[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE MUMBAI ATTACKS: A WAKE-UP CALL FOR AMERICA'S PRIVATE SECTOR
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 11, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-6
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Jane Harman, California Lamar Smith, Texas
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Daniel E. Lungren, California
Columbia Mike Rogers, Alabama
Zoe Lofgren, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Henry Cuellar, Texas Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Laura Richardson, California Pete Olson, Texas
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico Steve Austria, Ohio
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri
Al Green, Texas
James A. Himes, Connecticut
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio
Eric J.J. Massa, New York
Dina Titus, Nevada
Vacancy
I. Lanier Avant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas, Chairwoman
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Daniel E. Lungren, California
Columbia Pete Olson, Texas
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico Steve Austria, Ohio
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri Peter T. King, New York (Ex
James A. Himes, Connecticut Officio)
Eric J.J. Massa, New York
Dina Titus, Nevada
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (Ex
Officio)
Michael Beland, Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Joseph Vealencis, Minority Subcommittee Lead
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection.......... 1
The Honorable Charles W. Dent, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Pennsylvania, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection.......... 4
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 5
WITNESSES
Panel I
Mr. James L. Snyder, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Infrastructure
Protection, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
Mr. Raymond W. Kelly, Commissioner, New York Police Department:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
Mr. James W. McJunkin, Deputy Assistant Director,
Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
Panel II
Ms. C. Christine Fair, Senior Political Scientist for South Asian
Political and Military Affairs, Rand Corporation:
Oral Statement................................................. 38
Prepared Statement............................................. 41
Mr. David Bradley Bonnell, Director, Global Security,
Intercontinental Hotels Group:
Oral Statement................................................. 50
Prepared Statement............................................. 53
Mr. William G. Raisch, Executive Director, New York University's
International Center for Enterprise Preparedness:
Oral Statement................................................. 55
Prepared Statement............................................. 57
THE MUMBAI ATTACKS: A WAKE-UP CALL FOR AMERICA'S PRIVATE SECTOR
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Wednesday, March 11, 2009
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure
Protection,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:10 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee
[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Jackson Lee, Kirkpatrick, Cleaver,
Himes, Titus, Thompson (ex officio), Lungren, Dent, Miller, and
King (ex officio).
Ms. Jackson Lee. The subcommittee will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on
``The Mumbai Attacks: A Wake-Up Call For America's Private
Sector.'' Our witnesses today will testify about the November
attacks in Mumbai, the groups involved, and what we are doing
here to secure American facilities of the type attacked in
Mumbai.
I am proud to convene today's hearing to engage our Members
and the witnesses on important issues that have arisen from the
terrorist attack in Mumbai last November. I sincerely hope that
we can learn from the tragic event and apply its lessons to
what we are doing to secure the same types of assets in the
United States that were targeted in India. In the last 6 weeks,
I have been both in Pakistan and in India, and stayed in the
Taj in Mumbai, and so I have first-hand, or had a first-hand
look on the issues involving this hearing, but more
importantly, the question of protecting our infrastructure,
because some might ask the question, why a hearing on Mumbai?
This is not necessarily a hearing only on Mumbai. It is
asking the serious question of, how do we protect the Nation's
infrastructure, and to also ask the next question, how
vulnerable is the 85 percent of the Nation's infrastructure
held in our private hands? Responsibilities of this Nation,
responsibilities of this committee are in fact to protect the
homeland.
I do want to welcome our Chairman of the full committee,
Mr. Thompson, and thank him for his leadership, and of course,
the Ranking Member of the full committee and thank him as well,
Mr. King, for his leadership.
As the subcommittee with jurisdiction over the security of
critical infrastructure, 85 percent of which is owned by the
private sector, it is imperative that we study these types of
attacks, our government's outreach to its private-sector
partners, and whether the private sector is acting on any
information provided.
That was a very important question in Mumbai: What kind of
information was forwarded to those private owners, and what
actions did they take? How did they coordinate with the
government? This requires us to have an understanding of the
groups involved in the attack and their international
aspirations.
I believe today's hearing will shed a great deal of light
on these matters, and I am looking forward to our witnesses'
testimony and our discussion. We look forward to collaborating
in our work with our other subcommittees. The work we do in
this committee dealing with critical infrastructure relates to
the crisis on the Mexican border that asks the question, will
the spill-over violence come on to our shores? Well, our
question today, will attacks on infrastructure like hotels,
hospitals and schools, in other parts of the world, will they
spill on to the soil of the United States? We cannot be
unprepared for the probability.
But first, I would like to welcome back the subcommittee's
returning Members and welcome the subcommittee's new Members.
In particular, let me welcome our new Ranking Member, Mr.
Dent. We thank him very much for his leadership, and I look
forward to working with him.
We take note of acknowledging Mr. Cleaver, who is here as a
new Member, and we appreciate, again, his participation.
The subcommittee deals in important, interesting, and
demanding areas, and I am looking forward to working with all
of you in a bipartisan manner to secure the transportation
systems and infrastructure that support the American people and
their way of life.
I would like to extend an especially warm welcome to the
new Ranking Member of the subcommittee, as I indicated earlier,
Mr. Dent of Pennsylvania. We look forward to ensuring that this
committee answers the concerns of Americans.
The scope of this hearing includes several dynamics, all of
which are necessary for us to understand in order to have a
better idea about policy going forward. First, DHS, NYPD, and
FBI are here to provide an overview of what happened in Mumbai,
and we are grateful for their presence here. Both in terms of
events and tactics, they will also provide their perspective
about what steps need to be taken domestically to secure these
types of assets from such attacks.
Second, our witnesses, especially Dr. Fair, from RAND, will
be able to shed some light on the group implicated in the
attacks, the Lashkar-e-Taiba, or LeT, as well as its potential
aspirations beyond South Asia.
Third, we will examine the Department's outreach to the
private sector during and in the aftermath of the attack to
discern whether it provided private sector stakeholders, such
as hotels, with meaningful information about these groups and
relevant mitigation measures for bolstering security at their
critical assets.
Fourth, we will explore, with the help of Mr. Bonnell from
InterContinental Hotels and Mr. Raisch of NYU, the
implementation of security efforts at these types of critical
infrastructure since September 11, 2001, and the status of
security in America's hotels.
As many of you know full well, this committee has the
security of our Nation taken very seriously. In the last
Congress, we held several hearings on the effectiveness of the
Department's approach, and whether voluntary security efforts
were working. I am proud of our work in the last Congress,
particularly the work in and the legislation involving the 9/11
Act, which sought to promote private-sector security in a
market-based manner, and I stand ready to make improvements
where they are necessary.
In the 111th Congress, we will build our strong record and
continue to engage in thoughtful and robust oversight of these
issues. But passing legislation is key as well. We look forward
to doing so, just as we are very proud of the language we put
in the 9/11 bill that created the Transportation Security
Centers of Excellence.
There is more to be done legislatively to help our local
law enforcement and to protect the critical infrastructure of
America. In this context, the attack in Mumbai offers us a
pivotal moment to reassess whether we are securing the types of
targets that are being attacked world-wide, hotels, hospitals,
rail stations, and I have mentioned schools, universities.
Whatever we need to do to improve that, we must do it.
We must also understand emerging tactics of groups like
LeT, and whether our local law enforcement community is
prepared to subdue them quickly and effectively. It must be
said that DHS has taken many important steps to make America
more secure since it was created, and the multidimensional
issue of critical infrastructure protection cannot be resolved
overnight. This subcommittee stands ready to aid the efforts of
all stakeholders, whether Federal, State, local, or in the
private sector, but we ask them to ask us for help as we reach
out to help them.
The time line of the events in Mumbai are familiar to many
of us. On the evening on November 26, 2008, 10 men arrived in
Mumbai, India, by way of small boats in the Arabian Sea and
attacked a number of high-profile targets with automatic
weapons and explosives. The physical site made it more evident
as I viewed it. The water is very close to the Taj and there
were no barriers, nothing to protect the people inside the
hotel. By the time the siege was over, they had killed more
than 160 people in many places around the city and terrorized
the city for more than 60 hours.
Among the sites attacked in Mumbai, India's business and
entertainment capital, were two luxury hotels, the Taj and the
Oberoi, along with the main railroad terminal, a Jewish
cultural center, a cafe frequented by foreigners, a cinema
house, and two hospitals. In fact, it was the Chabad House. Six
Americans were among the 26 foreigners killed. These sites were
and are the very types that we are concerned about, and we are
committed to work with State and local law enforcement entities
as well as the private sector. DHS is charged to protect those.
As we continue to work on this issue, we will continue to be
assured that we will look to new weapons and technology to see
how we can prevent these kinds of attacks.
It has become clear that attacks carried out in this kind
of style, suicide incidents that saw nine of those involved
killed, are something that we need to be concerned about. A
recent op-ed in the New York Times by a professor at the Naval
Postgraduate School posited that ``right now, most of our
cities would be as hard-pressed as Mumbai was to deal with
several simultaneous attacks.''
My friends, the question is: How vulnerable are we? The
question is: As we answer that one, how will we be prepared?
Am I concerned? Absolutely. That is why this hearing is
being held today.
It is my pleasure now to recognize the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent, for an opening statement.
Mr. Dent. First, thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Let me start off by saying how pleased I was that Ranking
Member King appointed me as the Ranking Member of the
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure
Protection.
I thank you very much for that, Mr. King.
This subcommittee has a very ambitious oversight
legislative agenda this Congress, and I very much look forward
to working with the gentlelady from Texas in securing our
Nation from terrorist threats to its aviation and critical
infrastructure components. I thank you for your gracious
welcome here, and I look forward to working with you over the
course of this session.
Let me also, of course, welcome the Ranking Member of the
full committee, the gentleman to my immediate left from New
York, Mr. King, who has made it his mission to ensure that the
Federal Government takes a risk-based approach in managing
Homeland Security approach. Also I would say similarly to that
the Chairman of the full committee, Mr. Thompson of
Mississippi, I know also very much embraces a risk-based
approach to dealing with our Nation's homeland security issues.
So welcome to both of you.
Let me also recognize our new Members of the subcommittee,
some of whom will be arriving here over the course of the
hearing, deputy Ranking Member and also a fellow Texan, that is
Mr. Olson; the gentlelady from Michigan, Ms. Miller; and the
gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Austria.
Today's hearing will explore the Mumbai terror attacks that
occurred last Thanksgiving. However, rather than rehash what
the Senate examined 3 months ago, I want to focus on the way
forward on what the Department is doing to prepare for a
similar attack in the United States and how it is working with
State and local law enforcement as well as private-sector
representatives.
It took 12 hours for the Indian Emergency Services
personnel to arrive on scene, and 10 terrorists, using everyday
communication systems, held a nation hostage for more than 2
days while they methodically killed hundreds of innocent
bystanders. A 12-hour response time is simply unfathomable. I
wanted to know with certainty that such a broken response
scenario could never happen here in the United States.
I truly appreciate the competing demands for all of your
time, and so I thank all the witnesses for coming before the
subcommittee today, and I look forward to your testimony. At
this time, I yield back the balance of my time.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the distinguished gentleman from
Pennsylvania. It is my pleasure to yield now to the Chairman of
the full committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr.
Thompson, who as I indicated, has been forthright on so many
issues impacting the Nation's security.
The gentleman from Mississippi is recognized.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman, and I
welcome our first panel of witnesses to this hearing.
For more than 60 hours last November, the world watched as
Mumbai, India's entertainment and financial capital, was
terrorized by attacks on hotels, hospitals, the main railway
station, and other public places. By the time the siege was
over, 11 terrorists had killed more than 160 people using
automatic weapons and explosives. The style of attack, the
weapons, the technology used, and the diversity of the targets
raise new questions for how we should approach counterterrorism
and security measures here at home at all levels of government
and in the private sector.
It has become clear that the type of attack carried out in
Mumbai, a Fedayeen-style attack, where small groups engage in
combat operations, as distinguished from suicide bombings, pose
a challenge to our soft targets in our law enforcement
community.
The committee has jurisdiction over the security of
critical infrastructure, 85 percent of which is owned by the
private sector. As such, it is critical that we study this
emerging Mumbai-style of attack, evaluate how well DHS engages
private-sector partners in efforts to secure against such
attacks, and review how the private sector acts on shared
information.
By examining DHS's outreach to the private sector, during
and in the aftermath of these attacks, we can determine whether
it provided stakeholders, such as hotels, with actionable
information about the threat situation, the groups involved and
the mitigation measures to be implemented.
DHS, NYPD and the FBI will address what happened in Mumbai,
both in terms of events and tactics, as well as how information
was shared in the United States. They can also provide insight
into domestic measures we can implement to secure these types
of assets from similar attacks.
Dr. Fair, from RAND, will provide us with perspectives on
the group implicated in the attacks, LeT, as well as its
potential for operating outside of the South Asia region.
Witnesses from InterContinental Hotels and NYU will address
the implementation of security efforts at these types of
critical infrastructures since September 11, 2001, and the
status of security in America's hotels.
I look forward to the testimony of all the witnesses today
at this hearing about efforts to secure America's critical
infrastructure throughout the Congress.
I yield back.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
your remarks. Much appreciated.
The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the full
committee, the gentleman from New York, Mr. King, for an
opening statement, with the acknowledgment that one of his
constituents has been gracious enough to be part of this
hearing.
I yield the gentleman the customary 5 minutes.
Mr. King. I thank you, Chairwoman Jackson Lee.
I want to thank you for your courtesy today and also for
the great job you do as Chair, and also Mr. Dent, who I know
will do an outstanding job as your Ranking Member, and of
course, my good friend Bennie Thompson, Chairman Thompson, who,
he and I had a very wonderful lunch with Commissioner Kelly in
New York a few years ago. Even then, I was perceptive enough to
know that Bennie might be the Chairman some day, so I wanted to
get him on the good side of New York. Sure enough, he became
the Chairman, and he has been a staunch ally for the whole
concept of risk-based funding.
I want to welcome all the witnesses today.
General, I certainly wish you the very best on your job.
Deputy Assistant Director, we certainly appreciate your
efforts.
Commissioner Kelly, of course, I have known for many years
and know first-hand the terrific job that he does with the
NYPD.
It happened in Mumbai, and it reminded us, all of us, how
easy it could happen here. So I certainly look forward to the
testimony today, especially Commissioner Kelly's, because he
has brought the private sector so much into what has to be done
in New York.
General Snyder, that is part of your responsibility, also,
on a national level.
I think it is particularly important that we have hearings
like this, because for instance, just last week in New York,
the New York Times said that we should not be talking about
terrorism, that we shouldn't be scaring people. Well, I think
Mumbai showed just how essential it is that we do keep a level
of awareness, a heightened state of awareness, because, to me,
too many people have forgotten what happened on September 11;
the fact that 7\1/2\ years has gone by without an attack, we
can put it in the recesses of our mind, just like it was 8\1/2\
years between the first World Trade Center attack and the
second. So I think, despite maybe certain elements in the media
who say we shouldn't talk about it, if we don't talk about it,
if you don't go out and do your job and keep the public
engaged, they are not going to realize how vital this is.
So I really commend all of you for keeping your sense of
direction and your sense of motivation so high, and especially
Commissioner Kelly of New York, and General Snyder. You have to
keep the public engaged in this. You have to keep the private
sector engaged. I give you credit for doing it, because,
unfortunately, too many people have forgotten how terrible it
was and how real a threat it can be.
I also want to emphasize again the importance of
cooperation between all of the levels of government. Ranking
Member Dent and Chairwoman Jackson Lee spoke about the long
delay that happened in Mumbai. We could not tolerate that here
in the United States. I know that, certainly just speaking from
the New York perspective, knowing how closely engaged the NYPD
is with the Coast Guard and with Homeland Security, with the
FBI, with the State police, how essential that is. I look
forward in your testimony during the questioning to see again
whether all of you feel that the level of cooperation is
sufficient.
Also, when we are talking about risk-based funding, what
more has to be done on that as far as getting the type of
training, the type of equipment, the type of technology into,
especially in large cities like New York, Chicago, Boston, Las
Vegas, Houston, where you could have this type of attack, where
a hotel could be taken over, a house of worship could be taken
over, a subway system could be taken over, how, what more has
to be done in that regard?
Also, General, I would really be interested in, and you
have only had a few weeks on the job, but what do you think the
level of public sector interest is in this? Are they willing to
cooperate? I wonder, if the city has not been attacked, do they
realize how important it is that they do work with the police?
Also, obviously Homeland Security, but Homeland Security is
always going to be somewhat removed. I believe for it to be
successful, you have to have the private sector working with
the local Police Department and State officials, and what you
think the level of interest is around the country, or do we see
too much of what we saw in the New York Times where people just
say, ignore terrorism, and somehow it will go away or whatever
the thinking is?
So, anyway, I look forward to all your testimony. This is a
vital, vital issue, and I think the Chairwoman, I know the
Chairwoman deserves tremendous credit for taking an
international issue and showing why it is such, unfortunately,
such a local, State, and national issue to the United States of
America and such a really vital Homeland Security issue.
So, Chairwoman, again, I thank you for calling this
hearing. I thank the witnesses for being here. I thank the
Chairman and the Ranking Member.
I yield back.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Ranking Member, thank you for your
remarks. It just causes me, again, to repeat the name of this
committee, in terms of its focus on transportation, security,
and infrastructure protection, very important elements, but
also the name of the hearing, ``The Mumbai Attacks: A Wake-up
Call for America's Private Sector.'' I might edit it and say
private and public sector, and that is what we hope the
testimony will present us with this afternoon.
It is my pleasure to acknowledge Mr. Himes, who is a Member
of the committee and brings great leadership and also
knowledge. We thank you for you presence here.
I want to also acknowledge, I believe, Mr. Austria here and
thank him for his presence. We know, with Members' schedules
that they will be here in the hearing room. We thank them all
for their presence.
I welcome our first panel of witnesses. Our first witness
is Major General Jim Snyder, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Infrastructure Protection at the Department of Homeland
Security. In his capacity, he helps to lead the coordinated
national effort to reduce the risk to the Nation's critical
infrastructure posed by acts of terrorism and in increasing the
Nation's preparedness, timely response, and rapid recovery in
the event of an attack, natural disaster, or other emergency.
In particular, he works with the private sector to secure our
Nation's critical infrastructure.
Our second witness, Commissioner Ray Kelly, of the New York
Police Department, whom I had the pleasure of meeting with
earlier on this very issue, and I thank him for his courtesies,
was appointed police commissioner of the city of New York by
Mayor Michael Bloomberg in 2002, making Commissioner Kelly the
first person to hold the post for the second time in his
career.
Prior to his current position, Commissioner Kelly was a
commissioner of the U.S. Customs Service, where he managed the
agency's 20,000 employees and $20 billion in annual revenue.
Commissioner Kelly spent 31 years in the New York City Police
Department, serving in 25 different commands and as police
commissioner from 1992 to 1994.
It was reported last month that the NYPD launched a
counterterrorism initiative to train a new team of officers in
tactics for close quarters combat and rescuing hostages in
hotels and other high-rise buildings. This initiative was an
immediate response to lessons NYPD learned from Mumbai.
Our third witness, James W. McJunkin, is the Deputy
Assistant Director of the FBI Counterterrorism Division. Mr.
McJunkin has been with the FBI for nearly 22 years. In 2005,
Mr. McJunkin was selected as the Assistant Special Agent in
Charge of the Washington, DC, Field Office, where he provided
leadership and supervision to the Joint Terrorism Task Force,
provided management to all substantive counterterrorism
investigations conducted within the National Capital Region and
supervised a number of significant overseas investigations
involving terrorism attacks against U.S. citizens.
In March 2006, he has led a team of FBI investigators with
the on-scene investigation of a terrorist attack against the
U.S. Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan, that claimed the life of a
career diplomat and several foreign nationals. On January 24,
2008, Director Mueller designated Mr. McJunkin as the Deputy
Assistant Director for FBI Counterterrorism Operations, branch
one.
We appreciate very much the experience you bring to us this
afternoon.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record. I now ask each witness to summarize his
statement for 5 minutes.
Before I conclude on that, acknowledging Deputy Assistant
Secretary Snyder, let me also indicate that Members will have
the opportunity to submit their statements into the record. We
do appreciate it, without objection.
Beginning now with the testimony from the witnesses, we
will begin with the Deputy Assistant Secretary Snyder.
STATEMENT OF JAMES L. SNYDER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Snyder. Thank you, Chairwoman Jackson Lee and Ranking
Member Dent and Members of the subcommittee.
I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the DHS Office of
Infrastructure Protection interaction with our Government and
private-sector partners during the Mumbai, India, attacks.
The Mumbai attack reminds us that terrorism remains very
real and that those who wish us harm are remaining dangerous
and can adapt quickly. The commando-style attacks were well-
planned, well-coordinated and well-executed, striking multiple
targets in the transportation and commercial facility sectors.
The attacks were aided by the targets' open access, which
presents an inherent security challenge.
We also must adapt to this dynamic threat environment and
to similar dangers posed by catastrophic natural events by
remaining flexible and strengthening our coordination efforts
with the Government and private sector.
IP activities are based on the framework outlined in the
National Infrastructure Protection Plan which was released in
2006 and updated in 2009. Our mission is to work closely with
our Government and private-sector partners across the 18
critical infrastructure and key resource sectors to lead the
effort to secure and enhance the resiliency of the Nation's
infrastructure.
Because most critical infrastructure is owned and operated
by the private sector, the Department leverages partnerships to
achieve success. We have successfully established more than 40
voluntary partnership councils among Government and private-
sector entities. The value of these relationships has been well
demonstrated in local and national responses to hurricanes,
fire, and other incidents.
During Mumbai, IP worked directly with the commercial
facilities, banking and finance, and transportation sectors and
religious organizations to share information and organize a
response. On November 26, we disseminated reports on common
vulnerabilities, potential indicators of terrorist activity and
protective measures to our sector partners through the Homeland
Security Information Network for Critical Sectors--it goes to a
4,500-member user community--so that they could implement and
increase their security posture.
On the 27th, IP released the TRIPwire Significant Incident
Report on the attacks to over 6,000 users in the TRIPwire
community. TRIPwire is the Department's collaborative networks
for bomb squads, law enforcement, and other emergency services
personnel. IP issued three additional TRIPwire postings over
the next 13 days and updated HSIN-CS on December 1.
On December 2, IP's commercial facilities Sector-Specific
Agency coordinated a conference call with over 200 leaders
across the 18 sectors. On December 9, IP hosted a table-top
exercise based on a multiple IED attack with representatives
from all 18 sectors, and we reinforced the Mumbai lessons
learned.
On December 10, a conference call was held for 75 leaders
of the banking and financial sector. On January 12, INA and IP
conducted a classified briefing for senior security directors
of major hotel chains and other commercial ventures, providing
a detailed analysis of the Mumbai attacks.
On January 29, IP's commercial facilities Sector-Specific
Agency led a terrorism simulation exercise. It was conducted
with the Real Estate Roundtable subsector, and designed around
a Mumbai-style attack. Prior to the exercise, IP presented the
roundtable a briefing and discussion on the Title IX Voluntary
Private Sector Preparedness Program, now called PS-Prep, as we
have to all sectors, and we think that this program will become
a positive step forward in the process. These are only a few
examples of activities with our partners that build the
relationships and processes we use during response to an all-
hazard event.
Critical IP work is conducted in the field by Protective
Security Advisors. ADPSAs are in place around the Nation to
assist with State, local, and private-sector efforts to protect
critical assets. During national disasters and contingency
events, PSAs work in State and local emergencies to provide
real-time information on protective measures.
It is important to note that individual facility owners and
operators and their State and local officials know a specific
asset and are best positioned to lead coordination of security
and emergency response planning. DHS's role is to facilitate,
provide expertise and tools to augment that planning, and
advise on protective measures and response actions.
I believe the next attack may be prevented when law
enforcement or the private sector see something specific and
take immediate action. We have seen that many times before.
This, coupled with communications strengthened during hurricane
experiences, has developed operational linkages that enable
effective planning in advance of an incident, increase security
and resiliency of our Nation's infrastructure, and produce the
operational effect of a quick response should an incident
occur.
Thank you for your attention. I would be happy to answer
any questions you may have at this time.
[The statement of Mr. Snyder follows:]
Prepared Statement of James L. Snyder
March 11, 2009
Thank you, Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Dent, and Members
of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to participate in the
hearing ``The Mumbai Attacks: A Wake-Up Call for America's Private
Sector,'' and to discuss the Department of Homeland Security's Office
of Infrastructure Protection's interaction with our Government and
private sector partners during and following the terrorist attacks in
Mumbai, India.
As acknowledged with this hearing, the Mumbai attack on November
26-30, 2008, served as a strong reminder that the threat of terrorism
remains very real, and that those who wish us harm remain dangerous and
adapt quickly to changing circumstance. The terrorist attacks were
well-planned, well-coordinated, and well-executed. The terrorists
carried out a complex attack and struck multiple targets in the
transportation and commercial facilities sectors, particularly hotels
and religious locations. One example of their ability to adapt was
their decision to shift tactics and conduct a water-borne entry rather
than the normal overland entry to the target area, thus avoiding
observance. Their attacks were also facilitated by the targets'
business requirements for open access, a reality that represents an
inherent security challenge. This type of attack highlights the
vulnerabilities of soft targets, and how difficult it is to prepare,
prevent, and respond to such attacks.
Consequently, we too must adapt to this dynamic threat
environment--as well as to the dangers posed by catastrophic natural
events--by remaining both nimble and flexible in our approach to
infrastructure protection, and by continuing to enhance our
coordination efforts with government at all levels and with the private
sector.
IP activities are based on the framework and approach outlined in
the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). Our mission is to
work closely with our Government and private sector partners across the
18 critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) sectors and to lead
the effort to ensure that a comprehensive, multi-faceted framework
exists to secure and enhance the resiliency of the Nation's CIKR.
Because the majority of the Nation's CIKR are owned and operated by the
private sector, the Department must leverage partnerships and
relationships to achieve success. Using the NIPP framework, the
Department has successfully established primarily voluntary
partnerships among interested Federal, State, local, tribal, and
private sector entities. These partners work within the framework to
set goals and priorities, identify key assets, assign roles and
responsibilities, allocate resources, and measure progress against
national priorities. DHS released the NIPP in 2006 and, following its
first triennial review and update, recently re-released it as the 2009
NIPP. The subtitle of the 2009 NIPP is ``Partnering to Enhance
Protection and Resiliency.''
The value of the relationships we have built through this
partnership has been demonstrated in local and national response to
hurricanes, fires, and other real world incidents. In the steady-state
environment, we sustain these relationships through information
sharing, exercise, and training so that when an incident occurs,
whether man-made or natural, we can respond and recover effectively and
efficiently. For example, on December 9, 2008, IP hosted a tabletop
exercise based on a multiple improvised explosive device attack with
representation from all 18 critical infrastructure sectors.
Additionally, IP's Commercial Facilities Sector Specific Agency
Executive Management Office (SSA-EMO) participated in a January 29,
2009, Terrorism Simulation Exercise. The tabletop exercise, Threat &
Response Options--Public Communications Challenges, was conducted with
the Commercial Facilities Real Estate Roundtable subsector. The
exercise was designed around a Mumbai-style attack and facilitated
active discussion on preventive, response, and recovery activities.
These are only two of many exercises we conduct annually with our CIKR
partners that build the relationships and processes we use during
response to all-hazards events.
In the case of Mumbai, IP worked directly with the Commercial
Facilities Sector, Banking and Finance Sector, Transportation Sector,
and leadership from religious organizations to share relevant
information. To facilitate information collection, analysis, and
distribution, IP leveraged the incident management capabilities built
into its Incident Management Cell (IMC). The IMC is a cross-functional
operations group that provides the core staff and facilities around
which IP's scalable incident management capability coalesces during a
large-scale CIKR incident. Prior to the Mumbai incident, the IMC
provided effective leadership and coordination in communicating with
our partners during Hurricanes Gustav and Ike. IP's response is guided
by the National Response Framework and National Incident Management
System which enable a systematic approach to response operations.
IP's initial actions on the first day of the Mumbai attacks,
November 26, were to disseminate Common Vulnerabilities (CV), Potential
Indicators of Terrorist Activity (PI), and Protective Measures (PM)
Reports to public and private sector partners through the Homeland
Security Information Network for Critical Sectors (HSIN-CS) portal and
its 4,500-member user community. These reports provide security
officials with specific information on potential vulnerabilities and
recommendations on specific protective measures that they can implement
to increase their security posture.
On November 27, IP released a TRIPwire Significant Incident Report
(SIR) to provide information on the attacks to over 6,000 users in the
TRIPwire community. TRIPwire is the Department's on-line,
collaborative, information-sharing network for bomb squads, law
enforcement, and other emergency services personnel. It provides
continuously updated information about current terrorist improvised
explosive device (IED) tactics, techniques, and procedures, including
design and emplacement techniques. IP issued three additional TRIPwire
postings over the next 13 days. These updates provided detailed
analysis of the terrorist tactics, techniques, and procedures, and
recommended protective measures based on the employed strategies. These
updates, along with a Mumbai TRITON Special Report, were also shared
with members of the private sector through postings on the HSIN-CS
portal. TRITON reports are monthly or incident-reactive reports that
assess terrorist tactics, techniques, operations, and strategies.
TRITON reports are produced by a UK-based subject matter expert
company, and are provided by IP to our State and local government
TRIPwire users.
On December 1, IP e-mailed an updated TRIPwire SIR that contained
additional information to all TRIPwire system users and the National
Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC). IP also posted the SIR to
the TRIPwire web site ``What's New'' Portal and to HSIN-CS. Of note,
during the 8-day time frame of November 27 to December 4, TRIPwire had
over three times the average number of site visits, indicating intense
user interest in the Mumbai attacks and the terrorist tactics,
techniques, and procedures used in the attacks.
On December 2, IP's Commercial Facilities SSA-EMO coordinated a
conference call with over 200 leaders across all sectors. The
Department's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), Homeland
Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC), IP, and
Transportation Security Administration provided detailed information on
the Mumbai attacks to call participants. Their briefings included
analyses of the tactics, techniques, and procedures used in the Mumbai
attack, and provided security recommendations to address these attack
methods. Specific protective measures were proposed to address
surveillance, target selection, infiltration, target access, and
engagement with security forces. Based on positive feedback from that
call, an additional conference call was held on December 10
specifically for 75 leaders of the Banking and Finance Sector.
On January 12, I&A and IP conducted a classified briefing for
senior security directors representing major hotel chains and other
commercial venues. The briefing provided a detailed analysis of the
tactics, techniques and procedures used in the Mumbai attacks,
including specific details of the IEDs; terrorist exploitation of
technology; surveillance techniques; timeline of the attack including
the targets and tactics; and recommended protective measures for
surveillance, port security, access control, and coordination with
security forces on specific actions to improve the security posture at
their location.
In addition to the interactions with our NIPP partners in
Washington, DC, a significant portion of IP's work is conducted in the
field, across the United States, by the Protective Security Advisor
(PSA) cadre. Eighty PSAs are in place in communities throughout the
Nation to assist with State, local, and private sector efforts to
protect critical assets, providing a Federal resource to communities
and businesses. During natural disasters and contingency events such as
Mumbai, PSAs often work in State and local Emergency Operations
Centers. PSAs also provide real-time information on facility
significance and protective measures to facility owners and operators,
as well as State and local representatives. For example, during the
Mumbai event, the PSA for Las Vegas met with hotel, casino, and resort
security officials to answer questions and distribute our CV/PI/PM
reports that provide details on enhanced security recommendations and
best practices.
PSAs also conduct Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection
(ECIP) assessment visits to assess overall site security, identify
gaps, recommend protective measures, educate facility owners and
operators on security, and promote communication and information
sharing among facility owners and operators, DHS, and State
governments. Information collected during ECIP visits will be used to
develop ECIP metrics; conduct sector-by-sector and cross-sector
vulnerability comparisons; identify security gaps and trends across
CIKR sectors and sub-sectors; establish sector baseline security survey
scores; and track progress toward improving CIKR security through
activities, programs, outreach, and training. This information is
utilized during incidents to help focus national and local response
efforts on identified areas of criticality within the impact area and
assist in the prioritization of reconstitution efforts.
In addition to the PSA program, IP has provided support for
reducing risk of a terrorist attack to the Nation's CIKR by conducting
vulnerability assessments for assets in the Commercial Facilities
Sector. The Buffer Zone Protection Program (BZPP) is a DHS-administered
grant program designed to help local law enforcement and owners and
operators of CIKR increase security in the ``buffer zone''--the area
outside a facility that can be used by an adversary to conduct
surveillance or launch an attack. The BZPP focuses on identifying and
mitigating vulnerabilities at the highest-risk critical infrastructure
sites and is designed to increase local law enforcement capabilities
and preparedness.
Additional support is provided through Site Assistance Visits
(SAVs). These are ``inside the fence'' vulnerability assessments
conducted jointly by IP in coordination and cooperation with Federal,
State, local, and CIKR owners and operators that identify critical
components, specific vulnerabilities, and security enhancements. During
an SAV, consequence and vulnerability information is collected to
inform risk data, which is then used as supporting information for
risk-based decisionmaking.
IP has also conducted training for more than 1,900 stakeholders in
the Commercial Facilities Sector and law enforcement officials who
protect assets in the Lodging and Resorts Subsectors. Relevant courses
include Soft Target Awareness, Surveillance Detection, IED Awareness,
and Protective Measures.
To provide additional assistance to the Commercial Facilities
Sector, IP is currently deploying Risk--Self-Assessment Tool (R-SAT),
an upgraded, re-engineered version of the Vulnerability Identification
Self-Assessment Tool (ViSAT). ViSAT is a Web-based self-assessment tool
developed by IP and provided free of charge to CIKR asset owners/
operators, primarily in places of mass gatherings such as arenas and
stadiums. This tool assists owners/operators to raise the level of
security at CIKR facilities and establish a common baseline of security
from which all assets in certain sectors or subsectors can identify
weaknesses and establish protection plans. Modules have currently been
deployed for stadiums, arenas, convention centers, performing arts
centers, and speedways. Commercial facilities members currently have
access to ViSAT, and DHS has provided a grant to the International
Association of Assembly Managers, a co-chair of the Public Assembly
Subcouncil, to promote and provide training for this tool.
IP also provides the Constellation/Automated Critical Asset
Management System (C/ACAMS) to State and local communities at no cost.
Currently, 30 States use
C/ACAMS, a CIKR asset management system that focuses on the unique
requirements and information needs of first responders. It provides
vulnerability and consequence scoring tools that aid the user's
subjective analysis of criticality; an integrated open source
information portal, Constellation, which ties together critical asset
data and reporting about the current threat environment; a tailored
reporting capability to assist in data calls on critical assets; Buffer
Zone Generation capability; capability to generate pre-incident
operational plans; on-line resources for first responders; and an
integrated geographic information system via the Department's
Integrated Common Analytical Viewer.
Additionally, the Regional Consortium Coordinating Council (RCCC)
was established in Fall 2008 to bring the unique perspectives of
geographically based public and private partnerships into the NIPP
framework. The RCCC comprises existing functional and active regional
entities that include both Government and private sector members. The
RCCC provides a critical link between CIKR owners/operators and key
homeland security officials and activities at the regional, State, and
local levels.
These Departmental efforts and resources are critically important.
However, as we move forward and enhance our efforts, and recall the
lessons learned from Mumbai, it is also important to acknowledge that
individual facility owners and operators, and their State and local
officials, know the unique circumstances facing a specific asset and
are, therefore, best positioned to serve as primary lead in
coordination of security and emergency response planning. DHS's role is
to facilitate and augment planning and support where necessary and
appropriate.
I believe a key opportunity to prevent the next attack in this
country will be by local law enforcement and the private sector seeing
something suspicious and taking action or calling that information into
the proper authorities. Time and again, we have witnessed this
effective solution both here in the United States during the Fort Dix
and South Carolina incidents and overseas. The Federal Government and
the Department of Homeland Security can and do assist with these
efforts by providing valuable information to our local Government and
private sector partners.
As I have described, IP is focused on continuing to improve our
capability to provide timely and actionable information to our public
and private sector partners. This, coupled with partnerships
strengthened during recent hurricane experiences, has reinforced the
operational linkages that will enable effective planning in advance of
an incident, result in enhanced safety, security and resiliency of our
Nation's CIKR, and produce an operational effect for expeditious,
efficient, and effective response should an incident occur.
Thank you for your attention, and I would be happy to answer any
questions you may have at this time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentleman for his testimony.
I would like to acknowledge the presence of Congresswoman
Titus from Nevada. We appreciate her service on this committee.
I now recognize Commissioner Kelly to summarize his
statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF RAYMOND W. KELLY, COMMISSIONER, NEW YORK POLICE
DEPARTMENT
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Thompson, Congressman King, Congressman Dent,
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify about the New York City Police Department's response to
the terrorist attacks in Mumbai.
I want to begin my remarks by saying that partnership with
the private sector has been a hallmark of the NYPD's
counterterrorism program since 2002. It is our collective
responsibility to learn from events like those that took place
in Mumbai and adapt our programs to prevent them. That is
exactly what we have endeavored to do in New York.
We have a program called NYPD Shield that includes over
6,000 private security personnel who train with us and function
as additional eyes and ears. We held a briefing with 400
members of this group immediately after the attacks in Mumbai.
At that meeting, we had the lead officer in a three-man team
that we sent to Mumbai call in from Mumbai and share the
lessons that we learned with the audience.
I will update you on our response to those lessons shortly.
Before I do that, I want to make you aware of a more recent
study conducted by our intelligence division analyzing the
similarities between the Mumbai assault and the attack in
Lahore, Pakistan, on March 3, targeting the Sri Lankan national
cricket team. Eight people were killed in that incident,
including six Pakistani police officers. That terrorists would
attack a cricket team to attract maximum attention should not
come as a surprise considering the sport's immense popularity
in South Asia. Last year when the NYPD formed a cricket league
as part of our outreach efforts with the South Asian community
in New York City, it received scant attention in the New York
media but was widely covered in India, Pakistan, and other
countries in South Asia and Europe.
The attacks in Mumbai and Lahore are evidence of a shift in
tactics from suicide bombs to a commando-style military assault
with small teams of highly trained, heavily armed operatives
launching simultaneous sustained attacks. We are paying very
close attention to this trend.
Other similarities we identified include choice of
location; dense, relatively unprotected urban areas where the
terrorists could establish strategic choke points to impede the
response of authorities.
We also know that some form of detailed pre-attack
surveillance was carried out in both cases, as evidenced by the
terrorists' thorough familiarity with their target.
Likewise, both sets of attackers coordinated their
movements closely through the use of basic technology, cell
phones in Mumbai and small battery-powered two-way radios in
Lahore.
The assault teams themselves are composed of physically fit
males between the ages of 20 and 30. They were similar in
composition and in size with 10 people involved in the Mumbai
attack and an estimated 12 in Lahore.
In each instance, the teams appeared to break down into
smaller two-man operating units once the attack was launched.
In both Mumbai and Lahore the attackers were armed with
assault rifles, semiautomatic pistols, and grenades. They
carried backpacks with additional ammunition and explosives,
more than enough to sustain a prolonged siege. The attackers
were casually attired in Western clothing with oversized
jackets, button-down shirts and cargo-style pants that could
conceal contraband.
Both groups were calm, unhurried, and methodical. They also
carried food and drugs to enhance their performance and
stamina. In Mumbai, the terrorists reportedly used cocaine and
amphetamines to stay awake. In Lahore, remnants of unspecified
high-energy foods were recovered from the scene.
It appears both attacks were not initially designed to be
suicidal. The goals of the terrorists include hostage taking,
extending the violence and the resulting media coverage, and
escaping. In Mumbai, the terrorists were able to take captives.
However, they were captured or killed before they issued
demands or escaped. In Lahore, they were unsuccessful in taking
hostages, but they did manage to evade capture.
Both operations focused on highly symbolic targets. By
impacting tourism and international sports, they were intended
to instill fear and cause economic damage. They were also aimed
at attacking the global reputations of India and Pakistan and
heightening regional tensions between the two.
While the political root causes of these attacks appear to
be local, the terrorist networks behind them are global, well-
funded, and interconnected. The militant Islamic groups
suspected in these cases, mainly Lashkar-e-Taiba, have deep and
long-standing ties to al Qaeda. In fact, LeT has trained such
terrorists as convicted shoe bomber Richard Reid and Essa Al
Hindi, who surveilled buildings in New York's financial
district prior to September 11. They are also believed to have
trained militant Islamic fighters for conflicts around the
world, including in Iraq and Afghanistan. As far as we know,
they have not directly targeted a Western country, but they
specifically sought out locations in Mumbai with Western and
Jewish clientele. Hopefully we won't see their tactics migrate
to the United States, but if they do, we certainly intend to be
prepared.
Within hours of the end of the attacks in Mumbai, the NYPD
began making arrangements to send personnel there. This is in
keeping with the practice we followed for several years. In all
cases, our officers do not take part in investigative activity.
In Mumbai, our officers toured crime scenes, took photographs,
and asked questions of police officials.
They relayed what they learned back to New York. These
officers are a part of a Police Department overseas liaison
program in which we have posted experienced personnel to 11
cities around the world. They partner with local police and
intelligence agencies and respond when terrorist incidents
occur.
In this case, the most senior officer in the group had
served as the liaison in Amman, Jordan. In July 2006, when
seven bombs exploded in Mumbai trains and rail stations, he
flew to the city on a similar mission. The relationships he
forged during that trip proved helpful in December.
Our liaisons arrived in Mumbai on December 2, 3 days after
the attacks ended. By December 5, our intelligence division had
produced an analysis which we shared with the FBI. As I noted
that morning, we convened a special meeting with the members of
NYPD Shield. During the live conference call with our team
leaders in Mumbai, we posted photographs and maps to help the
audience visualize the locations he was describing.
We also conducted two exercises, one a tactical drill for
emergency service unit officers, the other a table-top exercise
for commanders. Both scenarios mirrored the attacks in Mumbai.
Based on our analysis of what took place in Mumbai, we have
been training additional officers to use heavy weapons in close
quarter battle tactics. In the event of a sustained attack such
as you saw in India, these officers will be able to support and
relieve the more than 400 members of our emergency service unit
who already have these skills.
Last month, 134 officers from our Organized Crime Control
Bureau became the first to complete the new course of heavy
weapons and tactics training. We are continuing this month with
another group of 135. Our goal is to qualify up to 1,500
officers in these special skills.
We also provided basic heavy weapons instruction for our
most recent class of over 1,000 police recruits. We will do the
same for our current academy class.
In Mumbai, the local police were simply outgunned by the
terrorists. We don't want that to happen in New York. We are
also meeting with service providers to see if a means can be
developed to pinpoint disruption of cell or satellite phones
used by a terrorists during an attack without the wholesale
disruption of communications in the immediate vicinity.
We also saw that, in Mumbai, the local authorities had
insufficient knowledge of the layouts of targets. In light of
this observation, we have assigned our emergency service unit
supervisors to tour major hotels and other landmarks. Out of
each visit, they develop a briefing book with a description of
the location and detailed diagrams, as well as a video that can
be used for training purposes. We have conducted 11 in-depth
tours of major hotels so far, and we are continuing to select
new locations.
At our December 5 Shield meeting, we also reviewed a list
of best practices in hotel security. This is a set of items we
routinely share when our counterterrorism officers conduct
training with hotel security.
Through another partnership, Operation Nexus, NYPD
detectives have made thousands of visits to the kind of
companies terrorists might seek to exploit, truck rental
businesses, scuba diving schools, or hotels. We let them know
what to look for and what to do if they observe suspicious
behavior.
As part of this initiative we have assigned a senior
officer to work exclusively with hotels. After Mumbai, he and
his team visited numerous hotels where they met with security
directors and developed emergency procedures to use in the
event of a Mumbai-style attack.
As part of our training, we also emphasize with hotel staff
the importance of knowing who is inside and recognizing that
the attack may be initiated from within the facility. We talk
about how to identify hostile surveillance or the stockpiling
of materials, controlling points of entry, and having a
thorough knowledge of the building's layout and a widely
distributed emergency action plan.
We also ask the hotel personnel to be acutely aware of
suspicious behavior on the part of visitors, such as denying
staff access to rooms for extended periods, loitering on guest
floors or in the lobby, requesting specific rooms, receiving
unusual parcels, and inquiring about hotel security. Along with
an array of other sensitive landmarks, major hotels are also
the site of visits by our Hercules teams and critical response
vehicles.
In addition to hotels, locations also include hospitals,
houses of worship, critical infrastructure and tourist
attractions, such as Times Square.
While we have to learn from Mumbai and Lahore and prepare
to defend ourselves against similar attacks, we cannot focus
too narrowly on any one preventive method.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Commissioner, are you wrapping up?
Mr. Kelly. I am. I am sorry. I apologize.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We want to hear you. Just wanted to----
Mr. Kelly. Let me stop here.
I want to thank you for inviting me, Madam Chairwoman.
[The statement of Mr. Kelly follows:]
Prepared Statement of Raymond W. Kelly
March 11, 2009
Chairman Thompson; Chairwoman Jackson Lee; Congressman King;
Congressman Dent; Members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify about the New York City
Police Department's response to the terrorist attacks in Mumbai. I want
to begin my remarks by saying that partnership with the private sector
has been a hallmark of the NYPD's counterterrorism program since 2002.
It is our collective responsibility to learn from events like those
that took place in Mumbai, and adapt our programs to prevent them. That
is exactly what we've endeavored to do in New York.
We have a program called NYPD Shield that includes over 6,000
private security personnel who train with us and function as additional
eyes and ears. We held a briefing with 400 members of this group
immediately after the attacks in Mumbai. At that meeting, we had the
lead officer in a three-man team we sent to Mumbai call in from
overseas and share the lessons we learned with the audience.
I will update you on our response to those lessons shortly. Before
I do that, I want to make you aware of a more recent study conducted by
our Intelligence Division analyzing the similarities between the Mumbai
assault and the attack in Lahore, Pakistan on March 3 targeting the Sri
Lankan national cricket team. Eight people were killed in that
incident, including six Pakistani police officers.
That terrorists would attack a cricket team to attract maximum
attention should not come as a surprise considering the sport's immense
popularity in South Asia. Last year, when the NYPD formed a cricket
league as part of our outreach efforts with the South Asian community
in New York City, it received scant attention in the New York media but
was widely covered in India, Pakistan, and other countries in South
Asia and Europe.
The attacks in Mumbai and Lahore are evidence of a shift in tactics
from suicide bombs to a commando-style military assault with small
teams of highly trained, heavily armed operatives launching
simultaneous, sustained attacks. We're paying very close attention to
this trend.
Other similarities we identified included the choice of locations:
dense, relatively unprotected urban areas where the terrorists could
establish strategic choke points to impede the response of authorities.
We also know that some form of detailed, pre-attack surveillance was
carried out in both cases, as evidenced by the terrorists' thorough
familiarity with their targets. Likewise, both sets of attackers
coordinated their movements closely through the use of basic
technology: cell phones in Mumbai and small, battery-powered two-way
radios in Lahore.
The assault teams themselves were composed of physically fit males
between the ages of 20 and 30. They were similar in composition and in
size, with 10 people involved in the Mumbai attack and an estimated 12
in Lahore. In each instance, the teams appeared to break down into
smaller, two-man operating units once the attack was launched.
In both Mumbai and Lahore the attackers were armed with assault
rifles, semi-automatic pistols and grenades. They carried backpacks
with additional ammunition and explosives, more than enough to sustain
a prolonged siege. The attackers were casually attired in western
clothing, with oversized jackets, button down shirts and cargo style
pants that could conceal contraband.
Both groups were calm, unhurried, and methodical. They also carried
food and drugs to enhance their performance and stamina. In Mumbai, the
terrorists reportedly used cocaine and amphetamines to stay awake. In
Lahore, remnants of unspecified high energy foods were recovered from
the scene.
It appears both attacks were not initially designed to be suicidal.
The goals of the terrorists included hostage-taking, extending the
violence and the resulting media coverage, and escaping. In Mumbai, the
terrorists were able to take captives. However, they were captured or
killed before they issued demands or escaped. In Lahore, they were
unsuccessful in taking hostages but they did manage to evade capture.
Both operations focused on highly symbolic targets. By impacting
tourism and international sports they were intended to instill fear and
cause economic damage. They were also aimed at attacking the global
reputations of India and Pakistan and heightening regional tensions
between the two.
While the political root causes of these attacks appear to be
local, the terrorist networks behind them are global, well-funded, and
interconnected. The militant Islamic groups suspected in these cases--
mainly Lashkar-e-Taiba--have deep and long-standing ties to al Qaeda.
In fact, L.E.T. has trained such terrorists as convicted shoe-
bomber, Richard Reid, and Essa Al Hindi who surveilled buildings in New
York's financial district prior to September 11. They are also believed
to have trained militant Islamic fighters for conflicts around the
world, including in Iraq and Afghanistan. As far as we know, they have
not directly targeted a western country but they specifically sought
out locations in Mumbai with western and Jewish clientele. Hopefully,
we won't see their tactics migrate to the United States, but if they do
we intend to be prepared.
Within hours of the end of the attacks in Mumbai, the NYPD began
making arrangements to send personnel there. This is in keeping with a
practice we have followed for several years. In all cases, our officers
do not take part in investigative activity. In Mumbai, our officers
toured crime scenes, took photographs, and asked questions of police
officials. They relayed what they learned back to New York.
These officers are part of the Police Department's overseas liaison
program in which we post experienced personnel to 11 cities around the
world. They partner with local police and intelligence agencies and
respond when terrorist incidents occur. In this case, the most senior
officer in the group had served as a liaison in Amman, Jordan. In July
2006, when seven bombs exploded in Mumbai trains and railway stations,
he flew to the city on a similar mission. The relationships he forged
during that trip proved helpful in December.
Our liaisons arrived in Mumbai on December 2, 3 days after the
attacks ended. By December 5, our Intelligence Division had produced an
analysis, which we shared with the FBI. As I noted, that morning we
convened a special meeting with the members of NYPD Shield. During the
live conference call with our team leader in Mumbai, we posted
photographs and maps to help the audience visualize the locations he
was describing.
We also conducted two exercises, one a tactical drill for Emergency
Service Unit officers, the other a tabletop exercise for commanders.
Both scenarios mirrored the attacks in Mumbai.
Based on our analysis of what took place in Mumbai, we've been
training additional officers in the use of heavy weapons and close
quarters battle tactics. In the event of a sustained attack, such as we
saw in India, these officers will be able to support and relieve the
more than 400 members of our Emergency Service Unit who already have
these skills. Last month, 134 officers from our Organized Crime Control
Bureau became the first to complete this new course of heavy weapons
and tactics training. We're continuing this month with another group of
135. Our goal is to qualify up to 1,500 officers in these special
skills. We've also provided basic heavy weapons instruction for our
most recent class of over 1,000 police recruits. We will do the same
with our current class. In Mumbai, the local police were simply
outgunned by the terrorists. We don't want that to happen in New York.
We are also meeting with service providers to see if a means can be
developed to pinpoint disruption of cell or satellite phones used by
terrorists during an attack, without the wholesale disruption of
communications in the immediate vicinity.
We also saw that in Mumbai, the local authorities had insufficient
knowledge of the layouts of the targets. In light of this observation,
we've assigned our Emergency Service Unit supervisors to tour major
hotels and other landmarks. Out of each visit they develop a briefing
book with a description of the location and detailed diagrams, as well
a video that can be used for training purposes. We've conducted 11 in-
depth tours of major hotels so far and we are continuing to select new
locations.
At our December 5 Shield meeting we also reviewed a list of best
practices in hotel security. This is a set of items we routinely share
when our counterterrorism officers conduct trainings with hotel
security personnel.
Through another partnership, Operation Nexus, NYPD detectives have
made thousands of visits to the kind of companies terrorists might seek
to exploit: truck rental businesses, scuba diving schools, or hotels.
We let them know what to look for and what to do if they observe
suspicious behavior.
As part of this initiative, we've assigned a senior officer to work
exclusively with hotels. After Mumbai, he and his team visited numerous
hotels where they met with security directors and developed emergency
procedures to use in the event of a Mumbai-style attack.
As part of our training, we also emphasize with hotel staff the
importance of knowing who's inside and recognizing that the attack may
be initiated from within the facility. We talk about how to identify
hostile surveillance or the stockpiling of materials, controlling
points of entry and having a thorough knowledge of the building's
layout and a widely distributed emergency action plan.
We also ask hotel personnel to be acutely aware of suspicious
behavior on the part of visitors, such as: denying staff access to
rooms for extended periods; loitering on guest floors or in the lobby;
requesting specific rooms; receiving unusual parcels; and inquiring
about hotel security.
Along with an array of other sensitive landmarks, major hotels are
also the sites of visits by our Hercules teams and Critical Response
Vehicle Surges. The former consist of heavily armed members of our
Emergency Service Unit, who appear unannounced at key locations in a
show of force designed to disrupt terrorist surveillance. This is also
the goal of our daily CRV surges, in which large convoys of patrol cars
proceed with emergency lights and sirens to a pre-arranged site based
on intelligence. In addition to hotels these locations include
hospitals, houses of worship, critical infrastructure, and tourist
attractions like Times Square.
All of the measures I have discussed are part of a robust
counterterrorism program we built from the ground up in 2002, when we
realized that it in addition to our focus on crime-fighting, the Police
Department needed to build the intelligence collection, analysis, and
infrastructure protection capabilities to defend New York City from
another terrorist attack.
We established the Nation's first municipal counterterrorism
bureau, and we restructured our Intelligence Division. We recruited the
best that the Federal Government had to offer to head those two
operations. We created a new civilian intelligence program to support
our field commanders with timely information and analysis. We tapped
the incredible linguistic diversity of the police department. We
assigned native speakers of languages such as Arabic, Urdu, and Pashto
to counterterrorism duties. We strengthened our patrols of key
infrastructure in the city, including bridges, tunnels, and a host of
landmarks and other sensitive locations. We forged collaborative
relationships with the private sector, with law enforcement
organizations up and down the east coast, and with Federal agencies,
especially the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security.
In the last 7 years, working with the FBI through the Joint
Terrorism Task Force, we've stopped multiple plots against New York
City. I know that this productive collaboration will continue to
thrive.
The Police Department's strongest and most innovative regional
partnership is the one supported by the Department of Homeland
Security, our Securing the Cities program. This is an unprecedented
initiative to protect New York with advanced radiation detection
devices installed at all points of access to the five boroughs,
including roads, bridges, tunnels, and waterways. We now train and
share information with dozens of neighboring jurisdictions.
Our collaboration with the Federal Government has been essential.
Through the Homeland Security, Transit Security, and Port Security
Grant Programs, among others, we have instituted effective and
innovative programs. In the past, the NYPD worked directly with the
Transportation Security Administration to obtain grants and steer
Federal funds to the most effective programs. We believe it is vitally
important to maintain this direct connection and to ensure that DHS's
transit security program preserve its distinct mission, purpose, and
management, without undue bureaucratic layers. It is our hope the
Congress will work with the new leadership at DHS to ensure that the
agencies with the shared mission of protecting the transit system be
allowed to work together.
While we have to learn from Mumbai and Lahore and prepare to defend
ourselves against similar attacks, we cannot focus too narrowly on any
one preventive method. We need to strengthen our defense on every
front, stay sharp, well-trained, well-equipped, and constantly
vigilant. And we must continue to work together at every level of
government and with the private sector to defeat those would harm us.
I want to thank the committee Members for your crucial support in
making this possible, and for this opportunity to update you on our
initiatives.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We look forward to the opportunity to
engage in questioning. Thank you for that very helpful
testimony.
It is my pleasure now to recognize Mr. McJunkin to
summarize his statement for 5 minutes. The gentleman is
recognized.
STATEMENT OF JAMES W. MCJUNKIN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
COUNTERTERRORISM DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Mr. McJunkin. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Jackson Lee,
Ranking Member Dent and Members of the committee. Thank you for
inviting me here today to discuss lessens learned from the
recent terror attacks in Mumbai, and how the FBI is working
with our U.S. and international intelligence and law
enforcement partners to apply those lessons to protect the
homeland and U.S. interests overseas.
Within hours of the first attacks on Mumbai, the FBI had a
representative on the scene, the assistant legal attache to our
New Delhi office, who was traveling in the direction of Mumbai
when he was notified of the attacks. He immediately made his
way to the Taj Mahal hotel.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. McJunkin, is your microphone on, or
could you move it closer to you, please? Thank you.
Mr. McJunkin. He immediately made his way to the Taj Mahal
hotel, which was still under siege, and contacted his Indian
counterparts. From there, he took part in the rescue of
Americans trapped in the hotel. He also worked with the U.S.
Embassy to obtain approval from the Indian government to deploy
our Los Angeles Rapid Deployment Team and key personnel from
FBI headquarters to assist with the investigation.
The team, which arrived in Mumbai on November 29, had two
major jobs. One is the pursuit of justice, which involves
traditional forensic-based investigative work to track down
those who were murdered Americans and determine who the
attackers co-conspirators were. Two, and equally important, is
the prevention mission, which involves generating new
information to determine who else might still be out there who
potentially poses a threat to the United States, our citizens,
and our allies.
The investigation continues, and we still have personnel in
India who have been working with our Indian law enforcement and
intelligence partners to help uncover information about how the
attacks were executed, how the attackers were trained, and how
long the attacks took to plan. We have been sharing that
information with our Federal, State, and local and
international law enforcement partners and using it to bolster
our efforts to protect the homeland.
So far, the Mumbai attacks have reinforced several key
lessons. One, terrorist organizations don't need weapons of
mass destruction or even large quantities of explosives to be
effective. The simplest weapons can be as deadly. It comes as
no surprise, therefore, that a small disciplined team of highly
trained individuals can wreak that level of havoc that we saw
in Mumbai. Last week's attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in
Lahore, Pakistan, is another example of a low-tech but
potentially high-impact operation. We are concerned about the
possibility that other foreign terrorist groups, including al
Qaeda or its affiliates, will take note of those attacks and
attempt to emulate them.
The take-home lesson for the FBI and DHS is that we must
continue to look at both large and small organizations with the
right combination of capability and intent to carry out
attacks. Two, we need to reenergize our efforts to keep the
American public engaged and vigilant. That is critical to the
effort to prevent something like the Mumbai attacks from
occurring on our shores. As we engage the public, we want to
encourage them to be cognizant of and report suspicious
activity that comes to their attention to their local, State,
and Federal law enforcement agencies.
A key tool for engaging the public and our law enforcement
partners is Guardian, a Web-based application to track
suspicious incident reporting. As we receive information on
threats from law enforcement, other Federal agencies, and the
general public, we input these reports into the system where
they can be tracked, searched, analyzed, and triaged for
action. No threat report is left unaddressed. Although roughly
97 percent of these incidents are ultimately determined to have
no conclusive nexus to terrorism, we believe we cannot afford
to ignore potentially important threat indicators.
We have begun a pilot deployment of eGuardian, an
unclassified system that enables participation by our State,
local, and tribal law enforcement partners. eGuardian will
enable near real-time sharing and tracking of terrorist
information and suspicious activities among State, local, and
tribal and Federal entities.
Another key lesson the Mumbai attacks reinforced is the
importance of international partnerships. As Director Mueller
said during his visit to India and Pakistan last week,
terrorism is not an issue for one country alone. We are all
fighting a common enemy. We all continue to work with our
counterparts in India and around the world to bring the
perpetrators of these attacks to justice and to prevent further
attacks.
In conclusion, Madam Chairman, as the threats to the United
States become more global, the FBI is expanding our
collaboration with our law enforcement and intelligence
partners here at home and around the world. We are working with
our international counterparts to prevent terrorist attacks and
assist in their investigation when they do occur. As we have
done with the Mumbai attacks, we will continue to analyze and
share lessons learned from these investigations to help prevent
future attacks at home or against U.S. interests abroad. Thank
you.
[The statement of Mr. McJunkin follows:]
Prepared Statement of James W. McJunkin
March 11, 2009
Good afternoon Chairwoman Jackson-Lee, Ranking Member Dent, and
Members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today
to discuss the FBI's role in investigating the November 2008 terrorist
attacks in Mumbai, India. I will also describe how we are working with
our U.S. intelligence and law enforcement partners to apply lessons
learned from the Mumbai attacks to protect the U.S. Homeland, as well
as how we are collaborating with our international partners to help
prevent attacks on U.S. interests and our allies overseas.
fbi role in mumbai investigation
As the committee knows, on November 26, 2008, several men armed
with hand grenades, automatic weapons, and satellite phones landed in a
rubber raft on the shores of Mumbai. They scattered to soft targets
across the city, launched simultaneous attacks that held India's
financial capital under siege for days, and killed more than 170
individuals, including six American citizens. Within hours of the first
attacks, the FBI had a representative on the scene: our Assistant Legal
Attache in the FBI's New Delhi office, who was traveling in the general
direction of Mumbai when he was notified of the attacks. He immediately
made his way to the Taj Mahal hotel, which was still under siege, and
contacted his Indian counterparts. From there, he took part in efforts
to rescue Americans trapped in the hotel, set up lines of communication
with his FBI and U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) counterparts, and
coordinated the arrival of our Los Angeles Rapid Deployment Team.
Even before the crisis ended, the investigation had begun. Agents
from FBI offices in New Delhi, Islamabad, and Los Angeles joined forces
with the Indian government, the CIA, the State Department, and foreign
partners. Through these partnerships, we had unprecedented access to
evidence and intelligence. Agents and analysts interviewed more than 70
individuals, including the sole surviving attacker. Our forensic
specialists pulled fingerprints from improvised explosive devices. They
recovered data from damaged cell phones, in one case by literally
wiring a smashed phone back together.
At the same time, we collected, analyzed, and disseminated
intelligence to our partners at home and abroad--not only to determine
how these attacks were planned, and by whom, but to ensure that if a
second wave of attacks was planned, we had the intelligence to stop it.
I also want to acknowledge the very fine work that the FBI's Office
of Victim Assistance, working in concert with U.S. consular officers in
Mumbai and the State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs, undertook
to assist the U.S. citizen victims and their families. That work
continues to this day.
threats posed by suspected sponsors of mumbai attackers
The surviving Mumbai attacker has claimed that the Pakistan-based
terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) provided him training and
direction for the attack. The FBI assesses that LT, which is well known
to the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC), remains a threat to U.S.
interests in South Asia and to the U.S. homeland. We have no current
intelligence indicating that there is an organized LT presence in the
United States or that LT senior leadership is seeking to attack the
U.S. homeland. LT does maintain facilitation, procurement, fundraising,
and recruitment activities worldwide, including in the United States.
For example, in 2003, several followers of ``Virginia Jihad'' cleric
Sheikh Ali Al-Timimi were convicted of providing material support to
terrorism relating to their training at an LT-sponsored training camp
in Pakistan, with the intention of fighting against Coalition Forces in
Afghanistan. In addition, the FBI is investigating a number of
individuals across the United States who are linked in some way to LT--
primarily through witting and unwitting fundraising for the group, as
well as the recruitment of individuals from the United States to attend
LT camps.
lessons learned from mumbai attacks
The principal lesson from the Mumbai attacks remains that a small
number of trained and determined attackers with relatively
unsophisticated weapons can do a great deal of damage. Last week's
attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore, Pakistan, is another
example of a low-tech, but potentially high-impact operation. We are
concerned about the possibility that other terrorist groups, including
al Qaeda or its affiliates, will take note of these attacks and attempt
to emulate them.
The FBI is implementing the lessons learned from the Mumbai attacks
by continuing to maintain a high level of vigilance for all indications
of developing terrorist activity. We recognize that the planning for
the Mumbai attacks likely unfolded over a relatively long period of
time with careful surveillance of the target sites and transportation
routes. We are continuing to work closely with our State, local, and
tribal law enforcement partners in our Joint Terrorism Task Forces to
follow up on indications of suspicious activity that could potentially
be related to terrorism.
We are also sharing relevant information from the Mumbai
investigation with our intelligence and law enforcement partners.
Classified information is available to cleared State and local law
enforcement personnel in Joint Terrorism Task Forces and Fusion
Centers. In addition, the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) jointly issued an unclassified alert about the attacks to State,
local, and tribal officials on November 27, 2008. The FBI and DHS also
issued an Intelligence Bulletin on December 3, 2008, to building owners
and operators, as well as the law enforcement community, to alert them
to preliminary findings regarding the techniques and tactics terrorists
used in the Mumbai attacks. The bulletin indicated that the FBI and DHS
had no credible or specific information that terrorists were planning
similar operations against public buildings in the United States, but
urged local authorities and building owners and operators to be aware
of potential attack tactics. We continue to work with our partners to
heighten the public's awareness of the continued threat of terrorist
attacks and the need to report suspicious incidents.
One key lesson the Mumbai attacks have reinforced is the importance
of international partnerships. The unprecedented collaboration we
developed with our Indian law enforcement and intelligence counterparts
in this investigation has strengthened our relationship with the
Government of India. As Director Mueller said during his visit to India
and Pakistan last week, terrorism is not an issue for one country
alone--we are all fighting a common enemy. We will continue to work
with our counterparts in India, and around the world, to bring the
perpetrators of these attacks to justice, and to prevent further
attacks.
conclusion
As the investigation into the Mumbai attacks progresses, FBI
counterterrorism agents and analysts continue to analyze all available
information to determine who was responsible, assess lessons learned,
determine if the United States may be vulnerable to a similar attack,
and determine the threat posed by the group--or individuals tied to the
group--to the United States. We are working closely with our USIC and
law enforcement partners in these efforts, and will continue to
disseminate information about lessons learned.
In summary, Madam Chairwoman, as the threats to our Nation and our
allies become ever-more globalized, the FBI is expanding our
collaboration with our international and U.S. law enforcement and
intelligence partners to prevent terrorist attacks and to assist in
investigating them when they do occur. We will continue to build on
these relationships to advance the FBI's national security mission.
And, as we have done with the Mumbai attacks, we will continue to
analyze and share lessons learned from these investigations to help
prevent future attacks at home or against U.S. interests abroad.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the witnesses for their
testimony. I am looking forward to the opportunity, again, of
all our Members being able to engage.
I will remind each Member that he or she will have 5
minutes to question the panel. I will now recognize myself for
questions.
Let me start with you, Mr. Secretary Snyder, and each
person I would appreciate answering the question. How
vulnerable are we in America? Is it important that we recognize
that the vulnerabilities today still exist with respect to an
attack on our infrastructure?
Mr. Snyder. Well, Madam Chairwoman, certainly, we use a
process beginning with a risk assessment that goes through
every sector to determine the vulnerabilities that are common
across sectors as well as within facilities in that sector. We
have an annual process called the SHIRA, which seeks input from
all the sectors, as well as States for the facilities that they
think are at most risk.
We look and develop a national risk profile. This year it
is based on an all-hazards risk, which is a wider-based risk
approach than what we have had in the 2008 risk assessment, and
that was based on a terrorist-specific risk. So we measure risk
in a relative sort of way, across the sectors, based on the
vulnerabilities of those facilities, based on the capabilities
that the terrorists or other disasters could have on that
facility, and then the consequences, you know, that would be
impacted upon the local populace, either economic or certainly
loss of life and property.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So you do an analysis to determine so?
Mr. Snyder. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think, in addition to the analysis it is
important to have real-life experiences as well, and I hope
that that is part of your assessment.
Commissioner Kelly, how many hotels in America, and again,
this is a question that is rhetorical. But what is your thought
about whether our hotels today in America have preparation
plans that would have addressed the commando attacks? Would you
also answer the question: How vulnerable do you think we are in
large sites, as in a hotel or stadium, around the country?
Mr. Kelly. Well, any free society is going to be
vulnerable. There is no question about it that we are
vulnerable. The issue is: What can we do to reduce that
vulnerability? I can really only speak for New York, what we
have done. We have done a lot. We certainly intend to do more.
I think the hotel industry, as the title of this hearing
says, I think they have had a few wake-up calls here, certainly
in Islamabad and certainly in Mumbai, and I think they are
responding to it. But it is difficult to redesign hotels. I
mean, these are standing structures.
I can tell you what we do. I mentioned in my lengthy
prepared remarks that we do talk to the industry, literally, on
a daily basis, the hotels in New York. We work with them as far
as developing best practices. We do inspections; we communicate
that information to them.
But, you know, there is only so much that you can do. We
are going to continually remain a free and open society. Hotels
themselves have to be accessible. They have to have, certainly,
elements of security, but they don't want to look like armed
camps. We understand that. So it is a big challenge in a free
and open society.
But as I say, I am really speaking for New York. We believe
that we are doing everything that we reasonably can do, given
the resources that we have, and certainly working closely with
our Federal partners.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Planning is extremely important.
Mr. McJunkin, in the course of the testimony of witnesses
that we have heard, the use of the word commandos versus
suicide bombing. Would you comment on what you think the
increase of that tactic may be, such as the commandos, and your
assessment of whether or not we continue to be vulnerable in
sectors like hotels, resort areas where we are close to water?
Mr. McJunkin. Madam Chairwoman, I would say that we are
always vulnerable, and these types of attacks continue to
mature. They also change tactics to thwart our efforts, and
they will continue to find any means necessary within their
capabilities to hit us. I believe that that is in fact true.
I also would say that, within the United States, we have,
within the FBI, 56 field offices, over 61 legal attaches
overseas; 100 JTTF or JTTF annexes working Nation-wide on this
problem full-time. We are assertive in our approach, and we
conduct on-going investigations. Beyond the State and local,
the FBI and our partners have teamed up with more closely than
ever with our intelligence community partners in order to spot
and assess potential threats before they ever enter our shores.
We work with the Department of Homeland Security to make sure
that we have TRIPwires in place to identify those people as
they come into the United States. We also look, on the local
and State departments, my experience is that we have come a
long way. Those departments have greatly enhanced their
capabilities. They are constantly vigilant, and they haven't
lost the scent. We are encouraged by that.
I would say that we have vulnerabilities, and it would
depend on the part of the country that we are talking about as
far as resources and training and all of that that rolls in.
But I am still encouraged by our improvements and our
continuing working relationships.
Ms. Jackson Lee. This is my last quick question to Mr.
Snyder, and it has to do with information. I have tasked the
subcommittee staff with looking into DHS coordination efforts
with the private sector, very important. But I was troubled to
hear that information about mitigation measures was not posted
on the Homeland Security Information Network for nearly a week
following the Mumbai attack. Could you please explain, in light
of the fact that similar information was provided to the law
enforcement network, TRIPwire, which is good, the day following
the attack, following this, have you made improvements so that
the information and outreach can get to its needed source as
quickly as possible?
Mr. Snyder. Thank you, ma'am. The system that we used or
the process we used for Mumbai was on the Wednesday evening,
the 26th, as the attack began, basically, we posted on HSIN-CS
existing products that had dealt with the common
vulnerabilities, the potential indicators of terrorist attack,
and the protective measures that had been developed generically
for hotels, as well as rail stations previously. Then, as you
mentioned, TRIPwire, we posted on the 27th, Thanksgiving
Thursday, some information that was beginning to come out of
the law enforcement channels related to Mumbai as the attack
unfolded. We updated that a couple of times on TRIPwire, and at
that point, we were beginning a process to integrate TRIPwire
with HSIN-CS, but we did not yet have it to the point where we
had tear lines to remove the law enforcement sensitive
information from the information available to go out to HSIN-CS
on the FOUO level. So, first thing Monday, with the new things
out of the TRIPwire development over the weekend, we did the
tear line posting of updated common vulnerabilities, potential
indicators, and protective measures to HSIN-CS.
Now, since then, we have linked those two things together
so that you actually see, the products are developed with that
tear line information, and you see it almost seamlessly from
one to the other.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, thank you. I know that that is
something that we need to further review.
Let me now recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr.
Dent, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Commissioner Kelly, I just wanted to just raise a question
for you. Obviously, many of the people on this committee and
elsewhere are certainly very concerned about terrorist attacks,
and we have observed over the years that al Qaeda has looked to
attack great American symbols, whether they be the World Trade
Center or the Pentagon or wherever else they may be planning.
That said, you have talked about the Mumbai attack as a turning
point, and that the other groups could mirror the relative
simplicity of that type of attack on perhaps a soft target like
a hotel, which you talked about. Could you expound a little bit
about that and what your views are about New York and perhaps
other communities, the type of threat that is posed to us by
terrorists on softer targets?
Mr. Kelly. Well, we have seen a change from the patterns
that have developed with Mumbai and Lahore, as we said, in
groups of well-trained, small number of, relatively small, 10
or 12, armed with fairly basic weapons. Our folks who went to
Mumbai don't believe that the weapons were even automatic, that
they were semiautomatic hand guns. Yet they killed and wounded
almost 500 people. They were well trained. They were armed with
hand grenades. They were armed with improvised explosive
devices. So we don't want to put ourselves in a corner. We want
to be flexible in our planning and flexible in our ability to
respond to any contingency.
The concern that developed with Mumbai was the fact that
you might have multiple sustained events happening in the city
at one time. So we have responded by increasing, as I said in
my remarks, the number of people trained to sort of back up our
heavy weapons first responders, which are emergency service
units. There is a cadre of 400 officers that do that. We spend
a lot of effort in training them. We are now expanding that to
a goal of having 1,500 officers who will be able to back them
up, so to speak, and be sufficiently trained in both the use of
weapons and tactics to help us in a sustained attack. So we are
gaming these sorts of thing. We have table-top exercises. We
just had one last Friday for our commanders and a similar fact
pattern and that is what we believe is going to help us respond
if, in fact, there is an event such as Mumbai in New York City.
Mr. Dent. Also mention, too, that it seems that New York
and Mumbai share some striking similarities in that both are
financial centers of their countries, both are accessible by
sea, and both are premier terrorist targets. I guess what I
want to know is that the perpetrators of the attacks in Mumbai
entered the country via the ocean, I believe. How would you
describe the New York Police Department's relationship with the
U.S. Coast Guard? How confident are you that a suspicious
vessel entering New York Harbor would be detected?
Mr. Kelly. Well, we have an excellent working relationship
with the Coast Guard. We have personnel assigned to their
operational headquarters in New York City. The members of our
Harbor Unit, which is our maritime unit, are cross-designated
by the Coast Guard so that they are able to board ships. We
have exercises on a regular basis. When an event happens on the
waterways, we frequently have a joint response. So I believe we
have a very high level of cooperation and camaraderie with the
Coast Guard.
Mr. Dent. Well, I am glad to hear that. I guess my final
question before I run out of team here is this: You mentioned
during your remarks that you have been reaching out to hotel
owners trying to work with them about the various threats that
they may face. How seriously do you think that these hotel
owners and others are taking the recommendations that you are
providing to them? Are they taking these tips seriously? Are
they training their staff appropriately? Do you think they are
engaged enough?
Mr. Kelly. I think they are taking it very seriously. We
have had a strong working relationship with them for quite a
while. Under the NYPD Shield rubric it has only gotten
stronger. As I said, we have a special unit now that just works
with hotels. They are, you know, they are concerned, and they
are serious about investing in training for their staffs and
investing to the extent they can to sort of harden the target
without, you know, making it look like an armed camp. So they
are very much engaged in this issue.
Mr. Dent. Thank you.
I thank you all for your service.
Yield back my time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair will now recognize other Members for questions
they may wish to ask the witnesses. In accordance with our
committee rules and practice, I will recognize Members who were
present at the start of the hearing based on seniority on the
subcommittee, alternating between majority and minority. Those
Members coming later will be recognized in the order of their
arrival. I would like to get to as many Members as possible and
ask them to also return after the last votes of the day.
The Chair recognizes for 5 minutes the distinguished
gentleman from Mississippi, the Chair of the full committee,
Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Deputy Assistant Secretary Snyder, did DHS produce any
recommendations after the Mumbai incident?
Mr. Snyder. Yes, sir. We did produce through the TRIPwire
and out through the law enforcement community, as well as
posting on HSIN-CS a couple of pieces on the specific tactics,
techniques, and procedures used by the terrorists in Mumbai and
the potential protective measures that might be taken by the
facilities to become aware of something like that, raise their
security files.
Mr. Thompson. Were these advisory in nature? Or have we
established some policy?
Mr. Snyder. They are always advisory in nature, due to the
partnership framework and the 85 percent of the critical
infrastructure that is owned and operated by the private
sector. The tactical level of that is the vulnerability
assessments and the recommended actions provided by the
protective security advisers, when they visit the actual
facilities in the field, the high-risk facilities. But what we
try to do is analyze what went on and then advise those
partners on the actions they might take. Many of them are
things that you would think of, such as surveillance cameras,
such as you mentioned, training.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you. Can you provide the committee with
whatever recommendations the Department provided, whether they
were advisory or whatever, after Mumbai?
Mr. Snyder. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Commissioner Kelly, I know you work with New
York. When your teams go out working with hotels or whomever,
is the protocol to make suggestions as to how they can do
better if it is an existing structure, or is there some
protocol established through the city for new construction that
would be a little more than advisory?
Mr. Kelly. No, it is right now, at this time, advisory.
There has been some discussion about putting forward best
practices, as far as construction is concerned, the actual
construction of buildings. Of course the Building Code itself
has been somewhat upgraded, perhaps it needs to be, some of my
staff believes it needs to be upgraded even more.
But since September 11, there have been upgrades in the
Building Code. But to answer your question specifically, when
we work with our hotel management, for instance, we are
strictly in an advisory capacity. There are not too many hotels
that look exactly alike, certainly in New York. So we make
suggestions, make recommendations, but they have to adapt them
to their own situation, their own structure.
Mr. Thompson. To the extent, Deputy Secretary Snyder, how
many other cities would you say are as prepared for these
situations as New York?
Mr. Snyder. Well, certainly, you know, I think you will
find or what we have found through our coordination with these
associations and our sector councils and subcouncils that deal
with the hotel and resort industry, you will find areas that
are highly populated, resort areas or highly populated cities
with a hotel industry that is pretty robust, you will find, you
know, quite a bit of preparedness and an awareness of measures
that go on routinely about training personnel what to look for
and so forth, when you, and of course----
Mr. Thompson. I just need a number.
Mr. Snyder. Oh yes, sir. Oh the number of cities? Certainly
there is----
Mr. Thompson. Name, number.
Mr. Snyder. The top five, you know, New York, Washington,
Chicago, Los Angeles.
Mr. Thompson. So you are comfortable that those cities meet
some standard that your Department is comfortable with.
Mr. Snyder. Well, as Commissioner Kelly said, there is not
a specific standard that exists right now. As I touched on
during my opening testimony, there is this potential for the
voluntary private-sector standards. That has some promise in
it, that will balance.
Mr. Thompson. Madam Chairwoman, I yield.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Obviously, the Chairman has raised
questions about preparedness, and certainly five cities out of
what I think may be thousands in this country leads us to
believe we have some important questions to ask.
I would ask now that the witnesses, if they would, would
wait on our return. We will recess the committee for votes, and
we will return immediately. This committee is now recessed.
[Recess.]
Ms. Jackson Lee. The meeting will come to order.
Mr. King, if you would indulge the witness from the FBI who
indicated to staff that he had not completed his answer on the
tactics question. Once he completes, I will yield to the
distinguished gentleman from New York.
Mr. McJunkin, would you finish your answer, please.
Mr. McJunkin. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
I just wanted to expand on one point. It was something that
was addressed in Commissioner Kelly's earlier testimony to the
Senate, and it addresses your point to Mr. Dent's earlier
question as well.
We have seen similar tactics in prior investigations here
in the domestic United States. In fact, there are three that
come right off the top of my head: one in Los Angeles, one in
Chicago, and one more recently in Fort Dix, New Jersey, where
those individuals had similar types of weaponry, similar types
of planning and plotting, similar types of targeting.
We had Jewish synagogues in Los Angeles as well as military
recruiting stations, shopping mall in Chicago, and then in Fort
Dix, it was the military installation there.
I would like to point out that these things don't occur by
accident. It is the close working relationship that we enjoy of
cross-agencies, Federal, State, and local, Department of
Homeland Security, certainly the New York City Police
Department, and our agency as well where we take advantage of
each other's resources, we take advantage of each other's time,
and we are able to thwart these efforts before they take route.
That is the conclusion of my statement, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank you.
At this time, I will recognize the gentleman from New York,
Mr. King, for 5 minutes, the Ranking Member of the full
committee.
Mr. King. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
I would like to address my questions to Commissioner Kelly.
Assuming the worse, assume there is an attack on a New York
hotel similar to Mumbai. Do you feel confident that you would
have immediate contact with the hotel security, and they would
be responsive to you, and you would be on the same page, the
same wave-length?
Mr. Kelly. That is certainly our goal. That is what we are
training for, and yes, I feel reasonably confident, given our
activities of the last few months, that we would be able to
work closely, contact them very quickly and work closely with
them if a similar event happened.
Mr. King. Are most of those security directors retired law
enforcement?
Mr. Kelly. Many of them are. Sometimes a big change will
bring people in from other areas of the country who not
necessarily are law enforcement, but there is also kind of a
homegrown cadre of former law enforcement people and are in
charge of securing the hotels.
Mr. King. Assuming there was an overlap between the hotel
and transit system, how closely coordinated are you with the
MTA police or the Port Authority police? What I am looking for
is the level of cooperation in those first few minutes or
hours.
Mr. Kelly. I think the level of cooperation in those
instances would also be very high. We work within the port
authority. Obviously we have interactions on a daily basis. The
port authority is on the Joint Terrorist Task Force, the MTA
police representative as well. So that is another venue when
you would come together.
The MTA police chief, Michael Coan, less than a year ago
left the NYPD. He was a chief in the NYPD. He is now chief of
the MTA police. We have a close relationship.
Bill Morange is the executive vice president and security
is under his bailiwick. He is a former NYPD chief. So just on a
person-to-person basis, we have a good working relationship.
But operationally, we have a good working relationship.
Mr. King. How about FBI and Homeland Security?
Mr. Kelly. We have an excellent working relationship. We--
over 120 of our detectives working with the FBI and the Joint
Terrorist Task Force. Homeland Security, we have the contacts
on a daily basis. I was just talking to the general about
Securing the Cities program that we have been involved in
Homeland Security for the last 2 years. That is a program where
state-of-the-art radiation detection equipment is being
distributed to an area, in essence, a 50-mile radius from New
York City. That is going extremely well. Homeland Security is
helping us with our Lower Manhattan Security Initiative.
So I think we have excellent cooperation and daily
interaction with both agencies.
Mr. King. If a hotel or a transit system is attacked,
basically, all you can do is minimize the damage and fight
back. I think you have always taken the approach of having to
layer defenses, of knowing in advance. That is why you have the
11 police overseas to get intelligence, why you have the Secure
the Cities to detect radiation devices coming into the city.
How important is intelligence both overseas and what you
get from the Federal Government, and how vital do you believe
the Secure the Cities program is going to be as far as building
up those layers of defense? Mr. Lungren is always talking about
layers of defense. There is no silver bullet that we have to
have those structured layers.
Mr. Kelly. Intelligence is the key. No question about it.
You want to stop them before you have to respond to an event,
and intelligence is the essence of prevention. We rely on our
Federal partners for our intelligence. The things that we do
supplement what the Federal Government does. We certainly can't
substitute. We can't do it on our own. We need a strong Federal
partnership. So intelligence is, in essence, coming from
Federal resources.
It is probably the most important element of them all. We
get information that enables all of our agencies to intercept,
to prevent before we have to be a first responder. It is key.
Securing the Cities is, as I said, a very important
initiative. We are the first city in the country to have this
program. The Homeland Security has been extremely supportive in
that regard. It is well on its way, and the concept is to have,
as I say, sort of concentric rings of radiation detection
equipment starting approximately 50 miles away from the city
but certainly right into the heart of the city itself and of
all of the tunnel and bridge entrances going into Manhattan.
That program is progressing well.
Mr. King. Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Now I will recognize Congresswoman Titus
for 5 minutes.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and thank you for
having this hearing on a topic that is very important to me.
I represent parts of Las Vegas where we have dozens of
hotel casinos with some of the most top-notch security
technology and personnel in the private sector. I am sure you
have all heard of the eye in the sky that watches you on the
casino floor, and if you saw Oceans 11, it is not far wrong.
So I would direct my question to Mr. Snyder and invite the
rest of you to comment, too.
I am glad to hear that you have so many planning and
assessment programs in place. I think I counted 13 acronyms in
two paragraphs. They range from the BZPP to the C/ACAMS. But
what troubles me a bit is in your statement you say, for
example, during the Mumbai event, the PSA for Las Vegas met
with hotel, casino, and resort security officials to answer
questions and distribute our CVPIPM reports that provide
details on enhanced security recommendations and best
practices.
Now, the reason that bothers me is that it seems to suggest
it is kind of late in the game that they are getting this
information about best practices and recommendations, and
secondarily, if they are getting it, that means they haven't
been involved in the process. So we are not taking advantage of
all of the assets that they have already in place.
So could you tell us, and in kind of layman's terms, what
is going on with all of the hotels in Las Vegas, and if we
could find a way to take better advantage of that security
system that is so incredible already.
Mr. Snyder. Well, I would, ma'am, want to make sure that
that wasn't the only perception of what I provided in the
statement.
The reason that they were calling the PSA is that there was
already a relationship established through prior associations.
I don't it have exactly in front of me, but the regular
engagement between the PSA, for instance, there has been over
100 liaisons and outreach visits in the lodging sector, but
they are continuously engaged, particularly in the Los Angeles
or the Las Vegas area because of the mass of the activities
there of high value and the State Homeland Security adviser,
the State police, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department,
State Gaming Commission representatives and corporate security
managers.
So there are regular meetings there with all of those
partners and the protective security adviser, as well as
members from the Department level that come down to do either
table-top exercises or assessments.
So that relationship is a strong one, and certainly we took
advantage of that at Mumbai, and they called the PSA and we
pushed out that information.
Ms. Titus. Any other comments?
Mr. Kelly. I really have nothing to add. I am focused, of
course, on New York. I think it is safe to assume that hotels
in New York don't have that level of technology that exists in
Los Angeles. But the people I talked to are very aware of
technology in the hotel.
So I really have nothing to add.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I can assure you being on this committee,
help is on the way.
We thank our witness.
I now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California, Mr.
Lungren.
Mr. Lungren. Commissioner Kelly, now do I understand it
right that you went to a Catholic grade school called St.
Therese?
Mr. Kelly. Yes, sir. I did.
Mr. Lungren. I was told by Mr. King that he followed you by
2 years and beat every one of your academic records; is that
right?
Mr. Kelly. That was easy. I am sure he did.
Mr. Lungren. It just shows you how someone can rise to a
position of prominence and other people are stuck where Mr.
King is.
Commissioner Kelly, in your written testimony, you talk
about your Department's analysis of the attacks that took place
in Pakistan and the fact that your Department has three liaison
offices overseas.
Some people have suggested that you folks ought not to be
in that, that is the business of the Federal Government, the
FBI, the CIA, the operatives that we have. Some have said you
are not the FBI and that you may have gone too far. Now, I
don't know what they meant by that, but I would like to hear
from you why your Department thought it was necessary and how
you, I presume, feel that that is value added to whatever your
Department would normally do domestically and value added to
what you get from the FBI, the Federal Government, or any other
links that you have to other agencies.
Mr. Kelly. I sit in a building that is five blocks away
from the World Trade Center. I live a block away from the World
Trade Center where almost 3,000 people were killed. I was
police commissioner in 1993 when we had 1,000 people injured at
the World Trade Center site. No other U.S. city has suffered
the losses that New York City has. We have had six plots
against New York since September 11. So we see ourselves as top
of the target list, and I think that is supported by a
consensus of people in the intelligence community.
We are looking for any bit of information that can better
protect our city. That is what our overseas liaisons give us.
We were able to get real-time information. As a matter of fact,
I was talking to our officer in an operation center at new
Scotland Yard on July 7, 2005 when the subway attacks took
place. Obviously, that happened during their rush hour. New
Yorkers getting on the subway 5 hours later would be concerned.
We wanted to raise their comfort label and enable us to deploy
additional resources, I think, to ease that concern that people
have.
So it gives us real-time information about what is
happening overseas.
Now, I must also tell you that taxpayer money is not
funding the cost of these officers overseas. It is funded by
private foundation. Salaries are paid by public funds, their
expenses are paid by a foundation.
But we think it is value-added. We are able to get
information quickly. We got information very quickly about the
Madrid bombings that took place in March 2004. We just see
ourselves as being positioned differently than other U.S.
cities.
Mr. Lungren. I am from the West Coast, for instance. Used
to be from Long Beach, I am now from Sacramento. But if I am
one of those departments, do I have a relationship with your
department so that I can get information on a timely basis, or
would that be a mistake if you had to respond to all other
departments?
What I am saying is you have actionable information, you
believe you get it in a timely fashion, you take certain steps
based on that. Some of that information might be a benefit to
your brethren in other departments. Is there a means, a
mechanism by which you share that information, or does that go
through the Feds or how does that happen?
Mr. Kelly. I mean, logically, if there was a threat against
Long Beach, we would notify the Long Beach authorities.
But the natural vehicle for the information is through the
Joint Terrorist Task Force. That is the entity that has the
broadest reach and the quickest reach as far as disseminating
information of that type.
Mr. Lungren. So what I am getting at is if you have
information through your chain of command, as opposed to DHS or
FBI or so forth, and then you thought it may not be specific to
Long Beach or specific to Sacramento but it would be of
interest to them, would you share that through the joint task
force; is that how you would do it?
Mr. Kelly. Absolutely. The information sharing has never
been better. There is a concern, really, years ago, about the
lack of information sharing. I think that is ancient history.
Now, the information exchange and information sharing has never
been better.
Mr. Lungren. Could I ask you, with the indulgence of the
Chair, with respect to the attack in Mumbai or the attack in
Pakistan, were you satisfied with the timeliness of the
information that you received from the National Terrorism
Center or the Department's national operations center?
Mr. Kelly. You know, we always want a little more. I think
we get probably----
Mr. Lungren. I understand that, but we are trying to figure
out--I am not trying to point fingers at anybody.
Mr. Kelly. We are not taking away from anybody. I think you
have to understand, this is--we are supplementing. This is
value-added.
Mr. Lungren. My question was were you satisfied with the
timeliness of the information that you received from the
National Terrorism Center, Counterterrorism Center, or the
National Operations Center?
Mr. Kelly. We didn't get the depth of the information from
the national assets in a timely fashion like we were able to
get from our own people.
As I said, on December 5 not only, you know, our own
people, we obviously use it in-house, but we had a meeting of
security directors in New York City, had 400 of them in our
auditorium on December 5. The attacks happened November 26 and
November 29. On December 5, we had 400 people there. We had
independent information, and we had our team in Mumbai on a
telephone hook-up with pictures that they had taken giving them
specific information.
So that is why I say it is value-added, it is something
more. That is what we feel that we have to do given the history
of New York City. We want that leg up.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The gentleman's time has expired.
I recognize now the distinguished gentleman from Missouri,
Mr. Cleaver.
Mr. Cleaver. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Let me apologize to the panel. I would like to come and
stay to the end, but I have a Financial Services Committee
hearing going on at the same time. But this is extremely
important, and I am very much concerned about what I consider
to be the inevitability of such strikes as Mumbai because while
I guess we can't categorize the hoodlums as terrorists who were
coming in with explosives tied to their bodies, I think, at
least based on what I read, they came realizing they would not
get out alive.
Am I on the right track that when terrorist groups decide
that they will sacrifice their life or their lives, that it is
difficult for us to stop it? I mean, there are preventative
steps we can take, but I mean, what I think people say quite
often and you hear on television, ``We want this never to
happen again.'' I want to know about the impracticality of such
a statement based on what happened in Mumbai.
Mr. McJunkin.
Mr. McJunkin. Yes, sir. I believe that the--I learned from
an AUSA in Texas that people move through time and space, and
when they do, they leave clues. In that, our ability to thwart
such attacks, regardless of the determination of the individual
attacker, it comes from our ability to share information
effectively and to be cognizant of the threat and to be
assertive in our searching of clues that will allow us to bring
them, dismantle them, and disrupt them before they have an
opportunity to strike.
I think that the important takeaway here is that any group,
no matter what their intent is or what their target is, has to
obtain a certain level of capability. It is our job, DHS's, the
FBI certainly, and the New York City police, as well as every
other police department in the United States, to be attuned to
the clues that we learned, particularly to attacks occurring
overseas, and look at them in the United States.
It could be a police officer that is answering a domestic
call that notices a strange odor in an apartment near by the
call. It is incumbent upon that officer to knock on that door
and find out what that smell emanates from. It is clues like
that that allows us to attack their capability.
We also have to be with the private sector. It has been
brought up here a number of times today that the private sector
has to be engaged. That is never truer than it is today. It is
those corporations and companies through their normal business
protocols and processes that will just in the normal course of
business stumble onto the clues that if we have an effective
sharing operation amongst ourselves and them, we will be able
to provide the links that give us that opportunity to disrupt
their ability to build capability.
Mr. Cleaver. Which is comforting, brings some comfort.
I guess maybe the answer I am looking for probably might
not bring comfort, which is these were suicidal terrorists. I
mean, they went in without any expectations of leaving, they
didn't have bombs strapped to their bodies; but they realized
at one point they were not going to get out alive. I guess my
question is, and maybe I asked poorly the first time, is: Isn't
it infinitely, for us, more difficult for us to say to the
public things like ``this will never happen again,'' when we
realize that if people are willing to sacrifice their lives,
they can kill others?
Mr. McJunkin. Sir, yes. I would agree with you.
I think that we are--in these times, we have to accept that
reality and understand that and determined people will, in
fact, be able to successfully accomplish their missions. Our
job is to make sure that we minimize that before and after they
begin their quest.
Mr. Cleaver. To any of the three of you, is there anything
that we need to do legislatively to equip all of the agencies
involved, including Homeland Security, to do it just as you
said, minimize the likelihood of such an event here on our
shores?
Mr. Snyder. I would just say certainly the continued
support of the committee is very helpful to us at the
Department, particularly infrastructure protection with the
private sector; specifically, being able to continue to develop
these operational relationships so we can have a deterrent
effect in time in advance and doing the training and the
exercises that we do is very helpful in trying to prevent what
you are talking about.
So we want to continue that work.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank you, Congressman.
I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to the gentlelady from
Arizona, Ms. Kirkpatrick. Welcome. Thank you very much.
Ms. Kirkpatrick. Thank you. I represent a vast rural
district in Arizona, and it includes ranches, right along the
border between Arizona and Mexico, it includes agriculture,
farming, and also rural electric co-ops which are sort of the
energy center for the district.
What kinds of things do you have in place to let them know,
to communicate, to share information specific to those groups?
Mr. Snyder. Well, we do, in our sector coordinating
councils partner with the Department of Energy to reach the
energy industry, including the rural electric co-ops, so that
these, similar to the hotel industry, the dialogs, the
preventative measures, those things that are developed, the
risk assessments not only happens at the strategic level, at
the Federal, national level, but they also take place down in
the local levels and get passed down, communicated, passed down
by the sector coordinating councils, the associations that are
members of that and corporations and all of the cooperatives
that belong to a larger corporation.
So they participate in that same level of interest and of
preparation and of risk assessment, vulnerability assessment on
their facilities.
So we think that they are engaged at that level and know
what their vulnerabilities are and what their preparatory
actions might be. They also, I am sure, are linked with their
local law enforcement for response measures.
Ms. Kirkpatrick. Interoperability in our district is a huge
problem, and I am a former prosecutor so I have been in talking
with law enforcement agencies. They can't yet communicate
seamlessly with each other let alone with many of these
communities.
So what is being done specifically to bolster that system
so that there can be continuous communication, and especially
in an emergency?
Mr. Snyder. I do know there is specific work being done on
the interoperability issue, and I am personally not versed
enough in it to offer an answer here, but I will be happy to
get back to you with information on those, some of which are in
the science and technology area.
Ms. Kirkpatrick. I yield back my time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentlelady very much. Let me
prepare the witnesses as we move to the next panel to just
clarify the record through Commissioner Kelly for a very brief
moment to ask a question that seems to need clarifying.
Commissioner Kelly, I think in your testimony--and you can
just, if you would, clarify it--that either in your research or
the visits of your officers glean that these commandos did not
intend to commit suicide; they intended to survive; is that
correct?
Mr. Kelly. I believe it is not all----
Ms. Jackson Lee. They were not suicide bombers.
Mr. Kelly. I believe there are still questions in the
intelligence community as to whether or not the Mumbai
attackers initially decided to or had a mission to kill a lot
of people and then die. It was some belief that it may have
changed.
We look at the transmissions. The Indian government put out
a report of the exchange of messages that took place from
people in Pakistan talking to the individuals in Mumbai, and
some believe that it may have just sort of moved in that
direction.
If you recall when you look at the report, two individuals
that are--one is captured and one is killed--they are driving
past the hospital. It looks like they were driving north on the
Peninsula perhaps attempting to get away. Now, we talk about
the Lahore attack, of course all of those individuals escaped.
None of them committed suicide.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Commissioner.
To follow up with you, Mr. McJunkin, because I think your
testimony suggested the decentralizing of terrorism, and if
not, testimony has been said today the decentralizing like LeT
and others.
With that in mind, do you feel that our mechanism, DHS,
FBI, and others, are moving toward understanding the potential
for commando-type activities on the soil of the United States?
Mr. McJunkin. Yes, ma'am. I think that our intent across
the board across governmental agencies is to be ready for
anything. It is tough to game plan every possible scenario. But
I think we are naturally able to respond to this type of an
attack just because of the way of our law enforcement is
structured in the State, local, and Federal levels.
I think that our influx of intelligences and combined with
the information that is coming off the street from the patrol
officer allows us, the way we move information, rather than in
selected sleeves that were traditionally law-enforcement based,
criminal prosecution driven, ways we moved information--we have
now sort of wiped those walls away and with all of the
information now flows equally left and right, north and south.
So I think that advantage that we have gained since 2001
has moved the ball down the field considerably for us in the
law enforcement communities.
I think we game-planned for the big scenario, the WMD. We
have to have the resources and the capabilities necessary to
continue to confront that threat. But I also think that our
cities, particularly our States and also in the rural areas of
our country, our law enforcement officers are better trained
today than they have ever been. The local crime and the normal
crime that they see in these cities in these rural areas very
much mirrors this type of threat.
So I think we are very well-suited to address it. It is
just a matter of raising the level of awareness and making sure
that we don't lose our edge.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I am very glad that you ended on that note
because Alabama, the incident over the last 20 hours, was not a
terrorist act, but what it did show us was someone who is
interested in doing harm can move from one jurisdiction to the
next on our own soil and we have got to work with each other.
I want to thank the witnesses, Secretary Snyder, Secretary
Kelly, and Assistant Director McJunkin from the FBI for giving
us what I believe is vital testimony.
As I indicated, this is a question of resources,
intelligence, but it is also a question possibly of enhanced
legislation to sort of get our hands around the next step in
fighting terrorism here and abroad. So I thank the witnesses.
The witnesses are now complete with their testimony.
We now welcome our second panel to the witness table.
Our first witness, Dr. Christine Fair, is a senior
political scientist with the RAND Corporation. Prior to
rejoining RAND, she served as a political officer to the United
Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan in Kabul. Dr. Fair's
research focuses upon the security competition between India
and Pakistan, Pakistan's internal security, the causes of
terrorism in South Asia, and U.S. strategic relations with
India and Pakistan. She has authored, co-authored, and co-
edited several books, and recently co-authored a RAND report
about the attack in Mumbai entitled ``The Lessons of Mumbai.''
Our second witness is Mr. Brad Bonnell. He is the director
of global security at InterContinental Hotels Group,
InterContinental Hotels Group includes seven hotel brands, over
160 million stays per year, almost 620,000 rooms, and more than
4,150 hotels across nearly 100 countries. As director of global
security, Mr. Bonnell's primary duties include directing the
corporate counterterrorism program, providing internal security
services, and crisis management planning.
InterContinental Hotels Group has been involved with the
real estate information sharing and analysis center in
partnership with DHS, and it is aligned with the State
Department's overseas security advisory council. Through its
membership on the real estate round table, it is a member of
DHS Commercial Facility Sector Coordinating Council. Welcome.
Our third witness is Mr. William Raisch. Mr. Raisch is the
director of the International Center for Enterprise
Preparedness at New York University. He founded the Center with
initial funding from the Department of Homeland Security as the
world's first academic research center dedicated to private
sector emergency preparedness and resilience.
Directly prior to founding the Center, Mr. Raisch served as
the private sector preparedness adviser to the 9/11 Commission
and assisted in developing the Commission's recommendations on
private sector emergency preparedness.
He continues to support the efforts of the 9/11 Public
Discourse Project in its on-going reporting and advocacy
activity. Mr. Raisch is actively involved in the 9/11 Acts
Voluntary Private Sector Preparedness accreditation and
certification program. Established in Title 9 of the act, this
program has the potential to help foster preparedness and
security at the types of assets in the United States that were
attacked in Mumbai.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted into the record.
I now ask each witness to summarize his or her statement
for 5 minutes beginning with Dr. Fair.
STATEMENT OF C. CHRISTINE FAIR, SENIOR POLITICAL SCIENTIST FOR
SOUTH ASIAN POLITICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS, RAND CORPORATION
Ms. Fair. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and your esteemed
colleagues, for the opportunity to speak about Lashkar-e-Taiba
and its parent organization Jamaat ul Dawa the group that
perpetrated the terrorist attack on Mumbai.
I was asked to focus on four specific areas, and I will do
so briefly in term.
The first situating Lashkar-e-Taiba among Pakistan's
numerous terrorist organizations. I have a much more lengthy
written statement that really distinguishes Lashkar from the
other groups but also shows how it resembles other groups in
many important ways. But I would like to make the following
points here.
First and foremost, Pakistan has used militancy as a tool
of foreign policy since 1947. With very few exceptions,
Pakistan's militant groups enjoy, enjoyed, and likely will
enjoy state patronage including financial, military, and other
assistance. Among these groups, Lashkar-e-Taiba is the most
lethal. LeT differs from the numerous other groups operating in
Pakistan in that its ideologies are actually Ahl-e-Hadith. The
other groups are actually Deobandi, and the Deobandi groups
include the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistan Taliban, etc.
What this means is there are important ideological
differences despite similarity of rules.
Now, Pakistan frequently points out that it is, itself, a
victim of terrorism, and it surely is. But I would like to
point out that the groups targeting Pakistan has been Deobandi.
Lashkar-e-Taiba has never attacked a target, either state or
international, within Pakistan itself; and as of yet, there is
no credible evidence linking the attack on the Sri Lankan
Cricket Team to Lashkar-e-Taiba. This fact has led many
analysts to believe that Lashkar-e-Taiba has continued to enjoy
state support in various guises despite the state's recent
efforts to ban that organization, actually the parent
organization.
Turning to its origins, operatives, and operations, I would
like to point out that we may just be hearing about it now in
2008, but it has been around since 1986. It was founded by two
engineering professors along with Abdullah Azan, a close
associate of bin Laden. Its parent organization was actually
set up to fight in Afghanistan and it set up its own camps to
do so. It became operational in the Indian Kashmir in 1990. I
have been perusing LeT literature now for years since I was a
graduate student, and going back to the 1990's, you can see in
their literature and in their posters a very clear desire to
target Indians, especially Hindus, Jews, Americans, and other
infidels and apostate Muslims.
They have been long interested in stoking larger Hindu-
Muslim discord in India and liberating all of India in
establishing a caliphate there.
MDI which is its parents organization, Lashkar-e-Taiba,
they claim to have participated in a number of national jihads
since their setup in 1986. Most of these can't be independently
confirmed. However, what we do know is that LeT-associated
individuals have appeared in Iraq, Australia, the United
States, United Kingdom and numerous European cities and
Lashkar-e-Taiba attacks U.S., NATO and Afghan allies in
Afghanistan.
LeT has a hallmark modus operandi. It is not suicide
attacks, as we have heard. Rather they are high-risk commando-
style missions. They always pick missions in which there is a
slim chance that they will survive. But the preference is to be
killed killing as many people as possible rather than being
taken hostage or taken captive by the authorities. The reason
for that is very clear as we have seen from the loan surviving
gunman: once captured you talk.
So the preference is to kill as many people as possible
before you yourself are killed.
I would like to point out that this particular style of
Fidayeen attack is also not new in the Lashkar-e-Taiba
repertoire. They have in fact been doing this since 1999. They
first attacked outside of Kashmir in 2000 when they did a
Fidayeen attack on the Red Fort in New Delhi.
Turning to the third section, the antecedents and
innovations of the Mumbai attack, in many ways that attack
resembled other attacks perpetrated by LeT. What differed, of
course, was the scope and the number of targets. LeT has
actually long pioneered the use of sea routes to get explosives
and personnel into theater. Certainly, this particular attack
pushed the use of sea routes farther than it had ever used
before. The sea routes and other logistical networks that
Lashkar has been able to build in India has actually been very
important. Lashkar's been operating outside of Kashmir against
since the late 1990's, and to do they rely upon international
networks, such as those based in Bangladesh. They also rely
upon domestic Indian collaborators as well.
When I look at the Mumbai attack, two elements strike me
apart from the number of targets involved.
First is that even though they have been attacking U.S.
soldiers in Afghanistan since at least 2007, maybe earlier,
this is the first time, despite a dedicated rhetoric of
attacking Americans and other internationals, that they have
actually done so.
The second interesting target was the Chabad House. Lashkar
has always been deeply anti-Semitic, but I would like to point
out Mumbai has a very historical Jewish community. In fact,
India has a number of Jewish communities. Yet despite the
decades of Islamists and avowedly anti-Semitic militant groups
attacking within the Indian homeland, never before has an
Indian-Jewish target ever been assaulted. So Chabad is not
simply Jewish in the Lashkar-e-Taiba targeting logic. It is
explicitly Israeli. We now know from the intercept of phone
conversations it wasn't simply anti-Semitism, it also had the
additional value of disrupting the important India-Israeli
security intelligence relationship that has developed in recent
years.
So very briefly in conclusion, I think the question that we
all have is whether or not Lashkar-e-Taiba can undertake such
operations in the United States. I am going to give a firm
``maybe.'' There is never a penalty for exaggerating a threat,
but if you underestimate it, you get dinged.
There have been a number of individuals, including converts
who have radicalized in the Diaspora and who have traveled to
Pakistan to train with the Lashkar-e-Taiba and other militant
groups, such as Jaish-e-Mohammad. Lashkar-e-Taiba and other
militant groups in the Pakistani province of the Punjab
comprise an important link between those who have radicalized
in the Diaspora and elsewhere in Pakistan's tribal area where
al Qaeda is firmly ensconced.
During my recent trip to Pakistan a week and a half ago,
one of my interlocutors described these Punjabi groups as the
escalator that connects the foreign militants to the tribal
areas.
Given the difficulty in Pakistan-based operatives in
obtaining a visa to come to western countries, the strategy of
pulling people in from the West is likely to be the most
productive strategy as those individuals likely speak English,
have the appropriate passport, they are more able to gain
access to the targeted countries, and especially those with the
visa waiver program are countries of origins that are of
considerable concern.
Thus to conclude, LeT certainly poses a number of concerns
for the United States, not the least of which include LeT-
supported cells attacking U.S. assets, citizens, etc., either
at home or abroad, on-going operations against the United
States and its allies in Afghanistan, the likelihood of future
attacks in India with the ever-present possibility of prompting
yet another Indo-Pakistan military crisis.
For these and other reasons, it is absolutely imperative
that Washington insists that Pakistan not only ceases all forms
of active and passive support for Lashkar-e-Taiba and similar
groups, but, in fact, actively undertake efforts to eliminate
them.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
[The statement of Ms. Fair follows:]
Prepared Statement of C. Christine Fair,\1\ The Rand Corporation
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of
the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record
testimony presented by RAND associates to Federal, State, or local
legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels;
and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a
nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and
effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and
private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not
necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Antecedents and Implications of the November 2008 Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)
Attack Upon Several Targets in the Indian Mega-City of Mumbai \2\ \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ This testimony is available for free download at http://
www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT320/.
\3\ The author is grateful to Peter Chalk, Lisa Curtis, James
Dobbins, and Praveen Swami who reviewed earlier drafts of this
testimony.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
March 11, 2009
introduction
On November 23, 2008 ten Pakistani terrorists associated with
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)/Jamaat ul Dawa (JuD), operating in four attack
teams, rampaged across some ten different targets in the Indian port
city of Mumbai. In part due to the complexities of the counterterrorist
operations, the tenacity and training of the attackers, and the
inadequate capabilities of the Indian security forces, it took some 4
days to end the terrorist campaign which claimed the lives of at least
172 victims.
In this testimony, I have been asked to focus upon four specific
concerns emerging from this attack and its perpetrators. First, I
contextualize LeT among the proliferating expanse of militant groups
operating in and from Pakistan. Second, I provide specific information
about LeT, the militant group responsible for this and many other
attacks within India. Third, I draw out both the antecedents and
innovations of the 2008 Mumbai attack. I conclude with a discussion of
some of the important implications that emerge from this and other LeT
activities for regional and international security generally and U.S.
security in particular.
While LeT was banned in 2002, the LeT began operating under the
banner of JuD, which was overtly operational until the Pakistan
government formally banned it following immense international pressure
in late 2008, including a resolution in the U.N. Security Council that
JuD is a terrorist organization. In the service of brevity, I use LeT
and JuD somewhat synonymously even though there are a few important
technical differences.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Technically, LeT remained the militant wing while JuD engaged
in a wider array of charitable activities such as establishing
hospitals, clinics, schools, and madrassah and other poverty relief
activities. Since LeT was outlawed, it largely operated under the
umbrella of JuD. Proponents of JuD's innocence assert the separation of
the organizations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
pakistan's myriad militants: situating lashkar-e-taiba
Pakistan has given rise to numerous militant groups in recent
decades that operate to secure Pakistan's state interests in India and
Afghanistan. In addition, Pakistan has sustained numerous covert
operations campaigns in Indian-administered Kashmir since 1947.\5\
Many--if not most--of these militant groups have enjoyed the specific
patronage of the Pakistani state intelligence and military agencies to
prosecute Islamabad's interests in India (with particular focus upon
Kashmir) and Afghanistan.\6\ These varied militant groups, until circa
2002, could largely be disaggregated according to religious ideology
(school of Islamic thought) and operational goals.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ In their most maximal objectives, these campaigns have aimed to
wrest from New Delhi the portion of Kashmir which it administers.
(India controls about two-thirds of the collective area known as Jammu
and Kashmir.) These campaigns have sought to secure Pakistani
sovereignty over the expanse of the disputed territory. In their most
minimalist objectives, these campaigns have sought to ``bleed India''
by requiring it sustain a large (often locally resented) counter-
insurgency grid in Jammu and Kashmir. For a discussion of the various
covert campaigns, see Praveen Swami. Indian Pakistan and the Secret
Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947-2004 (London: Routledge, 2006).
\6\ Ashley J. Tellis writes on this point that ``In fact, of all
the Pakistani-sponsored Deobandi [sic] terrorist groups operating
against India in Kashmir and elsewhere, only one entity--the Hizbul
Mujahideen--began life as an indigenous Kashmiri insurgent group; the
others, including the most violent organizations such as the Lashkar-e-
Toiba, the Jaish-e-Muhammad, and the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, are all led,
manned, and financed by native Pakistanis.'' See Ashley J. Tellis,
Pakistan and the War on Terror Conflicted Goals, Compromised
Performance (Washington, DC: CEIP, 2008), p. 5. Also see among numerous
other sources Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the
Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York: Penguin,
2009); See Husain Haqqani, Pakistan Between and Military (Washington,
DC: CEIP, 2005); Hassan Abbas and Jessica Stern, Pakistan's Drift Into
Extremism: Allah, then Army, and America's War Terror (New York: M.E.
Sharpe 2004).
\7\ This draws from C. Christine Fair, ``Who Are Pakistan's
Militants and Their Families?'' Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.
20, No. 1 (January, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Among Pakistan's various Islamic interpretative schools, the
Deobandi school of thought claims the most militant groups. Key
Deobandi militant groups include the Taliban (Afghan and the
Pakistani), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM), Harkat-ul-Jihad-Islami (HUJI),
Harkat-ul-Ansar/Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUA/HUM), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)
and Sipah-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan (SSP) among numerous offshoots. The
Deobandi tradition emerged as a puritanical movement to uplift Muslims
by purifying Islamic practice through discouraging mystical beliefs
such as intercession by saints and veneration of graves and shrines.
Deobandi institutions, notably a burgeoning archipelago of Deobandi
madaris across the Pashtun belt and beyond, received support from the
Pakistani government and others to produce mujahideen for Afghanistan
both in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods.\8\ These Deobandi militant
groups also have enjoyed both close connections to and overlapping
membership with Deobandi political organizations including personalized
factions of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI). Until the February 2008
elections, JUI factions comprised important partners in the Islamist
coalition (Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal or MMA) that formed the provincial
government in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), a
coalition government with President Musharraf's political ally (the
Pakistan Muslim League-Q) in Balochistan, and the loyal opposition in
the national parliament.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA,
Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10,
2001 (New York: Penguin, 2004). Pakistan developed and supported
Islamist proxies in Afghanistan before the Soviet invasion by
mobilizing those Islamists who had been ousted by President Daud after
1973.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A second important school of thought that animates militancy in
Pakistan is the Ahl-e-Hadith interpretative tradition. The most
prominent Ahl-e-Hadith militant group is the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).
Ahl-e-Hadith is a Sunni interpretative tradition associated with
Hanbali school of jurisprudence, which in Pakistan is sometimes called
Salafist or derogatorily ``Wahabbist.'' The Ahl-e-Hadith tradition is
the South Asian variant of the theological tradition motivating core al
Qaeda ideologues. While LeT is most known for its militant activities,
one of the organization's crucial functions is the expansion of the
market share of Ahl-e-Hadith adherents in Pakistan. For this reason,
LeT trains many more potential militants than it will ever deploy for
operations. LeT expects these recruits to return to their localities
and continue propounding support for LeT and its creed.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ See C. Christine Fair, ``Militant Recruitment in Pakistan:
Implications for Al-Qa'ida and Other Organizations,'' Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 27, No. 6 (November/December 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several groups operating in Kashmir (e.g. Hizbul Mujahideen and
related factions such as Al Badr) are associated with Jamaat-e-Islami
(JI), which is a supra-sectarian school of thought and Islamist
political party in Pakistan. Jamaat-e-Islami, while formally a
political party, espouses the ideological leanings of its founder
Maulana Maududi. Jamaat-e-Islami is similar in goals and outlook to the
Muslim Brotherhood. JI was, until the 2008 elections, a member of the
Islamist bloc (the MMA) despite growing differences between JI and the
Musharraf government and with other Islamist leaders within the MMA who
continued to support Musharraf. JI boycotted the 2008 elections.
In addition to these schisms across interpretative traditions,
Pakistan's militant groups can in some measure be distinguished by
their historical and current goals. As will be discussed herein some of
these goals have changed or have not always been stable. For example,
groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Hizbul
Mujahideen (HM) have traditionally focused upon the Kashmir issue. Only
the HM and other JI-related groups have limited their operations to
Indian-administered Kashmir.\10\ From 1999 if not earlier, LeT and JM
began operations in the Indian hinterland both in the name of
``liberating Kashmir'' but also in the name of a wider jihad in India
and exacerbating Hindu-Muslim discord within India to undermine India's
claims to be a diverse democracy that accommodates the aspirations of
its varied religious and ethnic groups.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ There have been some reports that these groups are operating
in Afghanistan. I have been unable to confirm these reports.
\11\ In 1999, the LeT attacked an intelligence outpost attached to
the Red Fort, a high profile tourist destination in New Delhi. In 2001,
Jaish-e-Mohammad attacked India's parliament building.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, Pakistan hosts a number of sectarian groups such as
the Deobandi Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Sipah-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan
(SSP) which traditionally focused upon anti-Shia targets. These groups
have also had a historical presence in Afghanistan as well. In the
past, Iranian-backed Shia militias such as the Tehreek-e-Jafria and the
Sipah-e-Muhammad have targeted Sunnis, especially those propounding an
explicit anti-Shia agenda. These groups were particularly active
throughout the 1990's. While the Deobandi-Shia axis garners the most
attention with respect to sectarian violence, it should be noted that
considerable violence and discord exists among Pakistan's various Sunni
traditions (maslaks).
From as early as 2002, some elements of Pakistan's varied Deobandi
groups (e.g. JM, HUJI, LeJ, SSP) began targeting the Pakistan state as
evidenced by the attacks on then President Musharraf, various civilian
leaders including the Ministry of Interior and former Prime Minister
Benazir Bhutto, and numerous military, police and intelligence
individuals and organizations. Analysts believe that these groups
disagreed with President Musharraf's policies of supporting the United
States and its military campaign in Afghanistan as well as Musharraf's
policy of ``moderated jihad'' in Kashmir. Musharraf adopted this
approach due to, inter alia, increased international pressure in the
wake of the Indian Parliament attack in December 2001 by Pakistan-based
militants. That attack triggered the largest amassing of Indian and
Pakistani troops and stoked international fears of an Indo-Pakistan
war. Indian diplomatic fortitude was again tested when the LeT
massacred wives and children of army personnel in Kaluchak. The United
States engaged in vigorous diplomacy to dampen the compound crisis and
avert conflict. In response to the Indian mobilization, Pakistani
troops swung from the west to the east which compromised U.S.
operations in Afghanistan.
Pakistan's various Deobandi groups have also been responsible for
numerous attacks against international targets such as the various
attacks on the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, the suicide attack against
numerous French naval engineers working in Karachi, a church in
Islamabad frequented by foreigners, among numerous others.\12\ Notable
among these groups attacking Pakistani and international targets within
Pakistan are JM, HUJI, and LeJ/SSP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ For an inventory of post-9/11 ``western'' attacks in Pakistan,
see South Asia Terrorism Portal, ``Post-9/11 Attacks on Western Targets
in Pakistan,'' no date. Available at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/
countries/pakistan/database/westerntargets.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Following Pakistan's military operations in the Pashtun belt and
U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, a series of Pashtun-led
militant commanders emerged that began targeting the Pakistani security
forces including the regular army, paramilitary organizations such as
the Frontier Corps and police. In late 2007, many of these commanders
coalesced under the banner of the ``Pakistani Taliban'' (e.g. Tehreek-
e-Taliban-e-Pakistan) under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsood based
in South Waziristan in Pakistan's federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA). Mehsood claims many allies all of whom to seek to establish in
various degrees sharia (Islamic governance) across the Pashtun belt in
Pakistan including the FATA and settled areas such as Swat.\13\ In late
February 2008, two dissident commanders (Mullah Nazir of South
Waziristan and Gul Bahadur of North Waziristan) set aside their
differences with Baitullah Mehsood and forged the Shura Ittehad-ul-
Mujahiden.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ See Hassan Abbas, ``Increasing Talibanization in Pakistan's
Seven Tribal Agencies,'' Terrorism Monitor Vol. 5, No. 18 (September
27, 2007), pp. 1-5; Hassan Abbas, ``A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban
Pakistan'' CTC Sentinel, Vol. 1, No. 2, January 2008, pp. 1-4; Syed
Shoaib Hasan, ``Profile: Baitullah Mehsud,'' BBC News, December 28,
2007. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7163626.stm.
\14\ Pakistan has considered Maulvi Nazir an ally because he helped
oust or kill numerous Uzbeks in South Waziristan. He is considered to
be a dedicated foe of U.S. and NATO forces as he dispatches fighters to
Afghanistan. Gul Bahadar has had a number of differences with Baitullah
Mehsood. It is not clear what this alliance means for Pakistan or for
the United States and allies in Afghanistan. See Saeed Shah, ``Taliban
rivals unite to fight US troop surge,'' The Guardian, March 3, 2009.
Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/03/taliban-
pakistan-afghanistan-us-surge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the above noted Pakistani groups, Pakistan also
hosts elements of the Afghan Taliban, with leadership committees
(shuras) in Quetta, Peshawar, and Karachi.\15\ The Afghan Taliban
remains focused upon ousting foreign forces in Afghanistan,
overthrowing the Karzai regime, and restoring their role in governing
Afghanistan. As is well known, Pakistani territory is also used by al
Qaeda. Al Qaeda operatives are known to reside in North and South
Waziristan and Bajaur among other areas in the Pashtun belt. Moreover,
many al Qaeda operatives (such as Abu Zubaidah, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad
among numerous others) have been arrested in Pakistani cities.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ See, inter alia, Senator Carl Levin, ``Opening Statement of
Senator Carl Levin, Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on
Afghanistan and Pakistan,'' February 26, 2009. Available at http://
levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=308740; Ian Katz, ``Gates Says
Militant Sanctuaries Pose Biggest Afghanistan Threat,'' Bloomberg News,
March 1, 2009. Available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601087&sid=aehmlRXgKi2o&refer=home; Barnett R. Rubin.
``Saving Afghanistan,'' Foreign Affairs, January/February 2007.
Available at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86105-p0/
barnett-r-rubin/saving-afghanistan.html;[sic]
\16\ See comments made by National Intelligence Director John
Negroponte cited in ``Al-Qaeda `rebuilding' in Pakistan,'' BBC News
Online, January 12, 2007. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
south_asia/6254375.stm; K. Alan Kronstadt, U.S.-Pakistan Relations
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008). Available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/115888.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pakistan has rightly noted that it is a victim of sanguinary
terrorist violence that has escalated since joining the U.S.-led war on
terror. Indeed, the TTP and other sectarian and ethno-nationalist
militants in Pakistan have wreaked considerable havoc in Pakistan with
63 suicide attacks and an astonishing 2,148 attacks or clashes with
security forces in 2008 alone.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ See Pak Institute for Peace Studies, Pakistan Security Report
2008 (Islamabad: PIPS, 2009) p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Howsoever horrific these facts are, the LeT has never targeted the
Pakistani state or international targets within Pakistan. This has led
many analysts within and without the region to intuit that LeT
continues to enjoy special relations with Pakistan's intelligence and
military agencies notwithstanding much-touted Pakistani efforts to
proscribe LeT's activities and those of its cover organization, the
Jamaat ul Dawa (JuD). The March 2, 2009 attack on the Sri Lankan
cricket team in Lahore may signal an important shift in LeT operations
and its ties to the state. In that incident, several heavily armed men
viciously assaulted the team, umpires, and related officials as well as
their police escort in the Punjabi city of Lahore, killing six police
officers and two civilians. Speculation is rife that the commando
operation may have been the handiwork of the LeT. If so, this attack
will be the first LeT attack on Pakistani soil. At the time of writing,
it is too early to inveigh upon the evidence for or against these
allegations of LeT involvement.
While the verdict is out on perpetrators of the attack on the Sri
Lankan cricketers, few analysts and journalists interviewed during my
recent trip to Pakistan believed that Pakistan could or would
decisively eliminate JuD despite its late 2008 ban on the organization.
This is both because JuD/LeT is still considered to be an important
asset in Pakistan's quest to secure its regional objectives and because
it, unlike the proliferating morass of Deobandi groups, has never
targeted the state. However, even if Pakistan were to resolve to
eliminate JuD/LeT, few believe that Pakistan has the ability to do so.
lashkar-e-taiba: origins, operatives, and operations
The LeT has focused the attention of policymakers in recent months
because it perpetrated the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai.
As this section narrates, the LeT has a long-standing presence in
Pakistan and South Asia. Since 2001, it has increasingly established a
presence well beyond the region. LeT emerged as the military wing of
the Markaz Daawat ul Irshad (MDI), headquartered in Muridke near the
Punjabi city of Lahore. MDI was founded in 1986 by two Pakistani
Engineering professors, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and Zafar Iqbal. Abdullah
Azzam, a close of associate of Bin Laden who was affiliated with the
Islamic University of Islamabad and the Maktab ul Khadamat (Bureau of
Services for Arab mujahideen), also provided assistance. He was killed
in Peshawar 2 years after the Markaz was founded. MDI, along with
numerous other militant groups, was involved in Afghanistan from 1986
onwards and established militant training camps for this purpose. One
camp was known as Muaskar-e-Taiba in Paktia (in Afghanistan bordering
Pakistan) and a second known as Muaskar-e-Aqsa in the Kunar province of
Afghanistan.\18\ (Kunar is known to be home to numerous Ahl-e-Hadith
adherents in Afghanistan, which overall has few followers in that
country. For this reason, Kunar has been an attractive safe-haven for
Arabs in Afghanistan.) Pakistan-based analysts note that MDI/LeT's
training camps were always separate from those of the Taliban, which
hosted Deobandi militant groups such as HUJI and Harkat ul Mujahideen.
This has led some analysts to contend that LeT has not had the
sustained and organic connections to al Qaeda as enjoyed by the
Deobandi groups, many of which became ``out sourcers'' for al Qaeda in
Pakistan.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ See Yoginder Sikand, ``The Islamist Militancy in Kashmir: The
Case of the Lashkar-e-Taiba,'' in Aparna Rao et al. Eds. The Practice
of War: Production, Reproduction and Communication of Armed Violence
(New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), pp. 215-238; Mariam Abou Zahab, ``I
Shall be Waiting at the Door of Paradise: The Pakistani Martyrs of the
Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure)'', in Aparna Rao et al. Eds. The
Practice of War: Production, Reproduction and Communication of Armed
Violence (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), pp.133158 [sic]; Saeed
Shafqat, ``From Official Islam to Islamism: The Rise of Dawat-ul-Irshad
and Lashkar-e-Taiba,'' in Christophe Jaffrelot Ed. Pakistan:
Nationalism without a Nation (London: Zed Books, 2002), pp. 131-147.
\19\ In 1998, the United States bombed several al Qaeda/Taliban
training camps in retaliation for the al Qaeda attacks on U.S.
embassies in Africa. Militants of several Pakistani Deobandi groups
were killed including operatives of HUJI and HuM among others. See
Barry Bearak, ``After The Attacks: In Pakistan; Estimates Of Toll In
Afghan Missile Strike Reach As High As 50,'' The New York Times, August
23, 1998. Also see Dexter Filkins, `` `All of Us Were Innocent,' Says
Survivor of U.S. Attack on Camp,'' The Los Angeles Times, August 24,
1998. Available at http://articles.latimes.com/1998/aug/24/news/mn-
16045.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1993, MDI divided its activities into two related but separate
organizations: MDI continued the mission of proselytization and
education while LeT emerged as the militant wing. The ISI is believed
to have funded the organization and analysts continue to believe that
LeT is a close proxy of Pakistani intelligence agencies.\20\ After the
Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, LeT/MDI shifted focus to Indian-
administered Kashmir. It staged its first attack (against a jeep
carrying Indian air force personnel) in Kashmir in 1990. The vast
majority of LeT operatives are Pakistanis (often Punjabis) and the
organization has spawned a vast training infrastructure throughout the
country to support its dual mission of training militants and
converting Pakistanis to the Ahl-e-Hadith interpretative tradition. For
much of the 1990's (with few exceptions), LeT operations were
restricted to Indian administered Kashmir.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Analysts believe that the LeT, with its explicit Islamist and
pro-Pakistan orientation, was established to counter the ethno-
nationalist and pro-independence militant group Jammu Kashmir
Liberation Front (JKLF). The JKLF eventually abandoned militancy and
assumed political activism. For more information about LeT's origins,
see Yoginder Sikand, ``The Islamist Militancy in Kashmir: The Case of
the Lashkar-e-Taiba,'' in Aparna Rao et al. Eds. The Practice of War:
Production, Reproduction and Communication of Armed Violence (New York:
Berghahn Books, 2007), pp. 215-238; Mariam Abou Zahab, ``I Shall be
Waiting at the Door of Paradise: The Pakistani Martyrs of the Lashkar-
e-Taiba (Army of the Pure)'', in Aparna Rao et al. Eds. The Practice of
War: Production, Reproduction and Communication of Armed Violence (New
York: Berghahn Books, 2007), pp.133158[sic]; Saeed Shafqat, ``From
Official Islam to Islamism: The Rise of Dawat-ul-Irshad and Lashkar-e-
Taiba,'' in Christophe Jaffrelot Ed. Pakistan: Nationalism without a
Nation (London: Zed Books, 2002), pp. 131-147.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A perusal of LeT literature demonstrates a commitment to targeting
Indian Hindus, Jews, Americans and other infidels and apostate Muslims;
stoking larger Hindu-Muslim discord in India; and liberating all of
India and establishing a caliphate.\21\ MDI claims that it has had a
leading role in armed struggles across the Muslim world, first in
Afghanistan, then in Bosnia, Chechnya, Kosovo, the Philippines, and
Kashmir among other venues.\22\ While there is no independent
verification of these claims, as discussed herein, many LeT-associated
individuals and cells have appeared in Iraq, Australia, the United
States, the United Kingdom and several European countries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ The author has collected LeT poster work and written materials
since 1995.
\22\ Sikand, ``Islamist Militancy in Kashmir,'' P. 219. Also see
discussion of LeT in Muhammad Amir Ranan (trans. Saba Ansari) The A to
Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan (Lahore: Mashal, 2004), pp. 324.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LeT has a hallmark modus operandi which has often been misconstrued
as ``suicide operations.'' In fact, LeT does not do suicide operations
per se in which the goal of the attacker is to die in the execution of
the attack. Rather, LeT's ``fidayeen'' missions are more akin to high-
risk missions in which well-trained commandos engage in fierce combat
during which dying is preferable to being captured. While martyrdom is
in some sense the ultimate objective of LeT operatives, the LeT selects
missions where there is a possibility (howsoever slim) of living to
kill more of the enemy. The goal of LeT commandos therefore is not to
commit suicide in the execution of an attack. Rather, they seek to kill
as many as possible until they either succumb to enemy operations or
manage to survive, perhaps by decisively eliminating the enemy in the
battle.
Zahab has described a typical LeT encounter in the following way
``the fighters are well trained and highly motivated and they engage
the enemy on its own territory. Small groups of fedayeen . . . storm a
security force camp and kill as many soldiers as possible before taking
defensive positions within the camp and engaging security force
personnel till they attain martyrdom. Battles often last twenty hours,
if not more.''\23\ She further notes that these spectacular and well-
planned attacks bring the LeT maximum publicity, expands recruiting and
donations and demoralizes the enemy which must resort to heavy fire,
which destroys their own buildings and causes substantial collateral
damage in the process. While LeT claims that it has only assaulted hard
targets, their record demonstrates an absolute willingness to kill
civilians in cinemas, hotels, tourist destinations, airports, etc.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Zahab, ``I Shall be Waiting,'' p. 138.
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Consonant with the rigor of a typical LeT mission, LeT recruits do
not predominantly draw from Pakistan's madaris (pl. madrassah). Rather
LeT recruits are generally in their late teens or early twenties and
they tend to be better educated than Pakistanis on average or even
other militant groups such as the Deobandi SSP or JM. A majority of LeT
recruits have completed secondary school with good grades and some have
even attended college. This reflects both the background of LeT's
founding fathers who were engineering professors and their commitment
to technical and other education. Many LeT operatives likely came into
contact with LeT through proselytization programs on college campuses,
which in turn lured the potential recruits to the large ``ijtema''
(congregation) held annually in Muridke. The fraction of madrassah-
educated LeT operatives is believed to be as low as 10 percent.\24\
Clearly not all LeT cadres are well-educated as attested by the lone
surviving Mumbai gunman, Azam Amir Kasab, a Punjabi with only a fourth-
grade education. By comparison, the mean years of schooling for males
in the Punjab is 4.7 years.\25\ LeT also actively targets women both to
expand their recruitment base of males and reportedly to recruit women
for militant operations.\26\ In sharp contrast, many of the Deobandi
groups including the Afghan Taliban rely upon madrassah and mosque-
based networks.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Zahab, ``I Shall be Waiting,'' p. 140, Shafqat, ``From
Official Islam to Islamism,'' p. 142.
\25\ Data on mean years of schooling is given for 2005. See Social
Policy Development Center. Social Development in Pakistan: Annual
Review (Karachi: SPDC, 2007), p. 152. Available at http://www.spdcpak.
com/pubs/sdip0607.pdf.
\26\ Farhat Haq, ``Militarism and Motherhood: The Women of the
Lashkar-i-Tayyabia in Pakistan,'' Signs, vol. 32, no. 4, Summer 2007,
pp. 1023-1046.
\27\ For a more throughout discussion of the connections between
militancy and education, see C. Christine Fair, The Madrassah
Challenge: Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan (Washington,
DC: USIP, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since the late 1990's, LeT has cultivated significant operational
reach beyond Kashmir and into India. While Indian citizens were always
required for facilitating LeT and other militant groups' actions within
Indian-administered Kashmir and the Indian hinterland, LeT has
successfully cultivated active cadres and figures preeminently in
founding of the Indian Mujahideen. In 2002, at least 14 young men from
Hyderabad left for Pakistan for training, reportedly motivated by the
massacre of Muslims in Gujarat in 2002. (Praveen Swami reports that
even as early as 1992 some Indian Muslims sought training in Pakistan
in response to the demolition of the Babri Masjid by Hindu extremists.)
The Hyderabad operatives received training in LeT and JM camps and
enjoyed operational assistance from Bangladesh-based Harkat-ul-Jihad-
Bangladesh (HUJI-B). This cell was responsible for the May 18, 2007
terrorist attack in Hyderabad's Toli Chowki area.\28\ LeT has moved
Indian personnel into and out of Pakistan via Bangladesh and other
countries through criminal syndicates as well as other Islamist and
militant groups such as the Students Islamist Movement of India (SIMI)
and Harkat-ul-Jihad-Bangladesh (HUJI-B) among others.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Praveen Swami, ``Terror Junction,'' Frontline, Vol. 24, No.
11, June 2-15, 2007. Available at http://www.hindu.com/fline/fl2411/
stories/20070615002303500.htm.
\29\ Praveen Swami, ``Lashkar-trained Indian Terrorists Pose
Growing Threat,'' The Hindu, December 19, 2008. Available at http://
www.hindu.com/2008/12/19/stories/2008121956141200.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the rhetoric surrounding the horrific events in Mumbai on
November 26, 2008, there were important antecedents of that attack.
Most recently, in July 2006, LeT working with local operatives,
detonated seven explosions across Mumbai's commuter rail system. That
2006 assault was even more lethal than the 2008 carnage, killing at
least 187. While that attack focused the public's attention upon LeT's
ability to strike deep within India, LeT had reportedly established
networks in Mumbai as early as August 1999. India's intelligence bureau
disrupted a pan-India network led by LeT-operative Amir Khan who was
tasked with recruiting from India's communal-violence afflicted
communities. In 2000, Indian authorities intercepted three Pakistani
LeT cadres who had planned to kill Bal Thackeray, leader of a Hindu
nationalist group called the Shiv Sena.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Praveen Swami, ``Road to Unimaginable Horror,'' The Hindu,
July 13, 2006. Available at http://www.hindu.com/2006/07/13/stories/
2006071303420800.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2004, another LeT cell was disrupted that aimed to attack the
Bombay Stock Exchange. (The Bombay Stock Exchange had been attacked
previously in 1993. The then India-based Mafioso, Dawood Ibrahim,
orchestrated that attack using Indian militants with Pakistani
support.) In June 2006, the Maharashtra police arrested an 11-member
LeT cell that shipped some 43 kilograms of explosives, assault rifles
and grenades to India using sea routes. Several of those militants had
ties to SIMI. Indian analysts believe that LeT, working with SIMI and
smuggling rings, have been able to successively move large amounts of
explosives and weapons by sea along the Gujarat coast.\31\ The movement
of explosives through the Maharashtra and Gujarat coastlines was
reminiscent of logistical routes used to supply explosives for the 1993
Bombay Stock Exchange.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ In May 2006, Mohammad Iqbal, an LeT activist from Bahawlpur (a
city in southern Punjab in Pakistan), was shot dead by Delhi Police.
Iqbal had worked through mafia-linked traffickers to ship a consignment
of explosives through Gujarat that was used in the February 2006 attack
on an Ahmedebad (Gujarat) train platform, See Praveen Swami, ``Road to
Unimaginable Horror,'' The Hindu, July 13, 2006. Available at http://
www.hindu.com/2006/07/13/stories/2006071303420800.htm.
\32\ See Praveen Swami and Anupama Katakam, ``Investigators Shut
Down Terror Cells Tasked with Executing Strikes in Gujarat, but the
Threat Remains,'' Frontline, Vol. 23, No. 10, May 20-June 2, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Needless to say, these are only illustrative--not exhaustive--
examples of LeT's penetration of India and cultivation of Indian
networks to conduct terror operations. With respect to the November
2008 attack, at least two Indian operatives played critical roles:
Fahim Arshad Ansari, a key LeT operative from Mumbai, and Sabahuddin
Ahmad of Uttar Pradesh. Both men helped prepare maps and videotapes to
guide LeT's operatives to their targets. Their contributions--perhaps
more so than the use of GPS devices--likely guided the terrorists'
movements through Mumbai.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ Y.P. Rajesh and Sagnik Chowdhury, ``26/11 The Indian hand,''
Indian Express, February 27, 2009. Available at http://
www.indianexpress.com/news/26-11-the-indian-hand/428565/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the early connections between MDI/LeT to Azam, along with
the organization's Salafijihadi outlook, fosters suspicion that LeT and
al Qaeda enjoy tight linkages. These suspicions are buttressed by a
number of developments and observations. First, al Qaeda operatives
(e.g. Abu Zubaidah) have been arrested in LeT safe houses. In addition,
LeT has been operating against U.S., NATO and Afghan forces in Kunar
and Nuristan in close proximity to al Qaeda, which operates in the same
region.\34\ Third, in recent years, LeT operatives have appeared in
small numbers in other theatres. For example, British forces captured
two Pakistani LeT operatives in Iraq and rendered them into U.S.
custody.\35\ A number of Australians (including apparent converts to
Islam) have been trained in LeT camps and have plotted to attack
Australian targets, discomfiting Australian authorities.\36\ Reports
persist that a wide array of American, Canadian, and British nationals
have trained in LeT camps.\37\ At least one of the bombers (Shahzad
Tanveer) in London's ``7/7'' subway attack is alleged to have contacted
LeT officials while in Pakistan as well as those associated with JM.
Apart from that incident, British officials contend that LeT has
numerous links with many terror cells and plots disrupted in the United
Kingdom. For example, Dhiren Barot, a Hindu convert to Islam and LeT
activist was arrested in the United Kingdom and charged with planning
several chemical and radiological attacks on financial offices in the
United States. LeT is also tied to Richard Reid (a.k.a. ``the shoe
bomber'') as well as a Virginia-based ``paintball jihad'' cell in which
several Islamists, including an American Muslim convert named Randall
``Ismail'' Royer, trained to participate in LeT's campaign against
India. Royer, who was convicted, dispatched recruits to an LeT camp in
Pakistan where they learned to use small arms, rocket-propelled
grenades, among other military resources to fight in India.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ Author fieldwork in Afghanistan between June and October 2007;
Kathy Gannon, ``Pakistan militants focus on Afghanistan: Jihadist
groups are increasingly attacking U.S., NATO forces in Afghanistan,''
Associated Press, Web site, July 14, 2008.
\35\ Richard Norton-Taylor, ``Britain aided Iraq terror renditions,
government admits,'' The Guardian, February 26, 2009. Available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/feb/26/britain-admits-terror-
renditions.
\36\ Recently, during a trial of several men plotting to attack the
United States from Sydney, a participant (a Korean-American Muslim
convert) alleged that an Australian citizen known as Abu Asad trained
with Lashkar-e-Taiba at a camp in Pakistan in 2001. See Geesche
Jacobsen, ``Australian in training camp named,'' Sydney Morning Herald,
January 13, 2009. Available at http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/
australian-in-training-camp-named/2009/01/13/1231608682540.html. For
information on another collective of Australians trained in LeT camps,
see Ashok Malik, ``Lashkar link in Aussie terror net,'' Indian Express,
June 12, 2004. Available at http://www.indianexpress.com/
oldstory.php?storyid=48832. Perhaps the most famous Australian to train
at an LeT camp is David Hicks who was recently freed from Guantanamo.
See ``David Hicks: `Australian Taleban,' '' BBC News, May 20, 2007.
Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3044386.stm.
\37\ See for example ``Lashkar training in US, Canada, UK,
Australia,'' Rediff.com, December 10, 2008. Available at http://
www.rediff.com/news/2008/dec/10mumterror-lashkar-training-in-us-canada-
ukaustralia.htm.
\38\ For more details about the ``paintball jihad'' cell, see
Stephen Schwartz, ``Lashkar-e-Taiba in America: A convicted terror
recruiter plays victim of the NSA,'' The Weekly Standard, December 16,
2006. http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/
015/927uxqry.asp.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pakistan-based analysts of LeT, among others, tend to discount the
claims of explicit al Qaeda-LeT linkages and note that al Qaeda
operatives have been arrested in Jamaat Islami safe houses as well and
note that LeT infrastructure in Afghanistan, as described above, was
separate from that of Al Qaeda and their patrons, the Taliban.\39\ Thus
the actual degree to which LeT is allied to al Qaeda remains an
important empirical question. However, LeT threatens U.S. interests
irrespective of its formal ties--or lack thereof--to al Qaeda. LeT has
well-established linkages to international terrorism and it espouses
goals that are similar to those of al Qaeda as the foregoing discussion
illustrates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ See Yoginder Sikand, ``The Islamist Militancy in Kashmir: The
Case of the Lashkar-e-Taiba,'' in Aparna Rao et al. Eds. The Practice
of War: Production, Reproduction and Communication of Armed Violence
(New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), pp. 215-238; Saeed Shafqat, ``From
Official Islam to Islamism: The Rise of Dawat-ul-Irshad and Lashkar-e-
Taiba,'' in Christophe Jaffrelot Ed. Pakistan: Nationalism without a
Nation (London: Zed Books, 2002), pp. 131-147. Why their infrastructure
was apart from the other Deobandi camps is an important question even
if there are no solid answers. Two possible explanations include: (1)
Be deliberate ISI decision to keep MDI/LeT separate from other groups'
camps or, (2) more likely, the deep-seated hostility that MDI/LeT has
historically had toward Deobandis and vice versa.
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implications of the november 2008 mumbai attack: antecedents and
innovations
The November 2008 attack bears many hallmarks of previous LeT
attacks. The assault employed dedicated and well-trained commandos who
used explosives, small arms and grenades--all but one of whom fought
until their deaths. While the available evidence suggests that the main
operators were Pakistani, the attack relied upon crucial domestic
assistance. Like previous LeT attacks in Mumbai and elsewhere, this
assault involved exclusively soft targets with little or no defenses.
Several of the targets (such as the Taj and Oberoi hotels) were Indian
icons and reflected the opulence of India's elite. They also attracted
wealthy international visitors. Other targets such as the Chatrapati
Shivaji Station rendered India's middle and lower-middle classes
vulnerable. (The train station was previously known as Victoria
Terminus and was renamed after an important 17th century Hindu leader
who re-established Hindu political dominance in the region after a long
period of Muslim rule.) Other targets, such as the Chabad House,
reflect an explicit expansion of LeT's focus as described below.
Most accounts of the attack dilate upon the daring infiltration of
the attackers who traveled from Pakistan by sea. While the sea-based
landing of the ten militants was exceptionally daunting, the concept
was not entirely new even if the complexity of the movement was. As
noted, mafia syndicates and Islamist militant groups have moved
explosives, guns, grenades and other illicit cargo through similar
routes since at least 1993. In the conduct of the 1993 Bombay Stock
Exchange, mafia leader Dawood Ibrahim working with an associate named
Tiger Memon, arranged for considerable illicit cargo to move into a
small fishing village near Mumbai via a small motorboat. In one of the
few comprehensive accounts of that conspiracy, S. Hussain Zaidi
describes how Memon and his crew boarded a small motorboat which
``sailed toward the open sea'' where it ``rendezvoused [sic] with a
large red speedboat,'' from which it loaded the weapons and other
materials (including AK-47s, large quantities of a military grade
explosive called RDX, pencil detonators, grenades, pistols) used for
the attack. They then returned to the fishing village and offloaded the
cargo. While the operatives of the 1993 blast exploited the widespread
belief that that Mumbai security forces were inept, the locally
recruited participants were ill-prepared for the operation and
unfamiliar with the weapons to be used. Dawood Ibrahim and Tiger Memon
arranged for their transportation to and from Pakistan where they were
reportedly trained by Pakistani intelligence.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ S. Hussain Zaidi, Black Friday: The True Story of the Bombay
Bomb Blasts (New Delhi: Penguin, 2002), pp. 50-67.
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However, other aspects of this attack were notable and distinctive.
While LeT has been operating against U.S., NATO, and Afghan forces in
Kunar and Nuristan \41\ and while LeT operatives went to fight allied
forces in Iraq, this was the first known LeT assault upon American and
international civilians. While it is now believed that LeT did not
single out foreigners across the targets, one target in particular was
distinctive: the Chabad Center. Mumbai, among other cities, hosts a
historical albeit shrinking Jewish population and boasts many
historical synagogues and Jewish cultural facilities. Despite the
decades of Islamist violence perpetrated by a range of groups espousing
an anti-Semitic agenda, no Islamist militant group had ever targeted
India's Jewish community. Chabad was distinctive because it was not
merely Jewish, but also associated with Israelis and other
international Jewish visitors.\42\ This target is most curious of all
as few from or familiar with Mumbai have ever heard of this
institution.\43\
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\41\ Author fieldwork in Afghanistan between June and October 2007;
Kathy Gannon, ``Pakistan militants focus on Afghanistan: Jihadist
groups are increasingly attacking U.S., NATO forces in Afghanistan,''
Associated Press, Web site, July 14, 2008.
\42\ Yair Ettinger, ``Mumbai attack sends shock waves through
Chabad community worldwide,'' Haaretz, November 29, 2008. Available at
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1041785.html; Anshel Pfeffer, ``9
dead in Mumbai Chabad house attack; Israel to help identify bodies,''
Haaretz, November 30, 2008. Available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/
spages/1041834.html.
\43\ Conversations with Indian journalists and others during a
recent trip to India and based upon conversations with a relative who
lives in Mumbai.
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While LeT and other groups have often posited and resisted the
``Brahmanic-Talmudic-Crusader'' alliance, no militant group within
South Asia violently operationalized this agenda until the Mumbai 2008
attack. In the case of LeT, it is puzzling that despite advocating this
agenda since the late 1980's, it took nearly two decades to act upon
it. Possible explanations for the choice of that target include the
growing Indo-Israeli military, counterterrorism, and intelligence
relationship which has long irritated Pakistan and animated the
rhetoric of Islamist militants across the region.\44\ Moreover, Israeli
lobby apparatus in the United States has nurtured India's own emergent
lobbying organizations and is rightly or wrongly associated with
helping India achieve the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal.\45\ Thus the
selection of the Chabad center--rather than any of India's domestic
Jewish institutions--may have sought to undermine this important
bilateral relationship. Transcripts of the phone intercepts of the
attack at the Chabad house buttress this explanation. The Pakistan-
based caller encouraged the attacker to kill the hostages arguing that
``If the hostages are killed, it will spoil relations between India and
Israel.''\46\ Another explanation may be that LeT was emboldened by its
attacks against U.S. forces in Afghanistan and influenced by al Qaeda
co-located with LeT in Afghanistan's Kunar and Nuristan provinces. Of
course, both may be valid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ Military and intelligence ties have in many ways formed the
backbone of the Indo-Israeli relationship and Israel is now India's
pre-eminent arms supplier. For an early account of the emerging
relationship see P.R. Kumaraswamy, ``Strategic Partnership Between
Israel and India,'' MERIA Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2, May 1998. Available
at http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1998/issue2/jv2n2a6.html. See Embassy
of Israel, New Delhi, ``Indo-Israel Relations,'' n.d. Available at
http://delhi.mfa.gov.il/mfm/web/main/
document.asp?SubjectID=2010&MissionID=93&LanguageID=0&StatusID=0&Documen
tID=-1; P R Kumaraswamy, ``Indo-Israeli military ties enter next stage:
A US$2.5 billion Indo-Israeli defense project marks a new phase in the
two countries' relations,'' ISN, August 3, 2007. Available at http://
www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/
?ots591=4888CAA0-B3DB-1461-98B9-E20E7B9C13D4&lng=en&id=53611; Efraim
Inbar, ``The Indian-Israeli Entente,'' Orbis, Vol. 48, No. 1, Winter
2004, Pages 89-104.
\45\ This judgment is based upon numerous visits to Pakistan since
the discussion of the deal emerged.
\46\ Andrew Buncombe and Omar Waraich in Islamabad, ``Mumbai siege:
`Kill all the hostages--except the two Muslims' Phone conversations
between Mumbai attackers and their `Pakistani handlers' cast chilling
new light on massacre,'' The Independent, January 8, 2009. Available at
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/mumbai-siege-kill-all-the-
hostages-ndash-except-the-twomuslims-1232074.html.
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conclusions: implications for u.s. regional, and international security
U.S. policymakers and analysts have pondered whether LeT could or
would undertake such operations within the United States. As the
foregoing suggests, a number of individuals (including converts) who
appear to have radicalized in the diaspora have traveled to Pakistan to
train with the LeT and other militant groups (e.g. JM). LeT and other
militant groups in the Punjab, comprise an important link between those
who have radicalized in the diaspora and Pakistan's tribal areas where
al Qaeda is ensconced. (In turn Pashtun militants from the tribal areas
rely upon Pashtun networks as well as Punjabi networks to execute
attacks throughout Pakistan.) During my recent trip to Pakistan, one
interlocutor described these Punjab-based groups as the ``escalator for
foreigners to get to FATA.''\47\ As FATA remains an important epicenter
for international terrorism, the importance of groups like LeT (among
others) cannot be understated and should motivate Washington to insist
that Pakistan cease all forms of active and passive support for these
groups and act decisively to eliminate them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ Author interviews with Pakistani and foreign journalists,
analysts and diplomats in Islamabad in late February 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A smaller number of Pakistani LeT operatives have found their way
to other theatres such as Iraq. Given the tenacity of opposition to the
U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, it is surprising that only two
LeT operatives made their way to Iraq suggesting limited capacity or
will. Given the difficulty in Pakistan-based operatives to obtain a
visa to visit western countries, the strategy of pulling in operatives
from the west is likely to be the most productive strategy as these
individuals speak English, have the appropriate passport, and are more
likely to gain access to targeted countries. Thus even if LeT (and
other such groups) may be less capable of dispatching Pakistan-based
militants outside of the South Asian theatre, LeT and other militant
camps in Pakistan remain destinations for international jihadists who
are not so restricted in reaching their desired theatre of operation.
Given the terrorist cells that have been disrupted in the United
States, United Kingdom, Europe, and Australia (among other venues) and
in light of the challenges posed by the visa waiver program, one cannot
rule out an LeT-facilitated attack within the United States. After
Mumbai, one absolutely cannot rule out further attacks against U.S.
citizens or interests abroad or those of U.S. allies.
Even if an LeT attack within the United States may be a low-
probability event, LeT poses a number of concerns for the United States
not the least of which include on-going operations against U.S. and
allied forces in Afghanistan, the likelihood of future attacks in India
with the ever-present possibility of prompting yet another Indo-
Pakistan military crises, and ``copy cat'' attacks in the United States
or elsewhere.
The challenges faced by the Indian security forces are also
illuminating.\48\ First, the Indian authorities lacked basic
information about the floor plan. Second, the Indian counterterrorism
forces were undermined by the media coverage which televised in real
time their efforts to eliminate the terrorists. The Pakistan-based
handlers, during on-going phone conversations with the militants,
relayed critical information gleaned from the coverage, as the
intercepted phone conversations attest. Third, given that many of these
targets are deeply embedded within organic urban growth, even under the
most optimistic assumptions, many of India's numerous high-value
civilian (e.g. tourism, commercial, industrial) targets will be
difficult to secure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ Some of the challenges faced by the Indian authorities also
stemmed from particular enduring lapses in Indian internal security
apparatus. These include, among other durable problems, the inability
of the National Security Guards to get to Mumbai, police ineptitude,
poor means to share intelligence between and across external and
domestic intelligence agencies, a deficient system for naval and
coastal security. See Angel Rabasa et al. The Lessons of Mumbai (Santa
Monica: RAND, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally the Mumbai attack and its sustained media coverage reminds
one that militants need not use extravagant suicide bombs to wreak
havoc. Rather militants waging coordinated attacks, against several,
soft and poorly defended--if not utterly indefensible targets--targets
using only small-arms can inflict considerable damage.\49\
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\49\ Notably, the Indian government did not limit the televised
images of the attack even as Indian commandos began their offensives
against the militants.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Bonnell.
STATEMENT OF DAVID BRADLEY BONNELL, DIRECTOR, GLOBAL SECURITY,
INTERCONTINENTAL HOTELS GROUP
Mr. Bonnell. Madam Chairwoman, Members of the committee, I
want to express my appreciation. It is an honor to speak to
you, and I hope that you will find my testimony to be useful.
It will certainly be less cerebral than Dr. Fair.
As the terrorist attack on Mumbai unfolded, as it was
unfolding, I was in contact with my counterparts with Marriott,
Starwood, Hyatt, and Hilton as a direct result of the
association that had come to exist as a result of the
Department of Homeland Security and the Overseas Security
Advisory Council. We were in constant contact throughout the
attack sharing information with each other, corroborating fact
from fiction, sharing information about resources available to
us. We have two managed hotels in Mumbai, two InterContinental
hotels. We were able to give them information that was useful.
So, armed with reliable intelligence concerning the nature
of the attack as it was occurring, we were able to provide our
two properties with useful intelligence that enabled them to
increase the level of security in response to this event.
In days following the attack, the Association of Corporate
Security Professionals shared information concerning various
resources that enabled recovery and the restart of the Mumbai
business operations confident that reasonable action had been
taken to mitigate what was now a foreseeable and predictable
threat in that part of the world.
This association of corporate security professionals
evolved as the results of the efforts of the Department of
Homeland Security. In bringing private sector security crisis
management personnel together in an effort to increase
preparedness in the private sector, DHS laid the foundation for
an association of hotel corporations that has served my company
very well. This relationship between the DHS and the IHG, the
InterContinental Hotels Group, has been beneficial about the
strategic and tactical level. From enabling corporations to
understand what constitutes a viable and defensible disaster
recoverable business continuity plan, to how a hotel should
effect an evacuation response to a bomb threat, that the
Department of Homeland Security has shown us how it can be
done.
I would like to refer to Title 9 compliance. Title 9 of the
9/11 Commission Act provided us with a map to crisis management
planning expressed in terms of preparedness in the private
sector and public sector for rescue, restart, and recovery of
operations, they should include a plan for evacuations,
adequate communications capabilities, and a plan for continuity
of operations.
In seeking to achieve the stated goals of Title 9,
Department of Homeland Security enabled private sector security
professionals to share best practices through its meetings,
conferences, and frequent communications. What has evolved in
the hospitality private sector as a result of this information
sharing are crisis management counterterrorism programs that
are threat-based and intelligence-led.
DHS and the Overseas Security Advisory Council both provide
much of the intelligence that is used in deploying resources
against emerging threats.
Since the 19th century the legal and moral duty of a hotel
concerning safety and security has been articulated in terms of
reasonable care, which is legally defined as the manner in
which a prudent and responsible person responds to a
foreseeable and predictable threat. The threat of a terrorist
attack against a hotel has now become a conspicuously
foreseeable threat, particularly in those parts of the world
where a jihadist threat exists.
There are currently 4,186 hotels around the world bearing
the InterContinental hotels groups brands of InterContinental
Crowne Plaza Hotels, Indigo Suites, Holiday Inn, Holiday Inn
Express, Candlewood Suites and Staybridge Suites. The majority
of these hotels are franchised and privately owned.
The world headquarters of my company is located in the
United Kingdom near London. The regional office for properties
in the Americas is located in Atlanta, Georgia, and the Office
for the Asia Pacific region of IHG is located in Singapore.
There are 27 corporate facilities that support the business
to include business service center reservation centers, data
centers and sales offices.
We seek to fulfill our legal and moral duty concerning
safety and security through a crisis management system that has
taken a great deal of direction from the goals of Title 9.
Integrated throughout the corporate structure, culture and
operation of the InterContinental group is a comprehensive
crisis management system that provides a flexible and effective
response to foreseeable and predictable threats. The system
consists of continuous threat assessment, site-specific
emergency action plans and business continuity plans, a senior
executive crisis response plan, crisis response teams, an
internal communications network and crisis emergency response
training program.
The crisis management system responds to a crisis through a
process that follows operational management structures,
existing lines of communication and established business
relationships. By following the organizational chain of
command, crisis management escalates as needed through a
process that connects all corporate operations to a common
crisis command organization.
Our counterterrorism program, as previously stated, is
threat-based and intelligence-led. The program consists of
categorizing all hotels against a terrorist risk profile,
conducting a regional strategic threat assessment from each
local hotel, conducting a comprehensive assessment of the
capabilities of a hotel to resist an attack, providing a
management action plan for increasing security capability,
monitoring plan compliance. Our counterterrorism program has
been implemented within the context of mandatory compliance
with brands standards concerning both operational and
structural safety and security.
For example, if a hotel is to be constructed within a
region that is categorized as high-risk, security design and
engineering requirements are imposed on both corporate and
franchise properties. The program is then reinforced through
security site visits and quality audits.
It is during the assessment of the property that a
determination is made as to plan for evacuation, communication
capabilities, and a plan for continuity of operations.
As the counterterrorism evolved, the value of the
intelligence and information provided by the U.S. State
Department sponsored Overseas Security Advisory Council became
apparent. Of equally obvious value was the OSAC-sponsored Hotel
Security Group, of which IHG is a member.
We are closely affiliated with the American Society of
Industrial Security and NFBA in seeking to acquire knowledge
concerning emerging risks and methods of mitigating those
risks.
Thank you very much.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentleman for his testimony.
[The statement of Mr. Bonnell follows:]
Prepared Statement of David Bradley Bonnell
March 11, 2009
summary statement
As the terrorist attack unfolded in Mumbai on 23 February, 2009,
individuals responsible for the counter terrorism program of their
respective corporations were in almost constant contact sharing with
each other timely and detailed information concerning the events and
circumstances of the attack. From this association of corporate
security professionals came a flow of intelligence that facilitated
critical crisis response decisionmaking, the effective deployment of
resources and the flow of constructive internal communications between
global corporate headquarters and hotels impacted by the attack.
Armed with reliable intelligence concerning the nature of the
attack as it was occurring, the InterContinental Hotels Group (IHG) was
able to provide its two Mumbai properties with instructions and
resources that enabled those hotels to quickly secure and defend
against an attack.
In days following the attack, this association of corporate
security professionals shared information concerning various resources
that enabled recovery and restart of Mumbai business operations
confident that reasonable action had been taken to mitigate what was
now a foreseeable and predictable threat in that part of the world.
This association of corporate security professionals evolved as the
result of the efforts of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In
bringing private sector security and crisis management personnel
together in an effort to increase preparedness in the private sector,
DHS laid the foundation for an association of hotel corporations that
has served IHG well.
The relationship between DHS and IHG has been beneficial at both a
strategic and tactical level. From enabling corporations to understand
what constitutes a viable and defensible disaster recovery/business
continuity plan to how a hotel should effect an evacuation in response
to a bomb threat, DHS has shown how it can be done.
title ix compliance
Title IX of the 9/11 Commission Act provided us with a map to
crisis management planning expressed in terms of,
``Preparedness in the private sector and public sector for rescue,
restart and recovery of operations should include (1) a plan for
evacuation, (2) adequate communications capabilities, and (3) a plan
for continuity of operations.''
In seeking to achieve the stated goals of Title IX, DHS enabled
private sector security professionals to share best practices through
its various meetings, conferences, and frequent communications.
What has evolved in the hospitality private sector as a result of
this information sharing are crisis management/counterterrorism
programs that are threat-based and intelligence-led. DHS and the
Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) both provide much of the
intelligence that is used in deploying resources against emerging
threats.
legal duty
Since the 19th Century, the legal and moral duty of a hotel
concerning safety and security has been articulated in terms of
``reasonable care'' which is legally defined as the, ``manner in which
a prudent and responsible person responds to a foreseeable and
predictable threat.'' The threat of a terrorist attack against a hotel
has now become a conspicuously foreseeable and predictable threat,
particularly in those parts of the world where a Jihadist threat
exists.
ihg
There are currently 4,186 hotels around the world bearing the
InterContinental Hotels Group (IHG) brands of, InterContinental Hotels,
Crowne Plaza Hotels, Indigo Suites, Holiday Inn, Holiday Inn Express,
Candlewood Suites and Staybridge Suites. The majority of these hotels
are franchised and privately owned.
The world headquarters of IHG is located in the United Kingdom near
London. The regional office for properties in the Americas is located
in Atlanta, Georgia and the office for the Asia Pacific region of IHG
is located in Singapore. There are 27 corporate facilities that support
the business to include business service centers, reservation centers,
data centers, and sales offices.
IHG seeks to fulfill its legal and moral duty concerning safety and
security through a crisis management system that has taken a great deal
of direction from the goals of Title IX.
ihg crisis management system
Integrated throughout the corporate structure, culture and
operation of the InterContinental Hotels Group (IHG) is a comprehensive
Crisis Management System that provides a flexible and effective
response to foreseeable and predictable threats. The system consists
of: continuous threat assessment; site-specific emergency action plans
and business continuity plans; a senior executive crisis response plan;
crisis response teams; an internal communication network; and crisis/
emergency response training programs.
The IHG Crisis Management System responds to crisis through a
process that follows operational management structures, existing lines
of communication and established business relationships. By following
the organizational chain of command, crisis management escalates as
needed through a process that connects all corporate operations to a
common crisis command organization.
The IHG Crisis Management System incorporates for its 27 corporate
support facilities viable disaster recovery/business continuity plans
and programs. Monitored and tested annually, IHG is confident in its
ability to quickly restore essential business functions either from
temporary or permanent locations.
Another critical component of the IHG Crisis Management System is
the counter terrorism program.
counter terrorism program
The IHG counter terrorism program is, as previously stated, is
threat-based and intelligence-led.
The program consists of:
Categorizing all IHG hotels against a terrorist risk
profile.
Conducting a regional strategic threat assessment for each
hotel location.
Conducting a comprehensive assessment of the capabilities of
the hotel to resist an attack.
Providing an management action plan for increasing security
capability.
Monitoring plan compliance.
Our counter terrorism program is then implemented within the
context of mandatory compliance with brand standards concerning both
operational and structural safety and security. For example, if a hotel
is to be constructed within a region that is categorized as being high
risk, Security Design and Engineering requirements are imposed.
The program is then reinforced through both security site visits
and quality audits.
It is during the assessment of the property that a determination is
made as to plan for evacuation, communication capabilities and a plan
for continuity of operations.
osac
As the IHG counter terrorism program evolved, the value of the
intelligence and information provided by the U.S. State Department-
sponsored Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) became apparent. Of
equally obvious value was the OSAC sponsored Hotel Security Group of
which IHG is a member.
Like DHS, the OSAC brought private sector security professionals
together in an effort to improve the security capability of the
business.
IHG is also closely affiliated with the American Society of
Industrial Security (ASIS) and NFPA in seeking to acquire knowledge
concerning emerging risks and methods of mitigating those risks.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Raisch, you are recognized for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM G. RAISCH, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY'S INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR ENTERPRISE PREPAREDNESS
Mr. Raisch. Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Dent, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. It is my sincere
honor to yet again provide testimony to this committee.
Our primary goal at InterCEP is simple. We have the
opportunity to bring together key stakeholders to identify and
collaboratively solve problems in the area of emergency
preparedness, security, and risk management. It is that
problem-solving orientation that I would like to bring to my
discussion this afternoon and touch on several key points which
are discussed in greater detail in my written remarks, but
focus on two particularly foundational opportunities.
The first is that presented in what has been termed Title
9, the Private Sector Preparedness Program called for by Public
Law 110-53. This is a program that was championed by this
committee and that offers the unique opportunity to begin to
establish corporate resilience and preparedness as a core
business discipline and connected more clearly with bottom-line
benefits than perhaps ever before.
Second, I would like to make a point in the course of my
discussion--an appeal, really, for collaborative action to
design and build in resilience into the current infrastructure
initiatives that are underway by Congress. We have a unique
opportunity to, in fact, prepare while we repair our
infrastructure. This is an opportunity that should not be lost
as we move forward. It is an opportunity that can yield
tremendous returns in minimizing impacts of future crises on
our people and our economy.
The primary focus of this hearing without doubt is a
specific risk, terrorism. In particular, Mumbai-style attack
perhaps on a soft target in the United States. This committee
has assembled a diversity of true experts in the terrorism risk
and the specific strategies that would flow from that.
I would not pretend to approach their expertise, but I
would suggest and stress that these specific risk strategies
optimally are built upon a foundation of basic all-hazards
preparedness, that this approach that acknowledges that many
different risks can, in fact, have common impacts on people,
property, processes; and that these impacts, these common
impacts can be addressed by a set of core capabilities of an
organization to essentially prepare, respond, and recover from
crisis.
These core capabilities can be dramatically advanced by the
Private Sector Prepared Preparedness Program called for by
Title 9 Public Law 110-53.
The program essentially provides a set of common criteria,
a standard for private sector preparedness, yet in a flexible
framework. It provides a measurement or assessment approach to
assure that criteria are in fact in place, and ultimately it
provides the foundation or the opportunity to link compliance,
conforming with those criteria with bottom-line impacts. It is
that bottom-line impact that will assure on-going and recurring
investment by the private sector in preparedness.
Yet there are critical next steps that must be taken to
assure that this program is successful. In particular, the
Department of Homeland Security needs to, in relatively short
order, designate one or more core standards as soon as possible
to move the private sector preparedness certification program
forward. The Department has already discussed the program with
the private sector widely through a diversity of forums. Now is
the time to move forward with one or more standards required by
the legislation.
DHS should also continue to build upon and support the
efforts of the designated accrediting body, which has a long
history in certification and long interface with the private
sector itself.
Furthermore, DHS should fund and work with appropriate
stakeholders to support a mapping of industry-specific
practices, best practices, if you will, in each of the major
sectors using the common criteria of the Title 9 program as if
you will, the Rosetta Stone that will allow us, once and for
all, to begin to gather perspectives that may come from the
elements of the private sector, including the hospitality
industry, and including utilities, financial services programs,
and begin to share these across sectors.
Furthermore, DHS should support the development and
delivery of training to assist in implementing the criteria of
the private sector preparedness programs. It should also
support and fund the development and delivery of the
appropriate tools to enable the implementation, including risk
assessment methodologies online resources.
There are a diversity of resources out there and potential
training available from various professional associations and
nongovernmental sources. These should be capitalized upon and
funded by the Department in this regard.
DHS should also support and fund a first wave of company
certifications under the PS-Prep program. Participants should
include high-profile opinion-leading companies, optimally with
significant supply chains, and working with these suppliers,
including both large, medium and small businesses. This will
provide a proof of concept and an opportunity to test the
program out on a small basis, if you will, and an opportunity
to learn those lessons, to capture them, to inform a wider
effort down the road, including, again, the critical small
business community.
DHS should also fund and support what is perhaps the most
long-term seminal impacting project. That is a research project
that uses the measurements of the Title IX program to
ultimately decide what the difference is, what the impact is of
preparedness over time. There is no data currently on the
impact of programmatic preparedness because, to date, there has
been no effectively commonly accepted measure of what
preparedness is, and there has been no commonly accepted
approach to, in fact, confirm that those criteria are in place.
With the Title IX program, we have an opportunity to begin
perhaps what is the first long-term effort to define the
financial rationale that is the real value of investment and
preparedness. Congress needs to continue its efforts, its
active oversights of key program initiatives in this area, as
evidenced by this committee's activity. It also needs to fund
DHS to accomplish the various initiatives that I briefly
outlined.
Businesses need to look to the PS-Prep program as, at the
very least, an informal internal assessment of their own
activities, and over time, they need to look at it specifically
for applications in their supply chain with the focus on supply
chain resilience. They need to continue to actively partner
with Government in information-sharing and public-private
partnerships, and they need to consider being part of that
first wave of company certifications under the new Private
Sector Preparedness Program.
Finally, I would suggest that all parties need to look at
the opportunity inherent in this new infrastructure program
that is certainly being funded as part of the overall stimulus
effort but to revisit this opportunity to prepare and repair as
we move forward in substantiating and really rebuilding our
infrastructure. Adding resilience to what essentially would be
the considerations and the design stage for much of the
existing infrastructure that has been targeted for rebuilding
could pay tremendous dividends down the road, and a risk-
assessment should and can be a standard step in advancing
planning for all infrastructure projects, much the same as
environmental impact studies have become in many other
development efforts.
Our center stands ready to assist wherever appropriate and
collaborate with all key stakeholders in the achievement of
these critical initiatives. I thank you again for the
opportunity to present to the committee.
[The statement of Mr. Raisch follows:]
Prepared Statement of William G. Raisch
March 11, 2009
Chairwoman Jackson-Lee, Ranking Member Dent, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, it is my sincere honor to again provide
testimony to this committee.
I join you today as past private sector advisor to the Federal 9-11
Commission and currently as Director of InterCEP, the International
Center for Enterprise Preparedness at New York University. InterCEP is
the world's first research center dedicated to private sector
resilience.
In my capacity today, I am at best a channel for the many insights
that are shared with the Center from hundreds of businesses and other
organizations that participate in InterCEP forums and initiatives.
Our primary goal at InterCEP is simple. We work with key
stakeholders to identify, understand, and collaboratively solve real
problems in the area of emergency preparedness, security, operational
continuity, and risk management.
I will now outline what we see as the current challenge of private
sector preparedness (with a particular focus on the hospitality
industry), the opportunity provided by the new Private Sector
Preparedness Program (PS-Prep) and then address urgently needed actions
in this arena for both Government and business.
the challenge
Preparedness can be generally seen as an effort to develop
capabilities to prevent a hazard where possible (and feasible) and to
mitigate the impacts of a hazard should it nonetheless occur including
capabilities to respond and recover while maintaining continuity of
core operations.
The significant law enforcement expertise assembled by this
committee today can better comment on the specifics of appropriate
prevention strategies for a Mumbai-style attack in the United States.
Clearly such prevention strategies would likely involve effective
public-private coordination in terms of advance warning and
intelligence sharing, a heightened level of awareness among staff and
customers alike as well as a level of physical security generally only
applied to VIP appearances in our country.
I would like to focus my comments today on ``all hazards''
emergency preparedness which should be, but often is not, the general
foundation upon which specific strategies to address any new or
evolving threat is built. At the center of all hazards preparedness is
preparing for the often common impacts of emergencies with common core
capabilities. It involves developing capabilities for such activities
as on-going threat assessment and situation analysis, a clearly
understood incident management structure, effective warning and crisis
communications with employees and customers alike, basic resource
management and logistics necessary to access needed supplies, targeted
training and exercises as well as effective relationships and
communications capability with public safety organizations. All hazards
programs should be what we fall back on in the event of the unexpected.
Overall preparedness appears to vary greatly among businesses
generally and key drivers appear to include the size of firm,
experience with crisis, and presence of regulatory requirements.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ While there is still no consensus-based measurement of
preparedness for the private sector (pending the implementation of PS-
Prep), we can draw on personal observations, anecdotal information, and
what might be considered indicators of preparedness elements, such as
surveys of expenditures on security or the presence of certain plans or
programs. From these inputs, overall assertions can be made.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Larger firms or facilities (with more overall staff and
other resources) tend on the whole to be more prepared than
smaller firms.
Firms that have experienced a crisis or recurring threats
tend to be more prepared than those that have not.
(For example, the well-established threat of room theft in
hotels has resulted in the general addition of room safes
and restrictions in some cases of who can enter guest room
areas).
Firms that have regulatory requirements for overall
preparedness (e.g., utilities and financial services firms)
tend to be more prepared on a programmatic basis than those
that do not. Similarly, specific requirements for elements of
preparedness (such as fire and life safety) are clearly
prompted by regulation. Such codes play an important role in
the hospitality industry.
Availability of financial resources and expertise is always
a limiting factor. Unfortunately, security and preparedness
expenditures are generally considered by most firms to be
``overhead'' costs and these have been severely cut and likely
will continue to be further eroded should economic conditions
worsen.
In the hospitality industry this can be exacerbated by the
franchise system, whereby major hotel corporations may
manage properties but these are owned by their franchisees
who may have to approve operating budgets. While issues
such as life safety and food safety are considered must-do
regulatory requirements and are an accepted element of
budgets, security is often considered optional in nature.
Even among the most prepared firms, research suggests that
preparedness and security overall can be significantly
improved. But to maintain even the current levels of
preparedness will require sustained funding but the current
economic environment is resulting in significant across-the-
board cutbacks to the area of preparedness and security.
the need
In large part, it can be argued that the current situation is due
to a lack of a clear ``what'' to do, ``how'' to do it and a compelling
``why'' to do it. In line with our prior testimony to this committee,
several factors contribute to this situation primarily focused on these
three considerations:
What to do.--A set of clear criteria for what constitutes
effective preparedness and security is needed. The criteria for
what good preparedness is can be difficult to ascertain. There
are a diversity of strategies, technologies, and approaches to
preparedness and effective security. Most firms are not aware
of any standards in this regard.
The criteria must optimally be derived from the private
sector and based upon actual business experience to assure
that it is applicable in the business environment.
Current successful industry practices must be acknowledged
and built upon, not displaced. As with a number of other
industries, the hospitality industry has significant
history internationally as well as domestically in the
security and preparedness arena; this experience should be
at the core of any effort.
How to do it.--Implementation strategies including risk
assessment methodologies, training, and planning resources are
necessary to apply the general criteria to specific business
facilities/operations. ``How'' preparedness criteria (if
identified) should be applied to a particular operation may not
be clear. Size, geographic location, type of industry, current
intelligence, etc. all can inform the nature of preparedness
actions to be undertaken. Likely a small motel along an
interstate does not require the same approach as a large hotel
property next to an iconic building in a major city. How should
risks be identified and prioritized? What training is
necessary? What resources are available to support planning and
implementation?
A risk-based methodology that can identify and prioritize
risks and inform prevention, preparedness, response, and
recovery activities is vital.
Appropriate training and other tools necessary to develop
and implement preparedness programs on a company basis are
needed.
Public-private partnerships in information sharing and
intelligence with an emphasis on actionable information
must be sought.
Why to do it.--A compelling business case and the
development of new incentives for preparedness with linkage to
the common criteria is needed. The business case for
preparedness is not always evident. Preparedness requires
investment of time and resources. Businesses invest in efforts
that increase profitability. It is not apparent to most
businesses that an investment in preparedness will either
increase revenue or decrease expense. The probability of
hazards and their potential impacts on a business are difficult
to assess. The perception that ``it's not going to happen to
me'' is widespread. Thus, unless there are clear bottom-line
reasons or regulatory requirements for preparedness and
security, activity in this area tends to be minimal.
An approach is needed that does not rely solely on the
risk of terrorism as the primary motivator (which will
likely be discounted by many) but rather looks to the
common impacts of many different risks on an operation and
focuses on common strategies of preparedness, response, and
recovery which can be established at a relatively lower
cost than developing a number of individual risk-specific
programs.
A serious and on-going research effort must be developed
that not only documents current anecdotal impacts of
preparedness but also develops new approaches to more
comprehensively clarify the economic benefits of
preparedness to the corporation and wider society.
The active engagement of key stakeholders in the
development of new incentives must be promoted and
maintained.
an opportunity: the private sector preparedness program
The new Private Sector Preparedness Program (PS-Prep) championed by
this committee and reflected in Public Law 110-53 holds great promise
in addressing a number of these needs. It is as you know, currently
under development by DHS. Key elements of the program include the
following.
The program is to be based on existing business preparedness
standards by the private sector based upon its experiences over
time, not by Government.
The program will be risk-based. All of the standards in this
arena require as a starting point a risk assessment and thus
would suggest activity appropriate to the risks identified for
each operation and not a one-size-fits-all approach.
Core standards in the arena also incorporate cost-benefit
analysis as part of their processes. Thus, firms are encouraged
to prepare reasonably and to the extent allowed by available
resources based upon true business value.
The program is poised to be link preparedness over time with
potential benefits and incentives. InterCEP currently has five
Working Groups involving approximately two hundred individuals
providing input on linkage to potential incentives over time in
supply chain management, legal liability mitigation, rating
agency acknowledgement, more rationalized business reporting on
preparedness and insurance.
Nonetheless, the PS-Prep Program is only an element of a more
comprehensive strategy needed to secure our businesses in general and
the hospitality industry in particular. Additional elements are
included below.
critical next steps
There are several critical steps necessary to move forward
preparedness within the private sector as a whole including the
hospitality industry. Critical next steps must be taken by the
Department of Homeland Security, Congress, and businesses.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS):
DHS must designate one or more core standards as soon as
possible to move the PS-Prep certification program forward.
While promising, this program is far from complete and the
designation of standards is a necessary precursor to further
activity. The Department has discussed the program with the
private sector widely through a diversity of forums. It has
developed and vetted its target criteria for the choice of
standards and announced them publicly in the Federal Register.
It has held two highly interactive national meetings with the
private sector on the program. Now is the time to move forward
and designate the one or more standards required by the
legislation.
DHS must continue to support the efforts of the designated
accrediting body, ANAB, to assure that this program has a firm
base in the historically proven private sector voluntary
accreditation process. ANAB has administered accreditation
programs in such areas as quality management (ISO 9000) and
environmental management (ISO 14000) for decades. It has
established relationships with the business sector and a time-
validated approach to conformity assessment of businesses.
DHS must support an outreach to the critical infrastructure
sectors to engage them in the on-going development and
implementation of the PS-Prep Program. These sectors are vital
to a resilient society and they often have a well-developed
appreciation of the importance of resilience. This outreach
must:
Educate these sectors on the opportunity presented by
certification program.
Clarify the program as an opportunity to identify and
credit best practices already existent in each sector and
not an effort to supplant existing and effective practices
where they exist.
DHS must fund and work with appropriate stakeholders to
support the mapping of existing industry specific practices in
preparedness and security, especially those in the critical
infrastructure sectors. The common criteria of the new
certification program offer a unique opportunity to identify
and categorize good practice in these sectors.
Such a mapping could be used to assist in crediting these
practices in the PS-Prep Program, so that those industries
and companies with strong preparedness programs would be
appropriately recognized.
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, this mapping
could create an opportunity to cross-walk practices across
industries allowing for cross-pollination of approaches and
strategies. Such an effort could create a ``rosetta stone
of preparedness'' which could establish a more robust body
of good practices for all organizations. InterCEP is
actively looking to engage with key industries in this
regard.
Given the importance of the hospitality industry and its
history to date, this industry could be one of the initial
targets for collaboration on a mapping of existing
practices.
DHS should coordinate this effort but consider that the
outreach might best be undertaken in conjunction with non-
governmental parties to minimize potential concerns about
creeping regulation.
DHS must support and fund the development and delivery of
training to assist in implementing the common criteria of the
PS-Prep program. Key professional associations should be
considered for this effort including the American Society for
Industrial Security (ASIS), Disaster Recovery Institute
International (DRII), the National Fire Protection Association
(NFPA) and the Risk Insurance & Management Society (RIMS).
DHS must support and fund the development and delivery of
appropriate tools to enable implementation including risk
assessment methodologies and on-line resources. Risk assessment
tools such as RAMCAP Plus (developed by ASME-ITI) should be
considered. On-line resources such as the DHS Ready.gov site,
the Open for Business planning tool offered by the Institute
for Business & Home Safety (IBHS) and the Red Cross Ready
Program from the American Red Cross should be considered.
DHS must support and fund a first wave of company
certifications under the PS-Prep Program. Participants should
include high-profile, opinion-leading companies with
significant supply chains as well as their suppliers including
small businesses.
This will provide a proof of concept and an opportunity to
test the program out on a small scale before being rolled
out on a wider basis.
Lessons learned can be captured and used to inform the
wider effort, including lessons for both large and small
businesses.
Leading corporations can both become familiar with the
certification program (on a pilot basis) as well as provide
high-profile leadership.
By including corporations with significant supply chains,
these initial undertakings could set the foundation for
supply chain-focused resiliency initiatives underscore a
clear economic rationale for preparedness among small
businesses. Such efforts could involve larger corporations
working with a targeted group of their critical suppliers.
In various InterCEP forums, several leading corporations
have already indicated their interest in potentially
mentoring their key suppliers in preparedness.
This first wave initiative should be funded by DHS and
potentially utilize the DHS grant mechanism.
DHS must support and fund a long-term seminal research
project to begin to measure the economic value of preparedness
over time. This project could ultimately provide the most
compelling rationale for widespread investment by the private
sector in resilience. There is no data on the impact of
programmatic preparedness because prior to the inception of PS-
Prep there has been: (a) No commonly accepted definition of
what constitutes effective preparedness and (b) no method to
measure if these preparedness criteria were in place. Lacking
these fundamental elements (a definition and a measure), there
has been no ability to see if prepared companies fare better
after emergencies occur versus those companies that are not
prepared. This lack of data has kept preparedness as a common-
sense strategy but one that lacked any financial rationale that
informed the real value of investment in preparedness. Hence,
corporate efforts have tended to be notional and other actors
such as insurance and rating companies have failed to strongly
acknowledge and reward preparedness. They have lacked any real
actuarial data on this vital area. With the PS-Prep Program in
place, a long-term project can now be undertaken to identify
different outcomes over time based upon whether or not a firm
is ``prepared'' as indicated by its PS-Prep status. InterCEP
seeks to be instrumental in this undertaking.
Congress:
Congress must continue its active oversight of key programs
and initiatives. Congress' wide perspective on this arena is
critical to a comprehensive and sustainable strategy for
private sector and overall society resilience.
Congress must fund DHS and other stakeholders as appropriate
to enable the above initiatives including the accrediting body
required by the legislation, the mapping of existing industry
practices to the common criteria of the designated standards,
training and tools necessary to implement preparedness, the
first wave of company certifications under the PS-Prep Program
and the long-term research initiative.
Businesses:
Businesses must look to the PS-Prep program for voluntary
guidance and, as a first step, undertake an informal internal
assessment of their operations based on the criteria of the
program. Core to this will be an initial risk assessment to
inform what preparedness measures are appropriate. Further
application of the PS-Prep program should be considered if it
presents additional business value.
Additionally, businesses should evaluate the use of the PS-
Prep Program in assuring supply chain resilience, especially
for suppliers of mission critical services to core business
operations. Firms with high priority needs and regulatory
requirements for continuity such as the utility and financial
services industries should especially evaluate this opportunity
to assess the resilience of their critical suppliers.
Businesses must actively partner with government in
information sharing and other public-private partnerships.
Information gained from these partnerships can inform risk
assessment as well as other preparedness, response, and
recovery activities. Federal programs include DHS Sector
Coordinating Councils, DHS Information Sharing & Analysis
Centers (ISAC's), DHS Protective Security Coordinator Division,
FBI InfraGard, U.S. State Department Overseas Security Advisory
Council (OSAC). State and city programs such as Chicago First,
NYPD Shield, New York City Office of Emergency Management
CorpNet/PALMS and the wide diversity of others should be
considered. Private not-for-profit organizations such as
Business Executives for National Security (BENS) should also be
considered.
Businesses should consider participation in the first wave
of company certifications under the new Private Sector
Preparedness Program.
Businesses must promote and participate in an industry-by-
industry effort to map and recognize existing preparedness and
security practices utilizing the criteria of the PS-Prep
certification program as the organizing theme.
Finally, all parties must work to assure that resilience is
designed into our Nation's infrastructure projects from the beginning
(not added after a crisis). We must prepare as we repair and expand our
infrastructure. The private sector and Federal, State, and local
governments must take constructive action to assure this.
Our goal must be to create a more resilient Nation as well
as a better supported one.
Adding resilience considerations at the design stage can
generally be done at minimal costs. Yet, resilience can pay big
dividends in reducing the cost of future disruptions that are
inevitable due to both natural and man-made hazards.
Risk assessments should be a standard step in the advance
planning for all infrastructure projects. Such risk assessments
could lead to designing in appropriate mitigation and
prevention measures for identified hazards as well as measures
which could facilitate response and recovery in any crisis,
large or small.
Existing strategies should be utilized to advance resilience
including the both programmatic standards such as those under
the PS-Prep program as well as risk assessment tools such as
RAMCAP Plus.
Infrastructure projects should consider local, State,
regional, and Federal preparedness planning.
In addition to protecting our people, a more resilient
infrastructure will make for a more competitive America in the
global marketplace.
Our Center stands ready to assist wherever appropriate and
collaborate with all key stakeholders in the achievement of these
critical initiatives.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We thank all the witnesses for their
testimony, and we will begin questioning the witnesses.
I will yield myself 5 minutes. We thank them for their
testimony.
It would appear that, in the quietness of this room, we
have nothing to fear. The reason that is so, because in the, if
you will, in the emergence after 9/11, we began to wake up and
understand the issues of terrorism and protecting the homeland.
We are grateful to all the witnesses for recognizing their role
in that. So we have, in fact, warded off, stopped, if you will,
pressed back terrorist acts on our soil.
But I think that if we have not gotten a wake-up call over
the last series of years, noting the numbers of terrorist acts
that have occurred on trains, the ones that were attempted on
airplanes, the ones that have been attempted in settings like
hotels and sports events, then I think we are not getting the
wake-up call that we should.
Let me start with you, Mr. Raisch, because you made a very
interesting point. How long has Title IX been law?
Mr. Raisch. I believe it was August 3, 2007. That would
make it roughly, what, 1 year and 6 months roughly, 6 or 7
months.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Enough time, if we were unlucky to have a
number of terrorist acts, if that was what terrorists intended
to do in the United States, and we were not prepared. Is that
not right?
Mr. Raisch. Certainly.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So your point is a point that I think
should be made very clearly. In that Title IX, I understand it
was established a Voluntary Private Sector Preparedness
Accreditation and Certification Program. Why don't you restate
for us your point about the actions of the Department of
Homeland Security from 2007 in terms of moving forward on
reaching out to create, if you will, action on that voluntary
accreditation certification?
Mr. Raisch. To be fair to DHS, there have been significant
actions on their part. At the same time, and over the course of
that period of time, there has been outreach by the Department.
There has been diversity of meetings. Most recently, two public
forums were held in January and February of this year.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Where were they held?
Mr. Raisch. They were held in Washington, one at the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce and the second one at the American Red
Cross Headquarters here in the District of Columbia. There have
been, my understanding, though, some outreaches. We
participated in hosting a number of them whereby DHS has tried
to get the word out.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So what have been the obstacles of moving
forward almost a year and a half to be able to establish the
program?
Mr. Raisch. I think the remaining obstacle right now, quite
frankly, is simply designating a standard and/or standards. The
legislation itself calls for one or more standards to be
designated. That, quite frankly, with a year, 6, 7 months into
it, we are beginning to lose potentially some momentum in that
regard. I think DHS has made a concerted effort to outreach and
vet. I think that vetting has been done, and I think it is time
to move forward in that regard.
I think the private sector is ready to move forward. I
think there has been input from a diversity of associations.
There has been some very good work done by the Alfred P. Sloan
Foundation. We brought together four major entities,
professional entities in this case, and they have chimed in on
it. We have heard InterContinental really speak about their use
of the program, even in its infancy. As such, I think we are
ready to move forward.
I think this needs to be a step progression, though. I
think moving forward involves, first and foremost, designating
the one or more standards. But then let's move out and in a
logical progression, I think, the possibility of some pilot or
first-wave projects.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think we need to move out, if you would,
beyond the Beltway and establish some meetings on that issue as
well.
The point that I think I would like to make in that is we
recognize that there has been a new administration, changing of
leadership. But I intend to and hope my Ranking Member will
join me on encouraging, by way of letter, DHS to move forward
on the characterization of the standards.
I would like to ask Mr. Bonnell, just to follow up in the
line of questioning, would InterContinental seek to be
certified and accredited?
Mr. Bonnell. Yes, ma'am. We in fact have applied for a
Safety Act Compliance Certification. We are in the application
process now.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me move forward, Mr. Bonnell, and
since I am going down the line, and thank you very much for
representing a hotel family, is that not correct?
Mr. Bonnell. That is correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So you are separate and apart; you are a
member of the Hotel Association, but you actually represent
active hotels.
Mr. Bonnell. That is correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. In the course of the council that has been
set up, the commercial council, the DHS Commercial Facilities
Sector Coordinating Council, are hotels actually sitting on as
members?
Mr. Bonnell. We are on the Real Estate Roundtable
committee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Alright. That is an interesting name. Are
you sitting on the Commercial Facilities Sector Coordinating
Council?
Mr. Bonnell. No, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you have a representative on that
council?
Mr. Bonnell. My company does not directly. I think through
the American Hotel Lodging Association we do have participation
indirectly.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I don't know the semantics, but I am much
more comforted by the fact that you would be on the Commercial
Facilities Coordinating Council than I might be on real estate.
There must be something in that real estate name that someone
attributes to covering the issues that we are concerned about.
But let me just ask you the question. Is there too much money?
Can we say that there is ever too much money invested in
security?
Mr. Bonnell. No, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Particularly in commercial facilities.
Mr. Bonnell. Absolutely not.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Can we be partners in helping commercial
facilities be more security wise?
Let me indicate, as I said before, I stayed at the Taj, and
so I understand what the post-November 26, what the description
that we have heard of the commandos going through hallways. The
question is, how much invasion of privacy are hallway cameras,
for example, safe places, training staff on how to act? There
were some heroic actions by hotel staff, and let me commend the
hotel industry, saving, if you will, the clientele, those who
were in the hotel as actual customers, not only of the
restaurants but elsewhere, actually saving them, moving to
their own safe spots. What is too much? What do you want from
the Government in terms of assistance?
Mr. Bonnell. Well, I don't know how I can say what is too
much.
I would say, to address some of the points, cameras in
hallways are not intrusive. There is no expectation of privacy,
and in many of our hotels, we strongly recommend the use of
CCTV where appropriate.
In terms of training, you can't do enough. I will say this:
The Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. State Department
has been a tremendous source of information in developing
training programs. For us, half of all knowledge is knowing
where to find it. If I have questions about vendors, products,
procedures, methods, I can go to these sites, the Web sites.
Ms. Jackson Lee. This is DHS?
Mr. Bonnell. DHS, OSAC, and NYPD Shield. Tremendous sources
of information. As I said, our security, and our
counterterrorism programs are all intelligence-led. As hotels
are being built, as the luxury class, full-service hotels are
being built, we are now incorporating security design in the
engineering phase, and we are making a requirement, both
company-managed and franchise properties. So we are changing
the way we are building hotels.
Existing properties, we have to do the best we can. But
again, could we do more? Could we get more from the Government?
I would certainly welcome any support. Again, for us, it is
intelligence. As the Commissioner said, no two hotels are the
same. So it is hard to come up with a one-size-fits-all
solution to security. We talk about the hotels that sit on
waterfronts, that, similar to the Taj, unique set of threats,
as opposed to say a hotel located in Phoenix. It is, again,
when we go to addressing the issues of security, we have to
look at what is reasonable, what is foreseeable, what is
predictable.
Now as terrorist attacks against hotels have become more
sophisticated, it is apparent that there are certain things
that we should invest in. Again, talking about the performance
of security personnel, for instance, the case at Islamabad,
over 20 security officers were killed at the Marriott
Islamabad. You will find that in many of the attacks, the
security personnel are doing a good job, particularly those
that are properly trained to look out as part of a
counterterrorism program.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, we thank you for that explanation.
With that, let me yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania,
Mr. Dent, for his questioning.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Thank you all for being with us this afternoon. Media
reports coming out of Mumbai indicate that the LeT attackers
had conducted significant surveillance prior to carrying out
those attacks, so that they had an in-depth knowledge of the
layout of the targets, even better than that of the first
responders. This is a general question. You all feel free
respond this. Is the U.S. private sector in a position to
recognize pre-attack surveillance and report to Federal
authorities? Anybody want to take a shot at that?
Mr. Bonnell. If I may, that is part of our counterterrorism
program, when we train people to look out, to look at these
points where the terrorists are going to be conducting these
surveillance. We know from past attacks that they do counter
surveillance and they invest heavily in counter surveillance,
so we train our people to be on the lookout for it. In fact,
there is an initiative underway now where hotels, different
brands are sharing information, where we are watching each
others' hotels, essentially watching each others' backs in
areas where we have high concentrations of hotels that are
close to each other.
So your point is absolutely spot on with our approach to
counterterrorism is to train our line-level employees to be
looking out and looking for the obvious indicators of counter
surveillance. If you are being surveilled, if you look for it,
you will see it.
Mr. Dent. Anybody else want to make a comment?
Mr. Raisch. I guess I could chime in there. In prepping for
this discussion here, I had the opportunity to reach out to a
number of chief security officers in various hotel chains, and
my understanding is it is definitely evolving. I think I was
astounded by most of them I spoke to had at least one of their
staff, if not themselves, had been in short order out to India
and had done some post-event analysis out there. My
understanding is there is an outreach to a great extent to the
back to the house right now where they are trying to develop
essentially posters that would reinforce suspicious activity,
what cues would be in that regard. So I think it is evolving. I
think there is some good work being done across the industry.
The interesting thing about preparedness is that sometimes
an industry will collectively look at issues that otherwise
might appear to be competitive because they have realized that
if one attack occurs in the United States at a single hotel,
people won't differentiate what flag is on that hotel. They
will become increasingly cautious about all hotels. So I think
we have a foundation for collaborative effort without question.
Mr. Dent. Finally, I just want to make a comment. Do high-
priority targets in the U.S. private sector adequately train
and exercise with first responders or provide critical
information to first responders in the event of some kind of an
attack, in your view?
Mr. Bonnell.
Mr. Bonnell. Do we train with first responders? We do. More
so in some markets than in others. For instance, take Orlando,
because of the high concentration of high-end hotels, we work,
in fact, I know the regional coordinator for the Department of
Homeland Security there who makes available resources for
training. So I would say that does take place. For instance, in
New York, we have the Barclay and the Crown Plaza Times Square,
both security directors are retired NYPD police detectives,
work closely with the local authorities. New York is really
probably gone a step above as far as preparing for a crisis in
terms of being certain the first responders are trained, that
we know exactly where the ambulances and the fire trucks are
going to come and the people know exactly what their assigned
duty stations are. I would say in some markets more so than
others.
Mr. Raisch. If I could elaborate, I would also say this,
and I would hope Mr. Bonnell would concur with me. There is a
stratification in the industry. You have the major players in
major, you know, certainly the larger hotels in larger cities
tend to be the ones where there is more staff and arguably more
cash-flow to rationalize much of the investment. There is a
different level of staffing. There may be three people in a
roadside, an interstate-side size hotel, and consequently, your
capability to have a significant security presence there is
minimal.
But I think the core approach to preparedness that I think
I heard from Mr. Bonnell here was something that you can roll
out through large and small entities and at least have the
threshold level of preparedness and security even at the
relatively smaller entities.
Mr. Dent. Thank you.
At this time, I have no further questions.
I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you for your
testimony.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Dent, for your questions.
The Congresswoman from Nevada, Ms. Titus.
Ms. Titus. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
My last question yielded little more than a mouth full of
bureaucratese, but I am going to try again with this panel, so
I appreciate your indulgence.
I would just ask you, either in your family of hotels or in
your study of hotels, if you have looked at those that have
gaming. You know, there are special needs when you have gaming.
Your lobby is a casino. They are built in such a way that you
can't find the door. We want you to come in, but we don't
necessarily want you to leave. So that makes it difficult.
There are no clocks, there are no water fountains. It is a
different setting. So I wonder if any of the study that you
have been doing or any of the standards that you have been
setting take into account those special needs.
Second, I want to be sure that everybody has the
information and knows the best practices. I know the security
forces do. I know the executives do. But what about the
cocktail waitresses? What about the card dealers? What about
the ladies that make the beds? Is that information getting
down? Is it available to the public? Would they know where to
go, where to stand to be rescued like you used to know where to
go with a fire, if you had a fire, and what elevator not to
take?
Finally, I would just ask you if you were going to rate how
prepared the private sector is, especially in terms of hotels,
how are we today on a scale of 1 to 10?
Mr. Raisch. I will yield to my industry colleague here.
Mr. Bonnell. Well, let me say, having been at the 30th
floor of the Bellagio during an earthquake, I had an
opportunity to watch the hotel deal with the crisis, and it was
clear they were prepared. They knew what to do. Again, this was
a shelter-in-place situation, as opposed to an evacuation. What
is unique about Las Vegas is you have these hotels with 3,000
rooms, versus a hotel with maybe 300 rooms; generally better
staffed in terms of security, emergency medical personnel that
are actually on staff. So what I find in Las Vegas and in Reno
is a very high level of preparation for crisis.
Now, traditionally, the investment in security had been in
the casinos. As the super hotels came along, and they became
victim, fell victim to premise security liability litigation,
they found themselves in court, being sued for negligence, they
began to increase the level of operational security on the
hotel side.
Having been involved, through the American Society of
Industrial Security, with the Gaming Committee, I tend to think
the hotels that I have seen in Reno and Las Vegas are superior
in many respects because, again, I think they anticipate these
events occurring. That is from my own personal knowledge. I
haven't conducted a study. I am more familiar with hotels in
the range of say 350 to 750 rooms, business and leisure, so I
am not well versed in casino.
Again, I think you draw a unique set of threats associated
with casino more in terms of criminal behavior. Again, as I
said, when I saw the folks at the Bellagio and the MGM Grand
respond to the earthquake, I was very impressed with their
knowledge of directing people. In fact, they were actually at
the bottom of the elevator banks with robes because they knew
that people were going to come fleeing out of the rooms in
their night clothes. So I was very impressed with that.
The other question--how do we rate? The hospitality
industry is highly regulated. We have to deal with OSHA, ADA,
NFPA, the constant threat of litigation in the form of premise
security liability lawsuits. Our insurance carriers want to
make certain that we are managing our hotels in preparation for
these foreseeable risks. So I would say, compared to say,
retail, we are doing pretty good. I can't say, I don't want to
say that we are doing a lot better, but I think that because we
are held to a higher level of accountability than say our
colleagues in retail, we do a better job overall. But of
course, when people check into our hotels, they are trusting us
with their lives and their safety. And generally we have much
longer contact with them. So I would be reluctant to give us a
score. I would say C-plus, maybe a B-minus.
Mr. Raisch. It is my hope in 2 years hence that that
question of what level is security and preparedness at hotels
can be met by giving you a number as to how many have actually
been certified under the program. That is inherent really in
one of the goals of the program is to provide some measurement
and common criteria because, to date, what your concept of
preparedness is or mine or any one of the folks on the panel in
this room, none of them would exactly jive.
In this case, we have the opportunity to look at some
bubble-up standards that have come from the industry, not
arbitrarily chosen in the Beltway, and to begin to apply those
and evolve them. Each of these standards are not frozen in
time. They actually have committees that maintain them on an
on-going basis, so they will adjust over time to other threats
as they evolve, perhaps along the lines of the Mumbai attack.
So I think there is an opportunity inherent in the Title IX
program to begin to measure that.
As we often know in many cases, until you measure
something, it is very difficult to manage it. So my sense is
that that is a strong opportunity really for the Title IX
program.
The other observations we have made essentially is,
obviously, as I mentioned before, larger firms with more
facilities, larger, in this case, larger facilities with more
staff, distinct from larger firms, because we have in this
industry a stratification of everything from 30-, 40-, 50-, 60-
unit hotels to 500- or 1,000-unit hotels, each of them with
different staffing levels, each of them following different
pricing mechanisms.
One factor that I did, became apparent to me, is the
franchise system. We have the opportunity here to talk to, if
you will, one of the major flags, InterContinental. While they
manage the hotels, they don't necessarily own them, and their
operating budgets are oftentimes approved by the local owners.
Unfortunately, on the regulatory side, fire was mentioned
before, OSHA, and so forth, there is a given in every budget
for that number.
The security side is a little bit more iffy, and as such,
oftentimes, I think security professionals like at this table
have to, if you will, make an argument to the local operators,
sometimes successful, sometimes not successful in what level of
security that they are willing to buy into.
Ms. Titus. Madam Chairwoman, thank you.
I think that Las Vegas does do a good job and has some
things to offer, especially that they have developed. So I
hope, as you develop these standards and this certification
program, that Las Vegas can play a part in helping to flesh out
some of that.
Thank you, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Madam Congresswoman, we hope to certainly
involve your constituents who certainly have had their
experience with large volumes of customers and revelers, if you
will, and that is a question that we ask today, is to move
quickly on the standards being, if you will, being put in
place. So we thank you for that offer. I know that the
committee will take up both your advice and counsel.
I am going to seek to yield myself 5 minutes just to
conclude. I don't know if Mr. Dent cares for that at this time,
but I want to clear up some issues that are on the record.
Dr. Fair, you have mentioned radicalization and LeT. I want
to make sure you are not suggesting that the people of Pakistan
are comfortable with terrorist acts and are not making efforts.
I was in Pakistan as well, post the November 26 incidents, and
I know that, though it might not have been fast enough, they
have come to recognize that there were Pakistani nationals
participating. They have made a commitment to prosecute them,
hopefully swiftly. Of course, they have themselves been victims
of terrorist acts, including the issue dealing with the
Marriott at Islamabad.
So my question to you is, how can we be effective in
collaborating with our world partners when terrorism is
becoming both decentralized and radicalized?
Ms. Fair. Actually, I want to respectfully disagree with I
think some of the points that you just made. There is a
tendency to think of this broad swath of militant groups as all
being interchangeable. In my written testimony, I go to great
lengths to talk about how Lashkar-e-Taiba is very different.
Lashkar has never targeted the Pakistani state. Lashkar-e-Taiba
has never targeted an international target within Pakistan.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So what are you disagreeing with me on----
Ms. Fair. No, no----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Because all I said was that they were
becoming decentralized terrorist groups so that they are
decentralized from al Qaeda and radicalized. Those are just the
two points that I made.
Ms. Fair. The part in particular that I think is an
important question that really requires vigilance on the part
of Washington is actually the extent to which they are
undertaking efforts to wrap up Lashkar-e-Taiba. I personally--
--
Ms. Jackson Lee. Who is ``they''?
Ms. Fair. The Pakistani government. I was not--there is a
pattern that has been followed here as has been followed in the
past; that is, before the organization is officially
proscribed, the moneys in the bank accounts are moved, and the
organization reconstitutes under another name.
The leader of the organization has not been arrested. He
has been under house arrest. There have been a number of
individuals who have been detained. Their actual accounting,
the accounting of where they are is absolutely unclear. I was
actually not impressed that the Punjab government, the
provincial government, simply took over----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Is that the state government?
Ms. Fair. The state government. The state government took
over the assets of an organization that the government itself
had declared to be a terrorist organization.
What government takes over the operating of enterprises
associated with a terrorist organization as opposed to shutting
them down and arresting the leadership?
So I think there are a lot of questions, particularly about
Lashkar-e-Taiba.
Ms. Jackson Lee. How can we be more effective in
collaborating with countries that have sovereign governments
who represent that they are trying to fight terrorism and to be
effective?
Ms. Fair. Well, I think we have to be very forthright with
them, both publicly, if need be, but certainly privately. Over
the last 7 years the United States has really given Pakistan a
mixed message about the groups that we think it should shut
down.
For much of the global war on terrorism, we emphasized al
Qaeda. We were actually very episodic in our emphasis upon
groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. I am sure, as
you know from previous testimony on the Hill, we were even
ambivalent about Pakistan's efforts against the Talibans.
So I think the first thing that we need to do is resolve in
our own discourse that groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba are not
simply India's problem, but they are also our problem, and they
are also Pakistan's problem.
Second, we really need to focus much more intelligence
resources to really understand what the government is and, more
importantly, what it is not doing. We have a tendency to look
at these attacks through the optic of as if it just happened,
and we tend to forget that in fact this group has been
operating since 1986, and there is a pattern of state behavior
with that particular group.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think your point is well taken, but we
also need to distinguish what is state government and what is
federal government in the context of Pakistan. We also need to
be assured that we promote and encourage those efforts where
the government is trying to at least work on a plan or an
effort to fight terrorism.
I think the point is well taken. I think, in addition, we
would hope that there would be notice, as I think your
testimony said, that there were Indian facilitators. So working
regionally, with India, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, I hope would
be also an important point for us. But I thank you very much
for your testimony and those very vital points.
Mr. Bonnell, let me ask, you want to certify under the
SAFETY Act. But you would be willing to have InterContinental
Hotel certify under the voluntary certification under Title IX?
Mr. Bonnell. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you think it would be helpful for DHS
to reach out, beyond the meetings that they have already had,
to really get, as Congresswoman Titus has indicated, sort of
insight and instruction for hotels beyond the Beltway and be
out in the areas, resort areas, for example, we have a lot of
coastline in the United States, Las Vegas, for example, and
other intense areas, do you think that would be helpful in
terms of quickly moving and trying to establish some standards?
Mr. Bonnell. Yes, ma'am. I totally agree. I think that
there are many best practices out there that we could share,
work with DHS, consolidate this, and crystallize this
information, and get it back out to where it would do the most
good.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I do want to emphasize, since I was
physically on-site, using my somewhat non-, both nonscientific
and non-law-enforcement eye, the importance of internal
preparedness plans for hotels. Though you represent one chain
and one family, is there a standard, without the involvement of
the Federal Government, where you would assess that hotels have
their own individual plans? Are they wide enough to, for
example, capture what Dr. Fair has said in terms of
organizations that may be even beyond the borders of where we
have seen them act out their terrorist acts? Are U.S. hotels
with preparedness plans that could respond to a commando-type
incident?
Mr. Bonnell. Limiting the discussion to the category and
class of hotel that we have been discussing, again, like the
Taj, the Oberoi or an InterContinental Hotel, you will find
that there are plans. Is there a standard? Is there continuity
and consistency? I don't think so. I can speak only to my
brands. Now I work closely with my colleagues, with Starwood
and Marriott, and we share information. I would say, within
this small group of the major brands, we share best practices,
and you would find some degree of continuity and consistency.
But when you look at all of the hotels in this country, I am
afraid the answer would be no. I think, again, setting a
standard and providing and offering that standard up as a best
practice would be very useful.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank you very much.
Mr. Raisch, you have expressed the offering of your
center's assistance and also your assistance for what has to be
an important charge and challenge, and that is for the overall
preparedness under Title IX, but in particular, establishing
these standards. What is your sense of urgency on helping us
move in that direction?
Mr. Raisch. That is the designation, and let's make it
clear, too, that really we are talking about designating
existing standards that actually are bubbling up or have
already bubbled up for some time for the private sector. So DHS
need not create something in this regard. It in fact is charged
by the legislation to designate an existing standard. So that
is the opportunity that we have, not to attempt to build from
scratch but rather to designate something that already has,
again, come from the private sector. It is the next step that
really is critical to move forward.
Absent a standard, really, the measurement process, the
assessment process can't go forward absent one or more
standards maybe designated by the Department in this regard.
But that is the final element. Quite frankly, we are working on
the bottom-line side of the house.
We have five different working groups over 200
organizations actively involved in it; that is, looking, once
the standard itself has been defined, to look for benefits and
insurance, mitigating legal liability, and acknowledgment by
rating agencies and moving forward with really supply chain
management where, perhaps, the most economic rationale----
Ms. Jackson Lee. You are looking across the private sector
in its totality, not isolating hotels. You are looking across
the board.
Mr. Raisch. We have representatives from utilities, from
financial services, from the major retailers across the board,
and all of them are really participating. The goal in all this
is, by getting the private sector involved in it up front, we
are essentially building something that is business and value-
oriented as opposed to--we referenced the Beltway before--
building something in here and trying to make it work out
there.
Ms. Jackson Lee. If I had to ask the question on a scale of
1 to 10, with 10 being the highest, how would you rate the
preparedness of America's private sector?
Mr. Raisch. I would really hesitate to put a specific
number because, quite frankly, the private sector is not a
homogeneous entity. It is big, small, you know, large.
Certainly the smaller businesses are more concerned about
meeting payroll in the next 4 weeks than they are necessarily
of putting their preparedness program together. I will tell you
that those entities that have experienced some sort of crisis
or near-miss, have gotten religion, those folks tend to be more
prepared. We tend to see preparedness paralleling, at least on
the life-safety side of the house--we reference NFPA and fire
safety and life safety. There are elements of that because it
has been required.
The typical business continuity and the more general
elements of preparedness still are looking for something in the
way of a definition as to what good preparedness is and a
bottom-line rational to undertake it. That is why I think,
once, if we link those two, which I think Title IX has the
opportunity to do, not immediately but a little bit over time,
then I think we will have the business rationale to make this
go forward.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, we certainly have an obligation to
provide them that. But I imagine what you are saying is that
they have not reached 10 yet.
Mr. Raisch. There is no question in my mind they have not
reached 10. I would say, on the whole, we are far; that is a
long reach.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think you have given us our marching
orders.
Let me thank our witnesses, of course, for their very
instructive testimony.
Dr. Fair, Mr. Bonnell, Mr. Raisch, we appreciate the
insight.
This hearing started off as I opened to connect the issue
of the terrible tragedy in Mumbai with a wake-up call for
America. Obviously, in order to fulfill the purpose of this
hearing, we will be instructing and requesting certain
responses from DHS of recognizing that we have a committed new
administration ready to answer some of the questions that have
been somewhat delayed.
We also will be actively engaged in pushing for the
standard and certification process under Title IX. We welcome
your input, and as well, we will be looking for a combination
of working with intelligence committees, our foreign affairs
committees, and this committee on the issue of terrorist
groups, that Dr. Fair has mentioned and how do we be
instructive with our allies who themselves are looking for a
way out of the burden of terrorism. So let me, again, thank you
for contributing to that.
Peter King mentioned a quote or a statement from one of our
very famous newspapers that I tend to agree with all the time
and has indicated we shouldn't be talking about terrorism.
Well, we should be talking about terrorism and preparedness,
because both of those, coming together, meaning prepared to
fight terrorism and being prepared will help to save lives, and
that is what this committee is about.
I want to thank my Ranking Member, Mr. Dent, for his
service. At this time, we will provide you with just a few
instructive remarks and then the hearing will be adjourned.
The Chair wants to acknowledge that the witnesses have
given valuable testimony. We thank the Members for their
questions. The Members of the subcommittee may have additional
questions for the witnesses, and we ask that you respond to
them expeditiously in writing.
Hearing no further business, the subcommittee stands
adjourned, and we look forward to submitting our questions.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 5:23 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]