[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE TENNESSEE VALLEY
AUTHORITY'S KINGSTON ASH SLIDE:
EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL CAUSES AND
UPDATES ON CLEANUP EFFORTS
=======================================================================
(111-54)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
WATER RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 28, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman
NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, JOHN L. MICA, Florida
Vice Chair DON YOUNG, Alaska
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
Columbia VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
JERROLD NADLER, New York FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
CORRINE BROWN, Florida JERRY MORAN, Kansas
BOB FILNER, California GARY G. MILLER, California
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi Carolina
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania SAM GRAVES, Missouri
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York Virginia
MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois CONNIE MACK, Florida
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia
JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio
TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
HEATH SHULER, North Carolina MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York VERN BUCHANAN, Florida
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky
JOHN J. HALL, New York ANH ``JOSEPH'' CAO, Louisiana
STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin AARON SCHOCK, Illinois
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee PETE OLSON, Texas
LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
PHIL HARE, Illinois
JOHN A. BOCCIERI, Ohio
MARK H. SCHAUER, Michigan
BETSY MARKEY, Colorado
PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York
THOMAS S. P. PERRIELLO, Virginia
DINA TITUS, Nevada
HARRY TEAGUE, New Mexico
VACANCY
(ii)
?
Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas, Chairwoman
THOMAS S. P. PERRIELLO, Virginia JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois DON YOUNG, Alaska
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri GARY G. MILLER, California
STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South
DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland Carolina
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
PHIL HARE, Illinois BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
DINA TITUS, Nevada MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
HARRY TEAGUE, New Mexico CONNIE MACK, Florida
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia
Columbia CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California ANH ``JOSEPH'' CAO, Louisiana
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii PETE OLSON, Texas
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizaon
JOHN J. HALL, New York
PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama
BOB FILNER, California
CORRINE BROWN, Florida
VACANCY
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
(Ex Officio)
(iii)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ vi
TESTIMONY
Almes, William S., Senior Engineer and Director of Geotechnical
Services, Marshall Miller & Associates, Incorporated........... 116
Kilgore, Tom, President and Chief Executive Officer, Tennessee
Valley Authority............................................... 116
Moore, Richard, Inspector General, Tennessee Valley Authority.... 116
Stanislaus, Mathy, Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste
and Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
accompanied by Stan Meiburg, Acting Regional Administrator,
Region 4....................................................... 116
Walton, William H., Vice President and Senior Principal Engineer,
AECOM.......................................................... 116
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Cao, Hon. Anh "Joseph", of Louisiana............................. 136
Carnahan, Hon. Russ, of Missouri................................. 138
Cohen, Hon, Steve, of Tennessee.................................. 139
Mitchell, Hon, Harry E., of Arizona.............................. 142
Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota............................ 143
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Almes, William S................................................. 146
Kilgore, Tom..................................................... 158
Moore, Richard................................................... 173
Stanislaus, Mathy................................................ 176
Walton, William H................................................ 187
SUBMISSION FOR THE RECORD
Almes, William S., Senior Engineer and Director of Geotechnical
Services, Marshall Miller & Associates, Incorporated,
supplementaty testimony........................................ 149
Johnson, Rep. Eddie Bernice, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Texas, "Inspection Report: Review of the Kingston
Fossil Plant Ash Spill Root Cause Study and Observations about
Ash Management"................................................ 3
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THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY'S KINGSTON ASH SLIDE: EVALUATION OF
POTENTIAL CAUSES AND UPDATES ON CLEANUP EFFORTS
---------- Tu
esday, July 28, 2009
House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Water Resources and
Environment,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:30 a.m., in
Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Eddie
Bernice Johnson [Chairwoman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Ms. Johnson. Good morning. The Committee will come to
order.
Today's hearing will begin by offering the Committee's
heartfelt condolences to the family of Larry LaCroix of
Burlington, Iowa. Mr. LaCroix was part of the Kingston ash
spill cleanup operation and was killed in a worksite accident
on July the 20th. The Subcommittee extends our thoughts and
prayers to his family.
This hearing is being conducted as one of several hearings
that meet the oversight requirements under clauses 2(n), (o),
and (p) of Rule XI of the Rules of the House of
Representatives.
As originally envisioned, today's hearing was to focus on a
technical review of the engineering analyses that evaluated the
root causes of the December 2008 Kingston coal ash spill.
However, since this hearing was originally planned, a number of
reports have come to light that demand we look at the collapse,
as well as the factors that led to it, with increased scrutiny.
I have done so and have come to the conclusion that the causes
as identified by TVA are, in fact, not causes at all. Rather,
they are symptoms of more endemic issues facing the Tennessee
Valley Authority.
As such, this hearing will look to answer three basic
questions: First, what geotechnical factors led to the spill;
second, what human or management factors contributed to the
collapse; and third, what actions will TVA take going forward.
Testimony from Mr. Bill Walton from the engineering firm
AECOM will help us answer the first question, based on the
AECOM Root Cause Analysis Report upon which his testimony is
formulated. We can learn the mechanisms of failure that led to
the collapse of the Kingston storage facility.
But that is only a part of the story. The second issue
regarding management culture will be addressed by TVA's
Inspector General Richard Moore and Bill Almes, an engineer
from the firm of Marshall Miller & Associates.
The third issue concerning what steps TVA is planing to
take going forward, will be illuminated through this hearing.
This morning's testimony comes in light of today's release
of a TVA Office of Inspector General report. It highlights a
string of problematic findings regarding TVA's management
culture prior to the spill as well as new steps TVA has made in
the months following.
Last week the TVA Board released an additional report
written by the law firm of McKenna Long & Aldrich that
identifies a management culture that, in combination with a
lack of accountability, standards, and controls, created
conditions that resulted in this spill. In my opinion, these
management failures were equally to blame for the Kingston
spill and are relevant to the larger debate.
I request unanimous consent that the McKenna report be
included in the record.
[The referenced information follows:]
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Ms. Johnson. The central thrust of this hearing, however,
involves the future. Can the Tennessee Valley Authority assure
Congress and the people of the Tennessee Valley region that its
other coal ash disposal facilities are sound? In other words,
can they ensure that they will not collapse, that they will not
leech toxins into the groundwater, and that TVA facilities will
not discharge carcinogenic and harmful substances into our
Nation's waters?
This second issue, informed by the TVA OIG and McKenna
reports, leads us to a subsequent line of questions that the
Subcommittee must get answers to, either in this meeting or in
other hearings in the months ahead. Can TVA provide the public
with credible risk assessments regarding the safety of its
facilities, including its coal ash impoundments?
Will the ongoing management and organizational changes
occurring within TVA produce results that address all of the
McKenna and TVA OIG report findings? Does TVA intend to become
a proactive environmental steward? If so, how? Does the
Congress need to take action to ensure that TVA facilities
cease to pose threats to public safety, human health, and the
environment?
Today's hearing is troubling. These recently released
reports indicate a management culture at TVA that is slow and
sometimes resistant to change. Testimony from our witnesses
today will help guide this Subcommittee to whether change must
be instilled upon this Federal entity. It will only be through
both acknowledgment of the issues that resulted in the Kingston
collapse and an active effort to address these issues that TVA
will be able to move forward.
Thank you. I now recognize our Ranking Member, Mr. Boozman.
Mr. Boozman. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Today this
Subcommittee continues its review of coal ash storage,
specifically the December 22nd, 2008 incident at the Tennessee
Valley Authority's power generating facility in Kingston,
Tennessee.
While public and private utilities have safely operated
approximately 600 coal ash sites for decades with only a few
documented failures, it is important to recognize that this
spill directly impacted more than 40 property owners. Homes
were rendered uninhabitable. Water mains and gas lines
ruptured. Nearby neighborhoods had to be evacuated. It is my
sincere hope that what occurred at the Kingston coal ash
disposal site was an isolated incident.
The witnesses today will discuss the causes of the accident
and report on some of their observations about the Kingston
site. In addition, these witnesses will address the agency
culture within the Tennessee Valley Authority and how this may
have contributed to the accident at Kingston.
As George Romney once said, ``Nothing is as vulnerable as
entrenched success.'' Traditionally, the Tennessee Valley
Authority has been a good steward of the environment. Most of
its employees, including some of the witnesses today, reside
within the Tennessee Valley and are directly impacted by the
actions taken by the agency.
Additional laws or Federal regulations would probably not
have prevented this terrible accident. New laws and regulations
will not replace homes, family treasures, heirlooms, or other
personal property lost as a result of the Kingston spill.
However, this is little comfort for those property owners
impacted by the Kingston spill who have sacrificed a great deal
and who in some cases have forfeited their homes and other
irreplaceable memories to this accident.
Moving forward, it is important for the Tennessee Valley
Authority, its Board of Directors, and its officers to review
the agency's existing ash management practices, recognize any
shortcomings, and subsequently make changes to ensure more
appropriate risk management at its facilities. Due to its
proximity to the Emory and Clinch Rivers, the Kingston site
carried an elevated risk. However, the Tennessee Valley
Authority needs to take aggressive steps at its other coal ash
storage facilities to identify and reduce risk to the public
and to the environment.
Compliance at all levels within the Tennessee Valley
Authority will help restore the level of trust that is expected
of one of the Nation's largest power providers. The benefits
that the Tennessee Valley Authority bring to the Nation are too
important to be threatened by poor structures and poor
management practices.
I am encouraged by some of the recent statements by TVA
management that indicate they get the message and intend to
emerge from this accident a better agency. I hope that we can
help them.
I thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this hearing. I look
forward to the testimony of the witnesses. With that, I yield
back.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Duncan for an opening
statement.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. I don't
have a formal written statement but I will say this: This spill
was not in my district but it is 40 miles, roughly, from
Knoxville.
I sent a member of my staff very soon after this happened
out there. A few days later I went out there and took a
helicopter tour and got a briefing. I have mentioned before
that I met with all kinds of people working for TVA and other
Federal, State, and local environmental agencies. I also met
with contractors. I have since met with others in regard to
this spill, participated in a meeting at Senator Alexander's
office with interested parties including some of the victims,
and have also participated in two previous hearings of this
Subcommittee. I think I have made my views pretty well known on
this.
TVA has been filled for years almost entirely with
environmentalists in the best sense of that word. I understand
that this retention pond and this system of storage was built
in 1985, long before any of the current leadership of TVA was
in there. All through those years the environmentalists at TVA,
the EPA, and other agencies thought that this was just fine.
Nobody really said anything about it.
Now, this is a terrible thing that has happened to TVA and
it is horrible for the people who have been severely damaged.
But I have always said that I think everything within reason
that could be done should be done. I think it has been done.
The progress that has been made has been amazing.
In our last hearing it was estimated that TVA's costs on
this would be about $1 billion. That may be a lowball estimate,
not counting the regulatory fines and lawsuits. Now, my feeling
is that if you disregard people who have a vested monetary
interest in this because they are connected to some
environmental group that wants to get contributions and make
money out of this, and if you put aside the contractors--and
all these are good people--but if you put aside the views of
the contractors who have a vested or monetary interest in this,
if you put aside all those people who are not tied into one of
those groups, I think 95 or 98 percent of the people who take a
look at this would say that TVA has done and is doing
everything humanly possible to get this area cleaned up.
The progress has been tremendous. I think in the end this
area is going to be cleaner than a lot of other areas around
the Nation. You can never satisfy the extremists or the kooks
in any situation. There will be some people that we will never
satisfy no matter if we spent the entire Federal budget on this
problem. But we have to be reasonable. We have to have a little
balance and common sense in this situation. I think that TVA
should be commended for all that they have done, are doing, and
will do in regard to this situation.
Thank you very much.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much.
Are there any other statements?
Mr. Cao. Yes, Madam Chairwoman. First of all, I would like
to thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for holding this important
hearing. I will keep my remarks brief but I would like to take
this opportunity to make some parallels between my community
and the community experience at Kingston in regards to the
spill.
In December of 2008, a retention wall at Kingston Fossil
Plant failed, releasing 5.4 million cubic yards of ash and 327
million gallons of water onto the land and into the nearby
rivers. The result of this failure was the release of five
million cubic yards of coal ash into the Emory River and 300
acres of land being filled with sludge, in some places up to
six feet deep. This spill caused extensive disruption to the
neighboring communities with evacuations and the loss of power
and gas, not to mention the houses that were destroyed in the
tidal wave of ash and water.
It is a miracle that no lives were lost at the time of the
spill. However, we do recognize the one life that was lost
during the cleanup earlier this month.
As the Representative of the second Congressional district,
I have great empathy for the communities that were directly
affected by this unexpected and unprecedented event. I am also
well aware of the effect failures in protective structures can
have on surrounding communities.
The damage to Orleans and Jefferson Parishes four years ago
wasn't because Hurricane Katrina made a direct hit on New
Orleans. Instead, it was because the strength of the storm
surge caused catastrophic failures in levees and flood walls
throughout the city, especially in New Orleans East and the
Lakeview area on the border with Navarre. The damage from these
breeches included flooding in 80 percent of the city, damage to
80 percent of the buildings, and damage to 40 percent of our
housing stock. Because of these failures, the city remained
under water for days and in some places weeks. But, like the
Kingston spill, the environmental hazards were great. We all
remember the images of the waters through which my constituents
had to wade to get food and water. These were commonly referred
to as a toxic soup because they were filled with sewage,
gasoline, and oil, to say nothing of bacteria and disease.
Like you, Madam Chairwoman, in the immediate aftermath of
the catastrophic failures that occurred as a result of
Hurricane Katrina, I sought accountability and assurances from
the Federal Government, especially the Army Corps of Engineers,
that repairs would be made to ensure such catastrophic failures
never happen again.
Through my work on this Committee and Subcommittee, I am
closely overseeing the work of the Army Corps to ensure they
are rebuilding our infrastructure to its former strength and
beyond. One of my priorities is ensuring the complete
rebuilding of the 17th Street and London Avenue Canals. I have
cosponsored legislation which states this. I continue to work
with the Army Corps and my delegation to ensure this protection
is achieved for my constituents. Just like the community
affected by the Kingston spill, my district cannot afford
another disaster.
Again, Madam Chair, thank you for holding this important
hearing. I look forward to working with you as you continue
your oversight of this important matter. Thank you very much.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much.
Testifying first is EPA's Assistant Administrator for Solid
Waste and Emergency Response, Mr. Mathy Stanislaus.
Accompanying Mr. Stanislaus is the Acting Regional
Administrator for EPA's Region 4, Mr. Stan Meiburg. Mr. Meiburg
will be available for questions. Our second witness is TVA's
President and CEO, Mr. Tom Kilgore. Following him is Mr.
William Walton, Vice President and Senior Engineer with AECOM.
Our fourth witness is the TVA Inspector General, Mr.
Richard Moore. Our final witness this morning, Mr. William
Almes, is a Senior Engineer and Director of Geotechnical
Services with Marshall Miller & Associates.
Your full statements will be placed in the record. We ask
that you try to limit your testimony to about five minutes as a
courtesy to the other witnesses.
I now recognize Mr. Stanislaus.
TESTIMONY OF MATHY STANISLAUS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE
OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY STAN MEIBURG, ACTING REGIONAL
ADMINISTRATOR, REGION 4; TOM KILGORE, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY; WILLIAM H.
WALTON, VICE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR PRINCIPAL ENGINEER, AECOM;
RICHARD MOORE, INSPECTOR GENERAL, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY;
AND WILLIAM S. ALMES, SENIOR ENGINEER AND DIRECTOR OF
GEOTECHNICAL SERVICES, MARSHALL MILLER & ASSOCIATES,
INCORPORATED
Mr. Stanislaus. Madam Chairwoman and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to provide
testimony on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's role in
the response and cleanup of the release of coal ash from the
Tennessee Valley Authority Kingston plant.
Appearing with me today is Mr. Stan Meiburg, Acting
Regional Administrator for EPA Region 4. Mr. Meiburg will be
able to answer any questions you may have regarding Region 4's
efforts related to the Kingston spill response.
I will summarize my testimony but I ask that my entire
statement be submitted for the hearing record.
As you know, Madam Chairwoman, TVA's Kingston facility
suffered a catastrophic failure, releasing an estimated 5.4
million cubic yards of coal ash into the Emory and Clinch
Rivers and surrounding areas. Shortly after learning of the
release, EPA deployed an on-scene coordinator to the site. EPA
joined TVA, the Tennessee Department of Environment and
Conservation, and other State and local agencies in a
coordinated response. EPA served as the lead Federal agency
throughout the emergency phase of the response and provided
oversight and technical advice to TVA.
On January 12th of 2009, the Tennessee Department of
Environment and Conservation issued an order to TVA to develop
a corrective action plan to address the spill and to conduct a
root cause analysis to determine the cause of the dike failure.
Over time, the lead Federal agency designation transitioned to
TVA as cleanup efforts moved into the recovery phase.
Subsequently, on May 11, 2009, EPA entered into an
administrative order and agreement on consent, AOC, with TVA
pursuant to EPA's authority under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, CERCLA,
under which TVA will continue to perform the response action
with EPA oversight. The EPA AOC with TVA does not replace the
Tennessee Department of Environment's order, which remains in
effect. EPA's working relationship with the State of Tennessee
has been exceptional and we will continue that partnership.
Under the AOC, response actions will take place through
time critical and non-time critical removal actions. The AOC
will help ensure that the cleanup is comprehensive, fully
transparent to the local community and public, and meets all
Federal and State environmental standards. A principal
objective of the time critical phase of the removal is to
recover the major portion of coal ash in the Emory River to
help minimize the potential for flooding and downstream
migration of the coal ash.
Under the Tennessee Department of Environment's order and
the EPA AOC, TVA was required to perform a detailed analysis of
off-site disposal options for coal ash removed from the Emory
River. That effort resulted in the selection of the Arrowhead
Landfill in Perry County, Alabama as the best off-site facility
to receive the coal ash generated from the time critical
removal action. The landfill is fully lined and meets all
technical requirements specified by State and Federal
regulations.
Another important factor in the selection was the
preference for rail transportation. Rail transportation greatly
reduced the potential for vehicle accidents, avoids local
traffic burdens, and is approximately three times more fuel
efficient than truck transportation. After a thorough review,
EPA approved the selection of the Arrowhead Landfill.
As stated in previous testimony provided to the
Subcommittee, the failure of the ash impoundment at TVA's
Kingston plant highlighted the issue of impoundment stability.
EPA is currently conducting an assessment of impoundments and
other management units which contain wet handled coal
combustion residuals. We are finalizing our review of the
responses to the CERCLA 104(e) letters that were sent to
facilities. Overall, the assessment responses are from more
than 200 facilities which have identified more than 500
management units. We expect to post that information on the EPA
website within the next six to eight weeks.
In the meantime, EPA staff and contractors are in the field
conducting on-site visits and inspections of those management
units reported as having a high or significantly high hazard
potential while also reviewing any current dam safety reports
available from States or the facilities. Our goal is to
complete all of the assessments for dams with high and
significant hazard potential ratings this year.
As to TVA's root cause analysis of the Kingston facility
failure, EPA staff have reviewed the currently released
analysis report which identifies some of the factors that could
have contributed to the Kingston facility structural failure.
EPA contractors are looking for structural stability factors in
our ongoing impoundment and management unit assessment efforts.
Some of the factors being looked for include the size, age, and
location of the structures; size of dam or dike erosion;
settlement, cracks, or other signs of deterioration; seepage or
leakage; and site soil, groundwater, and surface water
characteristics.
In addition, EPA is evaluating coal ash residual disposal
practices at coal fired power plants to determine if these
facilities are in compliance with existing Federal
environmental laws. We will take enforcement action where
appropriate to address serious violations.
Madam Chairwoman, that concludes my prepared remarks.
Either I or Stan Meiburg will be pleased to answer any
questions that you or the Subcommittee Members may have. Thank
you.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much.
We will now hear from Mr. Kilgore.
Mr. Kilgore. Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Boozman, and
Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to
update you on TVA's progress in the recovery of the Kingston
Fossil Plant spill. We appreciate the Committee's oversight.
Madam Chairwoman, we appreciate your visit to the site last
June.
We are working hard to rebuild the pubic trust. We know
that that is going to be a difficult task but we are working to
make sure that nothing like this happens again.
When the event happened, I knew we had to do many things. I
am here today to talk about what we did on root cause and to
ensure that our other facilities were safe. I knew we needed
technical answers about why Kingston happened, but even more
urgently we needed to find out about our other sites.
To get those answers, we commissioned two internationally
recognized and respected engineering firms. AECOM was brought
in to conduct the root cause analysis of Kingston and the spill
itself. Stantec, another firm, was commissioned to evaluate the
structural integrity of all of TVA's other ash ponds. We used
two different firms because of the urgency of the situation and
the size and the scope before each firm.
As you will hear shortly from Mr. Walton, AECOM's extensive
forensic investigation determined that four long-evolving
conditions, some existing since the 1950s, caused the event. I
will also address the management and system factors that
contributed to that. We have carefully studied AECOM's report
and accept Mr. Walton's thorough and well documented
assessment.
As AECOM was conducting its work at Kingston, Stantec was
busy at TVA's other sites with their technical evaluation.
Starting in January, Stantec began to inspect, test, and make
recommendations on our other facilities. We have worked
aggressively over the last six months to implement their
recommended changes.
I also wanted us to take a self-critical approach in
looking at the hazard classifications of the storage
impoundments. We were not among those 44 that were originally
listed. I recognize that and we moved to correct that. Although
we don't have any indication of these structures being in
danger of failing, we have reclassified impoundments at four of
our sites as having high hazard potential. We are prioritizing
our efforts at those sites.
In order to fully understand what happened at Kingston, we
needed also an analysis of TVA's organization and culture. The
TVA Board of Directors commissioned an independent
investigation to examine and identify possible management and
organizational factors that may have contributed to the
Kingston spill. That work began in January. The investigation
was led by the international law firm of McKenna Long &
Aldrich.
The MLA investigation that was presented to the Board by
MLA last week and released publicly did identify shortcomings
and missed opportunities in our organizational effectiveness
and our accountability. At the Board's direction, we are
already moving quickly to remedy these shortcomings. I have
initiated an agency-wide organizational effectiveness plan
focused on culture change and improving our systems, standards,
controls, and accountability.
I am pleased that MLA report recognized that we are making
some significant remedial progress to prevent any future pond
spills. But I also want to tell you that I heard the word of
caution that a comprehensive directive needed to provide
assurance that best practices would be sustained across TVA,
owned by senior management, and under the Board's oversight.
Last week I described the results of the MLA investigation
to our employees as tough medicine. It is hard to take, but
tough medicine will make us better.
Today we have the benefit of the report done by the Office
of Inspector General. Mr. Moore will testify on that shortly.
All four reports from AECOM, Stantec, MLA, and the
Inspector General will help us address both the technical and
cultural issues that contributed to the Kingston spill.
Importantly, these reports will be our road map going forward
both to strengthen the integrity of our facilities and to forge
a culture of accountability at TVA. Madam Chair, my written
testimony to submit to the Committee provides more details.
While we have much more to do, with the Chair's permission
I would like to give you some idea of the progress we are
making. We have a long way to go but I would like to show some
photographs.
This is the picture of the ash spill as it looks today.
This is what it looked like shortly after the event. You can
see the river is filled. We estimate that about three million
cubic yards were beyond what we called Dike 2. As we have
dredges in, we now have removed about a half a million cubic
yards of that material and are continuing to work.
This is what the railroad and the road looked like the day
after the event. We have that restored and that road is open to
the public.
One of the sloughs nearby, this is a minor slough that we
call Church Slough. You can see that it was filled with ash.
This is an example of what we have to do for the rest of the
site.
As I said, we have a lot of work to do. We are not finished
by a long shot. We look forward to continuing to work with the
Committee as we move forward.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much, Mr. Kilgore.
We will hear from Mr. William Walton now.
Mr. Walton. Good morning, Madam Chairwoman and
distinguished Members of the Committee. I appreciate the
opportunity to share with you the results of our five month
investigation of the root causes of the Kingston failure.
On the morning of December 22nd, 2008, a massive flow side
occurred. Within one hour it inundated the Watts Bar Reservoir,
several sloughs, and spilled over onto private properties.
There were no witnesses to the failure because it was
nighttime. No one knew where it started or how it happened. Our
assignment was to answer these questions and to determine the
geotechnical causes of failure.
We have conducted a thorough and comprehensive forensic
investigation and root cause analysis presented in ten volumes
with more than 5,400 pages. This RCA process involved frequent
input from TDEC; the TVA OIG and their consultants; the U.S.
EPA; the Bureau of Reclamation; the insurer's geotechnical
engineer; and the independent peer reviewer of Dr. Gonzalo
Castro, an elected member of the National Academy of
Engineering. We did this to ensure that they would all be fully
informed of our discoveries and progress as analyses evolved.
We met on eight separate occasions to share information and to
refine the analysis methodologies.
Our written testimony offers lessons learned that can be
applied to other wet ash disposal facilities. I will show you
several slides from the testimony that I have submitted that
illustrate the failure sequence and the controlling factors.
Due to the time allotment, I will go through these slides
briskly. However, I invite your questions on any information
that we have shared with you.
This is a photograph from April of 2008 showing the
confinement, the dredge cells, and the ash collection pond.
Within six months, this tragic and catastrophic failure
occurred, discharging more than two thirds of the contents
above the ash collection pond.
I will show you our opinion on the causation. We are
looking from northwest to southeast. We believe failure began
in the northwest corner, originating as a deep seated failure
internal to the exterior confinement. Like a pie coming out of
a pie plate, this material heaved out within a very short time
frame and surcharged the perimeter containment system, causing
a overload on the outboard containment. That caused that
outboard containment to breach, making the liquid contents
liquify and flow out. From a 3H:1V slope this flowed out to an
angle of repose less than one half degree.
I will show you a few historic photographs to see the
progression of this site. In 1949, this was a lake making up
the Watts Bar Reservoir created in 1942. The dotted red line
indicates the outside containment system hopping from island to
island. Note that for the first three or four years of
operation, from 1954 to 1958, the ash was released directly to
the waters of the Watts Bar Reservoir. This system was firing
power to Oak Ridge as a national defense facility.
By 1958, the containment pond was established. Here again I
will show you in green the distance that ash from the plant
would have to travel for waters to be released back to the
reservoir. It was over 5,200 feet, a mile. This ash would
collect from the coarsest grains on the south to the most fine
grains on the north. As we progress with time, this eventual
ash pond was eventually filled in and the material was stacked.
In 1984, in an effort to provide more material within the
confines of this containment system, a dredge cell super
elevated above the ash pond was created to store more material
as the plant operated.
By 1996, engineering plans were done to expand the facility
vertically.
By 2005, this photograph shows you the three cell system
that was collecting ash was now down to two. The footprint of
the disposal was getting smaller but the structure was getting
higher. Notice in red is the 2003 slide event where seepage in
piping occurred.
We looked at 12 failure modes at this particular site
identified in our work scope in late December and early
January. We then evolved to four controlling factors. It is too
hard to read all of these but these are a part of the testimony
that are included in the slides.
The point of fact is that this structure, on its way to be
built to the year 2014, did not make it to its ultimate height.
The red line demarks its failure.
The underneath foundation is shown to be a material of the
finest grains that had traveled the furthest early on in the
progression of this particular disposal facility. It is a
slime, a mining term meaning a material that travels the
farthest, that drops out at the last, being the finest, loosest
materials accumulating on the bottom. Those slimes were found
in the upper portion, the northernmost portion, at the furthest
distance from its deposition.
Again, it was an issue of finding these with an extensive
exploration program. We were able to see the slide plane and
identify these slimes through undisturbed sampling. We were
able to analyze the stability of those sections that failed on
the north as well as those sections that did not fail to the
east or were consequential to failure on the west.
I will take you very quickly through the progression of
failure in cross section as you would look west. The early
portion would fail like the pie I explained. That material
would surcharge over the initial containment dike, causing it
to be overstressed and breached. Notice the issue on the right
side. The flood wave from this event was a 47 foot flood wave
above the operating pool, clearly a very dramatic failure in a
very short period of time, resulting in the release of the
materials.
This leads us to the conclusion of four controlling factors
or failure modes that led to this: The load was impacted by the
ever increasing height and the constant force of ash. The
containment system was discontinuous and separated. That laid
on a foundation, and the foundation serves as the footing for
the building or home or whatever. The foundation is important.
If those three elements are weak and you contain a loose, wet,
liquefiable ash and lose your containment, it then can be
released in a very dramatic manner, 5.4 million yards.
Thank you very much.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much.
Mr. Richard Moore.
Mr. Moore. Good morning, Madam Chairwoman Johnson, Ranking
Member Boozman, and Members of the Subcommittee.
I am TVA's Inspector General, having been appointed to this
position by the President in May of 2003. Prior to becoming the
first Inspector General appointed by a President at TVA, I was
a Federal prosecutor in the southern district of Alabama for
approximately 18 years.
It is a pleasure to be able to testify here today about the
Office of Inspector General's review of the coal ash spill at
TVA's Kingston Fossil Plant in December of 2008. I believe you
have a copy of our report which, as you mentioned, is becoming
public today.
Mr. Moore. The Kingston spill has brought intense scrutiny
upon TVA, as is well known, and with it a call for more
oversight of the agency. The conditions at TVA that led to the
disaster of December 22nd, 2008 have existed for decades. It is
unfortunate that it has taken this kind of incident to prompt
changes.
The TVA culture at fossil plants relegated ash to the
status of garbage at a landfill rather than treating it as a
potential hazard to the public and to the environment. We
believe this culture resulted in management failures which
contributed to the Kingston spill.
Our report points out a number of issues that I would
summarize into basically three categories. First are the
warnings and red flags. Those warnings and red flags were
raised by outside consultants and internal staff but were
simply not addressed. Number two, there was an inadequate
system of management controls as evidenced by fragmented
organizational structures, a lack of policies and procedures,
and inadequate training for dike inspectors. Number three,
there were poor management practices that included a lack of
maintenance of dikes and overall poor communication between
organizations. Our report provides a more detailed discussion
of each of these items.
Madam Chairwoman, you have said that the Kingston spill was
caused by regulatory neglect, a lack of Government oversight,
and irresponsible coal ash practices. Our report that we make
public today supports your statement.
TVA management knew, for example, that consultants had been
hired by them and had urged them to perform a much needed
analysis and to take specific corrective actions. TVA
management knew that they had failed to follow the engineers'
recommendations and that they had failed to perform the
analysis or take the corrective actions. TVA's management also
knew that it had a history of poor maintenance of its ash ponds
and that it had experienced seeps or breeches in the past.
Finally, TVA management knew that there were no policies or
procedures for the management of coal ash. Documents supporting
what I have just said are a matter of public record, have been
made available by TVA through litigation. These facts are
widely known.
The TVA Board appears to clearly understand the gravity of
the situation. Recently they have taken bold steps to address
the problems that we have identified in our report. Also,
although TVA management was slow to publicly discuss management
failures, as we point out in our report, I am pleased to say
that they have made great strides in starting a long process to
not only rebuild the ash management program but to attempt to
rebuild the trust and respect of Congress, the American people,
and TVA's many stakeholders.
This will not happen without continued oversight by this
Subcommittee and other oversight authorities including that of
the Office of Inspector General. We are committed to devoting
resources to monitor TVA's new commitment to transparency and
accountability. We welcome your support in that endeavor.
In addition to the recommendations in our report, the
Office of Inspector General recommends that Congress hold
regular oversight hearings to determine number one, whether
TVA's coal ash facilities have either been closed properly or
modified to an appropriate safety level; number two, whether
TVA's culture has in fact been changed to become more
transparent and more accountable; and finally, whether TVA has
fulfilled its responsibilities to the citizens of Roane County
to clean up their community and to make them whole.
Madam Chairwoman, this concludes my opening remarks. I look
forward to answering any questions that you or the Committee
may have.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you so very much.
Mr. William Almes.
Mr. Almes. Good morning. Madam Chairwoman Johnson, Ranking
Member Boozman, and Members of the Subcommittee, my name is
William Scott Almes. I am the Director of Geotechnical
Engineering for Marshall Miller & Associates. I am a licensed
professional engineer with a Bachelor of Science and a Master
of Science in civil and geotechnical engineering. I have worked
in the field as a consulting engineer for nearly 20 years.
I was the lead project manager on a peer review of the
study commissioned by TVA to determine the root cause of the
December 22nd, 2008 ash spill at TVA's Kingston Fossil Plant. I
appreciate this opportunity to testify before you regarding the
results of that peer review and other observations about ash
management practices at TVA. We prepared this work for the TVA
Office of Inspector General. The details of it are incorporated
into their report that is being made public today.
I will now summarize the results of our work focusing on
three important topics. First is Marshall Miller's conclusions
regarding the root cause analysis. Second is our general
conclusions and observations of ash management practices. Third
is our recommendations for moving forward.
Our first conclusion regarding the root cause analysis is
that, in Marshall Miller's opinion, the four probable root
causes identified by AECOM are technically plausible,
reasonably supported by the data, and that all four contributed
significantly to the spill. However, Marshall Miller believes
that the AECOM root cause analysis focuses disproportionately
on the significance of this thin, discontinuous soft foundation
layer, which has been called a slimes layer or sensitive silt
layer, as one of the most probable root causes.
The significance of the ``fill geometry'' and the ``loose
wet ash'', in other words, hydraulically placed or sluiced ash,
indicate these factors also as probable root causes of equal or
greater significance to the soft foundation soils factor. They
should be equally emphasized. In Marshall Miller's opinion, the
failure was not strictly associated with the thin, weak,
sensitive silt and slimes foundation layer and more associated
with the ash dike geometry and the relatively low strength of
this sluiced loose wet ash and impounded material.
Lastly, this has significant implications for TVA and the
power industry. Other similarly constructed TVA impoundments
with or without the slimes layer could be at risk of failure
and should also be investigated.
I will now focus on our general conclusions and
observations concerning ash management. As early as 1985,
intrinsic problems related to the stability of Dike C, which is
the original dike, were known by TVA. An internal memorandum
included in our report indicated that the calculated factor of
safety for stability was less than the minimum accepted value
of 1.5. Close monitoring was recommended at that time to detect
any potential signs of failure in lieu of changing TVA policies
and procedures that would require that the ash pond be designed
to a higher dam safety standard. No specific action by TVA
appears to have been taken to improve the stability of the
earthen Dike C embankment.
In Marshall Miller's opinion, if TVA had included its ash
ponds in a dam safety program, as discussed in the December
1988 memorandum when TVA decided against this policy, the
probability of identifying some or all of the conditions that
led to the failure would have increased significantly.
The construction of successive upstream stages to an
elevation of 820 feet, which is the approximate failure
elevation, above the original containment dike may have
contributed to an additional decrease in the factor of safety
of the containment dike system. In essence, at the time of
failure, this increase in constructed height was approximately
70 feet higher than the original crest elevation of Dike C.
The design of the Kingston coal ash dredge cells should
have included a thorough engineering evaluation of all
potential failure modes. Our recommendations for moving forward
is that, since in our opinion, the Kingston ash pond failure
was not strictly associated with the thin, weak sensitive silt
and slimes foundation layer and more associated with the ash
dike or fill geometry and the relatively low strength of the
sluiced wet ash, other similarly constructed ash impoundments
could be at risk of failure and should be properly
investigated.
TVA and the power generation industry as a whole should
strongly consider all the factors evaluated by AECOM as
probable root causes of the Kingston failure when assessing the
condition and structural integrity of wet ash disposal
facilities. It is not prudent to presume that, if slimes
observed in the failed section at Kingston do not exist at any
other sites, there is adequate stability of these structures.
On the contrary, the information developed from the extensive
studies conducted by Stantec and AECOM indicates that there is
reasonable risk of other dike failures if changes are not made
in the design, construction, oversight, and operation of these
facilities.
Lastly, sound engineering practice is to design such
facilities with features that provide a reasonable degree of
redundancy or a second line of defense in the event that one or
more of these systems become inoperable. It is important that
this design philosophy be applied to all of TVA's ash disposal
facilities.
This concludes my statement. I look forward to answering
any questions you may have. Thank you very much.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much.
We will begin the first round of questions now.
Mr. Kilgore, first of all, thank you for the pictures of
the cleanup of Church Slough. I am really delighted and pleased
at what this remediation of the Kingston spill can look like
once it is all clean.
As you noted in your testimony, I have traveled to Kingston
and have seen the spill firsthand. Not 500 feet from the area
shown us in the photographs is another contaminated area known
as the embayment. Can we get a commitment from you today that
you will restore that greater area to the same standards and
the same conditions as you demonstrated is possible in the
Church Slough?
Mr. Kilgore. Yes, ma'am. We have made that commitment that
we will clean up the river first, as the EPA has testified.
Then we will move to the embayment. Then we have to move to the
failed cell itself and fix that. So we have really three areas.
We are committed to fix all three of those areas.
Ms. Johnson. Now, you have seen this. I don't know how long
it took for the buildup to come but have you determined how
often you might need to move this out to keep it from
accumulating to that level again?
Mr. Kilgore. How often we might need to move this ash?
Ms. Johnson. Yes.
Mr. Kilgore. Yes, ma'am. We are designing a dry collection
system there. That ash will have to be stored off-site. We
intend to dry all of those ponds out so that we do not have wet
storage on-site. As we move forward with that, as we design and
implement that dry collection system, I anticipate all the ash
will be transported off-site.
Ms. Johnson. I understand you are moving it now to Alabama?
Mr. Kilgore. We are.
Ms. Johnson. Is that going to be a permanent place that you
may be able to take it?
Mr. Kilgore. No, ma'am. I wouldn't say that. We solicited
bids from all locations that had the proper permits. We got
several responses to that. We selected the site we did because,
after we tentatively looked at that, I sent two of my senior
executives down to look at it and talk to the community. They
made sure that they were ready to receive it, that the pond and
the permit looked in order, and all of that. Then we asked EPA
for approval to ship that. We have committed to ship about
three million tons out of the existing 5.4 million that we need
to recover. We will be continuing to look at other sites for
shipment.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much.
Mr. Stanislaus, in your testimony you state that EPA
continues to evaluate coal ash disposal practices at coal-fired
power plants to determine if these facilities are in compliance
with existing environmental laws. Would you provide us a
summary of the findings so far? Please also speak to compliance
with Clean Water Act discharge permits.
Mr. Stanislaus. We are in the midst of doing the
assessment. We expect to complete the assessment of the high
hazards and significant hazards by the end of this year. When
we complete that we will certainly provide that to the
Committee and yourself.
Ms. Johnson. Now, let me just ask this one last question to
you. In your view, from both storage and water quality
perspectives, should coal-fired power plants be using wet ash
disposal methods or dry?
Mr. Stanislaus. Clearly, the use of wet ash is a
significant risk that we are looking at in terms of our rule
making. It has been identified as a risk of impact to
groundwater and water quality. That is something that we are
taking a hard look at in terms of our rule making, which we
will be completing by the end of this year.
Ms. Johnson. Do you plan to modify your oversight with TVA
in view of the Inspector General's testimony?
Mr. Stanislaus. TDEC, the Tennessee Department of
Environment and Conservation, has a local lead of that. We are
working with TDEC in terms of its oversight. We are in the
field in terms of overseeing the removal of the coal ash from
the river. We will be there throughout the removal of the coal
ash.
Ms. Johnson. Yes, but I mean in general. I also would like
to say, too, that until EPA really got involved, according to
the people in the area, they didn't see much change. What kind
of oversight will be performed by those persons that have that
responsibility?
Mr. Stanislaus. EPA is on the site every day overseeing the
work.
Ms. Johnson. They are now?
Mr. Stanislaus. Yes, they are.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much.
Mr. Boozman. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Moore, you
mentioned that you agreed with the statement about poor
oversight and lack of regulation as a contributor. I guess my
question is poor oversight from whom? Is it the State or EPA?
Your Office plays a role in this.
Mr. Moore. Certainly, as you are aware, the Kingston
facility was licensed or permitted as a landfill. There is a
question about how adequate that regulation was. There is also
a question, and I believe Mr. Walton FE
Mr. Boozman. In regard to that regulation, whose fault is
that?
Mr. Moore. I don't necessarily want to pin fault, but I
would say FE
Mr. Boozman. But that is your job.
Mr. Moore. Well, TDEC certainly was the regulating
authority. The question would be whether there should be other
regulators on these types of facilities. Certainly if they were
regulated as dam structures, as I believe both Mr. Walton and
Mr. Almes would recommend, there would have been more strenuous
examination. If that had been done in this case, I am reliably
told by Mr. Almes from Marshall Miller that it is possible that
the Kingston spill would not have occurred.
Mr. Boozman. So EPA was doing their job?
Mr. Moore. Well, I don't know what EPA's jurisdiction would
have been over a landfill at the time.
Mr. Boozman. You mention that lack of regulation. Was it
lack of regulation or just failure to enforce the current
regulation? I think that is important. I don't know. That is
why we are asking these questions.
Mr. Moore. My observations, sir, would be that even strict
regulation of a landfill, when you have the combined
geotechnical forces that were at work here, would not have been
sufficient.
Mr. Boozman. Very good. Mr. Kilgore, what steps is TVA
taking to ensure that this doesn't happen at the other coal ash
storage facilities? In particular, I know TVA utilizes wet ash
storage at other sites, some of which are no longer in
operation. While TVA is proposing to close the five operational
wet coal ash disposal sites, what is TVA proposing to do with
those sites that are no longer in operation?
Mr. Kilgore. We have one of those sites, sir, at the Watts
Bar Fossil Plant. We have contained it. The other five sites
that are wet storage, besides Kingston, we are moving forward
with a plan to take all of those to dry storage. So we are
going that way.
What we have done in the last six months is Stantec's
identification. They walked down all the facilities and they
identified initial issues that we needed to correct. We have
hauled about 82,000 tons of rock to shore up various places. We
have cleaned out vegetation so that the inspectors can see
better. But I think the most important thing is that we have
gotten a lot more intrusive. In other words, instead of doing
visual investigations, we have drilled holes. Stantec has gone
out there much like AECOM did on the failed facility and
drilled into these dams to ascertain what is underground so
that they know what is underground. That gives us some more
comfort but we will not be comforted until we know exactly what
is down there and we take all the remedial actions. We have
tried to unstop all the drains to make sure the drains are
properly operating. We have tried to backfill, as I said, with
stone. We put piezometers down, about 250 piezometers in these
ten other sites, so that we can see movement and see water.
Mr. Boozman. Very good. I have one final question, Mr.
Walton, real quick. When you all were contacted to look into
this and figure out what was going on, the root cause, were you
just asked to do the technical aspects of it or did you get
into the corporate culture and things like that? Were you asked
to do both?
Mr. Walton. No. Our role was the technical review of the
root cause for failure, the cause location and explaining the
failure mechanism.
Mr. Boozman. Okay. Thank you all very much. Thank you,
Madam Chair.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much. Mr. Griffith.
Mr. Griffith. Thank you, Madam Chair. The EPA initiated a
report in 2002 that has just been released in 2009 that
demonstrates the carcinogenic effect of coal ash combustion
material from coal. Are you familiar with that report release
in 2009?
Mr. Stanislaus. I am not specifically familiar with it.
Mr. Griffith. Let me tell you a little bit about it. In
1775, a year before 1776, Dr. Percival Pott described coal
combustion causing cancer in chimney sweeps. We have known for
that many years that these were carcinogenic agents that we
were producing. We have noted that all through the subsequent
years. In 2009, a report was issued that had been ongoing since
2002 within your agency. It demonstrated that the increased
risk of cancer around these coal ash deposits was significant.
My question is this: Do you believe that, had you told Mr.
Kilgore about those findings, there would have been a
heightened responsibility on the part of TVA? This dump in
particular was unlined and leaking into the goundwater. As far
as EPA is concerned will this spill have far reaching
consequences? The second part of that question is how are you
going to know when you have got that site cleaned up, if a
great majority of it has already gone downriver?
Mr. Stanislaus. With respect to your first question,
clearly this spill is a catastrophic event that should not have
occurred. Clearly the constituents in coal ash are something
that we are taking a look at in terms of regulation. We will be
issuing that regulation later this year. So we are taking this
seriously, the consequence of the constituents in that.
With respect to knowing when we are done, that is frankly
our job. We have historically remediated river sites. We will
ensure that everything is removed from the river.
I don't know if Mr. Meiburg wants to add to that.
Mr. Meiburg. I would only add to that, Congressman, that
fortunately, or unfortunately depending upon your point of
view, most of the material actually stayed in some vicinity of
the site. Our highest priority on the cleanup has been to get
the material out of the main stem of the Emory River to make
sure that more doesn't go downstream, especially during the
spring flood period. That is why we have been pushing to
accelerate the removal of the material from the river, so that
we could try to get most of it out of the main stem before next
spring. We have been making accelerated progress on that with
TVA over the last couple of months. We expect to continue that.
Mr. Griffith. Thank you. This issue really is not, I am
changing gears a little bit, this issue is really not about
cleanup. Mr. Almes, I think you were probably not surprised at
the spill after being an engineer and inspecting. I don't think
anyone is faulting anyone on the cleanup. What we are concerned
with is the multitude of areas in the country that are very
similar to Kingston. I know that you have had that experience
in Iowa. We have had that experience in Pennsylvania.
We do know that this coal ash is as carcinogenic as nuclear
waste. We know that arsenic, selenium and boron are chemicals
that we are finding in the waste. And we know that they are now
present in the drinking water in many communities. How can we
reassure our constituents? Since the Tennessee River runs
through my district, how can we reassure my constituents that
they are safe, that we are keeping them safe?
Mr. Stanislaus. I presume that is directed at me.
Mr. Griffith. Well, anybody can chime in on that one if you
have got a good answer.
Mr. Stanislaus. As Administrator Jackson has committed, we
are going around the Country and doing an assessment of all
facilities with high and significantly high hazard ratings.
That will be done by the end of this year. We will also be
taking a look at all of the facilities to assess where there is
any risk of failure and prevent that. Also, if there are any
violations, we plan to do enforcement actions. Those are the
short term actions. We are simultaneously looking at the risk
and the need to develop some rules to prevent any impact to
groundwater or surface water.
Mr. Griffith. This is just for Mr. Kilgore. My question is
whether we should rely on State agencies? Should we punt the
responsibility to a State agency that apparently has failed us
in this area as far as inspections?
In your organization, and I know you are new to the job,
essentially, and inherited a great deal of this, are heads
rolling? Are you getting anybody's attention there? TVA is like
turning around the Queen Mary. This will take a while. What can
we look forward to there?
Mr. Kilgore. Well, we have to change. If that means heads
have to roll or people have to leave, so be it. You would find,
if you go back from when I arrived until now, that about two
thirds of the senior management has changed. About 90 percent
of the plant managers have recently been rotated or, in some
cases, new plant managers have been installed so that we have
new eyes on this problem.
If I have learned one lesson about this, it is to be
intrusive and to be self-critical about things we don't know
about. That means that occasionally we need fresh eyes on the
subject and that we don't allow these waivers, if you will,
from looking at things.
I will be honest, the memorandum that was mentioned earlier
in 1985 said that the safety factor was not what it should be.
But further down it said that the remedy is a daily inspection.
That is not good enough. Knowing what we know now, it is not
good enough that the remedy was a daily inspection. The safety
factor has to be increased. We are the first line of defense on
that and we have to do that.
Mr. Griffith. I have one last thing, Madam Chair. I am over
time but I am concerned that we might be allowing TVA to grade
its own paper. In an agency that big, I know that you can't sit
there and watch them take the test. So my concern is that
grading your own paper is a great danger to us. Should we have
random independent inspections of facilities outside of the TVA
organization?
Mr. Kilgore. I think that is a question more to our
regulators, EPA. But I will tell you that we welcome the
outside. I have learned a lot in this. I don't think we are
grading our own papers since I have got EPA, TDEC, the OIG, and
an outside law firm that the Board employed. I have got four
people looking over my shoulder. We have put over 20,000 pages
of documents on the website so that everybody else can see
that. Some of those are very painful for me. I am both saddened
and frankly a little bit mad that I walked into this. But it is
my responsibility now that we have found it to clean it up and
to change the culture.
Mr. Griffith. Thank you, Mr. Kilgore. Thank you, Madam
Chair.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much. Mr. Hare.
Mr. Hare. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Mr. Kilgore, in
early July after the release of the root cause analysis by
AECOM, the TVA released a statement that included the following
statement. It says, ``TVA has asked Stantec to pay particular
attention to the four major contributing causes of the Kingston
ash spill to ensure the combination does not exist at any other
site. To date, nothing has been found that indicates that this
combination exists at other TVA facilities.''
Based on the earlier statements by Mr. Walton and Mr.
Almes, I wonder if you could explain the public statement by
TVA? In my view, this seems to imply that because that
particular combination does not exist, there is no viable
threat of collapse at these other facilities. I was wondering,
do you share that same plain reading interpretation?
Mr. Kilgore. I do not share that interpretation. Thank you
for asking that question. We obviously, since those four
factors were identified, pay particular attention to them
because I don't want any of those four factors to catch us
again. Stantec has been debriefed regularly by AECOM so that
they know what is going on. But they have not been limited to
that. What we are concerned about is that all the rest of these
structures, frankly, may be individual. None of them may be
like the other ones. So we have got to be, as I said earlier,
intrusive in each one of them.
AECOM drilled many, many holes. They even asked us to cut a
slice in the old dike at Kingston so that they could see what
was really down there. We are asking Stantec, they have already
started doing that and they have completed quite a bit, to put
those instruments down there.
So the implication that if these four factors don't exist
elsewhere we are home free is not an implication that I agree
with. We have to treat each one of those as its own individual
structure.
Mr. Hare. In your testimony today you state, ``There is no
evidence of imminent failure at other TVA sites based on
initial Stantec evaluations.'' However, in its recent Phase I
assessment report, Stantec itself states, ``Due to limited
record drawings and construction QA/QC documentation at any of
these facilities, Stantec is unable to render opinions relative
to overall structural integrity.'' These two statements seem to
be wildly inconsistent.
So, especially in light of the findings by the McKenna and
the TVA OIG reports concerning a broken culture of
accountability, this seems very troubling. Can you maybe
comment on this and enlighten me?
Mr. Kilgore. I will try. Let me address the Stantec report
first of all. What I understand from that, in talking to them
and others of my staff, is that when they looked at our
drawings they indeed found this culture problem. We had the
drawings of how the dams were supposed to be built but they
didn't have as-builts. So we didn't know what was changed and
we didn't know if they were built according to those drawings.
That is why we asked them to go be intrusive, to drill, to find
out everything they could about the as-built condition.
So, yes, they can't give me an unequivocal statement that
this is not in danger of failing. What we are doing is
following their advice, letter by letter, and trying to go
frankly a little overboard with some of it in terms of our
clearing and our progress toward drying it out.
As I said earlier today, I will not be comfortable until we
have the knowledge of what is underground on all of these.
Stantec has a few months yet to work on this to complete their
work. Even then, I think we still have to be self-critical and
intrusive.
Mr. Hare. I have just one last question, maybe for the
panel. I apologize because I came in late. What was the total
cost of this cleanup to the American taxpayers? What was the
total cost?
Mr. Kilgore. The total cost, we estimate, will be right at
$1 billion.
Mr. Hare. $1 billion?
Mr. Kilgore. $1 billion.
Mr. Hare. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much. Congresswoman Napolitano.
Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you, Madam Chair. Of great interest
to me especially is the area of groundwater. Mr. Kilgore, I am
under the impression that groundwater contamination was a
problem before. Where there is a combination of dams and wet
ash, is there leakage into an aquifer underneath that might
contaminate aquifers in the area from which people drink?
Mr. Kilgore. We have no evidence that I know of that it is
leaking into the aquifer. We have wells and we are monitoring
those. So we have no evidence so far. I will let the EPA
comment, but they commented also on the water and the intake
structure. We have been monitoring FE
Mrs. Napolitano. There is no lining.
Mr. Kilgore. Excuse me?
Mrs. Napolitano. There is no lining underneath.
Mr. Kilgore. You are right. There is no lining. This ash,
though, settles. The metals are not all soluble so it settles.
We think it stays there, unless we have an incident like this.
So our greatest need is to get all of this out of the river and
back onto dry land so it can dry out.
Mrs. Napolitano. Another area of concern, of course, is in
the July 2009 report of TVA's Inspector General. Appendix C
includes an internal TVA memorandum. Point four of this
memorandum, ``Because of concerns about groundwater
contamination, TVA is moving away from wet ash disposal
techniques to dry stacking.'' I would like to ask if you can
provide the Subcommittee with copies of the analysis that went
into formulating these concerns about groundwater in 1988, 21
years ago?
Secondly, in the 21 years since that analysis was presented
to TVA management, what specific action or actions have been
taken to alleviate TVA's own concerns about groundwater
contamination?
I am into water. I am, you know, the Chair of the
Subcommittee on Water and Power. So contaminants are something
that we have been facing on my own Subcommittee. We have no new
water sources. So any water that we abuse or misuse, we need to
clean up.
I am concerned that any of these pollutants may have leaked
into or contaminated the reservoir next to the Kingston
facility. I don't know what EPA has done about making sure that
contaminants are not being carried out to where effluent is
being pumped out as fresh water.
Mr. Kilgore. Well, I am concerned about the water, too,
because I live there and occasionally go boating. So I share
your concerns. We do have wells in the area that we are
monitoring. TDEC looked at 400 wells around the area and found
no groundwater contamination. That is not a reason for us to
rest. I take your concerns seriously and we are going to
continue to look at that.
Mrs. Napolitano. Would you provide this Committee, then,
with the copies of that analysis that went into formulating
that concern in 1988?
Mr. Kilgore. I will. Let me just admit that what the
Inspector General found was that there was not proper action on
some of those older things. I will admit that to you right now.
That is what I have to change.
Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you. EPA?
Mr. Stanislaus. I will let Mr. Stan Meiburg deal with the
local issues.
With respect to the impact on groundwater from impoundment,
that is something we are looking at right now. That has been
identified specifically as causing damage to groundwater and to
surface water. We are looking at that in terms of developing
new rules. Those rules will be developed by the end of this
year.
With respect to the specific local concerns, I would like
to let Mr. Meiburg address that.
Mr. Meiburg. Yes. As Mr. Stanislaus said, groundwater
contamination from these types of facilities has been a concern
to EPA. Whether or not groundwater contamination occurs in part
depends on the geological structure that underlays them. We
have done pretty extensive sampling, along with the Tennessee
Department of Environment and Conservation, at this particular
site. It appears that in this case we have been fortunate.
There has not been migration of contaminants through a
groundwater pathway in any of the samples that we have taken so
far.
Mrs. Napolitano. How often do you test those areas?
Mr. Meiburg. We have been testing those areas very
frequently now.
Mrs. Napolitano. Frequently meaning daily, weekly, or
monthly?
Mr. Meiburg. No, we have not been doing daily samples. What
we have done is gone and tested the wells, as Mr. Kilgore said,
together with TDEC and TVA since the accident occurred. We have
not yet found any movement into any of the wells that are
tested. But it is not a regular sample. It has been a sample on
request and demand.
Mrs. Napolitano. I have a great concern about the cost to
the general taxpayer, number one. Number two is the health and
safety of those areas. Then, of course, number three is whether
or not it becomes an issue that then comes back to the Federal
Government to clean up. I have a contaminated site that has
involved maybe 20 years in cleanup, costing millions upon
million of dollars. The taxpayer is paying for it because the
potential responsible parties are long gone.
I am certain that we don't want to face anything like that,
maybe, in the other areas where you may have these same
facilities. Steps must be taken to protect the water safety,
the public safety, and any other area that is of concern. Mr.
Kilgore?
Mr. Kilgore. Yes, ma'am. TVA does not get Government
funding so all of this will fall to us to pay. Unfortunately,
the steps that we didn't take in the past will now fall on our
rate payers. We will have to pay for that through our electric
bills. We intend to try to stretch that out. This problem
didn't occur overnight so we are going to try to amortize that
out over several years. Still, as you indicate, somebody has to
pay for the oversights in the past. As I said, my job is to
make sure it doesn't happen again.
Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much.
Mr. Hall.
Mr. Hall. Thank you, Madam Chair. I am sorry for being
late. I was double-booked, as many of us are. It so happens
that I was at the Select Committee for Energy Independence and
Global Warming where we heard, among other things, testimony
from Dr. Brent Constantz, a professor from Stanford University
and CEO of Calera Corporation, who talked about a potential
future solution to this kind of problem.
I am just curious, Mr. Kilgore or any of the engineers, if
you would comment on this CMAP technology, Carbonate
Mineralization by Aqueous Precipitation, in which the natural
carbonate mimics corals when they make their external skeleton,
capturing CO2 emissions and storing it in a stable mineral
form.
It can be used to replace or supplement traditional
Portland cement, offsetting emissions that would otherwise
result. It can be used as aggregate as well. The estimated
current market demand for cement and aggregate is over three
billion tons per year in the United States alone and over 30
billion tons per year worldwide.
The process has the potential to provide a positive use of
the overwhelming majority of U.S. coal fired emissions,
including solid waste normally bound for landfills such as fly
ash, luminous smelt, or byproducts such as red mud and other
waste products that can be incorporated into this process. I
know we need to solve this problem; we need to deal with the
existing old technologies. But this seems to me like maybe a
promising road for TVA to look at.
Mr. Kilgore. Yes, sir. I am not prepared to answer that
today but I would like to have my research and development
folks give me an answer for you and to file that for the
record.
I will say that as to climate change, TVA approved about a
year ago a goal to get us to less than 50 percent carbon-based
generation by the early 2020s. So we are cognizant of the
issue. This sounds like something that I would very much like
our engineers to look into.
Mr. Hall. I will make sure you get a copy of it. We got all
excited in the other hearing when we heard about this stuff.
I wanted to ask about specifically what actions, this is to
EPA, what actions have been taken at TVA's Widows Creek, Bull
Run, and Colbert power facilities? What enforcement actions has
EPA engaged in? Why has EPA not enforced the Clean Water Act
and other statutes as a result of this known pollution?
Mr. Stanislaus. With respect to this particular spill, the
Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation entered
into an order with TVA to address the cleanup. EPA subsequently
entered into an agreement on consent to oversee the cleanup
work by TVA.
With respect to Clean Water Act violations, I have to get
back to you on that.
Mr. Hall. In the January 2009 Senate Environment and Public
Works Committee hearing, Mr. Kilgore, you told Chairwoman Boxer
and Senator Merkley that you would look into the groundwater
and surface water contamination issues at these three
facilities, cited by EPA. Could you tell us today how these
facilities are implicated with the contamination of water? What
exactly has happened? What steps have you taken and what are
you looking forward to doing to deal with these facilities?
Mr. Kilgore. With respect to the three you talked about, I
didn't find any evidence that we had exceeded any groundwater
emissions there. We still plan on going to dry storage of the
ash on those sites. So what we are planning on doing is getting
rid of the wet storage there. That means that the water is less
and the volume is less. The ash is stored in a dry state.
Mr. Hall. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much, Mr. Hall.
I have one final question to Mr. Walton. You mentioned that
there were lessons learned that are maybe applicable to other
coal ash storage sites. Can you elaborate a little bit?
Mr. Walton. I would be honored to. There is a body of
knowledge that has been gained through the sampling of the
loose wet ash. There has been an awareness as to the
containment systems using the upstream dike methods of
construction, similar in the way that mine tailings facilities
are done. There have been some lessons learned in that the ash
does not improve its density with higher and deeper layers
placed on top of it. I think that is applicable to be used and
studied at other sites. Certainly the rate of loading is
important as these sites get higher and higher with the added
influence of gravity on these structures.
The lessons learned are that you don't have to have slimes.
You might have a foundation system made of clays or you may be
on some loose sands near an earthquake zone for those
facilities near seismic areas. There are also the issues of
piping and seepage and water management. These structures are
made by hydraulic methods, controlling the waters that pass
through and are contained. So there is water management,
seepage management, storage, and containment. All these factors
are lessons learned.
It is sort of an awakening in that trained engineers are
able to get out there, inspect, assess, and take this program,
through your guidance and others, forward so that this won't
happen again.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much. Mr. Kilgore, what I would
like to see is some communication between you and entities
responsible for some of the other spills. See if you can come
up with something of a plan for how often you have to move coal
ash to prevent buildup. If you talk to Kentucky and some of the
other places that have had similar issues, I would appreciate
it.
Mr. Kilgore. I will do that.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much. This is the end of our
hearing.
[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
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