[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
INTERNATIONAL PIRACY ON THE HIGH SEAS
=======================================================================
(111-6)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 4, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman
NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, JOHN L. MICA, Florida
Vice Chair DON YOUNG, Alaska
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
Columbia VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
JERROLD NADLER, New York FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
CORRINE BROWN, Florida JERRY MORAN, Kansas
BOB FILNER, California GARY G. MILLER, California
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi Carolina
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa SAM GRAVES, Missouri
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
RICK LARSEN, Washington SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts Virginia
TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California CONNIE MACK, Florida
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio
JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
HEATH SHULER, North Carolina VERN BUCHANAN, Florida
MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania ANH ``JOSEPH'' CAO, Louisiana
JOHN J. HALL, New York AARON SCHOCK, Illinois
STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin PETE OLSON, Texas
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
PHIL HARE, Illinois
JOHN A. BOCCIERI, Ohio
MARK H. SCHAUER, Michigan
BETSY MARKEY, Colorado
PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York
THOMAS S. P. PERRIELLO, Virginia
DINA TITUS, Nevada
HARRY TEAGUE, New Mexico
(ii)
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Chairman
CORRINE BROWN, Florida FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
RICK LARSEN, Washington DON YOUNG, Alaska
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin PETE OLSON, Texas
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York
LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
(Ex Officio)
(iii)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ vi
TESTIMONY
Baumgartner, Rear Admiral William D., Judge Advocate General,
United States Coast Guard...................................... 6
Branch, Rear Admiral Ted, United States Navy, Director of
Information, Plans, and Security, Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations..................................................... 6
Caponiti, James, Acting Administrator, Maritime Administration... 6
Chalk, Peter, Senior Political Analyst, Rand Corporation......... 24
Davies, Captain Phil M., Director, Oil Companies International
Marine Forum................................................... 24
Noakes, Giles, Chief Maritime Security Officer, Baltic
International Maritime Council................................. 24
Swift, Dr. Peter, Managing Director, Intertanko.................. 24
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., of Maryland............................ 35
Linder, Hon. John, of Georgia.................................... 50
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Baumgartner, Rear Admiral William D.............................. 53
Branch, Rear Admiral Ted......................................... 61
Caponiti, James.................................................. 66
Chalk, Peter..................................................... 78
Davies, Captain Phil M........................................... 86
Noakes, Giles.................................................... 145
Swift, Dr. Peter................................................. 150
ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD
World Shipping Council, Christopher Koch, President and CEO,
written statement.............................................. 156
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HEARING ON INTERNATIONAL PIRACY ON THE HIGH SEAS
----------
Wednesday, February 4, 2009
House of Representatives,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:01 p.m., in
Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elijah E.
Cummings [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Mr. Cummings. This hearing will come to order.
Before we begin, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Pete
Olson of Texas may sit with the Subcommittee today and
participate in this hearing. Mr. Olson has already been
assigned to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
and is to be assigned to the Subcommittee, but his Committee
assignments have not yet been formalized. Therefore, without
objection, it is so ordered.
I also welcome the other new Members of our Subcommittee
who have not gotten here yet, Mr. Kagen and Mr. McMahon on our
side, and Mr. Ehlers and Mr. Platts on the Republican side. I
am very pleased to have them.
Ladies and gentlemen, it is my honor to have been appointed
to a second term as Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Coast
Guard and Maritime Transportation. I know before becoming
Chairman of the Subcommittee the extraordinary work the Coast
Guard performed in the Gulf Coast region in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina. During my tenure I have come to see
firsthand what an amazing service the Coast Guard is and how
vital it is to the defense of our Nation and the safety of our
maritime industry. I also have come to understand how integral
maritime transportation is to the success of our economy.
As I embark on this new term as Chairman, I remain
committed to being the Coast Guard's biggest supporter, as well
as its most constructive critic. I will continue to pursue
every available opportunity to strengthen our Nation's Merchant
Marines and to support the more effective integration of water
into what should be an increasingly multimodal transportation
network in our Nation.
I welcome our new Ranking Member, Congressman Frank
LoBiondo, who previously chaired this Subcommittee with
distinction. I appreciate the expertise he brings to this
position, and I look forward to working closely with him.
I also welcome all of the new and returning Members of the
Subcommittee. We have planned an aggressive and what I trust
will be a productive schedule in the 111th Congress, and I look
forward to working with each of you to ensure the success of
our legislative and oversight efforts.
Today we convene our first hearing in the 111th Congress to
examine the causes of piracy at sea and its effects on global
shipping. The term "pirate" may conjure in many people's minds
romantic images of swashbuckling adventurers. However, in
reality, a 21st century pirate is frequently a desperately poor
individual from an unstable or failing state roaming the ocean
in a small skiff waiting to attack vulnerable cargo ships with
a rocket-propelled grenade launcher. There is nothing romantic
about this figure or about the crime of piracy, which threatens
the lives of mariners on innocent passages on the world's
oceans and could have the effect of raising shipping rates at a
time of a deepening economic recession.
Our hearing is intended to provide a comprehensive
examination of piracy, including its prevalence, its current
and potential impact on shipping, and the nature and
effectiveness of the international efforts being implemented to
combat it.
According to the International Maritime Bureau, there were
293 reported pirate attacks against ocean-going vessels in
2008. While pirate attacks occur sporadically in many parts of
the world, piracy is most prevalent in the Horn of Africa
region, with gangs from Somalia seizing vessels and holding
their crews for ransom.
The international community has mounted a multifaceted
response to piracy in this region. The United States is taking
an active role in this effort through its leadership of Task
Force 151. However, given the size of the ocean area the
international forces must control and their limited manpower,
international navy powers are unlikely to be able to protect
every ship passing the Horn of Africa from pirates.
Further, as we will examine, while the first priority of
the international forces active in the Horn of Africa's region
is preventing or intervening in pirate attacks, the question of
what to do with captured pirates is an important and
complicated one, given the absence of the rule of law in
Somalia and the complexity of international legal arrangements
pertaining to crimes at sea.
Efforts are currently under way to increase regional and
international cooperation to support the effective arrest,
detention and prosecution of pirates, And we look forward to
receiving an update on the status of the current and planned
agreements. That said, the piracy occurring at sea off the
coast of Somalia is, frankly, just a symptom of what is a much
greater problem, and that is the violence and instability that
has persisted inside Somalia for more than some 20 years.
Just last week, the Parliament of Somalia, which meets
outside the country, elected a new President, reportedly
another in a series of attempts undertaken by the transitional
government in recent years to form a stable administrative
structure. Frankly, this new administration's first challenge
will be to assert control over the country it was elected to
govern. When Islamist force is advancing, and where multiple
tribal and warlord factions continue to battle for domain over
various regions of the country, the lesson from the Straits of
Malacca, where piracy was a significant threat in the early
part of this decade, indicates that the key to controlling
piracy in the Horn of Africa region will be asserting the rule
of law at sea.
In the case of Somalia, however, the assertion of rule of
law at sea will likely require the establishment of some
semblance of the rule of law on land. To date, fortunately, no
U.S.-flag vessels or U.S. citizens have been attacked by
pirates. However, whenever a critical ocean trading route is
threatened by piracy, all ships passing through in that area
are at risk, and the world's economy, which is critically
dependent on the innocent passage of goods moved by water is
affected.
I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses from the
United States Coast Guard, the United States Navy, the Maritime
Administration and from a variety of maritime associations and
interests. And with that, I again welcome our new Ranking
Member and former Chairman of this Committee, Congressman
LoBiondo, and recognize him for his opening statement.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am very,
very, very honored to be on the Committee and to be serving as
the Ranking Republican in this 111th session of Congress. I
thank you for your leadership in the last session. I look
forward to working with you and Members of this Subcommittee
and Full Committee on both sides of the aisle to address the
needs of the Coast Guard and maritime community at large. I
know that you share my intent to address these issues with
swift enactment of a Coast Guard authorization bill this year.
The Subcommittee is meeting this afternoon to review
conditions that have led to an increase in piracy on the high
seas and combined efforts by the United States and
international community to respond to these attacks and to
prevent future attacks. Piracy is recognized internationally as
a crime against all nations and to which all nations--I
repeat--all nations must respond. Piracy not only disrupts the
safe and efficient movement of maritime commerce, it is a form
of terrorism that cannot be tolerated in any region of the
world.
In recent years we have witnessed a dramatic increase in
the number of attacks on merchant vessels transiting off the
coast of Somalia. In part, this increase is due to the
lawlessness that has resulted from the absence of a functioning
government, Mr. Chairman, as you pointed out. Today armed gangs
are operating with impunity, attracted to piracy by
multimillion-dollar ransoms that continue to be paid out by
vessel ownership groups. I am extremely concerned that the
conditions that are supporting the growth of piracy may be
exploited by other groups intent on carrying out terrorist
attacks here at home and abroad.
The United States has recently committed to place the Navy
and Coast Guard assets in the region to protect vessels in the
area and has invited other nations to join that effort. I
applaud the services for taking action, but I am concerned
about the specifics of how and to what extent U.S. assets and
personnel will be used in the region. I am interested in
learning more about the actions of our servicemen and women and
what they will be undertaking to deter future attacks, the
scenarios under which the U.S. personnel will be used to repel
or apprehend suspected pirates, and the procedures by which
suspects will be prosecuted. I would also like to learn more
about the measures industry can take to best protect themselves
from such attacks.
I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, again for calling this
hearing, and I thank the witnesses for appearing today and look
forward to the testimony in the Subcommittee.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Mr. Baird.
Mr. Baird. I thank the Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I regret I have another meeting to get to,
but I wanted to just put into the record two brief comments.
One, I had the privilege of being briefed in Bahrain very
recently on the efforts being made there, and I think they are
outstanding. But I had a troubling discussion with a young
cadet at the Merchant Marine Academy just a couple of years ago
who was on his annual--the year-long service at sea that the
Merchant Marine cadets do. He shared with me having crewed on a
ship in this region and had a very valuable cargo, and the
defense on board the ship consisted of Gurkhas with knives.
Now, the Gurkhas are fierce fighters, and knives are potent
weapons, but not against an RPG. So I wonder if our witnesses
could comment a little bit about the onboard defense
capabilities of these ships, and especially if the ships are
transporting U.S.-made goods, and even more importantly if they
are transporting U.S. military supplies.
The young man I was speaking to, if I remember the
conversation correctly, implied that the boat was laden with
U.S. military goods heading up to our military operations, and
that was of particular concern. But even if it were not
military, just valuable commercial supplies protected by
Gurkhas with knives in a dangerous area is not sound policy. I
would welcome comments. I will be unavailable to hear those,
but if you could offer it in the record or later in your
testimony, I would appreciate it. And I thank the gentlemen.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Coble.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And not unlike the
Ranking Member, I thank you for having called this hearing.
I will be very brief with my opening statement. It is my
belief, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, that these ruthless
acts of piracy must be addressed and resolved because it poses
a threat to maritime around the world. And as the Ranking
Member indicated, piracy is indeed a form of terrorism. So I
look forward to hearing the testimony today.
Thank you again for calling the hearing.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
calling today's hearing.
Piracy off of Somalia has recently emerged as a serious and
growing threat to shipping. In 2008, as we heard, pirate
attacks off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden have more
than doubled. Although piracy has been a threat to seafaring
nations for thousands of years, the emergence of aggressive and
persistent attacks off the Horn of Africa is especially
concerning.
The gulf here is a critical shipping corridor. Between 16-
and 20,000 ships transit it annually, including 12 percent of
the world's petroleum shipments. The rise of piracy in the
region puts mariners in danger and poses an economic burden to
shipping companies. In fact, according to a Chatham House
report, insurance premiums for ships traveling through the gulf
have risen tenfold in 2008.
Several factors have contributed to the frequency of pirate
attacks. A larger number of high-value targets passing through
the gulf, global proliferation of small arms trade, and most
significantly, as we have heard, persistent civil violence and
lawlessness in the country of Somalia.
Any comprehensive international approach at combating
piracy must address the current political situation in Somalia.
The international community has recently stepped up efforts to
combat piracy here. Combined Task Force 151 and Operation
Atlanta have begun to patrol the area and provide protection to
ships traveling through the gulf. The International Maritime
Bureau's Piracy Reporting Center and MARAD have helped inform
the maritime community about piracy and implement best
practices for ships to evade and defend themselves from pirate
attacks, and I look forward to hearing about those efforts.
But when it comes to piracy in the 21st century, there is
no X that marks the spot to point us in the right direction,
but there are several ways the U.S. policymakers can undertake
to help combat piracy: by encouraging the commercial maritime
industry to adopt best practices; make greater use of defense
technologies; help states in pirate-prone areas boost their
coastal monitoring interdiction capabilities; and finally,
provide resources to MARAD so they can continue to advise the
industry on how to strengthen their own security.
So, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you again for holding
this hearing. I look forward to discussing with our witnesses
how the IMB and shipping companies can increase security and
decrease opportunities for piracy, as well as the role that
MARAD and the Coast Guard and our Navy are playing to help the
maritime community navigate this serious issue.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Larsen.
Before we hear the testimony of our first panel, I just
want to recognize former Congresswoman Beverly Byron for
joining us today. I want to thank you, Congresswoman, for being
with us. I want to thank you for your service and all of the
things you have done with regard to transportation and the
issues that we confront. And thank you very much for being
here. And I thank you also for sharing the fact that we both
are from Maryland.
We will now hear from our panel. Rear Admiral William D.
Baumgartner is the Judge Advocate General of the United States
Coast Guard. Rear Admiral Ted Branch is the Director of
Information, Plans and Security in the Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations. And James Caponiti--am I close?
Mr. Caponiti. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. Caponiti is the Acting Administrator of the
Maritime Administration.
Rear Admiral William J. Baumgartner.
TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. BAUMGARTNER, JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD; REAR ADMIRAL TED
BRANCH, UNITED STATES NAVY, DIRECTOR OF INFORMATION, PLANS, AND
SECURITY, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS; AND JAMES
CAPONITI, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, MARITIME ADMINISTRATION
Admiral Baumgartner. Mr. Chairman, Representative LoBiondo
and distinguished Members of this Subcommittee, good afternoon,
and thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to
discuss piracy and the Coast Guard's role in addressing this
threat to freedom of navigation, the safety of international
shipping and the lives of those seafarers who are so crucial to
our international economy. I ask that my written statement be
included in the record.
Piracy is one of the oldest universal crimes. Under
international law, every nation has a legal authority to bring
pirates to justice. Such authority, however, does not guarantee
success. Coordinated, international action is essential.
The administration's recently released National Strategy
for Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa acknowledges that
lasting solutions require significant improvements in the
governance, rule of law, security and economic development of
Somalia; however, there are steps that can be taken in the near
term. The national strategy lays out these steps in three lines
of action. The first entails preventative and precautionary
measures to render piracy less attractive; most importantly,
measures to make commercial vessels more difficult for pirates
to attack.
The second focuses on operations to interrupt and terminate
piracy. Towards this end, U.S. Central Command has established
combined Task Force 151 to deter, disrupt and suppress piracy
in this region. Presently, Coast Guard Law Enforcement
Detachment 405 is operating under this combined task force and
is on board the USS San Antonio conducting boardings and
training in the Gulf of Aden.
The third focuses on effective prosecution of pirates.
Specific measures include development of regional antipiracy
agreements; promotion of existing international agreements such
as the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation, or SUA Convention; and the
enhancement of regional partner capabilities to prosecute
pirates. These efforts are well under way.
In January, the United States signed a Memorandum of
Understanding with Kenya under which Kenya will accept custody
of suspects and seize property for either trial in their
country or transfer to another. This agreement builds on
Kenya's past efforts, including the conviction of 10 pirates
captured by the United States Navy in 2006 and the pending
trial of 8 pirates captured by British Navy forces last fall.
The SUA Convention, which I mentioned earlier, has been an
invaluable tool in these efforts.
Just last week at a meeting convened by the International
Maritime Organization in Djibouti, 21 regional nations adopted
an agreement for cooperation in the interdiction, investigation
and prosecution of pirates, as well as the establishment of
regional information and training centers. Although not
eligible to become a party to this agreement, the U.S.
delegation led by the Coast Guard played an important role
supporting this effort.
As the Nation's primary maritime safety and maritime law
enforcement agency, as well as a branch of the Armed Forces,
the Coast Guard has a significant role in responding to piracy.
The Coast Guard leads U.S. antipiracy efforts at the
International Maritime Organization. The Coast Guard
establishes and enforces requirements for vessel security plans
under the Maritime Transportation Security Act and the
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code. These plans
include antipiracy measures. As well, the Coast Guard engages
in international training to enhance the capacity of other
nations to take action against pirates both on their waters and
in their courts. And currently we are engaged with several
nations in the Horn of Africa region doing precisely this.
Significantly, the Coast Guard has just published a revised
Model Maritime Service Code that developing nations may use as
a template to establish the laws and institutions necessary to
counter piracy.
As I conclude, I want to emphasize that piracy is a
multifaceted threat. The response requires a broad array of
legal authorities, operational capabilities, skills and
competencies, as well as the participation of numerous U.S.
Government agencies, international partners and commercial
entities. The Coast Guard has a unique role to play and remains
committed to this effort.
Thank you for the opportunity to address the Committee, and
I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Rear Admiral Ted Branch.
Admiral Branch. Good afternoon, Chairman Cummings and
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. I am happy to have
the opportunity to appear today and discuss the U.S. Navy's
counterpiracy efforts in the vicinity of Somalia.
Somalia is a lawless and largely ungoverned country, with
the shoreline stretching over 1,500 miles, equal to the
distance from Miami to Maine. The primary industry and
livelihood of coastal Somalia has always been fishing, and
Somalis are capable mariners.
During the last year, and especially last summer and fall,
piracy incidents and subsequent ransom payoffs increased
dramatically. The lack of governance, poor economic conditions,
vast coastline and numerous vessels along the coast created a
situation allowing pirates to mix with fishermen, evade
coalition navies, and take merchant vessels hostage with little
or no consequences.
It is estimated that 25,000 ships per year transit the area
in question. And the pirates enjoy complete freedom of movement
both at sea and ashore. Merchant vessels were forced to comply
with boardings by pirates brandishing automatic weapons and
grenade launchers. Compliant vessels and crews were generally
unharmed, and after days or weeks of negotiation, ship owners
paid a ransom to have their ships released.
For the past several years, countries in the region have
largely been unwilling or unable to receive or prosecute
captured pirates, so there was virtually no legal deterrent or
risk to committing piracy. This inability to effectively
investigate and prosecute suspected pirates was the single most
significant impediment to stemming the rising tide of piracy.
Now, due to the diligent efforts of the State Department and
international community, there are enhanced Security Council
resolutions on piracy and agreements in place for detention,
investigation and prosecution of suspected pirates.
Even though no United States ships or seamen have been
pirated, the United States Navy has taken a leadership role in
counterpiracy operations. In response to the increasing
frequency of piracy obviously in 2008, U.S. Naval Forces
Central Command, or NAVCENT, developed and is executing a
counterpiracy plan. This has four main components:
international naval presence, improved defensive measures from
the shipping industry, international legal framework for
resolving piracy cases, and removal of safe havens in Somalia.
NAVCENT began by designating a maritime security patrol
area in the Gulf of Aden where merchant vessels could transit
with a higher probability of encountering naval vessels along
the route. NAVCENT also engaged with the commercial shipping
industry through the International Maritime Organization by
working to help develop best practices for mariners in order to
reduce the risk of being pirated.
NAVCENT coordinated the support and participation of
several navies who have contributed ships to the campaign.
NATO, the European Union and other countries acting
unilaterally have agreed to participate or are already on
station conducting counterpiracy operations near Somalia.
Countries with naval ships who have or are participating in
counterpiracy operations include the United States, United
Kingdom, Germany, France, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Turkey,
Russia, Pakistan, India, Malaysia, China, and Saudi Arabia. The
Republic of Korea and Japan have announced their intention of
sending ships to the region to support this effort.
In January, NAVCENT stood up Combined Task Force 151,
focused on counterpiracy operations and commanded initially by
a United States Navy Rear Admiral. Even with this high level of
cooperation, the ocean area is vast, and both merchant ships
and potential pirated vessels are numerous.
Piracy is not a problem that can be solved with naval force
alone. It is an international crime requiring an international
solution. Efforts by the international community, industry and
NAVCENT are bearing fruit. There are currently more than 20
ships operating in the region, demonstrating international
willingness to provide assets and expend resources to help
solve this problem. Recent failed piracy attempts have been
caused by merchant ships taking evasive action when being fired
upon by pirates. In some cases, these defensive measures
delayed the pirates enough for naval forces to appear and
disrupt the attack. In other cases, the fact that merchant
ships presented a hard target was enough to dissuade the
pirates. In the last 2 months there have only been 5 successful
piracies out of 34 attempts.
With increased coalition naval presence, the merchant
shipping industry taking actions to limit their chances of
being pirated, and local countries such as Kenya agreeing to
detain and try suspected pirates, we are making positive
progress and lowering the level of piracy seen in August
through November off the coast of Somalia. We are pleased by
the positive progress in our counterpiracy efforts. As stated
at the offset, however, piracy is a problem that starts ashore
and requires an international solution. The ultimate solution
is ashore in Somalia, assuring security and stability and
eliminating the conditions that breed pirates.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I want to
thank you for inviting me to appear here today, and I will be
happy to answer your questions.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very, very much.
Mr. James Caponiti, please.
Mr. Caponiti. Good afternoon. And thank you, Mr. Chairman
and Members of the Subcommittee. It is a pleasure for me to be
here today to discuss the serious threat stemming from piracy
on the seas.
The impact of piracy has been very significant. Acts of
piracy threaten freedom of navigation and the flow of commerce
on which all trading nations depend. The recent incidents in
the Gulf of Aden have become very serious, as you outlined,
sir.
The Gulf of Aden links the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez
Canal with the Indian Ocean and is one of the busiest choke
points in the world. The area is operated--many vessels
operating in the area are serving Europe, which also--and also
East Africa, South Asia and the Far East; yet there are U.S.
flagships that serve the area. About one ship a day is in the
region, and many of the ships that are in the region may be
carrying government assistance cargo.
The vessels that are vulnerable are those with--that are
slow-speed vessels or low freeboard, which is the distance from
the water to the deck, and ships such as container ships or
roll-on/roll-off vessels are less vulnerable than tankers or
dry bulk ships.
Throughout 2008, the global piracy situation grew
substantially worse, and, as you said, particularly in the gulf
region area. Currently 10 commercial ships are being held for
ransom with about 200 crew members at risk. Just last week a
German-owned tanker under Bahamas' flag, the Longchamp, was
captured, and that was the third vessel in the month of
January.
Of course, ship owners and operators are negatively
impacted by the threat of piracy with higher costs--higher
costs in their own right, higher insurance premiums and the
threats to crews. The disruption to commerce, of course, is
something that threatens all trading nations.
The U.S. has been a leader in the international action to
combat the current piracy crisis, and the United States
welcomes the U.N. Intervention. The most recent U.N. Security
Council resolution in December 1851 raised the stakes on
necessary means that forces may take to counter piracy. And the
U.N. also created--in January meetings created a Contact Group
on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia for international
cooperation. One of those contact groups is being led by the
United States group, and it is the group that addresses
coordination of the commercial industry with best practices to
protect themselves.
MARAD is perhaps unique among government agencies with
regard to its interest in piracy issues. We are a civilian,
nonregulatory agency with a robust sealift mission which
leverages the assets and human resources of commercial
companies. We are very involved with our own vessels in the
Ready Reserve Force and the OIF and OEF sealift. We are very
involved in maritime education and training with our Federal
academy and assistant State academies, and we have assisted the
IMO in training regimes for security regimes on vessels and in
companies.
We also have cargo preference oversight, and we monitor the
flow of U.S. DOD cargo and aid cargo as it transports on the
oceans of the world. We have been involved in past operations
in the Falklands and then the Red Sea and Libya in providing
information to divert U.S. flagshipping from threats that exist
at sea.
We accompanied the State Department in meetings in late
December and January in the U.N. and have been asked to take
the lead on some issues in collaboration with the industry. We
are very involved with that. We were involved, leading up to
the end of your crises, with many forms in which we invited the
U.S.-flag community and the international community to discuss
means to combat piracy and to cooperate with naval forces. We
continue to meet with the industry to finalize BMPs and share
industry concerns with government agencies.
We have intensified our efforts in the fight against piracy
and will continue to do so throughout 2009 to further improve
coordination between the industry and the various navies
participating in the Gulf of Aden. Combating international
piracy is no small effort, evidenced by its long history. Much
work has already been done, but much remains to be done before
international piracy can be eliminated. MARAD has the unique
and vital role in the development of U.S. antipiracy policy,
and we believe we provide a valuable service to the commercial
industry.
Mr. Chairman, the Department of Transportation and the
Maritime Administration stand ready to assist in any way
possible to address this piracy issue and any other issues that
threaten the national and economic security of the United
States and our allies. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman and
the Members of the Subcommittee, for your leadership in holding
this hearing today, and I will be happy to answer any
questions. Thank you.
Mr. Cummings. I want to thank you all for your testimony. I
just have a few questions, and then we will go to Mr. LoBiondo.
Admiral Baumgartner, the Coast Guard has deployed the Law
Enforcement Detachment, LEDET, 405 on board the U.S. San
Antonio, I think you talked about that, which is a flagship of
Task Force 151. LEDET is serving as a boarding force and
providing training to Navy personnel on law enforcement
matters.
Can you comment on the work that LEDET has performed to
date? For example, how many boardings has it conducted?
Further, I understand that the Coast Guard cutter BOUTWELL has
been deployed to CENTCOM for 3 to 4 months. Will BOUTWELL be
deployed to undertake antipirate missions as part of Task Force
151?
Admiral Baumgartner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, with
the crux of your questions on the exact number of boardings
that LEDET 405 has conducted, I don't have that particular
information. LEDET is working underneath CTF 151. I will be
happy to get that information and provide it for the record.
[Provided subsequent to the hearing: As of February 4,
2009, LEDET 405 has conducted six boardings while assigned to
CTF 151. These boardings were conducted working with Navy's
Visit Board Search and Seize (VBSS) teams.]
I do know that they are conducting extensive training
there. They have specific law enforcement expertise. They are
used to acting in this mode with naval--U.S. naval platforms,
as well as the naval platforms of other services.
The BOUTWELL is, as you mentioned, on its way over to that
theater. It will be working for Central Command. I would
anticipate that Central Command may assign it at some point in
time to CTF 151, and that it might engage in counterpiracy
operations. However, once we turn the asset over to Central
Command, they will decide at any particular point in time what
is the most appropriate mission for the BOUTWELL to conduct. As
I said, I suspect they will be heavily engaged in this once
they get in theater.
Mr. Cummings. As you know, Rear Admiral, one of the things
that I have always been concerned about was the--and this
Committee has expressed concern about with regard to the Coast
Guard, particularly after 9/11--is how we have been--the Coast
Guard has been stretched to take on all kinds of missions and
what have you. And we understand what is happening here, but do
you see that as having significant impact on your operations
here in the United States and with regard to bringing safety
and guarding our coasts and what have you?
Admiral Baumgartner. Sir, the BOUTWELL's deployment is
something that we factor into our regular operations plan and
scheduling. We do have commitments, as one of our Nation's
armed services, to deploy and interact and have
interoperability with the Navy and the rest of the Department
of Defense. So it will not impact our normal scheduled
operations. It is vital for us to continue these types of
deployments to ensure that we bring our unique capabilities,
authorities and perspective to operations such as those in
Central Command.
With regards to your specific question about the impact
upon our marine safety mission, there will be no visible impact
there. The BOUTWELL does engage in submarine safety operations,
but is primarily engaged in law enforcement operations, search
and rescue and those type of things. So I would not see any
negative impact on our Marine safety mission.
As far as the law enforcement detachment is concerned, we
have had a law enforcement detachment over working for CENTCOM
really since we entered that theater back in 2003. And that is,
again, a planned deployment, and that is something that we
factored into our operations.
Mr. Cummings. The question that I think comes up when
people hear about these pirate acts--and I hear this when
people find out in my district that I chair the Coast Guard
Subcommittee, that this is the question they ask. So, wait a
minute, let me make sure I understand this. This is what they
say: So you mean you have got a ship that is carrying millions
upon millions and millions of dollars' worth of goods such as
oil, and some little boat can come up with some folks with some
guns and take over that ship? And the question becomes, does
the Coast Guard recommend that vessels carry armed guards; and
if not, why not; and if so, why so?
Admiral Baumgartner. Yes, sir. With respect to carriage of
armed guards, the U.S. Government does recognize that that is
an option available to a ship owner. We do recognize that that
option has to be thought out very carefully in advance,
particularly--once you bring armed guards and weapons on board
a vessel, you have to make absolutely sure that they are fully
qualified to use those weapons, trained, certified as
appropriate, and so forth. You also need a very well-thought-
out, well-coordinated and rehearsed practice method of using
those weapons. This is not something for crewmen or part-time
security guards or novices to engage in.
Now, the other thing that is essential there is to ensure
that all the other parties that are involved with that ship
transit are aware and are coordinated with what is happening.
For example, there are cargo interests. Some cargos may be
dangerous, may be hazardous. Obviously with liquified natural
gas, oil and so forth, there are significant problems and
dangers, and it may be totally inappropriate to have weapons on
board.
You also have to look at the flag state that is involved.
Frankly, most shipping is not carried on U.S.-flag vessels. I
think everybody is aware of that in this room. So you have to
look at what the flag state law is, and there are significant
concerns there. And armed security guards and crew that use
weapons have to be fully aware and be coordinated with that
flag state.
One other interest that is pretty significant here are
insurance interests, and they will have to be heavily involved
in reviewing any decision that is made.
So to summarize, it is an option that is available, it is a
complex one to use, and needs to be well thought out in
advance.
Mr. Cummings. If a merchant vessel comes under attack by
pirates in international waters, what are the rules of
engagement for the crew members on that vessel?
Admiral Baumgartner. Well, sir, some things may vary from
nation to nation. The flag state law will govern what that crew
is able to do. For the most part, though, that crew will be
able to engage in self-defense and defense of others. So if
they are threatened, and a pirate attack usually threatens
imminent bodily injury or death, under the laws of most
nations, they are entitled to take appropriate proportional
acts in self-defense.
Mr. Cummings. Just one last question. Admiral Branch, an
Islamist faction called al-Shabab is apparently working to
exert some type of control over Somalia. What do we know about
this group and its objectives? Is al-Shabab aligned with al
Qaeda, and if so, how closely? Further, I understand that al-
Shabab has been designated by the State Department as a
terrorist organization. Therefore, I ask what is your
assessment of the nature of the risks that terrorist entities
may begin to use piracy in some way to advance their agendas?
Admiral Branch. Thank you, sir.
My understanding is that al-Shabab is an offshoot of the
Council of the Islamic Courts from previous times in Somalia,
and they are a terrorist organization, according to the United
States Government. Their affiliation with al Qaeda is not a
direct affiliation, but an affiliation of common goals and
purposes as far as we can tell.
Interestingly, al-Shabab is opposed to piracy, demonstrably
opposed to piracy. And, in fact, when they and their fellows
were in charge, piracy decreased markedly in the areas where
they were in control.
The United States Government and Navy and naval
intelligence has looked for a nexus between piracy and
terrorism, and so far we have not found that nexus. In some
respects, it would be an easier problem to tackle if we could
establish that definitively, but we have not been able to.
Mr. Cummings. Why do you say that?
Admiral Branch. Why do I say what?
Mr. Cummings. What you just said. You said----
Admiral Branch. It would be a different problem to handle?
Mr. Cummings. You said it would be an easier problem to
handle.
Admiral Branch. I probably should have said a different
problem to handle, because we have very clear--I mean, we have
been engaged in the war on terror now for some number of years,
and we are pursuing that stridently wherever we find it. We
haven't found that nexus to terrorists. These are criminals in
the eyes of the United States Government as opposed to
terrorists, so we have to treat them as criminals with the
authorities that are ensued there.
Mr. Cummings. What does the ability of a relatively
unsophisticated individual in very small boats to quickly
commandeer large ocean-going vessels say about our ability to
prevent terror threats from small boats at sea? I mean, what
does that say?
Admiral Branch. Well, sir, I guess I would respond to that
by saying that piracy doesn't generally happen when grey ships
are there, whether they are U.S. Navy grey ships or others. The
problem we have is covering the area sufficiently to keep the
criminal act of piracy in progress from becoming a hostage
situation. Once the pirates are aboard and have taken over the
ship, now it is a hostage situation and not--again, the things
that we can do--our limitations are different. We have to have
permission.
For example, if we were to try to do some kind of hostage
takedown, that is a whole other ballgame than preventing an act
of piracy in progress, because you have the nation, the flag
state, the owning entity, the hostages themselves, the crew
member, the masters involved, the cargo owner is involved, and
you risk certain--you certainly increase the risk to the crew
members in that kind of takedown. Therefore, there hasn't been
any appetite to do those kinds of hostage takedowns once the
ships were captured.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. LoBiondo.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
If you would, Admiral, help me walk through--there is a
ship, a tanker, whatever the ship may be, and it is off the
coast, and they realize that there is some action starting
against them. That would typically be a small boat coming at
them. How do they communicate with the ship they are trying to
take over?
Admiral Branch. What we have seen in the past--it varies.
Merchant shipping has an alert watch which we endorse, an alert
watching capability that has a lookout that can see these ships
on the horizon and sees these small boats out there coming in a
threatening manner, should be alerted. That watch organization
should alert those ships. The ships that have an active
defensive capability or plan will begin to speed up, will begin
taking evasive action. Many of these ships that have
successfully evaded have passive defensive measures which can
be as simple as raising the accommodation ladders and the means
to get on the ship, or having fire hoses energized and going
over the side to help knock down anyone trying to gain access
to the ship. There has even been some cases of barbed wire,
razor wire on access points if the pirates try to climb up.
That would inhibit their activities.
So the ships, if they see the pirates coming, they can take
these evasive actions if they choose to. There have been very
few cases where ships that took evasive action and did not
comply with the pirates that have been actually pirated. In
most cases, those ships, the pirates decide it is too hard, and
they go somewhere else. And it was already mentioned in
testimony, I think over here, that the ships with the high
freeboard distance from the water to the rail and they can go
faster than about 18 knots or so are not impervious, but have a
very low chance of being pirated just because it is a tough
task to hook a boarding ladder up against the side of the ship
and climb up onto the ship from these small boats.
So the ships that have evasive plans, defensive measures in
place do present a very hard target. And that does two things
for us. It might just dissuade the pirates, or it might give us
time if we have a ship in the neighborhood to get the ship or a
helicopter in the area to have the pirates cease their attack.
Mr. LoBiondo. So it is up to each individual ship owner as
to what policy they have?
Admiral Branch. For a large part, yes, sir. There are
procedures in place in the military Sealift Command and for
government charters that have standardized approaches. The
training was mentioned, the training programs that--MARAD
professors are very good. We certainly endorse those training
proposals to enable the shipping industry to help in their own
defense.
Mr. LoBiondo. So let us say a ship is at watch, and they
see something coming up. I mean, typically what does that give
them, a half hour, an hour notice or warning?
Admiral Branch. We have about 15 minutes to react and to
interdict the piracy.
Mr. LoBiondo. So 15 minutes now. Is there a standardized
procedure or attempt to standardize procedure where the ship
would contact who to let them know that they believe they are
under attack?
Admiral Branch. Yes, sir. The coordination centers. The
ships can call the coordination centers. There is one in
Bahrain. There is one also in Djibouti. Sometimes they call all
the way back to London. But they have phones on ships now. They
can call, make those phone calls back to the coordination
centers and IMO centers.
Mr. LoBiondo. So the coordination center makes a
determination of who is closest to----
Admiral Branch. No, sir. It is not a commanding drill. That
is just spreading the word that there is a ship in danger.
Mr. LoBiondo. How does help get----
Admiral Branch. They also will go out typically on
registered British radio. It is a VHF radio, relatively short
range. So people that hear that call may well be in a position
where they can try to react, especially if there is an aircraft
airborne already to try to venture into that area.
Mr. LoBiondo. Is that military people you are talking
about?
Admiral Branch. I am talking about military people.
Mr. LoBiondo. So whatever military people might be in the
area that hear that SOS?
Admiral Branch. Yes, sir. And CTF 151 has coordinated where
these assets that are under their direction should best be
positioned to try to spread out the coverage, if you will, with
the ships that are there on national tasking or the ships that
are there under other authorities, to try to get as much of the
coverage of the grey holes that we can out in that area. And it
is all about response time in preventing the piracy from
happening. Once the pirates are on board the ship, there is not
a lot we can do then because now we have a hostage situation.
Mr. LoBiondo. Just one last question. Let us say that the
SOS goes out, and somebody is in close proximity, some military
asset is in close proximity. What do they then have the
authority to do to the pirates?
Admiral Branch. They have the authority to thwart the
pirates' attack.
Mr. LoBiondo. What does that mean?
Admiral Branch. That means to stop it.
Mr. LoBiondo. By force?
Admiral Branch. Yes, sir. By force.
Mr. LoBiondo. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. I am going to start off with some questions for
Admiral Branch. How many countries are involved with CJTF 151?
Admiral Branch. Right now the only countries that have
ships involved are the United States and the United Kingdom.
Mr. Larsen. And how many ships is that?
Admiral Branch. Five.
Mr. Larsen. And we have four?
Admiral Larsen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Larsen. We have four of those, and the U.K. has one.
But there are any number of other countries with ships as well?
Admiral Branch. Yes, sir.
Mr. Larsen. We are coordinating with those other countries,
but we are not coordinating the actions of those other
countries; is that right?
Admiral Branch. We are coordinating with those other
countries, but we are not--the countries that are there on
national tasking, we are not commanding those ships. It is a
coordination effort, but not a command relationship.
Mr. Larsen. There is a separate NATO task force or a
separate EU task force replacing the NATO task force?
Admiral Branch. Yes, sir. There is an EU task force on the
scene conducting counterpiracy operations, and they are being
commanded by a British one-star out of Northwood. There also
have been some NATO ships in the area, not presently engaged,
and then various ships on national tasking. The Chinese are
there. The Russians are there. And there are other ships that
are out there on their own national order.
Mr. Larsen. For the Chinese, this is their first major
overseas deployment since 1421, I think. Have we been
coordinating with them? And how do we communicate and
coordinate with them?
Admiral Branch. We have been communicating with them as
navies do, as a matter of deconfliction and safety of
navigation and whatnot. And we have been coordinating--
coordinating is probably too strong a word. We have been
communicating with them on e-mail actually to help ease the
language barrier, and that communication typically consists of
where they are, and what they are observing, and where they
intend to move and patrol that day. And we will adjust
accordingly to take advantage of that presence.
Mr. Larsen. I am not going to leave the other two out, but
just a few more. At what point for the U.S. Navy would we move
from a deterrence to a kinetic action for the Navy, in this
circumstance, in a piracy circumstance?
Admiral Branch. With the standup of CTF--Combined Task
Force 151, the orders are flowing that will initiate the second
phase of that operation. The first phase is really just the
standup of the organization and getting the position, getting
ready to run.
The second phase will be a situation where we go out more
actively and look for suspected pirates and apprehend them. The
long pole or the impediment to that has been up until now lack
of any reasonable disposition means. But now that we have an
agreement with Kenya, we have something that we can do with
these apprehended pirate suspects. We will be able to go out
and arrest them for being pirates and take them in, gather the
evidence, and take them to----
Mr. Larsen. So we have a place to put them, and presumably
the Kenyan justice system would then prosecute?
Admiral Branch. Right.
Mr. Larsen. Presumably.
One more question about the Navy. I will try to be quick
about this. This is the how much and how long--the thought of
putting U.S. Navy destroyers against Somalian fishing boats for
a certain amount of time seems reasonable, but for a longer
period of time seems to be a stretch of U.S. naval assets given
the other needs in the world. Another way of putting this--I
look forward to the next panel, because I would like to know
how long they are going to depend on the U.S. Cavalry to
protect them when they have things they can do to protect
themselves, and we have many other things that we need to be
doing with our own limited naval assets. Do you have a
direction on how much and how long for the U.S. Navy under 151?
Admiral Branch. No, sir. It is an open-ended construct
right now. There is a lot to do in the Central Command area of
operations, as you mentioned, but the United States Navy also
recognizes it has a piece to play in the solution of this
problem.
Mr. Larsen. Absolutely. I agree that you do. And I know
that the shipping companies do as well.
Mr. Caponiti, just quickly. In conversations with shipping
operators, they have spoken actually very highly of the work
that MARAD has done to help the industry implement best
management practices, especially the antipiracy assessment
teams. Can you give us an idea of this initiative's progress?
Mr. Caponiti. Yes, sir. Thank you.
The initiative is an MSC, military seal of command,
initiative. They are working with the Naval Investigative
Services and also the Justice Department training centers. We
are also assisting them in boarding vessels. This is strictly
voluntary. We have started with U.S.-flag vessels at first. We
think this might extend to the foreign-flag community. There is
a test going on this week at Norfolk with a Ready Reserve Force
vessel, one of the MARAD vessels, and we will then----
Mr. Larsen. Tomorrow, then?
Mr. Caponiti. Yes. And we will be testing with an APL
vessel after that.
Mr. Larsen. Do you expect an after-action report at some
point?
Mr. Caponiti. Yeah. This has been viewed--there are a
number of carriers who indicated that they want to participate
in this. They would like to voluntarily participate, and we
will obviously see how this goes and have more to report on it.
Mr. Larsen. Great. Thank you. I look forward to hearing
back about the progress on that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Coble.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good to have you all with us, gentleman.
Admiral Baumgartner, piracy is both a safety and security
issue in the maritime domain, and the Coast Guard, in my
opinion, seems to be the appropriate agency to lead the
counterpiracy efforts. Is it your belief that the Coast Guard
has the ability to serve in that capacity?
Admiral Baumgartner. Well, sir, as you mentioned, we are
uniquely positioned as a maritime safety agency, as well as a
maritime law enforcement agency, and as an armed force, so we
do have a unique position to play there and a unique role, and
we are able to bring different perspectives and different
capacities to bear.
We also have a long history of working with the
International Maritime Organization on piracy issues, including
circulars on antipiracy measures, and the International Ship
and Port Facility Code, and the antipiracy measures that are
contained in each ship's security plan.
As far as the Coast Guard leading the efforts, part of this
is a matter of capacity and where our ships and assets are at.
As far as the Horn of Africa is concerned, we obviously don't
have the ships to put over there, so that makes it very
difficult. We are not in a position to take an operational lead
in this particular fight. We are involved as--in cases as
pirates are apprehended. If they are apprehended by U.S. naval
forces, we are part of something called the motor or maritime
operational threat response process. That is a process where
all U.S. agencies that have expertise or authority in an area
collaborate to figure out how best to work together to address
a particular case. So we might be involved in consulting, or
providing investigators, or helping preserve evidence, or
things along those lines.
Mr. Coble. And, Admiral Branch, I didn't intend to cut the
Navy adrift with my question to that end.
Admiral Baumgartner, let me follow up with this. What can
the shipping industry and/or the maritime industry do to combat
piracy? In other words, are there any voluntary activities that
the industry can take to reduce the probability of acts of
piracy?
Admiral Baumgartner. Yes. There are several. And, in fact,
I think, as has been mentioned already, the industry is doing
quite a bit to work on best management practices. And, in fact,
I just yesterday got something that the Oil Companies
International Maritime Forum produced, and they will be on your
second panel, and I am sure they would love to talk about it.
But I think they just put out 27,000 of these booklets on
effective antipiracy measures. Some of them have already been
mentioned here, and preparedness is one of the most important
ones.
All of the vessels that are transiting that area are
supposed to have or do have vessel security plans. They have
annexes in those plans on how to deal with piracy and other
similar threats. Practicing those plans and reviewing those
plans and ensuring you are ready when you transit that area is
probably the most important thing.
Speed has already been mentioned here; appropriate erratic
maneuvers to make sure that the people from the small pirate
skiff can't climb easily aboard your vessel. Admiral Branch
talked about some of those as well, fire hoses, other things
that make it difficult to draw out the length of the attack so
that perhaps a warship or a helicopter or something can get
there. Those are all very important measures and steps that
industry can take. And I think one of the things is not to
stop. The vessels that continue to keep up speed, continue to
maneuver and buy time for help wear the pirates down, and that
is one of the most effective measures that can be taken.
Mr. Coble. Let me get to Admiral Branch and Mr. Caponiti.
Is there a solution to the problem, or do you have suggestions
that are ongoing now that would work toward reducing these
ruthless acts?
Admiral Branch. Sir, as you say, the long-term solution is
to make the conditions such as in Somalia or wherever the
pirates come from, that they are not inclined to go into that
business. We have to make it unprofitable for them and
uncomfortable for them to do this. And we can make it
uncomfortable in a number of ways, by arresting them when they
are out there in their skiffs with rocket-propelled grenades
and guns and ladders and sending them to jail. We can make it
uncomfortable for them by defeating their attacks, or we can
make it uncomfortable for them by being just too damn
frustrating to get aboard the fourth or fifth ship they try
when that ship is exercising active and passive defensive
measures.
Mr. Coble. Get their attention, in other words?
Admiral Branch. Yes, sir. Unless we can make it
unprofitable and uncomfortable, I think we will be in this
business in Somalia for a while.
Mr. Coble. I thank you, sir.
Yes, sir.
Mr. Caponiti. Sir, may I add, we believe the best
management practices that have been adopted by the industry on
a large scale have made a difference. There are a number of
them out there. We are consolidating those to provide to
nations that are willing to listen.
One other thing. One thing that we could do as a
government, that we could do in Congress, is to encourage our
Senate colleagues to adopt the Law of the Sea Convention. There
are some provisions in there that would help us to enforce the
laws of the sea and to bring them--to bring the bad guys to
prosecution. So that is one thing that this Nation could do to
assist the situation.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, gentlemen.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Ms. Richardson.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome back.
It is good to be back on the Committee.
My first question is for Rear Admiral Branch. Recently in
the news there has been great talk about both Russia and China
taking part in anti-piracy activity around the Horn of Africa.
How active has their participation been in the anti-piracy
activity?
Admiral Branch. Both the Russians and the Chinese have
established a presence in the Gulf of Aden primarily, and they
are actively engaged in helping deter piracy in the vicinity of
their forces. The Chinese primarily are concerned with Chinese
flag and Hong Kong flag vessels as they go through. The
Russians, I am not sure if the Russians are focusing there or
if it is--I could get back to you on the record to say who they
have been most closely coordinating with. But in any case, the
presence of those great hulls is a deterrent to piracy where
they are, and if they are in one particular area, we can put
the other assets that we coordinate in control and others to
spread out the wealth of the naval assets and make the problem
harder for the pirates.
Ms. Richardson. Are you working in coordination with them?
Admiral Branch. We are communicating with them. Again,
"coordination" is probably too strong a word for both of those
entities. But as mariners do at sea, we communicate generally
for safety navigation and to determine intentions. And in this
case we have done that kind of communications to establish
their areas of operations and their focus, and then we can--for
the forces we do command or coordinate, we can spread those out
to cover more area.
Ms. Richardson. Would you choose to coordinate more or is
the communication sufficient at this time?
Admiral Branch. We will communicate and leverage the
channels of communication we have to the best advantage as we
can.
Ms. Richardson. And, Admiral, you mentioned that we are not
the operating lead at the Horn of Africa. Is there anything
that we should do to change that or is it sufficient as it
exists?
Admiral Baumgartner. My comments were meaning that the
Coast Guard itself as an agency can't be leading the efforts
there simply because we don't have the platforms there. Now,
with Combined Task Force 151, as Admiral Branch has talked
about, we do have very much a leading role on the water in that
area, and as that task force ramps up I suspect that role will
only increase.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you very much.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Mr. McMahon, and welcome to the Committee.
Mr. McMahon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Cummings, it
is indeed privilege and an honor to be here, and I look forward
to working with you, sir. As a new Member, I am excited to join
this Subcommittee, and I thank you and these witnesses for
focusing on this important issue of international policy.
I know that much ground has been covered, and you mentioned
this a little bit, but I also serve on the Foreign Affairs
Committee, and just what we can do in Congress and what we can
do with that Committee in terms of the international mechanisms
to deal with this problem, whether it is the United Nations or
the different treaties that you mentioned that we as a NATION
can pursue on that front to deal with this very important
problem.
I leave it to you to choose.
Admiral Baumgartner. I will say a few words on that
account. We have been, as the Coast Guard, as a law enforcement
agency and working with these types of counterparts in other
countries been involved in this for quite some time. In terms
of what the Congress can do here, as Mr. Caponiti said, one
important thing is encourage your counterparts in the Senate to
act on the Law of the Sea Convention. That will help us
immensely as we go about negotiating additional agreements and
working in additional international forums. The Law of the Sea
Convention is really the constitution of the oceans in terms of
international law. It always makes our job more difficult when
we go to negotiate anything, it makes it more difficult because
we are not a party to that particular convention. It is a
always an obstacle, something we have to address. That is
probably the number one thing.
The other international mechanisms, they are out there.
Piracy is a universal crime well-explained in international
law. The SUA Convention provides good mechanisms for
cooperation, for prosecution or extradition of pirates and
similar criminals. We have been engaged in lots of efforts to
get other nations used to the idea of using these tools and
used to the idea of trusting in these authorities.
As we have seen with Kenya, Kenya has made good steps
forward. Last week there was a regional agreement in Djibouti
where 21 nations agreed to use these tools to investigate,
interdict, and prosecute piracy. So many of these things are
moving forward already.
From a parochial point of view, the Coast Guard, as the
Chairman knows, we would benefit greatly from an authorization
in the act that would allow us to proceed with our
modernization efforts. One of the key things in our
modernization efforts is establishing a Coast Guard operations
command so that we would have a very strong, operationally
focused--worldwide operationally focused command that can
ensure that we are making the most of all of our capabilities
and capacities addressing these kinds of threats.
Mr. McMahon. Thank you, Rear Admiral. And I look forward to
working with all of you, but in particular with you because, as
you know, I have in my district the Coast Guard base in Staten
Island which has the command for New York City and is vital for
our city and for our Nation.
How long has the Law of the Sea Convention been before the
Senate waiting for ratification?
Admiral Baumgartner. Well, I believe it was forwarded in
1995. That was right after the 1994 agreement that solved many
of the flaws with the original convention.
Mr. McMahon. Is there anything that you think would have it
move at this point, or is it eternally stuck there?
Admiral Baumgartner. I have great optimism that it will
move. Even in the last Congress, it was voted out of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee overwhelmingly in favor of
ratification, a good bipartisan vote there. It simply didn't
make it to a floor vote. I already have faith that this Senate
and this Congress will move forward on the Law of the Sea
Convention. We hope that we can see hearings scheduled and we
can see a floor vote.
I know that Secretary of State Clinton did mention this in
her confirmation hearings, the importance of this. So the more
messengers we have on this, the faster it will happen and the
more effective, and all of us here, MARAD, the Navy, the Coast
Guard, the State Department, can be in our international
efforts to combat piracy and other threats.
Mr. McMahon. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chairman, I yield the remainder of my time. Thank you,
sir.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Just one last question of the three of you.
Statistics from the International Maritime Bureau indicate
that there were 293 actual and attempted pirate attacks against
vessels worldwide in 2008, a decline from the 445 actual and
attempted pirate attacks recorded by IMB in 2003.
What likely accounts for the overall decline in piracy
worldwide in the last 5 years, and are attacks actually
decreasing or are fewer attempted attacks being reported or are
both happening?
Mr. Caponiti. The incidents of piracy--Malacca was the hot
spot a number of years ago, and that situation was diminished,
mitigated by really the action that happened on the land. The
two governments, Malaysia and Indonesia, took very strong
action within their territories to stamp out the pirate cells.
That is what cured that and that is really what we need.
We do think that since when the tempo heightened during the
summer this year and the international community began to get
together and talk about this, there was an increase in naval
forces, true. But the international community, the commercial
industry began to get together in forums to talk about this.
There was a lot of discussion about how they could harden the
target and the way they harden the target is through best
practices, basic maneuvers the Admiral spoke about. Before you
go into a region that has a threat of piracy, the crew needs to
be prepared. They need to know what they are going to do before
they get there if there is an attack and what each member of
the crew is going to do. We think those initiatives are paying
off.
You are going to have a panel here in a few minutes that I
think could probably give you a little more detail on that, but
we think that the community uniting the way it has to combat
this has really had an impact. Right now we have some bad
weather out there with the seasons, which may be one of the
reason why things have mitigated. We will know better as the
calendar goes along whether the actions that we have taken
really will have a permanent effect. We suspect we have
improved things.
The other thing, though, the pirates themselves are
adjusting their procedures as we adjust ours. So this
initiative needs to remain interactive. It remains dynamic. We
need to keep our eye on this and react as they react.
Mr. Cummings. Anyone else?
Admiral Baumgartner. Yes, sir. I would add here that there
is an interesting timing coincidence, and I don't think it is
any coincidence at all. You mentioned the statistics for 2003.
In 2004 is when the International Ship and Port Security
Facilities Code went into effect. Here domestically we call it
MTSA, Maritime Transportation Security Act. That introduced
significant vessel security plan requirements, facility and
port security requirements.
One of the important impacts of that is, as Jim Caponiti
said, it hardened vessels as targets for pirates. Now they had
to have organized and approved security plans. At the same time
this made it more difficult to bring stolen cargo or stolen
ships into ports because there were real port facility plans
and requirements in place. I think that is no coincidence at
all. And as Mr. Caponiti said, the regional cooperation in the
Straits of Malacca was key in ensuring there wasn't a landside
safe haven for pirates to take ships while they went about
their business, held their hostages and so forth. And certainly
in Somalia, as we all know, that is the key. There is a
friendly supporting coastline there that supports these
operations, and that is what is the real enabler for piracy off
the Horn of Africa.
Mr. Cummings. All right.
Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Baumgartner, the MOU with Kenya, is it just a U.S.
MOU with Kenya?
Admiral Baumgartner. Yes, sir, it is a bilateral MOU with
Kenya. But the U.K. has a similar MOU and the Djibouti
agreement, the Djibouti Code of Conduct, has many of the very
same provisions in it. That is a volunteer agreement. But that
will spread much of this throughout the region.
Mr. Larsen. So if the French navy captures pirates, they
can use Kenya, or would they?
Admiral Baumgartner. What they would do is under the
Djibouti Code of Conduct they would approach--they could
approach one of the regional countries and say under the terms
of the Djibouti Code of Conduct we would like you to take
custody of the prisoners and the evidence and prosecute the
case.
I would also note that the International Maritime
Organization has had a template for these procedures and
agreements out for a while as well.
Mr. Larsen. All right. That gives me the best answer maybe
you can give me but not as solid an answer as I would like to
hear.
Admiral Baumgartner. Yes, sir. France right now I would----
Mr. Larsen. And I don't mean to pick on the French. Any
other country but the United States that has an MOU with Kenya.
Picking the other countries, I want to be clear I am not
pointing out any one country.
Admiral Baumgartner. The U.K. does have an MOU with Kenya.
I am not aware of any other country that has a direct bilateral
MOU with Kenya at this point in time. They may have them, but I
am not aware of any.
Mr. Larsen. What is your expectation for Kenya once we
deliver people and evidence to the Kenyan justice system?
Admiral Baumgartner. My expectation is that Kenya will
accept those and they will put them right in their criminal
justice system. We already have one positive experience with
them. Ten pirates that we brought to them in the fall of 2006,
they tried them in their courts, convicted them, and they are
serving a 7-year prison term right now. And as we speak there
are eight pirates, if I have got the numbers right--I believe
it is eight pirates that the U.K. captured this fall that are
awaiting trial in Kenyan courts. I think it was scheduled
earlier this month, and I don't know if that trial has actually
started yet or not. I would expect that Kenya would continue
along in that vein and step up to the plate as they have.
Mr. Larsen. Do we have any negative experience, any
experience of turning people over and then no prosecutions
taking place or inadequate prosecutions taking place?
Admiral Baumgartner. I am not aware of that with Kenya.
Mr. Larsen. Any other countries you are aware of that with?
Admiral Baumgartner. I don't think the United States has
had any experience turning over prisoners other than those to
Kenya. It has been a problem in the past where naval forces
have captured prisoners and they haven't found a regional
country willing to take them, and there are significant legal
and logistical challenges. If your home country or the flag
state of the warship is 7,000 miles away, it may make it
extremely challenging to get those prisoners from the Horn of
Africa to your country in a timely manner to satisfy your own
judicial system. So there have been cases where navies just
have not been able to do anything with the pirates because they
can't get another country to accept that particular group.
Mr. Larsen. And what happens to that pirate?
Admiral Baumgartner. I think that in various times they
have been turned loose or they have been turned over to other
quasi-authorities in that area, authorities that we might not
recognize as the United States Government. The end result of
the pirates we really don't know, but I would suspect that----
Mr. Larsen. They might go back to pirating or they might
not make it back to pirating?
Admiral Baumgartner. Yes, sir. I do not expect that they
faced justice in any kind of a system that we would recognize.
Mr. Larsen. Sure. All right.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you. I want to thank the panel for your
excellent testimony. We will probably have some follow-up
questions in writing. But thank you very much.
I want to now call our next panel.
Mr. Peter Chalk is a Senior Political Analyst with the RAND
Corporation. Captain Phil M. Davies is Director of the Oil
Companies International Marine Forum. Mr. Peter Swift is
Managing Director of Intertanko. And Mr. Giles Noakes is Chief
Maritime Security Officer of the Baltic International Maritime
Council.
Mr. Chalk, you will be first.
TESTIMONY OF PETER CHALK, SENIOR POLITICAL ANALYST, RAND
CORPORATION; CAPTAIN PHIL M. DAVIES, DIRECTOR, OIL COMPANIES
INTERNATIONAL MARINE FORUM; DR. PETER SWIFT, MANAGING DIRECTOR,
INTERTANKO; AND GILES NOAKES, CHIEF MARITIME SECURITY OFFICER,
BALTIC INTERNATIONAL MARITIME COUNCIL
Mr. Chalk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee, for the opportunity to testify
before you today.
At the outset I would like to stress one main point. Piracy
is above all an economically driven phenomenon. This is true
both with respect to those who engage in the practice where the
objective is to make profits and those against whom attacks are
frequently directed where the desire to keep operating costs as
low as possible has at times precluded or outweighed
imperatives for instituting more onboard security.
A total of 1,845 actual and attempted attacks of piracy
were recorded around the world's waters between 2003 and 2008.
That figure probably underrepresents the true scale of piracy
because in many cases, possibly as many as 50 percent, attacks
are not reported. Sometimes shipowners do not like to report
attacks for fear that this will increase maritime insurance
premiums as well as result in lengthy and costly post-attack
investigations.
As we have heard, the concentration of piracy is greatest
around the Horn of Africa but other high-risk areas include
Indonesia, Bangladesh, India, Tanzania, and Gulf of Guinea off
West Africa.
Seven main factors would seem to account for the emergence
of piracy today in the scale we are seeing. First has been the
growing trend toward the use of skeleton crews, both as a cost-
cutting device and as a reflection of more advanced maritime
navigation. This has both precluded the option for concerted
anti-piracy watches as well as made the general task of gaining
control of ships that much easier.
Second, the general difficulties associated with personal
surveillance have been compounded by demands that are being
made on many littoral states to enact very expensive
territorially based systems of homeland security in the post-9/
11 era.
Third, lax coastal and portside security have directly
contributed to opportunistic attacks against ships at anchor.
Fourth, corruption and easily compromised systems of
judicial structures have encouraged official complicity in
piracy both with respect to providing intelligence on ship
locations as well as helping with the rapid discharge of
pirated cargos.
Fifth, the endemic anarchic situation in Somalia has
directly contributed to the rash of attacks we have seen off
Horn of Africa.
Sixth, the ready willingness of shipowners to pay
increasingly large sums for the return of their cargos and
vessels has provided an added financial incentive to engage in
maritime crime.
And, finally, the global proliferation of small and light
weapons has provided pirates with an enhanced means to act in a
more lethal and destructive basis than was previously the case.
The dangers associated with piracy are fairly multifaceted.
At the most basic level, attacks constitute a direct threat to
the lives of citizens of a variety of flag states. Piracy also
has a direct economic cost in terms of lost trade, stolen
cargos, and fraudulent trade. It is conservatively estimated
that it costs between $1 and $16 billion a year to the maritime
industry at present.
Politically piracy can also play a key role in undermining
government legitimacy by encouraging corruption. And, finally,
piracy has the potential to trigger a major environmental
catastrophe. The nightmare scenario would be a mid-sea
collision between a pirated vessel that is left to drift and a
heavily laden oil tanker.
As we have heard, the rapid escalation of piracy at the
Horn of Africa has prompted unprecedented international action
on the part of the global community. The United States has
enacted Combined Task Force 151 to monitor predefined maritime
corridors in the Gulf of Aden. That supplements a year-long EU
naval force that was deployed last year. Several other
countries have sent their own navies to the region, and the
U.N. Security Council has now sanctioned the use of force
against pirate dens on land by passing Security Council
Resolution 1851 in December of last year.
Although these initiatives have met with some success,
their overall utility does raise some questions. First, the
area to be monitored is enormous, over 1 million square miles.
There is also the issue of national interests. It is not
apparent how the EU naval flotilla will be funded or whether or
not the potentially thorny issue of cost-sharing is even being
broached.
In addition, questions of legal jurisdiction have yet to be
fully settled and appropriate rules of engagement have still to
be fully fleshed out. Employing force against pirate dens on
land carries the obvious danger of large-scale civilian
collateral damage and associated accusations that the West is
once again intent on destroying Muslim lives.
Finally, the deployment of naval frigates will only be able
to address the piracy problem at its end rather than at its
root on land.
I would like to conclude with five areas I think the
Committee should consider as worthy candidates for directed
further research:
One, what are the costs of piracy and how do these compare
to the expenses required for mitigation?
Two, what is the best way of dealing with piracy in areas
of endemic lawlessness and anarchy where there is no government
with which to engage?
Three, is the current international legal framework for
countering piracy sufficient, or does it need to be changed in
some fashion?
Fourth, what is the extent of government responsibility in
countering piracy and what role should the private sector play
in helping to manage the problem?
And, finally, what are the chief land-based factors that
contribute to modern-day piracy, and how can these best be
addressed?
Again, I thank you for the opportunity to be here today,
and I look forward to answering any questions that you might
have.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you.
Mr. Davies.
Captain Davies. Mr. Chairman, Committee Members, thank you
for your invitation today to address the Committee.
Piracy on the high seas is one of the most critical and
concerning issues facing the maritime community today. OCIMF
firmly believes that the establishment of law and order on the
high seas is an issue for international governments. However,
we also recognize that maritime security and in particular
piracy remains a concern to us all. OCIMF appreciates the
importance of this Committee meeting, particularly in light of
the current situation in the Gulf of Aden, and looks for
further ways industry can work with governments to reduce the
threat of piracy.
OCIMF itself is a voluntary association, having as its
members over 70 of the world's leading oil companies. Our
members engage in activities of mutual concern relating to
transportation of oil and gas by tanker with special reference
to the protection of the marine environment and the promotion
of safety in marine operations. In relation to piracy, OCIMF's
priority is the safety and well-being of our mariners while
adhering to the principle of free movement of trade in
international waters.
We have submitted written testimony, including a copy of
the booklet "Piracy - the East Africa/Somalia Situation,"
published in conjunction with the IMB, Intertanko, Intercargo
and SIGTTO.
My written testimony today covers six key areas related to
current operations in the Gulf of Aden, and this afternoon I
would like to focus on a few of these.
Industry has been engaged in efforts to combat piracy for
some time now and gives full support to the various efforts of
the United Nations bodies, particularly the International
Maritime Organization. In this regard we fully support the U.N.
Resolutions leading to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1851 in
December, 2008. We welcome the establishment of EUNAVFOR,
Combined Task Force 151, and the contributions of NATO. We also
welcome the contributions of other navies in the area and look
upon this as an opportunity for development of new friendships
and cooperation.
In this regard we need to ensure that lines of
communication are kept simple. There is currently a significant
amount of confusion in regard to overall operational control.
Vessels require a single point of contact for assistance,
particularly when under attack. OCIMF supports the continued
utilization of NAVFORUK, which is both an operational
headquarters for EU Naval Force in addition to a key NATO
facility. We also recognize the forward assistance provided by
the U.K. Maritime Trade Organization in Dubai and the United
States Maritime Liaison Office in Bahrain. OCIMF does not
support the establishment of further regional coordination
centers, as it is likely to do little to assist in mitigating
piracy on the high seas.
The shipping industry is engaged on many levels with the
fight on piracy, and this includes a provision of senior
merchant navy officers into the EU Naval Force Headquarters in
Northwood to assist with liaison development of best practices
in relation to operations in the Gulf of Aden. We are also
active, through the International Maritime Organization, with
the Maritime Safety Committee correspondence group reviewing
IMO measures and recommendations to industry.
OCIMF welcomes a contact group established under U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1851 and recognizes the leadership
of the United States in this important approach to resolving
the piracy issue. We look forward to working in partnership
with government and industry to further develop best practices
for deployment against the piracy threat.
The shipping industry estimates that approximately 30
percent of vessels transiting in the Gulf of Aden are still not
adequately prepared. It is hoped that our booklet, which I
mentioned earlier, may assist in educating these vessels and
mariners in basic precautions.
OCIMF fully supports training of mariners in nonlethal
means of avoiding, deterring, and delaying pirates boarding
vessels. However, this training must be completed under
existing international legislation such as the International
Ship and Port Security, ISPS, Code; and the Standards on
Training and Certification of Watchkeepers, the STCW
Convention.
We do not support the use of armed guards or other private
forces in protecting vessels. Oil tankers and LNG ships in
particular do not provide a platform conducive for armed guards
or gunfire. However, the same safety factors and concerns apply
to all vessels. The use of armed guards are likely to lead to
significant increased risk of personal injury, fire, and
explosion, risk of escalation of conflict, particularly as
pirates will assume all vessels are armed and attack tempo will
increase accordingly. We also note the use of armed guards is
not supported by any of the key international organizations.
OCIMF recognizes that in order to remove pirates from the
seas it is important to develop the necessary legal framework
such that authorities may prosecute pirates when captured. A
practical way forward is to establish treaties to allow
prosecution within littoral states to the conflict. Probably
the most suitable place of prosecuting Somalia pirates are
Kenya and Yemen, which are both close to the areas where piracy
occurs. OCIMF supports this approach and the agreements already
entered into as it allows the littoral states who do not have
naval assets to support the anti-piracy efforts through
successful prosecution of pirates.
Equally an important role for industry is to ensure that
evidence is clearly recorded and witnesses as requested are
available to the courts.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you and the Committee for the
opportunity to speak before you today and would be pleased to
answer any further questions.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Swift.
Mr. Swift. Congressman Cummings, distinguished Members,
thank you very much for the invitation to speak to you this
afternoon on this very important issue. Intertanko's members
represent about 80 percent of the world's independent fleet of
oil and chemical tankers.
Piracy on the high seas, as you have already heard, is a
major issue for the United States, for governments, for the
maritime industry, and eventually for the consumer. Piracy in
the strategically important chokepoint in the Gulf of Aden and
off the Somali coast is of particular concern for oil shipments
and my members. The hijacking last November of the Saudi
Arabian Sirius Star carrying more than 2 million barrels of
crude oil to the United States highlighted the reasons for our
concern and our alarm. We are therefore grateful that nations,
and especially the United States, have started to take
appropriate responses to that action.
While governments and many others have legitimate concerns
about these events, I want to assure you all that the prime
concern of our members, and I suspect all other shipowners, is
the safety and welfare of our seafarers, and the concern for
the security of our ships and security of their cargo come
second. But there are other consequences of these attacks which
are of major concern. These include, for example, the
additional costs for insurance and for crews transiting that
area or the extra costs associated with the longer voyages for
ships that opt to re-route around the Cape of Good Hope, costs
that are eventually borne by the consumer.
So what is being done and what else is needed? My members
firmly believe that the establishment of law and order on the
high seas is an issue for governments and not one that industry
can solve. That said, we recognize though that the shipping
industry does have a big part to play in this matter and there
is therefore a shared responsibility between industry and
governments.
On the industry side we are fully committed to the
development and the implementation of the best practices that
have been referred to. To this end we also cooperate with the
International Maritime Organization in reviewing and updating
guidance to owners and to ships. We distribute security
bulletins regularly to our members. We work with our industry
colleagues to provide both generic and specific advice for
transits, and we maintain regular contact with the military
advisers and reporting centers.
We have also seconded some of our staff to the EU Naval
Force Headquarters to enhance two-way communications between
military and commercial operations and to help ensure that
information is routinely and promptly updated. One particular
challenge does remain, and that is that we want to ensure that
all shipping transiting in this region is made fully aware of
those best practices.
We are therefore now focused on methods to promote
awareness, appraising other owners and operators of relevant
facts, the risks involved, and the measures that ships can take
to avoid, deter, or delay pirated attacks. We are focusing
especially on those ships outside the large net of well-
informed and responsible ship operators who are already well-
appraised and well aware. This is because while there continue
to be soft targets or relatively soft targets, the potential
rewards for pirates remain high, and therefore all shipping is
potentially vulnerable and remains at risk.
While industry is doing its best, my members believe that
governments must take the appropriate action to eliminate
pirates in the region. In this regard I believe there are five
main governmental functions that are necessary.
The first is to provide and then maintain sufficient
military assets, both naval and aviation, in the area. Until
recently, these were woefully inadequate, but fortunately with
the establishment of CT 151 and the combined European Naval
Forces, the situation has improved.
The second need is to ensure coordination between those
military assets and to ensure that we make the most effective
use of the resources available. From the ship operator's
standpoint, it is important that there be clarity in the
reporting and communication mechanisms with these forces.
Thirdly, there is a need to ensure single or at least
compatible rules of engagement for those military forces. Each
navy has its own national laws of engagement when confronting
pirates. Ideally they should engage on the same lines;
preferably upon arrival at the scene.
Fourthly, there is a need, as you have heard, to develop
the necessary legal authorities to prosecute pirates when
captured, and the examples given, such as in Kenya, are
particularly welcomed.
Fifthly, there is, of course, the need to develop a long-
term solution to the Somali problem, but I think we all
naturally understand that this will take time.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to reiterate the total
commitment of my members to take the best practical steps to
avoid these attacks and to cooperate fully with governments
operating in the region.
We thank you for the opportunity to address the
Subcommittee.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Mr. Noakes.
Mr. Noakes. Good afternoon, Chairman Cummings, Ranking
Member LoBiondo, and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for
inviting BIMCO, the largest of the shipowners associations, to
testify in front of your Committee.
Last year 14 of the 42 vessels hijacked off the coast of
Somalia were BIMCO members.
Piracy is a global but not a new phenomenon, but has only
really come to the attention of the international community in
the last 6 months or so. My aim now is to summarize briefly my
written statement on what the industry and particularly BIMCO
is doing about piracy and outline those areas of international
piracy that remain of gravest concern to BIMCO. I would like to
focus on three important competing security resources.
Firstly, global security and competing security resources.
In short, BIMCO is concerned that governments and the world's
navies have overlooked the fact that globalization is
fundamentally a bad trade, the physical movement of heavy goods
and commodities by sea. Recent statements, seminars, and in the
press, however, have made it clear that the defense of trade
appears archaic and dated.
The Malacca problem, however, took international efforts
and regional efforts to resolve it to guarantee freedom of the
seas to the global supply chain being challenged by local
pirates. This supply chain is once again being held to ransom
in the Gulf of Aden/Horn of Africa area, a commercial strategic
chokepoint. The cost of navies in order to mitigate the threat
has to be balanced with the implications of the inability to
maintain normal trade and the nations' vital interests. Indeed,
this has been seriously exacerbated only last week by the
declaration of two large container lines that they will now go
around the Cape.
The implications for the Suez Canal and regional economic
stability and the rest of the global economy are significant.
The attack on the capture and of the LPG carrier MV
Longchamp, discussed earlier, in the Gulf of Aden last Thursday
before dawn for the first time confirms that pirates are
resourceful and cunning. By deploying decoys, they led
coalition warships away from natural targets and succeeded in
boarding what is recognized as the most vulnerable type of
vessel, a slow-moving and low freeboard bulker. BIMCO
understands that it is impossible to fund sufficient warships
for navies to run escorted convoys, but it is clear there are
still not enough assets to make the current "area protection
system," so named, to work. It is clearly having an effect and
has continued communication and enhanced information sharing
also, but whilst attacks such as the Longchamp can take place
then more assets will still be needed.
The situation is forcing many in the industry to avoid the
area as it is economically more viable and safer for crews to
say nothing of the security of the hulls themselves. Indeed,
the industry has forecast a severe shortage of officers and
crews over the next decade, and the safety of crews has become
a major industry driver both for recruitment and retention.
Secondly, judicial weaknesses. Arrest and trial of pirates,
as we have heard, is proving difficult as even those nations
providing naval forces have not addressed their national law on
piracy and the necessary legal statutes to arrest and try
pirates. Nations who are committing resources and warships to
counter piracy seemingly fail to see that putting pirates back
ashore is making a laughingstock of them and failing to deter
the pirates from continuing their lucrative trade.
UNCLOS does not explicitly require states to enact
legislation, but it does obligate states to cooperate to the
fullest extent possible in the repression of piracy on the high
seas. Notwithstanding this obligation under UNCLOS to cooperate
to the fullest extent, the vast majority have not implemented
the requirements of SUA1988 signed by 149 nations. For example,
because of this the Danish warship which should be out at sea
deterring pirates is alongside in Bahrain today with five
pirates arrested in the act still onboard. It is waiting for
its government and the Dutch Government to make up their minds
how to hand over the pirates to the Dutch legally for trial.
The Dutch have said they would try them, but 1 month later this
situation has not been resolved.
BIMCO is aware that the U.S. Coast Guard is a strong
advocate of implementing the SUA1988 proposal swiftly, and
BIMCO will support all efforts to see a speedy implementation,
including cognizance within the U.N. Contact Group Working
Group tasked to address jurisdictional issues and by inviting
its members to engage with their national governments.
Thirdly and finally, perceptions and understanding. The
industry, with the International Maritime Organization, has
been at great pains to defend itself against piracy for some
considerable time, as evidenced in the number of actions as
listed in my statement. Over the last 6 months or so, however,
the industry has been continually invited to prove its own
defenses against piracy. You have heard it is working hard to
do so and mainly by the military. These range from best
preparations to using armed guards. The last it resolutely
opposes because of the risks, implications, and dangerous
precedents involved in accepting such measures.
The industry also understands the complications of
coordinating and controlling the vessels from four different
groups, from currently 14 nations with 20 ships soon to be 15
nations and 22 ships. The industry perception, however, is that
whilst this is clearly working and having an effect, it remains
a concern as to whether the capacity of these forces is being
maximized to best effect and indeed whether there are still
enough ships.
BIMCO would also suggest that there is a greater need to
understand the role of IMO as the preeminent maritime body and
the vehicles already exist to examine methods of deterring and
defeating piracy. The ISPS codes, for example, do not
specifically address piracy in name, but by utilizing the ISPS
ship security assessment requirements to address the piracy
threat, much can be achieved. The work of the piracy contact
group that has fallen out of UNSCR 1851 will need to be
coordinated through the IMO where work is already in hand to
revise Maritime Safety Committee Circulars.
In summary, it is accepted that it is naive to defeat
piracy totally. But the volume of successful attacks remains
unacceptable, and there is a requirement for a paradigm change
in how navies and governments view the industry. There is a
requirement for this paradigm change in order to, firstly,
appreciate the importance of shipping and the maintenance of
the global economic system and recognize its vulnerabilities;
secondly, make piracy less attractive by arresting and trying
captured pirates; and finally, to reduce the numbers taken and
held to gain the initiative to break the back of the problem.
Chairman Cummings, Ranking Member LoBiondo, Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you again for the opportunity to testify
today. BIMCO is committed to working tirelessly with our
industry partners and all stakeholders involved in protecting
seafarers and ships from international piracy. I am happy to
take any questions you may have.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much. I want to thank all of
you for your testimony. We have got our last votes for today
coming up. So what we are going to do is sort of abbreviate our
questions and what have you and try to resolve this hearing
before we go to vote. We have three votes.
You all have been so kind to stick around as long as you
have, and we have Members who have to get out of town also.
We are very pleased to have our Chairman of the entire
Transportation Committee, Mr. Oberstar, with us, and I am glad
to recognize him at this time.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to
congratulate you for your initiative in focusing Committee
attention on this issue of piracy and Mr. LoBiondo for
participating. Welcome back to the Coast Guard Subcommittee,
Mr. LoBiondo. You have performed exceptional service in years
past, and we are glad to have you back in this position.
Mr. LoBiondo. It is an honor to be here. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Oberstar. And Chairman Cummings has done extraordinary
service in his first 2 years of our majority in the last
Congress and is continuing in this Congress.
We have to make it clear to the international community
that piracy is a matter of great concern to all seafaring
nations and that it will not be tolerated, will not be taken
lightly, and that mariners should not be in fear of their lives
or their livelihoods as they transit this or any other region.
Piracy, whether it was in the Mediterranean in the early years
of our Nation or in our backyard in the Caribbean during the
time of the Fleu Boustea, the French pirates, is an act or a
series of acts that our government from its inception has not
tolerated and will not tolerate.
There are companies nonetheless that have not taken the
appropriate measures that they can and should take to protect
themselves. We know well oceans cover 80 percent of the globe
surface and navies can't be everywhere. So we have to have
responsible companies that will take charge of their own
destiny, but we have to have our naval fleets and our Coast
Guard authority present where there is high probability of
piracy action. And you can help us by the testimony you have
given, which is very well said.
I stayed up last night and read it, a greater understanding
of piracy, its impact, how it occurs, where it occurs, and what
actions we can take preventively, preemptively, and in the
course of commerce. We thank you very much for your testimony.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chalk, good to see you again. You were in my office a
few weeks back; so I am not going to rehash some of the things
we talked over. But since then we have received more
information on the MOU between the U.S. and Kenya and with
regards to what does a dog do with the car once he catches it.
Answering that question, what are your thoughts about the U.S.-
Kenyan MOU and what is going to be done with pirates who are
captured, and have you made an assessment whether that is going
to be enough of a deterrent effect?
Mr. Chalk. Thank you for that question. I think the MOU
that the United States has signed with Kenya is a positive
development because one of the greatest problems was, as you
said, what do you do with the pirates once you have caught
them? In most cases, though, they were just handed back into
Somalia, which was basically a get-out-of-jail card right
there.
The problem with the Kenyan judicial system if you are
looking at the country as a whole is that there is rampant
corruption and the judicial structure there has been the
recipient of numerous influxes of assistance both from the
United States and from the United Kingdom. And really in terms
of its functioning at this point, although it is a positive
development, I have my own doubts as to how efficient the court
system will be and how clean it will be as well.
So I think that there is still a lot to be worked out in
terms of the actual prosecution of apprehended pirates and
whether or not--I certainly do not see the Kenyan detention
system as being a sufficient deterrent for Somali-based
pirates, particularly given how much they are earning today and
the fact that the MOU really only extends to the United States;
so it doesn't affect other countries.
Mr. Larsen. That is something probably worth exploring for
us in the future.
Mr. Noakes, is that a correct pronunciation?
Mr. Noakes. Yes, sir.
Mr. Larsen. You talked about the capacity of the existing
military assets as well as the numbers. Let us not talk about
whether or not there is enough naval assets, but you mentioned
perhaps a capacity of the existing assets may not be used
fully. That is what I gathered. You probably also heard my
comments in the previous panel. It is sort of the how much, how
long question when we clearly have other needs around the
world. Some are more needy and some are less needy, but
certainly other needs around the world. So can you try to touch
on how much, how long and expand on the capacity of military
assets and how they are being used?
Mr. Noakes. Mr. Larsen, I don't quite understand what you
are getting at. I think my colleagues here would agree we
understand this can't go on forever, and I think all three of
us alluded to the issue of capacity. But the concern I think
that the industry has in general is that you have a commendable
reaction from the international community, and I mentioned the
issue of I think 14 nations, about to become 15 nations with 22
ships. That is a sizable what I used to call command and
control problem, and if that is maximized to its best, then I
suspect in a very short period of time it could achieve a
realistic amount of deterrence on the high seas, particularly
if supported by the other aspects of the judicial additional
weaknesses being resolved to a certain element, and that I
think is the problem. But how long is a piece of string? And
hence why I introduced my brief presentation over the issue of
what is important in terms of globally strategic commerce and
whose nations have those vital interests.
But there is no doubt about it. The revenues of the Suez
Canal have gone down in the last quarter of 2008. They are
going down probably this quarter already and two major box
lines have already opted not just because of the piracy
problem, but that is one of the reasons, as have some of the
Intertanko members, as has the biggest shipping line in the
world Maersk.
So we have to look at it from a holistic and big picture as
well as the nitty-gritty small issues, but equally the industry
is aware it has to help itself, too.
Does that go some way to answer your question?
Mr. Larsen. Yes, somewhat. I would like to do some follow-
up perhaps with you or Mr. Swift, Captain Davies, or your
representatives around here, to chat a little more about this
problem because I think we might try to go to the Seapower
Subcommittee on the Armed Services Committee and chat with our
Navy about this as well in a more complete manner.
Mr. Cummings. Ms. Richardson.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very
brief. Just one question for Captain Davies.
Over the past couple of years there have been armed attacks
at oil installations and tankers around the Nigerian Delta
region. What, if any, measures are being taken to lessen the
likelihood of future attacks which disrupt the flow of global
energy supplies, and how cooperative have the Nigerian
authorities been in helping to tackle this issue?
Captain Davies. Thank you, Ms. Richardson. I think
basically in terms of Nigeria it tends to be much more of an
armed robbery/kidnap situation than a hijacking of vessels.
What we have seen is that the Nigerian navy has tried to
engage. In fact, they are fighting them in two places. They are
fighting in the Delta. They are also trying to protect the oil
fields offshore.
Unfortunately, one of our members suffered an attack a
couple years ago where seven members were taken ashore, and the
psychological effects on the seafarers that were involved are
extreme, and that is one of our big concerns in this. But
certainly Nigeria is trying as hard as it can to protect the
installations, but one of the big problems there is it is
within Nigerian waters. So it tends to be a Nigerian problem
rather than an international problem, as we are seeing in the
Gulf of Aden.
Mr. Cummings. I want to thank you all for being with us.
Sorry we had to shorten this part a bit, but like I said, we
will follow up with you.
We are not going to resolve this situation overnight. One
of the things you have made clear is this is a very, very, very
complex problem and perhaps will require some complex
solutions, but I do believe that we will be able to address it,
and we will. Thank you very much.
This hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:52 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
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