    [House Hearing, 111 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                    SOMALIA: PROSPECTS FOR LASTING PEACE AND
                 A UNIFIED RESPONSE TO EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND GLOBAL HEALTH

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 JUNE 25, 2009

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 111-58

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

     Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

                                     ______

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                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
    GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York           ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
    ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American      CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
        Samoa                            DAN BURTON, Indiana
    DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey          ELTON GALLEGLY, California
    BRAD SHERMAN, California             DANA ROHRABACHER, California
    ROBERT WEXLER, Florida               DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
    ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York             EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
    BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts         RON PAUL, Texas
    GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York           JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
    DIANE E. WATSON, California          MIKE PENCE, Indiana
    RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri              JOE WILSON, South Carolina
    ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey              JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
    GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia         J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
    MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York         CONNIE MACK, Florida
    JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee            JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
    GENE GREEN, Texas                    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
    LYNN WOOLSEY, CaliforniaAs  TED POE, Texas
        of 3/12/09 deg.                  BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
    SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas            GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
    BARBARA LEE, California
    SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
    JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
    MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
    BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
    DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
    JIM COSTA, California
    KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
    GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
    RON KLEIN, Florida
                       Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
                    Yleem Poblete, Republican Staff Director
                                     ------

                    Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health

                     DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey, Chairman
    DIANE E. WATSON, California          CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
    BARBARA LEE, California              JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
    BRAD MILLER, North Carolina          JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
    GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York           JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
    SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
    LYNN WOOLSEY, CaliforniaAs
        of 3/18/09 deg.
                   Noelle Lusane, Subcommittee Staff Director
              Sheri Rickert, Republican Professional Staff Member
                         Antonina King, Staff Associate

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Mr. Ted Dagne, Specialist, African Affairs, Congressional
      Research Service...............................................     2
    J. Peter Pham, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Justice Studies,
      Political Science and Africana Studies, Director, Nelson
      Institute for International and Public Affairs, James Madison
      University.....................................................    13

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    Mr. Ted Dagne: Prepared statement................................     8
    J. Peter Pham, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.........................    18

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................    32
    Hearing minutes..................................................    33
    Written questions submitted for the record by the Honorable
      Barbara Lee, a Representative in Congress from the State of
      California [no responses received prior to printing]...........    34
    The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
      from the State of Texas: Prepared statement....................    36

        SOMALIA: PROSPECTS FOR LASTING PEACE AND A UNIFIED RESPONSE TO
                            EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, JUNE 25, 2009

                      House of Representatives,
              Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health,
                                  Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:13 p.m., in
    room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Donald Payne
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Payne. I will withhold my opening statement in order to
    save time. But I welcome all of you here, and I will make an
    opening statement after I return from the votes that we will
    have, that have already started, but we will hear from our
    first panel.
        We first have with us Mr. Ted Dagne, a graduate of Howard
    University. He is a specialist in African Affairs at the
    Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the
    Congressional Research Service. He has been with the CRS since
    1989.
        From 1993-1995, Ted Dagne served as a professional staff
    member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on
    Africa, under the chairmanship of Mr. Harry Johnston from
    Florida. Mr. Dagne also served as a special adviser from 1999-
    2000 to President Clinton's Special Envoy for Sudan and to the
    Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr. Susan
    Rice.
        Over the past 20 years, Mr. Dagne has written over 2,000
    major studies on Africa, including reports on the war on terror
    in Africa, the status of democracy, conflict resolution,
    humanitarian disasters, and studies on over 30 countries. Ted
    has also co-authored two books on Somalia and Africa and the
    war on terror.
        As a professional staff member and a staffer at CRS, Mr.
    Dagne wrote and assisted in drafting over 100 resolutions and
    legislative pieces in Congress. In 1994, Mr. Dagne helped write
    the African Conflict Resolution and Prevention Act, which was
    signed into law. The act provided funds to the Organization of
    African Unity Conflict Resolution Center and funded a number of
    demobilization and reintegration programs in Africa. Over the
    past two decades, Mr. Dagne has traveled on fact-finding
    missions to over 30 African countries on multiple occasions.
        Also, we have Dr. J. Peter Pham. Dr. Pham is director of
    the Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs at
    James Madison University in Harrisonburg, Virginia, where he
    holds an academic appointment as associate professor of justice
    studies, political science and African studies. He is also
    senior fellow for Africa Policy Studies at the Foundation for
    the Defense of Democracies in Washington, DC; senior fellow and
    project director at the National Committee on American Foreign
    Policy in New York City; and adjunct faculty for the sub-
    Saharan Africa course at the United States Air Force Special
    Operations School in Florida.
        Dr. Pham is the author of over 200 essays and reviews and
    is the author, editor or translator of over a dozen books.
        Dr. Pham is the incumbent vice president of the Association
    for the Study of the Middle East and Africa, an academic
    organization chaired by Professor Bernard Lewis and
    representing more than 700 scholars of Middle Eastern and
    African studies at over 300 colleges and universities in the
    United States of America.
        Dr. Pham was the recipient of the 2008 Nelson Mandela
    International Prize for African Security and Development,
    presented jointly by the Royal United Services Institute for
    Defence and Security Studies, the Brenthurst Foundation and the
    Nelson Mandela Foundation.
        At this time, the hearing will officially come to order.
        Mr. Dagne, would you begin?

       STATEMENT OF MR. TED DAGNE, SPECIALIST, AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
                     CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

        Mr. Dagne. Chairman Payne and members of the subcommittee,
    let me first express my appreciation for inviting me to testify
    before your subcommittee.
        I am sure many of you have seen the images on TV or have
    read about it in the newspapers, and some of you have witnessed
    the untold suffering of many Somalis over the years. I, for
    one, have stopped counting how many innocent civilians have
    been killed, maimed or how many people have been displaced from
    their homes.
        Unfortunately and sadly, many more people will die in the
    coming weeks and months. A Somali friend recently told me that
    he has given up dreaming about a better future for his family.
    Almost 3 years ago this week, in the testimony before the same
    subcommittee, I read a short Somali proverb in an attempt to
    describe the conditions that many Somalis face. The proverb
    goes like this:

            ``Sorrow is like rice in the store; if a basketful is
            removed every day, it will come to an end at last.''

        I stated then that Somalia's tragedy would come to an end;
    we just do not know how soon. Three years later, I still cannot
    tell you with certainty what the future holds for the millions
    of Somalis.
        One thing is clear. The determination and commitment I saw
    15 years ago, at the height of the civil war, by Somali women,
    human rights advocates and Somali nationalists is still very
    much alive. The leadership of the current government is not
    staying at the Serena Hotel in Nairobi, Kenya. They are in
    Mogadishu, facing the challenges and the risks every day. Some
    left family members and friends so that they can help their
    people.
        Hundreds of thousands of Somalis have died due to fighting
    famine or disease.
        I have witnessed firsthand the untold suffering of the
    people of Somalia over the decades. A generation of Somalis is
    growing up surrounded by violence, poverty, and they face a
    very bleak future. Many have been internally displaced or have
    been forced to flee their country.
        Indeed, the most affected by the violence and chaos in
    Somalia are women and children. Many Somali girls have been
    raped and violated by the so-called ``militia.'' Even a rape
    victim was stoned to death for reporting what happened to her.
    If the extremists waging war against the TFG succeed, we are
    likely to see more of these acts by the so-called al-Shabaab.
        What has happened over the past 6-7 weeks?
        Well, in early May, Somali extremist groups, backed by
    foreign fighters, launched a major offensive against the TFG
    and the African Union peacekeeping forces. Over the past 6
    weeks, more than 300 people have been killed and many more
    wounded. The primary objective of this offensive is to force
    the collapse of the TFG and to force AMISOM to leave Somalia.
        Several al-Shabaab factions, a group called Hisbul al-Islam
    and a number of foreign fighters, have been engaged in a series
    of battles against government forces. Al-Shabaab has also
    carried out in recent weeks, and in the past, a series of
    assassinations, including those of the police chief and the
    minister of interior, who were killed last week. This was, in
    large part, to create a leadership crisis.
        More than 400 foreign fighters, reportedly from
    Afghanistan, Yemen, Pakistan, the United States, Canada,
    Britain, Kenya, and several other countries have been engaged
    in fighting in support of the al-Shabaab forces. More than 290
    of these fighters reportedly entered Mogadishu in early May,
    while an estimated 50 of these fighters were in Mogadishu for
    much longer. Some of these fighters have been killed in battles
    in Mogadishu, but we do not know for sure how many.
        The insurgents definitely receive support from some
    governments and al Qaeda. In May 2009, the spokesman of al-
    Shabaab admitted that they have invited and that they have
    accepted some foreign fighters to join them in the fighting.
        In early June, al-Shabaab and Hisbul Islam made important
    gains in Mogadishu and in other parts of Somalia, in large part
    due to some defections to the insurgency and due to lack of
    resources. The TFG forces regrouped, and by mid-June, managed
    to regain some lost ground in Mogadishu, but the TFG remains
    vulnerable, and its ability to defeat the insurgents depends on
    resources, including armed personnel carriers, mobility and
    well-organized and sustainable military operations.
        The presence of the African Union force has helped prevent
    the takeover of Mogadishu thus far, but the African Union force
    does not have a Chapter VII mandate, requiring the force to be
    on the defensive rather than taking offensive measures against
    the insurgents.
        The African Union force, however, has used its long-range
    artilleries against the insurgents. These measures have
    weakened and have forced the insurgents to remain outside the
    range of those weapons.
        The most serious challenge facing the TFG forces and those
    of the African Union is that the insurgents are highly
    decentralized and move in small units and operate independently
    of one another, meaning that killing an al-Shabaab commander
    does not mean the end of the al-Shabaab, or destroying a unit
    of al-Shabaab does not mean the insurgency will be over. That
    is the danger that we face.
        So who are these leaders?
        Well, the leaders of al-Shabaab are not well-known with the
    exception of a few. Some of the key commanders and leaders of
    al-Shabaab actually do not come from south or south central
    Somalia. Some of them come from Somaliland.
        Ahmed Abdi Godane is one of the key leaders, who is also on
    the United States terrorism list, who was trained and fought in
    Afghanistan. Another one is named Mukhtar Robow, who is also on
    the U.S. terrorism list and is considered one of the key
    leaders of al-Shabaab and is the former spokesman, although in
    recent weeks he has been marginalized and has been at odds with
    the other commanders.
        Another key leader who comes from Somaliland is Ibrahim
    Haji Jama, who is also on the U.S. terrorism list. Again, he
    reportedly trained and fought in Afghanistan.
        Another one is Hassan al-Turki, a member of the Ogaden
    clan, who is not even a Somali, who comes from Ogaden,
    Ethiopia. He has openly called for jihad and has closely
    aligned himself with foreign fighters. There are a number of
    them who consider themselves to be leaders. What is important
    to remember is that these leaders have begun now to turn
    against each other.
        The U.S. Government placed the al-Shabaab on the terrorism
    list, but that has had very little impact on the operations and
    support that the al-Shabaab receives from outside.
        There is another leader that the international community
    has focused on, who is also on our terrorism list. His name is
    Sheik Hassan Aweys. In late April, Aweys, who is also on the
    terrorism list, returned to Mogadishu from Eritrea. Aweys had
    remained in Eritrea and formed his own faction after the top
    leadership of the ARS signed an agreement in Djibouti with
    other Somali parties, which led to the formation of the current
    government.
        ARS-Asmara, under the leadership of Aweys, did not garner
    significant support; although Aweys intensified his support for
    extremist groups inside Somalia, ARS leaders were not in full
    agreement with Aweys and his support for the extremist groups
    inside Somalia. Recently, they provided a visitor written
    documentation to this effect, disassociating themselves from
    him. By the end of May, most of them had left Eritrea, which
    means ARS-Asmara no longer exists.
        In late April, I met Sheik Aweys in Eritrea. He seemed
    confused at times. On a number of occasions, he contradicted
    himself. When asked if he was prepared to state publicly his
    support for peaceful participation in the current political
    process, Aweys responded positively. However, when he was asked
    whether he would renounce terrorism and call for an end to
    violence against civilians, Aweys stated that, since he
    considered the American interpretation of ``terrorism'' as
    anti-Islam, he cannot condemn terrorism. Doing so, he asserted,
    ``is denouncing his own religion.''
        When asked if he wished to be removed from the terrorism
    list, Aweys stated that he would not seek to be removed because
    that would be going against his own religion. When confronted
    about his role in support of terrorism and violence in Somalia,
    he characterized this act as a struggle against the enemies of
    Somalia.
        Upon his return to Mogadishu in late April, Aweys
    discovered that the clan leaders and militia who had supported
    him in the past now wanted him to work with the government. The
    militia group he created, Hisbul Islam, also was split, and
    some had joined al-Shabaab. Some of the top leaders of al-
    Shabaab also wanted him to declare an alliance with Osama bin
    Laden.
        In my view, Aweys is unlikely to emerge as the leader of
    the insurgency, and he seems to be losing support even within
    his own inner circle.
        Briefly now about the humanitarian and human rights
    conditions: Conditions in 2008 actually became worse than in
    previous years. The recent fighting in Mogadishu has added more
    challenges to already poor conditions on the ground. An
    estimated 1.1 million people have been displaced and more than
    0.5 million have fled to neighboring countries in the past
    several years.
        Human rights groups and Somali observers estimate that more
    than 22,000 have been killed over the past 2 years, most of
    them civilians. Civilians, humanitarian workers, journalists,
    and human rights advocates have been the primary targets of the
    insurgents.
        According to Amnesty International, rape, killing and
    looting have become widespread; entire neighborhoods have been
    destroyed. A number of Somali journalists covering the crisis
    in Somalia have been assassinated by insurgents and security
    forces over the past 18 years.
        The United States did provide significant assistance over
    the years, particularly in humanitarian aid. In the past 5-6
    months, the United States has also provided crucial support in
    terms of peacekeeping operation support as well as support to
    the TFG. In Fiscal Year 2009, it is estimated that the United
    States assistance to Somalia will reach $177 million, including
    peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance.
        Now, I am sure most of you have heard and have read about
    the piracy problem. I do not want to dwell on that issue since
    it has been overblown beyond what is needed. What is important
    here is, I would like to highlight some of the issues that have
    not been covered and some of the issues that have been ignored
    as it relates to piracy.
        By the way, who are these pirates?
        The number of Somali pirates is not known. While there are
    more pirates now than in previous years, the pirates do not
    seem to have a unified organization with a clear command
    structure. Many of these pirates are reportedly fishermen and
    former militia members. The pirates primarily come from the
    Puntland region of Somalia, and are members of different clans
    and do not necessarily come from one region. Some reports have
    suggested that the pirates are being controlled and directed by
    the Islamic insurgents in south central Somalia. I am not aware
    of any evidence, however, to support this assertion.
        What do Somalis say about piracy?
        Well, some Somalis view the piracy crisis as a foreign
    problem with little impact on their daily life. Some argue that
    the piracy problem will continue as long as ship owners are
    willing to pay the pirates ransom.
        In the face of difficult economic conditions and a growing
    humanitarian crisis, many Somalis resent the fact that the
    piracy problem has received a great deal of international
    attention. Some Somali community leaders contend that some
    Somalis get involved in criminal activities in order to
    survive, while many others have made this kind of activity a
    lifetime profession. Many Somalis contend, however, that in the
    absence of a better alternative, they have come to accept life
    with all the difficulties they face daily.
        Mr. Payne. Mr. Dagne, I think that, if you could hold your
    point, I will go vote now. There has been no voting time left
    for some time now, so I am going to rush over to the floor. We
    will have seven other votes at 2 minutes each, so it will be
    about 14 minutes--15--maybe 20 minutes at the most. I will see
    if I can catch this vote.
        The hearing will stand in recess. I should be back in 15-20
    minutes. Thank you. You can follow the votes on the screen as a
    matter of fact. Bye now.
        [Recess.]
        Mr. Payne. Thank you for your patience. Votes are still
    proceeding, but there will be about a 25-minute period of time,
    and then there will be about two other votes that will take
    about 10 or 15 minutes. We will break at that time after 25
    minutes, and then resume 10 minutes after that.
        I am calling the hearing back to order. We were in the
    process of hearing testimony from Mr. Dagne from the
    Congressional Research Service, and I would ask him to proceed
    as he sees fit.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Dagne. Let me, I am almost done with my testimony. I
    was talking about the pirates, who they are, and how we got
    into this problem. You know, the pirates, these fishermen have
    become pirates in large part because their way of life was
    destroyed. In 2005, the United Nations Environmental Program
    released a report documenting the damages resulting from toxic
    waste dumping on Somalia's shores. According to a UNEP
    spokesmen, uranium radioactive waste, there is lead, there is
    heavy metal like cadmium, mercury, there is industrial waste,
    there is hospital waste, chemical waste, you name it,
    everything was dumped.
        According to the report, the primary reason for toxic
    dumping in Somalia is cost. The report states that it costs
    $2.50 per ton to dump toxic waste in Africa compared to $250
    per ton to dump waste in Europe.
        So what are the policy options available to us in dealing
    with the political and security problems? The current
    government in Mogadishu is generally seen as the last defense
    against the extremists and terrorist groups currently waging
    war in south central Somalia. Effective policy options
    available to deal with these threats are limited. The
    international community may consider engagement with Islamic
    insurgents and clan elders to deal with the political and
    security problems facing Somalia. Regional and United States
    officials are convinced that it is pivotal to strengthen the
    moderate elements of the Islamist movement.
        Most observers believe that Al-Shabaab can only be
    contained by another Islamist Somali movement. Some Al-Shabaab
    leaders are determined to continue their military campaign, and
    are not inclined to participate in any negotiations. In this
    case, targeted measures, including sanctions and other harsh
    measures against the most extreme elements of the Al-Shabaab
    might pave the way for other moderate leaders to emerge. Harsh
    measures and sometimes violent measures against these
    individuals could backfire in the short term and increase anti-
    Western violence.
        A more effective option for containing the extremist threat
    may be to look for a Somali-led solution. The TFG Somaliland,
    Puntland, and other moderate Somali forces could possibly form
    a coalition to contain the advances of the most extreme
    elements of the Al-Shabaab. Such a coalition is likely to get
    support of the Somali population. A Somali-led initiative would
    take away one of the most powerful justifications used by the
    Al-Shabaab to wage war, the presence of foreign forces and the
    use of Islam for political reasons. However, it is important
    that the unified regional approach must be maintained.
        In conclusion, there appears to be no easy solution or
    options to bring a lasting peace in Somalia. Somalis continue
    to make great sacrifices to achieve this objective. There is a
    very telling Somali proverb that goes like this: The best bed
    that a man can sleep on is peace.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Dagne follows:]Ted
    Dagne deg.

        Mr. Payne. Thank you very much.
        Dr. Pham.

    STATEMENT OF J. PETER PHAM, PH.D., ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, JUSTICE
      STUDIES, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND AFRICANA STUDIES, DIRECTOR,
     NELSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, JAMES
                           MADISON UNIVERSITY

        Mr. Pham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the interests of
    time, I would like to offer a summary of my views and ask, with
    your leave, that my prepared statement be entered into the
    record.
        Mr. Payne. Without objection.
        Mr. Pham. Chairman Payne, Ranking Member Smith, and members
    of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to speak to
    you today about the critical conditions currently prevailing in
    Somalia and threatening the security and stability of the
    entire Horn of Africa. Permit me the liberty of observing it is
    3 years almost to the day since I appeared before the
    predecessor of this subcommittee at its first hearing on the
    threat of extremism emanating from Somalia, and this body under
    your leadership, Mr. Chairman, and that of Mr. Smith has
    maintained consistent vigilance on this important security
    issue, while simultaneously upholding the highest standards of
    respect for human rights.
        As a scholar who closely tracks developments in the
    subregion, allow me to add a personal note of appreciation for
    your leadership in keeping attention focused on issues relating
    to the Horn of Africa in general, and in particular for
    bringing about this historic hearing, which brings together in
    the same forum high representatives of the Transitional Federal
    Government of Somalia, the Puntland State of Somalia, as well
    as some of Somalia's international partners. I regret that the
    Foreign Minister of the Republican of Somaliland was unable to
    join us to share the experience of his people in avoiding the
    very scourges, including extremism, conflict and piracy, which
    this hearing endeavors to examine.
        While I understand the Somalilanders' sensitivity about any
    appearance prejudicial to their 1991 declaration of renewed
    independence and the delicate nature of the internal politics
    there, as Somaliland, alone of all the territories which were
    once part of the Somali Democratic Republic before the collapse
    of the Mohammed Siyad Barre regime, moves to its second
    democratic Presidential and parliamentary elections in just 3
    months, I nonetheless hope that the representatives of the
    Republic of Somaliland will provide the subcommittee with
    information on its contribution to security and peace in the
    subregion.
        This hearing convenes at a moment when Somalia is going
    through yet another grave crisis, the latest in a two-decade-
    long cycle of state collapse, political failure, and, sadly,
    human suffering. The various factions of Al-Shabaab, their
    assorted allies, including the Hisbul al-Islamiyya, helped by
    outside states and other actors, have proven themselves more
    resilient than many international observers have been willing
    to admit. Having in recent months consolidated their control of
    the area from the southern suburbs of the capital to the border
    with Kenya, the militants launched an offensive at the
    beginning of May with the apparent objective of encircling the
    capital to its north as well. In just the last week, the
    already bad security situation has deteriorated further, as
    militants, following on earlier incursions, brought their
    offensive into Mogadishu amid fierce fighting.
        Now is not the time to assign blame; however, if we are to
    go forward, we have to acknowledge the realities on the ground.
    Notwithstanding the hopes that accompanied the installation of
    Sheikh Sharif as the TFG president at the end of January--and I
    say installation because I would not call the extralegal
    machinations in Djibouti an election unless we want to hold up
    a mockery of the TFG's own charter by the parliamentarians as
    an example of constitutional governance for the subregion--the
    results have been disappointing. The TFG is not a government in
    any commonsense definition of the term. It is entirely
    dependent on foreign troops from the African Union mission in
    Somalia to protect its small enclave in Mogadishu, but
    otherwise it maintains no territory, it administers no laws,
    and even within its restricted zone, it has shown no functional
    capacity to govern, much less provide minimal services to its
    citizens.
        Even if Sheikh Sharif manages to reconcile the TFG's
    original secular framework with its more recent, albeit ill-
    defined, adoption of Sharia, the transitional government faces
    an almost insurmountable deficit of capacity, accountability,
    and credibility.
        This grim recital of just some of the TFG shortcomings is
    not gratuitous. Rather, the point I am trying to make is that
    even in what many view as the best-case scenario coming out of
    the current crisis, that the TFG will somehow manage to rally
    enough support among Somali clans and communities to push back
    the current offensive and win itself some time, the
    transitional regime is not very well positioned to win a long
    war against the insurgency by wooing some of the insurgents and
    defeating or at least marginalizing the others, much less to
    emerge as the foundation for whatever political settlement
    Somalis eventually agree upon.
        The worst-case scenario, of course, is that Al-Shabaab and
    its allies defeat the TFG entirely, assume control of the
    capital, as well as the bulk of south central and southern
    Somalia, which they already loosely control. If this were to
    happen, it would be a geopolitical disaster, with repercussions
    rippling well beyond the borders of Somalia.
        While comparisons with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan in the
    1990s are a bit of a stretch, that is not to say that outside
    actors, ranging from al Qaeda, which would undoubtedly try to
    capitalize at least propaganda-wise on the events, to Ethiopia,
    which would be tempted to return in force, to the United
    States, which would likely ramp up counterterrorism operations,
    will not treat it as such. However, it should be noted that
    even if the insurgents do not defeat the TFG outright, in many
    respects they have already achieved a status and represent a
    significant threat to Somalis and others.
        Whatever the origins and intent of the militants currently
    facing the TFG, they have clearly been radicalized. Even
    without taking Mogadishu, al-Shabaab and its allies have
    already succeeded in carving out a geographical space where
    they and like-minded groups can operate freely. To cite one
    example, the suicide bomber who killed four South Korean
    tourists and their guide near the ancient fortress city of
    Shibam in Yemen's Hadramut on March 15th underwent training at
    a Shabaab-controlled southern Somali camp before returning to
    his native country and carrying out the deadly attack.
    Intelligence officials believe the same to be the case with the
    suicide bomber who 3 days later hit a convoy carrying the South
    Korean Ambassador and investigators looking on that earlier
    attack. Thus without even toppling the TFG, Shabaab has already
    achieved a major objective by securing a territorial base from
    which like-minded militants and terrorists can carry out
    attacks elsewhere, especially against targets in the Arabian
    Peninsula, as well as participating in the current violence
    against Somalis.
        As if this were not disturbing enough for the United
    States, even more unsettling is the fact that a number of young
    Somali Americans have left their homes in the United States and
    gone to Shabaab-controlled areas of Somalia, presumably for
    training. One of these men, a naturalized United States citizen
    from Minneapolis, Minnesota, became the first-ever American
    suicide bomber when he blew himself up in an attack in
    Somaliland last October, an attack which left dozens of
    civilians dead.
        One hopeful indicator, however, amidst this gloomy
    landscape, has been the ideological motivations of al-Shabaab
    and aligned extremist movements do not permit them to proceed
    at a slower speed in their march through Somali territory and
    society. Instead, a certain internal dynamic compels them to
    keep pushing, even when it might be in their long-term
    interests to act with greater circumspection. Militarily, this
    temptation to overreach is visible in the relentless advance,
    whose cause one might argue would be better served by
    consolidating their rule in areas they already control.
        Turning to the issue of piracy, the attacks by Somali
    pirates on merchant shipping in the waters off the coast of
    Somalia have added an additional challenge to an already
    complicated regional security picture. The marauders have
    hardly been cowed by the international naval presence involving
    warships from the United States, the United Kingdom, France,
    Russia, China, India, Japan, Turkey, and several other
    countries, which assembled earlier this year in an
    unprecedented effort to prevent a repeat of last year's wave of
    more than 100 attacks on commercial vessels in the Gulf of Aden
    and nearby waters. The pirates have simply shifted their
    operations to areas which they know are not patrolled, with
    strikes taking place on the high seas of the western Indian
    Ocean and elsewhere, as witnessed by the seizure 2 weeks ago of
    a German-owned cargo ship 60 nautical miles south of Oman.
        While the 2 dozen or so cruisers and other vessels from
    various countries make for great political theater, and may
    have even proven useful in escort duty along narrowly defined
    sea lanes, there are simply not enough of them to make a real
    dent in operations against the pirates. And even if there were
    enough warships to conduct adequate counterpiracy operations,
    it is doubtful that the commitment is sustainable over a long
    term.
        Hence, what is needed is a pragmatic solution that deals
    with the economic, political, and security challenges caused by
    the expanded activities of Somali pirates, but whose costs can
    be contained within acceptable limits, and whose long-term
    operation is sustainable by those with the most immediate stake
    in its success, regional and local actors as well as merchant
    vessels which must transit these dangerous waters. So in
    addition to beefing up security on and for merchant vessels,
    the only sustainable option currently available for dealing
    with the scourge is dealing with the problem on land.
        I have repeatedly argued that the problem of lawlessness at
    sea will only be definitively resolved when the international
    community summons up the political will to adequately address
    the underlying pathology of de facto statelessness onshore. One
    of the ways to do this, of course, to achieve maximum local
    support, is building up Coast Guard capabilities that are
    viewed not purely as an antipiracy measure, but rather embed
    those efforts within the local economies of the districts,
    providing benefits to communities as a way of weaning them away
    from their dependence on criminal enterprises.
        Mr. Chairman, United States policy toward Somalia has
    veered from neglect in the 1990s to an emphasis on kinetic
    counterterrorism operations in the aftermath of 9/11, and
    especially after the Ethiopian intervention flushed out some of
    the terrorists long sought by American security officials. Even
    if justifiable in individual cases, the use of hard power has
    bred resentment and allowed radical forces to wrap themselves
    up in the mantle of nationalism, undermining our broader
    strategic objective of countering radicalization, to say
    nothing of humanitarian norms.
        More recently, even as the situation has gone from bad to
    worse, presenting the entire Horn of Africa with a security
    crisis of the first order, spreading instability across a
    fragile subregion, and raising the specter that transnational
    terrorist movements will find and exploit opportunities
    offered, the approach of the international community and
    apparently the policy of the United States has become ensnared
    in what is essentially a circular logic. For want of better
    ideas, the international community has opted to buy into a
    seductive but vicious cycle of its own manufacture, whereby it
    must stay the course and continue to devote scarce political
    and material resources, while exclusively shoring up the TFG
    because it has already invested too much time and resources
    into it to do otherwise.
        If the failure so far of no fewer than 14 internationally
    sponsored attempts at establishing a national government
    indicate anything, it is the futility of the notion that
    outsiders can impose a regime on Somalia, even if it is staffed
    with presumably moderate Somalis of our liking. Instead, in the
    context of the decentralized reality among the Somali, we, the
    concerned international community in general, and the United
    States in particular, need to invest the time and resources to
    seek out local partners who can, first of all, work with us in
    creating a modicum of stability, societal, economic, and
    ultimately governmental. This will not be an easy task since
    the conflict of recent years has taken its toll on civil
    society. Nonetheless, local groups do exist.
        If I may cite one example, SAACID, the extraordinary
    nongovernmental organization founded and directed by Somali
    women engaged in conflict transformation, women's empowerment,
    education, health care, emergency relief, employment schemes,
    development. Amid the current crisis, for example, this NGO is
    providing 80,000 2,000-calorie-a-day meals to residents of
    Mogadishu.
        I would add a consensus is emerging among experts who have
    tracked Somalia for some time that any workable solution must
    embrace a bottom-up or building-block approach rather than the
    hitherto top-down strategy.
        Given the ripple effects of continuing disorder in the
    Somali lands, in addition to helping the functional parts of
    the TFG, it makes no sense for the international community not
    to work with effective authorities in the Republic of
    Somaliland, Puntland State, the province of Gedo, and other
    areas, as well as to seek to engage traditional leaders and
    civil society actors. These figures enjoy both legitimacy with
    the populace and have actual, as opposed to notional, security
    and development agendas which complement our own goal of
    preventing chaos from reigning.
        With respect to intervening in Somalia, while I salute the
    courage and determination of the Ugandan People's Defense Force
    peacekeepers in AMISOM, along with their Burundian colleagues,
    and I am fully cognizant of concerns of Somalia's immediate
    neighbors like Ethiopia and Kenya, I would argue that the
    legitimate security interests of the countries in the region
    can best be met not by their becoming embroiled in a conflict
    where their support of the TFG has become itself a rallying
    point for the insurgents. Rather, I would argue that the
    African resources might be best put to work containing the
    spread of instability from Somalia, and preventing additional
    foreign fighters and supplies from fueling the conflict in the
    country.
        I readily acknowledge that the approach such as the one I
    am sketching out may strike many as minimalist; however, I am
    convinced, and even more so today, that it is the course most
    likely to buy Somalis themselves the space within which to make
    their own determinations about their future, while at the same
    time allowing the rest of the world, especially the countries
    of the Horn of Africa, to achieve their legitimate security
    objective. Not only does such a strategy offer the most
    realistic hope of salvaging a modicum of regional stability and
    security out of the situation that grows increasingly
    intractable, but it allows the time, space, and freedom for
    Somalis to rebuild their shattered common life.
        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, members of the
    subcommittee, I am grateful again for the opportunity to come
    before you today. I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Pham follows:]J.
    Peter Pham deg.

        Mr. Payne. Let me thank both of the panelists for your
    testimony.
        I will recess again. This time, though, I believe that I
    can be back within 10 or 15 minutes. We have 3 minutes left on
    the current vote, which should take about 7 or 8 minutes, and
    then an immediate vote to follow. So I really expect to be back
    within 10-12 minutes. So we will stand recessed.
        [Recess.]
        Mr. Payne. We will reconvene the hearing, and I will just
    ask our two presenters, I might ask a quick question or two,
    and then we will recess the hearing and move to our second
    panel.
        I listened to both presentations. We know that the
    situation in Somalia is very difficult. We know that it has
    been a country without a central government since 1991. We have
    seen the difficulty. Dr. Pham had a relatively gloomy
    perspective, and we are aware of the difficulties. Mr. Dagne
    also indicated that there are very, very difficult roads ahead;
    however, that there is a solution, in his opinion. Dr. Pham
    indicated that militarily Somalia could not be won, suggesting,
    I guess, that the Somalis support the insurgents, which I would
    kind of conclude, in Mogadishu.
        So I just wonder, if you, Dr. Pham, would comment on this,
    if I am mischaracterizing. And, of course, the criticism of the
    way the TFG was selected. I know that you said there was no
    election, which is true. It would be very difficult to have an
    election in Somalia after 20 years of no government. But from
    what I understand, there was an attempt to select a
    Transitional Federal Government that sort of represented the
    society of Somalia, the clans and the subclans and the regions.
    So if you could just, in a nutshell, once again reiterate your
    prognostication that it is virtually impossible, and then, Mr.
    Dagne, your prognostication on why it might be possible.
        Mr. Pham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to
    clarify.
        Militarily I think there are two, possibly three things
    that need to be distinguished. One is I am very critical, and
    although I do not believe that an external military
    intervention is helpful, because it will play directly into the
    hands of the extremists, who would then wrap themselves up in
    the mantle of nationalism.
        Mr. Payne. All right. But would you--you say an internal.
    Wouldn't you suggest that the insurgents are being supported
    externally?
        Mr. Pham. They are being supported externally by both
    foreign fighters, organizations, states, what have you. But
    what I am suggesting is that a foreign military force into
    Somalia would be totally inadvisable. We have seen where that
    has led already in the past, and I don't think that we want a
    reprise of that.
        What I do suggest, however, is that we work with effective
    authorities within Somalia itself, the functional parts of the
    Transitional Federal Government, the State of Puntland's
    authorities, the Republic of Somaliland, and other areas where
    we might identify those who resist the extremists and are
    capable and effective; that we work with them, that we don't
    simply channel all of our assistance through one channel, and
    we work with the effective authorities, and then allow the
    Somalis themselves the time to turn on the extremists.
        The extremists, I think, as my colleague would agree, do
    not represent Somali society or the traditional Islam practiced
    in Somalia. So with time and containment, in a way the
    extremists carry the seeds of their own internal contradiction
    and self-destruction from within. We just need to keep that
    from spreading beyond. And the most effective way is to work
    with those who are most effective.
        Mr. Payne. Thank you.
        Mr. Dagne. Thank you.
        Mr. Dagne. I think the Somalis, in my view, already have
    achieved a great deal in terms of bringing stability and
    attempting also to contain the threats posed by the extremists
    and terrorists. One just has to look at Puntland and also to a
    certain extent also Somaliland.
        Are we without clear option? The answer is no. We are--the
    U.S. Government is providing assistance. You have foreign
    forces. The Ugandans and the Burundians are there assisting.
    They are not there simply to function as peacekeepers, but they
    are protecting the legitimate government in Mogadishu.
        I think in addition to a Somali-led option, the
    international community also must see this threat as a threat
    not just to Mogadishu or Puntland or Somaliland, but the threat
    to the entire region. This is no longer a Somali-led
    insurgency. This is an insurgency now being led by outsiders,
    whose primary purpose is to destroy, to obstruct, and to
    establish a base for the terrorist groups.
        What specific measure can be taken? For one, I think the
    Somalis, both in Mogadishu and Puntland and in Somaliland,
    could come together, form a coalition to contain this threat.
    The international community can provide assistance, targeted
    assistance, in terms of logistic support, transportation. And
    at times it might be necessary also to target in order to take
    out some of the leaders who would never change their position.
        But the military option is not the only option. We also
    need to invest both in terms of economic development, as well
    as I think the basic necessities that the Somalis need. You are
    not going to have a piracy problem if the pirates were to have
    employment. If the Somali people see that there are schools
    being built, hospitals, they would be able to support and they
    would have an interest to fight the extremists and the
    terrorists.
        Mr. Payne. Well, let me thank both of you. We would
    probably have many more questions; but, because of the
    interruption with the votes, I would just like to thank both of
    you for your expert testimonies. And with that, I will conclude
    the formal meeting.
        All right. Go ahead. Yes.
        Ms. Woolsey. Go ahead.
        Mr. Payne. I think we would like to bring on our guests who
    have traveled here for a long time, because we may run into
    another set of votes. And I think that would not work well,
    since we have introduced so many folks. So with that, thank you
    very much, and I will adjourn this portion.
        [Whereupon the hearing adjourned to reconvene as a
    briefing.]

                                A P P E N D I X

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         Material Submitted for the Hearing RecordNotice deg.

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                                   QFRs--Lee deg.__

                                   Jackson Lee statement deg.
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