    [House Hearing, 111 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                     INTERNATIONAL PIRACY ON THE HIGH SEAS

    =======================================================================

                                    (111-6)

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                    COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

                                     OF THE

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                       TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                FEBRUARY 4, 2009

                                   __________

                           Printed for the use of the
                 Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

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                 COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

                     JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman

    NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia,   JOHN L. MICA, Florida
    Vice Chair                           DON YOUNG, Alaska
    PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon             THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin
    JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois          HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
    ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of   JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
    Columbia                             VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
    JERROLD NADLER, New York             FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
    CORRINE BROWN, Florida               JERRY MORAN, Kansas
    BOB FILNER, California               GARY G. MILLER, California
    EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas         HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South
    GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi             Carolina
    ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland         TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
    ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California        TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
    LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa             SAM GRAVES, Missouri
    TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania             BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
    BRIAN BAIRD, Washington              JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
    RICK LARSEN, Washington              SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
    MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts    Virginia
    TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York          JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania
    MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine            MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
    RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri              CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
    GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California      CONNIE MACK, Florida
    DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois            LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia
    MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii              JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio
    JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania          CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
    TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota           MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
    HEATH SHULER, North Carolina         VERN BUCHANAN, Florida
    MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York          ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
    HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona           BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky
    CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania  ANH ``JOSEPH'' CAO, Louisiana
    JOHN J. HALL, New York               AARON SCHOCK, Illinois
    STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin               PETE OLSON, Texas
    STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
    LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California
    ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
    SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
    PHIL HARE, Illinois
    JOHN A. BOCCIERI, Ohio
    MARK H. SCHAUER, Michigan
    BETSY MARKEY, Colorado
    PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama
    MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York
    THOMAS S. P. PERRIELLO, Virginia
    DINA TITUS, Nevada
    HARRY TEAGUE, New Mexico

                                      (ii)

            SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

                     ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Chairman

    CORRINE BROWN, Florida               FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
    RICK LARSEN, Washington              DON YOUNG, Alaska
    GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi             HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
    BRIAN BAIRD, Washington              VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
    TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York          TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
    STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin               PETE OLSON, Texas
    MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York
    LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California
    JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
      (Ex Officio)

                                     (iii)

                                    CONTENTS

                                                                       Page

    Summary of Subject Matter........................................    vi

                                   TESTIMONY

    Baumgartner, Rear Admiral William D., Judge Advocate General,
      United States Coast Guard......................................     6
    Branch, Rear Admiral Ted, United States Navy, Director of
      Information, Plans, and Security, Office of the Chief of Naval
      Operations.....................................................     6
    Caponiti, James, Acting Administrator, Maritime Administration...     6
    Chalk, Peter, Senior Political Analyst, Rand Corporation.........    24
    Davies, Captain Phil M., Director, Oil Companies International
      Marine Forum...................................................    24
    Noakes, Giles, Chief Maritime Security Officer, Baltic
      International Maritime Council.................................    24
    Swift, Dr. Peter, Managing Director, Intertanko..................    24

              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., of Maryland............................    35
    Linder, Hon. John, of Georgia....................................    50

                   PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES

    Baumgartner, Rear Admiral William D..............................    53
    Branch, Rear Admiral Ted.........................................    61
    Caponiti, James..................................................    66
    Chalk, Peter.....................................................    78
    Davies, Captain Phil M...........................................    86
    Noakes, Giles....................................................   145
    Swift, Dr. Peter.................................................   150

                            ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD

    World Shipping Council, Christopher Koch, President and CEO,
      written statement..............................................   156
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                HEARING ON INTERNATIONAL PIRACY ON THE HIGH SEAS

                                  ----------

                          Wednesday, February 4, 2009

                      House of Representatives,
        Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
       Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:01 p.m., in
    Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elijah E.
    Cummings [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
        Mr. Cummings. This hearing will come to order.
        Before we begin, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Pete
    Olson of Texas may sit with the Subcommittee today and
    participate in this hearing. Mr. Olson has already been
    assigned to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
    and is to be assigned to the Subcommittee, but his Committee
    assignments have not yet been formalized. Therefore, without
    objection, it is so ordered.
        I also welcome the other new Members of our Subcommittee
    who have not gotten here yet, Mr. Kagen and Mr. McMahon on our
    side, and Mr. Ehlers and Mr. Platts on the Republican side. I
    am very pleased to have them.
        Ladies and gentlemen, it is my honor to have been appointed
    to a second term as Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Coast
    Guard and Maritime Transportation. I know before becoming
    Chairman of the Subcommittee the extraordinary work the Coast
    Guard performed in the Gulf Coast region in the aftermath of
    Hurricane Katrina. During my tenure I have come to see
    firsthand what an amazing service the Coast Guard is and how
    vital it is to the defense of our Nation and the safety of our
    maritime industry. I also have come to understand how integral
    maritime transportation is to the success of our economy.
        As I embark on this new term as Chairman, I remain
    committed to being the Coast Guard's biggest supporter, as well
    as its most constructive critic. I will continue to pursue
    every available opportunity to strengthen our Nation's Merchant
    Marines and to support the more effective integration of water
    into what should be an increasingly multimodal transportation
    network in our Nation.
        I welcome our new Ranking Member, Congressman Frank
    LoBiondo, who previously chaired this Subcommittee with
    distinction. I appreciate the expertise he brings to this
    position, and I look forward to working closely with him.
        I also welcome all of the new and returning Members of the
    Subcommittee. We have planned an aggressive and what I trust
    will be a productive schedule in the 111th Congress, and I look
    forward to working with each of you to ensure the success of
    our legislative and oversight efforts.
        Today we convene our first hearing in the 111th Congress to
    examine the causes of piracy at sea and its effects on global
    shipping. The term "pirate" may conjure in many people's minds
    romantic images of swashbuckling adventurers. However, in
    reality, a 21st century pirate is frequently a desperately poor
    individual from an unstable or failing state roaming the ocean
    in a small skiff waiting to attack vulnerable cargo ships with
    a rocket-propelled grenade launcher. There is nothing romantic
    about this figure or about the crime of piracy, which threatens
    the lives of mariners on innocent passages on the world's
    oceans and could have the effect of raising shipping rates at a
    time of a deepening economic recession.
        Our hearing is intended to provide a comprehensive
    examination of piracy, including its prevalence, its current
    and potential impact on shipping, and the nature and
    effectiveness of the international efforts being implemented to
    combat it.
        According to the International Maritime Bureau, there were
    293 reported pirate attacks against ocean-going vessels in
    2008. While pirate attacks occur sporadically in many parts of
    the world, piracy is most prevalent in the Horn of Africa
    region, with gangs from Somalia seizing vessels and holding
    their crews for ransom.
        The international community has mounted a multifaceted
    response to piracy in this region. The United States is taking
    an active role in this effort through its leadership of Task
    Force 151. However, given the size of the ocean area the
    international forces must control and their limited manpower,
    international navy powers are unlikely to be able to protect
    every ship passing the Horn of Africa from pirates.
        Further, as we will examine, while the first priority of
    the international forces active in the Horn of Africa's region
    is preventing or intervening in pirate attacks, the question of
    what to do with captured pirates is an important and
    complicated one, given the absence of the rule of law in
    Somalia and the complexity of international legal arrangements
    pertaining to crimes at sea.
        Efforts are currently under way to increase regional and
    international cooperation to support the effective arrest,
    detention and prosecution of pirates, And we look forward to
    receiving an update on the status of the current and planned
    agreements. That said, the piracy occurring at sea off the
    coast of Somalia is, frankly, just a symptom of what is a much
    greater problem, and that is the violence and instability that
    has persisted inside Somalia for more than some 20 years.
        Just last week, the Parliament of Somalia, which meets
    outside the country, elected a new President, reportedly
    another in a series of attempts undertaken by the transitional
    government in recent years to form a stable administrative
    structure. Frankly, this new administration's first challenge
    will be to assert control over the country it was elected to
    govern. When Islamist force is advancing, and where multiple
    tribal and warlord factions continue to battle for domain over
    various regions of the country, the lesson from the Straits of
    Malacca, where piracy was a significant threat in the early
    part of this decade, indicates that the key to controlling
    piracy in the Horn of Africa region will be asserting the rule
    of law at sea.
        In the case of Somalia, however, the assertion of rule of
    law at sea will likely require the establishment of some
    semblance of the rule of law on land. To date, fortunately, no
    U.S.-flag vessels or U.S. citizens have been attacked by
    pirates. However, whenever a critical ocean trading route is
    threatened by piracy, all ships passing through in that area
    are at risk, and the world's economy, which is critically
    dependent on the innocent passage of goods moved by water is
    affected.
        I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses from the
    United States Coast Guard, the United States Navy, the Maritime
    Administration and from a variety of maritime associations and
    interests. And with that, I again welcome our new Ranking
    Member and former Chairman of this Committee, Congressman
    LoBiondo, and recognize him for his opening statement.
        Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am very,
    very, very honored to be on the Committee and to be serving as
    the Ranking Republican in this 111th session of Congress. I
    thank you for your leadership in the last session. I look
    forward to working with you and Members of this Subcommittee
    and Full Committee on both sides of the aisle to address the
    needs of the Coast Guard and maritime community at large. I
    know that you share my intent to address these issues with
    swift enactment of a Coast Guard authorization bill this year.
        The Subcommittee is meeting this afternoon to review
    conditions that have led to an increase in piracy on the high
    seas and combined efforts by the United States and
    international community to respond to these attacks and to
    prevent future attacks. Piracy is recognized internationally as
    a crime against all nations and to which all nations--I
    repeat--all nations must respond. Piracy not only disrupts the
    safe and efficient movement of maritime commerce, it is a form
    of terrorism that cannot be tolerated in any region of the
    world.
        In recent years we have witnessed a dramatic increase in
    the number of attacks on merchant vessels transiting off the
    coast of Somalia. In part, this increase is due to the
    lawlessness that has resulted from the absence of a functioning
    government, Mr. Chairman, as you pointed out. Today armed gangs
    are operating with impunity, attracted to piracy by
    multimillion-dollar ransoms that continue to be paid out by
    vessel ownership groups. I am extremely concerned that the
    conditions that are supporting the growth of piracy may be
    exploited by other groups intent on carrying out terrorist
    attacks here at home and abroad.
        The United States has recently committed to place the Navy
    and Coast Guard assets in the region to protect vessels in the
    area and has invited other nations to join that effort. I
    applaud the services for taking action, but I am concerned
    about the specifics of how and to what extent U.S. assets and
    personnel will be used in the region. I am interested in
    learning more about the actions of our servicemen and women and
    what they will be undertaking to deter future attacks, the
    scenarios under which the U.S. personnel will be used to repel
    or apprehend suspected pirates, and the procedures by which
    suspects will be prosecuted. I would also like to learn more
    about the measures industry can take to best protect themselves
    from such attacks.
        I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, again for calling this
    hearing, and I thank the witnesses for appearing today and look
    forward to the testimony in the Subcommittee.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Baird.
        Mr. Baird. I thank the Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, I regret I have another meeting to get to,
    but I wanted to just put into the record two brief comments.
    One, I had the privilege of being briefed in Bahrain very
    recently on the efforts being made there, and I think they are
    outstanding. But I had a troubling discussion with a young
    cadet at the Merchant Marine Academy just a couple of years ago
    who was on his annual--the year-long service at sea that the
    Merchant Marine cadets do. He shared with me having crewed on a
    ship in this region and had a very valuable cargo, and the
    defense on board the ship consisted of Gurkhas with knives.
    Now, the Gurkhas are fierce fighters, and knives are potent
    weapons, but not against an RPG. So I wonder if our witnesses
    could comment a little bit about the onboard defense
    capabilities of these ships, and especially if the ships are
    transporting U.S.-made goods, and even more importantly if they
    are transporting U.S. military supplies.
        The young man I was speaking to, if I remember the
    conversation correctly, implied that the boat was laden with
    U.S. military goods heading up to our military operations, and
    that was of particular concern. But even if it were not
    military, just valuable commercial supplies protected by
    Gurkhas with knives in a dangerous area is not sound policy. I
    would welcome comments. I will be unavailable to hear those,
    but if you could offer it in the record or later in your
    testimony, I would appreciate it. And I thank the gentlemen.
        Mr. Cummings. Mr. Coble.
        Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And not unlike the
    Ranking Member, I thank you for having called this hearing.
        I will be very brief with my opening statement. It is my
    belief, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, that these ruthless
    acts of piracy must be addressed and resolved because it poses
    a threat to maritime around the world. And as the Ranking
    Member indicated, piracy is indeed a form of terrorism. So I
    look forward to hearing the testimony today.
        Thank you again for calling the hearing.
        Mr. Cummings. Mr. Larsen.
        Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
    calling today's hearing.
        Piracy off of Somalia has recently emerged as a serious and
    growing threat to shipping. In 2008, as we heard, pirate
    attacks off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden have more
    than doubled. Although piracy has been a threat to seafaring
    nations for thousands of years, the emergence of aggressive and
    persistent attacks off the Horn of Africa is especially
    concerning.
        The gulf here is a critical shipping corridor. Between 16-
    and 20,000 ships transit it annually, including 12 percent of
    the world's petroleum shipments. The rise of piracy in the
    region puts mariners in danger and poses an economic burden to
    shipping companies. In fact, according to a Chatham House
    report, insurance premiums for ships traveling through the gulf
    have risen tenfold in 2008.
        Several factors have contributed to the frequency of pirate
    attacks. A larger number of high-value targets passing through
    the gulf, global proliferation of small arms trade, and most
    significantly, as we have heard, persistent civil violence and
    lawlessness in the country of Somalia.
        Any comprehensive international approach at combating
    piracy must address the current political situation in Somalia.
    The international community has recently stepped up efforts to
    combat piracy here. Combined Task Force 151 and Operation
    Atlanta have begun to patrol the area and provide protection to
    ships traveling through the gulf. The International Maritime
    Bureau's Piracy Reporting Center and MARAD have helped inform
    the maritime community about piracy and implement best
    practices for ships to evade and defend themselves from pirate
    attacks, and I look forward to hearing about those efforts.
        But when it comes to piracy in the 21st century, there is
    no X that marks the spot to point us in the right direction,
    but there are several ways the U.S. policymakers can undertake
    to help combat piracy: by encouraging the commercial maritime
    industry to adopt best practices; make greater use of defense
    technologies; help states in pirate-prone areas boost their
    coastal monitoring interdiction capabilities; and finally,
    provide resources to MARAD so they can continue to advise the
    industry on how to strengthen their own security.
        So, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you again for holding
    this hearing. I look forward to discussing with our witnesses
    how the IMB and shipping companies can increase security and
    decrease opportunities for piracy, as well as the role that
    MARAD and the Coast Guard and our Navy are playing to help the
    maritime community navigate this serious issue.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Larsen.
        Before we hear the testimony of our first panel, I just
    want to recognize former Congresswoman Beverly Byron for
    joining us today. I want to thank you, Congresswoman, for being
    with us. I want to thank you for your service and all of the
    things you have done with regard to transportation and the
    issues that we confront. And thank you very much for being
    here. And I thank you also for sharing the fact that we both
    are from Maryland.
        We will now hear from our panel. Rear Admiral William D.
    Baumgartner is the Judge Advocate General of the United States
    Coast Guard. Rear Admiral Ted Branch is the Director of
    Information, Plans and Security in the Office of the Chief of
    Naval Operations. And James Caponiti--am I close?
        Mr. Caponiti. Yes.
        Mr. Cummings. Caponiti is the Acting Administrator of the
    Maritime Administration.
        Rear Admiral William J. Baumgartner.

        TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. BAUMGARTNER, JUDGE
     ADVOCATE GENERAL, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD; REAR ADMIRAL TED
    BRANCH, UNITED STATES NAVY, DIRECTOR OF INFORMATION, PLANS, AND
     SECURITY, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS; AND JAMES
        CAPONITI, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

        Admiral Baumgartner. Mr. Chairman, Representative LoBiondo
    and distinguished Members of this Subcommittee, good afternoon,
    and thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to
    discuss piracy and the Coast Guard's role in addressing this
    threat to freedom of navigation, the safety of international
    shipping and the lives of those seafarers who are so crucial to
    our international economy. I ask that my written statement be
    included in the record.
        Piracy is one of the oldest universal crimes. Under
    international law, every nation has a legal authority to bring
    pirates to justice. Such authority, however, does not guarantee
    success. Coordinated, international action is essential.
        The administration's recently released National Strategy
    for Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa acknowledges that
    lasting solutions require significant improvements in the
    governance, rule of law, security and economic development of
    Somalia; however, there are steps that can be taken in the near
    term. The national strategy lays out these steps in three lines
    of action. The first entails preventative and precautionary
    measures to render piracy less attractive; most importantly,
    measures to make commercial vessels more difficult for pirates
    to attack.
        The second focuses on operations to interrupt and terminate
    piracy. Towards this end, U.S. Central Command has established
    combined Task Force 151 to deter, disrupt and suppress piracy
    in this region. Presently, Coast Guard Law Enforcement
    Detachment 405 is operating under this combined task force and
    is on board the USS San Antonio conducting boardings and
    training in the Gulf of Aden.
        The third focuses on effective prosecution of pirates.
    Specific measures include development of regional antipiracy
    agreements; promotion of existing international agreements such
    as the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
    the Safety of Maritime Navigation, or SUA Convention; and the
    enhancement of regional partner capabilities to prosecute
    pirates. These efforts are well under way.
        In January, the United States signed a Memorandum of
    Understanding with Kenya under which Kenya will accept custody
    of suspects and seize property for either trial in their
    country or transfer to another. This agreement builds on
    Kenya's past efforts, including the conviction of 10 pirates
    captured by the United States Navy in 2006 and the pending
    trial of 8 pirates captured by British Navy forces last fall.
    The SUA Convention, which I mentioned earlier, has been an
    invaluable tool in these efforts.
        Just last week at a meeting convened by the International
    Maritime Organization in Djibouti, 21 regional nations adopted
    an agreement for cooperation in the interdiction, investigation
    and prosecution of pirates, as well as the establishment of
    regional information and training centers. Although not
    eligible to become a party to this agreement, the U.S.
    delegation led by the Coast Guard played an important role
    supporting this effort.
        As the Nation's primary maritime safety and maritime law
    enforcement agency, as well as a branch of the Armed Forces,
    the Coast Guard has a significant role in responding to piracy.
    The Coast Guard leads U.S. antipiracy efforts at the
    International Maritime Organization. The Coast Guard
    establishes and enforces requirements for vessel security plans
    under the Maritime Transportation Security Act and the
    International Ship and Port Facility Security Code. These plans
    include antipiracy measures. As well, the Coast Guard engages
    in international training to enhance the capacity of other
    nations to take action against pirates both on their waters and
    in their courts. And currently we are engaged with several
    nations in the Horn of Africa region doing precisely this.
    Significantly, the Coast Guard has just published a revised
    Model Maritime Service Code that developing nations may use as
    a template to establish the laws and institutions necessary to
    counter piracy.
        As I conclude, I want to emphasize that piracy is a
    multifaceted threat. The response requires a broad array of
    legal authorities, operational capabilities, skills and
    competencies, as well as the participation of numerous U.S.
    Government agencies, international partners and commercial
    entities. The Coast Guard has a unique role to play and remains
    committed to this effort.
        Thank you for the opportunity to address the Committee, and
    I look forward to your questions.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
        Rear Admiral Ted Branch.
        Admiral Branch. Good afternoon, Chairman Cummings and
    distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. I am happy to have
    the opportunity to appear today and discuss the U.S. Navy's
    counterpiracy efforts in the vicinity of Somalia.
        Somalia is a lawless and largely ungoverned country, with
    the shoreline stretching over 1,500 miles, equal to the
    distance from Miami to Maine. The primary industry and
    livelihood of coastal Somalia has always been fishing, and
    Somalis are capable mariners.
        During the last year, and especially last summer and fall,
    piracy incidents and subsequent ransom payoffs increased
    dramatically. The lack of governance, poor economic conditions,
    vast coastline and numerous vessels along the coast created a
    situation allowing pirates to mix with fishermen, evade
    coalition navies, and take merchant vessels hostage with little
    or no consequences.
        It is estimated that 25,000 ships per year transit the area
    in question. And the pirates enjoy complete freedom of movement
    both at sea and ashore. Merchant vessels were forced to comply
    with boardings by pirates brandishing automatic weapons and
    grenade launchers. Compliant vessels and crews were generally
    unharmed, and after days or weeks of negotiation, ship owners
    paid a ransom to have their ships released.
        For the past several years, countries in the region have
    largely been unwilling or unable to receive or prosecute
    captured pirates, so there was virtually no legal deterrent or
    risk to committing piracy. This inability to effectively
    investigate and prosecute suspected pirates was the single most
    significant impediment to stemming the rising tide of piracy.
    Now, due to the diligent efforts of the State Department and
    international community, there are enhanced Security Council
    resolutions on piracy and agreements in place for detention,
    investigation and prosecution of suspected pirates.
        Even though no United States ships or seamen have been
    pirated, the United States Navy has taken a leadership role in
    counterpiracy operations. In response to the increasing
    frequency of piracy obviously in 2008, U.S. Naval Forces
    Central Command, or NAVCENT, developed and is executing a
    counterpiracy plan. This has four main components:
    international naval presence, improved defensive measures from
    the shipping industry, international legal framework for
    resolving piracy cases, and removal of safe havens in Somalia.
        NAVCENT began by designating a maritime security patrol
    area in the Gulf of Aden where merchant vessels could transit
    with a higher probability of encountering naval vessels along
    the route. NAVCENT also engaged with the commercial shipping
    industry through the International Maritime Organization by
    working to help develop best practices for mariners in order to
    reduce the risk of being pirated.
        NAVCENT coordinated the support and participation of
    several navies who have contributed ships to the campaign.
    NATO, the European Union and other countries acting
    unilaterally have agreed to participate or are already on
    station conducting counterpiracy operations near Somalia.
    Countries with naval ships who have or are participating in
    counterpiracy operations include the United States, United
    Kingdom, Germany, France, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Turkey,
    Russia, Pakistan, India, Malaysia, China, and Saudi Arabia. The
    Republic of Korea and Japan have announced their intention of
    sending ships to the region to support this effort.
        In January, NAVCENT stood up Combined Task Force 151,
    focused on counterpiracy operations and commanded initially by
    a United States Navy Rear Admiral. Even with this high level of
    cooperation, the ocean area is vast, and both merchant ships
    and potential pirated vessels are numerous.
        Piracy is not a problem that can be solved with naval force
    alone. It is an international crime requiring an international
    solution. Efforts by the international community, industry and
    NAVCENT are bearing fruit. There are currently more than 20
    ships operating in the region, demonstrating international
    willingness to provide assets and expend resources to help
    solve this problem. Recent failed piracy attempts have been
    caused by merchant ships taking evasive action when being fired
    upon by pirates. In some cases, these defensive measures
    delayed the pirates enough for naval forces to appear and
    disrupt the attack. In other cases, the fact that merchant
    ships presented a hard target was enough to dissuade the
    pirates. In the last 2 months there have only been 5 successful
    piracies out of 34 attempts.
        With increased coalition naval presence, the merchant
    shipping industry taking actions to limit their chances of
    being pirated, and local countries such as Kenya agreeing to
    detain and try suspected pirates, we are making positive
    progress and lowering the level of piracy seen in August
    through November off the coast of Somalia. We are pleased by
    the positive progress in our counterpiracy efforts. As stated
    at the offset, however, piracy is a problem that starts ashore
    and requires an international solution. The ultimate solution
    is ashore in Somalia, assuring security and stability and
    eliminating the conditions that breed pirates.
        Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I want to
    thank you for inviting me to appear here today, and I will be
    happy to answer your questions.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you very, very much.
        Mr. James Caponiti, please.
        Mr. Caponiti. Good afternoon. And thank you, Mr. Chairman
    and Members of the Subcommittee. It is a pleasure for me to be
    here today to discuss the serious threat stemming from piracy
    on the seas.
        The impact of piracy has been very significant. Acts of
    piracy threaten freedom of navigation and the flow of commerce
    on which all trading nations depend. The recent incidents in
    the Gulf of Aden have become very serious, as you outlined,
    sir.
        The Gulf of Aden links the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez
    Canal with the Indian Ocean and is one of the busiest choke
    points in the world. The area is operated--many vessels
    operating in the area are serving Europe, which also--and also
    East Africa, South Asia and the Far East; yet there are U.S.
    flagships that serve the area. About one ship a day is in the
    region, and many of the ships that are in the region may be
    carrying government assistance cargo.
        The vessels that are vulnerable are those with--that are
    slow-speed vessels or low freeboard, which is the distance from
    the water to the deck, and ships such as container ships or
    roll-on/roll-off vessels are less vulnerable than tankers or
    dry bulk ships.
        Throughout 2008, the global piracy situation grew
    substantially worse, and, as you said, particularly in the gulf
    region area. Currently 10 commercial ships are being held for
    ransom with about 200 crew members at risk. Just last week a
    German-owned tanker under Bahamas' flag, the Longchamp, was
    captured, and that was the third vessel in the month of
    January.
        Of course, ship owners and operators are negatively
    impacted by the threat of piracy with higher costs--higher
    costs in their own right, higher insurance premiums and the
    threats to crews. The disruption to commerce, of course, is
    something that threatens all trading nations.
        The U.S. has been a leader in the international action to
    combat the current piracy crisis, and the United States
    welcomes the U.N. Intervention. The most recent U.N. Security
    Council resolution in December 1851 raised the stakes on
    necessary means that forces may take to counter piracy. And the
    U.N. also created--in January meetings created a Contact Group
    on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia for international
    cooperation. One of those contact groups is being led by the
    United States group, and it is the group that addresses
    coordination of the commercial industry with best practices to
    protect themselves.
        MARAD is perhaps unique among government agencies with
    regard to its interest in piracy issues. We are a civilian,
    nonregulatory agency with a robust sealift mission which
    leverages the assets and human resources of commercial
    companies. We are very involved with our own vessels in the
    Ready Reserve Force and the OIF and OEF sealift. We are very
    involved in maritime education and training with our Federal
    academy and assistant State academies, and we have assisted the
    IMO in training regimes for security regimes on vessels and in
    companies.
        We also have cargo preference oversight, and we monitor the
    flow of U.S. DOD cargo and aid cargo as it transports on the
    oceans of the world. We have been involved in past operations
    in the Falklands and then the Red Sea and Libya in providing
    information to divert U.S. flagshipping from threats that exist
    at sea.
        We accompanied the State Department in meetings in late
    December and January in the U.N. and have been asked to take
    the lead on some issues in collaboration with the industry. We
    are very involved with that. We were involved, leading up to
    the end of your crises, with many forms in which we invited the
    U.S.-flag community and the international community to discuss
    means to combat piracy and to cooperate with naval forces. We
    continue to meet with the industry to finalize BMPs and share
    industry concerns with government agencies.
        We have intensified our efforts in the fight against piracy
    and will continue to do so throughout 2009 to further improve
    coordination between the industry and the various navies
    participating in the Gulf of Aden. Combating international
    piracy is no small effort, evidenced by its long history. Much
    work has already been done, but much remains to be done before
    international piracy can be eliminated. MARAD has the unique
    and vital role in the development of U.S. antipiracy policy,
    and we believe we provide a valuable service to the commercial
    industry.
        Mr. Chairman, the Department of Transportation and the
    Maritime Administration stand ready to assist in any way
    possible to address this piracy issue and any other issues that
    threaten the national and economic security of the United
    States and our allies. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman and
    the Members of the Subcommittee, for your leadership in holding
    this hearing today, and I will be happy to answer any
    questions. Thank you.
        Mr. Cummings. I want to thank you all for your testimony. I
    just have a few questions, and then we will go to Mr. LoBiondo.
        Admiral Baumgartner, the Coast Guard has deployed the Law
    Enforcement Detachment, LEDET, 405 on board the U.S. San
    Antonio, I think you talked about that, which is a flagship of
    Task Force 151. LEDET is serving as a boarding force and
    providing training to Navy personnel on law enforcement
    matters.
        Can you comment on the work that LEDET has performed to
    date? For example, how many boardings has it conducted?
    Further, I understand that the Coast Guard cutter BOUTWELL has
    been deployed to CENTCOM for 3 to 4 months. Will BOUTWELL be
    deployed to undertake antipirate missions as part of Task Force
    151?
        Admiral Baumgartner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, with
    the crux of your questions on the exact number of boardings
    that LEDET 405 has conducted, I don't have that particular
    information. LEDET is working underneath CTF 151. I will be
    happy to get that information and provide it for the record.
        [Provided subsequent to the hearing: As of February 4,
    2009, LEDET 405 has conducted six boardings while assigned to
    CTF 151. These boardings were conducted working with Navy's
    Visit Board Search and Seize (VBSS) teams.]
        I do know that they are conducting extensive training
    there. They have specific law enforcement expertise. They are
    used to acting in this mode with naval--U.S. naval platforms,
    as well as the naval platforms of other services.
        The BOUTWELL is, as you mentioned, on its way over to that
    theater. It will be working for Central Command. I would
    anticipate that Central Command may assign it at some point in
    time to CTF 151, and that it might engage in counterpiracy
    operations. However, once we turn the asset over to Central
    Command, they will decide at any particular point in time what
    is the most appropriate mission for the BOUTWELL to conduct. As
    I said, I suspect they will be heavily engaged in this once
    they get in theater.
        Mr. Cummings. As you know, Rear Admiral, one of the things
    that I have always been concerned about was the--and this
    Committee has expressed concern about with regard to the Coast
    Guard, particularly after 9/11--is how we have been--the Coast
    Guard has been stretched to take on all kinds of missions and
    what have you. And we understand what is happening here, but do
    you see that as having significant impact on your operations
    here in the United States and with regard to bringing safety
    and guarding our coasts and what have you?
        Admiral Baumgartner. Sir, the BOUTWELL's deployment is
    something that we factor into our regular operations plan and
    scheduling. We do have commitments, as one of our Nation's
    armed services, to deploy and interact and have
    interoperability with the Navy and the rest of the Department
    of Defense. So it will not impact our normal scheduled
    operations. It is vital for us to continue these types of
    deployments to ensure that we bring our unique capabilities,
    authorities and perspective to operations such as those in
    Central Command.
        With regards to your specific question about the impact
    upon our marine safety mission, there will be no visible impact
    there. The BOUTWELL does engage in submarine safety operations,
    but is primarily engaged in law enforcement operations, search
    and rescue and those type of things. So I would not see any
    negative impact on our Marine safety mission.
        As far as the law enforcement detachment is concerned, we
    have had a law enforcement detachment over working for CENTCOM
    really since we entered that theater back in 2003. And that is,
    again, a planned deployment, and that is something that we
    factored into our operations.
        Mr. Cummings. The question that I think comes up when
    people hear about these pirate acts--and I hear this when
    people find out in my district that I chair the Coast Guard
    Subcommittee, that this is the question they ask. So, wait a
    minute, let me make sure I understand this. This is what they
    say: So you mean you have got a ship that is carrying millions
    upon millions and millions of dollars' worth of goods such as
    oil, and some little boat can come up with some folks with some
    guns and take over that ship? And the question becomes, does
    the Coast Guard recommend that vessels carry armed guards; and
    if not, why not; and if so, why so?
        Admiral Baumgartner. Yes, sir. With respect to carriage of
    armed guards, the U.S. Government does recognize that that is
    an option available to a ship owner. We do recognize that that
    option has to be thought out very carefully in advance,
    particularly--once you bring armed guards and weapons on board
    a vessel, you have to make absolutely sure that they are fully
    qualified to use those weapons, trained, certified as
    appropriate, and so forth. You also need a very well-thought-
    out, well-coordinated and rehearsed practice method of using
    those weapons. This is not something for crewmen or part-time
    security guards or novices to engage in.
        Now, the other thing that is essential there is to ensure
    that all the other parties that are involved with that ship
    transit are aware and are coordinated with what is happening.
    For example, there are cargo interests. Some cargos may be
    dangerous, may be hazardous. Obviously with liquified natural
    gas, oil and so forth, there are significant problems and
    dangers, and it may be totally inappropriate to have weapons on
    board.
        You also have to look at the flag state that is involved.
    Frankly, most shipping is not carried on U.S.-flag vessels. I
    think everybody is aware of that in this room. So you have to
    look at what the flag state law is, and there are significant
    concerns there. And armed security guards and crew that use
    weapons have to be fully aware and be coordinated with that
    flag state.
        One other interest that is pretty significant here are
    insurance interests, and they will have to be heavily involved
    in reviewing any decision that is made.
        So to summarize, it is an option that is available, it is a
    complex one to use, and needs to be well thought out in
    advance.
        Mr. Cummings. If a merchant vessel comes under attack by
    pirates in international waters, what are the rules of
    engagement for the crew members on that vessel?
        Admiral Baumgartner. Well, sir, some things may vary from
    nation to nation. The flag state law will govern what that crew
    is able to do. For the most part, though, that crew will be
    able to engage in self-defense and defense of others. So if
    they are threatened, and a pirate attack usually threatens
    imminent bodily injury or death, under the laws of most
    nations, they are entitled to take appropriate proportional
    acts in self-defense.
        Mr. Cummings. Just one last question. Admiral Branch, an
    Islamist faction called al-Shabab is apparently working to
    exert some type of control over Somalia. What do we know about
    this group and its objectives? Is al-Shabab aligned with al
    Qaeda, and if so, how closely? Further, I understand that al-
    Shabab has been designated by the State Department as a
    terrorist organization. Therefore, I ask what is your
    assessment of the nature of the risks that terrorist entities
    may begin to use piracy in some way to advance their agendas?
        Admiral Branch. Thank you, sir.
        My understanding is that al-Shabab is an offshoot of the
    Council of the Islamic Courts from previous times in Somalia,
    and they are a terrorist organization, according to the United
    States Government. Their affiliation with al Qaeda is not a
    direct affiliation, but an affiliation of common goals and
    purposes as far as we can tell.
        Interestingly, al-Shabab is opposed to piracy, demonstrably
    opposed to piracy. And, in fact, when they and their fellows
    were in charge, piracy decreased markedly in the areas where
    they were in control.
        The United States Government and Navy and naval
    intelligence has looked for a nexus between piracy and
    terrorism, and so far we have not found that nexus. In some
    respects, it would be an easier problem to tackle if we could
    establish that definitively, but we have not been able to.
        Mr. Cummings. Why do you say that?
        Admiral Branch. Why do I say what?
        Mr. Cummings. What you just said. You said----
        Admiral Branch. It would be a different problem to handle?
        Mr. Cummings. You said it would be an easier problem to
    handle.
        Admiral Branch. I probably should have said a different
    problem to handle, because we have very clear--I mean, we have
    been engaged in the war on terror now for some number of years,
    and we are pursuing that stridently wherever we find it. We
    haven't found that nexus to terrorists. These are criminals in
    the eyes of the United States Government as opposed to
    terrorists, so we have to treat them as criminals with the
    authorities that are ensued there.
        Mr. Cummings. What does the ability of a relatively
    unsophisticated individual in very small boats to quickly
    commandeer large ocean-going vessels say about our ability to
    prevent terror threats from small boats at sea? I mean, what
    does that say?
        Admiral Branch. Well, sir, I guess I would respond to that
    by saying that piracy doesn't generally happen when grey ships
    are there, whether they are U.S. Navy grey ships or others. The
    problem we have is covering the area sufficiently to keep the
    criminal act of piracy in progress from becoming a hostage
    situation. Once the pirates are aboard and have taken over the
    ship, now it is a hostage situation and not--again, the things
    that we can do--our limitations are different. We have to have
    permission.
        For example, if we were to try to do some kind of hostage
    takedown, that is a whole other ballgame than preventing an act
    of piracy in progress, because you have the nation, the flag
    state, the owning entity, the hostages themselves, the crew
    member, the masters involved, the cargo owner is involved, and
    you risk certain--you certainly increase the risk to the crew
    members in that kind of takedown. Therefore, there hasn't been
    any appetite to do those kinds of hostage takedowns once the
    ships were captured.
        Mr. Cummings. Mr. LoBiondo.
        Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        If you would, Admiral, help me walk through--there is a
    ship, a tanker, whatever the ship may be, and it is off the
    coast, and they realize that there is some action starting
    against them. That would typically be a small boat coming at
    them. How do they communicate with the ship they are trying to
    take over?
        Admiral Branch. What we have seen in the past--it varies.
    Merchant shipping has an alert watch which we endorse, an alert
    watching capability that has a lookout that can see these ships
    on the horizon and sees these small boats out there coming in a
    threatening manner, should be alerted. That watch organization
    should alert those ships. The ships that have an active
    defensive capability or plan will begin to speed up, will begin
    taking evasive action. Many of these ships that have
    successfully evaded have passive defensive measures which can
    be as simple as raising the accommodation ladders and the means
    to get on the ship, or having fire hoses energized and going
    over the side to help knock down anyone trying to gain access
    to the ship. There has even been some cases of barbed wire,
    razor wire on access points if the pirates try to climb up.
    That would inhibit their activities.
        So the ships, if they see the pirates coming, they can take
    these evasive actions if they choose to. There have been very
    few cases where ships that took evasive action and did not
    comply with the pirates that have been actually pirated. In
    most cases, those ships, the pirates decide it is too hard, and
    they go somewhere else. And it was already mentioned in
    testimony, I think over here, that the ships with the high
    freeboard distance from the water to the rail and they can go
    faster than about 18 knots or so are not impervious, but have a
    very low chance of being pirated just because it is a tough
    task to hook a boarding ladder up against the side of the ship
    and climb up onto the ship from these small boats.
        So the ships that have evasive plans, defensive measures in
    place do present a very hard target. And that does two things
    for us. It might just dissuade the pirates, or it might give us
    time if we have a ship in the neighborhood to get the ship or a
    helicopter in the area to have the pirates cease their attack.
        Mr. LoBiondo. So it is up to each individual ship owner as
    to what policy they have?
        Admiral Branch. For a large part, yes, sir. There are
    procedures in place in the military Sealift Command and for
    government charters that have standardized approaches. The
    training was mentioned, the training programs that--MARAD
    professors are very good. We certainly endorse those training
    proposals to enable the shipping industry to help in their own
    defense.
        Mr. LoBiondo. So let us say a ship is at watch, and they
    see something coming up. I mean, typically what does that give
    them, a half hour, an hour notice or warning?
        Admiral Branch. We have about 15 minutes to react and to
    interdict the piracy.
        Mr. LoBiondo. So 15 minutes now. Is there a standardized
    procedure or attempt to standardize procedure where the ship
    would contact who to let them know that they believe they are
    under attack?
        Admiral Branch. Yes, sir. The coordination centers. The
    ships can call the coordination centers. There is one in
    Bahrain. There is one also in Djibouti. Sometimes they call all
    the way back to London. But they have phones on ships now. They
    can call, make those phone calls back to the coordination
    centers and IMO centers.
        Mr. LoBiondo. So the coordination center makes a
    determination of who is closest to----
        Admiral Branch. No, sir. It is not a commanding drill. That
    is just spreading the word that there is a ship in danger.
        Mr. LoBiondo. How does help get----
        Admiral Branch. They also will go out typically on
    registered British radio. It is a VHF radio, relatively short
    range. So people that hear that call may well be in a position
    where they can try to react, especially if there is an aircraft
    airborne already to try to venture into that area.
        Mr. LoBiondo. Is that military people you are talking
    about?
        Admiral Branch. I am talking about military people.
        Mr. LoBiondo. So whatever military people might be in the
    area that hear that SOS?
        Admiral Branch. Yes, sir. And CTF 151 has coordinated where
    these assets that are under their direction should best be
    positioned to try to spread out the coverage, if you will, with
    the ships that are there on national tasking or the ships that
    are there under other authorities, to try to get as much of the
    coverage of the grey holes that we can out in that area. And it
    is all about response time in preventing the piracy from
    happening. Once the pirates are on board the ship, there is not
    a lot we can do then because now we have a hostage situation.
        Mr. LoBiondo. Just one last question. Let us say that the
    SOS goes out, and somebody is in close proximity, some military
    asset is in close proximity. What do they then have the
    authority to do to the pirates?
        Admiral Branch. They have the authority to thwart the
    pirates' attack.
        Mr. LoBiondo. What does that mean?
        Admiral Branch. That means to stop it.
        Mr. LoBiondo. By force?
        Admiral Branch. Yes, sir. By force.
        Mr. LoBiondo. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Cummings. Mr. Larsen.
        Mr. Larsen. I am going to start off with some questions for
    Admiral Branch. How many countries are involved with CJTF 151?
        Admiral Branch. Right now the only countries that have
    ships involved are the United States and the United Kingdom.
        Mr. Larsen. And how many ships is that?
        Admiral Branch. Five.
        Mr. Larsen. And we have four?
        Admiral Larsen. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Larsen. We have four of those, and the U.K. has one.
    But there are any number of other countries with ships as well?
        Admiral Branch. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Larsen. We are coordinating with those other countries,
    but we are not coordinating the actions of those other
    countries; is that right?
        Admiral Branch. We are coordinating with those other
    countries, but we are not--the countries that are there on
    national tasking, we are not commanding those ships. It is a
    coordination effort, but not a command relationship.
        Mr. Larsen. There is a separate NATO task force or a
    separate EU task force replacing the NATO task force?
        Admiral Branch. Yes, sir. There is an EU task force on the
    scene conducting counterpiracy operations, and they are being
    commanded by a British one-star out of Northwood. There also
    have been some NATO ships in the area, not presently engaged,
    and then various ships on national tasking. The Chinese are
    there. The Russians are there. And there are other ships that
    are out there on their own national order.
        Mr. Larsen. For the Chinese, this is their first major
    overseas deployment since 1421, I think. Have we been
    coordinating with them? And how do we communicate and
    coordinate with them?
        Admiral Branch. We have been communicating with them as
    navies do, as a matter of deconfliction and safety of
    navigation and whatnot. And we have been coordinating--
    coordinating is probably too strong a word. We have been
    communicating with them on e-mail actually to help ease the
    language barrier, and that communication typically consists of
    where they are, and what they are observing, and where they
    intend to move and patrol that day. And we will adjust
    accordingly to take advantage of that presence.
        Mr. Larsen. I am not going to leave the other two out, but
    just a few more. At what point for the U.S. Navy would we move
    from a deterrence to a kinetic action for the Navy, in this
    circumstance, in a piracy circumstance?
        Admiral Branch. With the standup of CTF--Combined Task
    Force 151, the orders are flowing that will initiate the second
    phase of that operation. The first phase is really just the
    standup of the organization and getting the position, getting
    ready to run.
        The second phase will be a situation where we go out more
    actively and look for suspected pirates and apprehend them. The
    long pole or the impediment to that has been up until now lack
    of any reasonable disposition means. But now that we have an
    agreement with Kenya, we have something that we can do with
    these apprehended pirate suspects. We will be able to go out
    and arrest them for being pirates and take them in, gather the
    evidence, and take them to----
        Mr. Larsen. So we have a place to put them, and presumably
    the Kenyan justice system would then prosecute?
        Admiral Branch. Right.
        Mr. Larsen. Presumably.
        One more question about the Navy. I will try to be quick
    about this. This is the how much and how long--the thought of
    putting U.S. Navy destroyers against Somalian fishing boats for
    a certain amount of time seems reasonable, but for a longer
    period of time seems to be a stretch of U.S. naval assets given
    the other needs in the world. Another way of putting this--I
    look forward to the next panel, because I would like to know
    how long they are going to depend on the U.S. Cavalry to
    protect them when they have things they can do to protect
    themselves, and we have many other things that we need to be
    doing with our own limited naval assets. Do you have a
    direction on how much and how long for the U.S. Navy under 151?
        Admiral Branch. No, sir. It is an open-ended construct
    right now. There is a lot to do in the Central Command area of
    operations, as you mentioned, but the United States Navy also
    recognizes it has a piece to play in the solution of this
    problem.
        Mr. Larsen. Absolutely. I agree that you do. And I know
    that the shipping companies do as well.
        Mr. Caponiti, just quickly. In conversations with shipping
    operators, they have spoken actually very highly of the work
    that MARAD has done to help the industry implement best
    management practices, especially the antipiracy assessment
    teams. Can you give us an idea of this initiative's progress?
        Mr. Caponiti. Yes, sir. Thank you.
        The initiative is an MSC, military seal of command,
    initiative. They are working with the Naval Investigative
    Services and also the Justice Department training centers. We
    are also assisting them in boarding vessels. This is strictly
    voluntary. We have started with U.S.-flag vessels at first. We
    think this might extend to the foreign-flag community. There is
    a test going on this week at Norfolk with a Ready Reserve Force
    vessel, one of the MARAD vessels, and we will then----
        Mr. Larsen. Tomorrow, then?
        Mr. Caponiti. Yes. And we will be testing with an APL
    vessel after that.
        Mr. Larsen. Do you expect an after-action report at some
    point?
        Mr. Caponiti. Yeah. This has been viewed--there are a
    number of carriers who indicated that they want to participate
    in this. They would like to voluntarily participate, and we
    will obviously see how this goes and have more to report on it.
        Mr. Larsen. Great. Thank you. I look forward to hearing
    back about the progress on that.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Cummings. Mr. Coble.
        Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good to have you all with us, gentleman.
        Admiral Baumgartner, piracy is both a safety and security
    issue in the maritime domain, and the Coast Guard, in my
    opinion, seems to be the appropriate agency to lead the
    counterpiracy efforts. Is it your belief that the Coast Guard
    has the ability to serve in that capacity?
        Admiral Baumgartner. Well, sir, as you mentioned, we are
    uniquely positioned as a maritime safety agency, as well as a
    maritime law enforcement agency, and as an armed force, so we
    do have a unique position to play there and a unique role, and
    we are able to bring different perspectives and different
    capacities to bear.
        We also have a long history of working with the
    International Maritime Organization on piracy issues, including
    circulars on antipiracy measures, and the International Ship
    and Port Facility Code, and the antipiracy measures that are
    contained in each ship's security plan.
        As far as the Coast Guard leading the efforts, part of this
    is a matter of capacity and where our ships and assets are at.
    As far as the Horn of Africa is concerned, we obviously don't
    have the ships to put over there, so that makes it very
    difficult. We are not in a position to take an operational lead
    in this particular fight. We are involved as--in cases as
    pirates are apprehended. If they are apprehended by U.S. naval
    forces, we are part of something called the motor or maritime
    operational threat response process. That is a process where
    all U.S. agencies that have expertise or authority in an area
    collaborate to figure out how best to work together to address
    a particular case. So we might be involved in consulting, or
    providing investigators, or helping preserve evidence, or
    things along those lines.
        Mr. Coble. And, Admiral Branch, I didn't intend to cut the
    Navy adrift with my question to that end.
        Admiral Baumgartner, let me follow up with this. What can
    the shipping industry and/or the maritime industry do to combat
    piracy? In other words, are there any voluntary activities that
    the industry can take to reduce the probability of acts of
    piracy?
        Admiral Baumgartner. Yes. There are several. And, in fact,
    I think, as has been mentioned already, the industry is doing
    quite a bit to work on best management practices. And, in fact,
    I just yesterday got something that the Oil Companies
    International Maritime Forum produced, and they will be on your
    second panel, and I am sure they would love to talk about it.
    But I think they just put out 27,000 of these booklets on
    effective antipiracy measures. Some of them have already been
    mentioned here, and preparedness is one of the most important
    ones.
        All of the vessels that are transiting that area are
    supposed to have or do have vessel security plans. They have
    annexes in those plans on how to deal with piracy and other
    similar threats. Practicing those plans and reviewing those
    plans and ensuring you are ready when you transit that area is
    probably the most important thing.
        Speed has already been mentioned here; appropriate erratic
    maneuvers to make sure that the people from the small pirate
    skiff can't climb easily aboard your vessel. Admiral Branch
    talked about some of those as well, fire hoses, other things
    that make it difficult to draw out the length of the attack so
    that perhaps a warship or a helicopter or something can get
    there. Those are all very important measures and steps that
    industry can take. And I think one of the things is not to
    stop. The vessels that continue to keep up speed, continue to
    maneuver and buy time for help wear the pirates down, and that
    is one of the most effective measures that can be taken.
        Mr. Coble. Let me get to Admiral Branch and Mr. Caponiti.
    Is there a solution to the problem, or do you have suggestions
    that are ongoing now that would work toward reducing these
    ruthless acts?
        Admiral Branch. Sir, as you say, the long-term solution is
    to make the conditions such as in Somalia or wherever the
    pirates come from, that they are not inclined to go into that
    business. We have to make it unprofitable for them and
    uncomfortable for them to do this. And we can make it
    uncomfortable in a number of ways, by arresting them when they
    are out there in their skiffs with rocket-propelled grenades
    and guns and ladders and sending them to jail. We can make it
    uncomfortable for them by defeating their attacks, or we can
    make it uncomfortable for them by being just too damn
    frustrating to get aboard the fourth or fifth ship they try
    when that ship is exercising active and passive defensive
    measures.
        Mr. Coble. Get their attention, in other words?
        Admiral Branch. Yes, sir. Unless we can make it
    unprofitable and uncomfortable, I think we will be in this
    business in Somalia for a while.
        Mr. Coble. I thank you, sir.
        Yes, sir.
        Mr. Caponiti. Sir, may I add, we believe the best
    management practices that have been adopted by the industry on
    a large scale have made a difference. There are a number of
    them out there. We are consolidating those to provide to
    nations that are willing to listen.
        One other thing. One thing that we could do as a
    government, that we could do in Congress, is to encourage our
    Senate colleagues to adopt the Law of the Sea Convention. There
    are some provisions in there that would help us to enforce the
    laws of the sea and to bring them--to bring the bad guys to
    prosecution. So that is one thing that this Nation could do to
    assist the situation.
        Mr. Coble. Thank you, gentlemen.
        I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
        Ms. Richardson.
        Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome back.
    It is good to be back on the Committee.
        My first question is for Rear Admiral Branch. Recently in
    the news there has been great talk about both Russia and China
    taking part in anti-piracy activity around the Horn of Africa.
    How active has their participation been in the anti-piracy
    activity?
        Admiral Branch. Both the Russians and the Chinese have
    established a presence in the Gulf of Aden primarily, and they
    are actively engaged in helping deter piracy in the vicinity of
    their forces. The Chinese primarily are concerned with Chinese
    flag and Hong Kong flag vessels as they go through. The
    Russians, I am not sure if the Russians are focusing there or
    if it is--I could get back to you on the record to say who they
    have been most closely coordinating with. But in any case, the
    presence of those great hulls is a deterrent to piracy where
    they are, and if they are in one particular area, we can put
    the other assets that we coordinate in control and others to
    spread out the wealth of the naval assets and make the problem
    harder for the pirates.
        Ms. Richardson. Are you working in coordination with them?
        Admiral Branch. We are communicating with them. Again,
    "coordination" is probably too strong a word for both of those
    entities. But as mariners do at sea, we communicate generally
    for safety navigation and to determine intentions. And in this
    case we have done that kind of communications to establish
    their areas of operations and their focus, and then we can--for
    the forces we do command or coordinate, we can spread those out
    to cover more area.
        Ms. Richardson. Would you choose to coordinate more or is
    the communication sufficient at this time?
        Admiral Branch. We will communicate and leverage the
    channels of communication we have to the best advantage as we
    can.
        Ms. Richardson. And, Admiral, you mentioned that we are not
    the operating lead at the Horn of Africa. Is there anything
    that we should do to change that or is it sufficient as it
    exists?
        Admiral Baumgartner. My comments were meaning that the
    Coast Guard itself as an agency can't be leading the efforts
    there simply because we don't have the platforms there. Now,
    with Combined Task Force 151, as Admiral Branch has talked
    about, we do have very much a leading role on the water in that
    area, and as that task force ramps up I suspect that role will
    only increase.
        Ms. Richardson. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
        Mr. McMahon, and welcome to the Committee.
        Mr. McMahon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Cummings, it
    is indeed privilege and an honor to be here, and I look forward
    to working with you, sir. As a new Member, I am excited to join
    this Subcommittee, and I thank you and these witnesses for
    focusing on this important issue of international policy.
        I know that much ground has been covered, and you mentioned
    this a little bit, but I also serve on the Foreign Affairs
    Committee, and just what we can do in Congress and what we can
    do with that Committee in terms of the international mechanisms
    to deal with this problem, whether it is the United Nations or
    the different treaties that you mentioned that we as a NATION
    can pursue on that front to deal with this very important
    problem.
        I leave it to you to choose.
        Admiral Baumgartner. I will say a few words on that
    account. We have been, as the Coast Guard, as a law enforcement
    agency and working with these types of counterparts in other
    countries been involved in this for quite some time. In terms
    of what the Congress can do here, as Mr. Caponiti said, one
    important thing is encourage your counterparts in the Senate to
    act on the Law of the Sea Convention. That will help us
    immensely as we go about negotiating additional agreements and
    working in additional international forums. The Law of the Sea
    Convention is really the constitution of the oceans in terms of
    international law. It always makes our job more difficult when
    we go to negotiate anything, it makes it more difficult because
    we are not a party to that particular convention. It is a
    always an obstacle, something we have to address. That is
    probably the number one thing.
        The other international mechanisms, they are out there.
    Piracy is a universal crime well-explained in international
    law. The SUA Convention provides good mechanisms for
    cooperation, for prosecution or extradition of pirates and
    similar criminals. We have been engaged in lots of efforts to
    get other nations used to the idea of using these tools and
    used to the idea of trusting in these authorities.
        As we have seen with Kenya, Kenya has made good steps
    forward. Last week there was a regional agreement in Djibouti
    where 21 nations agreed to use these tools to investigate,
    interdict, and prosecute piracy. So many of these things are
    moving forward already.
        From a parochial point of view, the Coast Guard, as the
    Chairman knows, we would benefit greatly from an authorization
    in the act that would allow us to proceed with our
    modernization efforts. One of the key things in our
    modernization efforts is establishing a Coast Guard operations
    command so that we would have a very strong, operationally
    focused--worldwide operationally focused command that can
    ensure that we are making the most of all of our capabilities
    and capacities addressing these kinds of threats.
        Mr. McMahon. Thank you, Rear Admiral. And I look forward to
    working with all of you, but in particular with you because, as
    you know, I have in my district the Coast Guard base in Staten
    Island which has the command for New York City and is vital for
    our city and for our Nation.
        How long has the Law of the Sea Convention been before the
    Senate waiting for ratification?
        Admiral Baumgartner. Well, I believe it was forwarded in
    1995. That was right after the 1994 agreement that solved many
    of the flaws with the original convention.
        Mr. McMahon. Is there anything that you think would have it
    move at this point, or is it eternally stuck there?
        Admiral Baumgartner. I have great optimism that it will
    move. Even in the last Congress, it was voted out of the Senate
    Foreign Relations Committee overwhelmingly in favor of
    ratification, a good bipartisan vote there. It simply didn't
    make it to a floor vote. I already have faith that this Senate
    and this Congress will move forward on the Law of the Sea
    Convention. We hope that we can see hearings scheduled and we
    can see a floor vote.
        I know that Secretary of State Clinton did mention this in
    her confirmation hearings, the importance of this. So the more
    messengers we have on this, the faster it will happen and the
    more effective, and all of us here, MARAD, the Navy, the Coast
    Guard, the State Department, can be in our international
    efforts to combat piracy and other threats.
        Mr. McMahon. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield the remainder of my time. Thank you,
    sir.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
        Just one last question of the three of you.
        Statistics from the International Maritime Bureau indicate
    that there were 293 actual and attempted pirate attacks against
    vessels worldwide in 2008, a decline from the 445 actual and
    attempted pirate attacks recorded by IMB in 2003.
        What likely accounts for the overall decline in piracy
    worldwide in the last 5 years, and are attacks actually
    decreasing or are fewer attempted attacks being reported or are
    both happening?
        Mr. Caponiti. The incidents of piracy--Malacca was the hot
    spot a number of years ago, and that situation was diminished,
    mitigated by really the action that happened on the land. The
    two governments, Malaysia and Indonesia, took very strong
    action within their territories to stamp out the pirate cells.
    That is what cured that and that is really what we need.
        We do think that since when the tempo heightened during the
    summer this year and the international community began to get
    together and talk about this, there was an increase in naval
    forces, true. But the international community, the commercial
    industry began to get together in forums to talk about this.
    There was a lot of discussion about how they could harden the
    target and the way they harden the target is through best
    practices, basic maneuvers the Admiral spoke about. Before you
    go into a region that has a threat of piracy, the crew needs to
    be prepared. They need to know what they are going to do before
    they get there if there is an attack and what each member of
    the crew is going to do. We think those initiatives are paying
    off.
        You are going to have a panel here in a few minutes that I
    think could probably give you a little more detail on that, but
    we think that the community uniting the way it has to combat
    this has really had an impact. Right now we have some bad
    weather out there with the seasons, which may be one of the
    reason why things have mitigated. We will know better as the
    calendar goes along whether the actions that we have taken
    really will have a permanent effect. We suspect we have
    improved things.
        The other thing, though, the pirates themselves are
    adjusting their procedures as we adjust ours. So this
    initiative needs to remain interactive. It remains dynamic. We
    need to keep our eye on this and react as they react.
        Mr. Cummings. Anyone else?
        Admiral Baumgartner. Yes, sir. I would add here that there
    is an interesting timing coincidence, and I don't think it is
    any coincidence at all. You mentioned the statistics for 2003.
    In 2004 is when the International Ship and Port Security
    Facilities Code went into effect. Here domestically we call it
    MTSA, Maritime Transportation Security Act. That introduced
    significant vessel security plan requirements, facility and
    port security requirements.
        One of the important impacts of that is, as Jim Caponiti
    said, it hardened vessels as targets for pirates. Now they had
    to have organized and approved security plans. At the same time
    this made it more difficult to bring stolen cargo or stolen
    ships into ports because there were real port facility plans
    and requirements in place. I think that is no coincidence at
    all. And as Mr. Caponiti said, the regional cooperation in the
    Straits of Malacca was key in ensuring there wasn't a landside
    safe haven for pirates to take ships while they went about
    their business, held their hostages and so forth. And certainly
    in Somalia, as we all know, that is the key. There is a
    friendly supporting coastline there that supports these
    operations, and that is what is the real enabler for piracy off
    the Horn of Africa.
        Mr. Cummings. All right.
        Mr. Larsen.
        Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Baumgartner, the MOU with Kenya, is it just a U.S.
    MOU with Kenya?
        Admiral Baumgartner. Yes, sir, it is a bilateral MOU with
    Kenya. But the U.K. has a similar MOU and the Djibouti
    agreement, the Djibouti Code of Conduct, has many of the very
    same provisions in it. That is a volunteer agreement. But that
    will spread much of this throughout the region.
        Mr. Larsen. So if the French navy captures pirates, they
    can use Kenya, or would they?
        Admiral Baumgartner. What they would do is under the
    Djibouti Code of Conduct they would approach--they could
    approach one of the regional countries and say under the terms
    of the Djibouti Code of Conduct we would like you to take
    custody of the prisoners and the evidence and prosecute the
    case.
        I would also note that the International Maritime
    Organization has had a template for these procedures and
    agreements out for a while as well.
        Mr. Larsen. All right. That gives me the best answer maybe
    you can give me but not as solid an answer as I would like to
    hear.
        Admiral Baumgartner. Yes, sir. France right now I would----
        Mr. Larsen. And I don't mean to pick on the French. Any
    other country but the United States that has an MOU with Kenya.
    Picking the other countries, I want to be clear I am not
    pointing out any one country.
        Admiral Baumgartner. The U.K. does have an MOU with Kenya.
    I am not aware of any other country that has a direct bilateral
    MOU with Kenya at this point in time. They may have them, but I
    am not aware of any.
        Mr. Larsen. What is your expectation for Kenya once we
    deliver people and evidence to the Kenyan justice system?
        Admiral Baumgartner. My expectation is that Kenya will
    accept those and they will put them right in their criminal
    justice system. We already have one positive experience with
    them. Ten pirates that we brought to them in the fall of 2006,
    they tried them in their courts, convicted them, and they are
    serving a 7-year prison term right now. And as we speak there
    are eight pirates, if I have got the numbers right--I believe
    it is eight pirates that the U.K. captured this fall that are
    awaiting trial in Kenyan courts. I think it was scheduled
    earlier this month, and I don't know if that trial has actually
    started yet or not. I would expect that Kenya would continue
    along in that vein and step up to the plate as they have.
        Mr. Larsen. Do we have any negative experience, any
    experience of turning people over and then no prosecutions
    taking place or inadequate prosecutions taking place?
        Admiral Baumgartner. I am not aware of that with Kenya.
        Mr. Larsen. Any other countries you are aware of that with?
        Admiral Baumgartner. I don't think the United States has
    had any experience turning over prisoners other than those to
    Kenya. It has been a problem in the past where naval forces
    have captured prisoners and they haven't found a regional
    country willing to take them, and there are significant legal
    and logistical challenges. If your home country or the flag
    state of the warship is 7,000 miles away, it may make it
    extremely challenging to get those prisoners from the Horn of
    Africa to your country in a timely manner to satisfy your own
    judicial system. So there have been cases where navies just
    have not been able to do anything with the pirates because they
    can't get another country to accept that particular group.
        Mr. Larsen. And what happens to that pirate?
        Admiral Baumgartner. I think that in various times they
    have been turned loose or they have been turned over to other
    quasi-authorities in that area, authorities that we might not
    recognize as the United States Government. The end result of
    the pirates we really don't know, but I would suspect that----
        Mr. Larsen. They might go back to pirating or they might
    not make it back to pirating?
        Admiral Baumgartner. Yes, sir. I do not expect that they
    faced justice in any kind of a system that we would recognize.
        Mr. Larsen. Sure. All right.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you. I want to thank the panel for your
    excellent testimony. We will probably have some follow-up
    questions in writing. But thank you very much.
        I want to now call our next panel.
        Mr. Peter Chalk is a Senior Political Analyst with the RAND
    Corporation. Captain Phil M. Davies is Director of the Oil
    Companies International Marine Forum. Mr. Peter Swift is
    Managing Director of Intertanko. And Mr. Giles Noakes is Chief
    Maritime Security Officer of the Baltic International Maritime
    Council.
        Mr. Chalk, you will be first.

       TESTIMONY OF PETER CHALK, SENIOR POLITICAL ANALYST, RAND
     CORPORATION; CAPTAIN PHIL M. DAVIES, DIRECTOR, OIL COMPANIES
    INTERNATIONAL MARINE FORUM; DR. PETER SWIFT, MANAGING DIRECTOR,
    INTERTANKO; AND GILES NOAKES, CHIEF MARITIME SECURITY OFFICER,
                 BALTIC INTERNATIONAL MARITIME COUNCIL

        Mr. Chalk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished
    Members of the Subcommittee, for the opportunity to testify
    before you today.
        At the outset I would like to stress one main point. Piracy
    is above all an economically driven phenomenon. This is true
    both with respect to those who engage in the practice where the
    objective is to make profits and those against whom attacks are
    frequently directed where the desire to keep operating costs as
    low as possible has at times precluded or outweighed
    imperatives for instituting more onboard security.
        A total of 1,845 actual and attempted attacks of piracy
    were recorded around the world's waters between 2003 and 2008.
    That figure probably underrepresents the true scale of piracy
    because in many cases, possibly as many as 50 percent, attacks
    are not reported. Sometimes shipowners do not like to report
    attacks for fear that this will increase maritime insurance
    premiums as well as result in lengthy and costly post-attack
    investigations.
        As we have heard, the concentration of piracy is greatest
    around the Horn of Africa but other high-risk areas include
    Indonesia, Bangladesh, India, Tanzania, and Gulf of Guinea off
    West Africa.
        Seven main factors would seem to account for the emergence
    of piracy today in the scale we are seeing. First has been the
    growing trend toward the use of skeleton crews, both as a cost-
    cutting device and as a reflection of more advanced maritime
    navigation. This has both precluded the option for concerted
    anti-piracy watches as well as made the general task of gaining
    control of ships that much easier.
        Second, the general difficulties associated with personal
    surveillance have been compounded by demands that are being
    made on many littoral states to enact very expensive
    territorially based systems of homeland security in the post-9/
    11 era.
        Third, lax coastal and portside security have directly
    contributed to opportunistic attacks against ships at anchor.
        Fourth, corruption and easily compromised systems of
    judicial structures have encouraged official complicity in
    piracy both with respect to providing intelligence on ship
    locations as well as helping with the rapid discharge of
    pirated cargos.
        Fifth, the endemic anarchic situation in Somalia has
    directly contributed to the rash of attacks we have seen off
    Horn of Africa.
        Sixth, the ready willingness of shipowners to pay
    increasingly large sums for the return of their cargos and
    vessels has provided an added financial incentive to engage in
    maritime crime.
        And, finally, the global proliferation of small and light
    weapons has provided pirates with an enhanced means to act in a
    more lethal and destructive basis than was previously the case.
        The dangers associated with piracy are fairly multifaceted.
    At the most basic level, attacks constitute a direct threat to
    the lives of citizens of a variety of flag states. Piracy also
    has a direct economic cost in terms of lost trade, stolen
    cargos, and fraudulent trade. It is conservatively estimated
    that it costs between $1 and $16 billion a year to the maritime
    industry at present.
        Politically piracy can also play a key role in undermining
    government legitimacy by encouraging corruption. And, finally,
    piracy has the potential to trigger a major environmental
    catastrophe. The nightmare scenario would be a mid-sea
    collision between a pirated vessel that is left to drift and a
    heavily laden oil tanker.
        As we have heard, the rapid escalation of piracy at the
    Horn of Africa has prompted unprecedented international action
    on the part of the global community. The United States has
    enacted Combined Task Force 151 to monitor predefined maritime
    corridors in the Gulf of Aden. That supplements a year-long EU
    naval force that was deployed last year. Several other
    countries have sent their own navies to the region, and the
    U.N. Security Council has now sanctioned the use of force
    against pirate dens on land by passing Security Council
    Resolution 1851 in December of last year.
        Although these initiatives have met with some success,
    their overall utility does raise some questions. First, the
    area to be monitored is enormous, over 1 million square miles.
    There is also the issue of national interests. It is not
    apparent how the EU naval flotilla will be funded or whether or
    not the potentially thorny issue of cost-sharing is even being
    broached.
        In addition, questions of legal jurisdiction have yet to be
    fully settled and appropriate rules of engagement have still to
    be fully fleshed out. Employing force against pirate dens on
    land carries the obvious danger of large-scale civilian
    collateral damage and associated accusations that the West is
    once again intent on destroying Muslim lives.
        Finally, the deployment of naval frigates will only be able
    to address the piracy problem at its end rather than at its
    root on land.
        I would like to conclude with five areas I think the
    Committee should consider as worthy candidates for directed
    further research:
        One, what are the costs of piracy and how do these compare
    to the expenses required for mitigation?
        Two, what is the best way of dealing with piracy in areas
    of endemic lawlessness and anarchy where there is no government
    with which to engage?
        Three, is the current international legal framework for
    countering piracy sufficient, or does it need to be changed in
    some fashion?
        Fourth, what is the extent of government responsibility in
    countering piracy and what role should the private sector play
    in helping to manage the problem?
        And, finally, what are the chief land-based factors that
    contribute to modern-day piracy, and how can these best be
    addressed?
        Again, I thank you for the opportunity to be here today,
    and I look forward to answering any questions that you might
    have.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you.
        Mr. Davies.
        Captain Davies. Mr. Chairman, Committee Members, thank you
    for your invitation today to address the Committee.
        Piracy on the high seas is one of the most critical and
    concerning issues facing the maritime community today. OCIMF
    firmly believes that the establishment of law and order on the
    high seas is an issue for international governments. However,
    we also recognize that maritime security and in particular
    piracy remains a concern to us all. OCIMF appreciates the
    importance of this Committee meeting, particularly in light of
    the current situation in the Gulf of Aden, and looks for
    further ways industry can work with governments to reduce the
    threat of piracy.
        OCIMF itself is a voluntary association, having as its
    members over 70 of the world's leading oil companies. Our
    members engage in activities of mutual concern relating to
    transportation of oil and gas by tanker with special reference
    to the protection of the marine environment and the promotion
    of safety in marine operations. In relation to piracy, OCIMF's
    priority is the safety and well-being of our mariners while
    adhering to the principle of free movement of trade in
    international waters.
        We have submitted written testimony, including a copy of
    the booklet "Piracy - the East Africa/Somalia Situation,"
    published in conjunction with the IMB, Intertanko, Intercargo
    and SIGTTO.
        My written testimony today covers six key areas related to
    current operations in the Gulf of Aden, and this afternoon I
    would like to focus on a few of these.
        Industry has been engaged in efforts to combat piracy for
    some time now and gives full support to the various efforts of
    the United Nations bodies, particularly the International
    Maritime Organization. In this regard we fully support the U.N.
    Resolutions leading to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1851 in
    December, 2008. We welcome the establishment of EUNAVFOR,
    Combined Task Force 151, and the contributions of NATO. We also
    welcome the contributions of other navies in the area and look
    upon this as an opportunity for development of new friendships
    and cooperation.
        In this regard we need to ensure that lines of
    communication are kept simple. There is currently a significant
    amount of confusion in regard to overall operational control.
    Vessels require a single point of contact for assistance,
    particularly when under attack. OCIMF supports the continued
    utilization of NAVFORUK, which is both an operational
    headquarters for EU Naval Force in addition to a key NATO
    facility. We also recognize the forward assistance provided by
    the U.K. Maritime Trade Organization in Dubai and the United
    States Maritime Liaison Office in Bahrain. OCIMF does not
    support the establishment of further regional coordination
    centers, as it is likely to do little to assist in mitigating
    piracy on the high seas.
        The shipping industry is engaged on many levels with the
    fight on piracy, and this includes a provision of senior
    merchant navy officers into the EU Naval Force Headquarters in
    Northwood to assist with liaison development of best practices
    in relation to operations in the Gulf of Aden. We are also
    active, through the International Maritime Organization, with
    the Maritime Safety Committee correspondence group reviewing
    IMO measures and recommendations to industry.
        OCIMF welcomes a contact group established under U.N.
    Security Council Resolution 1851 and recognizes the leadership
    of the United States in this important approach to resolving
    the piracy issue. We look forward to working in partnership
    with government and industry to further develop best practices
    for deployment against the piracy threat.
        The shipping industry estimates that approximately 30
    percent of vessels transiting in the Gulf of Aden are still not
    adequately prepared. It is hoped that our booklet, which I
    mentioned earlier, may assist in educating these vessels and
    mariners in basic precautions.
        OCIMF fully supports training of mariners in nonlethal
    means of avoiding, deterring, and delaying pirates boarding
    vessels. However, this training must be completed under
    existing international legislation such as the International
    Ship and Port Security, ISPS, Code; and the Standards on
    Training and Certification of Watchkeepers, the STCW
    Convention.
        We do not support the use of armed guards or other private
    forces in protecting vessels. Oil tankers and LNG ships in
    particular do not provide a platform conducive for armed guards
    or gunfire. However, the same safety factors and concerns apply
    to all vessels. The use of armed guards are likely to lead to
    significant increased risk of personal injury, fire, and
    explosion, risk of escalation of conflict, particularly as
    pirates will assume all vessels are armed and attack tempo will
    increase accordingly. We also note the use of armed guards is
    not supported by any of the key international organizations.
        OCIMF recognizes that in order to remove pirates from the
    seas it is important to develop the necessary legal framework
    such that authorities may prosecute pirates when captured. A
    practical way forward is to establish treaties to allow
    prosecution within littoral states to the conflict. Probably
    the most suitable place of prosecuting Somalia pirates are
    Kenya and Yemen, which are both close to the areas where piracy
    occurs. OCIMF supports this approach and the agreements already
    entered into as it allows the littoral states who do not have
    naval assets to support the anti-piracy efforts through
    successful prosecution of pirates.
        Equally an important role for industry is to ensure that
    evidence is clearly recorded and witnesses as requested are
    available to the courts.
        Mr. Chairman, I thank you and the Committee for the
    opportunity to speak before you today and would be pleased to
    answer any further questions.
        Mr. Cummings. Mr. Swift.
        Mr. Swift. Congressman Cummings, distinguished Members,
    thank you very much for the invitation to speak to you this
    afternoon on this very important issue. Intertanko's members
    represent about 80 percent of the world's independent fleet of
    oil and chemical tankers.
        Piracy on the high seas, as you have already heard, is a
    major issue for the United States, for governments, for the
    maritime industry, and eventually for the consumer. Piracy in
    the strategically important chokepoint in the Gulf of Aden and
    off the Somali coast is of particular concern for oil shipments
    and my members. The hijacking last November of the Saudi
    Arabian Sirius Star carrying more than 2 million barrels of
    crude oil to the United States highlighted the reasons for our
    concern and our alarm. We are therefore grateful that nations,
    and especially the United States, have started to take
    appropriate responses to that action.
        While governments and many others have legitimate concerns
    about these events, I want to assure you all that the prime
    concern of our members, and I suspect all other shipowners, is
    the safety and welfare of our seafarers, and the concern for
    the security of our ships and security of their cargo come
    second. But there are other consequences of these attacks which
    are of major concern. These include, for example, the
    additional costs for insurance and for crews transiting that
    area or the extra costs associated with the longer voyages for
    ships that opt to re-route around the Cape of Good Hope, costs
    that are eventually borne by the consumer.
        So what is being done and what else is needed? My members
    firmly believe that the establishment of law and order on the
    high seas is an issue for governments and not one that industry
    can solve. That said, we recognize though that the shipping
    industry does have a big part to play in this matter and there
    is therefore a shared responsibility between industry and
    governments.
        On the industry side we are fully committed to the
    development and the implementation of the best practices that
    have been referred to. To this end we also cooperate with the
    International Maritime Organization in reviewing and updating
    guidance to owners and to ships. We distribute security
    bulletins regularly to our members. We work with our industry
    colleagues to provide both generic and specific advice for
    transits, and we maintain regular contact with the military
    advisers and reporting centers.
        We have also seconded some of our staff to the EU Naval
    Force Headquarters to enhance two-way communications between
    military and commercial operations and to help ensure that
    information is routinely and promptly updated. One particular
    challenge does remain, and that is that we want to ensure that
    all shipping transiting in this region is made fully aware of
    those best practices.
        We are therefore now focused on methods to promote
    awareness, appraising other owners and operators of relevant
    facts, the risks involved, and the measures that ships can take
    to avoid, deter, or delay pirated attacks. We are focusing
    especially on those ships outside the large net of well-
    informed and responsible ship operators who are already well-
    appraised and well aware. This is because while there continue
    to be soft targets or relatively soft targets, the potential
    rewards for pirates remain high, and therefore all shipping is
    potentially vulnerable and remains at risk.
        While industry is doing its best, my members believe that
    governments must take the appropriate action to eliminate
    pirates in the region. In this regard I believe there are five
    main governmental functions that are necessary.
        The first is to provide and then maintain sufficient
    military assets, both naval and aviation, in the area. Until
    recently, these were woefully inadequate, but fortunately with
    the establishment of CT 151 and the combined European Naval
    Forces, the situation has improved.
        The second need is to ensure coordination between those
    military assets and to ensure that we make the most effective
    use of the resources available. From the ship operator's
    standpoint, it is important that there be clarity in the
    reporting and communication mechanisms with these forces.
        Thirdly, there is a need to ensure single or at least
    compatible rules of engagement for those military forces. Each
    navy has its own national laws of engagement when confronting
    pirates. Ideally they should engage on the same lines;
    preferably upon arrival at the scene.
        Fourthly, there is a need, as you have heard, to develop
    the necessary legal authorities to prosecute pirates when
    captured, and the examples given, such as in Kenya, are
    particularly welcomed.
        Fifthly, there is, of course, the need to develop a long-
    term solution to the Somali problem, but I think we all
    naturally understand that this will take time.
        Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to reiterate the total
    commitment of my members to take the best practical steps to
    avoid these attacks and to cooperate fully with governments
    operating in the region.
        We thank you for the opportunity to address the
    Subcommittee.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Noakes.
        Mr. Noakes. Good afternoon, Chairman Cummings, Ranking
    Member LoBiondo, and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for
    inviting BIMCO, the largest of the shipowners associations, to
    testify in front of your Committee.
        Last year 14 of the 42 vessels hijacked off the coast of
    Somalia were BIMCO members.
        Piracy is a global but not a new phenomenon, but has only
    really come to the attention of the international community in
    the last 6 months or so. My aim now is to summarize briefly my
    written statement on what the industry and particularly BIMCO
    is doing about piracy and outline those areas of international
    piracy that remain of gravest concern to BIMCO. I would like to
    focus on three important competing security resources.
        Firstly, global security and competing security resources.
    In short, BIMCO is concerned that governments and the world's
    navies have overlooked the fact that globalization is
    fundamentally a bad trade, the physical movement of heavy goods
    and commodities by sea. Recent statements, seminars, and in the
    press, however, have made it clear that the defense of trade
    appears archaic and dated.
        The Malacca problem, however, took international efforts
    and regional efforts to resolve it to guarantee freedom of the
    seas to the global supply chain being challenged by local
    pirates. This supply chain is once again being held to ransom
    in the Gulf of Aden/Horn of Africa area, a commercial strategic
    chokepoint. The cost of navies in order to mitigate the threat
    has to be balanced with the implications of the inability to
    maintain normal trade and the nations' vital interests. Indeed,
    this has been seriously exacerbated only last week by the
    declaration of two large container lines that they will now go
    around the Cape.
        The implications for the Suez Canal and regional economic
    stability and the rest of the global economy are significant.
        The attack on the capture and of the LPG carrier MV
    Longchamp, discussed earlier, in the Gulf of Aden last Thursday
    before dawn for the first time confirms that pirates are
    resourceful and cunning. By deploying decoys, they led
    coalition warships away from natural targets and succeeded in
    boarding what is recognized as the most vulnerable type of
    vessel, a slow-moving and low freeboard bulker. BIMCO
    understands that it is impossible to fund sufficient warships
    for navies to run escorted convoys, but it is clear there are
    still not enough assets to make the current "area protection
    system," so named, to work. It is clearly having an effect and
    has continued communication and enhanced information sharing
    also, but whilst attacks such as the Longchamp can take place
    then more assets will still be needed.
        The situation is forcing many in the industry to avoid the
    area as it is economically more viable and safer for crews to
    say nothing of the security of the hulls themselves. Indeed,
    the industry has forecast a severe shortage of officers and
    crews over the next decade, and the safety of crews has become
    a major industry driver both for recruitment and retention.
        Secondly, judicial weaknesses. Arrest and trial of pirates,
    as we have heard, is proving difficult as even those nations
    providing naval forces have not addressed their national law on
    piracy and the necessary legal statutes to arrest and try
    pirates. Nations who are committing resources and warships to
    counter piracy seemingly fail to see that putting pirates back
    ashore is making a laughingstock of them and failing to deter
    the pirates from continuing their lucrative trade.
        UNCLOS does not explicitly require states to enact
    legislation, but it does obligate states to cooperate to the
    fullest extent possible in the repression of piracy on the high
    seas. Notwithstanding this obligation under UNCLOS to cooperate
    to the fullest extent, the vast majority have not implemented
    the requirements of SUA1988 signed by 149 nations. For example,
    because of this the Danish warship which should be out at sea
    deterring pirates is alongside in Bahrain today with five
    pirates arrested in the act still onboard. It is waiting for
    its government and the Dutch Government to make up their minds
    how to hand over the pirates to the Dutch legally for trial.
    The Dutch have said they would try them, but 1 month later this
    situation has not been resolved.
        BIMCO is aware that the U.S. Coast Guard is a strong
    advocate of implementing the SUA1988 proposal swiftly, and
    BIMCO will support all efforts to see a speedy implementation,
    including cognizance within the U.N. Contact Group Working
    Group tasked to address jurisdictional issues and by inviting
    its members to engage with their national governments.
        Thirdly and finally, perceptions and understanding. The
    industry, with the International Maritime Organization, has
    been at great pains to defend itself against piracy for some
    considerable time, as evidenced in the number of actions as
    listed in my statement. Over the last 6 months or so, however,
    the industry has been continually invited to prove its own
    defenses against piracy. You have heard it is working hard to
    do so and mainly by the military. These range from best
    preparations to using armed guards. The last it resolutely
    opposes because of the risks, implications, and dangerous
    precedents involved in accepting such measures.
        The industry also understands the complications of
    coordinating and controlling the vessels from four different
    groups, from currently 14 nations with 20 ships soon to be 15
    nations and 22 ships. The industry perception, however, is that
    whilst this is clearly working and having an effect, it remains
    a concern as to whether the capacity of these forces is being
    maximized to best effect and indeed whether there are still
    enough ships.
        BIMCO would also suggest that there is a greater need to
    understand the role of IMO as the preeminent maritime body and
    the vehicles already exist to examine methods of deterring and
    defeating piracy. The ISPS codes, for example, do not
    specifically address piracy in name, but by utilizing the ISPS
    ship security assessment requirements to address the piracy
    threat, much can be achieved. The work of the piracy contact
    group that has fallen out of UNSCR 1851 will need to be
    coordinated through the IMO where work is already in hand to
    revise Maritime Safety Committee Circulars.
        In summary, it is accepted that it is naive to defeat
    piracy totally. But the volume of successful attacks remains
    unacceptable, and there is a requirement for a paradigm change
    in how navies and governments view the industry. There is a
    requirement for this paradigm change in order to, firstly,
    appreciate the importance of shipping and the maintenance of
    the global economic system and recognize its vulnerabilities;
    secondly, make piracy less attractive by arresting and trying
    captured pirates; and finally, to reduce the numbers taken and
    held to gain the initiative to break the back of the problem.
        Chairman Cummings, Ranking Member LoBiondo, Members of the
    Subcommittee, thank you again for the opportunity to testify
    today. BIMCO is committed to working tirelessly with our
    industry partners and all stakeholders involved in protecting
    seafarers and ships from international piracy. I am happy to
    take any questions you may have.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much. I want to thank all of
    you for your testimony. We have got our last votes for today
    coming up. So what we are going to do is sort of abbreviate our
    questions and what have you and try to resolve this hearing
    before we go to vote. We have three votes.
        You all have been so kind to stick around as long as you
    have, and we have Members who have to get out of town also.
        We are very pleased to have our Chairman of the entire
    Transportation Committee, Mr. Oberstar, with us, and I am glad
    to recognize him at this time.
        Mr. Oberstar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to
    congratulate you for your initiative in focusing Committee
    attention on this issue of piracy and Mr. LoBiondo for
    participating. Welcome back to the Coast Guard Subcommittee,
    Mr. LoBiondo. You have performed exceptional service in years
    past, and we are glad to have you back in this position.
        Mr. LoBiondo. It is an honor to be here. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Oberstar. And Chairman Cummings has done extraordinary
    service in his first 2 years of our majority in the last
    Congress and is continuing in this Congress.
        We have to make it clear to the international community
    that piracy is a matter of great concern to all seafaring
    nations and that it will not be tolerated, will not be taken
    lightly, and that mariners should not be in fear of their lives
    or their livelihoods as they transit this or any other region.
    Piracy, whether it was in the Mediterranean in the early years
    of our Nation or in our backyard in the Caribbean during the
    time of the Fleu Boustea, the French pirates, is an act or a
    series of acts that our government from its inception has not
    tolerated and will not tolerate.
        There are companies nonetheless that have not taken the
    appropriate measures that they can and should take to protect
    themselves. We know well oceans cover 80 percent of the globe
    surface and navies can't be everywhere. So we have to have
    responsible companies that will take charge of their own
    destiny, but we have to have our naval fleets and our Coast
    Guard authority present where there is high probability of
    piracy action. And you can help us by the testimony you have
    given, which is very well said.
        I stayed up last night and read it, a greater understanding
    of piracy, its impact, how it occurs, where it occurs, and what
    actions we can take preventively, preemptively, and in the
    course of commerce. We thank you very much for your testimony.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Larsen.
        Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chalk, good to see you again. You were in my office a
    few weeks back; so I am not going to rehash some of the things
    we talked over. But since then we have received more
    information on the MOU between the U.S. and Kenya and with
    regards to what does a dog do with the car once he catches it.
    Answering that question, what are your thoughts about the U.S.-
    Kenyan MOU and what is going to be done with pirates who are
    captured, and have you made an assessment whether that is going
    to be enough of a deterrent effect?
        Mr. Chalk. Thank you for that question. I think the MOU
    that the United States has signed with Kenya is a positive
    development because one of the greatest problems was, as you
    said, what do you do with the pirates once you have caught
    them? In most cases, though, they were just handed back into
    Somalia, which was basically a get-out-of-jail card right
    there.
        The problem with the Kenyan judicial system if you are
    looking at the country as a whole is that there is rampant
    corruption and the judicial structure there has been the
    recipient of numerous influxes of assistance both from the
    United States and from the United Kingdom. And really in terms
    of its functioning at this point, although it is a positive
    development, I have my own doubts as to how efficient the court
    system will be and how clean it will be as well.
        So I think that there is still a lot to be worked out in
    terms of the actual prosecution of apprehended pirates and
    whether or not--I certainly do not see the Kenyan detention
    system as being a sufficient deterrent for Somali-based
    pirates, particularly given how much they are earning today and
    the fact that the MOU really only extends to the United States;
    so it doesn't affect other countries.
        Mr. Larsen. That is something probably worth exploring for
    us in the future.
        Mr. Noakes, is that a correct pronunciation?
        Mr. Noakes. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Larsen. You talked about the capacity of the existing
    military assets as well as the numbers. Let us not talk about
    whether or not there is enough naval assets, but you mentioned
    perhaps a capacity of the existing assets may not be used
    fully. That is what I gathered. You probably also heard my
    comments in the previous panel. It is sort of the how much, how
    long question when we clearly have other needs around the
    world. Some are more needy and some are less needy, but
    certainly other needs around the world. So can you try to touch
    on how much, how long and expand on the capacity of military
    assets and how they are being used?
        Mr. Noakes. Mr. Larsen, I don't quite understand what you
    are getting at. I think my colleagues here would agree we
    understand this can't go on forever, and I think all three of
    us alluded to the issue of capacity. But the concern I think
    that the industry has in general is that you have a commendable
    reaction from the international community, and I mentioned the
    issue of I think 14 nations, about to become 15 nations with 22
    ships. That is a sizable what I used to call command and
    control problem, and if that is maximized to its best, then I
    suspect in a very short period of time it could achieve a
    realistic amount of deterrence on the high seas, particularly
    if supported by the other aspects of the judicial additional
    weaknesses being resolved to a certain element, and that I
    think is the problem. But how long is a piece of string? And
    hence why I introduced my brief presentation over the issue of
    what is important in terms of globally strategic commerce and
    whose nations have those vital interests.
        But there is no doubt about it. The revenues of the Suez
    Canal have gone down in the last quarter of 2008. They are
    going down probably this quarter already and two major box
    lines have already opted not just because of the piracy
    problem, but that is one of the reasons, as have some of the
    Intertanko members, as has the biggest shipping line in the
    world Maersk.
        So we have to look at it from a holistic and big picture as
    well as the nitty-gritty small issues, but equally the industry
    is aware it has to help itself, too.
        Does that go some way to answer your question?
        Mr. Larsen. Yes, somewhat. I would like to do some follow-
    up perhaps with you or Mr. Swift, Captain Davies, or your
    representatives around here, to chat a little more about this
    problem because I think we might try to go to the Seapower
    Subcommittee on the Armed Services Committee and chat with our
    Navy about this as well in a more complete manner.
        Mr. Cummings. Ms. Richardson.
        Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very
    brief. Just one question for Captain Davies.
        Over the past couple of years there have been armed attacks
    at oil installations and tankers around the Nigerian Delta
    region. What, if any, measures are being taken to lessen the
    likelihood of future attacks which disrupt the flow of global
    energy supplies, and how cooperative have the Nigerian
    authorities been in helping to tackle this issue?
        Captain Davies. Thank you, Ms. Richardson. I think
    basically in terms of Nigeria it tends to be much more of an
    armed robbery/kidnap situation than a hijacking of vessels.
    What we have seen is that the Nigerian navy has tried to
    engage. In fact, they are fighting them in two places. They are
    fighting in the Delta. They are also trying to protect the oil
    fields offshore.
        Unfortunately, one of our members suffered an attack a
    couple years ago where seven members were taken ashore, and the
    psychological effects on the seafarers that were involved are
    extreme, and that is one of our big concerns in this. But
    certainly Nigeria is trying as hard as it can to protect the
    installations, but one of the big problems there is it is
    within Nigerian waters. So it tends to be a Nigerian problem
    rather than an international problem, as we are seeing in the
    Gulf of Aden.
        Mr. Cummings. I want to thank you all for being with us.
    Sorry we had to shorten this part a bit, but like I said, we
    will follow up with you.
        We are not going to resolve this situation overnight. One
    of the things you have made clear is this is a very, very, very
    complex problem and perhaps will require some complex
    solutions, but I do believe that we will be able to address it,
    and we will. Thank you very much.
        This hearing is now adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:52 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
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