ANOTHER CROSSROADS? PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION TWENTY YEARS AFTER THE GOLDFRATER-NICHOLS ACT AND THE SKELTON PANEL

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BEFORE THE
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
HEARING HELD
MAY 20, 2009

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# OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

**VIC SNYDER, Arkansas, Chairman**

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ANOTHER CROSSROADS? PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION TWENTY YEARS AFTER THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT AND THE SKELTON PANEL

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE,

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:06 p.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vic Snyder (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Dr. SNYDER. The hearing will come to order. Good afternoon, and welcome to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations' first formal hearing on professional military education (PME).

It is just over 20 years since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that reformed our military by institutionalizing what we call "Jointness." It is exactly 20 years after the Skelton panel reviewed professional military education to make sure that the military changed its culture to education to make sure that jointness would stick.

Today, we are starting a series of hearings to last over the next three or four months following on background work we have been doing for the last three months. Although there are many variations on PME, including distance learning and courses for enlisted service members and civilians, the scope of this project is limited to in-residence officer PME from the service academies to the company-grade and intermediate levels up through the war colleges, as well as the flag officer's course called Capstone.

Mr. Ike Skelton, our chairman, who was involved in that work over 20 years ago, recalls that militaries usually don't change things when they are successful. Instead, the reforms of the 1980s came on the heels of failures in Grenada and in attempting to rescue our hostages in Iran. In fact, Mr. Skelton reminded us often that, even with these failures, it was not easy to convince the services that they had to change. He knew then what we know now: that the way to change cultures is through education.

The issue before us as we embark on an investigation goes to the very existence of military schools. The famous, or perhaps for some of you infamous, journalist Tom Ricks questioned just last month whether there was even a need for our academies and war colleges. He reminds us that, from time to time, we should assess what our professional military schools are meant to do for the Nation. We
are also going to ask if they are doing what the Nation needs now and if they are doing it in the best way.

Finally, we are going to try to get to explore whether they are doing it successfully and, if not, what needs to change.

Our study seems to be timely. Several other related efforts are underway. The Defense Science Board has started a study of PME that they will complete next spring. In addition, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Center for a New America Security are both just beginning studies on the larger issue of joint officer management that will also include a look at PME. CSIS intends to complete their study by the end of the year.

In order to conduct our study, we will be asking about the mission of the PME system and of each of the schools and what makes them unique, one to the other, as well as different from civilian schools. We will also be asking about the rigor with which they go about their business. And because education is necessarily a human business, we want to learn more about the quality and qualifications of the senior leadership, faculty, and students at these institutions.

We will also be asking about the organization and resources the department and services afford these schools. And finally, we will explore their curricula. They each have their accrediting bodies for both the professional military education and their academic degrees, but we want to look broadly at the question of balance—balance between the enduring and the new, and the new challenges.

And, as each school tries to balance enduring and new, how they incorporate lessons learned and other important subject matter into their curricula on a continuing basis. We specifically want to know what they do with areas such as strategy and military history, irregular warfare, language skills, regional expertise and cultural competency, and, beyond jointness, inter-agency and multinational integration.

While in later hearings we will seek to hear from the commandants to the schools, and even the combatant commanders who employ the graduates of these institutions, our panel of witnesses is uniquely situated to get us started on the broader questions, and I am confident that you all will help us frame our investigation.

I will now yield to Mr. Wittman for an opening statement, and then we will see if Chairman Skelton would like to share some thoughts with us.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Snyder can be found in the Appendix on page 41.]

STATEMENT OF HON. ROB WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you, Chairman Skelton, Dr. Breslin-Smith, Dr. Cochran, Dr. Carafano, Dr. Kohn. Welcome here today. Thank you for taking your time to join us. This is, I think, a very, very important effort as we go forth with trying to make sure we know what the PME system needs to provide and the JPME system needs to provide to our men and women in uniform.

And to begin, you must truly be experts to be asked to testify at our opening hearing on professional military education, because
our committee expert and the person responsible for initiating this study is none other than our distinguished chairman, Ike Skelton. And because he cares deeply about professional military education, our chairman has exerted profound positive influence on the system over the past two decades.

This hearing begins a timely review of that system. And I would like to take a moment to frame the issue for the record. Any study must have limited, achievable objectives to avoid becoming swamped in unmanageable data, a caution well applied to congressional studies.

As I understand it, we will examine in-residence officer professional military education as a whole, starting with the military academies and continuing through the general officer Capstone course. Consequently, this review will not cover the military services’ extensive and growing distance learning programs, non-commissioned officer education programs, nor Reserve Officer Training Corps, or ROTC programs, on college campuses.

Furthermore, within the in-residence officer PME system, we will concentrate our efforts on the joint professional military education (JPME) system at the intermediate and senior levels. And I truly applaud this approach as we are concentrating on the area that was rejuvenated by the Skelton panel recommendations and continues to get the most attention today.

Indeed, officers must show that they have completed JPME levels I and II to advance in their careers to the flag or general officer level. No schooling, no promotion. Hence, JPME credit is important to individual officers.

Joint PME is challenging to manage for several reasons. For starters, this training and education system is operated from the office of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Mullen owns the National Defense University (NDU), and his staff sets the JPME standards that NDU and the military service war colleges must follow. Ordinarily, military education systems are managed by the military departments, but JPME is an exception, forcing the joint chief to function like a military service—excuse me, the joint staff to function like a military service, an unaccustomed role for the joint staff.

The service chiefs oversee their own institutions, like the eminent Marine Corps University at Quantico, Virginia, which is in my district, and provides for resources in hiring faculty. Finally, the military services select the students who attend all the PME institutions and make selections for promotion.

Given today’s operational tempo, there is tremendous pressure on the military services to ensure their officers attain JPME credit as efficiently as possible. Somehow, this complex mosaic seems to work as our Nation is blessed with fine flag officers in all branches of the service. Nonetheless, the system is due for a re-look in this time of change in extraordinarily busy operational tempo.

Our military officers, including our junior officers, are conducting not just joint military operations, but inter-agency and international operations, as well. Are our officers prepared for these real challenges of today? Not only at the tactical and operational level, but are we developing a cadre of grand strategists able to navigate the uncertain waters for tomorrow’s geopolitical struggles? We
must ensure that our military’s developing leaders today who will be effective in any situation.

This is a very exciting topic, which will generate much debate and much discussion about the direction we need to be doing. I look forward to this discussion today and the months to come.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the Appendix on page 44.]

Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.

Chairman Skelton, would you like to say a few words?

The Chairman. That is the definition of introducing a politician, would you like to say a few words. The answer to your question——


The Chairman. We don’t have time.

To answer your question, Mr. Wittman, are we developing those strategic thinkers, not long ago, I had the opportunity to visit with the outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace. And I asked him, of the average graduate class of the National War College, how many could actually sit down and have a serious discussion with George C. Marshall. His answer was, “Three or four.” That is not bad. That is really pretty good.

Everyone in the class will understand strategic thought, but how many would be creative enough to offer a serious discussion with the likes of George C. Marshall?

So we ask ourselves the question, what do you want out of professional military education? Well, being a product of law school and the agonies of studying the case work for some three years, what you really want is someone who is grounded, (A) in knowledge and (B) in the ability to think, whether it be on the tactical level or the operational level or the strategic level. And any questions whether our institutions of learning equip these young people to think that way with enough knowledge to do something about it.

It is good, and I compliment the chairman, Dr. Snyder, and the entire subcommittee on what you are doing here, taking a good, hard look. We did yeoman’s work way back yonder.

It is interesting. Prior to our effort, there were a good number of studies on professional military education that went on the shelf, and actually we were able to actually do something with it. And I hope you will take it several steps further, because we need those thinkers out there.

And seeing my friend, Dr. Kohn, here, who is one of America’s truly outstanding historians, I guess I have a phobia that every military officer should be a historian. That is not necessarily something that can happen, because I was talking with a friend of mine, a professor of mine—a number of years ago. He said that some people have a sense of history like some people have a sense of mathematics, which means we are not going to make historians out of all of them, but at least they would have an appreciation and understanding of it.

And if you are one of those that is gifted and you are wearing the uniform, you have a sense of history. You ought to have the ca-
pability of being a strategic thinker, or an operational thinker or a tactical thinker, depending upon your rank and where you are in the hierarchy or the scheme of things.

So I compliment you on this hearing, and I wish you well. Thank you.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We have also been joined—can enjoy the presence of Congressman Mac Thornberry from Texas, who I would say is also one of the real thinkers in the Congress.

Our witnesses today are Dr. Janet Breslin-Smith, former professor and department head at the National War College; Dr. Alexander “Sandy” Cochran, a private scholar who, in fact, has taught at every one of the service war colleges; Dr. James Carafano, the assistant director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at the Heritage Foundation; and Dr. Richard Kohn, Professor of History and of Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill.

Dr. Breslin-Smith, we will begin with you. We will put on our five-minute clock, if it works properly. When you see the red light go off, it is a signal five minutes has gone by. If you haven’t finished saying everything you want to say, feel free to continue. But I think we have votes coming up at 1:45. It would be nice to have your all statements done by then. Your written statements will be made a part of the committee record.

So, Dr. Breslin-Smith.

STATEMENT OF DR. JANET BRESLIN-SMITH, RETIRED PROFESSOR AND DEPARTMENT HEAD, NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

Dr. BRESLIN-SMITH. Thank you. Chairman Skelton, it is lovely to see you here.

Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Wittman, and members of the subcommittee, it is a privilege to be here and an honor, honestly, both the chairman’s work 20 years ago, having the panel on PME education, professional education for military officers, as well as what you are doing right now. The most important congressional activity beyond voting is oversight, and so I congratulate this subcommittee.

And I have to tell you, for the first half of my career, I sat on the other side of the witness table because I was legislative director for Senator Leahy for many years, doing agriculture issues in addition to defense and foreign policy.

But for the second part of my career, I had the privilege of teaching at the National War College. And it is on the basis of that experience and a history that I am just completing right now about the War College that I offer my observations to you about that unique school in and of itself, and also some recommendations for the subcommittee to consider in general.

As I said before, you are honoring really the work that was done in 1989 in the first really comprehensive, I think, study that the Congress took about professional military education. And now, here you are, looking at this issue 20 years later in a different strategic environment, and one certainly that my students at the War College confronted, where they weren’t just seeing nation-states with threatening armies on the horizon. We were having our students
and joining with them in dealing with a movement of people where the ideology wasn’t necessarily an economic ideology, but basically a theology, and how does a military officer prepare him or herself for that type of new strategic environment.

That type of question about preparing a military officer really intrigued me as I began my research about the War College, and I want to just take you for a moment back to that era, back in 1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, when General Eisenhower, General Arnold, other leaders in the military, in the midst of World War II, came to the conclusion—and I would say, Chairman Skelton, it is a remarkable event that they considered this in the midst of war—what they needed to do for professional military education for officers.

And they worked on some things in the midst of war. And then, right as the war ended, they took action to try an experiment, and this experiment was to say not only would this new school for senior officers be joint—in other words, all four services would send students to this school—but it also would have representation from the State Department and the intelligence agencies.

It had the support from everyone, basically, Forrestal, the Navy, the War Department, came together to say yes, we needed to do this experiment. And what is, I think, instructive about it in a sense of Eisenhower’s own personal power, he took the beautiful building that had been the Army War College and made a new creation in this building.

And basically, the Army War College closed for a number of years and reformed itself up in Carlisle later on, but he took this beautiful building, prime real estate in Washington, and made it this new institution. And as I said before, from its inception, it was joint, and it was inter-agency. His vision back in 1946 was the vision, honestly, that Secretary Gates talks about now. So I want to honor both Eisenhower’s initial vision and the fact that we are both looking at this issue again right now.

Not only was this school inter-agency and joint, but it had a focus intentionally on strategy. And again, to take you back at that time and how remarkable it was to think about this in this current era, in 1946, 1947, our first deputy commandant was George Kennan, the author of Containment Policy. And he wrote his famous articles, anonymously signed X in Foreign Affairs, while he was on the faculty. He formulated and wrote that article during that period of time.

He established a pattern that we still follow, which is he wanted an in-depth look at the strategic challenge facing the Nation then. And so he had lectures at the beginning of the year on who Stalin was, Russian history, the sources of Soviet conduct. After these lectures—and I should tell you, President Truman himself came to lectures—people would adjourn to the commandant’s house. Members of Congress would come. The secretary of defense came—the new secretary of defense, secretary of war at the time—would come, and it was an intellectual refuge in Washington for people of both parties with the executive branch to talk with educated people about Russia in that era, and to form a bipartisan consensus for a strategy that endured for generations. It was a remarkable time, and it is a remarkable institution.
And I have to say, in my years teaching, and even now going back every once in a while and just coming into a seminar, and I would urge you, if you could, to do this. On any day, in any seminar room, you are going to hear combat veterans and seasoned diplomats struggle over policy issues. You are going to see and hear academic specialists and intelligence officers in deep discussion over strategy.

You are going to hear them debate tribal issues in Afghanistan. You are going to hear them debate space issues. You are going to have people who had Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) experience, and I know this subcommittee has done work on this. You are going to have students from the State Department, from U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and Marines and Army officers compare notes on combat. It is still a special place.

Now, of course, we know that all institutions change over time. This has been over 60 years that we have been in business. And I think this subcommittee is doing the country a service right now by reflecting on all of our institutions for PME. And let me say, in my reflection in doing this history, my first recommendation of something for the committee to consider actually goes back to what Chairman Skelton's original study also found. In fact, a number of things I am going to say today are in his report, this report from 1989.

But the first one, and this is especially true for the National War College and also for the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), the Industrial College, which is our sister college next to us, I believe that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has to reclaim ownership of our colleges. And I am just going to talk really basically about the War College, but everything I am saying applies ICAF.

Both the chairman and the Joint Chiefs need to clarify the college's mission, enhance our leadership, establish criteria for appropriate faculty and student selections, and reassert the focus of our curricula, which is grand strategy. These are his schools, but there is a sense that the college—both colleges—have become orphans, and that the chairman and the joint staff are detached from this school. And I have to say, naturally, it is a totally understandable phenomena that all the service chiefs would automatically give preference and give more attention to their own service schools, without question. And that is why it is even more important that the chairman establish ownership of National War College.

I specifically think he needs to strengthen our leadership and the criteria for leadership. As a faculty member, I know the value of a good dean of faculty, and certainly we have a good tradition at the War College, and strong faculty. And I will get to faculty in a minute. I am out of time already.

Let me just say quickly, I think that the commandant should have a longer term of office and should come committed to leadership of this institution. I believe the commandant should teach.

I also believe we need to revive a board of consultants. The War College had that for 30 years. I think we need the oversight of an outside board specifically addressed to our program.
My comments about the faculty, both military, civilian and agency, are in my remarks. I do believe that the student body itself, the selection needs to be carefully undertaken by the services to make sure they get the best use out of this education.

I think our program is appropriately focused on strategy. And I have copies here of our syllabuses if you would like to look at how we address this issue.

Finally, I want to say a word about our experience in Iraq and the comments that have been made in the press about the failure of generalship. Since many of the general officers in both of these wars are war college graduates, I think it is a careful issue for us to consider, and I go into this at length in my testimony about how we approach this issue.

I also want to say that I think both in terms of preparation for these types of strategic questions as well as civil-military relations, they are both issues that the college is confronting directly.

Finally, I want to make a last comment about just the interagency aspects and going back into history. As I mentioned before, General Eisenhower was vitally involved in our formation. And at the time, his original idea, and among others at the time, the postwar period, was to have five colleges.

The original proposal was to have a consortium of schools—the War College, which did happen, the Industrial College, which was reformed and structured then. There was to be an Administration College, an Intelligence College, and a State Department college.

I think this subcommittee might look, maybe even with your sister committee, foreign affairs, at the idea of reviving this idea and having a College of Diplomacy and Development as a sister school for us again so that we could work together and that they could form the intellectual foundation that Chairman Skelton was looking for when he did this review panel 20 years ago.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Breslin-Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 48.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Dr. Breslin-Smith.

Dr. Cochran.

STATEMENT OF DR. ALEXANDER S. COCHRAN, HISTORICAL ADVISOR TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY, U.S. ARMY

Dr. COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the honor of testifying at this distinguished subcommittee.

My comments deal with the service war colleges and are based on my 15 years of teaching experience at all of these institutions. On a recent study that I completed while at the Wilson Center about these institutions, in my written statement I offer some observations based upon my teaching and some suggestions from my reflections.

In the interest of time, I would like to focus my suggestions in these comments here on three, four fields: faculty, students, governance, and curriculum. I add that these represent my own opinions and certainly not the Department of Defense.

On the faculty, let there be no debate: faculties make or break an institution. The Skelton reforms of the past 20 years signifi-
cantly enhance that faculty expertise, particularly with respect to the civilian faculty.

It is as a department chair and a faculty member I experienced an unintended consequence that needs, I think, your attention—that is the aligning of two different camps, each with their own professional standards, military versus civilians, kind of a “we” versus “they.”

And a new category, unanticipated I think at that time, of retired military faculty; all too often, officers that lack the academic credentials of their civilian counterparts. I believe, personally, this can be easily corrected if the war colleges reclassify their faculty as either field experts or academic specialists.

Secondly, the war colleges’ delivery of curriculum as mandated by Mr. Skelton’s reforms is that of seminar, the most demanding of the teaching profession. Teaching at war college is tough, with little time for outside research and writing.

The problem is compounded, in my experience, with the practice in the war colleges of all students receiving the same seminar experience at the same time by all members of the department, something I think that few civilian institutions would try. Solutions here, I think, are innovative scheduling, the possible increase of faculty size, or creating more curriculum contact time, a point that I will mention shortly.

On students, in my view, it is a matter of quality, not quantity. Though the size of our services have been significantly reduced over the past 20 years, the same number of officers attend. My experience has taught me that a significant number of these students really don’t want to be there, either that or they are not academically prepared.

I believe this can be corrected by instituting an application process. Students, by making individual applications with the appropriate credentials to separate war colleges rather than the current practice of being selected by the personnel system based on their past service, and the colleges would have to accept them.

On the other end, my experience indicates that up to one-third of the graduates will leave the service after one tour. I believe that graduates should incur a service obligation of at least five years, or two subsequent assignments, so the services and the taxpayers can gain maximum return with this outstanding block of instruction rather than the current two years.

With respect to governance, two comments, and part of these—I think Dr. Smith has raised that of leadership and organization. Each war college president, or each war college has a president, a commandant or a commander.

During my teaching experience, the average tenure of that position was about two and a half years. This is simply not enough time to make a difference, as one needs at least one year to become familiar with the process, and then one year to make the changes. War college presidents, in my view, should remain in position for a minimum of 5 years, a maximum of 10, with the same “tombstone” promotion model used at many of the service academies of a promotion to one grade higher upon retirement.

On organization, while each war college does some things better than the others, they simply don’t seem to talk to each other. Each
has fashioned its own unique mission statement with varied departmental alignments and bureaucratic arrangements.

At the senior level, there is the so-called MECC, Military Education Coordination Council. Yet, its title speaks rhetorically to its advisory role. I would argue what is needed is an office that fosters, indeed mandates just more than talk, such as the chancellors that you find at large state university systems. Here I would envision an Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) chancellor of war colleges, or chancellor of higher education, with not only fiscal, but some kind of statutory authority.

Lastly, curriculum, thought to be the most essential, and Ike Skelton’s charge here, vigorous, vigor. My experience is that, given a quality faculty, a receptive student body and enlightened leadership, vigor in the curriculum will take care of itself.

Each war college delivers a common curriculum, with minor differences—field trips, electives, and what have you. The common aspect of all is they try to do too much in too short a time, resulting in a mile-wide, inch-deep approach. I would suggest what is needed is focus. I would suggest doubling the in-residence time from the current 9 months to 18 months. This would permit hard decisions on that most common curriculum quandary, what not to teach.

To build this focus, each war college needs to be designated as a particular center of excellence to itself. The Army War College for leaders, people who are going to go on to strategic leadership positions, such as wings, ships, brigades. National War College for positions involving the formulation and execution of national security strategy.

Industrial College of the Armed Forces to deal with resource implications. The Naval War College to deal with theory. The Air War College at Maxwell to deal with technology, thus allowing each student to major in a particular area which would be important in his or her application. Service competence can simply be taught through electives.

In conclusion, all war colleges are justifiably proud of their programs, yet this pride, in my view, has created intense protective-ness. And I would suggest, as was done 20 years ago, Congress can probably step in to give them some help.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Cochran can be found in the Appendix on page 59.]

Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Dr. Cochran.

Dr. Carafano.

STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES JAY CARAFANO, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, KATHRYN AND SHELBY CULLOM DAVIS INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Dr. Carafano. Honored is not the right word. I am flabbergasted to be here. There are few issues that I am more passionate about than this. Twenty-five years in the Army, I am a product of the PME system and every level up through the war college. And in my Army career and since then, I certainly worked with, lectured at, or been involved with all of the Army schools and all of the staff colleges and all the war colleges.
I have four ideas I want to put on the table. I think they are more than out of the box. I think they are out of the closet, so you may just want to dismiss them. But I just want to put the four out there.

And as a preface, I just want to say I think you are exactly right in saying that you start with understanding officer PME and you grow from there, and that that is the touchstone of all. And that you start at the finish, that you start with understanding senior professional military education, and then you work backwards from there. So I think the focus of this committee is absolutely spot-on.

So the four ideas I would propose very quickly, is—the first is I think the war college comes simply too late in an officer’s career. The senior professional military education ought to come at the 10-year mark, and I would be happy to go into the logic behind that. But it ought to happen somewhere between the 5 and 10, 12-year mark, and it ought to be universal. It is the one thing that Goldwater-Nichols got wrong, which is tying JPME to promotion. Every officer needs JPME-like skills, and they need them very early on in their career.

The second point is I think we should move to a model that looks much more like the ROTC model, where the colleges, the formal war colleges remain as the touchstone of the ethic and the focus of the professionalism of the services and the military, but that senior professional military education be expanded throughout the entire civilian architecture, and that we do PME as well at civilian institutions.

The third point I would make I think is really, really vital. We are suffering from PME inflation. We are layering on more and more things, and today everybody has got to be Lawrence of Arabia, and who knows what tomorrow is going to be? And we ought to be going in exactly the opposite direction. We need to much, much more narrowly focus what PME, senior PME is, and we ought to have a really rigorous and tough debate on exactly what that is.

And the fourth point I would make is JPME is not inter-agency education. Inter-agency is all the vogue now, whole-of-government. I think that is right. I think we need a professional development system for the inter-agency community. But obviously, the military is way out ahead in professional development, but what we have seen in recent years is people say, “Well, we can just take JPME and we can bring in some State Department folks, and we can make this inter-agency,” or other people can learn from us, and that is simply wrong. You cannot start building an inter-agency curriculum—and it is an inter-agency professional development program—on the back of JPME. It is wrong-headed.

JPME is a component of that, needs to interface with that, but we need to build the inter-agency professional development program on its own merits. And I think there is a great place for a dialogue, and this committee could play a great role in doing that.

That is really the four things I have come to say. And I think that these reforms are absolutely fundamental. I don't disagree with many of the things that Sandy and Dr. Smith have said. But again, I think it is too late in the officer's career.
I think everybody needs it. I think we are too narrowly focused in just using the war colleges to deliver this education. And I think it is a piece. But again, inter-agency education and professional development are something else. We ought to have those discussions in tandem, not think that we can just expand that from JPME.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Carafano can be found in the Appendix on page 63.]

Dr. Snyder. Dr. Carafano, no college lecturer finishes the lecture before the end of class.

Dr. Carafano. Well, I do have one other——

Dr. Snyder. There you go. I knew it. You are off and running——

Dr. Carafano [continuing]. And that is calling it a “tombstone” promotion may not be the best marketing tool.

Dr. Snyder. Dr. Kohn.

STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD H. KOHN, PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, AND PEACE, WAR, AND DEFENSE, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL

Dr. Kohn. Chairman Skelton and Chairman Snyder and Ranking Member Wittman, thanks for the opportunity and the honor of testifying on this subject this afternoon.

I have been associated with the subject in one way or another for over 40 years, and I believe Mr. Skelton’s 1989 report is still the best discussion of the potential and the deficiencies of PME and of the solutions that has ever been written. Most of those problems remain, although there has been some marked improvement. The mission of the schools remains as it has always been—to educate officers in the waging of war.

At every level, PME has yet to reach the level of our better colleges and professionals schools in rigor or quality. Faculties are still less trained and distinguished, the academic workload is far less, and the focus and curricula sometimes stray from the mission.

At the academies, too much engineering crowds out the social sciences. The Air Force Academy in the last 25 years has gone from four to two required courses in history, and there is no American history, which means that Air Force officers don’t learn fundamental things about the client.

At Carlisle, the Department of Command Leadership and Management teaches leadership without any historical study. None of the schools use the case study method to any extent like civilian professional schools in law, business, and medicine.

Senior staff schools, as I agree with my colleagues, still don’t sufficiently emphasize strategy. Indeed, the Army War College was, a few years ago, moved under training and doctrine command, which does not have the term “education” in its title.

I think the common problems, to me, are structural, organizational, and cultural; structural in the way students are selected, graded and worked, resulting often in a low common denominator and poor motivation; the way faculty are selected and used, resulting in tensions of a mixed civilian and military faculty; in the difficulty of finding active duty officers with the proper experience, academic training, and military background; and in the leadership,
putting in command flag officers who are often inexperienced and unprepared for leadership in education.

Organizational, in that PME falls under personnel systems that slavishly force officers into proscribed careers; focus on staffing the operating forces, and privilege the operational, resulting in PME becoming for many officers a square filler, a relaxed break from demanding operational tours; and discouraging officers from faculty duty because the graduate education and time teaching almost always harms them for promotion.

Cultural in the sense that PME is shaped by the careerism in the military profession and, to some degree, the anti-intellectualism of the officer corps. The norms and attitudes and thinking that confuse education with training and disparage learning and reading and schooling and favor experienced command, physical prowess, and fraternal compatibility, and I think is suspicious of academe and academic work because it is viewed through a caricature partly derived from popular culture in the United States.

In the end, two things have influenced PME in the last 20 years in a positive direction. First, the efforts of Mr. Skelton and his colleagues, his careful investigation and wise thinking, and I must say his relentless focus; and second, the drive to give master’s degrees at the staff and war colleges, which forced an upgrading of the faculties at those institutions in order to qualify for accreditation, although at a significant, and in my judgment, dangerous cost.

Let me close by talking of George Marshall, the preeminent soldier of the 20th century, who spent three years at Leavenworth and taught at two other Army PME institutions.

He remembered his first year as, “The hardest work I ever did in my life. My reading, of course, was pretty helpful,” he noted, “as was my study of past operations. I learned how to digest them. My habits of thought were being trained. While I learned little I could use, I learned how to learn.” I think few of today’s officers would say the same about their PME.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kohn can be found in the Appendix on page 69.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Dr. Kohn.

Chairman Skelton, would you like to have some questions?

The CHAIRMAN. We have to leave at, what, 6:00 this evening?

Dr. SNYDER. Chapter one.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think this is fantastic, and I appreciate each one of you testifying, your testimony and your excellent thinking.

I hearken back to a hearing that we had at Ft. Leavenworth some 20 years ago when I made the then major general in charge of the Fort Leavenworth Command and General Staff College—his last name was Sullivan—answer the question about the caliber of his instructors, because we had just run into a group of lieutenant colonels who were teaching earlier that day who were complaining they did not make the cut to go there as majors, and yet they were there teaching. And I elicited, over a great deal of prodding, the fact that his faculty was less than what he had desired.
I note your comments about the caliber of the faculty and faculties today. All of us can hearken back. I guess I do, back to law school. The toughest instructors at the time, they were not very popular, but I will never forget. After I took the Bar examination, I said one thing I am going to do, I am going back and see Dean McCleary and thank him for teaching me torts, because if there is any part of the Bar examination I know I passed, I know I passed that.

And it is that type of instructor that you would like to attract and keep, and it is a bit concerning when I hear that all the instructors are not of that caliber. I compliment you for your efforts today, and I hope we can take away from this some lessons for tomorrow.

We don't want other people to out-think us. And hearken back to law school again, Mr. Chairman. There were not many cases that I handled, and I did a great deal of trial work for 20 years, there were not many cases I handled that were exactly like what I studied in law school. But as a result, I had to think about things, and I was able to handle them, some of them successfully. And that is what you are looking for here.

Thank you.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We will put ourselves—Mr. Wittman and I will put ourselves on a five-minute clock, and we will probably have time for him and I to ask questions—go ahead and start that, Lorry—and then we will come back after break.

When we started this, it was in the—and it still is in the spirit of revisiting it, what kind of improvements can be made, what things can Congress do, what kind of recommendations we might make to the services or the Pentagon. But I think we kind of stumbled into, and perhaps should have gone in with our eyes open, more existential questions. The Tom Ricks piece called for the closure of the academies and the war colleges, and he was a big believer in ROTC. Dr. Kohn, I think you recommended the closure of ROTC. I am not sure where everybody is going to go, or what is distinctive about it.

But I would like you all to talk about, maybe very briefly in a minute each, just existentially what this means, what would you recommend this subcommittee recommend to Chairman Skelton that flat-out gets closed?

Dr. Breslin-Smith.

Dr. BRESLIN-SMITH. Well, I guess I don't agree.

Dr. SNYDER. I didn't think you did.

Dr. BRESLIN-SMITH. And I have taught in both situations. I have taught at universities. I have taught at Syracuse and the University of California at Berkeley, and I know the type of excellent education they provide.

But at least in the case of the War College, and I think a number of the other schools here, the type of interaction that happens in the classroom—again, going back to Eisenhower’s image of this—is exactly what we talk about these days. How do we get a total national security team, USAID, State and military officers, to be able to work together, understand each other's culture, before they are in the field together?
So the type of education that goes on wouldn't be accomplished if you have everybody going to a university taking political science or international relations classes. I take issue with this question, even in terms of Dick's [Kohn] statement that people who come out of PME did not get anything out of it.

I have been tracking my students who graduated in the class of 2005, which was the first class coming after taking down the statue in Baghdad. And as I watched the growth and development of their thought—and I hope to do a retrospective analysis of them, because they are all making one-star right now—that experience in terms of the type of questions to ask, and hearing the types of questions the State Department person asks compared to what a Marine would ask I think is part of the educational process of the War College.

Dr. Snyder. Dr. Cochran.

Dr. Cochran. I would close one of them, and I would close the Basic Course. I have spent a total of 30 years as an active duty and a Reserve officer, and I went through all levels. And I am trying to think. That is a hard question.

I would close the Basic Course, because I think when you go on active duty as a young officer, you turn yourself over to a non-commissioned officer (NCO), and the NCO's first job is to train you, not educate you, train you. So if I had to save time and close one, I would go to the Basic Course.

Dr. Snyder. I am not saying you have to close anything.

Dr. Carafano.

Dr. Carafano. Yes.

Well, first of all, I think Tom's article couldn't have been more ignorant. I mean, we have had this debate. We have had it over and over again. It is him rediscovering this stupid debate.

And he fails because he fundamentally does what they all do, is they say, "Well, it costs this to educate somebody here, and it costs somebody to educate their own products," he is saying.

So first of all, he misses the big picture, which is the academies and the war colleges, they have numerous products, and the students they produce are only one of them. Yes, they produce students, but they also produce faculty.

And that faculty goes on, whether in the service or other places, to significantly influence military developments. If you look at who did the surge in Iraq, virtually from Petraeus on down, it is littered with former faculty from the military academy.

And then, the third product is institution itself. It does research. It produces conferences. See, you have got to look at all those products. It is not just what is student cost analysis. It is a student cost-benefit comparison.

And the reason why you have academies is simple. It is the same reason why you have a gold bar that measures a foot or an atomic clock that measures a second.

Somewhere you need an institution, which is the touchstone of the professional ethic, that talks about what it means to be an Army officer, what it means to be a professional, what it means to be ethical. And you want to control that in-house. You don't want to outsource that, just like you shouldn't outsource lots of things.
You don’t want to outsource the ethic. And the academies and the war colleges, they are the touchstone, the ethic, the professional touchstone of the military, so you never want to give that up.

There are schools that we need to close. I mean, if you accept the notion that young men and women between the ages of 25 and 30 can assimilate senior professional level education at the graduate level of the highest caliber, right, and you want to do that early in their career, well, we have got too many schools between zero and 10, so something has got to go.

And I think we could have a good discussion on that. I don’t think necessarily it is the staff college level, but I think that somewhere between the basic and the advanced course, there is some stuff that can be put out so we can let guys have a better balance between operational time and school time. But we have got too many schools. It is true.

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Kohn.

Dr. KOHN. Dr. Snyder, I think that trying to close these institutions or to radically transform them would be extremely difficult. And I think that is in your political world. I can’t address that.

But I think what the committee can do is to insist upon levels of quality up to the standard of American higher education, which, after all, leads the world. And you can do that, I think, by certain stipulations having to do with faculty, by reviewing the way in which PME exists in the personnel systems, by looking at the selection of students, as has been recommended here and as I talk about in my statement, by looking at the selection and tenure of the leadership of these institutions, and by trying to institute some outcomes-based studies of the research I think that the committee might undertake, for example.

What is the retention rate of the academies compared to ROTC at the 10-year mark, which I think is a good place? What is the average tenure on active duty of war college graduates in the sense of the taxpayers and the services getting the cost-benefit? How do these institutions fit into the culture of the armed services, and how are they viewed?

There are all kinds of modifications that can be made on the margins, but I think the most important thing the committee can do is to insist on the excellence that the services themselves and the chairmen set for themselves in every other walk of—or characteristic of their armed services, and the standards are there.

Dr. SNYDER. Before we go to Mr. Wittman, I want to be sure I understand what you are saying, Dr. Kohn. On page 17, you have a section where you say, “Other considerations underlying, abolishing the academies and ROTC.” Are you saying you are not recommending we abolish the academies and ROTC?

Dr. KOHN. Well, what I am saying is that you could do that with a system of national scholarships in which you go to the American people and allow them to take a scholarship to the school or university or college of their choice, and you could do away with the academies or convert them to one-year courses for graduates of colleges.

Dr. SNYDER. So you are presenting that as an option, not as a recommendation?
Dr. Kohn. That is an option. But I think that, from a practical standpoint, the idea—these institutions have spiritual value, as Jim has implied.

Dr. Snyder. Mr. Wittman, you want to get your prepared questions now?

Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You all make some very, very interesting, divergent, and thoughtful recommendations. And we know our PME institutions have evolved, but they are still based on a structure that was put in place before the placement of the Department of Defense.

So kind of taking the reverse look at this, if we were to start today from scratch, what are your thoughts about what PME should be today, the institutional structure, what incentives we ought to have to attract students, what incentives we ought to have to have officers there? Just those sort of things.

So if we were to start to scratch today, what should our PME system look like?

Dr. Smith.

Dr. Breslin-Smith. I have to say I would still go back to my original observation.

And the recommendation is I think that type of discussion would be really profitable to have with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in general, in that what is their vision of the role of education for officers, regardless of how it is established or provided, because usually when I am talking to somebody at the Pentagon, I will get this response.

When I make the plea to have more involvement, they will say, “Janet, we are fighting two wars. All these things are going on.” And PME is at the end of that list of things to do. So I think that is the first challenge to take on.

Mr. Wittman. Dr. Cochran.

Dr. Cochran. Sir, I think I would rethink very hard service parochial approach. And when you go back in our history, we had an Army that stood alone, a Navy that stood alone and developed its own system. Then, in the Second World War, you bring the Air Force on. And each service kind of shaped that.

We are at a crux point now where service—we have gotten through jointness. Our next challenge—and I think the next challenge for you is to confront the inter-agency. How do we handle that?

And if I had a license to re-think, I would start with that. Okay, we are now inter-agency. Jointness is accepted, service parochiality. What are we—based on that, where do we go? That is the approach I would take.

Dr. Carafano. If I was going to make three points, I would make these points.

And the first is, again, I would have the senior professional military education take place between, say, somewhere between 10 and 15, and there are 4 reasons for that. First of all, it is because you can do it. I mean, we know for a fact that people between, say, 25 and 30 can accept—have the brains and the experience to adapt and—if the most sophisticated professional educations we can hand out.
The second is, when you do that, you establish somebody for a lifetime of learning. What made Dick a world-class historian was not where he went to grad school. It was the practice of historian's craft after that. But he couldn't have done that without that.

So when you give somebody that at 10 as opposed to 20, 25 or 30, they have 15 years to practice that lifetime of learning, and so they are going to be that much smarter.

The third point is they are going to be a better mentor, because they are going to have those senior professional skills earlier on, so they will be a better mentor throughout their career.

And the fourth point is they are going to be better leaders because they are going to have better, more sophisticated skills much earlier in their career.

So why universal? Well, two reasons. First of all, I mean, we have seen this over and over again in Iraq and Afghanistan, and we see this in business every day, where people at very junior levels have to exercise very senior levels of critical thinking and very senior levels of professional skill. So everybody needs these skills, and they can't wait until the war college to get them.

And then, the second point is I don't know who the next George Marshall is, right? And what we do now is we wait until the very end to try to pick him out, right? And what we ought to be doing is we ought to be putting more bets on the table. If we educate people with this super charged education, which allows them to become a Dick Kohn or a George Marshall, right, early on we will have a bigger body of people to choose from. And we will have leaders who we may not think we meet 10 or 15 years from now, and 10 or 15 years from now we will discover, “Oh, my God, that is the guy or the woman I really need.”

So that is why universal. And just the third point, very quickly, is why spread this to civilian universities? And three points.

First of all, competition. The best way to make the war colleges better is to make them compete for the best students with civilian universities. One of the arguments for ROTC is it bridges the civilian-military divide, that we have officers who were trained in civilian universities, that they understand the civilian side. They bring that in.

You can make that same argument for the war college experience, our military officers getting their senior education. That would bridge that civil-military divide.

And the third is diversity, more colleges, more experiences, more geography, more languages. That is going to enrich the breadth of experience that these different officers bring back into the military.

Dr. SNYDER. We need to run for our votes, so why don't we recess now? And then, when we come back, Mr. Wittman will hear from Dr. Kohn. And then, if Mrs. Davis comes back, we will go to her.

[Recess.]

Dr. SNYDER. Let us resume. I am not sure what the schedule is for the rest of the day, do we know, on votes. We do not know, so we are—have an open mind here this afternoon.

Mr. Wittman was finishing up there. Take as long as you want.

Dr. KOHN. Mr. Wittman, thanks for the question. It is a good one.
And at the risk of confusing Chairman Snyder, I want to say that what I meant in that provision was that you could replace the academies and ROTC with a system of national scholarships. So in response to your question of what I would do if I could design the system whole cloth from the beginning is, at this point in time, I don't see a need for a separate educational system at the pre-commissioning level because we have such an outstanding and comprehensive system of higher education in the United States at the collegiate level.

My concern about the academies today is that they cram so much into so little time, and I wonder whether they are really providing an adequate college education for a lifetime of learning and development in the military profession. So from the beginning, I would have the system of national scholarships, but I would have these youngsters serving in the Reserves as enlisted people while they were in college so that they would learn what it is to be led as well as what military service is about.

At the intermediate level, I would focus on the operational as I think the intermediate service schools did, or at least the Army did, in the first four decades of the 20th century, as well as teaching some other materials that they might need to use as mid-grade and field-grade officers. In both cases, though, I would advocate the mixing or jointness.

For example, if you retain the system of academies that we have here now, there is no reason why youngsters could not have a junior year abroad. Even if they play football, it might be good for a Naval Academy midshipman who is a star football player to have to play for the Army in his junior year. It might indeed provoke some feeling of ecumenicism in response to the very powerful service-specific culture that students learn at the academies.

At the senior level, I think at senior service school, I would have one National Defense University. If you really want to teach jointness, and I have thought of this many years ago, you would have one war college where the students are mixed and where they learn strategy and they learn political-military affairs, and where you could have an equal number of students from the civilian agencies of government.

If my colleague, Jim Carafano, is right, you could cut down the numbers so that you wouldn't have to have so many officers. But if you still had a National Defense University with a 1-year, and in some cases a 2-year course for those who are identified as needing 2 years for a particular specialty, particularly to be strategists, and you had 2,000 to 3,000 officers at the National Defense University, that would be fine.

But I would add one more thing to this, and that is that I would try to identify early on, on the basis of their academic accomplishments in college and immediately afterwards, who were those officers who could pursue a career of outstanding operational accomplishments and academic accomplishment. One of the fears that I have with the teaching of strategy is that the armed services will delegate strategy to a core of specialists. I think the Army is doing this with their basic and advanced strategic art program at Carlisle.
Flag officers need to know strategy because they are the ones who have to make the choices. They are the ones who don't just apply strategy. They are the ones who recognize what are the best strategies, recognize the original strategy.

So to me, every officer who has the potential to go into the flag ranks and may be in command at some point needs to have familiarity with strategic thinking. And the best way to do that, in my judgment, at intermediate and senior service school is through the case study method, and not theory, and not theoretical or hypothetical case studies, but historical case studies. How about studying the reality of past warfare?

I once—with a very distinguished officer who was then later the dean at the National War College designed a whole curriculum for Air Command and Staff College and Air War College that consisted completely of historical case study. When the Chief of Staff saw it, he smirked and said, “I see the historian has been in charge of this exercise.” And I said, “Chief, this is not a history curriculum. This is just case studies according to the way the best professional schools teach their subject.”

Dr. Snyder. Mrs. Davis for five minutes.

Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you all for being here. And it has been interesting to listen to all four of you.

I think one of my question was just, if there is something that you heard from one of the panelists, any of you, that you either intensely disagree with or think that is really important—you have talked a little bit about ROTC and the role that ROTC should play, and I know there is a difference of opinion there. I am just wondering if there is something that really stands out. Those of us were trying to listen to all of you, and what——

Dr. Breslin-Smith. I have got something to say, but I don't want to go first.

Dr. Kohn. I will start.

Dr. Breslin-Smith. Yes, you can start at that end.

Mrs. Davis. You are all—have very good, strong points of opinion, and I am just trying to sort them out a little bit in terms of——

Dr. Kohn. Well, I would start.

I don't agree that the strategic level and the national political military levels, particularly civil-military relations, which has been my scholarly and, to some degree, teaching specialty all my career, should be imposed upon officers at the 10- or 12-year mark.

I think that one of the disagreements I have with the personnel systems of the armed services, and I have many with those, is that we are the most wasteful military in the world. We throw away these officers in the up-or-out system at the height of their powers, and nowadays people are much more active and much more vital at a much older age. And I think we ought to be keeping officers longer, and we ought to modify up-or-out.

And for this reason, I think that you could, and should, have a system of professional military education that is appropriate to the level at which officers will serve, and I wouldn’t cram it all into the early or the first 15 years when officers are really focused on
command and on competency in their form of warfare and learning staff and the operations.

And I wouldn’t abolish ROTC unless I could replace it with something. Again, I would emphasize that this committee could act in innovative ways to strengthen what we have rather than having a knock-down-drag-out Armageddon-type fight with the services over abolishing or consolidating.

Dr. Carafano. Yes. I guess Dick and I actually completely disagree on this, which is great, because that is what we do. And I think the one thing I would be most disappointed is if fundamentally we came back with the exact same model which we have now, which is basically just-in-time education.

If you look at the PME system, it is designed to provide the officer the educational experience needed, and then go forth in an operational assignment and apply that, right? And that is great in an industrial age world where everything is programmed and knowable, which is why the system endured so well during the course of the Cold War, because life was incredibly predictable.

We knew where we were going to be assigned. We knew what we were going to do. We knew what captains did. We knew what majors do.

Not to digress for a second, but I will anyway, and Dick may correct me if I am wrong. But I think one of the most inspirational periods in officer professional development was the inter-war years between the 1920s and the 1940s.

And the reason why I believe that is because nobody ever got promoted, but also nobody ever got fired. And what was great about that was, in those formative years in their 30s, officers could basically do whatever they wanted to. If they wanted to play polo, they did. If they wanted to sit in their library and read, they did.

And the result of that? We had an officer corps which I think was unprecedented in terms of its breadth of experience and knowledge and skill sets and attributes it brought to the table. And when you went to World War II, we had totally unpredictable environment, in a sense. You could look in the bag, and there was a Stovall for China. There was a Marshall for Washington. There was an Eisenhower.

And I guess in my heart of hearts, I want to get back to that, and I want to give officers, early on in their life, the deep toolkit for a lifetime of learning and critical thinking, and then I want them to go forth and prosper. Now, I am not opposed to formal educational experiences at the 20-, 30-, 40-year mark. We have similar things in other professions in terms of post-doc opportunities or continuing education opportunities, like they have for judges and other professionals.

So I am not opposed to that, but I guess I fundamentally disagree with Dick. I think just-in-time education is a very bad—it is a great model for getting toilet paper into Wal-Mart. It is a horrible model when you can’t know the future and when the future can become incredibly different in terms of the requirement and the needs in a very short amount of time, and you need an officer corps that is agile and mentally able to adapt to that. And I just want to give them those tools as quickly as I think they can possibly take them on.
I know where I disagree with everybody on this panel. It is implicit, but this whole business of awarding a master's degree. Its time has been served thanks to Mr. Skelton and pressuring the services, particularly war colleges, into awarding a master's degree. That is fine. But the degree itself has become worthless. Everybody who goes gets a master's degree, and they don't even apply. It is abused.

You ask people in the business of higher education, if you have a master's degree at one of these war colleges, will that be accepted at a university for entrance into their Ph.D. program? No, it will not. It is a meaningless degree in a lot of ways.

And I don't want to demean it. It is tough to administer when you have faculty that don't have a Ph.D. to administer the exams involved with a master's degree.

A large number of the students particularly at the war college level, particularly in the Air Force, arrive already with a master's degree, and you are going to tell them, “You are going to get a master's degree here, and we are going to work you hard for it,” and the answer is, “I already have one of those.”

Also, all of the intermediate schools—check me on this. I am not sure on this—all of the intermediate schools—School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) program have a legitimate two-year master's degree program, which is a legitimate program.

So I just think the usefulness of that master's degree has passed. It is time we just forget about it and drive on. And I know everybody at this table will disagree with me.

Dr. BRESLIN-SMITH. No. I agree with you.

Dr. COCHRAN. You do?

Dr. BRESLIN-SMITH. I think——

Dr. SNYDER. Let's see, I have got—just for the sake of our poor transcriptionist here, Dr. Carafano, you said, what, you——

Dr. CARAFANO. Well, yes. I mean, I agree with the point that a master's degree that isn't really a master's degree doesn't have a whole lot of utility.

Dr. SNYDER. And then, Dr. Breslin-Smith?

Dr. BRESLIN-SMITH. I think it—yes, for a specific reason I will get to, but yes.

Dr. SNYDER. Go ahead. What is your specific reason?

Dr. BRESLIN-SMITH. Well, I think the type of education we provide——

Dr. COCHRAN [continuing]. One thing. That is what causes this dysfunctional “we and they” military and civilian issue at war college faculties. Who are you to administer this degree?

Dr. BRESLIN-SMITH. And I can actually——

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Breslin—get back to Dr. Kohn.

Dr. BRESLIN-SMITH. Later on, after this is over, I can give you the history of why this came to be, why, during the Johnson Administration during Vietnam, we got into this pattern of the military responding to McNamara. That is how we got started doing the master's degree issue.

Again, to me, the value in what we do is seen every day in the seminar room, and it would happen with or without master's degree. The institution itself, war college—was not set up.
He could have set up a research university. Honestly, he could have done anything in 1946. He did not. He did not choose to do that. This is a professional school.

And I want to make one other comment about our sister school, ICAF. I also believe ICAF needs to go back to its roots. This should be its day in the sun. We are facing an economic crisis. The industrial base is under severe pressure. We are losing the transportation industry. We are facing this crisis. That is what they were set up to do, to evaluate, assess, and study mobilization of the industrial base.

Over the years, they have—just like all institutions, they have evolved and developed and expanded. I think now is their time to come back and embrace what they were established to do—help the military. Help us even over at the War College get a picture, get an image of what does all this mean for strategy, this contraction. So I would advocate, again, a strong interest on the part of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, but I would advocate ICAF going back to its roots.

Dr. Snyder. I wanted to ask—when somebody asked me what is elementary school like today, I think back to the 1950s when I was in elementary school. I can still remember what the halls smelled like from the cafeteria, and I have visited schools since then.

But I can't tell, from what you all are telling me, what the conclusions that you have reached, what it is based on. I think it is more than just anecdotally, "Well, I was at that school for a while, or at this school for a while. I talked to these students." I don't see any firm study that has been done.

So my question is, I presented the scenario, if we have three or four or five people that just sit down and talk to General Marshall, that he thought that was pretty good. That may be one criteria. That is not acceptable. We could probably save a lot of money by finding the top 100 people, and we would find our 3 or 4 probably in that top 100.

What is the criteria by which we judge how we are doing? Is it going to be—one of you mentioned—yes, you, Dr. Carafano, about the number of people involved in the surge and where they had come from. And we have heard discussions about Tom Ricks talks about, well, the people that helped General Petraeus write the counterterrorism manual were actually not from these colleges. But that seems like the kind of anecdotal evidence.

What are we going to base our conclusion on about this school is performing well, whether it does case studies or not, whether it offers master's degrees or not? How do we judge the quality of leadership that is coming out of these schools, which we think makes us safer? Maybe we will start with Dr. Kohn and go backwards.

Dr. Kohn. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think you can set standards on the basis of American higher education, and you can do the accreditation from the Pentagon with oversight from the Congress. As to the quality of the faculty, as to the relevance of the curriculum to whatever level of education is appropriate, pre-commissioning, intermediate, senior service school, or general officer and admiral level, and you can investigate what you think is needed, and you can discuss this at great length I think with senior officers and retired officers.
Anecdotal evidence I think is useful—I say this as a historian—when it is ubiquitous and consistent over time. Something is usually there. And in my case, it is talking to faculty members at these schools for 30-plus years, sending graduate students to teach there, accepting graduate students from the academies, lecturing in the last 15 years probably five or six dozen times at most war college.

Dr. Snyder. Well, I will interrupt you there. Didn’t you say over the last 30 years, but there was a dramatic change, we think, 20 years ago, and then we have had changes, we think, over the last 8 years since September 11th.

I mean, so when you mention experience, I want to know what we base our judgment on that the officers that are going to Iraq and Afghanistan today at the highest levels of leadership, that they—how do we judge whether they—it is not on whether they have a good master's degree program. I mean, where did General Grant rank in his leadership class?

Dr. Kohn. Well, in my judgment, the strategic failures of the United States in both Iraq and in Afghanistan seem to me to be indicative, and in the first Gulf War. I don’t want to name names here. I don’t think that would be useful.

But the United States has not succeeded strategically in much of its military operations and its wars at the military level in the last 30 years. When I think of General Petraeus, one of my graduate students was picked off by him.

He indeed cherry-picked the very best minds that he knew, since he had been the commander at Leavenworth, and he is attuned to these officers with Ph.Ds. He likes to run with them. He knows, and he knew how to find these people, but he had to draw them from all over the place.

And so I think that it may be unfair and it may be a very gross measure, but if you look at American military success from the strategic level since the beginning of the Vietnam War, there are questions to be raised.

Dr. Snyder. That is right. Well, I will let the rest of you comment here.

Dr. Carafano. I am going to make three points.

The first point I would make is I think what Dick and Sandy both said is exactly right. I mean, we can tell you what a good education is because we have got lots of experience at what good professional graduate level education is in this country. The war colleges don’t meet that standard. And if you want to say—that is the standard you would use, is you would look at the breadth of what other professionals are capable of doing in terms of graduate level education.

And again, my argument for why you would push this earlier is you can find lots of people between the ages of 25 and 35 who are capable of the most sophisticated level of intellectual activity possible, and they go through graduate programs and do that all the time. So the measure of what is a good graduate level education, regardless of the content, I think Dick and Sandy are right. You use the state of the art that we have now.

In terms of how do I measure the competency of the graduate, well; this is a problem that we simply can’t solve now because
have very poor predictors of cognitive development and future capabilities. It just doesn’t work.

Part of the reason why I think the problem that we got into at the end of the Gulf War and the post-Gulf period is—it is bigger than PME, is if you actually look at the military professional promotion system, basically what you had is, for 30 years, “like promoted like,” right? I promoted the people that looked like me, sounded like me, acted like me.

And that was fine, because you were in a very predictable operational environment. You know, it was Fulda Gap today. It is Fulda Gap tomorrow.

But the problem is the gene pool, if you will. The leadership pool was very, very good in a very, very narrow margin, and so we get to the post-Cold War, and we are all over the place, in different requirements, different strategic environments, and the pool is just not wide enough. There are a few outliers, like Dave Petraeus. But generally, we didn’t have an officer corps like we did at the beginning of World War II that had a vast breadth and depth of experience and knowledge and skill sets to apply to these different strategic settings.

And I think it is a fool’s errand to say, “Tell me how I am going to evaluate the quality of my graduates,” because right now, history is the only thing that is going to tell you whether you have good graduates or not, when it presents itself, and then you would have to deal with those challenges.

But this would lead to a third point I would make——

Dr. Snyder. I have got to interrupt you when you say it is a fool’s errand, but you just gave an example, or you did, where General Petraeus found those people, found people that he thought were top-notch, so that is not a fool’s errand. You just said he was successful at doing that.

Dr. Carafano. He did that, but the system didn’t do that for him, right? He had to go out and find them.

Dr. Snyder. Well, but my question wasn’t how is the system doing. I was asking how do we judge it, and you just gave me an example. You got a top-notch guy who looked for top-notch people, but you are saying we can’t set up a system to do that, apparently. It is a fool’s errand.

Dr. Carafano. But 10 years ago, Dave Petraeus may not have come to your mind as the obvious four-star that was going to pull us out in Iraq. I mean, people would say he is a great officer. He is really bright, but he doesn’t kind of look like the rest of us.

I mean, this is just not in the professional military field. I mean, you can look at the sport field, and you have got all these athletes. They have all similar attributes and everything. Why is one—other than steroids—why is one an incredible deliverer and the other guy not?

And there are cognitive things going on in the brain. Why do you have a 60 percent drop-out rate at SEAL school when all the guys and women—or I guess it is just guys—all the guys go in, and they can all run 2 miles in 30 seconds flat. Well, there is something going on in the brain that we just don’t quite understand, and so we have to kind of go back to the old tried-and-true model is we
will know great leaders when we see them, right, because they will perform and they will achieve great results.

And that is why my argument is put as many bets on the table as you can. Have as many officers you can who have skills and knowledge and various attributes, and you will have a deeper pool to draw from when the crisis arrives.

But I did want to get to this point, which is not in my testimony and which I do think is important, is 99 percent of what we do is—what we do here is we focus on when you get educated, what is in the curriculum. What we don’t talk about is the incredible developments that are going on in neuroscience and social sciences in terms of understanding cognitive ability and evaluating human performance and the potential for human performance. And we are not quite at yet where we can say, after somebody takes the test, “Well, that is the next Dave Petraeus,” but we are making enormous advances.

Well, if you actually look at the traditional education models in this country, when we learn something in the sciences of how brains work and how to educate people, by the time that transport over into the actual process of educating, it can take years, and decades, in some cases, and it winds up going through lots of political filters before—it doesn’t get applied right.

So we should think seriously, and this committee should think seriously about how do we track the cutting-edge developments in neuroscience and social sciences in understanding cognitive ability and our ability to learn, and the ability to judge human performance, and how do we make sure we capture those lessons and get them into the system as soon as possible, in the most efficacious manner as possible, rather than waiting for them to kind of fall out over 20 or 30 years later.

Dr. Snyder. I am going to make a comment and then go to you, Dr. Cochran.

About 10 years ago or so, I was talking with a school superintendent. I am sure he is retired by now. He struck me as being a very wise man. He said that after, like—he had been doing it for 40 years. He said the hardest job for him that he still wasn’t any good at was taking those new college graduates and figuring out which one he was going to hire that would turn out to be the best teacher. He said he just still struggled with that and was not right as often as he would have liked.

Dr. Cochran.

Dr. Cochran. Sir, the problem about going further in the line, you get all these times to kind of think and structure your argument, then somebody says something and you forget what you were going to say.

I had two points. I think, one, I speak this as a historian. And I think this is a subjective measure. You just have to trust your instincts, or if it is gray beards or if it is somebody, get together some people who are just really intelligent, really grasp, you can measure how well we are doing, how well the system in it. As you were saying with the school superintendent, it defies an objective judgment. And I am comfortable with that, but I am a historian.

The second point, I think the standard I would look for is what I would call mental agility in your profession, and this is what I
think the PME system does a wonderful job at doing, bringing people in. And think of what other profession brings people in at after 4 or 5 years and gives them a chance to think about what they have done, 10 years, then 15 years and 20 years. And the unfortunate thing is then you max out at 25 years.

This is a marvelous system when you have a chance to examine your profession, whether it is at the tactical level, where you put your weapons, or at the higher level, whether you view the diplomatic or the economic quiver or thing that you could use to solve that problem. And what comes out of that experience is the ability to change your mind, to say, “Wow, I have been thinking about this, and I have got this wrong,” and in the environment also with your contemporaries to share that in a non-threat experience.

And that is an agility of mind and a willingness to rethink. That is what I would look for in a subjective manner, does the system produce people that have that.

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Smith.

Dr. BRESLIN-SMITH. I used to think about this question, and I would say, “Well, okay, what are we trying to do, the War College?” And my conclusion the most simple way is I want to have wise decision-makers. I want to impart wisdom.

But I kept going back to your question about how do you measure this. How do I know? And toward the end of my testimony—I don't know if you have got my written testimony, but I lay out a chart, like the second to last page, or second or maybe the third page before the end of my testimony.

Dr. SNYDER. It is your chart about how to analyze a situation?

Yes.

Dr. BRESLIN-SMITH. Yes. What we do at the War College is, twice a year, we have in-depth oral exams. And what we do is we give the students a hypothetical scenario, crisis. And what we are looking for, not that they know the answers to those questions, but that they can raise those questions. What were the kind of questions they would need to know as a commander to have a strategic grasp of the problem they are confronting.

We want to know, do they think, in some disciplined, structured way, about everything they would need to know and to resist the impulse to act first, ask later.

As I look at it, I think we can actually tell, in the students’ response to this type of hypothetical question, are they prepared or not. Now, in all honesty, and I raise this issue in my testimony, I was taken aback when I read Paul Yingling’s article about the failure of generalship.

And even at a more deep level as a civilian, having the opportunity to sit in military campaign planning classes at the War College and really come to respect the discipline in planning that Army—let’s say the Army or the Marine Corps learned in terms of what does military campaign planning mean, it is a disciplined structure—courses of actions, branches, and sequels. It prepares you for both challenging your assumptions and acting on new realities.

When I hear students who came back in that period 2005, 2006, and even the run-up to the war, I didn’t see that basic level of campaign planning, military planning taking place. And as I said in my
testimony, as far as I know, I certainly know that nobody resigned over this issue, but I am not aware of a great movement of military officers saying this is not adequate.

That has led me to conclude that, while we offer a wonderful elective that really takes a student and makes them struggle with this issue of what is a professional responsibility of a military officer. We read “Soldier and State” by Huntington, and we read that book almost page by page together.

And it puts the students—and it put me—I took the class—it put me in a vice that I couldn’t get out of. I couldn’t have an easy answer of what I would do. And it makes you struggle with that question of how do you resist political pressure to act, and how do you learn the proper response. Dick Kohn has gone into this much more than I have in terms of aspects of proper response.

But I have to say those two issues, discipline of thought and analysis in terms of the questions we ask in orals, and then confronting head-on your capability of performing your responsibilities professionally as an officer—and I would add this is true for State, as well—and giving advice when it is asked for.

Dr. Snyder. Mr. Wittman, we have gotten kind of lackadaisical on our clock here, but we are dealing with college professors, so we let them go. No, it just seems like the conversation needs to go on.

Mr. Wittman for as much time as you need.

Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You know, it seems like as we look at these existing military education initiatives, we see in some instances where the service branch chiefs place a lot of attention and resources there, like the Marine Corps University, and those places really prosper. But then, it seems like you see others where the senior military officer maybe doesn’t quite have that in his sights, or it is not there at that level of emphasis.

And it seems that those kind of are out there adrift a little bit, and it seems like to me, for our senior War Colleges, if they are not seen as centers for intellectual thought by the senior military officer within that service branch, it seems like to me that is an awful, awful waste.

Is there something that Congress can do, you think, to elevate that whole effort to make sure that it is keenly in the sights and at the highest level of priority for our service branch chiefs? And I will go down the panel and ask your thoughts on that.

Dr. Breslin-Smith. Well, again, as I mentioned before, it is particularly a problem for us because we are joint, and we are orphaned, often. Our fate depends on the interest of the chairman solely. We don’t have a service responding to us.

But in more specific to you, there is nothing more powerful to a chief or the chairman than to have a Congressman ask him that question. Asking about their interest in education and their perception of the role of education is a powerful signal to them to be attentive.

Dr. Cochran. Sir, I served for two years as the Horner Chair at Marine Corps University, and my boss at that time was a one-star by the name of Jim Conway, who several years later we now know as the commandant. And actually, what I keep in the back of my
mind, I think if there is a service that does seem to value education more in the production, it is the Marine Corps.

And I asked myself why, and I think I learned that while I was there. It is just a small service. Everybody knows everybody. And they have that ability to turn quickly on a dime. And I have often held out the Marine Corps University as a model for what other services could do.

I think, along with my colleague here, what could Congress do is, as a service chief that comes through, is ask him or her where did you go to senior service school, or what did you do. And there is a caveat here, too, I would offer, and there I think I will be in the minority.

I think fellowships are fine. Sending somebody off for a year at Georgetown or Harvard or something like that, but they miss that interchange with their fellow students, particularly at a place like the National War College, where you have one quarter, one quarter, one quarter—and one quarter are civilians.

So I am not an advocate of sending somebody off for a fellowship. I think they ought to go to a War College. And ask that question.

Dr. CARAFANO. This is easy. One, you have to legislate that the service school belongs to the chief or the commandant or the chairman, period. So the Army delegating the Army War College Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), that is a travesty. So I would legislate that out. It is your college. You have to keep it.

The other point Sandy already made. It is ridiculous to have commandants rotating through the colleges and then thinking that they are going to go on to some—this is just some stop on their way to their next career. I mean, if they don’t serve between 5 and 10 years, I mean, it is ridiculous.

So I would mandate that the term of service be somewhere between 5 and 10 years. I think it needs to be better named, “grave-stone” promotion, is the right answer. And I would legislate that, by law, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) or the Commandant or the Chairman has to run their war college or their college, period.

Dr. Kohn. Mr. Wittman, I would agree with that, but I would also look to the model of the great research universities of this country. And I would mix teaching and research. The faculties have to do both teaching and research, and these faculties need to be consolidated. Why we have a separate faculty at the National War College and ICAP is beyond my comprehension other than by tradition. The same goes for Air University.

And I would put the think tanks of the services at those colleges, like the Army has Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) at Carlisle, like the joint staff has Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at NDU, but I would then also encourage—and perhaps you can do this with appropriations. You are not funding think tanks at a distance elsewhere in the armed services—encourage the service staffs, the COCOMs, the combatant commanders and the joint staff to use these institutions as centers for research and thinking. And by having the faculty involved in research, insisting that the faculty does research, because the best faculty in this country is doing research, even at some liberal arts colleges.
And I think if you create that kind of model, then there would be ownership and there would be buy-in. That would be my recommendation.

Dr. Snyder. Dr. Carafano, I understand you have a flight date. We will miss you. Thank you for being here. We don’t want you to miss your flight. Thank you for being here.

Dr. Carafano. Thank you, sir. I appreciate that.

Dr. Snyder. And I will tell the other folks, too, but you should feel free to submit any written materials, Dr. Carafano, you want to.

Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to just turn to the inter-agency piece for a second. And I think Dr. Cochran, or maybe Dr. Carafano, talking about having a broader net of trying to bring in more individuals, be they civilian, be they people in the Reserve, what have you, who could make a greater contribution if encouraged at different levels to participate in a different way.

I know that we have—when we started talking about inter-agency a few years ago, and it was clear that State Department didn’t have a deep bench, they weren’t able to bring people to seminars, it was really only the military that could participate in their activities, same with USAID and others.

And what would you like to share with us about—is there something? You talked about a National War College. I guess I would call it a National Security University, something like that, that would be focused not just on people who need command and control skills in the services, but also in homeland security, in conflict resolution, whatever that is that they are thrust into a situation, as our military has been in Iraq and Afghanistan, without the diplomatic skills, without the ability to do some of that work, and maybe even whether it is Agriculture (Ag) or finance or whatever.

Is that a need, to try and do that? And it is not replacing, certainly, the military academies, but we don’t really have that. And it has always been of interest to me that we probably sort of isolate those people, as you have mentioned, who choose the military as opposed to other walks of life that could also contribute that, but they are somehow—they are not anti-military. It is just not where they would go, and so they would need this broader net to be caught in to be part of the debate, the discussions.

How do we do that? I mean, is that something we should be doing? And are we doing it already and we just don’t quite see where it is?

Dr. Breslin-Smith. Well, it is a great question, and there are a couple of things just to note about it.

Again, as I said before, this was the original idea in 1946. State should have had its own college, and they couldn’t get the money for it. And that responds to what you are saying. They couldn’t get the money then, and they can’t get the money now.

I would throw it back to you, all of you, in that this issue of funding civilian activities in international security is a challenge for the Congress, because it involves voting for appropriations for foreign aid in the State Department. And that is the first issue.
The other issue is the culture at State. The Foreign Service generally has an approach to education that they are highly qualified. They take the Foreign Service test. And once they pass, that is it. They don't need to get an advanced degree. They don't need to have any further education. They come in highly educated.

I have to say, when students come to the War College, they do say, “Hey, we should actually—this is a good experience.” And so part of the proposal I am suggesting for this subcommittee to consider, the Foreign Service Institute is an institution. It primarily is focused on language training and small, short courses. It is a large, physical place. They, I think, could transform themselves into an intermediate school. In other words, at the 10-year level, you could have that beginning engagement with the inter-agency there at the Foreign Service Institute.

And then, my suggestion is is that you have a College of Diplomacy and Development. There is space available on our campus for that kind of activity. And it wouldn't just be an educational function in and of itself, but it would provide the foundation of knowledge that we really don't have in the State Department or USAID to remember things.

Mrs. DAVIS. Yes. Maybe going back to not necessarily 10 or 15 years out, I mean, should there be civilian academies that——

Dr. BRESLIN-SMITH. For diplomats, you mean at the undergraduate level?

Mrs. DAVIS. Not necessarily for diplomats. I mean, one of the things that is so compelling in terms of young people that choose to go into the military academies is that they are nominated by a member of Congress. I mean, there is a different level. Should there be something like that for——

Dr. BRESLIN-SMITH. It is a good question.

Mrs. DAVIS. So—as well who——

Dr. BRESLIN-SMITH. What you are reflecting is the military always has this notion they would represent society, and you could be from a farm or from a city and get an appointment to the academy and come. The tradition of the State Department was it was the eastern establishment elite initially, all Harvard graduates, and they were a very small group of people.

Over time, obviously there has been an expansion in the Foreign Service. I think you raise a good question. Traditionally, State folks go to college, do well, take the Foreign Service exam and then go in, and that is it. I think it is a legitimate question to say other countries have academies in a broader national security area, in the area of diplomacy.

I am involved in some reform efforts for State right now in trying to work with Foreign Service officers, either retired or current, to say what can we do to revitalize that profession. It is a good question.

Dr. COCHRAN. Three quick comments. We are dealing with trying to change a culture, as I am sure that—I mean, the military has had this culture of education is considered part of your career, and then they build in the float so that you can peel people off for six months or a year. That is going to take a sea change, a culture change for the other agencies to accept that. It will take time.
Being older, I get impatient. Don’t tell me why you can’t do something. Tell me how you are going to do it. So I have heard the reasons why agencies cannot peel people off for six months.

Or if you are really good, or if you are tasked to send somebody, are you going to send your really key guy or key gal, or are you going to send some kind of person that you can live without? And you know what normally happens. To me, that is unacceptable.

I find when I deal with the inter-agency concept, the issue there is we don’t have a Chief of Staff of the Army or the Air Force. We don’t have a Chief of Staff of the inter-agency that we can go to and say, “You have got to make this work.” And I think you need to address that.

And again, I think persistence on the part of Congress is so key here, because it is going to take—this is a sea change. This is a cultural change that has simply got to happen.

The last point I would make is I wouldn’t waste my time at the entry ROTC or that kind of young person level. I think the important thing is at the mid-level and at the senior-level, that there is a mix of people from the other agencies, and that is where I would concentrate.

We already have a pretty good system at the senior level war colleges, particularly the National Defense University, where one-quarter of their student body are real civilians. It is lesser when you get to the service school, but that has already been established. You are trying very hard at the mid-level to do it, but boy, it is nickel and dime.

But I would concentrate on that area. And it is so essential, so essential. You put your finger right on it, in my mind.

Dr. Kohn. I would agree with Sandy, Mrs. Davis. I think that to have academies would be, again, for the government to duplicate institutions that we may have in society that are of very high quality.

But that said, we do have a terrible recruiting problem at the civil service of getting the best youngsters. I have so many students who want to do public service, who want to have careers in government, that don’t find a way to get in, and it is really very difficult.

I would distinguish the inter-agency process as a body of knowledge to be taught how it works, what it does, with the education of people for inter-agency cooperation and working together. I think that the military leads the government in professional education past the undergraduate level, and probably leads society among professions.

You have this infrastructure, this large infrastructure in the military. I would make use of it, and make use of it by adding large numbers of civilians, again the best from other agencies, and that probably can be done on a funding basis and an encouragement basis. It is a cabinet-level issue for any administration. It requires a push from the top and funding from this side of the Potomac.

The problem is stovepipes. To add academies or even post-graduate institutions to the civilian agencies, it seems to me, would just perpetuate the stovepiping.

But that said, I think it has to be a cultural change within the military, also, because up until war college, most military officers are focused on working with other military officers first in their
service, then in the other services, with allied military services, and there is very little tradition of cooperative activity in the history of American foreign operations in other countries between military and civilian.

I once asked a very senior British officer if—retired—if in his career as a young officer, he would ever take orders from a foreign service officer or a civilian in his government. He said, “Well of course. We do that all the time at the mid-levels.”

And I thought to myself, “Would an American officer, a major, a lieutenant colonel, learn to take orders from a civilian and feel comfortable with that? Would his or her commanders, all the way up to the four-star level, be comfortable with that?” The answer is really, no. And so I think there is a cultural change that has to take place on both sides.

Dr. BRESLIN-SMITH. Except I just have to say that is, though, the experiment in this is what is happening in the PRTs now. At the captain, major, and lieutenant colonel level, they are coming to us with that experience and struggling with this question.

Dr. KOHN. I would also——

Mrs. DAVIS. And they are great ones to capture a lot of that experience.

Dr. BRESLIN-SMITH. You bet.

Mrs. DAVIS. I mean, I think we can build some things around that.

Dr. KOHN. I think that General Caldwell at Leavenworth, where I visited two months ago, is actually addressing this problem by inviting civilian agencies. I think he is even offering to send Army officers in exchange to get much more civilian attendance at the Command and General Staff College and the other courses at the Combined Arms Center.

And so there may be the kernel of an idea and a process there. It seemed very promising.

Dr. BRESLIN-SMITH. And I would say there are lessons-learned materials there on the PRT experience is really worth reading. It is very revealing.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

Dr. SNYDER. I have one final question, and we will see if Mr. Wittman or Mrs. Davis have anything more.

If you could institute three or four or five changes, given the institutions we have today the way they are, to increase the quality of the faculty, what would those things be?

Dr. BRESLIN-SMITH. For the military faculty, again, what we have all said I think is have the services take education more seriously so their placement is effective. The same thing is true for agencies. I would actually work with State, AID, Treasury, the other people we get faculty from earlier in their careers saying—highlight when you are older, would you want to come to War College and teach, think about that now. So I would recruit younger.

And with civilian faculty, we need to have more opportunities to do research, to have some time off. I like the idea of us going back and forth between the executive branch and coming back to the War College, so we have practitioners who work at OSD or work at State for a while and come back. So more flexibility with our civilian faculty.
We have increased our civilian faculty a lot since the era of the Skelton Commission, so I don’t really have any complaints about it, but I think we need more flexibility.

Dr. Snyder. Dr. Cochran.

Dr. Cochran. Two things, sir.

First of all, I would urge you all to re-examine the notion of tenure and under——

Dr. Snyder [continuing]. On your statement——

Dr. Cochran [continuing]. Mr. Skelton. And I was a Title X import. I came in under his initial things, and I ran the tenure gap, and I got there and it was marvelous. And it is, as I understand, at all PME institutions, tenure is no longer valid.

And I honestly feel that that is a worthy goal. I would also pursue within that the notion of tenure for military faculty themselves while they are still on active duty, similar to what they do at the service academy. I would have to think this through a little bit more, but that sparks me. I mean, you need to get good people that are good at what they do and stay there, and not with the threat of some kind, somebody coming in and changing the curriculum.

The second thing, I would seriously address this notion of somehow coming up with a differentiation between uniform faculty and civilian faculty. And I am not so sure what the answer is, but it does work at the inner—within a department, because each specialty has something they are really good at, and they don’t cross over. If you are an Air Force professor, you are pretty good at flying an airplane. If you are a civilian professor, you are pretty good at researching something.

What do I want to do? Do I want to learn to fly that airplane to get ahead and—, so I think someone needs to really think that one through, and I think that would improve the quality of the faculty.

And the last thing here, I differ with my colleague, Dick Kohn. Teaching at a PME institution is all about teaching. It really is. And if you want to go research and write, you are in the wrong place. You really are. You have got to go there as a teacher. And what I think of in my own experience with higher education, there are certain colleges, as opposed to universities, where the teaching experience is the one that is valued. That is most important. And I think that needs to be emphasized.

Dr. Snyder. Dr. Kohn.

Dr. Kohn. Well, I won’t take the bait from my friend Sandy, but the history of American higher education contradicts what he says.

I would make five points, Mr. Chairman. First, I would have the committee and the Congress mandate certain conditions, backgrounds, and tenures for the leadership of these institutions so that they have the experience of being on the faculty, understanding faculty, and will take on as their responsibility the making certain of having the highest quality faculty in their institutions.

Now, the second thing I would do is I would look at the personnel systems of the armed services to make sure that they are encouraging their best officers to get higher education in the civilian world and to become faculty members. One of the great points that the Skelton Report made was that many very senior and very
successful leaders in World War II had served on the faculties of War Colleges and the staff colleges.

The third thing, and I don't know how this could be done from the Congress, but the recruiting of civilian faculty needs some kind of oversight, because it seems to me that the civilian faculty often—if you have a Ph.D., you have a Ph.D. And Ph.D.s are differing in quality and substance across American higher education just as law degrees are, medical degrees and others are.

And so, I think that the service schools are isolated from American academe. They don't have the personal contacts in the best training institutions. Because I had experience in the Department of Defense and elsewhere and was known to the Air Force, they would send very good students, and to the Army, very good students to me for graduate training.

But you can get great graduate training at many other places, and I think they are disconnected there.

A fourth thing I would do is I would prohibit—I don't know how to do this, either—prohibit the number of retired officers who are hired onto these faculties, sometimes with quite good credentials, but oftentimes because of the compatibility factor. He or she understands us, knows the culture, won't make waves, won't rock the boat, et cetera, et cetera. There is a bit of sinecurism going on here, at some schools more than at others, and sometimes almost none at some schools.

And then, last of all, I heartily endorse the issue of tenure. I addressed that in my written testimony to say that tenure is what creates outstanding faculties because it forces an up-or-out decision on the people after a period of probation in which they have to demonstrate not only their accomplishment and their worth, but their promise for the future as faculty members.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Wittman, anything further.

Mr. WITTMAN. All done.

Dr. SNYDER. Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Can I just ask, are very many denied tenure?

Dr. COCHRAN. When I was at the Air War College, yes, there were. I would say at that time, and this was early 1990s, we actually had—it was 50 percent were denied tenure. And some people left because of that.

Dr. BRESLIN-SMITH. And I don't agree with that, with the tenure question. I support it at a normal university. I like the idea, at National at least, of having this vitality of bringing professionals in for a while, having a retired foreign service officer or somebody from cabinet level who is with us for a while, because we are so focused on Washington decision-making, that is the vitality of people coming together.

Dr. KOHN. Then your tenure track only goes for your academic side, not for your special——

Dr. BRESLIN-SMITH. Yes. We have it almost essentially—we have three-year renewable contracts. We have people who have been on our faculty for a long time. It kind of works out.

Mrs. DAVIS. Obviously started something here. I didn't mean to do that.

Dr. COCHRAN. Well, in my observation of some of these schools, the lack of tenure in process is no deterrent to keeping people on
for lifetime appointments, because, “Oh, well, we will just continue so-and-so on for another,” or, “I don’t want to go through the problem of letting them go.”

You can have a dual-track faculty, professors of the practice, as we have in some professional schools, and then tenured academic people. So I think that can work.

Dr. Snyder. Thank you all for being here. I think our question today, we hit mostly broad themes of this. All of your written statements, I think had a wealth of some very specific things for us to look at, and we will. I think this is a good kick-off for us, and I appreciate you all being here.

Let me repeat very formally, if you have anything written, modifications, addendums you want to submit, we will make it part of our record and deliberations here and share it with the other members on the subcommittee. And we are certainly going to feel free to grab you again should we have other questions.

Thank you all for being here. We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
Opening Statement of
Chairman Dr. Vic Snyder
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

Hearing on “Another Crossroads: Professional Military Education 20 Years after the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel”

May 20, 2009

The hearing will come to order.

Good afternoon, and welcome to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations’ first hearing on Professional Military Education.

It is just over 20 years since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that reformed our military by institutionalizing what we call “jointness.” It is exactly 20 years after the Skelton Panel reviewed Professional Military Education to make sure that the military changed its culture through education to make sure that jointness would “stick.”

Today, we are starting a series of hearings to last over the next three to four months following on work we’ve been doing for the last three months. Although there are many variations on PME including distance learning and courses for enlisted service members and civilians, the scope of this project is limited to in-residence, officer PME from the Service Academies through the company grade and intermediate levels through the war colleges as well as the flag officers’ course called Capstone. We started this because with all of the geopolitical and technological changes that have taken place over the last twenty years. Many events have changed our nation’s approach to the world and changed our military, including the attacks of September 11th and the wars we’re in. We question, whether if as in the 1980s when the Cold War ended, we are at yet another crossroads for Professional Military Education.
Our Committee Chairman, of course, remembers those days very well. Mr. Skelton recalls that militaries usually don’t change things when they are successful. Instead, the reforms of the 1980s came on the heels of failures in Grenada and in attempting to rescue our hostages in Iran. If fact, Mr. Skelton reminds us often that even with these failures, it was not easy to convince the Services that they had to change. He knew then, and we know now, that they way to change cultures is through education. The issues before us as we embark on the investigation go to the very existence of military schools. The famous, or for some of you infamous, journalist Tom Ricks questioned just last month whether there was even a need for our Academies and war colleges. He reminds us that from time to time we should assess what our professional military schools are meant to do for the nation. We are also going to ask if they are doing what the nation needs now and if they are doing it in the best way. Finally, we are going to try to get to explore whether they are doing it successfully and, if not, what needs to change.

Our study seems to be very timely. Several other related efforts are underway. The Defense Science Board has started a study of PME that they will complete next spring. In addition, the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Center for a New American Security are both just beginning studies on the larger issue of Joint Officer Management that will also include a look at PME. CSIS intends to complete their study by the end of the year.

In order to conduct our study, we will be asking about the mission of the PME system and of each of the schools and what makes them unique one to the other as well as different from civilian schools. We’ll also be asking about the rigor with which they go about their business. And because education is necessarily a human business, we want to learn more about the quality and qualifications of the senior leadership, faculty, and students at these institutions. We’ll also be asking about the organization and resources the Department and Services afford these schools. Finally, we will explore their curricula. They each have their accrediting bodies for both their professional military education and
their academic degrees, but we want to look broadly at the question of balance. Balance between the enduring and the new. And, as each school tries to balance enduring and new, how they incorporate lessons-learned and other important subject matter into their curricula on a continuing basis. We specifically want to know what they do with areas such as:

- **Strategy and Military History**;
- **Irregular Warfare**;
- **Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Competency**; and
- **Beyond jointness, interagency and multinational integration**.

While in later hearings we will seek to hear from the commandants and deans of the schools and even the combatant commanders who employ the graduates of these institutions, our panel of witnesses is uniquely situated to get us started on the broader questions. I'm confident they can help us frame our investigation. After Mr. Wittman's statement I will introduce them.
Thank you, Chairman Snyder, and good afternoon to our witnesses -- we appreciate your being here today.

You must truly be experts, to be asked to testify at our opening hearing on Professional Military Education, because our committee expert and the person responsible for initiating this study is none other than our distinguished chairman, Ike Skelton. And because he cares deeply about professional military education, our chairman has exerted profound, positive influence on the system over the past two decades. This hearing begins a timely review of that system.

I’d like to take a moment to frame the issue for the record. Any study must have limited achievable objectives to avoid becoming swamped in unmanageable data, a caution well applied to Congressional studies.
As I understand it, we will examine in residence officer professional military education as a whole, starting with the military academies and continuing through the general officer Capstone course. Consequently, this review will not cover the military services' extensive and growing distance learning programs; non commissioned officer education programs; nor Reserve Officer Training Corps, or ROTC programs, on college campuses.

Furthermore, within the in residence officer PME system, we will concentrate our efforts on the Joint Professional Military Education system at the intermediate and senior levels. I applaud this approach, as we are concentrating on the area that was rejuvenated by the Skelton Panel recommendations and continues to get the most attention today. Indeed, officers must show that they have completed JPME levels I and II to advance in their careers to the flag or general officer level. No schooling, no promotion—hence, JPME credit is important to individual officers.

Joint PME is challenging to manage for several reasons. For starters, this training and education system is operated from the office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Mullen owns the National Defense University and his staff sets the JPME standards that NDU and the
military service war colleges must follow. Ordinarily, military education systems are managed by the military departments, but JPME is an exception, forcing the Joint Staff to function like a military service, an unaccustomed role for the Joint Staff.

The service chiefs oversee their own institutions, like the eminent Marine Corps University at Quantico, Virginia, in my district, providing resources and hiring faculty. Finally, the military services select the students who attend all the PME institutions and make selections for promotion. Given today’s operational tempo, there is tremendous pressure on the military services to ensure their officers attain JPME credit as efficiently as possible.

Somehow this complex mosaic seems to work, as our nation is blessed with fine flag officers in all branches of service. Nonetheless, the system is due for a relook in this time of change and extraordinary operational tempo. Our military officers, including junior officers, are conducting not just joint military operations, but interagency and international operations as well. Are our officers prepared for these real challenges of today, not only at the tactical and operational level, but are we developing a cadre of grand
strategists able to navigate the uncertain waters of tomorrow’s geopolitical struggles? We must insure that our military is developing leaders who will be effective in any situation.

This is an exciting topic that will generate much debate. I look forward to the discussion today and in the months to come.
Statement of Dr. Janet Breslin-Smith
House Armed Services Committee
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
May 20, 2009

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Witman, Members of the Subcommittee. I want to thank you for your leadership, your concern for the men and women protecting and representing our country, and your active role in a most important congressional activity—oversight. For the first half of my career, I sat on your side of this witness table, as a Senate staff member, advising Senator Leahy on defense and foreign operations appropriations. For the second half of my career I had the privilege of teaching at the National War College and it is on the basis of that experience—and my recent research on the history of the College—that I offer my observations about its mission and unique role as well as recommendations concerning the College’s future for this Subcommittee to consider.

Your retrospective review of Chairman Skelton’s 1989 path-breaking panel on Professional Military Education is timely. Born out of the Goldwater Nichols reforms, Mr. Skelton’s work pushed the Armed Forces to make good on its commitment to “jointness” by improving officer education at the intermediate and senior level schools. The Skelton Panel assessed “the ability of the …military education system to develop professional military strategists, joint war fighters, and tacticians.” The Panel looked at the quality of education and had a special focus on strategy.

Now, 20 years later, this subcommittee has to evaluate the performance of PME in a new strategic era, when threat comes from movements as well as nation states, and the ideology of the adversary is a militant theology. The task today is not just moving combat units on the battlefield, but how to influence the political culture in the exotic far reaches of the world. How do we equip our nation’s senior officers and national security professionals to meet this uncomfortable and confounding challenge?

Over 60 years ago, General Eisenhower and others asked a related and more basic question in the final hours of World War II. He knew that the next generation of officers would need a new civil-military program in national security strategy to prepare them for higher responsibilities. His idea had the support of Generals Arnold and Marshall as well as Admiral Nimitz and Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal. They would come together to propose an experiment in professional military education. The newly created National War College would be the nation’s first senior inter-service and inter-agency school to offer a program in strategic military/political studies, on war and politics.

The post-war board that recommended the College had a clear vision of its mission: “the College is concerned with grand strategy and the utilization of the national resources to implement that strategy… Its graduates will exercise a great influence on the formation of national and foreign policy in both peace and war.”

1 Gerow Report, 1945, NDU special collections. The College’s first annual report defined the mission initially for military officers: “To prepare selected ground, air and naval officers for the exercise of command and performance of joint staff duties at the highest echelons of the armed forces. To promote the development of understanding between high echelons of the armed forces and those other agencies of government which are an essential part of a national war effort.” Later the mission evolved to its current definition: “The mission of the National War College is to educate future leaders of the Armed Forces,
Since 1946, the College has been at this task, and has remained remarkably faithful to the founders’ vision for the school. Although the College has more than doubled in size from its original 100 students and its core course program has undergone constant review and revision, the genius of Eisenhower’s and Arnold’s concept lives on. On any given day, in any seminar room, you will hear combat veterans and seasoned diplomats struggle over contentious policy issues; academic specialists and intelligence officers in deep discussion over strategy applied to tribal issues in the Middle East or new threats from space; Army officers comparing wartime experiences with PRT team members from the State Department or USAID who practiced their political or economic skills in the midst of war. It is still a special place.

Mr. Chairman, Secretary Gates could not have designed a better place to develop his idea of the 21st Century national security professional.

Of course, all institutions change over time—shifts in the political environment and new bureaucratic forces push, poke and prod, and attempt to modify the mission, redefine the program, and adapt to changing political currents. The War College has not been exempt from these forces. Indeed, the College, once a well known, independent, professional program for national security senior officials, is now but one part of a larger unit, the National Defense University, in effect a subset of a multifaceted organization including research centers, other schools and colleges, and various outreach activities.

Moreover, its program is no longer totally distinctive. As the other Senior Service Colleges expanded and shifted their curriculum to approximate and accommodate the joint/interagency orientation of the War College and its strategic focus, the College must once again revitalize and renew itself. It must ask: “Is the College still unique? Has it adapted to meet the needs of a new strategic era? What do the nation’s senior national security officials—in and out of uniform—need to know and be able to do in the twenty-first century, as strategic leaders? What is different in the leadership preparation at the College—compared to the other Senior Service Colleges or civilian universities— that continues to warrant its existence as a separate institution?”

These questions take on new urgency with the work of this Subcommittee and the current Defense Science Board Task Force on Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), which will study both Service specific and joint PME curricula as well as overall steps to make JPME “more effective in preparing U.S. military personnel to meet the uncertainties and challenges of future missions.” Buried in the DSB study directive may be an implied conceit: I would argue, Mr. Chairman, that today’s strategic leaders must give as much premium to “the thinking about” as to the “meeting” of uncertainties and challenges. As an early Secretary of Defense once said, “Asking what to do drives out thought.”

That insight, I believe, drove the founders to create the College in the first place. Strategic thinking, in their view, had to be given primacy over operational art and tactical actions, or else leaders would not be able to orchestrate and prioritize the application of state powers to achieve both short and long term national goals. Deep analysis of content, a global perspective, and profound thinking about vision must drive strategy, decisions, actions, and assessments.

State Department, and other civilian agencies for high-level policy, command, and staff responsibilities. To do this, NWC conducts a senior-level course of study in national security policy and strategy for selected U.S. and foreign military officers and federal officials.”

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Indeed, this was the tradition of George Kennan, the College’s first Deputy Commandant, and the author of a strategy—containment—that set the tone and direction for our nation’s national security policy through five Republican and four Democratic administrations.

I recently completed a history of the National War College and have reflected on the school’s promise and problems. While the College remains faithful to the founders’ vision, many of the challenges and issues raised today have been posed repeatedly over the years. If the College is to fulfill its original intention as a “school for strategy,” I believe that the Chairman must reclaim ownership of the College. Both the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs must clarify the College’s mission, enhance its leadership, establish criteria for appropriate faculty and students, and understand the focus of its curricula. I offer the following observations and recommendations to strengthen the College so it can better serve the nation in this new era. I will also suggest that the College and the University “go back to its roots” and revive the original concept for joint and interagency senior education that Eisenhower and other post-World War II leaders had for the College in 1946.

**Mission and Leadership**

**The Joint Staff and the Chairman need to clarify and support the distinct mission of the College.** The College began as an experiment in professional military education and had the active support of President Truman, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy and the heads of the Services. Both the War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) anchored a new educational endeavor at Ft. McNair in Southwest Washington that earned remarkable official and public acclaim. Now there is a sense that both Colleges have become orphans, and that the Chairman and the Joint Staff are detached from the school. The Services are more concerned about their own programs—now all have Joint PME II accreditation. Is the school still unique and needed? Mr. Chairman, it is clear to me that it is. The War College still has a special focus on strategy, a highly developed curriculum, and is truly an inter-agency program with students from the State Department, Homeland Security, Treasury, USAID, the FBI, and the intelligence community. As I mentioned before, it was our nation’s first interagency senior school. It has a joint military tradition that is deep and strong, and its extraordinary access to Washington policy makers and world leaders sets it apart.

There has been a significant investment in this College, but to continue to achieve its mission, it needs its senior stakeholders. **The College needs the active involvement of the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs, in policies that will strengthen the leadership team for the College, especially in the selection of the Commandant and in the extension of tenure for the position.**

**The Commandant.** As in the case of any institution, the College needs strong leadership. As a former faculty member, I know how important it is to have a strong and accomplished Dean of Faculty. But I also believe that the selection of Commandant is equally if not more important to the College. As my research reveals, there was originally a set pattern and tenure for

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2 Kennan was actually the first Foreign Service Officer to serve in the leadership of any senior military school.

3 The Army Industrial College was converted to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in 1946 and focuses on mobilization, acquisition, and industrial policy analysis. It is now located next to the National War College at Ft. McNair. At the time the War College opened its door in August, 1946, all major newspapers, newsmagazines and radio reported on its program.
Commandants: a rotation between Services for full three year tours. Admiral Harry Hill, the first Commandant, set the standard, with prior combat experience, intellectual curiosity, and a deep dedication to the mission of the College. Over the years, these standards have given way to limited tenures, frequent turn-over, and lack of either past combat or PME experience.

The Chairman and the Joint Chiefs must address this issue. There must be a review of the criteria and goals for this billet. Short tours and ill defined powers frustrate even the most dedicated leader. The College needs committed and intellectually involved Commandants who are given a sufficient length of tenure to become deeply involved in College, teach in the academic program, and engage the students in the strategic dilemmas that mark the War College pedagogy.

The Commandant of this unique joint and inter-agency College could be active duty or retired, but should be selected to match the mission of the school. Ideally, the Commandant should demonstrate a commitment to lead an institution that is a specialized professional school, and be able to hold this position for at least five years. This has been a problem of long standing. In a report to the Commandant in 1953, a member of an academic review team wrote:

The top management has been less effective than it could be expected to be. The reasons....are the relatively brief tenure of the Commandants,...and their lack of experience in running an institution of higher learning. Men of fine character, excellent minds, and wide experience have served as Commandants.... But their previous experience did not equip them to head a major, new, high-level academic institution in the exploratory field of national grand strategy under conditions of possible global, total war. And the shortness of their terms of office prevented them for accumulating very much experience....

To attract and mentor new Commandants, an Oversight Board, along the lines of the original Board of Consultants should be reconstituted. From 1946 to 1976, this Board played a vital role in advising, assisting and providing feedback and evaluations for the Commandant and the College. A revived Board would include, as it did in the past, distinguished former admirals and general officers, ambassadors, cabinet and sub-cabinet officials, as well as academic leaders. Many should be War College graduates. This Board could function as a selection advisory group for the Chairman, defining the criteria for leadership and reviewing the needs of the school.

Leadership Structure. But leadership goes beyond the selection of Commandant to the command structure of the College. The school currently has a Dean of Faculty who is a military officer and a civilian Dean of Students, who also serves as Chief of Staff. Is this the right assignment? I believe that the Dean of Faculty should have a PhD, prior teaching experience, and a commitment to the mission of the College. Should the College consider reverting to active duty the Dean of Students billet, while maintaining a civilian Chief of Staff?

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4 The importance of this issue was highlighted in a memo to the Commandant in the mid 1950's. "A commandant requires at least a year to become thoroughly acquainted with the College, but preparations for his second year have to go ahead during the first year, so it is hard for him to inszipcode before his third year. By the time he has gained considerable experience, he is replaced. " (Craig memo, 11 February, 1953 d)

5 The Board included over the years: General Omar Bradley, Father Theodore Hesburgh, Dr. Bernard Brodie, John J McCoy, among others.

6 The College needs a full time chief building maintenance officer, to contend with the many challenges of the grand old Roosevelt Hall, a national historic monument. 
Underlying these questions are the deeper issues, both for leadership and faculty, on the importance the Joint Staff places on PME itself. As the active duty forces are stressed by two ongoing wars and a multitude of other responsibilities, it has proven difficult to allow time for officers to obtain advanced degrees, take time out of their career paths to engage at the academic school house. The Defense Science Board needs to address this issue for all the PME schools.

Faculty

Military Faculty. Throughout its history, the War College debated the criteria for selecting its military faculty and their performance. The selection of the military faculty for the College is largely left to the individual Services and the criteria lack transparency. Obviously, the problem is exacerbated in times of war. The demands of deployments and wartime surges stress the ability of the Services to release combat veterans to come back for advance education and to return to teach. The problem at its most basic level is whether the Services see teaching at a senior PME institution as a valuable asset in an officer’s career or a terminal assignment?

The College needs intellectually engaged military faculty from a variety of backgrounds. From my view as a former faculty member, I am most concerned about an officer’s enthusiasm and ability to teach. This has been a perennial challenge at the War College. Over the years a number of recommendations have been advanced in this regard:

- Offer selected officers opportunities to pursue a doctorate with a future assignment to the College, expand these options for minority officers to broaden the diversity of the faculty.
- Extend the War College tour to three or four years.
- Allow for military faculty above and below the rank of O-6.
- Work with the Services to recruit officers who would best perform at the College.

Agency Faculty. In an effort to enhance the quality of Department and Agency personnel assigned to the faculty, the College needs to expand its interagency recruitment efforts, to encourage the best match between faculty background and interest in teaching at the College. The standard set by George Kennan was impressive. He taught and wrote and engaged with the College over his entire career. We need a more tailored selection process with the State Department, USAID, and the intelligence agencies, to increase awareness of the War College program and to alert younger personnel who might want to make longer term career choices based on an eventual tour at the College. Most importantly, the College’s ability to attract quality agency faculty depends on how their home agency advances their after teaching.

Civilian Faculty. The civilian academic faculty presents a series of special challenges. In the beginning, the College had four civilian “visiting professors,” who taught only in the fall semester. As it quickly became apparent, this “visiting” approach provided no continuity or planning for the following year’s course and within a short time civilian academic faculty was given multi-year contracts. Currently most of the civilian faculty members are hired under Title 10 of the Federal Code for the Department of Defense, for mainly three year, renewable contracts. There is no tenure process at the College.

A number of the Services are concerned with this issue, notably the Army, which is addressing this issue by working to bring experienced officers for tours at West Point, Leavenworth and Carlisle.
The absence of tenure reflects, in part, the distinct nature of the school and its unique mix of faculty groups. It was clear from the beginning that the College was not intended to be a typical graduate school, not created to produce researchers but policy and decision makers. The mark of this approach is a faculty of "reflective practitioners" and "applied" professionals, whose careers combined academic and policy experience. Given the diverse backgrounds of the faculty, the blend of scholars and practitioners (military officers, ambassadors, intelligence officers, and yes, even former Congressional staffers), it is vital that College’s tradition of collegiality be honored.

This has been the hallmark of the College over the years, and appreciated by faculty members in our study who reported that it was rare in "stove piper" Washington to have the sustained opportunity to work and learn with professionals who are "not in your lane." The College’s gift to the students is the vibrant exchange of views, a mature and vigorous debate between all communities.3 The College is an intellectual refuge, which must be protected. College leadership must continue to set the tone, an atmosphere of academic freedom and professional respect, a commitment to the students and the mission of the College.

The Student Body

The National War College is designed for its unique study body—men and women in mid-career, who their Services and Departments believe will go on to higher positions in the national security area. But do they? The process for selection to the War College as well as the decisions for follow-on assignments has always been opaque. The Services have their own senior service school selection boards and make their own decisions about assignments to the War College or the other PME senior schools. There is a need for an active outreach program to match student selection with the unique program of the College, and to have follow-on assignments use this education. As this Subcommittee, the Joint Chiefs and the Defense Science Board consider the role of PME and the mission of the National War College, serious attention should be paid to student selection and follow on career assignments. The nation invests scarce resources into the College, a specifically designed program. It should be offered to the most appropriately chosen student body.

This is easy to say, but a challenge for each Service. By the mid 1950’s, the Commandant of the War College noted that the Services fought to send their best to their own senior schools. Since the National War College has no "sponsoring" individual Service, the Chairman's leadership in this area is vital.

The Academic Program

The philosophy of the school’s program has not changed over the years. As the early student handbooks in the 1950’s noted:

...the best preparation which can be given its students for their future work is an increased capacity to think broadly, objectively, and soundly....[About]....national security in this increasing complex world in which we live. The emphasis therefore is on the educational process as opposed to the training process. The College does not train its people to be future J-3’s and Counselor of Embassy. But it does strive to make them think in such a manner that they cannot
help but be better I-3’s and Counselors of Embassy for having had the experience of attending this College. (Emphasis original)

The school’s guiding principles have been questioned recently, on three fronts. The first deals with the proper level of analysis for the school, the second with a focus on current or enduring themes, and the third with a U.S. or international focus. All three debates reflect tensions with the broader national security community on these questions.

Strategy or Operations? The College’s academic program was established to educate senior military and civilian officials to think broadly and soundly. The program’s focus has always been on grand strategy, all the tools of statecraft, as well as joint and interagency operations. But each year there is lively debate over a number of key issues which pose challenges for the future. Should the College keep the focus on grand strategy or should it focus on the operational level? There are two components to this question. The first reflects assumptions about the uniqueness of the College and the strategic nature of its curriculum. While the other senior schools are expanding their own programs to include grand strategy as well as joint and interagency topics, this is the key and central component of the War College program. Indeed, its curriculum has shifted closer to, not away from, the strategic level of analysis, the broader view of grand strategy using all the tools of critical analysis and statecraft. With the mounting cries that we lack “strategic leaders”, it seems that the focus should remain and deepen.

Contemporary or enduring themes. Second, is this focus on grand strategy too abstract, too “next war-its” in a world of immediate regional threats? Following the attacks from al Qaeda in 2001, the faculty discussed refocusing the course on the Islamic extremist threat. While some faculty members argued that this indeed was the strategic threat of the era, others held that this was merely the “crisis de jour” and thus should not impact the current course offerings. This has been a continuing debate over these past eight years. In this regard, it is useful to go back to the College’s earliest days to get a better sense of strategy and threat. In the context of the early years of the school, the “crisis de jour” over Stalin’s aggression became the existential threat defining a fifty year campaign.

This is how George Kennan presented the issue in 1946. In the fall of that year, Kennan began the College program with in-depth lectures on Russian history, Soviet psychology, and Communist thought. His careful analysis was critical, and hinged on three basic, but profound, conclusions: 1) the Soviet Union was too large a country to occupy; 2) a war fought with atomic weapons would have no victors, and 3) the ideological appeal of communism had to be countered. These three simple points, and his deep understanding of Soviet motivations, led him to the elegant and enduring strategy which contained the Soviet impulse to expand, set the stage for internal pressures to grow, and countered economic distress which fed the appeal of Marxism.

If Kennan were still teaching at the War College today, I believe he would be deep into a similar critical analysis of “the sources of terrorist conduct”. He would be analyzing a movement that crosses borders and is centered by theology not economic ideology.

Of course, this is not the only threat we face. In a post cold war/multi-polar/mixed threat world, settling on a new organizing principal prompts passionate debate. It is China and Russia? Islamic jihadists? Failing states? If it is all of these and more, is there time in the academic year to cover these threats, as well as the basic core course program? Should the intermediate schools begin this study with the War College providing “booster shot” instruction? To do
this job adequately would require a two year program with time to present thorough study of a host of nations and movements that challenge us now: Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Iraq, Iran, Israel, the Palestinian territories, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, but also Mexico, Venezuela, Cuba, China, Russia, al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the variety of smaller radical movements, as well as relations with other nations and movements in Europe and Asia, Latin America and Africa in this era of economic crisis.

US or international focus. Underscoring this argument is a third basic question of focus. Should the curriculum be US-centric or other-centric? That is, should the majority of the academic program consider the United States, our diplomatic history, bureaucratic politics, military history, joint military structures, and our foreign policy and crisis management challenges? Or should more time be devoted to the texture and detail of “the other”? As my history project revealed, the War College did not offer detailed—or indeed any—courses on Korea or Vietnam during those wars; nothing on the politics, cultural traditions, social or ethnic dynamics of these two battlefield nations. Now there are so many “targets of concern,” that the College does not have the time to provide the same level of texture that Kennan offered in the 1940’s.

This argument about focus is not confined to discussions about the War College curriculum. It can be seen in the larger lively debate within the military on doctrine. Should the military just concern itself with battles and operations or with political development and governance? Traditionally, military studies concentrated on orders of battle, operations, maneuver, envelopments, emplacements, tactics, technology, logistics, and “victory”. Armies faced armies over a battlefield, sea and air campaigns subdued an enemy force. But as war gravitated to complex political conflicts, insurgencies, and now tribal and religious conflicts, the military leadership in our nation is calling for new national doctrine and new definitions of center of gravity. If the center of gravity in these hybrid conflicts is the population, should the College spend more time educating the students on foreign cultures, religions, and politics? Should the training be less about us, and more about them?10 Can the College maintain its focus on grand strategy; cover all the instruments of statecraft, the national security decision making process, and interagency operations and still talk about warfighting as well?

Following this line of thought, we return to another fundamental question. Are we to be preparing students for their next job or their job 10 years from now? From the view of the long term strategist, the War College program should not be restricted to current policy demands, but rather should prepare the students for the challenges a decade ahead, both in and out of federal service. The view of policy from twenty thousand feet and twenty-five miles beyond is necessarily more aggregated, more abstract and analytical, than the highly textured detail of tribes and clans and cabals, either in Afghanistan or the Pentagon. The JCS established the College as a school for strategists, and it operates at that level, not the operational or tactical. On the other hand, as mentioned above, the components and subject of strategy seems to be shifting. How can the College respond to the direction of the current Chairman and the Secretary while being true to the founding goals of the program?

9 A two year program, referencing the past German General Staff structure and its military education system, was proposed by Martin Van Creveld in his study, The Training of Officers, from Military Professionalism to Irrelevance. New York: Free Press, 1990.
11 Keeping the war in War College, as students and faculty often quip.
A final observation is in order about Iraq. The dynamic intellectual forces in collision over military doctrine emerged in the past two years as the Army, in particular, came to grips with its frustrations in Iraq. The failure of "speed and precision" to bring final victory, the persistent combat casualties, and lack of political progress in a nation that had been selected as a candidate for democracy fomented intense discussions within the Army and to a lesser extent the other Services. The tensions between the conventional, "Big Army" approach, with new combat systems, a focus on counter terrorism and strength, was contrasted with General Petraeus' approach to counter insurgency. As the Army debated these approaches to warfare, it questioned its leadership. The spate of books covering the ramp up to the War and its first years were followed by articles from active duty troops themselves, as well as blogs, and online journal articles in sites such as Small Wars Journal. One notable article, by then Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, "Failure in Generalship", offers a crucial assessment of failures of "generalship" in Vietnam and Iraq. The article asserts:

America’s generals have failed to prepare our armed forces for war and advise civilian authorities on the application of force to achieve the aims of policy....America’s generals have been checked by a form of war that they did not prepare for and do not understand. They spent years following the 1991 Gulf War mastering a system of war without thinking deeply about the ever changing nature of war... Those few who saw clearly our vulnerability to insurgent tactics said and did little to prepare for those dangers. 13

Since many of these generals attended the War College during the 1990's, we must look carefully at this criticism, both in terms of preparing the students for their responsibilities 10 years hence, and more importantly, to encourage that depth of thought that the founders of the school envisioned. Could the College have done more to alert students to the changing character and conduct of war, the growing specter of insurgency, of religious, tribal, violence? Could the College have done more to encourage the students to periodically question the accepted wisdom? I believe an officer needs the experience of repeated scenarios and the discipline of thought that comes from the use of strategic frameworks to guide analysis. The pressure to respond to attack, to act, to "do something" in crisis, is so great that only a disciplined education, with appropriate specializations, can prepare an officer to "stand there" and think through the problem, seeing the pitfalls and recommending the best course of action.

An example of the College’s rigor and response to today’s conflict can be seen in its twice yearly oral examinations. Students are given a scenario and must think through the issue, assess the situation and develop a strategic response taking into account the resources of the nation, the domestic context, as well as the international and all the tools of statecraft. One approach for evaluation was designed by Colonel George Raach, a former Army member of the faculty. Raach’s approach reflects the College’s comprehensive program of critical analysis and in depth study. I add this to my testimony to give you a sense of the breadth and depth of War College evaluation techniques. Raach suggests that a student be able to reflect on the following questions in this framework:14

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12 See Tom Ricks, Fiasco; Trainer: Cobra II, etc.
14 A similar framework was done by Dr. Bard O’Neill in his courses on terrorism and insurgency.
Did War College graduates -- and by this I am referring both to military and civilian graduates -- go through this discipline, planning and preparing for action in Afghanistan or Iraq? Even setting aside this thoroughgoing analysis, and just using the basic components in military campaign planning, did any War College graduate object to less than complete planning or overly hasty operations? Did any note the deficiencies in the so called "Phase Four," post invasion, plan? Why did planners have so little knowledge about Iraq or Afghanistan — history, key leaders, culture, political dynamics — the questions that Kennan would have raised at the time. At a deeper level, did the College graduates speak truth to power? If the answer to that question is negative, should the College take on the issue in civ/mil relations in more depth? Should the College's existing elective in this area be expanded and include the entire student body? I believe that the students need not only the discipline of the strategic analysis models, but they also need the mental preparation to present their best military advice, even in the face of overwhelming political pressure to "go along." Some may call this ethics or leadership training, but despite the fact that the College had topics on all three, Yingling did not see it in many commanding officers. We need to confront this issue.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I believe we need to respond to the calls made by the Secretary, the Chairman, and the President to reconsider a "whole of government" or "integrated component" approach in national security, with reference to the balance between the military and the non-military instruments of statecraft, the so called mix of defense, diplomacy and development. Recent efforts to consider national security professional education should review the original 1946 plan by Eisenhower and others for post war professional education: a national security consortium of schools. As originally envisioned by Eisenhower and the college's founders, the War College and the Industrial College would have been joined by three other senior professional schools: A State Department College, and Administration College and an Intelligence College. These early cold war leaders anticipated the need for interagency competency. I suggest that this subcommittee consider an updated version of Eisenhower's plan, to include a College of Diplomacy and
Development to complement the War College’s program and foster great institutional strength at State and USAID\(^\text{15}\). I also strongly believe that ICAF, the Industrial College, should also reclaim its roots and revive its focus on industrial studies to respond to the economic crisis currently impacting the country and our national security strategy. This is ICAF’s day in the sun. It is designed for industry studies and economic analysis. It can help the nation evaluate the impact of the economic crisis, our industrial decline, on strategy. The nation needs ICAF to be ICAF, and step up to its responsibility and opportunity in this area.

This proposal suggests a larger interagency review panel, beyond the focus of this subcommittee, but certainly within the vision of Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton. I might suggest that the Defense Science Board propose a side study to this effect. But with or without a broader reform at the National Defense University, the proposals above for the strengthening and focusing of the War College stand.

The school is too important, the mission never more vital, and the requirement for strategic leaders, with the Kennan spirit, never more important.

\(^{15}\) The proposal would also include a College for Domestic Security, a College of Domestic National Security, a College of Intelligence and Political Studies, an Information Resources College as well as a War College and a revived Industrial College.
Testimony to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation
"20 Years Later: Professional Military Education"

War Colleges: Observations and Suggestions
Professor Alexander S. Cochran, PhD
20 May 2009

Introduction
From 1990 through 2004, I was associated with all six of the US military senior service schools – the war colleges – as teaching faculty, department chairperson, curriculum reviewer, and visiting professor. At each, I taught the core course on strategy and policy as well as electives on World War II, Vietnam, the 1st Gulf War, coalition leadership, and technology. In 2005, I was a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars during which I conducted an analysis of the six institutions entitled “America’s War College: Are They Teaching the Right Stuff?” while serving on the CSIS panel “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols” that examined PME. Since then I have continued to teach, lecture, and consult with the war colleges.

I remain convinced that the war colleges are valuable institutions that facilitate the professional development of senior officials preparing for their final years of careers - be they military or civilian on paths that will include leadership or advice. Individually, they perform an admirable job – one that has been greatly enhanced over the past 20 years by the efforts of Representative Ike Skelton and his staff. Collectively, they can learn much from each other – and my observations and suggestions offered below are made in that spirit.

My comments are divided into four specific categories, purposefully rank ordered – faculty, students, governance, and curriculum. Each is previewed by thoughts of a general nature, several observations derived from my experience and recommendations for future consideration. As a preview, suggestions involve adjusted professional standards for faculty; intense screening of incoming students; continuity of senior war college leadership; and hard decisions on what and what NOT to teach.

Faculty
The quality of war college teaching faculty is at the center of war colleges, and has been significantly enhanced by the recruitment and retention of civilian academics as urged by Ike Skelton over 20 years ago. I myself was a beneficiary of Title X appointment, service, and tenure. Indeed there has been a significant growth in the ratio of academically qualified civilian academic to professional military officers. The bottom line is that faculty make (or break) a war college.

Two observations derived from my personal experience as a teacher, department chair, and several visiting professorships are relevant. First, the growth of civilian professors amidst uniformed officers with lesser credentials has fostered an unexpected
“us” versus “them” environment simply because two professions have different standards. This has been heightened by the emergence of yet another category, retired military officers who lack PhD. The second aspect results from the chosen war college teaching philosophy of seminar learning. This demands not only exceptional teaching skills but also comfort at “cross disciplinary” education. War college faculty must be teachers first. As one who has done it, teaching at the war college is hard involving time consuming preparation.

To address these observations, I would suggest that the war colleges collectively rethink the categories of faculty as military and civilian to one of “field practitioner” and academic specialist. Each would have its own sets of standards for recruiting as well as professional development; indeed practitioners would rotating on and off the faculty while academic remain. Secondly, the war colleges need to address the tough demands upon heavy seminar teaching at the graduate level with sequential courses taught simultaneous by all members of the departments. It simply is not effective as no academic college does this. Either the teaching load must be reduced or time to execute the curriculum must be extended.

Students

The second most critical element for war colleges is the quality and receptiveness of students. As in the past, each war college has a concentration of officers from its own service component with the exception of the two NDU schools and the Marine Corps War College (most of these go to the other five schools). My experience documented an increasing emphasis over the past 20 years in quantity at the expense quality; this was complimented by significant increase in civilian students.

Several observations from my study are relevant. Military students for war colleges are selected by their own personnel managers based upon “seats available” and past professional performance with little apparent connection to next assignment. Interestingly though the size of the military has declined in the past decade, the total number of officers selected for war colleges has remained constant; indeed class size seems to be limited by physical capability of the institution (number of seats in seminar rooms). Secondly, discussion as a teacher with my students over a decade documented about 20% to 25% of them did not want to be at the war college either because they lacked the interest or were not academically capable of graduate level seminar instruction. This was compliment by my anecdotal evidence that approximately one third of the students planned to and would leave active duty within the next 3 years or follow on assignment.

My study offered two suggestions. First prospective student should be required to do what all who desire attendance at graduate schools do - apply for admissions with appropriate credentials, voicing a desire to attend. And they should rank order what war college they wish to attend – thus involving the war colleges in competition for the best and most qualified students. This would be complimented by my curriculum recommendation for each war college to be an individual “center of excellence.” Students would incur a service obligation upon graduation of at least five years or two
assignments. This would involve service personnel managers to insure proper utilization. Explicit here should assumption that non-attendance does not preclude promotion for 0-6 ranks; indeed event to flag rank (as has been the historic USN practice).

**Governance**

The third element addressed how each war college organizes itself to execute its mission and then the selection of its leaders. In general, each institution, based upon its evolution, tradition, and service expectations is organized differently with respect to specific academic departments and bureaucratic overhead. This parallels the fact that each has its own unique mission statement. And each has a senior leader, be they president, commandant, or commander, as well as a senior academic leader, a dean.

My experience highlighted two specific observations here. First with respect to the senior leader, his or her tenure has been uniformly short, averaging 2½ years during my war college teaching time. There were several instance where the president was there only one year, in another instance he was there four. Realizing that it takes one academic year to come to grips with academic issues and another year to implement adjustments, anything less than three years is not enough time for presidents to make a difference. Secondly, differences in separate department structures hindered attempts at “cross talk” between the institution, at the senior level, deans and departments, and finally teaching faculty. There has been an attempt for inter-war college exchange under the auspices of Military Education Coordination Council (MECC), yet its title speaks rhetorically to its advisory role. At the working level, war colleges simply ignore each other.

Here I would suggest two changes. First to insure continuity of high level leadership, war college presidents should remain in position for a minimum of five years, perhaps even ten to insure continuity of ideas – following the model of service academies with a “tomb stone” promotion to next higher rank upon retirement. While proficiency in service or functional responsibility is essential, equally essential is background in educational matters. Secondly, at OSD level, a chancellor for senior service schools needs to be created, similar to same position at large state universities, with real power/leverage/impact on both faculty and curricula issues. The main responsibility of this office would the institution and mentoring of inter war college issues.

**Curriculum**

The final element is curriculum, thought by many to be the key element. Here Ike Skelton has preached “vigor.” As I have learned, given a quality faculty, a receptive student body, and enlightened leadership, vigor in the curriculum will take care of itself. Each war college follows a series of common core courses - strategy through historical case studies - national defense policy through political science theory; peculiar service concerns through doctrine. Likewise, each has its own set of “wild cards” - overseas trips, research versus classroom “trade offs”, and electives. Yet each war college has its unique mission statement; thus each tailors its own curriculum linked to its own concerns. There is no common vision.
In my view, war college curricula lack concentration at the substance level. Given the encyclopedic nature that each tries to cover, the tight academic time frame (9 months with very little "wiggle room" about starting dates – except the Naval War College tradition), and constant demands to "stay current", the substance of the curriculum at all is "a mile wide and an inch deep"; at its worst just "dumbs down" to check the blocks. Curriculum becomes a matter of process as opposed to substance, contact time as opposed to substantive content.

Here I offer two suggestions. First, in curriculum matters, war colleges needs to realize that "one size does not fit all"; instead each needs to establish an individual "centers of excellence" such as the Army War college priority to operational/strategic command; National War College concentration on national security policy; ICAF focus upon resource management and procurement policy; Air War College attention to technology and strategy; Naval War College concentration in theory. Students then could "major" through the selection of a particular school. Likewise, faculty could be recruited and retained there within their area of expertise. Secondly, war college curriculum for each war college need to be doubled from 9 months to 18, commencing at least twice a year (the Naval War College has been doing so for over 20 years) to facilitate hard decisions on what and what not to teach. This should also address the issue of timely seat filling" in the current period of intense operational tempo – the fact that it is difficult to find time for education during wartime.

Summary:
In retrospect, all war colleges are justifiably proud of their programs, some of which have been in existence of almost a century. This negates recommendations that they can be duplicated by contracts to civilian universities or replaced by a fellowship year away from the military. My experience suggests that this pride has created intense protectiveness with respect their own prerogatives on both the process and substance of their operation. As a visiting professor, all I had to do to be ignored was to suggest that another war college did something better; indeed the JPME requirement has only enhanced this attitude. This has been more evident over the past 20 years as they have implemented the Skelton reforms. As experience with both Goldwater-Nichols and the Skelton reforms suggest, if the war colleges cannot do this for themselves, then Congress should do as they did 20 years ago, set the standards for them.
Testimony before the
Sub-Committee on Oversight and Investigations, Armed Services Committee,
United States House of Representatives

May 20, 2009

James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.

Assistant Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies
and
Senior Research Fellow for the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies
The Heritage Foundation

My name is James Jay Carafano. I am the Assistant Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom
Davis Institute for International Studies and a Senior Research Fellow for the Douglas and Sarah
Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation. The views I express in
this testimony are my own, and should not be construed as representing any official position of
The Heritage Foundation.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today. “The Pentagon is currently
undertaking a congressionally mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of strategy, force
structure, missions, and resources. One issue that should be on the table is defining professional
military education requirements. The current system is inadequate. The Department of Defense
(DOD) should restructure it to emphasize a broad range of graduate education opportunities early
in an officer’s career.” I wrote that in 2005. The QDR did not offer adequate clear strategic
guidance for professional military development. Likewise, the focus areas for the current QDR
do not appear to focus on this issue either. As a result, the services and the Defense Department
continue to adjust to the realities of the post-Cold War world in an ad hoc manner. This
committee has asked an appropriate question—whether such incremental adjustments make
sense. I don’t think they do.

In part, my recommendation was a reflection of watching the officer corps struggle with the
challenges of adapting to military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but more deeply it
stemmed from the observation that military schools had changed only modestly since the end of
the Cold War. Preparing to fight a known enemy required certain skills and knowledge, and
professional education focused on those narrow areas. As a result, officer schools and
development programs continued to train and promote leaders with skills and attributes to meet
the needs of the 20th century, not future challenges.

As our men and women in uniform have answered the call to arms, our military schools have
made adjustments—expanding curriculum on irregular warfare, homeland defense, and
interagency operations. We should ask, however, what can be done to do better than just keeping
up with what the armed forces are doing today.
The centerpiece of the reform discussion should be on senior-level professional military officer education. The reason for that is simple. The skills, knowledge, and attributes of strategic leaders are the most important product of the military’s professional development program. Fundamental change requires making three difficult but critical decisions—strategic leaders must be educated earlier in their careers; where strategic leaders are educated must be greatly expanded to include civilian universities; and the scope of senior-level strategic education should be narrowed rather than expanded. In addition, we need to clearly distinguish between professional military education and national security education for interagency leaders. One cannot be substituted for the other.

When We Teach

The most difficult and important decision that needs to be made is when we instill the skills of strategic leadership in our military leaders. The current system still proceeds at a languid pace, layering on formal education every few years in an officer’s career. The world is changing too fast to wait for that. The military model is outmoded. We need to instill the skills, knowledge, and attributes of strategic leadership as soon as leaders are prepared assimilate them—not just before we think they need to exercise them.

Likewise, today the military mistakenly ties senior education to promotion. In the 21st century, every officer will require critical thinking skills to operate in an increasingly complex environment with dispersed decision-making. Officers at all levels need to be able to analyze situations and make the best decisions possible in often difficult situations. Strategic leadership, knowledge, skills, and attributes should be a prerequisite because it provides the analytical skills necessary for functioning in dynamic environments. In addition, professional education requirements should be the same for active duty and reserve component leaders because they perform the same operational tasks.

The military defers senior-level professional military officer education until most attendees are over 40 years old. That is a mistake. Officers need this experience when they are young—before they are 30 years old—when education will have its greatest impact. Early education will prepare officers to: accept strategic responsibilities earlier in their careers; be better mentors; and be ready for a “life-time of learning” throughout their professional careers.

Earlier senior-level professional military officer education and the more frequent use of the military means something must give. The services will need to consolidate schools and rely more on short-term courses and distance education to train specialty skills.

Where We Teach

The next difficult decision that must be made is fundamentally rethinking where senior-level professional military officer education has to take place. While the service academies rightly remain the touchstone for pre-commissioning education, through the Reserve Officers Training Corps, future officers are also trained at colleges and universities around the nation. There is no reason why senior-level professional military officer education cannot follow the same model.
To build a well-educated, diverse officer corps, the military should use the free market. A requirement for educating a large pool of military officers will create a vast new demand. Officers should have a wide variety of options and opportunities. The primary goal of military education is to teach officers how to think. What or where officers are learning is less important than the types of skills that they are developing—skills that will serve them well in a wide spectrum of situations and conflicts. An officer can gain the same critical analysis skills from a political science course as from an advanced engineering course.

In addition, the military’s war colleges should have to compete with civilian schools to attract military students. Competition will lead to better services and programs as well as guarantee a diverse and well-trained officer corps. In addition, expanding senior–level professional military officer education to civilian schools will strengthen the bonds of civil–military relations.

What We Teach

Joint Professional Military Education requirements have become overly prescriptive. They are also growing. Quality is becoming a victim quantity. The current vogue of emphasizing “cultural” studies is a case in point. Reform proposals call for everything from Arabic-language training to negotiating skills to increased engineering and scientific training. These calls ignore reality. Operational requirements are leaving less, not more, time for professional education. Likewise, the Pentagon cannot be expected to foresee exactly which kinds of leaders, language skills, and geographic or operational orientations will be needed for future missions. The future is too unpredictable.

In the future, the attribute most needed by military officers is the critical thinking skills that come from a graduate education program. Thinking skills are the best preparation for ambiguity and uncertainty. Virtually any graduate program would suffice. In fact, the military should seek as broad a range of graduate experiences as possible as a hedge against unexpected operational and strategic requirements.

Rather than broaden the required curriculum, senior-level professional officer military development should sharpen its focus on only the most essential skills, knowledge, and attributes. The education core should be deep and narrow, allowing officers the maximum flexibility to round out their senior education in disciplines which suit them best. Arguably, the critical core could be reduced to three areas.

Moral and Political Instruction. Moral and political issues are part of war, not a separate sphere that military leaders can ignore. Officers will have to engage in the struggle of ideas against terrorism and other ideologies that may emerge in the 21st century. They will have to understand the political dimensions of war and the complexities of civil–military relations. Thus, every program must include at least some element of a classical liberal education to prepare leaders skilled in both the art of war and the art of liberty.

Network Science. A foundation in science, technology, engineering, and math are essential for any educated leader. In addition, the attributes of the 21st century scientist, engineer, and strategic leader share many traits in common. They must know how to work and lead teams;
adapt to the demands of their work environment; and create and innovate. Such leadership cannot be learned through any single scientific discipline. Senior strategic leaders should have an appreciation and practice in network science and systems integration. Network science is a term of art that represents a multi-disciplinary approach to research that combines the techniques of the social sciences with "hard science" disciplines. Network science examines how networks function. They study diverse physical, informational, biological, cognitive, and social networks searching for common principles, algorithms and tools that drive network behavior. The understanding of networks can be applied to a range of challenges from combating terrorist organizations to organizing disaster response. This science will be particularly fruitful for understanding how any networks from a terrorist cell to an evacuating city functions as well as how they can exploited, disrupted, manipulated, or improved upon.

Methods of Analysis. Arguably the most component of critical thinking and strategic judgment is the capacity to analyze complex problems applying cutting-edge analytical tools. As with understanding modern science and technology, strategic leaders must be capable of a multi-disciplinary approach to decision-making that recognizes that there is no assured single path to knowledge. Rather, they should have the capacity for testing cause and effects relationships through several means. Multidisciplinary studies are not new, but they can be particularly fruitful now. The information age provides an unprecedented capacity to tackle tough problems in different ways.

Beyond Professional Military Education

Another reform often proposed is to extend the use of professional military education system as a substitute for national security education for the interagency team. That is a mistake and disservice to both efforts. National security interagency professionals must have three essential skills: 1) familiarity with a number of diverse security-related disciplines (such as health care, law enforcement, immigration, and trade) and practice in interagency operations, working with different government agencies, the private sector, and international partners; 2) competence in crisis action and long-term strategic planning; and 3) a sound understanding of federalism, the free-market economy, constitutional rights, and international relations.

Lessons Learned

While whole-of-government and professional military education are different, there are elements of the military system that are relevant to interagency national security professional development. The U.S. military faced similar professional development challenges in building a cadre of joint leaders—officers competent in multi-service operations involving two or more of the armed services. The Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986 mandated a solution that required officers to have a mix of joint education, assignments, and accreditation by a board of professionals in order to be eligible for promotion to general officer rank. Goldwater–Nichols is widely credited with the successes in joint military operations from Desert Storm to the war on terrorism. Education, assignment, and accreditation are tools that can be applied to developing professionals for homeland security and other critical interagency national security activities.

Education. A program of education, assignment, and accreditation that cuts across all levels of government and the private sector with national and homeland security responsibilities has to
start with professional schools specifically designed to teach interagency skills. Military schools cannot substitute for this requirement. The government will have to establish new ones.

Assignment. Qualification will also require interagency assignments in which individuals can practice and hone their skills. These assignments should be at the "operational" level where leaders learn how to make things happen, not just set policies. Identifying the right organizations and assignments and ensuring that they are filled by promising leaders should be a priority. Military commands including the combatant commands could serve as qualifying interagency assignments whole-of-government professional development programs (for non-DOD personnel).

Accreditation. Accreditation and congressional involvement are crucial to ensuring that programs are successful and sustainable. Before leaders are selected for critical (non-politically appointed) positions in national and homeland security, they should be accredited by a board of professionals in accordance with broad guidelines established by Congress. Congress should:

- Require creation of boards that (1) establish educational requirements and accredit institutions that are needed to teach national security and homeland security, (2) screen and approve individuals to attend schools and fill interagency assignments, and (3) certify individuals as interagency-qualified leaders.
- Establish congressional committees in the House and Senate with narrow jurisdictions over key education, assignment, and accreditation interagency programs, including homeland security and other key national security missions. Members of other key authorizing committees, such as the armed services committee, should also serve on these committees.

In 2007, Presidential Executive Order 13434 established the National Security Professional Development program. This order affects 17 federal agencies including DOD. It includes the kernel of establishing a suitable education, assignment, and accreditation program for national security professionals. This committee should support and urge the administration to continue with this effort. For the immediate future, the program requires a suitable governance structure and appropriate Congressional oversight. That, however, is just the first step. The administration and the Congress must establish more robust capabilities for whole-of-government professional development programs.

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss this important issue with the committee.

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Statement
to the
House Armed Service Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
on
Twenty Years Later: Professional Military Education
May 18, 2009
Corrected May 30, 2009
Richard H. Kohn

Introduction

My first encounter with the subject occurred in the over forty years ago when I
investigated the views of the people who founded the military establishment in the 1780s and
1790s on military education.

Since then, PME has been a continuing interest and involvement, from teaching in these
institutions, training some of their faculty, consulting to their leadership, serving on visiting
committees and boards, discussing their mission and operation with officers and civilians on their
faculties (a few of whom were my own graduate students), to discussing the subject in my courses
on civil-military relations and American military history.

Mission

The mission of these institutions has not changed since their founding in the 19th century:
to educate officers in the waging of war. Pre-commissioning (the academies, ROTC) aims to
provide basic military training, a college education for lifelong learning and for a career in the
profession of arms, an introduction to the culture of a particular armed service, and preparation
for leadership at the tactical level of war, that is, leading men and women in small units in combat
or in organizations that support combat units. Intermediate service school (ISS--the staff colleges
and follow-on year programs such as SAMS, SAASS, and SAWS educate at the operational level

1Professor of History, Adjunct Professor of Peace, War, and Defense, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill.
of war, preparing officers for command and staff work in the larger units and military formations that fight battles and campaigns. Senior service school (the six war colleges) educate at the strategic level for leadership in major commands, theater staffs, and higher government military and civilian agencies whose purpose is to plan and lead military campaigns that achieve national policies and purposes.

Over time the emphasis in these institutions should shift further away from training (instilling specific knowledge or skills) to education: the ability to identify assumptions, ask the right questions, recognize reality through in the flood of information and uncertain evidence, engage in deep analysis, apply innovative methodologies, think critically, and formulate original solutions to difficult, ambiguous, and sometimes intractable problems.

I believe that PME at every level has largely improved in the last forty years but has not reached the standard of quality—in insisting on rigorous and precise thinking and writing, and in challenging students—prevalent in the civilian professional schools to which the armed services aspire, and to which they often compare themselves. The impediments lay rooted in the way students are selected, the qualifications and backgrounds of the faculties, the organization and leadership of the schools, and to some degree their culture and that of the armed services.

Below I outline these problems and propose some remedies.

**Pre-Commissioning Education**

On the basis of many visits and presentations, training some of their faculty in graduate school, and serving on some consulting committees, the three military academics seem the strongest leg of the PME system. They provide a basic college education, and in recent years have upgraded the academic experience with honors programs, study abroad, and other
enhancements.

Unlike the staff and war colleges, they insist that their faculties have rigorous academic training in the subjects they teach in residence at some of nation's finest graduate schools. West Point and Colorado Springs, under prodding from the Congress, have increased the percentage of civilian professionals, and Annapolis has begun sending officers for PhDs in civilian institutions. All grade their students on every academic and military activity and publish a ranked order of merit on graduation that determines assignment to duty.

Yet Army and Air Force still entrust the bulk of instruction to officers of little or no academic experience, and masters level training, on the grounds that role modeling trumps depth of disciplinary expertise and experience. All three cram character development, required physical and military training, and extra-curricular activities into a proscribed four year curriculum. All three overemphasize engineering, reflecting 19th century origins when war was largely an engineering problem and the American predilection for waging high tech, capital intensive warfare flowered.\(^2\) None possess anything approaching the range and number of courses and disciplines

\(^2\)The great novelist James Michener told the story of "four of us" in the Navy being "taken into a small room" at the beginning of World War II. "A grim-faced selection committee asked . . . 'What can you do?' and the [first] man replied, 'I'm a buyer for Macy's, and I can judge very quickly between markets and prices and trends.' The selection board replied, 'But you can't do anything practical?' The man said no, and he was shunted off to one side. The next man was a lawyer and . . . he had to confess, 'I can weigh evidence and organize information,' and he was rejected. . . . But when the fourth man said boldly, 'I can overhaul diesel engines,' the committee jumped up, practically embraced him, and made him an officer on the spot. At the end of the war . . . the buyer from Macy's was assistant to the Secretary of the Navy, in charge of many complex responsibilities requiring instant good judgment. He gave himself courses in naval management and government procedures until he became one of the Nation's real experts. The lawyer wound up as assistant to Admiral Halsey, and in a crucial battle deduced where the Japanese fleet had to be. . . . I was given the job of naval secretary to several congressional committees who were determining the future of America in the South Pacific. And what was the engineer doing at the end of the war? He was still overhauling diesel engines." James A. Michener, *A Michener
comparable civilian colleges offer. In an age when the United States has finally recognized that war is more of a human than a technical, scientific, or engineering phenomenon, no academy possesses an anthropology or sociology department. As one friend who rose to three stars to superintend his service's academy said years ago, when asked whether he had read a certain basic military text in college: 'you know I didn't go to college, Dick; I went to the ________ Academy.' The academies have the same quality of students as the best colleges and universities in the nation, and they provide outstanding training for junior officers. However my personal experience is that their graduates are not as prepared for graduate school as their civilian counterparts. Military students certainly learn how to manage their time, comply with authority, cut corners, and game requirements, but they seem not to be afforded the time or space to pursue the intellectual interests on which a college education depends. Too many times over the years I have heard knowledgeable people remark that while academy graduates by and large exceed their civilian peers in discipline, work efficiency, and sense of responsibility, they seem often to lack emotional and intellectual maturity.

To improve the education, enrich the college experience, and make both more relevant to the profession of arms today, the academies should:

-- Increase civilian professional faculty, only one-third of whom should be retired professional officers, in order to diversify approaches and perspectives and upgrade the experience and expertise of faculty in their subject matter.

-- Require more O-6 officers with PhDs at the Air Force and Naval Academies, teaching within the departments as opposed to serving in institutes, centers, administration, or other

capacities, to expand and diversify the military experience of cadre, provide more mature
mentoring of students, and increase the collegiality of departmental culture.

-- De-emphasize engineering both in required courses and number of majors, the latter not
to exceed fifty percent of each graduating class.

-- Institute departments of, or majors in, anthropology with a required course in cultural
anthropology.

-- Require proficiency in at least one foreign language to the extent of fluency, with at
least one course in the history, politics, literature, or culture of a country or a region where that
language is primary.3

-- Bring the procedures for tenure, promotion, and faculty review up to the standard of
comparable civilian institutions. Specifically, institute outside disciplinary review of every
department at least every ten years; outside review for every tenure and promotion action whether
internal or at appointment; periodic (at least every five years) review--to include Board of Visitors
and outside disciplinary members, and a study of the command/academic climate--for the
reappointment of academic department heads.

My experience with ROTC extends back some forty years with cadets and midshipmen
taking my courses. For eighteen years I served on the faculty committee that oversees ROTC

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3To its credit, the Air Force Academy has expanded its "cadets' language and culture
capabilities" by hiring "17 new foreign language instructors and nearly doubling foreign language
class enrollment and cadet foreign exchange programs since 2005." The Academy has "also
dramatically increased participation in language and culture immersion trips, from 82 cadets in
2005 to more than 400 cadets in 2008" and expects 600 in 2009. The United States Air Force
Academy Self-Study Report Prepared for the Higher Learning Commission of the North Central
Association of Colleges and Schools, Spring 2009: Executive Summary, p. 5 (accessed May 15,
2009).
programs at UNC (fourteen as chair of the committee). I observed ROTC during the 1980s when I was Chief of Air Force History for the USAF and served on the TRADOC Commander's Advisory Committee on Military History Education, and during 1996-2001 when I served on the Air University Board of Visitors.

ROTC is perhaps the weakest PME program in the Department of Defense, reflecting its priorities first as a recruiting program, then as an orientation/training/indoctrination tool, and last as an educational effort. Courses are decidedly inferior in substance and difficulty to those of the host civilian institutions, rarely offering much academic challenge; the services impose standard content and materials nationwide to be used equally in the best Research 1 universities and lesser regional state colleges. Recently the Air Force abandoned the use of a history of air power course at UNC-Chapel Hill, taught for credit by a retired USAF reserve officer PhD in military history, because his course (so popular and well taught that it regularly attracts over 200 undergraduates) lacked the specific content of the regular AFROTC curriculum. ROTC standards are lax; a recent study showed grades in Army ROTC at UNC in two recent fall semesters averaged 3.91 and 3.82 on a four point scale, high even for Carolina's grade inflation (which is in line with national trends).\(^4\) Across the board, faculty drawn from active duty or retired officers are inferior to civilian colleagues in knowledge, expertise, and teaching experience; Carolina has rejected many ROTC nominees because they lack the minimum college grades (3.0 average) that would qualify for admission to our graduate degree programs, believing that it should not appoint to the faculty

people who would be rejected to the graduate school. All of this leads the best schools to deny graduation credit for most ROTC courses. All of this engenders in the best students disrespect for the services, their values and people—and their intelligence and seriousness.

The remedies for ROTC center on upgrading the faculty and the curriculum.

-- Substitute for courses taught by cadre, courses offered for credit by host schools using their own or adjunct faculty with professional credentials in subjects that fit into their regular disciplinary offerings, specifically leadership, history, and international relations, as is already done by the army and navy for military/naval history.

-- Upgrade the faculty by making ROTC duty comparable in status to operational and staff assignments.

-- Require senior ROTC faculty to have graduate degrees in residence from civilian institutions comparable or exceeding in quality the schools of their duty assignments; if younger officers are assigned lacking in graduate degrees, they should be required to be accepted and enroll in residential (not distance or online) graduate programs at or near their duty stations and complete the degrees during their tours.

-- Require the leadership of ROTC units, and their superiors, to have served tours as faculty either in ROTC or at a military academy; just as the services assign commanders only with prior experienced in the branch or function, they should not assign officers to command or administer in education if they possess no faculty experience.

Intermediate Service Schools

My experience with staff colleges and their follow-on year-long programs (SAMS, SAASS, and SAWS) began in the 1980s when as Chief of Air Force History I visited Air
University frequently, and visited and lectured at Leavenworth. I served on committees advising commanders at both institutions, then in the 1990s served on the Air University Board of Visitors, and from then until today made presentations at the staff colleges and SAASS.

The staff colleges vary in length of residential programs and in quality more than schools at the other PME levels, from interesting and relevant courses, heavy reading loads, demanding assignments, extensive writing requirements, and experienced, high-quality faculty to lesser quality activities and weaker faculties. Graduate students whom I have advised, who have attended or taught at these institutions, and my own observations in visits beginning in the 1980s for lectures and panel discussions, lead to the conclusion that while rigor and work loads have improved over time, most of these schools operate well below the demanding level of comparable civilian professional schools.

Although I have not done a detailed study of staff college curricula, their relevance to the operational level of war seems uncertain. Some work seems remedial in nature; some topics, such as strategy, or high-level civil military relations, while relevant to the profession of arms, seems less appropriate for ISS, which should focus on higher level staff work, and command, planning, and the other functions necessary for large formations of land, naval, and air forces to operate in combat and contingencies around the world in different types of wars and greatly varied circumstances. First and foremost students need to learn the technical business of operating their armed forces in different environments. They should be upgrading their personal language fluency and familiarity with the countries and cultures of that language, learning to cooperate with other government agencies and allied military forces, and becoming familiar with military operations among civilian populations.
Students are chosen for the resident courses with little regard to academic background, ability, or even interest in higher education by selection boards convened by the personnel divisions of each service, overwhelmingly on the basis of the officers' military experience and promise for higher rank. In civilian graduate and professional education, acceptance rests in the hands of the schools, which set their own standards, and focus on applicants' academic achievement and capability, and suitability for the course of study and the profession.

Faculties vary greatly in quality. A few are extraordinarily accomplished officers with strong operational and/or academic backgrounds. Some are civilians with outstanding academic credentials and accomplishments. At some of the schools, however, too many are active duty officers without classroom experience or expertise in the subjects they must teach, or are retired officers lacking strong academic training, hired for their availability and compatibility with military or service culture. In some cases they would not qualify as students in their own institutions. Course directors and department heads are almost always active duty officers with less education, experience, and expertise than their civilian colleagues.

As a result, the burden of work falls unequally. Furthermore, faculty are distracted by incessant meetings to prepare everyone in the group for a lesson, or by additional duties such (such as escorting guest speakers) that should be assigned to support staff.

The most damaging result of weak faculty, however, is that classes are not carried on at the level of graduate education. Thus students—who are among the most accomplished and energetic in their year groups—lose interest, and even more disturbing, respect for the curriculum, the work, the school, and ultimately intellectual effort and PME itself. This would be bad enough, but it is aggravated by the fact that many students approach PME as relief from the pressures of
operational duty, or as "time off" to reconnect with their families, or as schoolwork to be endured with as little effort as possible, in the name of advancing their careers. Too few accept PME (beyond rhetorical acknowledgment) as part of the larger continuum of professional development that includes varied assignments and self-study. In these instances, PME reinforces the general anti-intellectualism that characterizes the officer corps.

Commandants are often chosen with no prior experience in higher education except as students. The military is usually careful to appoint to command only officers who have the appropriate knowledge and experience. The army and marines would not appoint a logistics officer to command an infantry battalion, the navy a supply officer to command a warship, the air force an intelligence officer to command a fighter wing. Nor would the best civilian universities or professional schools appoint presidents or deans who had no experience teaching or leading in higher education or professional practice in the field of endeavor. Yet all the services regularly put inexperienced flag officers in command of PME institutions, often as a final assignment prior to retirement. Some attempt change for its own sake or for career recognition, or pursue entusiasms based on their experience as students; others are placeholders who either out of lack of interest or understanding fail to recognize, investigate, and address the problems in their schools.

Deans, if empowered by their commandants, might provide the leadership but often do not command the respect or have the authority to institute changes, or are limited by the availability of competent faculty, or are constrained by outside requirements imposed by JPME, their services, accreditation, or budget. Unlike at the academies, they do not, by and large, seem to rise from the faculty but rotate in on assignment because of an academic credential.
To address these problems, the Subcommittee should consider the following:

-- Institute minimum entrance requirements set and administered by the schools, to include minimum scores on the graduate record examination and service/subject matter expertise, to assure that students have the capability and preparation to complete a rigorous course of study.

-- Institute application procedures set and administered by the faculties of the institutions, to include a short essay by each applicant on what they expect, and wish, to achieve in ISS, to assure that entering students have the motivation to take seriously intermediate PME, beyond enhancing their chances for promotion.

-- Change service personnel procedures to make uniformed faculty assignments comparable in status and promotability to the best operational and staff duty.

-- Prohibit assignment to the faculty of officers who would not/did not qualify for assignment to take the course in residence as active duty officers, whether they have academic credentials or not. The bottom 25 percent of officers should not be teaching the top 25 percent.

-- Prohibit the hiring of faculty from the ranks of retired officers with academic credentials unless they completed ISS in residence while on active duty or in reserve status, again to prevent the bottom half of the officer corps teaching the top half.

-- Recruit civilian faculty from the academic world in disciplines related to the subject matter taught at the staff colleges; there is a significant overhang of highly trained, competent, professional teachers and thinkers seeking employment who need only to be oriented to the armed services, their cultures, and the particular specializations needed to be taught. But they must be pursued at the beginning of the academic year using the same hiring processes used in civilian academe, including using personal inquiries to the major training programs and attendance at
professional meetings, and applying the same standards of quality: the demonstrated excellence in
their field based on evaluation of their scholarship and teaching ability—rather than their military
experience and personal compatibility.

-- Institute permanent tenure under the same standards, procedures, and timetables as
occurs in civilian higher education. Tenure is commonly misunderstood to lead to the
accumulation of dead wood in academic institutions. Indeed the evidence is quite the contrary:
the decision on whether to tenure an individual after a period of probation (commonly six years)
forces a comprehensive examination of accomplishment, quality, fitness, and promise, and then a
very tough-minded decision on "up or out," that leads to a much higher quality faculty. The tiny
percentage of faculty in higher education who slough off after achieving tenure are caricatures in
popular literature and public imagination. When Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner transformed the
Naval War College into an outstanding institution of higher education in the early 1970s, he did it
by hiring an outstanding faculty, and retaining it with academic tenure.

-- Assure seriousness of purpose by grading students on a competitive basis with rank
order of merit at graduation, to be part of their personnel record and to shape their duty
assignments following graduation.

-- Require commandants and deans to have prior faculty experience at ISS level along
with proper academic credentials; deans should be active duty officers chosen from the faculty
after demonstrated accomplishment as teachers, leaders, and scholars in their discipline or field.

-- Merge the faculties of the staff and war colleges, and SAASS, at Air University so that
expertise in subject matter can be shared appropriately and leveraged to strengthen instruction in
all three schools. Civilian institutions rarely separate faculty in the same disciplines and fields into
separate colleges or schools. In Arts and Sciences, for example, faculty profess their subjects to freshmen, advanced PhD students, and all in between; in medical schools, to entering med students and senior fellows who have already completed their residencies; at Newport, one faculty teaches both staff and war college students.

Senior Service Schools

My contact with the war colleges has been more extensive than the academies and staff colleges: service as a visiting professor at Carlisle in 1980-81 and 2006-07, adjunct at National War College 1985-1990, dozens of lectures to include all six war colleges to the present, as well as many discussions over the years with faculty, deans, and commandants.

The war colleges seem to have improved more than schools at the other levels, particularly with improved faculty: more outstanding civilians, more military with terminal degrees in their fields, and when hiring retired officers, choosing the strongest in terms of operational and academic experience. Few seem to be drawn from active or retired officers who lack teaching experience, proper academic credentials, or prior military careers that would disqualify them for attendance at their schools as students. The war colleges seem to nurture, support, and reward faculty research, understanding the intimate connections between rigorous thinking, precise writing, publication, expertise, and outstanding teaching.

The weaknesses in war college education lay elsewhere and to some degree mirror weaknesses at the staff colleges.

The students, very much the elite slice of officers at O-5 and early O-6 levels selected by service personnel procedures, usually come directly from command or the most demanding staff jobs, expecting less pressure and to work less. Almost invariably they are greeted by the most
senior officers of their services telling them exactly that, immediately undercutting their
determination to make the most of the year and the faculty’s ability to demand rigor, focus, and
determined effort. There are no entrance requirements other than career accomplishment and
promise, so the variations in preparation force instruction to the lowest common denominator.
While they are graded, there is no rank order of merit on graduation; no one can fail or flunk out.
All of them leave with a spotless record—war college certification and a masters’ degree. By the
spring nearly all are focused on their next assignment and eager to get on with it. Yet amazingly,
a very large percentage of them retire within four years, calling into question their selection and
the value of the year’s study.

The curricula, while more demanding and relevant than in years past, does not focus on or
teach the formulation of strategy, nor like professional schools in business, law, and medicine,
does it use the case study method except sparingly. Many subjects are taught through theory,
which while helpful to these practical, get-it-done men and women of action, does not necessarily
prepare them for the higher level of war making or political-military intercourse they will
encounter in the rest of their careers. Here the strength of the faculty, the increasing curricular
requirements imposed from the outside, the weak backgrounds of the commandants, and the
powerlessness of the deans can be a disadvantage. These faculties tend to be much more stable,
sometimes to include former deans; from long experience they often have strong views on what
should be taught and how, and they are skilled at resisting change or reshaping requirements,
particularly when their department heads are active duty O-6s who lack the same level of
expertise or experience, and rotate in and out of their positions for a few years. War colleges can
be insular and even parochial—more so than civilian professional schools, in the same way that the
military more generally is isolated from the rest of society, although these differences can be
overdrawn.

The weaknesses in the teaching of strategy have been manifest in American military
performance since World War II. While the navy and army war colleges concentrated on
teaching, understanding, and formulating strategy before 1941, with the outstanding results, such
has not been the case since.

The same weaknesses of the commandants at staff colleges apply to war colleges. In
cases where appropriate flag officers are not available, war colleges could appoint retired flags
with outstanding military and academic careers for five year terms once renewable, or even
civilians with the appropriate backgrounds. All institutions, but particularly military
organizations, benefit from outstanding leadership.

Many of my recommendations for strengthening the war colleges match those for the staff
colleges:

-- Institute minimum entrance requirements set and administered by the schools, to include
minimum scores on the graduate record examination and service/subject matter expertise, to
assure that students have the capability and preparation to complete a rigorous course of study.

-- Institute application procedures set and administered by the institutions, to include a
short essay by each applicant on what they expect, and wish, to achieve in SSS, to assure that
entering students have the motivation to take war college seriously, beyond enhancing their
chances for promotion.

-- Strongly encourage commandants to drop guest lectures from four-star officers unless
directly relevant to specific topics in the curriculum; too many of these presentations are
superficial tours of “what’s going on in their commands” and include gratuitous comments about the value or seriousness of purpose of PME.

-- Change service personnel procedures to make uniformed faculty assignments comparable in status and promotability to the best operational and staff duty.

-- Recruit civilian faculty from the academic world in disciplines related to the subject matter taught at the colleges using the same procedures, and standards, extant in the best of civilian academe.

-- Institute permanent tenure under the same standards, procedures, and timetables as occurs in civilian higher education.

-- Assure seriousness of purpose by grading students on a competitive basis with rank order of merit at graduation, to be part of their personnel record and to shape their duty assignments following graduation.

-- Require six years of active duty after graduation as a condition for attending war college in residence.

-- Require commandants and deans to have prior faculty experience at SSS level along with proper academic credentials; deans should be active duty or retired officers, or civilian academics, chosen from the faculty after demonstrated accomplishment as teachers, leaders, and scholars in their discipline or field. The Subcommittee ought seriously to consider making commandant/president/command positions at the war college level three-star billets lasting three to five years without the possibility of promotion afterward, or civilian positions.

Other Considerations
Abolishing the Academies (and ROTC). The military academies and ROTC could be replaced by
competitive scholarships that students could take to the college or university of their choice, probably at substantial savings to the government.\(^1\) The academies began during the 19th century when the country lacked many institutions of higher education and none in engineering; today the United States possesses the best and most comprehensive system of higher education in the world. ROTC originated in the 19th and early 20th centuries when the country relied on citizen soldiers for national defense and needed to build a large mobilization base of national guard and reserve officers.

A system of national scholarships, awarded on merit by competitive examinations and interviews, would attract a broader slice of American youth to the military and perhaps to military careers, and reduce the isolation and separation of the military from society. Students might serve in the enlisted ranks in the reserves during college to learn military service, and train during summers.

What would be lost to the military establishment, among other things, would be the regular infusion of officers with civilian in-residence graduate education (the faculties), the special introduction to military culture that the academies provide, and the storied tradition of the academies which serve important functions of cohesiveness and identification inside each of the armed services. Furthermore, graduate programs in military history and national security studies would shrink, diminishing both the size and the quality of those degree programs to the detriment not only of the services, but American higher education—and thus society—in general.

Civilian Graduate Degrees in Residence. The longstanding emphasis on civilian graduate degrees

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\(^1\) I suggested such a system in “An Officer Corps for the Next Century,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 1996, p. 80 footnote 3.
for officer education and advancement has in recent years been diluted in two ways: first, by the granting of MA/MS degrees by the staff and war colleges, and second, the proliferation of online, on base, and correspondence programs designed for the armed services. These square-filler degrees lack the depth, rigor, comprehensiveness, requirements, faculty, and overall quality of the better residential graduate and professional education. Graduate education on campus throws officers into close interaction with civilian youth and peers in ways active duty personnel rarely experience; the degree programs challenge their assumptions, develop originality and methodological sophistication, and bring to the services the most recent findings and methodologies in fields of study and disciplines of value to the military establishment. The personnel systems of the services should be encouraging in residence civilian educational assignments; Congress should fund them and consider making them an important consideration for promotion to flag rank.

Distance Education. Online courses can be very useful for imparting knowledge but is less effective in teaching critical thinking and other skills. Students in residential ISS and SSS programs could use them to reduce class time and learn such things as the interagency process, the geography of the national security bureaucracy, and the like, thus supplementing regular instruction. I was surprised and impressed when I compared the army war college distance education and in-residence curricula in the spring of 2007. The distance courses were equally substantive and demanding, the product of a remarkable director who was empowered by his dean to reform and strengthen the distance program. Such programs have inherent limitations, however. Not only do they lack the benefit of personal interchange and Socratic interaction prevalent in residence, but they require a very large faculty to communicate regularly with
students for discussion, grading, and feedback, and thus offer little or no savings of cost.

Student Research in PME. The introduction of honors programs at the academies, and original research requirements at the staff and war colleges has improved their curricula immeasurably. These assignments teach critical thinking, good writing, rigor, and precision. Equally important, writing a thesis or paper based on original research prepares officers to recognize poor conceptualization, sloppy thinking, inadequate research, and weak analysis—and thus improves staff work and command decisions throughout the services. However, supervision of research makes the recruiting of highly trained, widely experienced, and best quality faculty all the more indispensable to PME.

Conclusion

If the problems of PME institutions arise from their structure, organization, and culture, these largely derive from their context in the military: an atmosphere of isolation from, and suspicion of, American society in general and the academic world in particular. Many observers have noted over the years the anti-intellectualism of the officer corps even in its highest ranks. Furthermore, while it would be convenient to blame the operational tempo of the services for problems in staffing these colleges, these problems long antedated the current overseas campaigns and the struggle against terrorism. The real source lies buried in the personnel systems of the armed services: the rigidity of proscribed careers, the privileging of operational experience and command for promotion, the rigid qualifications for assignments, and the assignment patterns themselves. Officers with extensive civilian graduate school and faculty duty are always at a
disadvantage in promotion, often purposely penalized for their time in education.

Many longtime observers of PME believe that few of these problems can be fixed from the inside, for the services have other priorities and largely lack leaders in their flag ranks at who care about PME or recognize its deficiencies. Nor is the civilian leadership in the Pentagon likely to dent such a widely dispersed and decentralized system, even if senior leaders had the time and inclination to devote attention and resources.

PME has not yet attained the level of quality recommended by Chairman Skelton’s report of the late 1980s, which is still the most comprehensive and penetrating study of the issues. Indeed in the last twenty years the two influences that have strengthened PME the most have been the Skelton Report (and his personal attention in the years following), and the drive for masters degrees at the staff and war colleges, which has forced the upgrading of faculties in order to qualify the degree programs for accreditation.

Thus the ultimate answer to strengthening PME likely lies with Congress. I hope this statement assists in the effort.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MAY 20, 2009
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SNYDER

Dr. Snyder. 1. What should be the focus in our study? What questions should we ask the commandants and deans of the various schools? What should we ask the combatant commanders? What should we ask the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman? What should we ask the secretaries of the Services and their uniformed heads?

Dr. B Reslin-Smith. At heart, the key question for the study and indeed for our military leadership is simple: how important to this nation is professional military education? If the military is to overcome the perennial “anti-intellectual” charge against its officers, will the leadership, both civilian and uniformed, embrace and support PME? Will serious attention be paid to student selection, military faculty assignment and leadership recruitment? I would ask the Secretary, the Chairman, the Service Secretaries and the Chiefs and Combatant Commanders what they want in our war colleges, what they want from the National War College. I would ask what expect from graduates of the colleges—what skills, depth of understanding, regional preparation. Do they want our graduates to understand the distinct bureaucratic and service cultures?

Dr. Snyder. 2. What should be the role of ethical discussions and education in PME beyond “just war” theory?

Dr. B Reslin-Smith. On ethics education. Over my 12 years at the War College, I saw frequent requirements for ethics or leadership education. When offered suggestions for these topics, we received vague and general topics that did not address the tough questions that officers face when forced to choose between career and professional military advice. If an officer has observed over time that certain types of individuals are promoted for “going along” then no amount of ethics training will overcome that lesson. So my first challenge for each Service is to evaluate the promotion criteria, does it include the naysayers, the questioners? Are officers who respond to “those below as well as those above” promoted?

I did observe one type of course that provided a unique opportunity for officers to consider their professional responsibilities. The National War College has an elective on civil-military relations which requires a slow and most careful analysis of Huntington’s The Soldier and the State. This course exposes the students personally to the tension between career ambition and professional responsibility—with slowly increasing pressure and logical discipline. No student can shirk or dismiss Huntington’s profound questions. I would advocate this approach at all the War Colleges.

Dr. Snyder. 3. What specifically attracts top notch civilian academics to faculty, particularly if the programs are not accredited for master’s degrees?

Dr. B Reslin-Smith. The type of civilian academic we wanted at the War College was not the typical graduate school professor. We found that those attracted to this school came because it is a policy professional school, not an academic research institution. We do best with a mix of practitioners, former Ambassadors, governmental officials, Congressional staff, as well as civilians with specific academic specializations. The National War College attracted “top notch” civilians—from Harvard, Yale, Princeton—even before we went to the master’s degree. I believe the War College needs thoughtful “policy academics” who are comfortable in a mixed professional environment, and who want to teach.

Dr. Snyder. 4. Is the only way to achieve the Skelton Panel’s recommended joint (and now increasingly interagency) acculturation through long (at least 10 months) in-residence education?

a. Are the faculty and student mixes dictated for the various institutions still appropriate? If so, was it appropriate for Congress to allow the Service senior schools to award JMPE II credit (NDAA FY2005) despite their lower ratios and lack of a requirement to send any graduate to joint assignments? Do you see unintended consequences to that?

Dr. B Reslin-Smith. I do believe that the National War College program, which is interagency and joint BY INTENTION, must be in residence. It is the very intersection of the students and the faculty, the ongoing contact that brings together diverse bureaucratic cultures that Eisenhower, Arnold, Marshall and Forrestal had in mind when they established the College. This is not a training program that can
be done through distributed computer based learning, although that can be useful in other settings. This is a policy based educational experience that prepares officers for the real life interagency and inter-service tensions they will face on graduation.

Dr. Snyder. 5. What constitutes rigor in an educational program? Does this require letter grades? Does this require written exams? Does this require the writing of research or analytical papers, and if so, of what length? Does this require increased contact time and less “white space”?

Dr. Breslin-Smith. On the question of Rigor. I have observed that “letter grade” standard results in overall student A-/B+ grades. I would have you evaluate the experience at ICAF in this regard. I do believe that the Colleges need to work with students on their writing quality, but I am not convinced that writing a research paper is a definitive evaluation technique. To me, the most important evaluative measure, either in oral examination or in written examination, is the challenge of scenario analysis. As I mentioned in my testimony, I believe that National War College can demonstrate rigor and superior preparation of its students, through the use of strategic analysis along the lines of the framework series of questions that various professors have developed over the years. If a student can analyze the components of a given scenario, its strategic implications, and thoroughly respond to the in depth questions prompted by the discipline of the framework, we can assess the rigor of the student’s thought and preparation.

Dr. Snyder. 6. Should performance at PME matter for onward assignments? Does which school one attends matter for later assignments?

a. Does the requirement that the National Defense University send 50% (plus one) graduates to joint assignments and the Service senior schools have no such requirement matter even though now all award JMPE II credit (since 2005)?

Dr. Breslin-Smith. On the issue of onward assignments and student performance. It would be useful to track the career paths of DG graduates from the Colleges, versus the career paths of students with strong “sponsors” or mentors. The dynamic of the sponsor also impacts the selection of senior college. Logically, the Joint Staff and the Services should send students to ICAF for in depth economic/acquisition/industrial analysis, to National for strategy, and to the Service colleges for senior service specific education. I do not understand how the Service Colleges came to award JMPE II credit.

Dr. Snyder. 7. How does one measure the quality of the people in the PME environment?

Dr. Breslin-Smith. To measure the quality of the people in the PME environment, see my answer to #5. The purpose of the National War College is to educate officers in the field of strategy, in depth critical analysis. As our first Commandant mused, the measure of the College’s success is our ability to make the student’s “ponder.” As a professor, I encouraged students to take advantage of a year when they can try on other opinions, experiment with other views, dive into the study bureaucratic and international cultures, develop critical thinking skills.

Dr. Snyder. 8. Does gender and ethnic diversity matter in the assignment of senior leaders and the search for qualified faculty? How should PME institutions increase the diversity of their leadership and faculty?

Dr. Breslin-Smith. Years ago, I served on the diversity panel for the National Defense University. The panel recommended a number of steps to increase racial and gender diversity, beginning with earlier recruitment of military officers for advanced degrees and eventual assignment to NDU. We suggested that the services consider that advanced students at the command and staff level schools be contacted for possible future assignment to the War College. But more than gender or racial diversity, the military needs to foster more respect for officer advanced education and teaching.

Dr. Snyder. 9. How should PME commanders, commandants, and presidents be chosen? What background(s) should the Chairman and uniformed heads of the Services be looking for when they nominate individuals for these positions? Should the focus be on operational leadership or academic background?

Dr. Breslin-Smith. As obvious as this may sound, a key criterion for selection for PME commandants must be an officer’s intellectual engagement with senior officer education. While it would be useful for an officer to have had past academic or administrative experience in higher education, I believe that the key factor in success is a passion for the mission of the National War College, and a desire to teach. (One would not expect an Air Force fighter squadron to be commanded by officer who does not fly. Why do we not aspire to have a senior service school led by an officer engaged in the educational mission of the school?)
To assist in the Commandant Selection process, I recommend that the National War College revive its past advisory board, formally called the Board of Consultants. This Board could be active in identifying appropriate candidates and could do the initial screening interviews before recommending a slate to the Chairman.

Dr. Snyder. 10. How should PME institutions attract top-tier faculty away from the Harvards and Stanfords of the academic world? What are the elements that would attract the highest quality of faculty—tenure, copyright, resources, pay, ability to keep their government retirements, research and administrative assistance?

a. Please define academic freedom in general and discuss what its role should be in a PME setting.

Dr. Breslin-Smith. Again, my view is that the National War College is not designed to be a Research University. I believe the “top tier” faculty members are attracted to the War College because of their access to and impact on the future leaders of our country, the setting of the College in Washington and their proximity to the policy community. As I mentioned above, we have had outstanding civilian faculty over the years without tenure, copyright, and research assistance. That is not to say that these are not important factors to keep the mix of faculty that is so important. I support the current system of a few “tenured” faculty, more research support for those who want to do research, a more flexible sabbatical program to allow faculty to enter the policy process.

On academic freedom. Aside from DOD rules in article publication, which did not seem burdensome, there is a larger issue concerning the atmosphere of academic freedom. When a leader in an academic institution suggests that certain speakers should not be invited, that administration policy should not be questioned, that certain schools focus too much on history and policy criticism, great harm is done to military officers. In my mind, the goal of senior officer education is critical analysis and strategic thought … to be prepared to answer the question, “now what do we do?” Faculty and students need to be free to question, to reconsider, to challenge. It is the ultimate gift of a war college education.

Dr. Snyder. 11. What should be the role of history in PME?

Dr. Breslin-Smith. The role of history. For a nation that spends so little time considering the past, it is all the more important to expose its military leadership to both diplomatic and military history, as well as deeper understanding of the world’s political cultures. The benefit of the American generally positive focus on the future obscures the weakness of our analysis and strategic thought when we ignore the practices and experience of the past. The recent past, the after action analysis of the period leading up to the terrorist attacks and the subsequent wars must be studied before the complexity of the current blur of international and domestic issues numbs analysis.

Dr. Snyder. 3. What specifically attracts top notch civilian academics to faculty, particularly if the programs are not accredited for master’s degree?

Dr. Cochran. In my view, this question misses the point, particularly the notion that civilian academics are attracted by master programs. None of the service academies nor community colleges and many smaller academic colleges—all of which lack master degree programs—have problems with attracting quality civilian faculty. Rather, the issue is the lack of mobility for faculty between civilian and military PME institutions. Once any civilian academic makes a commitment to a PME faculty situation, few if any can expect to return to the civilian academic world. There is an inherent mistrust amongst civilian faculty towards military PME institutions [one of the purposes of the “visiting professor” positions at PME schools is to counter this] and the attitude towards academics who take the PME route are treated as if they sold their soul to the devil. Acknowledgement of this by PME officials, as well as members of Congress, would be helpful (see my response below for further on attraction of civilian faculty).1

Dr. Snyder. 5. What constitutes rigor in an educational program? Does it require letter grades? Does this require written examinations? Does this require the writing of research and analytical papers, and, if so, what length? Does this require increased contact time and less “white space”?

Dr. Cochran. As I stated in my oral testimony, rigor in any PME program will result in the synergy between a qualified civilian and military faculty teaching in their areas of expertise and a motivated student body that really wants to learn. From this will flow a rigorous curriculum. To think that “rigor” should drive is putting the cart before the horse. If the inherent curriculum is weak, a solid faculty

1These views represent Dr. Cochran’s based upon his PME experience and do not represent that of the US Army or Department of Defense.
with innovative leadership will fix that/responding to the demands of a student body.

The type of grade given is irrelevant as very few, if any, PME schools “flunk” students, certainly when compared to civilian institutions.

Written examinations are only as valuable if a qualified faculty is prepared to spend as much in the evaluation as the students did in the study and writing. More valuable are oral examinations that cut across academic departments—thus being truly integrated—as are conducted by the National War College faculty. Research papers are only as useful as the contribution of qualified faculty with requisite expertise who direct them; all too often “papers” at PME institutions are “check the block.”

On contact time, my experience has always been less is better, thus forcing hard decisions on what to and not to teach as opposed to filling time. The whole notion of “white space” is meaningless outside of PME; indeed it would be embarrassing to explain this to civilian academics?

Dr. SNYDER. 6. Should performance at PME matter for onward assignments? Does which school one attends matter for later assignments?

Dr. COCHRAN. How well students perform at PME should be a requisite for future assignment. However, the factors such as a 100 percent pass rate and the lack of weight given to “academic evaluation reports” inhibits competition. Such a system would require some innovation in the personnel system.

With regard to school attendance mattering for specific assignments, here various PME schools need to coordinate (particularly across services) on what is the focus of each institution—even create “centers of excellence” on inter-service matters such as Army schools on leadership, Air Force schools on technology, NDU schools on strategy. Another factor is the elimination of “waivers” prior to assignment that all too often become accredited after assignment.

Dr. SNYDER. 9. How should PME commanders, commandants, and presidents be chosen? What background(s) should the Chairman and uniformed heads of the Services be looking for when they nominate individuals for these positions? Should the focus be upon operational leadership skills or academic backgrounds?

Dr. COCHRAN. The military “heads” of the various PME institutions should be chosen on the basis of demonstrated leadership in the expertise and at the level of the applicable school. The more senior the school, the more essential this leadership category is. She should be assigned to that position for a minimum of three years (five for staff and war colleges) to plan, execute, and assess the programs, curriculum and changes. “Touch and go” or “holding pattern” assignments demean the seriousness of PME. The academic “dean” for each school should be chosen for academic background in field of the institution and kept in those positions for at least twice that of the “head” tenure to ensure overlap. As the “head” should be a military person, the dean should be civilian.

Dr. SNYDER. 10. How should PME institutions attract top-tier civilian faculty away from the Harvards and Stanfords of the academic world? What are the elements that would attract the highest quality of faculty—tenure, copyright, resources, pay, ability to keep their government retirements, research and administrative assistance?

Dr. COCHRAN. Similar to the first question above, this question misses the point. Most of the “elements” or perks for civilian PME faculty exceed those of comparable positions on civilian campuses with the MAJOR EXCEPTION OF TENURE. Matters of pay, funds for research and travel, access to resources, and assistance, particularly for younger scholars at prestigious “Harvards” and “Stanfords” as well as established scholars in the academic world, simply cannot be matched by civilian institutions. The issue is not so much “attraction” rather than “retention.” Here senior leadership needs to be innovative. Addressing the failure of PME institutions to implement a system of Title X tenure as outlined 20 years ago would be a positive step in that direction, for both younger scholars and established academics.

Dr. SNYDER. 10.a. Please define academic freedom in general and discuss what its role should be in a PME setting.

Dr. COCHRAN. In my view, it is not so much the definition of academic freedom in PME as it is abuse in the civilian world—and the lack of understanding by both military and civilian communities. The expectation (indeed the obligation) within the military culture to offer alternative views, particularly in the decision making process, is strong. A penchant to “hold on” to minority positions for long periods of time works at cross purposes with the orderly conduct of business is accepted within by most in academia. Helpful here is the notion that PME is for the military, about the military, and by the military. If one has a problem with that, then they should avoid becoming associated with PME.

Dr. SNYDER. 11. What is the role of history in PME?
Dr. COCHRAN. As noted above, the focus of Professional Military Education is the profession of the military; at its essence, it is about war—preparation for, conduct of, and assessment after. Hence it is “war studies”—past, present and future. In the past decades, civilian institutions have adopted exceptional war studies programs—an essential part of which is the study of history, along with that of political science, economic, behavioral studies, anthropology, and other established academic disciplines. History is a part of this but does not dictate or dominate. As war studies is multidisciplinary, the role of history in PME should be the same. While one cannot quantify just how much, it should be respectively complimentary.

Dr. SNYDER. 1. What should be the focus in our study? What questions should we ask the commandants and deans of the various schools? What should we ask the combatant commanders? What should we ask the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman? What should we ask the secretaries of the Services and their uniformed heads?

Dr. CARAFANO. As I stated in my testimony, “[t]he centerpiece of the reform discussion should be on senior-level professional military officer education. The reason for that is simple. The skills, knowledge, and attributes of strategic leaders are the most important product of the military’s professional development program.” The war colleges are the pivotal professional military development experience. If clear vision for what they do can be established, it is much easier to work in either direction to identify the other key assignment, education, and training milestones that support the war college experience. Likewise, understanding the requirements for officer professional military education is the backbone for then determining what needs to be done for enlisted personnel, warrant officers, and civilian employees.

In questioning senior military and civilian leaders I think it will be important to force them out of the “here and now.” Fundamental changes in the professional military educations won’t solve short-term problems. Furthermore, these changes will likely influence the character of the military for many decades. Thus, each should be asked to envision officer duties; the skills, knowledge and attributes; education and training requirements; and operational assignments—thirty years in the future.

Dr. SNYDER. 2. What should be the role of ethical discussions and education in PME beyond “just war” theory?

Dr. CARAFANO. As I stated in my testimony, “[m]oral and political issues are part of war, not a separate sphere that military leaders can ignore. Officers will have to engage in the struggle of ideas against terrorism and other ideologies that may emerge in the 21st century. They will have to understand the political dimensions of war and the complexities of civil-military relations.” Thus, ethical considerations must transcend traditional discussions of just war theory and include topics such as social justice, economics, and the environment.

In many ways, this curriculum will reflect what is often called a “classical liberal” education.

Dr. SNYDER. 3. What specifically attracts top notch civilian academics to faculty, particularly if the programs are not accredited for master’s degrees?

Dr. CARAFANO. Top notch research facilities and opportunities are always a powerful draw. Likewise, faculty is attracted by the opportunity to work with a talented student body. Finally, the opportunity to work in a truly “multi-disciplinary” environment with a minimum of distractions from administration.

Dr. SNYDER. 4. Is the only way to achieve the Skelton Panel’s recommended joint (and now increasingly interagency) acculturation through long (at least 10 months) in-residence education?

Dr. CARAFANO. No, but this must be the core component and a touchstone for the educational experience. The gold standard by which alternative educational models are measured. I would make the senior PME experience universal and not tied to assignment or promotion. My argument here is simple. You can never predict with clear certainty how officers will respond over the long-term and which will have the essential skills, knowledge, and attributes necessary for future conflicts. The more officers through the pipeline the better the odds you will have the right leaders when you need them. This may not be the most efficient process, but my guess is we are still decades away from solid predictors of cognitive performance and there won’t be any useful “metrics” to determine whether you are producing the right leaders other than how they perform in over the long-term.

Dr. SNYDER. 5. What constitutes rigor in an educational program? Does this require letter grades? Does this require written exams? Does this require the writing of research or analytical papers, and if so, of what length? Does this require increased contact time and less “white space”?

Dr. CARAFANO. Rigor comes from developing critical thinking skills. Probably the most important variable here is the quality of the faculty rather than the specific requirements and time allocation in the course. In general, however, I would advo-
cate for more depth-less breadth. As I stated in my testimony, “Joint Professional Military Education requirements have become overly prescriptive. They are also growing. Quality is becoming a victim quantity. The current vogue of emphasizing "cultural" studies is a case in point. Reform proposals call for everything from Arabic-language training to negotiating skills to increased engineering and scientific training. These calls ignore reality. Operational requirements are leaving less, not more, time for professional education. Likewise, the Pentagon cannot be expected to foresee exactly which kinds of leaders, language skills, and geographic or operational orientations will be needed for future missions. The future is too unpredictable.”

Dr. Snyder. 6. Should performance at PME matter for onward assignments? Does which school one attends matter for later assignments?

Dr. Carafano. See answer to question 4.

Dr. Snyder. 7. How does one measure the quality of the staff, faculty, and students in the PME environment?

Dr. Carafano. See answer to question 4. Metrics are a recipe for disaster for disaster. Increasing social science is finding that the over reliance on quantitative measures can actually drive down performance. Long-term performance is the only adequate measure.

Dr. Snyder. 8. Does gender and ethnic diversity matter in the assignment of senior leaders and the search for qualified faculty? How should PME institutions increase the diversity of their leadership and faculty?

Dr. Carafano. Diversity obviously matters. We live in diverse world. That is where men and women have to fight. That is the world they need to understand. There are ways to achieve an appreciation for diversity without imbedding it the make-up of the students and faculty. The quality of the faculty is the number one variable in the quality of the education. That should never be sacrificed. The best means to ensure a diverse, quality faculty and student body for senior PME is establish opportunities for career of service to diverse population and build professional development programs that qualify them to teach and learn at senior PME institutions.

Dr. Snyder. 9. How should PME commanders, commandants, and presidents be chosen? What background(s) should the Chairman and uniformed heads of the Services be looking for when they nominate individuals for these positions? Should the focus be on operational leadership or academic background?

Dr. Carafano. They should be chosen by an independent board. They should serve a term of ten years and have to retire afterwards and receive post-retirement promotions. The leaders that should be chosen are the ones best qualified to implement the vision for the institution regardless of their operational or educational background.

Dr. Snyder. 10. How should PME institutions attract top-tier civilian faculty? What are the elements that would attract the highest quality of faculty—tenure, copyright, resources, pay, ability to keep their government retirements, research and administrative assistance?

Dr. Carafano. See answer to question 3. I think existing practices for academic freedom in the military education institutions is adequate.

Dr. Snyder. 11. What should be the role of history in PME?

Dr. Carafano. Critical thinking is the most vital skill. History is a great instrument for teaching the practice of critical thinking. It is an essential, but not a sufficient component. Twenty-first century leaders must be “multi-disciplinary” and understand a variety of methods of analysis to solve modern complex problems.

Dr. Snyder. 1. What should be the focus in our study? What questions should we ask the commandants and deans of the various schools? What should we ask the combatant commanders? What should we ask the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman? What should we ask the secretaries of the Services and their uniformed heads?

Dr. Kohn. The focus should be on the extent to which the various schools accomplish their overall mission of education for the waging of war. Special attention should be paid to the obstacles or impediments PME faces, ones that could be overcome through different policies, procedures, and personnel. The mission at the pre-commissioning level is the education of potential officers and their basic preparation for company grade service; at the intermediate level, education in the waging of war and leadership/command at the operational level; and at the senior level, education in the formulation of strategy and leadership/command at the division, fleet, and major, unified, and specified command levels and higher.

Commandants and deans at the various schools (and in ROTC and OCS/OTS) should be asked what those impediments/obstacles exist to increasing the quality of their institutions: resources, quality/nature of the students, quality/nature of the
faculty and particularly support from their leadership (civilian and military). Attempt to differentiate what might be changed with different policies or behaviors from the leadership: could chiefs, service secretaries, and OSD do anything differently to enhance the schools’ mission success? Explore with them the exogenous factors that are more difficult to compensate for: ops tempo, personnel policies of the services (selection and follow-on assignment of students in particular); support from COCOMS and commanders at lower levels; and curricular requirements of the services, joint staff, and civilian accreditation authorities. (I suspect that jointness and interagency issues have quite likely come to crowd out other important subjects in ISS and SSS.) Then see if they think there is anything in their power that can strengthen their schools. The differentiation is critical.

Academy deans and superintendents should be asked about the balance between military training/education and more basic civilian education: do they give their cadets/midshipmen enough time, and enough encouragement, to pursue the intellectual experience of college, and develop both the respect for, interest in, and commitment to the profession of arms? To what extent do they rely on honor codes to reinforce professional ethics, as opposed to specific, targeted issues that will face as junior officers? Do the academies (and ROTC) require enough foreign language fluency to be of value to the military establishment in the future, enough civics/government/political science to understand the character of American government and how it differs from other forms of government, and enough American history to appreciate the development of the United States’s current economy, society, politics, and role in the world? Ask specifically whether the amount of science and engineering could be reduced, as vestigial holdovers from a distant past, in favor of less technical information that might prepare them for a lifetime of military service. Last, academy superintendents should be asked to explain why such a large percentage of their graduates leave the service after their minimum obligation, and at the ten year mark—and whether, if the chief reasons lay outside academy walls, whether they might during the four years better prepare officers to accept the challenges and remain committed to the profession of arms for lifetime careers. The combatant commanders should be asked if the graduates of ISS are adequately prepared to do the campaign planning needed by the command, and the graduates of SSS to formulate effective military strategy needed by their commands. Second, ask what in their judgment they could do personally or institutionally to make PME stronger; would they support alterations in the personnel policies of the services to improve PME? Do they think officers are adequately prepared for staff and war college? Do they think the educational experience is demanding enough? Do they think it was as demanding as their civilian graduate education, and if not, why not?

The Secretary of Defense, Chairman, service secretaries, and service Chiefs could be asked the same set of questions. First, on the selection of school presidents and commandants, should not prior experience as a faculty member be required for leadership of a PME institution? Second, inquire what these senior leaders see as the primary or most important mission of the various levels of PME, and what in their judgment might be done to improve the accomplishment of these missions. Third, ask for their judgment as to the comparative importance of PME as opposed to civilian professional development of officers, and if they believe both to be necessary, whether their personnel systems make sufficient space in assignment patterns for the most promising officers to pursue both and still compete for flag rank. Each should also be asked whether they believe assignment to a PME institution faculty is as valuable for officer development as operational assignments, indeed even command.

Dr. Snyder. 2. What should be the role of ethical discussions and education in PME beyond “just war” theory?

Dr. Kohn. Ethics should be central to education at every PME level, as part of the study of the broader subject of the profession of arms. At every level of education, the different stresses and dilemmas of core professional ethics need to be explored in depth. Officers need to be taught how to exercise their command power responsibly; what their obligations are to their soldiers, colleagues, and commanders; how to combine mission accomplishment and with personal ambition; what institutional pressures they will face in the course of a career; and many other professional dilemmas, pressures, and difficulties that arise in every profession at every level. There should be case studies and role playing, along with biographical studies. Ethics should be integral to the study of leadership and command, tactics, law, civil-military relations, public affairs, joint and combined operations, organization, and more. Professional ethics should be compared to, and sometimes differentiated from, personal ethics and morality, religion, social norms, and the like. The assertion of norms, values, and ethics needs to be supplemented with an investigation of them in depth in various situations. PME should play a
central role in defining professional ethics, teaching them, and nurturing an understanding from their application in tactics at the beginning of officers’ careers all the way through advising the president of the United States during wartime.

Dr. Kohn. Two things attract civilian faculty: the opportunity to teach their specialties to outstanding students, and to pursue their own contributions to their fields through research, writing, consulting, and publishing. This means specifically the freedom to choose (to some degree) what they teach and how (including the types and amounts of assignments), and research time and support, including travel and hours away from the office either in libraries, archives, interviewing, field work, or other venues. Like other professionals in other fields, scholars wish to be able to practice their profession at the highest level of accomplishment and excellence to which they are capable. They are particularly sensitive to whether the conditions of service support, rather than hamper, the pursuit of excellence and the opportunity to make their work known to colleagues in their field. Issues of compensation, provided that is at a living wage level and adjusted for a twelve month as opposed to nine month appointment, are secondary. See also question 10.

Dr. Snyder. 4. Is the only way to achieve the Skelton Panel’s recommended joint (and now increasingly interagency) acculturation through long (at least 10 months) in-residence education?

Dr. Kohn. No. In fact, jointness cannot be left to ISS and SSS, but needs to be installed from the very beginning of careers. Indeed much jointness training and education aims to undo service indoctrination, education, and cultural practice—down to the very humor officers of the various services use to needle each other and the intense competition engendered by service academy football and competing roles, missions, and budgets. BOTC units should be housed, train, and socialize together; induction and commissioning ceremonies should be joint; the academies should require a semester in residence at each of the other two academies; all pre-commissioning education should teach loyalty first to country, second to the profession of arms, and third to the service, while at the same time orienting and teaching cadets/midshipmen about the missions, purposes, character, culture, accomplishments, and mentality of the other services—and about the achievements of inter-service cooperation historically, as well as the harmful effects of interservice rivalry and competition in the 20th century. These subjects should be expanded at more advanced levels in ISS. In my judgment, interagency issues should gradually displace jointness at ISS and SSS—if jointness still needs to be indoctrinated to any significant degree (as opposed to described or studied) at war colleges, it means earlier efforts have failed. The same education in other agencies’ roles, functions, accomplishments, and purposes should be taught at every level of PME, with attendant respect for the way civilians and civilian institutions contribute to national security.

Dr. Snyder. 4.a. Are the faculty and student mixes dictated for the various institutions still appropriate? If so, was it appropriate for Congress to allow the Service senior schools to award JMPE II credit (NDAA FY2005) despite their lower ratios and lack of a requirement to send any graduate to joint assignments? Do you see unintended consequences to that?

Dr. Kohn. The mix of students and faculty seems reasonable and functional, and as long as a portion of the curricula address joint issues, JMPE II credit seems appropriate. Dictating from Congress assignment patterns of this kind will constrict the assignment of officers at a time when the services strain to meet operational and infrastructure personnel requirements, so I would recommend against levying the NDU requirement on the service war colleges.

In the last twenty-five years, jointness has become something of an obsession. It is not and never was either the root of our military difficulties or the solution to our military deficiencies. It may be displacing other, more important, subjects in PME curricula at the war college level, or forcing excessive time in class meetings and group exercises at the expense of individual student reading, research, and reflection. Jointness and interagency are not in my judgment the most important issues the HASC should address in PME.

Dr. Snyder. 5. What constitutes rigor in an educational program. Does this require letter grades? Does this require written exams? Does this require the writing of research or analytical papers, and if so, of what length? Does this require increased contact time and less “white space”?

Dr. Kohn. Rigor rests on challenging students to expand their knowledge, skills, abilities, and understanding; and to raise their standards, or the quality, of their research, writing, thinking, and discourse. Most important, faculty must insist on rigor and precision in analysis and interpretation in written work and oral discourse. While grades, exams (written or oral), briefings, group projects, and writing
are all indispensable—and the grading of them the only way to hold students accountable for their performance—what is most important is that the faculty press rigor in every classroom meeting and every student exercise and requirement. Vague, sloppy, superficial, poorly researched or conceived work or participation of every kind needs to be brought to students’ attention in a direct but supportive and encouraging way. And the higher the level, the more direct and explicit should be the feedback.

Unless students—each individual alone—write analytical papers based on in-depth and comprehensive research, addressing the most complex, ambiguous issues facing the United States in national defense, they will not be capable of high-quality staff work nor will they be able to recognize it. If they lack these skills, they cannot supervise subordinates in the preparation of quality staff work nor later, as commanders, will they be able to recognize shoddy thinking, writing, and advice.

This requires not only short (less than ten pages) and intermediate length (twelve to twenty-five pages) papers, but a thesis (indeterminate length) based on original research, and the supervision of a faculty member skilled and experienced in such teaching, that addresses an important subject in national defense or military affairs, and makes an original contribution to knowledge.

Finally, the term “white space” is misleading and offensive. It implies emptiness, the absence of anything much less something of substance. Rigor requires more time for individual student work: reading, research, writing, preparation. The higher one ascends in education, the less time is spent in the classroom listening or reciting or otherwise interacting with faculty and peers. More time is spent wrestling with complexity and uncertainty on one’s own, formulating problems or questions, pursuing research in depth and breadth (always time-consuming), honing one’s thinking, unraveling inconsistency, filling in gaps in research or logic, and crafting a finished product.

Dr. Snyder. 6. Should performance at PME matter for onward assignments? Does which school one attends matter for later assignments?

Dr. Kohn. Both should matter though I believe at present they matter little. In other professions—law, health sciences, business, the clergy, education, science, engineering, architecture, etc. etc.—where a professional gets his or her education, how they perform (which measures what they learned and the quality of their skills) largely determines their first jobs and often subsequent career trajectories. All professions value experience and accomplishment. Only the military seems to ignore academic performance in professional advancement.

Such was not always the case. In the army at various times during the first three-quarters of the 20th century, attendance at the Command and General Staff College and one’s rank in class had real effect on an officer’s career, and to some extent affected subsequent assignments and advancement as indicative of an officer’s professional ability.

Dr. Snyder. 6.a. Does the requirement that the National Defense University send 50% (plus one) graduates to joint assignments and the Service senior schools have no such requirement matter even though now all award JPME II credit (since 2005)?

Dr. Kohn. Not in my judgment.

Dr. Snyder. 7. How does one measure the quality of the people in the PME environment?

Dr. Kohn. People in PME should be measured first by their qualifications and second by their performance.

Students, faculty, and school leadership can be measured on qualifications the same way civilian professional schools measure their people.

Students should be measured on the basis of their prior academic performances and by examination of their aptitude and preparation, by their interest and motivation for professional schooling as demonstrated in an application and statement of interest and intent, and by the extent to which their careers and accomplishments to date indicate promise for success in the profession. Currently the service personnel boards review only the last. The first two should be weighted equally at least with the last. PME schools should assess the first two, and admission committees, in consultation with service personnel boards, should certify eligibility before those boards select the students.

Faculty should be measured on the basis of their professional education, experience, and accomplishments.

Civilian (or permanent) faculty should be assessed on their performance in graduate school and the graduate education they obtained, on the teaching ability they demonstrated or their potential for teaching in a military PME environment, and on their ability and expertise in their discipline and subject as measured by their writings/publications. This assessment should be undertaken by search committees
staffed equally by civilian and military faculty; finalists should be invited to campus for an interview; recommendations to deans and commandants should explain in writing the reasons for selection.

Military (or rotating) faculty should be assessed the same way as “professors of the practice” are measured by civilian professional schools: on the basis of experience, knowledge, and demonstrated excellence in the practice of the profession in a particular subject area. Search committees with an equal mix of civilian and military faculty should review nominations from the services, interview them, and make recommendations to the deans and commandants explaining in writing the reasons for selection, beyond nomination by a service.

Commandants/presidents should be measured on the basis of their education, experience, and interest in the position. At a minimum, they should have faculty experience in PME, for if prior command, familiarity with the function, and experience with the weapons system or branch are required for operational and support commands, the same should be true in PME. The truth is that faculty assignments and terminal degrees from civilian educational institutions almost always kill the chances for promotion to flag rank. However if too few flags have the background, the personnel systems should be growing sufficient flag officers to staff these institutions—if they are important institutions/commands.

Students, faculty, and commandants/presidents should also be measured on performance. Students can be evaluated by means of regular assessments in the form of grades and upon graduation, rank order in class just as is done in the academies. This will motivate officers to work hard, take advantage of PME, excel, and thus improve their professional capacities. Faculty should be measured just as are peers in civilian institutions: on teaching performance (as measured by occasional visits to their classrooms by senior peers and chairs, not by student survey alone), service (committees, course development, leadership, etc.), consulting, and writings/publications. A committee of peers should exist in every department to review the performance of each faculty member on a regular basis. Commandants/presidents should be evaluated as in civilian academe: by their supervisors but with input from students (including most recent alumnae/i), faculty, administrators, commanders/stakeholders, and Boards of Visitors.

Dr. SNYDER. 8. Does gender and ethnic diversity matter in the assignment of senior leaders and the search for qualified faculty? How should PME institutions increase the diversity of their leadership and faculty?

Dr. KOHN. Diversity matters just as much in PME as in the most prominent and desirable command and staff positions. Faculty are (or should be) role models for students, respected professional experts of accomplishment and reputation. They are very visible. An absence of diversity sends a most negative message. Diversity can be increased by active, targeted recruitment. However the larger problem is that faculty duty for uniformed officers at ISS and SSS is not career enhancing. That could be changed by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, service secretaries, or chiefs of service—and should be immediately. Recruiting minority and female civilian faculty is part of the larger problem of recruiting outstanding faculty from academe. See question 10. My sense is that the academies and ROTC have been successful in this respect.

Command of PME schools often functions a tombstone assignment for flags either with the requisite qualifications (rarely) or for whom other assignments don’t materialize. That, too, could be altered by the OSD, JCS, and service leadership.

Dr. SNYDER. 9. How should PME commanders, commandants, and presidents be chosen? What background(s) should the Chairman and uniformed heads of the Services be looking for when they nominate individuals for these positions? Should the focus be on operational leadership or academic background?

Dr. KOHN. The Chairman and chiefs of the services should be chosen just as other flag billets are filled, and with the active oversight, input, and approval of the civilian leadership in OSD and the services. The backgrounds sought should be outstanding academic performance in PME, faculty experience, diversity of operational and staff experience, outstanding performance in command, and personal interest in the position.

Academic background and interest should be equal to or superior to operational leadership skills, for leadership of a mixed service and civilian faculty rarely equates with command of ground, air, or sea operational units or forces, or the various support functions in each of the services or in the joint/interagency/combined arenas.

If insufficient flags exist at present, retired flags with the requisite background should be recruited or voluntarily recalled to active duty until the service personnel systems grow an appropriate number of flag candidates. Some years ago the army appointed a chief of military history by instructing the O–7 selection board to choose
from the several outstanding colonels with PhDs in history—and thereby filled the position for several years with some of the strongest leadership the Center of Military History and army historical program has ever had. The dean’s positions at the Military and Air Force Academies are similarly filled by promotion of a permanent professor selected for the job. The same could be done with PME commandants, commanders, and presidents.

However the need to fill these positions with academically qualified officers must not be the occasion to derail outstanding flag officers with PhDs into assignments that are career-harming. There should be enough qualified flags to staff a variety of positions; if the services wish to grow leadership that is as original and adept at strategy, civil-military consultation, staff support, and specialized command positions as in operations, they must alter the balance and mix of their flag ranks more broadly.

Dr. Snyder. 10. How should PME institutions attract top-tier faculty away from the Harvards and Stanfords of the academic world? What are the elements that would attract the highest quality of faculty—tenure, copyright, resources, pay, ability to keep their government retirements, research and administrative assistance?

Dr. Kohn. PME cannot recruit tenured faculty from the top level of civilian academe for permanent employment because military schools cannot offer the freedom to teach what top scholars wish to teach, or the research time to pursue cutting edge original work that will change aspects of their field. There are too few senior scholars expert or interested in the specialties desired by staff and war colleges. The best that can be hoped is that PME institutions can attract an occasional top faculty member from these institutions for a year or two under the intergovernmental personnel act, or younger faculty attracted for various reasons to teaching military officers and contributing the national defense.

To attract the best teacher/scholars from civilian academe, the academies, staff, and war colleges must offer tenure. Overwhelmingly the top tier people will not risk their professional livelihood under rotating military leadership that might not understand academic life, adhere to the norms and values of civilian higher education (which do differ in many respects from those of the military profession), or permit the kind of freedom of inquiry and working conditions common to research I universities. When in the summer of 1990 I asked Admiral Stansfield Turner how he recruited Philip Crowl, the distinguished naval historian, from the University of Nebraska, the Admiral replied that he made him an offer he could not refuse, and that it included tenure. Newport still possesses the most distinguished faculty of the various staff and war colleges, and still operates with tenure.

In truth, all the PME institutions practice tenure without its chief benefit: a rigorous, searching review of the accomplishments, fitness, and promise of faculty members after a suitable probationary period such that only the best are retained on a permanent basis. A systematic study of civilian faculty at those PME schools that lack a formal policy of tenure would reveal that few if any faculty have been discharged in the last ten or even twenty years, and that the average length of service probably approaches or exceeds ten years.

The argument that tenure undermines the currency of faculty and their familiarity with contemporary issues and expertise lacks all credibility. Currency resides both in the rotating military faculty and in the permanent civilian faculty, who keep up in their field through study, reflection, research, and continuous interchange with students, alumnae, and friends in uniform. The publication and professional activity record of the civilian faculty, so often praised in the statements of the commandants/presidents to the Committee, demonstrates the currency and excellence of long-serving faculty.

Other conditions of service would also be required: lower teaching loads, nine-month appointments (or teaching for only part of the academic year), the right to copyright their work and enjoy royalties from writing and income from consulting even when done on government time, dedicated secretary/administrative/research support, and more. Faculty in research I universities exist not in hierarchical organizations with an effective command or administrative structure but in loose, entrepreneurial institutions that afford them the maximum freedom to teach and research at the limit of their capabilities. They are accountable to their disciplines, their colleagues, their students, and their own ambitions. They work hard for long hours but on their own schedules, and essentially without supervision. Staff and war colleges, and even the academies, cannot duplicate this culture, and for the foreseeable future, few of the top American academics would be attracted to the military for professional careers because their interests are not focused on national defense.

Dr. Snyder. 10.a. Please define academic freedom in general and discuss what its role should be in a PME setting.
Dr. Kohn. I have seen no better description of academic freedom than the 1940 statement by the American Association of University Professors, available at http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/policydocs/contents/1940statement.htm:

**Academic Freedom**

1. Teachers are entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of the results, subject to the adequate performance of their other academic duties; but research for pecuniary return should be based upon an understanding with the authorities of the institution.

2. Teachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject, but they should be careful not to introduce into their teaching controversial matter which has no relation to their subject. Limitations of academic freedom because of religious or other aims of the institution should be clearly stated in writing at the time of the appointment.

3. College and university teachers are citizens, members of a learned profession, and officers of an educational institution. When they speak or write as citizens, they should be free from institutional censorship or discipline, but their special position in the community imposes special obligations. As scholars and educational officers, they should remember that the public may judge their profession and their institution by their utterances. Hence they should at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions of others, and should make every effort to indicate that they are not speaking for the institution.

Academic freedom is indispensable to all education but particularly PME, where faculty and students must be encouraged to discuss (which implies questioning and criticizing as well as describing, analyzing, praising, etc.) policy, leadership (political as well as military), past and present decisions, and everything else connected to military and national security affairs. Without free inquiry, learning cannot occur. Any subject, methodology, or thought that is off limits immediately stymies the search for truth and understanding. War and military affairs are complex, ambiguous, uncertain, and difficult enough without erecting artificial boundaries on their study. We want our military leadership to understand them as much as possible. Furthermore, censorship in their education leads to censorship later in their internal functioning and in their interaction with the political leadership. The result would be disaster in war.

Commandants and presidents of PME schools, as ranking officers functioning in highly hierarchal institutions operating under authoritarian discipline, must affirm an unwavering commitment to academic freedom upon taking command, and periodically throughout their tenure—if nothing else to dispel the intimidation inherent in rank and military culture.

Without academic freedom, top quality scholars in fields related to national defense would avoid employment in PME schools simply because of the limitation on their teaching and research.

Dr. Snyder. 11. What should be the role of history in PME?

Dr. Kohn. History is the foundation stone for PME: the accumulated experience of war in all of its complexity and diversity, treasure on which to draw for virtually any application in the present and future. It has no specific “lessons” nor can it “prove” anything. What it can do is arm soldiers with the range of possibilities to approach almost any problem. History offers deeper and broader ways of looking at military affairs, alerts commanders to the unanticipated and the contingent inherent in command. History reminds its students that war is neither science nor engineering nor art, but is above all a human phenomenon with all of the uncertainties and unintended consequences involved in human activity. In his speeches over the course of his congressional career (most recently at the Naval War College on June 19, 2009), Chairman Skelton has made these points with some of the most telling anecdotes and examples.

History can be used for case studies of virtually anything in military affairs—even technology and technological change—a faculty member wishes to teach. But it is...
especially useful to teaching the formulation of strategy, planning, operations, leadership, and command.

History can be used to explain how the world came to be as it is, in whole or in part, for one country or a region, for almost any issue or topic of interest to military officers.

History can be used to inspire officers to excel, and to reassure them that no matter how desperate the situation or difficult the problem, their predecessors faced similar challenges and succeeded or prevailed.

American officers are largely deficient in their knowledge and appreciation of history, despite required courses at the undergraduate level, history's increasing use in PME over the last generation, and the continuing efforts of professional historians and advocates like Chairman Skelton. In this the military reflects the larger ignorance and neglect of history by the American public, which largely views history as a primary and secondary educational exercise, as entertainment, as “gee whiz” curiosities—all of this in spite of billions devoted to museums, historic sites, required courses, and continual use (and abuse) of history by the media and prominent people.

While it does not necessarily promise a remedy, my recommendation would be to require in pre-commissioning education at least one semester of American history, one of world or global history, and one of military history: American history to educate officers about their client and the development of its political system, economy, society, and culture; global history to put the United States into context, and to alert cadets/midshipmen to the diversity of the world and its contingent development; and military history as an introduction to the profession of arms, its evolution, the nature of war from the human experience of combat to the high councils of government, the origins and effects of war on states and societies, and a number of other themes and issues. The military history should not be service specific but should include land, sea, and air warfare in its political, social, economic, and cultural context. And all of the historical instruction should be foundational: that is, designed to teach students to think in time, understand historical method, and learn to enjoy the reading of history as a requirement of the profession of arms. Three one-semester courses are certainly as important a professional foundation as three one-semester courses in math, science, and engineering since war, to repeat, is a human experience.

At ISS, history should be used as case studies to understand the development of the service sponsor of the school, of modern war, of planning and operations, and of leadership and command at the operational level. Ethics and civil-military relations should be part of this instruction, as well as joint and interagency issues. The case studies should be chosen for their diversity and so that, strung together, they impart a coherent sense of how war developed in the last two-plus centuries. ISS should build on subjects raised in pre-commissioning education and provide the basis for more advanced study in SSS.

At SSS, historical study should concentrate at the strategic and national and international levels: on the development of military thought, the history of strategy and planning, and selected wars campaigns that illustrate fundamental problems of grand and military strategy, civil-military relations, joint and combined war fighting, the marshaling and integration of various forms of national power, and the challenge of command and leadership at the highest levels. Both historical case studies and small, coherent historical courses or fragments could be used.

At present, there appears to be considerable overlap and redundancy in ISS and SSS. Both mix the study of national policy, strategy, operations, leadership, and command with a focus more limited than appropriate on the operational and strategic levels of war. There does not appear to be much communication or consultation on the content of curricula between the staff and war colleges, even within a single service with the possible exception of the Naval War College, which has the benefit of a single, unified faculty teaching both levels.