[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
STILL POST-KATRINA: HOW FEMA
DECIDES WHEN HOUSING
RESPONSIBILITIES END
=======================================================================
(111-37)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
May 22, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman
NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, JOHN L. MICA, Florida
Vice Chair DON YOUNG, Alaska
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
Columbia VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
JERROLD NADLER, New York FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
CORRINE BROWN, Florida JERRY MORAN, Kansas
BOB FILNER, California GARY G. MILLER, California
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi Carolina
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa SAM GRAVES, Missouri
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
RICK LARSEN, Washington SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts Virginia
TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California CONNIE MACK, Florida
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio
JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
HEATH SHULER, North Carolina VERN BUCHANAN, Florida
MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania ANH ``JOSEPH'' CAO, Louisiana
JOHN J. HALL, New York AARON SCHOCK, Illinois
STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin PETE OLSON, Texas
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
PHIL HARE, Illinois
JOHN A. BOCCIERI, Ohio
MARK H. SCHAUER, Michigan
BETSY MARKEY, Colorado
PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York
THOMAS S. P. PERRIELLO, Virginia
DINA TITUS, Nevada
HARRY TEAGUE, New Mexico
(ii)
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency
Management
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of Columbia, Chair
BETSY MARKEY, Colorado MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
HEATH SHULER, North Carolina SAM GRAVES, Missouri
PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri Virginia
TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, ANH ``JOSEPH'' CAO, Louisiana
Pennsylvania, Vice Chair PETE OLSON, Texas
DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
THOMAS S. P. PERRIELLO, Virginia
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
(Ex Officio)
(iii)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ vi
TESTIMONY
Garratt, David, Acting Deputy Administrator, Federal Emergency
Management Agency.............................................. 6
Jenkins, III, Rt. Rev. Charles E., Tenth Bishop of the Episcopal
Diocese of Louisiana........................................... 6
Rainwater, Paul, Executive Director, Louisiana Recover Authority. 6
Tombar, III, Fred, Senior Advisor to the Secretary for Disaster
and Recover Programs, Department of Housing and Urban
Development.................................................... 6
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Carnahan, Hon. Russ, of Pennsylvania............................. 50
Norton, Hon. Eleanor Holmes, of the District of Columbia......... 51
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Garratt, David................................................... 54
Jenkins, III, Rt. Rev. Charles E................................. 114
Rainwater, Paul.................................................. 126
Tombar, III, Fred................................................ 131
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Garratt, David, Acting Deputy Administrator, Federal Emergency
Management Agency:.............................................
Responses to questions from the Subcommittee............... 67
Responses to questions from Rep. Norton, a Representative
in Congress from the District of Columbia................ 105
Tombar, III, Fred, Senior Advisor to the Secretary for Disaster
and Recover Programs, Department of Housing and Urban
Development:...................................................
Response to question from Rep. Norton, a Representative in
Congress from the District of Columbia................... 134
Responses to questions from the Subcommittee............... 135
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
STILL POST-KATRINA: HOW FEMA DECIDES WHEN HOUSING RESPONSIBILITIES END
----------
Friday, May 22, 2009
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public
Buildings and Emergency Management,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in
Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eleanor Holmes
Norton [Chair of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Ms. Norton. We want to welcome today's witnesses.
Congress had scheduled to be in session but recessed early
because it finished its business yesterday. But we thought this
hearing was of great importance and that we should not postpone
it. We recognize that it poses some inconvenience to the
Ranking Member, who will have to leave early. As a Federal
official, it has to do with a subject not unrelated to the
subject before us, FEMA and hurricanes and what to do about
them before and after, but we are going to proceed because of
disturbing reports that need to be cleared up by this Committee
and need to be cleared up in short order.
So we will address today the Federal Emergency Management
Agency and Department of Housing and Urban Development, how
these two agencies will resolve still-outstanding issues that
the Federal Government faces in providing housing to families
whose homes were destroyed or damaged by Hurricane Katrina.
The hurricane made landfall August 29th, 2005, and proved
to be the costliest natural disaster in American history. The
storm had massive physical impact on the land, affecting 90,000
square miles, an area the size of Great Britain. Under the
authority granted to the President in the Stafford Act, the
President declared a major disaster in the States of Louisiana
and Mississippion the date the storm made landfall.
Approximately 143,000 families were housed in FEMA-provided
travel trailers and mobile homes as a result of Hurricane
Katrina. Since this peak, most families were transitioned to
more permanent housing. As of May 14th, 2009, approximately
4,052 temporary housing units continue to be in use in
Louisiana. FEMA has also provided $7.8 billion in financial
assistance to about 2.4 million households through FEMA's
Individuals and Households Program. FEMA's housing program
formally ended on May 1st, 2009.
The housing program for Hurricane Katrina was unusually
long and involved, as far more individuals needed housing
assistance because of the unusually catastrophic nature of the
disaster. To address ongoing housing needs of individuals who
could not return to their homes in the Gulf Coast, FEMA used
its authority under Section 408 of the Stafford Act and the
Disaster Relief Fund and delegated authority to HUD to
implement the Disaster Housing Assistance Program, or DHAP.
DHAP is a pilot program to provide temporary long-term
housing and related services for families that continue to need
housing as a result of Hurricane Katrina. Unlike FEMA's rental
assistance program, which provides payments directly to
residents who pay landlords, DHAP worked through public housing
agencies, providing rental payments directly to landlords.
The DHAP program began on December 1st, 2007, and served
36,816 families. The program was scheduled to end on March 1st,
2009. However, Congress appropriated $85 million to transition
program families in DHAP, extending the last eligible payments
to August 2009. Initially, 24,343 families were assisted
through this transitional program. HUD estimates that
approximately 18,000 families remain in the program as of May
2009.
The situation we now face was both predicted and
predictable. It has been clear from the recent FEMA hearings
that those left in disaster housing will be the most vulnerable
members of society, who may have had prior difficulties that
have been exacerbated by the disaster. While these programs
have formally ended, we still have families without a long-term
housing solution.
In order to facilitate an orderly transition, I wrote to
the then-Administrator of FEMA last July, requesting that the
March 1st, 2009, deadline be extended and announced
immediately. While FEMA did extend the program three times, in
each instance the extensions were announced at the last minute,
causing unnecessary stress and hardship.
My fear last summer was that this would be repeated as the
March 1st, 2009, deadline created by the Bush administration
approached and that this date would essentially push this
program to the new administration to scramble to address this
issue. That is exactly what has happened. The Obama
administration was compelled to announce the March 2009
extension.
Even with this deadline, it appears that many of the most
vulnerable citizens still in disaster housing have not had
enough time to find permanent solutions to their housing needs,
or if they have--and have not found those needs, then we need
to know why. Is it them and their refusal to accept the
available housing? We can't always have the housing we want. Or
is it the failure of the government? And this Committee is
open, because we want to resolve this issue, not point fingers
one way or the other.
The testimony we will receive today paints a conflicting
picture. The testimony of our Federal witnesses and our State
witnesses describe a much improved situation on the ground in
the Gulf from what we have seen in the past. However, other
testimony and recent disturbing media reports, including some
front-page articles, indicate that there are families without a
long-term housing solution facing eviction from disaster
housing. In today's hearing we hope to ascertain whether these
are isolated cases that are symptomatic of broader issues still
outstanding after the issue or what the cause is.
The Subcommittee does not want to be understood, however,
to say that FEMA should provide housing assistance
indefinitely. The statute does not allow HUD to do that. It is
also unacceptable, however, to turn people out of their
disaster housing with nowhere to go.
Ultimately, it is also required--and this is important--
that residents accept available housing, even if it is not in
the location they desire. Many Americans are, as I speak,
living in hotels, without jobs, where they do not desire. Only
rich people can live where they desire. So it is important that
residents accept the available housing, even if they prefer the
temporary housing or other housing.
We have to resolve this issue. We cannot allow people to be
put out in the street, but we will not allow people to stay
where they are simply because they prefer it that way.
FEMA and HUD have developed new and innovative housing
programs to address the unprecedented disaster housing needs.
However, these programs did provide housing solutions for the
vast majority of families left without housing by Hurricane
Katrina. The Subcommittee looks forward to hearing the
testimony of today's witnesses, addressing once and for all--
let's hope this is the last time--how we can resolve the
ongoing housing needs of those families who are still
experiencing the consequences of this devastating disaster.
I am pleased now to ask our Ranking Member, Mr. Diaz-
Balart, if he has any opening remarks.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Once again, I commend you and thank you for this hearing.
And we agree. We agree on not only the basics but I think even
on most of the details.
I may be a little repetitive, but I think it bears
repeating basically what you have just said. Again, as you just
said, Madam Chair, this program for families displaced by
Katrina and Rita ended the 1st of May. And those who remain in
temporary housing are expected to either vacate their trailers
or hotel rooms by the end of this month. Now, as you mentioned,
it was 143,000 individuals after Katrina and Rita who were
provided temporary housing. And, again, now we are almost 4
years later and there are still over 5,000 remaining.
And, obviously, the Stafford Act, as you also stated,
authorizes FEMA temporary housing programs up to 18 months of
housing, which can be extended, as has been done by the
President, obviously, under special circumstances. Now, in this
case, the housing program was extended for more than 2 years
beyond the 18-month limit.
So, obviously, it is an important issue, and how FEMA
decided and decides when housing responsibilities end is an
appropriate issue to address. And that is why again, Madam
Chair, I want to thank you for this hearing.
We are currently facing an ugly decision: either extending
the temporary program indefinitely, I guess, or discontinuing
the program for 5,000 people. And, obviously, neither one of
those options is attractive.
Forty-four months now, families and individuals have lived
in travel trailers or hotel rooms, obviously never intended for
long-term use. But even after all this time, there seems to be
no other solution that has been developed. And, you know, there
has not been a real, viable solution developed and implemented
by the State and local governments to address the long-term
affordable housing needs for low-income residents.
And, in fact, it was discovered during a staff trip to New
Orleans last fall, some low-income housing units with minimal
damage were slated to be torn down. Rental rates were three to
four times what they were pre-Katrina. And people who were
unemployed, obviously, were priced out of available housing
markets.
And then here we are, months later, on the verge of ending
the temporary housing program with, again, no viable, no
attractive, no real, viable option for these low-income
individuals and families.
On top of that, we have still no national recovery
strategy, as mandated by the Post-Katrina Emergency Management
Reform Act of 2006. It seems that, instead of improving, we may
have actually been going backwards. Again, that is at least a
perception that I think some of us have.
Now, when FEMA was moved into the Department of Homeland
Security, its focus obviously shifted, unfortunately, and its
capabilities were diminished. And we understand why that shift
happened, because terrorism is something that has to be dealt
with, but, again, we also, I think, see the consequences. And,
as witnesses testified at the Full Committee hearing just last
week, some recovery issues seem to have been neglected in that
shift. So, as a result, long-term recovering housing strategies
were put, frankly, on the back burner. And today we are still
picking up the pieces and trying to figure out what to do.
The Post-Katrina Act required the development of a number
of strategies, including a national housing disaster strategy
and a national recovery strategy. The national housing disaster
strategy was only finalized in January of this year, and the
national recovery strategy has yet to be done.
In addition, FEMA's recovery role requires that it be able
to plan and coordinate effectively with other Federal agencies,
as well as with State and local officials. Obviously, without
that, it cannot function adequately. Working with agencies like
HUD proactively in the planning process, as opposed to
reactively after a major disaster strikes, is crucial,
obviously, to an effective recovery effort.
Now, in the case of Katrina, at a February hearing before
this Subcommittee, I noted that no real strategy was developed
to address the long-term housing issues in Louisiana. That
hearing took place just as FEMA's direct housing assistance
program and the HUD's disaster housing assistance program had
just had been extended. And, as I said, here we are now in May
with the same dilemma that we were facing in February. So,
again, there lies the problem.
Earlier this month, the Chair held a field hearing in
southern Florida to examine preparedness for the 2009 hurricane
season. In my remarks at that hearing, I described the scenario
of Hurricane Ono, a hurricane model used for catastrophic
planning in Florida. And Hurricane Ono is not a weird
theoretical thing; it is actually modeled and based on the 1926
Great Miami Hurricane.
If such a disaster occurred, the consequences would be
devastating. It would require the evacuation of 3 million
people. Again, this is according to the simulations. Most of
south Florida would be under one to four feet of water for
weeks. Homes of 70 percent of the population would be
destroyed, and millions would be without electricity. And these
are only a few of the nightmares that would happen.
And there is nothing that says that such a hurricane could
not happen this season, next season, or the next season. Again,
it has already happened. We cannot think that Hurricane Katrina
is a once-in-a-generation or once-in-a-lifetime disaster,
unfortunately. So we obviously must ensure adequate time and
resources are focused on recovery following a disaster.
And housing is a huge part of that. Without long-term
housing strategies, families that are displaced will find it
very difficult to return to their communities. And the
communities will not be able to rebuild and begin anew.
So, while we look at the continued housing issues in
Louisiana and Mississippi today, we should also look forward as
to how we can prepare for the next big disaster that we all
know--we hope it won't come, but we know that one day it
probably will.
Again, if Hurricane Ono hits south Florida today, how long
will that recovery take? And we know how long past recoveries
have taken. Will the same long-term housing issues resurface,
or are there other improvements that have been made? Obviously,
it is essential that we prepare for the future but don't forget
the lessons learned from past storms like Katrina and others.
Again, I look forward to your testimony. I thank you all
for your service, and I thank you all for being here today.
Madam Chair, could I just--it is related, but it is kind of
a little bit off-subject, but I just want to throw a question
out there real quick.
Ms. Norton. By all means.
The Ranking Member has to catch a plane, has nevertheless
come to the hearing.
And you are free to ask questions.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And I don't expect the answer right now. But I was actually
on the phone with a constituent this week, and she reminded me
of the issue with pets, the evacuation of pets. And, obviously
Congress passed that Pets Evacuation and Transportation
Standards Act, which authorized assistance for the provisions
of rescue, care, and shelter for individuals and their pets or
service animals. The law required FEMA to insure that State
emergency preparedness operation plans take into account the
needs of individuals with household pets and service animals
prior to, during, and following a major disaster emergency.
If you could, when you get a chance, get back to my office
as to where that is, you know, what are the plans, just where
are we, what is the status of that. Because, actually, she
reminded me of it, and I thought it was a really good issue.
And, as she said herself, there may have been instances,
probably were, of people who just refused to evacuate because
they had a pet. And that is what the law was meant to deal
with.
Anyway, if you could just, when you get a chance--not now,
I know you are not going to be prepared to answer that right
now, but if you can get me that information, I would greatly
appreciate that.
Thank you for your indulgence, Madam Chair.
And thank you, and I look forward to the hearing.
Ms. Norton. We have called all of you on the same panel.
Normally we have Federal officials and then State officials,
but what we are trying to do in this hearing is to resolve this
issue once and for all. And therefore nobody is going to be
able to say something after somebody is gone. We are all going
to be able to hear what each has said so that we can finally
say we believe the hearing has brought us to the point where
everybody has an understanding of his responsibilities.
TESTIMONY OF DAVID GARRATT, ACTING DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY; FRED TOMBAR, III, SENIOR
ADVISOR TO THE SECRETARY FOR DISASTER AND RECOVER PROGRAMS,
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT; PAUL RAINWATER,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, LOUISIANA RECOVER AUTHORITY; AND THE RT.
REV. CHARLES E. JENKINS, III, TENTH BISHOP OF THE EPISCOPAL
DIOCESE OF LOUISIANA
Ms. Norton. So let us begin with Mr. David Garratt, who is
the acting deputy administrator of FEMA.
Mr. Garratt. Thank you. Good morning, Chair Norton and
Ranking Member Diaz-Balart.
It is pleasure to see you again, I am privileged to appear
before you today on behalf of the Department of Homeland
Security and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
As always, we appreciate your interest in and continued
support of emergency management, specifically disaster housing,
and in the efforts of the men and women who support that
undertaking at every level of government and within the private
and volunteer sectors.
The engagement of congress in this challenging issue
highlights the complexities that face States, local
governments, voluntary agencies and the Federal family as we
collectively look at providing disaster housing in a way that
meets the temporary and immediate emergency disaster housing
needs of individuals affected by disasters as well as
encourages and supports their transition to self-sufficiency.
Despite many challenges, FEMA and our partners, notably the
Department of Housing and Urban Development have supported and
facilitated the successful transition of more than 97 percent
of those affected by hurricanes Katrina and Rita to long-term
and permanent housing.
While FEMA-supported temporary disaster housing programs
have ended in the Gulf Coast States, FEMA is continuing to work
with its Federal, State and local partners to ensure a smooth
transition into more permanent housing solutions.
In response to hurricanes Katrina and Rita, FEMA conducted
the largest temporary housing operation in the history of the
country, providing temporary housing units to more than 143,000
families across the Gulf Coast. Additionally, FEMA has provided
more than $7.8 billion in housing and other needs assistance,
such as transportation, clothing and furniture, to roughly 2.4
million individuals and households affected by the hurricanes.
By law, eligible disaster survivors may receive temporary
housing assistance for a period of 18 months from the date of
the disaster declaration, unless that is extended. Because of
the extraordinarily catastrophic impacts of hurricanes Katrina
and Rita, the period of assistance was extended more than 2
additional years. In September 2007, housing assistance for
hurricanes Katrina and Rita disaster operations in the States
of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama was extended,
establishing a final end date of March 1, 2009.
In February 2009, Secretary Napolitano announced that
families would be given an additional 2 months to finalize
their long-term housing plans. This extension also served to
give the States additional time to establish a refined
transition support capacity.
Since the temporary housing unit program began nearly 4
years ago, FEMA has never stopped working with occupants to
transition them out of the program and into more permanent and
suitable homes. As of the programs end-date of May 1, FEMA has
been providing temporary housing for more than 44 months, 26
months beyond the statutory limit.
Despite the end of this unprecedented period of assistance,
FEMA will continue to make every effort to encourage and assist
individuals and families to find long-term housing to fulfill
their needs. Over the course of our assistance program, FEMA
has regularly and routinely made direct in-person contact with
occupants to follow up on their recovery plans, locate and
offer them rental resources that address their individual
housing needs, and make social service referrals to local,
State and voluntary organizations.
Additionally FEMA has coordinated with their housing
contractors on timelines for repairs, referred occupants to
local, State and voluntary organizations that are able to
provide assistance with building materials, volunteers to help
them rebuild, et cetera; located and offered affordable rental
resources when it was determined that the rebuilding would take
longer than expected; and offered every household the minimum
of three affordable rental resources that met the household's
individual housing needs.
In addition, many occupants have expressed an interest in
purchasing their FEMA-provided temporary housing units. Today
1,162 individuals and households have completed or are pending
final completion of the sale of their unit. In 2007, FEMA
partnered with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development to create and pilot the Disaster Housing Assistance
Program, a grant program that provides grant subsidies for non
HUD-assisted families displaced by hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
HUD utilizes its existing network of local public housing
agencies to administer this program.
In the nearly 4 years since Hurricane Katrina, FEMA has
worked to address the continuing housing challenges arising out
of the 2005 hurricane season while also responding to the needs
of many disaster survivors in communities affected by more
recent disasters. FEMA continues to institutionalize best
practices and expand our disaster housing capabilities.
Nevertheless the disaster housing environment will always be
physically and socially demanding and never more so than under
catastrophic circumstances.
So FEMA will continue to work with Katrina and Rita-
affected States to support case management efforts; and, as we
look to the future, continue to collaborate with Congress and
our Federal, State and local partners to aggressively explore
new and innovative forms of housing; refine and improve
delivery systems; expand and unify planning activities; and
cooperatively engage with States to improve their own disaster
housing capabilities.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Garratt.
Mr. Fred Tombar the senior advisor to the Secretary for
Disaster Recovery Program at HUD.
Mr. Tombar. Good morning Chair Norton, Ranking Member Diaz-
Balart, I am Frederick Tombar, senior advisor to Secretary
Shaun Donovan at the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development. Thank you for inviting me to testify today.
On behalf of the Secretary Donovan, I want to first express
HUD's commitment to seeing the Gulf Coast fully recover. That
commitment began with our plan to ensure that participants of
the Disaster Housing Assistance Program, or DHAP, were able to
make a smooth transition off of the program into more permanent
housing.
We worked with Congress and FEMA to provide additional
assistance to families through August 31st of this year. Also,
on March 5th, the Secretary joined Secretary Napolitano on a
trip to the Gulf Coast to see the recovery firsthand. President
Obama and Secretary Donovan are absolutely committed to helping
the Gulf Coast fully recover.
HUD continues to work closely with FEMA, State and local
governments and public housing agencies to assist impacted
families who were impacted by hurricanes Katrina and Rita. This
includes family that resided or currently reside in FEMA's
temporary housing unit program, or THUs.
Madam Chair, as you mentioned, FEMA offered each family at
least three rental housing resources that met their individual
housing needs and were within the fair market rent rate
established by HUD for the area. FEMA also offered each THU
family a referral to DHAP, which provided rental assistance and
case management services to over 30,000 displaced families.
Every family that resided in a FEMA THU was offered this
assistance, but some chose not to participate and currently
reman in FEMA THUs. The program ended officially May 1st, 2009,
but as of May 14th, approximately 4,000 families still reside
in THU units in Louisiana and Mississippi.
FEMA THU families who agreed to participate in DHAP are
eligible for transitional rental payments under the DHAP
Katrina Transitional Closeout Plan. As part of this program,
nearly $7 million was allocated to support the Louisiana
Recovery Authority with DHAP closeout case management for
Louisiana participants. HUD and FEMA are providing this
additional assistance to families to give them more time to
transition out of the DHAP.
Although current THU families that turned down DHAP are no
longer eligible for assistance, HUD has worked with States who
identified alternative resources to aid families. The two
primary sources of funding that can be used to support these
families that are currently in THUs, are HUD's Home Investment
Partnership program, or HOME, and the Community Development
Block Grant Program, CDBG.
Mississippi and Louisiana both received annual HOME
allocations to increase the affordable housing stock in their
States, and each State has significant amounts of unexpended
home funds. Nearly half or 43 percent of these funds have not
been committed by the States to a HOME activity or a unit of
local government and may be available for HOME-funded tenant-
based rental assistance programs.
Assuming that a State allocated $10 million of HOME funds
to TBRA and provided an average annual per-family subsidy of
$4,500, it could fund HOME TBRA for over 2,200 families. Using
these same assumptions, assisting 5,000 families per year would
cost $22.5 million.
The Gulf Coast States also receive CDBG disaster funding
for long-term rebuilding and recovery. Mississippi and
Louisiana both currently have a significant amount of CDBG
disaster funding remaining that has been awarded but not
disbursed.
Beyond CDBG and HOME, HUD has also awarded or is in the
process of awarding additional voucher funding to the Gulf
Coast States. In the Consolidated Security Disaster Assistance
and Continuing Appropriations Act of 2009, HUD received an
additional $50 million for project-based vouchers. These funds
will increase the affordable housing stock within the region by
more than 6,500 units.
Under separate funding, HUD awarded $23 million in project-
based vouchers to the Louisiana Recovery Authority. This
funding is anticipated to provide approximately 2,500 vouchers
in Louisiana.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss resources that can
be used to provide housing to FEMA THU families in Louisiana
and Mississippi.
I am now happy to take any questions you have and again
want to thank Chair Norton and the Members of this Committee
for the opportunity to speak to you today.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much Mr. Tombar.
Mr. Paul Rainwater, executive director of Louisiana
Recovery Authority.
Mr. Rainwater. Thank you, Madam Chair and Ranking Member
Diaz-Balart, for all your support in the Gulf Coast. And thank
you for allowing me to come here to talk to you about the
critical matter of transitioning those currently in temporary
disaster housing in Louisiana.
Although we are making great progression in Louisiana, we
have to remember that some of that progress was slowed by
Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, and the credit crunch has caused
some challenges in our rebuilding of housing.
At the height of post-Katrina and Rita FEMA trailer program
in Louisiana, we had more than 76,000 active trailer leases.
Through homeowners rebuilding their houses using Road Home
money, we have disbursed $8 billion to 124,000 Road Home
applicants, and other funds, the Disaster Housing Assistance
Program and rental units being restored and other recovery
efforts, this number has been whittled down to fewer than 3,000
residents.
Working together with FEMA and HUD and many nonprofits
across the state, we are reaching out to those remaining in
trailer residences to ensure that they are not made homeless at
the end of the month. Already we have housed 25 residents who
had to vacate their FEMA-subsidized hotel rooms at the
beginning of May through our existing rapid rehousing program
funded through Community Block Grants.
Additionally our staff each day speaks to trailer residents
to determine their needs and also meets with FEMA to review
files and cases on an individual basis to find solutions that
will prevent these citizens from becoming homeless.
Our staff has been assured many times by FEMA staff in
Louisiana that FEMA will work with trailer residents on a case-
by-case basis to ensure that families are not adversely
affected by these trailer deadlines. We are sharing information
with those--we have about 426 folks that are in trailers that
are Road Home applicants and also applying for hazard
mitigation money to help them complete their homes. FEMA and
our staff share this information on a daily basis.
We have seen great commitment from the new acting head of
the Transition Recovery Office in Louisiana, Tony Russell, and
we thank FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security for
sending him to us. He understands why this housing issue is so
critical and has tried to approach this transition with a
compassion for disaster victims, and his hard work has not gone
unnoticed in Louisiana.
Some of these residents can be assisted through other
programs. Some may be able to keep their trailers temporarily
while they finish home repairs, and others may benefit from
FEMA's donations and sales programs that will allow them to
keep their temporary housing units.
Beginning this month, the Louisiana Recovery Authority and
the Louisiana Department of Social Services has secured up to
$2 million in Social Services Block Grant Money to provide case
management for this population.
We do know that may of those who remain in trailers are
homeowners who have difficulty completing their home repairs.
Data from early March showed that the majority of those in
trailers who were Road Home applicants, about 1,800, had
received some level of funding from the program. However, many
cases for many reasons there are gaps in their financing, and
it is preventing them from moving forward quickly. To address
this, we have two pilot housing rebuilding programs that we
will soon send to HUD for approval.
In addition, there are a variety of Community Block Grant
and HOME-funded rebuilding programs that have been pushed down
to nonprofits and to municipalities underway in Louisiana,
particularly in New Orleans, and the State's $73 million
Permanent Supportive Voucher Program will start next month.
We also must transition 14,831 individuals receiving aid
from a the Disaster Housing Assistance Program administered
through HUD. Earlier this year, HUD Secretary Shaun Donovan
granted a 6-month extension of DHAP. We cannot thank him enough
for this action, which has been critical to assuring that we
prevent mass homelessness in Louisiana. Additionally HUD is
allowing the State up to $8 million for case management of this
population. In only 3 weeks, more than 9,000 clients have been
signed up. So far about 3,450 residents had their request to be
converted from Disaster Housing Assistance Program vouchers to
more Permanent Housing Voucher Process.
The State has also completed much repair work, which I have
outlined in my submitted testimony. We also aim to have more
than 5,000 new rental units online by the end of this year,
which will help greatly with creating affordable housing,
particularly in New Orleans.
I want to thank the Subcommittee for allowing me to come
here today. We have much work to do, but we are making much
progress. Thank you.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. [presiding.] Thank you so much for your
testimony.
Our last witness is Rev. Charles Jenkins, III. Thank you
for being here, sir, we appreciate your time and look forward
to your testimony.
Rev. Jenkins. Thank you. My name is Charles Jenkins. I am
Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Louisiana. I reside in the
Second Congressional District in New Orleans. And I want you to
know that my sanctuary slippers are on the ground, in the mud,
and covered with mold. And I am here to provide the contrast I
think to the three previous speakers.
I have been FEMA registered. I received help from FEMA. I
have been food step eligible. I am Road Home qualified. I have
been homeless. I have been called a refugee in my own country.
However, it was the former resident of 1600 Pennsylvania
Avenue who helped me understand my identity. He was frustrated,
and in a televised speech said, "those people down there need
to understand."
The next day, an African American minister said, "Bishop,
have you ever been called 'one of those people' before?"
I shook my head no.
He said, welcome to the club.
So I am glad to be one of those people down there.
Two days ago, I went to the home of Ernest Hammond on
Annette Street in the Seventh Ward of New Orleans. One of our
volunteer team there, composed of volunteers, Presbyterians,
Methodists, Catholics and Episcopalians from Pennsylvania, New
Jersey and New Hampshire, were cleaning out his home. We had
been told of Mr. Hammond and his dilemma prior to the New York
Times article May 8th. Our case managers are visiting with him.
The smell of the rot and dirt and the mold pushed at me as
I went into his house. I thought I would never smell that
again. Surely, I thought, we are beyond that.
Now this man is not one of that slice of society that will
always be dependent on others. He is 71-years-old. He drove a
truck for 31 years until the company went out of business. He
was a renter in this place for 11 years, saved his dollars, and
then bought it. He did not receive any FEMA or Road Home money
because it is a triplex.
His yard is planted in vegetables. He has sweet sugar cane
or soft sugar cane, as we call it there, and citrus. He will
gladly show you the hole in the roof he cut to get out of his
attic and the axe he used to cut it. He will show you the cans
that he collects daily to sell. And by the way, this is a smart
man, he is playing the future market on crushed cans, which is
now down to about 30 cents a pound. He sells only what he needs
to supplement his $250-a-month Social Security check. He hopes
that the price of cans will go back up to 85 cents. We wonder
how the recession hurts the poor.
He bought his house from his landlord using all of his
savings. A few weeks ago, a FEMA representative stopped by to
say that, at the end of the month, his trailer would be taken
away. This proud, hardworking man today leaned against the wall
and weeps huge tears. He said he has had no help until the
Episcopal Church came to him. He has nowhere to go when his
trailer is taken. What is the value of that trailer? Who needs
it, except him? There are two trailers on that lot, and I
hesitate to say this in front of FEMA, but as soon as the last
family moved out, another one moved in. Don't leave them vacant
down there.
A date for the ending of trailers in DHAP is set to satisfy
whom? Not us. It really doesn't matter what date you set
because we cannot meet it.
Chair Norton, it is not a matter of a refusal to meet it,
but a deadline of next week or next year is for us a
humanitarian crisis, not because we refuse but because we are
unable. I ask that you take away the yardstick, the charts, the
requirements. I haven't quoted any figures this morning of
these agencies and that you build a human needs-based program.
When the needs are met, then end the program. We have people in
Calcasieu Parish from Rita that are still living in tent
cities. They haven't even gotten the trailers yet.
I plead with you to move beyond the Catch-22 design that
always catches the poor in a frightening vise of what one lady,
Mrs. B, whose husband is a Vietnam Veteran, has cancer, and she
has to unplug his breathing machine to run the appliances to
cook dinner. They would love to get out of that trailer. The
bed is too small; he has bedsores. Let me move ahead.
The problem is one of effective case management. I am still
running a very effective case management program in New Orleans
with three people. We have helped 672 families since the KAT
program folded. They tell us, "you are not only doing a good
job, Bishop, but treating us as human beings." The much
anticipated disaster case management pilot never happened in
Louisiana.
In conclusion, it seems to us arbitrary. It seems to us
threatening. It frightens us with these seemingly arbitrary
decisions to please someone else, to end these programs. And
they are not going to motivate us, ma'am. We are doing the best
we can.
I will have taken on Mr. and Mrs. B, and I have taken on
Mr. Hammond. They will in time be all right. Certainly some of
us are that demographic slice who will never be able to live
without public support. But most of us are not of the
chronically unable to cope. That is a total
mischaracterization. Men like Earnest Hammond are heroes. He is
coping.
There was a lady with a sign standing outside the Moriel
Convention Center when we were evacuated there. Her sign said,
"I am an American, too." The National Guard trucks rolled by
her and kept going. We are Americans, too, don't roll by us
again, thank you.
Ms. Norton. [Presiding.] Yes, you are Americans, and there
is no such thing as abandoning people to the streets, but we
have got three agencies here, all of whom claim to be working
hard to locate these residents, and we don't seem to have a
problem-solving approach for the last remaining residents.
When you have been able to accommodate thousands upon
thousands, it is unfathomable that we would be having this
trouble. And so let me first ask the Ranking Member if, before
he leaves, he has any questions beyond that which he has
already asked.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Madam Chair. I have a list of
questions, but unfortunately, as you have stated, I have to
leave because the Secretary of DHS Napolitano is going to be in
south Florida. I am actually going to go meet her there.
Thank you for your indulgence, but unfortunately, as you
said before, I will have to part. I think my questions will
have to wait until next time, but thank you for this hearing
and thank everybody for their testimony.
Ms. Norton. Thank you Mr. Diaz-Balart.
Mr. Tombar on page 1 of your testimony, you say that FEMA
has offered each family residing in--what is a THU? Temporary
Housing Unit. And these three rental resources that met their
individual needs, then you name the kinds of needs and they
seem--they certainly seem reasonable to me--number of bedrooms,
accessibility, considerations, units within a reasonable
commuting distance. All of these resources were within the
fair-market rate established by HUD. Yet you say that residents
have refused to locate in any of these three units at their
disposal?
Mr. Tombar. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. Now, you will then have to explain to this
Subcommittee how that is possible, because we cannot believe
that people believe they are entitled to whatever housing is
available in the United States. People who have been living as
long as these people have been living in the worst of
circumstances would not easily say, "no, eenie meenie minie mo,
you go back and find some more; I am not leaving."
You have got to explain why that is happening. Who is
working with these residents? How many such residents are there
in Louisiana and in Mississippi who are given housing that
meets the requirements you just named, but despite having three
sources, have turned them down? I want to know how many such
people there are and what you have do to ascertain how that
could possibly happen.
Mr. Tombar. Madam Chair, my colleague Mr. Garratt has the
details and wants to answer. If I could, before he does, just
to let you know that I am a native of New Orleans, and the
folks that we are talking about, many of them are my family
members, my friends, my former neighbors. And so I know
anecdotally and from my own experience about people who have
been offered and have refused these resources.
Ms. Norton. Now, so from your own experience Mr. Tombar,
why, from your own experience, have people turned down three
offers? We will go to Mr. Garratt in a minute. Since you are
now testifying as an expert witness, tell me why your own
friends and relatives would have turned down houses.
Mr. Tombar. There is something very attractive about being
near home, and these trailers that people have been living in
are on their lots, at their home.
Ms. Norton. On their own lots?
Mr. Tombar. Yes, ma'am. That they are working on, the homes
that they are working to repair. And these families that I am
speaking of, that I know of personally who have refused, have
refused because they want to stay----
Ms. Norton. Now, are these homes that are likely in fact in
time to be repaired as they are now in the process of being
repaired? Mr. Rainwater.
Mr. Rainwater. Madam Chair, of the 3,000 trailer residents
we have in Louisiana, about 1,800 of those were Road Home
applicants; 1,400 of those have closed on a Road Home grant.
And what we are finding is that, in some cases, people will be
able to complete their repairs. And FEMA is working closely
with us on that to time line that out.
In some cases, we are having folks who are having gap
financing issues, and so we are starting to take some of the
Community Block Grant Program money we have and put it aside
for a pilot reconstruction program so that, because the way the
Road Home was approved by HUD, we have to be careful that we
don't cause the duplication of benefit. And so we get about----
Ms. Norton. So there is a group--now remember, this hearing
we are regarding is a problem-solver.
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. There is a group that, leave aside the gap
group, that is a big group in the United States today, by the
way.
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. There is a group that could finish the
rebuilding of their home. Now, just let me ask all of you here,
let's deal with that group first, is there any reason why those
people who are going to have their own home now, who are
rebuilding their own home should not be left in their trailers
until such time as that occurrence?
Mr. Rainwater. Madam Chair, we are sharing that
information. FEMA is sharing the trailer information with us,
and we are sharing Road Home information with them. We have two
spreadsheets, for Road Home applicants and when they got their
grant, and then FEMA is telling us----
Ms. Norton. Because the people didn't exactly receive their
grants in a timely fashion, let's put that on the record.
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am.
And I will tell you that we closed 31,000 grants last year,
which were the toughest grants because of title issues,
succession issues and those sorts of challenges; the challenges
of the contractor in 2007 had done some of the easiest grants
in the beginning. And so we did about 30 outreach sessions last
year, not outreach, working sessions, took the whole staff out,
went out in low-income and poor communities and just worked
with folks to get their grants closed. So we have about 1,200
folks left to close. We identified those in a FEMA trailer and
those who are going to get HOME grants.
Ms. Norton. So there we have, Mr. Tombar, a group of people
who wouldn't even have the problem, I can understand your
problem.
And by the way the notion of being close, millions of
Americans who have to travel to get to Washington, D.C., every
day because the only housing they can afford is 2 hours away
from here. So we understand. We are not saying that this is for
everybody's convenience. But we can't believe that people who
live in these homes are simply looking for the best and the
most convenient.
Now here we have a group of people, let's see if we can get
agreement to the following proposition: With respect to
extensions, let us, at least for those people who are going to
aid in the national recovery by rebuilding their own homes,
would it not make sense for an extension to be granted with
respect to those people, just as a commonsense way, rather than
put them out of their homes, stop them from--because they have
to then use what income they have simply to find a place to
live. Wouldn't it be in the national interest and in the
interest of the State to at least partition off those people
for an extension pending some reasonable time for completion of
their rebuilding of their own homes? Is there agreement on
that?
Rev. Jenkins. Yes, yes.
Mr. Garratt. Madam Chair, it is an attractive proposition,
but in fact, what we are looking at here are, as we calculate
it, in Louisiana, 367 families who could complete repairs on
their home in 5 months or less.
Ms. Norton. 360 families.
Mr. Garratt. 367; another 258 could complete repairs on
their homes in 11 months or less; and 509 families whose
repairs would take at least a year to complete, and then
another 711 who are not rebuilding at all.
Ms. Norton. All right.
Mr. Garratt. Now, these figures do not indicate that there
is active repairs going on. What they reflect is that, were
active repairs to commence or to continue on these homes in an
active way, in other words, daily work on these homes, that the
home could be repaired in 5 months.
Ms. Norton. Now this is good, this is good, this is going--
go ahead.
Mr. Garratt. One point I want to make, it doesn't 6reflect
that active rebuilding is necessarily going on in every case.
In some cases, they have been 5 months away from rebuilding
their home for a year and a half. It is not quite as simple as
just----
Ms. Norton. This is an important point. Can we also say for
the record that the most serious recession since the Great
Depression is going on? If anybody is able to pick up a hammer
and do anything today when we just finished a stimulus package
just short of a trillion dollars because even the biggest
developers didn't have anything into the ground, I just want us
to note that for the record.
But what you have said, Mr. Garratt, is very important. And
I am not here indicating that there is a solution, and this is
a solution. I am simply trying to disaggregate the problem to
see how much of a problem we have.
Now with respect to the rebuilders, it does seem to me that
they are operating in the national interest and in the interest
of the State. These are homeowners.
Mr. Garrett's figures, I believe, are important figures
because they show an analysis of what is on the table with
respect to the rebuilders. At the moment, I have to stress that
the work isn't ongoing, since the only work I know is going
into stuff we have given people through the Federal Government
since we are the only people who can write checks in the world
and not have it count against our checking account.
My question really goes to whether or not Mr. Rainwater in
particular or for that matter HUD, Mr. Rainwater, there has
been considerable criticism. You hear Mr. Garratt talk about
the different stages of rebuilding here. We have to note that
our program that we were so proud of, Katrina cottages, where
we were generous in funding, has not so far as I know, and here
is a State, produced a single unit. I don't know why I should
hold these people to the standard of renovating their unit when
a whole, big State with nothing but billions of dollars flowing
in hasn't been able to produce one Katrina cottage.
Are we holding these people to a standard we are not
ourselves meeting? And would you explain here for the record
why there is not even one cottage? I realize these people would
not be in Katrina cottages, but I am trying to look at some
objective measure by which to look at, they are getting put out
of their trailer, and the State having not produced not one
housing units from the very promising Katrina cottage program.
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, Madam Chair. A couple of things. One
is, we have asked for extensions to FEMA and to HUD----
Ms. Norton. And just like these people are asking for
extensions in order to do their work.
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. So far, you all are on the same page, but they
have a whole lot less resources when they come to Katrina and
say give us some more time.
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am. My point of that is not to point
fingers. My point is to say that one of the things that
happened to us last year was Gustav and Ike. I have been
involved in the four, Katrina, Rita, Ike and Gustav----
Ms. Norton. That happened to everybody, Mr. Rainwater. It
set back those people Mr. Garratt told us may have finished in
5 months. It set back people who, being faced with a recession,
have been set back perhaps some considerable time.
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. The question for those people, it seems to me,
Mr. Garratt, and I am coming back to this, might well be, if
those people have the resources to ultimately build, have you
looked to see whether they could possibly rebuild with the
government help that is due them and the rest; one question
would be if these people have the resources with the associated
help to build at all. And if they do within 5 months, 11
months, 1 year, that is something that FEMA and for that matter
this Subcommittee might well have to take into consideration.
We are talking about people who are homeowners, perhaps have a
job because they are there or probably would be someplace else;
people who, with assistance, some assistance, whatever they are
due, would in fact be able to rebuild?
Mr. Garratt. Once again, it runs the gamut, Madam Chair,
there are some among that group actively engaged in this and
have the resources to do that. As I indicated in my testimony,
we have also been working with them to help them identify
contractors and to work with voluntary agencies and others who
can provide building materials and help for those who cannot do
it themselves, but the bottom line is it runs the gamut.
We have got a wide range of engagement on the part of the
homeowners and how fast, how aggressively they are pursuing
rebuilding.
Ms. Norton. Are these people receiving some assistance?
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, Madam Chair. On the tactical level, on
the ground, I don't sit in Baton Rouge, I go out and talk to
nonprofits, talked to Road Home applicants. My staff and FEMA's
staff walk trailers together and talk to applicants, and then
they bring the information back to us, and we talk about where
they are at. And that is where some of these pilot
reconstruction programs have come from, are from meetings with
Road Home applicants and nonprofits about, how do we help them
with the gap issue?
The other piece of this is that the FEMA folks on the
ground, the Transition Recovery Office, have told us that they
will work with applicants, if someone is 5 months out or 6 or 7
months out from getting their construction complete; they will
work with us.
The other piece that we are trying to do is----
Ms. Norton. They will work with you, of course, working
with you may mean they can't be put out of their trailer.
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am, that is right, so they can
complete their reconstruction. There is a pretty massive
effort.
Ms. Norton. Does that mean, Mr. Garratt, that FEMA would
regard it as reasonable with respect to those people that Mr.
Rainwater has identified to allow them to remain in their
trailers until they can proceed and have their construction
done?
Mr. Garratt. If that was the only consideration at play
here, Madam Chair, perhaps, but it is not the only
consideration at play here.
The title of this hearing is, "Still Post-Katrina: How FEMA
Decides When Housing Responsibilities End." What i would like
to do is just address that as part of a comprehensive answer to
this question.
We provide temporary housing units as a last resort. We
provide temporary housing units, these forms of manufactured
housing, because there are no organic rental resources
available to support the population that needs this assistance.
So we roll these in; we set them up, and we provide those to
fulfill that gap. We continue to provide those until the rental
capacity reaches the point it could now support a population,
and we can move them out of what are largely, in the case of
travel trailers, an inadequate long-term living environment. We
have been up here to testify before about the inadequacies of
living in a travel trailer; that it is no place for families to
live long term. In fact, we have policies in place now that
only allow us to use those for 6 months in new disasters. We
have families who have been living in these things for
approaching 4 years at this point.
Ms. Norton. I have to stop you there for one second. If
these families were to move out of these trailers, I am trying
to get with this group of families here between you and Mr.
Rainwater; what would happen to those trailers?
Mr. Garratt. They would be scrapped, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. That is right. So let's get that on the record.
These trailers would be scrapped, so that there would be no
return to the government. Are the trailers costing you
anything?
Mr. Garratt. Yes, ma'am. We pay operations and maintenance
for these trailers.
Ms. Norton. So tell me what you pay.
Mr. Garratt. I can tell you what we pay, yes, ma'am. We can
get these figures----
Ms. Norton. I am talking about--I don't need the total
amount. If there is an individual trailer unit, what is it for
the maintenance of the trailer unit that you pay? Do you pay
the heat or the light or the utilities or what?
Mr. Garratt. No, ma'am. In most cases for trailers that are
on private property, they pay the utilities for that.
Ms. Norton. So what is that it you pay? I am trying to find
out the outlay of the government as opposed to the outlay of
the government, for example, if these people are thrust onto
the rental market. Let's do a cost/benefit analysis here.
Mr. Garratt. We pay a maintenance contractor. We have
maintenance and deactivation contracts. Those contractors----
Ms. Norton. Do you pay essentially the lease of what is
going to be destroyed?
Mr. Garratt. Well, we purchase those units and again we----
Ms. Norton. They are purchased now. You own them.
Mr. Garratt. We do.
Ms. Norton. So I am trying to find out what you pay. You
have already bought them. You are going to destroy them. They
are serving a good purpose at this point. I am not even talking
about all the people in the trailers. I am talking about the
people who fit these various months from reconstruction from
their home. What is the value to the government in putting
them--would they, in fact--if they were put onto the rental
market, would there be homes, rental housing for these families
if they vacated the trailers? Mr. Tombar, do you want to answer
that one?
Mr. Tombar. Yes, ma'am. Yes, in fact, the Governor of
Mississippi was recently here meeting with the Secretary of HUD
and put the vacancy rate in the southern part of Mississippi at
upwards of 25 percent.
Ms. Norton. For market rate for people of the income level,
we are describing here.
Mr. Tombar. Yes.
Ms. Norton. That is what the Governor of Mississippi said.
Mr. Tombar. He said that he has a vacancy rate of nearly
25----
Ms. Norton. For people, for example, who need Section 8
housing, sir. Does he have that kind of vacancy rate for them?
Mr. Tombar. We have, as I testified----
Ms. Norton. I have got a vacancy rate here too for people
who can pay $6,000 a month. What kind of talk is that, vacancy
rate? We are talking about the most vulnerable families----
Mr. Tombar. You asked the question--I am sorry, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. We are talking about the most vulnerable
families or people who will need housing assistance from you,
sir, from you, sir, almost all of them, if they are to be
moved.
Mr. Tombar. I was speaking about what units are available
and then there are resources that are available to go with
these units----
Ms. Norton. Mr. Tombar, would you submit within 2 weeks, 14
days, based on your own testimony, to this Committee the rental
units in the State of Mississippi and in the State of Louisiana
by income that--by contemplating income, whatever is the
technical term? Never come before this Committee with some
notion of a rental rate that includes everybody from the
richest people to the poorest. You didn't even say it was the
fair market rate of what level. That is to give us no
information. So that is all right, sir. You don't have the
information at your fingertips.
I want to know what is the vacancy rate in the State of
Mississippi by county, within 14 days, and by income level.
That information alone is useful to the Committee. We are not
going to require the government to do what is impossible, but
we are not going to accept massive nonsense figures like that.
Mr. Tombar. Ma'am, if I could----
Ms. Norton. It is very interesting that there is nobody
from Mississippi here, and I said to the staff there should
have been. But your answer--this whole hearing is about
Louisiana and you quoted me a rate for Mississippi. Now quote
me the rate for New Orleans. Quote me the rate for Louisiana.
Mr. Tombar. I will. And if I could, that was the first part
of my answer. The second part of my answer is that there are
resources available to subsidize rent for families that cannot
afford it, as I testified to in my testimony.
Ms. Norton. Okay. Now, this is important. Wait a minute.
Section 8 housing, we had phone calls to my office telling me
that--this is an example of a family who--it came from someone
in the District of Columbia that found housing for her own
disabled--for some disabled relatives. When she found the
housing, FEMA agreed that it must have been within the rate
that FEMA would allow people. Now she is being told that FEMA
will no longer pay because she is going to be past the
deadline. And, by the way, she has been told to get out of the
housing on a date soon to come, not August, but get out of the
date now. So these people are receiving these notices now. So
she has been told to get out of the housing or pay. Then she
went to HUD and they said--I think this was in the Baton Rouge
area, and they said we don't have any Section 8 housing
available.
This is a disabled person. What would be available to that
person whose relative has been rendering self help in the first
place and paid the rent until the relative qualified, since she
has been told there is no Section 8 housing and she is
disabled, what should my office tell this relative that your
testimony is here today.
Mr. Tombar. Yes, ma'am. For--I assume that she is near East
Baton Rouge Parish. And I have numbers here. For East Baton
Rouge Parish we have made available 459 vouchers for families
and prioritize--that housing authority has prioritized elderly
and disabled families. To date, only of those 459, there are
approximately 300 families that have availed themselves of
those vouchers so----
Ms. Norton. Explain that to me. So you say most of them
have come forward, 300 out of----
Mr. Tombar. Out of 459, 300 have been--families have been
invited in to make themselves available of those vouchers.
Ms. Norton. Oh, excuse me. I thought you meant 300 had, in
fact, accepted the vouchers.
Mr. Tombar. That number actually is 206.
Ms. Norton. So is this about half of them? So your
testimony to me is that there is Section 8 housing, voucher
housing, available in the Baton Rouge area.
Mr. Tombar. In the Baton Rouge area, in the New Orleans
area, in places throughout southern Louisiana, there are
resources available for families. Each of these housing
authorities, we have been working them since immediately after
the storm, ma'am, to get them to prioritize, providing
resources to families that were displaced by Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita. We have provided--this Congress has provided $85
million to convert families that were previously on DHAP
program to the Permanent Housing Choice Voucher program. With
that, we have prioritized families who are elderly and
disabled, like the woman that you mentioned. So there are
resources available in those States--in those communities for
those families. In fact, you asked specifically about New
Orleans. In New Orleans, there is a list of landlords who have
come into our local housing authority there saying that they
are willing to make their units available to eligible families,
that runs now over a thousand landlords along a thousand units
long that has been sitting there without new----
Ms. Norton. Mr. Rainwater, I hear this testimony from HUD.
They have got a glut of housing here, if we can only get
somebody to take it is essentially what he is saying. Can you
make this Subcommittee understand what the issue here is? See,
I am dealing with the trailers differently. I gave Mr. Tombar a
question regarding somebody who is renting. I have to assume,
and I must say I find this puzzling, if this person is in
housing that was approved by HUD with Mr. Garratt, I would
assume that that is the kind of housing that would qualify for
Section 8, because otherwise I don't think HUD--if FEMA would
have put this person in such a high-rent place that he couldn't
be converted to Section 8 if that time came.
Mr. Garratt. Actually, Madam Chair, that is not necessarily
accurate.
Ms. Norton. They could have been in a high-rent place where
you were subsidizing?
Mr. Garratt. Well, we didn't pick the apartments for
individuals through our program. We provide funding to
applicants and applicants choose where they live. Now, we can
identify available forms of housing and we do that for these
applicants, but they choose where they live as opposed to under
HUD's program, HUD will help place them in a HUD approved
property.
Ms. Norton. Now I want to speak with Mr. Rainwater and then
with Reverend Jenkins.
Now, Mr. Rainwater, is it your experience, as a State
official, that there is Section 8 housing just waiting for
people to come forward and accept it?
Mr. Rainwater. Madam Chair, one of the challenges I think
that--there is no doubt, as I have said earlier, we have made
great progress whether it is small rental or--we closed on six
large apartment complexes or actually did grand openings in
March of this year. Many of those are mixed-income communities.
So capacity is coming back online and in many cases or in some
cases what you have, and I have gone out and spoken with folks,
and you mentioned it earlier people don't want to commute or
they don't want to be away from their neighborhood. And that
is----
Ms. Norton. Just a moment. Mr. Jenkins, I come to the--
there is some truth in that. There is no question about it. You
find that, in fact, more settled people are--by the way, it is
interesting that there were statistics that came out of
Louisiana that said that people were all the populations in the
country over the migrations, the great migration, for example,
of black people to the north, people in Louisiana were the
least likely to leave. They liked where they were. So I can
understand it having visited New Orleans. And of course people
in New Orleans have seen huge catastrophes, just not quite one
this big. So what Mr. Rainwater has said, that there are people
that just can't imagine being away from their home community,
would, in fact, be the case.
Now, I have to ask you whether you find that and I also
have to ask you about case management, whether or not there is
an - people are working adequately with residents to understand
the limits of the Federal Government, the limits of the State
Government, and the limited choices we all have to make in this
life.
Rev. Jenkins. Thank you. I find that New Orleans is one of
the places in this country that still gives people a sense of
identity. Where there is a great American exodus happened, many
people stay in New Orleans. Many of the houses we discovered--
--
Ms. Norton. And indeed you have had a very rapid return of
population.
Rev. Jenkins. We have.
Ms. Norton. More than anyone thought. What is the
population of New Orleans now, please? And I will let you go in
a minute.
Mr. Rainwater. It is right at about a little over 300,000.
What is interesting though, ma'am, is the region is back up
over a million.
Ms. Norton. What was the region before?
Mr. Rainwater. It was about 1.3 million. It is up a little
over a million. In New Orleans before the storm was around
340,000, and it is up around 310, thereabouts, ma'am.
Rev. Jenkins. The demographic we find that is most--the
population that is returning to New Orleans now last month was
1,800 and some odd African American people, many of whom are
coming back from Texas, and just, I think, a couple hundred
Anglo and other returning. People are returning home. You get a
sense of identity of who you are in New Orleans.
I worked with Jerome Smith of Tamborine & Fan. Fifty-one
percent of youth of New Orleans are still gone, and we are
tracking them and trying to work with them where they are. I
personally--and I know that all my testimony is anecdotal and I
apologize for that. But I disagree with the effectiveness of
FEMA's understanding of case management. What I hear on the
streets and what I see on the streets is that when contact is
made, we are given a list of telephone numbers. I believe that
that list at----
Ms. Norton. Telephone numbers of whom, sir?
Rev. Jenkins. People like these thousand empty apartments,
people who are going to have resources for us, people who are
going to help. You can call those numbers and no one answers.
Ms. Norton. Just a moment.
Mr. Garratt, would you like to respond to that, the notion
that people are given telephone numbers rather than case
management?
Mr. Garratt. Madam Chair, actually much of case management
involves, as a matter of practice, referral. Case managers
identify needs and then they refer the individual to services
and people who specialize in dealing with those needs.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Garratt, I do agree with that and I think
that for the average American, that would surely be the case.
This hearing concerns disabled people, elderly people, people
who are least likely--they want to stay where they are because
they have no idea what happened to them or what will happen to
them. So if case management for a disabled person or an elderly
person amounts to here is what Mr. Tombar has to offer, my
question to you would be do you provide some transportation for
that person so that they can go look at these resources?
Mr. Garratt. Providing transportation is not something that
is normally a part of the case management.
Ms. Norton. Well, my Lord, let me assume some of these
people are blind, some of these people have no transportation
and live in that trailer or that unit because they have no way
to get out. How would they--most of these people are on
assistance, government assistance of some kind. How would you
suggest that those people go about dealing with the referral to
three units that Mr. Tombar has to offer?
Mr. Garratt. In most communities across the United States,
there are social service organizations and voluntary agencies
who will provide that kind of support.
Ms. Norton. All right. Let us now go to Mr. Rainwater. The
State interest in getting these residents to one of these
available units--this is the first time I ever heard of Section
8 housing being available in the city. So I am quite excited
about it. We don't have any available here. Your interest as a
State would be very high as well. What does the State or the
city offer? Let me ask you first, is it your responsibility or
whose responsibility--Mr. Tombar said I have got the units, Mr.
Garratt says I have got the referrals. What do you say, Mr.
Rainwater?
Mr. Rainwater. Madam Chair, last year when I took this job
in 2008, we started working on a strategy to create some sort
of safety net. We also started working on extensions, as you
know, and you know how the extensions work is they come up
every 6 months.
Ms. Norton. The extensions of what?
Mr. Rainwater. Extensions of the FEMA trailer program and
the Disaster Housing Assistance program. When Secretary
Donovan----
Ms. Norton. Mr. Rainwater, let me stop you there because
the extension notion could become like cocaine.
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. And here you are talking to someone here who is
very sympathetic to the residents because they are human beings
who have been subjected to the worst of disasters. But it
sounds to me as though you all need to be put into withdrawal.
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am. And I was going to get to that
point. I mean what I wanted to do was walk you through sort of
the steps of what we were looking at to move folks out of
disaster housing, and that is it is really time and money. It
was a matter of getting our small rental program----
Ms. Norton. With a minute, Mr. Rainwater. I want to insist
on an answer to my question. You see, we are trying to solve
something here. I have got the units, I have got the referrals,
and I don't have any way for some 80-year-old woman or some
blind man to get to a referral. My question to you is what does
the State or what does the city have to do in this--are you
part of it and----
Mr. Rainwater. Yes.
Ms. Norton. I am going to first insist upon an answer to my
question. Are you providing a service once these two agencies
have done their part?
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am, there are a number of nonprofits
that we work with throughout the city, throughout the region.
It is not the best case management program, and there is no
doubt it has gaps. There is no doubt about that. But we do
have--we have case managers working directly with FEMA. We have
contracted with the Housing Authority of New Orleans to help us
work through those issues. And we also work with groups like
Unity of New Orleans, who went out and pick up folks who are
disabled or the group that you are talking about and I have
seen those cases and we have actually been on the ground with
the nonprofits as they go and talk to people. But it is not--it
is--what we are trying to do, it is not as comprehensive as it
could be because we never got there----
Ms. Norton. Mr. Rainwater, I was very impressed by your
testimony last time you appeared here because you were the sole
problem solver in the bunch, and I must say you are not rising
to that level of problem solving here. Mr. Jenkins, for
example, in his testimony complains about FEMA's inability to
share information, and here is a nonprofit.
Mr. Rainwater. Madam Chair, we are--one of the things that
we did----
Ms. Norton. Client information he is talking about. Client
information with State and local governments so that additional
service can be provided. You know, with the kind of approach
you took, which was to get the actors, the relevant actors,
together, it seems to me that that kind of situation could be
solved as long as these two gentlemen are meeting their
obligations.
Mr. Rainwater. And that is what we are doing, Madam Chair.
I mean that is exactly what I have been trying to say is what
we have been doing for the last year and a half are working
with nonprofits, working with FEMA on the ground, the guys on
the ground working with----
Ms. Norton. Reverend Jenkins is on the ground and he is
here to complain. What is it about working on the ground, be
specific, that you have found inadequate, Reverend Jenkins?
Rev. Jenkins. Thank you, yes. I have found the example of
supposed case management that is being used by the State and by
FEMA to be inadequate for people who cannot help themselves.
Obviously, I was able to help them myself. I think the main
thing is a failure in case management. I would also point out--
--
Ms. Norton. Now, if there were case management, what would
it consist of Reverend Jenkins?
Rev. Jenkins. In our situation where we run a privately
funded case management operation, because people of faith and
goodwill are continuing to write checks as well even through
the recession, it means for us, first of all, that we take
seriously and respect the dignity of every human being. We see
them not as a means to an end that is profit nor----
Ms. Norton. No, sir. I want to know what it consists of.
Your own values are above reproach. I want to know what your
case management relationship to the State or the city consist
of.
Rev. Jenkins. To the State or city, we have little
relationship to the State or city.
Ms. Norton. This is important. Why? Since you are willing
to help people and you are doing it on your own dime?
Rev. Jenkins. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. What is the difficulty then of dealing with the
State or the city?
Rev. Jenkins. In some ways, Madam Chair, I felt that
ethically I could not participate in the case management system
that was being designed in that it did not provide the kind of
opportunity and freedom for New Orleanians to maintain their
homes in our city nor did it provide for the dignity of all. I
was in Renaissance Village north of Baton Rouge in the town of
Baker when a representative told this hugely primarily African
American group you can live anywhere in the United States you
want, except you can't go home.
Ms. Norton. Well, going home might have meant the Ninth
Ward so----
Mr. Jenkins. Right. I am building the Ninth Ward.
Ms. Norton. Well, maybe you can't go home there today. We
are trying to get people to something that can be home pending
the rebuilding of New Orleans. And I can understand the
position you have taken. I think I have got to go back to Mr.
Rainwater because even if you are doing--you, Reverend Jenkins,
are doing work, and I must say it is extraordinary work to do
that on private resources, the State of Louisiana and the city
of New Orleans and the parishes have a responsibility for
casework, so does for that matter FEMA, quite apart from any
private resources so the first place I would turn to for the
casework would be to the State and to the city and the parish.
Are there caseworkers assigned to these last remaining most
vulnerable residents?
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am, there are. And I will just--I
understand Reverend Jenkins' perspective. Many nonprofits chose
not to work with us on case management because we were not able
to provide--because of the way that dollars come down, because
of, you, just the--in some cases it is a little rigid.
Nonprofits chose not to work with us, and I can understand
that. And I have tried as hard as we possibly can to make these
dollars as flexible as possible to provide case management the
way they would like but in some cases we just couldn't do it.
Ms. Norton. Couldn't do what, sir?
Mr. Rainwater. Well, for example, in some cases nonprofits
felt like, you know, they didn't want to just have a referral
service, and we have been able to manage some transportation
and other things working through the network of different
providers whether it is at the city or whether it is at a
nonprofit. But what many of the nonprofits wanted to do was not
only have the case management but also have the dollars to
provide to the resident to help them to, you know, buy
furniture, to do other things. We didn't have those dollars to
do that because of the way some of the congressional
appropriations language was written. So that has been part of
the challenge.
Ms. Norton. So we would go back, then, to the case managers
from the State of Louisiana and the parishes involved----
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. --who would understand the rules. Are you
testifying here today that each resident who needs a case
manager has one?
Mr. Rainwater. I can't say that every resident has a
particular--there are--depending on--each resident gets a phone
call and each trailer who has a resident in it is getting a
visit from a State employee and a FEMA employee. Their needs
are talked about there, and then they come back, and what we
try to do is marry up----
Ms. Norton. Do you provide transportation to one of these
three units that Mr. Tombar has made available?
Mr. Rainwater. Using the city's transportation system and
the nonprofits out there----
Ms. Norton. The nonprofits may not be working with you. It
is the city's responsibility if there wasn't a single nonprofit
in the whole state----
Mr. Rainwater. The city of New Orleans is working with us,
ma'am. And we have meetings. It is the kind of meetings we
talked about at the last hearing. We are having meetings where
we talk about what the needs are and then we try to marry up
those needs with----
Ms. Norton. Mr. Rainwater, let me ask you this: It sounds
to me as though, quite apart from the valuable work that Mr.
Jenkins is doing, that we need a crisis group for these last
most vulnerable residents, that we need closer interaction
between FEMA, HUD, the State, and I would dare say the parishes
that are also involved.
Would--let me ask the three of you if you would be willing
to develop a task force devoted exclusively to finding a way,
an appropriate way--I am not here saying what it is. You notice
that I am not saying that they should be in housing, that they
should not be there or--but an appropriate way to find
solutions for the last remaining victims of Katrina. I am only
asking for a grouping who would be devoted solely to this task
so that Mr. Rainwater would not testify, as he has here, that
we of course called the local housing authority. I am not
talking about that. I am talking about somebody from the
housing authority that the State would say you must give us for
this task force, someone on the ground from HUD, on the ground
from FEMA who would work on the best way to find solutions
without any notion of what those solutions should be.
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am.
Mr. Tombar. Yes, ma'am.
Mr. Garratt. Not only yes, ma'am, but I believe we have
already established in Louisiana a Joint Housing Task Force,
with the State and HUD's participation, that has been up and
running for a couple of months now focused on exactly that.
Ms. Norton. Who are the members of this group that are
focused solely on this? What are their----
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am. It is a number of--my
organizations are the Recovery Authority, Department of Social
Services, FEMA, HUD representatives----
Ms. Norton. Are there people assigned from those agencies
whose job is to work on these--all those agencies is telling me
nothing. They have a statutory responsibility. I am asking for
a kind of task force.
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am. And that is what--we got into a
data-sharing agreement with FEMA and HUD at the beginning of
this year that allowed us to look at each other's information--
not just look at information but decide how we were going to
try to solve problems. And that is, you know, moving dollars to
a project management, to nonprofits like the lower Ninth Ward,
where they can help folks finish rebuilding their homes. I
mean, those are the kinds of things that we are trying to come
to solutions with. Again, it is complicated. But, yes, ma'am,
and we will go back----
Ms. Norton. Would you within 14 days submit to this
Subcommittee the name of the person on the task force--I am
calling it that. You can call it anything you want to--assigned
to working together with the agencies involved and the units
involved or any others that you think necessary to accomplish
the task, names that we want, names, who are working
specifically on finding solutions. I understand that you may
have a group of whom you have to tell us there are no solutions
we can find. We just need to know that. But we don't need to
know by agency. We need to know by person who is assigned to
this task.
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am.
Mr. Garratt. Absolutely.
Ms. Norton. And I need to you to know there is a
presumption, the government exercises a presumption against
extensions. We don't like the fact that extensions come at the
last moment. We think that causes, as I said in my opening
remarks, terrible stress. But that doesn't mean that we think
the answer here is an extension. At the same time, we are not
going to see people put out on the street, and at the same
time, we are not going to allow people to say I demand to be in
Orleans parish and I am not going. If they are not going, then
they can't ask the government of the United States to pay for
them where they are. But at the moment, we can't figure out one
from the other because the information is too vague and we are
too close to the August deadline and people are already being
put out and the press all over the country is running stories
about how people are being put out of trailers and other
housing, not being subsidized, without adequate housing being
provided.
And the reason this hearing is being held is we don't have
the answer back on who is right. You would think we would have
much better answers if we knew very specifically not that one
agency is calling the other agency to try to get somebody to
help out and getting some hardworking civil servant to do the
best that they can, but there is a concentrated group that
understands we are acting in, we are acting in, we are dealing
with the people who would be least likely to go out and take a
telephone number and find Section 8 housing or the like.
I never did get an answer because I am trying to solve a
problem rather than simply put answers on the record. But I
must get an answer better than the answer that, well, we have
had more than one, Mr. Rainwater, after all, more than one
hurricane. I can understand how you would be set back on the
Katrina cottages by the additional hurricane. What I can't
understand is the failure to produce one single cottage. That
is what you have got to make me understand.
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am. I went to work for the Governor
of January of 2008. To that point nothing had been done from an
administrative perspective as it relates to Katrina cottages.
Ms. Norton. What was the reason for that?
Mr. Rainwater. I don't know, ma'am. I just know that
Governor Jindal asked me to take it over and get it moving.
Ms. Norton. How much money is out there waiting----
Mr. Rainwater. It is $74 million, although that number is a
lot less now because we have actually spent money and we
actually have construction going up in four different sites in
Louisiana: Lake Charles, Baton Rouge and New Orleans.
Ms. Norton. For Katrina cottages?
Mr. Rainwater. Yes.
Ms. Norton. When is the earliest we can expect the Katrina
cottages to be up?
Mr. Rainwater. We expect construction in New Orleans in
August and in September. We have got sites that we plan to--
about a hundred will be up in New Orleans about August/
September time frame, working with the New Orleans
Redevelopment Authority. In December the 15th at HANO, we
expect another hundred to be up. And in Baton Rouge, Louisiana,
about 42 should be up or be complete by July 31. And in Lake
Charles, Louisiana, we expect another 70 or so in August of
this year. So we worked through a lot of the challenges and
we--you can see construction happening. We also got permission
from FEMA to build 200 system-built Katrina cottages so what we
did----
Ms. Norton. That was a--this is very good information to
put on the record. Would that take care of all the Katrina
homes that----
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am. By the end of September-November
timeframe, barring weather, we plan to have 500 cottages up. So
we are working with the nonprofits, four different nonprofit
agencies that, you know, have developed the eligibility
criteria that would take care of Katrina and Rita evacuees. So
yes, ma'am, we are making progress on that. We have worked
through a lot of issues there and FEMA has worked very closely
with us as has the city of New Orleans and the city of Baton
Rouge and Lake Charles.
Ms. Norton. Now, the progress you made, and I do know, Mr.
Rainwater, that you were called to this task that was not
moving at all and we knew from your prior testimony that you
have made things happen. The reason that we are concerned here
is because we need you to make something happen just as quickly
with respect to these residents. For example, there is a
program, $869 million State program, that was also federally
funded. It targeted more than 18,000 damaged rental unites. It
had resulted in fewer than 1,200 repairs by late March, so far
as we have been able to understand. Now, these would be the
units most, I suppose, in demand although Mr. Tombar says he
has got units to burn out there.
But in any case what is the reason for the slow progress in
the one kind of unit that you would think would be most in
demand, these rental units, with all that Federal money out
there, 18,000 targeted, 1,200 repaired by late March?
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am, there are two programs we are
running. One is a small rental program that targets what we
call mom and pop renters. Those are folks that--retired school
teachers. I have met with a lot of these folks that--a refinery
employee who had a lot of overtime one year and bought a duplex
to be part of the American Dream and own property. So after the
storm, obviously they lost their home. They lost their rental
unit. The State set up a rental program in 2007 before I was
there that basically gave someone a letter of commitment that
they took to the bank. When I got there in January of 2008, we
said I would give it 6 months to work. It didn't show much
progress and so we started doing some tweaks to the program. We
have actually gotten about 1,400 units produced today.
Ms. Norton. 1,400----
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am. Actually 1,439. We expect to
close or produce another 3,000 by the end of this year. We have
slowly changed the production and the makeup of the program.
What we are going to start doing is advancing cash to folks,
and that is basically--I have to tell you, Madam Chair, I have
to take some responsibility for that because I should have just
thrown the program out when I got there in February because it
was too slow moving. So we are going to start advances starting
this June, and we are doing a massive outreach program to these
mom and pop renters to work with them because in some cases
they are not necessarily professional, you know, managers----
Ms. Norton. Where are they now?
Mr. Rainwater. Mostly--New Orleans had a large majority.
Ms. Norton. Where are they living?
Mr. Rainwater. Many are back in their homes. And that was
part of the challenge, that they used their own home money
obviously and their insurance money to rebuild their home, not
necessarily their rental unit. And in some cases we have folks
living on one side of a duplex----
Ms. Norton. Let me understand this. These people, you call
them arm and pop?
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. Meaning what, please?
Mr. Rainwater. Just folks that live in the community that
bought----
Ms. Norton. That had homes.
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am, they had homes. Right. They had
duplexes and triplexes and fourplexes in New Orleans.
Ms. Norton. They wouldn't be going into the rental units,
then, would they?
Mr. Rainwater. Excuse me, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. They wouldn't be going into the rental units?
Mr. Rainwater. No, ma'am. Most of them are homeowners. Some
folks lived on one side and rented out other sides. And so--
where they fixed up one side of the unit and then wanted to
rent out the other side of the unit. So we are working with the
folks very closely.
Ms. Norton. I see.
Mr. Rainwater. The other program is the Low Income Housing
Tax Program. And we call it the piggyback program where we take
low-income housing tax credits and go-zone and take Community
Development Block Grant money and lay it on top of that. We had
about 57 projects awarded originally, but right now we have 19
under construction and that will create about 3,181 units. One
of our challenges obviously is the credit crunch that we are
having.
So what we are trying to do is move--working very closely
with HUD and the Louisiana Housing Finance Agency, we continue
to move dollars around and tax credits around to make projects
work. So we are making progress. We believe that by the end of
this year, there will be around--if you take the small rental
and you take the low-income housing tax credit program, we
think there will be about 7,000 units that will be available.
Many of those will be affordable units.
Ms. Norton. Now, we have figures that show about 4,000
homeowners, a little more than that, have received rebuilding
money only in the last 6 months and these people I think are in
trailers. Many of them have inadequate grants and, of course,
the court and credit crunch and the rest. What is the humane
and reasonable government response? For these people only got
it in the last 6 months in the middle of the worst recession,
what should we do with those people.
Mr. Rainwater. Madam Chair, what we have asked to work with
FEMA on is to--and with HUD is to give us time to continue to
work with those applicants to help them get the dollars they
need to complete their repairs.
Ms. Norton. This is where the task force is going to be
very important because we have got to break down these into the
units that Mr. Garratt suggested. There are some closer than
others. Perhaps there are some that won't be.
The one thing I have to ask you to take into account as we
consider what to be done because if it takes a statutory
change, you are going to get it. But one of the things you have
got to take into account is that there is no building being
going on to speak of in the United States of America except
building that is subsidized by the Government of the United
States. It is as if the recession put a stop when there were
shovels in the ground. So we had to step up and move matters
forward. There is no way in which we can fail to take that into
account with respect to private parties. So I would put that on
the table as an ingredient for the task force whose names you
are going to provide us within 14 days.
Now let me ask about evictions. Are people being evicted
from trailers as I speak? And if so, can you assure this
Subcommittee that all of them have adequate housing or have
been given three sources and have nonetheless refused and if
they refused, regardless of their circumstances and regardless
of their disability, they are simply evicted?
Mr. Garratt. Yes, ma'am. No one has been evicted. Evictions
have not, in fact, commenced. In fact, no one should expect the
evictions to commence for some period of time.
Ms. Norton. What about the August deadline? People have
received notice that they ought to get out within a couple of
weeks or within a timeframe, have they not?
Mr. Garratt. That is correct, ma'am. What we have done is
provided proper notification to them.
Ms. Norton. Suppose someone is notified that you must be
out by July 1st? What would you do if that person were not out
by July 1st of a trailer?
Mr. Garratt. I will walk you through the process here
again. We notified them early on that the program was ending on
May 1st. On June 1st is when we will officially begin making
referrals of individuals or households or can begin making
referrals of households who have not yet vacated those
properties. But that is a lengthy process, ma'am. We don't
refer them and then evictions begin the next day. In fact,
there are a number of steps that have to be gone through and I
would anticipate that evictions would not begin for some period
of time while that process----
Ms. Norton. Even after the August deadline for remaining in
that housing?
Mr. Garratt. It is entirely possible, ma'am. You also
asked----
Ms. Norton. A lot of this has to do with whether or not
this task force gets its act together with respect to case
management. Remember the Subcommittee has taken the position
that if you are given three resources that meet the tests Mr.
Tombar has indicated, you must take them. Even if they are not
where you want to be, even if they are not in the parish you
want to be you have to in fact do it. Now, we understand what
we are saying. It may be that you now have to--you now have to
drive. That is a terrible thing to say to somebody, but you
have got to drive and spend money on gas that you would not
have had to do, but I cite to you all the people that are doing
that in the ordinary course. Now, this would assume this person
had a job. In other words, we are all having to cut what we
spend on everything. We are not able to provide ever optimum
resources. Even those of us who have been fortunate in life do
not have optimum resources. So we are not going to put on the
government a burden that it cannot bear.
But we are certainly not going to say to somebody that here
are three resources and you have got to find your own way to
them or get you cane together or your crutch or get you
somebody, you who have no children in the area, get you
somebody to get out there and find it. That is just as inhuman
as an eviction. That is why I would be satisfied with a task
force doing what it can. And if you are assuring me there will
be no evictions, then I am satisfied with that answer.
Mr. Garratt. Ma'am, I am assuring you that there will be no
evictions on June 1, and assuring you that in fact the process
for beginning the actual evictions is a lengthy one.
Ms. Norton. Are you assuring me that there will be no
evictions on August, whatever is the final date----
Mr. Garratt. No, ma'am, I am not. However, I can assure
you, to follow-up previous request that you had, every single
one of these occupants has received a minimum of three
properties at the fair market rent made available to them and
in some cases as high as 90 offers. So every one of the
occupants has, we can assure you, been offered a minimum of
three housing resources within a reasonable commuting distance.
Ms. Norton. We understand also the difference of the dates
among you. There is the May 1st date, there is the August--the
August 30th date for referrals by HUD.
Mr. Tombar. That is the termination of the transition of
closeout plan, the program that follows the DHAP program which
ended on----
Ms. Norton. Excuse me. Would you explain termination of the
what? What it means.
Mr. Tombar. The Disaster Housing Assistance Program that
you mentioned in your opening remarks terminated for Katrina
and Rita victims at the end of February. Secretary Napolitano
and Secretary Donovan worked together to make sure that some
31,000 families would not be displaced and so put in for 6
months through the end of August of this year a transitional
closeout plan to allow those families time to either, one,
convert to the Housing Choice Voucher program for which I have
testified that there are ample resources available for families
that are eligible for that program and units available in many
of the communities in Louisiana or to transition----
Ms. Norton. Market rate units with subsidies provided by
the government where necessary.
Mr. Tombar. Yes, ma'am. Or to transition to self
sufficiency if, in fact, those families are not eligible for
that program. So that program----
Ms. Norton. In other words, transition to self sufficiency
if ineligible. I understand that. In other words, there might
be some people who are working but----
Mr. Tombar. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. And therefore would not be eligible. But what
would be the transition assistance in that case?
Mr. Tombar. In that case those families, the rent that they
were paying in February of this year was--their contribution to
that rent was increased by $100 each month thereafter. So the
government--for example, if a family had a rent of $600 in
March, we would have paid--the government would have paid $500
on that family's behalf and their contribution would have been
$100 and each month the family's contribution went up $100 in
the--and the government's went down by $100.
Allowing time for those families that were eligible to move
into the Housing Choice Voucher program which would cover a
substantial amount more of their rent by the government. The
government will cover that with resources through that HCV
program.
Ms. Norton. We understand there is a hardship there, but
the hardship is they have to pick up more of the cost of
housing through their own income. But I understand that will
mean, therefore, that the decision has been made that could
happen, that we are not dealing with a family for whom that
would be an intolerable hardship.
Mr. Tombar. Quite frankly, ma'am, part of the challenge is
that you talked about the problem with extensions. Having seen
extensions before, families just were not availing themselves
of the resources----
Ms. Norton. That is why I am sending two messages in this
hearing. One for you, but one for the families. I want to
compare themselves with other families in the United States and
they will see what I mean. I hate to say it, but there are
families who would love to live in a trailer rather than a
Holiday Inn in one room with three or four children today
because they couldn't pay their mortgage through no fault of
their own. So two messages are sent. That is why I am trying to
make sure the government does its part by having the
appropriate case management and the agencies working even
closer together than they have.
Now, Reverend Jenkins, you had----
Rev. Jenkins. Madam Chair, I respectfully disagree with
some of the testimony that has gone forward and again I have to
say based on anecdotal evidence. I believe that--I do not
believe there are a thousand Section 8 units available in New
Orleans, or if so, I can't find them, or they are not
affordable, or our friends----
Ms. Norton. By Section 8, you make them affordable if they
come within a certain limit, don't you.
Mr. Tombar. Yes, ma'am. What I was testifying to is the
fact that, as you said, unlike Washington, D.C., and most
communities around the country, there is in the Housing
Authority in New Orleans an ample supply of vouchers. There is
an oversupply of vouchers for eligible families as well as--and
this is a recent development over the past number of months--as
well as landlords who have repaired their homes and repaired
their rental units and have made them available to eligible
families.
Ms. Norton. Now wait a minute, Mr. Tombar. And maybe people
may not be aware of this; what made this happen only in the
last few months?
Mr. Tombar. It is the fact that, as Mr. Rainwater testified
to, that their program has started in earnest and has made
units available. And, quite frankly, it has been almost 4 years
since the storm, and that landlords have taken advantage of the
fact that they have settled with insurance companies; they have
gotten their own resources and financing, taken the government
subsidies that have been provided, and have used that to bring
these units back into commerce.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Jenkins, what did you have to say to that?
Of course, this has only recently happened.
Rev. Jenkins. Only recently happened. And I would say that
the quality of case management has to do with direct services.
We work with people no matter how long it takes. We do provide
transportation. And we walk with them through the process and
not simply refer them to it.
Ms. Norton. This is the testimony that is most important in
this hearing, the notion of what Rev. Jenkins is saying. We are
dealing with the most vulnerable--you know, if I am sitting
there on an ordinance, and I was, damn, they are going to have
to move me; when I am able to get out of here and work, that is
one thing, but we are focusing--you have done a good job with
respect to people who in fact should move themselves. What Rev.
Jenkins is saying, and I recognize he deals outside of your
matrix, but what he is saying out of his experience is that
these people are not likely to move unless there is expert case
management.
Rev. Jenkins. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. I mean, that is the bottom line. And we are
going to be looking at that, given Mr. Tombar's testimony, more
than anything else; what do we do to persuade people, and then
to make people understand? Carry my words from the
Subcommittee, so they know that extensions ad infinitum are no
longer possible. We won't let people be put out, but we believe
the State has over-depended on extensions--that is because Mr.
Rainwater only recently got there--and on our notions of
outrage at how slow the State and FEMA were in the first place.
But now we see most of the people have been dealt with. It is
only the people who can't take care of themselves.
And Mr. Tombar is going to have to submit to me, Mr.
Jenkins, within 14 days, by parish, where these houses are. So
he has testified here. And although we have not made people
stand and take oath, they are all under oath. So he is going to
have to provide the backup here.
And the only discrepancy I see here is, apparently through
the State's work, Mr. Rainwater's work and the work of others
in the parishes, there have been people to come forward; we get
to whether or not there has been adequate communication here.
Mr. Tombar said that all these people have already been
given--is that it? Everybody on the list has already been given
three sources. Without even going down the list, everybody
already has their three sources.
Mr. Tombar. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. So that does point to case management as a
notion.
Now, if the three are rejected, do you go back with three
more, or how does that work?
Mr. Garratt. That is really ours to take, ma'am.
We have often gone back many times with additional ones. As
I indicated previously, in some extreme cases, we have made as
many as 90 different referrals to----
Ms. Norton. What would make somebody reject 90 different
referrals?
Mr. Garratt. I would suggest it would be an interest in not
moving.
Ms. Norton. I think that would be the case often for people
who are working. We are dealing with people here who are often
not working. They will be away from family. That is a hardship.
But I don't think--I think we are to the point where we can't
look at anything except the available housing as close as
possible, but there may be limits on that. And I am impressed,
as Mr. Tombar says--you say in New Orleans itself?
Mr. Tombar. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. That is close enough to me right there; it is a
city no larger than the District of Columbia.
Rev. Jenkins.
Rev. Jenkins. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
Many of the people whom we are talking about do not have
cars. The state of public transportation in New Orleans has not
been addressed. If you live in the east, in New Orleans East,
the possibility of having a job in the central business
district where the tourists, the hotels, et cetera, are is nigh
because of the state of public transportation.
Ms. Norton. But we ought to separate those who work.
And Rev. Jenkins, look, we are not guaranteeing that you
have the same income used for the same purposes.
Rev. Jenkins. Right.
Ms. Norton. All over the United States, people are having
to pay more for transportation. They may have to pay more to
get to their job because New Orleans does not have a public
transportation system. What are we supposed to say to those
people, for example, who will have to move from a trailer
further from--they are still in New Orleans, but will have to
find some other way to get to work? What is the government
supposed to say to those people who have been given a place,
three places, but they are not as close to their work as most
people increasingly who don't have the highest income, what is
the government's response supposed to be in that case?
Rev. Jenkins. I would hope the government's response to
case management would be to teach people how and walk with them
and help them find how to get to their jobs.
Ms. Norton. Well, that is a reasonable answer, and it does
seem to me that that is the case. You take somebody from one
end of the parish who seldom has gone to the other end, and you
go there and the transportation isn't as good or may even be
hardly available, it does seem to me that, of the three sources
that are offered, one has to work with that person as if that
were a person, a human being, not just a place that you can go.
So I would ask that the task force look into the reasons
for the resistance. They often have to do more than
convenience; they may have to do with transportation.
Now, let me ask you this, Mr. Rainwater. In the District of
Columbia, because the people who would trouble me most are the
people who are disabled and don't have jobs. Indeed, let me ask
Mr. Garrett, wouldn't a disproportionate number of these be
people without jobs who are not going to ultimately be going to
work, but they are fairly isolated because of their age or
their disability?
Mr. Garratt. Ma'am, I would be speculating. We typically
don't engage in income verification sorts of things as a matter
of practice with this population; we simply don't have the
authority to do that. So it would be pure speculation.
Ms. Norton. Well, Mr. Tombar, of those who have been
offered, you would have more of that information on these
disproportionate people who don't work every day--when I say
"disproportionately," without knowing any percentage.
Mr. Tombar. Actually, I don't have that information. But I
do have the information to the previous question you asked.
Based upon the case management contractors that FEMA funds,
some of the reasons that we have heard repeatedly from families
about why they refuse to move into the DHAP program was the
households who were concerned about paying rent after the DHAP
program ended, the households did not want to relocate----
Ms. Norton. Wait a minute. So these would be people who
were able to pay rent then because you provide a subsidy,
right?
Mr. Tombar. Well, through the DHAP program, we did in fact
provide----
Ms. Norton. No, no. I am talking, for example, I am
assuming these would be some of the Section 8 people that you
told----
Mr. Tombar. Certainly. The Congress, as I said, provided
$85 million to convert those families who would be eligible for
subsidies to a permanent program.
Ms. Norton. So why would they be concerned about the rent
since, if they are eligible, you will help them?
Mr. Tombar. Exactly. I don't know the answer to that
question, but I do know the answer----
Ms. Norton. But that is an important thing to get on the
record.
And for the task force that I am now looking at, I
amassuming that the case management may help people
understand--you know, it is really interesting, people respond
once they understood--I, stupidly, in my exercises, lifted some
weights, and they gave me some things to do. He gave me
something to do that is the thing that I least like to do. And
I see what the problem is. If he had only told me why to do
this thing, as the way I sit and walk, I think I would be
doing--I had to figure out for myself, why would he give me
this thing that I like to do least? I understand only because I
have thought about it myself, having left the 3-week period
they give you to go and somebody tells you what to do, I
figured out why he wanted me to do this thing I hated to do,
and now I have begun to do it.
Now, most people are reasonable. And if a caseworker who is
patient, who has lived there--and most of them have--with the
people who have been the most unfortunate people in society
since Katrina, if they have the kind of approach to these
people, who are sitting in these homes, recalcitrant and
resistant, take the time to indicate what is available,
particularly if they compare them to what is happening to
families all over this country today, if they tell them that
the Subcommittee is not willing to recommend extensions ad
infinitum, that we are in the last pace here, that we are not
going to leave them stranded so they can't get from one end of
Orleans Parish to the other, that there are ways to move to
jobs because your task force is going to make sure that that
communication is given.
Indeed, before I go further, Mr. Rainwater, the District of
Columbia will provide, if there is a disabled person--using, I
am sure, there must be Federal funds in this--you can call and
get transportation to go even to recreational events. Is that
provided in New Orleans?
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am. We work through different
nonprofits, the city, continuums of care that we have funded
about $21 million for rapid rehousing, also to provide
transportation for folks.
Ms. Norton. See, if all of that is put on the table at the
same time that one is talking to a person, the resistance
begins to melt, particularly when they understand that once all
of this is made available to you, you are not going to get
another chance. But you have to have all of that in the package
to make people, who have every reason to be resistant,
understand that we are surrounding you with the services that
will be necessary.
In the District of Columbia, if your children live in
Northwest and you live in Southeast and you say, I want to
visit my family once a week, a van will come and get you once a
week. They know that, in the long run, that means you are not
going to be going into the emergency room or into some home
where it costs us $80,000 a year to maintain. They know there
is much to be said in the public interest.
Mr. Rainwater suggests that those kinds of services are
available. That person doesn't get their grown son or daughter
to come see them more often than that anyway. So they can be
assured that at least what they are accustomed to is not going
to fall away altogether. I think this can be done. It would
take sensitivity. It would take the agencies working together.
I am sorry. I may have interrupted, I think, you, Mr.
Tombar.
Mr. Tombar. Yes, ma'am. Some of the other reasons that
families have indicated that they did not want to move was
because they prefer to stay in the rent-free, disaster-based
assistance rather than HUD or State programs that would require
a contribution towards their monthly rent.
Ms. Norton. See, we can easily take care of that one. There
is no free lunch. And you can quote the Committee Chair, there
is no free lunch, even for those who have been hardest hit.
Mr. Tombar. Certainly. Others have indicated that they were
concerned about getting into government-subsidized housing,
even though it was explained to them that this was not "HUD
housing," but rather private housing that would be subsidized
with rent----
Ms. Norton. You do have to make people who don't want to
ever be said to have been wards of the State in any sense of
the word understand that this is not the same thing at all.
This is for people who have done all they can, working and
living in just the way we ask people to do, abiding by all the
rules, but find that the cost of housing where they happen to
live is beyond any reasonable means. Yes, it does have to be
explained to people who don't want to be said they are on
welfare.
Mr. Tombar. And finally, as I initially indicated, that
families did not want to relocate from the THU that was on a
private site where they were rebuilding their home.
Ms. Norton. Yeah, now, those are the people that you need
to work with hardest because here is where the Congress may
need, if you don't do it; if we do it, it is going to be much
to your not liking.
It seems to me that Mr. Garratt made a reasonable start by
talking about people within certain time frames rehabilitating
their homes. And let me say this for the record, it is in the
national interest, as consistent with the Stafford Act, that
people who are willing to rebuild their own homes with some
government assistance; that is rebuilding New Orleans; that is
showing that the Stafford Act and the other Federal statutes
work.
We do not believe it is in the national interest to snatch
away a trailer that is subsidized but not nearly what the
subsidy would be if that--I don't know, but might well not be
what the subsidy requires if that person would have to go off
his own land, where he is living probably under conditions that
he wouldn't tolerate and that we wouldn't tolerate, if we had
to put that person in some other housing.
We think it is in the national interest and the public
interest for that person to reserve their resources to rebuild
their own house so that in fact they require less and less
subsidy from the Federal Government or the State government.
Are we agreed on that?
Then we also have established that the trailers are not
going to be put to good use by another family, but they are
going to be scrapped. That is already a loss to the government.
We don't like to do things like that. We are having to do that
in these cases. These are not people in the formaldehyde
trailers where the people want to get out of the trailers.
These are people who want to stay in them in order to get into
their own homes, and we know, given ordinary conditions, how
close they would be to rehabbing their own homes.
We know that the State has been slow in getting them the
assistance. We know that, for example, to quote from one
example, a very small house blown down by the hurricane,
disabled--this is an example of the kind of person you are
dealing with. A 67-year-old person, the State gave her $28,000.
It wasn't enough to rebuild. I can't imagine that it would be
in the public interest for her to abandon land she owns.
Would she have to use the $28,000 for a rental, Mr.
Rainwater? I mean, she got $28,000, but it is only for,
apparently, rebuilding. What will she do with that money?
Mr. Rainwater. Madam Chair, in some instances, there were
people that did use money for living expenses. And what we are
trying to do right now, as I stated earlier, is create some----
Ms. Norton. Is that within the rules?
Mr. Rainwater. Not necessarily. I mean, I don't know how
many times it happened, to be very honest with you. FEMA did
provide assistance and HUD did provide assistance to folks as
well to help them live while they were working through issues.
Ms. Norton. But this $28,000 that she got----
Mr. Rainwater. That is subtracted from whatever insurance
she had, and then the $28,000--there is a formula that you use,
and so typically it is----
Ms. Norton. But she was supposed to use that to rebuild?
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. So I am assuming she wants to still rebuild?
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. I am going to ask you about the $2.4 billion in
a minute, but we will have complaints, whenever you do imminent
domain, everybody says they haven't given me enough money. Now,
she is saying it isn't enough to rebuild, except I believe her
these days because of what has happened and what has happened
to the economy.
Why are people being given too little money to rebuild?
Mr. Rainwater. The way the program that was set up in 2006,
2007, the Road Home Assistance Program, was developed based on
a formula.
Ms. Norton. She is 67. She is rebuilding out of a pension
or out of her own resources.
Mr. Rainwater. The cap that the State created and was
approved by HUD was $150,000. It is basically a ratio of how
much insurance you have got. What we have tried to do is we
have created an additional compensation grant for people who
were either elderly or low income to help them try to complete
that.
Ms. Norton. She may be getting some of that as well.
What happens to someone who hopes that the insurance is
being put aside, the $28,000 is being put aside, she still
can't rebuild? What should she do?
Mr. Rainwater. We are in the process of creating this pilot
construction program to help people. There is no doubt that
what we have seen in Louisiana in some instances of an elderly
person, a contractor took money or bids were too high; we work
with a number of nonprofits who can go in and assist folks, who
can buy materials at a wholesale rate, go in and help them
finish the repair to their house. So we are trying to push
those dollars as far down as we possibly can.
Ms. Norton. So during the boom time, some of these people
did try to rebuild in boom time, which just brought down the
country.
Rev. Jenkins. Madam Chair, may I say something?
Ms. Norton. Please, sir.
Rev. Jenkins. Thank you, ma'am.
I want to say that the churches and the nonprofits often
step in and fill the gap. We continue to host huge numbers of
volunteers who come to New Orleans, who pay for their lodging
with us in New Orleans now, and whom we charge to buy the
material used to fix up the 951 houses that we have gutted and
that we are rebuilding. So the people who come to work are
charged by us, and we are building and rebuilding houses for
people who have been robbed----
Ms. Norton. So here is a disabled 67-year-old. She got
$28,000 from the State. She probably has some insurance money.
Is she the kind of person that could have the rest of it done
with volunteer help and the like?
Rev. Jenkins. Yes. We are doing that with volunteer help.
And we are doing it on a handshake for people who have no
money. For people who have money, they are paying for their
supplies to rebuild. But we have yet to lose a penny on any
poor person who comes into money. They pay us back as soon as
they can.
Ms. Norton. Well, Mr. Rainwater, we do still hear--and we
have some of them from the District of Columbia--of people
coming in doing marvelous things. What relationship do you have
to these volunteer groups who, for example, the 67-year-old
lady I just talked about, if the State got together with the
volunteers, this lady might get this home built even in this
climate?
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am. So we started developing a
program in the last quarter of last year-- it is this pilot
project that we just sent to HUD for approval--which would
begin to move some dollars down to nonprofits, like the
Reverend----
Ms. Norton. Now, wait a minute. First of all, a lot of this
is being done by volunteer work?
Rev. Jenkins. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. I like what you are saying, but I am not
understanding what it is that the nonprofits would do.
Mr. Rainwater. Well, basically what we try to do is help
them to purchase building materials, pay for some of their
administrative costs----
Ms. Norton. This is so common sense, I am almost dying
here.
Mr. Tombar, these are the most motivated people in
Louisiana. They have worked all their lives, got a piece of
land and got a house. You are hearing that, limited though they
are, the nonprofits are seeing the potential here of purchasing
materials themselves because these are people with some
insurance money they haven't spent. These people want their
house back; they have got a piece of land.
You heard Mr. Rainwater say that they are asking for pilot
funds from HUD in order to speed up this volunteer effort, most
of which doesn't even come out of government funds, so that
these people could in fact get the materials to begin doing
what is necessary. What is the status of that approval?
When was it submitted, Mr. Rainwater?
Mr. Rainwater. It was submitted towards the end of last
month. So it is within a reasonable time frame, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. Are you aware of that, Mr. Tombar?
Mr. Tombar. I was not, but I am aware of the fact that the
CDBG program provides great flexibility, and this is the type
of----
Ms. Norton. Just a moment. You are saying Mr. Rainwater
already can do this then?
Mr. Tombar. No, ma'am. He is going through the
administrative process it sounds like.
Ms. Norton. Are you asking for CDBG funds that exist, or
are you asking for new pilot funds?
Mr. Rainwater. There are two different requests. One was we
had Community Development Block Grant money that we took out of
one of our programs, an infrastructure program, and sent an
action plan amendment to HUD, which they are very positive
about.
We are also working with FEMA and some of the congressional
delegation, on taking about $9 million that was for case
management to take it and put it into this creative nonprofit
pot.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Tombar, we are already at work on the task
force here as you can see. Could I ask that those approvals be
speeded up, as a request from the Subcommittee, that those
approvals be done within 30 days from today? I know that that
may be less time than is normally the case, but we are up
against a deadline, and we can't push the deadline without
pushing ourselves and the government as well. And since you are
a pilot program, we have a new administration that is open to
innovation. You see what the State is willing to do. Would you
be willing to press for an approval--that the approval period
would be over and done with in 30 days? We are up against an
August deadline.
Mr. Tombar. I will guarantee you that we will review,
provide technical assistance, should we find any issues with
the plan as submitted by the State, and work with them in the
next 30 days to resolve those and give full approval.
Ms. Norton. I thank you very much. That is very important.
Please get that information to us within 30 days of where we
are and whether the approvals have been done.
I think we have begun to deal with the people who Mr.
Tombar says--remember, we have established that there is a
place for everybody to go without being put on the street, one.
Two, we have established that they have been given three
sources. Three, we have found that the difficulty may be in
case management so that people understand they are at the end
of the road, and what services will surround them when they
leave the present situation in which they find themselves.
That leaves us with, so far as I can now see, the trailer
people, where Mr. Garratt has offered some important
information, at least to begin to work on, and that is the
people--367 within 5 months, 298 within 11 months, 50 percent
at least a year of--I guess this is started rebuilding--509
would be at least a year, and 711 not rebuilding at all.
Now, these people need to be separated and broken down.
Now, the people who are not rebuilding, we don't have enough
information. All we have is this helpful information. Let us
establish this, if there is a reasonable chance that a person
will contribute to the economy of the State of Louisiana by
becoming a homeowner able to pay property taxes and able to
contribute thereby to the parish in which that person lives, it
is within the interest of the government of the State and the
parish to in fact assist that family or individual toward that
end. "Reasonable" is an important point here.
I don't know about the 711, whether the people are not
building at all, whether it is reasonable. The reason these
figures are of any moment at all is because these people that I
am talking about that Mr. Garratt has figures on are all in
trailers. We have also established that it is not as if the
trailer is going to go to some other beneficial use.
The task force that is looking at those in rental units,
those in section--I want you to stay right in here, Mr. Tombar,
because some of these may in fact turn out to be people who
need HUD assistance. But we have got to disaggregate these
numbers to find out what we can do. We cannot fail to take
account of the fact--and let me say this for the record; were
it not for the New Deal vehicles left to us, unemployment
insurance--FEMA was not one of them--but Social Security,
Medicare and Medicaid, which are the next New Deal, the Great
Society, were it not for them, where we would be is where my
parents were, on bread lines. All 50 States are down. We are
only beginning to see the rattlings of the bottom. You know
when you have thought about it and you say, my butt is here, so
I think I am at the bottom? That is the most that the analysts
are willing to tell us. That is great news. That really has the
public going out and actually buying something. Because the
least optimistic of the analysts have said, we can't say we are
at the bottom.
We are not falling as fast, we know this. The greatest
lagging indicator is employment. And yet these people are
within some reasonable distance--at least some of them, I don't
know about the 509, and none of us know yet who are at least a
year out because it could be a year and some distance. But we
know that whatever else is keeping them from rebuilding, not
only is it Katrina; it as an economy that they had nothing to
do with making fall on its face. Because these are all
homeowners, these people were taking care of themselves, the
able-bodied people who were taking care of themselves are the
top of the list as far as I am concerned because they are
people who are used to providing for themselves.
I am going to ask the task force--because I can't tell
you--I know kind of what to do with these other folks,
sensitive case management, the pilot program that Mr. Tombar
kindly said he will do all he can to see it speeded up. The
Section 8 housing is available. This is a whole lot more
hopeful than I thought this hearing might turn out to be, which
is why oversight hearings are important in the first place.
It may be that FEMA, or this Committee, this Congress, will
have to act with respect to these trailers because we will look
like complete idiots putting people out of trailers who, but
for what the State could have done, what the economy could have
done, would be building their housing and then thrusting them
on the housing market. I don't even know, Mr. Tombar, whether
or not they would displace or eat up some of the Section 8
housing--which really shouldn't go to them, all things being
considered.
If, in fact, as Mr. Garratt says, they're within X or Y
months of building--it may well be these are the people who
have jobs--we don't want to crowd people from one sector onto
another sector. But we don't know enough about them.
Now, I am going to ask the task force--and this one will be
60 days because these people are not the people who are--well,
I should make that 45 days because these people may also find
themselves just--Mr. Garratt has testified there will be no
evictions. Let me see what kind of time frames we are under
here.
Mr. Garratt, I amsimply trying to give the task force time
to see what these figures mean. That is the only fair thing to
do. And I appreciate the figures you provided. You testified
that there would be no evictions; is that right?
Mr. Garratt. No, ma'am. What I testified to was that
evictions would not begin for some period of time. We haven't
even completed the termination and notification process, nor
have we referred at this point anyone for eviction. That won't
occur until, at the very earliest, the end of this month. And
even then, referrals will be taking place over some period of
time. And even then, there is a process, a rather lengthy
process that must be followed before that can even begin.
So what I testified to was, they won't begin on June 1, and
I think it is likely to be several months, some period of time,
before they would actually begin.
Ms. Norton. All right. That is good enough for me, 45 days.
We would like more information, and let me tell you who we
would like this from.
Mr. Garratt, these people are in your trailers. When you
gave figures about how much time it would take, all things
being considered, did that information come from your own
evaluation, or did it come from Mr. Rainwater, or HUD?
Mr. Garratt. I would say that that is probably information
that came from both of our efforts. We are in fact operating in
a joint environment in the field, so these are collaborative
efforts.
Ms. Norton. Given your testimony that you are not trying to
precipitously evict people, I am not going to do anything here
but speak to the need for analysis-based on the figures Mr.
Rainwater, Mr. Tombar and Mr. Garratt gave about the number of
months. Quite a few people were within building, given the
fact--now, these people have resources. We are talking about
people who have some insurance money. I am sure hope this means
that people understand you shouldn't be spending insurance
money. Do people understand that? Do people understand that? Or
does the insurance company only give the money when they see
that you are--if you say you are going to rebuild--rebuilding?
Mr. Rainwater. No, ma'am. One of the challenges that we
have had in Louisiana is there are a number of lawsuits related
to the insurance companies. And so what we have been doing last
year, and this year is working with residents to make sure they
get their Road Home grant. We have taken ourselves mostly out
of the debate between the citizen and the insurance company so
that they----
Ms. Norton. But I'm just asking, if she has got $28,000
worth of insurance, is she just given that money and told,
here, go rebuild, or go do something else?
Mr. Rainwater. No, ma'am. There are two choices. One, you
can rebuild where you are at; you can rebuild in Louisiana but
at a different location; or you can rebuild out of State. Each
time someone gets a grant though, they sign a 3-year covenant
that requires that they meet the new elevations, that they
build to the new building code or they repair their house. So
there are requirements.
Ms. Norton. So it is true that we are talking about people
who have some resources?
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. And when the economy recovers, it may be that
it is going to be, God help us, easier to rebuild because we
were working in a very elevated, escalated, really false, made
out of derivatives and non-money, really, false kind of
economy. Now people need, work and contractors need business,
as they say in the city, they need some business. So it may
turn out to be easier to build than it would have been even
when recovery began and was going on because people will be up
and running now, the contractors will be up and running.
In 45 days, I am going to ask the task force simply to give
us information. We don't have any basis to know where these
people are. The only strictures we have are ones imposed on all
of us alike, and that is the economy. And I have indicated that
the Subcommittee continues to be the overriding public interest
in keeping these people who are--people who own homes are the
most productive people in the society. So we would have an
interest in helping them help themselves. They have a habit of
saving. Most of them have owned homes and bought homes that
required them to save. And we believe that they will be
building and rebuilding the parish and rebuilding the State and
becoming taxpayers.
Now, you may find differently. This is a rebuttable
presumption. It is certainly rebuttable with respect to the 711
that Mr. Garratt says are not rebuilding at all. We can't tell
what in the world to do there. But at some point, the
government has to fish or cut bait. That may mean with the
trailers as well, as harsh as that seems. The Stafford Act does
not allow for government to perpetually provide trailers. That
would be, even for these self-sufficient people, an enabling
kind of activity and an activity that encourages dependency.
The reason we have great sympathy with these people is
these have been independent people. Mother Nature took over
from them and took away their independence. So we don't want to
make them any further dependent than they are, but if they
can't rebuild at all, ultimately they are going to need some
case work or some other reality that they are going to have to
come to grips with or else they are not operating in the public
interest. The area is not being rebuilt. Their land is not
going to contribute to the tax base of the parish or of the
State. And they are going to have to help us help them.
I don't know what to do about them yet, and I don't expect
you to know. So all I am asking, in 45 days--and we are going
to send you this in writing--is to know what it means--Mr.
Garratt's helpful figures. And he only meant them as an outline
of what we know now. You may know more or your own offices may
know more, but what it means for people within 5 months, 11
months, at least a year, what that means, 50 percent would take
at least a year, want that broken down; send to the Committee
as much information as you can. This information will be
necessary because we will have to decide whether or not any
extensions are called for, and if so, for whom.
We believe that the State has been enabled by the
extensions, even though we have felt we needed them. We think
the State has understood that we don't strand people. And just
because there has been a change in administration, do not think
that the standard has changed. We do not like that the decision
gets made at the last minute. We do believe that it is
permissible, so long as there is adequate case work going on,
to continue to tell people they have to leave now. In other
words, if people are given notice--and I don't know what the
usual notice is, let's say it is a month's notice, but they
have all of the surrounding--we don't think it is improper to
give people notice that, let us say, in the middle of June,
that by the middle of July, one of the three sources that they
have been given is one they have to take. And this is a
service.
So we are not trying to stop you from doing what is
reasonable. But we are saying that it is not permissible to do
that without very sensitive case work that lets these people
understand that they are being given that date for a reason.
And at that point, they subject themselves to eviction. Because
a State then has done all it can; it has provided you with
transportation. It has provided you with a case worker you can
always be in touch with. It has provided you with a way to get
to your medical services. It has provided you with information,
if you work every day, about how to get to your job even though
it is at a part of the parish that normally is harder to get
to. The government can't do the impossible.
So we are not trying to stop you from giving people notice.
We are trying to let you keep doing that so that we are not
left at the last minute with the need for another extension,
and we are not left at the last minute with people thinking
that the government has done it before, so they are going to do
it again. But the shorter time limits are based on being
assured that we are doing what we are supposed to do within the
time limits that have been previously set.
And this Committee will feel free to have further hearings
next month if we find that the only remedy you are leaving for
us is to extend the deadline. That is the least, that is the
least acceptable remedy to the government. Because that will
mean to this Subcommittee that the government hasn't done its
job, not given what Mr. Tombar has told us, not given the
figures that Mr. Garratt has given. If in fact there is a need
to extend it, the greatest reason will be that the combination
of forces recognized here--except for Rev. Jenkins, who
testified before us--have not done what is needed to move
people out. And we are not willing, because the government has
failed, to say that the government can keep on failing. So
expect there will be another hearing next month, unless the
figures you provide us indicate you are making the necessary
progress.
Now, I realize that I have kept people long beyond what
these hearings keep you, but you know why? Because these
hearings are usually about, "I got you, Mr. Rainwater," "see, I
told you, Mr. Garratt," "see, Mr. Tombar, you haven't done what
I wanted you to do." I don't believe in those kind of hearings.
The hearings that serve us best are hearings that help us help
you solve a problem.
Mr. Rainwater, one question before you go. The figure that
has blown me out of the water since I first heard it was $3.4
billion held by the State of Louisiana that could be used to
rebuild Charity Hospital. Mr. Garratt or Mr. Rainwater, your
forces couldn't get yourselves together. The Senator from the
State then went to a nuclear remedy and said that there would
be arbitration. Then the new Secretary for DHS said, oh, no, we
are going to get it together, and we will have some remedy that
is within what Senator Landrieu has offered.
So the first thing I want to ask you, sir, you testified
here--it must have been 2 months ago--how much of the $3.4
billion has now been put to good use in the State of Louisiana?
Mr. Rainwater. Madam Chair, you are referring to the
Community Development Block Grant money, the Disaster Recovery
Community Development Block Grant money?
Ms. Norton. It is the public assistance program, $3.4
billion.
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am. Let me look at my numbers real
quick. Just bear with me one second.
Ms. Norton. Sorry. This is the last question.
Mr. Rainwater. Madam Chair, of the $3.6 billion, so far we
have spent down $2.8 billion. And what we have done since our
last hearing is, FEMA has sent down some decision teams that
are working. And what we have done is we have broken up our
groups down the State to some real action-oriented teams that
are making decisions. So we have actually spent down from the
$3.6, we are at about $2.8 billion now that are unspent.
Now, some of those have to do with the gaps that exist, and
we continue to work through those issues. FEMA's Transitional
Recovery Office, Acting Director Tony Russell, and the action
people that they have sent down, are doing a very good job. And
we are----
Ms. Norton. This is good news. It is progress.
Let me ask you, you have spent down from $3.6 to $2.8, or
you have obligated----
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. What are those obligations for?
Mr. Rainwater. A multitude of projects, anything from
Southern University of New Orleans to Tulane University to
Delgado Technical College to fire stations and police stations.
If you go out into New Orleans and St. Bernard, you will see
construction occurring from those public assistance dollars.
Ms. Norton. So what happened, Mr. Garratt and Mr.
Rainwater? This is some progress, $.8 million spent. What
happened? How was the logjam broken?
Mr. Garratt. There are a couple of issues here at play. One
of them, obviously, is this unobligated--or this amount of
funding that was obligated to the State but was not drawn down
by subgrantees. In fact, the fact that there is several billion
dollars in there doesn't necessarily indicate a problem. What
it may indicate and what it does indicate is the State is doing
its due diligence. This is a reimbursement program, so it
doesn't immediately go to the State then immediately go to a
subgrantee. They do work; they submit invoices; the State
validates those invoices and then reimburses them for that. So
there is a process involved.
Ms. Norton. Wait a minute. I thought much of this had to do
with a dispute between FEMA and the State.
Mr. Garratt. Not in terms of the funding that has been
obligated to the State.That funding is for projects that were
approved, but it is up to the applicants to actually do the
work on those projects and submit the paperwork to get
reimbursement.
Ms. Norton. That is an important clarification.
Mr. Rainwater. What you are seeing, Madam Chair, is the gap
is being filled. And remember we had a dispute over what
dollars were owed to State, another piece that is just recently
taking place, it is very positive, in the recovery school
district in New Orleans, FEMA has agreed to what we call a
quick-start reconstruction program that allows the schools to
lump-sum $150 million and rebuild the way they need to rebuild
back to a more efficient process.
Ms. Norton. So there is a difference between the obligation
of funds that have been approved and funds where there is a
dispute between the State and the city. So, it is really
progress, particularly in this recessionary climate, that at
least the obligations have commenced.
Now, how much in funding is still in dispute between the
State of Louisiana and FEMA?
Mr. Rainwater. That is approximately around $1 billion. And
some of that relates back to the Charity Hospital dispute,
which is half of that, which the dispute is over whether or not
the building was damaged over 51 percent or more.
Ms. Norton. How is that dispute being resolved, if at all?
Mr. Rainwater. We just got through our first appeal. That
appeal was denied by FEMA Region Six. We can now go to our
second appeal, or there is conversation about using panel
arbitration.
Ms. Norton. All right. When we last met on this issue, it
wasn't at the appeal level; it was at the primary decision
area. I mean, appeals take time, and I want to know about that
time in a moment, but it seems to me the issue that was most
disturbing was at the initial dispute of how much. You can't
appeal until one side or the other in fact takes a stand--and I
guess, in this case, it would be FEMA, this is how much we are
going to pay. At that point, you go to an appeal. I want to
know at the "how much we are going to pay stage" are we?
Mr. Garratt. $150 million.
Ms. Norton. You see my issue; $150 million has been agreed
upon. Now, that says to me--and I understand the position Mr.
Garratt is in; his job is to husband the funds.
Your job, Mr. Rainwater, is to get as much of the funds as
possible.
If we understand this as a structural problem, it won't be
hard.
As I understand after the last hearing, a number of
different ways to just crack the nut, so it could go to appeal.
We had discussions with Senator Landrieu's office, we had
discussions with the American Arbitration Association. There
was some understanding in Senator Landrieu's office about some
administrative law judges.
I had some concern about those, unless they were people who
could resolve a dispute and weren't simply operating in an
appeal mode. Has any of that come to your attention?
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, Madam Chair, I have spoken with a
number of Committee staff. And as I understand it, the panel
arbitration piece hasn't been put together yet. There are a
number of players at the State level in this project.
There is some conversation about just going to the second
appeal, because it does--under the new appeals process, it does
allow for an oral appeal, and we can present additional
information.
Ms. Norton. Wait a minute, help me out, because I wasn't
even at the appeal. The $150 million is the amount that
interests me.
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. That has come out of the initial dispute
negotiations. Now, part of what could happen here is that the
slow-up may be because FEMA is, in fact, continuing to
negotiate with the State at all. They could hasten an appeal
just by coming down with numbers, one after another, and you
will have to appeal it.
So I take it at the dispute level, it is because somebody
is negotiating with FEMA and that they are negotiating in good
faith; is that true?
Mr. Rainwater. Madam Chair, when we negotiated last year we
went from 23 million to $150 million.
So in our particular case, our particular client is LSU,
the medical center of New Orleans, which is the new hospital to
be built. If you look at the two studies that were done, we
still believe it was $492 million.
And so we feel like that the attorneys--and I am not an
attorney--but the attorneys in our group feel like they have a
case based off two studies we had done last year.
Ms. Norton. But you see, you cracked the nut on that. I am
not even--on that one, I have been less critical.
It is the initial dispute, so we can get to appeal, and
still we have most of the money there. We have the money that
you have obligated. That is very important, because that
meant--and correct me if I am wrong--that it was not held up as
an initial dispute.
That is money you have since obligated that FEMA had
already signed on and that was included in the 3.6 billion
and.8 billion of that has been obligated. All told, Mr. Garratt
testified, is about a billion dollars still in the dispute
stage--is that true--and 150 million of that has been--150
million of that has gone down since we last met.
Mr. Garratt. I think it was actually Mr. Rainwater who
testified that he thought there was about a billion dollars
worth of unobligated project worksheets that were still out
there.
Ms. Norton. So if it is unobligated, that means you have
already approved it?
Mr. Garratt. Unobligated, we still have a number of
projects that we are still working through.
Ms. Norton. I want to know how much in that number--that
you are still working through--there are?
Mr. Rainwater. That would be--when we last testified, it
was about, we felt like there was about a 1.4 billion gap.
Ms. Norton. In disputed amounts?
Mr. Rainwater. In disputed amounts, yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. All I am trying to do is figure out what we are
doing with that.
Mr. Rainwater. But that number is continuing to come down
based off decisions that are being----
Ms. Norton. It is $150 million, Mr. Garratt just testified.
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am. And so what----
Ms. Norton. How has that come down, since that was in
dispute----
Mr. Rainwater. We went from $23 million to $150 million,
which was----
Ms. Norton. What procedures were used to do that, please?
Mr. Rainwater. Conversation.
Ms. Norton. Well, I don't see any evidence of any new
procedures in place. You are still haggling.
Mr. Rainwater. However, Madam Chair, I will say that at the
ground level, what FEMA has done and what we have done is put
these decision teams in place, and they continue to work
through. The Charity Hospital piece is being treated----
Ms. Norton. How much of it is Charity Hospital?
Mr. Rainwater. About 492 million. That is our disputed
number.
Ms. Norton. Okay, how about the rest of it, is projects
under--what is it--500 million? They are smaller projects.
There is a recession going on. Get some people to work. Why
can't we get decisions on those?
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am. That is what we are working on
right now. I just said we just decided $150 million for the
recovery school district.
Ms. Norton. Did the decision team help in some way, and, if
so, how?
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am. The decision team sat down and
worked through the issues.
Ms. Norton. Who is on the decision team?
Mr. Rainwater. Tony Russell is the Changes for Recovery
Office; a gentleman name Bill Vogel, and a gentleman named
Charlie Axton from FEMA.
Ms. Norton. They are all from FEMA?
Mr. Rainwater. Yes, ma'am. And then from the State we have
a gentleman named Mark Riley, who is the deputy director; and a
gentleman named Mark Debosier and a gentleman named James
Clark, who sit down and work through these issues.
We have a multitude of other folks underneath. But those
are the folks that come together. I am brought in at particular
points when there are very difficult decisions, and we work
through it and make decisions together. So we are making
progress on this. But it just takes time.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Garratt, we were pleased when the new
Secretary stationed these teams to be helpful.
Are those people in Louisiana who are on the ground now the
three people named by Mr. Rainwater?
Mr. Garratt. They are.
Ms. Norton. Could I ask you to do this? Congress went on
its vacation, we anticipated we would be here this morning at
least, but they went on the May 30 recess for a week yesterday.
Would you make available to the staff those three people so
that they can have an understanding--we would like to have
confidence in that process. Because if we don't, then what we
intend to do is to modify what Senator Landrieu put in place.
That is already statutory law to, in fact, make decision-making
occur.
We can't stand it that there is almost a $1 billion out
there that could be putting people to work in Louisiana. We
understand the difficulty, nor are we criticizing you for
simply not giving in to the State, nor the State for trying to
get as much out of you as possible.
We are saying this. This is a classic dispute where a third
party--you are using a third party from within the agency--is
almost surely, as a structural matter, going to have to put
their foot down or else we just go on and on and on, and each
side has to haggle itself out. He is under an obligation to get
as much money from you as possible, and you are under oversight
from us to make sure you don't give them any more than what
they deserve.
Whatever they get, they are going to complain about. This
is classic third party; help us out.
And we are not willing to go forward without knowing more.
So could I ask you to make available to staff these three
people to make us understand how this new process is working?
Mr. Garratt. Our staff are always available to support you
and your staff, Madam.
Ms. Norton. We would expect to see them next week before
Congress comes back in session.
I want to thank all of you for, really, very helpful
testimony that we have regarded as very problem-solving-
oriented. We believe we have gotten someplace. We are going to
put it in writing so that you will see what we believe has
resulted in commitments from this testimony and so that we can
all track each other to make the best things happen for the
people of Louisiana.
Thank you again for your patience.
[Whereupon, at 1:07 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
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