- SOMALIA: PROSPECTS FOR LASTING PEACE AND A UNIFIED RESPONSE TO EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM

[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

SOMALIA: PROSPECTS FOR LASTING PEACE AND
A UNIFIED RESPONSE TO EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM

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HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND GLOBAL HEALTH

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

__________

JUNE 25, 2009

__________

Serial No. 111-58

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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

______

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
Samoa DAN BURTON, Indiana
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts RON PAUL, Texas
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
DIANE E. WATSON, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York CONNIE MACK, Florida
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
GENE GREEN, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
LYNN WOOLSEY, CaliforniaAs TED POE, Texas
of 3/12/09 deg. BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
BARBARA LEE, California
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
JIM COSTA, California
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
RON KLEIN, Florida
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
Yleem Poblete, Republican Staff Director
------

Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey, Chairman
DIANE E. WATSON, California CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
BARBARA LEE, California JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
LYNN WOOLSEY, CaliforniaAs
of 3/18/09 deg.
Noelle Lusane, Subcommittee Staff Director
Sheri Rickert, Republican Professional Staff Member
Antonina King, Staff Associate

C O N T E N T S

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Page

WITNESSES

Mr. Ted Dagne, Specialist, African Affairs, Congressional
Research Service............................................... 2
J. Peter Pham, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Justice Studies,
Political Science and Africana Studies, Director, Nelson
Institute for International and Public Affairs, James Madison
University..................................................... 13

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

Mr. Ted Dagne: Prepared statement................................ 8
J. Peter Pham, Ph.D.: Prepared statement......................... 18

APPENDIX

Hearing notice................................................... 32
Hearing minutes.................................................. 33
Written questions submitted for the record by the Honorable
Barbara Lee, a Representative in Congress from the State of
California [no responses received prior to printing]........... 34
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Texas: Prepared statement.................... 36

SOMALIA: PROSPECTS FOR LASTING PEACE AND A UNIFIED RESPONSE TO
EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM

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THURSDAY, JUNE 25, 2009

House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:13 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Donald Payne
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Payne. I will withhold my opening statement in order to
save time. But I welcome all of you here, and I will make an
opening statement after I return from the votes that we will
have, that have already started, but we will hear from our
first panel.
We first have with us Mr. Ted Dagne, a graduate of Howard
University. He is a specialist in African Affairs at the
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the
Congressional Research Service. He has been with the CRS since
1989.
From 1993-1995, Ted Dagne served as a professional staff
member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on
Africa, under the chairmanship of Mr. Harry Johnston from
Florida. Mr. Dagne also served as a special adviser from 1999-
2000 to President Clinton's Special Envoy for Sudan and to the
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr. Susan
Rice.
Over the past 20 years, Mr. Dagne has written over 2,000
major studies on Africa, including reports on the war on terror
in Africa, the status of democracy, conflict resolution,
humanitarian disasters, and studies on over 30 countries. Ted
has also co-authored two books on Somalia and Africa and the
war on terror.
As a professional staff member and a staffer at CRS, Mr.
Dagne wrote and assisted in drafting over 100 resolutions and
legislative pieces in Congress. In 1994, Mr. Dagne helped write
the African Conflict Resolution and Prevention Act, which was
signed into law. The act provided funds to the Organization of
African Unity Conflict Resolution Center and funded a number of
demobilization and reintegration programs in Africa. Over the
past two decades, Mr. Dagne has traveled on fact-finding
missions to over 30 African countries on multiple occasions.
Also, we have Dr. J. Peter Pham. Dr. Pham is director of
the Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs at
James Madison University in Harrisonburg, Virginia, where he
holds an academic appointment as associate professor of justice
studies, political science and African studies. He is also
senior fellow for Africa Policy Studies at the Foundation for
the Defense of Democracies in Washington, DC; senior fellow and
project director at the National Committee on American Foreign
Policy in New York City; and adjunct faculty for the sub-
Saharan Africa course at the United States Air Force Special
Operations School in Florida.
Dr. Pham is the author of over 200 essays and reviews and
is the author, editor or translator of over a dozen books.
Dr. Pham is the incumbent vice president of the Association
for the Study of the Middle East and Africa, an academic
organization chaired by Professor Bernard Lewis and
representing more than 700 scholars of Middle Eastern and
African studies at over 300 colleges and universities in the
United States of America.
Dr. Pham was the recipient of the 2008 Nelson Mandela
International Prize for African Security and Development,
presented jointly by the Royal United Services Institute for
Defence and Security Studies, the Brenthurst Foundation and the
Nelson Mandela Foundation.
At this time, the hearing will officially come to order.
Mr. Dagne, would you begin?

STATEMENT OF MR. TED DAGNE, SPECIALIST, AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

Mr. Dagne. Chairman Payne and members of the subcommittee,
let me first express my appreciation for inviting me to testify
before your subcommittee.
I am sure many of you have seen the images on TV or have
read about it in the newspapers, and some of you have witnessed
the untold suffering of many Somalis over the years. I, for
one, have stopped counting how many innocent civilians have
been killed, maimed or how many people have been displaced from
their homes.
Unfortunately and sadly, many more people will die in the
coming weeks and months. A Somali friend recently told me that
he has given up dreaming about a better future for his family.
Almost 3 years ago this week, in the testimony before the same
subcommittee, I read a short Somali proverb in an attempt to
describe the conditions that many Somalis face. The proverb
goes like this:

``Sorrow is like rice in the store; if a basketful is
removed every day, it will come to an end at last.''

I stated then that Somalia's tragedy would come to an end;
we just do not know how soon. Three years later, I still cannot
tell you with certainty what the future holds for the millions
of Somalis.
One thing is clear. The determination and commitment I saw
15 years ago, at the height of the civil war, by Somali women,
human rights advocates and Somali nationalists is still very
much alive. The leadership of the current government is not
staying at the Serena Hotel in Nairobi, Kenya. They are in
Mogadishu, facing the challenges and the risks every day. Some
left family members and friends so that they can help their
people.
Hundreds of thousands of Somalis have died due to fighting
famine or disease.
I have witnessed firsthand the untold suffering of the
people of Somalia over the decades. A generation of Somalis is
growing up surrounded by violence, poverty, and they face a
very bleak future. Many have been internally displaced or have
been forced to flee their country.
Indeed, the most affected by the violence and chaos in
Somalia are women and children. Many Somali girls have been
raped and violated by the so-called ``militia.'' Even a rape
victim was stoned to death for reporting what happened to her.
If the extremists waging war against the TFG succeed, we are
likely to see more of these acts by the so-called al-Shabaab.
What has happened over the past 6-7 weeks?
Well, in early May, Somali extremist groups, backed by
foreign fighters, launched a major offensive against the TFG
and the African Union peacekeeping forces. Over the past 6
weeks, more than 300 people have been killed and many more
wounded. The primary objective of this offensive is to force
the collapse of the TFG and to force AMISOM to leave Somalia.
Several al-Shabaab factions, a group called Hisbul al-Islam
and a number of foreign fighters, have been engaged in a series
of battles against government forces. Al-Shabaab has also
carried out in recent weeks, and in the past, a series of
assassinations, including those of the police chief and the
minister of interior, who were killed last week. This was, in
large part, to create a leadership crisis.
More than 400 foreign fighters, reportedly from
Afghanistan, Yemen, Pakistan, the United States, Canada,
Britain, Kenya, and several other countries have been engaged
in fighting in support of the al-Shabaab forces. More than 290
of these fighters reportedly entered Mogadishu in early May,
while an estimated 50 of these fighters were in Mogadishu for
much longer. Some of these fighters have been killed in battles
in Mogadishu, but we do not know for sure how many.
The insurgents definitely receive support from some
governments and al Qaeda. In May 2009, the spokesman of al-
Shabaab admitted that they have invited and that they have
accepted some foreign fighters to join them in the fighting.
In early June, al-Shabaab and Hisbul Islam made important
gains in Mogadishu and in other parts of Somalia, in large part
due to some defections to the insurgency and due to lack of
resources. The TFG forces regrouped, and by mid-June, managed
to regain some lost ground in Mogadishu, but the TFG remains
vulnerable, and its ability to defeat the insurgents depends on
resources, including armed personnel carriers, mobility and
well-organized and sustainable military operations.
The presence of the African Union force has helped prevent
the takeover of Mogadishu thus far, but the African Union force
does not have a Chapter VII mandate, requiring the force to be
on the defensive rather than taking offensive measures against
the insurgents.
The African Union force, however, has used its long-range
artilleries against the insurgents. These measures have
weakened and have forced the insurgents to remain outside the
range of those weapons.
The most serious challenge facing the TFG forces and those
of the African Union is that the insurgents are highly
decentralized and move in small units and operate independently
of one another, meaning that killing an al-Shabaab commander
does not mean the end of the al-Shabaab, or destroying a unit
of al-Shabaab does not mean the insurgency will be over. That
is the danger that we face.
So who are these leaders?
Well, the leaders of al-Shabaab are not well-known with the
exception of a few. Some of the key commanders and leaders of
al-Shabaab actually do not come from south or south central
Somalia. Some of them come from Somaliland.
Ahmed Abdi Godane is one of the key leaders, who is also on
the United States terrorism list, who was trained and fought in
Afghanistan. Another one is named Mukhtar Robow, who is also on
the U.S. terrorism list and is considered one of the key
leaders of al-Shabaab and is the former spokesman, although in
recent weeks he has been marginalized and has been at odds with
the other commanders.
Another key leader who comes from Somaliland is Ibrahim
Haji Jama, who is also on the U.S. terrorism list. Again, he
reportedly trained and fought in Afghanistan.
Another one is Hassan al-Turki, a member of the Ogaden
clan, who is not even a Somali, who comes from Ogaden,
Ethiopia. He has openly called for jihad and has closely
aligned himself with foreign fighters. There are a number of
them who consider themselves to be leaders. What is important
to remember is that these leaders have begun now to turn
against each other.
The U.S. Government placed the al-Shabaab on the terrorism
list, but that has had very little impact on the operations and
support that the al-Shabaab receives from outside.
There is another leader that the international community
has focused on, who is also on our terrorism list. His name is
Sheik Hassan Aweys. In late April, Aweys, who is also on the
terrorism list, returned to Mogadishu from Eritrea. Aweys had
remained in Eritrea and formed his own faction after the top
leadership of the ARS signed an agreement in Djibouti with
other Somali parties, which led to the formation of the current
government.
ARS-Asmara, under the leadership of Aweys, did not garner
significant support; although Aweys intensified his support for
extremist groups inside Somalia, ARS leaders were not in full
agreement with Aweys and his support for the extremist groups
inside Somalia. Recently, they provided a visitor written
documentation to this effect, disassociating themselves from
him. By the end of May, most of them had left Eritrea, which
means ARS-Asmara no longer exists.
In late April, I met Sheik Aweys in Eritrea. He seemed
confused at times. On a number of occasions, he contradicted
himself. When asked if he was prepared to state publicly his
support for peaceful participation in the current political
process, Aweys responded positively. However, when he was asked
whether he would renounce terrorism and call for an end to
violence against civilians, Aweys stated that, since he
considered the American interpretation of ``terrorism'' as
anti-Islam, he cannot condemn terrorism. Doing so, he asserted,
``is denouncing his own religion.''
When asked if he wished to be removed from the terrorism
list, Aweys stated that he would not seek to be removed because
that would be going against his own religion. When confronted
about his role in support of terrorism and violence in Somalia,
he characterized this act as a struggle against the enemies of
Somalia.
Upon his return to Mogadishu in late April, Aweys
discovered that the clan leaders and militia who had supported
him in the past now wanted him to work with the government. The
militia group he created, Hisbul Islam, also was split, and
some had joined al-Shabaab. Some of the top leaders of al-
Shabaab also wanted him to declare an alliance with Osama bin
Laden.
In my view, Aweys is unlikely to emerge as the leader of
the insurgency, and he seems to be losing support even within
his own inner circle.
Briefly now about the humanitarian and human rights
conditions: Conditions in 2008 actually became worse than in
previous years. The recent fighting in Mogadishu has added more
challenges to already poor conditions on the ground. An
estimated 1.1 million people have been displaced and more than
0.5 million have fled to neighboring countries in the past
several years.
Human rights groups and Somali observers estimate that more
than 22,000 have been killed over the past 2 years, most of
them civilians. Civilians, humanitarian workers, journalists,
and human rights advocates have been the primary targets of the
insurgents.
According to Amnesty International, rape, killing and
looting have become widespread; entire neighborhoods have been
destroyed. A number of Somali journalists covering the crisis
in Somalia have been assassinated by insurgents and security
forces over the past 18 years.
The United States did provide significant assistance over
the years, particularly in humanitarian aid. In the past 5-6
months, the United States has also provided crucial support in
terms of peacekeeping operation support as well as support to
the TFG. In Fiscal Year 2009, it is estimated that the United
States assistance to Somalia will reach $177 million, including
peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance.
Now, I am sure most of you have heard and have read about
the piracy problem. I do not want to dwell on that issue since
it has been overblown beyond what is needed. What is important
here is, I would like to highlight some of the issues that have
not been covered and some of the issues that have been ignored
as it relates to piracy.
By the way, who are these pirates?
The number of Somali pirates is not known. While there are
more pirates now than in previous years, the pirates do not
seem to have a unified organization with a clear command
structure. Many of these pirates are reportedly fishermen and
former militia members. The pirates primarily come from the
Puntland region of Somalia, and are members of different clans
and do not necessarily come from one region. Some reports have
suggested that the pirates are being controlled and directed by
the Islamic insurgents in south central Somalia. I am not aware
of any evidence, however, to support this assertion.
What do Somalis say about piracy?
Well, some Somalis view the piracy crisis as a foreign
problem with little impact on their daily life. Some argue that
the piracy problem will continue as long as ship owners are
willing to pay the pirates ransom.
In the face of difficult economic conditions and a growing
humanitarian crisis, many Somalis resent the fact that the
piracy problem has received a great deal of international
attention. Some Somali community leaders contend that some
Somalis get involved in criminal activities in order to
survive, while many others have made this kind of activity a
lifetime profession. Many Somalis contend, however, that in the
absence of a better alternative, they have come to accept life
with all the difficulties they face daily.
Mr. Payne. Mr. Dagne, I think that, if you could hold your
point, I will go vote now. There has been no voting time left
for some time now, so I am going to rush over to the floor. We
will have seven other votes at 2 minutes each, so it will be
about 14 minutes--15--maybe 20 minutes at the most. I will see
if I can catch this vote.
The hearing will stand in recess. I should be back in 15-20
minutes. Thank you. You can follow the votes on the screen as a
matter of fact. Bye now.
[Recess.]
Mr. Payne. Thank you for your patience. Votes are still
proceeding, but there will be about a 25-minute period of time,
and then there will be about two other votes that will take
about 10 or 15 minutes. We will break at that time after 25
minutes, and then resume 10 minutes after that.
I am calling the hearing back to order. We were in the
process of hearing testimony from Mr. Dagne from the
Congressional Research Service, and I would ask him to proceed
as he sees fit.
Thank you.
Mr. Dagne. Let me, I am almost done with my testimony. I
was talking about the pirates, who they are, and how we got
into this problem. You know, the pirates, these fishermen have
become pirates in large part because their way of life was
destroyed. In 2005, the United Nations Environmental Program
released a report documenting the damages resulting from toxic
waste dumping on Somalia's shores. According to a UNEP
spokesmen, uranium radioactive waste, there is lead, there is
heavy metal like cadmium, mercury, there is industrial waste,
there is hospital waste, chemical waste, you name it,
everything was dumped.
According to the report, the primary reason for toxic
dumping in Somalia is cost. The report states that it costs
$2.50 per ton to dump toxic waste in Africa compared to $250
per ton to dump waste in Europe.
So what are the policy options available to us in dealing
with the political and security problems? The current
government in Mogadishu is generally seen as the last defense
against the extremists and terrorist groups currently waging
war in south central Somalia. Effective policy options
available to deal with these threats are limited. The
international community may consider engagement with Islamic
insurgents and clan elders to deal with the political and
security problems facing Somalia. Regional and United States
officials are convinced that it is pivotal to strengthen the
moderate elements of the Islamist movement.
Most observers believe that Al-Shabaab can only be
contained by another Islamist Somali movement. Some Al-Shabaab
leaders are determined to continue their military campaign, and
are not inclined to participate in any negotiations. In this
case, targeted measures, including sanctions and other harsh
measures against the most extreme elements of the Al-Shabaab
might pave the way for other moderate leaders to emerge. Harsh
measures and sometimes violent measures against these
individuals could backfire in the short term and increase anti-
Western violence.
A more effective option for containing the extremist threat
may be to look for a Somali-led solution. The TFG Somaliland,
Puntland, and other moderate Somali forces could possibly form
a coalition to contain the advances of the most extreme
elements of the Al-Shabaab. Such a coalition is likely to get
support of the Somali population. A Somali-led initiative would
take away one of the most powerful justifications used by the
Al-Shabaab to wage war, the presence of foreign forces and the
use of Islam for political reasons. However, it is important
that the unified regional approach must be maintained.
In conclusion, there appears to be no easy solution or
options to bring a lasting peace in Somalia. Somalis continue
to make great sacrifices to achieve this objective. There is a
very telling Somali proverb that goes like this: The best bed
that a man can sleep on is peace.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dagne follows:]Ted
Dagne deg.

Mr. Payne. Thank you very much.
Dr. Pham.

STATEMENT OF J. PETER PHAM, PH.D., ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, JUSTICE
STUDIES, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND AFRICANA STUDIES, DIRECTOR,
NELSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, JAMES
MADISON UNIVERSITY

Mr. Pham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the interests of
time, I would like to offer a summary of my views and ask, with
your leave, that my prepared statement be entered into the
record.
Mr. Payne. Without objection.
Mr. Pham. Chairman Payne, Ranking Member Smith, and members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to speak to
you today about the critical conditions currently prevailing in
Somalia and threatening the security and stability of the
entire Horn of Africa. Permit me the liberty of observing it is
3 years almost to the day since I appeared before the
predecessor of this subcommittee at its first hearing on the
threat of extremism emanating from Somalia, and this body under
your leadership, Mr. Chairman, and that of Mr. Smith has
maintained consistent vigilance on this important security
issue, while simultaneously upholding the highest standards of
respect for human rights.
As a scholar who closely tracks developments in the
subregion, allow me to add a personal note of appreciation for
your leadership in keeping attention focused on issues relating
to the Horn of Africa in general, and in particular for
bringing about this historic hearing, which brings together in
the same forum high representatives of the Transitional Federal
Government of Somalia, the Puntland State of Somalia, as well
as some of Somalia's international partners. I regret that the
Foreign Minister of the Republican of Somaliland was unable to
join us to share the experience of his people in avoiding the
very scourges, including extremism, conflict and piracy, which
this hearing endeavors to examine.
While I understand the Somalilanders' sensitivity about any
appearance prejudicial to their 1991 declaration of renewed
independence and the delicate nature of the internal politics
there, as Somaliland, alone of all the territories which were
once part of the Somali Democratic Republic before the collapse
of the Mohammed Siyad Barre regime, moves to its second
democratic Presidential and parliamentary elections in just 3
months, I nonetheless hope that the representatives of the
Republic of Somaliland will provide the subcommittee with
information on its contribution to security and peace in the
subregion.
This hearing convenes at a moment when Somalia is going
through yet another grave crisis, the latest in a two-decade-
long cycle of state collapse, political failure, and, sadly,
human suffering. The various factions of Al-Shabaab, their
assorted allies, including the Hisbul al-Islamiyya, helped by
outside states and other actors, have proven themselves more
resilient than many international observers have been willing
to admit. Having in recent months consolidated their control of
the area from the southern suburbs of the capital to the border
with Kenya, the militants launched an offensive at the
beginning of May with the apparent objective of encircling the
capital to its north as well. In just the last week, the
already bad security situation has deteriorated further, as
militants, following on earlier incursions, brought their
offensive into Mogadishu amid fierce fighting.
Now is not the time to assign blame; however, if we are to
go forward, we have to acknowledge the realities on the ground.
Notwithstanding the hopes that accompanied the installation of
Sheikh Sharif as the TFG president at the end of January--and I
say installation because I would not call the extralegal
machinations in Djibouti an election unless we want to hold up
a mockery of the TFG's own charter by the parliamentarians as
an example of constitutional governance for the subregion--the
results have been disappointing. The TFG is not a government in
any commonsense definition of the term. It is entirely
dependent on foreign troops from the African Union mission in
Somalia to protect its small enclave in Mogadishu, but
otherwise it maintains no territory, it administers no laws,
and even within its restricted zone, it has shown no functional
capacity to govern, much less provide minimal services to its
citizens.
Even if Sheikh Sharif manages to reconcile the TFG's
original secular framework with its more recent, albeit ill-
defined, adoption of Sharia, the transitional government faces
an almost insurmountable deficit of capacity, accountability,
and credibility.
This grim recital of just some of the TFG shortcomings is
not gratuitous. Rather, the point I am trying to make is that
even in what many view as the best-case scenario coming out of
the current crisis, that the TFG will somehow manage to rally
enough support among Somali clans and communities to push back
the current offensive and win itself some time, the
transitional regime is not very well positioned to win a long
war against the insurgency by wooing some of the insurgents and
defeating or at least marginalizing the others, much less to
emerge as the foundation for whatever political settlement
Somalis eventually agree upon.
The worst-case scenario, of course, is that Al-Shabaab and
its allies defeat the TFG entirely, assume control of the
capital, as well as the bulk of south central and southern
Somalia, which they already loosely control. If this were to
happen, it would be a geopolitical disaster, with repercussions
rippling well beyond the borders of Somalia.
While comparisons with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan in the
1990s are a bit of a stretch, that is not to say that outside
actors, ranging from al Qaeda, which would undoubtedly try to
capitalize at least propaganda-wise on the events, to Ethiopia,
which would be tempted to return in force, to the United
States, which would likely ramp up counterterrorism operations,
will not treat it as such. However, it should be noted that
even if the insurgents do not defeat the TFG outright, in many
respects they have already achieved a status and represent a
significant threat to Somalis and others.
Whatever the origins and intent of the militants currently
facing the TFG, they have clearly been radicalized. Even
without taking Mogadishu, al-Shabaab and its allies have
already succeeded in carving out a geographical space where
they and like-minded groups can operate freely. To cite one
example, the suicide bomber who killed four South Korean
tourists and their guide near the ancient fortress city of
Shibam in Yemen's Hadramut on March 15th underwent training at
a Shabaab-controlled southern Somali camp before returning to
his native country and carrying out the deadly attack.
Intelligence officials believe the same to be the case with the
suicide bomber who 3 days later hit a convoy carrying the South
Korean Ambassador and investigators looking on that earlier
attack. Thus without even toppling the TFG, Shabaab has already
achieved a major objective by securing a territorial base from
which like-minded militants and terrorists can carry out
attacks elsewhere, especially against targets in the Arabian
Peninsula, as well as participating in the current violence
against Somalis.
As if this were not disturbing enough for the United
States, even more unsettling is the fact that a number of young
Somali Americans have left their homes in the United States and
gone to Shabaab-controlled areas of Somalia, presumably for
training. One of these men, a naturalized United States citizen
from Minneapolis, Minnesota, became the first-ever American
suicide bomber when he blew himself up in an attack in
Somaliland last October, an attack which left dozens of
civilians dead.
One hopeful indicator, however, amidst this gloomy
landscape, has been the ideological motivations of al-Shabaab
and aligned extremist movements do not permit them to proceed
at a slower speed in their march through Somali territory and
society. Instead, a certain internal dynamic compels them to
keep pushing, even when it might be in their long-term
interests to act with greater circumspection. Militarily, this
temptation to overreach is visible in the relentless advance,
whose cause one might argue would be better served by
consolidating their rule in areas they already control.
Turning to the issue of piracy, the attacks by Somali
pirates on merchant shipping in the waters off the coast of
Somalia have added an additional challenge to an already
complicated regional security picture. The marauders have
hardly been cowed by the international naval presence involving
warships from the United States, the United Kingdom, France,
Russia, China, India, Japan, Turkey, and several other
countries, which assembled earlier this year in an
unprecedented effort to prevent a repeat of last year's wave of
more than 100 attacks on commercial vessels in the Gulf of Aden
and nearby waters. The pirates have simply shifted their
operations to areas which they know are not patrolled, with
strikes taking place on the high seas of the western Indian
Ocean and elsewhere, as witnessed by the seizure 2 weeks ago of
a German-owned cargo ship 60 nautical miles south of Oman.
While the 2 dozen or so cruisers and other vessels from
various countries make for great political theater, and may
have even proven useful in escort duty along narrowly defined
sea lanes, there are simply not enough of them to make a real
dent in operations against the pirates. And even if there were
enough warships to conduct adequate counterpiracy operations,
it is doubtful that the commitment is sustainable over a long
term.
Hence, what is needed is a pragmatic solution that deals
with the economic, political, and security challenges caused by
the expanded activities of Somali pirates, but whose costs can
be contained within acceptable limits, and whose long-term
operation is sustainable by those with the most immediate stake
in its success, regional and local actors as well as merchant
vessels which must transit these dangerous waters. So in
addition to beefing up security on and for merchant vessels,
the only sustainable option currently available for dealing
with the scourge is dealing with the problem on land.
I have repeatedly argued that the problem of lawlessness at
sea will only be definitively resolved when the international
community summons up the political will to adequately address
the underlying pathology of de facto statelessness onshore. One
of the ways to do this, of course, to achieve maximum local
support, is building up Coast Guard capabilities that are
viewed not purely as an antipiracy measure, but rather embed
those efforts within the local economies of the districts,
providing benefits to communities as a way of weaning them away
from their dependence on criminal enterprises.
Mr. Chairman, United States policy toward Somalia has
veered from neglect in the 1990s to an emphasis on kinetic
counterterrorism operations in the aftermath of 9/11, and
especially after the Ethiopian intervention flushed out some of
the terrorists long sought by American security officials. Even
if justifiable in individual cases, the use of hard power has
bred resentment and allowed radical forces to wrap themselves
up in the mantle of nationalism, undermining our broader
strategic objective of countering radicalization, to say
nothing of humanitarian norms.
More recently, even as the situation has gone from bad to
worse, presenting the entire Horn of Africa with a security
crisis of the first order, spreading instability across a
fragile subregion, and raising the specter that transnational
terrorist movements will find and exploit opportunities
offered, the approach of the international community and
apparently the policy of the United States has become ensnared
in what is essentially a circular logic. For want of better
ideas, the international community has opted to buy into a
seductive but vicious cycle of its own manufacture, whereby it
must stay the course and continue to devote scarce political
and material resources, while exclusively shoring up the TFG
because it has already invested too much time and resources
into it to do otherwise.
If the failure so far of no fewer than 14 internationally
sponsored attempts at establishing a national government
indicate anything, it is the futility of the notion that
outsiders can impose a regime on Somalia, even if it is staffed
with presumably moderate Somalis of our liking. Instead, in the
context of the decentralized reality among the Somali, we, the
concerned international community in general, and the United
States in particular, need to invest the time and resources to
seek out local partners who can, first of all, work with us in
creating a modicum of stability, societal, economic, and
ultimately governmental. This will not be an easy task since
the conflict of recent years has taken its toll on civil
society. Nonetheless, local groups do exist.
If I may cite one example, SAACID, the extraordinary
nongovernmental organization founded and directed by Somali
women engaged in conflict transformation, women's empowerment,
education, health care, emergency relief, employment schemes,
development. Amid the current crisis, for example, this NGO is
providing 80,000 2,000-calorie-a-day meals to residents of
Mogadishu.
I would add a consensus is emerging among experts who have
tracked Somalia for some time that any workable solution must
embrace a bottom-up or building-block approach rather than the
hitherto top-down strategy.
Given the ripple effects of continuing disorder in the
Somali lands, in addition to helping the functional parts of
the TFG, it makes no sense for the international community not
to work with effective authorities in the Republic of
Somaliland, Puntland State, the province of Gedo, and other
areas, as well as to seek to engage traditional leaders and
civil society actors. These figures enjoy both legitimacy with
the populace and have actual, as opposed to notional, security
and development agendas which complement our own goal of
preventing chaos from reigning.
With respect to intervening in Somalia, while I salute the
courage and determination of the Ugandan People's Defense Force
peacekeepers in AMISOM, along with their Burundian colleagues,
and I am fully cognizant of concerns of Somalia's immediate
neighbors like Ethiopia and Kenya, I would argue that the
legitimate security interests of the countries in the region
can best be met not by their becoming embroiled in a conflict
where their support of the TFG has become itself a rallying
point for the insurgents. Rather, I would argue that the
African resources might be best put to work containing the
spread of instability from Somalia, and preventing additional
foreign fighters and supplies from fueling the conflict in the
country.
I readily acknowledge that the approach such as the one I
am sketching out may strike many as minimalist; however, I am
convinced, and even more so today, that it is the course most
likely to buy Somalis themselves the space within which to make
their own determinations about their future, while at the same
time allowing the rest of the world, especially the countries
of the Horn of Africa, to achieve their legitimate security
objective. Not only does such a strategy offer the most
realistic hope of salvaging a modicum of regional stability and
security out of the situation that grows increasingly
intractable, but it allows the time, space, and freedom for
Somalis to rebuild their shattered common life.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, members of the
subcommittee, I am grateful again for the opportunity to come
before you today. I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pham follows:]J.
Peter Pham deg.

Mr. Payne. Let me thank both of the panelists for your
testimony.
I will recess again. This time, though, I believe that I
can be back within 10 or 15 minutes. We have 3 minutes left on
the current vote, which should take about 7 or 8 minutes, and
then an immediate vote to follow. So I really expect to be back
within 10-12 minutes. So we will stand recessed.
[Recess.]
Mr. Payne. We will reconvene the hearing, and I will just
ask our two presenters, I might ask a quick question or two,
and then we will recess the hearing and move to our second
panel.
I listened to both presentations. We know that the
situation in Somalia is very difficult. We know that it has
been a country without a central government since 1991. We have
seen the difficulty. Dr. Pham had a relatively gloomy
perspective, and we are aware of the difficulties. Mr. Dagne
also indicated that there are very, very difficult roads ahead;
however, that there is a solution, in his opinion. Dr. Pham
indicated that militarily Somalia could not be won, suggesting,
I guess, that the Somalis support the insurgents, which I would
kind of conclude, in Mogadishu.
So I just wonder, if you, Dr. Pham, would comment on this,
if I am mischaracterizing. And, of course, the criticism of the
way the TFG was selected. I know that you said there was no
election, which is true. It would be very difficult to have an
election in Somalia after 20 years of no government. But from
what I understand, there was an attempt to select a
Transitional Federal Government that sort of represented the
society of Somalia, the clans and the subclans and the regions.
So if you could just, in a nutshell, once again reiterate your
prognostication that it is virtually impossible, and then, Mr.
Dagne, your prognostication on why it might be possible.
Mr. Pham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to
clarify.
Militarily I think there are two, possibly three things
that need to be distinguished. One is I am very critical, and
although I do not believe that an external military
intervention is helpful, because it will play directly into the
hands of the extremists, who would then wrap themselves up in
the mantle of nationalism.
Mr. Payne. All right. But would you--you say an internal.
Wouldn't you suggest that the insurgents are being supported
externally?
Mr. Pham. They are being supported externally by both
foreign fighters, organizations, states, what have you. But
what I am suggesting is that a foreign military force into
Somalia would be totally inadvisable. We have seen where that
has led already in the past, and I don't think that we want a
reprise of that.
What I do suggest, however, is that we work with effective
authorities within Somalia itself, the functional parts of the
Transitional Federal Government, the State of Puntland's
authorities, the Republic of Somaliland, and other areas where
we might identify those who resist the extremists and are
capable and effective; that we work with them, that we don't
simply channel all of our assistance through one channel, and
we work with the effective authorities, and then allow the
Somalis themselves the time to turn on the extremists.
The extremists, I think, as my colleague would agree, do
not represent Somali society or the traditional Islam practiced
in Somalia. So with time and containment, in a way the
extremists carry the seeds of their own internal contradiction
and self-destruction from within. We just need to keep that
from spreading beyond. And the most effective way is to work
with those who are most effective.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Mr. Dagne. Thank you.
Mr. Dagne. I think the Somalis, in my view, already have
achieved a great deal in terms of bringing stability and
attempting also to contain the threats posed by the extremists
and terrorists. One just has to look at Puntland and also to a
certain extent also Somaliland.
Are we without clear option? The answer is no. We are--the
U.S. Government is providing assistance. You have foreign
forces. The Ugandans and the Burundians are there assisting.
They are not there simply to function as peacekeepers, but they
are protecting the legitimate government in Mogadishu.
I think in addition to a Somali-led option, the
international community also must see this threat as a threat
not just to Mogadishu or Puntland or Somaliland, but the threat
to the entire region. This is no longer a Somali-led
insurgency. This is an insurgency now being led by outsiders,
whose primary purpose is to destroy, to obstruct, and to
establish a base for the terrorist groups.
What specific measure can be taken? For one, I think the
Somalis, both in Mogadishu and Puntland and in Somaliland,
could come together, form a coalition to contain this threat.
The international community can provide assistance, targeted
assistance, in terms of logistic support, transportation. And
at times it might be necessary also to target in order to take
out some of the leaders who would never change their position.
But the military option is not the only option. We also
need to invest both in terms of economic development, as well
as I think the basic necessities that the Somalis need. You are
not going to have a piracy problem if the pirates were to have
employment. If the Somali people see that there are schools
being built, hospitals, they would be able to support and they
would have an interest to fight the extremists and the
terrorists.
Mr. Payne. Well, let me thank both of you. We would
probably have many more questions; but, because of the
interruption with the votes, I would just like to thank both of
you for your expert testimonies. And with that, I will conclude
the formal meeting.
All right. Go ahead. Yes.
Ms. Woolsey. Go ahead.
Mr. Payne. I think we would like to bring on our guests who
have traveled here for a long time, because we may run into
another set of votes. And I think that would not work well,
since we have introduced so many folks. So with that, thank you
very much, and I will adjourn this portion.
[Whereupon the hearing adjourned to reconvene as a
briefing.]

A P P E N D I X

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Material Submitted for the Hearing RecordNotice deg.

Mi nutes deg.

QFRs--Lee deg.__

Jackson Lee statement deg.
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