[House Hearing, 111 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY'S KINGSTON ASH SLIDE: EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL CAUSES AND UPDATES ON CLEANUP EFFORTS ======================================================================= (111-54) HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON WATER RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ JULY 28, 2009 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 51-348 WASHINGTON : 2009 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800 Fax: (202) 512�092104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402�090001 COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, JOHN L. MICA, Florida Vice Chair DON YOUNG, Alaska PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee Columbia VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan JERROLD NADLER, New York FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey CORRINE BROWN, Florida JERRY MORAN, Kansas BOB FILNER, California GARY G. MILLER, California EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi Carolina ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania SAM GRAVES, Missouri BRIAN BAIRD, Washington BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania RICK LARSEN, Washington JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York Virginia MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois CONNIE MACK, Florida MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan HEATH SHULER, North Carolina MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York VERN BUCHANAN, Florida HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky JOHN J. HALL, New York ANH ``JOSEPH'' CAO, Louisiana STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin AARON SCHOCK, Illinois STEVE COHEN, Tennessee PETE OLSON, Texas LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas PHIL HARE, Illinois JOHN A. BOCCIERI, Ohio MARK H. SCHAUER, Michigan BETSY MARKEY, Colorado PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York THOMAS S. P. PERRIELLO, Virginia DINA TITUS, Nevada HARRY TEAGUE, New Mexico VACANCY (ii) ? Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas, Chairwoman THOMAS S. P. PERRIELLO, Virginia JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois DON YOUNG, Alaska GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee BRIAN BAIRD, Washington VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri GARY G. MILLER, California STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland Carolina SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania PHIL HARE, Illinois BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania DINA TITUS, Nevada MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida HARRY TEAGUE, New Mexico CONNIE MACK, Florida ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia Columbia CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California ANH ``JOSEPH'' CAO, Louisiana MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii PETE OLSON, Texas HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizaon JOHN J. HALL, New York PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama BOB FILNER, California CORRINE BROWN, Florida VACANCY JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota (Ex Officio) (iii) CONTENTS Page Summary of Subject Matter........................................ vi TESTIMONY Almes, William S., Senior Engineer and Director of Geotechnical Services, Marshall Miller & Associates, Incorporated........... 116 Kilgore, Tom, President and Chief Executive Officer, Tennessee Valley Authority............................................... 116 Moore, Richard, Inspector General, Tennessee Valley Authority.... 116 Stanislaus, Mathy, Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, accompanied by Stan Meiburg, Acting Regional Administrator, Region 4....................................................... 116 Walton, William H., Vice President and Senior Principal Engineer, AECOM.......................................................... 116 PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS Cao, Hon. Anh "Joseph", of Louisiana............................. 136 Carnahan, Hon. Russ, of Missouri................................. 138 Cohen, Hon, Steve, of Tennessee.................................. 139 Mitchell, Hon, Harry E., of Arizona.............................. 142 Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota............................ 143 PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES Almes, William S................................................. 146 Kilgore, Tom..................................................... 158 Moore, Richard................................................... 173 Stanislaus, Mathy................................................ 176 Walton, William H................................................ 187 SUBMISSION FOR THE RECORD Almes, William S., Senior Engineer and Director of Geotechnical Services, Marshall Miller & Associates, Incorporated, supplementaty testimony........................................ 149 Johnson, Rep. Eddie Bernice, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, "Inspection Report: Review of the Kingston Fossil Plant Ash Spill Root Cause Study and Observations about Ash Management"................................................ 3 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1348.001 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1348.002 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1348.003 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1348.004 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1348.005 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1348.006 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1348.007 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1348.008 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1348.009 THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY'S KINGSTON ASH SLIDE: EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL CAUSES AND UPDATES ON CLEANUP EFFORTS ---------- Tu esday, July 28, 2009 House of Representatives Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Washington, DC. The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:30 a.m., in Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Eddie Bernice Johnson [Chairwoman of the Subcommittee] presiding. Ms. Johnson. Good morning. The Committee will come to order. Today's hearing will begin by offering the Committee's heartfelt condolences to the family of Larry LaCroix of Burlington, Iowa. Mr. LaCroix was part of the Kingston ash spill cleanup operation and was killed in a worksite accident on July the 20th. The Subcommittee extends our thoughts and prayers to his family. This hearing is being conducted as one of several hearings that meet the oversight requirements under clauses 2(n), (o), and (p) of Rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives. As originally envisioned, today's hearing was to focus on a technical review of the engineering analyses that evaluated the root causes of the December 2008 Kingston coal ash spill. However, since this hearing was originally planned, a number of reports have come to light that demand we look at the collapse, as well as the factors that led to it, with increased scrutiny. I have done so and have come to the conclusion that the causes as identified by TVA are, in fact, not causes at all. Rather, they are symptoms of more endemic issues facing the Tennessee Valley Authority. As such, this hearing will look to answer three basic questions: First, what geotechnical factors led to the spill; second, what human or management factors contributed to the collapse; and third, what actions will TVA take going forward. Testimony from Mr. Bill Walton from the engineering firm AECOM will help us answer the first question, based on the AECOM Root Cause Analysis Report upon which his testimony is formulated. We can learn the mechanisms of failure that led to the collapse of the Kingston storage facility. But that is only a part of the story. The second issue regarding management culture will be addressed by TVA's Inspector General Richard Moore and Bill Almes, an engineer from the firm of Marshall Miller & Associates. The third issue concerning what steps TVA is planing to take going forward, will be illuminated through this hearing. This morning's testimony comes in light of today's release of a TVA Office of Inspector General report. It highlights a string of problematic findings regarding TVA's management culture prior to the spill as well as new steps TVA has made in the months following. Last week the TVA Board released an additional report written by the law firm of McKenna Long & Aldrich that identifies a management culture that, in combination with a lack of accountability, standards, and controls, created conditions that resulted in this spill. In my opinion, these management failures were equally to blame for the Kingston spill and are relevant to the larger debate. I request unanimous consent that the McKenna report be included in the record. 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The central thrust of this hearing, however, involves the future. Can the Tennessee Valley Authority assure Congress and the people of the Tennessee Valley region that its other coal ash disposal facilities are sound? In other words, can they ensure that they will not collapse, that they will not leech toxins into the groundwater, and that TVA facilities will not discharge carcinogenic and harmful substances into our Nation's waters? This second issue, informed by the TVA OIG and McKenna reports, leads us to a subsequent line of questions that the Subcommittee must get answers to, either in this meeting or in other hearings in the months ahead. Can TVA provide the public with credible risk assessments regarding the safety of its facilities, including its coal ash impoundments? Will the ongoing management and organizational changes occurring within TVA produce results that address all of the McKenna and TVA OIG report findings? Does TVA intend to become a proactive environmental steward? If so, how? Does the Congress need to take action to ensure that TVA facilities cease to pose threats to public safety, human health, and the environment? Today's hearing is troubling. These recently released reports indicate a management culture at TVA that is slow and sometimes resistant to change. Testimony from our witnesses today will help guide this Subcommittee to whether change must be instilled upon this Federal entity. It will only be through both acknowledgment of the issues that resulted in the Kingston collapse and an active effort to address these issues that TVA will be able to move forward. Thank you. I now recognize our Ranking Member, Mr. Boozman. Mr. Boozman. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Today this Subcommittee continues its review of coal ash storage, specifically the December 22nd, 2008 incident at the Tennessee Valley Authority's power generating facility in Kingston, Tennessee. While public and private utilities have safely operated approximately 600 coal ash sites for decades with only a few documented failures, it is important to recognize that this spill directly impacted more than 40 property owners. Homes were rendered uninhabitable. Water mains and gas lines ruptured. Nearby neighborhoods had to be evacuated. It is my sincere hope that what occurred at the Kingston coal ash disposal site was an isolated incident. The witnesses today will discuss the causes of the accident and report on some of their observations about the Kingston site. In addition, these witnesses will address the agency culture within the Tennessee Valley Authority and how this may have contributed to the accident at Kingston. As George Romney once said, ``Nothing is as vulnerable as entrenched success.'' Traditionally, the Tennessee Valley Authority has been a good steward of the environment. Most of its employees, including some of the witnesses today, reside within the Tennessee Valley and are directly impacted by the actions taken by the agency. Additional laws or Federal regulations would probably not have prevented this terrible accident. New laws and regulations will not replace homes, family treasures, heirlooms, or other personal property lost as a result of the Kingston spill. However, this is little comfort for those property owners impacted by the Kingston spill who have sacrificed a great deal and who in some cases have forfeited their homes and other irreplaceable memories to this accident. Moving forward, it is important for the Tennessee Valley Authority, its Board of Directors, and its officers to review the agency's existing ash management practices, recognize any shortcomings, and subsequently make changes to ensure more appropriate risk management at its facilities. Due to its proximity to the Emory and Clinch Rivers, the Kingston site carried an elevated risk. However, the Tennessee Valley Authority needs to take aggressive steps at its other coal ash storage facilities to identify and reduce risk to the public and to the environment. Compliance at all levels within the Tennessee Valley Authority will help restore the level of trust that is expected of one of the Nation's largest power providers. The benefits that the Tennessee Valley Authority bring to the Nation are too important to be threatened by poor structures and poor management practices. I am encouraged by some of the recent statements by TVA management that indicate they get the message and intend to emerge from this accident a better agency. I hope that we can help them. I thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this hearing. I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses. With that, I yield back. Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Duncan for an opening statement. Mr. Duncan. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. I don't have a formal written statement but I will say this: This spill was not in my district but it is 40 miles, roughly, from Knoxville. I sent a member of my staff very soon after this happened out there. A few days later I went out there and took a helicopter tour and got a briefing. I have mentioned before that I met with all kinds of people working for TVA and other Federal, State, and local environmental agencies. I also met with contractors. I have since met with others in regard to this spill, participated in a meeting at Senator Alexander's office with interested parties including some of the victims, and have also participated in two previous hearings of this Subcommittee. I think I have made my views pretty well known on this. TVA has been filled for years almost entirely with environmentalists in the best sense of that word. I understand that this retention pond and this system of storage was built in 1985, long before any of the current leadership of TVA was in there. All through those years the environmentalists at TVA, the EPA, and other agencies thought that this was just fine. Nobody really said anything about it. Now, this is a terrible thing that has happened to TVA and it is horrible for the people who have been severely damaged. But I have always said that I think everything within reason that could be done should be done. I think it has been done. The progress that has been made has been amazing. In our last hearing it was estimated that TVA's costs on this would be about $1 billion. That may be a lowball estimate, not counting the regulatory fines and lawsuits. Now, my feeling is that if you disregard people who have a vested monetary interest in this because they are connected to some environmental group that wants to get contributions and make money out of this, and if you put aside the contractors--and all these are good people--but if you put aside the views of the contractors who have a vested or monetary interest in this, if you put aside all those people who are not tied into one of those groups, I think 95 or 98 percent of the people who take a look at this would say that TVA has done and is doing everything humanly possible to get this area cleaned up. The progress has been tremendous. I think in the end this area is going to be cleaner than a lot of other areas around the Nation. You can never satisfy the extremists or the kooks in any situation. There will be some people that we will never satisfy no matter if we spent the entire Federal budget on this problem. But we have to be reasonable. We have to have a little balance and common sense in this situation. I think that TVA should be commended for all that they have done, are doing, and will do in regard to this situation. Thank you very much. Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much. Are there any other statements? Mr. Cao. Yes, Madam Chairwoman. First of all, I would like to thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for holding this important hearing. I will keep my remarks brief but I would like to take this opportunity to make some parallels between my community and the community experience at Kingston in regards to the spill. In December of 2008, a retention wall at Kingston Fossil Plant failed, releasing 5.4 million cubic yards of ash and 327 million gallons of water onto the land and into the nearby rivers. The result of this failure was the release of five million cubic yards of coal ash into the Emory River and 300 acres of land being filled with sludge, in some places up to six feet deep. This spill caused extensive disruption to the neighboring communities with evacuations and the loss of power and gas, not to mention the houses that were destroyed in the tidal wave of ash and water. It is a miracle that no lives were lost at the time of the spill. However, we do recognize the one life that was lost during the cleanup earlier this month. As the Representative of the second Congressional district, I have great empathy for the communities that were directly affected by this unexpected and unprecedented event. I am also well aware of the effect failures in protective structures can have on surrounding communities. The damage to Orleans and Jefferson Parishes four years ago wasn't because Hurricane Katrina made a direct hit on New Orleans. Instead, it was because the strength of the storm surge caused catastrophic failures in levees and flood walls throughout the city, especially in New Orleans East and the Lakeview area on the border with Navarre. The damage from these breeches included flooding in 80 percent of the city, damage to 80 percent of the buildings, and damage to 40 percent of our housing stock. Because of these failures, the city remained under water for days and in some places weeks. But, like the Kingston spill, the environmental hazards were great. We all remember the images of the waters through which my constituents had to wade to get food and water. These were commonly referred to as a toxic soup because they were filled with sewage, gasoline, and oil, to say nothing of bacteria and disease. Like you, Madam Chairwoman, in the immediate aftermath of the catastrophic failures that occurred as a result of Hurricane Katrina, I sought accountability and assurances from the Federal Government, especially the Army Corps of Engineers, that repairs would be made to ensure such catastrophic failures never happen again. Through my work on this Committee and Subcommittee, I am closely overseeing the work of the Army Corps to ensure they are rebuilding our infrastructure to its former strength and beyond. One of my priorities is ensuring the complete rebuilding of the 17th Street and London Avenue Canals. I have cosponsored legislation which states this. I continue to work with the Army Corps and my delegation to ensure this protection is achieved for my constituents. Just like the community affected by the Kingston spill, my district cannot afford another disaster. Again, Madam Chair, thank you for holding this important hearing. I look forward to working with you as you continue your oversight of this important matter. Thank you very much. Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much. Testifying first is EPA's Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Mr. Mathy Stanislaus. Accompanying Mr. Stanislaus is the Acting Regional Administrator for EPA's Region 4, Mr. Stan Meiburg. Mr. Meiburg will be available for questions. Our second witness is TVA's President and CEO, Mr. Tom Kilgore. Following him is Mr. William Walton, Vice President and Senior Engineer with AECOM. Our fourth witness is the TVA Inspector General, Mr. Richard Moore. Our final witness this morning, Mr. William Almes, is a Senior Engineer and Director of Geotechnical Services with Marshall Miller & Associates. Your full statements will be placed in the record. We ask that you try to limit your testimony to about five minutes as a courtesy to the other witnesses. I now recognize Mr. Stanislaus. TESTIMONY OF MATHY STANISLAUS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY STAN MEIBURG, ACTING REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR, REGION 4; TOM KILGORE, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY; WILLIAM H. WALTON, VICE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR PRINCIPAL ENGINEER, AECOM; RICHARD MOORE, INSPECTOR GENERAL, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY; AND WILLIAM S. ALMES, SENIOR ENGINEER AND DIRECTOR OF GEOTECHNICAL SERVICES, MARSHALL MILLER & ASSOCIATES, INCORPORATED Mr. Stanislaus. Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's role in the response and cleanup of the release of coal ash from the Tennessee Valley Authority Kingston plant. Appearing with me today is Mr. Stan Meiburg, Acting Regional Administrator for EPA Region 4. Mr. Meiburg will be able to answer any questions you may have regarding Region 4's efforts related to the Kingston spill response. I will summarize my testimony but I ask that my entire statement be submitted for the hearing record. As you know, Madam Chairwoman, TVA's Kingston facility suffered a catastrophic failure, releasing an estimated 5.4 million cubic yards of coal ash into the Emory and Clinch Rivers and surrounding areas. Shortly after learning of the release, EPA deployed an on-scene coordinator to the site. EPA joined TVA, the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation, and other State and local agencies in a coordinated response. EPA served as the lead Federal agency throughout the emergency phase of the response and provided oversight and technical advice to TVA. On January 12th of 2009, the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation issued an order to TVA to develop a corrective action plan to address the spill and to conduct a root cause analysis to determine the cause of the dike failure. Over time, the lead Federal agency designation transitioned to TVA as cleanup efforts moved into the recovery phase. Subsequently, on May 11, 2009, EPA entered into an administrative order and agreement on consent, AOC, with TVA pursuant to EPA's authority under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, CERCLA, under which TVA will continue to perform the response action with EPA oversight. The EPA AOC with TVA does not replace the Tennessee Department of Environment's order, which remains in effect. EPA's working relationship with the State of Tennessee has been exceptional and we will continue that partnership. Under the AOC, response actions will take place through time critical and non-time critical removal actions. The AOC will help ensure that the cleanup is comprehensive, fully transparent to the local community and public, and meets all Federal and State environmental standards. A principal objective of the time critical phase of the removal is to recover the major portion of coal ash in the Emory River to help minimize the potential for flooding and downstream migration of the coal ash. Under the Tennessee Department of Environment's order and the EPA AOC, TVA was required to perform a detailed analysis of off-site disposal options for coal ash removed from the Emory River. That effort resulted in the selection of the Arrowhead Landfill in Perry County, Alabama as the best off-site facility to receive the coal ash generated from the time critical removal action. The landfill is fully lined and meets all technical requirements specified by State and Federal regulations. Another important factor in the selection was the preference for rail transportation. Rail transportation greatly reduced the potential for vehicle accidents, avoids local traffic burdens, and is approximately three times more fuel efficient than truck transportation. After a thorough review, EPA approved the selection of the Arrowhead Landfill. As stated in previous testimony provided to the Subcommittee, the failure of the ash impoundment at TVA's Kingston plant highlighted the issue of impoundment stability. EPA is currently conducting an assessment of impoundments and other management units which contain wet handled coal combustion residuals. We are finalizing our review of the responses to the CERCLA 104(e) letters that were sent to facilities. Overall, the assessment responses are from more than 200 facilities which have identified more than 500 management units. We expect to post that information on the EPA website within the next six to eight weeks. In the meantime, EPA staff and contractors are in the field conducting on-site visits and inspections of those management units reported as having a high or significantly high hazard potential while also reviewing any current dam safety reports available from States or the facilities. Our goal is to complete all of the assessments for dams with high and significant hazard potential ratings this year. As to TVA's root cause analysis of the Kingston facility failure, EPA staff have reviewed the currently released analysis report which identifies some of the factors that could have contributed to the Kingston facility structural failure. EPA contractors are looking for structural stability factors in our ongoing impoundment and management unit assessment efforts. Some of the factors being looked for include the size, age, and location of the structures; size of dam or dike erosion; settlement, cracks, or other signs of deterioration; seepage or leakage; and site soil, groundwater, and surface water characteristics. In addition, EPA is evaluating coal ash residual disposal practices at coal fired power plants to determine if these facilities are in compliance with existing Federal environmental laws. We will take enforcement action where appropriate to address serious violations. Madam Chairwoman, that concludes my prepared remarks. Either I or Stan Meiburg will be pleased to answer any questions that you or the Subcommittee Members may have. Thank you. Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much. We will now hear from Mr. Kilgore. Mr. Kilgore. Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Boozman, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to update you on TVA's progress in the recovery of the Kingston Fossil Plant spill. We appreciate the Committee's oversight. Madam Chairwoman, we appreciate your visit to the site last June. We are working hard to rebuild the pubic trust. We know that that is going to be a difficult task but we are working to make sure that nothing like this happens again. When the event happened, I knew we had to do many things. I am here today to talk about what we did on root cause and to ensure that our other facilities were safe. I knew we needed technical answers about why Kingston happened, but even more urgently we needed to find out about our other sites. To get those answers, we commissioned two internationally recognized and respected engineering firms. AECOM was brought in to conduct the root cause analysis of Kingston and the spill itself. Stantec, another firm, was commissioned to evaluate the structural integrity of all of TVA's other ash ponds. We used two different firms because of the urgency of the situation and the size and the scope before each firm. As you will hear shortly from Mr. Walton, AECOM's extensive forensic investigation determined that four long-evolving conditions, some existing since the 1950s, caused the event. I will also address the management and system factors that contributed to that. We have carefully studied AECOM's report and accept Mr. Walton's thorough and well documented assessment. As AECOM was conducting its work at Kingston, Stantec was busy at TVA's other sites with their technical evaluation. Starting in January, Stantec began to inspect, test, and make recommendations on our other facilities. We have worked aggressively over the last six months to implement their recommended changes. I also wanted us to take a self-critical approach in looking at the hazard classifications of the storage impoundments. We were not among those 44 that were originally listed. I recognize that and we moved to correct that. Although we don't have any indication of these structures being in danger of failing, we have reclassified impoundments at four of our sites as having high hazard potential. We are prioritizing our efforts at those sites. In order to fully understand what happened at Kingston, we needed also an analysis of TVA's organization and culture. The TVA Board of Directors commissioned an independent investigation to examine and identify possible management and organizational factors that may have contributed to the Kingston spill. That work began in January. The investigation was led by the international law firm of McKenna Long & Aldrich. The MLA investigation that was presented to the Board by MLA last week and released publicly did identify shortcomings and missed opportunities in our organizational effectiveness and our accountability. At the Board's direction, we are already moving quickly to remedy these shortcomings. I have initiated an agency-wide organizational effectiveness plan focused on culture change and improving our systems, standards, controls, and accountability. I am pleased that MLA report recognized that we are making some significant remedial progress to prevent any future pond spills. But I also want to tell you that I heard the word of caution that a comprehensive directive needed to provide assurance that best practices would be sustained across TVA, owned by senior management, and under the Board's oversight. Last week I described the results of the MLA investigation to our employees as tough medicine. It is hard to take, but tough medicine will make us better. Today we have the benefit of the report done by the Office of Inspector General. Mr. Moore will testify on that shortly. All four reports from AECOM, Stantec, MLA, and the Inspector General will help us address both the technical and cultural issues that contributed to the Kingston spill. Importantly, these reports will be our road map going forward both to strengthen the integrity of our facilities and to forge a culture of accountability at TVA. Madam Chair, my written testimony to submit to the Committee provides more details. While we have much more to do, with the Chair's permission I would like to give you some idea of the progress we are making. We have a long way to go but I would like to show some photographs. This is the picture of the ash spill as it looks today. This is what it looked like shortly after the event. You can see the river is filled. We estimate that about three million cubic yards were beyond what we called Dike 2. As we have dredges in, we now have removed about a half a million cubic yards of that material and are continuing to work. This is what the railroad and the road looked like the day after the event. We have that restored and that road is open to the public. One of the sloughs nearby, this is a minor slough that we call Church Slough. You can see that it was filled with ash. This is an example of what we have to do for the rest of the site. As I said, we have a lot of work to do. We are not finished by a long shot. We look forward to continuing to work with the Committee as we move forward. Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much, Mr. Kilgore. We will hear from Mr. William Walton now. Mr. Walton. Good morning, Madam Chairwoman and distinguished Members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to share with you the results of our five month investigation of the root causes of the Kingston failure. On the morning of December 22nd, 2008, a massive flow side occurred. Within one hour it inundated the Watts Bar Reservoir, several sloughs, and spilled over onto private properties. There were no witnesses to the failure because it was nighttime. No one knew where it started or how it happened. Our assignment was to answer these questions and to determine the geotechnical causes of failure. We have conducted a thorough and comprehensive forensic investigation and root cause analysis presented in ten volumes with more than 5,400 pages. This RCA process involved frequent input from TDEC; the TVA OIG and their consultants; the U.S. EPA; the Bureau of Reclamation; the insurer's geotechnical engineer; and the independent peer reviewer of Dr. Gonzalo Castro, an elected member of the National Academy of Engineering. We did this to ensure that they would all be fully informed of our discoveries and progress as analyses evolved. We met on eight separate occasions to share information and to refine the analysis methodologies. Our written testimony offers lessons learned that can be applied to other wet ash disposal facilities. I will show you several slides from the testimony that I have submitted that illustrate the failure sequence and the controlling factors. Due to the time allotment, I will go through these slides briskly. However, I invite your questions on any information that we have shared with you. This is a photograph from April of 2008 showing the confinement, the dredge cells, and the ash collection pond. Within six months, this tragic and catastrophic failure occurred, discharging more than two thirds of the contents above the ash collection pond. I will show you our opinion on the causation. We are looking from northwest to southeast. We believe failure began in the northwest corner, originating as a deep seated failure internal to the exterior confinement. Like a pie coming out of a pie plate, this material heaved out within a very short time frame and surcharged the perimeter containment system, causing a overload on the outboard containment. That caused that outboard containment to breach, making the liquid contents liquify and flow out. From a 3H:1V slope this flowed out to an angle of repose less than one half degree. I will show you a few historic photographs to see the progression of this site. In 1949, this was a lake making up the Watts Bar Reservoir created in 1942. The dotted red line indicates the outside containment system hopping from island to island. Note that for the first three or four years of operation, from 1954 to 1958, the ash was released directly to the waters of the Watts Bar Reservoir. This system was firing power to Oak Ridge as a national defense facility. By 1958, the containment pond was established. Here again I will show you in green the distance that ash from the plant would have to travel for waters to be released back to the reservoir. It was over 5,200 feet, a mile. This ash would collect from the coarsest grains on the south to the most fine grains on the north. As we progress with time, this eventual ash pond was eventually filled in and the material was stacked. In 1984, in an effort to provide more material within the confines of this containment system, a dredge cell super elevated above the ash pond was created to store more material as the plant operated. By 1996, engineering plans were done to expand the facility vertically. By 2005, this photograph shows you the three cell system that was collecting ash was now down to two. The footprint of the disposal was getting smaller but the structure was getting higher. Notice in red is the 2003 slide event where seepage in piping occurred. We looked at 12 failure modes at this particular site identified in our work scope in late December and early January. We then evolved to four controlling factors. It is too hard to read all of these but these are a part of the testimony that are included in the slides. The point of fact is that this structure, on its way to be built to the year 2014, did not make it to its ultimate height. The red line demarks its failure. The underneath foundation is shown to be a material of the finest grains that had traveled the furthest early on in the progression of this particular disposal facility. It is a slime, a mining term meaning a material that travels the farthest, that drops out at the last, being the finest, loosest materials accumulating on the bottom. Those slimes were found in the upper portion, the northernmost portion, at the furthest distance from its deposition. Again, it was an issue of finding these with an extensive exploration program. We were able to see the slide plane and identify these slimes through undisturbed sampling. We were able to analyze the stability of those sections that failed on the north as well as those sections that did not fail to the east or were consequential to failure on the west. I will take you very quickly through the progression of failure in cross section as you would look west. The early portion would fail like the pie I explained. That material would surcharge over the initial containment dike, causing it to be overstressed and breached. Notice the issue on the right side. The flood wave from this event was a 47 foot flood wave above the operating pool, clearly a very dramatic failure in a very short period of time, resulting in the release of the materials. This leads us to the conclusion of four controlling factors or failure modes that led to this: The load was impacted by the ever increasing height and the constant force of ash. The containment system was discontinuous and separated. That laid on a foundation, and the foundation serves as the footing for the building or home or whatever. The foundation is important. If those three elements are weak and you contain a loose, wet, liquefiable ash and lose your containment, it then can be released in a very dramatic manner, 5.4 million yards. Thank you very much. Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much. Mr. Richard Moore. Mr. Moore. Good morning, Madam Chairwoman Johnson, Ranking Member Boozman, and Members of the Subcommittee. I am TVA's Inspector General, having been appointed to this position by the President in May of 2003. Prior to becoming the first Inspector General appointed by a President at TVA, I was a Federal prosecutor in the southern district of Alabama for approximately 18 years. It is a pleasure to be able to testify here today about the Office of Inspector General's review of the coal ash spill at TVA's Kingston Fossil Plant in December of 2008. I believe you have a copy of our report which, as you mentioned, is becoming public today. Mr. Moore. The Kingston spill has brought intense scrutiny upon TVA, as is well known, and with it a call for more oversight of the agency. The conditions at TVA that led to the disaster of December 22nd, 2008 have existed for decades. It is unfortunate that it has taken this kind of incident to prompt changes. The TVA culture at fossil plants relegated ash to the status of garbage at a landfill rather than treating it as a potential hazard to the public and to the environment. We believe this culture resulted in management failures which contributed to the Kingston spill. Our report points out a number of issues that I would summarize into basically three categories. First are the warnings and red flags. Those warnings and red flags were raised by outside consultants and internal staff but were simply not addressed. Number two, there was an inadequate system of management controls as evidenced by fragmented organizational structures, a lack of policies and procedures, and inadequate training for dike inspectors. Number three, there were poor management practices that included a lack of maintenance of dikes and overall poor communication between organizations. Our report provides a more detailed discussion of each of these items. Madam Chairwoman, you have said that the Kingston spill was caused by regulatory neglect, a lack of Government oversight, and irresponsible coal ash practices. Our report that we make public today supports your statement. TVA management knew, for example, that consultants had been hired by them and had urged them to perform a much needed analysis and to take specific corrective actions. TVA management knew that they had failed to follow the engineers' recommendations and that they had failed to perform the analysis or take the corrective actions. TVA's management also knew that it had a history of poor maintenance of its ash ponds and that it had experienced seeps or breeches in the past. Finally, TVA management knew that there were no policies or procedures for the management of coal ash. Documents supporting what I have just said are a matter of public record, have been made available by TVA through litigation. These facts are widely known. The TVA Board appears to clearly understand the gravity of the situation. Recently they have taken bold steps to address the problems that we have identified in our report. Also, although TVA management was slow to publicly discuss management failures, as we point out in our report, I am pleased to say that they have made great strides in starting a long process to not only rebuild the ash management program but to attempt to rebuild the trust and respect of Congress, the American people, and TVA's many stakeholders. This will not happen without continued oversight by this Subcommittee and other oversight authorities including that of the Office of Inspector General. We are committed to devoting resources to monitor TVA's new commitment to transparency and accountability. We welcome your support in that endeavor. In addition to the recommendations in our report, the Office of Inspector General recommends that Congress hold regular oversight hearings to determine number one, whether TVA's coal ash facilities have either been closed properly or modified to an appropriate safety level; number two, whether TVA's culture has in fact been changed to become more transparent and more accountable; and finally, whether TVA has fulfilled its responsibilities to the citizens of Roane County to clean up their community and to make them whole. Madam Chairwoman, this concludes my opening remarks. I look forward to answering any questions that you or the Committee may have. Ms. Johnson. Thank you so very much. Mr. William Almes. Mr. Almes. Good morning. Madam Chairwoman Johnson, Ranking Member Boozman, and Members of the Subcommittee, my name is William Scott Almes. I am the Director of Geotechnical Engineering for Marshall Miller & Associates. I am a licensed professional engineer with a Bachelor of Science and a Master of Science in civil and geotechnical engineering. I have worked in the field as a consulting engineer for nearly 20 years. I was the lead project manager on a peer review of the study commissioned by TVA to determine the root cause of the December 22nd, 2008 ash spill at TVA's Kingston Fossil Plant. I appreciate this opportunity to testify before you regarding the results of that peer review and other observations about ash management practices at TVA. We prepared this work for the TVA Office of Inspector General. The details of it are incorporated into their report that is being made public today. I will now summarize the results of our work focusing on three important topics. First is Marshall Miller's conclusions regarding the root cause analysis. Second is our general conclusions and observations of ash management practices. Third is our recommendations for moving forward. Our first conclusion regarding the root cause analysis is that, in Marshall Miller's opinion, the four probable root causes identified by AECOM are technically plausible, reasonably supported by the data, and that all four contributed significantly to the spill. However, Marshall Miller believes that the AECOM root cause analysis focuses disproportionately on the significance of this thin, discontinuous soft foundation layer, which has been called a slimes layer or sensitive silt layer, as one of the most probable root causes. The significance of the ``fill geometry'' and the ``loose wet ash'', in other words, hydraulically placed or sluiced ash, indicate these factors also as probable root causes of equal or greater significance to the soft foundation soils factor. They should be equally emphasized. In Marshall Miller's opinion, the failure was not strictly associated with the thin, weak, sensitive silt and slimes foundation layer and more associated with the ash dike geometry and the relatively low strength of this sluiced loose wet ash and impounded material. Lastly, this has significant implications for TVA and the power industry. Other similarly constructed TVA impoundments with or without the slimes layer could be at risk of failure and should also be investigated. I will now focus on our general conclusions and observations concerning ash management. As early as 1985, intrinsic problems related to the stability of Dike C, which is the original dike, were known by TVA. An internal memorandum included in our report indicated that the calculated factor of safety for stability was less than the minimum accepted value of 1.5. Close monitoring was recommended at that time to detect any potential signs of failure in lieu of changing TVA policies and procedures that would require that the ash pond be designed to a higher dam safety standard. No specific action by TVA appears to have been taken to improve the stability of the earthen Dike C embankment. In Marshall Miller's opinion, if TVA had included its ash ponds in a dam safety program, as discussed in the December 1988 memorandum when TVA decided against this policy, the probability of identifying some or all of the conditions that led to the failure would have increased significantly. The construction of successive upstream stages to an elevation of 820 feet, which is the approximate failure elevation, above the original containment dike may have contributed to an additional decrease in the factor of safety of the containment dike system. In essence, at the time of failure, this increase in constructed height was approximately 70 feet higher than the original crest elevation of Dike C. The design of the Kingston coal ash dredge cells should have included a thorough engineering evaluation of all potential failure modes. Our recommendations for moving forward is that, since in our opinion, the Kingston ash pond failure was not strictly associated with the thin, weak sensitive silt and slimes foundation layer and more associated with the ash dike or fill geometry and the relatively low strength of the sluiced wet ash, other similarly constructed ash impoundments could be at risk of failure and should be properly investigated. TVA and the power generation industry as a whole should strongly consider all the factors evaluated by AECOM as probable root causes of the Kingston failure when assessing the condition and structural integrity of wet ash disposal facilities. It is not prudent to presume that, if slimes observed in the failed section at Kingston do not exist at any other sites, there is adequate stability of these structures. On the contrary, the information developed from the extensive studies conducted by Stantec and AECOM indicates that there is reasonable risk of other dike failures if changes are not made in the design, construction, oversight, and operation of these facilities. Lastly, sound engineering practice is to design such facilities with features that provide a reasonable degree of redundancy or a second line of defense in the event that one or more of these systems become inoperable. It is important that this design philosophy be applied to all of TVA's ash disposal facilities. This concludes my statement. I look forward to answering any questions you may have. Thank you very much. Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much. We will begin the first round of questions now. Mr. Kilgore, first of all, thank you for the pictures of the cleanup of Church Slough. I am really delighted and pleased at what this remediation of the Kingston spill can look like once it is all clean. As you noted in your testimony, I have traveled to Kingston and have seen the spill firsthand. Not 500 feet from the area shown us in the photographs is another contaminated area known as the embayment. Can we get a commitment from you today that you will restore that greater area to the same standards and the same conditions as you demonstrated is possible in the Church Slough? Mr. Kilgore. Yes, ma'am. We have made that commitment that we will clean up the river first, as the EPA has testified. Then we will move to the embayment. Then we have to move to the failed cell itself and fix that. So we have really three areas. We are committed to fix all three of those areas. Ms. Johnson. Now, you have seen this. I don't know how long it took for the buildup to come but have you determined how often you might need to move this out to keep it from accumulating to that level again? Mr. Kilgore. How often we might need to move this ash? Ms. Johnson. Yes. Mr. Kilgore. Yes, ma'am. We are designing a dry collection system there. That ash will have to be stored off-site. We intend to dry all of those ponds out so that we do not have wet storage on-site. As we move forward with that, as we design and implement that dry collection system, I anticipate all the ash will be transported off-site. Ms. Johnson. I understand you are moving it now to Alabama? Mr. Kilgore. We are. Ms. Johnson. Is that going to be a permanent place that you may be able to take it? Mr. Kilgore. No, ma'am. I wouldn't say that. We solicited bids from all locations that had the proper permits. We got several responses to that. We selected the site we did because, after we tentatively looked at that, I sent two of my senior executives down to look at it and talk to the community. They made sure that they were ready to receive it, that the pond and the permit looked in order, and all of that. Then we asked EPA for approval to ship that. We have committed to ship about three million tons out of the existing 5.4 million that we need to recover. We will be continuing to look at other sites for shipment. Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much. Mr. Stanislaus, in your testimony you state that EPA continues to evaluate coal ash disposal practices at coal-fired power plants to determine if these facilities are in compliance with existing environmental laws. Would you provide us a summary of the findings so far? Please also speak to compliance with Clean Water Act discharge permits. Mr. Stanislaus. We are in the midst of doing the assessment. We expect to complete the assessment of the high hazards and significant hazards by the end of this year. When we complete that we will certainly provide that to the Committee and yourself. Ms. Johnson. Now, let me just ask this one last question to you. In your view, from both storage and water quality perspectives, should coal-fired power plants be using wet ash disposal methods or dry? Mr. Stanislaus. Clearly, the use of wet ash is a significant risk that we are looking at in terms of our rule making. It has been identified as a risk of impact to groundwater and water quality. That is something that we are taking a hard look at in terms of our rule making, which we will be completing by the end of this year. Ms. Johnson. Do you plan to modify your oversight with TVA in view of the Inspector General's testimony? Mr. Stanislaus. TDEC, the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation, has a local lead of that. We are working with TDEC in terms of its oversight. We are in the field in terms of overseeing the removal of the coal ash from the river. We will be there throughout the removal of the coal ash. Ms. Johnson. Yes, but I mean in general. I also would like to say, too, that until EPA really got involved, according to the people in the area, they didn't see much change. What kind of oversight will be performed by those persons that have that responsibility? Mr. Stanislaus. EPA is on the site every day overseeing the work. Ms. Johnson. They are now? Mr. Stanislaus. Yes, they are. Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much. Mr. Boozman. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Moore, you mentioned that you agreed with the statement about poor oversight and lack of regulation as a contributor. I guess my question is poor oversight from whom? Is it the State or EPA? Your Office plays a role in this. Mr. Moore. Certainly, as you are aware, the Kingston facility was licensed or permitted as a landfill. There is a question about how adequate that regulation was. There is also a question, and I believe Mr. Walton FE Mr. Boozman. In regard to that regulation, whose fault is that? Mr. Moore. I don't necessarily want to pin fault, but I would say FE Mr. Boozman. But that is your job. Mr. Moore. Well, TDEC certainly was the regulating authority. The question would be whether there should be other regulators on these types of facilities. Certainly if they were regulated as dam structures, as I believe both Mr. Walton and Mr. Almes would recommend, there would have been more strenuous examination. If that had been done in this case, I am reliably told by Mr. Almes from Marshall Miller that it is possible that the Kingston spill would not have occurred. Mr. Boozman. So EPA was doing their job? Mr. Moore. Well, I don't know what EPA's jurisdiction would have been over a landfill at the time. Mr. Boozman. You mention that lack of regulation. Was it lack of regulation or just failure to enforce the current regulation? I think that is important. I don't know. That is why we are asking these questions. Mr. Moore. My observations, sir, would be that even strict regulation of a landfill, when you have the combined geotechnical forces that were at work here, would not have been sufficient. Mr. Boozman. Very good. Mr. Kilgore, what steps is TVA taking to ensure that this doesn't happen at the other coal ash storage facilities? In particular, I know TVA utilizes wet ash storage at other sites, some of which are no longer in operation. While TVA is proposing to close the five operational wet coal ash disposal sites, what is TVA proposing to do with those sites that are no longer in operation? Mr. Kilgore. We have one of those sites, sir, at the Watts Bar Fossil Plant. We have contained it. The other five sites that are wet storage, besides Kingston, we are moving forward with a plan to take all of those to dry storage. So we are going that way. What we have done in the last six months is Stantec's identification. They walked down all the facilities and they identified initial issues that we needed to correct. We have hauled about 82,000 tons of rock to shore up various places. We have cleaned out vegetation so that the inspectors can see better. But I think the most important thing is that we have gotten a lot more intrusive. In other words, instead of doing visual investigations, we have drilled holes. Stantec has gone out there much like AECOM did on the failed facility and drilled into these dams to ascertain what is underground so that they know what is underground. That gives us some more comfort but we will not be comforted until we know exactly what is down there and we take all the remedial actions. We have tried to unstop all the drains to make sure the drains are properly operating. We have tried to backfill, as I said, with stone. We put piezometers down, about 250 piezometers in these ten other sites, so that we can see movement and see water. Mr. Boozman. Very good. I have one final question, Mr. Walton, real quick. When you all were contacted to look into this and figure out what was going on, the root cause, were you just asked to do the technical aspects of it or did you get into the corporate culture and things like that? Were you asked to do both? Mr. Walton. No. Our role was the technical review of the root cause for failure, the cause location and explaining the failure mechanism. Mr. Boozman. Okay. Thank you all very much. Thank you, Madam Chair. Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much. Mr. Griffith. Mr. Griffith. Thank you, Madam Chair. The EPA initiated a report in 2002 that has just been released in 2009 that demonstrates the carcinogenic effect of coal ash combustion material from coal. Are you familiar with that report release in 2009? Mr. Stanislaus. I am not specifically familiar with it. Mr. Griffith. Let me tell you a little bit about it. In 1775, a year before 1776, Dr. Percival Pott described coal combustion causing cancer in chimney sweeps. We have known for that many years that these were carcinogenic agents that we were producing. We have noted that all through the subsequent years. In 2009, a report was issued that had been ongoing since 2002 within your agency. It demonstrated that the increased risk of cancer around these coal ash deposits was significant. My question is this: Do you believe that, had you told Mr. Kilgore about those findings, there would have been a heightened responsibility on the part of TVA? This dump in particular was unlined and leaking into the goundwater. As far as EPA is concerned will this spill have far reaching consequences? The second part of that question is how are you going to know when you have got that site cleaned up, if a great majority of it has already gone downriver? Mr. Stanislaus. With respect to your first question, clearly this spill is a catastrophic event that should not have occurred. Clearly the constituents in coal ash are something that we are taking a look at in terms of regulation. We will be issuing that regulation later this year. So we are taking this seriously, the consequence of the constituents in that. With respect to knowing when we are done, that is frankly our job. We have historically remediated river sites. We will ensure that everything is removed from the river. I don't know if Mr. Meiburg wants to add to that. Mr. Meiburg. I would only add to that, Congressman, that fortunately, or unfortunately depending upon your point of view, most of the material actually stayed in some vicinity of the site. Our highest priority on the cleanup has been to get the material out of the main stem of the Emory River to make sure that more doesn't go downstream, especially during the spring flood period. That is why we have been pushing to accelerate the removal of the material from the river, so that we could try to get most of it out of the main stem before next spring. We have been making accelerated progress on that with TVA over the last couple of months. We expect to continue that. Mr. Griffith. Thank you. This issue really is not, I am changing gears a little bit, this issue is really not about cleanup. Mr. Almes, I think you were probably not surprised at the spill after being an engineer and inspecting. I don't think anyone is faulting anyone on the cleanup. What we are concerned with is the multitude of areas in the country that are very similar to Kingston. I know that you have had that experience in Iowa. We have had that experience in Pennsylvania. We do know that this coal ash is as carcinogenic as nuclear waste. We know that arsenic, selenium and boron are chemicals that we are finding in the waste. And we know that they are now present in the drinking water in many communities. How can we reassure our constituents? Since the Tennessee River runs through my district, how can we reassure my constituents that they are safe, that we are keeping them safe? Mr. Stanislaus. I presume that is directed at me. Mr. Griffith. Well, anybody can chime in on that one if you have got a good answer. Mr. Stanislaus. As Administrator Jackson has committed, we are going around the Country and doing an assessment of all facilities with high and significantly high hazard ratings. That will be done by the end of this year. We will also be taking a look at all of the facilities to assess where there is any risk of failure and prevent that. Also, if there are any violations, we plan to do enforcement actions. Those are the short term actions. We are simultaneously looking at the risk and the need to develop some rules to prevent any impact to groundwater or surface water. Mr. Griffith. This is just for Mr. Kilgore. My question is whether we should rely on State agencies? Should we punt the responsibility to a State agency that apparently has failed us in this area as far as inspections? In your organization, and I know you are new to the job, essentially, and inherited a great deal of this, are heads rolling? Are you getting anybody's attention there? TVA is like turning around the Queen Mary. This will take a while. What can we look forward to there? Mr. Kilgore. Well, we have to change. If that means heads have to roll or people have to leave, so be it. You would find, if you go back from when I arrived until now, that about two thirds of the senior management has changed. About 90 percent of the plant managers have recently been rotated or, in some cases, new plant managers have been installed so that we have new eyes on this problem. If I have learned one lesson about this, it is to be intrusive and to be self-critical about things we don't know about. That means that occasionally we need fresh eyes on the subject and that we don't allow these waivers, if you will, from looking at things. I will be honest, the memorandum that was mentioned earlier in 1985 said that the safety factor was not what it should be. But further down it said that the remedy is a daily inspection. That is not good enough. Knowing what we know now, it is not good enough that the remedy was a daily inspection. The safety factor has to be increased. We are the first line of defense on that and we have to do that. Mr. Griffith. I have one last thing, Madam Chair. I am over time but I am concerned that we might be allowing TVA to grade its own paper. In an agency that big, I know that you can't sit there and watch them take the test. So my concern is that grading your own paper is a great danger to us. Should we have random independent inspections of facilities outside of the TVA organization? Mr. Kilgore. I think that is a question more to our regulators, EPA. But I will tell you that we welcome the outside. I have learned a lot in this. I don't think we are grading our own papers since I have got EPA, TDEC, the OIG, and an outside law firm that the Board employed. I have got four people looking over my shoulder. We have put over 20,000 pages of documents on the website so that everybody else can see that. Some of those are very painful for me. I am both saddened and frankly a little bit mad that I walked into this. But it is my responsibility now that we have found it to clean it up and to change the culture. Mr. Griffith. Thank you, Mr. Kilgore. Thank you, Madam Chair. Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much. Mr. Hare. Mr. Hare. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Mr. Kilgore, in early July after the release of the root cause analysis by AECOM, the TVA released a statement that included the following statement. It says, ``TVA has asked Stantec to pay particular attention to the four major contributing causes of the Kingston ash spill to ensure the combination does not exist at any other site. To date, nothing has been found that indicates that this combination exists at other TVA facilities.'' Based on the earlier statements by Mr. Walton and Mr. Almes, I wonder if you could explain the public statement by TVA? In my view, this seems to imply that because that particular combination does not exist, there is no viable threat of collapse at these other facilities. I was wondering, do you share that same plain reading interpretation? Mr. Kilgore. I do not share that interpretation. Thank you for asking that question. We obviously, since those four factors were identified, pay particular attention to them because I don't want any of those four factors to catch us again. Stantec has been debriefed regularly by AECOM so that they know what is going on. But they have not been limited to that. What we are concerned about is that all the rest of these structures, frankly, may be individual. None of them may be like the other ones. So we have got to be, as I said earlier, intrusive in each one of them. AECOM drilled many, many holes. They even asked us to cut a slice in the old dike at Kingston so that they could see what was really down there. We are asking Stantec, they have already started doing that and they have completed quite a bit, to put those instruments down there. So the implication that if these four factors don't exist elsewhere we are home free is not an implication that I agree with. We have to treat each one of those as its own individual structure. Mr. Hare. In your testimony today you state, ``There is no evidence of imminent failure at other TVA sites based on initial Stantec evaluations.'' However, in its recent Phase I assessment report, Stantec itself states, ``Due to limited record drawings and construction QA/QC documentation at any of these facilities, Stantec is unable to render opinions relative to overall structural integrity.'' These two statements seem to be wildly inconsistent. So, especially in light of the findings by the McKenna and the TVA OIG reports concerning a broken culture of accountability, this seems very troubling. Can you maybe comment on this and enlighten me? Mr. Kilgore. I will try. Let me address the Stantec report first of all. What I understand from that, in talking to them and others of my staff, is that when they looked at our drawings they indeed found this culture problem. We had the drawings of how the dams were supposed to be built but they didn't have as-builts. So we didn't know what was changed and we didn't know if they were built according to those drawings. That is why we asked them to go be intrusive, to drill, to find out everything they could about the as-built condition. So, yes, they can't give me an unequivocal statement that this is not in danger of failing. What we are doing is following their advice, letter by letter, and trying to go frankly a little overboard with some of it in terms of our clearing and our progress toward drying it out. As I said earlier today, I will not be comfortable until we have the knowledge of what is underground on all of these. Stantec has a few months yet to work on this to complete their work. Even then, I think we still have to be self-critical and intrusive. Mr. Hare. I have just one last question, maybe for the panel. I apologize because I came in late. What was the total cost of this cleanup to the American taxpayers? What was the total cost? Mr. Kilgore. The total cost, we estimate, will be right at $1 billion. Mr. Hare. $1 billion? Mr. Kilgore. $1 billion. Mr. Hare. Thank you, Madam Chair. Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much. Congresswoman Napolitano. Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you, Madam Chair. Of great interest to me especially is the area of groundwater. Mr. Kilgore, I am under the impression that groundwater contamination was a problem before. Where there is a combination of dams and wet ash, is there leakage into an aquifer underneath that might contaminate aquifers in the area from which people drink? Mr. Kilgore. We have no evidence that I know of that it is leaking into the aquifer. We have wells and we are monitoring those. So we have no evidence so far. I will let the EPA comment, but they commented also on the water and the intake structure. We have been monitoring FE Mrs. Napolitano. There is no lining. Mr. Kilgore. Excuse me? Mrs. Napolitano. There is no lining underneath. Mr. Kilgore. You are right. There is no lining. This ash, though, settles. The metals are not all soluble so it settles. We think it stays there, unless we have an incident like this. So our greatest need is to get all of this out of the river and back onto dry land so it can dry out. Mrs. Napolitano. Another area of concern, of course, is in the July 2009 report of TVA's Inspector General. Appendix C includes an internal TVA memorandum. Point four of this memorandum, ``Because of concerns about groundwater contamination, TVA is moving away from wet ash disposal techniques to dry stacking.'' I would like to ask if you can provide the Subcommittee with copies of the analysis that went into formulating these concerns about groundwater in 1988, 21 years ago? Secondly, in the 21 years since that analysis was presented to TVA management, what specific action or actions have been taken to alleviate TVA's own concerns about groundwater contamination? I am into water. I am, you know, the Chair of the Subcommittee on Water and Power. So contaminants are something that we have been facing on my own Subcommittee. We have no new water sources. So any water that we abuse or misuse, we need to clean up. I am concerned that any of these pollutants may have leaked into or contaminated the reservoir next to the Kingston facility. I don't know what EPA has done about making sure that contaminants are not being carried out to where effluent is being pumped out as fresh water. Mr. Kilgore. Well, I am concerned about the water, too, because I live there and occasionally go boating. So I share your concerns. We do have wells in the area that we are monitoring. TDEC looked at 400 wells around the area and found no groundwater contamination. That is not a reason for us to rest. I take your concerns seriously and we are going to continue to look at that. Mrs. Napolitano. Would you provide this Committee, then, with the copies of that analysis that went into formulating that concern in 1988? Mr. Kilgore. I will. Let me just admit that what the Inspector General found was that there was not proper action on some of those older things. I will admit that to you right now. That is what I have to change. Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you. EPA? Mr. Stanislaus. I will let Mr. Stan Meiburg deal with the local issues. With respect to the impact on groundwater from impoundment, that is something we are looking at right now. That has been identified specifically as causing damage to groundwater and to surface water. We are looking at that in terms of developing new rules. Those rules will be developed by the end of this year. With respect to the specific local concerns, I would like to let Mr. Meiburg address that. Mr. Meiburg. Yes. As Mr. Stanislaus said, groundwater contamination from these types of facilities has been a concern to EPA. Whether or not groundwater contamination occurs in part depends on the geological structure that underlays them. We have done pretty extensive sampling, along with the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation, at this particular site. It appears that in this case we have been fortunate. There has not been migration of contaminants through a groundwater pathway in any of the samples that we have taken so far. Mrs. Napolitano. How often do you test those areas? Mr. Meiburg. We have been testing those areas very frequently now. Mrs. Napolitano. Frequently meaning daily, weekly, or monthly? Mr. Meiburg. No, we have not been doing daily samples. What we have done is gone and tested the wells, as Mr. Kilgore said, together with TDEC and TVA since the accident occurred. We have not yet found any movement into any of the wells that are tested. But it is not a regular sample. It has been a sample on request and demand. Mrs. Napolitano. I have a great concern about the cost to the general taxpayer, number one. Number two is the health and safety of those areas. Then, of course, number three is whether or not it becomes an issue that then comes back to the Federal Government to clean up. I have a contaminated site that has involved maybe 20 years in cleanup, costing millions upon million of dollars. The taxpayer is paying for it because the potential responsible parties are long gone. I am certain that we don't want to face anything like that, maybe, in the other areas where you may have these same facilities. Steps must be taken to protect the water safety, the public safety, and any other area that is of concern. Mr. Kilgore? Mr. Kilgore. Yes, ma'am. TVA does not get Government funding so all of this will fall to us to pay. Unfortunately, the steps that we didn't take in the past will now fall on our rate payers. We will have to pay for that through our electric bills. We intend to try to stretch that out. This problem didn't occur overnight so we are going to try to amortize that out over several years. Still, as you indicate, somebody has to pay for the oversights in the past. As I said, my job is to make sure it doesn't happen again. Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you, Madam Chair. Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much. Mr. Hall. Mr. Hall. Thank you, Madam Chair. I am sorry for being late. I was double-booked, as many of us are. It so happens that I was at the Select Committee for Energy Independence and Global Warming where we heard, among other things, testimony from Dr. Brent Constantz, a professor from Stanford University and CEO of Calera Corporation, who talked about a potential future solution to this kind of problem. I am just curious, Mr. Kilgore or any of the engineers, if you would comment on this CMAP technology, Carbonate Mineralization by Aqueous Precipitation, in which the natural carbonate mimics corals when they make their external skeleton, capturing CO2 emissions and storing it in a stable mineral form. It can be used to replace or supplement traditional Portland cement, offsetting emissions that would otherwise result. It can be used as aggregate as well. The estimated current market demand for cement and aggregate is over three billion tons per year in the United States alone and over 30 billion tons per year worldwide. The process has the potential to provide a positive use of the overwhelming majority of U.S. coal fired emissions, including solid waste normally bound for landfills such as fly ash, luminous smelt, or byproducts such as red mud and other waste products that can be incorporated into this process. I know we need to solve this problem; we need to deal with the existing old technologies. But this seems to me like maybe a promising road for TVA to look at. Mr. Kilgore. Yes, sir. I am not prepared to answer that today but I would like to have my research and development folks give me an answer for you and to file that for the record. I will say that as to climate change, TVA approved about a year ago a goal to get us to less than 50 percent carbon-based generation by the early 2020s. So we are cognizant of the issue. This sounds like something that I would very much like our engineers to look into. Mr. Hall. I will make sure you get a copy of it. We got all excited in the other hearing when we heard about this stuff. I wanted to ask about specifically what actions, this is to EPA, what actions have been taken at TVA's Widows Creek, Bull Run, and Colbert power facilities? What enforcement actions has EPA engaged in? Why has EPA not enforced the Clean Water Act and other statutes as a result of this known pollution? Mr. Stanislaus. With respect to this particular spill, the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation entered into an order with TVA to address the cleanup. EPA subsequently entered into an agreement on consent to oversee the cleanup work by TVA. With respect to Clean Water Act violations, I have to get back to you on that. Mr. Hall. In the January 2009 Senate Environment and Public Works Committee hearing, Mr. Kilgore, you told Chairwoman Boxer and Senator Merkley that you would look into the groundwater and surface water contamination issues at these three facilities, cited by EPA. Could you tell us today how these facilities are implicated with the contamination of water? What exactly has happened? What steps have you taken and what are you looking forward to doing to deal with these facilities? Mr. Kilgore. With respect to the three you talked about, I didn't find any evidence that we had exceeded any groundwater emissions there. We still plan on going to dry storage of the ash on those sites. So what we are planning on doing is getting rid of the wet storage there. That means that the water is less and the volume is less. The ash is stored in a dry state. Mr. Hall. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back. Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much, Mr. Hall. I have one final question to Mr. Walton. You mentioned that there were lessons learned that are maybe applicable to other coal ash storage sites. Can you elaborate a little bit? Mr. Walton. I would be honored to. There is a body of knowledge that has been gained through the sampling of the loose wet ash. There has been an awareness as to the containment systems using the upstream dike methods of construction, similar in the way that mine tailings facilities are done. There have been some lessons learned in that the ash does not improve its density with higher and deeper layers placed on top of it. I think that is applicable to be used and studied at other sites. Certainly the rate of loading is important as these sites get higher and higher with the added influence of gravity on these structures. The lessons learned are that you don't have to have slimes. You might have a foundation system made of clays or you may be on some loose sands near an earthquake zone for those facilities near seismic areas. There are also the issues of piping and seepage and water management. These structures are made by hydraulic methods, controlling the waters that pass through and are contained. So there is water management, seepage management, storage, and containment. All these factors are lessons learned. It is sort of an awakening in that trained engineers are able to get out there, inspect, assess, and take this program, through your guidance and others, forward so that this won't happen again. Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much. Mr. Kilgore, what I would like to see is some communication between you and entities responsible for some of the other spills. See if you can come up with something of a plan for how often you have to move coal ash to prevent buildup. If you talk to Kentucky and some of the other places that have had similar issues, I would appreciate it. Mr. Kilgore. I will do that. Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much. This is the end of our hearing. 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