[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CONTINUING INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF
THE NATIONAL POLAR-ORBITING OPERATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL SATELLITE SYSTEM
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND
OVERSIGHT
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 17, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-36
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology
Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov
______
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chair
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois RALPH M. HALL, Texas
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California Wisconsin
DAVID WU, Oregon LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
BEN R. LUJAN, New Mexico RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
PAUL D. TONKO, New York BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
JIM MATHESON, Utah BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri PETE OLSON, Texas
BARON P. HILL, Indiana
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
KATHLEEN DAHLKEMPER, Pennsylvania
ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
SUZANNE M. KOSMAS, Florida
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
VACANCY
------
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
HON. BRAD MILLER, North Carolina, Chair
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio VACANCY
KATHY DAHLKEMPER, Pennsylvania
ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
BART GORDON, Tennessee RALPH M. HALL, Texas
DAN PEARSON Subcommittee Staff Director
JAMES PAUL Democratic Professional Staff Member
TOM HAMMOND Republican Professional Staff Member
JANE WISE Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
June 17, 2009
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Brad Miller, Chairman, Subcommittee
on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 10
Written Statement............................................ 11
Statement by Representative Paul C. Broun, Ranking Minority
Member, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee
on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives....... 12
Written Statement............................................ 13
Witnesses:
Mr. David A. Powner, Director, Information Technology Management
Issues, Government Accountability Office (GAO)
Oral Statement............................................... 15
Written Statement............................................ 17
Biography.................................................... 22
Mr. A. Thomas Young, Chair, NPOESS Independent Review Team (IRT)
Oral Statement............................................... 22
Written Statement............................................ 24
Biography.................................................... 25
Ms. Mary M. Glackin, Deputy Under Secretary for Oceans and
Atmosphere, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), U.S. Department of Commerce
Oral Statement............................................... 26
Written Statement............................................ 28
Biography.................................................... 33
Discussion
Ensuring Interagency Cooperation............................... 34
The Role of OSTP............................................... 35
Selecting a Management Strategy................................ 36
Program Cost................................................... 37
Coordinating Agencies and Technologies......................... 38
The Keys to Avoiding Future Problems........................... 40
Closing........................................................ 40
Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Mr. David A. Powner, Director, Information Technology Management
Issues, Government Accountability Office (GAO)................. 44
Mr. A. Thomas Young, Chair, NPOESS Independent Review Team (IRT). 47
Ms. Mary M. Glackin, Deputy Under Secretary for Oceans and
Atmosphere, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), U.S. Department of Commerce............................ 51
Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record
Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: With Costs Increasing
and Data Continuity at Risk, Improvements Needed in Tri-agency
Decision Making, Report to Congressional Requesters, U.S.
Government Accountability Office, June 2009.................... 56
NPOESS Independent Review Team, Final Report, June 1, 2009....... 108
CONTINUING INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE NATIONAL POLAR-ORBITING
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SATELLITE SYSTEM
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 17, 2009
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight,
Committee on Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:04 p.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brad
Miller [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
hearing charter
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Continuing Independent Assessment of
the National Polar-Orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellite System
wednesday, june 17, 2009
2:00 p.m.-4:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
Purpose
The Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight meets on June 17,
2009, for further oversight of the National Polar-Orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS). The Subcommittee will receive
the newest report on the program produced by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) and the findings from the Independent
Review Team (IRT) examining the program. NPOESS has been the subject of
sustained oversight as the risk that critical weather data might be
lost has grown. At this hearing, the Subcommittee will consider
alternative steps to limit the continuing deterioration in NPOESS
program management and maintain the present schedule of satellite
launches.
Program Description
In 1993, the decision was made to bring together the Defense
Meteorological Satellite Program satellites operated by the Air Force
and the Polar Operational Environmental Satellites run by NOAA, thereby
creating the NPOESS program.\1\ These satellites were intended to meet
needs for weather data by the military services as well as NOAA's
National Weather Service. NPOESS also offered the opportunity for NOAA
and NASA to assure continuity of the climate data that both agencies
are collecting. The Committee's work has shown that the benefits
expected from NPOESS have failed to materialize. Instead, the agencies
find themselves at risk of losing the flow of global data on weather
conditions and climate change that are critical to serving the needs of
the United States.
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\1\ GAO in its report provides a more detailed description of the
usefulness of satellites in polar orbits.
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The Committee has held five hearings on the NPOESS program since
2003, documenting cost overruns and schedule delays. A recurring issue
has been the ineffectiveness\2\ of the program's Executive Committee
(EXCOM), which consisted of the heads of the three agencies involved:
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\2\ In 2005, frustrated by NOAA's inability to respond to the
deteriorating conditions within the program, Representatives Gordon and
Wu called for the removal of NOAA's Administrator and his deputy. Then-
President Bush declined to take that step.
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the Administrator of NOAA,
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics (who delegated responsibility for
EXCOM activities to the Secretary of the Air Force); and
the Administrator of NASA.
Below is a diagram of the NPOESS management structure (left column)
established in response to the so-called Nunn-McCurdy
recertification\3\ in 2005. A System Program Director (SPD) was placed
in charge of the Integrated Program Office (IPO) handling the day-to-
day program oversight. A Program Executive Officer (PEO) became the
direct liaison to the EXCOM. This was to simplify reporting information
to the EXCOM and execution of resulting decisions.
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\3\ As set forth in the Memorandum of Agreement governing the
NPOESS program, the Air Force is managing the acquisition of the
satellites. It is therefore subject to Department of Defense
regulations for major defense programs. When such programs exceed
approved baseline costs by more than 25 percent, recertification is
required by 10 U.S.C. 2433 et seq.
With the reassignment of the first PEO, Air Force Brigadier General
Susan Mashiko, the EXCOM sought a replacement and ultimately settled on
her System Program Director, Dan Stockton. In assuming his new
position, Mr. Stockton retired from the Air Force and became a NOAA
employee. The new System Program Director, Ed Phillips, also
transitioned from the Air Force to a NOAA civil service position. As a
result, they also serve within the Department of Commerce management
structure (right column), communicating through the National
Environmental Satellite Data and Information Services (NESDIS) division
of NOAA.
According to the reports to be presented at this hearing, this
management structure is still failing to provide the leadership needed
for NPOESS program success. This leads to the obvious question: Is
there hope of repairing the flaws in the organization? If not, what
should replace it?
Witnesses
Mr. David Powner, Director, Information Technology Management Issues,
Government Accountability Office (GAO)
Mr. Powner is the head of the GAO team monitoring the NPOESS
program since 2001. He will present the latest in the continuing series
of reports commissioned by the Committee on this satellite program. He
will also respond to changes that have occurred in the program's status
since GAO completed work on its review.
Mr. Tom Young, Chair, NPOESS Independent Review Team (IRT)
Mr. Young served as the president of the Martin Marietta
Corporation until its merger with Lockheed Corporation; he then served
as Executive Vice President of Lockheed Martin until retiring in 1995.
Mr. Young also served as Director of NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center
earlier in his career. In recent years, he has lent his expertise to
numerous program reviews and mishap investigations in the space
program. He testifies today as Chair of the Independent Review Team
constituted by the NPOESS Executive Committee (EXCOM) to offer advice
on recovering from the severe technical and managerial problems in the
program.
Ms Mary Glackin, Deputy Administrator, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA)
The NPOESS program is fundamental to NOAA's weather missions, and
was also expected to contribute to the agency's monitoring of climate
and space weather phenomena. During the transition to the Obama
Administration, Ms. Glackin has served as NOAA representative to the
EXCOM, and has been coordinating with representatives of NASA and the
Air Force to deal with the problems that continue to beset the program.
Ms. Glackin has been asked to provide NOAA's responses to the reports
prepared by the previous witnesses. She will also describe the progress
of discussions now underway to plot a future course for the program.
Background
A. Helping NPOESS Succeed
The NPOESS program exists to collect data needed by NOAA, DOD and
NASA to forecast weather, help military units minimize weather impacts
on operations, and understand the influence of Earth's climate.
According to the IRT report, however, the ``customers'' have very
different views on ``how much is enough.'' DOD is quite satisfied with
the performance of those instruments currently flying and sees little
need for significant investments in improvements. For NOAA and NASA, on
the other hand, such improvements are needed to achieve their mission
goals. The IRT states, ``These differences are straining interagency
relationships and are impacting how people do their jobs, even down to
the lowest levels of the IPO. The IRT believes that this program will
not survive if this particular problem is not addressed immediately.''
[emphasis added] The IRT follows with the statement that this ``. . .
can only be resolved at the White House level.''
Whatever decision the White House makes on the question of what
NPOESS will do bears heavily on one of the major recommendations the
IRT offers as part of its ``Path Forward.'' The Team states that the
program needs support from the space system experts at either NASA's
Goddard Space Flight Center or the Air Force Space and Missile Command.
The team believes that, given the fact that NPOESS is critical to
NOAA's mission areas, NOAA should recast the program to work with
Goddard much as it is doing with the Geostationary Operational
Environmental Satellite upgrade (GOES-R). However, if the White House
defines the NPOESS program to be more in line with the DOD view that
NPOESS is little more than a replacement for the current polar-orbiting
satellites, then either organization would be acceptable. Whatever the
case, the present Integrated Program Office would continue in some
fashion and would be expected to work closely with whichever
organization is selected. The Committee's interest in NOAA and NASA
activities argues for support of the IRT's preference for a NOAA-NASA
partnership. Mr. Young also emphasizes that full control of the program
resources must be vested in the revamped acquisition organization.
The IRT also believes that the current contractors should be
retained. In the Nunn-McCurdy restructuring, studies were begun to
determine if the prime contract with Northrop Grumman should be changed
or terminated. These studies criticized Northrop Grumman and the
Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems team building the Visible/Infrared
Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) for poor performance. The Independent
Review Team received detailed presentations on the results from these
studies, which concluded that Northrop Grumman, at least, had made
progress in addressing its shortfalls. Therefore, the disruption caused
by finding a replacement was not warranted. The IRT team also
recommends retaining Northrop Grumman. However, the award fee plan for
the contract should be changed to focus on mission success.
The IRT also recommended that the government press forward with
Raytheon to obtain the VIIRS instrument, although it could not
determine how much longer it would take or how much it will ultimately
cost. Replacement options should be limited to obtaining another unit
of the existing Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR) imager
now in use should the VIIRS unit fail during its remaining test or
integration processes.
The IRT notes that the program is still operating with insufficient
funds to achieve the outcomes it is pursuing. Correcting this will be
another outgrowth of the White House decision process, in that more
funds will have to be found or something will have to be dropped. The
IRT estimates that accomplishing the current program plan will require
an additional $1 billion, which matches GAO's view (see section C,
below).
B. What About EXCOM?
Previous hearings have examined the role and performance of the
Executive Committee, which serves as the senior level of management for
the NPOESS program. In the Committee's 2005 hearing, Mr. Gordon (then
Ranking Member) had a sharp exchange with NOAA Administrator Conrad
Lautenbacher about the flow of information to the EXCOM and the slow
pace of EXCOM meetings even as the program was suffering severe budget
problems. In a hearing before the Energy and Environment Subcommittee
in 2007, GAO described the laborious process the EXCOM undertook to get
concurrence on the set of documents needed to implement the management,
technical and budgetary changes resulting from the Nunn-McCurdy
recertification decisions in 2006. A year later, Mr. Powner testified
that the updated Memorandum of Agreement and the new program baseline
had still not been signed by all of the three principals.\4\ The
repeated inability to make even basic decisions led the Committee to
ask GAO to focus attention on the EXCOM.
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\4\ On March 3, the EXCOM was notified that the accumulation of the
most recent technical trouble with the VIIRS instrument required delays
in the predicted launch dates for NPP and the NPOESS satellites. A new
baseline was to be submitted by June 4.
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Mr. Powner will testify that, despite the efforts undertaken to
repair the weaknesses in the EXCOM, ``. . . it has not effectively
fulfilled its responsibilities and does not have the membership and
leadership it needs to effectively or efficiently oversee and direct
the NPOESS program.'' Part of the problem involved the fact that while
the Secretary of the Air Force was serving as DOD's EXCOM
representative, he had no authority to make commitments for DOD. The
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
had not delegated authority to make commitments for DOD when reaching
procurement milestones. As GAO noted, however, the Under Secretary did
not attend EXCOM meetings, which contributed to the inability to gain
approval on the Memorandum of Agreement and the program baseline.
Thus the situation continues, and indeed has fueled growing
friction between the program participants. GAO's report illuminates
this where it states:
At the conclusion of our review, DOD officials reported that
part of the problem in escalating risks is that, in violation
of interagency agreements and inconsistent with DOD acquisition
policy, two senior NOAA officials review and limit what the
Program Executive Officer provides to the Executive Committee.
NOAA officials and the Program Executive Officer strongly
disagreed with this statement. NASA commented that NOAA's
enhanced oversight provides a healthy set of checks and
balances to the program.
GAO also described in its draft report that the EXCOM fails to make
clear decisions and does not regularly determine if progress is being
made on the tasks it has ordered to be accomplished. GAO found no
mechanism for tracking EXCOM decision milestones. Compounding this lack
of oversight, the decisions that have been made often did little to
actually resolve the problem. This is most clearly seen in the
continuing inability to bring the primary sensor, the Visible Infrared
Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS), to completion. Despite continued
pressure on prime contractor Northrop Grumman to achieve improved
performance from Raytheon, the EXCOM has not been able to solve this
major impediment to NPOESS progress.
Having been constituted by the EXCOM, Mr. Young's Independent
Review Team proved diplomatic in its comments. Still, it raised
concerns similar to those highlighted in GAO's report. As it concluded:
The EXCOM process is ineffective: The EXCOM is intended to be
a decision body to provide streamlined direction to the PEO.
The current DOD EXCOM representative has not been delegated the
proper authority from the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE),
who is also the NPOESS Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), and
decisions require an additional meeting and coordination to be
finalized. Additionally, the IRT has observed that many of the
topics that are discussed at the EXCOM delve too deeply into
program details and many critical top level issues are left
unresolved.
GAO recommends that the Under Secretary for Acquisitions,
Technology and Logistics be directed to attend EXCOM meetings. It
further recommends that the EXCOM devise a realistic timeline for
revising the program baseline, develop a plan to mitigate data gaps and
pay closer attention to the outcome from its decisions.
Mr. Young argues that the EXCOM should play a different role if the
NPOESS program becomes a NOAA-NASA responsibility. In that case, the
EXCOM will provide DOD continuing insight into the NPOESS program.
While DOD believes its needs are being met by the current generation of
instruments, it is also the case that users often cannot recognize
benefits from new technology until they are presented real, not
theoretical, products to evaluate. That is very likely to be the case
with NPOESS. Mr. Young believes that the EXCOM will then serve as the
forum by which DOD participates in the continuing evolution of data
requirements for future systems.
C. Cost Increases and Schedule Delays
The NPOESS program has changed significantly since its inception in
1994. A fundamental restructuring took place in 2005 and 2006 as a
result of the breach of cost ceilings defined by the so-called Nunn-
McCurdy provision of DOD procurement law. The recertified program,
announced in June 2006, provided for the following:
The estimate for acquisition cost rose to $11.5
billion (with an additional $1 billion to cover operating
costs, making the total life cycle cost $12.5 billion).
Only two satellites were guaranteed to be built, with
the first launch scheduled for 2013.
A decision to buy two more satellites, and to
reconsider the program's management structure, was to be made
in 2010.
The capabilities of the satellites were reduced, in
that one of the major instruments (the Conical Microwave
Imaging Sounder) was removed, to be replaced with a less-
capable instrument on the second NPOESS satellite that would be
launched in 2016. Also removed were instruments intended to
extend the data records for monitoring the Earth's climate, and
to track events on the Sun that had the potential to disturb
the planet's geomagnetic environment.
In the past seven years, Committee hearings on the NPOESS program
have documented a continuing rise in the program's life cycle cost
estimate and repeated delays in the expected launch dates for the
satellites. Using Mr. Powner's statements at these hearings, the
following table demonstrates the growing life cycle cost and schedule
delays:
The $14.9 billion estimate, according to Mr. Powner, includes some
$1 billion in additional costs for the sensor problems, possible
information security upgrades and estimates for the operational costs
for the last two years of the program's life. Thus, the program has
doubled in cost and yet will result in fewer satellites. It should also
be of concern that, despite the effort to reduce or eliminate risk in
the NPOESS program, cost increases on the order of $1 billion per year
are continuing to occur.
During the 2005 Nun-McCurdy recertification, continuity of the
existing data streams was the highest priority. As the Independent
Review Team report notes,
While continuity of data is a critical priority for all users,
it is at extreme risk: If all satellites are delivered on
schedule, launched without incident, and meet their full design
life, there will be no significant gap in capabilities. In
keeping with historical trends, there is a high likelihood of
early problems with the first few satellites. If NPOESS
exhibits similar characteristics, there will be a minimum gap
of several months. If there is a launch failure--a 41 percent
chance of occurring over the remaining DMSP launches, NPP and
NPOESS--there is a high likelihood of a gap measured in years .
. ..
NOAA's has assured data continuity by its policy of assuring spare
satellites available for launch in case a satellite is lost at launch
or fails prematurely. In the case of the geostationary program, NOAA
provides a spare in orbit to reduce the time needed to respond to
failure. This recently proved important when the current Geostationary
Operational Environmental Satellite covering the eastern United States
(GOES-12) suffered problems. NOAA was able to place the existing spare,
GOES-13, into service until it could restore GOES-12 to duty.
This policy for backup satellites was also provided in the original
NPOESS program. Yet by the time NOAA launched the last of its polar
satellites, NOAA-19, on February 6,\5\ the extreme risk identified by
the IRT became concrete. NOAA is now dependent on NOAA-19 lasting at
least for two years without incident, assuming that NPP achieves its
planned launch in January 2011. NOAA has been fortunate in that it has
not lost a satellite in a launch accident for some time. While it has
been clear for some time that the NPP satellite would take on this
``gap-filler'' operational role, it also is designed for a four- to
five-year lifetime. Should the first NPOESS satellite be lost,\6\ NPP
would be expected to carry on well into the next decade. The second
NPOESS satellite is intended to operate in the morning orbit, which is
of primary interest to DOD. The risk is somewhat lower there as DOD
still has three of its DMSP satellites in reserve.
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\5\ NOAA-19 was substantially rebuilt after it was dropped on the
floor September 6, 2003 at the Lockheed Martin production facility.
NOAA has regularly assured the Committee that all damage has been
completely repaired.
\6\ The change to operational status affects primarily the ground
system, as NPP was originally intended to provide data only to NOAA and
one of three military forecasting centers. The satellite will now serve
all four centers.
D. Program Status
The NPOESS program last month completed a Critical Design Review on
the NPOESS system. Northrop Grumman's program manager commented
afterwards that, ``The team demonstrated that the majority of the
detailed design is complete and meets requirements. NPOESS is at a
higher level of design maturity than typical at this milestone as a
result of building sensors and ground elements for the NPOESS
Preparatory Project . . ..'' The Government's System Program Director
reported to the EXCOM on May 22 that the consensus favored going
forward with the first NPOESS satellite, but with important
qualifications:
NPOESS satellite integration and test schedule is
high risk
Four percent (16/458) of the non-KPP (Key Performance
Parameter) attributes do not meet specification
Compliance to baseline design depends on unapproved
changes
Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) sensor design
insight and maturity is lacking
Open items from the Review are expected to be resolved by August.
The Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) instrument,
which has been the critical pacing item for some time now, is now
undergoing critical thermal-vacuum testing to determine if it can
withstand the conditions it will face during operation. The Cross-Track
Infrared Sounder (CrIS) is progressing through the steps needed to
restore the instrument following failure of the frame during vibration
testing. Screws in one element of the Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite
(OMPS) will be replaced to assure they were properly tightened. Funding
from the NOAA's allocation in the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act has been used to assure that the Total Solar Irradiance Sensor
(TSIS) and Earth Radiation Budget Sensor (ERBS) will be able to fly on
NPP, thus avoiding gaps in critical climate data collections.
The Integrated Program Office has also been contributing to efforts
currently underway in the NPOESS agencies to assist the White House in
responding to the recommendations from the two reports to be discussed
at the Subcommittee's hearing.
Chairman Miller. Good afternoon and welcome to today's
hearing, Continuing Independent Assessment of the National
Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System,
NPOESS. Today, this subcommittee will receive two reports on
the perennially unsettled NPOESS, the National Polar-Orbiting
Operational Environmental Satellite System. The Science
Committee, under the Chairmanship of former Chairman Boehlert
and our current Chairman Gordon, have devoted years of
oversight to this program, and despite our relentless pressure,
our relentless oversight, to get this program under control, we
meet again to learn what is going on, that the NPOESS
satellites are facing another delay, another schedule slip, and
that the total cost expected has grown an additional billion
dollars.
The Committee's first hearing on this subject was in 2003,
my first year in Congress. At that time, the first NPOESS
satellite was projected for launch in 2009, this year. Here we
are. Six years of effort have gained us one year of expected
progress. Now we think that the first NPOESS satellite is
likely to fly in 2014.
But if the math is correct and we continue to advance at
the rate that we are advancing, the satellite will not really
be ready for launch until 2039.
That is obviously not acceptable. The delays and cost
overruns we will hear about today are not the most important
news from the hearing. The most important news is what steps
need to be taken to reorganize the management of this program
in order to achieve a successful launch by 2014. We probably
can't manage one this year at this point.
To help us understand what still needs to be done, two
independent groups have given us the results of their recent
works. The Government Accountability Office, GAO, their team
represented by Mr. David Powner, has given the Committee
invaluable help overseeing NOAA's satellite programs. We are
also fortunate today to welcome Mr. Tom Young, who has found it
hard to enjoy his retirement with all of the investigations of
government space programs that we have asked him to lead in
recent years. He will present the findings of an Independent
Review Team that has just completed its review of the NPOESS
program management. Both Mr. Powner and Mr. Young have
recommendations for Congress and the Administration regarding
how to restructure the management of this program to get it
back on track.
And our third witness is NOAA Deputy Under Secretary Mary
Glackin, who has recently taken on this thankless, difficult
task of trying to shepherd NPOESS to a successful conclusion,
by which I assume we mean actually launching one. Serving in
her position since December of 2007 means that she should have
some historical perspective on all of the questions facing NOAA
and the Administration. Fundamentally, we hope she will help
shed light on why the last Director of OSTP failed to make
decisions on this project that are now left to the new
Administration.
I think that Mr. Young, Mr. Powner and Ms. Glackin will all
agree that NPOESS now needs key guidance that only the White
House can deliver. As a project shared among three agencies,
the Department of Defense, NASA and NOAA, NPOESS is cursed by
too many cooks and no agreed-upon recipe for the proper mission
for the program. Only the White House can settle those
differences and decide a path forward. The Subcommittee asked
OSTP to send a representative today, but unfortunately a
national security exercise has kept all senior OSTP staff
occupied today. So instead of being here at the Rayburn
Building, they are presumably at an undisclosed, secure
location.
When it comes to NPOESS, it has been years since we had the
luxury of time for making decisions. NOAA recently made its
last polar satellite operational. Its predicted lifetime is
five years. With every passing month, GAO reminds us that we
get closer to the probability of a data interruption in weather
data as well as the certain interruption in climate data. NOAA
primarily pins its hopes to avoiding such a data gap by using
the NPP satellite, which was never intended as an operational
satellite, as a gap-filler. I would feel much more confident
with that plan if the NPP launch schedule was not also slipping
and if we actually knew whether its main instrument was going
to work.
On March 12, speaking to State officials about the Recovery
Act, President Obama said, ``If we see money being misspent,
we're going to put a stop to it.'' We have seen money misspent
on NPOESS, but stopping NPOESS is not an option. NPOESS may be
a mess--no real maybe about it--and it may have been
mismanaged--not much maybe about that either--but the American
public needs the data produced by NPOESS in order to have
accurate weather forecasts, and the world needs the climate
data that would be collected by NPOESS to continue to
understand how our climate is changing. Cancellation of NPOESS
is not an option, and failure is unacceptable. If we do not
have NPOESS, we will need something like it, and we will need
it soon.
We will spend our time today trying to deal with the
program as it is, determine where we need to go and decide how
we will get there from here.
I want to thank the witnesses for appearing today, and I
now recognize my colleague from Georgia, the Ranking Member,
Dr. Broun.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Miller follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Brad Miller
Good afternoon.
Today, the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight will
receive two reports on the perennially unsettled National Polar-
Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS). The
Science Committee, under the leadership of former Chairman Boehlert and
current Chairman Gordon, has devoted years of oversight to this
program. Despite our relentless pressure to get this program under
control, we meet again to learn that the NPOESS satellites are facing
another schedule slip and that the total expected cost has grown an
additional billion dollars.
The Committee's first hearing on this subject was in 2003, my first
year in Congress. At that time, the first NPOESS satellite was
projected for launch in 2009. Here we are in 2009, and six years of
effort have gained us only one year of progress; now the first NPOESS
satellite is slated to fly in 2014.
If my math is correct, at this rate we will not get an NPOESS
satellite ready for launch until 2039.
That is obviously unacceptable. The delays and cost overruns we
will hear about today are not the most important news from this
hearing; the most important news is what steps need to be taken to
reorganize the management of this program in order to guarantee a
successful launch in 2014.
To help us understand what must be done, two independent groups
will give us the results of their recent work. The Government
Accountability Office (GAO) team represented by Mr. David Powner has
given the Committee invaluable help overseeing NOAA's satellite
programs. We are also fortunate to welcome today Mr. Tom Young, who has
found it hard to enjoy retirement with all of the investigations of
Government space programs he has been asked to lead in recent years. He
will present the findings of an Independent Review Team that has just
completed its review of NPOESS program management. Both Mr. Powner and
Mr. Young have recommendations for the Congress and the Administration
regarding how to restructure the management of this program to get it
back on track.
Our third witness, NOAA Deputy Under Secretary Mary Glackin, has
recently taken on the difficult task of trying to shepherd NPOESS to a
successful conclusion. Serving in her position since December of 2007
means she should have some historical perspective on all of the
questions facing NOAA and the Administration. Fundamentally, we hope
she will help shed light on why the last Director of OSTP failed to
make decisions on this project that are now left to the new
Administration.
I think that Mr. Young, Mr. Powner and Ms. Glackin will all agree
that NPOESS now needs key guidance that only the White House can
deliver. As a project shared among three agencies--the Department of
Defense, NASA and NOAA--NPOESS is cursed by too many cooks and no
agreed upon recipe for the proper mission for the program. Only the
White House can settle these differences and carve a clear path
forward. The Subcommittee asked OSTP to send a representative today,
but unfortunately a national security exercise has kept all senior OSTP
staff occupied today.
When it comes to NPOESS, it has been years since we had the luxury
of time for making decisions. NOAA recently made its last polar
satellite operational. Its predicted lifetime is five years. With every
passing month, GAO reminds us that we get closer to the probability of
a data interruption in weather data as well as the certain interruption
in climate data. NOAA primarily pins its hopes to avoiding a data gap
by using the NPP satellite--which was never intended as an operational
satellite--as a gap-filler. I would feel more confident with that plan
if the NPP launch schedule was not also slipping, and if we actually
knew whether its primary instrument was going to work.
On March 12, speaking to State officials about the Recovery Act,
President Obama said, ``If we see money being misspent, we're going to
put a stop to it.'' Unfortunately, we've seen money misspent on NPOESS,
but stopping NPOESS is not an option. NPOESS may be a mess and it may
have been mismanaged, but the American public needs the data produced
by NPOESS in order to have accurate weather forecasts, and the world
needs the climate data that would be collected by NPOESS to continue to
understand how our climate is changing. Cancellation is not an option
and failure is unacceptable. If we do not have NPOESS, we will need
something very much like it. We will spend our time today trying to
deal with the program as it is, determine where we need to go and
decide how we will get there from here.
I want to thank the witnesses for appearing before the Subcommittee
this afternoon and recognize my colleague from Georgia, Ranking Member
Broun.
Mr. Broun. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome our
witnesses here today and thank them for participating in this
important hearing.
This is the Committee's sixth hearing on the NPOESS
program, spanning both Democratic as well as Republican
controls of the Committee. This is, however, the first time
that this committee, the Investigations and Oversight
Subcommittee, has held a hearing, but we have been actively
involved for some time now.
NPOESS was originally planned to create synergies and cost
savings by combining the DMSP within the Department of Defense
and the POES system at NOAA. But instead, the program has
doubled in cost, shrunk from six to four satellites, degraded
its sensor capabilities, and seen its schedule slip six years.
If that wasn't bad enough, Mr. Young points out in his
testimony that, and I quote him, ``The current program has an
extraordinarily low probability of success,'' even after
numerous rebase linings and a significant Nunn-McCurdy
recertification.
So how did we get here? After several years of cooperation
it has become clear that the partner agencies had differing
priorities and levels of commitment. This is certainly
expected. There are unique missions. But this divergence has
ultimately created an untenable partnership. NOAA is pressured
by the scientific community to continue operation of research
satellites that feed cutting-edge data into weather and climate
models, while DOD is content to operate legacy hardware. NOAA
doesn't have any extra POES satellites to buff its transition,
while DOD still has two DMSP satellites on the ground. This is
NOAA's flagship mission, yet this barely amounts to a rounding
error in the Pentagon's budget.
Another reason is simply that space acquisition isn't easy.
This isn't an excuse, but it is worth noting that we aren't
asking these agencies to build cardboard boxes. Sure, the
government could do better with cost estimating, with
procurement, and contract management. But in the end we are
building one-of-a-kind, innovative hardware and launching it
17,500 miles per hour into the vacuum of space.
Because of this complexity, we have sought to limit our
costs by putting numerous sensors on fewer spacecraft and
launch vehicles, thereby restricting the opportunities for
performance upgrades to generational timeframes. In doing so,
we have created a program that is essentially too big to fail,
a phrase we have all heard lately to describe another huge
fiasco. By placing all of our eggs in one basket, we have
developed an architecture where it seems failure is not an
option. Further compounding the problem are issues of
requirement creeps from climate sensors, schedule pressure
because of data continuity concerns, and cost caps from
external factors like Nunn-McCurdy.
It really isn't surprising that the program isn't run well
when the managers can't fine tune fundamental program
management parameters like cost, schedule and performance.
So where do we go from here? The GAO and the Independent
Review Team have offered recommendations, and NOAA has proposed
future management budget and data options. The IRT states that
this program will ultimately require the White House to weigh
in. We certainly have near-term decisions on the horizon as
well as long-term plans to consider.
I look forward to exploring the implications of these
options and proposed directions with the Chairman. NPOESS is a
critical national asset that deserves not only this committee's
attention but also that of all partner agencies, the White
House, and the appropriators. Every American is impacted by
this program, whether they know it or not. It is our
responsibility to ensure that the farmers, fishermen, soldiers
and sailors, Marines, and everyday commuters continue to
receive weather and climate information, but we must not forget
to be good stewards of taxpayers' money and to root out waste,
inefficiency, and duplication wherever we can.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my
time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Broun follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Paul C. Broun
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome our witnesses here today
and thank them for participating in this important hearing. This is the
Committee's sixth hearing on the National Polar-Orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), spanning both Democratic and
Republican control of the Committee. This is, however, the first time
the Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee has held a hearing, but
we have been actively involved for some time now.
NPOESS was originally planned to create synergies and cost-savings
by combining the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) within
the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Polar-Orbiting Environmental
Satellite (POES) System at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA). Instead, the program has doubled in cost, shrunk
from six to four satellites, degraded its sensor capabilities, and seen
its schedule slip six years. If that wasn't bad enough, Mr. Young
points out in his testimony that ``the current program has an
extraordinarily low probability of success''--even after numerous
rebaselinings and a significant Nunn-McCurdy recertification.
So how did we get here? After several years of cooperation, it has
become clear that the partner agencies have differing priorities and
levels of commitment. This is certainly expected given their unique
missions, but this divergence has ultimately created an untenable
partnership. NOAA is pressured by the scientific community to continue
operation of research satellites that feed cutting-edge data into
weather and climate models, while DOD is content to operate legacy
hardware. NOAA doesn't have any extra POES satellites to buffer its
transition, while DOD still has two DMSP satellites on the ground. This
is NOAA's flagship mission, yet this barely amounts to a rounding error
in the Pentagon's budget.
Another reason is simply that space acquisition isn't easy. This
isn't an excuse, but it is worth noting that we aren't asking these
agencies to build cardboard boxes. Sure, the government could do better
with cost-estimating, procurement, and contract management, but in the
end we are building one-of-a-kind innovative hardware and launching it
17,500 miles per hour into the vacuum of space.
Because of this complexity, we have sought to limit our costs by
putting numerous sensors on fewer spacecraft and launch vehicles
thereby restricting the opportunities for performance upgrades to
generational timeframes. In doing so, we have created a program that is
essentially ``too big to fail''--a phrase we have all heard lately to
describe another fiasco. By placing all of our eggs in one basket, we
have developed an architecture where it seems failure is not an option.
Further compounding the problem are issues of requirements creep from
climate sensors, schedule pressure because of data continuity concerns,
and cost caps from external factors like Nunn-McCurdy. It really isn't
surprising that the program isn't run well when the managers can't
fine-tune fundamental program management parameters like cost,
schedule, and performance.
So where do we go from here? The General Accountability Office
(GAO) and the Independent Review Team (IRT) have offered
recommendations, and NOAA has proposed future management, budget, and
data options. The IRT states that this program will ultimately require
the White House to weigh in. We clearly have near-term decisions on the
horizon, as well as long-term plans to consider.
I look forward to exploring the implications of these options and
proposed directions with the Chairman. NPOESS is a critical national
asset that deserves not only this committee's attention, but also that
of all the partner agencies, the White House, and the Appropriators.
Every American is impacted by this program whether they know it or
not. It is our responsibility to ensure that the farmers, fisherman,
war-fighters, and everyday commuters continue to receive weather and
climate information. But we must not forget to be good stewards of
taxpayers' money and root out waste, inefficiency and duplication where
we can.
Thank you Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
Chairman Miller. Thank you, Dr. Broun. I now ask unanimous
consent that all additional opening statements submitted by
Members be included in the record, and without objection, it is
so ordered.
It is now my pleasure to introduce our witnesses at this
time. Mr. David Powner is the Director of Information
Technology Management Issues at the Government Accountability
Office. Mr. Tom Young is the Chair of the NPOESS Independent
Review Team, and Ms. Mary Glackin is the Deputy Under Secretary
for Oceans and Atmosphere at the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration.
As our witnesses should know, you will each have five
minutes for your spoken testimony. Your written testimony will
be included in the record for the hearing. When you have
completed your spoken testimony, we will begin with questions.
Each Member will have five minutes to question the panel.
It is the practice of the Subcommittee to receive testimony
under oath. Do any of you have any objection to taking an oath?
All the witnesses indicated that they did not. You also have
the right to be represented by counsel. Do any of you have
counsel here? All the witnesses indicated that they did not. If
you will now please stand and raise your right hand? Do you
swear to tell the truth and nothing but the truth? All the
witnesses responded in the affirmative. So the witnesses have
now taken the oath.
We will begin with Mr. David Powner. Mr. Powner, please
begin.
STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID A. POWNER, DIRECTOR, INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
(GAO)
Mr. Powner. Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun, and
Members of the Subcommittee, we appreciate the opportunity to
testify on our latest NPOESS report being released today. This
afternoon I will discuss NPOESS's continued problems and our
recommendations for improvement, both near- and long-term, so
that our nation will have continued data and imagery essential
for weather forecasting and climate monitoring.
Six years ago I first testified on NPOESS before Chairman
Ehlers' Subcommittee when NPOESS was a $7 billion program and
the launch of its first satellite was April 2009. Today the
cost has increased $8 billion to at least $15 billion, and the
first satellite launch has been delayed five years to March
2014.
I will briefly discuss these increasing costs, schedule
delays, as well as potential gaps in critical satellite
coverage and ineffective executive management.
The current cost of $14 billion and the various planned
launch schedules are not achievable. Technical problems with
two critical sensors, VIIRS and CrIS, continue to drive up
costs and push launch schedules out. We expect the current $14
billion estimate to increase at least a billion dollars to
cover sensor technical issues, new security requirements, and
additional operations and maintenance costs.
We also need to keep in mind that the integration and
testing of the sensors for the initial satellites has not yet
occurred, and this could be an additional cost driver. The new
cost estimates are scheduled to go to the EXCOM for approval by
the end of the month, and we understand that at least five
estimates are being considered.
Schedules for the demonstration satellite known as NPP, and
the first two satellites have been delayed seven, fourteen, and
five months, respectively. These delays endanger the continuity
of weather and climate data. With the current launch schedule,
should we run into any problems with the satellite launch
failure or operational problems, we will have gaps in satellite
coverage. My written testimony highlights these potential gaps
in each of the three orbits. In fact, a single launch failure
of one of the remaining DOD satellites known as DMSP or of NPP
could result in a gap in satellite coverage of up to five
years.
NOAA has been plagued by ineffective management over the
years, and today our report highlights that NPOESS's executive
committee has not been effective in fulfilling its
responsibilities, which has contributed to NPOESS's problems.
Specifically, the right folks don't attend the EXCOM meetings.
Those that do don't effectively manage risks, nor do they make
tough decisions when needed. For example, DOD's Under Secretary
for Acquisition is DOD's official EXCOM member as agreed to in
official memorandums of agreement. This official whose DOD's
acquisition authority has never attended an EXCOM meeting and
has delegated this role to the Under Secretary of the Air
Force. Not having the acquisition authority attend these
meetings has resulted in delays as the EXCOM decisions have
later been overturned by the acquisition authority.
The bottom line here is that having the right officials
attend could greatly streamline decision making. In addition,
although the EXCOM holds quarterly meetings, they do not
routinely track action items and issues to closure. Also, the
tri-agency structure creates a situation of differing and
competing priorities, and the EXCOM has not been effective in
resolving these differences. In fact, the EXCOM is about to be
presented with differing cost estimates by the end of the month
where they will be asked to make a tough decision on the right
program cost and scope, especially given the fact that NOAA and
DOD will likely have differing costs and program performance
that are acceptable.
Before discussing our recommendation, I would like to note
a few areas of progress. The NPOESS program has delivered and
integrated three of the five instruments for NPP. The ground
station systems have been installed and tested at both
locations, and the command and control system has passed
acceptance testing. However, moving forward, we recommend that
in the near-term the NPOESS program needs to have the right
EXCOM members attend and participate in the EXCOM meetings, and
this includes DOD's Under Secretary for Acquisition. Also, the
EXCOM needs to effectively manage risks and make decisions,
starting with approving new program costs and scheduled base
lines.
The program also needs to develop mitigation plans to
address potential gaps in satellite coverage, and it needs to
seek White House guidance on a direction forward. These near-
term recommendations are essential to keep the acquisition
moving forward, to mitigate future cost increases, schedule
delays, and gaps in satellite coverage.
Looking at this from a longer-term perspective, we need to
acknowledge this tri-agency experiment has been an epic
failure, and we need an exit strategy to go back to separate
satellite acquisitions for the next series of polar orbiting
satellites.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. Thank you for
your leadership and oversight of this acquisition.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Powner follows:]
Prepared Statement of David A. Powner
Polar-Orbiting Satellites: With Costs Increasing
and Data Continuity at Risk, Improvements
Needed in Tri-agency Decision Making
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to participate in today's hearing on
the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS). NPOESS is expected to be a state-of-the-art satellite system
that will replace two existing satellite systems. It is considered
critical to the United States' ability to maintain the continuity of
data required for weather forecasting (including severe weather events
such as hurricanes) and global climate monitoring. Three agencies share
responsibility for NPOESS: the Department of Commerce's National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of
Defense (DOD)/United States Air Force, and the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA). As requested, this statement summarizes
our report being released today that (1) identifies the status and
risks of key program components, (2) assesses the NPOESS Executive
Committee's ability to fulfill its responsibilities, and (3) evaluates
efforts to identify an alternative system integrator for later NPOESS
satellites.\1\
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\1\ GAO, Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: With Costs
Increasing and Data Continuity at Risk, Improvements Needed in Tri-
agency Decision Making, GAO-09-564 (Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In preparing this testimony, we relied on our work supporting the
accompanying report. That report contains a detailed overview of our
scope and methodology. All of our work for this report was performed in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background
Polar-orbiting satellites provide data and imagery that are used by
weather forecasters, climatologists, and the military to map and
monitor changes in weather, climate, the oceans, and the environment.
Since the 1960s, the United States has operated two separate
operational polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) series, which is
managed by NOAA, and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program
(DMSP), which is managed by the Air Force. Currently, there is one
operational POES satellite and two operational DMSP satellites that are
positioned so that they can observe the Earth in early morning, mid-
morning, and early afternoon polar orbits. In addition, the government
is also relying on a European satellite, called Meteorological
Operational, or MetOp, in the mid-morning orbit.
With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs
would reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May 1994
Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to converge the
two satellite programs into a single satellite program capable of
satisfying both civilian and military requirements.\2\ The converged
program, NPOESS, is considered critical to the United States' ability
to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting and
global climate monitoring. To manage this program, DOD, NOAA, and NASA
formed the tri-agency Integrated Program Office, located within NOAA.
Within the program office, each agency has the lead on certain
activities: NOAA has overall program management responsibility for the
converged system and for satellite operations; the Air Force has the
lead on the acquisition; and NASA has primary responsibility for
facilitating the development and incorporation of new technologies into
the converged system. NOAA and DOD share the cost of funding NPOESS,
while NASA funds specific technology projects and studies. In addition,
an Executive Committee--made up of the administrators of NOAA and NASA
and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics--is responsible for providing policy guidance, ensuring
agency support and funding, and exercising oversight authority.\3\ The
Executive Committee manages the program through a Program Executive
Officer who oversees the NPOESS program office.
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\2\ Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-2, May 5, 1994.
\3\ The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics delegated the responsibility for attending the meetings--but
not the authority to make acquisition decisions--to the Under Secretary
of the Air Force.
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Since the program's inception, NPOESS costs have grown to $13.95
billion, and launch schedules have been delayed by up to five years.\4\
In addition, as a result of a 2006 restructuring of the program, the
agencies reduced the program's functionality by removing two of six
originally planned satellites and one of the orbits. The restructuring
also decreased the number of instruments from 13 (10 sensors and three
subsystems) to nine (seven sensors and two subsystems), with four of
the sensors providing fewer capabilities. The restructuring also led
agency executives to mitigate potential data gaps by deciding to use a
planned demonstration satellite, called the NPOESS Preparatory Project
(NPP) satellite, as an operational satellite providing climate and
weather data. However, even after this restructuring, the program is
still encountering technical issues, schedule delays, and the
likelihood of further cost increases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Compared to original program plans, the demonstration satellite
has been delayed by approximately four and a half years, while the
first two NPOESS satellites have each been delayed by approximately
five years.
Progress Made, But Continued Instrument Problems Are Driving Costs
Upward, Forcing Launch Delays, and Endangering
Satellite Continuity
Over the past year, selected components of the NPOESS program have
made progress. Specifically, three of the five instruments slated for
NPP have been delivered and integrated on the spacecraft; the ground-
based satellite data processing system has been installed and tested at
both of the locations that are to receive NPP data; and the satellites'
command, control, and communications system has passed acceptance
testing. However, problems with two critical sensors continue to drive
the program's cost and schedule. Specifically, challenges with a key
sensor's (the Visible/infrared imager radiometer suite (VIIRS) )
development, design, and workmanship have led to additional cost
overruns and delayed the instrument's delivery to NPP. In addition,
problems discovered during environmental testing on another key sensor
(called the Cross-track infrared sounder (CrIS) ) led the contractor to
further delay its delivery to NPP and added further unanticipated costs
to the program. To address these issues, the program office halted or
delayed activities on other components (including the development of a
sensor planned for the first NPOESS satellite, called C1) and
redirected those funds to fixing VIIRS and CrIS. As a result, those
other activities now face cost increases and schedule delays.
Program officials acknowledge that NPOESS will cost more than the
$13.95 billion previously estimated, but they have not yet adopted a
new cost estimate. Program officials estimated that program costs will
grow by about $370 million due to recent technical issues experienced
on the sensors and the costs associated with halting and then
restarting work on other components of the program. In addition, the
costs associated with adding new information security requirements to
the program could reach $200 million.\5\ This estimate also does not
include approximately $410 million for operations and support costs for
the last two years of the program's life cycle (2025 and 2026). Thus,
we anticipate that the overall cost of the program could grow by about
$1 billion from the current $13.95 billion estimate--especially given
the fact that difficult integration and testing of the sensors on the
NPP and C1 spacecrafts has not yet occurred.\6\ Program officials
reported that they plan to revise the program's cost estimate over the
next few weeks and to submit it for executive-level approval by the end
of June 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ These estimates are subject to further refinement because the
Executive Committee has not agreed on a cost estimating methodology and
the agencies have not yet agreed to new information security
requirements.
\6\ This cost estimate includes launch vehicle costs of
approximately $329 million, which are funded outside the program's
baseline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As for the program's schedule, program officials estimate that the
delivery of VIIRS to the NPP contractor will be delayed, resulting in a
further delay in the launch of the NPP satellite to January 2011, a
year later than the date estimated during the program restructuring--
and seven months later than the June 2010 date that was established
last year. In addition, program officials estimated that the first and
second NPOESS satellites would be delayed by 14 and five months,
respectively, because selected development activities were halted or
slowed to address VIIRS and CrIS problems. The program's current plans
are to launch C1 in March 2014 and the second NPOESS satellite, called
C2, in May 2016. Program officials notified the Executive Committee and
DOD's acquisition authority of the schedule delays, and under DOD
acquisition rules, are required to submit a new schedule baseline by
June 2009.
These launch delays have endangered our nation's ability to ensure
the continuity of polar-orbiting satellite data. The final POES
satellite, called NOAA-19, is in an afternoon orbit and is expected to
have a five-year lifespan. Both NPP and C1 are planned to support the
afternoon orbit. Should the NOAA-19 satellite fail before NPP is
launched, calibrated, and operational, there would be a gap in
satellite data in that orbit. Further, the delays in C1 mean that NPP
will not be the research and risk reduction satellite it was originally
intended to be. Instead, it will have to function as an operational
satellite until C1 is in orbit and operational--and if C1 fails on
launch or in early operations, NPP will be needed to function until C3
is available, currently planned for 2018. The delay in the C2 satellite
launch affects the early morning orbit. There are three more DMSP
satellites to be launched in the early and midmorning orbits, and DOD
is revisiting the launch schedules for these satellites to try to
extend them as long as possible. However, an independent review team,
established to assess key program risks, recently reported that the
constellation of satellites is extremely fragile and that a single
launch failure of a DMSP, NPOESS, or the NPP satellite could result in
a gap in satellite coverage from three to five years.
Although the program's approved cost and schedule baseline is not
achievable and the polar satellite constellation is at risk, the
Executive Committee has not yet made a decision on how to proceed with
the program. Program officials plan to propose new cost and schedule
baselines in June 2009 and have reported that they are addressing
immediate funding constraints by deferring selected activities to later
fiscal years in order to pay for VIIRS and CrIS problems; delaying the
launches of NPP, C1, and C2; and assessing alternatives for mitigating
the risk that VIIRS will continue to experience problems. Without an
executive-level decision on how to proceed, the program is proceeding
on a course that is deferring cost growth, delaying launches, and
risking its underlying mission of providing operational weather
continuity to the civil and military communities.
Executive Committee Has Not Effectively Fulfilled Its Responsibilities
While the NPOESS Executive Committee has made improvements over the
last several years in response to prior recommendations, it has not
effectively fulfilled its responsibilities and does not have the
membership and leadership it needs to effectively or efficiently
oversee and direct the NPOESS program. Specifically, the DOD Executive
Committee member with acquisition authority does not attend Committee
meetings--and sometimes contradicts the Committee's decisions, the
Committee does not aggressively manage risks, and many of the
Committee's decisions do not achieve desired outcomes. Independent
reviewers, as well as program officials, explained that the tri-agency
structure of the program makes it very difficult to effectively manage
the program. Until these shortfalls are addressed, the Committee is
unable to effectively oversee the NPOESS program--and important issues
involving cost growth, schedule delays, and satellite continuity will
likely remain unresolved.
Executive Committee Has Responded to Past Recommendations
We and others, including the Department of Commerce's Inspector
General in a 2006 report, have reported that the Committee was not
accomplishing its job effectively. However, since then, the Committee
has met regularly on a quarterly basis and held interim teleconferences
as needed. The Committee has also sought and reacted to advice from
external advisors by, among other actions, authorizing a government
program manager to reside on-site at the VIIRS contractor's facility to
improve oversight of the sensor's development on a day-to-day basis.
More recently, the Executive Committee sponsored a broad-based
independent review of the NPOESS program and is beginning to respond to
its recommendations.
Key Acquisition Executive Does Not Attend Executive Committee Meetings
As established by the 1995 and 2008 memorandums of agreement signed
by all three agencies, the members of the NPOESS Executive Committee
are (1) the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere; (2)
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics; and (3) the NASA Administrator.\7\ Because DOD has the lead
responsibility for the NPOESS acquisition, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics was also designated
as the milestone decision authority--the individual with the authority
to approve a major acquisition program's progression in the acquisition
process, as well as any changes to the cost, schedule, and
functionality of the acquisition. The intent of the tri-agency
memorandums was that acquisition decisions would be agreed to by the
Executive Committee before a final acquisition decision is made by the
milestone decision authority.\8\
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\7\ The 1995 agreement specified that the NASA member would be the
Deputy Administrator. Responsibility was subsequently taken over by the
Administrator of NASA.
\8\ The 1995 and 2008 memorandums of agreement differ slightly in
this regard. The first agreement stated that DOD's milestone decision
authority will make acquisition decisions with concurrence of the other
Executive Committee members, while the second agreement states that the
DOD authority must consider Committee decisions. The second agreement
takes precedence in the case of a conflict.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, DOD's acquisition authority has never attended an
Executive Committee meeting. This individual delegated the
responsibility for attending the meetings--but not the authority to
make acquisition decisions--to the Under Secretary of the Air Force.
Therefore, none of the individuals who attend the Executive Committee
meetings for the three agencies have the authority to approve the
acquisition program baseline or major changes to the baseline. As a
result, agreements between Committee members have been overturned by
the acquisition authority, leading to significant delays.
Committee Does Not Aggressively Manage Risks
To provide the oversight recommended by best practices,\9\
including reviewing data and calling for corrective actions at the
first sign of cost, schedule, and performance problems and ensuring
that actions are executed and tracked to completion, the Executive
Committee holds quarterly meetings during which the program's progress
is reviewed using metrics that provide an early warning of cost,
schedule, and technical risks. However, the Committee does not
routinely document action items or track those items to closure. Some
action items were not discussed in later meetings, and in cases where
an item was discussed, it was not always clear what action was taken,
whether it was effective, and whether the item was closed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ GAO, Information Technology Investment Management: A Framework
for Assessing and Improving Process Maturity, GAO-04-394G (Washington,
D.C.: March 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the Program Executive Officer, the closing of an
action item is not always explicitly tracked because it typically
involves gathering information that is presented during later Committee
meetings. Nonetheless, by not rigorously documenting action items--
including identifying the party responsible for the action, the desired
outcome, and the time frame for completion--and then tracking the
action items to closure, the Executive Committee is not able to ensure
that its actions have achieved their intended results and to determine
whether additional changes or modifications are still needed. This
impedes the Committee's ability to effectively oversee the program,
direct risk mitigation activities, and obtain feedback on the results
of its actions.
Committee Decisions Do Not Achieve Desired Outcomes
Best practices call for oversight boards to take corrective actions
at the first sign of cost, schedule, and performance slippages in order
to mitigate risks and achieve successful outcomes.\10\ The NPOESS
Executive Committee generally took immediate action to mitigate the
risks that were brought before them; however, a majority of these
actions were not effective--that is, they did not fully resolve the
underlying issues or result in a successful outcome. The Committee's
actions on the sensor development risks accomplished interim successes
by improving the government's oversight of a subcontractor's activities
and guiding next steps in addressing technical issues--but even with
Committee actions, the sensors' performance has continued to falter and
affect the rest of the program. Independent reviewers reported that the
tri-agency structure of the program complicated the resolution of
sensor risks because any decision could be revisited by another agency.
Program officials explained that interagency disagreements and
differing priorities make it difficult to effectively resolve issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ GAO-04-394G.
Program Has Assessed Alternatives, But Has Not Yet Identified a Viable
Alternative for Acquiring the Last Two NPOESS
Satellites
When NPOESS was restructured in June 2006, the program included two
satellites (C1 and C2) and an option to have the prime contractor
produce the next two satellites (C3 and C4). In approving the
restructured program, DOD's decision authority noted that he reserved
the right to use a different satellite integrator for the final two
satellites, and that a decision on whether to exercise the option was
to be made in June 2010. To prepare for this decision, DOD required a
tri-agency assessment of alternative management strategies. This
assessment was to examine the feasibility of an alternative satellite
integrator, to estimate the cost and schedule implications of moving to
an alternative integrator, and within one year, to provide a viable
alternative to the NPOESS Executive Committee.
To address DOD's requirement, the NPOESS Program Executive Officer
sponsored two successive alternative management studies; however,
neither of the studies identified a viable alternative to the existing
satellite integrator. The Program Executive Officer plans to conduct a
final assessment of alternatives prior to the June 2010 decision on
whether to exercise the option to have the current system integrator
produce the next two NPOESS satellites. Program officials explained
that the program's evolving costs, schedules, and risks could mean that
an alternative that was not viable in the past would become viable. For
example, if the prime contractor's performance no longer meets basic
requirements, an alternative that was previously too costly to be
considered viable might become so.
Implementation of Recommendations Could Improve Management and
Oversight
In the report being released today, we are making recommendations
to improve the timeliness and effectiveness of acquisition decision-
making on the NPOESS program. Specifically, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to attend and participate in
NPOESS Executive Committee meetings. In addition, we are recommending
that the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce and the Administrator of
NASA direct the NPOESS Executive Committee to take the following five
actions: (1) establish a realistic time frame for revising the
program's cost and schedule baselines; (2) develop plans to mitigate
the risk of gaps in satellite continuity; (3) track the Committee's
action items from inception to closure; (4) improve the Committee's
ability to achieve successful outcomes by identifying the desired
outcome associated with each of the Committee actions, as well as time
frames and responsible parties, when new action items are established;
and (5) improve the Committee's efficiency by establishing time frames
for escalating risks to the Committee for action so that they do not
linger unresolved at the program executive level.
In written comments on a draft of our report, NASA and NOAA agreed
with our findings and recommendations and identified plans to implement
them. DOD concurred with one and partially concurred with our other
recommendations. For example, regarding our recommendation to have the
appropriate official attend Executive Committee meetings, the agency
partially concurred and noted that the Under Secretary for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics would evaluate the necessity of attending
future Executive Committee meetings. DOD also reiterated that the Under
Secretary of the Air Force was delegated authority to attend the
meetings. While we acknowledge that the Under Secretary delegated
responsibility for attending these meetings, it is an inefficient way
to make decisions and achieve outcomes in this situation. In the past,
agreements between Executive Committee members have been overturned by
the Under Secretary, leading to significant delays in key decisions.
The full text of the three agencies' comments and our evaluation of
those comments are provided in the accompanying report.
In summary, continued problems in the development of critical
NPOESS sensors have contributed to growing costs and schedule delays.
Costs are now expected to grow by as much as $1 billion over the prior
life cycle cost estimate of $13.95 billion, and problems in delivering
key sensors have led to delays in launching NPP and the first two
NPOESS satellites--by a year or more for NPP and the first NPOESS
satellite. These launch delays have endangered our nation's ability to
ensure the continuity of polar-orbiting satellite data. Specifically,
if any planned satellites fail on launch or in orbit, there would be a
gap in satellite data until the next NPOESS satellite is launched and
operational--a gap that could last for three to five years. The NPOESS
Executive Committee responsible for making cost and schedule decisions
and addressing the many and continuing risks facing the program has not
yet made important decisions on program costs, schedules, and risks--or
identified when it will do so. In addition, the Committee has not been
effective or efficient in carrying out its oversight responsibilities.
Specifically, the individual with the authority to make acquisition
decisions does not attend Committee meetings, the Committee does not
aggressively manage risks, and many of the Committee's decisions do not
achieve desired outcomes. Until the Committee's shortfalls are
addressed, important decisions may not be effective and issues
involving cost increases, schedule delays, and satellite continuity may
remain unresolved.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes our
statement. We would be pleased to respond to any questions that you or
other Members of the Subcommittee may have at this time.
Staff Acknowledgments
Other key contributors to this testimony include Colleen M.
Phillips, Assistant Director; Kate Agatone; Neil Doherty; Kathleen S.
Lovett; Lee McCracken; and China R. Williams.
Biography for David A. Powner
Experience
Twenty years' experience in information technology issues in both
public and private sectors.
Education
Business Administration, University of Denver
Senior Executive Fellows Program, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy
School of Government
Director, IT Management Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office
Dave is currently responsible for a large segment of GAO's
information technology (IT) work, including systems development, IT
investment management, health IT, and cyber critical infrastructure
protection reviews.
In the private sector, Dave has held several executive-level
positions in the telecommunications industry, including overseeing IT
and financial internal audits, and software development associated with
digital subscriber lines (DSL).
At GAO, Dave has led teams reviewing major IT modernization efforts
at Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station, the National Weather Service,
the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Internal Revenue Service.
These reviews covered many information technology areas including
software development maturity, information security, and enterprise
architecture.
Chairman Miller. Thank you, Mr. Powner. Mr. Young.
STATEMENT OF MR. A. THOMAS YOUNG, CHAIR, NPOESS INDEPENDENT
REVIEW TEAM (IRT)
Mr. Young. Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun, and
Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to present a summary
of the NPOESS Independent Review Team report.
We identified 10 findings and recommended corrective
actions.
Finding one, the current NPOESS program has an
extraordinarily low probability of success. Implementation of
the following recommendations that I will discuss are necessary
to address this finding.
Two, continuity of data, which each user organization
identifies as the number one priority, is at significant risk.
The program is hardware poor with little protection against a
launch failure or early spacecraft failure. Data outages in a
particular orbit can be measured in years with a failure.
Corrective action is limited to moving the third and fourth
spacecraft closer to the first and second spacecraft in their
development schedules, launching on need rather than schedule
and exploiting NPP data.
Three, NPOESS is being managed with cost as the most
important parameter and not mission success. This program cost-
focused culture needs to change to a mission success-focused
culture, and the NPOESS contract award fee criteria needs a
similar change in focus.
Four, NPOESS EXCOM is ineffective. Members must have
decision authority. The focus of the EXCOM should be top-level
issues and timely decisions.
Five, NPOESS program is not part of a space acquisition
organization, which makes program implementation extremely
difficult. NPOESS must be assigned to a space acquisition
organization such as Space and Missiles Systems Center or NASA.
Six, fiscal year funding shortfalls are causing decisions
to be made that are adding risk and increasing cost. Funding
shortfalls must be corrected.
Seven, the highest probability of success is to maintain
the current contractor team, Northrop Grumman and Raytheon, and
the IRT recommends this action.
Eight, due to potential for coverage gaps, NPP has become a
critical asset, and it is recommended that this be recognized
and incorporated in program planning.
Nine, priorities of NOAA and DOD/Air Force are not aligned.
DOD/Air Force stated that legacy performance is acceptable and
that they are unwilling to provide additional funding to
achieve above legacy capability. NOAA stated that current
weather forecasting utilizes legacy and NASA R&D satellite
data. Accepting legacy capabilities would be a significant step
back. This difference in priorities must be resolved.
Ten, the current budget is inadequate with a shortfall in
excess of $1 billion. Funding the program by fiscal year and
through completion to 80 percent confidence, including a
management reserve of approximately 25 percent, is required to
have an executable program budgeted at the most likely cost.
The IRT recognizes that NPOESS is a national program with
quality of life, economic, disaster planning, and national
security implications. While the IRT believes the cited
recommendations must be implemented, additional actions are
necessary to have a successful NPOESS program.
The critical issue is the lack of alignment of DOD/Air
Force and NOAA priorities. The IRT believes that the EXCOM will
be unable to resolve this difference, and the White House will
be required to define the NPOESS program that is in the
national interest.
Following the NPOESS program decision, the responsibility
for program implementation must be assigned to one
organization--Air Force with SMC having implementation
responsibility or NOAA with NASA having implementation
responsibility. Either can do the job.
The IRT believes that the managing organization must have
total acquisition responsibility, be allocated all currently
planned and programmed budget and be responsible for funding
the defined program at an 80 percent confidence level. The IRT
recommends that responsibility for NPOESS be assigned to NOAA
with NASA acting as NOAA's acquisition organization. This
recommendation is based upon the recognition that NOAA has a
broader responsibility for weather and climate requirements
than any other organization and is a natural advocate for this
program.
Under this construct NOAA/NASA will provide NPOESS data to
DOD and Air Force and establish a process to meet future DOD
and Air Force needs.
The EXCOM concept should continue to assure effective
program implementation. Implementation of the IRT
recommendations and additional actions is urgently required.
Risk and unnecessary cost are being realized at an unacceptable
rate.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Young follows:]
Prepared Statement of A. Thomas Young
Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun, and Members of the
Subcommittee, I am Tom Young and I chair the NPOESS Independent Review
Team (IRT) that was established by the NPOESS Executive Committee
(EXCOM) to review the NPOESS program baseline and the management
approach.
After numerous meetings, interviews with Air Force (AF), Department
of Defense (DOD), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),
and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) principals,
visits to the primary contractors Northrop Grumman and Raytheon, and
discussions with contractor Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), the IRT
identified ten findings and recommended corrective actions.
1) The current NPOESS program has an extraordinary low
probability of success. Implementation of the following
recommendations is necessary to address this finding.
2) Continuity of data, which each user organization
identifies as number one priority, is at significant risk. The
program is hardware poor with little protection against a
launch failure or early spacecraft failure. Data outages in a
particular orbit can be measured in years with a failure.
Corrective action is limited to moving C3 and C4 closer to C1
and C2, launching on need rather than schedule and exploiting
NPOESS preparatory Project (NPP) data.
3) NPOESS is being managed with cost as the most important
parameter and not mission success. This Program cost focused
culture needs to change to a mission success focused culture
and the NPOESS contract award fee criteria needs a similar
change in focus.
4) NPOESS EXCOM is ineffective. Members must have decision
authority. Focus of EXCOM should be top level issues and timely
decisions.
5) NPOESS Program is not part of a space acquisition
organization which makes program implementation extremely
difficult. NPOESS must be assigned to a space acquisition
organization such as Space and Missiles Systems Center (SMC) or
NASA.
6) Fiscal year funding shortfalls are causing decisions to be
made that are adding risk and increasing cost. Funding
shortfalls must be corrected.
7) The highest probability of success is to maintain the
current contractor team, Northrop Grumman and Raytheon and the
IRT recommends this action.
8) Due to potential for coverage gaps, NPP has become a
critical asset and it is recommended that this be recognized
and incorporated in program planning.
9) Priorities of NOAA and DOD/AF are not aligned. DOD/AF
stated that legacy performance is acceptable and that they are
unwilling to provide additional funding to achieve above legacy
capability. NOAA stated that current weather forecasting
utilizes legacy and NASA Research and Development (R&D)
satellite data. Accepting legacy capabilities would be a
significant step back. This difference in priorities must be
resolved.
10) The current budget is inadequate with a shortfall in
excess of $1 billion. Funding the program by fiscal year and
through completion to 80% cost confidence including a
management reserve of approximately 25% is required to have an
executable program budgeted at the most likely cost.
The IRT recognizes that NPOESS is a national program with quality
of life, economic, disaster planning, and national security
implications.
While the IRT believes the cited recommendations must be
implemented, additional actions are necessary to have a successful
NPOESS program.
The critical issue is the lack of alignment of DOD/AF and NOAA
priorities. The IRT believes that the EXCOM will be unable to resolve
this difference and the White House will be required to define the
NPOESS program that is in the national interest.
Following the NPOESS program decision the responsibility for
program implementation must be assigned to one organization, AF with
SMC having implementation responsibility or NOAA with NASA having
implementation responsibility. Either can do the job.
The IRT believes that the managing organization must have total
acquisition responsibility, be allocated all currently planned and
programmed budget and be responsible for funding the defined program at
an 80 percent confidence level.
The IRT recommends that responsibility for NPOESS be assigned to
NOAA with NASA acting as NOAA's acquisition organization. This
recommendation is based upon recognition that NOAA has a broader
responsibility for weather and climate requirements than any other
organization and is a natural national advocate for this program.
Under this construct NOAA/NASA will provide NPOESS data to DOD/AF
and establish a process to meet future DOD/AF needs.
The EXCOM concept should continue to assure effective program
implementation.
Implementation of the IRT recommendations and additional actions is
urgently required. Risk and unnecessary cost are being realized at an
unacceptable rate.
Biography for A. Thomas Young
A. Thomas Young is the former Director of NASA's Goddard Space
Flight Center and President and COO of Martin Marietta. He retired from
Lockheed Martin in July, 1995. Mr. Young is involved in various
advisory and review activities associated with the U.S. Space Program.
He is a Director of the Goodrich Corporation and Science
Applications International Corporation. Mr. Young is an Honorary Fellow
of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, a Fellow of
the American Astronautical Society, a Fellow of the royal Astronautical
Society and a Fellow of the International Academy of Astronautics. He
is a member of the National Academy of Engineering and the University
of Virginia Raven Society.
Mr. Young began his career with NASA at the Langley Research Center
in 1961. He was a member of the Lunar Orbiter Project Team and was
Mission Director for Project Viking. He became Director of the
Planetary Program at NASA Headquarters in 1976 and was appointed Deputy
Director of the Ames Research Center in 1978. Mr. Young was Director of
the Goddard Space Flight Center from 1979 to 1982. He joined the Martin
Marietta Corporation in 1982 and was subsequently President of
Baltimore Aerospace and the Electronics and Missiles Group. Mr. Young
was President and COO of Martin Marietta from 1990 to 1995.
As a part of his advisory and review activities, Mr. Young chaired
a group to assess the continued involvement of U.S. Astronauts with the
MIR Space Station. He was Chairman of an Independent Assessment of
Mission Success for Lockheed Martin. Following the Mars 1998 failures,
he chaired the Mars Program Independent Assessment Team. Mr. Young was
Chairman of the International Space Station Management and Cost Task
Force. He has been Chairman of the Task Force on Acquisition of
National Security Space Programs. He has chaired NASA's International
Space Station Advisory Group and Space Flight Advisory Group. Mr. Young
is a past member of the NASA Advisory Council. He chaired the National
Academy of Engineering Committee on Technological Literacy. Mr. Young
is currently a member of the National Academies Space Studies Board.
Mr. Young has received NASA's Distinguished Service Medal for his
role in the Viking Project, the Outstanding Leadership Medal for
contributions to the Voyager Project, Presidential Rank Awards of
Meritorious Executive and Distinguished Executive, the Public Service
Medal for his leadership of the Mars Program Independent Assessment
Team, and the Distinguished Public Service Medal for his leadership of
the International Space Station Management and Cost Task Force. Mr.
Young received the National Reconnaissance Office Medal for leadership
of the Task Force on the Acquisition of National Security Space
Programs. He is the recipient of the AIAA Astronautics Award and the
National Space Club Dr. Joseph V. Charyk Award. Mr. Young was selected
as one of nine Outstanding Corporate Directors in 2005. He received the
2006 Bob Hope Distinguished Citizen Award from the NDIA.
Mr. Young earned a Bachelor of Aeronautical Engineering degree and
a Bachelor of Mechanical Engineering degree in 1961 from the University
of Virginia. In 1972, he received a Master's of Management degree from
MIT which he attended as a Sloan Fellow. He also holds an honorary
doctor of science degree from Salisbury State University.
Mr. Young and his wife, Page, reside in Onancock, Virginia. They
have a daughter, Blair, and a son, Carter.
Chairman Miller. Thank you, Mr. Young. Ms. Glackin.
STATEMENT OF MS. MARY M. GLACKIN, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR
OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC
ADMINISTRATION (NOAA), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Ms. Glackin. Chairman Miller, Dr. Broun, and distinguished
Members and staff of the Committee, I appreciate the
opportunity to testify about the steps NOAA has taken over the
past year to address the ongoing challenges of this critical
program.
While I am a 30-year career employee of NOAA, I have only
served in my current position for the past 18 months. During
this short tenure, I have spent a significant portion of my
time learning about and overseeing the complex management of
NOAA's satellite programs, especially NPOESS.
The challenges the program faces are substantial, and I am
working closely with both Secretary Locke and NOAA
Administrator Lubchenco to address the recommendations
presented by both GAO and the Independent Review Team. Since
NOAA's final satellite in its current series was launched
earlier this spring, the agency is particularly focused on the
threat further delays in this program may have on crucial
weather and climate forecasts NOAA provides to the Nation.
NOAA is working with its partners, DOD and NASA, to move
quickly to resolve remaining program issues, given their
possible consequences. I would like to highlight two actions we
have taken over the past year on the program and then address
the recommendations that we have just heard from my two
colleagues here.
One step that NOAA has taken is that we have advocated with
our tri-agency partners last summer to install a government
program manager at the subcontractor facility where the main
imaging sensor, known as VIIRS, is being developed. By
installing a government official in plant, an action typically
taken by NASA for complex developments, it has enabled the
program to better address the ongoing technical problems. The
benefits are not only providing significant oversight of day-
to-day testing and quality assurance processes, but allows the
government to anticipate and react quickly to problems.
The second step, as highlighted by this hearing, is the
tri-agency leadership of the EXCOM called for the high-level,
independent review that Mr. Young just provided this committee.
When the IRT findings were initially reported to the EXCOM,
they made it very clear that the NPOESS program has little
chance of success as it is currently structured. NOAA is taking
the team's grim assessment of the program very seriously and is
working with DOD and NASA to respond to the recommendations.
Notably, we are actively working with the leadership of the
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy to resolve
the differences that exist among the agencies and implement
actions to respond to the recommendations. We are approaching
the responses to the findings and recommendations through three
major areas which I will address: management of the program,
satellite coverage and budgeting of the program.
For management, NOAA, DOD and NASA have been developing and
considering four possible options. Option one is to maintain
the existing tri-agency partnership with management
improvements and additional budget reserve. Under this option,
the tri-agency structure would remain in place, but the budget
and schedule would be adjusted to allow the program to continue
to address continued technical challenges.
Option two would establish NOAA as the national lead for
delivering weather and climate data. Under this option, NOAA,
with NASA as its acquisition agent, would have responsibility
for delivering a system that provides weather and climate data
required. DOD would continue to provide funds, and all agencies
would still coordinate on the data needs for their user
communities. The NPOESS program office would be transferred to
NASA's Goddard Space Flight Facility Center in Maryland.
Option three would be similar, but with DOD as the national
lead for delivering this. Under this option, the NPOESS program
office would be transferred to the Air Force Space and Missile
Center in Los Angeles.
Option four would result in a divergence of the NPOESS
program into two separate agency programs: one DOD and one
NOAA. Under this option each agency would be responsible for
acquisition of satellites in its own priority orbit, similar to
how NOAA and Air Force currently operate them.
The tri-agency partners are continuing to assess and
outline possible implementation approaches for each of these
options.
The second area is satellite coverage and continuity. In
partnership with NASA and DOD, we have been considering ways to
modify the constellation to address the risk of potential gaps.
Possible adjustments here include modifying the undeveloped
portions of the ground system and the one unbuilt sensor,
reconsidering the structure of the primary spacecraft, and use
of small satellites or commercial satellites to help make the
program more successful.
Regarding budget, NOAA, DOD and NASA are working to address
the budget challenges facing the program. Continued development
problems have consumed the program's resources and forced the
program to make difficult trade-offs. The program will likely
require increased budget to meet the Nation's needs or have the
program's scope reduced to better align with available budget.
Cost estimating is underway at this time.
Regarding GAO recommendations, NOAA concurs with all of the
recommendations and is implementing them.
In conclusion, I would just like to state that it is widely
acknowledged that satellites are very complicated and difficult
systems to design, build and operate. However, their
capabilities play a key role in NOAA's mission to observe and
predict the Earth's environment and provide critical
information used in protecting life and property. Based on the
steps NOAA has taken in partnership with NASA and DOD, the
program is on an initial path to resolve some of its current
challenges. However, it is clear additional work by the
government is required to fully resolve these issues, and the
program intends to continue to keep this committee apprised of
its developments as we move forward. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Glackin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mary M. Glackin
Introduction
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I am Mary Glackin,
the Deputy Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) within the Department of
Commerce (DOC). I appreciate the opportunity to testify about the steps
NOAA has taken over the past year to address the ongoing challenges
with the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite
System (NPOESS).
NPOESS--A National Asset for Weather and Climate Data
NPOESS is a tri-agency collaboration involving the NOAA, the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the
Department of Defense (DOD). The NPOESS program is designed to deliver
four operational satellites that will provide global weather and
climate coverage from 2014 to 2026, along with the NPOESS Preparatory
Project (NPP), which was originally intended as a risk reduction
satellite for the program's advanced sensor technology, and is now
scheduled to launch in 2011.
The NPOESS program, a pivotal national satellite constellation
designed to meet the Nation's weather forecasting and some key climate
monitoring needs, is at risk. Should delivery of the NPOESS satellites
be delayed or a catastrophic failure occur on launch or in orbit,
NOAA's forecasting ability would be severely degraded because current
forecast models rely heavily on NOAA and NASA's polar orbiting
satellites that will be coming to the end of their useful lives.
While NOAA's weather forecasting ability can sustain
gaps of less than six months by relying on older satellites, a
larger gap in satellite coverage would be unacceptable for
weather forecasting since NOAA would be unable to produce
useful 4 and 5 day hurricane track forecasts. Overall, weather
model forecast performance would degrade by approximately 10
percent, a regression back to the quality that existed in the
late 1990s.
A gap in satellite coverage of any length would most
likely interrupt critical climate measurements that are needed
for the Nation to determine the cause, magnitude and direction
of future climate change.
NOAA's final satellite in its Polar Operational Environmental
Satellite (POES) series, NOAA-19, was launched in February 2009 and
declared operational earlier this month. NOAA also operates the Air
Force's Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) satellites, a
program that continues to have two satellites awaiting launch. Given
that NOAA does not have any further polar satellites remaining to be
launched, the agency is particularly focused on the threat further
delays in the NPOESS program and the threat launch or early-on-orbit
failures may have on the crucial weather and climate forecasts NOAA
provides to the Nation.
The NPOESS program has the potential to provide crucial information
to our continued monitoring of the climate both nationally and
globally. Both Secretary of Commerce Locke and NOAA Administrator
Lubchenco have indicated their commitment to fix this program to better
ensure the future of the Nation's weather forecasting and climate
monitoring capability.
Steps Taken to Reduce Risk in NPOESS Program
Since NOAA last testified about the NPOESS program last June, the
agency has taken a series of steps to address the continued technical
and management challenges in the program. The following section
provides a summary of these steps in chronological order.
Working in partnership with DOD and NASA, NOAA has begun to address
the challenges facing the program. Given the recent completion of
crucial independent reviews, NOAA is seeking to move quickly to resolve
remaining program issues.
A. Government Program Manager Installed at Contractor Facility
To address ongoing technical problems in the development of the
Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite (VIIRS), the main imaging
sensor for the system, the NPOESS Executive Committee (EXCOM) agreed in
August 2008 to have a government program manager with the expertise to
oversee its development. Working in partnership with the existing prime
contractor team from Northrop Grumman, as well as the subcontractor
team from Raytheon, the senior NASA engineer and manager was installed
on site at the Raytheon plant in El Segundo, California.
Since the government program manager's start at the facility, she
has assessed the development of the VIIRS sensor being developed for
NPP as well as those to be built for NPOESS C1 and later NPOESS
spacecraft. She is leading the continued testing of the VIIRS
instrument with a team of government experts, providing significant
oversight on day-to-day testing and quality assurance processes.
B. Tri-Agency Joint Assessment Team Established by NPOESS Executive
Committee
As a result of the continued VIIRS development difficulties in
2008, the EXCOM chartered the Tri-Agency Joint Assessment Team (TJAT)
last fall to address the impacts to schedule and cost that these
ongoing development problems were causing. Consisting of senior
officials from NOAA, NASA, DOD, and Air Force, the TJAT determined the
following:
The best solution to maintain overall program data
continuity is to use NPP data operationally.
NOAA has accelerated the development of additional
environmental data products so NPP is able to produce
all of the products that NPOESS C1 was expected to
produce (additional 35 data products).
The program should proceed to plan to procure an
Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR), the main
imaging sensor on NOAA's POES satellites, as an option if the
program is unable to deliver VIIRS.
The AVHRR does not meet the full set of VIIRS
operational requirements. There is also no funding
available currently to implement this option.
The VIIRS sensor is currently undergoing thermal
vacuum testing that will continue through August. If
the sensor successfully proceeds through this testing,
the option to procure an AVHRR will not be required.
The EXCOM directed the NPOESS Integrated Program
Office (IPO) to complete the necessary procurement
planning in the event VIIRS thermal vacuum testing
problems require the program to proceed to procure an
AVHRR.
C. Alternative Management Studies
The June 2006 Acquisition Decision Memorandum directed NPOESS to
``. . . develop the option for a viable competing management structure
. . .'' to provide the EXCOM with a possible alternative to be
exercised when the decision is made in FY 2010 on whether to continue
with the same contractor team for the production of NPOESS satellites
C3 and C4. The Alternative Management Study (AMS) was commissioned by
the NPOESS Program Executive Officer (PEO) to assess management
structure options.
An AMS was conducted in 2008 and made recommendations to improve
program and sensor development oversight, fill key government
positions, and implement contingency planning. It did not identify a
viable alternative to the existing satellite integrator, or prime
contractor, on the program. Their program oversight recommendations
were addressed by creating an NPOESS Program Executive Officer-Program
Management Council (PEO PMC), a monthly conference of tri-agency
officials to support decision-making on the data requirements,
acquisition, operations, and resourcing of the NPOESS program.
Likewise, VIIRS oversight recommendations were addressed by deploying a
government program manager and government support team to work on-site
at the Raytheon subcontractor facility to provide additional oversight
on VIIRS sensor testing and development.
D. Independent Review Team
At the request of the tri-agency leadership of the EXCOM, a high-
level Independent Review Team (IRT) composed of senior independent
aerospace and science experts from industry, academia, and government,
concluded a comprehensive review of the program this spring. Chaired by
Tom Young, the recently released IRT report provides valuable findings
and recommendations regarding the current state of the program.
When the IRT findings were initially reported to the EXCOM, the IRT
was clear that the NPOESS program ``cannot be successfully executed
within the constraints of cost, schedule, performance, and with the
current management construct.''
NOAA is taking the team's grim assessment of the program very
seriously and is working with DOD and NASA to respond to the
recommendations and make the changes necessary to improve the
management and technical oversight of the program. Since Tom Young is
expected to testify in his role as IRT Chairman at this hearing, this
testimony will not summarize each of the team's findings and
recommendations.
NOAA, in partnership with DOD and NASA, is approaching the response
to the IRT findings and recommendations through three major areas:
the management of the program,
the satellite coverage and data continuity challenges
in the program, and
the budgeting of the program.
The IRT noted they believe some NPOESS issues ``can only be
resolved at the White House level,'' given the interactions they had
with government officials that indicate the agencies have differences
in how they propose to address key challenges in the program. The
Office of Science and Technology Policy has begun to engage the tri-
agency leadership to resolve the differences and implement actions to
respond to the IRT's recommendations.
Management: NOAA, DOD, and NASA are working to address the management
challenges in the program through a consideration of all of the
IRT's recommendations, but particularly the following four (out
of nine):
Focus on mission success (not on cost);
Fix the Executive Committee/oversight structure;
Assign the development management responsibility of
NPOESS to a space acquisition enter; and
Resolve and establish clear program priorities.
NOAA, DOD and NASA have been developing and considering management
alternatives to reformulate the NPOESS tri-agency relationship in
response to IRT recommendations. The options being considered include:
a. Maintain the existing tri-agency partnership with
management improvements and additional budget reserve.
Under this option, the current tri-agency
program structure would remain in place, but the budget
and schedule would be adjusted to allow the program to
address continued technical challenges.
Under this option, the NPOESS program office
could be transferred to NASA's Goddard Space Flight
Center in Greenbelt, Maryland or Air Force's Space and
Missile Systems Center in Los Angeles, California, to
enable it to use the resources of one of these renowned
space acquisition centers.
b. Establish NOAA-NASA as national lead for delivering a
satellite system that provides weather and climate data.
Under this option, NOAA, in coordination with
NASA as its acquisition lead, would have responsibility
for delivering a system that fulfills the NPOESS
requirements.
NOAA and NASA would be responsible for
designing and implementing an improved system to reduce
risk of weather and climate data gaps.
DOD would continue to provide funds at a to-
be-determined level, and all agencies would still
coordinate on the data requirements for each agency's
user communities.
The NPOESS program office would be
transferred to NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center in
Greenbelt, Maryland, to enable it to use the resources
of this renowned space acquisition center.
c. Establish DOD as national lead for delivering a satellite
system that provides weather and climate data.
Similar to the previous option, DOD would
have responsibility for delivering a system that
fulfills the NPOESS requirements.
The DOD would be responsible for designing
and implementing a system to reduce risk of weather and
climate data gaps.
NOAA would continue to provide funds, and all
agencies would still coordinate on the data
requirements for each agency's user communities.
The NPOESS program office would be
transferred to Air Force's Space and Missile Systems
Center in Los Angeles, California, to enable it to use
the resources of this renowned space acquisition
center.
d. Divergence of the NPOESS program into two separate agency
programs (one DOD, one NOAA)
Under this option, each agency would be
responsible for acquisition of assets supporting its
mission in its own priority orbits, similar to how the
NOAA POES and Air Force DMSP programs currently
operate.
Data sharing between the agencies would
continue as it does today.
Existing partnerships for satellite
operations, data distribution, and launch service would
be continued.
While dependent on when such a structural
change would occur, this option would require NOAA,
DOD, and NASA to negotiate which agencies would receive
the assets that have already been developed by the
NPOESS program.
New competitive procurements for individual
NOAA and DOD systems may be required shortly after such
a divergence decision is made, potentially in FY 2010
or FY 2011 if decision is made in the near-term.
The NPOESS tri-agency partners are continuing to assess and develop
cost estimates for these options.
Satellite Coverage and Data Continuity:
NOAA, DOD, and NASA are working to address the challenges of
satellite coverage and data continuity in the program through
consideration of all of the IRT's recommendations, but particularly the
following four (out of nine):
Proactively manage and mitigate the potential gap in
continuity of coverage,
Continue and strengthen the relationship with
Northrop Grumman and Raytheon;
Use NPOESS Preparatory Project data operationally;
and
Resolve and establish clear program priorities.
NOAA, NASA, and DOD have been considering ways to modify and adjust
the current planned NPOESS constellation of satellites to better
mitigate potential gaps in coverage as well as better address each
NPOESS agency's need for environmental data. The agencies are examining
initially the following areas to adjust the constellation to help make
the program more successful:
Alternatives for the currently undeveloped portions
of the ground system;
Alternative sources for the currently undeveloped
Microwave Imager/Sounder (MIS) sensor;
Alternatives for the structure of the primary
spacecraft; and
Use of a series of small satellites and inclusion of
sensors on commercial spacecraft, both of which may improve the
tri-agency's ability to recover from launch or on-orbit
failures.
Some of these options would require modifications to contracts and
additional resources. Some of the options may reduce the capability of
the NPOESS system.
Budget:
NOAA, DOD, and NASA are working to address the budget challenges
facing this program through consideration of all of the IRT's
recommendations, but particularly the following three (out of nine):
Proactively manage and mitigate the potential gap in
continuity of coverage;
Increase near-term funding; and
Fund the program by fiscal year and through the
duration of the program at an 80 percent cost confidence level,
including a management reserve of 25 percent.
Continuing development problems have consumed the program's
resources and forced the program to make difficult trades to preserve
schedule and remain within available annual funding. Unfortunately,
these trades have added substantial risk to the program. In the near-
term, the program will likely require increased budget to meet the
Nation's needs, or have to reduce program scope to better align the
program with its available budget.
In response to this concern, NOAA allocated $26 million of American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act funding for NPOESS, including funding
above its matching requirement with DOD. This additional funding will
allow NOAA to perform critical NPOESS development activities and
address risk mitigation within the program.
Based on the four above major steps the NPOESS program leadership
has taken recently, the program is on an initial path to resolve some
of its current challenges. Additional work by the government is
required to resolve the issues and the program intends to continue to
keep the Committee apprised of these developments.
Government Accountability Office Recommendations for Executive Action
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has provided regular
reviews of the NPOESS program and NOAA appreciates the perspective GAO
professionals have provided. NOAA has met with GAO and provided
information and feedback on its most recent report.
GAO made six recommendations that it anticipates will improve the
effectiveness and efficiency of the EXCOM. The first recommendation was
directed solely to DOD and the remaining five recommendations are
directed to DOC/NOAA, DOD, and NASA.
Recommendation 1: To improve the timeliness and effectiveness of
acquisition decision making on the NPOESS program, we recommend that
the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to attend and participate in
NPOESS Executive Committee meetings.
NOAA Response: NOAA defers to the DOD on this recommendation but has no
objection to EXCOM participation by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.
Recommendation 2: Establish a realistic timeframe for revising the
program's cost and schedule baselines.
NOAA Response: NOAA concurs with this recommendation. The NPOESS
Integrated Program Office is developing an updated program office
estimate for a revised acquisition program baseline as required by DOD
acquisition regulation. However, a revised program cost and schedule
estimate will be established later this year following a robust
independent cost analysis of recommended programmatic and acquisition
alternatives that better reflect a budget with appropriate contingency
funding to reduce risk. The revised program cost and schedule estimates
will be ready for initial EXCOM review in late summer 2009.
Recommendation 3: Develop plans to mitigate the risk of gaps in
satellite continuity.
NOAA Response: NOAA concurs with this recommendation. The NPP sensors
are capable of producing data that meet or exceed the data provided by
NOAA-19 (NOAA's current operational satellite). Accordingly, to
mitigate the potential gap in polar environmental satellite data
coverage in the afternoon orbit between NOAA-19 and NPOESS C1, NOAA
plans to make operational use of the data from the NPP spacecraft and
increase the number of products NOAA had planned to generate from the
NPP system as a risk reduction mission to minimize impacts to NOAA's
National Weather Service and other users.
Specifically, NOAA will accelerate development of 54 polar legacy
products. Previously, 19 legacy products were expected from NPP, with
an increase to 54 products in the NPOESS C1 era. NOAA will enhance its
NPP data processing ground system with sufficient infrastructure to
support the additional 35 products and 24x7 operations and support.
In the mid-morning orbit, NOAA will continue through the next
decade to process and deliver environmental products to its customers
from the U.S. and European instruments on board the European
Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites MetOp
series of satellites.
NOAA is assessing the use of additional international and
interagency assets as well as potential development of spare satellites
and instruments. The cost and schedule details associated with these
contingency options are currently under review. Any alternative
decisions will also take into account the results of the VIIRS sensor
testing currently underway.
Recommendation 4: Track the Committee's action items from inception to
closure.
NOAA Response: NOAA concurs with this recommendation. NOAA will task
the NPOESS Program Executive Officer (PEO) to ensure that Executive
Committee (EXCOM) action items are clearly and completely defined,
assigned to responsible parties for completion within a specific
timeframe, and tracked to completion, including reporting the results
to the EXCOM. NOAA will monitor EXCOM action items through the NOAA
Program Management Council, which I chair, and take corrective actions
needed to ensure action item coordination and closure.
Recommendation 5: Improve the Committee's ability to achieve successful
outcomes by identifying the desired outcome associated with each of the
Committee actions, as well as timeframes and responsible parties, when
new action items are established.
NOAA Response: NOAA concurs with this recommendation. NOAA will task
the PEO to ensure EXCOM action items and desired outcomes are clearly
and completely defined, assigned to responsible parties for completion
within a specific timeframe, and tracked to completion, including
reporting the results to the EXCOM. NOAA will monitor EXCOM action
items through the NOAA Program Management Council, which I chair, and
take corrective actions needed to ensure successful outcomes.
Recommendation 6: Improve the Committee's efficiency by establishing
timeframes for escalating risks to the committee for action so that
they do not linger unresolved at the program executive level.
NOAA Response: NOAA concurs with this recommendation. The PEO will
ensure that risks, resolution plans and schedules are established and
tracked at the PEO-PMC, the PEO's monthly management council. NOAA will
work with NASA and DOD to ensure the PEO establishes clear criteria and
timeframes for elevating risks to the EXCOM for action. NOAA will
monitor PEO action items and issue resolution through the NOAA Program
Management Council and the tri-agency NPOESS Oversight Council (NOC) to
take corrective actions needed to ensure timeliness in addressing
escalating risks.
The NOC, established in the spring of 2009, is the tri-agency
council that reviews the NPOESS program on a more recurrent basis than
the senior-level EXCOM. The NOC, which reports to the EXCOM, is co-
chaired by the Deputy Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere, the
Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force, and the Deputy Administrator
of NASA. These members are responsible for representing their agencies
and providing a reasonable representation of their EXCOM position to
ensure that issues and actions are responded to in a timely manner.
Conclusion
In conclusion, NOAA appreciates the Committee's continued interest
in the success of the agency's satellite programs. It is widely
acknowledged that satellites are very complicated and difficult systems
to design, build, and operate. However, their capabilities play a key
role in NOAA's mission to observe and predict the Earth's environment
and to provide critical information used in protecting life and
property. NOAA is acting quickly to support the important decisions
that are likely required to modify the program to more effectively
achieve its objectives in line with the recommendations of key
independent reviewers. DOC and NOAA remain committed to pursuing a
program that will provide continuity of data for the Nation's weather
and climate prediction needs. I would be happy to answer any questions
you may have.
Biography for Mary M. Glackin
Mary M. Glackin has been the Deputy Under Secretary for Oceans and
Atmosphere since December 2, 2007. In this role she is responsible for
the day-to-day management of NOAA's domestic and international
operations.
Glackin has more than 15 years of senior executive level experience
working in numerous NOAA line offices. She served as the acting
Assistant Administrator for Weather Services and Director, National
Weather Service from June 12, 2007, through September 15, 2007. Before
that, she was the Assistant Administrator for the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) Office of Program Planning and
Integration. From 1999 until 2002, she served as the Deputy Assistant
Administrator for the National Environmental Satellite, Data, and
Information Service of NOAA. From 1993 to 1999, she worked as the
Program Manager for the Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System
(AWIPS) with the National Weather Service (NWS), NOAA. Prior to this,
Ms. Glackin was both a meteorologist and computer specialist in various
positions within NOAA where she was responsible for introducing
improvements into NWS operations by capitalizing on new technology
systems and scientific models.
She is the recipient of the Presidential Rank Award (2001), Charles
Brooks Award for Outstanding Services to the American Meteorological
Society, the NOAA Bronze Medal (2001), the Federal 100 Information
Technology Manager Award (1999), the NOAA Administrator's Award (1993),
and the Department of Commerce Silver Medal Award (1991). She is a
Fellow of the American Meteorological Society and a member of the
National Weather Association and the American Geophysical Union.
Ms. Glackin has a B.S. degree from the University of Maryland.
Discussion
Chairman Miller. It sounds like there will be six more
oversight hearings on the NPOESS satellite system.
Ensuring Interagency Cooperation
I now recognize myself for five minutes of questioning. Mr.
Powner, your report, as well as Mr. Young's testimony,
attributed much of the failure to the inability of the three
agencies, NOAA, DOD, NASA, the tri-agency executive committee,
or EXCOM, to function properly for the different agencies
simply to play well with others. Your recommendation that in
the future they should develop their own satellites because
they just couldn't get along seemed like an extraordinary step
when there appear to be some significant savings or something
that should be available if they all need satellites flying to
cooperate.
We have got new players on the scene. We have got Dr.
Lubchenco at NOAA, Dr. Carter at DOD, Mr. Scolese if I have
pronounced it correctly, at NASA in the EXCOM positions. Do you
have access to their report cards from elementary school? Do
you know how well they play with others? Do you think there is
any chance that EXCOM can be made to work as intended with
different people in the seats?
Mr. Powner. I think clearly in the short-term the delivery
of the four satellites as well as the demonstration satellite
with NPOESS, we need to keep the current structure or go to
something similar to what Mr. Young is suggesting with one
agency lead. You know, we are about ready to deliver on the
demonstration satellite hopefully and then also with the first
satellite, C1. The recommendation long-term to split it, I
think if you look historically, this was intended to save
money. It hasn't saved money. We still haven't resolved the
differing agency missions. I think after these four satellites
are delivered, we ought to consider going back to separate
satellite acquisitions. In the interim, our recommendations are
geared toward getting the EXCOM on board. They still have a
management role here to deliver the satellites that are
currently on the table.
Chairman Miller. Mr. Young, do you agree? Is there
something that is just in the system of having these three
agencies try to work together? Is it a personality issue? Is
there any possibility now that we have got different people
sitting in the seats at the EXCOM meetings that we will have
better results, it will be less dysfunctional?
Mr. Young. I don't think it is a personality issue. I think
it really boils down to a couple of factors. One is the
priorities of the partners are different, and it is hard to
have an integrated management team when the various partners
have different priorities. But I will come back and say, you
know, as I mentioned in my testimony, I think even in the
revised program that IRT suggested, EXCOM has a role. But it is
almost kind of fundamental that the three parties be the people
who have decision-making authority, you know. As was pointed
out in the GAO report, the DOD representative is not the
individual decision-making authority. So fundamentally this is
an organization that meets some weeks. Afterwards there is some
meeting which I am not totally familiar with where the
decision-making authority, the individual who has milestone and
acquisition authority, makes decisions.
So I think there are ways to make it more efficient, but it
is hard to overcome the factor that the three organizations
have in our view different priorities. And by the way, I want
to come back and say it doesn't mean any of the priorities are
wrong. I mean, it is just that they are different.
The Role of OSTP
Chairman Miller. Mr. Young, your testimony embraced the
idea that the White House should--ultimately they are all three
executive branch agencies. Perhaps OSTP should come in and
decide between the priorities. That seems like kind of a big
task for a small office. But am I correct? Is that what you
think needs to happen? OSTP needs to come in and decide,
adjudicate the disputes?
Mr. Young. Yes, and let me add to that just a little bit.
It again is our observation or judgment that the EXCOM cannot
come to resolution on the issue for the reasons we have talked
about. So then as you said, it really has to go to another
level. When we really got looking at this, that was kind of
beyond where we had expected to go, to tell you the truth. But
when we started looking at this particular program, it becomes
very odd--this is a national program for all the reasons that
you folks identified. It is not a program that should be
subject to compromise. It is a program that should be decided
on what is in the best interest of the country. And the right
place for that to be done is the White House. So in our view,
the Office of the President has to designate a decision-maker,
underline decision-maker, not a committee chairman, not a
coordinator, but a decision-maker. And that decision maker has
to listen to all of the inputs and decide one, what is
affordable, and two, what is in the best interest of the
country. I think it can be done. We didn't identify who that
should be. It certainly could be the Director of the Office of
Science and Technology and Policy. It could be Director of the
NSC, but I think it is probably in those two organizations that
you would find the right expertise to provide this leadership.
But again, if you will excuse me, I want to underline, we
don't need another Committee Chairman and we don't need another
Coordinator. We need someone who is going to listen to all the
facts and decide what is in the best interest of the country.
Chairman Miller. My time is now expired. Both cloakrooms
have now told us that there will likely be votes shortly. We
will try to go and make a decision about whether we will come
back or not depending on how far we have gone. I think all the
Members should know that if they remain Members of this
committee, they will have many opportunities to ask questions
at NPOESS oversight hearings.
Dr. Broun for five minutes.
Selecting a Management Strategy
Mr. Broun. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Glackin, NOAA
has recommended four different paths toward the resolution as
we go forward in the NPOESS management. Do you all have a
preference of one over the other? Would you make that clear to
us, please?
Ms. Glackin. Yes, I will. I will speak from a NOAA
perspective here. NOAA believes that we have the broadest
mission requirements for this, for both weather and climate,
and we also recognize that this is a critically important
program to us. It is really germane to our mission, and NOAA
would be prepared to take leadership in this program, I think
as we move forward with it. There are quite a few--I would
hasten to say there are quite a few issues associated with
things that have to be worked out, and we are really in the
midst of doing that. But Secretary Locke has been actively
engaged in this program and is committed to finding the right
solution for the Nation. And if it is going to be right for the
Nation, then I think he would be prepared.
Mr. Broun. Okay. Would you rank those four options for us
in terms of effectiveness, difficulty in implementing each
option, and the likelihood of it being implemented?
Ms. Glackin. All of the options have, I think, pros and
cons to them that are still being evaluated at this point. I
think the status quo does represent some significant challenges
for us as Mr. Young has highlighted for us today. Options two
and three, I think, have a significant pro to them in that
there would be a very clear point for authority, accountability
and responsibility for a program there. To go to option two
would obviously be a transition to get there. Option three
would be easier.
In option four which I described as a divergence, I will
take another minute to say that there really is still a lot of
commonality in that site. We have a ground system today, and
the Committee may not be aware but NOAA actually operates DOD's
operational satellites for them today. So NOAA has a very
strong role in operations of these satellites.
Mr. Broun. Mr. Young, would you please comment on those
four options and any other option that you see of the four, as
well as rank them in order of effectiveness and implementation?
Mr. Young. Let me give just a little bit of background. You
are probably familiar, but our particular group, we had a
fairly broad representation. It was nine of us, but if there
was any waiting, it was in the direction of people who had
national security space experience. I really highlight that
because it was a group that I think was genuinely looking for
what is in the best interest of the country, not what is the
best organizational solution.
We debated a fair amount on that subject, and our
conclusion is a little bit as Ms. Glackin said, that NOAA is
really the organization that the country looks to to provide
weather and climate leadership, and when you're assigning
responsibility for something, I think you want to assign it to
that organization where it is their number one priority, not
their number seven priority. And in that regard, it is number
one priority to NOAA. It was very obvious to us that NOAA was
the organization.
NOAA is not a space acquisition organization, so they need
NASA to be a partner with them in order to be able to implement
it.
Mr. Broun. So you basically agree with----
Mr. Young. I do.
Mr. Broun.--Secretary Glackin. Mr. Powner, would you
comment, please?
Mr. Powner. Well, I think in the near-term we have the
existing structure to deal with. So that needs to go forward
over the next several months. Hopefully we will have a quick
decision if we go with the one agency. I agree that NOAA would
be that agency, because this is not a priority at DOD.
The fourth option is clearly a longer-term approach after
this constellation of NPOESS satellites would be launched.
Mr. Broun. Okay, Mr. Chairman. For the sake of time, I am
going to yield back.
Chairman Miller. Thank you for that very generous decision.
What I would propose is that each of the remaining
Members--we have been called for votes. You heard the bells or
the horns--that each of the Members ask one round of questions
if they can keep it below five minutes, maybe more like three-
ish. We can complete this sixth hearing on NPOESS and save our
questions for the seventh or eighth hearing.
Ms. Dahlkemper for five or less.
Program Cost
Ms. Dahlkemper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to be
brief. Mr. Powner, it seems that every time that you have come
before this committee, you are reporting cost increases in this
program. Yet the entire Nunn-McCurdy process was supposed to
stabilize the program.
Why haven't we converged on a stable cost estimate for the
program before this, and can you give me a firm number now?
Mr. Powner. Well, I think if you look at the history of
this program, the current overrun is primarily due to the
technical problems that the program has faced with the VIIRS
sensor. I think there were unforeseen technical problems. You
can argue that maybe those technical problems could have--we
should have anticipated those. So in the past, we can go back
to--there has been mismanagement across the board on this. We
are faulting EXCOM right now. Historically, you can go back.
There was a prime contractor not overseeing subs, there were
problems with program offices. So there has been mismanagement
throughout, not a single organization that we can point to say,
that is the one organization. It has been from contractors
through program offices, through PEOs through EXCOM. Everyone
is at fault.
I think if you look going forward, the estimate right now
of $3.9 billion, it is going to at least grow another billion
but likely more because there also will be integration issues
which typically occur on both NPP and that first satellite. So
I would expect at a minimum it will be $1 billion but likely
more. So that will place this in the $15 billion life cycle
cost range.
Ms. Dahlkemper. So I am sorry, what was the total?
Mr. Powner. $15 billion.
Ms. Dahlkemper. And can you say that that is a stable
number?
Mr. Powner. No, it will be higher than that.
Ms. Dahlkemper. So there is still no firm number?
Mr. Powner. And I think the program would agree with that,
too. That is why they want to have these detailed cost
estimates that they are going to work on. There are five
estimates that are currently in the works right now. We haven't
seen those. Those have not been disclosed to us. It is going to
at least be fifteen.
Ms. Dahlkemper. Mr. Young and Ms. Glackin, would you please
comment on my question?
Mr. Young. I really can't add to the cost numbers. In our
report, the thing that we were really trying--we said greater
than a billion dollars. What we were really trying to do is
make sure that everybody understood this wasn't a fixer-up
problem. I mean, it was a problem of a significant magnitude. I
don't know what the upper cap, you know, is on that particular
number. But it is in excess of a billion dollars.
Ms. Dahlkemper. Ms. Glackin.
Ms. Glackin. I agree with that.
Ms. Dahlkemper. Well, it certainly would be nice to have a
stable number. I am new to Congress, so I haven't been here for
all these other hearings, and I guess I will be here for quite
a few after this.
Mr. Broun. You hope you are.
Ms. Dahlkemper. What is that?
Mr. Broun. You hope you are.
Ms. Dahlkemper. Yeah, I hope I am. But I mean, I hope I am
not. I hope that we can put this problem behind us, you know,
just as a concerned citizen who came into Congress. These are
the kind of things that, you know, just make people back home
shake their heads and wonder what we are doing down here.
Mr. Young. I probably should, if I could add to that, I
agree. My personal belief is, it is not necessary to have a
seventh hearing.
Ms. Dahlkemper. We should be able to do this if we get a
decision maker in?
Mr. Young. The right leadership and the right corrective
actions can prevent a seventh hearing.
Ms. Dahlkemper. Thank you very much. I will yield back.
Chairman Miller. The record should note that most of these
hearings do predate Ms. Dahlkemper's service in Congress.
Mr. Bilbray for five minutes or such lesser time as he may
consume.
Coordinating Agencies and Technologies
Mr. Bilbray. Yes, Mr. Chairman, just as an editorial note,
it is nice to hear about a problem that is only a billion.
Chairman Miller. No, it is more than that.
Mr. Bilbray. That was with a B, not with a T, right? Okay.
Are we talking the biggest problem is incompatibility of
hardware between the three different choices? Is that a debate
over the hardware itself?
Mr. Young. I don't think so. I think it really--if I could
kind again hit the point I was trying to make in my testimony.
The DOD/Air Force states that they are satisfied with legacy,
meaning current weather satellite data. They are satisfied with
that capability.
Mr. Bilbray. Who is?
Mr. Young. The DOD and the Air Force.
Mr. Bilbray. Okay.
Mr. Young. And they are not willing to provide funding to
provide capability beyond that. Now, it has been kind of
directed that the two organizations fund 50-50. Now, NOAA and
Ms. Glackin can say this much better than I, but NOAA states
that today they use all their weather satellites, including
theirs and DOD's. But they also use some very special
capability from NASA R&D satellites that are operating well
beyond their designed lifetime. And it is the combination of
those data that gives us the quality of weather forecasting we
have today. To go to legacy capability only would be a
significant step back in the country's ability to do weather
forecasting. That difference in opinion is big, and when we
would sit in the meetings with the two organizations, good
people on both sides, but you could just sense the edge that
that created because each was trying to be supportive of their
respective organization's priorities, not surprising. Given
that large difference, and it is large, difference in
priorities makes any kind of an integrated implementation for
this program--I guess I could say difficult but I probably
should use even a stronger statement than that.
Mr. Bilbray. Well, let me say, for instance, if somebody
has been in government for over 30 years, I mean, any
bureaucracy that is satisfied obviously doesn't know what it
doesn't know. I mean, I think that seriously we need to talk
about that. And this whole in-fighting kind of reminds me of
trying to get 18 police agencies to agree on one communication
system----
Mr. Young. That would be right.
Mr. Bilbray.--and everybody has got their angle to it. And
I understand the in-fighting here.
My biggest concern is people thinking they don't have a
vested interest in the other guy's agenda. I don't think that
there are very many people in business who thought the military
doing Internet was going to be a big deal to them, and frankly,
I think there is a whole lot of technology exchange. I don't
think any of us know in the long run the benefits that may
happen through cooperation.
And so, Mr. Chairman, I just think that we have got to
approach this not just over the issues of what is the
forecasting that the three agencies want to look at or data
they want to acquire or the program they want. But the fact of
understanding that there are things out there that if we are
going to get a benefit and get problems in that we don't know
about and to approach that.
I mean, how many people in business really saw the
Eisenhower Act, which originally was designed for the military.
That really was a boon for interstate commerce. So I just hope
that we approach this with the attitude that there is a lot
more at stake than just, you know, forecasting the weather we
know now, and it just boggles my mind to think that maybe the
institutions that think they have enough data really aren't
aware of just how broad horizons are. I guess it goes back to
the old thing at the turn of the century when they said we
might as well shut down the patents office because everything
that has ever been invented has already been invented.
So I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Keys to Avoiding Future Problems
Chairman Miller. Thank you, Mr. Bilbray. Mr. Davis has made
our life slightly easier by going to vote and forgoing his
round of questions. Without making this another round of
questions, we do have just a minute or two more. Mr. Young said
he did not think we needed a seventh hearing, or an eighth or a
ninth or a tenth hearing, that there were things that we could
do to avoid that necessity, that need. Could each of you give
one sentence that you think is the most important thing to be
done to avoid the need for a seventh, eighth, ninth hearing and
further delays and further cost overruns and further everything
that has gone wrong. Mr. Powner.
Mr. Powner. There is an EXCOM meeting June 26. We need a
firm decision on program direction which includes scope and
cost; and if we don't have that decision, I think we do need a
hearing.
Chairman Miller. Does someone need to call the Secretary of
Defense and suggest someone show up? Mr. Young.
Mr. Young. The White House needs to establish the program
is in the best interest of the country, and then we need to
budget for it at the most probable cost which is an 80/20
confidence with a sufficient amount of contingency.
Chairman Miller. Ms. Glackin.
Ms. Glackin. I think that we need to make adjustments to
the program with respect to management, to have the management
oversight be more effective, and we need to develop realistic
cost and schedules for this program that we can live within.
Closing
Chairman Miller. All right. Any valedictory comments from
Dr. Broun?
Mr. Broun. I just want to thank Mr. Powner and Mr. Young
for their hard work on this. Hopefully we won't need another
hearing, hopefully we will get good management in place and we
can start flying birds and get the data that Ms. Glackin and
her agency needs and that this will be a soft problem, and I
just want to thank you all very much. I have tremendous respect
for Mr. Young. I knew him years ago when I was the physician
for the Martin Marietta plant in Americus, Georgia. And so I
have known him for a number of years, and I just have
tremendous confidence in what he recommends. And I thank both
of you gentlemen, and I thank you Madam Secretary for coming.
Thank you.
Mr. Young. Thank you very much.
Chairman Miller. All right. Now we need to sprint to the
Floor, but thank you again. We will bring this hearing to a
close. I thank all the witnesses for testifying. Under the
rules, the record will remain open for two weeks for additional
statements from the Members and for answers to any follow-up
questions the Committee may have for the witnesses. The
witnesses are excused. The hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:54 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix 1:
----------
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by David A. Powner, Director, Information Technology
Management Issues, Government Accountability Office (GAO)
Questions submitted by Representative Paul C. Broun
Q1. There are many different cost estimates for the NPOESS program.
Q1a. What do you know about them?
A1a. Currently, there are at least five different cost estimates for
the NPOESS program. One estimate is the program's current official cost
estimate of $13.95 billion, which is recognized as no longer being
achievable. Agency officials have provided us an overview of the other
four estimates, but not the estimates themselves since they were still
being determined at the time of our review. All of them are based on a
delayed schedule.\1\ The estimates, as explained by agency officials,
are:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ This schedule delays the launches of the NPOESS prototype--
called the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP)--and the first and the
second NPOESS satellites by seven, fourteen, and five months,
respectively.
Program officials' cost estimate at the 50 percent
confidence level.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ A 50 percent level of confidence indicates that a program has a
50 percent chance that the program will be delivered at the identified
cost.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense's Cost
Analysis Improvement Group's independent cost assessment at the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
50 percent confidence level.
Program officials' cost estimate at the 80 percent
confidence level.
Program officials' estimate that includes the cost of
acquiring the third and fourth NPOESS satellites as early as
possible (as recommended by a recent Independent Review Team
report).
Q1b. Which [cost estimate] do you think the program should use moving
forward?
A1b. The recent Independent Review Team (IRT) report recommends funding
the NPOESS program at the 80 percent confidence level and including a
management reserve for the program of approximately 25 percent. We
agree that, at this stage of the program, the cost estimate should be
at the 80 percent confidence level. Using an estimate with a higher
confidence level and management reserve should help the program plan
for and handle unanticipated issues as it moves from the development
phase to the production phase.
Q2. One of the findings of the IRT was that the Integrated Program
Office (IPO) does not have sufficient space acquisition expertise, and
they cited the Goddard Space Flight Center at NASA and the Air Force
Space and Missile Systems Center as good examples.
Q2a. Why can't the current IPO leverage the expertise of these
institutions without actually being co-located?
A2a. The program office currently leverages the expertise of these
institutions without being co-located. However, key agency officials
reported that co-location could provide a supportive infrastructure,
facilitate cooperation, and allow active oversight by the selected
center's management.
Q2b. Does the IPO consult with these organizations already?
A2b. Officials from both Goddard Space Flight Center and Air Force
Space and Missile Systems Center are members of, and participate in,
the Program Executive Officer's Program Management Council. In
addition, many of the program's and the program executive office's
employees are originally from either NASA or the Air Force, and both
the program and the program executive office work with NASA and the Air
Force to get specific expertise as needed.
Q2c. Is there an overhead cost associated with NASA running NOAA
programs?
A2c. There is an overhead cost associated with NASA running NOAA
programs. For example, on the Geostationary Operational Environmental
Satellites-R series (GOES-R) program, NOAA reimburses NASA for its
program office support such as facilities management and information
technology support services, which is calculated by NASA via a general
management overhead cost rate.
Q3. The NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) mission was meant to mitigate
program risk and test sensors and ground systems prior to the full
stand-up of NPOESS. I understand that we don't have many options now
because of concerns about data gaps, but what are the implications of
``operationalizing'' NPP?
A3. There are several implications of using NPP data operationally.
First, the four central data processing centers (one managed by NOAA,
one by the Air Force, and two by the Navy) will need to ensure that the
infrastructure they had planned to build to handle NPOESS data are in
place and that the scientific algorithms are ready to accept NPP data.
Because neither Navy facility will have an NPOESS Integrated Data
Processing System until the first NPOESS satellite is operational, they
may also need to make additional accommodations to use NPP data
effectively. Second, there are fewer operational ground stations
supporting NPP than will support NPOESS, which means that data will
take longer to get to the centers and, therefore, may be less useful.
Third, the NPP satellite was only designed to a five-year mission life,
unlike the seven-year mission life of the NPOESS satellites. Thus, if
there are further delays in the launch of C1, NPP may not bridge the
gap in satellite data.
Q4. NOAA is responsible for program management and operation, while
acquisition authority belongs to DOD.
Q4a. How has this affected the program?
A4a. As outlined in a tri-agency memorandum of understanding, NOAA,
DOD, and NASA each have different responsibilities for the NPOESS
program and all are represented on a tri-agency Executive Committee.
However, we recently reported that it is difficult for the NPOESS
Executive Committee to navigate the three agencies' competing
requirements and priorities.\3\ We also reported that the Executive
Committee has not been effective in fulfilling its responsibilities
because the official with the authority to make acquisition decisions
did not attend committee meetings, corrective actions were not
identified in terms of desired outcomes, actions were not tracked to
closure, and selected risks were not escalated in a timely manner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ GAO, Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: With Costs
Increasing and Data Continuity at Risk, Improvements Needed in Tri-
agency Decision Making, GAO-09-564 (Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Q4b. Is this relationship unique in the Federal Government?
A4b. The 2008 NPOESS Alternative Management Study team found that the
NPOESS tri-agency management approach has no prior model on which to
rely. Other similar programs, including NOAA's GOES program and Air
Force programs, use management approaches that have been in place for
decades. The team noted that the success of these other programs
appears to be attributable, in part, to the maturity of the government
management approach.
Q5. Given all of the technical issues experienced on the Visual/
infrared Imager Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) instrument, is it time to
pursue an alternative instrument?
A5. While the VIIRS instrument has had many serious technical issues,
the recent Independent Review Team recommended that the program stay
with the current sensor and contractor teams through the third VIIRS
sensor (for NPOESS C2). However, if problems on VIIRS persist during
its current thermal vacuum testing, the program plans to pursue an
alternative to ensure that launch schedules do not slip any further.
The Executive Committee has directed NASA to start the documentation
that will be needed to procure an Advanced Very High Resolution
Radiometer (AVHRR) for C1 at the beginning of the next fiscal year
(October 1, 2009)--should VIIRS performance during thermal vacuum
testing dictate such a need. Agency officials have noted that a
decision would need to be made by that time in order to avoid further
schedule delays.
Q5a. Is using an AVHRR the only option [for C1]?
A5a. The agencies' options depend on their goals, such as whether
schedule or cost is more important than system performance.
Specifically, an AVHRR is cheaper and easier to build than VIIRS, and
is NOAA's current operational imaging sensor. However, it offers a
major step back from NASA's Moderate Resolution Imaging
Spectroradiometer (MODIS) sensor, which NOAA and NASA both consider
their ``legacy'' sensor--and both agencies use MODIS data
operationally.
As of March 2009, over 80 percent of the parts for the second VIIRS
instrument (currently planned for C1) were in house at the contractor,
with plans in place to acquire the rest. Further, an independent review
team chaired by officials from NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory
recently reviewed the contractor's ability to build the second and
third VIIRS instruments. The team recommended staying with the current
VIIRS contractor for C1 and C2.
Q5b. When would the [Executive Committee] need to make this decision
by?
A5b. The Executive Committee has directed NASA to start the procurement
paperwork for an AVHRR for C1 at the beginning of the next fiscal year
(October 1, 2009)--should VIIRS performance during its on-going thermal
vacuum testing dictate such a need. A decision would need to be made by
that time in order to avoid further schedule delays to the C1 launch.
Q5c. What are the cost and performance implications of making this
decision?
A5c. Although building an additional AVHRR appears to be the least
costly of the options for replacing VIRRS on C1--should that be
required--the AVHRR sensor would be a significant step back in terms of
performance currently available through NASA's MODIS sensor. Further,
AVHRR would not meet the key performance parameters required for the
NPOESS program.
Q5d. Are there any international implications to this option since we
owe an AVHRR to the Europeans for their MetOp satellite?
A5d. The current direction of the Executive Committee is to plan for
the purchase of an AVHRR for C1 (in the afternoon orbit)--not for NPP--
beginning October 1, 2009, if needed. In that event, the program plans
to acquire a new AVHRR for C1--not the AVHRR intended for MetOp.
However, there are agreements in place between the European
Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites
(Eumetsat) and NOAA regarding the exchange of NPOESS data. These should
be examined before deciding how to proceed regarding an AVHRR.
In responding to these questions, we relied on information from our
recent review of the NPOESS program.\4\ The work supporting the report
was conducted from October 2008 to June 2009 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives. Additional details on our objectives,
scope, and methodology are provided in our report.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ GAO-09-772T and GAO-09-564.
\5\ GAO-09-564.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by A. Thomas Young, Chair, NPOESS Independent Review Team
(IRT)
Questions submitted by Representative Paul C. Broun
Q1. Your review found critical flaws in the way the three agencies
interact.
Q1a. If you were advising the Office of Science and Technology Policy
on how to proceed, what would you suggest?
A1a. Establish a sound program. A program that responds to all
requirements and corrective actions needs to be established for NPOESS.
This program should provide the capabilities necessary to meet Level 1
requirements and include all of the IRT recommendations regarding
management structure and data continuity. The resultant funding and
schedule for this program should be adjusted to support an 80/20 cost
confidence in each fiscal year and for the total program. The
affordability of the resultant program and the associated funding
should be assessed.
If the resultant program and level of funding are judged to be
unaffordable, then the scope of the program should be adjusted such
that the reduced program scope can be accommodated within the level of
the available funding at an 80/20 cost confidence level in each fiscal
year and for the total program. The acceptability of this reduced-scope
program should be assessed.
The IRT believes that, in addition to defining the NPOESS program
that meets national interests, responsibility for the program's
execution must be assigned to one organization (USAF or NOAA). Should
the selected NPOESS program option have requirements consistent with
current Level 1 requirements, the logical choice would be the
organization needing the improved capabilities above legacy, i.e.,
NOAA. If the decision is to constrain the program to be consistent with
legacy performance and the associated budget, either NOAH or the USAF
could be assigned the responsibility.
The organization assigned management responsibility must have total
acquisition authority including control and responsibility for all
supporting resources and functions such as people, budget, and
contracting. Additionally, that organization should be allocated all
currently planned and programmed NPOESS budget and then be responsible
for funding the NPOESS program at an 80-20 cost confidence level.
At the March 4, 2009 EXCOM briefing of the IRT findings and
recommendations regarding NPOESS, the EXCOM requested that the IRT
evaluate the organizational alternatives for the acquisition of NPOESS.
The conclusion of this evaluation is that either organization has the
capability to execute the NPOESS program. However, the IRT recommends
that responsibility for NPOESS execution be assigned to NOAA with NASA
acting as NOAA's acquisition organization. This recommendation is based
on the following two factors: 1) NOAA has the broader responsibility
for weather and climate than any other organization; and 2) this
national responsibility of NOAA aligns well with the national character
of the NPOESS program and makes NOAA the natural national advocate for
the NPOESS program.
Under this construct, NPOESS execution is assigned to NOAA with
NASA as NOAA's acquisition organization, NOAA/NASA will provide all
polar data from the NPOESS program to all users. Additionally, NOAA/
NASA, working with DOD, must establish a process that will ensure that
future DOD needs will be satisfied. The current EXCOM concept should
continue as an interagency forum to assure effective program
implementation.
Q2. How much more do you think this program will cost if it is
budgeted to 80/20?
A2. The program is currently funded at less than the 50/50 level which
is an insufficient level of funding. At this level of funding the
program lacks sufficient management reserve which leads to the program
using risk as its management reserve. The most probable cost is at the
80/20 level including reserves. To fund at the most probable cost, the
IRT estimated that the NPOESS budget has a shortfall in excess of $113
through program completion. Funding the program (by Fiscal Year and
through Estimate to Complete) to 80/20 cost confidence would provide a
management reserve of approximately 25 percent.
Q2a. Does this include your recommendation to mitigate the risk of
continuity gaps?
A2a. No, it does not. The IRT review of the baseline program
highlighted a concern regarding operational continuity associated with
how the baseline program was structured. Both heritage programs, the
DOD's Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) and the NOAA
Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) were planned
and constructed with spares on the ground to implement a ``launch on
need'' philosophy. Even early NPOESS planning carried this same launch
philosophy to preclude long gaps in coverage. The current NPOESS
program plan does not have that same level of assuredness regarding
operational continuity. Furthermore, the IRT was unable to find Level 1
requirements for operational continuity or constellation availability.
If all satellites are delivered on schedule, launched without
incident, and meet their full design life, there will be no significant
gap in capabilities. In keeping with historical trends, there is a high
likelihood of early problems with the first few satellites. They occur
across the manufacturing, integration and test, and on-orbit
performance phases. If NPOESS exhibits these characteristics, there
will be a minimum gap of several months. If there is a launch failure--
a 41 percent chance of occurring over the remaining DMSP launches, NPP
and NPOESS there is a high likelihood of a gap measured in years (note:
41 percent based on the Success Probability used in the Aerospace GAP
analysis). If there is a launch failure or an early spacecraft failure
on NPP, C1 or C2, there will be a capability gap of three to five
years. The NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP)--once a key risk reduction
activity for NPOESS--is now a critical asset to help mitigate these
potential gaps in operational coverage.
The IRT recommended that steps be taken to proactively manage and
mitigate the potential gap in continuity coverage. The EXCOM must
clarify the program priorities and determine if continuity of coverage
is a priority. If it is a priority, it should be clearly captured as a
Level 1 requirement. Spare satellites should also be programmed for
launch/early-orbit failure. Ideally, the spacecraft should be available
and tested to a common point for either orbit, with payloads available
for either orbit configuration. Move production and launch dates of C3
and C4 closer to C1 and C2. To bolster this fragile constellation, an
integrated management approach is needed for the remaining DMSP, POES,
METOP and NPOESS, including NPP. Modify the launch philosophy of all
polar-orbiting environmental assets to launch on need (or launch on
failure). Use the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) data, originally
intended for risk reduction, as an option to mitigate potential data
gaps. This will help but will not compensate for lack of spares in case
of launch or early spacecraft failures.
Information regarding the cost impacts of implementing these
actions was not available when the IRT conducted its review.
Q2b. If the cost is budgeted to an 80/20, what should the program
office cut in order to keep the program from undergoing another Nunn-
McCurdy review?
A2b. If the program is budgeted to a cost confidence level of 80/20
this will provide approximately 25 percent management reserve. If this
is done and the other IRT recommendations (e.g., placing priority on
and incentivizing mission success) are implemented, the program has a
very good chance of not undergoing another Nunn-McCurdy review.
Q3. One of the findings of your team was that the Integrated Program
Office (IPO) does not have sufficient space acquisition expertise, and
you cited the Goddard Space Flight Center at NASA and the Air Force
Space and Missile Systems Center as good examples.
Q3a. Why can't the current IPO leverage the expertise of these
institutions without actually being co-located?
A3a. Co-location is a secondary implementation issue. The key to the
proper implementation of this IRT recommendation is the nature of the
association of the program with the space acquisition center and the
center to the agency/department responsible for the execution of the
program. The arrangement should be one that holds,the center
responsible for the successful acquisition of the program and the
program responsible to the center for the same. However, while co-
location is not essential, it certainly can make the benefits of a
space acquisition center for the successful execution of the program
easier to achieve. Not only can the program more effectively draw on
the knowledgeable resources of the center but the status reporting from
the program to the center and the management oversight of the program
by seasoned senior space acquisition personnel can be more
comprehensive, timely, and effective.
Q3b. Does the IPO consult with these organizations already?
A3b. Consultation or communications does not meet the requirement.
Effective support and oversight of the program by a space acquisition
center requires the center to have responsibility for the success of
the program and be able to employ its support and oversight expertise,
resources, and processes to that end.
Q3c. Is there an overhead cost associated with NASA running NOAA
programs?
A3c. Certainly. NASA, as the space system acquisition organization for
NOAA, would bring the expertise and experience that NOAA does not have
that is required for successful execution of these space system
programs. NASA would be responsible to NOAA for the successful
achievement of the space system acquisition objectives. To accomplish
this, NASA would provide implementation as well as support and
oversight resources for the programs.
Q4. You recommended keeping the current contractor team because they
represent the highest probability of success at this point.
Q4a. How can the Federal Government continue with the current
contractors without creating a ``moral hazard'' by seeming to allow
poor performance?
A4a. Contractors should be held accountable for poor performance for
which they are responsible. With respect to NPOESS, it could be argued
that the incentive structure that placed priority on cost over mission
success, the lack of sufficient funding which lead to the adoption of
risk to resolve issues, the lack of space acquisition expertise, and
the lack of effective oversight and decision-making have been principal
causes for the poor results so far. Again from a mission success
perspective, the continued use of the contractor team that is familiar
with the program and the issues is more likely to achieve successful
execution, assuming the other issues are resolved, than spending the
time and money to change contractor teams and then bring the new team
up to the level of knowledge the incumbent team already possesses.
Q5. Your team believes NPOESS will ultimately end up costing at least
another $1 billion.
Q5a. Is this additional cost simply a result of budgeting to 80/20?
A5a. Yes, this is the result of funding the current program to the 80/
20 cost confidence level.
Q5b. Where is this additional cost coming from?
A5b. The program is currently funded at less than the 50/50 level which
is an insufficient level of funding. At this level of funding the
program lacks sufficient management reserve which leads to the program
using risk as its management reserve. The most probable cost is at the
80/20 level including reserves. Funding the program (by Fiscal Year and
through Estimate to Complete) to 80/20 cost confidence would provide a
management reserve of approximately 25 percent.
Q6. The NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) mission was meant to mitigate
program risk and test sensors and ground systems prior to the full
stand-up of NPOESS.
Q6a. I understand that we don't have many options now because of
concerns about data-gaps, but what are the implications of
``operationalizing'' NPP?
A6a. Rather than utilizing NPP and its data in a one-time or short-term
proof-of-concept or risk reduction approach, NPP data would be used
over the duration of the mission to address selected operational polar
data requirements. This might require additional processing and
dissemination capabilities for the NPP data.
Q7. NOAA is responsible for program management and operations, while
acquisition authority belongs to DOD.
Q7a. How has this affected the program?
A7a. A multi-agency organization is typically more complex and less
efficient than an organization contained within one agency. NPOESS, a
tri-agency program, is no different than many multi-agency
organizations, and not surprisingly has a few built-in challenges:
1. The NPOESS budget is funded 50 percent by the DOD and 50
percent by the DOC. This split funding requires significantly
increased effort and overhead in coordination. As an example,
to receive funding, the NPOESS budget is reviewed by six
Congressional committees. Once received, NPOESS must also use
two financial systems to execute the budget.
2. Requirements are also managed through another multi-agency
construct called the Senior Users Advisory Group (SUAG).
3. By the Memorandum of Agreement (Dec. 2008), the acquisition
reporting runs from the NPOESS PEO to the EXCOM, of which the
DOD EXCOM representative is also the Milestone Decision
Authority (MDA).
The EXCOM is intended to be a decision body to provide streamlined
direction to the PEO. As currently run, however, the EXCOM is not a
decision-making body, and major program decisions can only be finalized
(sometimes weeks) after the EXCOM. The current DOD EXCOM representative
has not been delegated the proper authority from the Defense
Acquisition Executive (who is also the NPOESS Milestone Decision
Authority) and decisions require an additional meeting and coordination
to be finalized. Additionally, the IRT has observed that many of the
topics that are discussed at the EXCOM delve too deeply into program
details and many critical top level issues are left unresolved.
For an EXCOM process to be effective, the EXCOM members must be the
decision makers or have the appropriate authorities delegated to them.
When they meet, the EXCOM should focus on strategic issues and
decisions-such as on program priorities, risk to data continuity, or
the inadequate budget - not on tactical day-to-day program development
status.
Q7b. Is this relationship unique in the Federal Government?
A7b. Not aware of any other tri-agency arrangements similar to NPOESS.
However, having one agency do acquisition for another is common. In the
space systems arena, the National Reconnaissance Office has been
acquiring space systems that were part of larger NSA and NGA systems
and programs for decades.
Q8. Given all of the technical issues experienced on the VIIRS
instrument, is it time to pursue an alternative instrument?
a. Is using the AVHRR the only option?
b. When would the EXCOM need to make this decision by?
c. What are the cost and performance implications of making
this decision?
d. Are there any international implications to this option
since we owe an AVHRR to the Europeans for the MetOp satellite?
A8. With a VIIRS Engineering Design Unit (EDU) already through
environmental testing, the recent successful completion of vibration
testing for VIIRS F1, and the planned completion of VIIRS F1 thermal
vacuum testing scheduled for the summer of 2009, there is growing
confidence that a VIIRS F1 can be delivered. With the maturity and
progress already invested in VIIRS, it is unlikely that a ``new''
instrument start would be any more cost effective or bring the schedule
in any closer. Another new instrument start will only siphon more money
away from an already budget-strapped program.
In addition, there are no apparent, viable, near-term alternatives
for VIIRS. The one remaining legacy sensor--the last Advanced Very High
Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR)--is slated for EUMETSAT via an
international agreement and will be used for METOP that supports the
mid-morning orbit. Re-opening the production lines for legacy sensors
such as the Operational Linescan System (OLS) and the AVHRR would not
save much, if any, money, nor would they be delivered any earlier or at
lower risk. These legacy sensors would also constitute a significant
step back in performance compared to VIIRS. In fact, while perhaps an
OLS-like performance would be suitable for some DOD requirements, the
AVHRR does not meet the requirements for NOAA and NASA. Other options,
such as starting an alternative VIIRS concept will also contain
significant cost and schedule impacts.
However, while not optimal, the IPO should continue to protect
AVHRR as an option until VIIRS completes Thermal Vacuum testing. Since
there are only minimal costs to develop and submit the paperwork to
potentially acquire an AVHRR (e.g., a Justification for Other than Full
and Open Competition and/or a Justification and Approval), the IRT
recommends the continuation of this no/low-cost effort until the VIIRS
thermal vacuum data is available in the summer of 2009. If the data is
favorable, this AVHRR option can be stopped.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Mary M. Glackin, Deputy Under Secretary for Oceans and
Atmosphere, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), U.S. Department of Commerce
Questions submitted by Representative Paul C. Broun
Q1. We understand that there are several alternative cost estimates
under consideration.
Q1a. What are they?
A1a. The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite
System (NPOESS) Integrated Program Office (IPO) submitted a
notification letter to the Defense Acquisition Executive indicating
that the schedule of the current Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) was
unachievable. As part of that notification process, the IPO is required
by Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition regulations to submit a
revised APB with an updated schedule and cost estimate. Prior to
submitting the revised APB for DOD approval, the NPOESS Executive
Committee (EXCOM) requires an independent assessment of the schedule
and cost estimate.
There will be only one schedule and cost estimate submitted for
consideration; however, it will be subjected to two different
independent reviews. One review is being conducted by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG), using DOD
methodology. The other review is being conducted by NASA and NOAA,
consistent with past assessment practices for collaborative satellite
procurements. Both of the independent assessments are proceeding and a
revised program cost and schedule estimate will be ready for review by
the EXCOM in fall 2009.
Q1b. Why is it taking so long to figure out what this program will
cost to complete?
A1b. The NPOESS Program has many variables that make cost estimating
challenging. It is somewhat premature to determine whether the
technical difficulties with the two primary instrument development
programs--the Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) and
Cross-track Infrared Sounder (CrIS)--have been overcome and whether the
positive impact of ``lessons learned'' in the development of the NPOESS
Preparatory Project can be incorporated into the next instruments to be
developed for the first and second NPOESS satellites (C1 and C2,
respectively). The EXCOM has directed a special detailed assessment
called a ``deep dive'' in order to develop shared agreement on the
magnitude of the program's challenges.
Once the technical challenges are fully identified, a revised
program schedule must be developed before the revised program cost
estimates are completed. As the agencies analyze schedule and cost,
they must reconcile the differences in their standards and approaches,
adding to the time required to complete an accurate cost estimate.
DOD and NOAA have fundamentally different approaches to cost
estimating, which are difficult to reconcile. The White House Task
Force led by the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) has a
working group focused on determining the best cost methodology for this
program.
Q1c. Is it true that going with the most conservative estimate, using
80 percent confidence level, you would trigger another Nunn-McCurdy
breach?
A1c. NOAA's current estimate for an 80 percent cost confidence NPOESS
profile for FY 2012 and beyond would result in a cost growth of 15.6
percent above the 2006 Nunn-McCurdy certified program budget. A 15.6
percent cost growth would require a notification to Congress, but not a
complete re-certification similar to the one performed in 2006. A
recertification is required if cost growth exceeds 25 percent.
Q2. In your opinion, why has the Executive Committee (EXCOM) failed to
effectively oversee the NPOESS Program?
A2. The answer is multifaceted. First, tri-agency management of any
program is inherently difficult. Second, the EXCOM should be utilized
for strategic direction related to the high-level needs and
requirements of the program and establishment of key budget baselines,
not for tactical day-to-day program oversight. The current structure
requires these very high level managers to provide both, which results
in both functions being weakened. It is also essential for the EXCOM to
have critical strategic issues presented at an appropriate level by
program staff to facilitate decision-making. Finally, NOAA, DOD, and
NASA agree with and have taken action on the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) finding that the EXCOM lacks the membership and leadership
needed to effectively and efficiently oversee and direct the program.
For the past three months, the DOD committee member with acquisition
authority has been attending Executive Committee meetings. NOAA also
agrees with GAO that the EXCOM failed to track action items to closure
and that many of the EXCOM decisions did not achieve desired outcomes.
The White House Task Force that is examining the NPOESS program is
considering these types of issues, with the goal of ensuring the most
effective possible management structure as we move forward.
Q3. Because of the continued delays to the NPOESS Program, we have
reached the point where weather and climate data continuity could be at
risk if NPP or NPOESS fail on launch or orbit. What is NOAA prepared to
do to ensure weather and climate data continuity?
A3. NOAA's Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites (POES),
both the operational on-orbit and recently launched satellites, are
performing well and there is no immediate risk to data continuity for
NOAA's weather and climate missions. NOAA is concerned about the
fragility of the constellation and the risk to data continuity once the
last operational NOAA POES and NASA Earth Observing Satellites (EOS)
missions reach the end of their expected life time by 2013.
For the afternoon orbit, which is most at-risk, NOAA plans to
maximize use of existing NOAA POES satellite assets, use NPP data
operationally, leverage data from other NASA and DOD environmental
satellites, and forge partnerships with international space agencies to
acquire data needed to support NOAA's operational weather and climate
missions.
In the mid-morning orbit, NOAA will continue processing and
delivering environmental products for its customers from the U.S. and
European instruments on board the European Organisation for the
Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT) MetOp series of
satellites through the next decade.
Q4. How does NOAA plan to ensure that all three agencies individual
priorities are weighed and needs are met?
A4. The NPOESS Executive Committee (EXCOM) was structured to be the key
decision-maker on the strategic direction of the program. Though both
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and NPOESS Independent
Review Team (IRT) have noted the EXCOM has not been focused enough on
strategic issues, NOAA, together with DOD and NASA, and more broadly,
the White House Task Force, are working to ensure the program gets
restructured in a way that ensures the requirements of each agency's
mission will be met.
Coordinating with the EXCOM development and sustainment of the
program's key data needs and priorities is the NPOESS Tri-agency Joint
Agency Requirements Council, along with its subordinate Senior User
Advisory Group and Joint Agency Requirements Group. These tri-agency
entities are responsible for developing and sustaining the Integrated
Operational Requirements Document (IORD), which details the data and
information priorities for the program. NOAA is engaged in these
working groups to ensure that all NPOESS requirements are accounted for
and traceable to each agency and its customers. The White House Task
Force led by OSTP is examining NPOESS in its requirements working
group.
Q5. The CERES instrument which measures Earth's radiance budget is
being put back on NPP and NPOESS.
Q5a. Does this instrument need a water vapor sensor on orbit to help
calibrate it?
A5a. No. CERES does not need a water vapor sensor on-orbit for
calibration purposes. The CERES instrument is calibrated using water
vapor data from an existing meteorological model which uses data from
multiple sources (sounders, microwave radiances, etc.). Use of this
model eliminates the need to use an additional satellite instrument for
calibration.
Q5b. MODIS has a water vapor sensor, but VIIRS does not. Are we adding
an instrument back to NPP and NPOESS that perhaps may not work
correctly when the MODIS mission ends?
A5b. No. Water vapor data is being provided by an existing
meteorological model which uses data from multiple sources (sounders,
microwave radiances, etc.) to meet mission requirements, so it is not a
requirement for VIIRS.
Q5c. Is this truly an issue, what is NOAA doing to mitigate this risk?
A5c. This is not an issue for NOAA with the use of the existing
meteorological model.
Q6. One of the findings of your team was that the Integrated Program
Office (IPO) does not have sufficient space acquisition expertise, and
you cited the Goddard Space Flight Center at NASA and the Air Force
Space and Missile Systems Center as good examples.
Q6a. Why can't the current IPO leverage the expertise of these
institutions without actually being co-located?
A6a. It may be possible to better leverage the expertise of the space
acquisition centers without being co-located. A White House Task Force
led by the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), with the
participation of NOAA, NASA, and DOD, is examining ways to strengthen
program management, including strengthening the program's access to the
expertise at the space acquisition centers.
The IPO currently takes advantage of selected technical resources
from NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) and the Air Force Space
and Missile Systems Center (SMC). However, having greater access to the
expertise and personnel at a space acquisition center like GSFC or SMC
could improve day-to-day management and oversight by providing a more
complete infrastructure of technical and program staff, policies and
procedures, and checks and balances at all levels of management. For
example, a space acquisition center has access to an extensive
infrastructure of engineering and mission assurance experts who can be
available on demand to support timely mission support. In addition to
timely technical support, this infrastructure provides expert oversight
of technical and management activities to ensure that staff is trained
and providing the highest level of performance.
Acquisition centers have a system of independent reviews they
perform on all programs throughout the course of their acquisition that
ensure they are remaining on track technically. Subjecting NPOESS to
such a system could be optimal for the program given its ongoing
technical challenges, especially on sensors, which have not been
noticed early enough in many cases by the program's current prime
contractor and tri-agency management structure. Such a set of customary
independent reviews would provide higher-level management, especially
the EXCOM, an ongoing stream of management information allowing them to
focus on the results and actions required, rather than needing to plan
and repeatedly call for future independent tests.
Q6b. Does the IPO consult with these organizations already?
A6b. The IPO consults with these agencies today as referenced in
response 6a above.
Q6c. Is there an overhead cost associated with NASA running NOAA
programs?
A6c. If the decision is made by the Executive Office of the President
that NASA would be the acquisition authority for the program, NASA
would not run the NPOESS program, but could act as NOAA's or DOD's
acquisition agent. There would be associated overhead costs for NASA
support as there currently is for DOD acquisition support. NASA's
overhead costs associated with individual programs are clearly
identified and tracked in the cost accounts for the program. This
practice is called ``full cost accounting'' and it provides
transparency for all costs associated with a program.
Q7. The NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) mission was meant to mitigate
program risk and test sensors and ground systems prior to the full
stand-up of NPOESS.
Q7a. I understand that we don't have many options now because of
concerns about data-gaps, but what are the implications of
``operationalizing'' NPP?
A7a. In order to use the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) data
operationally, NOAA needs to accelerate the installation of an NPOESS
Data Exploitation ground system, which includes critical hardware
improvements that will allow the NPP data to be used for operational
weather forecasting and climate monitoring. No NPP spacecraft design
changes are required to implement this.
The benefit of operationalizing NPP will be an expansion in the
number of operational environmental products (from 19 to 54) since the
instruments on NPP are capable of producing data that meet or exceed
the data provided by NOAA-19, our current operational afternoon polar-
orbiting satellite. The availability of these products will provide
additional data that will benefit NOAA's weather forecasts and warnings
as well as its climate assessments.
Q8. NOAA is responsible for program management and operation, while
acquisition authority belongs to DOD.
Q8a. How has this affected the program?
A8a. The tri-agency management structure adds complexity to an already
complex space system acquisition. Since guidance and direction to the
program must be coordinated between senior leaders within each agency,
program management is inherently more cumbersome and protracted in
comparison to major programs being managed within a single agency.
The White House Task Force led by OSTP is looking at ways to
improve the program management.
Q8b. Is this relationship unique in the federal government?
A8b. NOAA and NASA have a history of collaboration in the development
of satellite systems since the 1960s. While tri-agency programs are not
unique, NOAA is not aware of a tri-agency management structure
involving a program as large or as complex as NPOESS.
Q9. Given all of the technical issues experienced on the VIIRS
instrument, is it time to pursue an alternative instrument?
A9. VIIRS has satisfactorily progressed through ambient,
electromagnetic interference vibration testing. VIIRS has completed the
thermal vacuum testing process, though continued analysis of the
results is ongoing. Given that substantial risks also exist if a new
option must be developed in place of VIIRS, both the tri-agency
technical team and independent reviews recommended staying the course
with VIIRS.
The EXCOM did, however, direct the IPO to develop a plan to procure
an additional Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR)
instrument as a contingency option should VIIRS experience additional
problems that would drive cost and schedule to even more unacceptable
levels. Given that the instrument has progressed through thermal vacuum
testing, it is less likely an AVHRR will need to be procured.
Q9a. Is using an AVHRR the only option?
A9a. :After studying several options, a tri-agency technical team
concluded that planning for an additional AVHRR in case it was needed
was the best option. Given the status of current testing on VIIRS, it
is less likely an AVHRR will need to be procured.
Q9b. When would the EXCOM need to make this decision by?
A9b. A decision to procure an additional AVHRR instrument will be made
in fall 2009 following the completion of VIIRS thermal vacuum testing
and analysis of its results.
Q9c. What are the cost and performance implications of making this
decision?
A9c. The cost of procuring a single AVHRR instrument compatible with
the NPOESS C1 spacecraft is estimated to be $60 million. However, AVHRR
performance falls short of VIIRS capabilities in important areas
including cloud detection, aerosol monitoring, as well as land, ice and
snow products that are routinely used in numerical weather prediction
models. With only AVHRR, rather than a more advanced imaging sensor,
weather models could not be improved as rapidly as planned to enhance
environmental predictions.
Q9d. Are there any international implications to this option since we
owe an AVHRR to the Europeans for the MetOp satellite?
A9d. No. The procurement plan for an additional AVHRR instrument allows
for NOAA to meet its delivery commitments to EUMETSAT.
Appendix 2:
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Additional Material for the Record