THINKERS AND PRACTITIONERS: DO SENIOR PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION SCHOOLS PRODUCE STRATEGISTS?

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BEFORE THE
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OF THE
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CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2009

HEARING:
Thursday, June 4, 2009, Thinkers and Practitioners: Do Senior Professional Military Education Schools Produce Strategists? .............................................. 1

APPENDIX:
Thursday, June 4, 2009 ........................................................................................... 33

THURSDAY, JUNE 4, 2009

THINKERS AND PRACTITIONERS: DO SENIOR PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION SCHOOLS PRODUCE STRATEGISTS?

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services ................................................. 3
Snyder, Hon. Vic, a Representative from Arkansas, Chairman, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee ......................................................... 1
Wittman, Hon. Rob, a Representative from Virginia, Ranking Member, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee ......................................................... 2

WITNESSES

Belcher, Col. Michael F., USMC, Director, Marine Corps War College .......................... 15
Forsyth, Maj. Gen. Maurice H. “Maury,” USAF, Commander, Spaatz Center for Officer Education, and Commandant, Air War College ........................................ 13
Hall, Rear Adm. Garry E., USN, Commandant, The Industrial College of the Armed Forces ................................................................. 5
Wisecup, Rear Adm. James P., USN, President, U.S. Naval War College ............. 8

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Belcher, Col. Michael F. ................................................................. 149
Forsyth, Maj. Gen. Maurice H. “Maury” ........................................ 140
Hall, Rear Adm. Garry E. ............................................................. 41
Snyder, Hon. Vic ............................................................... 37
Steel, Maj. Gen. Robert P. .......................................................... 69
Williams, Maj. Gen. Robert M. ..................................................... 120
Wisecup, Rear Adm. James P. ....................................................... 89
IV

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:
[There were no Documents submitted.]

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING:

Dr. Snyder ......................................................................................................... 165
THINKERS AND PRACTITIONERS: DO SENIOR PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION SCHOOLS PRODUCE STRATEGISTS?

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE,

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vic Snyder (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Dr. SNYDER. Good morning. We are going to go ahead and begin. Mr. Wittman will be joining us shortly.

This is the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations’ second hearing on professional military education (PME); specifically today, officer-in-residence PME.

On May 20th, outside witnesses discussed the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act that reformed our military by institutionalizing what we call “jointness.” We also discussed the efforts of the 1989 Skelton Panel to review PME to ensure that jointness became part of the military’s culture through its officer education system.

Today we are looking at the six senior schools in the PME enterprise: the war colleges and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF). These schools are meant to focus on developing strategists and teaching strategy—national, military, and resource.

In later hearings we will hear from the commandants and the deans of the intermediate and “career” schools. And we will also invite the combatant commanders to appear, those who employ the graduates of these institutions; they should also be involved in these discussions.

Today our panel is the senior leadership of the senior PME schools, including their commandants, commanders, directors, or in some cases presidents, and they are joined by their academic deans.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Snyder can be found in the Appendix on page 37.]

Dr. SNYDER. We will now hear from Mr. Wittman.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROB WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Chairman Snyder. I appreciate the opportunity.

And good morning to our witnesses. We deeply appreciate your being here today and your service to our Nation.

Our opening hearing on officer professional in-residence education featured outside experts who offered a range of thoughtful suggestions. While it is always useful to hear suggestions from intelligent observers unbound by current operations, we must also learn from those faced with the day-to-day reality of managing our professional military education system.

We have such people here today, the commandants of the military service and joint senior war colleges. These institutions are the top of the PME system. Each of our witnesses has had a unique career path. Even so, the road to your positions lies predominantly with operational assignments rather than academic posts.

That successful officers come from the operational part of their respective services is no surprise, but I wonder how each of you adjusts to the particular challenges of running an academic institution where faculty cherish the right to exercise academic freedom and students are encouraged to think creatively. In short, do the witnesses believe their careers prepared them to be nurturing educators?

I am also interested in your suggestions on recruiting and retaining the best faculty. Do you have the tools you need to recruit and retain the high-quality faculty teaching the fine students the military services send as students? Can you offer an academic environment attractive to the high-caliber faculty we seek at your institutions?

Finally, I have to ask if the military services are sending the best students to our military senior service colleges. The military services each have their own unique service culture, and part of that culture is the view of the value of professional military education. Is that culture reflected in the quality of students?

The Department’s consortium of senior military professional educational institutions is a distinguished collection of academic excellence in all aspects of national security, diplomacy, and strategy. We provide experienced, talented military officers a year to read and think at taxpayers’ expense at these fine schools. Is the investment worth it to them and to the Nation? I believe it is, but would like to get your thoughts on the record.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.

We are pleased to be joined again by our full committee chairman, Ike Skelton, formerly the chairman of the Skelton panel from the late eighties.

And he has already broken our microphone. This happens all the time. Mr. Skelton, I am going to hold forth for about an hour. We could use this old book to prop it up with—Ike Skelton’s book.

Go ahead, Mr. Chairman.
STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Wittman. Thank you very much for the opportunity to sit in on this hearing. I want to compliment Dr. Snyder and the Ranking Member on holding hearings on this subject, which, as you may know, is near and dear to me through the years.

A bit of history. Back in 1982 Richard White, a member of the Armed Services Committee, held a series of hearings in his subcommittee—which was the predecessor of this subcommittee—on what David Jones, Air Force Chief of Staff and later Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said publicly: that the Joint Chiefs of Staff gives pabulum advice, and was very critical of it.

Needless to say he became a pariah among the military folks in the Pentagon; but, sadly, he was very, very right. After Richard White did the hearings, he retired. And Arch Barrett, who is one of those rare staff members that should be emblazoned in stone because he was so good at what he did here, convinced me to get involved with this same issue and introduced legislation to abolish the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which none of them handled very well.

After passing legislation three times in the House over four years, the chairmanship in the Senate changed from John Tower to Barry Goldwater and Barry Goldwater to Sam Nunn—who had their own legislation—and we ended up in conference passing later the Goldwater-Nichols Act which was not well-received among most of the officers of all services, with few exceptions like Bernard Trane and a few others.

Following that, at the behest of Arch Barrett, I chaired a panel on professional military education that built on Goldwater-Nichols and working on joint education, and we ended up with a series of year-long hearings where we came out with a Phase I, Phase II—you know, all of that—and tried to reestablish rigor.

We found that the various war colleges varied in complexity and difficulty. The Marines were way behind and to Al Gray’s credit he turned it around 180 degrees. And the Air Force had a long way to go and that came around. The Army was good, B or B-plus, doing pretty well. The best was the Navy, by far, and you didn’t have to go there to get promoted but it was, for some reason, the premier in 1988.

Well, fast forward to today. Have the war colleges, including National and ICAF, have they fulfilled their main purpose in life? And what is the main purpose? Well, Congressman Snyder mentioned it. It is to create strategists, strategic thinkers. Everybody that graduates from your school is not going to be a strategic thinker, but they will understand it, hopefully. But I also think that there should be a great deal of rigor. They should study every bit as hard as I did in law school. And of course being a product of a law school that did the case method, I think that might not be a bad idea for battles, campaigns, conflicts to be studied on a case-by-case basis, and hopefully you do at least some of that.

But I question whether you are turning out, A, the strategists, and, B, whether they are being recognized and taken care of and put in the right slots or not. I have a deep concern about that. I
have expressed that at the highest level within the military. And I hope that those magic people who are great strategists can be guided by you to the right positions on staffs and in commands where they can use that strategic thinking rather than being shunted aside in chagrin and caused to be discouraged. I have seen instances of this, and needless to say it bothers me a great deal.

We are and have been blessed throughout the years with outstanding thinkers, but we have more, and they are not being utilized as they should be. I think that is up to you to identify those rare breeds and to make sure that their follow-on assignments allow them to be encouraged and to make contributions to best of their abilities.

This is a serious time. These are very serious times, and a year off with your family at school is not going to do it. Of course, it is wonderful to have a family at school and to participate in the activities, but you are trying to turn out and you should turn out—and then later make sure that they get the right slots within the military, whether they be joint or within the service that that they serve. I cannot stress that any stronger than I am now.

So thank you for your hard work, for your intellectual abilities, and for your leadership. And, again, let me compliment you, Dr. Snyder, Mr. Wittman, for this series of hearings. It is timely and in dire need for our country. Thank you.

Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your very thoughtful comments and all your work through literally the decades now on these very important subjects to our Nation.

Our witnesses today are Rear Admiral Garry Hall, United States Navy, Commandant, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces; Major General Robert Steel, United States Air Force, Commandant, the National War College; Rear Admiral James Wisecup, United States Navy, President of the Naval War College; Major General Robert M. Williams, United States Army, Commandant, the Army War College; Major General Maury Forsyth, United States Air Force, Commander of the Spaatz Center and Commandant of the Air War College; Colonel Michael Belcher, United States Marine Corps, Director of the Marine Corps War College.

We will put the timer on you, gentlemen. Your written statements will be made part of the record. When you see the red light go on, we are not going to shoot you. You should feel free to continue your statement if you need to. The challenge that we have with six of you is we decided we wanted to have all of you together here. We thought that would be good for all of us. If you all go 10 minutes instead of 5 minutes, it will be an hour before we get to any questions. So we hope that you will stay within the five minutes.

Admiral, we will begin with you and we will go right down the line. Thank you all for being here, and as I said, your statements will be part of the record that the staff already have, as do the members.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. GARRY E. HALL, USN, COMMANDANT, THE INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Admiral HALL. Good morning, Chairman Skelton, Mr. Chairman, Dr. Snyder, Mr. Wittman, and Dr. Fenner. Thank you very much for the opportunity to be here today, and based on your opening statements, I know that you really get it in what we are trying to accomplish at our schools.

I have been the commandant at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces for 18 months now, and I have observed 2 classes, so that is 640 students or fellows, and worked with just under 100 faculty members. And I am extremely proud of the institution. My written statement, as you said, is part of the record so I have three takeaways from that statement that I would like to make.

And the first one is, the point is that ICAF is unique. We are the only senior service school that teaches economics, and this translates into an appreciation of resource constraints. Our students learn to develop a national strategy while considering the reality of resources. And this was recently highlighted at our joint land-air-sea simulation held annually at the Air War College, where the ICAF students were recognized for their bringing all elements of power to bear: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. So they really bring the soft powers and understand the resources.

Point two I want to make is, Chairman Skelton, you spoke to Navy flags well before I was appointed to ICAF, and I remember clearly your statement as saying you want your students to work as hard as you did in law school, and that resonated with me, as well as your story about the shoe shine. What is the difference between a $3 shine and a $5 shine? It's attitude. So I express both of those comments to each class as they enter ICAF.

So the second point is ICAF is a challenging and rigorous academic program. It is not your old generals' ICAF. Many senior officers say when folks are sent to ICAF, it is only a lot of reading, if you do it; it is a great time to work on your handicap. Students show up and find out it is a lot of reading and you are going to do it, and there is no time to work on your handicap. So this is not the old-school ICAF. Our students are graded rigorously based on class contribution; not participation, but their contribution to class. They are also graded on in-depth research papers for every one of their courses they take, and faculty members evaluate all students through every exercise. This gives us the ability to hand out an honor graduate award and also to recognize about 12 percent of our graduates as distinguished graduates based on their grade point average (GPA) and leadership contributions.

Anecdotally, the Department of Homeland Security's education officer came in, looked at our curriculum, saw how it was being presented, and she said it was equal to her Ph.D. program that she is completing right now. Also, a Stanford University professor, after examining our curriculum, said we are perhaps the finest senior executive development course in the Nation, minus the finance. We teach economics but we don't teach finance.

Also, during our industry studies in the field trips where I have participated, I have watched senior executives, after being inter-
viewed or having discussions with our ICAF students, say, boy, these guys know more about us than we know about us, and our folks ask tough questions in a very polite manner. So there is rigor at ICAF.

Point number three is, we are still true to our charter. As Bernard Baruch said, he wanted a small school in touch with industry. We are still true to being in touch with industry but we are not averse to change or growth. We are constantly evolving. ICAF provides a relevant education for today's strategic environment.

And, Chairman Skelton, you always ask or often ask: Can a graduate have a conversation with General Marshall? Well, I feel after observing 640 students, as you said, not all of them are going to be that unique strategic leader, but I think over 90 percent of my graduates not only can have a conversation with General Marshall but could understand that conversation. They could politely challenge him, and they could continue to help him to develop his strategic thought. And then in the end, they could capture that thought, put it in clear concise writing, and be able to communicate it to others, something I think is very important to our commanders.

Again, an example of could they have that conversation? For the past 15 years we have had the national security strategy exercise where our students look forward 10 years and create a national strategy. They then, at the conclusion of 2 weeks of this exercise, brief out to 60 distinguished visitors (DV) at the three- and four-star rank in uniform, in industry, and in government. And again and again, the DV participants say, can we please come back, these folks are really great. So I do think we are producing strategic leaders.

So in summary, I am proud to be the commandant. I am energized by the students. I am inspired by the faculty, and I am a strong believer that one person can make a difference. So next week, one week from today, we will graduate 320 individuals, who will immediately go out with the sophistication needed to operate at the strategic level and soon be the strategic leader themselves.

An example would be in uniform, General Ann Dunwoody, who is now the first female four-star in the United States Army; in government, Dr. Kaminski, who has been a thought leader for government for decades; in business/industry, Chet Huber is now the CEO of OnStar; and one of our international Fellows, Ambassador Yousef Al Otaiba, is now United Arab Emirates Ambassador to the United States.

Mr. Snyder, you asked about our preparation for our commandants. And I would say President Obama used the quote that “The life of law is not logic but experience.” And I translate that it is the experience that is important to being a commandant or president of one of these colleges. So it is my experience operationally that I think makes a difference, gives a new set of eyes, and it is very easy to operate in an environment of academic freedom, because that comes down to moral courage and moral leadership in doing what is right. And so I feel that I am prepared to be the commandant and I am proud to be the commandant, and I will be happy to answer any of your questions.
And also, Chairman Skelton, I do get involved when I see those unique people with the right energy and intellect to follow on, to make sure they are placed in the right environment, or talk to their service. And also, my biggest concern is more with the government employees who often go back to their original jobs. So I talk to all leaders that come through about placement in the next job.

I will be happy to take any further questions. Thank you very much.

Dr. Snyder. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Hall can be found in the Appendix on page 41.]

Dr. Snyder. General Steel.

**STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. ROBERT P. STEEL, USAF, COMMANDANT, THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE**

General Steel. Chairman Skelton, Chairman Snyder, Congressman Wittman, and members of the subcommittee, I want to thank you for the opportunity to address the education of the men and women protecting and representing our country.

In my written testimony I addressed my vision for the National War College, the quality of its faculty, the composition of its student body, and the rigor of its curriculum.

I would like to note a few key points from it. It is an honor and a privilege to serve as commandant of the National War College. The National War College prepares future generations of America’s top military and civilian leaders through a course of study that enhances student knowledge of the national security issues, sharpens their analytical abilities, and focuses specifically on the successful formulation and execution of grand strategy. We also stress the habits, breadth, and depth of mind needed by senior policymakers and military commanders. Above all, we encourage students to hone their critical thinking skills.

In my opening remarks I would like to emphasize three points. First, it is important to recognize and preserve the unique mission of each war college. Second, National War College’s focus on grand strategy is critical to producing leaders who can deal with the national security challenges of today and tomorrow. Third, the leadership and organization of our senior service colleges are not broken as some would suggest.

Ensuring Joint PME II (JPME II) at all the war colleges is important, but it should not detract from the specialized excellence that each provides. When Chairman Skelton stressed the criticality of jointness in JPME years ago, he was careful to ensure that people did not interpret that as one national uniformed service. He recognized that jointness functioned best when it synthesized the best each service brought to the table.

While we look for ways to improve JPME, I ask that you preserve the specific mission that each war college was chartered to accomplish. For the National War College, it is the national security strategy mission that must be preserved. Each of the three critical components of the college—faculty, student body, and curriculum—has unique joint, combined, interagency composition. There is no particular service or agency lens through which prob-
lems are viewed. Equally important, our Washington, D.C., location means we can attract top non-Department of Defense (DOD) U.S. Government students and faculty. It also means that our students have tremendous access to the highest echelons of our three branches of government, our most renowned think tanks, and the entire Washington diplomatic corps. With the exception of our sister college, ICAF, I am aware of no other institution, government or private, that has these critical assets.

Finally, I challenge those that suggest the leadership and organization in our senior service colleges are broken. Leading the college requires the same senior leadership skills required for any large and complex institution: a dedication to mission, an ability to integrate the very best that JPME and the civilian academic world can offer our students, and a vision to anticipate the challenges of tomorrow.

A commandant must remember that these are hybrid organizations, a mix of military, civilian government, and academic environments whose strength flows from their diversity. I would be concerned by any line of thinking that fails to take into account our unique strengths. As an institution, it combines the best of the civilian academic world with senior government and military expertise. We bring together the next generation of our country’s military and civilian leaders, along with their international peers, for a program of study that has the unique capacity of allowing them to interact intensively with one another over a 10-month period and come to grips with the key issues that they will confront as they rise to positions of greater responsibility.

This unique experience is the central added value that PME institutions like the National War College bring to the education of our future leaders. It is not replicated in private sector universities. The critical essential element in achieving our unique mission is professional diversity. Diversity in our leadership, in our faculty, in our student body, and in our curriculum.

While our academic professionals help guide curriculum development, understand theory, maintain academic rigor, our professional practitioners bring a sense of operational reality that can be applied to the theories we teach. Leading these institutions requires a careful blending, a balance of these two forms of education where we will find the success that Chairman Skelton, you and your subcommittee, Chairman Snyder, and we who lead the schools all seek.

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for this opportunity to testify on a vital national security issue, the education of our future national security leaders.

[The prepared statement of General Steel can be found in the Appendix on page 69.]

Dr. SNYDER. Admiral Wisecup.

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. JAMES P. WISECUP, USN, PRESIDENT, U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Admiral WISECUP. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Chairman Snyder, Mr. Wittman, and gentlemen and ladies of the Oversight and Investigations Committee. I thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today about professional military education in our Navy,
especially our senior level course, and the work of the team at the
Naval War College in providing career-long educational opportuni-
ties related to the mission of the Navy in serving the people of this
Nation.

The United States Naval War College will celebrate its 125th an-
niversary in October. From its humble beginnings in the structure
in which had been the Newport poorhouse, the college has built an
international reputation for professional military education with
alumni in nearly every corner of the globe. Our founder, Rear Ad-
miral Stephen B. Luce, set a true course for educational success by
choosing an approach based on focus and holistic study of war, its
prevention, and the statesmanship involved with both. He envi-
ioned active learning by students and faculty on seminal strategic
issues in a collegial environment. One hundred and twenty-five
years later, those traditions remain at the center of the college’s
approach to education.

We carefully apply a very wide aperture of perspectives, dis-
ciplines, and cultures to the study of war and its prevention. We
continue to seek to prepare our senior level students for the chal-
lenges and responsibilities of higher command and staff in an un-
certain, ambiguous, and often surprising world. We aim to help
prepare them for strategic level leadership, not simply their next
duty station. We do that principally by inculcating in them dis-
ciplined habits of thought through a strategic-level lens and by
helping them hone their ability to critically think and write about
the associated complex issues.

We are confident our approach, which highlights an executive
perspective in a seminar-centered environment requiring an appreci-
ation of alternative viewpoints and the synthesis of complex ideas
using multidisciplinary tools, is precisely on target. We expect ap-
lication of principles to case studies of real events and issues and
require our students to provide written analysis of complex, open-
ended issues. Grading clearly sustains the academic rigor. Through
such endeavors we believe we can well judge if our students are
achieving the required educational outcomes.

The College of Naval Warfare is a 10-month senior level PME
program with JPME Phase II designed to produce broadly educated
leaders who possess a strategic perspective underpinned by key an-
alytical frameworks. Graduates will be able to apply disciplined
strategic-minded critical thinking to challenges in the multiservice,
multiagency, and multinational environments.

About 20 percent of our student body is made up of international
officers hand-picked by their services. Students study three 13-
week courses in our core academic program. The strategy and pol-
cy course focuses on educating students to think strategically; to
develop a disciplined critical approach to strategic analysis; to un-
derstand the fundamentals of military strategy, national policy,
and the interrelationships between them; to appreciate the political
uses of military power; and to become familiar with the roles of
both military and political leaders in policy formulation, military
planning, and the conduct of war and peace.

The national security decision-making course aims to prepare our
officer and government students to successfully lead change in
large complex organizations poised to meet national security challenges in an uncertain international security environment.

The joint military operations course refines military officers' critical and creative thinking skills under the umbrella of military problem-solving, especially the ability to evaluate a range of potential solutions to ill-structured problems and to function in volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environments.

These courses, along with three elective courses complemented by two conferences and a speaker's program, form this framework for examination of national security and strategic studies.

Over the last two decades, our educational approach and methodology has stayed on course. However, much else has changed.

First, we have implemented the recommendation by the Panel on Military Education of the 100th Congress. Today we have distinct curricula for our senior- and intermediate-level courses. They are discrete courses with differing focuses and outcomes. Since we have a single faculty to teach both levels, I am confident the distinction will remain and that these courses will complement each other very well over the longer term. As our recent JPME certification showed, though this places a greater workload on our distinguished faculty, they have told me personally that they are very proud of the end result. Our culture is one of constant reassessment.

Second, our educational outreach has expanded along with our mission as a result of decisions made by my direct senior, the Chief of Naval Operations. And I can tell you Admiral Roughead is four-square behind us. The College is now responsible for all professional military education in the Navy. As a result, the number of students we touch has grown from 1,500 in 1989 to over 27,000 today, and the in-residence program from 300 to almost 600.

In my short time as president, seven months on Saturday, I have found the War College to be a professional graduate institution of the highest quality, with faculty and staff members who are satisfied they are doing meaningful work that makes a difference.

The students are highly motivated professionals, many right off the frontlines overseas, and we invite them in as we learn together about this serious business of war.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am happy to take any questions.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Admiral.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Wisecup can be found in the Appendix on page 89.]

Dr. SNYDER. General Williams.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. ROBERT M. WILLIAMS, USA, COMMANDANT, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

General WILLIAMS. Chairman Skelton, Chairman Snyder, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. My name is Major General Bob Williams and I am the commandant of the United States Army War College at Carlisle Barracks.

I am a soldier who has had the good fortune of being associated with education and training of cadets and soldiers for more than 34 years. I have served as an instructor and assistant professor at West Point and as commander of two of the Army's premier Combat Training Centers as well as the Armor School and Center. Ad-
ditionally I have had the great privilege of serving in the operational Army both in peacetime and in war. I feel well prepared for duties associated as commandant, and it is an honor to be here today to discuss the professional development of our Nation’s strategic leaders at the war colleges.

As has already been said, the mission of the war college is to shape and develop the senior leaders our Nation will require. The Army War College’s unique contribution is to prepare our students to deal effectively with complex unstructured problems in strategic security environments and render sound military advice when the application of land power is part of a policy option. We do this recognizing fully that military activities are often only a part of the solution to complex problems. As we review the ever-changing security landscape, particularly since 9/11, I believe that we will best—and we do—best serve the country through these men and women that we educate by achieving appropriate balance with faculty, the student body, and the curriculum.

I would like to speak briefly to these three areas that I believe are the key to assuring the rigor and responsiveness of professional military education at the senior service level.

To begin with, faculty. It is the center of gravity for the Army War College, and I am pleased to report that our faculty meets the standards set by law and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff officer professional military education policy. Our faculty achieves, I believe, a powerful synergy between the melding of two cultures. First, our military officers have 22 to 30 years of professional expertise and a lifelong experience of training and mentoring. Second, our academic professors with their academic credentials, their research expertise, and their ability to publish. I firmly believe students’ success is directly related to the assignment of quality experienced officers representing the joint U.S. Forces in recruitment of high-quality academic professionals.

We recognize the value of assuring stability in key faculty positions and have instituted the Professor of the United States Army College Program to create, for lack of a better word, hybrid professionals; that is to say, military officers selected to pursue appropriate doctoral degrees and return to the Army War College faculty.

Even as we seek continuity, we are willing to give up faculty to support ongoing operations for periods of six months to a year. Those faculty members return with valuable experience that enhances our curriculum and helps us stay current with the challenge our operational force is facing in the field.

Balance is equally important within the student body if we are to meet the expectations for future strategic leaders. The war college experience works best, as we have all found, with a cross-section of those military officers who will lead our Nation’s future operations. We know that a joint student body representing all the services is important; and, equally important is a mix of the branches that make up the core of the Army’s ability to execute its missions across the spectrum of conflict. We also blend civilians from National Security Agency (NSA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other branches of government and international officers into this student mix.
A 21st century reality is that we are never going to fight alone, and so we have embarked on a program, at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Army, to increase the number of international Fellows in the student body. We will increase that number by 25 percent this next year. He has asked me to look at increasing it 100 percent over the course of 4 years. This is not only important for U.S. officers to understand how to fight together; it is important to prepare them for effective coalition operations. And therefore we need the diverse perspectives that come from international Fellows. We sponsor the same intellectual dialogue and challenges in the seminar that they will see in the future battlespace with each other.

Students ought to be exposed and challenged about nations’ points of views. Our national investment in these international students pays large dividends as former students, as we all know, are often promoted to the highest ranks of their militaries and civilian governments.

For similar reasons we believe we should be stronger, with a greater interagency representation in the student body. It is our business to prepare students to understand how military power works in concert with other national elements of power. Our seminars duplicate interagency dialogue and explore the distinct cultures, skills, and attributes of other agencies. Our students learn perspectives of diplomacy, economics, and information elements of power.

I understand that other U.S. Government agencies do not have the depth of personnel currently to allow them to divert many for graduate-level education. That makes it tougher to recruit interagency students and that makes it all the more important to incorporate interagency representatives into professional military education. It is a smart investment in our Nation’s ability to apply what is commonly referred to as “whole-of-government strategies.”

My final comments are about achieving balance in the Army War College curriculum. In the face of accumulated demands to add to the curriculum, we sometimes risk diluting our focus on education and slipping into training missions. I will admit that to you here. Therefore, our curriculum reviews are marked by a continuous debate over breadth versus depth, and hard decisions about the time devoted to each subject, contact time with faculty, time to read and reflect have to be made.

I feel the mechanisms are in place for me as the commandant to push back on those things, but it does require hard costs. Since the last study conducted by this committee, the Army War College has transitioned its program of instruction to incorporate its study of strategy as the central aspect of the curriculum. Army War College students study classic theorists, but they also study new strategies as well. The Army War College must be adaptive to the needs of the current and future fight, and we solicit feedback from the combatant commanders and service chiefs as we assess and shape the curriculum on an annual basis.

We seek to achieve balance between case studies and military history, emerging doctrine such as the irregular warfare doctrine in the counterinsurgency (COIN) manual as an example, while pro-
viding a broad and strategic level look at the leadership, ethics, and cultural intersection with national strategy.

In closing, I can tell you that today’s Army War College is much different than the one of the late 1980s. It is a dynamic institution that plays a significant role in preparing selected leaders with the responsibilities of strategic leadership.

Reforms of the last 20 years, and particularly the advent of JPME II, set high standards and expectations for assessment and adaptation. Because the Nation needs agile and resourceful as well as creative strategic leaders, our senior service colleges must themselves be agile, resourceful, and creative. We all know that education is an adaptive process, one which will require continuous assessment and adjustment to ensure we are still getting it right. I am confident that we are on that path.

Chairman Snyder, I know that I have requested my written statement be provided. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss this fundamental issue with this subcommittee and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Williams can be found in the Appendix on page 120.]

Dr. Snyder, General Forsyth.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. MAURICE H. “MAURY” FORSYTH, USAF, COMMANDER, SPAATZ CENTER FOR OFFICER EDUCATION, AND COMMANDANT, AIR WAR COLLEGE

General Forsyth. Chairman Skelton, Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Wittman, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear and testify about the Air War College.

This morning I would like to try to capture the essence of our vision for the Air War College in a senior professional military education version of the three Rs: relevance, relationship, and renewal.

First, relevance. I admit right up front I have spent my career as a pilot, joint staff officer, and commander, not an academic. As such, however, I believe I can identify closely with both the needs of the students and the needs of the general officers and senior civilians who employ our graduates.

Like my other colleagues here today, I have witnessed firsthand some of the tasks, dilemmas, and strategic choices that our graduates will face. If our program is to remain relevant, the Air War College education must clearly prepare our graduates to meet the needs of joint, interagency, and multinational operations, and not only in today’s fight but also tomorrow’s, as unpredictable as that may be. Our curriculum must properly balance the presentation of theory with practical knowledge gained through the study of history, personal experience, and the experience of others to produce strategic thinkers and leaders.

Likewise, relevance demands a balanced faculty consisting of both distinguished academics and experienced warfighters to inspire and educate our students, many of whom are coming to school right off of today’s battlefields.

Finally, relevance requires that as a complement to our accredited joint curriculum, each school devotes some part of the educational experience to service competency; in our case, at the Air War College, the competency of the air component.
While highly qualified faculty and challenging curriculum shapes the relevance of our program, the students hold the key to building all-important relationships. The Air War College experience thrives on building relationships in and out of the classroom between faculty and students and, most importantly, on building relationships among the students who come from different backgrounds, different services, different agencies, and different nations.

In addition to academic growth, the relationships forged during the shared common experience of war college can and do have lasting impacts as graduates deal with complex issues throughout the remainder of their careers. Oftentimes, that impact is manifested in a phone call seeking a different perspective on a challenging issue. Other times it is the chance encounter with a trusted fellow graduate in the hallway prior to a critical meeting, or, even more significantly, at a deployed location.

Perhaps the most important of these relationships are those forged with the international officers from 45 different countries who make up almost 20 percent of the integrated student body. While some aspects of the Air War College for U.S. students may be duplicated in other graduate school settings, this one cannot: the chance to meet, interact, and build a lasting relationship with officers selected by their countries to spend time in this formative year of senior professional military education in the United States. Many of these international Fellows go on to hold the most senior positions in their nation’s military and government.

Cultivating these relationships has never been more important in today’s interconnected and interdependent security environment. The importance of relationships is difficult to quantify but hard to deny.

Similarly difficult to quantify but just as important is the opportunity for renewal. The Air War College experience must build energy, strength, and enthusiasm for the difficult tasks that lie ahead for graduates and their families. Renewal comes from a student discovering that other students have overcome similar difficult leadership dilemmas in their careers. Renewal comes from intense discussion and debate on the role of leadership, command, integrity, and ethics. Renewal comes from the students gaining confidence in their ability to craft strategy in the joint, multinational, and interagency environment at the strategic level. Renewal comes from executing a demanding academic schedule built on a scaffold of stability and predictability that allows students time to reflect, synthesize, and discuss the material they study, as well as time to reconnect with their vital support network. And, finally, renewal comes from developing a clear understanding of the importance of the contributions of graduates and senior leaders to the success of their units and their Nation.

I thank you again for the opportunity to testify and the chance to outline the important contributions of relevance, relationships, and renewal, the Air War College’s success and the success of our graduates. I look forward to your questions. Thank you.

Dr. Snyder. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Forsyth can be found in the Appendix on page 140.]

Dr. Snyder. Colonel Belcher.
Colonel Belcher. Good morning, Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Wittman, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I appreciate this opportunity to address the subcommittee today and discuss the educational achievements of your Marine Corps War College.

Inspired and supported by the House Armed Services Committee and its Chairman, the 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Alfred M. Gray ignited a renaissance in Marine Corps professional military education in the 1980s that still burns today.

In August of 1990 he directed the convening of an elite group of six lieutenant colonels to conduct an intensive one-year study of the art of war and the profession of arms. Entitled “The Art of War Studies Program,” it was a precursor of today’s Marine Corps War College.

Since then the college has grown in size and scope, yet remains true to its original charter. Now as then, the college remains committed to preparing the Nation’s next generation of strategic leaders to confront the challenges of an increasingly complex, volatile, and globalized world. To do so, it employs a rigorous multidimensional curriculum, presented by first-rate faculty to a small elite group of high-caliber, highly competitive senior military officers and government officials. Focused on the strategic level of war, the curriculum examines both traditional and irregular modes of warfare, the instruments of national power, as well as the application of soft and hard power. It employs historical analysis to derive enduring lessons from history and apply them to the critical issues existing in today’s operational environment as well as those emerging on the strategic horizon.

The curriculum also reflects the culture of the service in which it is borne, specifically a lean, agile, adaptable expeditionary mindset that spans air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace spectra.

It also reflects the words of General James T. Conway, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, or, more accurately, his commitment that “We believe the human dimension of war is the most critical element, and that boldness, creativity, intelligence, and warrior spirit are prime attributes.”

To foster the development of critical and creative thought, the college employs active, adult-learning methodology to include highly personalized in-classroom instruction; local, domestic, and international field studies; practical application exercises; self-selected scholarly research; and professional time for reading and reflection. To remain current and cogent, the curriculum undergoes a rigorous, continuous, and multi-level review and validation process.

The curriculum is taught by seasoned faculty comprised of military, government, and civilian professors; some operators, some academics, but all professionals in their fields of endeavor. The instruction is enhanced by an expansive adjunct faculty of functional experts, regional experts, and interagency experts as well as visiting guest speakers.

Due to the college’s proximity to the National Capital Region and our small size, the students are afforded unmatched access to senior military, interagency, industry, and academic leaders whom
they meet with on a one-to-one personal basis, which promotes open, intimate, and informal discourse. Our guest speakers rival those of the most prestigious civilian universities. Who others hope to have at a commencement, we have in the classroom on a routine basis.

Lastly, the educational experience is enhanced by the quality and diversity of the college’s student population itself. While small, the student body consists of top performers, hand-selected by their respective service or agency for their exceptional operational and academic performance as well as their future potential for service. The student body includes representatives from all four services, both active and Reserve components; the United States Coast Guard; several government agencies; and multiple ethnic groups; as well as a myriad of occupational specialties. Thanks to this mixture, the students learn joint and interagency operations not just through instruction but also through personal observation and daily interaction.

Our vision for the war college is to retain the academic advantages inherent in being a small, elite college—specifically, the academic access, agility, and excellence we currently enjoy—while progressively growing into a more robust educational institution. To achieve this vision we have commenced a program to expand the size and diversity of our student population; to expand the size, capability, and diversity of our faculty; and, most importantly, to expand our academic outreach efforts. While the college’s educational experience cannot be replicated by any civilian university, we believe that it can be enhanced through increased interaction with leading-edge civilian institutions as well as collaboration with the other military educational institutions here today.

Mr. Chairman, our graduates will face a world dramatically different from that of their predecessors. Consequently, the Marine Corps War College is dedicated to intellectually arming them for the challenges ahead, to mentally reset the force for the fights yet to come. I am convinced that we are achieving this objective, and with the continued advocacy and support of this subcommittee we will do so far into the future.

Thank you for this opportunity to address the panel and I look forward to your questions. Thank you.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Colonel Belcher.

[The prepared statement of Colonel Belcher can be found in the Appendix on page 149.]

Dr. SNYDER. I know Admiral Hall probably recognized that he is sitting at the beginning of six people, that every question will come to him first. But we are not going to do that. We will move it around so you can all have the experience of saying “I am so glad I wasn’t the first one asked.”

Admiral Wisecup, we are going to start with you this time, and we will loop around. I want to ask the following question. This morning President Obama, about seven o’clock eastern time, gave—I did not see the whole speech, I saw excerpts of it—he gave what seemed to be a very well-received speech, certainly a much anticipated speech, calling for a new beginning in terms of the relationship between our Nation and the world of Islam. How will that
speech impact what occurs on your campuses and classes this week?

Admiral Wisecup.

Admiral WISECUP. Sir, thanks for that question. I watched part of that this morning, and I will tell you, knowing the faculty like I do, this will all fold into our constant reassessment. We have faculty members who are very well connected. They are always out and about.

A faculty member, for example, who teaches in strategy and policy is also our area specialist in the Indian Ocean, Pakistan, India. He will, one, know about this speech; two, he will have the text; three, probably knows people connected with it. And then when the faculty does their curriculum review, which, in fact, they are in the process of now for the next academic year, those kinds of ideas will factor into how they retorque the curriculum.

So imagine, if you can, the network of people from our very distinguished faculty who are doing this same thing and then they all bring these in to talk. They do what they call bootstrap sessions as they review the curriculum for the next trimester’s teaching, week by week, class by class. And so these faculty members will sit in a room, for example, and have oftentimes a heated debate over what is going to go into this curriculum. That is when this kind of information, this kind of context, can be provided and factored right into the development of the curriculum, right up to just a few weeks before they actually go in front of the students on the podium, which really keeps things current.

Dr. SNYDER. General Steel.

General STEEL. Sir, I would echo what Admiral Wisecup said. What I would add to it is, even while his speech was ongoing, the blogging network was already alive with our network of graduates throughout the region there, already communicating with faculty here at the war college with what they were perceiving the receipt of this speech was. I anticipate that network to be alive and well here throughout this week, the discussions to be had. We will roll all transcripts, other discussions that the think tanks come out with, into our faculty—our curriculum review here during the summer. And when we get to this particular phase in our curriculum with next year’s class, I am sure there will be even new information to roll into our classrooms here as much progress is made in the months ahead from his speech here.

Dr. SNYDER. Admiral.

Admiral WISECUP. Yes, sir, I think this is a perfect time of the year for this to take place.

Dr. SNYDER. Let me interrupt you. Several of you have a graduation coming up, don’t you, so you are not in a full classroom mode now.

Admiral HALL. Right. But I know it will still have an impact, and it comes, as I said, at the right time of the year. We have 20 international fellows right now at ICAF, and I just counted them, I think about 50 percent of them are from the Middle East or Muslim countries, and also an Israeli student.

Now, at the beginning of the year, they might be hesitant. But now, as we said, academic freedom and the policy of non-attribution, as we go through the year, not only is their mind expanded,
but they become comfortable in the environment and they realize, the international fellows, they do have the freedom to speak openly about their opinions, and U.S. students have learned to accept these. It is a very fascinating process to see this awakening happen.

So they have fertile minds to process this. Today is a picnic for the international fellows, which I will attend, and I will ask them what they thought of the comments.

But each seminar has one international fellow. They will be questioned, what do you think about this, and there will be academic discussions in both directions without any fear of attribution. I think it is a perfect time, and their minds are open.

I have observed from two classes, it is about this time of year we want to get rid of our students because we have opened their minds so much they are a real pain in the fact they challenge every assumption and openly discuss issues. So I think it is a perfect time and it will be well received.

Dr. Snyder. Colonel Belcher.

Colonel Belcher. The impact back at the college campus would be, one, the professors beaming with pride that what they taught throughout the year is now coming to fruition, that the history and the background that they gave regarding Islamic culture, regarding previous campaigns, the regional studies that we did, as well as the international travel to Asia-Pacific region, specifically India, have proven true. So they are silently blushing.

The students are silently in awe that wow, they got it right and prepared us for what is coming up and prepared us to address these issues.

From that, there will be continued discourse and debate regarding what that means in the future, how that is applied, what the policy implications are, and, more importantly, what are the military ramifications that they need to be ready to implement when they go to their next job at a service or combatant command headquarters.

For the curriculum, we will continue to enhance that and look at that as we do our curriculum reviews, as discussed previously, and also it leads into the perfect segue that next year as we introduce our first international fellow, we have three coming on board, one from France, one from Canada, and most importantly a, a brigadier general from Pakistan, it will allow us to continue that discourse and debate the following academic year.

Dr. Snyder. Thank you.

General Forsyth.

General Forsyth. Mr. Chairman, sadly, on two accounts, I didn't hear the speech, number one, but number two, at the Air War College they did graduate last Thursday, and so we have no students there.

But that said, I think this is part and parcel to, quite frankly, one of the best class case studies, if you will, this whole entire year, the whole changing of the government, and thereby the changing of the strategy, the national security strategy that will roll down to the national military strategy and how that all takes place has been an incredible academic classroom in and of itself, and this is but one other piece of that that, as everyone has said, will be rolled
into next year, and, quite frankly, not just this speech, but the way we have gotten to where we are from the Bush Administration to the way we are in the Obama Administration throughout the entire year has been just an incredible academic groundwork, if you will.

Dr. SNYDER. General Williams.

General WILLIAMS. Sir, I did have the opportunity to watch it this morning. I think the President, I believe the President, had a number of major themes, obviously. But two of them I took note of was one of diplomacy and a willingness to listen, and also assist was one thing. But clearly also he reconfirmed that he will, this Administration will, protect the American public.

I believe for us it will perhaps push our desire, as we have had for some time now, in the education of our strategic leaders, to focus on an emphasis of all elements of national power, including diplomacy, economics, information, as well as the part that we are experts in, the military component.

But it clearly signals for us, I think, an emerging national security strategy that, of course, our academics, as we end our course on Saturday, we will take aboard and adjust our curriculum as appropriate.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Wittman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentleman, I think as a follow-up from that, I want to ask, in context of what we see today, which is a very, very dynamic period of time in our history, both nationally and internationally, with things changing constantly, how do you see your challenge of making sure that your schools can change in relationship to those external changes, but also remain true to making sure those fundamental subject matters are being taught and instilled in the graduates from your institutions? And also, how do you take the lessons learned under current operations and incorporate them within that whole context of making sure your graduates come out with that rounded strategic knowledge to be the leaders our Nation needs to go into the future?

I will start with General Steel.

General STEEL. Sir, you are right to highlight the challenge of the school in protecting some of the core elements in our educational requirements. For example, at the National War College, we try to stay at the strategic level.

I have got only 10 months to work with. We have got a lot of ground to cover. Our students, when they first show up, have all been operating at the operational level. Their minds are rather fixed and it takes several months to kind of unlock that and make progress. We constantly get challenged with themes that commanders in the field would like to see in graduates so that they are ready to go as soon as they get into their new job. Most of these requests are at the tactical and operational level.

So I work with my faculty regularly to resolve how to best approach the requests of the combatant commanders, senior leadership, other agencies, that this particular new dynamic environment be incorporated into your curriculum somehow. We usually find a way where either it is already being discussed, it is just not a sole centerpiece in the curriculum, but if we can find how to best thread
that new dynamic environment into our curriculum, we will do so, and we will find the best course to put that in.

Also, electives turn out to be a pretty good option for our student body as well to get a more focused study on a particular concept. So we do use the elective opportunity as one to take on some of these new fields that are being asked for the colleges to invest in.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thanks. Admiral Wisecup.

Admiral WISECUP. Sir, I think the best way to answer your question is to go back to the question that Chairman Snyder posed about the Obama speech, for example, and the mechanism that I outlined for you how we can roll things into our curriculum.

This is again a function of the faculty. I will give you an example. At this point, we are going into the nuclear posture review, so now time is right for people who can talk to these issues about nuclear deterrence in a new world. The interesting thing is we have people who have been constantly working those issues, kind of like the Christian monks in Ireland who preserved the sacred texts during the Middle Ages. And in fact, we have this expertise that has not been permitted to atrophy, and now that it is needed, we have been able to provide that expertise to a variety of agencies and government folks who have been asking for it and searching it out.

The other thing is looking at how the faculty gets out; one of our faculty members visited North Korea about a month and a half ago with a private visit of a major foundation, and he works research. Our faculty is constantly publishing. They are contributing constantly. These are the same faculty that are going to roll into the bootstrap sessions and talk about the curriculum.

The other thing was for example when I was strike group commander, at the Ronald Reagan Strike Group, before I even knew I was going to go be president of the war college, I actually knew the expertise of these experts and actually asked them to come out, like General Steel was explaining, to come out to my strike group and talk to us about the region of the Indian Ocean. So they got the benefit of coming out and talking with onsene commanders about the current situation, then flew off to visit their contacts in different places in the region, and we got the benefit of their knowledge. These are the same people who are going to roll this information into the bootstraps and into the curriculum development.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you. Colonel Belcher.

Colonel BELCHER. Thank you very much for that question, sir. Our curriculum is founded in the enduring tenets of war, which have not changed in many, many years. However, with that said, we do look to capitalize on new and novel approaches coming out of the current operations that we can apply within our curriculum. Specifically, we look back into history, identify those principles applicable, and then apply them in modern scenarios in the current setting that our students are operating in or will operate in as graduates.

To drive those, we go to multiple sources. First and foremost is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance through the learning objectives that he establishes and the yearly Special Areas of Emphasis. In large part, these will be the most critical elements of the upcoming year that we begin to integrate into our curriculum to ensure that we are dealing with the topical issues, but
not whipsawing the curriculum all around and chasing the topic of the day.

The other ways we do this are through hiring of faculty that are coming directly from operational backgrounds, myself just having come out of a regimental command tour, bringing the experience from that and previous combat tours, right to the schoolhouse.

Secondly, it is through continual scanning of the strategic horizon by the professors, through reading, research, interacting with the think tanks and study groups, such as the Strategy Division Group, the joint warfighting centers, to see what is on the strategic horizon that we need to prepare our students for, and then incorporating that in a coherent method that is synchronized with the rest of our curriculum.

Other ways include routine interviews with combatant component commanders and service leaders. Yesterday I had the opportunity to sit down and talk with Lieutenant General Allen, Deputy Commander at Central Command (CENTCOM), regarding his most critical issues, as well as the critical capabilities he is looking for from graduates from my war college.

The other ways, continuing to interview our graduates and their supervisors to see that the curriculum met the needs when they came into the force.

Finally, we also allow academic white space. We have a series of classes called “issues in modern warfare” that we purposely do not fill at the beginning of the year, knowing that critical issues will pop up during the year we would like to craft classes for. Having a small faculty, I have the organizational agility to put classes together, find leading-edge experts come in and fill those. Such topics in the past have been the repeal of don’t ask, don’t tell, what would be the implications for the military; the effects of a pandemic, which happened to be very timely because several weeks later swine flu began to reach the headlines; a variety of topics that we can then add in to make sure the student as he walks out the door is as up-to-date as he can be before he begins his next job.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, sir.

General WILLIAMS. Sir, I appreciate the question. I think that I don’t have a problem with staying current with the current student body at the tactical and operational level. With 70 to 80 percent of them coming in with recent Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) experience, if anything, that is a challenge for us to push them to the strategic level.

In terms of staying current at the strategic level, we have always been, like some of my colleagues here, a think tank, for lack of a better description, for the Department of the Army, the combatant commands (COCOMs) and various other agencies in the United States. There is enormous intellectual talent in the faculty, and they often are called for their expertise. In fact, this last year I have had members of the faculty serve on Brigadier General H.R. McMaster’s team building a new strategy for Afghanistan, as well as answering a call from International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for a strategist where I sent my director of National Security and Strategy for six months to assist in the building of the
strategy for Afghanistan. By the way, as his six months was over, we sent the number two man from that department, and he is down range right now.

So at any given time we look for opportunities to take our faculty and offer our faculty up to work on some of the hardest problems that the Nation is facing at the strategic level. When they come back, of course, they seed the faculty, they inform the curriculum. So that is enormously empowering.

The other part of your question, though, is how do we protect the core from a whole host of requirements, oftentimes that look like training as opposed to education. Sometimes those things come through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) at the Military Education Committee, and we are all in attendance at those, as well as our deans throughout the year, and we have an opportunity to push back on those items so that we aren’t required to put them into the curriculum. Sometimes we win, sometimes we lose, but I feel confident that the mechanisms are in place for us to do what we need to do or I need to do as a commandant.

I do not get that many requirements from the Army that I would call training requirements apart from those kinds of things that we would want to do anyway; recently suicide training. We take the time. It is important. It is absolutely required and we are proud to do that.

I hope I have answered your question. I think we have the mechanisms in place to stay current, which is to say we stay at the strategic level. We are in the business of allowing these students to master the strategic art, and we have to stay focused at that.

Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you. General Forsyth.

General FORSYTH. Sir, thanks for the question. Everybody has touched on or at least danced around a little bit where I would like to go with this, and that is the balancing act or the tension that is always there between the current event or the current topic of the day and the foundations of leadership, ethics, strategy, those things that need to be the bedrock of what we do. And I think that pretty much in many instances comes to the people at this table, to make sure that we have an advocate for both.

The faculty, at least at the Air War College is about a third civilian, a third military, Air Force military, and about a third joint military and interagency and, quite frankly, coalition as well. That mixture allows us to span the spectrum between the basic foundations and current events. Add into that the students, that as we just heard, many of them just came from the war and you try to extract them from either the tactical level or operational level and bring them up to strategic level, it makes for, quite frankly, a great dynamic within the classroom. So with respect to making sure that the foundations are there and the balance is correct, I think that rises, quite frankly, mostly, in many cases, to my level.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you.

Admiral Hall.

Admiral HALL. Yes. I heard the question as how the President’s speech affects your curriculum and how do we maintain our core courses. This is a dynamic period and it was a very compelling speech, but at ICAF, we want to develop strategic leaders, folks
that can formulate strategy, and analyze strategy, but not chase strategy. So this will become a case study to be in our national security studies and our strategic leadership courses as we work students through the Socratic method in challenging the assumptions. So we are constantly reviewing our curriculum. In fact, we are going through the formal process right now, and we see what is relevant.

I see it becoming part of a teaching package, to use as an example, in case study, but not changing the curriculum. You don't want us to chase policy speeches, but learn how to challenge and interpret policy and develop policy.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to all of you for all of your comments and your openness. I certainly appreciate it.

I have a few questions as you have been talking. One is the issue you mentioned, the six months kind of turnaround in terms of deployments and bringing people back into school. Has that been a problem, a major problem for any of you in terms of deployments, and does that mean that we might have fewer officers who are trained in advanced professional education?

General WILLIAMS. Whenever I get a request from the theater for assistance that might involve the pulling of one of my faculty for that purpose, I immediately go to the dean, who is sitting directly behind me, and I ask him, can we support the United States Army or this theater commander, wherever the requirement comes from, and not degrade our primary mission, which is the education of the students, which we are charged with? If he comes back to me and says yes, we can do that, then I believe it is part of my mission to support the operational and institutional Army. So I think it is important that we do that.

By the way, to your real question, do I have trouble with that, I usually have faculty members lining up in the hallways volunteering to do this, because they fully understand that as great educators, they are adding additional tools to their kit, for the audience and the constituencies they have to talk to. So, no, I don't have a personal problem from them, and so far we have not had to say no. We have gotten close a couple of times.

But I hope I have answered your question, ma'am. I have not had a problem with this.

Mrs. DAVIS. Anybody else want to weigh in differently on that?

Admiral HALL. I think the question goes to deployments and expect-ations, and the deployments affect all aspects of military life, including family life.

Back when Senator McCain and his classmates went to National Defense University, they said, You are coming back from being prisoners of war (POWs). This is going to be an opportunity for you to relax, to get back in touch with your family, to regroup and work on your health.

Our programs no longer allow that. As I referred to in my opening statement, it is a very rigorous academic program. So we bring folks in right from the field, whether it be Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine, and also many of our deployed civilians, they are told it
is a time to catch their breath, when really it is a very rigorous academic year, and they don't often get to catch their breath.

So, also many, if they are coming from out of theater, they may leave their families in their previous duty stations so now you have a situation of geobatching, as we call it, geographically isolated from your family. So there are implications to that.

So what do we do? We are always talking about post-traumatic stress and looking for that in our students. We have medical and psychological help. We have health and fitness. So we do work on that basis of healing any wounds, seen or unseen, and we have both types of wounds come to ICAF.

So, it is challenging, and you work with them, and you work with the families. But it is a rigorous course of study, and overall in the military everywhere, they are going to find challenges with all the deployments. That is a different perspective.

General STEEL. Ma'am, if I could add, it is not just deployments, but our schools and our faculty are sought after globally because of their expertise. So whether they are being asked to go and deploy to support the Army or combatant commander or just to come and help them with some research aspect, quite often the schools, and here at National as well, the first thing we look is to see whether we can support it with our ongoing activities at the college. If we can do that and it enhances this faculty's expertise, we will do everything we can to support it, because that faculty member will return with value-added.

Mrs. DAVIS. I can understand that.

If I can go really quickly, Mr. Chairman, back to General Williams, I think you mentioned you would like to increase the international officers by about 25 percent, 100 percent over 4 years. What percentage are they now?

General WILLIAMS. We have 40 in the class of 340. I have never figured out that percentile. We will go to 50 next year, and the Chief of Staff of the Army has asked me how we would go to 80. What that would do for us in the classroom, currently every one of our seminars has approximately two foreign international students in it. We would go to four.

Again, the desire is to open the aperture as part of our cultural training at the senior level, and there is no better vehicle I think to do that than to bring these very successful officers from around the world, all nominated by COCOMs that come through in some cases, in all cases, the Army staff, and then they are sent to us based on the G–3's decision of who will make it.

Mrs. DAVIS. I am just wondering, are there barriers to bringing more international officers in? Is it a matter of having the seats essentially, or are there other constraints that get in the way?

General WILLIAMS. You are absolutely hitting on an issue for us. But it is a matter of facilities and faculty. I am okay for this next year to go to 50, but the dean and the academic board have reported to me beyond that we have to look at some other ways before we increase any further. But there are no barriers beyond that that I think I need legislative help on for sure.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Snyder. I am going to pick on you, Admiral Wisecup. How often do you all get together, either formally or informally, as a group?

Admiral Wisecup. I am new to this process. I missed the meeting we recently had.

General Williams. Sir, I have been doing this for about 14 months now. I believe I would be correct in saying I have seen these guys about three or four times this last year in various forums. About eight months ago, my board of visitors sponsored a symposium in Washington, and all of them were invited to discuss PME. Together we collectively decided to get together prior to the Military Education Coordination Council (MECC), the joint staff meeting, and General Caldwell hosted a meeting at Fort Leavenworth, where we sat down and discussed issues and ideas before we would go to that meeting in Washington, D.C. I believe, if I am not correct, I am talking for their university, I believe they are going to host a meeting of just those you see at this table this coming fall.

I hope I have answered your question.

Dr. Snyder. I wanted to ask, some of us have talked about this before, but we have heard since we started doing this look and the staff has heard it also that there is variability amongst the services in where the students are within their career. Some branches of the service, the students clearly see being in one of these colleges as a career enhancing move. Others are not so sure.

I will pick on the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps seems to get the best kudos for both looking at the students before they get there, the faculty before they get there, but also figuring out where they are going to go afterwards in terms of, yes, this is going to help your career both as a faculty member and as a student. I may be wrong with that. These are just anecdotal things.

Would each of you respond. Do you think there is variability among the services in terms of how they go about selecting the students, selecting faculty for a contribution to your organizations, and then how they look at where these careers are going to go after the students have graduated and the faculty, I am talking about military faculty now, have completed their careers.

Admiral Hall, we will start with you.

Admiral Hall. Yes. I discussed this topic often because I say there are service cultures. So speaking from the Naval service, there are times in your career where you need expertise at sea tactically, whether it be in the cockpit, on amphibious ships, or in submarines. So therefore you don’t need somebody to be thinking strategically at that point. You need them to excel in leadership positions at sea, and that is part of our service culture in the Navy. That is how you get evaluated and promoted, again through challenging leadership assignments at sea, where other services might not have that same requirement, their culture is different. As you alluded to, the Marine Corps, it is more difficult to get in-residence senior level school than it is to make colonel. It is a smaller subset.

So I don’t think you can ever get uniformity across all of the services as to the right timing and the right measurement of career enhancement.
I know that in all services, it is going to be career enhancing to go to an in-residence senior level school, but you are not going to change the service cultures to get a uniform answer that you can stamp across-the-board.

I just looked at my distinguished graduates, and it is uniformly spread amongst the services on my distinguished graduates, whether it be Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps. So once they get here, they do excel uniformly. But I think as far as promotion goes, it is service culture.

General Steel. Sir, I would say at the National War College, we rarely see a military student show up that doesn’t meet our criterion. They all succeed. Most of them are either on a promotion list or get promoted while they are at the National War College. So I don’t see the experience of coming to the National War College as anything but a positive benefit to the military member when they are competed and selected and attend the National War College.

Again, the quality of student that the services are providing is high. As I shared with you yesterday, this being my second class experience, the only thing I have seen struggled in fulfilling the student list has been sometimes on our Army side, due to the operational tempo (op tempo). Usually they are a little bit late getting their slate in. But they always fill it and the quality is extremely high. Just as Admiral Hall shared with you——

Dr. Snyder. Excuse me, you are talking about students. How about faculty?

General Steel. For faculty, we are very selective. The services nominate to the National War College who they would like to contribute for faculty. That faculty is interviewed, screened and evaluated, a recommendation is made to me through a faculty hiring committee as to whether they meet the standards or not.

Dr. Snyder. I understand that. My question, though, was where it fits within the service. Admiral Hall referred to service culture. Do people come to you and say I have a dead-end career, I am going to faculty here for a year or two. Is there a variability amongst the services when the military services assign faculty to you, and I know you go through the selection process, they are top-notch people, but do they perceive that their career is enhanced by being a faculty member for a couple of years?

General Steel. Most of them have had a teaching background or experience, and they know what they are getting into, and they seek out the National War College as a way to again broaden their teaching credentials. So I think they come from all the services to the college fully aware of what their experience is going to be at the National War College. I don’t think they look down on it as something negative. They know they are getting into a teaching realm and most of them will already have at the Ph.D. level, so they are rather senior in their service careers already. I think they look at it as a positive set of years to spend in the remaining time that they are going to serve with their service there.

Dr. Snyder. Admiral.

Admiral Wiesecup. I think it is a positive. The people who come to the Naval War College’s military faculty may not have sought it out. But at some point in your career you get to the point where
there is not a lot of individual input into where you are going with your life.

But for example, one of our military faculty was just selected to be carrier air group commander. So I view that as a very positive sign that everyone is not going to go on to be Chief of Naval Operations, but I will tell you, the people I talk to, all view it as a positive and feel like they are really doing meaningful work. Here is the way we can help the person who is just coming right off the flight line.

For example, in our Strategy and Policy Department, we can put a very experienced civilian professor in with the newer strategy and policy professor, okay. But the point being, the people I have talked to, remember, I have only been there seven months, but I have talked to a lot of the military faculty, and almost all of them view it as a positive.

General Williams. I think we have to look at, and I will speak for the Army War College, we have to look at our colonels in a sort of unique way, to answer your question, sir. The colonels who come and teach at the United States Army War College are between their 25th and 30th year of service. They don't come back to get promoted to general officer. I think that is very important to say here.

I would welcome lieutenant colonels, senior lieutenant colonels, senior lieutenant colonels and/or junior colonels who are competitive for brigadier general. But perhaps one of the second or third order effects of Goldwater-Nichols is that when a student finishes at the war college, it is very hard for him or her to have the time, the discretionary time, to serve a tour of duty as an educator in the war college and still remain competitive, in part because they need to go and get "jointed" quite often. We have actually had students that we would like to keep on faculty, but if we kept them, they would not be competitive for general officer.

Now, having said that, I believe that the colonels who do serve, I don't think we have had to drag anyone back to do this. I think that they are at a point in their career that they want to give back and they want to be outstanding educators and the reputation of the institution is such they are very pleased to come back. They have great maturity, they have experience, and they fit this job particularly well at this particular time in their career.

So, I think that the quality of my faculty, particularly the military faculty, is absolutely outstanding. They are terrific educators. I hope I have answered your question.

Dr. Snyder. General Forsyth.

General Forsyth. Sir, I would agree completely with General Williams that the quality of the faculty is fabulous. I would say that the expectations of the faculty, the military faculty, are different and they run the full spectrum. There are those that, as you have heard, come there knowing that is probably their last assignment, sometimes because they want it to be, sometimes because of their timing in their career.

I have one data point. We lost one faculty this year in all, and she got a great joint assignment here in the D.C. area, basically what she wanted. So it was looked upon favorably there. We have
five volunteers to get their Ph.D.s to come back and teach at the Air War College.

So it spans the entire gambit. In this last brigadier general nomination board, one of the people had been a faculty member. So I think it is not what maybe in the past was looked at as a dead end assignment. I think it is looked at as a valuable assignment to the service. They can contribute still, no matter where they are in that spectrum, whether this might be their last assignment or whether they want to continue on.

Dr. SNYDER. Colonel Belcher.

Colonel BELCHER. Sir, the president of the Marine Corps University has made it his policy that he is willing to sacrifice continuity for capability. So it has been the policy of the university's throughout all the services to select the best and the brightest to come and instruct or direct at the various colleges.

So there is some risk in that, in that you will have an officer for a year, maybe two years, before he is selected for command or for promotion, but that is a risk we are willing to assume to get the competence that he brings from his past operational experience.

For myself as the director, I competed to get selected for this billet. The other Marine that will be coming on board this year similarly, coming out of the National War College, was hand-selected for this billet and has a bright potential for future service and promotion.

In fact, among my sister colleges at the Expeditionary Warfare School, the last two directors there were selected for brigadier general during their tours there, showing the value that the Marine Corps puts in education as an investment for the future.

Among the other services that we have on staff, the U.S. Air Force has sent us topnotch officers. My current Air Force officer was just selected to command at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. My prior U.S. Air Force officer is now sitting behind me, who decided to become the dean of academics because of his academic proficiency and his support for the school.

The Army similarly has given me operational experts, practitioners. My current Army officer was selected after a tour in Afghanistan where he worked at the current operations shop and is an active pilot.

I have been very impressed with the staff we have had from all of the services, and couldn’t have asked for a higher quality faculty to go forward with.

Thank you, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Wittman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to, again, take it to another step in the Chairman's question. I want to ask about, how do we go back attracting the best or I guess top tier of civilian faculty? What are the things that we need to be looking at to address that? Is it things like tenure, copyright, pay, them being able to keep their government retirement, research, administrative assistance? What do we need to be doing to attract and retain the best and brightest on the civilian side of the faculty?

General Williams, I will start with you.

General WILLIAMS. I may call on my dean here to speak up.
Let me start by saying we work very hard to bring in talented civilian faculty as well. Many are, by the way, former military officers who have received their terminal degree and so they serve us very well.

We also, and I mentioned this, have a program at the United States Army War College where we bring in those colonels in the 25 to 30 year mark who have a particular penchant for academics and being outstanding educators, and we send them off to work on their doctorate. I currently have 10 officers that have received their Ph.D. on my faculty, I have 5 that are working on it, and I have 5 civilian professors who are a product of that particular program.

We, of course, advertise throughout the United States for openings that come up, and we do very well with the standard professors of history, former planners, those kinds, leadership, but we are not competitive in a number of certain areas. As an example, economists, behavioral scientists, military sociologists. We do not pay competitively.

I would ask Dean Johnsen if he would like to add perhaps to that and offer up any insights into what we could do differently.

Bill.

Mr. JOHNSEN. Sir, thank you. One the things we find, sir, is given the nature of our curriculum and the professional nature of it, we sometimes have difficulty convincing standard liberal academics from a more liberal arts background that this is the place for them to come and teach.

I believe, like many of the other schools, if we can get someone to an interview at our institution and demonstrate to them that we are open, we have academic freedom, the quality of our students in particular, the faculty, the ability to influence policy on occasion, then we have a strong possibility of bringing those people to our faculty and then retaining them. It is doing the proper advertising and networking within the various disciplines that will allow us to do that.

Mr. WITTMAN. General Steel.

General STEEL. Sir, on that list you read off of, I would just echo that there should be some work done on the copyright issue and the annuitants discussion that is out there. I know that affects some of the faculty that we hire. So, yes, we do need to do some homework there.

We are fortunate again in the Washington area to have a little bit of a draw on some of that high talent that is out there just because this is Washington, people like to live and work around this city, and teaching over at National Defense University is a pretty good job, if that is what you like to do. So that is a draw.

We don’t have any problems getting people to apply for an opening at faculty at National Defense University. We usually end up whittling that down, and we have a good solid dozen every time to draw from. So I believe we are getting top-tier talent with our civilian hires.

As I shared with you yesterday, one of the things that I would like to see considered for the National War College was that kind of an endowed chair position to try to draw on the high policy National Security Agency talent, that when folks leave those positions, they have an opportunity to come over and teach at the Na-
tional War College and we can tap into their recent experiences, and that would add again to the college as far as becoming a pre-eminent national security strategy institution. So a look into that kind of endowed chair possibility would be helpful.

Mr. WITTMAN. Admiral Hall.

Admiral HALL. We have many similarities with the National War College. Our location gives us a great pool of faculty to pull from. But one thing that General Steel didn’t mention is accreditation. Both our schools are accredited. We want to maintain our accreditation, because why would a faculty member in D.C. want to work at a school that doesn’t give an accredited master’s degree, because they can go to George Mason, Georgetown, George Washington.

The other thing is there is always concern, are we paying them equivalent if they could go down to George Washington and things of that nature. So we are working on the pay.

Tenure, I don’t think I would want to go down the tenure route because we don’t want our institutes to become stale and not have that ability to keep currency.

At ICAF, my faculty members are about 92 members, that gives us a 3.5 to 1 ratio. Thirty of those are military, 45 are Title X, but I have 17 to 19 that are civilian, that are interagency faculty chairs, including an industry chair. Right now it is from IBM, and it was a very competitive process on her relief, and American Express is sending the next industry chair. So we have 20 chairs that come from interagency, everything from Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), to National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), National Security Agency (NSA), State Department, et cetera.

So we have a very dynamic civilian faculty. But our Title X, it is going to be accreditation, A, and, B, all the other points that Bob pointed out. Thank you.

Mr. WITTMAN. Colonel Belcher.

Colonel BELCHER. Congressman, thank you very much. That has been a topic of debate within our faculty and is very timely.

Let me begin by telling you what it is not. It is not high salaries. Competitive salaries are important, but I have not had a professor that the salary has been the deciding point when it is in the competitive range with other salaries in the area. What it is, is first the ability and the opportunity to teach and get in the classroom. To assist that, we try to remove as much administrative overhead from the faculty as possible, to move away from documenting each course to death and allowing more freedom of how they develop their syllabi, how they run their classes, and avoid micromanaging their work in the classroom, freeing them up to spend time mentoring and working with the students.

Secondly, it is the opportunity to research in their fields. They love their fields of endeavor and want to go deeper and broader into them. The more we can give them opportunities, through time to do that, whether that be sabbaticals, short-term research opportunities, involvement in symposia, panels, lectures, and expanding faculty development, it is to our benefit.

Also having topnotch research facilities, as we do at the war colleges, is very beneficial. Expanding the outreach between research
centers would be beneficial so they get timely information in their fields.

The research assistant program, we are looking at that currently again to free them up and go deeper and broader into their fields of study for research.

Two items that I would like to address that I think distract from our recruiting effort, the first is, to some degree, folks that are looking at the war college are self-selecting. They have perceptions about what the war colleges are and lack of academic freedom or lack of the topic matter that they will be able to cover. They are still looking at our fathers’ war colleges, not the war colleges of today.

We need to broaden our strategic communications to more civilian institutions, academic institutions, and think tanks so they know what we are about, and we have a broader pool to recruit from.

Similarly, it is up to us to then broaden that pool. When job announcements go out, that they go to a broader perspective and broader reach and professors that we might not consider otherwise that will come in and challenge the curriculum, challenge other professors with new and bold thoughts and thereby make us all better, not continue to hire from the same pool of professors that we may have in the past. That way I think we also broaden the educational opportunity for our students.

Thank you, sir.

General FORSYTH. Sir, it has not always been easy to hire folks to come to Maxwell, Alabama. But I will be honest with you, I have only been there a year, but I have not seen the pushback with respect to that. In fact, I have seen exactly the opposite.

I don’t know if it has to do with the economy or what have you. But we are just in the process of hiring a political economist that is coming to us from London, has his Harvard Ph.D., and we get those kind of people routinely and our faculty is littered with that kind of talent.

So I couldn’t be more pleased with the folks that we have and with the people that we get. Part of what we can offer at Maxwell that is not necessarily available everywhere else, except for maybe Washington, is we have all the schools there, and we have the Air Force Research Institute there where people can go and do research and publish and do those kinds of things that many of them want to do.

So, I haven’t seen it as an issue where I am at, and I am very pleased with what we have.

Mr. WITTMAN. Admiral Wisecup.

Admiral WISECUP. Thank you, sir.

I benefit from changes that Admiral Stansfield Turner put in place in the early 1970s. We have a very vibrant civilian faculty, as well as our military folks. For example, on our teaching side, we have 78 civilian faculty and 64 military, as an example, and then we have 276 total, some of which are doing research war gaming analysis, and they might teach an elective. But my point is, of the 22 Strategy and Policy faculty, all are Ph.D., from some of our most prestigious universities.
I have the option of tenure put in place by Admiral Turner. We are certified by the New England Association of Schools and Colleges. Other schools have taken our strategy curriculum. Yale has a grand strategy course they are starting, Duke, Princeton, all based on the Newport Strategy and Policy model. I am trying to hire an academic dean right now. We are down to about the last six candidates, any of whom could really do this, a strong Ph.D. academic leader who can help us with faculty. A vibrant series of chairs that we have in place. We are establishing regional chairs.

The faculty tell me it is also the unique student body. They know that they are not going to have to deal with a lot of nonsense from our students. These are mid-career, motivated students who are going places and coming right off the front lines.

There is also a faculty development aspect to this which one of my colleagues alluded to. We are on a trimester system, so one of those trimesters, our faculty has the opportunity to go and do their own research and do curriculum development and things like that. We have a budget of almost—I think we have spent over $600,000 on faculty development over the last couple of years.

I am aware of the copyright issue. I think it is a question of good policy. We have to watch that carefully. But I think we are okay on that. And the fact that just recently we went to .edu, for example, on the Web, tries to dispel some of what is going on and show people, turn a light on some of the academic work we are doing. There are a series of conferences.

Those are the attractors for good civilian qualified faculty.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Wittman and I are trying real hard to miss this vote, I think, so we are going to need to leave. We have an abundance of questions left. We have kept you here for almost two hours. We almost certainly will have some questions for the record. The questions go slower because we have the six of you.

We appreciate you all being here today. We appreciate your testimony. I am sure we will have some follow-up questions, both formally and informally in the future.

We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:56 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X

JUNE 4, 2009
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JUNE 4, 2009
Opening Statement of
Chairman Dr. Vic Snyder
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

Hearing on “Thinkers and Practitioners: Do Senior Professional Military Education Schools Produce Strategists?”

June 4, 2009

The hearing will come to order.

Good morning, and welcome to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations’ second hearing on Professional Military Education, specifically, officer in-residence PME.

On May 20th, outside witnesses discussed the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act that reformed our military by institutionalizing what we call “jointness.” We also discussed the efforts of the 1989 Skelton Panel to review PME to ensure that “jointness” became part of the military’s culture through its officer education system.

Today, we are looking at the six senior schools in the PME enterprise – the war colleges and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. These schools are meant to focus on developing strategists and on teaching strategy – national, military and resources.

I think our witnesses will tell us that they have fully joint curriculums as well as faculties and student bodies. We should learn more today about what they’re doing to develop professionals who can reach beyond jointness to develop and execute interagency and multinational strategies and policies. We want to learn about how they develop strategists, and how they measure their effectiveness in this mission. Perhaps most importantly, we want to discuss their senior staffs, faculty, and students. Our Chairman, Ike Skelton, would remind us that these three, the human component, along with pedagogy (or
teaching methodology), form the “bedrock” of these professional military schools.

Two weeks ago, we heard from outside experts about what the PME institutions and system were designed to do for the nation and how well they are doing it. Today, we want to hear from these senior leaders on these same issues. We want to hear about the mission of their particular school and what makes it unique amongst the others here. We’d like to hear about their personal vision for their institution, as well as the organization and resources that they believe will optimize that vision. Finally, we’d like to hear about the curriculum they pursue to fulfill their mission, and the rigor with which they pursue it. We want to discover their secrets for balancing, on the one hand, the enduring subject matter and critical habits of mind taught through military and diplomatic history and, on the other, the new critical areas like hybrid war and cyber security.

These senior schools and their faculties, are often referred to as the crown jewels in the treasure chest of the PME system. We want to ensure they are being sustained in a time of critical resource discussions. We know that often, educational pursuits are the first to be cut in tough times. We should think long and hard before we go back on this important investment in developing our current and future leaders. However, we also want to ensure these institutions are fulfilling their mission to the nation. We want to ensure they are developing strategists who will be successful in conflict and in peace in support of our national security.

In later hearings we will hear from the commandants and deans of the intermediate and “career” schools. And, will also invite the combatant commanders to appear – those who employ the graduates of these institutions should be involved in our discussions. Today, our panel is the senior leadership of the senior PME schools including their commandants, commanders, directors, or, in some cases, presidents and they are joined by their academic deans. After Mr. Wittman’s
statement, I will introduce them.

Mr Wittman’s Opening Statement

Chairman Skelton, would you like to say a few words?

Ranking Member Mr. McHugh?

Today our witnesses are:

- Rear Admiral Garry E. Hall, USN
  Commandant
  The Industrial College of the Armed Forces

  His dean is Dr. Alan Whittaker

- Major General Robert P. Steel, USAF
  Commandant
  The National War College

  His dean is Colonel Brian Collins, PhD, USAF

- Rear Admiral James P. Wisecup, USN
  President
  The Naval War College

  His acting dean is Professor William Spain (retired USMC)

- Major General Robert M. Williams, USA
  Commandant
  The Army War College

  His dean is Dr. William Johnsen (retired Army)
• Major General Maurice “Maury” Forsyth, USAF
  Commander of the Spaatz Center and Commandant
  The Air War College

  His dean is Dr. Mark Conversino (retired USAF)

• Colonel Michael Belcher, USMC
  Director
  The Marine Corps War College

  His dean is Dr. Robert Mahoney (retired USAF)

Welcome to all of you and thank you for being here. I ask that you keep your oral statements to 5 minutes, particularly since there are six of you. Your entire prepared statements will be made part of the record.
INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

PRESENTATION TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SUBJECT: THINKERS AND PRACTITIONERS: DO SENIOR PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION SCHOOLS PRODUCE STRATEGISTS?

STATEMENT OF: REAR ADimiral GARRY E. HALL
COMMANDANT, THE INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE
OF THE ARMED FORCES
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED
BY THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL GARRY HALL, UNITED STATES NAVY
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
JUNE 4, 2009

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Wittman, and members of the Subcommittee, I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before your committee to discuss the absolutely critical role professional military education plays in shaping our national security professionals. I am especially proud to share with you what I believe the Industrial College of the Armed Forces offers our current and future leaders as they move into an increasingly complex and dynamic national security environment.

ICAF contributes to the Nation's security and well being through the study of strategy, nurturing strategic thinking, and developing the critical analytical skills necessary for formulating and implementing high quality national security decisions. The entire ICAF program is carefully designed to develop strategic leaders capable of critical analysis of national security issues while considering their resource components. The program immerses students in a joint, interagency and international environment for 10 months and qualifies its graduates for a Joint Specialty Officer nomination and a Master of Science degree in National Resource Strategy.

Please allow me to share with you why ICAF is in a position to offer the leaders of tomorrow a well-rounded, high quality graduate-level education: ICAF is the government's only senior college to give its students the tools to understand and evaluate the fundamental dependence of national security upon the nation’s economic capabilities, and the conversion of the economic and social elements of national power into a comprehensive national security strategy. In my statement today, I will describe not only our core curriculum, but the many additional opportunities we offer our students to develop strategic thinking skills that will pay huge dividends to not only themselves and their organizations, but to the American taxpayer. I will also discuss how we evaluate our students to ensure they are benefiting from the curriculum we offer. Finally, I will discuss the composition of both our student body as well as our faculty, and how each is selected.

Some have recently opined that our military leaders should attend civilian universities so they can “interact with diplomats and executives.” Well, our students do just that. In fact, of the 320 students in the class of 2009, just 56 percent were U.S. military officers (an additional seven percent international). The remaining students are civilians from agencies including the State
Department, the Justice Department, the Department of Homeland Security, and USAID (among others). They are also industry fellows, with us from such companies as IBM, Boeing, and CSC. So, when we talk about our future leaders, we think not only of military officers, but all who will play an increasingly greater role in the formulation and execution of our government’s national security strategy.

President Obama recently reiterated the increased integration of “all aspects of American power” to meet the “increasingly unconventional and transnational” threats of the future. I am confident ICAF will play a critical role in training the leaders who enable our country to successfully meet these threats and defeat them.

**THE ICAF CURRICULUM**

The mission of ICAF is to “prepare selected military and civilians for strategic leadership and success in developing our national security strategy and in evaluating, marshalling, and managing resources in the execution of that strategy.” The structure of our curriculum is designed to ensure that graduates understand and evaluate strategic concepts, can formulate effective strategies to promote national security, and are able to marshal and manage resources in the execution of both a national security strategy and a national military strategy.

The first phase of the ICAF academic year focuses upon the domestic context of national security, assessing the foundations of the U.S. government, the checks and balances between branches, the fundamentals of national security and military strategies, the roles and missions of key departments and agencies involved with national security affairs, interagency dynamics and coordination, DOD processes for strategy development and allocation of strategic and operational resources, and U.S. economic policy and financial processes. Students also undertake a rigorous assessment of their own preferences and leadership skills, as well as the intellectual and leadership requirements at the strategic level with emphasis on critical and innovative thinking, and leading and transforming organizations in a time of rapid change.

The second phase of the ICAF academic year emphasizes the international context of national security, evaluating current and future strategic challenges the U.S. faces in the international system, logistical and international operational challenges in theater campaigning, international economic issues, regional security studies, and promoting the development of leadership strategies to ensure effective and agile leadership. By the conclusion of this phase ICAF students are expected to possess a critical understanding of strategic national security...
affairs, civilian and military ways and means with regard to instruments of national power, joint, interagency and multinational dynamics, domestic and international economic influences on national security, and the skills necessary to lead effectively at the strategic policy level.

The final phase of the ICAF academic year stresses the resource context of national security. During this phase, ICAF students look in depth at the challenges of resourcing a national security strategy through the assessment of various domestic and international industrial/economic sectors related to national security affairs as well as the strengths, weaknesses, and challenges of the processes by which the U.S. government acquires goods and services to support the warfighter and ensure national security.

Since September 11th and the U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, many parts of the ICAF curriculum have changed. The faculty undertakes in-depth departmental and program curriculum reviews on an annual basis to ensure that fundamental principles and continuities in strategic conditions and thought are properly balanced against contemporary and evolving strategic and operational policy challenges. At the heart of each curriculum review is a fundamental question: “What knowledge must ICAF graduates possess for effective leadership of strategic national security affairs when they achieve senior leadership positions?” Given the limited time available during the academic year to cover the multiple, complex dimensions of strategic national security affairs, ICAF carefully balances trade-offs among a number of pedagogical content areas with regard to determining what competencies and knowledge we believe every ICAF graduate should possess.

We believe it is a mistake to focus exclusively upon challenges from a purely threat-based perspective. To be certain, current and potential threats must be carefully analyzed and strategies, ways, and means developed for overcoming threats and achieving U.S. security objectives and goals. However, we believe that to focus exclusively on threat management diminishes the potential to exploit favorable conditions and other opportunities to achieve U.S. interests through the use of soft power.

ICAF Core Courses

Please allow me to offer a brief description of our core curriculum:

Military Strategy and Logistics (MSL): This course fundamentally addresses force planning and war strategy at the national level, to include the resourcing component. The curriculum provides students with the conceptual tools they need to assess a strategic military
situation, decide how to proceed, and construct a plan that meets national objectives. Coursework emphasizes the fundamentals of warfare, presenting the features of war that have remained constant through recorded history, and evaluating their relevance in today's environment. The curriculum also examines military strategy at the theater level: how a commander and his staff assess a situation, construct and select courses of action, build a plan, and adjust it for changing circumstances. Logistics are at the heart of this process, both for deployment and for execution.

The MSL course studies joint logistics, joint logistics planning and the interrelation of this planning to joint strategic planning and to national policy planning.

**National Security Studies (NSS):** This course is designed to prepare students to effectively operate at the strategic level of crafting a national security strategy, national-level policies and evaluating "why" one policy is more likely to safeguard the nation's security than another. The course educates students to be able to craft and integrate a wide range of policy decisions across diverse content areas such as domestic and international politics, military strategy, economics, and information and technological capabilities. Students become adept in the art and science of developing, applying and coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve strategic objectives that ensure national security. The course immerses students in the foundations of the ideals and structure of the American system of government, assesses key actors in the interagency national security system, and evaluates the role of congress, the media, and interest groups. The remainder of the course examines the role of the United States in international affairs, frameworks analyzing the major dynamics shaping the behavior of states in international affairs, current and future challenges in national security strategy including maximizing non-military instruments of power, evaluating the role and future of multilateral institutions, transnational issues (including non-state actors, energy issues, the environment, demographics, pandemics, and other topics), and critical examination of options and variants for future national security strategy.

**Strategic Leadership (SL):** This course is founded upon the college's conviction (based, in part, upon feedback from senior flag, ambassadorial, and cabinet officials) that leadership at the strategic level is significantly different from leadership at the tactical or operational level. We believe that the skill set required to be effective at senior levels is different when working with other services, agencies, countries, industry, and international actors. The course is designed to educate and develop senior leaders to critically understand the complexities
and interrelationships of the strategic (domestic & international) environment, as well as how to assess and address complex, multi-dimensional environments from multi-dimensional (i.e., interagency, inter-service, international, multi-cultural) perspectives. Strategic leadership further requires the ability to plan and lead organizational change in complex systems of systems in an ever-changing complex operational and strategic policy environment. Embedded throughout the course is a finely tuned program to develop student thinking skills and abilities required to operate effectively at the strategic level (e.g., conceptualization, expanding frames of reference, systemic and creative thinking, constructing and understanding complex models, ethical decision-making, strategic scanning of the environment, envisioning first and second order consequences, management as a strategic leader).

**Economics:** ICAF is the only war college with a Department of Economics. A primary objective of our economics curriculum is the development of practical knowledge about the relationships between economic dynamics and economic strength as a foundation of national security. Our fall course, “Economics of National Security,” is designed to provide students with the tools and perspectives necessary to analyze and develop economic strategy in the global world economy, analyze the domestic economic foundations of national security, study interactions among markets and industries, and critically evaluate the role of government in the allocation of resources within and between markets.

In the spring, “The Economics of Industry” provides students with tools of microeconomics and business strategy to help them analyze industries in general and a particular industry sector they evaluate in their concurrent Industry Study (IS). The spring course exposes students to basic principles of industry structure, regulation, the defense industrial base, and frameworks for business strategy.

We want our graduates to go beyond understanding economic principles and processes, and be able to integrate economic processes with political objectives as policy advisors and policy makers confronting contemporary problems. To strengthen this learning objective, ICAF uses Oxford Economics Ltd.’s Global Macro (economic forecasting) Model in a real world exercise. The Oxford Model is used by major corporations and financial institutions including various departments of the U.S. government, the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, government departments and central banks around the world for economic forecasting and policy planning. ICAF is one of the few academic institutions in the world (including Oxford
University's Executive Education Program) to use this highly sophisticated model to prepare future government leaders for real world strategic economic challenges.

**Acquisition:** This course provides students with a broad understanding of the defense acquisition process as well as the effects acquisition policies and practices have on the industrial base, the nation's economic well being and the nation's security strategy. The course enables students to evaluate the policies, principles and concepts used by the Federal government to acquire capabilities in support of a national security and military strategy, concentrating on the political, military and economic dimensions. Among the range of topics covered in the course are acquiring national defense capabilities; strategic resource allocation; defense acquisition system and acquisition strategy; acquisition logistics; and constituencies, politics and ethics. In response to evolving challenges from OIF and OEF, the course also critically evaluates acquisition issues related to acquisition and major services contracting in support of wartime operations, resourcing joint urgent operational needs, and evaluating the extent to which acquisition processes can respond to urgent or emergency requirements generated by wartime developments.

**Industry Studies program:** Our unique Industry Study (IS) program is designed to allow students to gain first-hand knowledge and experience in analyzing industries from a strategic national security perspective. Students spend five months evaluating the performance of various industry sectors in promoting economic well-being and supporting national security needs as well as examining the effects of government policy and regulations.

The evolution of our IS program is reflective of the changing national security landscape. Whereas areas of study used to focus primarily on traditional defense industrial base industries (aircraft, shipbuilding, space, land combat systems, weapons, etc), our program has grown over time to include areas that are now considered to be integral to national security policymaking: energy, environment, financial services, health care, education, and agribusiness, to name a few.

Our students benefit from numerous guest speakers who come to ICAF to speak to our students about cutting-edge trends in their respective industries and how these industries impact national security. They also benefit from the local, domestic and international field studies portion of the program which allows students the opportunity for first hand observation of industry facilities, capitalization, and quality of work as well as face-to-face discussions with corporate CEOs or other senior officials regarding their perspectives on industry-government
relations, contributions to national security, and their long-term business strategies in a highly competitive globalized economic system. Moreover, participating in both the domestic and international portions of the field studies program allows students the opportunity for a first-hand comparative assessment of U.S. industries vis-à-vis foreign competitors in important industry sectors related to national security.

Many of the opportunities our students have during the IS program are truly once in a lifetime. Students studying the Financial Services industry had meetings with the Security and Exchange Commission, the New York Federal Reserve bank and, while on international travel, with members of the Bank of China, the China Investment Corporation, and the China Banking Regulatory Commission -- the first time a DoD organization has met in an official capacity with Chinese financial regulators. Members of the Environment Industry study heard from the World Bank and scientists from NASA on the security implications of global climate change. The Health Care Industry Study met in Geneva, Switzerland, with the World Health Organization (WHO) to discuss global health issues, including the WHO's response to the ongoing H1N1 flu pandemic. These are just a few examples of the uniquely relevant and exciting opportunities ICAF students experience as a part of our Industry Study program.

Students graduate from ICAF with an in-depth understanding how national security rests upon the foundation of a strong economic system, how the domestic economic and industrial base operates, and how it interacts with a globalized, increasingly interdependent international economic system.

The Industry Study program is one of the crown jewels of the ICAF program and serves to integrate much of what the students have learned during their time here. At the end of the year, each IS prepares a written report as well as a presentation that is given to a distinguished visitor. These presentations allow the students to demonstrate what they have learned about the industry, trends and projections, and how it relates and contributes to national security.

**Regional Security Studies program:** In addition to the international politics component of the National Security Studies course, ICAF also conducts a required study of regional security that conducts an in-depth evaluation of cultural/political/economic/military characteristics in twenty countries or international regions. Courses examine political, cultural, social and religious differences, national and regional economic and political circumstances—including variations in hierarchies of political interests, goals and objectives. Students select their region
of study and also are exposed to a college-wide lecture series on each of the major regions of strategic importance to U.S. interests. These lectures are conducted by invited regional experts who typically emphasize cultural factors in addition to political-security-economic issues and U.S. interests and policy. There is no travel or language component in the RSS program, but students select their Industry Study area prior to selecting their Regional Security Study course. This scheduling allows students the opportunity to choose a regional study related to the area they will be visiting for the international field studies portion of the Industry Studies course, if they so desire.

**The Elective Program:** ICAF also participates in the National Defense University Electives Program which allows students the opportunity to deepen or broaden their knowledge through elective courses. Students are required to select four elective courses from the over 150 courses offered by the colleges and schools of the NDU. ICAF also offers several special concentrations.

**SPECIAL CONCENTRATION PROGRAMS**

ICAF has a number of special programs in which our students can enroll that gives them a more concentrated academic experience. The programs include:

**The Senior Acquisition Course (SAC):** The Senior Acquisition Course was directed by the “Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act of 1990,” and passed as Title XII of Public Law 101-510, The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991. Consequently, ICAF has been designated by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to conduct the SAC for selected acquisition professional students as part of the Defense Acquisition University (DAU). SAC is the preeminent course for members of the Acquisition Corps, and is designed to prepare selected military officers and civilians for senior leadership and staff positions throughout the acquisition community.

**Supply Chain Management Concentration Program:** Supply Chain Management is a driving force behind America’s economic growth and prosperity and Defense Logistics. It is important to understand the critical role supply chains play in supporting American industry and national security. This elective program looks specifically at concepts and the strategies that are transforming the DoD Supply Chain. The course of study includes an investigation supply chain network configuration, strategic alliances, international issues, supplier and customer
relationship management, and critical information technologies, as well as the impactions of these areas to joint logistics.

**Information Operations Concentration Program (IOCP):** The Information Operations Concentration Program complements the core curriculum of ICAF by integrating a wide range of elective courses and activities. The goal of the program is to prepare future national security strategists to employ the information component of power, and numerous graduates have achieved flag and SES rank.

**Concepts Covered Throughout Our Curriculum**

**Strategy:** We believe that our graduates must be skilled in the understanding and crafting of national security strategy in order to properly be able to evaluate the objectives and requirements for marshalling and managing resources in the execution of that strategy and a national military strategy. This means developing critical thinking skills to be able to evaluate resource constraints, trade-offs, and usability issues that significantly affect the government’s ability to advance its national interests and achieve its strategic goals.

The sum total of ICAF’s curriculum is designed to progressively increase the ability of its students to understand and evaluate strategic concepts and to formulate effective strategies to promote national security. Early course work in all four fall core courses include numerous lessons addressing how to think about strategy from different perspectives—including grand strategy, political and military strategy, economic foundations of strategy, and personal requirements for senior leaders to be able to understand, devise, and implement strategies. Our students develop an understanding that strategic national security affairs is complex, multi-dimensional, and requires the connection of diverse issues into a coherent policy process.

ICAF takes a broad, multi-dimensional approach to the understanding of strategy and its successful development and execution. A 21st Century understanding of the dynamics of domestic and international politics requires an appreciation of resource allocation and economics. As the only PME institution responsible both for developing national security strategy and in evaluating, marshalling, and managing resources in the execution of that strategy, we are especially proud of our Departments of Acquisition and Economics and core courses on National and International Economic Policy, and the Economics of Industry. Economic and soft power instruments of policy have become equally, if not more, important than military power in safeguarding national security and securing U.S. interests abroad. Moreover, students learn that
establishing strategic priorities involves difficult resource allocation decisions involving budgetary trade-offs. I can't think of anything more relevant in today's economic environment.

ICAF's curriculum uses numerous case studies focusing on historical and modern problems that provide insight into how strategic leaders and nations have adapted over time. We believe history is a valuable tool for the critical analysis of past conditions and strategies, and for illustrating that the decision making process a military commander uses prior to undertaking any military operation contains many continuities that are little changed across the millennia. The real key is balance, because theory and historical perspective provide a useful framework for inquiry into current issues and challenges. The ICAF curriculum seeks to caution students against the misuses of history—including the danger of false analogies or of politically driven interpretations of history. Building upon of the fundamentals of strategy, ICAF requires students to formulate their own strategies through exercises and writing papers addressing strategic concepts and problems and developing strategies for the future.

**Mobilization:** Returning to the question of how ICAF balances enduring principles and processes with new conditions and challenges, we believe that one substantive area related to the college's unique mission concerning the resource component of national security should be addressed. That area is mobilization—which was highlighted as one of ICAF's main study areas in the 1989 Skelton panel review of PME.

ICAF fully recognizes its unique responsibility to study and be a government resource on mobilization issues in the event of a national emergency. But as in other areas since the events of the end of the Cold War, September 11th, and OEF and OIF, the manner in which the U.S. will be able to mobilize in an emergency has changed significantly. The World War II-type mobilization of the broad U.S. industrial base is unlikely in the future. ICAF's year-by-year experience with the industrial base and acquisition processes has clearly revealed that future mobilization challenges will be different than changing assembly lines to produce tanks rather than automobiles, or fighters and bombers rather than commercial aircraft. As such, ICAF does not have a single mobilization course, but instead educates its students about the complexities of modern mobilization through several courses.

Future mobilization challenges are more likely to involve critical questions concerning:

- The economic viability of maintaining an adequate industrial base in the U.S. for specific fields relevant to defense
• Policy challenges for working with the private sector on technology development relevant to defense (including limiting export of sensitive technology while producing sufficient quantities to ensure profitability)
• Ensuring access to foreign firms during a crisis for critical technologies or specific components upon which the U.S. is dependent for defense platforms
• Devising and implementing capabilities for managing expedited procurements of urgently needed defense items (e.g., MRAP)
• Maintaining an adequate personnel base for active and reserve forces (including extended call-ups for reserves and use of contract personnel for security and security-support purposes).

Joint and Interagency Activities: Joint and interagency relations, interactions and coordination are a central focus of the ICAF experience for students, which is especially relevant due to current discussions underway to revamp the National Security Council and its processes. Because of our diverse student population, every seminar has two students from non-DOD civilian agencies, and at least three civilian students from DOD agencies in addition to nine military officers and one international officer. With students coming to ICAF possessing an average of twenty years of government service, this diverse service and interagency mix guarantees that discussions of first-hand experience in interagency and joint matters are a daily occurrence. It should be noted that the learning value of the day to day contact of students from across the joint and interagency spectrum cannot be approached by any correspondence or distance learning method.

Joint and interagency relations, interactions and coordination also are emphasized in all ICAF core courses. Understanding joint, interagency and multi-national operations is critical to understanding how the Department of Defense conducts its overseas contingency operations and also how it conducts its daily business. In addition, students role play as members of the interagency process during our two-week National Security Strategy Exercise (see below).

Multinational Collaboration: Multinational relations and multilateral interactions and collaboration are infused throughout the ICAF curriculum. As mentioned above, our Regional Security Studies program conducts an in-depth evaluation of cultural/political/economic/military characteristics, as well as assessing U.S. national interests and foreign policy in those regions in twenty countries or international regions. In our national security studies course, described in detail earlier, students experience a widespread assessment of regional global and transnational security challenges facing the United States and examine case studies dealing with contemporary multilateralism and multinational aspects of a 21st Century National Security Strategy. Our
economics curriculum devotes considerable time to issues of multinational relations, interactions and collaboration due to the evolution of the globalized economic system and its many interdependencies. Students analyze and critically evaluate international trade, finance, capital flows, economic globalization, economic development, and U.S. international economic strategy. Multinational and multilateral activities are also specifically addressed in our military strategy and logistics course, touching upon lessons drawn from Joint, interagency and multinational environment and the necessary to plan and execute a joint, interagency, and multinational military campaign.

**Ethics:** Of particular interest to me is the inclusion of ethics in our curriculum. In addition to ethics topics integrated into all core course areas, a review of all new curriculum revisions by academic departments must identify lesson issues (where appropriate) that also should address leadership ethics. Moreover, ICAF also holds special ethics programs in both the fall and the spring of the academic year. During the fall of 2008, ICAF sponsored a lecture by Major General Antonio Taguba, USA (Ret.) on the topic of “Instilling and Maintaining Ethics in Military Organizations” using Abu Ghraib as a case study. The feedback from the students on this session was overwhelmingly positive. In the spring of 2009, Ms. Wanda Denson-Low, Senior Vice President, Office of Internal Governance for the Boeing Corporation, gave a presentation on “Ethical Considerations—An Industry Perspective,” which discussed organizational ethics leadership and ethics related to government-private relations in acquisition.

**Irregular Warfare and Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations:** ICAF uses a multi-departmental and multi-program approach to assess the changing nature of warfare and provide broad coverage of irregular warfare topics and related SSTR issues. Also, the college leverages the recent field and joint staff experience and interagency mix of both faculty and students to bring current Overseas Contingency Operations, Counterinsurgency (COIN), SSTR information and best practices into the classroom.

ICAF schedules speakers from across the services and interagency with direct field and staff experience at the operational and strategic planning, command, and policy levels for college-wide lectures, for informal lunchtime discussions with students and faculty, and for faculty development sessions. In particular, we conduct a half-day workshop for students on “International Intervention And Strategies For Conflict Transformation.” which includes a panel discussion involving senior government officials with experience in interagency SSTR
operations and policymaking. The panel discussion is followed by a processing session with the panelists to discuss the practical challenges of planning and conducting interagency SSTR operations and lessons learned for policymaking in this area. Major areas of focus for this workshop are conflict transition and transformation issues as well as determination of political, security, economic, and rule of law strategies for conflict transformation.

Language and Culture: ICAF seeks to provide cultural education and some language enhancing opportunities through a variety of mechanisms in our program. We have sought to address cultural issues wherever possible in our core courses and major program areas, increase and enhance courses dealing with cultural and language issues in elective program offerings, and even introduce specialized events and programs to increase student exposure to language and cross-cultural issues and improve understanding. Some of these programs are:

- **Language Programs.** ICAF recognizes that developing foreign language expertise requires intensive training and practice over an extended period of time. It is not practicable to learn a language at the Senior Service School level given the heavy study load in the many dimension of strategic national security affairs. Nevertheless, ICAF has voluntarily facilitated foreign language instruction opportunities for its students interested in maintaining or improving their language skills, or even learning a new language.

- **Cultural Awareness Event.** ICAF holds a cross-cultural awareness event during the spring prior to international field studies. The goal of the event is to discuss cultural awareness and its strategic significance to decision makers and policy developers in both an international and domestic context. The first day includes speakers discussing conceptual aspects of cross-cultural understanding (e.g., cultural differences, ethnocentrism, and differences in beliefs, attitudes, and values), USG and DoD efforts to increase operational and strategic cross-cultural awareness, and practical information for personal conduct in foreign cultures. The second day includes a cultural diversity panel consisting of religious leaders and scholars from different cultural backgrounds.

- **Intercultural Development Inventory (IDI).** As part of its Cultural Awareness event, all students complete an Intercultural Development Inventory instrument. The IDI is a commercial instrument used for developing intercultural skills, consisting of a self assessment of an individual’s capacity for exercising intercultural competence and identifying issues which limit or facilitate development of intercultural understanding.
• Cultural Studies Courses. With the National War College, ICAF co-sponsors a two-
semester elective course dealing with Arabic Culture and Language. This is an intensive
course designed to develop significant Arabic language skills and cultural understanding.

**Additional Enrichment Opportunities**

**Guest Speakers:** I would be remiss if I did not mention how fortunate we are to have
two outstanding guest speaker programs at National Defense University. The first we share with
our sister school, National War College. The Distinguished Lecturer Program has brought to us
some of the most influential actors inside and out of government. Most notably, the president of
the United States has spoken to our students over the years. In fact, we were honored to hear
from both President Bush last fall and President Obama this spring. We have also heard from
distinguished members of Congress; military commanders such as Generals Petraeus and
Renuart; military service chiefs; high ranking officials in the Department of Defense, including
the current Secretary of Defense; retired general officers such as Anthony Zinni, Peter Pace,
Richard Myers and Colin Powell; important foreign nationals such as the Iraqi national security
advisor and the Pakistani Chief of the Army Staff.

A guest speaker program that is unique to ICAF is our Commandant’s Lecture Series.
Each year I try to bring in speakers who, true to ICAF’s mission, reflect a broad range of national
security interests, to include members of the government, the military and private industry. This
year we were privileged to hear from a vice president at Goldman Sachs, the director of the
NSA, the CEO of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the CEO of Proctor and Gamble, a reporter
from NPR, numerous distinguished authors, and the President, Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments, and many others.

The CLS and DLP speakers are an integral part of what we do at ICAF. No where else
can our students hear from such a diverse collection of the great minds of our time.

**Research & Writing Program:** ICAF vigorously promotes student research and
provides a number of opportunities and support systems for those students who wish to engage in
research activities. Although all students are required to conduct some level of research for the
many written papers required by core courses and programs, ICAF recognizes that not all
students wish to engage in longer term, in-depth research projects. However, we believe that
research is fundamental to the development of new ideas and strategies, and strongly encourages
and supports student research efforts.
ICAF students and faculty engage in a vigorous Research & Writing Program as a part of the NDU Elective Program and in support of a series of special research efforts. For the past three years, ICAF has participated in the Deputy Secretary of Defense’s Educational Initiative. Students also participate in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Annual Essay Competition, The Secretary of Defense National Security Essay Competition, Secretary of the Air Force’s Energy Research Fellowship Program, and the Department of Defense Business Transformation Research Fellowship Program. It is clear that ICAF’s research is intimately connected with issues of great concern to DOD. This partnership has allowed the Department to tap into the minds of the “best and brightest” minds while they are steeped in an academic environment, enabling them to focus on their research.

**Exercises:** Our College enjoys a dynamic exercise program that puts to the test the strategic thinking skills gained by our students at various points throughout the academic year. These include shorter exercises such as our “Interagency Exercise,” which this year simulated an outbreak of Avian flu, and the Joint Land-Aerospace-Sea-Simulation exercise, a dynamic, unscripted wargame set 10 years in the future. We also have a longer event designed to exercise student capabilities to develop “strategies for the future”: the two-week National Security Strategy Exercise (NSSE). This exercise had been held every spring for the past 15 years and occurs when students have completed most of their core courses, regional studies, and electives, and had significant exposure to resource, industry sector, and business strategy concepts during the spring semester.

The NSSE is strategy formulation at its highest levels. Students role play advisors to the National Security Advisor and are asked to develop a National Security Strategy report for the current administration that (1) evaluates domestic and worldwide political, economic, military, and social trends and conditions that the United States likely will face over the next ten years, and (2) results in an integrated strategy recommending policies and actions the U.S. should undertake. Following through on one of ICAF’s fundamental tenants that “a national security strategy isn’t worth the paper its written on if we are unable to adequately resource it,” students must evaluate current fiscal policy, conduct forecasts of future economic conditions, and produce a fiscal plan that will finance their ten-year strategy.

Ultimately, we require our students to present and defend their strategy to a panel of current or retired senior policymakers. HASC Chairman Ike Skelton sometimes asks whether
service school graduates would be able to "engage in a conversation with George C. Marshall." ICAF has put the principle behind this question into practice for over a decade by inviting 60 distinguished visitors (DVs) to hear the results of the strategies the students have crafted.

Approximately one-third of the DVs are current or retired 3- or 4- star flag officers, one-third are current or former senior government executives, and the remaining third are senior private industry executives. Each student seminar presents their plan to three DVs (one from each category), followed by a critique of the strategy's merits and extended general discussion about the challenges of developing and implementing strategy at strategic levels.

**Brown Bags:** In addition to our formal speakers, we periodically invite important visitors to what we call "brown bag" sessions. These are voluntary, less formal sessions that are scheduled over the lunch period. They allow for an exchange of ideas and generally tend to focus on professional development type issues. One example is our most current speaker, Lt Gen David Fridovich, Director of the Center for Special Operations, U.S. Special Operations Command. General Fridovich did not come to tell our students about life in special operations, but another subject near and dear to his heart: leadership and mentoring.

**Prep-Ts:** We have a number of voluntary short trips our students can sign up for that are designed to expand their knowledge of other agencies or concerns. These are scheduled during long weekends and costs are covered by the students. Some examples of our "Prep-Ts" trips are to Norfolk, FBI Headquarters, and the Panama Canal.

**Academic Rigor**

I believe ICAF conducts a challenging and rigorous academic program. We hold students accountable for mastering course content through a letter grading system with rigorous criteria, and opportunities for award recognition for academic achievement (Distinguished Graduate Program and the Honor Student Award), exceptional research and writing, and leadership. Furthermore, we provide multiple mechanisms for feedback to and from students. Finally, each year we review the curriculum to ensure we appropriately balance "white space" and "contact time".

Students are evaluated in all courses. Core course grades combine evaluation of seminar contribution (i.e., participation, quality of thought and enhancement of the overall seminar learning process), with evaluations of written papers of various kinds (see Appendix 3 for a description of our grading standards). Elective grades usually combine evaluation of seminar
contribution, evaluations of written papers, and/or evaluations of oral presentations. Finally, our faculty assesses the performance of students in all exercises, though they may not grade all exercises.

As previously discussed, we vigorously promote student research and provide a number of opportunities and support systems for those students who wish to engage in research activities. In addition to the Secretary of Defense National Security Essay Competition, and the Chairman’s Annual Essay Competition, awards for excellence in research and writing are sponsored by a variety of organizations that recognize the high esteem ICAF attaches to writing. Sponsors include the Canadian Department of National Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Transportation Command, and National Contract Management Association. It is clear that ICAF’s research is intimately connected with contemporary issues of great interest to DoD, interagency, and international players.

Academic rigor and value are enhanced through an extensive student feedback/critique system for all courses, auditorium speakers, and some special programs. Student course critiques are anonymous to ensure that candid feedback is received about the quality of the ICAF educational and instructional programs. Student critiques and course grades are released simultaneously to ensure that neither is influenced by the other.

Finally, each year we review our curriculum to ensure we have the appropriate mix of learning methods spread correctly across the academic year. We find a combination of seminar learning with faculty facilitated discussion; participation in activities like field studies and exercises; lectures typically given by non-NDU speakers; and unstructured time (“white space”) to allow students the opportunity to reflect and synthesize what they’ve learned and to prepare for future classes, provides this student population the best opportunity for learning. Of the structured, academic time, approximately 45-50 percent of the time is spent in the classroom seminar environment; 35-40 percent of the time is spent participating in exercises, field studies, and preparing seminar group papers and giving presentations; and approximately 10-15 percent of the time is spent in lecture.

**STUDENTS AND FACULTY OF ICAF**

**Our Students**

**Selection of Students:** ICAF’s decades of experience with students has demonstrated that the current selection process for attendance at ICAF is well-suited for an educational
program designed to develop strategic thinking capabilities and future strategic leaders. The Services select ICAF attendees through a competitive board process. DOD and non-DOD agencies select and nominate civilian students to attend ICAF. Civilian students complete a formal application that is reviewed by the Chief of Staff/Dean of Students. ICAF considers professional background, prior academic performance, and the agency’s assessment of the individual’s potential for future senior level leadership in making its admissions determinations. We select Industry Fellows using a virtually identical process to that used for civilian agencies.

A competitive selection process is appropriate for senior level colleges. Not all officers and civilians of appropriate grade and experience should attend a senior level college, because not all of them have the potential to lead at the strategic level. Students should attend a senior level college based on demonstrated potential for future growth to senior level positions of responsibility. While prior academic performance should be a factor in selection of senior level college attendees it should not be the only or the most important factor. The ideal officer at a senior level college has prior experience either as a commander, or in a policy level staff position on a Service or a Joint Staff. The ideal civilian student has been an intermediate level civilian agency leader on a senior staff and has demonstrated potential for promotion to senior leadership positions in the agency. All students should, at a minimum, possess a bachelor’s degree.

ICAF’s experience (and academic research on stratified systems) demonstrates that military officers and government officials require both a requisite number of years of experience and personal development and maturity before being able to fully grasp the complex, multidimensional realm of strategic issues and strategic thinking. ICAF believes that the current student admissions criteria (0-5 or 0-6/YA 3 / YC 3 / GS-14-15, with approximately 20 years, and of service and identified potential for senior positions) is optimal. Student should not attend senior level colleges too early in their careers, or late in their careers. More junior students, generally those less than age 38 – 42, typically lack sufficient experience and maturity of judgment to participate fully in strategic discussions and analysis, and substantially older students, generally those in their late 40s or 50s or may be too close to retirement.

**ICAF Student Body:** The caliber of students attending ICAF is very high. In keeping with Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) guidelines, ICAF accepts military students at the rank of lieutenant colonel or commander (O-5) or colonel or captain (O-6) or civilians at the YA 3 or YC 3 (GS-14 or GS-15 level) who are selected, generally on a
competitive basis, by their service or agency. Generally, about 65-70 percent of each year’s class has prior master’s degrees; about 5 percent have prior doctorates or other terminal degrees. Nearly all come with over 20 years of government service and have achieved senior levels of leadership as squadron or battalion level commanders, served on service or joint staffs or as civilian department heads.

**OUR SENIOR STAFF AND FACULTY**

**Senior Staff:** The leadership of the senior level colleges should have a balance of operational and policy level experience together with leadership skills and an appropriate academic background. The balancing of these skill sets depends on the position. Commandants of the senior level colleges have direct impact on the students, faculty and curricula of the colleges. Accordingly, the ideal commandant should have recent operational experience, have prior experience in a policy level position in a Joint organization or command, and be a senior level college graduate. Commandants provide invaluable leadership and ensure that the curriculum remains operationally relevant and credible. Ideally, academic deans should have extensive teaching and supervisory experience together with policy experience in the military or an executive branch agency. Deans must have the credibility to lead a diverse faculty, the experience to design and execute an ever-changing curriculum, and the skill to manage the resources of the college. Prior experience in professional military education, or other professional educational settings, is a preferable attribute to ensure that the college’s curriculum remains linked to the needs of the government and its future strategic leaders.

**Faculty Composition:** Overall, ICAF recruits and maintains a high quality faculty dedicated to fulfilling the college’s educational mission according to the highest standards. Current faculty include active duty military officers, Title X civilian faculty, senior State Department Ambassadors and State and USAID Foreign Service Officers, a former acting Under Secretary of Commerce, Senior Executive Service Officials, Intelligence Community SIS, former congressional staff members, former White House staffers, and a senior executive from private industry. At some time during their careers, ICAF faculty members have lived for at least a year in 34 countries and/or worked in a temporary duty status in an additional 56 countries.
The faculty brings a wealth of experience — military, government, and international as well as an intense commitment to the educational mission of ICAF. The ICAF faculty consists of Title 10 Civilian faculty to provide academic structure and continuity to the curriculum. Military faculty from all services provide current and joint operational relevance; and visiting professors from 17 agencies and industry provide interagency expertise and up-to-date information on Agency policy and practice. Ninety-seven percent of the military faculty is either Joint Qualified Officers or PME senior level college graduates. All three parts of this faculty triad are essential to providing a first-rate JPME II education.

**Title 10 Faculty Selection:** ICAF uses a competitive selection process to widely advertise for, interview and select new Title 10 civilian faculty members. We tailor each Title 10 vacancy announcement to meet the current needs of the college. For each faculty recruitment action, the Dean of Faculty, together with the department chairs, establish priorities for the discipline and experience level needed. Factors that ICAF typically considers in establishing highly qualifying criteria are: academic discipline, academic credentials, (doctoral or terminal degree required in most cases), teaching experience, prior policy–level experience in government or industry, regional expertise, industrial base expertise, and position-specific criteria.

ICAF currently has 45 Title 10 faculty members who constitute 48 percent of the overall faculty. Ninety-one percent hold a Ph.D. or other terminal degree (the remaining nine percent are currently pursuing their Ph.D.). Fifty-eight percent are retired military or have military experience, which provides a blend of academic and operational experience that enhances their credibility with students. Forty-four percent of our Title 10 faculty has graduated from a senior level PME institution, and 22 percent are Joint Service Qualified. In the past three years, ICAF has recruited faculty members for the Acquisition, Economics, and Strategic Leadership Departments and for a Director of Institutional Research and Assessment. In each case, ICAF was fortunate to receive between 20 and 80 applications for the positions and hired highly qualified individuals with Doctoral or other terminal degrees and substantial prior government experience. ICAF’s experience with civilian faculty demonstrates that senior military or government experience is important for establishing credibility with students in the classroom. Nevertheless, ICAF has found it beneficial to recruit more traditional civilian academic faculty with expertise in specific areas (e.g., economics, executive leadership, foreign area studies) to enhance curriculum development and overall faculty growth in knowledge and expertise.
Military Faculty Selection: The Services assign highly qualified, experienced officers to ICAF. ICAF seeks officers with recent operational experience in Iraq or Afghanistan, Brigade Command or prior assignments in senior policy positions on the Joint Staff, the National Security Council, and Combatant Commands and with appropriate subject matter expertise for the ICAF curriculum. ICAF faculty members keep in touch with officers in their fields of expertise and actively recruit potential faculty members.

ICAF currently has 29 military faculty members (10 USA, 10 USAF, 6 USN, two USMC, and one USCg) who constitute 31 percent of the overall faculty. Seventeen percent hold a Ph.D. or other terminal degree, 90 percent have graduated from a senior level PME institution, and 55 percent are Joint Service Qualified. The average tour length for all military faculty members is three years, the same as it was before September 11th.

Ongoing operations have improved the quality of Army faculty members. Since 2007, Army Senior Leader policy requires Army officers assigned to ICAF to have recent deployment experience which brings front-line perspectives to the classroom. Conversely, over the past five years, the Services have found it difficult to assign O-6 officers with Acquisition Level III and Logistics expertise to the faculty. ICAF recognizes the importance of officers with these skills in the operational environment, but notes that the absence of these officers creates challenges for the college in balancing faculty across all departments.

Visiting Civilian Agency Faculty: ICAF also currently has 17 Visiting Faculty, from 15 different agencies and industry, serving as “Agency Chairs” from the interagency including faculty from the Department of State, USAID, Department of Commerce, Department of Energy, CIA, USAID, NSA, DLA, FBI, NGA, and NSA. ICAF also currently has one international faculty member from the Canadian Forces, and one Industry Chair, who currently is a senior executive from IBM Corporation. ICAF invites agencies to nominate senior officials with teaching and policy level experience to serve as Agency Chairs. ICAF interviews each candidate and has been very successful in having superb individuals serve as Agency Chairs. The presence of visiting faculty from other Executive Branch agencies and Industry brings vitality and real-world experience into the seminar room, faculty development sessions and the curriculum. ICAF fully integrates Agency Chairs and they perform all the functions of military and Title 10 Faculty. In particular, they mentor students from their home agencies.
ICAF historically (and currently) lacks sufficient numbers of authorized and assigned military and Title 10 faculty to meet its 3.5 to 1 faculty to student ratio. To make up for this shortfall, ICAF annually recruits senior level officials from other U.S. Government agencies to serve as Agency Chairs in order to meet OPMEP Student : Faculty ratios and to broaden the experience base of the assigned faculty. Unquestionably, ICAF’s educational program benefits greatly from the interagency experience and perspectives of these faculty members, but because they are based upon memoranda of understanding these visiting faculty are subject to recall from their home agencies—in some cases in the middle of an academic year. At the beginning of this Academic Year, ICAF had three more Agency Chairs than we do today. Accordingly, at the present time, ICAF has fallen below its OPMEP-required 3.5 to 1 student-faculty ratio. As of 2 June 2009, the ICAF student-faculty ratio is 3.51 to 1, with 91 faculty members present, compared to the 92 that the OPMEP ratio requires.

ORGANIZATION/RESOURCES

ICAF is a component of the National Defense University and reports through the President of NDU to the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff. Funding support for the University comes from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Joint Staff support comes from the DJ-7 as the staff proponent for Professional Military Education. ICAF finds this flat organizational structure to be suitable.

In general, this allows the faculty to focus on formulating and executing the curriculum with minimal distractions or external attempts to shape the curriculum. Minimizing special projects for senior headquarters produces an environment conducive to teaching and professional development. High quality faculty members are attracted to positions at ICAF for three reasons: the opportunity to work with highly motivated, bright professionals who will be the nation’s leaders and possess a passion for learning; the opportunity to work in the nation’s capital; and a good work environment with adequate pay.

The NDU Board of Visitors provides the President of the University with external, senior level advisors on matters of national security strategy and policy. The members of the Board of Visitors offer independent perspectives and insights on University programs and plans and can serve as advocates for the University needs.
CONCLUSION

Mr Chairman and Mr Wittman, I would like to thank you again for the opportunity to appear before your committee today. You can certainly gather from my remarks that I am proud to serve as the Commandant of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. ICAF offers its students one of the most strategic, contemporary studies of today's dynamic and complex national security environment. Our graduates currently serve their respective agencies as senior decision makers all around the globe. As we tell our students on their first day, "Once you have entered the realm of a strategic thinker, you will never read the paper the same way again." I can honestly tell you I have heard from many graduates and that one remark has stayed with them; they think of it each time they are confronted with an important strategic decision.
APPENDIX 1

Composition of ICAF Student Seminar

ICAF carefully organizes the composition of each of its 20 seminars at the beginning of the academic year to maximize joint, international and interagency diversity. A typical ICAF seminar of 16 students has the following mix of students:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US Army</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Air Force</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Sea Service</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Fellow</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD Agencies</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-DOD Agencies</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3 representing different occupational specialties)
(3 representing different service specialty codes)
(3 different service designators and sub-specialties)
(1)
(3 representing different agencies)
(2 representing different agencies)
(1 (limited to one-half of the seminars due to limit on number of private sector students allowed under 10 U.S.C. section 2167(a)).

Through careful organization of the seminar mix the college actively seeks a balance of military warfighters (operators) and war-supporters (logisticians, acquisition, etc.) as well as international, interagency and industry representatives. This student mix permits the war-supporters to hear directly about the needs of the warfighters and, conversely, the warfighters to learn firsthand about logistical and other support complexities, as well as the roles and missions of non-DOD agencies involved in national security affairs.

Student seminars are remixed completely in the spring according to the Industry Study selected by individual students. Students also participate in classes with a different mix of students in each of their four electives and in their Regional Security Study seminar (also selected by each student according to interest). Consequently, ICAF students can expect to engage in substantive seminar discussions with different classmates in seven different configurations during their academic year. Moreover, ICAF's concentration of all students on the third and fourth floor of Eisenhower Hall facilitates opportunities for informal discussions with an even broader range of classmates.
APPENDIX 2

Composition of ICAF Student Body

Since Academic Year (AY) 2006 ICAF has supported a class size of 320 students divided into 20 seminars. The ICAF class of AY 2008-2009 has 179 U.S. military students (56%), 69 DOD civilians (22%), 39 non-DOD USG civilians (12%), 10 private sector Industry Fellows (3%), and 23 international officers (7%).

Military service composition included 59 USA officers, 60 USAF, 40 USN, 18 USMC, and 2 USCG. The ICAF student body meets the OPMEP standard that one-third of the officers in the class be from the Army, Air Force, and Sea Services. All U.S. officers began the academic year as lieutenant colonels, commanders, colonels or captains.


USG civilians in the class of 2009 from non-DOD agencies represented the following interagency components: Central Intelligence Agency, Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Commerce, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, Department of Transportation, Department of Treasury, and the Government Accountability Office.

International Fellows in the class of 2009 came from Australia, Bahrain, Djibouti, El Salvador, Finland, Guatemala, Guyana, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, and Ukraine. They hold ranks equivalent to 05-07 in the U.S. military.

Industry Fellows in the class of 2009 represented the following companies: BAE Systems, Battelle, Boeing, CSC (Computer Sciences Corporation), EADS, Harris Corporation, IBM, KPMG, L-3 Communications, and the LMI (Logistics Management Institute).
APPENDIX 3

ICAF Grading Standards: Overall Course Grades

"A" Work of exceptional quality at the executive/graduate level. This grade represents the work of an outstanding student whose performance is truly exceptional with regard to knowledge of course constructs, and the attainment of consistent understanding, analysis, evaluation, and application at the strategic level. Student performance attains a consistently exceptional balance between "listening" and regularly "contributing" exceptional quality content to seminar discussions that substantially advances the learning of the entire seminar. This grade recognizes a student who evidences exceptional preparation for every seminar, consistently demonstrates a comprehensive understanding of course constructs, and exhibits well developed complex, multi-dimensional, critical, and strategic thinking skills. Writing content reflects comprehensive understanding of course constructs, and exhibits well developed complex, multi-dimensional, critical, and strategic thinking skills and writing style demonstrates rigor and excellence in research (if relevant), command of the topic, logical organization, compelling argument, and excellence in English grammar and syntax. (4.0/credit hr)

"A-" Work of superior quality at the executive/graduate level. This grade represents the work of a superior student who attains a consistently advanced knowledge of course constructs, and understanding, analysis, evaluation, and application at the strategic level. Student performance attains a consistently superior balance between "listening" and regularly "contributing" superior content to seminar discussions that substantially advances the learning of the entire seminar. This grade recognizes a student who is well-prepared for every seminar, regularly demonstrates a comprehensive understanding of course constructs, and exhibits well-developed complex, multi-dimensional, critical, and strategic thinking skills. Writing content reflects comprehensive understanding of course constructs, and exhibits well developed complex, multi-dimensional, critical, and strategic thinking skills and writing style demonstrates rigor and excellence in research (if relevant), command of the topic, logical organization, compelling argument, and superior use of English grammar and syntax. (3.7/credit hr)

"B+" Work of high quality at the executive/graduate level. This grade represents the work of those students whose performance demonstrated high quality graduate/executive level work. The student must be able to regularly demonstrate an understanding of course constructs at the strategic level. The student must be a regular, constructive contributor to seminar discussions and achieving course objectives. The student must demonstrate mastery of course material and demonstrates the ability to understand and effectively apply other frames of reference. This grade recognizes a student who is well-prepared for every seminar, and demonstrates progressive understanding of course constructs and complex, critical, and strategic thinking skills. Writing content reflects high quality understanding of course constructs, and exhibits development of complex, multi-dimensional, critical, and strategic thinking skills and writing style demonstrates rigor and high quality in research (if relevant), command of the topic, logical organization, compelling argument, and high quality in English grammar and syntax. (3.3/credit hr)
"B" Work of acceptable quality at the executive/graduate level. This grade represents the work of those students whose performance demonstrated successful completion of all course requirements. The student contributes constructively to seminar discussions but not necessarily on a regular basis. This grade recognizes a student who is prepared for seminar sessions and whose contributions reflect some understanding of course material and constructs, and some development of strategic understanding. Writing content reflects understanding of course constructs and writing style demonstrates sound research (if relevant), command of the topic, logical organization, good argumentation, and acceptable quality in English grammar and syntax. (3.0/credit hr)

"B-" Work is below expected quality at the executive/graduate level. This grade represents the work of those students who did not fully meet course requirements, but were only deficient in a few areas. Student fails to demonstrate a sufficient understanding of course material and strategic concepts. Sometimes makes voluntary contributions to seminar discussions, but regularly makes no contribution. May demonstrate good knowledge in certain subjects, but has made insufficient progress in understanding other frames of reference and multi-dimensional aspects of strategic thinking. Writing content may reflect uneven understanding of course constructs and writing style demonstrates uneven research (if relevant), command of the topic, logical organization, argumentation, and quality in English grammar and syntax. (2.7/credit hr)

"C" Work is unsatisfactory at the executive/graduate level. This grade represents the performance of a student who failed to complete course requirements or whose work was of such poor quality that it clearly did not come close to meeting the course standards. Writing content reflects an unsatisfactory understanding of course constructs and writing style demonstrates unsatisfactory performance in some or all areas of research (if relevant), command of the topic, logical organization, argumentation, and quality in English grammar and syntax. Only in exceptional circumstances would a student earn a C, after failing to respond to counseling. (2.0/credit hr)

"F" Work is totally unsatisfactory in all aspects at the executive/graduate level. This represents the performance of a student whose work did not show even minimal satisfaction of any of the considerations. It is a grade of last resort. If the grade was earned as a course grade, and the student could not correct the deficiency after counseling, an F requires the student’s removal from the student body. (0.0/credit hr)
Statement of Major General Robert P. Steel U.S. Air Force
House Armed Services Committee
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
June 4, 2009

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Wittman, Members of the Subcommittee. I want to thank you for the opportunity to address your concerns for the men and women protecting and representing our country. In my testimony I will address my vision for the National War College, the quality of its faculty, the composition of its student body and the rigor of its curriculum.

It is an honor and privilege to serve as Commandant of the National War College which plays a prominent role in the education of our future national leaders. The National War College (NWC) has a unique mission. NWC prepares future generations of America’s top military and civilian leaders by conducting a senior-level course of study that expands and enhances students’ knowledge of national security issues; that sharpens their analytical abilities; and that focuses specifically on the skills essential to the successful formulation and execution of national grand strategy. To these ends, NWC develops and conducts a ten-month program in creating, implementing, and assessing strategy at the highest level. Our curriculum places emphasis on identifying strategic goals, weighing options for achieving them, and understanding global and domestic contexts as well as on the habits, breadth and depth of mind required by senior policymakers and military commanders. Above all, we encourage students to hone their critical thinking skills.

Mission and Vision

Our stated mission is to, "Educate future leaders of the Armed Forces, Department of State and other civilian agencies for high-level policy, command and staff responsibilities by conducting a senior-level course of study in national security strategy." To that end, my vision for NWC is to be the pre-eminent institution for education, research and outreach in national security strategy. To achieve that aim, it is essential first that our military departments, the Department of State and other government agencies will continue to send their best and brightest future strategic leaders first and foremost, to the National War College. Then, the foundation for success rests upon the reputation of our faculty and staff, and the outstanding curriculum they execute. An in-depth understanding of our faculty and the process for recruiting and retaining them is necessary to understanding why I truly believe NWC is the preeminent educational institution for the study of national security strategy.

We accomplish our mission through our high quality of faculty and staff. The NWC faculty combines an impressive blend of academic expertise, operational experience, and practical knowledge in the formulation and implementation of national security strategy. This distinctive fusion of teaching
talent enriches the academic experience for the students by creating an unsurpassed joint and interagency learning environment.

Faculty

The faculty is made up of three components: military officers, civilian academics, and faculty on detail from various government agencies involved in the defense and foreign policy arena. The military faculty is drawn from the three military departments, with most officers holding the rank of colonel (or captain in the USN/USCG), most having had post command and Joint Qualified Officer Designation, and all possessing at least a master's degree. The civilian faculty all possess doctorates (or in two instances, a law degree plus a postgraduate degree) in traditional academic disciplines related to the NWC mission. Agency faculty are generally flag rank officials coming from senior policy and leadership positions.

The faculty are tasked with the faculty responsibilities of teaching, course development, supervision of student research, advising students, and professional development. As Commandant, I further refine these responsibilities in an annual memorandum detailing priorities for the coming academic year. Generally, I stress the following priorities:

- Teaching
- Continuous course update, refinement, and curriculum development
- Advising, assisting, counseling, and evaluating students
- Additional service to the College and the University
- Scholarship and individual professional development
- Outreach to relevant professional, policy, and academic communities outside the University

We turn over approximately twenty-five percent of our faculty per year; therefore, our selection of faculty is very important and vital to mission accomplishment.

Military faculty are selected through a nomination process. NWC seeks senior O-6s who are war college graduates, have a background of senior command and/or joint staff experience, hold a master's degree or higher, and have teaching experience. Each Service has a specified number of military faculty billets and nominates qualified officers based on operational experience and academic background. The NWC Service Chairs coordinate nominations for their respective Services' billets. The Associate Dean of Faculty heads the search committees, with committee members selected from both the Department of Strategy and Policy and the Department of Security Studies. The selection committees interview and evaluate the candidates, and make their recommendations through the Dean of Faculty to the Commandant. Generally, the Services assign officers to the College faculty for a three-year term. There
are, however, provisions for extending officers beyond the normal three-year tenure, and some military faculty have served longer.

Civilian faculty are recruited through a process similar to that followed by civilian universities. NDU Regulation 590-4, Personnel-Civilian: Employment under 10 USC § 1586, spells out in detail the requirements and characteristics sought in civilian professors at various salary levels. NWC requires prospective civilian faculty to hold a doctorate or terminal professional degree, show evidence of quality as a scholar and/or teacher, and, preferably, have experience in the national security community. Search committees, chaired by a senior member of the faculty and operating under the guidance of the Dean of Faculty, manage the selection process. The committee prepares the vacancy announcements, screens applications, interviews the most qualified candidates, prepares written evaluations, and makes its recommendation through the Dean of Faculty to the Commandant.

Once the Commandant decides on a nominee, that name is forwarded to the NDU President for approval and the grant of a faculty appointment. Initial appointments are for periods of one to three years and, when desired by the College and approved by the University, appointments can be renewed repeatedly, normally for periods not to exceed three years, although NDU may authorize longer renewals in exceptional circumstances. Reappointment for a specified term begins with discussion of terms between the faculty member, department chair, and the Dean of Faculty. The Dean makes his recommendation to the Commandant, who in turn forwards the recommendation to the NDU President for approval. If approval is granted, the NDU President issues a letter renewing the appointment and setting forth the new conditions of employment.

Agency faculty are assigned to the College via a process similar to that for military officers. NWC seeks senior officials with a master’s degree or higher, teaching experience, considerable staff experience in the broad policy areas of the agency, and field experience related to the College mission. Participating agencies, working where possible with their senior representative currently assigned to the College’s faculty, nominate candidates to serve ideally for a minimum two-year tour. Whenever possible, a search committee will interview candidates and make a recommendation to the Dean of Faculty. The Dean, in turn, recommends a candidate to the Commandant, who grants final approval for the assignment of agency faculty.

While each individual faculty member is critical to our success, so is our ability to maintain a 3.5:1 student to faculty ratio. Currently, NWC is authorized 63 faculty members for a student body of 221. This includes the Dean of Faculty, International Affairs Advisor, both associate deans, and both department chairs, all of whom have significant teaching and curriculum development responsibilities. It does not include the Commandant and Dean of Students.
Twenty-five of the 63 positions are military faculty, with 22 in Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) authorizations (7 AF, 5 Navy, 2 Marines, and 8 Army), three detailed to the College via written or oral agreements with the U.S. Military Academy (USMA), U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and U.S. Coast Guard. Our Academic Year (AY) 2010 on hand projection indicates we will be down two Army officers and the West Point Fellow position will not be filled. However, we are in the process of completing an agreement with the Army National Guard for an ANG Chair that will add a faculty member in place of the USMA Fellow. Twenty-six faculty are Title 10 civilian professors. Our projection for AY10 is that we will be one down in the fall but we will have our total requirement by the spring of AY10. Currently we have 12 faculty representing federal agencies with which the College has long-standing agreements. We are in the process of adding one additional for AY10, an FBI Chair. This will provide us a total of 13 federal agency faculty.

For AY10 we project an on-board strength of 61 faculty for a student body of 221. A faculty short fall of two military (Two Army officers) will produce a student to faculty ratio of 3.62:1. While we work with the Army to fill their two JDAL positions, it appears unlikely that we will be successful as operational requirements are stressing their personnel system. We are working with the Joint Staff to remedy this situation.

Overall, NWC has enjoyed substantial success in attracting top-quality faculty. Of the current military faculty, 21 of the 22 are O-6’s. All have held senior staff positions and more than half have been assigned to joint commands and 83 percent have served as commanders. All but one (USMA fellow) earned a war college diploma prior to assignment to NWC. All hold a minimum of a master’s degree, and three have earned doctorates or law degrees from top graduate schools. Forty-two percent had taught at the undergraduate or graduate level before arriving here.

The civilian faculty is exceptionally strong. All but two faculty hold Ph.D. degrees from top graduate schools in disciplines central to the study of national security affairs, and the two exceptions have a law degree, one a former dean of a law school and one an SES (former ASD in OSD Policy) with extensive experience in the federal government. A number are well-known and widely respected scholars in their fields. All have served as teaching faculty at major universities or colleges, and all have published scholarly books and/or journal articles. Equally significant, many have served in some capacity at the federal level – adding immeasurably to their understanding of and capacity to teach national security affairs.

The thirteen agency representatives are all drawn from organizations that play principal roles in national security affairs, to include State, USAID, OSD, DIA, NSA, CIA, DHS, and FBI. The personnel detailed from these agencies are highly experienced senior managers and staff officers within their parent
organizations. Four of the agency faculty hold doctorate degrees or law degrees. Five are ambassadors (all are Minister-Counselors, a two-star equivalent), and most of the others hold SES or equivalent rank. Six are war college graduates and nearly half also taught at the undergraduate or graduate level prior to assignment to NWC.

A collective strength of our faculty is their skill level in JPME. The entire faculty is involved in teaching the JPME curriculum at NWC. NWC’s JPME centers on the theory, formulation, and execution of national security strategy, which is the essence of the College curriculum and thus the business of the entire faculty. Study of national security strategy and the national security strategy process is inherently joint and interagency in the highest sense of those terms. It involves analysis and judgments about how best to employ all the instruments of national power to protect national interests and achieve national objectives. The NWC faculty is admirably qualified for teaching the College’s JPME curriculum. The overall faculty mix promotes a thoroughly joint and interagency outlook within the faculty and ensures representation for the views of virtually every institution that plays a major role in the national security strategy process. As former senior commanders, managers and staff officers, military faculty and agency representatives have extensive experience in joint and interagency operations. Civilian professors not only have the impressive scholarly expertise needed to view national security problems from the broadest perspective, but most of them also have direct experience with either joint or interagency operations.

While the quality of our faculty is superb, we do not rest upon our laurels. Faculty quality at NWC is enhanced by a robust program of faculty development beginning as soon as a new faculty member arrives at NWC and extending all the way through his or her tenure. College policy for faculty development is set forth in the NWC Standard Operating Procedures Handbook and includes at least the following elements:

**New Faculty Orientation.** Upon arriving at the College, all new faculty attend a three day orientation – covering the range of issues any NWC faculty member is likely to encounter.

**Faculty Offsite.** Each year, the week before students arrive in the fall, the entire faculty attends an offsite to discuss the future year and to consider issues facing the College in the next three to five years.

**Faculty Mentors.** In their first semester, the College pairs each new faculty member with a veteran who is tasked with helping the new member get a sense of the variety of skills and techniques that underpin successful teaching at NWC.
Lesson Preparation. By emphasizing the criticality of individual lesson preparation and leading by example, deans, department chairs, and course directors ensure faculty undertake the continuous research, analysis and synthesis of their subject matter that is the most powerful engine of faculty development. To aid faculty preparation, Core Course directors prepare written guides for each lesson that provide a strong foundation upon which seminar leaders can build. Additionally, each core course director conducts a series of mandatory workshops to prepare faculty for seminars. In the end, however, the College recognizes and stresses that individual subject matter expertise, perspective, and teaching artistry are all crucial to achieving excellence in our educational endeavors.

End of Course Critiques. A variety of assessments after completion of each element of the academic program help faculty identify both areas for improvement and successful approaches/techniques to share with other faculty. These assessments include anonymous written critiques from students, as well as face-to-face “hot washes” with both students and faculty.

Curriculum Development. All faculty participate in course and curriculum development, and the intellectual investment involved is instrumental to honing the expertise of our faculty and keeping their work vibrant and fresh.

Faculty Pairings. Whenever appropriate, the College exploits opportunities to pair faculty, enabling them to reinforce each other’s expertise, share ideas about content and pedagogy, and add variety to their teaching.

Faculty Research and Publication. NWC encourages faculty to take maximum advantage of the time available for research and publication within the confines of their other responsibilities at the College.

Faculty Seminars/Colloquia. Over the course of the academic year, the College will sponsor a wide variety of informal discussion forums to stimulate professional discussion and keep faculty current on topics outside their own specialties.

Faculty Attendance at Conferences/Symposia. Each faculty member is given the opportunity and strongly encouraged to attend at least one of a wide array of conferences, symposia and other professional meetings for the purpose of either learning about others’ research or to present their own.

Faculty Sabbaticals. Every seventh year, civilian faculty are eligible for a 12 month sabbatical for research, writing, or some other professional development activity. Additionally, any faculty member – civilian, military, and agency – can request relief from a portion of the academic year to pursue some development opportunity.
Faculty Exchanges/Outreach. Both the College and the University have established formal or informal relationships with sister institutions around the world that give faculty the time to consider the work going on in other institutions, while also looking at trends, conditions and concerns that may be occurring around the world.

Along with all these measures, NWC has established clear goals for faculty improvement. The most important initiative is the replenishment of civilian faculty, an area where the College has enjoyed considerable success. In the last ten years, NWC has increased faculty expertise in the functional areas of terrorism, post-conflict stability operations, international negotiations, international law, political economy, energy, irregular warfare, multinationalism, language and culture, and in the regions of Latin America, Central Asia, the Caucasus and Africa. With a few recent losses (our Latin American expert became the DASD for Western Hemisphere, and the departure of our African specialist), future civilian hires would likely aim to increase further the College’s expertise in economics and political economy, governance, irregular warfare, stability/reconstruction and state building, cultural anthropology, Africa and Latin America. To bolster further the qualifications of its military faculty, the College intends to work with the Services to find O-6 candidates with the requisite and recent top-level combat/crisis command and staff experience who also have solid teaching experience at the undergraduate or graduate levels. Teaching experience is the greatest determinant of how quickly new faculty are able to function effectively in the classroom at NWC. Finally, the College is seeking to improve the credentials and teaching expertise of agency representatives. To this end, we are pressing for more participation in the selection process and are strongly encouraging agencies to allow their representatives to remain on faculty duty for three years rather than just two.

Mr. Chairman, NWC is justifiably proud of the quality of its faculty. Title 10 hiring procedures have permitted the college to recruit and, for the most part, retain a first-rate civilian faculty which currently includes nationally and internationally recognized scholars. Military faculty come from the best of the military scholarship and policymaking communities, or are senior officers with distinguished records in a broad spectrum of operational and staff assignments. Agency faculty bring senior-level staff and operational experiences from across the government, with many having served in leadership posts overseas. The thoroughly joint and interagency character of the faculty, combined with a proportionate mix of leading regional specialists, ensures that the entire program of study reflects joint, interagency and multinational perspectives.

Students

Let me now address our student body. In academic year 2009, 222 students will be graduating. We started with 224 but one international fellow passed away unexpectedly, and one DOS student developed a debilitating
illness that precluded completion of the course of study. The class reflects an interagency/international character similar to our faculty make-up. We have 130 military students (which includes U.S. Coast Guard), 61 U.S. Government civilians from DOD and non-DOD agencies, and 31 International students. The students in an average class have a service length of about 19.3 years, have an average age of 42 to 43, and usually possess about 10-12 Ph.D.’s. Approximately 80% possess Masters’ Degrees.

Generally, selection for the National War College is more competitive than promotion for the military services. The general requirements are a bachelor’s degree from an accredited college or university, and officers must have attained the grade of 0-5 before the academic year starts. They must have a demonstrated record of outstanding performance and have the potential for true growth in positions of senior strategic leadership. The Military Departments may allocate a portion of their military quotas for NWC to Reserve Component officers and Guard Officers, and generally this option is exercised by all the services, resulting in an average of one to three students from the Guard or Reserve. We ask that the Military Departments achieve an appropriate mix of specialties when selecting officers for attendance at NWC based upon the focus of the educational program (generally this course is most conducive to combat and combat support officers more than logistics and/or acquisition who generally attend ICAF). Generally, military officers sent to NWC have been selected from a service board process.

U.S. Government civilian students attending NWC are professionals in their parent organizations and comparable in rank to their military student counterparts (minimum of a GS14 or NSPS equivalent). They normally possess a graduate degree and demonstrate potential for senior executive-level service. Unlike most of our military students, civilian students are selected by an array of processes. Some are boarded, some have an extensive process such as the Defense Senior Leader Development Program (DSDLDP) (formerly the Defense Leadership and Management Program), and some are selected directly by their Agency or Department Senior Executive. Generally, a list of civilian candidates along with their individual nomination packages is sent to NWC for review and approval. The Dean of Students, the agency chairs and the NDU registrar screens each package for adherence to the entrance requirements and qualifications of the individual. Agencies are notified of acceptance or the requirement to submit alternate candidates.

We enjoy one of the largest international student bodies of any of the senior service schools; thirty-two different countries are represented. The admissions process for international fellows is distinctive. The University collects requests and consolidates the lists using priority lists provided by the combatant commands. NDU distributes seats in a manner designed to achieve a global representation in classes. NDU determines how many seats are apportioned to each combatant command and recommends countries for invitations or
placement on the alternate list. NDU scrubs the lists against the Security Cooperation Guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense and annotates countries by tier group. This process occurs in August. The University sends a single proposed list of international attendees to the Joint Staff. The J-5 reviews and comments on the list based on current politico/military situations and events and the Security Cooperation Guidance. J-7 adjudicates any differences between NDU and J-5 recommendations. The Chairman approves and sends invitations for NWC in November. NWC is then notified as to which countries and students will attend.

The quality of our students is superb. They come armed with a broad national security experience and have a proven record as practitioners. Many of our military students (both U.S. and International) have multiple tours in high level staffs or command in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other crisis areas. Several Department of State, USAID, and military members have a broad range of experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). Their success in achieving flag rank, senior executive service designation, or in the case of foreign officers, Chiefs of Defense, is impressive; about 50% of the class achieve such levels of success.

Curriculum

Mr. Chairman, let me now turn to our curriculum and our focus on critical thinking and development of National Security Strategy. Through a ten month curriculum that encompasses the international and American contexts, along with instruments of state power, NWC offers a comprehensive education that stresses the use of conceptual frameworks and critical thinking to develop future national security strategists.

Seminars constitute the heart of the NWC education experience and are taught in the “Socratic Method”, encouraging vigorous discussions and competing viewpoints to be articulated and debated. The very structure of our seminars places each student in an “interagency/international” context. Each seminar is composed of 13 students that includes 2-3 Army, 2-3 Air Force, 2-3 Navy/Marine/Coast Guard, one Department of State, 2-3 other civilian agencies, and two international fellows from diverse regions of the world. These seminars include interactive activities such as role playing and student-led strategic exercises that guarantee active participation from NWC’s diverse student body. The seminars typically dissect classical thinkers in strategic disciplines like Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao, Adam Smith, Keynes, Marx, Hamilton, and Madison as well as important contemporary strategists. This active learning is supplemented by a balance of influential and notable speakers who lecture on important current and historical global and domestic issues. This past year as an example, the students enjoyed hearing from two sitting presidents, both President Bush and President Obama, past and present Members of Congress, Dr Henry Kissinger, and General Petraeus, as well as Associate Justice Scalia.
As you well know, in order to understand complexity, you must be well grounded in the basic foundations of any issue. This is how we structure our curriculum to enable our students to become critical and complex thinking strategists. Core Course 6100, “Introduction to Strategy,” focuses on critical thinking and methods of strategic analysis. Historical case studies and crises are introduced, discussed, and analyzed with standardized frameworks. Students are then encouraged to break down these frameworks and to develop their own practical methods for analyzing issues. In this way, 6100 serves as the basis for subsequent courses focusing on military and non-military elements of statecraft, as well as the domestic and international contexts within which strategy must be implemented. During subsequent Core Courses, students are required to write papers that use these methods of analysis that they developed in this introductory offering.

Course 6200, “War and Statecraft,” is designed to improve the students’ ability to understand the nature, character and conduct of war in a combined and joint environment. Course 6300, “Non-Military Elements of Statecraft,” analyzes the non-military instruments/tools available to strategists and how those tools flow from the broader elements of national power. Course 6400, “The Domestic Context,” examines the U.S. domestic context of national security decisions across governmental agencies as well as factors external to the government that shape those decisions. Course 6500, “The Global Context,” examines the complex global forces and actors that shape the strategic context and inform US policy and strategy. Course 6600, “Applications in National Security Strategy,” synthesizes the previous courses by having the students create strategies using the entire spectrum of national power to address discrete emerging challenges. And finally, Course 6700, “Field Studies in National Security Strategic Policy-making,” allows for an eyes-on, hands-on view of one particular region and its strategic relationship with the United States and our allies by taking approximately two weeks to experience cultures and talk with senior leaders of other countries throughout the world. In AY08-09, twenty-two different trips spread out to all corners of the globe, and upon return, the students exchanged observations and lessons learned from their experience, tying in the lessons and learning of the NWC core curriculum studied here in Washington with the observations of other countries around the globe.

The final two courses synthesize learning objectives from the previous ones. Course 6600, “Applications in National Security Strategy,” focuses on complex national security issues that require the use of analytical tools developed in previous Core Courses. Course 6700, “Field Studies in National Security Strategic Policy-making,” offers on-site explorations of foreign countries’ national security strategies and perspectives.

Supplementing our core curriculum is an array of elective courses that build on the foundation provided by the Core Courses. All students take four electives, one of which supports their regional study travels, while the other three
are chosen from over 60 offerings at the College and many more across the University. In addition, through the analysis of topical issues (Global Economics, Analyzing Al Qaeda, etc.) and symposia, the students gain a more comprehensive overview of current strategic issues.

Another "supplement" to teaching strategy is the presence of our International Fellows who provide key viewpoints to each seminar and lecture. Through their experience and observations of the United States, the foreign officers provide perspectives that the majority of U.S. students rarely encounter. This interaction in seminar provides a critical shaping of the student cohort.

And finally, our interagency students and faculty help to foster further understanding of the governmental challenges that facilitate or inhibit strategic actions. During seminar and lecture, Department of State, USAID, intelligence agencies, Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Justice among other governmental entities further enhance students' understanding of the nuances of governmental activity in developing strategies for a wide range of critical national issues.

Thus, because each of the three critical components of the College—faculty, student body, and curriculum—have a joint/combined/interagency composition and emphasis, the National War College is uniquely positioned to address past, current, and future national and international strategic opportunities, problems, and challenges. There is no particular Service lens by which problems are viewed—because of the representation among the faculty and student body, the personalities and tools of differing agencies and governments can be addressed against the backdrop of regional and culturally unique factors that comprise the pantheon of national security problems.

**Academic Rigor**

With this strong curriculum, there must be rigor to ensure learning. Academic rigor is one of our most important principles. It is a "core principle" imbedded throughout our strategic plan. We base our approach upon the fundamentals and guidelines outlined in the Goldwater-Nichols Panel on Military Education Report of 1989, the CJCS Officer Professional Military Education Policy, and the Middle States Commission on Higher Education Standards. We recognize that academic rigor is a process, not an end state. Every aspect of the educational experience contributes to the level of academic rigor present in our program. Only ongoing program assessment will ensure that rigor is sustained. In our assessment process, we have identified four major indicators of academic rigor.

- A challenging curriculum that engages students at the highest cognitive levels: application, analysis, synthesis and evaluation. We have established a dynamic process of curriculum review that ensures
continuous improvement. That process includes having multiple sources of input and feedback: students, faculty, graduates, senior leaders, and peer institutions. Added to this is our establishment of an internal Curriculum Coordinating Committee that meets monthly and is charged with ensuring compliance so that the highest standards of learning are facilitated. Additionally, we conduct a 3-to-5 year cycle of “blank sheet of paper” curriculum reviews, focused on mission and in context with the latest near term and future (next 10 years) strategic challenges to national security. These efforts are then augmented with the periodic Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) and Middle States Reviews.

- An emphasis on active seminar learning which motivates students to interact with peers and faculty in critical thinking and creative problem solving is key to rigor. Our instruction emphasizes seminar interaction centered around a small size seminar of 13 students.

- A diversity of activities that require students to demonstrate their learning in relevant and realistic ways. We have developed diverse learning activities that challenge students to engage with ideas, to think critically and creatively e.g. case studies, exercises, debates, oral presentations and writing assignments. To enable the learning environment, faculty possessing subject expertise guide and prepare other faculty for course instruction. This is accomplished through a robust orientation of new faculty to seminar teaching; faculty Seminar Leader Qualification Criteria (new in AY 09); a “Backseat” instructor program for on-the-job training (OJT); weekly Core Course faculty workshops; and, an opportunity for improvement based on leadership and peer observations and student feedback.

- Evaluation of student learning against high standards which are clearly defined and consistently applied by teaching faculty. Learning assessment involves multiple evaluations and evaluators. Student performance is measured against standardized criteria: participation, writing and oral presentations. We have a well established remediation program provided for less than “Met” performance. Our demanding oral evaluations and our capstone Core Courses assess broader program outcomes to ensure the over all effort to develop critical thinking at the strategic level is accomplished. We reward superior performance (top 10%) through our Distinguished Graduate Program.

While we are proud of our efforts, we have several initiatives ongoing to improve our program. In our curriculum development and review process, we have initiated a number of exchanges with and benchmarking against peer institutions. We do this by increasing our faculty participation in PAJE evaluations and through the Military Education Coordination Council (MECC) working group. Additionally, we have developed a matrix to measure our course
objectives to OPMEP requirements. Finally, we have established systematic reviews of elective syllabi to ensure every elective has a paper, oral presentation or exercise requirement to assess learning. And of course, we conduct formal faculty seminar leader feedback session through our survey system.

Another initiative is in the realm of student evaluation. We have explored opportunities to best measure and document achievement of student learning outcomes. Specifically, we established a faculty assessment committee to develop a new rubric for evaluating student papers. This is in line with Middle States Standard 14 – assessing / documenting student learning outcomes. We ran a pilot program this year in our Core Courses 6600 and 6700. The intent was to look at whether students are learning what we say they do at a macro level. This provides the very feedback from student learning, to curriculum and to faculty that enhances the rigor of our program.

Mr. Chairman, I can say with confidence that we have a strong, rigorous program that is thoroughly assessed and maintained to meet today’s and tomorrow’s challenges.

Irregular Warfare

Let me now turn to another clear interest of this esteemed subcommittee, that is how we address Irregular Warfare. I will frame the question like this: How does the National War College incorporate concepts of irregular warfare (counterinsurgency and counterterrorism) and the changing character of war into its curriculum?

This year there were four lessons (out of 27) on irregular warfare in the Core Course on the military instrument (Core Course 6200): Theories of Insurgency (lecture given by Dr. Bard O’Neill), and three case studies (Algeria, Vietnam, and Iraq/Afghanistan). There was one session on globalization in the Non-military Instruments Core Course (6300) that discussed globalization and non-state actors. The Global Context Core Course (6500) had a lecture specifically focused on globalization and conflict that analyzed nontraditional threats including terrorism, piracy, mercenaries, enhanced communications (acovism, cyberthreats, etc.) and also briefly discussed hybrid warfare.

We have several electives that supplement this learning area. The following National War College courses deal directly with irregular warfare: NWC 5102: Insurgency and Terrorism; NWC 5203: Afghanistan: The Other War; NWC 5204: A History of the Vietnam War; NWC 5209: The Iraq War; NWC 5212: Analyzing Al Qaeda and other Transnational Threats; NWC 5215: US Experiences in Irregular Warfare; and NWC 5505: Introduction to US Special Operations Roles and Missions. The following either deal with support for irregular warfare or have special segments on the topic: NWC 5302: Intelligence and National Security; NWC 5303: Intelligence for the Twenty-first Century; NWC

Another supplementing activity includes the special seminars that we conduct annually. For example, in fall 2006, the National War College conducted a special research seminar series, “Analyzing Al Qaeda,” in conjunction with the Institute for National Security Studies which was held at Roosevelt Hall. It brought in the best national scholars in the study and analysis of Al Qaeda, including Peter Bergen, Fawaz Gerges, Bruce Riedel, Brian Jenkins, Marc Sageman, and Bruce Hoffman to speak, as well as two war college faculty members (Dr. Bard O’Neill and Dr. Audrey Kurth Cronin), among others. The seminars included war college students who were enrolled in a special elective by the same name. A large number of researchers from INSS and other organizations attended each session, as well as an average of 8-10 war college faculty members. There have also been numerous informal ‘brown-bag’ seminars by and for the students on issues related to Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly discussions of provincial reconstruction teams, challenges of Counter Terrorism intelligence, and operational experiences in counter-insurgency.

We have an impressive array of experts in Irregular Warfare on faculty. Two faculty members specialize particularly on Irregular Warfare, one on counterinsurgency (Dr. Bard O’Neill) and one on counterterrorism (Dr. Audrey Kurth Cronin). Another faculty member focuses mainly on post-conflict operations and counterinsurgency, mainly in Afghanistan and Iraq (Dr. Joseph Collins); a fourth is an expert on the use of air power in counterinsurgency (Dr. Mark Clodfelter), and a fifth is an expert in the lessons learned from Vietnam (Dean Mark Pizzo). In addition, the Special Operations Chair (COL Jim Campbell), the Army Chair (COL Rich Hooker), and a large proportion of the senior military faculty have recent operational experience in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency; most having just returned from tours in either Iraq or Afghanistan.

In terms of research and publications, our faculty has been very busy. The following books on irregular warfare have been published by NWC faculty members: Dr. John Ballard (recently left NWC to become the Dean of Faculty at the Center for Near East South Asia), Triumph of Self-Determination: Operation Stabilise and United Nations Peacemaking in East Timor (Praeger, 2008); Ballard, Fighting for Fallujah (Praeger, 2006); Ballard, From Desert Storm to Iraqi Freedom: The Long Conflict between Iraq and the United States (US Naval Institute Press, forthcoming 2009); Dr. Audrey Kurth Cronin, Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy (Georgetown University Press, 2004); Cronin, Ending Terrorism: Lessons for Defeating Al Qaeda (Routledge, 2008); Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist
Campaigns (Princeton University Press, forthcoming 2009); Dr. Bard O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse* (Potomac Books, 2nd edition, 2005). There are dozens of articles, occasional papers, and book chapters published recently by NWC faculty on the topic of irregular warfare. NWC faculty are heavily represented for example in the edited collection, *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century* (Praeger, 2007), on the subjects of counterinsurgency and applicability of the laws of war. In addition to these publications by faculty, we have many student initiatives to produce publications on the topic of irregular warfare. A sampling of recent student research projects on Irregular Warfare include: “Islamic Thought and Terrorism” (independent study, with Dr. John Ballard); “Prosecuting Terrorists” (long research paper with Harvey Rishikof, Esq.); “Legitimacy and Terrorism” (long research paper with Dr. Audrey Kurth Cronin).

**Language and Culture**

Another area of interest to the Committee is our work in language and culture. Our Core Course curriculum deals with cultural issues throughout and I will briefly highlight how we approach this subject area.

As I stated before, Core Course 6100, “Introduction to Strategy,” lays the conceptual groundwork for all other curriculum courses by examining the basic elements that go into the design of national security strategy. Central to this course is the understanding of domestic, international, and strategic context. To this end, several topics and numerous readings focus on the critical element of culture; both American strategic culture and international mindsets/worldviews, and their impact on strategy formulation.

Course 6200, “War and Statecraft,” is the seminal military strategy course that examines the classical and contemporary masters of military art as an intellectual foundation for evaluating the effectiveness of military power as a modern instrument of national policy. Understanding and predicting the actions of current and potential enemies is at the core of 6200. Drawing extensively on the rich asset of military International Fellows in each NWC seminar, students gain an appreciation for cultural differences in the development of strategy. This learning experience is complemented by Course 6300 which analyzes non-military elements of statecraft.

Course 6500, “The Global Context,” is focused on analyzing the global and regional contexts in which U.S. national security policies and military strategies are formulated and carried out. You will recall that it is in this course that we evaluate the interests, goals and behavior of major international actors. Special attention is paid to the historical, cultural, religious, social, economic, technological and political factors that influence them. Again, our International Fellows offer a unique perspective through which U.S. students gain a greater appreciation for how U.S. policies are viewed by different cultures. Course 6500
is closely linked to Course 6700 with writing assignments and strategic exercises focused on the region where students will visit during their 6700 practicum.

Course 6700, "Field Studies in National Security Strategic Policy-Making," is a practicum involving approximately 10 days of international travel to a region specifically studied during the course of the academic year. Preparation for travel includes completion of an elective course focused on the region for travel and 10, 2-hour blocks of trip preparation in which students meet with U.S. policymakers, representatives of foreign embassies, and non-governmental organizations to better understand the context in which U.S. policies are made, implemented and understood by foreign polities. Anecdotally, our students tell us that Course 6700 is the capstone course that solidifies for them the importance of understanding context, culture and the "others" perspective.

In addition to the Core Curriculum, the College addresses the issue of culture and language in a variety of ways. For example, the integration of our International Fellows (IFs) from allied militaries around the world constitute a significant enabler of cultural awareness at the National War College. IFs are integrated into every aspect of our U.S. students' professional, academic, and social activities. Their contributions to seminar and committee discussion, as well as numerous social events with spouses, enrich academic discussion and deepen U.S. students' cultural awareness.

Closely tied to our cultural awareness efforts is our language program. As you know, the CJCS has placed a premium on integrating language training across the spectrum of PME. Language education is not incorporated as an objective in the NWC Core Curriculum; however, "Arab Cultural Literacy" is offered as an elective to students expressing an interest. Faculty members picking up the charge of the Chairman worked hard to develop a viable program that would address the specific requirements of our student body.

"Arab Cultural Literacy" is a specialized course for those who want to learn and understand basic and practical Arabic language and culture. It reinforces Core Courses by delving in depth into the study of language and culture in the Arab and broader Islamic world. The course provides basic learning related to (1) the Arabic language; and (2) cultural norms for common situations, with variations for people, region, and sub-regions of the Arab and Islamic Worlds. This course is offered twice per academic year, once in the fall and once in the spring semesters. The contract is for a maximum enrollment of 24 students per year shared between the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. The "Arab Cultural Literacy" elective is taught by an outside contractor with oversight provided by a NWC standing committee.
Leadership, Organization and Resources

Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude by discussing three issues important to the committee: leadership, organization and resources.

I have read various pieces in which some question the quality of today's leadership for our senior PME institutions. I do not wish to make this a personal issue, but at the same time I wish to note my professional disagreement with this assessment. Leading the college requires the same senior leadership skills required for any other large and complex institution: a dedication to the mission, an immersion in the business of integrating the very best that the JPME and civilian academic experiences have to offer our students; and a vision to anticipate the challenges of tomorrow. Finally, a Commandant must also remember that these are hybrid organizations, a mix of military, civilian government and civilian academic environments, whose strength and effectiveness flow from their diversity. She or he must recognize and draw upon the strengths of a diverse, professional faculty and staff yet at the same time have the discipline required to make the tough decisions.

Thus, I disagree that our selection process for Commandants is broken or in dire straits. I also am concerned with what appears to be a line of thinking that fails to take into account our unique strengths as an institution that combines the best of the civilian academic world with senior government expertise. If the government simply wishes to provide its rising leaders with graduate degrees, our country has numerous high-quality institutions to which it can send them. However, offering an opportunity to earn a master's degree is not the only purpose of a school like the National War College. Instead, we bring together the next generation of our country's military and civilian leaders, along with their international peers, for a program of study that has the unique capacity of allowing them to (a) interact intensively with one another over an extended, ten-month period; (b) understand the various components and capabilities of national power which they represent; and (c) come to grips as a group with the key issues that collectively they will confront as they rise to positions of greater responsibility and authority.

This unique experience is the central added value that PME institutions like the National War College bring to the education of our future leaders. It is not replicated in private-sector universities, and without it we would lose our reason for existence. And the critical essential element in achieving our unique mission is professional diversity -- diversity in our leadership, in our faculty, in our student body, and in our curriculum. For example, we need a solid core of academic professionals (Ph.D. or JD) to help guide curriculum development, understand theory, and structure academic rigor. But we also need to have a core of professional practitioners who bring a viable sense of operational reality that can be applied to the theories we teach. Leading these institutions requires a careful blending and balance of these two forms of "education" where we will
find the success that Chairman Skelton, you and your subcommittee Chairman Snyder, and we who lead the schools seek.

I recognize that there are similar debates regarding the position of the Dean of Faculty, specifically the qualifications, experience and credentials required for an individual to succeed in this critical position. Our senior PME institutions staff this position in various ways. Some have active duty O-6 officers with Ph.D’s in the positions; others draw upon the retired military ranks; and still others have tapped into the civilian world. At the National War College we traditionally have chosen the former route, with a series of distinguished military Ph.D’s serving in the position.

I understand that the cohort of active duty military O-6 personnel with Ph.D’s may be shrinking, and that there may have been a shift in their fields toward engineering and the sciences, although I do not know if this means that there are now insufficient numbers Service-wide with degrees in such fields as international relations, political science, and history to staff such important positions at the Deans of Faculty at the senior PME schools. I acknowledge that academic distinction and teaching excellence are not the only characteristics we seek in a Dean of Faculty. Also important are prior leadership/command of large, complex and diverse organizations such as the College, familiarity with integrated “whole of government” operations, and an ability to inspire confidence and enthusiasm among peers, subordinates, and stakeholders.

While in the future one could consider placing a civilian Ph.D in this position, or use a proven military leader who lacks that degree, over the near term I would prefer to continue our traditional practice of having an active duty O-6 with a doctorate serve as incumbent. In this regard, I will need the support of the Services in identifying and nominating candidates having and indeed exceeding the aforementioned prerequisites. I also will need the Services to continue to emphasize educational accomplishment at the highest levels by affording promising officers the opportunity to pursue doctoral degrees, so that we can staff not just the Dean of Faculty position but indeed certain military faculty slots as well. Finally, I would stress that, just as I seek a faculty and student body drawn from a diverse set of Services, departments, agencies, and countries, so must I have a leadership team that reflects a breadth of expertise, experience, and skill and melds the best that the military, governmental and academic professions can bring to the table in support of our critical mission.

This leads to the second question, the Chief of Staff/Dean of Students. This position was civilianized to meet the concerns of Middle States Commission on Higher Education, which raised concern over continuity of the colleges. Having a retired military civilian in this position is the right call, and it provides credibility for our military students. Commandants and Deans of Faculty do and will continue to serve at the pleasure of the University President or the Commandant. The Chief of Staff/Dean of Students provides the continuity for
budgeting, maintenance, logistics, and all the support functions critical to the needs of both faculty and students. He or she alone allows the Dean of Faculty to focus on our most important mission, the education of our students and the quality of our academic program. If we were to make the Chief of Staff/Dean of Students a military position, then we would lose that critical continuity aspect. Thus I believe this position is properly identified and structured for a retired military civilian and is in the best interest of our College.

Mr. Chairman, we are all aware of the current economic situation we find ourselves in, but that does not remove the importance of having the right resources critical to meeting the mission we have been directed to execute. NDU has worked hard to meet the increasing demands of both JPME schools, and the other colleges and research institutions under the University. As you can imagine, there are competing requirements all critical to our national security efforts and the imperatives of the Secretary of Defense. Operationally, I believe we do pretty well. Maintenance and upkeep of our physical plants is a big challenge. We are tenants on an Army installation, and the heavy burden the Army currently faces strains their ability to meet all the installation and logistics requirements it oversees. We live in a 100 plus years old building with historic preservation status, and we struggle to maintain the critical infrastructure needed to provide an acceptable learning environment.

Mr. Chairman, let me close with the most immediate and pressing challenge facing the NWC – that is, rebalancing its military faculty. Currently, we are short two Army officers and we project that we will remain two short for the next academic year. We are not meeting our OPMEP requirement for an even distribution of Army, sea services, and Air Force military faculty. At this point, it likely will take strong intervention by the Joint Staff to help the College correct this deficiency. We all know the burden the Army faces with its many challenges around the world, but if we are to prepare the right military leaders for the challenges they face, then JPME must be a high priority for the services.

The challenge that would emerge if the College were required to fix its military faculty mix problem could result in a dramatic reduction in the College’s ratio of military faculty to civilian faculty. To maintain a proper military ratio, in addition to missing two Army faculty, we would not fill two sea service and two Air Force faculty billets. This six person swing in the balance of military to civilian faculty – six military billets unfilled and six additional civilian faculty hired to sustain the College’s required student-to-faculty ratio – could weaken the representation of the military perspective in faculty debates, lessen the emphasis on the military instrument in the curriculum, and possibly even result in the status of the military faculty becoming that of a junior partner. This may sound draconian, but Mr. Chairman, you are asking us here today to provide you a solid assessment of PME, and in that regard, I must highlight this critical challenge.
Conclusion

In conclusion, I see JPME as a glass half full. The quality of our faculty, staff, and students is superb. In all three categories, we have people that are dedicated to the mission, principles and values that Chairman Skelton addressed in his report some 20 years ago. I did say half full. There is always room for improvement and the areas I would suggest your subcommittee look at are resources, personnel requirements, and uniqueness of missions for the senior colleges. Ensuring JPME II for all the war colleges may be an important issue, but it should not detract from the specialized excellence that each provides. When Chairman Skelton stressed the criticality of jointness in JPME years ago, he was careful to ensure that people did not interpret that as “one national uniformed service.” He recognized that jointness functioned best when it synthesized the best each service brought to the table. While we look for ways to improve JPME, I ask that you preserve the specific missions each war college was chartered to accomplish. For the National War College, the national security strategy mission must be preserved.
STATEMENT OF
REAR ADMIRAL J. P. WISECUP, U.S. NAVY
PRESIDENT OF U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
WAR COLLEGE HEARING
4 JUNE 2009
PART I

Good morning, distinguished ladies and gentlemen of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee; I thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today about Professional Military Education in our Navy and the work of the team at the Naval War College in providing career-long educational opportunities related to the mission of the Navy in serving this people of this nation as well as providing professional and personal growth to all Sailors, officer and enlisted, throughout the course of the selfless sacrifice and service to our nation's security. My testimony is divided into three parts parallels the structure of Rear Admiral Ronald J. Kurth, USN when he hosted distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee twenty-one years ago. First, I will address the five, main questions posed by the panel regarding our teaching of strategy, interagency and multinational aspects of joint matters, irregular warfare, language, regional and cultural knowledge and the faculty's careful balancing of the curricula between enduring and current challenges across the Navy's PME Continuum. Second, I will discuss the recurring themes of professional military education in the Navy, outlining our progress over the last decade. Third, I will describe the current missions and military education programs at the U. S. Naval War College.

The first question was whether the Naval War College taught strategy. Yes, the senior and intermediate educational programs are structured to develop a strategic mindset in our students, providing them critical frameworks for strategic analysis while exposing them to the great theorists on war. We aim to develop in our professional students the ability to make wise strategic choices and resolve tough problems in positions of strategic leadership.

The core curricula provides a full trimester of study with the faculty in the College's Strategy and Policy Department, whose course is modeled on the tutorial system of liberal education found at Oxford by a former President, Admiral Stansfield Turner. For our senior-level students, strategy in the Strategy and Policy course is the use of war for the purpose of long-term political success in the international arena. In it, the students examine the full array of the instruments of national power and the military and non-military dimensions of war through historic case studies that extend over decades. These cases incorporate prewar, postwar, and interwar periods, while retaining periods of war as the principal focus. Over these longer periods of time, the perspective on policy becomes quite complex and strategy itself is judged against the aim of policy. The faculty has developed a series of course themes, actually a compendium of grouped, key questions, which forms the analytical framework for strategic evaluation and judgment. For the intermediate-level students, the strategy and war course taught by the same faculty is more narrowly aimed at the interface between strategy and operations. After reviewing the strategic theorists, these students examine a series of case studies consisting of a different war each week, each with a different purpose. The focus here emphasizes the military instrument of power and the military dimensions of war while retaining the larger context of the non-military aspects of each. For both courses, students are asked to think in a disciplined,
critical, and original manner about the international strategic environment, about a range of potential strategies, and about the strategic effects of joint, interagency, and multinational operations.

The other two core courses present strategy from different perspectives. For senior students in the national security and decision making course, their final exercise requires each seminar to assess the security environment over the next twenty years and to then create a new national security strategy, national military strategy, and appropriate force capabilities to support the national military strategy, then brief them to panel of faculty members. In preparation for this capstone event, students examine grand strategy, explore the concept of strategy, and consider various schools of thought about international relations and how they play out as strategic designs. They examine the relationship between strategy, the allocation of scarce resources, and the development and maintenance of forces to effectively implement strategy. They also examine through case studies how senior leaders developed, implemented or interpreted strategy, whether at the national or operational level. For the intermediate-level students, the capstone final exercise requires each seminar produce and present an executive-level strategic estimate of the future security environment over the next eight years, a theater strategic vision that advances and defends U.S. national interests, and a prioritized list of new or improved concepts/capabilities necessary to advance the strategy within one of the five region of the world. The group must include the identification of performance measures that will be used to facilitate evaluation of the performance of the theater strategy. In this course, the focus is theater strategy and security through the lens of a specific regional commander. Students critically examine the role of strategy, regional awareness, national strategies, theater strategy tools, and theater security. The course also shows how strategic documents drive and influence military capabilities and resource allocation.

During their study of joint military operations, students examine how to wield the military instrument of power, in peace and in war, to achieve national policy goals, focused at two levels—operational and strategic and operational. The JMO course enhances senior students’ leadership skills and critical thinking abilities to plan theater strategies and translate them into naval, joint, interagency, and multinational operations. Throughout this course, senior students review the current theory of operational art, compare it to the doctrinal basis for contemporary application of military power, and begin to distill the next generation of doctrine for our armed forces. For our intermediate-level students, the joint maritime operations course is focused on joint operations at the theater- and task-force level; however, national-level strategy formulation, implementation, and campaigning are also discussed. The course explores the relationship between strategy and operations with an emphasis on how operational level planning and execution is informed by strategy and the critical nature of strategic guidance to operational-level planning and action.

The second query concerned how the College curricula embedded interagency and multinational perspectives and issues. Interagency and multinational themes are an important
part of the curricula. The rich diversity of the student body with international officers, civilians from several government agencies, and US military officers expands the opportunities for seminar discussion of these issues and enhances our approach of them.

The institutional dimensions of strategy, a theme in the strategy and policy course, provides an analytical framework to examine how decision makers, the armed forces, government departments and agencies, and non-government organizations all pull together their individual efforts to achieve overall policy objectives. Additionally, case studies are infused with the importance of understanding the international environment and the working of coalitions in determining the outcome of wars and preserving peace. Case studies reflect that America’s wars were, have been, are, and will be coalition wars in the future.

The National Security Decision Making course examines how the interagency system helps the President in developing, coordinating, articulating and implementing National Security Policy. Moreover, the final exercise conducts a global security assessment and utilizes the regional knowledge possessed by both US and international students to guide seminar deliberations about what the national security strategy and the national military strategy should contain in order to increase its likelihood of success in tomorrow’s global security environment.

Essentially, almost every session in the Joint Military Operations Department’s curricula deal with interagency and multinational themes. All of the planning exercises and the capstone synthesis events are based on fictional scenarios in which the students develop plans in a multinational and interagency environment. Joint Interagency Control Groups are an important part of the coordination for planning operations. Additionally, students work with nongovernment organizations and private volunteer organizations to achieve success.

The third question involved how we teach irregular warfare. It is covered in both the core curriculum and many of our elective courses. In fact, one of the dedicated elective areas of study focuses on insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and counterterrorism. The College has long studied these aspects of irregular warfare, often as a supporting element to conventional military operations. In the last decade, however, the focused study of irregular warfare has had an increased emphasis.

The Strategy and Policy Department includes a diverse assortment of case studies focusing on irregular warfare and the challenges of countering belligerents that utilize irregular strategies. Students read Mao’s famous study *On Protracted War* along with a number of other case studies involving irregular warfare including the American Revolution, the Chinese Civil War, the Huk Rebellion, the Malayan Insurgency, Vietnam, and current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Joint Military Operations Department discusses irregular warfare in their sessions on insurgency and counterinsurgency, operational planning, campaigning, and countering global insurgency. Students read several case studies highlighting insurrections and counterinsurgencies noting the regional and local forces that make each unique. The National
Security Decision Making Department covers irregular warfare tangentially in many of its sessions especially its impact on strategy and force planning in future wars.

In addition, in 2008 the Naval War College created the Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) in order to promote and support research and teaching on irregular warfare and armed groups. The Center hosts a series of conferences that bring scholars, both American and international, together with military scholars and practitioners to analyze the national and international security challenges posed by armed groups and irregular warfare. CIWAG contributes to curriculum development in the strategy, joint military operations and elective courses.

The fourth question asked how the College incorporated foreign language, regional knowledge and cultural knowledge in our curricula. First, the Naval War College does not provide language training whatsoever. As part of the Navy’s Language and Regional Expertise and Culture Strategy, formal language training is delivered in other forums and is not included in the Navy’s Professional Military Education Continuum. However, regional knowledge and cultural sensitivity by deliberate design are evident throughout the broad range of the Navy’s PME continuum. At each educational level, cultural proficiency is a continuing theme that is studied and explored.

Officers in the grades O5 to O6 complete senior-level PME and the requirements for JPME II in residence. Students are able to bring a broad perspective of regional and cultural proficiency to strategic assessments and problem-solving and have a basic understanding of the region and its military threats. They apply an analytical framework that incorporates factors such as geopolitics, geostategy, society, culture, and religion in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns in the joint, interagency, and multinational arena.

Officers in grades O3 to O4 complete intermediate-level PME and the requirements for JPME I either as resident students or nonresident students via the fleet seminar program, a web-enabled program, a CD-ROM program, or the Naval War College Program at the Naval Postgraduate School. Graduates have a basic regional understanding, know the military challenges, and are able to apply both cultural awareness and cultural sensitivity to planning and execution of naval and joint operations worldwide. Selected resident intermediate-level students also complete the Naval Operational Planner's Course. This course enables students to explore both naval and joint operational planning in greater detail and to gain and in-depth appreciation of the cultural factors that impact military operations in the region.

The electives program provides five regional Areas of Study Asia-Pacific, Greater Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Eurasia. About 100 students per academic year chose one of the regional areas of study. They gain an in-depth understanding of the region and the factors that influence that region.
Officers in the grades of CWO4 to O3 and senior enlisted in the grades of E7 to E9 complete Primary PME via distance learning through the Navy Knowledge Online. Students learn about geopolitical structures and cultures in regions aligned with the Unified Command Plan such as the Greater Middle East, Eurasia, Asia Pacific, Africa and the Western Hemisphere.

Senior enlisted in grades E8 to E9 complete the Senior Enlisted Academy and achieve regional proficiency and cultural awareness in selected regional areas. The Naval War College has partnered with Senior Enlisted Academy to share expertise on both cultural awareness and cultural sensitivity.

Sailors in grades E1 to E4 complete Introductory PME on-line through NKO. These students learn about the importance of language and culture to expeditionary operations around the world. Sailors in grades E4 to E6 complete Basic PME through Navy Knowledge Online and are introduced to maritime-related regional studies and cultural issues.

The final question asked how the Naval War College balances between teaching enduring and current things. Throughout its history the College has held fast to the belief, first articulated by its founding president, Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, USN that “The War College is a place of original research on all questions relating to war and to statesmanship connected to war, or the prevention of war.” Admiral Luce intended students and faculty to develop a deeper understanding of the central element of the military profession. To do so, he initiated a holistic educational process which included the questions and methods of many disciplines used to examine seminal strategic issues. To hone the skills of abstraction and analysis required of higher level staff and command, reflection and study of history and case studies along with analysis and gaming of the embedded longer-term issues within their environmental context was paramount. The College follows that educational methodology today.

For decades, the College and its academic departments have practiced a disciplined and comprehensive approach to curricula development. Members of the teaching departments usually become quite committed to the collective enterprise of curricular development and teaching. The curriculum is constantly in some degree of revision because every faculty member is personally dedicated to the product.

The teaching departments emphasize faculty awareness of emerging issues that will affect the curricula. Faculty members not only design and constantly refine the curricula using formal and informal data, collected from internal and external sources, but they also establish a pattern of reaching ever-higher levels of academic excellence. Faculty members are actively engaged with the national security community and military leaders around the world as well as their peers in their respective academic or military fields. The Naval War College draws over twenty five guest lecturers each year, ranging from Combatant Commanders to prominent national security executives and politicians. This provides faculty and students a unique opportunity to remain at the forefront of national security issues.
Curricula currency and relevance are especially vital to a college whose students are high achieving, mid-career professionals. By encouraging their critical analysis and questioning, we often become the initial target of those improved skills. Yet, their feedback of the quality of the instruction and the relevance of the educational experience remains most positive leading us to the conclusion that we have achieved a solid balance between the enduring issues involved with the study of war and the challenges of the contemporary operating environment. Students discover for themselves the value of the critical frameworks provided through their studies to the emerging contemporary issues that they face as professionals. We aim to make them more comfortable in dealing with surprise, ambiguity, cultures and regions foreign to their own experience.

In carrying out its educational function, the Naval War College successfully prepares officers for the transition from duties in technical and tactical operations to responsibilities that require a broad understanding of national policy and strategy, resource allocation and management, and joint, interagency, and multinational combined operations. This kind of education does three critical things. It imparts a healthy skepticism about pat answers or easy solutions. In particular, it makes our students wary about received wisdom. Second, it exposes students to a tremendous variety of experience. As someone has said, "history has more imagination than any scenario writer in the Pentagon." In the summer of 2001 who would have predicted that by the end of the year Americans would be viciously attacked on their own shores by an enemy that has no capitol or conventional military force? And, within weeks of that attack, America would go to war in landlocked Afghanistan? And by the time the last fires of the World Trade Center were extinguished, that U. S. forces would be in Kabul? Third, a classical education makes professionals think differently. It prepares officers to continue self-education. And it makes them more intellectually adaptable as circumstances change and they confront surprise.

Recurring Themes in Professional Military Education

PART II

My predecessor, Rear Admiral Ron Kurth, USN, testified to the Panel On Military Education in 1988 that Rear Admiral Steven B. Luce, USN, founder and first president of the Naval War College "established it explicitly for the study of the higher aspects of warfare, grasped almost intuitively that naval strategy could only be understood by reference to the entire art of war and within the context of national and international affairs." Admiral Kurth then presented four recurring themes concerning (1) learning, (2) professional education, (3) national

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security studies, and (4) jointness. As his thoughts remain valid today, I will present his conclusions and then indicate how we have improved the Navy’s implementation of them over the last two decades.

About learning, “Admiral Luce made clear choices – a focused, holistic, long-term, active education and a balancing of scholars and practitioners and of professorial and collegial contributions to learning.” To the tension between training and professional education in a military career, Admiral Kurth indicated planning and management differentiate between “an examination of technique to a conceptual understanding of warfighting;” it is education which demands “abstraction and analysis as well as the cultivation of wisdom and judgment” that hones the mental skills required of higher levels of staff and command. The conceptual and long-term aspects of an integrated examination of strategy and warfare were paramount in national security studies, best pursued by a faculty composed of scholars and practitioners along with officer-students. Admiral Kurth stated “Our task is the study of strategy . . . We believe we have largely achieved this objective by a study that is both theoretical and contextual—that is the derivation and elucidation of strategic concepts from a disciplined examination of history, case studies, and games and simulations.” Admiral Kurth concluded with his belief that “Joint education cannot be separated from a general understanding of learning, professional education in general, and the organic qualities of an existent curriculum. . . . what education ultimately contributes to a successful military commander and strategist is a habit of mind and judgment and not a checklist of requirements satisfied.”

These themes are at the root of the College’s strategic tradition. Their purposes still resonates clearly today. They are the driving forces of the College’s approach to education and research, analysis and gaming. This strategic tradition is more than rhetoric; it has a very practical and abiding influence in everything the College does. Over the succeeding years, the faculty has continued to mature and refine the curricula in the senior and intermediate level courses with embedded JPME. They continue to improve and have clearly adjusted to a quite different environment. These educational programs still, however, are designed to foster the required mental flexibility and discipline to cope effectively with the intellectual demands of addressing uncertainty inherent in issues addressed by those in positions of significant responsibility within the broader national security community in the United States and that of our friends and allies.

But not every officer has the opportunity to study war in the resident program at Newport. The Navy and the Naval War College recognized this fact early on and saw the importance of bringing professional military education to military leaders where they live and work. That effort first began in 1914 when the Secretary of the Navy ordered the College to prepare to

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2 Ibid., p. 855.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., pp. 856-857
5 Ibid., 858.
conduct extension courses by correspondence. The challenge has always been to ensure the quality of that nonresident education remained high despite the inherent difficulties. In the years subsequent to Admiral Kurth’s testimony, the faculty also continued to mature and refine the nonresident intermediate program, ensuring the curricula derived from and closely paralleled that of the resident program. That diligence led to an improved program, which attracted students just as did the resident programs. Ultimately, the resident faculty directly involved themselves in the development and delivery of the nonresident educational programs. It was upon that solid foundation the Navy deliberately expanded the availability of professional military education until it evolved as an integrated system designed to create career-long opportunities for learning for every Sailor, officer or enlisted.

At the direction of the Navy’s senior leadership, the Naval War College began expanding its nonresident opportunities in 1996. Over the next eight years, substantial investments were made to more than double the opportunities and provide better access to NWC faculty through an intermediate-level education with embedded Joint Professional Military Education Phase I. The original two modes of nonresident education dating back to 1914 have today evolved into four modern methods, three of which involve consistent interface with a NWC professor. The first major change in delivery mode came when the College established an additional instructional location on the campus of the Naval Postgraduate School in 1999. On campus NWC faculty delivered an intermediate-level course restructured as elective courses designed to be embedded in the School’s graduate programs under its quarterly construct. In 2000, fifteen students completed the program, and in 2001 nearly one hundred finished it. Today, we average 330 enrollments per quarter in this program.

In 2001, with an eye toward embracing new technology in order to increase student throughput while retaining academic quality and rigor, the College introduced the Web-enabled Program. This internet-based instruction is taught by a professor to a cohort, or “virtual seminar” of about twenty students. This non-real time instruction uses an internet bulletin board methodology supported by the “Blackboard” learning management system. Students use books, readings and CD’s to complement the Web instruction, and the entire program of three courses is designed for completion in 18 months. This top-notch, state-of-the-art program was fully embraced by naval officers as it had 250 students enrolled by 2003. The high educational quality of this program and its astute design earned the coveted Crystal Award presented by the Association for Educational Communications and Technology (AECT) in a hard-fought international competition among the leaders in distance learning.

In 2001, the College also extended eligibility for the masters degree to successful students enrolled in our nonresident seminars under the Fleet Seminar Program. This high quality program closely replicates the curricula and methodologies of the resident program, yielding an equivalent, graduate-level professional military education. Regional accreditation by the New England Association of Schools and Colleges confirmed its superior educational excellence. Today it is taught at twenty sites in the U.S., including all fleet concentration areas and some
single naval bases. The program typically offers about fifty five separate seminars annually in
the three core courses. Seminars are comprised of about twenty students each and meet with
their adjunct professor one evening each week for thirty-five weeks. There are 1,200 seats
available nationwide each year.

In 2002, the Naval War College and the Naval Postgraduate School conducted a study of
graduate-level education opportunities in the Navy. The Graduate Education Review Board
Report of May 2002 served as the catalyst for the Navy’s senior leadership to increase the in-
residence opportunity for the intermediate-level program at Newport by one hundred Navy
students over a five year period. Subsequently, the Navy increased its student presence at the
Army’s Command and General Staff College as part of the larger expansion of the Army
students. These increases in resident and nonresident intermediate programs raised the
educational opportunity to eighty-five percent.

In April 2004, the final element of the reinvented nonresident program was fielded. The
CDROM-based program made its debut with the expressed purpose of replacing the obsolete
individual correspondence program, known affectionately as the “box of books.” Deployment
patterns, isolated duty stations, and unreliable connectivity to the worldwide web made it
mandatory especially amidst the Global War on Terror to continue to offer an individually-
focused, self-paced educational program to Sailors unable to participate in the other resident or
group-based nonresident programs. Students use books, readings and CD’s to prepare
assignments and assessments that they then send to Newport by email. This program has seats
for 600 new students each year and is designed for a 12-14 month completion time. This course,
now presented in DVD format, seized the cutting-edge technology to incorporate in-resident
lectures and panels into the distance learning arena.

By 2005 the paper Correspondence Program was ended, and 636 Web and CD program
students joined 1,110 FSP and 313 in the NWC at NPS program, and 329 pursuing their NWC
graduate degree for a record total of 2,388 students studying Intermediate PME with JPME
Phase I through NWC’s College of Distance Education. These numbers have increased every
year since, with the Navy’s increased emphasis on JPME I qualification and the Navy’s PME
Continuum, to a total of 3,449 students in the four intermediate level PME programs for this
academic year of 2008-2009, and just over 1,000 graduates per year.

With a robust nonresident educational infrastructure in place, the Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Clark, approved the Navy’s Professional Military Education Strategy in July, 2004. The
strategy created career-long educational opportunities related to the Navy’s mission and
supported the professional and personal growth of all Sailors, officer and enlisted. His decision
created the Navy’s PME Continuum and linked completion of professional military education to
career progression and assignment. As a major step toward that linkage, he required completion
of intermediate-level professional military education with JPME Phase I for assumption of
command as an unrestricted line Commander or its equivalent billet for the restricted line and staff communities.

As a result of this decision, the Naval War College was tasked to create two new officer courses, one for flag officers and a primary course for junior officers as well as create distinct curricula for the existing senior and intermediate courses. For enlisted Sailors, the Senior Enlisted Academy was the only professional military education opportunity. Three new courses had to be designed and fielded to meet the requirements of the PME Strategy. The President, Naval War College was assigned the responsibility for the Navy’s PME Continuum depicted below in its current form.

![The Navy’s PME Continuum 2009](image)

To ensure a logical, education progression, the College developed draft educational outcomes for the six major PME courses combining naval and joint requirements at every level. The President conducted a six month dialogue with key Navy flag-level leaders in the operating forces and the supporting establishment. The outcomes were refined, presented, and approved by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations with the full consent of his OPNAV “Board of Directors.” Using those validated outcomes depicting what were the expectations of the graduates at each level, the faculty turned to the task of designing courses and creating curricula. A summary of the courses as they now exist follows.
The Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Course (JFMCC) prepares future three-star officers for duties as Maritime Component Commanders by developing perspectives necessary to articulate effectively the role of the Maritime Component in the design and execution of campaign plans and theater-security efforts. Seminar forums led by our nation’s senior joint leadership and facilitated by senior mentors and assigned NWC faculty facilitate discussion for attendees from all services. Sessions address the practical challenges of operational-level leadership and ensure the flag and general officers gain a high degree of confidence with the concepts, systems, languages, and processes required to employ naval forces effectively in a multi-service, multi-agency, and multinational environment.

The Combined Force Maritime Component Commander Course (CFMCC) additionally improves the effectiveness of senior leaders who routinely function together at the operational level by incorporating flag-level peers from partner nations into the student body. Normally, CFMCC courses are conducted with a regional focus in order to develop and deepen relationships based on trust and confidence, to serve as a forum to evolve combined maritime command and control concepts and mechanisms, and to advance the understanding of those security issues facing participating nations.

CFMCC courses last about seven days and are held at least semi-annually either at Newport or in the respective theater AOR.

The College of Naval Warfare (CNW) is a ten-month senior-level PME program with JPME Phase II designed to produce broadly educated strategic leaders who possess a strategic perspective, underpinned by strategic analytical frameworks. Graduates will apply disciplined, strategic minded, critical thinking to challenges in the multi-service, multi-agency, and multinational environments. Graduates will also be able strategic planners and joint warfighters who are effective maritime advocates. This course and the CJCS Standards are the focus of this study.

In the Naval Command College (NCC) senior international officers pursue eleven months of graduate-level study in residence. Annually, CNO personally invites his counterparts in selected countries to nominate students for the NCC. Begun in 1956, NCC’s vision is to foster knowledge, friendship, and cooperation among navies from around the world. In so doing, NCC not only educates these officers in planning, decision making, strategic analysis, and naval and joint military operations but greatly strengthens understanding and builds trust and confidence between American and foreign officers.

International students are fully integrated with their U.S. counterparts in the College of Naval Warfare. Although international students do not receive formal grades or a master’s, they participate fully in all three core courses in the CNW program. They must complete all class and seminar exercises and writing assignments, and they receive written feedback from the faculty. NCC students are encouraged to enroll in electives.
The College of Naval Command and Staff (CNC&S) is a ten-month intermediate-level PME program with JPME Phase I designed to produce leaders who are skilled in warfighting, the joint planning processes, concepts, systems, and languages, and are capable of applying operational art in maritime, multi-service, multi-agency, and multinational environments. Graduates can apply disciplined, critical thinking from an operational perspective to the challenges associated with elements of the international security environment including the ongoing Global War on Terror, irregular warfare, Homeland Security and Defense, stability operations, humanitarian operations, and major wars, home and abroad. Graduates will be capable of excelling in command and operational-level staff billets on a numbered fleet, fleet, joint, interagency, or multinational staff.

International students are also fully integrated with in their U.S. counterparts in the College of Naval Command and Staff. These students are in the Naval Staff College's ten-month program, NSC-10. Their academic program consists of an orientation period followed by three trimesters of study of the CNC&S curriculum, supplemented by a Field Studies Program designed to promote understanding of U.S. institutions, society, and culture. In addition they will audit an elective in each trimester, one of which will be specialized study in operational law. Like their senior international officer counterparts, these students must complete the papers and examinations, which the faculty will evaluate, provide written feedback, but earn a diploma rather than a Master of Arts degree.

The Naval Operational Planner Course (NOPC) is a CNO-directed, thirteen-month course designed to develop operational-level leaders with depth in operational-level planning. The course prepares intermediate-level U.S. Navy and other-Service officers for assignment to operational planner billets on the staffs of the numbered fleet, naval component fleet, and unified (geographic and functional) commanders. It is a peer to the advanced war fighting schools of the other Services: Army's School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS Fort Leavenworth), Marine Corps' School of Advanced War Fighting (SAW Quantico), and Air Force's School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS Maxwell AFB).

The CNO approved this program in 1999. Each class of about thirty students (22 Navy and 8 Other-Services (Army, Marine Corps, Air Force and Coast Guard)) begins in August, taking the core intermediate-level CNC&S course and three tailored electives. After completing the intermediate-level academic program, the NOPC students remain in Newport conducting a contemporary, real-world crisis scenario exercise and conduct crisis action planning & execution as part of a two-week game. Based on their game experience, they devote the remaining ten weeks to deliberate planning by writing a formal, maritime component commander concept plan (CONPLAN), which will result in the development/refinement of a real-world, operational plan. Navy graduates proceed to either planner billets on operational staffs, or warfare community assignments followed by operational planner tours.
The Senior Enlisted Academy (SEA) provides PME to Senior Chiefs and selected Chiefs in resident and blended education formats. While NWC has long provided faculty for key topics at SEA and a capstone war game event, the educational relationship is now deepening to ensure alignment within the PME Continuum. Further, the SEA Board of Advisors has broadened its charter to review and to advise on enlisted PME Continuum matters.

The Navy’s Primary PME Program, which was fielded in May 2006, is uniquely designed to develop a shared understanding of Navy capabilities for the joint warfight by the Navy’s deckplate-level leaders—chief petty officers (E-7 to E-8) and young officers (O-1 to O-3). It includes about seventy hours of computer time on NKO and is divided into individual lessons that each has a short assessment that must be completed before moving to the next lesson. A tailored version of the course with visual aids depicting enlisted surroundings, but delivering duplicate substantive material was released in January 2007. The Primary PME (Enlisted) course prepares the Chief Petty Officer for attendance at the Senior Enlisted Academy and further assignment as a senior enlisted leader in Navy and Joint billets.

Two enlisted PME programs, Introductory and Basic PME, were designed for sailors in the grades of E-1 to E-4 and E-5 to E-6, respectively. These courses were fielded in January 2008. The Basic PME is about 40 hours work on NKO, and the Introductory PME is takes about 20 hours to complete. Both of these courses enhance the understanding of naval and joint matters for the junior enlisted Sailor as he or she advances in their career assignments.

In summary, the faculty at the Naval War College at the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations restructured both in-resident courses and created two versions of flag level courses. For the Navy’s nonresident and distance learning programs, they modified the Fleet Seminar Program and designed, developed, and fielded six new courses and programs to which Sailors responded by enrolling in ever-increasing numbers to further their professional military education and make themselves eligible for career advancement and joint job assignment. This incredible and unprecedented response to educational initiatives has resulted in an increase from 1,500 students in 1989 to a total of over 27,000 students studying for their naval and joint education in 2009.

PART III

I now turn to the third broad subject of this testimony, the mission of the College and our current professional military education programs. I will describe our mission, the curricula, our method of instruction, our faculty and students and close by describing other relevant activity at the College in order to give you a complete picture of the role the College and its educational programs along with its analysis, research, and war gaming activities support the mission of the Navy.
MISSION

The five major elements of the mission of the U.S. Naval War College are to:

Develop strategic and operational leaders: The College shall provide professional military education programs that are current, rigorous, relevant, and accessible to the maximum number of qualified U.S. officers and Navy enlisted personnel, civilian employees of the U.S. Government and non-governmental organizations, and international officers. The desired effect is a group of leaders of character who have trust and confidence in each other and are operationally and strategically minded, critical thinkers, proficient in joint matters, and skilled naval and joint warfighters.

Help CNO define the future Navy and its roles and missions: The College shall conduct research, analysis, and gaming to support the requirements of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), the Combatant Commanders, the Navy Component Commanders, the Navy’s numbered fleet commanders, other Navy and Marine Corps commanders, the U.S. Intelligence Community, and other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government. The desired effect is a program of focused, forward-thinking and timely research, analysis, and gaming that anticipates future operational and strategic challenges; develops and assesses strategic and operational concepts to overcome those challenges; assesses the risk associated with these concepts; and provides analytical products that inform the Navy’s leadership and help shape key decisions.

Support combat readiness: The College shall conduct training, education, leadership and assessment activities to support the ability of the Navy’s Joint Force Maritime and Navy Component Commanders to function effectively as operational commanders. This effort shall include supporting the needs of the Combatant Commanders, Navy Component Commanders, and the Navy’s numbered fleet commanders for operational planning, analysis, and war gaming to respond to emerging operational requirements. The desired effect is to improve the capability of Navy commanders to lead maritime, joint and combined forces and their staff members to plan, execute and assess and function cohesively as a maritime headquarters organization.

Strengthen maritime security cooperation: The College shall bring together senior and intermediate level naval officers from other countries to develop leaders for high command in their navies; understand and evolve operational planning methods; create opportunities for expanded, high-level professional exchange through venues such as the International Sea Symposium, Regional Symposia, formal college-to-college relationships with international counterparts, international publications, and alumni relations; and establish a regional studies structure to focus resources for greater impact in building and extending maritime partnerships. The desired effect is to build more robust and productive international maritime relationships, to improve the ability to operate effectively with partner nations, and to improve maritime security cooperation.
Deliver excellent support: To discharge successfully these primary mission responsibilities, the College shall strive for excellence in organization, processes, and infrastructure to enable mission accomplishment. The desired effect is to remain an exemplary steward of the resources entrusted to us and fully accomplish our mission both efficiently and effectively.

The first mission function, developing strategic and operational leaders, is the main focus of our academic programs. This education effort is the principal responsibility of our academic faculty, but they are augmented in this endeavor by our research, analysis and gaming faculty. Nearly fifty per cent of the mission funding for NWC is dedicated to this education function.

VISION

The 2007-8 strategic planning process produced a new vision for the College, which reads:

The Naval War College will be the Navy and nation’s first choice for educating and inspiring innovative leaders who think strategically, are masters of the operational art, and lead with confidence maritime, joint, interagency, and multinational operations to achieve national security objectives.

We will be foremost in providing the nation’s military leaders and statesmen with rigorous analysis, independent research and robust war gaming to clarify and resolve critical national security issues. As the intellectual center of the Navy, we will play an indispensable role in developing leaders, crafting strategy, and building trust and confidence—the foundation of enduring relationships of inestimable value to our nation and the world.

Our purpose remains as clear today as when the college was founded: to lead the world in the conduct of “original research in all questions relating to war and to statesmanship connected with war, or the prevention of war.”

The short term challenge remains improving the physical plant, which was designed for three hundred students and now through a series of conscious decisions by Navy leadership serves over six hundred. The longer term challenge is to ensure the Naval War College is constantly working toward excellence in the classroom and our research and gaming efforts.

RESIDENT CURRICULA

The core course work for the senior and intermediate programs consists of three trimesters of study, plus three electives, one per each trimester. The senior course consists of three equal trimesters of about thirteen weeks each. The intermediate course has one longer trimester of seventeen weeks for the study of joint maritime operations and two other eleven
week trimesters. NWC develops the three core courses as independent courses of study to accommodate the College of Naval Warfare’s unique system of matriculating and graduating students thrice annually in November, March, and June. While the courses are clearly interrelated, they are developed and delivered as independent courses. A speaker program and two professional conferences complete the College’s academic requirements. International officers are embedded with the U.S. students for the entire academic year. The structuring of the course work permits one faculty, in one facility, to teach both senior and intermediate students, an effective and efficient use of resources.

The CNW/NCC Joint Military Operations Course refines military officers’ critical and creative thinking skills under the umbrella of military problem solving: to enhance abilities to analyze and execute military strategy; to adeptly apply joint planning processes, and to creatively leverage the instruments of national power across the range of military operations; to strengthen leadership skills necessary to excel in major staff responsibilities and in theater-strategic positions of leadership, and to confidently act as trusted advisors to policy makers; to develop skilled senior warfighters, able to synthesize valid courses of action and to function in volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environments; to critical and creative thinking skills, especially the ability to evaluate a range of potential solutions to ill-structured problems.

The CNW/NCC National Security Decision Making Course educates military officers and U.S. government civilians in effective decision-making and leadership on security issues, particularly those involving force selection and planning challenges. The course pays special attention to: the changing domestic and international economic, political, and military environments affecting national security; major joint military force planning concepts, issues, and choices; the structure and process for planning and programming joint military forces and the interface of that process with the federal budget process; a conceptual understanding of the tools for critical thinking and deciding among complex defense issue alternatives; the context of and political, organizational, and behavioral influences on national security decision making and implementation; regional issues, interests, and cultural factors that affect U.S. policy making process; selecting leadership strategies to achieve key goals within complex national security organizations. The course is intended to expand the student’s personal philosophy of what constitutes an integrative, balanced, executive point of view. The outcome of the course is an officer who is capable of successfully leading change in large, complex organizations poised to meet national security challenges in an uncertain international security environment.

The CNW/NCC Strategy and Policy Course focuses on educating students to think strategically; to develop a disciplined, critical approach to strategic analysis, to understand the fundamentals of military strategy, national policy, and the interrelationships between them; to appreciate the political use of military power; and to become familiar with the roles of both military and political leaders in policy formulation, military planning, and the conduct of war. The outcome of the course is an officer who recognizes the value of and is capable of
dispassionate analysis of strategic issues and formulating strategic options and alternative strategies for achieving national policy objectives in war and peace.

An extensive Electives Program expands both the breadth and depth of the College's educational offerings by providing opportunities to explore subjects not included in the core curriculum or to investigate in greater detail specific elements of that curriculum. The elective courses are now offered in twenty-one distinct Areas of Study (AOS). The elective program this academic year offers fourteen areas of individual study ranging from five regional area studies, to leadership and ethics, Joint Warfare Analysis for the Commander and enterprise strategic planning, to operational law, insurgency and terrorism or information operations, command & control and battlespace awareness, and strategy, operations, and military history. There are also five Areas of Study designed for group study. Normally, interested students apply and then are selected to participate in one of these programs. This year’s programs include the Halsey Groups, the Mahan Scholars, the Stockdale Group, the Joint Land Aerospace, Sea Simulation and NOPC.

TEACHING METHODOLOGY

The seminar is the central focus for learning for resident students at the Naval War College. Seminar contact time and practical exercises, where the students are continuously together, are keys to the academic program's success. For those active interchanges, a well-constructed, relevant curriculum, that includes carefully selected readings designed to build the knowledge essential for informed discussion comprises the first essential element. The second element is a quality faculty member able to teach and lead a graduate-level discussion. The College has multilayered curricula and faculty development programs designed to sustain the relevance and currency of the academic programs and the individual faculty members. Curricula development, teaching notes, and faculty preparation all are premised on the disciplined work habits of the professionals who comprise the student body. The third and final element is the individual student's experience, preparation and participation. Their assiduous preparation and the high quality of their engagement add significantly to the quality of the educational experience.

While the seminar clearly predominates the in-resident educational experience, the faculty’s curricula design uses a wide variety of learning methodologies including lectures, guest speakers, panel discussions, films, group projects, and war games.

The 15-person seminars reflect a robust mix of Services and the incorporation of international students into most seminars. Interagency representation is less prominent; but the College’s academic leadership takes care to distribute such students to ensure maximum exposure. By reforming the seminars for each trimester, students are exposed to a broader array of their peers, providing further opportunities for building trust and confidence. Additionally, the elective program provides another forum for broadening student exposure and interaction, again remixed after each trimester.

Evaluating student performance is essential in judging the extent to which the College achieves its educational function of enhancing the professional capabilities of its students to meet the nation’s national security challenges as leaders and decision makers. Assessing student
achievement within the core courses also assesses students’ success in the joint professional military education learning requirements. Grading clearly sustains the academic rigor in the College’s programs.

Each department establishes specific learning objectives linked to the Navy’s educational outcomes for that particular educational level and then uses a combination of traditional graded events, such as papers and examinations, as well as ungraded events, to measure student and course achievement of those objectives. Two of the three departments end their courses with capstone events requiring students, individually and collectively, to apply their knowledge in practical exercises, where student learning outcomes including joint learning requirements are visible to the faculty. The third department curriculum uses an incremental process to evaluate the progress of students in applying the course’s analytical constructs through a series of essays and a comprehensive exam. Again, student learning outcomes are clearly visible to its faculty.

The number and form of graded events varies by department and changes as the curriculum evolves; but these events consistently include both research papers and examinations. Two of the departments also assign grades for contribution in seminar, providing another means of tracking individual achievement with regards to required learning throughout the course. Equally important in assessing both student performance and the value of the curriculum are numerous ungraded exercises scheduled throughout the academic year, such as simulations, individual and group presentations, and role playing. These events are designed to determine how effectively students have assimilated and can employ the material presented in the curriculum. The combination of graded and ungraded events provides the faculty with substantial evidence of student achievement including joint requirements, and the students with substantive and continuous feedback regarding their progress.

A student is considered to have successfully completed the JMO, NSDM, and S&P course upon attaining a minimum final grade of B- (80%) for a Master's Degree, or a C- (70%) for an NWC diploma. Grade descriptions of what constitutes grade letters (A+ through F) are provided to each student in the respective syllabus. Elective courses, although graded on a High Pass/Pass/Fail basis, also require either examinations or papers.

The study of war and its prevention in the modern era is highly complex and demands rigorous intellectual preparation. The professional, active and ongoing dialogue on warfare conducted at Newport between and among the students and faculty, in and out of the classroom, is part of the College’s strong and enduring strategic tradition. If for no other reason, graduate-level PME and JPME Phase I and II have a bright future at the Naval War College.
FACULTY

One of the enduring strengths of the Naval War College is its faculty. The College seeks to recruit, develop and retain faculty members that are best suited to the College’s mission, functions and tasks as assigned to it by the Chief of Naval Operations. The faculty is thorough -- one might even say aggressive -- in assessing the performance of their students against the College’s well-defined institutional standards.

This is noteworthy because faculty workloads remain substantial with the completion of the PME Continuum. This tension between workload and development continues to challenge the College's ability to sustain the kind of development program that it desires for its faculty; however, over the last two years there has been a better balance and considerable financial resources were devoted to faculty development. That said, this workload is appropriate to the College’s mission and is manageable given that most faculty members have little direct role in the governance and administration of the College. To their credit as dedicated, well-qualified professionals, the faculty’s effectiveness in executing these new tasks is high and their acceptance of the responsibility for ensuring that the content and methods of instruction to execute these new tasks meets or exceeds generally accepted academic and professional standards and expectations is noteworthy.

The professional qualifications, pedagogical competence, scholarly qualities, dedication, and enthusiasm of the teaching faculty have long been the primary source of the Naval War College’s very high reputation in the world of professional military education and in civilian academic circles as well. That reputation helps the College to continue to attract and retain outstanding professors. Quantitative measures of teaching performance for all departments are regularly quite high confirming the faculty’s teaching effectiveness. Graduates are exceptionally satisfied with their overall educational experience, the high quality of instruction, and, in the main, the honest feedback provided to them.

One key pillar of the College’s strategic tradition established by Admiral Stansfield Turner, the College’s thirty-seventh president, holds that “Scholarship for scholarship’s sake is of no importance to us. You must keep your sights set on decision making or problem solving as your objective.” That said, scholarship remains vital to the rigor, relevancy, currency and quality of the College’s academic programs as an important, supporting academic responsibility. The College has developed a systematic method of reviewing and approving individual faculty members proposed developmental plans to supplement its habitual, disciplined curricula development process. More than $600,000 has been committed to faculty development during the last two fiscal years.

Indeed, the record of publication among the faculty as a whole is remarkable for a group whose main institutional priority is teaching. The College faculty includes established scholars of national and even international renown in such fields as maritime strategy, naval power, amphibious operations, joint military doctrine, space, civil-military relations, war planning,
strategic theory and practice, classical theorists of war, political philosophy, American foreign policy and military history, European diplomatic history and military history, politics in the Balkans and in Russia, Russian and Soviet military history, international relations in Northeast Asia, and Chinese foreign policy. Among younger members of the faculty are promising scholars in the fields of air power, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, armed groups, insurgents, terrorist groups, ethnic conflict in the Middle East, Chinese history, and many others.

Faculty Profile

Civilian professors, U.S. and international military officers, and representatives from selected U.S. Government departments and agencies constitute the faculty. The College characterizes them as academic faculty or research faculty on the basis of their primary responsibility.

The academic faculty is largely located in the three core departments -- Strategy and Policy (S&P), National Security Decision Making (NSDM), and Joint Military Operations (JMO) or the College of Distance Education (CDE). Over the last two decades, the College has increased these core departments from eighty to one hundred and forty-two faculty members. As of the end of April 2009, the faculty of these three departments consisted of sixty-four military officers and seventy-eight civilians.

The faculty of the three core teaching departments comprises the bulk of the PME/IPME faculty. Military faculty members in the teaching departments at Newport are officers with the ranks of captain or colonel and commander or lieutenant colonel. All are graduates of war or staff colleges; almost all hold at least one master’s degree, and some have earned doctorates. All are also proven performers in their respective operational arenas. Emphasis for selection to a faculty position is placed on O-5 or higher command experience, a joint or service component operational tour, a joint, service headquarters or Washington, D.C. tour, and completion of a senior service college. Waivers to this are granted when considered against other relative operational background experience. Forty-seven percent of S&P military faculty members have held O-5 command. All have the requisite PME and hold a master’s degree with eighteen percent having a PhD or enrolled as doctoral candidates. Within the JMO Department’s military faculty, sixty-nine percent have held O-5 command, and over ninety-four percent are graduates of an intermediate or senior level service college and hold a master’s degree; forty-one percent hold multiple master degrees. Sixty percent of the NSDM military faculty has had O-5 command and sixty-seven percent hold multiple master’s degrees.

The College continues to encounter challenges in attracting the very best Navy officers to join the faculty since they are not credited with a joint duty tour as are their other Service peers. This makes the teaching assignment less advantageous and contributes to the perception within the Navy that assignment as a military faculty member at a Navy senior service college is, generally, not career enhancing.
For Academic Year 2008-2009, the military faculty staffing for the teaching departments is:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Sea Services</th>
<th>USN</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USCG</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>USAF</th>
<th>Royal Navy</th>
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<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>S&amp;F</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>65</td>
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Civilian faculty members are recruited from several sources: faculties at civilian academic institutions, the ranks of retired military officers, the business sector, and government agencies, such as the State Department. The last source provides only a small number, who are assigned to the College for a year or two. Typically, they have master's degrees but only rarely doctorates; they are valued for their professional experience in diplomacy or intelligence and often for their regional expertise as well.

Civilian faculty members who come from civilian academic institutions hold doctorates, almost always from the top doctoral programs in the United States or Europe. Nearly all have prior teaching experience and records of scholarly publication. Retired military officers who become civilian faculty members almost always have had experience as military faculty members, often at the Naval War College. Indeed, it is their record of excellence as teachers, not just their prior practical experience, training and education, which make them attractive recruits as civilian faculty members. While some may work toward their doctoral degrees, they are required to sustain the skills and expertise for which they were hired.

For civilian faculty, these departments seek an appropriate mix of expertise as well. For JMO, civilian faculty members all have a specialty which relates to the JMO curricula and complements the expertise of the military faculty. Twenty-two of the twenty-five civilian professors are retired military officers. All have significant and diverse military or military related backgrounds (e.g., Army, Air Force, Marine, Merchant Marine, etc.) which incorporate a broad range of tactical, operational, and joint duty experience into the overall skills base of JMO. All civilian faculty members have a minimum of a M.A. /M.S. and fifty-two percent hold a J.D. /PhD or are PhD candidates. Sixty-four percent hold multiple advanced degrees. Seventy-six percent were JPME Phase I or II qualified while on active duty and twenty-five percent were designated as Joint Qualified Officers or its equivalent while on active duty. There is significant previous joint duty experience among the civilian faculty.
The twenty-two civilian faculty members in the S&P Department all hold doctorates and are acknowledged experts in history, political science, or international relations. All come from prestigious universities or institutes. The civilian NSDM faculty members all have a specialty which relates to NSDM curricula and are proven experts in their respective field of endeavor. Currently, all NSDM civilian faculty members hold, at a minimum, a masters degree, while over seventy-one percent hold doctorates. Ten of the thirty-one civilians (thirty-two percent) are retired from the US military. Of the fourteen NSDM Department military faculty members, one hundred percent are JPME Phase I qualified and thirty-six percent are also JPME II and designated a Joint Qualified Officer or its equivalent. Of the thirty-one civilian faculty members, thirty-two percent completed JPME I educational requirements.

The College of Distance Education has twenty-six civilian faculty members in residence at Newport who administer and teach the College’s non-resident intermediate-level PME/IPME I programs. Periodically, these on-campus CDE professors augment the faculty in the core teaching departments. Many of these professors also teach in the Elective Program. There are also eighteen faculty members who teach the College’s intermediate-level PME/IPME I at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. There is one civilian faculty member in Washington, DC, who is responsible for coordinating and teaching in the non-resident Fleet Seminar Program in the Washington area.

The Center for Naval Warfare Studies (CNWS) includes twenty-seven military officers and thirty-six civilian faculty members. Many research faculty members teach elective courses in the degree program; some of these courses are co-taught with faculty from the core teaching departments.

The College of Operational and Strategic Leadership has nineteen civilian professors, one of whom is in Annapolis, MD. Several of them teach electives and mentor the Stockdale Group in their group advanced research project. Three civilian professors are involved with the flag and general officer level courses taught at the College -- the Joint Force Maritime Component Course (JFMCC) and the Combined Force Maritime Component Course (CFMCC). Additionally, there is one military and nine civilian professors with the Maritime Staff Officer’s Course (MSOC), and nine military and two civilian faculty members with the Assess and Assist Teams (AAT). In Newport, the Electives Program makes limited use of adjunct professors. There are no graduate teaching assistants in any of the academic programs.

STUDENTS

\[\text{This level of manning constitutes a substantial decrease from the sixty-eight military officers assigned to CNWS in 1994.}\]
\[\text{This level of manning constitutes more than four-fold increase in civilian positions since 1994.}\]
College of Naval Warfare  Naval War College senior resident students are approximately forty-three years of age with established careers. Approximately sixty-five percent of the CNW student body begins their studies in August and graduates in June. The remaining thirty-five percent of the student body arrives either in November or the March. Consequently, class size, mix and characteristics for the CNW student body fluctuate within a relatively narrow band over the course of an academic year.

The 215 U.S. students in the College of Naval Warfare represent a robust mix of the military services with a solid representation from the federal civilian community. One hundred and two Navy students in the grades of captain, commander, lieutenant commander, and two, CNO-designated command master chiefs, comprise forty-seven percent of the U.S. student body and thirty-nine percent of the overall class. The twenty-four Marines in grades of colonel and lieutenant colonel make up eleven percent of the U.S. student body and nine percent of the overall class. The two Coast Guard officers complete the sea service representation. The sea services account for sixty percent of the U.S. student population and forty-nine percent of the overall senior-level student body.

The thirty-seven Army officers in the grades of colonel and lieutenant colonel represent seventeen percent of the U.S. student body and fourteen percent of the overall student body. The Department of the Air Force provides twenty-five officer students in the grades of colonel and
lieutenant colonel; they represent twelve percent of the U.S. students and ten percent of the overall student body. Twenty-five federal civilians comprise twelve percent of the U.S. student body and ten percent of the overall student body.

**Naval Command College.** There are forty-eight international officers, each representing a different nation, in the senior-level international student body. They are the second largest element in the student body, accounting for nearly eighteen percent of the overall student population.

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**College of Naval Command and Staff.** Naval War College intermediate-level resident students are approximately thirty-six years of age. Approximately sixty percent of the student body begins their studies in August and graduates in June. The remaining forty percent of the student body arrives either in November or February. Over ninety-one percent of the off-cycle students are Navy, but Marine Corps, Army, Air Force, and civilian agencies also take advantage of the opportunity to send off-cycle students.

The two hundred and eighty-five US students in the College of Naval Command and Staff include representatives from all military services and several civilian agencies. There are one hundred and seventy-seven Navy students in the grades of lieutenant and lieutenant commander that make up fifty-six percent of the class and sixty-three percent of the US students. There are twenty-four Marines in the grades of major or lieutenant colonel who make up eight
percent of the class and nine percent of the US students. The five Coast Guard students represent two percent of the student body.

The forty-three Army officers in the grade of major represent fifteen percent of the US students and fourteen percent of the overall student body. The Department of the Air Force provides thirty officers in the grade of major and they represent ten percent of the US students and nine percent of the overall student body. Six civilians represent two percent of the overall student body.

**Naval Staff College.** There are thirty-two international officers each representing a different nation in the intermediate-level Naval Staff College course. They represent approximately ten percent of the overall student body.

**OTHER FACETS OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE**

The Naval War College is more than a school house that delivers a curriculum; it is the Navy's "center of thought" that regards the generation of new knowledge as an integral component of high quality professional and graduate education. It has additional three major departments, the Senior Enlisted Academy, and hosts the Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group.

**Center for Naval Warfare Studies**

The Naval War College, founded as a "place of original research," has closely integrated research and teaching throughout its 125 year history. We regard valid research as an essential component of quality PME. To this end, virtually all faculty conduct research but we also have a full-time research organization called the Center for Naval Warfare Studies. This arm of the College supports student education through the development of core course segments such as the joint military operations planning exercise, international law sessions, electives in area studies and analysis techniques, and directed research programs. The synergy of teaching by means of research is powerful and distinguishes our institution from others. Moreover, because of the joint composition of our directed research programs, the documented actions by our graduates to maintain contact in their subsequent assignments constitute a channel of communication among operational staffs of different services that would not otherwise exist. The Navy has directly benefited, for example from the presence of Army officers in our Halsey directed research groups who suggested the application of existing Army systems to emergent Navy force protection problems. These suggestions led to actual fleet experimentation.

By virtue of integrating research and classroom instruction, the Naval War College has been throughout its history been influential in helping the Navy adapt to emergent strategic environments. Most recently, the College conducted the gaming and analysis that underpinned the new maritime strategy. This project was conducted as a joint, interagency and international
project, with non-governmental and commercial organizations brought in as well. Students participated. Actually helping to shape the future of the Navy in such a way increases the credibility and value of the teaching at the College. Moreover, because our research is also oriented on enhancing the operational readiness and effectiveness of the fleet, it deals with cutting edge issues such as hybrid warfare, piracy, the Arctic and many others. This makes the institution more vital and relevant.

The Naval War College is also a significant actor in forging a global maritime partnership for increased maritime security. Faculty from the Center for Naval Warfare Studies are constantly collaborating with counterparts in sister institutions around the world on common issues and functions such as war gaming, counter-piracy, international law and research techniques. It is in no small part due to the actions of our research faculty that the relationship between the U.S. and Mexican navies has, in the last several years, attained unprecedented levels of interaction and interoperability. As an acknowledged world leader in war gaming, the College has not only played a significant role in the rebuilding of the New York City fire and police departments after 9/11, it has become the “institution of record” for providing war gaming and seminar support to the Proliferation Security Initiative. The language skills and regional expertise of the research faculty facilitate the development of collegial relationships with both military and civilian institutions around the world. Especially significant is our China expertise, and we not only study Chinese Maritime developments, we have established useful relationships with scholars and naval officers there; contributing in a material way to the reduction of misunderstanding and suspicion between our navies.

The Center for Naval Warfare Studies consists of six core departments supported by two detachments from external commands and two operational support officer units.

The Strategic Research Department consists of twelve civilian and two Navy faculty members and focuses principally on regional security studies. Its mission is to produce innovative strategic analysis for Navy, DoD and the broader national security community. SRD faculty teach several electives and either lead or participate in all of the College’s regional study groups. Especially noteworthy is the department’s language capability, which includes Chinese, Japanese, Russian, French, German, Korean, Spanish, Arabic, Turkish, and Farsi.

The International Law Department is a focal point in the Navy for the study of international law and oceans policy as they affect US military policy, strategy and operations. Led by a civilian professor, it is normally staffed by a uniformed lawyer from each Service. It advances the understanding of international law and oceans policy through research, publication, teaching, and international engagement, and helps shape the development of international law and oceans policy throughout the world to promote the rule of law.
The Warfare Analysis and Research Department consists of nine faculty and two technical staff that support advanced student research and maintain the Decision Support Center, a world-class conference facility. The College’s Advanced Research Groups focus on the operational level of warfare informed by classified tactical knowledge coupled with a clear understanding of the strategic environment where U.S. naval forces will be operating. Two of the groups draw heavily upon country-specific and regional expertise of the faculty including the college’s regional studies groups. The joint composition of each group enables them to apply an expansive joint and interagency approach to the challenges they are addressing. They continuously look at a broad spectrum of warfighting -- from high-end, technologically focused issues to asymmetrical and irregular warfare challenges and adapt contemporary lessons to the enduring elements of warfare. This has resulted in their research findings being highly sought after by senior leaders.

The War gaming Department is the most well-known and respected organization of its kind in the world. In addition to supporting various teaching departments with war games, this department provides extensive support to the Navy Staff, the operational fleets and a host of other organizations inside and outside the Navy. The department has twelve civilian, three contractors and seventeen military faculty members, thirty enlisted staff, three government civilian technicians and thirteen contractor technicians. Housed in McCarty-Little Hall, designed and built as an advanced war gaming center, the department operates a three-hundred workstation self-contained gaming network and an extensive array of audio-visual technology to simulate the modern operational staff environment. The department conducts over thirty games in a typical year as well as numerous other events such as conferences and tours. It is also notable that the department frequently supports the gaming efforts of allied nations including India, Japan, Uruguay, Norway and Mexico.

The Maritime History department consists of a world renowned naval historian and one other faculty member that directs and manages the Naval War College’s maritime history and sea service heritage program. The Department serves as the central resource and contact point for the entire Naval War College in matters relating to maritime history and has particular responsibility for implementing and coordinating the College’s research and writing program in this area, for its collections of historical materials, art work, artifacts, and documents, and for their use and display.

The Naval War College Press publishes the Naval War College Review, a quarterly professional journal as well as a series of monographs on naval subjects entitled The Newport Papers. The NWC Press also publishes a series of short monographs on Chinese maritime developments as well as an occasional book. The Press’ experienced staff is expert on naval and maritime subjects and makes the NWC Press a focused and highly respected forum for rigorous naval thought. It is broadening its reach through a web page and other internet media.
The Office of Naval Intelligence Detachment Newport provides the College with a wide range of intelligence support. The detachment is comprised of Navy intelligence, information warfare and surface warfare officers, enlisted intelligence specialists and civilian analysts.

The Navy Meteorological and Oceanographic Command supports a small detachment at the College that provides environmental information for war games and research as well as general support to the College.

**College of Operational and Strategic Leadership**

Key tenets of the College’s intermediate and senior courses have been the development of operational and strategic level planning, decision-making, and leadership. NWC has considerably expanded its reach in developing such expertise at the operational level of war with the establishment in 2006 of the College of Operational and Strategic Leadership (COSL). COSL aims to improve the capability of Navy commanders to lead maritime, joint, and multinational forces as well as improve the capability of Navy staff members to plan, execute, and assess and to function cohesively as a maritime operations center. The faculty is focused on supporting combat readiness at the operational level of war through the following:

The Navy’s C/JFMCC courses are executive level PME/JPME for U.S. (JFMCC) and International (CFMCC) flag and general officers designed to prepare them for theater-level combat leadership and broad perspective of operational and strategic levels of war. The College runs two or three annually with JFMCC courses normally done in Newport and the CFMCC courses within a specific area of responsibility.

The Maritime Staff Orientation Course (MSOC) provides organizational and individual-level education and training in planning, execution, and assessment functions and tasks for Navy leaders assigned to a Maritime Operation Center (MOC) or other operational level maritime staffs. These five-week long courses are for Navy Chiefs and officers en route to a MOC or operational level maritime staff. Student throughput is currently programmed for about seven hundred students annually.

The Assess & Assist Team (AAT) works with MOCs and operational level maritime staff in order to develop and maintain capability to enable the Navy to comply with Secretary of Defense and Fleet Force Commander’s requirements for certification of JFMCCs, Navy Component Commands, and other maritime operational level commanders. In order to bolster Navy competence at the operational level of war, AAT supports the Navy’s ongoing certification and accreditation cycle and conducts staff assist visits for Navy operational commanders.

This College also established and manages the CNO Senior Mentor Program. These senior mentors support C/JFMCC, MSOC, & AAT by providing experienced senior leadership
well imbued with historic operational level challenges, currency with ongoing challenges, and a key source of Joint/Interagency interface.

The COSL faculty and staff also conduct strategic planning and policy development for leadership and ethics education and character development as they pertain to the College's responsibility for developing operational and strategic level leaders. COSL faculty teach and mentor students selected for the Stockdale Group, develop the annual leadership and ethics theme, and then execute the ethics conference and ongoing panels and speakers throughout the academic year.

Regional and International Programs and Outreach Supporting Maritime Security Cooperation

The Naval War College is also a significant actor in forging a global maritime partnership for increased maritime security. The College builds on fifty-three years of global cooperation via international programs. More than 125 nations have sent over 3500 of their finest officers to study in one of our three international academic programs. Fully fifty per cent of these have become flag/general officers and ten per cent have risen to the top leadership position including twenty alumni currently serving as chiefs of their own service. After retirement, many go on to further prominence as ambassadors, cabinet ministers, businessmen and heads of state.

In addition to the formal PME academic programs for international students, the College is involved in a number of activities and engagements designed to build trust and collaboration with maritime partners worldwide. NWC faculty are constantly collaborating with counterparts in sister institutions around the world on common issues and functions such as curriculum design, teaching, war gaming, counter-piracy, international law and research techniques. It is in no small part due to the actions of our research faculty that the relationship between the U.S. and Mexican navies has, in the last several years, attained unprecedented levels of interaction and interoperability. As an acknowledged world leader in war gaming, the College has not only played a significant role in the rebuilding of the New York City fire and police departments after 9/11, it has become the "institution of record" for providing war gaming and seminar support to the Proliferation Security Initiative. The language skills and regional expertise of the faculty facilitate the development of collegial relationships with both military and civilian institutions around the world. Especially significant is our China expertise, and we not only study Chinese Maritime developments, we have established useful relationships with scholars and naval officers there; contributing in a material way to the reduction of misunderstanding and suspicion between our navies.

Our six regional studies groups provide the faculty a forum to collaborate with each other and peers deeply involved in international security studies in their respective regions. This consistent dialogue deepens understanding, creates insights and builds trust around the globe.
The College sponsors regional symposia around the world bringing our faculty, our alumni, and naval leaders assigned or deployed to the respective region together to discuss current international security challenges and developments.

On behalf of the students, faculty and staff representing each of our armed services, many of our international partners, and numerous Department of Defense and other federal activities, we thank you for your continued support within Congress and your commitment to professional military education.
STATEMENT BY

MG ROBERT M. WILLIAMS

COMMANDANT

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

BEFORE

OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
Introduction

My name is Major General Bob Williams. I am the Commandant of the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, PA. I am a Soldier who has had the good fortune of being associated with the education and training of Cadets and Soldiers for more than 34 years. I taught Philosophy and English as an instructor and assistant professor at West Point for three years, and I have also served as the Commander of two of the Army’s premier Combat Training Centers, as well as the Armor School and Center. In addition to those education and training jobs, I have had the great privilege of serving in the operational Army, both in peace and in war.

I am convinced that the War College I command is an invaluable asset to the Army and the nation. Our Senior Level College Program is the primary focus of the Army War College and is the best known of our programs. Students attend the Army War College only after extensive and highly successful performance at the direct and organizational levels of leadership. While a small number may have worked within the strategic arena, most of our students are in an unfamiliar environment at the strategic level where the problems and challenges they will face are less structured and certain than the conditions they have previously experienced.

My comments include: Mission, Vision, curriculum of the resident and distance programs, faculty, students, and assessment, as well as the specified areas of interest given to us by the committee.

Mission of the U.S. Army War College

As the Army’s ultimate professional development institution, the mission of the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) is to:

Prepare selected military, civilian, and international leaders for the responsibilities of strategic leadership in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment.

Four core competencies are inherent in our mission:

- Educate current and future leaders on the development and employment of landpower;
- Support the operational and institutional force;
- Conduct research and publish to inform thought on national security and military strategy;
- Support the Army’s strategic communication efforts.
Vision:

My vision to help realize the unique contribution of the United States Army War College is to focus all of our assets toward maintaining a balanced approach to the demands of landpower in an evolving strategic landscape. To do this, we must maintain a highly diverse mix of credible faculty that encompasses the educational spectrum we teach. We also must incorporate increased numbers of interagency and international students. Our institution must also effectively communicate understanding on how to operate in strategic security environments and deal effectively with complex, unstructured problems when the application of landpower is a policy option. Finally, we must continue to be responsive to the needs of the force in the field through the use of subject matter experts, timely support to Major Army Commands, the Department of the Army, and the larger national security community.

Curriculum

Our curriculum is distinct from other Senior Service Colleges by its focus on landpower in the context of the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environments.

First, and foremost, our program must satisfy the criteria for awarding the Army’s Senior Level College designation and the standards specified for Joint Professional Military Education Phase II (JPME II). In addition, we also must meet the broad academic expectations for a Master of Strategic Studies degree. We also must meet the current and anticipated needs of Major Army Commands and Combatant Commanders of unified commands around the world, as well as a variety of leader and staff positions in other agencies, militaries, and staffs. In so doing, our curriculum must help students identify, acquire, examine, evaluate, and synthesize the knowledge, skills, and competencies required by current and emerging trends in strategic leadership, international and national security affairs, and the profession of arms. In this regard, we are like other professional schools, such as business, education, or law in preparing our students for successfully in meeting the challenges confronting their professions and applying professional accreditation standards.

The nature of strategic studies and its practice influences the nature and implementation of the curriculum. On the one hand, the body of knowledge must address theoretical elements such as leadership, international and national political systems, international relations theory, social and economic issues, the nature of warfare, the classical strategists, and the profession of arms to prepare graduates for the environment they will encounter as they ascend to senior leadership positions. On the other hand, the curriculum must offer students practical applications of strategic leadership, policy and strategy formulation, and the implementation of policy, strategy, and plans for the environment and
positions they will confront immediately following graduation. These points are important, as students will assess and evaluate current strategic leadership, U.S. security and defense issues, policies, strategies, and planning as an integral part of their program of studies to prepare for both the near and long terms.

We consider this bifurcation to be complementary as opposed to contradictory. On graduation, students assume key subordinate positions in support of military and political leadership, applying their education and continuing their learning. Successful performance in this new realm will require students to break some old habits, hone existing critical skills, and develop new competencies. To succeed in the strategic environment will require these future senior leaders to think differently than they have in the past. To that end, and regardless of program, our curricula are designed to produce graduates who can:

- Distinguish the uniqueness of strategic level leadership and apply competencies required by strategic leaders;
- Use strategic thought processes to evaluate the national security challenges and opportunities facing the United States in the 21st Century;
- Evaluate the theory of war and strategy;
- Evaluate DOD, joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and NGO processes and relationships, including Army contributions to the nation in peace and war;
- Evaluate the role of landpower in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations;
- Synthesize theater strategies, estimates, and campaign plans to employ military power in a unified, joint, multinational and interagency environment;
- Synthesize critical elements, enablers, and processes that define the strategic environment in peace and war; and
- Study and confer on the American military profession and guide its future direction.

To help students achieve these institutional learning objectives, our strategic studies program is built around the concept of mastering the strategic art, which we define as:

"The skillful formulation, coordination, and application of ends (objectives), ways (courses of action), and means (supporting resources) to promote and defend the national interests."

Our educational offerings lay the foundation for strategic mastery, but its accomplishment is a lifelong enterprise in which graduates continue to study, practice, and improve their mastery. Mastering the strategic art encompasses three general areas of expertise: strategic leader, strategic theorist, and strategic practitioner. Each area of study requires knowledge, competencies, and skills
that graduates must have if they are to maximize their potential in service to their organizations and nations.

Identifying these essential qualities is only a first step. Within the curriculum, we help students in their transition from direct and organizational leadership skills to strategic level leadership competencies, to include the ability to distinguish between the nature of leadership and management in a strategic environment. In the latter case, the curriculum provides students with the skills needed to create or sustain value-based ethical behavior, decision-making, and cultures within organizations.

Senior leaders must be grounded in strategic theory. They must have the ability to evaluate today's emerging complex interdependent and dynamic international system, understand the interrelationship between the domestic and international environments, formulate and assess competing policies and strategies for securing national security objectives, understand the national security decision-making process, and articulate and integrate the role of military power as one of several instruments of power in recommending and securing national objectives. Strategic thinking requires creativity, as well as discipline, in grappling with the complex matters of policy, strategy, peace, and war.

In addition, a significant portion of the curriculum addresses the more specific skills needed by strategic practitioners in the military. Our curriculum helps students understand and apply the adaptive planning process involved in translating national and theater strategic guidance into theater strategies, campaign plans, theater security cooperation, and contingency plans. Equally important, this part of the curriculum addresses the students' abilities to assess the responsibilities, capabilities, and limitations of each Service in supporting unified Combatant Commanders as they develop and execute theater plans in support of national military strategy.

Successful warfighting and other military operations do not occur without well-trained, properly-equipped, and doctrinally-sound forces. The development, training, resourcing, equipping, and sustaining of U.S. military forces relates to important warfighting competencies. To that end, our curriculum focuses on providing students with the ability to analyze the roles of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Department of Defense, the Military Departments, the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commanders, and Congress in resourcing and implementing the national military strategy.

Key themes are woven throughout the curriculum. History, ethics, strategic vision, human dimensions of strategic leadership, and jointness are "enduring themes" that permeate the curriculum and are embedded in lesson outlines and discussions. Special themes are pursued on an annual basis to link the curriculum and mission with more contemporary themes of interest such as strategic communication and irregular warfare. Additionally, the Commandant
focuses student interest on the Commandant's Lecture Series each year. Each of these "themes" links curricula and mission by emphasizing key issues facing the profession and providing a frame of reference for students to mature within their profession.

The Electives Program supplements subjects taught in the core curriculum. Students have the opportunity to gain in-depth knowledge of specific subjects and issues related to senior leader development, joint and multinational planning and operations, theater warfare, coordination of interagency operations, and strategic studies and analysis. Electives also broaden individual perspectives and exercise the strategic thought processes, as well as prepare students for future assignments in the strategic environment where volatility, complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty are the norm.

Throughout the students' academic experience, we offer Special and Complementary Programs. While not part of the core body of knowledge, these programs contribute to the professional and personal development of senior leaders. "Special Programs" enhance academic development and students may receive elective credit for these programs. These include: Advanced Strategic Art Program, National Security Policy Program, Eisenhower College Series Program, the Joint Warfighting Advanced Studies Program, and the Joint Land-Aerospace-Sea Simulation war game. While not for academic credit, "Complementary Programs," such as Executive Development and Assessment Military History, and Military Family programs, enhance individual skills, while providing a better personal, as well as professional, balance in our students' lives. Together, the Special and Complementary Programs add breadth and depth to the students' core body of knowledge and practice of the profession, as well as enhance the overall quality of the educational experience and campus life. Distance Education students have similar, if more limited, opportunities.

The sum of all of the elements outlined above constitutes the body of knowledge presented at the USAWC. The curriculum offers students the opportunity to learn and master skills that will help them become effective masters of the strategic art. As befits a professional degree program, the body of knowledge contained in our curriculum combines academic and professional education to prepare graduates for the demands of the strategic environment they will face for the remainder of their careers.

Both the Resident and Distance Education programs adhere to this paradigm, although the delivery systems are different. The Resident Education Program is a ten-month course of study, while the Distance Education Program is taught over two years and includes two two-week-long resident courses. Successful completion of either program leads to the award of a U.S. Army War College Diploma and, for qualified graduates, the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. By law, Resident Education Program graduates receive JPME II credit, while Distance Education Program graduates receive JPME I credit.
Resident Education Program

The Resident Education Program consists of six core courses (Strategic Thinking, Theory of War and Strategy, Strategic Leadership, National Security Policy and Strategy, Theater Strategy and Campaigning, Joint Processes and Landpower Development), the Strategic Decision Making Exercise (a six-day comprehensive capstone exercise), five elective courses (one of which must be a Regional Studies elective), and the National Security Seminar. Each student also must complete a Strategy Research Project.

Distance Education Program

The Distance Education Program consists of a series of ten on-line courses (Strategic Leadership; International Relations and the Use of Power; National Security Policy and Strategy; War and Military Strategy; Regional Issues and Interests; DOD Organization, Planning, and Strategy; Theater Operations; Campaign Planning and Operational Art; Irregular Operations and Homeland Security; and Contemporary Military Issues) and two, two-week resident courses, taken over a two-year period. The program is comparable to the Resident Education Program and utilizes the same institutional learning objectives.

Specified Curricular Issues

While the entire curriculum is directed at preparing students for the responsibilities of strategic leadership, with emphasis on the strategic art, the Committee requested responses on several specific elements of the curriculum. The Resident Education Program will be the basis for the discussion that follows.

Strategy

As indicated earlier, the study of strategy is a central aspect of the curriculum throughout the academic year. The study of strategy begins with the course on the Theory of War and Strategy, designed to produce senior officers and leaders who understand the theory and nature of war and conflict, and who can evaluate the relationships between warfare and the complex, interdependent contemporary strategic environment. It also seeks to produce senior officers and leaders conversant in strategic theory.

The course offers a model for understanding strategy as the calculated relationship among objectives (ends), concepts (ways) and resources (means). The model also requires students to comprehend the nature of strategic risk and provides them techniques for evaluating strategies. Students also examine how strategists consider broad questions about the nature of strategy such as the purpose of war and how war should be fought and won. An informed
understanding of these elements also requires students to study factors that influence strategy formulation, including international law and legitimacy. These foundational topics are followed by an in-depth study of war and strategy, with particular emphasis on how to conduct war. This study begins with an examination of classics such as Carl von Clausewitz’s *On War* and Sun Tzu’s ancient text, *The Art of War*. By grappling with these works, students come to understand the nature and characteristics of war. The curriculum also exposes them to a broad range of theorists and strategists who have examined warfare and strategy within the context of a variety of domains (for example, land, sea, and aerospace). The course also addresses nuclear, limited, and irregular war, as well as forms of conflict and political violence such as insurgencies and terrorism. Theory is supported by the study of historical examples that demonstrate the practical application of the theory to conflict. This ability to "think in time" and to analyze and assess the strategy of past conflicts is essential to their progress as strategic thinkers. Study of these theorists and strategists enhances students’ ability to skillfully practice the art of strategy making and implementation.

The National Security Policy and Strategy course provides students with a framework for logically considering and organizing the process of strategy formulation. Because policy flows from the political process and is derived from our nation’s enduring beliefs, ethics and values, the course provides broad strategic guidance for political and military leaders and articulates national interests in the context of the strategic environment. The course requires students to understand the actors, both domestic and international, who influence strategy formulation, the policymaking and strategy formulation process, and ultimately, connects this process to the framework they learned in the previous course: the calculated relationship among ends, ways and means, considering risk, as well as the tests of an effective strategy. To underscore these learning objectives, the students review historical case studies, such as the formulation of NSC-68 during the Truman administration, and current national strategy documents, such as the National Security Strategy. The course ends with a capstone exercise in which the students devise a regional security strategy as part of an interagency task force at the national level.

Building on previous courses, Theater Strategy and Campaigning examines strategy formulation and implementation at the theater level. The course focuses on theater strategic level and Combatant Commands, particularly, the fundamentals of theater warfare and design of a theater strategy and campaign plan. It provides the doctrinal basis for employment of national elements of power with an emphasis on military capabilities. The course also addresses Campaign Design; the need for commanders to frame a problem and provide a vision for subordinates; courses of action development, war-gaming and selection; strategic concept; and concept of operations.
Using a realistic future scenario, students complete a series of practical exercises that result in a Combatant Commander's concept of operation. The exercises require students to apply full spectrum operations (offensive, defensive, and stability operations) along the spectrum of conflict. The scenario includes a complex variety of operational themes (e.g., conventional war, insurgency, irregular warfare, and peace operations) that force students to identify the critical transition points, and plan accordingly. The scenario and exercises also require students to apply Joint and Service doctrine.

**Military History**

History, one of our enduring themes, underpins the curriculum. Our faculty uses history to provide depth, breadth and perspective to lessons in both the core and electives programs. We also strive to instill a sense of "historical-mindedness" in our students. As part of that effort, an historian is assigned to seminar teaching teams for the resident seminars.

History (including biographies, case studies, historical examples, and staff rides) is infused throughout the six core courses. Strategic Thinking includes a lesson entitled "The Uses of History" to make the point that history will be used repeatedly throughout the year to illuminate theories, illustrate concepts, and demonstrate ideas. The Gettysburg staff ride, which follows, demonstrates how history can be used to discuss the use of military operations to secure political objectives, as well as offer insights on aspects of command, leadership, and management. History features prominently in our Theory of War and Strategy course, which includes discussions and readings that span history from the Peloponnesian Wars to 9/11 and lessons on topics that span from insurrections and terrorism to conventional war and weapons of mass destruction. Our National Security Policy and Strategy course makes abundant use of history to provide a context and perspective for discussions relating to the development and application of the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy. Historical examples illustrate the underpinnings of current joint and service doctrinal concepts in our Theater Strategy and Campaigning course.


**Irregular Warfare**

To prepare our future strategic leaders to meet the needs of our nation from a global perspective, we educate for an uncertain future. Specifically, we devote a significant portion of our curriculum to developing the skills necessary to gain an in-depth understanding of a complex problem prior to recommending a
solution. Irregular Warfare and its components represent a major portion of this endeavor. Upon graduation, our students will be able to recognize the interrelated characteristics of strategic problems and apply comprehensive, "whole-of-government" solutions to resolve them.

First, we grow students’ perspectives from a tactical to a strategic mindset by challenging and refocusing their viewpoints from singular to multiple. From an Irregular Warfare perspective, we provide students an appreciation for the complexity of the relationships between multiple state and non-state actors and the impact of those relationships on the strategic problem. Promoting a broad-based, strategic leadership perspective for students offers insights on interactions and introduces students to the requirement for practitioners to think and act at the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational level. Trust, highly developed interpersonal skills, and a willingness to collaborate create the synergistic effects necessary to achieve results in an irregular conflict.

We continue the foundation-building process by introducing the theory, characteristics, and the nature of warfare in order to define key components of conflict among state and non-state actors. Insurgency theories and theorists (e.g. Mao Tse Tung, Che Guevara, and urban warfare) and counterinsurgency theories (e.g. French, British, and U.S.) specifically enhance students' Irregular Warfare perspectives. In addition, emerging theories of terrorism as a strategy, compared to its classic use as a tactic, create a broader understanding of the complexity of the Irregular Warfare challenge. Counterterrorism theory completes the strategic-level curriculum in preparation for future strategy and campaign development.

Next, we delve into the concepts and theory behind national security policy and strategy to gain a greater understanding of the various "whole-of-government," non-governmental, and neutral actors’ perspectives on national security issues. This balanced study of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements of national power provides the students an appreciation of their interconnected nature relative to traditional or irregular conflict. In addition, this course provides students the strategic perspective necessary to approach and help resolve the problems challenging our nation’s values, security, and the stated objectives of our National Security Strategy. Numerous discussions of irregular warfare related topics permeate seminar dialogue.

These earlier foundation courses prepare students for the theater-level strategy and campaigning course encompassing traditional, irregular, and hybrid campaign concepts. This course places special emphasis on the unified command level to frame the problem and scope the solution. This course specifically emphasizes the development of a properly-sized, synchronized, and resourced Irregular Warfare strategy to prevent an adversary from gaining power and influence over the target population while sustaining the support of the legitimate government. Embedded exercises within this course highlight the
complexity of problems and the need to apply joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational solutions.

The culminating Strategic Decision-Making Exercise challenges students to perform in at least two different strategic roles. Each student makes critical decisions and/or recommendations related to the global security environment, both traditional and irregular in nature, in a time-compressed and resource-constrained setting. Unique to this dynamic exercise is the free-play aspect of the scenario requiring students to apply the skills developed in the classroom in an interagency and intergovernmental environment. Finally, the students develop an understanding of the need to measure risk, build coalitions, and negotiate solutions to complex problems.

Finally, two separate elective periods offer students multiple opportunities to select from over 15 courses to further their understanding of irregular warfare within a national security context. Each student also must complete a regional study elective to amplify his or her understanding of a specific region of the globe. The presence of International Fellows within each regional study elective adds credibility and transparency to the topics of discussion. Nearly every regional elective contains a reference to an ongoing irregular warfare campaign or specific Theater Security Cooperation activities designed to prevent the development of an insurgency or small-scale conflict.

We leverage the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) collocated at Carlisle Barracks. PKSOI senior staff members affiliate with each seminar, providing a dedicated, one-on-one resource for adult learning. In addition, peacekeeping institute experts assist faculty members with cutting-edge doctrine, publications, and course development recommendations throughout the academic year. These experts also host “noon-time” lectures and act as Strategy Research Project advisors.

Cultural Awareness

We approach the topic of “culture” broadly and strategically. Our goal is for students to possess a sophisticated appreciation for the cultural dimensions of strategy and policy formulation, implementation, and outcome. To that end, we provide them with a mental framework to conduct that inquiry in an intellectually rigorous manner. We, therefore, do not “train” strategic leaders on cultural skills such as cultural do’s and don’ts, but educate them on how to think strategically about culture’s intersection with national security.

In our efforts, we address three distinct areas. The first concerns cultural dimensions at the individual level. This includes leadership, management and interpersonal relations such as negotiations. The second area covers cultural factors that operate in and affect military operations from tactical to the theater level. This includes from military and organizational culture to doctrine, training
philosophy, leadership philosophy, and tactics and campaign design principles, as well as approaches to coalition operations. The third area concerns the cultural dimensions of strategy and policy formulation, implementation and outcome, or how cultural factors can affect the highest levels of strategy (grand strategy, national strategy) and policy. To ensure comprehensive coverage of cultural awareness at the senior leadership level, each of our three residential teaching departments oversees one of the three areas. The Department of Distance Education covers all three areas during their two-year program.

Because of the importance of this topic within the current operating environment and specific JPME emphasis, our efforts focus on culture as a fundamental strategic thinking precept that practitioners must always consider. Specifically, at the level where strategy and policy are concerned (e.g. a nation-state), cultural factors dominate. It is thus an imperative that strategy and policy formulation, the way plans are implemented, and the outcome to be expected must consider cultural dimensions.

To assist in understanding these critical linkages, the initial core course, Strategic Thinking, introduces a general consideration of culture, as well as a detailed analytical framework about the cultural dimensions of strategy and policy. The framework consists of three cultural dimensions: identity, political culture, and resilience that we believe are the most pertinent cultural factors affecting policy and strategy formulation, implementation and outcome. Identity refers to the basis for defining identity and its linkage to interests. Political culture refers to the structure of power and decision making and includes political structure and strategic culture. Resilience is the capacity or ability of a society to resist, adapt or succumb to external forces. Continuously evolving, the Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy and Policy informs the remainder of the academic curriculum. The framework also forms the foundational framework for the six regional studies courses, one of which every student must take.

The framework is not a how-to manual, but simply one way to consider cultural factors. Rather, the framework provides a way to get at the complex issue of how culture figures into strategic and political behavior. The students are encouraged to explore beyond the framework to achieve a level of comprehension and usefulness that works for them. We begin the educational process by applying the framework to the United States. This provides the necessary real life example that students can readily comprehend to understand the utility and importance of cultural considerations. Furthermore, it helps them to be more conscious of how American culture affects our strategy and policy by understanding how American sense of purpose, core values and national interests derive from American culture.

In addition to our curricular coverage, 40+ International Fellows (~15% of the student body) attend our College annually. In addition to daily participation in seminar, International Fellows present a series of regional panels that offer
insights into their region and sub-region. These panels provide a collective briefing to discuss their region's/sub-region's greatest concerns. Panelists offer broad subject matter that encompasses social, economic, environmental, and cultural issues, as well security issues. The panels are open to the entire College community. They are also broadcast, recorded and web streamed in order to attain the widest coverage and largest audience.

Faculty

In operational parlance, our faculty comprises what the great German philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz, termed the center of gravity—"the hub of all power and movement on which everything depends."

The experience and diversity (academic diversity as well as the more traditional dimensions of diversity) of our faculty competes favorably with graduate-level faculties of most American academic institutions. The faculty represents a merger of the best elements of two disparate cultures: the military officer and the academic professor. Military faculty members possess wide-ranging specialties and 22-30 years of professional expertise. To have been successful, all military officers also must have been life-long informal teachers. Civilian faculty members possess records of outstanding performance, a variety of terminal degrees, subject matter expertise, and academic credentials. Many are published authors in their field and have extensive research expertise. The melding of these two cultures forms a truly synergistic faculty that is more powerful than either of its parts.

The curriculum requires a blend of generalists and specialists in their area of expertise capable of articulating their life experiences coupled with the programmed curriculum onto the teaching platform. The breadth of subjects taught transcends the knowledge or experience of any one faculty member and requires numerous hours of research and preparation for new faculty members.

Recruiting:

The Dean, Department Chairmen, Directors of Centers and Institutes and the Chief of Staff are major participants in the recruitment effort for all faculty members. The Commandant is personally involved in the final selection. Equally important, current faculty members identify potential faculty members from former students or from operational assignments.

Military faculty positions (usually colonel-level or equivalent) are nominative. As a minimum, Army officers must possess the specialized experience and knowledge required by our Department Chairs, be Senior Level College graduates, have a proven record of high potential for outstanding performance of duty, have earned a Master's Degree, and be approved by the Commandant for reassignment to the USAWC. Faculty from other Services are
expected to meet similar qualifications or, at minimum, the qualifications specified in the CJCS Officer Professional Military Education Policy.

Normally, recruitment begins a minimum of one year in advance of assignment. Each autumn, Department Chairmen identify personnel to the USAWC Chief of Staff to begin the nomination process. As a matter of policy, staff and faculty fills from the resident student class are minimized. We prefer that incoming faculty members have field experience as a graduate of a Senior Level College before taking a faculty position. The Commandant may grant exceptions.

Civilian faculty usually fall under the provisions of 10 USC 4021; therefore they are recruited under established personnel regulations and local policies. The authorities provided under 10 USC 4021 for the employment of civilian faculty are a real strength. They offer the ability to identify specific faculty requirements, flexibility in hiring searches, and competitive salary and benefits. Because such positions are term-limited appointments, the provisions allow us to adapt the faculty to meet the evolving demands of the contemporary operating environment on our curriculum. Term-limited appointments also allow us to retain only the very best of our faculty.

Small numbers of civilian visiting professors also are hired under the provisions of the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) to teach and/or participate in research studies. Appointments are normally for one year with a possible one-year extension. Limited numbers of faculty are contracted in accordance with government regulations.

Composition

Faculty composition meets the standards set by law and the CJCS, Officer Professional Military Education Policy.

Special Initiatives:

- Professor, USAWC. The Chief of Staff of the Army authorizes the USAWC to select two to three officers per year to pursue appropriate doctoral degrees to increase the academic credentials of military faculty members, enhance curriculum development, and to retain this expertise on the faculty. National-level searches ensure that only the most highly qualified individuals are selected. Principal responsibilities of Professor, USAWC include academic leadership, teaching, and scholarship. Specific duties include teaching core curriculum as well as electives, faculty development, service on faculty committees, service in leadership positions, participation in strategic communications activities, and research. These officers will return to Carlisle Barracks and normally serve on the faculty until their mandatory retirement date. We can have as many as 12 to 15 Professors, USAWC (roughly ten
percent of the College faculty) at any given time.

- **Tour Stabilization.** The Chief of Staff of the Army has approved twelve tour stabilized positions for Army faculty. As a general rule, tour stabilization is awarded only to uniformed faculty demonstrating extraordinary potential for long-term continued service to USAWC and the Army. Additionally, selected tour stabilization provides institutional continuity and sustained excellence in key educational leadership, management, and administrative positions. Usually, but not always, these positions are held by Professor, USAWC.

**Students**

Our central academic focus is the education of leaders prepared to play key roles in the development and implementation of U.S. national security policy and strategy from the highest levels of government to the theater level. Graduates serve in key leadership and staff positions in the military and other governmental activities and are expected to understand the linkages among the elements of power at the national level, their strategic development by senior officials of the Defense Department, and the planning and conduct of warfare by theater Combatant Commanders. The requirements inherent in these responsibilities shape our student body.

Students are selected based on their past leadership and management record and, most importantly, for their potential to hold higher leadership and management positions. Such potential is key because the USAWC is a professional program dedicated through its stated mission to educate the future senior Army and Joint leadership. Because the majority of our students have already proven their academic capabilities, potential for future leadership rather than academic scores is a key selection criterion in this process.

Our students, the majority of whom are uniformed officers, are selected by their respective personnel commands through a central selection process. In short, a selection board reviews the prospective student's file to determine the individual's eligibility. All organizations adhere to "most highly qualified" selection processes that ensure that only the best members of the organization are selected. Within the Army, for example, only the top four to eight percent of a particular year group will be selected.

Each military Service has established criteria and a selection process for identifying students. The Army, for example, specifies in Army Regulation 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development that an Active Army, Army National Guard, or Army Reserve officer must be serving at Lieutenant Colonel or Colonel rank with at least 16 but not more than 25 years of military service completed at the starting date of this course. Military students must have completed the Army’s Command and General Staff College or its Service equivalent and have an earned baccalaureate degree from an accredited college or university.
Eligible civilian students must be an employee of Department of the Army, Department of Defense or a closely allied branch of Government service in the grade of GS/GM-14 (equivalent) or above. Civilians are chosen by their individual personnel activities, based on past accomplishments and potential for executive level service. We also enroll students from the Department of State, National Security Agency, CIA, and other branches of government. In each case, the agency selects the student(s) from the list of applicants or nominees and we review the individuals selected.

For International Fellows, we receive a list of the countries selected for participation from Headquarters, Department of the Army based on nominations from the Geographic Combatant Commanders. To ensure regional diversity, each Geographic Combatant Command is normally given a proportional number of available seats. Each respective country selects their candidate(s). International Fellows are all uniformed officers of their armed forces.

Student Composition:

The majority of our students are Army officers (no more than 60 percent) selected from one of the three components of Active Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard. The Resident Education Program enrollment has the largest number of active duty students while the Distance Education Program attracts a larger number of reserve component officers from various branches of Service. The difference reflects the fact that many Reservist Component officers have full-time civilian careers in addition to their reserve component duties. Thus, many are not able to leave their civilian positions for the ten-month commitment required for the Resident Education Program.

Of 336 students in the resident portion of the Class of 2009, 236 possessed graduate degrees at the start of the year. Of that number, 213 held master’s degrees, 13 had academic doctorates, and 12 had Juris Doctorates. The Distance Education Program Class of 2008 consisted of 276 students of whom 105 had master’s degrees, 12 had academic doctorates, and 18 had Juris Doctorates.

Joint student composition meets the standards set by law and the Officer Professional Military Education Policy.

Beyond Joint Students

I would like very much to increase the number of students from within the Interagency. However, recent experience of interagency partners’ inability to fill even limited numbers of student seats indicates that many civilian agencies within the US Government may not have sufficient staffing to allow for substantially increased numbers of students.
The Chief of Staff of the Army has directed us to double the number of International Fellows enrolled from 40 to 80 over the next four years. For Academic Year (AY) 10, we will enroll 50 International Fellows. Our plan is to enroll a total of 70 International Fellows in AY12 and 80 in AY13.

Balancing Continuity and Change

Our faculty engages in an ongoing dialogue on the need for continuity and change, the yin and the yang of the curriculum. The goal is not the extreme of one versus the other, but finding an appropriate balance between the old and the new; what should remain constant and what must change.

For example, war has been and will remain an intellectual endeavor, fought between thinking and adaptive opponents. Thus, how to think, rather than what to think, must remain a key element of continuity for senior leaders. Clearly, what to do and how to do it matters tremendously, but the decision on what to do must be preceded by an accurate framing of the problem, thoughtful analysis of the conditions surrounding the issues, assessment of options, and an evaluation of the opportunities and risks inherent in those alternatives.

Similarly, the nature of war is little changed. Thus, classical strategists, such as Thucydides, Sun Tzu, and Clausewitz, have much to offer today’s student of war. But the conduct of war, how the basic tenets of strategy are applied in the actual waging of war in the current operating environment, requires continuous adaptation. The curriculum, therefore, must address how effective senior leaders use these continuities to adapt to what Clausewitz referred to as the chameleon-like nature of war.

As ongoing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere routinely underscore, warfare—the conduct of war—is always evolving. So too, therefore, must the curriculum. Thus, in recent years our primary warfighting course has evolved from a focus on Implementing National Military Strategy to Theater Strategy and Campaigning. At the same time, the course evolved from a focus on crisis action planning and the military decision-making process to the concept of adaptive planning, and we have been on the leading edge of the concepts inherent in Commander’s Assessment and Campaign Design.

At the same time, as more modern strategists like Mao, Bernard Brodie, Thomas Schelling, or Colin Gray serve to remind us, strategic thought is not static. New strategies have and will continue to emerge from the specific contexts of their time. We must, therefore, remain alert for their emergence and diligent in introducing our students to these new and potentially disruptive changes. Even though some of these emerging concepts will fall by the wayside, we can ill-afford to neglect them until their utility has been proved or disproved.
In a similar vein, the basic tenets of senior level leadership, of leading and managing change in large, complex organizations are similarly well-known: know yourself, create a vision, understand the current and future environment, and be able to build consensus among diverse individuals, groups, and cultures, all the while fostering an ethical climate throughout the organization. But applying these skills under the specific conditions of a given time is an art that requires an adaptable curriculum that is open to new concepts and practices.

Likewise, the United States has enduring values and interests. But how to promote those values and secure those interests will necessarily change according to the specific circumstances facing our leaders at a particular point in time. Thus, we expose our students to the current versions of key policy and strategy documents, such as the National Security Strategy, National Defense, Strategy, and National Military Strategy, while underscoring the key continuities that guide and shape them.

Similarly, the DOD has a long-standing framework for strategic planning, resourcing, and force management processes. The details within each of those processes and, particularly, the policies that guide them evolve—sometimes significantly—over time. The perennial question is not guns or butter, but how much of each can the nation sustain given the specific security conditions of the time. This argues for specific lessons to evolve to fit those conditions.

**Balancing Contact Time and Time for Reflection**

We continuously struggle with balancing the amount of time devoted to seminar learning versus the amount of time out of class available for research, reflection, and synthesis. Our curriculum model strives to limit contact time (exclusive of exercises) to no more than 15 hours per week. However, curriculum demands driven by expanding requirements in the CJCS Officer Professional Military Education Policy, a growing number and complexity of Joint Professional Military Education Special Areas of Emphasis, and Army training requirements strain our ability to hold to 15 hours per week. These demands are compounded by the desires of senior civilian and military leaders to address our students, and the vital relevance of these senior leaders to our students.

To address the number of required and desired topics in the depth necessary for sophisticated understanding required at the senior level takes time. However, that time cannot be solely time spent in the lecture hall or seminar room. Students must be given the time necessary to reflect and synthesize ideas. These twin demands require us to continuously reassess the amount of time available to each activity. These are always spirited discussions. As demands for adding material to the curriculum—regardless of source—increase, so, too, will these internal debates sharpen in intensity.
These deliberations are influenced, in turn, by the continuous and frequently contentious debate over breadth versus depth in the curriculum. While both are reasonable philosophical approaches to curriculum development and delivery, Professional Military Education must avoid both extremes: knowing almost nothing about everything or knowing everything about nothing. But, achieving an appropriate balance between the two poles frequently requires hard decisions about the amount of time devoted to particular subjects. For example, in responding to new JPME II requirements in developing the curriculum for AY 06, we extended the amount of time devoted to core curriculum by five weeks. This increase came at the cost of reducing elective offerings from eight to five.

Demands for adding material to the curriculum are not likely to decrease in the near or long term. On the positive side, many see the USAWC as a possible solution to many of the challenges facing the military, in general, or the Army, in particular. On a less positive note, the accumulation of these demands runs the risk of diverting us from an education to a training institution.

**Student Assessment**

The faculty has the ultimate responsibility for evaluating student grasp of learning objectives and student progress towards graduation requirements. The faculty’s challenge is to provide an appropriate environment, resources, and direction for learning. The intent is to design and administer student academic requirements that enhance the learning process as well as to provide comprehensive and useful feedback to the student on those requirements. To those ends, our assessment objectives are to:

- Improve student learning;
- Provide timely, useful feedback to students;
- Measure student achievement against USAWC standards;
- Enhance the curriculum development process;
- Promote consistency in the evaluation of graduation requirements; and
- Provide student management and academic record keeping.

Our educational offerings coupled with the methods of instruction employed meet the requirements of graduate-level academic rigor. Through extensive seminar participation, oral presentations, written work, and role-playing exercises, the students in the Resident and Distance Education Programs are continuously evaluated on their ability to synthesize the knowledge, concepts, skills, competencies, and attributes of strategic leaders. Seminar dialogue, in particular, complements, reinforces, and stimulates learning, as students face the challenge of submitting their ideas for critical seminar group appraisal and discussion by their peers.

Student performance is measured against lesson and course objectives using a variety of techniques. While some distinctions in evaluation remain
between the Resident and Distance Education Programs, advances in online capabilities and required on-campus courses for distance learning students minimize these differences. Both programs stipulate written evaluative requirements that measure how well the course objectives are achieved. By methodology, the Resident Education Program relies more heavily on verbal contributions and presentations, and the Distance Education Program also evaluates student achievements in this manner while in resident courses.

Within the Distance Education Program, a former reliance on individual writing requirements has evolved to be part of a more varied and integrated learning process that includes online activities such as threaded discussions, a highly structured simulation, and informal student-to-student discussions, in addition to the intensive lecture, exercise, and seminar experience of the two summer resident courses. These innovations encourage students in educating themselves in "how to think" as opposed to knowledge based on "what to think." We believe that these efforts foster the higher levels of cognitive development expected from the curriculum.

While the final course evaluation for each core and elective course is based on a pass/fail system, all student requirements are evaluated on a scale from 1-5, (fails to meet standards, incomplete, meets standards, exceeds standards, and outstanding, respectively). The minimum passing evaluation is "meets standards" (3).

Conclusion

From my perspective, PME at the USAWC is in good health. The reforms of the last twenty years, and particularly the advent of JPME II, set high, but appropriate, standards that offer a firm foundation for continued improvement.

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss this vital issue with the committee.
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

PRESENTATION TO THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SUBJECT: WAR COLLEGES

STATEMENT OF: MAJOR GENERAL MAURICE H. "MAURY" FORSYTH
COMMANDER, SPAATZ CENTER FOR OFFICER EDUCATION,
AND COMMANDANT, AIR WAR COLLEGE
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

JUNE 4, 2009

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED
BY THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
In 1946, one year before the US Air Force became a separate service, the Air War College admitted its first students. Then, as now, the college reflected its motto, "profectusus more irretenti" (we make progress unhindered by custom). In May, the 237 members of the resident class of 2009 joined the ranks of 13,555 previous alumni, including 1,279 international fellows from 93 countries, defining the standard by which the Air War College must ultimately be judged: the quality of our graduates. Creating that quality graduate requires an outstanding faculty teaching a proven yet flexible curriculum, united by a common vision and mission for educational success.

Our vision for the Air War College is to be the foremost center for air, space, and cyberspace education and thought: preparing the world’s best joint strategic leaders. Our mission statement makes that vision operational: the Air War College prepares students to lead in a joint environment at the strategic level across the range of military operations; develops cross-domain mastery of joint, air, space, cyberspace power, and its strategic contributions to national security; and advances innovative thought on National Security, Department of Defense and Air Force issues. Whereas the curriculum addresses strategy writ large in terms of employing all elements of national power -- diplomatic, informational, military, and economic -- our vision and mission capture two things that make the Air War College unique. First, while many graduate programs teach critical thinking at the strategic level, as a professional military education institution the Air War College focuses on these subjects specifically in the context of military operations involving the joint, multinational, and interagency community. This contextual setting pays high returns particularly when it comes to building personal and professional relationships with the international fellows which influence cooperative, coalition and allied relationships long after graduation. Secondly, the Air War College places particular emphasis on
the employment of joint and multinational air, space, and cyberspace capabilities by an air component. Fulfilling the school’s educational mission and vision demands experienced, expert faculty members.

The 63 members of the Air War College resident faculty strive daily to accomplish the educational mission. We believe that the quality of the faculty, more than any other single factor, determines the school’s success. Our faculty is evenly balanced among approximately one-third Air Force colonels, one-third civilian PhDs, and one-third sister service, interagency, and international officers and civilians. Augmenting our assigned faculty are additional Air Force colonels and civilian PhDs assigned to the Air University Academic Centers but teaching at the college. These officers and civilians increase our faculty count by the approximately 15% needed to meet the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) required student-to-faculty ratio of 3.5-to-1. The Air Force faculty members represent a diverse cross-section of officer specialties from rated operations to non-rated operations such as space to mission support. The fully staffed complement of Army, Navy, and Marine Corps faculty members reflect the diversity of their respective services. In addition to their recent operational, leadership, and command experience, all of the military faculty members have master’s degrees and three have doctoral degrees. Two Air Force colonels, products of the Air Force’s advanced academic degree program, are returning from PhD programs within the next 6 months to join the Air War College faculty. Using the authority granted under Title 10 US Code, the Air War College has recruited an accomplished civilian faculty all of whom, save one, have PhDs in history, political science, military studies, or related disciplines. As testament to their scholarship, over the last two academic years the college’s faculty has published 13 books, 26 book chapters, and 52 journal articles.
The faculty has structured the Air War College curriculum to produce five broad outcomes. The Air War College graduate, in a joint, interagency and multinational environment, will be able to explain the air component's perspective; critically analyze, articulate, and present both verbally and in writing, succinct, comprehensive, and accurate accounts of strategic level issues; articulate a vision for organizational success, adopt a plan to achieve that vision, and then lead the organization in execution of the plan, adjusting for unforeseen changes as necessary; make decisions in the face of changing, uncertain circumstances, accurately describing assumptions and quantifying risks the decision entails; and enthusiastically pursue lifelong professional learning.

The Air War College curriculum reflects enduring concepts, as well as emerging topics. It is revised annually and updated continually to incorporate materials and cover subjects most relevant to today’s security environment while retaining that which has passed the test of time. For example, the curriculum includes a significant exploration of the topic of irregular warfare in both the core curriculum and specific elective courses. A number of lessons in the Foundations of Strategy core course focus on irregular warfare topics such as building partner capacity, counterinsurgency, counter terrorism, support to insurgency, finding-fixing-finishing-isolating insurgents or terrorists, and deterring and shaping operations. The Warfighting Course covers irregular warfare from the standpoint of joint and interagency capabilities and planning considerations, the new joint US counterinsurgency doctrine, current and future capabilities, and employment considerations of military and other instruments of national power in military operations. We currently have four elective courses that deal specifically with the topic of irregular warfare.
While flexible enough to accommodate emerging topics, the curriculum is firmly rooted in the study of military history and strategy. By examining various theorists’ concepts and applied disciplines, the Foundations of Strategy course equips senior leaders with the tools and knowledge to analyze, synthesize, and evaluate strategy (strategy development, statecraft, and the pursuit of national interests). A grounding in statecraft and the development of historical mindedness serves as the basis for understanding the concept of strategy and the ends, ways, and means model to analyze how nations pursue their national interests. The Foundations course pays special attention both to strategy development in the realms of air, space, and cyberspace, and to the impact of airpower on national and military strategy. Finally, the course serves as the underpinning for further study in follow-on courses that examine the national security decision-making process and the application of military power as a means to attain national objectives.

The National Security and Decision Making course assesses the context and processes for developing US security strategy and policy, as well as the use of the national instruments of power in support of that policy and strategy. The context assessment encompasses the overarching cultural, religious, political, and economic currents that influence local, regional, and global security environments. The course assesses the role and impact of civil-military relations, the interagency process, Congress, as well as the media and public opinion in policy development and execution.

Acknowledging culture as a major factor affecting strategy, the Air War College curriculum reflects its importance through its courses. The Global Security course examines growing and emerging security concerns affecting both state and non-state actors outside of the purely military context such as energy security, environmental security, migration, and changing population demographics. In the Regional and Cultural Studies course, students gain unique
regional and cultural perspectives through the study of one of more than a dozen regions. After investing 15 seminar periods in focused academic preparation, the students and faculty embark on two weeks of field research conducted in the region, examining issues relevant to the exercise of all elements of national power. The field research allows students to discuss security policy issues with senior political, military, religious, cultural, and academic leaders of other nations. It further encourages the students to consider security issues from non-US perspectives. Students also take the non-credit language elective most appropriate for their regional studies of the five languages (French, Spanish, Russian, Mandarin Chinese, and Arabic) taught by Defense Language Institute faculty.

While the Global Security and Regional and Cultural Studies courses highlight the challenges involved in operating in a multinational environment, the Warfighting course develops senior leaders with the skills to plan, deploy, employ, and command US and multinational forces throughout the range of military operations. Our students evaluate current and emerging joint warfighting and enabling capabilities with a special emphasis on the employment and sustainment of air, space, and cyberspace forces in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment. Students analyze the joint operation planning process through which combatant commanders set the military conditions for attaining national and coalition objectives as both a supported and supporting instrument of power.

The Leadership course analyzes the concepts and skills required of senior leaders through an examination of various command, leadership, and management practices. The course encourages personal and professional reflection, critical assessment, creative thinking and the consideration of leadership issues pertinent to today’s uncertain and chaotic global environment. The Leadership course emphasizes the imperative to support an organizational culture of
accountability, responsibility, and ethical decision making. The Air War College curriculum
hones students’ critical thinking and writing skills. In addition to written assignments across the
curriculum, resident students conduct in-depth research. They select a topic of personal and
professional interest nominated by a military or other government agency, conduct research, and
articulate their results, recommendations, and insights. The product of that research, the
Professional Studies Paper, is forwarded to the agency or office that requested the research. The
Research course provides a venue for students to address issues of relevance and importance to
sponsoring agencies while improving their abilities to conduct thoughtful, logical, and critical
research and analysis. Faculty advisors assist students in submitting papers for publication in Air
Force, sister service, and other professional journals or periodicals.

Finally, students must choose three electives to complete program requirements. The
Electives Program is designed to enhance the core courses by providing students with
opportunities to achieve greater depth and breadth of understanding in issues of special interest
and to provide courses that have the flexibility to adapt quickly to changes in the international
and domestic security environments.

The curriculum is academically rigorous; approximately 75 percent of all contact time is
devoted to active learning methods such as seminar discussions, case studies, and practical
exercises. The Air War College balances contact time with the need to preserve time for student
reflection and interaction. Next academic year, the resident program schedule will have a day
each week specifically devoted to research and reflection. Every course employs some form of
essay exam or other written assignment along with student-led exercises and briefings to
evaluate student progress. The faculty also assesses the quality and consistency of student
participation when determining student grades. With active seminar learning so much a part of
the Air War College experience, the final ingredient needed to produce the desired graduates is a quality student body.

The 240 officers and civilians in the typical Air War College resident class form a diverse, well-educated, uniquely-experienced student population. The military officers average 19 years of service, most having successfully completed command. They are selected to attend by their respective services; the Air Force students come from the top 15% of their peer group and comprise 47% of the student body. The addition of Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard students (7 each) brings the total host service representation in the class to 53%, well below the 60% maximum limit set by the OPMEP. Officers from the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps account for 18% of the students, DOD, and interagency civilians selected by their agencies another 10%. The remaining 19% of the class are senior officers from 45 countries, our international fellows, who are fully integrated into the student body and fully participate with their US counterparts in the academic program. Students are assigned to seminars in ways to ensure that each seminar reflects the diversity of the entire class.

The combination of a highly-selective resident student body, a challenging and relevant curriculum with a dynamic and accomplished faculty enables the Air War College to produce graduates with the education needed to lead in both today's and tomorrow's joint, multinational, and interagency environment. The Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS) has accredited Air University to grant a Master of Strategic Studies degree to Air War College graduates since 2004. More relevant to the school's military education mission, the Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) Team thoroughly reviewed the Air War College curriculum, faculty, and student mix during a routine onsite assessment in October 2008. In its final report, the PAJE team noted that the Air War College met or exceeded standards in all
areas, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff accredited the college's Joint Professional Military Education Phase II program for six years.

From its inception, the Air War College has endeavored to live up to its motto, "we make progress unhindered by custom." While the specific challenges posed by the future security environment remain unpredictable, it is practically certain that Air War College graduates will be in positions of leadership and called upon to develop, recommend, and execute joint, multinational, and interagency options. Our highly qualified faculty members delivering a first-class academic program to highly motivated students combine to create an educational experience that fully prepares our graduates to succeed in the challenges ahead.
STATEMENT OF

COLONEL MICHAEL F. BELCHER
DIRECTOR MARINE CORPS WAR COLLEGE

BEFORE

THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

ON

PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

4 JUNE 2009
"We believe the human dimension of war is the most critical element, and that boldness, creativity, intelligence and the warrior spirit are prime attributes."

General James T. Conway, Commandant of the Marine Corps

Introduction:

Good morning, Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Wittman and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. I appreciate this opportunity to address the Subcommittee and discuss the educational achievements of your Marine Corps War College.

Historical Foundations:

During testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on July 12, 1989, the 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Alfred M. Gray, conceptualized his vision for the future of Marine Corps training and education. Armed with the guidance and support of the Chairman and other Committee Members, he returned to his office and he drafted an order to the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) directing him to “make it happen.” Specifically, he mandated the development of “a concept for a Marine Corps University… a focal point for planning, doctrine, training, education, etc. it should provide insight and guidance on naval strategy and national strategy.” He envisioned a “world-class” educational institution for the study of war and the profession of arms. To that end, in August 1990, the University convened an elite group of six Lieutenant Colonels to participate in “The Art of War Studies Program,” the precursor of today’s Marine Corps War College. Since then the College has grown in size and scope, yet, I am proud to report, remained true to its charter and on course to achieve General Gray’s vision.

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Mission:

The College’s mission is “to educate selected senior officers and civilians for decision-making across the range of operations in joint, interagency, and multinational environment.” The College prepares its graduates to assume senior leadership positions of increasing complexity through the study of national security strategy, theater strategy, and military support to those strategies within the context of national security policies, decision-making, objectives and resources. Focused on strategic-level of war, the program is designed to educate students to operate in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environment. In accordance with our motto, “Sapere Aude – Dare to Know,” we strive to cultivate an academic atmosphere in which assumptions are challenged and new and novel approaches to national security are considered. Steeped in Marine Corps history, tradition and culture, the joint curriculum produces agile, strategic thinkers whose breadth and depth of knowledge comes from exposure to an elite, organizational culture born of an expeditionary mindset that spans the air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace spectra. In sum, via our progressive curriculum, we are preparing the Nation’s next generation of strategic leaders to take on the challenges of an increasingly complex and globalized world.

Methodology:

The intensive ten-month program consists of over 1,300 course hours dedicated to both the art and science of modern warfare. Recognizing our students’ extensive operational experience and occupational expertise, we employ active, adult-oriented teaching methods to provide a multidimensional educational experience to challenge students to think critically and creatively about enduring and emerging national security issues. Over 94 percent of the curriculum’s contact hours are presented utilizing interactive instructional methods such as
Socratic style-seminars, case study analysis, practical application exercises, battle staff rides, field study trips, independent research projects, written assignments, and oral presentations. Active learning methods require time for preparation and reflection. Accordingly, the College dedicates time ("white space") for the conduct of student research, reading, analysis, and synthesis. Student progress is evaluated throughout the year through graded written assignments, oral presentations, examinations, and class contributions. Students who excel are recognized through the College's Distinguished Graduate and Writing Award Programs with their class standing and academic achievements being noted on their official Service or Agency performance evaluations.

The student's active learning experience is significantly enhanced by the College's small student population (currently 19 students operating in two seminars) and the low student-to-faculty ratio (2.5:1). The small class size allows the students to receive highly personalized instruction, tailored to the students' unique educational needs and interests. It also affords them unparalleled access to the Nation's top military, government, industry, and academic leaders, whom they interact with in a more open and personal manner than afforded by larger colleges. Finally, it enables the College to rapidly adjust its academic schedule to address topical issues or capitalize on short-notice, high-value educational opportunities.

Elements of Education:

In 2006, the Marine Corps University sponsored a comprehensive study of Marine Corps Officer PME. The resulting report stressed that in order to achieve world-class status; the College must possess "a world-class faculty, world-class students, a world-class curriculum and world-class facilities and resources." Over the intervening years, the College has worked

diligently to advance and align each element—students, faculty, curriculum, and facilities and resources—to achieve the highest standard of academic excellence and become a world-class institution. The success of those efforts is addressed below.

Students:

The Marine Corps War College attracts high-caliber students from across the Services and Interagency community. Selection to the College is highly desired and therefore highly competitive. Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonels vying for a top-level school seat are screened by a Selection Board which selects only the most qualified candidates based on their operational and academic records. Of the hundreds of officers screened annually only the top 13 percent are selected, significantly less than the 36 percent selected for promotion to Colonel. Of those selected to a top-level school, 7 percent attend the Marine Corps War College. Amongst these Marine Corps officers, the College ranks third behind the National War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces and first among the Service Colleges as their educational institution of choice. Given the College’s small size and short history, this reflects very positively on its growing academic reputation. Another measure of the quality of the student body is the students’ assignment to demanding follow-on billets. Of the 16 military officers in the current class, five are assigned to O-6-level command positions, four to Service Headquarter staffs, three to Joint or Combatant Command Staffs, and four to instruct at PME institutions. Finally, over its brief history, the College has produced nine Marine Corps General Officers, or ten percent of its eligible graduates. This is more than double the average promotion rate of four percent, and is yet another indicator of the caliber of the students and the commitment of the College to produce strategic leaders capable of serving at the highest levels of the government.
This year’s student body consists of 19 senior military officers and government officials, representing each Service, both active and reserve components, three government agencies (Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives), and a wide array of occupational specialties. There are nine Sea Service officers, comprising only 47 percent of the student body, less than the 60 percent maximum outlined in CICS Instruction 1800.1C, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP). The high percentage of other Service and agency students provides all of our student population with an in-depth joint and interagency educational experience. The students bring to the table a wide range of educational and operational experiences to include 12 students with Battalion-level command experience and 11 students with combat experience in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM or IRAQI FREEDOM. By virtue of this extensive experience, the students bring unmatched operational expertise and insight into the classroom, thereby, educating others as they learn themselves. Their knowledge both complements and challenges that of the instructors, further enhancing the overall educational experience.

**Faculty:**

The faculty is small, but first-rate, possessing both academic and operational expertise. Currently the faculty is comprised of one senior military officer from each Service, one senior Foreign Service Officer, and three civilian Title 10 professors. Each is a subject matter expert in his or her field and between them they hold four Doctoral and 16 Master degrees.

The military instructors are all highly experienced officers with strong operational and academic records. Supported by the continuity provided by civilian instructors, the College actively recruits upwardly mobile officers, recognizing the risk that they may be reassigned due to promotion or selection to command. Each military instructor is a designated Joint Qualified
Officer as well as a graduate of a Senior-Level War College, as are two of the Title 10 professors. The faculty’s teaching experiences are extensive and include previous assignments at the College of Naval Warfare, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the Air Force Academy, and the U.S. Military Academy. Three taught undergraduates at the Oklahoma State University and the University of Minnesota, and one is currently teaching graduate students at the Georgetown University Security Studies program.

The College is first and foremost a teaching institution. Nonetheless, the faculty remains active in their fields through their attendance at lectures, symposia, and conferences. While not required, the faculty also conducts research and writes scholarly works for professional publications. Recent scholastic accomplishments include the publication of two major works on national security, a manuscript on counterinsurgency, and a chapter on interagency policy for irregular warfare and counterinsurgency.

Supplementing the College’s faculty are the Marine Corps University Chairs which include noted subject matter experts in the fields of Arabic culture, Iran, the Middle East, China the Near East, insurgency, terrorism, ethics, and leadership. Due to the College’s proximity to the National Capital Region, we capitalize on the expertise of distinguished guest speakers drawn from the highest levels of the government, military, industry, and academia.

Curriculum:

The College curriculum is derived from a myriad of sources. First and foremost, the U.S. Congress supervises and safeguards the educational requirements of its Armed Forces through the tireless advocacy of the House Armed Services Committee. The effectiveness of the Committee and its Chairman is evidenced in the PME renaissance that commenced in the late-1980s’ and continues today. Likewise, it was the Committee that foresaw the need for Senior-
Level Service Colleges to grant Joint PME Phase II certification and act accordingly, producing swift and highly successful results. The second source is the Commandant of the Marine Corps who provides guidance and direction through the Commanding General, MCCDC, the Commanding General, Training and Education Command, the President, Marine Corps University, and such visionary documents as Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025. Third, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff establishes enduring learning areas and annual special areas of emphasis through CICSI 1800.1C, OPMEP. Fourth, the faculty routinely interview Combatant, Component, and Service Commanders to determine the capabilities and characteristics required of graduates. Fifth, the University’s Institutional Research Directorate annually surveys students, graduates, and their supervisors. Sixth, faculty members continually scan the strategic horizon to identify the most crucial security issues the students are expected to face in the five-years following graduation. This process capitalizes on the long-range projections of a myriad of military, government, and academic “think tanks” to include the Marine Corps Strategic Vision Group, the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, the Quadrennial Defense Review Team, the National Intelligence Council, and the Combatant Commands. Through this measure the faculty is able to conduct “academic triage,” to narrow the curriculum. Lastly, the faculty continually gleans lessons learned from ongoing operations through such sources as the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, the Center for Army Lessons Learned, the Joint Lessons Learned Program, and the Center for Advance Operational Cultural Learning.

The curriculum is updated on an annual basis by the Director during the Course Content Review Board, validated biannually by the President of the Marine Corps University during Curriculum Review Board, assessed every six years by the Chairman of the Joint Chief Staff
during the Process of Accreditation of Joint Education, and inspected every six years by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools.

Aligned with the professional military education (PME) continuum, the program is progressive and dynamic, building on the student's prior military education. Courses and individual classes are integrated and synchronized to reinforce major themes and better demonstrate the potential for cooperation and conflict between the various elements of National power and influence. The curriculum consists of the five core courses discussed below.

Our *Leadership and Ethics* course challenges students to think about their personal style of leadership in preparation for greater responsibilities. Students study leadership in a fashion that allows them greater mastery of leadership concepts, communications, decision-making, and ethics. Designed to expand on the students' solid leadership experience, education, and training, the Leadership and Ethics course blends the study of theory with discussions with senior military and civilian practitioners of strategic leadership. Due to the College's small size and strict non-attribution policy, these intimate sessions provide students unmatched access to senior leader insights.

Our *War, Policy, and Strategy* course analyzes military theory and strategy through a historical lens. The course provides a study of the nature, theory, and conduct of war, as well as emphasizing the connection between war's moral and physical dynamics. The course examines the relationships among the elements of National power and their individual and collective contributions to National success in war. The course includes comparative analysis of major military theories and theoreticians. The course uses the historical study of World Wars I and II, the Korean War, the Cold War, the Vietnam War, as well as conflicts in Malaya, North Korea,
Iraq, and China to investigate the development of strategy using various models which align ends, ways, and means to achieve a military and political victory.

Our *National Security and Joint Warfare* course enables students to better understand the national security process and joint and combined warfare with considerations made to interagency and international collaboration, as well as incorporating new knowledge gained from on-going operations. Importantly, however, the course deliberately avoids a single-minded focus on today’s missions by utilizing studies of the future operating environment, such as the *Joint Forces Command Joint Operating Environment Report*, in order to anticipate the types of missions or decisions students may encounter in the near future. The course is designed to develop a deeper understanding of both the development of national security strategies and the execution of joint warfare. It includes visits to Combatant and Component Commands and the use of case studies and exercises, such as the Joint Land, Aerospace, and Sea Simulation exercise, an inter-War College exercise that emphasizes joint and interagency cooperation. The course takes advantage of the College’s proximity to the National Capital Region to meet with senior leaders and policy makers in the Pentagon, the National Security Council, the State Department, Service and Interagency Headquarters, the U.S. Capitol, and local “think-tanks.”

Our *Economics* course challenges students to analyze the strategic implications of economics in a globalized world. Recognizing the growing significance of economics to global security, the College provides the students with an understanding of fundamental macro-economic concepts, monetary and trade policy, defense acquisitions, strategic resources, and globalization. Included in the course is a field study trip to the New York Stock Exchange and various financial institutions.
Our Regional Studies course employs the expertise of diplomats, military leaders, visiting scholars, and civilian authorities to provide a multi-dimensional perspective for a deep analysis of U.S. global interests, regional policy objectives, and the complexities of formulating effective international strategies. The course explores international relations as well as political, economic, social, and cultural factors in vital areas of the world including Africa, Latin America, Europe, Asia-Pacific and the Middle East. To enhance their understanding and sensitivity to regional cultural issues, the students participate in an operational culture seminar taught by the University’s Cultural Anthropologist and participate in a cross-cultural strategic negotiation exercise. During the course, students are afforded the opportunity to enhance their foreign language skills through participation in on-line language training and participation in cultural immersion events during international field study trips.

A cornerstone of the Regional Studies course is its extensive international field studies program. During the program, the students travel to several strategic regions to gain local, national, and global perspectives through interaction with foreign military, government, academic, and transnational organizations, as well as the local population. Previous field studies introduced trips to the Asia-Pacific Region, Europe, and Africa. Additionally, the trips focus on all instruments of National power, not just the military, in order to broaden and deepen the students’ understand of other peoples, places and perspectives.

In order to be granted a Master of Strategic Study degree, students must also complete a six-month Independent Research Project on a self-selected topic of a strategic nature. This project requires the students to synthesize the knowledge gained from the courses outlined below as they explore topics of immediate and long-term importance to the various Services, agencies and commands.
Irregular Warfare

In the book *The Art of War*, Sun Tzu highlighted the need to balance traditional (chēng) and irregular (ch'i) warfare to be successful on the battlefield. This lesson is as relevant today as when it was written in the 6th century B.C. Recognizing that the United States will increasingly face hybrid threats posed by state and non-state actors, the College devotes over 150 seminar hours to the study of irregular warfare. The instruction includes analysis of historical and current irregular warfare campaigns, led by noted historians and current irregular warfare theoreticians. For example, the students read proofs of *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* by Dr. David Kilcullen before the book was published, with the author subsequently conducting the seminar on his findings. In academic year 2008, the students participated in a case study of the Battle of Fallujah with a panel of Commanding Generals and Officers, and utilized a case study on U.S. Civil War reconstruction. The College also attended a conference hosted by the National Defense University on the insurgency’s role in irregular warfare, where the students met privately with Mr. Jim Locher, architect of the Project on National Security Reform.

Facilities and Resources:

Currently the College’s facilities and resources are adequate to achieve its basic educational objectives. Housed in a historic building aboard Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA, the College presents a professional appearance to students and guests alike and a quiet, collegial environment for academic study. However, given the planned expansion of the College and the other resident Marine Corps PME institutions, classroom and workspace is at a premium. To alleviate over-crowding, Marine Corps University initiated a major revision of its Facilities Master Plan. This plan identified the requirement for several new academic facilities at
Quantico’s main campus. One of these new facilities is an Academic Support Instructional Facility (ASIF) that would house both our intermediate level school and the Marine Corps War College. The ASIF would contain state-of-the-art classroom facilities encompassing the latest in Information Education Technology (IET) infrastructure. The IET Master Plan calls for the integration of state-of-the-art IET for the performance of curriculum development, delivery and management, collaborative planning, and research services.

Vision:

Our vision for the College is to retain the academic advantages inherent in a small, elite College - specifically organizational access, operational agility, academic freedom, and educational excellence - while progressively growing into a more robust educational institution. To achieve this vision, we have commenced an ambitious program to expand: 1) the size and diversity of the student population; 2) the quality, quantity, and diversity of our faculty; and 3) our academic outreach efforts.

I am pleased to report that we are on track to achieve these objectives. In 2010, the College will expand the student population from 19 to 26 students through the inclusion of an additional student from each Service and the Department of State and the accession of three International Military Students from France, Canada, and Pakistan. The College will also join three additional faculty members, a Marine Corps Colonel, a Defense Intelligence Agency Chair, and a Title 10 Professor of Regional Studies. In 2011, the College will add four additional students and one civilian Title 10 faculty member.

While the College’s educational experience cannot be replicated by civilian institutions, it can be enhanced through increased interaction with leading-edge civilian graduate programs. To that end, we are evaluating several strategy programs at prestigious civilian institutions in an
effort to identify best educational practices and mutually beneficial educational opportunities. We recently entered into a dialogue with the Yale University Brady-Johnson Grand Strategy Program regarding collaborative educational opportunities. The Brady-Johnson Program, led by noted historians Drs. John Gaddis and Paul Kennedy, closely parallels our own in content, scope, and educational philosophy. Thus, we believe that there exist many untapped opportunities for academic collaboration. Our objective is to establish a forum through which future civilian policy-makers and military commanders can discuss policy, debate topical and historical issues, and develop mutually supportive networks.

**Conclusion:**

Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittee, our graduates will face a world dramatically different from that confronting their predecessors. The effects of globalization, demographics, resource competition, economic disparity, religious and ethnic conflict, and the rise of peer competitors and violent non-state actors are conspiring to make our world a more complex and dangerous place. The challenges facing our Nation and its leaders will be truly unprecedented. Consequently, the Marine Corps War College is dedicated to providing our Nation’s next generation of strategic leaders with a world class education required to intellectually prepare them for the multitude of challenges ahead. Through the means and methods to be described in testimony, I am convinced that we can meet those challenges, and with the continued advocacy and support of Congress, we are destined to succeed. Thank you for the opportunity to address this Subcommittee. Semper Fidelis.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

JUNE 4, 2009
Dr. Snyder. The terms “training” and “education” seem to be used interchangeably quite a bit. Can you tell me how you define the difference and what part of your curriculum is training and which part is education?

General Steel. CJCSI 1800.01C, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), dated 31 Jul 05, answers this plainly.

“The role of PME is to provide the education needed to complement training, experience and self-improvement to produce the most professionally competent individual possible. In its broadest conception, education conveys general bodies of knowledge and develops habits of mind applicable to a broad spectrum of endeavors. At its highest levels and in its purest form, education fosters breadth of view, diverse perspectives and critical analysis, abstract reasoning, comfort with ambiguity and uncertainty and innovative thinking, particularly with respect to complex, non-linear problems. This contrasts with training, which focuses personnel to enhance their capacity to perform specific functions and tasks. Opportunities for substantial professional education are relatively rare—particularly for the extended in-residence education that produces the learning synergies that only come from daily, face-to-face interaction with fellow students and faculty. Consequently, the PME institutions should strive to provide as pure and high quality education as feasible.”

National War College (NWC) concurs with this policy wholeheartedly and adheres to it as much as possible. While some training takes place at NWC as a by-product of our educational efforts, our curriculum is focused completely on educating our students in the analysis and development of national security strategies.

Admiral Hall. While some may use the terms “training” and “education” interchangeably, as the Commandant of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, I do not. In my view, training focuses on the development and performance of specific tasks and skills, while the proper focus of education is the human intellect, involving generalized and abstract information that may not necessarily be tied to specific tasks.

The goal of training is to prepare a leader or an organization to execute defined tasks and includes repetition to improve the physical performance of an individual or an organization to accomplish a specific mission. Education seeks to stimulate human intellect and inquiry to address the conceptual and abstract, and seek the “why” and “what if” of complex phenomena and issues. In other words, education teaches how to think and what the questions are, while training teaches what to think and what the answer ought to be.

At the Industrial College of the Armed Forces we educate. We prepare leaders in terms of how to think about major, complex national security challenges and issues and how to deal with strategic challenges, problems, and issues that may [or may not] have outright solutions.

Dr. Snyder. The 1989 Skelton Panel Report said all the Commandants and Presidents should teach so that they would understand what it takes to be a faculty member. Can you describe a typical faculty member’s day? Do you yourself teach or mentor individual students? a. Unlike civilian university professors who emphasize research, your faculty members generally do not have teaching assistants, research assistants, or set office hours. When do they have time for service, research, and writing? How much research and writing do you expect them to do outside the sabbatical windows? How is this assessed on their appraisals, military and civilian?

General Steel. Yes, I understand what it takes to be a faculty member. If I was teaching a core course, my day would start before lecture or class by going up to my seminar room and preparing the room for my seminar. I would also be checking in on my committee to see how my students are doing, and then work my way to lecture. During the lecture’s question and answer period, I would record my observations of those students who belong to me and their performance in the question and answers on my lecture. Following lecture, I would lead my seminar in discussion and debate about the topic. This would take me through lunch. In the afternoon, I would either finish preparing for my elective and conduct my elective, or I would be recording
observations about seminar performance, preparing for the next day’s activities, and/or counseling/mentoring students. In addition, I very well might be working on projects relative to my additional duties, which could include coaching a sport, serving as faculty advisor to an international fellow or American student, serving as faculty advisor to a student committee, or serving as an NWC faculty representative to a National Defense University (NDU) committee working on a university project, such as the NDU Academic Plan. I could also be conducting research or outreach. I do not teach. I do attend every lecture and I sit in seminars to observe both faculty and student performance. I do this routinely when not participating in NDU-directed activities. For example, I participate in all the international fellows’ academic trips as a mentor for them. Yes, I do mentor individual students.

The primary mission of the National War College is to teach our students. That has been and still is my number one priority. When our faculty members are teaching, a normal teaching load would be two core courses and two electives, one each in the fall and the spring. That would mean approximately 88 contact hours with students, not counting a significant amount of classroom preparation, normal duties such as advising and counseling students, serving as a faculty mentor on a student committee (i.e. Morale and Welfare Committee), or accomplishing another duty required to keep the College running. All those expectations take significant amounts of faculty time and effort. Even so, our faculty are still able to achieve impressive levels of professional development, scholarship and outreach. As an example, a partial list of the accomplishments of one of our faculty members during this past year includes:

- Advising the NDU President on issues concerning NDU relations with other national defense colleges in his area of expertise.
- Participated in visit to NDU of an international CAPSTONE course.
- Participated in preparations and conduct of a sophisticated war game at the Air University as an area expert.
- Lectured to other NDU organization on multiple occasions.
- Participated in a think tank project to survey future maritime security issues in his area of expertise.
- Participated in National Intelligence Council project on future security scenarios in his area of expertise.
- Participated in planning an OSD war game with nations in his area of expertise.
- Chapters published in a book on an international navy (Naval War College).
- Articles published in an online journal that specializes in his area of expertise.
- Lectured/led seminars at the United States Military Academy, the Naval War College, and Georgetown University.
- Reviewed manuscripts/books for University of Indiana Press, Australia National University, and the Journal of Military History.
- Testified before a Congressional commission.
- Participated in Army War College conference on the capabilities of a regional military; CAPS–RAND Conference on the same subject.
- Chaired panel at a conference at the Naval War College.
- Numerous media interviews.

This faculty member was able to achieve this high level of professional service, research and writing while carrying a full teaching load, advising three students and fulfilling other duties to the College.

Research and writing are encouraged after faculty members perform what I refer to as my first two priorities. First and foremost, we are a teaching institution; this is our core mission and my number one priority. My second priority and central focus is directed toward mentoring and educating students and providing them honest evaluations of their performance and making that extra effort to help them succeed. Behind this emphasis, I provide faculty time for professional development, whether that is faculty engaging in research and scholarship to advance the educational mission of the College or time to produce written materials tied to their research and field of expertise. My overall expectations are that each faculty member remains current and relevant in each of their disciplines.

Each faculty member is evaluated annually based on their contributions to the College, including their professional development. My department chairs under the leadership of the Dean of Faculty lead, guide and supervise the development of their department faculty. Based upon their observations and mentoring, they specifically
address these areas in the faculty annual evaluation report. It can be captured in many ways, from the writing of a core course syllabus, to publication of articles and books, to issuing papers requested from outside the College.

Admiral HALL. The 'typical' day for a faculty member is varied and diverse. The many activities a faculty member may be involved with on any given day include the following:

• Preparing to teach a class session that day.
• Teaching a core course lesson, program lesson (e.g., Regional Security Study, Exercise Program, or Industry Study), or elective course.
• Attending lectures or lunchtime "brown bag" guest speaker presentations.
• Meeting/mentoring with students (after class, with students assigned to that faculty member as advisees for the academic year, and/or with students conducting research in an area related to the faculty member's expertise).
• Attending student functions (student presentations on countries or agencies, intramural sporting events, promotions, award ceremonies, socials, etc.).
• Attending teaching team, department, college committee or faculty meetings.
• Researching/preparing for subsequent class sessions (in core course areas, program areas, or elective courses).
• Participating in the Industry Studies program (seminar and field studies sessions take place during January-May of each year) which involves both preparatory work and the execution of the program throughout the year. Because of the extensive number of industry contacts and visits that must be arranged, updating the course content continues throughout the entire year.
• Performing outreach activities (consultations with DOD or other executive branch departments and agencies, guest lecturing, attendance and/or participation in think tank or department/agency symposia, panel discussions, or forums).
• Conducting long term faculty research.

Additional information:
• Most faculty members have 2–3 core course lessons to teach each week. Many of the faculty teach at least one elective each semester.
• Student functions, guest lectures, teaching team, department, and college meetings do not occur each day, but some combination of most of these activities occur on a weekly basis.
• Outreach activities usually take place on days when faculty members are not teaching, but not always.
• Discretionary activities typically is used for teaching preparation (reviewing readings assigned to students, supplemental faculty preparation readings, briefing slides, lecture notes, preparing handouts, identifying and coping any additional supporting materials).

As indicated above, faculty must use whatever discretionary time is available to conduct research. The imperative for the ICAF curriculum to be up-to-date and relevant for the high level professionals who constitute our student population requires everyone in the faculty to maintain currency on vital operational and strategic policy concerns of the country's leadership in national security affairs. As such, faculty members constantly conduct research into contemporary developments and policy issues during their discretionary time.

All faculty members are required to conduct research throughout the academic year in order to keep the curriculum up-to-date and relevant. Writing related to research is conducted by all faculty members in the preparation of faculty teaching packets. Departments prepare a unique faculty teaching packet for each lesson taught during the academic year to ensure students in every seminar are exposed to the same concepts and material (checked against OPMEP requirements), regardless of the faculty member teaching the lesson. These departmental teaching packets are written by the faculty in each department, and are updated annually—requiring faculty to conduct research to ensure relevance and timeliness related to contemporary national security issues.

Many faculty members also seek to conduct more traditional academic research (books, journal articles, monographs, etc.) and ICAF has sustained a respectable publication record every year. In some cases, faculty with specific research projects or book/journal articles in development are given partial relief from teaching duties to give them additional time to work on completing their manuscript. ICAF also
gives an annual research award to faculty member(s) with notable research accomplishments during an academic year.

Department Chairs at ICAF monitor their faculty to ensure that they meet the college’s expectations for research throughout the academic year. On all Title X performance reports and annual evaluations, research is specified as a requirement in support of curriculum development and preparation of teaching packets. Evaluations of our military faculty members are documented on their individual services’ performance evaluation forms and are therefore oriented toward staff and command capabilities and do not specifically provide for evaluation of research activities. Narrative statements in the performance reports may mention significant research activities and publications as they relate to the mission accomplishment.

As the Commandant, I frequently sit in on seminar class sessions and contribute to the seminar discussions with my career, joint, and interagency experience, and prompt students to consider a more strategic level of evaluation of issues under discussion. My practice of visiting the seminars, rather than teaching a particular course, allows me to monitor the currency and quality of the academic content, the quality of teaching, and ensure students are being taught subject content at the appropriate level related to strategic national security affairs.

I conduct an open-door policy at all times with regard to students, faculty, and staff at ICAF. I regularly mentor individual students through follow-up discussions resulting from my visits to seminar rooms. I also seek out and engage students at ICAF and NDU academic and social events, and these opportunities often result in one-on-one discussions with students about their ICAF experience, career aspirations, or even family issues. In particular, I emphasize interaction and mentoring with the International Fellows. I believe it is critical that the International Fellows have access to senior leaders to discuss American culture, strategic thought, interests, and values, and that they undergo a positive learning and living experience during their year at ICAF.

Dr. SNYDER. Does having a master’s degree program at these schools detract from the PME mission, not from the standpoint of it being easy to accredit existing programs, but that it may tip the focus toward the academic instead of professional education?

General STEEL. Civilian graduate education and professional military education serve different purposes and therefore are underpinned by different educational dynamics. The danger with having a master’s program is the possibility of becoming seduced by the dynamics of civilian graduate education to the detriment of the PME mission. Examples would be: defining the purpose of the school as a graduate research institution rather than a teaching college; gauging faculty quality by their research and publication rather than their subject matter expertise and teaching prowess; and adopting civilian student assessment practices rather than developing a student assessment process tailored to the distinct characteristics of your student body and mission. NDU is particularly susceptible to this possibility due to the wide variety of missions its numerous components have and the natural bureaucratic tendencies to make everyone in the University look the same. Some NWC students benefit professionally from the opportunity to earn a master’s degree as part of their PME experience at the NWC and as long as a master’s program is important to the Chairman, the College will continue to have a master’s program. However, having a master’s program does not add anything to the ability to accomplish the PME mission. The National War College’s experience has been that having a master’s program has neither increased academic rigor, nor sharpened the relevance of the curriculum, nor improved the effectiveness of student and program assessment. The Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) has and continues to ensure academic rigor, a sharp and relevant curriculum and effective student and program assessments. A separate NWC Board of Visitors that could provide effective oversight of these two different and potentially opposing educational dynamics might be very beneficial in ensuring the accomplishment of the College’s PME mission.

Admiral HALL. Having a master’s degree program (and the accompanying accreditation process) does not detract from the PME mission. ICAF is first and foremost a JPME institution and everything done at the college flows from that mission. We find that academic standards reinforce the quality of the college’s execution of the JPME mission. Academic standards also reinforce the credibility of the academic aspects of the curriculum with regard to quality, rigor, and professional conduct by faculty.

Dr. SNYDER. Do all of your students receive master’s degrees—why or why not? What does top quality in uniformed faculty mean to you? Please be specific, is it more important to have an advanced degree in specific areas like international relations, political science, a regional study, or military or political history than it is to have a PhD in any subject even if that was in math or engineering?
General STEEL. Not all the students receive master's degrees. Students must complete all the academic requirements in order to qualify for the degree. This past year we had a very capable American student who missed an inordinate amount of class time due to an illness and he was incapable of completing the academic requirements. He was dropped from the course. Another example was a student who was pulled out of the course for a real world critical requirement and subsequently did not qualify for completion of the degree. We have a number of international fellows who do not meet the prerequisites for the master's or are incapable of passing the requirements to an acceptable level. These are all examples of students that do not receive a master's degree. We do, however, have a robust remediation program to provide every opportunity for a student to achieve success and complete the degree program.

When considering a Service's nomination for a faculty position at the National War College we look for the following in their file.

Minimum Requirements:
- Grade 06
- Command at the 05 level
- Senior Service College graduate
- Master's degree
- Completed JPME II
- Staff experience at the 3–Star level or higher

Enhanced Qualifications
- Joint Qualified
- Joint/Combined staff experience
- Operational experience OIF/OEF
- Previous teaching experience at undergraduate or graduate level
- Ph.D.

Our policy is that all full-time civilian faculty we recruit and hire under Title 10 authority must have Ph.D.s. Given that, it is essential that their degrees be in a discipline relevant to national security strategy since those individuals form the backbone of our faculty's academic expertise.

Admiral HALL. Nearly all ICAF students receive a master's degree. Often, one or two International Fellows receive a “diploma” rather than a master's degree. International Fellows sometimes elect not to seek a master's degree for personal reasons (including because they already possess a PhD) or are not eligible to receive a master's degree because they do not possess a bachelor's degree or equivalent educational experience. NDU uses a private company also used by other area universities to determine whether educational experience constitutes the equivalence of a bachelor's degree. The rare U.S. student who has only received a diploma usually lacks a bachelor's degree (an extremely rare occurrence) or fails to complete some portion of the academic program due to illness or other circumstances.

Diploma students (international or U.S.) participate in all regular educational experiences at ICAF, but are permitted to submit outlines in lieu of written papers for writing assignments.

Top quality in uniformed faculty means a senior JPME school graduate, broad operational and joint experience (ideally, at the strategic level) that supports the subject areas of the curriculum, adult education teaching experience (whenever possible), and someone with a desire to enhance the quality of the curriculum and education of the students.

ICAF prefers to have military faculty members (or executive branch department faculty) with an advanced degree (masters or PhD) in a subject area related to the substantive areas of the curriculum. In some cases, sufficient operational and joint experience (particularly at the strategic level) can sufficiently compensate for lack of a relevant advanced degree. On the other hand, faculty who lack both substantive experience and a relevant advanced degree (e.g., possess an engineering or math degree) typically experience difficulties in learning and effectively teaching course content, and establishing credibility with the students.

Dr. SNYDER. What does “top quality” mean for civilian faculty? Please be specific.

a. Does not having tenure affect how professors treat “academic freedom”?

General STEEL. Title 10, civilian faculty at the National War College are chosen with great care. Based on the needs of the College, the Commandant promulgates specific position announcements that initiate the faculty selection process. These announcements are put out nationwide through USA JOBS, the OPM website, and advertised in journals and other periodicals frequented by academics. The Com-
mandant develops highly qualifying criteria for selection and these criteria are used in selection committee deliberations and in final selections. The Commandant gives guidance to the selection committee chairman, receives progress reports from him, and out-briefs him when the full committee is prepared to make its recommendations. In one recent selection, which had 175 applicants, these were the actual highly qualifying criteria used:

- Substantial academic or professional background in political science, history, strategic studies or related fields to allow teaching across a broad range of subjects in the core and elective curriculum.
- Demonstrated teaching experience, either full or part time, at the university and preferably graduate level.
- Demonstrate willingness and ability to accept major administrative responsibilities in an academic or other setting; willingness to participate in the governance and curriculum development of the National War College.
- Practical experience in policy, legal, intelligence or military areas related to the development and implementation of national security strategy and policy.
- Substantial knowledge of, demonstrated scholarly achievement in, and/or policy experience with one or more of the following subjects related to the broad focus of strategic studies: Africa, China, Russia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, counterinsurgency, the changing character and conduct of war, and security assistance, stability, post-conflict, and peacekeeping operations.

Based on their review of the materials submitted by the applicants, the committee develops a list of fully qualified applicants and from them, a short list of best qualified applicant-interviewees, holding closely to the highly qualifying criteria throughout their work. After a detailed committee interview that includes a “job talk” and a discussion on teaching strategy for a particular curricular topic, the committee makes its recommendations to the Commandant, who in turn, makes his recommendations to the President of National Defense University, who ultimately decides on every hire.

This intense process has produced a first-rate teaching faculty with a very high professional standing. With two lawyers who hold juris doctorates on staff, the remaining 22 Title 10 faculty of the National War College is composed of professionals with doctoral degrees. Additionally, the Title 10 faculty boasts retired military and foreign service officers, a former deputy under secretary of defense, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense, and a former National Intelligence Officer for Europe. This complements nicely the great expertise of our rotating Department of Defense, State Department and other agency faculty.

Not having tenure does not affect how the National War College treats academic freedom. The Officer Professional Military Education Policy of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, directs the President, National Defense University, to establish a climate of academic freedom within the university that fosters and properly encourages thorough and lively academic debate and examination of national security issues. NDU's commitment to academic freedom is published in NWC faculty and student handbooks, as well as NDU Regulation 360–1. University leaders and College faculty continually review these polices, ensuring academic freedom is protected and thrives in and out of the seminar room.

Admiral HALL. ICAF seeks “top quality” civilian faculty members with the following attributes:

- Commitment to the ICAF mission.
- Ability to teach effectively as a subject matter expert in an adult education setting.
- Broad, relevant operational and joint or interagency substantive experience, preferably at the strategic level.
- A substantial understanding of strategy and strategic national security matters.
- A substantial understanding of joint logistics or knowledge related to the resource component of national security.
- An ability to work in a joint, interagency, multi-disciplinary setting and contribute to the synthesis of the various components into an integrated curriculum and educational experience. Understands how his/her course is integrated into the overall ICAF curriculum and can teach effectively in support of an integrated curriculum.
- Actively supports policies promoting organizational effectiveness in executing the ICAF educational mission (e.g., high quality grading of student papers and student classroom contributions; meets deadlines for returning student papers,
submitting grades, and completing student performance reports; respects students and is active and available as intellectual guide and counselor, etc.).

• Actively conducts research on strategy, strategic national security affairs, and the resource component of national security in support of the ICAF mission, continuous curriculum development, and faculty development.

• Practices intellectual honesty and exercises critical self-discipline and judgment in using, extending, and transmitting knowledge in support of the ICAF mission.

Not in my opinion. The American Association of University Professors 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure (with 1970 Interpretive Comments) clearly states that faculty members “are entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of results,” but it also states that faculty members have “special obligations.” One of those special obligations is that they “should exercise appropriate restraint.” ICAF faculty members understand that they are U.S. government officials and are expected to behave responsibly with regard to their stated or written opinions. ICAF faculty have full freedom to make public statements and publish articles which may be critical of U.S. policy, but they also recognize that as NDU faculty members they must do so in a responsible way, one that does not undermine U.S. policy. Any U.S. policy may be analyzed in terms of its strengths and weaknesses, and constructive criticism may be usefully applied to any policy debate.

I believe that having tenure would have no impact on the practice of academic freedom at ICAF. The obligation for responsible research, statements, and publications as government officials applies whether faculty have tenure or not.

Finally, a policy of tenure would interfere with the ability of the Commandant to effectively execute the mission of the college. In order to maintain the quality and currency of the curriculum in support of evolving national security and resource challenges, the Commandant must be able to bring in new faculty with recent policy or operational/strategic experience, or more in-depth areas of expertise when needed to maintain the high quality of the curriculum and the faculty.

Dr. Snyder. Since you don’t have tenure, what is the process for renewal and non-renewal of the civilian faculty? How transparent is the system? Do professors know six months before they are up for renewal whether they will be renewed, for how long, and why? In a tenure system people think the faculty members have all the power, in a no-tenure system it appears that the school has unlimited power. How do you avoid the extremes and appearances of arbitrariness? How many of your civilian faculty don’t have PhDs or JDs? Be specific about what degrees they do have and why they were hired.

General Steel. The National War College follows the policies and procedures for renewal and non-renewal as outlined in NDU Regulation 690–4, Personnel-Civilian Employment Under 10 USC § 1595, dated 4 August 2005.

The NDU regulation covering renewal and non-renewal are available for any faculty member to review. Written and verbal communication with the faculty member being considered for either renewal or non-renewal adheres to appropriate privacy act policies.

The National War College follows the requirements for renewal which are very clear in the NDU regulation. Below is an excerpt from Appendix C, paragraph 7 of NDU Regulation 690–4:

“At least twelve months prior to the expiration of a Title 10 employee’s current term of employment, the Academic Dean/Dean/Director must consider the question of renewal using such internal procedures as are deemed fair and reasonable. At least ten months prior to the expiration of term, the Commandant/Director will forward the renewal packet through proper channels at NDU. Employees should receive final official notification at least eight months before their current employment term ends.

If the Academic Dean/Dean/Director/Vice President determines that he/she will not recommend renewal, he/she should forward the recommendation through the commandant/Director to the NDU–P for the final decision at least 6 months in advance of the expiration of the current term when possible. Once a final decision is made by the NDU–P, the Title 10 employee should be notified in writing. No faculty member is entitled to renewal, and non-renewal at the expiration of an employment term is not an involuntary termination of employment.

If the Commandant/Director decides that he/she should renew the employee’s term of employment and the Title 10 employee agrees, the Commandant/Director will request approval for the renewal and provide the NDU staff and NDU–P with the following information:

• Basis for the proposed renewal.
Peer Review Process

Each college/component will establish a peer review process for faculty renewal requests. Each college/component will be afforded wide latitude in developing a relevant and rigorous process and will forward annually to HRD each July its methodology. NDU general guidance is that the process should include a panel of peers. The panel will consist of an odd number (minimum of 3) of qualified faculty members to evaluate the renewal request and validate the academic title recommendation. The packet going forward through channels to the NDU–P will include the panel recommendation along with the Commandant’s/College Director’s independent recommendation and a Provost/AA recommendation. If the Provost/AA recommendation is different than the Commandant/Director’s, the Commandant/Director will be notified prior to forwarding to NDU–P for signature. The general guidance is that the peer review panels should review the candidate’s career record and strictly apply academic title rigor including but not limited to academic degree credentials, teaching experience, professional experience, and scholarship.

- The employee’s performance appraisals for the current term of employment.
- Length of the proposed renewal term.
- The employee’s current pay and benefit costs.
- Proposed academic title and pay level with justification for renewal at a higher or lower title or pay level, based on the component peer review 

If the NDU–P approves renewal, HRD will notify the organization of the approval and process the renewal 30 days prior to the effective date.

Extremes and appearances of arbitrariness are avoided by adhering to the procedures as outlined in NDU Regulation 690–4. NDU Regulation 690–4 includes a section concerning employee grievances. The DOD Administrative Grievance System (AGS) DoD 1400.25–M applies to Title 10 employees at the National Defense University.

All of the Title 10 faculty members currently serving on the faculty of the National War College have either a Ph.D. or a JD.

Admiral Hall. ICAF’s policies regarding Title 10 faculty operates under the following applicable regulation: 10 USC 1595; Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 23 April 1990, “Delegation of Title 10 Authority”, AR 690–4, NDU Title 10, and NDU Regulation 690–4, revised 4 August 2005. Under this regulation, newly hired faculty members have a one-year probationary contract. Subsequently, faculty members are normally renewed for one to three years, with three years being the most common term of renewal. ICAF department chairs make recommendations to me through the Dean of Faculty and Academic Programs with regard to contract renewals one year prior to the expiration of the current contract. If the ICAF leadership decides not to renew a faculty member because of performance issues or need to hire faculty with different areas of expertise or more recent policy experience, the college’s policy states that faculty member is notified one year prior to the expiration of the contract; NDU policy requires 6 months “if practicable,” but no less than 60 days. NDU Title 10 policy states that “No faculty member is entitled to renewal, and non-renewal at the expiration of an employment term is not an involuntary termination of employment.” It is the policy of the current ICAF leadership to discuss with faculty members why their contract is not being renewed. The criteria mentioned in the previous question related to the characteristics of a “top quality” faculty member also are used in evaluating faculty for contract renewal decisions. Additional criteria would include expertise and currency with evolving national security issues, effectiveness as an instructor, contributions to college programs, adherence to ICAF and NDU administrative procedures and requirements, and ability to work effectively with other faculty and staff.

NDU’s current 690–4 Title 10 policy and ICAF policies for implementation are contained in the ICAF Faculty Handbook (last updated in 2008) which is distributed to all ICAF faculty. Discussions with faculty members about reasons for renewal or non-renewal of contracts are considered personnel issues and are treated confidentially.

As stated above, ICAF notifies faculty members as to whether or not they will be renewed 12 months prior to the expiration of their contract. Faculty members who will be renewed are made aware of the renewal period being recommended to the Commandant. Faculty who are not being renewed are notified 12 months prior to the expiration of their contract to provide adequate time for seeking alternate employment if that is desired.

As the Commandant, I am responsible to the CJCS for the adherence to the OPMEP and the proper execution of the college’s mission in support of the nation’s security. Faculty members accept employment at ICAF understanding that the composition of the faculty must be aligned with the needs of the nation and college’s mission. Nevertheless, faculty at the college exercise considerable power in the col-
lege with regard to interpreting its mission and determining how it is executed. I rely upon my faculty (many of whom have been at the college for many years) to advise me and the Dean of Faculty and Academic Programs about curriculum, and the fairness of NDU and ICAF personnel policies and regulations. Curriculum development, reviews, and revisions all take place through the faculty within the academic departments and are annually briefed to me for my review and approval.

ICAF also has had in place for many years a “Faculty Committee.” This Faculty Committee is elected by the entire faculty (excluding any with positions involving annual Title 10 performance evaluations such as department chairs, deputy chairs, and Deans) annually. Candidates are nominated by the entire faculty (excluding those mentioned above) and elected by secret ballot. Faculty Committee members serve for two to three years. The Faculty Committee functions as a sounding board for the Commandant and Deans with regard to policy matters and any issue that may affect faculty members—including personnel policies and regulations. The committee often is called upon to draft policy recommendations on issues that affect the faculty and to review policy changes being proposed by NDU. Likewise, the committee also provides a conduit for any faculty member to raise issues or concerns with the ICAF leadership without revealing their identity if that is their wish.

I believe that regular dialogue with the faculty through a variety of mechanisms helps to ensure that both faculty and I thoroughly discuss policy and curriculum issues of importance to the college and its mission. I meet several times each week with my Deans and Chief of Staff, Associate Deans, International Affairs Advisor, and Director of Institutional Research as my primary advisory staff. I have held a series of lunches with small groups of 5–6 faculty members to ensure that I know each faculty member personally and to provide a more intimate setting in which they can discuss with me any issues of concern to them.

ICAF also holds regular faculty meetings throughout the academic year in which faculty are encouraged to raise issues of concern to them to the Faculty Committee. ICAF also has an Academic Policy and Curriculum Committee composed of all department chairs, program directors, and the chair of the Faculty Committee which review and advise me on potential major changes to policies or the curriculum.

ICAF also conducts an annual off-site or on-site meeting to promote in-depth discussions among the faculty about curriculum issues. A recent faculty off-site constituted working groups covering the following topics:

- Facilitating quality student evaluations and writing feedback.
- ICAF Continuing Education: Effective Teaching.
- Industry Studies Program relationship with Micro-economics and Economics of Industry.
- Preparing Students for Policy Planning and Policy Making.
- Strategies for implementing improvements and change at ICAF.
- The role of Regional Security Studies in the ICAF curriculum.
- The role of exercises in the ICAF curriculum.

Four of ICAF’s 45 Title 10 faculty members do not possess Ph.Ds. Information on their backgrounds, degrees and position at ICAF is listed below.

1. The first faculty member is a long time part-time instructor in the Military Strategy and Logistics Department. He is a retired USA Colonel and former U.S. Senate staffer hired in 1995 for his experience in military strategy, Latin America, and DOD-Congressional relations. He holds an MS in Public Administration from Shippensburg University.

2. The second faculty member is a former USAF pilot whose civilian career included serving as the lead aircraft procurement appropriation analyst for the Secretary of the Navy Comptroller and manager of the FAA’s capital budget division, among other acquisition and budget positions. Hired at ICAF as a professor in the Acquisition Department, he has served as the Course Director for the Acquisition Core Course, faculty leader of the Aircraft Industry Study, and is currently the Director of ICAF’s Industry Studies Program. He was hired because of his acquisition expertise and knowledge of the aircraft industry sector. He holds a Master of Public Administration degree from The George Washington University and a Master of Science degree in National Resource Management from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. He is currently completing his dissertation toward a PhD in Public Administration and Public Policy.

3. The third faculty member is a retired USN Supply Corps Captain. She was hired to teach military strategy and logistics, and acquisition because of her military experience and educational credentials. She is a distinguished graduate of the Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania, earning a Master of Busi-
ness Administration degree as well as being a graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and the Senior Executive Program at the Kellogg School of Business, Northwestern University. She is currently completing her dissertation toward a PhD in Public Administration and Public Policy.

4. The fourth faculty member is a retired Canadian Forces Colonel and a naturalized U.S. citizen. He is the former Comptroller of the Army for Canadian Forces and has extensive experience in strategic financial planning. He was hired as a professor in the Economics Department, as an Industry Studies Program faculty member, and to add additional non-U.S. perspectives to strategic national security affairs. He is the former Canadian Forces Chair at ICAF, and holds an M.A. in Public Administration from The George Washington University, an ICAF diploma (pre-accredited M.A. period), and currently is completing his dissertation for a Ph.D. in Public Administration and Public Policy.

Dr. SNYDER. Some of you have indicated that you wish to hire “younger” PhDs. Do you think they may need a bit of seasoning or practical experience to be able to hold their own with the caliber and seniority of students you have? Does it mean you have to push out “older professors” who may be performing well in order to bring on younger ones?

General STEEL. Youth is not criteria of evaluation when hiring a new Title 10 faculty member. In our last Title 10 hiring effort, I gave the following guidance to the search committee chair.

“The candidates should be judged against the following criteria:

• Substantial academic or professional background in political science, history, strategic studies, economics, sociology, anthropology or related fields to allow teaching across a broad range of subjects in the core and elective curriculum.
• Extensive full-time professional teaching experience at the university level and preferably graduate level, particularly in a seminar environment.
• Demonstrates willingness and ability to accept major administrative responsibilities in an academic or other environment to include directing core and elective course; willingness to participate in the governance and curriculum development of the National War College.
• Practical experience in policy, legal, intelligence, or military areas related to the development and implementation of national security strategy and policy.
• Substantial knowledge of, demonstrated scholarly achievement in, and or policy experience with on or more of the following specific subjects related to the broad focus of strategic studies; Africa, China, Russia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, counterinsurgency, the changing character and conduct of war, and security assistance, stability, post conflict and peacekeeping operations.”

The National War College does not pursue “younger” professors and hence does not deliberately look to push out “older professors.”

Admiral HALL. The answer to this question depends upon what is meant by “younger” faculty or PhDs. ICAF believes that hiring faculty in their twenties or early thirties is problematic. I strongly believe that the faculty at ICAF needs “seasoning or practical experience” to hold their own with the students. ICAF subscribes to this judgment for two reasons. First, the mission of ICAF is to educate senior military officers and government officials about strategy, strategic national security affairs, and the resource component of national security. ICAF’s experience is that in order to teach about these topics, faculty must have had applied experience in these areas. A student population of professionals who average approximately twenty years of professional experience expects to be educated by a faculty who also has considerable experience with the national security matters they are teaching. Faculty who cannot speak from experience about joint, interagency, and national security issues lack credibility in the classroom.

Second, ICAF’s experience (and related academic research on stratified leadership) indicates that years of experience, knowledge, and personal maturity are required before one can conceptualize at the strategic level. Both this research and ICAF’s experience argue for hiring mature individuals with sufficient experience and maturity.

“Pushing out” older professors may be necessary in at least two circumstances. First, the normal progression of aging affects the capabilities of individuals at different rates and in different ways. Aging may affect an individual’s ability to maintain a full activity load, fully understand changing events and dynamics, or new concepts and ways of thinking. An objective assessment of diminishing capacity should be considered legitimate grounds for non-renewal of a contract.

Second, faculty must work hard to maintain currency in national security affairs, policy issues, interagency dynamics, and bureaucratic processes. ICAF currently has
numerous faculty whose experience as executive branch officials or military officers date back to the Cold War. Many have sustained active outreach and consultative programs to keep themselves up to date (and develop new areas of expertise) in the post-9/11 national security environment. However, it is incumbent upon ICAF to regularly refresh its continuing Title 10 faculty with individuals who possess more recent operational, joint, interagency, and policy experience in order to ensure currency in the curriculum and credibility with the students.

Dr. SNYDER. National and ICAF have 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 faculty and student mixes while the Service schools have a 60% host and 40% other mix. Are the faculty and student mixes dictated for the various institutions still appropriate? If so, was it appropriate for Congress to allow the Service senior schools to award JPME II credit (NDAA FY 2005) despite their lower proportions, non-neutral ground, and lack of a requirement to send any graduates to joint assignments? ICAF and National must send “50% plus one” graduates to joint assignments. Is this still appropriate? Should Service schools have some kind of requirement?

General STEEL. 1) A critical component of joint education is acculturation—ensuring officers from the various Services understand the professional cultures and warfare perspectives of their sister Services, have trust and confidence in the professional expertise and integrity of officers from the other Services, and are able to work effectively in a fully joint organization where each Service is represented with essentially equal weight. Acculturation cannot be taught well in a classroom; it must be experienced. Students must live and work in a fully joint environment where all the Services have approximately equal representation, and their debates over the best ways to orchestrate all the capabilities of the various Services must take place on neutral ground where no Service has an institutional advantage (such as at a Service college). Thus the 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 Service mix for military students and faculty is absolutely appropriate for the joint schools, which exist solely to provide a cadre of officers with special expertise in joint operations, and therefore they should aim to provide the highest quality joint education possible.

2) Service Colleges, on the other hand, exist first and foremost to provide a cadre of officers with special expertise in Service operations, and thus the military student and faculty mixes at those schools should favor representation from the host Service. Since joint expertise and perspective constitutes a critical secondary goal for Service schools, however, non-host Service students and faculty should be included in the mix to the maximum extent possible that their numbers can be supported by the non-host Services and their numbers will not degrade the focus on host Service expertise that must remain the principal purpose of each Service College. From that perspective, the 60/40 mix seems reasonable.

No, not if the aim is to provide the highest quality joint education possible before allowing an officer to earn designation as a joint specialist. As discussed above, acculturation is critical to high-quality joint education, and substantive acculturation can only be accomplished on neutral ground with equal representation of all the Services in both the military student body and the military faculty.

Since the sole purpose of joint education is to prepare officers for work in joint organizations, it only makes sense to send the bulk of their graduates to joint assignments once they have graduated from a joint educational school. If Service schools are going to continue to be allowed to award JPME II credit to their graduates (i.e., if they are going to be seen as preparing officers satisfactorily for work in joint organizations), then it would seem only reasonable that a significant proportion of their graduates also be designated for joint assignments. A possible danger of only ICAF and National sending the bulk of their graduates to joint organizations is officers viewing attendance at ICAF and National as detrimental to their careers due to more restrictive assignment opportunities after graduation.

Whether it was appropriate for the Service senior schools to award JPME II credit is dependent upon the criteria that the CJCS and the Congress believe is sufficient to constitute a Joint Qualified Officer.
Because of the emphasis on joint and interagency education at ICAF (and NWC), it is appropriate for a large percentage of their graduates to be sent to joint assignments. ICAF believes that the 50%+1 rule further promotes the objectives of Goldwater-Nichols and ensures greater jointness throughout DOD. Service school requirements should be based upon CJCS, Service, and Congressional determination of needs, bearing in mind that such a requirement would further promote jointness throughout DOD.

Dr. Snyder. What constitutes rigor in your educational program? Does rigor require letter grades? Does rigor require written exams? Does rigor require the writing of research or analytical papers, and if so, of what length? Does rigor require increased contact time and less “white space” or vice versa?

General Steel. The National War College recognizes that academic rigor is a process, not an end state. Every aspect of the educational experience contributes to the level of academic rigor present in our program and only ongoing program assessment ensures that rigor is sustained.

In our assessment process, we have identified three primary indicators of academic rigor.

1) A challenging, dynamic curriculum.

The College has established a curriculum review and renewal process to ensure continued relevance and currency in support of our college mission. Program and course objectives, which directly support the mission, are written at the higher levels of cognitive engagement to support a curriculum that challenges NWC students to apply, analyze and synthesize their learning. Feedback from multiple sources—students, faculty, graduates, and senior leaders—is a critical component of our continuous improvement process. The internal curriculum coordinating committee reviews all feedback and provides a venue for the discussion of curriculum changes. Finally, periodic self studies for the Program for the Accreditation of Joint Education and Middle States Commission are welcomed as a means of self-reflection and peer feedback.

2) Students and faculty actively engaged in the learning process.

The seminar forms the foundation of student learning at the National War College. A commitment to maintaining small seminar size, 13 students for core instruction, ensures that active learning prevails. This small size and multiple resectionings allow each student to be constantly challenged by a diversity of ideas and perspectives. For approximately 70% of the time, NWC students interact with their peers and faculty in critical thinking and creative problem solving activities such as analysis of case studies and exercises. While the remaining time is primarily devoted to lectures and panels, these are not purely passive activities; students engage with and frequently challenge the complex ideas presented in follow-on question and answer sessions and seminar discussions. Because our experienced and diverse faculty are key participants in this dynamic learning environment, maintaining faculty excellence is a priority. To enhance an already robust program of new faculty orientation, faculty seminar leader qualification criteria were adopted in AY 2009. Seminar leader excellence is further bolstered by numerous faculty workshops and opportunities for faculty improvement based on peer and leadership observations and feedback.

3) High standards and expectations for all participants.

The National War College students are evaluated against high standards that are clearly defined and consistently applied by teaching faculty. These standards are widely promulgated in the student handbook and NWC Standard Operating Procedures and faculty ratings are monitored to ensure consistent application. In addition to ongoing feedback in the seminar environment, students receive a minimum of 13 formal evaluations during the academic year which provide them an accurate picture of their achievement level and identify areas for improvement. A student who fails to meet the standards is involved in an individually tailored remedial process. Like many professional schools, the National War College maintains a high level of rigor without the use of A–F letter grades. Instead, we assign final course grades of “Pass” or “Fail” to certify that students have met—or failed to meet—our high college standards. Our continued use of pass/fail grades is based on the decision, validated over time, that this system maximizes learning for our mid-career students. Clearly, the lack of competition for letter grades has not resulted in a decline in the motivation of our students. On the contrary, the requirement to engage with their highly respected peers and faculty in small, active seminars continues to motivate NWC students to achieve at the highest levels. Removing the unnecessary grading pressure that can keep learners from taking productive risks frees them, in fact challenges them, to explore new areas rather than playing to their strengths in order to earn a grade.
While students receive “Pass” or “Fail” as final course grades, it is critical that faculty consistently measure students against the performance standards and provide them with a clear picture of their performance. NWC has successfully used “Above,” “Met” or “Below” ratings to let students know how their mastery of subject matter, preparation, leadership and interaction, writing and oral presentations measure up to the National War College standards. Equally important, however, are the candid, constructive faculty comments that support these ratings. Taken together, the ratings and the narrative give students comprehensive, meaningful feedback that they can use to gauge their progress through the curriculum and to challenge themselves to sustain or improve performance.

Although we do not assign letter grades, we do have a process in place to encourage and recognize superior performance. Faculty identify the top students in each core and elective seminar and, in core seminars, the writer of the best paper. These students earn points in the NWC Distinguished Graduate program, which is designed to identify the top 10% of the class, those students who have demonstrated that they are NWC’s outstanding students of strategy based on observed performance throughout the year. Excellence in writing is also recognized in the end-of-year writing awards program.

While many institutions of higher education use written exams to hold students accountable for their learning and ensure a high level of rigor, there are other equally valid methods to challenge students and assess learning at the graduate level. Rather than written exams, NWC faculty use a variety of techniques to engage the students and provide direct assessments of their learning. With small seminars, faculty are able to assess the student’s mastery of course material on a daily basis and give immediate feedback. Within the seminar environment, exercises, oral presentations, case study analysis and written assignments that are directly related to the course objectives provide multiple opportunities for faculty to observe and document student learning. Candid feedback from both faculty and peers motivates students to excel in these dynamic sessions.

In addition to seminar-related assessments, NWC students participate in oral evaluations in both fall and spring semesters. These evaluations engage two faculty members and one student in a 45-minute colloquy in which they are asked to integrate and apply what they have learned in the core program to the analysis of specific national security issues. These sessions enable faculty to evaluate an individual student’s progress in more depth than would generally be possible in a written exam. NWC students have also reported that the oral evaluations provide an excellent opportunity for honest self-assessment. Students who fail to meet the oral evaluation standards are immediately engaged in a remedial process that is tailored specifically to their needs.

NWC students are required to demonstrate the ability to analyze complex problems, develop solutions and support those solutions with well-formed arguments. While writing analytical papers is not necessarily a requirement for rigor, it is one of the methods by which we assess our students’ ability to do this and, as a consequence, is a factor in maintaining academic rigor at NWC. The rigor is derived, however, not from the paper length, but from the level of cognitive engagement required by the assignment. The core writing assignments, of approximately 8–10 pages in length each, are developed by the seven course directors to directly support the assigned learning objectives. Students receive detailed feedback that addresses the quality of critical thinking and analysis evident in their writing as well as the clarity and logic of their arguments. On average, an NWC student writes approximately 80 pages in the core and elective courses during the academic year.

The National War College also offers options for those students who wish to engage in more in-depth research. Students who are accepted into the Research Fellow Program (usually 3 to 5 per class) receive faculty mentoring and time to pursue year-long research. Others can request the opportunity to combine papers for two core courses or a core course and elective to facilitate a longer paper; in AY 2009, approximately 15% of the class took advantage of this option. Finally, students can register for an advanced writing elective and, with the sponsorship of a faculty member, earn two graduate credits for a research paper in lieu of an elective course.

At the graduate level, minimizing scheduled contact time is essential so that students can read, write and reflect on the ideas presented in lectures and seminar. The National War College has established an average of 13 contact hours per week as the standard and, based on experience, this is the maximum number that should be scheduled for our academic program. It is a challenging schedule but strikes the correct balance between engaging students with peers and faculty and providing them adequate time outside of class to think critically about their learning. This is also in line with other graduate programs, which frequently require only 9 to 12 contact hours per week for fulltime study. While recognizing the importance of lim-
The process is followed at the close of both fall and spring elective courses. At the faculty and students via the "Assessment" site on the NWC Intranet. A similar report is provided to leadership for use in curriculum review and revision and is made available to faculty and students via the "Assessment" site on the NWC Intranet. A similar report is provided to leadership for use in curriculum review and revision and is made available to faculty and students via the "Assessment" site on the NWC Intranet.

ICAF strongly believes that rigor does require the writing of research or analytical papers in order to be able to assess the quality of student thinking, whether they understand the conceptual material of the ICAF curriculum, whether they are able to devise and implement strategies, and whether they understand and can evaluate the strategic level of national security affairs. ICAF strongly believes that if a student cannot write his or her thoughts coherently on paper, then the student does not have a coherent understanding of the concepts being assessed. The same kind of assessment may be achieved through written essay questions, but ICAF prefers 5 to 7 page papers of analysis, conceptualization, and argument in order to evaluate whether students can produce complex, multi-issue papers that are coherent, well-organized, and well-argued. ICAF believes that 5 to 7 page papers test research, analysis, conceptualization, and argumentation skills on a variety of topics during the week and avoid limiting students to researching, analyzing, and arguing recommendations for only a few topics in a couple of more extensive and lengthy research papers.

ICAF believes that written exams of multiple choice or short answer questions would only assess whether students remembered key concepts and facts, and not whether they could organize them into a strategy, a coherent multi-dimensional analysis, or a complex and well argued policy paper.

ICAF currently uses letter grades, but is undertaking a reassessment of the effect of a letter grading system on the educational objectives of the college. The current letter grading system at ICAF clearly lays out detailed criteria for assessing different levels of student performance and assigning grades, but such criteria also could be applied to a non-letter grade system. During the 1990s, ICAF used a grading system similar to the National War College using a "met expectations," "exceed expectations," and "failed to meet expectations" grading system. ICAF's measures to ensure rigor in its educational program have been little changed from that system to its current use of letter grades. The ICAF program then and now uses multiple assessment devices to evaluate how well students are understanding course content and progressing into a truly strategic level of conceptual understanding and evaluation. As such, we do not believe that letter grades, in and of themselves, ensure rigor. Discussions with the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools during accreditation visits indicate that the college must use clearly defined and systematically applied criteria for whatever grading system it uses, and that letter grades are not a requirement. According to Middle States, a Pass/Fail system is considered acceptable if the criteria is clearly defined and systematically applied.

ICAF believes that rigor requires an appropriate balance of contact time and white space. Because ICAF has the unique mission of evaluating national security strategy (as do all the war colleges) and critically assessing its underlying resource component, it is keenly aware of the need to balance adequate contact time with white space to read, reflect, conceptualize, and strategize. ICAF has just completed a two-year restructuring of its academic course flow. The Class of 2010 will have seven special lectures or a lecture each morning of the week, electives on Tuesday and/or Wednesday afternoons, and white space on most Monday, Thursday, and Friday afternoons. Productive use of white space requires some self-discipline by students, but I believe ICAF now provides a good balance and adequate time for reading, reflecting, conceptualizing, and strategizing.

Dr. Snyder. Can you describe how you survey students, graduates, and graduates' supervisors to assess the quality of your program?

General Steel. NWC has a robust process in place for collecting feedback from students during the academic year. At the close of each core course, one student from each seminar meets with the Core Course Director to provide a first look at student perceptions of the course. All students are then asked to complete detailed on-line surveys. Through a combination of multiple response and narrative items, students evaluate the accomplishment of course objectives, the usefulness of specific topics, readings, and lectures, and the effectiveness of seminar instruction. They are also encouraged to provide comments on any aspect of the course that has added to or distracted from their learning. Each faculty seminar leader receives an electronic report of feedback from his/her seminar, while the Course Director is given immediate access to feedback from all seminars. The Director of IR and Assessment analyzes the surveys for trends and specific strengths and weaknesses and publishes a summary report. This report, along with all of the narrative comments, is provided to leadership for use in curriculum review and revision and made available to faculty and students via the "Assessment" site on the NWC Intranet. A similar process is followed at the close of both fall and spring elective courses. At the
end of the year, students complete a final survey in which they focus on the program as a whole and its contribution to their achievement of the broader program outcomes. In AY 2009, our survey response rate was 90% or greater for each of our core courses and 95% for the end-of-year survey, giving us a very reliable picture of student opinion.

The National War College conducts biennial surveys of graduates and their supervisors. Every two years, two classes are surveyed, one in their first post-graduation assignment and one in their second assignment. In October 2009, for example, we will survey the Class of 2005 and the Class of 2008. At the same time that we send surveys to our graduates, we ask them to provide a survey to their first-line supervisor. In addition, every three years, we request feedback from our senior stakeholders on the relevance of our outcomes and on areas that they think require additional emphasis in the education of strategists. The next senior leader survey, which takes the form of a letter from our Commandant, is scheduled for spring AY 2010.

The results of these surveys have provided us with feedback to use both for curriculum validation and renewal. The graduate survey items focus primarily on student perceptions of their achievement of the NWC curriculum outcomes, the contributions of the program to their ability to work in joint, interagency and international environments; any perceived gaps in their learning, and recommendations for program improvements. As we are looking for ways in which we can continue to connect with our graduates, we also ask them what we can provide to help them stay engaged with strategic issues post-graduation. Survey results are shared widely with leadership, the curriculum committee and the faculty at large. In addition, a summary is provided to survey respondents in appreciation for their contribution to our program.

Securing graduate and supervisor feedback has become more of a challenge in recent years and response rates have declined. Graduates have informed us that, because of the demands for accountability, they receive surveys from every educational institution that they have attended, both military and civilian. As a result “survey fatigue” has been an issue. Deployments of more recent graduates have also been a factor in this decline. Despite these challenges, however, we recognize that feedback from graduates is an essential component of our curriculum evaluation process. Consequently, while we will continue with our formal surveys, we are investigating other avenues by which we can engage graduates and supervisors. In AY 2010, we plan to pilot focus groups that will enable us to investigate specific aspects of our program. We have also developed a database on all NWC graduates who are in active flag officer positions as well as current ambassadors and plan to reach out to them as another means of securing feedback on the long-term value of our program. Finally, we have been fortunate to have a very active and supportive alumni association that forwards us anecdotal feedback that they receive from graduates.

Admiral HALL. Feedback is essential to making informed decisions on change and growth as an educational institution. At the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, we continually solicit feedback from our students, graduates and graduates’ supervisors.

During the academic year, we ask our students to fill out web-based surveys at the end of each course they complete. We also ask them to complete a survey at the end of the year covering their overall academic experience. Topics of the survey include how well the faculty accomplish course objectives, the usefulness of readings, how instruction can be improved to enhance learning, and how well the student believes the overall course of study meets his/her long-term professional needs as a senior leader.

We also conduct a web-based survey with our graduates both one year and three years after they graduate. The graduates are asked a myriad of questions, to include if they think ICAF covers the right subjects, which subjects should be added to the curriculum, and what knowledge, skills and abilities they think military officers and senior government officials will need the most in the next 10–15 years.

In conjunction with our graduate surveys, we also solicit input from graduates’ supervisors. We ask supervisors if they think our graduates are prepared for senior level responsibilities, for joint and interagency and international assignments.

Dr. S NYDER. Should the OSD Chancellors office be reestablished? Why or Why not?

General S TEEL. No it should not, at least not for the PME system. The Service and joint PME schools already receive significant direct policy guidance from either their parent Service headquarters or from the NDU headquarters. Centralized coordination of the entire PME system, as well as of each individual PME school, is provided by the CJCS via CJCSI 1800.01C, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), and via the J–7 Joint Education and Doctrine Division. This centralized coordination includes a rigorous Joint Staff-managed accreditation evalu-
tion of each PME school every six years. Adding another layer of bureaucracy would be redundant and burdensome, especially when you consider that quality education, as a largely creative enterprise, flourishes best when given as much autonomy as possible within broad, general guidelines. Piling up layers or degrees of bureaucracy crimps the innovation and artistry that are at the heart of the highest quality educational programs.

Admiral HALL. The OSD Chancellors office is not necessary for the senior school JPME system. CJCS, the Director of the Joint Staff, and J–7 provide more than adequate oversight and quality control of the senior school JPME system through the OPMEP, the PAJE, the MECC, and the MECC Working Group. An OSD Chancellors office may have value for coordination and quality control over other DOD civilian education and professional development activities to ensure that appropriate standards of academic quality and cost-effectiveness are met, but it would provide only an additional bureaucratic layer and no unique contribution for senior school JPME.

Dr. SNYDER. Ethics—what should be the role of ethical education at the senior schools beyond “just war” theory?

General STEEL. Strategy that ignores the ethical dimension is inherently weaker, as history continues to teach. Our early experience in Operation Iraqi Freedom is the latest example. In developing strategic thinkers, the National War College has a dual responsibility—both to help future strategists develop their own frameworks for dealing with the ethical dilemmas they invariably will confront and, in their transition from tactical to strategic roles, to give them the tools to shape ethical behavior across organizations. If “war amongst the people” represents the future of warfare, as an influential modern theorist posits, then ethical considerations loom even larger. Toward that end, a number of didactic methods are employed. A recurring theme throughout the year in the six required core courses at the heart of the NWC curriculum is the essential role of leadership, especially in Courses One—“Introduction to Strategy,” Two—“War and Statecraft,” Three—“Diplomacy and Statecraft,” Four—“The Domestic Context and National Security Decision-Making,” and Six—“Applications in National Security Strategy.” Through case studies, lectures, readings, and seminar discussions, students are exposed to dozens of key strategic leaders throughout history and the decisions that defined their legacies—both positive and negative. Ethics is often a factor. Exercises in the core course seminars provide the students with practical challenges they are required to confront—many with ethical dilemmas. In Course Six, last year’s students conducted an exercise on “Instability, Uncertainty, and Nukes,” where an incident of nuclear terrorism within the United States was a defining event. To help familiarize students with the historic and modern context of war and ethics, three separate topics are incorporated into Course Two: Just War Theory, The Rise of ‘Lawfare’ in Modern Conflicts, and the Quranic Concept of War. Similarly, two topics which have ethics as a key sub-theme are contained in Course Four: Dissent Within Interagency Negotiations, and Civil Military Interactions. The Commandant’s Lecture Series, a required six part series that incorporates readings along with six lectures by eminent practitioners, has as its theme “Strategic Leadership and Ethics.” Finally, NWC has embraced the Executive Assessment and Development Program as an important learning tool. EADP uses feedback from previous peers and subordinates to help students—supervised individually by faculty member—to improve their leadership skills. Ethics is one of the areas specifically addressed in the feedback.

Admiral HALL. Ethics are the core of our profession. Unfortunately, some senior leaders make poor decisions in regard to personal, professional and organizational ethics. We have seen the devastating strategic effect this behavior has had on mission effectiveness and our national security. When I arrived as the Commandant, I enhanced the existing ethics program at ICAF and established ethics as an area of special emphasis to be woven throughout the curriculum, not as a separate and distinct subject of study. The faculty has successfully integrated ethics into their course lessons and lectures and prepared our graduates to include an assessment of “What is the ethical dimension we are dealing with?” as a factor in addressing personal, professional, and organizational issues. During the academic year, ICAF schedules one day in each term to discuss the subject of ethics. In the fall, we have a panel of speakers and special seminar sessions to discuss ethics in national security affairs. In the spring, we focus the panel and seminar sessions on ethics involved in government-industry relationships.

Dr. SNYDER. Should each school have a Board of Visitors or Consultants, separate from your University’s, so it could focus just on your mission?

General STEEL. From the beginning of the College in 1946, NWC had a “board of consultants” who were originally picked by Admiral Hill, our first Commandant, to assist him in the preparation of the curriculum and the selection of faculty. The
Board, over the years, included distinguished four stars and ambassadors, chiefs of service, university presidents, distinguished scholars, and foreign policy leaders, from Omar Bradley to Bernard Brodie, to the President of the University of California system to Father Ted Hesburg from Notre Dame. The Board was an active participant in the College’s program. They had periodic sessions at the College, would sit in classes, review the course work, consult with the Commandant and generally give feedback to the school on its overall operation. They also attended to the College’s needs. The Board’s work is mentioned in each of the annual reports of the College until the establishment of the National Defense University. At that time the NWC Board was terminated. I do think we need our own board of consultants or oversight board. NDU’s Board of Visitors (BOV) is focused upon the bigger NDU strategic issues and pretty much disconnected from the components' specific requirements and needs. The NDU Board of Visitors has plenty to do just regarding NDU issues, subsequently, with the large growth of NDU, the effectiveness of the NDU BOV has been diluted somewhat when it comes to the specific components. NWC needs a board of consultants who know our mission, our challenges and who have been to NWC and can support the school in the same manner it did when it was first established. This is not to suggest that the NDU BOV is not needed. I would see value in the collaborative efforts of an NDU BOV and an NWC board of consultants.

Admiral HALL. Although ICAF does not have its own Board of Visitors, we do have a significant number of distinguished visitors that are authorities in the field of national defense, academia, business, national security affairs, and the defense industry. Through these visits and our robust outreach program, the College receives a lot of advice and recommendations on the mission and curricula, similar to the inputs a Board of Visitors provides.

Dr. SNYDER. What is being done to allow students sufficient discretionary time for study and reflection, given that the PAJE study noted that it was being squeezed out by an increase in extra-curricular requirements such as attendance at university-sponsored lectures?

Admiral HALL. Since the PAJE visit NDU has adopted a system of one university sponsored lecture (now called the Distinguished Lecture Program) per week. Likewise, ICAF also sponsors only one college-wide lecture per week, called the Commandant's Lecture Series. ICAF believes that this maximum of two lectures per week by outside speakers is appropriate for exposing students to a wide range of senior government and private sector speakers who can share their perspectives on policy, national security issues, strategy, and resource issues with our student population of future strategic leaders. Students need to hear from current leaders, but should not spend too much time in passive learning situations. ICAF believes that rigor requires an appropriate balance of contact time and white space. Because ICAF has the unique mission of evaluating national security strategy (as do all the war colleges) and critically assessing its underlying resource component, it is keenly aware of the need to balance adequate contact time with white space to read, reflect, conceptualize, and strategize. ICAF has just completed a two-year restructuring of its academic course flow and the class of 2010 will have seminar sessions or lecture each Tuesday and Wednesday afternoons, and white space on most Monday, Thursday, and Friday afternoons. Productive use of white space requires some self-discipline by students, but I believe ICAF now provides a good balance and adequate time for reading, reflecting, conceptualizing, and strategizing.

Dr. SNYDER. Have the writing requirements been reviewed in response to the PAJE observation that faculty and students both considered them excessive?

Admiral HALL. ICAF continually reviews its assessment program and balances the work load on students against the need for assessment and rigor. In order to ensure the ICAF program is rigorous in its ability to properly advance student learning with regard to strategy, strategic national security affairs, and the resource component of national security, each component of the ICAF program must involve some kind of assessment mechanism. Currently, ICAF predominantly uses 2 to 3 page or 5 to 7 page papers for most of its writing requirements. ICAF uses paper assignments to assess the development of student skills in analysis, conceptualization, and argument and to determine whether students can produce complex, multi-issue papers that are coherent, well-organized, and well-argued. Moreover, ICAF believes that its paper writing program also prepares students to produce high quality, complex papers in a short period of time—something that frequently is common at senior levels in national security affairs. Rapid turn-around of issue analysis or policy recommendation papers for principals is the norm at the NSC, DOD, State Department, and within the intelligence community. ICAF has only ten months to prepare students for senior policy positions and its writing pro-
gram both assesses student thinking and skills, and prepares them for operating effectively at senior levels.

Nevertheless, as mentioned in the previous question about whether rigor requires increased contact time and less “white space” or vice versa, ICAF has just completed a two-year restructuring of its academic course flow. The better alignment of the calendar has produced increased convergence of due dates for course papers. The college is establishing a faculty study committee to review our assessment mechanisms (especially the number and length of papers and their due dates), explore alternative means for quality assessment, and make recommendations to ensure that ICAF uses high quality assessment instruments while not overloading the students with writing requirements and diminishing student white space study time.

Dr. SNYDER. The renewal of civilian faculty contracts were characterized by a lack of “timeliness.” How has this been corrected?

General STEEL. This comment was tied directly to the formal process of submission through the NDU Human Resources Directorate (HRD), the NDU Chain of Command, and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service. There was a continuous stream of significant turnover so the learning curve for those in the processing chain delayed the submissions. There has been some improvement, however, HRD is still experiencing a significant turnover of personnel, and it is extremely short handed in key positions such as the Director of HRD which has been vacant for over a year, and the lack of a trained Title 10 expert, the last who departed some months ago. Vice Admiral Rondeau, the new NDU President, has initiated the hiring process for a new HRD Director effective July 22, 2009.

Dr. SNYDER. The terms “training” and “education” seem to be used interchangeably quite a bit. Can you tell me how you define the difference and what part of your curriculum is training and which part is education?

Admiral WISECUP. There is clearly a difference between training and education and they should not be used interchangeably. The American Heritage Dictionary defines training as “the process or routine of making someone proficient with specialized instruction and practice.” Education is defined as “the act or process of developing innate capacities especially by schooling or instruction.” A more PME-related distinction, written by Dr. David Trettler of National War College, appears in Enclosure A of the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (CJCSI 1800.01C). It describes education as: “in its broadest conception, education conveys general bodies of knowledge and develops habits of mind applicable to the broad spectrum of endeavors. At its highest levels and purest forms, education fosters breadth of view, diverse perspectives and critical analysis, abstract reasoning, comfort with ambiguity and uncertainty, innovative thinking, particularly with respect to complex, non-linear problems. This contrasts with training which focuses on the instruction of personnel to enhance the capacity to perform specific functions and tasks.”

At the Naval War College our senior course curriculum is education. What very little training that takes place within the course of instruction facilitates student activity and products in our several capstone exercises. For example, the capstone wargame exercise for the Joint Military Operations course requires the students to operate as joint force staff members in boards and cells in a networked environment. A half day of training is required to familiarize them with the supporting computer network, the electronic systems, web pages, etc.

Dr. SNYDER. The 1989 Skelton Panel Report said all the Commandants and Presidents should teach so that they would understand what it takes to be a faculty member. Can you describe a typical faculty member’s day? Do you yourself teach or mentor individual students? a. Unlike civilian university professors who emphasize research, your faculty members generally do not have teaching assistants, research assistants, or set office hours. When do they have time for service, research, and writing? How much research and writing do you expect them to do outside the sabbatical windows? How is this assessed on their appraisals, military and civilian?

Admiral WISECUP. Since the 1989 Skelton Report, the Naval War College has reorganized its leadership model, converting the Dean of Academics to a civilian position and adding a Provost, who effectively is the College’s Chief Operating Officer and the Dean of Faculty. All of the four Provosts have had teaching experience as faculty members and academic administrators. Each of the Deans of Academics has had extensive experience as a faculty member in professional military education and civilian universities or colleges. These organizational changes were designed to strengthen the faculty perspective within the College’s senior leadership.

The Deans of Academics have maintained an active role in the classroom, most often by teaching elective courses. The Provosts have also participated in the Electives Program and occasionally the core academic program, usually augmenting a full-time faculty member. The current President also occasionally participates in the
Electives program as a guest speaker, as did his predecessor. The President, Provost, and Dean of Academics regularly visit classrooms to observe and actively participate in seminar discussions. Likewise, they routinely meet with faculty members to exchange perspectives and remain attuned to the faculty’s challenges. The College’s leadership team remains deeply committed to the quality of education at the Naval War College and fully understands the College’s center of gravity is its faculty. In the aggregate, these actions, we believe, have accomplished the intent of this recommendation of the 1989 Skelton Panel.

The Naval War College developed an academic rhythm, distinct among the PME schools and colleges, suited to its paradigm of a single faculty teaching both the intermediate and senior level courses. First, we adopted a quarter-like system and teach three extended quarters, which we call trimesters, annually. Second, we developed three core academic departments, each with sufficient faculty to design, prepare and teach the curricula for its particular department. Faculty in each department then teaches the core academic program for two of the three trimesters. For that teaching trimester, a faculty member typically spends approximately four morning hours daily in the classroom with students. The afternoon is spent in tutorials, mentoring students, preparing for class, doing limited research, curriculum review, or maintaining currency in their specialty. During the third trimester and the six-week summer period, faculty members have more opportunity to conduct research and write, develop curricula, and pursue faculty development.

As stated in our Faculty Handbook, “The Naval War College expects all civilian faculty members whose duties are not primarily administrative to engage in professional research and exhibit a sustained commitment to scholarship. It expects most of them to publish at least some of the results of their research. Military members are not expected to publish, but are encouraged to do so in their areas of expertise.” For civilian professors teaching in the three core academic departments, there are common elements in every faculty members’ performance appraisal: teaching performance, curriculum development, research and publication, and service to the College’s larger mission. Individual faculty members meet with their departmental Chairs and establish personal plans annually to develop more specific criteria for those common areas and any distinct areas relevant to that professor’s performance. Additionally, the Faculty Handbook established criteria for consideration for promotion to the ranks of Associate Professor and Professor which include research and publication expectations. Thus, their annual appraisals, their potential for promotion, and ultimately their reappointment rest, in part, on their productive scholarship.

Dr. SNYDER. Does having a master’s degree program at these schools detract from the PME mission, not from the standpoint of it being easy to accredit existing programs, but that it may tip the focus toward the academic instead of professional education?

Admiral WISECUP. The Naval War College sought to grant the masters degree in order to get its students to focus on their PME studies. Twenty years ago, over 70% of our student body simultaneously pursued a master’s degree in a local college or university, using transferred credit hours from the NWC course of instruction to form the foundation for its graduate requirements. These night courses clearly competed for the students’ academic attention. To rectify this problem, the College asked the New England Association of Schools and Colleges to assess our educational program to see if it qualified for accreditation for a master’s degree. The Naval War College changed nothing in its educational routine to qualify itself for this degree. The regional civilian educators determined the academic program was sufficiently comprehensive and contained sufficient rigor to meet accreditation standards. The regional authority clearly recognized this College as a professional school with an academic program tailored to the military or defense professional. Curriculum content, student assessment, faculty qualifications, and our business and academic support processes all met their standards.

Since the College has begun to award master’s degrees, less than 1% of our U.S. graduates have pursued simultaneous degrees with local colleges or universities. We now have our students’ full academic attention on their PME studies. There have been several key benefits to the institution and its faculty which accompanied regional accreditation. For the faculty members, teaching in an accredited, graduate degree college has strengthened their credentials. For the College, it has provided stature and facilitated inter-institutional dialogue and activities as well as enabling us to attract top-notch faculty members. For the College and the
Navy, it has provided an external review to ensure our academic programs and institutional practices meet common standards within the educational community.

Granting of a master’s degree has strengthened our PME mission. An external authority ensures we continue to meet educational standards which ensures our students receive a bonafide graduate education and their parent Service (Army, Navy, Marine, Air Force, Coast Guard, etc.) gets back an officer grounded in both academic and professional military education capable of strategically minded critical thinking and excelling in positions of strategic leadership. Those officers also possess a credential recognized by their civilian counterparts in the interagency.

Dr. Snyder. Do all of your students receive master’s degrees—why or why not? What does top quality in uniformed faculty mean to you? Please be specific, is it more important to have an advanced degree in specific areas like international relations, political science, a regional study, or military or political history than it is to have a PhD in any subject even if that was in math or engineering?

Admiral WISECUP. Only our U.S. students are eligible for the master’s degree. Nearly all of them earn it; a few senior-level students over the years have not met the grading standards and have instead received a NWC diploma instead of a degree. Students must earn a final grade of B− or above in each core course (or an approved advanced research program in lieu of one of the core courses), and who pass three elective courses, to be awarded the Naval War College Master of Arts degree in National Security and Strategic Studies and the appropriate JPME certification. Resident students from the CNW and the CNC&S who complete the three core courses (or an approved advanced research program in lieu of one of the core courses), with an overall average grade of B− or better and not more than one course grade in the “C” category, and who pass three elective courses are eligible for the NWC diploma and the appropriate JPME certification.

International officers from the Naval Command College and Naval Staff College are excluded from the master’s degree program. The Department of Education and the Congress authorized granting of the degree only to U.S. students. The College has a partnership with a local university which resulted in a program available to these international officers to get a master’s degree by doing some additional research and class work.

For uniformed faculty, we expect expertise in their area of specialty (i.e. submarines, infantry, surface ships, aviation, logistics, etc.). We seek officers who have commanded as commanders or lieutenant colonels or held equivalent positions in the restricted line or staff communities and prefer officers who have also commanded as a captain or a colonel. We seek combat experience or operational experience in the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. We seek experience at the strategic or operational levels. We expect them to be intermediate-level school graduates with JPME Phase I and expect most of them to also be senior-level graduates. We seek officers with joint experience, preferably Joint Qualified Officers. For civilian education, we expect them to possess a master’s degree at a minimum. Although a majority of our faculty have advanced degrees in international relations, history, political science, or military or political history, the discipline is not as important as their teaching ability. Our faculty has advanced degrees in a variety of disciplines and this diversity adds to the richness of our education.

Dr. Snyder. What does “top quality” mean for civilian faculty? Please be specific.

Admiral WISECUP. As stated in our Faculty Handbook, “The Naval War College expects all civilian faculty members whose primary duties are not primarily administrative to engage in professional research and exhibit a sustained commitment to scholarship. It expects most of them to publish at least some of the results of their research. Military members are not expected to publish, but are encouraged to do so in their areas of expertise.” For civilian professors teaching in the three core academic departments, there are common elements in every faculty members’ performance appraisal; teaching performance, curriculum development, research and publication, and service to the College’s larger mission. Individual faculty members meet with their departmental Chairs and establish personal plans annually to develop more specific criteria for those common areas and any distinct areas relevant to the professor’s performance. Additionally, the Faculty Handbook established criteria for consideration for promotion to the ranks of Associate Professor and Professor which includes research and publication expectations. Thus, their annual appraisals, their potential for promotion, and ultimately their reappointment rest, in part on their productive scholarship. Military faculty members are expected to research and contribute to curricula development and are judged in their appraisals accordingly.

Civilian faculty members in the rank of associate professor can have a successful career at the Naval War College. When the College revised its published criteria for assignment of civilian professorial ranks and the criteria for promotion and pub-
lished it in the Faculty Handbook, we publicly identified our key indicators of top quality. They are the specific criteria for promotion to the rank of professor. The criteria are “excellence in teaching or research, not simply a satisfactory level of performance; significant contributions to either the NWC’s educational mission or NWC’s research, analysis, and gaming function; active engagement and visibility in the faculty members academic or professional community; significant productivity in scholarly publication or professional research; a consistent commitment in the faculty member’s teaching and/or research, analysis, and gaming to fostering critical thinking from a joint perspective and cultivating the ability of students/officers to function effectively in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment; a demonstrated commitment to teamwork with other faculty members across the departments and codes of the Naval War College, and the ability to develop or advance new ideas that enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of both the faculty members department and the college as a whole.”

The practice of academic freedom by faculty members at the Naval War College is robust. While the Congress, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, and CNO are rightfully involved in professional military education policy and engaged in determining professional educational standards, the College’s executive leadership has been successful in preserving the autonomy of the College and its faculty in deciding what to teach and how to teach it. Faculty members are allowed great scope for experimenting with different teaching methods and for expressing different points of view in the classroom. Aside from projects assigned to researchers in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, faculty members have been free to choose the subjects of their research and writing. Hardly a week passes without Naval War College professors publicly expressing opinions and offering expertise on current political and military issues in a wide variety of mass media—television, radio, newspapers, magazines, and journalistic websites. The College prides itself on respect for academic freedom; at the same time, the idea that the exercise of academic freedom should be informed in practice by a sense of responsibility is widely accepted among faculty members dealing with issues of great national and international importance.

Dr. Snyder. Since you don’t have tenure, what is the process for renewal and non-renewal of the civilian faculty? How transparent is the system? Do professors know six months before they are up for renewal whether they will be renewed, for how long, and why? In a tenure system people think the faculty members have all the power, in a no-tenure system it appears that the school has unlimited power. How do you avoid the extremes and appearances of arbitrariness? How many of your civilian faculty don’t have PhDs or JDs? Be specific about what degrees they do have and why they were hired.

Adm. Wisecup. The process of retaining faculty is an open, orderly and fair one. Though the College does not employ a system of tenure and has no intention of doing so, it accords its faculty reasonable contractual security consistent with the College’s mission. The College continues to sustain its quality standard for faculty. As a practice, the College renews contracts as early as 364 days in advance prior to the expiration of the contractual term. Faculty members with more than six years of continuous employment at the Naval War College have the right to request a peer review of their non-reappointment. (Six years is the typical length of time it takes to make tenure at a civilian university.) A Non-Reappointment Review Committee will be appointed to consider their appeal. This process is delineated in the Faculty Handbook. There has only been one request for peer review of a non-reappointment since the original Skelton Report was published in 1989. Non-reappointment of faculty who have served more than six years is unusual.

The College’s unique paradigm that one faculty teaches both the intermediate and senior level PME course influences our hiring practices for the civilian faculty. Terminal academic degrees are significant. However, professional expertise and experience can be substituted for a terminal academic degree.

As a matter of practice, the Strategy & Policy Department demands that all civilian faculty members hold terminal academic degrees. The twenty-two civilian faculty members in the department hold terminal academic degrees and are acknowledged experts in history, political science, or international relations. All come from prestigious universities or institutes.

The civilian faculty members in the National Security Decision Making (NSDM) Department all have a specialty which relates to NSDM curricula and are proven experts in their respective field of endeavor. Currently, all NSDM civilian faculty
members hold, at a minimum, a masters degree, while over seventy-four percent (23 of 31 faculty members) hold terminal degrees. Of the eight faculty members without terminal academic degrees, six are military retirees with professional experience relevant to the NSDM courses and one is a civilian professor who has completed her doctoral classes and is completing the required dissertation. The final civilian faculty member is not a Title 10 professor, but rather a representative from the State Department, a Foreign Service officer with extensive diplomatic experience overseas.

In the Joint Military Operations (JMO) Department, civilian faculty members all have a specialty which relates to JMO curricula and complements the expertise of the military faculty. Twenty-one of the twenty-four civilian professors are retired military officers. All have significant and diverse military or military related backgrounds, which incorporate a broad range of tactical, operational, and joint duty experience into the overall skills base of JMO. All civilian faculty members have a minimum of a M.A./M.S. and fifty-four percent (13 of 24) hold a J.D./PhD or are PhD candidates. Sixty-six percent (16 of 24) hold multiple advanced degrees. Seventy-nine percent (19 of 24) were JPME Phase I or II qualified while on active duty and twenty-five percent (6 of 24) were JSO equivalents while on active duty. There is significant previous joint duty experience among the civilian faculty.

Dr. Snyder. Some of you have indicated that you wish to hire “younger” PhDs—Do you think they may need a bit of seasoning or practical experience to be able to hold their own with the caliber and seniority of students you have? Does it mean you have to push out “older professors” who may be performing well in order to bring on younger ones?

Admiral WiseCup. The Naval War College has had good success in hiring “younger Ph.D.s.” About six years ago, the College identified the “graying” of the faculty as a concern. Accordingly, policies were put in place to clearly establish uniform criteria for academic ranks including hiring and promotion of civilian faculty. The College’s core academic faculty was still growing to meet its enlarging student population, providing an opportunity to hire new faculty members from across the academic ranks including Assistant Professors, a virtually unused, academic rank previously. The College networked with key national security or international security Ph.D. programs to identify noteworthy young scholars. The departmental faculty approached the hiring of younger scholars with great care, fully realizing the caliber and seniority of our students. Each of our younger faculty members possesses key expertise in areas where the faculty determined we needed strengthening and each was required to demonstrate teaching prowess in the seminar setting as an integral element of the hiring process.

The results have been most positive, especially in the departments that teach with a faculty team. These younger PhDs were paired with an experienced military faculty member during their first teaching year. Clearly, the senior military faculty member eased the concern about youth, experience and credibility with both our intermediate and senior students. Civilian faculty mentors also helped to transition these young scholars into the College’s educational model. Faculty workshops ensured they were fully prepared for seminar discussions. In the department without team teaching, additional measures were taken to ensure a smooth transition to the classroom.

We did not push out “older professors” in order to bring on the younger ones. First, these stalwarts are the foundation of our educational success. Additionally, they provide continuity to the institution. Second, we were in a growing phase for the faculty and hired a mix of younger scholars and more seasoned scholars. By doing so, we have improved the institution and addressed in part our concern about the “graying” of the faculty.

Dr. Snyder. National and ICAF have 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 faculty and student mixes while the Service schools have a 60% host and 40% other mix. Are the faculty and student mixes dictated for the various institutions still appropriate? If so, was it appropriate for Congress to allow the Service senior schools to award JPME II credit (NDAA FY 2005) despite their lower ratios, non-neutral ground, and lack of a requirement to send any graduates to joint assignments? ICAF and National must send “50% plus one” graduates to joint assignments. Is this still appropriate? Should Service schools have some kind of requirement?

Admiral WiseCup. A lot has happened to change the environment since the 1989 Skelton Report. Congress has even redefined the term “joint matters.” Those changes in the international security environment affected the way the Services operate for the last two decades. As a result Service cultures have matured. “Jointness” is not a foreign word to today’s midcareer military professional as it was for most officers in 1989. Clearly, joint acculturation is one of the key educational outcomes for senior Service Colleges, but today that means not simply multi-service, but something far closer to the revised definition of joint matters. For today’s stu-
dents, the mix of international partners and interagency representatives is as important as the joint acculturation process. If there were to be any revision in the mix requirement, it should clearly be expanded to include multi-agency and multinational representation as well. Using an expanded formula, the student mix for last academic year for the College of Naval Warfare was 39% U.S. Navy and 9% U.S. Marine Corps with 18% international partners, 14% U.S. Army, 10% Federal Civilians, and 9% U.S. Air Force.

We work hard to ensure that our students all get a first-class graduate education in national security, albeit with a maritime perspective. We regard the concept of “non-neutral ground” as an outdated construct, especially as we increase the numbers of interagency and international students.

The faculty and student mixes at the Service senior schools are appropriate for multi-service acculturation; as indicated by the data from our graduates over the last three years. Data from alumni surveys reinforce this conclusion. The current mix is sufficient and allows the Naval War College to continue to perform its Service PME mission and ensure that its graduates are well steeped in the contemporary challenges relevant to the maritime domain. Our graduates are ready to serve on the staffs of a Joint Force Maritime Component Commander or Maritime Operations Center. The expertise and functioning of such commands are critical to our continued success in the joint warfight.

**Dr. Snyder.** What constitutes rigor in your educational program? Does rigor require letter grades? Does rigor require written exams? Does rigor require the writing of research or analytical papers, and if so, of what length? Does rigor require increased contact time and less “white space” or vice versa?

**Admiral Wisecup.** RADM Kurth, in his testimony to the Skelton Committee, said “what education ultimately contributes to a successful military commander and strategist is a habit of mind and judgment . . .” The educational process at the Naval War College is designed to hone the critical thinking skills of its students at every level. Developing habits of mind requires a challenging academic program, one that forces students to reevaluate their personal decision making models, often refocus their perspective, and assess their own analytical approach. They must repeatedly be forced to think and required to attempt to resolve complex problems.

The Naval War College’s education program begins by expanding the student’s experience and knowledge through a demanding reading and study program. Students must then analyze and judge the reading material and present their assessment and conclusions. By relying predominantly on the case study method and graduate-level seminars, the College is able to repeatedly challenge the students’ habits of mind. The seminar interaction forces the students to present and defend their analyses and conclusions. Over the course of ten months, there is ample opportunity to develop expanded habits of mind and refine one’s judgment.

The College recognizes our students are competitive, self-motivated, mature professionals who possess the discipline and desire to apply themselves to these studies. In fact, the work we see from the students in the elective program which is graded on a pass or fail basis is equivalent to that in the core program where they receive letter grades. But we steadfastly believe grading, writing research (14–18 pages each) and analytical papers (10–14 pages each), and written exams are integral elements of our academic program. These exercises complement the daily seminar interaction and force students to integrate the learning into their approach to thinking and decision making. Grading is another form of teaching which the College’s faculty takes very seriously, providing significant feedback on each student’s work. For most of the year, we also grade the students’ contribution to the graduate-level seminar.

Over the decades, the faculty has concluded the students must have sufficient time to read, study and reflect as well as conduct research. Except for the scheduled periods of capstone exercises, the College has found a typical week of 15–18 hours contact time with the remainder reserved for student study, preparation, and writing is best.

**Dr. Snyder.** Can you describe how you survey students, graduates, and graduates’ supervisors to assess the quality of your program?

**Admiral Wisecup.** Short-term assessment of the curricula by the students has been a long-standing practice of the College. It has evolved into a continuous, systematic, and comprehensive evaluation program that provides students, graduates, and senior military leaders the means to stimulate significant curriculum revisions. We survey students throughout the academic year at different points. These are the elements of our survey system:

- **Explicit assessments of the curriculum** are routinely provided by all students through questionnaires. These include individual-session or curriculum-block questionnaires completed by students at the conclusion of each seminar to evaluate class
utility and materials. Such critiques provide immediate feedback to the faculty responsible for each session’s development as well as a continuous indication of the success of the course. A comprehensive end-of-course questionnaire is employed by all academic departments, the Electives Program, the Advanced Research Program, special programs (such as the Stockdale Group, Mahan Scholars and the Halsey Groups), and College of Distance Education to solicit feedback from students.

These electronic questionnaires ask students to evaluate a broad range of issues related to the curriculum and its execution. The students provide a numerical assessment as well as a qualitative one through their amplifying comments. Questions address the appropriateness of course objectives, the degree of attainment of these objectives, the difficulty of the course, the quality of instructor performance, and the perceived potential value of the course. The anonymous responses are compiled into both statistical and narrative summaries, which are reviewed by the faculty and analyzed and interpreted by the departments. Periodically, support elements throughout the College, such as the Library, administer a survey to students and faculty regarding their services. The results are presented to the Academic Policy Board, the Provost and President of the College.

Student assessment of the curriculum and operation of the College is also provided through the student academic committees. These committees bring student representatives from each seminar into contact with the Deans of Academics, Students, and Naval Warfare Studies, with academic department chairs, course directors, the Associate Dean of Academics for Electives and Directed Research, service advisors, the Director of the Eccles Library, and an Information Resources Department representative. Meeting at least twice each trimester, these committees ensure that students and administrative problems are addressed immediately or referred to appropriate planning bodies.

Students have informal opportunities to express opinions on the College and its programs to peers, instructors, department chairs, the Provost, and even the President. Student leaders periodically meet with Dean of Students and Provost, often to exchange views on the academic or co-curricular programs. The President and other senior leaders occasionally travel with officers in the international programs and use the opportunity to obtain qualitative feedback about the College.

For past several years, the College has administered a survey to its resident U.S. students as they graduate. The success of this survey led to similar survey instruments being developed and administered for graduating senior international officers and graduating Fleet Seminar students. During the last academic year, the College began regularly conducting focus groups with selected members of the graduating classes. The focus groups provide valuable insights not received in the electronic surveys. All of these surveys solicit information from these graduating students regarding the overall effect of their educational experience, including their judgments about the quality and utility of the instruction and the degree that certain educational outcomes were achieved. Survey analysis and results are provided to the members of the APC in order to inform educational policy making and contribute toward design of future academic programs and curricula.

Periodic alumni surveys also provide useful data in judging the quality and utility of the education to the careers of professional graduates. Recently, the College surveyed alumni from the classes of 2005, 2006, and 2007 from both CNW and CNC&S. There were approximately 1700 alumni surveys distributed and 458 responses received for a 27% response rate. Specifically, alumni were asked to estimate the appropriateness of the educational objectives, the degree to which these objectives were attained, and the contribution each core course made in preparing them for future positions in the national security arena. They were also asked to suggest possible revisions to the academic and co-curricular programs to make them even more useful to future students. Results once analyzed will be provided to the APC and other concerned elements of the College. The President sent congratulatory letters and surveys to graduates that have recently been selected for promotion to flag/general officers during the past year. This is valuable feedback focused on the suitability and completeness of the desired educational outcomes provided by flag/general officers from all Services.

Departmental faculty members routinely visit with key strategic and operational-level commanders and their staffs as an element of curricula currency and development. Those discussions invariably touch on the desired educational outcomes and objectives and the performance of our graduates. The continuing professional and personal relationships between faculty and alumni proved to be invaluable in validating the quality, relevance, and currency of the curriculum. Informally, these graduates provide unsolicited input on a continuing basis directly to the faculty concerning the value of curriculum material to their subsequent assignments and suggesting improvements in curriculum substance and pedagogy. Even more defini-
tively, the return of graduates to teaching positions at the College greatly enhances
the currency of the academic program. E-mail, while informal and anecdotal, has
increased the volume of this feedback and its substantive value. Those in more sen-
ior positions even provided insights and requirements that affected new course de-
sign.

Dr. Snyder. Should the OSD Chancellor's office be reestablished? Why or Why not?

Admiral Wisecup. The College's principal communication with the former OSD
Chancellor's office was related to the MECC and the CJCS accreditation process
(Process for Accreditation of Joint Education). The College has found the Joint Staff
J–7 and the supporting MECC organization productive and sufficient. The special
chain of command established by CJCS for policy and issues regarding professional
military education including joint education has continued to serve the College, the
Navy and the nation well. We are not convinced that reinventing a layer at OSD
divorced from the PME community would serve us as well. Education is not one of
the core competencies of the Department of Defense and without a direct supporting
vehicle like the MECC, another layer of staff may create more issues than they re-
solve. However, the Joint Staff J–7 whose duties are much more intimately involved
would be a better source for the comparison of the former office to the way OSD
is organized to do business today.

One of the current challenges for the Naval War College is dealing with the mul-
tiple sources of our federal service, civilian students. Articulating requirements, co-
ordinating applications, often dealing individually with potential civilian students
from many different sources is a time consuming, but necessary investment to en-
sure we have representation from the interagency arena and Department of Defense
activities and agencies. Since interagency representation is a common challenge for
the PME colleges, support from the OSD level might be helpful in making progress
on student and faculty mixes.

Dr. Snyder. Ethics—what should be the role of ethical education at the senior
schools beyond “just war” theory?

Admiral Wisecup. Just war theory is important at the SSC level because an un-
derstanding of the history and principles of just war augment and deepen the stu-
dents’ understanding of just war which is often limited to the Law of Armed Conflict
(LOAC). LOAC alone is inadequate for the higher levels of command (for one rea-
son) because law necessarily lags behind emerging technologies and threats. There-
fore, the deeper understanding of the long history of just war gives the students cat-
egories for thinking in principled terms about such legal gray areas.

In addition, ethical issues at the more senior levels of leadership are in some re-
spects quite different than those familiar to officers from their lower ranking experi-
ences. This is because the range of obligations multiply almost exponentially. One
is no longer only concerned with one’s personal integrity and the welfare of subordi-
nates. At more senior ranks, one must also consider the welfare of one’s Service,
the success of the overall operational or strategic plan, the health of the relationship
between the military and both the government it serves and the broader society it
represents. As those obligations multiply and conflict, the senior service college
provide an invaluable “safe” environment in which senior leaders can explore
and discuss how they might handle these morally complex and ambiguous environ-
ments. Typically, officers have a limited moral vocabulary (“maintain your integ-
rity,” “tell the truth”) which is sometimes insufficiently nuanced to really help them
think about these environments. By discussion of historical examples and case stud-
ies of moral decision making in such environments, officers are prepared (to the lim-
ited degree that any classroom can prepare one) to face and think clearly about the
future environments in which they will find themselves.

For decades, the College had an Ethics Conference as an integral element of the
academic program. We have a professor designated as the Stockdale Chair of Ethics
and Leadership to advise and improve our educational approach to ethics. In fact
the College has just hired one of the country’s most renowned scholars on military
professional ethics as the new Stockdale Chair. For the last two years, we refined
our approach and begin the academic year with an Ethics Conference which intro-
duces that year’s ethical theme and then follows with several other educational
events throughout the year. This year there will also be an intersessional conference
devoted to an ethics issue. Additionally, one of our Elective Program’s areas of study
is leadership and ethics.

Dr. Snyder. Should each school have a Board of Visitors or Consultants, separate
from your University’s, so it could focus just on your mission?

Admiral Wisecup. The Naval War College has traditionally had a Board of Advisors
(BOA) who advised the President on issues related to the College’s mission. Occa-
sionally, the Board would also communicate with the Chief of Naval Operations
concerning issues it deemed critical to the College and the Navy. That Board served only this College.

Recently (27 May 2009), the Secretary of the Navy was directed by the OSD Committee Management Office to disestablish the NWC BOA, recommending it be consolidated with the Naval Postgraduate School Board of Advisors. The Naval War College is working through the AAUSN to achieve a satisfactory solution.

Dr. Snyder. What has been done to improve the professional development opportunities for the faculty given that the PAJE noted that it compromised the college’s ability to retain outstanding faculty members? Explain the Admiral’s comment that he can afford tenure to some civilian faculty.

Admiral Wisecup. The Naval War College initially identified this issue in our Self-Study for the College of Naval Warfare PAJE for JPME II Certification. The fielding of differentiated senior and intermediate courses during Academic Year 2006–07 required the faculty to be heavily engaged in curriculum development over the previous two years. As a result, there was less opportunity for professional development because of the increased demand on the faculty to build separate and distinct curricula. The significant curriculum development task and the initial certification of the revised College of Naval Warfare course with embedded JPME Phase II ended with the 2007 PAJE. After that, the College leadership made a conscious decision to devote significant resources to faculty development. The increase in faculty development over the next two years was so much so that it received favorable comments on the draft report from the most recent PAJE in May 2009. The comment read “Since the last PAJE visit, the CNW has dedicated significantly more financial resources to faculty development.” The College has established a routine process for faculty to plan and seek NWC funding for professional development opportunities. The faculty can plan and schedule such opportunities on an annual basis.

Faculty development at NWC promotes innovation, collaboration, collegiality, and the art of teaching. Overall, the Faculty Development Program is designed to enhance both the personal and professional education and development of seasoned faculty as well as bring new faculty members up to a common standard of instructor capabilities. The three pronged faculty development approach of orientation, faculty workshops, and individual development programs, coupled with the senior faculty mentoring and evaluation of teaching abilities, provides the students with an unparalleled level of experienced moderators who are aware of the latest changes in the contemporary international security and operations environment.

The College, with the assistance of the Naval War College Foundation, has made a substantial effort to provide financial resources, through its annual budgeting process, for professional development, research, and scholarly publication. With over $600,000 earmarked specifically for faculty development, a substantial number of faculty members have benefited from travel to participate in professional conferences or conduct research. Additionally, some faculty members involved in the College’s international outreach have funded travel which also provides opportunity for research and collaboration abroad.

Although there is no tenure system at the Naval War College and none is under consideration, a very few senior professors have appointments without terms (indefinite appointments) which establishes eligibility to serve until retirement assuming that the faculty member continues to perform at or above the expected level as outlined in the Faculty Handbook. These indefinite appointments are awarded to professors/research professors who have long records of accomplishment that stand out even among the high achievements of others at that rank; that show promise of further high levels of performance, achievement, and service to the College; and whose expertise is expected to be needed for an extended period. While this is certainly not tenure, it is akin to it and is the program to which Rear Admiral Wisecup referred.

Dr. Snyder. The terms “training” and “education” seem to be used interchangeably quite a bit. Can you tell me how you define the difference and what part of your curriculum is training and which part is education?

General Williams. There are extensive (and oftentimes competing) bodies of knowledge on each subject. In simplest terms, training focuses on “what to think,” “what should be done,” and “how it should be done.” The focus is on the relatively short-term accumulation of practical application of information, usually within a fixed context of task, conditions, and standards, to enhance the capacity to perform specific functions and tasks. Problems are more or less straightforward, the circumstances of the issue are relatively well known and understood by the individual, and use of established procedures normally results in the one best solution to an issue.
Education, on the other hand, focuses on "how to think." Education provides a broad body of general knowledge and develops habits of mind applicable to a range of activities. Education fosters breadth of view, appreciation of diverse perspectives, critical analysis and abstract reasoning. In our context, at the strategic level, "how to think" usually concerns large, complex and unstructured problems for which there may be no fixed context of task, condition, and standards. Indeed, conditions are likely to be highly ambiguous and decision makers usually have less, not more, information on which to make decisions. Decisions at the strategic level rarely result in the one "best" solution. Rather, in this arena, decision makers may be faced with choosing the least bad alternative, and problems are more often managed, and sometimes not completely solved. These conditions require students to build upon old knowledge and experience to develop new knowledge that may be applied in new ways in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environment.

Training and education are not mutually exclusive. Nearly all training and education opportunities offer some elements of both approaches. While the Army War College experience includes some training (e.g., specific processes used within DoD or the set steps of the Crisis Action Process), students focus less on formats and processes, and more on the critical thinking and synthesis of theory, concept, and experience. Thus, while our students must master and retain specific information, our curriculum focuses on the synthesis of the multiple and multi-disciplinary skills necessary to ensure that processes and systems produce feasible, acceptable, and suitable policy options. This requires students to access their knowledge (as well as 20+ years of professional experience), analyze large, complex situations, heuristically create new knowledge, and apply that new knowledge to creative policy options to national level decision makers.

Dr. Snyder. The 1989 Skelton Panel Report said all the Commandants and Presidents should teach so that they would understand what it takes to be a faculty member. Can you describe a typical faculty member's day? Do you yourself teach or mentor individual students? a. Unlike civilian university professors who emphasize research, your faculty members generally do not have teaching assistants, research assistants, or set office hours. When do they have time for service, research, and writing? How much research and writing do you expect them to do outside the sabbatical windows? How is this assessed on their appraisals, military and civilian?

General Williams. When teaching a core course, mornings are spent teaching in the seminar. After class, instructors counsel and advise students and review the day's lesson and prepare for upcoming lessons individually and with their colleagues. Faculty have limited time for research and writing.

When not teaching core classes, instructors conduct research to support writing projects and curriculum development; prepare instructional materials; and participate in various work groups at the USAWC. They are frequently away from Carlisle Barracks supporting the operational and institutional force in the US and overseas and engaging in their communities of practice at conferences and workshops.

Faculty are engaged full-time during the New York City and Washington, D.C. trips, the Strategic Decision Making Exercise, and the National Security Seminar.

I attend classes regularly, both to observe students and faculty, as well as to provide the benefit of my experience and perspective. I occasionally lecture or facilitate instruction in a variety of our courses. My most recent lecture (April) was to three seminars on the ethical failure of Abu Ghraib and the limits of generalship.

Our curriculum structure allows faculty time to research and write. When not in session, faculty can conduct research for curriculum development or publication. In addition to sabbaticals, we offer both temporal and fiscal faculty research grants. We fund attendance at conferences and symposia that allow faculty to highlight their research efforts.

While our curriculum structure frees up blocks of time, this allocation of time is different from the experience of many of our civilian faculty who are used to having days within each week that they can use for research and writing. This requires some adaptability on their part.

Our appraisal criteria examine how an individual faculty member contributes to the overall mission of the USAWC: education, research and publication, support to the operational and institutional force, and strategic communications, as well as service to the institution. The value placed on each element depends upon an individual faculty member's primary duties.

In addition to formal appraisals, we also have an annual Faculty Writing Awards Program that offers monetary prizes and a formal recognition ceremony for award winners. Publications play a role in the selection of honorary academic chair holders.

Dr. Snyder. Does having a master's degree program at these schools detract from the PME mission, not from the standpoint of it being easy to accredit existing pro-
grams, but that it may tip the focus toward the academic instead of professional education?

General Williams. No. The US Army War College is a professional development institution that only secondarily awards a masters degree due to the quality of our faculty, curriculum, and students. We must not become a graduate school that only happens to award a secondary professional qualification.

Our civilian regional accrediting body, the Middle States Commission of Higher Education (MSCHE), has not asked us to do anything that runs counter to our professional program. MSCHE personnel have emphasized that they accredit all kinds of professional schools and understand that we have professional standards that we must meet.

Over the last decade, we have increased the difficulty of our programs, added more (and more complex) material, and increased standards. But, these changes have been made not because of any external academic pressure, but because it is the right thing to do for the professional development of our graduates who face an increasingly complex and difficult international security environment. To perform well as advisers to senior leaders or ultimately as senior leaders, requires our students to be exposed to a much broader set of more complex ideas than may have been true 10–15 years ago. While some of these concepts are academic in nature (e.g., critical and creative thinking, organizational culture and behavior, negotiations, international relations, or philosophies of war), these concepts are examined, analyzed, and assessed within a professional context. More importantly, our graduates will have to apply this professional development in the real world if, as senior leaders (or their advisers), they are to be successful in meeting the complex demands of the 21st century security environment. As a result of these changes, some of our students will discover that the Army War College does not resemble their “senior rater’s” experience of 10–12 years ago, and may find it convenient to blame the master’s degree and ”academics.” But, in reality, while professional topics, demands, and standards have increased, no new major, purely academic requirements have been added.

The greater risk of titling the institutional focus may lie in the type of faculty hired. If an institution hires only civilian faculty with terminal academic degrees, but little or no professional experience at the expense of hiring faculty with relevant professional experience (and, appropriate advanced degrees), then academic faculty may default to their academic perspective and eventually tip the balance in an academic vice professional direction. It is incumbent upon the College, Service and Joint leadership, therefore, to ensure that our PME/JPME institutions remain focused on the professional development of our students. This is not an argument against appropriate academic rigor or qualifications, but rather for an appropriate mix of the best of both the professional and academic worlds.

Dr. Snyder. Do all of your students receive master’s degrees—why or why not? What does top quality in uniformed faculty mean to you? Please be specific, is it more important to have an advanced degree in specific areas like international relations, political science, a regional study, or military or political history than it is to have a PhD in any subject even if that was in math or engineering?

General Williams. All US students who meet the prerequisite of a BA/BS degree are automatically enrolled in the Master of Strategic Studies Degree (MSS) program. In effect, this means nearly 100 percent, as only the occasional civilian student may not possess a BA/BS. Academic failures are very rare in our Resident Education Program, more frequent in our Distance Education Program. Student withdrawals (both voluntary and involuntary) occur.

International Fellows are not enrolled until they demonstrate appropriate English proficiency (usually via the Test of English as a Foreign Language) and the equivalent of a US BA/BS degree (vetted through an outside accrediting body). Roughly 60 percent of 40–43 International Fellows attending each year have earned the degree.

We look at all faculty recruiting from a holistic perspective. An ideal uniformed candidate would be a colonel (or equivalent) with past battalion and brigade command, service on a higher level staff, possession of a terminal degree in an academic discipline within our curriculum, senior level college credit, Joint Professional Military Education Phase II credit, and past teaching experience. As very few such candidates exist, we try to get the greatest possible number of these qualifications from each candidate.

Professional credentials carry the greatest weight for our uniformed faculty. Almost all military faculty are highly successful colonels (or equivalent) with O5-level command experience and are senior level college graduates. As the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) stipulates that only 75 percent of military faculty must be either Joint Qualified Officers or Senior Level College grad-
uates, we usually have 3–5 officers who possess neither qualification, though they usually have a specific professional skill (e.g., space operations, information operations, Foreign Area Officers). Also, given the nature of our curriculum, we seek a wide variety of specific military skills e.g.: planners with Service Component Command or Combatant Command staff experience, OSD/Joint Staff/Service Staff experience, force development and management, and intelligence, to name a few.

In terms of academic credentials, it is more important for uniformed faculty to have an advanced degree in a subject relevant to the curriculum they teach, than an advanced degree, even a Ph.D., in a discipline unrelated to our curriculum.

Dr. Snyder. What does “top quality” mean for civilian faculty? Please be specific.

General Williams. Ideally, all civilian faculty would possess a mix of both academic and professional credentials. While many of our faculty possess dual skills, not all do. Therefore, civilian faculty must be highly proficient in the skills for which they were hired. In some cases, they require a terminal degree in the academic discipline relevant to our curriculum. In other cases, they will require extensive professional credentials in a major subject area that we teach (e.g., joint doctrine, force management, budgeting, DOD processes, theater strategy and campaigning, or regional studies).

As a professional development institution, we are a student-centered, teaching-centric organization; therefore, civilian faculty must be good teachers. They must be particularly adept at facilitating adult learning of seasoned professionals with 16–25 years of service, using the seminar methodology. While we would prefer that faculty arrive with this skill, it is a talent that can be developed over time.

All faculty are expected to conduct research and use that research to enhance the curriculum. Faculty hired for an academic competency should have an established publication record, or if relatively junior, demonstrated the capacity for future publications. All faculty are encouraged to publish in academic or professional journals. Where appropriate, civilian faculty members contribute to doctrine and concept development, the body of knowledge of the military profession.

We expect civilian faculty with appropriate credentials to help support the operational and institutional force. This support includes temporary duty in combat theaters, as well as support to Combatant Commanders, the Joint Staff, Army Staff, or a wide variety of projects to assist the Army’s senior leadership.

In our most recent USAWC Faculty Climate Survey (22 Jun 09), 93 percent (strongly agree/somewhat agree collapsed) of our faculty surveyed (N 117 of 184, or 64 percent; statistically adequate) that they were free to discuss any ideas or material in seminar. Ninety-one percent indicated the environment encourages free discussion and inquiry. Eighty percent indicated that original thinking and academic freedom are valued at the USAWC. Qualitative comments in the survey reflect the numerical data. Based on this data, it appears that, by and large, the absence of tenure is not a major influence on the health of academic freedom at the USAWC. Nonetheless, academic freedom is oftentimes a fragile relationship requiring continuous attention by the USAWC leadership.

Dr. Snyder. Since you don’t have tenure, what is the process for renewal and non-renewal of the civilian faculty? How transparent is the system? Do professors know six months before they are up for renewal whether they will be renewed, for how long, and why? In a tenure system people think the faculty members have all the power, in a no-tenure system it appears that the school has unlimited power. How do you avoid the extremes and appearances of arbitrariness? How many of your civilian faculty don’t have PhDs or JDs? Be specific about what degrees they do have and why they were hired.

General Williams. We provide detailed guidelines for all aspects of employment of civilian faculty under Title 10 USC 4021 in our Carlisle Barracks Memorandum 690–2, Employment Under Title 10 Code Section 4021. We give a copy of this document to all civilian faculty upon hiring, and it is available on our web site.

Appointments under Title 10 USC 4021 are time-limited. Not earlier than 12 months and not later than 6 months prior to the expiration of an appointment, the Department Chair or Director, based upon discussions with the faculty member, recommends either appointment termination or reappointment, along with recommended terms. The Title 10 Board provides its recommendations to me for approval. If the Board recommends terms of reappointment less than that requested, we provide written notification to the faculty member, who has an opportunity to submit a written request for reconsideration through the Title 10 Board to me. Upon my final approval, the faculty member and their supervisor review the terms of the reappointment.

Sometimes the needs of USAWC change, leading to decisions not to reappoint faculty members. This may be driven by a reduction in Federal funds; a change in mis-
sion, curriculum, or workload; re-organization of one or more departments, institutes or centers; or other compelling reasons. In such circumstances, we will make a reasonable effort to provide a minimum of 6 months notice to the affected faculty member(s). The procedures used to implement the process are consistent with applicable laws and regulations governing reduction in force. If practicable and possible, at least a 6-month notice of termination will be given to the individual(s) affected, but in no event will the notice be less than 60 days. While we have changed the specifications of several positions over the last decade, to date, I have not had to implement any reductions to our Title 10 faculty.

Faculty may also be terminated for cause. To date, I have not terminated any faculty members for misconduct or inefficiency.

Faculty members involved in a Title 10 action have access to all the documentation sent to the Title 10 Board, and to the recommendations that the Board makes to me. Any faculty member who wishes to question his or her non-reappointment or termination may do so by raising the issue through his or her chain of command to the Title 10 Board. All decisions on appeals are documented in writing and provided to the faculty member within one week of the decision.

Faculty usually, but not always, have at least six-month notice of reappointment. But, the length of time depends primarily upon when, within the 12-month window prior to the end of their appointment, that the faculty member initiates the process. If submitted at the 12-month mark, the process is routinely completed quickly and the faculty member knows well before the six-month point. However, if a faculty member waits until the 6-month point to submit their request for reappointment, they obviously will have less notification time.

The primary mechanisms for avoidance of extremes and appearances of arbitrariness are our adherence to established, easily accessible rules that govern our procedures for reappointment and termination, and the availability of a process for appeals and grievances. Further, our faculty members have access to free advice and assistance from our Civilian Personnel Advisory Center, our Equal Employment Opportunity Office, and our Legal Assistance Office. Finally, our record on reappointments speaks for itself. The vast majority of requests for reappointment are approved, and many civilian faculty members serve here until retirement. We have never had a successful challenge to a non-reappointment decision.

Because we are a professional development institution, professional credentials are imperative for key members of the faculty. In some cases, there are no equivalent civilian academic credentials or experience for some of our subject areas (e.g., certain military specific disciplines, such as: joint and Army doctrine, campaign planning, force management, DOD, Joint, and Army processes). Or, we may find that a practitioner has the high level skills that a traditional academic scholar may not possess.

Some brief examples may be illustrative. Although the Director, Concepts and Doctrine, later completed his Ph.D. in Military History (Temple University), he originally was hired because, literally, no one in the world knows more about the organization of command and control of Army headquarters at the Army Service Component Command level and above. He also taught history at the U.S. Military Academy and served on the faculty of the Armed (now Joint) Forces Staff College (JPME II) for two years.

Our Professor, Resource Management, has a MS degree in Operations Research and Systems Analysis. More importantly, he spent three years on the Army Staff as the Chief, Resource Analysis and Integration. Few in the Army understand the planning, programming, and budget systems better. He routinely advises the Army Staff on resource matters.

The Professor, Strategic Art, Advanced Strategic Art Program, brings 30 years of experience as a retired colonel Functional Area 59, Strategist. A former USAWC Director of Theater Strategy and Elihu Root chair holder, he is a Joint Specialty Officer and School for Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) graduate with extensive on-the-ground experience in every area of responsibility. He was a key planner for Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, and served as an interagency advisor to and designer of the CENTCOM Joint Interagency Coordination Group in support of OEF and OIF. From 2005 through 2008 he was a Joint Staff J7 contracted interagency specialist and posted to EUCOM with exposure to the establishment of AFRICOM. He has become a recognized subject matter expert on interagency operations and ‘whole of government’ approaches, served on interagency transformation forums, and contributed to the “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II Report” and the Project on National Security Reform’s “Forging a New Shield.”

Practitioners can bring unique skills that an academic career cannot provide. Our Professor, Security Studies, served in the Pentagon for over 20 years, including as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations Policy and Support),
OASD, SO/LIC and Principle Director, Strategy Plans, and Resources, OASD (Homeland Defense). He brings unique insights into the workings of the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security and other national security agencies. His publication record adds further to his qualifications. Similar professional qualifications apply to our representatives from the Intelligence Community (CIA, DIA, and NSA). We are able to supplement this expertise with our DeSerio Chair of Strategic Intelligence (privately funded via an endowment) currently filled by a former very senior member of the Intelligence Community. We also benefit greatly from support by the Department of State and USAID, which routinely provide three-four faculty members with tremendous practical experience with the diplomatic instrument of power. Our Omar Bradley Chair of Strategic Leadership (an annual, rotating visiting professorship funded via our Army War College Foundation) oftentimes is held by an experienced practitioner. For example, ADM (Ret.) Dennis Blair, currently Director, National Intelligence, was Bradley Chair holder in Academic Year 2007–2008.

Dr. Snyder. Some of you have indicated that you wish to hire “younger” PhDs. Do you think they may need a bit of seasoning or practical experience to be able to hold their own with the caliber and seniority of students you have? Does it mean you have to push out “older professors” who may be performing well in order to bring on younger ones?

General Williams. Generally, we would agree that, given our student body of 16–25 year professionals, civilian faculty need a certain degree of seasoning to be effective. However, to a large degree, this depends upon the individual faculty member and the discipline they teach. We have several relatively younger (mid-30s) visiting professors and full-time faculty who have done well in the seminar. If they have the requisite academic and publishing credentials and are effective teachers, our students respond well.

No, we believe that we can accomplish this over time through routine attrition and hiring of younger faculty. It is worth noting, however, such opportunities are limited. Within our four teaching departments, we have only 27 full-time civilian teaching positions. Of those, we would classify only 20 of those as being academically related disciplines.

Dr. Snyder. National and ICAF have 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 faculty and student mixes while the Service schools have a 60% host and 40% other mix. Are the faculty and student mixes dictated for the various institutions still appropriate? If so, was it appropriate for Congress to allow the Service senior schools to award JPME II credit (NDAA FY 2005) despite their lower ratios, non-neutral ground, and lack of a requirement to send any graduates to joint assignments? ICAF and National must send “50% plus one” graduates to joint assignments. Is this still appropriate? Should Service schools have some kind of requirement?

General Williams. At the time of NDAA FY2005, we agreed that the 60/40 mix for Senior Service Colleges was appropriate; but that it put us close to the tipping point of being able to remain within a Joint context—the Army’s center of landpower excellence. Our experience since 2006 has reinforced that conclusion. We do not believe that the host percentage should be reduced below 60 percent.

We believe that, at the time, it was absolutely appropriate to grant Senior Service Colleges JPME II credit, and is even more appropriate today. Regardless of school, curricula are focused at the strategic level, where all actions are conducted in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational context. Service Colleges should be assessed on how well they meet standards for Joint education set forth in law and the CJCS, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP). This distills down to a combination of Joint curriculum and interaction with students from different Services, countries, backgrounds, and perspectives. The Joint Staff—via the rigorous and comprehensive Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE)—ensures that the Senior Service Colleges provide an appropriate Joint curriculum. In the second instance, we know of no objective evidence to assist in determining how many officers from different Services, nations and organizations are required for acculturation to occur. We remain convinced that NDAA FY05 provisions and the OPMEP standards provide sufficient acculturation.

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Dr. Snyder. Some of you have indicated that you wish to hire “younger” PhDs. Do you think they may need a bit of seasoning or practical experience to be able to hold their own with the caliber and seniority of students you have? Does it mean you have to push out “older professors” who may be performing well in order to bring on younger ones?

General Williams. Generally, we would agree that, given our student body of 16–25 year professionals, civilian faculty need a certain degree of seasoning to be effective. However, to a large degree, this depends upon the individual faculty member and the discipline they teach. We have several relatively younger (mid-30s) visiting professors and full-time faculty who have done well in the seminar. If they have the requisite academic and publishing credentials and are effective teachers, our students respond well.

No, we believe that we can accomplish this over time through routine attrition and hiring of younger faculty. It is worth noting, however, such opportunities are limited. Within our four teaching departments, we have only 27 full-time civilian teaching positions. Of those, we would classify only 20 of those as being academically related disciplines.

Dr. Snyder. National and ICAF have 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 faculty and student mixes while the Service schools have a 60% host and 40% other mix. Are the faculty and student mixes dictated for the various institutions still appropriate? If so, was it appropriate for Congress to allow the Service senior schools to award JPME II credit (NDAA FY 2005) despite their lower ratios, non-neutral ground, and lack of a requirement to send any graduates to joint assignments? ICAF and National must send “50% plus one” graduates to joint assignments. Is this still appropriate? Should Service schools have some kind of requirement?

General Williams. At the time of NDAA FY2005, we agreed that the 60/40 mix for Senior Service Colleges was appropriate; but that it put us close to the tipping point of being able to remain within a Joint context—the Army’s center of landpower excellence. Our experience since 2006 has reinforced that conclusion. We do not believe that the host percentage should be reduced below 60 percent.

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The issue of “neutral ground” may not be relevant. At the Army War College, it’s not simply about exposing Army officers to officers from other Services. It’s also about exposing officers from other Services to officers from the U.S. Army. Similarly, the lack of a requirement to send graduates to Joint assignments does not appear to be a relevant criterion.

With the granting of JPME II authority to Senior Service Colleges, it may be appropriate to apply some assignment criteria (perhaps 50 percent plus one) to the overall output from all JPME II producing schools, vice the existing requirement
levied only on ICAF and National War College. A comprehensive requirement would give Services more flexibility in assigning students.

Dr. Snyder. What constitutes rigor in your educational program? Does rigor require letter grades? Does rigor require written exams? Does rigor require the writing of research or analytical papers, and if so, of what length? Does rigor require increased contact time and less “white space” or vice versa?

General Williams. A response to this question requires some context. Senior Level Colleges are not Ph.D. producing programs. They are professional development programs leading to a master’s degree within the confines of the profession. Programs should be viewed and students should be assessed accordingly.

For Army students, at least, depending upon career field only 4–8 percent of a year group will attend any form of Senior Level College experience. And, these individuals are selected from a group that already has passed through a considerable winnowing process of multiple promotion and selection boards. In short, these are highly qualified and successful professionals.

Historically, the bulk of our students (77–81 percent between AY06–AY09) arrive with at least one advanced degree. Of those, 3–7 percent (depending upon the year) possessed a PhD/JD/MD. In one of our most recent curriculum surveys (AY2009), over 90 percent of students indicated (across eight different categories) that their USAWC experience was equal to or more demanding than their previous graduate experiences.

We should also recall that our students are very experienced professionals, the great bulk of whom are intrinsically and highly motivated to do well. Nor should we ignore the important effect of peer pressure upon seminar dialogue. Few, if any, of our students wish to appear unprepared or foolish in front of their contemporaries.

In this light, our evaluation system for each course relies upon faculty assessment of the student’s contribution (not participation, as they can be two very different results), an oral presentation (time allowing in the course), and evaluation of a written product (the length of which varies from course to course).

The rigor applied to each of these mechanisms depends to a significant degree upon the quality of the faculty member doing the evaluation, the standards that the faculty member applies, the consistency with which the faculty member applies those standards, and the manner in which feedback is provided to the student.

Without some form of grading system, the ability to determine student performance against learning objectives is not possible. Nor without some form of assessment system can students receive appropriate feedback on how well they have performed against those standards. But, just as graduate schools use a wide variety of grading systems; Senior Level Colleges should be free to use a system that best fits their institutional needs.

Written exams may or may not be appropriate; depending upon the institution’s chosen evaluation mechanisms. But, as numerous high-quality Ph.D. programs demonstrate, written examinations are not always required for individual courses.

Written requirements are absolutely necessary. Our graduates will increasingly use written communication as their primary means of disseminating information and gaining decisions. Good writing is a reflection of good thinking, and good thinking skills are what we require of our graduates. The nature of these writing mechanisms should stem from the nature of work required by the profession. Most of our graduates will hold positions where the two-page point paper will be an art form. On some occasions, those point papers will be buttressed by 5–10 page supporting documents. Our evaluation mechanisms and writing requirements should reflect those forms of professional communication. That said, because writing is as much a thinking exercise as a research exercise, we still require students to complete a 5,000 word (roughly 20 pages) Strategy Research Project.

The answer to the issues of more or less contact time vs. “white space” depends upon the particular assessment mechanisms and methodology used by a school. If class contribution is the primary evaluation mechanism, then more contact time offers greater opportunity to observe student contributions. Conversely, if research papers are the primary mechanism, then students should have more time for research and writing, with commensurate reduction in contact time. If written tests are given, with the test material largely taken from classroom lectures, then more time in class may be appropriate. Our mix of class contribution, participation in group practical exercise, short papers (5–8 pages), and point papers (1–3 pages) benefits from a different mix of in-class instruction and time out of class for reflection.

We also want students to reflect on the curriculum in light of their experience and what that may mean for their futures. Reflection requires students to master the material, compare that substance with their professional experience, synthesize new knowledge from that comparison, and then to be prepared to use that new knowl-
edge in innovative ways to address issues that they will face in the future. Reflection requires time, which argues for more "white space."

However, the need for more reflective time directly competes with the already high and increasing demands from multiple DOD, Joint, and Service leaders who place great faith in the ability of Senior Level Colleges (and other JPME/PME institutions) to address or remediate many of the problems currently facing the force. Demands to add more subjects and material to our programs run the risk of diluting the curricula to the point where schools may be unable to provide sufficient depth of inquiry and time necessary for reflection. The irony, therefore, is that to add rigor may require reducing the curriculum, not adding to it.

Dr. Snyder. Can you describe how you survey students, graduates, and graduates' supervisors to assess the quality of your program?

General Williams. The USAWC utilizes a variety of tools to assess institutional effectiveness. The Office of Institutional Assessment prepares and analyzes surveys of students, faculty and staff, alumni, and flag officers. Our Institutional Assessment Plan and the Curriculum Assessment Plan establish a process through which students, faculty, and staff are surveyed; data are collected, analyzed, shared, and used in planning and decision-making.

Students: Incoming resident students complete a pre-assessment prior to arrival at the USAWC to determine existing levels of knowledge in areas that students will study. Respondents to the pre-assessment are administered a post-assessment survey to determine if statistically significant differences exist between their pre-and post-assessment.

Students are requested to complete surveys on each of the core courses, the Strategic Decision Making Exercise, electives, and a comprehensive end of the year assessment of the resident and distance education programs. While each Course Director (resident program) or Course Author (distance program) provides input to the surveys, we consistently address institutional level issues across all courses, to include questions regarding the curriculum, course learning objectives, faculty instruction, experiential learning opportunities, and overall level of satisfaction with the course or activity. The USAWC leadership uses the information for planning and assessment of the effectiveness of the curriculum.

Students also complete exit surveys of the Resident, Distance, and International Fellows programs that include questions on satisfaction with program components, degree to which Institutional Learning Objectives were met, and overall quality of the USAWC experience. The results are analyzed and summarized in a report to the Dean, Department Chairs, Directors, and other individuals for purposes of continuous quality improvement.

Graduates: For the USAWC curriculum to be effective, it must address the requirements of the field. The USAWC leadership and faculty must know that what is taught is what is needed for USAWC graduates to function effectively. To ensure that the curriculum reflects requirements of the field, the USAWC conducts periodic surveys of its graduates once every two years as part of its curriculum evaluation and strategic planning cycle.

Graduates' Supervisors: General Officers of the Army, Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard are surveyed formally once every two years to obtain their views on the USAWC curriculum which are incorporated into curriculum revision. Respondents give their views toward the primary focus of a Senior Service College, skills senior officers will most need in the next 10 to 15 years, and adequacy of the USAWC curriculum.

Dr. Snyder. Should the OSD Chancellors office be reestablished? Why or Why not?

General Williams. We do not see the necessity of such an initiative. On a professional level, the CJCS via the Joint Staff oversees and accredits our JPME producing programs. The Army via Training and Doctrine Command oversees the Army PME portion of our curricula. Academically, the Middle States Commission on Higher Education (our regional accrediting body) oversees the accreditation of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. Adding a fourth layer of oversight seems neither useful to the PME/JPME institutions nor an efficient and effective expenditure of resources.

Dr. Snyder. Ethics—what should be the role of ethical education at the senior schools beyond “Just War” theory?

General Williams. The teaching of ethics at senior service schools should go far beyond that of “Just War” theory. If we want our students to advise and act to do what is right for the Nation, it is important and necessary for them to consider and study moral understanding, to understand the nature of personal responsibility, and to be able to think about and discuss ethical issues without confusion. This is difficult to do without some education on the ideas that have been developed and dis-
discussed by many of the greatest minds over the centuries. To that end, the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) treats the study of ethics in a holistic way, with an integrative approach to the core and elective curriculum. I’m confident that a similar approach exists in the other Senior Service Colleges and at the National Defense University, but I’ll limit my response to the Army War College experience.

Ethics has for years been identified as one of our “enduring themes” to guide our curriculum development and education experience. As such, the USAWC formally presents the study of ethics across the core curriculum. Chronologically, the students review the role and importance of Ethical Reasoning as a dedicated lesson within our Strategic Thinking course. They study Just War Theory (justification for war and just conduct in war) during our Theory of War and Strategy course. Then, students study Ethics of the Military Profession and Ethics for Strategic Leaders during two lessons in our Strategic Leadership course. A new reading this year will focus on the ethical use of power and authority as strategic leaders contemplate their roles in acquisition, resource stewardship, and advancing the health of their institution. During this course, we also host a funded guest lecturer to present to the students and faculty on the ethical perspectives of a national security issue of current interest. Finally, students study civil-military relations during our National Security, Policy, and Strategy course.

Ethics retains a prominent role in our elective program, with a highly subscribed course entitled, “Ethics and Warfare.” Additionally, in academic year 2009, Ethics was the theme of our Commandant’s Lecture Series, during which we hosted a number of internationally recognized speakers on a range of related topics including issues like; the limits of dissent and the role of proportionality in 21st Century.

I am convinced that a broad exposure to—and application of—the study of ethics throughout the year of senior service schools is crucial to the preparation of our students for continued service and leadership at more senior levels, both in their Services and in governmental agencies. We continue to look for such integrative experiences at the US Army War College at Carlisle Barracks.

Dr. SNYDER. Should each school have a Board of Visitors or Consultants, separate from your University’s, so it could focus just on your mission?

General WILLIAMS. As the USAWC is not part of a university system, our Board of Visitors focuses solely on the USAWC mission.

Dr. SNYDER. The terms “training” and “education” seem to be used interchangeably quite a bit. Can you tell me how you define the difference and what part of your curriculum is training and which part is education?

General FORSYTH. We do not use these terms interchangeably at the Air War College. Air Force doctrine differentiates between education and training as follows: “Although both education and training are essential to operational capability, they are fundamentally different. Education prepares individuals for dynamic operational environments, while training is essential in developing skill sets for complex systems . . . . the distinction between their essential natures remains critical to the success of each.”*

This doctrine document distinguishes education from training through the following comparisons:* 

1. Training
   a. Functions best within defined parameters and expected environments
   b. Develops skills that are usually limited to the specialty related to that skill set
   c. Does not involve developing logic talents to create new thought
   d. Diminishes in value with uncertainty; the further the situation progresses from the talents of the individual, the less effective the individual becomes in implementing a successful solution

2. Education
   a. Prepares people to cope with ill-defined parameters and reduce uncertainties
   b. Prepares the individual to think critically and creatively leading to solutions of unfamiliar problems
   c. Increases in value in the face of uncertainty and continually evolving situations
   d. Open-ended, looking strategically at relationships, synergies, and second/third order effects

Air Force doctrine also highlights the dominance of education at the strategic level stating “education and training at the strategic level assists in developing the skills to form accurate frames of reference, make sound decisions, uncover under-

*AFDD 1–1 “Leadership and Force Development” 18 Feb 2006
lying connections to deal with more general issues, and engage in creative, innovative thinking that recognizes new solutions and new options. At this level, education assumes a predominant role in an Airman’s development. Education emphasizes understanding of broad concepts and offers insights into complex issues not commonly available in operational environments. It focuses on the institutional Air Force and joint, interagency, business, and international views.”

The Air War College educational philosophy aligns with these doctrinal tenets, focused on education at the strategic level in the joint, international and interagency environment. Air War College focuses exclusively on education, leaving training to be conducted at the appropriate commander or functional course.

Dr. Snyder. The 1989 Skelton Panel Report said all the Commandants and Presidents should teach so that they would understand what it takes to be a faculty member. Can you describe a typical faculty member’s day? Do you yourself teach or mentor individual students?

a. Unlike civilian university professors who emphasize research, your faculty members generally do not have teaching assistants, research assistants, or set office hours. When do they have time for service, research, and writing? How much research and writing do you expect them to do outside the sabbatical windows? How is this assessed on their appraisals, military and civilian?

General Forsyth. Understanding what it takes to be a faculty member is an essential element of successful war college leadership. I do not, however, feel it is fundamentally different from the challenge of leading any complex organization; success does not require that the leader maintain all of the same tactical-level duties and certifications as line members of the organization. I maintain awareness of what it takes to be a faculty member by observing seminars and lectures, through course and curriculum reviews and through daily interaction with the faculty and students. All of my subordinate leaders such as deans, department chairs and course directors maintain their faculty qualifications and actively teach in the classroom. I act as a mentor for both faculty and students. From setting my expectations at the start of the academic year to periodic meetings with faculty and student leaders to sessions with the entire student body, my leadership style is personal, direct and hands-on. I have given numerous lectures in the leadership series and in the warfighting course in addition to addressing several elective classes.

A typical faculty member’s day varies according to the academic calendar. While the faculty member’s core course is “on the boards” (typically three to five months of the year), the majority of the day is spent advising student research, teaching and preparing to teach. The average week consists of two or three three-hour classroom sessions, usually two faculty workshops to prepare for those sessions, with the remaining time spent in preparation for class. When “off the boards” faculty members will still advise students and most likely will be developing curriculum for the next academic period. They may teach an elective course one or two days a week, pursue individual research interests, and attend conferences or other faculty development events to ensure they stay current and relevant.

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Although the Air War College does not have teaching or research assistants, we do have supporting structures, for example, that assist faculty members by obtaining copyrights for articles and assembling and producing course readers. The faculty and students collaborate on research projects which can result in edited volumes. Civilian faculty members participate in sabbaticals for research, including a standing agreement to provide one faculty member annually to the Air Force Research Institute to share research time between directed topics and topics of personal interest. When not on sabbatical, a faculty member’s workplan typically specifies completion of one journal article and one op-ed piece as minimum annual requirements. Military faculty members are expected to produce at least one journal article during their tour at the Air War College. Supervisors assess research and writing for both civilian and military faculty on annual appraisals based on individual workplans which outline expectations in the three areas of teaching, research and publication, and service to the institution. The Air University Commander has outlined these expectations for faculty at all Air University schools. Teaching is priority one for all faculty, followed in priority by research then service for civilian faculty and service.
then research for military faculty.† Within that broad guidance, supervisors build annual workplans for each faculty member, articulating specific, individually-tailored expectations and goals in the areas of teaching, research and publication, and service.

The research results speak for themselves. Over the last three academic years, Air War College faculty members have produced 13 books, 26 book chapters, and 69 journal articles. Faculty members have five books in the queue for publication in the coming academic year.

Dr. SNYDER. Does having a master's degree program at these schools detract from the PME mission, not from the standpoint of it being easy to accredit existing programs, but that it may tip the focus toward the academic instead of professional education?

General FORSYTH. The Air War College focuses first and foremost on delivering the best possible professional military education. Because we maintain the rigor of a graduate school with a PME curriculum created and taught by a highly-qualified graduate faculty, we have been able to achieve accreditation for our master's degree from the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools. This is a virtuous circle as accreditation helps us attract faculty members who are second to none, which in turn improves our PME curriculum and teaching.

The decision to maintain accreditation provides a master's degree for our graduates and translates into civilian terms the importance we place on rigorous education. We did not seek the master's degree for its own sake but rather as an acknowledgement of the quality of the PME educational experience and the importance of that experience to the Service. I believe that an academic focus and a professional education focus are complementary rather than conflicting.

Dr. SNYDER. Do all of your students receive master's degrees—why or why not? What does top quality in uniformed faculty mean to you? Please be specific, is it more important to have an advanced degree in specific areas like international relations, political science, a regional study, or military or political history than it is to have a PhD in any subject even if that was in math or engineering?

General FORSYTH. All US students, military and civilian, selected to attend Air War College in residence who possess a bachelor's degree or equivalent from a US college are enrolled in the master's degree program and will receive a Masters of Strategic Studies upon successful completion of Air War College. International Fellows who possess a US bachelor's degree or its equivalent (or meet admission requirements through the portfolio admission process) and meet English proficiency requirements by achieving a qualifying score on the Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL) may apply for admittance into the master's degree program. International Fellows who do not qualify, or choose not to apply, to the master's degree program receive an Air War College Diploma but not a master's degree upon graduation.* On average, approximately one-half of the 45 International Fellows are admitted to the master's program. Thus approximately 90% of the students in an average Air War College class receive master's degrees while the remaining 10% are international fellows who either choose not to apply or do not meet the master's admissions standards. Air War College perceives the master's degree as giving credit to the students where credit has been earned since the program meets the master's degree accreditation requirements of the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools.

What does top quality in uniformed faculty mean to you? Please be specific, is it more important to have an advanced degree in specific areas like international relations, political science, a regional study, or military or political history than it is to have a PhD in any subject even if that was in math or engineering?

Air War College defines top quality uniformed faculty as those who: possess a master's degree in a curriculum-relevant subject, are graduates of in-residence senior-level PME, are joint qualified officers (JQO), have commanded at two levels (squadron and group or wing for Air Force and equivalents for other Services), and have the background (air/land/sea/space/cyberspace operations, support, etc) necessary to develop and teach the curriculum. For example, the Air War College definitely prefers to have faculty members with PhDs in fields relevant to the PME curriculum such as history or international relations. But so few officers with such advanced degrees also have two levels of command and are JQOs that we may, with full knowledge, hire someone without all of those credentials to get a uniformed
PhD faculty member who meets our current requirements and needs. Conversely, a candidate with a PhD in an area such as math or engineering may not fare well in the selection process without two levels of command or JQO status since those terminal degrees are not as applicable to the curriculum. The ability to make such judgment calls is essential to recruiting and maintaining the highest quality military faculty possible with the diversity of experience needed to teach and refresh the curriculum while still being current and relevant.

Dr. Snyder. What does "top quality" mean for civilian faculty? Please be specific.

General Forsyth. Air War College defines a top quality civilian faculty as those who have: experience in the subject matter sought in the vacancy, evidence of academic activity and service, a record of publication in peer-reviewed outlets in the subject matter sought or related fields, and evidence of outstanding teaching and superior credentials. The Air War College's recent track record on hiring top quality faculty is very good; we recently hired a PhD from the University of Chicago who was teaching there and a PhD from Harvard University who was teaching at the London School of Economics. The majority of our civilian faculty members have earned their terminal degrees in top-30 universities such as Harvard University, University of Chicago, University of North Carolina, Georgetown University, University of Illinois, etc.

Tenure is an issue for some members of the faculty. There have been in the past some candidates vying for vacant faculty positions that have either voiced their concerns or withdrawn themselves from consideration after discovering we do not have a tenure track. The most often cited benefits of a tenure system would be to protect faculty members from the vagaries of faculty management policy changes and to provide additional reassurances on the promise of academic freedom.

Air University has a clearly articulated policy on academic freedom which is an amended form of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) definition of academic freedom. The Air University Policy states:

Air University faculty, students, and staff are members of a learned profession, and members of their respective educational organizations. The free exchange of opinions and ideas is essential to the educational process and, to the greatest extent possible, faculty, students, and staff are encouraged to speak and write freely. Even in this academic setting, however, the importance of the University's military mission requires limits on some types of expression. For example, in accordance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), commissioned officers, officer trainees, and cadets may not use contemptuous words toward the President, Vice President, Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force, and others. In addition, military members may not make disrespectful remarks about a superior commissioned officer, nor may an enlisted member make a disrespectful statement toward a superior noncommissioned officer. In addition to these specific restrictions on military members, faculty, students, and staff should remember that the public might judge the armed forces or Air University by their spoken or written statements. In any public forum, faculty, students, and staff members should make every effort to indicate clearly that the opinions they express are personal to the member, and do not represent the official views of their organization, Air University, the United States Air Force, the US government, or any other government or academic community.

The concerns some faculty members have expressed about variability of faculty management policies requires a more detailed explanation. The authority for hiring and reappointing civilian faculty members rests with the Air University Commandant, not the Air War College Commandant. Air University offered a tenure track for Air War College faculty until 1 May 2003. Without tenure, the length of an appointment period has been a concern for faculty members. Air Force policy states that initial appointments will not normally exceed three years. Air University policy is that subsequent reappointments after that initial three-year term are for periods of one to five years. While the faculty maintains confidence in the Air War College Commandant's ability to represent their interests adequately at the Air University level, some find disconcerting the fact that, in the absence of tenure, their Commandant is not the decision authority for reappointments.

Dr. Snyder. Since you don't have tenure, what is the process for renewal and non-renewal of the civilian faculty? How transparent is the system? Do professors know

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* Source AUI 36–2308
** Source AFI 36–804
*** Source AU Sup to AFI 36–804
six months before they are up for renewal whether they will be renewed, for how long, and why? In a tenure system people think the faculty members have all the power, in a no-tenure system it appears that the school has unlimited power. How do you avoid the extremes and appearances of arbitrariness? How many of your civilian faculty don't have PhDs or JDs? Be specific about what degrees they do have and why they were hired.

General Forsyth. Currently, the Air University Commander is the authority for reappointing civilian faculty members, not the Air War College Commandant. Therefore, Air University outlines the reappointment process in the Air University supplement to Air Force Instruction (AFI) 36–804 “Civilian Faculty Pay Plan for Air University and the USAF Academy.” Implementation guidance for Air University Instructions is contained in Spaatz Center for Officer Education Operating Instruction 36–3, “Faculty Management,” and Air War College supplement to AFI36–804, “Air War College Civilian Faculty Pay Plan Procedures.” A brief summary of the process follows.

The reappointment process normally begins 12 months prior to the expiration of a faculty member’s current appointment. Air University policy requires that any non-renewal decision must be communicated to the faculty member in writing at least 12 months before the effective date for those on an appointment of two years or longer.* The faculty member’s supervisor prepares a staff summary sheet which details the faculty member’s current appointment data and the requested reappointment terms. The faculty member’s vita or resume is attached as supporting documentation and forwarded to the Dean of Academics and the Air War College Commandant for review. The Air War College Commandant signs the staff summary sheet and sends the renewal package to the Air University Commander for approval. Once approved, the faculty member’s supervisor explains the terms of reappointment approved by the Air University Commander to the faculty member. In most cases, these should be the same terms the Commandant recommended with the initial package. In those cases where the approved terms are different than the ones the Air War College Commandant recommended, the rationale for the change will be communicated back to the faculty member. There are two exceptions to the general procedures as outlined: one for renewal of faculty completing their initial appointment and one for faculty being nominated for the maximum five-year renewal.

Air War College faculty members seeking renewal upon completion of their initial appointment assemble a more detailed package summarizing their teaching, research and publication, and service to the institution during their initial period of appointment. This package is submitted to the Air War College Review Group, a faculty advisory committee that makes recommendations to the Dean of Academics on initial reappointments and promotions. Members of the committee, two military and three civilian, are senior faculty members elected by their peers. The committee makes its recommendation on reappointment to the dean, who forwards it along with the more detailed reappointment package to the Air War College Commandant for review.

The second exception to the normal process occurs when the Air War College Commandant requests a five-year reappointment. It is Air University policy that the longest reappointment period will be five years. The current Air University policy is to not accept a five-year reappointment request until 120 days prior to the expiration of the faculty member’s current appointment rather than 12 months prior as is the case for reappointments of less than five years. * In a tenure system people think the faculty members have all the power, in a no-tenure system it appears that the school has unlimited power. How do you avoid the extremes and appearances of arbitrariness?

The levels of review and approval in the reappointment process, the use of standard reappointment periods and the peer review provided by the College Review Group for initial reappointments mitigate against extremes and arbitrariness. Without tenure, however, the length of an appointment period has been a concern for some faculty members. Air Force policy states that initial appointments will not normally exceed three years. ** Air University policy is that subsequent reappointments after that initial three-year term are for periods of one to five years. While the faculty maintains confidence in the Air War College Commandant’s ability to represent their interests adequately at the Air University level, some find disconcerting the fact that, in the absence of tenure, their Commandant is not the decision authority for reappointments.

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* Source AU Sup to AFI 36–804
** Source AFI 36–804
How many of your civilian faculty don’t have PhDs or JDs? Be specific about what degrees they do have and why they were hired.

Fully 20 of the 21 authorized Title 10 civilian faculty members have a terminal degree. The one civilian faculty member without a terminal degree is currently serving in the leadership department. He was hired based on his demonstrated teaching ability, as well as the understanding of military leadership that he demonstrated to the hiring committee, developed from his extensive record as a successful leader in both combat and in peacetime. He possesses a BA from Auburn University in American History, and a Masters of Military Art and Science from Central Missouri University.

Dr. Snyder. Some of you have indicated that you wish to hire “younger” PhDs. Do you think they may need a bit of seasoning or practical experience to be able to hold their own with the caliber and seniority of students you have? Does it mean you have to push out “older professors” who may be performing well in order to bring on younger ones?

General Forsyth. The Air War College has no intention of “pushing out” older professors to bring in younger ones. Furthermore, we would only consider hiring a candidate who can and will be relevant and has demonstrated through the hiring process that he or she would excel in our seminar teaching environment. Effective teaching is our number one goal.

Dr. Snyder. National and ICAF have 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 faculty and student mixes while the Service schools have a 60% host and 40% other mix. Are the faculty and student mixes dictated for the various institutions still appropriate? If so, was it appropriate for Congress to allow the Service senior schools to award JPME II credit (NDAA FY 2005) despite their lower ratios, non-neutral ground, and lack of a requirement to send any graduates to joint assignments? ICAF and National must send “50% plus one” graduates to joint assignments. Is this still appropriate? Should Service schools have some kind of requirement?

General Forsyth. I believe the 60% host, 40% other faculty mix is appropriate for the Air War College. Because civilian faculty are not included in the faculty mix calculation, it is important to note that uniformed Air Force officers only comprise one-third of the total Air War College faculty, a much lower percentage than the 60% military target would indicate. The Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) rigorously administered by the Joint Staff confirmed that Air War College is meeting the joint learning outcomes dictated by the officer professional military education policy. The 40% non-host faculty requirement gives us enough sister-service officers to meet the acculturation goals of Phase II joint professional military education while preserving enough room on the faculty to cover the breadth of Air Force experience needed to educate officers on the strategic role of the air component in joint, interagency and multinational operations.

With respect to Joint assignments for the graduates, this is really an issue for the individual service personnel system and the needs of the individual services. The Headquarters Air Force A1 Personnel office has expressed to me that for NDU they continue to support the 50+1. All that said, it is important to note that the quality of Air War College’s joint education is not influenced by whether an officer is going immediately to a joint assignment, or going to command after graduation with the potential for a joint assignment to follow.

Dr. Snyder. What constitutes rigor in your educational program? Does rigor require letter grades? Does rigor require written exams? Does rigor require the writing of research or analytical papers, and if so, of what length? Does rigor require increased contact time and less “white space” or vice versa?

General Forsyth. Rigor encompasses grading, active learning (seminars, reading, research and writing) and accountability for student performance. The Air War College program combines all of these elements to create a rigorous academic program. Students receive letter grades in every core and elective course. Grading for all courses measure student performance in deliverables such as papers, essay exams and presentations as well as class participation against objective criteria. 80% of the Air War College program is devoted to active learning: individual reading, exercises and seminar discussions. All exams given at the Air War College are in-class essay exams or take-home papers varying from 5 to 15 pages in length. Students complete a professional studies research paper of approximately 20 pages with the goal of publishing their work in a journal. The key measure of rigor is not contact time, but time spent in active learning. Rigor is not increased by adding additional hours to the program, but by maintaining seminar interaction and student accountability during the contact hours on the schedule. The “white space” on the schedule is anything but time off. It is essential time scheduled to give the students time to prepare for class, during which they are held accountable for their classroom participation.
Dr. Snyder. Can you describe how you survey students, graduates, and graduates' supervisors to assess the quality of your program?

General Forsyth. The Air War College executes an aggressive closed-loop feedback process to assess quality and constantly improve our program. While any student can critique any event, each week during the academic year we ask one third (rotating thirds) of the AWC class to provide feedback for the lectures, seminars, readings, and guest speakers delivered that week. These surveys provide a method to detect and influence immediate trends. At end of each core and elective course, all students and the faculty who taught the course are asked to provide feedback on the effectiveness, structure, relevance, and workload of the course as well as whether the course achieved its stated educational objectives. Just prior to graduation, we survey the students on the overall program, soliciting their feedback on whether the program achieved our published educational outcomes, the proportion of curriculum devoted to various courses, instructional methodologies and support. The end of course and graduate survey return rates give us a 95% confidence that the survey results accurately reflect the opinion of the student population within 5%. Finally, surveys are sent to graduates and the graduates' supervisors approximately 18 months after graduation to determine how the educational program helped the graduates perform in their current positions. All of this survey data is used to inform decisions of the curriculum builders, and is briefed to the commandant as part of the course approval process.

Dr. Snyder. Should the OSD Chancellor’s office be reestablished? Why or why not?

General Forsyth. I was not yet the Air War College Commandant when OSD had a Chancellor’s office and therefore am not personally aware of all of the functions that office served. That said, it is my opinion that the Air War College currently receives sufficient guidance and oversight from the Air University Board of Visitors, the Air University Staff, the Air Force staff via the Air Force Learning Council, the Joint staff via the Process for Accreditation of Joint Education and the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools through accreditation of the master’s degree program.

Dr. Snyder. Ethics—what should be the role of ethical education at the senior schools beyond “just war” theory?

General Forsyth. The Air War College program features a strong emphasis on ethics and we recently expanded the role of ethics education in the curriculum. Additionally, we emphasize the distinction between legal behavior and ethical behavior. Specifically, our Joint Strategic Leadership course incorporates the following instructional periods: establishing organizational ethics and values, ethical military leadership and just war, ethical dilemmas for senior leaders, and senior leader failures. Additionally, we offer the following electives which also deal with the subject: Legally Leading the Fight: New Mercenaries—The Causes and Consequences of Military Privatization; Command and Conscience; Right, Wrong, and In-Between: Ethics and Senior Leaders; Just War Theory and Application: Classical Wisdom and Contemporary Conflict; Why Insurgencies Win (and Lose) and Comparative Civil-Military Relations.

Dr. Snyder. Should each school have a Board of Visitors or Consultants, separate from your University’s, so it could focus just on your mission?

General Forsyth. Not in my opinion. When the decision was made to pursue accreditation for Air University rather than accrediting individual schools, the then-existing advisory boards for individual degree-granting schools were abolished and replaced by the single Air University Board instituted under the auspices of the Air University Chief Academic Officer. The Air War College receives sufficient guidance and oversight from the Air University Board of Visitors, the Air University Staff, the Air Staff via the Air Force Learning Council, and the Joint staff via the process for accreditation of joint education. I see no additional value for an Air War College board of visitors separate from the existing Air University board.

Dr. Snyder. Has full funding been secured for the Field Studies component of the Regional and Cultural Studies Course.

General Forsyth. The Regional and Cultural Studies Course has been underfunded since 2003 as the costs of travel continue to rise while the available budget has remained unchanged. Indicative of the value Air War College places on this course, we reduced the scope of the field study while diverting funds from other needs such as faculty development travel to pay for this program. Cost cutting measures taken included reducing the number of days for field study from 14 to 12, visiting fewer countries, reducing the number of trips, cutting faculty members on each trip from three to two, booking circuitous but less expensive travel and purchasing non-refundable airline tickets. For unrelated reasons, the Air War College...
student load was reduced 10% last academic year which reduced overall costs and allowed the budget to cover approximately 99% of the program.

As we make our cost estimates for the coming academic year, we believe the costs of the Regional and Cultural Studies Course will exceed our current budget by $120K. Having exhausted all cost saving measures we can implement and still execute a viable educational course, any more cuts will result in cancellation of the program. In previous years, Air War College and Air University have been able to shift funds from other programs in the year of execution to make up the Regional and Cultural Studies budget deficit, though growing budget pressures may ultimately place this program at risk.

Dr. Snyder. The terms “training” and “education” seem to be used interchangeably quite a bit. Can you tell me how you define the difference and what part of your curriculum is training and which part is education?

Colonel Belcher. Thank you for this insightful question. It cuts directly to the core of the Marine Corps War College’s organizational mission and educational philosophy. The Marine Corps War College develops exceptional leaders through a tailored combination of training, experience, and education gained throughout each Marine’s career. Training is a formalized process wherein students develop skills and behaviors in order to address known issues and events. It begins with entry-level training and is sustained through the completion of advanced schools and courses. Conversely, education is an experiential process wherein students develop the ability to think critically and creatively in order to address unexpected issues or events. Education allows the student to see beyond training and personal experience to operate successfully in a complex and dynamic environment. Per the direction of the 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Alfred Gray, “the education will emphasize how to think and stress the development of a logical thought process.” The Marine Corps adage that best summarizes the difference is: “We train for certainty, but educate for uncertainty.”

For this reason as military officers and government officials progress through their careers, the emphasis of their professional development correspondingly shifts from training to education. Consequently, as the Marine Corps’ Top-Level School, the Marine Corps War College’s focused almost exclusively on education. The College’s objective is to educate them to think independently and innovatively about the strategic military issues facing our Nation, rather than to train them for their next position. Therefore, the curriculum is broad-based and balanced, embracing not only military matters, but also history, philosophy, culture, economics, geography, and geopolitics, to provide the student with a wide intellectual aperture to view the world. The curriculum does include minimal training, primarily focused on the implementation of Department of Defense and Marine Corps policies such as equal opportunity, sexual assault prevention, suicide awareness, and safety. Even when presenting such training, the College seeks to expand the students understanding of the issue through critical analysis and open discussion. In this way, the College can better prepare students to not only adhere to such policies, but to establish and enforce such policies in their future roles as strategic leaders and planners.

Dr. Snyder. The 1989 Skelton Panel Report said all the Commandants and Presidents should teach so that they would understand what it takes to be a faculty member. Can you describe a typical faculty member’s day? Do you yourself teach or mentor individual students? a. Unlike civilian university professors who emphasize research, your faculty members generally do not have teaching assistants, research assistants, or set office hours. When do they have time for service, research, and writing? How much research and writing do you expect them to do outside the sabbatical windows? How is this assessed on their appraisals, military and civilian?

Colonel Belcher. The Marine Corps War College is first and foremost a teaching organization. However, in order for the faculty to maximize their educational effectiveness, they must continually grow through scholarly research and professional development. Recognizing this fact, the College’s leadership affords the faculty significant autonomy in scheduling their daily routines to meet their professional educational requirements as well as their personal scholarly needs. Consequently, each day may vary based on the particular faculty member’s participation in curriculum development, curriculum presentation, reading, research, or professional development activities. Typically, a faculty member will arrive at the College in the morning to finalize preparations for the first seminar. After reviewing correspondence, conferring with colleagues, and reviewing the courseware, the faculty member commences instruction. The faculty member then teaches either one three-hour seminar or two two-hour seminars based on the subject, the chosen instructional methodology, or the desired student-to-instructor ratio. The afternoon is generally reserved for the faculty member to conduct student counseling, mentoring, course preparation, professional reading, and research. Faculty members frequently capitalize on
this time to participate in meetings, symposia, conferences, and panels which advance their expertise in education as well as their respective field of study.

In academic year 2009, I taught the College’s course entitled “Economics as an Instrument of National Power” to include leading a field study trip to the New York City Financial District. Additionally, I mentor the students regarding personal, professional and academic issues throughout the year. To that end, I conduct initial, intermediate and final interviews with each student. Each week during a Director’s synthesis session, I query the students individually and collectively regarding the effectiveness of the curriculum and its presentation. I also meet weekly with the Student Class Leader to respond to questions and resolve concerns. Finally, I personally mentor each of the Marine Corps students. I monitor their academic progress and provide personalized guidance to prepare them for follow-on assignments to senior-level staff and command billets.

Although the College is primarily a teaching institution, faculty members are highly encouraged to conduct independent research and writing. The objectives of this effort are twofold and mutually supporting. First, such projects keep the faculty members up to date in their respective field of study, allowing them to better educate their students. Secondly, such projects enhance the College’s academic reputation while expanding its outreach efforts. Due to the individual and organizational benefits derived from such endeavors, faculty members are granted time in their daily schedules to conduct reading and research. While not required to research and write, faculty members are rewarded for doing so. Such extracurricular efforts are noted on performance appraisals and factored into the selection of faculty members for personal recognition or rewards.

Expanded research opportunities are available to the faculty through the Marine Corps University’s Personal Development Offsite Program. After completing five years of continuous service, teaching faculty members may apply for a six-month professional enrichment period during which he/she is expected to enhance his/her professional abilities while producing an academic product.

Finally, the College is currently assessing the viability of implementing an internship program wherein local civilian graduate students would be given the opportunity to serve as Research Assistants. This program would provide the interns with a greater understanding of US military and government organizations and operations while earning them academic credit at their parent institution. It would provide the faculty with assistance in expanding the breadth and depth of their research efforts.

Dr. Snyder. Does having a master’s degree program at these schools detract from the PME mission, not from the standpoint of it being easy to accredit existing programs, but that it may tip the focus toward the academic instead of professional education?

Colonel Belcher. The master’s degree program does not detract from the Marine Corps War College’s professional military education mission. In fact, it enhances it. Following his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on July 12, 1989, the 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Alfred M. Gray, directed the development of “a world-class” educational institution for the study of war and the profession of arms. In August 1990, an elite group of six Lieutenant Colonels convened to participate in “The Art of War Studies Program,” the precursor of the Marine Corps War College. Since then the College has grown in size and scope, yet remained true to its charter and intent focused on producing the Nation’s next generation of strategists.

In August 2001, the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS) accredited the College to grant a Master of Strategic Studies to students who successfully complete the curriculum. By focusing on how to teach, vice what to teach, SACS scrutiny of the curriculum added increased rigor and discipline to the process of preparing, presenting, and assessing professional military education. Though routine interaction SACS personnel and periodic assessments, the College was able to better leverage civilian educational “best practices” then apply them to the instruction of military strategy and war-fighting. Due to lessons learned from SACS accreditation, the University implemented numerous progressive educational measures to include the establishment of a rigorous course development process as well as the institutionalization of a Board of Visitors and a Directorate for Institutional Research and Effectiveness.

Dr. Snyder. Do all of your students receive master’s degrees—why or why not?

What does top quality in uniformed faculty mean to you? Please be specific, is it more important to have an advanced degree in specific areas like international relations, political science, a regional study, or military or political history than it is to have a PhD in any subject even if that was in math or engineering?
Colonel Belcher. All of the students who successfully complete the Marine Corps War College Master of Strategic Studies curriculum are granted a diploma. Students who fail to successfully complete the master's degree curriculum, yet complete the course are granted a certificate of completion. Due to the high quality of military officers and government officials selected to attend the Marine Corps War College, no student failed to earn a master's degree in since the College began awarding degrees in 2001.

My definition of a “top quality” military faculty member is an officer who has demonstrated exceptional proficiency and exemplary professionalism in both operational and academic environments. Such an officer should be broadly educated, possess the occupational expertise and operational experience required to present timely and detailed instruction. The officer should be a graduate of a Senior Level Service College, possess at least a Master's degree, and be a designated Joint Qualified Officer. In fact, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff requires that 75% of the faculty be Senior Level School graduates or Joint Qualified Officers. The Marine Corps War College is in full compliance with this criterion. Preferably, the candidate should also have experience as an instructor at a military or civilian graduate-level institution. The officer should possess both occupational and operational credibility gained through recent experience in command and staff positions. Lastly, the officer should be competitive for positions of higher rank and responsibility. The College policy is to risk continuity for capability and select upwardly mobile officers who may transfer early due to their selection for promotion or command.

Historically, the other Services have provided the College with a number of potential candidates for each Service Chair. When selecting a Chair, the College leadership carefully evaluates each candidate's level of education and area of study. All other factors being equal, I believe an officer with an advanced degree in the specific area (i.e. international politics, political science a regional study or military history) he/she will instruct is preferable to an officer with a terminal degree in a more general area of study (i.e. math or engineering). A focused educational background lessens the learning curve, enabling the incoming officer to more quickly master the course material and commence instruction. More closely tailored, academic credentials increase an officer's instructional capabilities, as well as his/her credibility and confidence. In my opinion, military occupational and operational experience more easily compensate for the lack of prestige and rigor of a terminal degree than the other way around.

The military faculty is a vital to the currency and credibility of educational program. Consequently, the College seeks only the best candidates—those officers with the expertise, experience, and education to instruct and inspire the Nation’s future strategic leaders, planners, and policy-makers.

Dr. Snyder. What does “top quality” mean for civilian faculty? Please be specific.

a. Does not having tenure affect how professors treat “academic freedom”? Colonel Belcher. My definition of a “top quality” civilian faculty member is a scholar and educator who possesses 1) expertise in his/her respective field of study, 2) operational experience in curriculum-related areas, 3) a general knowledge of adult educational methodology and most importantly 4) a passion for developing curriculum and teaching our unique type of student. Such an individual should possess a terminal degree, yet remain a life-long student of his/her craft, continuously pursuing greater understanding of the subject though reading, research, reflection, and participation in scholarly form. He/she should be proficient in written and oral communications, able to translate complex issues into understandable terms applicable to any audience—students or scholars. We have two types of civilian faculty at the Senior Schools, Agency Chairs and Title 10 full-time professors. A terminal degree is required for the Title 10 professors and desired for Agency Chairs.

The lack of tenure does not affect the “academic freedom” enjoyed by the faculty of the Marine Corps War College. As an institution, the College believes that “academic freedom” is fostered by a positive organizational culture, not guaranteed employment. It springs from an academic environment in which faculty and students alike are encouraged to voice their opinions on any relevant subjects in open, scholarly debate without risk of rebuke or reprisal. Such opinions must be expressed in a well-researched, well-reasoned, and rationale manner, based on valid, empirical data and devoid of emotion. The College’s strict non-attribution policy also safeguards academic freedom. It allows faculty, students and guest speakers who might otherwise be hesitant to express their opinions to voice their thoughts without fear of further dissemination. The College attempts to foster such an open atmosphere by routinely hosting panels of subject matter experts to debate controversial issues as civilian-military relations, media coverage of military operations, and the impacts of repealing the Department of Defense’s “Don’t Ask; Don’t Tell” policy. Similarly, the College encourages faculty and students to write and publish scholarly works.
on topical issues. For example, one professor recently submitted a chapter entitled "The Sky Won’t Fall: Policy Recommendations for Allowing Homosexuals to Serve Openly in the U.S. Military" to the forthcoming Department of Defense book entitled Social Policy Perspectives 2010. By providing a safe and supportive organizational climate, the College generates more academic freedom than tenure ever could.

Dr. Snyder. Since you don’t have tenure, what is the process for renewal and non-renewal of the civilian faculty? How transparent is the system? Do professors know six months before they are up for renewal whether they will be renewed, for how long, and why? In a tenure system people think the faculty members have all the power, in a no-tenure system it appears that the school has unlimited power. How do you avoid the extremes and appearances of arbitrariness? How many of your civilian faculty don’t have PhDs or JDs? Be specific about what degrees they do have and why they were hired.

Colonel Belcher. Civilian faculty members are hired under Title 10 authority granted to the President of Marine Corps University by the Secretary of the Navy. Civilian faculty members are offered a one, two or three-year appointment based on the needs of the college and the individual’s qualifications. New civilian faculty members undergo a one-year probationary period during which their performance is evaluated. During the period, they are supervised and counseled on a periodic basis regarding their performance by the Director and the Dean of Academics.

The faculty evaluation and renewal system is extremely transparent to the individual. He/she will receive periodic counseling as well as an annual performance appraisal. At least seven months prior to the end of the faculty member’s appointment, the Director of the college or school recommends to the President of the University whether the faculty member’s appointment should be renewed and for what period of time. If the University does not intend to retain an individual, the individual will be formally and informally counseled regarding his/her substandard performance and be given the means to improve. If he/she fails to improve, his/her performance appraisal will document the fact and state the reason for termination.

To avoid any appearance of arbitrariness, the College leadership manages the civilian faculty in an upfront and forthright manner, providing maximum transparency while maintaining open, two-way lines of communication. First, the College ensures that all rules governing policies and procedures are clearly delineated and equitably applied. Each faculty member is provided a College Faculty Handbook and Marine Corps University Title 10 Faculty Handbook which outlines the College’s policies for the handling of reappointments, terminations, appeals, and grievances.

Second, demonstrating its long-term commitment to its faculty despite the absence of tenure, the College invests time and funds into an aggressive faculty development program. The program seeks to advance the faculty members personal and professional abilities through participation in functional area and academic meetings, panels, conferences, symposium, field studies, courses, and classes. By investing in each faculty member’s development, the College develops a stronger cadre of instructors while recognizing the symbiotic and mutually supportive relationship between the individual and the institution.

All, but one, of the College’s civilian faculty members possess a Doctorate or Juris Doctorate degree. The sole exception is the Department of State Chair who is a very seasoned Foreign Service Officer and holds the rank of Minister-Counselor. A graduate of the National War College, he also instructed at the Foreign Service Institute in Arlington, VA. Between the six civilian faculty members they hold five Doctorates, one Jurist Doctorate, and eight Master degrees. Each was hired for their subject matter expertise, operational experience, and academic acumen.

Dr. Snyder. Some of you have indicated that you wish to hire “younger” PhDs. Do you think they may need a bit of seasoning or practical experience to be able to hold their own with the caliber and seniority of students you have? Does it mean you have to push out “older professors” who may be performing well in order to bring on younger ones?

Colonel Belcher. I define “younger professors” to mean those with more academic and less operational experience than their counterpart despite their age. Based on this definition, I believe that “younger professors” bring an academic vitality to the curriculum that is essential in keeping the curriculum current and vibrant. While they cannot replicate or replace the operational experience or expertise of “older professors” they can balance it. They can offer an educational counterpoint which challenges students and faculty alike to view old issues through new eyes. Similarly, younger professors bring new teaching methodology and technology (i.e. electronic courseware, blogs, on-line journals), to the classroom which is more acceptable to younger generations of students.

The ability of younger professors to “hold their own” against a more senior student population is based on their professional credentials and force of personality.
To discount their capabilities due to age or limited operational experience does a disservice to the professor and students alike. Routinely, dynamic young scholars move from academia to government administration, becoming the policy-makers our students will work with in developing and implementing national strategy. Consequently, in order to better to prepare our students in an interagency environment, the Marine Corps War College seeks the most qualified, vice the most senior, professors to instruct its students. This same effect can be achieved by increasing the academic interaction between Senior Level Service Colleges and the civilian graduate-level national security programs (i.e. The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, The Georgetown University Security Studies Program, Yale University, and Princeton University) who utilize younger professors to instruct. Our students would also benefit by interaction with the students enrolled in these civilian programs since frequently they consist of future government leaders, administrators and policy-makers. With this objective in mind, the College launched an ambitious academic outreach program to engage the Directors of prestigious civilian national security programs (i.e. The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, The Georgetown University Security Studies Program, Yale University, and Princeton University) who utilize younger professors to instruct. Our students would also benefit by interaction with the students enrolled in these programs in order to conduct curriculum consultations, share best practices, and identify mutually beneficial collaborative educational opportunities.

Professorial positions are filled based on availability, College requirements, and the evaluated merits of the candidates. However, given normal attrition rates and the College’s ongoing expansion program, integration of younger professors can be done incrementally without adversely affecting the careers of more established faculty members.

Dr. SNYDER. National and ICAF have 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 faculty and student mixes while the Service schools have a 60% host and 40% other mix. Are the faculty and student mixes dictated for the various institutions still appropriate? If so, was it appropriate for Congress to allow the Service senior schools to award JPME II credit (NDAA FY 2005) despite their lower ratios, non-neutral ground, and lack of a requirement to send any graduates to joint assignments? ICAF and National must send “50% plus one” graduates to joint assignments. Is this still appropriate? Should Service schools have some kind of requirement?

Colonel BELCHEER. The 60% host (Sea Services: Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard) to 40% non-host department (Air Force, Army, Interagency, and International) student and faculty ratios are appropriate for the Marine Corps War College. Normally the College operates well below the student and faculty mix ratios prescribed by the OPMEP. In academic year 2010, the College will have a student mix of 42% (11 of 26 military students) host and 58% non-host department. Of the five military faculty members 60% are from the host (3 of 5 military officers) while 40% are from non-host departments. This ratio enables the College to add a Sea Service flavor to an otherwise generic joint curriculum. The 60–40 ratio allows the other department students to learn Sea Service operational concepts and experience the Sea Service culture and concepts without overwhelming the joint curriculum. A lesser student ratio (i.e. 1/3, 1/3, 1/3) would dilute the educational experience of attending the Marine Corps War College. Consequently, it would deprive the Service Chiefs of the ability to tailor their officers’ education by assigning them to a particular War College. If all the Senior Level Services Colleges’ student mixes and curriculum were the same, the Nation would lose the intellectual diversity so critical to develop innovative solutions to complex national security issues.

Despite the Service-specific aspects of the Senior Level Service Colleges, Congress was right to grant authority for them to award JPME II credit. Though instruction and interaction, the Marine Corps War College immerses its students in a joint educational experience. The College’s curriculum is firmly founded on the enduring joint learning areas and emerging special areas of interest identified by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These joint educational standards are disseminated though the OPMEP and rigorously assessed by the Process for the Accreditation Professional Education. Yet even without such guidance, the College’s curriculum would be joint-focused since its emphasis is on the strategic-level of war which by its very nature is joint, interagency and multinational. The College is acutely aware of the changing nature of modern warfare and has worked diligently to adapt its curriculum accordingly.

The era of Service-centric education has passed. No matter where a graduate may be assigned, he/she will deal with joint, interagency, and/or multinational issues. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the Senior Level Service Colleges to provide a robust joint education, adaptable to any follow-on assignment. Regrettably, due to intense competition for limited joint billets, it would not be feasible to direct the Senior Level Service Colleges to implement a “50% plus one” policy. Consequently, the assignment of joint billets should be left to the Services and be based on 1) the
needs of the Service, 2) the student's past operational and academic performance and future potential, and lastly 3) the student's desires. The Services make an organizational investment each time they send students to the Senior Level Service Colleges; therefore the Services should be afforded the opportunity to determine where that education reaps the highest reward.

Dr. Snyder. What constitutes rigor in your educational program? Does rigor require letter grades? Does rigor require written exams? Does rigor require the writing of research or analytical papers, and if so, of what length? Does rigor require increased contact time and less "white space" or vice versa?

Colonel Belcher. In this context "rigor" refers to those measures utilized by an academic institution to challenge students and inject discipline, objectivity, and consistency into the educational process. To that end, the Marine Corps War College utilizes periodic written and oral assessments to determine the student's ability to analyze, synthesize, and evaluate (per Bloom's taxonomy) the information provided in the course of the curriculum (to include classroom instruction, field studies, and individual reading and research).

Graded assessments add rigor and competitiveness into the educational process. Students at this educational level are high achievers and strive for the highest grades. Nonetheless, while a good motivational tool, grades are not the ultimate measure of a student's academic achievements or progress. They are tools to gauge growth, not goals in and of themselves, and should be used accordingly. Since students enter the College with varying educational, occupational, and operational backgrounds, they do not start the process at the same place nor proceed at the same rate. Graded assessments are good measures of a student's position relative to his/her fellow students, but may not fully reflect his/her professional advancement. Also, we have found that:

In academic year 2009, the students were required to complete six two-page writing assignments as well as an extensive 20-page, self-selected Independent Research Project. The students were administered six multi-question essay examinations. The students also presented three oral presentations to include a defense of their Independent Research Project. Additionally, each student was evaluated on his/her participation in the Joint Land Air and Sea Simulation, an inter-War College strategic war-game held annually aboard Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, AL. Finally the students were evaluated on their contribution (vice participation) during the College's five core course. Each assignment was subsequently evaluated by one or several faculty members utilizing a standardize rubric and awarded a letter grade. The grades for the academic year were tabulated and the top two graduates (10% of the graduating class) honored for their superior academic achievements. Their exceptional efforts were recognized and rewarded during graduation and were noted on their academic fitness reports. To encourage academic freedom and bold, audacious thought, the College does not list the grades of its students on their academic fitness reports or performance appraisals. At the graduate-level, academic rigor means more "white space" not less. It means requiring the student to do extensive reading, research, and reflection in preparation for each seminar. After analysis, the students are required to formulate and discuss their findings in a clear, logical and well-reasoned manner. By their very nature, the College's students are mature, highly-competitive and self-directed individuals who excel in an indirect academic environment which allows them to integrate life experiences in the exploration of new concepts and the solution of novel problems. Like most adult learners, they need to know "why" before they commence their studies. Consequently, it is incumbent upon the faculty to set the broad contextual framework for their studies and then mentor the students as they follow their own path of educational exploration. Adult learners are experiential learners. Consequently, the College also relies heavily on exercises, role-playing, and case study analysis. In such venues, students need "white space" to analyze the situation, develop course of action, and reflect on their role. Understanding the need for "professional study and preparation time" the College dedicates each afternoon and one day per week solely to individual reading, research and writing.

Dr. Snyder. Can you describe how you survey students, graduates, and graduates' supervisors to assess the quality of your program?

Colonel Belcher. Working with and through the University's Director of Institutional Research, Assessment, and Planning, the College has implemented an expansive survey program. The program surveys the College's students, graduates, and their supervisors to gain information and insight regarding the quality and effectiveness of the curriculum. The first source of feedback is derived from course surveys given to each student during the academic year. These surveys are given at the end of each major block of instruction and ask the student to comment on the overall quality of the course,
the applicability of the course material, the proficiency of the instructor, and the effectiveness of the method of presentation. This information is analyzed to determine the course’s effectiveness in achieving the stated learning outcomes. Much of the information gleaned from these surveys is reiterated during the intermediate and final interviews with the Director.

A second source of feedback is derived from surveys sent annually for five years to graduates. The intent of these surveys is to assess whether the educational experience adequately prepared graduates for their follow-on assignments. A similar survey is sent to each graduate’s immediate Supervisor or Reporting Senior. This survey gains “the customer's perspective” on College’s educational effectiveness.

A third source of feedback comes from faculty and staff interviews with senior military officers and government officials. Throughout the academic year, faculty and staff members query senior personnel regarding the characteristics and capabilities expected of the College’s graduates. Such interviews are normally conducted during on-site seminars or field study trips to Combatant Command, Component Command, Service or Agency Headquarters.

The results of each of these surveys is analyzed and fed into the College’s annual curriculum review process. The results are then utilized to refine the College’s curriculum and teaching methodology to improve educational efficiency and effectiveness.

Dr. Snyder. Should the OSD Chancellors office be reestablished? Why or Why not?

Colonel Belcher. No, I do not believe that there is sufficient benefit—to OSD, the Services, or the individual institutions—in reestablishing an OSD Chancellors office. As configured, the current system provides sufficient oversight and guidance to the development, presentation, and assessment of joint military education.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting on his own and through the Joint Staff (specifically the Joint Education Branch (J–7)) is able to accurately monitor the current status of joint professional military education, identify existing and emerging strategic issues, and modify the curriculum accordingly. With an ear to Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Combatant Commanders and the Service Chiefs, the Chairman is in the best position to determine the needs of our future strategic leaders and planners. This guidance serves as the basis for CJCS Instruction 1800.01C, Officer Professional Military Education Program, which is the foundation for the Senior-Level Service College’s joint, interagency and multinational curriculum.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps provides the next level of academic scrutiny and educational guidance. Working through the Commanding General, Training and Education Command and President, Marine Corps University, he ensures that the War College provides a joint professional military education which reflects the culture and operational concepts of the Corps, yet remains firmly founded in joint doctrine. His guidance ensures that the joint curriculum is flavored with Marine Corps intangibles such as an understanding of national power projection and a lean, expeditionary and agile mindset. In doing so, he provides his fellow Service Chiefs with graduates who are uniquely capable to understand the Marine Corps and lead joint, interagency, and multinational organizations.

Finally, the Southern Association of Schools and College provides the academic oversight and guidance required to ensure that the joint curriculum meets the standards of modern post-graduate education.

These three levels of review are adequate for addressing each aspect of professional military education—Joint, Service and academic. A fourth level of oversight would not add sufficient benefit to warrant the additional burden (time, energy, resources, and personnel). The recommendation to reestablish an OSD Chancellor’s office, implies that the current system is broken which, based on the rigorous curriculum and high quality of graduates, it clearly is not. Therefore, the reestablishment of such an office is not required or desired.

Dr. Snyder. Ethics—what should be the role of ethical education at the senior schools beyond “just war” theory?

Colonel Belcher. “Just War” theory is just a fraction of the ethical education needed and taught at the senior professional military education schools. The fundamental emphasis of the senior schools is an attempt to bring about a change in the incoming students’ thinking from the tactical or operational level to the strategic level. The discussion of leadership and ethics, which are inextricably intertwined, must be a central feature in that growth. If our graduates are to advise senior leaders or act in the best interests of our Nation with a moral component to their decision-making matrix, they must be grounded in the theory and practice of ethics, beginning with ethics in the profession of arms. The Marine Corps War College treats the study of leadership and ethics in a holistic manner with not only a core course
dedicated to those topics, but also with opportunities to explore ethical dilemmas in other courses of study.

The Marine Corps War College recognizes each incoming student’s status as a mature, experienced professional. The fact that the student is selected to senior service school strongly suggests that he or she already knows much about the subject of leadership and ethics, has excelled as a leader at the tactical and possibly operational levels and has the potential to rise to very senior leadership positions. The College’s Leadership and Ethics course provides each student an opportunity to examine the competencies he/she already possess in the light of their future roles and responsibilities. Through reading, research, role-playing, case study analysis and interaction with strategic leaders, they study leadership in the complex and uncertain interagency, joint and international environments where there may be no right answers, only difficult decisions.

The Leadership and Ethics course begins with a study of critical thinking, creative thinking, decision making, and a cultural overview and then explores ethics and the profession of arms, the ethical and philosophical foundations of western philosophy from antiquity to the post-middle ages, and the ethical use of military force. It then continues with strategic decision making, collaborative decision making, leading change and the legal and moral implications of the use of force in humanitarian interventions.

Throughout the year other courses explore ethical considerations to include classes on such issues as civilian-military relations, “what is an American,” the American military tradition, torture, gays in the military, and war in traditional society. Exploration of ethics continues through the year as the students debate topical issues and interact with scholars and strategic leaders in small group settings. The exposure of students to ethical questions throughout the academic year is crucial to the preparation of our Nation’s future senior leaders.

Dr. Snyder. Should each school have a Board of Visitors or Consultants, separate from your University’s, so it could focus just on your mission?

Colonel Belcher. No, a Board of Visitors or Consultants should not be established for each subordinate school. A single University Board of Visitors is adequate and appropriate for assessing the overall institutional effectiveness of the University and in achieving its educational mission. A single Board is a more efficient and effective means to guide the University and its subordinate schools. A single Board represents a more judicious use of the time and energies of the President, the subordinate school Directors, as well as the Board members themselves. It also simplifies and clarifies the channels of communication to and from the Board.

Inherent in the concept of multiple Boards of Visitors or Consultants is the risk that such Boards may provide conflicting or competing guidance to the various schools, and thereby induce undue turmoil. Multiple Boards, providing conflicting advice, would undermine the integrity of the University concept. Marine Corps University truly operates as a University rather than a conglomeration of separate schoolhouses operating independently from one another. The President, as the Marine Corps’ advocate for professional military education, must depend on a single Board with the same overarching professional military education focus, rather than multiple Boards with a restricted single schoolhouse focus.

Further, the Marine Corps University, not the subordinate colleges and schools is regionally accredited by the Commission on Colleges of the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools to award master degrees. The Commission on Colleges requires a single Board of Visitors to oversee and advise the President of the University. Multiple Boards providing parochial advice could jeopardize the University’s regional accreditation. Given his/her seniority and authority, the President of the University is in the best position to receive and review a single Board’s input; then apply it where applicable within the University. If the President determines that more scrutiny is required for the University at large or one or several schools in particular, he can increase the frequency of Board meetings or tailor the agenda to address a focused area of concern.

Thank you for this opportunity to respond to questions regarding your Marine Corps War College. I would like to thank the Subcommittee for its unwavering support of the College since its inception in 1991. Due to the Subcommittee’s diligent efforts the College has successful produced generations of strategic leaders, planners and policy-makers, and is on track to become the world-class institution for the study of the profession of arms and war envisioned by General Alfred M. Gray in 1989. Semper Fidelis!