[Senate Hearing 110-1204]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-1204
U.S. COAST GUARD BUDGET AND OVERSIGHT
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANS, ATMOSPHERE, FISHERIES, AND COAST GUARD
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 18, 2007
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
79-550 WASHINGTON : 2013
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202�09512�091800, or 866�09512�091800 (toll-free). E-mail, [email protected].
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West TED STEVENS, Alaska, Vice Chairman
Virginia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
BARBARA BOXER, California OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
Margaret L. Cummisky, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Lila Harper Helms, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and Policy Director
Christine D. Kurth, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel
Kenneth R. Nahigian, Republican Deputy Staff Director and Chief Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANS, ATMOSPHERE, FISHERIES, AND COAST GUARD
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington, OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine, Ranking
Chairman TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
BILL NELSON, Florida JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on April 18, 2007................................... 1
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Lautenberg.................................. 18
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Statement of Senator Nelson...................................... 26
Statement of Senator Snowe....................................... 3
Statement of Senator Stevens..................................... 5
Witnesses
Allen, Admiral Thad W., Commandant, Department of Homeland
Security, U.S. Coast Guard..................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Appendix
Caldwell, Stephen L., Acting Director, Homeland Security and
Justice Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO),
prepared statement............................................. 49
Inouye, Hon. Daniel K., U.S. Senator from Hawaii, prepared
statement...................................................... 49
Reserve Officers Association of the United States, prepared
statement...................................................... 69
Response to written questions submitted to Admiral Thad W. Allen
by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 77
Hon. Daniel K. Inouye........................................ 72
Hon. John F. Kerry........................................... 85
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg..................................... 85
Hon. Trent Lott.............................................. 93
Hon. Olympia J. Snowe........................................ 89
U.S. COAST GUARD BUDGET AND OVERSIGHT
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 18, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and
Coast Guard,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met at 2:30 p.m., in room SR-253, Russell
Senate Office Building, Hon. Maria Cantwell, Chairman of the
Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. This Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Oceans,
Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard will come to order. This
afternoon we are having a hearing on the U.S Coast Guard budget
and oversight of the budget proposal.
We welcome Admiral Thad Allen, Commandant of the U.S. Coast
Guard, to be before the Committee today. I will point out to my
colleagues and staff that we also have written testimony
submitted by Steven Caldwell from the GAO and we'll have that
available and obviously the hearing, like all hearings, we'll
make the record open for two weeks post the hearing for
additional questions that we might propose to Commandant Allen
and to Mr. Caldwell. Before we get to you Admiral, if I could
make some remarks and then I am sure my colleague, Senator
Snowe, if she arrives in time, will want to make some comments
and then we'll turn it over to you.
I'd like to thank everyone for joining us here today
because I do believe that this important hearing on the Coast
Guard and its Fiscal Year 2008 budget request is critically
important.
Admiral Allen, I think you have been now before this
Committee numerous times even though your tenure as Commandant
has been brief.
But as you know from those time periods in your previous
service that America expects a lot out of the Coast Guard. You
are constantly being asked to balance the increased demands of
an evolving homeland security mission while ensuring that the
traditional missions are not cast aside.
When confronting the challenges facing the Coast Guard and
as we look at your budget, we must keep in mind that enormous
challenge of mission balance and the fact that security is a
critical component of that and probably no place knows that
better than Washington State where we have one of the busiest
and most complex waterways in the world--that is combined with
Seattle and Tacoma, we're the nation's third busiest port. Last
year more than 4 million cargo containers moved through our
ports. Seattle is also one of our busiest ports as we move
almost 26 million people and 11 million vehicles annually on
our ferry system around Puget Sound.
So when we talk about securing our borders and screening
our communities, it isn't an afterthought, it's a critical
component of the day-to-day lives and business operations in
the Northwest as it is in many ports around the country.
So we need to be sure that the Coast Guard has adequate
resources to protect our ports and commerce from the threat of
attack. While we depend on the Coast Guard for security, we
also depend heavily on the Coast Guard to meet its traditional
safety and stewardship missions.
In Washington State, our crowded waterways make the threat
of an oil spill particularly high. The Coast Guard plays a
critical role in preventing and responding to oil spills, and
I'm obviously concerned that we need to do more in this area to
increase our safety net.
I want to make sure that when we get to the Q&A that we
talk about the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and ways that we need
to make sure that the increased salvage and oil spill response
equipment is there for our Nation's coastline.
Admiral no organization, as I said earlier does more with
fewer resources than the United States Coast Guard, and I want
to commend you for those efforts. Having said that though, I am
concerned that the funding request for the Coast Guard's Fiscal
Year 2008 budget--whether it is sufficient to meet all of the
needs that we have outlined.
Our request of $8.7 billion is a flat line increase, only
$100 million over the Fiscal Year 2007 enacted levels and with
those resources, we will want to be very detailed about exactly
how missions, critical missions, of the Coast Guard are going
to be met.
In particular, there are a number of areas in this year's
budget request that concern me and I hope that you will be able
to shed some light on these in your testimony.
First of all, Deepwater and Rescue 21. Of course the single
most, largest acquisition in the Coast Guard's $8.7 billion
2008 request, is the $836 million request for the Deepwater
Program. This Subcommittee has already had one hearing, where
my colleagues and I have voiced grave concerns about Deepwater,
its oversight and the impact to the U.S. taxpayer. I know
Senator Snowe will have her own comments and thoughts on that,
but she has co-sponsored S. 924 to reform the Deepwater Program
because I believe that it is absolutely essential that we
ensure the greatest competition and transparency in the
Deepwater Program and the Coast Guard has the personnel and
tools to manage a contract of this size. The Coast Guard needs
to complete its mission safely and effectively and the
taxpayers need to get what they are paying for.
Additionally, we need to apply a similar dose of
transparency and oversight to Rescue 21. This critical upgrade
of the Coast Guard's communication system is vital to locating
and rescuing stranded mariners. Unfortunately though, the
program has suffered from cost overruns and program delays. It
is now scheduled for completion in 2011 instead of 2006. The
Coast Guard cost estimate is now $730 million above the
original plan. In addition, I hear that the outstanding
contract negotiations may cause the cost of Rescue 21 to climb
even higher.
I'm also concerned and disappointed to see that once again,
there is not a request for the funding of the Polar Icebreaker
Fleet. I see the Coast Guard plans to rely on the National
Science Foundation for reimbursement of the operation and
maintenance cost of these vessels even though the Memorandum of
Agreement that ensures this reimbursement might not even be
signed this year. We consider this a huge problem and I think
that is why we wrote into language in Maritime Transportation
Act of 2006, a requirement that the Coast Guard provide to
Congress with a long-term recapitalization plan for those Polar
Icebreakers.
The SAFE Port Act required the Coast Guard to establish
interagency operation command centers at our highest risk ports
within 3 years. I see little to no progress in this year's
budget to attempt to meet this goal and this concerns me
greatly.
Finally, the Coast Guard's 2008 budget recommends
realigning its five deployable Special Forces units into a
Deployable Operations Group requiring a base reallocation under
the Coast Guard's operating budget. Well, I can see that the
reorganization may help streamline operations. I also want to
make sure that there are no unintended or negative consequences
to this redeployment. I am looking forward to hearing your
reasoning for this reorganization and how we monitor its
effectiveness and the potential hurdles that we may face.
Before I turn things over to Senator Snowe, let me close by
just thanking Senator Snowe for attending today and Admiral,
for your presence here at today's hearing.
The Coast Guard is a critical resource issue for our Nation
and it's imperative that the budget of the Coast Guard and the
Coast Guard itself deliver on these priorities for our Nation.
We must provide both the oversight to prevent costly and
dangerous delays in the procurement of assets but also ensuring
that the American taxpayer gets the resources it needs for the
mission of the Coast Guard.
With that, I will turn it over to my colleague Senator
Snowe.
STATEMENT OF HON. OLYMPIA J. SNOWE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MAINE
Senator Snowe. Thank you very much, Madam Chair and I
appreciate the fact that you've called for this oversight
hearing on the Coast Guard budget request for Fiscal Year 2008.
Obviously this is a very important hearing to address the
funding requirements for the Coast Guard, and I look forward to
that critical review here today with the Commandant.
Let me also say it's difficult if not impossible, under
current circumstances, to deliberate on a blueprint for
spending for the Coast Guard without recalling the flaws in the
Deepwater Acquisition Program. Back in February, we met in this
room to discuss the immense challenges the Coast Guard
confronts in effectively executing what I still believe to be
one of the Nation's most vital modernization efforts.
So today provides us with an additional critical
opportunity to ensure that we as a Committee leave no stone
unturned in ensuring the mismanagement of the past is addressed
for the future.
We also recognize the significance of a properly executed
Deepwater Program for the continued viability of the Coast
Guard. There is no question that we must move from point A,
which is the Coast Guard with woefully outdated, outmoded
assets to a point B, with the outstanding men and women of the
service have the ships and helicopters and equipment
commensurate with not only the increased duties but also with
their admirable skill and professionalism.
As we meet here today, clearly the Coast Guard still finds
itself in desperate need of those assets. The fact remains that
the men and women of your service, Commandant, continue to
serve our Nation aboard ships that comprise the third oldest
naval fleet in the world. We've already invested more than $2.3
billion in this recapitalization effort.
As you stated yesterday, Admiral Allen, the Coast Guard
must redefine its responsibilities, its industry relationships
and frankly, its performance in managing this monumental
program.
I appreciate the fact that as Commandant, you have accepted
responsibility even though all the decisions that resulted in
the serious flaws in the Deepwater Program--all of the
deficiencies--predate your tenure as Commandant. I am aware of
the recent steps that you've taken to place Deepwater back on
track.
Your announcement yesterday that the Coast Guard will
assume the lead systems integrator role is an appropriate, if
long overdue step toward ridding the Coast Guard and the
government of the self-serving practices of the contractors.
But this is just the beginning of the process and if there
is continued vigorous scrutiny and skepticism from this Ranking
Member and the Chair of this Committee, I hope you understand
it's with good reason.
I know you respect the spirit in which I say that until I
see proud new and fully functional ships displaying the Coast
Guard's racing stripe as they patrol our shores, I will do
everything in my power not just to watch your service pursue
these assets but to guide your hands.
To bolster your efforts to gain control of Deepwater, as
the Chair indicated, she and I have introduced legislation that
will eliminate the contractors' ability to certify their own
work, mandate independent third party assessments of the Coast
Guard's decisions, and provide regular reports to Congress
specifically outlining how Deepwater funds are being spent,
when assets will be delivered, and how those assets will
facilitate completion of the Coast Guard's missions.
The Coast Guard has requested over $836 million to extend
the Deepwater Program into the Fiscal Year 2008. This funding
must be accompanied by legislation that we have introduced that
ensures the Coast Guard will adhere to the highest standards of
oversight without deviation.
Today we also must increase the scope of our discussion to
review the ongoing challenges and budget needs facing the
military service as a whole. As we all well know, the Coast
Guard is tasked with protecting our shores from threats,
natural and manmade, intentional and accidental, foreign and
domestic. This military service is the cornerstone of our
national security and we would be remiss if we failed to
provide the Coast Guard with the adequate assets and resources
to carry out the multitude of missions we have assigned to it
and that it has accomplished so admirably over the years.
The Fiscal Year 2008 budget request contains other items
that raise considerable concern as well. For the third year in
a row, the Administration request reduces funding for domestic
fisheries enforcement, this year by more than $50 million. For
the third consecutive year as well, the observed rate of
compliance with fishery regulations during at-sea boardings was
below the Coast Guard's goal of 97 percent.
I would suggest that this is no coincidence. To improve
stock status, help prevent overfishing and maintain a level
playing field for fishermen, we must ensure enforcement teams
have the funding they require. I do not see that taking place
under the current budget structure and we cannot reasonably
expect the Coast Guard to continue to do more while we
perpetually provide them with less.
Our Committee must ensure the Coast Guard is well
positioned and prepared to meet our future maritime challenges
and threats head on and to successfully fulfill its diverse yet
critical missions. While the Coast Guard desperately requires
additional resources, the job of this oversight Committee is to
maintain a proper balance between equipping the service in a
way that it can carry out its vital missions while protecting
the investment of the American taxpayer.
At today's hearing, I expect to learn how best to
facilitate that goal. Again, Admiral Allen, I'd like to thank
you for testifying here today. I have been impressed by your
leadership, your increased focus on transparency and your
candid and forthright assessment of the issues confronting the
Coast Guard and I look forward to hearing your testimony on the
roles and missions of this critical service and your plans to
better align the Coast Guard's disparate missions and assets
under a streamlined command structure.
I want to thank the Chair as well, for her leadership on
this issue and of course, on the legislation that she
introduced and I joined that will help to streamline the
approach and address the fundamental issues with Deepwater for
now and for the future.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Senator Snowe.
Senator Stevens, would you like to make an opening
statement?
STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Stevens. Yes, thank you, Madam Chairman. As many of
you know, Alaska has half the coastline in the United States
and the Coast Guard has a very daunting role of patrolling that
area and particularly taking it out to the 200 mile limit--over
three and a half million square miles.
Whether it is rescuing fisherman in the icy waters of the
Bering Sea or flying Medivac missions in the Southeast, the
Coast Guard has played a critical role in saving many lives in
Alaska. As a matter of fact, we used to call them midwives of
Alaska because they delivered so many babies there for a while.
The Coast Guard Station at Kodiak, the old former navy base, is
the largest Coast Guard station in the United States now.
On February 8, just 2 months before this hearing, the Coast
Guard decommissioned its oldest ship, the Coast Guard Cutter
STORIS, which I had the honor of traveling on for a while. It
was home ported in Kodiak, Alaska and it was over 64 years of
age. It was a wonderful vessel.
Taking its place now as the ``queen of the fleet'' is the
ACUSHNET. The ACUSHNET which is home ported in Ketchikan
celebrated its 63rd birthday on February 5. We look
forward to the day when the ACUSHNET will be replaced by one of
the state-of-the-art National Security Cutters that have been
developed under the Deepwater Program.
But I am concerned about the recent reports of cost
overruns and delays in that program. Many of the Coast Guard's
existing fleet of vessels and aircraft are nearing or have
reached the end of their useful service lives. Modernizing the
Coast Guard and replacing these vessels and particularly the
aircraft should remain a top priority.
Admiral Allen, I think it's critical to get the program
back on the right track and I look forward to trying to work
with you to do so. Thank you very much for appearing today,
sir.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Senator Stevens. Admiral
Allen, again welcome. We're glad that you are here this
afternoon to give testimony about the budget and I think you've
heard my colleague's concerns specifically about Deepwater,
which I am sure will be part of your testimony but welcome and
thank you for attending today's hearing.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL THAD W. ALLEN, COMMANDANT,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. COAST GUARD
Admiral Allen. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member
Snowe and Senator Stevens. I have a statement for the record
and I'll make a short oral statement to open with if that's OK.
I was telling my staff before I got here today, I didn't
know if I should prepare an opening statement for an
authorization hearing, a budget hearing, or a Deepwater hearing
and I think you've told me we need to talk about everything and
I think that's very appropriate, given the external
environment, what's going on with the Coast Guard right now.
I'd like to start with a little context piece if I could,
about what we are trying to do in the Coast Guard right now
because it not only involves Deepwater, it involves mission
balance, the budget and all the issues you've raised in your
opening statements.
When I became the Commandant less than a year ago, there
were five things I thought I needed to do to position the Coast
Guard to be successful moving forward in a very, very
challenging environment with increased mission emphasis
following 9/11 and following Katrina and the all hazards threat
environment that we live in. I thought it was most important to
focus on mission execution.
After Katrina and the enormous pride that the Nation had in
the Coast Guard, I thought it was very, very important that we
not take our eye off the ball and that we have an organization
out there that could keep up with the expectations of the
American public and our own expectations of what we expect of
ourselves as a service. But in order do that, we need the right
force structure, we need to be able to effectively command and
control those forces, we need to have a mission support
organization that makes sure that those assets are ready when
you need them in the hands of the people and properly trained.
We also have to have them supported by business processes that
make sense.
In a lot of those areas, over the last few years in the
Coast Guard, while we have made progress, there are areas where
we are not as well positioned to move forward as we should have
been. In February, in my State of the Coast Guard speech, I
told our men and women the external environment is changing and
the Coast Guard has to change. In fact, a number of changes
were initiated right after I took command last May that impact
what is going on with Deepwater, mission balance, and so forth
and I will make that point in just a second.
The bottom line from where I sit as the Commandant of Coast
Guard is to make sure that we have a competent organization
from top to bottom that is organized correctly in terms of
force structure and how we do things to be able to sustain the
mission execution the American public expects of us.
To start with, we need to know where we're going in the
Coast Guard and I remember at a hearing almost a year ago, we
talked about strategy and whether or not incremental changes
after 9/11 or after Katrina are the right way to manage the
maritime environment, a maritime security regime for this
country. We recently put out a maritime strategy that is
intended to be the capstone document during my tenure as
Commandant about what is important for safety, stewardship and
security. They all have to be in balance. They are three legs
of a stool. One cannot predominate and I agree with you,
mission balance is very important. We can't focus on security
at the exclusion of our other missions.
Once we have the strategy set, we need a source to the
strategy and that means budget, rulemaking, international
agendas at IMO, legislation that needs to be focused on what it
is we are trying to accomplish in terms of buying down risk,
increasing safety and to be more effective stewards.
So what I have tried to do in my first year as Commandant
is take a pause, if you will and take a look, get the strategy
right and then see how those pieces come together.
When you do that, you need to make sure that legislation is
cued up, that it will be able to result in rulemaking that
we'll be able to buy down risk in ports but that the budget
that you are submitting supports that also. If you are
successful legislatively but you don't have the resources,
you're not going to be effective.
So what I've tried to do is put all that together in a
comprehensive plan. That was not possible walking in the door,
so what you have before you today is a current services budget.
I will make no argument against that. That budget was almost in
place when I took over. I didn't think it was appropriate to
try and jam a lot of things into the budget without having
given it proper thought.
So Fiscal Year 2008 is somewhat of a contemplative
reorganization focus year for the Coast Guard, get the strategy
right, come to you all, have the policy discussions that we
need to and then move forward having legislation, rulemaking
and budget proposals linked together. There are places where
there are no funds requested this year. We surely expect in
future years to be requesting budgets, especially for command
centers and things like that.
There had been several comments made about Deepwater.
Yesterday, I held a press conference and made an announcement
regarding six strategic decisions that I had made in
consultation with the CEO's of Northrop Grumman and Lockheed
Martin.
I have met and communicated frequently with Bob Stevens and
Ron Sugar and these are decisions that we collectively came to
because there is an essential part of Deepwater that needs to
be understood as we move ahead with the conversation and that's
that there was work in progress that if stopped, would cause
cost and schedule implications that would not allow us to have
assets online when some of these older ships start getting to
the point where they cannot be operated and we may face a gap
in coverage even more significant than we have right now. To
that end, we all agreed that the Coast Guard had to play the
major role in leading systems integrations.
The reason we had to do that is that while ostensibly when
the contract was awarded, the Integrated Coast Guard System
will be systems integrator for the systems of systems related
to cutters, aircraft and sensors.
There is a larger Coast Guard out there. We have command
centers, we have small boats, we have polar icebreakers, we
have buoy tenders and the issue of who integrates the Deepwater
System into the larger Coast Guard System with a capital S, was
always silent.
I think for the reasons listed in the reports from the
oversight groups, from you all as we've had this discussion and
in addition to the fact that we need to integrate Deepwater
into the rest of the Coast Guard, nobody can do that except the
Coast Guard.
We will move forward as the systems integrator. We will use
the contractor where it is appropriate but the Coast Guard will
have the lead in making those decisions. Second, logistics
support. An assumption was made going in that we would consider
integrated logistic support provided through Integrated Coast
Guard Systems as a logistics provider.
Again, understanding that these platforms have to be
transitioned into a larger Coast Guard maintenance and
logistics system, the Coast Guard must be the lead logistics
integrator, the second point we agreed to.
Third point, external verification of construction and
work. You mentioned this earlier in your statements. We are
moving forward with a Fast Response Cutter B solicitation next
month in May. We will class that by American Bureau shipping as
needed. We will have an external certification as we move
forward.
Fourth, the National Security Cutter. We hope to have the
final design details for the structural changes that needed to
exceed--to meet the fatigue life standards that we need to
operate that cutter for 30 years done next month. Once we get
the third NSC baseline on what changes are needed, we then can
go back and see what changes need to be made to the first and
second hulls. We are prepared to move forward as fast as we
can. We have the commitment to resolve these issues with our
industry partners.
Fifth, for all assets that are in production right now, we
have agreed at some point when we demonstrated first article
performance--in other words, the asset is performing as it was
intended to specification. We need to question then whether or
not there is added value to execute that contract through
Integrated Coast Guard Systems and maybe it should be placed
directly with the original equipment manufacturer. In other
words, we are moving ICGS as the middleman with the additional
layer and the cost associated with that.
So we will look at every platform that's in production and
see whether or not that needs to be placed directly with the
manufacturer at a certain point in production. But we need to
get through the first initial items and make sure we have
performance demonstrated with each one of those assets.
Finally, we cannot be effective moving forward, meeting the
responsibilities that I have in the Coast Guard, the
responsibilities we have to you, the oversight committees, the
Inspector General, the Goverment Accountability Office, unless
I am personally involved in this. I have the commitment of both
CEOs of Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman moving forward as
long as we have a contractual relationship that we will meet at
least quarterly as a Senior Executive Group and provide
personal oversight to how we move forward on this.
The challenges associated with Deepwater, the challenges
associated with strategy and authorization and the challenges
associated with the budget all come against the backdrop of
what I call the tyranny of the present in Washington. That is
the day-to-day leadership and management of the Coast Guard and
this first year has not been without its challenges.
We were devastated by the loss of our shipmates on the
HEALY. You've held an oversight hearing on that. We are
tackling the problems associated with that. We lost a crewman
of our MSST in Seattle. There was a deploy to Seattle not long
ago--we need to look into that.
We need to understand where we have vulnerabilities inside
the organization because maybe we have grown fast and maybe we
have young people out there operating in environments they've
never operated before and it's my responsibility as Commandant
to keep them safe.
We just finished the top to bottom review of the Coast
Guard Academy, where we laid out a comprehensive plan to move
forward and redirect some of the energy that has been expended
to the Academy more to character development and getting all
assets of the Academy--the athletic programs, the faculty and
the cadet barracks involved and everybody understanding what it
takes to produce an officer.
We have over 100 line items that came out of that study. We
have placed that study online and it is open to the American
public. We are being completely transparent about it. I've
charged the Board of Trustees of the Coast Guard Academy to
move out and give us an execution plan on how to tackle the
recommendations that were made.
I would have one request of the Committee. There is a
legislative requirement for a Board of Congressional Visitors
at the Coast Guard Academy and I would like to work with your
staff to see if we can't re-energize that and get that back up
and operating. I think that it is very, very important that the
Congressional Board of Visitors play an active role moving
forward with the Coast Guard Academy.
So against that backdrop, thank you for having me here
today. I'd be glad to answer any questions you may have of me.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Allen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Admiral Thad W. Allen, Commandant, Department of
Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard
Introduction
Madam Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee: Good
morning, I am pleased to appear before the Subcommittee today to
discuss the President's Fiscal Year 2008 budget request for the Coast
Guard.
Before I begin, I would like to take this opportunity to explain
how I view the roles and missions of the Coast Guard, as well as the
direction in which I am taking the Service.
Roles and Missions
The Coast Guard is the principal Federal service charged with
maritime safety, security, and stewardship. The Coast Guard protects
the Nation's vital interests--the safety and security of the Nation's
citizenry, its natural and economic resources, and the territorial
integrity of its maritime borders; it operates wherever those interests
may be at risk--the navigable waters of the United States, along the
Nation's coasts, and in international waters. These roles and missions
have accrued to the Coast Guard over two centuries of service because
they serve a collective good and, significantly, a single Federal
maritime force can most efficiently and effectively accomplish them.
More importantly, these roles and missions are converging. The Nation's
response to increasing pressures on the Nation's waterways and maritime
resources and expanding external security threats is having a profound
impact on the development of new management regimes for the U.S.
maritime domain and borders. In this time of dynamic change, the Coast
Guard's multi-mission nature, which has always been a strong value
proposition to the Nation, is taking on new dimensions and
significance. For example:
The Coast Guard's work in marine safety is closely coupled
with, and reinforces new initiatives and standards for, vessel
and facility security.
Its waterways management capacity and expertise are
essential to maritime preparedness and port resilience (i.e.,
the ability to restore rapidly commerce and economic stability
after massive damage, intentional or natural).
Its Combating Maritime Terrorism missions and operations
contribute to the layered defense of the Nation.
The mission to protect marine environment and resources
complements the safety and security missions and ensures that
uses of the Nation's waters and resources are balanced and
sustainable.
The sovereignty enforced by the Coast Guard secures the
Nation's maritime borders from drug and alien smuggling,
contraband, illegal migrants, and robbery of the Nation's
natural resources.
All Coast Guard forces can respond to natural disasters and
emergencies, scaling up to a Katrina-level response when
communities are in danger, regardless of the cause.
In addition to these well known missions, in moments of
international crisis, the Coast Guard can flow non-redundant and unique
war fighting capabilities to the Department of Defense. During
Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Coast Guard, along with U.S. Navy and
coalition naval forces, participated in maritime interception
operations, port security and defense operations, coastal security
patrols. As well, the Coast Guard enforced U.N. sanctions prior to
hostilities and prevented the movement of Iraqi military forces during
and following hostilities. Since the cessation of major combat
operations, Coast Guard forces, along with coalition allies, have
maintained the integrity of Iraqi territorial seas from foreign
encroachment, have provided security of vital Iraqi maritime
infrastructure from insurgent threats, and have conducted training of
Iraqi maritime security forces while ensuring the uninterrupted flow of
the sea line of communications to coalition forces deployed in the
Central Commands area of operations.
The maritime border is unique and complex. It is a system that is
at once an international border, an international highway, a coastal
beltway, a playground for boating, and a site for a variety of economic
enterprises. It requires that the Nation understand that its national
maritime interests cannot be pursued in isolation from one another. As
such, there are eleven specific statutorily-mandated Coast Guard
mission-programs.\1\ Each directly supports the roles of safety,
security, and stewardship. Table 1 shows the primary alignment of Coast
Guard mission-programs to these roles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The term ``mission-program'' is used by the Coast Guard to
identify one of its 11 statutorily mandated missions that guide Coast
Guard budget presentations as well as strategic planning, programming
and performance.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Security Establishing
& Maintaining a Stewardship Managing the
Safety Saving lives secure maritime system sustainable & effective
& Protecting while facilitating use of its inland, coastal
Property its use for the and ocean waters &
national good resources for the future
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Search and Rescue Drug Interdiction Marine Environmental
Protection
Marine Safety Migrant Interdiction Aids to Navigation
Ports, Waterways & Living Marine Resources
Coastal
Security
Other Law Enforcement Ice Operations
Defense readiness
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 1
``Strategic Trident''--Coast Guard Force Structure
An important first step in aligning Coast Guard operational forces
involves the development of a layered security posture in the maritime
domain to meet all hazards and all threats.
Multi-mission Shore Based Forces. The Coast Guard has aligned its
shore-based operations in the establishment of interagency-enabled
Sectors, unifying operations in the Nation's ports. This consolidation
of these shore-based forces at the port level into Sector commands
provides a single point of accountability for operations, unifies
resource allocation, and enables risk-based decisionmaking tools, thus
focusing Coast Guard capabilities and competencies to identify and
mitigate threats.
Maritime Patrol and Interdiction Forces. The centerpiece of the
Coast Guard's future capabilities is the Integrated Deepwater System,
revised to reflect post-9/11 mission requirements such as enhanced
intelligence gathering and handling capabilities. The Integrated
Deepwater System concept was designed to secure the Nation's maritime
borders. This acquisition will integrate the Coast Guard maritime
presence and patrol capability, especially with respect to extended
offshore security operations, thereby allowing the Coast Guard to meet
and defeat threats at the greatest distance from the Nation's shores.
Deployable Specialized Forces. The final piece to the Coast Guard
force structure is the effective employment of deployable forces.
Deployable units will face increased threat levels, respond to
incidents of national significance, and form into adaptive force
packages within the Department of Homeland Security. The Coast Guard
has long maintained teams and detachments that are deployable, but
``stovepiped'' among different mission areas. In the future, these
teams will be placed under one command, a force structure designed to
integrate with the Department of Homeland Security and other Federal
and state agencies, to create a more agile, flexible force that can
deploy in advance of or after an event to mitigate any threats or
hazards. This new force structure will be a more efficient and
effective means of deployment in a post-Katrina environment.
Additionally, it will offer the much needed opportunity to develop
departmental doctrine to support adaptive force packaging for incident
response or surge operations.
Organizational Alignment
Past events have revealed the critical role the Coast Guard plays
in providing safety, security, and stewardship of national maritime
interests. The sinking of the TITANIC laid the foundation for the Coast
Guard's premier role in maritime safety. The EXXON VALDEZ oil spill was
the catalyst to the Coast Guard's much improved and highly visible
maritime stewardship responsibilities. The response to the terrorist
attacks of September 11th and subsequent participation in the Global
War on Terrorism have clearly showcased the Coast Guard's key role in
providing vital maritime security.
The Coast Guard's transfer to the Department of Homeland Security
was a significant step forward in providing for a capability that can
respond to the evolving demand to protect the homeland. Thus, the Coast
Guard's ability to adapt continuously in order to sustain and enhance
its overall mission execution is of paramount importance. As a result,
the Coast Guard is undertaking an organization-wide effort to
restructure and realign command-and-control and mission-support
(including organizational structures, human resources, maintenance,
logistics, financial management, acquisition oversight, and information
systems) to ensure more effective and efficient mission execution.
Efforts currently underway include the consolidation of all
acquisitions management functions to ensure the optimal balance of
contract and administrative personnel between each major acquisition.
Additionally, alignment between the command and control structure
within Coast Guard Headquarters and field unit organization is being
imposed to obtain proper oversight of Coast Guard functions and ensure
optimal mission balance.
This alignment will result in purposeful, service-wide
transformation and enhancement designed to better enable the Coast
Guard to meet the current and future needs of the Nation. The Coast
Guard will become a more agile, adaptive, and responsive organization
capable of working effectively with its interagency partners.
Furthermore, overall Coast Guard mission execution will be enhanced; it
will be even better prepared to fulfill its duty to the Nation. This
new operational framework will facilitate the timely and accurate flow
of information and direction among the strategic, operational and
tactical levels of mission execution. A new command and control system
will evolve and, like the Coast Guard itself, will be more agile,
adaptive, and responsive.
The Coast Guard's Strategy
The Coast Guard Strategy for maritime safety, security, and
stewardship describes how the Coast Guard will work to safeguard the
Nation against all threats, hazards, and challenges in the maritime
domain, today and in the future. It discusses the Coast Guard's
enduring roles, future challenges and threats, as well as a systems
approach for improving maritime governance. From these foundations, the
Strategy presents strategic priorities that build on the Coast Guard's
strengths and best focus its capabilities to serve the Department of
Homeland Security and the Nation. This Strategy is shaped by the laws,
executive orders, international conventions and agreements, and other
guidance that determine U.S. maritime policy (Figure 1).
The Strategy takes significant shape from the National Strategy for
Maritime Security (NSMS), the President's Ocean Action Plan (OAP),
National and Homeland Security Presidential Directives (NSPD/HSPD), and
the Department of Homeland Security goals and priorities. Additionally,
it is the product of the Coast Guard's Evergreen Project, which looks
across alternative futures to determine robust strategies that best
position the Coast Guard and the Nation for a changing world.
Challenges to maintaining America's maritime sovereignty and
security are looming, and the key strategic actions that the Nation
must take lie in three areas: improving operational capability,
building maritime awareness, and strengthening and integrating existing
domestic and international maritime regimes to protect the United
States and other coastal nations against growing transnational threats.
Regimes are the system of ``rules'' that shape acceptable
activities. Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) allows for the detection
and monitoring of activities occurring within the maritime domain.
Together, regimes and MDA inform decisionmakers and allow them to
identify trends, anomalies, and activities that threaten or endanger
U.S. interests. Operational capabilities deter, respond to, verify, and
counter threats. They also ensure the safe and sustainable day-to-day
use of the maritime domain and speed recovery from natural or man-made
impacts in times of crisis.
These activities are not the sole province of the Coast Guard; they
are ineffective without state, local, private and international
participation. Similarly, they are not solely domestic; they span the
globe and take place on all waters. Finally, this framework provides a
common approach to safety, security, and stewardship, often serving all
three objectives through common frameworks and activities.
Viewing maritime initiatives and policies as part of a larger
system enables a better understanding of their inter-relationships and
effectiveness. A well designed system of regimes, awareness, and
operational capabilities creates overlapping domestic and international
safety nets, layers of security, and effective stewardship. Taken
together, they provide a comprehensive system of maritime governance
for the Nation.
One of the fundamental building blocks of this system is Law of the
Sea Convention. Although we have signed this important Convention, we
are not yet a party. Joining the Convention with the declaration and
understandings reflected in Executive Report 108-10 (Senate Foreign
Relations Committee) is an important step in ensuring that we can
exercise the necessary leadership to make this happen.
Update of Deepwater Program
Six Principles of Strategic Intent
I met with the Lockheed Martin CEO Robert Stevens and Northrop
Grumman CEO Ronald Sugar in January to determine near and long-term
objectives and goals for the Deepwater program. Since then, we've
spoken frequently as both the Coast Guard and our industry partners
have taken a number of steps to improve the management, oversight and
performance of the Deepwater program. More recently, we reached
agreement on six fundamental principles that we have begun implementing
to ensure that the government's interests are fully and fairly achieved
in acquiring and fielding assets and capabilities being developed and
produced under the Integrated Deepwater System.
These principles will guide us as we seek to obtain the best value
for the government through robust competition and vigilant contract
oversight and management.
Working together with industry, the Coast Guard will make the
following six fundamental changes in the management of our Deepwater
program:
1. The Coast Guard will assume the lead role as systems
integrator for all Coast Guard acquisitions; including all
Deepwater assets (while continuing to employ ICGS, as
appropriate, to perform specific management, engineering and
system integration functions for which the Coast Guard
determines they are best suited).
2. The Coast Guard will take full responsibility for leading
the management of all life cycle logistics functions within the
Deepwater program (under an improved logistics architecture
established with the new Mission Support organization).
3. The Coast Guard will expand the role of the American Bureau
of Shipping (or other third-parties as appropriate) for
Deepwater vessels to increase assurances that Deepwater assets
are properly designed and constructed in accordance with
established standards.
4. The Coast Guard will work collaboratively with ICGS to
identify and implement an expeditious resolution to all
outstanding issues regarding the first two National Security
Cutters (we are close to final resolution on NSCs #1 and #2).
5. The Coast Guard will consider placing contract
responsibilities for continued production of an asset class (on
a case-by-case basis) directly with the prime vendor,
consistent with competition requirements, if: (1) deemed to be
in the best interest of the government, and (2) only after the
Coast Guard verifies lead asset performance within established
mission requirements.
6. Finally, I will meet no less than quarterly with my
counterparts from industry until any and all Deepwater program
issues are fully adjudicated and resolved.
These changes in program management and oversight going forward
will change the course of Deepwater.
By redefining our roles and responsibilities, redefining our
relationships with our industry partners, and redefining how we assess
the success of government and industry management and performance, the
Deepwater program of tomorrow will be fundamentally better than the
Deepwater program of today.
123-Foot Patrol Boat Decommissioning
A significant step in changing the course of Deepwater is resolving
outstanding issues within the program; I have made the determination to
permanently decommission the eight 123-foot patrol boats converted
under the Deepwater program.
As most of you know, a variety of structural failures occurred on
the 123-foot patrol boats between September 2004 and November 2006.
Despite two structural modifications, the cutters were forced to
operate under increasingly prohibitive operational restrictions in an
attempt to limit further structural damage.
On November 30, 2006, I directed that all eight cutters be
temporarily removed from service due to the heavy repair burden on the
crews along with the need for increased restrictions which would have
rendered the cutters operationally ineffective.
All eight cutters were relocated from Key West, FL to the Coast
Guard Yard in Baltimore in January 2007, where they have been in a
special, inactive status as we considered our options going forward.
Multiple extensive studies and analyses by both Coast Guard
engineers and third-party naval architects and marine engineers over
many months have described the failures in these vessels. They have
been unable to determine a definitive root cause for the 123-foot
patrol boat structural problem; although several design deficiencies
were identified that are consistent with the observed failures.
We believe the design of 123-foot patrol boat cut down on the
structural cross section necessary to support the added weight
distribution following the conversion. Our analysis has been
complicated, however, by the fact that we've observed permanent
deformations of each hull in slightly different ways.
Based on this analysis, any strategy to permanently repair these
cutters would require an iterative, phased approach over a long period
of time (years vs. months) with uncertain costs.
We estimate the total cost for repairing and modernizing these
eight cutters, including a Mission Effectiveness Project (MEP), would
be well over $50 million. The residual value from decommissioning these
cutters is about $50 million, including Deepwater funded equipment
materials and operating expenses that can be reused or redirected to
other programs.
The excessive cost and time associated with continuing to pursue an
uncertain resolution to these structural problems has convinced me that
permanently removing these cutters from service while recouping any
residual value and redirecting funds to other programs is in the best
interest of the government.
Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Request
The Coast Guard will head into FY 2008 making notable progress with
implementing a number of specific initiatives supported by Congress.
These include $10 million appropriated in FY 2006 for Area Maritime
Security Exercises as well as $15 million appropriated in FY 2007 for
foreign port assessments, spot checks of Maritime Transportation
Security Act (MTSA) regulated facilities, and domestic threat/
vulnerability assessments. These initiatives, coupled with requirements
in the SAFE Port Act such as the establishment of port security
training and exercise programs, facility exercise requirements and
interagency operational centers to name a few, all work in concert with
the initiatives shown below toward improving maritime security.
The President's Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Request maintains a
mission-focused Coast Guard that remains capable of answering the
Nation's call by improving operational capability, building maritime
awareness and creating comprehensive regimes. Some of these specific
initiatives within the Fiscal Year 2008 budget addressing capability
and awareness include:
Improving Operational Capability
Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) $836.9 Million (AC&I): The IDS is
a 25-year, performance-based, ``system of systems'' acquisition to
replace or modernize major Coast Guard cutters, offshore patrol boats,
fixed-wing aircraft, multi-mission helicopters and the communications
equipment, sensors, and logistics systems required to maintain and
operate them. As an integrated, interoperable network-centric system,
when complete, IDS will maximize operational capability while
minimizing total ownership costs by leveraging current and future
technologies to achieve maritime awareness in all maritime regimes in
which Coast Guard operates. This request funds the sixth year of
implementation after award and, among other things, will fund four
additional Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), long lead time material for
the National Security Cutter (NSC) #5 and complete funding for NSCs #1-
4, initiate production of the Replacement Patrol Boat (FRC-B), and
complete funding for Airborne Use of Force (AUF) outfitting for the 95
HH-65s and 42 HH-60s.
The IDS procurement is the largest and most complex acquisition
ever undertaken by the Coast Guard, and the acquisition strategy allows
flexibility to accommodate the continuously changing nature of this
evolutionary procurement action, enabling rapid response to changes in
technology, funding, and operational mission requirements. The Coast
Guard is also taking important steps to improve the management of the
program by evaluating the current acquisition strategy and reassessment
of the acquisitions management structure.
Deployable Operations Group (DOG) $132.7 Million base re-allocation
(OE): In the same way that Sector Commands improved unity of effort and
command among the Coast Guard's shore-based forces in the Nation's
ports and coastal regions, the DOG will be a new force structure that
aligns the Coast Guard's Deployable, Specialized Forces (DSF) under a
single unified command. Coordination of existing maritime safety and
security missions will improve and the capabilities of each unit can be
better exploited and used. Once the DOG is fully operational, it will
focus on improving contingency planning, developing adaptive force
packages to address a wide spectrum of national contingencies and
leading efforts to train for an ``all hazards . . . all threats''
response.
Movement of Personnel from Acquisition, Construction & Improvements
(AC&I) into the Operating Expenses (OE) Appropriation $80.5 Million
base re-allocation: This funding transfer will significantly improve
the Coast Guard's ability to successfully manage, oversee and
administer Coast Guard Acquisition, Construction and Improvement (AC&I)
contracts. Consolidating all AC&I personnel funding into the OE
appropriation will allow the Coast Guard to maximize efficiencies and
leverage potential synergies in acquisition activities and management,
as well as increase the Coast Guard's ability to surge personnel to
AC&I-related positions as appropriated project funding levels
fluctuate.
Integrated Deepwater System Surface and Air asset follow-on $55.5
Million (OE):
National Security Cutter (NSC) 751--Provides personnel, and
funding to operate the 2nd National Security Cutter. The NSC is
the largest of the new Integrated Deepwater Systems surface
assets (418,) with vastly improved capabilities over legacy
378, High Endurance Cutters. The NSC will be the most
sophisticated and capable cutter the Coast Guard has ever
operated. It will have a range of 12,000 nautical miles and an
underway endurance of 60 days. The cutter will be capable of
patrolling singly or with multiple Coast Guard vessels, U.S.
Navy vessels, or vessels from other nations' navies or coast
guards. The NSC will conduct proactive and reactive patrols
within its assigned operating areas and will provide a robust
Command and Control capability for the Task Unit Commander or
the On-Scene Commander. It will be capable of performing all
maritime Department of Homeland Security (DHS) missions, non-
General Defense Operations and General Defense Operations with
the Navy such as Ports, Waterways and Coastal Security as well
as Maritime Intercept Operations, Port Operations, Security and
Defense, and Peacetime Military Engagements.
C-130J--The Fiscal Year 2008 budget request provides
operation and maintenance funding for 800 annual flight hours
for the Coast Guard's HC-130J aircraft. These 800 flight hours,
combined with the 3,200 flight hours already appropriated, will
enable the Coast Guard to meet its full operating capability
requirement of 4,000 flight hours for five HC-130J operational
aircraft. The C-130J is the Coast Guard's long-range
surveillance aircraft. This four-engine, turbo-prop aircraft is
used extensively throughout the United States, the Pacific
Ocean and the Caribbean Sea in support of search and rescue,
homeland security, pollution prevention, logistics, personnel
transport and ice patrol missions.
Atlantic Area Deployment Center--This newly established
deployment center will replace the Coast Guard's Helicopter
Interdiction Squadron (HITRON), complete with Airborne Use of
Force (AUF)-capable aircraft and crews. The HITRON initiative
to lease eight MH-68 helicopters was developed as a bridging
strategy to bolster the Coast Guard's illegal drug interdiction
capability and support Port, Waterways and Costal Security
missions until the service could arm its organic helicopter
fleet. On February 1, 2008, the Coast Guard plans to complete
this strategic plan by terminating HITRON and activating the
Atlantic Area Deployment Center. More specifically, this action
will replace the eight leased HITRON MH-68 helicopters with ten
Coast Guard Airborne Use of Force (AUF) equipped, re-engined
MH-65C helicopters at the Jacksonville, Florida facility.
Special Purpose Craft-Law Enforcement Boat (SPC-LE) follow-on $3.3
Million (OE): This request provides funds to operate and maintain the
SPC-LE boats acquired with funding provided in Fiscal Year 2007. These
increased boat allowances will support Certain Dangerous Cargo (CDC)
and high-capacity passenger vessel security, migrant and drug
interdiction, shoreside and waterborne patrols, and boards of High
Interest Vessels (HIV).
Rescue Swimmer Training Facility $13.3 Million (AC&I): This project
will recapitalize the existing Rescue Swimmer Training Facility at
Aviation Technical Training Center, Elizabeth City, NC. As witnessed
during Hurricane Katrina, Aviation Survival Technicians are a vital
component of the Coast Guard's Search and Rescue mission. The existing
facility was built in 1948 and was initially used as a recreational
pool. It must be closed when winds exceed 40 mph due to the poor roof
structure and roof trusses. Funds requested will allow for the
construction of a new building containing a 50x25 meter, 12 foot deep
training pool; Modular Egress Training Simulator; classrooms; and a
dunker tank.
Maritime Security Response Team (MSRT) Shoothouse $1.8 Million
(AC&I) and $644K (OE): Funding will allow the Coast Guard to construct
a shoothouse training facility at Camp Lejeune, NC, for the Special
Mission Training Center to train deployable forces. This facility would
be unique in that it will provide the opportunity to train in a
shipboard like environment; in addition, due to its proximity to the
water, students would be able to train in the shoothouse in the morning
and on the water in the afternoon. These specialized forces rely on
interagency support to train their members to ensure standardization
and integration with Department of Defense (DOD) forces. Request also
includes funding to complete equipment and training requirements of the
MSRT's third Direct Action Section (DAS) and CBRNE Section funded in
Fiscal Year 2007.
Rescue 21 $80.8M (AC&I) and $8.2 Million (OE): The FY 2008 budget
request provides for maintenance and recapitalization of the aging
National Distress System in the Northeastern areas of the United
States, West Coast and Alaska. Rescue 21 will replace the existing
National Distress and Response System and enhance the Coast Guard's
ability to execute all of its missions through improved communications,
command and control capabilities in the coastal zone. It is the
foundation for coastal Search and Rescue, and is a critical enabler of
efficient and effective command and control of all missions in the
coastal zone.
Building Awareness
National Capital Region Air Defense $11.5 Million (AC&I) and $4.3
Million (OE): This project represents the second of a two-year project
to increase the Coast Guard HH-65C fleet by seven HH-65C helicopters
and related support facility improvements. These seven helicopters are
required to support the newly-assigned mission providing air intercept
to protect the National Capital Region. Primary responsibility for air
defense of the National Capitol Region Air Defense rests with DOD under
OPERATION NOBLE EAGLE. Within DOD, the North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD) is responsible for execution of the air defense
mission. The Coast Guard is the responsible service within DHS to
execute rotary wing air intercept operations to protect the National
Capital Region and has been performing this mission since September
2006.
Integrated Deepwater Systems Engineering and Integration $35.1
Million (AC&I): The Integrated Deepwater Systems (IDS) solution is
designed to incorporate off-the-shelf systems components where
possible. Systems Engineering and Integration is essential to ensuring
interoperability at the unit, system and organizational levels, both
internal to the Coast Guard and with other DHS and DOD assets.
Effective systems integration--bringing things technically and
operationally together so they operate as a whole--will minimize the
cost of asset acquisition, operations and maintenance, maximize the
assets' abilities to interoperate internally and externally, and
minimize the risk inherent in a comprehensive and complex engineering
project of Deepwater's scope and magnitude.
Nationwide Automatic Identification System (NAIS) $12 Million
(AC&I): Funds requested will continue implementation of NAIS to achieve
Initial Operating Capability (IOC) for receive and transmit capability
of AIS messages nationwide. Funding also covers costs associated with
systems currently operational.
Integrated Deepwater Systems C4ISR $89.6 Million (AC&I): Funds
requested will be used for design work for the upgrade of the Multi-
mission Cutter Helicopter (MCH) and the long-range surveillance
aircraft to increase maritime domain awareness capabilities.
Conclusion
The Coast Guard has already taken important measures in many areas
that will reduce security risk in the maritime domain. Since September
11th the Service accelerated efforts to improve the Nation's maritime
regimes, awareness and operational capabilities. Efforts are also
underway to integrate initiatives, build collaboration, and increase
unity of effort--as called for by the National Strategy for Maritime
Security. But much work remains to be done. Gaps in safety, security,
and stewardship are broadly recognized, and the Coast Guard and DHS
will work with the Executive Branch, Congress and other Federal, state,
local, private, and international partners to make needed changes.
Events, such as the September 11th terrorist attacks and Hurricane
Katrina, have demonstrated the importance of preparing for complex
threat situations and highlight America's growing vulnerability.
Although the U.S. capacity to save lives in the aftermath of these
tragedies proved unparalleled, more can be done to prepare for and
respond to the next major disaster.
No one can predict the next catastrophic event, nonetheless,
history tells us it will come. When it does, it will be vital to have
an ``all threats, all hazards'' Coast Guard--Semper Paratus. The
character of Coast Guard men and women has been tested from the
rooftops of New Orleans to the oil platforms of the Persian Gulf and
throughout the Nation's history there remains one constant: if Coast
Guard men and women are provided the training and equipment to do the
job, they won't let us down.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I will
be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Admiral Allen and for my
colleagues, we will start with five minute rounds and hopefully
we'll have time for a couple rounds of questioning. Senator
Lautenberg, would you like to make an opening statement?
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. I'll just take 2 minutes to say I'm
sorry that I arrived a little bit late and that I can't stay. I
want to say, Admiral Allen, that we're proud of you and the
entire Coast Guard Corp. There is never a time when the Coast
Guard is asked to take on a task, that they don't do it fully
even with resources slimming down, even with budgets being
retarded from where they should be. So, I want to say, my hat's
off to the Coast Guard and I thank all of them, all the Coast
Guard service people for the work that they do, for the heroics
that they perform when called upon.
They are a wonderful branch of the service, of our
government and I don't understand why here we are, fortunate
enough to have a Corp like the Coast Guard and when we think
about the size and Madam Chairman, I would ask that the full
statement be placed in the record.
Senator Cantwell. Without objection.
Senator Lautenberg. But I just want to say that for the
total act of duty for what's barely larger than New York City's
police department, the Coast Guard is being asked to patrol
nearly 93,000 miles of coastline with evermore assignments
being dished out and having too few dollars and too little
support from what I think it should be.
You know, I offered an amendment in 2004 to add $100
million to the Coast Guard budget Fiscal Year 2005 and the GAO
agreed that this money would be necessary in times of high
operating tempo and after my amendment was voted down, guess
what happened? The Administration came back to Congress for an
additional $112 million in supplemental funding and each one of
us sitting here has a coast that needs your attention but you
don't have to be a costal state to love the Coast Guard, I can
tell you that. They are called upon for many other things.
So, Madam Chair, if I can submit my questions in writing, I
would appreciate that and I will take no more of the
Committee's time.
[The prepared statement of Senator Lautenberg follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg,
U.S. Senator from New Jersey
Madam Chair, thank you for holding today's hearing where--once
again--it appears the Coast Guard is being given too few resources to
effectively accomplish its missions.
With a total active-duty force barely larger than the New York City
Police Department, the Coast Guard is being asked to patrol nearly 93
thousand miles of U.S. coastline. And since 9/11, the Coast Guard has
taken on a host of homeland security duties, including security patrols
in the waters off Iraq and security duties at our ports here at home.
But despite these homeland security missions, the Bush
Administration continues to cut resources for the Coast Guard's
traditional missions, such as search and rescue, boating safety, and
protecting our environment and commercial fisheries. So for Fiscal Year
2005, I tried to get the Coast Guard the resources they needed and
deserved. I offered an amendment to add an additional $100 million to
the Coast Guard's annual operating budget. The GAO agreed that this
money would be necessary in times of high operating tempo. And after my
amendment was voted down, guess what happened? The Administration came
back to Congress for an additional $112 million in supplemental
funding.
We need a budget that honestly reflects the demands we are placing
on the Coast Guard. And with one of the oldest fleets in the world, we
need a budget that provides the men and women of the Coast Guard the
tools they need to do their jobs. This means new ships, planes and
communications gear. To purchase those vehicles and equipment, the
Administration has relied on its Deepwater program which--to put it
mildly--is a mess.
I support funding for Deepwater. But I do not support the
Administration's complacency when it comes to its contracting. I am
encouraged by Admiral Allen's recent announcements to take back Federal
control and oversight of this vital procurement program from the
contractors.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
Thank you Madam Chair.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Senator. Admiral Allen, thank
you for your testimony and thank you for your comment
specifically about the Deepwater Program, because as you know,
it is the single largest acquisition project in the budget that
is being submitted and I know that yesterday--well, let me just
step back for a second and say thank you for mentioning your
process of strategic review of Coast Guard assets and
presenting those to a future Committee hearing.
We'll look forward to that. Thank you for mentioning the
integration issue on an international basis. I believe you are
correct, that the more that we can work together on an
international basis on security regimes, the more that we will
both lower our cost and increase our security, so I applaud you
for stepping back and taking a strategic review of that on
behalf of the U.S. taxpayers.
On the other side of the equation, your testimony also
included working together with the contractor, the systems
integrator and comments about not wanting to miss deadlines on
the delivery of assets. I can assure you that most Committee
members do not want you to miss deadlines either but we also
want to make sure that we are getting the assets that we are
paying for and not running into further problems and
predicaments in the specs and designs and the actual
effectiveness of those assets.
So with that, I want to turn to your statements yesterday
because I believe that you gave a review of some of the changes
in a speech yesterday, about the Deepwater Program and the fact
that the Coast Guard, you believe, should take on more roles
and responsibilities as the lead systems integrator.
As Senator Snowe said, she and I have been working together
on legislation, S. 924, which is very specific about what we
think needs to be done to make sure that we don't run into the
same situation again with a major procurement project that the
Coast Guard is undertaking. So if I could ask you a few
questions about yesterday's comments and concepts that are
similar to the legislation that we have introduced.
First of all, one of the biggest problems, I believe, in
the Deepwater Program was our decision to get rid of the major
Systems Acquisition Manual. So, basically in an attempt to
expedite and encourage integration, which is not a bad
concept--integration is not a bad concept--we basically threw
out the SAM. Do you intend to reinstitute the Systems
Acquisition Manual and the rules that obviously it implies?
Admiral Allen. Madam Chair, we didn't throw out the Systems
Acquisition Manual, we just didn't follow it. We have one. It
is a viable document. It probably needs some updating to
reflect what we need to do for Deepwater. As a Commander, I was
part of the project team that extended the service life of the
378 foot cutters that they are needing now that require
replacement. The Systems Acquisition Manual is a solid way to
go. Every acquisition the Coast Guard needs to be managed under
that and a project management regime that is standard across
the organization.
Senator Cantwell. Well, if you're not using it, then in my
sense, it has been out----
Admiral Allen. For the Deepwater project, there was an
exclusion for the Systems Acquisition Manual, for the other
projects it applies.
Senator Cantwell. And now you are reinstituting that in any
acquisition----
Admiral Allen. We will integrate all doctrine related to
acquisition in a Systems Acquisition Manual that will apply to
all acquisitions.
Senator Cantwell. In language in any contracts moving
forward, are you committing to language of ending self-
certification?
Admiral Allen. Yes.
Senator Cantwell. Are you committing to requiring a
comprehensive analysis of alternatives?
Admiral Allen. Yes. Business case analysis.
Senator Cantwell. Are you adhering to other reporting
requirements similar to what DOD provides to Congress, like the
SAR?
Admiral Allen. I'm not sure I--if I were to be given an
example, we could compare and contrast current reporting
requirements and give you a status on that ma'am. We'd be happy
to do it.
Senator Cantwell. I think that obviously, there are many
processes and procedures that have been good safety nets and
particularly, I think, for our Committee in notification of
cost overruns and problems so that we don't build up to a point
where we did where the Committee was without information until
a point in time that was pretty far down the road in the
contract.
Now, if I could get that information from our staff, I'll
be happy to, in the next round. Provide--ask some additional
questions on that point.
As it relates to your Engineering and Logistics Center,
will they be the lead organization and final decision on design
and performance standards?
Admiral Allen. They will. In fact, their responsibilities
will expand. As I said earlier, it's hard to disaggregate some
of the business changes that I am proposing for what we need to
do with Deepwater because I came into the job knowing we had to
fix some things about Deepwater in terms of the acquisition,
organization and the logistics and the maintenance
organization. The Engineering Logistics Center at Curtis Bay,
Maryland will evolve into a logistics center that will support
all surface assets of the Coast Guard in a similar way that the
Aircraft Repair and Supply Center in Elizabeth City is the
single logistics point for all aviation assets.
We, in the past, when I came in the Coast Guard, individual
districts did their own engineering of ships and you can
imagine, it was pretty uneven across the Coast Guard. In 1986,
we established maintenance and logistics commands on both
coasts. That left us with two maintenance and logistics
commands and the Engineering Logistics Center. We need to go to
one unified logistics center that provides life cycle
management of these assets though product lines and they are
the single technical authority.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you. Senator Snowe?
Senator Snowe. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Admiral
Allen, getting back to this ICGS management of Deepwater
assets, there has been a real question as to why the Coast
Guard is even extending the 43-month contract with the ICGS. I
mean, why do that at all? I know you're in the process of
renegotiating that contract, as I understand it, at least
indicated by the news reports.
Admiral Allen. Yes ma'am, happy to explain. Based on the
evaluation of the first award term, which was completed last
May before I took office as a Commandant, we are contractually
allowed to issue a contract for 43 months. The ICGS sets the
next award term.
Now, within that contract, we issue task orders. Our
intention right now is to sustain the contractual relationship
with the Integrated Coast Guard System because there are
certain things that are going on right now--were we to stop
would cause severe disruption and there are things that are not
visible because they are not related to a specific asset.
One of them is the development of an Integrated Logistics
Management Information System, which work needs to continue
because it's part of our ability to transition to a mission
support organization that I have talked about. Our goal right
now is to transition into the new contract period with task
orders only for work in progress and limit those task orders to
somewhere between and 18 to 24 months and issue no task orders
unless they meet the requirements that Senator Cantwell
mentioned earlier and that we issue no task orders unless we
have competition, third party validation and making sure we are
achieving the best value for the government.
But we do need to have the ongoing contractual relationship
because I believe I'll get a question pretty quick, if you
haven't already asked it, about well, if you're going to become
the systems integrator, how are you going to do that? The
question is, you have to have a transition period so there are
some contractual relationships we need to maintain with ICGS
while we are transitioning and putting that competency and that
organizational structure into the Coast Guard.
For instance, we have a Systems Integration Program office
in Roslyn that is an ICGS facility. Ultimately, we need to
close that down and take that function and put in to the new
mission support organization in the Coast Guard. You can't do
that overnight so I need the continuity of continuing the work
in progress under the current contract.
Senator Snowe. I see and it would be specifically for those
ships, for example, that are under production now?
Admiral Allen. Correct. In other words, we would issue no
task order--there would be no task order for pricing in the new
contract period, for instance, for the Offshore Patrol Cutter.
We need to be convinced we have the right design and the right
value for the government there.
Senator Snowe. Well, I just happened to notice yesterday
that an ICGS spokeswoman said she did not believe that your
announcement represented significant change in the Coast Guard
contractor relationship. I'd like to have your comment on that.
I mean, I think that that is sort of interesting, if not an
illustration of the problem that we are facing. They don't
accept that there should be a fundamentally altered
relationship and they did not acknowledge the problems that
existed and manifested themselves under their leadership. So
how would you characterize this announcement yesterday? Is it
major change or is it not--because I hope it is a major
change--and why is there a fundamentally different
interpretation of that relationship?
Admiral Allen. There is a fundamental change in how we are
doing business and the roles the Coast Guard will assume. I
have personally discussed this and negotiated it with Bob
Stevens and Ron Sugar, the two CEO's. I think what they are
referring to is the continuity of the contracting vehicle that
I just discussed.
Senator Snowe. I hope so. I hope that is clear----
Admiral Allen. I know what I intend, Senator.
Senator Snowe. OK. Well, that's fine and we'll obviously be
engaged in that oversight in the months to come because I think
it is absolutely imperative. How are we going to get this back
on track but still engaging in the oversight--it's going to be
so vital.
To that point, I noticed that you are in the process or
haven't determined yet, how much the government will recover
from the contractors, for all these deficiencies and the back
scheduling. The issues that happened with the Fast Response
Cutter that you've now really had to jettison and the National
Security Cutter. How are we going to modify these deficiencies?
How is that process going to come about? And does the
contractor accept any responsibility or are we going to have to
negotiate endlessly?
Admiral Allen. Well, I think we have two distinct issues
with the 123 foot cutters and National Security Cutter, if I
can talk about each for just a second.
There is no doubt in our minds that the 123, cutters and on
inspection, when you see basically deformed rails on our ships
and I think I have a picture of one in the handouts we provided
you. It's visual evidence that we are not getting performance
out of these hulls that were intended and the fact that we
can't retain them in service means that the Government needs to
have the value for the money that is invested. I have talked
with the DHS IG, whether it is contractual, legal--whatever
recourse we have, we will make sure that the government's
interests are protected here.
In response to a question at the news conference yesterday,
I made the statement that we are providing all materials
associated with this, with the DHS Inspector General, work very
closely with him to ascertain whether there may be any
accountability and recovery required and we will vigorously
pursue that.
Senator Snowe. Well, how would you characterize this? I
think this is a travesty, frankly, but how would you
characterize the Fast Response Cutter in terms of its
deficiency to the point----
Admiral Allen. I think in general--I'm sorry, ma'am.
Senator Snowe. Go ahead.
Admiral Allen. In general and I'm not a naval engineer, I
think there was a mis-estimation of the amount of structure
that could be applied to these ships that had already been
operated for a good number of years and whether or not they
were strengthened, what they call the hull girder, the inside
interior of the ship, to accommodate new weight on the end and
then the buckling and the forces that the hull is subjected to
in the sea states that were encountered.
We have gone back and taken a look at whether or not the
right computer models that calculated what we would call the
section modulus or the strength of the width of the ship was
correct to begin with and my guess is, if we're going to--we
may not get down to a single root cause. I think we're going to
find that played a major, major role.
Senator Snowe. Did you find it shocking?
Admiral Allen. Absolutely. I visited the ships myself. I
went to the shipyards. They pulled the starboard shaft out of
the VASHON at a shipyard in Savannah that I visited and when
they pulled the shaft out, the actual stern section came one
inch off the blocks they were resting on, which meant the shaft
was keeping the hull in alignment. Ships aren't supposed to
work like that, Senator.
Senator Snowe. Well, I can't imagine the contractor not
taking responsibility for that.
Admiral Allen. We are proceeding at this point--the
decision was just taken to--that is the question, yes, ma'am.
Senator Snowe. I know. It really is unfathomable. They are
the ones that are supposed to design and build the ships and if
they come out this way, I mean, that's a travesty to the Coast
Guard and to the American taxpayer, frankly. Thank you, Madam
Chair.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you. Senator Stevens?
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much. Let me first
congratulate you for that tremendous thing that took place with
the SELANDANG AYU, the vessel up by the Aleutian Chain and the
grand movie, The Guardian, I think that really did the service
a great deal of good.
I've been told that you have about a $150 million transfer
at the Department of Homeland Security and in the Department of
Defense. Does that offset the costs of your involvement of the
Coast Guard in the activities that are involved with homeland
security and defense?
Admiral Allen. Sir, are you talking about whether or not a
transfer of money within the allocations----
Senator Stevens. You've got basically money for equipment.
I don't see any money for operations in terms of interceptions
around Iraq, in terms of the activities of the homeland
security. Are you getting fully funded from them?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir, we are. I'm sorry I didn't
understand the question. For the activities in Iraq, we're
fully funded through the Supplementals, yes sir. It's included
in the Defense request for funding, sir.
Senator Stevens. If we get the Supplemental, yes, that's
true.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. We can give you a detailed
breakdown on the cost, sir.
[The information referrd to follows:]
Based upon the Fiscal Year 2007 Operating Iraqi Freedom budget
request, the following is a detailed breakdown of operational/
reconstitution costs:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Funding Request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Military Pay and Allowances $42,080,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Temporary Duty (TDY) and Temporary Additional Duty 18,020,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Clothing and Other Personnel Equipment and Supplies 1,070,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Medical Support and Health Services 3,180,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reserve Component Activation and Deactivation 2,040,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other Personnel Support 11,500,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Training 3,730,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operational Tempo 45,445,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other Supplies 5,510,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Facilities/Base Support 7,600,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reconstitution 54,658,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Command and Control 6,730,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Airlift 5,230,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sealift 3,500,000
========================================================================
Total $210,293,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Stevens. What about the GPS? We're told the GPS
looks like it may become unreliable and yet we asked for a
report on the LORAN in the bill last year. To my knowledge, the
Coast Guard hasn't prepared that LORAN report. Are you still
going to close down LORAN before we know what the future of GPS
is?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. A couple of comments related to
that. Number one, the big issue before us right now--we are
aware of the fact that GPS can be jammed. There is an
interagency group that has been looking at this for quite a
while. We are in the final decision stages right now between
Homeland Security and the Department of Transportation on how
to move forward and there are three options facing us at this
point.
One is phasing out LORAN-C. The other one is maintaining
status quo and repair the equipment we have in place. The third
option will be, go to what they call E-LORAN, which operates
very much like DGPS, that would be an Enhanced LORAN that could
be considered as a backup to GPS. We're very close to a final
decision with the interagency group and we should be able to
give you an answer shortly.
We are in the final stages of those determinations. That's
the reason the information hasn't been provided, sir.
Senator Stevens. Well, I've been on several small vessels
up my way where they still have LORAN and they really can't use
GPS in the areas they are in. Are you familiar with that?
Admiral Allen. If you give me the exact area, sir, I'd be
happy to comment on it. I understand there are reports where
there are coverage problems up there, sir.
Senator Stevens. Yes, they are out of Russell Bay and
north, basically but I understand there is a similar problem on
the Northeast Coast and we tried to get LORAN preserved at
least for Seattle north and for I think it was Massachusetts
north. Have there been similar complaints about the southern
part of the country? I know there are complaints in the
northern part. Is LORAN-C being abandoned easily in the
southeast, southwest and on to the Gulf Coast?
Admiral Allen. Sir, in general, most of the concerns I've
heard expressed have to do largely with the commercial fishing
community because of the repeatability of LORAN's signal and
the ability to return to where their fixed gear or pots are at.
Of the three options that I laid out before you, Enhanced
LORAN, which has an augmented signal very similar to DGPS will
continue service to that community if that is the outcome that
is chosen, sir.
Senator Stevens. Another subject--I'm told now within 5
years, we'll have at least 40 percent of our natural gas come
in the form of LNG. Will that change your activities with
regard to coastline protection?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. You've raised a very, very
significant point. There are a number of permits being sought
right now for liquid natural gas facilities around the country,
in almost all parts of the country because of the economic
viability of transporting gas in a liquefied form.
There are significant issues related to the impact on
waterways. The Coast Guard works with the Department of the
Interior through Minerals Management Service for the
Continental Shelf LNG facilities and with FERC for LNG
facilities that are within harbors and we do a waterway
suitability assessment and then we issue a waterways
suitability report as part of the permitting process for every
LNG facility that lays out what the Coast Guard thinks are the
adequate precautions or controls that need to be put in place
to adequately, safely and securely transfer LNG at those
facilities and they vary with where the facilities are proposed
but we are extensively involved in that, sir.
Senator Stevens. Thank you. I'll have some other questions
later, Madam Chair.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Senator Stevens. Senator
Nelson?
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. Your Miami Coast Guard and all that area of
Florida, the Florida Straits, they do a good job and they are
quite busy down there, as you know. The fact that you've had
this difficulty with these 123-foot boats, how do you expect
that the 100-foot boats are going to mitigate the
decommissioned boats?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. We have two strategies. Obviously,
we need to replace these boats as fast as we can and that's an
acquisition plan which we will have a request for proposals
released next month to the industry and the Coast Guard will do
that acquisition ourselves.
In the meantime, we have taken the eight crews of the 123-
foot patrol boats that have now been laid up and we are pairing
them with 110-foot patrol boats, both in Miami and St. Pete and
we are double-crewing those boats so we're able to recoup about
50 percent of the hours we would have had out of the 123-foot
cutters.
In addition to that, we are using other cutters to cover
and we are also using more aviation patrols to cut down on the
amount of time that boats are out there doing patrol and make
them more effective by using air assets to vector them in. In
addition, I've negotiated with the Chief of Naval Operations to
retain three 179-foot patrol craft that we were scheduled to
give back at the end of Fiscal Year 2008. We've got those
through Fiscal Year 2011 and the combination of all of those is
allowing us to bridge the gap but we need to move at best speed
and replace these cutters, sir.
Senator Nelson. In the Key West sector, how many Coast
Guard ships are currently on patrol?
Admiral Allen. I'd have to check our morning brief to give
you that answer, sir and I can give you the answer for today. I
would tell you that a lot of the assets that are in the Key
West sector are not from Key West. Our large cutters, which are
stationed around the coastline routinely deploy down there so
we might have a cutter from the mid-Atlantic homeport area down
in Key West at any particular time. We'd be happy to give you
the force lay down for this morning, sir.
Senator Nelson. Well, can you give me an approximation
right now?
Admiral Allen. We--as a rule, we keep two large cutters in
and around the Straits of Florida. We usually keep a cutter
down in Windward Pass and another large cutter in Mona Pass,
between the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico. In addition, we
have patrol boats that operate at a lower level because they
are faster. They go out and they can actually intercept the
targets of interest and we also have a significant aviation lay
down. I would rather not get into the exact number for some
obvious reasons. I'd be happy to provide it to you off the
record, sir.
Senator Nelson. OK. That's two, three big boats and then a
bunch of smaller boats and then aircraft and of course, you all
are doing a lot down there. You're doing search and rescue,
you've got the largest concentration of recreational vessels in
the country down there. You're interdicting drugs. You're
interdicting migrants. It's quite busy and you're doing that
with three boats plus a few little boats.
Admiral Allen. No, sir. Within the approaches to the
Southeast United States at any one particular time,
approximately five major cutters--there will probably be
anywhere from, I would say, four to six patrol boats and as you
know, we have the 33-foot fast interceptors and a lot of other
boats down there. In addition, further south, there are a large
number of vessels that are working for a Joint Interagency Task
Force South as the second layer down there and we move those
boats back and forth from what we would call the tactical
command of the Joint Task Force South, back to the 7th District
if we think we need them, if there was a spike from either
Cuba, Haiti or the Dominican Republic, more than what we're
used to seeing, sir.
Again, what I would propose if I could is to give you a
classified brief, sir.
Senator Nelson. OK. Now you all, along with the Navy and
other agencies, have a plan on the shelf called Operation
Vigilant Sentry.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. In case we had a mass migration. So if you
had--well, first of all, what would you consider a mass
migration? How many?
Admiral Allen. Sir, we measure the migrant threat down
there in terms of flow. In other words, we interdict migrants
today. They are interviewed for a credible fear of persecution,
lacking reason----
Senator Nelson. That's the present.
Admiral Allen. Right.
Senator Nelson. I'm talking about a mass migration. What
would you consider a mass migration?
Admiral Allen. We go through three stages of readiness.
When we start getting up to about 300 a day, that gets us to
one level. When we get up to about 7,000 a week, that gets us
to another level and then a higher threshold and at each point,
if we cannot keep up with the flow or the decision is made that
we might not--we might have to use the facilities at Guantomino
Bay. A higher-level threshold kicks in and the Navy assets are
sent to support us. Again, those cutoff areas, I'd like to
provide you a separate briefing, if I could, sir. But the plan
is in place and the Navy is prepared to provide the assets,
sir.
Senator Nelson. Right. But for the record now, let's say
that you had a mass migration in your second stage there, 7,000
a week. How many boats would you deploy to interdict?
Admiral Allen. Well, there are certain events, whether it
is Katrina or a mass migration or the events we had when we had
President Aristide leave Haiti and we thought we were going to
have a mass migration just a couple years ago. That's an all
hands on deck evolution. We would look at all assets that were
available in the Atlantic area and would send a number of
cutters down there. I think within at least 72 hours--and we
would have warning on this because we have indications that
would tell it was coming--we would have upwards of 19 to 20
cutters there, sir.
Senator Nelson. And you could get 19 to 20 cutters in the
Key West Straits, in the Florida Straits, you could get that
there within 3 days?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. What percentage of the migrants do you
think would get through with 19 or 20 cutters with your second
level migration of 7,000 per week?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. Were the plans to kick in, we
would basically have two picket lines. One would be sitting off
the north coast of Cuba and one would be sitting off the
Florida Keys because you have both the chance of both
northbound and southbound traffic. So you have back-to-back
picket lines, if you will. We understand there may be leakage,
the planning of factors that Admiral Kunkle has been using down
in the 7th District to do exercises lately. Even if we
interdicted 95 percent and you had 5 percent come ashore, you
would be dealing with migrants ashore, which I think is the
question you're asking, sir.
Senator Nelson. So you're saying that you would have a 95
percent pick-up rate?
Admiral Allen. We would attempt to do that, yes sir.
Senator Nelson. Well, what are you expecting with your
Level 2 of 7,000 per week?
Admiral Allen. Well, you have to have the flow--you take a
look at the flow you're expecting and you put the number of
assets and you keep bringing assets in. If we had to employ an
entire expeditionary strike group from the Navy, that would be
done, sir. It would not be all Coast Guard.
Senator Cantwell. Senator Nelson? Your time has expired
here.
Senator Nelson. Well, I'm just getting warmed up.
Senator Cantwell. Good. Is that an area, do you think, that
we should have a separate hearing on as well?
Senator Nelson. I'll wait until the second round.
Senator Cantwell. OK. I think it's an important area as we
talk about Deepwater assets and the challenges with the
Deepwater Program and making improvements to it that we also do
understand our security emergencies that may occur. So I think
your line of questioning is very important and I--besides going
to a second round, I hope that if you believe we should have
further oversight of this that the Committee would consider it.
Admiral back to a couple of questions----
Senator Nelson. Madam Chair, I was under the impression
that we were concerned about the reduction of these 120-some
foot boats and we've got a potential crisis that we hope it's
not going to occur but there certainly are rumblings and I'd
like to know the effect of that from the Commandant with regard
to the Straits of Florida and the protection of the homeland.
Senator Cantwell. A very important question, Senator, very
important. Admiral, I'm back to my question earlier in the
first round about DOD. There are two program reporting
requirements that Congress uses in other military acquisitions.
One is the Selected Acquisition Reports and the other is the
Unit Cost Reports. Both of these provide different types of
information on the schedule and cost problems of acquisition
and it's something, obviously, we'd like to see the Coast Guard
use moving forward. I don't know if you have thoughts on that
today or if you can get us an answer in writing.
Admiral Allen. I'm not familiar with the specifics of the
report but I'd be more than happy. If I could just make a
comment, though, on Navy processes and Coast Guard processes,
I've had several meetings with Secretary Winter, the Secretary
of the Navy and I've had several meetings with Admiral Mike
Mullins, the Chief of Naval Operations. In addition to the
announcements that I made yesterday, we are going to be meeting
periodically with Deputy Secretary Jackson, Secretary Winter,
Admiral Mike Mullin, and myself to take a look at how both of
our shipbuilding programs are going, what we might learn from
each other and how we might get more equal approach on how
we're dealing with industry. I'd be happy to report back to you
on how that moves. Our first meeting is scheduled within the
next month.
Senator Cantwell. Admiral Allen, another area, obviously,
of concern is the Rescue 21 program and as we've looked at this
program within the budget here, it obviously has had its
problems. You've done some demonstration but I'm troubled by
the GAO reports that Rescue 21 may not deliver on its
capabilities either. Could you make some comment about that and
the production sites that have already been underway and the
results of those studies and analyses?
Admiral Allen. Yes, ma'am. I don't think there is any doubt
that we had a couple of barriers early on in this program. One
of them was, I don't think we realize in the Coast Guard that
we weren't really buying a radio system, we were buying a large
software application with radios attached to it. The software
code that had to be written and the integration that had to be
done to be able to manage this system, I think, was
underestimated by both parties.
We are over that now. We have passed the test and
evaluation of the software. We have passed low rate production
and are moving into full rate production this year. We have
successfully deployed these systems on the East Coast in
Atlantic City and the eastern shore of Virginia. We most
recently rolled it out in the Tampa area. They were successful
in establishing an emergency site south of New Orleans
following Katrina and I think as you well know, most notably,
recently we've come online in the Port Angeles area.
We think the program is back on track. We're looking to go
ahead and finish the execution of this program in the next
three to 4 years, as was noted in the opening statement. We
think it has stabilized. The issue now is to make sure that we
control costs, we provide the proper oversight and we stay
within the acquisition baseline.
Senator Cantwell. And what about asset tracking and data
transfer? Are those going to be included in the Rescue 21
system?
Admiral Allen. They may or may not. Asset tracking was a
problem earlier on but we may have alternate technologies or
alternate ways where we need--we can probably deal with that.
As you know, in the commercial world now, we have automated
identification systems so technology has moved past where we
were when we solicited that proposal. That was problematic from
a technical standpoint early on and we removed that from the
requirements and we may come at that from a different direction
for the Coast Guard.
Senator Cantwell. Well, being I think the second largest
acquisition program within the budget and having some of the
same problems that we've seen in Deepwater; that is, project
monitoring, risk management, executive level oversight and some
of these things you're saying, you're right. We're not going to
do them now because they were challenging the asset tracking.
That whole question of the oversight and the specification
of what capabilities are required, what the Coast Guard really
wants to see in the delivery of these assets is critically
important and critically important who owns them when we're
going to make that commitment and not just because of the
complexity of the project, come back and change or drop some of
these assets. So I am very concerned about that oversight and
how we get to a final date for delivery that we all feel
confident that we're going to achieve.
Admiral Allen. I think we're fairly confident in the
delivery date right now. A lot of the things that we have just
talked about with Deepwater--we actually went through last
summer and last fall with General Dynamics. I personally met
with the CEO. I went to Scottsdale and we re-baselined the
program. We established a good technical baseline from which to
operate and moved into 4A production. My confidence is
increasing every day that we will come in on schedule on Rescue
21.
Senator Cantwell. But do you think that there is a
particular problem here in how the specification and designs
are done for these assets, across the Coast Guard?
Admiral Allen. Rescue 21 was dramatically different than
our other acquisitions, as I said early on. And this is my
impression. I haven't received a lot of briefs on it. The
amount of software or code that had to be written because what
we were doing is we were taking analog signal and an antenna,
digitizing it and going to Voice over Internet Protocol and
basically taking it to a data network. So from the minute that
signal hits the antenna, we're all of a sudden dealing with a
much different technical solution that we had ever dealt with
in the Coast Guard before that involved a lot of software
integration. In my view, that was the biggest technical issue
that we did not understand going into it.
We are past the software test and integration right now and
we're into production so I think we are behind that or past
that.
Senator Cantwell. I'll have more questions on this but my
time has expired. Senator Snowe?
Senator Snowe. Thank you. Admiral Allen, one other question
regarding the Deepwater contract. I notice in the budget,
obviously with the Coast Guard taking over as lead systems
integrator, that there has not been a commensurate request for
an increase in staffing, particularly for acquisition staff and
personnel. Obviously you'd be shifting certain personnel, from
within the budget, within your agency, but they will not have
the acquisition expertise that is essential to allow the Coast
Guard to effectively manage the oversight of the Deepwater
Program. How do you explain that contradiction in this budget
and why haven't you requested additional resources to provide
for acquisition personnel that have expertise tailored and
designed for this oversight responsibility?
Admiral Allen. We're coming at it from a couple different
directions. The desired end-state is a unified mission support
organization where acquisition and life cycle maintenance are
all contained in the same organization in the Coast Guard work
for the same senior manager with single point accountability.
As we make the transition, we will look at a mix of Coast
Guard, other government employees, Navy or other people that
have that expertise as needed. Independent contractors not
associated with the ones that do work for us, subject to
signing disclosure statements, should we use them. We have
requested in this year's budget that we unify our personnel
account for the purpose of personnel funding. In the past, each
one of our accounts has had to source their own personnel from
that appropriation. Putting all of our personnel together and
all the acquisition organization together gives you much more
flexibility on how to apply the personnel that you do have.
Additionally, some of the funds that have been allocated in
the past for systems integration and project oversight that
would have been executed through ICGS are going to flow to the
Coast Guard and if you look at the request for Coast Guard
program management versus the traditional amount of money that
was given to ICGS to do that, it's going to start flowing
incrementally as we make this transition from the ICGS contract
to the Coast Guard.
Senator Snowe. Well, in the ICGS, how many Coast Guard
personnel were assigned to it?
Admiral Allen. Within the Deepwater Program overall, we
have a little over 400 people. About a third of those are
military, about a third are civilian and about a third of them
are independent contractors.
Senator Snowe. Because one of the original reasons for
creating the ICGS was the shortage of trained and experienced
acquisition personnel within the Coast Guard. So obviously, we
don't want this to be a weakness that ultimately results in the
problems that we're confronting today.
Admiral Allen. Your point is well taken, Senator. Again,
getting back to my opening statement, this is an issue I
recognized when I became the Commandant last year and the
reorganization of the acquisition organization wasn't in
response to the press disclosures of the IG report. We already
knew well over a year ago that we needed to do this to organize
the Coast Guard more effectively to be able to execute these
acquisitions.
Senator Snowe. The Administration is requesting an $8.7
billion budget and I know you explained the reasons why you're
essentially focusing on strategy and reshaping the command
structure. But it only represents a 1 percent increase from
last year. We just recently passed the SAFE Port Act, for
example. That alone, I think would put inordinate pressures on
resources within the Coast Guard, which is managing not only
that mission but obviously the other missions that have, I
think, been underserved by the Coast Guard recently. This is a
departure, I think, from the standard that the Coast Guard has
adhered to with fisheries enforcement onboard compliance, with
fishery regulations below the 97 percent rate, as I mentioned
in my opening statement.
So how are you going to respond to port security, for
example, given the constraints in this budget? I do think it is
under-funded when you think of your multimissions, your
traditional missions that also are going to be handicapped with
this budget as well, the way it has been in the recent past.
Admiral Allen. Well, as you know, we're working through the
2009 budget bill process inside the Administration right now
and clearly there are issues that are not in the budget this
year that I am dealing with right now to go ahead and seek
funding for that although we haven't finalized it so I'm not at
liberty to detail it.
But rest assured, based on my comments earlier, now that
the strategy is set and we know where we're going, we have to
source the strategy and whatever resources we are seeking need
to be aligned with that and that is my intention. What we do
need to focus on very shortly here is the Command Center issue
and I'll explain--for two reasons. Number one, the SAFE Port
Act has a time limit associated with that but in a larger
sense, if you take a look at what we need to be doing in it as
far as integrating things across the Coast Guard, we have
Rescue 21. We have a need to configure and standardize our
command centers and be responsive to the SAFE Port Act. We have
automated identification systems and long range tracking and
our need to be interoperable with the Navy where we have fleet
concentrations and we work with them. All that tells me that
the solution has got to be coming forward, at least next year,
on where we're going with command centers, ma'am.
Senator Snowe. Thank you.
Senator Cantwell. Senator Stevens?
Senator Stevens. Just following up on that, we mandated in
the SAFE Port Act that we have a long range vessel tracking
system by April 1. We don't have one yet, do we?
Admiral Allen. Sir, we have access to sufficient locating
data right now. Our problem is, once the data has been
gathered, how do you display it and share it with everybody.
Access to the data is not a problem with us between
unclassified and classified systems, we have access to all the
locating data that we need right now, sir. The challenge is
bringing that down and putting it in a commonly held
architecture that everybody has access to, sir.
Senator Stevens. We are trying to deal now with the concept
of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing beyond our 200
mile limit. One of the problems we have is that--take the Gulf
of Alaska. There are more and more of those vessels that are
just outside our limit or outside even the Russian limit that
are literally vacuum cleaning the oceans with new tackle, new
techniques. I assume you've seen the National Geographic
article from last month?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
Senator Stevens. That would cover that. We're trying to
find some way to deal with that and we've been discussing the
concept of having transponders on every vessel that fishes in
the world and have those be capable of being tracked by
satellite. Is that feasible, in your opinion?
Admiral Allen. It is feasible, sir. Under the agreements we
negotiated last year at IMO, there is a requirement now for
vessels over 300 gross tons and you get to a cutoff of what
size fishing vessel you're talking about. But at least for
vessels over 300 gross tons, from countries that are signatory
to the SOLUS Convention, they will be required to carry long
range tracking or transponders that can be picked up within a
1,000 miles of a coastal state or if they've declared their
intent to enter a particular port, 2,000 miles, sir.
We are negotiating at IMO right now the technical standards
and how that is going to be actually implemented. In our view,
in the long run, that will be the way we need to do that. The
question is, will there be vessels less than 300 gross tons
that we're going to need and how to treat those? Inside the
United States, I've been directed by the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002 to drive transponder
carriage requirements down to vessels, commercial vessels 65
feet and above. That would pretty much take care of the United
States so the gap that would be remaining at that point would
be vessels less than 300 gross tons, sir.
Senator Stevens. Well, we're trying to figure out where
these vessels have been and what they've harvested. National
Geographic is working with us on this. We thought we might go
to the U.N. and ask them to give us some assistance like they
did on the drift nets. That hasn't been a complete success yet
but it has been a considerable success in eliminating drift
nets.
I don't know really how to tackle this in terms of
enforcement. You don't have enough vessels in Alaska right now
to take care of our over 3 million square miles. If we add that
Gulf to it, it's not possible to be dealing with it. We asked
you to try and pioneer using UAVs. Are you going to continue
that experiment?
Admiral Allen. Yes, I don't think--if I could just make a
statement. What we're really dealing with here is what I would
call tyranny of distance, sir and it's an issue--in Alaska,
it's an issue in the high seas drift net areas in the Central
Pacific. It is an issue of the new marine sanctuary north of
Hawaii and I think we need to take a new technology look at
this and see where we can leverage technology because it's
impossible to put enough floating assets out there to cover all
those areas.
Senator Stevens. It has to be sort of identification of who
is there and then have the capability to warn them and where
there is persistent violation, to have some kind of law
enforcement.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
Senator Stevens. It has to be in the third level. What
would it take for you to have that third level capability in
the North Pacific?
Admiral Allen. The response capabilities, sir?
Senator Stevens. Yes.
Admiral Allen. I think we have to figure out what the
standard is. Do you want to have somebody, if you sighted a
violation on the scene, say within 24, 48 or 72 hours. As you
know, we have some of these cases where it takes us 10 or 14
days to get to the sighting where a C-130 had actually been
over the top. The amount of vessels it would take to do that
would be astronomically high, sir. I think you'd have to come
up with a risk-based situation--what is it you want to achieve
and what is it you're willing to give up to do that? Where
would you place the vessels and how fast you'd want them there,
sir. I'd be glad to give it some thought and give you an
answer, sir.
Senator Stevens. One last question, if I may, Madam
Chairman Do you have enough correspondence and communication
with your foreign counterparts in the Pacific to keep track of
what they find out, in terms of what vessels come back to their
ports that may have been in our waters or may have been in
those unregulated waters?
Admiral Allen. I wouldn't say it's perfect but it is
improving, sir. We belong to something called the North Pacific
Coast Guard Forum and that's--there is annual meeting of the
Heads of Coast Guards for the United States, Canada, Russia,
South Korea, Japan and China. We meet every year. I was in the
Hainan Island in China last October. We meet in St. Petersburg,
Russia this coming September. One of the things we are
addressing are the illegal fisheries out there. Last year, we
actually deployed a Coast Guard cutter with a Chinese ship
rider who would help us enforce when we encountered those
vessels. Those conversations are maturing but you're right.
Those are the type of forum we're going to have to get into if
we're going to solve the problem, sir.
Senator Stevens. Well, we wish you luck. I'm sure the state
of Washington has the same interests in this. We lost two
complete runs. They didn't even come back. And we're certain
now that something is intercepting them and it's too large a
loss to be attributed to ocean mammals. This has to be a
concerted attack on specific species that are very valuable now
on the world market. So I'd like to be able to work with you in
the coming year to see how we might find some way to put the
fear of God in those people to just lay off our fish. Thank
you.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. And I might add, we're in the
process of standing up a North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum with
the countries that are in the North Atlantic, too.
Senator Cantwell. Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Madam Chair. Picking up, you had
stated that you have approximately 4 to 6 of these cutters
within Florida Straits area and I can't say enough good things
about your people because I see them down in the Miami Beach
station and I see them down in the St. Petersburg station and
they are excellent.
My concern is trying to get ahead of the power curve on if
we were to have a mass migration. Now, if you've got 4 to 6
down there and you say that you can surge to 19 to 20 ships
within 72 hours, that's 3 days. You would then have to bring
assets from Norfolk and New England, would you not?
Admiral Allen. It would depend on which cutters were
underway at the time, sir. We would bring them from wherever we
would need them. Obviously from New England, it wouldn't be
there in 72 hours. The steaming time is a little further than
that but we have cutters in the Gulf. We have cutters in the
Southeast that could be surged down there, sir.
Senator Nelson. How many cutters in Norfolk would you have
available to you?
Admiral Allen. Well, we have a certain number of cutters in
Norfolk. Some of them are on patrol. Some of them are in a
maintenance period. I can give you an exact lay down of all the
cutter homeports and the traveling times to the Straits, sir,
in great detail for the record, if you'd like.
Senator Nelson. All right, if you would and if you would
also include not from the time that you sail out of the port
but the preparation time for the ship--the loading of the ship,
the loading of the food and equipment, the gathering of the
crew. From the time the signal comes to how long in addition to
the 3 days traveling, for example, that you just said, from
Norfolk, is it going to take to get people there and if you
would also supply for the record, your greater elucidation on
the fact of a 95 percent interdiction rate.
[The information referred to follows:]
The ability of various cutters to respond to a mass migration is
dependent on numerous variables including number and flow of migrants,
as well as weather and the number and type of assets underway in the
Florida Straits, Caribbean Sea and along the Eastern seaboard. The
Atlantic Area Commander and Operation Vigilant Sentry Commander, in
accordance with OPLAN VIGILANT SENTRY, coordinate the deployment of all
assets and resources to South Florida in the event of a mass migration.
The first cutters to respond to a mass migration would be those assets
in an underway or standby status in the Florida Straits. For example,
Coast Guard District Seven has, on average, 10 cutters underway or in a
standby status within a 12 hour transit of the Florida Straits that
could respond immediately in the event of a mass migration.
Subsequently, the Coast Guard would then deploy other cutters underway
or in standby from other locations.
For instance, patrol boats from the Gulf Coast or Medium Endurance
Cutters (MEC) from the Caribbean Sea can be redeployed. The last
cutters to be deployed in the event of a mass migration would be those
assets inport in a dedicated maintenance period. These cutters would
likely be unable to get underway on short notice.
While OPLAN VIGILANT SENTRY details how many cutters are required
to respond to a mass migration, below lists the 101 cutters that the
Atlantic Area Commander has available to respond to a mass migration in
the Florida Straits:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transit time
Underway Transit to FL
Cutter Class Cutter Name Homeport Preparation Distance Straits
Time (Hrs) (NM) (Hrs)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
110 WPB CGC Drummond Key West, FL 48 0 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
270 WMEC CGC Mohawk Key West, FL 72 0 10
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
270 WMEC CGC Thetis Key West, FL 72 0 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Sawfish Key West, FL 48 0 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
110 WPB CGC Sitkinak Miami Beach, FL 48 175 12
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
110 WPB CGC Farallon Miami Beach, FL 48 175 12
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
110 WPB CGC Chandeleur Miami Beach, FL 48 175 12
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
110 WPB CGC Nantucket Miami Beach, FL 48 175 12
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
210 WMEC CGC Valiant Miami Beach, FL 72 175 12
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Dolphin Miami Beach, FL 48 175 12
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Gannet Fort Lauderdale, FL 48 204 14
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Marlin Fort Meyers, FL 48 250 17
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
110 WPB CGC Key Biscayne St. Petersburg, FL 48 286 19
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
110 WPB CGC Knight Island St. Petersburg, FL 48 286 19
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
110 WPB CGC Kodiak Island St. Petersburg, FL 48 286 19
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
110 WPB CGC Pea Island St. Petersburg, FL 48 286 19
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
175 WLM CGC Joshua Appleyby St. Petersburg, FL 48 286 19
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
210 WMEC CGC Venturous St. Petersburg, FL 72 286 19
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
210 WMEC CGC Resolute St. Petersburg, FL 72 286 19
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Hawk St. Petersburg, FL 48 286 19
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Cormorant Fort Pierce, FL 48 300 20
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Bluefin Fort Pierce, FL 48 300 20
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
210 WMEC CGC Confidence Cape Canaveral, FL 72 320 21
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
210 WMEC CGC Vigilant Cape Canaveral, FL 72 320 21
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Shrike Cape Canaveral, FL 48 320 21
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
175 WLM CGC Maria Bray Jacksonville, FL 48 470 31
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Kingfisher Jacksonville, FL 48 470 31
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Seahawk Carabelle, FL 48 506 34
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Bonito Pensacola, FL 48 506 34
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Coho Panama City, FL 48 520 35
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
225 WLB CGC Cypress Mobile, AL 72 544 36
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Stingray Mobile, AL 48 544 36
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Cobia Mobile, AL 48 544 36
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
210 WMEC CGC Decisive Pascagoula, MS 72 558 37
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PC-179 CGC Tempest Pascagoula, MS 48 558 37
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PC-179 CGC Tornado Pascagoula, MS 48 558 37
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PC-179 CGC Shamal Pascagoula, MS 48 558 37
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Razorbill Gulfport, MS 48 558 37
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Pompano Gulfport, MS 48 558 37
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
225 WLB CGC Oak Charleston, SC 72 579 39
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
378 WHEC CGC Dallas Charleston, SC 96 579 39
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
378 WHEC CGC Gallatin Charleston, SC 96 579 39
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Yellowfin Charleston, SC 48 579 39
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Tarpon Savannah, GA 48 584 39
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Sturgeon Grand Isle, LA 48 600 40
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Pelican Abbeville, LA 48 600 40
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
110 WPB CGC Block Island Atlantic Beach, NC 48 668 45
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
110 WPB CGC Staten Island Atlantic Beach, NC 48 668 45
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
210 WMEC CGC Diligence Wilmington, NC 72 668 45
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
225 WLB CGC Elm Atlantic Beach, NC 72 668 45
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Heron Sabine, TX 48 736 49
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
210 WMEC CGC Dauntless Galveston, TX 72 771 51
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Manowar Galveston, TX 48 771 51
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Skipjack Galveston, TX 48 771 51
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Manta Freeport, TX 48 797 53
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Amberjack Port Isabel, TX 48 849 57
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Manatee Ingleside, TX 48 850 57
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Steelhead Port Aransas, TX 48 856 57
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Brant Corpus Christi, TX 48 873 58
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
270 WMEC CGC Bear Portsmouth, VA 72 906 60
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
270 WMEC CGC Forward Portsmouth, VA 72 906 60
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
270 WMEC CGC Harriet Lane Portsmouth, VA 72 906 60
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
270 WMEC CGC Legare Portsmouth, VA 72 906 60
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
270 WMEC CGC Northland Portsmouth, VA 72 906 60
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
270 WMEC CGC Tampa Portsmouth, VA 72 906 60
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Albacore Little Creek, VA 48 906 60
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Beluga Little Creek, VA 48 906 60
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Cochito Little Creek, VA 48 906 60
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Shearwater Portsouth, VA 48 906 60
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Sea Horse Portsmouth, VA 48 906 60
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
110 WPB CGC Ocracoke San Juan, PR 48 965 64
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
110 WPB CGC Sapelo San Juan, PR 48 965 64
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
110 WPB CGC Matinicus San Juan, PR 48 965 64
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
110 WPB CGC Cushing San Juan, PR 48 965 64
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
110 WPB CGC Key Largo San Juan, PR 48 965 64
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
110 WPB CGC Chincoteague San Juan, PR 48 965 64
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
110 WPB CGC Bainbridge Island Highlands, NJ 48 1,106 74
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
210 WMEC CGC Dependable Cape May, NJ 72 1,106 74
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
210 WMEC CGC Vigorous Cape May, NJ 72 1,106 74
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Sailfish Sandy Hook, NJ 48 1,106 74
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Mako Cape May, NJ 48 1,106 74
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Finback Cape May, NJ 48 1,106 74
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Ibis Cape May, NJ 48 1,106 74
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Ridley Montauk, NY 48 1,150 77
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Chinook New London, CT 48 1,183 79
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
225 WLB CGC Juniper Newport, RI 72 1,185 79
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
225 WLB CGC Willow Newport, RI 72 1,185 79
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Tiger Shark Newport, RI 48 1,185 79
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
110 WPB CGC Grand Isle Gloucester, MA 48 1,343 90
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
110 WPB CGC Sanibel Woods Hole, MA 48 1,343 90
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
110 WPB CGC Tybee Woods Hole, MA 48 1,343 90
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
270 WMEC CGC Escanaba Boston, MA 72 1,343 90
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
270 WMEC CGC Seneca Boston, MA 72 1,343 90
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
270 WMEC CGC Spencer Boston, MA 72 1,343 90
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Flyingfish Boston, MA 48 1,343 90
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Hammerhead Woods Hole, MA 48 1,343 90
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
210 WMEC CGC Reliance Portsmouth, NH 72 1,360 91
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
110 WPB CGC Jefferson Island South Portland, ME 48 1,384 92
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
270 WMEC CGC Campbell Kittery, ME 72 1,400 93
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
270 WMEC CGC Tahoma Kittery, ME 72 1,400 93
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 CPB CGC Moray Jonesport, ME 48 1,400 93
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The time required for a cutter to transit from their
homeport to the Florida Straits assumes that each cutter
transits at a speed of 15 knots.
The amount of time needed for preparing the cutter to get
underway and transit to the Florida Straits assumes that each
cutter is in a maintenance status in their homeport with no
significant systems (engines, generator, etc.) down for
maintenance. Cutters that are underway or in a readiness status
will be able to be on scene in the Florida Straits much sooner
than the table may indicate. At any given time, two LANT WPBs
and two LANT MECs are in drydock at the CG Yard in the Mission
Effectiveness Project (MEP).
Underway preparation time by cutter class and size:
--378, WHEC 96 hrs
--270, WMEC 72 hrs
--225, WLB 72 hrs
--210, WMEC 72 hrs
--PC-179, 48 hrs
--175, WLM 48 hrs
--110, WPB 48 hrs
--87, CPB 48 hrs
Senator Nelson. For example, in the Cuban migrants that
came in 1994, you had a surge as many as 3,000 in the first
day. How are we going to interdict 3,000 in the first day?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. A couple of responses to that and
I would also offer you another classified brief, if I could, on
indications and warning and what we would know and how we would
know it, sir.
There are some different conditions right now that exist
that didn't exist before the 1994-95 mass exodus because they
are based on the migrant accords that we have negotiated with
Cuba since then and that is the ability to repatriate to Cuba.
A lot of what we may encounter down there is based on policy
decisions that will be made at the time and what would be the
reaction of the Cuban government. As long as we can manage the
flow, we can interdict and repatriate them to Cuba and it's not
an issue. The issue is when we don't have enough hulls out
there or hull space for the amount of people we are
interdicting and then if the overflow is Guantomino Bay, Cuba
after that, that's when we would ask for support from the Navy.
Not when it happened but well before and at that point, we are
capable of holding a significant amount of folks on decks out
there. The real issue is, how to repatriate them, sir.
Senator Nelson. And of course, what would spark a mass
migration, you would have to assume the worst, that you
couldn't repatriate them to the Island of Cuba because it would
be because of the turmoil of the Cuban government that would
cause such a mass migration that would not be a cooperative
government and when you're talking about having lots of folks
on deck, may I ask you also to respond to us, you probably know
that there is some huge percentage of the Cuban population that
has tuberculosis today.
So you get a whole bunch of migrants on a ship and one of
them has tuberculosis, how long is it going to take you to
clean that ship before you can turn it around and use it again?
So I would like you to consider all of those things and please
respond for the record.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. I would offer again, it would be
very helpful just to make sure I am responsive to you, if I
could arrange a classified briefing for you, sir.
Senator Nelson. Absolutely. I'll look forward to that, at
your convenience.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Admiral Allen. And if I could, it might be a good idea to
include Admiral Stavridis from the U.S. Southern Command
because they have a play in this, too, sir.
Senator Nelson. And I've been in touch with him as well. Of
course.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you. Admiral Allen, my colleagues,
I have a few questions. I'm happy to stay for a third round of
questions if anybody has any additional questions but Admiral,
if I could, back to the Deepwater Program and again, since it
is the major acquisition part of the budget here, you can
imagine our concern, obviously, from what's been--what we know
to date of the Deepwater Program and acquisition. But back to
your earlier comment in answering Senator Snowe about moving
forward with the changes in contracts.
I think you were referring to the fact that the new
contracts would reflect assets that were part of the Deepwater
plan but not necessarily part of the original contract and that
you would apply these new standards to those assets moving
forward. Is that correct? You're not going to go back to those
assets that are already contract and apply standards?
Admiral Allen. If I can give you a two-part answer----
Senator Cantwell. The manual, the----
Admiral Allen. The entire program needs to be brought under
an acquisition doctrine that is responsive to the way we have
acquired things in the past and the way we need to do it in the
future. That's work in progress and everything else. The actual
structure of the contract for the next 43 months when awarded,
will put new criteria, performance criteria on a contract that
will allow us, even under work in progress, to be able to
monitor that. And if we are not satisfied we're getting the
performance we need out of the contractor, we do not have to
issue the task order against the contract.
Senator Cantwell. Including the Acquisition Manual Rules
and Regulations?
Admiral Allen. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Cantwell. OK. On a specific asset that is under
contract now and obviously an expansion of that is the CASA
Maritime Patrol Aircraft? I'm assuming that you are familiar
with that.
Admiral Allen. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Cantwell. One of the issues that I want to make
sure that we're focusing on moving forward is transparency and
obviously, I think we want to understand the decisionmaking
process on the CASA Maritime Patrol Aircraft. Was security part
of the analysis, safety and security issues?
Admiral Allen. I would have to go back and check the
evaluation that was done on the proposals exactly how that
manifested itself. I'm not sure I understand by security what
you mean, ma'am.
Senator Cantwell. Well, more specifically, safety.
Admiral Allen. If you're talking about safety in regards to
the airframe itself, we are satisfied it has an adequate safety
record. We are aware that there have been incidents with CASAs
around the world. In fact, I had my staff take a look at it and
our analysis of that leads us to believe that in most cases, it
was pilot error that was associated with those mishaps.
Senator Cantwell. Nine crashes resulting in 92 fatalities?
Admiral Allen. Yes, ma'am. I've actually got a list and I
can provide it for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
List of CASA 235 Crashes
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Location Occupants Fatalities Narrative
------------------------------------------------------------------------
25FEB92 Antarctica 11 0 Crashed in snow.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
18OCT92 Indonesia 31 31 The CASA was
descending from
11,000 ft to 8,000
ft when it struck
a hill (Puntang
Mountain). The
accident happened
during a heavy
rainstorm.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
22MAY97 Indonesia 6 6 Lost control while
testing the LAPES
(Low Altitude
Parachute
Extraction System)
to drop a 400kg
load from a height
of 200m. The
parachute harness
apparently
detached during
the process,
causing the 400kg
load to remain on
the cargo door.
Control was lost
and the aircraft
crashed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
19JAN01 Turkey 3 3 Crashed after
entering a spin
from which
recovery was not
possible.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
16MAY01 Turkey 34 34 Control was lost at
17,000 ft and the
aircraft crashed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
18MAY01 Turkey 4 4 Crashed after
reaching an
altitude of just
100 feet. The CN-
235 plane was one
of eight that was
being modified for
use by the Turkish
Navy, and was on
its final test
flight.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
29AUG01 Spain 47 4 The flight was
cleared for an
instrument landing
approach. After
switching from the
Approach to the
Tower radio
frequency, a no. 1
engine fire
warning was noted
by the crew. The
co-pilot advised
Malaga Tower of
the emergency
``estamos en corta
final, llevamos
fuego en un motor,
declaramos
emergencia.'' The
co-pilot followed
emergency
procedures, during
which both engines
were switched off.
The plane
descended and
collided with the
post of the first
approach lights,
538 meters short
of the runway
threshold. It slid
220 meters, during
which it hit five
approach light
stanchions and
finally hit the
embankment of the
N-340 motorway.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
17DEC03 France 7 7 The CASA departed
Toulouse-Francazal
to drop
parachutists in
the area of Foix.
The airplane
crashed in a
mountainous area,
killing all
aboard. Reportedly
a number of
parachutists had
already left the
plane.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
21JUL05 Indonesia 23 3 Crashed while on
final approach to
Lhokseumawe's
runway 24. It has
been reported that
an engine failed
on finals.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Taken from Flight Safety Foundation Aviation Safety Network. This
information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the
Aviation Safety Network's opinion as to the cause of the accident. It
is preliminary and is based on the facts as they were known at the
time.
Senator Cantwell. So if we went back to the Deepwater
Program, would we see--you're saying as far as the
specification and design and asset capability, safety would
have been----
Admiral Allen. Oh, air worthiness is always a concern. They
have to be certified for use in this country. I would tell you
that all three industry teams that submitted a proposal for
Deepwater included the CASA--included Boeing, who is an
aircraft manufacturer.
Senator Cantwell. I'm more interested in this, our process
of laying out because I see a trend here and at least with
Rescue 21 and with the Deepwater Program, I want to understand
how the Coast Guard lays out the specifications that it wants
to see in the design and the delivery of the assets and how
that then is communicated. Obviously one of the greatest
concerns about the Deepwater Program was the concern about
coming back and then changing the specifications of the assets
that were to be delivered.
So obviously we want to be very clear moving forward what
that process is, how the specification and design work is done
and obviously, we want the engineering logistic team in
Baltimore to play the key role. We want to go back to using the
Systems Acquisition Manual so that those processes are clear.
We don't want contractors coming back and saying--making the
ultimate decision nor do we want the contractors saying that
somehow the process changed three times and that's why the
taxpayers are going to pay instead of $300 million for the
National Security Cutter, closer to a billion dollars. So this
is a very, to me, a key point about how the process works.
Admiral Allen. Yes, ma'am. We're in complete agreement. I
might add that regarding the aviation assets, we do have an
established technical authority. We have a product manager at
the Aviation Recovery and Supply Center in Elizabeth City. They
were completely involved in this and in fact, the first
aircraft that was offered by ICGS was rejected by the Coast
Guard. It was a CASA 235 extended range that we felt didn't
meet the operation parameters and there might have been safety
problems and actually rejected the first airframe offered.
Senator Cantwell. And is the U.S. Border Protection--they
are purchasing a different aircraft?
Admiral Allen. They are. They are purchasing the Dash 8.
Senator Cantwell. That's not an aircraft that the Coast
Guard wanted to purchase?
Admiral Allen. It's in the same area regarding performance.
There were a couple of things that the CASA gives us that the
Dash 8 didn't. The CASA has a stern rear ramp that drops down.
It can take up to three military pallets. In fact, that's the
way we're putting the sensor operator system into it and we
also introduced a very large observer window because when we
fly these things on search and rescue cases, we have to be able
to look down for folks that are in the water so the
configuration is slightly different and the Dash 8 wouldn't
have given us that level of performance. It is a little faster
than our CASA. Customs puts a premium on that because they do
air intercepts.
Senator Cantwell. So the $19 million difference between
those two planes, you're saying, is that ability to release
cargo?
Admiral Allen. There are a couple other differences. It has
to do with the avionics and the cockpit configuration but we
can give you a side by side.
Senator Cantwell. Can I get the original, as I said, spec
and design requirements that the Coast Guard was providing
that, provided for the bidding on that aircraft?
Admiral Allen. I'd be happy to do that, ma'am.
[The information referred to follows:]
During Phase I of the Deepwater Program in March 1999, Team
Deepwater, which later became Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS)
conducted an evaluation of 16 candidate aircraft to consider for
selection as the Coast Guard's Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA). Both
turboprop and jet aircraft were considered. New fixed-wing aircraft
alternatives were investigated, all with the potential to complement or
replace Legacy Aviation assets in the Integrated Deepwater System
(IDS). Candidate alternatives were evaluated to reduce operating costs,
improve mission performance, and expand upon Legacy fixed-wing multi-
mission capabilities. Most likely candidates were recommended for
further analysis. The evaluation included three separate CASA products.
As part of the Deepwater Final Phase II Proposal, submitted to the
Coast Guard in June 2002, the Coast Guard accepted ICGS's Integrated
Deepwater Systems design that included the CASA CN-325-300M ER. This
extended-range version of the Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) CN-235-
300 included modifications to the basic aircraft in order to meet the
performance specifications unique to Coast Guard missions.
Coast Guard Aviation officials had concerns about the capabilities
of the proposed aircraft. The main concern was with the aircraft's
growth margin because the proposed aircraft included airframe
modifications, but did not include a modified powerplant. These
concerns over the perception that the CN-235-300M ER could not safely
carry a full fuel load while operating in certain hot weather locations
that led the Coast Guard to request that ICGS conduct a another MPA
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). Aircraft performance, total ownership
cost, and capability to perform mission were examined. The results of
the analysis recommended the change to the CN-235-300M from the CH-235-
300M ER.
The results of this analysis were briefed to the Commandant in
March 2003. The Commandant approved the selection with a decision memo
on 10 March 2003, designating the CN-235-300M as a Maritime Patrol
Aircraft in the IDS (the HC-130H/J is the other MPA). A contract for
the development and demonstration of the first two CN-235-300Ms was
signed in May 2003.
A subsequent business case analysis was completed by ICGS in
December 2004. This analysis, once again, compared the CN-235-300M, CN-
235-300M ER, and C-27J. The analysis assessed the operational
effectiveness and total ownership costs of switching from the CN-235-
300M from the CN-235-300M ER. The analysis confirmed the CN-235-300M
was capable of performing all its missions and exhibited better weight
growth and climb performance characteristics.
In December 2006, the first CN-235-300M was delivered to the Coast
Guard at the CASA facility in Seville, Spain. Pilot and aircrew
training were conducted onsite. The aircraft was then flown from Spain
to the Coast Guard Aircraft Repair and Supply Center (ARSC) in
Elizabeth City, North Carolina, where the mission pallet is being
integrated with the aircraft. The pilot in command, CDR Douglas Nash
from Aviation Training Center Mobile, AL had this to say about the CASA
CN-235-300M (official military designation HC-144A):
``It has been a pleasure learning to fly the HC-144 with its
docile flight characteristics, simple mechanical systems, and a
state-of-the-art avionics suite providing incredible
situational awareness and ease of operation. Its wide array of
automated safety and surveillance systems and built in
mechanical redundancy will help avert potential mishaps, while
it's roomy cockpit and quiet, comfortable cabin are ideal for
the 7 to 10 hour surveillance missions the aircraft will be
performing. Also impressive is the aircraft's low speed
handling characteristics, and the outstanding visibility from
the large cockpit windows and cabin bubble windows, features
that will prove crucial in performing surveillance and SAR
missions.''
It is important to point out that individual aviation assets are
not required to meet each requirement and/or fill every function, just
as Aviation assets are not intended to meet each and every requirement
of the entire System Performance Specification (SPS). Aviation assets
that contribute to the overall IDS and the aviation asset mix were
selected based on performance and cost. The MPA is one part of the
Deepwater Program. It provides a Medium Range Surveillance capability
that supports the 11 Congressionally mandated missions assigned to the
Coast Guard.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MPA Timetable
------------------------------------------------------------------------
March 1999 Deepwater Phase I Analysis of
Alternatives for Aviation Assets
complete.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
June 2002 Revised Final Proposal from ICGS
accepted by Coast Guard. Proposal
included CN-235-300M ER as
replacement MPA.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
November 2002 MPA Platform Analysis study by ICGS
to validate selection of CN-235-300M
ER.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
March 2003 Analysis of Alternatives on risk
mitigation activities for MPA
complete. Showed upgrade to CN-235-
300M ER from CN-235-300M not
appropriate.
Results briefed to Commandant.
Congressional language in FY03
budget directs Coast Guard to
acquire replacement MPA.
Commandant signed decision memo
designating CN-235-300M as MPA
within IDS.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
May 2003 Contract signed with ICGS for
development and demonstration of MPA
1 & 2.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
December 2004 ICGS conducted business case analysis
on MPA selection. Analysis confirmed
performance characteristics a
mission performance capabilities of
CN-235-300M as compared with CN-235-
300M ER.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CY 2005 Design & production of CN-235-300M.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
December 2006 Delivery of first CN-235-300M to
Coast Guard. Pilot in command gives
very favorable endorsement to
aircraft's performance & safety
characteristics.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Cantwell. Thank you. And we will have other
questions, I'm sure, that we'll want you to answer in writing
about the Deepwater Program but if I could, because there are
so many issues that the Committee is concerned with as it
relates to the Coast Guard 2008 budget. One of them is the
polar icebreakers and I mentioned that in my statement earlier.
Why does the budget request again not include funds for the
Polar Icebreaker fleet?
Admiral Allen. We are in the process right now of trying to
get a policy determination on how to move forward with polar
icebreaking. If I could take you back a few years when we were
in the process of acquiring HEALY. That was done pursuant to a
Presidential determination requiring the need for icebreakers.
The National Academy of Science has produced a study last
fall that basically validated the need for three icebreakers
and that we should proceed with a plan on how to recapitalize
those. We are attempting to work through the policy apparatus
in the Administration right now to establish what the
requirements are for polar icebreaking and I've laid out
internally to the Coast Guard, there are three knotty problems
that I've got to get my arms around while I'm Commandant. One
of them is the polar icebreakers.
The other one is the inland Aids to Navigation vessels and
the third one is the condition of our shore infrastructure and
moving forward into the 2009 budget and beyond, we'll be
looking to attack those problems, ma'am.
Senator Cantwell. And I know, Admiral, that you are just
new as Commandant, relatively new but we did include--this is
not the first time that this Committee has been very direct or
the Congress has been very direct about this. In fact, in the
Maritime Transportation Act of 2006, we called for the Coast
Guard to submit such a plan. We required that plan and instead
what we got is basically that we're going to continue to rely
on the National Science Foundation.
So this is of great concern to many of us on the Committee
that the specific plan funding, recapitalization all need to be
there. We are not going to continue to see this mission
undermined by an Administration who wants to contract out for
these kinds of services through the National Science
Foundation, leaving the critical resources that are there with
the--is it the POLAR STAR or the POLAR SEA?
Admiral Allen. POLAR SEA is the one that is operating now,
ma'am.
Senator Cantwell. The POLAR SEA--we're not going to see a
budget play that leaves the resources of the POLAR SEA to play
catch up to a contractor that couldn't deliver to begin with
and now we have vessels stranded and then the POLAR SEA has to
respond to support them. So it seems to us--it's very clear
that there is a budget game going on here and the real question
is, do these assets need to be funded through the Coast Guard?
My sense is looking at scientific information even though we
have climate warming, it's only going to lead to more traffic
and transportation in these areas and a higher need of the
delivery of these services, not less.
So getting this right, getting this clear that these are
resources of the Coast Guard and must be budgeted for is a key
priority and so as far as we're concerned, that 2006 language
was specific and we think the Coast Guard is past due on
delivering a plan to us. So what is the time-frame for a
response for a real plan?
Admiral Allen. Yes, ma'am. As I said, we're working that
through the Administration right now and the baseline we're
working from is the report that was issued by the National
Academy of Sciences last fall and as we move forward, we'd be
glad to give you an update on our progress on that. We have to
have a way forward with the polar icebreakers. I'm in total
agreement with you and there are two issues. One is the
recapitalization but the other one is this situation right now
where we own the ship and the people but the funding is
resident in the National Science Foundation. I would rather
have all the money in the Coast Guard budget, even if it wasn't
enough.
And I said at a previous hearing, the current funding
process for the annual appropriations to execute this mission
is dysfunctional.
Senator Cantwell. Do you believe that the contracting out
of some of these services often time leaves the Coast Guard
still playing clean up on the security and mission?
Admiral Allen. Well, I'm not going to comment on National
Science Foundation's prerogatives. The problem is, all of our
vessels, even if they are icebreakers, which would seem to be
single mission vessels, are multimissioned. On the way back
from Antarctica this year, the POLAR SEA was diverted for that
Japanese oil processing ship that was on fire between
Antarctica and New Zealand, and we just had an Argentinian ship
catch fire and burn and sink just in the last week down in that
area there. We do other things in those regions.
The National Science Foundation is only bound by
appropriations law to reimburse us for what is related to the
``billable hours'' that support the science mission down there.
You can never get there from here. I think it needs to be
unified, ma'am.
Senator Cantwell. So we basically are not paying for these
services--we're not budgeting for these services.
Admiral Allen. Our operating budget for the polar
icebreakers is in the National Science Foundation's budget,
ma'am and they are only----
Senator Cantwell. And they're not reimbursing you?
Admiral Allen. Well, they are reimbursing us for what has
to do with the science missions, not everything we do with
those vessels.
Senator Cantwell. Well, I think just about every member of
the Committee brought up an issue in which they think that
either the security mission or the safety mission or the
resource allocation of the Coast Guard is coming into question
and I think we have to have the budgeting for these vessels in
a program and framework that actually accounts for the cost of
delivering those services and when you only have that allocated
through the National Science Foundation for some of the
services, it doesn't provide us an adequate budget for those
needs and I predict that they will be in even more demand in
the future.
Admiral Allen. I take no objection to your statement,
ma'am.
Senator Cantwell. Well, we will have to figure out an
appropriate action because I think that Congress has been clear
about this so we'll have to figure out exactly how we work to
get the--as you said, the recapitalization and the resources to
make sure that they are adequately budgeted because I would
make the point that then we're really stealing from other
resources, other security missions that the Coast Guard has to
meet as well and these security missions are serious
responsibilities of the Coast Guard as well.
Admiral Allen. Yes, ma'am, I would tell you in regards to
polar icebreakers, a concern that I have. If you look at what's
happening with the polar icecap, the potential for an
unfettered access from Europe across the top to Asia could cut
5,000 miles off a trip that would normally be through the
Panama Canal. I would tell you at that point, safety,
stewardship and security converge in the Artic and these become
less of a science platform than a national asset that we need
to seriously think about.
Senator Cantwell. And I would assume that the investment in
something like the POLAR SEA is not a resource that a lot of
other vessels have, is that correct?
Admiral Allen. It is a unique resource, yes.
Senator Cantwell. OK and just one last question, if I
could, Admiral. Obviously, our national fisheries are very
important. Again, it's part of this challenge of funding within
the budget and I know that this year's request--well, first of
all, the 2007 request--the 2006 to 2007 request was a decrease
and this year is an even lower trend. Can you explain that?
Admiral Allen. Yes, ma'am. I'm a former budget officer in
the Coast Guard and I'm going to try to explain this without
getting too, I guess, geeky or something here. There is an
anomaly in how we present budget figures and I'd be glad to
expound on it later on if it gets too arcane here.
The way we distribute the money in the budget as presented
is based on a cost allocation model by the number of hours we
allocated to those missions historically. We have the
capability through what we call a Mission Cost Model in the
Coast Guard to take an hour of high endurance cutter time or an
hour of C-130 time and load that with the cost of the
personnel, the fuel and so forth. So the cost of operating a
high endurance cutter is much more than the cost of operating a
patrol boat.
We then have every asset in the Coast Guard keep track of
their employment by hour so for X number of hours for a high
endurance cutter for a year, we can break that down into every
mission set that we have performance parameters for and can
load the cost.
The field commanders in all the districts out there apply
resources to the highest need or the risk in their area of
responsibility based on the threats that are presented to them
and they are not the same every year.
Our search and rescue numbers for Katrina in 2005 go
completely off the scope and so what you're seeing when we
allocate those costs--it's really not a projection of what we
intend to spend on the program, it's an historical allocation
of cost as we allocated the assets in the past projected
forward to the budget and if that's not the proper way to
present it then we need to think of another way but we've been
doing it this way.
I've been involved in this for over 20 years, going back to
when I was a commander in the Coast Guard and it has been the
way we've presented the cost and it may not be the most
meaningful way to present them to you but it is not a
prediction of what we are going to spend, it's a historical
allocation of cost to the level of effort that we have done in
the past.
Senator Cantwell. And you think those--then the reflection
of the 2008 budget, you think will be on target?
Admiral Allen. It rarely is the same because what we're
doing is we're saying if the past was perfect and we did the
same thing next year, that's what you would get and it never
is, ma'am.
Senator Cantwell. Well, I think for those of us--I mean,
just in the reauthorization of the Magnuson-Stevenson Act and
fisheries management, it's an important industry. It's very
important that we adequately enforce the laws and the Coast
Guard plays a key role in that.
So I think perhaps we ought to take a look at that, the
budgeting in this particular area so that we can--I think it
becomes challenging for each member of this Committee as they
look at various issues and regional issues to understand
whether the assets and resources are going to be there and when
budget numbers reflect a decrease or as in Senator Nelson's
case, he's trying to understand the current Deepwater proposal
and resource allocation might mean for the response time to an
emergency situation.
In the Florida Keys area, I think it is very important that
we be able to give some specific answers. We don't want to
continue to be with a Coast Guard at a second guessing point
about what the budget actually means.
We ought to be in agreement about the level of funding and
what that level of funding will provide. We might disagree
about those priorities or something but we ought to be able to
agree that this is the resource level that you will get with
this budget and so if you can help the Committee with that,
we'd much appreciate it.
Admiral Allen. Senator, going back to my more junior days
as a commander working the budget here and seeing how this has
evolved, if there was a way to kill this way of presentation, I
would come up with something else. I think it is probably time
to have that discussion.
Senator Cantwell. Well, Admiral, thank you for your
testimony today. We will keep the record open for two weeks. We
hope that--we do want to provide--submit some questions that we
hope you would answer in writing related to the Deepwater
Program but we thank you for your testimony this afternoon and
the Committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:07 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel K. Inouye, U.S. Senator from Hawaii
The Coast Guard has faced many unanticipated challenges during the
past few years, from saving lives during natural disasters such as
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, to protecting the public from harm by
carrying out additional security responsibilities assigned to it after
9/11 and through enactment of the SAFE Port Act of 2006. In addition to
these challenging missions, the Coast Guard has had to maintain its
traditional responsibilities. These have not been easy tasks, and the
problems associated with the Deepwater procurement program very well
may hamper the agency's ability to respond equally well in the future.
I would like to commend the men and women of the Coast Guard for their
tireless efforts, and the Commandant for his commitment to getting
Deepwater back on track.
However, I have just mentioned 2 of the Coast Guard's 11 missions.
Congress must ensure that the Coast Guard has the resources it needs to
carry out all 11 missions, each one vital to protecting the American
people, our natural resources and our way of life.
I am concerned that the Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2008 budget
request does not account for all 11 missions. For example, the budget
proposes a significant decrease in funding for living marine resource
missions. As you well know, Hawaii is the home of the Coast Guard's
District 14, which is responsible for the protection and enforcement of
the largest geographical area in the United States.
In addition to this, the President recently declared the
Northwestern Hawaiian Islands a Marine National Monument, further
increasing the Coast Guard's enforcement responsibilities in this area.
Given that the Administration's budget proposes a reduction in funding
for enforcement of marine resource laws, I am interested to hear how
the Coast Guard plans to address its enforcement requirements for this
expanded area of responsibility in the future.
Another issue of concern is the steady shifting of funding within
the total Coast Guard budget between security and non-security missions
given that the total budget has remained constant.
I continue to support priority funding for security
responsibilities in the aftermath of the events of 9/11, but those
added responsibilities should not be funded solely at the expense of
other responsibilities such as enforcing our natural resource laws, our
search and rescue programs, and our marine safety regulations.
I also have questions regarding other issues such as the status of
Rescue 21, the Coast Guard's project to modernize its maritime
emergency communications system, and the proposed realignment of the
Coast Guard's Deployable Operation Groups.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses, and working with them
to resolve these issues in the future.
______
Prepared Statement of Stephen L. Caldwell, Acting Director, Homeland
Security and Justice Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO)
Madame Chair and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to provide this statement for the record about the
President's Fiscal Year 2008 budget request for the Coast Guard. As you
know, the Coast Guard has grown significantly since September 11, 2001,
to help meet its responsibility to protect America's ports, waterways,
and waterside facilities from terrorist attacks while maintaining
responsibility for many other programs important to the Nation's
interests, such as helping stem the flow of illegal drugs and illegal
immigration, protecting important fishing grounds, and responding to
marine pollution. While the Coast Guard budget request continues to
increase in FY 2008, it also shows shifts in direction. By placing less
emphasis on acquiring new assets and reorganizing some of its
functional areas, the Coast Guard is attempting to rectify some of its
management concerns of the past while better preparing itself for the
challenges of the future.
My statement today provides:
an overview of the Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2008 budget
request and key performance indicators;
a discussion of various organizational changes and related
management initiatives;
a status update on some current acquisition efforts and
challenges; and
a look at additional challenges related to traditional
legacy missions.
My statement is based in part on prior GAO work focusing on the
Coast Guard's programmatic and management initiatives (a listing of
related reports is included at the end of my statement). Additionally,
we conducted interviews with headquarters, Pacific Area, and Sector San
Francisco personnel, and reviewed budget, performance, and acquisition
documents. The scope of our work did not include evaluating whether the
proposed funding levels are commensurate with the Coast Guard's stated
needs. Our scope was limited due to the short time available between
the release of the President's Fiscal Year 2008 budget request and the
hearing date of mid-April. All work for this statement was conducted in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards
between February and March 2007.
Summary
The Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2008 budget request is moderately
higher than its Fiscal Year 2007 budget, but it increased at a lower
rate, mainly reflecting a slowing in requests for funding acquisition,
construction, and improvement (AC&I) projects. The 2008 overall budget
request of $8.73 billion is approximately 3 percent higher than the
2007 enacted budget, but unlike in prior years, the AC&I budget
decreased by 19 percent. According to Coast Guard officials, this
decrease is in part due to some recognized problems with ongoing
acquisition programs and the desire to strengthen operating
capabilities, including contract and acquisition oversight. While the
AC&I budget request is down, a substantial pool of unspent funds
appropriated for acquisition projects in previous years remains
available to the Coast Guard. Current unobligated balances in these
projects total $1.96 billion, of which $1.63 billion is associated with
Integrated Deepwater Systems acquisitions. The Coast Guard expects to
meet its performance goals in 6 of the 11 mission areas in FY 2006 (as
compared to meeting performance goals in 8 of 11 missions in FY 2005).
Performance trends over the past 5 years also show that increased
homeland security activities have not prevented the Coast Guard from
meeting its non-homeland security mission goals. The Coast Guard
continues to develop ways to better understand the links between
resources it expends and the results it achieves.
The budget request reflects a continued emphasis on reorganization
efforts, all of which carry ongoing challenges. These efforts began
with the combination of marine safety offices and Coast Guard groups
into sectors in 2006. While the Coast Guard has completed its
organizational changes to place local units under sector commands, not
all of the units have been able to move to a single location, a key
ingredient in bringing about the improved integration expected from the
realignment. Funding was not provided in the Fiscal Year 2008 budget to
complete the desired colocation. A reorganization effort that is to
begin this year is designed to bring the different mobile deployable
units responsible for such actions as pollution response, law
enforcement, port security, and counterterrorism under a single command
rather reporting to three different authorities. The Coast Guard hopes
to gain more effective management, oversight, and coordination of these
deployable forces. Challenges here include addressing ``buy-in'' and
related issues from units affected by the changes, ensuring that
mission performance of sectors that previously made use of these units
for everyday activities is not compromised, and effectively
establishing and operating the new centralized command. A third
organizational effort to improve Coast Guard operations--in this case,
to improve its troubled acquisition contract management--is the merging
of the various acquisition management efforts under a Chief
Acquisitions Officer. One challenge in making this move effective is
the need to build a more robust cadre of acquisition management
professionals.
Three major Coast Guard acquisition projects are making progress at
varying rates, but challenges remain for all three in the future. The
record for Deepwater has been mixed. Seven of 10 asset classes being
acquired are on or ahead of schedule. Three classes, however, are
behind schedule for various reasons and several factors add to the
uncertainty about the delivery schedule of other Deepwater assets.
Contract management issues, accountability of the contractor, and cost
control through competition have been recurring challenges for the
Coast Guard. Separate from Deepwater, the National Automatic
Identification System (NAIS), a program designed to allow the Coast
Guard to monitor and track vessels as far as 2,000 nautical miles off
the U.S. coast, is under way, and infrastructure for the first phase of
the system is currently being installed. The Coast Guard is considering
whether to require more types of vessels to install and operate
tracking equipment--an issue that affects the extent to which the
system will provide information on the location of vessels of interest.
The Coast Guard's timeline for achieving full operating capability for
its search and rescue communications system, Rescue 21, was delayed
from 2006 to 2011, and the estimated total acquisition cost increased
from 1999 to 2005, but according to Coast Guard officials, many of the
issues that led to these problems are being addressed. Coast Guard
acquisition officials said they are providing more oversight to the
contractor after we reported on contract management shortcomings.
According to Coast Guard officials, the contracts that would set
specific schedules and budgets for the last 25 regions in which the
system will be installed have yet to be signed. Also, there has been a
reduction in promised improvements to limit communications gaps;
originally, Rescue 21 was intended to limit communications gaps to 2
percent, and that target was reduced to less than 10 percent.
Some of the Coast Guard's non-homeland security missions are facing
challenges based on competition for resources with homeland security-
oriented funding needs. Many domestic icebreaking and Aids-to-
Navigation vessels are also reaching the end of their designed service
lives. While these vessels have been able to meet mission goals to
date, without major rehabilitation or replacement, their ability to
carry out their designated missions will likely decline in the future.
The Coast Guard is currently examining options for addressing this
issue. Similarly, the inability to obtain needed maintenance funding
has led the Coast Guard to take one Polar-class icebreaker out of
service to keep its remaining aging Polar-class vessel, the POLAR SEA,
operational. With only one icebreaker capable of keeping access to
Antarctica open, there is a greater possibility that mechanical
problems or other maintenance issues could affect this mission.
Background
The U.S. Coast Guard is a multimission, maritime military service
within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). To accomplish its
responsibilities, the Coast Guard is organized into two major commands
that are responsible for overall mission execution--one in the Pacific
area and the other in the Atlantic area. These commands are divided
into 9 districts, which in turn are organized into 35 sectors that
unify command and control of field units and resources, such as
multimission stations and patrol boats. In Fiscal Year 2005, the Coast
Guard had over 46,000 full-time positions--about 39,000 military and
7,000 civilians. In addition, the agency had about 8,100 reservists who
support the national military strategy or provide additional
operational support and surge capacity during times of emergency, such
as natural disasters. Furthermore, the Coast Guard also had about
31,000 volunteer auxiliary personnel help with a wide array of
activities, ranging from search and rescue to boating safety education.
The Coast Guard has responsibilities that fall under two broad
missions--homeland security and non-homeland security. The Coast Guard
responsibilities are further divided into 11 programs, as shown in
table 1.
Table 1.--Homeland Security and Non-Homeland Security Programs by
Mission Area
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Activities and functions of each
Mission and program program
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Homeland Security Missions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ports, waterways, and coastal Conducting harbor patrols,
security vulnerability assessments,
intelligence gathering and analysis,
and other activities to prevent
terrorist attacks and minimize the
damage from attacks that occur.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Undocumented migrant Deploying cutters and aircraft to
interdiction reduce the flow of undocumented
migrants entering the United States
by maritime routes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defense readiness Participating with the Department of
Defense (DOD) in global military
operations, deploying cutters and
other boats in and around harbors to
protect DOD force mobilization
operations.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-Homeland Security Missions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Search and rescue Operating multimission stations and a
national distress and response
communication system, conducting
search and rescue operations for
mariners in distress.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Living marine resources Enforcing domestic fishing laws and
regulations through inspections and
fishery patrols.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aids to navigation Managing U.S. waterways and providing
a safe, efficient, and navigable
marine transportation system,
maintaining the extensive system of
navigation aids, monitoring marine
traffic through vessel traffic
service centers.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ice operations Conducting polar operations to
facilitate the movement of critical
goods and personnel in support of
scientific and national security
activity, conducting domestic
icebreaking operations to facilitate
year-round commerce, conducting
international ice operations to track
icebergs below the 48th north
latitude.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Marine environmental protection Preventing and responding to marine
oil and chemical spills, preventing
the illegal dumping of plastics and
garbage in U.S. waters, preventing
biological invasions by aquatic
nuisance species.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Marine safety Setting standards and conducting
vessel inspections to better ensure
the safety of passengers and crew
aboard commercial vessels, partnering
with states and boating safety
organizations to reduce recreational
boating deaths.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Illegal drug interdiction Deploying cutters and aircraft in high
drug-trafficking areas and gathering
intelligence to reduce the flow of
illegal drugs through maritime
transit routes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other law enforcement (foreign Protecting U.S. fishing grounds by
fish enforcement) ensuring that foreign fishermen do
not illegally harvest U.S. fish
stocks.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Coast Guard.
Note: The Coast Guard's homeland security and non-homeland security
missions are delineated in section 888 of the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (P. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2249 (2002)). Starting with the
Fiscal Year 2007 budget, however, the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) designated the Coast Guard's drug interdiction and other law
enforcement as non-homeland security missions for budgetary purposes.
For these 11 programs, the Coast Guard has developed performance
measures to communicate agency performance and provide information for
the budgeting process to Congress, other policymakers, and taxpayers.
The Coast Guard's performance measures are published in various
documents, including the Coast Guard's Fiscal Year Budget-in-Brief. The
Coast Guard's Budget-in-Brief reports performance information to assess
the effectiveness of the agency's performance as well as a summary of
the agency's most recent budget request. This, and other documents,
reports the performance measures for each of the Coast Guard's
programs, as well as descriptions of the measures and explanations of
performance results.
To continue executing its missions, the Coast Guard has programs to
acquire a number of assets such as vessels, aircraft, and command,
control, communications, computer, intelligence surveillance, and
reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. The Coast Guard's Deepwater program is
a 25-year, $24 billion effort to upgrade or replace existing vessels
and aircraft in order to carry out its missions along our coastlines
and farther out at sea. The program is eventually to include 10 major
classes of new or upgraded vessels and aircraft. The Coast Guard also
has an acquisition program called the National Automatic Identification
System to identify and track vessels bound for or within U.S. waters.
Another acquisition program is called Rescue 21, a program to replace
the Coast Guard's 30 year old search and rescue communications systems.
Rescue 21 was to be used not only for search and rescue, but to support
other Coast Guard missions, including those involving homeland
security.
Budget Places More Emphasis on Operational Expenses; Overall
Performance Trends Remain Positive
The Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2008 budget request reflects a
smaller increase than in years past. Requests for new capital spending
are down, as the agency slows the pace of new acquisitions for
Deepwater and other capital projects. Instead, several of the budget
initiatives being emphasized reflect a reorganization of internal
operations and support command infrastructure. Although the Coast Guard
met fewer performance targets than last year, overall performance
trends for most mission programs remain positive. That is, many of the
measures that Coast Guard uses to evaluate performance have improved
since last year, even though the agency did not meet as many of its
performance targets in 2006 as in the year before.
Overall Budget Request Is 3.3 Percent Higher Than Previous Year's
The Coast Guard's budget request in Fiscal Year 2008 is $8.73
billion, approximately $275 million, or 3.3 percent, more than in
Fiscal Year 2007 (see fig. 1).\1\ About $5.9 billion, or approximately
68 percent, is for operating expenditures (OE). This funding supports
its 11 statutorily identified mission programs; increases in cost of
living, fuel, and maintenance costs; and previous administration and
congressional initiatives. The greatest change from the previous year
is in the AC&I request, which at $949 million reflects about a 19
percent decrease from Fiscal Year 2007. According to Coast Guard
officials, no new appropriations are requested in Fiscal Year 2008 for
several Deepwater assets until business case reviews can be completed
to assess the viability of technology and contracting oversight. The
remaining part of the request consists primarily of funds requested for
retiree pay and health care fund contributions. If the Coast Guard's
total budget request is granted, overall funding will have increased by
over 55 percent since 2002, an increase of $3.1 billion.
The Coast Guard's budget request for homeland security missions
represents approximately 35 percent of the overall budget.\2\ Figure 2
illustrates the percentage of funding requested for homeland security
versus non-homeland security funding, and figure 3 shows the funding
levels by each mission program.
Budget Includes Reallocations to Match Reorganization
Two key budget initiatives--both reallocations rather than
increases--reflect reorganization efforts. First, a major budget
reallocation within the operating expenditures category establishes a
single unified command for the agency's deployable specialized forces.
These are the Coast Guard's response teams that can deploy wherever
needed for natural disasters, terrorism incidents, and other concerns.
According to senior Coast Guard officials, this initiative entails a
one-time, budget-neutral reallocation of $132.7 million from the
Atlantic and Pacific Area Commands to a new deployable operations
command, which will be located in Ballston, Virginia. No new funds have
been requested for this initiative. This initiative is discussed in
more detail later in this testimony. The second reallocation involves
an $80.5 million transfer from AC&I into the operating expense
appropriation. The operational aspect of this reallocation is
associated with creating a new consolidated acquisition function, also
discussed in further detail below. Coast Guard officials said this
reallocation consolidates all personnel funding into the operating
expense appropriation and enables the Coast Guard to manage one
personnel system for the entire agency. They said although this
reallocation is budget neutral in 2008, future budget requests may
include financial incentives that will enable the Coast Guard to
develop a more robust cadre of acquisition professionals.
Acquisition Budget Request Declines, but Substantial Unobligated
Balances Are Also Available
The 19 percent decrease in Fiscal Year 2008 for AC&I reflects a
slowing in the pace of acquisition efforts, which, according to Coast
Guard officials, is an attempt to address technology issues and
contracting oversight associated with Deepwater programs such as the
Vertical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle and Fast Response Cutter. The Coast
Guard also recognizes that it is carrying significant unobligated
balances for a number of its acquisition projects. These balances
reflect money appropriated but not yet spent for projects included in
previous years' budgets. During our work for this testimony, we
reviewed budget data and Coast Guard documentation showing the current
status of the agency's unobligated balances. We found, for example,
that the current unobligated balances total $1.96 billion for all
acquisition projects. The Deepwater acquisition alone has $1.6 billion
in total unobligated balances, which is nearly double the Coast Guard's
Fiscal Year 2008 request for the Deepwater project. Other acquisition
programs, such as the Nationwide Automatic Identification System and
Rescue 21, also have unobligated balances, but these are considerably
lower (see table 2). The unobligated balance for Rescue 21, for
example, is $30.5 million.
Table 2.--Total Unobligated Balances for Selected Acquisition Projects
[dollars in millions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2008 Unobligated
Acquisition project request balance
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Integrated Deepwater Systems $836.9 $1,632.6
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shore Facilities and Aids to 37.9 156.8
Navigation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nationwide Automatic 12.0 36.0
Identification System
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rescue 21 80.8 30.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vessels and Critical 9.2 30.3
Infrastructure Projects
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.
These unobligated balances have accumulated for a variety of
reasons as the Coast Guard has found itself unable to spend previous-
year acquisition appropriations. For example, we and others have
documented technical design issues involving the Coast Guard's 123-foot
patrol boat and the Fast Response Cutter. These problems have led to
major delays in some programs and outright cancellations in others. We
asked Coast Guard officials about their plans to spend these
unobligated balances either in Fiscal Year 2008 or beyond, but at this
point they were unable to provide us with detailed plans for doing so.
To the agency's credit, steps have been taken to address the issue,
including reporting quarterly acquisition spending levels. Since these
unobligated balances represent a significant portion of the Coast
Guard's entire budget, the degree to which the Coast Guard spends these
balances in Fiscal Year 2008 could have a substantial impact on the
overall level of capital spending for the year.
According to senior Coast Guard officials, each acquisition project
is now receiving more scrutiny and oversight of how previous funds are
spent. The Coast Guard is not requesting additional funds for the
Offshore Patrol Cutter, Fast Response Cutter, and Vertical Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle in the Fiscal Year 2008 budget request until business
case reviews are completed to assess the viability of the technology
and contracting oversight.
Performance Trends Generally Positive and Non-Homeland Security
Measures
Generally Sound
Despite the fact that Coast Guard met fewer performance targets
than last year, overall performance trends for most mission programs
remain positive. Performance in 7 of 11 Coast Guard mission areas
increased in the last year, but the Coast Guard also set performance
targets at a higher level than it did last year. Coast Guard's
performance did not improve sufficiently for the Coast Guard to meet as
many of its higher performance targets in 2006 as it did in 2005. In
Fiscal Year 2006, the Coast Guard reported that 5 of its 11 programs
met or exceeded program performance targets. In addition, agency
officials reported that the Coast Guard expected to meet the target for
1 additional program when results become available in August 2007,
potentially bringing the total met targets to 6 out of 11 (see fig. 4).
In comparison, last year we reported that in Fiscal Year 2005, Coast
Guard met 8 out of 11 targets. In Fiscal Year 2006, the agency narrowly
missed performance targets for 3 programs--Search and Rescue, Living
Marine Resources, and Aids to Navigation. In Fiscal Year 2005, it
missed only 1 of these 3, Living Marine Resources. The Coast Guard more
widely missed performance targets for 2 programs, Defense Readiness and
Marine Safety. In Fiscal Year 2005, Coast Guard met its Marine Safety
target, but missed on Defense Readiness. See appendix I for more
information on Coast Guard performance results.
Congressional committees have previously expressed concern that
Coast Guard's shift in priorities and focus toward homeland security
missions following the events of September 11, 2001, may have affected
the agency's ability to successfully perform its non-homeland security
missions. However, the Coast Guard's performance on its non-homeland
security indicators has not changed substantially over the past 5
years.
This past year, we also completed an examination of some of the
performance indicators themselves.\3\ We found that while the Coast
Guard's non-homeland security measures are generally sound and the data
used to collect them are generally reliable, there are challenges
associated with using performance measures to link resources to
results. Such challenges include comprehensiveness (that is, using a
single measure per mission area may not convey complete information
about overall performance) and external factors outside agency control,
(such as weather conditions, which can affect the amount of ice that
needs to be cleared or the number of mariners who must be rescued). The
Coast Guard continues to work on these measures through such efforts as
the following:
Standardized reporting. The Coast Guard is currently
developing a way to standardize the names and definitions for
all Coast Guard activities across the agency, creating more
consistent data collection throughout the agency.
Measurement readiness. The Coast Guard is developing a tool
to track the agency's readiness capabilities with up-to-date
information on resource levels at each Coast Guard unit as well
as the certification and skills of all Coast Guard uniformed
personnel.
Framework for analyzing risk, readiness, and performance.
The Coast Guard is developing a model for examining the links
among risk, readiness management, and agency performance. This
model is intended to help the Coast Guard better understand why
events and outcomes occur, and how these events and outcomes
are related to resources.
While the Coast Guard appears to be moving in the right direction
and is about done with some of these efforts, it remains too soon to
determine how effective the Coast Guard's larger efforts will be at
clearly linking resources to performance results. These initiatives are
not expected to be fully implemented until 2010.\4\
Coast Guard Continues to Make Organizational Changes Designed to
Improve Operational Effectiveness and Resource Management
The 2008 budget request reflects a multiyear effort to reorganize
the Coast Guard's command and control and mission support structures.
Three efforts are of note here--reorganizing shore-based forces into
sector commands, placing all deployable specialized forces under a
single nationwide command, and consolidating acquisitions management
programs. Each of these efforts faces challenges that merit close
attention.
Further Action Needed to Ensure Operational Benefits from Sector
Reorganization
As we reported for the last 2 years, the Coast Guard has
implemented a new field command structure that is designed to unify
previously disparate Coast Guard units, such as air stations and marine
safety offices, into 35 different integrated commands, called sectors.
At each of these sectors, the Coast Guard has placed management and
operational control of these units and their associated resources under
the same commanding officer. Coast Guard officials told us that this
change helped their planning and resource allocation efforts. For
instance, Coast Guard field officials told us the sector command
structure has been valuable in helping to meet new homeland security
responsibilities, and in facilitating their ability to manage incidents
in close coordination with other Federal, state, and local agencies.
Our follow-up work found, however, that work remains to ensure the
Coast Guard is able to maximize the potential benefits of sector
realignment. In particular, Coast Guard officials reported that some
sectors had yet to colocate their vessel tracking system (VTS) centers
with the rest of their operational command centers. According to field
officials, the lack of colocation has hindered communications between
staff that formerly were from different parts of the agency.
According to Coast Guard officials, competing acquisition
priorities are limiting the progress in obtaining funding needed to
colocate these facilities. The Fiscal Year 2008 budget does not provide
funds to colocate the VTS centers and command centers. Coast Guard
headquarters officials told us they would work to address this
challenge as part of the capital investment plan to build interagency
operational centers for port security, as required under the SAFE Port
Act, but they had not yet developed specific plans, timelines, and cost
estimates.\5\
Unified Command Structure for Deployable Forces Is Being Developed
The Coast Guard is planning to reorganize its deployable
specialized forces under a single unified command, called the
Deployable Operations Group (DOG). This change is reportedly budget
neutral in the Fiscal Year 2008 request, but it bears attention for
operational effectiveness reasons. According to Coast Guard officials,
the agency is making this change based on lessons learned from the
Federal response to Hurricane Katrina. They said the response
highlighted the need to improve effectiveness of day-to-day operations
and to enhance flexibility and interoperability of forces responding to
security threats and natural disasters. Currently, there are five
different types of Coast Guard specialized forces, totaling about 2,500
personnel. Their roles and missions vary widely, ranging from
conducting antiterrorism operations to conducting environmental
response and cleanup operations (see table 3).
Table 3.--Coast Guard Deployable Specialized Forces, Mission Area and
Primary Operational Activity, and Force Size
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mission area and primary
Specialized Force operational activities Force size
------------------------------------------------------------------------
National strike force Marine environmental 3 strike teams/328
(NSF) protection personnel
Domestic and
international response
for oil spills
Hazardous
material cleanup
Chemical,
biological, and
radiological response
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tactical law enforcement Law enforcement 2 units/180
teams (TACLET) Maritime personnel
interception operations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Port security units (PSU) Defense readiness 8 units/1,144
Expeditionary personnel
port security
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maritime safety and Ports, waterways, and 12 units/924
security teams (MSST) coastal security personnel
Domestic port
security
Antiterrorism
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maritime security Ports, waterways, and 1 unit/208
response team (MSRT) coastal security personnel
Counterterroris
m
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Coast Guard.
The Coast Guard's existing structure divides operational control of
specialized forces into three different command authorities--
headquarters, Pacific Area, and Atlantic Area. Under the planned
realignment, these forces would be available under a single operational
command, with the expectation of more effective resource management,
oversight, and coordination.\6\ The Coast Guard plans to establish
operating capability for this unified approach by July 20, 2007, with
an initial command center located in Ballston, Virginia. Officials told
us they were well under way in planning for this reorganization.
Officials expect about 100 staff will be assigned to the center when it
reaches its initial operating capability, growing to about 150
personnel once the command structure is completed. According to
officials, all administrative staff selected for the center will be
drawn from headquarters, district, and area levels.
We have not studied this reorganization, but our prior work on
other aspects of Coast Guard operations suggests that the Coast Guard
may face a number of implementation challenges. Some may be similar to
those that Coast Guard faced when it created its sector commands, such
as obtaining buy-in from personnel that will be affected by the
reorganization or addressing realignment issues at the district level.
Another challenge is to ensure that the change does not adversely
affect mission performance at the sector and field unit levels.
Currently, for example, sector commanders make use of available local
MSST units--made available by district and area commanders--to help
meet shortfalls in resource availability for everyday missions, such as
conducting high-risk vessel escorts and harbor security patrols. If
these units were not available to support mission needs, additional
strain could be put on the performance of these local units.
These changes to the command structure are part of plans that
extend beyond Fiscal Year 2008. In his recent State of the Coast Guard
speech, the Commandant of the Coast Guard unveiled a proposal to
combine the Coast Guard's Atlantic and Pacific Area command functions
into a single Coast Guard operations command for mission execution. In
addition, the Coast Guard plans to establish a new mission support
command, which will have responsibility for nationwide maintenance,
logistics, and supply activities. According to Coast Guard officials,
the current structure is not well suited to responding to post-
September 11 transnational threats. For example, Coast Guard officials
said the current structure at times works against the Coast Guard in
operations with Joint Interagency Task Forces, whose operating areas
are not the same as the Coast Guard's established area boundaries.
Coast Guard officials told us a working group had developed a blueprint
of the new operational force structure, but the Coast Guard is not
ready to release it. Coast Guard officials told us they expected the
reorganization would be implemented during the current Commandant's 4-
year term.
Consolidation of Acquisitions Oversight Management Challenged By
Staffing
Shortfalls
The Coast Guard also plans to consolidate its acquisitions
management offices, placing all major acquisitions programs and
oversight functions under the control of a single acquisitions officer.
The goals of this consolidation are to improve Coast Guard oversight of
acquisitions, better balance contracting officers and acquisition
professionals among its major acquisition projects, and address staff
retention and shortage problems associated with the acquisitions
management program. However, the Coast Guard has not adequately staffed
the acquisitions management program to meet its current workload, and
maintaining an appropriate staff size will be challenging, despite the
reorganization. For example, a February 2007 independent analysis found
that the Coast Guard does not possess a sufficient number of
acquisition personnel or the right level of experience needed to manage
the Deepwater program.\7\ Headquarters officials told us the
reorganization would address retention problems by creating a new
acquisitions specialty career ladder that could attract new pools of
talent. Still, given its past history of staff shortages and
difficulties retaining acquisition staff, the Coast Guard will face
challenges maintaining an appropriately sized acquisition staff, at
least in the near term. Coast Guard headquarters officials told us the
Deepwater program had pushed other important acquisitions priorities
aside, and this new organization would help the Coast Guard advance
these other priorities, such as boats, piers, and other shoreside
physical infrastructure. In our view, it is unclear how the
reorganization of the acquisition function will improve the prospects
for these other programs, given Coast Guard's priorities and ongoing
constraints on funding.
The reorganized acquisition office is expected to merge the now
stand-alone Deepwater acquisition project with the existing acquisition
directorate and research and development centers. The new office is
expected to be led by a new Coast Guard Chief Acquisition Officer who
will have responsibility over all procurement projects and by a deputy
who will deal largely with Deepwater issues. At the program management
level, Coast Guard is establishing four program managers to lead each
acquisitions area, including (1) surface assets; (2) air assets; (3)
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance; and (4) small boats and shore-based
infrastructure, such as command centers and boathouses. The Coast Guard
plans to begin implementing this reorganization in July 2007. It is too
early to tell if the Coast Guard's reorganization will enable it to
achieve its goals--notably, better balance of acquisitions support
between Deepwater and the Coast Guard's other acquisitions programs.
Acquisition Challenges Continue as Several Programs Make Progress
While some Coast Guard major acquisition projects continue to face
challenges, especially the Deepwater program, several of these projects
are making progress. The record for Deepwater has been mixed, with 7 of
10 asset classes on or ahead of schedule. Three classes, however, are
behind schedule for various reasons and several factors add to the
uncertainty about the delivery of other Deepwater assets. Contract
management issues that we have reported on previously continue to be
challenges to the Coast Guard. Installation of equipment for the
initial phase of NAIS, an acquisition that is designed to allow the
Coast Guard to monitor and track vessels as far as 2,000 nautical miles
off the U.S. coast, is currently under way, but without changes to
existing regulations, some vessels will be able to avoid taking part in
the system. The Coast Guard's timeline for achieving full operating
capability for its search and rescue communications system, Rescue 21,
was delayed from 2006 to 2011, and the estimated total acquisition cost
increased from 1999 to 2005, but according to Coast Guard officials,
many of the issues that led to these problems are being addressed.
Coast Guard acquisition officials said they are providing more
oversight to the contractor after we reported on contract management
shortcomings.
Coast Guard Continues to Face Acquisition Challenges with Deepwater
Program
The Coast Guard continues to face challenges in managing the
Deepwater program. The delivery record for assets is mixed and
technology and funding uncertainties, recent changes to Coast Guard
plans for procuring Deepwater assets, as well as the 25 year timeframe
for asset delivery add to uncertainties about the delivery schedule for
future Deepwater assets. We have reported concerns about management of
the Deepwater program for several years now and have made
recommendations aimed at improving the program. The Coast Guard
continues to address these recommendations as it seeks to better manage
the Deepwater program. In addition to these program management issues,
performance and design problems for certain Deepwater assets have
created additional operational challenges for the Coast Guard. The
Coast Guard is taking steps to mitigate these problems, but challenges
remain. Below is a summary of our recent Deepwater work.\8\
Deepwater Asset Delivery Schedule Is Mixed and Somewhat Uncertain
The Coast Guard's Deepwater program is a 25 year, $24 billion plan
to replace or upgrade its fleet of vessels and aircraft. Upon
completion, the Deepwater program is to consist of 5 new classes of
vessels--the National Security Cutter (NSC), Offshore Patrol Cutter
(OPC), Fast Response Cutter (FRC), Short-Range Prosecutor (SRP), and
Long-Range Interceptor (LRI); 1 new class of fixed-wing aircraft--the
Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA); 1 new class of unmanned aerial
vehicles--the Vertical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VUAV); 2 classes of
upgraded helicopters--the Medium-Range Recovery Helicopter (MRR) and
the Multi- Mission Cutter Helicopter (MCH); and 1 class of upgraded
fixed-wing aircraft--the Long-Range Surveillance Aircraft (LRS).\9\
Figure 5 illustrates the 10 classes of Deepwater assets.
Our preliminary observations indicated that, as of January 2007, of
the 10 classes of Deepwater assets to be acquired or upgraded, the
delivery record for first-in-class assets (that is, the first of
multiple aircraft or vessels to be delivered in each class) was mixed.
Specifically, 7 of the 10 asset classes were on or ahead of schedule.
Among these, 5 first-in-class assets had been delivered on or ahead of
schedule; and 2 others remained on schedule but their planned delivery
dates were in 2009 or beyond. In contrast, 3 Deepwater asset classes
were behind schedule due to various problems related to designs,
technology, or funding. Using the 2005 Deepwater Acquisition Program
Baseline as the baseline, figure 6 indicates, for each asset class,
whether delivery of the first in class asset was ahead of schedule, on
schedule, or behind schedule as of January 2007.
As part of our ongoing work, we are analyzing Coast Guard planning
documents to evaluate the current estimates of Deepwater asset delivery
dates. Several factors add to the uncertainty about the delivery
schedule of Deepwater assets. First, the Coast Guard is still in the
early phases of the 25 year Deepwater acquisition program and the
potential for changes in the program over such a lengthy period of time
make it difficult to forecast the ability of the Coast Guard to acquire
future Deepwater assets according to its published schedule. For
example, technology changes since the award of the original Deepwater
contract in 2002 have already, in part, delayed delivery of the VUAV,
and the Coast Guard is currently studying the potential use of an
alternative unmanned aerial vehicle. Second, changes to funding levels
can impact the future delivery of Deepwater assets. For example,
despite earlier plans, the Fiscal Year 2008 Department of Homeland
Security congressional budget justification indicates that the Coast
Guard does not plan to request funding for some Deepwater assets in FY
2008, such as the OPC and the VUAV. Acquisition of these two Deepwater
assets has now been delayed until FY 2013, at the earliest. Finally,
the Coast Guard has recently made a number of program management and
asset-specific changes that could impact the delivery schedules for its
Deepwater assets. For example, the Coast Guard has begun to bring all
acquisition efforts under one organization. Further, the Coast Guard
announced that it has terminated acquisition of the FRC-B, an off-the-
shelf patrol boat that is intended to serve as an interim replacement
for the Coast Guard's deteriorating fleet of 110, patrol boats, through
the system integrator and plans to assign responsibility for the
project to the Coast Guard's acquisition directorate. These types of
programmatic changes will take time to implement, and thus add to
uncertainty about the specific delivery dates of certain Deepwater
assets.
Deepwater Program Management, Contractor Accountability, and Cost
Control
In 2001, we described the Deepwater program as ``risky'' due to the
unique, untried acquisition strategy for a project of this magnitude
within the Coast Guard.\10\ The Coast Guard used a system-of-systems
approach to replace or upgrade assets with a single, integrated package
of aircraft, vessels, and unmanned aerial vehicles, to be linked
through systems that provide C4ISR and supporting logistics. In a
system of systems, the deliveries of Deepwater assets are
interdependent, thus schedule slippages and uncertainties associated
with potential changes in the design and capabilities of any one asset
increases the overall risk that the Coast Guard might not meet its
expanded homeland security missions within given budget parameters and
milestone dates. The Coast Guard also used a systems integrator--which
can give the contractor extensive involvement in requirements
development, design, and source selection of major system and subsystem
subcontractors. The Deepwater program is also a performance-based
acquisition, meaning that it is structured around the results to be
achieved rather than the manner in which the work is performed. If
performance-based acquisitions are not appropriately planned and
structured, there is an increased risk that the government may receive
products or services that are over cost estimates, delivered late, and
of unacceptable quality.
In 2004 and in subsequent assessments in 2005 and 2006, we reported
concerns about the Deepwater program related to three main areas--
program management, contractor accountability, and cost control.\11\
The Coast Guard's ability to effectively manage the program has been
challenged by staffing shortfalls and poor communication and
collaboration among Deepwater program staff, contractors, and field
personnel who operate and maintain the assets. Despite documented
problems in schedule, performance, cost control, and contract
administration, measures for holding the contractor accountable
resulted in an award fee of $4 million (of the maximum $4.6 million)
for the first year. Through the first 4 years of the Deepwater
contract, the systems integrator received award fees that ranged from
87 percent to 92 percent of the total possible award fee (scores that
ranged from ``very good'' to ``excellent'' based on Coast Guard
criteria), for a total of over $16 million. Further, the program's
ability to control Deepwater costs is uncertain given the Coast Guard's
lack of detailed information on the contractor's competition decisions.
While the Coast Guard has taken some actions to improve program
outcomes, our assessment of the program and its efforts to address our
recommendations continues, and we plan to report on our findings later
this year.
Deepwater Performance and Design Problems Creating Operational
Challenges for Coast Guard
In addition to the program management issues discussed above, there
have been problems with the performance and design of Deepwater patrol
boats that have created operational challenges for the Coast Guard. The
Deepwater program's bridging strategy to convert the legacy 110, patrol
boats into 123, patrol boats has been unsuccessful. The Coast Guard had
originally intended to convert all 49 of its 110, patrol boats into
123, patrol boats in order to increase the patrol boats' annual
operational hours and to provide additional capabilities, such as small
boat stern launch and recovery and enhanced and improved C4ISR.
However, the converted 123, patrol boats began to display deck cracking
and hull buckling and developed shaft alignment problems, and the Coast
Guard elected to stop the conversion process at eight hulls upon
determining that the converted patrol boats would not meet their
expanded post-September 11 operational requirements.
These performance problems have had operational consequences for
the Coast Guard. The hull performance problems with the 123, patrol
boats led the Coast Guard to remove all of the eight converted normal
123, patrol boats from service effective November 30, 2006. The
Commandant of the Coast Guard has stated that having reliable, safe
cutters is ``paramount'' to executing the Coast Guard's missions.\12\
Thus, removing these patrol boats from service affects the Coast
Guard's operations in its missions, such as search and rescue and alien
and migrant interdiction. The Coast Guard is taking actions to mitigate
the operational impacts resulting from the removal of the 123, patrol
boats from service. Specifically, in recent testimony, the Commandant
of the Coast Guard stated that the Coast Guard has taken the following
actions:
multicrewing eight of the 110, patrol boats with crews from
the 123, patrol boats that have been removed from service so
that patrol hours for these vessels can be increased;
deploying other Coast Guard vessels to assist in missions
formerly performed by the 123, patrol boats;
securing permission from the U.S. Navy to continue using
three 179, cutters on loan from the Navy (these were originally
to be returned to the Navy in 2008) to supplement the Coast
Guard's patrol craft; and
compressing the maintenance and upgrades on the remaining
110, patrol boats.
The FRC, which was intended as a long-term replacement for the
legacy patrol boats, has experienced design problems that have
operational implications as well. As we reported in 2006, the Coast
Guard suspended design work on the FRC due to design risks such as
excessive weight and horsepower requirements.\13\ Coast Guard engineers
raised concerns about the viability of the FRC design (which involved
building the FRC's hull, decks, and bulkheads out of composite
materials rather than steel) beginning in January 2005. In February
2006, the Coast Guard suspended FRC design work after an independent
design review by third party consultants demonstrated, among other
things, that the FRC would be far heavier and less efficient than a
typical patrol boat of similar length, in part, because it would need
four engines to meet Coast Guard speed requirements.
One operational challenge related to the FRC is that the Coast
Guard will end up with two classes of FRCs. The first class of FRCs to
be built would be based on an adapted design from a patrol boat already
on the market to expedite delivery. The Coast Guard would then pursue
development of a follow-on class that would be completely redesigned to
address the problems in the original FRC design plans. Coast Guard
officials recently estimated that the first FRC delivery will slip to
Fiscal Year 2009, at the earliest, rather than 2007 as outlined in the
2005 Revised Deepwater Implementation Plan. Thus, the Coast Guard is
also facing longer-term operational gaps related to its patrol boats.
Initial Deployment of Nationwide Automatic Identification System Is
Under Way, with Decisions Still to Come about Extending
Coverage to Additional Vessels
Outside Deepwater, one acquisition project included in the Fiscal
Year 2008 budget is the Nationwide Automatic Identification System, a
system designed to of identify, track, and communicate with vessels
bound for or within U.S. waters and forwarding that information for
additional analysis. NAIS uses a maritime digital communication system
that transmits and receives vessel position and voyage data. The Coast
Guard describes NAIS as its centerpiece in its effort to build Maritime
Domain Awareness, its ability to know what is happening on the water.
NAIS is not expected to reach full capability until 2014, when the
system will be able to track ships as far as 2,000 nautical miles away
and communicate with them when they are within 24 nautical miles of the
U.S. coast. It is being implemented in three phases, the first of which
is scheduled to be fully operational in September 2007. At that time,
the Coast Guard expects to have the ability to track--but not
communicate with--vessels in 55 ports and 9 coastal areas. The largest
areas of the continental U.S. coastline that will remain without
coverage after this first phase are the Pacific Northwest and Gulf
coasts. The second phase calls for being able to track ships out to 50
nautical miles from the entire U.S. coast and communicate with them as
far as 24 nautical miles out. This is the phase addressed in the Fiscal
Year 2008 budget.
The $12 million Fiscal Year 2008 AC&I request for NAIS is expected
to pay for implementing the initial operating capability for phase two.
The Coast Guard has received approval from the Department of Homeland
Security to issue solicitations and award contracts for this initial
capability, and the agency has held information sessions to gauge
industry interest in participating and to help refine its statement of
work for the initial solicitation. The initial solicitation will
provide requirements for full receiving and transmitting capability for
two sectors within one Coast Guard area and one sector in another area.
With this infrastructure in place the Coast Guard expects to be able to
test identification, tracking, and communication performance, including
such features as the ability to determine if the vessel transmissions
are accurately reflecting the actual location of a vessel.
The Coast Guard is considering whether to require additional types
of vessels to install and use the equipment needed for the Coast Guard
to track vessels and communicate with them. Current regulations require
certain vessels (such as commercial vessels over 65 feet in length)
traveling on international voyages or within VTS areas to install and
operate the transmission equipment.\14\ Vessels that are not subject to
current regulations generally include noncommercial and fishing vessels
and commercial vessels less than 65 feet long. This means that many
domestic vessels are not required to transmit the vessel and voyage
information and therefore will be invisible to the NAIS. The Coast
Guard has indicated in the Federal Register that it is considering
expanding the requirements to additional vessels.\15\
Coast Guard Has Taken Actions to Improve Oversight of Rescue 21
Contracts, but System Coverage Has Been Reduced
Another non-Deepwater project covered in the budget request is
Rescue 21, the Coast Guard's command, control, and communication
infrastructure used primarily for search and rescue. The Fiscal Year
2008 AC&I budget includes $81 million for continued development of
Rescue 21. In May 2006 we reported that shortcomings in Coast Guard's
contract management and oversight efforts contributed to program cost
increases from $250 million in 1999 to $710.5 million in 2005 and
delays in reaching full operating capability from 2006 to 2011.\16\ Our
recommendations included better oversight of the project, completion of
an integrated baseline review of existing contracts, and development of
revised cost and schedule estimates. According to the Coast Guard, it
has taken a series of actions in response, including program management
reviews and oversight meetings, conducting integrated baseline reviews
on existing contracts, and meeting regularly to assess project risks.
According to the Coast Guard officials we met with, the contractor
is currently on time and on budget for installing the full system in 11
Rescue 21 regions, including such regions as New Orleans, Long Island/
New York, and Miami. The last of the 11 regions covered by current
contracts is scheduled to be completed by October 2008. Contracts for
the 25 regions that remain have not been signed. To keep to current
project cost and schedule baselines, however, the Coast Guard has
reduced the required performance of the system. Originally, Rescue 21
was supposed to limit coverage gaps to 2 percent, meaning that the
system had to be able to capture distress calls in 98 percent of the
area within 20 nautical miles of the coast and within navigable rivers
and other waterways. The current contract calls for coverage gaps of
less than 10 percent. Rescue 21 was also intended to have the
capability to track Coast Guard vessels and aircraft and provide data
communication with those assets. Neither the capability to track the
Coast Guard's own assets nor data communications is included in the
current technology being installed.
Coast Guard Faces Additional Challenges Addressing Traditional Missions
While the Fiscal Year 2008 budget request contains funding for
specifically addressing the projects discussed above, certain other
projects were judged by Coast Guard officials to be lower in priority
and were not included. We have examined two of these areas in recent
work--vessels for Aids-to-Navigation and domestic icebreaking activity,
and vessels for icebreaking in polar areas.
Decline in Condition of Some ATON and Domestic Icebreaking Assets May
Require More Attention for Recapitalization or Outsourcing
Options
Last September, we completed work for this committee on the
condition of Coast Guard Aids-to-Navigation (ATON) and icebreaking
assets.\17\ More than half of these assets have reached or will be
approaching the end of their designed service lives. In 2002, the Coast
Guard proposed options for systematically rehabilitating or replacing
164 cutters and boats in these fleets after determining that the age,
condition, and cost of operating these assets would diminish the
capability of the Coast Guard to carry out ATON and domestic
icebreaking missions. We noted that no funds had been allocated to
pursue these options, apparently due to competing needs for replacing
or rehabilitating other Coast Guard assets. These competing needs,
reflected largely in the Coast Guard's expensive and lengthy Deepwater
asset replacement program, will continue for some time, as will other
pressures on the Federal budget. The Coast Guard is requesting no
additional spending for ATON assets or infrastructure in Fiscal Year
2008.
Without specific funding to move forward, the Coast Guard has
attempted to break the project into smaller components and pursue
potential funding from within the Coast Guard's budget, focusing on the
assets most in need of maintenance or replacement. In February 2006,
the Coast Guard began a project to replace its fleet of 80 trailerable
Aids-to-Navigation boats with new boats that have enhanced capabilities
to do ATON work as well as other missions.\18\ According to a Coast
Guard official, this acquisition would cost approximately $14.4 million
if all 80 boats are purchased and would bring on new boats over a 5-
year period as funds allow. The Coast Guard official responsible for
the project said the Coast Guard intends to make the purchases using a
funding stream appropriated for the maintenance of nonstandard boats
that can be allocated to the boats with the most pressing maintenance
or recapitalization needs. Availability of these funds, however,
depends on the condition and maintenance needs of other nonstandard
boats; if this funding has to be applied to meet other needs, such as
unanticipated problems, it may not be available for purchasing these
boats.
In addition to carrying out their primary missions of ATON and
domestic icebreaking, these assets have also been used in recent years
for other missions such as homeland security. The Coast Guard's ATON
and domestic icebreakers saw a sharp increase in use for homeland
security missions after the attacks of September 11, and while this
trend has moderated somewhat, the use of some assets in these missions
continues well above pre-September 11 levels. This increase is most
prominent for domestic icebreakers, which are being operated more
extensively for other purposes at times of year when no icebreaking
needs to be done. Newer ATON vessels, which have greater multimission
capabilities than older vessels, tend to be the ATON assets used the
most for other missions.
In addition to considering options for replacing or rehabilitating
its ATON assets, the Coast Guard also has examined possibilities for
outsourcing missions. In 2004 and 2006, the Coast Guard completed
analyses of what ATON functions could be feasibly outsourced. Although
possibilities for outsourcing were identified for further study, Coast
Guard officials noted that outsourcing also carries potential
disadvantages. For example, they said it could lead to a loss of
``surge'' capacity--that is the capacity to respond to emergencies or
unusual situations. Coast Guard officials noted that outsourcing or
finding a contractor to do work after an event such as Katrina is
difficult due to the increased demand for their services as well as the
fact that the labor pool may have been displaced. When a contractor is
found, it usually takes a long time to get the work completed due to
the backlog of work and tends to be very expensive. In addition, this
surge capability may be needed for other missions, such as those that
occur when ATON assets can be used to support search and rescue
efforts. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, for example, some ATON
assets provided logistical support for first responders or transported
stranded individuals. Coast Guard officials stated that after Hurricane
Katrina, its own crews were able to begin work immediately to repair
damaged aids and get the waterways open to maritime traffic again.
Coast Guard officials also indicated that outsourcing may adversely
affect the Coast Guard's personnel structure by reducing opportunities
to provide important experience for personnel to advance in their
careers.
Coast Guard Faces Decision on Future of Polar Icebreakers
The Coast Guard confronts ongoing maintenance challenges that have
left its polar icebreaking capability diminished. The Coast Guard has
two Polar-class icebreakers for breaking channels in the Antarctic.\19\
Both are reaching the end of their design service lives, and given the
funding challenges associated with maintaining them, the Coast Guard
decided to deactivate one of the two, the POLAR STAR, in 2006. This
reduced icebreaking capability since only one Polar-class icebreaker,
the POLAR SEA, was available, and for the POLAR SEA it increased
maintenance needs while reducing time available to conduct
maintenance.\20\
Coast Guard officials and others have reported that failure to
address these challenges could leave the Nation without heavy
icebreaking capability and could jeopardize the investment made in the
Nation's Antarctic Program.\21\ According to Coast Guard officials, the
remaining Polar-class icebreaker's age and increased operational tempo
have left it unable to continue the mission in the long term without a
substantial investment in maintenance and equipment renewal. One
option, refurbishing the two existing Polar-class icebreakers for an
additional 25 years of service, is estimated to cost between $552
million and $859 million. Another option, building new assets, would
cost an estimated $600 million per vessel, according to Coast Guard
officials.\22\
Coast Guard officials have begun planning a transition strategy to
help keep the sole operating Polar-class icebreaker mission-capable
until new or refurbished assets enter service, which would take an
estimated 8 to 10 years.\23\ According to officials, this 10 year
recapitalization plan will identify current and projected maintenance
service needs and equipment renewal projects and associated costs,
alternatives to address these needs, and timelines for completing these
projects.
Madam Chair and members of the subcommittee, this completes my
statement for the record.
Appendix I: Performance Results by Program from Fiscal Year 2002 through Fiscal Year 2006
[Appendix I provides a detailed list of Coast Guard performance results for the Coast Guard's 11 programs from
Fiscal Year 2002 through 2006.]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance
Program Program performance 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 target for
measure 2006
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Programs meeting 2006 targets:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Exclusive Number of detected 250 152 247 174 164 199
Economic Zone Exclusive Economic Zone
Enforcement (EEZ) incursions by
foreign fishing vessels.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ice Operations Number of waterway closure 7 7 4 0 0 2a
(domestic days.
icebreaking)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Marine Average of oil and 35.1 29.4 22.1 18.5 16.3 19
Environmental chemical spills greater
Protection than 100 gallons per 100
million tons shipped.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ports, Waterways, Percent reduction in n/a n/a n/a 14% 17% 14%
and Coastal maritime terrorism risk
Security over which the Coast
Guard has influence.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Undocumented Percentage of interdicted 88.3% 85.3% 87.1% 85.5 89.1 89%
migrant illegal migrants entering
interdiction the United States through
illegal means.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Program expected to meet 2006 target:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Illegal Drug Percentage of cocaine Not Not 30.7% 27.3% TBD c 22%
Interdiction removed out of total reported reported
estimated cocaine
entering the United
States through maritime
means b.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Programs that did not meet their 2005 targets:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aids to Navigation Number of collisions, 2,098 2,000 1,876 1,825 1,765 1,748
allisions, and grounding.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defense Readiness Percentage of time that 70% 78% 76% 67% 62% 100%
units meet combat
readiness level.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Living Marine Percentage of fisherman 97.3% 97.1% 96.3% 96.4% 96.6% 97%
Resources found in compliance with
Federal regulations.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Marine Safety 5-year average annual 5,766 5,561 5,387 5,169 5,036 4721
mariner, passenger, and
boating deaths and
injuries.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Search and Percentage of distressed 84.4% 87.7% 86.8% 86.1% 85.3% 86%
Rescue mariners' lives saved.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.
Note: TBD, to be determined; n/a, not available. Italic numbers indicate that performance targets were met
previously.
a The target for ice operations noted here is for domestic icebreaking only, and the target level varies
according to the index for an entire winter. Thus, for those winters designated as severe, the target is 8 or
fewer closure days. For winters designated as average, the target is 2 or fewer closure days. Because 2002 and
2004 were designated as average winters, the 7 and 4 days did not meet the target.
b The performance measure for the illegal drug interdiction program, the percentage of cocaine removed, was
revised in Fiscal Year 2004 from the percentage of cocaine seized in order to more accurately report the
impact Coast Guard counterdrug activities have on the illicit drug trade. As a result, the cocaine removal
rates for Fiscal Year 2002-2003 are not available.
c Complete data are not yet available for the illegal drug interdiction program. However, the Coast Guard
anticipates meeting the performance target for this program based on past performance.
Related GAO Products
Coast Guard: Status of Efforts to Improve Deepwater Program
Management and Address Operational Challenges. GAO-07-575T. Washington,
D.C.: March 8, 2007.
Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on Deepwater Program Assets
and Management Challenges. GAO-07-446T. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15,
2007.
Coast Guard: Coast Guard Efforts to Improve Management and Address
Operational Challenges in the Deepwater Program. GAO-07-460T.
Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14, 2007.
Homeland Security: Observations on the Department of Homeland
Security's Acquisition Organization and on the Coast Guard's Deepwater
Program. GAO-07-453T. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 8, 2007.
Coast Guard: Condition of Some Aids-to-Navigation and Domestic
Icebreaking Vessels Has Declined; Effect on Mission Performance Appears
Mixed. GAO-06-979. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 2006.
Coast Guard: Non-Homeland Security Performance Measures Are
Generally Sound, but Opportunities for Improvement Exist. GAO-06-816.
Washington, D.C.: Aug. 16, 2006.
Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and
Recovery Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina. GAO-06-903. Washington,
D.C.: July 31, 2006.
Maritime Security: Information-Sharing Efforts Are Improving. GAO-
06-933T. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2006.
Coast Guard: Status of Deepwater Fast Response Cutter Design
Efforts. GAO-06-764. Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2006.
United States Coast Guard: Improvements Needed in Management and
Oversight of Rescue System Acquisition. GAO-06-623. Washington, D.C.:
May 31, 2006.
Coast Guard: Changes in Deepwater Acquisition Plan Appear Sound,
and Program Management Has Improved, but Continued Monitoring Is
Warranted. GAO-06-546. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2006.
Coast Guard: Progress Being Made on Addressing Deepwater Legacy
Asset Condition Issues and Program Management, but Acquisition
Challenges Remain. GAO-05-757. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2005.
Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on the Condition of Deepwater
Legacy Assets and Acquisition Management Challenges. GAO-05-651T.
Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005.
Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, but Implementation and
Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. GAO-05-448T. Washington, D.C.:
May 17, 2005.
Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on the Condition of Deepwater
Legacy Assets and Acquisition Management Challenges. GAO-05-307T.
Washington, D.C.: April 20, 2005.
Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006
Budget Request. GAO-05-364T. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005.
Coast Guard: Station Readiness Improving, but Resource Challenges
and Management Concerns Remain. GAO-05-161. Washington, D.C.: January
31, 2005.
Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure an
Effective Port Security Assessment Program. GAO-04-1062. Washington,
D.C.: September 30, 2004.
Maritime Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal Costs and
Facilitate Implementation of Automatic Vessel Identification System.
GAO-04-868. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2004.
Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New
Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security. GAO-04-838.
Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004.
Coast Guard: Deepwater Program Acquisition Schedule Update Needed.
GAO-04-695. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2004.
Coast Guard: Station Spending Requirements Met, but Better
Processes Needed to Track Designated Funds. GAO-04-704. Washington,
D.C.: May 28, 2004.
Coast Guard: Key Management and Budget Challenges for Fiscal Year
2005 and Beyond. GAO-04-636T. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2004.
Coast Guard: Relationship between Resources Used and Results
Achieved Needs to Be Clearer. GAO-04-432. Washington, D.C.: March 22,
2004.
Contract Management: Coast Guard's Deepwater Program Needs
Increased Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight. GAO-04-380.
Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2004.
Coast Guard: New Communication System to Support Search and Rescue
Faces Challenges. GAO-03-1111. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2003.
Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime
Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain. GAO-03-1155T.
Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Mitigate Deepwater Project Risks.
GAO-01-659T. Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2001.
Coast Guard: Progress Being Made on Deepwater Project, but Risks
Remain. GAO-01-564. Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2001.
Coast Guard: Strategies for Procuring New Ships, Aircraft, and
Other Assets. GAO/T-HEHS-99-116. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 1999.
Coast Guard's Acquisition Management: Deepwater Project's
Justification and Affordability Need to Be Addressed More Thoroughly.
GAO/RCED-99-6. Washington, D.C.: October 26, 1998.
Endnotes
\1\ GAO's analysis of the Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2008 budget
request is presented in nominal terms. Supplemental funding received
for Operation Iraqi Freedom and Hurricane Katrina are not included in
the analysis, except where noted.
\2\ Beginning with the Fiscal Year 2007 budget, the Office of
Management and Budget designated the Coast Guard's drug interdiction
and other law enforcement programs as non-homeland security missions
for budgetary purposes. If these two programs are included as homeland
security missions, overall homeland security funding in the Fiscal Year
2008 budget request is approximately 52 percent of the total budget.
\3\ GAO, Coast Guard: Non-Homeland Security Performance Measures
Are Generally Sound, but Opportunities for Improvement Exist, GAO-06-
816 (Washington, D.C.: August 2006).
\4\ For more details on the Coast Guard's efforts to match
resources to performance results, see Appendix III in GAO-06-816.
\5\ Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884 (2006).
\6\ Although the deployable forces will be reorganized under a
single command authority, officials told us the units would remain
based in their current locations. However, personnel on these teams may
be rotated or cross-deployed with other specialized teams. For example,
an MSST located at Seattle will remain based in that location, but the
personnel attached to that MSST may be rotated or mixed with other MSST
units to meet ongoing needs.
\7\ Defense Acquisition University, Quick Look Study: United States
Coast Guard Deepwater Program, (Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 2007).
\8\ For a more complete description of our reviews of the Deepwater
program, see GAO, Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on Deepwater
Program Assets and Management Challenges, GAO-07-446T (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 15, 2007).
\9\ In addition to these asset classes, the Deepwater program
includes other projects such as Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR)
systems. For example, the Coast Guard plans to procure surveillance
data from another unmanned aerial vehicle, the RQ-4A. Because this is
not to be acquired as a capital investment, we do not include it among
the assets to be acquired or upgraded.
\10\ GAO, Coast Guard: Progress Being Made on Deepwater Project,
but Risks Remain, GAO-01-564 (Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2001).
\11\ GAO, Contract Management: Coast Guard's Deepwater Program
Needs Increased Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight, GAO-
04-380 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2004); Coast Guard: Progress Being
Made on Addressing Deepwater Legacy Asset Condition Issues and Program
Management, but Acquisition Challenges Remain, GAO-05-757 (Washington,
D.C.: Jul. 22, 2005); and Coast Guard: Changes in Deepwater Plan Appear
Sound, and Program Management Has Improved, but Continued Monitoring is
Warranted, GAO-06-546 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 28, 2006).
\12\ U.S. Coast Guard, Office of Public Affairs, Coast Guard
Suspends Converted Patrol Boat Operations, (Washington, D.C., 2006).
\13\ GAO, Coast Guard: Status of Deepwater Fast Response Cutter
Design Efforts, GAO-06-764 (Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2006).
\14\ Vessel traffic services areas are locations where the Coast
Guard monitors and communicates with vessels using AIS, radar, and
other technologies to prevent collisions and other accidents.
\15\ In our previous report we recommended that the Coast Guard
should pursue opportunities to cost-share with private entities that
were interested in receiving vessel and voyage information
transmissions. According to Coast Guard officials, subsequent to the
publication of the report they have partnered with private entities in
Tampa, Florida, and Alaska.
\16\ GAO, United States Coast Guard: Improvements Needed in
Management and Oversight of Rescue System Acquisition, GAO-06-623
(Washington, D.C.: May 2006).
\17\ GAO, Coast Guard: Condition of Some Aids-to-Navigation and
Domestic Icebreaking Vessels Has Declined; Effect on Mission
Performance Appears Mixed, GAO-06-979 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22,
2006).
\18\ These boats can be placed on trailers and transported on land
by truck.
\19\ In addition to the Polar-class icebreakers, the Coast Guard
acquired a third icebreaker, the HEALY, in 2000. Unlike the Polar-class
icebreakers, the HEALY was designed to be an Arctic scientific platform
and does not have the capabilities to break ice in the Antarctic under
most conditions. According to Coast Guard officials, although the HEALY
also has maintenance issues, the condition and extent of maintenance
needed for the Polar-class icebreakers is more severe.
\20\ Coast Guard officials estimated it would require $40 million
to $50 million and 2 to 3 years of service to refurbish the deactivated
Polar-class icebreaker--the POLAR STAR--to a capability level
commensurate with its other Polar-class icebreaker. Coast Guard
officials noted that this funding would cover upgrades to systems and
to replace vessel infrastructure and parts that Coast Guard had
cannibalized over the past years to replace parts on the POLAR SEA.
\21\ In the Antarctic, the United States maintains 3 year-round
scientific stations. Coast Guard Polar-class icebreakers provide heavy
icebreaking support necessary to open a shipping channel and allow
maritime resupply of fuel, food, and cargo to these scientific
stations. Polar icebreakers deploy to support primary missions such as
the U.S. Antarctic Program, but while present in the polar region, they
often support secondary missions such as search and rescue or respond
to maritime environmental response situations as situations arise.
\22\ According to the Coast Guard, this estimate this is based on
HEALY construction costs, making adjustments for increased structural
and power requirements.
\23\ In 2007, the National Research Council of the National
Academies issued a final report on the condition of the U.S. polar
icebreaking fleet (Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment
of U.S. Needs). This report corroborated Coast Guard's assessment of
the increased risks faced by the deteriorating condition of these
vessels and recommended that Congress immediately take action to
design, plan, and build two replacement polar icebreaking vessels to
replace the aging Polar-class vessels. Moreover, because these new
vessels would not be available for another 8 to 10 years, the report
recommends that Congress provide the Coast Guard with a sufficient
operations and maintenance budget to address maintenance backlogs on
the two operating polar icebreakers to ensure a minimum level of
icebreaking capability during this period. The report also recommends
leaving the POLAR STAR in caretaker status until the new vessels enter
service.
______
Prepared Statement of the Reserve Officers Association
of the United States
The Reserve Officers Association of the United States (ROA) is a
professional association of commissioned and warrant officers of our
Nation's seven uniformed services and their spouses. ROA was founded in
1922 during the drawdown years following the end of World War I. It was
formed as a permanent institution dedicated to national defense, with a
goal to teach Americans about the dangers of unpreparedness. When
chartered by Congress in 1950, the act established the objective of ROA
to: ``. . . support and promote the development and execution of a
military policy for the United States that will provide adequate
National Security.'' The mission of ROA is to advocate strong Reserve
Components and national security, and to support Reserve officers in
their military and civilian lives.
The Association's 70,000 members include Reserve and Guard
Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, Airmen, and Coast Guardsmen who frequently
serve on Active Duty to meet critical needs of the uniformed services
and their families. ROA's membership also includes officers from the
U.S. Public Health Service and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration who often are first responders during national disasters
and help prepare for homeland security. ROA is represented in each
state with 55 departments plus departments in Latin America, the
District of Columbia, Europe, the Far East, and Puerto Rico. Each
department has several chapters throughout the state. ROA has more than
450 chapters worldwide.
ROA is a member of The Military Coalition where it co-chairs the
Tax and Social Security Committee. ROA is also a member of the National
Military Veterans Alliance. Overall, ROA works with 75 military,
veterans, and family support organizations.
Disclosure of Federal Grants or Contracts
The Reserve Officers Association is a private, member-supported,
congressionally chartered organization. Neither ROA nor its staff
receive or have received grants, sub-grants, contracts, or subcontracts
from the Federal Government for the past three fiscal years. All other
activities and services of the Association are accomplished free of any
direct Federal funding.
Introduction
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Senate Subcommittee
on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard, on behalf of ROA's
70,000 members, the Reserve Officers Association thanks the Committee
for the honor, privilege, and opportunity to submit testimony on issues
relating to the Coast Guard budget.
The U.S. Coast Guard and its Selected Reserve are a valuable,
unique and increasingly visible service within the armed forces
structure of this Nation. ROA would like to thank the Subcommittee for
its on-going stewardship that it has demonstrated on issues of homeland
security as the Coast Guard is a non-DOD uniformed service. The USCG
structure needs and capabilities do not always receive the public
attention ROA believes they should. Since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
the Nation has come to expect even more from this proud service and has
levied additional consequence management missions upon it, while
retaining the mission as lead Federal agency for maritime homeland
security.
Executive Summary
Our Coast Guard's plate is overflowing with workload demands for
homeland security. That our men and women in the Coast Guard and its
Selected Reserve have kept their heads above water is a testimony to
exemplary leadership and selfless personnel motivation and dedication.
ROA asks the Committee to respond to the unselfish service of U.S.
Coast Guard's men and women and recognize the need for funding
assistance in order for the Coast Guard and its Reserve to continue
this outstanding work.
This high level of performance can only be sustained by supporting
the Total Force. The USCG Reserve component is cost effective and
provides flexibility in responding to changing demands and threats. The
Selected Reserve augments the active Coast Guard and reinforces all
eleven of the Coast Guard's missions. Yet like the active Coast Guard,
its Reserve has more missions than people to perform them. While the CG
Reserve is authorized at 10,000 serving members, it has only been
funded at a level of 8,100 Reservists.
ROA's testimony recommends an increase in funding to an interim
end-strength level of 9,300 for FY 2008, which will create a
more robust Coast Guard Selected Reserve by enhancing its
capabilities toward mission accomplishment.
Issues
1. Resetting the Force
In 1995 the Coast Guard Selected Reserve was fully integrated into
the Active duty Coast Guard to be trained and employed as a part-time
workforce doing the same jobs as Active duty members. The Congress
indicated, in 1995, that the minimum size of the CG Reserve be 8,000
serving members. Over the past several years, the Active duty Coast
Guard budget and mission scope has expanded to meet the service's
increased responsibilities for maritime homeland security.
A 2004 GAO report noted that resource hours for many of the Coast
Guard's traditional missions have decreased as demands for its critical
port security mission have increased. Coast Guard legacy vessels are
experiencing increased unscheduled maintenance and personnel stress
issues are arising as a result of higher operational demands across its
eleven missions.
ROA believes insufficient oversight has been given to the personnel
resources required to meet these new missions which are in addition to
the Coast Guard's traditional missions. This mission burden has clearly
had an effect on the overall readiness of the Coast Guard. In FY 2006
the Coast Guard was able to satisfactorily meet only 8 of its present
11 mission goals. Of particular note was the failure to meet its
Defense Readiness combat rating standard (69 percent achieved versus
100 percent target).
Sources within the Coast Guard have indicated to ROA that they have
recruiting and training resources that would permit them to expand
beyond an end-strength level of 8,100 to 9,300 in FY 2008.
ROA urges Congress to increase the funded size of the Coast
Guard Selected Reserve from the Fiscal Year 2007 level of 8,100
to 9,300 in FY 2008.
ROA Resolution Number 04-12 recommends increasing the authorized
end-strength of the Coast Guard Selected Reserve to at least 15,000.
The USCG has come up with similar results. In a recent study, the Coast
Guard identified through its Contingency Personnel Requirements List
(CPRL) an end-strength of 14,000 officers and enlisted by FY 2011.
The Coast Guard has the ability and infrastructure to immediately
begin recruiting to, and training of, a Selected Reserve funded to a
level of 9,300 serving members. As for the future, the Coast Guard can
ramp up to attain an authorized end-strength of 14,000 Selected
Reservists by FY 2012.
ROA suggests increasing authorization and funding of the Coast
Guard Selected Reserve to 10,475 in FY 2009, with further
sequential end-strength authorization increases and funding of
1,175 personnel each Fiscal Year from FY 2010 to FY 2012.
This increased end-strength will permit a highly cost effective way
for the Coast Guard to match the Contingency Personnel Requirements
List (CPRL) developed from the eleven mission performance goals
presently assigned to the service.
ROA recommends hearings by the U.S. Senate to determine FY 2008
authorization and funding levels for the USCGR and the
development of annual incremental increases to obtain an end-
strength level of 14,000 by FY 2012.
2. Not fulfilling Mission Areas
The Commandant's recent USCG Reserve policy prioritizes the CG
Reserve missions as follows: (1) Maritime Homeland Security (MHS), (2)
Domestic and Expeditionary National Defense, (3) Disaster Response and
Recovery. These mission areas are designed to support our Homeland
Security. In looking at how the USCG is accomplishing these missions
the following are illustrative examples.
1. Maritime Homeland Security (MHS)
Maritime Homeland Security is considered by many the most important
issue facing the United States today. Maritime Transportation Security
is a major element of this mission area. The 2002 Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA) levied requirements that included
Port Security Vulnerability Assessments in 55 strategic ports and the
development and implementation of Area Maritime Security Plans. These
are time and manpower intensive tasks. In an attempt to address these
mission assignments the Coast Guard has identified the need to set up
13 Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSST). A significant slice of
the team's 100 members are programmed to come from the Selected
Reserve. Insufficient Selected Reserve end-strength has allowed only
the partial staffing of just four teams for this strategically and
operationally important mission.
Additionally, the National Guard Bureau has asked the Coast Guard
to assume the state-level MTSA port and waterway responsibilities which
requires the assignment of senior Coast Guard Reserve officers to each
State Guard Headquarters as liaison officers. To date insufficient
Selected Reserve end-strength has allowed only three officers to be
assigned to this important Homeland Security duty.
2. Domestic and Expeditionary Support to National Defense
Port Security units (PSUs) are identified in Coast Guard and
Combatant Commander contingency plans that call for 11 Port Security
Units. PSUs perform maritime interception operations (MIO), coastal
security patrols, and port security missions for military and
humanitarian missions worldwide, including the protection of national
assets. Presently only 8 of the 11 PSUs, with a staffing of 115 Reserve
and 5 Active duty billets are operational.
PSUs are units that are being frequently deployed. As a result, the
USCGR is having a difficult time recruiting to these units from other
billets within the CG Reserve. As a result, this is the program with
the highest frequency of individual repeat mobilization for CG
Reservists, which has resulted in retention problems.
3. Disaster Response and Recovery
Since the 2005 hurricane season, Coast Guard Reserve liaison
officers to Federal, state and local disaster response agencies are in
high demand but short supply. Of more than 80 required positions, only
6 emergency preparedness liaison officers (EPLOs) can be filled from
the Coast Guard Reserve as requested.
These examples illustrate that some of the most vital missions
required to support Homeland Security and prevent or respond to another
terrorist incident are not being achieved due to inadequate reserve
end-strength. The country can ill-afford to ignore these requirements
any longer and risks not preventing the next terrorist incident.
ROA strongly recommends funding at a higher end-strength level
in order to accomplish all mission areas vital to Homeland
Security.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, since 9/11 the Coast
Guard has added 7,000 Active personnel and 5,000 civilian members, a
very expensive approach in a resource constrained environment that has
not yielded sufficient risk mitigation in the Homeland Defense and
Maritime Security mission areas.
With only 8,100 funded billets, the USCG is playing musical chairs
with its Reserve personnel. Insufficient Reserve end-strength requires
the Coast Guard Selected Reserve to transfer personnel from other vital
Reserve missions to another in an attempt that only partially addresses
these legislated national security requirements. Adding to Active
structure is an expensive solution and hiring civilians cannot
realistically solve these operational shortfalls. With the present size
of the CG Reserve, these missions have no realistic chance of being
fully accomplished. Neither can technology, in the near-term, address
these constraints on the Coast Guard's operational capabilities and
reach within the maritime domain.
Using FY 2007 Coast Guard budget data, the Coast Guard Reserve, as
presently structured only comprises about 2.25 percent of the Coast
Guard's budget. The tasks that the Congress has mandated in current
homeland defense legislation could actually be accomplished by the CG
Reserve at a cost of about one-fifth of what an active duty personnel
solution would cost. An increase in funded end-strength of the Coast
Guard Selected Reserve to 9,300 billets is a cost effective solution to
attain higher and more sustainable levels of mission performance and
accomplishment.
An under-strength Coast Guard Reserve was able to perform in a true
national disaster, but how long can this performance be sustained? The
right for increased funding has been earned. ROA does not wish to take
funds away from the active Coast Guard and its projects; we feel that
the CG Reserve is a good investment for additional funding.
The Reserve Officers Association respectfully asks the Committee to
support this requested funding in FY 2008 and review a programmatic and
sequenced increase in the authorized and fully funded end-strength for
the Selected Reserve of the U.S. Coast Guard.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye to
Admiral Thad W. Allen
Question 1. Adequacy of Coast Guard Assets in District 14--Hawaii.
Does the Coast Guard have enough assets and personnel to fully
implement all of its intended missions in the Northwestern Hawaiian
Islands Marine National Monument?
Answer. Yes. The Coast Guard will be able to enforce its missions
in the Pacific by leveraging the multi-mission character of our assets
to increase efficiency and effectiveness. Additionally, our budget
provides sufficient funding to support the manpower and asset
requirements needed for the Coast Guard to effectively execute its
statutorily mandated eleven mission-programs.
Question 1a. Does the Coast Guard have plans to increase the number
of assets and personnel in District 14 in the future?
Answer. The Coast Guard distributes available assets and personnel
according to the overall risks and goals across all of our mission-
programs. Adjustments to assets and personnel are made as necessary
through real-time asset tracking and annual budget requests. All Coast
Guard Operational Commanders carefully and judiciously balance
available resources against mission demands to apply resources to best
meet statutory requirements, particularly concentrating on those
missions and geographic areas that present the greatest risk. While
addressing capacity, capability, and operational tempo challenges, the
Coast Guard continues to ensure coverage of all mission areas based on
the assessment of risk and the careful allocation of available
resources.
Question 1b. Given these limited assets, and the designation of the
Northwest Hawaiian Islands Marine National Monument by President Bush
in June 2006, how does the Coast Guard plan to properly and efficiently
enforce the prohibitions on passage, fishing and other activities in
the National Monument?
Answer. The Coast Guard does not anticipate increasing deployments
in this area at this time. However, the Coast Guard will continue to
provide law enforcement presence with aircraft and cutter deployments
in the Monument area commensurate with threat levels and competing
demands.
Question 1c. Why has the Coast Guard not asked for more funding for
District 14 in the FY 2008 budget?
Answer. The President's FY08 budget provides sufficient funding to
maintain the manpower and asset requirements needed for the Coast Guard
to effectively execute its statutorily mandated mission-programs.
Question 1d. Admiral, are you familiar with the AIS Base Station
Network or the proposal to provide global access of commercial vessels
for tracking?
Answer. The term AIS Base Station Network is generic in nature and
can refer to a number of different systems deployed internationally or
for sale by a number of different vendors. The Coast Guard is
establishing a Nationwide Automatic Identification System (NAIS) to
collect, integrate, and analyze information from vessels equipped with
AIS systems that are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
using a combination of ground-based and space-based AIS receivers.
Question 1e. Is this a system that could be beneficial to the Coast
Guard in the tracking of vessels?
Answer. No. They are not suited to monitoring of remote oceans
areas.
Question 1f. Is the Coast Guard interested in engaging in a
private-public partnership for vessel tracking systems? Why, or why
not?
Answer. Yes, the U.S. Coast Guard is partnering with local
Automatic Identification System (AIS) providers in numerous locations
as part of the NAIS project and installing its own receive-only
capability in others. Additionally, the Coast Guard has contracted to
receive AIS information from a satellite that is scheduled to be
launched this year to enable access to information from thousands of
miles offshore.
Question 1g. Does the Coast Guard plan to include a budget request
for the enclosed air station hangar at Barbers Point, Hawaii in FY
2009's budget?
Answer. No. The Coast Guard will be initiating a Planning Proposal
to examine alternatives for the replacement of hangar facilities at Air
Station Barber's Point.
Question 2. Admiral, we have discussed on numerous occasions the
Coast Guard international inspection program for foreign ports. What do
you think about the possibility of developing a third party
verification system to better verify a foreign ports compliance with
ISPS?
Answer. The idea of third party verification using contractors is
generally unacceptable to our trading partners. Many, if not most
countries would likely be unwilling to allow a third party entity to
evaluate ISPS compliance at their ports due to matters of sovereignty.
Early on, the Coast Guard attempted to use a contractor to gather
preliminary information for a country visit and that government
objected. Even though the Maritime Transportation and Security Act
(MTSA) requires the Coast Guard to assess the effectiveness of
antiterrorism measures in foreign ports, we cannot do so unless
invited, and must respect the sovereignty of our trading partners.
However, to overcome some of the resistance to this program, we have
invited some of our trading partners to the United States to share
objectives.
While there are potential problems with a private third party
verification system using contractors, the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) has adopted a member audit scheme that has member
nations examine the compliance of other nations with various
international maritime safety instruments. The IMO has agreed to expand
this member audit scheme to include maritime security at a future date.
We are supportive of this approach and believe such an arrangement
would serve to leverage Coast Guard competencies and improve ISPS
compliance.
Question 3. Why do we keep seeing a trend of the Coast Guard's
security missions taking the majority of resources over non-security
missions?
Answer. The Coast Guard distributes available assets and personnel
according to the overall risks and goals across all of our mission-
programs. Adjustments to assets and personnel are made as necessary
through real-time asset tracking and annual budget requests. Coast
Guard operational commanders carefully and judiciously balance
available resources against mission demands to apply resources to best
meet statutory requirements, particularly concentrating on those
missions and geographic areas that present the greatest risk. This use
of risk is a fundamental aspect of Coast Guard operations. While
addressing capacity, capability, and operational pace challenges, the
Coast Guard continues to ensure coverage of all mission areas based on
the assessment of risk and the careful allocation of available
resources. Operational commanders will continue to allocate multi-
mission assets based on overall achievement of performance goals, given
current intelligence and risk assessments.
Question 3a. What, if anything, are you doing to make sure the non-
security missions are allocated as many resources if not more than the
security missions?
Answer. The GAO has determined that despite congressional concern
about an increased focus on homeland security missions, overall non-
homeland security mission performance has not suffered to any great
degree. In fact, in the case of domestic fishery enforcement--the 96.6
percent actual observed compliance rate (only .4 percent short of the
goal of 97 percent) has been constant since 2004. The Coast Guard
continues to strive to meet the demands of its traditional missions
while embracing its expanded homeland security duties. Coast Guard
assets are inherently multi-mission in character--this provides the
Service the flexibility to rapidly transition resources between
mission-programs as needed to support multiple priorities. We firmly
believe that this multi-mission capability, coupled with a risk-based
approach to resource allocation, has allowed our Service to improve
efficiency and effectiveness in both our homeland and non-homeland
security roles.
Question 3b. Can you explain why the Coast Guard was unable to meet
its target goals in all of its mission areas?
Answer. During Fiscal Year 2006, the Coast Guard met the
performance targets for many of its core missions, including marine
environmental protection, foreign fishery enforcement, and domestic ice
breaking. However, we missed performance targets by less than 1 percent
for search and rescue and domestic fishery enforcement. Over the past 3
years, only the Defense Readiness and Living Marine Resource mission
areas have trended away from targeted performance.
Although the overall SAR caseload continues to slowly decline, the
number of ``difficult'' cases where mariners are in danger continues at
a steady rate. Delays in fielding Rescue 21 is the major limiting
factor in achieving the 2006 SAR performance target of 86 percent of
mariners in imminent danger being saved.
Marine Safety performance improvement hinges on addressing the
remaining risks associated with recreational and towing vessels as
these account for the preponderance of current maritime accidents.
Coast Guard improvements to regulatory regimes and partnerships have
not led to as rapid a decrease in mariner, passenger, and boating
deaths and injuries as models suggested when the 2006 targets were
established. Additionally, the normalization of recreational vessel
injuries into the marine safety performance metric has increased the
variability of reported performance. The Coast Guard has adjusted its
performance targets for 2009-2013 to reflect this variability, and will
refine performance data to improve the accuracy of mission performance
reports while continuing to implement regulatory changes needed to
address the root causes of mariner, passenger, and boater deaths and
injuries.
Waterways Management/Aids to Navigation performance is likewise
driven largely by the uninspected towing vessel industry, to which 60
percent of the collisions, allisions, and groundings can be attributed.
As with Marine Safety, regulatory regime and partnership improvement
initiatives have not resulted in as rapid a decline in collisions,
allisions, and groundings as had been anticipated when the 2006 target
was established. As a result, the Coast Guard has adjusted its
performance targets for 2009-2013. The Coast Guard is currently
undergoing an independent program evaluation through the Center for
Naval Analyses with an aim to improving the performance metrics of this
mission.
Living Marine Resource performance is driven by excessive
violations in three major fisheries: Atlantic Sea Scallop, Northeast
Groundfish, and the Gulf of Mexico/Southeast Atlantic shrimp fisheries.
Three-fourths of all significant violations are from these three
fisheries. Days at sea restrictions, complex and continuously changing
regulations, and poor economic conditions have continued to create a
strong incentive for illegal fishing. Coast Guard boarding efforts are
back to near historical levels, and improvements in fishing vessel
monitoring technology, intelligence, and partnerships with enforcement
partners should slowly improve the compliance rate from 96.6 percent to
the targeted 97 percent.
Defense Readiness performance targets were not achieved primarily
due to Port Security Unit (PSU) readiness and declining High Endurance
Cutter material condition. PSU readiness shortfalls were primarily in
the area of training; and remediation of these shortfalls is subject to
reservists being available to attend training.
Question 3c. Protecting living marine resources is of particular
importance to my home state of Hawaii. Why are we seeing a trend of
decreasing resources requested for this mission?
Answer. The Coast Guard does not budget by or allocate funding by
mission-program; however, to project how funding will be distributed
across mission-programs the Coast Guard uses a tool called the Mission
Cost Model (MCM). The MCM's depiction of how funding is allocated and
expended across the Coast Guard's 11 mission-programs have caused
concern over the past few years, particularly when mission costs appear
to ``go down.'' Funding distribution using the MCM, in most cases, does
not have a direct correlation to ``doing less'' to support one mission
or another. For example, in the case of Search and Rescue, each year we
answer every call for assistance; however, severe winter conditions may
cause more resources to be used in 1 year than another. In addition,
extraordinary occurrences, such as a mass migration or a Hurricane
Katrina-like event contribute to large spikes in mission execution
during the year the event occurs.
The primary attributes to keep in mind when discussing the MCM in
general terms:
The Coast Guard does not budget for, nor allocate, funding
by mission, but rather by Congressionally-established
appropriations and PPAs.
The MCM represents a two-year rolling average of how funding
was spent by mission, primarily according to hours captured in
the Coast Guard's Abstract of Operations (AOPS).
Forcing the Coast Guard to increase funding to support a
given mission will jeopardize the agency's multi-mission nature
and ability to respond effectively to evolving threats.
Decreasing resources requested for LMR
As stated in the recent GAO report for OAF&CG, despite
congressional concern about an increased focus on homeland security
missions, non-homeland security mission performance has not suffered.
In the case of domestic fisheries enforcement the 96.6 percent actual
observed compliance rate (only .4 percent short of the goal of 97
percent) has been constant since 2004. We are also realizing
efficiencies in executing this mission through leveraging the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) National Vessel
Monitoring System (NVMS), as well as intelligence and interagency
cooperation.
Question 3d. What do you plan to do over the next year to ensure
that the Coast Guard's overall performance increases, so that it meets
its target goals in each of its 11 mission areas?
Answer. The Commandant has launched a number of initiatives to
ensure that the Coast Guard's overall performance increases and that we
meet our annual performance targets in each mission area. We have
developed a Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security and
Stewardship, which lays out the necessary changes required to
strengthen maritime regimes, achieve domain awareness, and enhance
operational capabilities. We are also reorganizing our command and
control structure around one commander in the field responsible for
Mission Execution and reorganizing our support systems around one
commander in the field responsible for Mission Support. Our strategic
focus for the next year will be to improve our operational capability,
improve awareness within the maritime domain, and improve maritime
regimes both domestically and internationally.
Within each mission area, program managers continually assess
performance toward our long term and annual outcomes to ensure
continuous improvement. Annually we develop specific targets and
milestones for each of our 11 mission programs and communicate
priorities to our field commanders through detailed operational
planning guidance.
Through the Coast Guard's Deepwater and other acquisition programs,
we will continue to improve operational efficiency and capability
across all mission-programs. HH-65 helicopters, recently re-engined
through the Deepwater program, will enhance mission performance in such
areas as search and rescue, environmental protection and ports,
waterways and coastal security. Current acquisition projects such as
the Deepwater National Security Cutter, Response Boat-Medium and Rescue
21 will further enhance Coast Guard capabilities to perform both
homeland security and traditional missions, including Living Marine
Resources, illegal drug interdiction, undocumented migrant
interdiction, and search and rescue.
Question 3e. If the Coast guard failed to meet its targets in 6
mission areas last year, should we expect significantly improved
performance this year, when a similar proportion of assets is devoted
to these non-security missions?
Answer. Efforts are underway to ensure performance improves in each
of our mission areas. Program managers have conducted assessments of
current performance, examined the external maritime trends, conducted
analysis of the key drivers of performance in mission areas, and
developed new performance targets and milestones. Detailed operational
planning guidance highlighting the priorities for FY08 will be
communicated to our field commanders for to use in developing tactical
level plans for conducting operations. Performance in each mission area
will be assessed quarterly to determine progress and to identify the
need for changes in tactical direction and/or resource allocation.
Question 4. I see the cost of the Rescue 21 project has increased
to $730.2 million from original estimates of $210 million in 1999. I
know that a portion of the increased cost is due to necessary changes
because of 9/11, but can you tell me what else went wrong that required
such a significant increase in the cost of Rescue 21?
Answer. Adjustments to the Rescue 21 total acquisition cost
estimate from 1999 to present have been driven by a combination of
factors, including refinement of operational requirements,
incorporation of technical analysis performed during the Concept and
Technology Development Phase (Phase 1) of the project, and cost and
schedule variances during initial Capability Development and
Demonstration/Production and Deployment (Phase 2) of the project. A
chronological summary of adjustments to the Rescue 21 total acquisition
cost estimate follows:
The original Rescue 21 Acquisition Program Baseline (APB),
dated April 16, 1999 estimated a total acquisition cost
threshold of $250 million. This initial planning-level estimate
was developed in preparation for Phase 1 of the project and was
based on preliminary assumptions prior to development of the
Rescue 21 Operational Requirements Document (ORD).
In preparation for Phase 2 of the Rescue 21 project, and
based on Phase 1 lessons learned, the Coast Guard revised the
Rescue 21 APB (APB Revision 2, dated March 11, 2002) total
acquisition cost threshold to $580 million. This represented
the first Rescue 21 acquisition cost estimate that incorporated
fully refined operational requirements, technical feasibility
analysis, and industry life cycle cost estimate input.
During the Initial Operating Capability (IOC) and Low Rate
Initial Production (LRIP) segments of Phase 2, the Rescue 21
project experienced cost overruns and schedule delays due to
Rescue 21 Ground Subsystem (GSS) infrastructure preparation,
construction and permitting activities, and software
development, integration, and testing efforts. Additionally,
the initial Vessel Subsystem (VSS) prototype and testing
efforts experienced significant cost escalation and schedule
delays. On May 25, 2005 the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) approved Rescue 21 APB Revision 3, which adjusted the
estimated total acquisition cost threshold to $720 million to
account for the cost and schedule variances experienced during
IOC and LRIP.
Rescue 21 APB Revision 4, dated April 10, 2006, set the
total acquisition threshold at $730.2 million, which
incorporated the $10.2 million in hurricane supplemental
funding appropriated (P.L. 109-148) to the Coast Guard to
repair storm damaged legacy communications infrastructure along
the Gulf Coast subsequent to Rescue 21 APB Revision 3.
Question 4a. What steps are you taking to ensure that Rescue 21 is
delivered on time and at no higher cost to the American taxpayers than
already required?
Answer. Major actions taken by the Coast Guard over the past year
to control Rescue 21 project cost and schedule include:
Through APB Revision 4, the Coast Guard down-scoped the VSS
asset tracking and data communications components. This
approach is more affordable and will result in a non-
proprietary, Automatic Identification System (AIS)-based
solution that is more compatible with other current or planned
Coast Guard vessel tracking/data communications systems.
Additionally, through APB Revision 4, the Coast Guard
committed to recapitalizing the legacy system, vice full R21
installation, in the Western Rivers regions (Ohio River Valley,
Upper Mississippi, and Lower Mississippi) to reduce total
Rescue 21 program acquisition costs while meeting Coast Guard
operational requirements within these geographic areas.
Chartered a team of executive-level Defense Acquisition
University specialists to conduct a comprehensive review of the
Rescue 21 project, identify areas of concern, and formulate an
execution strategy for the remainder of the production phase.
Implemented project management actions in response to
recommendations contained in Government Accountability Office
audit GAO-06-623 (``U.S. Coast Guard: Improvements Needed in
Management and Oversight of Rescue System Acquisition''),
including:
Conducted an Integrated Baseline Review (IBR) on the
contracted deployment activities for the first 11 FRP
regions to more accurately project cost, schedule, and
performance, enabling the Coast Guard to better identify
future cost and schedule variances, and implement
corrective actions as necessary.
Implemented quarterly executive governance meetings
between the Coast Guard's Assistant Commandant for
Acquisition and contractor's Executive Vice President to
monitor project performance and risk.
Established an executive oversight committee,
consisting of senior Coast Guard and DHS officials, to help
monitor the project's cost and schedule risks. The
committee first met in June 2006 and continues to meet on a
quarterly basis.
The Rescue 21 PM has initiated an independent government cost
estimate (IGCE) to validate current program costs.
Question 5. Admiral, do you think the creation of a Deployable
Operations Group (DOG) within the Coast Guard will make it easier for
resources to be allocated away from non-security missions? What
possible problems do you see, if any, in regards to this
reorganization?
Answer. No. The missions of all the units consolidated under the
command of the Deployable Operations Group will not change. The focus
of these units will remain maritime safety, security and environmental
response. The Deployable Operations Group will provide unified command
and an enhanced ability to develop adaptive force packages for
executing more efficient and effective responses to a threat or event.
There are no such challenges anticipated with this internal
reorganization.
Question 6. Admiral, I see that your budget proposes cutting
positions within the Civil Engineering Units of the Coast Guard. As you
know, some of the positions that would be cut would be from my state.
Can you tell me what benefit would actually be received from cutting 57
Federal positions nationwide?
Answer. The Coast Guard's Civil Engineering High Performing
Organization (HPO) initiative provides more effective processes and
services. Promulgated from OMB Circular A-76, the proposal includes a
bi-level maintenance system that standardizes procedures and provides
centrally-managed depot-level maintenance activities. We use a similar
model for aviation engineering that minimizes costs while maximizing
service quality.
Question 7. Could you please explain how the Coast Guard plans to
operate and maintain the three Coast Guard polar icebreakers, without
relying on funds from other Federal agencies?
Answer. The Coast Guard operates within the framework of the 2005
MOU with NSF and has not developed any alternative plan for polar
icebreaker operations and maintenance.
Question 7a. Considering the age and deteriorating condition of the
current polar icebreaker fleet, and the amount of time and money it
will require recapitalizing these assets, could you please explain why
the Coast Guard has not come up with any long-term plans on how to deal
with this looming problem?
Answer. The HEALY, commissioned in 2000, has an anticipated service
life of XX years. The need for any new icebreaking capability in the
polar regions is currently under review by the Coast Guard in
conjunction with interagency review of the current U.S. polar policy.
Question 7b. Why did you not provide a plan that would fund the
Coast Guard's polar icebreakers without relying on an agency, such as
the NSF, as was required by the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
Act of 2006?
Answer. In January 2007, DHS provided a report to Congress
outlining the operational intentions and fiscal requirements to operate
and maintain POLAR SEA and HEALY in Fiscal Year 2007 and the fiscal
maintenance plans for Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009.
Question 7c. Admiral Allen, is it true that the Memorandum of
Agreement between the Coast Guard and the National Science Foundation
has not been signed as of today for FY 2007?
Answer. The USCG-NSF Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was signed in
August 2005 and serves as the guiding document for transfer of funds
from NSF to the USCG each year to support polar icebreaker personnel,
maintenance and operations under the current budget authority. For
Fiscal Year 2007, the NSF received supplemental Continuing Resolution
funding of $60 million to fund International Polar Year initiatives and
polar icebreaker costs. To date, NSF has indicated it would provide $48
million through the third quarter of Fiscal Year 2007 but has not
provided a definitive funding total.
Question 7d. How will this affect the operations and maintenance of
the Coast Guard's polar icebreaker fleet for this year and beyond?
Answer. The Coast Guard and NSF will work within the framework of
the MOU to administer the icebreaking program plan.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Admiral Thad W. Allen
Question 1. Do we know how much money NSF will be providing to the
Coast Guard for Polar Icebreaker operations for Fiscal Year 2008?
Answer. No. In accordance with the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA),
NSF will provide the Coast Guard with a list of operational
requirements for FY08, and the Coast Guard will build a program plan to
meet them. We are currently gathering requirements from NSF and plan to
have the proposed program plan, and estimated cost, ready for NSF's
consideration by July 1st.
Question 1a. What steps is the Coast Guard currently taking to plan
for the longer term replacement or recapitalization of these unique
assets?
Answer. The need for any new icebreaking capability in the polar
regions is currently under review by the Coast Guard in conjunction
with interagency review of the current U.S. polar policy.
Question 1b. As you know, language was included in the Fiscal Year
2007 Continuing Resolution requiring the National Science Foundation to
reimburse the Coast Guard for polar icebreaker maintenance and
operations. But I understand that NSF never signed an official
agreement with the Coast Guard to provide these funds. Is this the
case?
Answer. The USCG-NSF Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was signed in
August 2005. Under this MOA, NSF annually sets the tasking for the
vessels, informed by coordination meetings hosted by NSF and attended
by the USCG and other agencies with a need for icebreaking services.
The USCG submits a program plan (a budget with operating and
maintenance information, as well as supporting documentation) to NSF
that addresses the tasking. The agencies then negotiate the program
plan, agree upon a budget that meets the plan requirements, and NSF
reimburses USCG for agreed-upon expenses. NSF's Congressionally-
approved FY07 operating plan allocates $57 million for polar
icebreaking. To date, NSF has approved $48 million through the third
quarter of FY07 in reimbursements to the USCG. The Coast Guard is
finalizing its fourth quarter request and will submit it to NSF
shortly.
Question 1c. If so, How can the Coast Guard assure that NSF will
reimburse the full $57 million slated for the polar icebreaker fleet
under this year's Continuing Resolution?
Answer. Coast Guard senior leadership is engaged with NSF senior
leadership on polar icebreaker funding issues.
Question 2. Do you agree that the Coast Guard should provide
reporting to Congress similar to what DOD provides? Specifically, what
are your thoughts on requiring Coast Guard reporting similar to the
DOD's Selected Acquisition Reports and Unit Cost Reports, as was
mentioned during the hearing?
Answer. Most Coast Guard acquisition projects, with the exception
of the NSC, are not at the stage or investment level that would require
a Selected Acquisition Report or Unit Cost Report under DOD standards
($2.7B). The Coast Guard is a mid-sized Federal acquisition agency and
it would be unduly burdensome to hold an agency of its size to DOD
reporting standards.
Question 3. There have been concerns raised to my staff about the
safety and cost of the CASA Maritime Patrol Aircraft. I understand that
out of the 220 CASA-CN-235 aircraft operating around the world in 24
countries, there have been 9 crashes resulting in 92 fatalities. As you
promised during the hearing, could you please provide a side-by-side
comparison between the CASA CN-235 and other, similar planes considered
by the Coast Guard such as the Dash 8?
Answer. A side-by-side comparison between the CASA CN-235 and
other, similar planes is provided in the table below.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of Aircraft Years Since First
Aircraft Type Loss Occurrences Flight
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aerospatiale/Aeritalia ATR-42 17 23
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beechcraft 1900 22 22
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CASA CN-235 9 24
------------------------------------------------------------------------
De Havilland DHC-8 (Dash 8) 19 24
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dornier Do-228 30 26
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Embraer 120 Brasilia 14 24
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Saab 340 19 24
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shorts 360 11 26
------------------------------------------------------------------------
These facts can be checked on the Aviation Safety Network site
(http://aviation-safety.net).
Question 3a. I understand the Inspector General of the Department
of Homeland Security is doing an analysis of whether the costs of
making these airframes operational are too high. Is it your opinion
that continuing with the CASA is in the best interest of the Coast
Guard and the American taxpayer?
Answer. Yes, continuing with the CASA is in the best interest of
the Coast Guard and the U.S. Government. The CASA CN-235 was designed
and built to meet strict performance specifications in order to execute
Coast Guard missions. Operational testing for the CASA will begin in
November 2007.
Question 4. It is my understanding that flight training facilities
are limited for the CASA aircraft and located in Spain, and parts and
qualified service personnel are also limited because of the relatively
small number of these aircraft in service. What are the additional
operating costs that will be incurred with the CASA because of this
limitation on training, parts, and qualified service personnel?
Answer. The CASA procurement contract includes training for Coast
Guard personnel. Currently, 6 Coast Guard pilots have been trained in
Spain at the facility of the Original Equipment Manufacture (OEM).
Maintenance and loadmaster training have also been provided to enlisted
personnel. The OEM will provide instructor pilot training at a future
date so that pilot training can be conducted at Aviation Training
Center (ATC) Mobile, AL. ATC Mobile is also developing course
curriculum for mechanic maintainer and loadmaster training for the
enlisted personnel.
To date, approximately $15M has been allocated for aircraft spare
parts and $2.5M for Mission System Pallet spare parts.
Question 4a. Will pilots have to be trained in Spain and will the
aircraft have to be serviced in Spain as well? If not, has the Coast
Guard invested additional funds in the CASA program to develop training
and service capabilities in the United States?
Answer. Aircraft Repair & Supply Center (AR&SC) Elizabeth City, NC
is currently working to establish contracts with CASA and Lockheed
Martin Eagan for field service representative access until the Coast
Guard program is self sustaining. The current procurement contract has
provisions for training two pilots for each aircraft procured and
additional maintenance and loadmaster training for enlisted crew
members. Pilot training, maintenance training and loadmaster training
will be provided at ATC Mobile, AL on future procurements.
The aircraft will not have to be serviced in Spain. They are
currently being serviced at AR&SC Elizabeth City, NC.
Question 4b. Were these kinds of extra costs factored into the
original estimated costs of the CASA when it was compared to (and
chosen over) other aircraft?
Answer. We do not see additional costs related to the CASA
procurement that would be significantly different than those incurred
with other aircraft. Any aircraft procured would require spare parts,
pilot training, instructor pilot training, maintenance training,
loadmaster training, course curriculum and other training and
infrastructure.
Question 5. As you know, the original Deepwater contract called for
a composite FRC. We were told that the reasons for going with
composites, rather than steel, were that composites have lower
maintenance and life-cycle costs, a longer service life, and are
lighter weight. Admiral, I'm wondering what changed in this analysis to
justify moving away from composites to steel?
Answer. The Coast Guard identified high technical risks with the
Integrated Coast Guard Systems' (ICGS) proposed composite design
leading to suspension of the composite Fast Response Cutter (FRC)
design efforts in February 2006. These risks were validated by an
independent third party design review conducted by Alion--John J.
McMullen & Associates (JJMA) that was completed in April 2006, and by a
panel of independent composite technology experts from the U.S. Navy,
private industry, academia, and the U.S. Coast Guard who participated
in a Technology Readiness Assessment in December 2006. These technical
risks would impact manufacture of the composite hull and had the
potential to impact cost and schedule.
An FRC-A Class Business Case Analysis (BCA), which included a
Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA), was also conducted. The FRC-A
BCA, completed by Designers and Planners, Inc. (D&P), an independent
third party, was reviewed by ICGS and comments were received in March
2007. The Coast Guard in concert with D&P reviewed the ICGS comments
and determined they do not materially change the results of the BCA.
The BCA and TRA results indicated there is no clear benefit to pursuing
a composite-hulled patrol boat. The TRA indicated a score between 4 and
5 for the composite FRC-A, while a score of 7 or higher is preferred to
keep technical risk acceptable. The BCA indicated the ``break-even''
point of TOC for steel versus composite patrol boat hulls occurs
whenever the composite can be shown to last 15-17 years longer than the
steel. The Coast Guard believes that the life span gap between
composite and steel hulls would be less.
Question 6. You recently announced that the Coast Guard will be
taking on full responsibility as the lead systems integrator for
Deepwater, rather than using ICGS. But you also stated that ``ICGS will
have an enduring role''. Could you please explain specifically how the
relationship with ICGS is changing, and specifically what role you
envision ICGS playing in the future? Also, will ICGS continue in its
current role for all 8 National Security Cutters and all 36 CASA
aircraft? As the Coast Guard takes on these new responsibilities as
lead systems integrator, will you require additional funds, and how
will this be reflected in the Coast Guard's budget requests?
Answer. As the Deepwater program has matured, the Coast Guard has
assumed a greater role both in management and oversight to the point
that the next logical and prudent step is to assume the lead role as
the systems integrator. This change will involve transition over a
period of time as the Coast Guard acquires additional expertise.
Specifically, the Coast Guard has taken over responsibility and control
in the following areas:
Development of the System Concept of Operations or Asset
Statements of Objectives
Responsibility for Technical Authority
Development of Business Case Analysis decisions to validate
the selection and mix of Deepwater Program assets
Leadership of Integrated Product Teams
Management of the Risk Management Plan
Greater oversight of ICGS's application of accepted System
Engineering principles and practices at the Deepwater System
design level
Greater oversight and control of Integrated Logistics
Support
In terms of what is different contractually, the work performed by
the systems integrator was accomplished under the System Engineering
and Program Management Delivery Task Orders (DTOs). Future DTOs will be
modified to de-scope or reduce those tasks accomplished by the systems
integrator since it will now be done increasingly by the Coast Guard.
ICGS has the potential to continue to provide the goods and
services already under contract, such as the MPA and the NSC; however,
the Coast Guard remains open to recompeting these assets if it is in
the best interest of the government to do so. ICGS may also participate
in future work; however, all future assets will be competitively
awarded.
It will most likely be necessary to shift additional funding to
government program management as the Coast Guard assumes more system
integration and oversight responsibilities.
Question 7. Do you currently have the authority and funding that
you need to fully staff your Deepwater acquisition team?
Answer. The Coast Guard is in a transition period as it assumes
greater oversight and assumes additional system integration
responsibilities. We have adequate funding for FY07 and we have
requested additional funding in FY08 as part of the President's Budget
Request.
Question 8. Recent reports have indicated that the Coast Guard's
Deepwater program is experiencing a massive cash backlog, carrying over
$700 million in unspent funds. It seems that we, the Congress, are
funding the program at a rate faster than you can spend it. Please
explain why such vast amounts of taxpayer dollars sit idle and remain
unspent.
Answer. The Deepwater Program is administrating an aggressive but
prudent obligation plan that will address some of the outstanding
unspent or unobligated funds. Based on this plan, the Coast Guard
expects to carryover approximately $350 million into FY2008. The table
below outlines our obligation plan. Unobligated funds are primarily for
3 assets:
FRC B-Class (Replacement Patrol Boat) which will be awarded
in FY 2008;
VUAV which will not be restarting until 2012 or later; and
FRC A-Class which will not be restarting until 2012 or
later.
Deepwater Financial Status Prepared 9 May 2007
[FY 2007 Carryover into FY 2008]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Projected Total Projected
3 May 2007 Obligations Balance as Balance on 30
Unobligated Planned Between Obligations Sept. 2007
Balance 3 May 2007 and Completed through (Carryover into
31 July 2007 31 July 2007 FY08)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Armed Helicopter Equipment $41,997,062 $39,257,062 $1,236,276,826 $2,740,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C-130H Conversion/Sustainment $56,611,596 $46,328,596 $1,189,948,230 $10,283,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C-130J Fleet Introduction $4,845,000 $4,845,000 $1,185,103,230 $0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Covert Surveillance Aircraft $263,386 $263,386 $1,184,839,844 $0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HH-60 Conversion Projects $46,624,602 $34,713,602 $1,150,126,242 $11,911,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HH-65 Conversion/Sustainment $20,412,346 $0 $1,150,126,242 $20,112,316
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) $37,915,023 $37,915,023 $1,112,211,219 $0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle $38,608,977 $3,608,977 $1,108,602,242 $35,000,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C4ISR $41,139,992 $41,139,992 $1,067,462,250 $0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Logistics $16,152,346 $16,152,346 $1,051,309,904 $0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Government Program Management $32,144,850 $32,114,850 $1,019,195,054 $0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fast Response Cutter (FRC)--A Class $41,580,181 $0 $1,019,195,054 $41,580,181
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fast Response Cutter (FRC)--B Class/ $116,160,369 $0 $1,019,195,054 $116,160,369
Replacement Patrol Boat
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2006 Congressional Reprogramming $8,247,000 $0 $1,019,195,054 $8,247,000
(123 WPB Close, OPC, NSC)*
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IDS Small Boats $1,804,137 $0 $1,019,195,054 $1,804,137
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Medium Endurance Cutter Sustainment $9,751,620 $8,460,620 $1,010,734,434 $1,291,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
National Security Cutter (NSC) $643,587,106 $643,587,106 $367,147,328 $0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) $105,142,331 $6,355,331 $360,791,997 $98,787,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Surface Ships Other $0 $0 $360,791,997 $0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
System Engineering and Integration $12,875,994 $12,875,994 $347,916,003 $0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total $1,275,533,888 $927,617,885 $347,916,003
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Note: This reprogramming is not a stand alone CIP line item. It is accounted for in previous CIP summaries and
unobligated balance questions in the ``110 Patrol Boat SLEP/Fast Response Cutter--B Class'' category.
It is important to have funds available and ready to obligate. Such
availability helps to garner more bids and greater competition, as
could be important in the upcoming FRC B-class (replacement patrol
boat) and other projects.
Question 9. Will industry continue to self-certify any design or
performance specifications for NSCs 1 and 2?
Answer. The Deepwater contract with Integrated Coast Guard Systems,
LLP (ICGS) currently uses tailored Cutter Specific Certification
Matrices (CSCM) to define the standards that are to be used for the
design and construction of each class of surface assets. This set of
standards was proposed by ICGS for each surface asset based on a
generic set compiled by the Coast Guard and American Bureau of Shipping
(ABS). Under the terms of the Cutter Certification Program, ICGS must
use ABS to certify compliance with all ABS standards (e.g., rules,
guidelines) cited in the CSCM. On the National Security Cutter (NSC),
fewer than 100 of the almost 1,000 standards of the CSCM involve ABS;
Federal agencies are the certification agent for six standards. The
contract permits ICGS to certify the remainder of the CSCM, and ICGS
has chosen that option.
Though the contractor ``certifies'' a line item in the CSCM, the
government retains the means to protect its interest. First, the Coast
Guard can challenge the certification, which is exactly what the Coast
Guard did in the Integrated Product Team process. Second, the
contractor is required to meet the terms of the contract; Coast Guard
members and representatives from ABS, the Navy, and qualified support
contractors conduct random inspections/tests as well as scheduled
inspection/tests to ensure this.
The Coast Guard intends to expand the role of ABS in the Deepwater
Program to increase the assurance that Deepwater surface assets are
properly designed and constructed to an integrated and comprehensive
set of standards.
The Coast Guard is also looking to ABS to strengthen the cutter
certification program and to augment Coast Guard resources for design
review and construction oversight. ABS is recognized in statute as the
classification agent for U.S. Government ship owners. 46 U.S.C. 3316(a)
states in part that ``Each department, agency, and instrumentality of
the U.S. Government shall recognize the American Bureau of Shipping as
its agent in classifying vessels owned by the Government and in matters
related to classification.'' ABS has been participating in the design
of the NSC and the Fast Response Cutter (FRC). They are a sound choice
for supporting the Deepwater Program.
The Coast Guard and ABS are actively engaged in defining revised
certification and/or classification plans for the NSC, Offshore Patrol
Cutter (OPC) and FRC. Even with an expanded role for ABS, there are
systems and equipment, (mostly in the area of C4ISR and combat
systems), where ABS does not have the required expertise. For these,
the Coast Guard will continue to practice its overall program of
quality management, consisting of onsite Coast Guard personnel or
representatives conducting random inspections, in addition to the use
of independent tests and evaluations.
Question 10. What Deepwater assets is the Coast Guard planning on
putting under contract in the next 6 months? In the Coast Guard budget
hearing, Admiral Allen, you stated to me that for all contracts moving
forward the Coast Guard would take on the responsibilities of the lead
systems integrator, implement the Coast Guard's Systems Acquisition
Manual, end self-certification, conduct independent business case
analysis, expand the role of the Coast Guard's engineering and
logistics center, and improve reporting to Congress. How exactly will
you ensure that you meet these standards for all future contracts
moving forward? How will this impact your management of the NSC and MPA
program?
Answer. The Coast Guard plans to award contract modifications for
NSC #1, #2, and award NSC #3. The Coast Guard also plans to put
contracts in place for sustainment and conversion of legacy assets to
include the HH-60J, HC-130H, Medium Endurance Cutters (for 270, and
210,) Mission Effectiveness Project (MEP), and 110, Patrol Boats MEP.
Even though these are not for assets, contracts for Program Management,
Systems Engineering/Integration, C4ISR and Logistics are also planned
for award.
The Coast Guard has significantly increased contract oversight and
lead systems integrator responsibilities. Specifically, the Coast Guard
has made improvements in the following areas:
Development of the System Concept of Operations or Asset
Statements of Objectives
Definitive Role of Technical Authority
Development of Business Case Analysis decisions to validate
the selection and mix of Deepwater Program assets
Leadership of Integrated Product Teams
Active management of the Risk Plan
Greater oversight of ICGS's application of accepted System
Engineering principles and practices at the Deepwater System
design level
Greater oversight and control of Integrated Logistics
Support
To implement these activities and assume this workload, the
consolidation of the Deepwater and Acquisition offices will leverage
the combined expertise of contracting and program management personnel.
Together with the deployment of the ``Blueprint for Acquisition
Reform'', we expect improvements in program management, contract
execution, and obligation of appropriated funds.
Both the NSC and MPA projects will benefit from increased direct
government oversight and management, CG technical expertise, and use of
Coast Guard practices in total logistics support.
Question 11. Coast Guard personnel and resources have increased
significantly since 9/11. This has resulted in increased maritime
domain awareness, increased presence in patrols, increased targeting
and inspection of facilities and vessels--an overall increase in field
presence. The multiple mission aspect of the Coast Guard has been a
tremendous benefit to our citizens. Can you detail specific steps and
actions that are you taking to leverage this multiple mission
tradition, to ensure personnel are cross-trained and to ensure the
focus and increased budget for homeland and port security missions is
also improving Coast Guard performance in traditional missions such as
marine safety, environmental protection, search and rescue and law
enforcement?
Answer. Following the tragic events of September 2001, and to
fulfill an operations strategy from the Coast Guard's 1999 Strategic
Plan, the Coast Guard shifted from a program-focused approach to policy
development, mission planning and execution to an integrated cross-
programmatic approach. The traditional program-focused approach led to
single-mission thinking and single-mission focus. The events of
September 11, 2001 reinforced the importance of a unified command
construct that increased interactions between operational commands and
interagency partners to improve performance across a full range of
mission activities and systems.
In 2004, the Coast Guard reorganized operational field commands
across the United States to form Sector Commands. The creation of
Sectors transformed a diverse array of field structures into a standard
organizational architecture, consisting of Prevention, Response and
Logistics components. The military, maritime, multi-mission character
of the Coast Guard is reinforced and strengthened by the Sector
structure. Relationships between the Sector's Prevention and Response
components have improved the Coast Guard's effectiveness and efficiency
across all mission areas. Coast Guard Sectors provide a unified command
and control structure responsible for assessing risks across all
mission areas, developing priorities, training forces to conduct
operations in homeland security and non-homeland security mission
areas, and allocating resources to activities in support of all Coast
Guard mission areas. This current organization has proven to be an
ideal alignment for coordinating our many missions.
At the beginning of each fiscal year, the Coast Guard issues
Operational Planning Guidance to field units to communicate priorities
and performance targets in each mission area. This guidance also
includes information to assist Area Commanders in making resource
apportionment and allocation decisions in support of annual performance
targets across all missions.
In June 2005, the Commandant issued ten Commandant Intent Action
Orders aimed at improving and sustaining mission execution across all
mission areas. Each of the Action Orders represent a change to the way
we do business to better prepare the Coast Guard for challenges in the
future within an ``all threats, all hazards'' environment. The single
most visible adjustment will be to the Coast Guard's command and
control structure. We will focus our entire organization on improving
and sustaining Mission Execution. We will do this by structuring our
service as a three-pronged force: shore-based operations, maritime
operations, and deployable operations. We have taken bold steps forward
by creating Sectors for shore-based operations. And we have created
truly deployable forces. The Coast Guard is taking a significant step
toward improving the Nation's ``all hazards . . . all threats''
response capability by establishing the Deployable Operations Group
(DOG). Across all of our forces, we will partner with other services
and agencies to integrate our efforts.
We have taken similar steps by advancing the Deepwater acquisition
for maritime presence, patrol, and response. Through the Coast Guard's
Deepwater and other acquisition programs, we have and will continue to
improve operational efficiency and capabilities across all mission
areas. HH-65 helicopters, re-engined through the Coast Guard's
Deepwater program, have not only enhanced homeland security missions,
but have improved the Coast Guard's capabilities to perform non-
Homeland Security missions such as search and rescue and environmental
protection. Current acquisition projects such as the Deepwater National
Security Cutter, Response Boat-Medium and Rescue 21 will further
enhance not only Homeland Security missions, but also the Coast Guard's
capabilities to perform its traditional missions including Living
Marine Resources, Illegal Drug Interdiction, Undocumented Migrant
Interdiction and Search and Rescue.
Question 12. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 has led to significant
reduction in oil spills throughout the country. There are still
provisions, however, that need to be implemented--specifically
provisions calling for Marine Firefighting and Salvage capabilities. I
understand these are complex issues but the implementation of these
rules has been delayed several times and now here we are in 2007 with
another announced delay. These rules are not only important to my home
state of Washington where the entrance from sea is a long distance from
our major ports but in many other areas throughout the Nation. Can you
summarize in detail what the main issues are that are holding up
implementation? What is being done to resolve these issues? When do you
expect to enact these important rules?
Answer. The Coast Guard implemented salvage and marine firefighting
regulations for all tank vessels carrying oil as cargo with the
publication of the Final Rule for Vessel Response Plans in 1996. These
regulations were mandated by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. After
implementing the vessel response plan regulations, it was determined
that a more robust and detailed regulation was needed to determine the
specific equipment and response times for required salvage and marine
firefighting resources. During the Coast Guard's push to implement the
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, we put the majority of
our other rulemaking projects on hold, including the new and improved
regulations for salvage and marine firefighting. An unintended result
of this delay, however, was that the underlying analyses that were
relied upon in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (environmental and
economic) became stale. We completed the public comment period for the
updated environmental analysis in January of 2006, and we are working
diligently to finalize the rule.
Question 13. I am hearing from Merchant Mariners in my state and
all over the country about the excessive time it takes to apply for and
receive a Merchant Mariner document. For some in the Gulf region and in
the inland waterways systems, it is taking anywhere from six to 8 weeks
if not longer. Additionally, when TWIC is finally implemented, there is
concern that wait times will only be further exacerbated. What steps is
the Coast Guard taking to reduce this backlog of applications, their
process time and the transparency of the application process?
Answer. The Coast Guard Mariner Licensing and Documentation (MLD)
program is diligently working to meet the increased demanded for
Merchant Marine Credentials (MMC's) by:
The need to meet growing international credentialing
requirements;
More rigorous evaluations to meet post-9/11 security
concerns;
The NTSB recommendation, from Staten Island Ferry allision,
for more stringent medical fitness evaluations; and
The restructuring and centralization plan currently being
implemented will increase efficiencies and decrease response time. The
end-state will be a more nimble program that provides better customer
service and is poised to meet emerging credentialing challenges.
In an effort to reduce the backlog and decrease processing time,
the following recent enhancements to data collection procedures will
help the Coast Guard to better compile, process, and track application
material for more responsive credentialing issuance, and will make the
process more transparent to the customer:
Electronic fingerprinting;
Upgrades to our internal database;
Online user fee submission via www.pay.gov;
Online ability to view status of application; and
Information exchange and assistance available to customers
via 1-888 Mariner Information Help Desk.
Future initiatives include:
Developing a combined Credential (MMC);
Upgrading examination administration and grading; and
Implementing additional upgrades to our internal database.
The Coast Guard does not anticipate an increase in processing time
of MMCs when TWIC is implemented. We are working with TSA to establish
a process to share security check information. When TWIC is
implemented, applicants will be able to provide fingerprints,
citizenship, and identity information at any of 131 TWIC enrollment
centers nationwide and appearing in person at one of the 20 Coast Guard
Regional Exam Centers (REC) or Monitoring Units. This will enhance
customer service and program efficiency.
Question 14. There are over 5.7 million residents of America's
domestic offshore communities who depend on waterborne commerce for
essential supplies of energy and for virtually everything they eat,
wear, and use. A security incident that closed our ports could
devastate those communities. Can you tell me what steps the Coast Guard
is taking to assure that the highest priority is assigned to restoring
these services in the event of a catastrophe?
Answer. The Coast Guard together with the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) Customs and Border Protection and other interagency
partners are developing national protocols for recovery and the
resumption of trade following a significant disruption to the Maritime
Transportation System (MTS). These protocols provide for improved
interagency coordination and enhanced collaboration with the private
sector to facilitate rapid recovery. Guidance for Coast Guard field
units is also being prepared that will provide local Commanders with
considerations for prioritizing vessel and cargo movements upon
reopening waterways. These considerations include the need for fuels,
foodstuffs and other locally important commodities.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John F. Kerry to
Admiral Thad W. Allen
Question 1. Last year, Congress rejected the Coast Guard's request
to shut down the LORAN system and directed the Departments of Homeland
Security and Transportation to develop a national LORAN policy. I
understand that officials from those agencies as well as others met
recently as part of a committee called the National Space-Based
Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) Executive Committee and have
reached a consensus that the United States should maintain the LORAN
system. Why did the Coast Guard again request the termination of the
LORAN system as part of its FY08 budget at the same time this committee
was in the process of determining what the policy should be?
Answer. The submission of the Fiscal Year 2008 President's Budget
pre-dated the March 28, 2007 convening of the National Space-Based
Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) Executive Committee.
Therefore, the Coast Guard continued to recommend termination pending a
final decision on LORAN's future.
Question 1a. Did you alert leadership in DHS and DOT of your
request? Is there a disconnect between the Coast Guard and the policy
departments within those agencies?
Answer. There is no disconnect among agencies. All appropriate
leadership and policy departments within the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and the Department of Transportation (DOT) have been
fully involved with the Coast Guard in the process of developing the
Administration's position on LORAN.
Question 1b. Can you provide a copy of the Committee report, along
with any briefing materials that were used to inform DOT/DHS and other
affected agency officials about the team's work?
Answer. The minutes of the March 28, 2007 National Space-Based PNT
Executive Committee are controlled by the National PNT Coordination
Office The Coast Guard does not have authority to release this document
or any of the briefing materials used during deliberations.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Admiral Thad W. Allen
Question 1. How does the Coast Guard intend to meet the mandate of
the 2006 SAFE Port Act to create Interagency Operations Command Centers
at all high priority ports within 3 years of the date of enactment if
you don't request any funding for this in the 2008 budget?
Answer. Leveraging prototype Interagency Operations Command Centers
in Charleston, SC; San Diego, CA; and Hampton Roads, VA, the Coast
Guard developed an acquisition project called Command 21. Command 21 is
a five-year project that will meet the SAFE Port Act requirements for
interagency operations centers in 24 high-priority Coast Guard Sectors.
The Coast Guard is currently refining project requirements and
milestones; construction should begin in 2009 as outlined in the Fiscal
Year 2008 President's Request Capital Investment Plan (CIP).
Question 2. What are your plans for the Port of New York and New
Jersey, the largest port on the East Coast, with some 40-50 public
agencies coordinating in the region?
Answer. The Port of New York and New Jersey is included in the
Command 21 acquisition proposal for Coast Guard Sector New York.
Command 21 is designed to field:
1. A surveillance network of radars and cameras covering
critical areas;
2. An information system for situational awareness and
collaboration (conceptually called WatchKeeper); and
3. Command center facility upgrades to host port partners.
Question 3. Has the Coast Guard made available its Maritime
Security Risk Assessment Model to ports, so they can evaluate project
risk scores on a level playing field? If not, when will it be made
available? If so, has anybody used it?
Answer. MSRAM is used by the Coast Guard Sector Commander/Captain
of the Port (COTP) and the Port Security Specialist with the maritime
stakeholders through the Area Maritime Security Committees (AMSCs). If
a maritime stakeholder requests a risk analysis of their facility, the
AMSC facilitates the request and Coast Guard Port Security Specialists
provide the analysis using the MSRAM tool. The Coast Guard conducted
outreach meetings at each AMSC in early 2007. These meetings provided
briefs on MSRAM the FY 2007 Port Security Grant Program and port risk
management.
Coast Guard COTP use MSRAM to evaluate port security grant
applications to determine their potential risk reduction. With the 2007
round of grants announced in May, the Sector Commanders will engage
grant applicants and provide feedback on how individual projects were
scored.
Question 4. What is the status of the Coast Guard's establishment
of the Delaware River and Bay Oil Spill Advisory Committee? When will
that Committee be formally established?
Answer. The charter to establish the Delaware River and Bay Oil
Spill Advisory Committee is under review at Coast Guard Headquarters.
The review is expected to be complete by the end of June 2007. After
charter establishment, solicitation for committee members will be
promulgated via the Federal Register, which is estimated to occur in
June 2007. When solicitation is complete, committee members will be
nominated and the Committee formally established.
Question 5. I understand the Coast Guard has made certain approvals
for a new liquid natural gas facility in Logan Township, New Jersey, so
long as certain security measures are taken, including armed U.S. Coast
Guard escorts. Is there funding in the proposed budget to manage the
security escorts for this and other planned LNG facilities? If not, who
will pay for these operations, and how? Is the Coast Guard meeting its
current escort requirement for existing LNG facilities?
Answer. The Coast Guard has not issued an approval for the LNG
terminal proposed for Logan Township, NJ. Coast Guard ``approval''
comes in the form of a Letter of Recommendation (LOR) attesting to the
suitability of the waterway for LNG vessel traffic. In December 2005,
the local Coast Guard Captain of the Port (COTP) provided the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) with a Waterway Suitability Report
(WSR) that made a preliminary determination that the Delaware River was
suitable for LNG vessel traffic provided certain security measures,
including armed USCG vessel escorts, are in place.
In June 2006, FERC approved the construction of the proposed Logan
Township, NJ, LNG facility, with certain conditions to be satisfied
prior to the commencement of facility construction and/or operation.
These conditions include issuance of the LOR from the COTP, and
resolution of certain jurisdictional issues related to a 1905
Interstate Compact between New Jersey and Delaware in a region of the
Delaware River belonging to the State of Delaware.
The LOR, and an accompanying LNG vessel transit management plan
(TMP) that precisely establishes the amount of CG and other government
agency resources necessary to responsibly manage the safety and
security risks of LNG vessel operations, is not expected to be issued
until the interstate jurisdictional questions are ultimately resolved
by the Supreme Court. Pending completion of the TMP, it is unclear what
the ultimate costs of CG security resources will be for the Logan
Township LNG facility.
As background in April 2007, a Special Master appointed by the
Supreme Court to examine the jurisdictional issues determined that the
state of Delaware has jurisdiction over the proposed LNG vessel pier.
Delaware has stated that construction of the LNG pier is inconsistent
with its federally approved Coastal Zone Management Plan, and will not
issue the necessary permits for pier construction. New Jersey has
indicated it will appeal the Special Master's determination to the
Supreme Court.
The Coast Guard strives to meet its current escort requirements for
all Certain Dangerous Cargoes (of which LNG is one). Coast Guard
Captains of the Port weigh these responsibilities, together with
statutory responsibilities for other legislatively-mandated missions,
to optimally balance resource allocation with risk mitigation.
Question 6. Can you highlight some aspects of the Deepwater program
which have been successful so far?
Answer. Examples of the Integrated Deepwater System Acquisition
include:
Legacy C4ISR upgrades
Four shore-side command centers upgraded; significantly
enhancing operational effectiveness and Maritime Domain
Awareness.
Initial upgrades of secure Internet, commercial satellite
communications, and automatic vessel identification equipment
have been completed on all 39 legacy cutters (378, HECs, 270,
and 210, MECs).
Successfully demonstrated core capabilities Increment 1 at
the Maritime Domain Awareness Center.
Two Communications Area Master Stations delivered and Sector
San Juan and District 7 command centers completed upgrades that
are being certified for delivery.
HH-65 Helicopter Re-Engining
84 re-engined operational HH-65Cs delivered (as of May
2007).
All HH-65 equipped units are now operating the HH-65C.
Medium-Range Surveillance Aircraft (CASA CN-235)
The first eight CASA CN-235s have been placed on contract
along with the first three mission pallets. (Aircraft 4 & 5
were awarded in Jan. 2007. Aircraft 6, 7, and 8 were awarded in
April 2007.)
The first aircraft arrived at the Coast Guard Aircraft
Repair and Supply center (AR&SC) in Dec. 2006. The second
aircraft arrived in Feb. 2007. Mission pallets will be
integrated on the aircraft at AR&SC.
Official readiness status at the first air station (3 A/C)
is projected to occur by January 2009.
Question 7. I am aware that some of the new communications
equipment developed as part of the Deepwater program has already been
implemented. Do you believe that the Coast Guard's mission performance
has improved because of this equipment? If so, how? And is it possible
to accelerate funding for this part of the program?
Answer. The Coast Guard's mission performance has improved because
of the communications upgrades on legacy cutters. The Deepwater program
has provided an avenue to implement critical C4ISR system upgrades much
earlier than originally planned within the Coast Guard's organic
planning and upgrade cycle. The upgrades have significantly improved
the ability to exchange mission essential information in a timely
manner and improved interoperability with other government agencies.
Installation of a classified Local Area Network and access to the
Department of Defense's classified network provides access to near
real-time intelligence information during operations and a means to
quickly exchange information between cutters and shore units. Upgrades
to the existing commercial satellite communications systems double the
data throughput and now allows two cutters to share a single satellite
channel, thereby providing greater access to a limited number of
channels. The addition of the Automatic Identification System (AIS) has
improved situational awareness, maritime domain awareness, and
navigational safety.
The Coast Guard supports full funding of the President's FY 2008
budget ($89.6M for C4ISR), which is necessary to keep the projects on
track to meet objectives.
Question 8. How are you encouraging the contractors developing the
communications equipment to expedite the delivery of these products?
Have these efforts been successful?
Answer. The Coast Guard has been able to implement a number of
communications upgrades on legacy cutters through the Deepwater
program. These improvements include:
1. Installation of a classified Local Area Network and access
to the Department of Defense's classified network providing
access to near real-time intelligence information during
operations and a means to quickly exchange information between
cutters, aircraft and shore units.
2. Upgrades to the existing commercial satellite communications
systems doubles the data throughput and now allows two cutters
to share a single satellite channel, thereby providing greater
access to a limited number of channels.
3. The addition of the Automatic Identification System (AIS)
has improved situational awareness, maritime domain awareness,
and navigational safety.
The Coast Guard has been unable to provide an incentive for
contractors to further expedite delivery of communication capabilities
due to limited C4ISR program funding. Moreover, a planned CG-C2
(Tactical and Communications Suite) Upgrade for legacy cutters and
additional SATCOM technology improvements has been deferred due to
funding levels. The Coast Guard desires to restore these additional
Command, Control, and Communications (C3) improvements in order to
improve mission performance and interoperability.
C4ISR Comparison between President's Budget and Congressional
Appropriation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year ($M) 2006 2007 Total
------------------------------------------------------------------------
President's Budget Request 74.4 60.8 135.2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appropriated (Includes Rescissions 44.0 50.0 94.0
through 2006)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Difference (Requested vs. Enacted ) (30.4) (10.8) (41.2)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 9. There appears to be a mixed record on some early
problems combined with more recent successes in the aviation,
communications, and logistics sectors of the Deepwater program. What
lessons have both the Coast Guard and the involved contractors learned
based on these successes and failures, and how will you use these
lessons to improve the performance of the program going forward?
Answer. The Coast Guard has engaged in a collaborative manner with
ICGS to review and change the terms and conditions of the contract for
the upcoming award term. As an example, CG-4 will lead an interim
logistics support plan for MPA 1-3. This effort is a mix of organic
Coast Guard support, use of other government agencies (NAVAIR), and
ICGS (through operations & sustainment CLINS). The interim support plan
is being managed from the MPA Product Line at the Aircraft Repair and
Service Center (AR&SC). An example of a lessons-learned was the
Commandant's decision to terminate the ICGS FRC-B proposal and
designate G-A (office symbol for the ``Coast Guard Acquisitions
Directorate'') as the lead directorate to acquire the FRC-B/Replacement
Patrol Boat. This decision ensures increased government management and
oversight, while leveraging CG-4 technical expertise in shipbuilding &
design. The ``parent craft'' approach will deliver a much needed
capability sooner as both design and production stages can be combined.
Most of these changes reflect lessons-learned from the business
practices that have developed during the first 4 years of the program.
For instance, in the original concept, ICGS developed the asset
performance specifications and the Implementation Plan for how those
assets would be fielded. For a variety of reasons, the Coast Guard has
taken ownership of the performance specifications and the
Implementation Plan. In the original concept, the Coast Guard provided
performance based Statements of Objectives; in this award term, the
Coast Guard will issue Statements of Work which contain specific
requirements. Finally, the Coast Guard has mandated the use of Earned
Value Management, competition at the Northrop Grumman Ship Systems
(NGSS) and Lockheed Martin (LM) level (via the award term metrics) and
use of a ``make-or-buy'' analysis, all of which have elements that will
improve cost control and performance.
Since the specification will be known more explicitly, the type of
contract action or contract order will also be shifting from ``cost
plus'' to ``fixed priced'' contracting. The shift to fixed-price will
depend on how extensively the Statement of Work is detailed and how
stable the specification of the asset or component is in terms of
requirements and production. This shift to more fixed-price contracts
will be accompanied with clauses for inflation adjustments, known as
Economic Price Adjustments. Overall, the more detailed Statements of
Work with fixed-price contracting will reduce the risk of cost
increases that are not tied to inflation.
The Coast Guard has also implemented improvements to Deepwater
program management. The major improvements to help the program move
forward include:
Merge Deepwater with the Acquisition Directorate to form one
Acquisition Organization to increase efficiency and improve
processes.
Designate the Assistant Commandant for Engineering &
Logistics Resources (CG-4) as the Coast Guard's technical
authority for all new ship acquisition designs.
Add staff on the government side to the Deepwater Program to
perform greater contractor oversight and assume some of the
system integrator duties.
Initiate a Business Case Analysis for all new acquisition
decisions to ensure that Deepwater is building and buying the
right tools for our Coast Guard men and women for a fair and
reasonable price.
Increasing application of Independent Third Party Review and
Analyses.
Coast Guard personnel will chair all Integrated Product
Teams.
Question 10. How will the Coast Guard's experiences with Deepwater
contractors thus far affect the actions you will take during the next
award term of the program?
Answer. The Coast Guard has engaged in a collaborative manner with
contractors to review and modify contract terms and conditions for the
next award term. Most of these changes reflect lessons learned from the
business practices that evolved during the first 4 years of the
Deepwater Project. For instance, in the original concept, ICGS
developed the asset performance specifications and the Implementation
Plan for how assets would be fielded. The Coast Guard has now taken
full ownership of the performance specifications and the Implementation
Plan. In the original concept, the Coast Guard provided performance-
based Statement of Objectives. In the next award term, the Coast Guard
will issue Statements of Work that contain specific requirements
metrics. Finally, the Coast Guard has mandated the use of Earned Value
Management, competition at the Northrop Grumman Ship Systems and
Lockheed Martin level (via the award term metrics) and use of a ``make-
or-buy'' analysis; each of these have elements that will improve our
ability to control costs.
The type of contract action or contract order will likely shift
from cost-plus contracting to fixed-priced contracting. The shift to
fixed-price will depend on how detailed the Statement of Work is as
well as how stable the specification of the asset or component is in
terms of requirements and production. This shift to fixed-price
contracts would be accompanied with clauses for inflation adjustments,
known as Economic Price Adjustments. Overall, the more detailed
Statements of Work combined with fixed-price contracting will reduce
risk of cost increases not tied to inflation.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Olympia J. Snowe to
Admiral Thad W. Allen
Question 1. One of the reasons the Coast Guard structured the
Deepwater contract using a lead systems integrator was the shortage of
trained and experienced acquisitions staff within the service. S. 924
includes language that would permit you to expand or contract your
acquisitions staff as you see fit. How will this help alleviate the
problem of staff shortage? By how much will you need to increase your
acquisitions staff in order to provide the vigorous oversight that
Deepwater has lacked to date?
Answer. The Deepwater Program has conducted a preliminary analysis
and identified a need for an additional 31 government billets for FY
2008, beyond those already approved, to efficiently obligate Deepwater
Program funding and ensure successful delivery of new assets to the
fleet. However, this preliminary analysis has not considered the
Deepwater Merger with the Acquisition Directorate to form one
Acquisition Organization. The staffing needs of the new organization
will be identified and implemented as this initiative evolves.
The Coast Guard's assumption of greater oversight and more system
integration responsibilities is in the transitional stage, and
therefore, we have not completed an assessment or identification of all
necessary staff changes. However, the increased funding in FY 2007 is
adequate for this year and we have requested additional funding in FY
2008.
Question 2. A case could be made that the missteps Deepwater has
experienced since its inception are all symptoms of a larger problem--
the reason why this program has gone so wrong. What is the heart of
this issue? Please explain how it can come to pass that we have
invested so much in this program, yet we have to little to show for it.
Answer. Before addressing the question asking about a single reason
for problems with Deepwater, it is prudent to address some of what
Deepwater has accomplished for the Nation. A discussion of the
accomplishments will set the stage appropriately to address the
challenges. The Deepwater Program is the top capital priority for the
Coast Guard. The program, only in its fifth year of execution, is the
modernization and recapitalization solution for the Coast Guard's aging
fleet of cutters, aircraft and mission systems. The Coast Guard's
ability to save lives, prevent and respond to terrorist attacks,
interdict drugs and alien smugglers, and to protect the environment are
completely dependent on the assets and capabilities provided by the
Deepwater program. Secretary Chertoff and I remain one hundred percent
(100 percent) committed to the success of this crucial endeavor.
The Deepwater aviation projects have been successful, delivering
assets early and on cost. For example, all eighty-four of 95 HH-65
helicopters have been re-engined and modernized, as part of their
eventual conversion to the Multi-mission Cutter Helicopter (MCH)
configuration, which is one and one-half months ahead of schedule and
within the projected budget. The Multi-mission Cutter Helicopter (MCH)
configuration starts with the HH-65 Dolphin helicopters and is upgraded
to the C-model aircraft, which features new Turbomeca Arriel 2C2
engines and upgraded gearboxes. The aircraft have 40 percent more power
than the B-models, and greater operational reliability. Already the HH-
65C has proven itself in challenging missions. The re-engined HH-65Cs
with their improved performance characteristics have saved lives across
the Nation, over 300 in Hurricane Katrina for example.
The Coast Guard has accepted delivery of two new HC-144A medium-
range Maritime Patrol Aircraft. The aircraft are undergoing
missionization at AR&SC Elizabeth City, N.C. Six aircraft are under
contract. Additionally, the first of six new, more capable HC-130J
long-range search aircraft has begun modifications for Coast Guard
missions, with delivery expected later in 2007. Meanwhile, Deepwater is
modernizing the existing fleet of HC-130Hs.
Since contract award in 2002, the IDS program has made significant
progress toward improving the capabilities of the legacy force, even as
the Coast Guard and industry work on the next generation of assets. For
example, all medium and high endurance cutters have received the
Deepwater Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) upgrades--which already are
making a difference in operations. A recent success was in March 2007,
when the cutters SHERMAN and HAMILTON and a Coast Guard C-130 aircrew
executed a record seizure of 19.5 metric tons of cocaine aboard the
motor vessel GATUN, off Panama.
The C4ISR upgrades installed on the SHERMAN through the Deepwater
program contributed to mission success by improving communications and
situational awareness among the cutters' and aircraft's crews. The
Deepwater C4ISR upgrade included new equipment--such as digital
radios--as well as additional computer processing bandwidth (which
allowed the cutter crew to share classified information, and to monitor
other activities in the operating space).
The SHERMAN also was equipped with the Nationwide Automatic
Identification System, enabling the crew to locate the GATUN near the
heavily-trafficked approaches to the Panama Canal. Additionally, the
system enabled the cutter's crew to monitor the GATUN while maintaining
the element of surprise, until the crew received permission to halt and
board the target.
But there were challenges to overcome, highlighting the continued
need for new assets. The SHERMAN, a 40-year-old vessel, operated with
significant mechanical casualties, including the loss of one main
engine--reducing speed and maneuverability. The SHERMAN also had
problems with its evaporation system resulting in the inability to make
fresh water. Additionally the crew overcame a problem with a small boat
that affected end-game capability.
The crew's success in spite of materiel adversity was a tribute to
their competency and commitment. Yet the situation also underscored the
urgent need to recapitalize and to modernize the Coast Guard's fleet
assets, which the Deepwater program is accomplishing today.
There are two National Security Cutters (NSC) under construction at
the shipyard in Pascagoula, MS. The NSC is designed to operate away
from homeport for approximately 230 days per year, contrasted with 185
days per year for 378, WHECs. The NSC also is much more capable than
legacy platforms, in terms of its aviation, C4ISR and other mission
systems capabilities.
As is the case with many Deepwater-provided assets, the NSC is a
good example of cooperative development, with the taxpayers gaining
best value by a concerted effort between government stakeholders and
industry. For example, based upon a standing agreement between the
Deepwater Program Executive Officer, and U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine
Corps counterparts, Deepwater is able to share common systems,
technologies and processes for improved interoperability and cost
avoidance.
No core factor has been identified as singularly responsible for
the Deepwater problems or setbacks. The findings and information
presented by the GAO, DHS-OIG, and the Coast Guard initiated Defense
Acquisition University Study are acknowledged as the factors
responsible for the problems and setbacks. The GAO reported in March
2004 that the CG's Deepwater Program needed increased attention to
management and contractor oversight. The CG has started implementing
the recommendations that GAO suggested in order to improve program
management.
The GAO indicated in a follow-on report issued in April 2006 that
these changes to Deepwater appear sound and that program management has
improved but continued monitoring is warranted. The Coast Guard has
taken the same approach and intensity to the DHS-OIG findings and
recommendations. Overall, the results have been similar to the GAO
results in that the DHS-OIG indicates that improvements have been made
while others require more information or longer-term monitoring.
Implementing these recommendations will improve Deepwater and the
rest of the CG acquisition system to obtain the appropriate cutters,
aircraft, and information systems for the service to the Nation.
Question 3. In the Coast Guard's FY08 authorization proposal, you
outline a strategy that proposes a considerable realignment of your
operational forces to comprise what you refer to as the ``strategic
trident.'' However, what is missing is a description of what the final
re-alignment will look like and how these pieces will integrate.
Can you describe what these changes will mean to the Coast Guard
once the operations are complete? If there will be geographic changes
to individual stations, please explain, to the extent possible, what
those will be. Given that you are still finishing up your establishment
of Sectors and trying to get a handle on the problems of Deepwater, how
will this initiative further disrupt the day-to-day operations of your
service?
Answer. Background:
The ``strategic trident'' is a management concept that aligns with
the proposed transformation of the Coast Guard's command and control
structure, as well as, the enhanced emphasis on readiness and mission
support to improve Coast Guard operational capabilities.
Description of Realignment:
Notional plans are to transform the Coast Guard command and control
structure so that it will ultimately be more flexible, nimble, and
capable of operating with multiple partners to respond to incidents,
surge operations, and increased threat levels while continuing to
sustain performance in traditional areas.
Key to enhancing these operational capabilities is the development
of a clear, coherent method to employ Coast Guard forces. This
strategic trident provides the layered defense our Nation needs
through:
Shore-based, multi-mission forces assigned to Sectors
Maritime Patrol and Interdiction Forces (High/Medium
Endurance Cutters and Maritime Patrol Aircraft)
Deployable specialized forces organized into a single
unified operational structure, the Deployable Operations Group
(DOG)
Other than the establishment of the DOG, the realignment into the
``strategic trident'' does not create or move any new operational field
commands. Rather, it realigns the management of existing forces to
better prepare the Service to meet emerging threats and challenges
through an adaptable packaging system of capabilities, established
competencies, authorities, and strong partnerships.
This planned organizational structure will transform the Service's
Atlantic and Pacific Area Commands, aligning operational mission
execution command functions into a single command entitled Coast Guard
Operations Command (CG OPCOM), and mission readiness functions into a
single command entitled Coast Guard Forces Readiness Command (CG
FORCECOM).
There will be one commander responsible for Coast Guard operational
mission execution. This same commander will also coordinate and
optimize mission execution and unity of effort with external partners
at the operational level i.e., DOD, DHS agency partners, EPA, etc. CG
OPCOM will serve as the Service's one single point of accountability,
completely focused on planning and executing operations.
CG FORCECOM will be responsible for the current and future
readiness of the Coast Guard's workforce, platforms, and
infrastructure, and ensuring the Service maintains the capabilities to
execute its missions. This one single command will direct and manage
the overall Coast Guard readiness posture, doctrine and force
allocation; including equipping the Service's work force. Unifying
readiness in this manner will eliminate geographical variances that
exist in current practices and provide a single point of accountability
for Coast Guard readiness, just like CG OPCOM will do for all Coast
Guard operations.
Re-aligning our command and control structure in this manner will
do away with current east coast/west coast organizational boundaries
that are irrelevant to drug trafficking organizations, and other
transnational threats, and are not aligned with the other armed
services. It will streamline the Service's operational decisionmaking,
and better facilitate the timely and accurate flow of information and
direction between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of
mission execution.
Conclusion:
While the proposed reorganization constitutes a substantial change
in the way the Coast Guard manages operations, readiness, and support
functions, it will have no disruption to the day-to-day execution of
our missions. Districts and units at the Sector level and below will
continue operations without any disruption of service to the public.
Similarly, major cutters will face a change in reporting and support
structure, but will continue to conduct operations in support of
District Commanders, Joint Interagency Task Forces and DOD Combatant
Commanders.
Overall the proposed reorganization will improve the Coast Guard's
ability to serve the public, and provide appropriate support to the
Service's workforce.
Question 4. Your FY08 request includes the creation of a command
cell to manage your deployable assets. You have mentioned that there is
a potential to wrap other Department of Homeland Security assets into
this concept. Which particular assets do you have in mind, and what is
the rationale for transferring those assets?
Answer. To clarify, the command cell referred to in the question
will be a deployable command and control (C2) element that provides
tactical commanders expertise regarding the capabilities of deployable
forces under their control. Additionally, the C2 element would be
immediately available to assist operational and tactical commanders in
managing during an attack, disaster, or other contingencies.
There are no specific assets identified at this time. However, the
Deployable Operations Group (DOG) staff is conducting outreach to
agencies within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), interagency
and Department of Defense (DOD). The primary purpose of this outreach
is to familiarize other agencies with the capabilities of the DOG and
to lay the foundation for future partnerships where possible.
Question 5. Your FY08 Authorization proposal seeks to close gaps in
Nation's Maritime Alien Smuggling law to close gaps in law enforcement
activities. Why, specifically, is current law insufficient and what
tangible benefits will the provision bring to enforcement of
immigration laws and border security?
Answer. Each year, maritime smugglers transport thousands of aliens
to the United States with virtual impunity because the existing law
does not sufficiently punish or deter such conduct. Only a small
fraction (less than 3 percent) of interdicted maritime alien smugglers
are referred for prosecution because the smugglers successfully
circumvent the elements necessary for the Government to prevail on
existing felony offenses.
Professional maritime smugglers often charge large fees and use
high-speed craft and increasingly sophisticated deception techniques to
avoid detection and apprehension, rapidly modifying their methods to
counter changes in law enforcement tactics. Smuggling routes primarily
involve transit from the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Haiti and the
Bahamas, but routes include travel from Canada, Ecuador, Guatemala,
Mexico and other countries as well.
Smugglers use various deceptions to conceal from law enforcement
that the venture is for-profit, including ``coaching'' smuggled aliens
in how to respond to law enforcement interviews and feigning rescues at
sea. Employing these and other methods and routes, maritime smugglers,
including organized crime syndicates, often evade criminal prosecution
while realizing annual revenues possibly ranging up to billions of
dollars from these activities.
Presently, 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1324 is the principal Federal criminal
statute under which alien smugglers, including maritime smugglers, are
prosecuted. That law was not designed for prosecuting the unique
evidentiary and jurisdictional issues associated with maritime
smuggling cases. Many of the difficulties encountered by the Coast
Guard in maritime smuggling enforcement stem from a statutory framework
that fails to consider the unique aspects of extraterritorial maritime
law enforcement operations. Further, under Sec. 1324, alien smuggling
is only a felony if the Government can prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that an alien smuggler sought commercial advantage or private financial
gain, caused serious bodily injury, or placed in jeopardy the life of
any person.
Maritime smuggling is inherently dangerous. Smugglers treat the
migrants like cargo; typically packing migrants into overcrowded, un-
seaworthy vessels, with little or no life saving equipment available,
no provisions for sanitation and little or no food or other basic
necessities. Moreover, smugglers often engage in efforts to evade
maritime law enforcement at high speeds, further subjecting migrants to
serious risks. Given the inherent dangers of this illegal trade of
human trafficking, felony prosecution should not be predicated on
additional proof of injury or risk. Likewise, maritime smugglers have
exploited the ``profit'' requirement for felony prosecution by offering
incentives to the aliens to lie and coaching the aliens to tell
criminal investigators that the smuggler was a ``good Samaritan'' who
``rescued'' them.
Thus, in the majority of cases, the Coast Guard is able to rescue
and interdict the smuggled aliens, but the Government is not able to
prosecute the crew or others involved in the smuggling operation. Such
actions have little deterrent effect on the crews or the trafficking
organizations. In the highly lucrative human smuggling trade, smugglers
consider such occasional seizures as a cost of doing business.
In 1980, Congress recognized and cured similar shortcomings in the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 by enacting
the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act. The Administration's proposal,
as well as several other bills now pending before the House and the
Senate, would provide the Government with the ability to enhance our
national security and ensure the safety of lives at sea by providing
maritime law enforcement and prosecutors the tools necessary to bring
meaningful consequences to human smugglers interdicted at sea. In
pertinent part, the Administration's proposal, as well as the other
pending bills, would: (1) remove the requirement to prove ``profit''
``inducement'' or subjecting migrants to specific risks of serious
bodily injury to reach a felony level prosecution; (2) establish
reasonable mandatory minimum penalties that would provide a genuine
deterrent to human smugglers and appropriately reflect the criminality
of the conduct; and (3) eliminate the possibility of smugglers using a
fabricated ``Good Samaritan'' defense while preserving such a defense
for legitimate rescues by requiring Good Samaritans to provide notice
to appropriate authorities of any rescue. The Coast Guard considers
these elements essential to any bill that Congress may enact.
Question 6. In the FY08 budget, the inland river tenders emergency
sustainment project is not funded nor is there recapitalization funding
for these rapidly aging vessels which, among their many duties, provide
critical ice-breaking services on Maine's rivers each spring. What is
your plan to address the needs of your aging inland river buoy tender
fleet, 140, ice breakers, and utility tugs?
Answer. The Coast Guard intends to continue to use maintenance
funding to correct casualties aboard individual cutters of all classes
when they arise.
Additionally, the Coast Guard will use maintenance funding for
subsystem renewal on all cutter classes in order to contain maintenance
costs.
The Coast Guard is evaluating a range of options for accomplishing
the AtoN mission throughout the inland river system that may or may not
necessarily require replacement of inland assets.
The first groups of cutters to be addressed in this evaluation are
the Inland River Tenders and Construction Tenders. After completion of
this mission analysis, the Coast Guard expects to plan for a
replacement vessel that may approach AtoN in a different manner from
existing River Tenders, and will likely have increased capabilities to
address a wider mission set.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Trent Lott to
Admiral Thad W. Allen
Question 1. Both the FY07 supplemental appropriations bill and S.
924 would prohibit the Coast Guard from executing certain Deepwater
contracting actions until the Coast Guard completed certain reports,
studies or consultations. Do you believe such legislative contingencies
are necessary in order to compel the Coast Guard to take those required
actions? Would the Coast Guard be responsive to legislation imposing
reasonable deadlines for completing such reports, studies, or
consultations without the Deepwater contracting contingencies?
Answer. No, legislative contingencies are neither necessary nor
preferred. The potential for unintended consequences is high.
Yes. The Coast Guard would prefer reasonable deadlines that did not
preclude timely contract actions that were in the best interest of the
Government.
The Coast Guard Acquisition Program has utilized the GAO Framework
for Acquisition Management (GAO-05-218G ``Framework for Assessing the
Acquisition Function at Federal Agencies'') as a tool to assess and
improve Coast Guard acquisition in the four areas of Organizational
Alignment and Leadership, Policy and Process, Human Capital, and
Knowledge and Information Management. As a result, the Coast Guard has
aggressively implemented a series of improvements in contract and
program management to ensure effective management oversight, sound
stewardship of taxpayer dollars and timely delivery of much-needed
assets. The improvements already underway include:
Consolidation of Coast Guard acquisition activities
(Deepwater, Office of Acquisition, acquisition policy, Research
and Development Center) into one directorate to increase
efficiency;
Designation of the Assistant Commandant for Engineering and
Logistics Resources as the Technical Authority for Deepwater;
Extensive progress in the implementation of the GAO
recommendations resulting from the 2004 Deepwater Contract
Management audit;
Development of new evaluation criteria for follow-on
Deepwater contract term;
A commitment to seek independent, third party evaluations of
new asset designs in Deepwater;
Increasing funds for Government Program Management for
Deepwater;
Increasing Government staffing at Deepwater manufacturing
facilities focusing on contract/quality management;
Contracted for Defense Acquisition University sponsored
panel of experts to assess current state and propose strategic
planning elements to improve Rescue 21 and Deepwater contract
executions;
Leadership focus on Human Capital to include Workforce
Training and Certification, Pay Incentives, Direct Hire
Authority and Recruitment and Retention of qualified
contracting and program management personnel;
Lessons Learned Exchange between Coast Guard and the
Department of Homeland Security staff;
Adoption of a DOD 5000 based revision to Coast Guard's Major
System Acquisition policies;
Extensive consulting with Defense Acquisition University
experts regarding training and program management competency
development.
Question 2. You testified that you plan to use the current
Deepwater contract with Integrated Coast Guard Systems to continue
ordering additional assets and systems of the types that are already
under production through that contract. Please describe these plans in
greater detail and describe the impact on the Cost Guard's plans to
replace legacy assets if the Congress prohibited the Coast Guard from
continuing to use the current Deepwater contract for that purpose.
Answer. The Coast Guard is assuming a greater role both in
management and oversight and will assume the lead role as systems
integrator Specifically, the Coast Guard has taken over responsibility
and control in the following areas:
Development of the System Concept of Operations or Asset
Statements of Objectives
Definitive Role of Technical Authority
Development of Business Case Analysis decisions to validate
the selection and mix of Deepwater Program assets
Leadership of Integrated Product Teams
Active Management of the Risk Plan
Greater oversight of ICGS's application of accepted System
Engineering principles and practices at the Deepwater System
design level
Greater oversight and control of Integrated Logistics
Support
In terms of what is different contractually, the System Integrator
work performed by Integrated Coast Guard System (ICGS) was accomplished
under the System Engineering and Program Management Delivery Task
Orders (DTOs). Future DTOs will be modified to de-scope or reduce those
tasks accomplished by the systems integrator since it will now be done
by the Coast Guard, which is moving as rapidly as possible to assume
lead systems integrator responsibilities. A combination of time and
funding is required to develop the necessary staff competencies and
capabilities for the Coast Guard to assume all of the systems
integrator responsibilities. The Coast Guard will accomplish this
gradually over the next few years in conjunction with the consolidation
of the Deepwater and Acquisition Directorates to form one Directorate
for all Coast Guard acquisitions. The staffing required for the new
organization to accomplish the system integrator role will be
identified and implemented as this initiative evolves.
ICGS has the potential to continue to provide the goods and
services already under contract, primarily the MPA and the NSC.
However, the Coast Guard remains open to re-competing these assets, if
it is in the best interest of the government to do so. ICGS also has
the potential for future work, but all future assets will be
competitively awarded. If the Coast Guard is prohibited from using the
current Deepwater contract, the best case scenario will take another
five plus years to get a NSC or MPA. A delay of 5 years in delivering
assets will have a serious operational impact on the Coast Guard and
the service provided to the American taxpayers.
Question 3. Please describe: (1) the condition of the legacy
cutters and aircraft that would be replaced by the NSC and MPA; (2) how
the maintenance expenses and operational availability of these legacy
assets have changed over the past several years; and (3) how you expect
the maintenance expenses and operational availability of these legacy
assets to change until they are completely taken out of service upon
replacement.
Answer.
NSC
1. The 378, WHEC will be replaced by the NSC with the first NSC
scheduled for operations in 2010. The 378, WHEC fleet is aging and
equipment obsolescence issues are degrading overall performance. In
1999, a ship structure and machinery evaluation board (SSMEB) was
convened on two WHEC 378, cutters to determine the condition and
estimate the remaining service life of the cutter class. In August
2003, a fleet sustainment conference was held to re-evaluate the
condition and remaining service life and identify all systems and
components that were difficult or becoming too expensive to reliably
maintain. The conference estimated the fleet's remaining service life
at 11 years using four criteria--safety, readiness, payback and
probability. To assure the capability and reliability of these cutters
until their decommissioning, the Coast Guard is dedicating OE funding
to address specific sub-system issues, (see table 1 below).
2. The 378, WHEC has consistently exceeded its Standard Support
Level (SSL) maintenance funding due to old and obsolete systems and
sub-systems. The chart below depicts fiscal year SSL funding per
cutter, the actual maintenance expense per cutter and maintenance
expenses plus re-capitalization project expenses per cutter. The SSL is
the budgeted amount for depot level maintenance and is increased each
year by Cost of Living Adjustments (COLA). COLA increases have been
inadequate to meet the actual maintenance expenses fleet wide. Due to
the high cost of a WHEC Mission Effectiveness Project (MEP) sustainment
initiative, the Coast Guard has decided to target specific replacement
of sub-systems identified as the most troublesome through ongoing
engineering and technological assessments.
Table 1.--WHEC 378--SSL vs. Actual Expenses (FY03-FY06)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard Support Level Actual Maintenance Actual Maintenance & Re-
(SSL) Expense cap Projects Expenses
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY03 $1,137,577 $1,937,812 $2,604,789
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY04 $1,126,394 $1,967,451 $2,758,164
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY05 $1,104,150 $2,055,975 $2,879,913
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY06 $1,104,409 $1,725,885 $2,623,121
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY07 $1,142,953
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The operational availability of the 378, WHECs as determined from
the Coast Guard Business Intelligence Data Base is depicted below.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percent Time Fully
Mission Capable (PTFMC)*
MEASURES as values --------------------------
2004 2005 2006
------------------------------------------------------------------------
WHEC (entire fleet) 26.4% 48.2% 41.0%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*PTFMC is defined as the percent of time the cutter has no category 3 or
4 equipment casualties during operational days. Major equipment
casualties are category 3 or 4, which are defined as ``deficiency in
mission critical equipment which caused a major degradation or loss of
a primary mission.'' The Coast Guard's PTFMC goal for WHEC's is 86
percent, with lower percentages indicating a decrease in operational
readiness.
3. The worst conditioned WHEC 378, are to be decommissioned
starting in 2009. Maintenance and re-cap projects are expected to
remain above SSLs until the entire class is decommissioned. The
operational availability is expected to remain fairly constant as the
worst conditioned WHECs will continue to be assessed and targeted for
removal from service. Maintenance expenses are expected to increase in
real dollars as inflationary pressures in this sector of the economy
outpace normal inflation.
Answer.
MPA
1. Under the current Integrated Deepwater System plan, the number
of fully operational HU-25's will gradually decline until all are
decommissioned in 2014. The HU-25 airframe is aging but maintains full
operating capability through an operating expense (OE) funded unit and
depot level maintenance and repair program. A recent Supplemental
Structural Inspection Program (SSIP) study determined that critical
airframe structural components are at less than half of their life
limit. However, the engines, many sensors, and aircraft systems are
becoming more difficult to maintain. These systems will continue to be
supported through the OE funded maintenance programs.
2. The operational availability has remained relatively stable over
the past several years, but falls short of the COMDT's goal of 71
percent. However, as the HU-25 ages, it becomes more maintenance
intensive as reflected by the increasing Labor Hour Per Flight Hour
(LHPFH) and cost per flight Hour (CPFH) The CPFH represents the
variable costs of spare parts and depot-level maintenance associated
with operating each aircraft type per flight hour. The HU-25 product
line is able to minimize support costs by cannibalizing high value,
hard to procure components from Coast Guard HU-25's stored at the
Aircraft Maintenance And Regeneration Center (AMARC) in Tucson, AZ.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AVAILABILITY 64.0% 67.2% 66.2% 68.7% 68.1%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LHPFH 12.9 12.8 13.5 13.3 14.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CPFH $1,807 $1,780 $1,896 $2,081 $2,178
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Operational availability has stabilized and is expected to
remain constant as long as the Coast Guard can afford rising
maintenance expenses. Maintenance expenses will continue to increase as
parts become obsolete or difficult to procure. The Coast Guard will
maintain the current 60 month OE Program Depot Maintenance (PDM) cycle
incorporating a PDM extension program during the last year of the
aircraft's service. The product line has initiated several engineering
modifications and reviewed maintenance procedures to decrease
maintenance hours and reduce costs.
Additionally, efforts to minimize operational impacts are underway,
including a long-term engine overhaul contract with the Original
Equipment Manufacturer (OEM). The ATF-3 engine reliability and overhaul
expense continues to be the most significant HU-25 cost factor, and
engineering modifications by the OEM are being negotiated as part of
the new contract. The OE funded engine overhaul contract will provide
sufficient replacements until 2014 when the aircraft is completely
phased out. The annual Non-pay inflation and PPA VI industry specific
inflation funding increases are crucial for the Coast Guard to keep
pace with escalating maintenance costs.
Question 4. The failure of the 110-foot to 123-foot patrol boat
conversion program has left the Coast Guard with a significant patrol
boat gap. To date, the Coast Guard has mitigated the gap by extending
the lease of three of the five Navy Patrol Craft and initiating the
FRC-B program. Please provide timelines and expected results for these
and any other planned actions to mitigate the patrol boat gap.
Answer. Approved Mitigating Initiatives: The Coast Guard has
approved two initiatives to assist in the mitigation of the patrol boat
gap. These initiatives will recoup 18,700 operational hours.
1. Multicrewing: The Coast Guard is utilizing crews from the
non-operational 123' WPBs in a multi-crewing effort to help
reduce both the overall Patrol Boat gap and the hour gap
specific to the District Seven Area of Responsibility (AOR).
Specifically, two crews are attached to each of the eight D7
Florida multi-crewed 110, WPBs and they operate at a pace of
3,600 hours per year thereby (recouping 11,200 hours) annually.
Multi-crewing began in February 2007.
2. Extending 179, WPC Memorandum of Agreement with Navy: After
Commandant/CNO discussions, negotiations with the Navy to
modify the current 179, WPC MOA to extend use until 2011 has
occurred. An Addendum to extend the use of three 179, WPCs for
a period of 3 years has been signed by both parties. Three of
the WPCs will remain in Pascagoula, MS until the end of Fiscal
Year 2011. This will provide 7,500 programmed hours each year.
Potential Near-term Mitigating Options: There are five potential
options that the Coast Guard is analyzing to mitigate the loss of hours
and hulls in District Seven:
1. Adjust WPB MEP Timeline: A Coast Guard decision to shorten
the WPB Mission Effectiveness Project (MEP) timeline is being
considered. By reducing the number of 110, inducted per year
into MEP from four hulls to three hulls and decreasing the time
spent undergoing MEP from 12 months to 9 months, the Coast
Guard can reduce the need for 110, WPBs in MEP by 21 months per
year recouping approximately 3,000 hours per year. If approved,
the schedule change would take effect in September 2007.
2. Procurement of Additional 87, Coastal Patrol Boats: The GWOT
Supplemental provided funds for the procurement of four 87,
Coastal Patrol Boats (CPBs) which are now under contract. The
additional 87, CPBs would be homeported in District Seven to
allow the most positive impact on Southern Florida AOR and
would add 7,200 programmed hours per year to the 87, CPB fleet.
One 87, CPB will be operational by the end of Fiscal Year 2008
with the remaining three becoming operational in Fiscal Year
2009.
3. Lease of Commercial Vessels: Lease four commercial high-
speed boats with similar characteristics of a Patrol Boat for
execution of Coast Guard missions in the District Seven Area of
Responsibility (AOR). Each leased vessel would be multi-crewed
using the former 123, WPB crews and operate 4,400 hours per
year. This option provides 17,600 hours per year (6,400 more
hours than the current multi-crewing initiative) and would
replace half of the hull and surge capacity lost by the non-
operational 123, WPBs. The Coast Guard Office of Acquisition is
currently conducting a lease vs. buy analysis to determine the
feasibility of leasing commercial vessels. If approved, the
lease vessels are projected to be available for Coast Guard
operations by February or March 2008.
4. Increase 87, Coastal Patrol Boat Programmed Hours: The Coast
Guard is assessing the costs and impacts of increasing
programmed operating hours for the entire fleet of sixty-five
87, CPBs from 1,800 hours to 2,000 hours per year. This would
provide an additional 13,000 hours per year to assist in the
mitigation of the WPB Op Hour Gap. If approved, this initiative
would take effect on October 1, 2008.
5. Increase 110, Patrol Boat Programmed Hours: The Coast Guard
is assessing the cost and impacts of increase programmed
operating hours for all non-District Seven 110, WPBs by 400
hours which will provide 5,400 hours per year to assist in the
mitigation of the WPB Op Hour Gap, a timeline when this option
could begin has not been determined. A specific funding source
has not been identified as these options arew still being
studied and evaluated.
Long-term Mitigating Options: The Coast Guard's primary long-term
mitigation strategy is procurement of the Fast Response Cutter.
FRC-B: The Coast Guard's Office of Acquisition (G-A) is developing
the Request for Proposal (RFP) package for the FRC-B. Overall, the
Coast Guard is planning to acquire twelve FRC-B assets. The first FRC-B
is anticipated to be delivered in Fiscal Year 2010 with the final hull
delivered by the end of Fiscal Year 2013.
Question 5. The Deepwater contractor raised several questions
concerning the validity of the Coast Guard's third party Business Case
Analysis for a composite hull FRC-A design. The Department of Homeland
Security Science and Technology Directorate has requested FY08 funding
to begin construction of a composite demonstrator vessel to reduce
technical risk and construction cost risk for a composite hull FRC-A. I
also understand that the Coast Guard has assigned a senior officer to
assist DHS S&T. Does the CG plan to request or reprogram Deepwater
funds to accelerate the construction of this demonstrator vessel? Will
the Coast Guard provide DHS S&T with performance requirements for the
demonstrator vessel?
Answer. The DHS S&T Scalable Composite Vessel Prototype (SCVP)
program is designed to mitigate technical and manufacturing risks
identified in the FRC-A Business Case Analysis (BCA). The actual
design, production, and repair costs could be used to validate the
calculated values used in the BCA. DHS S&T will develop the performance
specification and requirements for the prototype vessel and has asked
for Coast Guard input. A decision to request or reprogram Coast Guard
funding would be made if S&T and USCG develop a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA). No reprogramming is in development at present.
Question 6. More than $130 million has been appropriate for
Deepwater vertical unmanned aerial vehicles (VUAV) since the program's
inception. I understand that the development of the Eagle Eye VUAV is
behind schedule and will not be ready to deploy on the first NSC. Is
the Coast Guard planning to evaluate alternative existing VUAV designs
for shipboard use? If so, is the Coast Guard prepared to use Deepwater
funds to adapt an existing VUAV design for Coast Guard missions? Please
provide a timeline for how the Coast Guard plans to proceed.
Answer. Last Fall, the Deepwater Program Executive Officer
commissioned an independent study to assess the viability of the VUAV
program and to address the shortfalls in capability if the VUAV program
was postponed or canceled. The study was divided into three phases.
Phase 1 of the study, completed in February 2007, compared the Eagle
Eye to the U.S. Navy's Fire Scout Vertical Takeoff and Landing (VTOL)
program. After close evaluation, the study recommended not to procure
either the Eagle Eye or Fire Scout due technical risks and estimated
costs beyond the Coast Guard's VUAV program baseline. A stop-work order
has been issued to discontinue further development of the Eagle Eye
VUAV. The Coast Guard will not seek further funding for the VUAV until
cost, schedule, and risks associated with development have been more
thoroughly considered and addressed.
The Coast Guard is continuing with Phase 2 of the independent study
to explore alternatives to the VUAV program, including cutter-based and
land-based Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs), as well as manned aviation
assets. The Phase 2 report is due August 2007. The Coast Guard is
considering Phase 3 to the independent study, which would be a 2-year
effort to refine alternative solutions to the VUAV through UAS proof of
concept demonstration flights, operational simulation modeling, and UAS
air safety analyses.
Question 7. Why does the Coast Guard FY08 budget request include
funding for four MPAs? What is the impact of buying these aircraft
earlier than previously planned? Would similar benefits apply to buying
NSCs faster as well?
Answer. The original Deepwater Acquisition Plan of 2002 had seven
(7) MPA operational by CY-2007. Since these were not funded at levels
necessary to meet that original plan, an ``MPA Flight Hour Gap'' was
created where the declining availability of the HU-25 fleet has not
been offset by the expected arrival of CASA CN-235 300M aircraft. There
is a compelling need to fill this gap, which is currently estimated at
44,000 flight hours annually. Continued production and delivery of the
new MPA will increase the Coast Guard's Maritime Domain Awareness
capabilities.
The Coast Guard will benefit from maintaining steady production
lines at the CASA facility. Continuous production ensures experienced
engineering and manufacturing teams remain intact, and maximizes
efficiencies which can be translated to faster production and higher
quality deliveries.
This strategy will also allow the Coast Guard to maintain its
phase-out plan of the HU-25. There have been no plans to invest in the
HU-25 to extend its service life, and support contracts for major
aircraft systems, such as the engine, will expire at the end of FY
2007. There will, however, be sufficient sparing and support to
maintain a reduced fleet until 2012.
There are additional benefits to maintaining steady production on
the NSC. As the sole customer of the NSC, breaks in production would
have major cost and schedule impacts for the Coast Guard. Again, no
investment in 378, High Endurance Cutters has been made and the 378,
decommissionings start in FY 2009, so keeping the NSC production steady
is the best investment given limited funding.
Question 8. Some are advocating that the Coast Guard should make
greater use of the Naval Sea Systems Command in procuring Deepwater
cutters. However, The Navy's handling of its Littoral Combat Ship
program has shown that its own program management capabilities need
improvement, and that its requirements for similar sized ships are
significantly different from the Coast Guard's. It seems to me that,
while the Navy has expertise that could benefit the Deepwater Program,
buying cutters to meet Coast Guard mission requirements require Coast
Guard oversight. Please describe the Coast Guard's previous and planned
use of Navy shipbuilding expertise with respect to the Deepwater
Program?
Answer. There has been extensive collaboration between the Navy and
the Coast Guard Deepwater Program, and the Deepwater Program will
continue to consult with the Navy as vessel acquisitions move forward.
In particular, the Coast Guard has received extensive support from
Superintendents of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair Management
Group (Supships) at the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Gulf Coast
for on-site management of the production of NSC 1 and NSC 2. The
attached table describes recent and continuing support from multiple
resources within the U.S. Navy. As the FRC and the OPC move into
production, there will be increased consultation with the Navy to
provide the necessary support that the CG requires.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Navy Organization Description
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ATG Crew Readiness for Sea Training.
San Diego
Afloat Training Group
------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMOPTEVFOR Supporting CG-3 and DPM in
Commander, Operational Test & performance of Operational Testing.
Evaluation Forces
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOD International AIMS Program Will conduct IFF Platform
Office Certification for WMSL Class.
Robins Air Force Base
------------------------------------------------------------------------
INSURV Manage Acceptance Trials.
Board of Inspection and Survey
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Magnetic Silencing Facility Degaussing and deperming.
Naval Stations Norfolk & San Diego
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAVAIR NSC aviation facilities
Naval Air Systems Command, certification and helicopter
Patuxent River, MD dynamic interface testing (HDIT).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAVAIR Aviation System Inspection
Norfolk Field Office Representative (ASIR).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAVAIR PMA2133D ILS, AN/URN-25 TACAN. Funding
provided by SPAWAR.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAVAIR PMA251 Navy PARM for Visual landing Systems
being procured for the WMSL Class.
Provides hardware, logistics, and
engineering support.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAVICP Navy Supply agent for all spares for
the WMSL, WPC, and WMSM Classes for
Navy equipment being provided as
GFE to these classes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAVSEA SEA062 Program guidance on NSC platform
certification.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAVSEA PMS 317 Provides electronic database TSME,
for documentation of discrepancies,
trial card management and support
of test, trials & DD250
development.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAVSEA PMS501 Provides detailed data on LCS
Freedom Class for feasibility
studies for OPC.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAVSEA SEA04L Navy PARM for Radiological Equipment
being procured for the WMSL Class.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAVSEA SEA05T1 Radar cross section technical
assistance.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAVSEA SUPSHIP PMRO support covering all aspects of
Gulf Coast engineering, ship design, ship
Supervisor of Shipbuilding, construction, QA, program &
Conversion & Repair production management, contract
admin. & financial management.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Navy Interoperability Center Interoperability Certification.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Navy Supply Center Detachment Navy ISEA and depot for Radiological
Yorktown Equipment being provided to the
WMSL Class. Funded via SEA 04L.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAWC-AD Navy PARM and ISEA for the UPX-36/
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft UPX-29A being procured for the WMSL
Division Class. Provides systems, logistcs,
and engineering services in support
of the integration and installation
of the system on the WMSL Class.
PARM for APX-118 being installed on
the WPC. Developing IFF
Certification Stage 5 & 7 Test
Procedures for WMSL Class.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAWC-AD Navy ISEA for Visual Landing Aids,
Naval Air Warfare Center--Aircraft provides technical and logistics
Division Lakehurst support to the ICGS ship
integration and installation
efforts. Supports Aviation
Certification on WMSL Class. VLA
effort funded via PMA 251.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOSSA Weapons System Explosive Safety
Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Review Board review of the NSC
Office weapons system.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NSWC Crane Navy PARM and ISEA for the AN/SLQ-32
Electronic Warfare System being
procured for the WMSL Class.
Provides systems, logistics, and
engineering services in support of
the integration and installation of
the system on the WMSL Class.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NSWC-CD WPC (FRC original) cost estimations
Naval Surface Warfare Center, from: a parametric model; using
Carderock Division ship yard actuals; and Total
Ownership Cost (TOC), to support
the IPT; and special tradeoffs,
such as Steel vs. Composite [soon
to be mod' to add Combatant Craft
Department (CCD) support on the FRC
B efforts.]
--WMSM (OPC) cost estimations from:
a parametric model; using ship yard
actuals [NSC]; and TOC, to support
the IPT; and special tradeoffs,
such as number of engines;
[additionally supported an
assessment of NSC actuals and EAC
for PM and REA input.]
--NSC Structures to determine
fatigue life and special detailed
studies on issue areas, such as the
hanger racking.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NSWC-CD Degaussing system technical support.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NSWC-CD Board of Inspection and Survey
Philadelphia Detachment (INSURV)--Technical Assist Support.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NSWC-DD Providing System Engineering and
Dahlgren Division Integration support for integrating
the Mk 48 Gun Weapon System for the
WMSL Class. Funded via PEO IWS 3C.
USCG DW funds NSWC DD support for
Gun Weapon System Cut-outs, WMSL-
750 Principal for Safety, EMC/
RADHAZ Surveys, Gun Structural
Firing Tests. Also supports WSESRB
effort for WMSL Class. When funded
will support CG-2 System Software
IV&V and certification.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NSWC-PHD Navy ISEA for the SPQ-9B, provides
technical support to the ICGS ship
integration and installation
efforts. Funded via PEO IWS 2.0.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NSWC-PHD Supporting the USCG in the planning
and execution of the Combat Systems
Ship Qualification Test (CSSQT) for
WMSL-750. Develops Combat System
Alignment Manual. Funded via PEO
IWS 1.0.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NSWC-PHD Navy ISEA for the Mk 15 CIWS BLK 1B
Louisville Detachment provides technical and logistics
support to the ICGS ship
integration and installation
efforts. Funded by PEO IWS 3B.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NSWC-PHD Navy ISEA for the Mk 160 GCS, Mk 38
Louisville Detachment Gun, MK 110 Gun and Mk 46 OSS
provides technical and logistics
support to the ICGS ship
integration and installation
efforts. Funded via PEO IWS 3C.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NSWC-PHD Navy ISEA for the Mk 53 Decoy
Louisville Detachment Launching System provides technical
support to the ICGS ship
integration and installation
efforts. Funded via PEO IWS 2E.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NWDC Supporting the USCG in development
Newport of the Tactical Manual for the WMSL
Naval Warfare Development Center Class.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ONR Composite hull R&D/Risk Mitigation
Office of Naval Research for FRC Program. The FRC also
utilized the MOU between CG and ONR
for data sharing, production
inspection and joint design reviews
during the CHSV project and FRC
composite design. Also OPTEVFOR
participated during several FRC
design reviews . . .
------------------------------------------------------------------------
OPNAV N76 Navy Resource Sponsor for Navy Type/
Chief of Naval Operations Navy Owned Equipment going on WMSL,
WPC, and WMSM Classes. Sponsors
USCG-Navy Permanent Joint Working
Group and the Naval Operations
Capabilities retirements for the DW
Cutters.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PEO IWS 1.0 Navy Program Manager for CSSQT
Program Executive Officer, activities in support of the WMSL
Integrated Warfare Systems Class.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PEO IWS 1A5 PEO IWS Program Manger for USCG NTNO
equipment and resource allocation
of Navy WPN/WPN funds. Lead POC for
all NTNO technical, logistics, and
financial issues and requirements
for WMSL, WPC, and WMSM Classes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PEO IWS 1B Navy PARM for BFTT Electronic
Warfare Trainer (BEWT) being
procured for the WMSL Class.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PEO IWS 2.0 Navy PARM for Mk SPQ-9B Radar being
procured for the WMSL Class.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PEO IWS 2E Navy PARM for Mk 53 Decoy Launching
System being procured for the WMSL
Class.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PEO IWS 3B Navy PARM for MK 15 CIWS Blk 1B
being procured for the WMSL Class.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PEO IWS 3C Navy PARM for MK 160 Gun Control
System, and Mk 46 Optical Sight
System, being procured for the WMSL
Class. Procuring the Mk 38 Gun for
the WPC class. Procuring the Mk 110
57 MM Gun for the WMSL 752 thru
757.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PEO IWS3C 56MM Gun Weapons System--ammunition
& system development, safety and
integration. U.S. Navy Funded.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SPAWAR ILS, AN/SYQ-26(V)4 Tactical
Charleston Messaging System (NAVMACS II).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SPAWAR Navy PARM for TACAN and SRR-1
San Diego Communication systems being
procured for the WMSL Class.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SPAWAR Navy PARM for SCIF systems being
San Diego procured for the WMSL Class.
Providing systems and engineering
support to the integration and
installation of SCIF on the WMSL
Class.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SPAWAR C4I CG-C2 Software.
Philadelphia
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 9. There has been much criticism of the Coast Guard's
Deepwater program. Please describe the Deepwater Program's success
stories.
Answer. Successes from the Integrated Deepwater System Acquisition
include:
HH-65 Helicopter Re-Engining:
84 re-engined operational HH-65s delivered (as of 16 May
2007).
All HH-65 equipped units are now operating the HH-65C.
Cost, Schedule, and Performance requirements were met.
Medium-Range Surveillance Aircraft (CASA CN-235):
The first 8 CASA CN-235s have been placed on contract along
with the first three mission pallets. Aircraft 4 & 5 were
awarded in Jan. 2007. Aircraft 6, 7, and 8 were awarded in
April 2007.
The first aircraft arrived at the Coast Guard Aircraft
Repair and Supply center (AR&SC) in Dec. 2006. The second
aircraft arrived in Feb. 2007. Mission pallets will be
integrated on the aircraft at AR&SC.
The contract calls for delivery of the third aircraft no
later than Aug. 2007 but a May 2007 delivery is anticipated.
Aircraft 4 & 5 have an expected delivery date in the second
quarter of CY09.
Official readiness status at the first air station with CASA
CN-235s is projected to occur in January 2009 or earlier.
HC-130J Missionization:
Program originally outside of Deepwater and the estimate for
Missionization was over $300M with available funding being only
$120M.
Project transferred to Deepwater.
Deepwater developed new missionization approach using
architecture/equipment designs that existed in Deepwater.
Now projected to be completed within the $120M baseline.
National Security Cutter:
Delivery scheduled despite impacts of hurricanes and recent
labor strike.
Post 9/11 additional capabilities.
Legacy C4ISR Upgrades Afloat and Ashore:
Four shore-side command centers upgraded; significantly
enhancing operational effectiveness and Maritime Domain
Awareness.
Initial Upgrades of secure Internet, commercial satellite
communications, and automatic vessel identification equipment
have been completed on all 39 legacy cutters (378, HECs, 270,
and 210, MECs).
Successfully demonstrated core capabilities of Increment 1
at the Maritime Domain Awareness Center.
2 Communications Area Master Stations delivered. Sector San
Juan and District 7 command centers completed upgrades and are
being certified for delivery.
Shore Facilities Constructed to Support Assets:
Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) Hangar at Aviation Training
Center, Mobile, Alabama has been completed and will be used for
the MPAs that will be assigned there for training and
operations.
Training Facility (referred to as Building 500) has been
completed in Petaluma, California for National Security Cutter
(NSC) electronic equipment training.
Question 10. Your budget request asks for $130 million for the
Deployable Operations Group (DOG). What problem is this designed to fix
and how does it intend to fix it? Will the establishment of the DOG
lead to the consolidation or relocation of any operational assets?
Answer. The $132.7 million is a base re-allocation, not a request
for new funding. The Deployable Operations Group (DOG) will resolve
challenges within the Coast Guard's Deployable, Specialized Forces
(DSF) pertaining to training, equipment, interoperability, and
coordination by unifying under a single command. The DOG will oversee,
coordinate, and integrate adaptive deployable force packages from the
following Coast Guard specialized teams: Maritime Security Response
Team, Maritime Safety and Security Teams, Port Security Units, National
Strike Force, and the Tactical Law Enforcement Teams.
The coordination and integration of DSF's under the DOG will
provide increased standardization of training, tactics, and equipment
providing increased opportunities for cross-training and more effective
and efficient interoperability. Additionally, the DOG will focus on
contingency planning and cooperation with interagency partners to
develop multi-agency force packages. The establishment of the DOG does
not include the consolidation or relocation of any operational assets.
Question 11. I understand that the Coast Guard plans to reorganize
several major commands. What is the purpose and ultimate goal of this
reorganization?
Answer. The Coast Guard has embarked on an extensive transformation
effort to shape the service into a more agile, capable, and responsive
agency in the areas of mission support and mission execution. Lessons-
learned from Hurricane Katrina, and Deepwater program prompted this
cause for action, and the end result will be an agency that is better
prepared to meet the Nation's maritime safety and security needs into
the future.
Question 12. Why does the Coast Guard want authority to de-link its
Vice Admirals from specific assignments? How would this authority
compare to that of other armed forces?
Answer. The Coast Guard's vice admiral legislative provision will
proactively eliminate the redundancy and inefficiencies inherent in its
legacy, geographic-focused command structure. Currently, the Coast
Guard's Area Commands each have a staff for command and control, force
readiness and training and exercise planning--creating redundancy.
Similarly, the separate Maintenance and Logistics Command staffs for
vessel maintenance and personnel support functions result in additional
redundancy and too many support systems that are not fully integrated.
The legislative initiative will provide the necessary flexibility for
the Coast Guard to re-organize these command staffs along functional
lines to eliminate redundancy and improve efficiency and mission
effectiveness. The proposed vice admiral positions will have specific
functional responsibilities, which will be described in detail upon
nomination of each officer.
The Coast Guard now operates in an evolving, dynamic multi-mission
environment that requires both increased alignment with the other armed
forces and interagency partners and greater organizational flexibility
than the existing, geocentric command structure provides. The
geographically-driven area of responsibility leadership model is out of
alignment with that of our interagency partners and does not reflect
the reality of current Coast Guard missions and functions. The
limitations of the existing command structure became apparent, for
example, as the Coast Guard flowed forces from each Area Command during
the response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005.
The Coast Guard's legislative proposal would provide for temporary
appointment of vice admirals to ``positions of importance and
responsibility,'' similar to like appointments in the other armed
services, to provide organizational flexibility, while preserving
executive command and congressional oversight. This proposal would
allow the Coast Guard to move toward a more functionally-driven
leadership structure and provide the flexibility, with appropriate
congressional oversight, to adapt the structure in the future as
mission demands and circumstances may require.
The proposed authority would align the Coast Guard leadership
structure more closely with that of the other armed forces.
Specifically, the amendments to 14 U.S.C. Sec. 47 would fix the grade
of the Vice Commandant at admiral, aligning with the grade of the
deputy service chief with that of each of the other services. See,
e.g., 10 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 5035, 5044. Further, the proposed amendments
to 14 U.S.C. Sec. 50 would establish a leadership structure parallel to
the Deputy Commandants of the Marine Corps, and fixing the number of
vice admirals at no more than four. See 10 U.S.C. Sec. 5045. Each
position will be held by officers who, like the existing Chief of Staff
and Area Commanders, will have the grade of vice admiral, while so
serving, and perform such duties as the Commandant prescribes. See 14
U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 50(a) and 50a(a).
Background:
10 U.S.C. Sec. 601 provides, in pertinent part:
Sec. 601. Positions of importance and responsibility: generals and
lieutenant generals; admirals and vice admirals
``(a) The President may designate positions of importance and
responsibility to carry the grade of general or admiral or lieutenant
general or vice admiral. . . .''
* * * * * * *
10 U.S.C. Sec. 5045 provides, in pertinent part:
Sec. 5045. Deputy Commandants.
``There are in the Headquarters, Marine Corps, not more than six
Deputy Commandants, detailed by the Secretary of the Navy from officers
on the active-duty list of the Marine Corps.''
* * * * * * *
Coast Guard proposed text, regarding vice admiral positions:
Sec. 50. Vice admirals
``(a)(1) The President may designate no more than four positions of
importance and responsibility that shall be held by officers who----
(A) while so serving, shall have the grade of vice admiral,
with the pay and allowances of that grade; and
(B) shall perform such duties as the Commandant may
prescribe.''
Question 13. The Coast Guard has stated that its FY08 budget
request is a ``current services'' budget. Please explain what that
means and how that request would or would not cover the cost of the
Coast Guard responding to a major operational requirement, such as a
mass migration from Cuba or Haiti.
Answer. A ``current services'' budget means that the Fiscal Year
2008 President's budget request will ensure the Coast Guard is able to
maintain current operational performance levels while continuing vital
recapitalization projects and aligning strategically for enhanced
mission effectiveness. The Coast Guard does not budget for incidents of
national significance since it is speculative when incidents might
occur. The Coast Guard requested additional funding in all four
supplemental appropriations following Hurricane Katrina, of which the
Coast Guard received funding in Katrina Supplemental #3 (P.L. 109-148)
and #4 (P.L. 109-234)