remain
committed both to continuing ISS operations and to human exploration
beyond LEO, yet cannot return all of the money to the NASA budget that
has been removed in the last few years.
In such a case, at least in my opinion, it would be logical to
delay lunar lander development in order to make progress on the other
elements. I don't think it is a very good idea to try to make it
``smaller'' or somehow less capable in some other way. Current planning
is for a crew of four on the Moon. Carrying two pairs of two EVA crew
members is very logical, for all the reasons that apply to Shuttle
today. It also has the advantage of providing ample opportunities for
crew from international partners.
If that rationale is accepted, then I think it makes more sense to
delay the lander development than to compromise the design of a machine
that will be in use for a very long time. So, the Altair lunar lander
would be built when the money to do so becomes available. Ares I and
Orion should be completed as quickly as possible to support ISS, and
then Ares V should be built. They should not all be done in parallel;
that causes them to stretch out and costs more in the long run. It
makes more sense to start some elements later. In the meantime, once
Ares V becomes available but prior to human lunar return, Orion could
be used for some of the ``Flexible Path'' options cited by the
Commission. Such options were, in fact, considered from the first
during ESAS. The use of Constellation hardware for destinations that
were not included in the Vision for Space Exploration (as initially
stated) was a core part of our thinking during ESAS. I considered that
to be a strong point of the chosen architecture--it was flexible about
destinations. An Orion spacecraft that can take care of itself for six
months around the Moon can go a lot of other places.
I think that some variant of the approach outlined above makes the
most sense going forward. It would position us as well for the future
as we can be, given where we are today, unless a substantial sum of
money can be allocated to the original plan for lunar return by 2020.
The Summary Report suggests inviting international partners into
the critical path of program development. This is a valid alternative
if we are willing to depart significantly from prior policy. Europe,
Japan, or Russia could build a lunar lander just as well as could the
United States. Politically and culturally, this would be a big step. I
sat in front of this Committee, with a different Chairman, when former
Administrator Dan Goldin was advised in very direct terms to ``keep
Russia off the critical path on the ISS.'' But, if we wanted to be more
``inclusive,'' we could decide that the United States will develop the
heavy-lift launcher and deep-space crew vehicle, but a return to the
Moon will depend upon international partner contributions. I personally
do not favor such an approach, but it is a technically feasible option.
I would like to close with a quote from the Commission's Summary
Report: ``Finally, significant space achievements require continuity of
support over many years. One way to ensure that no successes are
achieved is to continually pull up the flowers to see if the roots are
healthy. (This committee might be accused of being part of this
pattern!)''
I couldn't agree more. As I see it, the Commission didn't find
anything wrong with the current program, didn't find anything safer,
more reliable, cheaper or faster. The roots are healthy. So, why throw
away four years and $8 billion pulling up the flowers? Let's apply some
plant nutrient and watch them grow.
This, to me, is our best option for re-affirming a stable civil
space policy.
Thank you.
Discussion
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Dr. Griffin. I will remind you
that Congress did appropriate every dollar that the last few--
or over the last few years it had been asked to.
Shuttle Extension
Admiral Dyer, in your statement you made a very definitive
statement concerning no extension of the Shuttle. Now, is that
period or was that in context to 2020, in that--and would you
extend it if it was recertified or if there was a mission or
two missions that came up in the next, you know, short period
that seemed to be very important? Is there still a period that
you wouldn't go one more?
Admiral Dyer. Three quick comments with regard.
The first is the thing that scares us most is that kind of
serial extension. Point number one. Point number two, we take
this position because we think the risk is more than we should
ask folks to shoulder, and we don't think there is full
transparency with regard to that risk. Thirdly, the time to
extend the Shuttle in the panel's opinion was several years ago
when the supply chain was still intact and when there was an
opportunity to move forward with the Measure Program. A number
of folks, myself included, who had--who participate on the
panel, have been or have lived through the extension of a
number of Department of Defense aircraft programs after they
were supposed to terminate. It is never a good experience.
I would offer one other caution. Could you with significant
money and with recertification extend the Shuttle? Yes. The
money would be impressive. It would have to go well through the
supply chain, and the risk of finding things demanding even
more resources during recertification is a real risk.
Chairman Gordon. Well, I think that is a thoughtful answer,
but I, you know, then I could understand the incremental of
going one more, one more, but with that same thought, I mean,
is the amount we have the perfect amount? Why not one less? I
mean, should not that decision maybe be reviewed at the time
rather than this far out?
Admiral Dyer. You know, we see in the military world that
the operational commander always has the authority to proceed
in the face of absolute requirements, and it would be an
equivalent position in the opinion of the panel. The Shuttle is
risky, it is becoming more so an extension beyond that which is
planned through the current manifest we believe would be
unwise.
Constellation Program With Budget Augmentation
Chairman Gordon. Thank you. Excuse me. Thank you, sir, and
Dr. Griffin, in your written statement you said that you
believe that the approach you have laid out would--or pardon
me. Within your written statement do you believe that the
approach you laid out would deliver a viable Constellation-
based exploration program on the same level of budgetary
augmentation as the Augustine panel proposed?
Dr. Griffin. I am not sure I understand your question. I do
agree with the Augustine panel's----
Chairman Gordon. Microphone.
Dr. Griffin. I am sorry. I am not sure I fully understand
your question. I do agree with Norm's conclusion that if $3
billion a year were added to the program, that the Nation could
have a viable space exploration program, continuing the
Constellation development, and featuring a return to the Moon
some time in the early to mid-2020s with other destinations as
possible choices according to the flexible path option if so
desired by the policy-makers of that time.
Chairman Gordon. I am for--because we maybe called, and I
want everybody to have an opportunity to participate, Mr. Hall,
you are recognized for five minutes.
Effect of NASA Budget Cuts
Mr. Hall. Thank you, sir. Dr. Griffin, you have a history
of long service to the Nation and particularly to NASA, and I
don't know of anybody that I think knows more about NASA or has
more interest in it and gave more hard time to it than you have
given, and I appreciate it.
Do you remember when President Clinton came aboard? Is it
your recollection that he put Vice President Gore kind of in
charge of overseeing the NASA thrust?
Dr. Griffin. Yeah. I do know that NASA's primary interface
in that time was with Vice President Gore, and it was to Vice
President Gore that our Space Station redesign plan and
associated inclusion of Russia in the partnership was primarily
briefed. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hall. And do you remember that Gore came to this
committee and told us that we had to have a 25 percent cut in
our budget?
Dr. Griffin. I believe that was Mr. Goldin who----
Mr. Hall. I think Mr. Gore did it--said that to Mr. Golden.
Dr. Griffin. That may well have been, sir. I don't--I was
not involved in that discussion.
Mr. Hall. But you remember the discussion took place.
Dr. Griffin. Yes.
Mr. Hall. It was in the papers and everybody knew about it.
Dr. Griffin. I do remember.
Mr. Hall. And do you remember that Sensenbrenner and Mr.
Boehlert were Chairman and the first runner up over on the
Republican--on the Democratic side?
Dr. Griffin. Yes. I----
Mr. Hall. And on the Republican side then----
Dr. Griffin.--sat in front of Mr. Sensenbrenner on more
than one occasion.
Mr. Hall. Boehlert was more of a Democrat than he was a
Republican, but he was a good man, did a good job, and I like
him. I don't have anything against him, but he was Chairman,
and Sensenbrenner was his--I don't know to call Sensenbrenner.
He was second in command there. And over on the Democratic side
was a guy named George Brown, and I was his first lieutenant I
guess the way it was, and we, with Boehlert, I believe, we all
four agreed that we would tell Golden to cut that budget
skillfully, or we were going to cut it with a butcher knife or
a baseball base, unskillfully. We didn't know how to cut it
that far without endangering safety of the pilots.
And for him to cut it and if he didn't cut it, we were
going to, and do you remember that he did cut?
Dr. Griffin. Yes, sir, I do.
Mr. Hall. About what percent do you remember that he cut it
to?
Dr. Griffin. Well, during the 1990s the NASA budget was
reduced in real dollars by about 20 percent.
Mr. Hall. Do you have any recollection of the budget cut
being in excess of 30 percent?
Dr. Griffin. No, sir.
Mr. Hall. How much did Mr. Goldin during his tenure cut the
budget? What percent?
Dr. Griffin. Well, NASA--I would have to say, sir, having
been one, that NASA Administrators neither raised nor cut the
budget. I would say that the only thing I could honestly say is
that during the 1990s, the NASA budget went down by about 20
percent in real dollars.
Mr. Hall. From what it was when----
Dr. Griffin. From what it was in 1993.
Mr. Hall. Yeah. Did that have any effect on the program, on
the NASA program, and if so, what was that effect?
Dr. Griffin. Well, the effect over the last decade and a
half of that downtrend has been to damage the efficiency with
which NASA's programs have been executed and to stretch them
out because as I think you gentlemen know quite well, when we
cut budgets, we hardly ever remove corresponding programs from
the suite of activities. Federal agencies are directed to
continue their programs at a slower pace to fit the available
budget, and that is greatly damaging to their efficiency.
Mr. Hall. And I think it was their feeling at that time
that Mr. Goldin probably did a good job of cutting the budget,
but what was the effect of it?
Dr. Griffin. Well, again, to cause most programs to stretch
out and to cause our operations to continue with less
efficiency than would have been desired. The earlier speakers
made the point that NASA has too much overhead. I agree. NASA
has the overhead associated with a larger agency.
Mr. Hall. And do you remember that NASA was taking a lot of
hard licks from the public at that time and from some people
close to NASA that were taking a view of the NASA thrust to the
extent that this Congress came within one vote of destroying
the Space Program in this country. Do you remember that?
Dr. Griffin. I remember we came within one vote of losing
the Space Station.
Mr. Hall. And it seems to me we have been going downhill
ever since, despite the hard work that you put in on it and the
money that you have asked for it and the money that you have
almost demanded for it, and we haven't really backed you up and
that we have not as I use the term, scratched and clawed and
fought for those advance, that $3 billion per year advance over
what we are spending, which is a small percent of the overall
R&D that anything as important to this country, important to
the youth of this country, the future of this country, as our
Space Program.
Dr. Griffin. Yeah. I agree.
Mr. Hall. Are you going to comment on that some?
Dr. Griffin. Well, I think it is as Mr. Gordon pointed out,
Chairman Gordon pointed out, the last President did not request
the funds necessary, the one before that did not request the
funds necessary, and the current President is not requesting
the funds necessary, and I believe the question for the
Congress will be do you wish to go along with that or not.
Mr. Hall. So you really and truly put it right back on the
Congress, don't you?
Dr. Griffin. Sir, Article 1 gives Congress the power of the
purse.
Mr. Hall. I agree with you, and I think we can do better,
and I think we have got to start doing better. We got to start
making some demands on something as important as the Space
Program is to the United States of America and to the free
world.
I yield back my time.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Hall. Just to briefly
continue on your history lesson, in 1993, President Clinton and
Vice President Gore inherited at that time what was the world's
largest budget deficit. They turned that deficit in five years
into a surplus that actually started paying down the debt. They
did that not by having a vendetta against NASA but rather
having to make tough choices and cuts across the board, passing
things like limited number of time you can be on welfare and
make tough choices.
I think our country--I just want to put that in
perspective. Hopefully we can start getting back to a surplus
soon, paying down the debt----
Mr. Hall. Would the Chairman yield?
Chairman Gordon. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hall. It is my recollection that that was done with a
Republican Congress, and that is when I switched parties.
Chairman Gordon. Well, actually, Mr. Hall, that was done
without a single Republican vote and but I don't--and we don't
need to get into that past history, but that----
Mr. Hall. I am going to lose every battle I have with the
Chairman. He has got the gavel.
Chairman Gordon. Well, that was then. Now is now, and we
are trying to move forward. And Ms. Giffords is recognized.
Ms. Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Hall, and
Admiral Dyer, Dr. Griffin.
Commercial Transportation to the ISS
We have heard a lot here today, and without dispute the
thing that brings us together is really our love for a Manned
Space Flight Program for the hard work that is done by NASA. So
there is strong support, but specifically we are in this room
today to talk specifically about this Augustine Report, and all
of us respect Norm Augustine. This man is an extraordinary
asset to our country. I like many talk about the Gathering
Storm Report as one of the real roadmaps that we have to U.S.
competitiveness.
But that being said, I think it is important to actually
read the language, and I don't know how many of the Committee
Members actually took the time to read the report. It is not
specially long. It is somewhat complex, but, Mr. Chairman, if
you will allow me, quoting directly from page 6. ``The current
Constellation Program Plan is to use the government-operated
Ares I launch vehicle and the Orion Crew Capsule. However, the
Committee found that because of technical and budget issues the
Ares I schedule no longer supports the ISS.''
Again, let me repeat. ``Because of technical and budget
issues the Ares I schedule no longer supports the ISS.'' We
heard Mr. Augustine today say that basically no other option or
alternative actually at this point with the funding levels
currently would support the ISS either.
Going on, this is on page 7. ``The United States needs a
way to launch astronauts to low Earth orbit, but it does not
necessarily have to be provided by the government. As we move
from the complex reusable Shuttle back to a simpler, smaller
capsule, it is an appropriate time to consider turning this
transport service over to the commercial sector. This approach
is not without technical and programmatic risks, but it creates
the possibility of lower operating costs for the system and
potentially accelerates the availability of U.S. access to low
Earth orbit by about the year of 2016. The Committee suggests
establishing a new competition for the service in which both
large and small companies could participate.''
So that is really where I think the misunderstanding and
the miscommunication takes place, and I am sorry that Mr.
Augustine isn't with us, but I guess I have some serious
reservations about the willingness of the Committee to
essentially bet the farm on the yet-to-be-developed commercial
crew capabilities to support the ISS in the lower-Earth orbit
or LEO as we refer to it.
I think everyone here supports a commercial space sector. I
think we all want to see that developed, and we hope that
happens, but I don't believe that we can be responsible
stewards of the taxpayer dollars if we let hope and ideology
trump the evidence, and specifically on the one hand the report
asserts that the commercial system could accelerate the
availability of U.S. access to LEO by about a year.
But on the other hand, I see that the commercial companies
that are trying to achieve essentially a much less challenging
objective of delivering not people but actually cargo to LEO
are struggling. For example, the NASA data indicates that
SpaceX, a fine company doing incredible work out in California,
has now slipped the readiness review for their first
demonstration mission by almost two years from their initially-
planned date. And another illuminating data point in Dr. Ride's
Scenario of Affordability Analysis Charts, she states that one
of the review committee's assumption was, and I quote, ``An
additional $200 million was added to the COTS cargo-based line
in fiscal year 2011, to incentivize current COTS cargo
demonstration.''
Now, given that the companies involved in COTS and this
demonstration project were just awarded $3.5 billion as a
contract to transport the cargo to ISS, how on Earth did the
review panel justify giving them another $200 million, and
again, I just want to find out if that 3.5 billion is not
enough of an incentive, and how can we especially have
confidence in this report when looking at this commercial
alternative, there are no specifics in terms of the safety for
the crew, the costs actually as well that is going to go into,
you know, developing this, and all of those specifics and
details that NASA is responsible for but we really don't see
presented in this.
So, you know, I turn to the Chairman and to members of the
panel to make sure that I am understanding this correctly, and,
again, I know that you didn't--you don't come up with the
report, but, you know, if you could give us some insight into
how this happened and hopefully we can hear from, you know, Mr.
Augustine as well to get some more specifics as this committee
and the President, I mean, essentially, this whole exercise was
to give a menu of options to the President and to the Congress
to determine how we move forward.
Admiral Dyer. I think speaking from the perspective of the
ASAP we would agree with much of what you have said,
Congresswoman. We note that there is a wide gap between the
COTS partners' belief that they are human rating and that they
are designing to human rating, vis-a-vis that which NASA
believes would be required.
Now, we have been critical of NASA here because, frankly,
NASA has been whistling by the graveyard in this regard in that
they have not engaged with the COTS contractors in terms of
what it would take to transport NASA personnel into space.
Dr. Griffin. Well, I certainly would say that I agree that
at this point you are--to use your words, betting the farm on
commercial transportation, is unwise. I have said so in
writing. Now, I am one who believes that as with airplanes and
air transport, there will be a day when the U.S. Government as
one option can turn to commercial providers, but that day is
not yet, and it is not soon.
Also, I would say that the definition of a commercial
provider is not one that you create by pumping in hundreds of
millions or billions of government dollars. Typically we call
that a prime contract. A commercial provider develops the
capability on his own nickel and then searches for a customer.
Now, I am in favor of incentives in government policy such as
anchor tendency. I was in favor of providing some seed money,
indeed, I created the COTS Program which provided that seed
money.
But to confuse the expectation that one day commercial
transport of crew will be there, to confuse that expectation
with the assumption of its existence today or in the near-term,
I think is risky in the extreme. And it is risky because it
holds hostage a $75 billion laboratory in space that this
committee has authored 20 some votes in support of and I would
say expects to see utilized to its fullest in the years ahead.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Dr. Griffin, and Ms. Giffords,
you raise very serious and legitimate questions. Hopefully
within the next couple of weeks we will have additional meat on
the bones in terms of the remainder of the report, the report
which will then need to be digested and more questions asked,
and I know you will play as Chairman of the Space and
Aeronautics Subcommittee, will play a very, very important role
in that, as well as your partner, Mr. Olson, who is the Ranking
Member, who is recognized now for five minutes.
Transforming NASA Expertise to Private Industry
Mr. Olson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like
to follow along the lines of questioning from my Chairwoman
down there, and this is a question for you, Admiral Dyer.
Up to this point, only NASA has had experience with setting
requirements designing for human-rated launch systems. How
difficult would it be to transfer that insight and experience
to the private sector? Are the processes and requirements for
human rating well understood by the commercial launch
companies? How--would they be held to the same standards as
NASA?
Admiral Dyer. I think there is two pieces of that, sir. The
first is NASA in their articulation of what is required for
human ratings is in the midst of change, in a state of flux.
There is much goodness associated with it because it is a
change from specificity or direction to one of imposing good
judgment. How good judgment is to be defined is a bit fuzzy
from the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel's perspective. So that
is a part of it.
The second part of it is once it can be clearly articulated
what the human ratings process is to be, I think, yes, sir, it
can be transferred to a COTS partner, but you have to start----
Mr. Olson. Yes, sir.
Admiral Dyer.--and that hasn't been an issue.
Mr. Olson. Dr. Griffin, do you care to comment?
Dr. Griffin. I don't think I have anything to add to what
Admiral Dyer said. We had a long and close relationship during
my tenure at NASA and his tenure as Chair of the ASAP, and I
think we pretty much see things very similarly.
Continuation of Constellation Development
Mr. Olson. Thank you for that answer, and I have got a
question for you, Dr. Griffin. Again, Constellation Program is
progressing, and just last week the Orion passed a major
milestone as you know through its preliminary design review.
My point is should we continue the development of the
Constellation? I mean, how much has already been spent on the
program, and what is going to be lost if we stop in the next
year or so?
Dr. Griffin. Sir, I obviously, you know, from my written
statement do agree with you or the import of your remarks. I
think we should continue on with where we are, but I would
agree with Mr. Augustine, who is an old and valued friend, that
we have come to a point where we cannot continue on unless the
program is properly funded. The Committee's, the Augustine
Committee's service in pointing out that the train wreck is
right in front of us is very valuable.
So I think we should continue. I think we have to fund it
properly. Had the Committee--this hearing is not about
Constellation or about who comes up with what alternative to
support the goal of human space flight. Had the Committee been
able to surface an option which was clearly better than what
was going on today, they would have had to get out of my way to
rush toward it. The issue is not what hardware we use to
accomplish the goal. The issue is the strategic goals. The
Committee did not, I would predict, cannot surface a better
option than where we are today, so our choice is stay on path,
funding it appropriately, or determine that the United States
is not going to go beyond the Space Station. That was what Mr.
Augustine said would happen. If we tense not have the extra
funding, the United States agreement go beyond Space Station. I
think that that is not a worthy future for the United States in
space.
Mr. Olson. Thank you for those comments. I couldn't agree
more, and sort of to follow up on that and some comments from
the previous panel, there is a big difference in spending $3
billion and investing $3 billion, and I think the Augustine
panel was asking us to invest $3 billion, and I strongly,
strongly support that, and I appreciate your comments to that
effect as well.
Dr. Griffin. I think that it was----
Mr. Olson. Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
Chairman Gordon. I am sorry, Mr. Olson. What was that?
Mr. Olson. I yield back my time. You are up.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, and Mr. Rohrabacher, thank you
for your patience, and you are--what we are going to do is you
will have the last question on your side. Ms. Giffords said
that she would like to ask another question, and then if that
is the case, then we will conclude, because we have votes that
will be shortly.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. Thank you very much. Let me
just note for the Chairman that when we did, when the budget
was balanced, it was a Republican Congress as our Ranking
Member noted, and the example that you gave of the great
savings of the Welfare Reform that passed, it passed the
Republican Congress after being vetoed three times by the
President over the issue of whether illegal aliens should
receive welfare benefits or not. Eventually he gave in, and
that is why we balanced the budget.
Chairman Gordon. Well, that and 1993, vote that accompanied
that to set in motion the various cuts.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right.
Chairman Gordon. But anyway----
Mr. Rohrabacher. But I do want to----
Chairman Gordon.--at the end of the day we all worked
together and got it done.
Budget Limitations and Miscalculation
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. We did, and I--but I do want to
bring up history, because history does relate to what we are
talking about here, because what we are really talking about
here is $3 billion, and all I keep hearing is isn't it sad that
we are not allocating $3 billion more and how NASA, we--their
budget went down at the time when we balanced the budget, along
with everybody else's budget in the government.
But let us take a look at the money that was spent. In
1996, how much did the mistake of putting money into the X-33
cost NASA? Mr. Griffin? Admiral?
Dr. Griffin. I don't know.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Several billion dollars. All right. What
about NPOESS? How much does that cost NASA and American
taxpayers?
Dr. Griffin. Sir, NPOESS is an Air Force Program. NASA is
a----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Good.
Dr. Griffin.--member of the Joint Program Committee but has
no money in, has no power for NPOESS.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, that is a good--let me put it this
way. I consider NPOESS to be, maybe not a NASA program, but I
have always considered it as part of the Space Program, and
maybe I am wrong because we are dealing with the same companies
that we deal with and okay. I understand it is $14 billion, it
is a $14 billion program. There is five or six satellites and
none of them have been launched so far.
Okay. If it is not money supposedly going to NASA, maybe
that money should have gone to NASA then. I don't know, but
there is $14 billion that we don't have anything to show for
it. A couple billion dollars is the extra three.
Tell me about Space Station. How much has Space Station
gone over the--its original budget request?
Dr. Griffin. President Reagan directed that a Space Station
be built for $8 billion, and the best estimate that I was able
to obtain while running NASA was that the United States had
spent or would spend by the time of station completion about
$55 billion, and the partners collectively have spent maybe 20
or will spend maybe 20 by the time it is deployed.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So it is almost, you know----
Dr. Griffin. It is a factor of ten.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Factor of ten. And what about the Space
Shuttle itself, which I remember was sold as something that
would bring down the cost of getting into orbit? How much has
that gone over the expectations?
Dr. Griffin. The Space Shuttle was sold or was directed by
President Nixon to be developed by--within $5.8 billion. NASA's
cost estimate at that time was that it would cost around $9
billion and ultimately to develop the Shuttle, about $9.9
billion in then-year dollars, not today's dollars, was spent.
The projected cost of the Space Shuttle depends on how old you
are and what the lowest cost you remember was, but was
invariably in the range of 14 to 16 to $18 million a launch.
Today it is probably 20 times that.
Mr. Rohrabacher. 20 times that. So let me just suggest that
when we are talking about we don't have the $3 billion that
maybe if NASA would have been doing a better job and let us
include also totally the American Space Program because I will
include NPOESS in that, and maybe if we had a Space Program,
not just NASA but altogether it was better managed that we
would have the money to do what we needed to do.
And it is not to say that we can't look for new resources.
I think that now that we are in this fix that maybe stimulus
money would be something that would be looked at. Also I talked
about this idea that we would tax AIG. I know that I did that
in jest but let us face it. We gave AIG $150 billion, and now
we are arguing about $3 billion for NASA. I mean, what do we
get out of the AIG? I will tell you what we got. We got a lot
of rich executives who kept their bonuses. This is what we got.
So maybe we should be running things a little bit better.
NASA should be doing a better job and maybe Congress should be
a better, doing a little bit better job in allocating money in
terms of what America's real priorities should be instead of
enriching wheeler dealers from Wall Street and maybe give it to
the American Space Program.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher, and to
demonstrated that we are rich in diversity of ideas, Ms.
Giffords is recognized.
Methodology of Cost Assessments
Ms. Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the reasons I
love serving on the Science Committee is because I think it is
truly one of the most bipartisan, non-partisan committees. So
we verged a little bit from this today, but I know the next
hearing we are going to get back on track to all of our
bipartisan love.
Dr. Griffin, there has been considerable public discussion
about whether the cost cited for NASA's Constellation programs
are accurate. Could you give us some insight into your thoughts
on the costing methodology used in the preparation of the cost
assessments for the Review Committee?
Dr. Griffin. Well, NASA's cost estimates for Constellation
marked a significant departure, an enormous departure from the
way NASA had prepared budgets in the past in the sense that
they were prepared in a probabilistic sense, which cost
estimation experts can discuss with this committee at great
length, and we are prepared to a much higher confidence level.
So it represented a departure from older ways of doing
business.
I was privileged to be provided the methodology by which
the independent cost estimates were prepared for the Augustine
Committee, and those independent cost estimates seemed not to
recognize that fact at all. So essentially NASA was not being
given credit for good behavior, and I would--it is one thing to
be slapped about when you are doing poorly, but when you have
done well, it would be nice to at least have that acknowledged.
The second thing I would add is that there was no
distinction made in the independent cost assessments between--
and the phrase has been used here several times today, view
graph programs and real programs.
Ms. Giffords. Uh-huh.
Dr. Griffin. NASA's current program, like it or not, has
four years of maturity behind it and $8 billion of money spent
on it. The cost estimates are becoming firmer. More is known
about the program, and yet the independent cost estimation
methodology applied a factor of 1.5 for assumed cost growth to
all programs, whether young and immature and idealistic or
having more scars on them. That is not a good way to do
costing. You have to look at the details of the individual
program and its level of maturity before you can make a
conclusion as to how much likely growth you should expect to
see. That was not done.
Completion Dates for Constellation
Ms. Giffords. Dr. Griffin, in terms of, essentially it is a
multiple accounting situation, and I look at that in terms of
how it much affect the estimated or rejected completion dates
for Constellation and also the costs. Can you talk about that a
little?
Dr. Griffin. Well, sure. If you believe that the cost is
going to be 50 percent higher as one example, and you know
because you have been told what your budget expectations are,
then whatever budget you had you should now expect the
completion date to be 50 percent greater.
Ms. Giffords. Uh-huh.
Dr. Griffin. But it is worse than that because when we have
to account for inefficiencies that go into a program as a
result of stretching it out, it always gets worse.
Joe, you look like you want to comment on that. I know you
and I have both had substantial DOD experience where programs
were stretched out, and it is just never as pretty as you would
hope.
Admiral Dyer. Congresswoman Giffords, my previous trips to
the Hill to testify have always been when I was in uniform, and
I had to be well behaved. I have got something I always wanted
to share, and you gave me an opportunity.
Resourcing major programs in our country has a lot in kind
with airline overbooking. We just plan for an efficiency that
is not real, and consequently, programs stretch out, and the
overheads are applied over time, and the cost of a program
grows dramatically vis-a-vis that which good resourcing would
support.
So this harmony, Mr. Chairman, that we appeal for in terms
of resources and requirements and acquisition strategy is an
important undertaking that if we could fund it at a proper and
sustained and stable level would solve many of the problems
that Dr. Griffin has highlighted here.
Thank you, ma'am.
Ms. Giffords. And Mr. Chairman, I mean, this is something I
think that we really need to tackle on this committee is how do
we get to the bottom of these apparent discrepancies so that
when we really look at the numbers and the data that we know
what the actual numbers and the data really, truly represent.
And I think that is just important to hear from our panelists
on that because, again, what the panels, at least the summary
report has ignited is from a public and from a press standpoint
this, you know, this set of beliefs that are out there and now
we are finding because of the hearing today and the testimony
by our panelists and the questions brought up by Members is
that it is just not that, you know, cut and dry.
So, Mr. Chairman, I am looking forward to seeing the full
report and working with our panelists and others to try to get
to the bottom of this.
Chairman Gordon. Madam Chairwoman, I am looking forward to
your hearings as you take the lead in getting to the bottom of
it and report back to us.
Ms. Giffords. Thank you.
Chairman Gordon. And so let me conclude by, again, thanking
our witnesses today. You have been with us a long time, and I
believe we are going to--our timing is going to work out just
about right with votes coming up shortly.
I will also announce that the record will remain open for
two weeks for additional statements from Members and for
answers to any follow-up questions the Committee may ask of the
witnesses.
So the witnesses are excused, and the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:58 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
Appendix 1:
----------
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Norman R. Augustine, Chair, Review of U.S. Human Space
Flight Plans Committee
Questions submitted by Chairman Bart Gordon
Q1. What methodology did the review committee use to determine that
options would fit within the increased budgetary threshold it
established despite options' differing maturity levels and thus greater
uncertainty in cost?
A1. On behalf of the Committee, the Aerospace Corporation conducted an
affordability analysis on all options using a process that is described
in the Final Report. In summary, the analysis outputs key dates,
element costs and manifests at the 65 percent confidence level. It also
estimates the uncertainty on dates and costs. The affordability
analysis corrects the input cost in several ways. First, it estimates a
range of expected growth of the cost for each program element from
System Design Review (SDR, Start of Phase B) to completion, based on
historical data of NASA programs. At the average, this introduces a 51
percent growth from the estimate held at SDR in the cost for
development (DDT&E costs). For elements that have not reached their
SDR, such as the Ares V or commercial crew service, this full
correction was applied. For elements that have passed their SDR, credit
was given for subsequent development and maturity of the design. For
example, the mean cost of the Orion in the analysis, due to this
factor, is only 25 percent higher than would be reported by the Program
of Record at the mean. Other, more mature programs, such as the Ares I,
receive credit by a similar process. In operations, a 26 percent growth
factor was applied to unproven systems, and no growth factor at the
mean was applied to existing systems such as the Shuttle or the ISS, or
to defined budget items such as the technology program.
NASA Headquarters asked the Program of Record to report cost and
schedule at the 65 percent level, and the Committee attempted to report
in a consistent manner. Note that on average, the difference between
the mean of expected costs and the 65 percent confidence costs adds
about 10 percent to all program costs calculated. Finally, the
affordability analysis combines the development schedule of all the
elements of the program. This process accounts for the additional cost
to one element if another element it depends upon slips in its
schedule. This integration of elements typically adds about an
additional 10 percent to the total program costs, higher in more-
constrained budgets, and lower in less-constrained budgets.
The Committee then examined the outputs of the affordability
analyses, and it made interpretations to extract from them the primary
information of interest, recognizing the inherent uncertainty in the
analysis. The reporting by the Committee attempts to focus on its
interpretation of the key milestones and associated uncertainties, and
the pace of events after the initial milestone.
Q2a. You testified that you were not asked to make recommendations and
had not done so. However, Dr. Crawley testified that the final report
would include an evaluation of the options against 12 parameters such
as the potential to involve internationals, cost, and safety. If you
are not making a recommendation--whether explicit or de facto, what is
the purpose of scoring each of the options, which will of necessity
result in a ranking of the options?
A2a. In order to conduct an independent review of ongoing U.S. human
space flight plans and alternatives, the Committee recognized that it
would be important to define a process that would equitably evaluate
the wide range of options to be identified. Consistent with the systems
engineering approach, it was important to clearly define the set of
criteria against which all options would be assessed, and to define an
evaluation process that would enable a fair and consistent assessment
of each option. Since many of the evaluation criteria are not
quantitative, the Committee did not intend that the evaluation would
generate a single numerical score; rather, it would provide a basis for
comparison across options, highlighting the opportunities and
challenges associated with each. Assigning weights to individual
figures of merit is within the purview of the ultimate decision-makers.
This was the purpose of scoring each of the options and it was a
requirement of the Committee's Statement of Task. At no time did the
Committee seek to rank one option against another the overall scoring
of the options.
Q2b. Considering that the options offered by the review committee
differ drastically in how well they can be defined at this time in
terms of costs, technical risk, schedule, and other programmatic
specifics, how can this ``apples to oranges'' situation result in
equitable comparisons?
A2b. Since many of the evaluation criteria are not quantitative, the
Committee did not intend that the evaluation would generate a single
numerical score; rather, it would provide a basis for comparison across
options, highlighting the opportunities and challenges associated with
each. Assigning weights to individual figures of merit is within the
purview of the ultimate decision-makers, not the Committee.
The Committee deliberated at length in public meetings about the
advantages and disadvantages of each option with respect to the twelve
criteria used in the scoring. Wherever possible, quantitative
analytical assessments were utilized to inform the ratings. In the end,
however, it was usually necessary to interpret the available
information through the considered judgments of the ten members of the
Committee, based on their collectively rather extensive and broad
experience in space matters.
Q3. The summary report notes that ``human safety . . . is treated as a
sine qua non'' throughout its report. At the same time, the report
states that the review committee ``was unconvinced that enough is known
about any of the potential high-reliability launcher-plus-capsule
systems to distinguish their levels of safety in a meaningful way.''
We have seen NASA use state-of-the-art methods like Probabilistic
Risk Assessment to provide relative safety assessments of numerous
launch vehicles that have been studied. What methodology did the review
committee use to ascertain the safety levels of the potential
alternative human space flight systems discussed in the report,
especially given the range of maturity levels of those potential
systems?
A3. Several factors contribute to a launch vehicle's risk: the design
itself; the extent to which the limitations of that design are
understood; the processes and people involved in preparing, launching
and operating the vehicle; and ``random'' component or system failures.
Studies of risk associated with different launch vehicles (both human-
rated and non-human-rated) reveal that many accidents are a result of
poor processes, process lapses, human error, or design flaws. Very few
result from so-called random component failures. The often-used
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a measure of a launch vehicle's
susceptibility to these component or system failures. It provides a
useful way to compare the relative risks of mature launch vehicles (in
which the design is well understood and processes are in place); it is
not as useful a guide as to whether a new launch vehicle will fail
during operations, especially during its early flights.
The best architecture to assure such safe access would be the
combination of a high reliability rocket and a capsule with a launch
escape system. As mentioned previously, the Committee was unconvinced
that enough is known about the potential failures of any of the
prospective high-reliability launchers plus capsule and launch escape
systems to distinguish their safety in a meaningful way. The
uncertainty in the safety models is large compared to the differences
they predict, among competing systems, and it is clear that many of the
failure modes observed in practice are not captured in the safety
analysis. Thus, the Committee did not ``ascertain the safety levels''
of the various launchers. We did include in our assessment those
launchers that were relatively well defined and met the criteria
specified above--a combination of a high-reliability rocket and a
capsule with a launch-escape system.
Q4. Did the review committee consider the extent to which each option
could contribute to extending the existing partnership or enabling
further international collaboration? If so, how was that assessment
done? Did the review committee examine international capabilities and
how they could be leveraged to benefit the various options?
A4. Yes. One of the twelve criteria used to assess the integrated
options was ``Global Partnerships.'' Global Partnerships was defined
as: ``provid(ing) the opportunity to strengthen and expand
international partnerships in the human space flight program. These
would include existing international partners, but should not preclude
expansion to new partners, and would allow partners to participate in
such a way that their contribution occasionally may be on the critical
path to mission success. Participation by other countries will be
advantageous not only from the perspective of encouraging global
cooperation, but also in terms of creating opportunities for
synergistic research, risk reduction and cost-sharing and technology
interchange.''
Q5. What cost, scheduled, and human-rating assumptions were used in
the development and assessment of options that rely on ``commercially
provided'' crew transportation systems? What prices were assumed for
the provision of those services to the government?
A5. See section 5.3 Crew Launch to Low-Earth Orbit of the Committee's
Final Report for a full discussion of the cost, schedule, and human-
rating assumptions used in the development of the Committee's findings
on commercially provided crew transportation systems.
The Committee assumed a recurring cost of $200M per flight for
commercial crew transportation services.
Q6. In considering options that rely on commercial crew transportation
services to the space station (post-Shuttle), if the commercial crew
capability does not meet NASA's human safety requirements or could not
be ready in time to service the ISS, what fall-back alternatives did
the Committee assume would be available to access the International
Space Station with U.S. astronauts, and how quickly did the Committee
assume those alternatives would be available?
A6. The Committee suggested that all new NASA-developed vehicles,
including heavy-lift launchers, be designed so that they are human-
ratable, i.e., could be reasonably human rated at some point in the
future. This is a compromise between human rating them at inception and
not human-rating them at all. It preserves the option to human rate in
the future at lower cost. NASA would benefit from this approach so that
it could use its heavy-lift launcher as a backup crew vehicle with
Orion, should the commercial providers fail to deliver for any
combination of business and/or technical reasons.
The availability of a human-rated heavy-lift launch vehicle depends
on the type and configuration of the launch vehicle design and the
available funding.
Q7. The review committee found that the ``Investment in a well-
designed and adequately funded space technology program is critical to
enable progress in exploration.'' How important is such technology
development to the ability to implement the options presented by the
review committee?
A7. An adequately funded space technology program was not deemed
critical to the implementation of Options 1, 2, or 3 and hence was not
included in the content of those options. The technology program was
much more important to the successful implementation of Options 4 and 5
and was consequently included in the content of those options. However,
none of the options presented by the Committee required a significant
technological breakthrough.
Q8. The summary report states that: ``NASA should be given the maximum
flexibility possible under the law to establish and manage its
systems.'' What flexibility does the review committee envision NASA
needing that the agency does not have today?
A8. There are several examples of this included in the Final Report,
including:
Programs need to be planned, budgeted and executed so
that development and operations can proceed in a phased,
somewhat overlapping manner.
NASA should be allowed to reenergize its space
technology program and not allow it to be sacrificed for other
short-term exigencies.
The NASA Administrator, who has been assigned
responsibility for the management of NASA, needs to be given
the authority to manage the organization. This includes the
ability to restructure NASA's resources, including its
workforce and facilities, to meet mission needs.
Managers of programs need clear lines of
responsibility and associated authority.
NASA should have the authority to move funds from one
human space flight budget line to another, and to obtain new
funds earlier than the typical two-year budgetary delay.
NASA and its human space flight program are in need
of stability, having been redirected several times in the last
decade.
NASA should have the ability to allocate work among
centers to reflect their legitimate ability to contribute to
the tasks to be performed, not simply to maintain a fixed
workforce.
NASA should have the ability to acquire a
strengthened systems engineering capability and would be able
to encourage, or at least permit, the movement of particularly
talented individuals back and forth between government and
industry, as was widely done during the Apollo program.
Questions submitted by Representative Ralph M. Hall
Q1. The Committee recommends increasing the current budget by $3
billion per year by 2014, asserting that such an addition would support
a viable human exploration program. How did the Committee arrive at $3
billion per year and what is the level of confidence that--even at this
higher funding level--NASA would be able to support and sustain a
credible human space flight program?
A1. While it was formulating integrated options, the Committee quickly
realized that viable options could not be found within the constrained
budget. It then examined potential increases in the budget that would
enable a sustainable and executable human space flight program. By
examining several different potential expenditure profiles, the
Committee arrived at this investment level that would provide for the
extension of the ISS, allow progress towards exploration beyond LEO,
and make an investment in technology. It provided a useful standard by
which various options could be compared in a meaningful way.
Q2. In your oral testimony you said it was your committee's view, ``.
. . that there should be a compelling reason to change an existing
program, and we believe that the existing [Constellation] program,
given adequate funds, is executable and would carry out its
objectives.'' About how much additional money would be necessary to
execute the current program with the current milestones, including an
Ares V heavy-lift capability? How much money would be required, and how
should it be allocated, to close the gap?
A2. The Committee did perform an affordability analysis of the current
Constellation Program, unconstrained by budget whatsoever. This option
contained only two slight variations from the Program, instituted by
the Committee: the provision for the Shuttle to be flown out in 2011;
and additional funds for the retirement/transition of the ISS in 2016,
after withdrawal of U.S. participation at the end of 2015.
As assessed by the Committee, this case delivers Ares I/Orion in
late 2016, achieves human lunar return by the early 2020s, and a human-
tended lunar outpost a few years later. These are very close to the
dates held internally by the Constellation Program. However, the
Committee's analysis indicates that in order to achieve the milestones
on that schedule, the Program requires in real-year dollars (stated at
65 percent confidence):
About $145 billion over the period from 2010 to 2020,
which is:
About $45 billion over the guidance of the
President's FY 2010 budget through 2020, and
About $17 billion more than what is provided
in the ``less-constrained budget.''
The expenditures reach $14 billion per year in FY
2016, about $2 billion above the ``less-constrained budget''
and $5 billion over the FY 2010 budget for that year.
The expenditures reach over $16 billion per year at
their peak in FY 2019, $3 billion above the ``less constrained
budget'' and $7 billion over the FY 2010 budget for that year.
With respect to the gap, if the Shuttle is retired in 2011, the
Ares I plus Orion will become available in 2016 or 2017, producing a
gap of about five to six years. If the Shuttle is extended, within a
fixed budget, the funds that would have paid for the development of the
Ares I and Orion will be further limited, and that will delay their
availability until late in the 2010s, producing a gap of at least
several years at that time. Additionally, the infrastructure changes
and workforce transition required for Ares I would be delayed. The gap
is not closed, but shifts to the future. The only way to close the gap
in U.S. crew launch is to extend the Shuttle to 2015 and to commission
a commercial service for transporting crew to low Earth orbit--which,
because it is potentially less expensive to develop, may, at some risk,
be available by 2016, even with extension of the Shuttle. Other than
this scenario, the Committee found no way to close the gap.
Additional funding is required for Shuttle extension. Assuming that
many of the current fixed costs must be carried somewhere in the NASA
budget, the relevant cost is the marginal cost of flying the Shuttle.
There are two factors to consider in estimating this cost. First, if
the Shuttle extension is coupled with a strategy to develop a more
directly Shuttle-derived heavy-lift vehicle as opposed to the Ares
family, there would be synergy that takes maximum advantage of existing
infrastructure, design and production capabilities. Second, since the
Shuttle would be available to carry crew to and from the ISS, there
would be some savings because the U.S. would not need to purchase
Russian Soyuz flights (the present plan), although the necessity of
maintaining a crew rescue capability could offset these savings to a
degree.
Q3. Mr. Crawley stated that the development of the Ares and Orion are,
``. . . paced by the pace of technical development, that to build a new
rocket will take a new human-rated rocket from either where we are in
the Ares, or any fresh start of any type will take at least another
five or six years.'' Given the significant progress that the
Constellation program has already made, what is the rational for
implying that ``any fresh start of any type'' has an equal chance of
being successfully developed in the same time frame as completing the
Constellation program?
A3. The original 2005 schedule showed Ares I and Orion available to
support ISS in 2012, only two years after scheduled Shuttle retirement.
The current schedule maintained by the Constellation Program now shows
that date as 2015, but with a relatively low schedule confidence factor
and little schedule slack on the critical path. The Committee
commissioned the Aerospace Corporation to perform an independent
assessment of the technical, budgetary and schedule risk on the
Constellation Program. The results of the analysis indicate to the
Committee that, under the FY 2010 budget profile, there is likely an
additional delay of at least two years, and perhaps as much as four,
indicating the Ares I and Orion would not be available until the late
2010's.
Regarding the comparison of the development schedule of the
Constellation Program with the other integrated options, the Committee
employed the Aerospace Corporation to conduct an affordability
analysis, described in detail in the Final Report. This analysis
combines the development schedule of all of the elements of the program
and outputs key dates, element costs and manifests at the 65 percent
confidence level. It also estimates the uncertainty of dates and costs.
The Committee then examined the outputs of the affordability analyses,
and made interpretations to extract from them the primary information
of interest, cognizant of the inherent uncertainty in the analysis. The
reporting by the Committee attempts to focus on its interpretation of
the key milestones and associated uncertainties, and the cadence of
events after the initial milestone.
The Committee examined the technical feasibility of utilizing a
commercial service to transport crew to low Earth orbit. First, it is a
statement of fact that all of the U.S. crew launch systems built to
date have been built by industry for NASA. The system under
contemplation is not much more complex than a modern Gemini, which was
built by U.S. industry over 40 years ago. It would consist of a three-
or four-person crew taxi, launched on a rocket with a launch escape
system. It would have an on-orbit life independent of the ISS of only
weeks, but potentially be storable at the ISS for months. Such a
vehicle would re-enter the Earth's atmosphere from the speed of orbital
flight, rather than the significantly higher speed for which Orion is
designed. Its smaller size makes possible the option of landing on
land, potentially reducing operations cost when compared to a sea
landing.
Recently, several aerospace companies began developing new rockets
and on-orbit vehicles as part of the commercial cargo delivery program.
Several other U.S. companies are contemplating orbital passenger
flight. There is little doubt that the U.S. aerospace industry, from
historical builders of human spacecraft to the new entrants, has the
technical capability to build and operate a crew taxi to low Earth
orbit in a timeframe consistent with that assumed by the Committee.
Q4. In oral testimony you explain that several of the options seek,
``to further invest in development in a robust domestic/commercial
space industry.'' Since this would presumably entail a new initiative
over-and-above the currently budgeted COTS and the Cargo Re-supply
Services contract, how much additional new funding would be required to
do this?
A4. Given a properly structured procurement, estimates the Committee
received from potential providers for the price of reaching initial
demonstration flight of a crew-taxi capsule ranged from $300 million to
$1.5 billion. For estimating purposes, the Committee assumed that three
contracts were initiated, and one competitor subsequently dropped out,
suggesting an expected cost to NASA of between $2 billion and $2.5
billion. In addition, the Committee believes that if a commercial crew
program is pursued, NASA should make available to bidders a suitable
version of an existing booster with a demonstrated track record of
successful flight, adding to the program cost. The best preliminary
estimate of the Committee was about a $3 billion program for the
fraction of the design, development, test, and evaluation (DDT&E)
effort that would be borne by NASA. After multiplying by the historical
growth factors and other multipliers associated with 65 percent
confidence estimating, the cost carried in the Committee's final
estimate of the cost of the program to NASA is about $5 billion.
Q5. In Dr. Griffin's testimony he believes, ``at present, the only
clearly available `commercial' option to lift Orion as designed is the
European Ariane 5.'' The Committee was presented with proposals from
United Launch Alliance regarding the use of the American-built Delta 4
heavy. What did the Committee conclude regarding its feasibility? Would
it be worthwhile for NASA to further examine Delta 4 heavy as an option
for launching Orion?
A5. The DOD (Air Force) has indicated that it is technically feasible
to human-rate the EELV systems, as verified for the Committee by an
independent Aerospace Corporation study. The Committee has no opinion
on whether it would ``worthwhile'' for NASA to do so.
Q6. In your oral testimony you said, ``our belief is that the net cost
of continuing to fly the Shuttle a couple times a year . . . is about
$2.5 billion a year.'' Does that estimate include the cost to restart
the closed production lines for the external tanks, and recertify the
system? If not, how much additional money would be required?
Considering that Ares assumes the use of some Shuttle facilities and
infrastructure once the Shuttle is retired, would continuing to fly the
Shuttle further delay the development schedule of the Ares and Orion?
A6. The costs to extend the Shuttle to 2015 assumed by the Committee
are shown in the following table.
The foundational estimate for these costs is based on the data
provided by the NASA Sidemount Team--Block 1/2 Sidemount Cost Team
Estimate, Space Shuttle Program Assessment Office, July 2009. These
estimates include the costs of restarting all necessary production
lines and recertifying vendors and the orbiters themselves.
Regarding the question of the effect of extending the Shuttle on
the development schedule of the Ares and Orion, the only Integrated
Option completed by the Committee that extended the Shuttle was Option
4B. That option assumed commercial crew transportation to LEO, not
Ares/Orion. Thus, the effect on Ares/Orion of extending the Shuttle was
not determined by the Committee.
Questions submitted by Chairwoman Gabrielle Giffords
Q1. What is the break-down of the $3 billion dollar wedge (on a per
year basis if possible) proposed by the review committee and how would
the increase be phased in over the five-year period?
A1. See table below.
Q2. In your written statement, you described the five integrated
options as ``representative families, since one can interchange certain
elements among the individual alternatives.'' What do you mean by that
statement? Since the options are described as ``integrated'' and
presumably were evaluated on that basis, in what manner do you believe
that elements could be interchanged? Given your statement, what is the
relevance for Congress of the options that you have included in your
summary report?
A2. The Integrated Options were prepared in order to understand the
interactions of the five key decisions described in the Summary and
Final Reports, particularly with regard to cost and schedule. By
formulating the Integrated Options, the Committee did not mean to
constrain the possible final decision, but only to inform it. Other
reasonable and consistent combinations of the choices are obviously
possible (each with its own cost and schedule implications), and these
could also be considered as alternatives. The Integrated Options
evaluated are intended to be representative of the families of options
that exist, yet without presenting an unmanageable number of
alternatives. The Committee, in keeping with its charter, expresses no
preference among these families, but does discuss the various
advantages and disadvantages with respect to the evaluation criteria
(without weighing those attributes).
Q3. The summary report states: ``the ISS should be funded to enable it
to achieve its full potential: as the Nation's newest national
laboratory, as an enhanced test bed for technologies and operations
techniques that support exploration, and as a framework that can
support expanded international collaboration.'' What level of funding
did the review committee assume was needed for utilization, and was
funding for the enhanced utilization included in the $3 billion
increase that the Committee state was needed for meaningful
exploration? What level of funding was assumed for ISS operations
beyond 2015?
A3. For the period FY 2010-2020, the costs associated with utilization
in the ``enhanced utilization'' scenario was $2,077M (Real Year). This
amount includes: multi-user system support (MUSS) functions, National
Laboratory enabling functions, and expenses associated with conducting
productive scientific, technological and industrial research and
development (R&D), as well as educational projects designed to
stimulate students to pursue careers in science, technology,
engineering and math (STEM) for the future. It does not include cargo
and crew transportation services. In addition, ``enhanced utilization''
assumes research investments planned by non-NASA entities under
National Laboratory initiative (e.g., NIH, USDA, NSF, private firms and
non-profits), and those investments are not included in the number
above.
Regarding whether this funding was included in the $3B increase,
the Committee did not assume specific budget wedges went with
individual cost items. For those options that included enhanced ISS
utilization, the costs associated with that were included in the
affordability analysis for that option, whether the option was
constrained to the FY10 budget profile or used the ``less constrained''
budget profile.
Regarding the level of funding for ISS operations beyond 2015, the
following funding profile includes all functions necessary to safely
operate and maintain the ISS in a continuously crewed and payload-
operating mode, including: program management; systems engineering,
analysis and integration; sustaining engineering of spacecraft elements
and distributed systems; mission flight and ground operations; and
safety and mission assurance.
Q4. In developing cost estimates for each of the review committee's
options, the Aerospace Corporation used a risk factor of 1.5 based on
historical data. Was that factor inclusive of launch system
developments or mainly instruments and satellite systems?
A4. The Aerospace Corporation has been involved in numerous past
studies identifying the main causes of cost growth and schedule delays
in NASA programs and projects. During this independent analysis,
Aerospace has compiled a database of NASA missions, including both
Human Space Flight and Non-Human Space Flight missions. The database
captures cost growth as measured from the formulation phase start
(approximately Phase B in NASA terminology), through launch. Projects
in the database include: science missions, exploration missions, and
there were also a limited number of ground operations projects within
the database. The majority of the missions are satellite systems, but
launch vehicle development projects are included as well.
On average, the 77 historical NASA Projects (human space flight,
non-human space flight, ground operations) included in the database and
used for Aerospace's affordability analysis for the Committee
demonstrated 51 percent cost growth from formulation start ( Phase B)
to launch. Human space flight missions--Gemini, Apollo, Mercury, Space
Station and Shuttle--exhibited higher mean cost growth at 100 percent.
While it could be argued that using the 100 percent cost growth factor
is more appropriate for the elements in the Integrated Options because
those elements are human space flight projects, the Committee chose to
go with the mean historical growth factor of 51 percent which
represented the average of a large body of NASA missions, so as not to
over-penalize the cost growth effect.
Q4a. Given that NASA's Constellation program's cost estimates were
being held to a 0.65 confidence level, what was the rational for
applying an additional 1.5 cost risk factor to the Constellation
program's cost estimate?
A4a. On behalf of the Committee, the Aerospace team conducted an
affordability analysis on all options using a process that is described
in the Final Report. In summary, the analysis outputs key dates,
element costs and manifests at the 65 percent confidence level. It also
estimates the uncertainty on dates and costs. The affordability
analysis corrects the input cost in several ways. First, it estimates a
range of expected growth of the cost for each program element from
System Design Review (SDR, Start of Phase B) to completion, based on
historical data of NASA programs. At the average, this introduces a 51
percent growth from the estimate held at SDR in the cost for
development (DDT&E costs). For elements that have not reached their
SDR, such as the Ares V or commercial crew service, this full
correction was applied. For elements that have passed their SDR, credit
was given for subsequent development and maturity of the design. For
example, the mean cost of the Orion in the analysis, due to this
factor, is only 25 percent higher than would be reported by the Program
of Record at the mean. Other, more mature programs, such as the Ares I,
receive credit by a similar process. In operations, a 26 percent growth
factor was applied to unproven systems, and no growth factor at the
mean was applied to existing systems such as the Shuttle or the ISS, or
to defined budget items such as the technology program.
NASA Headquarters asked the Program of Record to report cost and
schedule at the 65 percent level, and the Committee attempted to report
in a consistent manner. Note that on average, the difference between
the mean of expected costs and the 65 percent confidence costs adds
about 10 percent to all program costs calculated. Finally, the
affordability analysis combines the development schedule of all the
elements of the program. This process accounts for the additional cost
to one element if another element it depends upon slips in its
schedule. This integration of elements typically adds about an
additional 10 percent to the total program costs, higher in more-
constrained budgets, and lower in less-constrained budgets.
The Committee then examined the outputs of the affordability
analyses, and it made interpretations to extract from them the primary
information of interest, recognizing the inherent uncertainty in the
analysis. The reporting by the Committee attempts to focus on its
interpretation of the key milestones and associated uncertainties, and
the pace of events after the initial milestone.
Q4b. Given that the options differed widely in their levels of
technical and programmatic maturity, why was the same 1.5 factor
applied to Constellation and each of the other options?
A4b. The 1.5 factor was not applied uniformly to Constellation and/or
the other options. Cost growth factors were uniquely applied to the
options depending on the level of maturity of the systems. See the
answer to question 4a above for an explanation of the process the
Committee used.
Questions submitted by Representative Alan Grayson
Q1. You commented in your testimony that extending the Space Shuttle
is ``probably the least disruptive'' option ``to the ongoing workforce.
And it's also the only option that closes the gap.''
Q1a. Specifically, how would extending the use of the Space Shuttle
affect NASA and contractor workforces?
A1a. Extending the Shuttle would have a beneficial impact on the near-
term workforce issues. Some workforce reductions would be indicated by
the reduced flight rate proposed, but there would be several years in
which to manage these reductions. In 2015, when the Shuttle finally
retires, no NASA crew launch system would be available for several more
years, and then the problem of maintaining key workforce skills would
resurface. If, however, the commercial crew option were to be ready by
2016 or so, some national competence in crew launch would be nearly
continuous.
Q1b. What effects would the expiration of the Shuttle have on these
workforces?
A1b. The Space Shuttle is currently operated by a skilled workforce of
over 12,500 individuals whose experience and expertise in systems
engineering, systems integration, inspection, ground operations and
assembly, test and checkout, and mission planning and operations have
been developed and honed over decades. Once the Shuttle is retired,
NASA and its contractors will be forced to shed or reassign much of
that workforce due to the length of the gap in human space flight
activity. Of these 12,500 workers, 1,500 are civil servants who, under
current practices, will likely retain their jobs even though there is
no program to which they can easily transition. The jobs in the
contractor structure will likely be lost.
Q1c. What other benefits might option 4(b) offer?
A1c. The use of more Shuttle-derived components lowers the development
cost somewhat, and accelerates by about a year the availability of
heavy-lift. But, the date of first availability is still in the early
2020s at best, due to budget constraints and likely extension of the
ISS. Therefore, even if a Shuttle-derived vehicle is developed, and the
Shuttle is extended, there is about a decade of gap in heavy-vehicle
operations.
Option 4B also has the benefit of scoring well in the area of
``Programmatic Sustainability'' because NASA is flying Shuttle missions
between 2011 and 2015.
Q2. Would it be beneficial for NASA to begin planning for funding the
Space Shuttle through 2011? Would it make sense for the recipients of
task orders, regarding the Shuttle extension, to price out for 2011,
knowing that this creates no legal liability to NASA?
A2. Yes, it would be beneficial for NASA to understand the options for
funding the Space Shuttle through 2011.
Regarding the question of the pricing of task orders, that question
is best posed to NASA as the Committee did not study this issue in any
detail.
Q3. Your review committee presented several options regarding the
future of U.S. manned space exploration. Of these options, 4(b) would
extend the Space Shuttle through FY 2011. Given the Committee's
emphasis on safety, what evidence support option 4(b) as a safe choice?
A3. Although a thorough analysis of Shuttle safety was not part of its
charter, the Committee did examine the Shuttle's safety record and
reliability, as well as the results of other reviews of these topics.
The Shuttle is one of the few launch vehicles that have flown a
sufficient number of times to be considered ``mature.'' It has suffered
two accidents in its 128 flights, so its demonstrated success rate is
98.4 percent. Considerable effort has also been expended to develop a
Probabilistic Risk Assessment for the Shuttle. That PRA shows a
reliability of 98.7 percent, with the greatest contributor to risk
coming from the threat of micrometeorite or debris damage while in
orbit. Other launch vehicles in development have better PRAs,
indicating that once they reach maturity, they will carry less risk
than the Shuttle. In comparing Shuttle reliability to that of other
launch vehicles, however, the most important factor is actual flight
experience. The Shuttle completed its first 24 missions successfully
before the Challenger accident; after returning to flight, it flew
successfully 87 times before the Columbia accident, and has flown
successfully 15 times since. This is not to say that future vehicles
will not be more reliable--they likely will be--but the Shuttle has
reached a level of maturity that those launch vehicles will not reach
for many years.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Vice Admiral Joseph W. Dyer, USN (Ret.), Chair, Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel, NASA; President, Government & Industrial
Robots Division, iRobot Corporation
Questions submitted by Chairman Bart Gordon
Q1. Your safety panel believes that the Constellation Program or an
alternative option, offers a one-time opportunity for safety to be
better ``hard-wired'' into overall NASA processes.
Q1a. Can you expand on why you feel this is such a unique opportunity
in NASA's history?
A1a. Major programs like Constellation offer a rare opportunity to set
a new vector and to evolve the culture of an institution like NASA. The
way business is done on the Constellation program offers a chance to
build safety into the fabric of NASA's overall engineering and
management work processes. A successful integration of safety into the
Constellation program would give all of NASA's stakeholder's assurance
that safety was integrated into the design from the very start, and not
considered as a critical extra, yet separate, requirement.
Q1b. What does this say about NASA's current institutional focus on
safety?
A1b. NASA made significant progress in improving safety following the
Columbia accident and via implementing recommendations put forth by the
CAIB. The safety culture continues to further improve. However, the
Constellation program offers the opportunity to accelerate the positive
change and to make it a deep and lasting part of NASA's culture because
BIG programs like Constellation typically are the birthing place for
future leaders. Additionally, new processes and new technologies are
derived for and come from major programs. Constellation offers a way to
train future NASA leaders in the best safety practices.
Q2. I understand that your safety panel believes that if Constellation
is not the selected option, then any other new design needs to be
``substantially superior to justify starting over.''
Q2a. What evidence would you want from an alternative option to gauge
that its safety is ``substantially superior''?
A2a. We would expect a level of detailed and validated analysis that at
least approaches what present in the current NASA program of record.
This includes design validation, test, and analysis of the test
results. We have yet to see these data from the current funded COTS
partners who seemed to be claiming Human Rating.
NASA must seek crew survivability even when the mission fails. The
risk of loss of crew should be significantly less than the risk of loss
of mission.
Q2b. In your view, what is the risk of starting over without such
substantial difference being clearly identified in advance?
A2b. The risk in starting over without strong confidence that the
selected alternative is substantially better is that one arrives at the
same point having expended more time and money. Untested alternative
plans almost always outshine programs that have undergone deep analysis
and significant testing.
Q3. How concerned should we be that Loss of Crew and Loss of Mission
for alternative vehicles were not estimated nor safety estimates
verified in the analysis of options by the review committee?
A3. It comes as no surprise that Loss of Crew and Loss of Mission (LOC/
LOM) were not estimated nor was concrete safety estimates given for
alternative vehicles. Such data requires intensive analysis that is
based on specific facts that include actual design and performance
information for these vehicles. In the case of the alternative
vehicles, this information was either not available or did not exist.
Even if this information did exist and was available, the Committee did
not have the resources or the time to conduct such an analysis.
Therefore, great caution should be exercised with regard to employing
alternative vehicles whose LOC/LOM characteristics are unknown in
comparison to other vehicles whose design and associated data is far
more mature and well defined. A prudent decision in this regard is only
possible when comparing ``apples to apples.''
Q4. Is a high-reliability launch system equivalent to a high-safety
launch system for crew transfer Applications? If not, what additional
factors need to be considered?
A4. No, safety depends on much more than just reliability; and, crew
safety is far broader than system reliability. NASA must assure crew
survivability even after system failure. (This is why we put ejection
seats in fighter jets.) The Constellation's abort system is an example
of such a system and should be considered an ABSOLUTE requirement in
any manned spacecraft.
Even the most reliable rockets that we can make still have a
probability of anomaly on any given launch that is unacceptably high
for crewed applications. Having inherent robustness and effective
safety systems to protect the crew is essential to a Human Rated
system.
Robustness and the ability to continue to function even after
subsystem failures are also critical to crew safety. Safety approaches
such as these are the reason that the Loss of Crew probabilities can be
so much lower than the Loss of Mission probabilities.
Q5. In your prepared statement, you note that ``NASA needs to take a
more aggressive role articulating human rating requirements for the
COTS Project.''
Q5a. What steps does NASA need to take that it is not already taking
to ensure that commercial crew vehicles meet NASA's human rating
requirements?
A5a.
1. More than two years into the COTS program, NASA still has
not delineated the specific human rating requirements
applicable to the NASA-crewed COTS mission. While some within
NASA acknowledge their responsibility to define human rating
requirements that are necessary to certify the COTS vehicle as
``human-rated,'' others within the Agency continue to delay
perhaps out of concern of giving further momentum to COTS
vehicle development in lieu of a more traditional NASA approach
which they believe to be better and safer.
The ASAP has expressed some urgency with regard to Human
Rating and COTS vehicles. This urgency was communicated in the
following recommendation from its 2009 third quarterly meeting:
``Recent events make it likely that use of commercial vehicles
to transport NASA crews to LEO will occur much sooner than most
had planned. While the Panel recognizes that authority and
direction to proceed has not yet been formally given to NASA,
it also recognizes that systems to meet this need are already
under development by COTS vendors. If these systems are ever to
provide the level of safety expected for NASA crews, it is
imperative that NASA's criteria for safety design of such
systems be agreed upon and provided to such COTS enterprises.
This issue is becoming more focused and more urgent. Human
rating of COTS for the delivery of NASA astronauts into space
is now one of the Panel's primary concerns. Recommend that COTS
HR requirements be established as soon as possible and
promulgated to those that seek to design systems for this
future mission.''
2. As a minimum, the ASAP believes that NASA should begin a
dialogue with the funded COTS partners to address the
requirements for human rating. While some efforts have begun to
do this, recent ASAP discussions with one of the funded COTS
partners indicates that they continue to have a major
misunderstanding about the scope of the human rating
requirements applicable to the entire mission involving NASA
crew transport.
3. Additionally, the funded COTS partners, the Congress and
Executive stakeholders should clarify how much or how little
they will be involved in the design, certification and
operation of the NASA-crewed vehicles in order to verify that
the funded COTS partners are compliant with the human rating
requirements. For a NASA program, this effort would typically
include: determining the adequacy of deliverable products
including hazard analyses and risk assessments; evaluating the
design at major milestone reviews; and, performing audits and
evaluations of the human rating process.
Q5b. Does the ASAP have specific safety requirements in mind with
regards to human rating?
A5b. The ASAP believes that the recently revised NASA human rating
requirements provides an excellent baseline for developing human rating
requirements for NASA-crewed COTS. NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR)
8705.2B, Human Rating Requirements for Space Systems, issued May 6,
2008, updated requirements and captured lessons learned applicable to
the development and operations of crewed space systems developed by
NASA. It is the intent of NASA that this document be tailored
specifically for each NASA program. Tailoring of the NPR in developing
human rating requirements for NASA-crewed COTS would provide assurance
that similarity in developing human-rating programs for a NASA crew on
a COTS vehicle and that for a NASA crew on a NASA-developed vehicle
would optimally achieve an equivalent level of safety for the NASA
crew. The challenge for NASA will be in determining how much engagement
with the COTS contractors is required to insure the intent of the NPR
is met.
Q5c. What does the commercial sector need to be willing to do?
A5c. The commercial industry thus far appears to be very supportive and
willing to meet the requirements and provide the necessary evidence to
show that they are compliant. This said, they must first have a better
understanding of what the requirements are, and then they need to
incorporate those requirements into the design of their vehicles,
including the development of the necessary analyses, assessments, and
tests to show that the system is adequately safe for a NASA crew. The
longer the delay in achieving an understanding of what the requirements
must be, the harder it will be for the funded COTS partners to alter
their designs.
Questions submitted by Representative Ralph M. Hall
Q1. Crew safety is a paramount concern. The designs for the Ares and
Orion are intended to maximize crew safety. NASA claims that the Ares/
Orion will be about 10 times safer than the Shuttle with the
probability of loss of crew at 1 in 2850 for Ares/Orion.
Q1a. Is this a credible estimate for Ares/Orion?
A1a. The ASAP is not able to answer this question independent of NASA's
expertise. However, we have closely observed the quality of the NASA
engineers that have performed this analysis. We hold them in highest
regard and have faith that they are better schooled and experienced to
render such opinion than any others.
Q1b. Do you believe that any commercial human-rated launch system
should be held to the same level of safety?
A1b. If transporting NASA astronauts into space, yes.
Q2. In your testimony you said that the Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel believes that any proposals to replace the existing Constellation
program need ``to be substantially superior to justify starting over.''
In your view, do any potential options have substantially superior crew
safety?
A2. We have not seen compelling evidence that would indicate potential
options are substantially superior.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Michael D. Griffin, Eminent Scholar and Professor,
Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, University of Alabama,
Huntsville
Questions submitted by Chairman Bart Gordon
Q1. The review committee asserted that a $3 billion per year wedge
(reached by FY 2014) added to the President's FY10 exploration funding
runout would be sufficient for the alternative human exploration
program options identified in its summary report to be carried out on
the timetables contained in the report. Do you agree with the review
committee's assessment? If not, why not? What would be required to
develop credible estimates of cost, schedule, and technical risk for
any of the non-Constellation options, and how long would it take to do
so?
A1. Broadly speaking, I agree with the review committee's assessment
that a sustained increase of some $3B/year in NASA's budget is
sufficient to attain worthy goals, including: (1) completion of the
ISS, and continued use of that facility past 2015, (2) replacement of
the space shuttle with a new crew transportation system, (3) human
lunar return and the establishment of a lunar outpost, and 4)
development of the technology and systems required for a voyage to
Mars. I do not agree that presently-held goals for these
accomplishments; e.g., replacement of the shuttle by 2015 or lunar
return by 2020, can be achieved by means of a graduated ``wedge'' in
spending to reach the additional $3B. A more abrupt increase is needed
if previously planned schedules, or something close to those schedules,
is to be achieved. For example, the difference between a five-year ramp
to a $3B increase, and an immediate increase, is $7.5B. This is a
significant difference in total available funding, at a crucial time.
There is presently no funding in the NASA budget for sustained ISS
operations past 2015, and NASA's Exploration Systems budgets have
already been eroded by some $12B relative to the level provided by the
President's budget in 2005. Given these facts, attainment of reasonable
schedules (e.g., deployment of Ares/Orion around 2015, return to the
Moon soon after 2020) requires an immediate and significant boost in
NASA's funding.
Q2. Based on your experience, what methodology could be used to
ascertain the safety levels of the potential alternative human space
flight systems discussed in the report, especially given the range of
maturity levels of those potential systems? How concerned should we be
that Loss of Crew and Loss of Mission were not estimated nor safety
estimates verified in the analysis of options by the review committee?
A2. The best methodology available today to assess relative safety
levels of potential human space transportation system alternatives is
the informed use of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques.
This is a well-established discipline which, when systematically
applied, yields conclusions concerning the relative merits of various
system approaches that are accepted by the community of practice in
system design and safety analysis. The fact that the Augustine
Committee chose to ignore entirely the entire discipline of
quantitative risk analysis is, in my opinion, unacceptable. Real
differences in system performance exist, can be identified, and can be
taken into account when comparing alternative systems. These factors
have not only a human dimension, involving as they do the potential for
determination of the risk levels to which U.S. and international
partner astronauts will be exposed, they also have financial
implications. Each of the three fatal human space flight accidents this
nation has sustained has resulted in collateral damage measured in many
billions of dollars--and that is a very conservative estimate. On
financial grounds alone, to advocate the development and deployment of
a new government space transportation system that fails to incorporate
reasonably available safety practices, would be an unsound practice.
That the Committee took no note of these issues is a significant
concern.
Q3. What, in your view, are the most significant technologies needed
to support any of the alternative options going forward? How mature are
those technologies? Do any of those technologies require breakthroughs?
Have the technology development risks of the various options been
appropriately addressed and compared in the Augustine panel's review?
A3. Regarding the options put forth by the Augustine Committee, certain
recommended paths do in fact involve or assume technology which does
not presently exist and is unlikely to exist in the timeframe of
interest in pursuing those options.
For example, the use of so-called ``propellant depots'' as an
enabling element of space exploration beyond low Earth orbit, is ill-
advised. The zero-propellant-boiloff technology required for such
depots does not presently exist. This is in fact an important
technology, and will be crucial for Mars exploration irrespective of
what technique is ultimately employed to reach that planet. But to put
the development of that technology in series with human lunar return or
other activities short of the first voyage to Mars is unwise.
Similarly, the assumption that there will exist near-term
commercial human space transportation capability, and that such
presumed capability should guide our plans to support and utilize the
ISS, is equally ill-advised. I have no doubt that commercial human
space transportation can and will be accomplished, hopefully first by
U.S. providers. But until and unless it does, planning for the support
of the ISS by means of such capability is, again, unwise.
As another example, the Augustine Committee recommends proceeding
forward on a mission to visit a near-Earth asteroid as an alternative
to human lunar missions. The clear implication is that such a mission
would be easier and cheaper to accomplish than a lunar mission. In
point of fact, the contrary is true. Any near-Earth asteroid mission
will require in-space stays of at least many months, and maybe a year
or more, far from home, with in some cases no option for an early
return in the event of problems. The required total energy to reach any
known asteroid target substantially exceeds that necessary to reach the
Moon, and in many cases exceeds that necessary to reach Mars. There are
many aspects of near-Earth asteroids which make them very interesting
targets for future human missions; however, such missions are not
properly sequenced ahead of lunar missions insofar as their technology
readiness is concerned.
In general, I think it may be said that the Augustine Committee
offers numerous recommendations and options for which the actual
technical readiness required to accomplish them does not exist, or is
at a very immature state of development, yet the Committee sets these
alternatives forth as if they were on par with existing programs
underway at NASA and its contractors.
Finally, I cannot leave this topic without noting that, in my view,
the issues facing the U.S. space program in the near future are not
primarily issues of technology. They are issues involving the choice of
goals, and the resolve to commit the Nation to the path toward those
goals, once chosen, for a sufficient period to reach them. At no time
was this fact more clearly visible than in the immediate aftermath of
the Columbia accident, when the lack of long-term strategic planning
for the Nation's space program was directly cited by the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board as a contributory factor to that accident.
This was remedied by the enunciation of worthy goals for the program in
the Vision for Space Exploration by President Bush in 2004, and twice
endorsed and enhanced by the Congress in the NASA Authorization Acts of
2005 and 2008. What is needed now is to hold course toward those goals,
not the further and continued exploration of various possible goals and
various possible means of reaching them, as regrettably exemplified by
numerous options put forth by the Augustine Committee.
Q4. The sustainability of the workforce, critical skills, and
industrial base needed to carry out human space flight programs in the
future are important considerations in determining the appropriate path
forward. What is your view on how Congress should factor in those
considerations when choosing among alternatives?
A4. The Nation's human space flight program is, in my opinion, a
strategic national asset with regard to the perception and reality of
U.S. leadership in the conduct of large technically challenging
enterprises at the very edge of human accomplishment, and the creation
and sustainment of the industrial base to accomplish such things. In
the context of the U.S. industrial base as a whole, even an enterprise
on the scale of human space flight--a $10 billion per year effort--is a
niche activity. It is an extremely challenging and difficult niche, but
a niche just the same, and when such activities are not sustained in a
predictable way, their practitioners of necessity find employment in
other areas. This occurred during the poorly orchestrated transition
between Apollo and Shuttle, and it is happening again as we prepare to
retire Shuttle and transition to . . . what? This lack of certainty is
devastating to the technical professionals who sustain the space
program, and to the many, many third- and fourth-tier contractors who
support the program. We are losing those contractors by the day, and
the uncertainty as to our future national commitment to a stable human
space flight program is making it worse.
Q5. How, in your view, should international capabilities be leveraged
to support human space flight and exploration going forward? What is
your view on how the ISS should be used to further the development of
international partnerships in support of human exploration?
A5. I think the first point that must be made in regard to
``international capabilities'' is that they are in fact not our
capabilities; they are furnished by our partners--at their option--
either cooperatively in support of programs which are judged
meritorious by those partners, or they are furnished on a contractual
basis, for money. The first approach characterizes our relationship
with the Canadian, European, and Japanese space agencies on ISS, while
the latter properly describes our relationship with the Russian Space
Agency. Given these facts, I consider it to be unwise in the extreme to
place international partner capabilities in the so-called ``critical
path'' toward key national goals. Thus, if it is important to the
United States to maintain clear preeminence in space exploration and
exploitation, to be a clear leader among nations in this area--and I
believe that it should be--then the ability to reach low Earth orbit
without our own national systems should never be ``offered up'' for
international cooperation. Similarly, the next step--the ability to
again reach the surface of the Moon on our own terms--is not
appropriately sacrificed to the demands of partnership. We should wish
our partners well in the development of their own such capabilities,
should they wish to develop them. But we should give ours away. Thus,
international partnerships should be negotiated and arranged on our
part with a view toward expanding and enhancing the space enterprises
in which we engage, but not in a manner that allows others to control
whether they are possible at all.
The ISS is key to the future of long-term human space exploration--
i.e., beyond the Moon--in two ways: understanding human physiological
requirements for space flight and finding ways to meet them, and
developing systems capable of sustaining human presence in space for
the length of time necessary for a voyage to Mars. If we didn't have a
space station, we would need one to meet these objectives. These
questions will not be answered by 2015, or 2020, or any date certain.
For this reason, the ISS should be sustained and supported by the
Congress as long as it is practical and reasonable to do so.
Questions submitted by Representative Ralph M. Hall
Q1. Dr. Griffin, the review committee report suggests that now is the
time to consider using commercial services for delivery of cargo and
crew to low Earth orbit. With regard to crew, you appeared to take
strong exception to that assumption. Why do you feel so strongly that
the U.S. must have a government developed and government owned
capability to deliver humans to space?
A1. I take ``strong exception'' to that assumption because the most
casual glance at the overall U.S. aerospace industry reveals that, at
present, the capability to provide commercial service to the
International Space Station for either cargo or crew. The former will
likely be available within several years, assuming that we extend the
planned lifetime of the ISS so as to make commercial investments in
such capability a reasonable proposition. Crew capability will mature
some years after that; it is simply not consistent with 50+ years of
space flight history to suggest that new, entrepreneurial firms seeking
to develop commercial human space flight capability will successfully
do so in the near-term.
Now, I am one who believes that the U.S. Government should take all
reasonable steps, as a matter of policy, to aid in the establishment
commercial space transportation services for both cargo and crew.
Appropriate incentives could include guaranteed ``anchor tenancy''
markets when capability is demonstrated, tax incentives, small amounts
of ``seed'' capital, and other inducements for private investors.
However, such incentives should not go so far as to include a plan to
hold ISS support, resupply, and utilization hostage to the appearance--
or the lack thereof--of commercial space transportation services. That
is foolhardy.
If we believe, as I do, that space transportation in general and
human space flight in particular is a valuable strategic asset for the
United States, then it is essential that this asset be preserved and
protected. It becomes a responsibility of the U.S. Government to insure
that it continues to exist, to provide, protect, and promote it by
various means. One of the means is the fostering of the presently
nascent commercial industry; another is to ensure that government
capability to accomplish the mission is always available.
Q2. Assuming that we fly the International Space Station until 2020 or
later, and NASA is able to get a budget increase similar to the $3
billion per year that Mr. Augustine's panel recommended; when in your
opinion could NASA deliver the Constellation system (Ares I and Orion)
to support the Space Station, and when would we be able to return to
the Moon?
A2. If NASA receives a $3B increase as recommended by the Augustine
Committee, and a substantial amount of this money is made available
immediately, then I believe that Ares I/Orion can be kept on track to
deliver crew and cargo to ISS in 2015, and human lunar return can be
accomplished by the early 2020s.
Questions submitted by Chairwoman Gabrielle Giffords
Q1. What do you mean by ``commercial'' space flight? What was your
intention (given that definition) in establishing COTS, and how do you
think government should involve ``commercial space'' in future plans?
A1. By ``commercial'' space flight, I adhere to the conventional use of
the term with regard to commercial industry, business practices, etc. A
``commercial'' space flight enterprise would be one in which the
founders and owners of that enterprise develop a business plan to
furnish cargo/crew transportation service to low Earth orbit, raise
funding from private capital sources (possibly with some small amount
of government ``seed money'') to support that plan, complete their
product development, demonstrate that it works, and then offer service
to government and other industry customers. A commercial space flight
enterprise is NOT one in which the government is asked to provide
billions of dollars on the front end in order to initiate the
development. My intention in putting for the COTS program as NASA
Administrator was to provide the ``seed funding'' mentioned above; in
my own opinion, such seed funding should rightly be no more than five
percent or so of the likely total to be needed. If the enterprise is to
be ``commercial,'' then the money at risk must be largely private
funding.
It must be understood that I offer no objection to the expenditure
of government funds through traditional negotiated contracts (``prime
contracts,'' in the jargon of the business) for the development of
government space transportation capability. To the contrary, I strongly
advocate that we do just that, whether or not commercial capability is
brought into being. Government space transportation is a strategic
asset for our nation; it's existence should not depend upon whether or
not commercial providers also exist, any more than we eschew the use of
government aircraft merely because private alternatives exist.
However, I must make the key point that in the above case, such
negotiated contracts are hardly of a ``commercial'' nature. To label a
new, entrepreneurial space flight enterprise ``commercial'' simply
because it is not a traditional large prime contractor is to misuse the
term completely.
When and as commercial space flight capability does come into
being, I believe it should be the policy of the U.S. Government to use
it to the maximum extent possible, consistent with basic guidelines
including standards on safety, economics, and maintenance of strategic
government capability.
Q2. In your written statement, you state that Ares I and Orion should
be completed as quickly as possible to support ISS, and then Ares V
should be built. You indicate that they should not all be done in
parallel because that would cause them to stretch out and cost more in
the long run. The Augustine panel's summary report asserts that funding
the program of record (not including an extension of ISS) would enable
Ares I/Orion in FY 2017 and a return of humans to the Moon by the mid-
2020s. Do you agree with the review committee's assessment, and if not,
why not?
A2. If the money suggested by the Augustine Committee is restored to
NASA, then I believe Ares I/Orion could still be delivered by 2015. I
believe the cost and schedule estimates produced by Aerospace
Corporation for the Augustine Committee were conservatively biased;
without such biases, the competing alternatives offered by the
Committee would not look so favorable. The Augustine Committee report
makes a clear effort to treat all options ``equally,'' in some sense.
However, all options are not in fact equal. Constellation cost and
schedule estimates have some four years of maturity and refinement
underlying them. The other alternatives discussed by the Committee have
no such maturity, and in some cases are merely ideas. Yet, all are
presented as if they are equally suitable as potential future
alternatives.
Q3. What accounts for the apparent discrepancy between NASA's
Constellation program cost and schedule estimates and those developed
by the Aerospace Corporation for the Augustine review committee? How
can Congress resolve that discrepancy?
A3. The Augustine Committee cost estimates, performed by The Aerospace
Corporation, are exceptionally conservative. This was done, as best I
can determine from outside the deliberations of the Committee, because
arbitrary cost and schedule growth factors were applied to all options
considered by the Committee. It is my understanding that a 50 percent
growth factor was applied to NASA cost estimates. However, what the
Committee apparently did not understand, or did not credit, was that
conservative growth factors were already incorporated into NASA's
estimates, which were professionally performed in accordance with the
accepted state-of-the-art. The ``bottom line'' is that there was clear
evidence of ``double counting'' the cost reserve for NASA programs,
which makes the Constellation option appear unfavorable in comparison
to others.
Numerous contractors exist with the capability to do state-of-the-
art cost estimation. That expertise can be brought to this task, and a
new, independent assessment of Constellation costs developed. However,
NASA is a government agency; one does not properly hire contractors to
review and judge the work of government agencies. In any case, much of
NASA's cost estimation work has involved the use of external
contractors reporting to NASA managers, so it could be difficult to
obtain a new cost estimate for the Constellation Program without
relying upon contractor personnel who already have a vested interest in
the outcome. Nonetheless, if the necessary independence can be assured,
a new estimate can be developed for comparison to NASA's estimate.
Q4. What information does Congress and the White House need to
adequately evaluate the Constellation program versus the other options
offered in the summary report? In light of the sketchy schedules, low
fidelity of cost estimates of options, and uncertainty of relative
risks provided so far, other than for the current Constellation
program, how can Congress go about comparing the risks, costs, and
safety of each option in a meaningful manner? In your view, which
exploration strategy currently is the lowest risk with regards to
projected costs, technical risk, and ability to meet schedules,
assuming resources are matched to the tasks?
A4. In my view, Congress and the White House must trust NASA, as a
government agency, to furnish to Congress the information necessary to
make decisions as to the Nation's forward path in human space flight. I
believe that NASA has furnished faithful estimates as to the resources
required to complete the Constellation program, and can adequately
assess the potential utility of other options, if asked to do so. If
the Nation did not have NASA to manage the publicly-funded space
program of the United States, one would have to create an entity to do
so. That entity would be subject to the same criticisms by many and
various self-interested parties as has been NASA. That would not change
the fact that the U.S. Government must have such an entity to make
decisions as to the allocation of public funds in support of national
space goals. NASA is that entity today, and the agency should receive
the support of Congress in making and adhering to difficult decisions.
In my view, the Constellation Program as presently envisioned
offers the safest, lowest cost, lowest technical risk, most certain
technical path toward the goals enunciated for NASA by the NASA
Authorization Act of 2005, and renewed by the Congress in 2008. These
goals--to finish the ISS, to retire the Shuttle and replace it with a
new and safer system for human access to low orbit, to return to the
Moon, to establish the capability for a permanent outpost on that body,
and to prepare the way for later voyages to Mars--are the proper goals
for our space program, and should be retained and supported by the
Congress.
Q5. The Augustine review committee's Flexible Path option envisions
excursions to multiple destinations in the solar system. How does the
Flexible Path's multi-destination approach compare to that of the
Constellation program? What was the reason for selecting the Moon as
the initial destination under the Constellation-enabled architecture?
A5. It is not fully or widely appreciated that Constellation is a
``multi-destination'' architecture. The Constellation system can reach
every destination--the Moon, near-Earth asteroids, Lagrange points,
Martian moons, and Mars itself--which has been offered up as a
possibility in the so-called ``Flexible Path.'' The so-called
``Flexible Path'' option is a thinly-veiled attempt to bypass the Moon
as a near-term exploration destination, primarily to save the money
required to build a lunar lander and support a future lunar base. It is
an attempt to claim a great, forward-looking space program, without
actually have to pay for it. The so-called ``Flexible Path'' is
actually less ``flexible'' than Constellation, because it will not (if
put into place) enable a human lunar return in the near-term.
It is also not widely understood that NASA did not ``select'' the
Moon as the initial Constellation destination. The Moon as a
destination was recommended by President Bush in the initial Vision for
Space Exploration in 2004, and ratified, twice, by the Congress in 2005
and 2008. In designing the initial elements of Constellation to go
first to the Moon, NASA is carrying out its instructions, not self-
generating them.
With that said, I believe that in fact the Moon is the proper
initial post-ISS destination. The Moon is proving to be a most
interesting place, scientifically, based on the returns from a spate of
recent robotic missions to that body. The Moon is the closest
destination available to us; we can learn how to venture in deep space
for long periods of time, and live off-planet, while remaining only
three days from home in the event of an emergency. The Moon is far
easier to reach, on far a more regular schedule, than any of the near-
Earth asteroids. The Moon is much easier to reach than the moons of
Mars, which themselves can be more difficult to reach than the Martian
surface itself. By utilizing the ISS and the Moon, we will develop the
technology and experience to voyage, later, to all of these other
destinations and many more. But the Moon comes first, in my view.
Appendix 2:
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Additional Material for the Record