

FROM STRATEGY TO IMPLEMENTATION: THE FUTURE OF THE U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONSHIP

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TUESDAY, MAY 5, 2009

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:20 p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard L. Berman (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman BERMAN. The committee will come to order.

It is a real pleasure for me to welcome Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, to the committee this afternoon for his first appearance testifying before Congress in his new capacity, although he has been to this committee a number of times over the years. We know you have an extremely busy schedule, particularly with the second round of trilateral United States-Afghanistan-Pakistan meetings starting tomorrow. We appreciate your taking the time to be here.

Our second panel this afternoon will feature several noted regional experts, including Christine Fair from the RAND Corporation, Lisa Curtis from the Heritage Foundation, and Dan Markey from the Council on Foreign Relations.

I will yield myself time for an opening statement.

Ambassador Holbrooke, all of us are deeply concerned about the deteriorating security situation in Pakistan. As I noted in our recent hearing with Secretary Clinton, the United States has an enormous stake in the security and stability of that country. We can't allow al-Qaeda or any other terrorist group that threatens our national security to operate with impunity in the tribal regions of Pakistan. Nor can we permit the Pakistani state—and its nuclear arsenal—to be taken over by the Taliban. In short, it appears to many of us that Pakistan is at a tipping point and we need to do whatever we can to make sure it goes the right way.

We know you understand the gravity of the situation and commend you and your colleagues in the Obama administration for developing a comprehensive Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy. But now comes the hard part—translating that thoughtful strategy into real changes on the ground. How can the United States forge a true strategic partnership with Pakistan? What can we do to strengthen Pakistan's democratic government and to make it a force for stability in a volatile region?

To help achieve these goals, a bipartisan group of my colleagues and I recently introduced H.R. 1886, the Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement Act. This legislation would massively expand economic, social and democracy assistance to Pakistan and also provide a significant increase in military assistance.

Specifically, the bill provides funding to strengthen the capacity of Pakistan's democratic institutions, including its Parliament, judicial system and law enforcement agencies. It also calls for increased assistance for Pakistan's public education system, with an emphasis on access for women and girls. To demonstrate America's long-term commitment to the stability and democratic future of Pakistan, H.R. 1886 authorizes a permanent fund in the U.S. Treasury that will serve as a conduit for most nonmilitary assistance to Pakistan.

With regard to military assistance, our legislation increases funding for professional military education, with an emphasis on training in counterinsurgency and in civil-military relationships. It boosts the funding available for Pakistan to purchase military equipment and requires that 75 percent of those funds be used for items directly related to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism.

The legislation also codifies the 2006 contract between the United States and Pakistan that requires Pakistan to pay for F-16 fighter aircraft with its own national funds rather than American tax dollars. To strengthen civilian control of the military, H.R. 1886 mandates that all military assistance flow through Pakistan's elected civilian government.

Finally, and there has been much discussion and, I think, a great deal of misunderstanding, about the accountability provisions in this legislation. When I hear people talk about "rigid" or "inflexible" conditionality, I am not sure exactly what they are referring to.

Let me just read from the bill. Section 206 provides that no military assistance may be provided to Pakistan unless the President determines, and I am quoting,

"that the Government of Pakistan during the preceding fiscal year has demonstrated a sustained commitment to and made progress towards combating terrorist groups, including taking into account progress the Government of Pakistan has made with regard to: (A) ceasing support, including by any element within the Pakistani military or its intelligence agency, to extremist and terrorist groups, particularly to any group that has conducted attacks against the United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan, including Afghanistan National Security Forces, or against the territory of India or the people of India; (B) closing terrorist camps in the FATA, dismantling terrorist bases in other parts of the country, including Quetta and Muridke, and taking action when provided with intelligence about high-level terrorist targets; (C) preventing cross-border attacks into neighboring countries, and (D) strengthening money-laundering and anti-terrorism laws."

These are just factors in the consideration the President would give.

Ambassador Holbrooke, we are simply asking that the Pakistanis keep the commitments they have already made to fight the terrorists who threaten our national security and theirs, and that they make some progress doing so—with progress defined very broadly.

If the President is unable to make that determination—or a second one relating to cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation—then he can always take advantage of the waiver we provide. Which of these conditions are unreasonable or unattainable? And if they are, then what does that tell us about our relationship with Pakistan?

We hear that the administration will soon propose its own set of benchmarks for Pakistan. We look forward to working with you on accountability measures as H.R. 1886 moves through the legislative process, and we remain very open to hearing other formulations of the kind of accountability that I think all of us want.

Ambassador Holbrooke, we look forward to hearing your assessment of the situation in Pakistan, your recommendations for implementing the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy, and your thoughts on the legislation we recently introduced.

I now turn to my good friend, the ranking member Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, for any statement she may want to make.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much as always, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Ambassador and the other panelists who will be with us today.

I will focus my remarks on the outcome of the recent review and its implications for policy going forward. We are united in our goals. We want a long-term partnership with a modern, prosperous and democratic Pakistan that is at peace with itself and with its neighbors, a Pakistan that maintains robust controls over its nuclear weapons technology and a Pakistan that does not provide safe havens to al-Qaeda, Taliban, other Islamic militant extremists.

While command and control of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is presumably a top concern to Islamabad, recent Taliban advances underscore the critical importance of ensuring security for its nuclear materials and technology. As Secretary Clinton testified recently, nuclear weapons have been disbursed throughout Pakistan, increasing the risk that they may find their way to al-Qaeda, to the Taliban and other Islamic extremists. We must redouble our efforts on Pakistan's technical and human security capacity so as to ensure that there is a robust safeguards mechanism in place for its nuclear weapons program and facilities. The stakes are simply too high to ignore.

The administration has endorsed Senate proposals to increase nonmilitary assistance to Pakistan to \$1.5 billion over the next 5 years. When combined with existing or contemplated assistance programs, total United States aid to Pakistan, including reimbursement to the Pakistani military by the Department of Defense, would total at least \$3.5 billion per fiscal year or about \$17.5 billion total over the next 5 years. Operationally how are we going to effectively put such funds to use?

The American Embassy in Islamabad is under a virtual lockdown because of security concerns. We have withdrawn critical staff from our key consular outpost along the Pakistani frontier, and because of the difficult security environment, our Foreign Service officers generally only serve 1-year tours in Pakistan. This means that they

will have barely begun to understand their brief before they are rotated out and we lose critical institutional memory.

The administration proposes to remedy this difficulty in part with an \$800 million request in the supplemental appropriations bill for embassy security construction and maintenance for Pakistan. Completion of these projects however will in some cases take several months and in others many years. While issues of U.S. diplomatic capacity get sorted out, the administration has suggested that it may allocate much of the proposed increase in nonmilitary aid primarily toward budget support. Any proposed U.S. budget support would be in addition to at least \$14 billion committed by the international financial institutions through the year 2013.

Some would contend that enhanced trade with Pakistan may be far more economically meaningful than expanded aid. There are legislative efforts, we are told that the administration supports, that would create reconstruction opportunity zones in Afghanistan and in the border areas of Pakistan. Unfortunately, about a third of Pakistan's annual exports to the United States would be excluded from the definition of eligible products.

There is limited industrial activity on the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan obviously. The Pakistani state is finding it hard to provide for basic amenities for its current population, much less after the expected boom in its population size. Further, under the circumstances, entrepreneurs are likely to be wary of new investments in the proposed industrial zones. The United States therefore needs to think far more boldly about mechanisms to expand trade opportunities in Pakistan and elsewhere in the developing world.

Turning to the immediate security concerns and urgently needed assistance on this front, there needs to be a secure and reliable source of funding not just for military assistance but to assist the police and civilian law enforcement as the first line of defense against extremists. Some observers have recently argued that past cutoffs, which in turn affected IMET programs, have seriously harmed our bilateral efforts and have made those Pakistani officers not participating in IMET increasingly vulnerable to Islamic militants.

Ambassador Holbrooke, do you see any correlation between this and the rising pro-Taliban sentiment within the ranks of the Pakistani military? This raises the core question of political will, as implicit in proposals to dramatically ramp up U.S. foreign assistance. Is it the assumption that Pakistan's political class shares the increasing United States concern about the threat posed to their own country by Islamic radicals? If United States and Pakistani strategic priorities are seriously misaligned, then American foreign assistance will be of fleeting significance.

Congress and the Executive Branch must move quickly toward a common understanding on the immediate and longer-term priorities, the appropriate mix of policy instruments to maximize our prospects for success and the timeline for implementing the different elements of our strategy. Ultimately, if we are to succeed in eliminating safe havens and strengthening democracy in Pakistan, it will require steadiness of purpose in Washington but perhaps more importantly, commensurate commitments by Islamabad.

Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for your time.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired. We are now going to hear the opening statements from the chair and the ranking member of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, 3 minutes. And then we're not going to have a chance for other members to give 1-minute opening statements because we want to hear from Ambassador Holbrooke, but you will get 5 minutes of questions for Ambassador Holbrooke. And we do have a second panel, so I think that is the appropriate decision.

I now yield 3 minutes to the chairman of the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee, Mr. Ackerman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. Let us say that your pants were on fire. You would have to do two things to survive. First, you would have to recognize that the agonizing pain that you feel was the result of your pants being on fire. And second, you would have to do something about it before you lost the ability to do something about it. Let me be blunt. Pakistan's pants are on fire. That is bad of course, but things are actually much, much worse.

Pakistan's leaders, rather than recognizing and moving to address the urgent danger to their constitution and country, instead seem convinced that if left alone, that appeased or attacked piecemeal, the Islamist flame will simply burn itself out. That hope is at best folly. Tragically, neither President Zardari nor former Prime Minister Sharif appear to recognize the scope and seriousness of the crisis that their country is in or of the necessity of setting their personal or party political fortunes aside in order to meet the danger.

President Zardari has said the right things regarding counterterrorism, about how to fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, is Pakistan's fight as well, but in practice, his government's response has been slow, weak and ineffective as recent events have shown. And while Mr. Sharif's longstanding ties to Islamist political parties could enable him to persuade the Pakistani public of the need to confront the Taliban, his public downplaying of the Taliban threat raises serious questions about his commitment to fight the insurgents.

Whatever the rationale or the reason, the fact is Pakistan's political echelon has not yet risen to meet the moment. Historically, one could expect that if the political situation remains as unstable as it is now and if neither leader moves beyond his narrow political concerns that the Pakistani military might again emerge as the only institution capable of saving the state.

I fear, however, that this time might be different. Even now with insurgents a mere hour's drive from the capital, I suspect that among the senior officers of the Pakistani military, in particular those with connections to the ISI, their bedrock belief still that Pakistan's real enemy is India remains untouched by events.

Pakistan's Government, its military and most importantly its people must come to realize that the militants and terrorists they nurtured and supported for decades to fight in Kashmir and to antagonize India have now turned on them. I and many other friends of Pakistan have said again and again that the fight against extremists is not just an American fight, nor is it solely an Afghan fight. The fight belonged to Pakistan before, and it belongs to Paki-

stan now. I cannot say it more clearly. There is a real and present danger to Pakistan's survival, but it comes from inside, not outside the country. The fire is real and they need to respond.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

And I am now pleased to introduce our first witness. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke currently serves as Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. From 1999 to 2001, he served as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. As Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from 1994 to 1996, he brokered the Dayton Peace Accords, which ended the bloody wars in the Balkans. In his long and distinguished diplomatic career, Ambassador Holbrooke has also served as Special Envoy to Cyprus and the Balkans, U.S. Ambassador to Germany and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

I will introduce the second panel after questioning for Ambassador Holbrooke has finished.

Ambassador Holbrooke, it is yours.

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE,
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN**

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great honor to appear before you as the first opportunity I have had to testify before Congress since I assumed my new job, but far from the first opportunity I have had to appear before your committee. You were kind enough to invite me here as a private citizen. You are by my count the sixth chairman of this committee I have testified before. In fact it was the first committee I ever testified before in 1977. In those days, the rules were different and I was asked to testify before I was confirmed, but things have changed.

Mr. Chairman, H.R. 1886 is a step forward in concept from previous legislation in previous years. It is focused on the right issues. It puts Pakistan in the right construct. It responds to the importance of the issue as outlined by both you and the ranking member and my friend, Congressman Ackerman, who thinks I live in his district because I am next to it. So it is good to see you, sir. My actual Congressman, for the record, is Jerry Nadler, but I am happy to consider you my second Congressman.

This is a very important part of our effort to build correct policy, and with your permission, before I turn to the legislation and answer your questions, I would like to outline for you and for anyone who is listening what is going on in the next 3 days here in Washington, because these are historically important meetings and I think we should put them in the context. The administration began its term in office with the concept we are now all familiar with, that Afghanistan and Pakistan were interrelated in such a way so that success in either one required success in the other. Sounds simple now, but it was not the stovepipe approach that we inherited.

And as we proceeded with our strategic review and as we progressed, things developed. In late February, the Secretary of State invited the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan to Washington and asked them to bring delegations with them to begin a trilateral process. That first round of trilateral talks was suffi-

ciently successful so that President Obama decided to invite President Zardari of Pakistan and President Karzai of Afghanistan here to continue the talks at the presidential level.

This unprecedented trilateral diplomacy, including many senior members of both administrations, begins today. I will go directly from this meeting to meetings with members of the two governments. I already met with President Zardari last night, and I know that you will be meeting with President Zardari later in the day. And I would like to say in the presence of so many of your colleagues that that meeting with President Zardari this afternoon is an extremely important part of the formation of a correct American policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, and I congratulate you for chairing it. Your colleagues on the other side will have a similar meeting at lunch on Thursday chaired by Senator Kerry and Senator Lugar.

The formal meetings will begin tomorrow morning in the State Department. Secretary Clinton will meet privately with each delegation bilaterally, and then there will be a trilateral session in which we hope to produce some useful agreements of cooperation. We will then move to the White House tomorrow afternoon, where President Obama will follow a similar scenario, meeting first with President Karzai and then with President Zardari in strict protocol sequence and then a trilateral meeting of the two delegations.

This has not been done before. President Bush did have one dinner with the two Presidents when it was Musharraf and Karzai, but it resulted in no progress and there was no follow-on. This is part of a continuing process, and we would like your committee and the Congress as a whole to be partners in this very important effort.

It is interesting, Mr. Chairman, to discover that the two Finance Ministers have never met each other until they will meet tomorrow. The two Agriculture Ministers don't know each other. The two Interior Ministers do not know each other. And yet for the United States, our most vital national security interests depend on cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The animosity and misunderstandings between Afghanistan and Pakistan did not begin after 9/11 or even when the Soviet Union invaded 30 years ago. They go back to independence, partition, Pakistani independence, and it is an extraordinarily complicated story. We are involved in it because our most vital national security interests are at stake. I have heard people, including people in this body, compare this to Vietnam. I served 3½ years in Vietnam as a civilian alongside the United States military in the Mekong Delta and in the American Embassy.

And then I served another 4 years on Vietnam as a member of President Johnson's staff and the Paris Peace Talks. And I wrote one volume of the Pentagon Papers. And I want to say to you today and to your colleagues as clear as I can that while there are obviously structural similarities between the war in Afghanistan and the war in Vietnam and in both countries the problem of the sanctuary was critical, and the sanctuary area is the area we are here to discuss today, the core difference is that the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army never posed a direct threat to the American homeland.

The people who are in this area who we are fighting either pose a direct threat, having committed 9/11, having done Mumbai, having killed Benazir Bhutto, and they have publicly said they are going to do more of the same. That is al-Qaeda of course and its allies, the Taliban. So we need to be very clear that we are talking today about an issue that is of direct importance to our national security.

Now, in regard to H.R. 1886, this is a very big improvement on previous legislation. It vastly increases the economic assistance, it segments economic and military, the accountability provisions that you referred to apply as I understand it only to the military portion, a point which has been lost in the debate over it, and there are many other things in it that we greatly appreciate. And I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman and your colleagues, particularly the ranking minority member, for their bipartisanship in putting this bill together. It is very important and we hope that it will be passed and that the differences with the House and Senate versions will be reconciled.

Having said that, I also wish to echo what Secretary of State Clinton said when she was asked about the accountability, and that is that we should be careful that we look for a sweet spot that is acceptable. Now let me be clear here, the goals that you lay out in the accountability section are goals that we by and large share. But there has been a misunderstanding in Pakistan about motivation and about how this works. And so we would like to work with you, and I believe in this regard, Mr. Chairman, your meeting this afternoon with President Zardari is very important, arguably more important than this hearing. We would like to work with you and with the Pakistani Government to find that sweet spot that Secretary Clinton referred to.

In conclusion of my opening remarks, let me ask your permission to submit my formal opening statement for the record and to thank you very much, really deeply and personally, for your leadership in this most important issue. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Holbrooke follows:]

STATEMENT BY
RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BEFORE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
MAY 5, 2009

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, and Distinguished Members of the Committee:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great honor to appear before your committee again.

When I last testified before you, it was as a private citizen offering personal views on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Today, I appear before you as the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. I deeply appreciate the President's and Secretary Clinton's confidence in appointing me to this position.

A stable, secure, democratic Pakistan is vital to U.S. national security interests. We must support and strengthen the democratic government of Pakistan in order to eliminate once and for all the extremist threat from al-Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups.

Yet relations between the U.S. and Pakistan have been inconsistent over the years. In Pakistan, many believe that we are not a reliable long-term partner and that we will abandon them after achieving our counterterrorism objectives. Many in the U.S. question the dedication of some elements of the Pakistani Government to ending safe haven for terrorists on Pakistani soil. But our engagement has to be aimed at putting our relationship on a better long-term footing.

To assure a strong partnership in the fight against extremists, constancy and consistency must be the hallmarks of our engagement with Pakistan. This engagement must be conducted in a way that respects and enhances democratic civilian authority while also engaging the Pakistani people in our commitment to help them pursue a prosperous economy, a stronger democracy, and a vibrant civil society.

Administration Strategy

In March, President Obama announced the new U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan which reflected unprecedented input from both governments. The President's core strategic goal is to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al-Qaeda and to eliminate the safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The President's strategy makes clear the importance of Pakistan's future and stability to the United States and the rest of the world, and the need for increased security, governance and development assistance to Pakistan.

International Engagement

A critical objective of the Administration's new strategy is to forge an international consensus to support Pakistan. We will involve the international community to actively assist in addressing security, governance and development goals in Pakistan.

We have already made progress.

- At the April 3-4 NATO Summit, Allied leaders agreed to build a broader political and practical relationship between NATO and Pakistan.
- On April 17, the World Bank and the Japanese Government co-chaired a successful Pakistan Donors' Conference in Tokyo where the international community pledged more than \$5 billion in new support, well above the \$4 billion requirement identified by the International Monetary Fund.
- We are also urging allies to work closely with us both bilaterally and through the Friends of Democratic Pakistan to coordinate development assistance. The Friends held a successful ministerial meeting in parallel with the Tokyo Donors Conference, at which Pakistan's international partners affirmed their political support for the democratically elected government.

Most notably, we have begun an unprecedented high level U.S.-Afghanistan-Pakistan trilateral engagement that will continue quarterly. Secretary Clinton and I lead this dialogue; we will convene its second round tomorrow in Washington. President Obama will host his two counterparts, President Zardari of Pakistan and President Karzai of Afghanistan at the White House, and U.S.

Cabinet members will meet with their Pakistani and Afghan counterparts to explore new areas of cooperation on foreign policy issues, economic cooperation, agriculture, police and prison reform, and intelligence.

Strengthening Pakistani Civilian and Government Capacity

A key aspect to the new strategy is to put more attention and resources toward Pakistan's economic and governance challenges. By increasing economic and educational opportunities, expanding the reach of quality healthcare, reinforcing human rights – particularly women's rights – and empowering civil society, life for millions of average Pakistanis will improve. Towards this end, the President has voiced his support for the Congressional efforts to significantly increase non-military assistance to Pakistan. Introduction of bills in both Houses demonstrates Congress' support of our long-term commitment to helping the Pakistani people.

It is vital that we devote some of these resources to target the economic and social roots of extremism in western Pakistan with more economic aid. There have often been rebellions in that area historically, but this is the first time they have been tied to an international terror movement. Our assistance should support Pakistani efforts to "hold and build" in western Pakistan as part of its counterinsurgency efforts so extremists do not return to fill the vacuum once military operations have ended.

We must also do our part to enhance bilateral and regional trade possibilities by implementing Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) and encouraging foreign investment in vital sectors, such as energy. The Administration supports Congressional passage of ROZ legislation as a key way to boost private investment and sustainable economic development in targeted areas of Afghanistan and border areas of Pakistan. I ask for your support in expediting this crucial legislation.

Building Counterinsurgency Capacity

Successfully shutting down the Pakistani safe haven for extremists will require consistent and intensive strategic engagement with Pakistan's civilian and military leadership. It is vital to strengthen our efforts to develop and enable Pakistani security forces – both the military and law enforcement – so they are capable of carrying out sustained counterinsurgency operations. The Pakistani Army has traditionally been arrayed in a conventional deployment in the east, against India. We must work with Pakistan so that it has the resources and training

to recalibrate from its current conventional threat posture to one that addresses the insurgent threat on its Western frontier.

Strategic Communications

We are developing a strategic communications plan to counter the terror information campaign, based in part on a strategy that proved successful in Iraq. This is an area that has been woefully under-resourced. The strategic communications plan – including electronic media, telecom, and radio – will include options on how best to counter the propaganda that is key to the insurgency's terror campaign.

Supporting Legislation for Assistance to Pakistan

Security assistance for Pakistan has to show results. In the President's words, "We must focus our military assistance on the tools, training and support that Pakistan needs to root out the terrorists" but "we will not, and cannot provide a blank check." Pakistan must demonstrate its commitment to rooting out al-Qaeda and the violent extremists within its borders.

The Administration intends to implement measures of performance in its economic, social, and military assistance to Pakistan. We must ensure, however, that such tools do not impede the effectiveness of our assistance or play to the "trust deficit" that plagues our bilateral relationship and promotes distrust among the Pakistani people. Any legislation should engender the greatest level of cooperation by winning the trust of our civilian and military partners in Pakistan.

The Administration is committed to working closely with the members of this committee, and Congress, to ensure that together we are able to provide the resources necessary to carry out our new strategy in Pakistan.

All of our efforts in Pakistan are geared toward creating the vibrant, modern, and democratic state that Pakistanis desire and U.S. policy envisions as a partner in advancing stability and development in a key region of the world.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

Chairman BERMAN. Well, thank you, Ambassador, and without objection, your entire statement will be included in the record of this hearing.

And I will yield myself 5 minutes. In the last few weeks—and some of us were actually there in Pakistan when this was starting—we have heard a stream of dire reporting from Pakistan and statements from administration officials regarding the situation in Pakistan. It is unquestionably a critical one.

I am aware that the main institution in Pakistan, the military, remains intact, and that there are concerns among the Pakistani press that the United States is lending an air of panic to the situation. Talk to us for a moment about how critical the threat is and what efforts we are undertaking to communicate United States intentions to address the threat directly to the Pakistani people.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. You know, the relationship between the United States and Pakistan, which goes back to the birth of Pakistan as an independent nation, is a complicated relationship between allies who have often misunderstood each other. I make that comment when you use the phrase “U.S. lending an air of panic” or “contributing to an air of panic” about the situation.

Chairman BERMAN. According to the Pakistani press.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Yes. And so we actually had a kind of an echo chamber situation. If you analyze it, and it is worth looking at for a minute, we spent a lot of time on this, Mr. Chairman. We have had extensive meetings in the State Department, the White House, trying to make sure that people understand exactly what we are saying. When Swat fell and the deal was made, the concern that was expressed was not initially in the United States. It was among the people of Peshawar and Lahore and Islamabad, who understandably felt threatened.

Swat is not just another location, it is a very symbolic location. It is not part of the tribal areas, it was a vacation place. I like to point out to my New York friends that it is the same distance from Manhattan as East Hampton is from New York, and it bears the same psychological relationship to the people of Islamabad as a vacation spot, although real estate prices were not quite as high.

Chairman BERMAN. And we won't talk about the parties.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. No, please. But all joking aside, the fall of Swat created an air of panic not in the United States initially but among certain people in Pakistan. Even in India, I found people who recalled their vacations in Swat and were stunned by its fall. That then came back to the United States. People going out to Pakistan, including Members of the Congress, came back and made strong statements. Private citizens made strong statements. One very well-known counterinsurgency expert, not a member of the U.S. Government, not a consultant, said they had a matter of months before they might hit the wall.

And this began to create a ricochet effect. And so without anyone intending it, honest, well-intentioned statements of concern became interpreted as predictions. And the press magnified this. I am not actually blaming anyone. I am not blaming the people who made the statements. They were pro-Pakistan. I am not blaming the press. They were reporting them. But it really took off as a story. And in that atmosphere, President Zardari arrived in town yester-

day, and he raised this issue with me immediately. And let me say frankly to you I understand his concern and we all understand it.

So, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, let me make very, very clear why he is here and what our goals are in Pakistan so that we can try to dispel a self-fulfilling sense of what Congress Ackerman called the "Pants on Fire Syndrome." Now he said the pants really are on fire, and I understand exactly what he said, but I also think it needs to be put in the perspective of what we are trying to achieve. I would submit to you that Pakistan is of such immense importance to the United States strategically and politically that our goal must be unambiguously to support and help stabilize a democratic Pakistan headed by its elected President, Asif Ali Zardari.

I read in the newspapers that the administration is distancing itself from President Zardari in favor of his leading political opponent, Nawaz Sharif in the Punjab. That is simply not true. We have not distanced ourselves from President Zardari. If we were, why would President Obama have invited him to Washington today? Why would we be here today talking about additional money for his government? However, we do have relations with Nawaz Sharif and his brother, who is the Chief Minister of the Punjab, just the way we have relations with let us say David Cameron, the leader of the opposition in Great Britain.

The point that needs to be underscored here is that we have the highest strategic interests in supporting this government. That is what H.R. 1886 is about, and that is what our administration is trying to do. And we should not allow comments about how serious the issue is to be confused with predictions of a collapse. We do not think Pakistan is a failed state. We think it is a state under extreme test from the enemies who are also our enemies, and we have, Mr. Chairman, the same common enemy, the United States and Pakistan.

Chairman BERMAN. My time has more than expired. I didn't mention, and I should, that I will recognize people for 5 minutes. It will include their question and your answer.

And I now yield 5 minutes to the ranking member.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

How would you describe Pakistan's commitment to rooting out militant groups? To what extent is Pakistan leery of taking on this challenge for two reasons, its strategic concern with India and a perception that such a campaign either cannot be won or is actually against Pakistan's interests? Related to that, does the current situation in Pakistan make you any more concerned about the safety and security of the nuclear weapons, particularly the prospect of a radicalized military and the possibility of an inside job, meaning the seizure of some part of the arsenal by anti-American radicals within the Pakistani armed forces?

And thirdly, since we have limited time, if Americans are worried about Pakistan turning into a failed state, and I agree with you it is not a failed state, our friends in India ought to be extremely concerned. And I was interested in your comments on this question, in your discussion with leaders in India about the situation in

Pakistan, how would you assess their level of concern? Thank you, sir.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. The first point was which? I got the second and third.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The commitment of Pakistan in rooting out these militant groups. Are they hesitant because they think that they can't do it or because of the problems that they have with India?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. On your first point, we have long felt that our friends in Pakistan could put more resources into the struggle in the west. They have been reluctant to do so because of their longstanding concerns and past history with India. And we will continue to press on that. In the interest of time, let me just say on the nuclear issue, most of this needs to be discussed in closed session. It is not an issue I have personally concentrated on because there is such an overwhelming agenda on other issues. I have followed it. I would be happy to discuss it further in closed session and bring with me the experts.

On the last issue, thank you for saying that Pakistan is not a failed state. It is very important that people get away from easy and attractive journalistic clichés. It just isn't. But it is a state under enormous social, political and economic pressures, and India is always a factor.

Finally, I want to be clear that when I talked about H.R. 1886, your bill, I greatly appreciate its motives, but I do want to be sure that I am preserving the fact that there are things in it which Secretary Clinton and I and my colleagues do want to work with you on to be clear, and as we have talked privately, there are other bills moving forward on the Appropriations side.

And I want to underscore the point made in this morning's Washington Post by Ahmed Rasheed in the article, "Pakistan's Critical Hour," which I hope would be well read and perhaps it could be even inserted for the record.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, just because we have such limited time. Would you say that, related to the Indian leaders and their perception of Pakistan, in your discussions with them, how do they see that playing out for them?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. The Indians? Ever since I took this job, India has been in an election campaign. They are voting right now. There are 700 million people voting. They have been listening, they have been very interested, but they have not taken any clear positions at this point. The elections will be finished in less than 2 weeks, and I look forward to returning, and then I would be happy to return and give you a better answer. But let me just say one thing. They really do share the understanding that what is happening in western Pakistan is of direct concern to them.

The Indians have been public in saying they are not happy with the cooperation they got after the Mumbai attacks, we all know that. I believe that for the first time since partition, India, Pakistan and the United States have a common threat, a common enemy and a common task. And I hope that after the elections and after these bills that are working the Hill work their way through that we will be able to move to more of a consensus that a common

threat requires common actions. But there are a lot of moving parts here.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Sir, and we certainly understand that you endorse that bill. You don't need to plug it in in every answer. We get it. Thank you.

Good job, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BERMAN. Well, since the ranking member has committed your administration's endorsement to my bill, I will commit that as soon as we can we will get together with members of the administration to discuss in the terms of both the Secretary and you finding the sweet spot.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you.

Chairman BERMAN. And Mr. Ackerman is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much. Very good to see you again, Mr. Ambassador, and congratulations.

The proposed sale of the new F-16 to Pakistan, will they be using that to fight the terrorists?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. You are talking now about the new planes or the midlife upgrades? What are we specifically referring to?

Mr. ACKERMAN. The F-16 CD Block 50/52s. Combat aircraft, 18 new ones.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. The 18 new ones. First of all, as you know, the midlife upgrades are moving forward with \$142 million of payment. And they have to pay for these. I am told by F-16 pilots that an F-16 with modern avionics can be used as a counterinsurgency tool, but quite honestly, it requires very sophisticated training. They did use the aging F-16s in their battles in Bajur Valley and in Swat. But they can only be used in daylight and with good visibility. They can't be used at night. So we have not come to a final decision on how to proceed with this, and I know your body is looking at it very carefully. Right now we have approved the midlife upgrade, so they will be able to convert planes to counterinsurgency use.

Mr. ACKERMAN. What can you tell us in this open session about the ISI and their double-game strategy, as some people have called it, in cooperating with terrorist elements? And I know it is not the whole ISI but possibly just corrupt elements or individuals within it.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Ever since I began working on this difficult issue, I have been well aware of the allegations to which you refer, and we have looked into them very carefully in the first 100 days of this administration. I have had lengthy talks with the director of ISI, General Pasha, who is in Washington today and who I hope will get a chance to meet with some of you. General Pasha wishes to state and would tell you if he were here that ISI does not do these things anymore.

But he does not deny, nor does anyone else, that in the old days ISI and the American intelligence services worked together to set up some of the organizations which have now turned against the United States, and there may be some serious legacy issues. It concerns me greatly, and we need to put the most heavy possible pressure on our friends in Pakistan to join us in the fight against the

Taliban and its allies. We cannot succeed in Afghanistan without Pakistan's support and involvement, and that means working with the Army and the intelligence services in that regard.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Inasmuch as you brought up putting pressure on our friends, how much pressure should we put on them to give us access to A.Q. Khan?

Mr. Chairman, could we just ask those people passing those signs around to put them down? They are distracting.

Chairman BERMAN. Will the gentleman please put down his sign? That is inappropriate in the committee hearing room. And I would ask the gentleman if he would like to leave the room? Otherwise, he will remain quiet.

Mr. Ackerman?

Mr. ACKERMAN. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If the Ambassador would continue?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. The A.Q. Khan, I find it hard to understand, and I said publicly as a private citizen I found it inexplicable, that A.Q. Khan was not immediately made available to the United States. We had no access, and I just don't understand it, quite frankly, given the immense amount of damage he did.

Mr. ACKERMAN. But that was history and the previous administration.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I know. I understand.

Mr. ACKERMAN. What do we do now? He is still there, he still knows what he knows, and we still don't know what we don't know.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I have raised it with the Pakistani Government. Their response is, you know, this happened under the previous governments.

Mr. ACKERMAN. But the guy still has the ability to talk and give us information.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I understand, Congressman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. And if it is a good idea, should we make those F-16s conditional on talking to him to find out to what extent he might have given technology or material to terrorist organizations or failed states or what have you?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I do not think that linkage will help either half of the equation. But I certainly share your concern. I raised it on my first trip there, I raised it publicly, I will continue to raise it. But I just think that the linkage would work against both issues. But I understand the importance of it. I share your view.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Does the civilian Government of Pakistan have control over the military?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. The military in Pakistan has a long tradition of serving within the government but having its own role. There are other countries like this.

Mr. ACKERMAN. But the government still has a strong tradition of being overthrown by the military.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well, that is another matter. We are strongly opposed to any such event, Congressman Ackerman. We have made that unambiguous and clear to all parties publicly and privately. The chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, is in constant contact with his Pakistani counterparts on this issue, and we think this would be a terrible event. Over half

of Pakistan's history since independence they have had military rule.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

And the gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is recognized.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, I wish you well and I am very pleased that you were selected and have gone about this incredible task that you have. And just as pointed as my questions will be, do not think that I am not rooting for you to succeed in your job.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. First of all, let me note that I do agree with the chairman of the subcommittee. I would suggest that it is time for us to get real with Pakistan, and to the degree that over my career we have bent over backwards historically for this last 30 years to sort of not to come to grips with some real issues, and thus we have let things fester and it has gotten progressively worse. So it is time for us really to lay down a standard and say what is reality here.

And if there are leaders in Pakistan who oppose our getting to the real facts concerning A.Q. Khan, then those people are not our friends. The bottom line is something of that significance, of that magnitude, if the leaders of Pakistan are not permitting us to have the type of accountability for this individual and what has been done, then frankly those people are not our friends and do not deserve the type of support that we are trying to give them just for the record. If you have a disagreement with that, please go straight ahead.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. The issues that you and Congressman Ackerman raised should have been dealt with at the outset. A decision was made by another group of American officials not to raise them. A new administration came to office on January 2 facing a different set of problems. I raised A.Q. Khan immediately upon my being in Pakistan and I will continue to raise it. But the issue that Congressman Ackerman raised, and it is a very important one, is whether we should condition our own strategic interests, he linked it to the F-16s, but you have made it an even broader issue, to this issue.

At this time, there is no evidence that he is actively engaged in these things anymore. It would be enormously valuable to know what he did. The ice has frozen over this issue in a sense. I would love to crack it open. But, Congressman, as we speak and as Chairman Berman pointed out at the beginning, the enemy of our nation as well as Pakistan is active in the field not too far from the capital. We need to help Pakistan, and we need to weigh the help against the accountability issues. Let me define the right balance.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I am running out of time too, and let me just note that if Pakistan is unwilling to work together with us on something as significant as the nuclear weapons perhaps in the hands of terrorists who might do harm to the United States, well, then they do not deserve our help. Let us make it very clear. If a nuclear weapon goes off in the United States and it is because we have not followed through with what this Khan character has been

doing with other radical Islamicists, well, then we have not been doing due diligence to our own people.

You were in Vietnam, and at that time and you mentioned that, the support for the Vietnamese battle against us was Russia and China. We are now at war with radical Islam in Pakistan and Afghanistan in particular. Where are the radical Islamicists who are fighting this war against us getting their financial support to maintain this struggle?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. The other elements in other countries have been sending money to the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Does that include Saudi Arabia?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. It includes people in Saudi Arabia. I don't have any evidence it includes the government, but certainly money is flowing into what you might call the bad guys from the Gulf, from Pakistan and from other places in the world under the Hawala system, under hand-carried money. We do not have a program to close that down now. We are working on it actively. Our most senior officials have a task force that is trying to address this, and it is very high on our list.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Good luck in that operation, and also I hope that we are going to do the drug challenge as well.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman is expired.

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Wexler, recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador, we welcome you here as well and are rooting very much for you also. Recently Deputy Secretary Lew and Deputy Secretary Steinberg came before our committee and presented the administration's new plans for Afghanistan. And if I understand it correctly, in a nutshell, it calls for 17,000 additional troops in southern Afghanistan and an additional 4,000 troops on top of that.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Trainers.

Mr. WEXLER. Yes. You very eloquently talk about the interdependence of our Afghanistan and Pakistan policies and the interrelationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan or the lack of interrelationship. Could you share with us what the anticipated repercussion the anticipated goal of the additional troops in Afghanistan will be with respect to Pakistan? And can you also share with us in terms of al-Qaeda's two senior leaders, bin Laden and Zawari, what role do we believe them to be playing, if we know, in terms of the current circumstances in Pakistan? And finally, what role, if any, is Iran playing? And is there a potential for cooperation possibly with respect to Iran in terms of resolving the crisis in Pakistan?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. On your first question, Congressman Wexler, I believe the troops will make an enormous difference. They are going into a very difficult area. They are well-prepared for it and well-led. I know the commanders. They will displace the Taliban as long as they are there. The real test is can they transfer that responsibility to local security forces over time. As they progress, I think we can expect elements of the Taliban, some will fade back into the villages like all guerrillas do, and others will go east into Pakistan toward the Baluchistan area, and that is an issue that has to be addressed.

On your second point on Osama bin Laden, you wanted to know what their role was vis-à-vis the Taliban?

Mr. WEXLER. Vis-à-vis the circumstances in Pakistan today, do we have any information in terms of what role they are playing?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. In Afghanistan?

Mr. WEXLER. No, in terms of what is happening in Pakistan.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I am sorry, I misunderstood. In regard to al-Qaeda, I think it is very well-described in an article in this morning's New York Times where a Taliban spokesman said we do the local war against the Americans, al-Qaeda does the global war.

And finally, on your question about Iran, very interesting point. There have been two major conferences in the last month, March 31 in The Hague on Afghanistan, April 17 in Tokyo on Pakistan. The latter was a pledging conference. The Iranians attended both in The Hague at the Vice Foreign Minister level and in Tokyo on Pakistan at the Foreign Minister level.

And in Tokyo, they pledged \$330 million to the reconstruction effort for Pakistan. Quite an interesting thing to do. They could have done it bilaterally, they could have done it in some other method. And the speech that the Foreign Minister gave was one in which he outlined policy goals that were similar to ours. Now we have vast and important differences with Iran on nuclear weapons, Hamas, Hezbollah, Israel and many other critical issues, but here is one area where there seems to be a strategic similarity.

They don't want the Taliban whom they hate to succeed. They have vested interests on their eastern border. Hazrat is a city with very old historic cultural links to Iran. Their drug flow into Iran has caused a massive drug addiction problem. And so it looks to me like for reasons that don't make them nice guys but just are facts they are looking at this area as an area where instability would be adverse to them.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you very much.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from California, Mr. Royce, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And welcome, Mr. Holbrooke. I joined Chairman Berman on his delegation to India and Pakistan, and I had an opportunity there to talk to General Kiyani about the insurgency that is occurring and building in the Swat Valley, the tentacles that are going out from Swat. One of the quick observations I would make is that Abdul Aziz was released, this is the individual from the Red Mosque who had led so many young suicide bombers to commit attacks in the Punjab and in the capital, and he was out publicly preaching jihad and an overthrow of the government because Supreme Court Justice Chaudhury had released him.

And as we look at the situation of the graduates coming out of the madrassahs, the New York Times said yesterday two-thirds of the suicide bombers in Punjab have attended those schools. My question would be, is there the will in Pakistan to put in place a curriculum that isn't hostile? And is there the will to defeat the insurgency in Swat?

On the radio front, you have raised the point, Ambassador, that like with Rwandan hate radio we have the Taliban radio, 150 ille-

gal radio stations. I would ask on the jamming equipment, what is the status? I know you have been working to try to get that jamming assistance to the Pakistani Government.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Big issue for us.

Mr. ROYCE. A couple other questions I would just leave you with. One, you mentioned trade, and I want to encourage you on that front because I think giving Pakistan greater market access could do more good than aid, that frankly we have a limited capacity to implement. So, if it is a real trade and real engagement, you might have to take leadership on this. I think the Van Hollen approach is kind of unrealistic, but that might help civil society there.

The last point I would like to ask you about is on Afghan contracting, because that process in the country is really a mess. There is quite a bit of blowback. Corruption is rampant there, and the resentment that that creates among Afghans is a problem. And I think this is compounded when a foreign firm, take one example, Turkish firm brings in Turkish labor, doesn't hire Afghani labor, that does not build Afghani capacity.

So it is very hard for American firms of course to compete in this corrupt environment, and I think from community leaders here in the Afghan community, we have many engineers in the Afghan community who would like to go back, get engaged, hire Afghans obviously in order to build capacity there, and I think there is something you could directly do on that front which would help turn that around. But if I could ask your responses on some of those questions?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Very limited time, a lot questions.

Chairman BERMAN. 2 minutes and 20 seconds.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. 16 seconds, Mr. Chairman.

The Afghan contracting issue, I agree fully with you. But let us not limit it to competition with Turks. We have got a lot to answer for here ourselves. You know that only about 10 percent of American assistance in Afghanistan goes through the government. So I want to increase that to at least 40 or 50 percent because we are trying to build up Afghan capacity and we are undermining it by that process. And this is one of the things we discovered as we did our due diligence of what we inherited.

I would like to however use the remaining 1 minute and 36 seconds to ask you about the ROZs. I like Van Hollen's legislation. I publicly supported it. And I know there are differences between the Senate and the House versions, but it is a very important idea. Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen talked about it in her opening remarks. I share her comments. Perhaps I could just get a sense of why you disagreed with it.

Mr. ROYCE. I think that requiring American fabric in this, you know, you and I worked on the African Growth and Opportunity Act to try to create economic growth.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I remember.

Mr. ROYCE. We doubled trade between Africa and the United States. In my view, attempting to micromanage this with American fabric, as I have made the observation, we are going to have limited ability to have an impact with the aid that we do give. But in terms of trade, we are going to have a capacity to build civil society there, create jobs, and if we do that in tandem with education

and getting people out of madrassahs and into public education, which was once the case until the government made the decision to put all the money into armaments, then I think we are confronting some of the problems long-term that might turn things around.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I understand. As long as we agree that the general concept is correct, that is what I wanted to understand. Because it is up to you to work out the details, we want some legislation, it is really of high symbolic importance.

Mr. ROYCE. Ambassador, is there the will in the Swat Valley for the government to go in and get control of the situation?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. The government went back in yesterday, and this morning the deal broke down. President Zardari had always predicted this would happen. The first thing he said to me last night was I told you this deal wasn't going to work. Remember, Zardari had opposed it and he was forced to agree to it. So his answer to your question is the Army is going back in as we speak.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman is expired.

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And welcome, Ambassador Holbrooke. It is good to see you again. It is my understanding that over the last 7 years we have provided about \$12 billion in aid to Pakistan for military equipment and military training and resources. And yet Pakistani Army Chief of Staff General Pervez Kiyani said his troops do not have the necessary equipment to fight the militants. Given just the level of our aid, how is that possible? What is going on in Pakistan that they have inadequate resources to fight the militants?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Very simple, Congressman Connolly. The aid went for the wrong sort of assistance. They didn't get night vision goggles, they didn't get helicopters. Secondly, their own existing helicopter fleet is very inadequately maintained, and we want to help them with that too. Third, there wasn't a sufficient effort made to encourage a reconfiguration of the Army for counterinsurgency. Fourth, events between India and Pakistan always kept a larger number of troops in the east than in the west.

You are now addressing the core point which any military analyst would say has to be fixed. Otherwise, you end up in a Whac-A-Mole situation where you can fight them in Bajur and they will appear in Swat. You can fight them in Swat and they will be in Waziristan. There are not adequate numbers of troops in my view in the west. I think that my colleague, General Petraeus, would say exactly the same thing.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Do we have an understanding, Mr. Ambassador, or growing understanding with the Pakistani Government that that needs to be corrected?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. There is no question, Congressman Connolly, that recent events have increased the readiness of both sides to address that problem. Whether it is sufficient or not will be determined partly in the next few days. General Kiyani, however, is not here. He is back in the country, where he should be, directing these military offensives. But other senior military offi-

cials are here, and Admiral Mullen is practically commuting to Pakistan, I will be going back next week, your own chairman was just there. I think every discussion we ever have, this is sort of like the number one issue.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Because it just seems to me if we are going to have confidence in providing more aid to Pakistan in this hour of need, we have to have some assurances it is not just going to go to further the buildup and reinforce the capacity vis-à-vis the perceived threat from India.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I agree with that, and I think that can be shaped by the nature of the aid.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Let me ask you also, Mr. Ambassador, since President Zardari is here in town and I know you are meeting with him, looking at some events in Pakistan, it is a little unclear to us I think sort of who is responsible for what, but certainly some decisions have been made by the Pakistani Government. These aren't things that were done to them, they are decisions that they made. There was a decision to release the Imam of the Red Mosque, Abdul Aziz, who then went on television and talked about the need for national Sharia.

Similarly an Imam from Swat was given air time on television saying the same thing. The deal with Swat's passive understanding, did not the Pakistani Government understand what a potential threat that would pose to their security and to our bilateral relationship? What is your sense of the Pakistani understanding of those or at least the reactions to those events, and is there some reassessment going on within the Pakistani Government about perhaps the wisdom of making such agreements?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well, there is no way I am going to defend the release of the Red Mosque leader, but it was not done by the government, it was done by the Judiciary. And Pakistan has an independent Judiciary, and that was in fact the cause of the great political struggle against Musharraf and the considerable political disagreement in mid-March between the two leading political figures in the country. So I share your views, I share your concern.

The radio stations, I will repeat what I said earlier to Congressman Rohrabacher and Congressman Royce, it is inexplicable to me that we didn't have a program to deal with this. You know, these are low frequency FM stations on the backs of motorcycles and pickup trucks wandering around Swat with no counterprogramming. We should be suppressing this and we should be following up with the proper messages. It is a little bit like Rwanda, Mr. Chairman, they are announcing who they are going to behead and they are terrorizing people. And the bills that are before you include funds to deal with this problem. It is one of the reasons it is so important.

Mr. CONNOLLY. My time has expired.

I want to thank the Ambassador.

Chairman BERMAN. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Paul, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. PAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Mr. Ambassador. I have a couple concerns I want to express. The main concern I have is I was hoping to see maybe a change in our foreign policy from the last administration, but of

course we see just more of the same. More nation-building, more policing of the world, more involvement, and it just seems like we never learn from our past mistakes. We don't learn from what kind of trouble the Soviets got into, and yet we continue to do the same thing.

And even your last statement, it is a grandiose goal; we want to work for a vibrant, modern democracy, wow, what a dream. But think of how we are doing this. I mean, we label everybody that oppose what we are doing, we call them Taliban, and all of a sudden there are many, many thousands of Pashtuns that are right smack in the middle getting killed by our bombs and then we wonder why they object to our policies over there.

This to me means that we are into this for the long haul, and it is going to cost a lot of money, and it is going to cost a lot of lives. And if the Members of Congress had ever realized what Iraq would end up costing us in the number of deaths, in the number of dollars, now \$1 trillion, they would have been a little more hesitant, they admit that even now, well, maybe we shouldn't have. But who knows what this is going to end up costing in terms of lives, and the odds of it working are so slim.

This is what my great concern is. You know, in 1999, Sharif was the Prime Minister, and we were supportive of the military coup, and Musharraf comes in and we support him. So now it is said that we will have relationships with Sharif, which everybody knows exactly what that means, it means that we are involved in their elections, that is the way we have done it for so many years. But the Pakistani papers report it as "U.S. taps Sharif to be the next Pakistani Prime Minister."

Now whether or not we literally can do that, I think we can have a lot of influence. That is what they believe in. How do you win the hearts and minds of these people if we are seen as invaders and occupiers? And here we are just doing nothing more than expanding our role in Pakistan and in Afghanistan. I don't see any end to it.

But my particular question is this. It has to do with the Pashtuns that have been killed. I mean, we are bombing a sovereign country. Where did we get the authority to do that? Did the Pakistani Government give us written permission? Did the Congress give us written permission to expand the war and start bombing in Pakistan?

Why do we as a Congress and as a people and as our representatives in the Executive Branch just so casually and carelessly expand the war and say, well, today we have to do this, we will worry about tomorrow? What about our national debt? We have \$1.8 billion national debt facing us, we think nothing, oh, \$3.5 billion, which will turn out to be tens of billions of dollars after this. So I would like to know where you stand on this, the innocent killing of Pashtuns, are they all Taliban or are there some innocent people being killed?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Congressman Paul, I did not say exactly what you imputed to me, but I have thought a long time about the issues you raise. And you mentioned Iraq. Afghanistan and Pakistan is not Iraq. The reason we are in this area, notwithstanding its immense difficulties, is because the people in this area

attacked our country on September 11, 2001 and have stated flatly they intend to do it again. They have done all the other things we mentioned earlier. And therefore, it is not Iraq and it is not Vietnam, despite the fact that many people say it is. It is about defending our country.

It is not easy, I agree with you. It is not cheap. And having seen wars on three continents, having been shot at for my country, I sure don't feel comfortable where you ask brave young American men and women to risk their lives and sometimes pay the ultimate sacrifice. However, the President of the United States reviewed everything in regard to this and came to the conclusion, not that it is the same policy. We spent the whole meeting today talking about differences. And there are dozens of others. It is not the same policy, but our goal has to be to defeat al-Qaeda. You cannot let them take over an even larger terrain, move into other parts of the world and then plan what they are planning in my view.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

And the gentlelady from California, Ms. Woolsey, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Mr. Ambassador. President Obama recently expressed grave concern about the situation in Pakistan, offering that the very fragile civilian government there does not appear to have the capacity to deliver basic services to the Pakistani people. He further stated that this lack of capacity makes it difficult for the government to gain the support and loyalty of its people.

So I am asking you today, to what extent to you agree with this assessment, and what new actions by the U.S. Government might help, and where is the place for smart power, investing in humanitarian needs and infrastructure, economy, food, so that we can shore up the people? I believe we can do that and at the same time, you can correct me if you don't think this is appropriate, hold the government accountable.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you very much for the question. Smart power, which by the way is a phrase originated by a person who used to work for me at the U.N., Susanne Nossel, is exactly what this bill is trying to do. It is something we should have done a long time ago. It is using American resources in these areas that go beyond military activities. But, and I know this is difficult for some people, it has to be married up to the use of force and the search for security. And we are using every piece of leverage we have to encourage Pakistan to work with us in Afghanistan and close its own border and deal with its own problems.

Ms. WOOLSEY. Well, Mr. Ambassador, if the ratio to smart investment is 1 to 10, with the 10 being military investment, I don't know how we get where we are going.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I don't think it is 1 to 10 anymore. It was, and if you look at the figures that this committee authorized and your body appropriated for Pakistan, the ratio over the last 10 years, it is pretty hard to understand. But this bill is one of a number of bills now in the Congress to correct that, and that is why I am here, to say that although we have differences with some provisos, we think that this is a major step in the right direction.

Ms. WOOLSEY. Well, with Pakistan being a nuclear weapons state, how does that change our interactions? I mean, how complicated does that make the relationship to move to smart power?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I think that prior to your arrival we discussed that a bit, and I offered to discuss the issue in more detail with the experts in a private session. But it is of immense concern to anyone in the world who cares about stability when any country starts building up a nuclear arsenal. That does not change the fact that in the western part of Pakistan are people who attacked the United States on 9/11 and have stated publicly and repeatedly they intend to do so again. And I for one take them at their word, and that is why we are here today.

And somebody earlier, I think it was Congressman Paul, used the word "nation-building." We are not nation-building. Pakistan is a nation. We are helping them strengthen themselves against their enemies. Another one of your colleagues talked about the madrassahs, another example of a missed opportunity. The madrassahs grew up with outside funding from the Gulf, and as the New York Times article by Sabrina Tavernise in yesterday's paper front page clearly points out, a brilliant article, the students there are fodder for suicide bombing missions. And there was no counterprogramming. That is what you mean by "smart power," that is what the administration I am proud to be part of means by "smart power." That is what this bill addresses.

Ms. WOOLSEY. Well, do you see a pathway for Pakistan to become a partner for nonproliferation other than just telling them they can't use what they have and that they work with us and we work with them and the rest of the world toward nonproliferation?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I don't know. A very good question. We are wrestling with that and its related issues now. A very, very fair and good question.

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I want to be clear, Mr. Chairman. What I don't know is the precise answer to, can they be a partner in nonproliferation? It is not like we don't know anything about this.

Chairman BERMAN. I understand, and the record should so reflect.

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. MCCAUL. And I thank the chairman.

Thank you, Ambassador, for being here and your service. I commend you on your testimony that this is the number one issue. I think for too long this area has been left unfettered, and I believe the tribal areas have grown, the terrorist threat has grown from out of that region. You know, I worked counterterrorism in the Justice Department. It is pretty clear this is where the 9/11 threat emanates from when you look at Ramzi Yousef, the World Trade Center, his uncle, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the London arrests.

This is sort of the epicenter in my view if you will, and I am very pleased to hear the focus that is being given in this area. A couple of quick questions. One, the last time I was there I visited with then President Musharraf about education. The madrassahs, he had a policy to reform education and to reform the madrassahs.

That didn't happen. Do you see any progress for that under the new administration and particularly for women to be educated?

And then also, if I could just throw out another issue and let you answer both of these questions, the whole idea of conditioning foreign aid as we are looking at providing about \$6.7 billion in military aid to Pakistan, it seems to me that we ought to be looking at ways and working with the administration to condition that upon certain security agreements, and also access to A.Q. Khan, the master proliferator who we know proliferated to Iran, Syria, North Korea, and yet we have never had the opportunity to sit down with him and get information from him.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. You know, on January 12, 2002, if my memory is correct, President Musharraf gave a widely hailed speech in which he aligned himself with the United States in the War on Terror and said he would restore democracy and he would close down the madrassahs preaching violence. He did none of the above. And the United States did almost nothing to insist on it. And so we fast-forward to 2009, and we go back to the Congresswoman's point about smart power, and I urge you to read the article in yesterday's New York Times front page because it will astonish you that so little was done. But here we are, we have to start again.

On the issue of women, I think everyone in this room knows that for Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and for President Obama this is a huge issue, and we will do everything we can to promote it in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is very important. At the same time, I need to be very clear, going back to earlier comments, while women's rights are very important, we should not be in a position of asking young American men and women to risk their lives on behalf of issues that are not directly related to our national security. Those of us who have served in Indochina and elsewhere, those of us who have seen combat understand how that decision should be reserved.

And I cannot tell you how important the women's issue is, but I have been out there. I have talked to the troops in the western deserts west of Kandahar. I have seen them, the unit I spent time with had taken three casualties and never seen the enemy. And if they say, why are they fighting, you can't say you are fighting so that women have equal rights. If we do that, we are going to fight in a lot of other countries.

Mr. McCAUL. And I certainly agree.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. This is a very nuanced issue. I don't want anyone to think we are diminishing the importance of it or reduce its importance in your legislation, but I don't want people to think as they did a few years ago that that is why we are putting troops at risk in Afghanistan. We are there because the people in the western part of the country, some people there are saying publicly that they intend to attack the U.S. again, and we cannot leave them untouched and unchallenged.

Mr. McCAUL. And I agree with that assessment. The issue on conditioning the foreign aid, tying it to security?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Say again, sir?

Mr. MCCAUL. We have \$6.7 billion in military aid, and it seems to me we ought to condition that aid upon certain security arrangements and agreements and then A.Q. Khan.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well, both those issues we addressed at length earlier, but let me just say that it is understandable you want some degree of conditionality or as the chairman said accountability. Some of the things in your legislation I hope would be adjusted. The meeting that the chairman is going to have with President Zardari later today is very important in that regard. Our meetings don't begin until tomorrow morning. Secretary Clinton talked about finding the sweet spot between your legitimate and understandable desire and the need to help them quickly.

But I do want to underscore that however the final legislation turns out, the goals and motives of, I prefer the chairman's phrase, accountability, Section 206 of the legislation, the goals themselves are very similar to our own goals. But the methodology is something I would hope we would have a chance to discuss further as you move forward, and this afternoon's meeting will help us do that.

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman is expired.

The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And let me add my appreciation, I was going to begin, Ambassador Holbrooke, by saying I didn't know where to start, but I can start with saluting you as a great public servant and one who has consistently accepted challenges without regard to your personal security, and frankly I believe we owe you a debt of gratitude and applause. You are now tied inextricably to President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton, and I think that is a very dynamic and a very productive team, no nonsense but balanced. And I believe that is extremely important.

Let me just quote the former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who I had a chance to speak to before her death; but comments that she made:

"The next few months are critical to Pakistan's future direction as a democratic state committed to promoting peace, fighting terrorism and working for social justice. Democracy is to peace and to undermining the forces of terrorism."

She made it clear almost without the ability to see that challenge through. She almost was prophetic because obviously she lost her life, and in the months afterward we are facing these challenges.

But I want to try to get to a core set of issues in wondering how we can move forward. For example, you will continuously hear my colleague mention A.Q. Khan, and I respect that, but I do think as part of our negotiations we have to probe Pakistan even though it is not connected, and I believe it should not as we move forward in your position as an envoy, to convince us that Dr. Khan is contained. Those of us who have traveled to Pakistan have heard that stated repeatedly, and as I joined my chairman for a very, very instructive CODEL, I believe it is also key that we emphasize a unifying of the government.

We had a chance to meet opposition leaders as well as government leaders, and I think it is crucial that we focus on the unity of the Pakistan Government. It speaks to Benazir Bhutto's comment of moving forward and promoting peace, we cannot do it in a separated government. And I appreciate you commenting on that, but let me ask my further question here.

I am told and I am reading an article that should come out on May 18 in Newsweek that in fact the military has made some accomplishments through Operation Shirdil. And I am wondering whether you are aware of that and whether or not those accomplishments can be commented on. They have utilized friendly Taliban, they are working with tribesmen, they are the ones doing their work similar to the Sons of Iraq that we did in Iraq and the United States military did with them.

Lastly, I think we should read into the record what the New York Times said: "Pakistan's poorest families have turned to madrassahs or Islamic schools that feed or house the children."

So, Mr. Ambassador, if you would comment on, can we not bring some good news out of Pakistan so that Americans know that the people of Pakistan want peace, want security, that these terrorist acts have gone against Pakistan institutions, such as the Marriott was owned by a Pakistani, and that we have got to push the government even as the monies are coming to put in place alternative schools, not even to wait until our money flows, because obviously they have some good dollars from the donor conference that you were so keen in supporting. And I yield to you and thank you for your service.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Let me start by thanking you for co-chairing the Pakistan caucus and saying that Secretary Clinton is very grateful that you are going to assist us in helping mobilize more of the resources of the Pakistani-American community. Your colleague, Dan Burton, is also participating. And this is of great personal interest to the Secretary of State and the President.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And it is a great opportunity. The people of America who are Pakistani are very interested in being part of this.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. You will recall, Mr. Chairman, that when Secretary Clinton testified she referred frequently to the Pakistani diaspora, and that has not been done by previous Secretaries of State, and she is very serious about it, and Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee has been very, very supportive of this effort, and I would like to just record that.

Now, in regard to the madrassahs, you are quoting the article I have already referred to twice, and I do commend it. In regard to the operation you mentioned, I must confess that either I didn't hear its name or I am not aware of what we are referring to, so I apologize.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. It is Operation Shirdil, S-H-I-R-D-I-L, and it is in the Bajur area, and allegedly there have been some activities by the Pakistani military where they have embraced the tribesmen who are working to fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Bajur is where that is going on, and we don't have enough reports to know how well it is doing.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired. Ambassador, perhaps through writing there is a way to follow up on a couple of the questions that were not responded to.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BERMAN. I am told Ambassador Holbrooke, and I wasn't aware of this, he has to leave at 2 o'clock. Maybe we can squeeze in three more people.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Mr. Chairman, this came up while we were here. The White House asked if I could get right down. I apologize.

Chairman BERMAN. Okay, so we will have time for no more than three, at the most, questioners.

Mr. Burton is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BURTON. Well, Mr. Chairman, what I will do is just try to put all my questions together so that we can save some time.

There is a great deal of concern, and I don't want to be redundant, but Mr. Ackerman raised the issue about the intelligence operation in Pakistan and how there may be some agents that aren't quite on our side and may be working with the Taliban and may be double agents. I presume our intelligence agency, the CIA, is working with them to some degree, and I would like to know what is your assessment of the situation as far as whether or not we have got some potential enemies in their intelligence operation.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. With great respect, Mr. Congressman, I don't think it would serve the national interest to pursue this line in an open session.

Mr. BURTON. Well, then I would like to attend a closed session where we can get this information. The other thing I would like to ask is we have skirted around what we would do in the event that the Taliban did take over and move close to these nuclear sites in Pakistan, and I know you have to do this in a closed session, but I would like to have you explain to the Members of the Congress how we are going to protect those and what cooperation you can expect from the military in Pakistan even if the Taliban were to take over the civil government.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. You have a great talent, Congressman, for asking questions that are very sensitive, very tough, and probably ought to be reserved. We already discussed this issue. I think it might be worth a private session if he agrees with it.

Mr. BURTON. Yes, and I have one more question so I won't gobble up any more time. We talked about these madrassahs, and the Saudis and the Gulf States have been not only helping build madrassahs and create them in Pakistan, but they have done it in other parts of the world, in Canada, I believe some I have seen even down here in the United States. They have a vested interest in making sure that Iran does not get nuclear weapons, and yet when you start funding operations where terrorists can evolve out of them, you end up maybe getting bitten on the hand yourself. And I don't know if the Saudis have been made aware of that or not, but can you explain real quickly how you are going to stop the money getting into Pakistan and elsewhere so that these madrassahs are shut down or slowed down?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Congressman Burton, you are three for three on questions I think we ought to discuss in private. This is

a compliment. These are tough ones, and these are the front edge of what we are working on. I already addressed that earlier. And I do want to also thank you as I did Sheila Jackson Lee for your leadership with the Pakistani-American community and for your readiness to participate in the important meeting coming up this weekend.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I hope we will have a classified meeting if it is possible.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Will you yield, Mr. Burton?

Chairman BERMAN. We are very limited on time.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I am only asking the question, I just want to make sure that we all can join in that classified briefing, thank you.

Chairman BERMAN. Oh, yes, I would not convene a classified briefing just for Mr. Burton. But I would give him the first three questions. Absolutely, we will follow that up.

And now the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much.

Ambassador Holbrooke, welcome. I want to just make a point because I think you did refer to the fact of the nuclear issue that we would discuss some of that in private session. But I want to make this statement in public in reference to that, because regardless of all the other issues that come up, paramount on the minds and the hearts of not just the American people but the people across the world is that this situation in Pakistan is unique because Pakistan has these nuclear weapons.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Nuclear weapons in the center and al-Qaeda in the west.

Mr. SCOTT. Absolutely, and I want to get to both of those. But I do want to say we are giving them or are approaching to give them close to \$9 billion. Our aid is coming, it is very important, it is somewhat of a fragile situation, we have got this nuclear issue. It might not be improper to have some consideration of requirements on this aid tied to and a capacity for the United States to have some joint cooperation with making sure that these nuclear weapons are secured.

And I don't want you to have to respond to that. I just want you to know that there are some very strong feelings that we make sure, and I think that the world population is looking not for Pakistan to answer that question if their nuclear weapons are secure from that, but there must be a much more reliable source, and none more reliable than that the United States itself to say, yes, world, we have these in control, the nuclear capacity of Pakistan is under control. That will give the world a great sigh of relief, and I believe judging from the information we have that we are not there yet, and maybe we can make that a condition of our efforts.

Going back to al-Qaeda, what is the end game now? We are very fearful that we could be in for a long slog here, very reminiscent of Vietnam. One of the mistakes we have is that we don't have an exit strategy, we don't have an end strategy. There is a cluster, there is a disagreement on what that mission is. Could you very quickly state to us in your succinct words, the reason I say that is because there is considerable thought within the Congress that

we have just a year here, we have a year here to see what it is we can do over there and this administration. So I guess what I am looking at is, within that year, can we clearly define a mission now? Is that simply al-Qaeda? Is it getting Pakistan stable in the region? And what is our end game and our exit strategy?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Mr. Scott, we can define the objective very clearly, and President Obama did that very clearly in his major speech and many other times. It is to destroy, disrupt and dismantle al-Qaeda, which pose a threat to us. But to give a precise timetable is to put in motion the seeds of your own failure. You say 1 year, and they will say, great, we will wait you out. This is a difficult struggle, it will take an unspecifiable amount of time.

I fully understand the desire of the American people and the Congress for a time limit and an exit strategy, but there is a difference between an exit strategy and an exit timetable. And we have defined our strategy, but we certainly can't put a time on it.

Mr. SCOTT. And in terms of al-Qaeda, and in terms of the Taliban, in terms of the fact that, is it an accurate statement from the reports that they are within 60 miles of the capital city?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Not quite 60, but very close when they took Buner, but they have been driven out of Buner, and the Pakistani army is now trying to push them back in Swat. So it is more like 100, but the difference between 60 and 100 isn't that significant. The importance is who has the momentum. Until yesterday the momentum did not appear to be in the right hands. The army has now begun a major offensive which Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee alluded to, and we will have to wait and see how it goes. I hope you will address these questions to President Zardari.

Mr. SCOTT. We certainly will. Well, I have no seconds. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BERMAN. Could we have one more?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Of course.

Chairman BERMAN. Mr. Costa from California, 5 minutes.

Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Ambassador. I appreciate your good work. You have drawn a very difficult assignment in your portfolio. I am a very pragmatic realist as I suspect you are, and you deal with the cards you are dealt and I know that is what you are dealing with both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I was with the chairman in his last visit to Pakistan as well as India, and I have been to Afghanistan and Pakistan twice in the last 2 years. Afghanistan first, how do we succeed there in which corruption seems to be, if not endemic, a way of life, and we have got the problems with the opium trade, and nothing we have done so far seemingly has been able to penetrate at the local level, although I know there has been a reset in our policy there.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. How do we succeed? Well, we are putting into place a huge array of different plans. This bill is one of them because this bill significantly restructures the priorities, and I think it is very clear that we are trying to change our strategy.

Mr. COSTA. To be certain that the money that we provide actually gets to the local levels?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Am I certain? I am pretty certain that the money in the past, that not very much of it got down there. We want to change that.

One point, Mr. Chairman, I didn't make earlier is that I am now personally reviewing all aid projects for both countries, and I have been rejecting a lot of them precisely on the grounds of Mr. Costa's question, because I didn't see that it was getting out there. Some of the money was driveled away to contractors in the Washington area or elsewhere, then it was subcontracted in the field, there weren't sufficient end use checks.

We are restructuring everything. The other day we rejected a project for support of women's NGOs in Afghanistan because it was going through contractors, and we said let us put this money directly in the hands of the Ambassador for the same purpose, \$30 million. We want to time that up, we want to come back to you in a year and say that accountability in our Government has gotten better, not just the accountability you are interested in with the Pakistanis.

Mr. COSTA. I appreciate that, Mr. Ambassador, and there is some local investments from California that have provided monies for construction of hospitals and schools, and I would like to pursue that on a separate line of questions.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Delighted.

Mr. COSTA. Pakistan, same theme, I read the article that you referenced twice now. Two different Pakistans as the article pointed out, a third or 40 percent urban, secular, educated, the other 60 percent plus rural, poor and not much education. And yet the 60 years that we know of the history of Pakistan as a government has been primarily run by the military with intervals of democracy. Through all that time corruption has run fairly consistent. What are your milestones in these negotiations with our Pakistani allies? I agree with you, timelines don't make sense, but it seems to me there has to be milestones that they need to reach.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well, we are working with your committee on these what you call milestones. I think my colleagues in the administration like the word metrics, but we all know what we mean. I have always had a feeling that if we are succeeding we are going to know it.

Mr. COSTA. And the question hasn't been asked, but it has been inferred to, we hope the current government well and that they are successful, what is our backup plan if by the end of this year we are dealing with another government in Pakistan?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. If we have a backup plan of the sort you mean, we are just going to publicly undermine the government. Asif Ali Zardari is the democratically elected President of the second largest Muslim country in the world, the fifth largest country in the world, he is coming to meet you all this afternoon, and he should be treated as the leader of a country who vitally needs our support and whose success is directly related to our most vital national interests. And to address your question as an American official would be only to undermine that goal.

Mr. COSTA. I appreciate that, I understand that.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. But I do want to underscore again this is a country that has had over half its history in military rule, and we don't want that.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman is expired. We have one last person here. Do you think as you are bundling up to leave, Mr. Ellison could throw out a question or two to you?

Mr. ELLISON. Yes, I just have one question, Mr. Ambassador, and like everybody has lauded you, I want to join in that, but I won't waste time doing it because I know you feel good about the work you have done. I would like to see us connect aid to access to nuclear scientists to redeploying away from India to more in the more vital areas and a long list of other things we could connect aid to, but how does that make President Zardari look in the eyes of the people who want to defeat him? Do they use it to say, see, you are just a toy of the West, and then use that to sort of undermine what motion he could make?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Great question. President Zardari has often been accused of being too pro-American. And please bear that in mind. He has paid a price for being pro-American while some Americans don't appreciate how much he is trying to do the right thing for his country. And I am glad you asked that question as a scene-setter for your own meetings with him today.

Chairman BERMAN. And the only thing I would say, because I do think that is a very important question, but we just have spent 9 years not conditioning, not holding accountable, and what have we gotten for that? And one thing, Musharraf wasn't was a toy of the Americans. But in and of itself, that didn't solve the fundamental question.

Mr. ELLISON. Ambassador Holbrooke, I very much appreciate your being here. I know this is an incredibly busy week and an incredibly busy month and an incredibly busy life, and you have a huge job ahead of you. No one is better able to do it than you, and we thank you for being here.

Chairman BERMAN. We are going to have a second panel now even if it is just for me. But the second panel I am going to introduce as they come forward.

For our second panel today, we have several noted experts on Pakistan. Lisa Curtis is a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, where she focuses on America's economic security and political relationships with South Asia. Before joining Heritage in August 2006, she worked on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as a professional staff member for 3 years for then Chairman Senator Lugar. From 2001 to 2003, she served as a senior advisor in the State Department's South Asia Bureau. She has also worked as an analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency in the late 1990s.

Christine Fair is a senior political scientist with the RAND Corporation. Prior to rejoining RAND, she served as a political officer to the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and as a senior research associate in the United States Institute of Peace. Her research focuses on security competition between India and Pakistan, Pakistan's internal security, the causes of terrorism in South Asia, and United States strategic relations with India and Pakistan. She is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the

Council on Foreign Relations, and is the managing editor of *India Review*.

Daniel Markey is a senior fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations. His areas of specialization include security and governance in South Asia, international conflict, theories of international relations, and United States foreign policy. From 2003 to 2007, he held the South Asia portfolio on the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State. Prior to government service, Dr. Markey taught courses in the Politics Department at Princeton University and served as the executive director of Princeton's Research Program in International Security.

And while our audience is small, it is very interested. So, you know, you could talk to a lot of people who wouldn't care. You have got a few people who really do. So, Ms. Curtis, why don't you start. And try and summarize your opening statement in about 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF MS. LISA CURTIS, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, ASIAN STUDIES CENTER, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Ms. CURTIS. Okay. Chairman Berman, Congressman Burton, thank you very much for inviting me here today to testify on this very important topic. Pakistan is being roiled by a well-armed and well-organized insurgency pushing for the establishment of strict Islamic law, beginning in the country's northwest frontier province, but with the long-term goal of provoking a nationwide Islamic revolution. Although the collapse of the Pakistani state may not be imminent, as some have recently suggested, the government's surrender of the Swat Valley to pro-Taliban militants was a major victory for the extremists seeking to carve out pockets of influence throughout the country.

Islamabad's decision to allow the implementation of a parallel Islamic Court system in Malakand division of the NWFP, which includes Swat Valley, demonstrates the weakness of the Pakistan Government and military in the face of the militant onslaught. The Pakistan military had deployed some 12,000 troops to Swat Valley for 18 months in 2007 and 2008 before surrendering to the militants. The surrender occurred despite the overwhelming vote in favor of the secular political party, Awami National Party in the February 2008 elections, demonstrating that the people of the region do not support the extremist agenda but are merely acquiescing in the absence of support from the government to counter the militants.

Washington has repeatedly warned Pakistani officials about the danger of appeasing the militants through peace deals that confer legitimacy on them and help them consolidate control over ever increasing parts of the province. Pakistani officials have rejected Washington's concerns, accusing United States officials of hyping the threat and/or misreading the local ground situation. Pakistani officials have also glossed over the fact that the establishment of a parallel Islamic court system will have dire human rights consequences for average Pakistanis, mainly women and girls.

Events over the last 2 weeks, however, may have finally awakened some Pakistani officials to the downsides of the Swat peace deal. The leader of the pro-Taliban militants, Sufi Mohammed, de-

clared in a recent interview that democracy is not permissible under Sharia law, revealing the militants' ultimate objective of undermining Pakistan's democratic institutions nationwide. And just 1 week after Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari approved the Swat Valley peace agreement following passage of a parliamentary resolution urging him to do so, the Taliban took over the neighboring district of Buner.

The Taliban subsequently agreed to pull out of Buner on April 24 after Pakistan deployed paramilitary troops to the region. That same day, Chief of Army Staff General Kiyani sent a warning to the militants that the Army would not allow them to impose their way of life on the civil society of Pakistan. The statement was a positive first step in clarifying Pakistani policy toward the militants, but it must now be followed by sustained and consistent action based on a comprehensive civil-military plan to counter the militants' objectives.

Pakistani civilian leaders have been too slow to awaken to the threat before them and too willing to sacrifice their constituents to the brutal policies of the Taliban. For Pakistan to fend off the growing extremist influence in the country, civilian leaders need to highlight the brutality of the pro-Taliban militants, demonstrating they are forcing a way of life on Pakistani citizens that is alien to their own historical traditions of Islam and aspirations for constitutional democracy.

The struggle is certainly Pakistan's to fight, but the United States can support those Pakistanis standing up for the preservation of democratic institutions and promotion of tolerance, pluralism, rule of law, and the development of civil society. Both the Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement Act of 2009, the PEACE Act recently introduced in this Chamber, and the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 introduced yesterday in the Senate, demonstrate the United States interest in developing a broad-based, long-term partnership with Pakistan.

The PEACE Act provides comprehensive details on the shape of future economic aid to Pakistan, focusing on a range of areas, including strengthening the Parliament, the judicial system and law enforcement sectors. The PEACE Act also addresses the need for strong oversight and accountability in the provision and distribution of this aid and to ensure that it is not wasted or abused. Both bills also contain language calling for greater accountability with regard to future military assistance to Pakistan.

These measures would require Islamabad to permanently break the links between its security services and the Afghan Taliban and other extremist groups. While some have raised concerns that such conditions will discourage rather than encourage Pakistani cooperation against terrorists, others note that we must begin to develop leverage with our large-scale aid programs and ensure that U.S. taxpayer money does not perversely contribute to undermining United States objectives in Afghanistan.

Ambassador Holbrooke talked about reaching that sweet spot, and I would just point out that that sweet spot would recognize Pakistan's genuine security concerns but also make clear that the United States will not tolerate dual policies toward terrorists. While seeking to stiffen Pakistani resolve against the Taliban, the

United States must at the same time shore up Pakistani capabilities.

To this end, it is appropriate that Central Commander General Petraeus be given the latitude and flexibility he needs immediately to strengthen Pakistani capabilities to fight insurgents through the proposed Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund that would allocate \$400 million in this fiscal year to build the capacity of Pakistan's security forces and assist with humanitarian relief efforts in post combat zones. While the PCCF for this year has no specific conditions attached to it, the U.S. Congress should find some mechanism to ensure that the PCCF funding for future years will be contingent on whether the 2009 tranche has contributed to strengthening both Pakistan's capability and will to fight terrorism.

Chairman BERMAN. I think, Ms. Curtis, could you just sort of wind up?

Ms. CURTIS. Yes. And lastly, the United States should dedicate diplomatic resources to helping the leaders in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India develop a different security paradigm for the region that allows them to focus on containing dangerous nonstate actors, enhancing cooperation and regional integration. And lastly, while the United States should do everything possible to stabilize Pakistan, Washington's best efforts alone will not be sufficient for the task. We need Pakistan's leaders to also demonstrate they are willing to stand up against Taliban advances in their own country. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Curtis follows:]

**Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
“From Strategy to Implementation:
The Future of the U.S.-Pakistan Relationship”**

**Lisa Curtis, Senior Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation¹
May 5, 2009**

Developing and implementing an effective U.S. policy toward Pakistan is one of the most complicated yet important foreign policy challenges the Obama Administration faces. Pakistan is in the midst of societal and political shifts that are challenging its leadership's ability to maintain stability and even raising questions about the potential for an Islamic revolution in the country. Pakistan has long suffered from ethnic and sectarian divisions in different parts of the country. But the more recent threat from a well-armed and well-organized Islamist insurgency pushing for the establishment of strict Islamic law in the country's North West Frontier Province (NWFP) adds a new and more dangerous dimension to the country's challenges. Although the collapse of the Pakistani state may not be imminent, as some have recently argued, the government's surrender of the Swat Valley is a major victory for Islamist extremists seeking to carve out pockets of influence within the country.

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The Costs of Surrendering Swat Valley

Islamabad's decision to allow the implementation of a parallel Islamic courts system in the Malakand Division of the NWFP (including Swat Valley) demonstrates the weakness of the Pakistan government and military in the face of an onslaught by Taliban-backed extremists seeking to take over parts of the province. The government's capitulation to the Tehrik Nifaz-i-Shariat Muhammadi (TNSM), led by Sufi Mohammad, followed the group's campaign of violence and intimidation, which included the bombing of dozens of girls' schools, murder of women who declined to stop work, and public beheadings of those accused of spying.

The Pakistan military had deployed some 12,000 troops to the area for 18 months in 2007 – 2008 before surrendering to militants in the region, which apparently then numbered around 3,000 - 4,000. The surrender of Swat to the militants occurred, despite the overwhelming vote in favor of the secular political party Awami National Party (ANP) in the February 2008 elections, demonstrating the people of the region do not support the extremists' agenda but are merely acquiescing in the absence of support from the government to counter the militants.

The closing of the civil courts in Swat Valley several weeks ago has belied the Pakistan government's claim that the establishment of Islamic courts in the region would not usurp state authority. In fact, Sufi Mohammed declared in a recent interview that democracy is not permissible under Sharia law, revealing the militants' ultimate objective of undermining Pakistan's democratic institutions nationwide. Pakistani officials also gloss over the fact that the establishment of a parallel Islamic courts system will have dire human rights consequences for average Pakistanis –especially women and girls—in the region. The pro-Taliban militants have already destroyed numerous girls' schools and engaged in brutal public punishments to instill fear in the population and quell dissent from their harsh interpretation of Islam. In early April, Pakistani Chief Justice Iftikhar Ali Chaudhry raised several questions regarding a public flogging of a young woman in Swat, which had been aired on Pakistan's major media outlets, prompting many Pakistanis to express outrage over worsening human rights conditions in the region since the Taliban take-over.

Washington has repeatedly warned Pakistani officials about the dangers of appeasing the militants through peace deals that confer legitimacy on them and help them consolidate control over ever-increasing parts of the province. Pakistani officials have rejected Washington's concerns, accusing U.S. officials of hyping the threat and/or misreading the local ground situation.

Events over the last two weeks, however, may have finally awakened some Pakistani officials to the downsides of the Swat peace deal. Just one week after Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari approved the Swat Valley peace agreement following passage of a parliamentary resolution urging him to do so, the Taliban took over the neighboring district of Buner. Western media reports indicate local residents of Buner initially were prepared to counter the Taliban but were discouraged by the Government's agreement to concede Swat. A local politician told reporters that "When the (central) government showed weakness, we too stopped offering resistance to the Taliban."

The Taliban subsequently agreed to pull out of Buner district on April 24th after Pakistan deployed paramilitary troops to the region. The same day Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Kiyani sent a warning to the militants by declaring that “The Army’s pause was aimed at giving reconciliation a chance and the militants must not take it as a concession... we will not allow the militants to dictate terms to the government or impose their way of life on the civil society of Pakistan.” The statement was a positive first step in clarifying Pakistani policy toward the militants but it must now be followed by sustained and consistent action based on a comprehensive civil-military plan to counter the militants’ objectives. Unless the civilian and military leadership demonstrate they are willing to defend their people against militant intimidation and violence, the Taliban will again try to encroach on other areas of the NWFP.

In the final analysis, it will be up to the Pakistani military to decide how much of the country will be ceded to the Taliban. But Pakistani military leaders rightly acknowledge that they need the public behind them before they can take on the Taliban militarily. Pakistani civilian leaders have been too slow to awaken to the threat before them and too willing to sacrifice their constituents to the brutal policies of the Taliban. The combination of fatigue from the series of terrorist attacks in Pakistan over the last two years and high levels of anti-American sentiment have been obstacles to Pakistani leaders adopting firmer policies against extremism.

For Pakistan to fend off the growing extremist influence in the country, civilian leaders need to highlight the brutality of the pro-Taliban militants. They need to demonstrate that the insurgents are forcing a way of life on Pakistani citizens that is alien to their own historical traditions of Islam and aspirations for constitutional democracy. As former Pakistani Ambassador to the U.S. Maleeha Lodhi said in a recent op-ed, the Swat deal “represents a retreat for Jinnah’s Pakistan. Whatever the apologists of the deal claim, it is the very antithesis of the vision and ideals inspired by the country’s founder, the core of which was a modern, unified Muslim state, not one fragmented along obscurantist and sectarian lines.”

The struggle is Pakistan’s to fight, but the U.S. can support those Pakistanis standing up for the preservation of democratic institutions and promotion of tolerance and pluralism, rule of law, and the development of civil society. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s blunt warnings to this committee two weeks ago that Pakistan’s abdication to the Taliban was putting the rest of the world at risk were appropriate. Pakistani leaders should be reminded that their policies toward the Taliban have international ramifications.

Obama AfPak Strategy

In his speech March 27th unveiling a new strategy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, President Obama provided a clear signal that his Administration intends to dedicate the time, resources, and, most important, U.S. leadership necessary to stabilize the region and contain the terrorist threat in South Asia. Obama laid out a strong case for the American people on why the U.S. needs to remain committed to the region, reminding that the terrorists responsible for 9/11 remained in western Pakistan and threatened the regimes of both countries. Indicating he also understands the specific threat the Taliban pose to U.S. interests, Obama said senior Taliban leaders remain allied with al-Qaeda and “need to be defeated.”

The Obama strategy calls for intensive regional diplomacy with a special focus on a trilateral framework for Afghan, Pakistani, and American officials to engage at the highest level. The first high-level trilateral meeting was held in late February and another will take place this week. The Obama plan also emphasizes the need to establish benchmarks for the Afghan government to root out corruption within its ranks and for the Pakistan government to improve its efforts against terrorists within its borders. President Obama supports a vast increase in non-military assistance to the Pakistani people, but also explained that the U.S. would no longer provide a “blank check” to the Pakistani military and would expect more cooperation in combating the Taliban and other extremist groups.

One of the hotly debated issues surrounding the AfPak strategy is whether it is possible to establish a credible democratic process in Afghanistan. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in congressional testimony in February said the U.S. should not try to create a South Asia “Valhalla” in Afghanistan. While he is correct that we cannot expect Jeffersonian democracy from Afghanistan, it would be a false choice to say we should either fight terrorism *or* help rebuild a nation. The reality is if we want to ensure Afghanistan does not again become a safe haven for terrorists, we need to prevent hard line Islamists who support international terrorism from dominating the country. This means the Afghan people need an alternative to the Taliban. We cannot go back to the Afghanistan of the late 1990s. There needs to be a credible functioning political process for the people to support and that will prevail over the Taliban’s repressive and violent policies.

Afghan Foreign Minister Rangin Dadfar Spanta, during a speech in Washington in February, noted several positive constitutional, executive and parliamentary changes in the country since 2001. He said there is now more than 500 newspapers, 20 private television channels, 90 radio stations, and dozens of special interest groups, including women’s groups, that were pushing Afghanistan toward democracy. To quote minister Spanta, “Democracy is not only desirable for the Afghan people, it is a necessity in order to overcome the fundamentalist legacy...democracy is universally applicable and Afghan citizens are ready to accept constitutional government and modern values... democratization is not a project that can be exported or given; it takes time to develop and flourish.”

Gauging Pakistani Counterterrorism Cooperation

A central part of the Obama Administration’s strategy focuses on establishing benchmarks, or metrics, to gauge Pakistan’s role in fighting al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorists. The U.S. should work with Pakistan to develop a new strategic perception of the region based on economic integration and cooperation with neighbors and tougher policies toward terrorists, including severing official ties with all militant organizations and closing down all militant training camps. Washington needs to demonstrate that it is interested in establishing a long-term partnership with Pakistan but make clear it will not abandon efforts to build strategic ties with India at the same time.

The re-doubling of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan should help convince Pakistanis that America will not repeat its past mistake of turning its back on South Asia like it did in the early

1990s. This fateful decision still haunts U.S.-Pakistani relations and perpetuates a debilitating distrust between our two countries.

In turn, Pakistan must end its dual policies of fighting some terrorists while supporting others. Recent revelations by the media and senior U.S. officials on continued Pakistani links to the Taliban and other terrorists targeting coalition forces in Afghanistan indicate the enormous challenge the U.S. faces in seeking a counterterrorism partnership with Pakistan. U.S. officials have long been aware that Pakistani security officials maintain contacts with the Afghan Taliban and related militant networks. Pakistani officials argue that such ties are necessary to keep tabs on the groups. There is growing recognition by U.S. officials, however, that Pakistan's contacts with these groups go beyond "keeping tabs" on them and may involve Pakistani security officials supporting, and even guiding, the terrorists in planning their attacks and evading coalition forces.

A particularly troubling relationship is that between Pakistani intelligence and militant leader Jalaluddin Haqqani who operates in the border areas between the Khost province in Afghanistan and the North Waziristan agency of Pakistan's tribal border areas. Haqqani has been allied with the Taliban for nearly 15 years, having served as tribal affairs minister in the Taliban regime in the late 1990s.

The Haqqani network has reportedly been behind several high-profile attacks in Afghanistan, including a truck bombing that killed two U.S. soldiers in Khost in March 2008 and the storming of the Serena Hotel in Kabul during a high-level visit by Norwegian officials in January 2008. Credible media reports, quoting U.S. officials, further reveal a Pakistani intelligence link to the Haqqani network's planning and execution of a suicide bomb attack against India's embassy in Kabul last July that left over 50 Afghan civilians and two senior Indian officials dead.

Continued links between extremists and elements of the Pakistani security establishment have led to confusion both within the security services and among the broader Pakistani population about the genuine threat to the nation. This ambivalence toward extremist groups fuels conspiracy theories against outsiders (mainly India and the U.S.) that are aired in the Pakistani media and lead to a public discourse that diminishes the threat posed by terrorists.

Pakistani ambivalence toward the Taliban stems from its concern that India is trying to encircle Pakistan by gaining influence in Afghanistan. Pakistani security officials calculate that the Taliban offers the best chance for countering India's regional influence. Pakistan also believes that India foments separatism in its Baluchistan province. It is in India's interest to ensure that its involvement in Afghanistan is transparent to Pakistan. The U.S. also has a role to play in addressing Pakistani claims about India's role in Afghanistan and dismissing those accusations that are clearly exaggerated or misinformed.

U.S. Legislation

Both the "Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2008" introduced in the U.S. Senate last summer and the "Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement (PEACE) Act of 2009" recently introduced in this chamber demonstrate the U.S. interest in developing a

broad-based, long-term partnership with Pakistan. The PEACE Act, in particular is a comprehensive and detailed statement and plan of action for U.S.-Pakistan relations.

Both bills also contain language conditioning future military assistance to Pakistan. While some analysts have raised concerns that such conditions will discourage, rather than encourage, Pakistani cooperation against terrorists, others note that we must begin to develop leverage with our large-scale aid programs and ensure that U.S. taxpayer money does not indirectly end up assisting enemies that are fighting coalition forces in Afghanistan. CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus has acknowledged that U.S.-Pakistan military cooperation has improved along the Afghan-Pakistani border over the last eight months. At the same time, he has acknowledged that elements of the Pakistani security establishment retain unhelpful links to the Taliban. While language conditioning aid should avoid sending a message that the U.S. disregards Pakistani security concerns, it also needs to convey that the U.S. will not tolerate dual policies toward terrorism. Washington should acknowledge that it understands the deep-seated rivalry between India and Pakistan and will seek to play a low-key role in defusing their tensions but stop short of offering to mediate the vexed Kashmir dispute.

Some Congressional Members have expressed their view that the Pakistan military is unlikely to alter its policies of support to elements of the Taliban, and therefore the U.S. should focus the majority of its engagement in the region on Afghanistan and supporting the Afghan security forces, while giving up trying to coax greater cooperation from Pakistan. The current administration, however, is not yet ready to give up on Pakistan. Undersecretary for Defense Michele Flournoy recently told a congressional committee that Pakistan's cooperation against al-Qaeda was still an "open question" but that the U.S. needed to "test the proposition" that Pakistan's military can be turned in to a more effective and dependable partner in fighting terrorism. To this end, the Department of Defense (DoD) has proposed the "Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund" that would allocate \$400 million this fiscal year to DoD to build the capacity of Pakistan's security forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations and to assist with humanitarian relief efforts in post-combat zones in Pakistan.

Strategy Implementation: Challenges and Opportunities

Economic Assistance: The PEACE Act provides comprehensive details on the shape of future economic aid to Pakistan. In particular, the "Fortifying Democratic Institutions" provision rightly focuses on strengthening the parliament, judicial system, and law enforcement sectors. The PEACE Act also addresses the need for strong oversight and accountability in the provision and distribution of this aid. Section 302 of the Title III provision that focuses on researching and evaluating the impact of U.S. aid will help ensure U.S. assistance is not wasted or abused. Given current security conditions in Pakistan, the U.S. will have to rely on local partners to administer aid projects in the near-term. Some portion of the aid will need to go directly to the government as budget support, but the bulk of the economic aid should go through grassroots organizations subject to close U.S. monitoring.

Military Assistance: The U.S. Congress should condition future military assistance to Pakistan on Islamabad's efforts to fight terrorism and permanently break the links between its security services and elements of the Taliban and other extremist groups. Conditioning military assistance to Pakistan is necessary to demonstrate that the U.S. will not tolerate dual policies toward terrorists—and that there will be consequences for Pakistani leaders if elements of the

security services provide support to terrorists. Such consequences are necessary to stem regional and global terrorism. Conditioning military aid is not an ideal solution since it could create a backlash against the U.S. among senior Pakistani military officials who have lost nearly 1,500 troops fighting extremists along the border and hundreds of security personnel from terrorist attacks across the country over the last two years. But from Washington's perspective, the U.S. must seek to ensure that U.S. aid is not perversely contributing to undermining U.S. objectives in Afghanistan.

While seeking to stiffen Pakistani resolve against the Taliban, the U.S. must also shore up Pakistani capabilities to fight the insurgents. To this end, the Emergency Supplemental should constitute a one-time waiver to provide CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus the latitude and flexibility he needs immediately to strengthen Pakistan's capabilities to fight Taliban insurgents. While the PCCF for this year has no specific conditions attached to it, the U.S. Congress should pass a resolution or find some other mechanism to ensure that PCCF funding for future years will be contingent on whether the 2009 tranche has contributed to strengthening both Pakistan's capability and will to fight terrorism. This one-time infusion of aid allows Washington to test the proposition that the U.S. can coax greater counterterrorism cooperation from Pakistan. Meanwhile, maintaining conditions in the multi-year authorization legislation sends the signal that the U.S. will no longer turn a blind eye to information that indicates Pakistani security services are working at cross-purposes in the fight against terrorism.

Regional Strategy: The U.S. must dedicate its diplomatic resources to changing security perceptions in the region, turning Afghanistan and Pakistan away from zero-sum geopolitical calculations that fuel religious extremism and terrorism and toward a focus on enhancing cooperation and regional integration. Efforts such as the Peace Jirga process started in 2007; the trilateral military commission between NATO, Pakistan, and Afghanistan; and the establishment of border-crossing centers that are jointly manned by NATO, Afghan, and Pakistani intelligence and security officials are useful initiatives that can begin the process of changing regional security perceptions.

U.S. initiatives like the Afghanistan and Pakistan Reconstruction Opportunity Zones Act (ROZ) that would provide U.S. duty-free access to items produced in industrial zones in the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan would also help the South Asia nations experience the benefits of regional cooperation. The U.S. Congress should fast-track this long overdue piece of legislation.

A transformation of Pakistan–Afghanistan ties can only take place in an overall context of improved Pakistani–Indian relations that enhances Pakistani confidence in its regional position. Washington should avoid falling into the trap of trying directly to mediate the decades-old Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir, however. The U.S. is more likely to have success in defusing Indo-Pakistani tensions if it plays a quiet role in prodding the two sides to resume talks that had made substantial progress from 2004 to 2007.

Through this dialogue, the two sides strengthened mutual confidence by increasing people-to-people exchanges, augmenting annual bilateral trade to over \$1 billion, launching several cross-border bus and train services, and liberalizing visa regimes to encourage travel between the two countries. There was even progress on the vexed Kashmir issue with the two governments narrowing the gap in their rhetoric about an ultimate solution to Kashmir. Both sides referenced the idea of keeping the current boundaries intact and making the Line of Control

(LOC) that divides Kashmir irrelevant and instituting some type of joint mechanism to facilitate cooperation between the Pakistani and Indian parts of Kashmir.

The resumption of India–Pakistan talks now hinges on Pakistani steps to shut down the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), the group responsible for last November’s terrorist attacks in Mumbai. If Pakistan takes decisive action to close this group down and to prosecute the individuals involved in the attacks, Indo–Pakistani talks would likely resume, and the two sides could pick up the threads of where they left off in early 2007.

The U.S. needs quietly to help Pakistani and Indian officials develop a different security paradigm for the region that allows them to focus on containing dangerous non-state actors that destabilize both countries. The U.S. should take a more active role in ensuring Indian activities in Afghanistan are transparent to Pakistan. The U.S. should seek to allay Pakistani concerns, yet make clear that it will not tolerate unfounded Pakistani complaints and accusations. If and when bilateral Indo–Pakistani talks resume, Washington should encourage both sides to identify Afghanistan as a key plank of those discussions. Eventually, Washington should facilitate joint Indo–Pakistani development projects in Afghanistan as well as trade-transit agreements that begin to integrate the three countries economically.

Diplomacy: The U.S. should quietly encourage Pakistani leaders to develop a comprehensive plan of action to counter extremist trends in the country. Such a plan would require Pakistan’s federal and provincial civilian leaders and the army to work in tandem, reinforcing the tactics and strategies of one another. The U.S. must be careful with its public statements, expressing support for the principles of democracy and importance of respect for human rights, while seeking to ensure such statements are not interpreted as interference in Pakistan’s domestic affairs.

Coordinating with International Partners: Given the high level of anti-American sentiment in Pakistan, Washington will need to coordinate its policies closely with other countries interested in promoting stability in Pakistan. The Tokyo donors’ conference held in late April succeeded in raising pledges of over \$5 billion for Pakistan, demonstrating broad international support for the country. The development of the “Friends of Democratic Pakistan” initiative also has been helpful, but the group’s profile should be raised and the meetings should be more organized and formal with the objective of encouraging Pakistan to remain on the democratic path and to foster a stable economic and political environment conducive for greater international investment.

Conclusion

The U.S. needs to do everything it can to help stabilize Pakistan, while recognizing that Washington’s best efforts alone will not be sufficient for the task. Pakistani leaders also must step up to the plate and demonstrate they are fully committed to bringing peace and security to the region and are willing to stand up to Taliban advances in their own country. Given the fluidity of the current political situation, the U.S. must also develop contingency containment strategies that guard against the possibility of terrorists gaining access to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal.

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you.
Ms. Fair.

**STATEMENT OF MS. C. CHRISTINE FAIR, SENIOR POLITICAL
SCIENTIST, RAND CORPORATION**

Ms. FAIR. Thank you, Chairman Berman, Congressman Burton and esteemed colleagues, for the opportunity to participate in today's hearing on the future of United States-Pakistan relations.

The finding that the U.S. requires a "balanced, integrated, countrywide strategy that targets assistance throughout Pakistan and does not disproportionately focus on the military or a specific area or province" is a very welcome departure from past policies. Indeed, there is wide concurrence that perhaps the only path to a stable Pakistan at peace with itself and with its neighbors is one that is firmly controlled by capable civilians rather than one that is dominated by the military directly or indirectly.

I am similarly heartened by the explicit interest in ensuring transparency and effective accountability of all U.S. assistance and reimbursement to the country. While many of the provisions to strengthen the national Parliament, the political parties, and other civilian institutions as well as civil society seem appropriately configured and indeed vital to rehabilitating a civilian-controlled Pakistan, I will focus the balance of my remarks upon the areas that concern me most.

First, all of the efforts in this legislation presuppose effective partnering with Pakistanis truly vested in change. Without such collaborators for change, it is doubtful that these proposed efforts will fructify. Yet in all honesty, actual reformers in my view seem few and far between. Some of the proposed areas of activity, such as educational curricula reform, will likely be staunchly resisted on nationalist grounds even if they say yes in the presence of U.S. interlocutors.

Pakistanis have consistently expressed considerable concern about United States efforts to "de-Islamize" Pakistan's schools. So rather than dictating programmatic areas of reform, a better approach might be a required consultative approach with Pakistani counterparts to identify areas of reform and a joint plan of mutual resourcing and commitment. Without up front Pakistani commitment and buy-in, I am simply unconvinced that these programs as described will actually have effect.

And I would like to say as an aside the U.S. does some things very well: Encouraging competition. The World Bank has had very interesting results in the efficacy of private schooling, and maybe we could talk about this more in the question and answer period, there simply is no data that support a preponderance of students going into madrassahs or that madrassah students are more poor on the average than public school students. So there are a lot of data that simply doesn't support the most hair-raising of accounts that we hear in the media, and I am happy to talk about that, I have done a lot of work in that area.

I am also concerned that the United States may not have the capacity to execute such a capacious program responsibly and with effective outcomes given the human capital challenges within the United States mission in Pakistan, the constricted security envi-

ronment that constrains them, the very real danger to United States personnel in Pakistan, and a potential paucity of credible Pakistani reformers dedicated to the kinds of capacity-building you have envisioned in this legislation.

In addition, the U.S. aid business model of relying upon layers of contractors to deliver services may result in much of the funding returning to the United States, suboptimal outcomes and greater disappointment in the failure to deliver services to the Pakistani polity. What I do not see in this legislation is any provision to enable Pakistan to increase its own ability to raise domestic revenue.

Long-term aid aimed to help the Pakistani Government deliver services undermines the social contract between the government and the governed because the government has few incentives to raise revenue and redistribute these funds as services or even to make hard choices about budgetary commitments, and I am talking specifically about the tradeoff between human capital development and military expenditures. There are simply few reasons why Pakistan cannot in the near term learn to pay for itself, and it should be encouraged to do so.

The bill also pays scant regard to Pakistan's police. Despite the robust counterinsurgency literature that consistently finds that police win insurgencies, not armies, and we are learning this also in Afghanistan, this legislation simply doesn't pay adequate attention to the Pakistan police. Yet unlike the army, which has shown considerable resistance to change its doctrine toward one that is more coinclined and less inclined to be ready to fight India, Pakistan's police have actually tried to reform themselves. Yet they are obstructed by Pakistan's bureaucrats and political leadership. Yet the police are poorly trained, poorly equipped, undermanned and under fire from the insurgents. Quite frankly, they are sitting ducks.

My most significant concerns stem from the provisions in Section 206. The majority of the proposed security assistance is aimed at buttressing Pakistan's ability to effectively eliminate insurgent and terrorist threats. While I support the sense of the House that Pakistan must be held to account on nuclear proliferation and supporting militant groups terrorizing the region, there is little likelihood that Pakistan will acquiesce to stated demands. And this puts the United States in a very awkward position of having to once again execute waiver authority to allow funding to continue.

It continues a well worn cycle of the United States bending its commitment to accommodate the importance of dealing with Pakistan, and quite frankly it undermines Pakistan's interpretation of United States intentions of how serious these issues are. I prefer a benchmark or a metrics-based approach which actually tries to achieve the same goals that you have identified in this legislation but one which provides a mechanism for verification, data that will be used to prove compliance.

And we can talk about it more, perhaps in the Q&A, but I think a data-driven, process-oriented, benchmark-focused process has greater transparency and will be more easy to communicate to the Pakistanis if after concerted collaborative effort Pakistan continues to fail to meet our expectations, and revision of security assistance is needed. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Fair follows:]

TESTIMONY

From Strategy to Implementation

The Future of the U.S.-Pakistan Relationship

C. CHRISTINE FAIR

CT-330

May 2009

Testimony presented before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 5,
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C. Christine Fair¹
The RAND Corporation

From Strategy to Implementation
*The Future of the U.S.-Pakistan Relationship*²

Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs
United States House of Representatives

May 5, 2009

Chairman and distinguished Members: Thank you for inviting me to speak on the future of the U.S.–Pakistan relationship. The findings in the Peace Act of 2009 (H.R. 1886) that the United States requires a “balanced, integrated, countrywide strategy that targets assistance throughout Pakistan and does not disproportionately focus on the military or specific area or province” are a very welcome departure from past policies toward Pakistan and are desperately needed to help strengthen Pakistani civilian institutions. There is wide concurrence that perhaps the only path to a stable Pakistan at peace with itself and with its neighbors is to ensure that the state is firmly controlled by capable civilians rather than dominated by the military directly or indirectly. I am similarly heartened by the explicit interest in ensuring transparency and effective accountability of all U.S. assistance and reimbursement to the country.

While many of the provisions of the Peace Act of 2009 to strengthen the national parliament, political parties, other civilian institutions, and the polity seem appropriately geared and indeed vital to rehabilitating a civilian-controlled Pakistan, several provisions within the legislation may undermine its intentions and diminish the United States’ ability to influence Pakistani policymaking about issues that are vital not only to Pakistan’s own interests but also to those of other regional countries and of the United States.

In my testimony today, I would like to examine some of the challenges I see in transitioning from the strategy embodied in the Peace Act of 2009 to implementing that strategy. In particular, I want to talk about what I perceive as five needs: the need for demand-driven change; the need for the United States to expand its capacity to execute programs in line with Pakistanis’ preferences; the need for Pakistan to pay for itself; the need for Pakistan’s police force to become more effective

¹ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author’s alone and should not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony presented by RAND associates to federal, state, or local legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels; and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.

² This testimony is available for free download at <http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT330/>.

in dealing with security threats; and the need for a transparent and evidence-based approach to ensure Pakistani accountability for U.S. security assistance. I discuss each below in turn.

Need for Demand-Driven Change

Most of the proposed areas for strengthening Pakistan's civilian and even military capabilities presuppose—or should presuppose—some degree of effective partnering with Pakistanis who are vested in change. Without such collaborators for change, it is doubtful that these various proposed efforts will fructify. Yet actual reformers seem few and far between. Finding such partners for change when some of the proposed areas infringe on areas that Pakistan—and other nations—consider to be sovereign concerns may be difficult.

One particularly difficult area is Pakistan's educational system, where there is a clear expression in the legislation to improve it. One area of activity aimed at improving the educational system—curriculum reform—will likely be staunchly resisted on nationalist grounds. (In particular, Pakistanis have expressed considerable concern about U.S. efforts to “de-Islamize” Pakistan's schools and they are likely justifiably concerned.)

Moreover, many of the proposed activities require dealing with the Ministry of Education, which is a status quo institution that will likely resist such efforts. Under the circumstances, perhaps the United States should consider doing what it does best: foster competition by supporting private school initiatives. Work by scholars at the World Bank has found that private schools are cost-effective and provide better learning environments than public schools.³

Similarly, U.S. insistence on madrassah reform undermines those individuals within the religious and “worldly”⁴ educational system who are already seeking to reform madrassahs so that they produce religious scholars who are relevant for a modern and modernizing Pakistan. Moreover, such insistence flies in the face of the reality that madrassahs only account for a slender segment of the educational market in Pakistan; specifically, public schools account for nearly 70 percent of full-time enrollments and private schools nearly 30 percent, which means that madrassah attendance for full-time students is almost a rounding error.⁵

³ Tahir Andrabi, Jishnu Das, Asim Ijaz Khwaja, “A Dime a Day: The Possibilities and Limits of Private Schooling in Pakistan,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4066. November 1, 2006. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=944667.

⁴ Note that Pakistanis tend not to use the word “secular” because its Urdu translation (*ladini* or *lamazhabi*) implies a lack of religion. Few will concede a demand for truly secular education. Thus, many Pakistanis use the word “worldly” to denote those subjects that confer worldly benefits.

⁵ C. Christine Fair. *The Madrassah Challenge* (USIP: Washington D.C., 2008).

These examples from the education recommendations in the legislation are merely illustrative. Similar concerns register with the judicial reform recommendations. What is lacking in this action agenda for helping Pakistan is a consultative approach in which the United States partners with Pakistan to identify areas of reform where U.S. assistance may be most constructive. The current Strategic Dialogue is neither strategic nor a dialogue. A robust strategic dialogue is needed to cultivate Pakistani buy-in and demand for reform with U.S. assistance. Although such a consultative approach is less streamlined, it may ultimately prove more productive while diminishing the inclination to reject intrusive measures on sovereignty grounds. Without upfront Pakistani commitment and buy-in, I am not convinced these funds will have their desired salutary effect.

Need for U.S. to Expand Its Capacity to Execute Programs in Line with Pakistanis' Preferences

I am also concerned that the United States may not have the capacity to execute such a vast program responsibly and with effective outcomes given the human capital challenges within the U.S. mission in Pakistan, the constricted security environment, the real danger to U.S. personnel in Pakistan, and a potential paucity of credible Pakistani reformers dedicated to the kinds of capacity-building measures outlined in the legislation. To execute this ambitious agenda, the U.S. embassy will need greater capacity to handle such output and may need to embrace greater risk management rather than risk avoidance. Without greater capacity and mobility, there will be a strong desire to provide assistance as budgetary support, because such forms of assistance are easier to manage. Yet doing so may provide the most opportunities for monies to disappear or be used unaccountably—despite the stated support for accountability in the legislation.

In addition, USAID's business model relies heavily on layers of contractors to deliver services, something that likely results in much of the funding returning to the United States, suboptimal outcomes, and greater Pakistani and American disappointment with the quality and quantity of benefits delivered to Pakistani citizens. Indeed, during my several trips to Pakistan in recent years, I have found that Pakistanis do not understand how the United States can spend so much money while they have personally witnessed so few benefits. Many Pakistanis have come to believe that the United States has purposefully encouraged corruption in Pakistan to keep it weak, which has ended up fostering more distrust rather than diminishing antipathy for the United States. Moreover, there is a perception that the United States does not deliver the most useful programs to Pakistanis. Pakistan is facing a severe electricity shortage, with major cities facing hours of

load-shedding every day. "Development" and "education" consistently rank as lower priorities than "inflation," "poverty," and "electricity and water."⁶

Need for Pakistan to Pay for Itself

What I do not see in this legislation is any provision to enable Pakistan to increase its ability to raise domestic revenue through tax reform and any commitment to collect taxes that are due. (Sales taxes are regressive and disproportionately affect the poor.) Pakistan's elected elites—many of whom are feudals or who have large land holdings—have been loathe to introduce meaningful efforts to raise revenue through property or other (e.g., capital gains) taxes or to initiate meaningful tax reform and tax collection efforts.

Given that Pakistan has been a longstanding recipient of aid, the question persists as to why such aid has been generally ineffective. (One could argue that we do not know how bad Pakistan would have fared without this assistance.) In fact, long-term aid aimed at helping the Pakistani government deliver services and provide budgetary support undermines the development of the social contract between the governed and the government, because the government has few incentives to raise revenue and redistribute these funds as services. Yet such a contract is fundamental to developing a robust democracy in Pakistan. Moreover, Pakistan is justifiably complacent about this and fully confident that its varied crises of instability make it impossible for the international community to let it lapse into further economic, social, or political decline. The cumulative effect is that the chronic interest of the international community to save Pakistan from itself has allowed the state to defer making hard choices about its budgetary commitment to an enormous defense infrastructure relative to human development and other investments focused on the well-being of its citizenry. Pakistan should be able increase its capacity to raise domestic revenue and provide for its people *and* it should be encouraged to do so.

Need for Pakistan's Police Force to Become More Effective in Dealing with Security Threats

Pakistan is facing a grave threat from a variety of insurgent and terrorist groups. So far, the army has been the principal U.S. partner in contending with a variety of insurgent and terrorist threats in the tribal areas, the Northwest Frontier Province, and elsewhere.

⁶ See various polls by the International Republican Institute on Pakistan available at <http://www.iri.org/mena/Pakistan.asp>.

However, the scholarly and policy analytic literature consistently finds that a "police led" approach is more effective than one that is "army led." A "police first" strategy puts the police in a lead role, makes effective use of civilian intelligence capabilities, and assigns the army a critical supporting role (e.g., protecting high-value infrastructure targets and other static duties).⁷ Despite the critical importance of police in successful counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaigns, the legislation makes scant reference to Pakistan's neglected police forces. Moreover, the proposed areas of police-related activity do not fundamentally address the urgent need for Pakistan's police to become a more effective force in contending with the country's staggering security threats. Indeed, as the United States has learned in Afghanistan, there is an urgent need to expand police numbers and quality.⁸

So far, a slim amount of U.S. funding has gone to assisting Pakistan's police, with the vast majority going to support the military through reimbursements or assistance.⁹ Between FY 2002 and FY 2008, the accumulated outlays for INCLE (International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement) programming have totaled \$267 million, inclusive of border security programming. This is a mere 2.2 percent of the nearly \$12 billion provided as aid or military reimbursements under the generous Coalition Support Fund Program.¹⁰ While Pakistan's army has been hesitant to consider institutional change, key police (current and retired) leadership in Pakistan has struggled to pursue meaningful police reform, suggesting that there is demand for such effort.¹¹ This has been an enormous opportunity lost. (If

⁷ C. Christine Fair, "The Golden Temple: A Tale of Two Sieges," in C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly Eds., *Treading on Hallowed Ground: Counterinsurgency on Sacred Spaces* (New York: OUP, 2008), pp. 37–65; Seth G. Jones, Martin C. Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2008); Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler, *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned* (Routledge: London, 2009); James S. Corum, "Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies," *Strategic Studies Institute*, March 2006. www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/PUB648.pdf.

⁸ See The White House, "White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan," March 27, 2009.

http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/afghanistan_pakistan_white_paper_final.pdf. Also, see the discussion of efforts to build the Afghan National Police in Kenneth Katzman, "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy," CRS Report for Congress, March 4, 2009. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf>.

⁹ C. Christine Fair and Peter Chalk, *Fortifying Pakistan: The Role of U.S. Internal Security Assistance* (USIP: Washington, D.C., 2006); Cohen, Craig, *A Perilous Course: U.S. Strategy and Assistance to Pakistan* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2007).

¹⁰ See Table 1 "Overt U.S. Aid and Military Reimbursement to Pakistan, FY 2002-2009," in K. Alan Kronstadt, "Pakistan-US Relations," CRS Report, November 10 2008. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdf> For FY 2009, an additional \$32 million INCLE funds have been requested out of a total \$1.2 billion. For a critique of the CSF program, see Government Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Increased Oversight and Accountability Needed over Pakistan Reimbursement Claims for Coalition Support Funds," GAO-08-806, June 24, 2008. <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08806.pdf>.

¹¹ See National Reconstruction Bureau, "Report of the Subcommittee on Police Reform," N.D., http://www.ncgr.gov.pk/Forms/16-Reform%20papers/police_reform7-9.doc. Note that many of these suggestions were instituted in the Police Order 2002, which was never fully implemented. Many of the most important provisions to ensure that the police are not used as political tools were removed in the amended Police Order 2004. See the discussion in Hassan Abbas, "Police & Law Enforcement Reform in Pakistan."

the security or political environment makes this difficult, the United States could consider other partnerships to impart valuable training and equipment.)

Since 2005, insurgents and terrorists have singled out the police in suicide bombings, assassinations, and other heinous crimes. In this period, some 400 police on average have been killed. Because the police are outgunned, under-strength, poorly trained, largely unprofessional, and generally loathed, they are an easy target.

Moreover, sustained use of the army against its own citizens goes against the grain of most conventional militaries. Pakistan officers have expressed their concerns that they did not join the Pakistan army to kill Pakistanis. This suggests that the continued use of the army in these counterinsurgency activities may have an adverse effect on morale and readiness for its other duties. Therefore, I suggest a significant rethinking of the role of the army in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency engagements and of the importance of the police in securing Pakistan.¹² I am fully aware that this is a long-term transition. However, such a transition can only take place if preparations are begun now.

Finally, the legislation sometimes says "counterterrorism" (e.g., Sec.206 (b)) when "counterinsurgency" should also be included. This is very important, given the definitions for these activities provided in the bill.

Need for a Transparent and Evidence-based Approach to Ensure Cooperation and Accountability

My most significant concern about the legislation inheres in the provisions in Sect. 206 that are essentially conditionalities upon security assistance. I understand and fully support the spirit of these conditionalities. The United States is rightly concerned about Pakistan's past nuclear proliferation and should seek maximal assurance that the activities have ceased and will not happen again. Moreover, ongoing support for numerous militant groups acting against the interests and security of the United States, the region, and the international community must stop.

But I want to stress that there are at least two approaches to securing maximum cooperation on critical issues, and conditionalities of this nature are only one such method.

Crucial for Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Success," Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, 2009. <http://www.ispu.org/files/PDFs/ISPU%20-%20Police%20Reforms%20in%20Pakistan%20Report.pdf>.

¹² Hassan Abbas, "Police & Law Enforcement Reform in Pakistan."

One approach embraces the unfortunate reality that Pakistan's past track record is not inspiring and seeks to accommodate the growing chorus inside and outside the United States that Washington needs to strike a better deal with Pakistan. This approach assumes that sweeping conditionalities may best achieve these goals. Such an approach would perhaps be justifiable if the legislation called for more extensive security assistance that aids Pakistan's conventional fight against India. However, if I have understood this legislation correctly, it has largely narrowed the focus to those forms of security assistance that buttress Pakistan's ability to effectively eliminate insurgent and terrorist threats. Thus, in a sense, the specific conditionalities are not needed, provided that the intent of security assistance is not undermined.

Indeed, the conditionalities on access to individuals involved in proliferation and the India-specific language used have had a decisively negative impact. Moreover, there is little chance that Pakistan will acquiesce to the stated demands, which puts the United States in an awkward position of having to execute waiver authority to continue funding Pakistan if needed. This continues a well-worn cycle of the United States bending its commitment to its own laws to accommodate the importance of dealing with Pakistan. It also undermines Pakistan's appreciation of the seriousness of U.S. intent because Pakistan remains ever confident that Washington cannot cut off a partner as important as Pakistan, irrespective of the severity of divergence in national priorities or policies.

Even if one prefers this conditionally-based approach, most of the conditionalities detailed in the legislation are either not very enforceable or can be finessed to the point of futility. None of the provisions provide a mechanism for verification, establish an empirical basis for testing compliance, lay out a process of consulting Pakistan on these issues, or even stating how determination of compliance can be made. This is important in establishing a system that appears fair to Pakistan and to Pakistanis. This is particularly critical given the enduring myths across Pakistan's polity about the "1990 Pressler" cutoffs.¹³ Moreover, in some cases, acquiescence to such demands would involve admitting to engaging in activities that Pakistan has heretofore denied. This too is unlikely to prove productive, even though the accusations are justified.

However, there must be accountability in how U.S. security assistance accomplishes its goals vis-à-vis Pakistan-based terrorist and insurgent groups enjoying Pakistan's support and sanctuary and vis-à-vis further nuclear proliferation. This is key because Pakistan's nuclear umbrella has facilitated its use of militancy in prosecuting its foreign policies by increasing the potential costs of punitive action and by ensuring international intervention to diffuse any crisis that emerges from

¹³ For a criticism of this popular wisdom, see C. Christine Fair, "Time for Sober Realism: Renegotiating Relations with Pakistan," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (April 2009). http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_Fair.pdf.

Pakistan's use of militants. Thus, while U.S. policy tends to stovepipe these issues, they are in fact inextricably linked.¹⁴

Thus a second, and I would argue more transparent and ultimately effective approach, is one that is process-oriented and benchmark-based. It is essential that these processes and benchmarks be developed in concert with the Pakistani government. Both the United States and Pakistan must agree on how progress will be assessed and how remediation will be addressed. Pakistan must be a partner in achieving these objectives rather than an adversary being forced to acquiesce. The India-specific language in the legislation is most likely to be counterproductive, even if the stated goals of the conditions are absolutely valid. If using data-driven, transparent processes fails to achieve desired actions from Pakistan, the United States should consider provisions for cutting off security assistance.

The requirement for a transparent, evidence-based process is even more important because of the waiver-override mechanism in the legislation. While including this mechanism significantly undermines the logic of the waiver process in the first instance, I understand that congressional and administrative interpretation of the facts may vary, as demonstrated by the last eight years.

Conclusions

In conclusion, I applaud this effort to interject greater transparency into the use of funds and their impacts. Indeed, I would suggest even stronger efforts to demand accountability for how the United States disperses funds and how Pakistan uses those funds. However, I urge you to reconsider the modalities of proposed assistance, alter some of its focus, and rethink the best way to ensure maximal Pakistani collaboration with the United States in minimizing both the nuclear proliferation and militant threats. Both Americans and Pakistanis need to understand how these monies will be spent and what the outcomes of that spending are.

¹⁴ See Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair and Jamison Jo Medby, *Limited Conflicts Under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002).

Chairman BERMAN. Mr. Markey.

STATEMENT OF MR. DANIEL MARKEY, SENIOR FELLOW FOR INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND SOUTH ASIA, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Burton, and members of the committee, for this opportunity to discuss United States policy toward Pakistan.

My remarks today are based on my written testimony, which is in the form of a report that was released by the Council on Foreign Relations about a week ago and has been submitted to the record. I think we are all familiar, and we have become more familiar over the course of the last discussion, with the numerous policy challenges that we face in Pakistan. We have got al-Qaeda, we have got Taliban, we have got India tensions, we have got nuclear problems, we have got a weak state, just to mention a few.

But what worries me the most, and what I think doesn't get quite as much attention as it deserves, is the need to focus on what I would consider to be a next generation of challenges, the longer term threats that we face from Pakistan. And here I would identify for you, the fact of the matter is that the next generation of extremists and of globally interconnected terrorist groups are likely to come from Pakistan. Over half of Pakistan's population are teenagers. They suffer from poor education, from weak economic opportunities, and they are surrounded by this pervasive sense of anti-Americanism that is seeping into their lives and informing their actions.

So all the threats that we currently perceive coming from Afghanistan are there in spades in Pakistan, and so the implication of this, and what I draw in my report, is that the United States should shift its strategic focus not just from Iraq to Afghanistan, not just to link Afghanistan and Pakistan, but to go one step further and place Pakistan at the center of our strategic concerns. And I think we need to recognize that in doing so we face an incredibly difficult, complicated and probably very costly challenge for the United States looking ahead.

So, in order to do this, I tried to identify what I consider to be the best strategy moving ahead. And this is a long-term strategy, it is based on two central pillars. The first of these is what I would consider to be the inducement of allies and of partners within Pakistan's civilian political leadership, within its military, and within wider society. We should use our United States assistance to empower those elements within Pakistan that already see their interests in similar ways to the way that we do and to make them more effective at achieving those interests. That is pillar one.

Pillar two is that we should be seeking to reshape the strategic environment of the region as understood by those actors within the region. We should use our assistance, our military operations and our diplomacy to create new incentives for those actors to convince Pakistan's political and military leadership of the benefits of working with us and of the costs inherent of opposing our efforts.

Now, at best, these are going to be long-term goals. They are probably not going to make rapid progress even if we spend \$1.5 billion a year, even if we place 60,000 or more United States and

NATO forces into Afghanistan. They are going to require patience, and they are going to especially require patience within the next 3–5 years.

But remember, the point that I made earlier, the thing that concerns me the most about Pakistan is not just the urgent threats that we are all very aware of, but it is this next generation of challenges that we are likely to see coming from Pakistan. Now, in the next 3–5 years, until Pakistan is capable I think of being a more effective partner to meet those urgent threats, we will continue to need to use the forceful United States military and intelligence operations in Afghanistan along the Pakistan border. I think we all know what we are talking about here.

But in conducting those operations I would suggest that we need to do our best to do the least possible to jeopardize the prospects for a longer term partnership. So let me conclude by making a number of points about how this strategy that I have just laid out in very brief terms relates to pending legislation. First of all, I support this type of U.S. military and civilian programming of the sort that you have put forward in H.R. 1886.

And I would recommend in addition to that that the committee encourage the administration to go one step further, to fund adequately the funding of United States civilian capacity to operate effectively throughout Pakistan. The concerns about security that currently dog United States operations in Pakistan are so debilitating that I think it will be almost impossible unless we ramp up our operations there to adequately formulate or implement the kinds of programming that we would like to see in the country.

Secondly, I support military assistance and diplomatic commitment over the long haul to Afghanistan. And this relates to my desire to try and shape the strategic environment in the region. We have to convince the Pakistanis that we are committed to seeing the project in Afghanistan through to the end to make it clear that their strategy of hedging, which has led them to support various groups in the past, will not work.

Now I know I am out of time, so let me just say what I oppose and then we can go on at length later. I oppose legislation that is based on conditions that would curtail assistance in the future. We do not want to repeat mistakes of the past where the implication of Pakistanis not doing what we ask them to do is cutting off our assistance and further damaging the relationship.

I oppose United States diplomatic statements that undermine confidence among Pakistanis and make it more likely that Pakistanis who are in the elite, the intellectual class, are likely to believe that their country is really going down the tubes and make it more likely that they themselves will leave the country. And finally, I oppose the use, and this is something that seems to not have come up very regularly, I oppose the continued use of Coalition Support Funds as a particular mechanism for funding the Pakistani army.

I believe that this has been a very frustrating mechanism for us, and it has been very frustrating for the Pakistanis. To the extent that we are looking for a way to improve our partnership, I find it baffling that we would continue with this particular kind of mechanism. We need to find a different way, and I am sort of sur-

prised that this hasn't been a centerpiece of our revision of the kinds of assistance programming that we do with the Pakistanis.

And I will leave it there. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Markey follows:]

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Testimony of

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**Before the
United States House of Representatives
Committee on Foreign Affairs**

The Future of the U.S.-Pakistan Relationship

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POLICY OPTIONS PAPER

From AfPak to PakAf

A Response to the New U.S. Strategy for South Asia

Daniel Markey
April 2009

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Introduction

President Barack Obama publicly unveiled his administration's so-called AfPak (Afghanistan-Pakistan) strategy on March 27, 2009. Over the subsequent weeks, the White House has also briefed relevant congressional leaders and committees, the media, NATO allies, and other regional and international partners. The U.S. House of Representatives has moved ahead with its own legislative debate (the PEACE bill)¹, and the administration recently submitted a 2009 supplemental budget request consistent with its new strategy.

While the broad contours are in place, clearly Washington's approach to South Asia remains a work in progress. The strategy's authors insist that it is intended to provide a framework, not a strait-jacket, for U.S. policy. Questions remain about the correct prioritization of U.S. objectives; the level of and manner in which U.S. diplomatic, military, intelligence, and economic resources should be deployed; and the appropriate sequencing and duration of U.S. efforts.

CONTEXT

Over the past two years, the security environment in Afghanistan and Pakistan has taken a significant turn for the worse. The spread of militancy, whether by terrorists connected with al-Qaeda, the Taliban of Mullah Omar or Baitullah Mehsud, criminal gangs, narco-traffickers, or sectarian extremists, among others, has destabilized the Pashtun belt in southern and eastern Afghanistan as well as western Pakistan. At the same time, a range of other violent actors—from Punjabi anti-Indian extremists to Central Asian warlords—operates in the non-Pashtun areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Pakistan and Afghanistan offer these groups an unusually hospitable environment, one that complicates and magnifies the danger. Well-worn smuggling routes link the region's notoriously remote and difficult terrain to globally interconnected megacities, creating nearly ideal conditions for al-Qaeda operatives and their sympathizers. The geographic proximity of Pakistan's nuclear program to these sophisticated terrorists and the recent history of illicit transfers of material and know-how also pose a unique threat.

Fragile state institutions, weak leadership, and inadequate resources limit the ability of Islamabad and Kabul to fight militancy in the near term or to foster moderation over the long run. Finally, a trust deficit burdens the United States; anti-Americanism is widespread, and many of Washington's closest partners in the region express deep skepticism about U.S. intentions and commitment.

Many of Washington's challenges in Pakistan and Afghanistan are linked, and so it is correct—and overdue—that the United States should formulate a strategy to address the region as a whole. But the specific threats and policy options across and within these two states range widely. Moreover, the diplomatic, military, and development tools available to the United States vary from one side of the border to the other.

The Obama Strategy

President Obama's remarks on March 27, 2009, and an administration white paper released the same day outline the basic elements of the administration's approach.² Rooted in an assessment of persistent terrorist threat, the new AfPak strategy attempts to walk a middle path between a narrow counterterrorism mission and a much more ambitious nation-building agenda.

According to the White House, the fundamental objective for U.S. policy in Pakistan and Afghanistan should be to turn the tide against regional militants who offer safe haven to global terrorists, and to build indigenous security structures capable of prosecuting effective counterterrorism and counterinsurgency missions. A timely and generous injection of U.S. resources should be used to demonstrate the fundamental weakness of the Taliban, thereby offering breathing space to governments in Islamabad and Kabul.

As a U.S. senator and presidential candidate, President Obama stressed that the deterioration of security conditions in the region should be attributed to inadequate U.S. resources and attention since 2003. Al-Qaeda leaders eluded capture and the Taliban regrouped in Pakistan and Afghanistan while much of America's military, intelligence, and foreign policy machinery was dedicated to the war in Iraq. The sympathy and credibility the United States enjoyed in the region shortly after 9/11 have since evaporated, but the Taliban and al-Qaeda are by no means invincible. The ongoing draw-down in Iraq will—belatedly—offer significant new military and intelligence tools to commanders in the Pakistan-Afghanistan theater.

The basic counterinsurgency lessons from Iraq also appear to inform U.S. plans for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Washington will begin with a rapid expansion of military force to confront decisively the Afghan Taliban's offensive during the spring and summer fighting seasons. At the same time, the United States appears to be accelerating the use of Predator (unmanned aerial drone) strikes against Taliban leadership in Pakistan, while encouraging the Pakistani military to pursue offensive operations against militants based in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas along the Afghan border.

With these offensive operations underway, the United States plans to start a major expansion of the Afghan National Security Forces. The United States has already achieved significant success in building the Afghan National Army, while existing programs—such as Focused District Development, which takes entire district police forces off-site for an eight-week training course, then returns them with embedded trainers—appear to have the potential to improve the capacity of the Afghan police. In Pakistan, the Pentagon has already allocated roughly \$400 million to train and equip the paramilitary Pakistani Frontier Corps and recently proposed a Pakistani Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, which would allocate \$3 billion over the next five years to train and equip Pakistan's army and paramilitary forces for a counterinsurgency mission. All of these efforts are likely to be accelerated and expanded within several years, provided Washington can supply more trainers, build new training facilities, and work closely with Pakistani and Afghan counterparts.

In addition, aid to Pakistan's army will be carefully tailored to improving its counterinsurgency capacity (rather than boosting defenses against India) and conditioned upon effective action against

militants along the border with Afghanistan. When possible, the United States and its partners (Afghanistan, Pakistan, NATO, and others) will seek to translate battlefield successes into political settlements with local populations, negotiating from a position of strength to win support against the most extreme militants and to eliminate sanctuaries available to global terrorists. Intelligence leads from newly pacified areas will, in time, help U.S. forces find and destroy al-Qaeda's senior leadership.

Quick-hitting economic assistance is also to be used to support counterinsurgency efforts on both sides of the border. U.S. forces will have access to flexible emergency funds so they can rush humanitarian, development, and reconstruction programs into areas immediately after offensive operations. This rapid-response programming is designed to win compliance from local populations and avoid swelling the ranks of the insurgency. Vastly expanded nonmilitary assistance to Pakistan, along the lines of the Senate's soon-to-be-introduced Kerry-Lugar legislation (an updated version of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2008, which was introduced by Senator Joe Biden and Senator Richard Lugar in July 2008 but did not pass before the end of the session) and the House's PEACE Act of 2009, will help to build the state's capacity to deliver basic services and to improve law and order. Nonmilitary assistance will also provide a tangible, popular demonstration of the benefits of a U.S.-Pakistan partnership.

The Obama administration is prepared to foot a hefty bill for maintaining indigenous security forces in Afghanistan over at least the next decade or so. But compared to U.S. and NATO operations, the cost to U.S. taxpayers will be greatly reduced. By helping to stifle the Taliban-led insurgency and root out al-Qaeda's leaders while building and maintaining more effective indigenous security institutions, the White House hopes to reduce the footprint of American (and NATO) operations within several years and still achieve its vital security interests in the region.

AN EMERGING DEBATE

As a political statement, the AfPak strategy has been well received, perhaps in part because it leaves unresolved a number of contentious policy questions. In the public debates that will accompany congressional decisions on AfPak funding, as well as the Obama administration's internal debates on policy implementation, a middle-path strategy will face challenges from at least two competing alternatives.

Some critics will argue that the strategy correctly diagnoses the urgent threat posed by al-Qaeda and global jihadists, but that the administration's policy prescriptions are too costly and wide-ranging to meet that narrowly defined challenge. Others will argue that the administration has astutely situated the problem of global terrorism within a regional political-economic context, but that important elements of the strategy are still too narrowly conceived or inadequate toward the enormous task of achieving U.S. national security interests in Afghanistan, and even more so, in Pakistan.

These two alternative strategies are explored at greater length in the following sections.

Alternative 1: Focus Goals and Limit Costs

One alternative to the Obama administration's approach would be to limit U.S. costs by strictly focusing on the counterterror mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan, rather than getting bogged down in a messy quagmire of state capacity building and long-term development issues. From this perspective, the Obama administration is correct in its understanding that the fundamental objective for U.S.

policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan should be the reduction of the threat to U.S. national security posed by al-Qaeda. But a clear and sustained focus on al-Qaeda will protect U.S. interests best by limiting financial and human costs and by avoiding a wide range of exceedingly complicated challenges that Washington appears ill-equipped to manage.

Building moderate, stable, and more effective governments in Islamabad and Kabul and tackling long-standing regional tensions may be admirable causes, but they will require expensive, long-term U.S. investments that pay—at best—limited, uncertain dividends. The United States has relatively few essential interests in this region; even a stable and economically viable Pakistan and Afghanistan would remain distant and poor, and would play virtually no positive role in Washington's long-term political, military, or economic considerations.

Realistically, even a narrow focus on the threat posed by al-Qaeda will require a far more extensive U.S. presence in the region than existed prior to 9/11. But that presence should not primarily take the form of U.S. armed forces, diplomats, or U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) officials. The expansion of these personnel in Afghanistan, as advocated by the White House, is therefore ill-advised. An effective counterterror strategy should instead demand sustained investments in surveillance and human intelligence capabilities as well as the means to strike individuals engaged in the training, planning, and managing of terror attacks against the United States or its interests.

High-tech platforms, from next-generation unmanned aerial vehicles to satellites, will help the United States manage counterterror operations without a heavy ground presence in Pakistan or Afghanistan. The U.S. military presence in Afghanistan should be phased out over the next several years, providing just enough time and security for U.S. intelligence operatives and Special Operations Forces to cultivate a sustainable network of local partners engaged in human intelligence collection.

The focus of U.S. partnerships with Afghan and Pakistani intelligence services (as well as with other intelligence actors in the region) should narrow and intensify on terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda, that have global aspirations. In Pakistan, the United States should transfer technologies and other assistance that will help to protect Islamabad's nuclear warheads, facilities, and scientists from attack or infiltration by al-Qaeda or its sympathizers. U.S. assistance to Pakistani and Afghan security forces should continue, but it should be employed primarily as a means for inducing cooperation against al-Qaeda. The United States should avoid investments in regional security forces—such as the massive expansion of the Afghan National Army or the transformation of Pakistan's Frontier Corps—that are unlikely to be sustained by Kabul and Islamabad without permanent external assistance. Washington should instead encourage Pakistan and Afghanistan to seek alternative funding streams or redirect existing national resources in order to build those security institutions considered most vital to state stability.

The United States should also recognize that its own extensive presence in Afghanistan since 2002 has altered regional calculations—and not for the better. An open-ended U.S. commitment has created incentives for “free riding,” encouraged the pursuit of parochial interests, and raised fears that the United States has ulterior motives for maintaining its presence in the region. U.S. diplomats should therefore clarify Washington's intention to rededicate itself to the fight against al-Qaeda, to find common cause with all actors who support that effort, and to accept regionally generated solutions as long as they do not directly undermine counterterror goals. In addition to existing partners, the United States should reach out to China, Iran, and Russia.

In sum, the United States should focus and intensify its efforts to finish the fight that al-Qaeda started and avoid conflating that specific threat with a much more diffuse set of regional challenges.

A dire economic crisis at home and a world full of urgent and looming dangers require Washington to pick its battles carefully in order to win them. In its history, the United States has rarely demonstrated a capacity to rebuild broken states like Afghanistan or to transform enormous developing nations like Pakistan. In a region where American involvement is already unpopular, the Obama administration must understand that expanding U.S. engagement and investment is at least as likely to prove counterproductive as it is to yield the types of gains sought by the White House.

Alternative 2: Expand U.S. Effort, Focus on Pakistan

A second alternative to the Obama administration's approach would emphasize publicly just how long, difficult, and costly Washington's effort is likely to be and would focus on the hardest and most critical problem of the region—Pakistan—where relatively few resources have been spent compared to Afghanistan. U.S. policy tools are all too limited, and mutual distrust between Washington and Islamabad often proves debilitating.

The Obama strategy clearly recognizes that a fractured or incapacitated Pakistan would threaten core U.S. interests, not least because its nuclear weapons would be vulnerable to al-Qaeda or similar terrorist groups. Today, al-Qaeda's top leadership is most likely based in Pakistan, along with top Taliban leaders, both Afghan and Pakistani. In addition, the "Talibanization" of Pakistan's Pashtun belt is gradually moving eastward into settled districts, creating new terrorist safe havens in once-tranquil locales such as the Swat valley. Pakistan's non-Pashtun extremist and sectarian groups, some of which were historically nurtured by the state as a means to project influence into India and Afghanistan, also have the potential to prove deeply destabilizing. Organizations like the banned Jaish-e-Mohammed or Jamaat-ud-Dawa are well resourced and globally interconnected. Some appear to retain significant influence within state institutions and enjoy public sympathy, in certain cases because of the social services they provide. If present trends persist, the next generation of the world's most sophisticated terrorists will be born, indoctrinated, and trained in a nuclear-armed Pakistan.

But the Obama administration's strategy does not establish that securing Islamabad's political stability and partnership should be Washington's primary regional objective. The White House's intensified focus on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and the Pakistani tribal belt is not misplaced, but it will prove entirely insufficient to overcoming these deeper challenges. The United States should therefore make broad and ample investments beyond the Pashtun tribal belt and in Pakistan's civilian and military institutions as a means to improve their capacity and to create incentives for sustainable bilateral cooperation in the fight against extremism and militancy over the long run.

In some ways, the Obama AfPak strategy makes a good start along precisely these lines, but critical gaps remain. While the president's remarks prioritized Pakistan as a U.S. national security concern, U.S. resources and attention are far more heavily engaged in Afghanistan. Since 9/11, the United States has spent (or requested for fiscal year 2009) roughly \$170 billion on Operation Enduring Freedom and just over \$15 billion in assistance and reimbursements to Pakistan.³ Of course, achieving greater stability in Afghanistan would mitigate some of the political and military pressures now faced by the Pakistani state. A comprehensive strategy for Pakistan should therefore include major counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan. But it must also be recognized that a victory against the Taliban in Afghanistan will be hollow and illusory if it yields a destabilized or adversarial regime in Pakistan. Tactics that flush militants out from Afghanistan and into Pakistan will

prove counterproductive unless Pakistan's own security forces are ready to mount an adequate response. Today they are not. Similarly, the use of drone strikes in Pakistan's tribal belt must be weighed against the political costs they impose on U.S.-Pakistan cooperation, not least the role they play in amplifying popular anti-Americanism in parts of Pakistan well beyond the areas bordering Afghanistan.

The United States has relatively few direct policy tools for fighting extremism and improving state capacity inside Pakistan. Widespread anti-Americanism, official distrust, and poor security conditions now impose severe limits on U.S. military, intelligence, and even economic development efforts. The centerpiece of U.S. efforts should therefore be to win trust among partners within Pakistan's military, intelligence, and civilian institutions and to empower these partners to undertake the daunting task of fighting terrorism and militancy. A policy of inducement—through financial, technical, and diplomatic assistance—is the best means to shift the strategic calculations of influential Pakistanis and bolster moderates who share basic U.S. interests. Fortunately, although Pakistan's extremists are all-too-numerous and vocal, the overwhelming majority of the country's population abhors terrorist tactics and has no desire to live in a Taliban-like state.

Still, winning influential partners will not be easy. Pakistan's army and intelligence services have been frustrating and internally conflicted allies since 9/11. Many within their ranks doubt that close partnership with Washington will serve Pakistan's security interests; they prefer to hedge their bets by retaining ties to militant groups with violent anti-Indian and anti-Western agendas. But these security institutions are complicated, many-layered bureaucracies, not unitary actors. Washington should work to influence internal debates and transform mindsets among the rising classes of Pakistani officers.

As President Obama has stated, Washington should not be in the business of writing blank checks to Islamabad, whether for civilian or military purposes. That said, the United States should also resist the temptation to impose inflexible conditions on its military assistance as a means of ensuring Pakistan's cooperation. U.S. threats of this sort may be cathartic, but they are also counterproductive; they offer easy ammunition to America's skeptics in Pakistan while discouraging real and potential allies. Instead, Washington should maintain a baseline of generous defense assistance while seeking every opportunity to enhance COIN and CT training, bilateral engagement, and joint operations with Pakistani security and intelligence forces.

To help stem the tide of extremism and militancy within Pakistani civil society, the United States should implement vastly expanded assistance programs to improve state governance capacity (especially law and order), meet basic humanitarian needs, influence public opinion, and promote long-term development. The United States should set clear measures of success. But initial failures to achieve these benchmarks should prompt new implementation strategies, not threats to reduce or revoke resources.

In order to have any chance of effectively formulating, implementing, and monitoring these new and improved assistance programs, Washington must also invest in its own institutions. USAID and the Department of State will need expanded personnel and security to operate throughout Pakistan and to enable improved cooperation with public and private organizations.

The United States should also coordinate with regional and global partners in its effort to build and transform Pakistani institutions and to deal effectively with the full spectrum of Pakistan's political leaders and parties. China and Saudi Arabia have particular influence over Pakistan's military and

political leaders, and other major donors including Japan and the UK offer valuable resources, leverage, and experience.

A comprehensive approach to countering extremism in Pakistan will demand expensive and intense U.S. engagement over at least a decade, possibly much longer. But because smart, sustained investments ultimately represent the most cost-effective way for the United States to avoid a far more dangerous future, the Obama administration would be well advised not to narrow its ambitions from the outset or to understate the enormity of the challenge.

Recommendation: Shift from AfPak to PakAf

The Obama administration should recalibrate its strategy to emphasize the priority of the mission in Pakistan and to prepare domestic and international audiences for expanded, sustained U.S. engagement in South Asia. The present approach—professing narrow counterterror goals while seeking expanded state-building resources in Afghanistan and Pakistan—may be a politically astute means to garner early support, but runs the risk of confusing the American public (as well as U.S. allies and adversaries) down the road about Washington's true intentions. That confusion is likely to make a costly commitment to the region harder to justify and sustain over the long run.

A wide array of global and domestic considerations undoubtedly influenced the Obama administration's AfPak strategy. The costs—political, economic, and military—of a lengthy commitment to South Asia will invariably require real compromises on other issues and in other regions. At a time of severe economic distress, U.S. foreign assistance programming must contend with urgent domestic expenditures. And any strategy of long-term investment requires some confidence that resources and attention will manage to survive subsequent budget battles and future elections.

That said, if the United States takes seriously the enormity and complexity of the threat posed by extremism in South and Central Asia, only a comprehensive, Pakistan-centered strategy will serve U.S. security requirements today and into the future. Narrowing America's ambition to attacking al-Qaeda and its close associates may placate some budget hawks at home, but it will do little to address the serious, entrenched threats posed by instability and weak state capacity in Pakistan.

TURNING STRATEGY INTO POLICY

Much of the Obama team's strategy is already fairly consistent with a long-term, Pakistan-centered approach to the region. In order to be more specific about how a PakAf approach should be implemented over time, and where it would deviate from the administration's apparent plans, the following section offers policy guidelines as well as a limited number of detailed recommendations. It is intended to suggest the way ahead, not to serve as an all-inclusive policy agenda.

Near Term (Six Months): A Military, Political, Economic, and Diplomatic Surge

Over the next six months, the United States should surge resources into South Asia and work to eliminate the greatest immediate stumbling blocks to better cooperation with Pakistan and Afghanistan.

President Obama assumed power at a time of morale-sapping turmoil within both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Strong and cooperative political partners are in short supply, and security conditions have deteriorated to the point that U.S. civilian personnel face risky operating environments throughout the region. The Obama administration's efforts have been calibrated to begin to address

this situation. By devoting sufficient military resources to stem Taliban offensives in Afghanistan, Washington can help to secure greater geographic and political space for national elections and development programs. In Pakistan, the United States should continue with efforts to navigate ongoing partisan power struggles, capitalize on the opportunity presented by the restoration of the chief justice of the supreme court, and advance multilateral efforts to shore up Pakistan's economic situation, all while building closer working relationships with military and intelligence officials.

To enhance security across the region, the United States should take the following steps over the next six months, consistent with the administration's new strategy:

- Increase the mass of military power available to U.S. and NATO commanders in Afghanistan, starting—but not ending—with 17,000 additional U.S. troops;
- Practice a "population-centered" counterinsurgency approach in Afghanistan, with an emphasis on improving Afghan public confidence in U.S./NATO operations, in part by reducing civilian casualties through a more selective use of coalition airpower;
- Expand the frequency and intensity of senior-level U.S.-Pakistan dialogue and, where appropriate, intelligence-sharing and focused discussions about militant networks in Pakistan, including the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network, and Lashkar-e-Taiba.

At the same time, recognizing the centrality of its emerging partnership with Pakistan to achieving success in the region, the Obama administration should shift its approach in the following ways:

- Restrict attacks by unmanned aerial vehicles (such as Predators and Reapers) in Pakistan to counterterrorism targets (such as al-Qaeda leadership) to limit collateral damage and reduce an unpopular irritant in relations with Pakistan's political and military leadership;
- Follow through on existing assistance commitments to the Pakistani military, including the F-16 program, as a means to retain the confidence of officers who have bought into partnership with the United States;
- Work with the U.S. Congress to avoid new legislation that includes inflexible and potentially punitive "conditionality" on military assistance to Pakistan.

To strengthen the foundations for political partnership in Afghanistan and Pakistan, over the next six months the United States should also take the following diplomatic steps, consistent with the administration's new strategy:

- Apply diplomatic pressure on the Karzai government and provide security and technical assistance to enhance the likelihood that Afghanistan's presidential election is perceived as legitimate both by the Afghan public and international observers;
- In Pakistan, retain flexibility in the midst of intense partisan political competition by engaging in regular, active dialogue with leaders and second-tier officials from the full range of political parties.

Over the same time frame, the Obama administration should undertake the following overtures in order to clarify or shift Washington's political intentions:

- Refrain from official U.S. involvement in negotiations with the Afghan Taliban to avoid undercutting the legitimacy conferred by Afghanistan's electoral process or appearing too eager for an easy exit from the region;

- Delineate redlines with respect to future Pakistani negotiations with the Taliban to clarify that terrorist safe havens and the shrinking writ of the Pakistani state, not the implementation of traditional, or sharia, laws, are Washington's primary reasons for concern;
- Engage Pakistan's political leadership in discussions about the security and logistical procedures planned for Afghanistan's election as a means to encourage Islamabad's support for the process and acceptance of the outcome;
- Work with groups, including Pakistani and international nongovernmental organizations, academic institutions, and the legal community, to depoliticize Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry's reinstatement and turn it into an opportunity for meaningful judicial reform in Pakistan.

To stabilize regional economic conditions, set a new tone for development assistance, and jumpstart more constructive international engagement in the region, over the next six months the United States should do the following, all consistent with, if not necessarily dictated by, the administration's new strategy:

- Mount a review of USAID's Afghanistan mission to identify programming and personnel gaps, and, in particular, to craft new mechanisms for community-oriented aid disbursement and reduced dependence on non-Afghan implementing partners;
- Coordinate closely with the International Monetary Fund and major donors to Pakistan (through the Friends of Pakistan forum or an alternative grouping) to stabilize—where necessary—and boost—where possible—economic growth;
- Announce U.S. plans for major new nonmilitary assistance expenditures in Pakistan (\$1.5 billion a year, consistent with the imminent Kerry-Lugar legislation) and begin discussions with Pakistan's government, business leaders, and civil society to identify creative new mechanisms to oversee and manage a significant portion of these funds through demand-driven block grants, a trust fund, or other widely accepted means;
- Mobilize USAID to assist—in whatever forms acceptable—the Pakistani army and Frontier Corps in delivering reconstruction assistance to postconflict zones of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, especially the devastated civilian communities of Bajaur Agency;
- Raise Pakistan and Afghanistan to the top of Washington's diplomatic agenda with regional and global partners, including China, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the European Union, and others;
- Regularize Pakistan-Afghanistan-U. S. trilateral summits;
- Quietly encourage India's new government (shortly after its own national elections in April and May) to reinvigorate dialogue with Pakistan. Facilitate early interactions if necessary.

Medium Term (One to Four Years): Identify and Empower Partners

Over President Obama's first term in office, success in Pakistan and Afghanistan should not be measured solely by whether top al-Qaeda terrorists are eliminated or the Taliban is dealt a military setback in Afghanistan. Washington must also identify a range of partners among Afghan and Pakistani civilian and military institutions and empower them to assume moderating and stabilizing roles over the long haul.

By the end of this four-year period, Afghanistan's national security forces should be ready to assume a primary role in counterinsurgency operations. Over the same time frame, Washington should aim to develop far closer cooperation with the Pakistani military and intelligence services, including more extensive training and, where mutually acceptable, regular joint operations and extensive intelligence sharing. The United States should create the conditions for effective, long-term regional development programming and political outreach by investing in new U.S. personnel and facilities.

To shift Afghan counterinsurgency operations to an indigenous lead, and to enable intense, regular cooperation with the Pakistani security and intelligence services, over the next four years the United States should undertake the following steps, most of which are consistent with, if not dictated by, the Obama AfPak strategy:

- Accelerate and expand the training and equipping of Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police to create a force capable of bearing the bulk of national combat and policing duties;
- Revamp mechanisms for U.S. military assistance to Pakistan to improve transparency and to eliminate regular points of mutual irritation, such as the Coalition Support Funds program, while maintaining a U.S. commitment to generous budgetary support as a means to build trust;
- Expand educational opportunities for Pakistani officers in U.S.-based programs, especially those geared toward counterinsurgency and counterterrorism;
- Build on existing "train the trainer" programs for the Pakistani Frontier Corps;
- Seek opportunities for joint U.S.-Pakistan military and intelligence training missions outside Pakistan as a means to improve specialized counterterror skills and win trust (and with an eye toward joint operations down the road);
- Offer training and assistance to Pakistan's provincial police forces, starting with major urban centers, to promote reforms, reduce corruption, and improve law and order;
- Engage in a quiet, high-level nuclear dialogue with Pakistan to build bilateral trust and seek new ways to safeguard its nuclear program.

To enable better cooperation with civilian political leaders in the region, over the next four years the United States should also undertake the following steps:

- Use the occasion of Afghanistan's post-presidential election transition and subsequent parliamentary elections in 2010 to encourage political reforms that delegate greater authority to cabinet ministers, parliamentarians, and provincial officials relative to the presidency as one means of increasing the number and quality of potential U.S. partners throughout the Afghan state;
- Create additional civil-military units in Afghanistan similar to Provincial Reconstruction Teams to facilitate community and tribal outreach efforts (as part of a national reconciliation effort) and to improve the quality of subnational governance, especially the judiciary;
- Increase diplomatic staffing levels in Pakistan and establish new sub-consular offices (and requisite security procedures) to facilitate political outreach within and beyond Pakistan's major cities;
- Launch a cooperative initiative with Pakistan's military and civilian leadership to improve Islamabad's national security decision-making process, starting with a dedicated exchange program and training curriculum for a small group of rising mid-career Pakistani army, intelligence, and foreign policy officers.

To promote sustainable economic development in Afghanistan and Pakistan, over the next four years the United States should do the following:

- Build a more substantial USAID presence dedicated to long-term development assistance in Afghanistan, with the capacity and mandate to support and expand local, community-based development projects similar to the National Solidarity Program;
- Increase USAID staffing and secure facilities in Pakistan to support local development initiatives in coordination with provincial and local authorities throughout the country, including the Frontier Corps and political agents in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas;
- Follow through on pledges to provide Pakistan with sustained access to nonmilitary assistance, disbursed through mechanisms that are transparent and accountable to the Pakistani public;
- Identify and implement a major, high-profile infrastructure project in Pakistan to demonstrate to Pakistan's populace the tangible benefits of U.S.-Pakistan partnership.

In its diplomatic efforts within and outside the region, over the next four years the United States should do the following:

- Institute a regular, senior-level dialogue with China on Pakistan and Afghanistan as a means to leverage collective U.S.-China political, military, and economic influence in the region;
- Accept a de facto two-tiered NATO involvement in Afghanistan as a means to improve the alliance's efficiency in military operations while encouraging financial and other contributions from member states that cannot sustain military commitments;
- Reconvene the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference (RECC) for Afghanistan (or a successor forum) to promote trade opportunities linking Central Asia to South and East Asia, and encourage buy-in by other major regional actors, including Russia and China, as well as the private sector and international organizations such as the World Bank.

Long Term (Five to Ten Years or More): Build and Sustain Effective Institutions

Over the long run, the United States should anticipate continued involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but Washington's allocation of resources should also look far different than it does today. The United States will succeed only if more effective Pakistani and Afghan state institutions are built and sustained to counterbalance forces of extremism and militancy. During the next five to ten years, Washington should draw down U.S. combat forces in Afghanistan while continuing to provide military assistance, training, and logistical support along with close political partnership and extensive development programming. Over a similar time frame, the United States should aim to achieve broader and deeper cooperation with Pakistan's defense, security, and intelligence services, enabling extensive and sophisticated counterterrorism and counterinsurgency training, planning, and, where mutually agreeable, joint operations. In addition, the United States should be fully engaged in political outreach and economic development throughout Pakistan, helping to strengthen the state and civil society.

The Obama administration should move quickly to declare its long-term commitment to the region as a means to shift expectations and strategic calculations in Kabul, Islamabad, and neighboring capitals. A new, transparent bilateral agreement for defense and cooperation should be negotiated with Kabul after Afghanistan's national elections. Washington should use this negotiation process to signal that, while it has every intention to end the Taliban-led insurgency, it does not seek any permanent military presence in the region.

In addition, over the five-to-ten-year time horizon, the United States should undertake the following steps:

- Address the daunting challenge of the narcotics industry in Afghanistan by focusing on lasting solutions (alternative livelihoods, law enforcement and prosecutorial capacity, and the targeting and interdiction of traffickers), all of which must be built upon the foundations of effective state institutions;
- Approach deep and seemingly intractable challenges to stability in Pakistan—such as the imbalance between civilian and military power, the dynastic nature of major political parties, and deep social and economic inequality—through serious, sustained U.S. support for a wide variety of educational, social mobilization and reform efforts that will, at best, pay dividends only over a decade or longer;
- Engage in a dialogue with top Pakistani military and civilian leaders about prospects and avenues for normalizing the nuclear program in ways that are not perceived to threaten Pakistan's security with respect to India;
- Encourage rapprochement between India and Pakistan through quiet overtures and reiterate Washington's longstanding commitment to support or facilitate when and if necessary.

A Daunting Challenge

In its present formulation, the Obama administration's AfPak strategy is framed flexibly enough to permit a long-term, Pakistan-centered commitment to the region. But the White House's approach is now burdened by an Afghanistan-oriented military strategy, a rhetorical nod to tightly focused counterterrorism objectives, and tough-minded but potentially counterproductive plans for conditioning assistance to Pakistan. To preclude ambiguity and build sustainable domestic support for its agenda, the Obama administration should clarify that it will pursue sustained, comprehensive engagement in South Asia, with a heavy emphasis on improving cooperation with Pakistan through intense interaction and assistance, because this strategy offers the best prospect for long-term American security and regional stability.

Implementing such an ambitious program will be tremendously difficult. It may ultimately overtax Washington's diplomatic, financial, and military resources. Nor can there be any guarantee that even such a costly program will stave off the worst threats it is intended to address. Indeed, many critical dynamics in the region are to a significant degree outside America's capacity to control, no matter how hard it tries. That said, alternative strategies that focus more narrowly on the threats posed by al-Qaeda or by Afghanistan's Taliban insurgency may also fail to achieve their goals. More troubling, they may inspire policies that undermine stability in Pakistan or fail to direct adequate attention to the many sources of Pakistani instability situated outside the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan.

Under these difficult conditions, narrowing Washington's strategic ambition would represent a false economy, saving marginal U.S. resources in the near term but creating even greater long-term threats to U.S. interests as well as to regional and global security. Since 9/11, the United States has lurched from crisis to crisis in South Asia, putting out fires without investing in the future. The time has come to readjust the balance, to recognize that entrenched threats of this sort demand enduring and costly U.S. investments, and to commit forthrightly to meeting the daunting challenge in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Endnotes

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1. U.S. House of Representatives, 2009, PEACE Act of 2009, 111th Congress, 1st session, HR 1886.
 2. "White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan," March 27, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf.
 3. K. Alan Kronstadt, "Direct Overt U.S. Aid and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-2009," Congressional Research Service, April 15, 2009; Amy Belasco, "The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11," Congressional Research Service, October 15, 2008, p.6.

Chairman BERMAN. Well, thank you all very much. I am going to temporarily turn over the chair to Mr. Ellison, who will yield himself time to start the questioning. I will be back.

Mr. ELLISON [presiding]. Let me thank the panel, and I will yield myself 5 minutes. My first question is the question I left off with with Ambassador Holbrooke. What impact does linking aid have on the ability of Pakistani leadership to advance the issues that we care about here? How important is it to be concerned about how opponents of the government are going to paint the government if the government accepts a deal with the United States for aid that conditions things like redeploying away from India, improving relations with India, things like that?

Ms. FAIR, why don't you start?

Ms. FAIR. Well, as I said in my written statement, they simply won't do it. And then we are going to be put in the awkward position of using the waiver. And so I actually have a fairly strong opposition to putting conditionalities that we can say right off the bat they won't acquiesce to, forcing us to use this waiver. And if you look at the long expanse of United States history of engaging Pakistan, we have always done this. We have legislative commitments and we always override it.

Mr. ELLISON. So, Ms. Fair, are you saying we keep in the conditions but take out the waiver, or are you saying we don't put in a waiver or the conditions?

Ms. FAIR. Well, you know, this is a philosophical question in some measure, but I actually do believe that we cannot be paying the Pakistanis to participate in eliminating some terrorists while still continuing to foster and encourage other terrorist groups. So I actually do support the idea of conditionalities, but I really think it should be process-based, it should be evidence-based. The conditionalities as stated can be finessed to the point of futility or simply refused, forcing us to use a waiver. I also think that it has to be done collaboratively with the Pakistanis.

Mr. ELLISON. Thank you. That is a good point you closed on.

Mr. Markey, do you want to weigh in here?

Mr. MARKEY. Yes, I would agree with the tenor of your question, which is essentially we are playing into a complex political debate within Pakistan. We need to recognize that our words and our legislation have implications for how Pakistanis and Pakistan's leaders interact with their own people, and we can do things that will undermine our very partners.

And I think that that is unfortunately, even though I share all of the goals that are in this legislation, I think that is how it is playing out in Pakistan's very complicated political environment. We need to simply recognize this and deal with it. Now that doesn't mean that we don't require things, but we probably shouldn't require them in these forms, and at the very least we shouldn't implicate or imply that we will cut off assistance and repeat the mistakes of the past of severing the relationship if what we try first doesn't work.

Mr. ELLISON. Ms. Curtis?

Ms. CURTIS. I have a dissenting view, sir. I think the U.S. needs to find some leverage. We have tried inducements. Seven years later, \$11 billion later, we still have General Petraeus telling us it is a very mixed picture from the Pakistan military. Yes, we are getting more cooperation along the border, yet we still see unhelpful links to the Taliban. So I would just repeat my view that I think the time has come to demonstrate that we won't tolerate these dual policies.

Mr. ELLISON. You know, Ms. Curtis, if I had more than 5 minutes, I wouldn't mind letting you continue on. Let me move on. You know, in my own district in Minneapolis, when we discuss Pakistan, and we often do, one of the issues that comes up is the unmanned aerial vehicles. I wonder if each one of you would offer your assessment as to the net utility. I mean, I know they have a benefit, I know they have a detriment, but what is the net utility of the use of these unmanned vehicles, and how might we as Congress move forward to make them effective where there can be diminished civilian casualties which have been linked to them in a significant way?

Why don't we start with Ms. Curtis since we left off with her last time.

Ms. CURTIS. Yes. Well, I think there has been success in our counterterrorism efforts from the drone strikes. We have heard that we have been able to make more of an impact in disrupting the al-Qaeda leadership in the last 9 months from our drone strikes than we have since 9/11. So I think we need to just take account of that. On the other hand, I think the drone strikes, while they can address short-term risks, they are not a long-term strategy and they can undermine our long-term goals. So we need to assess whether in moving forward they will actually undermine our longer-term counterterrorism goals.

Mr. ELLISON. Ms. Fair?

Ms. FAIR. I have a very similar view. I will say that we actually are under this belief that Pakistanis uniformly reject drone strikes. I think it is an empirical question. There are actually surveys right now being done by IRI. I have a survey in the field that will come out in June that actually assesses this. The Ariana Institute released a poll of people in FATA, actually people in Fatah according

to those data, welcome the drone strikes. So my experience in going to Pakistan over the last year is that the drone discourse has changed. People who believe that there are terrorists in Fatah do not seem to oppose them as much as we think they do. The problem is that many people don't believe that terrorists live in Fatah.

Mr. ELLISON. I am sorry, Ms. Fair.

Mr. Markey?

Mr. MARKEY. I agree with much of what has been said. I would only add one point. That is that as these strikes have been used with accelerating frequency, there is some evidence according to certain sources that some of the individuals who are most targeted by them have moved to other parts of Pakistan. This is discouraging and potentially quite destabilizing because the other parts of Pakistan are further into Pakistan, and if Pakistan's stability is a central concern of the United States, then the further use of this particular tactic may prove counterproductive over the longer term.

Mr. ELLISON. Okay, let us talk education for a moment. Personally, I will just express my own bias. I wish that we in the United States would separate this talk about Islam and Muslims and all this stuff from the other problems of terrorism. When you link them, you just make every Muslim a little nervous that you are coming after them. And so I think that they should be delinked. I think that you can carry on the conversation without implicating religion.

But let me just say that the madrassahs, of course a lot of negative things have come from them, but not all of them, and it is important also to point out that they are the only option for much of the Pakistani poor. What can we do to not sort of put education versus Islam but sort of education and Islam? And let me just make this last final comment, and that is this is a Muslim country. You know, we have to respect the fact that this is not the United States, this is another country, and our goal should not be to make it a little United States in the East.

And I also just want to say that, when you look at some of these pictures of some of these kids reciting Koran, they do not know what they are saying. They know the phonetics of the Arabic alphabet and can sort of say the sounds that are presented on the page, but they don't know what that passage means. So, if somebody who has a nasty political motive says kill the infidel, they are like, well, that must be what it says because this respected person said that is what it says and I can't read it.

Would you all react to some of that? Ms. Fair?

Ms. FAIR. Thank you. You really hit the nail on the head. I do a lot of work on madrassahs. A couple of points. The data do not support that madrassahs are the vestige of the poor. In fact, if you look at data, madrassahs have more wealthy children in them than public schools do. So I always encourage people, look at what the data say. The World Bank as well as Pakistani researchers have done this.

Second, I wish the U.S. would stop harping on the madrassah problem. Pakistan is a Muslim country, it needs ulema, and it undercuts the efforts of actual reformers within the system who want to produce ulema that are relevant to a modernizing country. Now the work of those reformers has been undermined because they

look like U.S. puppets. Secondly, and related to that, the work of Quintan Wiktorowicz and others, including my own public survey work, finds that people who are actually more Islamic, i.e. educated in Islam, are prepared to resist the recruiters' methods.

It is the people who, as you noted, are unable to engage the ill-advised militant recruiter to say actually this isn't Islam. It is actually the deracinated if I can use that word in this context and unknowledgeable people who are most vulnerable. So I actually think there are other strategies that we can discuss, and that is why in my written testimony we should get out of the racket of telling Pakistanis how to run their schools.

If Canada were to tell us what we should be teaching, we would have a problem. We should do what we do best, and that is foster excellence through competition, and there are many people in Pakistan that are interested in educational options and we should really be engaging those people who want to partner with us rather than dictating an educational agenda that is born in Washington.

Mr. ELLISON. If either one of the other panelists want to respond, that will be my last question.

Ms. Curtis?

Ms. CURTIS. I agree that the majority of madrassahs in Pakistan are not producing terrorists and there are legitimate madrassahs training clerical leaders. What we need to do is hone in on the real problem, which are those madrassahs that are supporting terrorism like the Haqqania madrassah in the tribal areas, a couple unhelpful ones in Karachi, the Lashkar-e-Taiba complex in Muridke, Pakistan. I mean, we know where the unhelpful ones are and that is what we need to focus on.

Mr. ELLISON. And, Ms. Curtis, can you simply tell us for the record what the word madrassah translates to in English?

Ms. CURTIS. Islamic seminary, no?

Mr. ELLISON. Ms. Fair?

Ms. FAIR. It literally means school.

Mr. ELLISON. It literally means school. Thank you for saying that.

And I just want to let Mr. Markey respond.

Mr. MARKEY. Just very, very briefly. The focal points for the United States' strategy should be quality education, as Chris Fair said, and training camps. I think we can eliminate the madrassah point and simply say anywhere that there are training camps where extremists are preaching and training for violent acts should be targets for U.S. focus. It doesn't need to be linked.

Mr. ELLISON. And now we will recognize Congressman Dan Burton from Indiana.

Thank you for your indulgence, sir.

Mr. BURTON. I have been in the Congress for a long time and on this committee for 26 years now, and the one thing I have learned is you can't make the rest of the world over in our image. And in many cases, you can't create a democracy which we would all like to see because of the result of that democracy. And right now in Pakistan it appears as though the Taliban, should they be successful, we would end up with a government that we don't want because we tried to create a government the way we want it to be.

So my questions are first of all, it is obvious that the young people in that country are a majority, and they are in large part being trained by I guess the Taliban and other radical elements. And the money is not there for these schools to be built or created that would teach them things other than what is being taught in radical mosques. So what is the answer? They don't have the money over there as I understand it to go out in the countryside and make sure that the people who live out there can get a good education if they don't go to those schools in most cases. So how do we get that money out there for the educational purposes from your point of view? Go ahead.

Mr. MARKEY. I would say there is a resource issue, and this has been persistent for some time, but when I talk to United States aid officials on the education issue in particular, they will say a large part of this is an organizational problem, and it is a problem of politics in Pakistan. Even when resources have been available they have been siphoned off to purposes other than the public education system. So the problem is not simply dollars and cents, it is the adequate implementation of programming either by the United States, by NGOs or by Pakistani Government itself.

And so my recommendation is that if we want to have a better window into what is actually happening on the ground and encourage quality education, then we need to have U.S. and U.S.-linked officials based in Pakistan who can get out there and see for themselves what is actually happening. And right now we lack that. We lack that both because we don't have enough people there and because they are not safe to get around. And that is a critical gap in our capacity in Pakistan.

Mr. BURTON. You indicate that money that goes over there for educational purposes is not reaching its target. Is that because of corruption in the government?

Mr. MARKEY. That has often been the case, yes.

Mr. BURTON. So how do we get that educational money to that proper use? Go ahead.

Ms. FAIR. I have a dissenting view. I really want to go back to the data. The World Bank has looked at this repeatedly. Families who have no other opportunities but madrassahs are more likely to opt out of the public school system. We have to get rid of this myth that they are the school of last resort. Families actually choose in many cases to send their child to a madrassah because it confers religious benefits even while they send other children to public or private schools. So the first thing we have to do about education is really get rid of the myths and look at the data.

Second, as Dan Markey noted, it is not necessarily a resource constraint issue. It is a corruption issue, you have many ghost schools, and let me go back to the point that I made about private schools. The World Bank has consistently found that private schools can deliver a better education at lower cost, and the reason is you don't have ghost schools, you don't have as much teacher absenteeism. So we need to really rethink this educational issue.

Mr. BURTON. That really doesn't answer the question about how we get the money to its intended purpose so we can stop these young people being indoctrinated in many cases with a radical approach to Islam.

Ms. FAIR. Sir, let me tell you, Lashkar-e-Taiba does not recruit its terrorists from madrassahs. This is a fiction. Your average Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist has a 10-year attainment. That is approximately 5 years more than the average Pakistani. So this idea that terrorists are all poor and indoctrinated from madrassahs is an empirical falsity. We have to help Pakistan develop better education and employment opportunities across the board. We know the bad madrassahs, and let me tell you they are really training camps. I have been to numerous madrassahs all over Pakistan. We need training camp-focused policy, not madrassah-focused policy.

Mr. BURTON. Well, and that is my point.

Did you have a comment?

Ms. CURTIS. Just I agree that we need to focus on the public education system, but we also need to get the Pakistan Government to increase its share of GDP that it spends on education. I have heard from numerous United States aid officials we have put a lot of money into the education system in Pakistan, but unless we are matched with the Pakistan Government we are not going to be able to make the whole scale changes we need.

Mr. BURTON. Well, since there is corruption in administration after administration and the money is siphoned off for other purposes, what do we have to do, go through NGOs? Work out a deal with the government that we are going to help build schools that are not radicalized by sending people in there through an NGO? And you mentioned that there is a real security problem.

Ms. FAIR. Private schools. I think we really should look at these schools. There are a number of very good private schools. They have the advantage of aggregating interest, they only happen when there is an actual demand, and the other issue with girls' schooling, you need to have schools that are close to the girl's home. Otherwise the family won't send them. I really like Lisa's suggestion, without absolutely partnered Pakistani interest this is going to go nowhere. USAID will tell you they can't find where the \$100 million that they gave them went. The money has simply disappeared. But there are a number of private sector schools, and we do this so well, why can't we partner with private sector schools in Pakistan or give scholarships to poor kids who go to private sector schools?

Mr. BURTON. Well, that is the question I am asking.

Ms. FAIR. I think we should look at this. It is trying to be creative.

Mr. BURTON. Well, that is what I would like to have is some conclusion on how we get the money for its proper purpose. And if we are not, then we shouldn't be sending that money over in the first place.

I want to ask two more questions, Mr. Chairman, I will let them answer those all together.

First of all, the Saudis and the Gulf States have been sending a lot of money, and they are for these madrassahs, and they have been using that money in other parts of the world as well. I will agree that the vast majority of the mosques do not teach radicalism, but there are those that do. And the money that is coming in from Saudi Arabia and from the Gulf States, they are very wealthy because of our oil money, how do we make sure that that

is not going for radicalization of the young people there in Pakistan?

Ms. CURTIS. Well, I think we have to make the Pakistan Government accountable for what is happening within its own borders. And if there are radical madrassahs or training camps or whatever you want to call them, they need to be shut down, they need to be dealt with. And we have not seen that yet. So I would argue that we need to address it through Pakistan. We can try to work it from the Saudi angle stopping the private money going in, but I would make the Pakistanis responsible for what is happening on their territory.

Mr. BURTON. Well, Mr. Chairman, I see my time is expired, but let me just say to you that it appears to me that maybe we should talk to Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States and say when they do give this money for teaching Islam that they make sure that the madrassahs that are getting it don't teach this radicalism. I don't know how that is done, but I am very concerned that the long-term problems over in Pakistan are not going to go away.

That is a nuclear power and it is a breeding ground right now for terrorism, and many of the terrorists came from there and Saudi Arabia that attacked the World Trade Center, and it just seems to me that we have got to find some way to cut off the funding for the instruction that is going to these people that is radicalizing them. And that may not be the only place they are being taught this radical approach, but that certainly is one of them.

And the other thing is Saudi Arabia is worried that, and so are the Gulf States, about Iran becoming a nuclear power and them being able to run that whole region. And if Pakistan were to fall to the Taliban and you had Iran becoming a nuclear power, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States would be at their mercy. And they know that right now, so I can't understand why they can't say that the money that they are sending for these educational purposes is for education and not for any radicalization, and they ought to be able to set standards and boundaries on how that money is used so that we cut back on the amount of radicals that are being taught in the madrassahs.

Mr. ELLISON. The chair will recognize the chair from California.

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and to my friend from Indiana, I met this morning with the Saudi Arabian Ambassador, and I asked him a number of these questions. And I suggest it is worth the time to do it because these were questions that were raised on our trip to India and Pakistan, and they have been around for a long time, this whole issue of "Saudi money." And he makes a few points. One, there are a very large number of both Pakistani and other nationals in Saudi Arabia who—surprise of surprises—send remittances back to their home country, to the families in their countries.

Secondly, that the Saudis have internalized the danger of the whole threat of radical terrorists and are looking for any actionable information on who in their kingdom is actually doing the kind of funding. They think they have dealt with the charities, but they are open to getting any actionable intelligence. It was an interesting meeting, but that isn't why we are here.

Well, maybe it is, but I want to take a little time, I had the misfortune, we have brought three really excellent witnesses who have spent time thinking about and writing testimony that I haven't yet read, and then listening to them summarize very quickly some of their thoughts in my somewhat limited capacity to absorb everything they are saying as quickly as they are saying it. So I would like to deconstruct the bill for a second and then sort of see to put it back together.

Do you think we should be providing a significant amount of security assistance to Pakistan? I mean, that is sort of a yes or no kind of thing. Everybody seems to be saying yes. And is our goal beyond just making the Pakistani Government and the Pakistani military leadership happy with us or do we have a strategic objective along the lines outlined by Ambassador Holbrooke of, one, helping us be successful in Afghanistan, two, helping Pakistan resist more effectively the internal insurgency that it faces, and providing the means and the equipment to accomplish both of those goals? Is that the purpose of this security assistance or is it a more general walking around money to build a good relationship with the government?

Ms. FAIR. We want them to be more effective in prosecuting the mutual objectives.

Chairman BERMAN. Right. All right.

Ms. FAIR. I would add one more. Ending dual policies that also cause instability in Pakistan itself.

Chairman BERMAN. Dual policies?

Ms. FAIR. Dual policies toward terrorists which actually lead to instability within Pakistan.

Chairman BERMAN. Incentivizing the rejection of what some people refer to as appeasement agreements with these forces that end up only holding for a short period of time and then come back to haunt them. All right, now if that is the goal and now we have to sell the United States Congress on authorizing and appropriating a significant amount of security assistance in the wake of 8 or 9 years of providing a lot of assistance for which we didn't have benchmarks, we didn't have metrics, we didn't have accountability, we didn't have monitoring, and I think one of you mentioned the Coalition Support Funds, which was a wonderful story of money going somewhere for something that no one can tell me what it was for.

We have heard, Ambassador Holbrooke talked a little bit about it, the Pakistan military and probably their political leadership, sees a well-armed opponent, enemy, rival, across the border on the east, there have been a series of clashes. And for them, for a very long time that has been the dominant political threat or opponent. If our goal is strengthening their ability to fight the insurgency and dealing with those people who would do us harm in Afghanistan and those organizations that would try to hit us here, what is wrong with trying to ensure that the money we are giving, that American taxpayers are giving, isn't for those purposes rather than the purposes that Pakistan might have historically used the money for?

Mr. MARKEY. It is absolutely the right goal. The points of I think some of the criticism of the way in which that goal is being

achieved is that it is perceived by those actors, and in this case it is the Pakistani military leadership, as something that is deeply difficult for them politically to accept in the Pakistani political context.

Chairman BERMAN. And does that mean that you are sure they share our goal, want the money for the same goal that we have, or that they are deeply offended because it somehow constrains them from doing some of the things they might otherwise want to do?

Mr. MARKEY. Well, I think we are playing into a political debate within Pakistan which has different actors, some of whom are more inclined to do the things that we want and some of whom are not. And our goal should be to support those actors who are inclined to do what we want and give them a confidence that we will be with them over a long haul. Now we cannot be sure that they will win the debate inside of Pakistan. And so empowering them that we achieve our success.

Our statements publicly suggesting sanctions and the implication that if they don't do what we want that we will pull the money away basically undercuts those potential partners. It doesn't mean that that is not what we want them to do, it is simply that is not probably the best mechanism for getting them to do it. And that is not, I should say, an implication that we should just simply be shoveling more money at them but that doing it through legislation is probably not the most effective way to achieve our goal.

Chairman BERMAN. So first of all, the failure to appropriate additional funds for security assistance is not a sanction. There is no doubt that some of our policies, the Pressler Amendment, things like this, constrained our flexibility too much. But I don't think our bill should be viewed as sanctions for not doing something, it is sort of trying to set up some process for continuing to do a much greater effort than we have been doing. Let us assume we persist with this effort and somehow manage to get it through and at the end of the day it becomes law and the appropriators go along with it. What is the Pakistani reaction going to be?

Ms. CURTIS. Well, I would just point out that, you know, part of the bill is authorizing \$1.5 billion in economic assistance without condition.

Chairman BERMAN. Right.

Ms. CURTIS. And I think that shows very strongly a long-term commitment and wanting to partner with Pakistan. So I think we just need to keep that in mind, and hopefully that would be what Pakistanis would focus on. I think that the idea of conditioning, while I acknowledged in my remarks that we need to do it in a way that we do acknowledge Pakistani security concerns, we don't want to come across as not taking seriously their concerns, that is part of the partnership, understanding what are your core security concerns. But they need to understand our core security concerns, which is stabilizing and securing Afghanistan.

And so we need to sort of remove the emotion here and look at what we are trying to achieve. And I think in terms of a Pakistani reaction, I think the majority of Pakistanis would relish seeing more transparency in our aid, the way we provide aid, I mean you had many Pakistanis wondering where did all that security assist-

ance go? They were wondering just like a lot of Americans were. So I think it actually helps to provide a more even keel relationship and more transparency in our partnership.

Chairman BERMAN. But that is what we are trying to do in this legislation.

Ms. CURTIS. Agreed.

Chairman BERMAN. Yes.

Ms. FAIR. Well, my concern, Lisa and I are probably on the same page on this, we actually have large areas of goals that actually don't overlap. And we know about the transcripts from Kiyani saying that Haqqani is a strategic asset.

Chairman BERMAN. You are talking about Fatah Haqqani, not Ambassador.

Ms. FAIR. Yes, exactly. So there are a number of individuals like, for example, Malvi Nazir, obviously Haqqani, Hekmatyar, that they still see as assets, which are actually undermining our interests in Afghanistan. And, you know, the last 8 years has really been a period of ignoring this reality. So I actually am very pleased that there is some effort to grapple with this. I think part of the failure of the last 8 years of programming really has been this Coalition Support Fund and the lack of willingness to demand transparency and accountability.

Now I will say this, Pakistan has developed a tremendous sense of entitlement to United States funding. Therefore, not appropriating does seem redolent of in fact some kind of sanction. But what is interesting about this bill, which makes the issues of conditionality much more challenging, is that you have already narrowly focused the majority of the assistance to helping them do the things that we want them to do, which is go after the bad guys.

But we have seen in the last couple of years that the sense of the Congress has actually been overridden. We saw the discussion a couple years back that F-16s are an effective counterinsurgency tool. So, if you are confident that the money is going to be spent on the stuff you want them to do, there is an argument to be made that the conditionalities in state are kind of irrelevant. I mean, to play devil's advocate, do we really want to constrain ourselves from helping the Pakistanis go after the people we want them to go after?

Chairman BERMAN. To constrain ourselves from?

Ms. FAIR. Basically most of the aid is going to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism.

Chairman BERMAN. So the limitation that says 75 percent of this money has to go to those purposes doesn't bother you?

Ms. FAIR. No, I actually very much support that. The long haul of United States-Pakistan relations has been Pakistan saying I support your strategic goals when in fact it doesn't, and it uses that assistance to prepare itself for its strategic goal, which is its fight with India. So I have long been saying get rid of CSF, this should really be a collaborative programming to help them do the things that they want to do.

Now the Army has been very clear, they don't want to become a counterinsurgency force, which is why I say in my written testimony we have missed an enormous opportunity.

Chairman BERMAN. Yes, on the police. And we do have some reference to it, but we are going to expand that. We take your point on that.

Mr. MARKEY. Just to respond to the specific question of how the Pakistanis respond assuming that this became law. They will take the money, those within the Pakistani military will, some of them, resent us.

Chairman BERMAN. They are not going to get money. They are going to get equipment, they are going to get material, they are going to get training.

Mr. MARKEY. Well, they will take all of that and they will take the \$1.5 billion on the civilian side. So internally there will be some resentment and some grumbling. This will not help us in internal debates within the Pakistani Army, to the extent that we care about that, then they will proceed to fail on a number of accounts that have been laid out within the legislation. They will not achieve all of the things that we want, including, for instance, providing A.Q. Khan, I am almost 100 percent sure of that.

Chairman BERMAN. The bill doesn't require them to provide A.Q. Khan.

Mr. MARKEY. I understand. And then we will come back to them.

Chairman BERMAN. But if you understand, then what?

Mr. MARKEY. Well, I am saying this is a request that we have that it was the sense of the Congress that they should pony up A.Q. Khan.

Chairman BERMAN. No, we said that they should work with us to dismantle this proliferation network, and if it is necessary, include in that access to people who were involved.

Mr. MARKEY. Okay, that is fair. There will be other areas where they will fail to meet our stated goals, probably including there will be evidence of some continued collaboration, cooperation, assistance, passive or active, with groups that we perceive to be working counter to our purposes. I think that is fair to say. A year from now we will come back and the administration will be in a tough position of having to ask for waivers, and then we will be back, and it is hard to see where that benefits the broader, longer term goal of building up partners in Pakistan's state, society and military who are willing to work with us.

Chairman BERMAN. See, I look at it a little differently. I think fundamentally we are really only requiring two things: One, that the President, after looking at everything, conclude, one, that Pakistan is committed to this counterinsurgency campaign, and secondly that he thinks on balance you have the negatives, you have the positives, it is not going to be perfect, we know that on balance they are making some progress, whether it is because of that commitment and because of the assistance we are giving them and their own contributions, making some progress in dealing with it. And then everything else is just sort of indicators, not an exclusive list of them, of what they should be doing. And it doesn't seem like a huge reach when you are asking the Congress to do all this to at least sort of lay out what we expect to get here.

Mr. MARKEY. Then I think the earlier discussion of the sweet spot and the framing of precisely the kind of language that would

be less difficult for Pakistanis to take is exactly the way to go. And that sounds like the way you are going, so that is great.

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you.

Mr. ELLISON. The gentlelady from Texas is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank the chairman. And the good news is that the bells are 50 minutes to vote, so I have a long time to talk with you. Let me thank the chairman for this hearing, and both chairpersons, the presiding chairperson as well, and allow me to express some widely held levels of frustration.

If you doom a person or a country to fail, they will fail. And to a large degree I have heard discussions of failure, and it is frustrating. I think we need to recount the history of Pakistan, its original founder, even though it was founded out of the dissecting of the large area that now includes India and Bangladesh for reasons that we might debate now, Mr. Jinnah was a person who believed in democracy, though he acknowledged the distinctions between those who lived predominantly in the territory where India and the differences as relates to Islam and wanted to have a country of Muslims, but he believed in democracy.

Secondarily, my understanding is that Pakistan did wage a valiant battle during the 20-year Afghan-Russian war and worked alongside of the United States, and we are still reminded of that departure.

Thirdly, there is a vast constituency of educated Pakistanis of business class and others who want a stable Pakistan. Does anyone care about working with them? You cannot move forward if you do not allow some good news to come out of Pakistan. And from experts to a range of others we can't seem to capture any good news.

Now I join with my colleagues, I believe we have to get to the bottom of A.Q. Khan, if that requires some classified briefings which we need to have, and I thank the chairman for helping us and assisting us with that. That is vital because we need to get an understanding of where we stand as relates to A.Q. Khan's proliferation, continued dialogue, what he did in the past. But I do think it is worth noting that there were briefings last week at the White House and the administration came away with a certain calm about whether or not they were proliferating nuclear secrets. So let me start with that premise. I have laid my cards on the table and I appreciate that some of you as witnesses have been indicating let us look at the facts.

Ms. FAIR, is there not a contingent of peace-loving, democracy-loving Pakistanis that live in Pakistan?

Ms. FAIR. Actually, you know, I have done survey work on this issue. I have a survey right now going into the field of 6,000 people with a colleague at Princeton, we are looking at exactly this. In the survey that I fielded in 2007 when I was with the U.S. Institute of Peace, while the vast majority of folks did find al-Qaeda and other militant groups to be a significant threat, I did find anywhere between one in three and one in five largely urban respondents actually supported considerably or in a great deal a variety of militant attacks that we gave them to respond to.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And what were these urban persons that you polled? Do you have an economic base, an educational base?

Ms. FAIR. As a matter of fact I would be happy to brief you if you are interested in this. My colleague at Princeton, he is an econometrician, so we were able to cross-walk our data with household economic survey data, and we had a number of very surprising results, not surprising to us because it is a very robust result across work in a variety of countries. The least poor and the rich were not the ones who supported these terrorist groups on the main. It was actually the middle class, it is that very middle class that everyone talks about strengthening. The least educated are not the ones that worry about this. Again, it is the people who are right in the middle.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And the least educated dominate Pakistan, is that correct?

Ms. FAIR. Well, it depends on the metrics.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Yes, they do. The least educated dominate, the poor are the greater population in Pakistan.

Ms. FAIR. Yes, absolutely, there is no question.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So then we have a good base between the poor and the very rich that we could at least begin with, and we certainly have to address the question of the middle educated. And I am not doubting your data. In fact I am very glad and I would like to have a briefing, but my belief is that if we cannot find some common ground to work with, they are going to fail. I do think it is important for there to be a stable government, and so my question would be to Mr. Markey, the importance of possibly a unity government between the Sharif brothers and the present government, if that has any possibility or legs to it.

Mr. MARKEY. Well, as we have seen over the past year, there are a lot of possible configurations you could have in Pakistani politics. But the kind of debate that we have seen emerge and the kind of recurrent disagreements between those two parties over the past several months lead me to believe that there is a great deal of question that you would see a true unity government. But what you have seen is the return of a PMLN government, Nawaz Sharif's brother, Shahbaz Sharif, heading up in Punjab, and a center government by the PPP. This could conceivably be a relatively reasonable stable way to move ahead over the next several years. But that is not necessarily a unity government.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. No, and I understand that and I take your comment on that. I think your comment is instructive. So we should try to encourage at least dialogue, resolution around issues, and so as we discuss and have meetings with our friends this week from Pakistan we should emphasize that level of stability if we can.

Mr. MARKEY. Absolutely.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And that would not be considered intrusive. You were I guess in the audience when Ambassador Holbrooke spoke, and you know that his mission is Afghanistan and Pakistan. I have always made the argument that there should be a regional effort. Obviously the plate would be very full, but we should never leave out Bangladesh. We are delighted that they are at least not in the mainstream news at this point, we thank them for that having visited them some years ago.

And India, though we recognize that India doesn't want that to be their defining definition to the world. And I appreciate that, but

is there some value to looking forward, putting aside some of the mountains we have to climb, Kashmir, Mumbai, but should there be some sort of regional discussions so that there are some discussions that we foster if you will that would include India, Afghanistan, Pakistan and maybe even Bangladesh?

Mr. MARKEY. Absolutely, there should be a regional discussion. I would extend the regional discussion to go to China, to go to Saudi Arabia, which has come up in some of the earlier conversation here. But the problem is that in the particular instance of India, there is as much chance that if we extend say the writ of Ambassador Holbrooke to India that it is a counterproductive move to do it publicly. And to try to make that kind of conversation a broad diplomatic one with a high level of intense focus publicly, that may actually hurt us. So it is probably better, and I think most people have come around to the idea, that India needs to be a part of our strategic view of the region, but it may not need to be central to our diplomacy in a public sense.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, I think you have answered the question there should be a regional approach and the tactics is something that we should be sensitive to. And I agree, that is why I started by saying, they are not necessarily interested in being defined in that manner.

Let me emphasize to all of you to answer this one. I think Chairman Berman has struck a very effective cord, there seems to be some discord about how that works, but we understand that the madrassah, if I could finish this question I would appreciate it, if the madrassah is a school, the Taliban is a student. How much more can we do to get Pakistan to put real schools in place for these poor people mostly?

Ms. FAIR. The vast majority of madrassahs, there are actually different kinds of madrassahs. There is primary madrassahs where children simply learn to memorize the Koran as a part of going to other schools. So we have to really think about what a madrassah is, and as Lisa Curtis has said, we actually know with some certainty where the bad madrassahs are, and in many cases what we really should be focusing on, training camps.

I don't believe that the Ministry of Education is a partner. It is a status quo institution. No ministry or department of education wants to be told what their curriculum is. But there are a number, and I will tell you there is an interesting survey of students about their attitudes toward militancy, and it would perhaps not surprise you that the attitudes of madrassah students and public school students toward militancy is actually not that dissimilar. The private school students, well, let me put it to you this way, I want to live next to their houses.

So I think we really need to be creative. The private school sector is growing, it accounts for 30 percent of Pakistan's student body that attend school full-time. Public schools are 70 percent, madrassahs are a rounding error. So I think we need to be creative. We need to work with people who want to work with us. All parents in Pakistan, they want their kids to be well-prepared for the workplace, they want jobs for their kids, but we should really not underestimate the degree to which they want their children to be good Muslims.

There are a lot of parallels to be drawn I think to the parochial school movement here at the turn of the century. And rather than alienating people who want religion in their schools, maybe we should be partnering up with organizations that do parochial schooling here because I think they share many of the same values. There are many Islamic schools here in the States who have struck a balance between producing good Muslim values and also producing a good education.

This goes back to your diaspora question. We have got loads of Pakistanis here that find a way of balancing their commitment to Islam and their commitment to educating their children, and these are the sorts of organizations that we should be engaging to go back to Pakistan and help madrassahs professionalize. Again, not all madrassahs are simply teaching Koranic memorization. Jamat Islami madrassahs since the 1960s have been teaching a social studies curriculum, and many people will tell you that a Jamat Islami madrassah is better than your average Pakistani public school. So we really do need to rethink the way we conceive of the Pakistan educational problem. There are more solutions out there than I think we give ourselves credit for.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence.

And I thank the witnesses and look forward to working with the Pakistan community.

Mr. ELLISON. Additional answers will be submitted for the record. Without objection, members who were unable to make an opening statement may submit the statements for the record. Without objection, the full testimony of the witnesses on the second panel shall be made part of the record. This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE

Committee on Foreign Affairs

U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515-0128

Howard L. Berman (D-CA), Chairman

April 30, 2009

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be held in **Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building**:

DATE: Tuesday, May 5, 2009

TIME: 12:15 p.m.

SUBJECT: From Strategy to Implementation: The Future of the U.S.-Pakistan Relationship

WITNESSES: **Panel I**
The Honorable Richard C. Holbrooke
Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan

Panel II
Ms. Lisa Curtis
Senior Research Fellow
Asian Studies Center
The Heritage Foundation

Ms. C. Christine Fair
Senior Political Scientist
RAND Corporation

Mr. Daniel Markey
Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia
Council on Foreign Relations

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202-225-5021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MINUTES OF FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

Day Tuesday Date 5/5/09 Room 2172 RHOB

Starting Time 12:20 p.m. Ending Time 3:21 p.m.

Recesses ☐ (to)

Presiding Member(s) Howard L. Berman (CA), Chairman; Keith Ellison (MN)

CHECK ALL OF THE FOLLOWING THAT APPLY:

Open Session ☒ Electronically Recorded (taped) ☒
 Executive (closed) Session ☐ Stenographic Record ☒
 Televised ☒

TITLE OF HEARING or BILLS FOR MARKUP: (Include bill number(s) and title(s) of legislation.)
From Strategy to Implementation: The Future of the U.S.-Pakistan Relationship

COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

see attached

NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

n/a

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes ☒ No ☐
 (If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.)

Statement of Mansoor Ijaz, submitted by Jeff Flake
IPS article titled "US Lacks Capacity to Win Over Afghans" dated 4/21/09 submitted by Barbara Lee


ACTIONS TAKEN DURING THE MARKUP: (Attach copies of legislation and amendments.)

RECORDED VOTES TAKEN (FOR MARKUP): (Attach final vote tally sheet listing each member.)

Subject	Yeas	Nays	Present	Not Voting
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TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE _____

or
 TIME ADJOURNED 3:21pm



Doug Campbell, Deputy Staff Director

Attendance - HCFA Full Committee
From Strategy to Implementation: The Future of the U.S.-Pakistan Relationship
Tuesday, May 5, 2009 @ 12:15 p.m. , 2172 RHOB

Howard L. Berman (CA)	Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, (FL)
Gary Ackerman (NY)	Christopher H. Smith (NJ)
Brad Sherman (CA)	Dan Burton (IN)
Robert Wexler (FL)	Dana Rohrabacher (CA)
Eliot L. Engel (NY)	Donald Manzullo (IL)
Diane E. Watson (CA)	Edward R. Royce (CA)
Gerald E. Connolly (VA)	Ron Paul (TX)
Michael E. McMahon (NY)	Jeff Flake (AZ)
John S. Tanner (TN)	John Boozman (AR)
Lynn C. Woolsey (CA)	Connie Mack (FL)
Sheila Jackson-Lee (TX)	Michael T. McCaul (TX)
Barbara Lee (CA)	Ted Poe (TX)
Brad Miller (NC)	Bob Inglis (SC)
David Scott (GA)	
Jim Costa (CA)	
Keith Ellison (MN)	
Ron Klein (FL)	

Verbatim, as delivered

May 5, 2009

Chairman Berman's opening statement at hearing, "From Strategy to Implementation: The Future of the U.S.-Pakistan Relationship."

It's a real pleasure for me to welcome Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, to the Committee this afternoon for his first appearance testifying before Congress in his new capacity, although he's been to this committee a number of times over the years.

We know you have an extremely busy schedule, particularly with the second round of trilateral U.S.-Afghanistan-Pakistan meetings starting tomorrow. We appreciate your taking the time to be here.

Our second panel this afternoon will feature several noted regional experts, including Christine Fair from the RAND Corporation, Lisa Curtis from the Heritage Foundation, and Dan Markey from the Council on Foreign Relations.

Ambassador Holbrooke, all of us are deeply concerned about the deteriorating security situation in Pakistan.

As I noted in our recent hearing with Secretary Clinton, the United States has an enormous stake in the security and stability of that country. We can't allow al Qaeda or any other terrorist group that threatens our national security to operate with impunity in the tribal regions of Pakistan. Nor can we permit the Pakistani state – and its nuclear arsenal – to be taken over by the Taliban.

In short, it appears to many of us that Pakistan is at a tipping point – and we need to do whatever we can to make sure it goes the right way.

We know you understand the gravity of the situation, and commend you and your colleagues in the Obama Administration for developing a comprehensive Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy.

But now comes the hard part – translating that thoughtful strategy into real changes on the ground.

How can the United States forge a true strategic partnership with Pakistan? What can we do to strengthen Pakistan's democratic government, and to make it a force for stability in a volatile region?

To help achieve those goals, a bipartisan group of my colleagues and I recently introduced H.R. 1886, the Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement Act.

This legislation would massively expand economic, social and democracy assistance to Pakistan, and also provide a significant increase in military assistance.

Specifically, the bill provides funding to strengthen the capacity of Pakistan's democratic institutions, including its parliament, judicial system and law enforcement agencies. It also calls for increased assistance for Pakistan's public education system, with an emphasis on access for women and girls. To demonstrate America's long-term commitment to the stability and democratic future of Pakistan,

H.R. 1886 authorizes a permanent fund in the U.S. Treasury that will serve as a conduit for most non-military assistance to Pakistan.

With regard to military assistance, our legislation increases funding for professional military education, with an emphasis on training in counterinsurgency and in civil-military relationships.

It boosts the funding available for Pakistan to purchase military equipment, and requires that 75 percent of those funds be used for items directly related to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism.

The legislation also codifies the 2006 contract between the United States and Pakistan that requires Pakistan to pay for F-16 fighter aircraft with its own national funds, rather than American tax dollars.

To strengthen civilian control of the military, H.R. 1886 mandates that all military assistance flow through Pakistan's elected civilian government.

Finally, there has been much discussion – and, I think, a great deal of misunderstanding – about the accountability provisions in this legislation.

When I hear people talking about “rigid” or “inflexible” conditionality, I'm not sure exactly what they're referring to.

Let me just read from the bill. Section 206 provides that no military assistance may be provided to Pakistan unless the President determines, and I'm quoting, “that the Government of Pakistan during the preceding fiscal year has demonstrated a sustained commitment to and made progress towards combating terrorist groups, including taking into account progress the Government of Pakistan has made with regard to:

- A) ceasing support, including by any element within the Pakistani military or its intelligence agency, to extremist and terrorist groups, particularly to any group that has conducted attacks against the United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan, including Afghanistan National Security Forces, or against the territory of India or the people of India;
- B) closing terrorist camps in the FATA, dismantling terrorist bases in other parts of the country, including Quetta and Muridke, and taking action when provided with intelligence about high-level terrorist targets;
- C) preventing cross-border attacks into neighboring countries, and
- D) strengthening money-laundering and anti-terrorism laws.”

These are just factors in the consideration the President would give.

Ambassador Holbrooke, we are simply asking that the Pakistanis keep the commitments they have already made to fight the terrorists who threaten our national security and theirs, and that they make some progress doing so – with progress defined very broadly.

If the President is unable make that determination -- or a second one relating to cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation – then he can always take advantage of the waiver we provide.

Which of these conditions are unreasonable or unattainable? And if they are, then what does that tell us about our relationship with Pakistan?

We hear that the Administration will soon propose its own set of benchmarks for Pakistan. We look forward to working with you on accountability measures as H.R. 1886 moves through the legislative process, and remain very open to hearing other formulations of the kind of accountability that I think all of us want.

Ambassador Holbrooke, we look forward to hearing your assessment of the situation in Pakistan, your recommendations for implementing the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy, and your thoughts on the legislation we recently introduced.

**Opening Statement
Dan Burton
Committee on Foreign Affairs
May 5, 2009**

From Strategy to Implementation: The Future of the U.S.-Pakistan Relationship

Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, thank you for calling this important hearing, and I welcome our distinguished witnesses.

As a founding Chairman of the Congressional Pakistan Caucus, I have been a champion of Pakistan because I believe that a stable, democratic, and prosperous Pakistan is vital to U.S. interests. And I am extremely concerned, as are many other members of this Committee, about the increasingly negative news reports coming out of Pakistan. As we all know, Pakistan has a nuclear arsenal which would pose a grave threat should it fall under the control of extremists.

The intelligence is pretty clear that following the successful offensive of the United States in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002, hard-line Taliban and al-Qaida elements successfully relocated to western Pakistan. From there, they created a sanctuary to attack United States, Afghan and NATO forces, with the aim of destabilizing eastern and southern Afghanistan. NATO and Afghan forces cannot be beaten by the insurgency or by the Taliban. In addition, under the current circumstances, neither can our Coalition forces eliminate the Taliban by military means as long as they have sanctuary in Pakistan. In short, the tactical situation in Afghanistan can best be described as a stalemate; which is perhaps why Taliban and al-Qaida forces have begun launching attacks on Pakistani military units and civilian installations and moving westward within Pakistan. A destabilized Pakistan can only lead to a destabilized Afghanistan; the threat in Afghanistan feeds off the threat in Pakistan and vice versa.

I know the administration is working with our partners in Pakistan to prevent the situation from deteriorating even further. We must continue to work with the Government of Pakistan to prevent these radical groups from destabilizing the Pakistani State and the region. President Obama has called for a package of assistance that will help Pakistan to build schools, roads and hospitals and Pakistan's economic infrastructure. I support that call.

I also support the President's call to figure out a plausible approach to the situation in Kashmir. India and Pakistan have fought several wars over Kashmir, and almost fought another war as a result of what happen recently in Mumbai. I fully recognize that Islam-inspired terrorism is a global threat to people and governments everywhere. Nevertheless, we should not forget that the two terrorist groups implicated in the Mumbai attacks were both spawned to fight against the Indian "occupation" of Kashmir. It is essential that we eliminate this cause for complaint, not only to damper the radical's fire but also to free up essential forces fixed along the India-Pakistan border to places where they are needed even more. Pakistan has thousands of troops sitting along the Indian border that cannot be used to fight the militants. This, in my opinion, makes a resolution of the dispute on Kashmir a crucial component of any military plan to defeat the militants and stabilize Pakistan.

I do not know how the problem in Kashmir will be solved. I personally believe that the people of Kashmir should be given the plebiscite they were promised by the United Nations decades ago. Former

President Musharraf and Prime Minister Singh came close to finding a compromising solution when they presented a proposal to pull troops out, and open crossings between India-controlled Kashmir and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir to allow the people to largely govern themselves. If this effort had been met with success, I believe we could be looking at a very different Pakistan today.

Multiple intelligence estimates have warned that al-Qaida is actively planning attacks on the U.S. homeland from its safe-haven in Pakistan. If either the Afghan or Pakistani government falls to the Taliban – or allows al-Qaida to go unchallenged – that region of the world would once again be a base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can. It gets no clearer than that. The very people who attacked us on 9/11 are plotting future attacks on us in Afghanistan and the border region in Pakistan. We must disrupt and neutralize these groups before they strike again.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on these issues and others and I thank you once again, Mr. Chairman for calling this hearing.

Opening Statement
Congresswoman Diane E. Watson
Full Committee
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Tuesday, May 5, 2009
2172 Rayburn House Office Building
12:15 pm

“From Strategy to Implementation: The Future of the U.S.-Pakistan Relationship”

Mr. Chairman, thank for conveying this timely hearing on U.S. – Pakistan relations. As we all know, the situation in Pakistan is worsening. The porous border has allowed significant Taliban infiltration into the country from Afghanistan. For example, the Taliban have taken over the Swat Valley and invaded Dagar, a town only about 50 miles from Islamabad. Extremism is on the rise!

As a result, the economic situation in Pakistan is deteriorating. Fulfilling basics needs, such as food and healthcare, are becoming more difficult for the already struggling populous. Taliban militants have displaced tens of thousands of individuals from their homes and forced them into relocation camps. Consistent air strikes and counter insurgency operations are destroying the already fragile infrastructure in Pakistan.

These circumstances are undermining the popularly voted government and increasing political instability. The insecurity of the situation in Pakistan requires expedient diplomatic steps to stabilize the region. I hope that our speakers can address how best to move forward to prevent Pakistan from falling into extremists hands.

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I yield back the remainder of my time.

Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing:
From Strategy to Implementation: The Future of the U.S.-Pakistan Relationship
Tuesday, May 5, 2009

Rep. Gerald E. Connolly (VA-11)

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank you for organizing this hearing, and I would also like to thank our witnesses for attending a hearing on a topic that is so critical to our national security interests.

On a disquieting note, the Pakistani government seems to have capitulated to extremist militants who are implementing a very strict interpretation of Shari'ah. This capitulation by the Pakistani government could make negotiating with Pakistan very difficult.

The Pakistani government is calling the Swat arrangement a "peace deal." This most certainly is not a peace deal. It is appeasement of power-hungry militants in a feeble and fruitless attempt to quiet a once calm and tranquil valley. Instead of squelching militant ambitions, the Swat deal has only emboldened militants. They have crept closer to Islamabad, into the Buner District, "looting government and NGO offices for supplies and four-wheel-drive vehicles" on the way.

The Pakistani Taliban, as they've been called, arbitrarily choose which government institutions they will respect, depending on their power needs at that instant. For example, they negotiated with the Pakistani government for power, yet they declared that their Qazi courts are not subject to the jurisdiction of higher courts in Pakistan.

As if the so called "peace deal" were not enough, the organizer of the Laal Mosque standoff, Maulana Abdul Aziz, has been released from prison. Beitullah Mehsud, a Pakistan Taliban chief, is still at large. Just last month, he took responsibility for a police academy assault. All these developments occurring within a state that possesses a nuclear stockpile must be a source of genuine concern to us all.

As we highlight these troubling developments, we must also recognize the silent majority of moderate Pakistanis, whether they reside within that country's borders or, as Secretary Clinton mentioned last week, are part of the Pakistani Diaspora (in fact, many moderate Pakistani-Americans live in my district) and want peace and stability in their country. Last month thousands of Pakistanis displayed this desire for stability, security and democracy through participation in the long march—a protest with the goal of restoring the Chief Justice of Pakistan's Supreme Court, a goal that was in fact successful.

Though we have cause for great concern, we can work with our allies to ensure that moderates in Pakistan prevail. I look forward to hearing the testimony this morning.

**Statement of Congressman Gene Green
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
From Strategy to Implementation: The Future of the U.S.-Pakistan Relationship
May 5, 2009**

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing today and I would like to welcome both of our panels.

Mr. Holbrooke, I also want to congratulate you on your appointment; it is an honor to have you with us.

Today, we are here to discuss the future of our relationship with Pakistan, a country that seems to move more to the forefront of our foreign policy focus every day.

For years, Pakistan has been a leading recipient of U.S. assistance and an important ally in the region with now, roughly three-quarters of supplies for U.S. troops in Afghanistan moving either through or over Pakistan.

Clearly, it is in the U.S. interests that Pakistan remains a stable state.

Yet, over the last few years, the economic and political situation has continued to deteriorate in Pakistan with most recently, Islamist militants now operating in close proximity to the capital city of Islamabad.

We must address this issue as quickly as possible and that is one of the reasons why we are here today.

President Obama's recently announced a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan that conceives of the two countries as being part of "one theater of operations for U.S. diplomacy and one challenge for our overall policy."

Chairman Berman has crafted a bill that will "establish a sustained, long-term, multifaceted relationship with Pakistan" and would authorize \$1.5 billion in annual nonmilitary assistance to Pakistan over a five-year period towards this end.

Therefore, as we debate and develop our strategy for addressing the current situation in Pakistan, I am most interested to hear from each of you your broad assessment of the outcomes of U.S. policies toward Pakistan since 2001, including what aspects of our policy have been most successful in serving the national interests of both the U.S. and Pakistan and what aspects would you change.

I appreciate your being here today with us and thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this very important hearing.

Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas

Statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs

**“From Strategy to Implementation:
The Future of the U.S. – Pakistan Relationship**

May 5, 2009

First and Foremost, I would like to thank Chairman Berman for bringing the committee together today to have this important hearing on Pakistan. I would also like to thank our distinguished witnesses for the time and expertise they are contributing to their nation today; Honorable Rich C. Holbrooke, Special Representatives for Afghanistan and Pakistan; Ms. Lisa Curtis, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center and The Heritage Foundation; Ms. C. Christine Fair, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation, Mr. Daniel Markey, Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia, Council on Foreign Relations.

CODELS to PAKISTAN

I have been to Pakistan many times. My belief in this country and its relationship with the United States drove me to co-chair the Pakistan Caucus. This year alone, I have participated in two Congressional Delegation Trips to Pakistan, and I am very passionate about diplomatically relations between our two countries.

Benazir Bhutto, shortly before her death said that “The next few months are critical to Pakistan's future direction as a democratic state committed to promoting peace, fighting terrorism and working for social justice. Democracy is necessary to peace and to undermining the forces of terrorism.” I had the pleasure of knowing the late Benazir Bhutto and losing her death was truly a tragedy felt beyond Pakistan. She made this statement over two years ago, yet is relevant today more than ever.

PAKISTAN

As much as we must focus on the internal conflicts in Pakistan, we must not forget the external issues affecting the region as a whole and the need for stabilization.

Over the years, U.S. assistance to Pakistan has fluctuated with political events, sending mixed messages and leading most Pakistanis to question both our intentions and our staying power. Today, many Pakistanis believe the United States will cut and run when it serves our purpose, a belief which undermines our long-term efforts to defeat extremists, foster democratic change, and support transparent and accountable institutions that promote security and stability in Pakistan.

However, the *status quo* is not working: many in the United States believe we are paying too much and getting too little—and most Pakistanis believe exactly the opposite. Without changing this baseline, there is little likelihood of drying up popular tolerance for anti-U.S.

terrorist groups or persuading Pakistani leaders to devote the political capital necessary to deny such groups sanctuary and covert material support.

I look forward to hearing from the Ambassador and our other witnesses how we can assist Pakistan:

- 1) Push for human rights including addressing the Sharia laws;
- 2) deal with the speed of the Taliban offensive in Buner in April, when fighters moved into an area just 60 miles from the Pakistani capital, Islamabad;
- 3) persuade the Pakistan government that the Taliban represents a greater threat to its stability than its neighbor India; and
- 4) accept some conditions on U.S. aid, without seeing it as overly restrictive.

Soon we will be asked to act on President Obama's request for billions in supplemental spending for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which includes money for equipment, training and foreign aid. Moreover, the Administration has asked this body to quickly approve hundreds of millions of dollars in emergency military aid for Pakistan — in addition to the billions in assistance Washington has and will continue to direct there since the Sept. 11 attacks.

Pakistan's security, and U.S. support, will surely be on the agenda when the President holds talks with Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and Afghan President Hamid Karzai later this week at the White House. The real test then is how these issues have resonated not only with the Pakistan government but with the Pakistani people.

I will be interested to hear whether our witnesses believe the recent Taliban offensive may have finally sounded an alarm bell with the people of Pakistan or if there is a disconnect between the government and its people.

House Committee on Foreign Affairs

TOPIC: From Strategy to Implementation: The Future of the U.S.-Pakistan Relationship

May 5, 2009

Rep. Ron Klein

Thank you, Ambassador Holbrooke, for being here. As we all know, the failure of the Pakistani government would be disastrous for the world. The combination of a dangerous terrorist organization, nuclear weapons and perhaps the will to kill and to proliferate is a deadly equation for the region and for the United States and its allies.

We must do everything in our power to prevent this from happening. Recently, General Petraeus came to Palm Beach, in my district, and he said that Pakistan and Afghanistan have become a single issue as they share a local terrorist threat. So, while I believe that aid to Pakistan is important, I believe that we must shape the nature of the aid. Our aid must communicate security priorities, including the Pakistani government's assurances to safeguard the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan and to secure their nuclear facilities and weapons. Pakistan must maintain a certain level of commitment to fighting the Taliban.

In my travels to Afghanistan, I met with US military leaders and local Floridians who are serving in remote areas. They tell me that the Afghani people want to live their lives without the threat of terrorism. They want to invest in their local economies and take back their neighborhoods. This will start with smart aid in Pakistan and Afghanistan and a cohesive and comprehensive plan to fight the Taliban. This administration must communicate that we expect accountability from the Pakistani and Afghani governments and use every piece of leverage we have to stabilize the region.

Thank you for holding this hearing, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to a frank and honest discussion about how we can move forward.

Committee on Foreign Affairs
From Strategy to Implementation: The Future of the U.S.-Pakistan Relationship
Tuesday, May 5, 2009

Questions for the Record

Response from The Honorable Richard C. Holbrooke, Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan

Rep. Michael E. McMahon

Question:

Ambassador Holbrooke, thank you for being here today. As you can see, most of us on the committee are incredibly concerned over the collapse of the Pakistani state. Such a catastrophe is honestly unimaginable given Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, which leads me to my question. Pakistan has long been reluctant to disclose the location (or should I say, locations) and security of their nuclear sites. From your work in the field, are Pakistani officials showing any signs of greater cooperation with American officials to secure these sites from the threat of a spreading insurgency? Or is their fear that the US may destroy Pakistan's arsenal still preventing them from sharing such information?

Answer:

The U.S. has provided assistance for the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, with the full cooperation of the Pakistani government. I cannot comment further on the details of this assistance in an unclassified setting.

Pakistan's security forces are professional and highly motivated. They understand the importance of nuclear security and it is our understanding that they have taken significant steps to enhance it.

We welcome Pakistan's efforts in this area. The President has said that he feels confident that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal will remain out of militant hands.

Question:

There is an enormously complex agglomeration of extremist groups operating in the lawless region near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, including the Pakistani Taliban, the Afghan Taliban, Al Qaeda, and other affiliated and other sectarian groups. How should policy makers prioritize which of these to focus on?

Answer:

President Obama has made clear that our top objective is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda and its allies – the terrorists who planned and supported the 9/11 attacks and who continue to pose a threat to the U.S. homeland. It is essential to work with the Afghan and Pakistani governments to deal with all groups that pose a threat to the international community, regional stability, U.S. citizens and interests abroad, and the people of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Question:

Many analysts contend that U.S.-led efforts to stabilize Afghanistan will not be forthcoming as long as Pakistan's relations with India remain fraught with tension and mistrust. What is your assessment of the currently moribund Pakistan-India peace process? In your view, has the Pakistani government acted properly and with sufficient determination in responding to the apparent involvement of Pakistani nationals in the November 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai?

Answer:

While we support dialogue between Indian and Pakistani leaders to diminish tensions and promote regional stability, the timing, scope, and content of any such dialogue are strictly matters for Pakistani and Indian leaders to decide. In the aftermath of the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, which claimed the lives of six American citizens, the United States made very clear to Pakistan that it had a responsibility to fully cooperate with any investigations and to swiftly bring the perpetrators of those attacks to justice. We continue to encourage Pakistan to meet these obligations.

Congressman Ron Klein

House Committee on Foreign Affairs Hearing

From Strategy to Implementation: The Future of the U.S.-Pakistan Relationship

May 5, 2009

Response from The Honorable Richard C. Holbrooke, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan

Question:

In order to get supplies to US and NATO soldiers in Afghanistan, many of the supply convoys travel through Pakistan. These routes are becoming more and more dangerous. A convoy was attacked on May 4th by the Taliban. In March, the Taliban destroyed 15 trucks in a NATO supply convoy in northwestern Pakistan. In November, the Taliban hijacked 13 NATO supply trucks.

Terrorists in Pakistan are targeting our convoys of supplies for Afghanistan.

- Are the terrorist attacks in Pakistan preventing us from protecting our troops in Afghanistan?
- What are we doing to protect the convoys in Pakistan that are bound for Afghanistan?
- Have terrorists stolen any valuable information, military technology or weapons from these convoys?

Answer:

Attacks on supply convoys are of concern, but do not pose a strategic threat to our mission in Afghanistan and are not preventing us from protecting and supplying our troops in Afghanistan.

We have worked to diversify our supply lines to Afghanistan, including opening up a Northern Distribution Network that allows transit of materiel through Russia and several of Afghanistan's Central Asian neighbors. We continue to review and adjust our security posture based on our assessment of the environment. Pakistani authorities also are taking decisive action to address the safety and security of the convoys that move through their territory.

The Defense Department is best positioned to address specific operational measures to secure our supply lines as well as whether any military information or equipment has been stolen in attacks on these supply lines.

House Committee on Foreign Affairs Hearing
From Strategy to Implementation: The Future of the U.S.-Pakistan Relationship

May 5, 2009

Response from The Honorable Richard C. Holbrooke, Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan

Rep. Gerald E. Connolly (VA-11)

Question:

Mr. Holbrooke, in light of the dire circumstances in the Swat Valley, you have said that "an argument could be made for the acceleration of [US] aid," and two weeks ago, the White House asked Congressional leaders for \$400 million for counterinsurgency efforts in Pakistan. Similarly, the Pakistani Army's Chief of Staff, Gen. Parvez Kayani, has said his troops do not have the necessary equipment to fight militants, despite the 12 billion in aid that Pakistan has received over the last several years. How would you frame these calls for aid in the face of proposed legislation that would set conditions on future aid?

Answer:

Pakistan and the United States face a common enemy: al Qaeda and its related groups. The situation on the ground in Pakistan is quite fluid, with the needs of the Pakistani military evolving with its response to the threat posed by insurgents. We are committed to providing Pakistan with the assistance it needs to wage this challenging counterinsurgency campaign, as long as its concerted efforts towards these goals continue.

As the President has noted, we will not and cannot provide a blank check to Pakistan. Our security assistance to Pakistan will take into account Pakistan's progress in preventing al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups from operating in Pakistan and using Pakistan as a safe haven to launch attacks.

We believe that it is essential to deliver humanitarian assistance to those families leaving Buner and Swat. We expect to respond decisively to the crisis in those areas.

Question:

Yesterday, as a member of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, I attended a hearing where a gentleman with years of experience at USAID -including a stint as a Mission Director in Afghanistan - testified that USAID's long-term strategic plan is "an area of weakness." I personally believe that USAID has been hollowed out

during the last year years. What is your assessment of the current state of USAID and how can we harness the potential of USAID to meet our development goals in Pakistan and Afghanistan?

Answer:

Secretary Clinton has made clear that development, alongside diplomacy and a strong defense, is critical to tackling global challenges.

The Department of State and USAID, to include the two USAID employees assigned to my office, are working closely together and with many other agencies within the U.S. Government, to implement the President's strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. We are working collectively to ensure that our operating procedures and implementation mechanisms ensure that the maximum amount of U.S. foreign assistance reaches those who need it the most.

USAID is deploying more than a hundred additional direct hire civilians to Afghanistan and Pakistan to work closely with host governments, U.S. interagency partners, and other donors, and use that expertise to design effective programs and ensure accountability in the field. To bolster this effort, USAID will continue to draw upon our cadres of technical and operational support staff in Washington DC to provide essential services such as the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of newer programs.

Question:

There are multiple actors in Pakistan, including military, political, and civilian leaders. How can we align the interests of all these actors -whether they are from the ISI, the military or official government - to ensure the security of Pakistan from Taliban militants is in everyone's best interest?

Answer:

The Pakistani government's top military officials such as General Kayani recognize and have publicly stated that it is in their interest to confront the threat of violent extremism in Pakistan. Our diplomats are engaged with officials at all levels of the Pakistani government as well as with important non-government actors in order to express our concern regarding the threat posed by Taliban militants and to offer our assistance.

Question:

Last month, several Pakistanis participated in the "Long March," a protest to display their support for deposed Supreme Court Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, and in a larger sense support for an independent judiciary. Given moderate Pakistanis support for such a cause,

what strategies could the United States use to ally itself with the moderate, middle class Pakistanis; men and women who live in cities like Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi?

Answer:

This administration seeks to develop a long-term partnership with not only the Pakistani government, but just as importantly, with the Pakistani people. This partnership must span economic, security, development, and cultural arenas.

We are reshaping our assistance to Pakistan to focus more heavily on economic development and strengthening democratic, civilian institutions – two areas that have direct impact on the lives of everyday Pakistanis. We remain focused on the core elements of stability: security, economic well-being, and positive regional relations. This approach has allowed us to respond to recent events:

- To help stabilize Pakistan's economy, we successfully convinced the international community to provide more than \$5 billion in additional assistance at the Pakistan Donors' Conference in Tokyo, in April.
- We welcomed and have supported Pakistan's recent security operations to rollback the Taliban.
- We have helped Pakistan address the internal displacement situation via direct assistance, as well as by mobilizing our international partners to help Pakistan's people.

Furthermore, we aim to enhance stable, constitutional government in Pakistan. We are committed to working with the elected government, but we maintain strong relationships with Pakistani leaders across the political spectrum and engage with political leaders from other parties.

Question:

On May 6th and 7th, President Obama will host Presidents Zardari and Karzai. What specific results is the President hoping will come out of these meetings?

Answer:

Through the Afghanistan-Pakistan-U.S. trilateral mechanism, we are expanding cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan. At the May 6-7 Trilateral consultations, all parties involved will reaffirm their shared commitment to combat the spread of terrorism and extremism.

To maximize the effectiveness of these discussions, the trilaterals involve a wide range of U.S. cabinet agencies. We are exploring new areas of cooperation on foreign policy, economic policy, agriculture, police and prison reform, and intelligence. We

would like to have substantive discussions and deliver practical and concrete initiatives, including progress on the transit trade agreement, the cross-border jirga process, Border Coordination Centers, and cooperation on agricultural development and research.

Question:

Recently, two Afghan guards from a U.S.-funded civil defense group - the Afghan Public Protection Force - were killed in a roadside bomb in Wardak province. What are we doing to ensure the safety of civilians who are participating in U.S.-funded operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan?

Answer:

I refer you to the Department of Defense for details on the Afghan Public Protection Force.

In Afghanistan we believe that putting U.S. funds through the local system is increasingly important to build the capability and capacity for self-sufficiency and long-term stability. As a result, Afghan civilians are participating in Afghan-led programs that support their own government and reduce the need for security.

In Pakistan there is a constant need to strike a balance between getting out into communities to view project sites and interact with the local population and keeping our staff, implementing partners, and recipients safe. We coordinate closely with the Regional Security Office to ensure the safety of our staff in Islamabad and Peshawar as well as our partners and those who benefit from our assistance. In addition, there is increasing coordination between the security personnel and our partners, as well as improved information sharing with the Pakistani civilian authorities.

Question:

Given the number of resources that are at your office's disposal, for good reason given the situation in Pakistan, how are you utilizing these resources to maximize the diplomatic mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan in a novel way?

Answer:

Our diplomatic mission is multifold - disrupt and dismantle terrorism, promote civilian rule, stabilize Pakistan and Afghanistan's economies and strengthen effective democratic civilian government. Both countries need governments that can deliver services to and address the needs of a population reeling from the effects of extreme poverty. Thirty years of conflict in Afghanistan, first with the Soviets and since 1989 with radical and violent jihadis, destroyed much of Afghanistan's infrastructure and caused the United States to focus its assistance to Pakistan on security.

U.S. assistance spending takes into account the need for an aggressive campaign against the terrorists, improved coordination between Pakistan and Afghanistan, protection of the civilian population, development of effective civilian institutions, and assistance to stabilize the economy. In Afghanistan we are seeking to channel as much assistance as possible through the Afghan Government, in order to strengthen capacity and ensure that international donor assistance is in line with Afghan development priorities. In Pakistan much development is channeled through non-governmental and community-based organizations, but there too we are looking at ways our assistance can strengthen the democratically-elected civilian government. The President's strategy also builds international engagement/consensus and better coordination of assistance efforts. The magnitude of the challenge requires the efforts of many nations working together.

Question:

In May of 2003, the Department of Defense initiated the use of CERP funds in Iraq "to make an immediate impact and address local issues." The DoD has proposed to expand this program globally and has dramatically increased its fund request. Is the CERP program an effective means to transmit aid, and if so, would you recommend such a program for Pakistan or the Waziristan region?

Answer:

The Department of State supported the Administration's request for specific CERP authority for Iraq and Afghanistan, and has found it an invaluable tool where U.S. troops are on the ground. In other environments, the Department continues to support the use of humanitarian, reconstruction, and development assistance administered by the State Department and USAID.

Question:

During an Appropriations Committee hearing last month, CENTCOM Commander Gen. David Petraeus observed that resolving the Kashmir issue would allow Pakistan to face the Taliban threat on its Western border. Additionally, Prime Minister Gilani of Pakistan was quoted as saying "Kashmir is still a core issue." Given these two statements by key players in the region, how can the United States help resolve the Kashmir issue?

Answer:

The timing, scope, and content of any dialogue between India and Pakistan are strictly matters for Pakistani and Indian leaders to decide.

House Committee on Foreign Affairs Hearing
From Strategy to Implementation: The Future of the U.S.-Pakistan Relationship

May 5, 2009

Response from The Honorable Richard C. Holbrooke, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan

Rep. Ed Royce

Question:

The contracting process of the Afghanistan government is a mess. Corruption is rampant, reducing efficiency --and creating a great deal of resentment among Afghans. This is compounded by foreign firms bringing in foreign labor, not hiring Afghan workers. This doesn't build Afghani capacity. Additionally, it is very hard for American firms --probably more likely to utilize Afghan labor-- to compete in this corrupt environment. Does the Administration view the contracting process in Afghanistan as a problem? If so, what is it prepared to do? How great a priority is this?

Answer:

We agree that the Afghan government's contracting process is weak, and part of the larger challenge of building Afghan capacity. USAID is conducting training programs for Afghan officials in several areas of public administration, including financial management, budgeting, procurement, auditing, and monitoring. We are also working closely with Afghanistan's High Office of Oversight and other Afghan officials to develop and implement an anti-corruption strategy that is intended to ameliorate the problems of public corruption.

Despite these challenges, we can see clear progress in certain areas. For example, the Afghanistan Procurement Law has been established, meeting World Bank and international standards, and the Ministry of Finance established a Procurement Policy Unit and has begun training the procurement units in each Afghan Ministry, using Afghan staff. Over a four year period, USAID built the administrative and procurement capabilities of the Ministry of Public Health and Ministry of Finance; after a thorough assessment these are now considered to be sufficiently strong to warrant passing funds directly through the ministries as Host-Country Contracting (HCC). Under the HCC mechanism, USAID will provide funding to the Afghan government for MOPH contracts, while providing for U.S. oversight of the process. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) and the USAID Inspector General have the authority to audit the use of these funds. USAID recently signed a small HCC agreement for the Ministry of Communications, and in 2009-2010, we plan to accelerate the use of HCC for other Afghan ministries.

Question:

H.R. 1318, which establishes Reconstruction Opportunity Zones in Afghanistan and Pakistan, contains labor eligibility criteria and processes not contained in Senator Cantwell's companion bill. Are these requirements workable? Do they create disincentives for attracting the investment that is necessary to create jobs? Specifically, H.R. 1318 requires the creation of a complex program operated by the International Labor Organization to assess the compliance of textile and apparel firms established within the ROZs with international labor standards. Are these standards so broadly defined as to exceed U.S. law? By statute, the operation of this program would include regular site visits, including interviews with owners and employees. Is this viable given conditions on the ground? Has the Administration obtained assurances from the ILO that it has the capacity and willingness to operate such a program in Afghanistan and Pakistan?

Answer:

Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) are a key economic element of our counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and as such are a national security priority. By increasing legitimate economic and employment options, ROZs can help reduce the appeal of militancy in the impoverished areas that are otherwise fertile recruiting grounds for the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

The Administration and Congressional sponsors of the ROZ legislation have consulted extensively and plan to continue consulting with American labor and industry groups as well as our Afghan and Pakistani counterparts to ensure that the legislation includes workable labor monitoring provisions. We anticipate that capacity building will be needed in both Afghanistan and Pakistan to ensure these governments are capable of meeting the labor standards set forth in the final ROZ legislation. The International Labor Organization will be a vital partner in providing training and helping to build the capacity in both countries.

House Committee on Foreign Affairs Hearing
From Strategy to Implementation: The Future of the U.S.-Pakistan Relationship
May 5, 2009

Response from The Honorable Richard C. Holbrooke, Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan

Rep. Barbara Lee

Question

Afghanistan/Pakistan

Mr. Ambassador, I am interested in hearing your views on the disparity between funding for military operations and diplomatic and development activities in President Obama's supplemental request. The request includes \$75.5 billion to support military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in comparison to only \$7.1 billion for international affairs and stabilization activities.

Even further, only \$3.7 billion of these funds will be directed to diplomatic and development assistance in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.

**(Afghanistan- \$1.6 Billion, Pakistan \$1.4 Billion, Iraq \$.7 billion)*

Do you believe the Administration's strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as enumerated in his FY 2009 supplemental request, strikes the proper balance between smart and hard power?

Answer:

President Obama's new Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy utilizes a whole of government approach to defeat al Qaeda and its affiliated groups in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Beyond providing additional military resources, the strategy calls for additional civilian personnel and assistance money to help build Afghan and Pakistani government capacity to provide basic services to their populations. We appreciate Congress' support for providing the resources that our military and civilian agencies need to implement the new strategy.

There must be an aggressive military campaign against battle hardened terrorists. Large areas of the Pakistan border have fallen under Taliban control since July 2007 and many regions of Afghanistan remain under Taliban control. To clear areas under terrorist control requires the firepower and professional expertise of the army. To hold cleared areas requires properly trained and equipped police forces that can protect the public, address public concerns, and restore state legitimacy in these remote areas. So we will work with, train, and strengthen both Afghan and Pakistani military and police forces.

Capacity building and security go hand in hand. In responding to the security problem we create space for the work of development. Development work in Pakistan's tribal areas and in southern Afghanistan has been hindered by Taliban attacks on the transportation system, the power grid, civil administration and law enforcement, and those implementing development. The FY 2009 Supplemental increases funding for the forces that clear and hold areas cleared of terrorists and makes parallel increases in the amount of funding for capacity building.

The proposed FY 2009 supplemental, together with our efforts to increase international engagement and assistance to Pakistan, is also designed to support economic reform in Pakistan, which is already complying with an IMF Stand By arrangement to stabilize its economy. A better economy means more lawful job opportunities.

The magnitude of these challenges requires the efforts of many nations working together and we are working to increase international partners' contributions.

Question:

I would also like to note a recent article dated April 21, 2009, which indicates that the United States currently has 18 Foreign Service officers who can speak Pashto—the language of ethnic Pashtuns who represent about 42% of the population and traditionally have governed Afghanistan. Only two of these officers are now serving in Afghanistan, in the capital of Kabul.

I would like to ask the Chairman's permission to insert this article into the record.

These numbers are particularly striking when compared to the number of U.S. officials who had learned Vietnamese by the end of the Vietnam War—somewhere near 5,000 individuals.

If the Administration hopes to win this war by utilizing significant elements of soft power, shouldn't we be dedicating significantly more resources to bolster important diplomatic capabilities such as language proficiency?

Answer:

I agree that we need to increase significantly the number of officers serving in this theatre with Pushtu, Dari, and Urdu language skills. We are actively recruiting personnel who have previously served in the area and will bring language skills and local knowledge to the job - both in Washington and in the field.

Question:

Do you believe the Administration is currently able to effectively utilize all tools in the foreign policy tool belt in Afghanistan and Pakistan? Where do deficiencies lie, if any?

Answer:

As we seek to accomplish the President's objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan, we are coordinating an unprecedented whole of government effort. In my office, there are representatives from more than nine agencies and I meet multiple times a week with senior leaders from across the entire government to coordinate efforts in support of the President's policy. As a result of this unprecedented level of coordination, we have been able to intensify our civilian efforts to build capacity in both nations so that Afghan and Pakistani civilian institutions are able to meet the needs of local populations once security has been restored.

We are reshaping our assistance to Pakistan to focus more heavily on strengthening democratic, civilian institutions. We remain focused on the core elements of stability: security, economic well-being, and positive regional relations. This approach has allowed us to respond to recent events:

- To help stabilize Pakistan's economy, we successfully convinced the international community to provide more than \$5 billion in additional assistance at the Pakistan Donors' Conference in Tokyo, in April.
- We welcomed and have supported Pakistan's recent security operations to roll-back the Taliban.
- We have helped Pakistan address the internal displacement situation via direct assistance, as well as by mobilizing our international partners to help Pakistan's people.

In Afghanistan, we are working closely with the international community to build the capacity of the Afghan government to provide security, basic services and economic opportunity for the Afghan people. The Department of Defense is training the Afghan National Security Forces to provide population security. My office is overseeing a civilian increase that will more than double the number of direct hire civilians in Afghanistan. They will help build Afghan government capacity with our international partners. Finally, USAID, the Department of State, and other civilian agencies are providing the expertise and resources for the development of Afghanistan's economy, rule of law, and social services.

For both Pakistan and Afghanistan, we ask for Congress' full and continuing support for our requests for foreign assistance and operations funds. These funds are critical to help us achieve the President's goals.

Question:**No Permanent Bases in Afghanistan**

Mr. Ambassador, on six occasions Congress passed and President Bush signed, legislation that included provisions prohibiting permanent or long-term military bases in Iraq (i.e., PL 109-289, PL 109-364, PL 110-28, PL 110-116, PL 110-161, PL 110-181). I believe President Obama supported this position when he served in the Senate.

Do you foresee President Obama departing from a similar no permanent bases policy in Afghanistan? If yes, why?

Answer:

As the President announced on March 29, the United States has a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda and its extremist allies in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to prevent their return to either country in the future. He made further clear in his speech in Cairo on June 4 that "we do not want to keep our troops in Afghanistan. We seek no military bases there." We are preparing Afghans to take responsibility for their security so that we will ultimately be able to bring our own troops home.

Question:**Pakistan**

Although ongoing United States Predator drone attacks may be accomplishing tactical objectives of eliminating specific terrorists, they seem to be also accomplishing the Taliban's aim of driving the Pakistani populace against the United States. As I understand it, the objective of a counterinsurgency strategy is to win the hearts and minds of the populace, or in the words of the President, overcome the "trust deficit."

Have continued Predator drone strikes on Pakistani soil undermined counterinsurgency objectives in Pakistan?

Answer:

I cannot discuss operational issues. However, the President has made clear that our core goal is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan. Their targets remain the U.S. homeland, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Europe, Australia, our allies in the Middle East, and other targets of opportunity. We will continue to cooperate with our coalition partners and Pakistan to eliminate the threat this common enemy poses.

Question:

Would an escalation of the United States' military presence near or along the border region, and the unavoidable collateral damage associated with such an escalation, further fuel anti-American sentiment among the civilian population?

Answer:

I refer you to the Department of Defense for comments on our military strategy. We have generally found that Afghan support for coalition troops is substantially higher in areas where troops have focused on protecting the population.

Question:

President Obama has stated that "after years of mixed results, we will not provide a blank check" to Pakistan.

What leverage does the United States have with Pakistan beyond direct military and budget support?

Answer:

This Administration seeks to develop a long-term partnership with not only the Pakistani government, but just as importantly, with the Pakistani people. This partnership must span economic, security, development, and cultural arenas.

We would like to reorient our relationship by increasing economic assistance to Pakistan - to include development assistance, infrastructure investment, and technical advice on making sound economic policy - and strengthening trade relations. We believe this will maximize support for our policy aims; it should also help to provide longer-term economic stability.

We are focused on improving Pakistan's democratically elected, civilian government's ability to provide basic services, fair and efficient governance to its citizens, and economic opportunities for young people - all of which are intended to increase satisfaction with civilian government and decrease the appeal of extremist groups.

Our programs are designed to provide agricultural assistance to both unstable and vulnerable areas. Programs will help small producers organize into groups that will be integrated into commercial value chains generating substantial income gains. We are also making women's participation a priority in all agricultural activities.

Our economic development assistance will focus on providing job skills training; generating employment; rehabilitating water and irrigation systems,

bridges, roads, and markets; improving rural electrification/power distribution; and improving community infrastructure.

In basic education, our priority goals are to dramatically increase access to schools, significantly raise chronically-low enrollment rates, especially for girls, and improve educational quality. Our priority in health is to strengthen primary health care services, concentrating on priority geographic areas.

We have also proactively engaged our international partners in addressing Pakistan's short term macroeconomic crisis; supporting Pakistan's mid-to-long term economic and development challenges; and dealing more effectively with al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups which have safe haven in the Tribal Areas. We need to enhance bilateral and regional trade possibilities, in part by implementing Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs), and encouraging foreign investment in key sectors, such as energy.

Question:

What gains do you see the United States making in Afghanistan and Pakistan over the next year under the President's proposed strategy? Will the Administration's strategy change if significant progress has not been made?

Answer:

Already there are some promising signs. Our current efforts have not dismantled or defeated Al Qaeda and its Taliban allies, but progress has been made. Over the next 18 months we expect to see further progress against these terrorist groups to limit their capacity to plan and make attacks against the U.S. homeland. We also expect we will make the tribal areas less hospitable to these groups. In Pakistan the Army has moved thousands of troops from the India border to engage Taliban groups. The civilian government has weathered significant challenges in Swat with Taliban expansion and the displacement of a huge internal refugee population.

There is more cooperation at the ministerial level between Pakistan and Afghanistan as a result of our efforts to promote dialogue in the areas of trade, customs and border control, counternarcotics, and information sharing on cross-border issues. Within the next 18 months we think that this cooperation will bring tangible economic and security benefits to both countries.

Over the next year, we expect gains in security and an increase in U.S. and internationally funded development activity.

Conditions will be monitored continuously and course corrections to this strategy and its implementation will undoubtedly be required. The strategy is meant to be flexible and when a given course of action is not proving effective, we

will take corrective measures to advance the Administration's core goal and strategic objectives.

Question:

Is the Administration currently in the process of developing an exit strategy to guide the process of ending operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan? If so, will it be made available to the public or members of Congress, and when? If one is not being developed, why not?

Answer:

On March 27, the President unveiled the new policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan. In developing this policy we sought and received input from across the interagency, the international community including NATO and ISAF allies, nongovernmental organizations, the United Nations, and of course the Afghan and Pakistani governments. The policy clearly defines our national interest and our objective, which is to defeat Al Qaeda and its extremist allies and safehavens and prevent them from being able to return to power. For years our efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan have been severely under resourced. This lack of attention enabled the Taliban to regain strength and reassert control in many areas. Now, with Congress' support, we have begun to receive the resources required and we are refocused on this enormous challenge. With the Department of Defense, USAID, USDA, DHS, DOJ and other federal agencies we are now developing the plans and strategies to achieve our policy objective. Success in Afghanistan and Pakistan requires that all USG efforts are coordinated and focused on our priorities. It will not be easy, but it is critically important.

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE BARBARA LEE, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

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Inter Press Service News Agency

THE STORY UNDERNEATH

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POLITICS:

U.S. Lacks Capacity to Win Over Afghans

Gareth Porter*

WASHINGTON, Apr 21 (IPS) - President Barack Obama and other top officials in his administration have made it clear that there can be no military solution in Afghanistan, and that the non-military efforts to win over the Afghan population will be central to its chances of success.

The reality, however, is that U.S. military and civilian agencies lack the skills and training as well as the institutional framework necessary to carry out culturally and politically sensitive socio-economic programmes at the local level in Afghanistan, or even to avoid further alienation of the population.

In fact, the U.S. government does not even have a minimum corps of people capable of speaking Pashto, the language of the 14 million ethnic Pashtuns who represent about 42 percent of the population of Afghanistan. It is in the Pashtun southern and eastern regions of the country that the complex insurgency that has come to be called the Taliban has been able to organise and often effectively govern at the village level in recent years.

"If all you are going to do is kill the bad guys, then you don't need a lot of Pashto speakers," said Larry Goodson of the Department of National Security and Strategy at the National War College, who was a member of the team assembled by CENTCOM commander Gen. David Petraeus to formulate a proposal for Afghanistan and Pakistan. But an effort to win over Pashto-speaking Afghans cannot succeed without officials who can communicate effectively in Pashto.

According to Chris Mason, who was a member of the Interagency Group on Afghanistan from early 2002 until September 2005, the Pashtuns of southern Afghanistan are "proto-insurgents", meaning that they are "naturally averse to the imposition of external order".

The United States needs "thousands" of Pashto speakers to have any chance of success in winning them over, said Mason, recalling that 5,000 U.S. officials had learned Vietnamese by the end of the Vietnam War. "The Foreign Service Institute should be turning out 200 to 300 Pashto speakers a year," he said.

But according to an official at the State Department's Bureau of Human Resources, the United States has turned out a total of only 18 Foreign Service officers who can speak Pashto, and only two of them are now serving in Afghanistan – both apparently in Kabul.

The Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California trains roughly 30 to 40 military personnel in Pashto each year, according to media relations officer Brian Lamar, most of whom are enlisted men in military intelligence.

That indicates that there are very few U.S. nationals capable of working with local Pashtuns on development and political problems. The National War College's Goodson said the almost complete absence of Pashto-speaking U.S. officials in Afghanistan "betrays the U.S. commitment to a nation-building and counter-insurgency approach."

It is also emblematic of a broader human resource deficit in regard to a U.S. political approach to counter-insurgency as distinct from the past military approach in Afghanistan, according to Goodson. Winning over the Pashtun population "requires a level of human capital that, even prior to the global economic crisis was hard to come by," Goodson said, but in his view, "None of that staff is really in place."

The Washington Post reported that Obama announced in late March that the number of U.S. civilian officials to be involved in the new Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy would be increased by at least 50 percent to more than 900. But even a doubling of the civilian presence would not address the yawning human resource gap in regard to a non-military approach to the insurgency, according to Goodson.

That's because the additional civilians would be based on a model of "highly paid contractors" who live far from the people they are supposed to be helping to win over, Goodson explained. That creates friction with their poorly paid Afghan

counterparts and does nothing to establish relations with local people, said Goodson.

"You really do wonder if we are set up to do what we need to do in Afghanistan," said Goodson.

Mason warns that increased U.S. troops strength in Afghanistan is more likely to further alienate the population than help win them over unless the troops are trained for completely different operations from those they have done in the past. "Simply putting in more imperial storm troopers who do not speak the language and who are going to kick in more doors is just going to piss off more people," he said.

Mason believes many Army officers do understand the need to avoid traditional operations aimed at finding and killing or capturing insurgents, but are hamstrung by the Army itself. "The Army needs to move away from its default position, which has been war of annihilation, destroying the enemy, and focus on civil affairs," Mason said.

Col. David Lamm, who was chief of staff of the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005, Lt. Gen. David Barno, is doubtful about the willingness of the Army leadership to shift to a counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan. "The institutional army doesn't want to do this," he told IPS in an interview last September. "There isn't a lot of money in counter-insurgency. It isn't a high-tech war - it's a low-tech humint [human intelligence] operation."

Lamm recalled that the army's role in Afghanistan before Barno took command in 2003 had been "counter-terrorism" rather than counter-insurgency. The army "wanted to roll in, round up terrorists, drive them out of the country, kill them," he said. Barno shifted the mission to one aimed at winning over the Afghan population, but he did so on his own, without any guidance from Washington, according to Lamm.

With the transition to NATO responsibility for Afghanistan that began in late 2005, the emphasis in U.S. military strategy was on "force protection" and keeping casualties low, Lamm said. After the shift to NATO responsibility, most U.S. troops in Afghanistan were still committed to an explicitly "counter-terrorism" role of destroying al Qaeda and Taliban "holdouts".

One of the hallmarks of that role, which has continued since 2006, is heavy reliance on airpower as a means of trying to weaken the insurgency. Barno, now director of the Near East South Asia Centre for Strategic Studies at the National Defence University, told IPS in an interview last September, "There is a predilection to use airpower in lieu of close up encounters [with insurgents] to avoid U.S. casualties."

Barno recalled that he dramatically reduced reliance on airpower, because he regarded the Afghan tolerance for the U.S. military presence as a "bag of capital" that was used up "every time we used airpower or knocked down doors or detained someone in front of their family".

Barno's policy of curbing airpower was abandoned by his successor, Gen. Karl W. Eikenberry, from 2005 to 2007, and the number of airstrikes has continued to grow exponentially since 2005. Eikenberry was nominated by Obama to be ambassador to Afghanistan – an indication that the broad outlines of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan will continue to emphasise air attacks on suspected Taliban targets.

Growing Afghan anger at the hundreds of civilian casualties from U.S. airstrikes, often based on bad intelligence, has been exploited by insurgents across the country.

*Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist specialising in U.S. national security policy. The paperback edition of his latest book, "Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam", was published in 2006.

(END/2009)

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REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ARIZONA

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

**“From Strategy to Implementation:
The Future of the U.S.-Pakistan Relationship”**

Tuesday, May 5, 2009

12:15pm

Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building

TESTIMONY

OF

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STATEMENT

Thank you, Mr Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee, for making my remarks a part of the record today. I come before you as an American-born citizen whose Pakistani immigrant parents exemplified the best qualities of what Pakistan once was and can still be as a contributor to growth and stability in our world. Much has happened to my parents' homeland in the intervening 49 years since they landed on our shores – not all of it good – and the US-Pakistan relationship has endured many inflection points during this period, a key one of which we are addressing in this hearing today.

Pakistan, for all its travails, is an important country, and we must do everything in our power to help save it. It occupies an important geostrategic location at the crossroads of South and Central Asia and the Middle East. Its citizens and expatriates are important contributors to science and technology, philosophy and sport, and law and medicine. Pakistan's press is still largely vibrant and free, its armed forces are supremely disciplined and its 170 million Muslim people are mostly moderate and want peace in their daily lives. Most of all, Pakistan has a brilliant intellectual capability that can sustain its society if we can help it excise the cancerous lesions – Al Qaeda and the Taliban – killing its national identity.

Increasingly, Pakistani soil is used to plan terrorist attacks against its own citizens, its army and its civil servants. In fact, while no Pakistani or American government official would like to admit it, Pakistan is already engulfed in civil war. Terrorists carrying Pakistani identification have attacked India's citizens on their territory and have aided and abetted attacks on NATO and US convoys in Afghanistan. Two of history's most notorious terrorists – Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (who masterminded the 9-11 attacks upon the United States) and Ramzi Yousef (who masterminded the World Trade Center bombing in 1993) – drew sustenance from Pakistan.

Images today of a 17-year old girl being savagely beaten in one of Pakistan's most beautiful vacation spots – the Swat Valley – by bearded, black-turbaned Taliban mercenaries in the name of preserving Islamic values is an abhorrent reminder of an agenda the American people can never allow their taxpayer dollars to be used for. When adolescent children are held in prison for crimes without any proof of their involvement in the name of abstract blasphemy laws that have no place in civil society, it should serve as a clarion call for the American people to rise up and use our collective will to compel change in the thinking, behavior and actions of those in Pakistan who seek our money to survive. We must arrest Pakistan's slide toward infamy, but we must do it on principles that matter to us.

As members of this Committee and the full Congress prepare to earnestly debate how American taxpayer dollars are best spent in revitalizing our important ally, we will need to shelve old formulas of incremental aid given mostly in the form of military assistance in favor of much larger and more concentrated doses of aid mostly in support of civil society if we are to fix Pakistan's complex problems. What we do give in military assistance will need to in no small part go to rebuild police forces that maintain law and order and preserve public safety, for anti-terror equipment that enables Pakistan's military, national guard and army reservists to cleanse its frontiers of the Taliban scourge, and not for F-16s that are never likely to see combat duty.

For its part, Pakistan must understand that the patience and goodwill of the American people are running out, and that it is time for Islamabad's civilian government to take responsibility for the future of its citizens and use American aid to insure government can provide for the basic needs of its people. Most of all, Islamabad has to resolve politically to stamp out the scourge of radicalism that engulfs its existence as a nation. Eliminating – not co-opting or compromising with – but eliminating the Taliban and Al Qaeda on Pakistani soil must remain the key condition for continued American financial support.

Our legislative aid prescriptions should be aimed at engaging the vast majority of the Pakistani people who are moderate in as direct a manner as possible. We should be buying the goods and services Pakistanis need and making sure they get them rather than relying on a broken civilian system to deliver our aid. A day will come soon when Pakistan's civilian government can take over this task, but I suggest respectfully Mr Chairman that we need to do the job ourselves in the meantime, and legislatively require Pakistan to accept our help in a manner that directly assists its citizens – with our respect and humility.

The specter of the big American bully doling out cash to Pakistan's army brass and robber baron politicians has to be removed from the US-Pakistan equation. America's overt presence – whether in the form of Drone attacks that meet critical US national security objectives or in the frequency of high-profile American visits where our senior US officials publicly chew out and privately scold Pakistan's political and military leaders – is strengthening purveyors of extremist ideologies who claim Pakistan is under America's thumb and manipulated by the US Government for its own narrow objectives in the region. America is blamed for Pakistan's ills because Americans aren't paying attention to where their tax dollars go, and when those tax dollars disappear in places that are not in the best interests of either Pakistan or the United States, no one is questioning what happened. We need to get smart about how we spend our money, and compel the change we seek over there by giving it to the people who share our values so they can rebuild the fabric of Pakistan's civil society.

One of the most important ways this needs to happen is the creation of gainful employment for the growing population of unemployed teenage boys and young men who survive the brainwashing of Madrassa schools only to be seconded into the Taliban's militias when they have nowhere left to turn to feed their families. The Taliban have very effectively filled a void created by the failure of Pakistan's civilian government to create jobs for a growing segment of men 20 to 40 years old by using drug money obtained in the Afghan opium trade as well as the petrodollars of wahhabist clerics seeking influence over untrained Muslim minds to commandeer an entire generation of Pakistani men.

My colleague, Shuja Nawaz, Director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council recently told me that in the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) Region of Pakistan, for example, 50% of its 3.5 million residents are men. Of these, 20% are angry, frustrated young men who have nothing better to do all day than pick up Kalashnikovs and go wage jihad against some imaginary infidels, Americans at the top of their list. 20% of 1.75 million men needing 300-350,000 jobs – that's how manageable this problem really is.

We need to help Pakistan's civilian government create a major new jobs initiative for the areas of Pakistan that are most affected by the Taliban's ability to provide low-grade, lower cost civil services to men, women and children who turn away from their citizenship responsibilities because finding ways to obtain the basic necessities of daily life overtakes them.

The Pakistani government needs to create an equivalent of the Works Progress Administration (I would call it the "Benazir Development Authority" in honor of the slain leader who was Pakistan's promise personified in her early years and gave her life in search of a democratic solution for Pakistan's future). For example, Pakistan could propose to build a major rail line from Gwadar Port on the Arabian Sea to Peshawar, the capital city of the Northwest Frontier Province, thereby linking together two otherwise disenfranchised provinces and giving a large enough economic incentive for Baluchistan's equivalent of the Hatfields (the Bugti Tribe) and the McCoy's (the Marri Tribe) to make peace while building a major part of the national infrastructure. A major trunk could connect this rail line to Karachi, the country's commercial hub.

While theoretically a megaproject in terms of planning, railways are constructed in segments, and each segment is labor intensive. Men would have jobs, be able to take care of their families and have a hand in

rebuilding their country. We should require that as much as 20% of our funding commitments to Pakistan are used to create wage-earning jobs. The US Army Corps of Engineers could help Pakistan's Army Corps of Engineers plan such projects. Similarly, other small projects commissioned for the FATA region, like roads, bridges, mini and micro-dams, and other labor intensive work that would link FATA to the outside world could be formulated by the Pakistani government and funded by US taxpayer dollars. Our money could never be spent better than to give a young Pakistani man reason to make something out of himself more than a fanatic with a gun in his hand and anger in his heart.

Jobs that create economic opportunity and increase prosperity make it easier for societies to trust each other. This is the great lesson of India's economic rise as it built unprecedented bridges of cooperation with China. Building bridges of trust between Pakistan and India is of critical importance to US policy in the region. Greater trust leads to less reliance on expensive military hardware, which in turn allows more foreign aid to be spent on rebuilding the shattered lives of Pakistan's people.

Pakistan's army has for too long relied on an ambivalent policy of co-opting Islamist radicals to do its dirty work along indeterminate borders on its eastern front in Kashmir (against India) and on its western front in the FATA Region (against Afghanistan). But while jihad thrived along these borders during two decades of Pakistani military rule, India surpassed Pakistan economically, militarily, culturally and geopolitically.

India, in short, outgrew its role as Pakistan's mortal enemy.

It is time for American aid to encourage a change in Pakistani military thinking about who the real enemies of Pakistan are. US military aid to Pakistan should be used in part (5% of the total is a good starting point) to build institutional bridges of trust between the Indian and Pakistani armed forces and intelligence services. For example, the US could offer funding for and encourage the creation of bilateral counter-terrorism squads that train together and share intelligence data – simple stuff initially and more complex and sensitive data later on as trust builds – perhaps even with American counter-terrorism teams pitching in on training exercises. Reduced tensions with India would allow the Pakistani army to move troops away from the eastern border and reallocate them to areas inside Pakistan infested by the Taliban.

Ultimately, a stronger political infrastructure in Pakistan could engage in serious political dialogue with India to resolve the Kashmir dispute – resolution that would eliminate the army's need for jihadist mercenaries who currently sustain its Kashmiri front. Ending the flow of arms, munitions and other logistical support to these jihadists would prevent their militias from recoiling to act against Pakistan.

Placing excessive conditions on aid to Pakistan, whether in the form of placating other US allies in the region on narrow constituency topics or trying to force Pakistan to behave in ways it may not yet be flexible enough to follow represents a key hurdle that must be overcome as this Committee seeks to craft legislation. Conditioning Pakistani aid on Islamabad preventing ever again another terrorist attack on India, for example, is the perfect wall against which Taliban, Al Qaeda and other jihadist organizations can lean on to blackmail the Pakistani military and civilian government almost at will.

Imagine a scenario six months from now where Pakistan's president, now firmly in control of his domestic situation, receives a message from Mullah Fazalullah, the leader of Pakistan's Taliban who would in this hypothetical scenario be exiled to living in Iran, that if Islamabad does not cede the NWFP districts of Dir and Chitral to Taliban control, his forces will launch another Mumbai-style attack on Calcutta, India. If Islamabad concedes to Fazalullah, it violates its commitment to the United States not to deal with terrorist groups, in which case US aid must cease. If Islamabad does not concede, and the Taliban attack on India proceeds having been planned on Pakistani soil, US aid must cease because the

India condition has been violated. What would have been achieved by giving the Taliban such a gift that leaves them untouched while it shuts down funding to our ally?

Mr Chairman, I would like to now turn to the most sensitive area in which American policy toward Pakistan needs to mature and deal with ground realities there – nuclear security. Rather than concentrating on individuals whose past misdeeds may or may not yield material information that can help formulate future policy, American aid must focus on the real threats at hand.

Safety of Pakistan's nuclear weapons are not the principal threat to Pakistani, regional or global security because the weapons are stored largely disassembled in discreetly separate locations with only a handful of senior officials holding the essential knowledge that could ever make them operational. Loose nuclear waste materials or nuclear weapons grade materials being hijacked in transport, however, are another matter and that is where US policy should focus its energies.

For several years, the work of the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) has been critical in securing Pakistan's nuclear materials. Together with the US Department of Energy and the International Atomic Energy Agency, PNRA has worked diligently to develop and fund a Nuclear Safety and Security Training Center to train its personnel, to staff and equip a Nuclear Security Emergency Coordination Center, to train personnel and equip them to locate and secure orphan radioactive sources and to build an inventory of the most modern detection equipment that improves Pakistan's internal management procedures of its nuclear arsenals and radiation materials. But much remains to be done and US funding should be significantly increased to support the PNRA's important work on a much larger scale.

Finally, Mr Chairman, I would like to comment on Pakistan's dismal human rights policies. Perhaps if fundamental rights envisioned by Pakistan's founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, had been upheld throughout its life as a nation, the Taliban wouldn't have a chance today to occupy a street much less a district. But I dare say America has not done enough with its aid to compel a change in Pakistan's human rights record, and we need to urgently reconsider how fundamental freedoms fit in the equation of our national security interests over the intermediate and long term.

Members of this Committee may not be aware, but recently in the province of Punjab, Pakistan's most populous and prosperous, as Christians celebrated Easter Mass last month around the world, the Punjab Government sponsored an event on government property that looked a lot like the Pakistani equivalent of a Ku Klux Klan rally. The event was paid for by official Pakistani funds and was presided over by senior members of the federal and provincial government, including Pakistan's minister of religious affairs. The organizers and activists were some of Pakistan's most insidious hate-mongers and criminal terrorists, hiding behind religion as their banner of refuge while they called for the death of thousands of Pakistanis whose religious beliefs they disagreed with.

I can name names, tell you where it all happened, what they said, but that's not the point. The point is that when American taxpayer dollars go to Pakistan, we need to know these funds are not being used to systematically abuse the rights of ANY group of Pakistanis, no matter what they believe. That is the meaning of religious freedom. We need to insure the Pakistani government is not officially sanctioning the wildly out of touch behavior of a few that could then spread beyond Pakistan's borders and become America's next Al Qaeda headache.

The members of this Committee should know that the same group who organized the Punjab rally will come to Ontario, Canada on June 6, 2009 to incite hatred and fan the flames of religious intolerance right in our backyard. That is hardly in the best interests of the United States. Let us hope our taxpayer dollars are not paying for their airplane tickets and hotel rooms.

The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom recommended on May 1, 2009 that the Obama Administration designate Pakistan as a "country of particular concern" for its egregious violations of religious freedom, along with a short list of the world's other worst religious persecutors, and provided policy recommendations for it. The report and its recommendations can be found at: http://www.uscifr.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2260&Itemid=35.

Mr Chairman, this Committee, its members and staff, and many others have worked hard to find credible ways to engage Pakistan and lift it through this difficult period in its history. As we have often sought one voice in Pakistan who could turn the light switch on or off at our command, we now must speak to the Pakistani people clearly, directly and with one voice. Pakistan's enemies would love nothing better than for us to disintegrate under the weight of our democratic debate, rather than using the debate to raise our capacity to help the Pakistani people when they need us most.

Permit me to close my remarks by offering a final thought on the recent conduct of our government in dealing with Pakistan as its president, foreign minister, intelligence chief and other senior officials arrive in Washington this week. US officials need to stop their blustery rhetoric and public demeaning of Pakistan's leaders. It's not getting us anywhere with them, quickly. Whether Asif Ali Zardari is competent or not, he was elected by a wide majority of his people, and whether that election was a reflection of sympathy for his slain wife or not, we declared Pakistan's elections to be free and fair. To then go about undercutting Pakistan's civilian credibility seems to me is a way of defeating us by fiat.

Maintaining lines of communication to Pakistan's opposition is important, but openly endorsing Nawaz Sharif as a credible replacement for President Zardari if he doesn't do what we want him to do is not the way freedom-loving governments behave. Our national interests will not be served well if two weeks from now, Gen. Kayani takes over Pakistan's civilian affairs in a military coup that we quietly sanctioned, brings in another American installation of puppeteers and then calls for elections in which it is a foregone conclusion that Nawaz Sharif wins only to find out that he was a Pandora's Box with a different batch of problems. We have seen enough of the revolving door strategy in Pakistan to last us a lifetime – let's see if we can fix the door we hung our shingle on for once.

America should seek to be counselor and conciliator, not manager of Pakistan's internal affairs. The job of our diplomats is to encourage through diplomacy, not to coerce through intimidation. If that policy prescription is needed, it is best done by the president of the United States in closed quarters with his counterpart, not on C-SPAN or Fox News Channel. The behavior of our diplomats and military officials in recent weeks came dangerously close to interfering in Pakistan's internal affairs as we began to fear a complete meltdown there. Pakistan is not quite yet at that melting point. American actions in the coming weeks and months will carry much weight in determining whether Pakistan can stand again as a contributing member to the League of Nations, or falls into the hands of fanatics who want to take us all back to the Stone Age.

Thank you, Mr Chairman, and the members of this Committee for permitting my views to be heard.

Submitted for the record this 5th day of May, 2009
Mansoor IJAZ

