[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DISASTER CAPACITY IN
THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION:
EXPERIENCES, CAPABILITIES,
AND WEAKNESSES
=======================================================================
(111-22)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 3, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
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48-880 WASHINGTON : 2009
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman
NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, JOHN L. MICA, Florida
Vice Chair DON YOUNG, Alaska
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
Columbia VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
JERROLD NADLER, New York FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
CORRINE BROWN, Florida JERRY MORAN, Kansas
BOB FILNER, California GARY G. MILLER, California
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi Carolina
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa SAM GRAVES, Missouri
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
RICK LARSEN, Washington SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts Virginia
TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California CONNIE MACK, Florida
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio
JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
HEATH SHULER, North Carolina VERN BUCHANAN, Florida
MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania ANH ``JOSEPH'' CAO, Louisiana
JOHN J. HALL, New York AARON SCHOCK, Illinois
STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin PETE OLSON, Texas
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
PHIL HARE, Illinois
JOHN A. BOCCIERI, Ohio
MARK H. SCHAUER, Michigan
BETSY MARKEY, Colorado
PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York
THOMAS S. P. PERRIELLO, Virginia
DINA TITUS, Nevada
HARRY TEAGUE, New Mexico
(ii)
?
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency
Management
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of Columbia, Chairwoman
BETSY MARKEY, Colorado MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
HEATH SHULER, North Carolina SAM GRAVES, Missouri
PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri Virginia
TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, ANH ``JOSEPH'' CAO, Louisiana
Pennsylvania, Vice Chair PETE OLSON, Texas
DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
THOMAS S. P. PERRIELLO, Virginia
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
(Ex Officio)
(iii)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ vii
TESTIMONY
DeAtley, Craig, Director, Institute for Public Health Emergency
Response....................................................... 50
Delinski, Jeff, Deputy Chief Special Operations Bureau,
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority................. 28
Gallegos, Gabrielle, Director of Law Enforcement Policy,
Department of Homeland Security................................ 6
Herron, Vernon, Deputy Chief Administrative Officer for Public
Safety/Director of Homeland Security, Office of the County
Executive, Prince George's County.............................. 28
Mathes, Linda, President and CEO, American Red Cross of the
National Capital Area.......................................... 50
Nichols, Daniel R., Assistant Chief, United States Capitol Police
Department..................................................... 6
Nickles, Peter, Attorney General, District of Columbia; Daniel R.
Nichols, Assistant Chief, United States Capitol Police
Department..................................................... 6
Sarubbi, Jonathan, Region III Administrator, FEMA................ 50
Schwartz, Major General Errol R., Commanding General, District of
Columbia National Guard........................................ 28
Wall, Kenneth, Acting Director, Office of National Capital
Region, FEMA................................................... 50
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Diaz-Balart, Hon. Mario, of Florida.............................. 71
Norton, Hon. Eleanor Holmes, of the District of Columbia......... 74
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
DeAtley, Craig................................................... 78
Delinski, Jeff................................................... 127
Herron, Vernon................................................... 135
Mathes, Linda.................................................... 143
Nichols, Daniel R................................................ 162
Nickles, Peter................................................... 165
Sarubbi, Jonathan................................................ 170
Schwartz, Major General Errol R.................................. 192
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
DeAtley, Craig, Director, Institute for Public Health Emergency
Response:
``A Blueprint for Emergency Preparedness by Nonprofits,''
The Greater Washington Task Force on Nonprofit Emergency
Preparedness, September 2003............................. 81
"District of Columbia Healthcare Facilities Emergency Care
Partnership Program", chart.............................. 124
"Washington Hospital Center at a Glance", fact sheet....... 125
"HHS Awards $25 Million in Healthcare Partnership Emergency
Care", News Release...................................... 126
Responses to questions from the Subcommittee............... 117
Herron, Vernon, Deputy Chief Administrative Officer for Public
Safety/Director of Homeland Security, Office of the County
Executive, Prince George's County, responses to questions from
the Subcommittee............................................... 141
Mathes, Linda, President and CEO, American Red Cross of the
National Capital Area:.........................................
List of schools............................................ 151
Responses to questions from the Subcommittee............... 156
Sarubbi, Jonathan, Region III Administrator, FEMA, responses to
questions from the Subcommittee................................ 179
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8880.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8880.002
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8880.003
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8880.004
DISASTER CAPACITY IN THE
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION: EXPERIENCES,
CAPABILITIES, AND WEAKNESSES
----------
Friday, April 3, 2009
House of Representatives,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public
Buildings and Emergency Management,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in
room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eleanor Holmes
Norton [Chair of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Ms. Norton. The hearing will come to order. And I will ask
the first panel if you will be seated.
While the Senate hasn't finished its work, the House
finished its work, finished the budget, and I think most people
are home by now.
This hearing is so important, however, that we wanted to
proceed in any case. The Ranking Member, Mr. Diaz-Balart, has a
statement for the record. I am pleased to receive it at this
time.
I welcome today's witnesses at this hearing concerning an
important mission of the Federal Emergency Management Agency,
an agency of the Department of Homeland Security, under the
jurisdiction of our Subcommittee.
But for this hearing, I would be attending the funeral of
Mrs. Loree Murray, a gentle soul who became a beacon of
resistance of gun violence when crack and the crack wars
gripped the District in the 1990's. An indication of Mrs.
Murray's success as a citizen anticrime activist is that,
before I arrived at the viewing and wake last night, I am told
that D.C. Police Chief Cathy Lanier was in attendance. Mrs.
Murray was also such a statehood and voting rights advocate
that her family placed her ``Free D.C.'' cap in her casket.
Considering that an important part of what concerns us at
today's hearing is a new firearms risk posed by a dangerous gun
amendment proposed for the District of Columbia House Voting
Rights Act. I told Mrs. Murray's family and friends last night
that I wanted to dedicate today's hearing to Loree Murray.
Today we are pleased to welcome Federal and District law
enforcement officials, emergency managers, and first responders
to testify concerning steps to prevent, prepare for, and
respond as necessary to incidents of all types. FEMA is the
lead agency charged with preparing for and responding to
disasters and emergencies, whether natural or manmade.
When Congress established the Department of Homeland
Security shortly after 9/11, the statute that created it also
established a Special Office of National Capital Region
Coordination, now placed in FEMA. Our region faces the same
risks as other major areas of our country from natural
disasters, such as the 2001 floods in the Bloomingdale section
of the District of Columbia, or manmade disasters, such as the
tragic plane crash into the Pentagon on September 11, 2001.
The Nation's Capital occupies a special place in the
Nation's security network with the District ranking in the top
four at risk for terrorist threats, along with New York,
Chicago, and San Francisco. However, the challenges of
responding to threats in the seat of the Federal Government are
unique, and as a result, Congress established the NCCR, the
only regional office inside the DHS charged specifically with
coordinating security for one region alone.
The unique nature of the National Capital Region brings
distinct challenges for the region and its officials. For
example, the Metropolitan Police Department must work with no
less than 32 Federal police agencies, and MPD, the largest
police force in the region, is an indispensable part of the
Federal security network for the Nation's Capital and the
National Capital Region of our Nation.
The recent inauguration, the largest event ever held in the
Nation's Capital, with an estimated 2 million people in
attendance, including foreign dignitaries, entertainment stars,
and virtually every important Federal and State official in the
United States, is perhaps the quintessential example of what
makes the work of elected officials and police and security
officials in our Nation's Capital uniquely difficult.
Although hearings have been held concerning some problems
at the 2009 inaugurations, such as citizens who were held in
the Third Street tunnel, it is noteworthy that there was not a
single arrest at the National Mall, notwithstanding the
unprecedented crowds and the disappointments of some concerning
admission. The Third Street tunnel problems are among those
that will be studied by the Government Accountability Office
with a report and recommendation to come.
However, Mayor Adrian Fenty, D.C. Police Chief Cathy
Lanier, Metro, the Capitol Police, and the DHS agencies
involved, including the lead agency, the Secret Service,
deserve credit for the planning and operations that resulted in
what most agree was an unusually successful event. Although the
problems that arose require study, we are also interested in
how the Federal and District agencies in cooperation with the
region pulled off an event the size of which was unlike
anything we had seen before, as many as five times the number
of people on the Mall as anyone had ever seen, and how they
were able to keep it up for 4 days of the engagement, that is
also something that will help us to understand what a unique
event can bring since nobody knew how many people would come,
and the authorities had to be prepared for however many came,
almost all of them without tickets.
Since 9/11, this region has had notable success working
together to shore up unique risks to homeland security here.
Literally billions of dollars have been spent, not only to
repair the Pentagon, where 184 people were lost, but to fortify
Metro against the unique vulnerabilities of the National
Capital Region with its porous borders, 14 million people,
200,000 Federal employees, and national and foreign dignitaries
that pose security risks as they move often in motorcades
throughout the National Capital Region.
No risk is more apparent to homeland security in particular
than the widespread availability of firearms. While the city
was in the act of writing new legislation this summer, the
National Rifle Association forced a number of Democratic
Members of the House during the primaries just before the 2008
election to demand an up-and-down vote on a bill to eliminate
all gun laws in the District of Columbia and to strip the
District of all public safety gun enforcement jurisdiction.
This bill is essentially the same as the Ensign Amendment
now attached to the District of Columbia House Voting Rights
legislation passed by the Senate in February. Despite hearings
and testimony from Federal and D.C. police chiefs that the gun
bill posed a, quote, ``grave threat'' to elected and appointed
Federal officials and visitors in addition to D.C. Residents,
the bill passed the House on the belief that it could be
stopped in the Senate, and we were able to do so.
However, despite the hearings, almost no one had ever
looked at the gun bill itself. They were focused on not doing
harm to Members from more conservative districts who were
facing election. Now, with the Ensign Amendment attached to the
Voting Rights bill in the Senate, the time has come to look the
Ensign Amendment straight in the eyes.
Understand this, we are going to get the D.C. Voting Rights
passed this year. Therefore, if the Ensign Amendment is on the
bill in the House, it will become law right along with the D.C.
House Voting Rights Act.
The Congress has largely regarded the gun bill as just
another piece of local legislation. However, Federal police
must operate largely under the District's gun laws and have
testified that these gun laws have been critical to homeland
security.
Today we intend to face head on what it would mean for the
Nation's Capital to have no local gun laws. We must ask whether
the gun laws, as the Washington Post recently noted,
``protecting the lives of D.C. Residents as well as those of
tourists and foreign dignitaries, national leaders, and the
President, and his family,'' end quote, should be eliminated.
Before us today is whether appointed and elected Federal
officials, employees, visitors and Federal presence would be
more or less secure under the Ensign Amendment, which would
allow, and let's here hear it and face it, would allow
military-style weapons, including 50-caliber armor-piercing
guns, to be legally possessed without limit on the numbers in
the Nation's Capital.
The Nation's Capital becomes the only jurisdiction
permitting, indeed inviting, people to cross State lines to
purchase guns and bring them back from two nearby States,
facilitating gun running by criminals, felons, or terrorists
between the States and the Nation's Capital. A gun show
loophole would be open eliminating the assault weapons ban,
among other things, without any background checks of any kind,
permitting the purchase of weapons of every kind from private
individuals at gun shows on a cash-and-carry basis. No gun
registration is permitted, and therefore, there would be no way
for police to trace guns used in crimes.
The District is deprived of all gun safety jurisdiction to
revise its laws for the safety of residents and visitors and
government officials even if serious threats arise. Any person
could bring guns concealed or openly to any workplace in the
city. Employees therefore could bring guns to a Wizards game if
they worked the at the Verizon Center, to the National Baseball
Park at Nationals Park, to a national convention at the
Convention Center, to Pepco headquarters, to law offices, to
other small and large workplaces throughout the city, to
churches and other places of worship, to bars, restaurants and
nightclubs, to hotels, to power plants, and to all District
government offices. In short, would elected and appointed
Federal officials and foreign dignitaries, visitors and
District residents be safer and more secure with or without the
Ensign Amendment?
Asked another way, what is to be gained from the Ensign
Amendment? The time to ask these questions is now, not after
there is blowblack and recriminations following serious gun
carnage affecting residents, Federal officials, and employees.
Our job is to prevent, not only to protect.
Today's hearing, of course, will focus on not only this
most recent and serious threat to homeland security since 9/11,
but on all the steps that have been taken by the agencies
involved, including the District of Columbia National Guard,
the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, the U.S. Capitol
Police, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transportation
Authority Police, the D.C. Attorney General, Prince George's
County Office of the County Executive, the Washington Hospital
Center, and the American Red Cross.
Yet, the hearing is likely to be remembered most by whether
we in Congress, with a clear threat in plain sight on the
Voting Rights bill, did what was required to protect the
Nation's Capital and the National Capital Region and all who
live and work here. We are deeply grateful to today's
witnesses.
May I ask my good friend and colleague, Ms. Edwards, if she
has any opening statement.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
And just a brief statement. First, I want to say to all of
the witnesses who will appear today that you have a unique
responsibility in this region. And this region, as you know, is
different from just about any other in the country, both in
terms of our vulnerability and access, our meaning to this
country and around the world. So all the agencies in this very
close region sharing borders, crossing borders, require the
kind of coordination and communication that is different than
almost anyplace else.
So I thank you in advance for your testimony today and for
helping me as a new legislator to understand your
responsibilities, the challenges that you face, and what we
might do here in the United States Congress to try to mitigate
some of those barriers and those challenges.
I will say, as a representative of Prince George's and
Montgomery County in Maryland's Fourth Congressional District,
I can only recall my experiences as a parent and a worker on 9/
11 and the challenges of trying to get to a son over here on
Capitol Hill while I was over on Dupont Circle, while Dad was
over in Virginia, and trying to communicate, and the lack of
communication, the difficulty of moving in and getting out of
the city. And I thought just then that while, overall
obviously, we handled that disaster and tragedy quite well, we
still have a lot to do and especially if there were a more
compelling disaster in this region, just the mere movement of
people and vehicles and emergency services.
As someone who represents Prince George's and Montgomery
Counties, I have been more recently focused on things like our
communication systems for law enforcement, whether we have the
kinds of communication systems that allow us to communicate
across agencies and law enforcement operations. I am concerned
about that.
I am concerned about our emergency room and hospital
capacity to handle a tremendous disaster. We are home, as you
know, to Adventist Hospital, to Prince George's County
Hospital, to numerous other medical facilities, and yet in
that, we also know that these facilities face tremendous
financial and other challenges. And we have to, I think, in
this region pay particular focus to those facilities and make
sure that they have the emergency services and capacity to
handle any impending disaster. I am not sure, frankly, that we
are quite there yet. So I look forward to your testimony today
and learning from each of you as you appear, and obviously,
thank the Chairwoman for the foresight in pulling this
discussion together.
And let me just say on the Chairwoman's closing remarks,
particularly regarding D.C.'s autonomy and ability to make its
own decisions both about emergency services and other decisions
for the city, I am full square behind and with her because we
know in this jurisdiction that it is important to have people
who are capable of making decisions independently for their
jurisdictions but working together.
And we want a full partner, a full voting partner, in the
District of Columbia. And Maryland doesn't want the
responsibility of registering guns from D.C. Residents and
moving firearms across borders. That poses a tremendous burden
on our State. It poses an absolute burden on our local law
enforcement in Prince George's and Montgomery Counties. And so
I look forward to continuing to work with the Chairwoman to
address these issues as they impact our ability to respond to
disasters and emergencies.
Thank you very much, and I yield.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Ms. Edwards.
Mr. Perriello, do you have a comment you would like to
make, opening comments? Thank you.
I am very grateful to today's opening panel. I am grateful
particularly to District of Columbia Attorney General Peter
Nickles, who volunteered to come when Police Chief Cathy Lanier
encountered a family emergency. I am very pleased and grateful
to you, Attorney General Nickles, for coming.
I am pleased also to hear from the Assistant Chief of the
United States Capitol Police Department, who is here for Chief
Morse, who had to be away today.
We work very closely with you, Assistant Chief Nichols, on
homeland security here in the Capitol and in the District.
And I am particularly grateful to the administration for
providing us with a witness from the Department of Homeland
Security, Gabrielle Gallegos, who is Director of Law
Enforcement Policy at the Department of Homeland Security.
Ms. Norton. Let us begin with Attorney General Nickles.
TESTIMONY OF PETER NICKLES, ATTORNEY GENERAL, DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA; DANIEL R. NICHOLS, ASSISTANT CHIEF, UNITED STATES
CAPITOL POLICE DEPARTMENT; AND GABRIELLE GALLEGOS, DIRECTOR OF
LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Nickles. Good morning, Chairwoman and Members of the
Committee.
I appeared with the Chief almost a year ago when we
presented testimony with respect to the gun legislation that
was being considered by the House. And I am a poor substitute
for Chief Lanier, but I am very happy to be here to talk about
the impact on homeland security and this Nation's Capital of
what has been called the Ensign Amendment.
I want to first talk about a very important proposition,
and that is that the District of Columbia is in compliance with
the Second Amendment ruling of the Supreme Court in the Heller
case. Now, it is a fact that some of the same individuals and
lawyers who contest the original District legislation have sued
again, but I am confident and I would think the Congress would
be confident that the courts will ultimately resolve any issues
that relate to a very long and deliberate process engaged in by
the mayor and the City Council to satisfy the requirements of
the Supreme Court.
We fully respect the decision of the Supreme Court, and we
have signed into law and promulgated regulations that, in my
view as a lawyer who has practiced some 45 years, fully satisfy
the directives of the Supreme Court.
What is important to emphasize is that the laws that the
mayor and the Council have enacted affirm the District
residents' right to register hand guns and possess them for
self-defense in the home. I take note of the statement of
Justice Scalia, who wrote the majority opinion in Heller. And
he underscored the District's authority to regulate firearms
under the Second Amendment, and he stated, and I think it bears
repetition in this discussion, ``although we do not undertake
an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of
the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to
cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of
firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the
carrying of firearms in sensitive places, such as schools and
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.''
Consistent with that opinion, the District, like many
States, and the District is not alone here, has determined that
assault weapons and certain unsafe firearms are not eligible to
be registered and possessed.
I want to correct some of the misinformation that I have
heard about the District's gun laws. Shot guns, rifles, and
hand guns, including many semi-automatic models, can all be
registered in the District. Indeed, rifles and shot guns,
including many semi-automatic versions, were never prohibited
at all, and residents have been able to register many semi-
automatic handguns since September 16, 2008. And since the
Heller decision alone, more than 400 handguns and 160 long guns
have been registered. There is currently one licensed firearms
dealer in the District, and we think more will follow because
the market will take care of that.
To state it clearly, it is no more difficult to open a
dealership here than opening a restaurant. And the District is
certainly not alone in requiring a firearm dealer's license.
Indeed, 17 States do exactly what the District has enacted.
Now, the Ensign Amendment. In my view, the Ensign Amendment
goes far beyond compliance with Heller. Most importantly, this
amendment would repeal the District's ban on assault weapons.
The city's ban is similar to the Federal ban which was in place
until 2004, and that ban was not unconstitutional. And Federal
law had a sunset provision after 10 years, at which time it was
allowed to expire, and what is most important is that the
authority then reverted to the States.
And then, in all, 10 States have banned or regulated
assault weapons with 5 States having provisions that are
similar, if not identical, to that of D.C. Even the ATF has
described assault weapons, and I quote, as ``large-capacity
semi-automatic firearms designed for rapid-fire combat use.
Most are patterned after machine guns used by military
forces.'' Certainly the District's ban of this type of weapon
is a reasonable exercise of its regulatory authority and
certainly consistent with what Justice Scalia wrote in the
Heller case.
Now, critics of the District's ban will argue that
criminals can get assault weapons anyway, and we all know that
the use of assault weapons by criminals is a growing problem in
cities across the country. We saw that most recently in the
tragic incident in Oakland, California, in which two law
enforcement officers were killed by a parolee with an assault
rifle.
Fortunately, at this time, assault weapons do not have a
strong presence in D.C. Last year, of more than 2,500 illegal
firearms recovered by police, only 1 percent were assault
weapons. Certainly a determined criminal could get an assault
weapon, and if our assault weapons ban were merely repealed,
anyone eligible to purchase a firearm under Federal law would
be able to.
But the Ensign Amendment goes well beyond that by taking
the unprecedented step of allowing District residents to
purchase firearms in Maryland and Virginia, which would have a
significant effect on the ability of this entire region to
regulate firearms, including assault weapons. Nowhere in the
Nation, nowhere in the Nation, are residents allowed to
purchase a firearm in another State without going through a
federally licensed dealer in their own State, nowhere in the
Nation.
As the Governor of Maryland warned, his State would not be
able properly to regulate firearms purchased by District
residents. Maryland does not have the necessary expertise to
interpret District laws, much less the many possible
dispositions under the city's criminal justice system. The
result would be that even people who are prohibited under
Federal law from purchasing a firearm may be able to take
advantage of those gaps and buy a weapon, including an assault
weapon, in Maryland or Virginia.
Last September, our distinguished Chief of Police, Kathy
Lanier, testified before the Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform about the special concerns in protecting this
unique city, the District of Columbia. The terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, demonstrated something that we have known
for some time: Government facilities, dignitaries, and public
servants are prime targets for terrorists, both foreign and
domestic. Protecting government officials and infrastructure is
a challenge for every city in the United States, but in
Washington, the likelihood of attack is higher, and the
challenges to protect the city are greater. As a result, it
would seem to me that the District is the last place where U.S.
residents across the country would want to allow assault
weapons.
The District's high concentration of iconic structures,
such as the national monuments, the White House, and, of
course, the Capitol, make it a highly attractive target. The
high-profile human targets, from the Nation's top elected
leaders to the more than 400 foreign dignitaries that make
official visits to D.C. Each year, are obviously an attractive
target. Moreover, we should not be solely concerned about well-
coordinated terrorist attacks. We need also to consider the
unsophisticated lone wolf terrorist angry at the U.S.
Government for whatever reason.
The second key vulnerability, and Madam Chairwoman, I will
come to an end very shortly if you will give me a few more
seconds, is, due to the sheer volume of secure motorcades
traveling in this city every day, given the daily movements
around the city of the President, the Vice President, and their
families, and the fact that almost 3,000 foreign dignitaries
spend time in our city each year, the routes for those
movements cannot be shut down as they are in other cities.
As you know from your own districts, when the President and
Vice President travel outside of Washington, roads are cleared
of all traffic, parked cars and such. And spectators are often
kept behind barricades. We don't do this in this city because
shutting down the routes for every motorcade would make it
virtually impossible to navigate much of the city on a
continuous basis, and we do not want the Nation's Capital to
take on the character of an armed fortress.
This freedom, however, comes with the cost of high
vulnerability both for the officials and dignitaries and the
general population. As Chief Lanier noted last September, in
attempted and successful assassinations around the world, the
first step in attacking a motorcade is frequently to take out
the security detail with semi-automatic and automatic firearms.
This forces the motorcade to stop, at which point the
terrorists can use explosives to attack the armored vehicles
carrying the targeted individuals.
We all have an immediate concern for any life threatened or
lost in a terrorist event. But, as my colleague Chief Lanier
noted, here in the Nation's Capital, we must recognize that any
terrorist incident, no matter how small, would garner worldwide
attention and could have significant international
implications. The broader repercussions of an incident in the
city should be of grave concern to everyone in this room.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Attorney General Nickles.
Mr. Nichols, Chief Nichols.
Mr. Nichols. Good afternoon, ma'am.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss the public safety and the consequence of management
capabilities of the United States Capitol Police. I would like
to make some brief opening remarks and, with your permission,
submit my written testimony for the record.
The U.S. Capitol Police accomplishes its mission through a
variety of functions to provide comprehensive around-the-clock
protection for the United States Congress, the legislative
process, the Capitol complex, and the millions of visitors from
across the globe that come to see democracy at work. In an
effort to maximize our ability to prepare for and respond to
incidents affecting public safety, the U.S. Capitol police
specifically focuses on key internal capabilities which, when
necessary, can be augmented by specialized resources from our
partners in the National Capital Region. Our current internal
capabilities show the rewards of several years of investment in
training, robust command-and-control systems, and physical
security improvements.
Providing security, protection, and law enforcement
services to the United States Congress in the Capitol Complex
in a post-9/11 threat environment is a challenging task. To do
this, we rely on the provisions of Title II of U.S. Code 1961,
which states, ``Capitol police shall police the United States
Capitol Buildings and Grounds under the direction of the
Capitol Police Board.'' We also rely on Title XL of the U.S.
Code 5104, which states, ``except as authorized by regulations
prescribed by the Capitol Police Board, persons may not carry
on or have readily accessible to any individual on the Capitol
Grounds or in any of the Capitol Buildings a firearm, dangerous
weapon, explosives, or an incendiary device.'' We have recently
made a number of high-profile gun, explosives, and dangerous
weapons arrests through interdiction and security screening.
As the host law enforcement agency for many events of
national significance, we understand that working with our many
partners in the National Capital Region and sharing our
resources is imperative. In recent years, we have worked hard
to improve our interoperability with local agencies, such as
the D.C. Fire Department and the Metropolitan Police Department
as well as our Federal partners in the National Capital Region,
including the FBI, U.S. Secret Service, FEMA, Department of
Health and Human Services, and the Department of Defense.
The planning for such events involves an all-hazards
approach, an appropriate risk analysis, an event-specific
threat assessment, and a comprehensive crisis management plan
to ensure we are prepared to implement appropriate protective
measures with little or no notice. As an example, the U.S.
Capitol Police successfully implemented a mass notification and
evacuation of more than 8,000 people at two consecutive July
4th concerts in 2006 and 2007. We had to air security threat
evacuations at the Capitol Complex, one during President
Reagan's state funeral, demonstrating our ability to move large
amounts of people into safety while maintaining the security
and integrity of all legislative facilities. These evacuations
were based on imminent threat of severe weather creating unsafe
conditions for our visitors with regard to the two concerts,
and a direct air security threat to the Capitol Complex during
other events.
I would like to also acknowledge the relationship we enjoy
between the United States Capitol Police and the Capitol Police
Board. The support, guidance and oversight provided by this
entity allow the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the
U.S. Capitol Police planning to maintain a direct path and
ensures consistent messages are provided across Capitol Hill.
Consistent communications with this body ensures that we will
be able to elicit additional resources if they are required.
This process has been utilized effectively in the past,
allowing the U.S. Capitol to supplement its resources and/or
extend our abilities of the resources we have on hand every
day.
Thank you, Madam Chair. This concludes my opening remarks,
and I will be happy to answer any questions that you have.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Nichols.
Ms. Gallegos.
Ms. Gallegos. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman and other
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee.
I am Gabrielle Gallegos, and I am the Director of Law
Enforcement and Information Policy at the Department of
Homeland Security.
I appreciate being asked to appear before you, and on
behalf of the department, I very much want to recognize the
hard work that Congresswoman Norton has done over the years on
a range of important homeland security issues that impact the
safety and security of Washington, D.C., and the Capital
Region.
As we all know, Washington, D.C., is the site of numerous
embassies, international organizations, and Federal offices.
The high-profile events that occur in Washington and the many
dignitaries and officials that visit, live, and work here can
pose unique challenges.
That D.C. Is our Nation's Capital naturally affects the
security picture. DHS's mission is to address the broad range
of potential threats that can impact that security. Threats
that include chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
weapons, along with natural disasters of all types: threats
that may impact human health or our critical infrastructure;
threats that may come from other countries or originate right
here at home.
In developing and executing security policy in the National
Capital Region, DHS is very aware that multiple factors affect
the overall level of security. DHS recognizes that the security
of the Capital may be affected by local conditions and
policies. Also, given the prominence of Washington as the seat
of government and the proximity to Washington of Maryland and
Virginia and the other mid-Atlantic States, local circumstances
in this city inevitably have an impact on the work of the
Federal Government in promoting regional security. These and
other matters remain important as we work on a coordinated plan
to advance crucial goals in this area.
The Department of Homeland Security works closely with
local law enforcement and with all our State and local partners
to bolster Federal, State, and local capacity to respond to the
many security issues we face. One of the primary missions of
the department is to support and coordinate with State and
local partners, and I want to recognize the crucial
relationships the department is fortunate to have with all of
the local and regional police departments in the Capital
region, the emergency managers and first responders, the State
and local homeland security officers, and the National Guard.
And I feel particularly honored to be here with my fellow
witnesses today. They clearly represent the best of modern
policing and the important partnerships that we have in this
area. These working relationships and the mutual support they
provide are the cornerstone of our ability as a Nation to
achieve important security functions. We will continue to
foster these relationships as we work to address both existing
threats and emerging challenges.
Thank, you and I would be pleased to answer any questions.
Ms. Norton. Thank you again, Ms. Gallegos.
Let me begin with Attorney General Nickles.
Attorney General Nickles, you are one of the District's
most distinguished attorneys working before the District was
fortunate to attract you. And you are now the highest law
enforcement officer in the District until we get you the full
authority to be the District Attorney. So I am asking you some
questions in light of your legal background and your role in
the District.
Now, after the Heller decision, the city changed its gun
laws. The Heller decision speaks and uses the word throughout,
``handguns.'' Does the new law in the District of Columbia
disallow semi-automatic handguns?
Mr. Nickles. The new law authorizes a certain type of semi-
automatics to be registered in the District, and I think it
needs to be recounted that rifles and shotguns, including some
semi-automatic versions, were never prohibited at all. So we
have it--and I think a careful balance and the Council and the
Mayor have tried to achieve, consistent with the Heller case,
have been very receptive to the views of the gun proponents.
This is a balance, protection of the safety of our citizens
with the Second Amendment Rights of those same citizens. I
think we have struck the right balance, Madam Chairwoman, and I
think we have developed a scheme of legislation and regulation
that is fully constitutional.
Ms. Norton. Now, the Heller decision indicated that a
person must be able to have firearms, including handguns, in
the home and that these handguns must be kept operable. Is that
the case with District laws today?
Mr. Nickles. I think, effectively, yes, that we have
protected the Second Amendment Right of a citizen to have a gun
in the home for purposes of self-defense.
Ms. Norton. Now, the Heller decision did not allow guns
outside the home, is that correct? It spoke only of guns in the
home?
Mr. Nickles. Only in special cases where there were permits
for security-type individuals, your statement is correct. The
handgun or the registered gun, in our case, would be in the
home.
Ms. Norton. Let me ask Mr. Nichols, the Ensign Amendment
uses the words that a person may have a home in his place of
business. Well, the place of business for most people is where
they work. Could I ask you what you think--first, let me ask
you about the Capitol. How strict are the gun laws in the
Capitol of the United States?
Mr. Nichols. The gun laws within our jurisdiction, the U.S.
Capitol Complex, are very strict. As I mentioned in my opening
statement, we rely on Title XL of the U.S. Code to prohibit all
handguns, weapons, and incendiary devices within our
jurisdiction.
Ms. Norton. So no handguns, no guns of any kind can come
into this Capitol, and everybody in this Capitol is fully
protected from guns in this Capitol, even though it is a place
of business?
Mr. Nichols. Yes, ma'am. They are protected by us through
the----
Ms. Norton. Is this the case with the Federal courts as
well?
Mr. Nichols. I am sorry?
Ms. Norton. Is this the case with Federal courts as well,
that you can't take a handgun into Federal courts of this city?
Mr. Nichols. That is correct. I believe that there are also
restrictions, even though it is not our jurisdiction, there are
restrictions that deal with Federal properties elsewhere in the
city, also.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Nickles, under this bill, could you take a
gun into the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, the
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia?
Mr. Nickles. I would hate to think that is the case. At the
September 2008 hearing, we pointed out the problems in the
legislation being considered about carrying firearms in public
or concealed, and that was eliminated, but the dangerous
language in the Ensign Amendment is that while it would allow
the District to prohibit the carrying of firearms, concealed or
openly, but except at the person's dwelling place, place of
business, or on other land possessed by the person, as your
opening statement pointed out, that language ``place of
business'' or ``on other land possessed by the person'' is, in
my view, very dangerous. I am not personally familiar with the
rules of the Superior Court and the D.C. Court of Appeals. I
know there is significant screening there. I would doubt that
you could take guns into that venue, but----
Ms. Norton. You think the courts could, in the District of
Columbia, although--first of all, are these rules pursuant to
the laws of the District of Columbia, any laws that the courts
would have in the District of Columbia, pursuant to the laws of
the District of Columbia, or would they, because they are
Article I courts be protected under Federal legislation?
Mr. Nickles. I think because they are Article I courts,
they could adopt rules that would protect entrance into the
courts, but all these other places of ``business'' that you
discussed in your opening are potentially open, and that causes
me great concern.
Ms. Norton. Including the D.C. Council, the offices of the
District Government and the like, all of those would be places
of business where employees could have guns?
Mr. Nickles. Potentially. This language is very unclear,
but it is a loophole through which you could drive a truck.
Ms. Norton. You patrol off-campus, Mr. Nichols. And when I
was in my second term and the District was experiencing great
gun carnage, like every large city in the United States,
Congress decided it wasn't enough simply to allow the Capitol
Police, if invaded, to do what it could but extended your
jurisdiction. Would you describe your extended jurisdiction and
how the changes in the D.C. Law would affect your ability to
protect the Capitol in light of your extended jurisdiction, and
what jurisdiction you think you need now and what jurisdiction
you think you should have in any case?
Mr. Nichols. The jurisdiction of the United States Capitol
Police is rather unique. We have a primary jurisdiction that
encompasses the United States Capitol, all the congressional
buildings, about 19 congressional buildings, and all the
adjoining streets and parks. It is about 40 city blocks that
are in the core of the city. We have an extended jurisdiction
that extends out several blocks in any direction from the
United States Capitol where officers enjoy the same law
enforcement authority as that of the Metropolitan Police
Department, and we do have an active presence within that area
to enforce the laws of the District.
Also, elsewhere throughout the city, we have authority when
we are on official business to enforce the laws when it comes
to crimes of violence that are committed in our presence. So we
can protect the citizenry when we are in any given area of the
city at any given time. Layered on that is a Federal protective
authority that is provided to the United States Capitol Police
to protect Members of Congress anywhere within the United
States, its territories and possessions.
The way that we currently operate is that police in our
primary jurisdiction, we apply both D.C. Code or Federal Code
to ensure that we keep the complex safe. That is, if we
identify people who are unlawfully in possession of firearms,
incendiary devices, explosives, then, obviously, we can
identify them readily and make that arrest.
Elsewhere in the District of Columbia, just as we have all
the time that I have been a police officer for 25 years, when
you run into somebody on the street with a firearm, you can
assume that they are either a law enforcement officer or a
criminal because there really is no gray area in between right
now with how the gun laws on the street are applied. That is
how our officers are trained. [Submitted subsequent to the
hearing: There are limited exceptions for select registered
lawful firearms that are being transported.] Anyone in
possession of a firearm that----
Ms. Norton. If someone were to say, but, officer, I am on
my way, and I am just taking it there, would that be presumed
to be legal under the Ensign Amendment?
Mr. Nichols. As you know, ma'am, since we are a legislative
branch agency, we don't comment on pending legislation. I would
have to study the implications of that. But speaking in
general, because of the environment in which we work, anytime
we come in contact with an individual who has a firearm, it is
our position we have to treat them as if they are a threat
until we can prove that they are not because we have to
understand the context in which they are possessing that
firearm and what their potential intent is. So anything that
changes the current conditions that we are in is going to
complicate our enforcement efforts.
Ms. Norton. I am going to ask Ms. Gallegos a question, and
then I will go on to the other Members and come back with
remaining questions.
Ms. Gallegos, you have testified that you work closely in
the Department of Homeland Security with local jurisdictions.
Would that include the District of Columbia Police Department,
and if so, would changes such as the abolition of, elimination
of gun laws in the District of Columbia hurt or enhance
homeland security in the District of Columbia, in your view?
Ms. Gallegos. We do work closely with the Metropolitan
Police Department at the Department of Homeland Security, of
course through the Secret Service and through the Federal
Protective Service, and other law enforcement agencies.
There are a number of threats, of course, that the Capitol
faces, as you know. And we do the type of risk analysis and
threat assessment that Chief Nichols was talking about. And we
rely very closely on our State and local partners to provide
the on-the-ground information about the threats in their
jurisdictions and about the issues that are going to be most
important to them, and about the types of support that they are
going to need from the Department of Homeland Security.
Ms. Norton. So if guns could be brought in, military-style
weapons, for example, from other jurisdictions here, you would
rely on who in order to help preserve Homeland Security in the
District of Columbia?
Ms. Gallegos. We would be relying on a coordinated
approach. Just this morning, when I was coming here, listening
on the radio hearing about a new partnership between the
District of Columbia and Maryland and Virginia, those are the
types of partnerships that the Department of Homeland Security
wants to foster and applauds.
Ms. Norton. Are you prepared for a situation where you
would be called upon to help the jurisdictions detect military
style weapons that could be used in the District of Columbia in
light of home rule security risks? How would you handle that?
Ms. Gallegos. We work with a variety of scenarios. We are
constantly planning and preparing to adapt to changing
circumstances.
Ms. Norton. How would you adapt to individuals being able
to go without background checks and buy .50 caliber military-
style, armor-piercing weapons at gun shows in another
jurisdiction? How would you prepare for that?
Ms. Gallegos. We are going to approach that with the same
kind of threat assessment, planning, coordination, working with
State and local partners to address exactly that kind of
emerging threat which can come from that kind of quarter, or
from any number of quarters.
When we do threat assessment and we work with State and
local partners, we are not just looking at particular types of
weapons or particular types of incidences, we are planning
across the spectrum of scenarios for the range that could
include the type of weapons you are describing, or incendiary
devices, or shoulder mounted.
Ms. Norton. Well, this is a particular threat that no one
has had to prepare for, Mrs. Gallegos. Of the threats we have
had to prepare for, legal permission from the Federal
Government to buy guns in another jurisdiction that could be
military-style weapons that could be used against Federal
officials, is, so far as I know, not a contingency you have had
to prepare for. Do you have a risk assessment involving that
yet?
Ms. Gallegos. Well, I want to be careful when I answer
that, a specific risk assessment, because my day-to-day
responsibilities don't involve working with specific risk
assessments. You notice that my title is Law Enforcement and
Information Sharing Policy, and my focus is on the types of
day-to-day coordination partnerships and strategic planning
that I have been talking about. But I would be happy to, of
course, go back to the Department and see if we can provide
some additional information to you on the types----
Ms. Norton. Well, I appreciate that. And I realize you are
a policy expert, Ms. Gallegos. I am a Member of the Homeland
Security, and I have been kept very busy with the Department on
threat assessments. And I must say, the threat assessments that
we are most concerned about in this jurisdiction today, cyber
threats, carry-on nuclear devices, and the rest, lead me to
think that neither the Department nor anybody else is prepared
for a new threat from, of all places, military weapons coming
into the Nation's capital. We hope you won't have to include
this threat assessment in your arsenal of assessments, which I
am aware that the Department has taken on and taken on so well.
I am going to ask Ms. Edwards if she has questions at this
time.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I do have a
couple of questions.
First, in terms of the line of questioning that you have
been directing regarding the challenges to D.C.'s gun laws and
autonomy, I would like to have entered into the record a
response from Governor Martin O'Malley of Maryland to an
inquiry by our Maryland delegation regarding the impact on
Maryland of a change in--the impact of this Ensign amendment
and the effect on Maryland.
As I had described earlier, of course, one of the
challenges is that we face a tremendous fiscal and budget
crisis just like a lot of States and jurisdictions. We hardly
have the resources to apply to registering guns for D.C.
residents; it is just not what we are in the business of doing.
We are challenged by registering firearms in our own State and
our local jurisdictions. And it would be a huge burden on
Maryland to take on this responsibility.
That aside, for those who believe in not imposing unfunded
mandates on States, this clearly would be an unfunded mandate
on the State of Maryland, proposing a tremendous burden on our
State troopers and our budget.
For those people who are concerned about silly little
things like State sovereignty, well, I understand that there
are those who share the view that they can impose, at will,
anything on the District of Columbia because they don't view it
as a sovereign. Maryland is a State, Maryland is a sovereign.
And we can't have the United States Congress imposing on us the
requirement to register guns from another jurisdiction.
And so I would like to have entered into the record a
letter from the Governor of the State of Maryland, Martin
O'Malley, expressing our State's serious concerns, and I will
quote from the letter. ``We have serious concerns with the
language of Senate amendment 575 and request that you reject
this proposal if introduced for consideration in House bill
H.R. 157 and defeat it during a likely conference of the two
measures.'' And it does go on to state all of the implications
for Maryland that would really impose on our State sovereignty
and on our budget. I would like to have that entered into the
record.
Ms. Norton. So ordered. And Ms. Edwards, might I say that I
have spoken with your governor, Governor O'Malley and with
Governor Tim Kaine. And I am pleased to report here that both
Governors are strongly opposed to the entire Ensign amendment
and that, as I understand it, they are writing a joint letter--
in addition to the very well-documented letter that the
Governor of Maryland, on his own, has already written. I would
like to have that letter in the record as well, and any
information we have from these two sovereign States who have
been drafted into this matter without any consultation with
anyone in the State or with any Member of the Virginia or
Maryland delegation. I would like to have any information in
that regard put in the record so that that infringement, as the
Member says, we are accustomed to in the District, does not
begin to infect the two sovereign States that are our neighbors
and that work so closely with us. So ordered.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
And I just have a couple of questions; one to Assistant
Chief Nichols, a couple of concerns. One, we have a number of
your police officers who are constituents of mine in the Fourth
Congressional District in Maryland and have been greatly
concerned about the Blackmen-Malloy case, the discrimination
case, those 300 black law enforcement officers of the Capitol
Police. And I wonder just in terms of your ability to
coordinate with other jurisdictions, how that impacts the
morale of the law enforcement officers under your jurisdiction
and where we see this going so that it can be resolved?
Mr. Nichols. That is currently before the U.S. Capitol
Police Board. I know that our attorneys are talking to the
representatives of the Black Police Officers Association to try
to find some path forward on that. I think it is the District
Court was making a ruling about who was actually included in
the set of that lawsuit.
But I appreciate your question because it drives to the
heart of professionalism of the United States Capitol Police.
Regardless of some of the internal issues that we deal with on
a day-to-day basis with personnel policies and procedures and
even some of the concerns that the unions or the Black Police
Officers Association may have, our officers separate out those
issues from their professional responsibilities. And I think it
was evidenced during the inauguration the extraordinary lengths
that U.S. Capitol Police officers go to ensure that the Capitol
complex and all those who work and visit here are safe. We are
able to build upon that level of dedication and integrity to
coordinate with our partner agencies throughout the region
also, And we share a very good reputation, as do the other
agencies that we work with.
We all have a mutual responsibility here. And I can't
remember if it was your opening statement or Madam Chair's, but
there is no one agency that is an island in this city. We all
have to jointly work together to ensure the safety and security
of not only people who live and work here, but the millions of
visitors who come through here every year. And the laws that
affect us and allow us to do our jobs are important in our
efforts in that regard.
So we monitor these types of developments very closely. We
look at the impact, and then we move forward in a unified
fashion to ensure that we can meet the constitutional
requirements that are provided, and also the public safety
entities and responsibilities we carry every day.
Ms. Edwards. Well, I thank you for that. And of course I
greatly appreciate, even as a new Member, the professionalism
of the Capitol Police. But you should know at least that this
Member remains really concerned about that outstanding
litigation, precisely because so many of those officers do live
in the Fourth Congressional District.
I would like to say to you as well, you know, and just
again continue to salute the Capitol Police, and especially the
memory of John Michael Gibson and Private First Class Jacob
Joseph Chestnut, who was a resident of Prince George's County
in Maryland. It speaks to the high quality and caliber of
service of the Capitol Police. And I would just want to just
ensure that, as we go forward, that we not only have the
highest quality and caliber and performance, but that we
recruit in the most diverse way possible and reward those
officers for their service.
And then finally, and I know I am going over my time, Madam
Chairwoman, just one question for Ms. Gallegos. And the only
reason that I know to say Gallegos is because I grew up in New
Mexico. But I have one question for you regarding Homeland
Security and your coordination efforts because in this region--
and this region poses a different kind of homeland security
concern. We have so many different law enforcement agencies
that have responsibility in the region. And so I want to know
kind of more directly your relationship with the Prince
George's County police, Montgomery County police, in terms of
our local law enforcement and the District of Columbia, and how
often those agencies are pulled together for the purposes of
coordination, and the role that Homeland Security,
particularly, plays in that coordination.
Ms. Gallegos. Representative Edwards, I would be happy to
provide some additional information for you on that. I don't
have that level of detail with me today, but I would be happy
to provide a response after the hearing.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you very much. And I yield.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Ms. Edwards.
Mr. Perriello.
Mr. Perriello. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Let me start just by echoing Congresswoman Edwards'
comments. As a new Member, I have just been incredibly
impressed by the Capitol Police, the professionalism, the
handling, particularly under some very, very difficult
circumstances like the inauguration. So I just want to say,
from me and my staff, my family that has come to visit, we have
been incredibly impressed by the job that you do.
And let me also preface this by saying that I think you
have made a compelling case that there are many aspects of the
District that are unique in terms of security threats. I think
what we are probably interested in doing here is making sure
that you have the ability and the leeway you need to protect
us, to protect the city, to protect these national treasures.
At the same time, for better or for worse, the unique aspects
of the District also mean you have significant presidential
values for constitutional rights for other parts of the
country.
I certainly come from a part of the Commonwealth of
Virginia that has very different issues when it comes to gun
rights and people's use of guns. And I just, for now, want to
ask two clarifying questions, and then I may want to pick
things up offline.
First for you, Assistant Chief, you were saying that when
you stop someone who possesses a weapon, there is a presumption
that that person is a threat. Can you say a little bit more
about that, and about whether that matters whether that is an
authorized weapon or not, and what you mean by that?
Mr. Nichols. Well, the way that the gun laws work right now
within our complex is the only person who can lawfully possess
a weapon on the street is a law enforcement officer. So anyone
other than a law enforcement officer who we find to be in
position of a weapon, we automatically determine them to be a
threat. Now, it is a sliding scale. There are people who come
to the city who have a registered firearm and a license to
carry a firearm in their home districts, they come to the city
thinking that is legal here. It, in fact, is not.
So once we do the fielding interview, we will determine if
they are not a threat, they are just somebody who is
misinformed, but nevertheless in violation of the law. On the
other end of the spectrum, you have people who do come here
with the very intent of carrying a weapon in order to cause
harm or violate the law. And as Congresswoman Edwards talked
about, we have suffered the outcome of that when we had the
lone wolf come up here trying to force their way into the
United States Capitol building in 1998. Two of our police
officers were killed.
Just recently, within the past few months, we have had many
gun cases where people that cause us concern about what their
intent really was showed up within our jurisdiction with long
guns, shotguns, homemade hand grenades, things of that nature.
Because of our experience, and the fact that we know this
is a target not only for terrorists, but for people who want to
come here to seek retribution against the United States
Government, our officers are trained to be very wary of people
they run across in the field, whether it is within our primary
jurisdiction or extended jurisdiction, who are possessing
firearms because we have to run that investigation rather
quickly to determine, one, if they are a threat, and two, if it
is part of a larger threat that is going to be a multi-prong
attack on the Capitol complex. So it is a difficult position
for our officers. For our own protection, and the protection of
people like you and your family that you talked about, we have
to be very wary and very on guard of people we come into
contact with up here.
The way the laws are right now, either if you are in
possession of a gun, you are a law enforcement officer, or you
are violating the law. And it is pretty clear for us to move
forward in that respect.
If there are efforts to introduce gray areas, then of
course it is going to be more and more difficult for officers
to determine rather quickly the means by which somebody is in
possession of a gun. And it is going to take a lot of
retraining and a lot more coordinated effort to ensure that we
don't make an assumption on one end of the spectrum that is
wrong, or assume that there isn't a threat when there is one,
if there is, when there isn't. It just complicates the matter
for us.
Mr. Perriello. Maybe that is a segue to the Attorney
General. If you could give some sense--you have talked about
some about of the District laws that you believe are
permissible under the Heller decision. Can you give some sense
of what you think would not be permissible, other than what has
already been explicitly ruled out in your mind based on Heller?
Mr. Nickles. I am not quite sure what the Congressman has
in mind. We have looked at every element of the gun laws that
we have enacted. We have some lawsuits that have been filed
that challenge various elements of our gun laws, for example,
the requirement of training, certain of the preregistration
requirements.
But I think, by and large, the lawsuits that have been
filed accept the fact that the District has a basis in the
Heller decision reasonably to regulate handguns and who gets
the handguns and who gets the semi-automatics that are
permissible.
The concern I have, Congressman, is with section 210 of the
Ensign amendment. That is the one that creates the exception to
Federal anti-trafficking laws only for the Nation's capital,
which seems to me to be a sort of a contradiction in terms. You
have got the most unique jurisdiction in the world in terms of
the monuments and the government officials and the dignitaries
and the IMF conferences and the World Bank conferences and the
conferences of the G-7 and the G-20.
So everybody agrees this is the most unique place in the
world. And then we are talking about making this most unique
place in the world the only place in the Nation where residents
are allowed to purchase a firearm in another State without
going through some kind of licensed dealer.
To me, section 210, which also opens up the issue that
Madam Chairman talked about, the gun show problem, and also as
Congresswoman Edwards talked about foisted upon Virginia and
Maryland the issue of registration, or what to do about the
District residents. It doesn't make sense. And if the Congress
thought it didn't make sense, the Congress has plenary power
over the District. So our laws come in front of the Congress.
It was interesting to me that the date by which Congress
could have acted to change the laws we enacted was April 1--
April Fools Day. And we had no comment by Congress that any of
the laws that we had enacted over a long, arduous period of
negotiation with the community, with the advocates on both
sides of the issue, we put together what I considered to be a
very comprehensive statute and regulatory picture which I
believe will sustain any attack, and Congress lets it go into
effect for this unique jurisdiction.
So that is, perhaps, the long answer to a simple question,
but it poses to me the ultimate irony in the Ensign legislation
and in section 210; why would you take the most unique place in
the world and make it a unique place from the standpoint of
regulation of firearms? I don't understand it.
Mr. Perriello. I appreciate the passage you read from
Justice Scalia's decision on that. I am just trying to
understand in your mind what it is that you believe we could do
in terms of limiting firearms in D.C. that would be
unconstitutional, that would be out of bounds for the District,
that would be inconsistent with the other holdings of Heller.
Mr. Nickles. Well, I think if we were to take steps that
effectively impede, prevent, stand in the way unnecessarily of
the right of a citizen to have and provide self-defense in his
home, that would be very worrisome to me. And so when we had
advocates on the one side of gun regulation proposed that we
really not respond at all to Heller, I was very adamant, as was
the Council and the Mayor, in saying, now, look, we accept what
the Supreme Court has done. We are not going to fly in the face
of what the Supreme Court has said about the second amendment
right. But at the same time, Justice Scalia said, we don't
intend in any way to take away the right of your jurisdiction,
as every State in this country, the right of a jurisdiction
reasonably to regulate the use of firearms.That is what we have
done.
Mr. Perriello. Again, I appreciate all that you all have
done to try to protect the Capitol and to protect us and for
being part of this hearing. And I yield back.
Ms. Norton. Well, I have a number of questions raised in
part by the questions of my colleagues, very good questions of
my colleagues.
Let me ask Ms. Gallegos--see, I am not from the West----
Ms. Gallegos. Please call me Gabrielle, or Gabby.
Ms. Norton. You can tell I am a third generation
Washingtonian.
Ms. Gallegos, I am going to ask a question because she
speaks the language of Homeland Security.
In hearing after hearing in the Committee on Homeland
Security we have been told that the approach we should be
looking to protect our Nation, including of course the Nation's
capital, is a layered security approach, where one would wish
at every level, level after level, until you were sure, as
opposed to some great approach that would, in fact, accomplish
what we are after.
In your view, is a layered approach to Homeland Security
most effective in preventing a terrorist attack? And if so, how
would the elimination of all local gun laws affect a layered
approach if that layer was eliminated?
Ms. Gallegos. Well, that is a complicated question. Again,
I am afraid that my expertise doesn't extend to all of the
potential types of security planning and policy that goes into
answering that. And if you would permit, I would like to get
back to you with a more detailed response at a later time.
Ms. Norton. I would request within 10 days a response from
the Department on whether or not in the layered approach--which
they have virtually invented since 9/11--that approach would be
facilitated, hurt, helped, enhanced by the elimination of an
entire layer, local gun laws, there would be left whatever is
the Federal law that affects everybody. But even the most
permissive jurisdictions have their own set of gun laws, here
you would have none. And I understand your role and I very much
appreciate your testimony, but we are trying to document. And
you must understand that the leadership of the House and the
Senate are trying earnestly to discover at this point whether
there is any effect on homeland security, that for the first
time the leaders in both Houses are looking very seriously at
this gun law. And they are aware that the gun law is going to
become law because we are going to pass the D.C. House Voting
Rights Act. We are not letting anything stand in the way of
that. And they have strongly supported it; it is already
through the Senate. The House was the first to get it through
last time on a clean rule and a clean bill.
There is no question in my mind that these leaders are
going to get this done. And there is also no question in my
mind that if you have this attached to both bills, it is law.
And that is why I said in my testimony, don't want the
recriminations; want to know up front whether or not there is
any effect of having no layer of local law here.
Now, Mr. Nickles, this law would deprive the jurisdiction
of the District of Columbia of all authority over gun laws in
the District of Columbia. In the public safety hierarchy, where
does having some say over guns rank in the public safety
hierarchy of every large city? How important is it? What is the
biggest threat to public safety in every city?
Mr. Nickles. I think the Chief has spoken eloquently to the
fact that guns are at the heart of public safety, and the need
to regulate guns. The Chief has said many times, guns, drugs
and gangs. We have been working, and we had a meeting yesterday
with the Governor of Maryland to talk about how to improve
coordination with respect to matters of violence because there
are cross-border issues. But if the principal problems facing
any municipality, particularly the urban areas, is guns, gangs
and drugs, you take away the ability of the major police force
in the city to deal effectively with guns as the elective
leaders of the city have determined.
And I am no expert on the layered approach, but I am a
firsthand viewer of what the Chief and her terrific police
department do in this community. I sat with the Chief of Police
in September last year when she sought to explain the problems
in the House bill at that time.
Ms. Norton. Which is the same bill as this bill.
Mr. Nickles. Except for minor differences, it's the same
bill we are talking about. And it causes the Chief and myself,
particularly section 210, significant heartburn.
Ms. Norton. Could I ask Chief Nichols, Chief Morse raised
an issue that had not been raised before last time, and I will
ask your view on it. It had to do with officer safety. He spoke
of the changes that I enumerated in my testimony and the effect
of the safety on officers of the force here. Would you speak to
that, please?
Mr. Nichols. Yes, ma'am. It is pretty much in line with
what I responded to earlier. As we police the city now on the
streets, whenever you come in contact with an individual who is
in possession of a firearm, whether it is through an arrest
situation or through just merely seeing them on the street in a
patrol operation, you can safely assume with very limited
exceptions that, they are either a law enforcement officer or a
criminal who is unlawfully in possession of that firearm. And
that allows the officer, the officer who has made the contact
with the individual, to approach in a very cautious manner and
protect themselves in that regard because there really is no
gray area right now.
The officer can perceive anybody that they see on the
street carrying a firearm, whether it's a handgun or a long
gun, as a threat not only to public safety, but to themselves,
and they take the appropriate precautions to handle that
situation. It is the way that we have been policing in this
city for as long as I have been a cop.
When you generally have people on the street who are
lawfully in possession of weapons, it starts to gray the area a
little bit more because the officer will then know that it is
not as clear cut. And it is a concern that is going to take a
lot of retraining for our officers to ensure that they are
approaching the right way and that they understand that there
may be another added layer when they come in contact with
somebody.
Ms. Norton. So would you have to retrain every officer?
Mr. Nichols. Yes, ma'am. The way that we have been trained
now is that it is illegal to possess a firearm on the street.
And no matter how we come in contact with that weapon, whether
it is search incident to arrest, search of a vehicle, or merely
somebody that we see in possession of a handgun, if other
aspects of lawful possession are introduced with regard to
street operations, then, yes, that is going to take a lot of
retraining.
Ms. Norton. So you would have to come to the Congress and
ask for funds to retrain every officer of the Capitol Police
force.
I do want to clarify, with respect to Mr. Nickles, when I
was talking about depriving the local jurisdiction, leaving no
layer whatsoever there for Federal police because there is no
gun laws here, would you describe how gun laws and every other
law becomes effective?
Let me give you a law professor's hypothetical. Suppose the
District of Columbia passed a gun law that the Congress
disagreed with. Let us forget the question of constitutionality
for the moment because, as I understand it, Attorney General
Nickles, there have been 80 court suits brought since Heller
and not a single gun law has been overturned. So let's just
assume that the District passes a gun safety law with which the
Congress disagrees. Is the Congress, under present law,
powerless to do anything to correct its disagreement with the
District of Columbia, or must it now do, as this gun amendment
does, deprive it of all jurisdiction, no matter what the
circumstances over gun safety laws?
Mr. Nickles. Oh, absolutely not. The Congress has plenary
power over the District. And the District cannot enact any law
until that law lays over in the Congress for 30 legislative
days when you have a civil law, or 60 legislative days for
criminal laws, which sometimes, as the Chairwoman knows, could
mean months. So that the time frame and the ability of Congress
to say ultimately whether it agrees or disagrees with the gun
laws is an ultimate weapon by the Congress. If there is some
part of our gun laws that Congress does not like--putting aside
the constitutional issue--Congress has plenary power, because
no laws can become effective until those laws lay over here.
I might add, Madam Chairwoman, we are in the process of
submitting and having had hearings on it, an omnibus crime
bill. With the U.S. Attorney and the Police Department and the
Attorney General's office, we have spent literally months
developing an omnibus crime bill that deals with guns, with
gangs, with drugs, with stalking, with victim protection, and
many other features. And so to have in the middle of that very
comprehensive effort in the District to deal with crime, and
then in the middle of our effort to work with the Governor of
Maryland and all of his key people who were with us yesterday
in the Wilson Building, to have the Ensign amendment come in
sort of in the middle of this when the Congress does have the
power, ultimately, with respect to our gun laws or any other
laws, to say no, we don't like that. I am not really clear why
the Ensign amendment is being pressed at this time.
Ms. Norton. So, in other words, at best, it is redundant
because Congress can do whatever it wants to do with the
District. It could wipe out all the laws of the District of
Columbia right now, could it not?
Mr. Nickles. I am afraid to say yes. It makes me feel
pretty powerless, but the fact is the Congress has plenary
power over the District. And it is really upon that basis that,
at least in my view, that Congress has the power to grant
voting rights to the District because it does have this plenary
power, and in the past, in many situations, the Congress has
treated the District as a State.
Ms. Norton. Could I ask Ms. Edwards, who has another
question, and then I will come back.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
I just have one question that was raised in the message
that we received from our Governor, and it has to do with the
data systems integration and communications.
Assistant Chief Nichols, do you have the capacity now,
let's say, if Maryland had to register a gun of a resident from
the District of Columbia and that person somehow ended up here
on Capitol grounds, to be able to communicate with Maryland?
And does Maryland then have the ability to go into the data
systems in the District to know whether somebody has a mental
health prohibition or a previous conviction that would prohibit
the purchase or possession of a firearm? Do you have that
capacity now? Is it fully integrated?
Mr. Nichols. We do have a number of data systems that we
interact with local law enforcement and also Federal law
enforcement on. Whether those specific issues that you raise
can be obtained through those systems, I would have to go back
and then give the answer for the record.
Ms. Edwards. I would be curious to know that.
And then Mr. Nickles--and you don't have to answer this
now, and it may require checking and getting back to us--my
understanding is that if somebody in the District of Columbia
has a mental health prohibition or they had already registered
the firearm, as would be required under Ensign, in Maryland and
then got a conviction, Maryland wouldn't necessarily know that
it had to revoke that license because the systems are not
transparent in that kind of way. And so it would be really
complicated for Maryland or Virginia to do the kind of follow
up that it has to do with guns that are registered by its own
residents in the State because we have a State system that
allows us, if a subsequent conviction comes along or a mental
health prohibition comes along, we would know and then be able
to revoke that firearm. We would not necessarily have that
capacity registering folks in the District of Columbia, nor
would we have the capacity, I don't believe, to communicate
that from one law enforcement agency to another law enforcement
agency. And so it seems to me that, in terms of homeland
security, this problem really poses a great danger in terms of
the District even knowing whether someone who had a prohibition
didn't also still have a gun.
Mr. Nickles. Let me get back to you on that. I do know that
one of the nice features of the gun laws that we have enacted,
it has a very clear standard as to who can register a gun. And
it is also very important to us that if we find guns later, we
are able to trace those guns back.
As to the question of the data systems, I have got people
behind me that probably know the answer, but why don't we
confer and get back to you on that?
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Norton. Thank you. Perhaps Chief Nichols or Attorney
General Nickles can answer this question.
I think it is the Attorney General who has mentioned the
Federal anti-trafficking laws. I believe those were passed in
the 1930's. Why is it that Federal law requires that you
purchase a gun in your own State and only in your own State and
not go out of State in order to purchase a gun when we usually
allow free commerce across States?
Mr. Nickles. Well, I don't want to speculate, but it seems
to me commonsensical that if each individual State is doing the
registration of firearms, it can, A, ensure that people that
shouldn't have firearms don't get them. And then, if those
individuals go into Virginia or Maryland, for example, in order
for that individual to retrieve the gun, he has to go to a
federally licensed place in the District so that, once again,
the District and the Federal authorities can keep track of
those guns.
We are not dealing chewing gum here. I mean, there seems to
me to be some basic public interest in knowing where firearms
are and whether the individual who is receiving a firearm is
mentally competent has been convicted of a felony, and a
variety of different pre-registration requirements. This is not
unique to the District. All other States in this country have
similar regimes of regulation.
Ms. Norton. Thank you. Now, you are aware, perhaps, Ms.
Gallegos, that this Subcommittee is also in the process of
building a large new compound out in Ward 8 for the Department
where its headquarters and several of its agencies will be
located. Are you aware that under this amendment a person who
is voluntarily committed to St. Elizabeth's mental hospital--
and most people today are voluntarily committed--would be able
to immediately, upon release from a mental hospital, for
whatever period of time, without any waiting period, be able to
buy and keep a gun? And St. Elizabeth's Hospital is right next
to the planned Department of Homeland Security. Does that give
you any pause?
Ms. Gallegos. I was aware that that provision is in this
amendment. And as we build our facilities at St. Elizabeth's
Hospital, or St. Elizabeth's facility, we are, of course, going
to be concerned about the security of that facility as we are
about a number of the--I think the Federal Protective Service,
through the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency,
protects somewhere in the neighborhood of 9,000 Federal
buildings. And of course at all of those buildings we do
prohibit guns from coming in. And we do that through screening,
metal detection, of course visual inspection. And we are
concerned about creating that level of security in all of the
Federal buildings that we are protecting.
Ms. Norton. This is a particularly high-security agency, is
it not?
Ms. Gallegos. Yes. But of course we take the protection of
all the Federal workers in all of our Federal buildings very
seriously.
Ms. Norton. Well, we are very glad to have your concern. I
was asking a question about the Department itself and its near
location to the mental hospital.
Ms. Gallegos. I presume that we will continue our security
procedures when we are in that facility.
Ms. Norton. So you don't have any concern that people could
get out of St. Elizabeth's and buy a gun immediately.
Ms. Gallegos. I am certainly concerned about protecting
Federal buildings, which is our charge, and about protecting
our facilities.
Ms. Norton. Let me ask you, Chief. Is it of any concern
that assault weapons could be legally stored in houses or
office buildings surrounding the Capitol complex under the
amendment? Is it of any concern to the Capitol Police?
Mr. Nichols. Well, again, as you know, we don't comment
specifically on pending legislation. But speaking in general,
you were talking earlier about layers of security. The layers
of security that we use with the Capitol complex is concentric
rings, where we try to identify threats the furthest distance
away from the Capitol complex so we can intercept and mitigate
that threat.
The availability of stand-off weapons starts to skew that
ability to identify a threat further away because the longer-
range weapons extend out their actual threat parameters. So any
time that there is a long gun that is in our proximity, yes, it
is a concern, just as you get closer in, a handgun becomes more
of a threat because it is a closer threat-type weapon.
As you know, the Capitol complex is completely open and
inviting. And there are times where we don't know that we have
a threat coming toward us with regard to an armed individual
until they are actually at our doors. So despite our best
efforts, any time that there is a stand-off weapon nearby, it
is a legitimate concern to the United States Capitol Police.
Ms. Norton. Attorney General Nickles, on page 2of your
testimony you say the District is certainly not alone in
requiring a firearm dealer's license, and that 17 States do it
as well. We note that the gun amendment repeals the requirement
that licensed dealers keep records of ammunition received into
the inventory and ammunition sold or transferred. Were you
referring to that?
Mr. Nickles. I believe we were. The other provision that I
would just raise with you, Madam Chairwoman, that really causes
me also concern is this language where, under the Ensign
amendment the District would be barred from enacting any law
that would--let me give you the words, because these are far-
reaching--'' prohibit, constructively prohibit, or unduly
burden the firearm possession by anyone not otherwise
prohibited by Federal law.'' And then it goes on to bar the
District from enacting any laws or regulations that might
discourage private ownership or use of firearms in a person's
dwelling or place of business, including regulations that would
prevent the mentally ill, drug abusers, or domestic violence
perpetrators from obtaining and possessing firearms. So this
bill is a many splendored thing.
Ms. Norton. Yes, I just wanted to get your view of that on
the record, Attorney General Nickles.
I want to ask Chief Nichols a question about something that
is in Attorney General Nickles' testimony. He talks about the
assault weapon ban. And of course it is now up to the States,
and that has been his testimony. The ATF has described the
assault weapons that we are talking about as large capacity,
semi-automatic firearms designed for rapid fire, combat use.
Most are patterned after machine guns used by military forces.
Those are guns which could be possessed and stockpiled in the
District of Columbia.
Would you describe any concern you have that such
stockpiles of guns used, as the ATF says, by military forces
usually, what effect would that have on protecting the
jurisdiction under your control?
Mr. Nichols. Well, the concern is as it has always been,
that those types of weapons, or any weapons falls into the
wrong hands and then is used to further a criminal act or an
assault or an attack. So it is the availability of those types
of weapons, by whatever means they are obtained by people who
want to come up to the Capitol complex within our jurisdiction
and do harm, that is a significant concern. And as I said
earlier, we have had instances within the past 18 months where
we have had people come up here with assault-type weapons and
we have been able to intercept them and arrest them.
Ms. Norton. One final question. And this really flows from
the testimony of Chief Lanier in--I guess it was September. And
I would like the view of all three of you on this testimony
from the Chief.
'' If the gun bill, the very one before us now, were
passed, it would be far more difficult for the Metropolitan
Police Department and Federal law enforcement agencies in the
District of Columbia to ensure the safety and security of the
Nation's capital.''
Do any or all of you share those concerns?
Mr. Nickles. I would never disagree with the Chief of
Police, who I think is the city's foremost expert on what
affects the public safety and security of this city. She has
been in the police department for some 20 years, I think. She
is a woman that has seen every facet of public safety matters
in the city. She is a leader, and she is doing a great job. And
so when she says that, she means it. I support it.
Ms. Norton. Attorney General Nickles, as I understand it,
Chief Lanier established the city's own Department of Homeland
Security, was its first officer, and is the primary contact
with the Federal law enforcement and security network for the
Nation's capital; is that correct?
Mr. Nickles. That is correct. It is one of her many
distinctions.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Attorney General Nickles.
Chief Nichols.
Mr. Nichols. I have known Chief Lanier for a number of
years and I have watched her as Chief of the Metropolitan
Police Department. And I would agree with the comment she made.
I think that any professional law enforcement officer would
concur with her views on that matter.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Chief Nichols.
Ms. Gallegos.
Ms. Gallegos. At DHS, we respect Chief Lanier enormously,
of course. And as I mentioned earlier before, we regard the
views of the State and local partners that we work with as
extremely important. And they have enormous input into how we
formulate our policy and how we go forward.
Ms. Norton. Well, I want to thank all three of you,
Attorney General Nickles, Chief Nichols, and Ms. Gallegos, for
really very, very important testimony for this Subcommittee. It
is important to hear from those who are on the front line in
every respect. And I don't think we could have had a panel that
was more informative or more indispensable to our understanding
of how we should go forward.
Thank you again, all three of you.
Chief Nichols is going to stay for the next panel. And
could I ask the second panel to come up, in addition to the
chief; Mr. Jeff Delinski, Deputy Chief Special Operations
Bureau, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority; Major
General Errol Schwartz, Commanding General, D.C. National
Guard. And because my good friend and colleague has another
important engagement and must leave before the next panel, I am
going to ask Mr. Vernon Herron, who is the Deputy Chief
Administrative Officer of Public Safety and Director of
Homeland Security for Prince George's County, if he would come
forward in this panel. And instead of my asking the first
questions, I am going to ask that Representative Edwards ask
the first questions of this panel.
Perhaps we should proceed with Mr. Herron in case Ms.
Edwards has to leave early.
TESTIMONY OF DANIEL R. NICHOLS, ASSISTANT CHIEF, UNITED STATES
CAPITOL POLICE DEPARTMENT; JEFF DELINSKI, DEPUTY CHIEF SPECIAL
OPERATIONS BUREAU, WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT
AUTHORITY; MAJOR GENERAL ERROL R. SCHWARTZ, COMMANDING GENERAL,
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA NATIONAL GUARD; AND VERNON HERRON, DEPUTY
CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER FOR PUBLIC SAFETY/DIRECTOR OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF THE COUNTY EXECUTIVE, PRINCE
GEORGE'S COUNTY
Mr. Herron. Good morning, Chairwoman Norton. Thank you for
allowing me to be here today. I am Vernon Herron, Deputy Chief
Administrative Officer for Public Safety, and Director of
Homeland Security for Prince George's County, Maryland.
I appear before you today on behalf of one of the largest
counties in the National Capital Region. But before I begin, I
also would like to take this time to thank Congresswoman Donna
Edwards for her leadership in the critical issue of National
Capital Region public safety, and for recommending that I
appear before you today.
If time permits, I would like to offer testimony on the
Ensign legislation.
First, I want to take a moment to recall that Prince
George's County has testified on this issue before. In July of
2006, Prince George's County Sheriff Michael Jackson testified
before the House Energy and Commerce Committee on H.R. 5785,
the Warning, Alert and Response Network Act. In that testimony,
Sheriff Jackson explained that warning the public of an
impending disaster is a good first step, but not nearly enough
to address the total reality of public safety in response to a
large-scale disaster. We are pleased this hearing goes further
than debating how we warn the public and discusses how we can
lead and coordinate masses of people to safety.
Prince George's County, Maryland, is located in the heart
of the Baltimore-Washington corridor. The county borders
Washington, D.C., and is just 37 miles south of the City of
Baltimore. The county's population exceeds 820,000, with a
daily work population of well over 1 million people.
Covering an area of close to 500 square miles, the county
is home to many businesses, as well as State and Federal
agencies. Some of these Federal agencies include NASA's Goddard
Space Flight Center, Andrews Air Force Base, U.S. Department of
Agriculture's Beltville facility, a Federal Records Center, a
large Internal Revenue Service office complex, and the National
Oceanic Atmospheric Administration Center for Weather and
Climate Prediction. Additionally, a large portion of the
region's Metro system and Interstate 95 pass through Prince
George's County.
Fortunately, for most communities in America, the threat of
terrorism remains just that, a threat. However, the United
States has experienced several acts of terrorism and widespread
natural disasters which caused devastation and catastrophe. And
9/11 was an example of this devastation and catastrophe for New
York, the National Capital Region, and the entire United
States. Therefore, Prince George's County is in a prime
position to offer perspectives on how to address the need,
impact, and practicality for orchestrating large-scale public
safety response.
Coordinated planning across the National Capital Region
will greatly assist the utilization of limited resources
available to support evacuation and sheltering of residents,
citizens, and visitors to the National Capital Region. Actual
emergencies are inherently unstable and consist of rapidly
changing events whose outcome may be difficult, if not
impossible, to predict.
Resource sharing will be necessary in order to ensure the
region can efficiently manage a major evacuation or sheltering
event. Prince George's County works closely with the Maryland
Emergency Management Agency and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency to ensure all resources needed are being
utilized in the most efficient and effective manner.
Locally, we have executed MOUs with the Board of Education
to provide emergency access to the use of 260 public schools
located throughout the county. Although there is adequate
number of public schools to shelter thousands of citizens, we
do not have enough resources to open every school, or multiple
schools, simultaneously and also handle our daily
responsibilities.
In the event that multiple shelters would be needed to
house large numbers of citizens for an extended period, we have
preselected two mega shelters, Ritchie Coliseum in the northern
portion of the county and Show Place Arena in the southern
portion of the county. Both are capable of sheltering several
hundred people.
Prince George's County has also pre-stocked mobile caches
consisting of cots, blankets, pillows and personal hygiene kits
ready for transport to any shelter. For larger shelter needs,
we have pre-positioned FEMA tractor trailers loaded with
emergency shelter supplies ready to activate.
Having immediate access to emergency supplies enables
Prince George's County to mitigate, respond to, and recover
from disastrous events. Disasters require coordination between
Public Safety departments, our Health and Human Services
departments, as well as the other emergency support function
agencies. Having these departments train and exercise together
ensures that social service support and agency collaboration is
available to assist during this trying time.
In the event a full evacuation of a county is necessary,
the county's transportation department has access to traffic
cameras located at major traffic intersections. Using these
cameras can alter the time of the traffic light to reduce
gridlock and facilitate smooth traffic flow.
The experiences from past incidents reveal that vehicle
evacuation requires a unified effort, and this will be required
for the National Capital Region. Region coordination is
paramount in any effective response and recovery plan. To
facilitate and effect a recovery plan, the National Capital
Region has developed a regional video conference system. This
video conference system uses its own data network lines which
provide a direct link to every emergency operation center
throughout the National Capital Region. The ability for senior
officials from each jurisdiction to directly reach out and
communicate with their neighbor in the National Capital Region
will not only enhance the recovery process, but expedite the
use of resource sharing and mutual aid.
The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, also
known as COG, has played a major role in fostering regional
communications. Through COG, senior officials and public safety
chiefs and directors of each emergency support function meet
regularly to discuss issues and concerns that greatly impact
jurisdictions' ability to coordinate, communicate, and
collaborate during emergencies and disasters.
Prince George's County communicates directly with MEMA
during any major event. MEMA is advised of the event and placed
on alert that mutual aid may be required.
Prince George's County also depends on several Federal
funding mechanisms to support the county's operations. Those
mechanisms include the Urban Area Security Initiative, COPS Law
Enforcement Technology Program, the Byrne Memorial Justice
Assistance Grants, the Byrne Discretionary Grants, and the
American Recovery Reinvestment Act funds. These funding streams
are critical to our continued ability to deliver public safety
services and response capabilities.
Some of the grants require a match dollar amount for the
jurisdictions. For example, the Regional Catastrophic
Preparedness Grant program lies dormant due to the fact that
jurisdictions cannot provide the 20 to 25 percent grant match.
This grant requirement cripples the ability of the jurisdiction
to obtain the available funding, especially during this
difficult economic time.
Also, the fiscal year 2010 House Budget resolution
decreases the public safety function authority by $5 billion,
while increasing the outlay by only $1 billion. This
discrepancy gives us pause, as we are not able to provide as
much public safety response to the National Capital Region,
with cuts to important programs such as the ones I listed
above.
In examining the state of operations today, we would make
the following recommendations:
First and furthermore, we must keep UASI whole and urge a
fiscal year 2010 budget to not be set below $900 million;
Strive for greater coordination and communication between
local governments and FEMA, including conducting of unified NCR
drills and exercises;
Establish clear and efficient report instructions between
local governments, FEMA, and the Executive Office of the
President;
Establish mechanisms for emergency expenditure
reimbursement.If local governments are going to assist Federal
emergency response activities, there needs to be a clear path
which those local governments can seek reimbursement for those
costs.
Hurricane Isabel, 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, and the massive
crowds of this past inauguration, have all taught us valuable
lessons regarding large-scale public safety response. However,
if we are to move forward with the entire National Capital
Region en-sync, then more coordination will need to be
established and critical Federal support cannot be stripped
away.
Are all of our local governments fully interoperable within
themselves? And are all jurisdictions of the NCR? Is there a
coordinated National Capital Region plan for FEMA? And are all
local government entities completely versed with this plan?
These are the questions we should ask moving forward.
Prince George's County would continue to partner with the NCR
to make our country safe.
Each day we want to be able to inform our citizens that we
are better prepared today than we were yesterday. I want to
thank the Subcommittee for calling this hearing today and the
Chairwoman for allowing us to speak on this important matter.
I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Herron.
Let's move to, Major General Schwartz, D.C. National Guard.
General Schwartz. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman and Members
of this Committee for the opportunity to testify in front of
you today.
I have submitted my testimony for the record, but please
allow me to make some highlighting remarks concerning the
District of Columbia National Guard and their contribution to
the National Capital Region.
I have been a capital guardian now for 32 years, and we
continue to provide excellent support to the city. The District
of Columbia National Guard consists of the Air National Guard
and the Army National Guard, and we are housed within the
District of Columbia, at Andrews Air Force Base and Fort
Belvoir, Virginia. These installations outside of the District
of Columbia provide us the support that we would need to
perform missions in the District such as our air assets, our
schoolhouses and other important venues.
The District of Columbia National Guard has a Federal and a
District mission. It does not limit us to the way we perform
our duties from the limited actions during a nonemergency all
the way to martial law, where we can support the District.
I would like to emphasize the primary role of the District
of Columbia National Guard, and let you know that it is in
support of local authorities; we will only respond based upon
the requests of local authorities.
The District of Columbia National Guard is like no other
National Guard in the Nation. The 53 States and Territories
have a Governor that they report to as their commander in
chief. The District of Columbia's commander in chief is the
President of the United States. He has delegated that
responsibility through the Secretary of Defense, to the
Secretary of the Army who has oversight for all local missions.
The Secretary of the Air Force also has oversight over our
air assets. We provide excellent air support to Congress by
housing three C-40 aircraft out of Andrews Air Force Base to
move the congressional delegations around, two C-38 jets and
other support equipment.
The District of Columbia National Guard also performs its
Federal mission, that is, supporting the warfight, Army or air,
no matter what part of the world it is.
My responsibility is to make sure that the District of
Columbia National Guard can rapidly respond to any homeland
initiative. The Office of the Mayor will contact the Guard, I
will do the necessary coordinations with senior officials about
my level to make sure that the District of Columbia gets all it
needs in a very short period of time. We support 16 ESFs from
the response plan, and that is transportation, communication,
mass care, search and rescue, all-in hazards response,
agriculture, natural resources, public safety and security. The
District has added a 16th ESF for donation and volunteer
management which--we are supporting them with our field
kitchens and other resources that they may need from the Guard.
We are working very closely with the District of Columbia
Homeland Security Emergency Management Agency and other
agencies within the FEMA Region 3 area. We are housing the FEMA
Region trailer and the American Red Cross trailer in the
parking lots of our armory because we envision the armory with
its 58,000-square-foot capacity can house--can be a shelter in
case of an emergency here in the District, like we did for
Hurricane Katrina where we housed several individuals who came
in from Louisiana.
We have the ability to build capacity through our
partnerships in the region. The Maryland National Guard,
Virginia National Guard, Pennsylvania, Delaware and West
Virginia offer support to the District of Columbia when needed.
An example of that support, which stretches beyond those
States, is our support to the Presidential Inauguration in
January, where 30 States and one Territory provided over 7,000
troops to the District. Our objective is to remain in the
background, but to make sure that the events are safe and
secure.
In our capacities from Fort Belvoir, we have just received
new UH-72 helicopters for medevac reasons. We are picking up an
additional three helicopters in a week or so, and we will be
using those in case of local emergencies. I yield back my time,
Madam Chair, and I will be happy to answer any of your
questions at the end.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, General Schwartz.
Mr. Delinski.
Mr. Delinski. Good morning. And thank you, Chairwoman
Norton, for inviting me to testify on behalf of Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.
My name is Jeff Delinski. I am a Deputy Chief of the Metro
Transit Police. The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority, otherwise known as WMATA, or Metro, is a far-
reaching system, serving 3.5 million people living in an area
of roughly 1,500 square miles. We provide, on average, 1.2
million rides on weekdays, making WMATA an important
contributor to the health and vitality of the regional economy.
WMATA has a history of providing emergency response
training and outreach to our regional public safety partners.
WMATA opened the Carmen E. Turner Training Facility in 2002, a
first-of-its-kind facility in the United States dedicated to
transit. The facility includes a 260-foot tunnel, two Metro
railcars, a simulated electrified third rail for mock fire and
rescue exercises, and a passenger rail emergency evacuation
stimulator. Since its opening, nearly 15,000 people have been
trained at this facility, which has earned a national
reputation.
In 2004, the Metro Transit Police launched a training
initiative entitled Managing Metro Emergencies. During a 2-year
period this course provided over 5,000 regional law
enforcement, fire and rescue, Department of Transportation and
WMATA operations personnel enhanced training for mitigating,
evacuating, transporting and recovering from a major service
disruption in our system.
WMATA has recently intensified its focus on emergency
management activities by creating an Office of Emergency
Management. In December of 2008, Mr. Peter LaPorte was hired to
oversee this new office and has a direct report to Metro's
Chief of Police. With the recommitment of six internal staff
and the hiring of five personnel, Mr. LaPorte has created a
team that has over 200 years of transit-based incident response
and emergency management experience.
The Office of Emergency Management will oversee a new
training initiative involving the delivery of incident command
system training to an estimated 8,000 Metro employees. Funded
through the Department of Homeland Security's Transit Security
Grant Program and the regional Urban Area Security Initiative
funds, this program will raise awareness of security-related
issues and instruct operational employees to implement the
proper response procedures and command system structure during
the initial and developing phases of a Metro-specific incident
or emergency.
Above all, partnerships with first responders and regional
stakeholders are the foundation of effective emergency
management. WMATA would not be able to manage emergencies
without capitalizing on the strengths of our partnering
agencies. Continuance of frequent training and exercises as
well as ongoing involvement with the Metropolitan Washington
Council of Governments are the primary ways for building and
improving our relationships with external agencies.
WMATA is critically tied to the success of the numerous
special events that take place in this region. The most recent
of these large-scale special events was the 2009 Presidential
Inauguration, which resulted in the largest crowd served in
WMATA's history, providing over 1.5 million individual trips on
both bus and rail. The success on Inauguration Day is proof not
only of WMATA's ability to work within the region, but the
region's propensity to work together.
When an unplanned incident does occur in the National
Capital Region, it is our responsibility to ensure customer
safety, minimize the delay and get people moving again. WMATA's
actions on September 11, 2001, provides a good example of our
ability to move large numbers of people during a regional
emergency.
However, it must be said that while WMATA is willing and
prepared to operate in less than ideal circumstances, we do
have limits in our capacity to move passengers. Even in the
best conditions, the region always faces traffic management
challenges. To address this, WMATA in conjunction with its
regional partners has been active in the development of the
Metropolitan Area Transportation Operations Coordination
program, otherwise known as MATOC. MATOC is an area-wide
situational awareness effort that enhances coordination between
the region's transportation providers.
Thanks to funds appropriated by the Federal Government that
make emergency management a priority, WMATA and the region have
done a great job dealing with and responding to emergencies and
planning for events. Continued investment in emergency
management initiatives such as proper equipment, training
efforts, planned processes, response measures, recovery
protocols and overall prevention techniques is imperative for
enhancing the National Capital Region's mobility, safety and
quality of life.
The men and women of WMATA will continue to strengthen our
capabilities and relationships with our local, regional and
Federal partners to ensure a safer, more secure and better
prepared region. Thank you.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Delinski.
Mr. Nichols, do you have additional statement at this time?
Mr. Nichols. The only thing I would like to add, ma'am--
obviously, I have already submitted a statement for the record,
but one thing I would like to highlight is, you will hear today
in the previous panel and this panel the need to coordinate and
share resources within the Washington metropolitan area. There
is no one agency that is well suited to work in a unilateral
manner to handle the types of emergencies that occur in
Washington or could potentially occur in Washington. And we
have seen that, even something with the evacuation of the Mall
to coordination for the Inauguration and the events on 9/11.
One of the priorities of Chief Morse, myself and Gloria
Jarmon, our CAO, has is to make sure that the United States
Capitol Police are able to obtain a new radio system that
allows us to be a full partner with interoperability. The
requirement of the agencies to have plans is fine, but the
lifeblood of the agencies in this region to coordinate is our
ability to communicate with each other. And when you have a key
partner who has limited interoperable capabilities to talk to
the people who are sitting at this table--seated at this table,
certainly it causes a concern.
We are working very closely with U.S. Capitol Police Board
and the Committees of jurisdiction to make sure that we have
the authority and the appropriations to obtain this system, and
to make sure that we can fully integrate with the Washington
metropolitan area law enforcement public safety agencies should
there be a major situation develop that requires an evacuation
of the area or an event that causes us to bring resources into
our jurisdiction so we can communicate and coordinate those
rescue and law enforcement activities.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Nichols.
Let me understand your testimony. Your radio system is not
now fully integrated with even the D.C.--the Metropolitan
Police Department, which is the largest police department in
the region; is that so?
Mr. Nichols. We have limited interoperability with the
Metropolitan Police Department, but we don't have full
interoperability. When we bring some of our other partners, who
are seated at the table here, online, we have limited
interoperability.
The other problem that we have with our current system
radio system is, it is not encrypted, so that when we are
handling an emergency situation, everybody's little brother
with a scanner can listen to what we are doing and that,
therefore, compromises our operations.
Ms. Norton. I am going to go now to my good friend,
Representative Edwards, for the first series of questions. I
just wanted to make sure I understood what you were saying.
This testimony is that, even as we speak, the Capitol Police
are not fully interoperable within the region or even with the
D.C. Police Department located right here.
Ms. Edwards.
Ms. Edwards. Well, thank you, Madam Chairwoman. And also
thank you for enabling Mr. Herron to come to this panel as I
have to depart.
It is exactly this point of operability of systems that I
wanted to focus on. So I appreciate, Assistant Chief Nichols,
your raising that. And I want to direct this question also to
Mr. Herron, because my understanding is that the Prince
George's County Police Department also has a radio
communications operability concern and deficit. The Montgomery
County Police Department also has an interoperability problem,
in addition to the Capitol Police and the District of Columbia
police.
And I am not sure, Mr. Delinski, perhaps you can tell me
whether WMATA suffers the same deficit. Because this is a huge
concern.
Here we are in a region, and our major law enforcement
agencies have limited capacity in an emergency situation to
communicate with each other and to do it in a secure fashion.
This is perhaps--I mean, this is a tremendous deficit for one
of the most significant regions in the country. And I think
that as we look to--and this is an authorizing Committee and
not an appropriating Committee. But I would say to my
colleagues that as we go forward, this is a huge deficit that
needs to be cleared up. And it can't go any longer.
We are, perhaps, just lucky that we haven't had the kind of
emergency event that would require us to draw on our
communications capacity and then suffer for that deficit.
And so I appreciate, Mr. Herron, first, your comments about
Prince George's County's interoperability deficit.
Mr. Herron. Yes, ma'am.
If an emergency occurred today, Prince George's County's
first responders would not be able to seamlessly communicate
with partners in the National Capital Region.
As you know, during the 9/11 attacks, our first responders
responded to the Pentagon and had to be handing out radios so
we could communicate with those first responders.
We recently purchased a new radio system to replace our
existing 40-year-old radio system. We are hopeful to be online
with that system within the next 15 months. It is the latest
and the greatest encryption, and we will be able to communicate
effectively with our partners in the National Capital Region.
Ms. Edwards. Mr. Delinski.
Mr. Delinski. I share your concerns with interoperability
as well. It is certainly a problem that has been challenging
the Metro Transit Police Department.
As you know, we operate in all three major jurisdictions
here and communicate with all local police departments. We have
some limited capacity to do so, Metropolitan Police, for one,
on a limited basis and U.S. Park Police come to mind.
However, this issue has also been brought up through the
Council of Governments here in Washington, D.C., and using
Urban Area Security Initiative funds, we have purchased two
thousand radios that obviously do communicate with each other;
and they are in storage caches strategically placed throughout
the region. So if there is a major event, we do have that
option of pulling out those two thousand radios and
distributing them to the first responders on the scene of a
major incident.
So we have that option while we wait for technology to be
able to bring our radio systems together.
Ms. Edwards. Major General Schwartz, can you describe your
communications capacity with the law enforcement agencies and
other first responders in the region?
General Schwartz. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question.
First of all, let me talk about the framework in which we
communicate. The Joint Operation Center in the District of
Columbia is tied to the D.C. Emergency Management Agency
through several communications mechanisms, radio CB being one
of those, and radios if we have to be deployed to the streets.
It further is tied to other EOCs or JOCs within the region,
within the FEMA Region 3. So we have a 24/7 capability to
communicate to our Joint Operation Centers within this region.
If we are deployed to the streets to assist the
Metropolitan Police Department or the Park Police or whoever
requires our service, we are then issued land mobile radios, or
handhelds, to communicate back to our JOC and then out to
different regions so that they can report back what is going
on.
So because we are not on the streets 24/7, the pressures
that the law enforcement agencies may feel are not realized by
the Guard.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you.
And then finally, Mr. Herron, what would be the cost for a
fully interoperable communications system for Prince George's
County in this really critical metropolitan region?
Mr. Herron. The cost is $65 million, and as I indicated, we
did sign a contract with a vendor. We are moving forward with
the placement of the towers and the testing and so forth.
And I must say that there have been--the Byrne Grant
accounts and UAC's funding has helped us facilitate the
purchase of this equipment. And hopefully within the next 15
months, barring any other issues, we will be able to go live
with this radio system.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you.
And then lastly, before I have to depart, my other question
was also about medical emergency services. I have been really
concerned that at a time when we need to step up and think
about our regional medical emergency services and how we would
handle a disaster, we are seeing--for example, at Andrews Air
Force Base, Major General Schwartz, where some of your units
are supported--Malcolm Grow Medical Center will be declining
actually in its service, in its medical services at that
facility.
Prince George's Hospital Center is under great strain, even
though it has the region's trauma unit there. And I worry about
the capacity of then Washington--and we will hear from
Washington Hospital Center and the American Red Cross later on
about our capacity to deliver the kind of medical emergency
services that we need, especially outside of the District of
Columbia, presuming an event that might require movement of
great masses of people out into the suburbs and particularly
the southern suburbs of Prince George's County that are more
adjacent to the Capitol Complex.
And so I wonder, Mr. Herron, if you--because I am looking
right now at how we actually might support a much more regional
approach on medical service delivery for the purposes of
homeland security.
Mr. Herron. Yes, ma'am.
In the National Capital Region we have been working
together for the past couple years to deal with the capacity in
the hospitals, our surge capacity, so to speak. We rely heavily
on MOUs to support one another, and our hospitals have these
MOUs in place as well.
We have purchased several mobile medical buses to transport
large numbers of victims to hospitals. We are not at the place
where we really need to be--to address a large catastrophe, so
to speak. We are moving in the right direction, but there is
plenty of work to be done.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you.
Madam Chairwoman, I yield. And I look forward to both
reading and looking at the testimony of the remainder of this
panel and the subsequent one. And I appreciate your enabling me
to ask this line of questions.
And thank you all for your presence here today. Thank you.
Mr. Herron. Thank you.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Congresswoman Edwards. We are very
glad you live in the region so that even when Congress is
dismissed, you are willing to travel from Prince George's to be
able to offer the very, very important and helpful comments and
questions you have offered this afternoon.
Let me follow up on the Congresswoman's questions on
interoperability because it may involve a real-life
circumstance. That involves the enforcement--what we understand
to be a multi-law-enforcement approach to events like the
Inauguration.
Now, there has been a report issued thus far, and I have
indicated that we are not prepared until the GAO report is
issued to go very deeply, because we haven't had an independent
report on what happened. But we do know from constituents
around the country that there were people who could not get out
of the Third Street Tunnel. And some have identified this as
perhaps the most important, if not the only, homeland security
issue that arose during what was an extraordinarily successful
event in other ways. And yet there were perhaps hundreds of
people who were told to make their way by walking through the
Third Street Tunnel; they did and could not get out.
I am wondering if this was a question of interoperability,
whether any of you participated in communication with one
another so that these people who, we are told, were not even
told why they were being held.
Did the Metropolitan Police sergeant, did the Capitol
Police know about this? Did Metro? Did you, General Schwartz?
Did you, Mr. Herron? How did this occur? And was there any
communication among the agencies who appear to have coordinated
so well in other regards to the Inauguration?
Mr. Nichols. I can probably be in the best position to
answer that right now.
There was a joint report that was done by the agencies that
were involved in the planning of the Inauguration that
addressed this and some of the other issues we found, which
turned out to be rather significant challenges with regard to
the security plan and the balance and security plan with the
level of access that we wanted to provide people to the various
venues in the city.
Essentially, everything was compounded by the fact that
there was an unprecedented, almost 2 million people in the
city. Since that had never been experienced before, we didn't
really have a historical perspective on how that would strain
infrastructure, how that would test the communications
capabilities of the law enforcement public safety agencies, and
just generally the security plans that we put in place that
day.
I will be happy to send the report over to you if you
haven't had a chance to see it.
Ms. Norton. Actually, I am trying to find out from all four
of you whether you had any communication during the time that
people were in the Third Street Tunnel. I am trying to find out
whether interoperability or the communication system was partly
at fault here.
Did any of you know that there were people--I will go down.
You knew, Mr. Nichols?
Mr. Nichols. We knew that there were people in the
southbound tube of the Third Street Tunnel because that was a
designated pedestrian route. The command level positions at the
various multiagency command centers did not know that there
were people in the northbound tube. The northbound tube was
never intended for pedestrian use.
Ms. Norton. How did they get in there?
Mr. Nichols. Officers on the ground level, in order to
overcome crowding challenges that were taking place in the
northwest sector of the city, directed people down there to
relieve pressure.
Ms. Norton. See, this is interesting because this is the
kind of unplanned circumstance where the officer on the ground
has to make a decision. And actually, if you think about it, it
would seem to be a good kind of on-the-ground decision, but you
would expect it to be made--the notion that you are getting a
lot of crowding. Look, here is this tunnel that is closed. It
won't have vehicular traffic. Let's send them through this
tunnel. It makes perfect sense as long as everybody knows it.
Was the failure of communication related at all to
interoperability?
Mr. Nichols. I think--yes, I believe that that was one of
the factors. We had a multiagency command center going on, but
in the multiagency command center, what we are really doing is
listening to about 15 or 20 or maybe even more independent
radio transmissions from the independent agencies.
Ms. Norton. Including, for example, anybody can get on that
now because you are doing--you are tuning into other systems
rather than having your own system.
Mr. Nichols. That is correct. So there was no one radio
system you could monitor to get a global view of what was going
on in the city that day.
Conversely, should there have been a major situation
develop, the same would have been true. We would have had to
listen to all these multitude of different agencies'
transmissions in order to coordinate our activities and tie
operations together.
Ms. Norton. Including, for example, Mr. Nichols, if
somebody, you know, these incidents that we had here; and the
one which is most indelibly in our minds, of course, is the
incident that occurred here in the Capitol.
Here you had the tunnel open. You had millions of people
here, almost none of them with real tickets. Now, if among them
there had been someone with a military-style weapon who decided
to open fire, what would have been the consequence there? When
would you have known about it? How would that have been
handled?
Mr. Nichols. Well, we had contingency plans in place to
handle any number of situations that could occur, including an
active shooter. We actually had table-top exercises on how
these various agencies would respond, depending on whose
jurisdiction the event was taking place in at any given time.
But again, the potential for something like that to occur
occurs every day. It is compounded exponentially when you have
large crowds at a national secure event like that where you
have instant media attention of what is going on.
Ms. Norton. And, of course, it would be compounded if, in
fact, there was free access to military-style weapons which
would make it much, much easier to mow down people in such a
crowd if you happen to be either a crazy person or a person
intent upon doing harm.
Mr. Nichols. And that is an important point because,
obviously, our focus is on an enduring constitutional
government and the protection of the leadership of the United
States, because everybody was outside of the West Front of the
Capitol. You had the entire top level of the government in one
place at one time. That is certainly a significant security
concern.
But you can't discount the fact that there doesn't
necessarily have to be an attack upon that area in order to
completely disrupt and overtake the inaugural activities of
that day. And we were very cognizant of that. We always are.
The agencies that were involved in the Inauguration have a
constitutional requirement to make sure that the President is
sworn in at noon on the 20th, like the Constitution says; and
anything that has the potential of disrupting that, whether it
is an active shooter on the Mall or something occurring here on
the Capitol grounds, we have to guard against that.
And as the threats proliferate through access to weapons or
whatever, the difficulty of making sure that we hit that
constitutional requirement for the Inauguration is even more
difficult.
Ms. Norton. So would you be as alert today in looking for
the lone gunman, single shooter as looking for somebody
carrying a nuclear device, assuming that was possible, into
this area?
Mr. Nichols. Yes, ma'am. We run a spectrum of threats and
we look at threats based upon the probability and the
consequence. And we weigh our resource allocation toward that
scale.
Ms. Norton. Let's talk probability and consequence.
Isn't there a greater probability for a single shooter to
come in spraying a crowd or a motorcade than there is for
someone to bring in a nuclear device today?
Mr. Nichols. Yes. And I think if you look at some of the
terrorist attacks that have taken place just recently--Mumbai
is probably the best example of what a small group of people
who are heavily armed can do to disrupt an entire city. We are
not immune from that.
We have seen--and you have talked about it, I have talked
about it also--what occurred on July 24, 1998, where we had one
individual with one handgun, and the disruption that he caused
and two police officers dead and a citizen wounded.
So, yes, it is a significant concern. It is a significant
test of the planning and response capabilities of the law
enforcement agencies in the city. And it is something we have
to be cognizant of every single day.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Chief.
Now, I would like to go down the line and ask any of you if
you knew--of all the things that happened, most of the things
you would expect to happen. I think what people didn't expect
was that the officers would have to make an almost instant
decision about the crowding and sending people through a
tunnel. As it turns out, some of those had tickets. In fact,
many, many of those had tickets and did not get out.
I am trying to learn whether or not, with the present
system of operability, if any of you were informed of the fact
that there were people in the Third Street Tunnel.
Mr. Delinski?
Mr. Delinski. I will say that communications up to and
including the Inauguration itself were very robust. The
planning was tremendous; the event was tremendous. We had
officers and officials assigned to many different command posts
throughout the region that were able to feed back information
to our EOC at Metro, so we would get real-time information and
so forth. We had an extensive antenna out in the field, getting
as much information as we could.
However, to my knowledge, we were not notified of the Third
Street Tunnel condition. There was no request made to help
alleviate that. Of course, we had our hands full with Metro-
related issues, transporting 1.5 million people.
Ms. Norton. You would have had your hands full, Mr.
Delinski, if there had been a shoot-out in there, but I bet you
would have dispatched Transit Police to help in the event that
there was such an event.
Mr. Delinksi. Absolutely.
Ms. Norton. I am just trying to hear--I am not casting
blame. If anything, we are trying to help, because we are
shocked, amazed, and awed that there would not be
interoperability among all those related and that you would
have to do what looks like a jerry-built system if you want
interoperability.
Major General Schwartz, you had a major role to play. In
fact, you were the commander of all the forces, not only the
D.C. National Guard, but all forces at the Inauguration.
Were you informed through radio or other kinds of contact
that people were stuck in the Third Street Tunnel?
General Schwartz. Ma'am, the joint task force D.C. was not
missioned to provide support to the tunnel. We had 7,000----
Ms. Norton. Yes, sir, I am just trying to know if you knew
about it.
General Schwartz. No, ma'am, we did not know about it.
Now, does that point towards a physical communication
problem or just failure to communicate? And that is what we
have to look at. The officer who was probably sending folks
down into the tunnel probably had no situational awareness of
what was happening in the tunnel. Therefore, was it the failure
to communicate or a communications problem physically?
Ms. Norton. Well, we will find out, but the--in this age of
high technology, it doesn't seem to us, if there were a state-
of-the-art system available to officers, that there would have
been lack of notice of all officers. And, again, although there
were people who got sick in the tunnel, handled very well, you
hardly heard anything about it.
And although people continued to be joyful about the
Inauguration, our job and your job is to think of worst-case
scenarios. And the worst-case scenario that I know, from
speaking to a number of you about planning, was not that there
would be a lot of folks there--you had already shown you could
handle lots of people--but that something unforeseen would
happen. As it turns out, this was the unforeseen event. And it
happened in part because officers were trying to relieve
crowding, not because of some outside force. And yet some
outside force could have taken advantage of the failure to
communicate.
Mr. Herron, you are a public safety officer, as well. Do
you know whether Prince George's officials or you were informed
that people, I am sure some from your own county, were stuck in
the Third Street Tunnel?
Mr. Herron. Madam, I was in the emergency operations center
during the entire event, and we were not informed.
Ms. Norton. And this is the emergency operations center of
where?
Mr. Herron. Prince George's County.
Ms. Norton. And you were not informed.
Mr. Herron. No, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. I think that the testimony here of very
competent officers is all that needs to be said about this
appropriation period and interoperability.
Chief Nichols, isn't it true that some funds have been
allocated to begin, at least, on interoperability among the
region and the District of Columbia police?
Mr. Nichols. Yes, ma'am. I believe that there was a lot of
money that was given to the Department of Homeland Security to
distribute across the Nation, with regard to grant money for
local and State law enforcement agencies.
The U.S. Capitol Police, because of the fact that we are a
legislative branch agency, can't receive grant money. So we
were appropriated a supplemental appropriation to begin
planning for our new radio system. And we have requested
additional funds in the current bill.
Ms. Norton. So how far along are you, sir?
Mr. Nichols. We are pretty far along in the planning stages
right now. We are being monitored very closely by the
Committees of jurisdiction to make sure that we are in the
realm of----
Ms. Norton. Does that mean not only the D.C. Police
Department, but Metro? Does that also mean the region, that you
would be interoperable with the entire region?
Mr. Nichols. Yes, we would be interoperable with the entire
region. We project right now, if we getting the funding that we
are requesting and the authority to move forward, it would
still be about 3 years before we get our system completely
online and up and running. That is why the chief has made this
such a priority, because nobody can predict in the span of 3
years what we are really going to be facing, not only within
the Capitol complex but within the region. So this is something
that has a very high priority so we can get it online and get
down the road with fulfilling our mission.
Ms. Norton. Yes, General Schwartz?
General Schwartz. Madam, may I just add that if the system
is going to be delivered in 3 years, we have to look at
upgrades to the existing system to make sure that they can all
interoperate or upgrade it together.
Ms. Norton. And it looks like between now and a fully
interoperable system we are into jerry-built systems, at some
considerable risk, I take it, it to homeland security.
Mr. Nichols. You are right. Right now we are making due
with what we have. I believe that, obviously, from the
testimony today, we are not the only agency that is in this
position. But the agencies in the region have to continue to
bridge the gaps that we experience with regard to our
communications capabilities.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Herron, could I ask you a question? Once
there was the evacuation of New Orleans, everybody talked
about, how can we evacuate? Some of us have emphasized ``stay
in place,'' that there are few events where there would be a
need to evacuate whole populations. For example, we have floods
in this area, but seldom have we had a hundred-year event, as
they are called.
However, it could be that there would be the need to
evacuate people from the District of Columbia. It is a pretty
big jurisdiction. You have spoken of a place--a shelter. I want
to make sure I have--the places that are mentioned, which have
been mentioned.
Mr. Herron. Ritchie Coliseum and Showplace Arena.
Ms. Norton. Ritchie Coliseum, Showplace Arena. How many
people could be sheltered in these two facilities?
Mr. Herron. I think, combined, we can probably shelter up
to probably 3,000 people.
Ms. Norton. If more than 3,000 poured out, think about
where Prince George's is located.
Mr. Herron. Then we are in trouble. To be quite honest with
you, we are in trouble. You know, we have asked our citizens to
be prepared to make a plan to shelter in place to prepare for
the future.
In Louisiana, we had more than 2,000 residents migrate to
Prince George's County to stay with relatives, which impacted
our capacity. They self-evacuated and stayed with relatives in
Prince George's County, and it was a strain on our resources.
Ms. Norton. Do you advise shelter in place unless told to
evacuate?
Mr. Herron. I think every citizen should have a plan to
shelter in place, have alternative housing with friends and
relatives that they can migrate to in case of an emergency.
Of course there will be that segment of society who will
not have the resources to do that. And that is when the
government must be prepared to respond to the needs of those
citizens.
Ms. Norton. Most of the time, when there has been an event
of some kind, you don't know what it is. Chief Nichols has
testified that it is likely to be a spraying event of some
shooter, as we had here in the capital, as it is to be some
exotic event. So, therefore, the first thing is we don't know
anything. That is why the questioning that Ms. Edwards and I
have done on operability, in the first place.
And before we tell people to stay in place, we would like
to know what the event is, so that we can know what we are
talking about. It puts us in a terrible position, you in a
terrible position, to tell people to stay in place or to go
without being able to speak to one another, with everybody
trying to get on these little jerry-built systems that you have
concocted. And, by the way, in case of a terrorist event,
others being able to listen in to what it is you are saying.
I would like to know, in the event of an emergency, whether
known or unknown, where you would expect a unified command, who
is in charge of making decisions?
General Schwartz. Ma'am, I would think the local incident
commander is in charge. That is the first person on the scene.
Ms. Norton. Now, that would mean whoever in the
jurisdiction, like Mr. Herron?
General Schwartz. I think the first responders, which is
normally police or fire, would be on the scene, and then the
supporting packages will come in to assist that incident
commander.
Mr. Delinski. He is exactly right, if I could follow up on
that. When there is an incident such as an active shooter, the
first law enforcement official on the scene would set up an
incident command. Any responding units, whether it be from that
particular agency or other agencies, would report to incident
command and ask for directions, get information and so forth,
and feed that information back to their departments as well.
If it is a rescue situation, such as a fire it would be in
the hands of the fire department. At that point, law
enforcement would respond to incident command and then work
with them to mitigate the situation.
Ms. Norton. Could I ask you this question, Mr. Delinski? I
noted in your testimony, if I can find it, 2008, Metropolitan
Transit Police Department investigated 224 suspicious packages
and people, nine unknown substances, 20 bomb threats in your
facilities. ``Investigated,'' that doesn't mean you found
anything.
Mr. Delinski. Correct.
Ms. Norton. And I do appreciate that. Did any of these
investigations involve guns?
Mr. Delinski. There were a few incidents that were reported
of suspicious people that were seen carrying weapons.
Ms. Norton. When you see--now, of course, your system
transports people throughout the region and especially to the
District of Columbia, which is the hub of the region. If you
see a person with a weapon in one of your facilities, how do
you respond today?
Mr. Delinski. If the weapon is concealed, obviously you
approach that person and get as much information, maintaining a
safe distance, watching the person's hands and so forth, doing
the----
Ms. Norton. How would you know if it were concealed, sir?
Mr. Delinski. Because of a bulge maybe in the side, maybe
someone else had seen it previously. It may have been
moderately displayed underneath his jacket, where it was
sticking out, the butt of the gun, or something along those
lines.
Obviously, if the weapon is out, we make the immediate
police challenges to, raise your hands, stop what you are
doing. And we have the person, if the weapon is in their hand,
direct them to drop the weapon on the ground, move it away from
them, and then spread them out in the prone position on the
ground, where we can go and secure them and then investigate
the circumstances that led us to that point.
Ms. Norton. I believe, if I am not--I believe that Virginia
does allow concealed weapons.
Mr. Delinski. Correct.
Ms. Norton. How do you handle the fact that one part of
the--I am not sure Maryland does, however.
Mr. Delinski. No, it is illegal.
Ms. Norton. Maryland does not.
Mr. Herron. You have to have a permit issued by the
Maryland State Police in order to carry a concealed weapon.
Ms. Norton. So you can have one with a permit?
Mr. Herron. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. It may require a permit, for that matter, in
Virginia. But the point is you can conceal, carry, carry in
many places in Virginia for sure.
Mr. Delinski. Yes.
Ms. Norton. How does the Metro handle three jurisdictions,
all with vast amounts of the Federal presence, who have their
own quite different gun laws?
Mr. Delinski. It is complicated, to say the least. I mean,
that is one of the reasons our recruits are selected through a
vigorous background process. We go through three training
academies. We are certified in all three States, as we refer
to, the District of Columbia----
Ms. Norton. So you have to know the laws, essentially, in
all three States?
Mr. Delinski. We have to learn the laws in all three
States, correct.
Ms. Norton. So you would, if we passed a whole new gun law
in the District of Columbia, so new that it said, ``You don't
have any more gun laws in the District of Columbia,'' would you
have to retrain every officer?
Mr. Delinski. All 450 sworn members we would have to
retrain, yes.
Ms. Norton. Are you funded to retrain all sworn officers of
the Metropolitan Transit Authority?
Mr. Delinski. There is currently no funding available for
that now.
Ms. Norton. How would you handle bus travel? Do bus drivers
assume any responsibility--they are not law enforcement
officers--for people carrying weapons? How would they be
expected to respond, when coming from two jurisdictions which
do have their own local gun laws to a jurisdiction which has no
gun laws whatsoever, the Nation's capital?
Mr. Delinski. We ask our employees, particularly those on
the buses and in the rail system, to be vigilant in observing
suspicious behavior. And we ask that if they do see this type
of activity, a concealed weapon or otherwise, that they report
it to us immediately. We do not ask them to intervene or take
any type of police action and to be very limited in their
contact with any type of suspicious person.
Ms. Norton. Would such personnel, and in particular I am
thinking about personnel who may see people who board the
vehicle, such as a bus driver, would such personnel have to be
retrained, as well, if there were no gun laws in the District
of Columbia and they traveled on vehicles between the District
of Columbia and other jurisdictions?
Mr. Delinski. Currently, there is no training in the law
for other employees outside the police department.
Ms. Norton. So how do they know whether to call if there is
a concealed weapon, for example?
Mr. Delinski. We ask them through public service
announcements and also public awareness campaigns, internally
and externally, to follow those procedures and not take any
type of direct action and contact us and let us do that.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Herron, did you have something to add to
that?
Mr. Herron. Yes, ma'am, if I may take this opportunity to
speak briefly about the amendment.
Ms. Norton. Please.
Mr. Herron. As you know, I am the public safety director in
Prince George's County. As part of my responsibilities, I
direct the police department and the fire department, the
Department of Corrections.
Prior to my appointment as public safety director, I was a
Maryland State trooper for 27 years, and I proudly served in
several jurisdictions throughout the State of Maryland,
including Prince George's County. During my tenure, 13 of my
colleagues were killed in the line of duty. Two of these
colleagues were personal friends of mine, and they were killed
at the hands of men who possessed illegal firearms. I
personally was involved in a shooting where a man who attempted
to take my life possessed a gun unlawfully.
If this legislation passes, Prince George's County
currently would be in a situation where our crime would
increase tremendously.
Just recently, we announced a drop in crime that had reach
an all-time low. It hadn't been this low in 20 years, and this
is because of the work of our men and women of the police
department and our citizens. During this fight to decrease
crime, two of our police officers were killed in the line of
duty, Sergeant Richard Findley and Sergeant Goggins. Sergeant
Goggins was killed at the hands of a criminal who should not
have been in possession of a handgun.
In the State of Maryland, we have gun straw purchases,
where people can buy guns legally and then give those guns to
somebody who should not possess them. With the enactment of
this amendment in the District of Columbia, it will triple the
straw purchases in the region. And I can tell you from
experience from a local level that that would cause an
increased amount of gun violence in Prince George's County and
throughout the national capital region.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Herron, the testimony is important,
especially your testimony concerning increase and, as you have
been able to report, the recent decrease in gun violence in
Prince George's County. The District had as many as 430, 440
homicides in the early 1990's, and it is down to something a
little over 200 now.
We cannot imagine how rapid or how savage would be the
increase in gun violence if there were no gun laws in the
District of Columbia at all. When everyone thinks of tight gun
laws, all one has to imagine is a jurisdiction where there is
none at all and you are left to your own devices.
Now, let me ask you, Mr. Herron, as a public safety
officer, how would the absence of gun laws here in the District
of Columbia complicate any evacuation activities? You have your
own gun laws; we would have none. You could stockpile assault
weapons. You could have any--you could have gone to Maryland,
you could have gone to Virginia. Maybe when you are leaving you
want to take your guns with you.
How would the presence of no gun laws, and therefore the
accumulation of guns here, complicate evacuation and other
activities associated with a natural or man-made disaster?
Mr. Herron. I think the absence of gun laws, Madam Chair,
would impair our efforts in the national capital region to keep
our citizens safe. It is important that we have these layers of
security, and the interdiction of illegal guns is one of those
layers. If we are not able to control or we are in partnership
with a jurisdiction that has no gun laws at all, it would
definitely impede or impact not only evacuations but the safety
of our citizens in the national capital region.
You asked a question about the training of police officers,
additional resources. You know, currently, the Maryland State
Police is responsible for registering handguns and the purchase
of handguns. If, in fact, this burden would be put on the State
of Maryland, I don't think the State of Maryland has the
resources to be able to have to register handguns from another
jurisdiction.
Ms. Norton. Would guns be allowed in any of the shelters
where you would receive people from other jurisdictions or from
your own jurisdiction?
Mr. Herron. No guns would be allowed in any shelters unless
you were a law enforcement officer.
Ms. Norton. Of course, particularly with interoperability,
it might be hard for people to know that.
Mr. Herron. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. If any kind of event were to occur now.
General Schwartz. Similarly with the D.C. Armory, now that
we have metal detectors on each of our entrances, we will be
able to detect if any weapons would be coming into the
building.
Ms. Norton. I wonder if--no, that maybe under Federal law.
Let me ask all four of you about layers. Again, this comes
from testimony that we have received in hearings of the
Homeland Security Committee, where the mythology of layers
after layer after layer, local level, certain things happen
there, certain things happen at the State, and the cumulative
effects, if I may summarize it, is that you are able to provide
security in a region as high-risk as this.
I would like to speak about layering and what would happen
if one layer, namely gun laws in the District of Columbia, the
Nation's capital, were to disappear? Let's start with Mr.
Herron and go on down.
Mr. Herron. Madam Chair, I was present when you asked this
question previously. I think that without a doubt that, if that
layer was removed, it would impact homeland security in this
region.
It is important to have layers. It is important to have
collaboration and cooperation. It is important to know what
happens in others' jurisdictions about the sale and the
purchase of guns and things of this nature.
I am very concerned, our county executive is very concern
about this pending amendment and how it is going to impact our
citizens in Prince George's County.
Ms. Norton. Major General Schwartz, you, of course, are
perhaps most aware of the military-style weapons. I know that
you have served in Iraq. I would like you to describe the
notion of layering, which I understand goes on also on the
ground when you are in a theater of war.
General Schwartz. Ma'am, first, to clear the record and get
it straight, I was not in Iraq, but my troops were in Iraq.
But on the topic of layering, I think the first thing we
have to do is the education of all citizens in this area so
that they know the laws, so that they can assist the local
authorities with this problem. If all citizens are fully aware
of what the laws are, what the issues are----
Ms. Norton. But, you see, I am not at the citizen level. I
am now asking for officers. I am trying to find out--I
understand the citizen layer has to be aware. I am assuming
that the citizen layer, by the way, is not aware. I am not
going to assume what millions of people know. I am trying to
find out about the layering provided by various authorities
available to us.
General Schwartz. Yes, ma'am. And I think that, in the law
enforcement arena, all layers are extremely important, and we
cannot eliminate any one of those layers. There would be a
significant gap, and there the security and safety of the
entire population will be at risk.
Ms. Norton. General Schwartz, if there had been no assault
weapon ban in the District of Columbia at the time of the
Inauguration, would that have complicated or affected the
National Guard security that you were called upon to provide?
General Schwartz. Yes, ma'am, it would have affected the
briefings that our men and women received before going out on
their mission, especially in the Mall where there were no
screening required for the large number of folks----
Ms. Norton. Well, please, let's make that point clear.
There was screening if you happened to be close in and to have
a ticket. But if there were 2 million people on the Mall,
surely a million and a half were completely unscreened
individuals.
Go ahead, sir.
General Schwartz. Yes, ma'am. As a matter of fact, they all
were unscreened. They would only be screened if they were going
into the parade corridor or close to the Capitol.
So it was a concern. And we were very vigilant in making
sure--and, as you hear earlier, we had mechanisms in place to
conquer what may happen. And we were very fortunate that day
that nothing happened.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Delinski, going on down the line.
Mr. Delinski. One of the things that we pride ourselves on
at WMATA is our very low crime rate. The chances of someone
being a victim of a Part 1 crime in the system, meaning one of
the more serious crimes--rape, robbery, homicides, and so
forth--are very low. Chances of being a victim of one of those
Part 1 crimes is less than three per every million riders that
we have on a regular daily basis.
So if suddenly there is this influx of weapons that maybe
this bill may bring about, you would certainly expect that we
would see an increase of guns in the Metrorail system, which
you can go down the road through this process and say may
equate to a higher level of crime.
Mr. Delinski. Also, we have a very open system at Metro. We
do not have security points in place like airports----
Ms. Norton. No screening whatsoever to get onto----
Mr. Delinski. We have approval for random bag checks at
station entrances. However, it is under conditions of higher
alert levels or significant threat against a system. So they
are not out there every single day.
We don't have this airport-type screening of everyone who
is coming into our system. So I think, with this amendment
being passed, or if it would be passed, you would certainly
expect that our vulnerability would increase as a result.
Ms. Norton. I must compliment the Metro for apparently
receiving endless numbers of new riders. You have become the
most popular ticket in town. And you have kept a low crime
rate.
Of course, more people, more risk. And you are finding all
kinds of people, including Federal officials who decide they
are going to pass up that ride and just get on a Metro and get
here. So that has increased, as well, we know for a fact.
Finally, Chief Nichols?
Mr. Nichols. Yes, ma'am, within our jurisdiction, we use a
concept that allows us to identify threats the furthest point
that we can. Our goal is to detect, deter, respond to a threat,
defeat that threat, and then mitigate the results of what that
threat brought to our jurisdiction.
Those principles have to interplay well with each other.
And, as you know, we are in the middle of this city, so we are
not an island. Things that occur just on the other side of the
street from us, even though it may be legal in that
jurisdiction, especially with regard to weapons, doesn't
diminish the concern that we have within our jurisdiction about
a potential incoming threat.
So it is a very significant issue; it has to interplay with
each other. And we do take the layers of security and the
concentric rings of security very seriously.
Ms. Norton. The testimony of all four of you has been quite
indispensable to this hearing. We are trying to get a sense of
the threats to the region. We are trying to understand
evacuation. We are trying to understand what happened, of
course, at the inauguration.
And even given the criticism, I want to take this
opportunity to commend each and every one of you for a stellar
performance. We didn't expect perfection; we didn't get it.
Perhaps we didn't expect the Third Street Tunnel, but we should
have expected there would be something like that.
I don't know how Metro was able to absorb all of these
people. It isn't as if you had any idea how many you were
supposed to absorb.
I do want to say for the record that, when it became clear
that Metro had done all it could, I asked Mr. Catoe to come see
me to do even more, so that the subways would be kept open
beyond what he had already agreed to do without additional
resources.
I want you to know this is one Member--I think I have my
whole region with me--going to try to get those additional
resources for what was a Herculean job Metro did. There just
would have been no inauguration, let's face it, without Metro.
We would have been sitting here by ourselves, telling the
President, ``It is 12 o'clock now. Metro has broken down, so
nobody has come.'' That is just how indispensable Metro has
been.
And the reason people felt so safe, despite the crowds, was
precisely because of the job each and every one of you did
during that time. I regard it as an unplanned event. Sure,
there was planning, and, sure, most of the planning worked. But
I think it is most valuable because of what you could not
possibly have planned for.
So I want to take this opportunity, even given my
questioning, to thank all of you for the work you did then and
especially for your testimony concerning a brand-new threat
that none of you could have contemplated and that may be upon
us. I thank you very much.
And I am going to now call the next panel. I am going to
ask the--because we have run past where some of you I know
expected, I am going to ask all of you who have not testified--
Mr. Sarubbi, Mr. Wall, Mr. DeAtley, Ms. Mathes--to come forward
at this time. I apologize for the time it has taken.
The purpose of this hearing was to get on the record what
Members of Congress do not know. No one has read the bill.
People were about to vote blindly against the security that we
have spent billions of dollars to protect. At least no one will
be able to say that they did not know, if they approve the
Ensign amendment.
And we are very pleased to hear from Jonathan Sarubbi, the
regional administrator of FEMA, where the Office of National
Capital Region is located; from Kenneth Wall, the acting
director of that office, which is also in FEMA; from Craig
DeAtley, director of the Institute for Public Health Emergency
Response, ER One, and Washington Hospital Center; and, finally,
from Linda Mathes, who is the president and CEO of the American
Red Cross.
Could I ask you to testify in that order?
Mr. Sarubbi?
TESTIMONY OF JONATHAN SARUBBI, REGION III ADMINISTRATOR, FEMA;
KENNETH WALL, ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NATIONAL CAPITAL
REGION, FEMA; CRAIG DEATLEY, DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC
HEALTH EMERGENCY RESPONSE; LINDA MATHES, PRESIDENT AND CEO,
AMERICAN RED CROSS OF THE NATIONAL CAPITAL AREA
Mr. Sarubbi. Good morning, Madam Chairwoman. I am Jonathan
Sarubbi, the regional administrator for the Federal Emergency
Management Agency Region III, based in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before
the Subcommittee to discuss today's hearing topic, ``Disaster
Capacity in the National Capital Region: Experiences,
Capabilities, and Weaknesses,'' and to answer your questions.
I am joined today by my colleague, Kenneth Wall, acting
director of FEMA's Office of National Capital Region
Coordination.
In my position as regional administrator for Region III, I
oversee FEMA's all-hazard preparedness and emergency management
efforts in Delaware, the District of Columbia, Maryland,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia. Region III works
with our partners in the regional, State, and local levels to
prepare for, respond to, and mitigate against man-made and
natural disasters.
The regional office is composed of experts in four distinct
areas that provide support in our mission, and they are
preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery. As a part of
our mission, Region III plays a vital role in the event that a
Federal disaster declaration is issued for our region,
including assisting in the development of preliminary damage
reports and providing support for public assistance grants and
individual assistance grants.
Let me address a number of specific points of interest to
the Committee.
We partner closely with our colleagues in the Office of
National Capital Region Coordination. This partnership includes
areas of risk assessment to support decision-making,
participating in drills and exercises, and the coordination in
response to incidents in the national capital region. Should a
natural disaster occur in the national capital region, FEMA
Region III coordinates disaster response and recovery under the
guidance of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act.
In accordance with the national response framework,
disasters are managed locally. Within the national response
framework, FEMA Region III provides direct support to Virginia,
Maryland, and the District, including assistance with
evacuations, sheltering, and other unmet needs. Each State and
the District maintains sovereign authority and receives support
in disaster funding from FEMA Region III independently. The
Stafford Act directs that the District be treated as any of our
50 States. The Stafford Act also equates the position of mayor
with that of a State Governor, and he or she would act
accordingly for the purpose of asking for Federal disaster
assistance.
During an incident within the District, local first
responders establish command of the incident and manage the
response. FEMA Region III monitors the incident, assesses
District needs, and provides assistance upon request to the
mayor and approval of the President.
On the issue of mass care, the District's Department of
Human Services has the lead for Emergency Support Function Six.
This entity would be responsible for shelter or feeding
operations within the District. The American Red Cross of the
National Capital Area supports the District's Department of
Human Services by providing sheltering management teams while
Serve D.C. Augments with further volunteer support upon
request. In addition, the District Department of Health
utilizes the Medical Reserve Corps and works in conjunction
with the Department of Health and Human Services to support any
medical needs.
With regard to the Capitol grounds, we are not aware of any
formal agreement between the legislative and executive branches
to address disasters on the Capitol grounds. In the event of a
localized incident, such as a fire or severe storm, the local
jurisdiction response would normally address the response. The
Capitol Police would be the first to respond to an incident on
the Capitol grounds and, as the incident commander, coordinate
with other response agencies as necessary. This is in line with
the National Incident Management System and the National
Response Framework.
For a larger event, such as a major hurricane, where there
is a Stafford Act declaration, any Capitol grounds issues could
be coordinated through the Unified Coordination Group within
the Joint Field Office. The Joint Field Office coordinates the
delivery of Federal assistance and funds to the District of
Columbia.
In conclusion, our disaster capacity in the national
capital region is robust. Through working with the Office of
National Capital Region, State, Federal, and local entities,
Region III is prepared to provide the support necessary in the
event of a disaster in the national capital region. The
experiences we have had with disasters in this region, a
refinement of our capabilities, and lessons learned have Region
III properly prepared to respond to a disaster in our region
and specifically in the capital area.
I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you,
Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much.
We will go on to Mr. Wall now, the Office of National
Capital Region Coordination.
Mr. Wall. Good afternoon, Madam Chair. I am Ken Wall,
acting director of the Office of National Capital Region
Coordination, which is now part of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency. And I appreciate your invitation to join my
colleagues Jon Sarubbi, Craig DeAtley, and Linda Mathes in
appearing before the Subcommittee today.
As you mentioned in your opening statement, due to the
unique nature of the national capital region, Congress
established the Office of National Capital Region to coordinate
Federal, State, local, and regional authorities for the purpose
of enhancing preparedness in the national capital region.
We do this by working closely with our regional partners,
an example of which is our engagement with the National Capital
Region Senior Policy Group, which is compromised of the
homeland security advisors and chief emergency managers of
Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia, who represent
their chief executives and jurisdictions. I am a member of the
Senior Policy Group, representing the Department of Homeland
Security and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
The Senior Policy Group plays a key role in sustaining a
coordinated regional approach to homeland security and
strengthening integrated decision-making and planning. This is
just one example of the engagement of the Office of National
Capital Region Coordination. We also work closely with other
National Capital Region stakeholders and partners, to include
the local chief administrative officials, public health
officials, first responders, emergency managers, leaders from
the private sector and nonprofit communities, and many other
Federal, State, local, and regional officials.
Working with our National Capital Region partners, the
office provides support and build in capacity to respond to an
incident in a coordinated fashion. For example, the Office of
National Capital Region Coordination and other Senior Policy
Group members developed the ``First-Hour Checklist'' for the
National Capital Region to guide coordinated leadership
decisions and actions during the initial response to an
incident in the National Capital Region.
Significant strides have also been made with regards to
interoperability, as well as risk analysis to support decision-
making by NCR leaders. Additionally, the Office of National
Capital Region Coordination plans, leads, or participates with
regional partners in exercise and drills and events that occur
frequently in the National Capital Region. These efforts
bolster regional information-sharing and integrated planning.
During response to a natural disaster, the office is able
to support Region III and the Federal coordinating officer. For
example, we provide enhanced situational awareness, assist in
the coordination with national capital region partners, and
deploy agency representatives to National Capital Region
Operation Centers, where needed, to augment FEMA and Region
III's capability.
The Office of National Capital Region Coordination's
activities allow us to contribute to FEMA's broader efforts to
improve and maintain relationships with State and local
partners, toward the end of working well together in the event
of another natural disaster.
I look forward to addressing any questions you may have.
Ms. Norton. Mr. DeAtley?
Mr. DeAtley. Madam Chairwoman, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today. I previously submitted my written
testimony but appreciate, in particular, the opportunity to
share some concise remarks and have brought one additional
document that I would request, if possible, to be added to the
record.
I would like to begin my comments today by noting that, in
the context of remarks that have been made prior to mine, I
think it is important to keep in mind that when laws are broken
and weapons are used to inflict harm, oftentimes the victims of
that crime end up in a trauma center such as the Washington
Hospital Center. I think it is also important to keep in mind,
too, that hospitals and, as we saw last weekend, even nursing
homes can become the actual site of that violence.
When talking about disaster capacity, given the current
climate for change in our health care system, I think it is
also important to keep in mind that no meaningful change can
occur in our system at present that does not include expanding
the support given to emergency preparedness both for our
hospitals in the national capital region and across this
Nation, as well as for all other members of the health care
system.
Since 2002, I have been one of two people responsible for
coordinating emergency preparedness at the Washington Hospital
Center, more recently at the National Rehabilitation Hospital,
as well as for MedStar Health, the parent company for both of
these facilities. Prior to that time, I spent 29 years at
George Washington University, where I had similar
responsibilities.
The Washington Hospital Center recognizes that, as the
largest hospital in the national capital region, home of the
busiest trauma center, emergency department, and only adult
burn unit, we have special responsibility in the area of
emergency preparedness.
Since 1999, with the inception of the project ER One, a
unique federally funded project to develop an all-hazards, all-
risks-ready health care facility, the Washington Hospital
Center has undertaken a number of important initiatives to
improve our state of readiness. These include, but are not
limited to, introducing an innovative facility design to
maximize capacity, capability, and protection, as well as
building a state-of-the-art ready room to take care of victims
from mass casualty incidents from natural as well as man-made
causes.
The Washington Hospital Center took the lead in writing and
obtaining, on behalf of a broad-based District of Columbia
health care coalition, one of five nationally awarded $5
million Department of Health and Human Services coalition
partnership grants. The purpose of this grant is to improve the
emergency preparedness of the entire District of Columbia
health care system. The Washington Hospital Center is
privileged to be administering that Federal grant.
I think it is important to note that the health care
facilities occupy a unique position in the emergency response
framework. If you look at the big six--police, fire, EMS,
hospitals, public health, and emergency management--hospitals
are the only ones that are privately funded. The work we need
to do to become and stay prepared and ready to respond to a
major disaster must be funded from clinical care or else be
supported by government grants and other forms of assistance.
In December 2007, in response to a recognized problem of a
siloed and fragmented health care system in the District of
Columbia and as a result of that $5 million HHS grant, the
District of Columbia Emergency Health Care Coalition was
founded to create a more comprehensive and collaborate approach
to preparedness as well as response, one that unites all
aspects of our health care system. The District of Columbia
Emergency Health Care Coalition now includes all of the D.C.
Government agencies with health care facilities working
alongside all of the private-sector health care organizations
in our Nation's capital.
In the short span of 18 months, the coalition's Emergency
Management Committee and associated work groups have conducted
a first-ever hazard vulnerability analysis for the health care
system, written a much-needed emergency operations plan and
accompanying attachments on communication and the role of the
public information officer. And soon there will be a health
care facility evacuation template, as well. We have expanded
our hospital mutual aid radio system and included additional
partners as part of that system.
We are solving the family reunification problem; that is,
how does a family member or friend find out which hospital
their loved one has been taken to in the midst of a mass
casualty incident? Soon, seven of the busiest emergency
departments in the city will be sharing real-time patient
registration data with the D.C. Department of Health during a
declared emergency. This is a remarkable accomplishment, one
that is equalled by few other cities in our country.
The coalition has also hired a consultant to conduct a
security risk assessment for eight hospitals and completed a
design charrette of the Washington Hospital Center campus, a
campus that has been identified as one of 24 critical
infrastructures in our city.
We also recognize that a mass casualty incident does not
respect political or geographic boundaries. We need to and have
been increasingly coordinating our efforts with our colleagues
from Maryland and Virginia.
Despite the significant improvements and the progress that
I mentioned, there are still numerous needs and issues that
individual hospitals, such as my own, and the coalition itself
are confronting. These include but are not limited to, for
example: The Washington Hospital Center is still seeking $120
million to fund the building of our ER One facility, to provide
expanded and adequate capacity and capability, to deliver
emergency care to the people of District of Columbia, and also
to be a national demonstration facility for emergency care
design, optimized both for daily operations and high-
consequence events. The coalition funding will end September of
2009, and there is no follow-on Federal funding being planned.
We need that continued funding in order to meet the additional
substantive work that remains to be done.
And, finally, changes need to be made in State and Federal
funding regulations. Currently, hospitals are not allowed to
receive disaster funding under the Stafford Act and other
select Federal, State, and local disaster regulations. During
the inauguration, for example, hospitals throughout the
national capital region incurred millions of dollars in
expenses and lost revenues associated with supplemental
staffing and cancelled elective admissions and procedures, but
were told by FEMA that we are not eligible for relief funding,
despite there being a presidential declaration. The fear that
some of us has is the disaster within the disaster.
uncompensated expenses related to our response will bankrupt a
hospital such as my own because we are operating on a 1 to 2
percent operating margin.
Since 9/11 and especially over the past 18 months, the
health care system in our Nation's capital has made significant
improvement in emergency preparedness. And the Washington
Hospital Center feels privileged and pleased to have played a
role in facilitating some of these improvements. But much more
needs to be done.
I would be glad to answer any subsequent questions that you
have.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. DeAtley.
Now Ms. Mathes?
Ms. Mathes. Chairwoman Norton, thank you for inviting me to
participate on this important panel with these great
colleagues. I am Linda Mathes. I am CEO of your American Red
Cross in the national capital region. I am absolutely honored
to represent the American Red Cross in the District of Columbia
and, in Virginia, Alexandria, Arlington, Fairfax County, Prince
William and Loudoun Counties, and, in Maryland, Prince George's
County and Montgomery County, Maryland, and all the cities
within these counties.
With your permission, I would like to submit the entire
written testimony and simply highlight right now a few key
comments, major themes in the testimony.
First, a little bit about the background of the role and
the experience and the capacity of the American Red Cross in
this region. For more than 125 years, our Nation has relied on
the American Red Cross in times of disaster to help provide
shelter, food, clothing, emotional and other support. We also
supply nearly half the Nation's blood, and we teach literally
hundreds of thousands of people in life-saving and emergency
preparedness skills. In addition, we support the men and women
of the military and their families.
In this community, we have been engaging the community in
carrying out this mission and delivering these services for
over 104 years. Our mission is to provide relief to the victims
of disasters and help people prevent, prepare for, and respond
to emergencies. We carry this mission out absolutely every day,
responding typically every day to some two to four disasters,
typically fires in this community, like the three we responded
to this Saturday. We assisted some 33 people, spent about
$8,000 providing for food and clothing and health and medical
supplies and mental and emotional support that is needed.
While responding to these everyday local disasters, we also
respond to the larger periodic disasters that have been
mentioned today--hurricanes, floods, tornadoes--and those odd
ones like the sniper attack, the anthrax attack, the terrorist
attack. While responding to these, we are always preparing for
the next major, large disaster that could occur. In addition,
our local Red Cross has a unique opportunity to work with
community officials in preparing for and responding to national
special security events, like the presidential inauguration or
memorial openings or presidential funerals.
Our typical role and the one that is built into local and
county plans and even the National Response Framework is
largely mass care, human care, providing the feeding and the
sheltering and the bulk distribution of critical supplies.
To carry out all these services, we rely on a network of
thousands of volunteers. We have thousands of volunteers in
this area and about a thousand who are dedicated to helping us
with disaster work. We manage large numbers of spontaneous
volunteers, as well. The example of the thousands of people who
were displaced by Katrina coming into our community. There were
some 7,000 evacuees who came into our community. We mobilized
some 2,000 volunteers to help us here, and we deployed some
2,000 to help along the Gulf Coast.
We rely on partnerships and collaboration with dozens of
public and private and nonprofit partners to recruit volunteers
and carry out these services. Partnerships with faith-based
organizations, with organizations like 100 Black Men, the
Nonprofit Roundtable, Salvation Army, Catholic Charities. We
work with the Board of Trade and the Council of Governments.
We also rely on having ready access to equipment and
supplies to enable us to shelter and feed thousands of people,
particularly critical during those first 72 hours up to a week.
Our model for disaster services is collaborative, diverse,
inclusive. This is truly all about neighbors helping neighbors.
We have increased our capacity significantly over the past
several years. We have focused on increasing preparedness of
Red Cross chapters throughout the area, increasing the
preparedness of families and businesses throughout the region.
And we have done you this through a variety of education and
training programs. We train, in the course of a given year,
typically over 100,000 people in important life-saving and
emergency preparedness skills.
We focus on extending our outreach, again, through dozens
of public and private and nonprofit partnerships. We play the
leadership role with the Nonprofit Roundtable and at the seat
with the Council of Governments on the Emergency Preparedness
Council with the Regional Human Services Working Group. We co-
chair the Nonprofit Emergency Preparedness Task Force. We reach
out to networks of networks to engage our partners and
colleagues.
Within the region, we have developed region-wide plans to
mobilize Red Cross resources throughout the region wherever
they are needed. We have been fortunate to receive UASI
funding--UASI has been mentioned several times today--to be
able to increase our critical supply of cots and blankets and
comfort kits, the kinds of essential supplies we need to
shelter and feed thousands of people at any time. We have also
been fortunate in acquiring charitable dollars and private
sponsorships that has enabled us to open up a Regional Disaster
Coordination Center to facilitate coordination and
communication throughout the region.
Three remaining key points: First, we have a plan in place,
and we have experience implementing it. We test it, we drill
it, we learn from our experiences and update our plans.
Secondly, we have made great progress. And this is largely due
to the kind of collaboration and partnerships each of us has
spoken about today.
Thirdly, as much progress has we have had, there is much
progress yet to be had. Some key areas for further
strengthening are: first, volunteers. Well, we have thousands
of volunteers, and they are the backbone of the American Red
Cross. We need more. We need people to step up to the plate and
get training before the next disaster occurs.
Secondly, and this has been mentioned today too, the
importance of more families taking seriously the development of
personal and family emergency preparedness plans, taking those
few basic, core actions to prepare themselves and their
families for emergencies. We urge more attention and more
leadership to encouraging families to do this.
Thirdly, supplies. We have the ability, we have ready
access to the kind of supplies that would enable us to shelter
some 15,000 people tonight. We have the ability to feed more
than twice that many. We need more supplies. We need more
supplies that would enable us to take care of people with
special needs and disabilities. We have some; we need more.
And, lastly, we need the kind of warehouse and storage
space to store these supplies, and, again, on both sides of the
river.
In conclusion, Madam Chairwoman, I am confident that we are
more prepared now as a local community, a region, and a nation,
more prepared than we ever have been. We have made great
progress. You can count on your American Red Cross to do
everything we can to work with you to help the families in this
community and the businesses and the community in general be as
prepared as we can possibly be for excellent response.
Thank you.
Ms. Norton. Well, thank you, Ms. Mathes. I should thank you
for your continuing really indispensable activities here in the
District of Columbia all the time, always available.
Mr. Sarubbi and Mr. Wall, you heard the testimony, I
presume, concerning interoperability. Were you aware of this
interoperability? And to what extent is this region-wide
interoperability?
Mr. Wall. I would like to address that.
We were aware that there are legacy systems that exist
still in the National Capital Region----
Ms. Norton. Well, Mr. Wall, let me ask you, before you go
any further, how much money have you received, you the region--
as a region, our money comes straight to you first off--how
much money have you received from the Federal Government since
9/11?
Mr. Wall. The National Capital Region, through the Urban
Area Security Initiative grant, has received about $335 million
since, I believe, the first round in 2003.
Ms. Norton. Now, of that, how much money has gone to
systems for interoperability?
Mr. Wall. Specifically for voice interoperability radio
systems, I believe Chief Delinski mentioned the radio cache. We
have 1,250 radios positioned around the region for catastrophic
events to provide some of that interoperability. About $5.5
million has gone for the purchase of those radios to maintain--
--
Ms. Norton. So who is interoperable on what you are
describing there as various devices?
Mr. Wall. The caches that I am describing were purchased by
the region to assist with the jurisdictions that aren't in a
full operational state right now, including Federal responders,
such as Capitol Police, as the chief mentioned, and other local
jurisdictions.
In addition to that, I believe about $6 million from the
regional Urban Area money was also provided in support of
Prince George's County, to help them with their
interoperability challenge as well.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Wall, is there any plan to have a--first of
all, I appreciate what you have done to fill in the blanks
there. But in light of the fact that even the Capitol Police
can't talk with the D.C. Police, have any funds been set aside?
Are we in the process of making the national capital region
interoperable one with another?
Mr. Wall. Yes, ma'am, I believe we are. I think we are
taking aggressive steps to do that.
And one thing that I would like to raise, just so we have
in context the state of interoperability, the Department of
Homeland Security a couple years ago went to urban areas around
the country and did an interoperability test. And the national
capital region was one of a handful of jurisdictions that
received the highest marks for tactical-level voice
interoperability.
So, in terms of where we are with the rest of the Nation,
through the systems that we have in place, both legacy systems,
both in systems that connect legacy systems to other systems,
you know, we do have that tactical voice interoperability.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Wall, I think you have done exactly the
right thing, given what, I take it, is a much larger expense
for complete interoperability. I must start, though, from the
hit on the Pentagon. From the description, I believe it was the
chief or Mr. Herron, of how they had to just hand out whatever
they had then.
And I must ask then, therefore, is there a plan and has any
money been set aside to make the National Capital Region, where
the bulk of the Federal presence is located, fully
interoperable, quite apart from what you have? It seems to me
done quite well to fill in the gaps pending what I still
haven't heard. Is there a plan to make the region fully
interoperable?
Mr. Wall. I will say, yes, there is a plan, but
understanding that, when we are talking interoperability in the
National Capital Region, we have resources that are available
to our State and local responders. And that process has worked
very well. We have put a lot of resources into that----
Ms. Norton. So the money that went to State and locals they
have tried to use for that purpose. What would it take for all
of them to be a part of an interoperable system so that you
wouldn't need little radios and the rest that you have already
done to, in fact, make it possible to talk among yourselves?
Mr. Wall. I am sorry, I am not sure I----
Ms. Norton. What would it take, either in terms of
logistics or funds, to go beyond what you have done since 9/11?
Mr. Wall. It would take some resources for some Federal
responders so they can come up to the same level of capability
that our State----
Ms. Norton. Are you satisfied that if there were an event,
with what you have been able to do--and I commend you for what
you have been able to do--that there would be secure systems,
that you could talk one to the other, today?
Mr. Wall. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. Who owns those radios or other devices you are
speaking about?
Mr. Wall. The devices that I am speaking about and the
radio caches are owned by the region, if you will. They were
bought with regional funds. They are managed by Fairfax County,
Montgomery County, and the District of Columbia. So they
maintain the radios, they program the radios, they deploy the
radios.
Ms. Norton. If your testimony is that you are satisfied
that the devices of various kinds that you now have on the
ground are secure and interoperable, why do we need
interoperability at all? Or do we? Perhaps you are testifying
we don't need interoperability.
Mr. Wall. No, ma'am, I am not testifying that we don't need
interoperability. And to the point made on the earlier panel, I
think there are steps that we still can achieve to increase our
interoperability.
What I am saying is we have a baseline of capability today
that was developed by the region, by the public safety folks in
the region, the decision process up through their chief
executives, that size what we have now and the capability and
the plan so that we have, today, interoperable communications.
Ms. Norton. All right. Are you satisfied with what Chief
Nichols and the chief of police of the District of Columbia
have on the ground in terms of the way they do
interoperability?
Mr. Wall. I can't speak specifically to the state of the
Capitol Police, so I would have to get back to you.
Ms. Norton. Well, what do you think of the fact that most
of the officers I asked at the table, I don't think one of them
knew that hundreds, if not thousands, of people were stuck in
the Third Street Tunnel, didn't know it, even though they had
been funneled there by what seems to me to be a competent
decision on the part of the police. And other police at the
other end of the tunnel, seeing these people come, even though
they had tickets that they were waving in the air, kept them
there.
How do you justify that kind of interoperability, if that
is what they were supposed to have had, given their testimony
that none of them even knew about it at the time?
Mr. Wall. I don't justify that situation. And----
Ms. Norton. I ask you about that because it is a real-life
example. We have very few real-life examples, and that was a
tremendous success. But here is an in-time example of no
interoperability when we had more people in the District of
Columbia than at any time in the history of the Nation's
capital.
So when you say we have these devices on the ground, you
would have expected, of all the time they would have been
working, during the inauguration. So I am left to understand
how that could have occurred, that even Capitol Police at one
end of the tunnel didn't know that other police had, in fact,
funneled people through the tunnel, and others were completely
in the dark, including the commander of all of the forces, the
military forces, who were here. So I am not yet understanding
interoperability with these devices that you have on the
ground.
Could it happen again? I guess since you say, ``Hey, we
have got these devices,'' what is to keep that from happening
tomorrow if, in fact, we have people in the Third Street
Tunnel?
Mr. Wall. I would say, my understanding of exactly what
happened is very limited, that there is--I think the takeaway
from----
Ms. Norton. The only reason I press you, Mr. Wall, is that
you have testified that what you now have is secure--and you
haven't even said you have requested full interoperability--is
secure and does, in fact, give you the ability to operate as
you are supposed to operate.
It is only in light of that question that I am putting
these questions before you. Because I have this real-life
example that I have to account for. And I have the fact that
this could happen again, and I don't have any way to know what
I, as a Member of Congress, should be doing, what I should be
asking for, and the like.
Mr. Wall. I am not----
Ms. Norton. Maybe Mr. Sarubbi, your superior, has some
ideas. I need to know, could this happen tomorrow? Are you
satisfied with what is on the ground? This is the national
capital region. We have a real-life example from 9/11 of 2
million people here, thousands stuck in the tunnel.
And Mr. Wall has put together the best he can with the
money he has had. And I want to know why that didn't work
during the inauguration and thousands of people were stuck in a
tunnel.
Mr. Sarubbi. Well, our role in FEMA is to prepare first
responders to respond to a disaster, and also to assist them in
responding to a disaster by providing direct Federal
assistance, as well as funding. So I think the questions that
you are asking are perhaps a little bit outside my purview, in
terms of----
Ms. Norton. Mr. Wall reports to you, sir. This is an office
in FEMA. We set up a special office. First it was located just
in the office; then they moved it on to FEMA.
Now, Mr. Wall is only a coordinator. He has coordinated, it
sounds to me, as best he can. And yet he is unable to tell me
whether or not, if you had people stuck in the Third Street
Tunnel, the system he has put in place would work interoperably
so that people at one end of the tunnel would know what people
at the other end of the tunnel were doing.
Therefore, I don't know what to ask Congress to do, what to
tell my colleagues. I am left here with no answer. Somebody has
to tell me what to do so there is not another Third Street
Tunnel event.
Mr. Wall. Madam Chair, if I might just--I, perhaps, gave a
bad description of what my role is and led to some sort of
misunderstanding.
The interoperable communications that I was talking about
funded through the Urban Area is State and local capability
based on State and local decisions and plans. We, as a
coordinator, support that process and make sure that the
Federal, State, and local people are part of that process and
have awareness into it.
But I don't have--it is not the role of the office to put
in place an operable communication for an event such as the
inauguration.
Ms. Norton. No, I understand the difference between an
operations office and a coordinator. But you are the
coordinator. You are the only ones who know--who are supposed
to know what is at one end of the tunnel and what is at the
other so you can tell the others what it is they have to do.
Mr. Wall. Well, I think that assumes that we have a
tactical-level operational role, which our office does not.
Ms. Norton. So do we have a void there? Nobody knew what
was happening in the tunnel, and nobody is able to tell me who
should have known or what we should do about it.
Could I ask you to do this, Mr. Wall?
Mr. Wall. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. I have no complaint about what you have done,
given the resources available to you. I have had to sit here
and listen to the chief of the Capitol Police say he can't even
talk to the chief of the largest police office in his very
jurisdiction, that is to say the District of Columbia. Then,
upon further examination of witnesses, they say they can't talk
either.
And yet you have testified that you have these devices that
enable people to talk; they are fairly secure. But you have not
been able to tell me that there have been conversations that
tell you that these devices enable you to be interoperable in
the Third Street Tunnel again, should an event occur there. I
have to assume an event will occur there. It is not my job to
assume that this is the last event in the Third Street Tunnel
or some other tunnel. We have nothing but tunnels in the
District of Columbia.
It is my obligation to ask you to meet with the members of
the region to discuss interoperability and, within 30 days,
indicate to us whether or not you believe, in the event of an
event in the tunnel or, for that matter, in WMATA, which is
also in essence a tunnel, whether you could communicate, one to
the other, and what it is, regardless as a request for funds,
but what it is you would need in order that police even in the
same district, the District of Columbia, can talk to one
another and certainly across the district.
We are not going to be sitting up here having another event
and people didn't even tell us what to do, or another Third
Street event and we weren't even warned that you were not
interoperable. That is why we feel so strongly. I lost three
schoolchildren, among other residents, among these 184 people.
And we need more information on interoperability so that,
in my role as a Member of the Homeland Security Committee, in
my role as Chair of this Committee, which has the major
jurisdiction over FEMA, I can know what it is to tell my
colleagues is needed.
Now, Mr. DeAtley, you testified that, under the Stafford
Act, the hospitals weren't even--some of them weren't even
eligible to be reimbursed. Now, first of all, I am told--let me
ask you this question to precede it. What hospitals in the
District of Columbia are for-profit, and what hospitals remain
nonprofit? Are you aware of that?
Mr. DeAtley. Generally speaking, yes, ma'am. The three for-
profit facilities that I am personally familiar with are George
Washington University and the specialty hospitals of Hadley and
Capitol Hill. And, actually, I think there is a fourth; that
would be United Regional.
The remaining facilities----
Ms. Norton. You said United Regional. That is Greater
Southeast?
Mr. DeAtley. Old Greater Southeast, yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. How about Metropolitan Hospital Center?
Mr. DeAtley. The Washington Hospital Center is a not-for-
profit. NRH is a not-for-profit. Those other facilities in the
system, if you will, which number now, I believe, about eight
others, are all not-for-profit, is my understanding.
Ms. Norton. Mr. DeAtley, I have been informed by staff that
one of the reasons--and this is an absurdity. This is why
people need to tell us and why I am pressing Mr. Wall and Mr.
Sarubbi to get us the appropriate information. I am told that
the Stafford Act provides funding for nonprofits. Isn't that
ridiculous? I mean for nonprofits only.
For at least 50 years, you have had hospitals turning from
nonprofit to for-profit. Here we have some of the biggest
hospitals in the District of Columbia now for-profit. And I am
sitting up here with a major jurisdiction over the Stafford Act
not even knowing that I should have requested a change in the
Stafford Act to request a change in medical funding and medical
operations today where they are often owned, even if they are
connected with a university, by a for-profit entity.
And I do want to thank you for that testimony, because it
is another one of the absurdities of how easy it is for the
bureaucrats to simply answer, when you ask for funding,
``Sorry, we only fund for-profit,'' without coming and telling
us about that. Any Member of Congress will today have for-
profit hospitals that yesterday were nonprofit.
So forgive me for not knowing that. And that is a change I
expect to request in the Stafford Act upon finding more
information about it.
Ms. Mathes, as I am aware of the extent which you are
dependent upon volunteers, I need to know how many of your
thousands of volunteers live in the District of Columbia.
Ms. Mathes. We will be happy to follow up with you to give
you some precise numbers. The figures I quoted to you, several
thousand volunteers who work with us in this region, that
figure can be broken down according to how many are in the
District and how many are in other parts of the region. If you
would permit me, I would like to follow up and give you that
level of detail.
Ms. Norton. I am aware that there is great generosity in
sharing volunteers across regional lines. But I would, in the
event of an event, getting to the District, if you were a
volunteer who resided in the region, might be difficult. And
your own people might be asking you to give aid first and
foremost there.
So we really do need to know the breakdown of these
volunteers. I would like it for the District of Columbia,
Montgomery County, and Prince George's County and the other
regions in the national capital region, if you will.
Have you had any mock exercise here, either for evacuation
or any other event, Ms. Mathes?
Ms. Mathes. We have participated in numerous exercises with
our colleagues at the table and colleagues around the region,
exercises and drills in the District and elsewhere.
Ms. Norton. Any involving evacuation?
Ms. Mathes. I would like to--typically, the exercises and
drills involve a particular type of incident. I would like to
get back to you on a precise answer regarding if any of them
have regarded evacuation.
Ms. Norton. One of the things I am most interested in, Ms.
Mathes, is whether, in the event of an evacuation, absent some
kind of event with gases so noxious that they were being
released all over the District of Columbia, one could imagine a
situation where instead of evacuating to Prince George's
County, which has limited capacity as you heard in prior
testimony, one might evacuate to other sheltering places in the
District of Columbia, such as the Armory, such as large places
such as the Verizon Center and the rest.
Are those places considered places for evacuation? In other
words, for sheltering within the District of Columbia, what
would those places be, please?
Ms. Mathes. We have identified quite a few shelter
locations in the District of Columbia and elsewhere. They are
typically schools, some churches, some other organizations. We
have identified some 56,000 spaces, again throughout the
region, but I can follow up with you to provide a specific
number of those within the District of Columbia.
We have surveyed them to make sure that they meet some
basic criteria for being able to accommodate the immediate and
emergency needs of people.
Ms. Norton. We would very much appreciate those numbers.
Mr. Sarubbi and Mr. Wall, have there been any discussions
within the region of differences in gun laws and capacity in
the event of a gun event in this city or region?
Mr. Sarubbi. Again, Madam Chairman, our role within FEMA is
to provide support to our State and local partners----
Ms. Norton. All right, then let me ask Mr. Wall, since he
is the coordinator.
Have you assumed, Mr. Wall, that all have different gun
laws, and yet if there were a spraying, such as of a motorcade
where dignitaries traveled daily, or an event involving guns,
have you assumed that there are different gun laws in how you
would handle such an event? Have there at least been
discussions on a coordinating level of that kind?
Mr. Wall. I have not been involved in any conversation of--
--
Ms. Norton. How would those discussions have occurred, sir,
if they occurred at all? If not within an office whose job it
is to do coordination, where and with what form would they have
occurred?
Mr. Wall. As I said, I am not aware of discussions that
have occurred----
Ms. Norton. Could I ask you to--go ahead.
Mr. Wall. There are forums, as mentioned before, at the
Metropolitan Washington Council of Government, where chiefs of
police and our law enforcement folks from the region get
together and talk about law enforcement issues. I would imagine
that such a discussion would happen in one of those forums.
Ms. Norton. As a coordinator, I would ask that, if such
discussions occur, you be informed of them so that you can know
that such a--I mean, it is hard to understand what the role of
a coordinator is if not to at least understand what is being
discussed among the various parties he coordinates.
Mr. Wall. Yes, ma'am. And we do have representatives in
each of those meetings. And what I am saying is, to my
knowledge, the specific discussion that you mentioned has not
occurred.
Ms. Norton. In light of the fact that the testimony here
has been that a gun attack would be more likely than any other
attack in the District of Columbia today given risk analysis,
could I ask that you assure this Subcommittee that such
discussions do, in fact, occur?
Mr. Wall. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. I appreciate it.
Mr. DeAtley, ER One has been a major concern to me. It
would be the only system capable of receiving people who were
contaminated and of decontaminating them in large numbers.
You have apparently received some funds, some $5 million
from HHS to improve emergency preparedness. Were any of these
related to the so-called ER One, which would, of course, be a
demonstration project but would also be such a facility here in
the District of Columbia to handle contamination of people in
the region?
Mr. DeAtley. No, ma'am. The coalition's focus primarily has
been across the spectrum over the health care facilities.
$100,000 of the $5 million is being spent on developing
what we refer to as the ceiling membrane concept. That would be
studying the airflow using a revised filter or ceiling tile
being strategically in rooms that would isolate and contain
contagions, if you will.
But that is a concept development. The rest of the money is
going to a broader coalition set of deliverables than
decontamination.
Ms. Norton. So most of the money to decontaminate people,
for example--you are the closest hospital or one of the closest
hospitals straight up the way from the Congress, from the
Supreme Court. Most of the money to do decontamination, if
there was contamination, for example, some kind of
contamination got set loose in the Capitol or in the Supreme
Court or in the White House, you do not have the funds
presently to decontaminate individuals, officials, residents,
and the like?
Mr. DeAtley. All of the hospitals in the District of
Columbia and the national capital region, including the
Hospital Center, have spent their own moneys to a point in
building their current capacity. That initial outlay of funding
and its sustainment cost has been supplemented periodically by
other sources of funding, including a grant which is currently
in place to focus just on mass decontamination where hospitals
and hazardous material team personnel are working together to
do a gap analysis--that has been completed--to purchase
equipment to fill the gap and, once that equipment arrives, to
initiate training to use that equipment so there can be a
greater sharing.
That all having been said, additional funding support would
be keenly appreciated by hospitals, especially to sustain, if
not to expand, our current capability.
Ms. Norton. Well, as important as it is, indeed it is
vitally important, that local hospitals be able to do
decontamination, what is the point of ER One as a major
facility for decontamination?
Mr. DeAtley. Well, the Washington Hospital Center, as I
said previously, is the largest hospital in the national
capital region. So, being the largest facility, having the
busiest ER and the only adult burn unit, we fully expect that
in incidences throughout the national capital region we will
get a large percentage of that population coming to our
facility.
Ms. Norton. Would your plan be to direct, to the extent
possible, if ER One were to become fully operative, that such
patients be brought to that facility as opposed to other
facilities?
Mr. DeAtley. Well, we are not trying to advocate for taking
patients away, so much as we are trying to be, as a facility,
prepared for the unusually large number of patients that we
would expect to see because of who we are and where we are
located.
ER One is all about taking a concept of what the ideal
facility is to be designed like to now request funding to build
that facility, to have that enhanced capability, while at the
same time serving as a national model, a study place, if you
will, for further developing scientific approaches to some of
these ongoing problems.
Ms. Norton. With the Secretary, the first Secretary of HHS
under President George W. Bush, I came to the Washington
Hospital Center, sat with your personnel, and had a very
impressive briefing of what ER One would look like and how it
would operate.
As I understood it, the Washington Hospital Center was
prepared to invest considerable funds on its own into that
center. Could you discuss that, please?
Mr. DeAtley. Yes, ma'am. I am not the one that is
ultimately in charge of that design, but, from my perspective
of being one of five directors of the institutes that
constitute ER One, I know that the Washington Hospital Center
had, particularly early on, spent significant sums of its own
operating capital to fund an improvement in the emergency
department itself and then, using funding that came from the
city and from the Federal Government, to build what we now have
as the ready room.
And what we have built from that is additional funding to
do the first and the second phase of the ER One project, which
was to take a subject matter group of experts to define what
should we be doing, how better could we be doing it. That was
phase one. Then working with architects to design the facility
capable of operationalizing those concepts. And that leads us
up to this current phase three, where, with that additional
funding to match what the Washington Hospital Center and
MedStar Health is willing to commit, to build----
Ms. Norton. If the funding were available, would you be
prepared to start--with the design work having been done, as I
hear your testimony, would you be prepared to start in building
such a decontamination facility in the District of Columbia?
Mr. DeAtley. We would be anxious and quite willing to
proceed as quickly as possible.
Ms. Norton. Mr. DeAtley, would you, within 10 days, get to
this Committee a record of the funds from Washington Hospital
Center, non-Federal sources, District of Columbia, Washington
Hospital Center and other non-Federal sources that have already
been committed to or would become committed if the Federal
funds were available?
Mr. DeAtley. Yes, ma'am, we would be glad to.
Ms. Norton. Ms. Mathes, we understand that the Red Cross is
indispensable. We have seen you operate so often, giving food
and shelter. Do you give cash to victims of disasters, of
natural disasters or, for that matter, other disasters?
Ms. Mathes. We do provide assistance to family members to
assist in their purchasing the kind of food and clothing and
health and medical supplies they need.
Ms. Norton. What is the extent of your Federal funding in
the District of Columbia? How much of your funds come from
Federal sources, what percentage from private sources?
Ms. Mathes. Virtually all of our funding comes from private
sources. We are totally dependent upon people giving of their
time and their money to make Red Cross services possible.
We have applied a couple of times in the past few years for
the Urban Area Security Initiatives funding and have been
fortunate to receive some funding for equipment and supplies.
But, otherwise, it is the people of this community who are
making our services possible.
Ms. Norton. And is that in the event of a natural or man-
made disaster as well?
Ms. Mathes. Yes.
Ms. Norton. It is important to put that on the record,
because people see the Red Cross on the job so often when there
is a natural disaster such as the one we just had in North
Dakota, Minnesota, Kentucky. And they just figure you are one
of us. And it is important that the record know that is one of
you; that is to say, that is the people of the United States of
America. And we are grateful for those contributions.
You have testified, Ms. Mathes, that there are
approximately 55 volunteers to each paid staff member in the
national capital region. I don't know how to evaluate that
compared to other regions. Is it high or low compared with
other metropolitan regions?
Ms. Mathes. Thank you. We like it to be higher. Again, back
to the important role a volunteer can play----
Ms. Norton. How does it compare with New York, Los Angeles,
Chicago, and the like, for example?
Ms. Mathes. Madam Chairwoman, I am not certain of their
percentages, their ratios. We find it very important to track
that ratio; not all of our colleagues do. I would be happy to
follow up and report back to you on it.
Ms. Norton. It would be very important for us to be able to
say to our region how we compare with the other regions. You
heard me name four other cities, which really means regions--
San Francisco, Chicago, and what am I leaving out? New York.
How could I? All of whom are in the top four. It would be
important for us to know what the ratio of volunteers here is
compared to there.
Mr. DeAtley, there is a District of Columbia Health Care
Coalition. Who are they? And who is responsible for calling
that coalition into action?
Mr. DeAtley. The coalition was created as a result of that
HHS grant that I spoke about earlier. It is a combination of
all of the city government agencies that have health care
responsibilities, coupled with all of the other private-sector
health care organizations. We have never seen such a coalition
in my 36 years of working here in the city before December of
2007.
Insofar as the action is concerned, it is present itself on
a daily basis. By that I mean there is a duty officer, for
example, that is standing watch, representing the coalition,
working with----
Ms. Norton. Is that a duty officer in every particular
hospital?
Mr. DeAtley. No, ma'am. That is one duty officer. There is
13 of us that volunteer to take this weekly tour of duty, if
you will.
Ms. Norton. Rotating?
Mr. DeAtley. Rotating responsibility. There is a primary
and a backup.
There is an additional source of volunteers to--if an event
were to happen in the city, we could activate depending upon
the situation what we call our Health Care Coalition Response
Team to work with that duty officer to support the District of
Columbia, principally HSEMA and DOH, to deal with health care
system delivery-related problems.
But the core of the effort, quite candidly, is the
Emergency Management Committee that is meeting every 2 weeks
that volunteer committee members from all of the member
organizations to do the development work, the policies, the
procedures. We are right now beginning to plan a citywide
exercise to be held in June, all in an effort to improve our
preparedness.
Ms. Norton. Indeed, you presaged a question. I want to know
if ER One has ever had a test-run of capabilities, or are you
waiting for the funding?
Mr. DeAtley. No, ma'am. The ER One, the Washington Hospital
Center stands ready to respond to an emergency right now. We
have a decontamination capability. We train our personnel. We
have the equipment to at least start that effort. So it is not
about having no capability; we are talking about improving that
capability.
Ms. Norton. If, indeed, there was some kind of
contamination, how many people in the District of Columbia or
region could you handle today?
Mr. DeAtley. One, I would like to reiterate that it would
not be a single facility that would be successful. It needs to
be a combination of facilities.
But, in our particular case, particularly during what I
will call prime-time business hours, up until 8 o'clock at
night, we could process with our current staffing and equipment
for at least a 3-hour period of time roughly 100 critical
patients an hour and 200 noncritical participants. That is the
most that we could do.
Lesser staffing, off-hours, then that would begin to drop
off.
Ms. Norton. Now, does ER One assume that, in the event of
an event involving contamination, that some hospitals at least,
for example, you are located in northwest Washington, might be
able, given how you share apparently and have your duty officer
and the rest, might be able to direct, despite some capability
on their own, that participants be taken to the larger
capability at ER One? For example, Howard University Hospital,
which is close by; for that matter, Walter Reed, which is close
by; some of the other hospitals perhaps.
Does the existence of a very special hospital, with larger
capacity than others, assume that there would be some capacity
to take referrals from others in the event of a capacity rather
than do what you do now, which is everybody is on his own?
Mr. DeAtley. We are working hard with D.C. Fire-EMS and
their hazardous material team officials for a situation like
you described, to try and ensure that facilities are not
brought patients in excess of their current capability.
Would we at the Hospital Center expect for an incident in
the city to receive more patients than the other hospitals?
That is entirely plausible, and we are trying to prepare for
that possibility, most definitely.
What I would like to reiterate, the strength of the system
is not having one that can do it all. It is the sum of the
parts that we need to continue to struggle to improve upon.
Ms. Norton. That is a very important point. But I ask this
question because, to the extent that the Federal Government is
supposed to be paying for a central facility, which is a
facility for demonstrating to the entire Nation and a facility
for the District of Columbia and the region, the Congress is
likely to expect some specialization if Federal money is going
into such an activity. But fully understanding precisely what
you said, we would also expect everybody to be able to handle
patients as they receive them.
Mr. DeAtley. If I may follow up on that comment, while we
are talking about decontamination as one aspect, I would also
point out that the ER One project, the concept design is about
treating patients of a variety of different problem sets,
whether it would be trauma from an explosion, biologic in
nature, as well as contamination from a chemical or radiologic
incident.
Ms. Norton. That is an important point, as well. On the
other hand, it is a contamination point that I think would most
interest the Federal Government. Because there you would have
to have not only the people who do what you do every day--look,
we have a lot of gun trauma. If we had an explosion, somebody
who works in a trauma emergency room would know how to handle
that.
But I am not certain that the same capability throughout
the region would exist if some unknown substance--first of all,
it would be unknown. Secondly, it would be dispersed around the
region and then have everybody trying to figure out what it is,
what personnel would be best suited to handle that kind of
contamination. That is the kind of expertise that I believe we
are looking for in ER One.
Mr. DeAtley. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. One final question. The, perhaps, most
pathetic, most tragic part of Katrina had to do with people who
could not take care of themselves, and these were patients,
trauma patients who were in hospitals.
I would like to ask if the Red Cross has any coordinator
for persons with disability. I am not dealing with hospitals
now; that, I have to assume, the hospitals understood. But the
region has very generous programs for dealing with people with
disabilities. How would the Red Cross handle large numbers of
people with various kinds of disabilities?
We have everything from Gallaudet, where people are hard of
hearing or cannot hear at all, sometimes cannot speak; to
people who are in group homes; to children who go to special
schools to get special education. This is a region that has
many special facilities for disabled people.
How would the Red Cross handle an event with so many widely
dispersed people with disabilities across the region?
Ms. Mathes. Excellent question. Madam Chairwoman, we work
closely with partners who specialize in working with people of
special needs and disabilities. We engage them in planning
efforts and in the execution of them. So we would count on our
close working partnerships with our colleagues in the
government, as well as our nonprofit colleagues, who work
closely with people with special needs and disabilities.
We work, for example, with the National Organization on
Disability to anticipate the needs of people with special needs
and disabilities in coming into shelters. We have acquired
quite a bit of equipment specifically to accommodate people
with special needs; also children, special equipment for
children, for sheltering.
We have worked with partner organizations to mount
preparedness efforts, preparedness education efforts, to assist
with what we have talked about earlier today in terms of
helping families develop emergency preparedness plans.
Ms. Norton. Well, staff tells me, Mr. Sarubbi, that, after
Katrina, headquarters now has a disability coordinator by
statute. That is one of the things we learned from Katrina. Is
there a disability coordinator in this region and, to your
knowledge, in other regions?
Mr. Sarubbi. There is a disability coordinator at the
national level. Each of the FEMA regions do not have a
disability coordinator. But we work closely, similar as to what
my Red Cross colleague indicated, with our partners in helping
to assess the evacuation and sheltering of people with special
needs, particularly special medical needs.
For example, we have been working on a project here, the
last 2 1/2 years, called the gap analysis, where the scenario
would be a Category 3 hurricane. How would we deal with the
evacuation of people with special medical needs? We have been
looking at ways of enhancing that capability, also working
closely with our partners at HHS.
It is not an issue that has been resolved as of yet. There
is still much work to be done in that area. But it is certainly
one of our focuses, particularly here in Region III, in the
national capital region, as well as for a hurricane scenario in
the Hampton Roads area, which is an area that is extremely
vulnerable to a direct hit by a hurricane and, because of the
geography of the area, would be particularly difficult in
evacuating citizens, particularly citizens or people with
special medical needs.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Sarubbi.
May I ask that, of all of the--one of the things that we
had testimony here today was about the use of July 4th as a
real-time exercise. And something we would like to see in this
region is more real-time exercises.
But I have to ask you that, of all--you know, for the
average person, which might be a quick learner, we have seen
very good results when people are told what to do, who have all
of their capabilities. Without real-time exercises, perhaps
they could get through.
I would ask, in this region, that you consider real-time
exercises for people with disabilities. They are all over the
region. They are often away from their home base. Without real-
time exercises, I have no confidence that a disabled person of
whatever disability would necessarily be prepared, as any able-
bodied person might, to simply do what the person is instructed
to do, where sign language may be necessary, where the person
could be handicapped in other ways.
So I would ask FEMA, through your disability coordinator
established by statute after Hurricane Katrina, to consider
real-time exercises throughout the United States, of course,
but particularly in this region, where we are more vulnerable
than most other regions.
Mr. Sarubbi. I will certainly do that, Madam Chairman. And,
as I indicated earlier, that is an area of emphasis for us, to
continue to work with people with special medical needs. And,
certainly, having real-time exercises, I think, is an important
step in that direction. Thank you.
Ms. Norton. I know that all of you have waited a very long
time for us to testify and then to undergo my cross-
examination, as it were. But all I am trying to do is to get on
the record what we need to know in order to respond to your
needs.
I have found the testimony of each and every one of you
invaluable. And may I thank you, first of all, for your great
patience in waiting so long, but most of all for your very
valuable testimony. Thank you very much.
And this hearing is finally at an end.
[Whereupon, at 2:20 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
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