[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
KEEPING THE SPACE ENVIRONMENT SAFE
FOR CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL USERS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 28, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-22
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.science.house.gov
______
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chair
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois RALPH M. HALL, Texas
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California Wisconsin
DAVID WU, Oregon LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
BEN R. LUJAN, New Mexico RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
PAUL D. TONKO, New York BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
JIM MATHESON, Utah BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri PETE OLSON, Texas
BARON P. HILL, Indiana
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
KATHLEEN DAHLKEMPER, Pennsylvania
ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
SUZANNE M. KOSMAS, Florida
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
VACANCY
------
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
HON. GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona, Chair
DAVID WU, Oregon PETE OLSON, Texas
DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio Wisconsin
PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama DANA ROHRABACHER, California
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
BARON P. HILL, Indiana MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
SUZANNE M. KOSMAS, Florida
BART GORDON, Tennessee RALPH M. HALL, Texas
RICHARD OBERMANN Subcommittee Staff Director
PAM WHITNEY Democratic Professional Staff Member
ALLEN LI Democratic Professional Staff Member
KEN MONROE Republican Professional Staff Member
ED FEDDEMAN Republican Professional Staff Member
DEVIN BRYANT Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
April 28, 2009
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Gabrielle Giffords, Chairwoman,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 16
Written Statement............................................ 17
Statement by Representative Pete Olson, Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 18
Written Statement............................................ 19
Witnesses:
Lieutenant General Larry D. James, Commander, 14th Air Force, Air
Force Space Command; Commander, Joint Functional Component
Command for Space, U.S. Strategic Command
Oral Statement............................................... 20
Written Statement............................................ 22
Biography.................................................... 25
Mr. Nicholas L. Johnson, Chief Scientist for Orbital Debris,
Johnson Space Center, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA)
Oral Statement............................................... 27
Written Statement............................................ 28
Biography.................................................... 30
Mr. Richard DalBello, Vice President, Legal and Government
Affairs, Intelsat General Corporation
Oral Statement............................................... 30
Written Statement............................................ 32
Biography.................................................... 37
Dr. Scott Pace, Director, Space Policy Institute, Elliott School
of International Affairs, George Washington University
Oral Statement............................................... 39
Written Statement............................................ 41
Biography.................................................... 46
Discussion
Iridium-Cosmos Collision and Going Forward..................... 47
Commercial and Foreign Data Sharing............................ 49
International Agreements on Orbital Objects.................... 51
Iridium and Cosmos Collision and Military Concerns............. 53
Russia's Policy on Orbital Debris.............................. 54
Status of Current Debris Creation.............................. 54
Increasing Satellite Strength.................................. 55
Future of CFE.................................................. 56
Future of CFE With Commercial Industry......................... 57
Costs and Benefits of Monitoring............................... 58
Private Industry Charging for Satellite Data................... 59
Characteristics of Current Debris.............................. 60
CFE Resource and Priority Concerns............................. 61
CFE Computer Analyses.......................................... 62
Debris Risks................................................... 63
Timeline for Debris Warning.................................... 64
Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Lieutenant General Larry D. James, Commander, 14th Air Force, Air
Force Space Command; Commander, Joint Functional Component
Command for Space, U.S. Strategic Command...................... 68
Mr. Nicholas L. Johnson, Chief Scientist for Orbital Debris,
Johnson Space Center, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA).......................................... 73
Mr. Richard DalBello, Vice President, Legal and Government
Affairs, Intelsat General Corporation.......................... 76
Dr. Scott Pace, Director, Space Policy Institute, Elliott School
of International Affairs, George Washington University......... 80
Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record
Statement of Marion C. Blakey, President and CEO, Aerospace
Industries Association......................................... 86
Statement of the Secure World Foundation......................... 88
KEEPING THE SPACE ENVIRONMENT SAFE FOR CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL USERS
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 28, 2009
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics,
Committee on Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gabrielle
Giffords [Chairwoman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
hearing charter
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Keeping the Space Environment Safe
for Civil and Commercial Users
tuesday, april 28, 2009
2:00 p.m.-4:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
I. Purpose
The House Committee on Science and Technology's Subcommittee on
Space and Aeronautics is convening a hearing to examine the challenges
faced by civil and commercial space users as space traffic and space
debris populations continue to grow. The Subcommittee will explore
potential measures to improve information available to civil and
commercial users to avoid in-space collisions as well as ways to
minimize the growth of future space debris. The hearing will focus on
the following questions and issues:
What are the current and projected risks to civil and
commercial space users posed by other spacecraft and space
debris?
What information and services are currently available
to civil and commercial space users in terms of real-time data
and predictive analyses?
What can be done to minimize the growth of space
debris?
What is the level of coordination among military,
civil, and commercial space users in the sharing of space
situational awareness information?
Have shortcomings been identified by civil and
commercial space users with regards to the availability of
situational awareness information they need? How are these
shortcomings being addressed?
Have civil and commercial space users identified
their long-term situational awareness needs? What options are
being considered to address them?
II. Witnesses
Lt. Gen. Larry D. James, Commander, 14th Air Force, Air Force Space
Command, and Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Space,
U.S. Strategic Command
Mr. Nicholas Johnson, Chief Scientist for Orbital Debris, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration
Mr. Richard DalBello, Vice President of Government Relations, Intelsat
General Corporation
Dr. Scott Pace, Director of the Space Policy Institute, George
Washington University
III. Overview
Ensuring the future safety of civil and commercial spacecraft and
satellites is becoming a major concern. The February 2009 collision
between an Iridium Satellite-owned communications satellite and a
defunct Russian Cosmos satellite above Northern Siberia highlighted the
growing problem of space debris and the need to minimize the chances of
in-space collisions. That collision also increased the number of pieces
of space debris circling the Earth, a debris population that had
already experienced a significant increase two years earlier following
a Chinese anti-satellite weapons test that created thousands of
fragments. As recently as last month, astronauts aboard the Space
Shuttle and the International Space Station maneuvered the connected
crafts to avoid a piece of space debris that NASA believed could
potentially have led to an impact.
While several nations such as Russia, France, Germany and Japan
have some form of space surveillance capability, these systems are not
interconnected and are neither as capable nor as robust as the United
States' Space Surveillance Network (SSN). SSN consists of a world-wide
network of 29 ground-based sensors that are stated to be capable of
tracking objects as small as five centimeters orbiting in Low-Earth
Orbit (LEO)--that is, the region of space below the altitude of 2,000
km (about 1,250 miles). Many remote sensing satellites use LEO, as do
all current crewed orbital space flights. However, to be useful,
information on potential collisions obtained through tracking efforts
needs to be disseminated to all space users, including non-governmental
entities. Furthermore, the data needs to be of sufficient accuracy that
predictions of possible collisions can be computed with a high level of
confidence. That level of confidence is essential in light of the
implications of making evasive maneuvers. If a space user knows that a
particular object in space poses a collision risk to a satellite or
spacecraft, the user can potentially maneuver the satellite or
spacecraft to avoid the debris. However, flight changes to avoid
potential collisions come at a high price since satellites carry
limited quantities of fuel and avoidance maneuvers could result in
decreased operational life.
Following congressional direction, the Air Force's Space Command
initiated a three-year Commercial and Foreign Entities (CFE) Pilot
Program in 2005 aimed at providing space users with tracking
information and analytical services. The program gradually transitioned
support responsibilities from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) to the Air Force's Space Command; up until 2005,
orbital data had been provided on NASA Goddard Space Flight Center's
Orbital Information Group (OIG) web site free of charge. The Air Force
also provides, for a fee, advanced analytical support such as on-orbit
assessment of conflicts and pre-launch safety screenings. Legislation
allows space surveillance data and analysis to be provided to any
foreign or domestic governmental or commercial entity, so long as
providing the data and analysis is in the national security interests
of the United States. Furthermore, before being provided with such
data, a non-U.S. Government entity must enter into an agreement with
the Secretary of Defense agreeing to (a) reimburse the Department for
costs DOD incurs in providing data support and (b) not transfer any
data or technical information received under the agreement without the
approval of the Secretary. Nevertheless, desirous of having
capabilities of its own, the European Union has initiated an effort to
research what is required to develop a European Space Surveillance
Awareness System.
Many questions remain as to how to improve space situational
awareness with an ever growing population of spacecraft and
international operators. Improvements in information services,
capabilities, resources, and coordination will all have to be
addressed. In addition, although organizations and individuals have
examined the pros and cons of potential space traffic management
approaches or international ``rules of the road,'' at this point, there
does not appear to be a consensus on the appropriate long-term
framework for space traffic management.
Testimony at this hearing should provide the Subcommittee with an
assessment of (1) what is being done to keep the space environment safe
for civil and commercial space users given the growing number of
satellites, spacecraft, and space debris, (2) how future propagation of
space debris can be mitigated, (3) what space surveillance awareness
capabilities and services are currently available, and (4) what
challenges civil and commercial users face trying to get enhanced space
surveillance awareness information. Keeping the space environment safe
for civil and commercial users involves protection from a multitude of
factors besides space debris, such as adverse space weather phenomena
and radio frequency interference. However, this hearing will focus
primarily on issues associated with space debris.
IV. Potential Hearing Issues
The following are some of the potential issues that may be raised
at the hearing:
What practices do civil and commercial space
operators utilize to minimize the risk of collision in space?
Should we be concerned about the projected worldwide
growth in space traffic and debris generation? Could the risks
of collisions in space grow to unacceptable levels?
What is the status of the U.S. Government-sanctioned
Commercial and Foreign Entities (CFE) Pilot Program? What are
the lessons learned so far? What are the Department of
Defense's (DOD) plans for providing a CFE capability in the
future?
What techniques and procedures can space operators
use to minimize the future growth of orbital debris? What are
the biggest challenges to reducing the growth of orbital
debris?
What space situational awareness system would
commercial space users like to have in place in 10 years? How
far are we from having such a system today and what will need
to be done to make it possible?
A comprehensive space situational awareness system
that meets the needs of the military, civil, and commercial
space sectors would seem to require the involvement of each of
those sectors both domestically and internationally. Are there
any good governance models that could be used to construct and
operate such a comprehensive system?
How does DOD coordinate with commercial space users?
For example, what major issues have been raised at the series
of meetings between DOD leadership and the CEOs of the top 10
commercial satellite companies focusing on enhancing
cooperation to improve surveillance and what are the plans for
addressing those issues?
How can coordination among military, civil, and
commercial users be enhanced relative to both orbital debris
mitigation and collision avoidance?
What can be done to address the shortcomings in
current space situational awareness information, predictive
capabilities, and supporting infrastructure to enable safe
civil and commercial space operations in the future?
What are the key policy questions that need to be
addressed in determining the best path forward for keeping the
space environment safe for civil and commercial users?
Are international ``rules of the road'' needed to
prevent future in-space collisions and debris growth?
V. Background
The Space Debris Threat
Space Environment
Since 1957, there have been several thousand payloads launched into
space. These launches have contributed to an ever growing population of
man-made objects in space, which have themselves generated an even
larger amount of orbital debris. NASA defines orbital debris ``as any
object placed in space by humans that remains in orbit and no longer
serves any useful function or purpose. Objects range from spacecraft to
spent launch vehicle stages to components and also include materials,
trash, refuse, fragments, or other objects which are overtly or
inadvertently cast off or generated.'' These objects, ranging in size
from that of a microscopic paint chip to a large defunct satellite, can
travel at speeds up to 11 km/second.
Most of today's spacecraft operate in two major orbital altitudes.
The most populated is Low-Earth Orbit (LEO), where many scientific and
human spacecraft operate between altitudes of 320 km and 2,000 km. The
other is Geostationary Orbit (GEO), which is populated primarily by
communication satellites that orbit as the same speed as the Earth so
as to continuously face one region of the planet. These satellites
operate at an altitude of approximately 36,000 km. There are
approximately 900 operational spacecraft currently in orbit. Of those,
approximately 800 are maneuverable.
Extent of Orbital Debris in Space
The first fragmentation of a man-made satellite occurred in 1961.
Since then, there have been over 190 spacecraft fragmentations, and
four accidental collisions resulting in the generation of debris (there
has been only one collision between two intact spacecraft). Even though
some of the debris from these fragmentations has fallen out of orbit,
numerous other incidents over the years have increased the overall
population of space debris dramatically. According to an Aerospace
Corporation study, ``the creation rate of debris has out-paced the
removal rate, leading to a net growth in the debris population in low-
Earth orbit at an average rate of approximately five percent per
year.''
The majority of Earth's orbital debris currently resides in LEO
between the altitudes of 600 km and 1,500 km, where there is an
estimated 300,000 pieces of debris one cm in size or greater. Of that
number, there are more that 18,000 objects that are five cm or greater
in size. Objects that are between one cm and 10 cm in size are of
primary concern to spacecraft in LEO as these are the most difficult
pieces to track and have enough mass to completely disable a
spacecraft.
The orbital lifetime of debris varies, as some pieces can re-enter
the Earth's atmosphere within several days of their fragmentation,
while some pieces can stay in orbit for over several hundred years.
Currently, more debris is being accumulated in orbit than is falling
out of orbit. According to a NASA study completed in 2006 which assumes
no new launches of any kind past 2005, in-orbit collisions will sustain
the current population of debris, even as other objects decay into the
atmosphere. As indicated in a NASA Orbital Debris Quarterly
publication, by 2055, collisions will become the primary source of
debris generation. Even though a majority of the debris lies in LEO
orbit, concerns are still growing over the future of GEO as it a highly
valuable and fairly costly area to place a satellite. Debris that
continuously fly at GEO altitude are too high to be affected by
atmospheric drag and rarely fall back to Earth. It is also extremely
difficult to track and characterize objects less that 1 m in GEO with
current technologies.
Causes of Fragmentation
Space debris comes in many different forms, but the velocity at
which these objects move in relation to the object they impact is what
makes them potentially lethal. A piece of debris as small as one cm can
potentially destroy a satellite, while an object less that 0.1 cm can
penetrate an astronaut's suit during an Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA).
Debris can be created in a number of ways, from actual collisions
to incidents occurring during spacecraft separation. The most common
causes of fragmentations are propulsion-related incidents that involve
remaining fuel or pressurized components exploding in discarded rocket
stages. This type of event was prevalent in the 1970s and 1980s but has
since slowed due to increased mitigation techniques practiced
worldwide. Until recently, the objects from these events constituted
about 40 percent of current orbital debris.
Other sources of fragmentation debris include accidental
collisions, battery explosions, fuel leaks, failures of attitude
control systems, failures during orbital injection maneuvers and other
unidentified causes. Not all of these fragmentation events create
equivalent amounts of debris. The damage and subsequent results of a
collision in orbit are dependent on multiple variables such as velocity
and design of the structure as well as the angle of collision. For
example one collision in the mid-1990s of a European satellite involved
a small piece of debris striking an extended antenna, which resulted in
only one piece of debris being generated.
The more troubling type of fragmentation event is the intentional
breakups that are deliberately taken, such as in the form of an anti-
satellite weapons test. Such actions have historically led to very
accurate strikes and thus produced larger amounts of debris than other
collisions and self generated explosions.
Risks Generated by Orbital Debris
Since January 2007, there have been three major debris generating
incidents that have increased Earth's orbital debris environment
significantly. As a result, the risks to active and non-active
spacecraft have greatly increased. Experts have predicted that it is
only matter of time until there is another large debris generating
collision.
The International Space Station (ISS) flies at an average altitude
of 349 km to 358 km and the Hubble Space Telescope flies at an altitude
of 570 km. For the remainder of its manifest, the Space Shuttle will
fly only to these two orbits and as such are subject to their orbital
hazards. The upcoming STS-125 flight will allow crew aboard the Shuttle
Atlantis to repair the Hubble Space Telescope. Recent reviews of the
threat of an orbital debris strike have remained nearly constant since
its initial review last September. Since that time, the recent Iridium-
Cosmos collision has added to the debris field in LEO and represents a
71 percent increase in the amount of threatening debris to STS-125. Due
to its low altitude in LEO, the ISS' risk of collision will be lower
than that of spacecraft that operate at higher altitudes in LEO.
Nevertheless, the ISS still remains at risk from micro-meteoroid and
orbital debris strikes. The possibility of having to maneuver the ISS
away from harmful debris will remain constant throughout its life-time.
Typically, an ISS maneuver takes approximately 30 hours to plan and
execute.
In addition to on-orbit risks, there are economic consequences that
flow from the increase in orbital debris and a potential lack of
adequate situational awareness. The need to maneuver leads to the use
of limited spacecraft fuel supplies, which can shorten the on-orbit
operational lifetime of the spacecraft. Another economic consequence
could be the disruption of data and services of commercial satellites.
Even if they aren't actually struck, maneuvering satellites out of
harm's is costly, as data and service continuity become disrupted as a
result of the maneuver.
Over the past several years, there have been several incidents
which contributed to the rise in the number of orbital debris:
Iridium 33--Cosmos 2251 Satellite Collision: On
February 10, 2009, a U.S. Iridium communications satellite
collided at a near right angle to a decommissioned Russian
Cosmos communications satellite at an altitude of 790 km. This
was the first hypervelocity collision of two `intact'
spacecraft ever. According to Space News, the collision created
at least 823 pieces of trackable debris (with many smaller
pieces not yet cataloged) and increased the risk of a debris
strike on the Space Shuttle by approximately six percent. The
majority of this debris will remain a threat to other
satellites in LEO for decades.
Chinese A-SAT test on Fengyun-1C: In January of 2007,
the Chinese government launched an SC-19 missile at one of
their country's decommissioned weather satellites and destroyed
it. It is the worst fragmentation event in the history of space
flight and at the time, accounted for more than 25 percent of
cataloged objects in LEO. The estimated debris population
larger than one cm in size generated by the collision will
eventually exceed 150,000. Resultant debris has already
enveloped the Earth and now poses a threat to all spacecraft in
LEO.
Russian spent stage explosion--Russian Arabsat 4: A
Russian upper stage from a Proton rocket exploded in February
2007, almost a year after its launch to GEO failed, creating an
initial amount of over 1,100 pieces of trackable debris. The
cause of the explosion was determined to be leftover fuel in
the failed stage that was ignited by several possible sources.
Mr. Nicholas Johnson, a witness at the hearing, will be able to
provide additional details on the risks associated with these recent
events.
Space Surveillance Capabilities
Although the U.S. has the most capable space surveillance system in
the world, other countries also utilize radars and telescopes to
perform similar tracking activities. Limited in their space
surveillance capabilities, other nations must use information generated
by the U.S. system to supplement their own data.
U.S. Space Surveillance Capabilities
Space surveillance refers to the ability to detect, track, and
identify objects in space. Surveillance services used by space
transportation users include calculation of debris-clear launch
trajectories and in-orbit debris tracking and collision warnings. The
primary supplier of space surveillance capability is the Space
Surveillance Network (SSN), consisting of a world-wide network of 29
ground-based sensors including electro-optical, conventional and
phased-array radars. The SSN permits the cataloging of objects in
space. According to an April 2009 presentation by a representative of
NASA's Orbital Debris Program Office to the NASA Advisory Council, the
number of cataloged objects has increased by more than 30% since
January 2007. The catalog currently accounts for more than 14,000
objects in orbit.
The SSN can collect data about objects' altitude, orbit, size, and
composition. The capabilities of the network are limited by the debris'
size and altitude, however. Initially, the SSN could not detect or
track objects smaller than 10 centimeters in LEO, and only objects 30
centimeters and larger could be continuously tracked. Remote sensing
satellites typically use LEO, as do most manned space flights. In March
2003, the sensitivity of the SSN was enhanced so that objects as small
as five centimeters orbiting in LEO can be tracked. As altitude
increases, the ability of the SSN's sensors to detect small objects
decreases. Consequently, objects in Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO) need to
be located through optical instruments (as opposed to radar) and also
must be at least one meter across to be tracked. Satellites in GEO
orbit the Earth once a day at an altitude of approximately 35,786
kilometers (about 22,236 miles). Satellites in geostationary orbit are
primarily used for communications and meteorology.
Protection of NASA assets is a major concern. The Joint Space
Operations Center (JSpOC) within the U.S. Strategic Command provides
collision avoidance analysis for the Space Shuttle and International
Space Station (ISS). During NASA missions, the JSpOC computes possible
close approaches of other orbiting objects to the Space Shuttle or ISS.
The JSpOC also conducts re-entry assessments for objects including
prediction of time, location of atmospheric reentry, and potential
ground impact.
Space surveillance capabilities are likely to improve in the next
few years. The Air Force's Space Based Space Surveillance (SBSS)
Program, initiated in 2003, will consist of a single satellite and
associated command, control, communications, and ground processing
equipment when operational. The SBSS satellite, scheduled for launch in
2009, is scheduled to operate 24 hours a day, seven days a week, to
collect positional and characterization data on Earth-orbiting objects
of potential interest to national security. The SSN's only space borne
sensor to date, the space-based visible (SBV) sensor carried aboard the
Midcourse Space Experiment (MSX) satellite, was retired in June 2008
after nearly 12 years of operation. DOD considers SBSS to be an
essential element in developing a space situational-awareness
capability. In an article published in Space News, it was reported that
``SBSS will allow airmen to monitor satellites in the geosynchronous
orbit 24 hours a day, which Space Command can't presently do with its
Ground-based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance (GEODSS) system.
Airmen on the ground can only collect data on satellites using the
GEODSS at night when the sun is reflecting on the targeted satellite.''
This is because unlike ground sensors, the space-based SBSS is not
limited by lighting conditions, weather, or atmospheric distortion.
One of the SSN's oldest systems is the Space Fence which grew out
of an effort by the Naval Research Laboratory to detect and track
satellites that did not emit signals as part of their normal
operations. Ushered into existence as the Naval Space Surveillance
System (NSSS) in 1961, the Space Fence is composed of three
transmitters and six receivers interspersed across the southern United
States. As reported by C4ISR Journal, DOD is considering upgrading the
Space Fence with more powerful radars and sites overseas for more
expansive coverage. According to an article in Inside the Air Force,
the service hopes to award a concept development phase contract in July
2009. The upgraded Space Fence will be capable of detecting tenfold the
amount of objects in Low- and Medium-Earth Orbit. It also will be able
to monitor objects five centimeters in diameter, compared to the 30-
centimeter limit of the legacy asset. According to Inside the Air
Force, the Air Force anticipates ``that the winning contractor will
deliver the initial, southern hemisphere coverage Space Fence sensor
``no later than fiscal year 2015'' and deliver all expected blocks of
coverage by FY20.'' ''
International Space Surveillance Capabilities
Other countries also have space tracking capabilities, but they are
not on par with the SSN. For example, according to an article in Space
News, the Russian-led International Scientific Optical Network, based
at Moscow's Keldysh Institute of Applied Mathematics, includes some 25
optical telescopes, mainly in the republics of the former Soviet Union,
that can be deployed on a case-by-case basis as part of commercial
transactions. But this network's focus is on objects in geostationary
orbit, the operating orbit for most commercial satellites but far above
LEO regions where debris is of most concern. French, German, and
Japanese systems are also in use. For example:
France has developed a radar system called Graves
(Grand Reseau Adapte a la Veille Spatiale), a demonstrator
which has been operational since 2005 and can watch the sky up
to 1,000 km above the French territory. According to its
developer, ONERA, the Graves system consists of ``specific
radar combined with an automatic processing system that creates
and updates a database of the orbital parameters for the
satellites it detects.'' Graves is operated by the French Air
Force.
The European Space Agency (ESA) collaborates with the
operators of the German TIRA system (Tracking and Imaging
Radar), located at FGAN (Research Establishment for Applied
Science), near Bonn, Germany. According to ESA's Space Debris
web site, TIRA has a 34-meter dish antenna. The radar also
conducts beam park experiments, where the radar beam is pointed
in a fixed direction for 24 hours so that the beam scans
360+ in a narrow strip on the celestial sphere
during a full Earth rotation. During such experiments, the web
site says, TIRA can detect debris and determine ``coarse orbit
information for objects of diameters down to two cm at 1000 km
range.''
According to a report on ``Space Debris Related
Activities in Japan'' presented by Japanese representatives to
the UN's Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOUS) in February, 2009, observation of objects in
geosynchronous orbit (GEO) and determination of their orbit
characteristics are routinely carried out using Japanese
optical telescopes. Research to develop software that can
automatically detect smaller objects in GEO is progressing.
Japanese representatives also said that LEO observations are
being conducted using radar telescopes and that research to
observe objects in LEO is also being conducted using high-speed
tracking optical telescopes.
U.S. Space Surveillance Services
To be useful, information related to potential in-space collisions
that is obtained through tracking efforts needs to be disseminated to
all affected space users, including non-governmental entities. If a
space user knows that a particular object in space poses a collision
risk to a satellite or spacecraft, the user can maneuver the satellite
or spacecraft to avoid the debris. However, avoidance maneuvers consume
valuable fuel supplies, which translates into a reduced operational
life. Since collisions in space increase the amount of debris, it is in
the interest of all parties concerned to ensure space users have access
to relevant space surveillance data. Initially, the data from the SSN
had been made available through NASA's Orbital Information Group's
(OIG) web site.
However, in November 2003, the Congress directed the Secretary of
Defense through the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act [P.L. 108-
136, Section 913] to provide space surveillance data to any foreign or
domestic governmental or commercial entity, so long as it was
consistent with national security. The Secretary delegated
implementation responsibility to the Secretary of the Air Force in
October 2004. The national policy of providing space surveillance
information was further articulated in the President's National Space
Policy dated August 31, 2006. In achieving the goals of the national
policy, the Secretary of Defense was assigned responsibility for
supporting the space situational awareness requirements of the Director
of National Intelligence and conducting space situational awareness for
``the United States government; U.S. commercial space capabilities and
services used for national and homeland security purposes; civil space
capabilities and operations, particularly human space flight
activities; and, as appropriate, commercial and foreign space
activities.''
With regards to orbital debris, the National Space Policy
acknowledges that orbital debris poses a risk to continued reliable use
of space-based services and operations and to the safety of persons and
property in space. Consequently, the policy states that ``the United
States shall seek to minimize the creation of orbital debris by
government and non-government operations in space in order to preserve
the space environment for future generations.'' The policy also states
that the ``United States shall take a leadership role in international
fora to encourage foreign nations and international organizations to
adopt policies and practices aimed at debris minimization and shall
cooperate in the exchange of information on debris research and the
identification of improved debris mitigation practices.''
Commercial and Foreign Entities (CFE) Pilot Program
Pursuant to the legislative direction, the Air Force Space Command
implemented the Commercial and Foreign Entities (CFE) Pilot Program.
The CFE pilot program was designed to be implemented in three phases
over a three-year period, gradually transitioning CFE support
responsibilities from NASA to the Air Force's Space Command. In
addition to the free orbital data previously provided on NASA's OIG web
site, the Air Force offered to provide, for a fee, advanced analytical
support such as on-orbit conjunction assessment and pre-launch safety
screenings. The Air Force's goal was to provide increased situational
awareness for commercial and foreign operators, thereby improving
orbital safety for all space vehicles. The previously cited legislation
allows space surveillance data and analysis to be provided to any
foreign or domestic governmental or commercial entity, so long as
providing the data and analysis is in the national security interests
of the United States. Furthermore, before being provided with such
data, a non-U.S. Government entity must enter into an agreement with
the Secretary of Defense agreeing to (a) pay for any fee charged by the
Secretary to reimburse the Department for the costs of providing space
surveillance data support under the agreement and (b) not transfer any
data or technical information received under the agreement without the
approval of the Secretary.
The Air Force selected the Aerospace Corporation to operate the CFE
Support Office (CSO) and tasked it to interface with commercial and
foreign entities on behalf of the Air Force Space Command and develop
the Space-Track.org web site to replace the NASA OIG web site.
Initially, the CFE pilot program was scheduled to last three years and
end in May 2007. However, in October 2006, the Congress extended the
pilot's end date to September 30, 2009 [P.L. 109-364, Section 912].
Aviation Week and Space Technology recently reported that the CFE
program is scheduled to transition from the Air Force Space Command to
the U.S. Strategic Command later this year.
According to the Air Force, the CFE Pilot Program was to be
implemented in three phases, Phase 1 being a transitionary one where
the CSO activated the Space-Track web site offering a limited subset of
the NASA OIG web site functionality. During Phase 2, the NASA OIG web
site ceased operating and functions such as specific queries, a 60-day
decay forecast report, and a satellite situation report were made
available.
The CFE Pilot Program is currently in Phase 3. The CSO provides
advanced services and products on a fee-for-service basis because of
the additional analysis and manipulation required by additional Air
Force personnel. Services provided include all services offered under
Phase 1 and Phase 2 and more advanced capabilities such as launch
support (Pre-Launch safety screenings and/or early orbit
determination); conjunction assessment (CA) (determining the likelihood
of a conjunction between orbiting objects); end-of-life/reentry support
(including reentry support and planned de-orbit operations); anomaly
resolution support (including attitude determination and spacecraft
configuration); and providing emergency support. Emergency support is
required when significant mission degradation or failure occurs for
either the affected party's asset or U.S. Government assets,
endangerment of human life or degradation of U.S. national security.
Emergency support is a free service.
More advanced information and services may soon be available.
According to a March 2009 article in Space News, the Air Force is
moving towards providing ``wider access to its high-accuracy catalog
showing the whereabouts of orbital debris and operational satellites as
part of an effort to enable commercial and non-U.S. Government
satellite operators to better avoid in-orbit collisions, according to
U.S. Air Force officials.'' The new policy, Space News reported, should
be announced in June 2009. In a March 2009 response to Space News
questions, the Air Force's Space Command said that: ``In the near
future, the public will also receive more advanced services to include
End-of-Life support, Anomaly Resolution support, and potential threat
notification support. The vision is to provide these advanced services
via the same web site as the [collision-risk analysis] and Launch
support service is provided.'' Space News cited an Air Force official
as having said that a full review of how space traffic management is
conducted is being readied for completion before this summer.
Space News also reported that Iridium Satellite has been given
special access to otherwise nonpublic Space Surveillance Network
information, but only for limited periods. According to Iridium's Vice
President for Government Affairs, Iridium was given access to the high-
accuracy data starting in January 2007, following China's anti-
satellite missile firing that destroyed a retired Chinese weather
satellite operating in an orbit near Iridium's. Space News reported
that Iridium's access to the high-accuracy data was only for the debris
from the Chinese anti-satellite test. The publication reported that
although the access ended in January 2008, it was renewed in February
2009 to aid Iridium in repositioning an on-orbit spare satellite to
replace the one that was destroyed.
The Space News article also said that the data furnished by the Air
Force was based only on the Air Force's catalog and had not included
inputs from Iridium on the exact location of its satellites. The
``fusion'' of such data is seen as augmenting space situational
awareness. According to Space News, ``operator input makes even the
most precise Air Force information more accurate because operators know
the exact position of their own spacecraft.''
Many questions remain as to how to improve space situational
awareness with an ever growing population of spacecraft and
international operators. Improvements in information services,
capabilities and resources, and coordination will all have to be
addressed. One approach, the previously referenced fusion of data,
would allow combining multiple sources of information to produce a more
detailed and refined estimation of the orbital environment. Efforts are
underway to improve the system of integrated data by incorporating
foreign information, ground and space based observations, space weather
data, and other data sources. This information should help provide more
accuracy to automated processes and computations that will reduce the
reliance on human analysis.
Notwithstanding DOD's plans to upgrade the SSN, concerns have been
raised regarding the Department's level of investment in space
surveillance and whether funding may be sufficient to provide the data
commercial space users need to protect their satellites. In a March
2009 testimony before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, House Armed
Services Committee, retired Major General James Armor said that the SSN
is not sufficiently resourced to support civil and commercial
operations. The former Director of DOD's National Security Space Office
said that the Air Force does not have the resources to conduct CFE
support, adding that ``recent complaints by commercial operators about
unwarned movement of DOD satellites and lack of support for moving
commercial satellites at GEO, as well as the Iridium Satellite
collision with a defunct Russian Cosmos satellite are indications of
inadequate resources and lower priority for CFE.'' In addition, space
users have also indicated concern about insufficient funding. An
article in Aviation Week and Space Technology recently quoted a
satellite communications official as saying that the question is
``whether there will be enough money to get more than the two-line
elements currently available.'' The article added that ``Industry
analysts say the two-line element sets do not satisfy operators'
accuracy needs: they want specific data sets that include such
information as maneuvering details necessary to predict the ephemeris
(daily computed position) of active satellites and to accurately
forecast the close approach of drifting debris.''
The Air Force has indicated that 25,000 users and 149 nations have
availed themselves of the CFE Pilot Program's services. Lt. Gen. Larry
D. James, a witness at the hearing, will provide the latest status on
the CFE Pilot Program, including steps envisioned following the Pilot
Program's completion. Mr. Richard DalBello, also a witness at the
hearing, will provide perspectives from the commercial user's
viewpoint.
Other Space Surveillance Analysis Tools and Services
There are other means for space operators to gain access to
additional assistance. For example: NASA has developed a software tool
to be used by the Agency's programs but also made available to other
space users.
The Debris Assessment Software (DAS) is designed to
assist NASA programs in performing orbital debris assessments
and provides the user with tools to assess compliance with the
requirements. In addition, NASA has developed a computer-based
orbital debris engineering model called ORDEM2000. The model
describes the orbital debris environment in the low-Earth orbit
region between 200 km and 2,000 km altitude. NASA says that the
model is appropriate for those engineering tasks requiring
knowledge and estimates of the orbital debris environment and
can also be used as a benchmark for ground-based debris
measurements and observations. This engineering model will soon
be enhanced with the upcoming release of ORDEM2008.
The Satellite Orbital Conjunction Reports Assessing
Threatening Encounters in Space for Geosynchronous (SOCRATES-
GEO) service offered by the Center for Space Standards and
Innovation (CSSI) provides commercial space users with an
alternative to DOD analyses. Based in Colorado Springs, CO,
CSSI is a research arm of Analytical Graphics, Inc. (AGI).
SOCRATES-GEO is a partnership between CSSI and several
commercial GEO providers where voluntary owner-operator
positional data and maneuver schedules are provided to CSSI by
the commercial partners. The CSSI analysts and software combine
this information with data pulled from the U.S. military's
public satellite catalog on debris and other objects.
As indicated in the European Space Agency's (ESA)
Space Debris web site, the consolidation of knowledge on all
known objects in space is a fundamental condition for the
operational support activities of ESA's Space Debris Office.
This knowledge, the web site says, is maintained and kept up-
to-date through the DISCOS database (Database and Information
System Characterising Objects in Space). DISCOS serves as a
single-source reference for information on launch details,
orbit histories, physical properties and mission descriptions
for about 33,500 objects tracked since Sputnik-1, including
records of 7.4 million orbits in total. According to ESA,
DISCOS is regularly used by almost 50 customers worldwide.
ESA's most prominent debris and meteoroid risk
assessment tool is called MASTER (Meteoroid and Space Debris
Terrestrial Environment Reference). In order to study the
effectiveness of debris mitigation measures on the debris
population stability, long-term forecasts are required to
determine future trends as a function of individual mitigation
actions. This type of analysis can be performed with ESA's
DELTA tool (Debris Environment Long-Term Analysis).
Collaborative Efforts to Mitigate the Growth of Orbital Debris And
Enhance Space Situational Awareness
Because of the global nature of the risks of orbital debris to
space users of all nations, several collaborative efforts have emerged
in the form of guidelines to minimize the propagation of space debris
and research to improve space situational awareness capabilities. While
space surveillance focuses on securing positional data, situational
awareness oftentimes requires the ``fusing'' (combining) of multiple
data types and sources, thus creating information conducive to
decision-making.
International Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines
The Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) is an
international governmental forum for the worldwide coordination of
activities related to the issues of man-made and natural debris in
space. The primary purposes of IADC are to exchange information on
space debris research activities between member space agencies, to
facilitate opportunities for cooperation in space debris research, to
review the progress of ongoing cooperative activities, and to identify
debris mitigation options. IADC member agencies include ASI (Agenzia
Spaziale Italiana); BNSC (British National Space Centre); CNES (Centre
National d'Etudes Spatiales); CNSA (China National Space
Administration); DLR (German Aerospace Center); ESA (European Space
Agency); ISRO (Indian Space Research Organisation); JAXA (Japan
Aerospace Exploration Agency); NASA ; NSAU (National Space Agency of
Ukraine); and ROSCOSMOS (Russian Federal Space Agency).
An initial set of space debris mitigation guidelines was developed
by IADC in 2002, reflecting the fundamental debris mitigation elements
of a series of existing practices, standards, codes and handbooks
developed by a number of national and international organizations. The
UN's COPUOUS acknowledged the benefit of a set of high-level
qualitative guidelines having wider acceptance among the global space
community. The Working Group on Space Debris was established by the
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the Committee to develop a set
of recommended guidelines based on the technical content and the basic
definitions of the IADC space debris mitigation guidelines, taking into
consideration the United Nations treaties and principles on outer
space.
This activity resulted in the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines
being endorsed by the United Nations' General Assembly in December
2007, a document that outlines space debris mitigation measures for the
mission planning, design, manufacture and operational (launch, mission
and disposal) phases of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages.
Compliance is voluntary; in addition, Guidelines are not legally
binding under international law. However, many Member States have
incorporated them through national mechanisms. The Guidelines,
characterized numerically in the United Nations document, focus on
seven areas:
Guideline 1: Limit debris released during normal
operations
Guideline 2: Minimize the potential for break-ups
during operational phases
Guideline 3: Limit the probability of accidental
collision in orbit
Guideline 4: Avoid intentional destruction and other
harmful activities
Guideline 5: Minimize potential for post-mission
break-ups resulting from stored energy
Guideline 6: Limit the long-term presence of
spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages in the low-Earth
orbit (LEO) region after the end of their mission
Guideline 7: Limit the long-term interference of
spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages with the
geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) region after the end of their
mission.
Shortly after the February 10, 2009 collision between the inactive
Russian Federation communications satellite Cosmos 2251 and the
operational U.S. satellite Iridium 33, the Director of the United
Nations' Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) issued a call to all
Member States and international organizations to voluntarily take
measures to ensure that the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines are
fully implemented. The Director stressed that ``the prompt
implementation of appropriate space debris mitigation measures is in
humanity's common interest, particularly if we are to preserve the
outer space environment for future generations.''
5th European Conference on Space Debris
During the 5th European Conference on Space Debris held earlier
this month in Darmstadt, Germany, experts from around the world met to
discuss a variety of issues associated with space debris such as
measurements and debris environment characterization; environment
modeling and forecasting, risk analysis for the in-orbit and re-entry
mission phases, protection and shielding, debris mitigation and
remediation, and debris policies and guidelines.
As noted on the Conference's web site, the Conference's main
finding was that mitigation alone cannot maintain a safe and stable
debris environment in the long-term future and that active space debris
remediation measures will need to be devised and implemented. Conferees
recognized that such measures are technologically demanding and
potentially costly, but saw no alternative to protect space as a
valuable resource for the operation of indispensable satellite
infrastructures. The web site conference summary stated that as far as
satellite infrastructures are concerned ``their direct costs and the
costs of losing them will by far exceed the cost of remedial
activities.''
Research on a European Union Space Surveillance Awareness
System
ESA is undertaking research on European countries' needs for Space
Situational Awareness (SSA). ESA defines SSA as the comprehensive
understanding and knowledge of (a) the population of space objects, (b)
the space environment, and (c) possible threats/risks. As such, the
European SSA differs in philosophy to the U.S. SSN in that
``astronomical threats,'' such as asteroids, will be tracked. In a
September 2008 presentation entitled ``ESA's initiative towards a
European Space Situational Awareness System'' at the Space for Defence
and Security Conference sponsored by the Royal United Services
Institute, an ESA representative outlined his agency's progress to
date. He provided the background for the research, noting the European
Union's (EU) dependency on space assets; the major consequences of a
shutdown of even a part of the space infrastructure on the European
economy and security; and the fact that the EU does not have the
capability to monitor its space assets and identify threats. The ESA
representative said that relative to the SSA research program, ESA had
(1) established an informal user group representing the full spectrum
of potential SSA user communities (civil, military, commercial
operators, national space agencies, insurance companies, scientific
community, defense intelligence, etc.), (2) initiated several
preliminary studies such as a compilation of a SSA Users' Needs list;
and (3) prepared an SSA research Program Proposal.
According to the ESA representative, the overall research program
will be conducted from 2009 to 2018. With regards to the benefits of a
Europe-U.S. cooperative SSA effort, the ESA representative listed those
benefits as making the two systems more capable, more robust, and more
``credible'' (i.e., ``through reciprocal independent situational
assessment and validation'').
Others in the global community also believe an inter-agency
coalition should be formed to develop an international space traffic
management organization. A February 23, 2009 Space News article quotes
Air Force Gen. Michael Carey, Deputy Director of U.S. Strategic Command
as saying that the Air Force would be willing to help coordinate an
international effort to create a space traffic management system, but
the service stopped short of suggesting what entity would take the lead
in operating such a system.
Future Challenges Associated with Space Debris Mitigation, Removal, and
Designation of Responsibility
There are a number of challenges facing the global community with
regards to how space debris could be mitigated or removed, how
responsibility for space traffic management will be assigned, and
whether rules of conduct to minimize space debris need to be explicitly
stated.
Space Debris Mitigation and Removal
There are two major methods for stemming the growth of orbital
debris. Growth mitigation is currently the primary and only means for
combating space debris. This more cost effective method includes all
preventative measures taken to reduce the possibility for multiple
types of debris generating events. One method of mitigation involves
disposing of spacecraft at the end of their operational life time by
maneuvering them into the Earth's atmosphere or by placing them into a
higher ``graveyard orbit.'' The passivation of aging spacecraft is used
to prevent accidental debris generating events that can occur many
years after mission completion by reducing stored energy sources by
venting or burning remaining propellants and pressurized systems, and
the discharging of batteries. There are also preventative design
measures that can be added to a spacecraft or rocket during its design
and manufacturing stages that can reduce the possibility of future
explosions and that limit the amount of debris generated during in-
space activities.
The second method is active debris removal. NASA studies have shown
that even if there were no new launches of any kind, orbital debris
would continue to grow as existing spacecraft and debris continued to
collide and propagate. Therefore, various experts have recently come to
the conclusion that active debris removal must be viewed as a possible
solution as there is no other apparent alternative for proactively
reducing debris. Yet, active debris removal is extremely expensive to
design, test, and produce and has therefore been a historically low
engineering R&D priority. Very few theoretical methods of active debris
removal exist, and several studies have been initiated by different
space agencies and groups to verify the technical feasibility of
several proposed methods.
Responsibility for Space Traffic Management and Rules of
the Road
Retired General James Armor testified at the previously noted House
Armed Services Committee subcommittee hearing that there is currently
no assigned organizational responsibility for space traffic management
in the U.S. While acknowledging that the National Security Space Office
(NSSO) maintains DOD's joint agency architecture, he noted that
responsibilities for space traffic management are located in several
other agencies. For example, the FAA's Office of Commercial Space
Transportation grants launch and re-entry licenses, the Federal
Communications Commission grants orbital locations and spectrum, and
the Air Force operates the Space Surveillance system. He drew an
analogy with the Global Positioning System (GPS) that started as a
strictly military system but rapidly grew to have civil and commercial
applications. General Armor recalled how organizational responsibility
became vested in a National Executive Committee co-chaired by DOD and
the Department of Transportation having oversight over diverse agency
functions and resources. He advocated that ``Synchronizing these
agencies to jointly start studying a space traffic management
investment framework might be productive. Working towards a
commercially secure space operating environment is an opportunity for
global U.S. space leadership that addresses a huge portion of space
security. This is also where discussions about rules of the road might
be beneficial.''
In addition, there have been other organizations and individuals
that have examined the pros and cons of potential space traffic
management approaches or international ``rules of the road.'' There is
currently no international treaty, document or set of agreed upon
guidelines that mandates a legal set of approaches towards space
traffic management. The most concrete set of ``rules of the road''
originate from the space agencies internally. Legal solutions to such
concerns as liability issues remain unclear. No standard exists for
what constitutes negligence, nor is there a clear approach towards
resolving possible incidents between foreign civil, commercial and
military spacecraft. At this point, there does not appear to be a
consensus on the appropriate long-term framework for space traffic
management.
Chairwoman Giffords. This hearing will come to order. Good
afternoon, everyone, and welcome to today's hearing of the
Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee.
One of my favorite photographs can be seen in the other
room, which is the Hubble Deep Field photograph where you look
at it from a distance, and it looks like it is a photograph of
a bunch of stars, but as you get closer you see, in fact, it is
a photo of a bunch of galaxies. And the more you learn about
this incredible photograph you realize they just decided to
take an image from Hubble into the universe, and it is
approximately as large as your thumb if you were to hold it up,
and it really goes to show is what Kurt Vonnegut had said,
``The universe is a big place.''
And that is why it is such a surprise to me and many others
on the Subcommittee when we heard the news that two satellites
had collided in orbit in February of this year. It is hard to
believe that space has gotten that crowded. It was equally
difficult to believe that nothing could have been done to
prevent the collision, given that one of the satellites was
active and by all accounts would have had the capability to
move, maneuver out of harm's way. But the collision did happen,
and the resulting increase in space debris has made the space
environment more hazardous to civil and commercial satellites
and spacecraft alike for many, many years to come.
So now it is three months later, and someone like myself
who serves both on the House Science Committee and also on the
House Armed Services Committee, I believe that I speak for my
colleagues on both committees and others as well that we want
to know where things stand, and we want to know what we need to
do in order to keep an event such as the one that happened in
February from happening again.
For example, how confident can we be that we are not going
to face a similar hazardous situation in the near future
between a commercial satellite and a U.S. or another nation's
government spacecraft?
Equally important, what assurance can we have that there
will be adequate warning of a potential collision before it is
too late to do anything about it? We also want to hear how DOD,
NASA, the commercial space operators, and other space-faring
nations coordinate in order to minimize the threat of such
occurrences. And is the information on space debris and
potential collisions getting to the people who need it when
they need it?
In short, was the February collision a fluke that could
have been awarded--avoided, or do we need to improve our
national and international capabilities for keeping the space
environment safe for both civil and commercial users? If so,
what is needed, and how do we go about getting it put into
place?
We hope to get the answers today to these important
questions at the hearing, and I believe that we have a good
panel of witnesses to help us in our oversight of this
important issue. One thing is already clear. The space
environment is getting increasingly crowded due to the
relentless growth of space debris. Many say that if we do
nothing, the problem will continue to get worse.
As our witnesses will testify, the U.S. Space Surveillance
Network is currently tracking more than 19,000 objects that are
in orbit around the Earth. In addition, it has estimated that
there are more than 300,000 pieces of debris as small as a half
inch in size orbiting the Earth, including most recently a
small spatula and a tool kit as well.
So it is clear to me that if space-faring nations of the
world don't take steps to minimize the growth of space junk, we
will eventually face a situation where low-Earth orbit becomes
a risky place to carry out civil and commercial space
activities. This subcommittee wants to avoid that kind of space
future if we can, and this hearing is going to be an important
milestone in that effort.
With that I want to welcome our distinguished panel of
witnesses, and I look forward to your testimony.
And with that I would like to recognize Mr. Olson for any
opening remarks he would like to make.
[The prepared statement of Chairwoman Giffords follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairwoman Gabrielle Giffords
Good afternoon and welcome to today's hearing of the Space and
Aeronautics Subcommittee.
To quote the late Kurt Vonnegut, ``the universe is a big place . .
.''
That's why it was such a surprise to me and many others when we
heard the news that two satellites had collided in orbit in February of
this year.
It was hard to believe that space had gotten that crowded.
It was equally difficult to believe that nothing could have been
done to prevent the collision, given that one of the satellites was
active and by all accounts would have had the capability to maneuver
out of harm's way.
But the collision did happen.
And the resulting increase in space debris has made the space
environment more hazardous to civil and commercial satellites and
spacecraft alike for years to come.
It's now almost three months later.
As someone who serves on both the Science and Technology Committee
and the House Armed Services Committee, I want to know where things
stand, and what we're going to do to keep such an event from happening
again.
For example, how confident can we be that we aren't going to face a
similar hazardous situation in the near future between a commercial
satellite and a U.S.--or other nation's government spacecraft?
Equally importantly, what assurance can we have that there will be
adequate warning of a potential collision before it is too late to do
anything about it?
How do DOD, NASA, the commercial space operators, and other space-
faring nations coordinate to minimize the threat of such occurrences,
and is the information on space debris and potential collisions getting
to the people who need it when they need it?
In short, was the February collision a fluke that couldn't have
been avoided, or do we need to improve our national--and
international--capabilities for keeping the space environment safe for
civil and commercial users?
If so, what is needed, and how do we go about getting it put in
place?
We hope to get answers to these and other important questions at
today's hearing, and I believe we have a good panel of witnesses to
help us in our oversight of this important issue.
One thing is already clear--the space environment is getting
increasingly crowded due to the relentless growth of space debris.
As our witnesses will testify, the U.S. Space Surveillance Network
is currently tracking more than 19,000 objects that are in orbit around
the Earth.
In addition, it is estimated there are more than 300,000 pieces of
debris as small as half-inch in size orbiting the Earth.
That's a lot of debris! And of course there is the temporary bump-
up in the amount of debris that results whenever the odd astronaut
spatula or toolkit floats away from the International Space Station . .
..
It is clear that if the space-faring nations of the world don't
take steps to minimize the growth of space junk, we may eventually face
a situation where low-Earth orbit becomes a risky place to carry out
civil and commercial space activities.
I want to avoid that kind of space future if we can, and this
hearing is going to be an important milestone in that effort.
With that, I want again want to welcome our distinguished panel of
witnesses, and I look forward to your testimony.
I now want to recognize Mr. Olson for any opening remarks he may
care to make.
Mr. Olson. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for calling this
afternoon's hearing. I believe this is the first time that the
Committee has considered this issue, the Subcommittee has
considered this issue, and my thanks to the witnesses for
taking time out of your busy schedules to appear before us
today. I know you have invested many hours of preparation for
today's hearing, and I am grateful for your efforts and your
expertise.
Satellite collisions and the danger posed by satellite
debris have captured the public's and industries' attention. As
the Chairwoman alluded to, the Iridium-Cosmos collision should
serve as a stark signal that space-faring nations can no longer
be complacent about the threats posed to all who use space.
Congress through the Administration must also take note as
we endeavor to establish future policies and programs that rely
on routine access in use of space. There are many issues I look
forward to hearing about today and to ask questions about our
path forward.
As more countries join the ranks as space-faring nations,
all of us must determine ways to prevent future collisions, to
mitigate the threat of debris, how best to track debris, how to
minimize debris generation during future launches, and to
better understand the economic and operational effects that
space debris poses on civil, commercial, and military users.
Once again, this committee is addressing an issue that has
moved from the realm of science fiction to one of science fact.
Can we track a bolt that came off a dead satellite moving at
thousands of miles an hour to prevent it from hitting a still-
working spacecraft that is critical to our daily lives or to
the lives of a crew that is on board that spacecraft? The
chance of this may not be as great as the chance of me getting
into a fender bender going down the Gulf Freeway during rush
hour, but the consequences are much greater than a traffic jam
caused at one rush hour. No other nation is as heavily invested
in space-based commerce, national security, and environmental
monitoring research as the United States of America.
Given the critical role that space plays in our daily lives
and one that is so critical to preserving a high standard of
living, we simply must improve our ability to monitor and
mitigate the threats posed by other satellites and space
debris. And we can't stop at our borders. I think it is
critical that we must also convince other space-faring nations
of the urgency to adopt similar strategies, especially as more
and more satellites are lofted into more and more crowded
orbits.
To the unknowing, the term space traffic management may
sound a bit geeky or a little esoteric, but as I was preparing
for this afternoon's hearing I was quickly convinced that the
term has real meaning and describes a discipline we all need to
pay close attention to. I am aware that government-owned and
operated satellites rely on intensive monitoring programs to
avoid collisions with other satellites and debris, but as more
and more satellites come into use, especially from commercial
users, many of whom are from overseas countries, the challenge
of maintaining safe separation will grow.
Again, I want to thank our Chairwoman for convening this
timely and important hearing, and thanks again to our
witnesses. I am anxious to hear your testimony and ask you some
questions later on.
Madam Chairman, I--Chairwoman, I yield my time back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Olson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Pete Olson
Madame Chairwoman, thank you for calling this afternoon's hearing,
which I believe is the first time this subcommittee has explored this
issue, and my thanks too, to our witnesses for taking time out of your
busy schedules to appear before us today. I know that you have invested
many hours in preparation for today's hearing, and I am grateful for
your efforts and your expertise.
Satellite collisions and the dangers posed by space debris have
captured the public's and industry's attention. As the Chairwoman
alluded to, the Iridium/Cosmos collision should serve as a stark signal
that space-faring nations can no longer be complacent about the threats
posed to all who use space. Congress and the Administration must also
take note as we endeavor to establish future policies and programs that
rely on routine access and use of space. There are many issues I look
forward to hearing about today and to ask questions about our path
forward.
As more countries join the ranks of space-faring nations, all of us
must determine ways to prevent future collisions, to mitigate the
threat of debris, how best to track debris, how to minimize debris
generation during future launches, and to better understand the
economic and operational effects that space debris imposes on civil,
commercial and military users.
Once again, this committee is addressing an issue that has moved
from the realm of science fiction to one of science fact: Can we track
a bolt that came off a long dead satellite moving at thousands of miles
an hour from hitting with a still working spacecraft that is critical
to our daily lives or to the lives of a crew inhabiting that
spacecraft? The chances of this may not be as great as the chance of me
getting into a fender bender on the Gulf Coast Freeway, but the
consequences are greater than ruining one rush hour.
No other nation is as heavily invested in space-based commerce,
national security, environmental monitoring and research as the United
States of America. Given the critical role that space plays in our
daily lives, and one that is so critical to preserving our high
standard of living, we simply must improve our ability to monitor and
mitigate the threats posed by other satellites and space debris. And we
can't stop at our borders. I think it critical that we also convince
other space-faring nations of the urgency to adopt similar strategies,
especially as more and more satellites are lofted into more and more
crowded orbits.
To the unknowing, the term `space traffic management' may sound a
bit geeky and esoteric, but as I was preparing for this afternoon's
hearing, I was quickly convinced that the term has real meaning and
describes a discipline we all need to pay close attention to. I am
aware that government-owned and operated satellites rely on intensive
monitoring programs to avoid collisions with other satellites and
debris, but as more and more satellites come into use, especially from
commercial users, many of whom are from overseas companies, the
challenge of maintaining safe separation will grow.
I want to thank our Chairwoman for convening this timely and
important hearing, and to again thank our witnesses. I am anxious to
hear your testimony and ask some questions about the way forward.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Olson. If there are
Members who wish to submit additional opening statements, your
statements will be added to the record at this point.
At this time I would like to introduce our witnesses. First
up we have Lieutenant General Larry D. James, who is a
Commander of the 14th Air Force, Air Force Space Command, and
the Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for
Space. Welcome.
We also have Mr. Nick Johnson, who is the Chief Scientist
for Orbital Debris for NASA. So welcome, Mr. Johnson.
We have Mr. Richard DalBello, who is the Vice President of
Government Relations at Intelsat General Corporation. Glad you
are here.
And finally have Dr. Scott Pace, who is the Director of the
Space Policy Institute at George Washington University.
As our witnesses should know, you will each have five
minutes for your spoken testimony. I know that is not a long
period of time, but it will keep us on track. Your written
testimony will be included for the record for the hearing, and
when you have all completed your spoken testimony, we will
begin questions. Each Member will have five minutes to question
the panel.
And we would like to begin with General James.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LARRY D. JAMES, COMMANDER, 14TH
AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND; COMMANDER, JOINT FUNCTIONAL
COMPONENT COMMAND FOR SPACE, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND
General James. Well, Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member
Olson, and distinguished Members of the Space and Aeronautics
Subcommittee, I am honored to be here today for my first
opportunity to appear before you as United States Strategic
Command's Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command
for Space. It is a distinct privilege to address you on the
challenges faced by civil and commercial space users and to
represent the men and women of JFCC Space who employ space
capabilities around the globe every day.
Today I will focus my discussion on what the current space
environment looks like, how we work with commercial space users
through the Commercial and Foreign Entities Pilot Program, and
identify some of the challenges we face as we work to meet the
growing challenges of operating safely in an increasingly-
complex and congested environment.
Space traffic growth today is both a challenge and a
concern. In 1980, only 10 countries were operating satellites
in space. Today nine countries operate space ports, more than
50 countries own or have partial ownership in satellites, and
citizens of 39 nations have flown in space. In 1980, we were
tracking approximately 4,700 objects in space, 280 of those
objects were active satellites, while another 2,600 were
debris. Today we are tracking as you said approximately 19,000
objects, 1,300 active payloads, and about 7,500 pieces of
debris. So in 29 years space traffic has quadrupled.
We have made progress in improving our space situational
awareness, however, as you noted February's collision between
an active Iridium communications satellite and an inactive
Russian satellite and a January, 2000, test of a Chinese ASAT
continue to shape our future planning by tangibly demonstrating
the vulnerability of our space assets.
With increased use of space by a growing number of state
and non-state users and the increased threats to our valuable
space systems, it is paramount that the Department of Defense
in collaboration with its partners in the U.S. Government, work
hand in hand with civil, commercial, and international
operators to ensure a space environment, a safe environment.
The DOD does have a sound relationship with commercial space
providers and operators, particularly those commercial
communication and remote imaging organizations that support
U.S. and national security activities. The relationship
includes formal contractual arrangements for the provision of
service to the DOD, routine strategic-level meetings between
the commercial satellite CEOs and DOD senior civilians and
officers, and numerous working-level meetings.
As part of the Commercial and Foreign Entity Pilot Program
or CFE Program, commercial users can access the
AirForceSpaceCommandSpaceTrack.org website to obtain
unclassified element-set data on current catalog objects. If a
user would like more information, they must sign an agreement
for CFE support via the website and submit a specific request
for specific support.
The CFE Pilot Program has been successful in transitioning
the routine provision of satellite positional information from
NASA to Air Force Space Command. Air Force Space Command has
also developed an initial set of legal agreements. These
agreements allow for the provision of additional services such
as conjunction assessments and launch support and help identify
the long-term desires of commercial and foreign entities for
space situational information.
The DOD intends to operationalize its support to commercial
and foreign entities in the fall of 2009. The goal is to
seamlessly transition the program from an Air Force Space
Command Pilot Program to U.S. Strategic Command operational
activity. The Joint Space Operation Center at Vandenberg Air
Force Base will be the central node for sharing of information.
We will continue to work closely with the commercial and
foreign space communities to understand their evolving needs
and desires for space situational awareness information and
continue to grow our cooperative relationships to share
information in ways that will improve space flight safety.
Space situational awareness is more than understanding the
space environment, tracking objects, and conducting conjunction
assessments. We need to be able to discriminate between natural
and manmade threats. We need to understand the location, the
status, and purpose of these objects, their capabilities and
their owner's intent. This comprehensive knowledge allows
decision-makers to rapidly and effectively select courses of
action to ensure our sustained freedom of action and safety in
what is a contested environment. To get there we require more
network sensors and information systems that seamlessly share
information to more effectively use our current resources.
The U.S. must continue to lead the community of space-
faring nations and encourage responsible behavior in the space
environment. The United States' dependence on space across our
military, civil, and commercial sectors requires improved space
situational awareness and command and control capabilities to
ensure our ability to safely and effectively operate in an
dynamic and contested environment. Working in collaboration
with our other departments and agencies in the U.S. Government,
DOD must continue to build relationships, processes, and
capabilities within the global space community that allow us to
operate effectively together to meet the needs of national
defense.
Thank you for inviting me here today, and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Lieutenant General James
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lieutenant General Larry D. James
Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Olson, and distinguished Members
of the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee, I am honored to be here
today for my first opportunity to appear before you as United States
Strategic Command's (USSTRATCOM) Commander of the Joint Functional
Component Command for Space (CDR JFCC SPACE).
It's a distinct privilege to address you on the challenges faced by
civil and commercial space users, and to represent the men and women of
JFCC SPACE who employ space capabilities around the globe every day.
These Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines are a dedicated and
innovative joint force, working hard to generate timely, accurate and
thorough space situational awareness (SSA) and conduct command and
control of our worldwide space forces. Their professionalism ensures,
to the maximum extent possible, that the U.S. and our Allies may
operate freely and safely in space.
Today I will focus my discussion on what the current space
environment looks like, how we work with commercial space users through
the Commercial and Foreign Entities (CFE) Pilot Program and identify
some of the challenges we face as we work to meet the growing challenge
of operating safely in an increasingly complex and congested space
environment.
CURRENT SPACE TRAFFIC ENVIRONMENT
Space traffic growth is both a challenge and a concern. In 1980
only 10 countries were operating satellites in space. Today, nine
countries operate spaceports, more than 50 countries own or have
partial ownership in satellites and citizens of 39 nations have
traveled in space. In 1980 we were tracking approximately 4,700 objects
in space; 280 of those objects were active payloads/spacecraft, while
another 2,600 were debris. Today we are tracking approximately 19,000
objects; 1,300 active payloads and 7,500 pieces of debris. In 29 years,
space traffic has quadrupled.
It's challenging to accurately predict the growth of active payload
space traffic and debris. In addition to the growth of national
security and commercial satellites from existing and new space-faring
nations, we believe the global diffusion of space technologies,
especially the availability of small spacecraft technologies and
providers, will lead to a larger and more diverse population of active
spacecraft.
Based on the last 10 years of launch activity, we conservatively
project the number of active satellites to grow from 1,300 to 1,500
over the next 10 years. We also estimate the overall number of tracked
objects could increase from 19,000 to as much as 100,000 depending
largely on anticipated increases in sensitivity of future sensors such
as the Space Fence. The increased sensitivity will allow us to track
existing but undiscovered small debris. However, there will still be
potentially lethal objects in space too small to be tracked by the
Space Surveillance Network (SSN).
We have made progress in improving our SSA; however, February's
unfortunate collision between an active Iridium communications
satellite and inactive Russian satellite, and the January 2007 Chinese
test of an anti-satellite (ASAT) continue to shape our future planning
by tangibly demonstrating the vulnerability of our space assets. To
date we have cataloged over 870 pieces of debris as a result of the
Iridium/COSMOS collision. The ASAT test by the Chinese left over 2,400
pieces of potentially destructive orbital debris that we're still
tracking 24 X 7. In both cases, there are likely thousands of smaller
pieces our sensors can't track. A combined total of only 58 items have
re-entered so far, with the remainder expected to be in orbit for
decades. This debris will slowly decay due to natural forces and will
remain a hazard to manned and unmanned space flight in low-Earth orbit,
and to satellites transiting that region, from low to higher orbits.
With an increased use of space by a growing number of State and
non-State users and the increased threats to their valuable space
systems, it is paramount that the Department of Defense (DOD)--in
collaboration with its partners in the U.S. Government--work hand-in-
hand with civil, commercial, and international operators to ensure a
safe environment.
DOD AND COMMERCIAL SPACE USER COORDINATION
The DOD has a sound relationship with commercial space operators,
particularly those commercial communication and remote imaging
organizations that support U.S. and national security activities. The
relationship includes formal contractual arrangements for the provision
of service to the DOD, routine strategic-level meetings between the
commercial satellite CEOs and DOD senior civilians and officers, and
numerous working-level meetings.
As part of the CFE Pilot Program, commercial users can access the
Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) Space-track.org web site to obtain
unclassified element set data on current catalogued objects. If a user
would like more information, they must sign an agreement for CFE
support via the web site and submit a request for specific support. The
request is first reviewed at AFSPC to ensure it meets policy and
security requirements. Once cleared through AFSPC it is sent to the
614th Air and Space Operations Center (614th AOC) via 14th Air Force
for operational review and processing. The 614th AOC works directly
with users to process requests.
The recent Iridium/COSMOS collision provides an excellent example
of the relationship we have with commercial users and what we are doing
to ensure safe space operations. The Joint Space Operations Center
(JSpOC) began increased conjunction assessment screening of Iridium
assets four hours and fifty minutes following the conjunction, and now
screens over 330 objects daily to ensure safe space flight operations
for both DOD and commercial space users supporting DOD missions.
Despite our efforts and the milestones reached, we continue to face
challenges. Specific challenges we are working hard to resolve include
sharing of SSA data, improving timeliness and accuracy of data, and
protecting sensitive information. The DOD has engaged with most of the
major commercial satellite operators who provide support to the U.S.
Government to discuss their needs for SSA as well as their ability to
provide inputs to our awareness. AFSPC has initiated a working group
which includes commercial operators to identify specific technical
solutions that will allow the sharing of additional spacecraft
positional and status information to enhance collective space flight
safety. Additionally, AFSPC recently conducted an industry day at the
25th Annual National Space Symposium in Colorado Springs and hosted a
round table discussion with owner/operators, sharing short- and long-
term goals of the CFE Pilot Program.
COMMERCIAL AND FOREIGN ENTITY PILOT PROGRAM
The CFE Pilot Program has been successful in transitioning the
routine provision of satellite positional information from NASA to
AFSPC for developing an initial set of legal agreements. These
agreements allow for the provision of additional services such as
conjunction assessments and launch support, and help identify the long-
term desires of commercial and foreign entities for space situational
information.
The AFSPC Space-track.org web site has been providing unclassified
satellite catalog data to approved account holders since 2004. To date,
we have hosted over 37,000 users spanning over 110 countries with 75
percent of the users coming from the U.S., Canada, France, Germany,
United Kingdom, and Australia.
The next phase in the CFE Pilot Program evolution provides advanced
services to commercial and foreign entities which establish or have a
pre-existing agreement with the DOD. These services include conjunction
assessment and launch support delivered through web services. The long-
term solution includes integrating commercial and foreign entity
advanced services in the JSpOC Mission System with the ability to
ingest data directly from these entities on a voluntary basis.
There have been a number of important lessons learned from the
pilot program. These include a greater understanding of: 1. the
specific commercial and foreign desires and rationale for space
situational information; 2. the operational agility and limitations of
commercial and foreign operators; 3. the necessary resources required
to satisfy commercial and foreign desires for information; and 4. the
potential value of the information commercial and foreign operators
might share among themselves and with the DOD. The DOD intends to
operationalize the support to commercial and foreign entities in the
Fall of 2009. The goal is to seamlessly transition the program from an
AFSPC pilot program to a USSTRATCOM operational activity. The JSpOC
will be the central node for the sharing of information. We will
continue to work closely with the commercial and foreign space
communities to understand their evolving needs and desires for SSA
information, and continue to grow our cooperative relationships to
share information in ways that will improve space flight safety.
Although we have made large strides in SSA, it is imperative that
we address the shortcomings in current SSA information, predictive
capabilities, and supporting infrastructures, and develop an SSA vision
for the future.
CHALLENGES AND WAY AHEAD
Space situational awareness is more than understanding the space
environment, tracking objects, and conducting conjunction assessments.
We need to be able to discriminate between natural and man-made
threats. We need to understand the location, status and purpose of
these objects, their capabilities, and their owners' intent. This
comprehensive knowledge enables decision-makers to rapidly and
effectively select courses of action to ensure our sustained freedom of
action and safety in what is clearly a contested environment. To get
there we require more automated, net-centric capabilities to command
and control space forces, and networked sensors and information systems
that seamlessly share information to more effectively use our current
resources. This will give us the ability to rapidly react--real-time
data flow to the JSpOC for processing and analysis, and then real-time
flow of the refined product back to the user.
The overarching command and control and SSA program that will lead
us towards our vision is the JSpOC Mission System. The program fuses
multi-sourced space object tracking data with status and capability
details, and provides automated assessment and decision-making aids.
The Enhanced Space Sensors Architecture (ESSA) project will be
folded into the JSpOC Mission System and brings valuable sensor data
into a net-centric architecture. The technology being developed and
demonstrated by the ESSA project puts sensors' space object imaging and
metric tracking information on the network for faster analysis,
evaluation, and end-use by operators and decision-makers at all levels.
The JSpOC has participated in two demonstrations of ESSA, and is
scheduled to participate in its third demonstration in May.
The U.S. space surveillance architecture currently detects and
tracks thousands of objects, but critical gaps remain in an ability to
fully track and characterize all on-orbit objects, analyze and predict
conjunctions, and protect not just military satellites, but also
commercial and civil satellites critical to national security. The SSN
provides acceptable coverage in the northern hemisphere, but we have a
significant coverage gap in the southern hemisphere. By filling this
gap we increase the JSpOC's ability to rapidly detect, track, and
characterize new payloads and maintain awareness of maneuvering
spacecraft. A key program to address this gap is the Space Fence. The
Space Fence will be the most accurate dedicated radar in the SSN and
will provide critical coverage from the southern hemisphere. With the
capability to perform 750K observations per day and track over 100,000
objects, the Space Fence will significantly reduce coverage gaps and
significantly improve our low-Earth and medium-Earth orbit SSA.
Our sensor network is currently able to track objects as small as
10 centimeters across. We do this well for low-Earth orbits; however,
our ability decreases as we track objects in geosynchronous (GEO)
orbit. We need to improve our capability to track and assess smaller
objects in all orbits if we are to keep pace with the potential threats
from the emerging small satellite technologies, and to gain better
awareness of the hazards posed by small space debris. Today, many GEO
objects go days without being tracked. The Space-based Space
Surveillance (SBSS) satellite will provide the ability for the
uninterrupted scan of the entire GEO belt every 24 hours--vital to
maintaining positional knowledge, called ``track custody'' of high
interest objects in deep space. Additionally, this new system's revisit
rate for all GEO objects will greatly reduce the ``lost list'' of
objects that change position between observations. I look forward to
the successful fielding of SBSS, and the marked improvement to
situational awareness it will bring.
With respect to cooperation with friends and allies, AFSPC experts
are supporting the DOD and Department of State in discussions on SSA
cooperation with the European Space Agency and European Union, as well
as key European allies. These discussions provide a foundation for
expanded trans-Atlantic cooperation on space situational awareness in
support of common civil, commercial and military requirements. They
also can serve as a model for discussions on SSA cooperation with our
friends and allies in other regions.
The U.S. must continue to lead the community of space-faring
nations and encourage responsible behavior in the space environment.
The JSpOC is the nexus of SSA and the focal point for ensuring safe,
effective operation of our space forces and those of our partners. We
need to gather real-time, quality data, have the ability to exploit
that data rapidly and accurately, and then export decision-quality
information across a range of customers from the intelligence community
to deployed forces, foreign partners, and commercial users.
CONCLUSION
The nature of space operations is rapidly evolving. The United
States' dependence on space across our military, civil, and commercial
sectors requires improved SSA and command and control capabilities to
ensure our ability to safely and effectively operate in a dynamic and
contested environment. Working in collaboration with other departments
and agencies in the U.S. Government, DOD must continue to build the
relationships, processes, and capabilities within the global space
community that allow us to operate effectively together to meet the
needs of national defense. I am truly honored to lead such a talented
group of men and women. Perfection is our standard and you can be proud
of your Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines that expertly tackle the
challenges we face every day.
Biography for Lieutenant General Larry D. James
Lt. Gen. Larry D. James is Commander, 14th Air Force (Air Forces
Strategic), Air Force Space Command, and Commander, Joint Functional
Component Command for Space, U.S. Strategic Command, Vandenberg Air
Force Base, Calif. As the U.S. Air Force's operational space component
to USSTRATCOM, General James leads more than 20,500 personnel
responsible for providing missile warning, space superiority, space
situational awareness, satellite operations, space launch and range
operations. As Commander, JFCC SPACE, he directs all assigned and
attached USSTRATCOM space forces providing tailored, responsive, local
and global space effects in support of national, USSTRATCOM and
combatant commander objectives.
General James entered the Air Force as a distinguished graduate of
the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1978. His career has spanned a wide
variety of operations and acquisition assignments, including Space
Shuttle Payload Specialist, Air Staff Program Element Monitor, Global
Positioning System Satellite Program Manager and Chief of Operations,
14th Air Force.
General James has commanded at the squadron, group and wing levels,
and was Vice Commander of the Space and Missile Systems Center. He has
served on the staffs of Headquarters U.S. Air Force, U.S. Space Command
and Air Force Space Command. He also served as the Senior Space Officer
for Operation Iraqi Freedom at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia.
Prior to his current assignment, the General was Vice Commander, 5th
Air Force, and Deputy Commander, 13th Air Force, Yokota Air Base,
Japan.
EDUCATION
1978--Distinguished graduate, Bachelor of Science degree in
astronautical engineering, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado
Springs, Colo.
1983--Master of Science degree in astronautical engineering,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge
1984--Squadron Officer School, by correspondence
1988--Program Managers Course, Defense Systems Management College, Fort
Belvoir, Va.
1989--Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
1993--Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
1997--Joint Professional Military Education Phase II, Armed Forces
Staff College, Norfolk, Va.
2002--National Security Management Fellowship, Syracuse University,
N.Y.
2006--Combined Forces Air Component Commander Course, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
2007--Intelligence Community Executive Leader Program, Kellogg School
of Management, Northwestern University, Chicago, Ill.
2007--Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander Course, Naval War
College, R.I.
ASSIGNMENTS
1. July 1978-August 1981, Project Officer, Advanced Space Guidance
Systems, Directorate of Technology, Space and Missile Systems
Organization, Los Angeles AFB, Calif.
2. August 1981-January 1983, student, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Cambridge
3. January 1983-December 1987, Space Shuttle Payload Specialist and
Chief, Global Positioning System Space Systems Division, Headquarters
Space and Missile Center, Los Angeles AFB, Calif.
4. January 1988-July 1988, student, Defense Systems Management
College, Fort Belvoir, Va.
5. August 1988-July 1989, student, Air Command and Staff College,
Maxwell AFB, Ala.
6. August 1989-June 1991, Program Element Monitor, Global Positioning
System, Directorate of Space Programs, Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force for Acquisition, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
7. June 1991-July 1992, Executive Officer to Director, Space
Programs, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, the
Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
8. August 1992-July 1993, student, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
9. September 1993-July 1994, Commander, 45th Spacecraft Operations
Squadron, Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Fla.
10. July 1994-July 1995, Commander, 5th Space Launch Squadron, Cape
Canaveral AFS, Fla.
11. July 1995-January 1996, Deputy Commander, 45th Operations Group,
Patrick AFB, Fla.
12. January 1996-May 1997, Deputy Chief, Space Control Mission Team,
Air Force Space Command, later, Chief, Requirements and Programs
Branch, Integration Division, U.S. Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.
13. May 1997-August 1998, Chief, Integration Division, Directorate of
Plans, U.S. Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.
14. August 1998-June 2000, Commander, 614th Space Operations Group,
and Chief of Operations, 14th Air Force, Vandenberg AFB, Calif.
15. June 2000-April 2001, Executive Officer to Commander, North
American Aerospace Defense Command, Commander, U.S. Space Command and
Commander, AFSPC, Peterson AFB, Colo.
16. April 2001-June 2003, Commander, 50th Space Wing, Schriever AFB,
Colo.
17. June 2003-July 2004, Assistant Director of Air and Space
Operations, Headquarters AFSPC, Peterson AFB, Colo.
18. July 2004-July 2005, Vice Commander, Space and Missile Systems
Center, Los Angeles AFB, Calif.
19. July 2005-May 2007, Director, Signals Intelligence Systems
Acquisition and Operations Directorate, National Reconnaissance Office,
Washington, D.C.
20. May 2007-December 2008, Vice Commander, 5th Air Force, and Deputy
Commander, 13th Air Force, Yokota Air Base, Japan
21. December 2008-present, Commander, 14th Air Force (Air Forces
Strategic), Air Force Space Command, and Commander, Joint Functional
Component Command for Space, USSTRATCOM, Vandenberg AFB, CA.
MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
Defense Superior Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
Legion of Merit with three oak leaf clusters
Bronze Star Medal
Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters
Air Force Commendation Medal
OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS
Top third graduate, Air Command and Staff College
Top 10 percent graduate, Air War College
National Finalist, White House Fellow Program
EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION
Second Lieutenant May 31, 1978
First Lieutenant May 31, 1980
Captain May 31, 1982
Major April 1, 1988
Lieutenant Colonel April 1, 1992
Colonel Dec. 1, 1997
Brigadier General Feb. 1, 2004
Major General Aug. 2, 2007
Lieutenant General Dec. 9, 2008
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you.
Mr. Johnson, please.
STATEMENT OF MR. NICHOLAS L. JOHNSON, CHIEF SCIENTIST FOR
ORBITAL DEBRIS, JOHNSON SPACE CENTER, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND
SPACE ADMINISTRATION (NASA)
Mr. Johnson. Madam Chairwoman and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before
you today to discuss the important topic of space debris.
While the adage, ``what goes up must come down,'' still
applies in the space age, most satellites take a very long time
to fall back to Earth. In many cases this descent can take
hundreds or even thousands of years.
Thus, the numerous operational satellites as well as the
human-occupied International Space Station now circling the
globe, performing vital functions of communications,
navigation, Earth observation, science and research,
exploration and defense, are accompanied by a much larger
population of defunct spacecraft, derelict launch vehicle
orbital stages, intentional refuse, and the products of more
than 200 satellite explosions and collisions.
For 30 years, NASA has led the world in scientific studies
to characterize the near-Earth space debris environment, to
assess its potential hazards to the current and future space
operations, and to identify and to implement means of
mitigating its growth.
Since 1988, the United States National Space Policy has
specifically addressed the need to limit the growth of the
space debris population. The current National Space Policy
signed by the President in 2006, charges U.S. Government
agencies and organizations with seeking, ``to minimize the
creation of orbital debris by government and non-government
operations in space in order to preserve the space environment
for future generations.''
The Policy also states, ``The United States shall take a
leadership role in international for--to encourage foreign
nations and international organizations to adopt policies and
practices aimed at debris minimization.''
In 1995, NASA was the first U.S. Government organization to
establish formal space debris mitigation guidelines. In 2001,
the U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard
Practices, based upon the NASA Space Debris Mitigation
guidelines, was adopted after a lengthy and thorough inter-
governmental review and coordination with the aerospace
industry. The fundamental elements of these standard practices
were adopted in 2002, by the major space-faring nations under
the auspices of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination
Committee, whose members represent the space agencies of ten
countries, as well as the European Space Agency. In 2007, the
United Nations, through the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, adopted a similar set of space debris mitigation
guidelines.
While NASA continues to promote the curtailment of the
generation of new space debris, we must also operate in the
existing debris environment. To this end, NASA designs
spacecraft to withstand small particle impacts, and the Agency
works with the U.S. Space Surveillance Network to avoid
collisions between our space assets and the known resident
space objects.
NASA procedural requirements call for conjunction
assessments or close-approach predictions to be performed for
all our maneuverable spacecraft. During 2008, NASA twice
maneuvered a robotic spacecraft of the Earth Observation System
in low-Earth orbit and once maneuvered a tracking and data
relay satellite into geosynchronous orbit to prevent potential
collisions. Twice since last August the International Space
Station has conducted collision-avoidance maneuvers.
The recent collision of two intact satellites underscores
NASA's 1970's era finding, reiterated more recently in a NASA
study published in Science in 2006, that the amount of space
debris already in Earth orbit is sufficient to lead to more
accidental collisions, which in turn will lead to an unintended
increase in space debris and increased risks to operational
space systems. In the future such collisions are likely to be
the principle source of new space debris.
The most effective means of limiting satellite collisions
is to remove non-functional spacecraft and launch vehicle
orbital stages from Earth orbit. However, the remediation of
the near-Earth space environment presents substantial technical
and economic challenges. The threat posed by orbital debris to
the reliable operation of space systems will continue to grow
unless the sources of space debris are brought under control.
The international aerospace community has already made
significant strides in the design and the operation of space
systems to curtail the creation of new orbital debris but more
can be done.
Currently, the Department of Defense's Commercial and
Foreign Entities Program is the principle means of distributing
space situational awareness data to space system operators and
the general public. Enhancement of this program, both to serve
a larger number of users and to increase the variety of
services available, especially conjunction assessments, offer
the greatest near-term and lowest cost improvement to space
safety.
I would be happy to respond to any questions you and other
Members may have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Nicholas L. Johnson
Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the important topic
of space debris. While the adage ``what goes up, must come down'' still
applies in the space age, most satellites take a very long time to fall
back to Earth. In many cases, this descent can last hundreds, even
thousands, of years. Consequently, after more than 4,600 space missions
conducted world-wide since Sputnik 1, a large number of human-made
objects have steadily accumulated in Earth orbit. Thus, the numerous
operational satellites as well as the human occupied International
Space Station now circling the globe, performing vital functions of
communications, navigation, Earth observation, science and research,
exploration, and defense, are accompanied by a much larger population
of defunct spacecraft, derelict launch vehicle orbital stages,
intentional refuse, and the products of more than 200 satellite
explosions and collisions.
Characterization of the Near-Earth Space Debris Environment
For 30 years, NASA has led the world in scientific studies to
characterize the near-Earth space debris environment, to assess its
potential hazards to current and future space operations, and to
identify and to implement means of mitigating its growth. The near-
Earth space debris environment ranges in altitude from 100 to more than
20,000 miles above Earth, and the debris itself ranges in mass from
less than an ounce to many tons. Consequently, this population of space
debris is a matter of growing concern for all space-faring nations.
Today, the United States Space Surveillance Network, managed by
U.S. Strategic Command, is tracking more than 19,000 objects in orbit
about the Earth, of which approximately 95 percent represent some form
of debris. However, these are only the larger pieces of space debris,
typically four inches or more in diameter. The number of debris as
small as half an inch exceeds 300,000. Due to the tremendous energies
possessed by space debris, the collision between a piece of debris only
a half-inch in diameter and an operational spacecraft, piloted by
humans or robotic, has the potential for catastrophic consequences.
United States and International Debris Policy
Since 1988, the United States National Space Policy has
specifically addressed the need to limit the growth of the space debris
population. The current National Space Policy, signed by the President
in 2006, charges the U.S. Government agencies and organizations with
seeking ``to minimize the creation of orbital debris by government and
non-government operations in space in order to preserve the space
environment for future generations.'' The policy also states that ``The
United States shall take a leadership role in international fora to
encourage foreign nations and international organizations to adopt
policies and practices aimed at debris minimization . . ..''
In 1995, NASA was the first U.S. Government organization to
establish formal space debris mitigation guidelines. In 2001, the U.S.
Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices, based upon the
NASA space debris mitigation guidelines, were adopted after a lengthy
and thorough intergovernmental review and coordination with the
aerospace industry. The fundamental elements of these standard
practices were adopted in 2002 by the major space-faring nations under
the auspices of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee,
whose members represent the space agencies of 10 countries, as well as
the European Space Agency. In 2007, the United Nations, through the
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, adopted a similar set of
space debris mitigation guidelines.
NASA Debris Avoidance and Mitigation
While NASA continues to promote the curtailment of the generation
of new space debris, we must operate in the existing debris
environment. To this end, NASA designs spacecraft to withstand the
impacts of small debris, and the Agency works with the U.S. Space
Surveillance Network to avoid collisions between our space assets and
other known resident space objects. NASA procedural requirements call
for conjunction assessments, i.e., close approach predictions, to be
performed for all our maneuverable spacecraft. During 2008, NASA twice
maneuvered robotic spacecraft of the Earth Observation System in low-
Earth orbit and once maneuvered a Tracking and Data Relay Satellite in
geosynchronous orbit to avoid potential collisions. Twice since last
August, the International Space Station has conducted collision
avoidance maneuvers.
For the 35 years from mid-1961 to mid-1996, the population of
cataloged objects (i.e., objects that are four inches in size or
larger) in Earth orbit increased at an average rate of 270 per year.
However, with the concerted efforts of the major space-faring nations
of the world, the rate dropped dramatically to only 70 per year for the
next decade. Unfortunately, the intentional destruction of the Chinese
Fengyun-1C weather satellite in January of 2007 and the accidental
collision of American and Russian spacecraft in February of this year
have increased the cataloged debris population by nearly 40 percent, in
comparison with all the debris remaining from the first 50 years of the
Space Age.
The recent collision of two intact satellites underscores a NASA
1970s-era finding, reiterated more recently in a NASA study published
in Science in 2006, that the amount of debris already in Earth orbit is
sufficient to lead to more accidental collisions, which in turn will
lead to an unintended increase in space debris and increased risk to
operational space systems. In the future, such collisions are likely to
be the principal source of new space debris. The most effective means
of limiting satellite collisions is to remove non-functional spacecraft
and launch vehicle orbital stages from orbit. However, the remediation
of the near-Earth space environment presents substantial technical and
economic challenges.
Conclusion
The threat posed by orbital debris to the reliable operation of
space systems will continue to grow unless the sources of debris are
brought under control. The international aerospace community has
already made significant strides in the design and operation of space
systems to curtail the creation of new orbital debris, but more can be
done.
Currently, the Department of Defense Commercial and Foreign
Entities program is the principal means of distributing space
situational awareness data to space system operators and the general
public. Enhancements to this program, both to serve a larger number of
users and to increase the variety of services available, especially
conjunction assessments, offer the greatest near-term and lowest cost
improvement to space safety. In the longer-term, technical advances in
space surveillance, including more capable sensors and higher accuracy
data, are likely needed.
I would be happy to respond to any question you or the other
Members of the Subcommittee may have.
Biography for Nicholas L. Johnson
As NASA Chief Scientist for Orbital Debris at the NASA Johnson
Space Center since 1997, Mr. Johnson serves as the agency authority in
the field of orbital debris, including all aspects of environment
definition, present and future, and the operational and design
implications of the environment to both manned and robotic space
vehicles operating in Earth orbit. He is responsible for conceiving and
conducting research to define the orbital debris environment, for
determining operational techniques for spacecraft to protect themselves
from the environment, and for recommending techniques to minimize the
growth in the future orbital debris environment. He leads the U.S.
delegation to the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee
(IADC) and since 1997 has served as the U.S. technical expert on
orbital debris at the United Nations. He served concurrently as the
Program Manager for NASA's Orbital Debris Program Office from 1997 to
2006. Mr. Johnson has 30 years experience in orbital debris research
and applications and is the recipient of the NASA Distinguished Service
Medal, the NASA Exceptional Achievement Medal, and the DOD Joint
Meritorious Civilian Service Award for his work in this field.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Johnson.
Mr. DalBello.
STATEMENT OF MR. RICHARD DALBELLO, VICE PRESIDENT, LEGAL AND
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, INTELSAT GENERAL CORPORATION
Mr. DalBello. Chairwoman Giffords, Ranking Member Olson,
and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you very
much for this opportunity to discuss the role that the
commercial satellite industry plays in keeping the space
environment safe for the civil and commercial users.
The commercial satellite industry has been providing
essential space services almost for as--almost as long as
humans have been in space. Today Intelsat operates a fleet of
over 50 satellites. In response to business opportunities and
changing market needs we routinely replace satellites and
relocate them in orbit. To change the orbital location of a
satellite, we must delicately move a mini-bus-sized object,
multi-ton object traveling thousands of kilometers an hour
through the crowded geostationary arch, avoiding the potential
for collision with or for disturbing the radio communications
of any of--any one of the hundreds of commercial and government
satellites in that orbit.
By and large this project--process takes place without
government regulation or oversight, using rules developed
through experience and implemented by consensus among the
commercial operators themselves. This remarkable example of
international and inter-company cooperation and self-reliance
is premised on a simple realization; that the results of a
collision could be catastrophic.
In flying our satellites Intelsat relies on data from our
own spacecraft and information derived from the U.S. Air
Force's Commercial and Foreign Entities Program. During special
activities such as satellite relocations and transfer orbit
missions, we also exchange data with other satellite operators
whose satellites are operating near or adjacent to our
satellites.
There are, however, drawbacks to relying on the CFE data.
These data do not have a--have the required accuracy for
credible collision detection. The data also lacks the
spacecraft maneuver information that is necessary to properly
predict the orbit, the orbital location of active satellites.
An operator that is relying on the CFE data alone must
increase the calculated collision margin to avoid potential
close approaches. This wastes fuel and satellite life and
introduces uncertainty into the equation. Because of the
relatively imprecise nature of the publicly-available data, the
U.S. Air Force has also established the interim CFE Data
Analysis Redistribution Approval Process, more commonly known
as the Form-One Process. Through the Form-One Process operators
can request additional, more precise information on specific
close-approach situations.
However, the current Form-One Process is difficult to
incorporate as an operational tool. There is no approved, DOD-
approved Form-One guidance document that articulates the
boundaries of the program, nor is there any written
specification of the operational procedures that a compliant
operator should follow when using the process. This lack of
clarity also creates uncertainty.
In response to the shortcomings of the current program, a
number of global satellite operators have begun a dialogue on
how to best ensure information sharing within the industry. One
proposal currently being discussed is the creation of a global
data center. That would allow operators to augment data coming
from the CFE Program with precision orbit data and maneuver
plans from their respective fleets. Today a prototype of the
data center is operating with seven of the largest global
operators regularly contributing data from over 120 satellites.
While there is still significant work left to refine the
process, the initial results from the data center prototype are
promising.
Although such private initiatives have great value, it is
essential that the U.S. Government continue to play a
leadership role on the issue of space traffic control. In
pursuit of this objective, we would offer the following
specific recommendations. These are detailed more completely in
my written testimony, but just in bullet form.
Provide adequate funding for space situational awareness.
The space situational network that we have today was developed
during the Cold War, mostly for looking for missiles coming
over the horizon. There is a lot of opportunity for good,
productive investment in upgrading that capability.
Maintain and expand the U.S. Commercial and Foreign
Entities Program. As Lieutenant General James pointed out, it
is current--the program is currently a pilot, and it is
important that we mature that program to an operational status.
Third, develop new mechanisms for sharing space traffic
information between and among nations. Several other countries,
including France and the UK and Australia, Russia I am sure has
a network. There are many countries who have networks
monitoring space. The question is how are we going in the
future to share information between those networks.
Fourth, take advantage of the data readily available from
the private sector. We all monitor all of our satellites all
the time. It is information that is more precise than the
information that the government can have by sensing us in
space. We would gladly share this information in the interest
of creating a safer space environment.
And finally, be creative in the development of new data
sources. We have offered to fly a sensor on every one of our
commercial satellites that is going to space, and if you were
go put a sensor on every commercial satellite and every
scientific satellite that went up over the next five years, you
would have for almost no investment you would have an amazing
view of the heavens.
So in conclusion, within the next decade many more
countries will gain the ability to exploit space for
commercial, scientific, and government purposes. It is
essential that the world's governments provide leadership on
space management issues today in order to protect the space
activities of tomorrow.
[The prepared statement of Mr. DalBello follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard DalBello
Commercial Management of the Space Environment
Chairwoman Giffords, Ranking Member Olson, and distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss
the role that the commercial satellite industry plays in ``Keeping the
Space Environment Safe for Civil and Commercial Users.'' The commercial
satellite industry has billions of dollars of assets in space and
relies on this unique environment for the development and growth of our
businesses. As a result, safety and the sustainment of the space
environment are two of our highest priorities. This afternoon I would
like to provide a quick survey of past and current industry space
traffic control practices and to discuss a few key initiatives that the
industry is developing in this area.
Background
The commercial satellite industry has been providing essential
space services for almost as long as humans have been exploring space.
Over the decades, this industry has played an active role in developing
technology, worked collaboratively to set standards, and partnered with
government to develop successful international regulatory regimes.
Success in both commercial and government space programs has meant that
new demands are being placed on the space environment. This has
resulted in orbital crowding, an increase in space debris, and greater
demand for limited frequency resources. The successful management of
these issues will require a strong partnership between government and
industry and the careful, experience-based expansion of international
law and diplomacy.
Throughout the years, the satellite industry has never taken for
granted the remarkable environment in which it works. Industry has
invested heavily in technology and sought out the best and brightest
minds to allow the full, but sustainable exploitation of the space
environment. Where problems have arisen, such as space debris or
electronic interference, industry has taken the initiative to deploy
new technologies and adopt new practices to minimize negative
consequences.
In the late 1970s and early to mid 1980s, both Russia and the
United States engaged in the testing of anti-satellite weapon systems.
Both countries abandoned these efforts, in part because the creation of
additional space debris was inconsistent with their plans for the full
exploration and exploitation of the space environment. Similarly, the
future preservation of the space environment will rely on every
nation's appreciation that its own self-interest lies in preserving
this precious common good.
The major commercial satellite operators routinely share
information and resources with each other and with governments to help
ensure the protection of the unique and irreplaceable space
environment. Intelsat operates a fleet of more than 50 satellites--the
largest geostationary commercial fleet ever assembled. In response to
business opportunities and changing market needs, Intelsat regularly
replaces satellites and relocates satellites in orbit. Recently, in
response to a request from DOD, Intelsat moved a satellite that had
been operating over the United States to the other side of the world in
order to provide critical UAV services in Afghanistan and Iraq. This
entire process was completed in less than two weeks.
The majority of our fleet is in geostationary orbit. This orbit is
32,000 km above the Earth in a region where the movement of our
satellites exactly matches the rotation of the Earth, thereby making
the satellite seem ``fixed'' in the heavens. To change the orbital
location of a satellite, Intelsat must delicately move a minibus-sized,
multi-ton object, traveling thousands of kilometers per hour, through
the crowded geostationary arc, avoiding the potential for collisions
with, or for disturbing the radio communications of, any of the more
than 250 other commercial communications satellites in that orbit.
Other satellite companies that operate in lower Earth orbits--some a
few hundred kilometers above the Earth--must deal with many more
operational objects and a substantially increased debris environment.
The recent collision between the Iridium satellite and a non-
operational Russian satellite took place in this lower Earth orbit.
With the exception of the initial grant of approval by a national
regulator, by and large, the management of satellite operations takes
place without governmental regulation or oversight, using rules
developed through experience and implemented by consensus among the
commercial operators themselves. This process has been used effectively
and without incident since the commercial satellite communications era
began in the 1960s. This remarkable example of international and inter-
company cooperation and self-reliance is premised on a simple
realization that the results of a collision could be catastrophic.
In low-Earth orbits (generally 200-1000 km above Earth), objects
and debris will slowly, over a decade or so, re-enter the Earth's
atmosphere. In the narrow geostationary orbit (32,000 km above the
Earth) the debris from a collision would endure for tens of thousands
of years, effectively rendering a portion of the GEO arc useless.
Space Traffic Control--Past and Future
I would like to take a moment and describe Intelsat's past and
current approach to space operations. I would also like to describe the
current state of data-sharing among commercial satellite operators and
suggest a new paradigm for easing critical communications among
operators and between operators and governments.
As I alluded to above, commercial satellite operators, working with
limited government oversight, have over the years developed their own
internal protocols and procedures to ensure the safe operation of their
fleets. Operators have also become adept at informal coordination and
information exchange with operators who are `flying' satellites
adjacent to or near their satellites.
At the beginning of the space age and through most of the 1970's
and 1980's there was no serious examination of `space traffic control'
since there was a great deal of space and, quite literally, no traffic
to control. As the world entered the 1990's deregulation,
privatization, and the rapid expansion of the video market all served
to power a growth in communication and broadcast satellite activity. By
the late 1990s, Intelsat decided that it would be prudent to gather
better information on the space environment, so it contracted with the
Aerospace Corporation via the Space Operation Support Office (SOPSO) to
conduct close-approach monitoring.
The Aerospace Corporation developed a fully automated two-tier
program that determined satellite close approaches based on miss-
distances and conjunction probabilities. The initial detection was
based on the publicly available NORAD data known as the Two Line
Element sets (TLE). Once a potential conjunction between two space
objects was identified, Aerospace would request the more accurate
special perturbation (SP) ephemeris data from the Air Force to confirm
the conjunction. The Aerospace Corporation shut down the SOPSO office
abruptly in November 2002.
In 2003 Intelsat contracted MIT Lincoln Lab to perform close-
approach analysis. It was a semi-automated system and the conjunction
detection was based on miss-distances only. Because MIT had a
contractual relationship with the Air Force, and therefore direct
access to the more precise observations from the deep space
surveillance network, the conjunction monitoring was based on a single-
tier process. However, the monitoring was restricted to non-active
space objects, such as debris. This restriction was due to the
difficulties in detecting past maneuvers and predicting future
maneuvers of active satellites. Such maneuvers tend to invalidate
longer term close-approach predictions.
Since January 2007, Intelsat has relied on an in-house close
approach monitoring system. This system follows the two-tier model and
relies on the US Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) to validate
potential conjunctions detected using the TLE data that is available
through the U.S. Government's ``Spacetrack.org'' web site. We routinely
screen our satellites using the TLE data, and, during special
activities such as satellite relocations and transfer orbit missions,
we also exchange data with other satellite operators whose satellites
are operating near or adjacent to our satellites. The exchanged
information usually consists of the latest orbital information, near-
term maneuver plans, frequency information and contact information for
further discussion.
There are drawbacks to the current close-approach monitoring
process. In addition to a lack of standards for TLE modeling, TLE data
do not have the required accuracy for credible collision detection. An
operator that is forced to rely on TLE data must increase the
calculated collision margin to avoid potential close approaches. In
most cases, threats identified using the basic TLE data are downgraded
after coordination with other operators or further evaluation with more
precise orbital data. In addition to the inaccuracies of the TLE data,
these data also lack reliable maneuver information. This limits the
usefulness of the TLE for longer-term predictions, since maneuver
information is necessary to properly predict the orbital location of
active satellites. Today, operators relying on chemical propulsion
systems will maneuver about once every two weeks to maintain their
orbital position. Accurately predicting the orbital location of a
satellite will become more difficult as more satellites employ ionic
propulsion systems and are, essentially, constantly maneuvering.
Adding complexity to this problem is the fact that there is no
single standard for representing the position of an object in space.
Different operators characterize the orbital position of their
satellites differently, depending on the software they use for flight
operations. In addition, there is no one agreed upon protocol for
sharing information, and coordinating operators must be prepared to
accommodate the practices of other operators. To do this, operators
must maintain redundant file-transfer protocols and tools to convert
and reformat information so that it is consistent with other owners'/
operators' software systems for computing close approaches. Separate
tools are necessary to exchange data with each operator. Some operators
write their own software tools for monitoring and predicting the close
approach of other spacecraft while others contract with third parties
for this service. The magnitude of the effort to maintain ``space
situational awareness'' grows quickly as the number of coordinating
operators increases. Unfortunately many operators are not able or
willing to participate in close approach monitoring due to lack of
resources or capabilities.
Because of the relatively imprecise nature of the TLE data, the
U.S. Air Force established the ``Interim CFE Data/Analysis
Redistribution Approval Process'' (Commonly referred to as the Form 1
Process) for granting operators access to information that goes beyond
the basic TLEs. Through the Form 1 Process, operators can request
additional information (the special perturbation, or SP, data) on
specific `close approach' situations. Although helpful, it is
cumbersome to rely on the Form 1 Process as an operational tool because
it requires advance notice, which is often impossible in emergency
situations. In addition, conjunction events often require close
cooperation and interactive communication. Today, the Form 1 Process
relies primarily on e-mail as a method of communication and the U.S.
Government does not guarantee the rapid turnaround necessary in most
cases.
The U.S. Government is currently reviewing its policies on the
distribution of TLE data. One proposal would require the negotiation of
individual ``tailored agreements'' between the U.S. Government and
satellite operators requesting information. Other proposals have
suggested that the U.S. Government might be willing to provide
additional conjunction assessment services on a reimbursable basis. At
this writing, it is unclear how or whether the CFE program, which was
originally scheduled to terminate this year, will continue.
Recently, Intelsat conducted an informal survey of satellite
operator professionals who routinely interact with the JSpOC and the
CFE process. Their reaction indicated that there are a few key areas
where the current process could be immediately improved:
1. Clarify the Process--To manage expectations, publicly
clarify the process that should occur from the moment a Form 1
request is submitted to JSpOC until the analysis is returned to
the operator. The JSpOC should also designate a POC for
questions.
2. Make the Process Interactive--To reduce uncertainty, JSpOC
should provide a receipt to acknowledge that the operator
request has been received (or that JSpOC has received the
information it requested) and provide notification of status
change as operator requests go through the system, or as the
JSpOC responds to perceived threats.
3. Distinguish between Routine and Emergency Requests--Allow
operators to include a priority flag for time-sensitive
requests so critical issues can receive attention first.
4. Where Possible, Indicate Data Quality--To assist the
operators in making decisions, provide quality flags, where
possible, to indicate the quality of the data used by the JSpOC
in conducting their analysis.
Data Center Proposal
In response to the shortcomings of the current TLE-based CFE
program and the recognition that better inter-operator communication is
desirable in and of itself, a number of satellite operators have
recently begun a broad dialogue on how to best ensure information-
sharing within the satellite communication industry. One proposal
currently being discussed in the international operators' community is
the ``Data Center.'' As conceptualized, the Data Center would be an
interactive repository for commercial satellite orbit, maneuver and
frequency information. Satellite operators would routinely deposit
their fleet information into the Data Center and retrieve information
from other member operators when necessary. The Data Center would allow
operators to augment existing Two Line Element (TLE) data with
precision orbit data and maneuver plans from the operator's fleets. The
Data Center would also:
Perform data conversion and reformatting tasks
allowing operators to share orbital element and/or ephemeris
data in different formats;
Adopt common usage and definition of terminologies;
Develop common operational protocols for handling
routine and emergency situations;
Exchange operator personnel contact information and
protocols in advance of need.
If the Data Center were to gain acceptance, it could perform
additional functions, such as the close-approach monitoring tasks
currently being conducted by the operators. In this phase, U.S.
Government-provided TLE data could be augmented by the more precise
data available from the operators. This would improve the accuracy of
the Center's conjunction monitoring and could provide a standardized
way for operators to share information with the U.S. Government and
other governments. In the early stages, information on non-operational
space objects would still need to be supplemented by TLE data from the
Air Force CFE program and/or other government programs. U.S.
Government, or other government support would still be required when
precise information is needed to conduct avoidance maneuver planning.
A prototype active Data Center was established to study the
feasibility of such an approach following workshops of the major
commercial owners/operators held in February 2008 in Washington, DC and
December 2008 in Ottawa. A majority of the operators present agreed on
the need to simplify the data exchange process to minimize risk for
safety of flight and on the importance of creating a common Data
Center. The operators agreed to work on a prototype Data Center as a
proof-of-concept to improve coordination for conjunction monitoring.
The prototype Data Center expanded quickly and today seven
operators are participating and regularly contributing data from over
120 satellites in geostationary orbit. The participating operators
receive daily close-approach alerts when the miss-distances and
conjunction probabilities fall below certain thresholds and a daily
neighborhood watch report showing the projected separations of
satellites that are flying in an adjacent control box. The
participating operators provide their ephemeris data in the reference
frames and time systems generated in their flight software and the Data
Center performs the transformation and reformatting to a common frame
for close-approach analysis. This greatly simplifies the efforts and
reduces the burden on individual operators and thus encourages
participation. A strict data policy has been put in place to ensure
privacy of the data. The Data Center is not allowed to redistribute the
data received from the owners/operators without approval from the
owners of the data. While there is still significant work left to
refine the process, the initial results from the Data Center prototype
are very promising.
The principal goal of the Data Center is to promote safety in space
operations by encouraging coordination and communication among
commercial operators. The Data Center could also serve as a means to
facilitate communication between operators and governments. Details on
the implementation of the Data Center, services to be provided, usage
policies, structure of the organization and by-laws have yet to be
determined and would ultimately require agreement among the member
operators. The development of a Data Center could provide new
visibility and awareness of the geostationary orbit, allow all
satellites to be flown in a safer manner and reduce the likelihood of
an accidental international incident in space.
The Data Center is a tool for commercial operators to exchange
information about their active spacecraft. However, the operators must
still rely on the U.S. Government to monitor dead satellites and other
objects drifting in geostationary orbit, that could collide with an
active satellite. The safety of commercial space activities can be
ensured only if there is a commitment from the U.S. Government, and
other governments equipped with the same type of radar or optical
observation capabilities, to monitor uncontrolled space objects and to
alert commercial operators, in real time, of the risks of collision
with their operational satellites.
To be sure, the motivations behind the civil and military space
activities of nations are far more complex than those of the commercial
satellite industry. However, the central goal of preserving the
operational space environment binds all space participants with a
common purpose. It is important to note, in particular, the very
critical role played by the geostationary orbit. Should this unique
circular orbit be polluted by a space collision, the impact on military
and commercial communications would be devastating.
For all of these reasons, the U.S. Government should play a
leadership role on the issue of Space Traffic Control. In pursuit of
this objective, we would offer the following specific recommendations:
Provide adequate funding for Space Situational
Awareness--Space Situational Awareness (SSA) is the ability to
monitor and understand the constantly changing space
environment. The task of locating and tracking active
satellites and space debris is one of the most challenging
aspects of SSA. Currently, the U.S. Air Force's JSpOC plays a
key role internationally in tracking, and reporting on, all
man-made objects in orbit. The JSpOC receives on-orbit
positional data from the Space Surveillance Network, which is
composed of both optical and radar sensors throughout the
world. This allows the JSpOC to attempt to maintain accurate
data on every man-made object currently in orbit. Today the
JSpOC is tracking more than 10,000 objects in space. Like all
parts of the Pentagon budget, funding for expansion of the
Space Surveillance Network is under pressure. In light of
recent events, Congress and the Air Force need to provide
higher priority for this funding.
Develop new mechanisms for sharing space traffic
information between nations--The U.S. is not alone in its SSA
efforts. Russia, several European states, China, Australia, and
others are making investments in SSA capabilities. Each of
these data sets, taken alone, is not likely to solve the
emerging space traffic problems. It is also critical that
nations strive to create rapid, reliable, and non-bureaucratic
institutions for sharing the new data they are collecting.
Maintain and expand the U.S. Commercial and Foreign
Entities (CFE) program--Established by the U.S. Congress as a
pilot program, CFE now provides a limited but essential set of
U.S. Government data on existing space objects for release to
certain commercial and foreign entities. Although CFE has been
advantageous for governments and industry, the accuracy of the
data currently provided is not sufficient for precise collision
detection/assessments, support of launch operations, end of
life/re-entry analyses, or anomaly resolution. The CFE pilot
program was originally set to expire this year. It is essential
that the current program be formalized and expanded to meet the
evolving needs of global space operators.
Take advantage of the data readily available from
commercial satellite operators--It would be extremely valuable
if satellite operators and governments could find a way to
share their collected data in an organized, cooperative
fashion. Such a sharing process could result in the creation of
a ``Global Data Warehouse'' for space information. Governments
and operators might be encouraged to submit information on the
orbital elements of space objects as well as their maneuver
plans and operational frequencies. If information were gathered
in a central depository, warning and alert messages could be
distributed automatically in a common format to participating
operators, while protecting sensitive commercial or government
data. Intelsat, along with other satellite operators, has
offered to share its information, free of charge, with the U.S.
Government.
Be creative in the development of new data sources--
As I mentioned previously, most commercial operators rely on
the Air Force Space Command's ``JSpOC,'' for tracking man-made
objects and debris in orbit. The JSpOC receives satellite
position data primarily from the global Space Surveillance
Network. As upgrades to this network are likely to be expensive
and long-term in nature, it is important that we look at
creative solutions to respond to our growing needs. As an
alternative to expensive terrestrial infrastructure and
dedicated government programs, DOD should try to take creative
advantage of every commercial platform going to orbit. Every
commercial launch is an opportunity for a technology testbed,
or the deployment of a novel operational capability. Rather
than develop and launch dedicated assets to address this
problem, the Air Force should consider launching low-cost
sensors on every satellite going to orbit. By including
commercial and scientific satellites in this endeavor, it would
be possible to obtain a holistic view of the space environment
in a few years, with little government investment. Intelsat
alone has 10 satellites currently under construction or in
development. Our colleagues and competitors in the industry are
similarly positioned with respect to their new spacecraft
investments. Imagine, if you will, the improvement to our
understanding of the space environment if every satellite
launched over the next five years were part of an integrated,
global monitoring system for space.
Begin an international dialogue on `Rules of the
Road' for space--Although there are reasonable differences of
opinion regarding the value of additional laws or international
agreements, there seems to be general acceptance among space
operators that certain guidelines or norms developed by
consensus may play a useful role in ordering our future space
activities. A good example is the space debris guidelines
developed by the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordinating
Committee, an intergovernmental body created to exchange
information on space debris research and mitigation measures.
The development of other non-binding guidelines should be
investigated. Such non-binding guidelines might include:
A formalization of existing rules regarding the
movement of spacecraft between orbital locations;
Protocols for informing other operators when one of
their spacecraft could potentially cause damage to
other space objects;
Protocols for managing the loss of control of a
satellite.
Within the next decade, many more countries will gain the ability
to exploit space for commercial, scientific and governmental purposes.
It is essential that the world's governments provide leadership on
space management issues today in order to protect the space activities
of tomorrow. Bad decisions and short-term thinking will create problems
that will last for generations. Wise decisions and the careful
nurturing of our precious space resource will ensure that the
tremendous benefits from the peaceful use and exploration of outer
space are enjoyed by those who follow in our footsteps in the decades
to come.
Biography for Richard DalBello
SUMMARY OF QUALIFICATIONS
Creative administrator with more than 15 years of
experience in the communications and aerospace industries
Detailed knowledge of U.S. Government legislative and
regulatory processes
Comprehensive understanding of international
organizations and policy processes
Proven skill in international business, trade, and
negotiations
Dynamic leader and team builder capable of motivating
others towards success
RECENT WORK HISTORY
Intelsat General, August 2005-Present
Vice President, Legal and Government Affairs for the leading global
provider of commercial satellite services to U.S. Federal, State and
Local Governments, NATO members, and to the integrators that support
them.
Oversees all aspects of legal, contracts, and
procurement departments for $300 M satellite services provider
Chief lobbyist and legislative coordinator
Provides policy support for key business development
initiatives
Serves as Intelsat General's public voice through
high-profile editorials, articles, conferences, and radio and
television appearances
Manages Human Resources and security functions
Satellite Industry Association/Satellite Broadcasting and
Communications Association, August 2001-August 2005
President of premier trade organizations representing U.S. and
international satellite manufacturers, launch service companies, and
direct broadcast and satellite radio service providers.
Managed a staff of 20 and a budget of $4 million
Served as key industry adviser to policy-makers in
Congress, the FCC, and the Administration on commercial
communication and direct broadcast satellite issues
Organized over 50 pleadings and hundreds of informal
meetings regarding critical spectrum allocation decisions at
the FCC
Led industry efforts to revise satellite export
control regulations resulting in the introduction of draft
legislation in the Senate
Spotcast Communications, December 1999-August 2001
General Counsel of global wireless-media and content-delivery company
with operations in Europe, Asia, and the United States.
Managed securities compliance for private and
institutional funding rounds totaling in excess of $15 million
Drafted and negotiated contracts and license
agreements in the United States, Hong Kong, Singapore, and
France
Managed foreign and domestic external legal counsel
Developed and implemented policies to ensure that
personal customer data was handled in a way consistent with
emerging national and international privacy laws
Managed company's patent and trademark portfolio and
eventual sale of these assets when the company ceased U.S.
operations
ICO Global Communications, April 1997-December 1999
Vice President, Government Affairs and Business Development for London-
based satellite company offering mobile communication services around
the globe.
Established company's North American office
Developed and implemented strategies to secure
critical operating licenses resulting in negotiated spectrum
transition agreements with U.S. broadcasters
Functioned as business development liaison between
North America and London on projects involving broadband data
and navigation technologies
Managed U.S. export license process for critical
space hardware
White House, February 1993-April 1997
Assistant Director (Office of Science and Technology Policy) for
satellite communications, space technology, and aeronautics
Coordinated White House efforts which led to the
privatization of INTELSAT and INMARSAT
Served as White House representative to business,
international, and contractor communities during space station
redesign effort
Developed government-wide policy to assure commercial
access to the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS)
Developed funding rationale and investment plan for
NASA and DOD Advanced Launch Vehicle programs
NASA, March 1991-February 1993
Director (Commercial Communication Satellite and Remote Sensing
Division) for research and commercial applications programs at four
NASA centers and various universities
Managed $20 million R&D and technology application
program to transfer NASA communication satellite and remote
sensing technology to the private sector
Negotiated NASA/industry and NASA/university
technology agreements
Directed industry-sponsored experiments program for
the Advanced Communication Technology Satellite (ACTS)
OTHER RELEVANT WORK EXPERIENCE
U.S. Congress--Project Director, Office of Technology
Assessment
U.S. Department of Commerce--Director, Office of
Space Commerce
San Francisco Superior Court--Law Clerk
California Supreme Court--Intern
EDUCATION
University of Illinois, Urbana, IL, B.A. Political
Science--1975
University of San Francisco School of Law, San
Francisco, CA, J.D.--1979
McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, LL.M.--1984
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you.
Dr. Pace.
STATEMENT OF DR. SCOTT PACE, DIRECTOR, SPACE POLICY INSTITUTE,
ELLIOTT SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, GEORGE WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY
Dr. Pace. Thank you, Madam Chairman and Ranking Member
Olson, distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for
the opportunity to be here today.
The long-term sustainability of the space environment from
low-Earth orbit out to the moon is, of course, of fundamental
importance to many national interests, from national security
to the global economy. So I commend the Committee for holding
this hearing today and appreciate it.
The space environment, as has been pointed out, is very
different today from what it was in 1957, when the first
satellites were launched, and the concerns about sustainability
today arise not so much from the activities of the traditional
space-faring nations like the United States, but from new
entrants and potential entrants such as Iran and North Korea,
who have virtually no capabilities to monitor and control space
objects. So, if you will, there are certainly some new
irresponsible drivers on the highways these days.
It is easy to understand the appeal of terms like space
traffic control, space traffic management, but these can be
misleading on a variety of both technical and political
grounds. That is, the space environment is not like aviation or
the highways. Satellites cannot maneuver as easily as cars or
airplanes might, and of course, operating an international
regime, questions of sovereignty are much different than they
are for the highways.
Where the analogy of traffic management does work is in the
idea of having common understanding of definitions, standards,
operating procedures, and practices for space operators to
communicate with each other. As with the civil aviation, and,
of course, I am hopeful they will communicate in English, this
has been helpful to us, a good example of the evolving
international norms with these standards and procedures can be
found in the Inter-Agency Debris Coordination Committee
guidelines as Mr. Johnson mentioned on minimizing orbital
debris. These guidelines deal with breakup of space systems,
end of mission life, satellite disposal, and avoiding
intentional harm.
The IADC guidelines on orbital debris emerge from
discussions of best practices among technical experts rather
than legal arguments among international lawyers. IADC
discussions include government, academic, commercial experts
from many countries with a focus on what made operational
sense, and we should continue to encourage efforts that look at
best practices in real-world space operations and develop
further voluntary guidelines.
I should point out that the former head of the French Space
Agency, Gerard Brachet, is currently leading international
discussions along this line that have included the United
States and other major space powers, and it is my understanding
that the U.S. has found this constructive.
To support these norms and other international interests,
there is a clear need for better space situational awareness
for all sectors, civil, commercial, national security. A first
step in improving monitoring is to enable better, faster
standardized information exchange among satellite owners and
operators. And some good news here is that international open
standards are close to approval. The Consultative Committee for
Space Data Standards, which is made up of all the major space
agencies in the world, including I would point out China and
Russia, approved a draft recommended standard for orbit debris
messages in July of last year. The CCDS, this international
body, over 400 space missions have chosen to use CCDS
communication standards. So there is a large-installed base, I
think, of interest there for promulgating these new standards.
At Congressional direction, the Air Force operates a
Commercial and Foreign Entities Program that distributes
satellite positions known as two-line elements, as you have
heard, and related messages free of charge. This has been an
excellent start toward improved data sharing across the
different space sectors, but it is only partly satisfactory.
The two-line element data is not the most precise, and
sometimes it is out of date or otherwise incorrect. It is
perfectly fine for cataloguing. It is not so fine for
conjunction analyses as you have heard.
This leads to false alarms about potential conjunctions due
to the broad error envelopes associated with the TLE position
predictions, and such alarms in turn consume more analytical
resources and requests for more precise and timely data to
resolve potential concerns. The commercial satellite industry
as you have heard proposes to increase data sharing, and this
is, I think, again, another excellent start, but there are some
natural concerns. For example, we may not want to say where
some satellites are, even if they exist. We may not want to
reveal what our full capabilities are or their limitations.
There is concern about liability and the timeliness of any data
provided, and there is a normal competition for public
resources as we are all familiar with.
So there is still an international need for independent
verification of the information provided. There are a variety
of analogies for how to organize and govern these models for
data sharing, which I provided in my written testimony, which I
would be happy to discuss, but I think the most important thing
to realize is that the core policy problems associated with
this are primarily on data policy and information
dissemination. It is not about technology per se. It is about
what we want to do to secure our common interests, and it is my
hope that the United States will recognize the value of
sustainable space environment as an international public good
that, in turn, supports our own strategic national interest. We
are more reliant on space than virtually any other country, and
therefore, our leadership in this area I think is in our
national interest.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Pace follows:]
Prepared Statement of Scott Pace
Thank you, Madam Chairman, for providing an opportunity to discuss
this important topic. The long-term ``sustainability'' of the space
environment, from low-Earth orbit and out to the Moon, is of
fundamental importance to many national interests, from national
security to the global economy.
Introduction
Space activities contribute to the long-term well being of society
through improved scientific understanding in every field of knowledge,
most notably with respect to the global environment. The design,
development, and operation of space systems constitute major technical
and managerial challenges in systems engineering and thus help
strengthen the engineering capacities of participating nations. China
and India are but the latest examples of nations that see the value of
space to their further development.
Most immediately, space systems such as satellite communications,
environmental monitoring, and global navigation satellite systems are
crucial to the productivity of many types of national and international
infrastructures such as air, sea, and highway transportation, oil and
gas pipelines, financial networks, and global communications.
Information services enabled by the unique capabilities and global
reach of space systems are crucial to the functioning of the global
economy. In a time of global economic crisis, the United States and
other space-faring nations need to cooperate more closely to protect
space systems from intentional or unintentional interference.
The space environment today is a very different from what it was in
1957 when the first satellite was launched, or 1972 when the
international convention on liability for damage caused by space
objects was signed. In the past two years, a Chinese anti-satellite
test and communications satellite collision have added thousands of
orbital debris to the local space environment, much of which will be in
orbit for many years to come. Today, the Joint Space Operations Center
is tracking over 19,000 man-made objects and that number is growing.
The space environment is not safe--it might be fairly characterized
as an environment in which everything is trying to kill you and your
spacecraft. It can however be made sustainable in that the vital
functions we use space for today can be reliably maintained for
generations to come.
Concerns about sustainability arise not so much from the activities
of traditional space-faring nations, like the United States, but from
new entrants such as Iran and possibly North Korea who have virtually
no capabilities to monitor and control space objects. Concerns arise
with respect to China, which has significant and impressive space
capabilities, but whose ASAT test showed an alarming disregard or lack
of understanding of orbital debris. Finally, there are non-state actors
like universities, who are deploying increasingly small satellites for
commercial and scientific purposes that may be challenging to monitor
in the crowded near-Earth environment.
Space Sustainability
The irreversible accumulation of orbital debris constitutes the
most obvious concern for the sustainability of space use. However, it
is not the only factor and I'd like to mention two that are often
overlooked:
Space weather--yes, space has weather of a sort. There are
geomagnetic storms from the Sun, varying energies from the Van Allen
radiation belts around the Earth, ionosphere disturbances and
scintillations, and geomagnetic induced currents. Coronal mass
ejections from the Sun and their associated shock waves can compress
the Earth's magnetosphere and induce geomagnetic storms with effects on
Earth as well as local space.
Space weather cannot be controlled, but monitoring and prediction
are becoming more important as humans go farther out into space and
more of the global economy depends on the reliable functioning of space
systems. Space weather monitoring is becoming less of a ``science
project'' and more of an operational requirement alongside traditional
weather monitoring systems in space.
Radio frequency interference--there is no point in going to space
if you cannot communicate home. No nation ``owns'' the radio frequency
spectrum but all nations depend on keeping it free from interference,
whether intentional or unintentional. Space-based services are
particularly vulnerable to interference because satellites in space
cannot easily increase their transmitted power in the face of increased
noise. Many space services are not traditional two-way communications,
but include passive monitoring, active sensing, and one-way
broadcasting. As a result, critical frequency bands require special
international protection, e.g., those used for GPS, weather and climate
monitoring, and satellite communications.
There is growing pressure on all these bands from terrestrial
commercial technologies and regulatory protections are more important
than ever. In this regard, the Federal Communications Commission, in
partnership with the National Telecommunications and Information Agency
has an important role in protecting the national security, public
safety requirements, and scientific needs of federal agencies relying
on space systems.
Returning to the topic of orbital debris, it is easy to understand
the appeal of terms like ``space traffic control.'' The drama of
International Space Station astronauts taking temporary refuge in their
Soyuz return capsule and greater awareness of space operators taking
precautionary maneuvers seem to argue for putting someone in charge.
Unfortunately, ``space traffic management'' can be misleading on both
technical and political grounds. The space environment is not like that
of aviation or highways in that satellites cannot maneuver easily.
Further, the space environment belongs to no one and thus there is no
central authority that spacecraft owner/operators can use to protect
regions of space vital to them. An international agreement authorizing
an independent organization to provide and enforce where sovereign
space assets may travels is a difficult concept for many nations.
Where the analogy with traffic management does work is in the idea
of having a common understanding of definitions, standards, operating
procedures, and practices for space operators to communicate with each
other. As with international civil aviation, I am hopeful that they
will communicate in English. Rather than imposing a ``top down'' space
authority, there are promising avenues for an evolving consensus on
``rules of the road'' and confidence-building measures based on
international norms for all types of space activity.
Guidelines and Standards
A good example of evolving international norms can be found in the
Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) guidelines on
minimizing orbital debris. These guidelines deal with the break-up of
space systems, end-of-mission-life satellite disposal, and avoiding
intentional harm. Another good example is the international
condemnation of the Chinese ASAT test that showed international
awareness of the risks posed by tests that create long-lived orbital
debris.
To support these norms and other national interests, there is a
clear need for better space situational awareness for all space
sectors--civil, commercial, and national security. While space traffic
control may not be feasible, better space traffic monitoring is
feasible. A first step in improved monitoring is to enable better,
faster, standardized information exchanges among satellite owners and
operators. Some good news here is that international, open standards
are close to approval. The Consultative Committee for Space Data
Standards (CCSDS) approved a Draft Recommended Standard for Orbit Data
Messages in July of last year. The CCSDS is an international body of
all major space agencies and over 400 space missions have chosen to use
CCSDS communication standards. These missions have included everything
from the U.S. rovers on Mars to the Chinese Chang'e missions to the
Moon.
Use of CCSDS standards allows for (but does not mandate)
operational cross-support among space agencies. Representation is quite
broad, with expert participation from the French space agency (CNES),
the European Space Operations Center (ESOC), the German Space
Operations Center (GSOC), the Japanese space agency (JAXA), Intelsat,
Inmarsat, the U.S. Air Force, and NASA's Goddard Spaceflight Center,
and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Representation is not systematic,
however, and often depends on a few dedicated individuals whose work is
tolerated but not always supported by home institutions busy with other
priorities. A more intentional U.S. strategy that resources and staffs
international standards work would improve the coordination of U.S.
positions and the chances for greater international support of those
positions. For example, I would see closer coordination by the Air
Force Space Command, National Reconnaissance Office, and the
Operationally Responsive Space Office with on-going NASA efforts as a
good near-term opportunity.
An important characteristic of CCSDS standards are that they are
open and transparent and do not require the transfer of sensitive
technologies. This is necessary if international satellite operators
are to be able to share location data with each other--if not the
characteristics of the satellites themselves. A more difficult
challenge for space traffic monitoring will be in determining where a
spacecraft might have been or where it will be. This requires
mathematical modeling techniques of propagation or interpolation from
existing information to make predictions. These models can vary quite a
bit and will often contain proprietary techniques that make it
difficult to make comparisons between different models. While models
can and should evolve, it will be important to international acceptance
that any proposed standard for a predictive model not be proprietary
but subject to open inspection and improvement.
As satellite architectures evolve, information exchanges and
practices can be expected to evolve as well. For example, it is
difficult to track objects smaller than 10 centimeters in Earth orbit
but networks of nano-satellites may be that small or smaller. Each such
satellite or group of cooperative nano-satellites might be modeled as
sphere of fixed size. Independent verification of their location might
in turn require active measures such as transponder beacons or passive
ones such as laser reflectors. Larger satellites could be used to carry
piggyback payloads that observe their local environment and supplement
information from dedicated ground and space-based sensors.
Different areas of space are used for different kinds of satellites
and operational practices in low-Earth orbit, geosynchronous orbit, and
polar/sun-synchronous orbits will be different. Groups of
communications satellites operated by the same owner in geosynchronous
orbit tend to be relatively slow moving with respect to each other and
can be spaced closely. Conversely, communications satellites operated
by different owners in low-Earth orbit may be moving at high speeds
relative to each other and will need wider spacing for safety. In
analogy to air traffic, satellites may be stacked into different
altitudes and inclinations to ensure separation; with separations being
wider for satellites operated non-cooperatives (i.e., by different
organizations).
The IADC guidelines on orbital debris emerged from discussions of
best practices among technical experts rather than legal arguments
among international lawyers. Those technical discussions included
government, academic, and commercial experts from many countries with a
focus on what made operational sense. At this stage, it seems premature
to specify any binding ``rules of the road'' for space but it is time
to look at real-world operations and see if there are useful practices
that could be documented in similar voluntary guidelines. The former
head of the French space agency, Gerard Brachet, is currently leading
international discussions along this line that have included the United
States and other major space powers.
Improving Data Sharing
At congressional direction, the Air Force operates a Commercial and
Foreign Entities Support program that distributes satellite positions
(know as two-line elements) and related messages free of charge. This
has been a good start toward improved data sharing across the different
space sectors, but only partly satisfactory. The two-line element (TLE)
data is not the most precise and is sometimes out-of-date or otherwise
incorrect. This leads to false alarms about potential conjunctions due
to the broad error envelopes associate with TLE position predictions.
Such alarms in turn consume more analytical resources in requests for
more precise and timely data to resolve potential concerns.
The Air Force rightly gives top priority to human missions in space
and national security functions. Unfortunately, they don't have the
resources to look at everything (e.g., a continuous catalog-on-catalog
collision screening) and some risks will not be addressed until it's
too late. This is my understanding of what happened in the case of the
recent Iridium-Cosmos collision in which it was only apparent what
happened after the fact.
To meet the need for more analytical attention as well as data from
optical sources, radar sources and satellite owner/operators, the
commercial satellite industry has proposed data sharing through and
international data clearinghouse. It is understandable that firms with
billions of dollars of assets at risk in space would want to take steps
to protect those investments. The primary challenges to implementing a
data sharing warehouse are not technical or economic, but policy,
notably how to balance commercial and security interests in the
dissemination of data.
While a single, inclusive space situational awareness program,
operated by the government or industry may seem to be the obvious
answer the ``one size fits all'' approach will likely not work for
multiple reasons.
The government may not want to say where some
satellites are or even if they exist
The government may not want to reveal what its full
capabilities are or its limitations
There is concern about liability and timeliness for
any data provided
There is the normal competition for public resources
There will still be an international need for
independent verification
These are some of the obvious concerns that would arise in managing
information about U.S. Government, international, and private sector
satellites in a single source.
Aside from security, there is often a concern that the United
States bears and would continue to bear a disproportionate share of the
international space situational awareness (SSA) burden since we have
the most capabilities. That is true but I would also say that we also
have a disproportionate share of the dependency on space and improved
data sharing is in our national self-interest. International
cooperation provides an opportunity to access SSA data (e.g., optical,
radar) from geographically dispersed areas of the world that would be
expensive for us to access and an opportunity to routinely get data
from satellite owner/operators who have better data than routinely
found in government systems, at least compared to what is published in
TLE form. While building new radars is quite expensive, it might be
possible to exploit radio astronomy telescopes, but at some
displacement of science observing time. Thus, outreach should include
the international scientific community as well as foreign government
and commercial industry.
The United States is already participating in an expanding dialogue
with the European Union and the European Space Agency (ESA) on space
situational awareness cooperation. In February, ESA hosted a technical
meeting in Germany for U.S. and European technical experts to discuss
standards for space object survey and tracking as well as cooperation
in space weather monitoring. These discussions should not remain
limited to Europe, of course, but should include U.S. friends and
allies in other regions, such as Asia. As with other forms of security
cooperation, sharing space situational awareness data will likely see
expanding circles of trust--proceeding from the United Kingdom,
Australia, and Canada, to NATO members, Japan and then other space-
faring states, such as India.
As part of expanding cooperation, more formal steps could be
envisioned such as banning any destructive testing in space that would
create long-lived orbital debris--the kind of debris that pose a threat
to all space activities. This would not necessarily means a ban on
``space weapons'' which would be unverifiable, nor would it ban space-
based kinetic energy interceptors used for ballistic missile defense,
or ground-based interceptors such as the SM-3. Priority should be
placed on potential agreements that offer the best chance for an
international consensus and verification.
Building international consensus can be a slow process but it
should be kept in mind that there are risks in trying to be too
comprehensive in approaches to space (e.g., creating a new treaty
regime). There is a broad and flexible body of existing international
space law that is sufficient for virtually anything we want to do in
space. The development of new norms should start with our friends and
allies that are active in space--in short, those with the most ``skin
in the game'' and those willing to contribute new data sources or other
capabilities.
Improving international space situational awareness is very
feasible, in part because the information needed is quite basic and
need not infringe on national security. The fundamental needs are to
know where and when an object is located in space, a point of contact
responsible for the object, plus knowledge of space weather and the
Earth's atmosphere over time. There are many complex products and
services that can be created with such basic information and space
agencies and operators will do so. International cooperation should
focus on sharing basic information using open standards while
recognizing that proprietary ``value-added'' products will arise on
their own in response to user needs.
Governance
It is an open question how international sharing of SSA data will
occur. Several analogies come to mind in terms of governance models for
international SSA data sharing. For example, sharing could evolve like
the Internet, with a network growing based on common protocols. The
CCSDS standards and rules of the road growing out of the IADC
guidelines provide a starting point for this approach. A non-
governmental, international, non-profit body modeled after ICANN
(Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) could encompass
governments, non-governmental organizations, and private corporations
that own and operate satellites to promote safer operations.
Another approach would be to expand the current Commercial and
Foreign Entities (CFE) program by making high precision data more
easily available for all reported objects. Sharing might initially be
with other countries with security ties or space monitoring
capabilities, similar perhaps to the U.S./Canadian sharing of warning
information in NORAD, but on a much wider scale.
If expanded sharing via governments proves too slow, one might
expect that geosynchronous (GEO) satellite operators (e.g., Intelsat,
SES, J-Sat) will create their own data clearinghouse as a separate
initiative. They would continue to use CFE-provided data but would
share higher precision information from their satellites with other
members.
It is hard to imagine the creation of a central international
organization for SSA--what is sometimes called an ``ICAO for Space'' in
analogy to the International Civil Aviation Organization. Similarly, it
is hard to imagine expanding the role of the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) to include orbital debris. Both
organizations have regulatory functions that work through sovereign
states. They do not have direct operational roles. In the case of the
ITU, it already has enough difficulties with managing the allocation of
geosynchronous orbital slots due to the number of ``paper satellites''
in the pipeline already.
There are examples of mixing public and private data for common
purposes, such as with weather predictions based on all sorts of
international data. There are also examples where the government
encourages non-government data sources, such as the International GNSS
Service at the jet Propulsion Laboratory that monitors the GPS
constellation through a voluntary federation of over 200 sites around
the world. However, there is a clear line between awareness of data
from open sources and using that data to operate the GPS constellation.
In the case of space situational awareness, the benefits of sharing
information have to be balanced against the risk of that same
information being used to harm U.S. or allied assets. Another important
policy question will be that of direct or indirect user fees. In
general, international cooperation for the United States has worked
best when not based on the exchange of funds, but the shared
contributions to a common goal. The United States has opposed the
charging of direct user fees for safety services in ICAO in order to
not deter the use of those services. One might imagine similar
treatment of orbital debris data as a safety service. While this might
place a burden on the U.S. as the majority supplier of such data, our
interests would not likely be served by trying to impose direct user
charges that would lead to even more complex negotiations.
Summary
The issues that need to be addressed in keeping the space
environment safe for civil and commercial users include:
1. Protection of the space environment and mitigation of
orbital debris. Improving space situational awareness and
reduction of the hazards posed by manmade orbital debris are
both vital to the long-term sustainable use of space for all
nations. Space-faring nations should adhere to consensus
orbital debris mitigation standard practices recognized by the
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the United Nations
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Improving space
situational awareness should also be regarded as a promising
area of international cooperation. In this context, proposals
for voluntary ``rules of the road'' for space traffic need to
be seriously considered.
2. Protection of the radio spectrum used by space services
from harmful interference, with special attention to aviation
safety services such as GPS and environmental services such as
remote sensing. After space launch, communication is the most
pervasive requirement for all space systems. Space-faring
nations should work through the Space Frequency Coordination
Group and within the International Telecommunications Union to
achieve international support for necessary protections. Space
agencies and industries should closely track the standards
development work of terrestrial data communications
standardization bodies in order to ensure compatibility of
emerging commercial devices and services with current and
future space needs.
3. Promotion of open, inter-operable standards for space
systems and their associated mission operations systems to
increase opportunities for international collaboration in
space. Space-faring nations should support space standards
developed by the International Standards Organization and
utilize the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems and
the Interagency Operations Advisory Group to strengthen
capabilities for cross support across the international space
community.
The core SSA policy problems are centered on data policy and
information dissemination, followed by the assignment of appropriate
roles and responsibilities to federal agencies and services. The
primary data issue is to determine how much high precision information
from U.S. Government sources can be made available in a timely manner
and with whom. The second issue is how to most effectively promote
international acceptance of CCSDS-developed standards for multilateral
data exchange and to encourage non-proprietary propagation and
interpolation models for conjunction analyses.
The United States should recognize the value of space
sustainability as an international public good that also supports its
own strategic interests. The United States needs to retain freedom of
action in space while at the same time recognizing the presence of new
actors in space and our own dependence on space systems. The most
promising approach toward international norms aligned with our
interests is to engage with other parties in creating a technically
based consensus on reducing the hazards posed by orbital debris. We
should avoid top-down prescriptive, legalistic or politically driven
structures that do not allow for flexible evolution. Similarly, we
should remain focused on mutual protection against common hazards found
in the space environment and not be tempted to overreach, e.g., the
creation of comprehensive space weapons bans or centralized space
traffic management authorities.
If we actively support open technical standards and operational
innovations based on real-world benefits, we will have the credibility
necessary to establish new international norms that will add to our
security and strengthen our economy.
If we focus on continuing to earn the trust of the billions of
users worldwide that today rely on space systems, we will have the
international support necessary to sustain the use of space for
generations to come.
Thanks you for your attention. I would be happy to answer any
questions you might have.
Biography for Scott Pace
Dr. Scott Pace is the Director of the Space Policy Institute and a
Professor of Practice in International Affairs at George Washington
University's Elliott School of International Affairs. His research
interests include civil, commercial, and national security space
policy, and the management of technical innovation. From 2005-2008, he
served as the Associate Administrator for Program Analysis and
Evaluation at NASA.
Prior to NASA, Dr. Pace was the Assistant Director for Space and
Aeronautics in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
(OSTP). From 1993-2000, Dr. Pace worked for the RAND Corporation's
Science and Technology Policy Institute (STPI). From 1990 to 1993, Dr.
Pace served as the Deputy Director and Acting Director of the Office of
Space Commerce, in the Office of the Deputy Secretary of the Department
of Commerce. He received a Bachelor of Science degree in Physics from
Harvey Mudd College in 1980; Master's degrees in Aeronautics &
Astronautics and Technology & Policy from the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology in 1982; and a Doctorate in Policy Analysis from the RAND
Graduate School in 1989.
Dr. Pace received the NASA Outstanding Leadership Medal in 2008,
the U.S. Department of State's Group Superior Honor Award, GPS
Interagency Team, in 2005, and the NASA Group Achievement Award,
Columbia Accident Rapid Reaction Team, in 2004. He has been a member of
the U.S. Delegation to the World Radio communication Conferences in
1997, 2000, 2003, and 2007. He is a past member of the Earth Studies
Committee, Space Studies Board, National Research Council and the
Commercial Activities Subcommittee of the NASA Advisory Council. Dr.
Pace is a currently a member of the Board of Trustees, University Space
Research Association.
Discussion
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Dr. Pace.
We are going to begin our rounds of questioning. We are
going to try to keep to five minutes each, and I want to
encourage Members if they haven't had a chance to read the
written testimony, it was excellent, and there is a lot of
detail, of course, that you can't get into in five minutes.
Iridium-Cosmos Collision and Going Forward
I guess I would like to start off just fundamentally saying
in terms of the Iridium-Cosmos collision in February, and I am
going to start with you, General James, what went wrong, and
how are we going to prevent it from happening again?
Clearly, we are not looking to assign blame, but we had a
major problem, we have a program in place, we are looking for
solutions of what we and the Congress can do, whether it is the
public sector or the private sector, but this is a clear
example of a problem that we haven't heard from the panelists
yet. We are going to start with you, General, and then go to
other members if we can get a clearer answer. Thank you.
General James. Certainly, Madam Chairman. In terms of the
Iridium collision, I would say that at the time we were not
looking at the Iridium satellite to do conjunction analysis. We
track, as we have said, 19,000 objects or so, but we only do a
conjunction analysis or an assessment of whether they are going
to come close to another body on a subset of that.
Primarily DOD payload, certainly manned payloads, the
Shuttle, the International Space Station, and those payloads
that support the U.S. Government in one form or fashion. So on
the day that the Iridium collision happened, we were not
looking at the Iridium satellite nor the Cosmos satellite to
determine if there was going to be a close approach, if you
will. So on that day there was no data that would have told the
owner operators to any degree of precision whether there was a
potential collision or not.
Certainly if you look to the future, you can define which
particular spacecraft you want to assess for conjunctions, and
we are ramping up to be able to ultimately do conjunction
analysis on the 800 or so satellites that can maneuver. So
obviously if a satellite can't maneuver, even if he knows that
there is a piece of debris coming toward it, there is not a
whole lot that that particular satellite can do. But for those
that can maneuver, the intent is to do that conjunction
analysis, provide that potential warning that says we have an
analysis that says there will be a close approach within 100
meters, 200 meters, 300 meters, whatever the case may be, and
then the owner operator of that particular system could take
action.
So that is the path we are moving down in the near future
to do that assessment on those 800 or so maneuverable
spacecraft.
Chairwoman Giffords. And do you have a timeframe for that,
General?
General James. Certainly within the next year and ideally
before the end of the year.
Chairwoman Giffords. Okay, and I know that you can't get
too detailed, but do you believe that you will have the
resources necessary in order to do the job?
General James. Yes. We have been working with our
headquarters to get additional processing capacity as well as
personnel to implement that capability.
Chairwoman Giffords. Okay. Would other panelists--yes. Dr.
DalBello.
Mr. DalBello. Yes. I think this raises an important issue
as to what we as a Nation want to happen, and we had this
debate, was it maybe 10 or 15 years ago, when we decided what
were we going to do with the GPS system. Were we going to have
it as an exclusive system for the U.S. Government, or were we
going to make it available globally? And recognizing at that
time there were all sorts of people who were arguing that
making GPS more generally available introduced significant
risks, national security risks, in terms of our potential
adversaries using the GPS system against us.
I think we are in a similar place now in trying to decide
as a Nation where are we going with space traffic control. I
think that Lieutenant General James and the JFCCS are doing a
great job, but I also think that as a Nation we haven't decided
whether we want to be in the space control business or not. Is
this something that we want to take on, either alone or with
other countries, for the world?
Inherent in your question was the assumption that someone
should have been watching that Iridium satellite. The system
today is not set up that way. The operators are, you are on
basically your own. We have our own internal management system.
Now, we operate in a different orbit, a less-cluttered orbit
than the Iridium satellites do, but the operators are
responsible for their own safety. So we actually request when
we see a potential issue, we do make requests. Occasionally we
do get comments and calls from the Joint Space Operations
Center.
But you--but the situation we are in today is we do not
have something that approaches an operational space traffic
control system, and I think that is a policy decision that this
Nation needs to make.
Chairwoman Giffords. Speaking of policy, Dr. Pace.
Dr. Pace. Certainly. Well, and this is where analogies I
think can be a dangerous thing. Everything that my colleagues
said is quite correct, but, for example, you could imagine how
the maritime world developed. There wasn't a central sea-
control facility that was guiding and tracking, you know, every
ship. Again, pardon the strange analogy, but operators both in
the military and the civilian side developed rules and
procedures for navigating with respect to each other. They
adopted certain procedures about separation of ships based upon
long operational experience and developed navigation aids.
There became laws that arose through Admiralty Law in courts
for adjudicating and handling liability in these environments.
So I think that when you are looking at the policy and
governance for how space traffic might evolve in the future, I
suspect you will see really two separate streams that will
hopefully merge. One is expansion of the CFE Program to involve
a number of our allies who are--we already have security
relationships with, so it will become more capable and broader
and more inclusive, including commercial input.
And the second part is the operators themselves are--have
large investments at stake, and so you would imagine that they
would be exchanging information in and amongst each other, and
they would be watching out for each other. And so between the
two of those, a bottoms-up sort of approach by the commercial
community, which is increasingly at risk, as well as expansion
and strengthening for the new environment of traditional
military functions to involve greater number of civil and
international actors, you will likely see. I don't think you
will see a centralized master plan. I think you see growth and
expansion in both areas.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you.
Mr. Olson, please.
Mr. Olson. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Commercial and Foreign Data Sharing
And my first question is for General James. General, in
your testimony you state that the long-term solution for the
provision of high-fidelity orbital data includes integrating
commercial and foreign entity advanced services in the joint
space operations missile system, with the ability to ingest
data directly from the entities on a voluntary basis. And what
new resources will be required for you to provide this--to
implement such a service? Has a concept been discussed with
foreign and commercial operators, and do you have any concerns
about the joint space operations missile system taking on an
expanded role outside of its charter?
General James. Well, thank you, sir. Looking at the
resources required, in terms of ingesting data as Mr. DalBello
said, we think that is a worthy goal. In other words, if there
are data coming from the satellite owners themselves, we should
have mechanisms to bring that data into our systems, and
frankly, that frees up our sensors because we know where those
satellites are, and I don't have to task a telescope or a radar
to go look for a particular satellite.
Now, there are things we have to work there, because we
have to verify that the data is valid. Before I put that into
the Space Surveillance Network I have got to know that that is,
indeed, good data. So there needs to be processes and
procedures that allow us to do that.
But the resources to do that, I think, are not great,
because it is more process, it is more taking the data that is,
that they are putting together for the commercial entities and
determining how to put that into the right formats and verify
that it is good data. So from a resource perspective in that
capability I think we can move down the path, but it will take
some time.
I would say this is not necessarily outside the Joint Space
Operations Center mission area, but it will require assessment
in terms of manpower, in terms of processing, the things that I
discussed earlier, to allow us to continue to improve these
processes.
And, again, the CFE Program as we said, it is a pilot
program. I mean, we are learning this year exactly, okay, what
are the processes, how does a commercial entity need to
request, what legal agreements do we need to have, and we are
making great progress so that by October, November timeframe we
will say, these are the processes, and we can transition this
to the U.S. Strategic Command successfully.
Mr. Olson. Thank you for that answer, General.
And this is a question for all of you, and we will start
with Mr. DalBello, involving space traffic. Since all the
space-faring nations and commercial entities have an interest
in keeping the space environment as pristine as possible, what
is impeding the widespread adoption of the data center concept
that you mentioned in your testimony, and what is impeding
nations and commercial entities right now from sharing orbital
data today?
Mr. DalBello. I think when the space age started and up
until very recently, I think most operators had an attitude
characterized perhaps as the big sky approach, which is space
is vast, and the odds of two objects intersecting in space, the
odds are still quite low. So I think up until very recently
there was a perception among operators that this wasn't
something that they had to worry about. And we even find even
today among smaller operators that they will say to us, well,
if I am flying in my box, box being an assigned location in
space from whatever regulator licensed your launch to space, if
I am flying in my box, what do I have to worry about anyone
else, which has really, I think, got it exactly backwards.
So one answer to your question is that we have--it is only
recently that people have been worried about the complex
interaction between debris, dead spacecraft that were not
removed from orbit, and maneuvering spacecraft. And I think as
we look out forward, it is clear that environment is going to
get more complex rather than less.
So I think that the idea like the data center, which
started out with one group of operators, the large operators in
geostationary orbit, those operators who, all who were used to
working with each other, could adopt a common set of protocols
that they could use to exchange data.
There are still many other operators who do not--who are
either in different orbits or who are not part of that group
who don't perhaps yet see the overall value to it. And I think
other people take an assumption that they shouldn't have to
worry about, this is something the governments should worry
about.
So I think a variety of reasons, and it is part of the
maturing approach, I think it started out with Dr. Johnson's
great work on space debris, what is it, almost a decade ago
now? And it raised the awareness that we couldn't just do
anything we wanted in space. And so we have taken baby steps
since then, I think, to get to where we are today.
Mr. Olson. Thank you. Dr. Pace, would you care to comment,
sir?
Dr. Pace. Yeah. I would agree with that. I would also say
that there--we are focusing on orbital debris, but I would say,
though, there is a couple of other factors that need to be
taken into account in terms of keeping with the hearing's title
about keeping space sustainable and safe for civil and
commercial operators, and we are not really probably going to
spend a lot of time talking about it, but understanding of the
space weather environment, which perturbs these satellites and
which monitoring of that environment is sort of a long-term
interest of all the operators. Better understanding of the
radio frequency environment. I mean, part of the reason why
satellites are spaced the way they are across the GEO
synchronous arc is not just physically because space is vast
but because of how they radiate and so how they radiate and
potentially interfere with each other.
So radio frequency interference, space weather environment,
better modeling of all of those characteristics and then
getting standardized data to exchange with each other, those
are things that are the foundation for any sort of future
decisions. And so right now people I think are still working on
the standards part. The awareness is there, the standards are
still developing to even talk with each other, and people are
trying to look at, okay, what are the right operational
practices so we don't make hard and fast rules too early but
that we get moving on it and not make them too late.
Mr. Olson. Thank you for that answer.
Mr. Johnson, would you care to comment? You don't have to
say yes.
Mr. Johnson. I don't think I have much to add. The
situation in low-Earth orbit is dynamically different than geo,
so we will have to find some other method of communicating data
positions for low-Earth orbit.
Mr. Olson. Thank you for that answer. I am out of my time.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Olson.
Congresswoman Fudge.
Ms. Fudge. Thank you, Madam Chair.
International Agreements on Orbital Objects
I actually have two questions. The first one I would like
to address to Mr. Johnson. You alluded to the whole concept of
there being some international discussions about orbital
debris. My question is do you believe--is there an
international treaty on orbital debris, and if not, should
there be one?
Mr. Johnson. We do have--the primary way of communicating
with an international environment is through the Inter-Agency
Space Debris Coordination Committee I mentioned earlier.
Ms. Fudge. Uh-huh.
Mr. Johnson. We have been very successful. It is considered
the preeminent world body for technical assessment of the
debris environment. Now, we have provided information to the
United Nations, which enabled them to adopt space debris
mitigation guidelines in 2007. So they are guidelines only.
They are not legally enforceable. It is not a treaty status,
but what we are looking for is allowing the individual members
of the United Nations to implement these guidelines through
their national mechanisms and to watch their compliance. The
current agenda in the United Nations is to review the
implementation of these guidelines on an annual basis when we
meet in Vienna every February.
Ms. Fudge. Well, I guess that really is my question. Should
there not be something that is enforceable?
Mr. Johnson. Yeah.
Ms. Fudge. Internationally. Anyone can answer. If you would
like to, Mr. Johnson, but any panelist can----
Mr. Johnson. Actually, it has been my experience over the
last 25 years that talking with industry, and of course,
operators, that they have always been very responsive. This has
been one of those rare instances where legal requirements are
not always necessary, and we have time. The environment is
certainly degrading over time but at a very relatively low
rate.
If we find that voluntary measures are not working to the
extent that we would like, other options are certainly possible
in the future, but so far we found very good reception at the
voluntary level.
Thank you.
Mr. Pace. I would just simply add a particular example of
that. Under the Outer Space Treaty in 1967, state parties are
responsible for persons under their jurisdiction or control,
which would include, for example, registered satellite
operators or people licensed say by the United States, whether
remote sensing or commercial satellites. And one of the ways
the U.S. has responded or carried out that obligation to the
Outer Space Treaty for things like these technical guidelines
is to then write domestic regulation in place for how those
regulations, those guidelines are enforced.
So for example, the Federal Communications Commission has
part of its licensing requirement discussions about, well, how
does a licensee propose to deal with the end of life of this
satellite? How are they going to dispose with it? And they had
a full regulatory review and hearing and public comment and so
forth on that. So for FCC licensees when people go to the
Commerce Department for a commercial remote sensing license,
there is a section in there that deals with end of life
disposal.
So the State Department when it reports back to the U.N.
S&T Committees, it says here are the domestic regulations we
have adopted in implementing these guidelines in our own way.
And that--and then we encourage other countries to do that. So
in lieu of a master, kind of one-size-fits-all treaty, the U.S.
proposes that other sovereign administrations adapt the
guidelines, you know, to their own environments. And so far, as
I said, that has worked out I think fairly well without
triggering a larger international treaty debate, which as you
can imagine could be quite contentious.
Ms. Fudge. Thank you. Mr. DalBello, I just want to follow
up on our chair's question. You in your prepared statement
indicated that there should be some dialogue on rules of the
road, who we develop guidelines or protocols that would inform
other operators when one of their spacecraft could potentially
cause damage to another.
How do you propose we do that?
Mr. DalBello. Well, it is--this is the kind of issue where
you are going to have to have a partnership between government
and the commercial industry. I think we can do part of that
ourselves. I think that we are--we routinely share information,
we routinely discuss protocols and flight operations,
procedures. We obviously, we can't do anything to instruct or
to coordinate with governments or smaller companies flying from
other countries.
So we--there is--part of the job can be done by large
operators cooperating on a set of what you would just say would
be common sense procedures, but there will be a role for
governments, and I think it can look, that process can look
something like the process that Dr. Johnson outlined with the
IADC, the debris coordination, where you start out by saying,
what are our best practices?
So if you are going to move a satellite or if you know that
you will pass near a satellite as you are either putting a
satellite in orbit or relocating a satellite, what are your
obligations with respect to other operators? Those are issues
that--those are the kind of issues that we can wrestle with,
and there may be a process whereby beginning that international
dialogue we can end up with something that looks like the
debris mitigation guidelines.
Ms. Fudge. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Iridium and Cosmos Collision and Military Concerns
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, and I
offer my praise as well to the Chairman or Chairwoman I should
say, pardon me, for calling this hearing. It is a very
important issue and has not been given the attention it
deserves.
General, about the Cosmos and Iridium, you know, collision,
we, of course, knew what the Iridium orbit was and did we--was
the Cosmos one of the objects that had been traced before, or
was that an unknown object to you?
General James. No, sir. Both those objects were tracked and
were in our space catalogue.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Well, if they are in the space
catalogue, have we not--did their orbit change in some way?
Have we not run out the orbit so we know that after a certain
number of years they are going to cross? Or do they change
their orbit in space?
General James. Sir, kind of a two-part answer. The Iridium
constellation does maneuver their orbit occasionally, and in
fact, they had done a maneuver as I understand it prior to the
collision, but, again, in reality when we track something, all
we do is we produce basically what we call an element set that
says this is the characteristics of that orbit. We do not then
for all objects do an assessment, is that orbit going to
intersect with any other orbit. We only do that on a subset of
objects.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let me suggest that in an era of computers
that it is not that costly for us to simply task, maybe you
could task an intern to go and put all these orbits into the--
into your computer and find out if any of them are going to
cross. It seems to me that that is not--let me put it this way.
To be more responsible I think it would, that that would have
been a responsible course of action if your office is, indeed,
tasked with this issue.
About China, China intentionally demonstrated their great
capabilities by blowing up one of their satellites in orbit.
Now, of course, there is no one here to speak for the
Administration, Madam Chairman, so I can't ask the question
that should be asked today. So let us note that there is no one
here from the Administration, and let us hope that perhaps the
Administration will pay some attention to NASA and give us a
new leader of NASA so that we can actually interact with them.
I think that might be a good recommendation. I certainly would
yield to the Chairwoman.
Chairwoman Giffords. And, Mr. Rohrabacher, thank you for
bringing up obviously a very important issue. We are hoping
that the House Armed Services Committee will pick this topic up
and also have a committee hearing, because there is a defense
side to the problem as well, and we look forward to hearing
from the Administration in the future.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
Chairwoman Giffords. Yield back.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And but it would help to have a new leader
of NASA here or at least an official representative of that
leader rather than someone who may or may not have the leader's
ear whenever that administrator is chosen.
But let us just say that China intentionally created
massive debris but yet the Administration from what I now
understand is supporting permitting American satellites to be
launched on Chinese rockets. I guess that is the way to prove
to them how upset we are with their creating massive space
debris.
Russia's Policy on Orbital Debris
About cooperation in space, do--are any of you aware that
the Russians have presented a plan to try to deal with space
debris? What I have heard today is only ideas about how we
track space debris. The Russians actually have presented
something a few years ago of how we might be able to actually
deal with it and take some of the space debris down. Are any of
you aware of that proposal? Yes, sir.
Mr. Johnson. Yes, sir. The Russians, as well as several
other individuals and organizations, have proposed different
techniques for removing debris from orbit, either small debris
or large debris.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Uh-huh.
Mr. Johnson. As I said earlier, it is a challenge. It
requires a substantial amount of research, and of course, later
funding, and none of that has taken place.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes. I would suggest, Madam Chairman, that
this subcommittee might take a leading, play a leading role in
let us say promoting cooperation with other countries to deal
with this, not just to identify debris but perhaps in finding a
real solution because the Russians have presented a plan. It
would take international cooperation, international effort, and
maybe this subcommittee might be able to play an important role
in that.
Thank you very much.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher, and I
fully agree with you.
Next we are going to hear from Mr. Griffith.
Mr. Griffith. Madam Chair, thank you for the opportunity,
but my questions have been asked. Thank you.
Mr. Olson. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I would like to ask
another round of questions here, gentlemen, just a couple more
for you, and this is for all of you, sort of building on some
of the comments we have heard earlier today.
Status of Current Debris Creation
Implicit in the suggestion that the rules of the road need
to be more uniformly-advocated and encouraged is that some
nations that are commercial operators are not fully observing
best practices, and is this the case, other nations and
operators continuing to generate large amounts of debris with
each new launch?
Mr. Johnson, you seem to be the one who raises the hand.
Mr. Johnson. I would say that on average most space-faring
organizations and countries are creating very small amounts of
orbital debris on each mission. Typically one debris or less,
sometimes maybe three or four. It is the accidental explosions
which are leading to a growth in the environment, and of
course, the most recent collision.
Mr. Olson. Dr. Pace, do you have a comment? It looks like
you were going for the microphone.
Dr. Pace. Mr. Johnson can maybe correct me if I am wrong,
as I recall the history of it, the Chinese initially were
actually quite a bit dirty in their initial launches. They
created a fair amount of debris, and they--some effort--they
got involved in the IADC and got involved in these
international technical discussions, and Chinese practices then
improved over the years such that the amount of debris they
wound up producing in their routine launches became noticeably
less, and people felt this was a good example of technical
cooperation.
That is why their--ASAT against their weather satellite was
so shocking I think to many people was not simply the military
capability but the fact that they intentionally created a large
amount of orbital debris when their technical experts had been
involved in the IADC and their operational practices had, in
fact, improved over the years.
So it points out that there is a sort of an international
norm side of it. I think the Chinese were somewhat surprised at
the amount of international reaction that occurred as a result
of that, in part because people recognized that an
international norm about what was proper hygienic practices, if
you will, in orbit had been violated.
And so these international discussions are really quite
valuable, but they have to have--they have a political
component as well as a technical component, and so that it one
of the reasons why we should keep supporting them.
Increasing Satellite Strength
Mr. Olson. Anybody else? Any other comments? Okay. One more
question sort of coming at this problem from another angle in
terms of hardening our satellites to prevent them from being
damaged if they are impacted by orbital debris. What measures
are currently out there being employed to harden satellites,
and obviously this has to be very small debris, whether it is
man-made or natural, and what are the limits, what is being
done to do that, and what are the limits with hardening our
satellites to protect themselves?
And that is for all of you. General James, if you would
like to start, please.
General James. Well, certainly as I think was mentioned
earlier, as you look at the very small particles that we
encounter, you know, quite often frankly, most satellites have
sufficient protection against, you know, micro-meteor, micro-
millimeter type objects. But as you get into the larger
particles, one centimeter and larger, that is a more difficult
problem. Certainly within the Air Force we are looking at that
from a space protection program point of view to assess what
needs to be done in the future to protect our systems from
those type of objects.
But that is an ongoing work, and again, there is always
tradeoffs between cost and weight and size and protection and
probability. So all of that has to be weighed in the analysis
as we look to the future.
Mr. Olson. Thank you, General, for that comment.
Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. The International Space Station is the most
heavily protected vehicle currently in Earth orbit, and the
best we can do is to guard against particles one centimeter and
less. It is a technology issue. Actually, 10 percent of the
entire mass of the International Space Station is devoted to
shielding. Robotic spacecraft can't afford to do that. Most
robotic spacecraft are vulnerable to particles three, four
millimeters in diameter, and there any many, many of those.
Mr. Olson. Thank you very much, Mr. Johnson.
Mr. DalBello.
Mr. DalBello. The--I think what Dr. Johnson pointed out is
correct that the challenge of protecting something against
anything but the smallest particles. We in the commercial
satellite industry, we simply couldn't, we couldn't commit that
amount of weight on the satellite for protection. Luckily our
experience and where we operate our satellites, our experience
has been that I don't think--there is no recorded loss of a
satellite in geostationary orbit from debris.
So I guess I would have to answer is that we don't do
anything on protection specifically other than the normal
structure of the satellite that, you know, needs to be a
certain robustness to survive launch. But other than that we
don't take any extraordinary measures, and that is purely
driven by our assessment of the risks and the realization that
there really are no good technologies for protection.
Mr. Olson. Thank you.
Dr. Pace.
Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. I yield my time
back.
Future of CFE
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Olson. My apologies for
getting a little bit out of order. We are starting the second
round. I am going to go and then we are going to shoot over to
Mr. Rohrabacher, then we are going to hear from Mr. Griffith.
So General James, I would like to get back to what you
talked about with the CFE. In your prepared testimony you
stated that the DOD intends to operationalize support to the
commercial and foreign entities by the fall of 2009.
But I would like to hear in concrete terms what that means.
If you are simply going to extend the current CFE Program, do
you plan to expand it, its budget, or are you planning on
making additional changes to it?
General James. Yes, ma'am. The first piece of that is to,
as I said earlier, work out the processes that we are currently
doing to make sure that the commercial entities understand and
the foreign entities understand how to engage in the system,
what are the legal forms that have to be filled out, what are
the agreements that have to be reached, and make sure that
process is all in place. And that is where we are headed right
now.
But we are looking to expand capabilities. One option that
we are looking at is to push more out on the web, if you will,
so that there is automatic information that is pushed out to
those who signed up for the Commercial and Foreign Entities
Program. We are also looking at additional capabilities, for
example, if there is an anomaly on a spacecraft, if an operator
comes in and says, hey, I need this potential support for end
of life, those sorts of things, we would add that to the
Commercial and Foreign Entities Program. And then, again,
providing that high accuracy data that Mr. DalBello talked
about, essentially those who signed the agreements today would
get that high accuracy assessment of their satellite.
So we are continuing to look at ways to improve, ways to
more automate the processes, ways to push the data out to the
individual end users that have signed the agreements and make
this a better program.
Future of CFE With Commercial Industry
Chairwoman Giffords. Mr. DalBello, if you can please--you
have heard what the General has said, you have heard the
description for the plans for DOD and the CFE Program, but I am
curious whether or not those plans address the commercial space
sector's needs, and if not, what more is needed?
Mr. DalBello. I think they don't today, and, again, I don't
mean that as a criticism but just a judgment on where we are as
compared to where we would all like to be. I think as a first
measure we need to do that simple things. You have hundreds of
space objects from the commercial sector, and we know where all
those objects are, because we are constantly ranging those
objects with our ground antennas. So we know precisely where
they are. So there should be a way to incorporate that data,
and why is that important? Well, it is important because the
Air Force network can't constantly monitor spacecraft. It sort
of takes a picture of a particular point in time, and then it
says, I think that object should be here based on where I last
saw it.
We are actually constantly monitoring, and what you miss
when all you are doing is taking a snapshot of the heavens is
you miss maneuvers, and as General James pointed out, that may
have been what resulted in the Iridium crash. So if someone
maneuvers, then your past information is no longer accurate
because it changes significantly.
So, number one, we need to incorporate the data from the
operators that are willing to give it. We need to--and this
goes to Congressman Rohrabacher's concern, we do need to
develop the computer capacity to run what they call all against
all, so we are running the data, the entire data set, and this
is just purely a computer limitation issue. I mean, we need to
have the computing power to run all against all on a regular
basis.
We need to have the rules and procedures for getting high-
accuracy data to the commercial sector at a minimum for those
objects that are not maneuvering, and at a minimum for spent
rocket stages and parts of--and components of dead satellites.
I understand there is sensitivity. We are trying to walk a
line here that is somewhere between safe operations in space.
On the other hand, we don't want to give away the store on what
our military is doing in space on every single program.
So we are actually trying to do a complicated thing. We
don't want complete transparency of the heavens, but we want
them to be opaque in a safe direction. So it is a challenge,
and, again, I think we aren't there yet. That is not meant as a
criticism. I know there are a lot of folks working really hard
at the JSpOC. I think it starts with a fundamental--with a
national policy decision that we do intend to do this.
As Thoreau said, ``In the long run, men only hit what they
aim at.''
Costs and Benefits of Monitoring
Chairwoman Giffords. Following along those lines, we have
heard a lot today about space situational awareness, but I am
curious as the cost to monitor space debris increases. Who
exactly should pay for the services provided to both commercial
and also to foreign users? I am interested about pushing out
more information on the web, but obviously this is going to
cost U.S. taxpayers increasingly more money.
I would also like to hear whether or not the U.S.
Government or the United States people derive sufficient
benefits from the information and whether, again, we should be
charging for the services, and if so, how much.
So, Mr. DalBello, if you can just make a stab there and----
Mr. DalBello. Yeah. Congresswoman Giffords, obviously this
is something that we have spent a lot of time thinking about,
because it is one of those `be careful what you ask for'
situations. We think that there is a good middle ground. What
we are offering is to be able to explain where we are all the
time, and that will reduce the U.S. or perhaps other countries'
burdens substantially. So we are coming to the table with a lot
of data as it is. So that is the first thing.
And secondly, we think if you are going to build out a
total space situational awareness capability, you will want to
go to space, and, again, we have offered and continue to offer
to make our platforms available if the United States Government
can define a simple, low-cost, low-weight sensor, we would be
glad to take it to orbit. So we could become part of the
network.
So my first answer is----
Chairwoman Giffords. Mr. DalBello, do you find that that is
the same with your counterparts or your competitors in the
industry? Is that generally the position that----
Mr. DalBello. I can't speak for anyone other than Intelsat,
obviously, but I know that in our dialogues I have heard very
sympathetic comments from the largest operators; SES, Inmarsat.
So some--many of the largest operators have expressed their
enthusiasm for these ideas.
Chairwoman Giffords. General, do you have any comments?
General James. Yes, ma'am. A couple of things.
First on utilizing the data from the commercial vendors, we
certainly as I said earlier, agree with that, and as we have
the agreements that we build for the CFE Program, that is one
of the things we discuss with those commercial operators is
their willingness to provide their satellite positional data
into our engine, if you will, and that allows us not to have to
task our sensors as I said earlier.
So it is just a matter, I believe, of working out the
procedures, the formats, and the processes until we can get
that in place. But that is a dialogue we do have with those
commercial satellite vendors.
In terms of payment for this, again, I think that is a
national policy decision. The Authorization Act allows the DOD
to request payment for these services. At this point we have
elected not to do so, but, again, I think that has to be a
dialogue at levels above us in terms of policy at OSD and
above, in terms of do we want to change for this or not to
offset some of the expenses of sensors and so on.
And then lastly, in my testimony I did point out that we
are going to space with our sensors. The space-based
surveillance system is a DOD-dedicated space surveillance
sensor that should launch this summer that will allow us to
much more actively track everything in the geo-belt, which we
cannot always do today due to the telescopes being weathered
out and had to be nighttime and so on.
So we do recommend the importance of space-based sensor
capabilities, and we are launching one of those this summer.
Private Industry Charging for Satellite Data
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you.
Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let us note that we now have the
capability of determining the course of a near-Earth object
that is millions and millions of miles away to determine
whether or not that object is a threat to hitting the Earth.
Now, if we can chart an object that is in distant space and
determine whether or not it will hit the Earth or come in this
direction so it is a concern, certainly we can chart the course
of objects that are in low-Earth orbit and determine whether
they are going to hit each other and put them into the
computer.
So I think if nothing else has come out of this hearing, it
is our understanding that we haven't been doing something that
we are very capable of doing that is not costly. So let us pay
attention to that. Next time we have a hearing on that I hope
to hear how we have made some progress on that.
I think the idea that we are missing a little bit here with
the Chairwoman's suggestion of where perhaps someone can be
charged for certain data. It is not necessarily the data from
commercial operations, General. It is also the cataloguing, not
just the, you know, actually obtaining of the data but the
cataloguing of that and perhaps the actual dispersing of that
for a charge.
Apparently that is--does the--do you have any suggestions
or any reaction to the idea of having a commercial company open
up shop and start charging people for information, especially
satellite, people who will be launching commercial satellites
will have to get--and perhaps the military as well would have
to have the information approved and the course of their orbit
charted by and approved by this or at least certify that it
will not in some way run into an object that is already in
space. This could be done by a private sector company, could it
not, Mr. DalBello?
Mr. DalBello. Yes. It is something that we have thought
through at the very beginning stage in our data center
prototype, which is you certainly could set up--it is not
technically challenging to do what you describe. The challenge
you have is managing the national security issues, and what is
the level of data, and this gets into who are your customers
for this information. At some point you do want to have a
dialogue with the Russians and the Chinese and everyone else
who has got objects in space, because you wish to know not only
where they are but where they are maneuvering and those issues.
So is it possible? Absolutely it is possible.
Mr. Rohrabacher. What about the percentage of the--of what
you are describing, the problematic part of it is only a small
percentage. Aren't we talking about----
Mr. DalBello. Small percentage.
Mr. Rohrabacher.--10 percent or 20 percent and----
Mr. DalBello. Yes.
Mr. Rohrabacher.--the rest of what can be tracked and
catalogued and made available so that we can actually start
working at that--at least at that level. We are not talking
about an overwhelming percentage, are we, when we say the
national security issue?
Mr. DalBello. No. I think it is--it would be the smaller
part definitely. Whether it is 10 pr 20, I don't know that I am
competent today to answer, but it would be definitely the
smaller portion. It would obviously be significant to those
people.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So we could make a significant difference
without solving the whole problem. There is still a national
security part of it that we may not be able to handle but a
significant part of the challenge can get done, and we are
capable of doing that.
I also might add I think that we are very capable of
working with our international partners, with the Europeans and
the Russians and others, to perhaps even go even further and
bring down space debris. And if we chart it, if you are already
charting the course, all we have to do is get something up
there that will knock it down, and that doesn't have to be
something very sophisticated, just a big bulldozer in the sky
you might say and perhaps something like that would actually
be, not be as expensive as we think, especially if we were
doing it internationally.
So thank you very much for holding this hearing. There are
very good ideas that we been talking about.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Griffith.
Characteristics of Current Debris
Mr. Griffith. Thank you, Madam Chair. This is an
interesting discussion. I think that I would have the opposite
view of my colleague that I don't think there will be a
reduction in space debris. I think the idea that we are going
to have a conversation with Iran, North Korea, or China and
have them jeopardize their national security as they see it is
maybe a little bit naive.
So if that, if my premise is correct, what is the nature of
space debris? Is it--are the particles charged? Do they travel
in the same orbit as they find themselves in, or is it more of
a Brownian movement as to you get into sub particle, and what
is their electromagnetic nature? Because I think it is
important for us to know their nature, the particles' nature,
because it sounds like we are going to have to be our own BFI
up there as far as our space vehicles are concerned. And if we
are going to rely on Iran or North Korea to cooperate with us,
it can change our cataloguing of debris in an instanct because
the SC-19 missile 27 months ago that hit the decommissioned
weather satellite created 25 percent more that day than we
would have had if we had had a catalogue.
So it seems like we need to know what the nature of this
debris is, and all I have heard so far is the physical size of
it. Do we know anything else about it besides its size?
Mr. Johnson. Yes, sir. We actually spent a great deal of
effort in trying to characterize the debris, not only by size
but by density, its radar properties, its optical properties.
It turns out, though, that even lightweight things moving at 10
kilometers per second can do a sufficient amount of damage
should you run into it or it run into you.
So to answer your question about charging, actually there
is a very modest charging effect which takes place. We have
look at it in terms of maybe taking advantage of it, using some
sort of electromagnetic field to perturb the orbit. That
doesn't seem to be a very promising avenue.
Mr. Griffith. Yes, sir.
General James. Sir, just one other comment. As we look at
tracking this debris, it is something that you can't track it
and then, you know, two days later assume it is going to be
exactly where you expect it to be, because there are various
forces acting on it, you know, gravitational forces, solar
wind, solar particles, atmospheric forces depending on where
you are in the orbit. So over time, even though we track it and
say, okay, six hours from now it should be here, generally it
will be pretty close to that, but as you go out further and
further there are forces acting on those particles, especially
the smaller ones, one centimeter, five centimeters, 10
centimeters, that do, indeed, change that orbit, which require
us then to go back and recalculate. That is why I can't give
Intelsat a prediction a week away that says this thing will hit
you within 20 meters----
Mr. Griffith. Sure.
General James.--because it is going to change fairly
significantly over that period of time.
Mr. Griffith. Good. Thank you very much. I appreciate that.
CFE Resource and Priority Concerns
Chairwoman Giffords. Okay. All right. Well, we have time so
we are going to do another round, and I will start. We will see
who can--who will hang in there.
This question is for General James. Retired Major General
James Armor recently testified that the Space Surveillance
Network is not sufficiently resourced to support civil and
commercial operations. He said that the Air Force does not have
the resources to carry out the CFE support and added that
recent complaints by commercial operators about unwarned
movement of DOD satellites and lack of support for moving
commercial satellites at GEO were indications of inadequate
resources and lower priority given to the CFE.
So I am curious about your views on General Armor's stated
concerns regarding insufficient resources for the Space
Surveillance Network.
General James. Well, certainly as we have looked to the
programs that we have in place, I believe we do have a
reasonably good plan to address some of the shortcomings that
we have. First, we--I talked about the space-based Space
Surveillance System. That is addressing our ability to map the
GEO belt with our satellites to a more accurate capability and
more real-time capability. So that is in place.
We also have a program in place called the Space Fence,
which addresses one of our shortcomings, which is the Southern
Hemisphere. We don't have a lot of sensors in the Southern
Hemisphere, and one of the components of the Space Fence will
put a very accurate radar system in the Southern Hemisphere to
allow us to get more tracking capability in the Southern
Hemisphere.
So we are also looking, as I said, at increasing our
processing capability that Representative Rohrabacher talked
about. We should be able to do that, and we are moving down
that path. When you talk about doing conjunction assessment on
everything that is up there, that is 19,000 objects against
19,000 objects roughly. That is a lot of calculations, a lot of
time, and a lot of effort to do that.
And the other piece of that is that you can automate a lot
of that but where it gets tricky is that when the analysts with
the computer says, I now have a potential close conjunction,
then an analyst has to get involved, he looks at the data, he
then says, well, the data that that was based on is 48 hours
old. So now I have to go task a sensor to look at that data
again and rerun the analysis. I then have to talk to the owner
operator potentially and say, can you give me any additional
information? Do you plan to maneuver, et cetera?
So it is not just the computing power. Once it identifies
something, then the person has to get involved to do some
additional assessment. So all those things we are addressing,
as I said. I think we are on a good path to get to 800 and then
1,300, but 19,000 versus 19,000 is something I think, frankly,
again, we have to decide is that what the U.S. wants to do for
the world.
CFE Computer Analyses
Chairwoman Giffords. And following up on that, obviously, I
am not an expert in orbital mechanics, but, you know, I have
heard what was said today, and you know, I heard Mr. DalBello
talk about the all-against-all computer analysis. I know that
Mr. Rohrabacher has had to leave and with all due respect to
our incredible interns that we all have, I am a little
concerned, again, about the complexity and the cost associated
with these computer analyses.
So perhaps, General, you could talk about that a little bit
more in-depth.
General James. Well, again, I don't know how much more in-
depth I can go, but as I said, getting to the active payloads,
roughly 1,300, and doing an conjunction assessment with those
payloads against any of the debris that is, you know, around
the Earth is doable, and that is the path we are headed down.
But if I want to take debris piece X and look at it for--is
it going to hit debris piece Y, number one, do we want to do
that? I mean, is there any value in that because they are both
just pieces of debris? And then if I do, you know, there is a
fair amount of processing and computational capability that is
required to do that.
And while we have not made that decision yet that is that
the path we want to go down. But it is doable. It is just--
requires resources.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you.
Debris Risks
Let me shoot over to Dr. Pace. You indicated in your
prepared statement that the Air Force does not have the
resources to look at everything, and that some risks will not
be addressed until it is too late.
Well, that certainly got our attention, so can you talk a
little bit more about these risks?
Dr. Pace. Well, I think that you have actually heard a
description of that. There is going to be a spectrum of these
risks. Obviously the highest-priority items is going to be for
human space flight and looking at national security payloads,
and that is appropriately what the Air Force does. The question
is is how far down that list are you going to go. Plainly the
Iridium and the Cosmos collision fell below the resource line
in terms of what people could go look at.
Now, the problem is if you go all the way over to say,
well, I want everything on everything, on orbital mechanics
every object has roughly ten orbital elements associated with
it, so 20,000 objects times 20,000 objects, each with ten
orbital elements, we quickly come up with 40 billion numbers
that you are worrying about. Maybe $40 billion. So 40 billion
things that you are now going and tracking, and then that
changes with time, because, again, the things don't move in
static orbits, but the weather, how--whether there were any
maneuvers and so forth. So it is a very, very dynamic model.
So you are going to be drawing a line somewhere, and the
question is is can you do things that mitigate the chances of
there being something bad occurring? Now, some of the IADC
practices mentioned or things like venting your tanks after you
are done so that there isn't a chance of accidental explosion,
putting catchers on bolts so that you don't blow them off into
space. Pretty common sensical sorts of things.
So with good operational practices, with people not doing
things like creating large debris at high altitude as the
Chinese did, but if you do create debris as the U.S. did in the
case of USA 193, I guess, there is the case that system cleaned
itself out in the space of a few days.
So there are proper and improper ways of engaging with
space objects and in bringing them down. Establishing those
operational norms is sort of the first thing. Making sure that
you don't get any worse is the next thing.
I think that there are some interesting ideas about
mitigating debris out there, and as Congressman Rohrabacher
mentioned and actually some of the French proposals include
things like ground-based lasers against small debris items.
Now, of course, there is a fine line between a ground-based
laser cleaning orbital debris and a weapon system. And so you
would have to have an amount of international discussion as to
whether or not that makes any sense.
Let me pause right there.
Chairwoman Giffords. Okay. Thank you, Dr. Pace.
Mr. Olson.
Timeline for Debris Warning
Mr. Olson. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and I will be brief
with the questions. First of all, I want to thank you for
holding this hearing again. The first time this topic has been
heard from in this committee. I think it is critically
important. I also want to thank your witnesses. I have learned
a lot today, and I appreciate your time and expertise.
And General James, my last question is for you. Building on
your conversation with the Chairwoman, when you go through that
analytical process, how long does it typically take or how much
advanced notice can you determine that there is going to be a
threat of a conjunction?
General James. Generally speaking about four days out is
where we feel that the data is reasonably accurate and won't
change very much over that period of time. So that is when we
do an assessment, and if we get something that says there is a
potential conjunction let us say within a kilometer, then,
again, we will normally go task our sensor system to give us
more updated data. We will run the assessment again and see if
that is still valid, and we will continue to march that down
all the way up to really the point of conjunction.
So certainly, for example, on the International Space
Station we are very aware of that. We run those analyses every
four to six hours if there is a potential conjunction. We have
two NASA orbital analysts that reside at the JSpOC and are in
close communication with NASA constantly whenever we get into
those scenarios, and we move forward from there.
But, again, there can be very small objects that may
suddenly have changed from the last time we looked at them and
create a conjunction that is only 12 hours, 24 hours out, and
then we have to do those assessments fairly quickly.
Mr. Olson. And one more follow-up question, General. When
the--what was the timeframe, the warning for the last sort of
conjunction with the Space Station, remember when the
astronauts had to go into the hardened area of the station in
the event of an impact.
General James. And, sir, I will have to give you the exact
time for the record, but again, and you can probably add to
this, but that was a scenario where the object was fairly
small. The data we had was fairly old and then when we did an
updated data set, it essentially said we have a predicted
conjunction coming up fairly quickly, which did not give NASA
the time to actually conduct a maneuver on the spacecraft.
And I don't know if you want to add to that at all but----
Mr. Johnson. The other contributing factor was that that
particular particle was in a relatively elliptical orbit, which
means you had fewer opportunities to track it. It was also more
susceptible to perturbations in the atmosphere, and so its
orbit was actually changing pretty rapidly every time it went
around the world. And so it was much more of a challenging
situation than we normally are faced with.
Mr. Olson. Thank you very much for those answers.
Madam Chairwoman, I yield my time back. Thank you all
again.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Olson.
Mr. Griffith.
Mr. Griffith. I just wanted to thank the panel and then--
you guys are great. Kind of reminds me of your next science
question. If a two-centimeter particle hits a five-centimeter
particle, is it Wednesday or Thursday? And so I thank you all
for being here. Thank you very much.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you. Obviously I want to thank
the witnesses for coming today, and before we bring the hearing
to a close, I especially want to recognize General James, and
we were just speaking earlier before, and there are some models
out in the entry room, and the fact that you have seen Saturn,
the Space Shuttle, Delta IV all launch really speaks to your
history in space and aviation. We appreciate your service.
And to our other Members that spoke today on our panel,
thank you for your service. We only touched on just the brief
cursory beginning of what will be an importantly--increasingly
important issue for all of us, and I am pleased that, Mr.
Olson, we had a good discussion today. This is just the
beginning. We have a lot more to cover, but I thank the
Subcommittee Members for being here. The record will remain
open for two weeks for additional statements from the Members
and for answers to any follow-up questions that the
Subcommittee may ask of our witnesses.
The witnesses are excused, and the hearing is now
adjourned. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix 1:
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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Lieutenant General Larry D. James, Commander, 14th Air
Force, Air Force Space Command; Commander, Joint Functional
Component Command for Space, U.S. Strategic Command
Questions submitted by Chairwoman Gabrielle Giffords
Q1. In your prepared testimony you state that ``the DOD intends to
operationalize the support to commercial and foreign entities in the
Fall of 2009.'' You also indicated during the hearing that you were
ramping up to ultimately do conjunction analysis on a greater number of
satellites and that you are working with your headquarters to get
additional processing capacity as well as personnel. You also said that
you were looking to expand capabilities, and looking at ways to
automate processes and ways to push the data out to the individual end
users that have signed agreements with you. Now that the President's
budget for FY 2010 has been released, please provide more details on
the ``operationalized'' CFE follow-on program, projected costs in
executing that program, costs of planned improvements to space
surveillance capabilities, and projected milestones associated with the
aforementioned actions.
A1. Provided we remain on track for guidance publication as well as the
delivery of information technology and human capital resource
improvements, we anticipate being able to provide daily safety of
flight screenings for all active, maneuverable payloads by the end of
2009. If there are significant delays in the delivery of any of the
aforementioned we will see a continued delay in being able to take on
this vital mission set.
The Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) Mission System (JMS) will
incrementally deliver additional advanced services. CFE capability
depends on the collaboration of multiple space situational awareness
and command and control systems used by operators to collect data,
process and analyze it, and to handle CFE requests and reports. Costs
and activities specifically associated with CFE improvements include:
Additional data processing equipment and associated
support equipment will directly increase the ability to handle
larger volumes of data for calculations, and provide backup
capability in case of equipment failures: $7.6M (ECD: 15 Jun
09)
Migration of CFE processing from legacy system to new
net-centric JSpOC Mission System: $9.9M (ECD: 2013). In the
interim, AFSPC will deliver a basic Conjunction Assessment (CA)
capability to USSTRATCOM 1 Oct 2009 by delivering additional
computing power, personnel, and processes to bridge the gap
until delivery of JMS.
Additional personnel to handle CFE operations: $1.2M
per year (ECD: 2009)
Prototype system to improve data from existing
sensors by filtering data to find more objects at the limits of
detection: $4.5M (ECD: 2009)
Recurring costs estimated at $5M per year
24 civilian billets (ECD: 2010)
AFSPC developed a three-tier solution to delivering
CA capability: short-term, mid-term, long-term solution
Short-term delivery is to build out current
capability (described above) by expanding legacy
systems with additional computing power, personnel, and
procedures to meet CFE needs. Allows for CA services
for 800 active maneuverable versus all cataloged
objects
Mid-term addresses the gap between now and the 2013
JMS delivery. AFPSC engaged with the SPO to evaluate
commercial or government owned solutions to enhance CA
services until JMS delivery.
Long-term solution is the 2013 JMS
Q2. You state in your prepared statement that the relationship between
DOD and commercial space operators is sound but that challenges remain,
such as sharing of SSA data. Your statement references a recent round
table discussion with owner/operators sharing the short- and long-term
goals of the CFE Program. Was there a meeting of the minds on how
commercial users' information and analysis needs could be better met?
A2. We have made great strides in developing relationships and
beginning to understand CFE requirements. There have been two round
table discussions between the DOD and Commercial and Foreign Entities
(CFE). The first was conducted on 2 April 2009 during the National
Space Symposium and the second was held 14 May 2009. We have gained
tremendous insight into CFE needs by closely working with the entities
we already have support agreements with. The goal of our interaction
with CFE is to set expectations, understand CFE needs, and explain to
CFE what data and services the Joint Space Operations Center can
provide consistent with National Security interests and on a non-
interference basis. This dialogue will continue with the resurrection
of the Flight Dynamics Task Force Working Group, which will serve as a
focused, technical forum comprised of system experts from industry and
government.
The Flight Dynamics Task Force (FDTF) is a task force established
by the Mission Assurance Working Group (MAWG). The FDTF was established
in 2006 to address commercial SATCOM industry concerns over CFE
Program. The FDTF surveyed the industry to gather technical information
from industry and determine their desires for the CFE program which was
provided to AFSPC in 2007. The current stand-up of the FDTF will be to
update the information from the previous study and will include more
commercial SATCOM participants as our numbers have increased along with
the commercial Remote Sensing operators.
The DOD Executive Agent (EA) for Space, with CDRUSSTRATCOM and ASD
(NII) meet at least annually with the commercial SATCOM CEOs to discuss
issues relevant to the commercial SATCOM operators--one of the primary
topics is CFE. The National Security Space Office (NSSO), as the staff
for the DOD EA for Space, leads the MAWG. The FDTF is an appropriate
forum as the NSSO has an established relationship with the commercial
SATCOM operators through the aforementioned forums. At present, it is
the best forum as the Air Force and USSTRATCOM work to determine how
best to engage with industry on matters such as this.
Q3. According to a March 9, 2009 article in Space News, the Air Force
is planning on producing a new space traffic management policy before
the beginning of June which would ``provide wider access to its high-
accuracy catalog showing the whereabouts of orbital debris and
operational satellites as part of an effort to enable commercial and
non-U.S. government satellite operators to better avoid in-orbit
collisions.'' Is such a policy going to be implemented? And if so, what
are the details of this policy?
A3. There are currently no plans for the Air Force to conduct a space
traffic management role. The Federal Aviation Administration's Office
of Commercial Space Transportation has regulatory oversight of launch
and reentry operations conducted by U.S. citizens or in the U.S. There
is currently no authority to regulate commercial on-orbit operations.
The Air Force does publish basic catalog data on the Space-Track.org
web site, which can be accessed after registration approval, but has no
plans to publish any high accuracy space catalog data to Commercial and
Foreign Entities (CFE) satellite operators.
However, in an effort provide crucial conjunction assessment
support to CFE, the CFE may enter into a legal agreement with Air Force
Space Command. Once approved, the CFE will be able to receive
conjunction assessment and space support information based on the Air
Force's high accuracy catalog through a future release on the Air Force
Space Command sponsored Space-Track.org web site.
Q4. Your prepared statement notes that ``the global diffusion of space
technologies, especially the availability of small spacecraft
technologies and providers, will lead to a larger and more diverse
population of active spacecraft'' What does a potential increase in
small satellites mean for estimated debris growth and potential
collisions in the future? What actions are needed to address any
questions about an increase in the use of small satellites?
A4. The smaller a satellite gets, the harder it is to track. With less
tracking data the positional accuracy degrades and so too does our
ability to provide accurate conjunction assessments. Ensuring that we
bring new capabilities on line such as the Space Fence and Space
Surveillance Telescope will be essential in improving our ability to
track these smaller spacecraft and keep up with small spacecraft
technology trends.
Q5. Mr. DalBello's prepared statement notes that ``there is no single
standard for representing the position of an object in space. Different
operators characterize the orbital position of their satellites
differently, depending on the software they use for flight
operations.'' Is a standard for characterizing the position of an
object in space needed? If so, what entity or entities would develop
the standard?
A5. Since different satellite operators have different mission
requirements, it would not be practical to require one standard for all
space flight operations. However, within a user community where it is
necessary to exchange satellite positional information, it is crucial
to maintain inter-operability. AFSPC currently does this by providing
inter-operable orbit prediction models to users of JSpOC orbital
products. Another approach for ensuring inter-operability would be to
provide a common data exchange format. This format should spell out the
coordinate systems and time standard for a series of predicted
satellite positions (this is often referred to as ``satellite
ephemeris''). However, limitations of legacy communication systems and
limited bandwidth have made this difficult to implement on a large-
scale basis.
Q6. What are the challenges associated with fusing data from different
sources such as radar and optical systems?
A6. The challenge is not in fusing the data but acquiring enough high
quality satellite tracking from either source for the fusion process,
especially on small pieces of debris. The current Space Surveillance
Network has not been optimized for small debris tracking but with
programs like the Space Fence and Space Surveillance Telescope (SST)
our ability to track small debris will be greatly enhanced.
The current legacy Command and Control system (SPADOC) does have
some throughput limitations in high volume observation correlation
processing for ``angles only'' data on newly discovered unknown
satellites (the type you could get from future optical systems like
Space-based Space Surveillance and SST). The correlation activity
occurs at the front end of the observation processing flow prior to the
data fusion process. These capacity limitations should to be addressed
in the SPADOC replacement system known as the JSpOC Mission System
(JMS).
Typically radars focus more on LEO orbits and optical systems more
on GEO and HEO, although we can get data on all three orbit classes
from both types of sensors. As new space based optical satellite
tracking capabilities become available this mix of data may change
somewhat. However, the two types of data are complementary and we are
able to readily fuse them and obtain excellent results when we have the
data.
Q7. If conjunction analysis and other warning activities could be out-
sourced without infringing on national security considerations, what
would be the limitations you see as having to be established?
A7. The DOD performs CA and other warning activities for satellites
conducting DOD mission requirements [i.e., United States Government
(USG) satellites and non-USG satellites supporting DOD missions].
Protection of DOD assets/missions is inherently and should remain a
government responsibility. Space situational awareness data is critical
to the security of our DOD assets/missions, characterized by very tight
decision and maneuver timelines to preserve national assets from debris
or maneuvering objects.
Outsourcing poses challenges regarding duplication of effort,
forcing competition over resources, protection of data, and data
release control. In light of these challenges it does not seem feasible
to out-source to a commercial entity other than through government
contract. However, a government contract poses its own set of
challenges.
Contractors would likely have to be collocated with the Joint Space
Operations Center (JSpOC) for effective comparisons and notifications.
Appropriate clearances would have to be obtained for the contractors.
Assurances would have to be made that requested services are
appropriately screened, securely delivered, and safeguarded by the
receiver. Finally, with a government contract, upon renewal it may turn
over to another company, and with it its expertise.
The space control community is small, experienced operators are
rare, and continuity is critical. The ideal model to meet the
increasing need for CA and other warning activities would be to keep
these functions within government and hire government civilians to work
in the JSpOC. This would maintain continuity and create a centralized,
stable location to keep and grow CA/warning expertise.
Questions submitted by Representative Pete Olson
Q1. During our hearing, you stated that the Air Force is increasing
its ability to process orbital data, which will eventually lead to
broadening the system's ability to do conjunction analysis for up to
1,300 objects. How does the Air Force plan to manage the distribution
of this data to civilian satellite operators? Will satellite operators
be charged a fee?
A1. The Air Force is extensively engaged with allies and partners with
respect to the sharing of SSA data. Through DOD and Air Force
international cooperation strategies, the DOD details its goals with
respect to SSA cooperation, data sharing, and plans for future
expansion of these capabilities.
AFSPC leads the pilot program for Commercial and Foreign Entities
(CFE) allowing expanded sharing of space track data.
This program is generally considered successful, but
not without concerns. The pilot program has identified legal
and policy issues which must be addressed to allow expanded
data services.
Effective 1 October 09, this pilot program will be
taken over by USSTRATCOM, who will continue to work closely
with other entities (government and commercial), and when
appropriate share data of higher accuracy.
The DOD and Department of State are leading discussions on SSA
cooperation with key allies. AFSPC experts support such discussions.
These discussions provide a foundation for expanded
SSA cooperation in support of common civil, commercial, and
military requirements.
These discussions serve as a model for developing SSA
cooperation with our space partners in other regions.
Bilateral SSA Engagements are addressed on a case-by-case basis.
Each interaction is governed by delegation guidance and DOD and AF
International Engagement strategies.
Q2. To what extent is the Air Force coordinating orbital surveillance
and tracking efforts with other governments? Are there plans to work
more closely with other governments to share data and increase its
accuracy?
A2. The Air Force is extensively engaged with allies and partners with
respect to the sharing of SSA data. Through DOD and Air Force
international cooperation strategies, the DOD details its goals with
respect to SSA cooperation, data sharing, and plans for future
expansion of these capabilities.
AFSPC leads the pilot program for Commercial and Foreign Entities
(CFE) allowing expanded sharing of space track data.
This program is generally considered successful, but
not without concerns. The pilot program has identified legal
and policy issues which must be addressed to allow expanded
data services.
Effective 1 October 09, this pilot program will be
taken over by USSTRATCOM, who will continue to work closely
with other entities (government and commercial), and when
appropriate share data of higher accuracy.
The DOD and Department of State are leading discussions on SSA
cooperation with key allies. AFSPC experts support such discussions.
These discussions provide a foundation for expanded
SSA cooperation in support of common civil, commercial, and
military requirements.
These discussions serve as a model for developing SSA
cooperation with our space partners in other regions.
Bilateral SSA Engagements are addressed on a case-by-case basis.
Each interaction is governed by delegation guidance and DOD and AF
International Engagement strategies.
Questions submitted by Representative Dana Rohrabacher
Q1. When a commercial user asks the Air Force to provide satellite
data, is there a standard set of data and a standard published price
list that is publicly available? Is the typical data set that you
provide sufficient, or do most commercial users require additional
information?
A1. The most commonly requested data, two line element sets, are
provided on the AFSPC Space-track.org web site to registered users free
of charge. The two line element sets provide basic orbital parameters,
based on general perturbations, and the level of accuracy is sufficient
for the majority of registered users; however, commercial operators
often require/request data with a higher accuracy level. The Joint
Space Operations Center (JSpOC) can provide high-accuracy data and
conjunction assessment based on special perturbations; however, this is
done only for commercial users who enter into an agreement with the
U.S. Government.
Commercial operators can request special perturbations data and
advanced services by registering on the Space-track.org web site, and
then submitting a Space Support Request (SSR) to AFSPC. AFSPC will
review the SSR to ensure security and legal requirements are met. If
the SSR is supportable, a legal agreement is signed, and the SSR then
goes to the JSpOC. The JSpOC works directly with the commercial users
to deliver high-accuracy information (based on the special
perturbations) and advanced services free of charge. Since we do not
charge for services, this is no published price list.
Q2. Although we have not yet seen widespread commercial human space
flight, it is clear that within a few years there will be several
commercial entities capable of regular sub-orbital, and possibly
orbital, service. In the planning for future programs, is any
consideration being given to this industry? Is there concern that these
entities might present further dangers to civil and commercial users?
A2. The space situational awareness support required for any future
commercial human space flight is the same as the orbital safety and
anomaly resolution support provided today for NASA human space flight.
The services include launch conjunction assessment, on-orbit
conjunction assessment, on-orbit anomaly resolution, positional data,
and reentry support. Our planning for future systems such as JSpOC
Mission System includes requirements to deliver these services and is
scalable to handle the future growth of new customers who need these
types of services. DOD policy related to CFE support would need to be
modified to include language covering the commercial human space flight
needs and priorities.
Q3. What are the hurdles in expanding our international agreements
beyond debris mitigation to include debris remediation? Are there
nations or commercial operators who would be against such an expansion?
A3. Directing debris remediation efforts for international governments
and CFE are beyond DOD authorities. Initiatives would need to be
coordinated with the DOS and FAA.
Debris remediation is one potential approach to increasing the
safety/security of both manned and unmanned space systems. AFSPC is
prepared to examine such options as a part of the larger space
protection suite of capabilities.
There are several hurdles that must be addressed before debris
remediation can be become operationally feasible, these include:
policy/legal challenges, technological challenges, and fiscal
challenges.
U.S. Policy and international law will need to be
addressed prior to developing and employing a U.S. capability,
or agreeing to support any foreign/cooperative effort to
remediate space debris.
The Outer Space Treaty provides that the State of
registry of a space object retains ``jurisdiction and
control'' while the object is in outer space. This
provision applies equally to active satellites and to
debris. Therefore, a State could only take remediation
measures for its own debris unless there is an
international agreement in place.
If a remediation capability were developed that
permitted the return of an object to Earth, the U.S.
Government would need to be aware of the possibility of
technology transfer of our sensitive satellites in
violation of the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations.
Studies by NASA and Industry allude to the
technological feasibility of debris remediation. However, such
systems are beyond the scope of current technology development
programs. As AFSPC continues to examine the realm of space
protection and situational awareness, we will actively seek any
technology that will allow us to protect and maintain our space
capabilities.
Fiscal hurdles will also limit the ability of the
U.S. to field a space remediation capability. Any system
capable of providing a remediation of debris will be expensive,
and beyond the current ability of the MAJCOM to budget for
without reduction in some other space capability. A joint U.S.-
Allied approach might be more fiscally tenable.
Other nations might be against a debris remediation capability.
Each nation will have its own political and technological reasons for
either supporting or not supporting debris remediation. Until the U.S.
begins to discuss this concept with our allies and partners we will not
have a true sense of what other nations views are on this issue. It
seems unlikely that commercial entities will have any issues with a
government agency expending resources to provide a safer domain for
their commercial enterprises.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Nicholas L. Johnson, Chief Scientist for Orbital Debris,
Johnson Space Center, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA)
Questions submitted by Chairwoman Gabrielle Giffords
Q1. In 1995, NASA was the first space agency in the world to issue a
comprehensive set of orbital debris mitigation guidelines. It took
until 2002 for a consensus set of guidelines to be adopted by major
space agencies. And the U.N. General Assembly endorsed a set of
voluntary orbital debris mitigation guidelines finally in December
2007. Why did it take so long to gain global acceptance of urgently
needed guidelines? What does this bode for the universal endorsement of
other needed agreements, such as reaching consensus on a space
surveillance awareness system and code of conduct for space operations?
A1. In January 1998, the ``U.S. Government International Strategy on
Orbital Debris'' was drafted. This strategy, which was updated numerous
times, envisioned a multi-year, three-step process: (1) development and
adoption of U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard
Practices; (2) development and adoption of orbital debris mitigation
guidelines by the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee
(IADC); and, (3) adoption of orbital debris mitigation guidelines by
the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN
COPUOS). All three steps in the process required considerable
discussion within the domestic aerospace community, and then across the
principal foreign aerospace communities to inform them of the threat of
orbital debris and means to mitigate that threat.
Step (1) was completed in February 2001, and step (2) was completed
in October 2002. In February 2003, the IADC Space Debris Mitigation
Guidelines were formally presented to the Scientific and Technical
Subcommittee (STSC) of UN COPUOS. The hope was that the STSC, and then
the full COPUOS, would adopt or endorse the IADC guidelines by 2004.
However, after two years of discussion, the STSC decided to develop an
independent set of guidelines, but one which would be based upon the
IADC guidelines. Two additional years were required for the completion
and adoption of the guidelines.
The groundwork, including the development of organizational and
personal relationships, established during the process of creating
international orbital debris mitigation guidelines should facilitate
future efforts related to space surveillance awareness systems and
potential codes of conduct for space operations. However, these topics
involve complex issues of technology and policy, and it is difficult to
predict how long either would take to reach an initial consensus.
Q2. Your office's April 2009 issue of Orbital Debris Quarterly News
indicates that debris caused by the February 10 collision between the
Iridium satellite and a defunct Russian Cosmos spacecraft were observed
by a pair of radars at Goldstone, CA because they were too small to be
seen by the Space Surveillance Network.
Considering the heavy workload the aging radars of the Deep Space
Network already perform for NASA's Science missions, what is the
likelihood similar space debris observations will continue to be made
in the future? Do you know if this particular use has been incorporated
by NASA in establishing the requirements of the future Deep Space
Network?
A2. Orbital debris observations made with the radars at Goldstone are
carried out on a non-interference basis with the principal missions
being tracked by the facility. Typically, about 100 hours are available
annually. The Goldstone data fill in a relatively narrow gap between
one mm (about the largest size of debris found in returned spacecraft
surfaces) and five mm (smallest debris size normally seen by the
Haystack radar). While generally helpful to NASA orbital debris
environment assessments, these data are not critical. NASA is currently
reviewing requirements for the Deep Space Network's future
capabilities, including orbital debris tracking, as part of the 70 m
antenna replacement study.
Q3. Dr. Pace's prepared statement notes that radio astronomy
telescopes could possibly be used to aid space situational awareness
efforts. Has NASA taken any steps to explore the potential use of radio
astronomy telescopes for this purpose or engaged the international
scientific community on this question?
A3. In 1989, the Arecibo radio telescope was used successfully in a
pioneering effort to detect small orbital debris. This exercise led to
the ongoing work with the Goldstone radars noted in the NASA response
to Question for the Record number two immediately above. To date, NASA
has not identified a need to employ radio astronomy telescopes to
support the characterization of orbital debris populations. The use of
the U.S. Space Surveillance Network and the Haystack, Haystack
Auxiliary, and Goldstone radars, and the examination of spacecraft
returned surfaces span the entire size regime of orbital debris.
Q4. Mr. DalBello's prepared statement notes that ``there is no single
standard for representing the position of an object in space. Different
operators characterize the orbital position of their satellites
differently; depending on the software they use for flight
operations.'' Is a standard for characterizing the position of an
object in space needed? If so, what entity or entities would develop
the standard? Do you envision this to require international
involvement?
A4. Since the 1960s, the U.S. Government, through the U.S. Space
Surveillance Network, has established standards for representing the
position and trajectory of objects in space. These standards are widely
used domestically and in the international community and have evolved
as needs have arisen and technology has permitted. The Department of
Defense, as the operator of the U.S. Space Surveillance Network, is
best-suited to maintain and, if required, improve these standards.
Q5. You were recently quoted in a National Geographic article that it
may be time to think about how to remove orbital debris from space.
While recognizing that current technology makes it neither technically
feasible nor economically viable to do so at present, you equated this
to an environmental problem. What are the steps that need to be taken
before any sort of active debris removal strategy can be established?
Are there any technology R&D efforts that should be undertaken to give
us future options for debris removal?
A5. The International Academy of Astronautics (IAA) is nearing the
completion of a multi-year assessment of concepts for remediating the
near-Earth space environment, i.e., the removal of orbital debris. This
report will be the first comprehensive look at the problem with respect
to both small and large debris and for debris at low and high
altitudes. NASA plans to take advantage of the work done by the IAA in
addressing how best to proceed. In addition, NASA and the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency have recently begun discussions on
joint work with the U.S. aerospace and academic communities to
investigate possible cost-effective means of removing hazardous orbital
debris.
Q6. If conjunction analysis and other warning activities could be out-
sourced without infringing on national security considerations, what
would be the limitations you see as having to be established?
A6. At this time, out-sourcing conjunction assessment analyses and
other warning activities would be extremely challenging. In addition to
inseparable national security issues, only the U.S. Space Surveillance
Network (SSN) has the raw data and the expertise necessary to perform
these operations. Moreover, conjunction assessments and other warning
activities involve interactive processes, such as realtime tasking of
individual space surveillance sensors to acquire new data, which cannot
be accomplished via out-sourcing. Conjunction assessments currently
performed by some using publicly available data from the SSN are of
insufficient accuracy upon which to base collision avoidance decisions.
Questions submitted by Representative Pete Olson
Q1. During our hearing, it was suggested that one solution to mitigate
the likelihood of future orbital collisions would be the provision of
high-accuracy data to the commercial sector for those objects that are
not maneuvering. Were the Air Force to provide such data, would civil
operators have the capability to generate their own conjunction
analysis for their satellites? Instead of relying on the Air Force to
perform conjunction analyses for the universe of operators, is it more
effective to rely on operators (or coalitions of operators) to do their
own analysis based on raw data provided from multiple sources,
including the Air Force?
A1. At this time, out-sourcing conjunction assessment analyses and
other warning activities would be extremely challenging. Conjunction
assessments and other warning activities involve interactive processes,
such as real-time tasking of individual space surveillance sensors to
acquire new data, which cannot be accomplished via out-sourcing. In
addition, the U.S. Space Surveillance Network (SSN) uses a set of
validated software which is designed to work specifically with the raw
data provided by the SSN sensors. Further, national security issues
prevent the release of information needed to provide the most accurate
conjunction assessments.
Q2. You stated that ``the international aerospace community has
already made significant strides in the design and operation of space
systems to curtail the creation of new orbital debris, but more can be
done.'' Please explain what additional steps could be taken?
A2. First and foremost is to continue to improve compliance with the
recently established United Nations space debris mitigation guidelines.
This is done primarily via reporting and discussions at the annual
meeting of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the United
Nations' Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Space and via the various
major international space conferences, e.g., the annual International
Astronautical Congress and the biannual Scientific Assembly of the
Committee on Space Research Some spacecraft and launch vehicle design
changes could also reduce the risk of the inadvertent generation of
debris. For example, not all pressurized vessels are designed to be
vented when no longer needed.
Questions submitted by Representative Dana Rohrabacher
Q1. Although we have not yet seen widespread commercial human space
flight, it is clear that within a few years there will be several
commercial entities capable of regular sub-orbital, and possibly
orbital, service. In the planning for future programs, is any
consideration being given to this industry? Is there concern that these
entities might present further dangers to civil and commercial users?
A1. Member States of the United Nations (UN) are expected to implement
the 2007 UN Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines in their national
regulations of future commercial human space flight operations. Human
space flight is currently conducted at low altitudes where the orbital
debris population is low and where the inadvertent creation of new
orbital debris is mitigated by short orbital lifetimes. The vast
majority of civil and commercial spacecraft operations take place above
the regime used for human space flight.
Q2. What are the hurdles in expanding our international agreements
beyond debris mitigation to include debris remediation? Are there
nations or commercial operators who would be against such an expansion?
A2. The principal hurdle is to identify practical and affordable means
of removing debris from orbit. The International Academy of
Astronautics has been conducting a survey of many concepts during the
past few years. In general, the concepts are either not technically
feasible or are too costly. At this point, it would be premature to
judge whether there would be opposition to the development of
practical, affordable debris removal systems; as such systems have not
yet been identified.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Richard DalBello, Vice President, Legal and Government
Affairs, Intelsat General Corporation
Questions submitted by Chairwoman Gabrielle Giffords
Q1. At the hearing you urged DOD to be creative in the development of
data sources in recognition of the high costs associated with upgrading
the Space Surveillance Network. You suggested, as a potential
alternative to utilizing expensive terrestrial infrastructure, that DOD
place sensors on every commercial platform going into orbit. How big an
impact would making provision for such sensors be on your commercial
satellite operations?
A1. Making provisions for the accommodation of sensors on every
commercial satellite need not create an operational burden for
industry. If the sensors were relatively small and consumed a modest
amount of power, they could be accommodated without a significant
impact to the commercial mission. Multiple classes of sensors may be
needed to match various commercial satellite configurations. The
government would need to play a role in the development and
coordination of these devices. Specialized, larger, or `single mission'
sensors could also be flown, but, the bulk of the program should
probably be built around common and relatively inexpensive units. The
communication component of the mission (returning the sensor data to
Earth) could be handled easily through the use of the satellites
commercial transponders.
In order to routinely add space surveillance sensors to commercial
satellites, the private sector would need:
A clear statement of government objectives and
requirements;
Government provided or designed low-cost, sensors;
Well-defined and common technical interfaces to
reduce cost and allow the package to be `designed in' at the
start of the programs;
A commitment that the government would have `insight,
not oversight' of the commercial program;
Contracts that are simple, are based upon commercial
terms, and are for a sufficient length of time to justify
commercial sector efforts.
Q2. Commercial space users have indicated concern about inadequate
funding. An article in Aviation Week and Space Technology reported on a
satellite communications official's concern that there is a question on
``whether there will be enough money to get more than the two-line
elements currently available.'' The article added that industry
analysts say existing data sets do not satisfy operators' accuracy
needs. Do you believe inadequate funding will translate to your
industry not receiving data that is as accurate as it needs?
A2. It is our current understanding that DOD intends to expand
significantly the resources available to its Space Situational
Awareness Program. How much of this funding will eventually be
allocated to the CFE program is unclear. Our current conjunction
monitoring systems depend on the two-line elements provided through CFE
for initial screening. Should future funding constraints result in
limitations on our access to the current two-line elements, or further
degrade their accuracy, satellite operators would lose the ability to
perform initial screening. The current accuracy of two-line elements
does not support reliable conjunction monitoring. However, because this
is the only means available for providing the orbital elements for the
objects in the catalog, operators rely on it for initial screening
only. Once a potential alert is detected, operators typically request
assistance from JSpOC via the CFE Form-1 process. If the two-line
elements are unavailable or their accuracy is degraded, operators will
need to rely more on the direct aid of JSpOC which will increase the
workload and expense of this operation. Alternatively, if higher
accuracy data are made available to the public, operators could tighten
the collision thresholds in their initial screening and thus reduce
false alarms and unnecessary requests of assistance from JSpOC for
second screening. This would reduce the unnecessary workload on JSpOC
and allow for optimal use of its resources.
Q3. In your prepared statement, you advocate beginning an
international dialogue on ``Rules of the Road'' for space to develop
guidelines such as protocols for informing other operators when one of
their spacecraft could potentially cause damage to other space objects.
How would you initiate such a dialogue and what do you consider the
major obstacles to agreeing on such Rules of the Road?
A3. An international dialogue on ``Rules of the Road'' should be
pursued through both government and non-government channels. The United
States Government should take a leadership role in discussions on space
traffic management in international bodies such as the United Nations
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), the
Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS), and the Inter-
Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC). Leadership and
engagement in these fora will be instrumental in efforts to develop a
common international understanding of definitions and standards. In
addition to these activities, significant attention should be paid to
current operational practices. Specific ``'best practices''' should be
developed by the appropriate communities currently engaged in space
operations. The commercial industry's proposal to create a Data Center
for the coordination of space traffic information would be one
mechanism to engage the participation of commercial satellite
operators. Other space actors, such as the science community and the
human space flight community, will also need to engage to capture their
own unique ``best practices.'' The U.S. Government can play a
meaningful role in coordinating the sharing of information between and
among these various communities. It is important that the development
of ``Rules of the Road'' be based on practical, experienced-based
lessons. Attempts to create a top-down, treaty-based approach or an
approach that emphasizes the creation of new international
bureaucracies is unlikely to be productive.
Q4. Your prepared statement notes that ``there is no single standard
for representing the position of an object in space. Different
operators characterize the orbital position of their satellites
differently, depending on the software they use for flight
operations.'' What are some concrete examples showing how this lack of
standard is affecting the ability of some operators to share
information on close approach monitoring?
A4. Different operators represent the orbital position and velocity of
their spacecraft in different reference frames, time systems and
formats based on the flight dynamics systems they use for flight
operations. The table below illustrates some examples of the different
systems that Intelsat must accommodate when we exchange orbital
elements with other operators based on our experiences.
The problem is further complicated due to inconsistent use of terms
and definitions. There are many subtle differences even if the ``same''
reference frames are used and if not carefully accounted for will lead
to errors of a few of kilometers in the satellite positions.
Q5. Given that the need for and benefit of space surveillance
awareness is worldwide and cuts across military, civilian government,
and commercial lines, what are the prospects for establishing a cost-
sharing approach to the provision of the space surveillance function?
Does the U.S. derive sufficient benefits from the information that it
should provide the services free of charge, or should users pay a fee?
What are the pros and cons of establishing user fees?
A5. It may be more immediately productive to characterize space traffic
management as a ``burden sharing'' rather than a ``cost sharing''
opportunity. The commercial industry stands ready to provide valuable
information to the U.S. Government by sharing with the government its
satellite ephemeris data based on their its dedicated ranging systems.
This high quality data will provide better accuracy than the special
perturbation orbital data derived from DOD's space surveillance
network. In addition, the industry ephemeris data contains the maneuver
information which is essential for predictions in the future and for
reliable close approach analysis. By sharing this high quality data
with the government, operators also free up the government resources so
they it can focus on monitoring the high priority targets. This will
result in cost savings to the government. We believe, therefore, in
exchange for the industry ephemeris data, that the government should
provide the close approach monitoring services for free. Since any
collision in space will create more debris and thus impact the
operation safety for all others sharing the same space, it is important
to encourage as many satellite operators as possible to participate in
the close approach monitoring. If a fee is imposed on the service, it
may discourage some operators from participating.
Q6. If conjunction analysis and other warning activities could be out-
sourced without infringing on national security considerations, what
would be the limitations you see as having to be established?
A6. Intelsat believes that it would be feasible to out-source the space
traffic management function to a private entity or to a consortium of
operators. To successfully carry out the space traffic management task,
it is essential that the designated entity have access to high quality
information on all space assets. Such information would likely be
derived from U.S. and foreign observations and from data sharing
between commercial and government entities. Obviously, the sharing of
information on the location and maneuver of government space assets can
raise important security concerns. Initially, an out-sourced space
traffic entity might have to segregate its information into ``open''
and ``restricted'' categories. ``Open data'' might reasonably be
accessible by all, whereas ``restricted data'' might be limited to a
pre-designated group of entities. Such segregation would be complicated
by the need to include non-U.S. entities in the data sharing plan. Over
time, as more nations develop the ability to monitor space activities
and space is rendered increasingly transparent, the difference between
``open'' and ``restricted'' data sources is likely to diminish.
Questions submitted by Representative Pete Olson
Q1. During our hearing, it was suggested that one solution to mitigate
the likelihood of future orbital collisions would be the provision of
high-accuracy data to the commercial sector for those objects that are
not maneuvering. Were the Air Force to provide such data, would civil
operators have the capability to generate their own conjunction
analysis for their satellites? Instead of relying on the Air Force to
perform conjunction analyses for the universe of operators, is it more
effective to rely on operators (or coalitions of operators) to do their
own analysis based on raw data provided from multiple sources,
including the Air Force?
A1. If the Air Force were to provide the high quality data for non-
active satellites and debris, the industry would be able to use this
data to conduct conjunction monitoring with respect to those objects.
One of the goals of the Data Center initiative is to enable operators
to provide close approach monitoring for as many space objects as
possible. One of the limitations in our effort is the lack of high
quality data for non-active objects and non-cooperative operators.
Provision of high quality data regarding non-operational objects would
not be sufficient to perform conjunction analysis in all cases, since
operators would still have to account for active government and non-
cooperating satellites. Nonetheless, such a sharing approach would
enhance commercial operators' assessment capabilities, while reducing
the burden on the Air Force JSpOC.
Over time, it would be possible to use raw data provided from
multiple and disparate sources to substitute for the services currently
provided through the CFE program. However, such sharing arrangements--
particularly between different nations--are not yet in place. Even if
countries and companies were committed to data sharing, there are still
important data format and data validation issues to resolve. So, in
short, it is not today more effective to rely on data from coalitions
of operators and multiple sources to perform conjunction analysis;
however, we hope and expect that it will be in the future.
Questions submitted by Representative Dana Rohrabacher
Q1. Although we have not yet seen widespread commercial human space
flight, it is clear that within a few years there will be several
commercial entities capable of regular sub-orbital, and possibly
orbital, service. In the planning for future programs, is any
consideration being given to this industry? Is there concern that these
entities might present further dangers to civil and commercial users?
A1. For Intelsat's part, the expansion of commercial human space flight
should have no impact on its operations. Typically, human space flight
activities take place within a few hundred miles of the surface of the
Earth. Intelsat's satellites are in geostationary orbit at
approximately 22,000 miles from the Earth.
Our interests notwithstanding, there are many commercial operations
in communications and imagery that will have to share `low-Earth orbit'
with future commercial human space flight activities. It is my
understanding that currently NASA, working with DOD's JSpOC, pays very
close attention to the safety of the space station. As other human
space flight activities proliferate, the JSpOC, or other future space
traffic management entity, will need to add these activities to its
list of actively monitored objects. The number of objects represented
by future commercial human space flight activities is likely to be
small and therefore should not challenge our state-of-the-art
computational capabilities for space traffic management. So, in short,
increased human space flight activity does add another set of
challenges for space traffic management, but these challenges should be
well within our technical competence.
Q2. What are the hurdles in expanding our international agreements
beyond debris mitigation to include debris remediation? Are there
nations or commercial operators who would be against such an expansion?
A2. In Intelsat's opinion, there are no practical technologies
available today that could be used to provide low risk, cost effective,
and reliable debris remediation. Intelsat closely monitors progress in
this field and is routinely briefed by entrepreneurs and innovators
regarding emerging debris remediation techniques. For example, we
recently reviewed several ``space tug'' concepts that would be designed
to remove whole satellites from the geostationary orbit. Intelsat would
support government and industry efforts to advance the state-of-the-art
in this important field.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Scott Pace, Director, Space Policy Institute, Elliott
School of International Affairs, George Washington University
Questions submitted by Chairwoman Gabrielle Giffords
Q1. Your prepared statement advocates international cooperation
focusing on sharing basic information using open standards while
recognizing that proprietary ``value-added'' products will arise on
their own in response to user needs.'' Can you elaborate on what basic
information should be shared and what open standards you envision?
A1. The basic information that should be shared is the object's
location and enough data to be able to estimate (or ``propagate'') the
object's position forward in time with sufficient accuracy to do
conjunction analysis. In addition, there should be a ``point of
contact'' for that object if possible (i.e., who to call regarding
maneuvers or impending collisions).
The two-line elements (TLE) put out by the Commercial and Foreign
Entities (CFE) pilot program are a common means of representing an
orbit. They contain position information, orbital characteristics, and
time information about each object in a comprehensive catalog of space
objects. ``Orbital characteristics'' are represented by parameters such
as the orbital period, inclination, apogee, perigee, eccentricity,
semi-major axis, longitude of the ascending node, argument of
periapsis, mean anomaly, etc. With information about an object at a
particular time (or epoch), the future orbit can be calculated.
Realistically, this means taking into account complex perturbations
including, among other effect, atmospheric drag, solar radiation
pressure, gravity field variances, third-body effects due to the Moon
and Sun, and spacecraft maneuvers.
The International Standards Organization (ISO) has two
subcommittees (ISO/TC20/SC13 and ISO/TC20/SC14) which between them
develop the full body of international space standards. In cooperation
with these ISO subcommittees the international Consultative Committee
for Space Data Systems (CCSDS) has developed a recommended standard for
``Orbit Data Messages'' which provides a common framework for the
interchange of orbit data across the international space-faring
community. There are three general types of messages: 1) Orbit
Parameter Message which specifies the position and velocity of an
object at a specified epoch or time; 2) Orbit Mean-elements Message
which specifies the orbital characteristics of a single object at a
specified epoch or time; and 3) Orbit Ephemeris Message in which the
position and velocity of a single object is specified at multiple
epochs within a specified time range. For a given object, analysts may
use all three types of messages to get an accurate ephemeris (or
description of the object's behavior).
In addition, scientific information about the space and Earth
environment, such as space weather, models of the Earth's gravity and
atmosphere, are needed to accurately predict orbital behavior over
time. The basic framework of required standards needs to be more
comprehensively defined and their development responsibility assigned
to the appropriate standards organizations. Once the basics are agreed
via open international standards, value-added augmentations from the
private sector will follow. One way to establish the basic framework
could be to assign its definition as a joint working activity between
the two existing ISO subcommittees.
Q2. Some European space agencies have signed the European Code of
Conduct for Space Debris Mitigation. Is there a need for a code of
conduct to be followed by all space-faring nations?
A2. A goal of having a code of conduct followed by all space-faring
nations is a worthwhile one. The current EU-proposed code is a starting
point but other nations such as the United States, Russia and China,
need to be part of the shaping of any code if voluntary adherence is to
be effective. The code of conduct can be expected to evolve as
countries gain more space experience. It should be kept in mind that
this proposal Is separate from the current Space Debris Mitigation
Guidelines. The Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC)
that includes all the major space agencies produced these guidelines.
Q3. What are the main challenges associated with active debris
removal? What research should be undertaken to better understand the
technical, policy, and cost issues associated with such removal?
A3. There are complex technical, cost, policy, and legal issues
associated with active debris removal. At a technical level, the
challenge is how to accurately impart sufficient energy to create a
change in an object's velocity to de-orbit or put it into intersection
with the Earth's atmosphere so it will reenter. For object too high for
atmospheric reentry (e.g, MEO and GEO orbits), the challenge is to put
the satellites into stable disposal orbits and vent residual propellant
to mitigate the possibility they disintegrate into a cloud of debris.
The energy may be imparted by ground-based systems (e.g., lasers) or by
in-space devices through collision, manipulation, or propulsion. For
physical contact, it is unclear how one would rendezvous with a
spinning, potentially unstable object.
The technical options are all costly with low economic incentives
to remove any particular piece of debris. What objects would be
targeted for removal first? Would we target the most massive objects or
the objects most likely to disintegrate or those in the most crowded
orbits? Further, it may be difficult to tell the difference between
intentional and unintentional debris removal and thus the actions of a
space weapon. From a legal perspective, objects in space still belong
to States and there is no ``salvage law'' for space to deal with what
are effectively abandoned objects. This raises policy questions such as
whether States should only remove their own objects or those whose
removal has been specifically consented to. Some small objects may be
both unidentified and unidentifiable as debris below certain sizes are
very difficult to track if costs of debris mitigation are to be shared,
then agreement will be needed on which objects should be given prior
for removal based on some common understanding of potential risk.
Q4. Your prepared testimony also refers to the increasing deployment
of small satellites. Can you comment on how this might complicate
things?
A4. Small satellites typically have little to no internal Delta V
capability (i.e., ability to change their orbit) for end of mission
life disposal. Countries, companies, and academic institutions may
deploy small satellites into uncoordinated orbits or fail to follow
operational practices developed for larger satellites. This may be a
particular concern for polar orbits where many satellite orbits
intersect above the poles. On the other hand, if deployed into very low
orbits, they wall tend to have low orbital lifetimes and need not be a
persistent threat: For small ``swarms'' of nano- or pico-satellites,
their optical or radar cross-sections may be so small as to render
direct observation difficult, In those cases, small satellites may be
required to have optical or radar reflectors or radio transponders to
ease and tracking. Passive reflectors would likely be preferable as
they would not require satellite power.
Q5. Your testimony refers to the need for ``a common understanding of
definitions, standards, operating procedures, and practices for space
operators to communicate with each other.'' What mechanism do you
believe is appropriate for developing this ``common understanding''
nationally and internationally?
A5. The two ISO subcommittees mentioned previously seem to provide a
viable and easily activated mechanism for developing a common
international framework of definitions and open standards. ISO/TC20/
SC13 (the parent of the CCSDS) develops data communications and
exchange standards for space systems and ISO/TC20/SC14 develops
electromechanical and process standards. A joint working group could be
quickly established between these subcommittees to parse the problem
and to develop the common operating standards and practices to
accommodate different locations and conditions, e.g., GEO
communications satellites, environmental monitoring satellites in polar
orbits. With the necessary standards under development, discussions
would then occur among IADC members with recommendations incorporated
into air evolving code of conduct. This avoids premature constraints
that may be created by a top-down treaty approach while including all
space-faring nations into a common, fact-based process. Consensus will
likely be slow but it will also be more reliable and effective than
attempts at mandates. For this approach to be truly useful to the
United States, however, strong interagency coordination for a national
position and active agency support for the international discussions
will be needed, e.g., in the ISO space standards subcommittees and the
IADC.
Q6. What are the challenges associated with fusing data from different
sources such as radar and optical systems?
A6. I am not an expert in fusing data from optical and radar systems
and identifying the problems would seem to be another task that might
be assigned to the joint ISO working group suggested above. I would
note however that the CCSDS in particular is already defining the
necessary basis of information architecture, information packaging and
associated XML-based data interchange standards that provide a common
platform for the rapid sharing and fusion of multi-source data across
the international space community.
Radar and optical systems have advantages and disadvantages so data
from both are important to have, especially in geographically dispersed
areas. Radars are useful for finding and ranging objects very quickly
and they can track multiple objects at once. Unfortunately, radars are
also expensive and thus there will be relatively fewer sites in use.
Radar wavelengths can often be greater than really small objects and
thus not useful for tracking them. Optical tracking is less expensive
but slow with the need for multiple sightings. Tracking lasers cannot
find objects but they can be very fast and accurate given optical and
radar cuing information. At a minimum, it would seem that standardized
exchange of calibration agreement and verification would be vital as
the same object can have very different optical and radar cross-
sections and thus verification that data from two systems actually
concerns the same object can't be assumed.
Q7. Given that the need for and benefit of space surveillance
awareness is worldwide and cuts across military, civilian government,
and commercial lines, what are the prospects for establishing a cost-
sharing approach to the provision of the space surveillance function?
Does the U.S. derive sufficient benefits from the information that it
should provide the services free of charge, or should users pay a fee?
What are the pros and cons of establishing user fees?
A7. The United States is especially dependent on space to support its
national security and economic interests. We have a Navy to protect our
interests and dependencies on the sea and in a similar way, the United
States needs to have a leading role in capabilities like SSA to protect
our interests and dependencies in space. The fact that the benefits of
SSA are international and cross all space sectors (and the ground
systems that depend on space), would argue that SSA is a public good.
In peacetime, one nation's use of SSA does not reduce the benefit of
another nation's use of SSA and both may benefit from the positive
externalities of sharing information. Thus cost sharing is not quite
the right question to be asking. International space cooperation has
long been based on the principle of `no-exchange of funds'' and the
pooling of efforts for shared objectives.
We should be asking how each space sector and space-faring nation
could make efforts that improve common SSA. For example, commercial
firms can share information about their systems and data exchanges with
each other and they can do independent conjunctions analysis. The same
is true for civil agencies that may also be able to contribute data
from ground-based radars and optical tracers. Both industry and civil
agencies could create opportunities for hosting payloads on their
satellites to improve SSA from sensors in space. There can be
international contributions of data from geographically distributed
optical and radar sources that would otherwise be difficult and
expensive for the United States to create alone.
The 1996 National Space Policy (now superseded by the 2006 National
Space Policy) contained some guidance if fees of any sort were
considered:
(a) Prices charged to U.S. private sector, State and local
government space activities for the use of U.S. Government
facilities, equipment; and services will be based on costs
consistent with federal guidelines, applicable statutes and the
commercial guidelines contained within the policy. The U.S.
Government will not seek to recover design and development
costs or investments associated with any existing facilities or
new facilities required to meet U.S. Government needs and to
which the U.S. Government retains title.
Improved but still limited SSA services such as those provided by
the CFE pilot program, should be provided freely to all who contribute
to stronger SSA capabilities for the United States. This includes civil
agencies, allied countries, commercial operators with data sharing
agreements, and even NGOs. If fees were charged, there would be
incentives to not use safety services and thus increase risk to others.
Fees would also creates incentives for separate SSA systems and could
undermine data sharing with common standards which would in turn reduce
the public good afforded by SSA. Finally, there would be the
transaction cost associated with the task of calculating and collecting
the fees.
Q8. If conjunction analysis and other warning activities could be out-
sourced without infringing on national security considerations, what
would be the limitations you see as having to be established?
A8. If conjunction analysis and other warning activities were out-
sourced, regulatory guidance would have to be in place to define
quality standards for analyses and standards of liability for warnings.
As with other safety services, the government can provide them or allow
the private sector to provide them, but four the latter approach,
government requirements for public safety would need to be defined. At
present, it is too soon to set such requirements.
The government should be wary of out-sourcing its intellectual
capability to produce conjunction analyses and warnings. Even though
the government relies on expert contractors, the existence of a
substantial fixed cost government capability results in a relatively
low marginal cost for doing an additional analysis. Thus it is hard to
see how paying another contractor to serve non-government customers
would save significant resources. For national security purposes, the
government may not wish to discuss particular space objects or
detection capabilities. If the United States doesn't reveal some
information and an incident occurs, it would be likely held responsible
for any consequences. Again, this creates a practical problem for out-
sourcing.
Questions submitted by Representative Pete Olson
Q1. During our hearing, it was suggested that one solution to mitigate
the likelihood of future orbital collisions would be the provision of
high-accuracy data to the commercial sector for those objects that are
not maneuvering. Were the Air Force to provide such data, would civil
operators have the capability to generate their own conjunction
analysis for their satellites? Instead of relying on the Air Force to
perform conjunction analyses for the universe of operators, is it more
effective to rely on operators (or coalitions of operators) to do their
own analysis based on raw data provided from multiple sources,
including the Air Force?
A1. With high precision data, many commercial operators (e.g., GEO
comsat firms) should be able to generate their own conjunction
analyses. Such analyses may be more challenging for commercial firms
operating communication satellites and remote sensing satellites in LEO
due to the faster moving nature, and stronger orbital perturbation
effects in the LEO environment.
As stated elsewhere, conjunction analyses can only be performed
against objects the satellite operators are told about. A pilot effort
could be started with the major satellite operators in GEO by sharing
high accuracy information with them try return for hosted space sensors
on some of their satellites and routine information on the precise
location of the commercial GEO satellites. The Air Force, in
cooperation with other government agencies, should remain responsible
for conjunction analyses in LEO for now.
Questions submitted by Representative Dana Rohrabacher
Q1. What are the hurdles in expanding our international agreements
beyond debris mitigation to include debris remediation? Are there
nations or commercial operators who would be against such an expansion?
A1. Leaving aside technical and cost difficulties, there are policy and
legal issues associated with debris remediation. It may be difficult to
tell the difference between intentional and unintentional debris
removal and thus the actions of a space weapon. Thus some countries
might object remediation fearing the creation of a means for hostile
actions on still operational satellites and spacecraft.
From a legal perspective, objects in space still belong to States
and there is no ``salvage law'' for space to deal with what are
effectively abandoned objects. This raises policy questions such as
whether States should only remove their own objects or those whose
removal has been specifically consented to. Some small objects may be
both unidentified and unidentifiable. If costs of debris mitigation are
to be shared, then agreement will be needed on which objects should be
given prior for removal based on some common understanding of potential
risk. One approach to developing an international agreement on debris
remediation could be the clarification of any permissible salvage
rights for man-made objects in space. Some countries may object to this
as a modification to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.
Q2. Although we have not yet seen widespread commercial human space
flight, it is clear that within a few years there will be several
commercial entities capable of regular sub-orbital, and possibly
orbital, service. In the planning for future programs, is any
consideration being given to this industry? Is there concern that these
entities might present further dangers to civil and commercial users?
A2. I am not aware of specific regulatory considerations being given Lo
the commercial human space flight industry. I am aware of an FAA
licensing requirement for collision avoidance as part of flight safety
analyses for commercial space launches. The requirement is to maintain
a distance of at least 200 km from any habitable orbiting object, e.g.,
the International Space Station and perhaps other commercial human
space flights. It is unclear how that requirement will be met, what
would constitute an acceptable analysis, and how potential collisions
would be addresses. Should commercial launch operators be required to
pay for conjunction analysis by the government, private third parties,
or will their own work be acceptable? At this stage, it would seem
prudent for the government to remain flexible and encourage use of non-
proprietary collision avoidance models that allow independent
verification of a collision avoidance analysis.
Appendix 2:
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Additional Material for the Record
Statement of Marion C. Blakey
President and CEO
Aerospace Industries Association
Introduction
Chairwoman Giffords, Ranking Member Olson and distinguished Members
of the Committee, thank you for holding this important hearing on space
debris and space environment safety. I appreciate the opportunity to
submit this testimony for the record.
I represent the Aerospace Industries Association--we are an
association of nearly 300 aerospace manufacturing companies and the
657,000 highly-skilled employees who make the satellites, space
sensors, spacecraft, launch vehicles, and the ground support systems
employed by NASA, NOAA, and the DOD. I welcome the opportunity to
provide testimony on the major challenges and risks associated with
debris in the space environment.
First, let me thank the Committee for its foresight and dedication
needed to ensure the U.S. maintains our leadership in space, and we are
grateful for your recognition of the role our nation's space programs
play in both our economic strength and national security. The stimulus
package was an excellent first step in providing the necessary support
our space and aeronautics programs need to keep up with the demands of
space exploration, aeronautics research and development, Earth
observation, scientific research, and critically important
manufacturing technology programs.
Current Threats Facing Our Crowded Space Environment
Just recently astronauts aboard the Space Shuttle Discovery and
International Space Station (ISS) were forced to engage in maneuvers to
avoid a small piece of debris that put their lives at risk. Crew aboard
the ISS have also taken shelter in their Soyuz spacecraft as a
precaution against possible collisions several times in the past. These
incidents highlight a stark reality: space is becoming increasingly
crowded. Over 60 nations are engaged in space efforts, and tens of
thousands of man-made objects--including debris orbit the Earth. As the
number of nations placing objects in space grows, risks to U.S. space
systems and our ability to operate in space also increases. Space
technology is a critical infrastructure that contributes to a strong
and secure America. It needs to be adequately protected. This includes
additional funding for space protection and space situational awareness
efforts, better data-sharing with our international allies to limit
space debris and maintain a safe environment, and improvements to
government-industry partnerships.
From the early days of the Space Age, space systems have grown to
become critical components of the modern U.S. economy, our national
defense, and our preeminence in science. Today, U.S. satellites provide
early warning when nations like Iran or North Korea launch a missile.
They allow secure global communications and provide bandwidth for
unmanned aerial vehicles used by our troops in isolated battlefields
like Afghanistan. NASA's Science Directorate provides a better
understanding of our Earth, and the universe. NASA's Aeronautics
Research and Development endeavors tie the use of space systems into
the completion of the NextGen air transportation modernization program
and continued efforts to reduce aviation's environmental impact.
Weather satellites give us warnings of storm fronts, deep freezes, and
hurricanes. Space systems are also an important part of the modern U.S.
economy; providing business communications, navigation through OPS
handsets, remote sensing, and digital television and music for millions
of consumers. In 2008 space system industry sales topped $33 billion
providing thousands of high-wage, middle class jobs.
Yet we are not adequately protecting or ensuring the safety of our
space assets. The Defense Department currently acts as the de facto
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for space--responsible for
providing space situational awareness for over 18,000 man-made objects
in the Earth's orbit. This is no easy task. Remember, it's not just
military satellites the Pentagon has to worry about; multiple systems
from NASA, the intelligence community, commercial providers, and
international assets are all circling the Earth at speeds of thousands
of miles per hour.
Debris is a major concern. When an airplane accident occurs here on
Earth, the associated debris does not impact future flights. In space
however, debris can orbit the Earth for years, decades, or even
centuries. if debris interacts with additional man-made objects, the
problem can be compounded and result in the creation of even larger
debris fields. In January 2007, a Chinese ballistic missile destroyed
an aging weather satellite, which created a massive debris field that
will orbit the Earth well into the future. In February 2009, the
Pentagon's job became even more difficult when a commercial U.S.
satellite and a defunct Russian satellite collided. Recent reports by
NASA have detailed multiple debris threats to the Space Shuttle and
ISS--endangering lives and billions of dollars of space infrastructure.
Since we don't yet have the ability to clean up space, debris fields
present a very real impediment for future uses of space by the U.S. and
our international allies.
With its current minimal budget for space situational awareness,
the Defense Department is forced to prioritize what objects it tracks.
Limited resources force it to track space objects that could interfere
with humans in space or military satellites as its top priorities.
Tracking of commercial assets gets an even lower priority. To its
credit, the Defense Department recently created, along with the
National Reconnaissance Office, a Space Protection Program that
supports interagency collaboration on space threat assessments and
collaboration on space protection strategy. This is an important step
forward for the military and intelligence community. Yet when compared
with the FAA, which is provided billions every year for air traffic
control and safety, our national space situational awareness efforts
are lagging far behind.
Investment in Space Protection and Space Situational Awareness is
Critical
Given our reliance upon military, intelligence, civil, and
commercial space systems, and growing threats including debris and
other satellites, the U.S. needs to provide robust funding for space
situational awareness and the protection of our space assets. This
funding should not only maintain current capabilities, but advance them
towards significant improvement. This includes funding modernization
programs for space systems to harden satellites from attack, and
establishing contingency plans to ensure redundancy of space
capabilities. Important initiatives like Operationally Responsive Space
seek to develop systems that can be rapidly deployed and help improve
space system redundancy, but with more systems in orbit we will need to
increase the fidelity of tracking items in space. We also need to do a
better job of sharing information with our international partners and
between government and industry.
Space systems are no longer the dreams of rocket scientists of the
early 20th Century; they have arrived and are part of our way of life.
The space industry supports thousands of high-tech jobs and billions of
dollars in economic activity. But without increasing resources for the
protection of our space systems, we are putting our security and
economic competitiveness at significant risk. Now, as the
Administration puts the final touches on its Fiscal Year 2010 budget,
is the right time to make the right investment in this critical
infrastructure by providing significant resources to space protection
and space situational awareness. Interagency partnerships and
government partnerships with industry should be strengthened to provide
robust protection of our critical space assets. It will also be
important to take the steps necessary to work with our international
allies to prevent additional collisions and the proliferation of debris
in the global space environment.
Statement of the
Secure World Foundation
Secure World Foundation is pleased to provide this written
statement to the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics in its
consideration of the role of space situational awareness in supporting
the long-term sustainability of activities in outer space. In order to
continue to reap the substantial benefits provided by activities in
Earth orbit, the United States will need to find a satisfactory way to
enhance space situational awareness.
The current space environment and the value of space situational
awareness
On February, 10, 2009, the communications satellite Iridium 33 was
passing over Siberia on its way up over the North Pole and then
southwards, a journey that had taken place without incident every one
hundred minutes for the past eleven years, four months, and twenty-
seven days of its mission providing satellite telephone services. That
day, it experienced a sudden, violent shock and then fell silent.
Iridium operators later learned that Iridium 33 had collided with
another space object, a Russian communications satellite that had
ceased operation years earlier. The two spacecraft had approached each
other at speeds faster than any human eye could have ever followed.
If we desire to continue to reap the immense benefits that space
can provide, we must take steps to preserve the Earth's orbital
environment. A key concern is the threat of loss of utility of key
orbits because of a proliferation of space debris. The unavoidable
first step to this preservation is to determine what is in Earth orbit
and where it is going: space situational awareness (SSA). Space
situational awareness is not a new concept--it has been an important
part of military space activities for many years. But like many other
space applications, such as global positioning data and satellites
communications, there is also a growing need for SSA in the civil
world.
The fundamental difference between civil SSA and military SSA is in
the types of information that it provides. Civil space situational
awareness only needs to focus on the location of an object in Earth
orbit and a point of contact for that object, along with environmental
information about space weather. The additional military requirements
of determining function, intent, and capabilities and limitations are
not necessary for civil uses.
Imagine that you are in a car, driving down the road on a clear and
sunny day. In this situation, the driver has excellent situational
awareness and has all the information needed to operate the vehicle in
a safe and efficient manner. However, if the windows are blacked out
the situation becomes much different. Even if the driver is using a GPS
device to display the car's position on the road the driver has no
information about either the locations or movements of the other cars.
This environment of highly limited information is the same in which
many of the satellites in Earth orbit are operated today. The owner or
operator of a particular satellite usually has excellent knowledge
about the position of that satellite in space, but little to no
information about the locations of other objects around them. This
situation was the root cause behind the collision of two satellites in
February--the owner of the Iridium satellite, which could have
potentially maneuvered it out of the way, did not know about the
impending close approach.
This collision produced close to one thousand pieces of space
debris larger than four inches, which are currently being tracked by
the U.S. military. Although still a serious incident, this number could
have been significantly higher had the two satellites collided with
more than what seems to have been a glancing blow.
The debris generated by the February 10th collision is just a small
fraction of the overall debris population. Over 18,000 pieces of debris
are being tracked in Earth orbit by various militaries, scientists, and
amateur observers around the globe. Much of this population will stay
in orbit for decades and even centuries. This debris, which is the
result of placing and operating objects in orbit, will pose an ever
more challenging threat to our continued use of space, including for
commercial benefit and exploration.
Space is a vast domain, yet there are only a few regions from which
we derive the majority of the scientific and economic benefits. These
regions are limited natural resources, and our use of them can have
long lasting negative effects on their utility. SSA is crucial not only
to understanding the effects of humanity's activities in space but also
in minimizing the costs those effects have on future space activities.
The value of space situational awareness to human space flight and use
of outer space for scientific and commercial
benefit
Globally, outer space provides many services that are crucial to
both the US and global economy and to increasing our scientific
knowledge. Collisions between objects in orbit not only lead to
potential disruptions in these services but also leave debris in orbit.
This debris raises the economic costs of future operations in space by
increasing the measures satellite operators must take to protect their
assets. These measures include more frequent maneuvers, which expend
fuel and can cause service outages as well as potentially increasing
manufacturing and launch costs.
Space situational awareness is also crucial for the safety of human
space flight. On March 12th, 2009, the crew of the International Space
Station (ISS) was forced to prepare for an emergency evacuation inside
the Soyuz spacecraft in response to an unexpected close approach by a
piece of debris from the 1993 US launch of a Global Positioning
Satellite. This was followed by another close approach by a piece of
debris from an expired Russian satellite on March 16th. On March 22nd,
the docked Space Shuttle Orbiter and ISS were forced to change orbit to
avoid an extremely close piece from a Chinese rocket booster launched
in 1999.
The remote sensing satellites that make up NASA's primary Earth
observation A-Train constellation and provide invaluable data for
climate and resource management also have dealt with the issue of
satellite collisions. In June of 2007, the $1.3 billion Terra satellite
was forced to change its orbit to avoid a piece of Chinese debris and
in July 2007 the CloudSat satellite maneuvered to avoid a near miss
with an Iranian remote sensing satellite.
Likewise, operators of commercial satellites in geostationary orbit
22,000 miles above the Earth are on a constant lookout for debris.
Their satellites must stay within a fairly narrow assigned slot, both
to maintain a fixed position for their customers on Earth and to
prevent possible collisions with other satellites operating nearby.
Natural forces continually pull these satellites in different
directions, forcing all geostationary satellite operators to perform
periodic maneuvers to maintain their precise positioning. Many times
these maneuvers are made without precise knowledge of the location of
neighboring satellites.
For U.S. strategic, commercial, civil and scientific objectives,
improved space situational awareness of all parties is essential to
ensure the viability of U.S. interests in space in the long-term.
The importance of increasing SSA capacity
As the number of actors in space has risen dramatically in recent
years, there is a pressing need for space situational awareness
information for all space-faring States. The fallout from a
hypothetical on-orbit collision between the satellites of two emerging
space states with limited access to SSA information will unavoidably
place US space assets at risk. Access to SSA information, along with
the capacity to interpret it for all space actors, both emerging and
developed, can significantly enhance the safety of U.S. space assets.
Improved operational practices through SSA will hopefully help to
prevent future collisions and other debris causing incidents.
Unfortunately, most actors in space do not have the resources or
capacity to provide their own space situational awareness information
necessary to make safe and secure decisions regarding activities in
space. The few States that do have the resources to provide this
information are often limited by national security or military
restrictions from sharing it with other actors.
Accurate tracking of all objects in Earth orbit from the ground
requires a geographically distributed network of both radar and optical
telescopes. Such a network is very expensive to create and maintain.
The United States military currently has the world's best SSA network,
but it still has significant limitations as a result of the lack of
coverage in areas where the United States does not have a presence.
Additionally, from an organizational perspective, this network does not
currently have the financial resources, capacity or requirement to
provide the necessary SSA data and resources for civil and commercial
purposes globally Upgrades to this network are planned and underway by
the U.S. military but are subject to fiscal constraints that may cause
delays or reductions in desired capabilities.
The United States is not alone in its capacity to provide SSA data.
Many other States possess a limited SSA capability, usually not more
than a few radar or optical telescopes. Taken separately, these sensors
only provide spot coverage and very limited capacity. However, if the
data from these existing sensors were combined, they would provide a
large fraction of the capabilities necessary for global coverage. Thus,
some level of international data sharing would increase SSA capacity
without the expense of building additional sensors.
In addition to global sensor coverage, space situational awareness
must include data from commercial satellite owner-operators, as they
have positional data on their satellites that is more accurate than any
ground-based sensor could obtain. These commercial operators have very
precise information about the locations of their own satellites, but
little to no information about other satellites, dead satellites and
other pieces of debris that float through their slots. Their positional
data complements the ground-based tracking of debris and also reduces
the workload requirements for the tracking networks, freeing up
capacity to focus on inactive satellites and debris.
Concluding Thoughts and Summary of Key Points
Secure World Foundation's main goal is to improve SSA for all space
actors as a matter of safety and long-term sustainability of outer
space activities for all actors. In this regard, we do not necessarily
support any specific means of accomplishing this goal over another.
Nevertheless, Secure World Foundation believes that the long-term
sustainability of outer space activities will in time require a broad
international approach to space situational awareness.
To sum up our key points:
SSA is vital to the continued long term use and
sustainability of Earth orbit
There are civil and commercial requirements and uses
for SSA data, the U.S. military currently does not have the
resources to provide this service
An SSA system needs to combine multiple data sources,
including ground and space-based sensors, satellite owner-
operators, and space weather data
While some elements of the SSA system can and should
be done unilaterally, there are multiple options for
international participation and engagement
The key benefit to international participation in SSA
is greater capability for relatively low cost, by combining
existing sensors and data sources
About Secure World Foundation
Secure World Foundation (SWF) is headquartered in Superior,
Colorado, with offices in Washington, D.C. and Vienna, Austria. SWF is
a private operating foundation dedicated to the secure and sustainable
use of space for the benefit of Earth and all its peoples.
SWF engages with academics, policy-makers, scientists and advocates
in the space and international affairs communities to support steps
that strengthen global space security. It promotes the development of
cooperative and effective use of space for the protection of Earth's
environment and human security.
The Foundation acts as a research body, convener and facilitator to
advocate for key space security and other space related topics and to
examine their influence on governance and international development.