    [House Hearing, 111 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                REGIONAL AIR CARRIERS AND PILOT WORKFORCE ISSUES

    =======================================================================

                                    (111-41)

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                                    AVIATION

                                     OF THE

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                       TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 JUNE 11, 2009

                                   __________

                           Printed for the use of the
                 Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

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                 COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

                     JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman

    NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia,   JOHN L. MICA, Florida
    Vice Chair                           DON YOUNG, Alaska
    PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon             THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin
    JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois          HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
    ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of   JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
    Columbia                             VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
    JERROLD NADLER, New York             FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
    CORRINE BROWN, Florida               JERRY MORAN, Kansas
    BOB FILNER, California               GARY G. MILLER, California
    EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas         HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South
    GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi             Carolina
    ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland         TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
    ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California        TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
    LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa             SAM GRAVES, Missouri
    TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania             BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
    BRIAN BAIRD, Washington              JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
    RICK LARSEN, Washington              SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
    MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts    Virginia
    TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York          JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania
    MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine            MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
    RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri              CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
    GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California      CONNIE MACK, Florida
    DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois            LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia
    MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii              JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio
    JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania          CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
    TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota           MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
    HEATH SHULER, North Carolina         VERN BUCHANAN, Florida
    MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York          ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
    HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona           BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky
    CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania  ANH ``JOSEPH'' CAO, Louisiana
    JOHN J. HALL, New York               AARON SCHOCK, Illinois
    STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin               PETE OLSON, Texas
    STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
    LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California
    ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
    SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
    PHIL HARE, Illinois
    JOHN A. BOCCIERI, Ohio
    MARK H. SCHAUER, Michigan
    BETSY MARKEY, Colorado
    PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama
    MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York
    THOMAS S. P. PERRIELLO, Virginia
    DINA TITUS, Nevada
    HARRY TEAGUE, New Mexico

                                      (ii)

                            Subcommittee on Aviation

                     JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois, Chairman

    RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri              THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin
    PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama             HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
    MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York         JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
    PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon             VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
    ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of   FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
    Columbia                             JERRY MORAN, Kansas
    BOB FILNER, California               SAM GRAVES, Missouri
    EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas         JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
    ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California        SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
    LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa             Virginia
    TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania             JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania
    MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts    CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
    DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois            CONNIE MACK, Florida
    MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii              LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
    HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona           JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio
    JOHN J. HALL, New York               MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
    STEVE COHEN, Tennessee               VERN BUCHANAN, Florida
    LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California      BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky
    JOHN A. BOCCIERI, Ohio
    NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia
    CORRINE BROWN, Florida
    ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
    JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania
    SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
    MARK H. SCHAUER, Michigan
    JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
      (Ex Officio)

                                     (iii)

                                    CONTENTS

                                                                       Page

    Summary of Subject Matter........................................    vi

                                   TESTIMONY

    Ayers, Dr. Frank, Chairman, Flight Training Department, Professor
      of Aeronautical Science, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University..    45
    Babbitt, J. Randolph, Administrator, Federal Aviation
      Administration.................................................    13
    Cohen, Roger, President, Regional Airline Association............    45
    Graeber, Ph.D., R. Curtis, Fellow, The Flight Safety Foundation..    45
    Lee, Hon. Christopher J., a Representatives in Congress from the
      State of New York..............................................     8
    Loftus, John Michael, Families of Continental Flight 3407, Father
      of Madeline Loftus/ Victim of Flight 3407 Crash, Former Pilot
      with Continental Airlines......................................    45
    May, James C., President and CEO, Air Transport Association......    45
    Morgan, Daniel, Vice President, Safety And Regulatory Compliance,
      Colgan Air, Inc................................................    45
    Prater, Captain John, President, Air Line Pilots Association,
      International..................................................    45
    Rosenker, Mark V., Acting Chairman, National Transportation
      Safety Board, Accompanied by Thomas E. Haueter, Director,
      Office of Aviation Safety, National Transportation Safety Board    13
    Scovel, III, Calvin L., Inspector General, U.S. Department of
      Transportation.................................................    13
    Slaughter, Hon. Louise M., a Representative in Congress from the
      State of New York..............................................     6

              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Capito, Hon. Shelley Moore, of West Virginia.....................    65
    Carnahan, Hon. Russ, of Missouri.................................    67
    Costello, Hon. Jerry F. Costello, of Illinois....................    68
    Johnson, Hon. Eddie Bernice, of Texas............................    78
    Lee, Hon. Christopher J., of New York............................    82
    McMahon, Hon. Michael E., of New York............................    85
    Mitchell, Hon. Harry E., of Arizona..............................    89
    Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota............................    90
    Slaughter, Hon. Louise M., of New York...........................    96

                   PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES

    Ayers, Dr. Frank.................................................    99
    Babbitt, J. Randolph.............................................   105
    Cohen, Roger.....................................................   118
    Graeber, Ph.D., R. Curtis........................................   124
    Loftus, John Michael.............................................   132
    May, James C.....................................................   145
    Morgan, Daniel...................................................   149
    Prater, Captain John.............................................   158
    Rosenker, Mark V.................................................   174
    Scovel, III, Calvin L............................................   206

                           SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

    Babbitt, J. Randolph, Administrator, Federal Aviation
      Administration, additional testimony...........................   115
    Boccieri, Hon. John, a Representative in Congress from Ohio,
      letter to Colgan Air and their response........................    30
    Rosenker, Mark V., Acting Chairman, National Transportation
      Safety Board, Accompanied by Thomas E. Haueter, Director,
      Office of Aviation Safety, National Transportation Safety
      Board, responses to questions from the Subcommittee............   196

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                REGIONAL AIR CARRIERS AND PILOT WORKFORCE ISSUES

                                  ----------

                            Thursday, June 11, 2009

                      House of Representatives,
                              Subcommittee on Aviation,
                Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
    Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jerry F.
    Costello [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
        Mr. Costello. The Subcommittee will come to order. The
    Chair will ask all Members, staff and everyone to turn
    electronic devices off or on vibrate.
        The Subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on the
    regional air carriers and pilot workforce issues. I intend to
    give a brief opening statement. I will call on the Ranking
    Member Mr. Petri to give his opening statement or remarks. And
    then I intend to call our first panel up, let Congresswoman
    Slaughter testify quickly, and then we will come back to
    Members to give their opening statements after your testimony.
    We understand that Congresswoman Slaughter has a conflict and
    has to be out of here by 10:30, so we are going to accommodate
    your schedule.
        I welcome everyone to the Aviation Subcommittee hearing on
    regional air carriers and pilot workforce issues today. On
    February 12, 2009, a Colgan Air Bombardier Dash 8, doing
    business as Continental Connection Flight 3407, crashed en
    route to Buffalo-Niagara International Airport. All 45
    passengers and the 4 crew members died as well as 1 person on
    the ground.
        Mr. Mike Loftus' daughter Madeline was a passenger on
    flight 3407. I am pleased he is here joining us today to offer
    his testimony. On behalf of each and every Member of this
    Subcommittee, I extend our sincere condolences to everyone as
    well as the family members and friends who lost loved ones in
    this tragic accident.
        The National Transportation Safety Board held a 3-day
    public hearing on May 12, 13 and 14 on the Colgan aircraft
    flight crash 3407. The investigation is ongoing, and the final
    conclusions and outcomes are not expected to be made for many
    months. We need to let the NTSB investigation run its course.
    We will hear from the NTSB this morning. However, the NTSB
    hearing identified the need to closely examine the regulations
    governing pilot training and rest requirements and the
    oversight necessary to ensure their compliance, with a
    particular focus on regional airlines.
        While we do not have all the facts, I am concerned that
    these issues could be symptomatic of larger trends driven by
    economic pressures within the airline industry. We are in an
    economic downturn that has placed enormous pressures on
    airlines to cut costs. Airlines cannot control the cost of fuel
    or the cost of the aircraft, but they can control what they pay
    their pilots, how they train their pilots, what the training
    will cost, and when the pilots can fly.
        Due to cost concerns, major airlines have cut their own
    domestic capacity and have outsourced air transport services in
    many cases to the lowest bidder, to smaller, lower-cost
    regional airlines, and then they keep the passenger ticket
    revenue. Approximately 90 percent of regional airline
    passengers travel on flights that are scheduled, processed,
    marketed, ticketed and handled by major airlines through code
    share arrangements. To win the contract to fly for the major
    carriers, the regional airlines have gone to great lengths to
    provide their services at the lowest possible cost.
        With today's economic and outsourcing business practices,
    pilots with decades of experience are laid off from the major
    carriers, but cannot afford to work for one of the regional
    carriers because they are faced with starting over as a first
    officer making less than $25,000 a year.
        The economic incentives to outsource to cheaper contractors
    must not outweigh the value of having experienced pilots in the
    cockpit. Today regional airlines are viewed by pilots as an
    entry-level stepping stone. They do not pay as well as the
    major airlines, and they do not require as many flight hours to
    get hired. However, regional airlines have been involved in the
    last six fatal airline accidents, and pilot performance has
    been implicated in three of these accidents. There must be one
    level of safety between major and regional airlines mandated
    rather than just recommended by the FAA.
        I believe we need to take an industrywide look at
    strengthening pilot training requirements. In theory, FAA
    training programs certify that every airline, both regional and
    major, train its pilots to the same standard. I think the FAA
    regulations are too broad, and the minimums are too low. We
    must find a solution to fix this so everyone is on the same
    level, not just in theory but in practice.
        I have requested that the inspector general for the
    Department of Transportation review the FAA's regulatory
    requirements for airline pilot training programs and report
    back to this Subcommittee.
        It is important to note that many of the training issues
    that surfaced during last month's NTSB hearing are not new. We
    have seen them surface in other accidents; for example, as a
    result of the December 2003 Federal Express crash at Memphis
    involving a pilot that failed numerous proficiency checks. The
    NTSB recommended requiring airlines to establish remedial
    training programs for pilots who have demonstrated performance
    deficiencies.
        In 2006, the FAA responded by issuing guidance recommending
    that airlines implement remedial training programs. NTSB will
    testify today that despite the FAA's recommendation, Colgan did
    not have the remedial training program in place.
        While I applaud the Obama administration's call to action
    earlier this week, I do not believe that we can rely on
    airlines to voluntarily comply with industry's best practices.
    As we now know from testimony at the public hearings, Colgan
    had not fully implemented industry best practice safety
    initiatives, such as flight operational quality assurance
    programs, before the accident. We need to require all regional
    carriers to implement the best practice safety initiatives that
    are common among the major carriers. Further, the major
    carriers need to take more ownership of the regional carriers'
    training programs and implementation of best practices.
        I also want to have a frank discussion regarding airline
    pilot pay. I have met with a number of pilots, a number of
    groups. I understand their concerns that pay and benefits have
    declined over the years due to bankruptcies, mergers,
    acquisitions, oil prices, 9/11, failed labor negotiations and
    furloughs. Airline pilots are highly skilled safety
    professionals. They are responsible for people's lives. Airline
    pilots deserve the respect that their profession once had, and
    they should be paid far more than $25,000 a year, which is what
    the first officer of Flight 3407 was paid.
        Low pilot pay is symptomatic of other troubling pressures
    and trends within the industry. Some regional airlines are
    paying pilots the absolute minimum that the market will bear
    with no relation to the lives they are responsible for or the
    value or seriousness of the work they perform. It is
    detrimental to the overall self-image and morale within the
    airline pilot profession, which is reflective, in some
    instances, by poor professionalism. While low pilot pay may
    keep airline costs down, it does not serve the public well.
    Moreover, low pay drives away qualified and experienced pilots.
    There was a time when a high percentage of our commercial
    pilots were former pilots in the U.S. military. That is not the
    case today. Far fewer military pilots, when they retire, are
    applying to the airlines when they retire because of the low
    pay of the regional carriers.
        The NTSB is also looking at fatigue with regard to the
    Colgan accident. Fatigue has been on the NTSB's most wanted
    list since 1990 and continues to be identified as an issue in
    many accidents. The FAA has yet to update its rules governing
    crew rest requirements taking into consideration the latest
    research on fatigue. Nor has the FAA developed and used a
    methodology that will continually assess the effectiveness of
    fatigue management systems implemented by operators. This is
    simply unacceptable. I have asked the inspector general to
    conduct an extensive review of fatigue issues, and I look
    forward to hearing how he intends to move forward with this
    audit.
        After this hearing I intend to draft legislation to address
    some of the concerns and issues that we will discuss today.
        Finally, this hearing is not intended to condemn the major
    airlines or all regional carriers. It is intended to identify
    problems in the system that need to be addressed to improve and
    enhance safety.
        Before I recognize Mr. Petri for his opening statement, I
    ask unanimous consent to allow 2 weeks for all Members to
    revise and extend their remarks, and permit submission of
    additional statements and materials by Members and witness.
    Without objection, so ordered.
        At this time the Ranking Member Mr. Petri is recognized.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for having
    this important hearing. And in light of Representative
    Slaughter's time pressure, and in light of the presence of our
    Ranking Minority Member of the Full Committee, I ask that Mr.
    Mica precede me.
        Mr. Costello. The Ranking Member Mr. Mica is recognized.
        Mr. Mica. Thank you.
        First of all, I want to thank our Chairman Mr. Costello for
    holding this meeting.
        Mr. Petri and I have been concerned about the performance
    and the accident rates of our regional commuter carriers. We
    have some incredible expertise on this panel. Mr. DeFazio was a
    distinguished Ranking Member. You have had the Chair. We have
    another Ranking Member Mr. Ehlers, and Mrs. Capito have a great
    wealth of expertise on this panel. And I think that we have a
    responsibility to make certain that if there are deficiencies
    in the operation of our regional carriers, that actions are
    taken to correct those deficiencies.
        I understand, too, that Ms. Slaughter is here, and our
    sympathies certainly go out to Ms. Slaughter and those from the
    Buffalo area or anyone who lost loved ones in the tragic
    Buffalo commuter airline disaster and to the others who have
    suffered similar losses.
        We will hear from our FAA Administrator. He has only been
    on the job less than 2 weeks. However, I have to express my
    concern that FAA as an agency has been immobilized, and for 2
    years we haven't had an Administrator. When I came to Congress,
    we had five Administrators in about 6 years. We put in place a
    mechanism to change that. It is difficult enough when you have
    an agency with an administrator, let alone an agency that is so
    important and critical to safety, and not have a confirmed
    administrator in place. So I can't criticize in any way Mr.
    Babbitt. He has only been on the job 2 weeks, and these
    problems have festered the last several years.
        There is something wrong when we have planes, commuter
    planes, falling out of the sky. There is something wrong when
    we have repeated accidents. The Chairman just spoke. We have
    had six very serious loss-of-life, fatal commuter crashes. The
    potential factors outlined as the reasons why we had those
    crashes all dealt with pilot performance. Well, I won't say all
    of them, I will say at least four of the six.
        Now, we instituted when I became Chairman a risk-based
    system. And certainly that risk-based system would be geared to
    looking at where we have had problems. And if we have commuter
    airline crashes, and we have pilot performances as a key issue
    in creating some of the factors that led to those crashes, the
    system--there is something wrong in not addressing those
    deficiencies.
        It is my understanding that--and let me go back to--I think
    Peter was involved in this--our FAA reauthorization, the last
    time, I think that Mr. DeFazio will recall that we saw NTSB
    come forward with recommendations that were not instituted.
    They would make a recommendation, and then it would just sort
    of fall off the cliff or would stay on the shelf. Now, we put
    into law a mechanism that required that those recommendations
    be reported back to Congress that were not addressed, and I
    found out yesterday that the DOT and FAA were to have had, in
    February, to Congress, their recommendations on deficiencies in
    aviation, and we still don't have those before Congress. There
    is either something wrong with what we passed, and we need to
    make certain that those recommendations do come to Congress,
    and that either FAA, DOT or the administration, someone, acts
    on those. And when you have repeated fatal crashes, and we have
    a risk-based system, we have a requirement for reporting those
    incidents, and nothing is done, there is something wrong.
        So, Mr. Chairman, you just said that we will pass
    legislation, and I will join you. Let me say in closing also
    the FAA and, I think, the Chairman of NTSB has said he has
    recommended that we open up the performance records of pilots
    beyond 5 years. Now it is limited to 5 years, and then a pilot
    has to give a waiver, and I understand the regionals often
    don't even ask for that. But those records must be opened on
    their performance and I think also on their training and their
    certification to be behind the yoke of an aircraft or in the
    pilot or copilot seat so that we know that people with
    qualifications and training are there; we know that where we
    have identified deficiencies in a pilot's ability to perform or
    to be certified, that that is known.
        So I will join you, our side of the aisle, Mr. Petri and I
    will join you. If we have to take corrective action by
    legislation, we will put in place whatever measures. If we have
    to go back, Mr. DeFazio, and change what we put into law to
    require that those recommendations by NTSB are not just left on
    the shelf--and I was stunned that FAA and DOT still have not
    gotten what should have been in February before us, to us, and
    this is June.
        So again, in the spirit of cooperation, a spirit that we
    need to stop this carnage in the air, I look forward to working
    with you and pledge our support.
        Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Costello. I thank the Ranking Member for his comments,
    and we will make two comments concerning points that you made.
    The last reauthorization, I don't necessarily think we need to
    change the law. I think we know what the problem is. It is
    within the FAA. And we need to address that, and we hope that
    the new Administrator will, in fact, address the issue. I
    understand, and when he testifies, we will have an opportunity
    to talk to him about what he intends to implement as far as
    tracking NTSB recommendations at the FAA and reporting to
    Congress.
        Secondly, we do intend to work in a bipartisan manner to
    address a number of issues that need to go into legislation. We
    have a number of recommendations by the NTSB. We have other
    recommendations that are made by the FAA to the airline
    industry that have not been complied with. As opposed to making
    recommendations, we need to put some of these things into law
    so they are mandatory and not discretionary.
        So with that, I would recognize and ask Congresswoman
    Slaughter to please come to the table, and we will be joined by
    Congressman Christopher John Lee as well.
        And at this time, the Chair will recognize the first panel,
    hear from Congresswoman Slaughter and Congressman Christopher
    John Lee. And then after their testimony, we will go back to
    opening statements by any Member who wants to make an opening
    statement.
        At this time the Chair recognizes the Chairwoman of the
    Rules Committee in the House, the distinguished gentlelady from
    the 28th District of New York, the Honorable Louise Slaughter.

          STATEMENT OF THE HON. LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, A
         REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

        Ms. Slaughter. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you
    for your gracious invitation to be here this morning. I did
    hear so much in both opening statements that made me feel quite
    elated, if we can use that word on such a sad day.
        It is a very important hearing that you are having today,
    and some of the family members from the Buffalo crash are here,
    and among them are Karen and Susan Eckert. sisters of a woman
    named Beverly Eckert, whom we all learned to know and to love,
    because Beverly lost her husband in 9/11 and was one of the
    family members working there, and devoted herself to airline
    safety.
        This Committee is very special to me. It was the first
    Committee I sat on. I sat where Mrs. Capito is, and Peter
    DeFazio and I were elected the same day, and he is very special
    to me all by himself. Peter and I have a caucus. You may not be
    surprised to learn it is called the "cantankerous caucus."
    There are only two of us on it.
        As we are all acutely aware, one of the worst plane
    accidents in the recent U.S. history occurred earlier this year
    on the night of February 12 just outside of Buffalo, New York.
    We lost so many lives that night, and we continue to pray and
    to think often of the people whose grief and loss are
    immeasurable. And we have to learn from this tragedy in order
    to prevent the future loss of life.
        Now, beginning on May 12, the NTSB conducted 3 days of
    hearings on Colgan Air Flight 3407, and we were shocked and
    saddened about what we learned about regional carriers. There
    are still many unanswered questions and lots of work to be done
    to ensure the safety of passengers and crew when traveling on
    regional airlines, and as Members of Congress, it is our
    responsibility and our mission.
        Much of what we have learned about regional airline
    industry training and standards is shocking. And we want to
    immediately attack that, and I am so pleased to hear this
    morning that that will be done. The regional airlines' training
    programs are clearly inadequate. It is unacceptable for flight
    academies such as Florida-based Gulfstream Academy, to
    advertise that they can train amateur pilots who have
    aspirations to fly for a major carrier in only 3 months for as
    much as $30,000 in tuition.
        Passengers deserve only the best-trained pilots, and I
    commend Secretary LaHood and Administrator Babbitt for recently
    ordering the FAA inspectors to ensure that regional carrier
    training programs are complying with the Federal regulations.
    And we must demand that all pilots receive extensive and
    thorough training as well as enforce the high standards for the
    regional carrier industry. I think "enforce" is the operative
    word here.
        I was amazed to learn how little pilots are paid upon
    graduating from flight academies. The first officer was paid
    $16,000 a year. If that isn't a minimum-wage job, I really
    don't know what is. In addition to that, she had to pay her own
    way back and forth to work. I have learned, and I believe this
    is so, that if she was not flying, her wages did not take place
    at all. She was not paid for anything except flight time. Any
    time to and from work was not considered.
        And there is a joke that goes around among some of the
    pilots. It says what do you call a regional first officer
    without a girlfriend? And the answer is homeless. Now, that is
    not funny when regional carriers account for half of the
    country's scheduled airline trips.
        Thousands of lives are at stake daily, and these pilots
    must be compensated properly to ensure that we attract the
    people who can fly the planes adequately, and this leads me to
    the issue of fatigue, which you have spoken of. It was
    certainly a major factor in Buffalo's tragedy because both
    pilots had had no rest. They were not paid sufficient money to
    be able to get a hotel room or stay overnight to sleep, and
    slept sometimes in their cars or in the pilots' lounge, where I
    understand it is perfectly illegal, but they do it nonetheless.
    Now, it is no wonder that they were found sleeping in the crew
    lounges. But we must demand compliance with the orders that we
    have for sufficient rest in order to remain alert and react
    properly. I am one of the thousands of people who believe that
    that was complied with and just assumed that it was.
        But I was stunned to learn that the pilots of Flight 3407
    had failed five tests, including two with Colgan. Even more
    disturbing is that the airline was not aware of the three other
    failures, and Mr. Mica referred to that, something we
    absolutely cannot allow. We must have more transparency. It is
    unacceptable. We have to provide the airlines access to a
    pilot's entire flying history, and it should be made readily
    available on the Internet. Passengers shouldn't have to guess
    whether a pilot is competent and rested and even well, because
    I understand that in some cases they don't get to take off a
    day if they are ill. They fly, or no pay.
        Like many of my colleagues, I fly weekly on regional
    airlines. I purchase my ticket from U.S. Air, but the plane is
    operated and maintained by Wisconsin Air. The information is
    not provided at the point of purchase, let alone prior to
    boarding the plane, and I am sure that 90 percent of the
    persons believe they are flying U.S. Air. We have to require
    airlines to disclose to consumers the operator of the flight
    prior to purchasing their ticket so they have the opportunity
    to make well-informed choices.
        Most recently an FAA investigation accused Florida-based
    Gulfstream Airlines of overworking their pilots and breaking
    airline maintenance rules. And former pilots for Gulfstream
    report watching seeing pieces fall from their airplanes and say
    that records were routinely changed or even erased. They had
    even complained that they had installed on those planes
    unapproved air conditioner compressors. These types of
    practices must come to an end, and regional airlines must be
    held accountable for negligence.
        I think we have only scratched the surface of "anything
    goes," and safety can sometimes be second to profit. We must
    address these critical issues to ensure our safety when
    boarding a regional airline. It is our responsibility and duty
    to help restore the public's faith through introducing strong
    and meaningful legislation which has to require compliance with
    standards, and an FAA that can assure us that they are able to
    certify those standards are being met. There are many charges
    of a too cozy relationship between airline owners and the FAA.
        And I would like to mention, too, I would like to see a
    little more teeth in what the NTSB does with their painstaking
    work and the recommendations. Now, I understand they are only
    recommendations, and they may or may not be followed. I would
    like to see a little bit of work done on that as well. I know
    that they do not want to be regulators, nor do we want them to
    be, but the suggestions that they make after the kind of work
    they do should be given a priority. Lives depend on it.
        Thank you all, Members of this Committee, for allowing me
    to come today, and I look forward to working with you with some
    legislation that can make us all feel safer and bring to some
    fruition the dream of the families and the parents of the
    children who died on that airplane that it won't be happening
    again. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you. And we will say that we
    will work closely with you. We have had a meeting earlier in
    the week, and last week we discussed a number of issues, your
    interest in bringing forth legislation. We intend to work
    closely with you, and we thank you for your testimony.
        Ms. Slaughter. I feel a great deal of comfort with your
    expertise and your knowledge of this and your intent in seeing
    this through. I thank you very much for that, Mr. Costello.
        Mr. Costello. Thank you.
        The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from the 26th
    District of New York, the Honorable Christopher John Lee.

    STATEMENT OF THE HON. CHRISTOPHER JOHN LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                  CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

        Mr. Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased, actually
    being a resident of Clarence, New York, and being directly
    affected--actually where the plane went down was roughly 3
    miles from where I raise my family. So this obviously has a lot
    of meaning to me; and directly knowing three individuals who
    were on that Flight 3407. So I am grateful to have the
    opportunity to speak here today on an issue that is not only
    important to my constituents, too, but all constituents
    throughout the United States.
        As major airlines have confronted significant challenges in
    maintaining market share, regional airlines have continued to
    expand their operations and now, as we know, account for
    roughly half of the Nation's commercial flights. That includes
    Continental Connection Flight 3407, which departed Newark, New
    Jersey, on the night of February 12, 2009, carrying 49
    passengers and crew en route to Buffalo, New York.
        One of those passengers was a 24-year-old woman by the name
    of Madeline Loftus. Madeline was returning to Buffalo that
    night to play in an alumni hockey game at Buffalo State
    College, and though she had purchased a Continental ticket, she
    was actually flying on a plane operated by Colgan Air, by a
    crew hired and trained by Colgan. Madeline died that evening
    when flight 3407 crashed in Clarence Center New York, just 5
    miles from the Buffalo-Niagara airport. All 49 passengers on
    board and 1 resident on the ground were lost.
        Today this panel will hear from Madeline Loftus' father
    Mike, who served for more than 20 years as a pilot on
    Continental Airlines. Mr. Loftus wants nothing less than to
    ensure that a tragedy like this never occurs again. And I thank
    the Committee for allowing him to appear before you today on
    behalf of the family members of victims 3407.
        I also had the opportunity to meet many of the families,
    and the part that has astounded me is how resolute they are on
    having something positive come out of this horrible tragedy.
    And I commend all of them.
        As you know, the need for further congressional scrutiny of
    this accident became rapidly apparent when recent NTSB hearings
    revealed a number of troubling findings, including the crew's
    lack of hands-on training and experience in the plane's safety
    systems. For instance, the crew was trained in the activation
    of the stick shaker, but not in the next step, activation of
    the stick pusher.
        Questionable handling of failed check rides by Colgan Air,
    specifically despite the fact that the pilot of flight 3407 had
    failed two general aviation check ride failures. We now know
    that Colgan did not attempt to access this information. And I,
    for one, believe the FAA should have made this a mandatory
    requirement, not a voluntary requirement.
        And nonessential cockpit conversation below 10,000 feet is
    in violation of the FAA's sterile cockpit rule.
        These revelations have left the families to struggle with
    the harsh reality that this horrific tragedy may have been
    preventable and far more questions than answers about how all
    the regional carriers operate.
        For my part I am concerned that a culture of cost cutting
    has pervaded the regional air carriers leaving passengers at
    risk. That is why I have joined with my colleagues from west
    New York to push for an independent, comprehensive review of
    all commercial pilot training and certification programs. The
    Government Accountability Office study would look at every
    aspect of these programs, including required training hours,
    training practices for new technologies, and adequacy of
    responses to unsatisfactory check rides.
        Additionally, we are interested in learning what
    information is required to be provided by pilots on their job
    applications, and what ability air carriers now have to verify
    that data. And while we are pleased that the House has given
    the go-ahead for this analysis in the form of an amendment to
    the recently approved FAA reauthorization legislation, it is
    clear that we should not wait any longer to proceed.
        I am submitting into the record today a letter
    Congresswoman Slaughter, Congressman Higgins and I have written
    to the GAO instructing them to begin their work at once. I urge
    this panel to lend its support to this bipartisan effort so we
    can expose information that will inform future steps taken by
    Congress to improve pilot training practices and ensure
    passenger safety and confidence.
        I also urge this panel to hold the FAA accountable and
    demand that it does its part to strengthen oversight of the
    regional air carriers and implement the NTSB's most wanted
    safety recommendations on flying in icy conditions.
        Finally, like many west New Yorkers, as I mentioned, I knew
    several people who lost their lives on Flight 3407, including a
    personal friend of mine, an expectant mother whose child would
    have been just 2 or 3 weeks old at this point in her life.
        I just want to say that I am very proud of the first
    responders, the volunteers and all members of my community for
    coming together to provide support to those who have been
    affected by this horrible tragedy.
        Again, I am grateful for the Committee's time here today,
    and I hope this hearing is just the beginning of a prolonged
    effort to ensure justice is brought forward and increased
    safety for our families. So thank you.
        Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you for your testimony, and
    we look forward to working with you on legislation.
        The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Oregon Mr.
    DeFazio.
        Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
    convening this important hearing, and hopefully we will get
    results and changes this time. The scheduling of this hearing
    caused me to go back and review some of my history with this
    issue starting in a 1992 hearing on these issues of crew
    training and fatigue. And Mr. Babbitt actually testified during
    that hearing. And I will be following up on some of the issues
    he raised at that time now that he is in charge and hopefully
    can fix the problems that he identified at that time, which I
    believe led directly to the crash of this plane and the deaths
    of many innocent people.
        We need to set some standards here. We have got to stop the
    race to the bottom. We have an industry that is in economic
    distress, and we have a race to the bottom. We have been
    talking about this for a very long time, and it is time for
    action.
        I just find it extraordinary, Mr. Chairman, that the FAA
    has set such a low bar for minimum standards, 250 hours for a
    first officer. Now, of course, it is up to the airline to
    determine how many more hours they would require for initial
    hire, and it is also, unfortunately, up to the airline to
    determine what kind of training they will provide to that
    person once they are hired, although the FAA does oversee or
    confirm the training that the airline would provide.
        None of that is right. We need to set a much, much higher
    minimum bar. And that will get to the root of a lot of these
    problems. This is a fairly serious undertaking, flying an
    airplane, particularly in difficult conditions. We would think
    that it would be perhaps looked at as seriously as training to
    be a nail technician. In the State of Oregon, you have to have
    600 hours of training to be a nail technician. You have to have
    1,350 hours to be a barber, but you can't use chemicals. And
    then when we get to the point of being able to color people's
    hair, it requires 1,700 hours of training. But the FAA has set
    the bar at 250 for pilots, and they leave it up to the these
    regional airlines to determine how many more hours they might
    require for an initial hire.
        That has to change. And if we set the bar a good deal
    higher, then, of course, compensation will follow. If
    compensation follows, we won't find young women living with
    their parents in Seattle, red-eyeing across the country, and
    sleeping in the crew room, and then trying to fly a plane in
    conditions that she did not have adequate experience to deal
    with. This has got to stop. It has to stop. And this hearing
    has to be the beginning of that change at last.
        We will hear from the NTSB. The issue of crew fatigue has
    been on their most wanted list for 19 years. The FAA proposed a
    rule in 1995. We don't have it yet. Why? I am told, well, there
    are big disagreements between the pilots and the airlines. And
    we will hear from the Regional Airline Association. They will
    say no pilot would ever fly fatigued. All they have to do is
    call in and say it. But Mr. Babbitt testified in 1992, no, in
    fact, there is intimidation, harassment and firing if you call
    in fatigued.
        Now, if they can't agree on a rule, it might be because the
    pilots think that the current rules cause people to fly
    fatigued, and the airlines say, well, this would cost us money.
    So if we want to follow the rules that the airlines say they
    follow, which is it is always up to the pilot, then the
    airlines should have conceded to the pilots, we should have
    adopted a fatigue rule. And we shouldn't be sitting here today
    with this hearing. But we are.
        So, Mr. Chairman, I hope this is a new beginning with a new
    administration, a new Administrator, and a very assertive
    Chairman that we finally get these things done. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you, Mr. DeFazio, and now
    recognizes the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee Mr. Petri.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you again for holding this hearing, Mr.
    Chairman. And I just need to emphasize that our Committee's
    highest priority is aviation safety, and that comes before
    everything else. And that is what we are attempting to--that
    emphasis is what we are attempting to underline by having this
    hearing and to actually do what we can to actually improve
    safety.
        It is only fair to say that the American aviation industry
    is, in fact--especially the large commercial aviation
    industry--is about the safest in the world. But that is no
    reason for relaxing, and it is no reason for not reviewing and
    improving procedures everywhere that we can. And I know we are
    committed to that goal.
        According to the Department of Transportation Office of
    Inspector General, since 2003, there have been six fatal
    commercial passenger accidents, and all have involved regional
    carriers. So it is imperative that we fully explore the issues
    related to the safety of regional carriers as we are doing in
    this hearing. Four of those, as has been pointed out, where
    evidently, at least in part, pilots' performance as a potential
    factor in the fatal accident.
        The National Transportation Safety Board has made
    recommendations on icy conditions, runway safety and recording
    devices. And in light of their recommendations, I look forward
    to hearing from today's witnesses. It is important that we hear
    from those who are directly involved, and that the witnesses
    have the opportunity to share their expertise and insights on
    how to address this important but complicated aviation safety
    issue.
        A number of my constituents have contacted me, and I will
    be asking some questions that they have suggested as well,
    because this is something that affects, obviously, the
    traveling public and all of us as citizens.
        With that I will put my full statement in the record. I
    just want to thank Mr. Loftus in particular, who is here
    testifying on behalf of the Families of Continental Flight
    3407. I know that your and other members' insights will be
    important to this Committee, and we appreciate the effort you
    have put into being here today.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the Ranking Member.
        I would remind Members that we have 11 witnesses scheduled
    to testify. We have our first panel of two witnesses. Members
    have gone, the Members panel, and now we have a government
    panel. So I would encourage Members, strongly encourage
    Members, if they would, to submit their statements for the
    record. If, in fact, someone wants to make an opening
    statement, feels strongly about it, I will recognize you. But I
    would strongly encourage you to put statements in the record so
    we can get to our witnesses and have ample opportunity for all
    of you to be able to ask them questions.
        With that, the Chair now will go to our panel of witnesses
    before us. The Chair now recognizes Mrs. Schmidt, who wants to
    be recognized.
        Mrs. Schmidt. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I will be brief.
    I want to thank you for holding this hearing. I want to thank
    our Ranking Member of the Full Committee Mr. Mica, and our
    Ranking Member of the Subcommittee Mr. Petri for this important
    hearing.
        So much has been said about Continental Flight 3407. It is
    a tragic and heartbreaking accident. And I think it is
    important that we do not prejudge what the NTSB is going to say
    when it completes its investigation. But regardless of the
    conclusions it winds up drawing, Congress and the airline
    industry should take a hard look at regional carriers. And
    based on what we have learned so far, we really need to review
    pilot experience, fatigue, training and the safety standards.
        I also think it is fair to recognize that air travel is the
    safest it has ever been, and still I am sure my colleagues in
    the industry would agree that one preventable accident is just
    too many. And so if we can take some reasonable measures and
    precautions to make air travel even safer, it is not that we
    should, we absolutely must.
        I look forward to hearing from everyone, but, most
    importantly, Mr. Loftus, who lost his wonderful 24-year-old
    daughter Madeline, because, you see, I was touched in my own
    district. I represent two wonderful people, Robert and Denise
    Perry of Loveland, Ohio, whose 27-year-old son Johnathan was
    among the passengers. And he was their love and their life, and
    that mother goes to bed every night with empty arms simply
    because pilots made a mistake.
        I continue to be awed by the strength and the perseverance
    of folks like Robert and Denise and their hope when they came
    to me and said, "Make something positive come from this." It is
    our duty to do that. And so I want to thank you, Chairman
    Costello, for giving us this opportunity to make something
    positive out of this. And I look forward to this important
    hearing.
        Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentlelady, and now we
    will introduce our panel of witnesses before us: The Honorable
    Mark Rosenker, who is the Acting Chairman of the NTSB. He is
    accompanied by Mr. Tom Haueter, who is the Director, Office of
    Aviation Safety, with the NTSB; Mr. Randy Babbitt, who is the
    new, as you heard, FAA Administrator; Mr. Calvin Scovel, III,
    who is the inspector general with the U.S. Department of
    Transportation.
        As all of you know, gentlemen, you have testified before
    the Subcommittee before. We would make you aware that your
    entire statement will appear in the record. We would ask you to
    summarize your statement.
        And the Chair now recognizes the Honorable Mr. Rosenker.

       TESTIMONY OF MARK V. ROSENKER, ACTING CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL
    TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, ACCOMPANIED BY THOMAS E. HAUETER,
     DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF AVIATION SAFETY, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION
       SAFETY BOARD; J. RANDOLPH BABBITT, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL
     AVIATION ADMINISTRATION; AND CALVIN L. SCOVEL, III, INSPECTOR
               GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

        Mr. Rosenker. Good morning, Chairman Costello, Ranking
    Member Petri and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. I
    would like to begin my testimony with a short summary of the
    NTSB's investigative actions to date regarding the accident
    involving Colgan Air Flight 3407. I want to emphasize this is
    still an ongoing investigation. There is significant work left
    for our investigators. My testimony today will therefore be
    limited to those facts that we have identified to date, and I
    will steer clear of any analysis of what we have found so far
    and avoid any ultimate conclusions that might be drawn from
    that information.
        On February 12, 2009, at about 10:17 p.m. Eastern standard
    time, Colgan Air Flight 3407, a Bombardier Dash 8 Q-400 crashed
    during an instrument approach to runway 23 at Buffalo-Niagara
    International Airport in Buffalo, New York. The flight was
    operating as a Part 121 scheduled passenger flight from Liberty
    International Airport, Newark, New Jersey. The 4 crew members
    and 45 passengers were killed. The aircraft was destroyed by
    impact forces and postcrash fire. One person in a house was
    also killed, and two individuals escaped from the house with
    minor injuries.
        On May 12, 2009, the NTSB commenced a 3-day public hearing
    on the accident in which we explored airplane performance, cold
    weather operations, sterile cockpit compliance, flight crew
    training and performance, and fatigue management. I would like
    to note that all of these issues are pertinent to every
    airline, operation, major air carriers as well as regional air
    carriers.
        Our investigation continues, and every day we make
    progress.
        Now I would like to discuss some of the Board's important
    safety recommendations. The NTSB has issued numerous
    recommendations to the FAA on stall training, stick pusher
    training, pilot records, remedial training for pilots, sterile
    cockpit, situational awareness, pilot monitoring skills, low-
    air-speed alerting systems, pilot professionalism and fatigue,
    and aircraft icing. Two of these issue areas, aircraft icing
    and human fatigue, are on the Board's most wanted list.
        While there are currently more than 450 open
    recommendations to the FAA, on January 12, the Agency took
    action on some of those recommendations when they published an
    NPRM addressing pilot training and qualifications. The notice
    also proposes to amend issues including the requirement of
    flight training simulators and traditional flight crew member
    training programs and adding training requirements in safety-
    critical areas.
        The NPRM addresses issues raised in numerous safety
    recommendations that the NTSB has issued to the FAA. In 1995,
    the NTSB issued recommendations to the FAA to require an
    airline to evaluate an applicant pilot's experience, skills and
    abilities before hiring the individual. The following year
    Congress enacted the Pilot Records Improvement Act, PRIA. PRIA
    required any company hiring a pilot for air transportation to
    request and receive records from any organization that had
    previously employed the pilot during the previous 5 years;
    however, PRIA does not require an airline to obtain FAA records
    of failed flight checks. The Board has recognized that
    additional data contained in FAA records, including records of
    flight check failures and rechecks, would be beneficial for a
    potential employer to review and evaluate. Therefore in 2005,
    the NTSB issued another recommendation to the FAA to require
    airlines, when considering an applicant for a pilot position,
    to perform a complete review of the FAA airman records
    including any notices of disapproval for flight checks.
        In response to this NTSB recommendation, the FAA stated
    that notices of disapproval for flight checks for certificates
    and ratings are not among the records explicitly required by
    PRIA, and, therefore, to mandate that air carriers obtain such
    notices would require rulemaking or a change in PRIA itself. To
    the credit of the FAA, on November 7, 2007, an advisory
    circular was issued informing carriers that they can ask pilots
    to sign a consent form giving the carrier access to any notices
    of disapproval.
        The recommendation is currently classified ``Open-
    Acceptable Alternate Response.'' However, to date, the FAA has
    not taken rulemaking action or asked Congress to modify the
    Act.
        Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony, and I will be
    glad to answer any questions.
        Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you, Mr. Rosenker, and now
    recognizes the FAA Administrator Mr. Babbitt.
        Mr. Babbitt. Thank you, Chairman Costello, Ranking Member
    Petri and the distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. Thank
    you for inviting me here today to discuss regional air carriers
    and pilot workforce issues.
        Let me begin by saying that we at the FAA deeply mourn the
    tragic loss of Colgan Air Flight 3407. This is an agency that
    is dedicated to aviation safety, and any loss that we incur is
    felt keenly by all of us. Likewise, our sympathies also go out
    to the families and loved ones of the passengers and crew of
    Air France flight number 447.
        This is my first appearance at a hearing before this
    Subcommittee since I was sworn in as the FAA Administrator, and
    I want to advise you that I certainly look forward to working
    with you, Mr. Chairman, and the entire Subcommittee as we move
    forward. We have a very ambitious agenda ahead of us at the
    FAA, and I intend to work very hard to achieve those safety
    goals.
        Since the mid-1990s, there has been a requirement for one
    level of safety that all regional carriers must operate under
    the same rules and at the same level of safety as the major
    airlines, their counterparts. And I am proud to say when I was
    president of the Airline Pilots Association, I led the efforts
    in coordination with the FAA to make those changes. All air
    carriers that operate today with 10 or more seats are required
    to operate at and meet the same level of safety standards and
    the same level of safety oversight across the board.
        When the NTSB conducted its public hearing last month on
    the Colgan Air crash, several issues came to light regarding
    pilot training and their qualifications, pilot crew fatigue,
    and the consistency of safety standards and compliance between
    air transportation operators. Given that the NTSB has not yet
    concluded its investigation, I cannot speak at this point on
    the potential findings. My written testimony does provide
    details, which I will submit, as to the current requirements
    with regard to pilot training, pilot records and flight-time
    and duty-time limitations.
        But I can tell you that on Tuesday, Secretary LaHood and I
    announced that we have ordered FAA inspectors to focus their
    inspections on training programs in order to better ensure that
    all airlines, including regional airlines, are complying with
    Federal regulations. We are also taking the step of gathering
    representatives from the major air carriers, their regional
    partners, aviation industry groups and labor here in
    Washington, D.C., on June 15 to participate in what we are
    calling a Call to Action, and the sole focus will be to improve
    airline safety and pilot training. This review will address
    those issues, pilot training, cockpit discipline and other
    issues, that are associated with flight safety.
        And while we await the findings of the NTSB's investigation
    of the Colgan Air crash, the Secretary and I believe that there
    is no time to lose in acting on the information that we already
    have and is available to us. So on June 15, our summit is
    designed to foster actions-- immediate actions-- and voluntary
    commitments that we will get from the carriers. And they are to
    focus on four key areas: First, air carrier management
    responsibilities for crew education and support; second,
    professional standards and flight discipline; third, training
    standards and performance; and fourth, mentoring relationships
    that exist or should exist between mainline carriers and their
    regional partners.
        The Colgan Air accident and the loss of Air France 447
    remind us that we can never rest on the laurels of our safety
    record, and that we must remain alert and vigilant and aware of
    the challenges that are in our aviation system. We have got to
    continue to work to enhance the safety of this system. This is
    a business where one mistake is one mistake too many.
        So, Chairman Costello, Ranking Member Petri, Members of
    this Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would
    be happy to answer any questions.
        Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you for your testimony and
    now recognizes the inspector general for the Department of
    Transportation General Scovel.
        Mr. Scovel. Chairman Costello, Ranking Member Petri,
    Members of the Subcommittee, we appreciate the opportunity to
    testify today regarding regional air carriers and pilot
    workforce issues.
        Safety is a shared responsibility among FAA, manufacturers,
    airlines, and airports. Together, all four form a series of
    overlapping controls to keep the system safe. The past several
    years have been one of the safest periods in history for the
    aviation industry; however, the tragic accident in February of
    Colgan Flight 3407 underscores the need for constant vigilance
    over aviation safety on the part of all stakeholders.
        Last month the NTSB held a preliminary hearing into the
    cause of the Colgan accident in which some evidence suggested
    that pilot training and fatigue may have contributed to the
    crash. As a result, Mr. Chairman, you requested that our office
    begin an extensive review into some of the issues that were
    brought to light during that hearing. We have already begun
    work on this review.
        Today I would like to discuss some of the operational
    differences between mainline and regional air carriers and then
    move on to weaknesses in FAA's oversight of the aviation
    industry.
        First, it is important to note that regional flights
    represent one-half of the total scheduled flights in this
    country. And regional airlines provide the only scheduled
    airline service to over 400 American communities. Therefore, it
    is critical that there truly be one level of safety for all
    carriers.
        Our preliminary audit work has identified differences in
    regional and mainline carrier operations and potential
    differences in pilots' training programs and level of flight
    experience. For example, regional carriers typically perform
    short and medium hauls to hub airports. This could result in
    many short flights on the same day for a pilot with a regional
    carrier. Multiple studies by agencies such as NASA have
    concluded that these types of operations can contribute to
    pilot fatigue, but FAA has yet to revise its rules regarding
    crew rest requirements.
        As for FAA's role in determining whether both mainline and
    regional air carriers have developed programs to ensure that
    pilots are adequately trained and have sufficient expertise to
    perform their responsibility, we find these issues to be
    particularly acute for regional carriers. As you know, the last
    six fatal accidents involved regional carriers and the NTSB
    cited pilot performance as a potential contributory factor in
    four of those accidents.
        Moving to my second point, weaknesses in FAA's oversight of
    the aviation industry. Our past work has shown serious lapses
    in FAA's safety oversight and inconsistencies in how many of
    its rules and regulations are enforced. The hearing in April
    2008 before the Full Committee highlighted such weaknesses in
    FAA's risk-based oversight system, known as ATOS, and air
    carrier compliance with safety directives.
        While our work identified safety lapses in Southwest
    Airline's compliance, many stakeholders were concerned that
    they could be symptomatic of much deeper problems with FAA's
    air carrier oversight on a systemwide level.
        In 2002, we reported that FAA needed to develop national
    oversight processes to ensure that ATOS is effectively and
    consistently implemented. Then in 2005, we found that
    inspectors did not complete 26 percent of planned ATOS
    inspections. Last year we reported that weaknesses in FAA's
    implementation of ATOS allowed compliance issues in Southwest's
    maintenance program to go undetected for several years.
        Our most recent, and still ongoing, work has determined
    that lapses in oversight inspections were not limited to
    Southwest. FAA oversight offices for seven other major air
    carriers also missed ATOS inspections. Some had been allowed to
    lapse well beyond the 5-year inspection cycle. Additionally,
    FAA's national oversight of other facets of the industry, such
    as repair stations, has struggled to keep pace with the dynamic
    changes occurring in those industries.
        Mr. Scovel. These facilities are rapidly becoming air
    carriers' primary source for aircraft maintenance.
        We have found that FAA relies heavily on air carriers to
    provide oversight of those repair stations. However, that
    oversight has not always been effective. In 2008, we reported
    that air carriers did not identify all deficiencies at repair
    stations and did not adequately follow up on deficiencies
    identified to ensure that problems were corrected.
        This is of particular concern for regional carriers who
    rely heavily on repair stations. According to data provided to
    the Department, regional carriers send as much as half of their
    maintenance to repair stations. NTSB's investigation into the
    crash of another regional carrier, Air Midwest Flight 5481 in
    January, 2003, identified serious lapses in the carrier's
    oversight of outsourced maintenance.
        Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by reiterating that we will
    continue to do our part in advancing the Department's goal of
    one level of safety. While all stakeholders are committed to
    getting it right, including FAA, who has made progress in
    improving aspects of its safety oversight, our work continues
    to identify significant vulnerabilities that must be addressed.
    This will require actions in areas FAA has already targeted for
    improvement, as well as other areas where FAA will need to
    revisit differences in standards and regulations and rethink
    its approach to safety oversight.
        That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy
    to address any questions you or any other Members of the
    Subcommittee might have.
        Mr. Costello. Thank you, Mr. Scovel.
        And as I mentioned earlier that I had a meeting with
    Administrator Babbitt on some of these issues, I also had a
    meeting earlier this week with Mr. Scovel.
        The Chair now recognizes the distinguished Chairman of the
    Full Committee, Chairman Oberstar.
        Mr. Oberstar. Thank you for holding this hearing, Mr.
    Chairman, your continuing vigilance over aviation safety and
    the tight rein you are holding on government--and
    accountability on government agencies and on the airlines
    themselves.
        As I said many, many times, safety begins in the corporate
    board room. You need a corporate culture of safety permeating
    the industry. And where that lapses, then the FAA, the National
    Transportation Safety Board, the Inspector General, and our
    Committee and our counterpart Committee in the other body must
    maintain vigilance.
        And we have done that. We had a hearing on regional safety
    when I chaired this Subcommittee 15, 17, 18 years ago. I think
    you testified at that hearing, Captain Babbitt. And the NTSB
    has time again issued recommendations and directives--not
    directive but recommendations for action, and those need to be
    implemented, and we need the Transportation Safety Board's
    continued vigilance.
        You mentioned as I walking in, Administrator--Captain
    Babbitt, flight deck management and procedures, and I hope that
    is a matter we can explore further in the course of this
    hearing. But it is one that you need to review.
        Again, I hope that this meeting you have called that there
    will be renewed interest in pairing in the flight deck of the
    pilot and the first officer, matching experience levels,
    revisiting the experience levels of those who serve on the
    flight deck in regional airline operations, assuring that there
    is compatibility and comparability of service.
        All too often we have seen in the past and in the tragedy
    that occurred in Hibbing in my district, we had a very--a
    relatively senior captain and a very junior first officer who
    was intimidated by his captain and reluctant to speak up and
    say, are you--as we know from the voice recorder, didn't say
    anything while going through a fast rate of descent.
        We need to have that ability of that flight deck crew to
    talk with each other if--for one who sees something that is not
    quite appropriate to speak up and have--feel the freedom to
    speak up and understand that he or she has the responsibility
    to speak up. And I see Chairman Rosenker nodding in agreement,
    and I appreciate that.
        In the 1990s, the Department and the FAA concurred in the
    industry on a one level of safety. You can't have one for one--
    Part 121 carriers, Part 135 carriers, and for the air taxi
    services and for the rest. We need one level of safety. You can
    begin your tenure as Administrator by ensuring that one level
    of safety is revived, alive, and well, invigorated and
    enforced. That is what we are looking to you to do.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you, Mr. Oberstar.
        Mr. Scovel, you indicated in your testimony--you heard me
    mention in my opening statement that, in theory, we have this
    one level of safety for both the majors and the regionals, but,
    in practice, it does not exist. And is that what I heard you
    say when you testified?
        Mr. Scovel. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Costello. What is your recommendation on what should be
    done in order to take it from theory to practice to make
    certain that we in fact do have one level of safety for the
    majors as well as the regionals?
        Mr. Scovel. Mr. Chairman, the phrase ``one level of
    safety'' to me expresses FAA's, the Department's and the
    Congress' goal or aspiration for one standard of safety. But,
    clearly, the record tells us that we haven't reached it yet.
    One level implies level. It implies attainment or achievement.
    We are not there yet.
        In order for FAA to get there, it needs to pay greater
    attention, more consistent attention to its safety oversight
    programs. As our reports to FAA and to this body including our
    testimony last year in the Southwest hearing have indicated
    with the ATOS program, while the risk-based oversight approach
    to safety is highly recommended and we commend FAA for
    undertaking that effort, its implementation has been
    problematic. Our forthcoming report will show that, in addition
    to Southwest, seven other major carriers have had problems
    completing their required safety attribute inspections on a 5-
    year cycle as required by ATOS regulations.
        Regionals were recently brought into the ATOS program. Our
    discussions with FAA inspectors responsible for implementing
    ATOS at the regionals show that they are struggling with it.
        It seems to them that ATOS has been designed to foster
    safety or account for safety programs in the majors but seems
    to have less applicability to the regionals. In May, reported
    on ASAP, sir, a voluntary disclosure reporting program made
    available for aviation industry employees so that they can
    report safety problems without fear of administrative or
    disciplinary action by their employers or FAA.
        The majors have told us that ASAP is a key element of their
    safety efforts.
        We reported that ASAP is a missed opportunity for FAA
    because it is not accumulating and analyzing the data from ASAP
    for itself with respect to regionals, we have found that 37
    percent of the larger regional carriers do not participate in
    ASAP. If it is a valuable program for the majors, we think it
    might also be a valuable program for the regionals. We
    understand it is a voluntary program for carriers, but perhaps
    with greater FAA attention and accommodation more regionals
    might be persuaded to join.
        Risk-based oversight, sir. With regard to repair stations,
    we have testified repeatedly in this Committee and also over in
    the Senate that FAA's implementation of its new risk-based
    oversight system when it comes to outsourced maintenance
    remains ineffective. In order to have risk-based oversight, you
    need to know where the risk is so you can target your scarce
    inspector resources. In order to do that, you have to acquire
    data. FAA has been unable to date to devise a mechanism that
    will induce the carriers to provide data on what maintenance
    has been conducted, how much, and where it has been performed
    so that FAA can follow up.
        In addition, sir, and in closing, I would commend FAA to
    look carefully to the outstanding NTSB recommendations, all of
    which will provide a further roadmap in order to achieve the
    goal of one level of safety.
        Mr. Costello. Thank you.
        Administrator Babbitt, I was pleased when the President
    selected an Administrator who was a commercial pilot, who has
    testified before this Subcommittee, who has worked with the
    Congress on many issues in the past, who has knowledge of many
    of the issues that we are trying to address here in this
    hearing. However, you are taking over an agency that has a
    history of becoming more of a bureaucracy than an agency that
    performs well and responds well to demands of the Congress and
    the public. So you have a big job ahead of you.
        I know that Secretary LaHood and you announced this
    initiative and that you will be meeting with the regionals and
    I assume the majors as well. Tell us about what you hope to
    accomplish and tell us how you intend to move forward after the
    meeting.
        Mr. Babbitt. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Chairman, the purpose here--and let me echo a statement
    that the Inspector General made: I concur completely with his
    observation that we have one standard of safety; and we do, in
    fact, have one standard of safety. What we are seeing, however,
    and this tragic accident has put a pretty bright light on the
    fact that we don't have an equivalent level of safety.
        We find that some of the carriers are doing a remarkably
    good job and should be commended for operating well above the
    bar, well above the minimums required. We know, for example,
    that one of our major carriers has it as a policy that anyone
    that provides service to them via a capacity purchase agreement
    or other commercial arrangement, they require them within a
    given period of time, that they must have a FOQA program. They
    must have an ASAP program. They must have a mentoring program.
        So the purpose of us bringing these folks together next
    week is twofold. Number one, let us get down, sit in a room,
    and be very candid about what are those best practices, what
    are people doing that is above and beyond and superlative to
    what is required by the statutes and by the regulations. And
    let us learn what those best practices are; and then,
    secondarily, can we implement those quickly? And I intend to
    use the bully pulpit of this job to the extent that I can to
    bring people into compliance, which has to be voluntary at this
    point.
        But my motivation is that by the time the NTSB finishes its
    good work--and it will be good work--We will learn from it. But
    that is 6 months from now. And if I acted the morning they gave
    me the recommendations, I am 6 months from promulgating a
    regulation I can put in force. That is a year from now, and
    that is too long.
        So what I would like to do is take the knowledge that we
    have already learned from their preliminary investigation, take
    the knowledge from the industry. People want to do this right.
    This industry, I marvel at how well it does try to perform. Let
    us gather that best information. Let us provide mentoring
    programs.
        I can tell you from my own experience as a new pilot, my
    first trip--I never flew in an airplane where I didn't sit in
    the right seat with someone who had at least 10 years of
    experience. That was a wonderful finishing touch to my primary
    education as a pilot. What I really learned was in line
    operation from senior captains, people who mentored me. And
    that is the way the process works.
        We have to question how much mentoring is going on, how
    much professional standards exist when a carrier expands very
    rapidly. And we can't critique them for it. It is a reality.
    You get a new contract, you buy five new airplanes, guess what?
    You hire 50 new pilots.
        How do we mentor them? Maybe we need to look to the major
    carriers and let them share that senior experience with these
    younger pilots, build that professionalism in and move forward.
    That is our goal in the short term.
        Mr. Costello. What concerns me and I think concerns a lot
    of people in this room today is the voluntary versus mandatory.
    And I understand what you are talking about, rule making, but I
    believe we need to look at some of these issues and mandate
    them through legislation. And I hope you will work with us on
    that.
        We intend to move forward to address some of these issues.
    I mentioned earlier in my opening statement that I intend to
    look at legislation. Mr. Mica indicated he would like to do it
    in a bipartisan way. So we are going to work together, Mr.
    Petri and I and Members of this Subcommittee.
        My experience has been too often when you leave it up to
    the airlines or you leave it up to many agencies that it
    doesn't get done if it is voluntary, if there are no penalties,
    if there is no mandate. So that is something that we will be
    looking at, and we will be looking to take your recommendations
    as well as Mr. Scovel and Mr. Rosenker.
        One final question----
        Mr. Oberstar. Mr. Chairman, before you leave that point,
    may I interject a thought?
        Mr. Costello. Please.
        Mr. Oberstar. From that very chair, at that table, a dozen
    plus years ago, maybe 15, 18 years ago, Don Engen, then
    Administrator of FAA, had a hearing that we conducted on
    closing of overwing exits on 747 aircraft which was happening
    unknown to the Administrator because of the then stovepiping of
    the regional offices of FAA.
        Don Engen, after hearing the testimony of flight attendants
    who had been engaged in rescue efforts on 747 where the only
    surviving exit was the overwing exit, said in his very opening
    remarks, Mr. Chairman, I have sent a message to the airlines
    and to Boeing now. I can't order them to do it. To do so will
    take rule making, will take weeks, but I have sent a
    handwritten note to them right from this table to stop the
    process now.
        That is the kind of decisiveness--you mentioned that you
    were going to do this. You are not going to wait for the rule
    making. And you said bully pulpit. You have more than a bully
    pulpit. You have power. The airlines know they will go against
    you only at their peril, and we are here to support that
    initiative, and we expect you to take that kind of leadership.
        Mr. Babbitt. I appreciate both your confidence and your
    support. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Costello. Final question, Mr. Babbitt. We have other
    Members who want to ask questions, and I will come back
    hopefully in a second round.
        You have heard mentioned earlier that the NTSB
    recommendations as they come to the FAA, there is a report that
    is supposed to come to the Congress. It is overdue. It was due
    in February of this year, and we are now in June. I would ask
    you to go back in to make certain that that happens, to get it
    done, and get that report to us.
        Finally, tell us--you had indicated that you were setting
    up a procedure to look at all of the NTSB recommendations and
    to respond to them. Tell us about the procedure that you intend
    to implement.
        Mr. Babbitt. Yes, sir.
        First, at the risk of ratting out my boss, that is a DOT
    report I believe you are referring to. We have turned over our
    portion of that in a timely fashion. But I will look into that,
    and I understand why. I think there are other modes that have
    to report into that.
        With regard to the NTSB recommendations, I have done a sort
    of a quick background research, and I will bring you up to date
    with that.
        Let me repeat what I put forward in my confirmation hearing
    and what I have announced in hearings in another body. It is
    fairly straightforward, and I hope it is fairly simple and
    helpful. And that is the NTSB does great work, and they
    investigate, and they do the full range of their investigation.
    We should take those--and I intend to take those--
    recommendations very seriously.
        And what I have said and will fulfill is we will act upon
    those recommendations in one of three ways.
        We will adopt them as written as soon as practically
    possible, number one. There may be occasions where we have
    another regulation in place or we might have some reason to
    suggest modification to it. We will adopt it as modified and
    notify you what modifications we made to the recommendation.
    And if for any reason we were not to adopt one of their
    suggestions, I will advise you why we didn't adopt that
    regulation and the rationale behind it, in concert and
    coordination with the NTSB.
        Let me just recap for you the results. We have indicated, I
    think, that there are approximately 450 recommendations. That
    sounds like an astounding number. It doesn't sound quite so
    astounding when you realize that we have adopted almost 5,000
    of the ones they have recommended; and of those 437, a number
    of them are general aviation related. But when we get all
    through boiling it down, many of them are in regulatory format
    now. They are working their way through the process of NPRMs. A
    number of them we have gone back to the NTSB and working in
    coordination with them.
        And I would note for the record that in my first week and
    before this hearing was even scheduled I reached out to both of
    these gentlemen to better coordinate and ask for meetings. It
    is my goal to work closely with them. They are valuable sources
    of information, as well as the Subcommittee's staff and team.
        So I am looking for input from all sources. But when we get
    all through boiling this down, there is about 130 left. And,
    again, I want to know why didn't we adopt them; and I will give
    you a rationale why we did not.
        Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you and now recognizes the
    Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Mr. Petri.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        As you consider all these suggestions--and I assume some
    are from the top down and some are from the bottom up and some
    are from each side, probably--I wondered if I could just--it
    would help me to understand how you go through the process a
    little bit if I could extract from a letter of a constituent
    and ask you to respond, if anyone on the panel who could care
    to, to this particular constituent's suggestions for some
    changes.
        I am a captain based at Reagan National in Washington,
    D.C.--but the person lives in Wisconsin--I fly a 50-passenger
    regional jet. I am a 30-year-old pilot, husband, and father of
    one. I am a professionally experienced pilot intent on spending
    my career flying airplanes.
        I have a few concerns about the FAA regulations governing
    rest and duty times for airline pilots, specifically regional
    airline pilots. I have suggestions for you.
        Duty time needs to change from 16 hours for a regional
    airline pilot to 12 hours. This change would force the airlines
    to schedule pilots to fly either during the morning or evening.
    This will help combat fatigue, which I experience every week. I
    work out at my hotels, and I pay $2,700 a year for a crash pad
    in Crystal City to ensure proper rest for myself.
        Even with all my precautions, I cannot keep up with the
    continually degrading schedules. When you are in the airplane
    for 14 hours a day, you can't help but get tired toward the end
    of the day. The 30 hours in 7 days need to change to 30 hours
    in 10 days.
        During the past 11 days, I spent one night at home and flew
    34 hours. This may not seem like a lot of flying, but flying on
    the east coast is very demanding, the responsibility to ensure
    safe travel of 50 people into the world's busiest airports. I
    can't see myself being able to do this job for very long, given
    my current workload.
        Regional airline pilots should be restricted to six legs of
    flying a day. At present, we are limited to 8 hours scheduled
    flying, but we are not limited to how many times we fly.
    Limiting the number of legs a day will increase safety,
    decrease fatigue and stress. It is very hard to focus after six
    legs of flying in a day.
        I also wish we could force airlines to build commutable
    schedules, but that is a pipe dream.
        Do you have any reaction to his two suggestions about
    taking into consideration legs as well as hours and limiting
    the time to 12 instead of 16 hours?
        Mr. Babbitt. I will start off and try to address some of
    the points made.
        One of the things that I consider a top priority--having
    sat here and testified before the good Chairman Oberstar a
    number of years ago on this very issue-- one of priorities that
    I have is to address the flight time/duty time issue. I think
    one of the difficulties that your constituent has pointed out
    is the fact that he has selected an arbitrary number.
        I think one of the things that we are learning--we are
    learning it from NTSB, we are learning it from the Inspector
    General, we are learning it from NASA--we have science today to
    help us with flight time/duty time calculations; and I think we
    need to really look at this in the light of science.
        There is a big difference between an arbitrary 12 or 14 or
    whatever the number is, 16 hours. Let us use 14. If you and I
    went to work together at 7:00 in the morning, we would be tired
    at 9:00 at night, but we would be okay. But if we went to work
    at 9:00 tonight, at 11:00 tomorrow morning I wouldn't want to
    drive in a car with you, much less fly in an airplane. So there
    is a big difference between what 12 or what 14 hours are we
    measuring.
        There is also a difference when pilots fly. We have rules
    where you can go beyond with supplemental crews long-haul
    flights.
        And your constituent is exactly correct and I concur with
    the idea that multiple landings--it is one thing to fly one 8-
    hour leg from here to Paris; it is another thing to fly 7 hours
    and make 14 stops and never leave the State of Florida. And I
    have done that.
        So I know the difference in measuring arbitrary numbers.
    And I think, as much as I respect what he is trying to achieve,
    I think we really should bring science and use the best
    knowledge and create rules that keep people from being
    fatigued.
        The FAA did, I think, a very credible job of trying to
    address this by having a fatigue seminar. And I think we should
    go the next step now. Let us take what we have learned in those
    seminars and let us apply it to proper regulations that will
    help people, help them become aware of when they are fatigued.
    That is another leg to it.
        Thirty in seven versus thirty in ten, I put it in the same
    box. One 30 hours, that is Detroit to Narita. Those are two
    long legs, two landings. That is not the same as 30 hours in
    the Northeast, shooting approaches to 200 feet in snow. So,
    again, we need to measure what we are doing and apply the
    proper parameters for the proper conditions.
        Six-leg limit. I think when we looked at flight time/duty
    time a number of years ago, that was absolutely one of the
    considerations where you might have--you can say it is okay to
    fly 10 hours a day with one leg. But if you begin to have
    multiple legs, maybe you then reduce the cap. And I think he is
    probably on target there. I am just not sure what the limits
    should be at this point.
        Mr. Rosenker. If I could add to Administrator Babbitt's
    position, he is exactly on target. We believe that fatigue is a
    most insidious condition. Many people are unaware they have
    this condition; that is the frightening aspect. They make poor
    judgments which many times results in accidents.
        Back in 1995, I believe the FAA attempted to make some
    changes through an NPRM. It never came to fulfillment.
        The reality is that it has been about 50 years since the
    hours of service has truly been examined. The aviation industry
    has changed significantly in 50 years. The kinds of aircraft we
    fly and the kinds of training we get, distances we travel, they
    are different than they were 50 years ago.
        So it is time to make changes, and I look forward to
    working closely with the Administrator, and I applaud him on
    his work and his quick action to improve the industry. We
    continue to talk about it; we must never, ever begin to
    segregate the regionals from the majors. It is the entire 121
    industry that we are dealing with, and we don't make
    recommendations to segments of the industry. Virtually all of
    our recommendations go to the industry as a whole. We attempt
    to ensure that the standard for the entire industry is
    maintained at the safest level possible. We have a safe
    industry today, and our objective is to make it even safer.
        Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you, Mr. Petri; and I will
    recognize the gentleman from Oregon, Mr. DeFazio.
        Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Administrator Babbitt, ever hear the term "pilot pushing"?
        Mr. Babbitt. Yes, sir.
        Mr. DeFazio. Do you recall or have you reviewed your 1992
    testimony regarding intimidation, punitive firing, disciplinary
    action by airlines when pilots reported fatigue?
        Mr. Babbitt. I haven't reviewed my testimony, but I have a
    recollection of it, sir.
        Mr. DeFazio. You have the recollection. You said you could
    bring in an amazing parade of people to testify that this went
    on in the industry.
        Mr. Babbitt. Yes, sir.
        Mr. DeFazio. But then you said here, people want to do the
    right thing. I guess I have trouble reconciling pilot pushing,
    intimidation, punitive firing, discipline for pilots who are
    trying to follow the law and report themselves fatigued and
    people want to do the right thing.
        I would say there are some in the industry who want to do
    the right thing; and our current rules, unfortunately, go to
    the lowest common denominator. Good old Frank Lorenzo dragged
    down a lot of the industry. You can't compete with people like
    that, because they are at the bottom of the barrel.
        We need to have a uniform higher standard. I just can't
    believe we still have a standard of 250 hours minimum
    qualification for a first officer when a nail technician takes
    600 hours in Oregon. There is something wrong there. And if the
    FAA said, no, we are going to make it 750 or whatever would be
    appropriate, then people can still operate above that, and
    there would be some that would do that or who are more
    attractive employers or who pay better, but at least you
    wouldn't have the bottom-of-the-barrel operators taking the
    people with 250 hours and paying them just absurdly low wages,
    so bad that they have to live with their mother, and then stick
    them up there in difficult conditions.
        Can't we consider those sorts of things? I didn't see it in
    the list of the NTSB's recommendations. I don't know if it has
    been recommended to establish a higher initial bar.
        Mr. Babbitt. Let me, if I may, address two issues.
        You raised, first, the pushing. And I would say we have a
    number of carriers who do that, and the problem is the
    knowledge level of some of the new pilots.
        I can tell you right now a senior pilot in a major carrier,
    if he was fatigued, he would simply say to the company, listen,
    we have been on duty 10 hours. It is the wrong 10. We are all
    tired. We are going to the hotel. And nobody would blink. But
    you take a pilot who has been 3 months with a brand new
    carrier, not even covered by any representation, has no----
        Mr. DeFazio. That is one of the keys which you pointed to
    in 1992, if they don't have protection.
        Mr. Babbitt. That is correct. And they have no whistle-
    blower protection. They worked very hard to get this job; and
    they are not about to say, oh, gee, I am a little tired today.
    I am not going to fly. They may be exhausted, but they are
    reluctant, and that is an area we all have to focus on.
        Second, the quality in the 250 hours, if I could, let me
    just politely suggest that there may be a difference. Two
    hundred and fifty hours in the airplane has also been matched
    by hundreds of hours of ground school training, simulators, all
    of that type of stuff. We are not talking about 8 hours in a
    classroom.
        Mr. DeFazio. But some--and we had Ms. Slaughter reference
    one particular outfit that does training in Florida and pushing
    people through pretty quickly. The quality of that time varies
    tremendously. And it just seems to me--and some of the regional
    airlines require considerably more than 250 hours for hiring,
    no matter how much ground school people have had. And I am just
    suggesting that is something additionally that needs to be
    reviewed.
        Did NTSB have any----
        Mr. Rosenker. Mr. DeFazio, I think you are making an
    excellent point. We don't know yet if 250 hours is the
    appropriate number. It may well be that something will come
    from the Colgan accident which may involve a re-examination of
    minimum requirements. At this point, we have not made any
    recommendations addressing that issue.
        Another point that I would like to make is that hours don't
    always ensure pilot proficiency. Many times at the Board we
    have investigated terrible accidents that have been made by
    high-hour pilots-- those with 12,000 to 15,000 hours-- where
    the pilot has just made an incredibly amateurish mistake--for a
    host of reasons.
        So, we cannot necessarily equate number of hours flown with
    high levels of proficiency and skill. We would always want to
    take a look at the programs they are going through, the
    continual proficiency checks that they must pass before we can
    say that these pilots are highly qualified.
        Mr. DeFazio. I appreciate that.
        You did point out in your testimony on the subject of
    fatigue that Colgan had changed their handbook to say--previous
    editions said, flight crew members should not attempt to
    commute to their base on the same day they are scheduled to
    work, but their current edition at the time of this accident
    said, a commuting pilot is expected to report for duty in a
    timely manner.
        And I would note that the first officer took the red-eye
    from Seattle. I have taken that flight. By 6 or 7 o'clock the
    next night, I am not at my best just making judgments about
    editing things in the office or something else, let alone
    flying a plane in icy conditions. I would say it is a fairly
    similar circumstance, and I have done a lot of this.
        I am just trying to point out that some operators are going
    to take the flexibility that they are given and use it to dive
    for the bottom. Then they can offer a lower cost product. And
    the other people who are trying to do a better job and say you
    should never, ever take the red-eye, come here and fly the same
    day, spend the day in the crew lounge and fly the same day--If
    some other operator is doing that, you know, they are probably
    going to have to pay them more than $23,000 a year so they
    don't have to live with their mother in Seattle and fly across
    the country.
        I mean, I am trying to point out that we need to
    establish--I think it is the FAA's duty to establish a higher
    bar, and then no one is at a competitive disadvantage. And I
    don't think you will find a single person who would be
    unwilling to pay an extra 2 or 5 bucks for a ticket because we
    raised the bar and Colgan Air isn't out there dragging
    everybody down or somebody else like them--not just to pick on
    them. Our good old Frank Lorenzo and everybody else that has
    tried to do that in the industry.
        That is all. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentleman and now
    recognizes the Ranking Member of the Full Committee, Mr. Mica.
        Mr. Mica. Welcome, Mr. Babbitt. I am so pleased that we do
    have a confirmed administrator and one with your high
    credentials. I guess we are going to lose Mr. Rosenker as the
    Chair. So I compliment you on the great job you have done at
    NTSB and will continue to do. But we appreciate your past
    service and your beginning service, Mr. Babbitt.
        A question for both of you. Well, actually, it will include
    our representative IG panelist. Are our regional airlines safe,
    Mr. Babbitt?
        Mr. Babbitt. Yes, they are.
        Mr. Mica. Thank you.
        Mr. Rosenker?
        Mr. Rosenker. I would agree with the administrator. They
    are, sir.
        Mr. Mica. Mr. Scovel?
        Mr. Scovel. Mr. Mica, I have no evidence that they are
    unsafe.
        Mr. Mica. Thank you.
        Well, I think that is important. I guess 25 percent of the
    passengers I guess--or flights rather--flights, not
    passengers--are on regional airlines. We need to reassure the
    public.
        And it is my understanding you testified at the beginning--
    I heard your remarks, Mr. Babbitt--that we had the same
    standards in place for both our large commercial aircraft as
    also for our regional carrier; is that correct?
        Mr. Babbitt. Yes, sir. They all operate under Part 121, and
    they meet those standards.
        The point I was making was----
        Mr. Mica. I think we have to reassure the public. And, of
    course, as I point out to folks, that today more than 100
    people will die in automobile accidents and every day, 365 days
    a year. So while we have had some tragedies, we have an
    incredible record with our large commercial aircraft
    domestically.
        And I have a quick question about the problem that we may
    have with the Airbus in a second. But, Mr. Rosenker, you
    recommended--or NTSB recommended I think more than 3 years
    ago--I have got a copy of the recommendation--that we actually
    open up some of the records beyond 5 years of the performance.
    I was shocked to hear that, again, that some of the mechanism
    that I thought Mr. DeFazio and I put in place some years ago to
    continue to call those recommendations to the attention of both
    Department of Transportation, FAA and also Congress--because,
    ultimately, we are responsible if an agency isn't acting. Do I
    need to change what we put in law? What is the problem with not
    getting your recommendations acted upon, Mr. Rosenker?
        Mr. Rosenker. Sir, I wish I had a silver bullet to be able
    to tell you that, if we did this, all of the NTSB
    recommendations would be enacted.
        Mr. Mica. But I have your recommendation here. I have the
    number of flights that--commuter flights that we have lost with
    fatalities. Obviously, there is some disconnect. Because I said
    earlier, I have commuter--an unfortunate number of fatal
    crashes. You have a recommendation. Four of the six
    recommendations related to pilot performance. And I can't get a
    simple recommendation from you into a rule or a law.
        Mr. Rosenker. If we are talking about some open recs that
    we have related to the Colgan Buffalo accident, I can share
    with you approximately where we are. The stick pusher
    recommendation and the upset training are going to be handled
    and implemented when the NPRM is fully implemented. It is being
    covered by the January NPRM.
        Mr. Mica. What about the records recommendations?
        Mr. Rosenker. We are talking about the records. That has
    been on our recommendation list for a number of years.
        Mr. Mica. 2005?
        Mr. Rosenker. 2005, yes, sir.
        Mr. Mica. But we still don't have implementation. What is--
    --
        Mr. Rosenker. There are some regulatory concerns, and there
    has----
        Mr. Mica. There is an also a privacy concern I know, too,
    as far as pilot certification issues.
        But I think, again, when we are putting someone behind the
    yoke or in control of an aircraft, the airlines should be able
    to access--the representative from New York, Ms. Slaughter,
    went beyond what I had recommended, that this should be on line
    or public information. But at least the person hiring should
    have access to information about performance and their ability
    to pass certification tests.
        Mr. Rosenker. We agree with you, Mr. Mica; and, as I say,
    we put this forth in 2005. An excellent first step is what the
    Congress did in 1996 when it enacted the Pilot Records
    Improvement Act (PRIA). The continuation where we find we can
    get additional information which is being stored at the FAA,
    that information is extremely valuable. This deals with pass/
    fail, the kinds of certifications that the candidate has. This
    would be an extremely valuable source of information when an
    airline is attempting to evaluate and decide which one of the
    candidates they should hire. Should they take one who has had
    five failures, or should they take one who seems to be
    extremely proficient in going through their instruction
    programs? So we have made that recommendation.
        In reality, an airline can get the material by having the
    pilot sign a waiver, but it should be a requirement. It should
    be made significantly easier to obtain this information.
        Mr. Mica. But it hasn't been implemented.
        Mr. Babbitt.
        Mr. Babbitt. If I may, a little background. I am familiar
    with the Pilot Records Act, and that Act was born from the lack
    of information that one carrier hired a pilot not knowing that
    he had multiple failures in training at another carrier. So the
    focus was on the entry pilot's activities. And they said, you
    know what? We should know what he did at the last carrier.
        I think what this accident has shone some fairly bright
    light on is excluded in that, as it was in the subject of the
    discussion at the time, was the fact that the FAA maintains
    another database. We maintain all the records of every rating,
    all the writtens and so forth. Those, too, are maintained.
        But the Pilot Records Act, my suggestion would be that we
    probably need to modify that rule statutorily so that you get
    both. There are privacy concerns that come into that issue, and
    I think we do need to look at that. The FAA, of course, has the
    oversight authority. Once you make that regulation change, then
    it is the obligation of the FAA to ensure that those
    regulations are being complied with. But the oversight is that
    we didn't ask for enough when we wrote the rule.
        Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the Ranking Member and now
    recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Boccieri.
        Mr. Boccieri. Thank you, Mr. Costello; and thank you to the
    panel coming here today.
        It is becoming clear that the 50 deaths that occurred that
    night in February were not only tragic but completely
    avoidable. And I want to focus on three things, Mr. Chairman. I
    request that the letter that I submitted to Colgan Air and
    their response and my remarks be submitted to the record.
        [The information follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Boccieri. Three things I want to focus on. With 15
    years of training with the United States Air Force and
    thousands of hours as a C-130 pilot, I am baffled by the
    response and I am baffled by the lack of attentiveness to the
    recommendations that have been made from the NTSB to the FAA.
        Number one, when I buy a ticket from an airline--I buy a
    ticket from Continental, Delta, whomever--I am buying a ticket
    with them because I like their training records, their
    statistics, and I like and respect the fact that they have a
    certain level of expectations with respect to their pilots. Yet
    the co-chair agreements that we have right now in practice are
    for purely marketing reasons, and the FAA even acknowledges in
    its own admission that it has nothing to do with safety. In
    fact, they said the co-chair agreements reported that safety
    was not treated as a major factor in the Department's co-chair
    approval process and the FAA did not take an active role in
    approval or oversight of these agreements.
        That is a shame, and it is tragic.
        Number two, the regional airlines do not have the same
    standards as the major airlines. The FAA likes to talk about we
    train like we fly and we fly like we train. But yet when I dug
    down and found the root of why this aircraft commander, this
    captain did not apply the appropriate procedures to recover
    from this stall--it was a full stall, an approach to a stall
    and a full stall--he did not apply the appropriate procedures.
        And when I wrote to Colgan Air, they suggested that every
    pilot receives complete ground training on the Q-400 stall
    system which includes a stick shaker, a stick pusher. The
    training includes the recognition and recovery from near stall,
    an indication of a stall, the stick shaker for the push-off.
        Yet the NTSB said when they interviewed check pilots,
    interviewed the demonstration or instruction of the aircraft
    pusher system, it is not part of the training syllabus for
    initial or recurrent training by Colgan. These pilots did not
    know how to recover from a full stall. Completely, completely
    avoidable.
        And, in fact, the NTSB said that, in their training
    requirements, that the FAA should have upset recovery training
    aides; and the NTSB advised that training and stall recovery
    should go beyond the approach to a stall to include training
    recovery from a full stall condition in addition to the cases
    where the flight data are available, weather flight test
    incidents, that these data should be used to model stall
    behavior and facilitate training beyond the initial stall
    warning. Yet, since 1974, the FAA has not enacted stall
    recovery, stall training, and stall recovery requirements for a
    series of accidents that happened back in the 1970s.
        Unacceptable. As a military pilot, we would not be able to
    fly. We would not be able to fly if we were not allowed to
    recover--or not able to recover from a full stall, approach to
    a stall and an unusual attitude recovery.
        And, in fact, the major airlines--I went to reserve duty
    this weekend, and I asked a couple of my buddies who fly for
    the major airlines, and they suggested, oh, we go into all
    kinds of unusual attitudes, unusual recoveries, full stall
    recognitions, and they have to recognize the performance and
    structural integrity of their aircraft when they recover from
    those procedures.
        Yet these have not been enacted.
        The third item, why are we permitting our pilots in
    commercial aviation to fly into severe icing? As an airlift
    pilot of the United States Air Force, the United States Air
    Force does not allow me to fly into severe icing. Yet this crew
    flew into what is arguably considered severe icing, freezing
    drizzle, freezing rain.
        Yet the training manual says that do not--for Colgan Air--
    suggests--and this is from the NTSB safety report--do not
    attempt to take off or make an approach to land in freezing
    rain, sleet or drizzle, wet snow conditions that are beyond the
    performance limits of the aircraft.
        So it is clear that as long as performance indicators of
    what they do when they crunch their numbers in their charts,
    before they land based on their weight and atmospheric
    conditions, they may make a mistake or they may not, but yet
    they are permitted to fly into freezing rain and severe icing.
    That is unacceptable.
        I think that this panel not only has an obligation but a
    duty to force the FAA to adhere to every one of the
    recommendations that they make.
        In particular, for the record, I want to cite Alpha-96-120,
    the advisory of the NTSB that talks about unusual attitudes and
    recoveries, with respect to this still being an open and
    unacceptable response by the FAA as it pertains to Part 121. I
    hope we get down to the brass knuckles with respect to changing
    this. Because we have families that are sitting over there
    right now, right now grieving the loss of their loved one
    because we had inadequate training.
        Now, knowing that Colgan Air pilots were not able or
    trained to recover from a complete stall in an unusual
    attitude, I ask you, Mr. Rosenker, would you fly on one of
    these regional airlines if you knew the pilot was not able to
    recover from a full stall or not trained to recover from a full
    stall?
        Mr. Rosenker. In fairness, Congressman, if I knew that, I
    wouldn't.
        Mr. Boccieri. To Mr. Babbitt, would you fly on a regional
    airline if you knew that the pilots were not adequately trained
    to recover from a fall stall?
        Mr. Babbitt. I not only wouldn't fly, I would ground it.
        Mr. Boccieri. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think this has
    brought to light some very serious issues that we need to bring
    to the attention of not only this Committee but the entire
    public that flies on these regional airlines. Thank you.
        Mr. Costello. I thank the gentleman for his thoughtful
    comments and questions and look forward to working with you as
    well as we go forward with legislation to address some of these
    issues.
        Mr. Oberstar. Mr. Chairman, may I just observe what a
    storehouse of knowledge we just heard from the gentleman from
    Ohio and his experience in military aircraft and icing. It was
    a textbook case. Thank you for your contribution. It is
    invaluable.
        Mr. Costello. The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from
    West Virginia, Mrs. Capito.
        Mrs. Capito. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
    Petri, for holding this very important hearing.
        I would like to ask--I will be submitting my opening
    statement for the record, but I do want to thank, as we have--
    several of us have met several of the families who are affected
    by this deep tragedy; and I want to thank them for their
    courage, for their knowledge and for them helping to enlighten
    a lot of us in I think bringing forth many issues today.
        My question is kind of bouncing a little bit off of what my
    colleague from Ohio was talking about. Originally, when the
    original accident--this accident occurred, it was referred to
    as the Continental connection flight. Very quickly, it became
    Colgan Air. And in the NTSB report I think it is referred to
    almost unanimously or always as Colgan Air but maybe began as
    Continental. And my guess is--and many of us have said this--
    that the passengers who buy the tickets think they are buying
    Continental.
        I fly US Air and fly Colgan Air every week. I think--what
    is the responsibility or the relationship between the major
    carrier/contract carrier when it comes to safety? Is it totally
    separate? Because I am kind of hearing conflicting opinions
    here.
        You are saying it is the same safety standard, but then Mr.
    Rosenker wanted to reinforce that we must keep these on the
    same level, which tells me there is a belief that they are not.
    Could you talk about that relationship a little bit?
        Sure. Whoever wants to take it.
        Mr. Babbitt. Both the carriers in this case were operating
    under Part 121 of the Federal regulations. However, there may
    have been--and we are certainly going to await--both some
    findings from the NTSB and the Inspector General who has been
    directed to look into aircraft training, airline training. So
    we are going to look to both of those.
        We are also not going to just simply wait. We are bringing
    in these folks that represent major carriers, regional
    carriers, and the pilots and unions involved in these to better
    understand what are the gaps. Are there gaps, in fact, between
    what is going on at these various carriers? That is what we
    want to look into.
        The standards are there. They are embodied in Part 121. And
    the regulations that guide both of these carriers are clear.
    But what we have seen and I have been referring to here, we are
    finding that some people have raised the bar considerably; and
    if that is the case, then we want to ask if we now have an
    expectation that why isn't everyone raising that bar?
        Mrs. Capito. Just in terms of the resources that are
    available for safety training, whether it is a regional,
    whether it is a major, I am assuming the major has more
    resources available for training. Is that a reasonable
    assumption?
        Mr. Babbitt. Well, I think what you see at major carriers,
    the tenure and longevity of the people that have the safety
    training departments, their experience over the years has
    allowed them to build on a base that is more robust. If a
    carrier is newer, comes into being later, they get certified,
    they operate legally, but they don't have the experience. There
    are no 25-year pilots at some of these carriers.
        And what we are looking to do when we bring everybody
    together is, is there a way to "cross pollinate"? For lack of a
    better term? Can't we take that experience and lessons learned
    in other cases and let them use it, give them the benefit of
    that knowledge and expose them to it? That is our goal now.
        Then we will have, optimally, 6 months to a year of
    experience of seeing this; and, at that time, we fully expect
    to get some additional recommendations from the NTSB. We will
    already have some operating experience with trying to do just
    those things. I indicated in earlier comments that we know full
    well that some of these carriers demand that the regional
    partners have some of these safety attributes that they have
    themselves.
        Mrs. Capito. I think people flying assume that is what is
    actually occurring, and I think that is one of the astounding
    things that we have discovered here today.
        I didn't mean to interrupt you. I want to ask one other
    question, because my time is getting short.
        When you have a mechanical failure on a plane or a
    mechanical issue with a plane, it is mandatory that it is
    upgraded, recalled, stopped, thank goodness. But it is my
    understanding that if there are some pilots that need
    additional training or they have had issues with falling
    short--we have already heard they failed some of the tests--
    that there is no mandatory requirement that they go back to
    remedial training. It is just suggested.
        If that is the case, we have got to change that. I think
    that is no less important, whether the plane can fly or whether
    the pilot can fly under optimal conditions. I don't know if you
    have a response to that.
        Mr. Rosenker, I cut you off on the first question.
        Mr. Rosenker. I will let the Administrator answer that
    question, and then I will follow up with the original question.
        Mr. Babbitt. There are a number of elements involved in
    training. A pilot may take--and remember that these are
    probably the most tested people in the world-- they take two
    physicals a year and three rides. One of them is a proficiency
    check, one of them is a check ride, and then they get a random
    line check. Three times a year, their performance is observed.
        In the proficiency training, if there is a pilot, and his
    training pilot said, look, you can do this particular element
    better, let us have a little more training for you tomorrow,
    that pilot can't fly. That pilot is now grounded.
        Mrs. Capito. Is that mandatory grounding?
        Mr. Babbitt. Yes. The pilot has not passed his check ride,
    so he is grounded.
        Mrs. Capito. So the pilot that we have been talking about,
    if he didn't pass his check ride, he was unable to fly again
    until he passed the test?
        Mr. Babbitt. That is correct. So we would go back and
    revisit that element, give him additional training to make them
    proficient. When that proficiency is demonstrated, then he
    passes the check riding and he is okay. It is just like fixing
    the part.
        I remind people that this is a complex profession. I also
    remind people that Tiger Woods takes golf lessons every week.
        Pilots get training all the time. We learn things all the
    time. We have better techniques to teach them. We have better
    equipment to teach them in. The fidelity of a simulator today
    is vastly improved, and I have seen it grow over time.
        As we learn these things, we apply them. Sometimes there is
    a gap. Sometimes it takes our good friends at the NTSB to point
    that gap out. And we say, wait a minute: we should change the
    regulation and take it up to the next level of safety.
        Mr. Rosenker. If I could follow up to the Congresswoman's
    question about the relationship between the major and the
    regional carriers. It defies logic, at least the way I look at
    it, that when you put a brand, when you put a logo, when you
    paint the aircraft with your colors, that all you would be
    interested in is the financial aspects of when the ticket money
    is being deposited in the bank. I believe we are going to be
    uncovering a good deal of information concerning relationships
    like this through our investigation.
        What is important to note is that the minimum standards are
    there. Are the minimum standards adequate? Should we be raising
    those standards? And can we look at the best practices? These
    are some of the aspects I believe the Administrator and the
    Secretary are going to consider next week.
        Again, it is going to take time for us the NTSB to finish
    this investigation. We look forward to being completed in about
    the first quarter. But we believe there will be a good number
    of recommendations coming from it that, and if implemented by
    our colleagues at the FAA, they will do a great deal to prevent
    this kind of accident from happening again.
        Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentlelady and now
    recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Lipinski.
        Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    Ranking Member Petri, for holding today's hearing and your
    continued leadership in working to ensure safety and the
    integrity of our Nation's air transportation system.
        Administrator Babbitt, I want to welcome you and
    congratulate you. I am looking forward to working with you
    here.
        While so far we have rightfully focused on pilot workforce
    issues, another possible issue in the Colgan Air tragedy may
    have been the weather. I would like to focus on a broader issue
    involving weather and air traffic. Specifically, I want to
    discuss a plan submitted by the National Weather Service to the
    FAA in December. This plan proposes closing the center weather
    service units located within a 20 air route traffic control
    centers in the continental U.S.
        As you know, this plan was developed by the National
    Weather Service in response to the Bush administration's
    request to cut costs at FAA; and it calls for the National
    Weather Service to send the 20 FAA facilities forecast from two
    central units located in Maryland and in Kansas City. So I know
    I am not alone in worrying that, if this plan is implemented,
    air traffic controllers at the air route traffic control
    centers will no longer have the immediate expertise of on-site
    meteorologists to advise them on where route aircraft
    experience difficulties when weather conditions play a critical
    role in that decision. As we have talked about that certainly--
    we don't know if that had an impact here, but weather certainly
    was an issue in this crash. So I think clearly we need to
    carefully evaluate this proposal.
        Now, you probably haven't had time to consider the proposal
    in detail. You haven't been in this job for very long yet, but
    I know back in 1996 when you were head of the Airline Pilots
    Association, you strongly opposed eliminating or weakening the
    center weather service units.
        I understand 13 years is a long time and things do change,
    but I would like to know what your thoughts are now that you
    can share on how this proposal will impact redundant safety
    systems and how do you plan to assess performance of the new
    centers? Because I have great concerns--a question about how
    the proposed centralized forecasters can have intimate
    knowledge of local microclimates and air traffic patterns.
        But since we are running short on time here, I know, let me
    also throw this in there and get your response. I think
    probably the most important question here is, if you have any
    doubts about the performance of the proposed system, would you
    be willing to put on hold this development until those concerns
    can be addressed? Because I know that the leadership at the
    Department of Transportation has taken a closer look at the
    Bush administration plans to consolidate FAA engineering
    activities and was wondering if that was also a possibility if
    you did have concerns about this.
        Mr. Babbitt. Sure. I appreciate your recognition of my
    short tenure. I have, in fact, had a little bit of an
    understanding on this. Just a couple of quick observations.
        The local knowledge issue, these meteorologists providing
    information at the centers are no matter where they are, they
    are looking at the weather all over the United States. Flights
    are going everywhere. They don't just stay in that area, number
    one.
        Number two, one of the restraints that we have today is
    most of these are manned for 16 hours a day. That leaves us
    with a third of the day with no meteorologist, and what they do
    today is call into other areas.
        So while I completely respect the point you are making, and
    I certainly will look into it, my understanding is the idea
    that centralizing into a couple of locations for the purpose of
    having redundancy if we had a communication failure or
    something like that, you would always have the other center,
    but you would also get a much more robust, 24-hour-a-day
    availability for meteorology advice and forecasting and so
    forth.
        Mr. Babbitt. I would also note most of the major carriers
    today-- while in the era a long time ago when I was hired, we
    did have meteorologists at every pilot domicile, and you met
    physically with the dispatcher, you met physically with the
    meteorologist before your flight--there was some resistance to
    it, but at the end of the day they did--and I think today every
    major carrier has centralized meteorology. It is more
    efficient, it gives you redundancy, it gives you a broader
    depth.
        So that said, I will certainly look into if you have got
    additional information. I think the Department of Commerce
    actually has that as opposed to the DOT. But it is, again, my
    understanding that the FAA buys those services from the
    Department of Commerce. So we will certainly look into it and
    be respectful. If there is a better way, I am all for it.
        Mr. Lipinski. I appreciate that you keep a close eye on
    this and make sure that we are doing the right thing and are
    ensuring safety. Thank you.
        Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentleman from Illinois.
        Let me inform everyone that we have two votes pending on
    the floor. We have about 5 more minutes left before we have to
    leave to vote. I will recognize the gentlelady from Ohio for
    her questions, and then after her questions we will recess for
    approximately 30 minutes for us to get the two votes out of the
    way, and we will reconvene the hearing at that point.
        The gentlelady from Ohio Mrs. Schmidt is recognized.
        Mrs. Schmidt. Thank you, and thank you, Mr. Chairman,
    because if I appear passionate with this issue, it is because
    in addition to losing Johnathan Perry from Loveland, Ohio, a
    community I grew up in and still live in, the Wolinksys, who
    live on Long Street in New York, spent almost a decade in
    Loveland, went to the same church that I grew up in. And so
    this is really a very personal issue for me.
        And, Mr. Babbitt, I want to ask you a question and then the
    panel one, and I will try to be brief. Chairman--or Ranking
    Member Mica talked a little bit about the issue of privacy and
    also the issue of pilot training and access to that
    information. And it is my understanding that if a pilot fails a
    number of safety tests with one airline and then switches to
    another airline, the new employer does not necessarily know
    that the pilot has failed those tests, and there is no uniform
    database that allows airlines to review the past performance of
    pilots on all safety tests.
        I am wondering how do we make this safer? Would it be
    acceptable and useful and not violate the 1974 right of privacy
    policy that you alluded to on page 7 of your testimony--would
    it be acceptable if we create a safe and secure private
    database, not open to the public, but open to the airline
    industry, so that when a pilot crosses to another industry,
    that they can access that data and see what tests they have
    passed and what tests they have failed, and not just put an
    arbitrary date of 5 years on them, but their lifetime scoring
    so that the airlines can adequately review their performance
    tests?
        Mr. Babbitt. I think your point is a good one. They do--in
    fact, when a pilot applies at another carrier, they can get his
    training records from the carrier.
        Mrs. Schmidt. Is it mandatory, or is it always accessible?
        Mr. Babbitt. They have to. But that is only their training
    records from the previous carrier. That is my understanding.
        Now, the bright light that is being put on here is there is
    no requirement. There is a suggestion and an advisory circular
    from the FAA that you should ask the pilot. And I have asked,
    based on what I have just learned in the last week from the
    NTSB investigation--I have asked counsel at the FAA would it be
    discriminatory? One of my concerns was you are trying to hire
    me as a pilot, and you ask me, may I access your database
    records at the FAA, and I say no. Is that discriminatory for
    you not to hire me? It would certainly raise my eyebrows if I
    were you and I refused to give you access to my records. I
    would want to know why.
        And so I agree that we perhaps need to find a vehicle, A,
    is it legal, and, B, do we have to change a statutory
    requirement to get to those, provided the adequate protections
    for personal information.
        Mrs. Schmidt. Thank you.
        And this is to anyone on the panel that can answer this.
    There has been some talk about the salaries, and some of these
    salaries are at 20-, $23,000. Who sets the salaries for these
    pilots? Is it negotiated by a union? Is it the airline
    industry? How does this pay grade occur? Do you have that level
    of expertise, or do we wait for the next panel?
        Mr. Babbitt. I have a little background in that area.
        Mrs. Schmidt. That is why I kind of looked at you.
        Mr. Babbitt. I sensed that.
        The first year of employment is typically set by the
    carrier. It is not negotiable. The employee is a pilot. He or
    she is at will. They have no protection. They typically are not
    even eligible to belong to a union or be represented. After
    that, usually 1 year, 18 months into their employment,
    somewhere in that range, then they became covered by a
    collectively bargained agreement.
        Mrs. Schmidt. Thank you.
        Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentlelady and announces
    that we will recess until approximately 12:30.
        And let me thank the members of this panel for being here
    this morning to offer their thoughtful testimony. I have other
    questions that I will submit to you in writing and ask that you
    respond.
        Mr. Costello. We look forward to working with you on this
    critical issue as we move forward with legislation. So we thank
    you for testifying.
        This panel is dismissed. We would ask that the second panel
    be at the witness table at approximately 12:30. Thank you.
        [Recess.]
        Mr. Costello. The Subcommittee will come to order.
        The Chair would introduce now the second panel of
    witnesses. First, Mr. John Michael Loftus. Mr. Loftus is
    testifying today on behalf of the families of Continental
    Flight 3407. He is a former pilot with Continental Airlines,
    and, of course, his daughter Madeline, as I mentioned earlier,
    was on Flight 3407.
        Mr. Loftus, again, we offer our condolences to you and to
    the other family members who are here. We appreciate the fact
    that you are willing to testify and to give your perspective
    before our Subcommittee.
        Next, Mr. John Prater, Captain John Prater, who is the
    president of Air Line Pilots Association, International; Mr.
    Roger Cohen, president of the Regional Airline Association; Mr.
    Daniel Morgan, vice president of safety and regulatory
    compliance with Colgan Air; Mr. James May, president and CEO of
    the Air Transport Association; Dr. R. Curtis Graeber, fellow
    with the Flight Safety Foundation; and Dr. Frank Ayers,
    chairman of the flight training department, professor of
    aeronautical science at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.
        Gentlemen, thank you all for being here today to testify
    before the Subcommittee. Let me say that your entire written
    statements, your testimony, will be submitted in the record.
    And we would ask you to summarize your testimony so that we
    have an opportunity to ask questions.
        At this time the Chair now recognizes Mr. Loftus.

       TESTIMONY OF JOHN MICHAEL LOFTUS, FAMILIES OF CONTINENTAL
     FLIGHT 3407, FATHER OF MADELINE LOFTUS/VICTIM OF FLIGHT 3407
      CRASH, FORMER PILOT WITH CONTINENTAL AIRLINES; CAPTAIN JOHN
    PRATER, PRESIDENT, AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL;
     ROGER COHEN, PRESIDENT, REGIONAL AIRLINE ASSOCIATION; DANIEL
       MORGAN, VICE PRESIDENT, SAFETY AND REGULATORY COMPLIANCE,
        COLGAN AIR, INC.; JAMES C. MAY, PRESIDENT AND CEO, AIR
     TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION; R. CURTIS GRAEBER, Ph.D., FELLOW, THE
      FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION; AND FRANK AYERS, CHAIRMAN, FLIGHT
     TRAINING DEPARTMENT, PROFESSOR OF AERONAUTICAL SCIENCE, EMBRY-
                     RIDDLE AERONAUTICAL UNIVERSITY

        Mr. Loftus. Mr. Chairman, Subcommittee Members, thank you
    for the opportunity to speak before your Subcommittee today. My
    name is John Michael Loftus. I am here today on behalf of
    Families of Continental Flight 3407 both as a father and as a
    former pilot with Continental and Continental Express for over
    20 years.
        My daughter Maddy was on board Flight 3407 February 12,
    2009. Madeline was a beautiful 24-year-old woman just starting
    down the pathway of her adult life. She had just finished her
    education and had returned to New Jersey, to home, where she
    had landed an excellent job in an outstanding pharmaceutical
    advertising agency. She was surrounded by family and friends
    who loved her.
        As she boarded Flight 3407, she was so excited about going
    back to Buffalo State College to an alumni hockey game, so
    excited to see her old teammates and friends and to pursue one
    of the loves of her life, hockey. In other words, she was
    poised to begin the rest of her life. But that night on board
    Flight 3407, all her hopes and dreams and plans for the future
    career, love, marriage, motherhood, were brutally extinguished,
    and we are left here sitting today asking why.
        I don't think we can ever make sense of the tragic loss of
    Maddy and the other 49 people on board that flight that night,
    but we can and we must do everything in our power to ensure
    that it never happens again.
        I speak to you not only as a grieving parent, but I also
    bring my aviation background, having been a commercial pilot
    for 26 years and 22 years of flying experience with Continental
    and Continental Express. If.
        I could leave you Members with two things, two thoughts
    today, they would be there is no substitute for experience in
    the air, and the importance of pilot training, especially in
    emergency circumstances, cannot be overstated.
        My experience in the cockpit involved many difficult flying
    conditions. I flew into thunderstorms, low ceiling, dense fog
    and many winter seasons involving icing conditions. The key to
    my success was being able to gain the knowledge by flying with
    other, more experienced pilots who had dealt with these same
    difficult flying conditions longer than I.
        . When I flew for Continental Express as a regional pilot,
    I had the benefit of having the access to the same training and
    pilot resources that the pilots at Continental, our major
    carrier, had. However, as a third tier of regional airlines
    sprung up, I saw the industry devolving into two levels of
    safety, one for the majors and a second for the regionals.
    Small regional carriers like Colgan Air have less resources for
    training. Pilots could not benefit from the existing training
    department, the extensive training department, with decades of
    institutional knowledge.
        These are just a few of the insights that I have gathered
    during my years as a commercial pilot that relate to some of
    the safety issues that have been exposed by the tragedy of
    Flight 3407. More important than just identifying the problems,
    however, our family members implore you to push for solutions.
        First, we need to take an industrywide look at the
    experience requirements in terms of hiring, upgrading and the
    pairing of pilots together in the cockpit. In the case of
    Flight 3407, the fact that the pilot had failed check rides in
    2006 and 2007 while at Colgan, yet still was upgraded to
    captain in 2008, and was paired with a young first officer who
    was uncomfortable with her icing training, reflect the
    improvement that needs to be made in this area.
        Second, we need to revamp the approach to training; more
    importantly the difference of not just what is trained, but how
    it is trained. That is where the wide gap exists between the
    majors and the regionals. Regional pilots typically have less
    experience, fly more legs in a day, and often face more
    difficult low-altitude weather conditions, and yet they are not
    receiving the high level of training their counterparts receive
    at the major carriers.
        So what we need is for the major carriers to play a more
    hands-on role in the design, execution and oversight of the
    training programs utilized by the regional partners. When our
    loved ones bought tickets under the Continental name, that is
    what they were entitled to.
        Finally, we need to require, not just recommend, that all
    regional carriers implement best practice safety initiatives
    that are commonplace among today's major carriers: FOQA, LOSA
    and ASAP. There is no reason for the state-of-the-art safety
    tools not to be made available to the regional pilots.
        Unfortunately, as a veteran of the industry, I have often
    heard it said that most aviation regulations and procedures are
    written in blood. My Maddy and 49 other people who died that
    tragic night in February have given their blood, and now we
    believe they are owed solutions. We are asking you to invest
    time, effort and resources to make the necessary changes in the
    airline industry. You are the only ones who can bring together
    all the stakeholders, the regionals, the majors, the unions,
    the manufacturers, the FAA, and the interests of the flying
    public. You alone can marshal the forces of the government to
    ensure we receive one level of safety that all Americans
    deserve.
        Although some of the voices in the industry may complain
    about the economic costs to safety improvements, we are here to
    tell you that no price tag can match the price that we have
    paid with the loss of our loved ones. It is our responsibility
    to ensure that no other Americans will have to pay this price
    in the future. When you are faced with the tough decisions,
    please think of your son, daughter or loved one flying on a
    turboprop airplane, the last flight of the night in the dead of
    winter in Minnesota, Illinois, Wisconsin, Upstate New York, and
    please ask yourself how much is their life worth?
        I miss my daughter every day. Her mother, brother and
    sister miss her terribly, too. My wish is not to have to see
    another father, mother, husband, wife or child sitting before
    this Committee and asking the same questions. Let us join
    together and commit to solve these problems and these issues
    now. Thank you.
        Mr. Costello. Mr. Loftus, thank you.
        Captain Prater.
        Mr. Prater. Thank you, Chairman Costello. Good afternoon to
    the Committee.
        As Captain Loftus and I go back over 20 years, as
    Congresswoman Schmidt recognized, accidents are personal, and
    they are personal to those of us who fly the airplanes. I, too,
    knew Maddy as she tried to teach me how to ice skate.
        We commend this Committee for calling this hearing and
    looking at the importance of these vital issues. And we look
    forward to participating with the FAA in their call to action
    summit next week to address the issues in much more depth.
    While this summit is a good start, these issues are complex,
    and long-term solutions need to be identified. And we encourage
    the continued attention and participation of this Committee.
        In recent years the major airlines have come to rely
    heavily on code share arrangements with so-called regional
    airlines to connect large, midsized and small cities in the
    U.S., Canada and Mexico to their international hubs. This has
    resulted in the exponential growth in the regional sector of
    the industry.
        Still, the major carriers exert a great deal, total
    economic pressure on the regional airlines to provide their
    service at the lowest possible price. They control ticket
    pricing and schedules and regularly move flying between their
    regional partners. Some major airlines have even begun
    outsourcing their flying to regionals and laying off their own
    pilots, losing decades of experience in the process. These
    experienced pilots cannot afford to work for one of these so-
    called regional carriers as a newly hired first officer. As a
    result, many of the smaller regional carriers hire pilots at
    the FAA minimum standards and do not employ adequate screening
    processes during hiring that identify that ideal candidate.
        As was brought out during the NTSB's recent hearing on the
    tragic accident in Buffalo, many pilots who fly for regional
    airlines are not getting adequate training or enough rest.
    Airlines are requiring pilots to work longer days, and more of
    them, each month. Fleet and base changes are forcing pilots to
    decide between commuting or possibly taking a huge pay cut to
    train on new equipment.
        The consequence is the quality of airline pilot careers has
    been greatly diminished, and the severe erosion of benefits and
    quality of life are motivating the experienced pilots to move
    to other professions.
        Current training practices do not take into account the
    drastic change in pilot applicants' experience. Instead, they
    assume that pilots are far more experienced than they may
    actually be. ALPA believes there must be a new focus on
    standardization, and even on some fundamental flying skills. To
    meet this challenge airlines and other training providers must
    develop methodologies to train for that lack of experience and
    to train for judgment.
        Current training practices may also need to be adjusted to
    account for the source and experience level of that new pilot
    entering into initial training at his or her airline. ALPA also
    believes there should be more stringent academic requirements
    to obtain both commercial and airline transport pilot ratings
    in preparation to start a career as an airline pilot. The FAA
    should develop and implement a structured and rigorous ground
    school and testing procedures for pilots who want to qualify to
    fly for Part 121 airlines. ALPA also recommends that airlines
    provide specific command and leadership training courses for
    new captains to instill in them the necessary skills and traits
    to become a real leader on the flight deck.
        Airlines should also implement mentoring programs for both
    captains and first officers as they first enter operations in
    their new crew positions to help them apply the knowledge and
    skills to line operations, and to supplement their own limited
    experience by learning from their experienced peers.
        Flight experience and pilot capabilities cannot be measured
    by mere flight hours. Screening processes should be established
    prior to initial pilot hiring to ensure that new-hire airline
    pilots are indeed the best and brightest as far as abilities,
    airmanship, professionalism and performance.
        Turning to another area of concern, this Committee has
    listened to me and my predecessors since 1990 on pilot fatigue.
    I won't mention anything longer except to say we have talked
    long enough. It is time to implement science-based regulatory
    changes.
        Other means to enhance safety and improve airline
    operations are the data collection and the analysis programs
    such as FOQA and ASAP share that information across the
    industry and then modify and take indeed the best practices and
    implement them.
        In order to allow these programs to grow and make the
    reports more readily obtainable, we will need additional
    legislative protections to be put into place that will limit
    the use of ASAP and FOQA data in civil liability cases.
    Restrictions need to be strengthened to ensure the data is used
    for safety purposes only.
        I will close with many major carriers have implemented
    these type of programs. We want them to spread and be
    protected. The best safety device on any airplane is a well-
    trained, well-rested, highly motivated pilot. A strong safety
    culture must be instilled and consistently reinforced from the
    highest levels within an airline and among its code share
    partners. This type of organizational safety culture will
    encourage the highest levels of performance among professional
    pilots, improve airline operations, and, most importantly,
    advance aviation safety so we are not back here again in the
    future. Thank you.
        Mr. Costello. Thank you, Captain Prater.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Cohen.
        Mr. Cohen. Chairman Costello, Ranking Member Petri, and
    Members of the Subcommittee, I am Roger Cohen, and I am
    president of the Regional Airline Association. And I want to
    express our deepest sympathies for the lives of the passengers
    and the crew of Flight 3407 that were lost and for their
    families affected by the crash, and that we share in their
    grief.
        I also want to express, not only for our member airlines,
    but for the 60,000 highly trained professionals in our
    industry, our total and unwavering commitment to safety and to
    work towards ensuring that this postaccident process does not
    have to be repeated ever; to take whatever steps are necessary
    to make certain that our flight crews and our airplanes are as
    safe as humanly possible.
        The safety of the Nation's skies is a shared
    responsibility, and our challenge for the Federal aviation
    safety agencies, for the airlines, for our employees is to
    review all of the issues with but one single objective, and
    that is to prevent any future accidents. And as we do that, it
    is important to keep our perspective to reassure the American
    public that flying is extremely safe. In fact, until this
    recent tragedy, commercial airlines had gone the longest period
    in aviation history without a fatal accident.
        Working collectively, airlines have steadily improved our
    safety record over the course of many decades of safety
    initiatives, investigations and reviews of accidents and
    incidents, large and small. Nevertheless, we can do better. And
    our industry's overarching goal has been and always will be
    zero accidents and zero fatalities.
        Mr. Chairman, today we want to better define today's
    regional airlines to clear up any misconceptions, but more
    importantly, we would like to talk about the steps regional
    airlines have already taken and the actions we plan to take to
    further intensify this commitment to safety and accident
    prevention. As has been described, our airplanes typically
    carry up to 100 passengers. More than 50 percent of the
    scheduled flights in the United States are on regional
    airlines, and most notably, three out of every four communities
    in this country with scheduled service are served exclusively
    by regional airlines.
        Our airlines largely operate in seamless partnership with
    the major airlines. Regional airlines provide the crew and the
    aircraft, while major airlines set the flight schedules, the
    fares and the customer service standards. Regional airlines and
    their major airline partners operate as a single integrated
    system, one ticket, one trip, one safety standard.
        All passenger airlines are subject to the exact same FAA
    safety standards and requirements. It has been this way for
    more than a decade. But our goal is to prevent accidents, and
    that is why the Regional Airline Association has embarked upon
    our strategic safety initiative to underscore our safety
    culture and to help prevent accidents, and this strategic
    safety initiative has four elements.
        First, we are bringing together our own safety
    professionals to review all of the procedures and address any
    issue that could even be perceived, perceived, as a
    contributing factor to an accident. Second, we are going to
    conduct a thorough review of fatigue, looking at all the human
    factors that have been described today in the scientific field
    to minimize risks associated with fatigue. Third, REA will
    implement a fatigue awareness management program so that our
    airlines keep this issue at the top of the mind for both their
    flight crews and, just as importantly, airline management.
        The last element is reaching out in partnership with you in
    Congress, across the government, and to our fellow stakeholders
    in labor and throughout the aviation industry to explore the
    full range of issues that could help us improve safety and
    prevent future accidents. And among those are, it has been
    noted, establishing a single integrated FAA database of pilot
    records, exploring random fatigue testing, full examination of
    commuting, extending the period for background checks from 5 to
    10 years, analyzing the information from cockpit voice
    recorders in settings other than accident investigations, and
    mining this great field of check ride data for trends.
        We have already begun implementing this initiative, and we
    look forward to working with this Subcommittee and keep you
    informed throughout the process.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I will be glad to answer any
    questions you might have.
        Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you, Mr. Cohen, and now
    recognizes Mr. Morgan.
        Mr. Morgan. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        Mr. Chairman and Committee Members, I would first like to
    take this opportunity to express the condolences from all of us
    at Colgan Air to the families of those who were lost in the
    tragedy of Flight 3407. We know your grief, and I assure you
    that we all have a common goal to prevent such catastrophes
    from ever happening again. The nature of flying airplanes
    entails risk, and it is the job of all professionals in the
    airline industry to reduce that risk to an absolute minimum. As
    such, this process today is vital to that mission.
        Mr. Chairman, every aviation accident teaches us something
    more about how to prevent another tragedy. We all learn from
    our experiences, and as a result, we constantly improve our
    industry. Those of us who have long been part of this industry,
    whether from the airlines, FAA, NTSB or other regulatory
    entities, and particularly those of us from the safety
    departments of the business, are always saddened by the loss of
    any airplane from any airline anywhere in the world. But we
    also know that we what learn from each event will make us
    stronger, and indeed it has.
        In my 30 years as an airline professional, I have seen the
    U.S. airline industry endure some remarkable challenges in a
    constantly changing environment. Our business is incredibly
    complex. The aircraft, the air traffic systems, the intricacies
    of regulations all make this a demanding industry. But the men
    and women I have had the privilege to work with in my career
    have continuously stepped up to the challenges, and because of
    what we have learned, we have made the U.S. commercial airline
    system the absolute best in the world.
        I have no doubt that the next generation of airline
    professionals will continue to face this inexorable challenge
    of change. I believe it is my job, as well as the job of all of
    us in this business, to use our experience and the knowledge we
    have gained in our careers to hand that next generation a safer
    product and, in so doing, leave a safer industry for the public
    to enjoy. And that is why I am here with you today to defer the
    legacy of air travel, safe air travel.
        I appreciate the opportunity to come before this Committee
    today and continue the process of furthering aviation safety. I
    have also provided additional remarks and information in my
    submitted testimony, and I am prepared to address your
    questions and concerns.
        Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you and now recognizes Mr.
    May.
        Mr. May. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, or
    afternoon.
        Let me begin by saying that the crash of the Colgan Air
    aircraft near Buffalo was a tragedy that has produced
    indescribable heartache for the relatives and friends of
    victims of that accident. And I personally expressed my
    condolences to Captain Loftus, and I do so for the rest of the
    families.
        In the airline industry, safety is our highest priority. We
    work closely with all members of the aviation community to
    achieve high levels of safety, including regional airlines. It
    is in that spirit that I appear before you this morning. No
    accident, as you have heard others say, is acceptable. We have
    a responsibility to understand through rigorous and searching
    inquiry the cause of the Buffalo accident and to take whatever
    corrective measures are needed.
        In light of that responsibility, we are very fortunate that
    there are three expert government forums in which that scrutiny
    is happening. This is as it should be. The public needs to be
    confident in our responses to aviation safety issues. The
    National Transportation Safety Board's ongoing investigation
    will produce a far more complete picture than we have today of
    what so tragically unfolded that evening. In this, as is in
    previous accidents, the Board is the authoritative source for
    making that determination and recommending corrective actions.
        In addition, the Department of Transportation's inspector
    general recently began an assessment of the FAA's oversight of
    certification, pilot qualification, training and other issues.
    When that review was announced, we, ATA, immediately offered
    our resources and full cooperation to the inspector general. I
    have met with Inspector General Scovel and his team, and we
    will do so again. His evaluation and the constructive
    suggestions that we know will result from it will augment the
    NTSB's effort.
        Finally, next Monday's FAA-sponsored call to action meeting
    is an immediate, broad-based forum to look at safety issues,
    including those raised at this morning's hearing. ATA was a
    major participant in the runway safety call to action held by
    the FAA 2 years ago that advanced runway safety through the
    well-informed assessments and concrete recommendations of the
    participants.
        We look forward to being equally engaged with the FAA and
    other interested stakeholders in the vital work that will begin
    next Monday. And I think it is actually Tuesday. Although we
    won't have the results of the NTSB's investigation and the
    inspector general review for some time, we do expect similar
    positive results.
        I don't believe that any topic, any topic, should be off
    the table at the call to action meeting. We need to have a full
    and frank conversation about safety. So let me suggest seven
    subjects that, for openers, should be considered. First,
    mandatorily applying the FOQA, Flight Operational Quality
    Assurance, programs used by major carriers to regional
    airlines. FOQA works. The collection and analysis of data
    recorded during flight improves safety.
        Second, applying Aviation Safety Action Program, ASAP,
    which encourages voluntary reporting of safety issues and
    events that come to the attention of employees to those
    regional airlines that do not have such a program already.
        Third, identifying advanced training best practices of
    major carriers for use by regional airlines like AQP for
    training.
        Fourth--this has been said by others today--we need to have
    a centralized database of pilot records to help airlines
    evaluate the backgrounds of applicants for flight deck
    positions. We think that the FAA should determine if such a
    system can be efficiently, effectively implemented.
        Fifth, the issue of compliance with the sterile cockpit
    rule has been raised. Let us see if FAA needs to increase
    compliance oversight in this area.
        Sixth, let us examine flight crew preparedness. In
    particular we should look at what crew members have done before
    they have reported to work that may affect their performance in
    the cockpit.
        And seventh, let us also examine crew member commuting and
    whether it requires additional attention.
        Mr. Chairman, we are committed to working with the
    stakeholders to develop solutions to any safety issues,
    including those that emerge from these three important
    governmental initiatives. Thank you.
        Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you and now recognizes Dr.
    Graeber.
        Mr. Graeber. Chairman Costello, Ranking Member Petri and
    distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, my name is Curtis
    Graeber. I am a fellow of the Flight Safety Foundation and a
    former NASA scientist.
        The foundation is an international organization dedicated
    to the continuous improvement of global aviation safety, and we
    appreciate the opportunity to testify about recent scientific
    progress related to flight crew fatigue.
        Unfortunately, fatigue is ubiquitous and unavoidable in
    aviation. To address it, regulators have traditionally imposed
    limits governing how long and how often pilots can operate an
    airplane. Different countries impose different limits usually
    based on very little scientific knowledge. The FAA's flight-
    time limitations are no different and have remained essentially
    unchanged for 50 years.
        Several attempts have failed to update the regulations;
    however, such efforts would likely result in little improvement
    because they are really attempts to tweak what already exists.
    More effective tools are needed. Fortunately over the past
    three decades, there has been an extensive scientific effort to
    better understand the complex origins of fatigue, its impact on
    performance and how to mitigate its risk.
        In 1980, the Congress directed NASA to undertake a
    multiyear effort to improve our understanding of crew fatigue
    and jet lag. The results of this work, as well as other
    nonaviation studies, can now provide the scientific basis for a
    paradigm shift in how we manage fatigue risk. This shift is
    known as fatigue risk management, a systematic approach to
    addressing fatigue in a comprehensive, proactive manner that
    does not rely solely on adherence to a set of prescribed hourly
    limits. In its broadest form, fatigue risk management takes a
    systematic, three-pronged approach incrementally to manage
    fatigue risk: prevention, mitigation and intervention.
        The first step, prevention, can be characterized as
    strategic risk prevention. It includes such measures as
    scientifically defensible scheduling and education about sleep
    and fatigue. We believe that this step should also include
    medical identification and treatment of sleep disorders.
    However, the FAA's medical examination has no requirement to
    identify them in pilots. It should.
        The second step encompasses risk mitigation at the
    operational level.
        The final step, intervention, recognizes the inevitable
    fact that crews sometimes experience significant fatigue
    despite the best efforts to prevent it. It may include
    interventions such as controlled rest on the flight deck.
        A key part of the initial prevention step involves the
    alternative use of a fatigue risk management system, or FRMS,
    in place of prescribed flight-duty limits to determine what is
    ``scientifically defensible scheduling.'' It takes into account
    known variables that affect sleep and alertness which
    prescriptive flight-duty limits cannot address.
        In contrast to prescriptive limits, an FRMS employs a
    multilayered, data-driven defense to manage operational fatigue
    risk proactively. Objective and subjective data related to crew
    alertness, as well as FOQA data, are routinely collected and
    analyzed to monitor where fatigue risk occurs and where safety
    may be jeopardized. The system then allows for generating new
    scheduling solutions or other strategies to mitigate measured
    fatigue risk. At the same time, FRMS provides operators with
    flexibility to seek the most efficient, safe crewing solutions
    to meet operational needs.
        In early 2006, ICAO established a subgroup to develop an
    international regulatory framework for fatigue risk management.
    Their starting point was the model developed by the Flight
    Safety Foundation for ultra-long-range operations beyond 16
    hours. ICAO's draft framework recommends incorporating FRMS
    into an operator's proactive and accountable SMS. The Flight
    Safety Foundation strongly encourages the industry to adopt a
    proactive approach of prevention, mitigation and intervention
    to systematically address fatigue risk management.
        The United States aviation community can no longer treat
    fatigue risk as just another rule that has to be met. We
    congratulate the FAA for sponsoring a major international
    symposium on aviation fatigue management last June. Several
    non-U.S. airlines reported on their successful implementation
    of FRMS that has resulted in enhanced safety, improved crew
    satisfaction, greater operational flexibility, and lower costs,
    including insurance premiums.
        The foundation also believes that controlled rest on the
    flight deck should be made legal for use when necessary for the
    safety of flight. Its effectiveness was demonstrated
    dramatically by NASA in 1989 and incorporated into a draft
    advisory circular in 1993, yet it has never been implemented in
    the United States. Numerous authorities around the world have
    approved it. It has been successfully used by foreign carriers
    since 1994, and, frankly, the oft-repeated excuse that it
    doesn't pass the `Jay Leno' test isn't valid anymore.
        Finally, the foundation urges the FAA to further develop
    and implement fatigue risk management on a trial basis, as it
    is already doing for ultra-long-range flights from the U.S. to
    Mumbai and to Hong Kong. Together these actions will enable
    U.S. Commercial aviation to enhance its level of safety with
    regard to fatigue risk and do so efficiently and proactively.
    The foundation believes the United States should be leading the
    world in fatigue risk management instead of following it.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I am happy to answer any
    questions.
        Mr. Costello. Thank you, Dr. Graeber.
        And the Chair now recognizes Dr. Ayers.
        Mr. Ayers. Chairman Costello, Ranking Member Petri,
    Chairman Oberstar, Committee Members, my name is Frank Ayers,
    and I have the privilege of managing the training for all the
    pilots at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Daytona
    Beach, Florida, who are moving on to the regional and the major
    airlines. As you may be aware, Embry-Riddle was founded as a
    flight training school in 1926; in fact, well before many of
    the major airlines and the regional airlines. In the
    intervening 83 years, while we have expanded to become a major
    engineering, business and aviation university, our core
    capability has always been in producing the best pilots
    available in the industry.
        As I listened to Captain Prater's comments about what a
    training organization should be, I reflected back on what I see
    every day at Embry-Riddle, and I think it might inform the
    discussion of how training is done for young people who move
    from off-the-street into regional airline cockpits.
        First, the program at Embry-Riddle has high selection
    standards. You have to compete to get into the program, and
    then you compete against the high academic standards of a 4-
    year university to remain in the program and to graduate.
    Competition is good. It is the hallmark of military flight
    training and other very successful flight training programs
    around the world.
        Additionally, our program is extensively peer reviewed.
    There are about 30 major universities that band together under
    an organization called the Aviation Accreditation Board
    International, and we willingly submit ourselves to peer review
    of our program. That increases the strength of our program, and
    it spreads the good word in a collegial atmosphere to other
    institutions so all the boats rise on the tide at the same
    time.
        Additionally, we think a program that teaches pilots to fly
    in the regionals and in the majors should be stable
    financially. In our area alone, we have had three flight
    training providers go bankrupt or go out of business in the
    last 6 months; two, in fact, in the last 3 months. Most was
    significant loss of money to the individual and a loss of
    training.
        We think it is important that students that put down a
    sizeable amount of money, maybe 60- or $70,000, there is an
    expectation that they will graduate. Again, in the collegiate
    aviation training environment, that expectation is that you
    have an opportunity to compete against the standard to
    graduate. And we think that is a much better way of doing
    business than simply cash for training.
        A successful aviation training program like ours has a
    strong academic quotient. In the first 1-1/2 years of a 4-year
    degree, our students complete all the academic work associated
    with the FAA-required commercial pilot certificate, and that is
    the certificate required to become a regional airline pilot.
    However, the next 2-1/2 years in a bachelor of science degree
    program heavy on math and physics, our students essentially get
    the same education that a senior 747 captain has, while
    certainly not their experience, but they get that same
    education in jet engine systems, in weather, icing, autopilot
    usage, all those various functions.
        We think it is very important that they be fully prepared
    to fly jet aircraft.
        Additionally, the flight training and simulation program
    that supports their training should be a modern one. We have
    chosen at Embry-Riddle to follow Part 142 of the Code of
    Federal Regulation. We are the only major university and one of
    the few general aviation training programs that trains under
    Part 142, which is essentially the way the airlines train.
        After the downturn in our business after 9/11, in 2003, our
    university made a huge investment in technology, almost $10
    million in simulators and about $2 million in Automatic
    Dependent Surveillance Broadcast equipment so that our students
    would be on the cutting edge of aviation training. By being in
    Part 142, we do about 35 percent of our training in those
    simulators where we can train for those emergencies in real
    time. And we think even though it subjects us to greater FAA
    scrutiny, it is the way to train. It is what we should be
    doing.
        I would also speak in my remaining couple seconds here for
    the young men and women that I work with all the time. They
    would ask that at the completion of this rigorous program that
    they could make a living wage. I think the combination of the
    low wage and the commuting situation we have right now is very
    challenging. If you are a senior captain and can have a home in
    Florida where I live, it is a really good thing. But if you are
    a young person making $22,000 a year, it is a lot of expense.
        In closing, I would say Embry-Riddle shares the grief in
    this tragedy. We have a young man--had a young man named Joseph
    Zuffoletto. Joseph was a pilot for Colgan. He was dead-heading
    in the back of the aircraft, and he was a graduate of our
    Prescott program, an outstanding young man and an outstanding
    young pilot. And we grieve for all the victims of the Buffalo
    crash because the Embry-Riddle community grieves as well.
        We thank you for your attention, and I stand ready for your
    questions.
        Mr. Costello. Thank you Dr. Ayers.
        Captain Prater, in your written testimony you talk about
    the fatigue cushion that was once provided and was negotiated
    as part of the work rules has virtually been eliminated by the
    airlines. Tell us why that is.
        Mr. Prater. Chairman Costello, thank you. One of Captain
    Babbitt's predecessors, I believe it was Admiral Engen, once
    said, we don't have to change the flight-duty time FARs because
    the ALPA contracts are more conservative. They are safer than
    that.
        I would say through the processes of bankruptcy, we have
    lost many of the work rules that used to make our contracts
    safer. They were above the FARs. I will give you some concrete
    evidence.
        As a new airline pilot back in late 1970s, early 1980s, I
    would fly approximately and be paid for 75 to 79 hours a month.
    That took in the credit time, so if my duty day was 15 hours
    long, I was not paid or credited with just the 3 hours that I
    actually flew. I was given a credit for, say, 5 hours. That
    limited me to how many days I worked.
        After bankruptcy, at Continental in 1983, we went to basic
    FAR minimums. It has greatly increased the workloads of pilots.
    What we have seen in the last round of bankruptcies following
    9/11 is that has spread to all corners of the industry.
        The regional industry was created to make up for the loss
    of the national industry. We lost all the airlines like Ozark
    and North Central. Those airlines were career pilot jobs. They
    had career contracts. They had pension plans, if you can
    imagine that. Now those are all gone. They have been replaced
    because the major carriers are looking for a cheaper way to do
    business. They created the regional industry, and they are at
    the very minimums of pay, and they fly right up on the maximum
    FARs, and we have been unable to change that through collective
    bargaining. Hopefully we will be able to change that so that we
    can make it a better job and make it a more stable career.
    Thank you.
        Mr. Costello. So the bottom line is it is all about money.
        Mr. Prater. Not at all. I like to go home every night after
    my trip. I want to get home. Over half of the founders of the
    Air Line Pilots Association were pilots in their thirties, died
    in airplane crashes. Our foundation as a union is based upon
    professional standards. It is based upon increasing those
    safety standards. We dedicate ourselves to that, and we charge
    our members a very high rate to be part of that.
        Mr. Costello. I think maybe you may have misunderstood my
    question or my comment, and it is all about money where the
    airlines are concerned as far as cutting back on the work rules
    relative to fatigue cushion and a number of other things.
        Mr. Prater. We are actually proud to work for airlines. We
    want to do a good job. They are under tremendous competitive
    pressures. They have gotten too low. The competition has led us
    to look for every cut in every corner, and I believe that is
    cutting into the fabric of the safety levels that we see.
        Mr. Costello. Captain Prater, how does your--you heard Mr.
    May talk about a centralized pilot record system, a database,
    and others have mentioned that as well. How does ALPA feel
    about a centralized database?
        Mr. Prater. Well, obviously we are much more concerned
    about the performance day in and day out. As Captain Babbitt
    said, airline pilots are tested continually. There is a lot of
    information available to our employers or prospective employers
    about our performance. But just like hours in a log book, it is
    what you do today, and you have to prove yourself day in and
    day out. Whether a young pilot at Embry-Riddle failed a
    maneuver on his commercial test, such as turns about a point or
    spiraling maneuvers, and had to retake that provision, that is
    not that important to an airline. Now, trend analysis, how many
    failures, multiple failures on the same maneuver, that would
    raise the awareness.
        But there are no perfect pilots. I don't represent any. I
    haven't been one. We learn by making mistakes. We are a safe
    airline crew because we have got a first officer that is
    trained at that same level and traps my mistake and catches it.
    That is the foundation of airline safety in the cockpit.
        Mr. Costello. Mr. Morgan, you state that Colgan recently
    increased the minimum flight experience requirements for new
    pilots and captain upgrade candidates. Tell us what the old
    standard was and what the new standard is.
        Mr. Morgan. The new standard was implemented in October of
    last year, and that standard is 1,000 hours for minimum time.
    The standard prior to that was 600 total time and 100 hours of
    multiengine time.
        Mr. Costello. Why did you find it in essential to increase
    the minimum standards?
        Mr. Moran. We didn't necessarily find it a necessity to
    increase the time, but certainly with the market supply of
    pilots that is out there today, you can go to a higher
    standard, although we do feel as we move into a larger
    aircraft, more experience was necessary to do.
        Mr. Costello. You indicate also--let us talk a little about
    bit about the stick pusher training. Colgan required that in an
    academic sense, but not in a simulator; is that correct?
        Mr. Morgan. That is correct, sir.
        Mr. Costello. Why is that?
        Mr. Morgan. The approach to training for the stalls has
    been long done this way in the industry. But it is more of the
    recognition and recovery from a stall rather than going full to
    the stick pusher. This was something that is termed for a long
    time, I believe, negative training. We wanted to take a
    positive training step that says we are going to teach you how
    to recognize that you are approaching a stall; when you reach a
    stall, you recover from the stall. You should never reach a
    point where the stick pusher gets activated. Therefore we felt
    it was appropriate to make you aware that the stick pusher was
    there, but not to train you, because you should never, ever see
    it.
        Mr. Costello. Mr. Loftus, would you like to comment?
        Mr. Loftus. Yeah. I think that is a big mistake to make. I
    can't see their logic behind why you wouldn't demonstrate at
    least the stick pusher. It takes about 2 minutes to do that in
    a simulator, to do it properly, to avail the students to at
    least be aware of what is going to happen. If anyone has ever
    been in a simulator and experienced that condition, it is like
    a three-alarm fire, and to be able to think and make the right
    callouts, it is--I don't know why you wouldn't want to do it.
        Mr. Costello. Mr. Morgan, through--as a result of the NTSB
    3-day hearings, it was revealed that Captain Renslow had four
    disapprovals due to failed check rides during his career. Three
    occurred before he was hired by Colgan and included failed
    check rides for his commercial pilot instrument, his complete
    commercial and his commercial multiengine certificate. What did
    you know at the time? What did Colgan know at the time as far
    as Captain Renslow's record when he was hired and then promoted
    from first officer to captain?
        Mr. Morgan. At the time, sir, what we knew was what we were
    able to retrieve through the PRIA system and what Mr. Renslow
    provided to us on his application. We used the 5-year
    background check as reported under PRIA. We did not have
    anything that was reported by Mr. Renslow as having any
    previous failures. The failures that he had achieved or had
    experienced while he was with Colgan, each of those we followed
    the process to remove him from flying until he successfully
    completed that check and moved on up to the next level, as any
    other pilot would do when they failed a check.
        Mr. Costello. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member
    Mr. Petri.
        Mr. Petri. Thank you very much. I thank all of you for your
    testimony.
        I have a lot of questions and little time, so I will do my
    best to touch on a few highlights. And especially, Mr. Loftus,
    you bring a concern and knowledge to this, and hopefully it
    will be very helpful to us as we go forward.
        In your testimony you emphasized, as I understood it, two
    things really, the importance of experience and of training.
    And really, I guess, being a pilot is--there is kind of a--you
    learn tricks of the trade, in effect, by working with people
    who have had the experience and passed that down, as happens in
    many aspects.
        You didn't really talk about fatigue. I know that is an
    issue in transportation broadly, people driving, whether it is
    any vehicle, and trying to make sure that that doesn't
    overwhelm safety. I know that the investigation is still going
    forward, but do you feel that that was a problem or is really
    more training?
        Mr. Loftus. I addressed it in my written statement a little
    bit. But, yes, I do think it is a common problem; maybe not
    with more experienced pilots. They know how to manage, they
    have been there doing it 20 years, so they have learned to
    manage their time. They are making more money, too. They can
    afford to buy a crash pad or a hotel room or day room to get
    their rest when they come in and commute. But many times I have
    flown repeated hours--my hours at Express, 8, 10 legs a day,
    and then have to fly Part 91 at night back to a maintenance
    base, inherently very dangerous. These things need to be
    addressed.
        I think the commuting aspect needs to be addressed outside
    the bargaining area. I think that is why it took us two tries
    in the contract. In contract 97 they subsequently got it, at
    Continental Express, a commuter policy, an effective commuter
    policy which allows for pilots to get into the base, but it
    also gives the company some protections, too, and some heads up
    and things. And I think that would be a good--commuting is
    going to stay around forever. Pilots are going to live where
    they want to live. They are going to work where they work, and
    follow the equipment they want to base by base. But I think an
    effective commuter policy that works both for the airlines and
    the pilots would be effective in this avenue instead of
    regulations. I think no matter what you are going to do, people
    are still going to live where they want to live. I think a
    better way to attempt it, to solve the problem, would be a
    commuter policy outside the bargaining area.
        Mr. Petri. The whole plane was lost, the passengers and the
    crew. They clearly had an interest in trying to operate the
    plane's safety. They lost their lives as well. I am not an
    expert, but it makes me think that training and preparation are
    absolutely key, because the person has every desire to react
    correctly.
        Mr. Loftus. One of my favorite sayings was that there was
    only one person's life that was more important on that aircraft
    than the passengers, and that was mine. I wanted to be around
    at the end of the day. I think every pilot has that feeling as
    well.
        Mr. Petri. One other area I wonder if I could just touch on
    and that is alluded to quite a bit in the testimony, that is
    the relationship between the major airlines and the commuter
    airlines and whether there is adequate provisions for the
    majors to supervise and ensure the safety of the feeder
    airlines. And I wonder, Mr. Cohen, if you could address that.
        Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Petri.
        There is a number of these programs. All the programs that
    you have heard about today, ASAP, FOQA, LOSA, those are shared
    extensively throughout the regional industry as well. The
    relationship between these carriers that--we have regular
    meetings with all the mainline people, both directly and under
    the umbrella of the associations, through the ATA and the RAA.
    So there is quite an extensive interrelationship. It is one of
    the reasons we are such enthusiastic supporters of the call to
    action next week, that we can actually make this even--
    institutionalize this even more. We are strong supporters of
    it.
        Mr. Costello. The Chair now recognizes Mr. DeFazio.
        Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Captain Prater, I would just like to give you some quotes
    from some of your predecessors testifying before this Committee
    from ALPA, Mr. Dwayne Worth: Pilots have been disciplined,
    including terminated, for calling in fatigued. They have been
    called in to see the chief pilot, which is, again, a varied
    response depending upon the nature of the airline, nature of
    the management team and whether they have the benefit of a
    union contract. So clearly what we need is a Federal regulation
    to make that a nonquestion of compliance.
        That was 1999. Then, of course, we have the current FAA
    Administrator from that 1999 hearing, Captain Babbitt: The
    intimidation factor is clearly there. I could parade a string
    of witnesses in here that would shock you. There is no private
    whistle-blower protection. The pilots are intimidated. What
    quite often will happen is pilots resist that and again I can
    present hard copy where a pilot is terminated. We use
    agreements machinery and defend them. In maybe 8 or 10 months a
    neutral will give him his job back. In the meantime, who paid
    him? I can assure you that is a lesson to the pilots. They are
    intimidated by the carrier.
        Does this still go on?
        Mr. Prater. Yes. Absolutely. We still have managements that
    believe they can push pilots by threatening them because the
    flight must go on the trip must go on or we don't get paid.
        I am saying the airlines--some airlines continue to battle
    practices that were first created in the Lorenzo era, in my
    time, maybe the Cord era in earlier times. They continue to
    push pilots. They threaten them with terminations. And we see
    it. We then win the grievances, and they refuse to reinstate
    pilots.
        So when we look under the covers starting next week with
    Captain Babbitt, I will parade those people in here where we
    are still seeing those practices. I will name names to Captain
    Babbitt at that time and let them deal with it.
        I believe that the major airline that sells the ticket must
    ensure those practices do not exist within any of the carriers
    that they use, whether they own them or whether they outsource
    them to other contract carriers. But those practices are alive
    and well, sir.
        Mr. DeFazio. What would the representative of the regional
    transport association say in response to that? Is he lying,
    making it up?
        Mr. Cohen. If those kind of practices exist, they should
    not exist.
        Mr. DeFazio. Okay. So we have been hearing this for 17
    years. Probably there are hearings before that on this
    Committee that I don't recall. I have just gone back to review
    transcripts from 1992.
        At least you are a little more in line here, but the RTA
    representative back then gave me the example of what if you are
    in Bend, Oregon, and the pilot says he is too tired to fly? I
    said, great, I will take the bus back over to the valley with
    him. I don't want to fly if he doesn't want to fly.
        The point is, everybody--you, Mr. Morgan and the ATA--all
    say, well, it is the pilot's call. It is the pilot's call. But
    we are hearing from Captain Prater it is not the pilot's call
    if he or she values their job in some of these organizations.
        We have got to root this out. I mean, we just have to root
    this out. I mean, I can't believe--I have been hearing this for
    17 years, and we have heard it from the current head of the FAA
    17 years ago, and it is still going on.
        We have here a blind study. Dr. John Caldwell, a fatigue
    management consultant for the Air Force and Army, his research
    found that 80 percent of regional pilots surveyed they had
    nodded off during a flight and that scheduling factors such as
    multiple takeoffs and landings every day were top contributors
    to operational fatigue. Do you acknowledge that we have got a
    problem here?
        Mr. Cohen. Mr. Chairman, Mr. DeFazio, issues of fatigue is
    right at the top of the list of human factors, that we have
    said that we need--as Mr. May pointed out, we need to be
    looking at all of these issues, because it is time to address
    all of these issues in a holistic way.
        Mr. DeFazio. My key point over all the years has been--and
    I made it to the earlier panel. If we adopt a standard that
    everybody has to follow that prevents these problems, then
    nobody is at a competitive disadvantage and you don't have to
    worry about that one bad actor who is trying to drag everybody
    down.
        Hey, I can provide a cheaper flight. How can you do that?
    Well, my pilots are tired, they are not as well-trained, my
    planes aren't as well-maintained, the FAA doesn't really impose
    those things on us.
        We have got to get rid of that. That has got to go. If we
    are assuring people of safety, then that stuff has got to go
    and nobody is going to be at a disadvantage. Everybody starts
    at the same place. I would hope the associations support robust
    changes that will bring about an end to these practices.
        Mr. May.
        Mr. May. Congressman, I think from the ATA's perspective,
    we absolutely do. We have said in the past--I mean, Dwayne
    Worth and John Prater and Randy Babbitt have vastly more
    experience in this industry than I do, so I am not going to sit
    here and try to suggest they are wrong. But I think there is
    now a forum, run by one of the three as a matter of fact, that
    we will all be participating in next week.
        I am sure the issue of fatigue and flight and duty time
    needs to come up, should come up. I think the issues of
    commuting and the impact that has on readiness, I think the
    issue of professionalism of pilots needs to come up. All of
    these issues need to be addressed. They need to be laid on the
    table. There ought not to be any restrictions as to what
    subjects are there. And if Captain Prater has specific evidence
    of pilot pushing by carriers, I think we would welcome seeing
    that put on the table.
        Mr. DeFazio. Are you going to do that, Captain Prater?
        Mr. Prater. I would be more than happy to.
        Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Costello. Sure. The Chair thanks the gentleman and now
    recognizes the Ranking Member of the Full Committee, Mr. Mica.
        Mr. Mica. Thank you.
        I am pleased to see Dr. Ayers here from Embry-Riddle, which
    happens to be located in my congressional district. It is
    without question the finest aeronautical institute and
    university not only in the United States but the world.
    Everywhere I go I am proud to meet graduates in every field of
    aviation industry who are absolutely outstanding.
        I venture to say--and you don't have to respond to this--
    that very few of your graduates are involved in some of these
    issues, because I have never seen anything but, again, the
    highest standards performed by those graduates who are--first
    come so dedicated and then are so professional.
        I am going to ask my staff to look at the background of
    some of these flights where we have had fatalities just out of
    curiosity to see the difference in training. I don't know if
    you want to comment, Dr. Ayers.
        Mr. Ayers. I certainly would. Let me expand upon my
    statement a little bit.
        We think that it is not how many hours a pilot has in their
    logbook, but what was done, what was examined, what was
    measured, what was trained in that hour. And we really stand
    ready as a university with a deep research background to
    provide some science to some of this discussion so we can see
    what it really does take.
        We think what we have come to--and on the second page of my
    prepared remarks there is data that shows that our pilots, even
    with fairly low hours, in the 500-hour range, score in the same
    area where military pilots do. We are very proud to be in that
    group. That is a very high echelon of aviation expertise. So we
    do think that how we train makes a difference.
        Mr. Mica. Mr. Cohen and Mr. Prater, do you favor opening
    performance records and training certification to, again, the
    employers without restriction?
        Mr. Cohen. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Mica, absolutely. It is the
    number one thing that we have proposed.
        Mr. Mica. How about you, Mr. Prater?
        Mr. Prater. I believe the full background should be
    available. But that raises another level, sir, and that means
    that those records have to be kept in some type of standardized
    basis so we are comparing apples with apples.
        Mr. Mica. Very good.
        Mr. May, if I had a pound of butter and I spread it over 10
    loaves of bread----
        Mr. Prater. The answer is 14.
        Mr. Mica. But then if I had a pound of butter and I spread
    it over 20 loaves of bread, what would happen with the second
    20 loaves of bread? Your answer is they get less butter.
        Mr. May. I think that is the answer that is expected. I am
    not sure that is the case with aviation safety.
        Mr. Mica. What I want to do is take the number of
    inspectors--I looked at the administration's proposal. There is
    a 4.4 percent increase in safety operations. But we are also
    mandating from Congress some inspections for foreign repair
    stations that we already have being done at the same standards.
    So we are taking personnel to do what is done--existing
    standards and using those personnel where we don't need them.
    Wouldn't you think it would be better served to spread that
    butter where we need the coverage?
        Mr. May. I think that makes ultimately good sense, Mr.
    Mica, but it raises an interesting point. We have talked about
    one level of safety here. I think on paper we have one level of
    safety, certainly. It is called FAR 121. And we all, whether it
    is a regional airline commuter, airline mainline carrier have
    to live up to the principles and standards of FAR 121. The
    question is whether or not it is being aggressively enforced,
    audited, et cetera.
        Mr. Mica. That is where spreading the butter thinner and
    doing things we don't need to do--thank you.
        Mr. May. May I have one moment?
        Mr. Mica. No, I am running out of time. Mr. Costello holds
    me right to the--he gives me a little bit of leeway as the
    Ranking Member.
        But I just want to get a question on the record about the
    way compensation is determined for regional carriers. Now, I am
    told it is a negotiation between I guess the union or the pilot
    representatives and the air carrier. Is that the way it is
    done, Mr. Cohen?
        Honestly, I don't know the answer to my question. Mr.
    Prater, I have been told--is there is a preliminary wage level
    set and then is there--can you explain to the Committee how
    that is done? Because I have heard a lot about wages and the
    airlines are doing--that the regionals are doing this on the
    cheap and pilots aren't getting paid adequate compensation or
    copilots are getting far less than they should and pilots get a
    certain--how is that compensation determined?
        Mr. Cohen. At all but one of our carriers, every one of the
    agreements for the crew members is collectively bargained.
        Mr. Mica. That is a determination between, again, the
    pilots' representatives and the airlines. And then the
    difference between the levels, say, for a captain or the
    primary pilot and the copilot or lesser position, is that also
    part of that----
        Mr. Cohen. Also all covered under the collective bargaining
    agreement.
        Mr. Mica. So it is agreed upon by the union or the
    representative and the airline?
        Mr. Cohen. Correct.
        Mr. Mica. Thank you.
        Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you, Mr. Mica; and let me
    thank all of our witnesses for being here to testify today, in
    particular you, Mr. Loftus, on behalf of the families. I can
    assure you and the family members who are with us and those who
    could not be with us today that this Subcommittee is not going
    to let this issue slip away, that we are going to work--we are
    looking forward, as all of you are, to the meeting on Monday
    with the Department of Transportation and the FAA Administrator
    to see what comes out of that meeting.
        But it is clear at least to me--I can't speak for other
    Members of the Subcommittee--that we can no longer rely on
    recommendations by the FAA, that some standards are going to
    have to be changed. And I think we need to look at the
    relationship between the major carriers and the regional
    airlines, and I think we need to take a look at the training to
    find out if, in fact--for instance, some of the issues that we
    talked about today should be incorporated as mandatory training
    as opposed to leaving it up to the airlines, to their
    discretion.
        Obviously, fatigue is a major factor. As Captain Prater
    said, this not the first time that he has talked about the
    issue before the Committee. We have heard others, not only
    pilots but air traffic controllers and others within the
    system, talk about their concern. We have heard testimony from
    the Inspector General, we heard testimony from the GAO on the
    issue of fatigue.
        I think we need to look at pilot records and to determine
    if we need a data bank and how far those records--how far we
    can go back so that all of the airlines have access when they
    are hiring a new first officer, a new pilot to know what that
    person's record is, as well as all of the NTSB's
    recommendations.
        I, at least, feel at this point that with the new
    administrator, given his background and his experience as a
    pilot and with ALPA, that he understands the importance of when
    the NTSB makes a recommendation that he is going to implement a
    system to review those recommendations, figure out either, one,
    implement them, two, modify them or, three, reject them and
    give a solid reason for rejecting them and to get reports to us
    and to the Congress on these issues.
        So, again, we thank all of you for being here today to
    offer your testimony; and let me just say that, again, we are
    going to do everything we can to continue to focus, as we did
    with the past administration, with this administration, to
    follow our responsibility to provide the oversight so that the
    FAA and others in the system are doing what they need to do to
    continue to have the safest aviation system in the world.
        With that, I would ask the Ranking Member, Mr. Petri, if he
    has any final thoughts or comments.
        Mr. Petri. No. We join you in the determination to stick
    with this; and, again, thank you all for being here.
        Mr. Costello. Again, thank you.
        That concludes the hearing today, and the Subcommittee
    stands adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 1:49 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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