    [House Hearing, 111 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                        FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                           COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  MAY 20, 2009

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 111-30

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

          Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov

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                           COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

                     JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan, Chairman
    HOWARD L. BERMAN, California         LAMAR SMITH, Texas
    RICK BOUCHER, Virginia               F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr.,
    JERROLD NADLER, New York                 Wisconsin
    ROBERT C. ``BOBBY'' SCOTT, Virginia  HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
    MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina       ELTON GALLEGLY, California
    ZOE LOFGREN, California              BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia
    SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas            DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
    MAXINE WATERS, California            DARRELL E. ISSA, California
    WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts   J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
    ROBERT WEXLER, Florida               STEVE KING, Iowa
    STEVE COHEN, Tennessee               TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
    HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,      LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas
      Georgia                            JIM JORDAN, Ohio
    PEDRO PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico         TED POE, Texas
    MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois               JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah
    LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois          TOM ROONEY, Florida
    BRAD SHERMAN, California             GREGG HARPER, Mississippi
    TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
    CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas
    ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
    ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
    LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
    DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida
    DANIEL MAFFEI, New York

           Perry Apelbaum, Majority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
          Sean McLaughlin, Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                                  MAY 20, 2009

                                                                       Page

                               OPENING STATEMENTS

    The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress
      from the State of Michigan, and Chairman, Committee on the
      Judiciary......................................................     1
    The Honorable Lamar Smith, a Representative in Congress from the
      State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary.     2

                                   WITNESSES

    The Honorable Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of
      Investigation
      Oral Testimony.................................................     3
      Prepared Statement.............................................     7

                                    APPENDIX
                   Material Submitted for the Hearing Record

    Prepared Statement of the Honorable Jerrold Nadler, a
      Representative in Congress from the State of New York, and
      Member, Committee on the Judiciary.............................    65
    Prepared Statement of the Honorable Maxine Waters, a
      Representative in Congress from the State of California, and
      Member, Committee on the Judiciary.............................    66
    Post-Hearing Questions submitted to the Honorable Robert S.
      Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation........    67

                        FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, MAY 20, 2009

                              House of Representatives,
                                    Committee on the Judiciary,
                                                        Washington, DC.

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:22 a.m., in
    room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable John
    Conyers, Jr. (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Present: Representatives Conyers, Nadler, Scott, Watt,
    Lofgren, Jackson Lee, Waters, Delahunt, Wexler, Cohen, Johnson,
    Quigley, Sherman, Gonzalez, Schiff, Wasserman Schultz, Maffei,
    Smith, Sensenbrenner, Coble, Gallegly, Lungren, Issa, King,
    Franks, Gohmert, Jordan, Poe, Rooney, and Harper.
        Staff present: Robert Reed, Majority Oversight Counsel;
    Crystal Jezierski, Minority Oversight Counsel; and Renata
    Strause, Majority Staff Assistant.
        Mr. Conyers. Good morning. The Committee will come to
    order.
        And now we would like to turn to the business of the day.
        This is the regular oversight hearing on the Federal Bureau
    of Investigation.
        We welcome FBI Director Rob Mueller to today's hearing. The
    FBI is the anchor of the Nation's Federal law enforcement.
        The bureau has responsibilities, as we recall, to include
    the ability to combat crime, conduct surveillance, initiate
    investigations, and to effectively perform its responsibility
    requires an internal strength inside its own operations.
        And I would like to just point out that the recent
    inspector general's report regarding the FBI disciplinary
    system raised questions about the process within the bureau.
        We are hoping that FBI personnel who engaged in the
    improper use of exigent letters, once the IG's upcoming report
    is released, when we find out what actually happened, we will
    expect a proper follow-through.
        We want to ensure that the FBI has the resources to combat
    the problems that have arisen out of the global financial
    crisis that started in the United States with the subprime
    mortgage meltdown and we want to make sure that FBI has the
    resources to investigate questionable activity.
        We know that there was mismanagement, more than likely,
    fraud, white-collar crimes, perhaps even RICO issues, that have
    contributed to this very serious economic problem now facing
    the country.
        I will put the rest of my statement in the record, and turn
    to Lamar Smith, the Ranking Member of the Committee, from
    Texas.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the
    mission of the bureau changed dramatically from that of a
    traditional law enforcement agency to an agency tasked with
    investigating terrorism and national security threats.
        The bureau has undertaken significant efforts to conform to
    its new mission, to revise its investigative techniques,
    retrain its agents, and more effectively analyze and respond to
    intelligence information.
        America is safer today because the men and women of the
    bureau and other agencies work tirelessly to protect us.
        At the end of this year, the remaining temporary provisions
    of the USA PATRIOT Act are set to expire. These provisions,
    which include roving wiretap and FISA business records
    authority, are essential to the bureau's ability to prevent
    acts of terrorism and respond to other threats to our national
    security.
        To ensure that there is no lapse in these vital
    authorities, I have introduced legislation to extend the
    expiring provisions for 10 years.
        The threat to America from terrorists, spies and enemy
    nations will not sunset at the end of this year and neither
    should America's antiterrorism laws.
        Despite the bureau's efforts to keep America safe from
    terrorists, I am concerned that the new Administration's
    decision to close Guantanamo Bay may result in some of the most
    dangerous terrorists being transferred to the U.S. or released
    into America's communities.
        To me, bringing terrorists to the U.S. undermines the
    bureau's efforts to prevent another terrorist attack. No good
    purpose is served by allowing known terrorists, who trained at
    terrorist training camps, to come to the U.S. to live among us.
        Guantanamo Bay was never meant to be another Ellis Island.
    Terrorists were detained there for a reason--to keep American's
    safe.
        I understand that the bureau is part of the Gitmo detainee
    review process established by President Obama. I hope that the
    bureau will express its concerns to the Administration about
    the threat these terrorists pose to Americans here at home.
        While the bureau pursues its national security efforts, I
    know it will continue its law enforcement mission, including
    the investigation of widespread fraud associated with America's
    financial crisis.
        Many factors contributed to this collapse, including
    predatory lending by corrupt lenders, mortgage fraud, and even
    foreclosure fraud.
        Another important focus of the bureau is preventing crimes
    against children, particularly Internet-based crimes involving
    child pornography or child exploitation.
        Often, the only mechanism for identifying an operator or
    user of a child pornography Web site is their Internet photo-
    call address.
        Currently, a law enforcement officer can request subscriber
    information from an Internet service provider. However, ISPs
    regularly purge these records, making it difficult, if not
    impossible for law enforcement officials to apprehend the
    distributors and consumers of child pornography on the
    Internet.
        I have sponsored bipartisan legislation, the Internet
    Safety Act, to require ISPs to retain these records for up to 2
    years.
        I am interested in knowing what are Director Mueller's
    thoughts on the need for record retention to investigate child
    pornography and other Internet-based crimes, and I will be
    asking a question about that in a minute.
        Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank Director Mueller for joining
    us today and I look forward to hearing from him.
        I yield back the balance of my time.
        Mr. Conyers. Thank you.
        All other Members' statements will be included in the
    record at this point.
        We welcome, again, Robert Mueller, III, director of the FBI
    since September 4, 2001, from Princeton, Virginia Law School,
    the Marines, where he received combat medals, assistant United
    States attorney in San Francisco, in Boston and Washington, DC.
        He served with distinction in two law firms and called back
    from San Francisco to Washington in early 2001 to become acting
    deputy general, until he served--and is the director.
        We welcome you again to our humble Committee room. Your
    statement is in the record, and we urge you to make your
    comments as you would like us to hear them.
        Welcome, again. Good morning.

     TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, DIRECTOR,
                    FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

        Mr. Mueller. Thank you, Chairman Conyers, Ranking Member
    Smith, and other Members of the Committee.
        As, Chairman Conyers, you pointed out, and Congressman
    Smith, we in the FBI have undergone unprecedented
    transformation in recent years, from developing the
    intelligence capabilities necessary to address emerging
    terrorist and criminal threats to creating the administrative
    and technological structure necessary to meet our mission as a
    national security service.
        Today, the FBI is a stronger organization, combining better
    intelligence capabilities with a longstanding commitment to
    protect the American people from criminal threats. And we are
    also ever mindful that our mission is not just to safeguard
    American lives, but, also, to safeguard American liberties.
        Certainly, the threats currently present in the national
    security arena continue to be a grave concern. Terrorism
    remains our top priority and, as was illustrated by the Mumbai
    attacks, we cannot become complacent.
        Al Qaida, lesser known groups and homegrown terrorists will
    continue to pose a threat to the United States.
        And we in the FBI must also continue to guard our country's
    most sensitive secrets from hostile intelligence services and
    remember that our Nation's cyber infrastructure is vulnerable
    to compromise or disruption, be it from a terrorist, a spy or
    an international criminal enterprise.
        But these three are by no means our priorities. While
    Americans justifiably worry about terrorism, it is crime in
    their communities that often most directly impacts their daily
    lives.
        Public corruption continues to be a top criminal priority.
    The FBI has 2,500 pending public corruption investigations; in
    the last 2 years alone, has convicted more than 1,600 Federal,
    state and local officials. And we remain committed to ensuring
    that those given the public trust do not abuse it.
        As was pointed out, economic crime is, of course, a
    critical concern now more than ever. For example, the FBI's
    mortgage fraud caseload has nearly tripled in the past 3 years
    from over 800 to over 2,400 active investigations.
        The FBI currently has more than 580 pending corporate fraud
    investigations, including cases directly related to the current
    financial crisis.
        In response, we have been shifting personnel within the
    organization, to the extent possible. We have been using new
    analytical techniques to better identify trends and violators,
    and we have been building upon existing partnerships to further
    leverage expertise and resources.
        For example, we created the national mortgage fraud team at
    FBI headquarters to prioritize pending investigations, provide
    additional tools to identify the most egregious violators, and
    provide strategic information to evaluate where additional
    manpower is needed.
        We also have established 18 mortgage fraud task forces and
    50 working groups with other government agencies across the
    country so that we may more effectively focus on these problem
    areas.
        While the FBI is surging resources to mortgage fraud,
    public corruption investigations, our expectation is that
    economic crimes will continue to skyrocket.
        The unprecedented level of financial resources committed by
    the Federal Government to combat the economic downturn will
    lead to an inevitable increase in economic crime and public
    corruption cases.
        Historically, the bureau has handled emerging criminal
    threats by transferring personnel within its criminal branch to
    meet the new threat. Since September 11, we have lost some of
    this elasticity.
        In response to the September 11 attacks, the FBI
    permanently moved approximately 2,000 of its criminal agents to
    our national security branch. This transfer has substantially
    improved our counterterrorism program and we have no intention
    from retreating from preventing another terrorist attack on
    American soil as our number one priority.
        But the logical consequence of cannibalizing our criminal
    resources to augment our national security efforts is that we
    have reduced the ability to surge resources within our criminal
    branch.
        Although we have begun an effort to rebuild our criminal
    resources back to our pre-9/11 levels, we still have a
    substantial way to go.
        As always, the FBI will set priorities to attack the most
    severe threats, but a note of realism is in order in light of
    the scale of the FBI's existing mission after September 11 and
    the degree of strain on our current resources.
        Violent crime, let me discuss this for a moment, because
    it, quite obviously, is a very serious concern. And although
    data indicates violent crime continues to decline across the
    country, in general, the citizens of many communities,
    especially small to midsized cities, continue to be plagued by
    gang violence and gun crime.
        Since 2001, our gang cases have doubled and the spread of
    international gangs, such as MS-13, has increased. The FBI
    continues to combat this threat through more than 200 safe
    streets, gang violent crime and major theft task forces across
    the country.
        These task forces enable us to work effectively with state,
    local, tribal and international partners to provide an
    immediate response to surges in violent crime.
        And so, too, must we continue our work with state and local
    counterparts to combat crimes against children, the most
    vulnerable members of our communities.
        While the FBI is committed to combating child sexual
    exploitation, child pornography via the Internet, trafficking
    and child prostitution, or abuse on Federal lands or Indian
    country, more must be done.
        I thank the Committee for its support of increased
    resources to the bureau in this area and would be happy to
    continue working with you to ensure our Nation's children are
    protected.
        We are also deeply concerned about the high levels of
    violence along the southwest border. Gang activity, drug cartel
    competition for supremacy, murders and kidnappings plague the
    border in both the United States and Mexico.
        The impact of these crimes can even extend well beyond the
    border into America's communities. And we will continue our
    strong alliance with our Mexican and domestic law enforcement
    partners to address border-related crime, especially as it
    relates to public corruption, gangs, and intelligence analysis.
        Finally, we will continue our efforts to combat health care
    fraud, mindful of estimates that more than $60 billion of our
    Nation's health care spending each year is lost to fraud.
        In 2008, FBI investigations led to nearly 700 convictions
    of health care-related crime and we will continue partnerships
    with the national health care organizations and other Federal
    agencies to address these cases as we are able.
        I also want to spend just a moment to update you on key
    changes we have made within the FBI, both in our structure and
    in the way we do business to more effectively meet the
    challenges presented since September 11.
        We know that the FBI's best and strongest asset is our
    people. And so we have paid attention to recruiting, training,
    and maintaining a workforce with the skills necessary to meet
    the challenges of today's mission.
        Our hiring goals include agents, intelligence analysts, IT
    specialists, linguists, and professional staff. And this year,
    we have received more than 450,000 applications and have
    already extended 5,500 job offers.
        Finally, a few words regarding improvements in the FBI's
    technology. Sentinel, our Web-based case management system, is
    on time and on target. The bureau currently has more than
    30,000 workstations in the FBI unclassified network, providing
    desktop Internet connectivity to employees throughout the
    enterprise.
        BlackBerries with internet capability have been issued to
    24,000 of our employees, and we are strengthening other
    information technology programs to help us operate more
    efficiently.
        In closing, I would like to thank this Committee for your
    support to the men and the women of the FBI, and I look forward
    to working with the Committee on these and other challenges
    facing our country.
        Mr. Chairman, Representative Smith, Members of the
    Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today and
    look forward to answering your questions.
        Thank you, sir.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Mueller follows:]
           Prepared Statement of the Honorable Robert S. Mueller, III

                                   __________

        Mr. Conyers. Thanks for your opening statement.
        Could I ask Lamar Smith to begin the questioning today?
        Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And, Director Mueller, thank you for being here today.
        My first question is this. In general, what concerns do you
    have about releasing individuals suspected of terrorism into
    our communities? What dangers could they pose?
        Mr. Mueller. Well, I am quite aware of the discussions that
    are ongoing in the Department of Justice and elsewhere in the
    Administration as to what should be done with the detainees in
    Guantanamo.
        I can speak generally, without getting into those
    discussions, that the concerns we have about individuals who
    may support terrorism being in the United States run from
    concerns about providing financing to terrorists, radicalizing
    others with regard to violent extremism, the potential for
    individuals undertaking attacks in the United States.
        All of those are concerns relevant to an individual who
    comes into the United States, from whatever source, who may
    present a challenge.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you.
        Recently, you have said that you support reauthorization of
    the three expiring provisions of the PATRIOT Act.
        Do you foresee any need to make any changes in those three
    expiring provisions?
        Mr. Mueller. No. I previously, when questioned, testified
    that the three provisions, the first one, the business records
    provision, has been exceptionally useful for us over the period
    of time that it has been on the record books and we have used
    it over 230 times.
        The second provision that is sunsetting relates to roving
    wiretaps. We have used that over 140 times. It has been
    exceptionally useful and cut down on not only paper, but also
    enabled us to better facilitate our investigations.
        And, lastly, the Lone Wolf provision, while we have not
    used it with regard to an indictment, it continues to be
    available for that individual whom we lack evidence to put with
    a particular terrorist group, but does present a threat as an
    international terrorist.
        Each of those three provisions are important to us. And
    while I don't believe the Department of Justice has yet weighed
    in with its letter, this is what I have testified to in the
    past and is my current opinion.
        Mr. Smith. And you don't foresee the need to make any
    changes in any of those provisions.
        Mr. Mueller. Not at this juncture.
        Mr. Smith. Okay.
        Mr. Mueller. No, sir.
        Mr. Smith. Do you see the need to make any changes in the
    standards for issuing national security letters?
        Mr. Mueller. No, I do not. I know, in the past, I have had
    discussion with Congressman Nadler in terms of the standard for
    the issuance of national security letters and as I have said
    before and believe to this day, that national security letters
    enable us to obtain information on the fact of a call as
    opposed to the content of a call is absolutely essential in
    order to building the probable cause we need for a warrant from
    the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and we would be
    badly hampered if we did not have that tool available to us
    with the current standard.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you for that answer.
        The last question is this, and this goes to--and you
    covered it a little bit in your opening statement--the need to
    better prosecute and reduce the prevalence of Internet child
    pornography.
        I have introduced a bill, bipartisan bill, that requires
    the Internet service providers to retain their records for 2
    years to allow the law enforcement authorities to be able to go
    after the individuals who buy their trade.
        Would you support that 2-year retention of those records by
    the ISPs?
        Mr. Mueller. Well, I would be guided by, being in the
    Department of Justice, by the--guided by the position taken by
    the Attorney General and the Department of Justice.
        On the other hand, I can say that in any investigation,
    particularly when it comes to child pornography or even
    terrorism, where you may identify an individual who is
    utilizing the Internet either for child pornography or either
    recruiting or operating a terrorist network recruiting or
    operating over the Internet, it is not just that which you pick
    up on the first day of the investigation that is essential not
    only to the investigation, but successful prosecution, but
    those records, historical records that may be available that
    enable you to both further the investigation and undertake the
    prosecution.
        Mr. Smith. So longer record retention would be helpful.
        Mr. Mueller. Yes.
        Mr. Smith. Isn't the international standard 2 years for
    record retention or don't many countries use that 2-year
    period?
        Mr. Mueller. I haven't looked at it in a while, but I
    believe, the last time I looked at it, it was up to 2 years. I
    think the European Union has adopted a standard of up to 2
    years.
        Mr. Smith. Two years, okay. Thank you, Director Mueller.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Conyers. The Chairman of the Constitution Subcommittee,
    Jerry Nadler.
        Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Director.
        I heard your answer to Mr. Smith's question a moment ago
    about the Guantanamo detainees being released to the United
    States, but you were referring to terrorists released to be
    free in the United States, obviously, from the context of your
    question.
        My question is: assuming that people at Guantanamo are
    released into super-maximum security prisons in the United
    States, is there any problem holding them there?
        Mr. Mueller. Well, I hesitate to get into the specifics. It
    depends where the person is held, what kind of security
    procedures there are.
        Mr. Nadler. I didn't ask that. I said do we have the
    capacity to hold dangerous people in our maximum security
    prisons.
        Mr. Mueller. Yes.
        Mr. Nadler. Does their presence in our maximum security
    prisons present any danger to the United States?
        Mr. Mueller. Again, it depends on the circumstance. If it
    is a national security, if it is Florence or something, I think
    it would be very difficult for the person to get out and very
    difficult for the person to undertake any activity.
        However, I will caveat by saying that in gang activity
    around the country, using it as an analogy, there are
    individuals in our prisons today, as I think you and others are
    familiar, who operate their gangs from inside the walls of
    prison.
        So while there may not be the opportunity to escape, there
    may still be the risk, as we have seen----
        Mr. Nadler. We have a very----
        Mr. Mueller [continuing]. Operating.
        Mr. Nadler. We have a number of Al Qaida prisoners
    convicted and things like Ramzi Yousef and the sheikh, what is
    his name, from the 1990's, and planned to blow up the World
    Trade Center, planned to blow up the Holland Tunnel and so
    forth.
        We have those people in our prisons today, do we not?
        Mr. Mueller. Yes.
        Mr. Nadler. Have they presented any particular danger to
    us?
        Mr. Mueller. If you are talking about physical danger in
    terms of being able to escape and undertake an attack, no.
        Mr. Nadler. Thank you.
        Let me turn to the subject of national security letters.
    Two years ago, the IG for the Department of Justice issued her
    first report on the FBI's use of NSLs from 2003 to 2005. The IG
    made 11 recommendations for improvements.
        In the second report, last year, the IG found that a number
    of actions have not yet been taken to implement their
    recommendations.
        What is the current status of the FBI's implementation of
    the recommendations from the IG's March 2007 report? Have they
    all been fully implemented?
        Mr. Mueller. I would have to check on each one of those. I
    know we pursued every one of them. There may be one or two
    which we have a disagreement with, but I would have to get you
    the report card on each of those recommendations.
        Certainly, as soon as we have received those reports, we
    have started implementing those recommendations and, in many
    cases, to the extent that we have information about a procedure
    that needs to be upgraded or changed, we would make the changes
    in anticipation of the report and the recommendations.
        Mr. Nadler. Thank you.
        Now, as you know, there have been recent reports that--
    well, actually, these were responses to questions posed to the
    FBI by the--questions posed to the FBI General Counsel Caproni
    in response to her March 2007 appearance before this Committee.
        And in her answer, provided in January, she said, ``The
    FBI''--the questions were with respect to information collected
    by NSLs, but not relevant or being no longer relevant, whether
    those would be destroyed.
        And she writes as follows, ``The FBI has legitimate
    investigative reasons for retaining information properly
    collected during the course of an authorized investigation,
    even if the data pertains to individuals who are ultimately
    determined not relevant to that investigation.''
        The answer concludes, ``The FBI does not support a policy
    that requires the destruction of data merely because, upon
    initial analysis, the person to whom it relates appears
    irrelevant to national security concerns.''
        Is the FBI saying by this answer that all NSL-collected
    information is kept indefinitely, even when the subject is not
    relevant to an FBI law enforcement purpose?
        Mr. Mueller. I think you have to put it in the context of a
    records retention policy for all investigations, whether it be
    a grand jury subpoena, whether it be records retained as a
    result of an NSL, and the records retention policy gives us
    guidelines in terms of how long we maintain those records, even
    though records may be obtained in the course of an
    investigation which proved to be irrelevant to the solution.
        It can occur in a national security investigation, it could
    occur in a kidnapping investigation, a public corruption
    investigation in which we obtain, either by grand jury or
    administrative subpoena or testimony, records that only are
    determined to be irrelevant, but we keep that according to our
    records retention policy.
        Mr. Nadler. You keep that indefinitely?
        Mr. Mueller. You keep that, sir, and I think it is 20-25
    years.
        Mr. Nadler. So you keep for 20 or 25 years----
        Mr. Mueller. Twenty years, yes.
        Mr. Nadler. You keep for 20 years information about
    innocent people, private information that you have collected in
    the course of an investigation in which it turns out they had
    nothing to do with.
        Mr. Mueller. We may well undertake an--an allegation may
    come in as to the involvement of a person in a mortgage fraud
    scheme. We go and investigate, find that that person is
    innocent, the allegation is false, we keep those records, yes.
        We have a records retention policy, which we have had for
    the 100 years of our existence, that, in some sense, requires
    us to keep the records.
        I can tell you, from the perspective of the Freedom of
    Information Act, in terms of what we have to go through, there
    are substantial records that have been maintained according to
    our records retention policy, even though it may relate to
    persons who ultimately are not indicted, are not convicted of a
    crime for which they are being investigated.
        Mr. Nadler. Thank you.
        Mr. Conyers. We now turn to our first ex-attorney general
    from the State of California, Dan Lungren.
        Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Mueller, a number of years ago, I was in Los Angeles
    for a hearing that was, at that time, chaired by Jane Harman.
    It was a meeting of the Homeland Security Committee and it was
    specifically to investigate the issue of prison radicalization,
    at least with respect to California prisons, and we had
    testimony from people who had had experience in New York and I
    believe we may have had testimony from Federal officials.
        This was a concern with respect to hate groups, with
    respect to terrorist groups and so forth.
        Do you share that concern?
        Mr. Mueller. Yes. If I can broaden it somewhat, we
    recognize that there is a potential for radicalization in a
    number of ways, whether it be for gang activity, for terrorist
    groups, for other extremists.
        With regard specifically to terrorists, in the wake of
    September 11, we have now, I think, it is over 100 joint
    terrorism task forces around the country.
        Generally, we will have persons on the task force from
    certainly the Federal prison entities, but also may well have
    persons representing the institutions in a particular state, to
    keep our fingers on the potential for radicalization and
    prisons.
        Also, having been in San Francisco, I am familiar with
    Pelican Bay, for instance, and the concerns that one has in
    Pelican Bay, not only physically being within Pelican Bay, but
    also the operation of those outside of prison.
        Mr. Lungren. Well, that is our highest security prison and
    even there we have difficulty ensuring that those inside the
    prison don't direct actions outside the prison.
        Mr. Mueller. But on the Federal side, as well as the state
    and local side, there are intelligence efforts to assure that
    we pick up on individuals who may present threats.
        Mr. Lungren. Does the name Lynne Stewart mean anything to
    you?
        Mr. Mueller. Yes.
        Mr. Lungren. And Lynne Stewart is?
        Mr. Mueller. I believe she was involved with a radical
    group--I am having trouble----
        Mr. Lungren. Well, she was a defense attorney representing
    the blind sheikh.
        Mr. Mueller. Ah, yes, that is----
        Mr. Lungren. And I believe she has been convicted of
    Federal offenses relating to being a conveyor of information
    from the blind sheikh inside the prison setting to those
    outside.
        Does that refresh your recollection?
        Mr. Mueller. Yes.
        Mr. Lungren. You don't have to state an opinion on that,
    but to me, that gives reality to the concerns some have about
    increasing the number of terrorists that we have on our shores,
    whether they are in prison or out of prison.
        I want to give you a hypothetical. If, hypothetically, some
    who are currently in Guantanamo were to come here to an
    incarceration facility and then, in accordance with a Federal
    judge's decision that they be released, they would have to be
    released in this country, because the country of origin would
    not take them, under those circumstances, would the FBI view
    those individuals as suspected terrorists or people that you
    would have to keep an eye on while they are in the United
    States?
        Mr. Mueller. I am not certain it is a hypothetical, but in
    the sense that----
        Mr. Lungren. Well, I am, because I am not going to
    presuppose that a Federal judge would do something like that,
    because we know they have great respect for the executive
    branch. Under those circumstances.
        Mr. Mueller. I think, generally, to the extent that persons
    who have some background in either supporting, facilitating or
    training with terrorists, it would present a concern to which
    we would utilize--maximize our efforts to minimize and mitigate
    that concern, whether it be by surveillances or wires or other
    efforts to assure that we have minimized that concern.
        Mr. Lungren. I appreciate that, because I think the
    American people ought to understand that some people held at
    Guantanamo Bay are most likely not subject to criminal
    prosecution. We are not holding them for that purpose.
        We are holding them because they are combatants in the
    traditional definition of combatants and under the rules of
    war, you have the right to hold them until the cessation of
    hostilities.
        However, we have had some Federal judges who take a
    different position. Therefore, you could have the possibility
    of someone coming into the United States by access to the
    Federal courts, making the argument that they are not subject
    to criminal prosecution, a Federal judge saying you could not
    hold them indefinitely, and, therefore, allowing them out, and
    a foreign country not receiving them.
        And we have limitations as to how long we can keep someone
    like that incarcerated before they must go out in the public
    domain.
        And so while I gave you a hypothetical, I think people
    ought to realize that is a legitimate concern that we in
    Congress ought to deal with.
        And I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        And I thank you, Mr. Director, for your time and your
    service.
        Mr. Conyers. Thank you.
        The Chair of the Crime Subcommittee, Bobby Scott of
    Virginia.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you, Mr. Director, for being with us.
        You mentioned financial crimes, health care, specifically.
    There are other, of course, financial crimes, ID theft, the
    securities fraud. We have had a lot of Ponzi schemes revealed,
    organized retail theft, which are essentially financial crimes,
    and, of course, the mortgage fraud.
        We have testimony that there are only about 250 FBI agents
    with accounting backgrounds assigned to the mortgage fraud
    case, whereas approximately 1,000 were assigned to the savings
    and loan debacle a few years ago, which was only one-third the
    size.
        We just recently passed legislation that would give you
    resources to hire additional agents to address financial fraud.
        Can you provide us with your capacity needs in terms of
    accountants so that we can address these financial crimes?
        ID theft is going on now, to a large extent, because nobody
    thinks they are going to get caught. If you do the legwork, you
    can investigate and prosecute those cases, but, basically, they
    are just--the credit card company wipes it off, there is nobody
    complaining, and the people continue their fraudulent
    activities.
        Can you give us an idea of your capacity needs to address
    all of these areas of financial misdeeds?
        Mr. Mueller. Yes, I would be happy to do that. I will say
    that we have--you are accurate in terms of those on mortgage
    fraud, we have 260 agents. We have another 100-plus agents on
    corporate fraud and another 150 on securities fraud.
        But we did have, at the height of the savings and loan
    crisis, almost 1,000 agents addressing this.
        We would be happy to provide that material. There was, in
    the stimulus package that came from the Senate, a bill which
    would have accorded us an additional 165 special agents to
    address this, but did not last and is not part of the
    legislation.
        But we will be happy to provide you with a recitation of
    the needs that we feel we--or the numbers we would need in
    order to fully address the issue.
        Mr. Scott. We have legislation on the way to the President
    that would authorize additional funding. So hopefully we can
    address that.
        You are familiar with the Federal Prison Industries.
        Mr. Mueller. Yes.
        Mr. Scott. Do you view that as a positive program that
    helps reduce recidivism?
        Mr. Mueller. Yes.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you.
        Backlog and DNA kit. As you know, particularly in New York
    City, there are thousands of untested DNA samples, which means
    that cases are not being prosecuted and people aren't being
    caught.
        Can you give us an idea of what we need to provide you in
    terms of resources to eliminate the DNA backlog?
        Mr. Mueller. Let me address it to you and, also,
    Congressman Schiff, I know, has asked questions in the same
    area.
        If I recall correctly, last week, the question put by
    Congressman Schiff to the Attorney General related to the fact
    that we got additional moneys, $30 million.
        We had made an assertion that with that $30 million, we
    would have reduced our backlog from the convicted offender
    program by, I think, January 1 or December of this year.
        We got the $30 million, but we did not get our budget to
    March. And so the personnel that are reflected in that $30
    million, along with the technical equipment we need, we now
    have and my expectation in reducing the backlog on the
    convicted--putting samples into the convicted offender program
    will be June 1 of next year.
        It has been 6 months because of basically the budget delay.
    But we will have, I believe, by this time next year, by then,
    have additional persons, but, also, technological improvements,
    reduce that backlog.
        We do have a caseload backlog. Most of that caseload
    backlog relates to missing persons, and I would be happy to get
    you additional numbers on that backlog.
        When it comes to New York or Los Angeles or other cities
    where there is a backlog of rape kits, it generally is where
    the police departments utilize either private laboratories,
    state laboratories or municipal laboratories, and those--unless
    they are a Federal case, we generally do not handle them.
        Mr. Scott. I wanted to get in one more question before time
    goes out, and that is on the issue of torture.
        Can you tell us what participation there was by FBI agents
    in enhanced interrogation techniques that everybody in the
    world, other than a few people in the last Administration,
    viewed as torture, what participation there was by FBI agents?
        Mr. Mueller. We followed our protocol, which does not
    include coercion of any kind.
        Mr. Scott. And what does that mean in terms of your
    participation in what was going on?
        Mr. Mueller. We did not participate in the--except for
    maybe an isolated incident, relatively minor, one or two, we
    did not participate in the use of those techniques, enhanced
    interrogation techniques.
        Mr. Scott. Is that because you concluded that they were
    illegal?
        Mr. Mueller. I would not say that it was because it was
    illegal. I would say because we felt it was necessary to follow
    our own protocols. We believe that our protocols work and are
    effective and given the work that we do, our protocols were
    appropriate to the work we were asked to do.
        Mr. Conyers. The Chair recognizes Howard Coble of North
    Carolina, a senior Member of Judiciary.
        Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I had to
    go to a piracy hearing. I am sorry I am late getting here.
        Mr. Director, good to have you with us.
        Mr. Director, last week, the Attorney General testified
    before this Committee and I posed a question, as did a couple
    of my colleagues, regarding the organized retail crime problem.
        According to the North Carolina Retail Merchants
    Association, the FBI, in conjunction with several other law
    enforcement agencies, successfully apprehended and charged
    individuals involved in three alleged fencing operations in
    western North Carolina.
        I am told that future operations may be severely affected
    because of resources or lack of resources.
        Will the FBI continue to pursue these cases and are you
    able to comment on whether the U.S. attorney intends to
    prosecute the individuals in these three cases?
        Mr. Mueller. I am not in a position to say what the U.S.
    attorney would do.
        In terms of resources, we are--as I have indicated
    previously, we have to prioritize and the retail fraud is down
    on our list of priorities.
        We try to leverage our capabilities and work closely with
    state and local law enforcement. And so quite probably, if
    there is a need in a particular jurisdiction to address a
    particularized threat, then we would participate and help our
    state and local law enforcement authorities to address it.
        I am not familiar with those three cases, be happy to get
    back to you in terms of what happened in those cases and
    whether or not it is likely that we will be participating in
    additional such cases.
        Mr. Coble. If you could, I would appreciate that, because
    as you know, it is a problem that just plagues the retail
    community very severely.
        Mr. Director, I am told that the bureau currently operates
    18 regional task forces and 47 working groups to investigate
    mortgage fraud.
        Can you update the Judiciary Committee on all the bureau's
    efforts to combat mortgage fraud specifically, but other types
    of fraud, as well?
        Mr. Mueller. Well, as I believe I indicated either in my
    written remarks or my opening remarks or in response to other
    questions, we have over 2,400 mortgage fraud cases, we have 260
    agents that are addressing those; over 580 corporate fraud
    cases, of which over 40 of those relate to the subprime
    mortgage industry, with 113 agents; and, over 1,300 cases of
    securities fraud, with 158 agents.
        We have a total of almost 530 agents working in this field.
    Many of them are accountants. They are backed up by accounting
    technicians, intelligence analysts and professional staff.
        As you pointed out, we have a number of task forces. We
    have 18 and then another 47 working groups. We have requested
    additional resources in the budget submissions and our hope is
    to improve on that.
        I will say, over a period of time, we have been very
    successful in our investigations and prosecutions. What we have
    to do is prioritize and expedite those investigations and
    prosecutions to have the maximum deterrent effect.
        We prioritize them. We want to make certain that the most
    culpable are prosecuted swiftly and quickly and are serving
    time in jail.
        We have reached out to the--with the anticipation of
    additional frauds as a result of the TARP program and other
    programs, we have reached out to the inspector generals to put
    into place recordkeeping systems that will enable us to better
    investigate.
        I met with the new director of the securities commission,
    Mary Schapiro, this last week to coordinate better our works
    with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and my expectation
    is, working together, that we will continue our successful
    investigations and prosecutions. It is a question of resources.
        Mr. Coble. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Director, I assume that mortgage fraud is generally
    regarded as a Federal offense, is it not?
        Mr. Mueller. Yes.
        Mr. Coble. I thank you, sir. I thank you for your service
    and thank you for being with us.
        Mr. Mueller. I will say, though, that part of our approach
    in addressing this is it is not only a Federal offense, but
    often is a state and local offense, and we want to make certain
    that if, for some reason, we do not take on the Federal side,
    that state and local law enforcement work closely with us and
    take it on the state and local side.
        Mr. Coble. And I repeat, thank you for your service, for
    being here.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Conyers. Mel Watt is a senior Member of the Committee,
    Chairman of the Finance Subcommittee, and a past Chairman of
    the Congressional Black Caucus.
        Mr. Watt. Thank you, Mr. Mueller. Thank you for being here.
        I want to try to get to three different areas, if I can.
        First of all, we have had, as a very practical question
    that I will set up like this, we have had a major spike in my
    district offices of complaints about mail fraud and scams on
    seniors that essentially involve calls from out-of-state
    sources saying that they have won some lottery or ``pay me X
    number of dollars to go and find this big bucket of money for
    you.''
        And local law enforcement can't handle that, nor can state
    law enforcement handle it, because the calls are coming from
    out of state.
        I was on the phone recently with some gentleman in San
    Francisco professing to be a customs officer with the Federal
    Reserve is what he represented to me.
        As a member of the Financial Services Committee, I
    immediately contacted the Federal Reserve to find out whether
    this person existed. He didn't exist. He was representing, in
    fact, to my mother that she had won some big pot of money.
        My practical question is under those circumstances, what is
    the best way for me to get you all engaged when we have a
    specific complaint in our district offices?
        Mr. Mueller. It is your local FBI office. Just pass it on
    to the local FBI office. There is a complaints agent who is
    there during the day, will take the complaint and follow up.
        What you find is--what we find in these scams, and there
    are a number of them out there and it is not just a customs
    officer from the Federal Reserve, they use the FBI and they use
    me, amongst others.
        Mr. Watt. Right.
        Mr. Mueller. And what we try to do is accumulate them,
    identify the persons responsible, and then pursue them
    federally, if it all possible.
        Mr. Watt. Well, I have a name and a phone number for you,
    and I will get it to my local.
        But I am telling you that because of the allocation of
    resources that you just discussed with Representative Scott and
    Representative Coble, the reallocation of resources to
    terrorism, antiterrorism, which is important, a lot of these
    things just are not getting priority and they are on the
    increase.
        So I hope that you all are going to aggressively seek more
    agents to do domestic kinds of situations.
        I am not suggesting that we can fall back on our efforts to
    protect our citizens from the homeland security and terrorism
    concerns that are going on around the world or in the United
    States, for that matter, but these things are real to people
    every day, and, particularly, seniors are vulnerable to those
    kinds entreats.
        And if you don't pursue them, they just proliferate and get
    bigger and bigger, and some big case needs to put some of these
    people in jail so that there will be a deterrent effect.
        Let me go on to the second issue, which is--I wasn't going
    to ask about this, but Jerry Nadler asked you about record
    retention policies and it sounded to me like you are following
    a 100-year-old record retention policy that may or may not be
    justified.
        How aggressively have you, as the FBI director, looked at
    the rationale of this 100-year-old policy that you are
    following and evaluated whether it makes sense to keep records
    on people for 25 years who are not engaged in anything?
        That increases the demands that you have to meet under the
    Freedom of Information Act. If you don't have the files or you
    have gotten rid of them, no records there to be providing.
        How aggressively have you looked at this policy and
    reevaluated it?
        Mr. Mueller. I have not looked at it hard. I am not sure it
    is 100 years old. It is certainly many years old.
        Mr. Watt. Well, that is what you testified. That was your
    testimony. It wasn't my testimony.
        Mr. Mueller. I am walking back from maybe 100 years. It has
    been there, I believe, on the books for a long time and it may
    well be, and I would have to look at it, a combination of the
    rules for records retention that have been set by the
    government and archives, as well as our own internal rules.
        But I will go back and look at it, and we will get back to
    you on that particular issue.
        Mr. Watt. Thank you.
        I wanted to ask about some discrimination issues, but my
    time has expired.
        I want you all to take care of my mother, first of all. So
    I will talk to your local people about that.
        Mr. Mueller. Well, you can give us the number, if it is
    your mother.
        Mr. Watt. That is my number one constituent.
        Mr. Mueller. Go talk to the local person.
        Mr. Watt. I don't get but one of those. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Mr. Conyers. The Chair recognizes Darrell Issa, who is, in
    addition to Judiciary Committee, the number two man on the
    Government Reform Committee, as well as an active participant
    on the Intelligence Committee.
        Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You can revise and
    extend, if you would like.
        I think I will quite while I am ahead there.
        Director Mueller, I have got a couple of questions, some of
    which go to your predecessor, some are yours.
        But the FBI is present at Gitmo, correct?
        Mr. Mueller. Yes.
        Mr. Issa. And has been the entire time.
        Mr. Mueller. We have had agents rotating through, yes, for
    almost the entire time.
        Mr. Issa. And the FBI has presence virtually every place we
    have an embassy in the world, correct?
        Mr. Mueller. We have over 60 legal attache offices around
    the world.
        Mr. Issa. Okay. Well, maybe not virtually, but all the
    places I hate to go to.
        The Administration made a determination to do this enhanced
    interrogation technique or now is commonly one of--one of the
    techniques being waterboarding.
        When were you first made aware of it and when was the FBI
    first made aware of it overall?
        Mr. Mueller. I believe I first became aware of the use of
    enhanced interrogation techniques sometime in the summer of
    2002 with an agent who was involved in an interrogation
    overseas who indicated that additional techniques beyond what
    we traditionally do would be used.
        We determined that it was not appropriate for him to
    continue in the conduct of that particular interrogation.
        Mr. Issa. Was that agent, in 2002 or at the time that you
    became aware of it in 2002, was he present for that
    interrogation that included waterboarding or other enhanced
    interrogation?
        Mr. Mueller. And I do not believe that I became aware of
    waterboarding, as such, until several years later, and I don't
    believe--well, I don't--I can't say really what that agent
    knew, but certainly those were not the enhanced techniques that
    we, at that time, anticipated were going to be used and
    triggered the withdrawal of him from that particular
    interrogation.
        Mr. Issa. Okay. Earlier, you mentioned that once or twice.
    Was that one of the once or twice that your organization was
    involved in techniques that would qualify as enhanced
    interrogation?
        Mr. Mueller. No.
        Mr. Issa. What were the once or twice?
        Mr. Mueller. Can you excuse me just 1 second?
        Mr. Issa. Certainly.
        Mr. Mueller. The inspector general did a report and what I
    am trying to do is recall from the inspector general's report a
    couple of instances where he said that, I think, a prisoner's
    hands were handcuffed behind him and he was given water in a
    dribble.
        It was treatment that is not a treatment that we ordinarily
    would use, but it is certainly not in the category of the
    enhanced interrogation techniques that we have been talking
    about.
        I just wanted to be clear that the IG, in his report, had
    pointed out two instances where we could have done a better
    job.
        Mr. Issa. Okay. Has the FBI ever given people large amounts
    of water and then told them to wait to go to the bathroom, that
    it wasn't available right now?
        Mr. Mueller. Not to my knowledge.
        Mr. Issa. Left lights on deliberately to deny people sleep
    or rest?
        Mr. Mueller. I can't say for sure, but I have no knowledge
    of such treatment. That would go against our protocol.
        Mr. Issa. Okay. So each and every one of those techniques
    that has now become public for enhanced interrogation would be
    inconsistent with what the FBI would ever allow to be done.
        Mr. Mueller. Yes.
        Mr. Issa. The next one is a little more serious. The
    speaker of the House has alleged that the CIA outright lied to
    her.
        Is lying to Congress a crime?
        Mr. Mueller. Yes.
        Mr. Issa. Are you investigating that allegation by the
    speaker of the House?
        Mr. Mueller. No.
        Mr. Issa. Why not?
        Mr. Mueller. The process that is followed generally is that
    we have a referral--not we--the Justice Department obtains a
    referral from Congress.
        The Justice Department makes a determination as to whether
    or not the referral warrants further investigation, and then we
    are called upon to conduct that investigation.
        Mr. Issa. I am a Member of Congress. If CIA is lying to any
    of us, and I have been briefed many times by them on the
    Intelligence Committee, it puts me in a position of not being
    able to do my job properly.
        Would you say I have standing to ask you to investigate
    whether the CIA has lied to any or all of us?
        Mr. Mueller. I am not familiar with the intricacies of the
    referral process that has been established in such
    circumstances.
        I know that generally it is triggered by a referral from
    Congress to the Justice Department and then we do the--may well
    be--others can be asked, but generally we are asked to do the
    investigation.
        Mr. Issa. Well, then, with my remaining time, I would
    assert that I believe I should have standing, that I am in
    doubt as to whether or not, unresolved, I can believe in the
    briefings that I am receiving from the IT community, and would
    ask you to investigate it and ask you to respond as to whether
    you believe that my standing and my asking you to do it
    represents a proper referral or one that at least you can
    follow up on.
        Mr. Mueller. We will take what you have indicated, sir, and
    pass it to the Department of Justice and then follow the
    directives of the department.
        Mr. Issa. I will look forward to your response. Thank you.
        Mr. Mueller. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Conyers. The Chair of the Committee on Immigration,
    from California, Zoe Lofgren.
        Ms. Lofgren. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        It is good to see you, Director Mueller, and thank you for
    your testimony today.
        It is good news that you have continued your march forward
    with technology, but the march forward with technology also
    raises questions. And I wanted to briefly touch on the
    investigative data warehouse data mining issue that both the IG
    and the Electronic Frontier Foundation have recently discussed.
        It is my understanding that there are just shy of a billion
    individually identifiable pieces of information in the data
    warehouse, which, by way of comparison, I think the Library of
    Congress has about 138 million pieces in its collection.
        So it is a massive amount of data. And there may have been
    litigation on this. You can tell me if that is correct. But I
    believe that the FBI would be required to publish a systems of
    record notice and a privacy impact assessment related to this
    data warehouse, and that that has not been done.
        Can you tell me anything about the privacy notices and
    whether those are planned or if they haven't been planned, why
    not?
        Mr. Mueller. We try to be very careful, in terms of
    whenever we put a new system online or contemplate it, assuring
    that we go through all the steps with notification.
        If you are talking about the investigative data warehouse,
    it is----
        Ms. Lofgren. I am.
        Mr. Mueller [continuing]. It is a compendium of our case
    files, which has grown up since September 11 in a different
    format, a different--different servers, we have different
    software, and different type of relational databases. That
    enables us to search it better than the old VCS.
        I will have to check in terms of privacy notices on the
    data, investigative data warehouse. It has been online for a
    number of years, but it is our case file system.
        Ms. Lofgren. Well, doesn't it have 58 different sources of
    data, including----
        Mr. Mueller. It may well.
        Ms. Lofgren [continuing]. US-VISIT and a variety----
        Mr. Mueller. Well, I am not certain which dataset you are
    talking about. The investigative data warehouse, I am thinking
    one thing. It may be that you are thinking about the records
    that are obtained by the foreign terrorist tracking task force,
    which looks at individuals coming into the country and utilizes
    other private companies that already have data to locate
    persons within the United States, which is different than the
    investigative data warehouse, which is where we house most of
    our data.
        I would have to get back to you in response to those
    specific questions, to make sure I know which database you are
    talking about.
        Ms. Lofgren. Yes, it is the investigative data warehouse.
    And it is my understanding that it includes 58 sources,
    including SEVIS and US-VISIT and the no fly list, and a whole
    variety of other items.
        And if you want to get back to me, that is absolutely fair.
    But could I look to a particular time by which you will get
    back?
        Mr. Mueller. Two weeks.
        Ms. Lofgren. I would appreciate that very much.
        Let me move on to another subject, which is the whole--and
    you mentioned it briefly in your opening statement--the
    situation of concern at the border.
        Two years ago, I and a bipartisan group of Members went to
    Mexico City and we met with the Mexican attorney general and
    some of their law enforcement people, and they expressed
    extreme concern over what the United States was not doing in
    terms of the flow of guns from the United States to Mexico, as
    well as a less than aggressive effort, they felt, to track
    money laundering in the United States.
        I think that there has been recent attention, we are
    ramping up our efforts. But can you tell me--I don't want you
    to jeopardize an investigation--but how many ongoing
    investigations do we have now into both the gun running issue,
    as well as the drug money laundering issue?
        Mr. Mueller. Well, the guns flowing from North America to
    South America----
        Ms. Lofgren. Correct.
        Mr. Mueller [continuing]. From the United States into
    Mexico is generally in the purview of ATF. And as you say, they
    have ramped up. We are going to get additional ATF agents to do
    that.
        Ms. Lofgren. I thought there were joint task forces
    underway.
        Mr. Mueller. We do and we participate in task forces along
    the border and whenever there are guns involved, we bring in
    ATF, because they not only have the expertise, but the
    databases that we all use.
        We also, though, from our perspective, have increased
    personnel addressed to cross-border kidnappings, individuals in
    the United States who travel to Mexico, they may have family,
    they may have businesses down there, are kidnapped and the
    victims' families are in the United States. We have ramped it
    up in places like San Diego and El Paso.
        Ms. Lofgren. And Phoenix, I assume.
        Mr. Mueller. Pardon?
        Ms. Lofgren. Phoenix, as well?
        Mr. Mueller. And Phoenix, yes, but the phenomenon there is
    a little bit different than in San Diego and El Paso. Phoenix
    is--they have a very high rate of home invasions and the like
    and, yes, we work on task forces there.
        The other step that we have taken is to combine our
    intelligence capabilities along the border along with EPIC. So
    that our field offices, our legal attache office in Mexico has
    access to the information relating to border crime immediately
    as opposed to coming back through headquarters and is linked up
    with EPIC, the El Paso Intelligence Center, to give us a much
    more effective view of what is happening along the border.
        Ms. Lofgren. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Director.
        Mr. Conyers. The gentleman from Iowa, Steve King, Ranking
    Member on Immigration.
        Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate being
    recognized.
        And, Director, I appreciate your testimony and I think it
    reflects the long service to this country and the significant
    depth of knowledge that has been built upon that experience.
        And I would--based upon that, I would ask you if you are
    familiar with 18 USC 47, 1001, which reads, in part, ``Whoever,
    in any matter, knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or
    covers up, by any trick, scheme or device, a material fact,
    whoever makes any material false, fictitious or fraudulent
    statement or representation shall be imprisoned not more than 8
    years.'' That is in part.
        Do you at least have some basis of knowledge that would
    reflect that section of the----
        Mr. Mueller. I am familiar with 1001, yes.
        Mr. King. And I reiterate this, because would you--would
    you view that to be at last a statute that you would review if
    you were to respond affirmatively to Mr. Issa's request?
        Mr. Mueller. I believe the prosecutor is looking at this.
    Department of Justice attorneys would look at 1001, absolutely,
    as a possible statute to be applied.
        Mr. King. And with your long and deep experience, and we
    have, I think, about 15 members of the intelligence community,
    their sense of integrity in their office, when their integrity
    is challenged, can you tell us what happens to the morale if
    that should continue, if their integrity is challenged?
        Mr. Mueller. Well, I understand the import of the question
    and, generally, I will speak very generally, of course, in any
    institution in which there has been a challenge to the
    effectiveness, efficiency, integrity of the department, it does
    affect morale.
        Mr. King. And if someone challenges the integrity of your
    agency or any other, is it likely that there would be people
    within your agency that would volunteer to do a briefing to
    that person?
        Mr. Mueller. Well, all I know, part of my responsibility is
    to represent my agency fully and appropriately, I admit
    mistakes when the mistakes happen and move forward, and to also
    speak out when you think that your detractors are off base.
        Mr. King. And should there be a reluctance to provide that
    briefing to whichever individuals would have security
    clearance, could that potentially impact negatively on our
    national security due to that lack of information and perhaps
    lack of appropriations and perhaps policy changes that might
    flow from that relationship that could be interrupted or
    distrusted because of the allegations?
        Mr. Mueller. I am sorry, sir. I am not familiar with the
    predicate of the question in terms of briefing.
        Mr. King. I am seeking to ask the question hypothetically,
    and so it maybe sounds a little vague and I will try to keep it
    hypothetical, Director, for the benefit of everyone in this
    room.
        But when that relationship of trust is severed, then the
    working relationship would, I think, certainly be damaged. And
    are you concerned that it could affect our national security?
        Mr. Mueller. I can't answer that hypothetical, sir.
        Mr. King. I understand, Director, and I think that you do
    understand my question.
        Let me move--let me, first, join Mr. Issa in his request,
    if two are better than one. I would ask you to look into the
    basis that you have responded to Mr. Issa and I won't ask you
    to respond to that question again to me.
        But I would like to take this down to Gitmo and ask you
    instead, of the techniques that have been used to interrogate
    the Gitmo detainees, are you aware that there were any
    techniques used there that were more severe than we have used
    in training of our own special forces?
        Mr. Mueller. I don't think I have sufficient knowledge to
    answer the question, sir.
        Mr. King. Well, do you have any indication otherwise?
        Mr. Mueller. I don't have sufficient knowledge to answer
    the question.
        Mr. King. Do you have any indication that the PATRIOT Act
    has violated anyone's civil rights--been utilized to violate
    someone's civil rights?
        Mr. Mueller. I don't believe so, but I must also say that
    without--and put in context--that when it comes to NSLs, in
    particular, NSLs, they were issued improperly.
        Now, I don't want to parse words in terms of--but I don't
    want you to think that that is not a concern of ours, was not a
    concern of ours, and I do believe it was remedied, but that was
    a concern, because it does affect civil liberties, it does
    affect the privacy interests of individuals.
        Mr. King. Was there anything done at Gitmo that would be
    criminal if it was done in the United States?
        Mr. Mueller. I can't answer that question, sir.
        Mr. King. I thank you, Director.
        And I yield back the balance of my time.
        Ms. Lofgren. [Presiding.] The gentleman yields back.
        I would recognize now the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr.
    Delahunt.
        Mr. Delahunt. Yes, thank you.
        Welcome, Mr. Director.
        Recently, there has been considerable discussion about
    Guantanamo and a group of detainees that are Uighurs, Chinese
    Muslims. And there has been the use of the term ``terrorist''
    as it relates to these Uighurs.
        And I have a concern that that is an unfair label and some
    have indicated that that label came about as a result of
    communist Chinese intelligence, which, I would submit, is
    extremely suspect given the history of suppression by the
    Chinese Communist government as it relates to that particular
    minority.
        There was a report issued in May of 2008 by the Department
    of Justice inspector general, and I am going to read an excerpt
    to you and ask you to respond.
        ``Another FBI agent,'' and, again, I am reading from the IG
    report, ``Another FBI agent stated in his survey response that
    several Uighur detainees were subjected to sleep deprivation or
    disruption while being interrogated at Camp X-Ray by Chinese
    officials prior to April 2002.
        Chinese officials visited Guantanamo and were granted
    access to these detainees for interrogation purposes. The agent
    stated that he understood that the treatment of the Uighur
    detainees was either carried out by Chinese interrogators or
    was carried out by U.S. military personnel at the behest of the
    Chinese interrogators.''
        Are you familiar with the report of Mr. Fine and are you
    familiar with this report emanating from an FBI agent?
        Mr. Mueller. Now that you read the excerpt, Congressman, I
    think it was from the report that the inspector general did on
    the FBI's interrogation or interviewing techniques.
        And I would check one thing, if I might.
        Mr. Delahunt. Please.
        Mr. Mueller. It is a report, I believe, that was done on
    our interviewing/interrogation techniques. I am not familiar
    with the incident other than what is in the IG report.
        Mr. Delahunt. The IG report is, obviously, based on a
    report by an FBI special agent.
        Mr. Mueller. Apparently.
        Mr. Delahunt. And you would not contradict that report.
        Mr. Mueller. I have no knowledge of the incident, so I
    cannot contradict the report.
        Mr. Delahunt. Okay, but it is in the report and it is a
    statement by one of your agents that Chinese Communist
    intelligence agents were allowed to interview Guantanamo
    detainees. That is their statement according to the IG report,
    as you understand it.
        Mr. Mueller. In the IG report, the investigators for the IG
    must have talked to an agent and that is what they wrote down
    with regard to what the agent told them.
        Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Director, myself and several other
    Members of Congress would prefer to have some briefing done by
    the FBI regarding this particular issue, and I know I would
    like to have an opportunity to interview the FBI agent that
    actually wrote this report and would make that request to you,
    so that we can actually make a determination as to the status
    of the Uighur, because there was another report that was done
    by another FBI agent, and I want to read it into the record, if
    the Chair will indulge me for another minute.
        I am reading, again, reading from that report, ``The
    Uighurs are moderate Muslims who occupy east Turkistan, which
    was taken over by the Chinese. The Uighurs would often land in
    Afghanistan in order to gather personnel opposing Chinese
    suppression.
        They were often inspired by Radio Free Asia. The Uighurs
    considered themselves to be fighting for democracy and they
    idolized the United States. Although the Uighurs are Muslim,
    their agenda did not appear to include Islamic radicalism.
        They claim to have no political connection to Islamic
    terrorists or the Taliban. However, their camp in Afghanistan
    was bombed and they fled to Pakistan. The Uighurs were captured
    by the Pakistanis, with half being transferred to the U.S. and
    half being remanded directly to the Chinese.
        It was alleged that the Uighurs who were transferred
    directly to the Chinese were immediately executed. The Uighur
    detainees at Guantanamo were convinced that they would be
    immediately executed if they were returned to China.''
        And I would also note that it is a matter of public
    knowledge that they were captured not by American soldiers. In
    fact, they were apprehended by Pakistanis, who, in turn,
    received a $5,000 bounty for each of these Uighurs that were
    turned over to the Americans and, presumably, to the Red
    Chinese, who allegedly executed them upon their release.
        I suggest this is a very, very important issue, because
    questions are being raised, statements are being made, and I
    dare say we don't really know the truth yet.
        And I think before we find ourselves in an embarrassing
    situation, and I am, again, referring to Members of Congress,
    that we ought to have a thorough review, and I think the FBI,
    your credibility, and, again, I think the excellent record of
    the FBI in terms of Guantanamo ought to lead this investigation
    and provide information.
        Ms. Lofgren. The gentleman's time has expired.
        I would turn now to Mr. Franks.
        Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Madam Chair.
        And thank you, Director Mueller.
        I would say to you, sir, that the way you have comported
    yourself with the hearing this morning affirms the conclusion
    that many of us have held in the past that you have personified
    public service and your patriotism and your professionalism,
    and I appreciate you being here.
        Mr. Mueller. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Franks. Attorney General Holder was here before our
    Committee last week and, in my judgment, he seemed to have a
    difficult time articulating what a terrorist really is, and
    that concerns me, since he is the lead law enforcement official
    in the country, charged with protecting us from terrorists.
        And I was struck to find out that someone in the Obama
    administration, however, seems to have no difficulty in
    articulating what a terrorist is, and that is the director of
    Homeland Security, secretary of homeland security, Janet
    Napolitano, the former governor of my state.
        Ms. Napolitano was the subject of controversy after the
    Department of Homeland Security threat assessment report,
    entitled ``Right Wing Extremism,'' was made public in April of
    2009.
        Now, the report indicated several factors, including the
    election of the first mixed President in the person of Barack
    Obama, perceived further gun control measures, illegal
    immigration, the economic downturn beginning in 2008,
    disgruntled military veterans' possible vulnerability to
    recruitment efforts by extremist groups, as risk factors for
    right-wing extremism.
        Then it kind of went on to explain and define right-wing
    extremism in roughly general terms, like opposing restriction
    on firearms or opposing lax immigration, opposing the policies
    of the Obama administration the expansion of social programs,
    opposing continuation of free trade agreements, paranoia of
    foreign regimes, fear of communist regimes, fear of one-will
    governments, and bemoaning the decline of U.S. stature in the
    world.
        Now, Mr. Director, not to be tongue-in-cheek here too much,
    but that includes about 70 percent of my district and I am
    concerned, since this report was directed to law enforcement
    agencies, which I presume means the FBI, as well, I am
    concerned how the FBI might interpret this report.
        I mean, should my district be concerned at this point,
    being the subjects of concern on the part of the FBI as
    potential right-wing extremists?
        Mr. Mueller. I don't believe so at all. We open
    investigations where we have allegations that a person may be
    involved in violent extremist or illegal activity.
        That covers a number of various groups of individuals, but
    the predicate is illegal activity and, generally, it is violent
    extremism, and I don't believe the intent of the report was to
    paint with such a broad brush.
        But I do not believe that the question is should persons be
    concerned about our undertaking investigations against
    individuals who are exercising, rightfully so, their first
    amendment privilege or rights under the Constitution. I do not
    believe so.
        We take that exceptionally seriously. When it looks like
    one of our investigative actions will implicate the first
    amendment, we have a series of reviews that have to be done to
    assure that the actions taken are appropriate to the
    circumstances, and I believe that was the intent of the piece
    from the Department of Homeland Security.
        Certainly, it is our intent in each of our investigations
    to assure that we don't trespass on the first amendment right
    without the appropriate, adequate predication.
        Mr. Franks. Thank you, sir.
        Let me shift gears then. We had testimony before this
    Committee regarding our terrorist surveillance program that
    people within the United States boundaries don't really need to
    be fearful of surveillance.
        One of the parts of the testimony was that even if Osama
    Bin Laden was in a downtown hotel making calls, that we
    couldn't--and we knew it was him, but we couldn't monitor his
    calls without a warrant.
        And I think because he is here in--if he was here in the
    United States, I think that makes sense, to me. I think that
    comforts me a great deal.
        I guess my question to you, sir, is under the new
    Administration, has the practice or the policy related to
    terrorist surveillance changed to any appreciable degree and
    are you concerned that citizens either in the previous
    Administration or this Administration need to be concerned
    about their private phones being tapped here in this country?
        Mr. Mueller. No. As all are well aware, the FISA statute
    was amended a year or so ago and it answered a number of the
    issues we have, particularly with regard to the interception of
    conversations by individuals overseas talking to other persons
    overseas who are not American citizens. And it addressed, I
    believe, a difficult issue and resolved that.
        I have seen no change in terms of the approach to the FISA
    statute, any difference in this Administration than I saw in
    the past Administration.
        Mr. Franks. Well, thank you for your service, sir. Thank
    you very much.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Ms. Lofgren. The gentleman yields back.
        I would recognize Mr. Cohen at this time.
        Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Director, you have done, I think a marvelous job and you
    have a great reputation on the Hill, but your activities are so
    abundant, your areas of investigation, from counterterrorism,
    which you kept concentrating on, and counterintelligence to the
    traditional FBI days of criminal activities.
        Do you think that the FBI has grown so much that maybe it
    needs to have two different bureaus, one for homeland security
    and counterterrorism and counterintelligence and all these
    areas, our borders, and another for the criminal section?
        Mr. Mueller. For approximately 2 to 3 years now, we have
    had essentially a criminal branch and a national security
    branch. The national security branch is counterterrorism and
    counterintelligence, and the directorate of intelligence.
        In the criminal branch, we have the criminal division, we
    have the cyber division. And I am probably missing one or two,
    but there has been that development of two branches, we call
    branches, not the bureau, as you say, for the focus on national
    security, on the one side, and the criminal programs on the
    other side.
        Mr. Cohen. You don't believe that it would be beneficial
    possibly to have two different distinct offices. You think that
    them coming under one umbrella is the most efficient way to
    operate.
        Mr. Mueller. Absolutely, and, increasingly, in this
    globalized world, terrorism cuts across--money laundering cuts
    across cyber issues. Terrorists are funded through narcotics
    trafficking in Colombia and Afghanistan.
        Mr. Cohen. Let me ask you about narcotics trafficking, and
    I think I asked you about this last year.
        The war on drugs has gone on since, I think, President
    Nixon coined the term maybe and maybe since Harry Anslinger,
    and we haven't become more successful. I mean, if it goes back
    to Anslinger, it is like 80 years and we are zero and 79 and
    winning.
        Do you feel we are any closer to winning the war on drugs,
    based on all of the problems with Mexico and the cartels and
    the fights over our border and the drugs being imported from
    Mexico, than we were last year?
        Mr. Mueller. Well, whether you call it a war on drugs or
    some other term, I mean, I firmly believe that we need to do
    what we should to stem drug trafficking into the United States
    and drug usage in the United States, and I do believe there
    have been some successes, particularly when it comes to the use
    of drugs by children in high school or college and the like.
        There are others, ONDCP and others who are much more
    familiar with that than I am.
        Mr. Cohen. When you say some successes, do you have any
    statistics to show? Statistics actually say that more people
    are using, say, marijuana than have, because the public has a
    feeling about use of certain drugs that maybe the FBI doesn't.
        Is there a better way that some people suggest of looking
    into a system of legalization that might be effective in
    stemming the tide of drugs from Mexico and in the border wars
    and the immigration problems from Mexico? Have you considered
    this as a possibility?
        Mr. Mueller. I think anybody who looks at this problem
    considers it and, ultimately, when you look at it, rejects it.
        I tend to think that the use of particular drugs goes in
    waves. You will have marijuana for a period of time, then you
    will have heroin, then you will have cocaine, then you have
    crack cocaine, then you will have methamphetamine, and then you
    will have Oxycontin, and it goes in waves.
        And too many people----
        Mr. Cohen. Let me ask you about----
        Mr. Mueller. I am sorry. There are too many individuals,
    both parents and others, who have lost their lives to drugs, to
    give a ready answer that it should be legalized.
        Mr. Cohen. I agree with you, sir, and there are lots of
    parents who have lost their lives to crack cocaine,
    methamphetamine, heroin, and they have somewhat gone in waves.
        Name me a couple of parents who have lost their lives to
    marijuana.
        Mr. Mueller. Can't.
        Mr. Cohen. Exactly, you can't, because that hasn't
    happened. There hasn't been a wave, because that has been a
    constant thing in America since Harry Anslinger, because
    African-Americans used it and saw it as something that was
    crippling and gave it to the Latin Americans and put an ethnic
    tone to it.
        When have we--don't we--is there sometime we are going to
    see that we ought to prioritize meth, crack, cocaine and
    heroin, and deal with the drugs that the American culture is
    really being affected by and lives are being lost?
        Mr. Mueller. The only thing I would say is that you talk to
    parents who have lost their children to drugs----
        Mr. Cohen. Right.
        Mr. Mueller [continuing]. And they will inevitably say that
    they started off with marijuana.
        Mr. Cohen. The probably started off with milk and then went
    to beer, and then they went to bourbon, and then they might
    have gone to marijuana.
        The gateway theory doesn't work. It is a reality.
    Obviously, we are not going to agree there.
        Let me ask you about this. In Memphis, we have got a real
    serious problem with the rape crisis program. We used to have a
    national honored, awarded rape crisis program.
        It has come to light that as much as $500,000 which has
    been given to our local city of Memphis government for rape
    crisis reimbursements for kits and for examinations is not
    being reported in their budget.
        And I know the Federal Government pays for the treatment of
    the victims and the kits are provided through our state
    government, I think, through the Fed.
        What area in the FBI would look into the misuse of Federal
    funds, if there is misuse, in local governments and using
    moneys for rape victims and look into the use of our Federal
    funds and appropriating those to see if they have been used for
    the proper purposes?
        Mr. Mueller. I think, initially, it would be up to the
    state and local law enforcement, whether it be the police
    departments or district attorneys to look at it.
        But we also might be involved in terms of public
    corruption, fraud and the like, depending on the seriousness of
    the issue.
        Mr. Cohen. Madam Chair, if I could just close.
        Would you maybe look into it with your local office in
    Memphis to see if there has been an abuse of Federal funds? And
    if there is, that is a serious wrong in these days when we use
    money for----
        Ms. Lofgren. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Ms. Lofgren. Mr. Gohmert, the gentleman from Texas, is
    recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Gohmert. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        And, Director, it is good to see you again.
        Mr. Mueller. And you, sir.
        Mr. Gohmert. I am going to change gears from the milk to
    beer line of questioning.
        In the Ted Stevens case, is there any information that any
    FBI agents were aware of the withholding of exculpatory
    evidence that the judge got upset about?
        Mr. Mueller. I think it has been made public that there was
    one agent who brought to the attention of others actions which
    he was concerned of. But because the case is in litigation--not
    in litigation, but under investigation, let me just put it that
    way, in terms of what occurred in the course of that case,
    under investigation by, I believe, OPR and Department of
    Justice, I am really constrained from saying much more about
    it.
        Mr. Gohmert. Was it FBI agents who recorded conversations
    between Rick Renzi and his attorney that were apparently pretty
    clear they were attorney-client privileged conversations?
        Mr. Mueller. I think I would have to disagree with you in
    terms of the context of conversations, and, again, that case
    is----
        Mr. Gohmert. But they were between an attorney and a
    client, correct?
        Mr. Mueller. I am not certain what conversations you are
    talking about and because it is in litigation, I really am
    precluded from talking about.
        Mr. Gohmert. With regard to the widely reported wiretap of
    conversations between Jane Harman of this congressional body
    and two Israelis, was that based--were those wiretaps based on
    a warrant or were they based on warrantless wiretaps out of the
    PATRIOT Act?
        Mr. Mueller. I cannot speak to a particular case, but I can
    tell you that we do not intercept the content of conversations
    without a warrant from a Federal judge, whether it be from
    the----
        Mr. Gohmert. But we covered this now when we talked about
    the PATRIOT Act. And some of us were very defensive of the
    provision that would allow the wiretapping of suspected foreign
    terrorists who were calling from a foreign country, and that
    there would be times that, because they are being wiretapped in
    a foreign country, when they may call in to the United States,
    and the wiretap would pick up a conversation with someone in
    the United States.
        And testimony we have heard before indicated, though, that
    once it was realized it was someone in the United States and it
    was warrantless, based on the PATRIOT Act, then that would be
    minimized and no further wiretaps regarding that individual
    would be had within the United States without first getting a
    warrant.
        That is why I am asking the question. Could that have
    been--were the Israelis actually outside the country, which
    would authorize, under the PATRIOT Act, those warrantless
    wiretaps?
        Mr. Mueller. I can't get into the details of any national
    security investigations we----
        Mr. Gohmert. Well, somebody has gotten into them, because
    it is out in the public that Jane Harman was wiretapped. And
    that is why I am trying to figure out is this consistent with
    what we were told here in this Committee would be done with the
    PATRIOT Act or were these wiretaps within the country?
        Somebody is getting that information out. Otherwise, I
    wouldn't know about it, other than reading the paper.
        Mr. Mueller. All I can tell you is that interceptions by
    the FBI in the United States of individuals in the United
    States are conducted either under Title 3, in the case of a
    criminal matter, or under----
        Mr. Gohmert. But you don't know what happened in the case
    of Jane Harman, correct?
        Mr. Mueller. Pardon?
        Mr. Gohmert. You don't know what happened in the case of
    Jane Harman.
        Mr. Mueller. I am not going to say that. I am going to tell
    you I cannot talk to you about ongoing or past national
    security investigations.
        Mr. Gohmert. So you think Jane Harman is a suspect?
        Mr. Mueller. No, I am not saying that. I am telling you
    that I cannot discuss the details of the case.
        Mr. Gohmert. Well, since I was one of those who----
        Mr. Mueller. And let me just say that that does not assume
    there is a case. I am saying that I cannot discuss the matter
    which you are seeking to get answers.
        Mr. Gohmert. I was one of those who defended the provision
    that would allow warrantless wiretaps of foreign agents in
    foreign countries and who may inadvertently pick something up
    coming in this country. I want to make sure that that is not
    being violated.
        And I know you are concerned about past improprieties not
    being repeated and this was certainly before your watch, but in
    the vein of trying to prevent future illegal disclosures of FBI
    file contents, do you know how it was that 1,000 FBI files,
    approximately, came into the possession of the Clinton White
    House and what steps may have been done to prevent that
    illegality from happening again?
        I know Chuck Colson went to prison for having one in the
    White House. Do you know how that occurred?
        Mr. Mueller. I am not familiar with that.
        Mr. Gohmert. Does it concern you that 1,000 FBI files could
    make their way into the White House to be reviewed there?
        Mr. Mueller. Well, I can tell you that during the time I
    have been at the bureau, we, both between--well, the bureau,
    but, also, with the Department of Justice, assure that we
    follow the appropriate procedures for keeping the privacy of
    our files.
        Mr. Gohmert. Madam Chair, could I ask for a written
    response for one quick question?
        Ms. Lofgren. Certainly.
        Mr. Gohmert. Thank you.
        Director, there is information about 15 percent of
    terrorism cases, this is an IG report, the FBI failed to
    nominate subjects to a watch list. In 8 percent of closed
    terrorism cases, they failed to remove subjects from the watch
    list, and that the FBI removed a subject untimely from the
    watch list, 72 percent of the time it was untimely.
        Could you give us a report on what is being done to try to
    make that more effective?
        As somebody who has prior service members who still find
    themselves on the watch list inappropriately----
        Ms. Lofgren. I think that is a request for a written
    answer.
        Mr. Gohmert. Yes, that is correct.
        Mr. Mueller. Let me just respond. There were 16
    recommendations made in that IG report and we are pursuing each
    one of those recommendations, and many of them have already
    been put into place.
        Mr. Gohmert. Okay. If we could find that out, that would be
    great.
        Mr. Mueller. I would be happy to get back to you on that.
        Mr. Gohmert. Thank you, Director.
        Ms. Lofgren. The gentleman yields back.
        The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Quigley, is recognized for
    5 minutes.
        Mr. Quigley. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        I guess good afternoon now, Director.
        Sir, if you could respond to the reports that have been
    listed here, as well, about members of the FBI and ATF not
    always getting along, I guess is the best way to describe it,
    reportedly, at crime scenes where FBI and ATF agents threaten
    to arrest each other or a battle over jurisdiction and key
    evidence.
        Mr. Mueller. I think that was a problem, it was much more
    of a problem several years ago. I think we have done much to
    resolve those issues.
        There is overlapping jurisdiction in some areas, but I
    think we have done much to remove those barriers between the
    two agencies.
        When I travel around, one of the first questions I ask in
    an office is, ``How are you getting along with DEA? How are you
    getting along with ATF?'' The fact of the matter is 99 percent
    of the times in the field, the answer is, ``We get along
    fine.''
        There are some cases where we will have somebody who has a
    long memory about some slight from ATF or somebody in ATF has a
    long memory about some slight from the FBI, but I do think it
    is more personality driven in isolated instances as opposed to
    what I think, some years ago, was an institutional problem.
        That does not mean that there are not areas that we still
    are in the process of resolving in terms of explosives
    databases and the like, but I think we have made substantial
    headway.
        I will tell you that John Pistole, our deputy, spends a
    great deal of time with his counterparts at ATF to minimize
    such problems.
        Mr. Quigley. And I appreciate your candor. When it happens
    on a scene, such as I described, it is one thing. That lack of
    cooperation, if it dealt with national security type issues,
    would be all together another and far more important and
    dramatic, obviously.
        Earlier, you spoke about the cartels and the drug wars as
    relates to the Mexican border, and one of my colleagues
    discussed the issues of representatives from Mexico concerned
    how we were tracking weapons or how weapons are--most of the
    weapons that are being used in Mexico come from the United
    States.
        I guess I juxtaposition this with if these are assault
    weapons and we are concerned about tracking them, wouldn't it
    just be a whole lot easier if we renewed the ban on assault
    weapons as was done previously?
        Mr. Mueller. It might have some impact. One of the things
    that we talk about the percentage of weapons going to Mexico,
    large numbers come from the United States, but, also, the
    cartels, the Zetas and others, are not averse to buying
    elsewhere.
        And so I think you will also find a number of weapons,
    particularly military style weapons, that come into Mexico from
    countries other than the United States.
        That does not mean that we should not be doing better in
    terms of stopping the flow from the United States into Mexico,
    and several, I guess, discussed legislatively may have some
    impact on it.
        Mr. Quigley. Well, the manpower required, the difficulties
    required with tracking or trying to stop, you are judging how
    effective that is versus not selling assault weapons in the
    United States.
        Mr. Mueller. I can't give you an insight into that. I would
    refer to you my friends at ATF who may have better and more
    precise knowledge on those particular issues.
        Mr. Quigley. Well, I appreciate your candor and your
    service. Thank you.
        Mr. Mueller. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Quigley. I yield back.
        Ms. Lofgren. The gentleman yields back.
        I recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Poe, for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Poe. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for your patience.
        Thank you for being here.
        I want to follow up on the weapons in Mexico. Isn't it true
    that there have been at least 100,000 members of the military
    that deserted and most of them took their weapons, which many
    of them, if not all of them, are made in Belgium? The Mexican
    military. Are you familiar with that?
        Mr. Mueller. I am familiar with the fact that there have
    been--one of the issues that the military in Mexico faces is
    desertions. I am not familiar with the numbers.
        Mr. Poe. And regardless of where the weapons come from, and
    I take issue that most of them come from the United States, I
    think the statistics prove they come from all over the world.
        Would it seem to you that Mexico has the responsibility to
    protect their borders from illegal weapons coming in, just like
    we have the responsibility to keep drugs out of our country?
        Mr. Mueller. Yes, yes, yes, shares responsibility and both
    sides have a shared responsibility in ensuring that contraband
    does not flow either way.
        Mr. Poe. Going on to another issue. I appreciate the fact
    that you know what terrorism is. FBI has a definition of
    terrorism, does it not?
        Mr. Mueller. Yes.
        Mr. Poe. And without going into it today, I was somewhat
    disturbed that the Attorney General came in here and I asked
    him what he thought terrorism was and he could not give me an
    answer. So he is supposed to give us a written answer on that.
        But at least the FBI knows terrorism when they see it.
        Mr. Mueller. There is a statutory definition of terrorism.
        Mr. Poe. You all follow it.
        You have been to Guantanamo Bay prison.
        Mr. Mueller. Yes.
        Mr. Poe. How many times have you been there?
        Mr. Mueller. Once.
        Mr. Poe. I have been there two. And the information that
    Khalid Sheikh Mohammed provided the United States in now
    Justice Department secret memos that have been released to the
    whole world regarding a plot to blow up the Brooklyn Bridge, a
    plot to crash a plane into the tower in Los Angeles, ratting on
    a cell of 17, including Majid Khan, Hambali, Rusman ``Gun Gun''
    Gunawan, he is an interesting fellow, and Yazid Suffat, Jose
    Padilla, and Iman Farris.
        Did all that information turn out to be true, what he told
    us?
        Mr. Mueller. That is a very broad question, sir, and----
        Mr. Poe. I know, because you told us a lot of things.
        Mr. Mueller [continuing]. Individuals, I can't--I can't
    speak to pieces of information that were provided by those
    individuals.
        Mr. Poe. My question is did information that KSM gave the
    United States, did that information, any of it, turn out to be
    true?
        Mr. Mueller. Without looking at a particular piece of paper
    or whatever, yes, I believe so.
        Mr. Poe. Do you know of any place in the United States
    where people have offered to house Gitmo detainees in the
    United States? Do you know any state, local, Federal Government
    that wants those people?
        Mr. Mueller. I don't, but I would not necessarily be the
    person to know that, other than what is written--what is in the
    newspaper.
        Mr. Poe. Do you have a solution what to do with them all?
        Mr. Mueller. I don't. That is being discussed across the
    street and down the avenue.
        Mr. Poe. All right.
        Mr. Mueller. I think it is a very difficult--I mean, I will
    say I think everybody recognizes it is a very difficult issue
    and people are honestly wrestling with what the best resolution
    is, and it is a very difficult issue.
        Mr. Poe. And my last question. You said you went to Gitmo.
    When were you there?
        Mr. Mueller. Several years ago. I can't recall. I would
    have to get back to you on that, if it is important.
        Mr. Poe. It is all right. You don't have to get back with
    me on it.
        Thank you very much. Yield back.
        Ms. Lofgren. The gentleman yields back.
        We have been called for votes, but what I would like to do,
    if we can and if Members will be very concise, we have two more
    Members who would like to ask questions. If we can get through
    this, we can go vote and you can go off to do your work without
    waiting for us.
        So Ms. Jackson Lee is actually, since she was here earlier,
    is next, and she is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Director, thank you very much. And let
    me apologize for being in a markup in another Committee, but we
    had a chance to greet each other just a few--just a day or two
    ago.
        I am very interested in what progress has been made in the
    diversity of the workforce of the FBI. I think that is crucial.
        I also want to emphasize that I have great respect for your
    special agent in charge, agents in charge across America. And I
    think it is important for them to be made aware that
    collaborating with the community is okay.
        We realize that the resources are to be spent on
    investigation, but say, for example, there is a child abduction
    and the community is in an uproar or a predator on the loose.
    And, in fact, a few years ago, I called on the special agent in
    charge in Houston to help our police department find a
    predator, but calm a community.
        Now, the way they handled that was that they were able to
    use the FBI's lab. At that time, we were in a flux about DNA.
    But there is some skepticism and I would appreciate if some
    protocol would be established that it is okay for SACs to come
    to a meeting where a community is to explain what the FBI does.
    Certainly, that is not their main occupation.
        So I would like to just capture that in terms of how SACs
    work in the community.
        The other aspect is to comment on the work that the FBI is
    doing as it relates to civil rights investigations, what level
    or what percentage of work involves that, and I would include
    hate crimes in that.
        Then, lastly, I would be very interested--we have had
    challenges on the watch list, which, as you well know, is said
    to be held by the FBI. That is a complicated, difficult paper
    list, it appears.
        I am interested in how you create or do you create
    terrorist profiles and what kind of underlying data you use,
    but, more importantly, I want to know what progress have we
    made with updating that watch list?
        And I thank the gentleman very much.
        Mr. Mueller. Let me see if I can hit the first one in terms
    of diversity. I absolutely agree with you, the importance of
    diversity. All of our SACs are evaluated on the contributions
    made to diversity in their hiring, promotion, and we have made,
    I believe, good progress, but there is more progress to be
    made.
        I would be happy to get you the----
        Ms. Jackson Lee. I think that would help me, if you would.
    And I would like to work with you on outreach issues regarding
    that, please.
        Mr. Mueller. With regard to the civil rights cases, again,
    I think that would take some time. We have an initiative to
    look at older civil rights cases, and I would like to have you
    briefed on where we are in that particular initiative and the
    numbers we assign to that.
        In terms of having our SACs or the office respond to a
    child abduction or another immediate emergency where persons'
    lives are at danger, there is not a one that would not do it in
    a second. And every SAC is encouraged and evaluated on the
    outreach to the community.
        I cannot imagine, in Houston, for instance, that you would
    not have had the full support at your community meetings or
    otherwise from our personnel in Houston.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Now, it will be even better.
        Mr. Mueller. It will, but that is wherever we are. We have
    got 400 resident agencies, we have got 56 field offices. We
    know that responding to a child abduction is important to every
    one of us.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. And the terrorists?
        Mr. Mueller. The terrorist screening centers, I indicated
    before, the IG report that identifies deficiencies made 16
    recommendations. Many of those recommendations have already
    been pursued and the rest of them are being followed up on.
        We would be happy to tell you where we are and the progress
    we have made on that.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Madam Chair, I am going to yield back, but
    I am going to ask the director if we can have a more detailed
    discussion.
        I sit on the Homeland Security Committee, as well, and deal
    with the watch list as relates to airports, and I would like a
    very detailed briefing, if necessary, classified, on that issue
    dealing with the watch list.
        And I thank you. On the other issues, I will take a
    briefing on the diversity and, as well, cases involving civil
    rights and hate crimes.
        Mr. Mueller. A briefing on the terrorist screening center,
    I think it would be beneficial to have a joint briefing between
    ourselves and DHS.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Very good. I yield back.
        Ms. Lofgren. The gentlelady yields back.
        The gentleman from California, Mr. Schiff, is recognized
    for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Schiff. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        And thank you, Mr. Director, for the good work you do.
        I have three questions which I am going to just get out
    very quickly and see if you have time to respond. If not, maybe
    we could follow up later.
        But one brief commentary on some of my colleagues' points
    on the other side of the aisle vis-a-vis Gitmo. And that is, I
    assume my colleagues on the other side of the aisle support
    efforts the Administration is making to get some of our allies
    to agree to take some of these detainees and detain them.
        I don't know where my colleagues think they are going to be
    detained in these other countries or how we can make the case
    that Germany or France or England ought to take detainees and
    detain them if we are unwilling to detain any of them in our
    maximum security prisons.
        That is just an aside.
        My three questions are this. First, on the issue of crack
    cocaine, I know the Administration supports changing the
    enormous disparity between crack and powder cocaine in terms of
    sentencing.
        Do you, Mr. Director, favor a strict equivalence or are
    there some reasons that you feel that crack's nature lends
    itself to some continued disparity or do you think the
    disparity should be eliminated, both in terms mandatory
    minimums and in terms of quantities? That is the first
    question.
        The second question is on the DNA issue. If I understood
    you correctly earlier, you anticipate that there will be no
    backlog in the offender DNA as of June of next year.
        Mr. Mueller. Yes.
        Mr. Schiff. What additional resources do you need, if any,
    to make sure that there is no backlog in June of next year on
    case samples?
        And then, finally, if I could, and you may need to respond
    to this last question at a later date. When I was with the U.S.
    attorneys, I handled the Miller spy case involving an FBI
    agent, Richard Miller.
        So I am very interested in the counterespionage and
    penetration issues. I know the IG did a follow-up report to see
    how many of its earlier recommendations in terms of performance
    had been implemented, and there were, I think, a few very
    pivotal ones that had not yet been implemented in terms of
    preventing penetration.
        One was to create a unit within the bureau focused on
    internal penetration. A second was developing a computer need-
    to-know system, but now that we have gone from a virtual case
    file system to Sentinel, will the Sentinel have that kind of
    safeguard in it and then will that be ready by the end of the
    year?
        And then, finally, in the Hanson case, he was able to walk
    out of the FBI with classified documents without any
    difficulty.
        Have measures been taken to be able to detect that people
    are leaving the premises with classified information?
        But if you could address the first two questions and if you
    get time on the last, great; if not, I will follow up with you
    at a later date.
        Ms. Lofgren. There are 2 minutes left.
        Mr. Mueller. On crack cocaine, I have not wrestled with
    that issue. I would have to defer to Justice on that.
        On the second one with regard to the resources necessary to
    reduce the backlog or eliminate the backlog on the case work as
    opposed to the convicted offender program, I would have to get
    back to you on that.
        We are making progress each day, particularly with regard
    to technological fixes, but I would have to get back to you on
    the specific resources.
        In terms of the third issue relating to counterespionage,
    we did establish a unit that is focused on that, which was a
    recommendation of the IG.
        The Sentinel program has those precautions in it to assure
    that we track and monitor everybody who is using the system and
    put out alerts if it is being--if persons are trying to get
    into or get access where they are not allowed to go.
        And lastly, in terms of detecting persons who are exiting
    the building, we have put into place some measures, but it is
    very difficult to prevent a person who has a classified paper
    document or a thumb drive from exiting a building. It is near
    impossible.
        So while we have put into place some provisions, I can't
    tell you that we would be able to stop a person leaving the
    organization with a thumb drive or a classified document.
        Mr. Schiff. Mr. Director, thank you. You have managed to do
    that in 2 minutes, remarkable.
        Madam Chair, I yield back.
        Ms. Lofgren. The gentleman yields back.
        We have been joined by Mr. Johnson. We do have 2-1/2
    minutes before the vote is called.
        So we will ask Mr. Johnson to be as terse as possible, and
    we will conclude our hearing.
        Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        I feel abused and discriminated against, and we will talk
    about this later.
        Ms. Lofgren. Well, we will stay for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Johnson. All right. I don't think it is going to take
    that long.
        Director Mueller, thank you for your service to the Nation
    and thank you for coming out today.
        And I have three questions, all three of them just simply
    requiring a yes or no answer, and then I will allow you to
    follow up.
        The first question is: there is a well established link
    between the drug trade and weapons. Isn't that true?
        Mr. Mueller. Yes.
        Mr. Johnson. And, also, isn't it a fact that most of the
    guns that are in the hands of these drug cartels are basically
    American-made weaponry?
        Mr. Mueller. The figure that is thrown around is 90
    percent. I am not certain the basis of that and the accuracy of
    it, but that is what I have seen elsewhere.
        Mr. Johnson. If you heard--well, I won't even ask that
    question.
        Mr. Mueller. I have heard, yes. I mean, I will tell you, I
    have heard that, also, they have weapons, particularly weapons
    they cannot get in the United States, higher power, and
    explosives and the like elsewhere from the United States, from
    other governments in South and Central America.
        Mr. Johnson. Okay. And assault weapons, in particular, are
    the weapon of choice around the world for drug cartels, for
    street crimes, et cetera, et cetera. Correct?
        Mr. Mueller. I would have to say not necessarily. I know
    you want a no or a yes, but not necessarily. It depends on
    where you are in the United States.
        There are certain areas of the United States where assault
    weapons have become a weapon of choice, but there are other
    areas in the United States, most of the communities in the
    United States, where that is not the case.
        Certainly, around the world, you could make the case that
    assault weapons are the Kalashnikovs or AK-47s or the like are
    the weapons of choice.
        Mr. Johnson. Yes. Well, let me ask this question, then.
    Given those facts that you have just agreed to, with the
    exception of the last one, which is qualified, as I would say,
    can you tell us the justification for the continued failure to
    address the assault weapons ban in terms of the gun shows,
    where you can buy anything open and notoriously, without a
    background check, just any kind of weapon whatsoever?
        Can you respond to that?
        Mr. Mueller. I would have to defer to the Department of
    Justice on that. That is a policy issue that has--I have been
    through two Administrations and there are questions that are
    asked in each Administration and each time on this particular
    issue, I defer to the Department of Justice.
        It is a policy issue that the Attorney General generally
    opines on.
        Mr. Johnson. Yes, certainly, that would be appropriate.
        But I just wanted to know what--and I know that you carry
    out policies, but I do want to know. Have you discussed this
    issue with the Administration, with the President?
        Mr. Mueller. Not with the President nor do I think I have
    discussed it with the Attorney General. It has not been a topic
    of our discussions to date.
        Mr. Johnson. Do you think it should be?
        Mr. Mueller. It probably, at some point, will come up. I am
    not certain I can opine on whether it should or should not be.
        Mr. Johnson. Is there any justification for gun show
    loophole remaining like it is, in your mind?
        Mr. Mueller. Well, there are a number of explanations and
    policy arguments both for and against that.
        Mr. Johnson. Can you tell us, briefly, what those are?
        Mr. Mueller. It would be hard for me to resurrect them.
    Clearly, those who oppose the--clearly, on one side will be
    those that believe that the gun shows are a loophole that allow
    felons and others to obtain weapons that they ordinarily could
    not have access to.
        There are others who argue that, for the most part, you
    have antique weapons that are appropriately both kept and sold.
        Ms. Lofgren. The gentleman's 5 minutes has expired.
        Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Ms. Lofgren. We will adjourn this meeting, with thanks, Mr.
    Director, for your testimony and your service.
        Without objection, Members will have a minimum of 5
    legislative days to submit additional written questions to you,
    Mr. Director, which we will forward and ask that you answer
    promptly.
        Without objection, the record will remain open for 5
    legislative days for the submission of other material.
        This has been a very useful hearing, I think. We look
    forward to the additional material you have agreed to send to
    us.
        And this hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:23 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
                                A P P E N D I X

                                  ----------

                   Material Submitted for the Hearing Record

    Prepared Statement of the Honorable Jerrold Nadler, a Representative in
       Congress from the State of New York, and Member, Committee on the
                                   Judiciary
        Thank you, Chairman Conyers. And thank you, Director Mueller, for
    being here and providing your testimony.
        As you may recall, Director Mueller, I am very concerned about
    National Security Letters (NSLs) and the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation's (FBI) handling of its NSL authority. In the past I have
    talked about this at hearings with you and other FBI officials. I am
    going to keep talking about this issue until the relevant statutes get
    fixed--the privacy and constitutional rights of the American people are
    at stake.
        NSLs allow the FBI to gain almost limitless personal information
    about any American from third parties. These requests are done in
    secret and without court approval--there is no one to check the FBI.
    These requests for records or other information can go to a variety of
    third parties, including telephone companies, internet service
    providers, insurance companies, travel agencies, banks, car
    dealerships, and so on. And, since the PATRIOT Act, the requests have
    only to be ``relevant'' to a counter-terrorism or counter-intelligence
    investigation.
        Not surprisingly, with such a low standard, the number of NSL
    requests exploded. It rose from 8,500 in 2000 to an average of about
    50,000 per year between 2003 and 2006. It is difficult to say what
    benefits this has yielded, because outside of general statements and
    idiosyncratic data on their use, I have not seen any hard, empirical
    evidence that this explosion in requests has had any measurable impact
    on counter-terrorism or counter-intelligence.
        What I have seen is that between 2001 and 2008, outside of spikes
    in 2002 and 2004, the number of international terrorism prosecutions
    stayed relatively stable. And, the share of international terrorism
    cases referred by the FBI but rejected for prosecution by the
    Department of Justice (DOJ) rose from 33 percent in 2001 to 87 percent
    in 2006. More information and investigation is not leading to more
    prosecution.
        We also have recently seen evidence of numerous mistakes and abuses
    by the FBI in using its NSL authority. DOJ Inspector General (IG)
    reports in March 2007 and 2008 showed that FBI improperly collected or
    retained personal information. Responses to NSLs were also lost,
    putting our privacy and security at risk. Another IG report, showing
    how the FBI abused its authority by issuing so-called ``exigent
    letters,'' will hopefully be released shortly.
        Not only do NSLs affect the privacy rights of Americans, but they
    affect the First Amendment rights of third parties as well. Those who
    are recipients of NSLs are generally prevented from talking about them
    by the government. Under the statute as written, recipients have the
    burden of bringing court challenges of these orders, and government
    assertions that such disclosures would harm national security,
    diplomatic relations, certain investigations, and so on are treated as
    conclusive. Fortunately, last December, the Court of Appeals for the
    Second Circuit, in Doe v. Mukasey, struck down some of these ``gag
    order'' provisions as unconstitutional. It is time for Congress to fix
    the statute with respect to gag orders and the entire NSL scheme.
        Along with Reps. Delahunt, Flake, and Paul, I have re-introduced
    legislation, H.R. 1800, the National Security Letters Reform Act of
    2009, to address these issues. Among other improvements it would
    restore the pre-PATRIOT Act standard that there must be ``specific and
    articulable facts'' that the information requested pertains to a
    foreign power or agent thereof, provide NSL recipients a meaningful
    right to challenge the letter and the nondisclosure requirement, allow
    NSL targets to challenge their issuance, and require procedures so that
    information concerning persons no longer of interest is destroyed. I
    think this legislation is critical to restoring the balance between
    fighting terrorism and protecting our civil liberties and freedoms.
        I look forward to talking with you, Director Mueller, about NSLs
    and hearing your testimony on what I am sure will be a whole host of
    issues. Thanks again for being here.
        With that, I yield back the balance of my time.

    Prepared Statement of the Honorable Maxine Waters, a Representative in
      Congress from the State of California, and Member, Committee on the
                                   Judiciary
        Mr. Chairman, thank you for arranging today's oversight hearing for
    the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I'd also like to welcome Director
    Mueller back before the Committee today.
        I'd like to focus my time and questions today on three areas that I
    believe need more attention: crimes related to mortgage and financial
    fraud; problems of police misconduct; and the need to address
    persistent complaints of discrimination and double standards at the
    FBI. In the limited time I have today, let's see what information you
    can provide now and the remainder of my questions will be submitted to
    you in writing.

     Post-Hearing Questions submitted to the Honorable Robert S. Mueller,
                III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation*
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        *Note: At the time of the printing of this hearing, the Committee
    had not received a response to the post-hearing questions submitted to
    the this witness.