    [House Hearing, 111 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                      FROM STRATEGY TO IMPLEMENTATION: THE
                    FUTURE OF THE U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONSHIP

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  MAY 5, 2009

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 111-33

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

     Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

                                     ______

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                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
    GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York           ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
    ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American      CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
        Samoa                            DAN BURTON, Indiana
    DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey          ELTON GALLEGLY, California
    BRAD SHERMAN, California             DANA ROHRABACHER, California
    ROBERT WEXLER, Florida               DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
    ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York             EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
    BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts         RON PAUL, Texas
    GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York           JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
    DIANE E. WATSON, California          MIKE PENCE, Indiana
    RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri              JOE WILSON, South Carolina
    ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey              JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
    GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia         J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
    MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York         CONNIE MACK, Florida
    JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee            JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
    GENE GREEN, Texas                    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
    LYNN WOOLSEY, CaliforniaAs  TED POE, Texas
        of 3/12/09 deg.                  BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
    SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas            GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
    BARBARA LEE, California
    SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
    JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
    MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
    BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
    DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
    JIM COSTA, California
    KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
    GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
    RON KLEIN, Florida
                       Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
               Yleem Poblete, Republican Staff Director
                David S. Abramowitz, Chief Counsel deg.
               Kristin Wells, Deputy Chief Counsel deg.
         Alan Makovsky, Senior Professional Staff Member deg.
           David Fite, Senior Professional Staff Member deg.
       Pearl Alice Marsh, Senior Professional Staff Member deg.
         David Killion, Senior Professional Staff Member deg.
          Hans Hogrefe, Senior Professional Staff Member deg.
            Manpreet Anand, Professional Staff Member deg.
         Robin Roizman, Professional Staff Member/Counsel deg.
            James Ritchotte, Professional Staff Member deg.
             Michael Beard, Professional Staff Member deg.
              Cobb Mixter, Professional Staff Member deg.
             Amanda Sloat, Professional Staff Member deg.
             Peter Quilter, Professional Staff Member deg.
                    Daniel Silverberg, Counsel deg.
             Brent Woolfork, Junior Professional Staff Member deg.
               Jasmeet Ahuja, Professional Staff Member
          Laura Rush, Professional Staff Member/Security Officer deg.
            Genell Brown, Senior Staff Associate/Hearing Coordinator

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    The Honorable Richard C. Holbrooke, Special Representative for
      Afghanistan and Pakistan.......................................     6
    Ms. Lisa Curtis, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center,
      The Heritage Foundation........................................    35
    Ms. C. Christine Fair, Senior Political Scientist, RAND
      Corporation....................................................    46
    Mr. Daniel Markey, Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South
      Asia, Council on Foreign Relations.............................    58

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    The Honorable Richard C. Holbrooke: Prepared statement...........     9
    Ms. Lisa Curtis: Prepared statement..............................    38
    Ms. C. Christine Fair: Prepared statement........................    48
    Mr. Daniel Markey: Prepared statement............................    60

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................    94
    Hearing minutes..................................................    95
    The Honorable Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress from
      the State of California, and Chairman, Committee on Foreign
      Affairs: Prepared statement....................................    97
    The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the
      State of Indiana: Prepared statement...........................   100
    The Honorable Diane E. Watson, a Representative in Congress from
      the State of California: Prepared statement....................   102
    The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
      from the State of Virginia: Prepared statement.................   103
    The Honorable Gene Green, a Representative in Congress from the
      State of Texas: Prepared statement.............................   104
    The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
      from the State of Texas: Prepared statement....................   105
    The Honorable Ron Klein, a Representative in Congress from the
      State of Florida: Prepared statement...........................   107
    Written responses from the Honorable Richard C. Holbrooke to
      questions submitted for the record by:
      The Honorable Michael E. McMahon, a Representative in Congress
        from the State of New York                                      108
      The Honorable Ron Klein........................................   110
      The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly...............................   111
      The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress
        from the State of California.................................   116
      The Honorable Barbara Lee, a Representative in Congress from
        the State of California......................................   118
    The Honorable Barbara Lee: Submitted material....................   125
    The Honorable Jeff Flake, a Representative in Congress from the
      State of Arizona: Submitted material...........................   127

       FROM STRATEGY TO IMPLEMENTATION: THE FUTURE OF THE U.S.-PAKISTAN
                                  RELATIONSHIP

                                  ----------

                              TUESDAY, MAY 5, 2009

                      House of Representatives,
                                  Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:20 p.m. in
    room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard L. Berman
    (chairman of the committee) presiding.
        Chairman Berman. The committee will come to order.
        It is a real pleasure for me to welcome Ambassador Richard
    Holbrooke, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan,
    to the committee this afternoon for his first appearance
    testifying before Congress in his new capacity, although he has
    been to this committee a number of times over the years. We
    know you have an extremely busy schedule, particularly with the
    second round of trilateral United States-Afghanistan-Pakistan
    meetings starting tomorrow. We appreciate your taking the time
    to be here.
        Our second panel this afternoon will feature several noted
    regional experts, including Christine Fair from the RAND
    Corporation, Lisa Curtis from the Heritage Foundation, and Dan
    Markey from the Council on Foreign Relations.
        I will yield myself time for an opening statement.
        Ambassador Holbrooke, all of us are deeply concerned about
    the deteriorating security situation in Pakistan. As I noted in
    our recent hearing with Secretary Clinton, the United States
    has an enormous stake in the security and stability of that
    country. We can't allow al-Qaeda or any other terrorist group
    that threatens our national security to operate with impunity
    in the tribal regions of Pakistan. Nor can we permit the
    Pakistani state--and its nuclear arsenal--to be taken over by
    the Taliban. In short, it appears to many of us that Pakistan
    is at a tipping point and we need to do whatever we can to make
    sure it goes the right way.
        We know you understand the gravity of the situation and
    commend you and your colleagues in the Obama administration for
    developing a comprehensive Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy. But
    now comes the hard part--translating that thoughtful strategy
    into real changes on the ground. How can the United States
    forge a true strategic partnership with Pakistan? What can we
    do to strengthen Pakistan's democratic government and to make
    it a force for stability in a volatile region?
        To help achieve these goals, a bipartisan group of my
    colleagues and I recently introduced H.R. 1886, the Pakistan
    Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement Act. This
    legislation would massively expand economic, social and
    democracy assistance to Pakistan and also provide a significant
    increase in military assistance.
        Specifically, the bill provides funding to strengthen the
    capacity of Pakistan's democratic institutions, including its
    Parliament, judicial system and law enforcement agencies. It
    also calls for increased assistance for Pakistan's public
    education system, with an emphasis on access for women and
    girls. To demonstrate America's long-term commitment to the
    stability and democratic future of Pakistan, H.R. 1886
    authorizes a permanent fund in the U.S. Treasury that will
    serve as a conduit for most nonmilitary assistance to Pakistan.
        With regard to military assistance, our legislation
    increases funding for professional military education, with an
    emphasis on training in counterinsurgency and in civil-military
    relationships. It boosts the funding available for Pakistan to
    purchase military equipment and requires that 75 percent of
    those funds be used for items directly related to
    counterinsurgency and counterterrorism.
        The legislation also codifies the 2006 contract between the
    United States and Pakistan that requires Pakistan to pay for F-
    16 fighter aircraft with its own national funds rather than
    American tax dollars. To strengthen civilian control of the
    military, H.R. 1886 mandates that all military assistance flow
    through Pakistan's elected civilian government.
        Finally, and there has been much discussion and, I think, a
    great deal of misunderstanding, about the accountability
    provisions in this legislation. When I hear people talk about
    ``rigid'' or ``inflexible'' conditionality, I am not sure
    exactly what they are referring to.
        Let me just read from the bill. Section 206 provides that
    no military assistance may be provided to Pakistan unless the
    President determines, and I am quoting,

            ``that the Government of Pakistan during the preceding
            fiscal year has demonstrated a sustained commitment to
            and made progress towards combating terrorist groups,
            including taking into account progress the Government
            of Pakistan has made with regard to: (A) ceasing
            support, including by any element within the Pakistani
            military or its intelligence agency, to extremist and
            terrorist groups, particularly to any group that has
            conducted attacks against the United States or
            coalition forces in Afghanistan, including Afghanistan
            National Security Forces, or against the territory of
            India or the people of India; (B) closing terrorist
            camps in the FATA, dismantling terrorist bases in other
            parts of the country, including Quetta and Muridke, and
            taking action when provided with intelligence about
            high-level terrorist targets; (C) preventing cross-
            border attacks into neighboring countries, and (D)
            strengthening money-laundering and anti-terrorism
            laws.''

        These are just factors in the consideration the President
    would give.
        Ambassador Holbrooke, we are simply asking that the
    Pakistanis keep the commitments they have already made to fight
    the terrorists who threaten our national security and theirs,
    and that they make some progress doing so--with progress
    defined very broadly.
        If the President is unable to make that determination--or a
    second one relating to cooperation on nuclear
    nonproliferation--then he can always take advantage of the
    waiver we provide. Which of these conditions are unreasonable
    or unattainable? And if they are, then what does that tell us
    about our relationship with Pakistan?
        We hear that the administration will soon propose its own
    set of benchmarks for Pakistan. We look forward to working with
    you on accountability measures as H.R. 1886 moves through the
    legislative process, and we remain very open to hearing other
    formulations of the kind of accountability that I think all of
    us want.
        Ambassador Holbrooke, we look forward to hearing your
    assessment of the situation in Pakistan, your recommendations
    for implementing the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy, and your
    thoughts on the legislation we recently introduced.
        I now turn to my good friend, the ranking member Ileana
    Ros-Lehtinen, for any statement she may want to make.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much as always, Mr.
    Chairman. And thank you, Ambassador and the other panelists who
    will be with us today.
        I will focus my remarks on the outcome of the recent review
    and its implications for policy going forward. We are united in
    our goals. We want a long-term partnership with a modern,
    prosperous and democratic Pakistan that is at peace with itself
    and with its neighbors, a Pakistan that maintains robust
    controls over its nuclear weapons technology and a Pakistan
    that does not provide safe havens to al-Qaeda, Taliban, other
    Islamic militant extremists.
        While command and control of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is
    presumably a top concern to Islamabad, recent Taliban advances
    underscore the critical importance of ensuring security for its
    nuclear materials and technology. As Secretary Clinton
    testified recently, nuclear weapons have been disbursed
    throughout Pakistan, increasing the risk that they may find
    their way to al-Qaeda, to the Taliban and other Islamic
    extremists. We must redouble our efforts on Pakistan's
    technical and human security capacity so as to ensure that
    there is a robust safeguards mechanism in place for its nuclear
    weapons program and facilities. The stakes are simply too high
    to ignore.
        The administration has endorsed Senate proposals to
    increase nonmilitary assistance to Pakistan to $1.5 billion
    over the next 5 years. When combined with existing or
    contemplated assistance programs, total United States aid to
    Pakistan, including reimbursement to the Pakistani military by
    the Department of Defense, would total at least $3.5 billion
    per fiscal year or about $17.5 billion total over the next 5
    years. Operationally how are we going to effectively put such
    funds to use?
        The American Embassy in Islamabad is under a virtual
    lockdown because of security concerns. We have withdrawn
    critical staff from our key consular outpost along the
    Pakistani frontier, and because of the difficult security
    environment, our Foreign Service officers generally only serve
    1-year tours in Pakistan. This means that they will have barely
    begun to understand their brief before they are rotated out and
    we lose critical institutional memory.
        The administration proposes to remedy this difficulty in
    part with an $800 million request in the supplemental
    appropriations bill for embassy security construction and
    maintenance for Pakistan. Completion of these projects however
    will in some cases take several months and in others many
    years. While issues of U.S. diplomatic capacity get sorted out,
    the administration has suggested that it may allocate much of
    the proposed increase in nonmilitary aid primarily toward
    budget support. Any proposed U.S. budget support would be in
    addition to at least $14 billion committed by the international
    financial institutions through the year 2013.
        Some would contend that enhanced trade with Pakistan may be
    far more economically meaningful than expanded aid. There are
    legislative efforts, we are told that the administration
    supports, that would create reconstruction opportunity zones in
    Afghanistan and in the border areas of Pakistan. Unfortunately,
    about a third of Pakistan's annual exports to the United States
    would be excluded from the definition of eligible products.
        There is limited industrial activity on the border areas of
    Pakistan and Afghanistan obviously. The Pakistani state is
    finding it hard to provide for basic amenities for its current
    population, much less after the expected boom in its population
    size. Further, under the circumstances, entrepreneurs are
    likely to be wary of new investments in the proposed industrial
    zones. The United States therefore needs to think far more
    boldly about mechanisms to expand trade opportunities in
    Pakistan and elsewhere in the developing world.
        Turning to the immediate security concerns and urgently
    needed assistance on this front, there needs to be a secure and
    reliable source of funding not just for military assistance but
    to assist the police and civilian law enforcement as the first
    line of defense against extremists. Some observers have
    recently argued that past cutoffs, which in turn affected IMET
    programs, have seriously harmed our bilateral efforts and have
    made those Pakistani officers not participating in IMET
    increasingly vulnerable to Islamic militants.
        Ambassador Holbrooke, do you see any correlation between
    this and the rising pro-Taliban sentiment within the ranks of
    the Pakistani military? This raises the core question of
    political will, as implicit in proposals to dramatically ramp
    up U.S. foreign assistance. Is it the assumption that
    Pakistan's political class shares the increasing United States
    concern about the threat posed to their own country by Islamic
    radicals? If United States and Pakistani strategic priorities
    are seriously misaligned, then American foreign assistance will
    be of fleeting significance.
        Congress and the Executive Branch must move quickly toward
    a common understanding on the immediate and longer-term
    priorities, the appropriate mix of policy instruments to
    maximize our prospects for success and the timeline for
    implementing the different elements of our strategy.
    Ultimately, if we are to succeed in eliminating safe havens and
    strengthening democracy in Pakistan, it will require steadiness
    of purpose in Washington but perhaps more importantly,
    commensurate commitments by Islamabad.
        Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for your time.
        Chairman Berman. The time of the gentlelady has expired. We
    are now going to hear the opening statements from the chair and
    the ranking member of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and
    South Asia, 3 minutes. And then we're not going to have a
    chance for other members to give 1-minute opening statements
    because we want to hear from Ambassador Holbrooke, but you will
    get 5 minutes of questions for Ambassador Holbrooke. And we do
    have a second panel, so I think that is the appropriate
    decision.
        I now yield 3 minutes to the chairman of the Middle East
    and South Asia Subcommittee, Mr. Ackerman.
        Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Let us say that your pants were on
    fire. You would have to do two things to survive. First, you
    would have to recognize that the agonizing pain that you feel
    was the result of your pants being on fire. And second, you
    would have to do something about it before you lost the ability
    to do something about it. Let me be blunt. Pakistan's pants are
    on fire. That is bad of course, but things are actually much,
    much worse.
        Pakistan's leaders, rather than recognizing and moving to
    address the urgent danger to their constitution and country,
    instead seem convinced that if left alone, that appeased or
    attacked piecemeal, the Islamist flame will simply burn itself
    out. That hope is at best folly. Tragically, neither President
    Zardari nor former Prime Minister Sharif appear to recognize
    the scope and seriousness of the crisis that their country is
    in or of the necessity of setting their personal or party
    political fortunes aside in order to meet the danger.
        President Zardari has said the right things regarding
    counterterrorism, about how to fight against al-Qaeda and the
    Taliban, is Pakistan's fight as well, but in practice, his
    government's response has been slow, weak and ineffective as
    recent events have shown. And while Mr. Sharif's longstanding
    ties to Islamist political parties could enable him to persuade
    the Pakistani public of the need to confront the Taliban, his
    public downplaying of the Taliban threat raises serious
    questions about his commitment to fight the insurgents.
        Whatever the rationale or the reason, the fact is
    Pakistan's political echelon has not yet risen to meet the
    moment. Historically, one could expect that if the political
    situation remains as unstable as it is now and if neither
    leader moves beyond his narrow political concerns that the
    Pakistani military might again emerge as the only institution
    capable of saving the state.
        I fear, however, that this time might be different. Even
    now with insurgents a mere hour's drive from the capital, I
    suspect that among the senior officers of the Pakistani
    military, in particular those with connections to the ISI,
    their bedrock belief still that Pakistan's real enemy is India
    remains untouched by events.
        Pakistan's Government, its military and most importantly
    its people must come to realize that the militants and
    terrorists they nurtured and supported for decades to fight in
    Kashmir and to antagonize India have now turned on them. I and
    many other friends of Pakistan have said again and again that
    the fight against extremists is not just an American fight, nor
    is it solely an Afghan fight. The fight belonged to Pakistan
    before, and it belongs to Pakistan now. I cannot say it more
    clearly. There is a real and present danger to Pakistan's
    survival, but it comes from inside, not outside the country.
    The fire is real and they need to respond.
        Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
        And I am now pleased to introduce our first witness.
    Ambassador Richard Holbrooke currently serves as Special
    Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. From 1999 to 2001,
    he served as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. As
    Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from 1994 to
    1996, he brokered the Dayton Peace Accords, which ended the
    bloody wars in the Balkans. In his long and distinguished
    diplomatic career, Ambassador Holbrooke has also served as
    Special Envoy to Cyprus and the Balkans, U.S. Ambassador to
    Germany and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and
    Pacific Affairs.
        I will introduce the second panel after questioning for
    Ambassador Holbrooke has finished.
        Ambassador Holbrooke, it is yours.

       STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE, SPECIAL
              REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

        Ambassador Holbrooke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a
    great honor to appear before you as the first opportunity I
    have had to testify before Congress since I assumed my new job,
    but far from the first opportunity I have had to appear before
    your committee. You were kind enough to invite me here as a
    private citizen. You are by my count the sixth chairman of this
    committee I have testified before. In fact it was the first
    committee I ever testified before in 1977. In those days, the
    rules were different and I was asked to testify before I was
    confirmed, but things have changed.
        Mr. Chairman, H.R. 1886 is a step forward in concept from
    previous legislation in previous years. It is focused on the
    right issues. It puts Pakistan in the right construct. It
    responds to the importance of the issue as outlined by both you
    and the ranking member and my friend, Congressman Ackerman, who
    thinks I live in his district because I am next to it. So it is
    good to see you, sir. My actual Congressman, for the record, is
    Jerry Nadler, but I am happy to consider you my second
    Congressman.
        This is a very important part of our effort to build
    correct policy, and with your permission, before I turn to the
    legislation and answer your questions, I would like to outline
    for you and for anyone who is listening what is going on in the
    next 3 days here in Washington, because these are historically
    important meetings and I think we should put them in the
    context. The administration began its term in office with the
    concept we are now all familiar with, that Afghanistan and
    Pakistan were interrelated in such a way so that success in
    either one required success in the other. Sounds simple now,
    but it was not the stovepipe approach that we inherited.
        And as we proceeded with our strategic review and as we
    progressed, things developed. In late February, the Secretary
    of State invited the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and
    Pakistan to Washington and asked them to bring delegations with
    them to begin a trilateral process. That first round of
    trilateral talks was sufficiently successful so that President
    Obama decided to invite President Zardari of Pakistan and
    President Karzai of Afghanistan here to continue the talks at
    the presidential level.
        This unprecedented trilateral diplomacy, including many
    senior members of both administrations, begins today. I will go
    directly from this meeting to meetings with members of the two
    governments. I already met with President Zardari last night,
    and I know that you will be meeting with President Zardari
    later in the day. And I would like to say in the presence of so
    many of your colleagues that that meeting with President
    Zardari this afternoon is an extremely important part of the
    formation of a correct American policy toward Afghanistan and
    Pakistan, and I congratulate you for chairing it. Your
    colleagues on the other side will have a similar meeting at
    lunch on Thursday chaired by Senator Kerry and Senator Lugar.
        The formal meetings will begin tomorrow morning in the
    State Department. Secretary Clinton will meet privately with
    each delegation bilaterally, and then there will be a
    trilateral session in which we hope to produce some useful
    agreements of cooperation. We will then move to the White House
    tomorrow afternoon, where President Obama will follow a similar
    scenario, meeting first with President Karzai and then with
    President Zardari in strict protocol sequence and then a
    trilateral meeting of the two delegations.
        This has not been done before. President Bush did have one
    dinner with the two Presidents when it was Musharraf and
    Karzai, but it resulted in no progress and there was no follow-
    on. This is part of a continuing process, and we would like
    your committee and the Congress as a whole to be partners in
    this very important effort.
        It is interesting, Mr. Chairman, to discover that the two
    Finance Ministers have never met each other until they will
    meet tomorrow. The two Agriculture Ministers don't know each
    other. The two Interior Ministers do not know each other. And
    yet for the United States, our most vital national security
    interests depend on cooperation between Pakistan and
    Afghanistan.
        The animosity and misunderstandings between Afghanistan and
    Pakistan did not begin after 9/11 or even when the Soviet Union
    invaded 30 years ago. They go back to independence, partition,
    Pakistani independence, and it is an extraordinarily
    complicated story. We are involved in it because our most vital
    national security interests are at stake. I have heard people,
    including people in this body, compare this to Vietnam. I
    served 3\1/2\ years in Vietnam as a civilian alongside the
    United States military in the Mekong Delta and in the American
    Embassy.
        And then I served another 4 years on Vietnam as a member of
    President Johnson's staff and the Paris Peace Talks. And I
    wrote one volume of the Pentagon Papers. And I want to say to
    you today and to your colleagues as clear as I can that while
    there are obviously structural similarities between the war in
    Afghanistan and the war in Vietnam and in both countries the
    problem of the sanctuary was critical, and the sanctuary area
    is the area we are here to discuss today, the core difference
    is that the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army never posed
    a direct threat to the American homeland.
        The people who are in this area who we are fighting either
    pose a direct threat, having committed 9/11, having done
    Mumbai, having killed Benazir Bhutto, and they have publicly
    said they are going to do more of the same. That is al-Qaeda of
    course and its allies, the Taliban. So we need to be very clear
    that we are talking today about an issue that is of direct
    importance to our national security.
        Now, in regard to H.R. 1886, this is a very big improvement
    on previous legislation. It vastly increases the economic
    assistance, it segments economic and military, the
    accountability provisions that you referred to apply as I
    understand it only to the military portion, a point which has
    been lost in the debate over it, and there are many other
    things in it that we greatly appreciate. And I want to thank
    you, Mr. Chairman and your colleagues, particularly the ranking
    minority member, for their bipartisanship in putting this bill
    together. It is very important and we hope that it will be
    passed and that the differences with the House and Senate
    versions will be reconciled.
        Having said that, I also wish to echo what Secretary of
    State Clinton said when she was asked about the accountability,
    and that is that we should be careful that we look for a sweet
    spot that is acceptable. Now let me be clear here, the goals
    that you lay out in the accountability section are goals that
    we by and large share. But there has been a misunderstanding in
    Pakistan about motivation and about how this works. And so we
    would like to work with you, and I believe in this regard, Mr.
    Chairman, your meeting this afternoon with President Zardari is
    very important, arguably more important than this hearing. We
    would like to work with you and with the Pakistani Government
    to find that sweet spot that Secretary Clinton referred to.
        In conclusion of my opening remarks, let me ask your
    permission to submit my formal opening statement for the record
    and to thank you very much, really deeply and personally, for
    your leadership in this most important issue. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Holbrooke
    follows:]Holbrooke deg.

        Chairman Berman. Well, thank you, Ambassador, and without
    objection, your entire statement will be included in the record
    of this hearing.
        And I will yield myself 5 minutes. In the last few weeks--
    and some of us were actually there in Pakistan when this was
    starting--we have heard a stream of dire reporting from
    Pakistan and statements from administration officials regarding
    the situation in Pakistan. It is unquestionably a critical one.
        I am aware that the main institution in Pakistan, the
    military, remains intact, and that there are concerns among the
    Pakistani press that the United States is lending an air of
    panic to the situation. Talk to us for a moment about how
    critical the threat is and what efforts we are undertaking to
    communicate United States intentions to address the threat
    directly to the Pakistani people.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. You know, the relationship between
    the United States and Pakistan, which goes back to the birth of
    Pakistan as an independent nation, is a complicated
    relationship between allies who have often misunderstood each
    other. I make that comment when you use the phrase ``U.S.
    lending an air of panic'' or ``contributing to an air of
    panic'' about the situation.
        Chairman Berman. According to the Pakistani press.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. Yes. And so we actually had a kind of
    an echo chamber situation. If you analyze it, and it is worth
    looking at for a minute, we spent a lot of time on this, Mr.
    Chairman. We have had extensive meetings in the State
    Department, the White House, trying to make sure that people
    understand exactly what we are saying. When Swat fell and the
    deal was made, the concern that was expressed was not initially
    in the United States. It was among the people of Peshaware and
    Lahore and Islamabad, who understandably felt threatened.
        Swat is not just another location, it is a very symbolic
    location. It is not part of the tribal areas, it was a vacation
    place. I like to point out to my New York friends that it is
    the same distance from Manhattan as East Hampton is from New
    York, and it bears the same psychological relationship to the
    people of Islamabad as a vacation spot, although real estate
    prices were not quite as high.
        Chairman Berman. And we won't talk about the parties.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. No, please. But all joking aside, the
    fall of Swat created an air of panic not in the United States
    initially but among certain people in Pakistan. Even in India,
    I found people who recalled their vacations in Swat and were
    stunned by its fall. That then came back to the United States.
    People going out to Pakistan, including Members of the
    Congress, came back and made strong statements. Private
    citizens made strong statements. One very well-known
    counterinsurgency expert, not a member of the U.S. Government,
    not a consultant, said they had a matter of months before they
    might hit the wall.
        And this began to create a ricochet effect. And so without
    anyone intending it, honest, well-intentioned statements of
    concern became interpreted as predictions. And the press
    magnified this. I am not actually blaming anyone. I am not
    blaming the people who made the statements. They were pro-
    Pakistan. I am not blaming the press. They were reporting them.
    But it really took off as a story. And in that atmosphere,
    President Zardari arrived in town yesterday, and he raised this
    issue with me immediately. And let me say frankly to you I
    understand his concern and we all understand it.
        So, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, let me make very,
    very clear why he is here and what our goals are in Pakistan so
    that we can try to dispel a self-fulfilling sense of what
    Congress Ackerman called the ``Pants on Fire Syndrome.'' Now he
    said the pants really are on fire, and I understand exactly
    what he said, but I also think it needs to be put in the
    perspective of what we are trying to achieve. I would submit to
    you that Pakistan is of such immense importance to the United
    States strategically and politically that our goal must be
    unambiguously to support and help stabilize a democratic
    Pakistan headed by its elected President, Asif Ali Zardari.
        I read in the newspapers that the administration is
    distancing itself from President Zardari in favor of his
    leading political opponent, Nawaz Sharif in the Punjab. That is
    simply not true. We have not distanced ourselves from President
    Zardari. If we were, why would President Obama have invited him
    to Washington today? Why would we be here today talking about
    additional money for his government? However, we do have
    relations with Nawaz Sharif and his brother, who is the Chief
    Minister of the Punjab, just the way we have relations with let
    us say David Cameron, the leader of the opposition in Great
    Britain.
        The point that needs to be underscored here is that we have
    the highest strategic interests in supporting this government.
    That is what H.R. 1886 is about, and that is what our
    administration is trying to do. And we should not allow
    comments about how serious the issue is to be confused with
    predictions of a collapse. We do not think Pakistan is a failed
    state. We think it is a state under extreme test from the
    enemies who are also our enemies, and we have, Mr. Chairman,
    the same common enemy, the United States and Pakistan.
        Chairman Berman. My time has more than expired. I didn't
    mention, and I should, that I will recognize people for 5
    minutes. It will include their question and your answer.
        And I now yield 5 minutes to the ranking member.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
    Ambassador.
        How would you describe Pakistan's commitment to rooting out
    militant groups? To what extent is Pakistan leery of taking on
    this challenge for two reasons, its strategic concern with
    India and a perception that such a campaign either cannot be
    won or is actually against Pakistan's interests? Related to
    that, does the current situation in Pakistan make you any more
    concerned about the safety and security of the nuclear weapons,
    particularly the prospect of a radicalized military and the
    possibility of an inside job, meaning the seizure of some part
    of the arsenal by anti-American radicals within the Pakistani
    armed forces?
        And thirdly, since we have limited time, if Americans are
    worried about Pakistan turning into a failed state, and I agree
    with you it is not a failed state, our friends in India ought
    to be extremely concerned. And I was interested in your
    comments on this question, in your discussion with leaders in
    India about the situation in Pakistan, how would you assess
    their level of concern? Thank you, sir.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. The first point was which? I got the
    second and third.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The commitment of Pakistan in rooting out
    these militant groups. Are they hesitant because they think
    that they can't do it or because of the problems that they have
    with India?
        Ambassador Holbrooke. On your first point, we have long
    felt that our friends in Pakistan could put more resources into
    the struggle in the west. They have been reluctant to do so
    because of their longstanding concerns and past history with
    India. And we will continue to press on that. In the interest
    of time, let me just say on the nuclear issue, most of this
    needs to be discussed in closed session. It is not an issue I
    have personally concentrated on because there is such an
    overwhelming agenda on other issues. I have followed it. I
    would be happy to discuss it further in closed session and
    bring with me the experts.
        On the last issue, thank you for saying that Pakistan is
    not a failed state. It is very important that people get away
    from easy and attractive journalistic cliches. It just isn't.
    But it is a state under enormous social, political and economic
    pressures, and India is always a factor.
        Finally, I want to be clear that when I talked about H.R.
    1886, your bill, I greatly appreciate its motives, but I do
    want to be sure that I am preserving the fact that there are
    things in it which Secretary Clinton and I and my colleagues do
    want to work with you on to be clear, and as we have talked
    privately, there are other bills moving forward on the
    Appropriations side.
        And I want to underscore the point made in this morning's
    Washington Post by Ahmed Rasheed in the article, ``Pakistan's
    Critical Hour,'' which I hope would be well read and perhaps it
    could be even inserted for the record.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, just because
    we have such limited time. Would you say that, related to the
    Indian leaders and their perception of Pakistan, in your
    discussions with them, how do they see that playing out for
    them?
        Ambassador Holbrooke. The Indians? Ever since I took this
    job, India has been in an election campaign. They are voting
    right now. There are 700 million people voting. They have been
    listening, they have been very interested, but they have not
    taken any clear positions at this point. The elections will be
    finished in less than 2 weeks, and I look forward to returning,
    and then I would be happy to return and give you a better
    answer. But let me just say one thing. They really do share the
    understanding that what is happening in western Pakistan is of
    direct concern to them.
        The Indians have been public in saying they are not happy
    with the cooperation they got after the Mumbai attacks, we all
    know that. I believe that for the first time since partition,
    India, Pakistan and the United States have a common threat, a
    common enemy and a common task. And I hope that after the
    elections and after these bills that are working the Hill work
    their way through that we will be able to move to more of a
    consensus that a common threat requires common actions. But
    there are a lot of moving parts here.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Sir, and we certainly understand that you
    endorse that bill. You don't need to plug it in in every
    answer. We get it. Thank you.
        Good job, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Berman. Well, since the ranking member has
    committed your administration's endorsement to my bill, I will
    commit that as soon as we can we will get together with members
    of the administration to discuss in the terms of both the
    Secretary and you finding the sweet spot.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. Thank you.
        Chairman Berman. And Mr. Ackerman is recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much. Very good to see you
    again, Mr. Ambassador, and congratulations.
        The proposed sale of the new F-16 to Pakistan, will they be
    using that to fight the terrorists?
        Ambassador Holbrooke. You are talking now about the new
    planes or the midlife upgrades? What are we specifically
    referring to?
        Mr. Ackerman. The F-16 CD Block 50/52s. Combat aircraft, 18
    new ones.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. The 18 new ones. First of all, as you
    know, the midlife upgrades are moving forward with $142 million
    of payment. And they have to pay for these. I am told by F-16
    pilots that an F-16 with modern avionics can be used as a
    counterinsurgency tool, but quite honestly, it requires very
    sophisticated training. They did use the aging F-16s in their
    battles in Bajur Valley and in Swat. But they can only be used
    in daylight and with good visibility. They can't be used at
    night. So we have not come to a final decision on how to
    proceed with this, and I know your body is looking at it very
    carefully. Right now we have approved the midlife upgrade, so
    they will be able to convert planes to counterinsurgency use.
        Mr. Ackerman. What can you tell us in this open session
    about the ISI and their double-game strategy, as some people
    have called it, in cooperating with terrorist elements? And I
    know it is not the whole ISI but possibly just corrupt elements
    or individuals within it.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. Ever since I began working on this
    difficult issue, I have been well aware of the allegations to
    which you refer, and we have looked into them very carefully in
    the first 100 days of this administration. I have had lengthy
    talks with the director of ISI, General Pasha, who is in
    Washington today and who I hope will get a chance to meet with
    some of you. General Pasha wishes to state and would tell you
    if he were here that ISI does not do these things anymore.
        But he does not deny, nor does anyone else, that in the old
    days ISI and the American intelligence services worked together
    to set up some of the organizations which have now turned
    against the United States, and there may be some serious legacy
    issues. It concerns me greatly, and we need to put the most
    heavy possible pressure on our friends in Pakistan to join us
    in the fight against the Taliban and its allies. We cannot
    succeed in Afghanistan without Pakistan's support and
    involvement, and that means working with the Army and the
    intelligence services in that regard.
        Mr. Ackerman. Inasmuch as you brought up putting pressure
    on our friends, how much pressure should we put on them to give
    us access to A.Q. Khan?
        Mr. Chairman, could we just ask those people passing those
    signs around to put them down? They are distracting.
        Chairman Berman. Will the gentleman please put down his
    sign? That is inappropriate in the committee hearing room. And
    I would ask the gentleman if he would like to leave the room?
    Otherwise, he will remain quiet.
        Mr. Ackerman?
        Mr. Ackerman. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        If the Ambassador would continue?
        Ambassador Holbrooke. The A.Q. Khan, I find it hard to
    understand, and I said publicly as a private citizen I found it
    inexplicable, that A.Q. Khan was not immediately made available
    to the United States. We had no access, and I just don't
    understand it, quite frankly, given the immense amount of
    damage he did.
        Mr. Ackerman. But that was history and the previous
    administration.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. I know. I understand.
        Mr. Ackerman. What do we do now? He is still there, he
    still knows what he knows, and we still don't know what we
    don't know.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. I have raised it with the Pakistani
    Government. Their response is, you know, this happened under
    the previous governments.
        Mr. Ackerman. But the guy still has the ability to talk and
    give us information.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. I understand, Congressman.
        Mr. Ackerman. And if it is a good idea, should we make
    those F-16s conditional on talking to him to find out to what
    extent he might have given technology or material to terrorist
    organizations or failed states or what have you?
        Ambassador Holbrooke. I do not think that linkage will help
    either half of the equation. But I certainly share your
    concern. I raised it on my first trip there, I raised it
    publicly, I will continue to raise it. But I just think that
    the linkage would work against both issues. But I understand
    the importance of it. I share your view.
        Mr. Ackerman. Does the civilian Government of Pakistan have
    control over the military?
        Ambassador Holbrooke. The military in Pakistan has a long
    tradition of serving within the government but having its own
    role. There are other countries like this.
        Mr. Ackerman. But the government still has a strong
    tradition of being overthrown by the military.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. Well, that is another matter. We are
    strongly opposed to any such event, Congressman Ackerman. We
    have made that unambiguous and clear to all parties publicly
    and privately. The chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff,
    Admiral Mike Mullen, is in constant contact with his Pakistani
    counterparts on this issue, and we think this would be a
    terrible event. Over half of Pakistan's history since
    independence they have had military rule.
        Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
        And the gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is
    recognized.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Ambassador, I wish you well and I am very pleased that
    you were selected and have gone about this incredible task that
    you have. And just as pointed as my questions will be, do not
    think that I am not rooting for you to succeed in your job.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. Thank you.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. First of all, let me note that I do agree
    with the chairman of the subcommittee. I would suggest that it
    is time for us to get real with Pakistan, and to the degree
    that over my career we have bent over backwards historically
    for this last 30 years to sort of not to come to grips with
    some real issues, and thus we have let things fester and it has
    gotten progressively worse. So it is time for us really to lay
    down a standard and say what is reality here.
        And if there are leaders in Pakistan who oppose our getting
    to the real facts concerning A.Q. Khan, then those people are
    not our friends. The bottom line is something of that
    significance, of that magnitude, if the leaders of Pakistan are
    not permitting us to have the type of accountability for this
    individual and what has been done, then frankly those people
    are not our friends and do not deserve the type of support that
    we are trying to give them just for the record. If you have a
    disagreement with that, please go straight ahead.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. The issues that you and Congressman
    Ackerman raised should have been dealt with at the outset. A
    decision was made by another group of American officials not to
    raise them. A new administration came to office on January 2
    facing a different set of problems. I raised A.Q. Khan
    immediately upon my being in Pakistan and I will continue to
    raise it. But the issue that Congressman Ackerman raised, and
    it is a very important one, is whether we should condition our
    own strategic interests, he linked it to the F-16s, but you
    have made it an even broader issue, to this issue.
        At this time, there is no evidence that he is actively
    engaged in these things anymore. It would be enormously
    valuable to know what he did. The ice has frozen over this
    issue in a sense. I would love to crack it open. But,
    Congressman, as we speak and as Chairman Berman pointed out at
    the beginning, the enemy of our nation as well as Pakistan is
    active in the field not too far from the capital. We need to
    help Pakistan, and we need to weigh the help against the
    accountability issues. Let me define the right balance.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. I am running out of time too, and let me
    just note that if Pakistan is unwilling to work together with
    us on something as significant as the nuclear weapons perhaps
    in the hands of terrorists who might do harm to the United
    States, well, then they do not deserve our help. Let us make it
    very clear. If a nuclear weapon goes off in the United States
    and it is because we have not followed through with what this
    Khan character has been doing with other radical Islamicists,
    well, then we have not been doing due diligence to our own
    people.
        You were in Vietnam, and at that time and you mentioned
    that, the support for the Vietnamese battle against us was
    Russia and China. We are now at war with radical Islam in
    Pakistan and Afghanistan in particular. Where are the radical
    Islamicists who are fighting this war against us getting their
    financial support to maintain this struggle?
        Ambassador Holbrooke. The other elements in other countries
    have been sending money to the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Does that include Saudi Arabia?
        Ambassador Holbrooke. It includes people in Saudi Arabia. I
    don't have any evidence it includes the government, but
    certainly money is flowing into what you might call the bad
    guys from the Gulf, from Pakistan and from other places in the
    world under the Hawala system, under hand-carried money. We do
    not have a program to close that down now. We are working on it
    actively. Our most senior officials have a task force that is
    trying to address this, and it is very high on our list.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Good luck in that operation, and also I
    hope that we are going to do the drug challenge as well.
        Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman is expired.
        The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Wexler, recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Wexler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ambassador, we welcome you here as well and are rooting
    very much for you also. Recently Deputy Secretary Lew and
    Deputy Secretary Steinberg came before our committee and
    presented the administration's new plans for Afghanistan. And
    if I understand it correctly, in a nutshell, it calls for
    17,000 additional troops in southern Afghanistan and an
    additional 4,000 troops on top of that.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. Trainers.
        Mr. Wexler. Yes. You very eloquently talk about the
    interdependence of our Afghanistan and Pakistan policies and
    the interrelationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan or the
    lack of interrelationship. Could you share with us what the
    anticipated repercussion the anticipated goal of the additional
    troops in Afghanistan will be with respect to Pakistan? And can
    you also share with us in terms of al-Qaeda's two senior
    leaders, bin Laden and Zawari, what role do we believe them to
    be playing, if we know, in terms of the current circumstances
    in Pakistan? And finally, what role, if any, is Iran playing?
    And is there a potential for cooperation possibly with respect
    to Iran in terms of resolving the crisis in Pakistan?
        Ambassador Holbrooke. On your first question, Congressman
    Wexler, I believe the troops will make an enormous difference.
    They are going into a very difficult area. They are well-
    prepared for it and well-led. I know the commanders. They will
    displace the Taliban as long as they are there. The real test
    is can they transfer that responsibility to local security
    forces over time. As they progress, I think we can expect
    elements of the Taliban, some will fade back into the villages
    like all guerrillas do, and others will go east into Pakistan
    toward the Baluchistand area, and that is an issue that has to
    be addressed.
        On your second point on Osama bin Laden, you wanted to know
    what their role was vis-a-vis the Taliban?
        Mr. Wexler. Vis-a-vis the circumstances in Pakistan today,
    do we have any information in terms of what role they are
    playing?
        Ambassador Holbrooke. In Afghanistan?
        Mr. Wexler. No, in terms of what is happening in Pakistan.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. I am sorry, I misunderstood. In
    regard to al-Qaeda, I think it is very well-described in an
    article in this morning's New York Times where a Taliban
    spokesman said we do the local war against the Americans, al-
    Qaeda does the global war.
        And finally, on your question about Iran, very interesting
    point. There have been two major conferences in the last month,
    March 31 in The Hague on Afghanistan, April 17 in Tokyo on
    Pakistan. The latter was a pledging conference. The Iranians
    attended both in The Hague at the Vice Foreign Minister level
    and in Tokyo on Pakistan at the Foreign Minister level.
        And in Tokyo, they pledged $330 million to the
    reconstruction effort for Pakistan. Quite an interesting thing
    to do. They could have done it bilaterally, they could have
    done it in some other method. And the speech that the Foreign
    Minister gave was one in which he outlined policy goals that
    were similar to ours. Now we have vast and important
    differences with Iran on nuclear weapons, Hamas, Hezbollah,
    Israel and many other critical issues, but here is one area
    where there seems to be a strategic similarity.
        They don't want the Taliban whom they hate to succeed. They
    have vested interests on their eastern border. Hazrat is a city
    with very old historic cultural links to Iran. Their drug flow
    into Iran has caused a massive drug addiction problem. And so
    it looks to me like for reasons that don't make them nice guys
    but just are facts they are looking at this area as an area
    where instability would be adverse to them.
        Mr. Wexler. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
        The gentleman from California, Mr. Royce, is recognized for
    5 minutes.
        Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And welcome, Mr. Holbrooke. I joined Chairman Berman on his
    delegation to India and Pakistan, and I had an opportunity
    there to talk to General Kiyani about the insurgency that is
    occurring and building in the Swat Valley, the tentacles that
    are going out from Swat. One of the quick observations I would
    make is that Abdul Aziz was released, this is the individual
    from the Red Mosque who had led so many young suicide bombers
    to commit attacks in the Punjab and in the capital, and he was
    out publicly preaching jihad and an overthrow of the government
    because Supreme Court Justice Chaudhury had released him.
        And as we look at the situation of the graduates coming out
    of the madrassahs, the New York Times said yesterday two-thirds
    of the suicide bombers in Punjab have attended those schools.
    My question would be, is there the will in Pakistan to put in
    place a curriculum that isn't hostile? And is there the will to
    defeat the insurgency in Swat?
        On the radio front, you have raised the point, Ambassador,
    that like with Rwandan hate radio we have the Taliban radio,
    150 illegal radio stations. I would ask on the jamming
    equipment, what is the status? I know you have been working to
    try to get that jamming assistance to the Pakistani Government.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. Big issue for us.
        Mr. Royce. A couple other questions I would just leave you
    with. One, you mentioned trade, and I want to encourage you on
    that front because I think giving Pakistan greater market
    access could do more good than aid, that frankly we have a
    limited capacity to implement. So, if it is a real trade and
    real engagement, you might have to take leadership on this. I
    think the Van Hollen approach is kind of unrealistic, but that
    might help civil society there.
        The last point I would like to ask you about is on Afghan
    contracting, because that process in the country is really a
    mess. There is quite a bit of blowback. Corruption is rampant
    there, and the resentment that that creates among Afghans is a
    problem. And I think this is compounded when a foreign firm,
    take one example, Turkish firm brings in Turkish labor, doesn't
    hire Afghani labor, that does not build Afghani capacity.
        So it is very hard for American firms of course to compete
    in this corrupt environment, and I think from community leaders
    here in the Afghan community, we have many engineers in the
    Afghan community who would like to go back, get engaged, hire
    Afghans obviously in order to build capacity there, and I think
    there is something you could directly do on that front which
    would help turn that around. But if I could ask your responses
    on some of those questions?
        Ambassador Holbrooke. Very limited time, a lot questions.
        Chairman Berman. 2 minutes and 20 seconds.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. 16 seconds, Mr. Chairman.
        The Afghan contracting issue, I agree fully with you. But
    let us not limit it to competition with Turks. We have got a
    lot to answer for here ourselves. You know that only about 10
    percent of American assistance in Afghanistan goes through the
    government. So I want to increase that to at least 40 or 50
    percent because we are trying to build up Afghan capacity and
    we are undermining it by that process. And this is one of the
    things we discovered as we did our due diligence of what we
    inherited.
        I would like to however use the remaining 1 minute and 36
    seconds to ask you about the ROZs. I like Van Hollen's
    legislation. I publicly supported it. And I know there are
    differences between the Senate and the House versions, but it
    is a very important idea. Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen talked
    about it in her opening remarks. I share her comments. Perhaps
    I could just get a sense of why you disagreed with it.
        Mr. Royce. I think that requiring American fabric in this,
    you know, you and I worked on the African Growth and
    Opportunity Act to try to create economic growth.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. I remember.
        Mr. Royce. We doubled trade between Africa and the United
    States. In my view, attempting to micromanage this with
    American fabric, as I have made the observation, we are going
    to have limited ability to have an impact with the aid that we
    do give. But in terms of trade, we are going to have a capacity
    to build civil society there, create jobs, and if we do that in
    tandem with education and getting people out of madrassahs and
    into public education, which was once the case until the
    government made the decision to put all the money into
    armaments, then I think we are confronting some of the problems
    long-term that might turn things around.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. I understand. As long as we agree
    that the general concept is correct, that is what I wanted to
    understand. Because it is up to you to work out the details, we
    want some legislation, it is really of high symbolic
    importance.
        Mr. Royce. Ambassador, is there the will in the Swat Valley
    for the government to go in and get control of the situation?
        Ambassador Holbrooke. The government went back in
    yesterday, and this morning the deal broke down. President
    Zardari had always predicted this would happen. The first thing
    he said to me last night was I told you this deal wasn't going
    to work. Remember, Zardari had opposed it and he was forced to
    agree to it. So his answer to your question is the Army is
    going back in as we speak.
        Mr. Royce. Thank you, Ambassador.
        Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman is expired.
        The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, is recognized
    for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And welcome, Ambassador Holbrooke. It is good to see you
    again. It is my understanding that over the last 7 years we
    have provided about $12 billion in aid to Pakistan for military
    equipment and military training and resources. And yet
    Pakistani Army Chief of Staff General Pervez Kiyani said his
    troops do not have the necessary equipment to fight the
    militants. Given just the level of our aid, how is that
    possible? What is going on in Pakistan that they have
    inadequate resources to fight the militants?
        Ambassador Holbrooke. Very simple, Congressman Connolly.
    The aid went for the wrong sort of assistance. They didn't get
    night vision goggles, they didn't get helicopters. Secondly,
    their own existing helicopter fleet is very inadequately
    maintained, and we want to help them with that too. Third,
    there wasn't a sufficient effort made to encourage a
    reconfiguration of the Army for counterinsurgency. Fourth,
    events between India and Pakistan always kept a larger number
    of troops in the east than in the west.
        You are now addressing the core point which any military
    analyst would say has to be fixed. Otherwise, you end up in a
    Whac-A-Mole situation where you can fight them in Bajur and
    they will appear in Swat. You can fight them in Swat and they
    will be in Waziristan. There are not adequate numbers of troops
    in my view in the west. I think that my colleague, General
    Petraeus, would say exactly the same thing.
        Mr. Connolly. Do we have an understanding, Mr. Ambassador,
    or growing understanding with the Pakistani Government that
    that needs to be corrected?
        Ambassador Holbrooke. There is no question, Congressman
    Connolly, that recent events have increased the readiness of
    both sides to address that problem. Whether it is sufficient or
    not will be determined partly in the next few days. General
    Kiyani, however, is not here. He is back in the country, where
    he should be, directing these military offensives. But other
    senior military officials are here, and Admiral Mullen is
    practically commuting to Pakistan, I will be going back next
    week, your own chairman was just there. I think every
    discussion we ever have, this is sort of like the number one
    issue.
        Mr. Connolly. Because it just seems to me if we are going
    to have confidence in providing more aid to Pakistan in this
    hour of need, we have to have some assurances it is not just
    going to go to further the buildup and reinforce the capacity
    vis-a-vis the perceived threat from India.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. I agree with that, and I think that
    can be shaped by the nature of the aid.
        Mr. Connolly. Let me ask you also, Mr. Ambassador, since
    President Zardari is here in town and I know you are meeting
    with him, looking at some events in Pakistan, it is a little
    unclear to us I think sort of who is responsible for what, but
    certainly some decisions have been made by the Pakistani
    Government. These aren't things that were done to them, they
    are decisions that they made. There was a decision to release
    the Imam of the Red Mosque, Abdul Aziz, who then went on
    television and talked about the need for national Sharia.
        Similarly an Imam from Swat was given air time on
    television saying the same thing. The deal with Swat's passive
    understanding, did not the Pakistani Government understand what
    a potential threat that would pose to their security and to our
    bilateral relationship? What is your sense of the Pakistani
    understanding of those or at least the reactions to those
    events, and is there some reassessment going on within the
    Pakistani Government about perhaps the wisdom of making such
    agreements?
        Ambassador Holbrooke. Well, there is no way I am going to
    defend the release of the Red Mosque leader, but it was not
    done by the government, it was done by the Judiciary. And
    Pakistan has an independent Judiciary, and that was in fact the
    cause of the great political struggle against Musharraf and the
    considerable political disagreement in mid-March between the
    two leading political figures in the country. So I share your
    views, I share your concern.
        The radio stations, I will repeat what I said earlier to
    Congressman Rohrabacher and Congressman Royce, it is
    inexplicable to me that we didn't have a program to deal with
    this. You know, these are low frequency FM stations on the
    backs of motorcycles and pickup trucks wandering around Swat
    with no counterprogramming. We should be suppressing this and
    we should be following up with the proper messages. It is a
    little bit like Rwanda, Mr. Chairman, they are announcing who
    they are going to behead and they are terrorizing people. And
    the bills that are before you include funds to deal with this
    problem. It is one of the reasons it is so important.
        Mr. Connolly. My time has expired.
        I want to thank the Ambassador.
        Chairman Berman. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Paul, is
    recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Paul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Welcome, Mr. Ambassador. I have a couple concerns I want to
    express. The main concern I have is I was hoping to see maybe a
    change in our foreign policy from the last administration, but
    of course we see just more of the same. More nation-building,
    more policing of the world, more involvement, and it just seems
    like we never learn from our past mistakes. We don't learn from
    what kind of trouble the Soviets got into, and yet we continue
    to do the same thing.
        And even your last statement, it is a grandiose goal; we
    want to work for a vibrant, modern democracy, wow, what a
    dream. But think of how we are doing this. I mean, we label
    everybody that oppose what we are doing, we call them Taliban,
    and all of a sudden there are many, many thousands of Pashtuns
    that are right smack in the middle getting killed by our bombs
    and then we wonder why they object to our policies over there.
        This to me means that we are into this for the long haul,
    and it is going to cost a lot of money, and it is going to cost
    a lot of lives. And if the Members of Congress had ever
    realized what Iraq would end up costing us in the number of
    deaths, in the number of dollars, now $1 trillion, they would
    have been a little more hesitant, they admit that even now,
    well, maybe we shouldn't have. But who knows what this is going
    to end up costing in terms of lives, and the odds of it working
    are so slim.
        This is what my great concern is. You know, in 1999, Sharif
    was the Prime Minister, and we were supportive of the military
    coup, and Musharraf comes in and we support him. So now it is
    said that we will have relationships with Sharif, which
    everybody knows exactly what that means, it means that we are
    involved in their elections, that is the way we have done it
    for so many years. But the Pakistani papers report it as ``U.S.
    taps Sharif to be the next Pakistani Prime Minister.''
        Now whether or not we literally can do that, I think we can
    have a lot of influence. That is what they believe in. How do
    you win the hearts and minds of these people if we are seen as
    invaders and occupiers? And here we are just doing nothing more
    than expanding our role in Pakistan and in Afghanistan. I don't
    see any end to it.
        But my particular question is this. It has to do with the
    Pashtuns that have been killed. I mean, we are bombing a
    sovereign country. Where did we get the authority to do that?
    Did the Pakistani Government give us written permission? Did
    the Congress give us written permission to expand the war and
    start bombing in Pakistan?
        Why do we as a Congress and as a people and as our
    representatives in the Executive Branch just so casually and
    carelessly expand the war and say, well, today we have to do
    this, we will worry about tomorrow? What about our national
    debt? We have $1.8 billion national debt facing us, we think
    nothing, oh, $3.5 billion, which will turn out to be tens of
    billions of dollars after this. So I would like to know where
    you stand on this, the innocent killing of Pashtuns, are they
    all Taliban or are there some innocent people being killed?
        Ambassador Holbrooke. Congressman Paul, I did not say
    exactly what you imputed to me, but I have thought a long time
    about the issues you raise. And you mentioned Iraq. Afghanistan
    and Pakistan is not Iraq. The reason we are in this area,
    notwithstanding its immense difficulties, is because the people
    in this area attacked our country on September 11, 2001 and
    have stated flatly they intend to do it again. They have done
    all the other things we mentioned earlier. And therefore, it is
    not Iraq and it is not Vietnam, despite the fact that many
    people say it is. It is about defending our country.
        It is not easy, I agree with you. It is not cheap. And
    having seen wars on three continents, having been shot at for
    my country, I sure don't feel comfortable where you ask brave
    young American men and women to risk their lives and sometimes
    pay the ultimate sacrifice. However, the President of the
    United States reviewed everything in regard to this and came to
    the conclusion, not that it is the same policy. We spent the
    whole meeting today talking about differences. And there are
    dozens of others. It is not the same policy, but our goal has
    to be to defeat al-Qaeda. You cannot let them take over an even
    larger terrain, move into other parts of the world and then
    plan what they are planning in my view.
        Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
        And the gentlelady from California, Ms. Woolsey, is
    recognized for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Woolsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you, Mr. Ambassador. President Obama recently
    expressed grave concern about the situation in Pakistan,
    offering that the very fragile civilian government there does
    not appear to have the capacity to deliver basic services to
    the Pakistani people. He further stated that this lack of
    capacity makes it difficult for the government to gain the
    support and loyalty of its people.
        So I am asking you today, to what extent to you agree with
    this assessment, and what new actions by the U.S. Government
    might help, and where is the place for smart power, investing
    in humanitarian needs and infrastructure, economy, food, so
    that we can shore up the people? I believe we can do that and
    at the same time, you can correct me if you don't think this is
    appropriate, hold the government accountable.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. Thank you very much for the question.
    Smart power, which by the way is a phrase originated by a
    person who used to work for me at the U.N., Susanne Nossel, is
    exactly what this bill is trying to do. It is something we
    should have done a long time ago. It is using American
    resources in these areas that go beyond military activities.
    But, and I know this is difficult for some people, it has to be
    married up to the use of force and the search for security. And
    we are using every piece of leverage we have to encourage
    Pakistan to work with us in Afghanistan and close its own
    border and deal with its own problems.
        Ms. Woolsey. Well, Mr. Ambassador, if the ratio to smart
    investment is 1 to 10, with the 10 being military investment, I
    don't know how we get where we are going.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. I don't think it is 1 to 10 anymore.
    It was, and if you look at the figures that this committee
    authorized and your body appropriated for Pakistan, the ratio
    over the last 10 years, it is pretty hard to understand. But
    this bill is one of a number of bills now in the Congress to
    correct that, and that is why I am here, to say that although
    we have differences with some provisos, we think that this is a
    major step in the right direction.
        Ms. Woolsey. Well, with Pakistan being a nuclear weapons
    state, how does that change our interactions? I mean, how
    complicated does that make the relationship to move to smart
    power?
        Ambassador Holbrooke. I think that prior to your arrival we
    discussed that a bit, and I offered to discuss the issue in
    more detail with the experts in a private session. But it is of
    immense concern to anyone in the world who cares about
    stability when any country starts building up a nuclear
    arsenal. That does not change the fact that in the western part
    of Pakistan are people who attacked the United States on 9/11
    and have stated publicly and repeatedly they intend to do so
    again. And I for one take them at their word, and that is why
    we are here today.
        And somebody earlier, I think it was Congressman Paul, used
    the word ``nation-building.'' We are not nation-building.
    Pakistan is a nation. We are helping them strengthen themselves
    against their enemies. Another one of your colleagues talked
    about the madrassahs, another example of a missed opportunity.
    The madrassahs grew up with outside funding from the Gulf, and
    as the New York Times article by Sabrina Tavernise in
    yesterday's paper front page clearly points out, a brilliant
    article, the students there are fodder for suicide bombing
    missions. And there was no counterprogramming. That is what you
    mean by ``smart power,'' that is what the administration I am
    proud to be part of means by ``smart power.'' That is what this
    bill addresses.
        Ms. Woolsey. Well, do you see a pathway for Pakistan to
    become a partner for nonproliferation other than just telling
    them they can't use what they have and that they work with us
    and we work with them and the rest of the world toward
    nonproliferation?
        Ambassador Holbrooke. I don't know. A very good question.
    We are wrestling with that and its related issues now. A very,
    very fair and good question.
        Ms. Woolsey. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. I want to be clear, Mr. Chairman.
    What I don't know is the precise answer to, can they be a
    partner in nonproliferation? It is not like we don't know
    anything about this.
        Chairman Berman. I understand, and the record should so
    reflect.
        The gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul, is recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. McCaul. And I thank the chairman.
        Thank you, Ambassador, for being here and your service. I
    commend you on your testimony that this is the number one
    issue. I think for too long this area has been left unfettered,
    and I believe the tribal areas have grown, the terrorist threat
    has grown from out of that region. You know, I worked
    counterterrorism in the Justice Department. It is pretty clear
    this is where the 9/11 threat emanates from when you look at
    Ramzi Yousef, the World Trade Center, his uncle, Khalid Sheikh
    Mohammed, the London arrests.
        This is sort of the epicenter in my view if you will, and I
    am very pleased to hear the focus that is being given in this
    area. A couple of quick questions. One, the last time I was
    there I visited with then President Musharraf about education.
    The madrassahs, he had a policy to reform education and to
    reform the madrassahs. That didn't happen. Do you see any
    progress for that under the new administration and particularly
    for women to be educated?
        And then also, if I could just throw out another issue and
    let you answer both of these questions, the whole idea of
    conditioning foreign aid as we are looking at providing about
    $6.7 billion in military aid to Pakistan, it seems to me that
    we ought to be looking at ways and working with the
    administration to condition that upon certain security
    agreements, and also access to A.Q. Khan, the master
    proliferator who we know proliferated to Iran, Syria, North
    Korea, and yet we have never had the opportunity to sit down
    with him and get information from him.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. You know, on January 12, 2002, if my
    memory is correct, President Musharraf gave a widely hailed
    speech in which he aligned himself with the United States in
    the War on Terror and said he would restore democracy and he
    would close down the madrassahs preaching violence. He did none
    of the above. And the United States did almost nothing to
    insist on it. And so we fast-forward to 2009, and we go back to
    the Congresswoman's point about smart power, and I urge you to
    read the article in yesterday's New York Times front page
    because it will astonish you that so little was done. But here
    we are, we have to start again.
        On the issue of women, I think everyone in this room knows
    that for Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and for President
    Obama this is a huge issue, and we will do everything we can to
    promote it in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is very
    important. At the same time, I need to be very clear, going
    back to earlier comments, while women's rights are very
    important, we should not be in a position of asking young
    American men and women to risk their lives on behalf of issues
    that are not directly related to our national security. Those
    of us who have served in Indochina and elsewhere, those of us
    who have seen combat understand how that decision should be
    reserved.
        And I cannot tell you how important the women's issue is,
    but I have been out there. I have talked to the troops in the
    western deserts west of Kandahar. I have seen them, the unit I
    spent time with had taken three casualties and never seen the
    enemy. And if they say, why are they fighting, you can't say
    you are fighting so that women have equal rights. If we do
    that, we are going to fight in a lot of other countries.
        Mr. McCaul. And I certainly agree.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. This is a very nuanced issue. I don't
    want anyone to think we are diminishing the importance of it or
    reduce its importance in your legislation, but I don't want
    people to think as they did a few years ago that that is why we
    are putting troops at risk in Afghanistan. We are there because
    the people in the western part of the country, some people
    there are saying publicly that they intend to attack the U.S.
    again, and we cannot leave them untouched and unchallenged.
        Mr. McCaul. And I agree with that assessment. The issue on
    conditioning the foreign aid, tying it to security?
        Ambassador Holbrooke. Say again, sir?
        Mr. McCaul. We have $6.7 billion in military aid, and it
    seems to me we ought to condition that aid upon certain
    security arrangements and agreements and then A.Q. Khan.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. Well, both those issues we addressed
    at length earlier, but let me just say that it is
    understandable you want some degree of conditionality or as the
    chairman said accountability. Some of the things in your
    legislation I hope would be adjusted. The meeting that the
    chairman is going to have with President Zardari later today is
    very important in that regard. Our meetings don't begin until
    tomorrow morning. Secretary Clinton talked about finding the
    sweet spot between your legitimate and understandable desire
    and the need to help them quickly.
        But I do want to underscore that however the final
    legislation turns out, the goals and motives of, I prefer the
    chairman's phrase, accountability, Section 206 of the
    legislation, the goals themselves are very similar to our own
    goals. But the methodology is something I would hope we would
    have a chance to discuss further as you move forward, and this
    afternoon's meeting will help us do that.
        Mr. McCaul. Thank you.
        Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman is expired.
        The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, recognized for
    5 minutes.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        And let me add my appreciation, I was going to begin,
    Ambassador Holbrooke, by saying I didn't know where to start,
    but I can start with saluting you as a great public servant and
    one who has consistently accepted challenges without regard to
    your personal security, and frankly I believe we owe you a debt
    of gratitude and applause. You are now tied inextricably to
    President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton, and I think
    that is a very dynamic and a very productive team, no nonsense
    but balanced. And I believe that is extremely important.
        Let me just quote the former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto,
    who I had a chance to speak to before her death; but comments
    that she made:

            ``The next few months are critical to Pakistan's future
            direction as a democratic state committed to promoting
            peace, fighting terrorism and working for social
            justice. Democracy is to peace and to undermining the
            forces of terrorism.''

    She made it clear almost without the ability to see that
    challenge through. She almost was prophetic because obviously
    she lost her life, and in the months afterward we are facing
    these challenges.
        But I want to try to get to a core set of issues in
    wondering how we can move forward. For example, you will
    continuously hear my colleague mention A.Q. Khan, and I respect
    that, but I do think as part of our negotiations we have to
    probe Pakistan even though it is not connected, and I believe
    it should not as we move forward in your position as an envoy,
    to convince us that Dr. Khan is contained. Those of us who have
    traveled to Pakistan have heard that stated repeatedly, and as
    I joined my chairman for a very, very instructive CODEL, I
    believe it is also key that we emphasize a unifying of the
    government.
        We had a chance to meet opposition leaders as well as
    government leaders, and I think it is crucial that we focus on
    the unity of the Pakistan Government. It speaks to Benazir
    Bhutto's comment of moving forward and promoting peace, we
    cannot do it in a separated government. And I appreciate you
    commenting on that, but let me ask my further question here.
        I am told and I am reading an article that should come out
    on May 18 in Newsweek that in fact the military has made some
    accomplishments through Operation Shirdil. And I am wondering
    whether you are aware of that and whether or not those
    accomplishments can be commented on. They have utilized
    friendly Taliban, they are working with tribesmen, they are the
    ones doing their work similar to the Sons of Iraq that we did
    in Iraq and the United States military did with them.
        Lastly, I think we should read into the record what the New
    York Times said: ``Pakistan's poorest families have turned to
    madrassahs or Islamic schools that feed or house the
    children.''
        So, Mr. Ambassador, if you would comment on, can we not
    bring some good news out of Pakistan so that Americans know
    that the people of Pakistan want peace, want security, that
    these terrorist acts have gone against Pakistan institutions,
    such as the Marriott was owned by a Pakistani, and that we have
    got to push the government even as the monies are coming to put
    in place alternative schools, not even to wait until our money
    flows, because obviously they have some good dollars from the
    donor conference that you were so keen in supporting. And I
    yield to you and thank you for your service.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. Let me start by thanking you for co-
    chairing the Pakistan caucus and saying that Secretary Clinton
    is very grateful that you are going to assist us in helping
    mobilize more of the resources of the Pakistani-American
    community. Your colleague, Dan Burton, is also participating.
    And this is of great personal interest to the Secretary of
    State and the President.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. And it is a great opportunity. The people
    of America who are Pakistani are very interested in being part
    of this.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. You will recall, Mr. Chairman, that
    when Secretary Clinton testified she referred frequently to the
    Pakistani diaspora, and that has not been done by previous
    Secretaries of State, and she is very serious about it, and
    Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee has been very, very supportive
    of this effort, and I would like to just record that.
        Now, in regard to the madrassahs, you are quoting the
    article I have already referred to twice, and I do commend it.
    In regard to the operation you mentioned, I must confess that
    either I didn't hear its name or I am not aware of what we are
    referring to, so I apologize.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. It is Operation Shirdil, S-H-I-R-D-I-L,
    and it is in the Bajur area, and allegedly there have been some
    activities by the Pakistani military where they have embraced
    the tribesmen who are working to fight against al-Qaeda and the
    Taliban.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. Bajur is where that is going on, and
    we don't have enough reports to know how well it is doing.
        Chairman Berman. The time of the gentlelady has expired.
    Ambassador, perhaps through writing there is a way to follow up
    on a couple of the questions that were not responded to.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Berman. I am told Ambassador Holbrooke, and I
    wasn't aware of this, he has to leave at 2 o'clock. Maybe we
    can squeeze in three more people.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. Mr. Chairman, this came up while we
    were here. The White House asked if I could get right down. I
    apologize.
        Chairman Berman. Okay, so we will have time for no more
    than three, at the most, questioners.
        Mr. Burton is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Burton. Well, Mr. Chairman, what I will do is just try
    to put all my questions together so that we can save some time.
        There is a great deal of concern, and I don't want to be
    redundant, but Mr. Ackerman raised the issue about the
    intelligence operation in Pakistan and how there may be some
    agents that aren't quite on our side and may be working with
    the Taliban and may be double agents. I presume our
    intelligence agency, the CIA, is working with them to some
    degree, and I would like to know what is your assessment of the
    situation as far as whether or not we have got some potential
    enemies in their intelligence operation.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. With great respect, Mr. Congressman,
    I don't think it would serve the national interest to pursue
    this line in an open session.
        Mr. Burton. Well, then I would like to attend a closed
    session where we can get this information. The other thing I
    would like to ask is we have skirted around what we would do in
    the event that the Taliban did take over and move close to
    these nuclear sites in Pakistan, and I know you have to do this
    in a closed session, but I would like to have you explain to
    the Members of the Congress how we are going to protect those
    and what cooperation you can expect from the military in
    Pakistan even if the Taliban were to take over the civil
    government.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. You have a great talent, Congressman,
    for asking questions that are very sensitive, very tough, and
    probably ought to be reserved. We already discussed this issue.
    I think it might be worth a private session if he agrees with
    it.
        Mr. Burton. Yes, and I have one more question so I won't
    gobble up any more time. We talked about these madrassahs, and
    the Saudis and the Gulf States have been not only helping build
    madrassahs and create them in Pakistan, but they have done it
    in other parts of the world, in Canada, I believe some I have
    seen even down here in the United States. They have a vested
    interest in making sure that Iran does not get nuclear weapons,
    and yet when you start funding operations where terrorists can
    evolve out of them, you end up maybe getting bitten on the hand
    yourself. And I don't know if the Saudis have been made aware
    of that or not, but can you explain real quickly how you are
    going to stop the money getting into Pakistan and elsewhere so
    that these madrassahs are shut down or slowed down?
        Ambassador Holbrooke. Congressman Burton, you are three for
    three on questions I think we ought to discuss in private. This
    is a compliment. These are tough ones, and these are the front
    edge of what we are working on. I already addressed that
    earlier. And I do want to also thank you as I did Sheila
    Jackson Lee for your leadership with the Pakistani-American
    community and for your readiness to participate in the
    important meeting coming up this weekend.
        Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I hope we will
    have a classified meeting if it is possible.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Will you yield, Mr. Burton?
        Chairman Berman. We are very limited on time.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. I am only asking the question, I just want
    to make sure that we all can join in that classified briefing,
    thank you.
        Chairman Berman. Oh, yes, I would not convene a classified
    briefing just for Mr. Burton. But I would give him the first
    three questions. Absolutely, we will follow that up.
        And now the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, recognized
    for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you very much.
        Ambassador Holbrooke, welcome. I want to just make a point
    because I think you did refer to the fact of the nuclear issue
    that we would discuss some of that in private session. But I
    want to make this statement in public in reference to that,
    because regardless of all the other issues that come up,
    paramount on the minds and the hearts of not just the American
    people but the people across the world is that this situation
    in Pakistan is unique because Pakistan has these nuclear
    weapons.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. Nuclear weapons in the center and al-
    Qaeda in the west.
        Mr. Scott. Absolutely, and I want to get to both of those.
    But I do want to say we are giving them or are approaching to
    give them close to $9 billion. Our aid is coming, it is very
    important, it is somewhat of a fragile situation, we have got
    this nuclear issue. It might not be improper to have some
    consideration of requirements on this aid tied to and a
    capacity for the United States to have some joint cooperation
    with making sure that these nuclear weapons are secured.
        And I don't want you to have to respond to that. I just
    want you to know that there are some very strong feelings that
    we make sure, and I think that the world population is looking
    not for Pakistan to answer that question if their nuclear
    weapons are secure from that, but there must be a much more
    reliable source, and none more reliable than that the United
    States itself to say, yes, world, we have these in control, the
    nuclear capacity of Pakistan is under control. That will give
    the world a great sigh of relief, and I believe judging from
    the information we have that we are not there yet, and maybe we
    can make that a condition of our efforts.
        Going back to al-Qaeda, what is the end game now? We are
    very fearful that we could be in for a long slog here, very
    reminiscent of Vietnam. One of the mistakes we have is that we
    don't have an exit strategy, we don't have an end strategy.
    There is a cluster, there is a disagreement on what that
    mission is. Could you very quickly state to us in your succinct
    words, the reason I say that is because there is considerable
    thought within the Congress that we have just a year here, we
    have a year here to see what it is we can do over there and
    this administration. So I guess what I am looking at is, within
    that year, can we clearly define a mission now? Is that simply
    al-Qaeda? Is it getting Pakistan stable in the region? And what
    is our end game and our exit strategy?
        Ambassador Holbrooke. Mr. Scott, we can define the
    objective very clearly, and President Obama did that very
    clearly in his major speech and many other times. It is to
    destroy, disrupt and dismantle al-Qaeda, which pose a threat to
    us. But to give a precise timetable is to put in motion the
    seeds of your own failure. You say 1 year, and they will say,
    great, we will wait you out. This is a difficult struggle, it
    will take an unspecifiable amount of time.
        I fully understand the desire of the American people and
    the Congress for a time limit and an exit strategy, but there
    is a difference between an exit strategy and an exit timetable.
    And we have defined our strategy, but we certainly can't put a
    time on it.
        Mr. Scott. And in terms of al-Qaeda, and in terms of the
    Taliban, in terms of the fact that, is it an accurate statement
    from the reports that they are within 60 miles of the capital
    city?
        Ambassador Holbrooke. Not quite 60, but very close when
    they took Buner, but they have been driven out of Buner, and
    the Pakistani army is now trying to push them back in Swat. So
    it is more like 100, but the difference between 60 and 100
    isn't that significant. The importance is who has the momentum.
    Until yesterday the momentum did not appear to be in the right
    hands. The army has now begun a major offensive which
    Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee alluded to, and we will have
    to wait and see how it goes. I hope you will address these
    questions to President Zardari.
        Mr. Scott. We certainly will. Well, I have no seconds.
    Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Berman. Could we have one more?
        Ambassador Holbrooke. Of course.
        Chairman Berman. Mr. Costa from California, 5 minutes.
        Mr. Costa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you, Ambassador. I appreciate your good work. You
    have drawn a very difficult assignment in your portfolio. I am
    a very pragmatic realist as I suspect you are, and you deal
    with the cards you are dealt and I know that is what you are
    dealing with both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I was with the
    chairman in his last visit to Pakistan as well as India, and I
    have been to Afghanistan and Pakistan twice in the last 2
    years. Afghanistan first, how do we succeed there in which
    corruption seems to be, if not endemic, a way of life, and we
    have got the problems with the opium trade, and nothing we have
    done so far seemingly has been able to penetrate at the local
    level, although I know there has been a reset in our policy
    there.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. How do we succeed? Well, we are
    putting into place a huge array of different plans. This bill
    is one of them because this bill significantly restructures the
    priorities, and I think it is very clear that we are trying to
    change our strategy.
        Mr. Costa. To be certain that the money that we provide
    actually gets to the local levels?
        Ambassador Holbrooke. Am I certain? I am pretty certain
    that the money in the past, that not very much of it got down
    there. We want to change that.
        One point, Mr. Chairman, I didn't make earlier is that I am
    now personally reviewing all aid projects for both countries,
    and I have been rejecting a lot of them precisely on the
    grounds of Mr. Costa's question, because I didn't see that it
    was getting out there. Some of the money was driveled away to
    contractors in the Washington area or elsewhere, then it was
    subcontracted in the field, there weren't sufficient end use
    checks.
        We are restructuring everything. The other day we rejected
    a project for support of women's NGOs in Afghanistan because it
    was going through contractors, and we said let us put this
    money directly in the hands of the Ambassador for the same
    purpose, $30 million. We want to time that up, we want to come
    back to you in a year and say that accountability in our
    Government has gotten better, not just the accountability you
    are interested in with the Pakistanis.
        Mr. Costa. I appreciate that, Mr. Ambassador, and there is
    some local investments from California that have provided
    monies for construction of hospitals and schools, and I would
    like to pursue that on a separate line of questions.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. Delighted.
        Mr. Costa. Pakistan, same theme, I read the article that
    you referenced twice now. Two different Pakistans as the
    article pointed out, a third or 40 percent urban, secular,
    educated, the other 60 percent plus rural, poor and not much
    education. And yet the 60 years that we know of the history of
    Pakistan as a government has been primarily run by the military
    with intervals of democracy. Through all that time corruption
    has run fairly consistent. What are your milestones in these
    negotiations with our Pakistani allies? I agree with you,
    timelines don't make sense, but it seems to me there has to be
    milestones that they need to reach.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. Well, we are working with your
    committee on these what you call milestones. I think my
    colleagues in the administration like the word metrics, but we
    all know what we mean. I have always had a feeling that if we
    are succeeding we are going to know it.
        Mr. Costa. And the question hasn't been asked, but it has
    been inferred to, we hope the current government well and that
    they are successful, what is our backup plan if by the end of
    this year we are dealing with another government in Pakistan?
        Ambassador Holbrooke. If we have a backup plan of the sort
    you mean, we are just going to publicly undermine the
    government. Asif Ali Zardari is the democratically elected
    President of the second largest Muslim country in the world,
    the fifth largest country in the world, he is coming to meet
    you all this afternoon, and he should be treated as the leader
    of a country who vitally needs our support and whose success is
    directly related to our most vital national interests. And to
    address your question as an American official would be only to
    undermine that goal.
        Mr. Costa. I appreciate that, I understand that.
        Ambassador Holbrooke. But I do want to underscore again
    this is a country that has had over half its history in
    military rule, and we don't want that.
        Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman is expired. We
    have one last person here. Do you think as you are bundling up
    to leave, Mr. Ellison could throw out a question or two to you?
        Mr. Ellison. Yes, I just have one question, Mr. Ambassador,
    and like everybody has lauded you, I want to join in that, but
    I won't waste time doing it because I know you feel good about
    the work you have done. I would like to see us connect aid to
    access to nuclear scientists to redeploying away from India to
    more in the more vital areas and a long list of other things we
    could connect aid to, but how does that make President Zardari
    look in the eyes of the people who want to defeat him? Do they
    use it to say, see, you are just a toy of the West, and then
    use that to sort of undermine what motion he could make?
        Ambassador Holbrooke. Great question. President Zardari has
    often been accused of being too pro-American. And please bear
    that in mind. He has paid a price for being pro-American while
    some Americans don't appreciate how much he is trying to do the
    right thing for his country. And I am glad you asked that
    question as a scene-setter for your own meetings with him
    today.
        Chairman Berman. And the only thing I would say, because I
    do think that is a very important question, but we just have
    spent 9 years not conditioning, not holding accountable, and
    what have we gotten for that? And one thing, Musharraf wasn't
    was a toy of the Americans. But in and of itself, that didn't
    solve the fundamental question.
        Mr. Ellison. Ambassador Holbrooke, I very much appreciate
    your being here. I know this is an incredibly busy week and an
    incredibly busy month and an incredibly busy life, and you have
    a huge job ahead of you. No one is better able to do it than
    you, and we thank you for being here.
        Chairman Berman. We are going to have a second panel now
    even if it is just for me. But the second panel I am going to
    introduce as they come forward.
        For our second panel today, we have several noted experts
    on Pakistan. Lisa Curtis is a senior research fellow at the
    Heritage Foundation, where she focuses on America's economic
    security and political relationships with South Asia. Before
    joining Heritage in August 2006, she worked on the Senate
    Foreign Relations Committee as a professional staff member for
    3 years for then Chairman Senator Lugar. From 2001 to 2003, she
    served as a senior advisor in the State Department's South Asia
    Bureau. She has also worked as an analyst for the Central
    Intelligence Agency in the late 1990s.
        Christine Fair is a senior political scientist with the
    RAND Corporation. Prior to rejoining RAND, she served as a
    political officer to the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
    and as a senior research associate in the United States
    Institute of Peace. Her research focuses on security
    competition between India and Pakistan, Pakistan's internal
    security, the causes of terrorism in South Asia, and United
    States strategic relations with India and Pakistan. She is a
    member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies,
    the Council on Foreign Relations, and is the managing editor of
    India Review.
        Daniel Markey is a senior fellow for India, Pakistan, and
    South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations. His areas of
    specialization include security and governance in South Asia,
    international conflict, theories of international relations,
    and United States foreign policy. From 2003 to 2007, he held
    the South Asia portfolio on the Policy Planning Staff of the
    Department of State. Prior to government service, Dr. Markey
    taught courses in the Politics Department at Princeton
    University and served as the executive director of Princeton's
    Research Program in International Security.
        And while our audience is small, it is very interested. So,
    you know, you could talk to a lot of people who wouldn't care.
    You have got a few people who really do. So, Ms. Curtis, why
    don't you start. And try and summarize your opening statement
    in about 5 minutes.

      STATEMENT OF MS. LISA CURTIS, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, ASIAN
                STUDIES CENTER, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

        Ms. Curtis. Okay. Chairman Berman, Congressman Burton,
    thank you very much for inviting me here today to testify on
    this very important topic. Pakistan is being roiled by a well-
    armed and well-organized insurgency pushing for the
    establishment of strict Islamic law, beginning in the country's
    northwest frontier province, but with the long-term goal of
    provoking a nationwide Islamic revolution. Although the
    collapse of the Pakistani state may not be imminent, as some
    have recently suggested, the government's surrender of the Swat
    Valley to pro-Taliban militants was a major victory for the
    extremists seeking to carve out pockets of influence throughout
    the country.
        Islamabad's decision to allow the implementation of a
    parallel Islamic Court system in Malakand division of the NWFP,
    which includes Swat Valley, demonstrates the weakness of the
    Pakistan Government and military in the face of the militant
    onslaught. The Pakistan military had deployed some 12,000
    troops to Swat Valley for 18 months in 2007 and 2008 before
    surrendering to the militants. The surrender occurred despite
    the overwhelming vote in favor of the secular political party,
    Awami National Party in the February 2008 elections,
    demonstrating that the people of the region do not support the
    extremist agenda but are merely acquiescing in the absence of
    support from the government to counter the militants.
        Washington has repeatedly warned Pakistani officials about
    the danger of appeasing the militants through peace deals that
    confer legitimacy on them and help them consolidate control
    over ever increasing parts of the province. Pakistani officials
    have rejected Washington's concerns, accusing United States
    officials of hyping the threat and/or misreading the local
    ground situation. Pakistani officials have also glossed over
    the fact that the establishment of a parallel Islamic court
    system will have dire human rights consequences for average
    Pakistanis, mainly women and girls.
        Events over the last 2 weeks, however, may have finally
    awakened some Pakistani officials to the downsides of the Swat
    peace deal. The leader of the pro-Taliban militants, Sufi
    Mohammed, declared in a recent interview that democracy is not
    permissible under Sharia law, revealing the militants' ultimate
    objective of undermining Pakistan's democratic institutions
    nationwide. And just 1 week after Pakistani President Asif Ali
    Zardari approved the Swat Valley peace agreement following
    passage of a parliamentary resolution urging him to do so, the
    Taliban took over the neighboring district of Buner.
        The Taliban subsequently agreed to pull out of Buner on
    April 24 after Pakistan deployed paramilitary troops to the
    region. That same day, Chief of Army Staff General Kiyani sent
    a warning to the militants that the Army would not allow them
    to impose their way of life on the civil society of Pakistan.
    The statement was a positive first step in clarifying Pakistani
    policy toward the militants, but it must now be followed by
    sustained and consistent action based on a comprehensive civil-
    military plan to counter the militants' objectives.
        Pakistani civilian leaders have been too slow to awaken to
    the threat before them and too willing to sacrifice their
    constituents to the brutal policies of the Taliban. For
    Pakistan to fend off the growing extremist influence in the
    country, civilian leaders need to highlight the brutality of
    the pro-Taliban militants, demonstrating they are forcing a way
    of life on Pakistani citizens that is alien to their own
    historical traditions of Islam and aspirations for
    constitutional democracy.
        The struggle is certainly Pakistan's to fight, but the
    United States can support those Pakistanis standing up for the
    preservation of democratic institutions and promotion of
    tolerance, pluralism, rule of law, and the development of civil
    society. Both the Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation
    Enhancement Act of 2009, the PEACE Act recently introduced in
    this Chamber, and the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of
    2009 introduced yesterday in the Senate, demonstrate the United
    States interest in developing a broad-based, long-term
    partnership with Pakistan.
        The PEACE Act provides comprehensive details on the shape
    of future economic aid to Pakistan, focusing on a range of
    areas, including strengthening the Parliament, the judicial
    system and law enforcement sectors. The PEACE Act also
    addresses the need for strong oversight and accountability in
    the provision and distribution of this aid and to ensure that
    it is not wasted or abused. Both bills also contain language
    calling for greater accountability with regard to future
    military assistance to Pakistan.
        These measures would require Islamabad to permanently break
    the links between its security services and the Afghan Taliban
    and other extremist groups. While some have raised concerns
    that such conditions will discourage rather than encourage
    Pakistani cooperation against terrorists, others note that we
    must begin to develop leverage with our large-scale aid
    programs and ensure that U.S. taxpayer money does not
    perversely contribute to undermining United States objectives
    in Afghanistan.
        Ambassador Holbrooke talked about reaching that sweet spot,
    and I would just point out that that sweet spot would recognize
    Pakistan's genuine security concerns but also make clear that
    the United States will not tolerate dual policies toward
    terrorists. While seeking to stiffen Pakistani resolve against
    the Taliban, the United States must at the same time shore up
    Pakistani capabilities.
        To this end, it is appropriate that Central Commander
    General Petraeus be given the latitude and flexibility he needs
    immediately to strengthen Pakistani capabilities to fight
    insurgents through the proposed Pakistan Counterinsurgency
    Capability Fund that would allocate $400 million in this fiscal
    year to build the capacity of Pakistan's security forces and
    assist with humanitarian relief efforts in post combat zones.
    While the PCCF for this year has no specific conditions
    attached to it, the U.S. Congress should find some mechanism to
    ensure that the PCCF funding for future years will be
    contingent on whether the 2009 tranche has contributed to
    strengthening both Pakistan's capability and will to fight
    terrorism.
        Chairman Berman. I think, Ms. Curtis, could you just sort
    of wind up?
        Ms. Curtis. Yes. And lastly, the United States should
    dedicate diplomatic resources to helping the leaders in
    Afghanistan, Pakistan and India develop a different security
    paradigm for the region that allows them to focus on containing
    dangerous nonstate actors, enhancing cooperation and regional
    integration. And lastly, while the United States should do
    everything possible to stabilize Pakistan, Washington's best
    efforts alone will not be sufficient for the task. We need
    Pakistan's leaders to also demonstrate they are willing to
    stand up against Taliban advances in their own country. Thank
    you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Curtis
    follows:]Curtis deg.

        Chairman Berman. Thank you.
        Ms. Fair.

    STATEMENT OF MS. C. CHRISTINE FAIR, SENIOR POLITICAL SCIENTIST,
                            RAND CORPORATION

        Ms. Fair. Thank you, Chairman Berman, Congressman Burton
    and esteemed colleagues, for the opportunity to participate in
    today's hearing on the future of United States-Pakistan
    relations.
        The finding that the U.S. requires a ``balanced,
    integrated, countrywide strategy that targets assistance
    throughout Pakistan and does not disproportionately focus on
    the military or a specific area or province'' is a very welcome
    departure from past policies. Indeed, there is wide concurrence
    that perhaps the only path to a stable Pakistan at peace with
    itself and with its neighbors is one that is firmly controlled
    by capable civilians rather than one that is dominated by the
    military directly or indirectly.
        I am similarly heartened by the explicit interest in
    ensuring transparency and effective accountability of all U.S.
    assistance and reimbursement to the country. While many of the
    provisions to strengthen the national Parliament, the political
    parties, and other civilian institutions as well as civil
    society seem appropriately configured and indeed vital to
    rehabilitating a civilian-controlled Pakistan, I will focus the
    balance of my remarks upon the areas that concern me most.
        First, all of the efforts in this legislation presuppose
    effective partnering with Pakistanis truly vested in change.
    Without such collaborators for change, it is doubtful that
    these proposed efforts will fructify. Yet in all honesty,
    actual reformers in my view seem few and far between. Some of
    the proposed areas of activity, such as educational curricula
    reform, will likely be staunchly resisted on nationalist
    grounds even if they say yes in the presence of U.S.
    interlocutors.
        Pakistanis have consistently expressed considerable concern
    about United States efforts to ``de-Islamize'' Pakistan's
    schools. So rather than dictating programmatic areas of reform,
    a better approach might be a required consultative approach
    with Pakistani counterparts to identify areas of reform and a
    joint plan of mutual resourcing and commitment. Without up
    front Pakistani commitment and buy-in, I am simply unconvinced
    that these programs as described will actually have effect.
        And I would like to say as an aside the U.S. does some
    things very well: Encouraging competition. The World Bank has
    had very interesting results in the efficacy of private
    schooling, and maybe we could talk about this more in the
    question and answer period, there simply is no data that
    support a preponderance of students going into madrassahs or
    that madrassah students are more poor on the average than
    public school students. So there are a lot of data that simply
    doesn't support the most hair-raising of accounts that we hear
    in the media, and I am happy to talk about that, I have done a
    lot of work in that area.
        I am also concerned that the United States may not have the
    capacity to execute such a capacious program responsibly and
    with effective outcomes given the human capital challenges
    within the United States mission in Pakistan, the constricted
    security environment that constrains them, the very real danger
    to United States personnel in Pakistan, and a potential paucity
    of credible Pakistani reformers dedicated to the kinds of
    capacity-building you have envisioned in this legislation.
        In addition, the U.S. aid business model of relying upon
    layers of contractors to deliver services may result in much of
    the funding returning to the United States, suboptimal outcomes
    and greater disappointment in the failure to deliver services
    to the Pakistani polity. What I do not see in this legislation
    is any provision to enable Pakistan to increase its own ability
    to raise domestic revenue.
        Long-term aid aimed to help the Pakistani Government
    deliver services undermines the social contract between the
    government and the governed because the government has few
    incentives to raise revenue and redistribute these funds as
    services or even to make hard choices about budgetary
    commitments, and I am talking specifically about the tradeoff
    between human capital development and military expenditures.
    There are simply few reasons why Pakistan cannot in the near
    term learn to pay for itself, and it should be encouraged to do
    so.
        The bill also pays scant regard to Pakistan's police.
    Despite the robust counterinsurgency literature that
    consistently finds that police win insurgencies, not armies,
    and we are learning this also in Afghanistan, this legislation
    simply doesn't pay adequate attention to the Pakistan police.
    Yet unlike the army, which has shown considerable resistance to
    change its doctrine toward one that is more coin-inclined and
    less inclined to be ready to fight India, Pakistan's police
    have actually tried to reform themselves. Yet they are
    obstructed by Pakistan's bureaucrats and political leadership.
    Yet the police are poorly trained, poorly equipped, undermanned
    and under fire from the insurgents. Quite frankly, they are
    sitting ducks.
        My most significant concerns stem from the provisions in
    Section 206. The majority of the proposed security assistance
    is aimed at buttressing Pakistan's ability to effectively
    eliminate insurgent and terrorist threats. While I support the
    sense of the House that Pakistan must be held to account on
    nuclear proliferation and supporting militant groups
    terrorizing the region, there is little likelihood that
    Pakistan will acquiesce to stated demands. And this puts the
    United States in a very awkward position of having to once
    again execute waiver authority to allow funding to continue.
        It continues a well worn cycle of the United States bending
    its commitment to accommodate the importance of dealing with
    Pakistan, and quite frankly it undermines Pakistan's
    interpretation of United States intentions of how serious these
    issues are. I prefer a benchmark or a metrics-based approach
    which actually tries to achieve the same goals that you have
    identified in this legislation but one which provides a
    mechanism for verification, data that will be used to prove
    compliance.
        And we can talk about it more, perhaps in the Q&A, but I
    think a data-driven, process-oriented, benchmark-focused
    process has greater transparency and will be more easy to
    communicate to the Pakistanis if after concerted collaborative
    effort Pakistan continues to fail to meet our expectations, and
    revision of security assistance is needed. Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Fair
    follows:]Fair deg.

        Chairman Berman. Mr. Markey.

       STATEMENT OF MR. DANIEL MARKEY, SENIOR FELLOW FOR INDIA,
         PAKISTAN, AND SOUTH ASIA, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

        Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Burton,
    and members of the committee, for this opportunity to discuss
    United States policy toward Pakistan.
        My remarks today are based on my written testimony, which
    is in the form of a report that was released by the Council on
    Foreign Relations about a week ago and has been submitted to
    the record. I think we are all familiar, and we have become
    more familiar over the course of the last discussion, with the
    numerous policy challenges that we face in Pakistan. We have
    got al-Qaeda, we have got Taliban, we have got India tensions,
    we have got nuclear problems, we have got a weak state, just to
    mention a few.
        But what worries me the most, and what I think doesn't get
    quite as much attention as it deserves, is the need to focus on
    what I would consider to be a next generation of challenges,
    the longer term threats that we face from Pakistan. And here I
    would identify for you, the fact of the matter is that the next
    generation of extremists and of globally interconnected
    terrorist groups are likely to come from Pakistan. Over half of
    Pakistan's population are teenagers. They suffer from poor
    education, from weak economic opportunities, and they are
    surrounded by this pervasive sense of anti-Americanism that is
    seeping into their lives and informing their actions.
        So all the threats that we currently perceive coming from
    Afghanistan are there in spades in Pakistan, and so the
    implication of this, and what I draw in my report, is that the
    United States should shift its strategic focus not just from
    Iraq to Afghanistan, not just to link Afghanistan and Pakistan,
    but to go one step further and place Pakistan at the center of
    our strategic concerns. And I think we need to recognize that
    in doing so we face an incredibly difficult, complicated and
    probably very costly challenge for the United States looking
    ahead.
        So, in order to do this, I tried to identify what I
    consider to be the best strategy moving ahead. And this is a
    long-term strategy, it is based on two central pillars. The
    first of these is what I would consider to be the inducement of
    allies and of partners within Pakistan's civilian political
    leadership, within its military, and within wider society. We
    should use our United States assistance to empower those
    elements within Pakistan that already see their interests in
    similar ways to the way that we do and to make them more
    effective at achieving those interests. That is pillar one.
        Pillar two is that we should be seeking to reshape the
    strategic environment of the region as understood by those
    actors within the region. We should use our assistance, our
    military operations and our diplomacy to create new incentives
    for those actors to convince Pakistan's political and military
    leadership of the benefits of working with us and the
    deg.of the costs inherent of opposing our efforts.
        Now, at best, these are going to be long-term goals. They
    are probably not going to make rapid progress even if we spend
    $1.5 billion a year, even if we place 60,000 or more United
    States and NATO forces into Afghanistan. They are going to
    require patience, and they are going to especially require
    patience within the next 3-5 years.
        But remember, the point that I made earlier, the thing that
    concerns me the most about Pakistan is not just the urgent
    threats that we are all very aware of, but it is this next
    generation of challenges that we are likely to see coming from
    Pakistan. Now, in the next 3-5 years, until Pakistan is capable
    I think of being a more effective partner to meet those urgent
    threats, we will continue to need to use the forceful United
    States military and intelligence operations in Afghanistan
    along the Pakistan border. I think we all know what we are
    talking about here.
        But in conducting those operations I would suggest that we
    need to do our best to do the least possible to jeopardize the
    prospects for a longer term partnership. So let me conclude by
    making a number of points about how this strategy that I have
    just laid out in very brief terms relates to pending
    legislation. First of all, I support this type of U.S. military
    and civilian programming of the sort that you have put forward
    in H.R. 1886.
        And I would recommend in addition to that that the
    committee encourage the administration to go one step further,
    to fund adequately the funding of United States civilian
    capacity to operate effectively throughout Pakistan. The
    concerns about security that currently dog United States
    operations in Pakistan are so debilitating that I think it will
    be almost impossible unless we ramp up our operations there to
    adequately formulate or implement the kinds of programming that
    we would like to see in the country.
        Secondly, I support military assistance and diplomatic
    commitment over the long haul to Afghanistan. And this relates
    to my desire to try and shape the strategic environment in the
    region. We have to convince the Pakistanis that we are
    committed to seeing the project in Afghanistan through to the
    end to make it clear that their strategy of hedging, which has
    led them to support various groups in the past, will not work.
        Now I know I am out of time, so let me just say what I
    oppose and then we can go on at length later. I oppose
    legislation that is based on conditions that would curtail
    assistance in the future. We do not want to repeat mistakes of
    the past where the implication of Pakistanis not doing what we
    ask them to do is cutting off our assistance and further
    damaging the relationship.
        I oppose United States diplomatic statements that undermine
    confidence among Pakistanis and make it more likely that
    Pakistanis who are in the elite, the intellectual class, are
    likely to believe that their country is really going down the
    tubes and make it more likely that they themselves will leave
    the country. And finally, I oppose the use, and this is
    something that seems to not have come up very regularly, I
    oppose the continued use of Coalition Support Funds as a
    particular mechanism for funding the Pakistani army.
        I believe that this has been a very frustrating mechanism
    for us, and it has been very frustrating for the Pakistanis. To
    the extent that we are looking for a way to improve our
    partnership, I find it baffling that we would continue with
    this particular kind of mechanism. We need to find a different
    way, and I am sort of surprised that this hasn't been a
    centerpiece of our revision of the kinds of assistance
    programming that we do with the Pakistanis.
        And I will leave it there. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Markey
    follows:]Markey deg.

        Chairman Berman. Well, thank you all very much. I am going
    to temporarily turn over the chair to Mr. Ellison, who will
    yield himself time to start the questioning. I will be back.
        Mr. Ellison [presiding]. Let me thank the panel, and I will
    yield myself 5 minutes. My first question is the question I
    left off with with Ambassador Holbrooke. What impact does
    linking aid have on the ability of Pakistani leadership to
    advance the issues that we care about here? How important is it
    to be concerned about how opponents of the government are going
    to paint the government if the government accepts a deal with
    the United States for aid that conditions things like
    redeploying away from India, improving relations with India,
    things like that?
        Ms. Fair, why don't you start?
        Ms. Fair. Well, as I said in my written statement, they
    simply won't do it. And then we are going to be put in the
    awkward position of using the waiver. And so I actually have a
    fairly strong opposition to putting conditionalities that we
    can say right off the bat they won't acquiesce to, forcing us
    to use this waiver. And if you look at the long expanse of
    United States history of engaging Pakistan, we have always done
    this. We have legislative commitments and we always override
    it.
        Mr. Ellison. So, Ms. Fair, are you saying we keep in the
    conditions but take out the waiver, or are you saying we don't
    put in a waiver or the conditions?
        Ms. Fair. Well, you know, this is a philosophical question
    in some measure, but I actually do believe that we cannot be
    paying the Pakistanis to participate in eliminating some
    terrorists while still continuing to foster and encourage other
    terrorist groups. So I actually do support the idea of
    conditionalities, but I really think it should be process-
    based, it should be evidence-based. The conditionalities as
    stated can be finessed to the point of futility or simply
    refused, forcing us to use a waiver. I also think that it has
    to be done collaboratively with the Pakistanis.
        Mr. Ellison. Thank you. That is a good point you closed on.
        Mr. Markey, do you want to weigh in here?
        Mr. Markey. Yes, I would agree with the tenor of your
    question, which is essentially we are playing into a complex
    political debate within Pakistan. We need to recognize that our
    words and our legislation have implications for how Pakistanis
    and Pakistan's leaders interact with their own people, and we
    can do things that will undermine our very partners.
        And I think that that is unfortunately, even though I share
    all of the goals that are in this legislation, I think that is
    how it is playing out in Pakistan's very complicated political
    environment. We need to simply recognize this and deal with it.
    Now that doesn't meant that we don't require things, but we
    probably shouldn't require them in these forms, and at the very
    least we shouldn't implicate or imply that we will cut off
    assistance and repeat the mistakes of the past of severing the
    relationship if what we try first doesn't work.
        Mr. Ellison. Ms. Curtis?
        Ms. Curtis. I have a dissenting view, sir. I think the U.S.
    needs to find some leverage. We have tried inducements. Seven
    years later, $11 billion later, we still have General Petraeus
    telling us it is a very mixed picture from the Pakistan
    military. Yes, we are getting more cooperation along the
    border, yet we still see unhelpful links to the Taliban. So I
    would just repeat my view that I think the time has come to
    demonstrate that we won't tolerate these dual policies.
        Mr. Ellison. You know, Ms. Curtis, if I had more than 5
    minutes, I wouldn't mind letting you continue on. Let me move
    on. You know, in my own district in Minneapolis, when we
    discuss Pakistan, and we often do, one of the issues that comes
    up is the unmanned aerial vehicles. I wonder if each one of you
    would offer your assessment as to the net utility. I mean, I
    know they have a benefit, I know they have a detriment, but
    what is the net utility of the use of these unmanned vehicles,
    and how might we as Congress move forward to make them
    effective where there can be diminished civilian casualties
    which have been linked to them in a significant way?
        Why don't we start with Ms. Curtis since we left off with
    her last time.
        Ms. Curtis. Yes. Well, I think there has been success in
    our counterterrorism efforts from the drone strikes. We have
    heard that we have been able to make more of an impact in
    disrupting the al-Qaeda leadership in the last 9 months from
    our drone strikes than we have since 9/11. So I think we need
    to just take account of that. On the other hand, I think the
    drone strikes, while they can address short-term risks, they
    are not a long-term strategy and they can undermine our long-
    term goals. So we need to assess whether in moving forward they
    will actually undermine our longer-term counterterrorism goals.
        Mr. Ellison. Ms. Fair?
        Ms. Fair. I have a very similar view. I will say that we
    actually are under this belief that Pakistanis uniformly reject
    drone strikes. I think it is an empirical question. There are
    actually surveys right now being done by IRI. I have a survey
    in the field that will come out in June that actually assesses
    this. The Ariana Institute released a poll of people in FATA,
    actually people in Fatah according to those data, welcome the
    drone strikes. So my experience in going to Pakistan over the
    last year is that the drone discourse has changed. People who
    believe that there are terrorists in Fatah do not seem to
    oppose them as much as we think they do. The problem is that
    many people don't believe that terrorists live in Fatah.
        Mr. Ellison. I am sorry, Ms. Fair.
        Mr. Markey?
        Mr. Markey. I agree with much of what has been said. I
    would only add one point. That is that as these strikes have
    been used with accelerating frequency, there is some evidence
    according to certain sources that some of the individuals who
    are most targeted by them have moved to other parts of
    Pakistan. This is discouraging and potentially quite
    destabilizing because the other parts of Pakistan are further
    into Pakistan, and if Pakistan's stability is a central concern
    of the United States, then the further use of this particular
    tactic may prove counterproductive over the longer term.
        Mr. Ellison. Okay, let us talk education for a moment.
    Personally, I will just express my own bias. I wish that we in
    the United States would separate this talk about Islam and
    Muslims and all this stuff from the other problems of
    terrorism. When you link them, you just make every Muslim a
    little nervous that you are coming after them. And so I think
    that they should be delinked. I think that you can carry on the
    conversation without implicating religion.
        But let me just say that the madrassahs, of course a lot of
    negative things have come from them, but not all of them, and
    it is important also to point out that they are the only option
    for much of the Pakistani poor. What can we do to not sort of
    put education versus Islam but sort of education and Islam? And
    let me just make this last final comment, and that is this is a
    Muslim country. You know, we have to respect the fact that this
    is not the United States, this is another country, and our goal
    should not be to make it a little United States in the East.
        And I also just want to say that, when you look at some of
    these pictures of some of these kids reciting Koran, they do
    not know what they are saying. They know the phonetics of the
    Arabic alphabet and can sort of say the sounds that are
    presented on the page, but they don't know what that passage
    means. So, if somebody who has a nasty political motive says
    kill the infidel, they are like, well, that must be what it
    says because this respected person said that is what it says
    and I can't read it.
        Would you all react to some of that? Ms. Fair?
        Ms. Fair. Thank you. You really hit the nail on the head. I
    do a lot of work on madrassahs. A couple of points. The data do
    not support that madrassahs are the vestige of the poor. In
    fact, if you look at data, madrassahs have more wealthy
    children in them than public schools do. So I always encourage
    people, look at what the data say. The World Bank as well as
    Pakistani researchers have done this.
        Second, I wish the U.S. would stop harping on the madrassah
    problem. Pakistan is a Muslim country, it needs ulema, and it
    undercuts the efforts of actual reformers within the system who
    want to produce ulema that are relevant to a modernizing
    country. Now the work of those reformers has been undermined
    because they look like U.S. puppets. Secondly, and related to
    that, the work of Quintan Wiktorowicz and others, including my
    own public survey work, finds that people who are actually more
    Islamic, i.e. educated in Islam, are prepared to resist the
    recruiters' methods.
        It is the people who, as you noted, are unable to engage
    the ill-advised militant recruiter to say actually this isn't
    Islam. It is actually the deracinated if I can use that word in
    this context and unknowledgeable people who are most
    vulnerable. So I actually think there are other strategies that
    we can discuss, and that is why in my written testimony we
    should get out of the racket of telling Pakistanis how to run
    their schools.
        If Canada were to tell us what we should be teaching, we
    would have a problem. We should do what we do best, and that is
    foster excellence through competition, and there are many
    people in Pakistan that are interested in educational options
    and we should really be engaging those people who want to
    partner with us rather than dictating an educational agenda
    that is born in Washington.
        Mr. Ellison. If either one of the other panelists want to
    respond, that will be my last question.
        Ms. Curtis?
        Ms. Curtis. I agree that the majority of madrassahs in
    Pakistan are not producing terrorists and there are legitimate
    madrassahs training clerical leaders. What we need to do is
    hone in on the real problem, which are those madrassahs that
    are supporting terrorism like the Haqqania madrassah in the
    tribal areas, a couple unhelpful ones in Karachi, the Lashkar-
    e-Taiba complex in Muridke, Pakistan. I mean, we know where the
    unhelpful ones are and that is what we need to focus on.
        Mr. Ellison. And, Ms. Curtis, can you simply tell us for
    the record what the word madrassah translates to in English?
        Ms. Curtis. Islamic seminary, no?
        Mr. Ellison. Ms. Fair?
        Ms. Fair. It literally means school.
        Mr. Ellison. It literally means school. Thank you for
    saying that.
        And I just want to let Mr. Markey respond.
        Mr. Markey. Just very, very briefly. The focal points for
    the United States' strategy should be quality education, as
    Chris Fair said, and training camps. I think we can eliminate
    the madrassah point and simply say anywhere that there are
    training camps where extremists are preaching and training for
    violent acts should be targets for U.S. focus. It doesn't need
    to be linked.
        Mr. Ellison. And now we will recognize Congressman Dan
    Burton from Indiana.
        Thank you for your indulgence, sir.
        Mr. Burton. I have been in the Congress for a long time and
    on this committee for 26 years now, and the one thing I have
    learned is you can't make the rest of the world over in our
    image. And in many cases, you can't create a democracy which we
    would all like to see because of the result of that democracy.
    And right now in Pakistan it appears as though the Taliban,
    should they be successful, we would end up with a government
    that we don't want because we tried to create a government the
    way we want it to be.
        So my questions are first of all, it is obvious that the
    young people in that country are a majority, and they are in
    large part being trained by I guess the Taliban and other
    radical elements. And the money is not there for these schools
    to be built or created that would teach them things other than
    what is being taught in radical mosques. So what is the answer?
    They don't have the money over there as I understand it to go
    out in the countryside and make sure that the people who live
    out there can get a good education if they don't go to those
    schools in most cases. So how do we get that money out there
    for the educational purposes from your point of view? Go ahead.
        Mr. Markey. I would say there is a resource issue, and this
    has been persistent for some time, but when I talk to United
    States aid officials on the education issue in particular, they
    will say a large part of this is an organizational problem, and
    it is a problem of politics in Pakistan. Even when resources
    have been available they have been siphoned off to purposes
    other than the public education system. So the problem is not
    simply dollars and cents, it is the adequate implementation of
    programming either by the United States, by NGOs or by
    Pakistani Government itself.
        And so my recommendation is that if we want to have a
    better window into what is actually happening on the ground and
    encourage quality education, then we need to have U.S. and
    U.S.-linked officials based in Pakistan who can get out there
    and see for themselves what is actually happening. And right
    now we lack that. We lack that both because we don't have
    enough people there and because they are not safe to get
    around. And that is a critical gap in our capacity in Pakistan.
        Mr. Burton. You indicate that money that goes over there
    for educational purposes is not reaching its target. Is that
    because of corruption in the government?
        Mr. Markey. That has often been the case, yes.
        Mr. Burton. So how do we get that educational money to that
    proper use? Go ahead.
        Ms. Fair. I have a dissenting view. I really want to go
    back to the data. The World Bank has looked at this repeatedly.
    Families who have no other opportunities but madrassahs are
    more likely to opt out of the public school system. We have to
    get rid of this myth that they are the school of last resort.
    Families actually choose in many cases to send their child to a
    madrassah because it confers religious benefits even while they
    send other children to public or private schools. So the first
    thing we have to do about education is really get rid of the
    myths and look at the data.
        Second, as Dan Markey noted, it is not necessarily a
    resource constraint issue. It is a corruption issue, you have
    many ghost schools, and let me go back to the point that I made
    about private schools. The World Bank has consistently found
    that private schools can deliver a better education at lower
    cost, and the reason is you don't have ghost schools, you don't
    have as much teacher absenteeism. So we need to really rethink
    this educational issue.
        Mr. Burton. That really doesn't answer the question about
    how we get the money to its intended purpose so we can stop
    these young people being indoctrinated in many cases with a
    radical approach to Islam.
        Ms. Fair. Sir, let me tell you, Lashkar-e-Taiba does not
    recruit its terrorists from madrassahs. This is a fiction. Your
    average Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist has a 10-year attainment.
    That is approximately 5 years more than the average Pakistani.
    So this idea that terrorists are all poor and indoctrinated
    from madrassahs is an empirical falsity. We have to help
    Pakistan develop better education and employment opportunities
    across the board. We know the bad madrassahs, and let me tell
    you they are really training camps. I have been to numerous
    madrassahs all over Pakistan. We need training camp-focused
    policy, not madrassah-focused policy.
        Mr. Burton. Well, and that is my point.
        Did you have a comment?
        Ms. Curtis. Just I agree that we need to focus on the
    public education system, but we also need to get the Pakistan
    Government to increase its share of GDP that it spends on
    education. I have heard from numerous United States aid
    officials we have put a lot of money into the education system
    in Pakistan, but unless we are matched with the Pakistan
    Government we are not going to be able to make the whole scale
    changes we need.
        Mr. Burton. Well, since there is corruption in
    administration after administration and the money is siphoned
    off for other purposes, what do we have to do, go through NGOs?
    Work out a deal with the government that we are going to help
    build schools that are not radicalized by sending people in
    there through an NGO? And you mentioned that there is a real
    security problem.
        Ms. Fair. Private schools. I think we really should look at
    these schools. There are a number of very good private schools.
    They have the advantage of aggregating interest, they only
    happen when there is an actual demand, and the other issue with
    girls' schooling, you need to have schools that are close to
    the girl's home. Otherwise the family won't send them. I really
    like Lisa's suggestion, without absolutely partnered Pakistani
    interest this is going to go nowhere. USAID will tell you they
    can't find where the $100 million that they gave them went. The
    money has simply disappeared. But there are a number of private
    sector schools, and we do this so well, why can't we partner
    with private sector schools in Pakistan or give scholarships to
    poor kids who go to private sector schools?
        Mr. Burton. Well, that is the question I am asking.
        Ms. Fair. I think we should look at this. It is trying to
    be creative.
        Mr. Burton. Well, that is what I would like to have is some
    conclusion on how we get the money for its proper purpose. And
    if we are not, then we shouldn't be sending that money over in
    the first place.
        I want to ask two more questions, Mr. Chairman, I will let
    them answer those all together.
        First of all, the Saudis and the Gulf States have been
    sending a lot of money, and they are for these madrassahs, and
    they have been using that money in other parts of the world as
    well. I will agree that the vast majority of the mosques do not
    teach radicalism, but there are those that do. And the money
    that is coming in from Saudi Arabia and from the Gulf States,
    they are very wealthy because of our oil money, how do we make
    sure that that is not going for radicalization of the young
    people there in Pakistan?
        Ms. Curtis. Well, I think we have to make the Pakistan
    Government accountable for what is happening within its own
    borders. And if there are radical madrassahs or training camps
    or whatever you want to call them, they need to be shut down,
    they need to be dealt with. And we have not seen that yet. So I
    would argue that we need to address it through Pakistan. We can
    try to work it from the Saudi angle stopping the private money
    going in, but I would make the Pakistanis responsible for what
    is happening on their territory.
        Mr. Burton. Well, Mr. Chairman, I see my time is expired,
    but let me just say to you that it appears to me that maybe we
    should talk to Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States and say
    when they do give this money for teaching Islam that they make
    sure that the madrassahs that are getting it don't teach this
    radicalism. I don't know how that is done, but I am very
    concerned that the long-term problems over in Pakistan are not
    going to go away.
        That is a nuclear power and it is a breeding ground right
    now for terrorism, and many of the terrorists came from there
    and Saudi Arabia that attacked the World Trade Center, and it
    just seems to me that we have got to find some way to cut off
    the funding for the instruction that is going to these people
    that is radicalizing them. And that may not be the only place
    they are being taught this radical approach, but that certainly
    is one of them.
        And the other thing is Saudi Arabia is worried that, and so
    are the Gulf States, about Iran becoming a nuclear power and
    them being able to run that whole region. And if Pakistan were
    to fall to the Taliban and you had Iran becoming a nuclear
    power, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States would be at their
    mercy. And they know that right now, so I can't understand why
    they can't say that the money that they are sending for these
    educational purposes is for education and not for any
    radicalization, and they ought to be able to set standards and
    boundaries on how that money is used so that we cut back on the
    amount of radicals that are being taught in the madrassahs.
        Mr. Ellison. The chair will recognize the chair from
    California.
        Chairman Berman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and to
    my friend from Indiana, I met this morning with the Saudi
    Arabian Ambassador, and I asked him a number of these
    questions. And I suggest it is worth the time to do it because
    these were questions that were raised on our trip to India and
    Pakistan, and they have been around for a long time, this whole
    issue of ``Saudi money.'' And he makes a few points. One, there
    are a very large number of both Pakistani and other nationals
    in Saudi Arabia who--surprise of surprises--send remittances
    back to their home country, to the families in their countries.
        Secondly, that the Saudis have internalized the danger of
    the whole threat of radical terrorists and are looking for any
    actionable information on who in their kingdom is actually
    doing the kind of funding. They think they have dealt with the
    charities, but they are open to getting any actionable
    intelligence. It was an interesting meeting, but that isn't why
    we are here.
        Well, maybe it is, but I want to take a little time, I had
    the misfortune, we have brought three really excellent
    witnesses who have spent time thinking about and writing
    testimony that I haven't yet read, and then listening to them
    summarize very quickly some of their thoughts in my somewhat
    limited capacity to absorb everything they are saying as
    quickly as they are saying it. So I would like to deconstruct
    the bill for a second and then sort of see to put it back
    together.
        Do you think we should be providing a significant amount of
    security assistance to Pakistan? I mean, that is sort of a yes
    or no kind of thing. Everybody seems to be saying yes. And is
    our goal beyond just making the Pakistani Government and the
    Pakistani military leadership happy with us or do we have a
    strategic objective along the lines outlined by Ambassador
    Holbrooke of, one, helping us be successful in Afghanistan,
    two, helping Pakistan resist more effectively the internal
    insurgency that it faces, and providing the means and the
    equipment to accomplish both of those goals? Is that the
    purpose of this security assistance or is it a more general
    walking around money to build a good relationship with the
    government?
        Ms. Fair. We want them to be more effective in prosecuting
    the mutual objectives.
        Chairman Berman. Right. All right.
        Ms. Fair. I would add one more. Ending dual policies that
    also cause instability in Pakistan itself.
        Chairman Berman. Dual policies?
        Ms. Fair. Dual policies toward terrorists which actually
    lead to instability within Pakistan.
        Chairman Berman. Incentivizing the rejection of what some
    people refer to as appeasement agreements with these forces
    that end up only holding for a short period of time and then
    come back to haunt them. All right, now if that is the goal and
    now we have to sell the United States Congress on authorizing
    and appropriating a significant amount of security assistance
    in the wake of 8 or 9 years of providing a lot of assistance
    for which we didn't have benchmarks, we didn't have metrics, we
    didn't have accountability, we didn't have monitoring, and I
    think one of you mentioned the Coalition Support Funds, which
    was a wonderful story of money going somewhere for something
    that no one can tell me what it was for.
        We have heard, Ambassador Holbrooke talked a little bit
    about it, the Pakistan military and probably their political
    leadership, sees a well-armed opponent, enemy, rival, across
    the border on the east, there have been a series of clashes.
    And for them, for a very long time that has been the dominant
    political threat or opponent. If our goal is strengthening
    their ability to fight the insurgency and dealing with those
    people who would do us harm in Afghanistan and those
    organizations that would try to hit us here, what is wrong with
    trying to ensure that the money we are giving, that American
    taxpayers are giving, isn't for those purposes rather than the
    purposes that Pakistan might have historically used the money
    for?
        Mr. Markey. It is absolutely the right goal. The points of
    I think some of the criticism of the way in which that goal is
    being achieved is that it is perceived by those actors, and in
    this case it is the Pakistani military leadership, as something
    that is deeply difficult for them politically to accept in the
    Pakistani political context.
        Chairman Berman. And does that mean that you are sure they
    share our goal, want the money for the same goal that we have,
    or that they are deeply offended because it somehow constrains
    them from doing some of the things they might otherwise want to
    do?
        Mr. Markey. Well, I think we are playing into a political
    debate within Pakistan which has different actors, some of whom
    are more inclined to do the things that we want and some of
    whom are not. And our goal should be to support those actors
    who are inclined to do what we want and give them a confidence
    that we will be with them over a long haul. Now we cannot be
    sure that they will win the debate inside of Pakistan. And so
    empowering them that we achieve our success.
        Our statements publicly suggesting sanctions and the
    implication that if they don't do what we want that we will
    pull the money away basically undercuts those potential
    partners. It doesn't mean that that is not what we want them to
    do, it is simply that is not probably the best mechanism for
    getting them to do it. And that is not, I should say, an
    implication that we should just simply be shoveling more money
    at them but that doing it through legislation is probably not
    the most effective way to achieve our goal.
        Chairman Berman. So first of all, the failure to
    appropriate additional funds for security assistance is not a
    sanction. There is no doubt that some of our policies, the
    Pressler Amendment, things like this, constrained our
    flexibility too much. But I don't think our bill should be
    viewed as sanctions for not doing something, it is sort of
    trying to set up some process for continuing to do a much
    greater effort than we have been doing. Let us assume we
    persist with this effort and somehow manage to get it through
    and at the end of the day it becomes law and the appropriators
    go along with it. What is the Pakistani reactions deg.
    going to be?
        Ms. Curtis. Well, I would just point out that, you know,
    part of the bill is authorizing $1.5 billion in economic
    assistance without condition.
        Chairman Berman. Right.
        Ms. Curtis. And I think that shows very strongly a long-
    term commitment and wanting to partner with Pakistan. So I
    think we just need to keep that in mind, and hopefully that
    would be what Pakistanis would focus on. I think that the idea
    of conditioning, while I acknowledged in my remarks that we
    need to do it in a way that we do acknowledge Pakistani
    security concerns, we don't want to come across as not taking
    seriously their concerns, that is part of the partnership,
    understanding what are your core security concerns. But they
    need to understand our core security concerns, which is
    stabilizing and securing Afghanistan.
        And so we need to sort of remove the emotion here and look
    at what we are trying to achieve. And I think in terms of a
    Pakistani reaction, I think the majority of Pakistanis would
    relish seeing more transparency in our aid, the way we provide
    aid, I mean you had many Pakistanis wondering where did all
    that security assistance go? They were wondering just like a
    lot of Americans were. So I think it actually helps to provide
    a more even keel relationship and more transparency in our
    partnership.
        Chairman Berman. But that is what we are trying to do in
    this legislation.
        Ms. Curtis. Agreed.
        Chairman Berman. Yes.
        Ms. Fair. Well, my concern, Lisa and I are probably on the
    same page on this, we actually have large areas of goals that
    actually don't overlap. And we know about the transcripts from
    Kiyani saying that Haqqani is a strategic asset.
        Chairman Berman. You are talking about Fatah Haqqani, not
    Ambassador.
        Ms. Fair. Yes, exactly. So there are a number of
    individuals like, for example, Malvi Nazir, obviously Haqqani,
    Hekmatyar, that they still see as assets, which are actually
    undermining our interests in Afghanistan. And, you know, the
    last 8 years has really been a period of ignoring this reality.
    So I actually am very pleased that there is some effort to
    grapple with this. I think part of the failure of the last 8
    years of programming really has been this Coalition Support
    Fund and the lack of willingness to demand transparency and
    accountability.
        Now I will say this, Pakistan has developed a tremendous
    sense of entitlement to United States funding. Therefore, not
    appropriating does seem redolent of in fact some kind of
    sanction. But what is interesting about this bill, which makes
    the issues of conditionality much more challenging, is that you
    have already narrowly focused the majority of the assistance to
    helping them do the things that we want them to do, which is go
    after the bad guys.
        But we have seen in the last couple of years that the sense
    of the Congress has actually been overridden. We saw the
    discussion a couple years back that F-16s are an effective
    counterinsurgency tool. So, if you are confident that the money
    is going to be spent on the stuff you want them to do, there is
    an argument to be made that the conditionalities in state are
    kind of irrelevant. I mean, to play devil's advocate, do we
    really want to constrain ourselves from helping the Pakistanis
    go after the people we want them to go after?
        Chairman Berman. To constrain ourselves from?
        Ms. Fair. Basically most of the aid is going to
    counterinsurgency and counterterrorism.
        Chairman Berman. So the limitation that says 75 percent of
    this money has to go to those purposes doesn't bother you?
        Ms. Fair. No, I actually very much support that. The long
    haul of United States-Pakistan relations has been Pakistan
    saying I support your strategic goals when in fact it doesn't,
    and it uses that assistance to prepare itself for its strategic
    goal, which is its fight with India. So I have long been saying
    get rid of CSF, this should really be a collaborative
    programming to help them do the things that they want to do.
        Now the Army has been very clear, they don't want to become
    a counterinsurgency force, which is why I say in my written
    testimony we have missed an enormous opportunity.
        Chairman Berman. Yes, on the police. And we do have some
    reference to it, but we are going to expand that. We take your
    point on that.
        Mr. Markey. Just to respond to the specific question of how
    the Pakistanis respond assuming that this became law. They will
    take the money, those within the Pakistani military will, some
    of them, resent us.
        Chairman Berman. They are not going to get money. They are
    going to get equipment, they are going to get material, they
    are going to get training.
        Mr. Markey. Well, they will take all of that and they will
    take the $1.5 billion on the civilian side. So internally there
    will be some resentment and some grumbling. This will not help
    us in internal debates within the Pakistani Army, to the extent
    that we care about that, then they will proceed to fail on a
    number of accounts that have been laid out within the
    legislation. They will not achieve all of the things that we
    want, including, for instance, providing A.Q. Khan, I am almost
    100 percent sure of that.
        Chairman Berman. The bill doesn't require them to provide
    A.Q. Khan.
        Mr. Markey. I understand. And then we will come back to
    them.
        Chairman Berman. But if you understand, then what?
        Mr. Markey. Well, I am saying this is a request that we
    have that it was the sense of the Congress that they should
    pony up A.Q. Khan.
        Chairman Berman. No, we said that they should work with us
    to dismantle this proliferation network, and if it is
    necessary, include in that access to people who were involved.
        Mr. Markey. Okay, that is fair. There will be other areas
    where they will fail to meet our stated goals, probably
    including there will be evidence of some continued
    collaboration, cooperation, assistance, passive or active, with
    groups that we perceive to be working counter to our purposes.
    I think that is fair to say. A year from now we will come back
    and the administration will be in a tough position of having to
    ask for waivers, and then we will be back, and it is hard to
    see where that benefits the broader, longer term goal of
    building up partners in Pakistan's state, society and military
    who are willing to work with us.
        Chairman Berman. See, I look at it a little differently. I
    think fundamentally we are really only requiring two things:
    One, that the President, after looking at everything, conclude,
    one, that Pakistan is committed to this counterinsurgency
    campaign, and secondly that he thinks on balance you have the
    negatives, you have the positives, it is not going to be
    perfect, we know that on balance they are making some progress,
    whether it is because of that commitment and because of the
    assistance we are giving them and their own contributions,
    making some progress in dealing with it. And then everything
    else is just sort of indicators, not an exclusive list of them,
    of what they should be doing. And it doesn't seem like a huge
    reach when you are asking the Congress to do all this to at
    least sort of lay out what we expect to get here.
        Mr. Markey. Then I think the earlier discussion of the
    sweet spot and the framing of precisely the kind of language
    that would be less difficult for Pakistanis to take is exactly
    the way to go. And that sounds like the way you are going, so
    that is great.
        Chairman Berman. Thank you.
        Mr. Ellison. The gentlelady from Texas is recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the chairman. And the good
    news is that the bells are 50 minutes to vote, so I have a long
    time to talk with you. Let me thank the chairman for this
    hearing, and both chairpersons, the presiding chairperson as
    well, and allow me to express some widely held levels of
    frustration.
        If you doom a person or a country to fail, they will fail.
    And to a large degree I have heard discussions of failure, and
    it is frustrating. I think we need to recount the history of
    Pakistan, its original founder, even though it was founded out
    of the dissecting of the large area that now includes India and
    Bangladesh for reasons that we might debate now, Mr. Jinna was
    a person who believed in democracy, though he acknowledged the
    distinctions between those who lived predominantly in the
    territory where India and the differences as relates to Islam
    and wanted to have a country of Muslims, but he believed in
    democracy.
        Secondarily, my understanding is that Pakistan did wage a
    valiant battle during the 20-year Afghan-Russian war and worked
    alongside of the United States, and we are still reminded of
    that departure.
        Thirdly, there is a vast constituency of educated
    Pakistanis of business class and others who want a stable
    Pakistan. Does anyone care about working with them? You cannot
    move forward if you do not allow some good news to come out of
    Pakistan. And from experts to a range of others we can't seem
    to captures any good news.
        Now I join with my colleagues, I believe we have to get to
    the bottom of A.Q. Khan, if that requires some classified
    briefings which we need to have, and I thank the chairman for
    helping us and assisting us with that. That is vital because we
    need to get an understanding of where we stand as relates to
    A.Q. Khan's proliferation, continued dialogue, what he did in
    the past. But I do think it is worth noting that there were
    briefings last week at the White House and the administration
    came away with a certain calm about whether or not they were
    proliferating nuclear secrets. So let me start with that
    premise. I have laid my cards on the table and I appreciate
    that some of you as witnesses have been indicating let us look
    at the facts.
        Ms. Fair, is there not a contingent of peace-loving,
    democracy-loving Pakistanis that live in Pakistan?
        Ms. Fair. Actually, you know, I have done survey work on
    this issue. I have a survey right now going into the field of
    6,000 people with a colleague at Princeton, we are looking at
    exactly this. In the survey that I fielded in 2007 when I was
    with the U.S. Institute of Peace, while the vast majority of
    folks did find al-Qaeda and other militant groups to be a
    significant threat, I did find anywhere between one in three
    and one in five largely urban respondents actually supported
    considerably or in a great deal a variety of militant attacks
    that we gave them to respond to.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. And what were these urban persons that you
    polled? Do you have an economic base, an educational base?
        Ms. Fair. As a matter of fact I would be happy to brief you
    if you are interested in this. My colleague at Princeton, he is
    an econometrician, so we were able to cross-walk our data with
    household economic survey data, and we had a number of very
    surprising results, not surprising to us because it is a very
    robust result across work in a variety of countries. The least
    poor and the rich were not the ones who supported these
    terrorist groups on the main. It was actually the middle class,
    it is that very middle class that everyone talks about
    strengthening. The least educated are not the ones that worry
    about this. Again, it is the people who are right in the
    middle.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. And the least educated dominate Pakistan,
    is that correct?
        Ms. Fair. Well, it depends on the metrics.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes, they do. The least educated dominate,
    the poor are the greater population in Pakistan.
        Ms. Fair. Yes, absolutely, there is no question.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. So then we have a good base between the
    poor and the very rich that we could at least begin with, and
    we certainly have to address the question of the middle
    educated. And I am not doubting your data. In fact I am very
    glad and I would like to have a briefing, but my belief is that
    if we cannot find some common ground to work with, they are
    going to fail. I do think it is important for there to be a
    stable government, and so my question would be to Mr. Markey,
    the importance of possibly a unity government between the
    Sharif brothers and the present government, if that has any
    possibility or legs to it.
        Mr. Markey. Well, as we have seen over the past year, there
    are a lot of possible configurations you could have in
    Pakistani politics. But the kind of debate that we have seen
    emerge and the kind of recurrent disagreements between those
    two parties over the past several months lead me to believe
    that there is a great deal of question that you would see a
    true unity government. But what you have seen is the return of
    a PMLN government, Nawaz Sharif's brother, Shahbaz Sharif,
    heading up in Punjab, and a center government by the PPP. This
    could conceivably be a relatively reasonable stable way to move
    ahead over the next several years. But that is not necessarily
    a unity government.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. No, and I understand that and I take your
    comment on that. I think your comment is instructive. So we
    should try to encourage at least dialogue, resolution around
    issues, and so as we discuss and have meetings with our friends
    this week from Pakistan we should emphasize that level of
    stability if we can.
        Mr. Markey. Absolutely.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. And that would not be considered
    intrusive. You were I guess in the audience when Ambassador
    Holbrooke spoke, and you know that his mission is Afghanistan
    and Pakistan. I have always made the argument that there should
    be a regional effort. Obviously the plate would be very full,
    but we should never leave out Bangladesh. We are delighted that
    they are at least not in the mainstream news at this point, we
    thank them for that having visited them some years ago.
        And India, though we recognize that India doesn't want that
    to be their defining definition to the world. And I appreciate
    that, but is there some value to looking forward, putting aside
    some of the mountains we have to climb, Kashmir, Mumbai, but
    should there be some sort of regional discussions so that there
    are some discussions that we foster if you will that would
    include India, Afghanistan, Pakistan and maybe even Bangladesh?
        Mr. Markey. Absolutely, there should be a regional
    discussion. I would extend the regional discussion to go to
    China, to go to Saudi Arabia, which has come up in some of the
    earlier conversation here. But the problem is that in the
    particular instance of India, there is as much chance that if
    we extend say the writ of Ambassador Holbrooke to India that it
    is a counterproductive move to do it publicly. And to try to
    make that kind of conversation a broad diplomatic one with a
    high level of intense focus publicly, that may actually hurt
    us. So it is probably better, and I think most people have come
    around to the idea, that India needs to be a part of our
    strategic view of the region, but it may not need to be central
    to our diplomacy in a public sense.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, I think you have answered the
    question there should be a regional approach and the tactics is
    something that we should be sensitive to. And I agree, that is
    why I started by saying, they are not necessarily interested in
    being defined in that manner.
        Let me emphasize to all of you to answer this one. I think
    Chairman Berman has struck a very effective cord, there seems
    to be some discord about how that works, but we understand that
    the madrassah, if I could finish this question I would
    appreciate it, if the madrassah is a school, the Taliban is a
    student. How much more can we do to get Pakistan to put real
    schools in place for these poor people mostly?
        Ms. Fair. The vast majority of madrassahs, there are
    actually different kinds of madrassahs. There is primary
    madrassahs where children simply learn to memorize the Koran as
    a part of going to other schools. So we have to really think
    about what a madrassah is, and as Lisa Curtis has said, we
    actually know with some certainty where the bad madrassahs are,
    and in many cases what we really should be focusing on,
    training camps.
        I don't believe that the Ministry of Education is a
    partner. It is a status quo institution. No ministry or
    department of education wants to be told what their curriculum
    is. But there are a number, and I will tell you there is an
    interesting survey of students about their attitudes toward
    militancy, and it would perhaps not surprise you that the
    attitudes of madrassah students and public school students
    toward militancy is actually not that dissimilar. The private
    school students, well, let me put it to you this way, I want to
    live next to their houses.
        So I think we really need to be creative. The private
    school sector is growing, it accounts for 30 percent of
    Pakistan's student body that attend school full-time. Public
    schools are 70 percent, madrassahs are a rounding error. So I
    think we need to be creative. We need to work with people who
    want to work with us. All parents in Pakistan, they want their
    kids to be well-prepared for the workplace, they want jobs for
    their kids, but we should really not underestimate the degree
    to which they want their children to be good Muslims.
        There are a lot of parallels to be drawn I think to the
    parochial school movement here at the turn of the century. And
    rather than alienating people who want religion in their
    schools, maybe we should be partnering up with organizations
    that do parochial schooling here because I think they share
    many of the same values. There are many Islamic schools here in
    the States who have struck a balance between producing good
    Muslim values and also producing a good education.
        This goes back to your diaspora question. We have got loads
    of Pakistanis here that find a way of balancing their
    commitment to Islam and their commitment to educating their
    children, and these are the sorts of organizations that we
    should be engaging to go back to Pakistan and help madrassahs
    professionalize. Again, not all madrassahs are simply teaching
    Koranic memorization. Jamat Islami madrassahs since the 1960s
    have been teaching a social studies curriculum, and many people
    will tell you that a Jamat Islami madrassah is better than your
    average Pakistani public school. So we really do need to
    rethink the way we conceive of the Pakistan educational
    problem. There are more solutions out there than I think we
    give ourselves credit for.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your
    indulgence.
        And I thank the witnesses and look forward to working with
    the Pakistan community.
        Mr. Ellison. Additional answers will be submitted for the
    record. Without objection, members who were unable to make an
    opening statement may submit the statements for the record.
    Without objection, the full testimony of the witnesses on the
    second panel shall be made part of the record. This hearing is
    adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

                                A P P E N D I X

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         Material Submitted for the Hearing RecordNotice deg.

                                   Minutes deg.

                                   Berman statement deg.
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                                   Burton statement deg.
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                                   Watson statement deg.
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                                   Connolly statement deg.
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                                   Green statement deg.
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                                   Jackson Lee statement deg.

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                                   Klein statement deg.
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                                   McMahon QFR deg.__

                                   Klein QFR deg.__

                                   Connolly QFR deg.__

                                   Royce QFR deg.__

                                   Lee QFR deg.

                                   Lee FTR deg.

       Material Submitted for the Record by the Honorable Barbara Lee, a
            Representative in Congress from the State of California

                                   Flake FTR deg.__

       Material Submitted for the Record by the Honorable Jeff Flake, a
              Representative in Congress from the State of Arizona